AFFIRM; Opinion issued Deccniber 4. 2012

In The 

## (nitrt nf \pprat .fifi1! Jutrtct nt iiX1 1t 

### Iathti No. 05-11-01 122-CR
CLINTON GRASSER, Appellant V. STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F07-23944-Y 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges. Francis, and Lang Opinion By Justice Bridges Appellant Clinton Grasser appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault ofa child underthe age of 14 and accompanying sentence of20 years’ imprisonment. Intwo issues, appellant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and (2) he did not receive elTective assistance ofcounsel. We affirm. Background A,W. was 13 years old atthe time ofthe alleged offense. She testified she met appellant in
a computer chat room, and that the person from the chat room was named “Clint.” According to

The judgment indicates AW was 3. however A \V and her mother testified AW as 12 at the time ofthe offense.A.’v.. she told appellant she was 12 years old, and appellant told her that he was 16. In October 2006. she was talking to appellant on the phone when he told her to sneak out of the house. Sometime after midnight, A.W. met appellant at an elementary school in Garland. A.W. testified appellant asked her ifshe wanted to “make out” or suck his penis. A.W. testified she just wanted to talk. She said he withdrew his penis fromhis pants, tookherhand, and made her “lack him off.” She then took his penis voluntarily and began to suck it. while he told her. ‘you are good dear.” She indicated some “pre-cum” had been released from his penis. and she wiped his seminal fluid on her pants. They leftthe school separately. Appellant left in ablacktruck, andA.W. walkedhome alone. When she arrived at home around 3:00 a.m., her mother confronted her. According to A.W.’s mother, A.W. refused to tell her where she had been or what she had been doing out ofthe house. On April 13. 2007, A.W. told her mother what had happened between her and appellant. A.W.’s mother called the police, and Detective Hale was assigned to the case. He went to A.W.’s house on April 13. 2007 to investigate. A.W. told Detective 1-Tale what happened between her and appellant. She gave Detective Flale the phone number she had for the person she met at the school and a description ofhis truck. Detective Hale and another officer showed her a standard photo line up. At first, A.W. did not identify anyone as the perpetrator ofthe sexual assault. Later. however, she called Detective Hale back and claimed she knew who he was. She identified appellant in the photo line-up and then again at trial as the perpetrator. Along withthe identification ofappellantinthephoto line-up, Detective Hale discoveredthe telephone number given to him by A.W. belonged to appellant’s mother and A.W.’s description of the truckmatched the vehicle registeredto appellant. Attrial, A.W. admitted she liedwhen shetold her mother and Detective 1-lale that appellant had forced her to suck his penis. She said she lied,because she 

### was concerned appellant would not get in trouble ifhe had not forced her to suck his penis. While A.W. rccalled she had discarded her clothes from that night. Detective Hale recalled he had been told her clothing had been washed. The age ofappellant was established to he 27 years old at the time ofthe crime. Detective Hale stated appellantcalledhim atone pointand claimedthe only times he had everbeento Garland
was when he was making deliveries in Garland as part ofhis duties as acourier. Once appellantwas arrested, however, he gave I)etective Hale a voluntary, written statement in which he admitted to meeting A.W.. but claimed he did not touch her in any way. The State established the distance betweenappellant’s homeinMidlothian andthe location ofthe school inGarlandwas approximately 50 miles. The jury found appellant guilty ofaggravated sexual assault, and the trial court sentenced appellant to 20 years’ imprisonment. Analvsis In his first issue, appellantcontends the evidence was insufficientto supporthis conviction. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier offact could have found the essential elements ofthe offinse beyondareasonable doubt. 

### Jacksonv. Virginia. 443 U.S. 

### 307, 319 (1979); 

### Brooks v. Staie, 323 S.W.3d 

### 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We are requiredto deferto thejury’s credibility andweightdeterminationsbecausethejuryis the solejudge ofthe witnesses credibility andthe weighttobe giventheirtestimony. 

### SeeJackson, 443 U.S. at

### 326 (“a court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even ifitdoes not affirmatively appearintherecord—thatthetrieroffactresolved any such conflicts in favor ofthe prosecution, and must defer to that resolution”).In order to obtain a conviction, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally orknowingly causedthe penetration ol the mouth ofachild by the sexual organ of appellant and the victim was younger than 14 years ofage. FEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 

### § 22.021 (West 2012). A.W. testified appellant had her suck his penis, and she was youngerthan 14 at the time ofthe incident. She further identified appellant in a photo line-up and in court as the perpetratorofthe assault. She indicated the person from the chatroom identifiedhimselfas “Clint.” Both the phone number and truck description A.W. gave Detective Hale linked appellant to the crime. The testimony ofa child victim alone is sufficientto support a conviction. See Jar v. State. 74 S.W.3d 555. 560 (Tex. App—Dallas 2002, pet. reid). In addition, Detective Hale testified appellant initially denied meeting A.W. in Garland, but then later changed his story to indicate he met A.W.. but only to talk to her. The jury learned appellantdrove approximately 50 miles to meetA.W. aftermidnight. The factthatappellantchanged his story is evidence ofhis consciousness ofhis guilt. See Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155. 163-64 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1999, pet. reid): Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Tex. App.—Austin 1 990, no pet.). As we have already noted, we are required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations, because thejury is the solejudge ofthe witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Based on the record before us. we conclude the evidence was sufficientto convict appellant ofaggravated sexual assault ofa child less than 14 years ofage. 

### See Brooks. 323 S.W.3d at 894-95. We overrule appellant’s first issue. In his second issue, appellant complains he received ineffective assistance olcounsel when his trial counsel: (I) failed to object to testimony that appellantwas involved in the Ku Klux Klan andwas a “granddragon” ofthe Ku Klux Klan, and (2) was cumulatively ineffective, giventhetotal

-4-instances of Ihilure to act on behalfofappellant. A claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel is reviewed undcr the Strickland test. Jlernundez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland v. 

### Washington, 466 

### U.S. 668 (1984)). In determining whether counsel rendered inefflctive assistance, an appellate court considers two lhctors: (1) whether counsels performance fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness and (2) whether, but for counsel’s deficient performance. the result ofthe proceeding would have been different. Jhompson v. Slate. 9 S.W.3d 808. 812 (Tex Crim. App. 1999). Appellant bears the burden ofproving his counsel was ineffective by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Id. at 813. There is a strong presumption that counsels conductfell withinthe widerange ofreasonable professional assistance. Bone v. State. 77 S.W.3d 828. 833 (Tex. (‘rim. App. 2002): Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. To defeat this presumption, appellant must prove that there was no plausible professional reason for a specific act or omission. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 836. Any allegations of ineffectiveness mustbe firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson. 9 S.W.3d at 813. Thus, areviewing courtwill rarelybe able to fairly evaluatethe merits ofan ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal because the record on direct appeal is not developed adequately to reflectthe reasons fordefense counsel’s actions attrial. Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here. we do nothave an adequate recordto review appellant’s claim ofineffectiveness. See id.; Thompson. 9 S.W.3d at 813-15. Appellant mustprove thatthere is no possible strategic reason for counsel’s actions andtrial counsel should be given the opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as “ineffective.” Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 836. The record before us is devoid of evidence from trial counsel himselfand is “simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings oftrial counsel.” Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 (citingJackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954. 957

—5—(Fex. Crim. App. 1998)). The record is silent 

### as to why appellant’s trial counsel: (1) tailed to object to testimony that appellant was involved 

### in the Ku Klux Klan 

### and was a grand dragon’ ofthe Ku Klux Klan. 

### and (2)


### was cumulatively ineffective, given the total instances of failure to act on behalf of appellant. Therefore. appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that counsel’s decisions were reasonable. and we overrule appellant’s second issue. Bone. 77 S.W.3d at 833; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 8 13-14. Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm thejudgment ofthe trial court.

DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R .APP. P. 47 111 122F.U05

### Qnitrt 

## nf Apirahi Fifti! Ditrirt uf cxai 

## at 1a11a JUDGMENT CLINTON GRASSER, Appellant No. 05-l1-01122-CR V. Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 

### 7 ofDallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F07- 23944-Y). Opinion delivered 

### by Justice Bridges. THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee Justices Francis and Lang.
Based on the Court’s opinion ofthis date, the judgment otthe trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered I)ecember 4,2012.

DAVID L. 7

BRIDGES JUSTICE