THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS 

Headquarters, Dep tartment of the Army October 1990 
Personal Viewpoint; 

Why Study Military Geography? 


Battle is conducted in physical geographic zones traditionally defined by land, sea, air, 

and more recently, space. As 

proposed by Jomini, the suceessful military commander will 

study and anticipate his theater 

of operations. The modern commander must understand a complex battle environment, which 

merges these zones through the 

synergism of dynamic weapon 

systems and joint operations. 

As the Army's terrain and 

facility development experts, engineers must develop a battlefield 

environment perspective. We 

must also clear the way for a 

return to the study of military 

geography as the basis for preparing, altering, and restoring the 

battlefield for continued cultural 

development. 

The process which provides 

commanders with the geographical aonditions of battle has 

evolved with the complexity of 

warfare. The broad study of 

military geography has various 

interpretations in maritime and 

continental strategies, strategic 

geographic appraisal, and more 

recently, the Army's tactical Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlefield and terrain analysis. 

Each evolution has adapted to 

specific needs. 

Modern western military 

strategy has drawn from Mahan 

(maritime), Mackinder (continental), Spykman (rimland), and 

Seversky and Douhet (air) in order 

to describe the character of a particular battle environment. These 

global views defined geopolitical 

potential in terms of objectives, 

position, and technology. They 

"If a general desires to be a successful actor in the 

great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations so that he may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it 

presents for himself and his enemies." 

Jomini 

each place a single physical 

geographic zone (land, sea, or air) 

in the dominant and decisive battle environment role. 

The fixation with one strategic, 

physical geographic zone represses the potential for environmental synergism among them all. 

Jomini and Clausewitz offer environmental views at the strategic 

and operational levels of war. 

Clausewitz uses terrain, as the 

key to developing a sense of place, 

and military geography with its 

spatial relationships as a primary 

element when developing the concept of center of gravity. A commander's view of the battle environment will depend on factors 

like the level of interest (strategic, 

operational, or tactical), breadth 

of the area of interest, and the forces at his command. 

Let me emphasize that mere 

data of physical geography (position, topography, resources, 

population, and climate) have no 

intrinsic political or military significance. Such data acquire 

military geographic or political 

significance only when they are related to some frame of assumption 

as to what is to be attempted by 

whom, when, where, and in conjunction with what adversaries, 

allies, and neutrals. Within the 

context of military geography, the 

physical geographical elements of 

the battle environment (land, sea, 

air, space) and their associated 

geoscience disciplines (topography, oceanography, meteorology, 

astronomy) are not only interdependent, but also relevant to 

the cultural and operational 

dimensions. 

To be of any value, the data 

must be communicated in a 

timely manner and in a form 

which supports the decision. The 

synthesis of these elements will 

provide what the commander 

needs to know about the battlefield environment. 

Without a military geography 

framework, the commander's 

decision-making process is 

deluged with discrete hierarchies 

of environmental, cultural, and 

operational data. For example, in 

combat mobility operations we 

might merge physical terrain and 

weather information and not consider the roads and man-made 

drainage systems that link urban 

and rural developments. 

Or, consider the simple example 

of mud, which Napoleon called the 

fifth element of war. Mud is the 

synergy of soil and water (terrain 

and weather). The commander, 

however, is concerned with its effects on friendly and enemy forces, 

not its composition. 

According to U.S. joint policy, 

geographic area is the most 

(Continued on page 26) 

By Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Kirby 

Volume 20 PB 590-3 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 

Major General Daniel R. Schroeder 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Phillip R. Howell, Jr. 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

CARL E. VUONO 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

THOMAS F. SIKORA 

Brigadier General, United States Army 

I 

Front cover illustration by Alan Speer 

I 

FEATURES 

4 Whose Slde Are Those !*@h& Engineers On, Anyway? 


by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Maclver and 


Major Andrew H. Hough 


9 Staff Rldes & The Flawed Works Of Fort Constltutlon 

by Lieutenant Colonel James M. Johnson 

17 Engineers And The Army Of The 1990s 

by General Carl E. Vuono 

22 STRAC: A Tralning Strategy That Works 

by Captain Jim Glass 

29 Obstacle Breaching And Marking For Squads 

by Sergeant First Class Bruce Rider 

34 ARTEP Mission Tralnlng Plans: Making Life Easier 

by Captain Robert C. Kurtz 

38 Hedgehogs: iron Animals For Engineers 

by Captain John H. Breidenstine, Jr. 

40 The Command Sergeant Major As Seen By The Battalion 

Commander 

by Lieutenant Colonel Herbert F. Harback 

43 Revlsed MQS System Will Enhance Officer Training 

by Captain Jonathan M. Williams and Captain Thomas G. Young 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: Personal Viewpoint 

2 Clear the Way 44 Engineer Solutlon 

3 Bridge the Gap 45 Lessons Learned 

27 Engineer Safety 47 Engineer Update 

37 Englneer Problem 51 past in Review 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0346-19890) Is prepared quanedy by the U.S. Army En- 01 expertise. Views express& are those ol the author and do not necessarily 

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ollices. to edit material. 

POSTMASTER: Send address chenges to ENGINEER, the Pmfsssional BulL CONTENT is not copyrlghlad. Materla may be reprinted If credit Is given to 

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Army englnssrs nlatmed of mrrent and emerging developments within their areas Superintendant 01 Dacuments. 
----. -

LEAR THE WAY 

By Major General Daniel R. Schroeder, 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

As we move toward the 21st century, the Corps 

of Engineers is actively preparing to fight and 

win anywhere in the world. Future threats will arise 

swiftly from unexpected and lethal quarters. The 

key to our success will be a quality force led with 

doctrinal proficiency by leaders who have prepared 

for contingency operations throughout the 

world. 

The new Military Qualifications Standards (MQS) 

system promotes the doctrinal and technical proficiency demanded by the future AirLand Battlefield 

(see article, page 43). It provides a common ground 

for our officers, better enabling them to speak the language of the combined arms team. MQS I provides 

the essential leadership, management, and combat 

survivability skills needed by officers entering the 

military service. MQS II, tier 1, taught at the basic 

course, provides basic engineer warfighting skills 

necessary for successful platoon leadership in a combined arms environment. MQS 11, tier 2, taught at the 

advanced course prior to company command, 

focuses on advanced doctrinal, leadership, and 

management training. Plans are underway to 

develop MQS Ill tasks for field grade officers. 

To prepare for a complex variety of potential conflicts, the future engineer force structure must be 

leaner and more battle-focused. Future combat engineer battalions will be organic to maneuver 

brigades and structured to retain the mobility and 

momentum of the force in offensive operations. At 

the division level, the engineer regimental colonel 

will serve as the maneuver commander's engineer 

advisor and planner. At the corps level, engineers 

will provide topographic, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment engineering support. 

The combat heavy battalion will evolve into a unit 

which provides support to installation commanders, 

while maintaining the capability to support deploying, 

reinforcing, and contingency forces. 

Topographic engineers will produce automated, 

battlefield geographic information for command, control, intelligence, maneuver, and weapons systems 

employment. Topographic technology will be integrated with command and control systems to produce sophisticated, understandable tactical decision 

aids that will enhance the maneuver commander's 

ability to visualize and exploit the battlefield. 

Future engineer organizations will use the latest 

technology to enhance battlefield performance. Engineers will employ standoff mine detection and clear 

scatterable mines to improve the survivability and 

mobility of maneuver units. Sensor technology, such 

as multi-spectral images, will improve our ability to 

detect enemy camouflage, while our own ability to 

hide will improve through developments such as terrain masking. 

Reserve Components will continue to play a critical role in "rounding out" the Active Army. They will 

be fully integrated into the technological and developmental improvements of the Active Army, as they 

must be to ensure a full range of responses to world 

contingencies. 

In addition to shifts in organizational structure and 

improvements in technology, more emphasis will be 

placed on battle-focused training in which the 

commander's intent is the governing principle of all 

actions. The lethality of modern weapons systems, 

their potential for mass destruction, and their 

widespread proliferation, make it imperative for 

leaders at all levels to have the skills necessary to 

recognize and act upon the commander's intent. To 

survive, units will remain widely dispersed while emitting minimal electronic signatures. They will mass 

with great speed at the appointed place and time 

and advance decisively behind a wall of fire, only to 

disperse again upon achieving their objective. 

During each phase of such a future battle, engineers will be a critical asset. They must speak the 

language of the combined arms team with fluency 

and be trained to recognize and buttress the 

commander's intent. 

Many of the potential contingencies for which we 

prepare will stop far short of high-intensity conflict. 

Rescue and recovery, noncombatant evaluation, and 

disaster relief, for example, are operations with a critical engineer component. Our organization, training, 

and doctrine must remain flexible enough to meet 

these needs. 

We are unique among the combined arms team in 

that the level of support required of us will remain 

high, regardless of the contingency. We must make 

every effort to integrate battle-focused leader training 

with lean, flexible organizations, and improvements 

in technology. Our success depends on this. 

2 Engineer 
-, BRIDGE THE GA 

By Command Sergeant Major W. E. Woodaii 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

"They send us in front with a fuse an' a mine 

To blow up the gates that are rushed by the Line, 

But bent by Her Majesty's Royal Engineer, 

With the rank and pay of a Sapper!" 

A verse from "SAPPERS, " by Rudyard Kipling 

he term sapper goes back to the 16th century 

wars. Since then, sappers have proven their technical and tactical abilities'by building and destroying 

fortifications, roads, obstacles, and airfields. 

In the past, success on the battlefield often 

depended on sappers leading the way. To continue 

this success, we must develop competent and confident noncommissioned officers who have the ability 

to operate under stress as team members. Fort 

Leonard Wood's Sapper Leader Course provides a 

unique training opportunity for the engineer corps to 

build these skills. 

Mission. The mission of the Sapper Leader 

Course is to train engineer leaders so they can better 

support maneuver units. The course trains an engineer company's leadership and focuses on the 

development of team leaders and squad leaders. Instruction is oriented primarily at the sergeant and 

staff sergeant skill levels. Many of the topics covered 

are especially pertinent to light, airborne, and air assault engineer battalions. Although designed mainly 

for light engineers, the training is available to any 

combat engineer unit. 

Training. The 28-day program provides instruction 

in a mix of light and special operations engineer skill 

areas. Topics include air, water, and mountain operations; medical techniques; land navigation; demolitions; expedient antennas and communications; survival; and small unit tactics and patrolling. 

While most of the material is taught in a classroom, 

it is reinforced through repeated practical exercises. 

Sapper students spend the last 10 days of the course 

in the field, putting to use the skills and techniques 

they have learned. 

The course teaches our junior leaders how to fight 

and win as a member of a unit. When an entire unit 

attends the Sapper Leader Course, the leaders have 

only one thing to accomplish--to successfully complete the program. In other words, the training is conducted in an environment free from daily distractions. 

Because it is conducted in a tough, uncompromising 

environment, units leave the course a better trained 

and more cohesive group. 

Our sapper course challenges every leader regardless of rank, position, or experience. The continuous 

operations, together with the mental and physical 

demands, place students in very stressful conditions. 

Noncommissioned officers are stressed to the limits 

of their endurance. Obviously, the challenges are 

many, but equally apparent are the rewards of better 

trained noncommissioned officers. 

The key to success for a unit to graduate as a sapper company is to prepare or train-up the company 

and its leaders before coming to Fort Leonard Wood. 

Preparation. I have watched units attending the 

Sapper Leader Course, and there are two individual 

training areas that we, as noncommissioned officers, 

need to fix: Physical fitness and land navigation 

skills. These two areas are the major reasons why 

students fail to graduate from the course. Our training 

is strenuous, and it requires that soldiers be in peak 

physical condition. As a minimum, students must be 

prepared to pass the Army physical fitness test, complete fast-paced runs, and road march as far as 12 

miles with a rucksack. 

The land navigation course complements the sapper's fitness program. To fully prepare for the sapper 

leader course, soldiers need to sharpen their basic 

map-reading and land-navigation skills. These skills 

are tested over the most rugged terrain Fort Leonard 

Wood has to offer. The rolling Ozark hills make the 

land navigation course physically demanding. 

To complete the course, students must use different navigation techniques, including terrain association and the use of "attack points." They negotiate the 

course with rucksacks and as individuals-not as 

buddy teams. The course is a true test of a sapper's 

ability to move cross country. 

Other skills you may want to sharpen in preparation for the course are math skills, drownproofing, 

and the combat water survival test. 

The Sapper Leader Course is a unique training opportunity for combat engineers. Unlike other schools' 

programs, the training is primarily for unit leaders and 

focuses on the development of noncommissioned officers. We invite you and your unit to come and take 

advantage of this training opportunity. With the proper 

train-up and warrior spirit, any noncommissioned officer can earn the title of Sapper Leader. 

Engineer 3 
"whose Side Are 


Those ?*@F%cceJ 


By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. MacIver 

and Major Andrew H. Hough 

K, so the "book," FM 

100-5, tells us that divisions "assignn obstacle zones and 

brigades assign belts. 

The purpose of belts is to block, 

turn, £ix or disrupt the attacking 

enemy. Lanes may be speded 

through a zone or belt to enable the 

defender to move-not maneuverthrough the area. Obstacles installed by defending engineers have 

to be located within the belts. 

All very nice and neat. Right? 

The concept integrates the battlefield operating systems of 

maneuver and countermobility. 

Smartly done, it integrates fires, 

too. Trouble is, nobody does itat 

least not very well. 

The common result is that the 

defending maneuver force finds 

out the hard way that "theirn engineers put obstacles in surprising 

places. And such surprises often 

lead to the uttering of many 

phrases, the most polite of which 

is the title of this article. 

Everyone thinks they understand the commander's intent and 

scheme of maneuver when it's first 

stated. Then everyone takes a 

copy of the maneuver graphics and 

goes off in separate directions to 

put their piece into action. Too 

often, the maneuver graphics do 

not show obstacle belts at all, or 

give only an indication of obstaclefree zones. 

Presumably, the engineer recommends belt locations and gets them 

approved later. But somehow this 

later approval plan never quite 

"...we think we 

have a better, 

simpler way to 

keep us engineers 

well integrated.'' 

works, i.e., what ends up on the 

ground never quite jives with the 

maneuver plan. In the worst cases, 

obstacle belts are designed %om 

the bottom up." &r well-meaning 

engineer platoons dot the map with 

proposed (and then installed) obstacles, the staff engineer "circlesn 

groups of the dots, thereby designating belts for his brigade commander. It may be well coordinated 

at company/team or even task force 

levels, but it certainly isn't integrated in the brigade or division 

scheme of maneuver. 

In other words, current practice 

looks good in the brigade TOC, but 

causes fratricide on the ground. 

The lesson is one we, as engineers, have all learned-but 

seem slow to apply: When the 

brigade's maneuver and engineer 

plans are developed separately, 

the results aren't likely to be integrated. Take this thought across 

a brigade boundary, and the situation is a magnitude worse. The 

repositioning of forces, lateral 

reinforcement, counterattack, and 

passage all suffer. AirLand Battle 

remains in the book and doesn't 

happen on the ground. 

Well, here in the hinterlands of 

the Fulda Gap, we think we have 

a better, simpler way to keep us 

engineers well integrated. This article explains the thought behind 

the process, and why we think it 

ought to be the next improvement 

in FM 5-100. The two overlays 

(Figures 1and 2) allow you to immediately see what the scheme of 

maneuver is, and where obstacles 

will go and why. 

In our operations with the 11th 

Armored Cavalry, the regimental 

commander's overlay for a defense 

(or covering force battle) shows a 

set of engagement areas in which 

to focus squadron andfor regimental fights. Here, of course, the 

4 Engineer 
terms regiment and squadron thoughts in mind, blocking and gineer battalion and company 

equate to brigade and task force. turning belts are identified as easi- commanders are happy because 

The regiment wants to get the ly as any other feature of the plan. they have clear guidance. And the 

enemy into an engagement box and When the regimental com- regimental commander is happy 

thenfocus all available combat power mander issues his order and over- because the process is simple 

on him there. If it looks like there is a lay, he also assigns obstacle belts; and it works. 

particularly ~tcworthf' enemy better yet, he articulates their What we do is best seen in some 

force coming into a box, the regiment purpose and priority. The way this examples. Look at the first overlay 

will move friendly elements laterany assignment happens is that the S- (Figure 1on page 6). Suppose the 

to reinforce the fight Obstacles help 3 and engineer draw the belts on 11th ACR mission is 'to be a coverget the enemy into a box and keep the initial operations overlay. ing force forward of phase line 

him there. There is no separate overlay for (PL) Mustang. The covering force 

The trick is to install obstacles the obstacle graphics. Obstacles area is designated by corps as an 

that have the desired effect on the are an essential feature of the obstacle zone. The commander's 

enemy without impairing our own maneuver plan, so the belts are concept is to: 

agility for lateral reinforcement drawn on the maneuver graphics. Delay forward of PL Goodwill. and other maneuvers. We ensure Further, the commander specifies 

such agility by having the en- the routes he wants to use for Strip away enemy reconnaisgineer in the dialogue when the lateral reinforcement or other sance using indirect fires (arengagement areas are first out- moves. Putting these extra fea- tillery, air and disruption 

lined. The design process usually tures on the overlay takes no ap- obstacles). 

involves the S-2, S-3, the en- preciable extra time and it pays 

gineer, and the fire support coor- big dividends. Avoid decisive engagement. 

dinator. We determine where we Maneuver commanders at task Delay back to PL Goodwill, 

prefer to conduct the fights and force and team levels are happy then defend behind PL Goodwhere we prefer to maneuver, but because they know what to expect will to make it appear to be 

that's not all. We also determine in terms of obstacles in their own the main battle area (MBA). where the obstacle belts should and adjacent sectors. They know 

be. The obstacle belts may even where they can move and Cause enemy deployment. 

be designed first, and then the maneuver. Their artillery coor- Identify his main effort. best engagement areas stand out. dinator is happy because he now 

The necessary obstacle belts and has better ideas about where, Pass lines rearward and hand 

their purposes are immediately ob when and why to target. The en- off the battle to MBA brigades. 

vious when the belts and the 

engagement areas are designed jointly. In certain places, 

we need to block enemy movement so he can't get around 

the engagement areas. In other 

places, we want to turn the 

enemy and encourage his 

movement toward the engagement arm In an engagement 

area, we want to fix the enemy. 

We treat the engagement 


areas as Y5xing" belts because 


they are places where we want 


to make the ground "sticl$' for 


the enemy while we apply our 


combat power. In some areas, 


usually well forward, we want 


to disrupt enemy movement, 


echelonment, command and 


control, and followan support. 


the S-2, S-3 and en- Defending maneuver forces often flnd out the hard way that "thelr" engineers 

gineer are bending over the have put obstacles In some surprlslng places. The lack of solld integration of ensame map together with such glneer effort can lead, at best, to confusion, and to fratrlclde In the worst cases. 

Engineer 5 
! 

PL 

Mustang , ,*%% 

/ Editor's Note: LTCRoger Somerville, 

Chief, Tactics, Training and Doctrine 

Division for the Engineer School's 

Department of Combined Arms, found 

the authors' article "on the mark." 

The Engineer School is now teaching a technique that solves many typical 

obstacle integration problems. LTC 

Somerviile writes: "(Our new Engineer 

School) technique has proven effective 

on the training center battlefield. It allows for brigade and task force commanders to convey their obstacle intent 

to subordinates. The synchronization of 

obstacle effects is, therefore, top driven. 

However, it also provides the subordinate TF or Corrrn commander the 

flexibility to further refine the obstacle 

intent to fit his particular scheme of 

maneuver or direct fire plan. Obstacle 

integration is, therefore, bottom driven 

where it Is most effective." 

An article detailing this new technique will appear In the next issue of 

ENGINEER. The authors' graphicoverlay symbols, used here to illustrate thelr 

technique, should not be used in lieu of 

the recently-approved symbols which 

appear below: 

Disrupt Turn Fix Block 

Figure 1 

I The regiment issues the operations overlay, which shows several 

engagement areas (V-or victory-boxes) in which to focus 

squadron and/or regimental 

fights. Each squadron will be positioned across one or two potential 

enemy regimental avenues of approach. The overlay also shows the 

obstacle belts, their purpose, and 

their priority within each 

squadron (task force) sector. 

We depart from the standard 

symbols shown in FM 5-100 in 

that we do not show triangular 

"bumps" on our obstacle belt 

lines. The bumps make it easy to 

see the belts on a crowded overlay, but they are a source of confusion. For example, can we place 

obstacles in a bump or not? Finally, the overlay shows routes we 

want to be able to use, including 

what we see as the best exit 

points for rearward passage. We 

then recommend these to the 

MBA brigades for passage points. 

The belts are named for their 

Figure 2 purpose and priority. For example, 

6 Engineer 
the purpose of belt Block A1 is to 

block movement in part of task 

force area A. It is also engineer 

obstacle priority number "1" in this 

sector. The belts name carries the 

regimental wmmander's intent 

that this blocking belt is the most 

important of the belts in this seetor. 

Once everyone is familiar with the 

naming system, the belt name may 

be shortened to simply "BA1." 

The turning belts include arrows to indicate the direction(s) in 

which we want to encourage 

enemy movement. Belt Qrn B2" 

is in task force area B. The belt's 

purpose is to encourage enemy 

movement into either engagement 

area V13 or V14, and it is the 

second obstacle priority in this 

task force sector. 

The letter designators "A" and 

"B" for different task force sectors 

are a simple addition to the name 

of each belt that make the name 

unique. By the way, there is no 

special reason why we use the letters 4B, and C in this example to 

refer to different task force areas. 

For better distinction from the "B" 

that means "Block," you can use X, 

Y and 2. In other words, use 

whatever provides easy distinction of belts in different areas. 

The engagement areas are understood to be fixing belts without 

being so labeled The choices of a 

letter (such as 77" here) and some 

numbers to name the engagement 

areas are arbitrary. The numbers 

do not imply priority. These 

engagement area fking belts have 

a priority lower than that of blocking and turning belts, and this will 

be wvered in greater detail shortly. 

Disruption belts, if there is time 

and effort enough to have any, are 

also labeled. They have the lowest 

priority among the belts. It is possible that "ground mounted" engineer effort may not be committed in a disruption belt. 

Instead, these may be areas where 

artillery or air-delivered scatterable mines are focused. 

Another overlay feature is the 

series of dashed lines which show 

regimental routes to be kept open. 

Where these routes cross into the 

MBAis where we prefer to conduct 

the rearward passage. Normally, 

we give each route a name. 

Several features of standard 

operating procedure (SOP) help 

keep execution integrated with 

the commander's intent. Our SOP 

is that obstacles are planned and 

installed in accordance with the 

named priorities. This is not to 

say that all engineers work first 

in belts numbered priority 1,then 

move to number 2, and so on. 

Available engineers are allocated 

by platoon to address the needs 

we estimate in each task force 

and companylteam area. Exactly 

Englnwr effort on the 

ground often doesn't 

match the maneuver 

plan. In the worst cases, 

obstaclebelts are designed from the bottom 

up," by well-meanlng 

engineer platoons (U.S. 

Army photo). 

who works where, on what and 

when is leR to the commanders 

on the ground. 

As work progresses, some task 

organization changes may occur if 

our initial estimate needs to be 

adjusted. In a given sector, work 

may be in progress concurrently in 

several different belts. The net 

result, however, is what one would 

expect. High priority belts tend to 

get more effort earlier, have more 

obstacles in them, and get done 

sooner than low priority belts. 

In general, blocking and krming 

belts are the west priority because 

the fi&t won't happen where we 

want it to hawless the blocking and tuming belts accomplish 

their purpose first The fixing belts 

(i.e., obstacles in the engagement 

areas) are lower priority than the 

blocking and turningbelts. 

Combat power will be focused in 

the engagement area ltls possible to 

win the fight there even if there is too 

little time to install tixing obstacles, 

as long as the blocks and turns are 

effective. Dimption obstacles rate 

the lowest obstacle effort priority. 

These are not likely tote done by engineers on the pund unless time, 

materials and engineer effort are 

plentaul before the fight starts. 

Artillerydelivered scatte~*able mines 

are oRen very useful in such die 

tion belts, and they may be the only 

ohtacles planned or installed 
Obstacles cannot be placed outside of belts or on regimental 

routes unless approved at regiment. Such approvals usually 

make the obstacle a regimental 

reserved target, or tie its execution to a specific event (e.g., passage). Squadron (task force) level 

commanders may designate additional squadron level engagement 

areas, but these are not new 

obstacle belts unless so approved 

at regiment level. Squadrons may 

also designate additional routes. 

In center sector, for example, the 

squadron commander may fight by 

positioning one or two of his scout 

troops (company teams) forward of 

PL Goodwill. The scouts screen the 

area between PL Goodwill and PL 

Wrangler. With help from air 

scouts, they observe the advancing 

enemy, send in a steady stream of 

spot reports, get off a few wellaimed shots, call in artillery and 

air-delivered fires, and delay without becoming decisively engaged. 

The scouts delay back through 

V13 andlor V14 to pre-determined 

positions from which to fight the 

battle focused in the engagement 

area. Other elements of the 

squadron are positioned in belts 

Block B3 and Turn B1. They help 

the belts serve their purpose by 

covering obstacles with fire. They 

also help to "encouragen the enemy 

into V13 and V14. 

The squadron's tank company 

is in a hide position at the rear of 

belt Turn B2, and is prepared to 

move and attack quickly into 

either V13 or V14. On call from 

the regimental commander, the 

tanks may even move out of sector to the north, to V23 or V24, or 

out of sector to the south to V43, 

depending on where the best 

enemy target force is moving. 

Engineers continue to install 

obstacles, improving the belts, 

until the fight forces them back. As 

the fight progresses, engineers 

focus attention on the designated 

lateral mobility routes and passage routes to ensure they remain 

open. By the time the enemy gets 

to engagement areas V13 andV14, 

his combat recon patrols and forward security elements will have 

taken a severe beating. 

The enemy's advance guard battalion bullies his way into one of 

our engagement areas. Artillery, 

attack helicopters, close air support, tank maneuvers, electronic 

measures and fixing obstacles all 

come into play as the squadron 

destroys the advance guard. The 

action forces the enemy regiment 

to deploy. The cavalry continues to 

grind down the enemy as it hands 

off the battle to the MBA. All 

across the corps front, enemy regiments are identified and "greeted" 

in this fashion. We are able to 

identify the main enemy effort, 

bloody his nose, make him deploy, 

and set him up for MBA brigades. 

The second example (Figure 2 

on page 6) shows a four-task force 

brigade in the defense of an MBA. 

One task force is in depth. An important aspect not evident without 

the map is that there is a significant natural obstacle in the 

terrain. A difficult ridgeline runs 

from the northwest side of engagement area V30 to the rear of belts 

Block Dl and Turn D3. 

Forward of the ridgeline, a 

potential enemy regiment (or 

larger) avenue of approach runs 

through V20 to V40. This brigade 

overlay shows division counterattack axes Touchdown and Button 

Hook. Such axes are usually designated as obstacle-free zones, but 

this blanket restriction isn't always required. With some care, it 

may be reasonable to put fixing 

obstacles in V20 without impairing Axis Touchdown, and put turning obstacles in Turn D2 without 

impairing Axis Button Hook. 

One criteria for success of the 

counterattack is that the force must 

be able to transit the axis without 

undue impediment, and without 

fratricide. The counterattack force 

commander must have approval 

authority (or, he must have &sap 

prod authority) over what obstacles 

go into V20 and Turn D2. He and all 

his leaders, down to M1 and hC2 

commanders, will need to know 

precisely what routes will be open, 

and where each target will be 

planned. As work progresses, the 

counterattack force engineer will pay 

close attention to obstacle reporting 

by the forward units. V20 and Turn 

D2 are places where the division engineer earns his pay-helping to ensure I%&both the defense and the 

counterattackare supported. 

For those division and brigade 

commanders out there, this is the 

prescription for the next time you 

are ready to throw down your kevlar in disgust, and shout 'Whose 

side are those !*@I#%& engineers 

on anyway?" 

We're on your side. Just let us 

help draw smart lines on your 

operations overlay. 

To belt or not to belt. That is the 

question. 

And we have the answer. k€ 


Lieutenant Colonel MmIver is the 

professor of military science at 

Bucknell University. He previously 

served as commander of the 54th 

Engineer Battalion. Other assignments include assistant corps engineer, V Corps; executive oficer, 

317th Engineer Battalion; assistant 

professor of physics at West Point, 

and command of two engineer companies. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College, 

and holds a master's degree in engineering applied sciences from the 

University of California at Davis. 

He is a West Point graduate. 

Major Hough is the S-3 of the 54th 

Engineer Battalion. He previously 

served as the regimental engineer 

for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has commanded two engineer companies, and served as 

resident engineer for the Corps of 

Engineers in the Netherlands. He is 

a graduate of Command and 

General Staff College, and Combined Arms and Services Staff 

School. He holds a master$ degree 

in mechanical engineering from 

Washington State University, and is 

a registered engineer in Virginia. 

8 Engineer 
VieFlawedWork of Fort Constitution 


There is an old saying that those who ignore 

history are doomed to repeat it. It's a truism 

which holds particular significance for Army 

leaders. Military successes or failures of a 

hundred or even a thousand years ago can hold important lessons for modern combat commanders. 

But finding a way to take history off the bookshelf and put it to practical use isn't always easy. 

One of the best avenues for instilling historical 

lessons in young military leaders is the staff ride. 

Staff rides allow commanders to use the accomplishments--or follies--of long-gone military figures to 

provide important lessons in decision making. 

Hundreds of militarily important historical sites 

throughout the United States provide the backdrop for old problems and crises that can parallel 

a surprising number of modern military situations. A good example of one of these sites, and 

one that the Department of History of the U.S. 

Military Academy uses often, is the juncture of 

the Hudson River and West Point. 

And therein lies the story of Bernard Romans 

and Fort Constitution-a story that all modernday engineers should learn well. 

The Hudson River and West Point played a significant role in the outcome of the American 

evolution.' This article will critique the work of 

Romans, the first military engineer at Constitution Island. 

American and British political and military 

leaders considered the Hudson River militarily significant throughout the American Revolution. 

George Washington had recognized the value of 

the Hudson River at least as early as May 1775, 

when he had served on a committee of the Continental Congress that had recommended fortifying both its sides in the Hudson ~i~hlands.~ His 

later view, in 1783 in his "Sentiments on a Peace 

Establishment," was that the fortifications at 

West Point had been the "key of America." This 

had influenced his thinking throughout the war. 

Units of the Continental Army generally garrisoned in the Hudson Highlands, and Washington 

concerned himself personally with the construction of the works along Popolopen Creek and at 

Constitution Island, Pollepel's Island, and West 

~oint.~ 

The British made the "line of the Hudson" the 

centerpiece of their strategies to take New York 

City in 1776, Albany in the Saratoga campaign of 

1777, and West Point in 1780 (with the assistance 

of its commander, Benedict Arnold). The British 

Commander in Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton, 

who was involved in all three of these plans and 

By Lieutenant Colonel James M. Johnson Engineer 9 
the capture of Stony Point in 1779 later wrote 

that "the River Hudson naturally presents itself 

as a very important object.'* 

Washington, Clinton, and their respective political leaders were convinced that the British could 

bisect the colonial rebellion economically and 

politically by controlling this major river.' The 

New York Provincial Convention and Committee 

of Safety repeatedly reminded the Continental 

Congress of the Hudson's importance "for the 

defense of the United American States, and keeping up a communication between the eastern and 

southern states," as it solicited funds for its 

defen~e.~British subjects and Americans would 

forfeit their lives and national treasure as they 

tried to maintain control of this vital artery. 

The initial requirements for fortifjmg the Hudson at West Point had been clear from the very 

first reports rendered on May 19 by Washington's 

committee and on June 13, 1775, by James Clinton and Christopher Tappen. Both of these men, 

sent by the Provincial Congress to determine the 

best location to block the river, were New York 

delegates and residents of the Hudson Valley. Additionally, Clinton, a surveyor, had served as a 

captain of militia in the French and Indian War. 

The Continental Congress and the two New 

Yorkers had agreed that both sides of the river required posts and garrisons. After surveying other 

sites, such as Popolopen Creek and Con Hook, 

Clinton and Tappen chose the difficult, "S"-shaped 

curve at West Point. They believed the narrowness of the channel here and the effects of tide (3- 

feet high) and current made this the most appropriate spot. Their report included a description 

West Point cadets view 

the site of Romans' 

planned fortifications 

during a staff ride sponsored by the school's 

Department of History 

(U.S.Army photo). 

and drawing of a post on Martelaer's Rock with a 

garrison of 300 men and another at West Point 

with 200 men. They had also recommended 

stretching booms across the Hudson between the 

two posts. 7 

Why did a venture that began with such insight 

and energy result in failure? Why were the works 

in the Hudson Highlands so flawed that they 

failed to stop the British in October 1777? 

The failure was at two levels. First, the engineer hired by the New York Committee of 

Safety, Dutch-born surveyor, cartographer, and 

botanist Bernard Romans, failed as a military engineer at Martelaer's Rock. He did not locate the 

fortifications there properly. Secondly, he failed to 

develop them effectively, expeditiously, and 

economically. On August 29, 1775, Romans began 

work on a "Grand Bastion," dubbed Constitution 

Fort. 

By February 9, 1776, when the Continental and 

Provincial Congress dismissed him, Romans had 

completed only an octagonal, wooden blockhouse 

with eight four-pounder cannons, barracks, a 

storehouse, and a curtain or wall mounting a battery of fourteen cannons? Romans' failure at 

Martelaer's Rock led colonial leaders, who still accepted parts of his general plan for Fort Constitution, to seek alternative sites for fortifications and 

obstacles. Congressional leaders heard from visiting committees that Fort Constitution was inadequate, and that Popolopen Creek, more than four 

miles downriver, had off-setting advantages. 

Beginning in January 1776, precious manpower 

and materials were diverted to two forts 

(Montgomery and Clinton), along with a chain and 

10 Engineer 
boom. A chevaux-de-frise(iron-tipped, wooden 

stakes protruding from sunken log cribs filled 

with rocks) was to be emplaced between 

Pollepel's Island, across the river to Plum Point 

on its west bank.g 

These works and the chevaux-de-friseat 

Pollopel's Island would divert effort and manpower from Fort Constitution, as it was now 

called. Consequently, the patriots had incomplete fortifications or barriers at three places 

and too few soldiers to man them. The end 

result was failure when success might have 

been possible. 

Romans failed at Martelaer's Rock because 

he did not follow the basic rules of military engineering as they were understood at the time. 

This is not surprising, because he apparently 

had little or no practical experience as a 

military engineer. His biographer cites some 

training in England prior to 1756, but this 

presumably was in civil engineering.10 

Romans had a working knowledge of military 

terms and structures, which he revealed in his 

observations of Fort St. Augustine, Florida." 

He had also assessed the cost of repairing Fort 

Ticonderoga for Benedict Arnold in May 1775, 

after that once formidable work was captured. 

Since his arrival in North America, however, 

Romans earned his livelihood as a surveyor, 

cartographer, and botanist. In fact, while he 

was in the pay of the New York Provincial Congress, the King of England was paying him a 

50 pound annual stipend as the botanist for the 

Floridas. 

To his credit, Romans purchased a copy of 

Roger Stevenson's Military Instructions for Officers Detached in the Field in Philadel hia 

before travelling to New York.P2 He 

may have learned something about fortifications from John William Gerard 

de Brahm, a military engineer and his 

original superior as Surveyor General 

of the Southern District. However, 

there is no evidence that he consulted 

or owned other treatises about military 

engineering. 

Romans would have served himself 

and his adopted country better had he 

followed the maxims of acknowledged, 

published engineers, particularly those 

of Stevenson. He might then have first 

built field fortifications of earth and 

wood that commanded the river rather 

than starting a bastioned fort of masonry. A committee of the Continental 

- Congress observed on November 23, 

Engineer 11 
Romans' Plan #1indicated the terrain seen by 

Romans on Martelaer's Rock. 

1775, that as the southwest curtain was the "least 

useful, we think it should have been last finished. 

. . ."I3 Without doubt, Romans was very skillful 

with a pen, as his drawings and plan of work for 

Fort Constitution reveal. His approach to his craft 

as a cartographer and even, perhaps, as a civil engineer are evident in the introduction to his book, 

A Concise Natural History of East and West 

Florida: 

A describer of countries, ought in a great measure, to 

imitate a building Engineer, in first laying before those, 

whom he will employ, accurate and distinct plum of his 

intended work, thereby enabling them more distinctly of 

the execution thereof: . . .

14 

Unfortunately for Romans, there was and is 


more to military engineering than a well-drawn 


plan, a point that John Muller made directly at 


the time to all who read his treatise on fortifica- 


tions.16 The flawed execution of Romans' plan 


would be his undoing and, ultimately, the 


Highlands' as well. 

Because of his apparent inexperience as a 

military engineez, Romans chose poor locations for his major works. Had he consulted 

or remembered the contents of prominent 

published treatises on fortifications, such as 

those of Muller, Vauban, or Pleydell, he 

would have noted their caution to practitioners to be careful about their "choice of 

situation" and "to make use of every advantage of ground. . ." Muller even thought 

that leaders should not trust the judgment 

of a single engineer, even one "so well 

qualified " but rather should seek other 

opinions?' Unfortunately for the colonies, 

engineers were in short supply. New York 

and the Continental Congress had little 

recourse at the time but to rely upon the 

careful drawings and detailed estimates of 

Bernard Romans. 

In "his choice of situation," Romans accepted too literally the location on 

Martelaer's Rock proposed by Tappen and 

Clinton rather than surveying and tracing 

out the best site himself. His initial proposal proved that he was not totally bound 

by the opinion of "Some gentlemen, not well 

enough versed in the sience [sic]. . ." because he had himself found a spot a short 

distance to the east of the one selected by 

the cornmittee.17 Furthermore, after sketching a blockhouse and battery for a site that 

Clinton and Tappen had chosen at West 

Point, he had then ignored these dominating heights across the river less than one-half 

mile away. 

Stevenson pointedly warned against allowing 

such a thing to happen with terrain in the very 

book that Romans owned and presumably had 

read.18 

Although most observers, like Clinton and Tappen, recognized the value of the higher ground at 

West Point, it would continue to be ignored until 

1778. In June 1776, for example, Lord Stirling, 

General William Alexander, noted that "every 

work on the island is commanded by the hill on 

the West Point. . . ."lg The reason for this crucial 

oversight may have simply been that Fort Constitution had now become an auxiliary to Forts 

Montgomery and Clinton. Cannons emplaced at 

Romans Battery would be unable to take an 

enemy ship under fire until it was broadside, more 

than halfway through the "Sn-curve. 

Field works, made from fascines (bundles of 

sticks), timber, dirt, and sod-and located farther 

to the east at the future site of the Gravel Hill 

12 Engineer 
Battery where Romans himself had drawn a blockhouse and a battery-would have at least confronted both problems. Romans would have done 

well to have remembered or read Pleydell's admonition in 1768 That an hundred men properly 

posted, and entrenched according to rule, can effect more than a thousand, who have taken up a 

wrong position."20 

Having chosen the wrong place to begin his 

work, Romans next ignored or misunderstood the 

command relationship established by the New 

York Provincial Congress when it appointed the 

commissioners for the fortifications in the Highlands. As a result, there was no unity of command. The famous French engineer, Vauban, had 

made clear in his writings that members of his 

profession were "often forced to follow someone 

Romans' Plan #2 shows his original scheme for 

batteries and blockhouses. 

else's opinions and work at strange n~tions."~' 

To his ultimate regret, Romans stubbornly or 

pridefully viewed himself as the sole director of 

construction. He did not show his original plan to, 

or coordinate it with the commissioners, who then 

criticized it without offering an alternative. The 

plan was delivered directly to the New York Committee of Safety, which forwarded the impressive 

drawin s and estimates to the Continental Congress.2'This initial action led to increasing 

animosity and a paper war between the principals 

of the projectRomans writing from his blockhouse and the commissioners from their office in 

the storehouse a short walk to the rear.23 This 

was not the first time, nor would it be the last, 

that Romans would show his difficult 

personality.2q 

Embroiled in controversy first with the 

commissioners and later with the respective Congresses, Romans proceeded to 

build a blockhouse and a battery too slowly and at too great expense. Muller had 

pointed out that a major consideration in 

planning a fortress must be The expence 

necessary in the building of it" to avoid 

the possibility that "instead of being an 

advanta e, it becomes a burthen to the 

nation."' Tappen and Clinton had 

originally estimated that the cost of their 

two proposed posts would be about 1,500 

pounds; Romans' initial estimate was 

4,645 pounds, 4 shillings, 4 pence, excluding ropes, iron stoves, and artillery. The 

minutes of the New York governing 

bodies indicate the routine disbursement 

of funds to support the construction to 

the north.26 

Had the results of Romans' labor been 

more evident to the many observers sent 

to evaluate progress, the expense might 

not have been a major factor. Lord Stirling summarized the issue very succinctly in his report of June 1, 1776: "Mr. 

Romans has displayed his genius at a 

very great expence and to very little 

publick advantage."27 

Cost became a consideration precisely 

because, even by the time of Lord 

Stirling's visit, Romans, the commissioners, and their laborers had accomplished so little of consequence. The 

commissioners completed a second curtain, to be called Marine Battery, mounting eight cannons. 

Investigating committees, influenced 

by their reports to the Provincial 

Engineer 13 
Congress, further added two batteries of fascines, 

planks, and earth (Gravel Hill--8 cannons, and 

Hill Cliff--3 cannons) on the eastern end of the island. Here, the cannon could fire on British ships 

long before they reached Martelaer's Rock. 

The British, upon their arrival in October 1777, 

faced a Fort Constitution that comprised Romans' 

Battery and Blockhouse, Marine Battery, and Hill 

Cliff and Gravel Hill ~atteries.~~ Even these 

works, such as they were, would not be tested. 

The small detachment of militia and Continentals 

was demoralized by the British victories 

downriver at Forts Montgomery and Clinton. They 

would flee these works, third in priority at the 

time for resources behind the projects at 

Popolopen Creek and Pollopel Island, after firing 

only one shot at a British flag of truce.29 

Forts Montgomery and Clinton fell quickly and 

tragically for reasons that parallel those that led 

to the ignominious demise of Fort Constitution. 

Started in the fall of 1775 as an alternative to 

Fort Constitution, these works nonetheless competed for men and materials, and later with the 

chevaux-de-friseat the northern gate of the Highlands. Patriot laborers had not completed either of 

the forts by the time of the British attack. 

Generals George and James Clinton found that 

the forts were too large for the few Continentals 

and militia they were able to muster. Disregarding Washington's warnings, these inexperienced 

leaders and General Israel Putnam, the overall 

commander, failed to guard critical passes to the 

south and west. That allowed the British to attack 

the landward side of forts, which were tragically 

and ineffectually oriented on the river. 

A chain, boom, row galleys, and Continental 

frigate served little useful purpose as Loyalist 

Colonel (and local resident) Beverley Robinson led 

British Regulars and provincials through Timp 

Pass and Doodletown. They attacked the rear of 

the two American works in a final assault that 

lasted only about 30 minutes. After occupying Constitution Island, the British naval squadron made 

equally short work of the inadequately defended 

chevaux-de-fn'seat Pollopel's Island and roamed 

as far north as Kingston, New York. 

The Provincial Convention fled as 

the British first took and then 

burned the capital. Unable to save 

"Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne at 

Saratoga, Clinton's soldiers and 

Hotham's sailors destroyed 2-years' 

futile efforts by Americans to 

prevent just such an outrage as they 

fell back downriver to New York 

The story loops full circle back to 

the post proposed for Martelaer's 

Rock, and the one at West Point 

and to Bernard Romans' flawed interpretation of his assignment. 

The New York Provincial Congress had hired Romans as a 

military engineer to block the Hudson River at a point that would 

begin to prove decisive in early 

1778. As his "imagination took 

wing," Romans squandered time and 

money trying to build a "Grand Bastion" rather than field fortifications 

better suited to the needs of the moment.31 Of even greater significance, 

he chose to build the fort where it 

Romans' Plan #3 of the "Grand 

Bastion." Romans completed only 

the center curtain and the 

octagonal blockhouse. 

14 Engineer 
commanded little and could be dominated from almost every direction. 

Romans' initial failure led his political and 

military masters to fortify Popolopen Creek and 

Pollopel Island even as they continued some efforts at Fort Constitution. The patriots had too 

few men, too little time and money, and too little 

experience to do all of these tasks effectively at 

the same time. 

It is most unfortunate that the reasoning of 

Silas Deane, of Connecticut, did not prevail 

in October 1775, as he and fellow delegates to the 

Continental Congress debated the future of Fort 

Constitution: "they have employed an engineer. 

The people and he agree in the spot and the plan. 

Unless we rescind the whole we should go on; it 

ought to be done.w32 

The second generation of fortifications at West 

Point were true to Tappen's and Clinton's 

original conception. More competent engineers 

blocked the Hudson with a mighty chain and 

covered it with the fires of forts, batteries, and 

redoubts on both sides. Perhaps the words of engineer Pleydell best indicate why success could be 

achieved at West Point in four short months in 

1778, when failure had plagued the work of the 

previous two years: 

It is very certain, that many, after throwing away 

great part of their lives in handling the scak and compass, have yet been uruabk, on service, to fortifj, posts as 

they ought to be; that is to say, they have not known 

how to take every advantage of the ground, and judge 

of its strengths and defects.33 

Bernard Romans' failure as a military engineer 

set in motion a chain of events that proved disastrous but not fatal in 1777. Victory would come, 

and Fortress West Point would play a major role. 

Paradoxically, the United States Military 

Academy later arose at the same site. Its mission 

was, and still is, to train military leaders to do 

their job better than Romans did his. 11l 

Lieutenant Colonel Johnson is associate professor 

of history at the U.S. Military Academy. He has 

served as speechwriter for the Chief of Staff, US. 

Army. Other assignments inclucle S-3 of 2nd Battalion, 78th Field Artillery, and REFORGER action 

offier for Headquarters, USAREUR. He has commanded two f~ld artillery batteries. He is a 

graduate of the College of Naval Command and 

Staff, and holds a doctorate in history from Duke 

University. 

All art, except where indicated, courtesy of Special Collections, 

US. Military Academy Library, West Point, New York. 

Notes: 

l~incolnDiamant, Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for 

the River in the American Revolution (New York: Carol 

Publishing Group, 1989). 

%orthington Chauncy Ford, ed. Jouds of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1905) 252-53,57, 59-60; Peter Force, d, 

American Amhives, 4th ser., 6 (Washington: M. St. Clair 

Clark and Peter Force, 1837-1853) 2: 84-4-45; George 

Washington, The Diaries of George Washington, ed. Donald 

Jackson (Charlottesville: Univermty Press of Virginia, 

1978) 3:330-31. 

'Garge Washington, The Writings of George Washington 

fmm the Original Manuscript Sources 1746-1799, ed. John 

C. Fitzpatrick (Washington: United States Government 

Printing Office, 1938), 26:382. 

'sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, ed. William 

B. Willcox (New Haven: Yale Univermty Press, 1954), 11. 

'Richard Palmer, The River and the Rock (NewYork: 

Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969), chap. 21; 

Charles E. Miller, Jr. et al., eds.,Highland Fortress: The 

Fo&.fu:ation of West Point During the American Revolution, 

1776-1783,2d ed. (West Point: USMA Department of Hietory, 1988), 5-8. 

%ew York. The Journal of the Committee of Safety, 25 

November 1776, Library of Congress, Reconls of the States 

of the United States, Reel 1,p. 718, microfilm. (Hereinafter 

cited by page number from the respective New York governing body). 

of James Clinton and Christopher Tappen to the 

New York Provincial Congress, June 13, 1775, Force, 4th 

ser., 21296, map, 736. New York Journal of the Provincial 

Congress, 20, 40-41; Papers of the Continental Congress, 

1774-1789 (New York State Papers, 1775-17881, National 

Archives, Record Group 360, Roll 81, pp. 286, 288-290, 

microfilm (M247), hereinafter cited a6 Papers, Continental 

Congress. Lincoln Diamant's poor copy of the map unfortunately obscures the letter "Bnused to mark the "post" at 

West Point, leading him to conclude in both books that the 

committee had only meant to fortify Martelaer's Rock. 

Chaining the Huhn, 4, and Bernard Romns, 60. 

'~incoln Diamant, Benard Romans: Forgotten Patriot of 

the American Revolution (Harrison, N.Y.: Harbor Hill 

Books,1985); New York Provincial Congress, August 18, 

1775, Force, 4th eer., 3535; Romans to New York Commitc 

tee of Safety, September 14, 1775; Commissioners to New 

York Provincial Congress, November 11,1775, Force, 4th 

ser., 3733-36, maps between 736-37, 1891-92; also in 

Papers, Continental Congress, 55-58, 272, 274, 276, 278-79; 

Romans, "Plan of a Part of Hudson's River Near & About 

the Fortifications Now Erecting in the Highlands," undated 

(probably late fall, 1775), USMA Special Collections. 

?Report of Nicoll, Drake, and Palmer, December 14, 

1775, bid., 312-19; the Continental Congress had asked 

the New York Provincial Congress to determine if there 

were other places "where small batteries might be erected," 

and Romans had highly recommended "Pooploop's Kill," 

minutes, October 7, 12 and 17, 1775, Romans, Samuel 

Bayard and William Bedlow to Nathaniel Woodhull, Preeident of the New York Provincial Congress, October 16, 

1775, New York, Journal of the Provincial Congress, 172, 

174, 177, 179-80. 

'%amant, Bernard Romans, 15,71, 132. 

Engineer 15 
"~ernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East 

and West Florida (New York: Bernard Romans, 1775; repr., 

New Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1961), 174-75. 

"P. Lee Phillips, Notes On the Life and Works of Berruzrd Romans (Deland, Fla.: The Florida State Historical 

Society, 1924), 47, 54; Diamant, Benulrd Romans, 70. 

13Roger Stevenson, Instmtwns for Oficers Detached to 

the Field: Containing a Scheme for Forming a Corps of a 

Partisan (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1775); Robert R. 

Livingston, Robert Treat Paine, and John Langdon to John 

Hancock, November 23, 1775, Force, 4th ser., 3:1657-58. 

14Romans, Natural History, 1. 

16~ohnMuller, A Treatise Containing the Plactical Art of 

Fortifwatwn in Four Parts, 3d ed.(London: W. Strahan et 

al., 17741, 123-24. 

16~.c. Pleydell, An Essay on Field Fortif~ations (London: J. Nourse, 1768), vi-vii; John Muller, A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortif~atwn, Regular and Irregular (London: J. Nourse, 1746; repr., Ottawa: Museum 

Restoration Service, 1968); Sebastien LePrestre de Vauban, 

A Manual of Seigecraft and Fortification, trans., George A. 

Rothrock (AnnArbor: The University of Michigan Press, 

1968), 157; Stevenson, 9; Muller, Practical Art, 124, 128-29. 

17Romans to the New York Committee of Safety, September 14, 1775, Force, 4th ser., 73536. 

"~arked"C" on Plan No. 2, September 14, 1775, Papers, 

Continental Congress, 274. No blockhouse or battery appeared at West Point in his "plan" done in late fall; he seems 

to have substituted instead a battery at presentrday garrison on the eastern side of the river. The sketch accompanying the 

report of Nicoll, Drake, and Palmer does not indicate any fortification at West Point, December 14, 1775, Papers, Continental Congress, 280-83. "He must take care not to be com- manded by any neighboring heights, ..."Stevenson, 10. 

'?Lord Stirling to General George Washington, June 1, 

1776, Force, 4th ser., 6:672-78. 

?leydell, ix. 

?Minutes, August 18, 22, 30, September 6, October 16, 18, 

23, 1775, New York Provincial Congress and Committee of 

Safety, Force, 4th ser., 3:535, 541, 567, 571,880, 1290, 1295 

96, 1301, 1363-64; only Samuel Bayard had accompanied 

Clinton and Tappen on the original survey, ibid., 21296; commissioners would continue to supervise construction at Fort 

Constitution and Popolopen Creek until June 13, 1776 when 

the Commander in Chief assumed control, New York, Journal of the Provincial Congress, 493; minutes, September 25, 

1775, ibid., 15859; New York Committee of Safety to the Continental Congress, September 19, 1775, Papers, Continental 

Congress, 41; John Berrien to the New York Committee of 

Safety, September 21, 1775, Phillips, 112. 

23The correspondence exchange between the commissioners and Romans may be found in Force, 4th ser., 1355 

67 and in Merle G. Sheffield, The Fort That Never Was: A 

Discussion of the Revolutionary War Fortifications Built onConstitution Island, 1775-1783(West Point: Constitution Island Association, 1969), 13, C-1-C-12. 

24~aptainMott of the Connecticut militia had com- 
 mented on this in his journal while enroute to Fort 


Ticonderoga in May 1775: 'Mr. Romans left us and joined us no more; we were all glad, as he had been a trouble to 

us, all the time he was with us." General Philip Schuyler 

would later prefer court-martial charges against Romans, now the commander of a Pennsylvanian company of matrosses, in April 1776, during his march to the Canadian 

Department, Diamant, Bernard Romans, 52, 123-26. 

26~uller,Practical Art, 130. 

26~eportof Clinton and Tappen, June 13, 1775, Force, 

4th ser., 21296; Romans' estimate, September 18, 1775, 

Papers, Continental Congress, 55-58. 

'"Lord Stirling to General Washington, June 1, 1776, 

Force, 4th ser., 6:672-78. 

?3ir Henry Clinton to Sir William Howe, October 9, 

1777, and Commodore William Hotham to Lord Viscount 

Howe, October 9, 1777, Donald F. Clark, ed., Fort 

Montgomery and Fort Clinton (Fort Montgomery, NY: Town 

of Highlands, 19521, 12, 14. 

'O~or the most complete story of the state of the forts 

and their fall, see ibid., 3-16; William H. Carr and Richard 

J. Koke, Twin Forts of the Popolopen: Forts Clinton and 

Montgomery, New York 1775-1777, Historical Bulletin Number 1(Bear Mountain, NY: Commissioners of the Palisades 

Interstate Park and the American Scenic and Historic 

Presewation Society, July 1937); report of Court of Inquiry 

to His Excellency George Washington, April 5, 1778, and 

Alexander McDougall to Washington, May 21, 1778, 

Alexander McDougall Papers, New York Historical Society, 

microfilm. 

31~iamant,Bernard Romans, 72. Report of Francis 

Nicoll, Joseph Drake, and Thomas Palmer to the New York 

Provincial Congress, December 14, 1775, Papers, Continental Congress, 312-19; report, 4:420-22, Lord Stirling to 

General Washington, June 1, 1776, 6:672-78, Force, 4th 

ser.; New York, Journal of the Provincial Congress, 322, 

330; minutes, February 1776, Ford, 4133-34. (In a 2-day 

visit to the Highlands, Captain William Smith, the en- gineer of General Charles Lee, traced out the former on 

Gravel Hill on a site identified but not fortified by Romans 

because the Continental and Provincial Congresses had dismissed him as of February 9, 1776. Smith would also 

propose a trace for Fort Montgomery). 

32~otesof debate, October 6, 1775, Ford, 3:485. 

HERE STOOD 


"THE FORT THAT NEVER WAS" 


Art courtesy Constitution Inland Association 

16 Engineer 
By General Carl E. Vuono 

Army Chief of Staff 

Throughout our long and proud national history, 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has played a 

unique and vital rolein both peace and war-in building and protecting this nation. From the construction of 

the nation's capital to the opening of the west, the 

Corps of Engineers has helped forge the very foundation upon which this nation rests. Throughout the land, 

countless bridges, waterways, monuments, and railroads serve as silent reminders of the timeless contributions of the Corps to the American people. 

U.S. Army combat engineers take a back seat to no 

one in valor and courage in battle. Engineers like 

Private Junior N. Van Noy, a 19-year old from Idaho 

and a posthumous winner of the Medal of Honor in 

New Guinea, have helped defend this nation with their 

sweat and with their blood for mre than two centuries. 

As proud heirs to this legacy, the engineers of 

today-along with the Army they serve-are poised 

on the brink of new challenges and new opportunities. In this article, Iwill discuss the Army's view 

of the future and my perspectives on how the Corps 

of Engineers must evolve to meet our national objectives in this decade and beyond. Finally, Iwill discuss 

the single most important quality that each engineer 

leader must have as we approach an era of great 

change. That quality is professionalism. 

The International Environment 

No discussion of the Army's future can begin 

without an examination of the evolving international environment-for that environment dictates the 

characteristics and qualities that the Army must have 

to fulfill its strategic obligations to the nation. It is no 

secret that the current international environment is in 

the throes of dramatic change, particularly in Europe 

and the Soviet Union. Over the course of the past 

year, we have witnessed events of profound significance, and we have seen the once monolithic 

Soviet empire begin to unravel. 

These are events that, first of all, demonstrate that 

our unrelenting defense of freedom has not been in 

vain. Put simply, democracy in Europe is winning, 

and the emerging triumph is due, in no small 

measure, to the selfless service of millions of 

American soldiers. These are the soldiers who have 

manned the ramparts of freedom along the Iron Curtain for four decades and who, supported by the 

other services and standing shoulder to shoulder with 

our NATO allies, have broken the back of Soviet 

aspirations in Europe. 

But the struggle is not yet over, and the victory is 

not yet won. In Europe we have yet to build a new 

and enduring security structure from the ashes of the 

old otder, and there remain many challenges that the 

free world must confront before we can pronounce 

that continent safe for democracy. Indeed, as we listen to the clamoring of many to cash in on the socalled "peace dividend," we must also remember the 

haunting words of Neville Chamberlain who, in 1938, 

pronounced that the world had achieved "peace in 

our time." As history records, less than a year later 

that same world was embroiled in the mightiest war 

in human experience-a global conflict that would 

consume whole nations and leave 50 million dead. 

Iam not suggesting that the Europe of 1990 is 

teetering on the brink of a world war. But the continent is clearly entering a period of great uncertainty 

and potential instability as newly emerging 

Engineer 17 
democracies and, indeed, the Soviet Union itself, 

struggle with the impact of cataclysmic change. This 

argues strongly that the United States, in conjunction 

with our NATO allies, must remain a bulwark of 

stability and an anchor of continuity as the winds of 

uncertainty howl through the continent. 

At the same time, we cannot ignore the emerging 

military power of nations in the developing world where 

regimes hostile to the United States are acquiring vast 

arsenals of tanks, artillery, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons. These capabilities join forces with 

regional animosities, ethnic conflicts, religious hatreds, 

and the lust for economic power to create a world simmering with the potential for violence and war. 

For those who would argue that warfare and conflict are relics of the past and that economic power 

now commands the international community, Iwould 

only point to the ongoing levels of violence that we 

see around the world-violence at a level that was 

demonstrated by the Iran-Iraq war and demands an 

effective ability by the United States to respond. 

In the international environment of today and tomorrow, it is a cold, hard reality that military force 

remains a primary instrument of national power. If we 

are to create a better, more peaceful world in the 

next century, we must recognize that such a world 

can emerge only if armed conflict becomes such a 

fruitless alternative that the community of nations has 

little choice but to resolve international disputes in a 

nonviolent fashion. This, in turn, demands a powerful 

United States Army to deter aggression and to 

defend America's interests wherever they are 

threatened. This is an inescapable requirement for 

this nation and the price of admission for a superpower in the decade of the 90s and beyond. 

The Corps of Engineers has a central part to play 

in the Army of the 1990s, for the Corps uniquely serves the nation across the entire spectrum of operations-from peacetime competition and nation assistance to international conflict and global war. 

Shaping the Force 

As we shape the Army and the Corps in a complex and demanding environment, we must 

keep our eyes firmly fixed on a simple vision of the future-a vision of a trained and ready Army today and 

tomorrow capable of meeting its strategic obligations 

anytime, anywhere. 

In fulfilling this vision, we begin from an enviable 

baseline. Put simply, the Army of today is the finest 

peacetime force this nation has ever fielded. It is an 

Army that is built on the solid foundation of six enduring imperatives-principles that serve as an anchor 

of continuity in an era of change and as a beacon to 

steer us into the next century. I have written and 

18 Engineer 

spoken extensively about these Imperatives, but they 

bear highlighting because of their central importance 

to the Army and to the Corps of Engineers. 

First, the Army must maintain an effective and 

evolving warfighting doctrine--eff ective for today and 

evolving for tomorrow. In the midst of extensive discussions of maneuver and fire support, it is no exaggeration to say that the success of our doctrine of AirLand Battle--and its tenets of agility, initiative, 

synchronization, and deptwepend upon our engineers. This is because engineers provide our 

maneuver elements with the capability to move quickly, to mass effectively, and to achieve overwhelming 

combat power at the critical point. Moreover, engineers are crucial in shaping the battlefield to deny 

the enemy freedom of movement, in enhancing the 

survivability of our forces, and in expanding the 

lethality of our battlefield systems. 

As our doctrine evolves into Airland Battle-Future, 

the role of the engineers will become even more important to the combined arms team. Engineers at all 

levels must understand the Army's doctrine and, 

equally important, be proficient in the tactics, techniques, and procedures that bring doctrine to life on 

the battlefield. 

Second, we must maintain a mix of forces--armored, light, and special operations-in our Active 

and Reserve Components. This force mix gives us 

the indispensable capability to tailor force packages 

that are appropriate to the threats we face. As an integral element of each of these forces, engineers 

must understand their unique capabilities and must 

be able to function effectively in force packages of 

diverse designs. Engineers from heavy units must be 

prepared to work alongside units from light elements, 

and all engineers must be capable of supporting the 

unique requirements of our special operations forces. 

Next, we must continue to modernize the force, 

even in the face of severe budgetary constraints. We 

modernize for a single purpose-to enhance our combat capabilities. Our modernization strategy is 

straightforward and effective. First, we will continue to 

modernize those systems in which we have a significant battlefield deficiency. The forthcoming fielding 

of the M9 Combat Earthmover, the VOLCANO multiple mine delivery system, and the Digital Topographic 

Support System will address pressing needs we have 

in each of these areas. Second, we will accept some 

near-term risk by deferring, delaying, or deleting other 

systems. Certainly, no leader likes to accept additional risk. But, if we must accept risk to meet the constraints of the budget, now is the time to do it. 

The more distant future, however, is far less certain. 

Accordingly, the last element in our modernization 

strategy is to continue to invest heavily in research and 

development, pushing back the frontiers of technology 
lenges, for you must work diligently to ensure that the engineers are fully integrated 

in training the combined arms team. 

Maneuver and fire support commanders 

must understand what the engineers can 

do and how to exploit your almost limitless 

potential to influence the outcome of battle. 

Every engineer must become a tireless 

proponent of mobility, countermobility, and 

survivability, always with your eye firmly 

fixed on the scheme of maneuver you are 

supporting. 

Engineers within our districts have equally daunting challenges in the training arena. 

You must maintain and build your technical 

skills while you are working on the tasks 

and projects that support our national infrastructure. 

Regardless of your training responsibilities, however, the principles of sound 

training remain the same. FM 25-100 outlines the Army's fundamental concepts for 

training. This year we have completed FM 

25-1 01, which provides "how to" instructions for the execution of the principles contained in FM 25-1 00. Together, these two 

manuals form a solid foundation upon 

which an effective training program can rest. 

As the Army's fifth imperative, we continue to develop competent, confident 

leaders with unmatched ability--officers Army engineers drill a well as part of our natlon assistance pro- and NCOs who are fully capable of leading gram. Englneer efforts In this program will become Increasingly Im- the Army to victory anywhere in the world. portant In the 1990s as we defend America's Interests abroad (U.S. In the Corps of Engineers you have special Army Photo). 

and seeking genuine "leap ahead" improvements in 

weapons systems beyond the year 2000. 

Engineers have a uniquely important role in the 

modernization process. Not only must engineers absorb and adopt new equipment themselves, they 

must also provide the facilities, the training simulators, and the support that make every other modernization plan work. 

The fourth imperative is our uncompromising commitment to tough, realistic training. Each of us must 

understand one of the iron lessons of history-the 

mote we sweat in peace, the less we will bleed in 

war. So every time you spend that extra hour planning training, every time you invest that extra effort in 

executing training, and every time you devote that 

extra energy to assessing training, you are investing 

in the security of this nation and protecting the lives 

of America's soldiers. As an Army, we must never 

back away from setting and enforcing the highest 

standards in training that we can possibly achieve. 

The Corps of Engineers faces unique training chalresponsibilities, for each of your leaders 

must be an integrator of combat power and must fully 

understand how to lead in the combined arms team. 

And equally challenging, our engineers must be particularly adept at dealing with civilians and community 

leaders around the world. You must understand their 

concerns and their desires as you fulfill your responsibilities in engineer districts throughout the United 

States and in nation-assistance operations in the far 

reaches of the globe. 

For engineers of all ranks, your model must be engineers like General Bill Hoge, after whom the headquarters building at Fort Leonard Wood is named. 

General Hoge cut his teeth as a professional engineer 

on the spines of the Canadian Rockies, building the 

AlCan Highway, which remains a marvel of engineering today. He led engineers in combat in two world 

wars and ultimately rose to command the IX Corps in 

Korea. He was a leader who understood not only the 

technical aspects of his trade but also the integration 

of combat power that is fundamental to victory. His is a 

proud legacy to which every engineer should aspire. 

Engineer 19 
The final imperative--last listed but first in importance-is to maintain a quality force. Throughout the 

ages it has been the quality of the soldier that has 

made the difference in battle and has determined the 

fate of nations. Quality is the very foundation of the 

entire Army and, indeed, of our national defense. 

And quality is particlilarly vital to the Corps of Engineers for, whether in the crucible of combat or in 

the building of nations, your work is of singular importance. By the very nature of your tasks, engineers 

are often required to work individually or in small 

groups with little supervision. This, of course, requires 

the highest quality soldier our nation can produce. 

We achieve that quality in the Army and in the Corps 

by establishing an environment that attracts young 

Americans into our ranks and encourages our 

veterans to remain. This must be an environment that 

fulfills each soldier's highest expectations for personal growth and professional achievement. 

These are the Army's six imperatives and the principles by which we must shape the Corps of Engineers for the future. Building on these imperatives, 

we have created an Army of unchallenged capability 

today. By sustaining these imperatives, we will maintain the Army that our nation needs in the challenging 

times ahead. 

Vision of the Army

As good as the Army is today, and as competent 

as the Corps of Engineers has shown itself 

today, we cannot stand still. In an era of historic 

change and unprecedented challenge, we must move 

Tomorrow's Army wlll 

depend on highly tralned 

engineers who are capable 

soldlers and experts In the 

art of war. Competence and 

the wllllngness to accept 

responslblllty are hallmarks 

of the professlonallsm demanded of soldlers now 

and In the future (U.S, Army 

photo). 

fotward aggressively to shape the Army to meet our 

national responsibilities and to respond to increasingly austere budgets. We must apply the lessons of the 

past and take command of our own destiny. For if we 

do not, someone else will. 

In forging the Army of tomorrow, we are guided by 

a single, clear commitment. We will not compromise, 

equivocate, or yield on the six imperatives. Even 

under the most Draconian budgetary constraints, we 

must never accept an Army that is undermanned, illequipped, or poorly trained-an Army that we allow 

to be fractured by the budget or one that will be 

neither credible for deterrence nor capable of defense. 

Our choices are clear. We can either maintain an 

artificial force structure at the expense of training and 

readiness, or we can build a smaller force in which 

our standards of training and readiness are not 

sacrificed. Although it is painful to take down the 

flags of proud divisions, that is the road we must take 

if we are to maintain the trained and ready Army that 

our nation will require in the tumultuous decade 

ahead. 

Accordingly, over the course of the next five years, 

we will carefully, deliberately, and gradually shape a 

smaller force, including a smaller Corps of Engineers. 

We will shape the force based on the Army's overall 

plan that we have developed and refined over the 

course of the past two years-a plan that has our 

strategic responsibilities as its foundation and takes 

into full account both the evolving international environment and the budget realities we confront. 

If we adhere to this plan, we will continue to have 


an Army that has the vital characteristics needed to 


20 Engineer 
support our nation's security. It will be an Army that is 

versatile in its ability to respond to crises, conflicts, and 

contingencies worldwide--from Central America to 

Europe; from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia. We 

will be an Army that is deployable--able to project significant land forces quickly to trouble spots around the 

world. And we will be an Army that is lethawetha1 to 

fight and win on any battlefield, against any enemy, 

anywhere our interests are threatened. 

The Corps of Engineers is central to each of these 

characteristics, for you provide the Army the indispensable ability to move throughout the length and 

breadth of the battlefield, to survive in an era of unprecedented destructiveness, and to dictate the 

shape of combat to an enemy. 

Professionalism 

he Corps of Engineers has a bright future as an 

integral component of the trained and ready 

Army and as a national asset of enormous value. For 

those of you who are facing uncertainty as we shape 

the Army for the future, Isay to you: Do not fear the 

night. The Corps of the 90s will be a challenging, exciting, rewarding place to be, and the engineers will 

always have room for quality men and women, in 

both the Active and Reserve Components. 

As you prepare yourselves to meet the challenges 

of this Army in a brave, new world, there is an overriding characteristic that each engineer must adopt as 

a personal creed. That characteristic is professionalis~nlya single word but a powerful concept that 

embraces all that you can be, all that you must be, 

and all that you shall be. I have written about professionalism in other fora, but 1 want to reiterate the components of this vital characteristic because they are 

of singular importance to the future of the Army and 

to the lives of each engineer. 

First, Army engineers must be competent in the 

profession of arms, expert in the art of war, and the 

most capable engineers this nation can produce. 

Competence is not an inherited trait; it grows from 

study, discipline, and plain hard work. Throughout 

your careers, you must continuously acquire expertise from our educational institutions, both military 

and civilian, from your operational assignments, and 

from your own independent efforts. 

This must be an ongoing process, for the world 

does not stand still. Onrushing technology, changes in 

doctrine, and the evolution of the challenges we confront demand that competence be built and sustained 

throughout an entire lifetime. And your competence 

must extend far beyond the confines of engineer tasks. 

In order to properly apply your expertise, you must be 

knowledgeable in every element of the combined arms 

team-you must understand the principles of 

maneuver, fire support, command and control, and 

every other battlefield operating system that is influenced by the work of the engineers. 

But competence alone is not enough. To be a 

professional, you must willingly embrace responsibility-responsibility for the performance of your unit 

and responsibility for every soldier with whom you 

serve. Engineers share a special responsibility to the 

rest of the combined arms team; you deal in tactics, 

techniques, and procedures that may not be fully understood by the units you support. You must persevere in the sure knowledge that your efforts may 

well determine the difference between victory and 

defeat and will certainly decide the fate of great numbers of soldiers. 

Finally, a professional must be committed to the 

profession of arms and to the nation. You must be 

willing to serve in the difficult assignments and in the 

isolated posts, and you must be prepared to give 

your life for the defense of the nation. It is this commitment that lends meaning to sacrifice, and it is this 

commitment that lends honor and humility to personal 

achievement. 

These qualities of competence, responsibility, and 

commitment make up the professional of today-a 

leader of rare distinction and an asset to be carefully 

nurtured throughout an entire lifetime. 

Conclusion 

perhaps at no time in our national memory does 

the Army offer such challenge and such opportunity. Our profession asks much of us, but that is not 

surprising, for ours is a special calling. We are 

entrusted with an awesome responsibility--the protection of a great nation and the defense of freedom 

worldwide. 

Engineers throughout the world should take enormous pride in the important contributions you are 

making to the preservation of the ideals upon which 

this nation was founded. To people all over the worldto those who have freedom and those who aspire to 

it-the American soldier is the embodiment in the 

ideals and principles of individual liberty for which the 

United States stands. And often the American soldier 

is represented by the young Army engineer helping to 

build a road, a school, or a bridge, and symbolizing for 

many the hope of a better life. 

You and Ihave a sacred obligation to our fellow soldiers, to the U.S., and to freedom everywhere. We can 

never relax our efforts to maintain a trained and ready 

Army and a Corps of Engineers second to none. I ask 

that every engineer in the Army now rededicate yourself to the spirit embodied in your motto as we confront 

the challenges of tomorrow: EssayonMet Us Try. No 

nation could ask for more. YI 

Engineer 21 
By Captain Jim Glass 

T	raining with mines and 

demolitions is dangerous. - It 

is also a necessary part of 

preparing engineers for combat. 

And the job of teaching soldiers 

these skills is tough enough 

without having to wrestle with 

the system to get the munitions 

you need for training. 

For the foreseeable future, the 

expected reduction in training 

funds will require leaders to make 

ingenious use of increasingly 

limited resources to produce combat ready engineers. The Standards in Training Commission 

(STRAC) provides some answers 

to these challenges. 

As a company commander in 

the 9th Infantry Division, I knew 

that the S-3 and S4 used STRAC 

to determine how much ammunition and munitions (Class V) I 

would receive in a given year. I 

even reviewed STRAC in the vain 

hope that I could increase the 

amount of ammunition my company would get. 

No such luck. 

The assistant S-3 who managed 

the 15th Engineer Battalion's ammunition account could only get 

the ammunition that was available at division. If there was a 

22 Engineer 
shortage of mines, for instance, 

then those precious munitions 

were divided equally among the 

companies. 

The only bright spot in this picture was the hope of a training 

bonus at the end of the year. If a 

fellow engineer or other combat 

arms unit had been too busy to use 

up its allocation--or had done a 

lousy job of planning its training 

schedule-I could often get my 

hands on the leftover Class V. 

What also helped sometimes was 

being able to get munitions 

through the maneuver units we 

were attached to during training. 

Often, they were able to provide 

most of the Class V we needed. 

One thing that STRAC does well 

for the average commander is to 

outline training strategies vital to 

the process of becoming an engineer. After becoming familiar 

with STRAC, I knew how many 

times a year to train mines, 

demolitions, and other weapons to 

be considered a qualified, competent engineer unit. I also knew 

the recommended ammunition requirement. Not only did I know 

this for engineers and engineer 

systems, but I also knew what my 

fellow combat arms units needed. 

Common Standards 

The STRAC program is managed at the Army Training ~u~po<~enter (ATE) at Fort 

Eustis. The program provides commanders and other unit trainers 

with a common set of standardsfor 

weapons and weapon systems 

qualifications. Suggested weapons 

training strategies outline the minimum attainment and wtainment 

standards needed to be a proficient One thing that STRAC 

engineer. These standards are does weN for the average measurable and will assist the commmder in evaluating a portion of commander is to outline 

his unit's overall training readiness. training strategies vital to 

The Engineer School (USAES) the process of becoming analyzes proponent training an engineer. 

strategies and munitions allocations for mines, demolitions, and 

the combat engineer vehicle 

(CEV). The Infantry School recommends the strategies to qualify 

with all small arms, anti-tank 

weapons, and claymore mines. 

The other proponent branch systems and weapons (e.g. howitzer, 

tank,etc.) do not directly apply to 

engineer units. 

The revised DA Pamphlet 350-


38, Standards in Weapons Dain- 


ing (STRAC), is scheduled for 


publication in October 1990. It 


Engineer 23 
has some new training strategies cause them to be rejected. The apand ammunition allocation recom- proved recommendations are then 

mendations that will change how submitted to ATSC for approval 

engineers train. and funding. 

It does not, however, completely The 1990STRAC revision chanresolve some issues that are still ges the training readiness condibeing debated in the engineer tions (TRC). These TRCs contain 

community and the Army. recommendations on how much 

The Engineer School conducts a Class V you get, and how many 

biannual Council of Colonels to times you must train to be conreview changes submitted in the sidered qualified. 

engineer arena. These recom- The Department of the Army asmended changes come from the signs TRCs on an annual basis. 

engineer community and other Factors considered in assigning 

branches of the Army that train TRCs are deployment times, conwith mines and demolitions. tingency missions, prepositioning of 

The Engineer School's Direc- materiel configured to unit sets 

torate of lkaining and Doctrine (POMCUS) fill, and home station 

(DOTD) coordinates requests for locations. In general, TRC "A" units 

changes, and facilitates the are those in the Active Army. TRC 

analysis to support justified re- "4"which replaces the old TRC "l3" 

quests. All requests, by the way, categov, will represent those units 

are considered justified unless in the light infantry divisions. TRC 

sound reasons are found that "C" covers the reserve units. 

b 


Latrlne 

Assembly lAmmol 


and 


maintenan- Down + 


I 


Rear flrlng llna Fomard flrlng flne 

.115m OOOm 

I I 

An Issue At Point 

nruring the on-going STRAC 

process, one of the issues 

coming under close scrutiny by the 

Engineer School and by the Army is 

live mine training. While DA has 

temporarily banned the use of live 

mines for training, the Engineer 

School advocates that engineer 

units must be allowed to use antitank mines in training. Such training should be conducted, according 

to the engineer community, based 

on a unit's mission essential task 

list (METL), a risk analysis by the 

chain of command, and the amount 

ofClassV available. 

The use of live mines to train the 

individual skills that support such 

tasks as installing a point 

minefield or conducting a hasty 

minefield breach will insure that 

engineer soldiers and leaders are 

Brldge 

400111 500m 600m mOm 

I I I I 

The new STRAC-approved CEV Table V Isscheduled to be Incorporated into the next revision of TC 5117, "Combat 

Engineer Vehlcle Operatlons."The expanded table will permlt multiple engagements and firing on the move. 

24 Engineer 
able to gain a firm appreciation for 

mine capabilities. Allowing a soldier to uncrate, arm and detonate 

the actual munitions will give that 

soldier more confidence in his 

ability to accomplish his wartime 

mission. 

The Engineer School maintains 

that there is no valid reason why 

engineer units, using proper 

safety procedures, should be 

denied the use of live anti-tank 

mines in training. The risks associated with live mine training 

are no greater than those associated with infantry "live battle 

runs" or combined arms live fire 

exercises (CALFEX). These exercises, like live mine training, require complex coordination and 

stringent safety procedures. 

History supports the Engineer 

School's position that live mine 

training is safe. Mine injuries in 

5Wm-800m 

nlghl llme only 

the recent past have been due to 

human error. Accidents happen 

when mine placement or mine 

arming/disarming procedures are 

not followed. 

Because of this, the Engineeer 

School is conducting a risk analysis 

of live mine training. The Engineer 

School is using a new method that 

has been developed by the United 

States Army Safety Center 

(USASC). USASC has provided assistance in this effort by sending 

safety experts to the Engineer 

School to take part in joint work 

sessions. The resulting proponent 

risk assessment is the prototype for 

other schools and posts. 

TRADOC and DA are currently 

reviewing the risk assessment, 

and initial feedback indicates they 

will support the Engineer School's 

initiative. 

Some have raised the concern 

that engineers will train with 

live mines in ways that create 

risk. One issue involves the risk 

of excessive arming and disarming of mines. This may have 

some foundation, especially with 

anti-personnel mines, such as 

the M14. Individual tasks like 

these will be trained using inert 

mines, as outlined in the STRAC 

regulation. 

However, mine systems that are 

unsafe in training should not be 

used in wartime either. The Army 

is working to eliminate faulty or 

dangerous mines. 

The Engineer School will recommend, in the final risk assessment, which mines can be trained 

"live," and how many times a live 

mine can be armed or disarmed 

before it is destroyed. These are 

artificial constraints placed on 

training, based on the availability 

of live mines. 

Another example of the Engineer 

School working with the STRAC 

system involves the use of live antihandling devices on inert training 

mines. The Engineer School is 

proposing that live devices, such as 

the MI, MI-A1, M3, M5 and M142, 

be trained with inert activators/- 

boosters. Units would also be allowed to use trip wires. 

In the event of error during assembly or disassembly, the 

flashmang would come only from 

the replaceable percussion cap inside the standard. The danger of 

minor injury is negligible and is 

offset by the valuable training experience for soldiers. 

The Army is developing one 

universal anti-handling device, the 

M142, which will ease training and 

stockage issues. Until all other 

stocks are depleted, however, the 

Army must continue to train on all 

types of anti-handling devices. 

Live mine training, including 

the use of live anti-handling 

devices, is intended to replicate 

wartime conditions. It is not intended, however, to replace inert 

training aids such as the place 

training mine (PTM) kits. Rather, 

inert training will prepare soldiers 

to train with live munitions. Inert 

training also provides reliable sustainment training. 

But there is no god substitution 

for hands-on live mine bining. 

S'I'RAC and the CEV 

Changes and additions are also 

being made to the combat engineer vehicle (CEV) gunnery pm 

&am under the revised STRAC. 

Until a future generation vehicle, 

such as the combat mobility vehicle 

(CMV), is fielded sometime near the 

turn of the century, the CEV will 

figure prominently in the future of 

all engineer operations. 

A new STRAGapproved CEV 

Table V, which significantly improves realism and training value, 

is scheduled to be incorporated into 

the next revision of TC 5-117, Combat Engineer Vehicle Opemtions. 

The old table uses static firing with 

single engagements, while the new 

table allows for multiple firing ad 

firing on the move. 

Another product of the STRAC 

program is the XM970, a 40 
millimeter (mm) subcaliber device 

that allows more CEV main gun 

firing. The device is scheduled to 

be fielded at Fort Leonard Wood 

this year and to other units in 

1991. While it doesn't duplicate 

the exact trajectory of regular 

practice rounds, the XM970, 

which is shaped like a regular 

165mm round, allows excellent 

realism for a subcaliberdevice. 

Other systems and training 

devices to be integrated into 

STRAC in the near future include 

the Volcano, a multiple-delivery 

mine system, the Modular Pack 

Mine System (MOPMS), and the 

Tactical Explosive System 

(TEXS). A complete list is in the 

USAES' Systems Handbook. The 

handbook, while not distributed 

Army-wide, is issued to all engineer officers attending their 

basic and advanced courses. 

Smart use of existing ammunition and judicious application of 

STRAC will result in training 

strategies that will produce qualified engineers. Become familiar 

with the STRAC system. If you 

thinkthere is a need for changes in 

the allocation of munitions or in 

the standards for training with 

them, let us know how you feel. 

The Engineer School has a good 

track record for getting the changes 

needed by line units. 

Remember, if you don't ask for 

changes,then someone will decide 

that what you already have is 

sufficient. w 

(Personal Viewpoint continued) port the battle en1 nt requ: joint 

COI , ..--_rnlll~aryservices and agencies, and U.S. 

foreign military commitments. 

The Corps can provide operational support through its tactical units, laborato 

works elements. 

I propose that the uurys of Engineers pursue a fully integrated 

environmental mission to formulate and coordinate policy, and to 

provide direction and oversight 

of battle environmental support 

and training to the Armrv, joint 

nmands, and ot 3 serles and agencic lneers 

~uldbe trained LU apply their 

litary engineering to nation 

sistance and battlefield en-

'onments on a firm foundation 

military geography.To do this, 

mopose that the Engineer 

hool set the example for 

LADOC and internate mjl:+--r 

vironme 

irement 

nmands 

s of tht 

. other 

3 Army, 

-111L--. commonly used basis in the organization of a command. The 

geographic area determines the 

size and nature of assigned forces, and the extent of authority 

exercised by the commander so 

that he may implement strategic 

plans and guidance. The impact 

of military geography influences 

the doctrine, organization, 

materiel, training, and logistics 

requirements of the forces and 

the feasibility of different military courses of action. 

The Army I 

responsible for 

related discipllrles {Lopograpn 

hydrology, and envir~ 

sciences) and military 

tion and related nation a 

Engineersimpose their support c 

the battlefield and dictate its el 

vironment before, during, an 

after combat. Engineer 

tion of the battlefield I 

overcomes the terrain 

tural developments. 

We engineers must use tl 

broad scope of military geograpl 

in battlefield planning and exec1 

tion because we will be called upon 

to restore the environmental infrastructure after the battle. For 

military engineers, the study 

military geography must becon 

as much a part of our profession 

development as tactical support, 

engineering design, and project 

management. We must anticipate 

the where of the battlefield, ara 

why its environmental characb 

has relevance to the support v 

give. Engineer terrain experti, 

must evolve to military geograpl 

expertise in order to execute 01 

geographically diverse endnee 

ing missions. These 

range from nation ass 

the Americas to combac suppa 

and sustainment of thc 

Army force in south we^ 

As the nation's eng 

Corps of Engineers has an c 

ganizational structure to su 

ries, an( 

A r( A,," 

1 civil 

nakes c 

* enviro~ 

1--- /Irs COI 

Ly vic 

Y, she 

onmentr 

constru 

~ssistanc 

a1 mi 

c- as! 

e. vir 

II 

ylc;pal, 

dters ar 

and cu 

m- LA, 

td gec 

11- at 

NC 

rubax j 

uction 

,anted 

VZraphy 

the basil y n --A -

into or 

c officer 

.E---1-

-

lr instri 

and adv 

JV UllU ulllver It: vels. . .. 

Rell, that's my opinion.What do 

u think? The ENGINEER 

ofessional Bulletin and I welle 1 

Y YO' 

u- Prc 

me you1 

ulum sur 

commf 

ggestionr 

mts anc 

5. 

C01 

ric 

ert I? 

epartrineer-

.- -- - --

eutenant Colonel Rob 

rby is the director, DI 

!nt of Topographic Eng 

ang, U.S. Army Eng 

School. Previous assign; 

include terrain intelligen 

firer, 517th Engineer D( 

?nt, Vit 

Impany 

tttalion 

zneer 

ments 

Lce ofofn~h- UIVUrIrnder, 

rineer 

comCaptain Glass serves as chief,Collective Training Branch, Directorate of Daining and Doctrine, 

U.S.Army Engineer School. Previous assignments include platoon 

leader for the 2d ACR, company 

commander of B Co, 15th Engineer Bn (CBT), and as the assistant division engineer of the 9th 

Infantry Division (MTZ). He is a 

graduate of Combined Arms and 

Services Staff School and has a 

bachelor's degree from Mankato 

State University, Minnesota. 

comma 

th Eng 

tnam: 

znder, . 

lion (Tc I .~~~--

29th ~n~ineer Batpographic), Hawaii; 

.a ropographic programs ofer, Offic 

Staff 

?partmc 

:e of A! 

for . 

~ntof 

rsistant 

lntellie 

Army. 

Chief 

rence, 

LTC 

e stratef 

it Asia. 

ineer, tl -- -- -

rby holds a ml 

geodetic scien 

be University 

aduate of the Army War - -

aster's c 

.ce from 

and 

degree 

L Puris a ---

26 Engineer 
High-Risk Traininat4 

By Major Randolph L. Hessrnan 

The operation started smoothly and according to 

1 1 plan. An engineer platoon was conducting night 

rafting operations in fast-moving water. A bridge 

truck, loaded with a bridge erection boat, backed 

onto a riverside ramp and parked. The operator put 

chock blocks in back of the front wheels and set the 

electric (hydraulic) brake switch. Then he climbed 

into the boat to prepare it for launching. 

Because the truck operator was not on the water 

and was not yet involved in watercrossing operations, 

he did not wear a personal flotation device (PFD). He 

coukl not swim and was, in fact, afraid of water. 

When the soldier moved to the stern of the boat to 

check a bilge drain plug, the vehicle began to roll. 

Neither the brake nor the chock blocks held the truck, 

and R rolled into the water with the boat still sewred. 

Within moments, the force of the water turned the 

vehicle downstream and broke the port bow tiedown. 

The boat capsized, and the sinking truck dragged it 

to the river bottom. 

The soldier panicked when he fell into the swiftly 

moving current. Within seconds a strong undertow 

pulled him beneath the water, and despite rescue attempts, he never resurfaced. 

Analysis

An analysis of this accident determined that 

several factors contributed to it. 

bA critical factor was the lack of a PFD on a nonswimmer-a nonswimmer who was afraid of water 

despite completion of two drownproofing courses. 

,The electric (hydraulic) brake was disconnected 

at the time of the accident. The operator did not 

know this-he pressed the switch and thought the 

brakes were engaged and holding. Because it positively holds the bridge truck in position during launching and retrieval operations, the brake lock is an important part of the safety system. 

bThe parking brake was not set. Current Department of Army publications are contradictory about the 

necessity of this requirement. Only the operator's 

manual for the bridge transporter (TM 5-5420-209-12) 

requires the use of both brakes. 

bThe chock block placed behind the front wheels 

could not hold the vehicle on the inclined ramp, partitularly when the soldier moved around in the stem 

of the boat. His movements lightened the load on the 

front wheels. In addition, the chock block was positioned before the electric brake was applied, giving 

the false impression that the brake was working. 

Although fast-water tralnlng Is dangerous, personal floatation devlces (PFD) can reduce the severity of accldents. PFDs are requlred any tlme soldiers (swimmers 

and nonswimmers) work over water. 

Engineer 27 
Lessons Learned 

(Ceveral lessons learned from this accident may 

%'help prevent similar ones in the future. 

I, ~nsure'allsoldiers put on their PFDs before climbing into a bridge boat that is either on, over, or near 

the water. It is especially critical that nonswimmers 

wear PFDs whenever they are around water hazards. 

b Designate a PFD control area around all water 

operation sites, and require that PFDs be worn while 

personnel are in this zone. 

b Engage both the electric (hydraulic) and the parking 

brakes during boat preparation, launching, and retrieval 

ramp operations. Upcoming changes in technical 

manuals (TM) will reflect this requirement. In the future, 

TMs and soldier training products (STP) will describe 

the electric (hydraulic) brake as the 'brake lock." 

)Do not use chock blocks during launch or 

retrieval operations. 

b Ensure that a qualified operator is in the vehicle 

cab at all times when the truck is parked on an inclined ramp and during launcNretrieva1 operations. 

b Check the brake lock (electric [hydraulic] brake) 

during pre-operation PMCS. Upcoming changes in 

TMs will add this check. 

b Designate lifeguards, train them to Red Cross 

standards, and provide them with rescue equipment. 

Post a lifeguard with rescue equipment downstream 

immediately upon arrival on site. Ensure a lifeguard 

is on the first boat (safety boat) launched. 

b Develop and rehearse emergency water rescue 

drills. Contact the Engineer Branch Safety Office for assistance (AV 676-520015002 or (314) 563-520015002). 

b Do not expect nonswimmers to help themselves 

when they enter the water. They panic--even those 

wearing PFDs. Visually identify nonswimmers with 

white arm bands, reflective armbands, or chemlites 

(as visibility conditions dictate). They allow the 

28 Engineer 

The safety boat should be 

the flrst craft launched 

durlng a brldglng operatlon. 

A tralned lifeguard should 

remain onboard thls boat 

untll all tralnlng Is wmpleted (U.S. Army photo). 

lifeguard and chain of command to keep track of 

these soldiers at all times and enable rescuers to find 

and retrieve them quickly. 

b Remember, nonswimmers panic. They may not 

yell for help. They may not hold onto a flotation 

device, and they may attack rescuers. Nonswimmers 

may have trouble keeping their heads out of the 

water even when wearing PFDs. The chain of command should consider these individuals' special 

needs when conducting water operations. 

b Reduce the risks associated with fast-water training at night by: 

-	 Verifying equipment operability 

-	 Demonstrating soldier training competency in 

lighted, calm water conditions 

-	 Ensuring soldiers are in optimum condition (rest, 

morale, and training) 

-	 Rehearsing rescue operations 

A leaf floating calmly on the surface of a river does 

not reflect the tons of water force that strike a boat or 

bridge bay when it enters fast-rnoving water. Swift currents, cold water temperatures, and strong undertows 

can quickly overcome even the strongest swimmers. 

Out-of-control boats, bridge bays, or soldiers will be 

swept downstream and will smash into, through, or 

under obstacles in their path. 

Fast-water river crossings are hazardous, high-risk 

operations that are critical to the Army's success in 

battle. Leaders contribute to the success of the entire 

mission or battle when they take measures to stop 

water-crossing accidents. 

Major Hessman is the Combat Engineer Military Systems Safety Manager at the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker. 
and arkivy"C For 

By Sergeant First Class Bruce Rider 

I

n combat, when units lose the ability to conduct 

a breach using mine clearing line charges 

(MICLICs) or mechanical means, forward momentum doesn't have to stop. Both engineer and infantry squads should be trained and resourced to 

hand-breach and mark minefields and wire 

obstacles. 

The first unit to reach an obstacle must be able 

to create a breach wide enough to allow assaulting 

forces to pass through. The lanes must be clearly 

marked so units do not become disoriented and 

lose valuable time. 

Too often though, maneuver units wait for engineers to clear an obstacle, or engineer squads 

are short of breaching and marking materials. 

What I recommend here is a breaching and 

marking materials list for infantry and engineer 

squads. I've based this article on my own experience at the National Training Center (NTC), 

and on published engineer battle drills. 

Before we discuss breaching, we must identify 

the type of obstacles we are preparing to breach. 

The NTC Opposing Force (OPFOR) emplaces surface-laid anti-tank minefields with three to four 

rows. The distance between mines is 4 to 6 meters 

and rows are 20 to 40 meters apart. Thus the 

minefield could have a depth of up to 120 meters. 

The normal density is 550 to 750 mines per kilometer of front. Minefields supporting a fire sack 

(kill zone) normally have a wire fence on the 

enemy side, while flank protection obstacles 

generally do not. 

What is the goal of a maneuver unit when it approaches a minefield? Obviously, the unit would 

prefer to bypass the obstacle, but that is a 

decision to be made by the unit commander. 

When a unit bypasses a minefield, both the 

obstacle and the bypass route must be marked so 

that follow-on units are not delayed. 

If bypassing is not feasible and the obstacle 

must be breached, FM 5-101, Mobility,states that 

the initial lane must be at least 4 meters wide to 

accommodate advancing vehicles. Even better is 

an 8-meter lane, which, given sufficient time, can 

be developed from an initial 4-meter lane. 

At the NTC, an 8-meter initial lane is 

preferred. The larger lane provides a greater margin of safety, and there simply isn't enough time 

to come back and expand smaller lanes. After the 

lane is cleared, it must be marked to ensure the 

safe and swift movement of vehicles through the 

obstacle. Again, FM 5-101 calls for units to mark 

lanes with whatever resources are available. 

Markers must show the beginning and end of the 

lane, along with the side limits. Markings should 

be at least 1foot inside the mine-free area to provide a safety margin. 

There are three methods of breaching conventional mined areas: mechanical, explosive and 

manual. I will discuss only the manual breach 

method, using explosives. It requires minimal 

equipment, and is not as risky or time consuming 

Engineer 29 
as using grappling hooks, A-frames, or removing 

mines by hand. 

The primary techniques employed at the NTC 

are the use of detonating cord ring mains, line 

mains, or the "pop and drop" method. All of these 

techniques involve placing a 1-pound block of TNT 

next to each enemy mine. 

The probability of enemy mine detonation is 

best with ring main, diminishes somewhat with 

line mains, and is lowest with the pop and drop 

method. However, the chances of success come at 

the price of increased material requirements and 

breaching times. 

A breaching kit for the line main method requires at least 150 meters of detonating cord. The 

line main consists of identical lengths of detonating cord, taped together every 18 inches to keep 

the cords from separating. 

To prepare the cord, place an overhand knot at 

the end of the line main on which you intend to 

place the initiating system. Cut 5-meter-long 

branch lines and tape the ends to prevent moisture from entering the det cord. Use these branch 

lines to prime the individual blocks of TNT. The 

linemain should be electrically primed for command detonation, with a backup non-electric 

system. 

To carry the line main, roll it back on the reel 

in which the det cord was delivered, oruse the 

DR-8 and reeling machine you use for blasting 

wire. Before packing them away, prime each of 

the TNT charges with det cord. Wrap the cord 

around each block to prevent it from becoming 

entangled. 

The ring main is prepared much like the line 

main. Prepare the TNT charges the same way. 

Keep the det cord on the shipping roll. After arriving on site, lay out the cord and cut it to the 

length you need. This will prevent kinks from getting in the line. As with the line main, use an 

electric initiating system so it can be commanddetonated, and a non-electric system as a back-up. 

The favorite method of emplacement at the 

NTC is the pop and drop. The pop and drop is not 

recommended by the Engineer School because of 

safety concerns and its somewhat diminished effectiveness. While this method is very dangerous, it 

is faster than forming a ring or line main, 

and can be extremely useful in critical tactical 

situations. 

To make pop and drop (or individual assault) 

charges, the TNT should be primed with a nonelectric cap, 2.5-3 minutes of time fuse, and an 

M60 fuse ignitor. The time fuse should be 

wrapped or taped around the TNT to prevent the 

time fuses from getting tangled together. (Author's 

Note: Although beyond the scope of this article, an 

excellent reference for the organization and execution of the pop and drop drill is Supper Techniques 

11, dated August 1988, and published by the Engineer School). 

With an OPFOR minefield density of 0.75 mines 

per meter of front, the average number of mines 

in an 8-meter-wide path is six, with a maximum 

of eight. 

A carrier for eight charges can be made from an 

M25A1 protective mask carrier, or an M18A1 

claymore mine bag. 

A basic squad-sized demolition kit for manual 

breaching of surface-laid minefields should consist 

30 Engineer 
of the following: 

50 1-pound blocks of TNT 


9 11000-foot roll of det cord 


9 100 feet of time fuse 


20 fuse ignitors 


5 electric caps 


9 	20 non-electric caps 

20 fise adaptors 

2 M18A1 claymore mine bags or M26A1 mask 

carriers 

2 DR-8 reels with reeling machine and 

detonating wire 

1M35 blasting machine 

2 crimpers 

2 pliers with side cutters 

9 	1roll of electrical tape 


1roll of cloth tape 


This package will allow at least two breaches 

using any of the three methods. 

To provide the signature of a deliberately laid 

minefield, the OPFOR places either single or 

double concertina on their side of the minefield. 

If you need to cut this wire, use grappling hooks 

to shake the wire first to check for booby traps. 

The NTC OPFOR has become particularly adept 

at using grappling hooks. They will attach 25 feet 

of 1/8-inch wire cable, 1-inch-diameter rope, or 

Ul6-inch-diameter chain to their grappling hooks, 

and attach the other end to their vehicles. The 

hooks are thrown over the wire, and the vehicles 

pull it away from the breach site. 

This method of breaching will normally take 

from 30 seconds to 1minute. Since there is always 

the chance that wire obstacles may be booby 

trapped, additional tools are needed to facilitate 

breaching. Each squad should carry: 

1pair of bolt cutters 

2 wire cutters 

2 grappling hooks 

100 meters of Marline or parachute cord 

Terrain is a major factor in deciding which kind 

of lane marking system to use. It's essential to 

have a system that can be easily identified by the 

assaulting and follow-on forces. I will explain the 

types of marking systems that have been effectively employed by units during their training rotations at the NTC. 

Tripod with VS17 Panel. The tripod (Figure 

1)is formed by bolting three long, U-shaped pickets together. The pickets are spread apart to form 

a tripod base, with the bolted end at the top and 

one leg facing the friendly forces. Attach the VS17 

panel to the top and bottom of the leg on the 

friendly side of the tripod. To mark the lane, place 

the tripod on either side of the entrance and exit 

of the breached lane. This system is good on flat 

or raised terrain. 

Engineer tape or Hand Emplaced Mine 

Marking System (HEMMS) marking tape. 

Tape is good for marking the limits of the 

breached lane. The most effective technique is to 

use multiple strips to delineate the right side from 

the left. Use two strips of tape on the right side, 

and one on the left. The tape should be attached 

to the entrance and exit markers at waist height. 

Nine-foot pole with 2x2 yellow marking 

flag. The pole is constructed using three - camouflage net poles, with a 2 foot by 2 foot 

yellow marking flag attached at the top. To 

support the pole, a 4-foot metal rod (a generator grounding rod is recommended) is driven 

into the ground about 2 feet. The poles are 

placed over the top of the rod. Any flag larger 

than 2 feet by 2 feet will cause excessive 

strain on the anchoring rod, causing it to 

bend in windy conditions. One unit put this 

setup to good use by grouping three poles, 

. 100 to 200 meters from their breach. This 

provided a larger visual signature for ap- 

.. proaching units. This system is good for rolling terrain and brushy areas. 

Pyrotechnics. Colored smoke at the 

entrance andfor a colored star cluster can be 

used to tell the unit the breach has been completed. Because pyrotechnics dissipate 

% 

Figure 1 

Engineer 31 
quickly, it's necessary to keep firing these until all 

units are through the breach. 

I recommend that a combination of these marking systems be used (Figure 2). To initially mark 

the breach, place the tripods with the VS17 panels 

at the entrance and exit. Pop a colored smoke 

grenade to mark the entrance. This will allow the 

assault force to move through the breach. The 

squad should continue to improve the lane by 

marking its limits with engineer tape. The flag 

poles should be placed 100 to 200 meters from the 

entrance to the lane. Star clusters should then be 

fired to direct units to the area of the breach. 

Colored smoke should then be continuously 

employed to mark the lane entrance. 

Night and limited-visibility conditions present 

unique problems in identifying the lane. The 

tripod system can still be used, but a visible light 

source is needed to attract vehicles at night. 

Chemlights or flashlights. The entrance and 

exit should be marked using a color code. The 

entrance should be marked on both sides with 

green lights, and the exit with blue. This will 

reduce any confusion as units approach the 

breach. Remember, chemlights fade over time and 

are designed for varying durations. With night 

Trlpod w& 


panel 


9' Poles wI2' x 2' 

yellow flags 

txx:: 

;I7panel 

Blue, green, red light 

Englneertap,.'. 

Figure 3 

32 Engineer 
-- - 

- --- 

visibility at 60 percent or less, the lights can be 

seen up to 1 kilometer (km) away. A flashlight 

retains its brightness for up to 8 hours, and can 

be seen for 1to 3 km depending on the terrain. 

Both chemlights and flashlights can be used as 

directional signals that cannot be seen from the 

enemy side. Remember, colors cannot be distinguished when wearing night vision goggles. A possible solution for this is to use multiple lights on 

the right side, and only one on the left. 

Road fires. These flares last 20 minutes or 

longer, depending on the length of the flare. Because of its very bright, omnidirectional light, 

these flares work best during smoke operations or 

fog. Otherwise, they tend to expose vehicles to 

enemy fire at night. 

For low-visibility situations, the best arrangement is to combine the flashlights with the tripod 

marking system (Figure 3 on page 32). Once a 

lane has been marked with the tripods, place blue 

or green tinted flashlights to mark it. At the 

entrance, place additional tripods 20 meters to the 

side of the lane on the minefield side, and mark 

2 ne BNGINEER Writer's Guide 

We think engineers take a special pride in 

their profession, and ENGINEER is always looking for articles from readers who want to share 

their expertise, experience and ideas. 

- If you're a potential contributing writer, hfivn 11C.l C

are a few ' "WTiterls guide" tips thai ;should help 

steer you in the r ight dire !ction: 

" -,.-,.. .-A- &en:. 

-, * 

tions or cloctrine, r equipm.ent, hist ory, or 

olther are as of ger west to rm enginreer -- >---x: reauersn~ip. 

We're especially interested in articles th at 

have a "how-to-do-it-better" theme. For ins itance, 

we're not looking for articles telling reader ,s how - .- you conducted a routine field exerr cise. ' But ' if you

think yoc L have a Unew-and-impro\ red" way of concLucting aI tactical operation, traini ng exerc ise, or .LL----- --- - - ---- L-1- 0~11ar~~arational procedure that n~ay 
 prove rleluful to other engineerethat's what we nee 


Articles should generally come from con 


tributors with first-hand experience with t 


ject being presented. 


Avoid theatrical writing styles like: "It vvas a 

dark and stormy night ...," or "...the soldier blazed 

tbrough 1the jmgl le on hi$ lumbering D7, p 

ing a tra: il of freec dom for 1the other vehicle! 

Article!s should . be conc: ise, straightforwr 

L le active voice. 

1 should range bc 1,000 and 1 4,000 

I ~d the text shoul 3written and 

these with a red flashlight. Mark the lane with 

two strips of engineer tape on the right, and 1 

strip on the left. Smoke can obscure the lane, so 

also consider using a colored star cluster to mark 

the breach site. 

The materials and techniques covered here 

should allow any engineer or infantry squad to 

breach and mark minefields and obstacles. The 

use of rehearsals for units from squad level 

through task force will ensure that a unit will be 

able to make a successful breach. 

Even without MICLICs or mechanical clearing 

assistance, a well-trained squad should be able to 

clear the way and allow assaulting forces to maintain the momentum of the attack. WI 

Sergeant First Class Rider is the engineer individual skills trainer for the 177th Armored 

Brigade (OPFOR) at the National Training Center. 

He has served as the brigade's operations NCO, 

and as a platoon sergeant in 42 maneuver training 

rotations at Fort Irwin. 

double-spaced. Generally, each such page will contain from 200 to 250 words. 

Articles containing attributable information or 

quotations not referenced within the story should 

carry appropriate footnotes. 

Mrtnuscripi;s must 1>e origin, al, unpublished, 

and r lot mde~ r conside !ration b: y another publica- .------ -- -..L tion. Normally, you call exyecr, a reply to your 

;submission within two weeks after we receive it. 

All submissions are subject to editing. 

Contributors are encouraged to include blackand-white photos, artwork, andfor line diagrams 

to help illustrate your article. 

Include your full name, rank, current unit and 

job title. Also include a list of your past assignments, experience and education, your mailing 

addn~ss,and 1daytime phone number-preferably 0-- AU~OVUII. ner~dyour articles to: Editor, ENGINEER Professional Bulletin, ATTN: A!l'SETDM-PB, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6650. 

If-A 
 you have any questions about an article 

you'r1e working on--or considering wrii 'e 

our fceatures editor, Phil Howell, a call 

Aqx+,.. -~,."von 676-7532, or commercial (314) 563-7532. 


We look forward to hearing from yo1 


S. ENGINEER is planning to start a Letto the Editor column soon, and corondence fkom our readers is welcome. 

Engineer 33 
-- - 

ission training plans Lr . 
 (MTPs) can makes-


your life a lot easier, -


~articularlv " if " vou're *L=-'--&


an engineer unit leader. 

How many times have you had 

the experience of trying to fill out 

your unit's training schedule, and fully train on 

you just can't think of anything collective tasks. 

new or interesting to put on it? Both the "ARTEP MTP" name and dusted off, and grudgingly used 

The operations sergeant wanted it format are new. In 1989, the En- for a couple of weeks. 

yesterday, he's already called gineer School published the first In the past, companies spent 

MTPs for the combat engineer bat- valuable time conducting "ARTEP twice today, and the only thing talion, company and platoon, and train-up" exercises on those things you've got on the form so far is PT for the airborne/light/air assault that the Mission Essential Task at 0600 every morning. List (METL) said you needed to You're lost for ideas. Your unit combat engineer battalion, comseems to be in a rut, training on pany and platoon. The chart on know to succeed in your wartime 

the same events every three page 35 shows the manuals al- mission. Then you deployed to the 

months or so. It seems the only ready published, and those field, with ARTEP evaluators hot 

place to find ideas is a stack of old scheduled to be published in FY91 on your heels for the duration. 

lesson plans. and FY92. Your company and battalion "did 

Maybe it's time for the aspirin. The MTP manuals were pre- their thing," and got an "attaboy" 

Or maybe you can use an MTP for viously referred to as Army from the battalion commander. 

assistance in conducting your Training and Evaluation Pro- Another year and another 

training program. gram (ARTEP) manuals. They ARTEP exercise successfully comwere bulky and cumbersome to pleted, according to your 

use. Unit trainers seldom used evaluators (whose battalion you 

Out With The Old them, except when it came time are scheduled to evaluate next 

for the battalion's annual month). But did your unit really 

MTPs are manuals which assist ARTEP exercise. Then they were get any good training from the 

soldiers and leaders in line units dug out from the bookshelf, exercise? 

34 Engineer By Captain Robert C.Kurtz 
Headquarters and Headqua 

Heavy DivisionlCorps 

5-145-11-MTP 

5-025-31 -MTP 

5025-11 MTP 

Combat Engineer Platoon, Heavy DivisionlCorpslArmored 

Cavalry Regiment 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combat Engineer Battalion 

(AirbornelLightlAir AssaultlMotorized Division and Airborne Corps) 

Combat Engineer Company, (AirbornelLighVAir AssaulVMotorized 

Division and Airborne Corps) 

Combat Engineer Platoon, (AirbornelLightlAir AssaulVMotorized 

Division and Airborne Corps) 

Oct 89 

5-1 45-32-MTP 

5-145-1 2-MTP 

Engineer Bridge Company 

Engineer Bridge Platoon 

5-415-31-MTP 

5-415-13-MTP 

541 5-14-MTP 

5-41 5-15-MTP 

5-415-1 7-MTP 

Engineer Company, Engineer Battalion (CBT) (HVY) 

Construction Equipment Platoons, Engineer Battalion (CBT) (HVY) 

Maintenance Platoon, Engineer Battalion (CBT) (HVY) 

Equipment Support Platoon, Engineer Battalion (CBT) (HVY) 

Construction Platoon, Engineer Battalion (CBT) (HVY) 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Battalion (CBT) 

5-605-31-MTP 

5-605-1 1 -MTP 

Engineer Company, Engineer Battalion (TOPO) 

Engineer Platoon (TOPO) 

Engineer 35 
HEADQUARTERS. 

DEPARTMENT 

THE 

OF 

AAMY ARTEP 5-025-MTP

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 


COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION 


OCTOBER 1989 

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unl~rn~ted 

The old ARTEP manuals had 

other problems as well. The 

training standards for the tasks 

were long and tedious to read. 

The manuals were hard to use 

and understand, which made the 

training process unnecessarily 

difficult. 

Better Guidance 

The new ARTEP MTPs don't 

have these problems. The MTP is 

a lot more user friendly than the 

old ARTEP manuals. Their purpose, as the preface in each MTP 

states, is "to provide a descriptive, 

mission-oriented training program to be used as a guide to train 

the unit to perform its critical wartime missions." The MTP provides 

better guidance for leaders on how 

to successfully complete a meaningful ARTEP exercise at platoon, 

company or battalion level. 

Training and evaluation outlines (T&EO) make up the vast 

majority of each MTP. They are 

the outlines of the collective tasks 

which have been deemed critical 

for your particular type of unit. 

These collective tasks were compiled from comments from the 

field, and by executive committees 

convened at the Engineer School. 

Each T&EO has a number to 

distinguish it from other branches 

and from other T&EOs within 

each branch. The first number 

identifies the branch that is the 

proponent for that collective task. 

Engineer collective tasks begin 

with number 5. The second number stands for the unit level at 

which this task is performed and 

evaluated. Number 1 is for battalion, 2 for company, 3 for 

platoon, 4 for squad, and 5 for 

tearnJsection. The last four numbers represent the unique collective tasks. 

The T&EO explains exactly, 

step by step, what you need to successfully train your unit on a given 

task. Many junior leaders have 

had to write an outline for each 

training event, and then determine the training, resources and 

time required to support it. Well, 

the MTP takes care of all that for 

you. 

In each T&EO, the element, 

task, condition and task standards 

are identified for each collective 

task. After the task standards, the 

T&EO lists all the steps required 

to successfully complete that collective task. It is nothing more 

than a lesson plan on how to teach 

and train that task-all laid out 

for you in an easy-to-follow 

format. 

At the end of each TdEO, there 

are two items that will greatly assist trainers: individual task references, and opposing force 

(OPFOR) tasks/conditions/standards. Listed here are the individual soldier and officer tasks 

that support the T&EO. This feature allows trainers to go directly 

to the Soldier Training Publication 

(STP), and the Military Qualification Skill (MQS) Manual, to find 

the individual task steps which 

support the collective task. The 

OPFOR tasks/conditions/standards allow trainers to put their 

unit against an OPFOR element to 

36 Engineer 
form that collective task under 

pressure. 

The new MTPs also have 

sample situation training exercises (STX), which are a collection 

of T&EOs wrapped into a field 

training exercise. An STX is a 

platoon- or company-level exercise 

that lasts up to 72 hours. The 

sample STX provided in the MTP 

is set and ready to go and includes 

such things as a proposed time 

line and suggested resource requirements. The STX can be used 

as is, or modified by unit trainers 

as they see fit. 

Getting Better All The Time 

Future MTPs will contain 

several innovations which will 

make them even more useful 

training aids to the leader in the 

field. The addition of OPFOR 

tasks/conditions/standards will 

allow units to more fully test their 

ability to perform combat missions. Additional emphasis on integrating nuclear, biological and 

chemical (NBC) skills into training, and a more extensive individual soldier task list at the 

bottom of T&EOs should further 

increase the usefulness of MTPs. 

In early N91, the Engineer 

School will publish a drill book 

which lists all drills a combat engineer, an engineer vehicle crewman, or a bridge crewman might 

use. A drill is a critical action a 

small unit conducts as part of a 

collective task. The drill manual 

will be pocket-sized, which should 

make it easier for the average soldier to use. The Infantry School 

also publishes a drill book that 

provides engineer soldiers with 

valuable information on basic 

combat skills. 

The MTP should prove to be a 

valuable tool for engineers. It is 

one way to train--but it's not the 

only way. It is a foundation that 

must be modified for each engineer unit, based on the 

commander's mission essential 

task list (METL) and that age-old 

acronym, METT-T (mission, 

enemy, troops, terrain and time). 

The Engineer School plans to 

revise and re-issue MTPs every 

five years, or earlier if warranted. 

Questions or comments concerning MTPs can be mailed to Commandant, U.S.Army Engineer 

School, A'ITN: ATSE-TDU-C, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO 65473, or by 

calling the Collective Training 

Branch at Autovon 676-778417706 

or commercial (314) 563-

77847786. ka 

Captain Kurtz is' a training 

analyst with the Collective 

Training Branch, Directorate 

of Training and Doctrine, U.S. 

Army Engineer School. He previously served as a platoon 

leader, mobility lcountermobility platoon leader, company executive officer, and assistant S-3 for the 16th 

Engineer Battalion. He is a 

graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course. He 

holds a bachelor's degree in 

civil engineering from Purdue 

University, and a master's degree in civil engineering from 

New Mexico State University. 

Engineer Problem 


Your platoon has been tasked to emplace a 500 

meter (m) row minefield with a density of 0.75-0-0.You 

have decided to space the mines 6 m apart. Determine 

the number of MI5 mines to order and the number of 

5-ton dump trucks required to deliber the crated 

mines. 

I I
 Reference:FM 20-32 

I Engineer Solution on page 44. 

Engii 
jron Anlmak For Engineers T 

By Captain John H. Breidenstine, Jr. 

ell, you've seen your en- Now you can hear the roar of resembles a giant toy jack. Used 

Wgineer company put up a the lead vehicles of the infantry by the 130th Engineer Brigade 

vast array of training obstacles task force as it edges through the strictly as a training aid during 

during this particular ARTEP, pass-and right through one of maneuver exercises, the hedgehog 

and you're proud of what your your "minefields." There are no has proven its worth in adding a 

soldiers have done. The "enemy" umpires to be found anywhere, significant amount of realism to 

advance is expected any time and the enemy charges on to out- engineer field training. 

now, and you're in a vantage flank your own task force. The hedgehog is a relatively 

point to watch them try to make Ever wish you had something a simple design that consists of 

it through a particularly critical little more substantial to put in three pieces of 2-meter-long angle 

mountain pass. You and your the way of the opposing force iron, and is assembled with bolts. 

men have put a day and a half of during field exercises? Assembly consists of spreading 

work into carefully covering the The answer may lie in the apart two angle irons that are alpass with training minefields. hedgehog, a training device that ready bolted together into the 

shape of a cross, and then 

sliding the third leg into position to form the "toy jackn 

shape. The three are then 

bolted together. Each hedgehog weighs about 250 pounds, 

depending on the size of the 

angle iron. 

The hedgehog is a highly 

visible device that requires 

Hedgehogs being used to 

block an open tield In Germany during a Reforger exerclse. Such an obstacle, reinforced wlth barbedwire, takes 

a combat engineer squad of 

seven men about two hours to 

assemble and Install (U.S. 

Army photo). 

38 Engineer 
manpower not only for installation, but for removal as well. It's 

also "nestable," so large numbers 

of them can be easily stored in a 

relatively small space. Too, the 

"hog" provides the bulk weight required to simulate the amount of 

Class IV and V barrier material 

that would be needed by a combat 

engineer unit. 

A combat engineer squad of 

seven men requires about two 

hours to assemble and install five 

such devices (including supporting barbed wire) on a standardsized road. This five-hedgehog 

obstacle, nicknamed HEX,weighs 

about 1,250 pounds. A squad can 

transport two complete HEX 

obstacles on a trailer. 

Additional equipment required 

includes several sledge hammers 

and crescent wrenches. Ideally, a 

cable should be run through the 

ends of each hedgehog and securely anchored at each end of the 

obstacle. This adds to the 

"enemy's" difficulty in removing it. 

Barbed wire should be liberally 

employed in and around the HEX 

to help deter manual breaching. 

While not designed for wartime 

use, hedgehogs can serve as a 

valuable training obstacle. The 

best use of the device is probably 

as a good countermobility obstacle 

that would effectively channelize 

the enemy. They have sufficient 

weight and volume to discourage 

manual breaching, and combined 

with minefields and wire 

obstacles, they make for an effective and challenging training 

scenario. 

Some of the hedgehog lessons 

learned by the 130th include: 

The devices are very manpower intensive and are an excellent engineer obstacle 

emplacement training drill. 

9 	They can't serve as obstacles 

by themselves, but need to be 

supplemented by minefields, 

wire, or booby trap devices to 

reinforce their effectiveness. 

Combat engineers bolt together pleces of angle iron to form a hedgehog. 


While not designed for wartlme use, hedgehogs serve as valuable training 


devices (U.S. Army photo). 

Like all obstacles, they must 

be tied into natural terrain 

features to be effective. 

A disadvantage is that the 

hedgehog, once disassembled, 

is fairly easy to transport and 

install. Once an enemy has 

cleared the obstacle, it would 

be a simple matter for him to 

use it against you. 

In conclusion, it needs to be restated that the hedgehog is not 

suitable as a wartime obstacle. It 

is, however, an extremely effective 

obstacle device that can serve your 

unit well in countermobility training. Give it a try. And you won't 

need an umpire to tell your 

ARTEP opponent to stop for an 

obstacle. LJI 

Captain Breidenstine is commander 

of C Company, 54th Engineer Battalion. He previously served as the 

assistant adjutant of the 130th Engineer Brigade. He has served 

as a platoon leader. He is a 

of the Combined Arms 

and Servks Staf and EngbeerOfier Advanced Course, 

Engineer 39 
By Lieutenant Colonel Herbert F. Harback 

uch has been said about two critical "command 

teams," the commander and his spouse, and 

the commander and his subordinate commanders. 

This article focuses on a third team, seldom written 

about but more important than the other two. It is the 

commander and the command sergeant major. 

The halls of both officer and NCO clubs are filled 

with "war stories" of past tenuous commanderlcommand sergeant major relationships. "Would have 

been better off without him!" "I had to do both jobs!" 

"He had no idea how to handle it!" These comments 

sum up some of the things said by both parties at 

one time or another. 

Formlng the Team 

n spite of an awareness that such disconnects 

may exist, there still remains a void of academic 

guidance, field-tested procedure, and sage advice. 

Both commander and command sergeant major, 

more often than not, find themselves "assuming" 

more than actually talking. Particularly when it comes 

to their responsibilities to one another and to the unit 

they serve. Seldom written about, yet key to any success their soldiers are to enjoy, the commanderlcommand sergeant major team is not an easy one to 

form or sustain. 

The letter which follows is one commander's view 

of how that relationship should be. Each time 1 have 

formed up a new command team, Ihave prepared 

such a letter for my command sergeant major. Given 

on the first day and informally updated on a monthly 

basis, it is the start of an open partnership. Although 

the words may change with time, and as each new 

team forms, the basic philosophy of command and 

40 Engineer 

the senior enlisted leader's role in that relationship 

remain the same. 

The Starting Polnt 

Five key points provide the interlacing for the 

team's flexibility and strength. First, responsibilities must be clearly spelled out in order to establish focus and efficiency. They also serve to provide 

accountability. 

Secondly, the commander must understand that 

his command sergeant major has been successful 

not being an officer, and that there exists two separate and distinct career patterns. The commander may 

not want to be an NCO, but neither does the command sergeant major want to be an officer. 

The third point is an open dialogue. Easy to say, but 

hard to do. Every workday there must be a huddle of 

the two leaders. No matter how great one may think the 

team is going, daily azimuth checks are needed. 

Next, be honest and talk through the bad-as well 

as the good--days. In most cases, both commander 

and command sergeant major are about the same 

age and time-in-service, and are going through many 

of the same feelings. Share them in order to form a 

bond of trust and honesty. 

Finally, there is only one commander. He must not 

abdicate his authority or responsibilities. He must 

cooperate and delegate. The commander needs to 

respect the command sergeant major, for he is--like 

the commander-nly one soldier deep. Neither must 

be placed in a position of failure or isolation. 

Together, the commander and the command sergeant 

major form the unit's true command team. 

Here is my letter: 
Command Sergeant Major 

Responsibilities of the Command Sergeant Major 

A 

. Our relationship is the single most important 

factor in the success of the battalion. As a team, 

things will click and the spirit of the battalion will be 

high. If we are not in harmony, there will be needless confusion and damaging frustration. The purpose of this letter is to provide to you my thoughts, 

expectations and initial guidance. 

. Much time was spent in developing of the 14 

command policy memos. I need for you to understand each one and to enforce them wherever you 

go. I see your range of operations covering all parts 

of the battalion. Your presence should be known and 

sought, not avoided or feared. Iconsider you my 

main counsel and a major mentor for both NCOs 

and officers. Ido not expect you to be with me at all 

times. Isee us as a team, split to cover more area, 

but speaking with one voice. I anticipate getting 

together at least twice a day to discuss our sensing 

as to where the battalion is, and what our actions 

will be to keep the battalion at its cutting edge of 

readiness. 

3. As a key leader, you need to understand the 

NCOs and off icers-their needs, goals and responsibilities. You are not an officer candidate, you are 

the senior NCO of the battalion. You possess a 

great deal of experience which must be shared with 

both NCOs and officers. You are the chief advisor in 

CTT and engineer skills. You are the person I turn to 

for ITEP, NCOES, squad proficiency, schools, 

marksmanship, physical training and soldier certification programs. I expect for you to be an expert in all 

of these areas. Become personally involved in our 

support to Fitch School, the battalion's Developmental Physical Readiness Program, the implementation 

of the monthly soldier, and the new EER counseling 

systems. In addition, I need you to inspect the companies--their formations, training, billets, retention 

activities, and motor pool operations. Do not spend 

the bulk of your time on specifics. Rather, dedicate 

yourself to checking on soldier development and 

leadership. Meet with and work with the first sergeants and the senior staff NCOs. The battalion will 

rise or fall based on the caliber of leadership we find 

at the NCO leader levels. You are the key player in 

this endeavor. 

4. First impressions are lasting ones and are 

very important. A good first impression allows us to 

call our own shots, keeps the established momentum going, and permits us to train as we had 

planned. A bad impression brings a lot of outside onlookers, uninvited inspections, and general confusion. First impressions start with the appearance of 

the battalion headquarters (inside and outside) and 

company areas. They continue with the way the soldiers act, salute, dress, train and project a solid warrior spirit. Ineed your help in these areas. When a 

person comes by, he should know he is in combat 

engineer country! "Rugged' was the motto of our 

regiment, and it is our motto. It is that feeling of 

being among professional soldiers-rugged. Topnotch troopers should jump out in what people see 

and how we feel about ourselves. Our battalion history is very important. It gives to the soldiers a common heritage and direction. It provides roots. I need 

for you to inculcate this positive spirit into ALL of our 

soldiers. Soldiers and their equipment must be in top 

shape, on the ready line, and leaning forward--cornbat ready, anytime, anywhere. 

5. I look to you, as the senior NCO, to be the 

role model for all junior NCOs. That means you must 

constantly possess the values and standards of a 

professional leader. Your focus must be on the mission, and on the soldiers and equipment which will 

do the mission. Standards of conduct and readiness 

which you must display require exacting states of 

physical, mental and moral strength. You need to be 

totally involved in all missions which impact upon the 

soldier and his family-be it PAC activities, post support, field exercises, battle drills or reenlistments. I 

am very concerned with sole parent issues, family 

unrest and the proper care of the soldier and his 

equipment. Who is he? How is he? Where is he? 

Engineer 41 
These are the three questions 1 want you to constantly push on all leaders in this battalion. Help me 

train the good leaders, and weed out the substandard ones. Our soldiers deserve only the best in 

leadership. 

6. I have mentioned a number of items in the 

paragraphs above. Let me highlight the top five issues I need for you to begin work on now as you 

develop programs on the other points. 

a. Command policy memos. Know them, implement them at all levels and at all times-starting now. 

b. Upgrade of company and billet areas. We 

need a first class, rugged, combat soldier area of 

operations. No matter what the MOS, every soldier is 

a combat warrior. Get a winning, battle-focused spirit 

going in all we do and in how we look and feel. Take 

special time and effort in keeping the soldiers of the 

761st as 100 percent members of the battalion team. 

c. ITEP, NCOPD and NCOES. Get them off center 

and moving. Don't accept excuses when it comes to 

soldier skills, physical fitness, and SQT scores, as 

well as training, counseling and marksmanship 

programs. Low-density MOS training needs your immediate attention. METL focus and FM 25-100 must 

be the central theme of our NCOPD. 

d. Power down. Place the focus at the lowest 

level of leadership and allow that leader to lead soldiers as he develops himself. Get accountability lined 

up with authority and responsibility. Make the training 

programs real. Hold the trainers' feet to the fire. Concentrate on ClT and battle drills. Be the advisor to 

officers as well as NCOs. You have the experience to 

help both groups. Counsel every new officer on the 

role of the NCO, and how to be a leader. Set up a 

program of transition from soldier to NCO for all 

promotable specialists and recently promoted sergeants. 

e. Standards. Enforce them. Leaders live them all 

of the time. Accepting substandard performance, conduct or appearance means that we have a substandard leader who, if allowed to continue, will bring our 

battalion to a nonmission-capable status. Push bars 

on the substandards-the profile riders, the overweight and out-of-shape soldiers, the shammers, the 

drug users and all the others who can't cut it. Instill 

a battle focus in all of our actions, and total combat 

readiness in our soldiers and their equipment. This 

task force is to continue to be the hallmark of professional standards-from head to toe in all we are 

about and do. That includes garrison, motor pools, 

training areas, and on the battlefield. 

7. In order to do all that I have mentioned, you 

and I must be a team. We need to be where the action is, anytime--day or night--throughout the whole 

week. We need to anticipate and assist. Above all, 

we must lead by example here and down range. 

Where are we now? I know we have a superb battalion with strong leaders and solid soldiers. Ialso 

feel that standards need to be continually stressed. 

Basic field skills need help. We must also maintain a 

full court press on sustaining a combat focus of 

readiness (physical, mental and moral) in our daily 

operations. 

q. I look to you as my partner in these efforts. If 

you feel any doubts about this relationship, now is 

the time to discuss them. We are on a fast train, and 

tomorrow is too late. The soldiers and junior leaders 

need us now. This letter is my initial counseling to 

you and will be the focus of our next meeting. 

9. Rugged! 

Herbert F. Harback, 

LTC, EN 

Commandlng 

Beyond The Letter 

nt's a start. Without this charter there can be no 

sense of responsibility or focus. Both the commander and the command sergeant major need to understand each other and how they will function 

together as a team. This letter begins that process. 

But more important is what lies beyond the letter. A command will have unlimited potential if the 

commander and command sergeant major team 

takes the point and leads the unit to new levels of 

readiness. llrJl 

Lieutenant Colonel Harback is the commander of the 

14th Combat Engineer Battalion (Corps), Fort Ord. 

He has served in various command and staff positions, including executive officer, Bayonet Combat 

Support Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light); deputy 

commander, 7th Engineer Brigade, VII Corps; S-3, 

7th Engineer Brigade, and aide-de-camp to the corn 

manding general, U.S. Army Western Command. 

42 Engineer 
By Captain Jonathan M. Williams 

and Captain Thomas G. Young 

The Military Qualifications 

1L Standards (MQS) System is 

undergoing a complete revision 

designed to improve its value as 

an officer training tool. 

Previous MQS manuals have 

met with criticism from the field 

because they were too long and 

troublesome to use. To improve 

their usefulness, Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

directed that the system be revised. 

Since that guidance was issued, 

all MQS products have been 

scrutinized and are under various 

stages of revision. The Engineer 

School is currently revising its 

branch MQS manual and expects 

to distribute the new product by 

January of next year. 

The MQS system provides commanders with an important tool 

for structuring a comprehensive 

professional development program. It outlines critical tasks for 

officers, while allowing commanders to tailor the program to 

their unit's mission essential task 

list (METL). 

The MQS lists the critical common tasks and professional 

knowledge subject areas within 

each task. The tasks are also identified as to their training location 

(resident versus nonresident). The 

system serves as a convenient assessment tool, allowing the commander to provide feedback to 

junior officers on their progress. 

In April, the Engineer School 

conducted a selection board to 

determine which engineer-specific 

tasks would be included in the 

branch guide. The board had instructions to keep the manual 

short and concise, and avoid 

duplication between the branch 

guide and the common guide. 

Both the branch and common 

guides contain task summary 

sheets (TSS). These are not meant 

to provide comprehensive "how to" 

guidance, like enlisted soldiers' 

manuals, but are intended to provide training outlines. As a 

separate, parallel effort, training 

support packages (TSP) are being 

developed which support each 

task with detailed information. 

Each TSP will be a "stand-alonen 

product which should give the 

trainer all the resources necessary 

to conduct training on a specific 

task. 

Upon completion of the MQS 

development effort, the Engineer 

School will integrate the revisions 

into the resident officer basic and 

advanced courses. The new MQS 

materials are scheduled for their 

first appearance in officer classes 

in FY91. 

The MQS I program provides 

tasks for precommisioning 

programs like West Point, ROTC, 

and OCS, and is entirely task 

oriented. This manual is undergoing final review at the Combined 

Arms Center. 

The new MQS I1 program has 

two tiers: Tier I for lieutenants 

and Tier I1 for captains. The 

Combined Arms Center is currently reviewing the task summary sheets that will be included 

in the common guide, which is expected to be "on the street" by 

early next year. 

The goals of the MQS I1 are to 

prepare company grade officers for 

their wartime missions, and to provide a sound basis for their continued professional development 

The revised MQS system is an 

officer professional development 

milestone. It will do much to 

guide officer training in critical 

engineer skills. 

Questions or comments involving the development of the MQS 

system can be addressed to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, ATTN: ATSE-TDU-I, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO, 65473, or call 

Autovon 676-7553lCommercial 

(314) 563-7553. hd 

Captain Williams, currently in 

graduate school, wm an analyst 

in the Directorate of Daining and 

Doctrine (DOTD), at the Engineer 

School. He previously served as a 

company commander with the 

35th Engineer Battalion. He is a 

graduate of the Combined Arms 

and Services Staff School. He 

holds a master's degree from 

Webster University. 

Captain Young, commander of the 

International Student Detachment 

at Fort Leonard Wood, formerly 

worked in the Course Development 

Division, DOTD, at the Engineer 

School. He previously served as a 

company executive officer and 

platoon leader with the 10th Engineer Battalion. He is a graduate 

of the U.S. Military Academy. 

Engineer 43 
Step 1. Determine the number of antitank (AT) mines required. Multiply 

the desired density by the minefield frontage: 

0.75 mine per meter x 500 m = 375 mines. 

Step 2. Determine the number of AT mines per row. Divide the minefield 


frontage by the desired spacing interval between mines. 


Note: Round down the answer to the nearest whole number. 


500 m + 6 m = 83.3 (round down) = 83 mines per row. 

Step 3. Determine the number of rows. Divide the number of AT mines 

by the number of mines per row. 

Note: Round up the answer to the nearest whole number. 

375 - 83 = 4.51 (round up) = 5 rows. 

Step 4. Determine the actual number of mines. Multiply the number of 

AT mines per row by the number of rows. 

83 x 5 = 415 mines. 

Step 5. Determine the number of AT mines to request. Allow for 10 

percent waste. Multiply the actual number of AT mines by the 10 percent 

factor for waste. 

Note: Round up the answer to the nearest whole number. 

41 5 x 1.1 0 = 456.5 (round up) = 457 mines. 

Step 6. Determine the number of trucks required. Refer to table B-1, 

page 249 in FM 20-32 or page 3-26 in FM 5-34. 

457 t 204 = 2.24 (round up) = 3 trucks. 

This problem was submitted by SSG John Chester, an instructor in the 

Mine Warfare Branch, Department of Military Engineering, U.S. Army 

Engineer School. 

44 En, 
LESSONS LEAPWED 


By Captain Martin B. Dorey 

The follow in^ Lessons Learned apply to equipment, mobility, and survivability issues. Derived from 

after action reports submitted by the National Training 

Center, they are in the engineer lessons learned data 

base. For more information, write to Commandant, 

U.S. Army Engineer School, Attn: ATSE-ES-AL, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO 65473-6630. Or, call (314) 563- 

532 1/5339, AV 676-532 1/5339. 

ISSUE: Structural and curb damage to the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB). 

DISCUSSION:The class 60 AVLB has sustained 

structural and curb damage because the 

M60/M48/M88 and MI family of vehicles are driven at 

excessive speeds. 

RECOMMENDATION:The Tactical Army Command (TACOM) imposed the following restrictions in 

a "Safety of Use" message issued in June 1987, subject: Operational Crossing Restrictions for Class 60 

Bridge, Armored Vehicle Launched (NSN 5420-00- 

522-9599). These restrictions apply to combat 

vehicles that exceed a 504011 vehicle weight. 

Vehicle must be centered on bridge. 

Maximum crossing speed is 8 miles per hour (13 

kmlhr). 

No stopping, accelerating or gear shifting while 

on the bridge. 

All subordinate units and operators of vehicles exceeding 50 tons must follow these restrictions. 

Units in charge of AVLB sites should fabricate conspicuous signs listing these restrictions and post 

them at crossing sites. 

Commanders are responsible for ensuring that 

vehicle operators are properly briefed on crossing 

restrictions and for ensuring that operators strictly adhere to the restrictions. 

ISSUE: M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) 

Operations. 

DISCUSSION: Testing of the ACE at Fort Hood, 

Texas, has produced the following lessons 

leamed: 

River Crossing. The ACE should be used in tandem during rivercrossing operations. One will 

prepare the access ramp; the other will prepare 

Armored Vehicle 

Launched Brldge (AVLB) 

Engineer 45 
ISSUE: Lack of coordination and effective planning for breaching 

obstacles. 

DISCUSSION: The task force engineer was not involved in the tactical 

planning phase for various missions. 

Therefore, the maneuver force was unable to coordinate breaching operaA 

tions or use the engineer units effectively. As a result, breaching 

operations were ineffective and not according to doctrine. In one case, an 

obstacle that could have been 

bypassed easily was not. Due to lack 

of coordination, the engineers and 

maneuver units did not rehearse 

together. Instead, the individual companylteams and the engineers conducted separate rehearsals. 

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) For one mission, the task force engineer was involved in planning and 

for swimming and be available to recover the briefing the companylteams. This time the obstacles 

first, if required. were breached effectively, which greatly improved the 

Slope Operations.The ACE can negotiate task force's ability to continue the attack. 

slopes up to 60 percent and side slopes up to RECOMMENDATION:Stress the effective use of 

40 percent. Excessive slope, heavy vegetation, task force engineers to maneuver commanders and 

and rocks can cause the ACE to throw a track. the engineers themselves. Ensure the staff coordinates 

On very steep slopes, the vehicle climbs better SO that breaching is integrated into the tactical plan. Inin reverse. tegrate the engineer and maneuver units and perform 

rehearsalsto ensure successful obstacle breaching Smoke Launcher. The smoke grenade launcher and continuation of the attack. system can ~rovidea smoke screen aDproximately i25 meters away from the vehicle 

for a period of 30 seconds, depending on the 

weather. When the system is not being used, the 

rubber caps should be placed over the tubes to 

prevent rain, snow, or other foreign matter from 

entering them. The operator's hatch must be 

closed before firing to prevent accidental burning 

of the operator. 

Vehicle Recovery. Winch capacity of the ACE 

is 12.5 tons. Proper winding and lubrication 

procedures will ensure that this effective 

capacity is maintained. Deploy the ACE in tandem for recovery operations, especially in light 

divisions. 

Night Operations. Night-vision goggles are required when the ACE operates in the dark. 

Operators must receive acclimatization training 

for these goggles to avoid nausea while wearing 

them. Also, the instrument panel lights may 

cause the goggles to malfunction temporarily. 

Until a product improvement plan is completed to 

correct this situation, operators should turn off the 

panel lights when operating with night-vision 

goggles. 

ISSUE: Cosmetic berms constructed in front of 

vehicle fighting positions provide no protection. 

DISCUSSION: Engineers often expend much effott 

constructing berms in front of vehicle fighting positions. A berm creates a false sense of security for the 

user. A modern armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSD) round will easily penetrate loosely 

compacted soil berms. 

RECOMMENDATION: Use the available engineer 

effort to construct additional survivability positions. 

Engineers must stress this lesson to the maneuver 

commander to ensure that these berms are no longer 

used. 

ISSUE: Use of scoop loaders to dig survivability 

positions. 

DISCUSSION: During a training exercise, a unit 

used a scoop loader to construct survivability positions. Because the soil was too compact, the equipment broke down. 

RECOMMENDATION:Only responsible individuals 

knowledgeable of soil conditions should select the 

type of equipment to be used for diggingsurvivability 

positions. Scoop loaders should be operated only in 

loose soil conditions. 

46 Engineer 
I ENGINEER UPDATE 6 Y 


Directorate of Training 


and Doctrine (DOTD) 


Department of C0m bined 

Arms (DCA) 

Common Collective Task Tralnlng. Units without an 

ARTEP Mission Training Plan (MTP) are advised to use 

ARTEP 5-145-Series, as applicable, for common collective task 

training. The manual of common collective tasks and standards that 

was distributed in June 1989 for units without proponent MTPs is no 

longer available. It was developed primarily for use as a TRADOC 

training development aid, and had limited distribution on a one-time 

basis. Point of contact (POC) is Russ Hinkle, AV 676-7513, or (314) 

563-751 3. 

Engineer Drllls-ARTEP 5-74-DRILL. An ARTEP designed to support all combat engineer units is scheduled for publication in November 1990. ARTEP 5-145-Drill includes breaching, bridging, and 

CEVIAVLB drills. POC is CPT Frank Barry, AV 676-7512 or (314) 

563-751 2. 

Units subscribing to ARTEP 5-025 and 5-145 series MTPs will 

receive ARTEP 5-145-DRILL on the initial distribution. Other units 

may order it from the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center 

(USAPDC), 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. Their 

hotline number is AV 584-2533 or (301) 682-8529. 

Soldier Quallflcatlon Test (SQT) Notice. Soldiers are advised to study only those references given in the SQT notice by 

task. These references are used to develop questions in the individual SQTs. 

Attention Light Engineers. The 6th Annual Light Engineer Conference at Fort Leonard Wood, scheduled for 23-26 October 1990, 

has been cancelled. The conference will be rescheduled later, possibly for spring 1991. POC is CPT Thomas Kula, AV 676-5821 or 

(314) 563-5821. 

Obstacle Control Problems. Combat Training Centers (CTC) 

report that obstacle control continues to be a major problem. Inadequate control procedures have led to fratricide and have hindered 

the mobility of friendly forces on the battlefield. Problems include 

improper reporting and recording, failure to disseminate obstacle 

location information to appropriate leaders and staff, inadequate 

obstacle turnover, failure to execute lane closure plans, and unmarked friendly minefields. 

Obstacle control is a critical task that requires discipline and continual sustainment training. References are FM 5-100 for obstacle 

control, FM 5-102 for reserve obstacle procedures, and STANAG 

201 7 for target folder procedures. 

Engineer and maneuver units rotating to a CTC must include obstacle control tasks when they conduct predeployment training. The following tips may help you improve these 

skills. 

Engineer platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must understand 

obstacle reporting and recording procedures and forward reports 

as required. 

Maneuver staffs must develop fieldnactical standing operating procedures (SOP) that emphasize minefield marking requirements 

and standards. 

Engineer 47 
Directorate of Combat 


Developments (DCD) 


Pock crusher 

Critical engineer-related items, such as reserve target responsibility or lane closure plans, must be stated in paragraph 3 of 

subunit instructions. 

Staff engineers must ensure that obstacle information is reported 

to the maneuver unit for dissemination. 

9 	Staff engineers must emphasize to their maneuver commanders 

the need to rehearse lane closure plans. 

POC is CPT Bob Wray, AV 676-5519, (314) 563-5519. 

New Rock Cmsher On Board. Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Knox 

received new and improved rock crushing plants in August. The 

equipment can produce as much as 150 tons per hour (TPH), is 

mobile, diesel and electric motor driven, and has crushing and 

screening capabilities. 

The rock crushing plants consist of several state-of-the-art 

components. The primary crusher consists of a Thunderbird 

trailer, John Deere diesel engine, Pioneer variable speed vibrating feeder, and a 3042 jaw crusher. The secondary crusher consists of a Thunderbird trailer and triple deck shaker box, John 

Deere diesel engine, and an El-Jay 45-inch cone crusher. The 

1st Engineer Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, is responsible for 

training on this equipment (see item on page 49). For more information, contact MSG Michael Hammond, AV 676-7344 or 

(314) 563-7344. 

"Bunker Busting" Systems Update. Three new weapons systems are being considered by the Engineer School as possible 

standoff bunker busters for the light engineer force. These systems 

are capable, in various degrees, of standoff bunker and field fortification reduction. Currently engineers are forced to use the 90mm 

recoilless rifle for this purpose. The introduction of one of these systems will allow the 90mm to be used solely for its intended purpose-killing tanks. 

The three systems are: 

Ranger antiarmor/antipersonnel weapons system (M3 RAAWS). 

This system is now employed in NATO forces and will be issued 

to Army Rangers starting in September 1990. 

Multipurpose individual munitions (MPIM). This developmental 

item is being evaluated by the Infantry School. 

Shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapons (SMAW). This 

weapon was developed by the Marine Corps, and they are currently upgrading and modifying it. 

A decision as to which, if any, of these systems will be issued to 

engineer forces is pending. POC is Benny Pardue, AV 676-7239 or 

(314) 563-7239. 

Engineer Organization Changes. The engineer force structure 

concept for AirLand Battle-Future goes before the October 1990 

Common TOE Update board for final document validation and 

verification. The following- engineer force structure changes are expected to occur out of this process: 

The heavy division engineer organization will consist of an engineer regimental headquarters, and three engineer battalions. 

These are organized for 80 percent offensive support and 

48 Engineer 
Department of Military 

Engineering (DME) 

Directorate of Engineer 

Branch Safety (DEBS) 

Ist Brigade 

20 percent countermobility support. All bridging assets will be located in the corps engineer brigade. 

The corps engineer brigade will include corps mechanized engineer battalions, and corps wheel engineer battalions. The reorganized combat support equipment company will include three 

similar earthmoving platoons. Other units within the corps engineer brigade structure include ribbon bridge companies, 

medium girder bridge companies, and a topographic company (all 

L-series TOE). 

At echelons above corps, the combat heavy engineer battalion 

will be reorganized similar to the Air Force's "Prime Beef" battalion. These battalions will support BASOPS and conduct nation assistance missions. POC is MAJ Joseph Seerley, AV 

676-7149 or (314) 563-71 49. 

EOAC Dlvlslon Update. Some Reserve Component officers 

continue to enroll in the incorrect resident phases. The Company 

Commander Course, Phase I - EOAC-RC, is Course 4-5-C23, 

not Course 4-5426, Phase I. Detailed course requirements are 

in the Army Formal School Catalog, DA Pam 351-4. A secret 

clearance is required for portions of the Company Commanders 

Course. Ensure that unit security managers have provided the 

necessary documentation before you arrive. POC is Captain 

Chuck Boaz, AV 676-5646 or (314) 563-5646. 

Attentlon Vehlcle Operators! Operators should not raise the 

hoods of vehicles when they park them in tactical bivouac areas. 

Hot engines will leave a significant thermal signature that may be 

detected by enemy infrared equipment. For more information, 

refer to Chapter 2 of FM 20-3. POC is CPT Vince Harackiewicz, 

AV 676-5585, (31 4) 563-5585. 

MI80 Flrlng Distances. The minimum safe distance when 

firing the MI80 cratering kit is 1200 meters for unprotected personnel and 150 meters for personnel in missile-proof shelters. 

This information is in TM 9-1 375-21 3-1 2-1, Practice Mines Update. Authorized practice mine and fuze combinations are in TM 

43-0001-36, Army Ammunition Data Sheets for Land Mines. Use 

of any mine and fuse combinations other than those listed can 

result in serious injuries. POC is Paul Rusinko, AV 676-5002 or 

(314) 563-5002. 

Rock Crusher Tralnlng Implemented. Our latest acquisition, a 

rock crushing plant capable of producing as much as 150 TPH, was 

delivered in August. (See item under DCD, page 48.) The equipment 

is a significant additionto the quarry specialist training course (62G). 

Beginning in September 1990, all 62G students will receive training 

on the new crusher as well as the 75 TPH plant currently being 

taught. In addition, Reserve and National Guard soldiers who currently hold the 62G MOS will be sent to Fort Leonard Wood to train 

on this equipment. To accommodate the new training requirements, 

an additional 36 hours of technical training will be incorporated into 

the 62G Program of Instruction: 

Engineer 49 
Current 75-Ton Per Hour (TPH) Crusher Course 

Phase Hours 

Combat Engineer Training 43 

MOS Specific Training 

Introduction 12 

Assembly 16 

Crushing (75 TPH) 36 

Drilling 36 

Demolition 24 

Operation and Maintenance 3n 

Field Training Exercise 

-

- Training for 150 TPH Crusher 

Class .IVYIC 

Operator Maintenance 8 

Cone Adjustment 1 

.Iw--., Adjustment 1 

Re19acelAdjust Bolts 

Screen Adjustments 

lshing 10 

36 

Students receive training on rod< drills, scoop loaders, water pumps, 

conveyors, wash and screen units, demolitions, and maintenance. POC 

is MAJ Andrew Semple, AV 581-251 9 or (314) 596-251 9. 

132 Brigade Brigade Inactivated. When the 132 Brigade was inactivated in August, 

the 31st, 35th, and 589th Engineer Battalions became part of the 1st 

Engineer Brigade. The reorganized 1st Engineer Brigade is now responsible for MOS 12BC Initial Entry Training, 15 Advanced Individual Traim 

ing (AIT), one addiiional skill identifier (AS!) course, and Sapper Leader 

Training. POC is CPT Mark Lane, AV 581 -41 04 or (314) 59641 04. 

136th Engineer Brigade Quarfy Detachment Welcomed. Fort Leonard Wood welcomed 

the 285th Engineer Quarry Detachment as the newest Forces Command (FORSCOM) unit on 17 October 1990. The 285th Engineer 

Detachment is relocating from Panama and will be assigned to the 

51 5th Engineer Company (Pipeline) (Construction Support). The 

primary mission of the 31-soldier detachment is rock crushing operations. Capable of producing as much as 75 tons of crushed rock per 

hour, the unit greatly improves the brigade's ability to accomplish 

major horizontal construction projects such as roads, storage facilities, 

and airfields. POC is SFC Harkins, AV 581-7447. 

News and Notes Engineer Desert Opemtions Engineer lessons learned applicable to 

desert operations are available in a report just published by the Engineer 

Studies Center, Fort Behroir, Virginia. The book has nine sections covering everything from host nation support to well drilling and vehicle main 

tenance. POC is Danny Brannon, AV 345-21 15 or (703) 355-21 15. 

50 Engineer 
"In no other profession are the penalties for employing 

untrained personnel so appalling as in the military." 

General Douglas MaArthur 

uring World War 11, 

the American Army 

called together millions of 

civilians and molded them 

into units that could work 

together to go about the 

business of winning the 

war. One such unit was the 

51st Engineer Combat Battalion (ECB). How well it 

trained and the successful 

results of that training is 

the thrust of this article. 

At the beginning of World 

War 11, the United States 

Atmy sent its newly inducted recruits to units for 

training. Engineer Military 

Training Program (PUTrP) 

5-1 called for 13 weeks of 

basic, individual, and team 

training. The next phase, 

unit and combined training, Eider D. ompny A, 51sI ECB, on a "Watch on the Rhine" in March 

consisted of seven to eight 1945.Tbsucc e taalnlng the 51st recelved in New York and Englandwas 

months of training as a refl,ectecRin tFlenlr many achlsvments during World War I! (U.S. Army photo). 

unit. ~twas followed by training training. The Army training sys- 20 miles south of the Canadian 

with other units, and culminated tem depended on unit cadres who border on Lake Champlain, in Ocin maneuvers with divisions, first received training and then tober. The 51st chose Macomb 

corps, and armies. trained new recruits. Reservation, some 12 miles north 

One of the 131 engineer units A new commander, Colonel H. of Plattsburg Barracks, as its field 

formed in 1942 was the 51st En- Wallis Anderson, took over the unit training area. There it constructed 

gineer Combat Regiment (ECR), on August 17. Through example training sites in preparation for 

activated at Camp Bowie, Texas. Colonel. Anderson, a World War I the arrival of basic trainees. 

In June of that year, the 51st En- veteran, laid the foundation for the Enlisted men began arriving at 

gineer Regiment's cadre of 76 en- development of teamwork and the Plattsburg railroad depot on 

listed men and 50 officers, most of esprit de corps that bound the 51st Christmas Day, 1942. The Army 

them graduates of the Engineer together. had inducted these men into the 

OfXcer Candidate School at Fort The unit moved to Plattsburg service from all corners of the 

Belvoir, Virginia, began cadre Barracks, New York, located about United States, issued them 

By Barry W.Fowle 

Engineer 51 
- - 

-- 

Traff lc rolls over a heavy pontoon bridge built over the 

Rhine River at Kripp, Germanv. In 1945. Thls was one 

of many bridgesbuilt by the 

51st Engineer Combat Battalion during their march 

across Europe (US. Army 

photo). 

units. The 51st ECB scored 83 percent, the highest rating of any 

similar organization in the XI1 

Corps. 

Advanced training, which followed, incl luded bo th infantry tactic:s and ex lgineer training. It con- -.---1 121 Ci--L-. ti]:meuUI~L~Ioeywmber, when the 

beittalion moved to the XI1 Corps 

maneuver area in Davis, West Virginia. There the soldiers built 

rolads and culverts, an airplane 

landing strip, and constructed a 

B;ailey bridge and a fixed-target m*~d known-distance range. The 

531st moved to Fort Belvoir for 12 

uniforms, and sent them to 

Plattsburg for training. By January 11the strength of the regiment had increased from about 

150 officers and men to more 

than 1,600. These recruits received a shock when they stepped 

off the train into 8 inches of snow 

and below-zero temperatures. 

Basic, individi ml, and team 

training beg1 m in JsL"yw and lasted unti 1 April . The 

recruits learned cl ose orde !r drill 

and then trained ()n crew- sewed 

1 .


weapons. During eneneer trmning the men learned how to use 

explosives and demolition! 3, how 3 h ~ W . 7 to build field fortificationr 3, LLUW 

to emplace fixed and fl~ oating

bridges, and how to buil .d and 

repair roads and aiifields. 

Temperatures reached 35 

degrees below zero on several occasions during basic training, and 

in most places the groun Id-was 

covered with 2 feet of sno IW. Because Lake Champlain was frozen -- --.

over, floating bridge training was 

conducted on ice that was 3-feet 

thick. 

In spite of these conditions, the 

regiment conducted training out52 Engineer 

side. The 51st established an 

obstacle course to strengthen the 

stamina and self-confidence of 

each soldier. Many of the men 

came down with colds soon after 

arrivil~g in Plattsburg, but the 

health of the unit returned rapic Ily -a_-- arwr extensive physical conditic bning. At the end of basic traini ng 

each company built two tactic cal 

bridges at night under blackc but .... conanLons. This realistic traini ng 

would pay dividends in the futu re. 

In 1Vlarch 1943, the 51st Ezn-

-.--- gineer Combat Regiment w'as 

redesignated. Its Headquartt ?rs 

and Service (H&S) Company 1be- sys as demonstration troops for .+ t.h dr 

came the llllth Engineer Coml: --.le school, and then went to Fort Jau 

Group (ECG), its 1st Battalion 1became the 51st ECB, and the 2nd 

Battalion became the 238th EC B. 

On April 7, t;he 51st :ECB beg 

unit and corntbined training 

Macomb Resel ...#.+ :A- vauull. The m 

marched 12 miles to Macomb 

Monday mornings, where th 

practiced building various types 

fixed and floa king bri~ dges. TI 

they Imarched. back to camp 

F'ridajr afternoons. Eve !ryone slc 

on the ! ground in pup tcents duri ing 

the wt ?ek. 

NerLr the c!nd.- of 1ipril, X,111 

Corps conducted MTP 1tests for 1the 

llllth ECG and itc 3 assigrled 

Dix, New Jersey, are for 

dt?parture oversear 

After arriving in England on 

20, 1944, the 5lst 

nore training. This inuueu construction of Bailey 

ridges, mine and booby trap 

'aining (using the latest German 

lines . . and methods), camouflage 

md infantry tactics. 

r he men in the 51st began 

, using the training gained 

o1ver the past 18 months-when 

tlley landed in France on June 
27, 1944. Their highly successful 

battalion operations in Europe 

demonstrated the quality of that 

training. 

From June until November, 

while under First Army, the batr 

talion moved across France constructing roads, bridges, and culverts, and sweeping areas for 

mines. In France and Belgium they 

replaced portable Bailey bridges 

with semi-permanent wooden 

bridges on major roads. The Bailey 

bridges were then moved forward 

for use in combat operations. 

At the end of October, the 51st 

moved into Marche, Belgium, and 

began sawmill operations using 

local sawmills and their personnel. First Army tasked the 51st to 

produce three million board feet of 

lumber for its winterization program. The men of the 51st, who 

were trained in using chain saws, 

cut the trees for, and supervised 

the operation of, 32 sawmills, At 

peak production the three companies produced a total of 80,000 

board feet of lumber each day. 

Sawmill operations stopped on 

17 December, when the 1111th 

ECG was assigned the battalion 

barrier operations along a 40-mile 

front against the German Army's 

Ardennes Offensive-the Battle of 

the Bulge. That evening Company 

C, 51st ECB, went to Trois Ponts 

to organize a defense of the town 

and prepare bridges for destruction. For three days the company 

held off German tank and infantry 

attacks until it was relieved by the 

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division. The 

infantry training the unit received 

in Plattsburg served them well. 

River Crossings 

he rest of the battalion was 

assigned - the mission of

preparing all crossings of the 

Ourthe River from Durbuy to La 

Roche, France, for demolition. They 

were also tasked to establish 

obstacles such as minefields and 

abatis on roads near the river. The 

battalion's key point in that defensive line was the Ourthe River 

bridge at Hotton. On December 20, 

Company B and the First Platoon, 

Company A, held off a German 

tank and infantry attack at that 

bridge for 7 hours. 

Tiny elements of all three line 

companies and the H&S Company 

manned roadblocks scattered 

throughout the area and stopped 

the Germans cold. For its actions 

in the Battle of the Bulge, the 51st 

ECB received the Distinguished 

Unit Citation and the French 

Croix de Guerre. 

During the first two months of 

1945, the 51st supported both the 

82d Airborne Division and the 

75th Infantry Division, building 

bridges, maintaining roads, and 

removing numerous minefields 

and barriers. In January, the battalion constructed five Bailey 

bridges in four days. One was constructed at night, while under 

enemy fire and in terrible weather. 

Three days of rain, snow, and 

freezing temperatures had coated 

the bridge parts with a layer of ice. 

Blow torches used to melt the ice 

brought in enemy artillery fire, 

forcing the men to use hacksaw 

blades to cut the ice away. The 

winter training received at Plattsburg again proved to be usefbl. 

On March 7, the Americans captured the famous Ludendorff 

Bridge over the Rhine River at 

Remagen. 111Corps chose the 51st 

and 291st ECBs to build two 

bridges over the Rhine so that 

American troops could cross while 

the heavily damaged LudendorfT 

bridge was closed for repairs. The 

51st built a 969-foot heavy pontoon bridge at Kripp, about 1.5 

miles south of Remagen, while 

under small arms and artillery 

fire and German fighter attacks. It 

was completed on March 11, 27 

hours after construction started. 

When the bridges were finished, 

Major General John Millikin, commander of 111Corps, praised the 

two engineer battalions. "I feel 

that one of the most outstanding 

accomplishments of the entire 

operation was the building of the 

two additional bridges under artillery and small arms fire." 

The 51st was assigned to 

General George S. Patton's Third 

Army on April 17. Two days later 

the battalion began and completed 

a 255-mile trip in 20 hours with 

just one major breakdown, which 

was quickly repaired. The success 

of the road march reflected the 

high state of maintenance of the 

equipment in the 51st and was a 

credit to its training. 

Mission Completed 

ompany A, 51st ECB, began 

a 325foot class 40 treadway 

bridge over the Danube River at Ingolstadt on April 26. They were 

under direct German fire from the 

far side of the river during construction. The 51st crossed the 

Danube and finished the war maintaining roads, filling craters, and 

building Bailey bridges. 

On May 12, Lieutenant Colonel 

Harvey R. Fraser, the battalion 

commander, called the men 

together and addressed them as a 

group for the first time since he 

joined the unit in mid-December. 

He paid tribute to the 51st for the 

work the men had accomplished 

during their drive across Europe. 

Well might he have given them 

praise. The unit had performed in 

an outstanding manner while accomplishing all of its missions, 

both as engineers and as infantry. 

That it did so can be traced to the 

high caliber of training the unit 

received in the rugged, cold 

weather at Plattsburg, New York, 

and in England. 

(Thisarticle is based on a history of 

the 51st, The 51st Again, scheduled 

for publication in 1991.) 

Barry W. Fowle is a historian, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers. 

Engineer 53 
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