UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4743

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

SHAWN SADLER, a/k/a Tangulifu M. Barber, a/k/a Carlos Watts, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:04-cr-00330-CMC-5) 

Submitted: June 24, 2009 Decided: September 9, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit 

Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William W. Watkins, Sr., Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, Nancy C. 

Wicker, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 A jury convicted Shawn Sadler of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and the 

district court sentenced Sadler to 240 months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Sadler’s counsel contends that the district court erred 

in denying the motion to suppress currency seized from the 

vehicle Sadler was driving and all other evidence, including 

Sadler’s statements, obtained by law enforcement officers after 

the vehicle search. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 We review the factual findings underlying the denial 

of a motion to suppress for clear error and the court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 

(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The 

evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 

704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 “[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment do not bear 

on every encounter between a police officer and a member of the 

public; it is only when a ‘search’ or a ‘seizure’ has occurred 

that the Fourth Amendment comes into play.” United States v. 

McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. 

denied, 128 S. Ct. 2492 (2008). Thus, when the deputy 

approached Sadler, identified himself, and inquired why Sadler 

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was in the neighborhood, a seizure had not yet occurred. See

id. (“If all that is involved is the officer approaching a 

person, announcing that he is an officer, and asking if the 

person would be willing to answer some questions, then no 

reasonable suspicion is required because no seizure has 

occurred.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 

see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968) (stating a 

seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment does not occur until an 

“officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 

in some way restrained the liberty of” the individual). 

 Moreover, “the police can stop and briefly detain a 

person for investigative purposes if the officer has a 

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 

criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks 

probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion to continue 

his inquiry beyond the initial encounter with Sadler. See

United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(considering the totality of the circumstances, “giv[ing] due 

weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of 

their experience and training” in assessing Terry stop). 

Finally, the search was proper as Sadler voluntarily gave his 

consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 

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(1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the 

requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search 

that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). Therefore, we 

conclude the district court properly denied the motion to 

suppress. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We deny Sadler’s motion to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED