SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4692-14T3

TERENCE M. HAIGNEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

U-HAUL CO. OF NEW JERSEY, INC.;1

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________________

Argued November 10, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli, Carroll and Gooden 

Brown. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket 

No. L-3542-14.

Daniel P. Waxman (Bryan Cave LLP) of the New 

York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the 

cause for appellants (Mr. Waxman and Post & 

Schell, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Waxman and 

Jonathan E. Ginsberg (Bryan Cave LLP), on the 

briefs).

David P. Corrigan argued the cause for 

respondent (Hobbie, Corrigan & Bertucio, P.C., 

attorneys; Mr. Corrigan and Michael R. Hobbie, 

on the brief).

 

1 Referenced in the record also as U-Haul of New Jersey, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 29, 2017
2 A-4692-14T3

PER CURIAM 

Defendants U-Haul Co. of New Jersey, Inc. and U-Haul 

International, Inc. (collectively U-Haul) appeal from the May 13, 

2015 Law Division order, which confirmed a June 19, 2014 

arbitration award on liability in favor of plaintiff Terence M. 

Haigney and dismissed U-Haul's counterclaim with prejudice.

2 For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the record. Haigney was 

a fencing contractor since 1995. In his business, he often rented 

trailers to transport bags of cement to his job sites using this 

procedure: he would drive to the trailer supplier, the trailer 

supplier would attach a trailer to his vehicle, and he would then 

drive to the cement supplier and load bags of cement onto the 

trailer and bring them to the job site.

On November 4, 2011, Haigney rented a six-foot by twelve-foot 

open trailer from U-Haul. He went to U-Haul's facility in 

Middletown, where U-Haul's employee, Thomas Bia, attached the

trailer to his vehicle. Haigney drove from U-Haul's premises to

a local Home Depot, where he loaded twenty bags of cement weighing 

 

2 The arbitration was bifurcated, with the liability phase 

proceeding first. Since this appeal only concerns the arbitrator's 

award on liability, we do not address the damage award.
3 A-4692-14T3

eighty pounds each into the trailer. He then drove two miles to 

a train station, where he picked up two day laborers. At no time 

did Haigney notice any problems with the trailer or feel the 

trailer whip or sway while he was driving. 

While driving to his next destination, Haigney came to an 

abrupt stop at a traffic light. After the light changed, he 

accelerated to approximately thirty-five miles per hour and 

proceeded downhill. As he drove, his steering wheel started 

shaking violently and the trailer started swaying from side to

side. The trailer eventually disconnected and crashed into the 

rear of his vehicle, punching a hole in the bumper and causing the 

vehicle to flip over and the trailer to jackknife into a guardrail. 

Haigney sustained serious permanent injuries as a result of 

the accident. In a recorded statement given to an insurance 

investigator from his hospital bed five days after the accident, 

Haigney said that the trailer fishtailed uncontrollably, but he 

had no idea why this happened. He said "I've had numerous 

trailers. The guy put it on incorrectly or it was a faulty 

trailer, I have no idea." He also said that he loaded cement in 

the trailer and evenly distributed the load. 

Haigney filed a complaint against U-Haul in the Law Division.

In lieu of filing an answer, U-Haul filed a motion to compel 

binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement that
4 A-4692-14T3

compelled arbitration before a single arbitrator in accordance 

with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration 

Association (AAA). The arbitration agreement was governed by the 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 to 307. The court 

granted the motion.

During discovery, Haigney advanced several theories of 

liability, including: (1) the ball clamp that held the trailer 

onto the trailer hitch that was attached to his vehicle was 

defective and fractured and disconnected the trailer; (2) the 

trailer's brakes were inoperable because U-Haul failed to install 

brake fluid; and (3) U-Haul's employee improperly attached the 

trailer to his vehicle (the improper attachment theory). Haigney

asserted that after he left U-Haul's premises, the inoperable 

brakes created pressure on the ball clamp and ball mount when he 

braked. This condition weakened the connection between the ball 

clamp and ball mount, which was already weakened because the 

trailer was attached improperly and the ball clamp was defective. 

Consequently, the ball clamp detached and the trailer began to 

sway, causing the crash. 

Haigney asserted the improper attachment theory several times 

in his answers to U-Haul's interrogatories. Although Haigney's

interrogatory answers were not presented to the arbitrator,

retired Judge Marina Corodemus, they are in the record on appeal. 
5 A-4692-14T3

Nevertheless, there was other evidence supporting Haigney's

improper attachment theory. Bia testified at his deposition, 

without objection, about the procedure he used to attach a trailer 

to a vehicle. He testified that after connecting a trailer to a 

vehicle, he would make sure it was properly attached by pushing 

back on the ball clamp and listening for a click to make sure the 

ball clamp was "all the way tight." He also testified that making 

sure the ball clamp was tight kept it from separating from the 

trailer coupler while driving, and acknowledged that if the ball 

clamp was installed too loosely, "[i]t would come off and screw 

everything up[]" and "cause problems." This deposition testimony 

was read into the record during Haigney's case-in-chief without 

objection. 

On direct examination during the arbitration hearing, UHaul's representative and liability expert, James D. Fait, 

testified about and demonstrated the proper method for attaching 

a trailer. On cross-examination, he testified, without objection, 

that the person attaching the trailer must tighten the ball clamp 

until it is tight and that listening for one click was "not the 

proper procedure. That's not what they are trained and that's not 

the proper installation." Fait agreed with Bia that if the ball 

clamp was not properly tightened, the trailer coupler "could come 

off the ball [clamp], if you hit a bump or something like this[.]" 
6 A-4692-14T3

Fait also acknowledged that if the trailer was not secured properly 

and disconnected, it could possibly cause a crash. 

In addition to this evidence, in his written summation on 

liability, Haigney asserted, in part, that Bia's improper securing 

of the ball clamp to the trailer coupler, which caused the ball 

clamp to separate from the trailer coupler, was a proximate cause 

of the accident. In its written summation on liability, U-Haul

responded in a footnote that Haigney's experts did not present the 

improper attachment theory. However, U-Haul did not ask Judge 

Corodemus to disregard or strike this theory; rather, U-Haul argued 

that Fait had properly discredited it. 

U-Haul conceded that the trailer lacked operable brakes due 

to a lack of brake fluid, but asserted this was not a proximate 

cause of the accident. Rather, U-Haul averred that Haigney's

improper loading of the cement bags onto the trailer with 100% of 

the weight in front of the centerline was the sole proximate cause 

of the accident. U-Haul concluded that the improper loading caused 

a catastrophic loss of control as Haigney accelerated, and the 

ball clamp fractured during the rollover of his vehicle, causing 

the trailer to separate from the trailer coupler. 

At his deposition, Haigney testified that he knew the proper 

requirements for loading a trailer. He testified that the majority 

of the weight should be ahead of the wheels, and noted that the 
7 A-4692-14T3

U-Haul contract he signed stated "[y]ou should always . . . load 

trailer heavier in the front[.]" As to how he loaded the cement 

bags in the trailer on the day of the accident, he testified that

"[y]ou start in the front and then you behind -- you know, one row 

of them and then two, you know." He did not recall whether he 

loaded any of the bags to the rear of the centerline. 

At the arbitration hearing, Haigney testified that he evenly 

distributed the load of cement bags across the length of the 

trailer bed. He explained that the trailer had to be loaded evenly 

with about sixty percent of the weight loaded in the front half 

and the remaining forty percent loaded behind the front half. He 

also explained how he loaded the cement bags on the day of the 

accident: he started in the front and put a first row of three 

bags approximately two feet from the front wall, then put the next 

row of three bags approximately one foot behind the front row, and 

then put the last two bags approximately one foot behind the second 

row. He then looked at the trailer from the side to make sure it 

was level. He testified that he did not load all of the bags in 

the front of the trailer, and that such loading "would be 

completely unlevel[, and he] probably wouldn't have been able to 

even get out of the [U-Haul] parking lot without [the trailer] 

swaying all over the place." He reviewed an exhibit that showed

the side of a similar open trailer attached to a similar vehicle
8 A-4692-14T3

with twenty bags of cement all loaded in the front, and testified

that this was not the way his trailer looked from the side after 

he loaded it. He emphasized that the trailer depicted in the 

exhibit was so off level that the back wheels were almost off the 

ground and no one would ever drive the trailer that way. 

Antonio Sic, one of the day laborers, testified at the 

arbitration hearing that prior to entering Haigney's vehicle, he 

looked and saw that the cement bags were properly loaded on the 

trailer and did not need to be fixed or rearranged. He testified 

that the trailer was level and the cement bags were not loaded 

entirely in the front. He also reviewed an exhibit showing twenty 

cement bags all loaded up against the front wall of a similar

trailer, and testified this was not how the cement bags were loaded 

in the subject trailer.

Before the second day of the arbitration hearing, U-Haul 

conducted additional testing by placing twenty cement bags in a 

similar trailer in the manner in which Haigney had testified at 

the arbitration hearing. U-Haul took three photographs of the 

trailer, which it sought to introduce into evidence to rebut 

Haigney's arbitration testimony about how he loaded the cement 

bags, which U-Haul asserted was diametrically different from his 

deposition testimony. Judge Corodemus declined to consider the 

rebuttal evidence based on a lack of notice to Haigney, and because 
9 A-4692-14T3

the photographs were not offered for the truth of the matter 

asserted and were merely illustrative. 

In a June 19, 2014 written liability award, Judge Corodemus

addressed the alleged inconsistency between Haigney's deposition 

testimony and arbitration testimony about how he loaded the 

trailer. She found his arbitration testimony was consistent with 

his statement to the insurance investigator and was corroborated 

by Sic's testimony. She concluded that Haigney had properly loaded 

the trailer. 

Judge Corodemus did not find that the ball clamp was 

defective; rather, she found it was damaged as a result of the 

accident. However, she found that U-Haul breached its duty to 

Haigney by allowing him to leave its premises with a trailer that 

had inoperable brakes, and by failing to properly attach the 

trailer to his vehicle. She concluded that these two conditions 

were a proximate cause of the accident. She also concluded that 

Haigney's failure to confirm that the trailer was properly attached 

was also a proximate cause of the accident. Accordingly, Judge 

Corodemus apportioned U-Haul's liability at eighty percent and 

Haigney's at twenty percent. In a September 11, 2014 written 

damages award, she awarded plaintiff $1,800,000, molded to 

$1,440,000. 
10 A-4692-14T3

Following U-Haul's failure to pay the damage award, Haigney

filed a verified complaint and order to show cause to confirm the 

two arbitration awards. U-Haul sought to vacate the awards, 

arguing that Judge Corodemus exceeded her authority by finding 

liability on the improper attachment theory, of which it had no 

notice and which was not alleged by Haigney or supported by lay 

or expert evidence. U-Haul also argued that Judge Corodemus

exceeded her authority and violated due process by barring the 

rebuttal photographs. 

In a May 13, 2015 oral opinion, Judge Jamie S. Perri confirmed 

the arbitration awards. Judge Perri found that Judge Corodemus 

did not exceed her authority by finding negligence based on 

improper attachment, reasoning as follows:

[Judge Corodemus'] decision was based on the 

submissions and testimony presented in the 

arbitration hearing. Her decision was in the 

scope of [the] submissions because she relied 

on the evidence to determine that each party 

acted negligently. This did not delve into 

an area of law foreign to the evidence or the 

arguments presented by either side.

[Haigney] originally sought to prove [UHaul's] liability through allegations of 

negligence in maintenance and inspection. 

Broadly construed, Judge Corodemus' decision 

was based on the theory that the U-Haul 

employee who attached the trailer was 

negligent in maintaining the trailer coupler 

and hitch and failing to inspect the coupler 

and hitch to insure it was properly attached. 
11 A-4692-14T3

Here, Judge Corodemus was presented with 

a set of facts and was obligated to determine 

whether, based upon those facts, U-Haul owed 

a duty to Haigney, the violation of which 

proximately caused his injures. A careful 

review of the arbitration record discloses 

that in September 2013, Haigney stated in 

response to U-Haul's interrogatories, that 

damages were being sought on the basis that 

"the U-Haul employee improperly connected and 

improperly maintained [the] trailer to [his

vehicle]."

. . . . 

Fait demonstrated the proper method for 

attaching the coupler and ball mount on the 

date of the accident.

. . . . 

As such the evidence presented to Judge 

Corodemus during the course of the hearing 

established the proper method for securing the 

trailer to the vehicle, a method that U-Haul 

. . . allegedly taught to its affiliates

through training sessions and videos. 

Evidence was also produced that Bia, a U-Haul 

. . . employee had not properly secured the 

trailer to the vehicle before it left the UHaul facility, and that he was of the belief 

that "a click" was sufficient to secure the 

trailer.

[U-Haul] . . . cannot claim surprise in

this regard since [it was] already in 

possession of Bia's testimony and knew or 

should have known of their own procedures and 

instructions for inspecting the trailer and 

securing it to the vehicle before releasing 

it to the customer.

. . . . 

Judge Corodemus' conclusions were 

supported by the law and the factual record 
12 A-4692-14T3

developed during the arbitration hearing. No 

expert was required to add to Haigney's 

position that Bia's negligence in failing to 

properly secure the trailer was a proximate 

cause of the accident. And Judge Corodemus 

did not exceed her authority in rendering her 

final decision and allocating negligence[.]

. . . .

[T]he issue presented to Judge Corodemus was 

whether U-Haul was negligent and whether its 

negligence was a proximate casue of the 

accident. The fact that she based her 

decision on evidence developed during the 

arbitration hearing which indicated 

negligence for reasons other than those 

originally embraced by [Haigney], does not 

render her decision unenforceable.

Simply stated, Judge Corodemus was asked 

to render decisions on liability and damages 

based upon the evidence presented to her. She 

carefully considered the evidence and came to 

a reasonable conclusion that coincided with 

the credible evidence regarding the cause of 

the accident.

She assessed liability and apportioned it 

between the parties. She did not exceed her 

authority and did not consider or rule on 

issues that were not properly before her.

Addressing whether Judge Corodemus exceeded her authority and 

violated due process by barring rebuttal evidence, Judge Perri

found as follows:

U-Haul . . . attempts to equate evidentiary 

decisions to misconduct under 9 [U.S.C.A. §]

10(a)(3). And argues that Judge Corodemus 

denied U-Haul a fair hearing because she would 

not consider rebuttal evidence regarding the 

loading of the trailer. . . .
13 A-4692-14T3

This argument is simply without merit. 

As previously noted U-Haul's defense was based 

upon its claim that Haigney improperly loaded 

the trailer and that this was the sole 

proximate cause of the accident. During the 

course of the arbitration U-Haul offered 

extensive evidence on this issue and had the 

opportunity to cross examine Haigney.

It was unquestionably within Judge 

Corodemus' discretion to rule on evidence 

issues such as denying [U-Haul's] application 

to bar [Haigney's] expert witnesses, or in 

declining to permit as rebuttal tests that 

were performed by [U-Haul] while the 

arbitration hearing was ongoing. The fact 

that U-Haul was not given leave to present 

further cumulative evidence on the issue, did 

not deprive it of a fair hearing. And cannot 

even remotely be considered misconduct on the 

part of [Judge Corodemus]. . . . U-Haul . . . 

[has] not shown that such decisions were 

without basis or that they rise to the level 

of warranting the invalidation of the 

arbitration award.

This appeal followed.

Because a trial court's decision regarding an arbitration 

award is a decision of law, our review is de novo, but with a 

recognition of the wide authority bestowed upon the arbitrator by 

statute. Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 136 (App. 

Div. 2013) (citations omitted); Manger v. Manger, 417 N.J. Super.

370, 376 (App. Div. 2010); see also Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. 

Enserch Energy Servs., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying 

the de novo standard of review to an arbitration award), cert. 

denied, 546 U.S. 1089, 126 S. Ct. 1021, 163 L. Ed. 2d 852 (2006). 
14 A-4692-14T3

Essentially, we must determine whether the arbitrator and the 

trial court have each adhered to the requirements of the 

controlling statute. Minkowitz, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 136. 

The FAA is the controlling statute here. "Review of 

arbitration awards under the FAA is 'extremely deferential.'

Vacatur is appropriate only in 'exceedingly narrow'

circumstances[.]" Metromedia Energy, Inc., supra, 409 F.3d at 578 

(citations omitted). Under the FAA, a binding arbitration award 

may only be vacated :

(1) where the award was procured by 

corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or 

corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 

them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of 

misconduct in refusing to postpone the 

hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in 

refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 

material to the controversy; or of any other 

misbehavior by which the rights of any party 

have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their 

powers, or so imperfectly executed them that 

a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 

subject matter submitted was not made.

[9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a).]

Prior to Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 

U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008), it was widely 

accepted that a court could also vacate an award if the arbitrator 
15 A-4692-14T3

showed a manifest disregard for the law. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. 

v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969). Post-Hall Street, 

the Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law left open the question 

of whether the manifest disregard standard still applies. In any 

event, even if it does apply, to demonstrate manifest disregard, 

the party seeking to vacate an award must show that the arbitrator 

acknowledged and subsequently disregarded an explicit, wellsettled, and clearly applicable legal rule in making her decision.

Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, LLC. v. Smith, 389 F. 

App'x 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010). 

"Likewise, an arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly, 

factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to 

refuse to enforce the award." Metromedia Energy, Inc., supra, 409

F.3d at 578 (citation omitted). In reviewing an arbitration award, 

courts do not consider claims of factual or legal error by an 

arbitrator. Major League Umpire Ass'n v. Am. League of Prof'l

Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 

543 U.S. 1049, 125 S. Ct. 861, 160 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2005). "[T]here 

must be absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the 

arbitrator's determinations for a court to deny enforcement of an 

award." News Am. Publ'ns, Inc. Daily Racing Form Div. v. Newark 

Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990) 

(internal citations omitted).
16 A-4692-14T3

Further, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(3) cannot be read "to intend that 

every failure to receive relevant evidence constitutes misconduct 

which will require the vacation of an arbitrator's award." 

Sherrock Bros. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC, 260 F. App'x

497, 501 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 

18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968)).

9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(3) does not require arbitrators to hear all 

evidence proffered to them; an arbitrator is only required to 

provide parties with "an adequate opportunity to present its 

evidence and argument." Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120

F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997). Misconduct under 9 U.S.C.A. 10(a)(3)

"will not be found 'unless the aggrieved party was denied a 

fundamentally fair hearing.'" Vitarroz Corp. v. G. Willi Food 

Int'l Ltd., 637 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting 

Sherrock Bros., supra, 260 F. App'x at 501). 

On appeal, U-Haul does not allege that the liability award 

was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means, or that there 

was evident partiality or corruption. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(1)-(2). 

Rather, U-Haul argues that Judge Perri erred in confirming the 

arbitration award because Judge Corodemus exceeded her authority

and showed a manifest disregard for the law by finding liability 

on an issue not advanced by Haigney, for which it had no notice; 

and Judge Corodemus exceeded her authority and engaged in
17 A-4692-14T3

misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to 

the controversy. 

We find no merit in U-Haul's argument. The sole issue in 

this case was negligence, and that was the only issue Judge 

Corodemus decided. Haigney consistently asserted U-Haul's 

negligence based on deficient maintenance, inspection, and 

operation of the ball clamp and ball mount. Haigney relied in 

part, on the improper attachment theory, and advanced this theory

of liability well before the arbitration hearing in his discovery 

responses, placing U-Haul on notice it was an issue in this case. 

Further, the parties presented the improper attachment theory

during the arbitration hearing and in their post-hearing

submissions without objection. We agree with Judge Perri that 

Judge Corodemus' reliance on evidence developed during the 

arbitration hearing which indicated negligence for reasons other 

than those Haigney originally advanced did not render the 

liability award unenforceable. We are satisfied that Judge 

Corodemus did not consider or rule on issues that were not 

properly before her or show a manifest disregard for the law. She 

properly ruled on the sole issue – negligence.

Nor did Judge Corodemus exceed her authority or engage in

misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to 

the controversy. Haigney did not change his testimony at the 
18 A-4692-14T3

arbitration hearing. He did not testify at his deposition that 

he loaded the trailer unevenly, and he never deviated from his 

statement to the insurance investigator that he evenly distributed 

the load of cement bags. His arbitration testimony was consistent 

that he had evenly loaded the trailer, and was corroborated by 

Sic's testimony. 

In any event, AAA R-34 gave Judge Corodemus broad discretion 

to admit or bar evidence: "The arbitrator shall determine the 

admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered 

and may exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative 

or irrelevant." During the arbitration hearing, U-Haul presented 

extensive evidence and had the opportunity to cross-examine 

Haigney on how he loaded the trailer. The fact that Judge 

Corodemus declined to consider the three photographs did not 

deprive U-Haul of an adequate opportunity to present its evidence 

and argument, or deny it a fair hearing. 

Affirmed.