UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-4698

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN C. CURTISS, a/k/a Jay Curtiss, d/b/a Centerline Carbon 

Products,

Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (3:87-cr-00112-RLW-1)

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Argued: December 8, 2010 Decided: January 13, 2011

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Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. 

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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ARGUED: Amy Leigh Austin, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Benjamin L. Hatch, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, 

Patrick L. Bryant, Research and Writing Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

On December 14, 1987, Appellant John C. Curtiss was 

indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for mail fraud, 

false statements, false claims upon the United States and 

conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1341, 1001, 287 and 

286, respectively. The gravamen of all of the charges was that,

despite his debarment from entering into government contracts, 

Curtiss continued to engage in fraudulent contracting with a 

Department of Defense agency located in Virginia. 

Prior to trial, Curtiss moved to dismiss the indictment on 

the ground of improper venue. The district court denied the 

motion and a jury convicted Curtiss on all counts. Sentencing 

was scheduled for May 1988, but Curtiss absconded and was not 

apprehended until 2009. The proceedings resumed with a 

sentencing hearing on July 14, 2009. The district court 

sentenced Curtiss to a 15-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, 

Curtiss assigns error in the denial of his motion to dismiss and 

in the inadequacy of the district court’s statement of reasons 

for the sentence. We affirm. 

I. 

A.

The Defense General Supply Center (“DGSC”), located in the 

Eastern District of Virginia, procures and stores a variety of 
3

military supplies, including electrical contact brushes, which 

are devices designed to maintain electric currents in rotating 

machinery. Curtiss supplied DGSC with electrical contact brushes 

but was barred from doing so after he was convicted in 1983 of 

the unlawful sale of government property. The debarment order 

prohibited Curtiss from government contracting from February 22, 

1984 to December 28, 1986. 

After Curtiss was barred from government contracting, he

approached the owner of Sent Electric Company, Peter 

Kljucaricek, a/k/a Peter Kay, about using Sent Electric Company 

to make brush sales to the DGSC. Kay agreed to the arrangement

in return for a ten-percent commission on the sales. Around the 

same time, Curtiss’s wife registered a new company, Centerline 

Carbon Products, in her name in Michigan. Under the arrangement 

with Kay, Curtiss received information about brushes DGSC 

intended to purchase, prepared bids in the name of Centerline 

Carbon Products, and submitted them in the name of Sent Electric 

Company. When the government submitted a contract to Sent 

Electric Company, Kay would transfer the contracts to Centerline 

Carbon, which handled the stock selection, packing, labeling,

and shipping. As a result, Curtiss was able to continue to 

participate in the contracting process during his period of 

debarment. 
4

DGSC initiated an investigation after it received

complaints about the quality of the contact brushes. The 

investigation revealed that Curtiss would either select and ship 

less expensive, unauthorized brushes instead of the required 

brushes, or he would resell brushes from government surplus that 

he possessed, in violation of the contract.

B. 

On December 14, 1987, Curtiss was indicted in 21 counts for 

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; false statements, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; false claims upon the United 

States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287; and conspiracy to 

defraud the Department of Defense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

286. Each count alleged that the offense occurred within the 

Eastern District of Virginia prior to November 1, 1986. 

Curtiss filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment 

for improper venue, relying on constitutional provisions and 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.1

 1 Article III provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . 

shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 

committed.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. In addition, the 

Sixth Amendment provides that “[in] all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 

by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 

shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 18 codifies these principles: 

While Curtiss’s motion 

Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, 

the government must prosecute an offense in a 

(Continued)
5

did not seek a transfer of venue pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 21(b),2

At the conclusion of a three-day trial, the jury convicted 

Curtiss on all counts. Prior to sentencing, however, Curtiss 

absconded, and the district court issued a bench warrant for his 

arrest. Curtiss was not apprehended until March 25, 2009, more 

than twenty years after he fled. 

the government’s opposition stated in 

a footnote that Curtiss’s allegations “seem to fit the framework 

of that Rule.” J.A. 38. In its denial of Curtiss’s motion to 

dismiss, the district court cited law pertaining to 

constitutional venue principles and Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 18. 

When Curtiss was returned to Virginia for sentencing in 

2009, the government filed an updated sentencing memorandum, 

 

district where the offense was committed. The 

court must set the place of trial within the 

district with due regard for the convenience of the 

defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the 

prompt administration of justice.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. 

2 Rule 21(b) provides: 

Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may transfer 

the proceeding, or one or more counts, against that 

defendant to another district for the convenience of 

the parties, any victim, and the witnesses, and in the 

interest of justice.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b). 
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requesting a five-year term of imprisonment. At the sentencing 

hearing, Curtiss argued for a term of three to four years of 

imprisonment. The district court announced its sentence by 

stating:

Pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) . . . I 

sentence Mr. Curtiss to a total term of 15 years, 

consisting of five years on count one, five years on 

count two, and five years on count three, all to run 

consecutively to each other; and ten years on count 21 

to run concurrently to the 15-year term imposed on 

counts one, two and three. 

J.A. 655. On the remaining counts, the court suspended sentence

and placed Curtiss on five years of supervised release upon his 

release from prison. Curtiss noted a timely appeal, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II. 

A.

Curtiss first maintains that the district court committed 

error in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for 

improper venue.3

 3 The government urges us to decline to consider Curtiss’s 

appeal of the denial of his venue challenge based on the 

fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The fugitive disentitlement 

doctrine generally provides that federal courts “have authority 

to dismiss an appeal . . . if the party seeking relief is a 

fugitive while the matter is pending.” Degen v. United States, 

517 U.S. 820, 824 (1996). In addition, although Curtiss had not 

yet appealed (for he had not been sentenced) at the time he 

absconded, courts have the authority to dismiss a criminal 

He notes that many of the events related to the 

(Continued)
7

government contracting offenses occurred outside of Virginia, 

and that the scheme he created originated in Michigan, where 

Curtiss, his wife, and Kay resided. 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to 

dismiss for improper venue. See Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 

405 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 

(4th Cir. 1993). When multiple counts are alleged in an 

indictment, venue must be proper on each count. United States v. 

Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 2001). The government bears 

the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence. 

United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005). 

As mentioned, the Constitution sets forth the basic 

parameters for venue in a criminal case. Under Article III, 

“[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State 

where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. 

art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 

district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”). Federal 

 

appeal under the doctrine where there is some nexus between “a 

defendant’s [prior] fugitive status and his appeal.” OrtegaRodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 249 (1993). We 

conclude that Curtiss’s venue challenge plainly lacks merit. 

Therefore, we decline to apply the fugitive disentitlement 

doctrine in this case. 
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 reiterates this principle: “Unless 

a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must 

prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was 

committed.” Together, these provisions “protect the defendant 

from bias, disadvantage, and inconvenience in the adjudication 

of the charges against him.” United States v. Johnson, 510 F.3d 

521, 524 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ebersole, 411 F.3d at 524).

In keeping with these principles, Congress may prescribe 

specific venue requirements for a particular crime. Johnson, 510

F.3d at 524. If Congress adopts such a statute imposing venue 

requirements, “that provision must be honored (assuming, of 

course, that it satisfies the constitutional minima.)” Id.

(quoting United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir. 

2004)). In addition, federal law provides that venue is proper 

in any district where an offense was begun, continued or

completed. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). 

Here, venue in the Eastern District of Virginia was proper 

for each count. Venue was proper for the mail fraud counts 

because Curtiss caused DGSC to mail contract payments from the 

Eastern District of Virginia. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (noting venue 

is proper, among other places, where a defendant causes a letter 

to be placed in an authorized depository for mail); United 

States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 632-33 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); 

see also 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) (“Any offense involving the use of 
9

the mails . . . may be . . . prosecuted in any district from, 

through, or into which such commerce, mail matter, or imported 

object or person moves.”).

Venue was proper for the false statement counts because 

Curtiss made and used false documents knowing they contained 

materially false information, and these documents were filed in 

the Eastern District of Virginia. See Blecker, 657 F.2d at 636-

37 (noting venue is proper where the claims were prepared, where 

the claims were received by the government, or where the 

defendant causes the government to place the funds in the mail); 

see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 

1991) (noting venue is proper under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 either 

where documents were prepared or filed). 

Similarly, venue was proper for the false claims counts 

because Curtiss made and used false documents knowing they 

contained materially false information, and these documents were 

presented to the government in the Eastern District of Virginia.

See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (noting venue is proper in any district in 

which the claims were made, prepared or presented to the 

government). Finally, venue was proper for the conspiracy count 

because overt acts in furtherance of the charged conspiracy were 

committed in the Eastern District of Virginia. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3237(a) (Where a crime is “begun in one district and completed 

in another, or committed in more than one district,” federal law 
10

permits prosecution “in any district in which such offense was 

begun, continued, or completed.”). 

Curtiss argues, in the alternative, that even assuming 

venue was proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, the 

district court should have transferred the case to the Eastern 

District of Michigan pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 21 and abused its discretion in failing to do so. 

However, Curtiss waived any argument concerning transfer of 

venue by failing to seek such a transfer pursuant to Rule 21. 

United States v. Sorce, 308 F.2d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 1962); see 

also United States v. Blackwell, 946 F.2d 1049 (4th Cir. 1991)

(“[B]ecause defendants failed to request a retransfer of the 

prosecution . . . under Rule 21(b), we may not review whether 

the proceedings properly should have gone forward there.”). 

For the reasons set forth above, it is plain that venue in 

the Eastern District of Virginia was proper for each count of 

the indictment and the district court properly so concluded. 

B.

Curtiss next asserts that his sentence should be vacated 

and the case remanded for resentencing because the district 

court erred by failing to give individualized reasons for the 

sentence imposed. However, the district court was not required 

to abide by the requirements surrounding the Sentencing 

Guidelines, and therefore was not required to give 
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individualized reasons. This is because all of the offenses of 

conviction were completed prior to the effective date of the 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1987 and thus, before the Sentencing 

Guidelines became applicable. 

The United States Sentencing Guidelines “apply only to 

offenses committed after” November 1, 1987. Sentencing Act of 

1984, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2(a); United States v. Munoz, 974 

F.2d 493, 495 n.* (4th Cir. 1992) (“Since [the defendant’s] 

crimes were committed before November 1, 1987, the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to this case.”). Here, § 

3553(c) is inapplicable because all of Curtiss’s offenses were 

committed and completed before November 1, 1987.

Consequently, we review the district court’s sentence as it 

would have been reviewed prior to the implementation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Prior to the implementation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, broad discretion was given to sentencing 

courts to consider a wide range of information concerning the 

background, character, and conduct of defendants. Munoz, 974 

F.2d at 495; Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) 

(observing that sentencing courts may consider “any and all 

information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence 

for the particular defendant, given the crime committed”); 

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (“[A] sentence 

imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, 
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is generally not subject to review.”). Further, a district court 

can consult the Guidelines to “to inform a pre-Guidelines 

sentence.” United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir. 

1991). 

Here, the district court’s statement of reasons was 

sufficient under governing law. While the district court stated 

that it found that “the sentence imposed is fair and appropriate 

for this defendant in light of the requirements of 18 United 

States Code section 3553(a),” the fact the district court 

mentioned the inapplicable Sentencing Guidelines framework is 

not dispositive. See Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740. The district court 

adopted the presentence report without change. The presentence 

report indicated that the correct statutory framework for 

Curtiss’s sentencing was governed by pre-Guidelines legal 

principles. In addition, the sentence imposed was within the 

statutory limits. Consequently, the district court committed no 

error in sentencing Curtiss.

III. 

For the reasons stated, we hold that the district court did 

not err in denying Curtiss’s motion to dismiss the indictment 

for improper venue. In addition, we hold that the district court
13

did not err in fashioning Curtiss’s sentence. Accordingly, the 

judgment is 

AFFIRMED.