[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-10893

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00037-SPC-CM

GLENN LEE SELDEN, 

 Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

ELIZABETH M. WARREN, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(April 3, 2020)

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Glen Selden, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his construed 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus as an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition and denial of his 

post-judgment motion for release. After careful review, we affirm.

Selden filed a § 2254 petition in 2010 in which he challenged his convictions 

for armed burglary and grand theft and resulting sentence. The district court 

denied the petition as untimely and, alternatively, as meritless. Selden then filed 

several additional pleadings construed as § 2254 petitions, including the instant

filing, which the district court construed as a pro se § 2254 petition. Construed 

liberally, the petition alleged that Selden was entitled to release from prison. The 

district court dismissed this petition for lack of jurisdiction because it was 

successive and he had not first obtained authorization from this Court under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to file it.1

 After the district court entered its judgment, Selden 

filed a “Demand of Immediate Release Pending Appeal,” which the district court 

construed as a motion for release and denied, concluding that the motion presented 

no grounds for Selden’s release. Selden has appealed.

1 The court dismissed the petition without prejudice to permit Selden to seek 

authorization from this Court to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. Selden has not done 

so.

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We review de novo a district court’s determination that a habeas petition is 

second or successive. Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 

2011). We review the denial of a post-judgment motion for an abuse of discretion. 

Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). Although 

“we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a 

pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 

(11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provides that, 

before an inmate in custody due to a state court judgment can file a “second or 

successive” federal habeas petition under § 2254, the inmate must “move in the 

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider 

the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In general, a “district judge lacks 

jurisdiction to decide a second or successive petition filed without our 

authorization.” Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2014). 

We recognize that the phrase “second or successive” is “not self-defining” 

and does not “refer to all habeas applications filed second or successively in time.” 

Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859. To determine whether an inmate’s petition is second or 

successive, we look to whether the petitioner filed a federal habeas petition 

challenging the same judgment. Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1279. If so, then a second 

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petition is successive if the first was denied or dismissed with prejudice. Guenther 

v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). A dismissal for untimeliness is a 

dismissal with prejudice. See Jordan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1353 

(11th Cir. 2007).

Here, the district court determined that Selden’s present petition was barred 

as second or successive. On appeal, Selden’s brief only addresses why he is 

entitled to habeas relief, not whether the district court erred in dismissing his 

unauthorized, successive petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Selden

thus has abandoned any such argument. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. 

Even construing Selden’s pro se brief as a challenge to the district court’s 

dismissal of Selden’s present petition for lack of jurisdiction, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in dismissing the petition. The petition was impermissibly 

successive because it challenged the same state sentence as his first § 2254 

petition, which was dismissed as untimely. Because Selden failed to obtain leave 

from this Court to file his current petition, the district court properly dismissed it 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1278. We 

therefore cannot review the substantive challenges that Selden has raised in his 

present petition. Finally, because the district court correctly determined that it had 

no authority to address Selden’s petition, the court was within its discretion to deny 

Selden’s motion for release. We therefore affirm both of the district court’s orders. 

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AFFIRMED.

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