### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00388- CV

Jim m ie Lue c ke Chi ldr e n P ar tn e r ship , Lt d., App e lla nt
v. Elain e P runcutz, John Pr uncutz and Am y P ete rs, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LEE COUNTY , 21ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 11,936 , HO NORAB LE DON B . MO RGAN, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellee s Elaine Pruncutz, her husba nd J ohn Pruncutz, and her daug hter Amy Peters (collec tively , “Pruncutz”) f iled suit seeking to have a 5 2 5.39-ac re tra ct of land pa rtitioned in kind betwee n their i ntere sts and the interest owned by appellant, the Jimm ie L

uecke Children Partnership, L td. (“the Par

tnership”) . After

Pruncutz moved for a no- evidenc e summary judgme nt, the trial court gra nted summary

judgme nt determining the owner ship interests of the pa rties, finding that the proper ty was susce ptible to pa rt i t i o n in kind, and order ing that Elaine Pruncutz’s share of the proper ty should i n cl u d e t h e h o u se located on the prope rty , in which she ha d lived since 1980 a nd wh ic h s he and

he r h us ba nd cla im ed as t

he ir ho me ste a d. Th e Part

ne rs hip a pp e a ls, arguin g that it prese nted evidenc e ra ising a fac t issue as to whether the proper ty is susc eptible to pa

rtition in kind2

and that the issue of

partitionability

should be deter

mined by a jury . We affir

m the trial court’ s jud g me nt.
Bac kgr ound

Th e pa rt ie s a g re e on

the fa c ts und e rl y ing thi s disp ute
. El a ine Pr un c utz a nd he r l a te hu sb and B e rn ard Pe te rs bo ug ht the pr op e rt y in 19 73
. I mpr ov e me nts on the pr op e rt

y inc lud e a ho us e in which Elaine ha s lived since 1980, stock pens, and corr als. I n 1983, Elaine and B erna rd conve y ed a 50% inter est in the proper ty to J immie L uecke , who later convey ed that interest to the Partne rship. I n 1988, E l ai n e and B erna rd conve y ed a 12.5% interest to their son, Timothy Peters, who in turn convey ed his in te r e s t t o h is s is te r , A my Pe te r s . A f

te r B e r n ar d d ie d in 1 9 9 5 , o w n e r s h ip o f

the pr op e rt y pa sse d to El a ine . E la ine la te r marr ie d J oh n Prunc utz. He r 37. 5% int e re st in th e pr op e rt y is he r se pa

ra te pr op e rt

y , bu t sh e and John Pr

un c utz liv e in the ho us e and have ma de it the ir ho me ste a d. Th e Part

ne rs hip us e s th e pr op e rt

y fo r a c a ttl e op e ratio n, and

the pa rt ie s r e c e ive inc ome from roa dway

ag ree ments with oil and ga s companies that have oper ations on the proper ty . The parties a g ree that the Partner ship owns a 50% interest, Elaine Pruncutz owns a 37.5% intere st, and Am y Pe te rs ow ns a

12 .5 % i nte re st. Th e on ly dis pu te is w hethe r th e pro per ty is s us c e pti ble to partition in kind, as a

rg ued by Pruncutz, or must be partitioned by sale, a s argued by

the Partner ship. I n J uly 2001, Pruncutz filed a petit ion to partition the property in kind. After discovery was conducte d, Pruncutz moved for summary judgme nt a sserting the rig ht to pa rtition and
c on te nd ingthat th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e that th e land wa s n ot s us c e pti ble to part iti on in k ind . Pr un c utz argued that the Partnership, which opposed in-kind partition and would have the burden of proof at3

trial to show that the proper ty is not susceptible to partition in kind, failed to produce e vidence on the issue. The tria l court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

Pruncut z, finding that the Partnership owns a

50 % u n d i v i ded intere st in the property and that the a

ppellees tog ether

own an
un div ide d 5 0% int e re st c on sis tin g of a 37 .5 % i nte re st o wn e d b y

El a ine Pr un c utz a nd a 12 .5 % i nte re st owned by Amy Peters. The co u rt further found that Elaine’ s homestead include s the house and order ed that Elaine ’s share of the prope rty should include the house. The court found that the proper ty is susceptible to partition i n k i n d and appointed three c ommissi oners to par tition t he pr op e rt y in ac c or da

nc e wi th the pe rc e nta g e int e re st o wn e d b y e a c h p art y . O n a pp e a l, t he Part ne rs hip d o e s n o t d is p u te th e o w n e r s h ip in te r e s ts o f th e p arti e s o r th e h o me s te a d c la im o f E la in e Pr u n c u tz
. I ts sole issue is that the trial court er red in findingthe prope rty susceptible to par

tition i n kind.
Stand ard of Review A “no-e vidence ” summary judgme nt is essentially a pre trial direc ted ver dict. King Ranch , Inc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003). The movant f or a no- evidenc e summary judgme nt ne ed not pr ove her rig ht to judg ment as a matter of law on a cla im or defe nse, but instead simply asser

ts that the re is no evidenc e of one or more e ssential elements of a claim or de fense on wh ic h th e op po sin g pa

rt y wi ll h a ve the burd e n o f p ro of a t tr ia l. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); Holmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). We revie w a tria l court’s g rant of
su mma ry jud g me nt b y

c on sid e ri ngthe e vid e nc e in t he li ght mo st fav or a

ble to t he no n- mov a nt, disreg arding all contra

ry evidenc e and infere nces. King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. A no-e vidence summary judgme nt is proper ly g rante d if the non-movant does not pr oduce more than a scintilla of4

probative evidence raising an is sue of materia l fac t as t o an essential element of a cla im on which the no n- mov ant wo uld have the burd e n of pr oo f a t tr ia l. Te x. R. Civ
. P. 1 66 a (i ); King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. More tha n a scintilla of ev i d en ce e x ists when the evidenc e supporting a finding
wo uld enable r easona

ble and f air-minded pe ople to differ in their conc lusions. Ki n g R a nch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. C onverse ly , less than a scintilla of evide nce e x ists when the evidenc e does no more than cr eate a surmise or suspicion of a fa ct, and the le g al ef

fec t is that there is no evidence
. Id . The non-movant nee d not “marsha l its proof,” but it must poi nt to evidence ra i s i n g a gen u ine issue of
ma te ri a l f a c t. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ) c mt. The propert y code allows a joint owner or claimant of a

n interest in a piec e of r eal proper ty to “compe l a partition of t he int ere st or the prope rty among the joint owners or c laimants,” Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 23.001 ( W es t 2000), and that rig ht to partition is absolut e. Moseley v. He arre ll , 171 S.W. 2d 33 7, 33 8 (T e x. 19 43 ); Dierschk e v. Central Nat’l Branch of F irst N at’l Bank , 876 S.W .2d 377, 380 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ). When the rig ht to p ar t i tion is i nvoked, the trial cour

t must determine the intere st owned by eac h owner , any questions of law or e quity , and wh e the r t he pr op e rt

y is s us c e pti ble to p art iti on . T e x. R. Civ. P. 760 , 761
. I f the c ourt fi nd s th a t a fair a nd equitable pa

rtition can be made, the cour t should order the pa

rtition, specify

ing e ach pa

rty ’s int e rest, and a

pp oin t di sin te re ste d c omm iss ion e rs to d ivi de the pr op e rt y in a c c or da

nc e wi th t ho se int e re sts . T e x. R. C iv. P. 761
. I f part iti on in k ind wo uld be un fa ir or ine qu ita ble , th e pr op e rt

y sh a ll be sold and the pr ocee ds divided acc ording to the parties’ respe ctive shar es. Tex. R. Ci v. P. 770.

The lawfavor s partition in kind over partition by

sale. Cecola v. Rule

y , 12 S.W .3d 848, 853 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). How ever , a party opposing partition need not show5

that land is phy sically

incapa ble of pa rtition. See id . at 855. Rather, the presumption in favor of partition in kind may

be over come b y ev i d en ce that the opposing party would incur substantial economic loss bec ause the value of its divi ded shar e would be materia lly less than its share of the undivided whole. Id
. Discussion

Partition in ki nd is favore d over pa rtiti o n b y s ale, and the par ty opposing in-kind partition has the burden of proof on this issue at trial. Id. at 853-54. The ref ore, to de feat Pruncutz’s
n o -e v i d en ce m o t i o nfo r s u m m ar y j u d gm en t , t h e P ar t n er s h i p wa s re qu i re d t o p ro d u ce en o u gh
e vid e nc e to a llo w re a so na ble min ds to dif

fe r o n w he the r a

fa ir and e qu ita ble div isi on

of the pr op e rt

y could be made
. The Partne rship offe red a s evidenc e two of i t s re sponses to Pruncutz’s discovery reque sts and the af

fidavit of Ji mmie Luecke . Pruncutz c orre ctly notes that the Partner ship’s answer s to a re quest for disclosure and to inter rog atories may not serve a s summary judgme nt evidence
. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 197.3 (answe rs t o interrog atories may only be used a g ainst responding party ); Y ates v. Fisher , 988 S.W .2d 730, 731 (Tex. 1999) (same ); Jeffrey v. Larry Plotnick Co. , 532 S.W .2d 99, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1975, no writ) (answer s to reque sts for admissions and interrog atories
c an b e us e d only a g a ins t re sp on din g pa rt y ). Th e re fo re , only Lue c ke ’s a ff ida vit re ma ins a s p os sib le
e vid e nc e de fe a tin g Pr

un c utz’ s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt. I n his affidavit, L

uecke asser

ts f ive arguments ag ainst partition in kind: (1) limi ted
acc ess to one of the halves would result in a dim inution in t he value of the inac cessible tra ct; (2) theTh e Te xas P ro pe rt y Cod e pr ov ide s th a t c omm iss ion e rs sh a ll g ra nt a n on e xclu siv e a c c e ss 1 ease ment to allow for ingr ess and e g ress among pa rtitioned tracts, whic h sug g ests that acc ess issues have be en re solved by statute and do not, without more, im pair the ability to partition in kind. See Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 23.006( a) ( West S upp. 2004-05). 6 roadw ay ag ree ments with oil and g as companies would result in a n inequitable division of the two tr a c ts; (3 ) inv e stm e nts ma de by Pr un c utz t o th e ho us e and

inv e stm e nts ma de by

the Part ne rs hip in the fo rm of c a ttl e pe ns and

c or ra ls w ou ld m a ke pa

rt iti on in k ind “ imp ra c tic a l” and

“ wo uld re su lt i n
a dim inutio n in the va lue of the tw o tra c ts” ; (4) the hig he st an d b e st u se of the pr op e rt

y wo uld be to maintain it a s one larg e trac t; a nd (5) oil a

nd g as production wells located on various parts of the land make the f

air division of the surface estate “ toge ther with the minera ls . . . an impossibi lity .” Ho we ve r, a s summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e , L

ue c ke ’s a ff

ida vit is d e fe c ti ve bec a

us e it p re se nts his subjective beliefs and conclusions without pr oviding supportingfac ts. See Tex as Div.-Tranter , Inc.

v . Ca rrozza , 8 7 6 S
. W
. 2 d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994) (“Ca rrozza’s subjective be liefs ar e no more than conclusions and a

re not c ompetent summary judgme nt evidence .”); R i

z ka l l a h v. C

onner , 952 S.W .2d 580, 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (“A conc lusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying fac ts that suppor t the conclusion. Conclusory statements in affidavits are not proper a s summary

judgme nt proof if ther e ar e no fa cts to support the conc lusions.”). F or e a c h o f h is po int s, Lue c ke fa ils to p ro vid e fa c ts s up po rt inghis c on c lus ion s. Lue c ke a sse rt s th a t be c a

us e of lim ite d ac c e ss to the pr op e rt y , “ pa rt iti on int o tw o tr a c ts w ou ld r e su lt in diminut ion in value to one of the t rac ts,” but does not point to any evidenc e that the land c annot be d iv id e d

in s u c h a w ay th a t b o th p arti e s r e ta in

a c c e s s . T h e s a me d e f

e c t a p p li e s to th e issues 1 related to the roa dway ag ree ments and oil a nd g as we lls and to L uecke ’s asser tion that because ofFu rt h er , we n o t e t h at t h e mi n er al ri gh t s ar e no tat i s s u e i nt h i s s u i t
. I nm ak i n g i t s ru l i n g, 2 t h e t r i a l c o u rts t a t e d

t h a tt h e p r o p e rt y a f

f e c t e d b y t h e j u d g m e n ti s t h e s u r f a c e e s t a t e o n l y. The pa rties in Ce c ola eac h owned a n undivided 50% intere st in a .257-ac re strip of la nd 3 40 fee t wide by

280 fee t long. Cecola v. Rule y , 12 S.W .3d 848, 851 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). A surveyor testified that beca use of the proper

ty ’s narr ow dimensions, it was inc apable of y ielding two e conomically viable units. Id . at 85 5. Th e surv e y or te sti fi e d that the hig he st a nd be st use wa s to sell it to the adjoining, landlocked pr operty owner . Id . at 854. The e x pert fur ther testified that th e va lue of

the un div ide d p ro pe rt

y wa s worth

$1 ,2 50 to $ 2, 50 0, wh e re a s th e div ide d tr a c ts would have no value. Id
. at 8 5 6
. Fo l l o wi n g Ce c ola , this Court recently upheld a tria l court’s ruling that a 100-a cre proper

ty was not subject to par

tition i n kind among 3 1 h ei rs , s o me with share s as small as 1/ 728th of t he whole. Tay lor v . H ill , No. 03-03-00540- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 5747, at *1 (Austin J uly 1, 2004, no pet.) (me mo. op.). As in Ce c ola , partition in kind was shown under the fa c ts to be ma te ri a lly un fa ir , and re qu ir ing a pa rt iti on in k ind wo uld de pr ive the sma lle st i nte re st holders of a

ny value in their inhe ritance
. Id . at *9. 7 the “ size and

loc a tio n” of

the pr op e rt

y , th e “ hig he st a

nd be st u se ” of the land wo uld be to m a int a in i tas o n e l ar ge t ra ct
. T h e a ff i d av i t cl ai m s t h at “a n y p ar t i t i o n wh i ch at t em p t ed t o d i v i d e t h e a cr ea ge would result in a disproportionate compensa tion to the acre ag e which r ece ived the roa dway s” but prese nts no facts to s u p p ort this conclusion. The af fidavit does not desc ribe the loc ation of the
ro a dw ay s o r t

h e w e l l s or

ind ic a te wh y

the se c ha ra c te ri sti c s n e c e ssa

ri ly pr e ve nt t he 52 5- a c re pr op e rt

y 2 fr o m being divided equitably . I n Ce c ola , the par ty opposing in-kind pa

rtition offere d an expert’s
re po rt to e xpla in h owlim ite d a c c e ss a nd the sma ll s ize and

lim ite d use fu lne ss o f t

he pr op e rt

y supported his conc lusion that in-kind partition was impractica ble and that the “hig hest and best use” of the pr op e rt

y wa s to ma int a in i t a s o ne un div ide d tr a c t. See 12 S.W .3d at 854-56. I n this case, 3 howeve r, L

uecke ’s af

fidavit mere ly

asser ts that partition in kind would result in l imited acce ss that
w o u ld mate r ia ll y

a f f e c t t h e v a lu e o f

th e d iv id e d

p r o p e rty an d inv it e s o n ly s u r mi s e a s to w h y

th e “ s iz e and location” of the prope rty leads to t he conclusion that its highe st and best use i s to rema in as oneThe Partne rship corr ectly notes that as non-mova

nt, it is not require d to “marsha l” its proof, 4 bu t it mus t “ po int

ou t” e vid e nc e ra isi nga

fa c t is su e to de fe a t a

no -e vid e nc e mot ion . T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 6 6 a (i) cmt.; see Pe rez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of T ex. , Inc. , 1 2 7 S. W. 3 d

8 2 6 , 8 3 2 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied)
. T h e P ar t n er s h i p , ci t i n g Rayson v. J ohns , note s tha t the iss ue of wh e the r l and

c an b e fa ir ly 5 partitioned i s a q u es t i o n to be deter mined by a finde r of f

act a fter a full evidentiary

hear ing. 524 S.W .2d 380, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1975, writ ref

’d n.r.e.)
. Howeve r, the rig ht to have a jury deter mine that question presuppose s that the evidenc e “is c onflicting or admits of more tha n one infe renc e.” Id . I n Rayson , the party opposing partition in kind offer ed evide nce that the trac t w a s n o t s u s c e p ti b le to a f a ir d iv is io n in k in d , th

u s r a is in g a f

a c t issue. Id
. at 3 83. Her e, the Partnership ha s not offer ed any evidenc e ra ising a

n issue as to the equity

of par tition i n kind. 8 52 5- a c re un it. B e c a

us e Lue c ke fa ils to pr ov ide any sp e c if ic s to su pp or t his a sse rt ion s, the a ff

ida vit , the Partner ship’s sole piece of evide nce, is not compe tent summary judgme nt evidence
. 4 Even if we wer e to consider the af fidavit as competent summary judgme nt evidence , the Partner ship has not met its burden of ra isin g a genuine issue of fac t on the issue of pa rt iti on a bil ity . L ue c ke ’s a ff

ida vit le a ds no t to a c on c lus ion or e ve n a sur mis e tha t th e pr op e rt

y is
no t su sc e pti ble to b e ingpa rtit ion e d in

kin d b ut i ns te a d le a ds me re ly to a c on c lus ion

that a fa ir pa rt iti on woul d n e e d to take c e rt a in m a tte rs of e qu ity int o a c c ount ( e.g. , the value of the roa dway ag ree ments and t h e re l at ive values of the Pruncutz homestead and the cattle pe ns and cor rals). 5 Lu e c k e c la im s in

h is a ffid a v it

th a t “ [a ] d iv is io no f

p r o p e rty w h ic h a tt e mp te d

to p e r mi t [ Pr u n c u tz ] to r e ta in h e r i nte re st i n th e c la ime d h ome ste a d a nd on e -h a lf of t he pro pe rt

y wo uld be a ma te ri a lly
u n f a i r d i v i s i o no f

p r o p e r t y . ” Lu e c k e an d

t h e P art n e r s h i p s u g g e s tt h a tt h e p art i t i o ni n t o t w o f i f t yp e r c e n t s h ar e s w o u ld r e qu ir e th e c o u rt to d ivide the acreage in half, which, c onsidering the value of th e h o me s te a d

an d o th e r im p r o v e me n ts , mi g h t r e s u lt in th e Pa rtn e r s h ip ’ s p o rti o nb eing substantially

diminis hed in value. However , the proc edure for pa rtitioning prope rty

in kind allows9

a cour t and commi ssioners to take a ll issues of value and e quity into consideration whe n dividing land amongparties. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 7 60 , 7 68 (c omm iss ion e rs sh a ll div ide pr op e rt y int o appropr iate number

of shar es, “ha

ving due re gar d in the division t o the situation, quantity and advanta g es of e ach s h ar e, so that the share s may be equa l in value, as ne arly as may be to the respe ctive intere sts of the parties e ntitled”).

Th e dist ri c t c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e c omm iss ion e rs to d ivi de the pr op e rt y a c c or din g to the share s of the par

ties, not by lot. Following the instructions of the cour t, the commissioners have the a uth or ity to d e te rm ine ho w t o p art iti on a pr op e rt y so a s to e qu a lize the va lue of the pa rt ie s’ share s. See Y

tur ria v . Ki mb ro , 9 21 S.W. 2d 33 8, 34 3 (Tex . App .— Cor pu s Ch ri sti 19 96 , n o w ri t) (“ Matte rs of

va lu a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y i tse lf and ob je c tiv e c on sid e ra

tio ns c on c e rn ingthe be st
mann e r o f d ivi din g the pr op e rt y in a c c or da

nc e wi th t

he ins tr uc tio ns g iven [ by th e co ur t] wh ile reta ining the hig hest value f or the partitioned trac ts, a re e ntrusted to the commissioners and not the judge or jury .”). I f, af

ter the c ommissi oners make a dete rmination, the Partner ship feels a g g rieve d by the mann e r i n w hic h th e pr op e rt y ha s bee n part iti on e d, it may a pp e a l th e c omm iss ion e rs ’ r e po rt
. Tex. R. Civ. P . 771; Y

tur ria , 921 S.W .2d at 344. Thus, the Partne rship’s conc erns se em pre mature. Ra the r t ha n p ro vid inga

sc int ill a of e vid e nc e to s ho w the pr op ert y canno t be fa ir ly and e qu ita bly divided, the Partner ship through L uecke ’s af

fidavit mere ly

lists factors, unsupported by fac ts, that sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d b y

the c omm iss ion e rs in a sse ssi ngand e qu a lizin g the va lue of

the tw o tr a c ts. The Partne rship could ra ise these issues in objections to the commissioners’ rec ommendations, but at this tim e, it has not offe red pr obative evide nce that partition in kind would result in a substantial d i m i n u t i o ni nt h e v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e rt y.10 Conclusion The Partnership failed to pr ovide more than a scintilla of evidenc e that partitioning the prope rty

in kind would r esult in substantial economic loss or materia lly impair the value of the land . T he re fo re , w e ov e rr ule its iss ue and

a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s su mma ry jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 21, 2005