RAIL REPAIR IN BOSNIA 
By Major Gcncrcrl Rohert B. Flowers 

Conzmarzdant, U.S. Army Engirzeer School 

ENFORCE was a great success this year, with the Next, I invite you all to a conference this fall that will be 

Engineer Tattoo being one of the most memorable just as rewarding as ENFORCE. A mine warfare symposium 

highlights in an event-filled week. I want to thank sponsored by the Association of the United States Army 

everyone for their long hours and hard work and for paying (AUSA) will be held at Southwest Missouri State University 

attention to the small details to ensure everything went [SMSU] in Springfield and at Fort Leonard Wood. The 

smoothly. I am proud that Fort Leonard Wood was able purpose of the conference is twofold: to showcase how the 

again to shine and demonstrate that it is one of the Army's United States is leading the international effort to demine the 

premier installations. (See article, page 13.) A job well done world; and then, after an introduction to our current mine 

by all. doctrine, to conduct a live-fire demonstration of two selfDuring his speech at ENFORCE, LTG Ballard destructing [SD] mine systems. Final dates and details will 

announced the new regimental vision encompassing the follow. 

entire corps and stressed the importance of everyone The first day, at SMSU, will include a series of 

participating in the process to develop a truly comprehensive lectures and displays. Presentations will cover the 

vision. I echo our chiefs comments and expect everyone to spectrum of the entire landmine debate, from official 

get involved: read the vision, think about it, and provide 

feedback. The future of our Corps and its mission in service 

to the nation lie in the balance. So, take the time and become 

part of the future. The easiest way to do this is from the 

USAEC home page at www.wood.army.mil. Use the hotlink 

and go directly to the regimental vision to read and comment 

about the work to date. The candidate vision statement is: 

The Engineer Regiment: 

w The World's premier engineering organization 

Our vision must encompass all members of the regiment 

(active and reserve, officer and enlisted, DA civilian and 

contractor, associations and retirees). 

w FuU-spectrum engineer force 

We must be capable of meeting future engineering tasks 

across all conditions of peacetime and wartime. 

Vital member of Army and Joint Teams 

The regiment is successful only if those we support 

recognize that we are integral to their mission success. 

Values-based, respected, responsive, reliable 

In all we do, we must embody Army values and the 

Essayons spirit. 

Meeting tomorrow's challenges-relevant to our 

National Military Strategy 

Throughout our history Army engineers have responded 

to the changing needs of the nation. We must continue this 

proud heritage by ensuring our regiment is fully engaged in 

proactively changing for the future. 

policy and training of deminers to treating and 

rehabilitating mine victims. The capstone for the day will 

be a mediated panel discussion representing all views on 

the use and utility of mines today and in the future. 

Topics to be debated will include the defense of our ally, 

the Republic of Korea; the responsible use and need of 

tactical SD mine systems; and feasible courses of action 

to eliminate the suffering caused by mines already in the 

ground. In preparation, 1 recommend reading an excellent 

article from the May 1998 issue of Proceedings titled 

"Landmines, Lies and Other Phenomena," by MG [R] J. 

D. Lynch, U.S. Marine Corps. 

The next day, at Fort Leonard Wood, will center on the 

live fire of two SD mine systems, the Volcano and the 

Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS). Following an 

introduction to their current tactical uses, both will be 

deployed. After the mine systems self-destruct, refreshments 

will be served downrange to clearly demonstrate the 

weapons' reliability. This is a unique training opportunity to 

see firsthand weapon systems used exclusively in tactical 

situations in high-intensity conflicts. We have already 

received inquiries from combat leaders who wish to see this 

demonstration, and I hope to also see many from the 

Engineer Regiment. 

I have been your commandant for the last year and every 

day just gets better. From our dedicated civilian work force 

to the high quality of new soldiers entering the Army here, I 

am very impressed and pleased. Whether active, reserve, 

national guard, civilian, or retired, we have the best 

personnel here at Fort Leonard Wood. 
GJuly 1998 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 28 PB 5-98-3 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 

COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT 

Major General Robert B. Flowers 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer Morgan 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

DENNIS J. REIMER 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

04795 

Front Cover: Destroyed railroad bridge at 

Brcko, Bosnia (see article on page 2.) 

Back Cover: A historical example of the Army 

value "Duty." 

FEATURES 

2 NATO Rail Operations in the Balkans 

By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Toomey 

7 Planning Engineer Support for a MOUT Attack 

By Captain John C. DeJarnette 

13 ENFORCE Breakout Session Summaries 

By Lieutenant Colonel Susan Myers and the ENFORCE Team 

21 Standardized Training Using Engineer Qualification Tables 

By Sergeant First Class Russell Marth 

22 Commissioned Officer Development and Career 

Management: Engineer Chapter of DA Pam 600-3 Revised 

By Major David Hartley and Captain Aaron Walter 

24 Who Are Engineer Warrant Officers? 

By CW4 Clinton Parker, CW4 Fred Tressler, and CW4 Gilbert 

Rios 

32 Sidewinder Team Situation Report 

By Lieutenant Colonel Richard Graves 

36 Improving Digitized Engineer Communications 

By Captain Daniel R. Smith 

40 Engineer Support to Engagement Area Development 

By Major Kenneth J. Crawford 

46 The Command Post SOP: A Blueprint for Success 

By Captain Eric R. Price and Captain Jay A. Hedstrom 

49 The Origins of Military Mines: Part 1 

By Major William C. Schneck 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside front cover: Clear the Way 

12 Letter to the Editor 34 Engineer Safety 

26 CTC Notes 39 PERSCOM Notes 

31 Maneuver Support Battle 56 Engineer Update 

Lab News 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by the U.S. Army Engineer 

School, 320 Engineer Loop, Suite 370. Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929. Second 

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July 1998 Engineer I 
NATO Rail Operations 

in the Balkans 

By Lieutenant Colorzel Christopher J. Toomey 

Bgmi@=~-- "re will take measures to repair and inlprove the road 

and rail infrastructure of the area in order to jacilitate 

movenlents fbm east to rvest and north to south." 

Carl Bildt 

U. N. High Representative 

14 February 1997 

hen the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) 

deployed to Bosnia in 1996 to enforce the 

military provisions of the Dayton Accords and 

ensure peace and stability, it found a rail system in total 

disarray. The devastating civil war from 1990 to 1994 

resulted in serious damage to the rail systems in both 

Bosnia and Croatia: lines were torn apart, blown up, or 

mined. Embankments were used as field fortifications and 

became inundated with bunkers. Wooden sleepers (pieces 

of timber used to keep steel rails in place) were burned for 

fuel or used in constn~ction, as were tons of ballast. Bridges 

were destroyed and approaches mined. Telecommunications systems, rail stations, and rolling stock-the 

trains-became casualties of the conflict. More than 75 

percent of the locomotives in the region were destroyed, 

and the traffic loss was immense. In 1996, passenger rail 

traffic was estimated at 10 percent of the 1989 lcvel, and 

freight traffic was at 15 percent of the prewar level. 

This article examines the efforts by both IFOR and 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) engineers, working in conjunction with the international community, to rejuvenate 

the Balkan rail system. The primary office responsible for 

theater-level engineer planning, the Combined Joint 

Engineer (CJENGR), is headquartered in Sarajevo. 

To influence the rebuilding of the rail system, CJENGR 

accepted four major tasks: 

. Serve as technical advisor to the command and civilian 

organizations. 

Develop policies and implement programs to translate 

the commander's intent into concrete action. 

I* 

-- ---- -. . Unify the various IFOWSFOR agencies that touched 

The railroad bridge at Brcko was reconstructed by USAID in rail operations, including the civil affairs and informa1997. tion campaigns. 

2 Engineer July 1998 
I RAIL STATUS, JANUARY 96 I 

scprdlng the ReWlc - Damagedlmined track -- of Srbekafrorn the 

a ch,- * 

Formr confmrhtlon line 

scprdlng the ReWlc ' Damagedlmined track -- of Srbekafrorn the 

a ch,- I 

Synchronize SFOR actions with various civilian initiatives to ensure maximum use of resources. 

1996 Initiatives 

rom the outset of its involvement in Bosnia, NATO's 

military planners and engineers were concerned with 

reestablishing an effective rail system. In a country 

with a very lilnitcd road network, a functioning rail line is an 

asset to any military force concerned with supplying and 

reinforcing its forces. 

Initially, only IFOR had the resources, the manpower, 

and an organization available to make immediate and 

noticeable rail improvements. They focused on developing 

the rail network to link and support NATO's Multinational 

Divisions. Since the cost to repair severely damaged rail 

bridges along the Sava River was estimated at several 

million dollars, IFOR decided to avoid the north-south line 

and concentrate on opening the east-west line from ~nlinja 

through Doboj and on to Zvornik (see map). In all, NATO 

repaired or funded the rejuvenation of 460 kilo~netcrs of 

track at a cost of $5.6 million. The project consumed more 

than 1,000 tons of rail and included extensive demining and 

the repair of three major bridges. 

The project was an outstanding example of multinational 

military cooperation, with German, Italian, Hungarian, 

Romanian, and U.S. engineer units working together along 

various sections of the line. The bulk of rbe work was 

executed by the Italian Railway Engineer Regiment, which 

also maintained overall technical supervision. 

Sevcral international organizations, working in 

coordination with NATO, initiated repair efforts dur~ng 1596. 

Three groups In particular-the International Management 

Group (IMG), the World Bank, and thc U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID+became key players in 

focusing money and resources on rail reconstruction in the 

region. 

1997 SFOR Initiatives 

R ealizing the enormous economic potential that a fully 

rejuvenated rail systcln means to Bosnia, SFOR 

became involved in devcloping the system above and 

beyond direct support to NATO forces. Reestablishing an 

effective rail link between Bosnia and Europe will help 

promote regional stability, a major component of SFOR's 

mission. 

Obstacles 

Despite IFOR's efforts, there was still significant damage 

to the rail system at the beginning of 1997. The IMG repaired 

electrical and communication lines between Sarajevo and 

Ploce in 1996, but clectrification and signaling remained 

major shortfalls. 

Political problems complicate the situation. Three rail 

companies operate in the region, each aligned with a particular 

ethnic faction: Croatian Rail, Rail Company of the Republic 

of Srbska, and Rail of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

(ZBH). With no central governing body, there is constant 

discourse on priorities and rcsourcing. Each company is 

fiercely territorial and consistently considers its portion of the 

line in isolation rather than as Dart of a network. 

July 1598 Engineer 3 
It is seemingly impossible to prevent political agendas Contractors completed the following work by November 

from influencing activity along the rail lines. SFOR's 1997: 

freedom of movement along the lines is xm.~red by the . Improved the road network and buildings in and around 

Dayton Accords, but in early 1997 physical damage and the junction. 

political impasse prevented restoration of regular traffic. . Completed communication links between dispatchers in 

Developing Priorities the station and along the line, switch operators, and operators in the locomotive depot and marshalling yards. 

In establishing SFOR's priorities, CJENGR worked . Repaired automatic telephone networks. 

closely with SFOR civil affairs experts, the Civil Military 

Commission (CIMIC), to form the Theater Rail Working 

Group. This group periodically brought together SFOR and 

external agencies-IMG, USAID, and the World Bankwith a rail interest in Bosnia. The working group 

established the following priorities for 1997, with the 

overall aim of creating a link between Bosnia and the rest 

of Europe: 

Complete repairs to the east-west line. 

Improve signaling at Doboj Junction. 

Facilitate repairs between Tuzla and Brcko. 

. Facilitate linking Brcko through Croatia into Hungary. 

SFOR's priorities were synchronized with the IMG's plan 

to concentrate on upgrading the line between Ploce and 

Doboj while USAID constructed the railhighway bridge 

over the Sava River at Brcko. 

East-West Line. Funds from the 1996 project were used 

to resume repair on the east-west line in April 1997. The 

upgrade involved repairs between Banja Luka and Doboj 

and cost almost $5 million. Work contracted through the 

Rail Company of the Republic of Srpska included repair or 

replacement of ballast, sleepers, rails, switches, and rudimentary signaling at various sections along the line. Many 

small bridges were upgraded, and some areas were demined 

to permit reconstruction. NATO furnished much of the 

material and pushed initiatives to make local military 

personnel participate in demining. As in 1996, the Italian 

Railway Engineer Regiment maintained overall technical 

supervision of the repairs. Work on this line was completed 

in October 1997. 

Doboj Junction. A major rail junction in Bosnia, Doboj 

Junction lies within the zone of separation between the 

Republic of Srbska and the Federation. The junction is 

important both technically and politically, because it is an 

area in which the two factions in Bosnia must come together 

to resolve differences. 

Several months of discussion resulted in a decision by 

NATO to invest almost $500,000 to increase the junction's 

throughput capacity to 60 trains a day. This ensures that 

SFOR trains can travel uninterrupted for the foreseeable 

Tuzla-Brcko-Hungary Line. Traditionally, the mineralrich Tuzla Valley was a key economic area with a strong 

industrial base. Before the war and the destruction of 

connecting rail lines, goods and minerals were shipped by rail 

to the Sava River port of Brcko or to ports along the Danube. 

As 1996 ended, industrial output in the region was estimated 

at 15 percent of prewar levels, while unemployment was at 

70 percent. SFOR and U.N. economic analysts projected that 

reopening full rail traffic would immediately bring nearly 

$20 million to the region and employ 1,200 people, with a 

potential for 56,000 jobs in the Brcko-Zenica industrial 

region. 

Politically the area is troubled. Brcko, claimed by both 

Serbs and Muslims, is still a divided city patrolled by U.S. 

forces from Multinational Division (North). The potential for 

economic growth that a healthy rail line brings will help 

reduce political and ethnic tension. 

In Croatia, the line enters another contentious areaEastern Slovenia-which was governed by the U.N. 

Transitional Authority for Eastern Slovenia until late 1997. 

Conditions there were economically grim with un-employment at 60 percent. Completing the railroad enables 

access to the Danube River ports, connection to the European 

line in Hungary, and the potential for significant economic 

improvements. 

Developing a Strategy 

The SFOR effort was led by the CJENGR with heavy 

support from the CIMIC Task Force. These two 

organizations formed a "rail team" that attacked rail issues 

and worked as partners throughout the process. The team 

fully assessed the technical, political, and economic issues 

involved in re-vitalizing the rail system. Key components of 

the strategy follow: 

Focus on the Permanent Railway. As with the 

effort, SFOR realized that it was initially important to 

the track functional. Support for signaling and 

communications will follow once the international 

munity sees the tracks in use. 

1996 

make 

telecomfuture. Improvements to Doboj Junction have definite civil Work Closely With USAID-Bosnia. Since the earliest 

benefits because the station links the important industrial introduction of NATO forces, USAID resourced projects 

areas of Tuzla and Zenica with the rest of Bosnia. throughout the country. It rebuilt the rail and highway bridge 

4 Engineer July 1998 
The first train of U.S. equipment leaves the Bosnian military railhead at Lukavac on 21 April 1998. 

across the Sava River at Brcko in anticipation that SFOR Hungarian Engineer Contingent, which executed numerous 

would rebuild the rail line between Tuzla and Brcko. general engineering tasks, to include demining. Soldiers from 

Use NATO Engineers When Available. Using SFOR or the Army of the Republic of Srbska, who were trained under a 

additional NATO forces to help construct all or part of the U.S. of Defense-s~onsored program, also perrailway reduces the overall cost and makes projects more formed demining. 

attractive to USAID and other civil organizations. The Italian USAID eventually contributed about $2 million, which 

Railway Engineer Regiment deployed to Bosnia in 1997. Other provided material for the line; contract repair of bridges at 

forces included the Romanian Engineer Battalion and Hun- Lipovac, Kalanac, and Spionica; repairs at a landslide at 

garian Engineer Contingent (a force larger than a battalion), Tinja; and repair of the train station at Bukovac. 

which are directly under CJENGR's control as part of SFOR. Rebuilding Brcko to Hungary 

Open Negotiations in Croatia. Any work in Croatia The map on page 3 shows that repairing the Tuzla to 

requires the input of Croatian Rail and the Croatian Brcko section was pointless without also repairing the line 

Government, as well as civil organizations that act ex- through Croatia into Hungary. However, the direct line to the 

clusively in Croatia. north was heavily damaged in Croatia. A major technical 

Rebuilding Tuzla to Brcko 

From the outset, USAID funded all material for repairing 

the line between Tuzla and Brcko but could not fund 

contract labor for the entire line. Deployment of the Italian 

Railway Engineer Regiment greatly reduced the overall 

repair costs. Italian engineers repaired more than 600 breaks 

in the line and replaced the main section between the 

Kalanac and Lipovac bridges. They were supported by the 

obstacle was repair of the Basut River bridge and the 12 

kilometers of track between the bridge and Vinkovci. 

Croatian Rail pledged to repair this section, including 

demining the line and the bridge, if USAID provided material 

assistance. USAID-Bosnia pledged the materials and 

committed $400,000 to repair the bridge. SFOR's office in 

Zagreb, in conjunction with USAID, provided project 

oversight and overall technical supervision. The project was 

completed in December 1997. 

July 1998 Engineer 5 
Thc line from Vinkovci to Osijek was entirely destroyed. nil system. In fact, much U.5. equipmen? moves over rebuilt 

Much of the 35-kilometer line was heavily mined and sections ofthe rail line, Many countries that contribute force.; 

inaccessible. The estimate to restore the permanent railway 

is about S 1 5 million, which ma'kes it uneconomical to rcpair 

at this time. Instead. traffic was moved from Vinkovci rn 

Vroplje and [hence to Osijck. where the Iinc was in good 

repair and required onIy additionaI switching and signating 

to transfcr the trains at Uroplje, 

Thc last section. Osijck to BeIi Manistar (along the 

I-lungarian border), eventually required minimal SEOR 

input. Once Croatian Rail was convinced that the Brcko to 

Vsnkovci section was a reality, they began to repair thc 

Osijek-Beli Manistar line in a joint venture with Hl~ngarian 

rail authorities. This efTort included extensive contract and 

military clemining. 

Lessons Learned 

M iIitary engineers can gain much from CJENGR's 

experiences in developing the strategic rail plan. 

'Takc a Tram Approach. The success of SFOWs rail 

prngsam is largely due to the positive interaction of the 

various elements of the command. Working as a team magnifies the expertise of individual components. 

Look Bevond the Technical Issues. Most problems are 

complex and invt~lvc much more than surmounting technical 

obstacIes. Engineers must becoine involved in addressing 

the often closely related politics! and economic issues. In 

many instances. CJENGR became involved in nepotitrtions 

that required engineers to fully ~mdcrstand the cconomio and 

political issues at hand. 

Work With Civil Agencies. An integral part of SFOR's 

cffrjrts was to develop a positive relationship with interested 

civiI aycncies. This included iinderstnnding their objectives 

and concerns. as well as exhibiting the ability to cornpromise. Civil agencies do not necessarily ltave thc same 

agenda as the military forcc end oflcn have n diffcrcnt time 

line. Engineers must for~e pnmcrships wit11 civil a~encies 

to tap inlo diverse rcsourocs ant1 ensure a mesh between 

rnil~lary and civiliiiir ptanning. 

Think Regionally. Infrastructure, psflicularly aansportation networks, must be thought of regionally. Shifling 

political boundaries nlny not align with nitrural bollnd:lries, 

which influences thc devclopmcnt nf mad and nil networks. 

By deveiclpinp a reyiona! approach. military enfiineers can 

team to npprecintc thc brtadth of l'actors at'fectin~ ' ' IXSUCS. 

to SFOR are expanding their usc of rail in moving and 

supporting forces in the region. Rail is also used extensively 

in Croatia, with the Croatian government working to 

maximi~e the economic potential of a hinctioning rail 

system. 

Civilian traffic within Bosnia is still minimal. Much of 

this is due to polilical complications. Perhaps the follawing 

10 Fehn~ary 1998 statement Fmm Radio Frce Europc 

accuntc!y scnds the message: 

KIi~in t7rc.s Res/nrurion o/ Bo.vt~icrrr Rail T~.nJ/ir. Jut ytrr.~ 

Klcin [d~ptrfy to dttl U.N. High Rryrt.s~nr~livt~ ,fi~ Implrrnrrrrorio~l q/' lhr P~ncr Agr~emc~irl SUE(/ irr Snr.nic~'o on 7 

Fehnrrrqn I/FO~ the roil .yatr?n prescr7l.v "tl~t. ~m-,vf rvrf,rr (?J nlt 

?he pr~hlrc rrrilities [in Bosnia]. Alrnm~ pro train i.~ nnlrlning .... 

[ri-itirh / ntennr. wmtr on a lat:ye scnle, hecnrrse no frnirt 

rneorls no inve.~/met~t. no irr~~e.vtncnt meart.7 no.johs." 

Although some technical obstacles exist, most of the 

issues that prevent reglar traffic are political and involve 

reluctance by the various entities within Bosnia and Croatia 

to pnt Full access to cross-border traffic. Many people recognize the importance of rail for economic repencrntion. but 

internal restrictions to free movemcnt across borders keeps 

political leaders horn allowing the rail system to rcn!izc its 

enorn~o~~s potential. 

Ultimate responsibility for successfi~l rejuvenation of the 

rail system rests with the Bosnian and Croatian governtnents. 

They must show the good faith and willingness to support 

progess that will entice international investment on a large 

scale. Restrictions on movement will he the deciding point on 

the futurc of rail tral'fic-and thc rcgcneraticln OF thc 

economy-in Bosnia. m 

Lielrtr~nunt rolonr'l Toomqn. 1I.S. Ar?n.v Colp~ rl( 

f3nnyinc~t~r.s, i~ rtir,unt(~' ronlmarlrlitlg IAP 14t/1 Engirl~cr. 

Rorlolior~ at For! La~t~i.\*, Wrr?ikir~~c/on. Hr> ubrrs plrviori~ (11 

SFCIR lr. C'lriel: Etqineer- Pkuus. L TC Toomq' i.s n ey~udrrrrrc vf ' 

thc U.S. .Mi?i!ri~y Acur/~nn: 

Prognosis 

hrough the efforts 01' SFOR and partner civil 

agencies, the permanent railway is func~ioning along 

man sections of the 11nt.. NATO forces arc using tho 
Planninn Enaineer Suaaort 

for a MOUT Anack 

8y Caplain John C. D~Jnrnctt~ 

oday's soldiers must be prcparcd to fighi on 

increasingly diverse terrain, including tesrain 

containing manmade features found in urban areas. 

These elements are viewed as obstacles of maneuver. 

Military operatioris on urbanized terrain (MOUT) encompass all military actions planned and conducted on a 

terrain complex where manmade constn~ction ~rnpacts on the 

tactical options availabIc to a commander. 

This article providcs considerations Ibr engineer planners 

and Ieadcrs to crnplny whcn battalions and brigades seize 

built-up areas. It is mtcnded to amplify current doctrine 

outlined in FM 90- 10- 1 , At1 Infarl~r:)vmrr :F GuiCIE tn Csnihnf 

in Rui11-Up Areas (with change I). Lessons learned are 

drawn from observing attacks on the Shugart-Gordon 

MOUT training facility at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center. 

mine-cIearing Iine charge (MICLIC), tank-mounted 

co~mteminc equipment, and manua! breach techniques. 

Balance exposure of the breach force to enemy fires with 

the probability that a system may be killed before it can 

be employed. 

J How will reconnaissance forces link up, guide, or 

mark ob~faclcs for hypass/hreaching operations? 

o What are the counterattack routes of the enemy 

force? Consider the terrain and weather, Deterniine if 

enemy counterattack routes can be used to move friendly 

combat service support assets based on the enetny event 

template and time phasing of the counterattack, Determine what situational obstacles (rapid mining, scatterable rninlng) the enemy counterattack force has 

nvailabIe. 

rl What is the safety zone and trigger for using scatterahle mines? Ensure that this infilmation is disseminated 

Mission A~lalysis at all rchearsaIs. 

ission analysis sets the for planning and What is the composition of the buildings to be 

ultimate success of MOUT operations. Engineer attacked? Determine the effects weapons will have on 

these structures (rhis drives the selection of fuze!shell planners must identify specified, implied, and combinations and aircraft attack munitions). essential tasks as well as constraints and limitations. Wellprepared engineer battleiield assessments (EBA) and terrain ' What is the " the both above and 

below wound? Detern~ine the protected areas. such as analysis products arc essential. Answering the following churches, hospitals, and muscurns. Soltrces for this infor- questions will help engineer planners develop an effective mation are imagery from the div~sion, gn camera tapes MOUT ofknsive mission analysis. from OH-5R/At-1-64 heiicoptcs, Michelin road maps, 

7 Whcrc is the keyldccisivc terrain'? ldentify this terrain 

far the approach march and for seizing buildings. Conduct a line-of-sight analysis alonp the route and compare it to the enemy template. 

3 Where are the best reduction sites and support-byfire positions for securing st foothold? Considcr the 

terrain, tht enemy force template, and massing tires. 

Dct~minc ihc minimum cnginuer rorce reqwred to 

seize a Coothold. seize esscntial racililics, and provide 

mobility support to mounted Forces. such as how to 

sequencc engineer rasks and change thc engineer task 

organization to i~cmrnplish essential tasks. Idcntif'y the 

key Ieadcrs required to facilitate command and coiltrol 

of critical cvents and task organization changes. 

7 How should subordinate units execute in-qtride vcrsus delibcratc breaching operations based on the 

enemy template and results of reconnaissance and 

survcillancc (R&S) efforts'! Decide where ta use the 

and tour honks. 

Support Products 

T he engineer stat'f planner helps when the fdlnwinp 

products are developed to support the military 

decision-making process (MDMP) after the initial 

warning order is received. Thcse products are updated based 

on the rcsults of recannnissance and surveillance. 

IJng~lreer Battlet?elrI Assessment 

The EBA fccds many uf tht. subsequenr products. Clearly 

articulate the enemy engincer capability based on the most 

likely and rnost dangerous courscs of action. Considor past 

experience with this enemy, his current strengh. anticipated 

barrier material basic loads. expected resupply rates, and 

locally available materials the enemy can use to prepare his 

defense. This infomat~on will suppon development of the 

situalion ternpIate (SITEMP). 

Engineer 7 
Identify friendly engineer capabilities for mobility, 

countermobility, and survivability operations. Explicitly 

state the number and types of breaches each engineer unit is 

capable of executing based on its personnel, equipment, and 

logistical status. Leader proficiency and audacity impact on 

this estimate, so plan two levels down, based on the unit. 

Use this information to develop the task organization later in 

the MDMP. 

Estimate the impact of terrain and weather on both 

friendly and enemy capabilities. Line-of-sight, hydrology, 

cross-country movement, and line-of-communication 

overlays are helpful and can be provided by the division 

terrain detachment or quickly approximated from maps. 

SITEMP 

Know the enemy capability based on an estimated unit 

basic load of Classes IV and V materials and anticipated 

resupply. The time available to prepare the defense is 

essential. Reconnaissance assets should observe the delivery and emplacement of barrier materials. Template 

enemy obstacles and counterattack routes based on terrain 

and weather conditions. Determine what resources are 

available in the MOUT area (ammonium nitrate, acetylene, 

propane, lumber yards, jersey barriers, vehicles, and 

construction equipment) that can contribute to his defensive preparation. 

Based on this analysis, the engineer and S2 jointly 

template the enemy engineer countermobility/survivability 

capability on the SITEMP. It should include minefields, 

tactical and protective wire obstacles, and vehicles and other 

barriers in roads. This overlay is used to plan the engineer task 

organization, because this and the friendly scheme of 

maneuver determine the number of sapper squads needed and 

where mobility assets are placed in the order of movement. 

Time and materials will impact his defensive capability. 

The force array in the security zone and main defensive belt 

impacts the amount of defensive preparation. Indirect-fire 

systems can only service one priority target and must shift to 

cover other targets, which may help in adjusting the obstacle 

template. Locations and movement of mounted weapons 

may indicate usable lanes for our infiltration of vehicles. 

Event Template 

Determine what triggers the commitment of enemy 

counterattack forces. Determine what situational obstacle 

capabilities he has, where and for what purpose the capabilities will be committed, and what the triggers are. 

Determine the structures likely to be set for destruction 

(such as petroleum and natural gas storage facilities). 

Friendly Forces Survivability Time Line 

Construct positions to support the forward displacment of 

combat support and combat service support assets and 

limited command and control nodes. The survivability effort 

should be an essential part of the maneuver deception plan. 

Breach Execution Matrix 

This matrix helps task force engineers allocate assets and 

determine when in-stride and deliberate breach techniques are 

required. Specify where to use the MICLIC, hand-emplaced 

explosives, armored combat earthmover (ACE), armored 

vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB), and tank-mounted countermine equipment. 

Decision Support Template/Decision Support Matrix 

Help the S3 identify and plan branches and sequels to the 

plan. It is essential to know where engineers will culminate 

and how rapidly platoons can be consolidated, reorganized, 

and put back into the fight. 

Execution Checklist/Operations Schedule 

Develop with the S3 the operations schedule (OPSKED), 

which is a combination of key events from the synchronization matrix and associated code words. This product 

supports the decision support template and helps the battle 

captain and maneuver commander track the battle and make 

decisions. Prepare a rough execution checklist after receiving the warning order and continue to refine it during 

mission analysis. Finalize the checklist during wargaming 

and provide "bootleg" copies to task force engineers and 

squad leaders (see page 1 1). 

Troop-Leading Procedures Time Line 

Ensure that adequate time is available to prepare the 

rehearsal site and that rehearsals are directed and supervised 

by key leaders. 

R&S Planning Considerations 

ntegrate engineer reconnaissance teams into the brigade 

R&S plan. Focus these teams on engineer targets such as 

landing zone denial, obstacles in the reduction area, 

enemy survivability on the objective, and obstacles on 

approach routes into the objective area. The named areas of 

interest (NAIs) assigned to engineers should have priority 

intelligence requirements (PIR) that determine the best 

reduction sites into the city and confirm or deny enemy 

fortification of key sites. 

Precombat Inspections (PCIs) 

After conducting precombat checks (PCCs), inspect 

materials used to mark obstacle bypass lanes. Conduct FM 

and HF radio communications exercises using the OPSKED 

and reports specific to the current operation. Inspect all maps 

for operations security considerations. Sterile maps are not 

required, but information provided on overlays should not 

compromise the attack plan. Overlays should portray only 

NAIs. Targets, pickup and landing zones, and link-up 

locations should not be on overlays taken into the objective 

area. All soldiers must clearly understand the NAI priority and 

associated PIR, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan, abort 

criteria, compromise plan, exfiltration and link-up plan, and 

communications windows. 

8 Engineer July 1998 
Mobility Planning Considerations 

P roviding mobility support to a maneuver force in a 

MOUT environment normally will require engineers 

to support multiple combined arms breaching 

operations. The reverse planning process discussed in FM 

90- 13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, applies to 

all terrain situations. The following considerations 

complement this process: 

Conduct Approach March 

Plan a primary route and an alternate route to support the 

movement of each maneuver battalion's combat forces. 

Clear these routes using standard tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP). Control of movement routes is critical, 

particularly when ground evacuation is the primary method 

of removing casualties. Coordinate one-way, two-way, and 

alternating-direction traffic on routes with the brigade 

executive and operations officers. Identify decision criteria 

for switching to alternate routes. Maximize aerial reconnaissance of routes to identify possible obstacles, combat 

outposts, and ambushes. 

Precombat Inspections. Conduct standard routeclearance PCCs and PCIs, which should be listed in the unit 

SOP. As a minimum check initiation systems, demolition 

charges, reduction equipment, marking materials, and mine 

detectors. 

Rehearsals. Address all the breach tenets and explain the 

movement-control plan during each phase of the ground 

maneuver. 

Secure the Foothold 

Create lanes through obstacles using one sapper squad 

per lane, with a minimum of one lane per simultaneously 

assaulting platoon. (This does not mean nine lanes per 

infantry battalion. Analyze carefully.) Use adequate 

marking materials, guides for assault and follow-on forces, 

and lane hand-over procedures. It takes at least 30 minutes 

to "cycle" this squad back into the fight. 

A squad cannot support breaching operations continuously. 

A decision point or trigger must support any changes in task 

organization and missions for engineers. Establish decision 

points for changing approach routes, reduction sites, and 

initiation of SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce). 

Precombat Inspections. Equip the unit with bolt cutters 

(two per engineer squad), grapnels (three per en&' weer 

squad), a lane-marking kit, hand-emplaced explosives (10 

per squad, per lane), mine detectors, and probes. Ensure that 

handheld smoke is available for each infantry soldier and 

that vehicles or utility helicopters carry smoke pots. Mass 

this smoke with the breach force at the objective rally point. 

Ballast load marking system upgrade materials on gun 

trucks. Use expedient reduction tools, such as Skidco litters, 

for wire reduction. 

Rehearsals. No matter what rehearsal type or technique is 

used, perform basic SOSR rehearsals (see FM 101-5, Stajf 

Organization and Operation, Appendix 6, for more information on rehearsals). 

Suppress. Ensure that all personnel understand the location 

of support-by-fire positions and the pyrotechnic and radio 

signals to initiate obstacle reduction and indicate when the 

lanes are open (proofed and marked). The rehearsal site 

should have a full-scale lane-marking system visible to every 

soldier. All key leaders should understand the commitment 

criteria for the breach force. 

Obscure. Rehearse triggers for artillery delivered, handemplaced, and vehicle-generated smoke. Consider the 

position of the moon relative to the support-by-fire position, 

the percent of illumination, and the night-vision goggle 

window. 

Secure. Hold a combined arms rehearsal of the breach 

force using the full-dress technique. This rehearsal includes 

engineers and attached maneuver elements dedicated to 

suppressing direct fires and destroying local counterattacks. 

Reduce. The combined arms rehearsal should include 

handing over lanes from engineers to maneuver soldiers. The 

rehearsal should be "NCO to NCO" and discuss details of 

linkup and handover. Consider the need to back-haul 

casualties when planning the number of lanes. 

Seize Key Facilities 

Plan procedures for dynamic entries into buildings and 

vertical envelopment, which require prepared special 

demolition charges (see FM 90-10- 1, change I), expedient 

assault ladders, and climbing grapnels. Rehearse the TTP for 

getting into windows on second and third floors. Have cutting 

tools available to prepare climbing poles at the objective rally 

point. Plan for subsurface entry. Consider the use of reducing 

wire in stairwells and hallways. 

Precombat Inspections. Inspect special breaching 

charges (see FM 90- 10- 1, with change 1). Ensure that charges 

are properly constructed and that they will "stick" when 

placed. Use double-sided foam tape when placing vertical 

breaching charges during warm, dry conditions. Use spikes, 

braces, or Ramset-type power-actuated fasteners during rain 

or when temperatures are below freezing. Ensure that 

sufficient handheld and hand-emplaced smoke is available. 

Maneuver soldiers can carry smoke pots and additional 

explosives. Where practical, use battering rams (picket 

pounders or equipment found in MOUT areas) to enter doors. 

Conserve explosives by bringing one or two 24-inch 

crowbars to lift manhole covers and pry open entryways in 

buildings and sewers. Provide night-vision goggles to 

soldiers who reduce obstacles, because infantry leaders use 

infrared "tactical pointers" extensively, and reduction 

element soldiers must be able to see these signals. Use all 

available infrared lights. Mount and zero all ANIPAQ-4s and 

July 1998 Engineer 9 
ANIPVS-4s during the preparation phase of the mission. 

Engineers must bring handheld infrared light sources (such 

as Phantom lights or infrared filters on Maglites) and visible 

light sources (D-cell Maglites or SureFire TAC Lights) to 

help move and reduce obstacles inside buildings and 

subsurface structures. Ambient light inside hallways and 

underground is virtually zero, so plan for additional light 

sources. Mark cleared buildings so the marking is visible 

from rotary-wing aircraft and armored vehicles and by 

dismounted soldiers. 

Rehearsals. Focus on the location and control of support 

forces and signals for commiting the breach force. Ensure 

that soldiers understand the minimum safe distance and the 

best reduction site based on the building structure. Clearly 

identify routes between buildings and the marking method 

for "safe routes." Deconflict building clearance marlungs 

from collection points for casualties, displaced civilians, and 

enemy prisoners of war. Rehearse close quarters combat 

drills for interior building clearing. Basic SOSR rehearsals 

from "secure the foothold" apply to dynamic entry into 

buildings, but these rehearsals usually focus on the infantry 

platoon and an engineer squad. 

Civilians on the BattlefieldIEnemy Prisoners of War. 

Establish "protected areas" for civilians on the battlefield, 

and clearly mark routes for displaced civilians. Consider an 

expedient countermobility effort to restrict access to these 

civilians and enemy prisoners of war. Liaison officers from 

psychological operations, civil affairs, and the military 

police should address this topic in the brigade maneuver 

rehearsal. Although there are no specific engineer requirements, be prepared to provide technical assistance 

during planning and execution phases. 

Subsurface Fight. This is a variation on the theme of 

clearing buildings. Salient points are: entering the tunnel or 

sewer complex using hand tools or explosives, identifying 

and neutralizing mines and booby traps, and marking cleared 

areas. Navigation inside sewers and radio communications 

from inside the tunnel to aboveground soldiers is challenging. There is no ambient light inside tunnels, so plan and 

rehearse using infrared and visible light signals. 

Move Within the City 

Plan one vehicle lane per mounted platoon entering each 

section of the city. The lane through tactical and perimeter 

protective obstacles will become an "axis" for movement 

within the MOUT area. These lanes initially will support 

one-way traffic. Plan and rehearse traffic control as lanes 

become alternating traffic lanes to allow for CASEVAC. 

Improve at least one lane to two-way traffic and designate 

this as the primary CASEVAC route. Designate, clear, and 

mark a route from the casualty collection point to the 

CASEVAC primary and alternate helicopter landing zones. 

Use combat route-clearance techniques to clear the ground 

CASEVAC route. Reduce or bypass obstacles created by 

"junk vehicles," CONEXs, rubble, etc. If bypassing is part of 

the plan, make it a branch to the plan and include associated 

decision points and conditions. 

Precombat Inspections. Inspect MICLIC and tankmounted CME. Ensure that designated dismounted sappers 

have at least 20 blocks of TNT or C4 and 500 feet of 

detonating cord to reduce a 100-meter deep "lane" for 

vehicles. Inspect mine detectors carried by engineers 

designated to execute this mission. Sandbag one vehicle to 

use for proofing vehicle lanes, and dismount all passengers 

when proofing the lane. Ballast load additional lane marking 

material on vehicles. To assist the maneuver force in locating 

the correct lane to support their tactical plan, ensure that 

markings for multiple lanes are easily distinguished by day 

and at night. CASEVAC lanes must have a dedicated traffic 

control post (TCP). One technique is for this post to be 

initially manned by representatives from the medical platoon 

of the lead task force. Integrate a tank-mounted plow or 

properly prepared heavy vehicle (dozer, loader, or 5-ton truck 

with winch) into the plan to reduce rubble or junk vehicle 

obstacles. 

Rehearsals. A combined arms breaching rehearsal is 

required according to FM 90- 13- 1. This rehearsal will serve 

as the final check for mission-essential equipment and final 

adjustments to the plan based on PCIs. Synchronize the 

establishment of support-by-fire positions to isolate reduction sites and trigger conditions for initiating reduction 

operations (the conditions and who makes the decision). 

Determine who shifts obscuration and suppressive fires and 

when they are shifted. Key leaders must rehearse handing 

over lanes to follow-on forces. Rehearse time-phasing the 

ground CASEVAC route clearance to helicopter landing 

zones and ambulance exchange points. Construct the unit's 

standard lane-marking system and route signs at the 

rehearsal site. 

Countermobility Planning Considerations 

ddress these issues in the brigade-, battalion-, and 

company-level rehearsals. Plan to issue a scatterable 

mine warning (SCATMWARN) to prevent 

fratricide. 

Tactical Employment of Scatterable Mines 

Plan in detail the employment of artillery-delivered 

antipersonnel mineslremote antiarmor mines (ADAM/ 

RAAM) and multiple-delivery mine systems (Volcanos). 

Specify the target to be attacked, a tentative location, its 

effect (disrupt, turn, fix, or block), the delivery system, the 

observer, and the trigger. 

Protective Employment of Scatterable Mines 

Ballast load the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS) on 

vehicles moving into objective area blocking positions. 

10 Engineer July 1998 
Engineer Staff Planning Checklist 

(Brigade and Below) 

Plan 

General 

0 Identify and resource all mobility/survivability essential 

tasks. 

0 Address all the breach tenets during planning and 

rehearsals. 

0 Request terrain products, MOUT layout diagrams, and 

data on building composition from higher headquarters. 

0 Study available terrain products to determine which 

subsurface routes to use and how to defend against 

enemy use of these systems. 

0 Study available maps and photos to determine the best 

routes to use when approaching the city and within the 

city. Determine where to establish casualty collection 

points, aid stations, and ammunition and water resupply 

points. 

o Use scatterable mines to support engagement areas 

that block mounted counterattack routes. Disseminate 

this plan to critical maneuver and combat service support leaders. 

0 Establish essential engineer friendly forces' information 

requirements and no-later-than report times. 

0 Nominate engineer-specific PIR and associated NAls to 

support the reconnaissance plan. Ensure that the latest 

time information is of value (LTIOV) is clearly understood. Decide what actions to take if the PIR are not 

answered before LTIOV. 

0 Disseminate the enemy obstacle template to all engineer leaders. 

U Task organize engineers to support essential mobility/ 

survivability reconnaissance missions. 

0 Determine how much and what types of obscuration 

smoke are available. Determine the wind direction and 

speed, which will impact the effects of smoke. Coordinate 

with the fire support officer for recommended uses of 

white phosphorus (both mortar and artillery delivered) 

and handheld smoke. Coordinate with the smoke platoon 

leader for duration of smoke and level of obscuration. 

0 Designate and clear routes for mounted forces and 

reserve forces. 

U ldentify the "conditions" and a decision point for initiating deliberate breaching operations during each critical 

event of the operation. 

ADD~O~C~ March 

Designate routes for ground convoys and allocate engineers to clear them. 

Determine the clearance method and acceptable risk. 

Ensure that all vehicles have lane- and bypass-marking 

materials on board. 

0 Designate ground CASEVAC routes. 

0 Determine the decision point for using alternate 

routes. 

0 Determine when to establish TCPsIguides at critical 

obstacles on the route. 

0 Establish NAls along the ground route to confirm or 

deny the enemy obstacle template. 

Secure the Foothold 

0 Designate the best reduction site and technique 

based on enemy force array, terrain, and trafficability. 

0 Nominate NAls for breaching operations. 

o Designate one lane for each simultaneously assaulting platoon and the engineers needed to reduce it. 

0 Explain the lane-marking system. 

0 Establish a traffic-control plan for dismounted and 

mounted traffic. 

0 Establish a vehicle route and a dismounted route from 

the foothold to the CASEVAC helicopter landing zone. 

0 Designate locations for blocking positions to keep 

counterattacks from interfering with breaching operations. Resource blocking positions with MOPMS, conventional mines, and expedient barrier capability (such 

as abatis). Depict the planned locations of scatterable 

mines (include the safety zone) on maneuver and 

combat service support graphics to reduce fratricide. I 

Seize Key Facilities 

0 Designate buildings to enter and a reduction site that 

will support maneuver to the point of penetration. 

0 Designate where the support force will enter buildings. 

0 Resource battalions and their engineers with sufficient ' 

explosives and hand-emplaced and artillery smoke. 

o Explain the cleared-building and cleared-lane marking 

systems. I 

PreparelExecute 

n Construct appropriate rehearsal sites to support 

I 

maneuver and combat service support operations. !I 

n Provide enough detail in the troop-leading procedure I 

time line to encourage both engineer and combined 

arms rehearsals. 

n Issue sketch maps and terrain products to engineers. 

o Construct a lane-marking system and bypass-marking 

I 

system that all vehicle drivers must go through I, 

en route to the objective area. I 

I 

Provide enough detail in the maneuver and engineer 

execution checklists to effectively use the Decision 

Support Matrix. 

Specify times for engineer-specific precombat inspections conducted by platoon leaders, company commanders, and first sergeants. 

July 1998 Engineer I I 
Consider 

limired 

defense 

Engagcrncn 

Specify 

and 

barrier materials 

sling 

t 

thc 

blocking 

Arei~ 

loading 

engagement 

Dt'v~l~pn~cl~~ 

enemy 

the MOPMS, 

to 

counterattacks. 

area 

support 

to 

conventional 

interdict 

transitioning 

the 

mines, 

to 

enemy 

and 

the 

- 

counterattack force. Ensure that battalion and brigade 

reserve forces have specified routes to move lo the 

engagement area. Engineers may not be available to ci~lplacc 

ebstacles, so specify the enpagement area development 

tasks. including obstacle emplacement and tire integration, 

to maneuver units. 

Str rviva hility Planning Consirlerations 

erform this work conct~rrently with initial reconnaissance and "condition setting" by the brigade to 

suppori the brigade and division deception plans. 

Field Artillery. Determine positioning areas and plan 

counterfire radars and aimmunition stocks. 

Forward Area Refuel Point. Establish locations for 

stocking 1~1el and arnrnunitic~n. Plan for multiplc rcfucling 

sites to support thc attack nnd lift aviation sirnulraneously. 

Advance Trauma Lifesaving Slt~. Locate Forward 

treatment facilitie~ and inpresslegress routes. Thc implied 

task is to establish heticoptcr landing 7ones for these sites. 

Sarnrnary 

hile the process for ptanning engineer support to a 

MOUT attack follows existing decision-making 

steps, engineer planners must understand how this 

diverse terrain impacts cnginccr operations. Critical points 

includo: 

Letter to ,@'(a 

Several readers had questions regarding the 

article 'The MARTEN: A Quantum Leap for 

Engineers" in the February 1998 issue (page 18). 

Some questioned the name MARTEN. The following 

Information will clarify any misconceptions we may 

have unintentionally raised. 1, Using the TRADOC Concept Evaluation 

I you've ever constructed a concertina fence by 1' n Decentrali~ed execution-while staying collectively 

synchronized-is required. driving the pickets with a sledge hammer, 1'11 bet 

you'd rather have something (a MARTEN?) with a 

il MWT-specific precombat checks, precombat inspec- hydraulic pieket-pounding attachment. 

tions, and rehearsals mr~st be conducted. 1 encourage units that have utilized skid steers to 

By accounting for these impacts, engineer planners can submit after-action reports or comments to the 'I 

make sound decisions to set the stagc. for effective engineer Director of Combat DeveEoPments using the 

suppori to the rnancuvcr fnrcc in this demanding comment form on the Engineer School home page 

environment. w at http:\\w.wood.army.mil. 

) 

1 

1 Srn~ctures become key ternin. 

Relowground and milltilayered aboveground dimensions 

Cuptairr D.eJurnrtfe is an erlgineer ohscn~~r/r'ont~~oller~ (11 

file Joint Readiness Trnining Center, For! Polk. Loui.~iann 

He previordslJb send ~mifh /11e 37th Etrgitleer Bn~talic~n, Forf 

Bragg, Xorrh Carolina, nnd ns commnnder, B Com/~an~b. 

Program, the Engineer School obtained from Melroe 

Company a Model 763 skid steer in 1997 for 

evaluation. Their company logo reflects the face of a 

If readers focus on the name MARTEN versus 

Bobcat and not on how well the MARTEN performs, 

they mmptetely miss the point. It's what the system 

Alan Schlie 

Force Development Analyst ~ 

I 1 tl~ Engineer Batti~lion. Fort S~CIV{ICII'I, Georria. 1 

1 bobcat and their skid steers are called "Bobcats," a 

copyrighted name we could not use. The MARTEN 

is the author's name and is not official. 

1 The article might also lead one to believe that the 

Army spent millions developing a system that is 

readily available as a commercial off-the-shelf 

1 (COTS) purchase. That is not so. The Engineer 

School leased the skid steer and all its attachments 

are added. I brings to the engineer on the battlefield that is 

n Terrain enhances the enemy's countcrmobility and sur- important. A system capable of increasCng an 

vivahility eflbns and increases the friendly Corce's engineer squad's productivity by 25 percent can be 

mobility requirements. I calved anything you want, just have it available? If 

I 

I 

a? a very favorable rate and has since returned it to 

the manufacturer. 

The purpose of our evaluation was to quantify 

the increased pedormance afforded by a skid steer. 

The data and evaluation results are necessary for 

school personnel to create requirements 

documents, a process that eventually will result in 

fielding the skid steer to engineer and other units. 
RRFAKOUT SESSION SUMMARIES 

By Lieutenant Colonel Susan Myers and the ENFORCE Team 

NFORCE Conference breakout sessions are evolving 

into a regimental think-tank, and the information they 

provide is valuable to staff and action officers working 

issues that impact our engineer force. Other sources of 

communication, such as the Engineer Center home page, video 

teleconferences, council of colonels, and e-mail newsletters, 

offer opportunities to link engineer leaders with the latest 

developments. Summaries of breakout sessions held during the 

April 1998 engineer conference follow. Some have been 

updated to reflect actions taken since the conference. 

Echelons Above Division 

By Peter Malley 

T his session had two purposes: First, to inform 

participants about proposed engineer force structure 

requirements to support Force XXI, new evolutions 

of the battlefield, and future redesigns of the echelons above 

division (EAD) organizations. Second, to seek input to 

assist in determining the "right" designs for EAD organizations based on wartime missions and fi~ture concepts-i.e., Force XXI and Army After Next. 

We began by explaining how engineer structure is 

developed from approved doctrine, concepts, and comments 

from field personnel. We described how the workload 

allocation rule for the Engineer Battalion, Combat Heavy, 

was developed using 23 wartime tasks and the number of 

personnel assigned to the unit. This discussion raised the 

following questions: 

Why aren't equipment hours factored into the 

workload allocation rule? We asked the Concepts 

Analysis Agency to answer this question. The data used 

to determine engineer requirements is based on information provided by the Engineer Strategic Studies Center and identified wartime tasks. Neither of these 

sources itemizes equipment hours. Engineer School 

leaders will review this issue to determine if equipment 

hours can be factored into the workload allocation rule. 

Who will develop the EAD operational and organizational (0&0) plan for Corps XXI? TRADOC is 

developing the Corps XXI 0&0 plan. It will be accomplished through a series of workshops attended by proponent school personnel. A "tiger team" has been 

developed to provide engineer input on specific issues. 

The tiger team includes doctrinal and concept developers and is chaired by a colonel. 

Will the engineer organization include one engineer 

group with planning capabilities or will a modular 

section be available to augment the senior engineer 

organization in theater? This question will be 

answered during the Corps XXI redesign process, which 

will be completed by October 1998. 

We briefed the evolution of the future battlefield layout 

and potential roles for engineers. MG Flowers provided his 

guidance and perceptions in response to questions. This topic 

will remain a hot issue and will be reviewed as it develops. 

We discussed proposed redesigns of EAD organizations. 

Two major organizations, the Engineer Combat Battalion, 

Corps Mechanized, and the Engineer Battalion, Combat 

Heavy, were described in detail. Others, such as the Engineer 

Command, the Combat Support Equipment Company, and 

the Engineer Combat Battalion, Corps Wheel, were 

summarized. Participants were most concerned about the 

following units: 

o Engineer Combat Battalion, Corps Mechanized. 

Today this unit is a mirror image of the heavy division 

battalion. Participants concurred that the organization 

requires changing and that it should be revised based on 

breaching, survivability, countermobility, and general 

engineering capabilities no longer available within the 

heavy division battalion. We agreed to review the possibility of adding a Delta Company in the design and discussed adding more 62 MOS operators and reducing the 

number of combat engineers. We agreed to consider 

replacing ACEs with D7 dozers-that decision will 

depend on the availability of ACEs. Questions were 

raised about requirements for the CEV (future) and the 

Panther. Consensus was that a "bunker buster" or some 

type of weapon could be used in lieu of the CEV 

(hture), and that the Panther could be placed in war 

stockage and withdrawn when necessary. The group suggested that we replace the M548s (Volcano vehicle) with 

a newer version and provide a dedicated support vehicle 

for MICLlCs. We agreed to add a property book officer 

to this organization because the unit has considerable 

property that requires this officer's expertise. 

Engineer Battalion, Combat Heavy. After reviewing 

the mission statement, most participants agreed there is 

no requirement for bituminous paving, quarrying, or 

crushing operations. Engineer School personnel will 

review this requirement during the redesign process. We 

reviewed the 23 wartime tasks and recommended that 

three more be added: force provider, chemical decontamination support, and lines of communication bridging 

requirements. It was suggested we also add range construction and road construction and upgrading to the list. 

July 1998 Engineer 13 
The Concepts Analysis Agency agreed that these tasks Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). After these 

can be added if the commanders in chief (CINC) have briefings, we posed the following questions to stimulate 

these requirements. The tasks will be added based on discussion: 

CINC input. 

o Engineer Command. The Engineer School requested 

that representatives from the two engineer commands 

review their tables of organization and equipment 

(TOE) to determine whether this unit can be redesigned 

using modular sections versus the standard TOE staff 

positions. They agreed to this request. 

0 Engineer Brigade, Theater Army. Requirements for 

the brigade headquarters are not clearly defined in engineer doctrine. Colonel Quinn, 41 1th Engineer Brigade, 

provided a paper that identifies the brigade tasks. His 

data will be used to define the unit's mission and roles 

in future force structure requirements. 

fl Engineer Combat Battalion, Corps Wheel. Several 

commanders wanted to discuss this organization, but we 

could not because no proposed redesign has been developed. The commanders agreed to review their Unit Reference Sheets and submit suggestions for the redesign. 

0 Engineer Combat Support Equipment Company. 

Two options were raised: The Engineer School either 

develop a workload allocation rule or embed this company in the Corps Mechanized and Wheel Battalions. 

Consensus is that this unit must remain in the structure 

because its capabilities are critical to adequately support 

divisions. 

0 Engineer Battalion Headquarters Team. Participants 

requested that the Engineer School develop a team to 

command and control the separate corps companies and 

teams. Engineer School staff are reviewing this 

proposal. 

Engineer Terrain Analysis Platoon. We briefed a 

proposed redesign, which has increased the number of 

Active Component spaces to support terrain analysis 

requirements. Participants suggested we place some of 

the platoon sections in the Reserve Component structure. The Terrain Visualization Division is reviewing 

this proposal. 

Comments and suggestions regarding this session are 

welcome and may be sent to the following e-mail address: 

malleyp@wood.anny.mil. 

Digital Breach Operations 

By Lieutenant Colonel Harry Greene 

T his session began with presentations on the 

Wolverine and the Grizzly, which will form the 

backbone of the firhrre heavy divisions' breach 

capability. When fielded in FYOO and FY04, respectively, 

both the Wolverine and the Grizzly will have situational 

awareness capabilities similar to those of the supported 

heavy maneuver force. We also discussed engineer 

command and control and the engineer portion of Force XXI 

0 Given the information dominance provided by a digital 

force, do leaders still need to conduct a dismounted 

reconnaissance to determine the best breach site? 

Can we reduce the number of breach rehearsals or 

change the type of rehearsals conducted? 

o Is it smart to use an MI tank to follow reduction assets 

through a lane and provide security? 

While we did not come to resolution on these questions, 

we will use the information and opinions gathered to shape 

future doctrine development for digital breaching operations. 

Several themes recurred during our discussion: 

0 Digitization and the resulting information dominance are 

most usehl before and after a close fight. During a close 

fight, we expect communications to be conducted by 

methods similar to those used today. Attendees agreed 

that FM radios provide the most responsive form of communication at critical points in a battle. 

0 Marking lanes digitally is most valuable when vehicles 

approach the breach lane. Manually marked lanes are 

still required at the entrance and as vehicles move along 

the breach lane. 

0 Humans will remain a critical element on the digitized, 

situationally aware battlefield. Human eyes are needed 

for reconnaissance, and leadership is critical at the 

breach. 

o Digitization and situational awareness were discussed at 

length. Participants agreed that digitization will increase 

the availability of information and the speed at which 

information is disseminated. We did not agree on how 

that information will impact the decision-making 

process. 

0 The presentation on engineer use of FBCB2 provoked 

lively discussion on reporting and command and control 

links. Engineer School leaders are working to clarify the 

types of reports required and the proper flow of reported 

information. 

This breakout session served as a means to continue 

ongoing dialog concerning how digitization and situational 

awareness will impact engineer operations. Discussion 

will continue in Engineer magazine and at future 

ENFORCE conferences. The point of contact is 

guilford@wood.army .mil. 

Force XXI Topography 

By Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hooper 

e began with a review of Task Force XXI and 

Division Advanced Warfighting Experimental 

designs and insights for future topographic 

missions. Most of the discussion focused on Topographic 

Force Structure 2010. The Terrain Visualization Center is 

14 Engineer July 1998 
developing future topographic structure options, and two 

major options were presented. Lieutenant Colonel Hooper 

described a single theater battalion with robust corps 

companies. Lieutenant Colonel Luce (commander of the 29th 

Engineer Battalion) presented a two-battalion design with 

heavy theater companies and a unified brigade headquarters. 

Both designs focus on a set of key factors, which will drive 

future topographic missions and which, in turn, will drive our 

doctrine. Descriptions of the key factors follow. 

0 A common terrain operating environment (CTOE). 

This does not mean that we all have the same view of 

terrain. We know that requirements for terrain visualization, analysis, simulation, and modeling differ across 

each battlefield operating system and across each echelon. The CTOE is the commonality of the underlying 

terrain data that drives each system to accomplish its 

terrain visualization and evaluation missions. 

n Rapid data production and data dissemination. Data 

production from the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency (NIMA) is critical. That agency's fiture plans 

call for it to provide foundation data "on the shelf." The 

foundation data will not meet all terrain data requirements for our future digitized organizations. Rather, 

that data must be reinforced with more detailed data 

sets produced "just in time" to support military operations. The "just in time" data production forms the basis 

of mission-specific data sets (MSDS). For the Army 

topographic community, this opens two new missions. 

The first is to get rapidly produced data to digital systems throughout the battlefield. The second is to fill 

data voids in the MSDS with data produced by Army 

topographic elements. The NIMA phrase used to represent this sift in data production philosophy is "just in 

time, not just in case" data production. 

fl Expanded availability of terrain analysis support. 

Future digital command and control systems offer 

extensive communications connectivity. This allows the 

analysis and dissemination of terrain data. Previous terrain analysis efforts normally reached only G2IG3 elements due to limited personnel and the low volume of 

hard-copy products. Digital distribution allows each 

command and control node down to the maneuver battalion level access to many of the analysis products previously limited to operations and planning elements at 

division level or above. 

0 Embedded terrain evaluation in command and control systems. Each system can perform many basic 

evaluation tasks and develop visualization products formerly provided by terrain analysis teams. These tasks 

include lines of sight, masked area plots, intervisibility 

plots, oblique views, perspective views, and slope analyses. Embedded tools allow individual users to obtain 

many visualization products without direct support from 

a topographic element. This capability is key to the overall terrain visualization mission in Force XXI. Topographic missions continue to shift toward data creation, 

management, and dissemination. The new missions provide the terrain data that empower the evaluation capability embedded in future command and control systems. 

Attendees at this session provided an excellent cross 

section of the engineer community. The collected expertise 

included all topographic battalion commanders, the commandant of the Defense Mapping School, and the commander 

of the Topographic Engineering Center. The session closed 

with comments from MG Flowers and BG Arnold. They 

encouraged the team not to focus on fixing the existing 

structure but to design a structure that will meet future 

requirements. 

The Terrain Visualization Center is working with the 

Concepts Division of the Directorate of Combat Devclopments and the Engineer Personnel Proponency Office to 

expand the two echelons-above-division options noted above. 

The assistant commandant provided an initial review and 

guidance in June. We are preparing a detailed concept design 

that will be staffed throughout TRADOC this fall. The point 

of contact is hoopere@wood.army.mil. 

Long-Range Experimention Plan 

By Vern Lowrey 

T he Maneuver Support Battle Lab (MSBL) hosted a 

breakout session to discuss engineer-related experimentation proposals as far forward as FYOI. We 

briefed the battle lab experimentation process described in 

TRADOC Pam 71-9, Requirements Determination. We also 

discussed an ongoing effort by TRADOC to expand Army 

experimentation efforts over five axes: 

fl Army XXI axis to determine final requirements for the 

First Digital Division (FDD) by FYOO. 

fl Corps/Echelons Above Division axis to experiment with 

structures needed to support the FDD and follow-on digital divisions that support fielding the First Digital Corps 

(FDC) by FY06. A corps Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) will be conducted in FY03. 

0 Joint Contingency Force axis to experiment with contingency and expeditionary forces will culminate in an 

AWE planned for FY02. 

0 Battle Force GroupIStrike Force axis to experiment 

with concepts tied to a highly lethal and deployable force. 

7 Army After Next axis to continue intellectual thought 

and discussion on Army force requirements beyond the 

year 2025. 

We then discussed proposed engineer-related experiments 

based on the new Army patterns of operations (project the 

force, protect the force, gain information dominance, shape 

the battlespace, conduct decisive operations, and sustain and 

transition the force). Resourced MSBL experiments will tie 

into each Army axis as appropriate. 

Feedback from ENFORCE participants was extremely 

helpful in validating engineer-related experiment proposals. 

Engineer 15 
Tighter linkage of MSBL experiment efforts was discussed 

with the Director of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer 

laboratories. A proposal was made to tie materiel-related 

experiment efforts with existing operational requirement 

documents to determine if the requirements are still valid or 

need modification. 

The MSBL Long-range Experimentation Plan (LREP) 

has been staffed with the U.S. Army Chemical, Engineer, 

and Military Police Schools. It is posted on the MSBL 

Internet home page. Comments or suggestions for future 

engineer-related experimentation ideas are welcome. The 

point of contact for the LREP, Major Steve Jeselink, may be 

reached at (573) 563-4082 or Defense System Network 

(DSN) 676-4082. 

The Bradley-Equipped Engineer Company 

By Lieutenant Colonel Dick Homack and Major Doug Victor 

D uring this session, we solicited input concerning the 

Engineer Regiment's transition to the Bradley 

engineer fighting vehicle (BEFV). The Engineer 

School will use data from the session to develop and finalize 

an operational and organizational (0&0) concept to 

incorporate into the BEFV concept evaluation plan. The 

0&0 concept will address the optimum organization for the 

engineer company, training issues, and doctrinal impacts of 

a Bradley-equipped engineer force. The Maneuver Support 

Battle Lab will continue to work this action. 

Subject areas used to facilitate discussion were engineer 

company and platoon organizations, training and doctrinal 

implications, and follow-on testing that will fully develop 

the Bradley engineer company concept. 

Engineer Company Organization. Engineer combat 

repair teams and combat service support should mirror 

requirements of the maneuver community. First sergeants 

should be in M113s along with the repair teams. Company 

commandersloperations sergeants must have a HMMWV, so 

we need to relook HMMWV distribution within engineer 

companies. Units may not be able to deploy with 100 

percent of their assigned systems due to soldiers who are 

sick, on profile, etc. 

Engineer Platoon Organization. Reduction platoons 

should have redundant capabilities to reduce obstacles and 

proof and mark lanes. They need the armored combat 

earthmover (ACE)--a mobility asset-rganic to the 

platoon to complement other reduction assets. The ACE can 

reduce antitank ditches and berms (constructed obstacles) 

and provide proofing capability through complex obstacles. 

Maintaining the ACE in reduction platoons will minimize 

task organization changes for offensive operations within 

engineer companies. 

Training Implications. We presented three proposals for 

engineer gunnery: 

0 Fire tables I-VIII 

o Fire tables I-VIII; don't fire tables I11 and IV. 

fl Fire tables I-VIII (Modified); don't fire tables 111 and IV. 

The group thought that engineer gunnery tables should 

parallel the maneuver tables I-XII, with tables XI and XI1 

being the squad and platoon qualifications, respectively. 

Engineer qualification tables should be merged into the 

current Bradley tables I-XI1 to create an engineer gunnery 

program with an end state of completely qualified squads and 

platoons. The Engineer School will continue to work 

engineer gunnery issues, including resources. 

Doctrine Implications. Engineer commanders expressed 

concern that four Grizzlies may be insufficient to support a 

maneuver task force during breaching operations, since we 

need to make as many breach lanes as possible for the 

assaulting task force. Engineer companies must retain as much 

of their current breaching capability as possible, because the 

Army will buy only a limited number of Grizzlies. 

Follow-On Testing. To help Engineer School personnel 

analyze the Bradley engineer company, the 4th Infantry 

Division's engineer brigade transitioned one engineer 

company to BEFVs in April 1998, using the same configuration as the infantry Bradley company. An Engineer 

School team will evaluate this concept, including load plans, 

maintenance, training, and doctrine. The 4th Infantry 

Division will test the concept throughout the summer and 

will deploy to the National Training Center in August with 

two engineer companies--one Bradley company and one 

M 1 13A2 company. 

The Engineer School will continue to evaluate engineer 

gunnery tables, engineer qualification tables, ammunition 

implications, the feasibility of adding a bunker-busting 

munition to the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided 

(TOW) missile, and the need to change to the Bradley 

stowage capacity to accommodate engineer equipment. A 

proposed FY99 concept evaluation plan will address 

enhancements to the Bradley, which include rollers, plows, 

Volcano, MICLIC, and possible hydrauliclpneumatic tools. 

The point of contact is steinigp@wood.army.mil. 

Total Army Training System Courses 

By Lieutenant Colonel Susan R. Myers 

e provided information about the Total Army 

Training System (TATS) courses and solicited 

feedback as to how material should be fielded 

throughout the engineer regiment. 

The Total Army School System (TASS) is the realization 

of former Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon 

Sullivan's vision for the Active and Reserve Components to 

train to the same standard. His vision is being realized now 

that seven functionally aligned training battalions offer 

reclassification courses to the engineer Reserve Components. 

TATS courses are the means to standardize training technical 

tasks, and the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) is the 

process used to develop programs of instruction. 

Systems Approach to Training 

The Training and Doctrine Command updated the SAT 

process in 1995 to re-establish a long-term approach to 

planning future training requirements for TATS courses. 

16 Engineer July 1998 
SAT has five interrelated phases: analysis, design, 

development, implementation, and evaluation. 

Analysis. This phase identifies and describes collective 

and individual tasks and determines what needs to be 

trained. Analysis for TATS courses is accomplished by 

bringing together representatives from all components to 

determine training needs. Achieving consensus on training 

needs and critical tasks is a difficult process. The Engineer 

School received Active Duty Special Work funds to help 

ensure that feedback from field commanders and Reserve 

Component instructors is integrated into the analysis phase. 

Design. This phase ensures the systematic development 

of training progralns and materials to enhance the learning 

process and make it more effective. Virtual and diagnostic 

learning strategies being incorporated into TATS courses 

will require access to and fielding of technological learning 

systems. Linking these systems is critical to the success of 

future training capabilities, and the medium to accomplish 

the link is comoonent distance learning - plans. & 

Development. This process turns the design into training 

products, programs, and materials required to implement 

training. The program of instruction, lesson plans, student 

handouts, soldier's manuals, and interactive courseware are 

products of the development process. Combat engineer 

courses were validated this year (1998) at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri; the Army National Guard Regional 

Training Institute at Camp Grafton, North Dakota; and the 

Army Reserve engineer TASS battalion at Camp Dawson, 

West Virginia. This validation process ensures that training 

issues from all components are incorporated. Construction 

and equipment operator courses will be completed this fall. 

All courseware will be available for distribution from the 

Army Training Support Command in October 1999. 

Implementation. During this phase, courses are 

conducted using training materials and exercises based on 

unit training needs. The implementation process is 

expanding to accommodate training battalion evaluation 

criteria mandated by the TRADOC accreditation program. 

Evaluation. Units are evaluated annually, and TASS 

battalions are accredited every three years (as a minimum). 

The accreditation system evaluates instructor and student 

performance, instructor credentials, testing programs, course 

materials, and training resources. Some of the Engineer 

Regiment's greatest challenges are to plan and resource 

training to meet military occupational specialty qualification 

quotas and, more importantly, to ensure that soldiers are 

prepared to perform critical technical tasks to standard 

before graduating from the course. 

The Future 

Engineers must continually asscss both individual and 

collective skills and knowledge to anticipate filture training 

requirements. Acquiring resources for training is often the 

weak link because of changes in doctrine and lead times 

needed to procure materials. Distance learning is touted as 

the solution to reducing the time required for training. 

However, our technical skills and knowledge are perishable 

without continuous reinforcement and practice. The Director 

of Training seeks feedback and lessons learned concerning 

training needs, distance learning, and training effectiveness 

from unit commanders, training commanders, and other 

training experts. Leaders must learn more about the TATS 

courses. They are the tools to train the entire Force XXI 

Engineer Regiment and the bridge to bringing the Active and 

Reserve Components together for readiness. The point of 

contact is stephens@wood.army.mil. 

Training Modernization 

By Connie Welch and A1 Waftman 

his session presented the Engineer School's initiative 

to modernize engineer training. Participants were 

shown prioritized lists of modernization initiatives 

developed by the school's Training Modernization Integrated 

Concept Team and were asked to comment on the list's 

completeness and priorities. 

Updated priority lists follow. 

Maneuver Engineering 

1. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations 

(TADSS) to support staff training in the technical engineer 

areas of breaching, force protection, obstacle planning, and 

river-crossing operations. 

2. Computer-based training and simulations to train 

general tactical operations center (TOC) procedures. 

3. TADSS to support mine detection (virtual-realitybased). 

4. An improved mine-effects simulator for the combat 

training centers. 

5. An armored combat earthmover (ACE) simulator. 

6. A Volcano simulator. 

7. More training events integrated with other TRADOC 

schools and between courses at the Engineer School. 

8. A large, regional, fast-water, river-crossing training 

area for the Army. 

9. A bridge boat operator and raft commander simulator. 

10. Multimedia training to support bridge design and 

Bailey bridgelmedium girder bridge simulators/simulations. 

11. An improved mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) 

and MICLIC trainer. 

12. A remedial math class or computer-based training. 

Force Support Engineering 

1. TADSS to support heavy construction engineer 

equipment, such as dozers, graders, scrapers, loaders, and SEES. 

2. TADSS similar to a simulation network to support 

construction engineering activities. 

3. A base camp demonstration site at Fort Leonard 

Wood for resident training, similar to the model motor pool or 

the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) facility. 

4. A handheld electronic expert system, which will 

contain the equivalent of FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, and 

perform calculations. 

5. A simulation to support engineer and route 

reconnaissance. 

6. Move reclassificaton training to the Total Army 

School System battalions. 

July 1998 Engineer 17 
Terrain Visualization 

1. Embedded training for the Digital Topographic 

Support System. 

2. Digital terrain training support package (CBT) for 

producing map products. 

3. Maneuver Control System and Joint Mapping 

Tools Kit training in leadership courses in the Engineer 

School. 

4. Computer-based training that demonstrates battlefield obscuration and its effects on engineer operations. 

5. A camouflage training site at Fort Leonard Wood. 

6. Re-evaluate the initiative to move the Defense 

Mapping School to Fort Leonard Wood. 

Systematic/Process Topics 

1. Revitalize the individual training program process 

to identify resource requirements, and develop and program 

a training strategy. 

2. Nonsystem TADSS acquisition system fails and 

requires redesign too often. 

3. Review course length limits versus increasing skill 

complexity due to new technologies. 

4. Standardize DoD equipment: Multiple brands of 

equipment across the total force cause problems. 

5. Human factors are not included in training and 

equipment designs. 

Participants made the following recommendations. 

0 Add Volcano and ACE training devices to the maneuver 

engineering list. 

o Separate survivability issues from force protection 

issues on the force support list. 

The second portion of this session was devoted to the 

Engineer Force Battle Command and Staff Trainer modernization initiative. Suggestions included: 

o Consider consolidating the analog and digitized CDROM. Digitized training could be an annex or add-on to 

the analog CD-ROM. 

n Add a company support platoon leader trainer. 

3 Add a company-level supply position trainer. 

Engineer School personnel are reviewing these recommendations and will incorporate them into final 

prioritized lists. The lists will be presented to the school 

commandant for approval by mid-August 1998. The point of 

contact for training modernization at the Engineer School is 

waltmana@wood.army.mi1. 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

By Major Durren Naztmunn 

T he purpose of this session was to brief results of the 

EOAC customer survey and Task Site Selection 

Board and discuss the Total Army Training SystemCourseware (TATS-C) and EOAC-Reserve Con~ponent 

Distance Learning Implementation Plan. We also solicited 

input for improvements to the EOAC. 

EOAC Survey. The group agreed that the EOAC 

customer survey is valid but were concerned that the top 10 

tasks reflect priorities facing a peacetime Army. They 

thought that survey results should not drive the train for 

EOAC course instruction but should be viewed as one of 

many inputs to the course design. We discussed the 

complexity level of tasks instructed in the EOAC-whether 

they are the most difficult or most often encountered-and 

agreed that the course should focus on foundation skills on 

which the officer can build. 

Consensus was that the survey be conducted annually, that 

it is beneficial for commanders to provide input to EOAC 

design, and that we should administer a similar survey to 

maneuver commanders. The following improvements were 

recommended: 

fl Change the cover letter to emphasize the importance of 

commanders' input to the course. 

0 Change the wording of questions to reflect the survey 

purpose; for example, "What important skills and knowledge should be taught in the EOAC?" 

o Provide commanders the ability to quantify the detail 

level of skills and knowledge taught; for example, 

differentiate between "integrated," "awareness," "refresher," and "programmed" training. 

fl Administer future surveys to EOAC graduates as well as 

battalion/brigade/group commanders. To reduce costs, 

conimanders will be responsible for distributing surveys 

to EOAC graduates in their command. 

fl Distribute future surveys to U.S. Marine Corps engineer 

unit commanders. 

Task Site Selection Board. The group thought that the 

critical task list and recommendations from the board were 

not indicative of the engineer branch as a whole but reflected 

the types of units represented on the board. 

Total Army Training System-Courseware. The group 

recommended that lesson plans for tasks encountered least 

often be converted and published first under the TATS-C 

program. 

Distance Learning Implementation Plan. Participants 

agreed that it may be difficult to synchronize quarterly video 

teletraining and mobile training team sessions with Reserve 

Component units. They recommended that the sessions be 

archived so students can access them. 

Recommendations. Teach EOAC students to be 

managers, not technicians, and focus instruction on 

management-level issues and systems that company 

commanders should know. Increase students' exposure to 

issues relevant to today's fight, such as support operations 

and stability operations, rather than focusing entirely on 

fighting "World War 111." The point of contact is 

naumannd@wood.army,mil. 

18 Engineer July 1998 
Figure 1. Planning, achieving, and maintaining obstacle integration 

Achieving obstacle_ Maintaining obstacle 

Scatterable Mine Systems and Integration 

integration Reporting 

Bv Major David Holhrook. Major Michael Rose, Mqjor 

Darold McCloud, cznd Mr. Charles Jackson 

Turnover integration 

Protection 

e discussed and solicited feedback on negative 

combat training center trends, current doctrine, 

and future systems related to scatterable mines. 

Attendees reviewed several trends related to scatterable 

mine employment and integration across DTLOMS, with 

doctrine, organization, and materiel trends being most 

Scheme of maneuver 

desired effect 

integration 

rapidly changing, and doctrine must keep pace. The 

"dynamic battlespace" we fight in today is leading the way 

for future systems that reach out and kill the enemy at greater 

distances. The Raptor is a system that fits this mold. 

"Dynamic" in itself has a single meaning, but when added 

as a descriptor at the beginning of existing doctrinal terms, it 

requires definition in the doctrinal lexicon. According to 

Webster, "dynamic" is defined as (1) forceful; energetic (2) 

of or pertaining to force or energy related to motion. We 

proposed that to be "dynamic" an obstacle mustnotable. Engineer School personnel will work these issues Colnmunicate with command and control systems and 

based on information obtained during the session. other engagement systems. 

Doctrine o Be remotelv controlled (onlofflon). 

We 'greed to a graphic training aid (GTA) that n Report banlevace intelligence (lype, number, direction, outlines system checks for the Volcano and MICLIC. and rate of movement). Consensus was to limit the Volcano section to the ., ground 

Volcano. since aircraft crew chiefs conduct additional O Be 

(nonengineer-related) checks on the air Volcano that are o Engage vehicles. 

inappropriate for an engineer GTA. The group suggested 

that system checks for the MOPMS be included on a future 

GTA. 

We discussed scatterable mine integration concepts in 

current doctrine. FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle 

Integration, now being reviewed by the field, will contain 

information on planning, achieving, and maintaining obstacle integration (Figure 1). We concluded this section by 

discussing available scatterable mine assets and points in the 

military decision-making process that will assist leaders in 

While these descriptors apply to the-future Raptor system 

(see materiel section), they do not apply to current scatterable 

mine systems. 

Participants thought we do not need another term to 

describe our obstacles, but they provided some interesting 

insights and acknowledged that Inany leaders use the term 

"dynamic obstacle." The term will be defined in future 

doctrine, based on the above criteria and the following 

synopsis of the attendees' comments: 

planning scatterable mine integration. 

~~~i~~l~~~ was discussed in detail, particularly the term o Obstacle-If it is not an obstacle, it is not linked to engi- 

"dynamic obstacle," which emerged during the National neer proponency. 

Training Center's Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) Dynamic-Has on/off/on capability at least once. 

in March 1997 and was used in the Division AWE at Fort 17 Active-Sensors are not active; they only receive, Mines 

Hood last fall. Although the term has never been defined, it 

are passive, while radar and sonar are active, To be 

continues to show up in correspondence and in lessons- "dynamic" a system must be active. 

learned documents circulating through the Engineer School. 

term "dynamic- is frequently used in F~~~~ XXI o Mobile-Replace the term "mobile" with "interactive" 

operations, and engineers must embrace it. The Army is when describing the Raptor. 

July 1998 Engineer 19 
Air-Delivered Acoustic Sensor (ADAS) 

I.I,,,~,~,~~(I C,!I-/F- EX^ I,, W,~T,II~,? Ground Control Statbn 

,m ,. ,+. and gateway - r+al.llmv 

p~tu"= o!b~ll~otl~ld 

-. A- "ptl.1-s 

ILjnkpd tahW-5 

X- ., ./ Gateway 

a r,--.. ' . ., , M ~PS Ra~ror elernen& 

I,, ,!,.: ,. , , 

8- - ?L5 ./ --- - - - Pruxstdos tracklnu data lu GC4 - T,>l! 3tt1 ,b =,,% EYPCU~?C ~m,rnr~~?ndef'$ rqtenl . 5t" dd?r~~:ls 

Meters 

Ihan v I n I ,I I d ,I ., 1I n 

Detect (ADA~) ' Early warning ,-L - - . - r Oerccf IHormt) . Timely attack - Classify . 8 

- I Attack Flexible -- I-' , ~etect Track engagement options ,a Classify 

I -. I' * Attack 

L .I 

Figure 2. Raptor - A Force XXI Capability 

7 Qc~,yi\.i,.pr1 Ejfir-t-Allows kee mobility thr the BLUE: is Sulf-Destnrct Times. We agreed that diffcrcnt selfan ohstncle to the RED; and is no dallger to the GREEN destruct limes should he devetoped for our fcattcrable mine 

Inoncomhntantsi. ~ystems. The current times of 4 hours, 48 hours, nnd 15 days 

(for the Volcano) are not conducive ti) fut~~rc rn~ssion Organization execution. Suggestinns includeti: Attcndeeq a~reed - thar ~hc M54R Volcano carrier should 

have a c~l~munic;ltinns pl~tfnnn fr,r inl>lluting a rallio lo '11 Base changes to self-riestmcl time% 011 ctiemy echelonunI~nnco comn~and and control rsl' this cr~tical asset. ment: for example, thc duration shnitld cover the tline 

when the first echdon enter'; the main battle area throuyh 

Materiel cul~nination ol'tht. second echelon. 

Suggestion? concerniny n standard minefield-marking Changc ~hr: times to 1 ? hours, 4n hours. and t 5 days. svstcrn tncl~~dt.cI: 

7 Cliangc the tiines to 4 hoi~rs. I X hours. nntl4X hours. 

1 EstnhZish the standard n1 theater corps level at thc 

beginning obach hpcrnlion. n Align all systems that Iiave ~l~e RCU-contro!lciZ MOPMS 

with a cornm;ind-dctonation optloll. 7 Use n material for thc marking system that is readily 

a~ailable to 811 units. 0 Incrcasc the avail;~hility of scatlcrnhle mine Class V 

1 Include minefield-marking matesi:kl in the STRAC supplics (ammunition). 

rnanuaf. Raptnr. Previously called tllc irltcIIigcnl rninelield (IMF), 

-I Enszt~c that the minefield-marking mslcriaf can bc used 

Iby both heaw and ligl~t fnrces. 

'7 Adopt the Pearson Pathtjndcr marking system used by 

tIic Brifisl~ arnly. 

Valcann Min~fieltl-Marking Sy5tem (VMMS). Wu 

d~scusscd this possible fitrtiru Fystenl. whiclr wiri~ld 

climinatc stimc negative trends users e~periencc witli the 

current Volcano a! combat training centers. Thc VMMS will 

autornntica2ly mark the Volcano minefield as it deploys. 

Participants approved this concept and suygcstetl 

improvcments to bc incorporated under thc L'c~lcnno 

iinprovcment plan. Thc VMMS should have a comnlunications pIntforrn and built-in Cilohnl Positioning 

Syvtcm (GPS) and be capablc of being carried by soldiers 

(man-packed). This last fuature will enahIc sddiers tn 

rapidly rnark any unmarkcd areas created by tcrrnin or tflc 

\vstcrn itself. 

the Raptor is both a weapon and an inYi~mntion-collection 

sy~tcm. which ~rlnkcs El llard to categorize. Thc syqtem 

consists of' air-del ivorcd ncoustics sensors. FIornct munit ions, 

a ~itcwny mda ground-control station (Figurc 3). Several 

suggested irnpsovcrncnts to the Raptor concern sakty and 

utility. The group thought the Homct shwld have a disarmnnd-reuse cnpabllity aliur it is hilly itnncd. C'urrenlly the 

I-Surnct cat) be redeployed hcfore final arming, hul it either 

self-destructs at 3 ptcset lirnc or is rcrno~cIy command 

detonated when fully aimed. 

lie ENFORCE Conference breakout sessiclns keep 

lcadcrs of \he Engineer Rcgimcnt informed of'ongoing 

issues. Feedback gathered duriny the sessions will he 

cxtrcrnely helpfi11 in developing htl~re doctrine and engineer 

systems. Your contitiucrl interest and suppon are appreciated. 

u 
( ENFOKOI') C'onfcrciiccs cstabl tshcd I hc 

framework for the EQTs. 

Unit represerrtnlivcs from 1hc 

ENFORCE scssions agreed that tl~c U.S. 

Army Engineer School shor~ld creatc one 

set of tables to cncolnpass all cornhtt 

engineers. rcgnrcllcss of 'I'08E or componenl - Otlc Ac),qin~t*t~t, Onc Ft.yh I. Otre Set 

01 T(xl~lra. School pctionncl oryanizcd 

i~ni! st~ggesticrns Into twclvr t:ihlcc that 

mirror (lie Infnntry and Amlor gilnncv 

tablcs. 'l'l~s dcsign allows the thrce Army 

bmnchcs tn spe:ik tlic sumc langunpc nl 

training and rcsourcc rncetir~gs. Tl~c 

EQTs wcre then fitlclccf to tlie cntirc cngincer force for rovicw. postud to the engincer liomc papc. and rcvicrvcd nt n 1097 

ENFORCE hrcitkout stssion. After thosc 

recommendations wcrc incorpuntcd. thc 

rcviscd vcrsion wi~s staffed l'or rcvicw by 

enginecr brigndc cornmnnders fmm scleactf enginucr anits. Frnal rccommcndalions wurv incclrpontcd In the EQTs and 

brid'cd to a coui~cll 01' coloncls on 27 

Ocroher 1997. 

'Ric ncw standnrcli~cd EQTs pcmiit 

wqucnt ial training and qu:~lificntion of' 

engineer units. ptr~gcssing fm individ7 ne firnly s ncw stanoartiizccl qua!- 

ual to squad to piatnon qua!ificatioiis. 

Leildcrs are also qualitied to ensure they 

are proficient at tlie tasks they w~ll evaluate. The q~talificn~inn process defines 

tmining readinesq during mohitization, 

post inohilimtron, deployment, and stistainmcnt at any localiot~. 

Squad and platoon tables contain 

fot~ndation dr~Fls and tarks that cornhat 

cngineer units intiqt hc able to accornplfsh 

to support maneuver rorces durttlg comhincd arm4 or joint operations. Tllc unit 

commander can tailor the EQTs Tor tlic 

itnil mission and the missinn-essential 

t~sk Iist (METI,) hv adding ;vlditional 

tavks and drills. 

A combat sccnnrio incl~ldctl in the 

EQT? is a vcliiclc [or tack u~ecutinn. 

Embedded tasks are intetidccl tu he 

trained In this scenano or in a hcenarin 

crested by the unit, as long 21s !Iic tasks 

are directly linked tn cornhincrl arms 

training stratcgius. \'Jll!le Illc scenario is 

not the only mean.; nf execution. it ties a11 

taqkr; to the rnisqion stid allows effective 

use of training resources. 

Authonmt~on provlcled in DA Pamificalion mbles lbr enginccis will 

phIet 350-3X, Strr~~dnrclr. irr Ijkirporls 

fininirrg (Standards in Training C'ommission [STRAC-I). is thc basis OF rcsnurce 

allocatiun for cxccutin? thc tablcs. Ilowcvcr. the EQTs arc nut constr:iincd hy 

tliosc authornzations. Sincc thc unit can 

tailor tlrc EQTs to lhcir METL and mission. ainrnunition usc inay vary. Appendix U is a fccdbnck 2brm dcsi_mcd lo 

capture data and provide the Engincsr 

Sclraol tlic arnaunl of Classes IV and V 

nlatcrials LIFC~ during the EQTs. The 

school will usc data on these forms to jusrify future STRAC' adyu~trrtcnts. Appcndix C provides a nicthod ol'rccoriling ~hc 

qualification status of individuals and 

units. 

TIic final vcrsIon of TC 5-1 50. Drgitlcrr. Q~~rrlifiunrion L~hl~g.~, is dated I h 

June IYYX. It is on thc Enginccr Ceiltcr 

liainc page. w 

- - - ..- 

~i~~t ~I~.T.Y M[I~I/I i.~ (l Tc71~l~~r 

rnrnhnt ntln(1:r.t (~trd writel- it7 thc I1ir.wtnrrrrc of Tvrrirrrtrg nrrrf Doc.fr.irlr. U.S. 

..Irtyy firgi~reerr. ,School. Hi, iv rrlr .4,iOS 

1340 solrlii~r. rrirh 1 7 j.t~rrr-v of .W?I ire. 

Ra~gn~Ri -- '. 

enable every unit In have thc same 

levcl of trn~ning nntf readiness. For many 

years. the Eng~neer Rmtlch [ins opcr~itcd 

withont a oo~nrnoi~ single aainlng standard hr wc:~pons. dcniol itions. and 

mines. Tlic Armor and Inihntw Brnnchcs 

have used rlualilicat~nn lablcs for ovcr 15 

years. which gave lhern a significant 

advantage Tor jlatil3ing ammunilion. tcrrain. and nngt. use. 

Tl~c need for cnginccr quiilificntion 

tahlcs (IIQTs) was established in tlie 19Y5 

Senior Engineer Leader 'l'raining Con furence. .4n evcr-decreasing training bud@ 

and the increasing scope oT cmploymcnt 

and vcmatility of the fcorcc cornpo~u~d< 

tli~s nccd. I3renkoiit scssions hcld durInl: thc 199h and 1997 Enqinccr Force 

T~bl~t 

Appendrx 

I 

11 

111 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

Vlll 

1X 

X 

XI 

Xlll 

b 

0 

C - 

- - - - - - - - - - 

Tlttc 

Indrv~duallCrew Weapons Ouallltcatron 

Leader Dernol~t~ons and Mtne Oualiflcat~on 

lnd~viduat Demol~t~ons and Mine Profic~ency 

lnd~v~dual Demolittons and Mlne Oual~ficat~on 

Preliminary React to Contact 

Prelim~nary Tralning Course 

Intermediate Prof~c~ency Course 

Intermediate Qualif~cat~on Course 

Advanced React to Contact 

Advanced Tratning Course 

Advanced Prof~ciency Course 

Advanced Qualif~cation Course 

Metrlc Convers~on Chart 

Englneer Amrnun~tion 

Eng~neer Qualif~cat~on Table Work Sheets 
Commissioned Offices Development 

and Career Management: 

Engineer Chapter of DA Pam 600-3 Revised 

By Major David Hartley and Captain Aaron Walter 

fficer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI 

is a new officer professional development and 

management system designed to build an officer 

corps that will hlfill future needs of the Army and the 

nation. The revised Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 

(DA Pam 600-3) addresses officer professional development 

and career management under OPMS XXI. Army officers 

will use it as a road map when making career decisions 

based on OPMS XXI. DA Pam 600-3 is scheduled for 

publication in October 1998, so that officers will have it 

before the new Career Field Designation (CFD) boards 

convene in FY99. 

The Engineer Personnel Proponency Office (EPPO) 

submitted a revised Engineer chapter to update DA Pam 

600-3 in February 1998. This chapter includes current 

features of the Engineer Branch, required officer 

characteristics, engineer officer development information, 

and an updated section on engineer Reserve Component (RC) 

officers. The Engineer chapter provided for the updated DA 

Pam 600-3 is available on the Fort Leonard Wood web site 

(www.wood.army .mil/EPPO/eppo-hp. htm). 

Some of the most significant changes to the Engineer 

chapter pertain to engineer officer development. This section 

describes branch qualification, education, leader development and command preparation, and assignments for 

each grade. Figure 1, the Engineer Life Cycle Development 

Model (Active), highlights the redefined branch qualification 

requirements for each grade. Other changes include goals of 

Years of 

I I I 'I I I I I 

Service 0 5 10 15 20 25 

I ILTI CPT MAJ 1 LTC I I L Q) 0.0 v, gzz 

orn0 

- Battalion staff 

Branch 

Qualifying 

Complete Captains Career Course 

Company command 

(minimum of 12 months) 

* Functional * Career lield 

area decision dec~s~o n 

Captains 

Career Course 

Minimum of 12 

months in a 

troop-leading 

position 

-Company commander 

- Battaliodbrigade staff 

- USACE project officer 

-AC/RC support posit~on 

-Service school instructor 

- CTC obserirerlcontroller 

- Functional position 

- ROTCIUSMANSAREC 

Complete Command and Staff 

College 

Mlnimum of 12 monthsas 

-Battalion XO 

- Battalionhrigadelgroup S3 

- Assistant division engineer 

-Cavalry regiment engineer 

- Engineer training supporl 

Battalion S3KO 

- Deputy district engineer 

-Director of Public Works 

Master's degree 

Professional license 

Command and Staff 

College 

- Battalionlbrigade staff 

- MACOM/DA/jointstaff 

- ACIRC support position 

- Service school instructor 

- CTC observerlcontroller 

- ROTCIUSMANSAREC 

Senior Service 

College 

Minimum of 12 montb in 

an engineer position 

- Battalion commander 

-District commander 

- MACOM/DA/joint staff 

- Deputy district engineer 

- AC/RC support position 

- CTC observer/controller 

- ROTC PMS/USMA/ 

USAREC 

-Director of Public Works 

Minimum of 12 months in 

an engineer position 

- Brigade commander 

-District commander 

- Director at the Engineer 

SchoolIUSACE 

- MACOMIDAljoint staff 

-AC/RC support position 

Figure 1. Engineer Life Cycle Development Model (Active), from Figure 16-1 in DA Pam 600-3. 

22 Engineer July 1998 
-- - -- 

Figure 2. Engineer Life Cycle Development Model (Reserve), from Figure 16-2 in DA Pam 600-3. 

years of' 

15 to 18 months in command for captains and 18 to 24 

months in one of the listed positions for majors. These goals 

are desirable for leader develop~nent and unit cohesion, as 

defined in the leader development and command preparation 

sections for these two grades. 

Several changes in the updated DA Pam pertain to RC 

engineer officers. These changes are shown in Figure 2, the 

Engineer Life Cycle Developmental Model (Reserve) (from 

the Engineer chapter), and are briefly described below: 

For more information on OPMS XXI, visit the OPMS XXI 

web site (www.army.mil/opms) or the AR-PERSCOM web 

site at (www.army.millusarlar-perscom/ppo.htm). M 

I 

Major Hartley is the officer coordinator for the Engineer 

Personnel Proponency Ofice at the U.S. Army Engineer 

Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He can be reached at 

(573) 563-4087 or DSN 676-4087. His e-mail address is 

hartleyd@wood. army. mil. 

Service 0 7 14 2 1 24 30 

- MACOM/DA/jolnt staff 

Officers must complete the Engineer Officer Basic Captain Walter (AGR) is the Engineer Branch Personnel 

course (EOBC) by the second (not year of Proponent Integration Officer at the Army Reserve Personnel 

service. Command (AR-PERSCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri. He can be 

I 

- Battallon staff 

Officers must complete a bachelor's degree before proreached at (314) 538-2737 or DSN 892-2737, His e-mail 

motion to captain. address is AARON. WALTER@arpstl-emh2.army.mil 

The Engineer Officer Advanced Course (EOAC) and 

the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) have 

been integrated. The new course is called Captains Career 

Course. AC and some RC engineer officers attend an 18- 

week EOAC, which is immediately followed by six weeks 

of CAS3. Most RC engineer officers, however, will 

continue to attend EOAC and CAS3 in its current format 

until EOAC-RC is reconfigured and other details are 

worked out. 

I 

4 IMA assignment (USAR) b 

4 4GR F 

Notes: 

1. Must complete EOBC by second year (USAR) or 18 months (ARNG) of service. 5. Must complete 50 percent of CSC for promotion to lieutenant 

2. Mustcomplete a degree prior to promotion to captain. colonel and then 100 percent within three years of promotion. 

3. Ml~st complete EOAC by the 14th year of service. 6. Mustcomplete SSC for promotion to brigadier general. 

4. Mustcomplete CAS3 for promotion to major. 

- USAR school instructor 

- DEH (ARNG) 

- Br/FA generalist 

July 1998 Engineer 23 

I 

- BrIFA generalist 

-Brigade XO 

- Sub-Installation 

commander 

I 

commandant USAES 

- MACOM/DA/jointstaff 

- BrIFA generalist 

- Ill Corps ACE 
Who Are Engineer Warrant Officers? 

R-v C W4 Clinton P:trker, C W4 Fred Tre.~sler, and C W4 Gilbert Rina 

crhaps the leiat undcrstuod soldicrs In the U.S. Army arc ctlgincer equipment nnd direct maintcnancc and supply 

warrant officurs, whu arc nppolntcd by wnrrant of thc mitnagcrnent opemtiotis. In stafrpos~tions, they nssi~t and advisc 

Sectetary of thc Anny. They are highly specialized cotnm~tntlurs in ilrcas pertainmy to niaintenancc and maincxperta ant1 trninerh wh<+ by gninrng progrcsstvr lcvels uf tcnancc operations. Tl~cy elso scrvc as trrjin~ng iniplcrncntcrs 

expurtisc and leadcrshi~)perutc, mni~lt;tin, adinini~tcr. and and tlcvclopci~, cornhit dcvclopers (cclriiprncnt). and 

manage equipment, support actibitich, nnd tecFi~~ical systcmq maintcn;tnce officers. 

thrnughour the Anny's divcrsc biimcl~cs. Voro thnn 25.000 

active and referve snldiers are warrant oficcrs, who scrvc in Opportunities . . 

specialties ranging from hclicoptcr pilot thru~igh vctcrinnry A crlrccr tu: n wnrrant oFficcr offcss rewarding opporh~nlt~es ~erviccs technician 10 lepl adrninislratur for leaderslilp and growth. It also demands gredt deEngineer Warrant Officers tlictltion and the higliltst moral character. 

Warrant officer cand~dates must havc abovc-avcra~c skills. 

flc Cops of engineers is the Propnent for two wmanl tlemonstratcd ability. and supcwisory cxpcsicncc In a particular 

officer mitiltat- occupational specialties (MOSS)--Utility reeder MOS. Tllgir l~@Iy spcciarizcd skiIIh nj-c wnnnnl oftyficc~' 

Operation and Mainlen~nce Technrci~n (210A) and Tcr- most vital conhi bitiion. Civilian etlucation and oxpcrlcncc may 

min Ar~alysis Technician (2 15D). Until Oclobcr 1994, thc Corps ui" substi tt~te for some military [raining atid cxpcriencu. 

Engineers waq also pmponenl for tlic Engi~rccr Eqi~ipmcnt Repair In adtIEtlon to MOS qualtfications, warrant officers cxccutc 

Technician MOS (919A). but now cnginccrs hnvc only training "urnerous managerial f~lnctions. They arc cx~cctcd to kcc~ 

resWnfihility ror this MOS. and rhc ~~d~~~~~~ corps haq all other abreast of changes in eqtlipmcnb organization, and ~roccdurcs in 

~~ponsibilities. Table 1 sh~ws ~lic enlivted fccdcr MOSq hi- "lei' special^. 

Male or female NC'Os. E5 or higher, may llavc what it takcs to accession into thcsc warnjut olliccr MOSS. hecome a warrant oficer, The Amy's goal is to appoint NCOs with Ahout 80 percent of cnginccr warrant officerq are it1 the cight or fewer years of servlce in either the Active or Reserve Reserve Components, which consiqt? of tlre Army Nntiorlnl Components as warrant oficers. Applicants with concurrent orders Guard (ARNGj ;~nd thc U.S. Amiy Reserve (IJSAR). Their to active duty should not exceed 12 years of active Fedcn~l scrvicc. missions span the n~illtnry and crvil engineering Tpectruln. 

Duties 

oht posilions in the rlirec warrant officer MOSS are 

coded fnr partic~~lar grades. Specific tIutics for tach 

grade arc SFIOWH in Tablc 2. page 25. 

MOS 21E)A 

Utility Opcratic~n and Maintenance Techn~cians organize 

and mrlnagr: pcrsonncl and orgsnizatlons that provide engineer 

support on the battlcficld and in rear arcas. They plnn, organize, 

and supervise the rnaintelrance and repalr of ilti lities eqlr lpmen t 

to support commartders c~~gagcd In real property mnintennnce 

actrvities, such as rehabilitating or remodeling nnd upgrading 

existing racilitics. Thoy maintain fixed or rnoh~le electrical 

power plant% (Primc Powcr Tcnms). instaZl or set up deployable 

rncdical hospitals, and illstall and maintain Ii~gh-voltnge 

electrical power I~nes. 

MOS 215D 

Enginccr Terrain A~lnlysis Technicians provide geographic 

infonnatiun 111 digital and hard-copy forms. so that maneuver 

commanders and staff elements can visualize the terrnrli and 

rormulazc possiblc courses of action early in [he decisionmaking preccss. 

MOS 91 9A 

Enginecr Equipmcnl Repair Technicians manage. sup-vise, 

and coord~nate gencral support rnaintcnancc activ~ties for 

Table 1 

?d Feeder MOS Warrant Off ict 

51 8 Carpentry and Masonr 

51 H Construction Engineerrng Supervisor 

51 R lnterlor Electrlclan 

52C Ut~l~ties Equ~pment Repairer 

520 Power Generatton Equipment 

52E Prime Power Production Specialist 

52G Transmission and Distribution Spe52D Power Generation Equipment 

628 Construction Equipment Repairer 
Table 2 

Jpport and 

nal mantel 

- . . . - . . - - W5riXrnt Officer BGtieZ -- ---- 

evacuation 

lance of w Ile medical 

I 

- - - - - - - - 

MrjS Gri~dc 

I WOl/CWZ 

4ssigned tc I hospitals. 

?UPF?N~SB 4 heeled vek 

3oruer plan 

qepalr, modify, and rehabil~tate utiltly systems and subsystems, facilities, slruclures, power plants, statron 

?osp~tals, ahospr:als. 

%W4 

210 Zommand ntachrnents ae prime power. 

>!an and suurrvlsc expeclteqt verriual curl~~ruction and rmid rehau~r~rcltruri UI srrucrlrrss. ~dcllities., 

erlor 01 facilrties (carpentry, mast 

truct base camps. 

support et 

I 

, 

215D 

separate dl . - - - . - - . 

bV*3 

Serve as supervisor or adv~sory manager or in a staff position. 

WOllCW2 

Work at drvision level, usually as Terrain Analysis Detachment commanders. 

Suppod the G2 on rntelligence preparazlon of the battlefield 

CW316W4 

Serve an theater topographic battalion stafts, echelons above corps, and at major regional commands to 

help lormulate topographrc and terraln analys~s requrremenls. 

Serve as prolecl offlcers at the Engineer School's Department of Training and Doctrine or Directorate of 

Combat Developments, where they develop englneer doctrlne and ident~fy mapplng, charting, and geodesy 

requrrements lo support a mobile army ~n a drgital env~ronment 

CW5 

1 Work at the Topograph~c Engineering Center to help identify and coordinate research and development ~nltlatives to meet the technlcal and automailon needs of tomorrow. 

WOlICW2 

Assigned to engineer, ordnance, 

91 9 

rior and exl 

n, and con 

Supervise engfneer and nonengl 

II Overwe reaalr of eou~oment for rluwrji rlellt.r63rruri carul triuvlrlu. S~I~~JI~IU CVlTlUdEIIIIU ~lrttriu. ~IIU IU~UIIIU: 

quarryrnq, 

equlpment. 

CW31CW4 

E A~~i~lned tcr eilylr~etlr uauallwrls airu ~[~II~IIL~ LUIII~~~ tit-a 111edvy CIIIU 11yr11 VIVI>IUII~I. 

~rgarr~zaho ?ct suppod ma~ntenance anti staff responslt 

nd painting 

~eneral sul enance act igrnepr eqrllprncnt 

pair of pob tion, earlk frrgeration. air conrltfil 

Serve in staft posttiom 

maintenance and mall 

- Prov~de ma~nlenance expenrse In oranance, engneer, atrDorne, ana rianr ana neavy orvlslonal anc . .. ... . I sons unts 

mies and t 

_ -- - _A! - - 

and trznsp 

necr equip1 - . . . - - - - - 

ortzt~on (te 

Tent malnt .--A -- - .. 

rminal sen 

enance. 

.L. - - 

rice) cornpi 

-L----- - 

rock crusl- 

- ....*.-,.*- 

ling; road 

LA&-,:*-- - 

n and ai? 

:-A IC. . 

nal and din 11litieS. 

ming, and 

Supervtse I 

Supervise 4 

Oversee re 

lpon marnt 

ver genera other engi neer and 

nt. 

s al brigadt 

ntenance o ,. . 

3 level or hi 

perations. 

ling and ac 

. . lvising corn . .. . . 

manders ir 

. , 

I areas per 

.. . 

Additional rcql~irc~nc~~ts arc n high school diploma, n general 

technical scorc of' 1 10 or l~igE~cr, and an cnlisted fccdcr MOS. 

Warrililt oficcr candidates must completc thc L-Varrant 

Ofiiiccr Cnilciidatc Coursc at FOII Ri~ckcr, Alnbniila, bcfore 

ntte~~diny thc Warrant Officer Basic Course at Fort Leonard 

Wood. Missouri. 

Amy RcyiI;ttio~l (1 1 1- 1 12. Mn~zrrnl of' rF(lrmnr 0flici.rMili~un Qrrztpntinnnl Sperinlrrc.~. Cliaptcr 5. and Department of 

I hc Army Circular 60 1-94- I. Il'urrant (1ffic~1- P~OC'III'P~IF?~~ 

Pro"yrot~;, provide dctnilcd ~nfom~ation on application 

pruccdurcs; or call CW4 Trcsslcr at (573) 563-4088. To lemm 

murc abuut warrant officer h~story. v~sit the Warnnt Dficer wcb 

sile at hrt/~-//lecnl-rr.ri,~t: drrrr~-.tnil/wocr. Bd 

C11'4 Pnrkrr. iv n trnitzit~g rrnrr/l~.rf a1 IC~P US. Anur, D~grtrerr. 

School. A grndzrnte of the 1iilr.rnnt Oljrjcer Strrf/ nrid ,4drfit~-ed 

Cr~rrr:vr,s, hr~ Iir~lthr. u ,nns!cr :v rlr~grpe itr rrzar~(;g~~rrrnt /ism 

~VLJ/T.YIP~ L;r~;ver.~it\*. 

TR'4 Rrmc is u tivr'lziti t~rr~r Tv~r rt~uitnicmn, LI.S .41rntU Enflirrr>r 

B.l~ooE. .J! jp~irtlttc o J IIIP Hirmmr Oficrr S/irff nrrd dhntrr.(~(/ 

Colrt:sce, i~c hi,klr. rr hrrr.Crr.lr>r :v ~IL~+PP fiotrr cf r rsrin Pmr . Str~t~ 

CJtn'\vr:vit\:. 

C lV4 Trc~.~,d~r is th~ IV nrt-fmt f~flk~r r-(>or(Iirtoftw i~ the 

D;,qin~r.r- Pnlvonr~rl Proponcnr:~~ 0IJic.r. 1:s. ,.lrnr~~ E~l~irrrer 

Sc.hool. A graduart. of ?he PVnrrctnr Qjtfct~r Stof nnd A h,onceci 

Coirr,r<~.s. {zr hnlr/r n hrtc'ht~lor :r r/~prrr fom Cnllr nthil~ Colltrg~. 
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 

Survivability and Force Protection Operations in 

the Light Brigade Combat Team 

By Captain John DeJarnefte 

Force protection operations are essential for a unit 

to be successful on the lethal, modern battlefield. 

Critical equipment and supplies must be protected 

from observation and attack. As stated in FM 5-103, 

Survivability, "Setting survivability priorities is a 

maneuver commander's decision based on the 

engineer's advice." 

Units rotating through the JRTC typically struggle 

with planning and executing survivability and force 

protection operations. Most engineer planners do not 

clearly plan or effectively communicate their 

recommendations for survivability missions. Maneuver 

commanders generally do not place priority on the 

execution of survivability operations, and most soldiers 

and leaders do not know the standards for constructing 

individual and collective survivability positions. 

Guidance to help soldiers successfully plan and 

execute fortification and survivability operations 

follows. 

Survivability Planning 

Issue 

Engineer company commanders and brigade 

engineers must prepare explicit plans for survivability 

operations and include this information in the brigade 

operations order. Omission of a clear, executable 

survivability plan is partly due to the lack of a clear 

doctrinal procedure for planning survivability operations 

at the brigade level. FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and 

Engineer Company Combat Operations, thoroughly 

discusses the force protection planning process but 

does not provide sample survivability planning and 

execution products. Most engineer company leaders do 

not understand how to extrapolate the generic force 

protection planning process for tactical survivability 

operations. As a result, standard fortification priorities, 

work estimates, and sample planning and execution 

products are not included in their engineer and 

maneuver tactical standing operating procedures 

(TACSOPs). 

Technique 

Complete the following steps: 

1. Identify all assets within the brigade. List the 

company-level organizations and major company assets 

in a matrix format. Explicitly state the command and 

control nodes, special signal equipment, major weapon 

systems, and high-value combat service support (CSS) 

assets that companies will control when they are task 

organized for operations. Include specialty units such as 

advanced trauma lifesaving teams, battalion mortars, 

combat trains, and forward aviation refuellrearm points. 

2. Prioritize the assets. Clearly state the priority of 

weapon systems within a given unit and the general 

priority of units. 

3. Group the companies spatially as they will be 

arrayed on the battlefield. Recommended groupings are 

the brigade support area, forward logistics elements, 

forward aviation assembly areas, artillery batteries, 

tactical operations centers, the maneuver battalion, and 

signal nodes. 

4. Prepare work estimates for the protective systems 

required to counter the anticipated threat. Consider 

preparing estimates to address three general threat 

levels. For example, Level I generally addresses 

subversives and criminals capable of small arms direct 

fire and mortar attack; Level II focuses on the addition 

of terrorists capable of stationary and moving vehicle 

bombs; and Level Ill addresses direct attack by a 

company-sized or larger element with cannon artillery 

indirect fire capability. 

The resultant planning matrices are a useful 

reference for unit TACSOPs and initial force protection 

planning. The threat evaluation and the commander's 

priorities are then incorporated into the survivability 

execution time line prepared by the engineer company. 

Survivability priorities for each weapon system and unit 

must be included in the maneuver brigade and battalion 

26 Engineer July 1998 
base operation orders to avoid conflicts when the force 

protection plan is executed. 

Survivability Missions 

lssue 

Maneuver commanders must establish clear 

command and control of engineer digging assets and 

aggressively monitor execution of the fortification plan. 

Maneuver and CSS battalions typically appoint a 

maneuver leader as "CINC Dozer" only during 

deliberate defensive operations. During offensive, stability, and support actions, the engineer equipment 

platoon leader often must decide how to execute the 

brigade fortification plan. When command and control is 

inadequate for the brigade force protection effort, 

several problems may emerge: 

n The engineer unit and the customer unit fail to 

coordinate their work efforts before the blades 

arrive at the supported unit. This situation occurs 

when survivability sections in unit TACSOPs are 

poorly written and when units do not associate 

habitually during routine field training. 

o Engineer equipment supervisors are not integrated 

into the advance parties of the supported unit. As a 

result, the supported unit receives no technical 

advice on how to site and mark survivability and 

protective positions. Inadequate coordination early 

in an operation results in wasted time and effort for 

both the customer and the engineer and inefficient 

use of engineer equipment. Drainage is a critical 

task that generally is not addressed and often is 

omitted when engineers are not part of the supported unit quartering party. The cumulative result 

of poor engineer integration is unnecessary disruption of the supported unit's operations in order to 

construct appropriate fortifications. 

o When construction standards are not well documented, the engineer equipment supervisor usually receives conflicting guidance from the 

supported unit's first sergeant, the unit commander, and supported unit equipment crews. 

Poor coordination almost always results in wasted 

blade time and considerable frustration for both 

the engineer and supported unit leaders. 

Technique 

n Each customer unit should appoint a senior leader 

as "CINC Dozer." Establish graphic control measures such as logistics release points, checkpoints, or coordination points where engineer 

equipment teams will link with supported units. 

TACSOPs. Engineer equipment supervisors routinely should be part of the advance party of the supported unit to ensure that survivability positions are 

marked before the engineer and supported unit 

equipment arrives. This practice allows the supporting engineer unit to prepare fortifications before the 

main body of the customer unit arrives. It also allows 

the supported unit's chain of command to verify the 

overall layout of the unit's position. 

lssue 

Security of blade teams during movement is a 

continuing problem. Most maneuver brigades require 

the supported unit to provide security when this 

equipment is moved to battle positions or assembly 

areas. While this technique seems logical during a 

briefing, it is extremely difficult to execute. Because CSS 

units and infantry rifle companies lack vehicles with 

mounted weapons to escort the blade teams, engineer 

equipment frequently moves around the battlefield 

without escort or security. As a result, engineer 

equipment is frequently lost, damaged, or destroyed, 

and the brigade's fortification effort is significantly 

delayed. 

Technique 

The maneuver commander should dedicate a 

security element to escort engineer equipment to work 

sites. The security element should come from either the 

Delta Company of an infantry battalion or a Military 

Police section. Ensure that both the customer unit's 

"CINC Dozer" and the security escort unit know where 

and when to link up. Clearly state radio frequencies and 

call signs for link-up operations in the fragmentary order 

or operations order that directs survivability operations. 

Consider using existing CSS or maneuver graphiccontrol measures such as logistics-release points, 

traffic-control points, or coordination points as link-up 

locations for engineer equipment. 

Construction Standards 

lssue 

Both engineer equipment operators and supported 

unit leaders must clearly understand fortification and 

digging standards. Because most maneuver leaders are 

not well versed in survivability construction standards, 

protective positions generally are substandard. Overhead cover and bunkers rarely are constructed to 

standard. Some are unsafe because soldiers don't know 

the construction standards and leaders don't check 

construction quality. 

o Coordinate early and train habitually with sup- Technique 

ported units to establish shared expectations. Document survivability position standards in brigade, 

o Document unit fortification requirements in the battalion, and company TACSOPs. Require that both 

July 1998 Engineer 27 
supporting engineer unit leaders and supported unit 

leaders inspect the construction standards of 

survivability positions. Quality-control inspections are 

particularly important for equipment not covered in FM 

5-103, such as air-defense and fire-finder radar, signal 

intelligence equipment, and mobile subscriber equipment vans. 

Battle Tracking 

Issue 

Maneuver commanders and their staffs must 

aggressively monitor the execution of force protection 

plans. When the survivability effort is not closely tracked, 

critical assets may be unprotected for long periods and 

survivability operations may react only to enemy events. 

When maneuver commanders are unaware of delays in 

survivability construction, they cannot adjust work and 

equipment priorities to support their main effort. 

Technique 

Include survivability levels and work priorities in the 

unit TACSOPs. Task force and brigade engineers 

should brief the execution status of the survivability 

construction effort daily at the commander's update. 

Summary 

Fortification and force protection operations at the 

Joint Readiness Training Center historically have not 

been well planned or well executed. Units can reverse 

this trend by applying the force protection planning 

process and by incorporating standard survivability 

planning and execution products in their unit SOPS. 

Captain DeJarnette is the Engineer Company 

Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

measures and effect intents. This excellent article is 

worth review, particularly for those serving at corps or 

division levels. In the article, LTC Snodgrass notes that 

all unit staff officers are familiar with obstacle-control 

measures, but few of them effectively use the obstacle 

zones and effect intents. 

Recent BCTP Warfighter exercises indicate this 

inefficiency remains. Engineer staff officers fail to 

synchronize the mobility and survivability battlefield 

operating system (60s) with the maneuver plan, 

especially during defensive operations. Engineers 

usually could achieve greater synchronization through 

the judicious use of obstacle-control measures and 

effect intents. The following information continues the 

discussion of how to improve synchronization of the 

engineer effort with the maneuver plan. I focus on 

division-level operations, although the lessons are 

essentially the same for engineer staff officers at corps, 

division, or brigade levels. 

FM 5-71 -1 00, Division Engineer Combat Operations, 

lists three obstacle-control principles that can help 

engineer staffs achieve synchronization. Obstacle zone 

planning is guided by these principles: 

o Support the division commander's intent and 

scheme of maneuver. 

o Balance maximum flexibility versus a focused 

obstacle effort. 

o Facilitate future operations. 

Let's examine these principles to assess how 

engineers can increase synchronization. 

Support the Commander's Intent and Scheme of 

Maneuver 

Engineers must understand the commander's intent 

and scheme of maneuver, specifically where the 

commander wants to kill the enemy and how he wants 

to shape the battlefield. Commanders and staffs often 

complete the military decision-making process 

(MDMP), but neither the base order nor the engineer 

annex address a cohesive, division-wide effort to shape 

the battlefield. Engineer staff officers must press the 

commander for these details. 

Obstacle-zone and effect-intent graphics provide a 

doctrinal method to convey a common picture showing Command Training Program (BCTP) how the commander wants to shape the balefield. 

Most commanders understand the obstacle effects of Obstacle-Control Measures as a disrupt, fix, turn, and block. Use of obstacle-zone and Synchronization Tool effect-intent graphics allows the commander to 

By Lieutenant Colonel Ron Light determine if his plan will shape the battlefield in 

In the August 1997 ~ssue of Engineer (page 421, accordance with his vision and if the engineer effort is 

LTC Dave Snodgrass discusses obstac~~-~ontrol synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. These 

28 Engineer July 1998 
graphics help answer the following kinds of questions: 

Did we plan to turn the enemy into this high-speed 

avenue of approach? Do we really want to turn the 

enemy into this supporting-effort brigade? Do we have 

enough time and materiel to block the enemy across 

the entire division zone, and how will he react to that? 

Is my counterattack route free of friendly obstacles? 

Doctrine does not require that the division commander use obstacle-zone and effect-intent graphics. 

The commander can specify how he wants to shape 

the battlefield and where he wants to kill the enemy in 

the intent narrative or in the scheme of maneuver. This 

rarely occurs, and when units attempt a narrative, it is 

often long and confusing. A simple graphic showing 

obstacle zones and effect intents can convey more 

than several paragraphs of text. Whichever method is 

used, the entire divisior+all staff officers and all 

subordinate units-must clearly understand how the 

commander wants to shape the battlefield. This is 

where synchronization starts. 

Balance Flexibility Versus Focused Obstacle Effort 

Experience gained at Warfighter exercises 

suggests that the engineer effort is not synchronized 

with the scheme of maneuver due to too much 

flexibility rather than too much control. In a desire to 

provide brigades with maximum flexibility, the 

commander and his staff often underprescribe 

obstacle-control measures and effect intents. The 

division engineer and his staff do not focus the division 

obstacle effort. The overall intents for division obstacle 

zones are left to subordinate brigades. 

The lack of engineer focus also affects other staff 

areas. The staff engineer and the division G4 often 

allocate resources (such as Volcano systems and 

Class IVN obstacle materials) to brigades in a way 

that does not support the scheme of maneuver. In an 

effort to be strong everywhere the unit ends up being 

strong nowhere, and mass is not achieved. To achieve 

a balance between obstacle control and subordinate 

unit flexibility is an art. Doctrine admonishes us to "get 

ahead of the enemy's decision cycle." Greater 

control-through the use of obstacle effect and intent 

graphics-makes sense on a dynamic battlefield 

where the staff must consider an end state that 

supports future operations. 

Facilitate Future Operations 

Effective use of obstacle-control measures facilitates future operations. Ineffective obstacle-control 

measures often result in disaster and chaos. Without a 

clear understanding of how the scheme of maneuver 

and obstacle plan "nest" within their higher 

headquarters' missions, subordinate unit leaders plan 

and conduct their fights independently. Brigades 

construct obstacles without regard to division-level 

counterattack routes or main supply routes. Selfdestruct times for scatterable mines are not 

synchronized with the division plan. The division does 

not achieve the principles of war of mass, economy of 

force, offensive, and unity of command, because each 

succeeding echelon's concept of the operation is not 

nested in the other. 

Obstacle-control measures should support future 

operations while maintaining a degree of flexibility for the 

commander. This is true for both offensive and 

defensive operations, which is a fact most engineer staff 

planners overlook. Just as engineers should plan a 

breach operation from the objective back to the line of 

departure, obstacle-control measures should support 

the operation from the end state of at least each phase 

of an operation back to the beginning of that phase. 

When engineers fail to apply the three obstaclecontrol principles, the results are predictable: Without a 

clear understanding of how they are to shape the 

battlefield, subordinate units fight their sectors with little 

regard to the overall division fight. Other staff officers do 

not effectively weight their BOS to achieve mass. When 

the enemy's main effort becomes clear to the division, 

the commander is unable to defeat the attacker because 

the maneuver units cannot mass and counterattack 

routes are impassable. The enemy then defeats the 

maneuver brigades one at a time. 

By using obstacle-control measures effectively, we 

can improve our ability to synchronize engineer operations with the scheme of maneuver. The obstaclecontrol principles listed in FM 5-71-1 00 provide division 

engineers and their staffs with a test of countermobility 

plans: Does my plan support the commander's intent 

and scheme of maneuver? Is it evident to subordinate 

units where and how the commander wants to shape the 

battlefield and kill the enemy? Does the plan provide for 

future operations? Evaluate your plan against these 

principles and MET-T, and determine if the engineer 

plan is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. This 

evaluation allows you to gain a proper balance between 

obstacle-control measures and subordinate unit flexibility, and it will show the degree to which you must 

utilize obstacle-control measures. 

Lieutenant Colonel Light is an observer/controller for 

the Battle Command Training Program at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as the S3 

and XO of the 168th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 2d 

Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. 

July 1998 Engineer 29 
National Training Center (NTC) 

Increasing ABE Proficiency 

By Captain Shawn McGinley 

Recent rotations at the NTC have shown that the 

majority of assistant brigade engineers (ABEs), while 

working hard and accomplishing some great things, 

have been unable to fully develop themselves or their 

sections in providing continuous mobility and 

survivability support. Part of the problem is the lack of a 

mission training plan (MTP) that addresses tasks an 

ABE must accomplish. The only reference is the 1989 

version of the Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, Engineer Battalion, Heavy Division MTP. 

Observations from past rotations have shown that to 

be proficient in their duties, ABEs must accomplish the 

following tasks for each mission: 

- The engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) 

- Terrain analysis 

- Situational obstacle planning 

- Engineer-related input to the brigade combat team 

(BCT) order 

Observations and recommended solutions follow. 

Engineer Battlefield Assessment 

Observation 

o Most ABEs are proficient in the elements that 

make up the EBA but seldom complete them due 

to poor time management skills. Many units train 

using computer simulations and are unprepared 

for the battlefield friction the NTC imposes on 

them. 

Recommendations 

o ABE sections and engineer battalion plans sections must incorporate time constraints, battlefield 

friction, and stresses of continuous operations in 

their home station training. 

o Units should prepare detailed standing operating 

procedures (SOPS) that include the distribution of 

labor within the ABE and engineer battalion plans 

sections. 

o Units should cross train all members of the ABE 

and engineer battalion plans sections to increase 

their flexibility. 

Terrain Analysis 

Observations 

o The brigade staff does not appreciate how significantly terrain will impact BCT operations. 

o Many ABEs brief terrain only in general terms 

(mountain high, valley low) and fail to discuss 

OCOKA (observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of 

approach). 

o Mission-specific terrain products are produced too 

late to assist the BCT and task-force-level planning. 

Recommendations 

o The BCT staff must allow sufficient time during the 

military decision-making process (MDMP) for the 

ABE to brief the impacts of terrain in detail. 

o The ABE section must anticipate mission-specific 

requirements and produce terrain products early in 

the planning process. 

o Everyone in the ABE section must be proficient in 

using TerraBase II software. 

Situational Obstacle Planning 

Observations 

o The brigade staff plans situational obstacles only 

where the BCT expects to make decisive contact 

with the enemy. 

o ABE and BCT staffs do not synchronize the 

observer and trigger plan for employing situational 

obstacles. 

o The ABE section assigns engineer companies "mission impossible" situational obstacle tasks. 

Recommendations 

o Situational obstacles must be planned throughout 

the depth and width of the BCT zone. The enemy 

may not do what we want him to do! 

o The observer must see the trigger (TerraBase II 

software helps with this). If he cannot, the observer 

must move, another observer must be put into position, or the BCT should forget about that planned 

situational obstacle. 

o All planned, brigade-level situational obstacles 

should be war-gamed during the MDMP. The BCT 

staff must address the feasibility of employing situational obstacles based on the enemy situation and 

the employment system. 

30 Engineer July 1998 
Engineer-Related Input to the BCT Order 

Observations 

o BCT base orders lack engineer-specific details to 

assist the BCT with executing missions. 

o Brigade S3s do not allow ABEs to include critical 

engineer-related tasks-specifically subunit and 

coordinating instructions-in the base order. 

o Many BCT subunits receive the brigade order but 

fail to read the engineer annex. Thus, the subunits 

do not accomplish critical engineer-related BCT 

tasks listed in the engineer annex. 

o BCT orders rarely include survivability and countermobility time lines. 

Recommendations 

o Engineer battalion leaders must ensure that home 

station training for BCT staffs focuses on including 

critical engineer-related tasks in the BCT base order. 

o The BCT order must include survivability and countermobility time lines to facilitate task-force-level 

planning. 

Information in this article will help assistant brigade 

engineers as they plan home station training strategies. 

It does not describe all of the many tasks ABE sections 

must accomplish. While the ABE position may be 

deleted in future engineer battalion tables of organization and equipment, the mobility and survivability 

tasks discussed above will not go away. Therefore, 

engineer battalions must plan to do more with less. The 

above recommendations will help ensure that engineers 

provide quality mobility and survivability support and 

remain an integral part of the brigade combined arms 

team. 

Captain McGinley is attending the College of Naval 

Command and Staff. He served as an observer/ 

controller at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 

California, from 1996 to 1998. 

July 1998 Engineer 31 

I 

I 

I 

I 

i 

~ 

I 

BIANIZUVBR S1JIDlD01V1' 

I~ArIL"~IAII IAB W IIWS 

Soldiers from B Company, 5th Engineers, recently wear tested a new, lightweight chemical 

protective textile material at Fort Carson. B Company soldiers conducted mobility, countermobility, 

and survivability operations in support of 113 ACR. 

SP4 Reyes conducts preventive maintenance 

checks and services during the chemical 

protective combat uniform wear test. 

Two soldiers from 2d Platoon, B Company, 

emplace a picket during the test. 
'nrrs rotatins Ilirclugh tht 

National Tmining Ccntcr (NTC) 

may have noticeil scvcral 

uhangcs in thc way hripdc comhnt 

tcarns ( BCTs) and thcir cnyinecr bilttalions execute trainin? mis5icm~. While 

none of the changes are revolutionary, 

coIlectiveIy they substantially impmve 

Lhe quaIity and realism 01' ln!nin~. 

Some changes contradict current rules 

of engagement, and Inany are innmations developed by units at home stntron and "tried out" during their NTC 

rotation. We provide ttlc hllowing 

intormation to units during tlieir Leader 

Training Progrnm and present 11 here to 

assist leaders as thcy dcvelnp their 

horne-sration training. 

Training Scenario 

hc Opposing Forcc is still the 

toughest enemy in the world. bar 

none. We have not changed the 

~raditionnl mix of five force-on-force 

fights and two live-fire missions. with 

their ilsunl assortlnent of' attacks, 

movements to contact. and dcfznse in 

scctors. Thc nbscrver/contmllsr (Or) 

and tho platoon and company afteraction rcvicw proccss, are still the heart 

and stluE of the NTC. The Sidewinder 

Tcnrn continues to provide as many 

instrurncnted battalian after-action 

rcvicws as possible, with l'ocused rcviews base<! on unit requem ur OC recommendations. 

What has changed Tor some RCTs is 

the addition of one to three days of 

division-directed rehearsals (DDRs) at 

the beginning of a rotation. DDRs are 

IIC-directed situational training exercises (lane training). with the frst day 

being platoon-level events and the sccond and third days company (cam and 

I task force combined-arn~s events, re- requirements. we suggest that units 

spect~vely. First-day DDRs conducted assemble checklsts of planning. preparI by the Sidewinder Team include tasks ing, and executing considerations for a13 

from the engineer qualification tablcs. likely misqiom befbre the rotation. 

II' yoiir BCT plans to excctilc DDRs in 

eilllcr format, we suggest you coordinalc early with the Sidewinder Tennl to Training Realism 

establish a lane composition that meek ' 

A s a secondary role, OCs provide 

your training objcctives. realist it: battlefield effects. We 

Amther change to recent ratatic)ns have made several changes tn 

is of One Or flex better replicate expected battlefield I missions in the scenario. Tlicse nlis- effects and llelp unlrs meet their Twinsioils are BCT flexibilrty "gut checks." ing objectives. examp~e, we 

I With from to !lours !lotice dliced the mine effects simulator (MES) I before execution. RCT's llieher 1 Cur bur11 the Blue and Opposing Forces. 

headquarters--the 52d Mechanized men {hr. lield of the MES is 

Infanrv Division-~asses hgmen- 1 disturbed, I[ sends a pulse that kilr.; a]] 

tary order to expand or con tnct bound- MILES IEequipped and 

I aries. change objective Iocstions. or within its rO-meter killing 1 even change the entire mission. radius. Employmenl rcquircs an cxtm 

In the planning stsp-shunting two contacts on rl~e 
MES-hut the payhack is a ~nosc Training Innovations rnand and control nodes sprcad across 

robus1 minefield obslacle. the entire hattlcspacc from thc BSA to 

The NTC has lony been behind the ost hattnlic~ns bring to the thc breach site, engineers are thc best 

time< with respect to dernolitinn effects NTC a uniye organization. candidates for integ~ating EOD teams. 

~imulntnrs (DES). The n~ler of cngage- piece of equipment, or tactics, I Attaching the teams, tn thc enginecr ha[- 

mcnt allaw t)ES on an exceptional tuchniqi~cs. and procedtlres (TTP) de- tnlion achieves n nibinher of important 

hasi~. Howcvcr, the NTC Stzndards in vclopcd at hntne station and expect to tritinillg ohicctivcs: 

Train~ng Cnrnrnission (STRAC) TahIe Ilou' the COnccpt fights. In the Pasf I The BCT develclps to 

10-3 allocation for live-firc Class v year wc havc tested scvcral variations identik repon, and track UXO. 

materials docs nnt provide ennugli det- of llic consolidated bladc and Volcano 

nnat~on cord for breaclling operations, plnt00n concept%. Centr;ilizina Cum- , The cngineer 5:lttalian cxerclses 

much less DES con';tmction. The Fofl mand and control. maintenance. and comrnnnd and conirt>l of attached 

units. Invin Trainin? Support Center (TSC) mission CKCcutron need not reduce flexdocs not stock thc Flecessary cardboard ihil~ty or support to nmncltver corn- I . Thc 60D company and tcam pertubes. clay, chalk, etc.. so training units manclers. hut thfs can't he determined form missions ~afcly in a tactical 

are not inolincd to u~e DES. snlcty by reading a manual. The best ~nvironmcnt, 

Engineer battolrons have success- techniques usually are dcvelopcd while Creating a UXO-rich training envifi~lly overcome these obstacleq and 1 units exccotc engineer rnissionr. ronment that more closely repiicates 

Tmmed that constructing and employing Engineer seconnafs'iatice is another ,,*ime llazards and effects on mobi 1- 

DES suhstantrally improves fnrce-on- tnsk we havc tried to improve this year. ,ty tbrther enhances uxo 

rorce realism, Tile units used Clnqs Bnginecr-spec~fic intclligencc often is 

rnatcrials allocated for live fire, but with ponrly co1luctc.d and di5seminated or 

may not exist. One solufion is to attach Conclusion a little pIanning, they can transfer sufficicnl Class V mntcrials from their individuals or tcanls nf sappers to a i 

BCT or lo task force scouts. Ano~hcr hesc innovations, and many we 

home-station to the NTC for this pur- option is fi~r independent cngineer have not heard of yet, have a 

posc. For a Iong-term fix, the Sidercconnnissancc teams to work for the place at the NTC. Units are not 

winder Teain is working with the TSC 

enginecr battalion 52. Mast reconnais- 1 penalized lor alecking age-old prohtci procure the constn~ction rnalertalq. 

sance methods achieve some mensure Icrns, but solutioi~s tnay be diflicult in 

The team is alsn working to change the , of success. and all of them provide I this era of ever-dwindling resources. 

STRAC' allocation to provide more 

training: for tht commander. \taff. and FORSCOM/TRADOC Regiilatiun 350- 

Class Y materials for hreaching and I 50- 1, Trrrini13.r at ?/re :Vdionrtl Tmining DES and to demoli- sappersthat is attainable only at thc 1 NTC. Crrttw, is fairly definitive about what 

lion initiators (MDls). Until the STRAC 

Some units attach explosive urd- imits can do. Howcver. requests for 

aIlwation is changed, unit? can either 

nance disposal (EOD) teams or EOD exceptions can be scnt to thc NTC by transfcr MDl from the home station to 

companies to cn~ineer battalions. letter 180 days bel'ore the rotation. Tlre 

the NTC or conducl convcntionnl initi- I This is a nondoctrinnl solution to the Sidewinder Team will help as rnucli as 

ating systems training at home skltion to 1 EOD command and control problem possible with obtaining exceptions and 

prepare for their rotation. 

(little doctrine exisfs). Historical pre- n~ay even be able lo provide sozne TTP 

Another sttcczss story involves im- ccdence for practice waF set in ideas. Contact thc team by e-mail or 

provemenls in scntternble mine mpIoy- by the lst Arnlored Division thouyh the Sidewinder home page at 

merit. The NTU longer caregoncalI~ Engineer Brigade. I~ prevlouk years htt~://~vww.invin.army.mivsidewinder. den~es unit requests for atiditiunat situa- fit llle NTC, E-D teams were The site provides slides used for Leadttonal obstacle capahilitics and longer- th, furward support in ership Training Program classes on 

duration self-destruct tin~es. Each re- brigade suppon nrca (BSAE, obstacle integralion and deliberate 

quest is considered on its own merit ant1 of lhcir Mbusinessv in RSA+ breach planning and other itemu. w 

unit training objectives. The 52d Mech- With configuralion, , ani7ed Division engineer reviews the multjplicr was and Li~tttrrtrmt Cr)lntwl GI'OIX'.F is fh~ 

mission- enemy. Ierrain. mops. and I unly on a smaEl of battle- I Dqvrh' S~wio I' Engineer Rrrtrnlit~tl 

tirne available (METT-T) conditions , and the rEst of BCT 7hinr.r- a! [he hTnrionol Twining Crwbefore reallocating scarce Class V re- rcccivcd litllc l~ncxp20ded ordnance t~r. Fort Irwin. Crrl[/ort~irr. I-le p,r~dsources witlii~i the division, asking X 1 (UXO) proccdllres oush scn~ed ar ciiicf' of fire Docirinr 

Corps For additional resources. or pnt- With eneincEr battalion focusl.d , Dnjrloptprrtunl Divisrt~n, U. S. A rt~z~. 

ing Ionyer selfklee4tmct times. on mohility. and will1 engineer com- , Enginerr Scl~onl. 
Enaineer Safetv 

Safety Com~rance Training 

By Major Scotty DeClue and Captain Glenn Gamlin 

A sk anyone, in any organization, 

if he or she believes safety is 

important, and all will agree 

that it's one of the most important topics in the workplace. One might ask, "If 

everyone believes safety is so important, why should we perform safety 

compliance assessments?'The answer 

is that not everyone fully understands 

the safety rules or follows the published rules. "Safety Rules " are derived 

from 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations). These legal guides provide specifications for safe operations for people 

using chemicals or electrical and lifting 

equipment or who are involved with 

industrial activities. 

The 416th Engineers conduct total 

facilities assessments (TFAs) at U.S. 

Army Reserve (USAR) facilities across 

the continental United States and overseas. The TFA includes an Environmental Compliance Assessment, a Facility Safety Assessment, an Energy 

Assessment, and a Facility Condition 

Assessment. The following information describes how to design, develop, 

and implement a Facility ,Safety Assessment training program for USAR 

soldiers. 

Members of the USAR environmental staff and the 4 16th Engineers have 

taught an Environmental Compliance 

Assessment System (ECAS) training 

course for several years. As a result of 

this training, the USAR staff consistently produce high-quality environmental assessment reports, which help 

us achieve or maintain compliance with 

numerous environmental laws. Funding for a comparable safety compliance 

course was not available in 1997, so we 

developed the Facility Safety Assessment training course to help soldiers 

identify safety deficiencies. 

Common OSHA* Violations 

Circuit breakers must be 

properly labeled. 

Electrical outlets within 6 

feet of wet areas must have 

ground fault circuit interupters, as shown at left. 

Live electrical equipment 

operating at 50 volts or 

more must be enlosed in a 

metal container. 

' Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

34 Engineer July 1998 
The Program 

o prepare the program, we followed the five-step Systematic 

Approach to Training (SAT) 

process: Analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate. 

Analyze. First, we conducted a 

needs analysis to determine if the training is required and can correct a deficiency. The 416th Engineers designated Safety Assessments as the 

number 2 priority after Environmental 

Compliance Assessments. Job and task 

analyses are part of this step. Conducting a Facility Safety Assessment is 

within the scope of the Facility Engineer Team, but its safety checklist 

(provided by the USAR Command 

[USARC] Safety Office) is only a list 

of potential impacts at USAR facilities. 

The checklist does not describe how to 

evaluate safety items to determine 

compliance versus noncompliance, nor 

does it provide a means to take corrective action on items identified as deficiencies. This information is needed to 

identify and correct safety deficiencies 

within USAR facilities. 

photos, page 34). We wrote a lesson 

plan to identify and correlate deficiencies and to present the training in a logical sequence. 

Implement. We scheduled a classroom, coordinated use of a USAR facility for the field training exercise, 

prepared an agenda, and advertised the 

course, which has five phases: lecture, 

practical exercise, field training exercise, report preparation, and findings 

briefing. Then we conducted a practice 

session to validate that objectives were 

met and the level of instruction was 

appropriate. 

Evaluate. The course has been 

evaluated several times to date, but this 

step is ongoing. Students evaluate the 

course at the end of every session to 

determine strong and weak points and 

if they feel it prepares them to conduct 

Facility Safety Assessments. They 

complete a second survey six months 

later to determine their retention of 

course content and if they have experienced difficulty conducting Facility 

Safety Assessments. The USARC 

Regional Support Commands, the 

USARC Safety Office, and USAR 

annual savings in excess of $100,000. 

The USARC spent about $30,000 for a 

2-day training course in 1996. We plan 

to conduct four 2-day Facility Safety 

Assessment training courses in FY99 

on drill weekends instead of using 

annual training days. 

The true measure of our success is 

not whether the 416th Engineers can 

produce excellent Facility Safety Assessment reports but if, through our 

efforts, USARC facilities are a sajer 

place for soldiers and civilians to work. 

We believe that base camps in forward 

areas can use our facility safety assessment format to evaluate their safety 

compliance programs. The program we 

developed will reduce the number of 

noncombat injuries and assist the overall mission accomplishment of any 

operation. 

Major Scotty C. DeClue, a registered envirorzmental manger and certified environmental trainer, serves as 

the Technical Training Program 

Adrnini,stratnr for the Department of 

Energy's Savanna/z River Site in Aiken, 

South Carolina. 

Captain J. Glenn Gamlin, a certrfied 

July 1998 Engineer 35 

the Facility Safety Asse.ssment Guide. 

We reviewed FY96 safety checklists 

to identify common deficiencies and 

verify requirements in 29 CFR. Then, 

Design. During this step, we wrote facility managers will evaluate the ' safetyprofessional and hazardous ma416th Engineers' Facility Safety ASsessments at the end of FY98. By identifying common deficiencies and corrective actions, the 416th intends to 

terials manager, works as the Safety/ 

Environmental Manager for Cummins 

Diesel Recon Cornpan-v in Memphis, 

Tennessee. 

E-mail comments or questions to 

MAJ DeClue, CLUE815@AOL.com or 

CPT Gamlin, jggamlin@bell-south.net. 

using the ECAS format as a guide, we publish lessons learned to assist facility 

developed a "safety finding sheet." 1 managers when they conduct selfThis sheet states the requirement, spe- assessments to improve their safety 

cific legal references, and information posture. ~ the assessor must check. Deficiencies 

are listed individually. The format is a 

significant improvement over the 

safety checklist because it describes 

Benefits 

! w e conservatively estimate that 

the deficiencies in detail. We used in- our initiative to design, de- formation on the safety findings sheet velop, and implement the 

learning and safety training program saved the 4 16th 

establish criteria for the performance- Engineers more than 50,000 in 

based evaluation. I 

FY97. This figure is based on an estiDevelop. During visits to several mate of current professional consulting 

USAR facilities, we took photographs rates and the hours we spent developing 

depicting safety deficiencies and pre- the course. By having Army Reserve I pared slides and overhead transparen- soldiers conduct this training (versus 

cies to support class discussions (see 1 professional consultants), we project 
Im~rouina Diaitized 

Engineer Communications 

By Captain Daniel R. Smith 

he Army has pushed its advanced guard into the 2 1 st 

century. The past decade has seen extensive 

experimentation at all levels, with the concept of a 

computerized (or digitized) Army of the future. Units 

involved in these experiments are known as Task Force 

XXI. 

Recently, I served as supply officer (S4) and senior battle 

captain in the engineer battalion Administration and 

Logistics Center (ALOC) during the Task Force XXI 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment. For the 299th Engineer 

Battalion and the rest of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th 

Infantry Division, the AWE was much more than a twomonth exercise in the desert. It was an 18-month learning 

experience. The daily lessons learned, problems solved, and 

challenges met provided Army soldiers, numerous defense 

contractors, and our senior leaders with valuable feedback to 

use in charting our course into the future. Ironically, 

communications-the very thing Force XXI was supposed 

to improve and the lifeblood of any tactical operations center 

(TOCtbecame our biggest challenge. This article 

discusses four communications problems experienced by 

the 299th Engineer Battalion S1/S4 section and recommends some possible solutions. 

Communications Problems 

he experiment was conducted through a train-up and 

brigade-level training rotation in March 1997 at the 

National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 

Preceding the train-up were various computer instruction 

classes, computer equipment installations (known as 

appliqu&), and new equipment training to familiarize leaders 

and soldiers with initiatives we were expected to use and test 

in simulated combat operations. 

Numerous problems plagued our communications. Most 

grew out of the contractors' misunderstanding of engineer 

logistical operations and communications requirements and 

how they differ from maneuver logistical operations and 

communications requirements. Like other members of the 

brigade, we in the engineer battalion ALOC faced a myriad 

of technical, training, and architectural problems with the 

tactical internet and other experimental initiatives. 

Officers of the 299th Engineer Battalion (Task Force XXI) 

company first sergeants or TOCs and the engineer battalion 

ALOC. The command sergeant major, the three company 

first sergeants, and each company TOC continually sent 

applique messages to the ALOC from their respective 

vehicles (known as platforms), but the messages never 

arrived. Digitized message acknowledgment logs inside the 

applique showed neither a machine acknowledgment of nor 

an operator response to the messages. 

Possible operator training andlor communications and 

maintenance problems were exhaustively investigated and 

corrected when necessary, but we determined that they 

weren't the main problem. Continued investigation showed 

that the digital messages had to move through other platforms 

called sewers or nodes to get from one vehicle's appliqd to 

another's. If a message had to "hop" through more than four 

nodes, it disappeared. 

Lacking understanding of engineer operations, the contractor had arranged the vehicles in the tactical internet so if 

engineers tried to send a message to the battalion ALOC from 

one of the vehicles, the message almost always had to pass 

Problem: Digital message traffic between the ALOC and through more than four nodes. In addition, whenever a server 

specific engineer vehicles, which was essential to combat became overloaded with digital traffic, messages reaching 

sewice support (CSS) execution, was virtually nonexistent. that server were ignored and disappeared. While a few 

There was no digital message traffic between engineer messages were received, digital message communications 

36 Engineer July 1998 
Second, current architecture does not 

allow the ALOC to monitor the engineer 

battalion command net. The ALOC is a 

battalion command post and an alternate 

TOC for the battalion TOC. Thus, the ALOC 

needs the capability to monitor, track, and C2 

engineer combat operations. The A&L net is 

not effective for this purpose because the 

architecture dictates that the only platforms 

on that net are the ALOC, the company first 

sergeants, the command sergeant major, the 

support platoon, and the headquarters 

company commander. The architecture does 

not allow the Maneuver Support Company a 

single radio on the A&L net. If the ALOC 

could monitor the battalion command net, it 

would have voice communications with the 

battalion and company TOCs and 

A soldier shows the applique inside his vehicle. commanders, which would facilitate battle and 

from each of the platforms remained inconsistent and CSS tracking. A third radio is needed so the 

unreliable. ALOC can monitor the engineer battalion command net. 

Recommendation: Continue to investigate the software Third, current architecture doesn't allow the ALOC to 

for problems and revise the architecture so that the engineer monitor the brigade A&L net. The engineer battalion is the 

command sergeant major, company first sergeants, and only battalion in the brigade not on the brigade A&L net. As 

TOCs have a direct route for messages to the ALOC. a result, the engineer ALOC is out of the loop for essential 

With few exceptions, engineer units must maintain effective CSS information and coordination necessary for brigade 

communications with maneuver command and logistics nodes mission success. The nature of engineer operations requires 

as well as with their parent battalion's command and logistics detailed coordination and cross talk among the engineer 

nodes. It is essential that digital systems allow the company to ALOC and the brigade and task force ALOCs. For example, 

communicate as effectively with the engineer battalion ALOC Class IV resupply operations and task organization changes 

as it does with the task force. require detailed coordination to effectively distribute assets 

and materials. Allocation of a fourth radio would allow the 

Problem: The modified table of equipment (MTOE) and ALOC to monitor the brigade A&L net. 

applique architecture allocate an insuflcient number of 

radios to the ALOC to monitor all essential nets. Recommendation: Allocate the engineer battalion 

The MTOE allocates the engineer battalion ALOC only ALOC two additional radios and change the architecture to 

two radios. The applique architecture forces the ALOC to allow the ALOC to monitor the proper nets. 

use those radios to monitor only the engineer battalion Typically, Force XXI maneuver battalion field trains 

administration and logistics (A&L) net and the forward command posts (FTCP) and headquarters company combat 

support battalion (FSB) A&L net. This architecture is not trains command posts (CTCP) are colocated and have a 

tactically sound for several reasons. First, the FSB conducts seven-net capability. They monitor task force command, 

command and control (C2) and all other business on the FSB A&L, brigade A&L, FSB command, and three other nets. 

command net, not on the FSB A&L net. Therefore, the The engineer battalion ALOC is required to perform both 

engineer battalion ALOC is out of the loop and does not roles and, as a minimum, requires four-net capability to 

receive essential information. Examples of missed monitor engineer battalion command, engineer A&L, 

information are enemy contact reports in the brigade support brigade A&L, and the FSB command nets. 

area (BSA), jump or movement C2, changes in the Problem: The applique architecture does not allow the 

mandatory operational protective Posture (MOPP) level, air Maneuver Support Company to monitor the A&L net ,for 

defense artillery status, and all net calls. As a memberitenant ,,ice traffic, 

of the BSA, the engineer battalion ALOC must monitor the The Maneuver Support Company lacks even one platform 

FSB command net, not the FSB A&L net. with voice communications with the ALOC; the architecture 

July 1998 Engineer 37 
dictates total dependence nn digital mewage ccommunLntion 

with that cnilipany. I)i_ritnl mes5age traftic. evcn if depcnd:thIe. is not sirfficienr for hattle or CSS tracking and does 

not support the AI.OC's role as alternate battalion TOC. 

I'rohlrm: TI113 /~rrrrrr[iotr rrrlri ror~tprrrli~ TOC'Y crr~ no( 

CII/O(YI!LY/ [I rr~dio 10 IIIOII~~OI- t/1(* !~tirt(ifioti A& L 1;~r. 

Aucor(ling to current nrchi~ccrure, the engineer bnttal ion 

and company TOCs do not have cnglnuer A&L net 

capnbilisy, anti the curront MTOE doec not allt>catc a radio 

lu monitor the ABL nct. As a rcuult. tllc ALnC's only link to 

thc cngincer bi~tlalion iind cornpanics is through one or six 

plntli>rn~s: lllc commnnd sergeant major. thc foz~r company 

liml ~crgcants. or thc headquarters rompiiny commander. In 

addition, cacll vcl~iclc is n l i~ht-skinned, Inw-mrvivnhility 

vcl~iclc tha~ is easily killed, firrthcr dcgmdii~g thc ALCIC's 

ability tcl cr>~n~nu~licxtu. This problcrn is ~ntcnsified hecn~lse 

the cnginecr conlpnny TOYS arc tho prnnnry httlu and CSS 

trackers ti~r the conlpnny [not t hc company 17rsl sergeant as 

in n maneuver company). Wirli no A&L capability in the 

TOCs. I hc enginccr ha~tnl ion and compnn y TOCs cannot 

talk to tt~c onglnccr ALOC ~~nlcxs onc platlbnn or thc othcr 

devi~tch I'rtrm thc urchitcctr~rc by changing ncls. This is not 

practical hccnusc chnn~ing ntl.; Tor any lolgtli 01- tinit 

dismpts rhe flotv of digitar ~rnrlic and tithcr pulls ;I major C2 

nodc olTcnrninand ncls or cluttcrs thcm with AJZL traffic. 

Rccommendiation: Cl?ott,qr rlw rljlTOE n? rrlloc.nrt~ 

~ngi:irrrw hrlttrlliorl mltf cmnrn/)rrrjj. T0C.r (111 rrddi~ir~r~cil rotEirl 

trtid (,lt(i~;,yc* 11w ~irt~/iiti~r/~tt.c= fo ~~llo~j* !lie T0C.i ro I~ZOPIIIOI. 

fhc .I&L ncr. 

Summary 

hc technological advancemt.nts tested hy Force ,LYI 

arc cxciling nnrl point lo a new en of conibal 

operations. As comhrit engineers, wc musl he able ti1 

communicnlc and coa-dillare C'SS issuus in suppun t'astrr 

mob ins. more ttcxiblc mnncuvcr Forccs. Solviny thc 

shortcon~inys (hat hindcr cngincur ALOC co~nlil~~niuntions 

will help cnsurc our dipifizcd Army of thc fuhirc. 

I 

Note From the Directorate of 

Cam bat Developments I 

I By Mike Bonomolo 

In essence, Captain Smith is correct. The inltial 

version (7.0) of the Force XXI Battle Command 

Brigade and Below (FBCB2) software had the sixnode limit, which included the initiator and the 

destination. This problem has been solved through 

the application of role-based functionality. Now, if a 

first sergeant sends a logistics message, the 

FBCB2 software configures the network so that the 

message will not "hop" through more than four 

nodes. The FBCB2 system no longer sends the 

message up and across to reach a destination, 

therefore eliminating lag and reducing handling 

errors. 

The shortage of radios within the battalion 

ALOC Is a much more difficult problem to solve. 

The ALOC is authorized a fax, an Enhanced 

Position Locating Reporting System User Unit 

(EPUU-V1 ), a mobile subscriber receiver/ 

transmitter (MSRT), a lightweight computer unit 

(LCU), a Unit-Level Logistics System (ULLS)-S4, 

and a VRC-89D radio. The maneuver battalion 

conf~gurat~on can monitor up to seven FM nets 

between the FTCP and the battalion task force 

CTCP. Because the engineer battalion is not 

authorized a battalion task force CTCP, it is 

I 

required to perfarm both roles from the engineer 

battalion FTCP. At the next command, control, 

communications, and computers (C4) configuration board in early FY99, w8 will recommend 

addlng a single-channel, ground-to-a~r radlo 

system (SINCGARS) with dual-net capability. 

Although operational requirements show that 

divisions need approximately 700 SINCGARS, 

there are only enough available to fill 535 of these 

requirements. 

A joint tactical radio Is being developed that 

passes voice and digital traffic simultaneous4y. This 

radio, which is scheduled for distr~but~on in the 

FY03 time frame, should align the requirement of 

radio nets monitored with the capability on hand. 

In the Interim, voice-based logistics messages 

must move to a digital format. The CCU can move 

digital message traffic within the battalion. The 

success of this option weighs heavily upon fielding 

the updated Maneuver Control System. 

I 

I 
PERSCOM NOTES 

Limited Call to Active Duty for Captains 

By Major Davicl Hartley 

T he Army is conducting a call to active duty for 

captains in basic branches. The original recall 

message was amended on 8 July 1998 to delete 

the requirement for officers to be branch qualified. 

Applicants for active duty are restricted to captains who are 

in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), Army National 

Guard (ARNG), or former active duty officers. Neither 

USAR Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) nor ARNG AGR 

officers are eligible. Applications from lieutenants or field 

grade officers will not be accepted. 

This call to active duty expires 30 September 1998. 

To be eligible, applicants must meet the following 

parameters: 

Have a captain's date of rank of 941002 or later. 

Have not been passed over for promotion while on 

active duty. 

Be advised that those who received Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP) or Special Separation Benefit 

(SSB) pay when they left active duty may have to repay 

that amount. 

Have a bachelor's degree or higher. 

Be medically qualified. 

Meet the height and weight standards outlined in AR 

600-9. 

Be able to attain 20 years of active federal commissioned service (AFCS) by age 55. 

Be able to complete I0 years of AFCS before completing 20 years of active federal service. 

PERSCOM has approval authority for this specific call to 

active duty. The authority for accession is 10 USC 12301 

(D) and AR 135-2 10. Information on application procedures 

and forms is available from Ms. Smith at commercial (800) 

325-4898 or Defense System Network 892-3398. 

Major Hartley serves as qflicer coordirzator for the 

Engineer Personnel Proponency Ojfice at the U.S. Army 

Engineer Scl7ool. 

NCO Advancement 

By Sergeant Major Jay Florance 

A cluestion we hear from soldiers is, "What can I do to 

get ahead?" For NCOs, there are several opportunities to excel and get in the best position for 

advancement. 

A sergeant (P) or staff sergeant needs at least two years of 

squad leader time. This is more of a challenge in some 

military occupational specialities than others, but avoiding 

this duty puts you behind your peers. Once you gain this 

experience, look for a job in a table of distribution and allowanccs (TDA) environment that broadens your NCO skills. 

Jobs such as drill sergeant, recruiter, and instructor will help 

develop a career path. Most NCOs will be considered for one 

of these duties, so be proactive in letting your branch know 

your desires so we can schedule the best time possible. To be 

eligible, you must have a general technical (GT) score of 100 

or higher and have no derogatory infonnation in your 

personnel file. To a lilnited extent, duty at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the National 

Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; or with a 

reserve unit are possibilities. All of these jobs, when 

performed successfully, will help you achieve your career 

goals. 

The most important job as a sergeant first class is time as a 

platoon sergeant. Following this experience, several jobs can 

help achieve the next plateau. Any job accomplished 

successfully at the grade level beyond your present grade 

indicates to the board that you are capable of handling 

responsibilities required of that grade. Sergeants first class 

who have the rare opportunity to serve as first sergeants, and 

who serve with distinction, are in the top percentile for 

advancement. Being an operations sergeant helps broaden 

your scope of military fiinctions. There are TDA opportunities, especially if you have not yet served in one of 

these positions. Most jobs for sergeants first class are with 

reserve units, at the JRTC or the NTC, or as an instructor. 

Remember that your peers are seeking these same skills. 

Since each NCO who gets a second TDA assignment keeps 

someone else from getting his first one, few will get a second 

TDA job. If your GT score is below 100, get with your 

education center and raise your score above 100. Most TDA 

jobs are tough, but success in them shows promotion boards 

you can adapt to that environment. 

Your record has a lot to do with the duty you get and when 

you get it. Strong and consistent NCOERs determine the jobs 

you qualify for, so remember that every job is important! 

Concentrate on getting the troop time first and a TDA job 

second. If you have already worked one TDA job as a staff 

sergeant, get back into a modified table of organization and 

equipment (MTOE) unit before performing another TDA 

assignment. Too much TDA time can be a distracter! Some 

NCOs get into a TDA environment and never go back to 

troop-leading positions. This is a disadvantage since it 

appears they are "hiding" from the field unit environment. 

The Engineer Branch is available to provide career 

counseling. 

Sergeant Major Florance serves as the Engineer Branch 

sergeant major at PERSCOM. His e-mail address is 

floruncj@hoffn~an.arm~y.mil. 

Engineer 39 
By Major Kenneth J. Crawford 

ost engineers are challenged when they prepare for 

combined arms defensive operations-it's never 

the same twice in a row. What we do to effectively 

integrate engineer expertise into engagement area planning 

depends on the military decision-making process (MDMP). 

We must thoroughly understand the impact engineers can 

have in tactical operations. This article describes how staff 

engineers can best support the planning phase of engagement area development during the MDMP. 

Development Steps 

S uccessful integration of engineer capabilities into the 

MDMP requires that we read, understand, and apply 

our knowledge of the supported unit's doctrine and 

tact~cal standing operating procedures (TACSOPs). Engineers who support division or brigade defensive operations 

that assign or direct engagement areas must understand how 

to effectively integrate their capabilities into engagement 

area development. 

Doctrine provides a sound planning reference that must 

be applied to the current situation and surrounding terrain. 

Figure 1 shows a variation of the seven steps of engagement 

area development found in FM 7 1 - 1, Tnnk and Mecl7anized 

Cornpnny Team, and FM 7-20, The Injhntry Bnttnlion. The 

most significant difference is the switching of steps 4 and 

5-positioning forces (direct-fire assets) before planning 

and integrating obstacles. This switch is logical because the 

maneuver commander is the "client" we support. In addition 

to pointing to a map and stating where he wants to kill the 

1. Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach. 

2. Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver. 

3. Determine where to kill the enemy. 

4. Position direct fire weapon systems. 

5. Plan and integrate obstacles with direct fires. 

6. Plan and integrate indirect fires with direct fire 

and obstacles. 

7. Conduct rehearsals. 

Figure 1. Engagement area development steps. 

enemy (step 3), the maneuver commander must conduct 

mission analysis and understand the enemy's intent (steps 1 

and 2) and know what he can see to kill throughout the depth 

of the battlefield. 

Developing a defensive course of action (COA) takes each 

battlefield operating system into account and synthesizes a 

combined arms team designed to achieve a given mission 

against an attacking enemy. The focus of the defense is to 

destroy or defeat the enemy at predetermined sites where 

terrain favors the defending friendly forces-the engagement 

areas. Determining what will be critical events, or decision 

points (DPs), during defensive operations requires detailed 

planning, analysis, war gaming, and synchronization. DPs 

40 Engineer July 1998 
trigger multiple actions during combat operations and must 

be synchronized by thorough staff planning and 

coordination. When executing defensive operations, 

commanders fight from a position that allows them to 

visualize the battlespace (the three-dimensional fight). 

Engineers are the best-suited personnel in the combined 

arms staff to facilitate terrain visualization and positioning 

of forces during the MDMP. 

To support the maneuver commander's intent and the 

combined arms staff, engineers must apply our capabilities 

and knowledge to each step of engagement area 

development. Just as the engineer estimate provides a 

format to align planning efforts with the MDMP, the 

following process provides an effective tool for defensive 

planning. 

1. Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach 

Staff engineers work c!osely with the S2 to analyze the 

terrain as soon as the mission is received. This is the first 

step in the engineer battlefield assessment. The OCOKA 

(observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key 

terrain, and avenues of approach) analysis must include the 

impacts of weather and the advantages and disadvantages 

that terrain offers. Engineers identify maneuver elements 

(friendly and enemy) favored by the combination of terrain 

and weather and explain why. Terrain visualization enables 

engineers to identify potential sites that offer an advantage 

over the range of the enemy's maneuver and weapon 

systems. Use of TerraBase I1 software and the Division 

Terrain Teams can help identify areas where terrain facilitates enemy approaches into our engagement areas 

behind intervisibility lines or through restricted terrain. 

Products engineers can easily produce to help in this process 

are lines of sight, obliques, weapon range fans (to identify 

dead space), and perspective images. As these products are 

developed, engineers should analyze them to determine the 

time and distance that enemy forces maneuver through and 

to estimate how long we can engage him with fires. These 

products can be used throughout the MDMP as tools for 

COA development (positioning of forces), war gaming, and 

rehearsals. 

Engineers should consider the following factors when 

analyzing the avenues of approach through assigned sectors: 

Compartmentalization of the terrain and possible 

engagement windows for direct-fire and wire-guided 

missile systems (time of flight vs. tracking vs. enemy's 

ability to accurately return fire). 

Locations where the combination of terrain and manmade obstacles can achieve the desired effect. 

Availability and use of the Division Terrain Team. 

Early identification and prioritization of products created using TerraBase I1 promotes efficient use of 

resources by eliminating "nice to have" products. Since 

the situation and the commander dictate what is important for each mission, an SOP for product requirements 

is not needed but can be used. 

2. Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver 

Engineers focus directly on the enemy's mobility1 

survivability capabilities and limitations during the second 

step of the engineer battlefield assessment. Working with the 

S2, they develop an estimate of enemy mobilitylsurvivability 

assets and the order of battle, using TRADOC Pamphlet 350- 

16, Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook; FM 100-60, AR and 

Mechanized-Based OPFOR Organization Guide; and FM 

100-63, Infantry-Based OPFOR Organization Guide. This 

step is critical because obstacle groups in engagement areas 

are designed to defeat the enemy's ability to sequentially 

breach or bypass obstacles in depth. Determining how the 

enemy will employ breach assets along an avenue of approach 

is a "best guess" based on staff engineers' knowledge and 

experience. The success of massed direct and indirect fires 

hinges on our ability to accurately site and emplace obstacles 

and target specific enemy mobility assets. Additionally, this 

step helps us to identify, recommend, and prioritize highvalue targets. 

3. Determine where to kill the enemy 

By accurately estimating the force size, formations, speed, 

and the most likely and most dangerous COA along specific 

avenues of approach, engineers can predict where the enemy 

will transition his formations. Although distances for these 

transitions vary depending on the tactical situation, the 

following sequence and distances are doctrinally correct for 

an enemy attack: 

Mechanized infantry brigades transition to individual mechanized infantry battalion columns at 12-1 5 kilometers. 

Mechanized infantry battalions transition to company columns at 4-6 kilometers. 

Companies transition to platoon columns at 2-3 kilometers. 

Platoons transition to attack formations at 600-1,000 

meters from the main defense. 

If the situation permits, we can use ground or air observers, 

ADAMIRAAM, or attack aviation (provided we have air 

parity and a synchronized suppression of enemy air defenses 

[SEAD] plan) to disrupt the enemy's command, control, and 

maneuver as he transitions from battalionslcompanies in 

column to battalions/companies on line. Companies begin to 

transition to platoons in column where we plan to engage with 

tank- and wire-guided missile systems. If the combined arms 

staff can identify where the terrain masks enemy maneuver, it 

can position systems (covert operations lazing teams [COLT], 

scouts, fire support teams, observer teams, etc.) to engage 

enemy vehicles on the high-value target list. Otherwise, these 

vehicles may be in dead space to direct-fire systems that 

occupy DPs. 

4. Position direct-fire weapon systems 

Terrain surrounding potential engagement areas is the most 

significant factor in positioning direct-fire weapon systems. 

Although the range capabilities of our weapon systems are 

July 1998 Engineer 41 
Figure 2. Direct-fire systems can be tentatively sited using a combination of terrain analysis 

and imagery. Above left depicts the center of mass for company team battle positions 

overlooking Drinkwater Lake at the NTC.To the right is a satellite image of the area. 

considerable, the enemy has the advantage with wire-guided 

systems (the AT-518 = 4 kilometers and the AT-1011 1 = 5 

kilometers). Engineers must analyze the terrain to determine 

how to minimize the range of enemy systems. Use a reverse 

slope defense, intervisibility lines, defile, or integrate 

obstacles with restricted terrain to prevent him from 

maneuvering large formations. 

The decision aids (tools) created in steps 1-3 are used to 

identify the best locations for the engagement area. For 

example, a weapon range fan shows that we can observe and 

engage a vehicle in an avenue of approach for 2.5 kilometers. 

The next step is to calculate how long it will take the enemy to 

move that distance at a given rate of march (2.5 kilometers120 

kilometers per hour = .I3 hours or 7 minutes 30 seconds). At 

this range, the tracking time for our wire-guided missile 

systems (1 2 seconds at 2 1 1 meters per second) and 120- 

millimeter main gun (2 seconds at 1,5 17 meters per second) is 

an important factor. The maneuver S3 knows the distance 

where the probability of hit (Ph) and probability of kill (Pk) are 

highest. For planning purposes, determine these probabilities 

for each type of maneuver unit (mechanized and armor) based 

on the unit's Table XI1 gunnery and apply them as a constant. 

Vegetation is another consideration. Neither the Digital 

Topographic Support System (DTSS) nor the TerraBase I1 

program accurately shows how vegetation affects observation at any given position. We must analyze maps and 

conduct reconnaissance to confirm data the DTSS or 

TerraBase I1 provides. 

Engineers may create additional products that support 

COA development and use them when completing the 

analysis and decision steps of the MDMP. The only 

limitations on product development are time, initiative, and 

experience. The needs of the supported element will dictate 

which products are most useful. 

After the commander selects a COA, the staff provides the 

terrain products to subordinate units for their use during 

reconnaissance and when occupying positions or sectors. The 

terrain selected for the fight drives the frontages of each 

subordinate element. For example, when fighting in an open 

desert, the frontage of a defending platoon can be extended 

significantly further than when it is defending in rolling and 

forested terrain. Prepare for the possibility that terrain and 

vegetation may degrade the range of enemy and friendly 

weapon systems to meters rather than kilometers. 

After tentatively identifying positions for weapon systems 

throughout the sector (Figure 2), the staff engineer can 

develop a survivability execution matrix for blade assets. 

After the COA decision brief, the commander's survivability 

guidance may include: 

General intent for engineer effort. 

Priority of support by unit, engagement area, andlor 

phase. 

Focus of digging assets, including the survivability level 

and priority for each system. 

Level of force protection for key command, control, and 

communications nodes. 

If the COA calls for alternate, supplementary, or 

successive battle positions, use the data developed in the third 

step of the engineer battlefield assessment and identify what 

support engineers can provide. If the COA requires additional 

blade assets, identify the duration, benefits gained, and the 

potential impact or alternatives if the assets are not available. 

The TACSOPs must state that occupying maneuver units, not 

engineers, are responsible for positioning systems. Once 

maneuver elements identify these positions, they must mark 

and prioritize the positions to maximize the efficiency of 

42 Engineer Ju1.y I998 
blade assets (Figure 3). However, as the terrain experts, 

engineers must coordinate with the supported unit before the 

blades arrive and recommend ways to improve blade 

effectiveness based on site conditions (rocky, water table, 

egress routes, etc). 

5. Plan and integrate obstacles with direct fires 

FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 

describes how engineers can be most efficient and 

effective during obstacle emplacement. This step comes 

after the direct-fire weapon systems are positioned. To 

effectively site, mark, emplace, and turn obstacles in 

sector, engineers must know what can or cannot be seen 

from the battle positions (Figure 4). When analyzing the 

combined effects of obstacles and direct fires, we must 

know the Ph, based on the percentage of vehicles entering 

the observed obstacle group and detonating a mine. 

The enemy decides whether to breach or bypass an 

obstacle group. If he elects to breach, use the Ph for the 

obstacle effect (see Figure 5, page 44), combined with the 

Ph/Pk of our direct-fire weapon systems to determine the 

number of vehicles the enemy is likely to lose. For 

example, the direct-fire engagement trigger will be the lead 

motorized rifle battalion (MRB) encountering a fix effect 

obstacle group. The Ph for an MRB in battle formation is 

50 percent (worst case). This equates to four vehicles 

through the depth of the obstacle group (nine tanks lead in 

an MRB attack formation). The enemy must react to the 

obstacle encounter, which triggers the overwatching 

elements' direct-fire engagement. A tank company team 

firing against a lead enemy battalion (approximately 42 

combat vehicles) at a range of 2.5 kilometers may have a 

Pk of 90 percent. This would yield 29 enemy vehicles 

remaining at the end of the first volley (42 enemy vehicles 

Figure 3. Maneuver company team commanders must site 

and mark positions before survivability assets arrive. 

Blade teams must understand the standard for the types 

of positions they are to prepare. 

-[I4 friendly vehicles engaging X 90 percent Pk = 12.61 = 

29.4 or 29 enemy vehicles remaining). 

Few units have perfect fire control or distribution and kills 

for every round fired against a moving target. In this scenario, 

the combined effect of obstacles and direct fires is 25 enemy 

vehicles attempting to maintain command and control, 

maneuver, breach, and return fire. Specific fire-control plans 

destroy the enemy's primary breach assets. This may cause 

the enemy to fix friendly forces and wait for second echelon 

forces before continuing to move, attempting to bypass, 

withdrawing, or mechanically breaching through the obstacle 

group. 

To clarify his intent and help develop the engagement area, 

the maneuver commander provides the following information 

to focus engineer countermobility efforts: 

+ Protective -+ ., Tactical 

Obstacles Obstacles w 

BP . - - - - . . . - - . . - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - -- --- ----------- - ,llo 

-- 

uDeadSpace" ----------- /-'-- 1090 

_f -- 1080 

-. - - . - - . - - - . _,I>=- .--------'------------.-...----..-...--------------------------------.-loEo 

0 I1 '2 km 

'I2 - 'I, Maximum effective range of overwatching systems "Space fo; engaging 

- 

I and killing the enemy ------- b (desert terrain). 

Maximum effective range of overwatching systems 

Figure 4. Example of aTerraBase I1 line-of-site view at Drinkwater Lake. It accurately depicts range, dead 

space, and elevation data from a given point on the ground. 

July 1998 Engineer 43 
Standard planning factors identify the resources {Class W mines) required to 

emplace obstacles along an avenue of approach as follows: 

1 AA = Avenue of approach. 

Linear density (LD): number of mines + front length(rn) = mines per meter of front. 

Area density (AD): number of mines - fmnt X depth = mines per m2. 

To convert AD to LD: AD X depth(m) = LD. 

Figure 5. Minefield probability planning based on effect 

W Priority of obstacle effort by engagement area or phase. using the fallowing equation: 

Intent for obstacle effccts--disrupt. fix, turn. w block. 

(These art: the rcsults the mancuvcr commander wants to 

achieve lhrough cornbind usc of direct fires, obstacles. 

and indirect tires along spccific avcnucs or approach.) 

c Mobility requirements and obstacIe restrictions (counterattack axis, main supply rauteq, withdrawal routes, 

reserve ohstacles, etc.), 

r Intent of employing scatterable nines or siti~ational 

obstacles [by system-where, when, duration. and 

M~+E+A<T>C,W~~~~: 

M' = the cumulation of the fnllowing applicable times, 

The cumulation must be less than the time it takes the enemy 

to reach the TAl. 

- Movement of communications (time required for the 

observer to call the controlling HQ, plus the time for the IiQ 

to receive approval from the authorizing commander, plus the 

time for the HQ to direct the emplacing elemenvunit to 

execute). 

authnriq). - blovcr to TAI (the time required to mavetfire tolinto the 

Maneuver forces' support to obstacle errort (pard force TAI [ground 'air systems or time of flight for indirect 

requirements for reserve obstacles. ntarking. mine dump munitions]). 

and Classes IV and V support, etc.). - Muvejkom TAI (the time required for the elementhit to 

move from the end point to a reload or securc hide position). Nute: Uvirrg PR~~IIPCI'F to n10rk obsmt.lcs, it1 acI~Iiriorr to 

et?l~lM'il?.~ t!lcm, r.~dzrr.e~ rhc lola! llmOttt?l r?('~hslflc!~ efl0rl E = tinle required to dispense or fire the nliFsion. 

in srshlov. 

A = time reqi~ired to am~lactivate the rnunit~nns. 

Obstacle protection (countcrrcuonnaissanc~.. rcsccd 

plan. deception, enemy breach asset destruction). T = time required for the targeted cncrny elcrncnt tu nlrwc 

liom the first c~bscrvcd Tocation in a named arcn of in~crcst ' Obstacle and (NAI) to thc TAI (or c~hstnclc location). Contact therc is 

marking, lane closurt., reporting. tracking, restrictions, initiated by either a mlnc strike or direct fires from an 

and control measures-zones, hclts, and ~roups). overwatching cletntnt. 

Obstacle deception. 

Sihiatinnal obstacles require a significant amount of staff 

synchronization. Step 2 identifies how the enenly is likelv to 

attack and employ breaching assets according to the order of 

hattlc. The trigger for srtuational obstacles is one of thrcc 

Lhings: enemy action. liiendly action. or a combination of 

both. By employing a scatterable mine system triggcrcd hy 

enemy action (for example, ,a company-sized or larger Corce 

approaching or passing through a DP). the distanoc frnm the 

targeted area of interest (TAI) to the DP can bc a~lculntcd 

C = time required tn positirm a tiiendly maneuver element 

in an ovcnvatching hattlc position. Friendly forccs nrust 

cstahlish a defcmive poshlrc in a battle position (or other 

advantageous position) before the encnly has the opportunity 

10 engage. (Plan a m~nimurn of a 4kilometer range for enemy 

antitank weapon standoff and t~nderstnnd the risk when 

applying lesscr distances.) 

Maneuver co~nmnnders at company team, battalion, and 

brigade levels must ensure that ohstacIes. direct-fire weapon 

systems. and indirect fires are integrated. Ciround 
reconnaissance cannot be replaced with "eyehall ing" a map 

nr using decision aids developed for the COAs. Grnund 

reconnaissance helps site obstacles and must occur as early 

as possible. To expedite obstacle emplacement after the 

C'OA is approved. staff engineers provide suhordinate 

engineer units with information to help them begin parallel 

plannzng and direct coordination between engineers and 

supported maneuver units. When the MDMP is complete, 

execution matrices, time lines, Classes IV and Y resourcing 

and allocation. and s survivability plan are developed and 

included in both the Engineer Annex and the subordinate 

engineer operations order. 

6. Wan and integrate indirect fires with direct fire and 

obstacles 

As staff engineers identib obstacle groups, lire support 

coordinators develop a fire plan 'to support the intcnded 

effccts of engagement areas. Thcy target fires on the enemy 

sidc of obstacles where the enemy is most likely to be (dead 

space), the point at which assets begin to canalize through a 

breach point, nr at targets dctermincd by thc maneuver 

commanders and subordinate fire support teams. The point 

where obstacle groups tie, or anchor, into existing obstacles 

is critical. The anchor point is where the crrn~bined effects of 

thc obstacles and fires force the enemy to commit to a 

breach or seek a bypass. 

This is net the time to consider using ADAMRAAM, 

because integrating ADAMIRAAM must be done early to 

be effective. The maximum pFanning range of scatterable 

rnunitlons is 17.5 kilometers for MI09 fires and 17.7 

kilometers for M198 fires. If the point along an avenue of 

approach where the second echelon mechanized infantry 

brigade transitions from battalions in column to battalions 

on lrne can be targeted, or if the advanced guard main body 

can be separated from the second echelon battalions, we can 

identify the associated NAIs, DPs, and TAIs to support this 

mission. The key concern is whether it will take more than 

15 minutes for a battery to fire the mission. When 

developing the COA, identify how many artillery batteries 

are available to support the mission and determine whether 

to use low- or high-angle fires. Since the maximum rate of 

lire is four rounds per minute per tube, the angle of fires 

directly impacts he length of time and number of rounds it 

will take to fire ithe mission. Generally, high-angle fire 

requires four times more rounds than low-angle fire for 

RAAM. Therefore, more time or tubes may be required to 

complete the mission. 

The staff mwt weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 

the time it may take the fre support elements to complete the 

mission (for example, copperhead, mcerdiction, SEAD, or 

suppression) and make recommendations to the maneuver 

commander. He must decide whether to use artillery tubes to 

fire hDAMIRhhM rn~ssions based on the size and twe of 

enemy element (target), the Ph For the avenue of approach 

(location). and the overwatching elements' abitity to observe/ 

engage the enemy as he negotiates the obstacie (effect). 

7. Conduct rehearsals 

Units conduct combined arms rehearsals to ensure that all 

elements are properly synchronized. Review CALL 

Newsletter No. 98-5, R~h~arsals, and incorporate its concepts 

into TACSOPs. Specific engineer-related topics addressed in 

combined arms defense rehearsals follow. 

Priorities of engineer effort (obstacle group sequence of 

cmplacement, who is marking, link up and execution of 

hladc effort, Q36 mdar and air defense artillery coverage). 

FASCAM triggers and execution (M' + E + A < T > C). 

R Classes IV and V supply point and mine-dump operntions. (These may he discussed during cornba~ service 

support rehearsals but must be understood for tlrc combined arms rehearsals.) 

Obstade turnover, responsibility, and sccurity. 

Lane closures. 

Counterattack mobility support 

At any given time during mission execution, engineers 

should be able to tell the maneuver cotnmander whcre the 

engineer effort stands-the "glide path." Engineers must 

thoroughly understand and transla~e the impact that 

incomplete obstacle groups have on enemy maneuvcr so the 

commander can adjust his orders to achieve the same effects. 

Summary 

E ngineer staff oficers arc key players in engagement 

area development. They produce quality and useful 

decision aids, intcgratc engineer capabili~ies into 

engagement area plans, u~~dcrstand the capabilities 01 

supported units, and provide sound tactical recornmendaltions 

lo corn~nandes based on a complete analysis or the mission, 

enemy, terrain, troops. and time available (METT-T). 

Engineers are especiaIly important in terrain visualization. 

They know where to apply available tools to best support the 

commander's battlespace visualization during engagement 

area development. w 

Major Crawford ins Chief of Comhat Engineer Tacfic~ at 

the W.S. Army Engineer Sc'chool, Previous e.~per.ienc~ inu1ude.s 

EOAC Small Groirp Itutruc~or: Senior Company and Plrrtnon 

Ohs~rwr/Controller crr JRTC, unnd two company cnrnmand~ at 

Fort Brugg crnd in Sornulia. He holds o master 'k dc,qi-ee,fi-orn 

the Univrr.~itv qf Mi,vouri-RolIu otid wilr attend FY 98-!79 

Command and Gcnrral Slafl Ofircr Course at Fort 

I,eovunwrth. 
The Command Post SOP: 

A Blueprint for Success 

By Captain Eric R. Price and Captain Jay A. Hedstrom 

ix months have passed since you left the Advanced 

Course and were assigned as an assistant S3 in a 

divisional combat engineer battalion. In that time you 

have helped develop the battalionl.s training plan, which 

culminates with the battalion's first National Training 

Center rotation in two years. Today, as you update the 

battalion commander, many thoughts race through your 

mind. The battalion changes command in just two weeks; 

three key staff captains recently took command, leaving 

lieutenants to pick up the pieces; the battalion operations 

NCO just arrived last month; and enlisted personnel 

turbulence within the Headquarters Company is high. Your 

chest tightens as you realize for the first time that only two 

staff exercises remain before the rotation. The battalion 

commander reminds you that since the new S3 just arrived, 

you are the senior, most experienced man on the battalion's 

battle stafff: Heading back to the office, you war-game ways 

to pull the stafftogether in the short time left to prepare. 

This article describes a method the combat engineer 

battalion's battle staff can use to develop and implement a basic 

CPSOP. The method is applicable to all battalion command 

posts. It focuses on establishing the CPSOP around six basic 

TOC functions; identifying the key supporting tasks and related 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for each of these 

functions; and organizing and implementing those TTPs. 

CPSOP Development 

here are several ways to arrive at a workable CPSOP. 

Each member of the battle staff should first turn to 

doctrinal manuals, because it is important not only to 

understand his own duties and responsibilities but also those 

of other personnel. Many manuals include an overview of 

TOC operations, but few provide detailed guidance on 

establishing and implementing a workable SOP. Our CPSOP 

development begins with the six basic TOC functions 

identified in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 

newsletter, Tactical Operations Center (May 1995). 

I n today's Army of rapidly changing missions and high O Receive 

personnel turbulence, integration and quick training of 0 Distribute information. 

new personnel are prerequisites for success. Engineer ~~~l~~~ infomation. 

battalions work hard to develop, refine, and execute simple o Make recommendations. 

battle drills at squad and crew levels. Limited training 

resources have resulted in focused platoon battle tasks and O Integrate 

company mission essential task lists. However, many units O Synchronize resources. 

spend little time organizing command post operations, or 

when they do, they fail to commit the results to paper. At 

best, this causes them to reinvent the wheel-rather than 

building and refining an existing product-very time a new 

commander, executive officer, or S3 assumes his duties. 

Worst case, units must re-establish procedures every time 

their command post deploys. In either case, the command 

post staff spends too much time managing internal 

operations rather than focusing on timely and effective 

command and control of combat operations. Units arriving 

at the National Training Center often are ill-prepared to 

execute the key staff battle task of operating the battalion 

tactical operations center (TOC). Battalions with a wellestablished Command Post Standing Operating Procedure 

(CPSOP) for their main, rear, tactical, and administrative 

command posts are better able to cope with the rapidly 

changing conditions of the battlefield and tend to conduct 

more successful combat operations. 

This CALL newsletter clearly explains how to assess current 

command post operations and develop a training plan for 

improvement. The six TOC functions are not listed in any 

Army field manual, but they fit the axiom "form follows 

function." In other words, decide up front what functions the 

TOC must perform to be successful. Then identify the 

methodology to best accomplish each function with available 

resources. 

Despite calling them six "TOC" functions, they apply to 

the main, tactical, and rear command posts. Throughout this 

article, references to the TOC pertain to all combat engineer 

battalion command posts. To ensure that all essential tasks 

and supporting TTPs are addressed and filly integrated in the 

final product, all staff sections and other command post 

personnel must be involved in the development process. 

Begin by gathering personnel from each battalion command 

post to discuss these functions. Work together to determine 

essential tasks that support each function. Because each 

46 Engineer July I998 
function depends on the others, some tasks don't fit well 

under any particular one. List those tasks separately, as they 

will be addressed further when CPSOP organization begins. 

Tasks in the CALL Newsletter provide an excellent 

starting point for developing a list of tasks that support each 

TOC function. Identify additional tasks based on the unit's 

specific experience and mission. Detailed descriptions of the 

functions and supporting tasks identified in CALL's 

Tactical Operations Center follow: 

Receive Information. Receive information through 

standardized reports and orders from subordinate, higher, 

and adjacent units. Supporting tasks include: 

o Receive messages, reports, and orders. 

0 Monitor the tactical situation and track the battle. 

Monitor the location and activities of friendly units. 

o Update TOC charts and heads-up displays. 

0 Update maps and overlays. 

CI Maintain a TOC journal. 

Distribute Information. Control information distribution within the TOC; report information to subordinate, 

higher, and adjacent units. 

0 Submit reports. 

0 Control message traffic flow. 

CI Conduct retransmission operations. 

o Conduct relay operations. 

o Publish and distribute orders. 

0 Conduct shift change, command, and information briefings. 

Analyze Information. Consolidate reports and conduct 

battle staff analysis as part of the Tactical Decision-Making 

Process (TDMP). 

o Consolidate reports. 

0 Conduct predictive analysis using collected data. 

Develop a time line. 

fl Conduct the TDMP and orders drill. 

Make Recommendations. Submit recommendations to 

the commander based on the analysis of information collected. 

Integrate Resources. Coordinate integration of the unit's 

activities with those of subordinate, higher, and adjacent 

units. 

0 Conduct assistant brigade engineer and tactical operations. 

0 Produce annexes for the higher headquarters order. 

0 Receive and integrate engineer and combined arms 

attachments. 

Synchronize Resources. Synchronize the unit's activities 

with those of subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. 

0 Conduct liaison operations. 

0 Coordinate with other units. 

The following tasks relate to the overall operation of the 

command post and support all six basic TOC functions: 

o Identify the task or purpose of each command post. 

0 Set up and dismantle the command post. 

o Establish mission-dependent command post 

configurations. 

o Establish guard, sleep, and shift manning plans. 

o Monitor radios. 

0 Provide life support for TOC personnel. 

After identifying essential supporting tasks, outline the 

TTPs used to execute each task based on doctrine and the 

unit's way of doing business. If the unit has no established 

method for executing an identified supporting task, brainstorm 

a method and commit it to paper. Since this is a working 

document, it's okay to try new things. However, the TTPs you 

develop should not conflict with other established SOPS for 

your unit or with those of your supported maneuver unit. Once 

TTPs for each supporting task have been identified, organize 

the tasks into a logical sequence to develop the layout of the 

CPSOP. 

CPSOP Organization 

he six basic TOC functions provide a means of 

identifying supporting tasks, but because the functions 

are interrelated, it is difficult to use them to organize 

supporting tasks in a final SOP. Instead, look at the tasks 

using the five "Ws"-who, what, when, where, why-and how. 

Sections of the CPSOP can then be designed around 

answering one or two of these questions. Organize each 

section by addressing the TTPs that support each task as it 

relates to all of the unit's command posts. Use subparagraphs 

or subsections as necessary to provide detailed information 

regarding TTPs that pertain only to one command post. The 

figure on page 48 shows a sample format. 

Another method of organizing the CPSOP is to first list the 

main, tactical, and rear command posts and then discuss the 

manning, layout, and operation of each. However, this 

approach can lead to redundancy and a sense of 

compartmentalization. Addressing tasks in the CPSOP by the 

five "Ws" focuses on the fundamentals of command post 

operations before differences between each type are 

described. This method eases the transition of personnel from 

one command post to another within the unit, as often happens 

when units "surge" personnel to the main command post just 

before a battle. 

CPSOP Implementation 

T he last stage in the process is to train and implement 

the CPSOP, thus turning written products into true 

TTPs for the entire battalion battle staff. While many 

approaches will achieve the desired results, CALL's Tactical 

July 1998 Engineer 47 
Sample CPSOP Format 

Table of Contents 

I. Command Post Overview (Why) - a brief description 

of the how and why of each command post. 

0 Mission of each command post within the unit (tactical, 

main, rear, combat trains, etc.). 

0 Task or purpose of each command post. 

0 Battlefield laydown and locations of command posts. 

II. Duties and Responsibilities (Who, What) - a 

definition of the specific role each person plays in command 

post operations in terms of mission requirements. 

0 Manning and shift makeup and schedule. 

0 Life support for command post personnel. 

0 Roles and responsibilities of all command post personnel (battalion commander, executive office^ command 

sergeant major, primary staff and staff NCOs, support 

staff and staff NCOs, assistant brigade engineer, battle 

captains and battle NCOs, liaison officers, radiotelephone operators, drivers, etc.) 

Ill. Command Post Layout (Where) - a detailed 

description of the command post's physical properties. 

0 Physical layout of command post vehicles, extensions, 

briefing tents, sleep tents, and antennas. 

0 Locations of maps, heads-up displays, equipment, 

equipment storage, supply storage, and personnel. 

0 Alternate command post configurations. 

0 lntegration with supported unit command post. 

0 Security plan. 

0 Communications or other links with adjacent command 

posts. 

0 Required items such as maps, overlays, charts, orders 

books, manuals, and supplies. 

IV. Command Post Operations (When, How) - a clear 

description of routine actions during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of combat operations. Lay 

out this section using the six basic TOC functions as an 

outline. It should address: 

Information management. 

TOC chart and heads-up displays. 

Battle-tracking procedures. 

Maintaining the command post journal. 

Briefing formats. 

Standard unit time lines. 

TDMP procedures. 

Reporting procedures. 

Shift-change procedures. 

Displacement procedures. 

lntegration procedures. 

Retransmit and relay operations. 

V. Standardized Chartdieads-Up Displays (How) - 

examples of each tracking or information chart to be posted 

in the command post. These should be standardized across 

all command posts within the unit. 

Operations Center newsletter suggests the following: 

Conduct CPSOP Classes. Conduct classroom training for 

all command post personnel on tasks such as the TOC journal, 

battle tracking, reporting and TDMP procedures, displacement, 

and setuplteardown. Classes will familiarize personnel with 

procedures outlined in the new CPSOP. 

Make the CPSOP Part of Garrison Operations. Take 

tasks from the CPSOP that mirror tasks currently performed in 

garrison and make them part of the daily routine. For example, 

train battle-tracking skills by maintaining a status board of the 

battalion's companies in the S3 shop using the command post 

heads-up displays. In addition, have radio-telephone operators 

answer phones, maintain a staff journal, and pass on messages 

using the same forms as those used in the command post. 

Train subordinate units to submit reports in garrison using the 

report formats in the tactical SOP. 

Set Up the Command Post Every Month. Exercise load 

plans, storage plans, and multiple command post configurations. Coordinate for all the battalion command posts to 

set up and conduct communications exercises and TOC 

exercises simultaneously and regularly. 

Integrate Command Post Operations Into Routine Unit 

Training. Don't set up command posts only during field 

training exercises or command post exercises. Use routine 

training events such as firing ranges and land navigation 

courses as training opportunities for the command post. Set up 

battalion command posts to support company training events 

so that both company and battalion command post personnel 

receive training. 

Revise and Improve the CPSOP. Use the above training 

methods to validate the CPSOP. Reassess the TTPs and 

update them as necessary. The CPSOP must be a "living" 

document to meet the changing needs of an organization. 

Conclusion 

bservations at the National Training Center indicate a 

direct correlation between the ability of units to 

conduct synchronized and efficient command post 

operations and their level of success in executing combat 

missions. Unit tracking charts may not make the breach go in, 

but accurate information gives the commander and staff 

opportunities to take advantage of situations as they develop. 

A battalion battle staff can identify command post hnctions 

and essential tasks that support each function, commit those 

tasks to paper, and train them like a battle drill. Then they can 

use training opportunities like those provided at the National 

Training Center to train personnel in the art-rather than the 

mechanics--of command and control. m 

Captain Price, the engineer battalion logistical trcriner. 

has been an obsewer/controller at the NTC since 1997. 

Captain Hedstrorn, the engineer battalion TOC trainer, 

has been an observer/controller at the NTC since 1996. 

48 Engineer July 1998 
Earliest known sketch of a Civil War minefield (Official Record of the Rebellion, Vol42, Pt. Ill, published 1893, GPO, Washington, D.C.) 

The Origins of Military Mines: 

Part I 

By Major William C. Schneck 

I nnovations in mine warfare have come from a variety of 

sources throughout history, and it is often engineers on 

the ground who gain the critical insights required for 

the next leap forward. Mine and countermine technologies 

and techniques have evolved over the past 3,000 years and 

continue to evolve in the typical measure/countermeasure/ 

counter-countermeasure cycle seen for other weapons. Part I 

of this article traces that evolution from the first 

underground mines through the antipersonnel mines and 

boobytraps used during World War 11. 

Early Mining 

C ommercial underground mining first began in the 

Bronze Age when surface deposits of minerals and 

gems were exhausted, forcing miners to follow ore 

veins deeper into the earth by digging vertical shafts and 

horizontal drifts. The earliest identified underground mines, 

dating from 7000 B.C., were copper mines in Anatolia, now 

part of Turkey. Egyptians began to mine copper and 

turquoise in Sinai around 3400 B.C. The following Iron Age 

began among the Hittites, who mined iron ore between 1900 

and 1400 B.C. They used this revolutionary material to make 

superior weapons that greatly facilitated the conquest of their 

neighbors. 

Early in the Bronze Age, walled cities began to appear in 

the Middle East to protect against raiders and other attackers. 

Jericho, on the west bank of the Jordan River, just north of 

the Dead Sea, is the oldest known walled city (dating from 

approximately 8000 B.C.). The walls at Jericho were about 7 

meters high and 4 meters thick and were surrounded by a 

moat 9 meters wide and 3 meters deep.' Later, protective 

walls developed into huge affairs. Under Nebuchadrezzar I1 

(around 600 B.C.) the walls at Babylon increased to a 

thickness of about 26 meter^.^ 

Early military mining techniques were developed in 

response to these walled cities and probably were devised by 

impressed civilian miners at the behest of conquerors. Before 

military mining, attackers' options were limited to 

blockading a city (starving them out), scaling the walls, 

breaching the walls with a battering ram (which began in 

Egypt about 2000 B.C.), or by stratagem (such as the Trojan 

Horse). Although the stone-throwing engine of war was first 

developed by the Phoenicians, the catapult was one of the 

first effective missile engines. It was developed for battering 

July 1998 Engineer 49 
down town walls during the reign of Phillip I1 of Macedonia, 

the father of Alexander the re at.^ In the third century B.C., 

the great military engineer Archimedes built a missile engine 

that could hurl a 173-pound stone about 200 meters. 

Engineers took their name from these "ingenious" device^.^ 

Mechanical stone-throwing engines remained in action as 

late as the Siege of Rhodes in 1480~ and Cortez' conquest of 

Mexico (around 1520). In fact, improvised grenadethrowing catapults were used in close combat situations 

during both world wars. 

Early Military Mines 

T he Assyrian Army organized the first known "corps 

of engineers" during the time of Ashurnasirpal I1 

(about 850 B.C.). These elite specialists operated 

siege and bridge trains and provided mobility support for 

chariots. They were the first soldiers equipped with 

advanced iron pioneer tools and are credited with the first 

known use of offensive mine warfare. This occurred about 

880 B.C. when engineer soldiers drove tunnels (mines) 

under or through walls and fortifications6 to gain access to 

fortified areas or to create a breach large enough for a fullscale attack. These engineers excavated a chamber under the 

wall and braced the ceiling with timber supports. The 

supports were then burned, causing the chamber and the 

structure above it to collapse. Attacking soldiers then 

assaulted through the breach. 

Among the many successful mines throughout history are 

those used by Alexander the Great and his engineer Diades 

at the sieges of Halicarnassus (334 B.C.) and Gaza (332 

B.c.)~ and Julius Caesar and his engineer Mamurra during 

the siege of Marseilles in 49 B.c.~ Although effective 

mining and other combat engineering skills were critical to 

the military successes of both of these great captains, the 

skills frequently are neglected by historians. 

Early Obstacles 

n early example of a reinforcing obstacle intended 

for use on a battlefield, as opposed to during a siege, 

.occurred around 330 B.C. during the time of 

Alexander the Great. The Greeks were aware of a new 

invention called caltrops, which could be scattered in front 

of their battle lines to disrupt the terrifying attacks of the 

massive Persian war elephants.9 Caltrops are devices with 

four metal points arranged so that when three are on the 

ground, the fourth projects upward as a hazard to animal 

hooves or tires. Caltrops were used as recently as the Korean 

Conflict, when the U.S. Air Force dropped them on Chinese 

convoys to puncture tires. The U.S. also dropped them on 

the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War. 

During the siege of Alesia in 52 B.C., Julius Caesar's 

engineers directed the emplacement of a complex obstacle 

100 meters deep. It was a combination of towers, palisades, 

ditches, abatis, and caltrops to slow the attacking Gauls, so 

that Roman missile engines could more effectively engage 

them. These obstacles gave Caesar time to successfully 

deploy reserve forces to threatened areas along his 13-mile 

perimeter.'0 Another early obstacle is the abatis, emplaced 

by English longbow men to protect against mounted French 

knights at the Battles of Crecy (1346) and Agincourt 

(1415).11 

Black Powder 

A lthough the origin of black powder is uncertain, it 

probably was developed by Chinese alchemists 

seeking an "elixir of immortality" during the T'ang 

Dynasty around 850 A.D. It was used against the invading 

Mongols of Ghenghis Khan in 1209.12 Black powder 

apparently remained an oddity, for although it terrified those 

unfamiliar with it, the Chinese did not successfully integrate 

it into an effective weapon. It apparently impressed the 

Mongols, who carried black powder with them during their 

reign of conquest and introduced it to Europeans at the 

disastrous Battles of Liegnitz and Sajo River in April 1241 .I3 

The advent of black powder in Europe marked the beginning 

of modem artillery, when it was fired from mechanical 

missile engines used by military engineers of Medieval 

Europe. In fact, the term gunner may be a variant of 

"gynour," a form of engineer.14 Serpentine powder, the 

earliest form of black powder, was a dust that burned slowly 

and gave low bore pressure. A method of "coming" powder 

into larger grains to increase performance was developed 

about 1450.'~ 

Explosive Mines 

T he ability to manufacture and detonate black powder 

occurred in Europe in the 14th century and resulted in 

the next major improvements in military mining. 

Tunnel Mines 

The surprise and effectiveness of tunnel mines was 

significantly increased by exploding large charges of black 

powder at the end of galleries driven under fortifications. 

The first recorded use of such a mine in Europe was in 

1403, during a war between Pisa and Florence, when the 

Florentines exploded a charge in a forgotten passage in the 

walls surrounding pisa.16 One of the individuals involved 

with these early explosive mines was a military engineer 

named Leonardo Da Vinci, who was working for 

Ludovico, the Duke of Sforza, around 1500.'~ However, 

for a long time black powder was a scarce and expensive 

commodity,'8 so the less spectacular method of burning 

out the timber supports beneath the walls continued for 

some time.19 The slow evolution of the cannon eventually 

forced the high castle walls of the Middle Ages to be 

replaced by low-walled bastioned fortresses, finally 

making this method of mining completely obsolete. 

In his work on siege warfare (published in 1740), 

Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban (French Marshal, 1630- 

1707) codified principles of military mining that remained 

valid well into the 19th century.20 Vauban, in what could be 

considered the first scientifically based denlolitions manual, 

described a method of charge calculation and placement 

50 Engineer July I998 
based on characteristics of the target fortress and the desired 

effect. He defined these mines by the depth and size of the 

charge: 

W For depths less than 3 meters, it was called a fougasse 

(or contact mine). 

For depths greater than 3 meters, it was called a mine. 

w When used as a "countermine" against an enemy mine, 

it was called a camouflet. 

W When intended to destroy an entire fortification (using 

2,500 kilograms of powder or more), it was called pressure halls (globes de compression). 

According to Vauban's tables, explosive charges for 

mining could range up to 12,200 kilograms. The purpose of 

mines was not only to cause destruction but also--with the 

rocks and soil ejected-to form an earthen ramp that assault 

troops could use to gain immediate access to the breach. 

Because the demolition often came as a surprise to 

defending forces, it frequently caused panic and confiision 

among them. 

Tunnel mines were very time consuming to employ. 

Typically about 18 miners and 36 unskilled workmen were 

employed in three 8-hour shifts to construct an assault mine. 

Military mining during a siege could last 30 days or more, 

and specialists were required for the job. During the Middle 

Ages, coal miners were hired. Formal mining units were not 

formed until standing armies were raised by the absolute 

monarchs of the 17th century-1673 in France, 1683 in 

Austria, 1742 in Prussia, and 1772 in Britain (the Company 

of Soldier Artificers). Their work demanded courage and 

special caution-lack of oxygen and possible flooding were 

hazards. 

Against the bastioned fortresses of Vauban's time, 

mining normally began as soon as sappers (military 

specialists in attack and defense of fortifications) completed 

the last parallel in front of the glacis of a fortress or fortified 

town. Then besieging miners dug galleries about 1.25 

meters high and 1 meter wide and lined them with wood. 

Once they reached the site selected for the explosion, they 

dug the blast hole perpendicular to the previous direction of 

the gallery. Then they filled the mine chamber with the 

amount of black powder determined by the siege engineer. 

To ignite the mine, they fed an ignition "sausage" out of 

the mine chamber. This sausage was a tube made of linen 

and filled with granulated black powder that led back to 

the point of ignition (minenherd). The ignition sausage, a 

predecessor of the modern time fuze, was normally laid in 

a 6-centimeter-wide wooden duct and covered with a board 

to protect it from moisture or other damage. The gallery 

was finally tamped with sod or earth, over a length of 6 to 

10 meters. At the appointed time, the miner ignited the 

powder in the ignition sausage with an ignition sponge and 

then retreated quickly before the sponge burned to the 

powder. 

Immediately after the explosion, the besiegers could 

assault the fortress or extend their sap trenches into the crater 

and reinforce them with gabions. If necessary, additional 

mines were used to destroy the palisades of the covered 

passage and the supporting walls of the counterscarp or scarp, 

thus facilitating entry into the fortress. 

While working in tunnels, miners looked for the defenders' 

listening tunnels and countermines. Attackers tried to deceive 

the defenders' listening posts by constructing phony "noise" 

galleries, where they intentionally made a lot of noise. 21 

Military engineers incorporated the latest technologies 

from civilian mining as they became available, including more 

efficient explosives: nitrocellulose in 1845 (Christian 

Schoenbein, Germany), dynamite in 1866 (Alfred Nobel, 

Sweden), picric acid in 1871, and TNT in 1902 (C. 

Hausermann, ~erman~).~~ Other improvements included 

electric (galvanic) ignition (1850s)~~ and forced-air ventilation systems. During World War I, both sides employed 

new mechanical tunnel-boring machines developed for 

commercial coal mining, as well as traditional techniques.24 

Tunnel mining has continued sporadically into the modem 

era and was used by Napoleon at Acre (1799), the Crimean 

War (~evasto~ol),~~ General Grant's men in the American 

Civil War (~icksbur~~~ and ~etersburg~~), the RussoJapanese War (Port ~rthu?~), World War I (Western 

and the Isonzo Front3'), World War I1 (Russian Front3'), and 

the French-Indochina War (Dien Bien ~hu~~). Most recently, 

the Peruvians used tunnel mines to liberate hostages held in 

the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima. The North 

Koreans may use them in the future-some of their tunnels 

have been discovered under the demilitarized zone (DMZ) 

and more are suspected. 

~ou~asse~~ 

Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, stated that 

"Fougasses formed into a T-like mine, in order to blow up the 

same place three times, can be added to the entrenchments. 

Their use is admirable; nothing fortifies a position so strongly 

nor does more to ward off attacker^."^^ These fougasses were 

simple black powder devices first developed for defending 

permanent fortifications. They were intended to detonate in 

the face of an enemy assault. A black powder charge was 

placed in a chamber excavated in the face of a fortification 

(firing horizontally) or in front of it (firing vertically). The 

chamber was then packed with a quantity of fragments, 

normally rocks or scrap iron and called a stonefougasse, or 

filled with explosive artillery shells and called a shell 

fougasse. If properly emplaced, a horizontally fired fougasse 

functioned as a crude claymore mine, while the shell fougasse 

could function like a bounding antipersonnel (AP) mine or a 

simple fragmenting mine. Fougasses were commanddetonated by manually igniting a powder train from a 

protected position at the appropriate time. Fougasses had 

several defects: they were vulnerable to the elements--even 

moderate dampness rendered them inoperative-and were 

difficult to detonate at the optimum time. However, in the 

July 1998 Engineer 51 
right circumstances, filrga.s.seLs caused heavy casualties, as 

occurred during the sieges ol'ciudad Rodrigo, Radajoz, and 

Santander in the Di~kc of Wcltington's Peninsular Campaign 

of the Napoleonic Wars. 

Fougas~es wcre employed by one of Georgc 

Washington's engineers. Francois de Fleury (of de Fleury 

Medal fame). in October t 777 against the EIessians at Fon 

Merccr. New Jersey, on the east bank of the Delaware 

~ivcr." During the Wnt of 1 XI?, an American ammunition 

chest nccidentally exploded during a Britrsll attack on Fort 

Erie, Canada. This cat~sed the attack to collapse. and ~hc fc:w 

nf additional fuugasses prevented fiirther British attacks."' 

(Thc only engineer unit in the American Anny during his 

war-the Conlpany of Sappers. Mincls and Bornbardicrsrought in this hartle). Durrng the Mexictin-American War of 

1345, the Mexicans attempted lo c~nploy fbugasses on thc 

approaches to ~hs~ultc~ec.~' Slonc t-clu~assrlx arc still 

employed nccnxionnlly by ~rregular I'orces. ~uch a.; the Viet 

Cnng, Central A~nerrcan _pucrillas.;y and ~osnian~." xvho 

lack access to modern land mines. 

Sclf-Contained Mines 

Military cnginecrs in China onployed the first selfcontained c.xplosive AP lilincs ag;~inst Kuhlai Khan's Mongol 

invaders in 1277. Manufacttuutl in many shnpes and sizes, 

these mines could hc command-detonated or activated with 

either a pressurc duvicc (prohahly hased on a match) or a pullfiring dcvicc (a rc~rcmnncr of thc tl~nrlock mechanism)!' 

Mowcvcr. llrcy werc scldun~ ilsed and were largely forgotten 

by thc timc Western cxplnrers arrived En the Orien~. 

[ntmduction of the European flintluck in 1547 led tn thu 

first target-act~vntcd AP mine in the Wcst. Tl~is/luriti~~rmi~ze, 

dcvclaped by Samuel Ziminernlnnn ol' Augsbutg in 1573, 

consisted of one or more pcrtirlds ol'black powdcr buricrl, a1 a 

shallow deptl~ in the glacis ol' a lilt-rress. It was actuated hy 

stepping on it nr hy Irippin_r u wirc along the yrrt)~~nd rhnt 

releaser1 a flintlock igniter to fire thc nlnin cl~arpc. Like the 

fougasse. these devices were highly vulncmhlc tn dn~npness 

and required freqi~ent mainlenancc. Thcy wcrc uscd mninly 

around fived fortifications." flnddcrrnines were used 

agamst Frederick thc Circa! during the Siege of Schweidnitz 

in 1 75% and by the Gcnnans during thc Franco-Pmssian War 

in 1 870-1 87 1 ." 

Although the Cl~incsc Lrst introduced explosive shells 

(as opposed to solid shot) in about 1221, they were 

untetiablc and wcrc ilscd mainly with mortar<. Reintrodt~clion oTcxplosivc shells, in tlie West in the I700s, 

combintd with the invention of the percussgon cap by 

Reverend Alcxandcr Farsythe of Scotland in I 8 I 4." 

rnade possible thc next important step in tlie develop~nent 

of reliablc nlinec by grcntly improving their resistance to 

rnoiszurc. Conl'cdcratc soldiers under General Gabriel 

Raines 1mprovi.l;ed ~hc first of this type of' AP mine rrom 

artillery shclls at Kedt>ubt No. 4 near Ynrktown, Virginia. 

during Ihc ual-npai~m of I 8h2." After several casualties, 

these werc cluared by two companies from the 50th New 

York Vnluntcer Enpinccr ~c~inient." By the end of the 

Civil War, the Confederates had ernplaced thousands of 

land rorpeclnes around Richmond. Charleston, Mobile. 

Savannah, and Wilmington, which produced hundreds or 

casualties (see table on page 53). Robert E. Lee, John 

Mosby, and J.E.B. Stuart all advocated thc usu of AP 

mines. 

Land torpedoes were also used against Shennnn in 

Mississippi, by Genera1 Raines on roads into Augusta. and by 

General Wheeler on the roads into Savannah ant1 Pocotaptio. 

A c.oof /orpc(io (a type of boobytrap with an irregular sheeriron case filled with black powder and painted black) wns 

used to destroy General Butler's headquarters sle;~mcr 

G'rry~hot~~ld, and coal torpedoes were implicated in tl~o 

sinkings of the L%~nurzgo and rhe Srrl~arlrr. Union troopc of I 

Company. 3rd U.S. Colored Troops. also used tvrpedocs near 

Savannnl~. Five of he torpedoes dcsigned by Cleneml Rnfnes 

werc f'ound near Mobilc. Alnban~n. in 1960. 

The British employed mines dlzring the Boer War in 190 1 

to protect railroads and deny fording sites to the enemy.'" In 

the Sicgc rlf Pr>n Arthur during thc Russo-Japanese War of 

1904, the .lapanese tried to breach Russian mines with 

vduntccr srr~cide squads tltat were to hrce o passage by 

sacrilicing their own bodies. Upon approaching thc 

rnineficld, the volunteers found tha~ heavy rains liud exposed 

many of the rnines.17 

Bctween the Civil Was and WorId War I, powerf'ul 

military explosives were in~ndvccd tha~ sign i titantly 

increased tl~e mincs' IcthaIity. 131ack pcswdei- shell.; or tlre 

Civil War prriod Isurst into nnIy two tn tive fragments, while 

lliose of the France-Prussian War hurtt into 20 to 30 

fragments. By World War 1. a ?-inch high-cx losive shcll 

produced about 1,000 high-vclocity fmSmcnts.4 l' 

The German trr~trnrtl~ (step-on mine). the ncsL highexplosive mine to appear. wen! into lilni trtl production bcf-nrc. 

World War I. Lieutenant Ernst J1ingi.r of the 73rd I-lanclvcrlan 

Fusilier Reginlent described Gcman imprt>vised nlincs this 

way: "These hotheads arc fijrevur puzzling out thc possihlc 

ways of ... making thc pund in front of thc treilch 

murderous with explosive rnachincs. Perhnp~ thcy cut a 

narrow passage through the wire in fiont of their pcists in 

order to cnticc an encmy patrol. by this hait af an easy way 

through. straight up to the~r rifles.'jq 

The United States aIso had a fairly advanced concept of 

landmine warfarc. as stated in Errpin~w Fi~fd ~Mcrnrrui. P~II-IS 

1-Ifll, in 101 8.'" However, all the World War I combatants 

rclied heavily on artillery and machine guns and seldom used 

AP mines. It was not until the Second WorId War that AP 

mines reaclled full maturity, and they have been an importtint 

facet of aIrno~t every conflict since. 

Fragmenting AP Mines 

Evcn thm~gh 1nndc1-1~. self-contained fragmei~ting AP 

mines have hcen elnplnyed in the West in relatively small 

numbers si~~ce the American Civil War, they did not appear 

in sig~iificant numbers until World War 11. At that time, three 

typ~s of fragmenting A P mines emerged: hnrtnrfing ntirl'?;, 

the prcdcccssors of ~hc M ti5 "Hnuncing Betty"; tii~~c.c.rinnr~l 
Civil War Landmine (Torpedo) Employment 

We* Point Railroad 

south of Atlanta, Gb 

Fort McAllister, GA 

I Fort Fisher. NF 

Sister's Ferry, GA 

Richmond, VA 

barge 

Sherman's troops emplaced pressure fuzed mines during railroad 

destruction 

7- or 8-inch shells 3 feet apar! 

24 electitcally commanddetonated Singer torpedoes, 200 

feet In 'front of the trenches around 

the fort. 80 feet apart 

James Tomb laid 40 10 50 torpedoes using 6- and 10-powder 

shells 

At least 1.298 mines 

Spanish Fon, At "Several" killed 

TOTAL Hundreds of casualties . 

9 April 1865 

-- 

Unknown 

12 kilEed and about 80 wounded 

Flring wires cut by attrllery Are 

Two exploded and kilred "several" of 

Sherman's men 

Delayed Union General Weitzel's XVlll 

Corps' advance by several hours 

28 August 1 864 

13 December 

7864 

22 January 

1865 

29 January 

1865 

April 1865 
mines, the predecessors to the MI8 Claymore; and simple 

.fragmenting mines, like the Soviet POMZ-2 stake mine. 

Bounding AP Mines. An 1859 U.S. military engineering 

manual by General Halleck includes the design for an 

improvised command-detonated bounding AP mine called a 

shell fo~~asse.~' However, modem manufactured examples 

of this type did not make their combat debut until early in 

World War 11, when French patrols on the Siegfried Line 

began to take unexplained casualties. These casualties were 

attributed to a device the French dubbed "the silent soldier," 

the famous German "S" mine introduced during the 

1930s.~~ These mines were commonly called "Bouncing 

Betty.~. " 

Directional AP Mines. These mines descended from an 

early directional type of stone fougasse used in Europe. 

Under the guidance of physicists Franz Rudolf Tomanek 

and Hubertn Schardin, the Germans developed a directional 

AP mine, called a trench mine, late in World War 11. The 

French fielded a directional AP mine in 1947, but it was the 

Americans who refined it in response to the human-wave 

attacks of Chinese Communist forces during the Korean 

Conflict in the early 1950s. The new mine was developed 

and placed in production in 1953, too late to see combat in 

Korea. Called the M 18 Claymore after a famous type of 

Scottish broadsword, it first saw combat in Vietnam in 

1961.~~ 

Simple Fragmenting AP Mines. Stake-mounted, 

fragmenting AP mines were introduced in the Russo-Finnish 

War of 1939, when badly outnumbered Finns improvised 

them from grenades. When the Finns fought the Russians to 

a standstill along the Mannerheim Line in November 1939, 

this setback forced the Russians to conduct the first mounted 

breach of a mined, complex obstacle. In preparation for a 

deliberate breach, the Russians improvised roller tanks and 

flamethrower tanks and conducted extensive rehearsa~s.'~ 

The stake mine that emerged from World War I1 is still used 

today without significant changes to its design.55 The bestknown example is the Soviet-made POMZ-2 mine. 

Blast AP Mines 

Blast AP mines descended from the vertical fougasse and 

large underground mines that were dug under fortified 

positions and then detonated. It is unclear which mine is the 

first modern "toe-popper" blast AP mine, but the Sovietmade PMK-~O~~ and the British-made "Ointment BOX"^^ 

mine are good candidates. 

Chemical Mines 

The British-developed Livens Projector was first employed in 1917 and is arguably the first chemical mine.58 

The Germans also developed and employed what the Allies 

dubbed the "Yperite Mine" in 1918. It used a delayed action 

demolition charge containing mustard agent ("Yperite") to 

deny bunkers that were being abandoned during a withdra~al.'~ The first modern chemical mine, the Spruh-buchse 

37 (Bounding Gas Mine 37), was developed and produced 

by Germany during World War I1 and normally had a 

mustard-agent fill. It was never used in Except for 

the introduction of nerve-agent fills, the design of chemical 

mines has not changed significantly since the Second World 

War. 

Flame Mines 

"Liquid Fire" and "Greek Fire" have existed since classical 

times. However, the first reported flame mine was improvised 

by Confederate soldiers near Charleston in 1864, possibly 

from shells containing Greek Fire, which the Union fired into 

the city and that failed to fun~tion.~' During World War 11, the 

Russians used a trip-wire-activated static flamethrower at the 

Battle of ~ursk.~~ These devices were quickly copied by the 

Germans and used in the Atlantic The British also 

employed improvised flame mines during the First Battle of 

El Alamein in 1942.~~ TheUnited States developed the first 

modem flame mine, the XM-55, for use in Vietnam. It was a 

pressure- or trip-wire-activated bounding mine.65 There are 

no indications that it was ever used in combat. Improvised 

flame mines, sometimes called Jame fougasse, are still 

occasionally used in combat. 

Boobytraps 

The first explosive boobytraps were employed by the 

Chinese against the Mongols in 1277.~~ They first appeared 

in the West during the Seminole War of 1840.~~ During 

the Civil War, Confederate soldiers employed a variety of 

these devices-including pull-firing devices, timer-rundown 

fuzes, and coal or wood "torpedoes" that detonated when 

burned in a boiler. Boobytraps reached full maturity during 

World War 11, when reliable German mechanical antihandling devices were introduced, and have been used in 

almost every conflict since. 

Conclusion 

uring the 20th century, the antipersonnel mine evolved 

into a highly effective weapon and combat multiplier. 

It proved to have great utility for protecting outnumbered American soldiers against dismounted attacks, as 

shown in Anzio and Korea. The innovations that made this 

mine possible came from a variety of sources, including the 

ingenuity of combat engineers. 

Part I1 of this article begins with antivehicle mines, first 

used around 120 B.C., and continues through countennines, 

sea mines, and antiaircraft mines being used or developed 

today. La 

Major Schneck, a professional engineer, is the Assistant 

Division Engineer, 29th Light Infantry Division (Virginia 

Army National Guard), and a senior project engineer in the 

Countermine Division, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 

Directorate, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A veteran of both the Gulf 

War and Somalia, he has published numerous papers on mine 

warfare. Major Schneck is a graduate of the Command and 

General Staff College and holds a master's degree in 

mechanical engineering from Catholic Univejsity. 

54 Engineer July 1998 
-ndnotes 

Inncient ~~~,.~~~i~~~~, by peter jalnes and ~i~k ~h~~~~. ~~ll~~~i~~ ~~~k~, N~~ york, i4Frederic~ the Great. On the Arl of War, by Frederick 11. edited and translated by 

page 200. Jay Luvaas. copyright 1966, The Free Press, New York, page 288. 

'A ~i~~~~~ o,.~ol?ificntion, from 3000 BC to AD 1700, by sidney T~~, ~~i~~~~~, 35Er~girrei,~.s oflrrdcpendcnce, A Documrrrlary Histon' of lhc Anr!). Er1girleers in the 

London, 1966, page 2. A~rrerican Revolrrtiori. 1775-1783, by Paul K. Walker, Historical 1)ivision. Oflicc of the 

Chicf of Engineers. Washington, D.C., page 158-159 

'The Gerreralship r~fAle.ri~nder the Great, by J.F.C. Fuller. Rutgers University PI-ess. 3, Ncw Hmnswick, N. .I.. 1960, page 45. Cbnrpoigrrs of the !+'or oflBI2-15 Agrrinst Great Britain, Sketched and Critised: 

n,ith Brief B~~r,qrrrphies of the American Brgineer~, by MG George Cullum, James 

4~~gin.s, ,4 Shorl Etyrno10,qicol Dictionary c/~Wodern Lr~glirh, by Er~c Partridge, the Mrller. New York, 1879. pages 237-250. 

Macmillan Company, New York, 1966, page 251. '77he Uhr with rMe.ric~~. by Donald Chidscy, Crown Publishers, New York, pages 161- 

50~ CIT, A Hirtor,: ofFrrrrifictrtion. Fmnl 3000 BC to A D 1700, page 256. 163. 

'~ile Arl qf I+'arfare in Biblical Lond.7, I/olrrme I. by Yigael Yadin, McCiraw-Hill "~~~rrn'os de lnstruccion Contra hlirms. Trumpas Y Ar~efnctos E1p1osr1,o.s. 

Book Company. New York, page 317. Note however, that thc earliest mention of Guatemalan Corps of Engineers, untlatcd, pagc 60. 

engineer soldiers is attributed to the Hittites as early as 1600 HC. Also, thc early Hittite capital Hogha7koy ll;ld predug hlnnels to allow for defellsive sorties against any '9~~:~~~eer Contingency ffarrdhook (former Yugoslavia), US Army Engineer School. 

prospective besiegers. See Thc Hiltites, by 0. R. Gurney. Penquin Books. Ft Leonard Wood, M~ssouri, July 1993, page 1-32. 

70~ CIT, Thi, Geni,ralsAip ofAIexarrder the Great, pages 200-218. 400~ CIT,The Genius qf Cliinri, page 235-237. 

41.. "Vrrr. Conrm~~ntories of Caesar., by Julius Caesar, translated by Rex Warner, The M~ne Warfare, Land," by Ulricli Kre~rzfeld, Interrrotional Military and I)e/trrcc 

New American Library, 1960, pages 259-266. Frcyrlopedia, Vohmle 4, Brassey's Inc., Washington, D. C., 1993, pages 1756-1757. 

'kf't~rfire in .4ritiqrrrty. The Hic-tory offhe Art of War. Volroire I, By Hans Delbruck. 42 OP CIT, Pioniere. Ent~dcklung einer Dmtschen IV"fftngattrnrg. pages 36 and 1 18. 

translates by Walter Renfroe, Unrvers~ty of Nebraska Prcss, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1990 43The(//llsrm~cd~ng;c[o,~er/ia lgth ~e,rltrr:v~i,.ear.nu, by i,,qajor F. M~~~, creSerll edition, page 212. See also "M'eaponry," by Robert W. Reid. Mil~ta~y History ~~~k~, ,+,,york, page Magazine, /\ugust 1998, page 20. eels Linrterrinrtk. Volrrrne I, Douglas Southall Freeman, 1942, pages 268-269. See "OP CIT. M'ar C~1n1rnentarie.s (,f Crrescrr; page 173. also Southern I-listorical Society Papers, Volume 111, January to Junc 1877, Broadfoot 

" 7he Face ofBottle, by John Kcegan, Penquin Hooks, 1976, pages 90-91. Publishing Company, I990 edition, pages 38-39. The shells used were ordinary 8- or 10- 

~nch mortar or columhiad shells. he Geriiru of Chirra. by Robert Temple, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, 

page 224. 45~ririge Brrilclin~ in M'ar-tirne, Colorre1 FVe'erlq Brairrerd :Y ~bfenloir o/ the 5lll/r New 

13%. York I/olun/eer Engineers, edited by Ed Malles, University of Tennessee Press, 

Mongol Invas~on of Europe," by Erik Hildingcr, Military Histog~iMagazine, June Knoxville. Tennessee, 1997, page 65. 

1997, pagc 44. '"'The Royal Engineers Journal," December 1, 1903. page 267. 

I40P CIT, Origins. d Short E~~~nrologrcal Dictionary ?/Modern Englbli, page 271. 47~lre Short Viclorious War. The Russo-Japane.~e Conflict. 1904-5, by David Walder, 

I5rhe Complete lllrcslrared Err~:),clopedin qf the IVorld~s Fir-enrrns, by Ian V. Hogg, Harper & Row, New York, page 102. 

A & W Puhl~shcrs, Ncw York, pagc 8. 4R~he Evo/ution of Weapons rrrrrl Wirr$~re. by T. N. Dupuy, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 

th.t4inr/~unte,mi~re Opernrions a/ the Conrpnrry Level. FM 20-32, Department of Indianapolis, 1980, page 213. 

Doctrine and Training Development. IJS Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 

30 September 1976. page 133. 49~he Slorrn of Sleel, From the Diary of cr Gernrnrr Stor-rn-tr-oop Officer on the 

Western Front, by Ernst Junger, Howard Fertig, New York, 1993 edit~on, page 43. 

"~rr~irreer.~ of the Rerini.ssnnce, by Bertrand Gille, The MIT Press. Cambridge, 

Massachusetts, page 124-125. 50~ngineer Field Manual, Parls I- I///, Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers, 

US Army, No.29, Fifth Edit~on (corrected to December 31, 1917). Government Printing 

"A /fi.sti~r? qf Artiller): by Ian V. Hogg, Mamlyn, New York. pages 23-24. The Oflice, Washingon, 1918, page422. 

entire English inventory was only 84 pounds of powder In 1370. 51~lements qf Military Art and Science: or, Courxe of Inrtrrrction in St~-ate.~y, "AS portrayed during the siege of Hasfleur (1415) in Shakespeare's play ''He~uy V." Fort!fication. Tactics ofBatlle &c, by H. Wager Halleck, D. Appleton &Company. New 

York, New York, 1859, page 363. Note however, that this type probably predates this "A Mi~rrucrl of Siegecrafl and Fort!ficofion. Sebatien de Vanban, translated by work and in fact, it may be shell follgasses [hat were emplaced by the ~~~i~~~~ at George Rothrock, The University of Michigan Press, 1968. Chapultepec, but the available clescriptions are not clear. 

*I0'~iege." by Gert Bode, Internutionnl hlililnry rind I)cli.nse Gnc):clol~erlia, f'ohlrne 52E,lgineer,y in ~(~,,l~, by pa,,[ W, ~h~~~~

~ili~~~ service Publishing Company. 5, Hrasscy's Inc., Washrngton, D.C., 1993, page 2421. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1942, pages 64-71, translat~on of an anlcle in 

22 Military Explosn~cs, TM 9-1300-214, Department of the Army, September 1984, V1erteljahreshefte Pionicre, 3rd Quarter, 1940. 

pages 2-4 to 2-8. 51 Clcryrnore Mirre.7, Their Histov and Developmen/, by Larry Gncpp, Paladin Press. 

23~lthough Count Volta ~nvented his "voltic pile" battery in 1800. its potential utility 1993. 

was only slowly recogn~zed. ''~he IVirrrer IVo,: Tlre Rrrr.ro-Finrri.sh Cmflicf, 1939-40, by Eloise t;,ngle and Lauri 

241Vur lindergrounrl. The T~mrirllers oftlre Great War, by Alexander Barme, Tom Pam"""n~ Scribner's Sons, New 

Donovan. London, England, pages 196-206. 55~;asterr~ Europe, Iflorld War 11, Landmine and Courrteurrinc IVurfire, Englneer 

'5/fn Elernen~ar,: C'o11r:se of !\dilircl1:), Erl,pjnecnrlg. Prlrt I. Cornpri.sirrg t\gency for Resources inventories. Washington, D.C., August 1973, page 155. 

Fort~ficofiorr. Military Mining, anli Siege Ojrertrtion.~, By D. H. Mahan, Wiley & Son, 5hS01,iet M~~~~ war;fare E~~~~~~

TM 5-223~. D~~~~~~~~ of A~~

New York. New York, 1867. pages 172-177. Washington, D.C., Aupst 195 1, page 129. 26.. Engineer Operat~ons During the Vicksburg Campaign." by Robert Puckett. AD- 57~~i~i~h, ~,.~~~~h rlullrtn M~~~ fi~~~rfa~~ E~~;~~~~~~

.TM 5-223D, D~~~~~~~~ of A255-141, Ft Leaven\vo~ih, KS, 1992, pages 124-132. the Army, Washington, D.C., May 1952, page 61. 

27~lie Siege 0fPeler~b11)9. by Joseph P. Cullen, Eastem Acorn Press. 1970, pages 17- 58~l~~~~i~~/ NT~~:~~~~ in World MI^,. I: TJ,~ ~~~~~i~~~ ~~~~

,917.19,8, by 23. The minc exploded by Federal troops under the Confederate earthwork at 1:lliot's ,-harles ~~ll~~, ~~~~~~~~~~h papers N~, 10,combat shldies lnsIibte, F~ ~~~~:~~

Salient at Petersburg, Virginia, on 30 July 1864 was 510 feet long, charged with 8,000 K~~~~~, september 1984, page 20.21, pounds of powder and produced a crater 9 meters (30ft) deep, 18 rncters (60ft) wide, and 

52 meters ( 170ft) long. The subsequent Federal assault, liowevcr, was unable to exploit the 59" Report on an Yperite M~ne," Report No. 2-741, by A. Kling, Municipal Chcmical 

tcmporasy advantage gained by the explos~on and the surprise. 4 work force reaching over Laboratory, Paris, France. 3 December 1918, DTIC # AD499336. 

400 men at times co~npleted the mine in slightly over a month. hn~er-man Mine Warfire Equipnrerrt, TM 5-223C. Deparnnent of the Army, 

2X~~re his to^)' ~fFortificatiorr. by Ian Hogg, St. Martin's Press. New York, pages Washington, D.C., March 1952, page 146. 

185-189. "ln/cr7~al Mnchine.~. The Story qf Confederate Srrhnrnrine arid Mrne U'arfbre, by 

290~ CIT, M'rrr lindergrorrrrd The Tunnellersofthe Great IVar, pages 243-261 On 7 Milton F. Perry, Louisiana State University Press, 1965, page 166 

June 1917 British engineers fired nineteen mines with 430 tons of Ammonal at a depth 

of 40 ~nctcr.; at Wylscliacte Salient south of Ypres. destroying three Gernlan battalions. 62~he Hi.rror), ofthe Por~zerkorps Grossd~~ot.scAlrinr(. Volrrrne 2, by Heln~ulh Spactcr, 

J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Winnipeg, Canada, 1995 edition, page 121. 

'oOtl 13 March 1918, Austrian engineers blew up pan of Mount Pasubio, wh~ch was 

occupied by the Italians. using 50,000 kilograms (5Stons) of explosives k~llrng 485 men. "0~ CIT, Easterrr Europe, World War 11. Lnndrriirie and Corrrrternrine War:firI'e. 

pages 387-399. For an example of their use in the Atlantic Wall. see "Defenses of the 

319i~i~11 Unif Act~on.~ During the Genrrarr Cbrrrprrigri irr Russia. Ch,fH Pub 104-22, Normandy Peninsula," by Shenvood Smith, The Militap Engineer, Vol. XXXVII, No. 

Ccnter of Military History, Washington, D.C., Facsilnilc edition 1988, pages 165-1681 2, page 50. 

The "Blitzkrieg" or~ented German Army of WWll maintained special "Minier Pioniere" war (Pionicre, ciner I)eutschen by @~e~ort from the 3'd Reconnaissance Battalion, 21" Pannzer Division, dated 26 July 

~i~~~i~l~ petter, wehr und wissen ~~~l~~~~~~~ll~~~~~f~ MBH, ccrmany, 1942, Capbred Gern~an Records, National Archives. T-3 13. Roll 43 1. Frame 8723884. 

1963. page 245). The British and Canadians are retnincd this type of unit during WWII. 65yietnanl, 1964-1969. ,T~~~,,~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~i~~~i(lrforc, ~~~i~~~~ A~~~~~ for 

32ifell in a Ve'L.,)..Ymnll PIilcc. by Bernard Fall, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1966, pages Re"llrces Inventories, Washington, D.C., June 1972, page 47. 

384-386. '%P CIT, Ancierrt Inventions, page 207. 

j3Not to be confused with the irnproviscd flame mine that US Army engineers 67~~~~~h~,.,~ ~~~t~~i~~l ~~~~~w papers, v~[~~~~ X, J~~~~~,:~ to ~~~~~b~~ 1882, occasionally employ and call a "fougassc." Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1990. pages 257-260. 

July 1998 Engineer 55 
ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

Maneuver Support Center MANSCEN EventsThe initiative to stand up the MANSCEN at Fort Leonard Wood is on 

(MANSCEN) track. The following events indicate progress to date: 

w MG Flowers was appointed the provisional MANSCEN Commander by General Hartzog, TRADOC Commander, effective 30 April 1998. 

w Garrison Command is preparing the Reception Plan, which will be completed by 1 

October 1998. 

w Final plans for integrating Fort McClellan elements into Fort Leonard Wood facilities are 

under way. Many organizations will move within the schoolhouse and telephone numbers will change. New telephone numbers will be listed on the Fort Leonard Wood LAN 

system. 

w Construction of new facilities is on schedule. Anticipated occupancy dates are being 

finalized, which will affect the procurement of furniture and the installation of communications and data lines. 

w The Chemical Defense Training Facility will begin surety training and testing in January 

1999. 

MANSCEN training begins in June 1999. 

Additional information is available on the MANSCEN home page at: 

www.wood.army.mil/manscen/index.htm 

POC is LTC Susan Myers, -61 34. 

Department of Training Field Manual Update. Engineer School personnel recently digitized several field 

and Doctrine (DOTD) manuals that are not currently available in the Army Doctrinal and Training Digital Library. 

These manuals are posted to the Engineer School's Publications Page at http:// 

www.wood.army.miI/PUBS/newpubs. htm. 

The Engineer School is reviewing the first draft of the next iteration of doctrine to support 

Force XXI operations. This doctrine will be published as changes to existing manuals. 

The following manuals are scheduled for publication and release to the field within the 

next 180 days. 

FM 5- 1 1 6, Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps 

w FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data 

w FM 5-436, Paving and Surfacing Operations 

w FM 5-41 5, Fire Fighting Operations 

w FM 5-434, Earth Moving Equipment 

FM 90-1 3-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations 

FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 

POC is Sandra Gibson. -4100. 

Directorate of Combat M34 Blasting Machine. A Safety of Use Message (SOUM ACALA 98-05) from the Tank 

and Automative Command (TACOM) deadlines the M34 Blasting Machines manufactured by (DCD) Minowitz Manufacturing. The M34 is a component of Demolition Kit (LIN F91490) and EOD 

Field Maintenance Set (LIN T57126) and is used with the MlCLlC (LIN 67342). If you have a 

Minowitz M34 Blasting Machine or a blasting machine that cannot be identified as 

manufactured by a company other than Minowitz, it must be removed from service until it is 

tested. A blasting cap connected to the machine can be detonated by voltage produced when 

the bail lock is released and the handle of the blasting machine is extended to the "ready" 

position. Minowitz M34 Blasting Machines are identified by a lot number beginning with 

"MMW that is etched or stamped on the bottom. To obtain a detailed test procedure from 

TACOM, call the Logistics Management Office at Rock Island Arsenal at (309) 782-1709 or 

DSN 793-1 709. POC is Alan Schlie, -61 91. 

Nuclear Densimeter. The contract award for a new nuclear densimeter is scheduled for 

July 1998, with the date of issue programmed for the 4th quarter of FY99. An article 

describing the equipment and the responsibilities of the using unit commander will appear in 

the fall issue of Engineer. POC is SSG Troy Miller, -61 85. 

56 Engineer July 1998 
/@ Lead the Way kvBy Command Sergeant Major Robert M. Dils 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

ENFORCE Conference 

A nother ENFORCE Conference has come and 

gone. By all accounts, this was a great one. All 

of us at the Engineer Center appreciate your 

efforts and the support you provided. Now it's time to 

look ahead. 

Change 

0 ur Army is an institution that constantly 

changes. Reasons include changes in our 

National Policy, the impacts of changing 

resources (people, funding, etc.), and technological 

advances. All of us are impacted, but some feel the 

effects of change more than others. As noncommissioned officers, it is our responsibility to remain 

positive about changing conditions and to give leaders 

our ideas and opinions concerning proposed changes. 

You can address your ideas and opinions to Army 

leaders through the chain of command and to the 

Engineer Center, which is your "voice" on issues 

related to changes in engineer doctrine, force 

structure, equipment modernization, and training. We 

value your input and, frankly, we can't do without it. 

Input to the chain of command and the Engineer 

Center is a positive way you can affect change. 

At the same time, we must shelter our subordinates 

from negative, nonproductive discussions about 

change. As noncommissioned officers, we must remain 

focused on training, maintenance, quality of life issues, 

and mentoring. We must help our soldiers focus on 

what is truly important. If we do this, the impacts of 

change will be reduced and less noticeable to our 

soldiers. We must help them adjust to required 

changes and ensure they remain focused on what is 

truly important: training, maintenance, and career 

development. 

Command Sergeants Major Fall Engineer 

Training Conference 

A s you may have heard, a Command Sergeants 

Major Training Conference will be held in 

Vicksburg, Mississippi, on 20-22 October. If 

you have not received an invitation and would like 

to attend, please send an e-mail message to: 

dilsr8wood.arrny.mil. Invitation packets will be mailed 

by 15 August 1998. A very informative program is 

planned and we look forward to seeing you. 

In preparation for this training conference, we ask 

that you complete one of the three surveys posted 

on the Fort Leonard Wood home page 

(www.wood.army.mil). Separate surveys are posted for 

NCOs in career management fields (CMFs) 12,51, and 

81. We ask that you complete the survey no later than 1 

September. 

Engineers Lead the Way! 

W e extend a big "Hoo-ah!" to the following 

individuals for their outstanding achievements: 

Specialist Jason D. Etling, 642nd Engineer Company, 41 st Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, is the Division Soldier of 

the Quarter for the 2nd quarter, FY98. 

Sergeant John W. Swartz, D Company, 10th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, 

Georgia, is the Division NCO of the Quarter for the 

2nd quarter, FY98. 

SSG Bradley J. Houston, 12B, Fort Leonard 

Wood's Drill Sergeant of the Year, was recently 

selected to be the United States Army Active Component Drill Sergeant of the Year. 

SSG Thomas J. Ross, 12B, 98th Training Division 

Drill Sergeant of the Year, was recently selected to 

be the runner-up for the United States Army 

Reserve Component Drill Sergeant of the Year. 

SPC Mack H. Welch, 12B, C Company, 16th Engineer Battalion, Engineer Brigade, I st Armored Division, was selected to be the United States Army 

Europe (USAREUR) Soldier of the Year for 1998. 

Did you know that the 4th Engineer Battalion, Fort 

Carson, Colorado, has 12 members of the Sergeant 

Morales and the Sergeant Audie Murphy Clubs? 

That significant record will be hard to beat! 

Congratulations to you all! 

July 1998 * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1998: 655-120 180003 Engineer 57 
ARMY VALUES 

'Doyour du& in all things. You cannot do more. 

You shodd wer wish fo do kss. " 

Robert E. Lee 

Map of the Yorktown Battle 

I I Showing Engineer Siege Works (October 1788) 

"Thls corps of Mlners was reckoned an honorable one ... I was a sergeant and I think 

I did use my best abilities to perform the duties of the omce according to my best 

knowledge and judgement. Indeed, I can say at this late hour of my Me, that my 

conscience never did, and 1 trust never will, accuse me of any failure in my duty to my 

country ... I always MilIIed my engagements to her ..." 

Sergeant Joseph Plumb Martin, Company of Sappers and Miners