NO. 93-036

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1993

LESLIE LEE LOVELL,

Petitioner and Appellant,

-vsSTATE COMPENSATION MUTUAL

INSURANCE FUND,

Defendant, Insurer

and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: Montana Workers' Compensation Court,

The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Terry Spear; Matovich, Addy & Keller, Billings

Montana

For Respondent:

Laurence A. Hubbard; State Compensation Mutual

Insurance Fund, Helena, Montana

Filed:

Submitted on Briefs: August 12, 1993

Decided: September 2, 1993

_", .i.i~
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Leslie L. Love11 (Lovell) appeals from a judgment of the

Workers' Compensation Court awarding him temporary total disability

benefits of $8.26 per week. The State Compensation Mutual

Insurance Fund (State Fund) cross-appeals the Workers' Compensation

Court's imposition of a twenty percent penalty, attorney's fees and

costs. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

We phrase the issues on appeal as follows:

1) Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in refusing to

consider Lovell's earnings from other sources when determining his

weekly wage rate for temporary total disability benefits?

2) Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in imposing a

twenty percent penalty against the State Fund for unreasonably

delaying benefits to Lovell?

3 ) Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in imposing

attorney's fees and costs against the State Fund?

In 1988, Lovell, a twenty-eight-year-old alcoholic, worked as

a painter and roofer and provided lawnmowing services in Forsyth,

Montana. On or around August 9, 1988, he stopped in at the Oak

Room Bar (Oak Room) in Forsyth for a drink after work. Bob

Thompson (Thompson), an owner of the Oak Room, asked Love11 to help

him unload a rol:L carpet and some tiles from a truck. Although

there was no discussion of wages, the parties have stipulated that

Thompson employed Love11 for a two-hour job. The carpet fell on

2
Love11 and he suffered a serious knee injury. The State Fund has

stipulated that Love11 is temporarily totally disabled.

Love11 subsequently signed a tax-withholding statement for the

Oak Room and filled out a claim for workers' compensation benefits.

Love11 testified that he did not want to sign either document, but

Thompson told him that the only available insurance was through

workers' compensation and Love11 would not get his medical bills

paid otherwise. At the time of Lovell's injury, the Oak Room was

enrolled under Plan Three of the Workers' Compensation Act, with

the State Fund as its insurer.

On October 27, 1988 the State Fund accepted Liability for

Lovell's injury and began weekly disability benefits, retroactive

to August 16, 1.988, of $6.33 per week, based on Thompson's

assertion that he intended to pay Love11 $4.75 per hour for a twohour job. On March 1, 1989, his disability benefit rate increased

to $8.26 per week after Love11 sent the State Fund his W2 taxwithholding form from the Oak Room indicating he received $6.20 per

hour. During this time, Love11 attempted to provide the State Fund

with earnings information concerning his painting and lawnmowing

jobs; the State Fund maintained that his other wages were

irrelevant.

On August 13, 1991, the State Fund reduced Lovell's disability

benefits to zero after receiving a computer printout indicating

that Love11 was receiving Social Security benefits. Although

Love11 received Social Security benefits due to his alcoholism, the

claims examiner from the State Fund assumed the benefits were for

3
his knee injury, and applied the Social Security offset pursuant to

§ 39-71-701(4), MCA (1987).

Love11 submitted travel expense vouchers to the State Fund for

the trips he made to obtain medical treatment and physical therapy

for his injured knee. In July, September, October and December of

1991, the State Fund reduced the mileage Love11 claimed by fifty

miles each month because of a "technical error" on the part of the

claims examiner and, as a result, did not reimburse him for that

mileage.

Due to the ongoing dispute over the amount of benefits due,

Love11 filed a petition with the Workers1 Compensation Court on

April 23, 1992. The State Fund apparently reimbursed Love11 for

the withheld travel mileage sometime in September, 1992.

The Workers' Compensation Court heard the case on September

21, 1992, with the parties stipulating that Love11 was employed by

the Oak Room, that he had suffered an industrial injury, and that

he was temporarily totally disabled. The Workers' Compensation

Court concluded that the State Fund had correctly computed Lovell's

weekly wage rate for purposes of temporary total disability

benefits. The court also imposed the statutory twenty percent

penalty against the State Fund for unreasonably terminating

Lovell's benefits due to the Social Security offset in August of

1991 and for improperly denying mileage from his travel claims. On

that basis, the Workers' Compensation Court also awarded Love11

attorney's fees and costs. This appeal followed.

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in refusing to

consider Lovell's earnings from other sources when determining his

4
weekly wage rate for temporary total disability benefits?

Our review of decisions of the Workers ' Compensation Court is

two-fold. We will not overturn its findings of fact if there is

substantial credible evidence in the record to support them. Grenz

v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut (1991), 250 Mont. 373, 378, 820

P.2d 742, 745. The Workers' Compensation Court's conclusions of

law will be upheld if the court's interpretation of the law is

correct. Grenz, 820 P.2d at 745. The first issue in this case

turns on a question of law.

In computing Lovell's temporary total disability benefits, the

Workers' Compensation Court determined that $12.40 was 'Lovell's

correct weekly wage with the Oak Room. The court applied the

definition of wages found in § 39-71-123, MCA (1987), the statute

in effect at the time of Lovell's injury. Although Love11 argued

that he should be allowed to aggregate his wages from other

employments, the court concluded that because § 39-71-123(3)(a),

MCA (1987), specifically referred to the claimant's employment with

the "same employer," the statute precluded consideration of other

wages. Relying solely on that phrase, the Workers' Compensation

Court concluded that subsection (3) (a) "seemingly precludes

aggregation of wages from other sources when determining an

employee's wages." We conclude that this interpretation was in

error.

Prior to 1987, wages were defined as "the average gross

earnings received by the employee at the time of injury for the

usual hours of employment in a week. . . .I' Section 39-71-116(20),

5
MCA (1985). Under this definition of wages, we allowed aggregation

of earnings from separate, concurrent employments in the

determination of disability benefits. See Cattyson v. Falls Mobile

Home Center (1979), 183 Mont. 284, 599 P.2d 341; Gee v. Cartwheel

Restaurant (1982), 197 Mont. 335, 642 P.2d 1070; Harmon v. Harmon

(1986) I 220 Mont. 445, 716 P.2d 605; Milender v. Carpenter (1987),

230 Mont. 1, 748 P.2d 932. This Court consistently held that:

The general rule is that earnings from concurrent

employments may be combined if the employments are

sufficiently similar so that a disabling injury at one

employment would necessarily disable the employee in

respect to the other employment.

Milender, 748 P.2d at 933, quoting Harmon, 716 P.2d at 607. Thus,

prior to 1987, it was well-established that if an injury disabled

the employee from concurrent employments, aggregation of the wages

from the concurrent employments was allowed for purposes of

determining disability benefits. We focus our interpretation,

therefore, on whether the 1987 legislature effectively modified

this existing case law in enacting the new definition of wages

found in § 39-71-123, MCA (1987).

The rules of statutory construction require the language of a

statute to be construed according to its plain meaning. If the

language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is

required. GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dep't of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont.

261, 265, 815 P.:2d 595, 597. This Court resorts to legislative

history only if legislative intent cannot be determined from the

plain wording of the statute. State ex rel. Roberts v. Public

Service Comm'n (1990), 242 Mont. 242, 246, 790 P.2d 489, 492.

6
Section 39-71-123, MCA (1987), reads:

Wages defined. (1) "Wages" means the gross

remuneration paid in money, or in a substitute for money,

for services rendered by an employee. Wages include but

are not limited to:

(a) commissions, bonuses, and remuneration at the

regular hourly rate for overtime work, holidays,

vacations, and sickness periods:

(b) board, lodging, rent, or housing if it

constitutes a part of the employee's remuneration and is

based on its actual value; and

(c) payments made to an employee on any basis other

than time worked, including but not limited to piecework,

an incentive plan, or profit sharing arrangement.

(2) Wages do not include:

(4 employee travel expense reimbursements or

allowances for meals, lodging, travel, and subsistence;

(b) special rewards for individual invention or

discovery;

(c) tips and other gratuities received by the

employee in excess of those documented to the employer

for tax purposes:

(d) contributions made by the employer to a group

insurance or pension plan: or

(e) vacation or sick leave benefits accrued but not

paid.

(3) For compensation benefit purposes, the average

actual earnings for the four pay periods immediately

preceding the injury are the employee's wages, except if:

(a) the term of employment for the same employer is

less than four pay periods, in which case the employee's

wages are the hourly rate times the number of hours in a

week for which the employee was hired to work; or

(b) for good cause show by the claimant, the use of

the four pay periods does not accurately reflect the

claimant's employment history with the employer, in which

case the insurer may use additional pay periods.

Although this statute clearly is more specific than the pre-1987

definition, the essence of that earlier definition of wages did not

materially change with the 1987 amendment. Prior to 1987, wages

were Vhe average gross earnings received by the employee . . . ,'I

while the 1987 provision defines wages as "the gross remuneration

paid in money . . . for services rendered by an employee." Section

39-71-116(20), MCA (1985): 5 39-71-123(l), MCA (1987). The

7
remainder of 5 39-71-123(l), MCA (1987), further refines what is

included in "wages;" subsection (2) sets forth types of

remuneration which do not constitute "wages." Subsection (3)

provides the means by which the amount of wages is computed for

purposes of workers' compensation benefits. Nothing in the plain

language of the 1987 amendments creates a material change in the

definition of wages which could be construed as a departure from

existing law regarding aggregation of wages. When taken in the

context of the entire definition, we cannot agree with the Workers'

Compensation Court's conclusion that the phrase "same employer"

contained in subsection (3)(a) demonstrates such a change.

Even if subsection (3) is interpreted in isolation, the plain

language neither directly addresses the aggregation of wages from

other employments nor directly precludes aggregation. Under the

general rule of § 39-71-123(3), MCA (1987), wages are computed for

compensation benefit purposes by using the average actual earnings

for the four pay periods immediately preceding the injury. If

wages cannot be computed under the general rule because the

employee has not yet worked four pay periods with the employer, or

if the use of the preceding four pay periods does not accurately

reflect the employee's work history, subsections (a) and (b)

provide alternative methods for computing wages. Nothing in the

plain language of f, 39-71-123(3), MCA (1987), suggests that the

legislature intended to abolish aggregation of wages from

concurrent employments.

Furthermore, this Court should not interpret a Statute So aS

8
to defeat its purpose; rather, interpretation should achieve the

social purpose for which the statute was enacted. Maney v. State

(1992) t 255 Mont. 270, 274, 842 P.2d 704, 706. An important

purpose of the 1987 Workers# Compensation Act was to provide a

wage-loss benefit that bears a reasonable relationship to the

actual wages lost as a result of the work-related injury. Section

39-71-105(l), MCA (1987). The aggregation principle in effect via

case law at the time of the 1987 amendments comports with the

stated purpose. As we stated in Gee, the amount of compensation

must bear some reasonable relation to the loss sustained on account

of disability. Gee, 642 P.2d at 1071. The Workers' Compensation

Court's interpretation of 5 39-71-123, MCA (1987), defeats this

statutorily stated purpose of the 1987 amendments to the Workers'

Compensation Act.

In sum, we cannot conclude that the reference to the "same

employer" in 5 39-71-123(3)(a), MCA (1987), demonstrates the

legislature's intentional revocation of the well-established

principle allowing aggregation of wages from concurrent

employments. Nothing in the plain language of 5 39-71-123, MCA

(1987) I suggests that the legislature intended to affect, in any

manner, prior case law allowing aggregation of wages from

concurrent employments. We concludethatthe Workers' Compensation

Court erred as a matter of law in interpreting 5 39-71-123(3)(a),

MCA (1987), to preclude aggregation of wages from concurrent

employments.

Because of its conclusion on the aggregation issue, the

9
Workers' Compensation Court did not determine whether Love11 was an

"employee" under the Workers' Compensation Act with regard to other

work he may have been performing or whether other income

constituted wages from concurrent employment. Those issues remain

to be determined by the Workers I Compensation Court on remand.

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in imposing a twenty

percent penalty against the State Fund for unreasonably delaying

benefits to Lovell?

On August 13, 1991, after receiving a computer printout that

indicated that Love11 was receiving Social Security benefits, the

State Fund applied a statutory offset and reduced Lovell's

disability benefits to zero. In addition, the State Fund

erroneously reduced Lovell's mileage claims for trips he made to

obtain medical treatment for his injured knee by fifty miles each

month for July, September, October and December of 1991.

The Workers' Compensation Court found that the State Fund's

decision to terminate Lovell's disability benefits was unreasonable

because the claims examiner had not investigated, in even a cursory

fashion, the basis upon which Love11 received Social Security

benefits. Investigation would have established that Love11

received Social Security benefits due to his alcoholism. The court

also found that the State Fund's admitted clerical error in denying

reimbursement for a portion of Lovell's claimed medical travel

mileage was unreasonable. The Workers' Compensation Court,

therefore, assessed a twenty percent penalty, pursuant to $4 39-71-

2907, MCA (1987), on the amount of reimbursement due for the

withheld mileage and the erroneous Social Security offset.

10
The State Fund argues that the Workers‘ Compensation Court's

conclusion of unreasonableness was not supported by substantial

credible evidence. Specifically with regard to the erroneous

Social Security offset issue, it contends that it was reasonable

for the claims examiner to assume that Lovell’s Social Security

benefits were for his work-related industrial injury. The State

Fund also contends that, after receiving notice of its intention to

apply the Social Security offset, Love11 had a duty to inform the

State Fund of the reason he received Social Security benefits.

Whether an insurer's conduct was unreasonable is a question of

fact: a finding of unreasonableness will not be overturned on

appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Coles v. Seven Eleven

Stores (1985), 217 Mont. 343, 349, 704 P.2d 1048, 1052; Milender,

748 P.2d at 935. The claims examiner testified that she assumed

Lovell's Social Security benefits were for his knee injury and did

not investigate the matter before terminating his benefits. The

claims examiner also testified that a clerical error resulted in

her denial of medical travel reimbursement for fifty miles each

month for four months. We conclude that the claims examiner's

testimony provided substantial evidence in support of the Workers'

Compensation Court's finding of unreasonableness.

Furthermore, we have held that an insurer has a duty to make

at least a minimal investigation of a claim's validity in light of

the relevant statutes. Absent such an investigation, denial of a

claim for benefits is unreasonable. Gaumer v. Montana Dep't of

Highways (1990), 243 Mont. 414, 421, 795 P.2d 77, 81. The Gaumer

11
rationale is applicable here.

Section 39-Tl-701(4), MCA (1987) (emphasis added), provided:

(4) In cases where it is determined that periodic

disability benefits granted by the Social Security Act

are payable because of the iniury, the weekly benefits

payable under this section [compensation for temporary

total disability] are reduced, but not below zero, by an

amount equal, as nearly as practical, to one-half the

federal periodic benefits for such week . . . .

The statute allows the State Fund to apply the Social Security

offset only when Social Security benefits are payable because of

the claimant's work-related injury. In light of 5 39-71-701(4),

MCA (1987), the State Fund had a duty to investigate the

circumstances surrounding Lovell's receipt of Social Security

benefits prior to reducing his workers' compensation benefits.

This duty to investigate is independent of, and unrelated to, any

action by a claimant. In this case, the State Fund's failure to

fulfill its duty to investigate provides a sufficient basis for the

Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that the State Fund's

behavior was unreasonable.

The State Fund also claims that its behavior cannot be

considered unreasonable because it has paid Love11 for the

unreimbursed mileage and apparently has agreed to remove the Social

Security offset. We disagree. Payment of unreasonably withheld

benefits "on the courthouse stepsI1 does not negate the insurer's

potential liability for a penalty for unreasonable delay of

benefits. To conclude otherwise would render the "unreasonable

delay" provisions of the penalty statute moot. m Handlos v.

Cyprus Indust. Minerals (1990), 243 Mont. 314, 316-17, 794 P.2d

12
702, 703.

The State Fund additionally argues that the Workers'

Compensation Court had no jurisdiction to award a penalty because

the parties had not complied with the dispute resolution and

mediation requirements of 5 39-71-2401, MCA (1987). This argument

is inconsistent with the State Fund's position before the Workers'

Compensation Court. The Pretrial Order, signed by the State Fund,

includes uncontested fact No. 8, which reads, "[plursuant to § 39-

71-2401, et sea., MCA, dispute resolution requirements were

satisfied regarding this dispute." The State Fund also included

this statement as an uncontested fact in its proposed findings of

fact and conclusions of law.

Similarly, the State Fund argues that the Workers'

Compensation Court lacked jurisdiction to award a penalty based on

the Social Security offset because Love11 had not included that

precise issue in his petition. Lovell's petition requested a

penalty pursuant to § 39-71-2907, MCA (1987), alleging that the

State Fund had acted unreasonably. Issue No. 2 in the Pretrial

Order reads:

Whether the Defendant has unreasonably delayed or denied

payment of Petitioner's benefits, thereby incurring an

[sic] twenty percent [sic] pursuant to § 39-71-2907 MCA.

We conclude that the penalty issue was properly before the Workers'

Compensation Court.

Because the Workers' Compensation Court's finding of

unreasonableness is based on substantial credible evidence, we hold

that the court did not err in imposing a twenty percent penalty on

13
the State Fund pursuant to 5 39-71-2907, MCA (1987).

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in imposing attorney's

fees and costs against the State Fund?

The Workers" Compensation Court concluded that Love11 was

entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs for the State

Fund's actions regarding the Social Security offset and travel

reimbursement. An award of attorney's fees is governed by 5 39-71-

611, MCA (1987), which provides:

(1) The insurer shall pay reasonable costs and

attorney fees as established by the workers' compensation

court if:

(a) the insurer denies liability for a claim for

compensation or terminates compensation benefits;

(b) the claim is later adjudged compensable by the

workers' compensation court: and

(c) in the case of attorneys' fees, the workers'

compensation court determines that the insurer's actions

in denying liability or terminating benefits were

unreasonable.

. . .

The Workers' Compensation Court did not analyze the question of

attorney's fees under 5 39-71-611(1)(b), MCA, and applicable case

law. See Yearout v. Rainbow Painting (1986), 222 Mont. 65, 719

P.2d 1258; Milender, 748 P.2d at 935.

The record before us is unclear as to whether the State Fund

has reimbursed Love11 for the erroneous Social Security offset or,

if the parties had settled the matter, when the settlement was

reached. Because we are remanding this case for further

proceedings as a result of our holding on the aggregation issue, we

direct the Workers' Compensation Court to readdress the issue of

attorney's fees relating to the Social Security offset and mileage

reimbursement issues.

14
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We concur:

Chief Justice

15
Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs:

While I concur in the Court's opinion, I do so in utter dismay

of the fact that this case is even before us. The claimant, here,

was never eligible for worker's compensation benefits in the first

place. Mr. Love11 stopped by the Oak Room Bar to have a beer and

was asked by one of the owners to help unload some carpet and tiles

from a truck. Mr. Love11 was not the bar's employee; there was

never any discussion of wages; the claimant was never even paid for

the work he did at the bar on the date of his injury.

While helping to unload the truck, the claimant seriously

injured his knee when a carpet roll fell on him. To his credit, at

least, Mr. Love11 did not want to make a worker's compensation

claim. Why should he? He was not the bar's employee: he was not

entitled to benefits. But, since the owners of the bar apparently

did not carry public liability insurance, they convinced Mr. Love11

that the only way he was going to get his medical expenses paid was

to make a claim against their worker's compensation coverage.

The claim was a hoax. The State Fund was simply being used --

abused, actually --- so the bar owners would not have to pay for Mr.

Lovell's injuries out of their own pockets because they failed to

have the foresight and good business sense to carry public

liability insurance.

This travesty was then compounded when the State Fund accepted

liability and began paying benefits of less than $10.00 a week on

the dummied-up claim. Mr. Lovell, again, to his credit, attempted

to undo the claim by numerous phone calls to the State Fund

16
explaining the circumstances of his injury and by filing suit

against the bar for his damages in a separate civil action.

The State Fund would have none of that, however, and continued

to accept liability for the claimant's injury and to pay benefits,

with the result that Mr. Lovell's civil case against the bar was

dismissed because of the exclusivity provision of the Worker's

Compensation Act. That provision prohibits an employee from suing

his V'employer*l for injuries arising out of an "industrial

accident". Unfortunately, however, this comedy of errors did not

end there.

His only other civil remedy having been precluded and having

been determined by the State Fund to be "entitledl* to benefits, the

next logical progression in the chain of events was a dispute over

the amount of the benefits being paid. Mr. Love11 claimed that he

was entitled to combine wages from other odd jobs he had performed

with the "wages" from his "employment" at the bar in order to

establish the wage base on which his benefits were determined. At

least prior to 1987 and after 1989 that was permissible under the

law. The State Fund disagreed with that approach, however, on the

basis of the 1987 statute applicable to Mr. Lovell's claim. The

Fund claimed that Mr. Lovell's only llemploymentV' was at the bar and

that his other wages were irrelevant.

That disagreement, naturally, necessitated a mediation hearing

and, ultimately, a full-blown trial (with all the attendant

discovery that goes with a trial) before the Worker's Compensation

Court.

17
To be fair, there likely would not have been a disagreement

over the proper interpretation of the statute, but for the fact

that every session the Legislature seemingly feels obliged to

rewrite all or substantial portions of the worker's compensation

laws in its biennial attempt to stave off what appears to be the

imminent collapse of the entire system. Rewriting an existing law

or enacting a new law is, at best, risky business, because it often

takes several years and a lawsuit or two for some court to

interpret the law. Here, we are interpreting a law, long since

changed, that was enacted six years ago. In any event, for reasons

probably no one will ever know, in 1987, the Legislature changed

one portion of the statute at issue. (True to form, in 1989, the

law was changed again).

Unfortunately, when the Legislature amended the law in 1987,

the language used was not as precise as it might have been. Hence,

the disagreement between the claimant and his attorneys and the

State Fund and its attorneys over what the statute really said and

meant.

The Worker's Compensation Judge took his best shot at trying

to interpret the statute. In the process, he also determined that

the State Fund had underpaid Mr. Love11 by wrongfully reducing his

mileage claims and offsetting his social security benefits against

his worker's compensation benefit payments. That resulted in the

State Fund having to repay the under-payments along with a 20%

penalty and, possibly, Mr. Lovell's attorney's fees.

Now, the whole case is before the Supreme Court. This Court

18
has spent considerable time applying appropriate legal

interpretations to the facts and law at issue in a case that only

got here by its own bootstraps. Having accomplished our task, we

are now sending the case back to the Worker's Compensation Court

for still further proceedings. I assume that whatever decision is

made on those issues will generate yet another appeal.

I suspect that the average person could put their child

through college on what this case has already cost the State in

attorneys' fees, penalties, expenses, medical costs, travel costs,

benefits and the wasted time and salaries of bureaucrats,

investigators, claims examiners, hearings examiners and judges. To

make matters worse, the final chapter in this case has yet to be

written.

The tragedy of this -- compounded in one form or another in

other cases -- is that employers, taxpayers and, now, employees,

alike, are paying their hard-earned premium, tax and wage dollars

for this nonsense. It is small wonder that the State Fund is in

perpetual financial extremis, if this case is anything but an

anomaly -- which I can only hope is true.

I concur in the Court's opinion because, on the narrow legal

issues presented, the opinion is a correct interpretation of the

law -- long since changed -- and because we are without authority

to do anything but resolve the legal issue presented. It is,

appalling, nonetheless, that this case eve
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage and Justice Terry N. Trieweiler concur

in the foregoing special concurrence.

2 0
September 2, 1993

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following

named:

Terry Spear

Matovich, Addy & Keller

225 Petroleum Bldg., 2812 Fist Ave. No.

Billings, MT 59101

Laurence A. Hubbard, Legal Counsel

State Compensation Mutual Ins. Fund

P.O. Box 4759

Helena, MT 596044759

ED SMITH

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF MONTANA