Filed 6/28/24 Sadeghi v. Sadeghi CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ANGIZEH SADEGHI,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SIDNEY SADEGHI,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G062028

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01228676)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of 

Orange County, Martha K. Gooding, Judge. Affirmed. Requests for judicial 

notice denied. Motion to dismiss denied.

Holt Law Firm and Peter T. Holt for Defendant and Appellant.

Maralan Law and Sam Maralan for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
2

Angizeh Sadeghi (Angizeh) sued her brother Arman Sadeghi 

(Arman) and his former spouse, Sidney Sadeghi (Sidney), for failing to repay 

a loan.

1 At the time the lawsuit was filed, Sidney and Arman were in the 

middle of a dissolution proceeding in which they both listed the loan as a 

community debt. Angizeh obtained a default judgment in the civil case;

Sidney later sought to vacate the default on the grounds the court lacked

jurisdiction to issue orders affecting a community debt. We are not 

persuaded and therefore affirm.

FACTS

Sidney and Arman married in 2009. In 2018, Sidney and Arman 

received a loan from Angizeh. In 2020, Sidney filed for divorce. In their 

pleadings, Sidney and Arman both identified the loan as a community debt. 

In 2021, while the dissolution matter was pending in the family law court,

Angizeh filed a separate civil complaint against Sidney and Arman which 

alleged breach of the loan agreement. In 2022, while the marital dissolution 

matter was still pending, the court entered a default judgment against 

Sidney and Arman. Sidney later filed a motion to vacate the default 

judgment on the grounds the family law court had priority jurisdiction and, 

the civil court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 

loan. The court denied the motion.2

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them 

by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

2

Sidney requests we exercise our discretion and take judicial 

notice of certain trial court pleadings filed in the family law case. Since

Sidney has no basis to appeal, we decline to judicially notice these

documents.
3

DISCUSSION

Sidney appeals from an order denying her request to vacate the

default judgment.3 It is well established that Sidney can appeal from the 

court’s ruling only if the underlying default judgment is void. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) A default judgment is void if the issuing court did not 

have jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of the action when the 

judgment was entered. (Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (1997) 14 Cal.4th 939, 951-952; 

Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) A void 

judgment is the equivalent of no judgment at all. (LAOSD Asbestos Cases

(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 870 (LAOSD Asbestos Cases).) A party can attack 

a void judgment at any time after its entry. (Ibid.)

When a court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a 

case acts beyond the bounds of its jurisdictional authority, such action is 

voidable rather than void. A court exceeds its jurisdictional authority when 

its action “contravene[es] certain defined limitations on the exercise of its 

powers [citation]; ordinary mistakes of law or procedure do not constitute acts 

in excess of jurisdiction.” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at 

3

Sidney’s notice of motion and motion to vacate default and to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction make no mention of a statutory 

basis for the motion. Sidney only mentions Code of Civil Procedure 

section 473, subdivision (d), once on the final page of her memorandum of 

points and authorities. The trial court treated the motion as brought under 

section 473, subdivision (d), which permits the court to set aside a void 

judgment upon motion of a party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) 

Accordingly, we treat this as an appeal from a denial of a statutory motion to 

vacate a default judgment. We note even if this were an appeal from a 

nonstatutory motion to vacate a default judgment, we would reach the same 

conclusion.
4

p. 870.) A judgment in excess of a court’s jurisdiction remains valid unless it 

is set aside in the same action. (Id. at p. 871.) 

Here, Sidney contends that because the family court was first to 

assert jurisdiction over the loan, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue 

orders or judgments relating to the loan, and its default judgment was 

therefore void. We disagree.

Even if the doctrine of priority jurisdiction applies, the judgment 

here is voidable rather than void. Under the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, 

when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the 

court which first assumes jurisdiction over the subject matter does so to the 

exclusion of others. (BBBB Bonding Corp. v. Caldwell (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 

349, 374.) “The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts 

that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory 

decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing 

vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 

78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255.) But this does not mean the second court lacks 

jurisdiction. The second court retains jurisdiction over the parties and the 

subject matter. It simply must wait to act until the first court resolves its 

action. (Id. at p. 255-256.) 

Therefore, even assuming the priority jurisdiction doctrine 

applies here, it would limit the power of the trial court to act; it would not 

divest the court of jurisdiction. The default judgment would therefore be 

voidable, not void. Accordingly, Sidney has no grounds to appeal, and we 

affirm the court’s ruling.

4

4 Angizeh filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on disentitlement 

grounds. As we affirm, the motion becomes moot.
5

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to vacate 

default judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs incurred on 

appeal.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.