NEI 06‐04

Revision 1

Nuclear Energy Institute

Conducting a Hostile Action‐Based

Emergency Response Drill

October 30, 2007

Nuclear Energy Institute, 1776 I St. N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006 (202.739.8000)
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This document was developed by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Emergency 

Preparedness (EP) Working Group and the NEI EP Hostile Action-Based Drill Task 

Force in conjunction with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) staffs. We appreciate the direct participation of the NRC and 

the industry support members that contributed to the development of the guidance. 

EP Hostile Action-Based Drill Task Force 

Marty Hug Nuclear Energy Institute 

Sue Perkins-Grew FPL Energy Seabrook Station 

Kevin Appel Exelon Nuclear 

Steve Erickson Exelon Nuclear 

Nick Avrakotos Entergy 

David Young FPL Energy Seabrook Station 

Vernon Higaki First Energy 

Brian Ashbrook Southern California Edison 

Steven Giannell Southern California Edison 

Diane Coffin PPL Susquehanna LLC 

James Tucker FPL Energy Seabrook Station 

Larry Green Lake County Ohio Emergency Management 

Kevin Bruckerhoff AmerenUE 

James Michael Davis Florida Power & Light Energy 

Theresa Gildersleeve Progress 

Cheryl Jenkins FirstEnergy 

Scott McCain Exelon Nuclear 

Alan Nelson Nuclear Energy Institute 

Martin Vonk Nuclear Management Co. 

Industry Support 

John Baer FPL Energy Seabrook Station 

Kelle Barfield Entergy 

Beth Boesch Nebraska Public Power District 

Guy Cerullo DTE Energy 

Edward Conaway South Texas Project 

John Costello Dominion 

Luke Graessle AmerenUE 

Steve Higginbottom Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Glenda Jardel Exelon 

Walter H. Lee Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Mark Lemke Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 

John Rayman Dominion 

William Renz Dominion 

Ron Rose FirstEnergy 

Jerry Sims Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 

Paul Sullivan Nuclear Management Co. 

Mary Ann Wilson Entergy 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Pilot Sites and Host/Participating States 

Diablo Canyon California 

Duane Arnold Iowa, Illinois 

North Anna Virginia 

Vermont Yankee Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, 

 Iowa, Illinois, Pennsylvania 

Callaway Missouri, Iowa, Illinois 

Liaisons to Task Force 

Joseph Anderson Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Randy Sullivan Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Vanessa Quinn FEMA/Department of Homeland Security 

Dan Wilcox FEMA/Department of Homeland Security 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

NOTICE 

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by NEI. Neither NEI nor any of its employees, 

members or consultants make any warranty, expressed or implied, or assume any legal liability or 

responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or 

process disclosed in this report, or represent that its use would not infringe privately-owned rights. 

The opinions, conclusions and recommendations set forth in this report are those of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the views of NEI, its employees, members or consultants. 

Because NEI is supported in part by federal funds, NEI’s activities are subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color or national origin, and other federal laws 

and regulations, rules, and orders issued thereunder prohibiting discrimination. Written complaints of 

exclusion, denial of benefits or other discrimination on those bases under this program may be filed with 

the NRC at 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852; with any other appropriate federal regulatory 

agency; or, among others, with the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity 

at 400 West Summit Hill Dr., Knoxville, TN 37902. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 1-1 

2.0 OBJECTIVE DEVELOPMENT........................................................................... 2-1 

3.0 PLANNING AND PREPARATION..................................................................... 3-1 

4.0 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT............................................................................ 4-1 

5.0 IMPLEMENTATION........................................................................................... 5-1 

6.0 OPERATING EXPERIENCE ............................................................................. 6-1 

7.0 PRE-DRILL TABLETOP GUIDANCE ................................................................ 7-1 

8.0 SUMMARY OF CHANGES................................................................................ 8-1 

APPENDIX A—Required Functional Demonstrations ..................................................A-1 

APPENDIX B—Acronyms and Glossary ......................................................................B-1 

APPENDIX C—Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines ............................................................. C-1 
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1.0 Overview 

The NEI EP Hostile Action-Based Drill Task Force has developed this document to 

establish guidelines for conducting hostile action-based emergency response drills. 

These drills are intended to practice the integrated response to a land- or water-based 

or airborne attack on a commercial nuclear power generating facility. 

NEI 06-04 Revision 1 provides guidelines for each of the following drill elements: 

• objective development 

• planning and preparation (including conduct of pre-drill tabletop) 

• scenario development 

• implementation. 

The periodic implementation of a hostile action-based emergency response drill has 

replaced the practice of conducting a tabletop drill during each force-on-force exercise. 

There are several key differences between the force-on-force tabletop drill and a hostile 

action-based emergency response drill. Specifically, a hostile action-based drill: 

• will not include an actual adversary force or armed tactical responses by site 

security officers or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) in order to neutralize 

the adversary or forcefully regain control of occupied areas/equipment 

• will include a method to demonstrate the capabilities of site security interface with 

associated facilities (e.g., the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary 

alarm station (SAS) and control room) 

• will assume that the adversary force successfully inflicts significant damage to 

the facility and some casualties to the station staff 

• will require activation and operation of an on-site or near-site incident command 

system (ICS) facility (e.g., incident command post (ICP)) 

• will include a demonstration of an integrated response among on-shift personnel 

(primarily from operations and security), law enforcement, fire fighters, and 

medical response personnel 

• will include a demonstration of the coordination and decision-making actions 

necessary for prompt mobilization or relocation of the emergency response 

organization (ERO) once the threat has been neutralized 

• will involve participation by key off-site emergency response personnel (e.g., 

state/county decision-makers). 
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As discussed in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Actions for Security-Based Events,” licensees should periodically test and exercise 

hostile action-based emergency response capabilities. To this end, it is expected that 

each site will perform one hostile action-based drill within the three-year period between 

September 2006 and December 2009. Going forward, as part of ongoing NRC and 

Federal Emergency Management Agency rulemaking efforts, the use of a hostile actionbased scenario in one exercise in the six-year cycle will be incorporated into the 

licensee’s drill program.
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2.0 Objective Development 

On-shift personnel (from operations and security) will demonstrate the receipt of threat 

information, and perform the immediate and near-term actions and communications 

necessary to respond to the event. The expected actions and communications are 

summarized below: 

• communicate pre-determined protective actions to on-site personnel that are 

appropriate to the threat conditions 

• notify off-site first responders (law enforcement, fire response, etc.) 

• perform/discuss immediate actions in response to the hostile action 

• assess and classify the event 

• notify the ERO 

• notify state, county and/or local warning points, including transmittal of protective 

action recommendations (PAR) appropriate to the licensee’s emergency plan 

and response procedures, and the threat conditions 

• Implement plant shutdown and cool-down as well as coping strategies 

• NRC notifications (including accelerated notifications when required). 

Off-site response organizations (ORO) are expected to demonstrate their initial 

response actions, prioritize and allocate resources, and support the site in response to 

the consequences of the postulated hostile action. 

Once the ERO is activated and integrated into the station’s response to the event, it is 

expected that the following key capabilities will be demonstrated: 

• activation and implementation of the ICS, in accordance with local protocols, and 

coordination between the ICS facilities and the ERO and other applicable ORO 

facilities 

• coordination of decision-making and actions necessary to permit coordinated 

movement of responding resources and mobilization of the ERO 

• activation of ERO facilities (primary or alternate) 

• ongoing response coordination among the ERO, on-site security, OROs, local 

law enforcement, federal agencies, and fire and medical response personnel 

• ERO and ORO responses to the consequences of the attack (i.e., largescale/significant damage to the plant). The scenario must present the conditions 

necessary for, or leading to, core damage with a potential for a radiological 

release such that if actions are not taken, core damage and a subsequent 

release will occur. A success path to prevent the radiological release will be 

provided as part of the scenario. 

• coordination with off-site EROs, including consideration of conditions unique to a 

hostile action-based response (e.g., contingency resource management based 

on currently deployed or unavailable ORO resources) 

• development of public information. 
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Licensees already have in place a standard set of objectives for the demonstration of 

emergency response functions and capabilities specific to each site. These objectives 

cover the elements necessary to respond to a declared radiological emergency. 

Implementation of a hostile action-based emergency response drill will require the 

development of additional objectives reflecting the unique actions taken in response to 

an attack. 

Appendix A presents the required functional demonstrations for a hostile action-based 

drill. Each licensee should use this generic guidance when considering existing plans 

and procedures and should include the expected performance-based attributes of an 

acceptable demonstration. 

Each drill shall be critiqued using the licensee’s standard critique process. Drill 

weaknesses identified by the critique process shall be entered into the site’s corrective 

action program. 

Objectives and extents-of-play for OROs should be premised on the standard DHSFEMA REP exercise evaluation criteria with consideration given to exceptions made to 

the criteria based on challenges presented by a hostile action-based scenario. Because 

a hostile action-based scenario will be incorporated into the six-year evaluated exercise 

schedule, eventually the ORO objectives should address as many of the exercise 

evaluation criteria as normally would be included in extents-of-play for evaluated 

exercises. 

The Exercise Evaluation Manual section of NEI 06-04 revision 0 is not repeated in this 

revision, but remains available as guidance for off-site organizations familiar with the 

traditional FEMA REP exercise objectives and extent-of-play descriptions. 

During Phase 3 drills (2006-2009), ORO objectives may be streamlined to focus on 

elements of the response that are specifically challenged by a hostile action-based 

event. These elements of the ORO response include, but are not limited to: 

• twenty-four hour capability of off-site responders to be notified by the licensee of a 

hostile action-based incident requiring off-site law enforcement/fire/emergency 

medical services (EMS) response 

• mobilization of off-site first responders to assist on-site response to the hostile 

action-based event 

• implementation of the ICS in response to the hostile action-based incident 

• capability to identify and mobilize support resources (e.g., mutual aid resources) 
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• coordination of ICS command staff with the licensee’s operations, security response, 

and radiation protection personnel to ensure protection of first responders arriving at 

the plant site 

• twenty-four hour capability of off-site warning points to receive notification of a 

declared emergency classification while LLEA/fire/EMS response to the attack is 

under way 

• mobilization of ORO personnel and activation of principal ORO emergency facilities 

• communications between licensee emergency response facilities, ICS facilities and 

off-site emergency response facilities 

• implementation of emergency support functions in support of LLEA/fire/EMS 

response to the attack 

• support for site access controls and traffic controls beyond the site boundary 

• assessment of the extent of plant damage and potential off-site radiological 

consequences with consideration of limitations on deployment of field monitoring 

teams near the site 

• protective action decision-making for off-site populations with consideration of 

potential threats posed by an attack on the plant 

• implementation of protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public including 

consideration of conditions unique to a hostile action-based response (e.g., 

contingency resource management based on currently deployed or unavailable 

ORO resources) 

• consideration of effects of a mass casualty event on local medical resources 

including the ability to implement PADs 

• generation of timely, accurate and coordinated public information statements 

• timely implementation of alert notification system and concise, readily understood 

instructions for the public 

• development of public information with considerations for law enforcement 

restrictions 
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A physical attack on a nuclear power plant would not be expected to occur in a vacuum, 

and the assessment of other nearby infrastructure vulnerabilities to a hostile action and 

development of protective strategies would be a logical and expected response by 

OROs. Assessment of infrastructure vulnerability is not included in the standard DHSFEMA REP exercise evaluation criteria, but developers of the off-site components of a 

hostile action-based drill or exercise are encouraged to consider it as an ancillary 

objective for hostile action-based scenarios. 
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3.0 Planning and Preparation

The success of any drill is largely dependent upon the amount of planning and degree 

of preparation. This responsibility typically rests with the site and/or corporate EP 

department; however, a hostile action-based drill requires the active involvement of site 

security department management. Adequate security department support is critical to 

the successful development and execution of the drill. Specific elements required of 

security involvement include: 

• knowledge of procedures, indications and timelines 

• credible attack sequence and reports 

• simulation of CAS/SAS/officer response actions 

• coordination between CR/simulator and security controllers 

• ensuring no safeguards concerns. 

Off-site response agencies have or will be adopting the protocols described in the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the ICS. To facilitate better 

response and drill planning, EP and security department personnel are strongly 

encouraged to become familiar with the concepts and principles of the NIMS and ICS. 

Key drill participants should receive a thorough briefing on the proposed drill scope, 

extent-of-play and performance expectations. (Note: Given the significant role played by 

the incident commander (IC), it is recommended that this individual be afforded an 

opportunity to observe a hostile action-based drill at another site before participating in 

one). 

 

The IC, and representatives of local and regional law enforcement agencies should be 

familiarized with the importance of allowing a prompt/timely ERO mobilization once the 

known threat has been eliminated. To give licensee’s perspective on these situations, it 

is recommended that participating LLEA personnel be offered an opportunity to observe 

or participate in a simulator training session(s) using a hostile action-based scenario 

leading to plant damage. 

The licensee should review the location and adequacy of the ICP chosen for the drill. 

This facility should be located at an appropriate standoff distance from the power block. 

The resources and capabilities should be consistent with that of existing capabilities that 

enable implementation of key ICS functions. In addition, the following facility readiness 

elements should be assessed to maximize drill effectiveness: 

• accessibility by off-site responders 

• security of the selected location 

• work spaces 

• communications capabilities (e.g., test hand held radio devices) 

• logistics (e.g., displays, documents, etc.). 
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Provisions should be in place to facilitate the accurate and timely flow of information 

between the ICP and other emergency response facilities. Liaison(s) (with operational, 

security, radiological knowledge, etc.) should be dispatched to the ICP to coordinate the 

performance of priorities and strategies between law enforcement, fire fighters and ERO 

representatives. 

Specific communication protocols between the ICP and other emergency response 

facilities may be necessary to address the unique challenges of the release of public 

information. These communication protocols should be established and verified by all 

stakeholders prior to conducting the drill. The licensee should consider evaluating the 

need for a public information liaison between the ICP and the Joint Information Center 

(JIC). 

To better reflect the conditions of a real event, the drill scope should include fire fighting 

and medical responses. The drill extent-of-play should discuss the resources required to 

demonstrate these responses. Consideration should be given to the number and type of 

responders and vehicles, use of staging areas, communications equipment, and 

simulated or actual processing into the protected area. 

Actions that would normally occur inside the protected area may be simulated at other 

locations. If play will occur inside the protected area, developers should determine 

access needs (actual or simulated) and complete access requirements necessary 

before the drill to facilitate prompt entry into the protected area during the drill. 

The expected communications paths among emergency response facilities (both onand off-site), the ICP and in-field/on-scene responders should be clearly defined and 

verified. Communications paths and protocols should be reviewed with off-site decisionmakers, and identified issues should be addressed for communicating plant and threat 

status information. For instance, an actual test of communication capability (e.g., call 

downs) should be conducted prior to the drill. 

In accordance with NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator 

Guideline, Revision 5, a licensee should determine if the drill/exercise performance 

(DEP) opportunities from the drill will count and declare their decision in advance. As 

discussed in NEI 99-02, Revision 5, drill participation (ERO) performance indicator 

credit may be given even though a DEP opportunity is not presented, provided certain 

other conditions are met. 

Prior to the drill, the licensee should conduct an integrated tabletop drill with the 

organizations and agencies participating in the drill. All key on- and off-site decisionmakers should be represented. The tabletop drill should be done 4-6 weeks before the 

NEI 06-04 drill. Refer to Section 7.0 and Appendix C for information on conducting a 

hostile action-based tabletop drill. 
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Licensees should consider the information presented in the NRC Letter, 

“Communication Expectations for an Aircraft Threat Scenario, Leach to Nelson,” dated 

Aug. 2, 2007, (ADAMS accession number ML071770326), when assessing response 

procedure readiness and, if using this type of threat, during scenario development. 
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4.0 Scenario Development

A team of representatives from key on-site stakeholder organizations including EP, 

operations and security should develop the drill scenario. Effective collaboration is also 

required with off-site stakeholders. Such stakeholders should include local law 

enforcement and fire agencies, and emergency response decision-makers at the state, 

county and local level. 

When developing a hostile action-based scenario, the first decision to be made is 

whether the drill will be based on a land- or water-based attack or an airborne attack. As 

used here, an airborne attack refers to the commandeering of a large aircraft and its 

impact on the site. Each attack type presents its own unique challenges and response 

requirements. 

The following high-level scenario structures are recommended as a guide to developing 

the drill scenario timeline. 

Land- or Water-Based Attack Airborne Attack 

The drill begins with the commencement 

of the attack (consideration in the 

scenario should include possible 

diversions and other attacks).1 A 

declaration in accordance to station 

procedures is expected. Allow a 

reasonable amount of time for the attack 

phase such that the adversaries are 

successful in disabling selected 

equipment. 

The drill begins the receipt of an 

airborne threat notification 

(consideration in the scenario should 

include possible diversions and other 

attacks).2 A declaration in accordance 

to station procedures is expected. The 

control room should implement 

prioritized immediate airborne threat 

response actions before aircraft impact. 

Assigned drill players should follow the 

instructions normally provided for this 

event (e.g., remain in place). The ICP 

should be established as early as 

possible. 

Assigned drill players should follow the 

instructions normally provided for this 

event. The ICP should be established 

as early as possible. 

Terminate the attack phase by informing 

the appropriate players that all known 

adversaries are accounted for and 

eliminated. (Controller injects may be 

required to facilitate ERO decisions). 

Key participants will be expected to 

demonstrate unique considerations of 

an unknown environment (e.g., 

After an aircraft impacts the site, 

disabling selected facilities/structures, a 

declaration in accordance with station 

procedures is expected. Restrictions on 

access to large areas would be 

expected. 

                                                           

1 Consider use of an insider threat as an option.

2 Consider use of an insider threat as an option.
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Land- or Water-Based Attack Airborne Attack 

discussions regarding controlled 

movement of personnel). 

Following termination of the attack 

phase, decisions should be made to 

allow operational assessment and ERO 

movement /mobilization. Authorization 

for ERO movement should be 

determined by the appropriate decisionmakers. 

Following the impact, decisions should 

be made to allow operational 

assessment and ERO 

movement/mobilization. Authorization 

for ERO movement should be 

determined by the appropriate decisionmakers. 

If necessary, introduce additional 

equipment failures to achieve a general 

emergency (GE) declaration (if one was 

not previously declared), which would 

drive protective action discussion prior 

to the end of the drill. Re-establish 

perimeter control and preservation of the 

crime scene. 

Following the impact, introduce 

equipment failures to achieve a GE 

declaration (if one was not previously 

declared), which would drive protective 

action discussion prior to the end of the 

drill. Re-establish perimeter control and 

preservation of the crime scene. 

To maximize the engagement of all on- and off-site participants, the drill should be run 

real-time or as near real-time as feasible. A time jump or time compression may be 

used provided that it does not preclude the demonstration of significant decisions or 

actions that participants would have made during the jumped/compressed period (i.e., 

the decisions or actions necessary to meet the drill objectives).

The approach outlined above for the land- or water-based attack scenario “accelerates” 

through the threat resolution period to a point where ERO mobilization can be 

considered. It is recognized that some period of time would elapse before law 

enforcement personnel would allow conditional or unrestricted movement by plant 

personnel. During the drill, the granting of authorization for ERO movement should be 

preceded by a robust discussion of the attendant event constraints and considerations. 

Actions that would be required before personnel movement is allowed should be 

determined; however, it is not expected that these actions be played out (e.g., actual 

sweeps for devices or additional hostile forces). Use of a drill message to inform 

participants that the actions have been completed may be used to allow the drill to 

progress. This approach allows the drill to progress near real-time, and allows for 

initiating mobilization of the ERO within a reasonable time period. 

The scenario events are expected to present the conditions necessary for, or leading to, 

significant damage to irradiated fuel. Additionally, the scenario events should create a 

sense of urgency in assessment and the need for restoration of equipment or systems 

that drive the need for mobilization of resources in a controlled manner. The threat may 

be presented to fuel either in the reactor core or the spent fuel pool. In addition, there 

must be a potential for a radiological release. The drill will not include a radiological 

release; however, the scenario needs to present a threat significant enough to drive 
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discussion between the ERO and off-site agencies on response actions in anticipation 

of a release and potential public protective actions (e.g., deployment of field monitoring 

teams, etc.). A GE declaration will be necessary to ensure a licensee-issued PAR and 

any associated protective action discussions between the licensee and OROs are 

observable. A PAD by OROs is expected. 

It is recognized that some licensees may encounter complications with scenario 

development regarding plant conditions that require a GE declaration, yet do not include 

a radiological release. In such rare situations, the use of contingency messages 

directing the GE declaration may be used to force a “discretionary” GE declaration. This 

method would exclude counting the declaration as a DEP opportunity. 

These drills will not simulate the defeat of the site security force nor reveal safeguard 

information. The scenario presents the failure of multiple safety systems, as is done in a 

typical reactor event scenario, but the failures are initiated by events associated with a 

hostile action-based event. Care should be taken when selecting and specifying the 

equipment damaged by the attack. A complete target set should not be specified; 

however, if a complete target set is used to drive the core threat, then the scenario must 

specify enough additional damaged equipment such that an outside observer could not 

identify which components comprise a complete target set. Also consider specifying in 

the initial conditions that certain components are out of service for maintenance. These 

out-of-service components could compound the results of the attack or provide a 

success path for the ERO. 

Due to the potential information value, scenario-related information should be treated as 

security sensitive. Scenario development staff should be familiar with the requirements 

of 10 CFR 2.390 in reference to release of information regarding physical protection or 

processes. Sharing experiences and insights with other emergency responders is 

expected; however, caution should be used when sharing information with a wider 

audience if it could include sensitive information. 

The development of a detailed land- or water-based attack timeline (i.e., the adversary 

movements and events occurring during the attack phase) will require support from 

knowledgeable security department personnel. This timeline should provide a listing of 

critical officer reports, camera observations, door alarms and information from other 

sources that can be used by a controller to describe the progress of the attack. This 

information should contain the number and location of all casualties. The times for 

damage to safety-related equipment should also be specified. Once developed, this 

timeline should be included as a mini-scenario in the master drill package; however, 

distribution should be limited to appropriate controllers and players. 
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A mini-scenario(s) may also be developed for fire fighting and medical responses. 

Proper scenario development may serve as credit for required medical and fire drills; 

however, these response actions should be maintained under the purview of the local 

IC. A fire mini-scenario provides a description of the fire and the expected actions by the 

on-site fire brigade and off-site fire department personnel. A medical mini-scenario 

would typically contain the number and location of the fatalities and injured. Medical 

information should also include vital signs for the injured, simulated names for injured 

members of the site staff and expected triage assignments. 

The scenario package should contain drill-specific emergency messages to the plant 

staff, (e.g., plant page announcements, pager text messages, etc.) These messages 

should contain the elements of real messages but be modified as needed to reflect the 

drill extent-of-play. For example, a message may include a statement such as 

“Personnel not assigned to the drill should continue with normal duties.” Off-site 

agencies should be encouraged to develop specific scenario components that will allow 

those agencies to exercise desired capabilities or functions. For example, a county 

emergency management agency electing to test a triage facility should develop the 

scenario conditions and supply the resources for the demonstration of that miniscenario. As part of scenario development meetings, the level of engagement 

necessary to develop and successfully execute a mini-scenario (i.e., scenario detail and 

resources) should be provided to the off-site agencies. 
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5.0 Implementation

It is expected that hostile action-based drills be implemented using the site’s simulator 

control room. 

A method (e.g., a control cell) should be established to demonstrate coordination and 

communication with a simulated CAS and SAS. The selected method should include 

participation by personnel familiar with the operation of these facilities, and capable of 

simulating responses by the CAS and SAS. For a land- or water-based attack scenario, 

the events of the simulated attack timeline should be presented to the appropriate CAS 

or SAS individual by a security controller. The CAS or SAS operator is expected to 

initiate and maintain communications with the simulator control room and other 

response facilities in accordance with site-specific procedures and training. 

To the degree practical, off-site personnel should respond to the ICP and the site in 

real-time, (i.e., do not pre-stage personnel unless normal travel times are prohibitive). If 

personnel are pre-staged, consider use of appropriate time delays before allowing 

individuals to begin play. 

On-site and off-site ICs (e.g., emergency directors), and security shift supervisors 

should jointly determine a plan of action to facilitate prompt mobilization of the ERO. In 

developing this plan, decision-makers should assess accessibility of on-site facilities 

(e.g., TSC) to determine specific restrictions and requisite coordination to implement 

restrictions and if alternate facilities need to be used. Once the plan is developed and 

approved, a controller can provide a message initiating the conditions necessary to 

begin mobilization of the ERO. The plan should contain sufficient detail to drive 

discussion on specific unique actions. Players should actually perform these actions to 

the extent possible as defined by drill conditions. To maximize exercise fidelity, ERO 

members should respond to their facilities in real-time; however, time compression and 

pre-staging may be used to keep the scenario fluid and coherent. 

Controllers should be prepared to deliver, or control the delivery of, emergency 

messages to the plant staff and ERO members, (e.g., plant page announcements, 

pager text messages, etc.) These messages should be modified as needed to reflect 

the drill extent-of-play. Field controllers need to be knowledgeable in the functions that 

they are controlling (e.g., security actions being controlled by security personnel, firefighting actions controlled by individuals with fire-fighting expertise). Field controllers 

should have means of communication back to drill manager and or control cell. 
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6.0 Operating Experience 

NEI maintains a listing of “lessons learned” from each Phase III threat-related drill. Site 

drill managers and scenario developers are strongly encouraged to review this 

information as they prepare for the drill. A copy of the “lessons learned” may be 

obtained by contacting NEI.  

NEI should be used as a resource during the development of the extent-of-play to 

ensure that all elements that are required are covered in a licensee’s drill plan. 
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7.0 Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidance 

The tabletop drill provides the opportunity for key personnel of the on-site and OROs to 

review and discuss their respective roles, priorities and response actions during a 

hostile action-based event. In particular, it permits the diverse organizations to gain an 

understanding of each other’s immediate priorities and concerns in a hostile actionbased event. For example, these events can provide off-site responders the perspective 

of the plant operating crew’s immediate concerns with restoration of equipment 

important to safety and the need for ERO assistance. On the other hand, station staff is 

able to understand what special knowledge requirements (e.g., NIMS concepts) hostile 

action-based scenarios present to off-site decision-makers in order to exercise their 

responsibility for public safety. Therefore, it is important that the tabletop drill 

encourages a free exchange of priorities and concerns among the key participants while 

they have the opportunity to be in the same room. 

Using a scenario, the tabletop facilitators would lead participants through a set of events 

and ask for their responses in a logical sequence. Normally, station security would 

explain its initial responses. The sequence would then progress through the responses 

of the operating crew, off-site first responders, station ERO response personnel and 

ORO responders. The tabletop thus takes the form of on-the-job training in the 

systematic approach to a training model. 

Participating organizations should be arranged in the room to represent the level of 

communications that would be expected during the drill. Guidance for arrangement of 

the tabletop participants is provided in Appendix C. 

The general theme of the tabletop scenario would be expected to be the same as that 

used for the drill (i.e., either airborne threat or land- or water-based attack). The specific 

sequence of scenario events should be sufficiently dissimilar if the drill scenario is to be 

taken as credit for the DEP indicator. The scenarios for the tabletop and the drill can be 

the same or similar, if DEP credit is not being taken and the drill is only for training 

purposes. 

Refer to Appendix C for additional guidance. 
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8.0 Summary of Changes 

This section summarizes the more significant changes made to Guideline with Revision 

1. This is not intended to be a complete tabulation. The document was restructured and 

streamlined in the interest of incorporating industry lessons learned from the conduct of 

these drills in 2007 and to promote a more consistent approach to hostile action-based 

drill implementation. Additionally, the intent of the document restructure is to provide 

licensees with a more succinct guideline to follow in the development and 

implementation of these drills. This revision focuses on the unique characteristics and 

attributes that a hostile action-based drill imposes upon a licensee’s drill program. 

Revision 0 provided an original design basis for this drill initiative whereas Revision 1 

provides more refined guidance in meeting the expectations for the conduct of these 

hostile action-based drills. 

Revision 1 structure is comprised of the following sections to model the process for 

developing and implementing a hostile action-based drill: 

1.0 Overview 

2.0 Objective Development 

3.0 Planning and Preparation 

4.0 Scenario Development 

5.0 Implementation 

6.0 Operating Experience. 

These new sections contain the elements of Revision 0 sections as applicable to the 

revised focus on only the unique attributes of these drills and consistency with industry 

lessons learned. For instance, the implementation guidance was rewritten to minimize 

the focus on dividing the drill into two parts and making the time jump optional (an 

industry lesson). 

7.0 Pre-Drill Tabletops 

This is a new section added to promote an industry best practice. 

Appendix A—Required Functional Demonstrations 

This new Appendix A replaces Revision 0 Appendix A—On-site Objective and 

Demonstration Criteria. The intent with this change is to promote flexibility in the 

development and performance of objectives in accordance with the licensee’s drill 

program and administrative requirements. Licensees have established drill programs 

that prescribe the format, performance and periodicity of objectives. The new appendix 

provides a list of demonstrations necessary to implement a hostile action-based drill; 

however, it allows the licensee to incorporate these demonstrations into objectives and 

performance criteria that is consistent with their program and stakeholders. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

8-2 

Appendix B—Acronyms and Glossary 

This appendix reflects no significant changes from Revision 1. 

Appendix C—Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

This new appendix was included as an industry best practice. 

Appendix B—The Exercise Evaluation Manual section of NEI 06-04 Revision 0 is not 

repeated in Revision 1, but remains available as guidance for off-site organizations 

familiar with the traditional FEMA REP exercise objectives and extent-of-play 

descriptions. Additional text regarding off-site objective development was incorporated 

into new Section 2, Objective Development. The basis for this change is that objectives 

and extents-of-play for OROs should continue to be premised on the standard DHSFEMA REP exercise evaluation criteria. Again, this guideline was re-written to focus on 

considerations and exceptions imposed upon the criteria based on challenges 

presented by a hostile action-based scenario. 

.
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix A 

Required Functional Demonstrations 

A-1 

Functional Demonstration 

NUREG 

0654 

Planning 

Standard 

Performance Attributes 

1. Demonstrate the ability to implement 

the emergency plan during a hostile 

action-based event. 

A, B, D, E, 

F, J 

Timely and correct implementation of 

appropriate procedures for direction of 

on-site protective measures, emergency 

classification, PARs, off-site notifications 

and ERO notification. 

2. Demonstrate the ability to make initial 

notifications to law enforcement and 

other first responder agencies during 

a hostile action-based event. 

C, E, F Timely notification is made to law 

enforcement, fire, medical and other 

response agencies as specified by 

appropriate procedures.

3. Demonstrate the ability to make 

accelerated NRC notifications. 

F Perform accelerated notification to the NRC 

in accordance with appropriate procedures. 

4. Demonstrate the ability of on-shift 

Operations and Security personnel to 

coordinate response actions among 

themselves, the IC and with law 

enforcement. 

F Discussion, decision-making and 

communication related to: 

• communicating initial damage 

assessment and priorities for off-site 

response activities 

• threat location and progression 

• control, coordination and prioritization of 

on- and off-site resources for near-term 

response in accordance with security 

plan (e.g., perimeter control 

supplemented by LLEA) 

• radiation protection for off-site resources 

• changes to protective strategies 

• entry and/or staging points for law 

enforcement personnel 

• support for rapid deployment of law 

enforcement personnel.

5. Demonstrate the ability of operations 

and security personnel to coordinate 

responses by on- and off-site first 

responders (e.g., fire and medical 

response) after the threat is 

neutralized and prior to activation of 

ERO facilities. 

F, L Discussion, decision-making and 

communication related to: 

• control of site access for various 

responders, ensuring security measures 

are taken to protect the site from 

additional intrusion, coordinating with 

the IC 

• entry and/or staging points for fire 

trucks, ambulances, etc. 

• support for rapid deployment of first 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix A 

Required Functional Demonstrations 

A-2 

Functional Demonstration 

NUREG 

0654 

Planning 

Standard 

Performance Attributes 

responder personnel. 

6. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the 

ERO in a timely manner following 

threat neutralization. 

B, F Discussion, decision-making and 

communication related to: 

• confirmation that the threat has been 

neutralized 

• status of the plant and potential for core 

damage/threat to public 

• fire fighting and medical responses 

• selection of safe passage routes and/or 

use of escorts 

• instructions on movement to be provided 

to responders (e.g., routes, escorts and 

exclusion areas; proceed directly to 

facilities; do not detour to inspect 

damage, etc.) 

• crime scene preservation 

• protection of emergency response 

facilities and staff by posting officers 

• coordination for allowing responder 

vehicles to exit the site for the EOF and 

JIC. 

7. Demonstrate the ability of the site and 

the ERO to support activation and 

operation of an ICP. 

F, H The following elements should be assessed. 

• accessibility by off-site responders 

• dispatch of personnel to the ICP to 

serve as liaisons to ERO facilities 

• availability of site and plant layouts, and 

other logistics that the ICP staff might 

need to effectively manage law 

enforcement, fire and medical 

responses 

• communications with field responders. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix A 

Required Functional Demonstrations 

A-3 

Functional Demonstration 

NUREG 

0654 

Planning 

Standard 

Performance Attributes 

8. Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to 

coordinate in-plant and on-site 

response actions with security and the 

ICP. 

F • Effective interface must be 

demonstrated between the emergency 

director, on-site liaison(s) and the IC, 

including their roles, responsibilities and 

authorities as conditions change. 

• The ERO must coordinate the 

movement of on-site and in-plant 

response personnel with security and 

law enforcement decision-makers. 

• Response personnel must adhere to 

movement restrictions imposed by 

security and law enforcement decisionmakers, (e.g., stay clear of perimeter 

zones, definition of free movement 

areas, special identification, two-person 

line-of-sight rule, use of escorts, etc.). 

9. Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to 

activate alternate facilities (if required 

by the scenario). 

F, H Determine if activation of alternate facilities 

is necessary based on the event conditions, 

and communicate this decision to ERO 

members. 

• determine effectiveness of these 

locations 

• develop a plan to transition from 

alternate locations to primary ERFs 

as applicable 

10. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate 

and conduct fire and medical 

responses in the field. 

F, L • Coordinate deployment of fire and 

medical response resources between 

ICP, on-site ERO facilities (if activated), 

and security. 

• Responses should be demonstrated to 

both multiple personnel casualties and a 

fire in the protected area potentially or 

actually affecting safety-related 

equipment. 

11. Demonstrate the ability to account for 

on-site personnel once the threat is 

neutralized. 

J Discuss and/or implement appropriate 

strategies for conducting accountability and 

facilitating movement of on-site personnel 

(including assembly and release as 

required) in the post-threat environment. 

12. Demonstrate radiation protection K As appropriate to the post-threat 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix A 

Required Functional Demonstrations 

A-4 

Functional Demonstration 

NUREG 

0654 

Planning 

Standard 

Performance Attributes 

measures for off-site responders. environment, discuss and/or implement 

measures such as dosimetry, KI, respiratory 

protection, etc. 

13. Demonstrate the ability to perform an 

assessment of off-site radiological 

consequences from a projected 

release. 

I • Perform an off-site dose projection 

based on a possible (e.g., what-if) 

radiological release. 

• Determine if the projection results cause 

or alter PARs. 

14. Demonstrate the ability to assess the 

impact of the attack on the security 

plan, and to identify and implement 

compensatory measures if needed. 

None • Security management should assess the 

effects of the attack on the ability to 

control access (to both the site and the 

protected area), maintain defensive 

positions (officer casualties, damage to 

protective enclosures, etc.), and operate 

security-related equipment. 

• Compensatory measures should be 

developed to restore physical security; 

this may include use on law 

enforcement personnel and resources. 

• As needed, security should advise the 

appropriate ERO personnel of the need 

to invoke 10 CFR 50.54(x) 

• ERO and Operations perform 

subsequent notification to the NRC. 

16. Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to 

coordinate the development and 

release of public information with the 

ICP. 

G Integrate public information officials from law 

enforcement agencies into JIC operations. 

Press releases and statements must be 

vetted for sensitive and safeguards 

information prior to issuance. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-1 

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 

ADAMS ..............................................Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

CAS...............................................................................................................Central Alarm Station 

CFR................................................................................................... Code of Federal Regulations 

DEP...................................................................................................... Drill/Exercise Performance 

DHS ..........................................................................................Department of Homeland Security 

EAL .......................................................................................................... Emergency Action Level 

ECL............................................................................................... Emergency Classification Level 

EMAC.................................................................... Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

EMS ..................................................................................................Emergency Medical Services

EOC ............................................................................................... Emergency Operations Center 

EOP ................................................................................................... Emergency Operations Plan

EP ......................................................................................................... Emergency Preparedness 

EPA............................................................................................Environmental Protection Agency 

EPZ.......................................................................................................Emergency Planning Zone 

ERF................................................................................................. Emergency Response Facility

ERO ....................................................................................... Emergency Response Organization 

FBI ................................................................................................Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCO ...................................................................................................Federal Coordinating Officer 

FEMA ............................................................................Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FOSC .............................................................................................Federal On-Scene Coordinator 

HSPD .............................................................................Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IC ...................................................................................................................Incident Commander 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-2 

ICM ...............................................................................................Interim Compensatory Measure 

ICP............................................................................................................Incident Command Post 

ICS.......................................................................................................Incident Command System 

IMT..................................................................................................... Incident Management Team 

INS...............................................................................................Incident of National Significance 

IPZ ........................................................................................................... Ingestion Pathway Zone 

JFO ...................................................................................................................... Joint Field Office 

JIC.............................................................................................................Joint Information Center 

JOC........................................................................................................... Joint Operations Center 

KI......................................................................................................................... Potassium Iodide 

LLEA ............................................................................................ Local Law Enforcement Agency 

MACC ...........................................................................................Multi-Agency Command Center 

NCP .................................... National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 

NEI............................................................................................................Nuclear Energy Institute 

NGO.............................................................................................. Nongovernmental Organization 

NIMS ................................................................................. National Incident Management System 

NIRT...........................................................................................Nuclear Incident Response Team 

NRC ............................................................................................ Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

NRP ......................................................................................................... National Response Plan 

NRT........................................................................................................ National Response Team 

NSSE ............................................................................................National Special Security Event

OCA ........................................................................................................... Owner Controlled Area 

ORO............................................................................................. Off-Site Response Organization 

PA ...........................................................................................................................Protected Area 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-3 

PAD....................................................................................................... Protective Action Decision 

PAR.........................................................................................Protective Action Recommendation 

PFO.......................................................................................................... Principal Federal Officer 

PIO..........................................................................................................Public Information Officer 

RERT ............................................................................Radiological Emergency Response Team 

RRT....................................................................................................... Regional Response Team 

SFO..............................................................................................................Senior Federal Officer 

SAMG .............................................................................Severe Accident Management Guideline 

SAS......................................................................................................... Secondary Alarm Station 

SWAT...............................................................................................Special Weapons and Tactics 

UC...................................................................................................................... Unified Command 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-4 

Applicable National Response Plan Glossary 

Area 

Command 

An organization established (1) to oversee the management of multiple incidents by an 

ICS organization or (2) to oversee the management of large or multiple incidents to 

which several incident management teams have been assigned. Area command is 

responsible for setting overall strategy and priorities, allocating critical resources 

according to priorities, ensuring that incidents are properly managed and ensuring that 

objectives are met and strategies followed. Area command becomes unified area 

command when incidents are multi-jurisdictional. Area command may be established 

at an emergency operations center (EOC) facility or at some location other than an 

ICP. 

Casualty Any person who is declared dead or is missing, ill or injured. 

Catastrophic 

Incident 

Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary 

levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and/or government functions. A 

catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period 

of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal 

and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts 

governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national 

security could be threatened. All catastrophic events are incidents of national 

significance (INS). 

Command 

Staff 

In an incident management organization, the command staff consists of the IC and the 

special staff positions of public information officer, safety officer, liaison officer and 

other positions as required, who report directly to the IC. They may have an assistant 

or assistants, as needed. 

Credible 

Threat 

A potential terrorist threat that, based on a threat assessment, is credible and likely to 

involve weapons of mass destruction. 

Emergency As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is “any occasion or instance for which, in 

the determination of the president, federal assistance is needed to supplement state 

and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health 

and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United 

States.” 

Emergency 

Operations 

Center 

The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support 

domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a 

temporary facility or a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a 

higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major 

functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., 

federal, state, regional, county, city, tribal) or by some combination thereof. 

Emergency 

Operations 

Plan 

The “steady-state” plan maintained by various jurisdictional levels for managing a wide 

variety of potential hazards.
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-5 

Emergency 

Public 

Information 

Information that is disseminated primarily in anticipation of an emergency or during an 

emergency. In addition to providing situational information to the public, it also 

frequently provides directive actions required of the general public. 

Off-Site 

Response 

Organization 

Includes federal, state, local and tribal public safety, law enforcement, emergency 

response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities) and related 

personnel, agencies and authorities. Also known as “emergency responder” or 

“emergency response provider” in the National Response Plan (NRP). 

Evacuation Organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal or removal of civilians from 

dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas. 

Federal 

Coordinating 

Officer 

The federal coordinating officer (FCO) is appointed to manage federal resource 

support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is 

responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance resources 

and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and the 

private sector. 

Federal 

On-Scene 

Coordinator 

The federal official pre-designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the 

Coast Guard to coordinate responses under subpart D of the NCP, or the government 

official designated to coordinate and direct removal actions under subpart E of the 

NCP.

First 

Responder 

Local and nongovernmental police, and fire and emergency personnel who, in the 

early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, 

property, evidence and the environment, including emergency response providers as 

defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as 

emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works and other skilled 

support personnel (e.g., equipment operators) who provide immediate support services 

during prevention, response and recovery operations. First responders may include 

personnel from federal, state, local, tribal or nongovernmental organizations (NGO). 

General 

Emergency 

Events are in process or have occurred that involve actual or imminent substantial core 

degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile action 

that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be 

reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. 

Hostile 

Action 

An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent 

force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee in order to 

achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water using guns, explosives, 

projectiles, vehicles or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that 

satisfy the overall intent may be included. Hostile action should not be construed to 

include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted 

attack on the nuclear power plant. Nonterrorism based emergency action levels should 

be use to address such activities (i.e., violent acts between individuals in the owner 

controlled area). 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-6 

Imminent Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be 

successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. 

Incident An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, that requires an emergency 

response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major 

disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks or threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, 

hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, 

hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war-related disasters, and public health and 

medical emergencies. 

Incident 

Action Plan 

An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for 

managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and 

assignments. It also may include attachments that provide direction and important 

information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods. 

Incident 

Command 

Post 

The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command 

functions are performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other 

incident facilities. 

Incident 

Command 

System 

A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to 

provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the 

complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by 

jurisdictional boundaries. The ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, 

personnel, procedures and communications operating with a common organizational 

structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. The ICS is 

used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and 

complex incidents. The ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, 

both public and private, or organized field-level incident management operations. 

Incident 

Commander 

The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of 

strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has overall 

authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for 

the management of all incident operations at the incident site. 

Incident 

Management 

Team 

The IC and appropriate command and general staff personnel assigned to an incident. 

Incident of 

National 

Significance 

An actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective 

response by and appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, 

nongovernmental and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives and minimize 

damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation 

activities. 

Initial Actions The actions taken by those responders first to arrive at an incident site. 

Initial 

Response 

Resources initially committed to an incident. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-7 

Joint Field 

Office 

The joint field office (JFO) is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a 

central point for federal, state, local and tribal executives with responsibility for incident 

oversight, direction and/or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, 

preparedness, response and recovery actions. The JFO will combine the traditional 

functions of the joint operations center (JOC), the FEMA DFO, and the JIC within a 

single federal facility. 

Joint 

Information 

Center 

A facility established to coordinate all incident-related public information activities. It is 

the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident. Public 

information officials from all participating agencies should collocate at the JIC. 

Joint 

Operations 

Center 

The JOC is the focal point for all federal investigative law enforcement activities during 

a terrorist or potential terrorist incident or any other significant criminal incident, and is 

managed by the senior federal law enforcement officer. The JOC becomes a 

component of the JFO when the NRP is activated. 

Mobilization 

Center 

An off-site temporary facility at which response personnel and equipment are received 

from the point of arrival and are pre-positioned for deployment to an incident logistics 

base, to a local staging area or directly to an incident site, as required. A mobilization 

center also provides temporary support services, such as food and billeting, for 

response personnel prior to their assignment, release or reassignment and serves as a 

place to out-process following demobilization while awaiting transportation. 

Multi-Agency 

Command 

Center 

First used to describe an interagency coordination center established by DHS/Secret 

Service during national special security events as a component of the JFO. The multiagency command center now serves as the focal point for interagency planning and 

coordination, including the coordination of all incident-related information from other 

intra- and inter-agency centers (e.g., ICPs, unified area commands, EOCs, and JICs). 

MultiJurisdictional 

Incident 

An incident requiring action from multiple agencies that each has jurisdiction to 

manage certain aspects of an incident. In ICS, these incidents will be managed under 

unified command (UC). 

National 

Incident 

Management 

System 

A mandated system that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, 

local and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs to work effectively and 

efficiently together to prepare for, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, 

regardless of cause, size or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility 

among federal, state, local and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of 

concepts, principles and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multiagency coordination systems; training; identification and management of resources 

(including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; 

and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident 

resources. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-8 

National 

Response 

Center 

A national communications center for activities related to oil and hazardous substance 

response actions. The National Response Center, located at DHS/Coast Guard 

headquarters in Washington, D.C., receives and relays notices of oil and hazardous 

substances releases to the appropriate federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC).

National 

Response 

Team 

The national response team (NRT), composed of the 16 federal agencies with major 

environmental and public health responsibilities, is the primary vehicle for coordinating 

federal agency activities under the NCP. The NRT carries out national planning and 

response coordination and is the head of a highly organized federal oil and hazardous 

substance emergency response network. The EPA serves as the NRT chair, and 

DHS/Coast Guard serves as the vice chair. 

National 

Special 

Security 

Event 

A designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic, social or religious 

significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. 

Nuclear 

Incident 

Response 

Team 

Created by the Homeland Security Act to provide DHS with a nuclear/radiological 

response capability. When activated, the nuclear incident response team consists of 

specialized federal response teams drawn from the Department of Energy and/or the 

EPA. These teams may become DHS operational assets providing technical expertise 

and equipment when activated during a crisis or in response to a nuclear/radiological 

incident as part of the DHS federal response. 

Principal 

Federal 

Official 

The federal official designated by the secretary of homeland security to act as his or 

her representative locally to oversee, coordinate and execute the secretary’s incident 

management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for INSs. 

Public 

Information 

Officer 

A member of the command staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media 

or with other agencies with incident-related information requirements. 

Radiological 

Emergency 

Response 

Teams 

Teams provided by the EPA’s Office of Radiation and Indoor Air to support and 

respond to incidents or sites containing radiological hazards. These teams provide 

expertise in radiation monitoring, radionuclide analyses, radiation health physics and 

risk assessment. Radiological emergency response teamss can provide both mobile 

and fixed laboratory support during a response. 

Recovery The development, coordination and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for 

impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services 

through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental and public assistance programs 

that: identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; 

address long-term care and treatment of affected NRP persons; implement additional 

measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, 

as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop initiatives to 

mitigate the effects of future incidents. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix B 

Acronyms and Glossary 

B-9 

Regional 

Response 

Teams 

Regional counterparts to the NRT, the regional response teams (RRT) comprise 

regional representatives of the federal agencies on the NRT and representatives of 

each state within the region. The RRTs serve as planning and preparedness bodies 

before a response, and provide coordination and advice to the FOSC during response 

actions. 

Senior 

Federal 

Official 

An individual representing a federal department or agency with primary statutory 

responsibility for incident management. Senior Federal Officers utilize existing 

authorities, expertise and capabilities to aid in management of the incident working in 

coordination with other members of the JFO coordination group. 

Situation 

Assessment 

The evaluation and interpretation of information gathered from a variety of sources 

(including weather information and forecasts, computerized models, GIS data 

mapping, remote sensing sources, ground surveys, etc.) that, when communicated to 

emergency managers and decision-makers, can provide a basis for incident 

management decision-making. 

Threat An indication of possible violence, harm or danger. 

Unified 

Command 

An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident 

jurisdiction or when incidents cross-political jurisdictions. Agencies work together 

through the designated members of the UC to establish their designated ICs at a 

single ICP and to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single 

incident action plan. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix C 

Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

C-10 

I. OBJECTIVES 

The overarching objective of the pre-drill tabletop is to achieve mutual understanding by key participants 

of the roles, responsibilities, priorities and response actions of each organization and facility that has a 

response role in a hostile action-based event. This understanding should contribute to a successful 

integrated response during the hostile action-based drill. 

The following are suggested tabletop outcomes from which specific objectives can be developed. The 

tabletop should facilitate discussion to familiarize participants on:

Outcomes 

How and by what means the licensee will notify off-site first responders of the hostile action-based 

event (i.e., who will make the notification, what communications link will be used, who will receive 

it, and to whom and by what means the notification will be relayed among off-site agencies) 

Initial site security actions in response to the event.

The operating crew’s actions per hostile action-based operating procedures: 

• procedures for declaring an emergency classification and for notifying off-site 

authorities. 

Initial off-site responder actions upon notification by the licensee: 

• site access requirements for off-site first responders 

• reporting location of off-site first responders. 

How the ICP would be established: 

• who is in charge of the overall response and how transitions in command and control 

would take place as the scenario evolves 

• kKey support personnel who will be reporting to the IC and their respective functions 

• how off-site first responders obtain turnover from and integrate with the site response 

• primary and backup means of communications among site facilities, response 

personnel and the ICP. 

Radiation protection provisions made for off-site responders to the site. 

Communication mechanisms that are available to site responders and that can support 

communications among the operating crew, site security and the ICP. 

How the decision to allow activation of the station ERO will be made and considerations involved 

in allowing ERO activation while ensuring the safety of ERO personnel in transiting to their 

emergency facilities: 

• method that will be used to notify ERO personnel of ERO activation 

• mustering locations of station ERO personnel and alternate facilities that will be 

utilized, if any

• credentials required for ERO personnel returning to the site to access through off-site 

law enforcement access controls. 

How the ICP will be apprised of and understand operational priorities for restoration of damaged 

plant equipment and for application of fire fighting resources. 

Management of the on-site emergency medical response to triage, treat and transport injured 

personnel and utilization of off-site medical resources. 

Informational requirements of off-site public protection decision-makers. 

Public PADs appropriate to the event. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix C 

Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

C-11 

Outcomes 

How and when the public alert and notification systems will be implemented: 

• coordination and dissemination of public information from the outset of the event prior 

to ERO activation and subsequently via activation of the JIC. 

Crime scene preservation. 

II. PREPARATION 

Preparation guidelines emphasize early involvement of off-site stakeholders, particularly the first 

responder organizations, in the design of the pre-drill tabletop and the selection of key participants. The 

off-site official who will serve as the IC, or a designee of the IC, should have a role in such preparation 

activities as selecting participants, establishing objectives, designing the scenario, arranging the room 

layout and deciding who will facilitate. In short, the tabletop should be a partnership of the lead off-site 

sponsor organization and the site EP organization. 

Preparation Guidelines 

Identify the lead off-site sponsor organization. Ideally, the IC represents the lead off-site sponsor 

organization and is the person who participates in preparing the tabletop. 

Develop a relatively simple, straightforward scenario that postulates the attack on the plant and 

consequences that require a range of off-site responses.

Review the scenario with the off-site sponsor to ensure that it involves the desired range of off-site 

participation 

With the off-site sponsor, identify off-site organizations that will be invited to participate in the 

tabletop. 

With the off-site sponsor, select a date, time and location for the tabletop. This activity may require 

the off-site sponsor and site EP staff to consult with other participating organizations to obtain as 

much mutual agreement as possible. 

Issue a joint invitation from the off-site sponsor and the site EP organization to the identified 

participant organizations. The invitation should identify the overarching purpose of the tabletop 

and the specific persons from the invited organization who are being asked to attend. 

The off-site sponsor and site EP staff meet with selected key participants (e.g., lead LLEA, lead 

fire-fighting organization, emergency management officials) to review the tabletop scenario and 

timeline and to solicit their suggestions for conducting the tabletop. Suggested outcomes from this 

activity are: 

• given the scenario, determine what the agencies perceive as their role and extent-of-play 

• determine what the agencies want to learn from the tabletop as a guide for the facilitator 

• determine which agencies will have a lead role at different stages of the timeline 

• provide the agencies’ the opportunity to think about their individual extents-of-play as the 

tabletop scenario evolves and how the command structure may change 

• establish ownership of key off-site participants in their respective roles in the tabletop. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix C 

Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

C-12 

Preparation Guidelines 

The off-site sponsor and site EP staff determine the room layout for the tabletop. Thought should 

be given to locating the various organizations in the room to achieve maximum interaction and 

communication among key participants at the various stages of the scenario. For example, the IC 

and other key first response organizations will be located together at one table to represent the 

ICP and other NIMS command structure entities. The room arrangement should facilitate 

communication between this location and initial on-site response personnel (i.e., site security and 

the control room). A suggested arrangement includes licensee representation with ICP personnel 

to facilitate communication and understanding of plant information important to fire fighting and law 

enforcement priorities and strategies. 

Figure C-1 depicts a sample organizational arrangement for a hostile action-based tabletop. 

In addition to the organizational arrangement depicted in Figure C-1, observers and other nonparticipants should be located in peripheral areas of the room so as not to interfere with participant 

interaction. A nearby break-out location may be designated for security personnel in the event 

safeguard discussions become necessary. 

III. CONDUCT 

The tabletop should be co-facilitated by on-site and off-site representatives in accordance with a scenario 

and timeline of events. Each participant should be provided with a diagram of the tabletop facility layout 

that identifies the participating organizations. Each participant should also be provided a list of 

participants, their emergency response titles and the organizations they represent. A typical sequence for 

conduct of the tabletop is provided below: 

Conduct Guidelines 

Prior to the participants’ arrival, set up the facility in accordance with the arrangement of 

participating organizations as shown on the tabletop specific layout diagram. Each table should 

display a sign readable by all participants that identifies the represented organization. A name and 

position placard should identify individual participants. 

Depending on the size of the room and how far participants are situated from one another, a 

sound system and microphones may aid discussion.

Designate a non-participant to take notes of the discussion, identify “parking lot” issues, and recap 

major points of discussion and issues at the conclusion of the tabletop. 

A facilitator should have participants introduce themselves in order of the organizational 

arrangement of the tabletop. Participants should state their names, organization, emergency 

position and a brief statement of their emergency role. 

The tabletop should be facilitated by an on- and off-site cosponsor to represent the on-site/off-site 

responder partnership and to encourage maximum engagement by the participants. 

The on-site facilitator cautions participants to avoid open discussion of safeguards information and 

informs them that accommodations have been made for separate, secure safeguards discussions 

by LLEA and site security personnel if necessary. 

The facilitator(s) initiate the scenario by stating the initiating conditions and by eliciting the initial 

response actions by site personnel. This initial segment of the scenario would include the process 

of threat identification and notifications to on-site personnel and off-site first responders. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix C 

Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

C-13 

Conduct Guidelines 

A short break may follow this initial segment to allow the notified organizations to review their 

response actions internally (at their respective tables) and prepare to present them to all tabletop 

participants. 

If necessary, the facilitator(s) should lead the discussion to address information requirements of 

each organization and how communications will occur among emergency facilities. 

Facilitator(s) should also lead the discussion to identify the conditions required for activation of the 

station ERO and how ERO activation will occur. This segment should include discussion of the 

transition of licensee’s command and control structure and how this transition is communicated to 

the off-site responders. Included in this segment is the means of coordination between the station 

ERO and the ICP. 

The facilitator(s) advance the timeline of the scenario segment by segment, eliciting response 

actions of each participating organization and emergency response function. 

If a time jump is used to separate initiating conditions and responses in part 1 and ERO/ORO 

response actions in part 2, facilitators should allot time (~15 minutes) for responders to adequately 

prepare for part 2. Allow participants to organize the initial conditions that are the part 2 actions 

they have already taken and prepare to present their initial conditions to the tabletop group as a 

whole. 

IV. CRITIQUE AND FOLLOW UP 

At the conclusion of the tabletop discussion, the facilitator(s) should request that each table conduct its 

own critique and identify issues presented to its response by the tabletop. Allow ~15 minutes for each 

table to complete this activity. Participants should be asked to focus on issues that impeded an integrated 

response. 

Critique and Follow-up Guideline 

The organization lead at each table should be asked to present the critique items and issues to the 

tabletop group. A person should be designated to record critique items and issues identified by 

each table on a display for everyone to see.

After presentation of critique items and issues by each table, the critique should be open to all 

participants and observers. 

Issues requiring further action should be identified and the actions assigned to appropriate 

personnel. 

A report of the tabletop should be issued to the participants prior to the drill. 

Ensure any resolutions are communicated to the appropriate participants prior to the drill. 
NEI 06-04 Revision 1 

Appendix C 

Pre-Drill Tabletop Guidelines 

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