Foreign Missile Developments

and the Ballistic Missile Threat

Through 2015

December 2001

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate

Foreign Missile Developments

and the Ballistic Missile Threat

Through 2015

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate

This Estimate was approved for publication by the

National Foreign Intelligence Board under the

authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for

Strategic and Nuclear Programs. Inquiries may be directed to the NIO

through the Office of Public Affairs on (703) 482-7778.

1

Preface

Foreign Missile Developments and

the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has requested that the Intelligence Community (IC)

produce annual reports containing the latest intelligence on ballistic missile developments and

threats and a discussion of nonmissile threat options. This paper is an unclassified summary of the

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that is the fourth annual report.

The NIE describes new missile developments and our projections of possible and likely ballistic

missile threats to the United States, US interests overseas, and military forces or allies through

2015; updates assessments of theater ballistic missile forces worldwide; discusses the evolving

proliferation environment; and provides a summary of forward-based threats and cruise missiles.

We examine future ballistic missile capabilities of several countries that have ballistic missiles and

ballistic missile development programs. Each country sectio n includes a discussion of theaterrange systems and current and projected long-range systems.

Our assessments of future missile developments are inexact and subjective because they are based

on often fragmentary information. Many countries surround their ballistic missile programs with

extensive secrecy and compartmentalization, and some employ deception. Although such key

milestones as flight-testing are difficult to hide, we may miss others. To address these

uncertainties, we assess both the earliest date that countries could test various missiles, based

largely on engineering judgments made by experts inside and outside the Intelligence Community,

on the technical capabilities and resources of the countries in question, and, in many cases, on

continuing foreign assistance; and when countries would be likely to test such missiles, factoring

into the above assessments potential delays caused by technical, political, or economic hurdles.

We judge that countries are much less likely to test as early as the hypothetical “could” dates than

they are by our projected “likely” dates.

In making these projections, we examine the level of success and the pace individual countries

have experienced in their missile development efforts and consider foreign technology transfers,

political motivations, military incentives, and economic resources. We have not attempted to

address all of the potential political, economic, and social changes that could occur; we have

projected missile developments between now and 2015 independent of significant political and

economic changes. For example, some countries that currently have hostile or friendly intentions

toward the United States could change significantly over the next fifteen years. As we prepare

each annual report, we review strategic trends that could indicate such changes in order to make

any necessary adjustments in our projections.

2

Contents

Preface 1

Key Judgments 3

Discussion 5

Introduction 5

Russia 7

China 8

North Korea 9

Iran 9

Iraq 10

Libya 12

Syria 12

India 13

Pakistan 14

Forward-Based Missile Threats to the United States 14

Nonmissile WMD Threats to the United States 15
3

Key Judgments

Foreign Missile Developments and

the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Most Intelligence Community agencies project that before 2015 the United States most likely

will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq—barring

significant changes in their political orientations—in addition to the longstanding missile forces of

Russia and China. One agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat

from Iran before 2015.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles already pose a significant threat overseas to US

interests, military forces, and allies.

· Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the

missile systems in their inventories—posing ever greater risks to US forces, interests, and

allies throughout the world.

· Proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise—especially by

Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities—has enabled emerging missile states to

accelerate missile development, acquire new capabilities, and potentially develop even more

capable and longer range future systems.

Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal

will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015—with or without arms control.

· Although Russia still maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of

reaching the United States, force structure decisions resulting from resource problems,

program development failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and

arms control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear forces over

the last 10 years.

The Intelligence Community projects that Chine se ballistic missile forces will increase

several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United

States—which will number around 75 to 100 warheads—will remain considerably smaller

and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States.

· China has three new, mobile strategic missiles in development—the road-mobile DF-31

ICBM; the longer range road-mobile DF-31 follow-on; and the JL-2 submarine-launched

ballistic missile (SLBM).

· These programs date from the mid-1980s and are the basis of Beijing’s efforts to field a

modern, more survivable strategic deterrent to the United States and Russia.
4

North Korea’s multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is capable of reaching parts of the

United States with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred kg) payload, may be ready for

flight-testing.

· North Korea in May 2001, however, extended its voluntary moratorium on long-range missile

flight-testing until 2003, provided that negotiations with the United States proceed.

· A Taepo Dong-2 test probably would be conducted in a space launch configuration, like the

Taepo Dong-1 test in 1998.

· The North continues to develop missiles.

Iran is pursuing short- and long-range missile capabilities.

· Tehran has 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that could be

launched in a conflict.

— Iran is pursuing an ICBM/space launch vehicle (SLV) system. All agencies agree that Iran

could attempt a launch in mid-decade, but Tehran is likely to take until the last half of the

decade to flight test an ICBM/SLV; one agency further believes that Iran is unlikely to

conduct a successful test until after 2015.

Iraq, constrained by international sanctions and prohibitions, wants a long-range missile

and probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-variant missiles.

· If UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced, Iraq would be likely to spend

several years reestablishing its short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force, developing and

deploying solid-propellant systems, and pursuing MRBMs.

· All agencies agree that Iraq could test different ICBM concepts before 2015 if UN prohibitions

were eliminated in the next few years. Most agencies, however, believe that it is unlikely to do

so, even if the prohibitions were eliminated. Some believe that if prohibitions were eliminated

Iraq would be likely to test an ICBM masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before 2010 if it

received foreign technology.

Several countries could develop a mechanismto launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack

cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are likely to do so—more

likely for cruise missiles—before 2015.

Nonmissile means for delivering weapons of mass destruction do not provide the same prestige,

deterrence, and coercive diplomacy as ICBMs; but they are less expensive, more reliable and

accurate, more effective for disseminating biological warfare agents, can be used without

attribution, and would avoid missile defenses.

Foreign nonstate actors—including terrorist, insurgent, or extremist groups that have

threatened or have the ability to attack the United States or its interests—have expressed an

interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials.
5

Discussion

Foreign Missile Developments

and the Ballistic Missile Threat

Through 2015

Introduction

The ballistic missile remains a central

element in the military arsenals of nations

around the globe and almost certainly will

retain this status over the next fifteen years.

States willingly devote often scarce

resources in efforts to develop or acquire

ballistic missiles; build the infrastructures

necessary to sustain future development and

production; and actively pursue

technologies, materials, and personnel on

the world market to compensate for

domestic shortfalls, gain increased expertise,

and potentially shorten development

timelines.

Most US Intelligence Community agencies

project that during the next 15 years the

United States most likely will face ICBM

threats from North Korea and Iran, and

possibly Iraq—barring significant changes

in their political orientations—in addition to

the strategic forces of Russia and China.

One agency assesses that the United States

is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran

before 2015.

The threats to the US homeland,

nevertheless, will consist of dramatically

fewer warheads than today owing to

significant reductions in Russian strategic

forces. China has been modernizing its

long-range strategic missile force since the

mid-1980s, shifting from reliance primarily

on silo-based liquid-propellant CSS-4s to

mobile solid-propellant systems. The

Intelligence Community projects that by

2015, the total number of Chinese strategic

warheads will rise several-fold, though it will

remain still well below the number of Russian

or US forces.

North Korea has extended until 2003 the

missile launch moratorium it announced late

in 1999, although the North continues to work

on the Taepo Dong-2 program. The Taepo

Dong-2—capable of reaching parts of the

United States with a nuclear weapon-sized

payload—may be ready for flight-testing.

The initial test likely would be conducted in a

space launch configuration. Iran also is

pursuing a longer range missile capability.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,

particularly if armed with WMD, already pose

a significant threat overseas to US interests,

military forces, and allies. Moreover, the

proliferation of missile technology and

components continues, contributing both to

the production of SRBMs and MRBMs and to

the development of even longer range

systems.

The trend in ballistic missile development

worldwide is toward a maturation process

among existing ballistic missile programs

rather than toward a large increase in the

number of countries possessing ballistic

missiles. Emerging ballistic missile states

continue to increase the range, reliability, and

accuracy of the missile systems in their

inventories—posing ever greater risks to US

forces, interests, and allies throughout the

world. A decade ago, US and allied forces

abroad faced threats from SRBMs—primarily

the Scud and its variants. Today, countries

have deployed or are on the verge of

deploying MRBMs, placing greater numbers

of targets at risk.
6

Proliferation of ballistic missile-related

technologies, materials, and expertise—

especially by Russian, Chinese, and North

Korean entities—has enabled emerging

missile states to accelerate the development

timelines for their existing programs,

acquire turnkey systems to gain previously

non-existent capabilities—in the case of the

Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to

Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the

expansion of domestic infrastructures to

potentially accommodate even more capable

and longer range future systems.

North Korea has assumed the role as the

missile and manufacturing technology

source for many programs. North Korean

willingness to sell complete systems and

components has enabled other states to

acquire longer range capabilities earlier than

otherwise would have been possible—

notably the sale of the No Dong MRBM to

Pakistan. The North also has helped

countries to acquire technologies to serve as

the basis for domestic development efforts—

as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of the No

Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile,

Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile

technology.

States with emerging missile programs

inevitably will run into problems that will

delay and frustrate their desired development

timelines. The impact of these problems

increases with the lack of maturity of the

program and depends on the level of foreign

assistance. Most emerging missile states are

highly dependent on foreign assistance at this

stage of their development efforts, and

disturbance of the technology and information

flow to their programs will have discernible

short-term effects. The ready availability of

assistance from multiple sources, however,

makes it likely that most emerging missile

states will be able to resolve such problems

and advance their missile programs, albeit

with a slippage in development time.

Projecting When a Country Could and Is Likely To Test an ICBM

Expertise from inside and outside the Intelligence Community was used to examine many possible options

for ICBM development and to determine when a country could test each option, based largely on technical,

industrial, and economic capabilities. These judgments indicate when countries would be capable of

testing if they met certain conditions, such as beginning engine testing by a certain date. This formulation

also addresses what a country may be capable of achieving if a decision were made to try to field a missile

as rapidly as possible and if the program progressed without significant delays. Other factors—including

potential technical problems, motivations and intentions, and political and economic delays—then were

applied to assess the likely timing of the country testing an ICBM. These judgments provide the

Intelligence Community assessments of the most likely course of events based on a variety of factors.

Providing assessments of when a country could and is likely to test an ICBM takes into account

uncertainties and cases where a solid evidentiary base is not available for making more definitive

assessments. The availability of foreign assistance is frequently a critical driver in both formulations, and

is so noted, especially when foreign assistance accelerates the program dramatically. These assessments of

future missile developments are, by their nature, subjective. This Estimate examines the level of success

and the pace individual countries have experienced in their missile development efforts and considers

foreign technology transfers, political motivations, military incentives, and economic resources. But it does

not attempt to address all of the potential political, economic, and social changes that could occur; it

projects missile developments between now and 2015 independent of significant political and economic

changes. As each annual report is prepared, we review strategic trends that could indicate such changes

and make necessary adjustments to the projections.
7

The probability that a missile with a weapon

of mass destruction will be used against US

forces or interests is higher today than

during most of the Cold War, and it will

continue to grow as the capabilities of

potential adversaries mature. More nations

have ballistic missiles,1and they have

already been used against US and allied

forces during the Gulf war. Although the

missiles used in the Gulf war did not have

WMD warheads, Iraq had weaponized

ballistic missile warheads with BW and CW

agents and they were available for use.

Some of the states armed with missiles have

exhibited a willingness to use chemical

weapons with other delivery means. In

addition, some nonstate entities are seeking

chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear (CBRN) materials and would be

willing to use them without missiles. In

fact, US territory is more likely to be

attacked with these materials from

nonmissile delivery means—most likely

from terrorists—than by missiles, primarily

because nonmissile delivery means are less

costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable

and accurate. They also can be used without

attribution. Nevertheless, the missile threat

will continue to grow, in part because

missiles have become important regional

weapons in the arsenals of numerous

countries. Moreover, missiles provide a

level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and

deterrence that nonmissile means do not.

Russia

Russia maintains the most comprehensive

ballistic missile force capable of reaching

the United States, although force structure

decisions resulting from resource problems,

1 Although during the Cold War many Warsaw Pact

nations had ballistic missile units, a decision to use

these missiles would have been made by the USSR—

not independently by the Warsaw Pact nations.

program development failures, weapon

system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, and arms control treaties have resulted

in a steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear

forces over the last 10 years. From a high of

approximately 10,000 warheads in 1990,

Russia now maintains almost 4,000 warheads

on its ICBMs and SLBMs.

· Russia currently has about 700 ICBMs

with 3,000 warheads and a dozen SSBNs2

equipped with 200 launchers for SLBMs

that can carry 900 warheads.

· In the current day-to-day operational

environment—with all procedural and

technical safeguards in place—an

unauthorized or accidental launch of a

Russian strategic missile is highly

unlikely.

Strategic Missile Forces

ICBMs. Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces

(SRF) is extending the service lives of its

older ICBMs—silo-based SS-18s and SS-19s,

and road-mobile SS-25s—in part to

compensate for the slow deployment of its

newest ICBM, the SS-27.

Russia’s ICBMs and US Missile Defense

Concerns over the US Missile Defense (MD)

program have led several high-ranking

Russian political, military, and industry

officials to openly discuss military

countermeasures to the system. The SS-27—

developed in the 1980s as a response to the

Strategic Defense Initiative—probably is the

basis for Russia’s most credible responses to

MD.

SLBMs. The disintegration of the Soviet

Union, developmental problems, and resource

constraints have resulted in significant

2

SSBN is the acronym for nuclear-powered ballistic

missile submarine.
8

SSBN/SLBM program delays and the

requirement to simultaneously extend the

service lives of older systems while

maintaining newer, more capable systems.

The Intelligence Community has various

projections of Russia’s strategic forces for

2015, all less than 2,000 deployed nuclear

weapons. The availability of resources,

inclusion of missiles with multiple

independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRVs), and the success of development

programs are the key factors in determining

the ultimate force size.

Theater Ballistic Missile Force

Russia has the most technologically evolved

and best-equipped, maintained, and trained

theater ballistic missile force in the world

today. The SS-21 and SS-26 SRBMs

provide Russian general-purpose ground

forces with a rapid, precision-guided, theater

deep-strike capability.

China

Strategic Missile Forces

China's current ICBM force consists of

large, liquid-propellant missiles armed with

single nuclear warheads. Of these ICBMs,

about 20 are CSS-4 silo-based missiles that

can reach targets in the United States. The

Chinese also have about a dozen CSS-3

ICBMs that are almost certainly intended as

a retaliatory deterrent against targets in

Russia and Asia. China also has a mediumrange SLBM (the CSS-NX-3/JL-1).

Beijing is concerned about the survivability

of its strategic deterrent against the United

States and has a long-running modernization

program to develop mobile, solid-propellant

ICBMs. The IC projects that by 2015, most

of China’s strategic missile force will be

mobile.

China has three new, mobile, solid-propellant

strategic missiles in development—the roadmobile CSS-X-10 ICBM (also called the

DF-31), which is now in the flight-test stage;

a longer range version of the DF-31; and the

JL-2 SLBM. This modernization effort,

which dates from the mid-1980s, forms the

foundation of Beijing’s efforts to field a

modern, mobile, and more survivable

strategic missile force.

· China could begin deploying the DF-31

ICBM during the first half of the decade.

· Beijing could begin deploying the DF-31

follow-on ICBM and JL-2 SLBM in the

last half of the decade.

China has had the capability to develop and

deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system3for

many years, including a MIRV system. The

IC assesses that China could develop a

multiple RV system for the CSS-4 ICBM in a

few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV

capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs

would encounter significant technical hurdles

and would be costly.

The IC has differing projections of the overall

size of Chinese strategic ballistic missile

forces over the next 15 years, ranging from

about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily

against the United States. MIRVing and

missile defense counter-measures would be

factors in the ultimate size of the force. In

addition, China would have about two dozen

shorter range DF-31 and CSS-3 ICBMs that

could reach parts of the United States.

Theater Ballistic Missile Force

China maintains a robust CSS-5 MRBM force

and continues to increase the capabilities of

its SRBM force deployed opposite Taiwan.

3 Multiple reentry vehicle payload systems include

those that independently target each RV in the system

(MIRVs) and those that do not provide independent

targeting for each RV (MRV).
9

Conventionally Armed Ballistic Missiles

China’s leaders calculate that conventionally

armed ballistic missiles add a potent new

dimension to Chinese military capabilities,

and they are committed to continue fielding

them at a rapid pace. Beijing’s growing

SRBM force provides China with a military

capability that avoids the political and

practical constraints associated with the use

of nuclear-armed missiles. The latest

Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and

effective conventional strike force and

expand conventional ballistic missile

coverage.

The IC projects an SRBM force in 2005 of

several hundred missiles.

North Korea

North Korea has hundreds of Scuds and No

Dong missiles and continues to develop the

longer range Taepo Dong-2, which will

enable the North to target the United States.

In May 2001, however, Kim Chong-il

unilaterally extended the North’s voluntary

flight-test moratorium—in effect since

1999—until 2003, provided negotiations

with the United States proceeded.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Taepo Dong-2. The multiple-stage Taepo

Dong-2—capable of reaching parts of the

United States with a nuclear weapon-sized

payload—may be ready for flight-testing.

The North probably also is working on

improvements to its current design.

The Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage ballistic

missile configuration could deliver a

several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000

km—sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and

parts of the continental United States. If the

North uses a third stage similar to the one

used on the Taepo Dong-1 in 1998 in a

ballistic missile configuration, then the Taepo

Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kg

payload up to 15,000 km—sufficient to strike

all of North America. A Taepo Dong-2 flight

test probably would be conducted as an SLV

with a third stage to place a small payload

into the same orbit the North Koreans tried to

achieve in 1998.

No Dong. The 1,300-km-range No Dong

remains the longest-range ballistic missile

North Korea has deployed.

WMD Payload Options

The Intelligence Community judged in the

mid-1990s that North Korea had produced

one, possibly two, nuclear weapons, although

the North has frozen plutonium production

activities at Yongbyon in accordance with the

Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea

also has chemical and biological weapons

programs.

Foreign Assistance

North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in

developing and producing ballistic missiles

and has demonstrated a willingness to sell

complete systems and components that have

enabled other states to acquire longer range

capabilities earlier than would otherwise have

been possible and to acquire the basis for

domestic development efforts.

Iran

Iran’s missile inventory is among the largest

in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-

km-range Shahab-3 MRBMs, a few hundred

SRBMs, and a variety of unguided rockets.

Tehran’s longstanding commitment to its

ballistic missile programs—for deterrence and

war-fighting—is unlikely to diminish.
10

Ballistic Missile Programs

Shahab-3. The 1,300-km-range Shahab-3

MRBM—based on the North Korean No

Dong—is in the late stages of development.

ICBMs/SLVs. In addition to SRBM and

MRBM development, Iran is likely to

develop space launch vehicles to put

satellites into orbit and to establish the

technical base from which it could develop

IRBMs/ICBMs capable of delivering

payloads to Western Europe and the United

States. Iran is likely to test these vehicles

initially as SLVs and not as ballistic missiles

to demonstrate an inherent IRBM/ICBM

capability without risking the potential

political and economic costs of a long-range

missile test. Iran certainly is aware of the

North Korean SLV/missile program and the

benefits P’yongyang has tried to gain from

the inherent ICBM capability posed by the

Taepo Dong-1 and -2.

· All agencies agree that Iran could

attempt to launch an ICBM/SLV about

mid-decade, although most agencies

believe Iran is likely to take until the last

half of the decade to do so. One agency

further judges that Iran is unlikely to

achieve a successful test of an ICBM

before 2015.

· Iranian acquisition of complete systems

or major subsystems—such as North

Korean TD-2 or Russian engines—could

accelerate its capability to flight-test an

ICBM/SLV.

- If Iran were to acquire complete TD2 systems from North Korea, it could

conduct a flight test within a year of

delivery, allowing time to construct a

launch facility. Iran is unlikely to

acquire complete ICBM/SLV

systems from Russia.

- In contrast, a halt or substantial

decrease in assistance would delay

by years the development and flighttesting of these systems.

WMD Payload Options

The Intelligence Community judges that Iran

does not yet have a nuclear weapon. Most

agencies assess that Tehran could have one by

the end of the decade, although one agency

judges it will take longer. All agree that Iran

could reduce this time frame by several years

with foreign assistance. Iran has biological

and chemical weapons programs.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance—particularly from Russia,

China, and North Korea—will remain crucial

to the success of the Iranian missile program

for the duration of this Estimate.

Iraq

Baghdad’s goal of becoming the predominant

regional power and its hostile relations with

many of its neighbors are the key drivers

behind Iraq’s ballistic missile program. Iraq

has been able to maintain the infrastructure

and expertise necessary to develop missiles,

and the IC believes it has retained a small,

covert force of Scud-type missiles, launchers,

and Scud-specific production equipment and

support apparatus. For the next several years

at least, Iraq’s ballistic missile initiatives

probably will focus on reconstituting its preGulf war capabilities to threaten regional

targets and probably will not advance beyond

MRBM systems.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq had several

programs to extend the range of the Scud

SRBM and became experienced working with

liquid-propellant technology. Since the Gulf

war, despite UN resolutions limiting the range

of Iraq’s missiles to 150 km, Baghdad has

been able to maintain the infrastructure and
11

expertise necessary to develop longer range

missile systems.

· A military parade in December 2000

showcased Al Samoud missiles on new

transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).

The liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM

probably will be deployed soon.

· The IC assesses that Iraq retains a small

covert force of Scud-variant missiles,

launchers, and conventional, chemical,

and biological warheads.

We cannot project with confidence how long

UN-related sanctions and prohibitions will

remain in place. They plausibly will

constrain Iraq during the entire period of this

Estimate. Scenarios that would weaken the

prohibitions several years from now also are

conceivable, allowing Iraq to reconstitute its

missile infrastructure and begin developing

long-range missiles before the end of the

decade. The discussion that follows

addresses developments that could and are

likely to occur should UN prohibitions be

significantly weakened in the future.

Iraq is likely to use its experience with Scud

technology to resume production of the preGulf war 650-km-range Al Hussein, the

900-km-range Al Abbas, or other Scud

variants, and it could explore clustering and

staging options to reach more distant targets.

Iraq could resume Scud-variant

production—with foreign assistance—

quickly after UN prohibitions ended.

· With substantial foreign assistance,

Baghdad could flight-test a domestic

MRBM by mid-decade. This possibility

presumes rapid erosion of UN

prohibitions and Baghdad's willingness

to risk detection of developmental steps,

such as static engine testing, earlier. An

MRBM flight test is likely by 2010. An

imported MRBM could be flight-tested

within months of acquisition.

For the first several years after relief from UN

prohibitions, Iraq probably will strive to

reestablish its SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf

war numbers, continue developing and

deploying solid-propellant systems, and

pursue MRBMs to keep pace with its

neighbors. Once its regional security

concerns are being addressed, Iraq may

pursue a first-generation ICBM/SLV.

Although Iraq could attempt before 2015 to

test a rudimentary long-range missile based

on its failed Al-Abid SLV, such a missile

almost certainly would fail. Iraq is unlikely to

make such an attempt. After observing North

Korean missile developments the past few

years, Iraq would be more likely to pursue a

three-stage TD-2 approach to an SLV or

ICBM, which would be capable of delivering

a nuclear weapon-sized payload to the United

States. Some postulations for potential Iraqi

ICBM/SLV concepts and timelines from the

beginning of UN prohibition relief include:

· If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North

Korea, it could have a launch capability

within a year or two of a purchase.

· It could develop and test a TD-1-type

system within a few years.

· If it acquired No Dongs from North

Korea, it could test an ICBM within a few

years of acquisition by clustering and

staging the No Dongs—similar to the

clustering of Scuds for the Al Abid SLV.

· If Iraq bought TD-2 engines, it could test

an ICBM within about five years of the

acquisition.

· Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong2-type system within about ten years of a

decision to do so.

Most agencies believe that Iraq is unlikely to

test before 2015 any ICBMs that would

threaten the United States, even if UN

prohibitions were eliminated or significantly
12

reduced in the next few years. Some believe

that if prohibitions were eliminated in the

next few years, Iraq would be likely to test

an ICBM probably masked as an SLV

before 2015, possibly before 2010. In this

view, foreign assistance would affect the

timing and the capability of the missile.

WMD Payload Options

Baghdad had a crash program to develop a

nuclear weapon for missile delivery in 1990,

but coalition bombing and IAEA and

UNSCOM activities significantly set back

the effort. The Intelligence Community

estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would

take several years to produce enough fissile

material to make a weapon. Iraq has

admitted to having biological and chemical

weapons programs before the Gulf war and

maintains those programs.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is key to Iraqi efforts to

develop quickly longer range missiles. Iraq

relied on extensive foreign assistance before

the Gulf war and will continue to seek

foreign assistance to expand its current

capabilities.

Libya

Ballistic Missile Programs

The imposition of UN sanctions has

impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign

assistance for its longer range missile

programs. Nevertheless, even if Libya were

to obtain a No Dong-class MRBM, Tripoli

would be likely to continue to try for longer

range systems to increase the number of US

and NATO targets it can hold at risk. If a

missile were offered with range sufficient to

strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya

would try to obtain it.

Libya lacks the infrastructure required to

develop by 2015 a ballistic missile system

with sufficient range to target US territory.

Libya’s paths to obtaining an ICBM during

the time frame of this Estimate probably

would be to purchase a complete missile

system or to set up a foreign assistance

arrangement where foreign scientists and

technicians design, develop, and produce a

missile and the necessary infrastructure in

Libya.

WMD Payload Options

Libya has biological and chemical weapons

programs. Libya would need significant foreign

assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, but

Tripoli’s nuclear infrastructure enhancements

remain of concern.

Foreign Assistance

Libya’s missile program depends on foreign

support, without which the program eventually

would grind to a halt.

Syria

Missile Programs

Syria maintains a ballistic missile and rocket

force of hundreds of FROG rockets, Scuds,

and SS-21 SRBMs. With considerable

foreign assistance, Syria progressed to Scud

production using primarily locally

manufactured parts.

Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus

to seek a longer range ballistic missile

capability such as North Korea’s No Dong

MRBM. The IC judges that Syria does not

now have and is unlikely to gain an interest in

an ICBM capability during the time frame of

this Estimate.

WMD Payload Options

Syria has developed CW warheads for its

Scuds and has an offensive BW program.

The IC remains concerned about Syria’s

intentions regarding nuclear weapons.
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Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is critical to Syrian

efforts to improve its production capabilities

and to gain access to export-controlled

components and technology.

India

New Delhi believes that a nuclear-capable

missile delivery option is necessary to deter

Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and

thereby preserve the option to wage limited

conventional war in response to Pakistani

provocations in Kashmir or elsewhere.

Nuclear weapons also serve as a hedge

against a confrontation with China. New

Delhi views the development, not just the

possession, of nuclear-capable ballistic

missiles as the symbols of a world power

and an important component of self-reliance.

Missile Programs

Growing experience and an expanding

infrastructure are providing India the means

to accelerate both development and

production of new systems. New Delhi is

making progress toward its aim of achieving

self-sufficiency for its missile programs, but

it continues to rely on foreign assistance.

Converting the Indian SLV into an

ICBM?

Rumors persist concerning Indian plans for

an ICBM program, referred to in open

sources as the Surya. Some Indian defense

writers argue that possession of an ICBM is

a key symbol in India’s quest for recognition

as a world power and useful in preventing

diplomatic bullying by the United States.

Most components needed for an ICBM are

available from India’s indigenous space

program. India could convert its polar space

launch vehicle into an ICBM within a year

or two of a decision to do so.

· The 150-km-range Prithvi I SRBM

continues to be India’s only deployed

ballistic missile.

· The Prithvi II SRBM is a modified Prithvi

I with an increased range of 250 km.

· The Agni series, which probably will be

deployed during this decade, will be the

mainstay of India’s nuclear-armed missile

force.

· The Sagarika SLBM probably will not be

deployed until 2010 or later.

Foreign Assistance

India continues to push toward selfsufficiency, especially in regard to its missile

programs. Nevertheless, New Delhi still

relies heavily on foreign assistance.

Pakistan

Pakistan sees missile-delivered nuclear

weapons as a vital deterrent to India’s much

larger conventional forces, and as a necessary

counter to India's nuclear program. Pakistan

pursued a nuclear capability more for

strategic reasons than for international

prestige.

Ballistic Missile Programs

Since the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued

development of an indigenous ballistic missile

capacity in an attempt to avoid reliance on

any foreign entity for this key capability.

Islamabad will continue with its present

ballistic missile production goals until it has

achieved a survivable, flexible force capable

of striking a large number of targets

throughout most of India. Pakistan’s missiles

include:

· The short-range Hatf I, which Pakistan

also is attempting to market, as it is

relatively inexpensive and easy-tooperate.
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· M-11 missiles that Pakistan acquired

from China in the 1990s. (The M-11

SRBM—called the Hatf III in

Pakistan—is a single-stage, solidpropellant missile capable of carrying a

payload at least 300 km.)

· Ghauri/No Dong MRBMs that Pakistan

acquired from North Korea.

· The Shaheen I, a Pakistani-produced

single-stage, solid-propellant SRBM.

· The Shaheen II, a road-mobile two-stage

solid-propellant MRBM that Pakistan is

developing. (Based on several mockups

publicly displayed in Pakistan, the

Shaheen II probably would be able to

carry a 1,000-kg payload to a range of

about 2,500 kilometers.)

Foreign Assistance

Foreign support for Pakistan’s ambitious

solid-propellant ballistic missile acquisition

and development program has been critical.

Forward-Based Missile Threats to

the United States

Several countries are technically capable of

developing a missile launch mechanism to

use from forward-based ships or other

platforms to launch SRBMs and MRBMs, or

land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) against

the United States. Some of these are likely

to develop and deploy forward-based

systems—more likely cruise missiles—

during the period of this Estimate.

Nevertheless, long-distance strikes against

the United States probably would be

operationally difficult. Other methods

would be less complicated—CBRN

terrorism, for example.

Ballistic Missile Threats

An SRBM or MRBM could be launched at

the United States from a forward-based sea

platform within a few hundred kilometers of

US territory. Using such a sea platform

would not pose major technical problems, but

the accuracy of the missile probably would be

reduced significantly because of the

movement of the ocean. Still, the accuracy

probably would be better than for some of the

ICBMs discussed in this Estimate. The

simplest method for launching a shipborne

ballistic missile would be to secure a TEL

onboard the ship and launch the missile from

the TEL. Somewhat greater accuracy could

be obtained by placing the TEL on a

stabilization platform to compensate for wave

movement. Another option would be to add

satellite-aided (GPS or GLONASS)

navigation to the missile.

The Land-Attack Cruise Missile Threat

One to two dozen countries probably will

possess a land-attack cruise missile (LACM)

capability by 2015 via indigenous

development, acquisition, or modification of

such other systems as antiship cruise missiles

or unmanned aerial vehicles. Most LACMs

will have a range of a few hundred km—

posing primarily a theater-level threat—but

with sufficient range to be forward-deployed

on air- or sea-launch platforms.

Cruise Missile Threats

From a technical standpoint, cruise missiles

are a better alternative than ballistic missiles

in launching from forward areas. Many

countries would therefore see these missiles

as advantageous in attacking the United

States. The most plausible alternative for a

forward-based launch would be a covertly

equipped commercial vessel.

Technically, cruise missiles can be launched

from fighter, bomber, or even commercial

transport aircraft outside US airspace. Both

the perceived US capability to detect and

track threats approaching the coast, and the
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limited range of most foreign fighter and

bomber aircraft, however, tend to mitigate

such a threat. Modifying a commercial

aircraft to become a cruise missile platform

would entail significant aerodynamic,

structural, electrical, and possibly flight

control system modifications. Cruise

missile launches from a submarine would

have the advantage of being relatively

covert. The technical sophistication

required to design or to modify a cruise

missile for launch from torpedo or missile

tubes, however, almost certainly would

require detailed assistance from the defense

industry of a major naval power.

Nonmissile WMD Threats to the

United States

Nonmissile means of delivering weapons of

mass destruction do not provide the same

prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive

diplomacy associated with ICBMs.

Nevertheless, concern remains about options

for delivering WMD to the United States

without missiles by state and nonstate

actors. Ships, trucks, airplanes, and other

means may be used. In fact, the Intelligence

Community judges that US territory is more

likely to be attacked with WMD using

nonmissile means, primarily because such

means:

· Are less expensive than developing and

producing ICBMs.

· Can be covertly developed and

employed; the source of the weapon

could be masked in an attempt to evade

retaliation.

· Probably would be more reliable than

ICBMs that have not completed rigorous

testing and validation programs.

· Probably would be much more accurate

than emerging ICBMs over the next 15

years.

· Probably would be more effective for

disseminating biological warfare agent

than a ballistic missile.

· Would avoid missile defenses.

Terrorist Interest in CBRN

Foreign nonstate actors—including terrorist,

insurgent, or extremist groups—have used,

possessed, or expressed an interest in CBRN

materials. Most of these groups have

threatened the United States, and all of them

have the ability to attack the United States or

its interests. The events of September 11 and

its aftermath have caused the Intelligence

Community to focus significantly more

resources on the threat from terrorism, and we

are obtaining more information on potential

terrorist actions.
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