NRC NEWS U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 Office of Public Affairs Telephone 301/415-820

 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov

 Web Site: www.nrc.gov

No. S-03-017

REMARKS

by

Chairman Nils J. Diaz

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

at the

Joint NRC/DHS State Security Outreach Workshop

June 17, 2003

The Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary McQueary, all the NRC partners in

securing our homeland, especially our guests from the States, representatives of DHS and our

sister Federal Agencies, members of the NRC staff: it is my pleasure and privilege to address you

at this first, but surely not the last, Joint NRC/DHS State Security Outreach Workshop.

On behalf of the Commission, I thank Under Secretary McQueary and DHS for jointly

sponsoring this very important workshop. In many ways, this meeting highlights a very

important transition: from a period of policy-making and preparation that is taking place for

America’s homeland security to a more systematic, disciplined, coordinated implementation of

security measures. This does not mean that, if called for, we all would not have jumped in and

taken care of our people, with passion and thoughtfulness. We would not have worried about

“who does it”. We would have focused on “what” needs doing. We are now ready for a more

cohesive and comprehensive program to defend our homeland from attacks. Your participation

in this workshop is a tribute to how far we have come and your commitment to developing an

integrated Federal, State, and local response.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Agreement State licensees were better prepared to respond

to the spectrum of credible threats before 9/11 than most other facilities that are part of the

civilian infrastructure and, continue to be so. Of course, we can always make further

enhancements. Security against threats of diversion at our nuclear fuel facilities or sabotage at

nuclear power plants are a 25year old business for the NRC and for our licensees. The

awareness, resources and vigilance were there, but all went to a higher level when 9/11 showed

the determination of enemies of the United States to attack our people and our way of life.

September 11, 2001 was a defining moment in American history and, in a very practical way, for

all of us here today. The terrorist attacks focused public concern on the vulnerability of the

national infrastructure to hostile action. For many in the public, the media, and the Congress, one

immediate question especially concerning the NRC’s licensees was: suppose the terrorists had

chosen to attack a nuclear power plant? What then? There was nothing unreasonable about

asking that question; on the contrary, it would have been unreasonable not to ask it, given the

public prominence of anything related to nuclear power or radioactivity. The first answer, as the

Commission has been stating, is that nuclear power plants, to a greater extent than any other kind

of facility in our entire civilian infrastructure, are built to withstand powerful impacts. The

second is that nuclear power plants have been required for a generation to assume that attack by

well-armed terrorists is a real possibility, to be guarded against 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Third, we have mitigation systems in place, including emergency planning and response, to

minimize any impact on public health and safety. There is no doubt that today, both in our

understanding and in our actions on how these three work together, there are significant

improvements in the protection of public health and safety. They are not easily seen -- and

sometimes that is intentional, for security doesn’t always advertise -- but they are there. And

they get better, everyday.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Commission, unanimously, undertook a number

of measures to improve security at nuclear power plants, to assess areas of possible vulnerability

and to define corresponding mitigation strategies. The enhanced security construct we have

established for the defense of nuclear power reactors includes three strongly interdependent

elements, all of them directed to one fundamental goal: how to best protect our people, with the

appropriate resources placed at the right places. These three elements are: 

1) enhanced access controls, to prevent unauthorized entry of persons and materials to nuclear

facilities; 

2) enhanced work hour and training requirements for security personnel to increase their capability

to detect and respond to threats; and 

3) a revised Design Basis Threat that describes those adversary characteristics that are credible and

reasonable for a private sector organization to protect against, based on the current threat,

demonstrated terrorist attributes and intelligence as well as law enforcement information.
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The aim of the security construct is clear enough: to deny access to potential wrongdoers and to

ensure an ever-present security force that serves as a strong deterrent and as a tactically and

weaponry-qualified defensive team that is capable of defending a facility with high assurance

against a Design Basis Threat. 

A key Commission statement, with strong implications for the NRC, DHS, and you, was made by

the NRC regarding what was accomplished and the path forward: “The Commission believes that

this DBT represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private security force

should be expected to defend under existing law.” I repeat, “The Commission believes that this DBT

represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private secuity force should be

expected to defend under existing law.” This security framework includes both strengthened security

by licensees and a clear role for the government in providing security beyond the licensee’s

capability while maintaining the ability of these industries and users to fulfill their intended

functions. Let me repeat again, “providing security beyond the licensee’s capability while

maintaining the ability of these industries and users to fulfill their intended functions.”

In addition to enhancements at the nuclear power facilities, NRC has also taken actions to enhance

security at all our licensees -- from fuel cycle facilities to those licensees possessing discrete

radioactive sources. For example, NRC and the Department of Energy are working to strengthen the

U.S. regulatory infrastructure to increase the protection of high-risk radioactive sources which could

be used to make a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The Commission recently approved the

initial study of a joint NRC/DOE Working Group which provided action thresholds for radioactive

materials of greatest concern. This report also addressed issues such as tracking and control of

radioactive sources and recovery of unsecured radioactive material. We are also working closely

with DHS in this area. For example, NRC staff is participating on the DHS Radiological Dispersal

Device/Improvised Nuclear Device Working Group.

The Commission understands that it may not always be able to draw a bright line between security

responsibilities of NRC-regulated entities and those of defense, security and law enforcement

authorities. Responses may overlap for certain threats and coordination or integration of the

responses of the various private and governmental organizations would be required. This is where

the Commission, DHS, and other Federal Departments and agencies, and State and local authorities

must work closely in developing integrated security contingency plans to complement licensee

capabilities. The Commission believes that this integration is the responsibility of the Department

of Homeland Security, and we have and stand ready to support DHS efforts in achieving integration.

As we work to resolve integration issues at the Federal level, we also encourage efforts at the State

and local level to develop the specific response protocols that will best serve the nation in enhancing

homeland security. 

At each step over the last 20 months, NRC has done what needed to be done to secure these

facilities, but as we learn more, I am confident that the NRC, the Department of Homeland Security

and you will do whatever it takes to protect the people of this country.
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I would like to turn now towards another very important responsibility of the NRC. That is our

responsibility to respond to radiological events of any kind, within our statutory responsibilities, and

to coordinate Federal resources in support of State and local needs.

In May of 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued an initial version of a "National

Response Plan" (NRP) to address the management of domestic incidents, whether they are terrorist

events or natural disasters. This Plan provides a framework from which Federal Agencies and

Departments can begin to develop revisions to their existing incident response plans. This process

will ultimately result in a comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The Plan

recognizes the vital roles that State and local authorities play in responding to all of the hazards that

we face. We look forward to working with our Federal and State partners to implement this Plan,

and encourage you to coordinate your activities closely with NRC licensees located within your

states.

I have mentioned the NRC security construct and our commitment to incident response. I am

pleased and proud to recognize that our new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

(NSIR) has done a tremendous job over its first year of existence in developing policies for the

Commission, as well as in developing the requirements and oversight for other areas of homeland

protection, and done so in a year of large uncertainties, as the nation is establishing its priorities. Our

NSIR has done well for this country. I would like to recognize Roy Zimmerman, Director of NSIR,

and all who labored long and well to increase our nuclear security and response capabilities. Roy,

job well done!

With NSIR’s transition to an implementation mode, the NRC is today taking another step to increase

our attention to any cross-cutting issue of the agency’s responsibilities that directly or indirectly

affects security, incident response, emergency preparedness, vulnerability assessments and their

mitigation strategies, and external integration of comprehensive strategies for these areas. At my

request, and in consultation with the Commission, the Executive Director for Operations, Bill

Travers, is establishing the position of Deputy Executive Director for Homeland Protection and

Preparedness. The new Deputy, responding directly to the EDO, and both of them to me and the

Commission, will have the authority to go across the agency lines of authority, to seek and resolve

protection and preparedness issues, no matter who is doing it or where they reside in the agency. At

NRC, the protection and preparedness of the homeland from nuclear events will respond to one

senior manager, who will have the full support of every office in the agency. It is my pleasure to

announce to you that Mr. William Kane has accepted the responsibility for Homeland Protection and

Preparedness at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

You obviously note that I use the term homeland protection and preparedness rather than homeland

security. There is a reason for the change. DHS has the overall responsibility for Homeland

Security, and we are all responsible for different areas of concern. The NRC’s main responsibility

has always been the radiological protection of our people, as well as common defense and security.

Our radiological protection requirements and expectations are based on multiple layers of defense,

often referred to as defense-in-depth. The last layer of radiological protection is emergency 
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preparedness, and there is no doubt that it has been, and is good. For example, the Commission

believes that rapidly developing accident scenarios in nuclear power plants, whatever the initiator,

are covered by the extensive emergency preparedness plans which are in place, and that the

significant security improvements we have achieved, plant mitigation strategies, and emergency

plans and off-site communications, are all contributors to robust and enhanced protective measures

for the public. Yet, emergency preparedness must run deeper, covering the spectrum of radiological

risks to our nation. There are concerns in this area that need to be addressed very clearly. I believe

that mostly it is an issue of significantly enhancing the communication of what we do. But I am not

discounting the probability that we can do better, especially in assuring that the communication and

coordination links and resources are there if ever needed. I can assure you that the probability of a

life-threatening radiation release from a nuclear plant is very small, yet we need to be prepared.

These same concerns albeit to a much lesser degree, apply to events involving other licensed sources,

the most noteworthy being an RDD event, yet, we need to be prepared.

I know this is an area of great concern to all the states, and particularly so for those high population

areas where coordination of efforts is essential. As a key component of our focus on

implementation, the NRC is going to pay increasingly close attention to homeland protection and

preparedness. 

I have provided my thoughts on some of the major issues facing the NRC, and focused them on the

mutual dependence we have in ensuring the security of NRC-licensed facilities. I hope that I have

provided some things for you to think about that will be useful to you in your discussions here over

the next two days to build on what was good in the past, and move to what is better in the future.

The work of the NRC is, in microcosm, a reflection of the nation as a whole. There are competing

interests and different points of view, strongly held, but what unites us is far greater than what

divides us. All of us -- the NRC, its licensees, States and the public -- have a common interest in

nuclear safety and security, and the well-being of our nation. All of us have different perspectives

and insights to contribute; at its best, democracy permits a synthesis, in which we glean the best from

divergent viewpoints and apply them to our common purposes. I look forward to the opportunity to

join with you, our constituent stakeholders, toward a goal we all share: to benefit the American

people. 

Have a great workshop.