IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-2096

Filed July 3, 2024

JULIE HANSEN SCHLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

SIOUX COUNTY, STAN OOSTRA Individually and in his Official Capacity as 

Deputy Sheriff for The Sioux County Sheriff’s Office, LISA SCHEELE and 

GARY SCHLEY, Individually, and as EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATES of 

DONALD SCHLEY and MARGERY SCHLEY,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Jeffrey A. Neary, 

Judge.

A plaintiff appeals the district court’s rulings granting defendants’ motions 

for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.

Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Zachary D. Clausen and Douglas L. Phillips of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux 

City, for appellees Stan Oostra and Sioux County.

Matthew T.E. Early of Matthew Early Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellee 

Lisa Scheele.

Darrell J. Isaacson of Isaacson Law, Nora Springs, for appellee Gary 

Schley.
2

Douglas A. Haag of Patterson Law Firm, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellees 

Estates of Donald Schley and Margery Schley. 

Heard by Badding, P.J., Langholz, J., and Bower, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2024).

.
3

BADDING, Presiding Judge.

A “very bitter ugly divorce” between Julie and Gary Schley led to Julie’s 

arrest for violating a no-contact order that prohibited Julie from contacting Gary’s 

girlfriend, Lisa Scheele. After a magistrate dismissed the charge, Julie sued Gary, 

Lisa, Gary’s parents, Sioux County, and Sioux County Deputy Sheriff Stan Oostra,

alleging claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, tortious infliction of 

emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, defamation, 

negligence, and breach of contract. These claims were dismissed through a series 

of summary judgment rulings over the four years the lawsuit was pending. 

Julie appeals, claiming the district court erred in (1) granting the summary 

judgment motion filed by Sioux County and Deputy Oostra on her claim for false 

arrest and (2) determining her claims against the remaining defendants were 

barred by the “wrongful conduct” rule. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In August 2016, Julie discovered that Gary, her husband of twenty-two 

years, was having an affair with Lisa. Julie started leaving Lisa angry voicemails 

and texting her things like, “Did I tell you that my boys know where you live?” Lisa 

reported these messages to the police in Sioux Center, who told Julie to stop 

contacting Lisa. But Julie didn’t listen, leaving Lisa a voicemail in January 2017 

that said, “Listen you fucking bitch, tell Gary he better get his ass home tonight,”

and calling her three times in April. 

The next month, Julie was charged with third-degree harassment, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(4) (2017). She pled guilty, and a no-contact 

order was entered at the end of August. The order prohibited Julie from having 
4

contact with Lisa “in person, by telephone, in writing, or through third parties until 

further Order of the Court.” And it stated in bold type that “a Defendant that violates 

this Order faces immediate arrest. Violation may occur even if the protected 

party(ies) consent(s) to prohibited contact.”

The day after the no-contact order was entered, Julie commented on a 

photo posted on social media by one of Lisa’s friends. In the photo, Lisa was 

shown enjoying a vacation with friends in Las Vegas. Julie’s comment read, “The 

bitch in the middle without married boyfriend tonight????” 

Lisa reported the message to the police, and Julie was charged in 

September with the simple misdemeanor crime of violating the no-contact order 

under Iowa Code section 664A.7(5). A magistrate dismissed the charge, ruling

that code section only refers to violations of orders issued for domestic abuse 

assault or under Iowa Code chapters 232, 335F, 236, 598, or 915.

1

 Because 

Julie’s no-contact order was issued under section 708.7(4), the magistrate 

determined that she could not be charged with a violation of section 664A.7(5). 

Julie and Gary’s divorce was finalized in November, and all was quiet until 

January 6, 2018. Gary was living in a house on farmland owned by his parents—

Donald and Margery Schley—in rural Sioux County. Julie had a lease agreement 

with Donald and Margery that allowed her access to the farm for her show horses. 

She would typically be at the farm at least twice a day to care for her horses. That 

1

Iowa Code section 664A.7(5) provides in relevant part that

[v]iolation of a no-contact order entered for the offense or alleged 

offense of domestic abuse assault in violation of section 708.2A or a 

violation of a protective order issued pursuant to chapter 232, 235F, 

236, 598, or 915 constitutes a public offense and is punishable as a 

simple misdemeanor.
5

day, Lisa was at the farm helping Gary paint the inside of the house. Julie came 

to the farm around 5:00 p.m. to care for her horses. Gary and Lisa were inside 

painting the living room, although Gary said that he “was doing more watching 

football than painting.” He noticed Julie’s vehicle parked outside but didn’t say 

anything to Lisa.

Meanwhile, Lisa went outside to take a break from painting. While she was 

outside, Julie drove by on her way out of the property. Lisa waved at Julie—she 

said that she did it reflexively, not knowing who was in the vehicle. But Julie 

described Lisa’s wave as vigorous, like she wanted to get her attention and bait 

her into contact. Julie testified in a deposition that she rolled her window down to 

spit out her gum and, while “cursing a blue streak,” yelled “bitch.” She continued 

down the road out of the farm for about a half mile before pulling over to text Gary 

messages that said:

Lol what a fat bitch!

Geesh. 

btw-does she know that all the harassment stuff was 

dismissed by the judge? Haha nothing on my record either...

So happy for you Gary! Hope she knows about your money 

problems

Lisa went inside the house and told Gary that she saw Julie and heard her

say, “something bitch.” While Lisa was telling Gary this, his phone went off with 

the texts from Julie. Gary showed the messages to Lisa, who decided to call the 

Sioux County Sheriff’s Office because she was worried about “what tomorrow 

morning would bring involving Julie.” Lisa also said the county attorney’s office 

told her that “if anything else would ever happen, that I was to call and report it.” 
6

Dispatch notified Sioux County Deputy Sheriff Stan Oostra about Lisa’s 

report, and he called her back. Lisa told him “that she was out at the farm, that 

Julie had been out at the farm, and she was concerned that there was going to be 

issues in violation of a protection order.” Deputy Oostra confirmed there was a nocontact order in force and then drove to the farm to talk with Lisa and Gary. Lisa 

told the deputy that “she had went out to the truck to get something and, when 

Julie was leaving,” Lisa heard “something bitch being said.” Gary also showed 

Deputy Oostra the text messages from Julie. While he was talking to Gary and 

Lisa, the deputy noticed there were security cameras on the farm. Before leaving, 

Deputy Oostra got written statements from the couple and asked Gary to work on 

getting video of the incident from the cameras. Consistent with her verbal report 

to the deputy, Lisa’s written statement said: 

I was on the property & went out to the truck . . . to get some 

of my belongings. . . . I saw Julie leaving as I was going to the truck 

& out of habit waved to whoever was driving by & it was her. When 

she drove away & was turning around, she said ------ Bitch. . . . I 

didn’t hear the 1st part. It’s windy. Two minutes after that, she texted 

a nasty message to Gary who she knows I am dating & have been 

for some time. 

After talking to Lisa and Gary, Deputy Oostra contacted Julie and asked her 

to come to the sheriff’s office to speak to him. She told the deputy “that Lisa had 

been outside. And when she left, she was standing there waving.” Believing he 

had “probable cause from the statement and from the text message,” Deputy 

Oostra arrested Julie for violating the no-contact order and charged her under 

section 664A.7(5), unaware that the charge from September 2017 under that 

section had been dismissed. When Deputy Oostra later reviewed the video from 
7

the security cameras, he saw that Lisa had not gone to the truck but was just 

standing outside when Julie drove by.

Less than a week after her arrest, Julie was terminated from her position as 

a middle school principal. She again moved to have the charge under 

section 664A.7(5) dismissed, which was granted by the magistrate for the same 

reasons as before. Once the charge was dismissed, Julie filed suit in 

November 2018 against Gary and Lisa for false arrest, malicious prosecution, 

tortious infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, civil 

conspiracy, and defamation. She also asserted claims for negligence against Gary 

and his parents, Donald and Margery, plus claims for vicarious liability and breach 

of contract against just Donald and Margery.2 And she sued Sioux County and 

Deputy Oostra, individually and in his official capacity, for false arrest, malicious 

prosecution, and tortious infliction of emotional distress.3

Deputy Oostra and Sioux County moved for summary judgment on the 

claims against them in November 2019, which the district court granted in 

March 2020. Gary sought summary judgment the next month, and the court

granted his motion on Julie’s claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest. 

The remaining claims were set for trial. After additional discovery, Gary moved for 

summary judgment again in April 2022, this time under the “wrongful conduct” rule, 

which prohibits a plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action “based on his [or her] 

2 Donald and Margery passed away in 2021, and their estates were substituted as 

defendants. 

3 Julie included state constitutional claims against Sioux County and Deputy 

Oostra under Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled by Burnett 

v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). The district court dismissed those claims 

after Godfrey was overruled, and Julie does not pursue them on appeal. 
8

own wrong.” Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981) (citation omitted). 

Lisa and the estates of Donald and Margery joined in Gary’s motion. The court 

granted the motion in July 2022 and dismissed the rest of Julie’s claims against 

the remaining defendants.

4

 Julie appeals these summary judgment rulings.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment for correction 

of errors at law. Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 544 

(Iowa 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party 

establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). 

“In determining whether a grant of summary judgment was appropriate, we 

examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all 

legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in his or her favor.” 

Homan v. Branstad, 887 N.W.2d 153, 163–64 (Iowa 2016). A genuine issue of 

fact exists if “reasonable minds can differ as to how a factual question should be 

resolved.” Id. at 164. 

III. Analysis

A. False Arrest

“The essential elements of the tort of false arrest are (1) detention or 

restraint against one’s will and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.” 

Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 678–79 (Iowa 1983). Once a plaintiff shows 

4 The only claim left after this ruling was Lisa’s counterclaim against Julie for 

tortious infliction of emotional distress. In November 2022, Lisa and Julie entered 

into a settlement agreement that resulted in the dismissal of Lisa’s counterclaim 

and Julie’s agreement to not pursue any claims against Lisa on appeal. 
9

there was a warrantless arrest, “the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show 

justification for the arrest.” Id. at 679. “If the officer acts in good faith and with 

reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person arrested 

committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not attach.” Id. at 680

(noting that in “civil damage actions for false arrest, courts apply a probable cause 

standard less demanding than the constitutional probable cause standard in 

criminal cases”). Relying on that defense from Children, the district court found 

that the “undisputed facts of the case demonstrate that Deputy Oostra acted with 

a reasonable belief that a crime had been committed, therefore liability cannot 

attach and so summary judgment is proper.” 

Julie argues the court erred in finding that Deputy Oostra’s actions were 

justified because her warrantless arrest “violated statutory provisions under 

chapters 804 and 665 of the Iowa Code.” Sioux County and Deputy Oostra 

contend these provisions are not at issue because “there was a court order 

requiring the arrest of Plaintiff, and a statute mandating the same.” 

The order that Sioux County and Deputy Oostra are referring to is the nocontact order entered against Julie after her guilty plea to third-degree harassment 

in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(4). That order is subject to the provisions 

of chapter 664A, which applies “to no-contact orders issued for violations or 

alleged violations of sections 708.2A, 708.7, 708.11, 709.2, 709.3, and 709.4, and 

any other public offense for which there is a victim.” Iowa Code § 664A.2(1). The 

no-contact order warned Julie that “a Defendant that violates this Order faces 

immediate arrest.” This warning tracks Iowa Code section 664A.6(1):
10

If a peace officer has probable cause to believe that a person 

has violated a no-contact order issued under this chapter, the peace 

officer shall take the person into custody and shall take the person 

without unnecessary delay before the nearest or most accessible 

magistrate in the judicial district in which the person was taken into 

custody.

 

Julie argues section 664A.6(1) “must be read in conjunction with section 

804.7,” which sets out circumstances in which peace officers can make 

warrantless arrests. So, according to Julie,

the only time a peace officer can lawfully arrest a person based on 

probable cause for the violation of a no-contact order issued under 

chapter 664A without a warrant is if the alleged violation is a public 

offense and meets one of the criteria for warrantless arrests set forth 

in section 804.7. Otherwise, as required in section 804.7, arrests 

can only be made in obedience to a warrant.

We disagree.

“The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine whether 

the statute is ambiguous.” State v. Middlekauff, 974 N.W.2d 781, 793 (Iowa 2022) 

(citation omitted). “Our inquiry ends with the plain language if the statute is 

unambiguous.” Id. (citation omitted). Julie does not identify any ambiguity in 

section 664A.6(1), nor do we find any in its clear directives. See State v. Finders, 

743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008) (“A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 

understood in two or more possible ways.” (cleaned up)). Instead, her argument 

invokes the rule of in pari materia, which requires related statutes to “be construed 

together as though they constituted one law.” State v. Peters, 525 N.W.2d 854, 

857 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). But we resort to that rule “only in search of 

legislative intent. It is only a rule of construction to be applied as an aid in 

determining the meaning of a doubtful statute, and it cannot be invoked where the 

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,” as it is here. Id. at 857–58
11

(cleaned up); accord 2B Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes & Statutory 

Construction § 51:1 (7th ed. 2014) (“Consonant with the basic rule on the use of 

extrinsic aids, courts do not resort to other statutes if the statute being construed 

is clear and unambiguous.”). 

Section 664A.6(1) unambiguously authorizes a peace officer who has 

probable cause to believe that a person has violated a no-contact order to arrest 

that person without a warrant. See Henley v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 533 N.W.2d 199, 201–

02 (Iowa 1995) (stating section 236.14, which was repealed in 2006 when 

chapter 664A was enacted, “plainly authorizes the immediate custodial arrest of a 

person believed to have violated a domestic violence protective order”); 4 Robert 

R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Series: Criminal Law § 33:71 (Oct. 2023 update)

(characterizing section 664A.6 as a “mandatory arrest” provision). It’s true, as Julie 

points out, that the statute does not include the phrase “without a warrant.” But if 

we adopted Julie’s interpretation, we would be adding requirements to the statute

that its text does not support. See Moulton v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 34 N.W.2d 

211, 216 (Iowa 1948) (“We can neither add words to the statute nor eliminate 

them.”). 

Julie alternatively claims that chapter 665, governing contempt 

proceedings, required Deputy Oostra to obtain a warrant before arresting her

because any violation of her no-contact order had to be pursued as a contempt. 

See Iowa Code § 664A.7(1) (“Violation of a no-contact order issued under this 

chapter . . . is punishable by summary contempt proceedings.”). Julie cites 

section 665.7 in support of this argument, which requires an offender to “be served 

personally with an order to show cause against the punishment” or “brought before 
12

the court forthwith, or on a given day, by warrant, if necessary.” But, as Sioux 

County and Deputy Oostra point out, the opening phrase of section 665.7 only 

requires those measures to be taken “[b]efore punishing for contempt.” Id. § 665.7 

(emphasis added). They were not required at the time of Julie’s detention, as 

section 664A.6(1) makes clear. See Henley, 533 N.W.2d at 202 (“The fact that the 

detention is accomplished summarily does not mean—as Henley suggests—that 

the police have adjudicated and punished her for contempt without opportunity for 

notice or hearing.”). 

So the question before us is whether, upon viewing the record in the light 

most favorable to Julie, Deputy Oostra had probable cause under 

section 664A.6(1) to believe that she violated the no-contact order? The 

undisputed facts show that he did. Contrary to Julie’s arguments otherwise, 

“[p]robable cause necessary to support warrantless arrest does not demand the 

same strictness of proof as proof of guilt upon trial.” Children, 331 N.W.2d at 679 

(citation omitted). “Probable cause must be determined on the particular facts in 

each case” that were “within the officers’ knowledge at the time the arrest is made.” 

Id. at 680 (emphasis in original). “In determining probable cause, all the 

information in the officer’s possession, fair inferences therefrom, and observations 

made by him, are generally pertinent; and facts may be taken into consideration 

that would not be admissible on the issue of guilt.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Julie argues that Deputy Oostra “had information, or should have had 

information had he adequately investigated the matter, that showed Lisa initiating 

contact with Julie in an attempt to get her in trouble with authorities and then made 

a false report to Deputy Oostra in order to get her arrested.” The “false report,” 
13

according to Julie, was Lisa’s statement to the deputy that she “went outside to get 

some property from a vehicle” and while she “was outside, Julie was driving her 

vehicle, leaving the property.” In his deposition, Deputy Oostra agreed the video 

from the farm, which was not made part of the summary judgment record, showed 

Lisa “never went to get any belongings from her truck.” Instead, Deputy Oostra 

testified that “[y]ou can just see her standing. You can see her hand on her head 

and she is waving as Julie drives by.” 

No matter what Lisa was doing outside, Julie admitted in her deposition that 

she was “absolutely furious” when she saw Lisa and “was cursing a blue streak”

and “saying bitch, fuck, damn, shit. I was saying everything under the moon.” Lisa 

told Deputy Oostra that she heard Julie say “something bitch.” And after watching 

the video of their interaction at her deposition, Julie testified, “I’m surprised the 

audio could pick up what I was saying in my truck. But, yes, I used the word bitch.” 

Affording Julie every legitimate inference that can reasonably be deduced from 

these undisputed facts, we conclude Deputy Oostra had probable cause to believe 

that Julie violated the no-contact order by yelling “bitch” out her window while Lisa 

was outside.

Julie seeks to analogize the facts here to those in Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 

where our supreme court held 

that when a police officer makes a warrantless arrest, for a crime not 

committed in his presence, on the strength of a single witness’[s]

uncorroborated statements and there exist circumstances known to 

the officer which could cause a reasonable person to doubt the 

veracity or reliability of the statements, then the credibility of the 

statements is a pertinent fact relating to the existence of probable 

cause. It is for the jury to determine whether the witness’[s]

uncorroborated accusation would lead to a reasonable belief that the 
14

person accused committed a crime and thus afford probable cause 

for arrest.

359 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Iowa 1984). But Lisa’s statements were not uncorroborated. 

Before taking Julie into custody, Deputy Oostra interviewed Lisa, Gary, and Julie. 

He saw the text messages that Julie admitted she sent to Gary right after her 

encounter with Lisa. Those messages were significant in Deputy Oostra’s 

probable-cause determination: “It just confirmed everything at that moment. At 

that time, it confirmed everything that Lisa was telling me, when she was leaving 

the yard, that words were said. And then the text message came via third party.” 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

on Julie’s false arrest claim against Sioux County and Deputy Oostra.

B. Wrongful Conduct Rule

The remaining defendants sought summary judgment on the rest of Julie’s 

claims against them under what some jurisdictions term the “wrongful conduct” 

rule. See Lauren Rousseau & I. Eric Nordan, Tug v. Mingo: Let the Plaintiffs Sue—

Opioid Addiction, The Wrongful Conduct Rule, and the Culpability Exception, 34 

W. Mich. U. T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 33, 52 (2017) (discussing the rule). This rule 

provides

that a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his 

cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or 

immoral act or transaction to which he is a party, or to maintain a 

claim for damages based on his own wrong or caused by his own 

neglect, . . . or where he must base his cause of action, in whole or 

in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws.

Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 

In granting summary judgment under this rule, the district court noted that 

Julie’s “remaining claims stem from the [no-contact order] violation incident on 
15

January 6, 2018.” Referencing its summary judgment ruling on the false arrest 

claim against Sioux County and Deputy Oostra, the court found the “facts 

surrounding Julie’s conduct on January 6, 2018 are no longer in dispute to the 

extent that reasonable minds could differ.” The court reasoned that “[j]ust because 

a criminal conviction did not ultimately result . . . does not mean that the 

conduct . . . did not take place and that it did not, in fact, violate” the order. The

court concluded:

To allow a party, even one not criminally convicted for their 

wrongdoing, to sue and collect damages stemming from the 

consequences of their wrongful actions would blatantly send the 

wrong message, especially if those lawsuits were directed at and 

sought damages from the victims of the wrongful conduct.

Julie argues the court erred in reaching this conclusion because “she did 

not violate the no-contact order and . . . Lisa made a false accusation to Deputy 

Oostra which resulted in her arrest.” But the undisputed facts discussed in the 

preceding section show that regardless of why Lisa was outside the house, Julie 

violated the no-contact order by yelling “bitch” at her. We agree with the court that, 

to establish her claims, Julie must rely on that wrongful conduct. See Anderson v. 

Miller, 559 N.W.2d 29, 33–34 (Iowa 1997) (applying the wrongful conduct rule to 

bar plaintiff’s claim against a defendant for negligently entrusting a vehicle to the 

plaintiff’s intoxicated decedent); Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885, 888 

(Iowa 1994) (concluding “it would be wrong as a matter of public policy to allow 

recovery on a consortium claim which arose from the lawful incarceration of a 

spouse”); Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1982) (concluding 

wrongful conduct rule barred convicted murderer’s civil action against his former 

psychiatrist); Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768 (finding a patient could not recover in tort 
16

from her psychiatrist on a claim that he negligently failed to prevent her from 

committing murder because “[i]t is that very criminal act which she claims as her 

damages”); Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245, 247–48 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) 

(barring wife of decedent whose illegal drug addiction resulted in his death from 

maintaining an action against his doctor, pharmacist, and pharmacies). 

Julie does not contest this point on appeal. Instead, she contends 

application of the wrongful conduct rule is “directly contrary to” our supreme court’s 

decision in Hoyt v. Gutterz Bowl & Lounge, L.L.C., in which a plaintiff sued a bar 

for negligence after the plaintiff was assaulted outside the bar by a patron he 

insulted earlier in the evening. 829 N.W.2d 772, 773 (Iowa 2013). Because the 

court in Hoyt “held that an individual who actually instigated a fight could still 

maintain a cause of action,” Julie argues “then certainly the claims made by [her] 

should be submitted to a jury.” She makes a similar argument under Mulhern v. 

Cath. Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2011), in which the court 

concluded that our state’s comparative fault act “permits a jury to compare the fault 

of a noncustodial suicide victim with the negligence of the mental health 

professionals treating her.” We disagree for two reasons.

First, the wrongful conduct rule was not at issue in Hoyt or Mulhern—or 

even mentioned by the court in those cases. Second, to the extent that Julie’s

argument implicates comparative fault principles, we rejected a similar argument 

in Pappas: 

At the outset a distinction must be drawn between lawful activities 

regulated by statute and activities which are entirely prohibited by 

law. In the first instance, it is familiar law that a violation of a statute 

governing the manner in which activities should be conducted, would 

merely constitute negligence or contributory negligence. . . . Such 
17

cases would today be resolved under the rule of comparative 

negligence. . . . However, when the plaintiff has engaged in activities 

prohibited, as opposed to merely regulated, by law, the courts will 

not entertain the suit if the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a serious 

violation of the law and the injuries for which he seeks recovery were 

the direct result of that violation. In this latter instance recovery is 

denied, not because the plaintiff contributed to his injury, but because 

the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to those 

injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act. 

494 N.W.2d at 247–48 (quoting Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. Ct. App. 

1984)) (alterations in original); cf. Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below 

in Mingo Cnty., 773 S.E.2d 627, 635 (W. Va. 2015) (concluding that “a plaintiff’s 

immoral or wrongful conduct does not serve as a common law bar” to recovery for 

damages from another’s tort and must instead be assessed under comparative 

fault principles). Nothing the court said in Hoyt or Mulhern changes that analysis. 

As a result, we affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment on 

Julie’s remaining claims against the rest of the defendants.

5

AFFIRMED.

5

In doing so, we note the court’s dismissal under the wrongful conduct rule 

included Julie’s breach-of-contract claim against the estates of Donald and 

Margery. While Iowa has only applied the rule to tort claims, Julie does not contend 

on appeal that its application to the contract claim was improper. Cf. Howell v. 

Normal Life of RI-005 Georgia, Inc., 788 S.E.2d 840, 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) 

(Barnes, J., specially concurring) (noting the wrongful conduct rule “has been 

applied in both tort and breach-of-contract cases”). So we consider that issue 

waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3).