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HUMAN RIGHTS AND

DEMOCRATIZATION IN

THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

MARCH 28, 1995

[CSCE 104-1-3]

 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN

THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 1995

 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 106,

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC., Hon. Christopher

Smith, Chairman, presiding.

Commissioners Present: Hon. Christopher Smith, Chairman; Hon.

Alfonse D'Amato, Co-chairman; and Hon. Frank R. Wolf, Commissioner.

Witnesses: Hon. Tedo Japaridze, Dr. Eduard Gudava, Ms. Erika

Dailey, and Dr. Stephen F. Jones.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SMITH

Chairman Smith. I want to thank all of you for coming to this hearing, which to my knowledge is the first hearing in the history of the

U.S. Congress focused exclusively on Georgia. This is the latest in a

series of Helsinki Commission hearings that examine the state of democratization and human rights in individual countries and regions of

the former Soviet Union.

In the late 1980's, Georgians began to organize politically to undo

communism and to gain independence. They lived through a very exciting period, although a key element in the chronicle of the liberation

movement was tragic, the April 1989 killings of peaceful protesters in

Tbilisi by Soviet forces.

Since then, however, Georgia has endured very difficult times. It has

been one of the most strife-torn New Independent States, a victim of

internal political and ethnic divisiveness, and external provocation and

aggression.

Georgia was the first former Soviet Republic whose elected president,

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted in an armed uprising. The shock waves

from that political earthquake have continued to rock the country ever

since.

In March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze, who had been Georgia's Communist Party leader before becoming Soviet Foreign Minister, returned

to his deeply troubled homeland. Though his role in ending the cold war

and removing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is well known and

appreciated in the West, Georgian supporters of the ousted president

saw Shevardnadze's return as a betrayal.

A period of intense civil conflict ensued, with Georgia society polarized, and open military confrontations took place. At the same time,

Abkhazia and South Ossetia launched movements that sought to alter

their relationship with Tbilisi, threatening the territorial integrity of
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Georgia. Russian forces were involved in these efforts by the Abkhazians

and Ossetians, and Moscow's pressure on Tbilisi has been constant

throughout this period.

Obviously these are not the best circumstances for democracy to flourish, but since his return, Mr. Shevardnadze has called for the establishment of a rule of law state in Georgia, where observance of human

rights is a priority, and institutions have been put in place to ensure

the implementation of human rights commitments.

The purpose of this hearing is to see how well he has done to date, by

examining the general state of democratization and human rights in

Georgia. The direct impetus for this hearing, however, were reports

about violations of due process in the recently concluded trial of 19 individuals for various crimes, including an alleged assassination attempt.

Given the confrontational background of Georgian politics and society, this trial has taken on an unavoidable political coloring. In examining this case, therefore, I want to make clear that the Helsinki Commission is in no way supporting terrorism, and takes no position on the

guilt or innocence of the accused. Our purpose simply is to ask whether

the trial of these defendants has taken place according to international

legal norms.

At the same time, I hope this hearing will also examine other key

problems besetting Georgia: to what extent this trial reflects the general level of democratization and human rights, how to address the

problems of rampant organized crime in Georgia, Russia's goals in Georgia, and Moscow's methods for achieving them.

Finally, I would like to say that we have some very fine witnesses,

and I would like to begin by saying that we are very pleased to have

Ambassador Japaridze, the Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to

the United States, who will present his perspective on these issues. The

Ambassador has long served in Georgia's Foreign Ministry, where he

has been Vice Chairman of the Council for UNESCO Affairs, head of

the Political Department, Deputy Foreign Minister, and First Deputy

Foreign Minister. In 1992, he was named National Security Advisor to

the Head of State, Eduard Shevardnadze.

I just want to let you know, ladies and gentlemen, that I have been in

touch on behalf of the Commission with Eduard Shevardnadze about

the case that I mentioned earlier and about the general situation of

human rights in Georgia. Just yesterday the Helsinki Commission received a letter from him in which he mentioned, among other things,

that over 350 former policemen in Georgia are now in prison for various

crimes, including human rights abuses.

I was sorry to learn that Georgian policemen have been engaging in

these activities, but it is a welcome sign that the authorities are taking

at least some measures to address the problem.

Mr. Shevardnadze also said that the case of the recently sentenced 19

defendants would be carefully reviewed, and that Georgia would welcome the involvement of Western human rights organizations in that

process. This, too, is a very welcome announcement.

At this point I would like to, before inviting the Ambassador to address the Commission, ask my good friend and Co-chairman of the Commission, Mr. D'Amato, if he would like to make any opening comments.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CO-CHAIRMAN D'AMATO

Co-chairman D'Amato. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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In the interest of time I am going to ask that my full statement be

included in the record as if read in its entirety.

I have a vote coming up any minute in another conflicting hearing,

but I want to assure the participants and the Ambassador, in particular, that that does not diminish my interest in this very serious and

vexing problem.

I am going to take just a few seconds to indicate that we recognize the

desperate situation in Georgia, a condition that some have described as,

I quote, ``a stable crisis.'' We restate, I believe, the Commission view,

that Georgia must make a serious attempt to meet its international

obligations, especially those concerning human rights.

Building a law-based society out of the ruins of the old Soviet structure will help ensure respect for human rights, and it will serve as a

foundation for economic revival, political stability, and general progress

for Georgia.

So I certainly hope that we can at least move in that direction. I

recognize that that may be an oversimplification, and I commend the

Chairman for holding this hearing at this important time.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and without objection your full statement will be made a part of the record.

Co-chairman D'Amato. I thank the chair.

Chairman Smith. I would like to invite to the witness table the distinguished Ambassador from Georgia, Ambassador Japaridze.

Mr. Ambassador.

TESTIMONY OF HON. TEDO JAPARIDZE,

 AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

Ambassador Japaridze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished

members----

Chairman Smith. Could you bring the mike a little bit closer, please?

Thank you.

Ambassador Japaridze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished

members of the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to your

Commission on behalf of my country, the Republic of Georgia.

I have been asked to address the issue of human rights abuses in

Georgia, and I intend to do so presently. Allow me to reflect for a moment on the irony of Georgia's position with respect to this Commission.

Only a few years ago no Georgian could have dreamed that he or she

would have an opportunity to address any institution of the U.S. Congress. At that time, we had no right to present our nation abroad or

even a right to any kind of independent statehood. Georgia, like many

of what you call the new states, was part of an empire whose very purpose was to usurp our identity, deny our aspirations as an historic people

and distinct culture, and prevent our freedom. To every Georgian

America was the place where abuse of these kinds could never take

place.

We watched with special pride and wonderment as the Congress and

the American people championed the emergence of free countries from

the beast of colonialism. I believe it was President Reagan who characterized the United States as a shining city on a hill. For those of us

locked in colonial bondage, President Reagan's words rang with clarity.
4

It is no exaggeration to say that Georgians have always felt a special

kinship with Americans, not the least because of our admiration for

your support of human rights as an elemental building block in a civil

society. We applauded when you sat and enforced strict human rights

standards in the conduct of foreign policy. How could we do otherwise?

We know first hand what it is to be on the receiving end of an empire

that places no value on human rights or the individual.

It is, therefore, ironic that one of my first official acts as the Georgian

ambassador to Washington is to explain and defend our record in a

single human rights event that is neither representative of our society

as a whole, nor a fair description of the distance we have traveled in our

efforts to build not just an acceptable human rights record, but, given

the circumstances under which we live, a rather good one.

Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the alleged abuse are themselves far from clear, and there is substantial evidence to suggest that

the reports of human rights abuse, particularly the British Helsinki

Commission report, suffer from serious exaggerations and errors.

I mean no disrespect or sarcasm when I observe that the Georgian

people, who are trying to develop a modern civilized state in the midst of

economic devastation, civil strife and political instability, will wonder

why Georgia's visible relationship with America should begin on this

note and at this time. Without diminishing the importance of human

rights, many will wonder about how priorities are set.

Cases like this one tend to distract attention from the significant

gains Georgia has made in establishing a viable democracy and extending human rights guarantees throughout Georgian society in the face

of unimaginable odds. Our country is still plagued by internal disorder,

a huge refugee problem, industrial breakdown, economic stagnation,

and political instability. We have not overcome the legacy of 70 years of

communist rule which has left deep psychological scars on our vibrant

nation, and which is at the root of many of the human rights violations

that occur.

A society like Georgia that only recently threw off a system that minimized the right of individuals relative to the state cannot leap automatically to a full embrace of human rights, regardless of the best intentions to do so.

At the same time, I must mention that the biggest problem we face

currently is terrorism, not terrorism of the kind that blows airplanes

from the sky, although this is certainly possible. I mean the terror

inflicted on the entire population of Georgia by those who are interested

in de-stabilizing our politics and undermining our economy, and which

resulted in emigration of up to 20 percent of Georgians from their homeland.

During the last 5 years, we suffered one civil war, two wars to defend

our territorial integrity. The last two resulted in the documented ethnic

cleansing of Georgians.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind one more time this Commission of more than 200,000 Georgian refugees in their own country who

are victims of ethnic cleansing, massive abuse of human rights. The

most recent abuses were noted on March 11–14, 1994, by the United

States.
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We asked countless times for the assistance of U.N. peacekeeping

forces to calm the hostilities. We asked for peacekeeping help from the

Western states. We asked for human rights groups to monitor the atrocities. Ultimately we accepted the Russian peacekeeping forces in the

region.

I would be bending the truth if I claimed that the introduction of

Russian peacekeeping forces was a popular step. Meanwhile the population of Georgia witnessed first hand the paralysis of peacekeeping and

human rights organizations to offer them the most basic protection or

mediation.

Every family in the country has been touched in some way by this

terror. Not surprisingly, many of them have developed a healthy skepticism about the West's willingness or ability to defend their human

rights in the face of flagrant abuse.

Against these formidable odds, Mr. Shevardnadze has led an aggressive effort to create the conditions that will make human rights less

dependent to the altering adverse social, political, and economic factors

that are at the root of many of man's baser instincts. Our goal is threefold.

First, we seek to reform society, which means to overcome our communist past. This will require changes in psychology of our population.

Such changes cannot be imposed solely from within or exclusively from

outside. They are the human outgrowth of changes elsewhere, particularly in the extension of economic opportunity and the normalization of

our political life.

Second, we seek to build a modern state that possesses the kind of

democratic institutions that are responsive to society and which can

support a free and honest political process. Our efforts are mainly placed

in three basic areas: (a) ensure the viability of multi-party parliament;

(b) create an active civic society; and (c) establish an independent judiciary system.

We welcome any assistance from various international organizations

and NGO's, including fact finding missions and international observers

from the United Nations, OSCE, Amnesty International, International

Alert, et cetera.

Third, the most important, we seek to reform the economy. It is selfevident that economic growth and recovery is the foundation upon which

almost everything else must be built. We have sought and continue to

seek Western, particularly American, aid to help us put this cornerstone in place.

I am not saying that without U.S. aid we will return to barbarism,

but let us be frank and honest. American generosity is an important

key to our recovery. Without it, creating the conditions that make human rights a central priority in our society will become infinitely more

difficult.

Since our liberation from communist tyranny, we have made enormous, though certainly not complete, progress toward building a state

that incorporates a respect for human rights and democracy at its very

core. While Georgians wish we could be compared favorably to the stricter

human rights standards that guide a number of Western nations, we

know we are not yet ready for that comparison.

I do not mean to imply that we should not be held accountable to the

higher standard. Of course, we should, but our zeal for perfection should

not obscure the significant progress that has already taken place in
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Georgia. When compared to where we were just two or three years ago,

Georgia's human rights record is vastly improved. This improvement

by itself should be seen as firm evidence of our commitment to achieve

much more and as an implicit promise that we shall, indeed, do so.

What does our progress look like? Here are some examples.

First, nongovernmental human rights groups report significantly

fewer abuses by Georgian security services during 1994. We have moved

aggressively to curb the potential for human rights abuses in this area.

For example, as Chairman Smith admitted, currently we detain under

arrest more than 350 former policemen who are charged with a variety

of crimes, including human rights abuses.

In addition, we have formally requested via the American Embassy

in Tbilisi specialized help from the United States to train our police and

other security forces in basic human rights policies and practices, as

well as we expect assistance from the IPMT, International Police and

Military Training, in this area.

Second, freedom of the press in 1994 was almost universal in Georgia, with active and important opposition media.

Third, multi-party elections that are free and fair are the norm

throughout Georgia, and there are many, many other evidences.

I do not ask you to take my word for any of these achievements. These

are the conclusions of the U.S. State Department in its most recent

reports on human rights in Georgia. The reports also noted correctly

that we have a long way to go.

Indeed, we do, but Georgians are extremely proud of these accomplishments, which I am sure you understand could not have happened

without a great deal of pain and sacrifice and social disruption. These

are not the accomplishments of a nation whose traditions and spirit are

indifferent to human rights.

While these accomplishments set our course in the right direction,

and even outdistance those of many states facing fewer obstacles and

less perverse recent histories, they do not make us a perfect society.

Far from it, individual passions still run high on many issues, and

individuals in Georgia acting on their passions can and do violate human rights and the norms of common decency. Georgia is not unique in

this regard.

At the same time, I can never agree that the heinous acts of a few

individuals or group of individuals can be ascribed collectively to the

Georgian people.

The State Department reports made another important and relevant

observation. The Georgian government does not prevent nongovernmental organizations from investigating human rights violations. Quite the

contrary, in fact, we have systematically removed impediments so that

those who wish to investigate our human rights practices may do so.

The State Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, which Mr.

Shevardnadze created in 1992, is no rubber stamp government department, as even our human rights detractors know. It is an active and

energetic critic.

We have welcomed many human rights groups to Georgia. We intend

to invite experts from the Victims of Torture, and we shall continue to

do so.

At the same time, it is not the case that outside human rights groups

are ipso facto correct in their analysis of what they believe to be human

rights violations simply because they are outside groups. For example,
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we do not accept the British Helsinki Commission's conclusions on the

case at hand. The evidence they collected of abuse is one sided and tendentious. They, and not only they, did not even speak to the official

organs they accuse of abusing the criminals. I have in mind the concrete investigators, concrete prosecutor, concrete prison employee or

attendant.

Georgians rightly ask: how is it possible that these groups accept the

word of criminals and terrorists over that of our officials? They dismiss

out of hand the observation of American Embassy political secretary

that the trial was fair and the behavior of the defendants was reprehensible. They have not considered other explanations for the apparent abuse,

which are logical, supportable, and documented.

Their reports leave the impression that we are hiding something or,

worse, that we are lying. Yet they fail to explain why we would throw

open the doors to them and others to conduct their investigations if our

intention is to deceive. Where is the logic?

Mr. Chairman, our government has undertaken to strengthen these

areas of basic human rights not because we fear the scrutiny of committees and commissions, but because it is due and proper responsibility of Mr. Shevardnadze's government. We wish to be open and honest

about our efforts.

I doubt that I am the first Ambassador to note the irony of this position, that our openness and willingness to be scrutinized by outsiders

has resulted in the criticism that brings me before this Commission,

but I can assure you that this is a risk we are prepared to accept.

With respect to this case of the convicted terrorists, Mr. Shevardnadze,

as you, Mr. Chairman, admitted, has made it clear that due process

will be followed and the defendants' rights and that international standards will be applied. The Appeals Commission must review the sentences, and if appropriate, Mr. Shevardnadze as Head of State will become involved after that review.

He has indicated his willingness to listen to all sides, including relevant human rights organizations who will have the right to examine

all documentation, and he particularly requested yesterday OSCE to

monitor the appeals process.

I would be remiss if I failed to note how difficult Mr. Shevardnadze's

position is in this regard. No one disputes the defendants' guilt, and

Mr. Shevardnadze is under great pressure from many Georgians for

not doing enough to control terrorism and crime. Being tough on crime

has a much different meaning in our context than in the United States

of America, you can well imagine. It is, indeed, a delicate balancing act

to be tough on crime, on one hand, while attempting to observe human

rights when the methods of training required for these areas have not

been yet fully implemented.

How carefully Mr. Shevardnadze walks this fine line will have a strong

influence on Georgian public opinion on human rights issues, and it

will set the tone for our ongoing efforts to improve human rights observance in Georgia.

Mr. Chairman, Georgians are no different from anyone else in our

dislike of criticism, but we are very different from many states in our

willingness to encourage healthy and honest criticism of our own national growth. We shall continue to ask the U.S. Government for assis-
8

tance in supporting our efforts to make human rights protection an

integral part of our civic culture, and we shall continue to seek the

advice of this Commission.

Thank you for your time and for your attention.

Chairman Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very, very much for

your testimony, and we do welcome the overture by Eduard Shevardnadze

to welcome the OSCE to monitor the appeals process. I think that is a

very positive step, and I would hope that you would be able to stay on

while the other panelists make their presentations, at which time I and

other members who I think will be joining us by then will pose some

questions to our distinguished witnesses.

We do have three other witnesses to appear today, and I want to ask

them to come to the witness table as I introduce them.

Erika Dailey is a researcher for Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, and

was the Director of their Moscow office for the past year. She completed

her tour of duty last week.

Ms. Dailey has written many reports on human rights, democratization, and nationality conflicts in the former Soviet Union. She is the

author of three reports documenting abuses and violations of due process in the trial that I had mentioned earlier.

Welcome, Ms. Dailey.

Dr. Eduard Gudava, President of the U.S.-Georgia Foundation, was

a dissident in Georgia during the Soviet period and left the USSR in

1987. I well remember his testimony before the Helsinki Commission

at that time when he appeared before us.

He has been closely affiliated with a leading opposition force in Georgia, the National Democratic Party. The U.S.-Georgia Foundation, which

he heads, promotes the transformation of Georgia into a democratic,

free market society.

And finally, Dr. Stephen Jones, Associate Professor of Russian and

Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College, is a specialist on Georgia,

where he spent 5 months doing research in 1994. He is the author of

over 35 articles on past and current politics in Georgia and the

Transcaucasus.

I welcome all of our witnesses and would ask, Erika, if you would

begin, and then Dr. Gudava and Dr. Jones, if you would.

Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF MS. ERIKA DAILEY, RESEARCHER, HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI

Ms. Dailey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of Human Rights Watch, which is an independent, nonpartisan, human rights organization, I would like to thank you very much

for the opportunity to address you today. We welcome the work of the

Helsinki Commission. It has conducted extremely consistent and careful attention to the Georgian human rights situation.

From a human rights perspective, the Republic of Georgia holds a

special place in the constellation of former Soviet republics. On the one

hand, it practices and condones serious abuses, including state sponsored torture, and presides over a justice system that is often corrupt

and fails to protect basic human rights and due process. On the other

hand, much progress has been made, mostly notably in the area of free

speech. Georgia does not interfere with foreign monitoring, and indeed,

in many ways cooperates with it. It protects enough free speech to allow
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violations to come to light and be discussed in a positive way, and the

government and society as a whole generally respond positively to external pressure for change. It is also a country with which the United

States enjoys good and active relations. Therefore, the United States

can and should use its authority to push for change in abusive practices.

Human Rights Watch has conducted investigations on a broad spectrum of violations in Georgia several times a year since 1991, documenting violations of international law under both former President

Zviad Gamsakhurdia and current Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze.

In my capacity as a researcher, I personally have been there four

times since June 1994 alone and was in Abkhazia just 2 weeks ago.

Our representatives meet regularly with government officials and

representatives of international organizations, take testimony from refugees, the wounded, combatants, and prisoners, and attend trials in which

there are reported due process violations. We have issued reports on

laws of war violations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and numerous

reports and letters of concern about abuse of civil and political rights,

and maintain an open dialog with the Georgian government.

Human rights abuse in Georgia spans the full scope of rights. Police

arrest arbitrarily and harass individuals, sometimes because of their

opposition to the current administration, and disrupt peaceful public

demonstrations. Prison conditions are appalling, with prison doctors

often presiding over the beatings and torture of inmates. The law enforcement bodies, judiciary and penal branches of government, are often corrupt and abusive. Today, however, I would like to focus on some

of the most pressing violations, specifically the laws of war violations in

Abkhazia, denial of the right to due process, and torture, by which we

understand cruel and inhuman treatment.

Thanks to the ongoing U.N.-sponsored peace process in Abkhazia,

the guns have largely fallen silent there between the Abkhazian rebels

and Georgian government forces in the 16-month conflict spanning 1992

to 1994. This development has curbed perhaps the single greatest source

of human rights in Georgia in recent years.

However, based on recent field work, Human Rights Watch believes

there remains a great risk that human rights violations will persist on

a large scale in Abkhazia. Individuals who have committed atrocities

during the war on both sides have not been punished, and courts on the

Georgian and Abkhazian sides are not equipped to arrest and try fairly

their own combatants or those of the enemy.

Until those criminals are apprehended, there is little chance for reintegration of the warring sides in Abkhazia. A political deadlock and the

unwillingness of the Abkhazian authorities to facilitate the safe return

of displaced persons have left homeless some 200,000 individuals, overwhelmingly ethnic Georgians, denying them their right to return home.

Moreover, since Russia's attack on Chechnya in December 1994,

Moscow has imposed strict controls on its border with Abkhazia. Ostensibly the controls were instituted to prevent arms and combatants from

flowing into Chechnya and escalating the violence there. However, in

effect, it has blocked food and medicine from reaching the civilian population in Abkhazia, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Russia has

also failed to identify and punish members of its armed forces who provided arms to combatants during the war in Abkhazia, which were

used against the civilian population causing widespread atrocities. If
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the mandates for the U.N. military observers and Russian peacekeepers are not renewed in May, as they are scheduled to be, the fragile

peace in Abkhazia is seriously jeopardized.

The brutality and lawlessness that characterized military behavior

on both sides of the conflict in Abkhazia is an extension of the brutality

practiced by Georgian law enforcement throughout the republic and,

indeed, in many parts of the former Soviet Union. We have interviewed

scores of individuals in Georgia who have been brutally beaten and in

some cases burned with cigarettes, hot iron rods, and scalding water in

order to extract confessions. Among these victims were old men and a

blind woman.

By the accounting of the Georgian government's own Committee on

Human Rights and Interethnic Relations, 50 detainees died in 1993 in a

single facility in the capital due to mistreatment and neglect. Indeed,

Human Rights Watch has found that brutality is so common during

arrest and interrogation that many victims we spoke to did not even see

it as torture, merely as routine.

To maintain the human face on victims of abuse in Georgia, Human

Rights Watch has focused particular attention on a single criminal case

recently prosecuted in the Georgian capital, Criminal Case No. 7493810,

which you mentioned earlier, as did the Ambassador. I would like to

read the testimony given to me by one of the suspects in that case who

was arrested in 1992. The other 18 co-defendants in the case have complained of similar physical and psychological abuse at the hands of police and other prisoners at the behest of the prison officials.

I am citing now:

The same night I was arrested, the security forces started beating

and torturing me. They didn't say what they wanted from me. They hit

me with their fists, with clubs, kicked me, held me upside down, beat

the soles of my feet, my head. It lasted all night. You hang there. People

come in and out. I lost consciousness several times, but they would

burn me or throw water on me to wake me up. I was covered in blood. I

kept going in and out of consciousness.

The next day I was all blue from head to toe. My left leg and arm were

broken, and I had cuts all over. They tried too hard. I couldn't stay

conscious. The doctor said, ``If you don't take him to the hospital he'll

die.'' They took me to the hospital. I couldn't move. I could only sit or lie

flat.

The interrogations continued, different people doing the interrogations. They would dictate my testimony. They began pouring boiling

water on the right side of my neck and my back. They made me put on

a shirt when they took me to the official. They made me wear a heavy

jacket, which you can imagine on burned skin. . . .

I said, ``Tell me what you want and I'll sign.'' I had said this before.

First they said I should write that I was involved in the terrorist act

against Jaba Ioseliani. They brought in electric shock cords. I was already dreaming of dying. I wanted them to apply the shock cords. It is

easy to say now, but then I was hoping that they would kill me, but the

chief officer said I was already ready to sign. I was held in solitary

confinement for a month after that so that no one would see the results

of the torture.

As in many cases in Georgia, such illegally obtained testimony is

then submitted as evidence in court, although the fact of abuse by law

enforcement agents is not. Indeed, as international protest against the
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prosecution of Case No. 7493810 grew in 1994, the judge expelled 12 of

the 19 defendants from the courtroom for the final several months of

the trial. The man whose testimony I just read was expelled for allegedly smirking. That was the quotation from the legal document under

which he was expelled from the courtroom. All but one of those expelled

potentially faced capital punishment, and most were unrepresented by

a lawyer.

All were convicted to prison sentences. Two are in legal limbo. Two

await execution today.

This type of unbridled abuse has closely touched on U.S. interests as

well. The man convicted of the 1993 murder of CIA Agent Fred Woodruff claims to have been tortured into confessing. These serious charges

are not known to have been investigated, and Anzor Sharmaidze is currently serving a lengthy prison sentence in Georgia.

Our organization takes no position on the guilt or innocence of any of

these individuals. Human Rights Watch draws attention to these cases

for two reasons. First, because such appalling treatment demands redress. Second, we see Criminal Case No. 7493810 as a microcosm of

abuse which is pervasive in Georgia. We hope that by focusing a spotlight of international attention on a specific case we cannot only help

avert a gross miscarriage of justice, but in the long term break the

pattern of abuse. We seek to set a precedent of government candor and

responsibility for the actions of its law enforcement and judicial bodies

and for establishing proper legal protections in the future.

We welcome the opportunity to speak before you today, in particular,

because we are concerned that the U.S. Government is not known to

have raised concern about Georgia's dismal human rights record recently, except for the letter that you recently mentioned.

The United States has provided critically needed humanitarian aid

and administers extremely valuable educational programs in Georgia.

The immediate intercession of the embassy has prevented abuse. In the

past a single phone call from the Human Rights Officer has stopped

prisoners from being beaten in detention.

However, the U.S. Government appears to have limited its protests

almost exclusively to the work of its embassy and to the pages of its

annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The government's

own findings are not known to have translated into the U.S. bilateral

agenda. That must change.

We call on the U.S. Government to speak out publicly and vigorously

against the broad spectrum of abuse practiced or tolerated by the Georgian government and to send a clear message that perpetuation of these

practices will harm full cooperative relations with the United States.

We also call on the U.S. Government to urge the Russian Government

to lift the blockade of foodstuffs and medicines it has imposed along the

Abkhazian border. We urge the Clinton administration to support the

expanded work of the American Embassy, U.S. Aid Programs, and the

OSCE in upholding and teaching about the rule of law, and to help

furnish an OSCE mission with a human rights mandate in Abkhazia,

and to help finance the U.N. peacekeeping and CIS de-mining program

in Abkhazia. We respectfully request that President Clinton take advantage of Mr. Shevardnadze's scheduled visit later this year to communicate these concerns and to make respect for human rights the

centerpiece for all future bilateral relations with the Republic of Georgia.
12

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Ms. Dailey, I want to thank you for your very fine

testimony, and in a few moments I will pose some questions to you, but

at this point I would like to ask Dr. Gudava if he would make some

comments.

Dr. Gudava. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Smith. And just let me note that your full statement, if

you care to summarize, will be made a part of the record, but proceed as

you wish.

Dr. Gudava. I am going to make just a partial statement, and I hope

the full statement will be put in the record.

Chairman Smith. Without objection, it will be.

TESTIMONY OF DR. EDUARD GUDAVA,

PRESIDENT, U.S.–GEORGIA FOUNDATION

Dr. Gudava. Thank you.

Thank you for inviting me here. Unfortunately Georgia is plunged in

darkness by all meanings of the word. Water, gas, and electricity are

frequently unavailable, even in the capital Tbilisi. The economy is in

shambles. Industry is functioning at less than a fifth of its capacity,

and inflation is doubling each month. The standard of living has dropped

far beyond poverty.

As for human rights, it is no wonder that in the background of such

a disastrous general situation in Georgia, the abuses of internationally

recognized human rights continues routinely.

I am familiar with all reports on that subject, both governmental and

nongovernment. I entirely agree with these assessments. The only point

that I believe really needs to be made here is that most of human rights

abuses in Georgia were inherited from the past. They are nothing new.

Generally speaking, the entire Georgian judiciary system consisting of

the old Soviet appointees is corrupt. It often receives its orders from

powerful personalities, both from within and from outside the government.

Also, there is nothing new in torture being used in criminal investigations or injustice found in penitentiaries. These are remnants of the

old Soviet system. Anyone who was lucky enough to enjoy a relationship with the Soviet penitentiary system, and I was, can testify to the

fact that prison officials use certain inmates to oppress other target

prisoners.

Soviet investigators did not bother to waste their resources conducting costly investigations or trials, such as we do here, for example, O.J.

Simpson. The Soviet judicial system tended to speed up the judicial

process by simply forcing the criminal suspect to confess, regardless of

the suspect's guilt.

These practices have been inherited by many of the USSR successor

states, including Georgia.

However, there is something that is absolutely new and absolutely

dangerous and menacing in many of the newly independent states, especially in Georgia: the explosion of killings, organized crime, and political assassinations in Georgia is coupled with another new phenomenon: the utter impotence of the authorities in dealing with these

matters. These are the urgent human rights issues in Georgia and are

of paramount importance.
13

I would like to switch the attention from the just mentioned 19 sentenced people in the recent trial which took place in Tbilisi to the same

number, 19, political assassinations which we currently have in Georgia, investigations of which have gone nowhere.

It is true there have been contract killings in many other regions of

the former USSR. The well-publicized recent assassination of Russian

TV Network Director Vlad Listyev drew worldwide attention to the problem. Yet I would like to stress the evidence difference between such

murders in Georgia and other regions.

In Georgia, political assassinations are committed in broad daylight.

Killers do not bother to cover their faces or hurry up during and after

their crimes. The criminals openly demonstrate their fearlessness of

the law.

The flourishing of such a terrible criminal environment has been

harmful for political and social life. As a result, efforts to transform

Georgia into a democratic and civilized nation based on respect for the

rule of law have been stymied.

Along with the corruption that plagues the current administration,

Georgia, as well as many new republics and Russia, is sinking into an

abyss of contract killings, drug trafficking, money laundering, and bank

fraud.

Organized crime discredits the market system and undermines democratic institutions. The government must drastically reorganize their

law enforcement and legal systems. It should involve the creation of

entirely new criminal investigation agencies, the arrests and prosecutions of suspected prominent criminals, the rewriting of the criminal

code to better define organized crime, and the recruiting and training of

a new judiciary.

These are just a few first steps that should be taken.

Governments must apply economic policies that foster the free market, not mafia development. The West should cooperate with local law

enforcement authorities as much as possible to share computerized data

on criminal activity to identify trustworthy and reliable law enforcement personnel in Georgia, to provide help in writing criminal codes,

and to create witness relocation programs, et cetera.

The topics of expanding crime in the former Soviet Bloc countries and

appropriate Western reactions are in-depth topics, the details of which

are beyond the bounds of the discussion today.

Nevertheless, this troublesome rise in crime should be the focus today because without dealing with this fundamental obstacle to the normalization and decriminalization of Georgia and other countries in the

region, it is impossible to speak meaningfully about human rights and

democratization.

Talking about democratization, what the United States could and

should do, severe problems are on both ends of this process, both for the

aid supplying country and recipient, Georgia. On the one hand, Georgia

has met all of the qualifications to be excluded from U.S. assistance

programs, such as Food for Progress, Public Law 480, and others because it does not meet the requirements for such assistance.

However, the United States-Georgia Foundation which I represent

here does not recommend severing aid right now and considers it necessary to continue U.S. governmental assistance to the Republic of Georgia for a number of reasons.
14

If U.S. aid is eliminated entirely, it would worsen matters for the

population because Georgia entirely depends on humanitarian grain

shipments from abroad. Chaos and crime would intensify, resulting in

advancement of organized crime structures.

Terminating U.S. aid to Georgia would leave her alone with the Russian modern expansionism that is worsening the situation in Caucasus. A slide into an irreversible and complete criminal anarchy that

would endanger the stability of not only Georgia and the Transcaucasus

region, but eventually this would affect the Western world through the

expansion of organized crime. Hence, a cut in aid would actually be

detrimental to U.S. national interests.

The United States-Georgia Foundation's democratic friends inside

Georgia tell us that aid is still an important symbol of U.S. commitment to them in their standoff against the Russian drive to reestablish

an empire. Aid visibly demonstrates the Western support to the cause

of democracy in Georgia, and we at USGF strongly believe that the

United States aid to the Republic of Georgia should be intensified despite the current disastrous situation indicates that the country is not

currently moving substantially forward on its path toward democratization.

Stating that U.S. aid to the Republic of Georgia is greatly needed does

not mean, however, that the current programs utilizing this aid denote

the right solution. I would like to note that the effectiveness of the assistance to a foreign country in general, especially channeled through such

a rigid, sophisticated, bureaucratic apparatus as the Agency for International Development, is highly questionable.

The countries which have been heavily subsidized by AID remain

very poor because aid and technical assistance to them did not encourage the full scale transition to a free market. Instead, heavy dependence on foreign aid slowed down the development of the economic freedom infrastructures, and promoted statist economic policies.

Georgia does not need to be listed on AID's eternal list of subsidized

countries. What Georgia desperately needs is the United States' tangible help setting up democratic institutions, the rule of law, and free

market infrastructures. Precisely for this purpose, our foundation was

created here in Washington, D.C., at the request of Georgia's political

leaders and free market reformers.

Unfortunately, this type of potentially invaluable aid has not been

provided to the republic yet. In spite of the fact that we prepared a

number of pilot projects in many spheres of the democratization process, it has been impossible so far to move things from the ground because of the current bureaucratic incapability of the U.S. foreign aid

complex.

Based on my first-hand experience in dealing with the system, we

thoroughly support the current initiative of the leaders of the 104th

Congress to modernize the U.S. foreign aid complex in order to make it

more effective.

The success of supplying Georgia with United States aid rests on the

following primary principles.

The first, control of the distribution of aid should decrease the possibility of this aid somehow serving to enrich the criminal elements in

Georgia.
15

Second, the U.S. legislature should support innovative ways to improve the program design, efficiency, and delivery of aid to the Republic

of Georgia.

Third, the best personnel, expertise, and technical resources available in both the United States and Georgia must be involved in the

assistance process in order to make such aid effective and insure against

worsening the Georgian situation.

Fourth, active U.S. intervention to assist Georgia in the transition to

a free market economy and a healthy democratic state based on internationally recognized respect for the rule of law and human rights can

be undertaken only with the consent and willingness of the powers that

exercise control over Georgia.

Fifth, the Russian factor must be considered in all attempts of active

engagement with Georgia. The Russian Federation must be aware and

at least minimally supportive of Western assistance in Georgia in order

to ensure stability and friendliness in the region, while protecting the

practical feasibility of aid projects.

Sixth, it is naive to expect that Western aid will heal Georgian wounds

overnight. However, so long as the United States remains engaged,

there is a chance that Georgia will eventually join the community of

civilized nations. If the United States and the West isolate themselves

from Georgia, that possibility disappears.

To achieve American foreign policy goals, United States aid to the

Republic of Georgia must be delivered quickly and efficiently. This cannot be accomplished if the old approach and reliance on AID experts

remain.

In conclusion, I would like to list the steps to be made by the U.S. in

order to achieve the needed results in providing aid to the Republic of

Georgia.

First, continue conditioned assistance. A strong statement should be

made in order to make clear for the Georgian people that such assistance is given not as a gesture of supporting the developments in Georgia, which have been quite bad, but this aid serves vital U.S. national

security goals. Strong caution should be expressed. The Georgian government must understand that political support for the supply of aid

cannot be maintained in the United States if the Georgian government

continues its scornful attitude toward human rights and the rule of

law.

Second, strict control of any assistance distribution. In order to stretch

the value of U.S. taxpayer dollars and be sure that they are used for

promoting and strengthening young democratic and free market structures, a control mechanism must be available. Otherwise the United

States aid will disappear like water in the sand.

Moreover, if this aid ends up going to corrupt institutions, the final

result is quite opposite. It strengthens the criminal structures. Therefore, control as to how the U.S. aid is distributed and used is crucial for

the advancement of positive changes. The U.S. Embassy must have

unlimited access to restrain any transactions involving U.S. aid funds.

Third, increase the volume of U.S.-Georgian nongovernmental program. We believe that private U.S. NGO programs are the most effective for supplying aid to Georgia. Since Georgia is a compact country,

the scale of its aid programs does not require a huge administrative

force and very successfully might be managed excluding big bureaucracies, such as AID, USIA, and others.
16

According to existing U.S. code, these types of programs must be

conducted through a special bank account that must be under the total

control of the U.S. Embassy. NGO delivered aid could be very valuable

in Georgia since substantial amounts of aid funds could be saved in low

overhead, administrative costs. Small private organizations are more

dynamic and creative. Their financial activity in the recipient country

is under the control of the U.S. Embassy. The funds to broaden assistance programs through private NGO's might be obtained from the

shrinking of the government-to-government type of aid.

Fourth, provide support to independent NGO's in Georgia, specialized human rights monitoring groups, and independent media in Georgia. It is axiomatic that the best antidote for all kinds of shadowy activities is the existence of free and independent mass media. Therefore, it is

of paramount importance to strengthen existing private media entities

and to encourage the creation of new ones.

Fifth, intensify the U.S. foreign broadcast services. It is hard to understand that such a well developed and sufficient mechanism of civic

education, such as Voice of America and Radio Liberty, which has been

so effective during the communist era, now when there is a great need

to transfer Western knowledge and expertise to the states of the former

Soviet Union are losing its identity and becoming less effective.

We consider the Radio Liberty and Voice of America must utilize the

Western expertise on the subjects and intensify their broadcasts to deliver to Georgian listeners the quality educational programs on human

rights, the rule of law, and free markets.

And the last one, the United States should pursue innovative ways to

improve the program design, efficiency, and delivery of aid to Georgia.

In order to be effective, the aid must take advantage of the best experts,

personnel, and technical resources available in both the United States

and Georgia.

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much, Dr. Gudava.

And last, but not least, it is my privilege to welcome Dr. Jones to

testify before our Commission, and again, proceed however you would

like, Doctor, if you would like to summarize or if you would like to go

with your entire statement.

TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN JONES,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RUSSIAN

 AND EURASIAN STUDIES, MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE

Dr. Jones. I will give a shortened version of the testimony.

Chairman Smith. Without objection, your full statement will be a

part of the record.

Dr. Jones. Right. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission for inviting me here and giving me the chance to talk to you about Georgia.

When Mr. Ochs invited me to be a witness at this hearing, he asked

me to give a broad context to the current situation in Georgia, and

that's what I'll be doing.

When Eduard Shevardnadze came to power in Georgia in March 1992,

of the multiple and interrelated tasks that he faced, the most pressing

were an end to the wars in South Ossetia and West Georgia, accommo-
17

dation with Georgia's ethnic minorities, reestablishment of civilian control over the paramilitaries, and the restoration of some normality in

economic life.

Shevardnadze's period in office has brought mixed results in all of

these areas, and many of these problems remain unresolved. He has

been dogged by powerful paramilitaries unwilling to cede their power,

Russian military intervention in Abkhazia and to a lesser extent in

South Ossetia, devastation of the economic and political infrastructures,

and a population severely handicapped by its Soviet mentality.

Despite these obstacles, Shevardnadze's realism and his willingness

to compromise brought the conflict in South Ossetia to an end within 3

months of his arrival. Within 7 months in October 1992, he had established a newly elected parliament and a temporary power structure

with himself popularly elected as both Chairman of parliament and

Head of State.

The appeasement of former President Gamsakhurdia's followers and

the National minorities proved less easy. A civil war with ex-President

Gamsakhurdia's supporters bested in the West Georgian region of

Mingrella lasted until the fall of 1993, and a more violent war with

Abkhazian separatists which broke out in August 1992 and ended in

Georgia's defeat in September 1993 with the loss of the Abkhazian autonomous republic and between five to 10,000 lives.

All of these things undermined Shevardnadze's attempt to rebuild

Georgian institutions and ``civilianize'' the Georgia paramilitaries. The

permanent military crisis increased the power of the paramilitaries

particularly in the absence of a regular army, worsened the crime rate

as armed soldiers returned home to joblessness, and undermined the

legal power structures set up by the temporary law on power in November 1992.

The parliament, due to a bad electoral law designed to prevent a repeat of the single party monopoly under Gamsakhurdia, produced 26

parties. The inexperience of the new politicians, the limited power given

to the speaker and parliamentary authorities to control the conduct of

debates, the newness of procedure, and a traditional Georgian skepticism toward authority were not unsurmountable barriers to an effective legislature.

But fluctuations in the fortunes of war and mistakes in its conduct,

and condemnation of Shevardnadze's policy of ``capitulation'' to the

Russians who eventually forced Georgia back into the CIS, led to a hysterical legislature and highly charged partisanship which prevented

compromise, sabotaged the parliament's legislative program, and undermined public confidence in parliamentary politics.

Bitter distrust between the parliamentary opposition and

Shevardnadze grew as the latter, ignoring parliament's sensibilities but

needing to take action, gained and used emergency powers to tackle

Georgia's military, financial, and political crises. The weak and disorganized parliament has undermined a central pillar of the new constitutional structure in Georgia and has done great damage to the longterm health of Georgian democracy.

The war not only undermined Georgian democracy, but also undermined the Georgian economy. All resources were devoted to the war

effort. Economic reform was indefinitely postponed, and following

Georgia's defeat in Abkhazia, the state was burdened with almost a

quarter of a million refugees.
18

Shevardnadze cannot be blamed alone for the 1994 levels of industrial

and agricultural output and labor productivity which have fallen to

below the level of the 1960's. He inherited many of these problems and

was forced to fight a war without adequate resources.

But until September 1994, when under pressure from the World Bank

and the IMF the first steps were taken to implement real economic

reform, there has been no effective privatization of large scale industry,

total confusion in land redistribution, continued massive price and employment subsidies, an absence of revenue collection, and an uncontrolled budget deficit.

This led to a massive decline in living standards and unprecedented

levels of poverty as the salaries paid by the government in official coupons became totally worthless.

The Shevardnadze administration has made some progress in reducing crime, and since the appointment of Vardik'o Nadibaidze as Defense

Minister in April 1994, he has begun to restore a regular military subject to civilian control. He has ended Georgia's international isolation

and brought relations with the strategic neighbors of Russia, Armenia

and the North Caucasus onto a more even keel.

Although his commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts with the

Abkhazians and the Ossetians backed by the Russians has brought

only limited success, both Abkhazia and Ossetia remain outside Georgian control, and despite a signed agreement with the Abkhazian separatists in May 1994 for the return of refugees, very few have been permitted by the Abkhazians to return 10 months later.

In order to bring peace to Georgia, Shevardnadze has effectively sacrificed a great deal of Georgian sovereignty. Russia exercises the greatest influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in return for its arbitration of the separatist conflicts it had militarily supported, it has

been granted four military bases, joint use of all Georgia's ports and

airfields, and supervision of Georgia's borders.

Shevardnadze's administration, despite the war in Abkhazia, has

improved relations with Georgia's national minorities. He has preserved

basic civil liberties, despite pressures from a state under siege to introduce more authoritarian measures. His record in the field compares

favorably with President Ter Petrosian of Armenia, who recently banned

the largest official opposition party and closed down 12 newspapers and

news agencies in Armenia. Shevardnadze also has an incomparably

better record than Gaidar Aliev in neighboring Azerbaijan.

Regarding human rights, the charges against Shevardnadze's government are very serious indeed. Anybody who has read the British

Helsinki Human Rights Group report on the torture of prisoners in

Georgia must be greatly alarmed, but although it pains me to say this,

I do agree with the Ambassador after reading the report that there were

serious inaccuracies in this report, underlined in my view by a certain

one-sidedness.

I will only say the following without any attempt to downgrade the

abuses highlighted by the Helsinki Watch Commission.

First, in the political chaos of Georgia, the disregard of rules and

responsibility continue to affect all institutions from the parliament

and ministries to the police and the judiciary.
19

Second, the wiring of the old Soviet state is still in place, by which I

mean a corrupt judiciary and police force. Everyone is aware of that,

including Eduard Shevardnadze, and there is as yet very little opportunity to replace them with new and untainted personnel.

This requires time and more attention to the problem than Western

countries have been willing to give so far.

Third, Georgia shares with other former Soviet republics absent legacies, such as the rule of law, accountable bureaucracies, and relationship of trust with the government.

Fourth, traditional Georgian political culture emphasizes patron-client relationships rather than institutional ones. Loyalty, even when

it's misguided, and the use of gifts and bribes to secure influence have

all contributed to Shevardnadze's inability to institutionalize Georgian

democracy or to make it more than surface deep.

As head of state, Shevardnadze has a large apparatus which parallels

the government, but despite full use of his prerogatives to issue decrees

and states of emergency, his power to change old habits is limited. He

can punish, which he should do more energetically than he is doing

currently, but I don't think it is useful to spotlight Shevardnadze's role

when discussing the abuse of prisoners, just as I would not single out

the Clinton administration for racism in the Los Angeles police force.

The problem of human rights abuse in Georgia cannot be solved by

fiat. Rather, it is a reflection of a brutal legacy, the current state of

society, and the absence of effective institutional control from above and

civic control from below.

But it must be said that the concentration of power in Shevardnadze's

hands, his seeming indifference to the self-destruction of the Georgian

parliament, and the retention of conservative ``apparatchiks'' in

policymaking positions is undermining popular faith in the institutions

of democracy and the market.

Shevardnadze managed to save the Georgian ship of state when it

was perilously close to sinking, but he has given it little direction since,

partly because of the permanent political and military crisis in the country. In attempting to reassert political authority and end the feudalization

of Georgian politics characterized by the rise of unaccountable economic

and political barons who run their spheres through informal networks,

mutual favors, and obligations, Shevardnadze faces a dilemma.

Should he continue to keep power in his own hands, promote trusted

but conservative friends, ignore the ineffective legislature, and stall

major economic change which can only temporarily at least worsen the

population's economic well-being? This is a course designed to muddle

through.

Or should he take a risk and remove economic subsidies, reform the

welfare system, replace experienced ``apparatchiks'' with inexperienced

reformers, push harder for a reconstructed and perhaps more challenging parliament, and remove corrupt leadership figures like Jaba Ioseliani

who out of government may de-stabilize Georgian society at a time of

intensified economic pain?

The second course in the short term is more politically unstable and

certainly more painful, but unless Shevardnadze's administration is

encouraged to take it with substantial economic support from the West,

Georgians may find themselves led by a politician who lacks the scruples

and the experience of Eduard Shevardnadze.
20

Western Europe and the United States can help Shevardnadze's government accomplish the second course. This is not a time to reduce aid,

nor after the experience in Chechnya which was partly a result of the

West's passivity and indifference to similar Russian behavior in Abkhazia

is it a time to further isolate Georgia.

All human rights abuses must be condemned. The most egregious, of

course, are happening today in the Russian controlled area of Abkhazia,

but engagement, education, and economic carrots are the way to deal

with it, not economic penalties, which will only further de-stabilize

Georgia and make further human rights violations more rather than

less likely.

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much, Dr. Jones.

I would like to acknowledge that Congressman Wolf, Commissioner

Wolf, is with us today, and he has been a longstanding member of this

Commission, very concerned about human rights everywhere in the

world, especially in the newly independent states, and himself was briefly

in Tbilisi last September.

Before beginning some of the questioning, I noticed as each of you was

speaking that some were nodding in agreement or disagreement. If there

might be some comments, Mr. Ambassador, you might want to make

in response to some of the comments made by our witnesses, not to turn

this into a free-for-all, but I think it would be helpful to hear some of the

interplay between our panelists, and then I intend on posing some questions.

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Japaridze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank you very much, you personally and

the Commission members, for this opportunity to participate in these

extremely interesting, positive hearings concerning my country, the

Republic of Georgia, and I would like to thank very much the participants, the panel, and participants of this discussion for their constructive criticism, their ideas, their suggestions.

Though with some of them I cannot agree and some of them, as panel

participants have just admitted, some of these arguments are just onesided. I would like to come back to Mr. Jones' phrase about Georgians'

traditional skepticism toward government and toward law. Maybe it is

true, but at the same time we should take into account where Georgia

used to be just a couple of years ago.

We may put it another way, you know. Unfortunately, Georgians

traditionally had antipathy toward Soviet law, and it should take a

certain amount of time before Georgians, I speak about Georgian society, Georgian citizens, understand that they should be obedient to law,

and it is not already Soviet, but it takes time. I agree with Mr. Jones'

remarks in general.

Speaking about Ms. Dailey's remarks, there is no doubt we cannot

agree with what is going on in Georgia speaking about the law enforcement officers, but this at the same time, you know, is the concrete case.

It is not the microcosm of what is going on in Georgia in general.

I would like also to say Ms. Dailey, how you look at Georgia--the

bottle is half empty or the bottle is half full. For me it is half full, and

it's a process. It's a very positive process, though I also am very open to

your criticism and will take your remarks in general into consideration. At the same time I want to mention the terrible story you have
21

just told. You did not mention the name of this poor man or lady. I have

different arguments and as an ambassador I should not accept your

arguments. I received a letter from the First Deputy Prosecutor of Georgia who says the opposite--maybe he is wrong. I don't know, and maybe

you are wrong, but I would have appreciated your argument about this

torture incident or this story about this man or lady if after visiting the

prison you would have gone to the place where these 350 policemen are

detained now and you would have asked the question to one of them who

might have participated in torturing these people because I'm sure that

these policemen, you know, if you had asked this question, might have

told you another story.

But at this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank all of the

panelists and first of all Ms. Dailey, who was especially critical, for this

constructive criticism, and we'll take all of this information back home

and inform my government.

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Ms. Dailey, did you want to respond?

Ms. Dailey. Yes. We certainly welcome the Ambassador's statements

and look forward to future dialogue on these issues, which I know are of

mutual interest and importance.

Concerning the issues of torture, I respectfully disagree. We have

followed the issues of police brutality for several years now, and as I

said, we believe that these are not isolated instances. This is common

practice.

As Mr. Gudava mentioned, this has certainly been going on since the

Soviet period. What we're looking forward to in Georgia is, through the

assistance of the international community and the cooperation of the

Georgian authorities, to recognize this as the problem that it is, which

is widespread, and to curb it immediately.

As you know, under international law there is never any justification

for torture under any circumstances. There have been statements by

the authorities that, for example, as part of the fight against terrorism

many things happened. Certainly our respected guests will appreciate

that there is no justification and that certainly the fight against terrorism is not furthered by the practice of torture.

These are issues that we have engaged in dialogue with the Georgian

authorities about and look forward to cooperating on.

Ambassador Japaridze. Just a short remark, Mr. Chairman.

I thank Ms. Dailey for her counter-remark. At the same time, I would

like one more time to admit that I would like Georgia to be, as well as I

understand you want, to be a shining city, but we are not a shining

city. We were formally independent; we were formally sovereign; we are

members of different international organizations, but the most important thing is that we are in a transitional period, and we are within this

process, which is a long, painful, and as I told Ms. Dailey and other

participants and the members of this Commission, that we are open to

any kind of constructive criticism and will be ready to accept it. Just in

the morning I get a call from Mr. Shevardnadze, and he asked me to

deliver his gratitude and his appreciation for this Commission's efforts.

He told me, you know, that he expects, you know, this constructive

criticism and is ready to answer any question and work with any human rights organization or the delegation from your or other Commission.
22

Chairman Smith. Let me say that that kind of transparency and

openness is certainly appreciated.

You know, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices notes that police routinely beat, and I am quoting here,

routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees during pre-trial detention. I was wondering of the 350 policemen who are incarcerated for,

quote, various crimes how many, if any, are there because of brutality

inflicted upon detainees or prisoners.

Ambassador Japaridze. Sure, sure.

Chairman Smith. And are these recent cases, the 350, because that

is all we have.

Ambassador Japaridze. I have been informed by Mr. Shevardnadze

and Mr. Kavsadze, whom Ms. Dailey maybe knows--he is the Chairman of this Committee on Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights, and

this is an absolutely correct figure, and I hope that representatives of

human rights organizations, as well as other international organizations will visit these people and investigate why they are in this, why

they are detained.

Chairman Smith. It would be helpful for the Commission if we got

that information, and also as this dialog gets deeper, the kind of training. I mean we have in this country and every country has problems

with police who misuse the privilege that they have been given, entrusted, if you will, by the people, and there is always due process and

rights afforded the accused that help to guard against that kind of abuse.

The more Georgia matriculates to a rule of law and those rights are put

firmly in place, that the accused have certain rights that cannot be

abridged by an errant police officer, the less often these kinds of abuses

will happen.

If anybody would like to comment on that, because I think that is

part of the key issue, that accused people have access to competent

attorneys to defend them, that they are not taken off to some detention

area where God knows what happens to them.

Ambassador Japaridze. Mr. Chairman, you should excuse me because I am taking time of the panel participants.

Chairman Smith. That is why we are here.

Ambassador Japaridze. Yes, that is why I am here, and when you

mention policemen and police people, just to be more exact, one incident

or one let's call it a story came into my mind. When we speak about the

standards and the goals the Georgian police and Georgia itself, you know,

should pursue. Just a couple of days ago I walked to the embassy office.

We have no embassy residences, small two rooms in a building, which

is nearby the White House. I was walking nearby the White House and

there was a demonstration of janitors, and they blocked the streets, you

know, near the White House, and the police appeared.

As far as I was preparing myself for these hearings, it was interesting for me--it was a very open lesson for a Georgian Ambassador--to

watch, how they interact with each other. I should tell you they arrested these demonstrators, but putting this in general terms, though

there was some pushings and other things, but I can qualify these

pushings as friendly hugging.
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I understand it is an ideal thing to have this kind of police in Georgia,

but another idea came to mind. We will never have this kind of police

until the society is not the same. So what is Georgian police? It is a

reflection of Georgian society, of the conditions in which the Georgian

society is now.

The panelist mentioned two civil wars, town war, economic stagnation.

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record, because we have

gotten conflicting reports, just so it is very clear and unambiguous,

what is the official view of the Georgian Government? Was any of the

19 defendants in this case, who have been accused of terrorism, subjected to torture or physical mistreatment? What is the official government position on that?

Ambassador Japaridze. I myself have not been involved in this case,

and I can use just official information. I received, as I told you, a couple

of days ago. This information admits that during the process of investigation, this paper says that there was no torture used. That's the information I received, you know, from official structures.

Chairman Smith. Again, that's----

Ambassador Japaridze. But, you know, what Mr. Shevardnadze told

is that he will take under his control this case and get information,

additional information, wherever torture has been used during investigation or not.

Chairman Smith. This is where the problem with credibility comes

in because, again, Mr. Shevardnadze himself confirmed the use of torture at a press conference in October 1992, and the delegation to the

CSCE meeting in Budapest in October 1994 also acknowledged that one

of the defendants was tortured. I would hope we could get a clear-cut

clarification from the government on that so we can make it a part of

the record.

Ambassador Japaridze. Yes. I will inform my government, and as

soon as I get the more detailed information, I will transmit this information to your Commission.

Chairman Smith. Mr. Wolf.

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Ambassador, just one question, and I appreciate your

coming and the entire panel.

Will there be a retrial? Will the 19 have an opportunity for----

Ambassador Japaridze. Sure, sure. I concluded my statement before you came, and I just mentioned that retrial might take place.

Mr. Wolf. It will take place?

Ambassador Japaridze. Reconsideration might take place, these

people can appeal to the parliamentarian commission, and the case might

come to Shevardnadze's attention. So there are certain phases.

Mr. Wolf. So there is an opportunity that there will be a retrial?

Ambassador Japaridze. Oh, yes.

Mr. Wolf. What should the Commission do then? Should Mr. Smith

and the members of the Commission do a letter to our Ambassador in

Tbilisi asking that he go in to see Mr. Shevardnadze urging that there

be a retrial? What would be----

Ambassador Japaridze. Mr. Smith already delivered the letter to

Mr. Shevardnadze, and Shevardnadze just transmitted his response,

and you can read the letter, which explains the process concerning the

case of these sentenced people.
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Mr. Wolf. Our embassy has been working with your government.

Ambassador Japaridze. I hope.

Mr. Wolf. Yes. It depends sometimes, but I just wanted to know before leaving. That was why I came, because of the 19. Is there a commitment, and maybe I am missing some and I apologize for coming in

late? When will the retrial take place?

Ambassador Japaridze. As I understand there is a certain legal procedure after sentencing these people. There is a legal base for this reconsideration or retrial. So in a certain period of time, you know, this

retrial, reconsideration process will start.

Mr. Wolf. Yes. The letter that Mr. Smith got back does not say yes or

no. It says, ``Should the appeals process reach the point where it is

appropriate where I believe the state to become involved, I will pay strict

attention to not only the documentation of the case thus far, but to

those concerns voiced by the human rights organizations. I will endeavor to ensure that the myriad considerations of this case be addressed

in as fair and transparent a way as possible.''

I would urge you, and maybe Mr. Smith and I will do another letter

again asking that there be a retrial, and if we could get notification,

what we will do is we will cable our embassy, ask them to formally go in

and ask officially for a retrial, and if you could get back to Mr. Smith

and he could let me know when that will take place.

I know you have a difficult situation there. I was there in September

for a brief period of time. We were picked up at the Armenian border

and drove through there, and I know you have got a pretty rough situation there, but I think if you really want to move into a more democratic way, the best thing you can obviously do is to have a retrial of the

19 people, have it fair. We would then ask that a representative of our

embassy attend the trials, and then at that time I think perhaps there

could be some reconciliation, and then I think it would be very, very

positive.

Ambassador Japaridze. Congressman, we will inform my government.

Mr. Wolf. No, you go ahead.

Ambassador Japaridze. It is in a legal code of Georgia. After sentencing, these people should appeal, you know, to the court of appeals,

and then after the decision of the court of appeals, the reconsideration

process starts. Mr. Shevardnadze just met yesterday OSCE representative in Georgia, and he asked this organization to monitor the appeals

process.

So this process will be open, and if your embassy will participate, we

will appreciate and welcome it.

Mr. Wolf. Yes, we will do a letter to the Ambassador asking, one,

that we get a firm date; two, that they participate.

Ambassador Japaridze. And, Congressman Wolf, I can mention for

the record, you know, the lady who works in the U.S. Embassy in Georgia, who is already involved in this process, Mrs. Jessica LeCroy, and

you can appeal directly to her or to the Ambassador. We will appreciate

it. That is what I can tell you.

Mr. Wolf. How is the relationship between our embassy and your

government? Does the American ambassador have a good relationship

with Shevardnadze?
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Ambassador Japaridze. As far as I used to work as Shevardnadze's

National Security Advisor, I personally had very open, very constructive, very frequent communications with Ambassador Kent Brown, who

has frequent communications with Shevardnadze, who is also open to

your Embassy. Any time the U.S. Ambassador wants to come to Mr.

Shevardnadze, just to ask a question, to inform back--he is welcome.

Mr. Wolf. Would it also help if former Secretary Baker made a request to Mr. Shevardnadze on this issue?

Ambassador Japaridze. Please.

Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much.

I thank the panel.

Chairman Smith. Thank you, Commissioner.

Again, before we go on to another question, the question of whether or

not this appeal actually occurs is of great interest, especially in your

own testimony, Mr. Ambassador, when you said no one disputes the

defendants' guilt.

As I said in my opening statements, we are not saying pro or con. We

do not know if they are guilty or not, but the means of extracting confessions would not hold up in any court that I know of, and if, indeed,

torture was employed against at least one and perhaps several of these

individuals, that taints any outcome, calling for a mistrial and hopefully a retrial under open and fair circumstances.

Dr. Jones, would you like to comment on some of this?

Dr. Jones. I would just like to add that I agree with the Ambassador

that Georgia is going through a tremendous transition at the moment,

and that most of the judiciary is Soviet trained judiciary. Most of the

police force is an ex-Soviet police force. In both of these institutions

there is corruption, and in the police force a tradition of brutality.

I don't expect that to change any time soon, and that must be taken

into account when we discuss these questions of police brutality in Georgia.

Chairman Smith. In addition to humanitarian aid, then, would it be

wise if some of the international aid was focused on human rights training?

Dr. Jones. Absolutely. I think that it really has not been significant

so far.

Chairman Smith. On the issue of humanitarian aid, if I could, Dr.

Gudava, you made a very strong appeal for that aid not to dissipate.

You say if it was stopped, things could worsen for the population. It

could lead to anarchy and other very, very bad outcomes, and yet you

provided several suggestions as to how that aid might be better focused

and delivered.

I wonder if our other witnesses, especially my comment on whether

or not U.S. aid sent today is being diverted to bandits and gangsters

and thieves, whether or not it is getting to its intended population and

what we might do to better funnel that aid to its intended recipients.

Ms. Dailey.

Ms. Dailey. I can only agree heartily that humanitarian aid is desperately needed, and we would certainly welcome all efforts on the part

of the U.S. Government and the international community generally to

further those efforts. It is desperately needed.

Chairman Smith. Mr. Ambassador.
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Ambassador Japaridze. Mr. Chairman, I also support what Dr.

Gudava said and Ms. Dailey commented about, U.S. aid to Georgia, as

well as to other republics, because this is one of the central political

issues for Georgia, and for your information, we work very closely and

constructively with the State Department, especially with Ambassador

Simons' office, and what we can recommend is the U.S. Congress to

redirect U.S. aid from the humanitarian to technical and investment

oriented. We talked about this when we met, if you remember.

Chairman Smith. Let me just ask a couple of additional questions.

Ms. Dailey, as you probably know, the State Department Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices suggests that there are no political

prisoners in Georgia. Do you agree with that?

Ms. Dailey. It is a very difficult question, and the one thing that I

would point out in terms of the U.S.' position on this is that in the 1993

Country Report, it was stated that there were more than 100 political

prisoners in Georgia. In this year's report, however, it states that there

are none without any explanation. For example, if there had been an

amnesty which had released them, that would explain it. So I would

actually appreciate a clarification on the part of those who prepare these

reports about why that is, where these 100-plus people have gone to.

Clearly, it would not be because of a change in the definition, but at the

same time it leaves a lingering question mark.

We have not taken a position on this issue to date. There is strong

evidence to believe that there are people who have been certainly persecuted because of their political positions, but we have not been able to

confirm this.

Chairman Smith. Mr. Ambassador, please.

Ambassador Japaridze. Yes, just a very brief comment, Mr. Chairman, because as Ms. Dailey just admitted, there used to be just about

100 political prisoners less than a year ago, and now the document

issued by the State Department about human rights conditions in the

world, including Georgia, as well as other documents, indicate that there

is no Georgian political--we have no political prisoners in Georgia.

These kind of contradictions, and I agree with Ms. Dailey, just disorient not only Georgians, but as I understand also Americans. We will

appreciate if we get objective information what kind of conditions we

have with human rights, straightforward from the State Department,

as well as from the U.S. Congress.

Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Elections are supposed to take place in October

1995. Considering the extent of corruption at high levels and the influence of organized crime, in your view--and I would ask all of you if you

would like to touch on this--can free and fair elections be held in Georgia, and what do you make of the Communist Parties that have been reregistered and united into one unified organization? Do they have a

good prospect of winning in Georgia?

Would anyone like to start? Dr. Jones.

Dr. Jones. Well, my suspicion is the answer to that is no. Another

question was whether there could be free and fair elections?

Chairman Smith. Free and fair elections.

Dr. Jones. What the Georgians are working on currently is a new

electoral law. I commented in my statement that one of the problems

with the last election was a poorly designed electoral law which led to a

fractious and incohesive parliament.
27

Corruption is widespread throughout Georgia, and there are certainly

recorded electoral abuses, but not to the extent that the last elections

were considered unfair. I think that given a good electoral law, there is

no reason why there should not be free and fair elections in Georgia.

Chairman Smith. Dr. Gudava?

Dr. Gudava. I think that the question here is in a definition, what

do we consider a free and fair election. I don't think that future elections this year, the upcoming elections, might be less fair than the

previous one, if we agree that the previous elections are free and fair.

Chairman Smith. Nobody else would like to comment on that one.

Let me just conclude by asking what you think the Russian goals are

currently, especially with the peacekeeping mandate in Abkhazia. What

is the expiration date on that?

Ms. Dailey. May.

Chairman Smith. May. What do you think will happen post-May?

What do you think the Russians will do, as well as the Georgian government?

Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Japaridze. May I start?

Chairman Smith. That would be fine.

Ambassador Japaridze. Nobody knows. It's a very good question,

but this question is also very, very complicated because nobody knows,

you know, what Russia can do. There are problems, you know.

At the same time I would have appreciated it if this Commission, the

Helsinki Commission, and other U.S. Congress committees and commissions would have been more active before 1994. Let's say if they had

been more active in 1990 and 1992, as Mr. Jones absolutely correctly

admitted, that certain forces from Russia manipulated the problems

inside Georgia.

And just as a follow-up, when Ms. Dailey speaks about human rights,

you know, violations, she speaks about the Republic of Georgia, and

when she speaks about, you know, other issues, she uses Abkhazia and

Georgia, which might confuse the distinguished panel and you, Mr.

Chairman, because as I understand it, Russia and the United States,

they confirm that Abkhazia is a territorial, historical part of Georgia.

We mentioned the behavior of certain Russian forces of Russia from

1992, you know.

There is no doubt that they manipulated with our problems, and we

have the negative result. We have more than 200,000 refugees still out

of their homes, and this might be the answer to your question, what

Russian peacekeepers are doing, but at the same time I'd like to admit

that there is slight, you know, progress in the region.

And we will appreciate if alongside with Russian peacekeepers, and

as I understand the Russian side is also ready for this, other international organizations will be more active.

But what Russia might undertake in the future I cannot tell you.

Chairman Smith. Would anyone like to? Yes, Ms. Dailey.

Ms. Dailey. Mr. Chairman, if I might make an important clarification, our organization takes no position on the status of Abkhazia. We

merely make those distinctions because the war took place on Abkhazian

territory, and between the residents of Abkhazia and government forces

in Georgia.
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Our position in terms of the blockade has been that we object to any

attempt to impede the transmission of foodstuffs and medicine, which

is effectively what has happened. We have not heard of that problem

existing in larger Georgia. We have only heard of that existing in

Abkhazia proper.

If there is a correction to be made, I would appreciate that.

Ambassador Japaridze. But we talked about this, Russia closed the

border not with Abkhazia, but the border with Georgia?

Ms. Dailey. Yes, that is correct. We don't make that distinction.

Ambassador Japaridze. Okay.

Ms. Dailey. It is our understanding from a recent field visit that

foodstuffs and medicine are being prevented from entering Abkhazia.

That is a de facto blockade.

Ambassador Japaridze. But this blockade is used not to transfer

and smuggle weapons.

Ms. Dailey. Again, whatever happens across that border, our only

concern is that foodstuffs and medicines reach the civilian population.

Chairman Smith. I only have two final questions, but just let me

preface the first. Some years back Mr. Wolf and I visited one of the

gulags in Russia, then the Soviet Union, Perm Camp 35. As a precondition to our going, we got an explicit statement from the Procurator

General that there would be no repercussions to those with whom we

spoke, and we met with a number of political and religious dissidents

and prisoners who were in Perm 35, and we met with them for several

hours, tape recorded their comments, and videotaped them, and then

brought them out and widely disseminated them.

To the best of our knowledge, people were not injured as a result of

that visit. We worried about it. We sweated over that, and I was wondering, Ms. Dailey, in your contacts with people behind bars if you've

gotten those assurances and, most importantly, if anyone has been adversely affected for talking to you.

Ms. Dailey. It's a terribly important question. I'm glad that you

raised it.

Our work is predicated on that guarantee. We, like the ICRC, the

International Committee of the Red Cross, will not meet with prisoners

unless we have obtained that guarantee ahead of time and also unless

we are able to meet with detainees one on one in full confidentiality.

I have met with individuals under those circumstances, again, with

those guarantees. I would like to point out, though, that in one instance

my meeting with someone in the prison hospital resulted in that person

being put under strict isolation by the judge in the case. He was removed punitively after our meeting the following day, in fact, removed

from the prison hospital back to the prison where conditions are even

worse, frankly, than in the hospital, and it took us a month of lobbying

and asking for that person to be returned to have him actually returned

to the hospital where he could get proper medical care.

This is not the first time that this has happened. In fact, I'm told by

representatives of the American Embassy that the same thing had happened with them, that when they met, again, with this same individual,

he was forcibly removed from the hospital against the wishes of his

doctor, and again, it took them about a month of phone calling and

requests to have that person returned to the hospital.

Chairman Smith. Ms. Dailey, if you could ensure that this Commission knows the names and the specifics of each of these cases.
29

And, Mr. Ambassador, I would just ask that you would use your good

offices to try to ensure that, again, no one has any adverse effects for

simply speaking to a human rights activist or to their own counsel.

Again, one of the rules of law is that you can convey information to

your defense counsel without fear of the prosecutor using bully tactics

against you, that is to say, torture.

One final question, and this would be to Dr. Gudava. The Georgian

opposition strongly criticizes Mr. Shevardnadze. Can you suggest that

any other politician, given the fact that there's a tremendous amount of

Russian pressure, widespread corruption: could somebody else do a better job in your view?

Dr. Gudava. Oh, Mr. Chairman, well, it's a difficult question, but in

short, I think that there is not an alternative candidate to this position

nowadays in Georgia. The problem with Mr. Shevardnadze is not that

he is a bad politician or a bad person, but the environment in which he

started, after his return in Georgia, is such that the qualities which

made him famous worldwide are useless in the criminal environment of

today's Georgia. So he has come up with the matters and problems with

which I doubt he ever dealt before. I am talking about organized crime.

I am talking about political assassinations. I am talking about explosion of all of these criminal activities and taking over almost the entire

sphere of life in the Republic of Georgia, as well as many other places of

the former Soviet Union.

Therefore, the answer is that I think that Shevardnadze's presence

in Georgia was and is a very positive one, but because of the reasons

which are beyond his maybe ability, the situation is worsening. So I

don't see any other candidate who could do a better job than

Shevardnadze, taking into account the circumstances which are in

Georgia today.

Chairman Smith. Dr. Jones, did you want to comment?

Dr. Jones. Generally I would agree with Mr. Gudava about that, but

I do think there are alternatives to Eduard Shevardnadze. There must

be alternatives to Eduard Shevardnadze because he cannot go on forever.

I think one of his problems is that because of the complete collapse of

power in Georgia, many of the things that he wants to get done are not

done. He has really limited control over many of the things that are

happening in Georgia, particularly in the regions.

One of the criticisms that could be leveled at Mr. Shevardnadze is

that he is that he is too cautious, and displays a lack of energy in tackling particular some major economic problems in Georgia, although

this last fall that has been remedied to a certain extent. There are also

serious problems in his personnel policy. He appoints people that he

trusts, that he knows, and that he feels can cope better with the situation in Georgia rather than looking for reformers. But it is the latter

where his emphasis should go. He should be encouraged at this stage to

change his government and employ as many reformers as possible and

take a much more energetic line in terms of the economic transformation of Georgia.

Chairman Smith. I thank you, and I want to thank our very distinguished panel for your testimony. I think it will be very helpful to the

Commission, and we will endeavor to make this information that you've
30

imparted to us available to every member of both the House and Senate,

especially as we proceed to marking up the foreign aid bill which is just

around the corner.

One of the other hats that I wear is as Chairman of the International

Operations and Human Rights Committee. We'll be marking up our

legislation some time right after the recess, and then we go to the full

foreign assistance bill immediately after that.

So this information will be very, very useful, and I can assure you we

will make it available to members who will be in strategic

decisionmaking positions in the very, very near future.

So I thank you for your testimony. It is most enlightening, and without further ado, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
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