U.S. Army Engineer School

573-563-8080 / DSN 676-8080

COMMANDANT

MG R.L. Van Antwerp

563-6158

<vanantwerpr@wood.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

BG William H. McCoy, Jr.

563-6192

<mccoyw@wood.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Clinton J. Pearson

563-8060

<pearsonc@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL John (Pat) Leake

563-8080

<leakej@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Gerald Lago

563-8045

<lagog@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Dennis V. Smith

563-8046

<smithde@wood.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC John D. Drolet

563-7116

<droletj@wood.army.mil>

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for ENGINEER COMBAT SYSTEMS

COL John H. Holler

563-4081

<hollerj@wood.army.mil>

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE–TERRAIN DATA

COL David A. Kingston

563-4086

<kingstond@wood.army.mil>

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Paul W. Kelly

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<kellyp@wood.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

COL Thomas E. O’Donovan

563-4093

<odonovant@wood.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Dr. Rebecca N. Johnson

563-4119

<johnsonr@wood.army.mil>

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE

LTC Reinhard W. Koenig

563-7537

<koenigr@wood.army.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Paul Arcangeli

596-3869, DSN 581-3869

<arcangelip@wood.army.mil>

COUNTERMINE/COUNTER BOOBY TRAP CENTER

LTC Billy G. Tollison

563-7347

<tollisob@wood.army.mil>

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0330810
ENGI

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

NEER

 Engineer 1

COMMANDANT

Major General

R.L. Van Antwerp

October-December 2003

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

37 Engineer Safety - “Wearing Synthetic Fiber

Underwear Under the Nomex CVC Uniform”

By Mr. Larry T. Hasty

56 Past in Review - “Bad Day at Dalat”

By Colonel Larry Saul

59 The Engineer Writer’s Guide

62 Soldier’s Creed

FEATURES

04 Victory Sappers: V Corps/CJTF-7 Engineers in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Part 2: Since the Liberation . . .

 By Colonel Gregg F. Martin

11 130th Engineer Brigade Lessons Learned and Recommendations From

Operation Iraqi Freedom

 By Colonel Gregg F. Martin

14 Force Protection of Forward Operating Bases in Baghdad

 By Captain Jason M. Railsback

19 Capturing the Lessons of War - The Engineer Perspective on Operation Iraqi

Freedom

By Lieutenant Colonel Jack Drolet and Major Glen Masset

20 Innovative Engineers Pave New Paths in Afghanistan

By Major Steven A. Baker

23 Uncovering Mysteries in the Iraqi Desert

By Sergeant Jodie Stansbury

24 Environmental Issues Associated With Operation Enduring Freedom

By Mr. Robert J. Chartier

28 Increasing Safety in Afghanistan

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sponfeldner

30 Engineer Assessment Teams in Disaster Relief Operations

By Captain Thomas M. Turner

36 Disaster Relief After Hurricane Lili

By Captain Thomas M. Turner

38 Integrated Life Cycle Base Camp Sustainment

By Mr. Richard M. Marlatt

41 AC-RC in the 21st Century From an AC Perspective

By Captain Jason Meharg and Captain Michael Konczey

44 Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness

50 Doctrine Updates: A Bridge to the Future Force

By Lieutenant Colonel Reinhard W. Koenig

54 Leadership the “Leahy Way”

By Colonel Gregg F. Martin

60 Peacekeeping From an HHC Perspective

By Captain Ralan Hill and Captain Kevin Stoll

October-December 2003 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 33 PB 5-03-4

63 CTC Notes - “Sapper Platoon Sergeant: Operating in a

Lightfighter’s Tactical Environment”

By Sergeant First Class Anthony S. Sparks and Captain Jason

D. Williams (JRTC)

65 CTC Notes - “Simultaneous Explosive Reductions”

By Captain Kirk Gibbs (NTC)

65 CTC Notes - “Explosive Ordnance Disposal Integration”

By Captain Mark R. Faria (NTC)

66 CTC Notes - “Obstacle and Class IV/V Supply Point

Support Teams”

By Major Michael W. Rose (JRTC)

68 Engineer Update

69 Accessing Army Training Publications Through AKO

UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

Front and Back Cover:

Soldiers with the 205th

Engineer Battalion fill

sandbags and load

them onto a truck at

Kandahar Army Airfield,

Afghanistan, 25 August

2003. Photo by PFC

Hugo A. Barry-Vasquez.

MANAGING EDITOR

EDITOR

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

CONTRIBUTING

EDITORS

Rena L. Humphrey

Mona E. Mitchell

Olivia A. Prewett

Shirley Bridges

Rick Brunk
2 Engineer October-December 2003

Clear The Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

Now that 2004 is here, we reflect on

our accomplishments of the past

year. We have activated the largest

number of Reserve and Army National

Guard soldiers since the Korean War. We

helped liberate 23 million people in Iraq and

maintain liberation for another 23 million in

Afghanistan.

Today in Iraq, almost every city, town,

village, and province has a government or a

council chosen by and run by local Iraqis.

More than 130,000 Iraqi Security Forces are

taking responsibility for security for their

own country. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation—a free press in

that country for the first time in decades. Hospitals, clinics,

schools, and universities are open—with an increased load of

students. Water, power, and essential services are at or above

prewar levels in most of the country. These successes and

many more are documented in this issue of Engineer.

I am pleased to report that we had a great turnout at the

Engineer Warfighter Conference in November, held in conjunction with the Society of American Military Engineers

(SAME)/Army Engineer Association (AEA) Regional Meeting in Savannah, Georgia. My thanks go to these two organizations for hosting such a professional event. Thank you also

to all who took the time to attend and especially to those of

you who made expert presentations. The

joint and multinational perspectives

brought home the fact that no matter what

uniform we wear, we are all engineers with

the same skills and challenges. The conference validated the issues associated

with initial lessons learned for engineers

and has mapped out the way ahead for us.

To truly make these lessons “learned,” we

must find solutions before the next war.

We will continue the progress we made

at the Warfighter Conference and give an

update to the field at the ENFORCE Conference on 26 - 30 April 2004. The theme for

ENFORCE 04 is “Forging Our Future—

Shaping Engineers for Joint and Multinational Operations.”

Many of you have already expressed an interest in attending,

hosting a breakout session, or making a presentation to the

group. I encourage you to come prepared to share lessons

learned with the rest of the Regiment.

During my recent trip to Iraq, I was impressed with the total

professionalism of our engineer soldiers. I had the honor of visiting with soldiers and leaders who are making a difference and

preserving our freedoms. I am proud of you! Let me close by

remembering those in our Regiment we have lost there since the

last issue of Engineer was published. As we begin this New Year,

let us resolve not to forget their ultimate sacrifice. Essayons!

Sergeant Benjamin Biskie 5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Captain Christopher Soelzer 5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Major Christopher Splinter 5th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Specialist Charles Haight 14th Engineer Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington

Specialist Curt Jordan 14th Engineer Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington

Specialist Cory Hubbell Bravo Company, 46th Engineer Group, Fort Rucker, Alabama

Specialist Nathan Nakis Bravo Company, 52d Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado

Specialist James Wolf Headquarters Company, 52d Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado

Private Jonathan Falaniko Alpha Company, 70th Engineer Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas

Specialist Marlon Jackson Alpha Company, 94th Engineer Battalion, Vilseck, Germany

Private Algernon Adams Charlie Company, 122d Engineer Battalion, Graniteville, South Carolina

Specialist Raphael Davis Bravo Company, 223d Engineer Battalion, Calhoun City, Mississippi

Private First Class Rayshawn Johnson Charlie Company, 299th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

Private Scott Tyrrell Charlie Company, 299th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

First Lieutenant Joshua Hurley Charlie Company, 326th Engineer Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Kimbrough 416th Engineer Command, Darien, Illinois

Staff Sergeant Eddie Menyweather Charlie Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

Specialist Joseph Norquist Headquarters Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

Staff Sergeant Thomas Christensen 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin

Staff Sergeant Stephen Hattamer 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin

Specialist James Chance Charlie Company, 890th Engineer Battalion, Columbia, Mississippi

Specialist Jon Fettig 957th Engineer Company, Bismarck, North Dakota
Lead The Way

By Command Sergeant Major Clinton J. Pearson

U.S. Army Engineer School

October-December 2003 Engineer 3

I

t is indeed an honor to be selected to

serve as your Regimental Command Sergeant Major (CSM) and very difficult

to express how grateful and blessed I feel.

This is a position of service to our soldiers,

Regiment, and Army and to our great nation. I use the word “serve” because being

selected to a nominative leadership position has little to do with the person being

selected—but rather how well you have

served others, the Army, and the nation. I

will continue to serve others as I have for

the past 26 years.

I once read a quote that states, “To whom

much is given, much is expected.” This is

true in our profession. I am truly grateful to Major General

(MG) Joe Peterson, whose leadership and guidance over the

previous two years in the 1st Cavalry Division is sincerely

appreciated; MG R.L.Van Antwerp for selecting me; and Brigadier General (BG) William McCoy for embracing me. I thank

CSM Bill McDaniel, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center

(MANSCEN), and CSM Michael Balch, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE), for their unwavering support during my

transition from Fort Hood, Texas.

On 26 November 2003, CSM McDaniel and I executed the

battle handoff. As I stood among the leadership of the

installation and the MANSCEN team, I felt sincerely humbled.

The presence of MG Jack Waggoner (Retired), the honorary

colonel of the Regiment; CSM Jack Butler (Retired), the

honorary CSM; and CSM Robert Dills (Retired), previous

USACE CSM, made it more meaningful. I was again reminded

that this position is about serving something greater than

myself. These gentlemen have given so much to our Regiment

and nation and are three superb examples of selfless service.

 I charge all leaders to embrace the Regiment’s T3s (Transform the Regiment, Train Soldiers and Leaders, and Take

Care of the Regiment). Leaders must lead the Regiment with a

vision that is focused on the Army’s Future Force as we continue transformation. The key is understanding where the

Army is going with transformation, staying abreast of those

changes, and ensuring that our engineer forces are where they

should be to support any environment. Training the Regiment

must remain our top priority. We must continue to produce the

most highly trained engineer soldiers in the world. This begins with instilling pride and the Army’s core values in initialentry soldiers. Our noncommissioned officer (NCO) education system (NCOES) must be structured to meet the demands

of a fast-paced, challenging, and changing

environment. It is important to exploit every opportunity to conduct joint and multicomponent training, bridging the gap with

all engineers across the armed services. It

is absolutely crucial that engineers in the

Reserve Component—approximately 76

percent of our engineer force—receive the

same training opportunities as our active

force. Training must be tough and conducted in the most realistic environment we

can provide. Taking care of the Regiment

means equipping soldiers with the most advanced equipment and technology the

Army has to offer; ensuring that we have

the right people in the right jobs; and placing quality NCOs with

coaching, teaching, and training experience at our training base.

We have such NCOs at the 1st Engineer Brigade. I had the

privilege of spending a week with CSM Gerald Jones and the

CSMs of the 1st Engineer Brigade, visiting each of their training battalions. This is one of the largest (if not the largest)

brigades in the Army, responsible for training officers, NCOs,

and soldiers of our Regiment. Colonel Paul Kelly, CSM Jones,

and their battalions are charged daily with the sacred responsibility of ensuring that soldiers are fully integrated into the

Army and Regiment. This team is always seeking ways to

improve training and readiness because training remains our top

priority. I must say that after the week ended, I was amazed at the

professionals in the 1st Engineer Brigade. As I marched alongside soldiers on Day Seven of basic training—with their chests

out and arms swinging, singing cadence with such pride in their

voices—I was especially proud to be a soldier. I couldn’t help but

reflect on the new Soldier’s Creed (printed on page 62). Being

a soldier is the greatest contribution one can make to his country. It is serving something greater than yourself, because

you’re charged with the protection of an entire nation and a

way of life. Be proud to be called a soldier wherever you go.

As we continue our course, we will not forget those soldiers who have given their lives in the defense of our great

nation and our way of life. CSM Balch and I recently visited

the Regiment’s wounded soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Although they have injuries far beyond our imagination, their spirits remain intact and indestructible. They are

a constant reminder that freedom is not free. I’m very proud of

the soldiers serving in harm’s way and of the unsung heroes—their families—serving on the home front. My daily

prayers are with you. God bless America! Essayons!

means
4 Engineer October-December 2003

With the fall of Baghdad and the collapse of Saddam

Hussein’s regime in early April 2003, Iraq was

liberated. Since then, V Corps and other coalition

forces have grown in size and combat power; expanded into

and attacked enemy forces throughout the battlespace of Iraq;

and conducted humanitarian, civic action, and reconstruction

operations simultaneously. The V Corps engineer force of fewer

than 4,000 soldiers that attacked into Iraq on 21 March grew to

more than 19,000 under Coalition Joint Task Force - 7 (CJTF-7).

This engineer force consists of nearly every type of unit within

the U.S. Army Engineer Regiment (active duty, National Guard,

Reserve, and civilian), as well as engineers from the Marine

Corps, Navy, and Air Force and from coalition forces.

With the mission to reconstruct Iraq and win the peace,

this powerful engineer force has performed every type of

mission in a complex combat environment across hundreds of

thousands of square kilometers, to include—

 Combat engineer and infantry missions.

 Construction and repair of infrastructure, base camps, and

facilities.

 Fixed and assault float bridging.

 Ground and riverine patrols.

 Topographic/geospatial engineering from the tactical

through strategic levels.

 Diving, well-drilling, and fire-fighting missions.

 Electrical-power repair, generation, and distribution.

 Infrastructure assessment, repair, and reconstruction.

 Contract construction and facilities design and management.

 Asphalt, concrete, and crushed stone production.

 Captured enemy ammunition and missile destruction.

This article highlights what the 130th Engineer Brigade

and echelon-above-division (EAD) engineers have accomplished

since the liberation of Iraq, as well as the leadership and

organizational challenges that have been overcome. This article,

in conjunction with “130th Engineer Brigade Lessons Learned

and Recommendations From Operation Iraqi Freedom” (page

11) captures important lessons which will help the Engineer

Regiment and improve the Future Force.

(Note: The role of divisional and echelon-above-corps

(EAC) engineers, as well as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(USACE) and contractors, each of whom played a major role,

is beyond the scope of this article.)

Background

I

n December 2002, V Corps and the 130th Engineer Brigade

were ordered to deploy to Kuwait and prepare for possible

combat operations. The brigade deployed in January and

February 2003 and in late February finalized the initial EAD

engineer task organization to support V Corps’s initial

maneuver elements, which included the 3d U.S. Infantry

Division (3ID) (V Corps main effort) and the 11th Attack

Helicopter Regiment (V Corps supporting effort.)

In March, the 130th conducted rehearsals, prepared for

combat, and helped supervise the reduction of the KuwaitIraq border obstacle complex. On 21 March, the 130th crossed

the line of departure in support of V Corps in the liberation of

Iraq. V Corps attacked up the southwest side of the Euphrates

River past An Nasiryah, through As Samawa, and on to An

Najaf, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF)

attacked along the Euphrates River to An Nasiryah, north to

Al Kut, and then along the eastern side of the Tigris River.

Fighting a tough and determined enemy, V Corps secured its

lines of communication and continued to build combat power

V Corps/CJTF-7 Engineers V Corps/CJTF-7 Engineers V Corps/CJTF-7 Engineers

in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Part 2: Since the L t 2: Since the L t 2: Since the L.i.beration . . . beration . . . beration . . .

By Colonel Gregg F. Martin

Part 1, “The Attack to Baghdad and Beyond . . .” was published in the July-September 2003 issue of Engineer.

“Our engineers continue to excel, both in leading the way toward the reconstruction of Iraq and in providing route

clearance, force protection, quality-of-life improvements, and troop construction for our deployed Coalition Joint Task

Force. They remain flexible, committed, and professional during this challenging campaign.”

—Major General Walter Wojdakowski

Deputy Commanding General, V (U.S.) Corps/CJTF-7

Victory Sappers: y Sappers: y Sappers:
October-December 2003 Engineer 5

at Logistics Support Areas (LSAs) Cedar in the vicinity of An

Nasiryah and Bushmaster in the vicinity of An Najaf, as it

prepared for the final attack on Baghdad.

Near the end of March, the 101st Airborne Division (Air

Assault) and the 82d Airborne Division (-) joined the attack,

conducting major military operations in urban terrain, which

relieved pressure on the main effort (3ID). This enabled 3ID to

launch the final push through the Karbala Gap on 3 April,

attack over the Euphrates River, complete the destruction of

the Medina Republican Guard Division, and seize objectives

south and west of the city of Baghdad—to include Baghdad

International Airport. Simultaneously, 1MEF was pushing into

objectives southeast and east of Baghdad. Within a few days,

V Corps and 1MEF forces were executing “thunder runs”

throughout Baghdad.

Before the enemy could mount an effective defense, V Corps

and 1MEF had won the much-anticipated “Battle for

Baghdad.” The shock and speed of U.S. military power,

combined with the courage and leadership of our ground

forces, overwhelmed the enemy. With this new freedom came

a vacuum in power and authority as the regime’s surviving

army and police forces collapsed or melted away.

By late April, V Corps had gained the 4th Infantry Division

and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and controlled the northern

60 percent of Iraq; 1MEF and United Kingdom forces controlled

the southern 40 percent. In May, the 1st Armored Division

moved into Baghdad and completed a relief in place with 3ID.

In May, V Corps learned that it would form the nucleus of

CJTF-7, which would stand up on 15 June. In addition, an

enormous EAD engineer force had arrived in Kuwait (to

supplement the engineers already in place) and completed

reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI),

and its members were either in Iraq or preparing to move north

for subsequent operations.

Task Organization

B.

y June, the V Corps (and subsequently CJTF-7)

engineer force had increased to 19,000 soldiers (6,000

divisional engineers and 13,000 EAD engineers)

organized into 3 brigades, 6 groups, 36 battalions, 21 numbered

companies, and 28 detachments. (Note: These figures do not

include coalition engineers embedded inside the multinational

divisions; joint engineers from the Marines, Navy, or Air Force;

or EAC engineers under the 416th Engineer Command or

Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).

Depending on mission requirements and the tactical

situation, which fluctuated over time, each division ultimately

received an EAD package that generally consisted of a group

headquarters; 1 or 2 corps combat battalions; 1, 2, or even 3

combat heavy battalions; 1 or more multirole bridge companies;

an additional construction company (combat heavy or combat

support equipment [CSE]); a utilities detachment; a facilities

engineer team (FET) or portion of a facilities engineer detachment (FED); and a fire-fighting detachment. Well drillers, divers,

The Minnesota National Guard’s 142d Engineer Battalion places concrete for a high-voltage power plant at LSA Anaconda

in Balad, Iraq.
6 Engineer October-December 2003

and topographic, bridging, and prime power soldiers, as well

as USACE Forward Engineer Support Teams (FESTs) were

also provided on an as-needed basis.

Although the size and composition of the 130th Engineer

Brigade has changed, a typical snapshot from June to

September revealed a unit composed of approximately 6,500

to 7,000 soldiers organized into 3 groups; 5 combat heavy

battalions; 2 corps wheeled battalions; 2 corps mechanized

battalions; a bridge battalion with an assault float bridge

company and a medium girder bridge company; a Korean

battalion (plus a Republic of Korea army medical company); 3

combat support equipment companies; 3 multirole bridge

companies; a construction support company; a prime power

company; a topographic engineer company; and numerous

detachments and teams, including utilities, fire-fighting, diving,

well-drilling, FETs, FEDs, and FESTs.

Operating throughout Iraq since the end of the ground

offensive, this robust, multifunctional brigade has executed

more than 3,000 missions, focused on V Corps and CJTF-7

priorities, and backstopped every division and major

subordinate command (MSC) on a wide variety of

missions.

(Note: Always adapting to meet the needs of the battlefield

and providing the best possible engineer support, several of

the above-mentioned units have since been moved to

maneuver units.)

Missions, Priorities, and

Commander’s Guidance

Missions

Once maneuver forces had secured their

areas of operations, the priority of engineer

effort was to provide mobility, survivability,

and general engineering support to V Corps

forces to allow the Iraqis to rebuild their

nation, establish a stable government, and

develop a peaceful, prosperous society. Reconstruction of civil infrastructure and

humanitarian construction in support of the

Iraqi people were to be accomplished by

civilian contractors under the supervision of

the coalition’s Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The

original plan was for military engineers to

focus almost exclusively on support to V

Corps and coalition forces. The 130th was to

provide humanitarian engineering only under

emergency circumstances. Contractors were

to take on as much work as possible to

regenerate the economy, put people back to

work, and rebuild the country. (Note: The

USACE-led Task Forces Fajir [New Light] and

Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO] were already well under

way to restoring Iraqi electrical power and

oil, using a combination of USACE and Iraqi expertise and

civilian contractors.)

The 3ID engineer team, working in Baghdad since the

collapse of the regime in early April, was already responding

to the urgent situation and was performing extensive civil and

humanitarian construction. By late April and early May, after

V Corps forces had expanded into the battlespace of northern

and western Iraq, the dire straits of the Iraqi people and their

dilapidated infrastructure became more apparent. Soon, military

engineers were called on to provide emergency assessments,

construction, and repairs. By 12 May, it became clear that the

situation demanded a focused emergency response. Military

engineering resources were diverted to immediate civil

requirements as civilian engineer contractors were unable to

respond to demands. With the original Task Force

Neighborhood in Baghdad—a concept conceived by the

V Corps commander and assigned to the 130th Engineer Brigade

for planning and execution—military engineers leaped fully

into the fray of civil-military operations and humanitarian

construction. This concept rapidly expanded to maneuver and

engineer units throughout Iraq. By mid-May, V Corps

engineers were fully engaged in both military engineering in

support of V Corps forces and humanitarian/civil-military

engineering operations in support of the Iraqi people and

society.

Standing Up the C-7. Upon learning that V Corps would

form the nucleus of the new CJTF-7, the 130th Engineer Brigade

Prime power soldiers from the 249th Engineer Battalion prepare wiring

for a branch circuit to refrigerate Army and Air Force Exchange Service

storage containers.
October-December 2003 Engineer 7

and the V Corps staff engineer section went to work planning,

sourcing, and standing up the new CJTF-7 staff engineer

section (C-7)—a 55-person coalition-joint staff that would take

over engineer staff planning and coordination from the 18-

person V Corps staff engineer section. This enormous

planning, leadership, and logistical challenge was made even

more difficult because it was accomplished in the midst of

RSOI, combat, and stability operations. With “cover-down”

personnel from both V Corps and CFLCC to temporarily fill the

joint manning document, the new C-7 officially took over the

engineer fight in Iraq on 15 June.

The C-7 immediately faced three strategically critical

missions: providing facilities for the new Iraqi army, bedding

down and constructing operational infrastructure for coalition

forces, and destroying captured enemy ammunition. Taking

into account the relative strengths of troop units, USACE,

and contractors, the C-7—in conjunction with the other

elements of the CJTF-7 engineer team—developed innovative

solutions for these missions. Next, C-7 needed to rapidly

increase electrical power production throughout Iraq to make

an immediate positive impact on the lives of the Iraqi people.

The solution was to form “Task Force 4400,” which put

coalition military engineers into Iraqi power plants to improve

management and operation, expedite repairs, and quickly

increase power production across the nation to 4,400

megawatts.

Transitioning to a Theater Army Engineer Brigade.

Simultaneously, the 130th Engineer Brigade became the de

facto theater Army engineer brigade (TAEB) in Iraq. Manned

and trained to perform as V Corps’s combat engineer brigade,

the 130th had to stretch itself physically, mentally, organizationally, and doctrinally to effectively perform this new

role. Adding to the challenge was the need to staff three

command posts: a rear command post in Kuwait to command

and control the RSOI of incoming EAD forces; the brigade

main command post at the V Corps logistics and air hub in

north-central Iraq; and the brigade tactical command post in

Baghdad, where it played a key role in standing up the new C-7.

Although the 130th was transitioning to a TAEB, it was still

fulfilling its primary mission of supporting V Corps’s MSCs

throughout Iraq.

Exacerbating the situation was the requirement to send the

130th Engineer Brigade deputy commander to work as the

V Corps engineer at ORHA in downtown Baghdad. Supplementing and reinforcing ORHA and then the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) was critical to the planning,

funding, and execution of both civilian and military engineering

programs in Iraq. His experience in both USACE and joint

engineering operations made him ideal for these key strategic

roles, where he has made a valuable contribution.

Fortunately, the commander of the 18th TAEB dispatched

one of his key lieutenant colonels to be the new deputy

commander of the 130th. Having just served as the operations

officer of the 18th TAEB, where he planned and developed

military infrastructure for the northern option, the new deputy

commander brought his organizational expertise to the fight in

Iraq. Arriving in late June and serving as the deputy

commander for 101 days, he helped recast the 130th from a

combat-focused corps engineer brigade to a constructionfocused TAEB.

The 565th Engineer Battalion patrols the Tigris River at Tikrit, Iraq.
Cooperating with the C-7, the 130th Engineer Brigade played

a key role in fulfilling several major functions which went

beyond its doctrinal mission. (Note: Several of these functions

were ultimately taken over by the C-7.)

 Engineer oversight and construction/design support to

theater/CJTF-7 enduring bases.

 Execution of the theater/CJTF-7 construction program.

 Engineer reinforcing support to the MSCs for master

planning, design, and assessments; oversight of Class IV

supplies; and direct support when MSC engineering

requirements exceeded their capabilities.

 Assistance to the C-7 in theater engineer planning, force

structure management, and personnel.

 Establishment of a theater bridge park.

The 130th Engineer Brigade faced the following challenges:

 It was a corps combat brigade now cast in the role of a

TAEB.

 It did not have an organic construction management section

(CMS) comparable to the robust 36-person CMS in a TAEB.

(Note: The 130th does have a small CMS element which

will return to the 18th Engineer Brigade, from which it came

about a decade ago.)

 With the stand-up of the C-7, the 130th lost its organic

staff engineer section, which became the nucleus of the

C-7.

 Of the engineer groups assigned to the 130th for command

and control of construction in Iraq, two are combat groups

with no CMS, and the one construction group has very

few personnel with engineering degrees. This reinforced

the need for a strong CMS in the 130th.

 Development of LSA Anaconda was the largest

construction mission in Iraq, but the assigned FET was

not resourced adequately for such a huge mission.

 Division engineer brigades and combat engineer groups

throughout Iraq are not staffed to manage large construction missions, which means the 130th must be

prepared to backstop the construction program throughout

the theater, as required.

 There was no theaterwide plan to provide quality assurance

for contract construction in support of coalition forces, so

the 130th must be prepared to backstop this effort.

To accomplish its mission as TAEB, the 130th Engineer

Brigade made the following organizational adjustments:

 Relocated and embedded a portion of a FED into the 130th

staff and combined it with the remnants of the 130th CMS

to perform the functions of the TAEB’s “missing CMS.”

 Relocated the V Corps FEST from the C-7 and aligned

it under the 130th CMS.

 Created a 16-person 130th CMS that, in cooperation with

the C-7, performed construction management at the CJTF-7

enduring base camps; provided master planning, design,

assessments, and contract facilitation to theater enduring

base camps; managed Class IV supplies; and provided reinforcing support throughout Iraq to the C-7 and MSCs.

130th Engineer Brigade Commander Priorities

In July, after “sprinting” for six months through the

deployment, preparation for combat, ground offensive,

movement into the Iraqi battlespace, and stand-up of the C-7,

the one-year tour length for Operation Iraqi Freedom was

announced. It became clear we could not function effectively

without developing a way to accomplish the mission, train,

maintain, take care of people, and sustain ourselves for the

long haul. Since we were conducting combat operations but

also were conducting many of our functions in a garrison-like

environment, I directed the 130th Engineer Brigade staff to

develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) that described

how we would do business in Operation Iraqi Freedom, an

8 Engineer October-December 2003

A soldier from the

320th Engineer

Company (Corps)

(Topographic) uses

an automated

integrated survey

instrument at LSA

Anaconda.
environment in which neither our field SOP nor our garrison

SOP applied neatly.

Simultaneously, I reviewed my command philosophy, which

was published in June 2002 after taking command of the 130th

Engineer Brigade in Germany. My intent was to make sure that

the vision laid out during peacetime in Europe still applied for

the brigade at war in Iraq. I did not change a word, because it

still applies to what we are doing:

 People are our essence. Care for, develop, and inspire them.

 Training is the glue that holds us together. Focus on the

basics of “shoot, move, communicate, and survive” at

individual, crew, and squad levels to ensure that our soldiers

stay alive to accomplish the mission and get home safely

when the time comes.

 Maintenance of equipment and people will sustain us over

time and enable us to accomplish the mission.

 All of this must be encased under the overarching umbrella

of discipline, safety, and force protection.

Commander’s Guidance

With enormous demand for engineers but only limited

resources, I established a priority of engineer effort that met

the CJTF-7 commander’s intent and guidance:

 Provide coalition forces with mobility, survivability, and

general engineering support during military operations to

create a safe and secure environment.

 Provide force protection and beddown construction to

protect our soldiers and provide a decent quality of life (at

a minimum: out of the dirt, environmental control units,

toilets, and showers.)

 Support CPA and Iraqi people with civil infrastructure,

humanitarian civic action, and Task Force Neighborhood

missions.

 Train to survive on the battlefield. We can afford to lose a

day on a project to ensure that our soldiers are prepared

for the challenges and dangers they face daily.

 Do “good things” to help coalition forces and the Iraqi

people. Let’s work ourselves out of a job.

 Ensure that engineers are gainfully employed at all times—

no idle engineers.

 Respond immediately to 911 calls. Be flexible and ready to

respond. We are at war!

 Perform other missions as needed.

Subordinate commanders were instructed to develop a

sustainable operational tempo which would ensure mission

accomplishment while building better, stronger, more motivated

soldiers and units that would be better and more inspired when

they departed Iraq than when they arrived in theater. We

enhanced our daily communications rhythm of battle update

briefs, staff updates, and engineer video teleconferences with

weekly maintenance conferences; biweekly planning and

operations conferences; and monthly commanders conferences, training briefs, and unit status reports. The intent

was to enhance our communications, connectivity, and future

planning. In addition, my specific guidance to everyone in the

brigade was as follows:

 We will be in Iraq for a full year. This is a grueling and

dangerous “ultramarathon.” Plan accordingly.

 Reestablish predictability and retain the ability to respond

immediately to “hot missions” and 911 calls.

 Establish the proper balance between the mission and

people/training/maintenance/supply, and emphasize the

human dimensions of job/mind/body/spirit/family/

friends.

 Learn continuously and grow as a professional each day.

 Encourage everyone to “sharpen the ax” and “recharge

batteries” each day.

 Get enough rest, eat a healthy diet, work out, and maintain

personal hygiene.

 Strive to take one day off each week, and when it makes

sense, take leave or rest and relaxation.

 Support the chaplains’ programs and help inspire soldiers

to maximize their time in Iraq and on earth.

 Make time for physical training and sports and social events

such as movie nights, karaoke nights, and soldier talent

shows. Make this year in Iraq the ultimate soldier and life

experience.

 Make a positive difference every day. Help others. Be a

good person and friend.

 Stay positive and enthusiastic, and maintain an “attitude

of gratitude” in all circumstances.

 Have fun, and enjoy each day. This is important in a combat

zone, where any day could be your last.

Leaders relentlessly communicated, enforced, and tried to

live this philosophy every day, while encouraging subordinates to follow suit.

Major Achievements

Since the liberation and end of major combat operations,

the 130th Engineer Brigade has contributed to Operation

Iraqi Freedom by completing more than 3,000 missions

in support of CJTF-7, MSCs, CPA, and the Iraqis, to include

the following highlights:

 Provided combat, construction, topographic, design, prime

power, infrastructure assessment, bridging, riverine, firefighting, and diving support throughout Iraq.

 Planned and executed the original Task Force Neighborhood

missions in Baghdad.

 Planned, organized, and stood up the C-7 for CJTF-7.

Continues to provide a nucleus of personnel for this vital

and successful staff section.

October-December 2003 Engineer 9
 Developed the prisoner holding areas, interrogation

facilities, helipad, and coalition base camp for the Baghdad

Central Confinement Facility.

 Planned, designed, and constructed the largest CJTF-7

base camp (LSA Anaconda) and repaired the heavily

damaged airfield by placing more than 8,000 cubic meters

of concrete.

 Provided construction support to both ORHA and CPA.

 Delivered and installed a 20-megawatt power plant at the

Basra oil refinery, averting widespread rioting.

 Worked with Iraqis to repair high-tension electrical power

lines in support of CPA.

 Upgraded a 100-kilometer stretch of Highway 1 in southern

Iraq so it could serve as a safe main supply route.

 Reduced hundreds of kilometers of berms and fighting

positions throughout Iraq that were potential ambush sites.

 Hauled tons of captured enemy ammunition to secure sites

for destruction.

 Planned, coordinated, and provided command and control

of Task Force Rocketeer, in which the 130th helped secure

and destroy dozens of surface-to-air missiles throughout

Iraq.

 Planned and executed more than 100 humanitarian and civic

action projects throughout Iraq, to include the renovation

of schools, health clinics, playgrounds, and sports facilities.

 Assigned units planned, executed, and managed nearly

$900 million worth of contractor or contractor-equivalent

construction. (Note: The 937th Engineer Group’s facilities

program for the new Iraqi army is valued at $800 million.)

 Trained forces on the South African Interim VehicleMounted Mine-Detection System (IVMMDS) and

developed combined arms tactics, techniques, and procedures to use this system to detect and neutralize

enemy mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

 Developed Task Force Right of Way, using the IVMMDS,

sappers, and earthmoving equipment to detect and

neutralize IEDs along main supply routes. Established a

training academy and exported this concept to MSCs.

 Trained forces for the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in

support of the Ukrainian brigade of the Polish-led

multinational division in south-central Iraq.

Conclusion

The Victory Sappers of V Corps and CJTF-7 built a

cohesive, motivated, multifunctional engineer team of

more than 19,000 active duty, Reserve, and National

Guard soldiers and civilians from all four Army corps,

comprising every facet of the U.S. Army Engineer Regiment.

This dynamic team has executed thousands of missions of

every type over hundreds of thousands of square kilometers.

It has incorporated joint and coalition engineers into the team

as it continues to assure the mobility, survivability, and force

beddown of first V Corps and now CJTF-7. The Victory Sappers

“engineered the victory” during the ground offensive and

have played a critical and larger-than-expected role in rebuilding

Iraqi infrastructure. The Victory Sappers continue to play a

key role in support of coalition efforts to win the peace and

build a stable and prosperous Iraq.

Members of the 130th Engineer Brigade are grateful for the

privilege of serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. No matter

how tough the situation, we have chosen to have “an attitude

of gratitude” in all circumstances. We are thankful and proud

to be engineers and are committed to ensuring victory. We

hope that our experiences, lessons learned, and recommendations are beneficial to the Engineer Regiment and the

Army so that we improve the Future Force.

Colonel Martin has served as commander of the 130th

Engineer Brigade and as V Corps engineer since June 2002.

After deploying to Kuwait, he led the brigade’s attack on

Day One of the ground offensive and has served in Iraq since.

He also served as the CJTF-7 director of engineering C-7,

responsible for standing up a coalition-joint engineer staff.

Previous assignments include command of the “Fightin’ 5th”

Engineer Battalion, service with Joint Task Force Bravo in

Honduras, and teaching at West Point and the Army War

College. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the Army

and Naval War Colleges, and the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, he holds a Ph.D. in construction engineering

management and public policy.

The author would like to thank the following people:

Those great Americans and allies who shed their

blood or gave their lives to free Iraq.

The soldiers and civilians of the 130th Engineer

Brigade, V Corps, and CJTF-7 who put their lives

on the line to liberate Iraq and win the peace;

and the superb leaders of the 130th Engineer

Brigade, V Corps staff engineer section, CJTF-7 C-7,

and MSC engineer units who planned, coordinated, and fought the engineer fight.

Every member of the worldwide engineer team—

military, civilian, and contractor—who had a role in

fielding, training, deploying, supporting, and fighting

with the Engineer Regiment in Operation Iraqi

Freedom.

Members of the 130th Engineer Brigade who

provided ideas, input, and comments for this article.

(Note: For more information on the 130th Engineer

Brigade, after-action reviews, SOPs, articles, and

photos, see the 130th Engineer Brigade Web sites at

NIPRNET <http://www.130thengineers.army.mil> or

SIPRNET <148.35.87.68>.)

10 Engineer October-December 2003

Photos by Jayme Loppnow, 130th Engineer Brigade Public

Affairs.
Using the Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s)

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader

development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)

format, this information is divided into strengths that should

be sustained and areas of concern that should be improved.

Doctrine

Sustain

 We needed and received many EAD engineers, but we

needed them earlier in the force flow.

 The military decision-making process works. Teach and

use these concepts, along with ways to modify them on

the fly in combat.

 The assured mobility concept is sound. Continue to

develop and teach it.

 Aggressive, rapid execution works. Teach “A partial

solution now!” and ways to tailor and employ flexible

mission modules in combat.

 Active and Reserve Component integration worked. Teach

leaders how to build a cohesive team in combat. Build on

this success.

 Units simultaneously commanded and controlled

deployment, RSOI, high- and low-intensity conflict,

stability operations, and support operations. Understand how this was done, and continue to develop this

flexibility in our leaders.

 The adaptability and flexibility of engineers in rapidly

executing numerous nondoctrinal missions was excellent.

Build on this success.

 The ability to task-organize to tailor the right mix of skills

and forces for the mission was a success.

 The integration of hard-skilled USACE engineers into the

fight worked well.

Improve

 We must do a better job of “telling the engineer story” to

the Iraqi, American, and world media. Public affairs and

information operations are fundamental and must be an

integral part of the plan and campaign—not a nice-to-do

add-on. The entire force needs extensive education,

training, and organizational adjustment to improve in this

strategically crucial pillar of modern warfare.

 We must understand the proper use of command and

support relationships. Leaders must resist the urge to

assign “units to missions” and must instead assign

“missions to units,” especially in stability operations and

support operations.

 Engineers are flexible and possess a “can-do” spirit.

However, leaders must resist the urge to use them for

everything because we quickly run out of engineers and

do not have them available to perform critical engineer

missions, especially during stability operations and

support operations.

 We need to better understand and teach “how-to-fight”

combat heavy battalions, CSE companies, multirole bridge

companies, FEDs, FETs, FEST-As, etc.

 The transition from the ground offensive to stability

operations and support operations was very challenging.

We need to understand, teach, and plan this better.

 Construction contractors did not deliver as much or as

quickly as planned and expected. Troops must be ready to

go it alone with little contract construction support for a

long time in an austere and dangerous environment. We

need to use host-nation engineer capabilities as much as

possible.

Organizations

Sustain

 Combat heavy battalions, CSE companies, and corps

wheeled battalions provide powerful, multifunctional

capabilities. We need more of these units in the Active

Component.

 All engineer headquarters—brigade, group, and

battalion—are huge force multipliers. We need to embed

or plug in key enablers such as a CMS, civil affairs, linguists,

and contracting, especially for stability operations and

support operations.

 The O-6 division engineer brigade headquarters has been

a huge force multiplier in all phases of the campaign. We

must retain these in the heavy divisions.

 Always attach separate companies and detachments to a

battalion, which provides “family, love, and discipline.”

When this did not happen, we had problems.

 The FEST-As were a huge success in terms of reachback

and technical expertise. We need to resource and fund one

per corps, division, and armored cavalry regiment. We

should embed this in organization and doctrine.

 Employment of the 1138th Engineer Battalion headquarters

(Missouri Army National Guard) as the V Corps/CJTF-7

Mine Explosive Ordnance Information Command Center

was a success. It resulted in a superb “fusion center” for information and analysis of enemy mines and explosive threats.

Improve

 A TAEB or engineer command would have been ideal for

the enormous engineer mission in Iraq, especially after the

ground offensive. At a minimum, the equivalent CMS and

contracting capability should have been provided to the

corps combat brigade.

 The optimal task organization evolves over time but is very

hard to change, especially if it means taking units away

from an MSC. We need to plan and agree in advance on

solid disengagement and change criteria for taskorganization transitions.

 Leaders need a better understanding and appreciation of

low-density engineer units such as prime power platoons,

multirole bridge companies and utility detachments, as well

130th Engineer Brigade Lessons Learned

and Recommendations From Operation Iraqi Freedom

October-December 2003 Engineer 11

By Colonel Gregg F. Martin
as well drillers, divers, firefighters, FETs, FEDs, and

FESTs. Their capabilities must be introduced in professional

military education, and the leaders of these units must go

to warfighter and other training exercises in order to educate

the force through seminars and discussion.

 We need to develop multifunctional EAD engineer battalions that combine combat, construction, and bridging

capabilities.

 Quarrying, rock-crushing, and paving capabilities are

needed in Active Component combat heavy battalions.

 The Army should officially recognize and staff the 565th

Engineer Battalion (Provisional) headquarters and make it

our expert bridging unit. The 565th played a crucial role in

Operation Iraqi Freedom, because it planned and constructed

assault float bridges, medium girder bridges, and MabeyJohnson bridges throughout Iraq. Other than the

565th, there are no centers of expertise on the proper employment of tactical bridges. The 565th could fill this role.

 We must better educate leaders to resist the urge to break

up and farm out the elements of combat heavy battalions

to such a degree that we diminish the huge impact they

can make on the battlefield. The potential effects of massing

EAD engineers—especially in stability operations and

support operations—is greatly diminished when they are

piecemealed out.

 Every O-6 engineer headquarters needs a construction

management capability on its staff. Habitual training

associations with FEDs, FETs, or FESTs could fulfill this role.

Training

Sustain

 Our training philosophy was validated in Operation Iraqi

Freedom. Focus on the basics. Train better on less.

 Topographic engineering was a huge success. Build on

what we have, and continue to improve our topographic

training, organization, materiel, and doctrine. This is a huge

force multiplier.

 The development of flexible, adaptive, innovative leaders

and soldiers was a success. All engineers must be trained

on basic infantry and engineer skills. All engineer leaders

must understand maneuver and combined arms operations,

as well as the fundamentals of combat engineering and

construction management.

 We continued to train on the threat and enemy situation as

they evolved, with weapons ranges, live fires, mounted

live fires on the move, situational training exercises that

reflect the reality of the threats in Iraq, combat first aid,

tactical convoy procedures, reaction to enemy contact and

ambushes, and communications procedures. This was

critical to soldier readiness and morale, mission accomplishment, and protecting our troops.

 Mobile training teams from the U.S. Army Engineer School

were highly beneficial.

Improve

 Engineer Qualification Tables, training programs of

instruction, and mission-essential task lists must include

stability operations and support operations in a hostile

environment. Examples are convoy operations, ambushes,

IEDs, and mounted gunnery.

 Education and training of leaders for postconflict stability

operations and support operations should include topics

such as contracting, language and cultural knowledge,

employment of local workers, and use of local materials

and building techniques.

 All Army units need a simple, self-help construction program

for nonengineers so their units can quickly enhance their

own quality of life with tent floors, basic wiring, burn-out

latrines, and field showers. A booklet with simple drawings,

instructions, and bills of materials should be developed and

issued Armywide. This will allow engineers to focus time and

effort on more complex engineer missions.

Materiel

Sustain

 TeleEngineering Toolkits were extremely valuable. We

need to distribute them down to the battalion level.

 D9 dozers provided a powerful capability throughout the

campaign, and the M1 Panther was also useful. Program

and field this equipment with dedicated heavy equipment

transports, communications, and weapons.

 The hydraulic excavator (HYEX) or trackhoe and Bobcat®

skid steer were big winners.

 The South African IVMMDS was valuable for both counterIED and countermine operations.

 Continue to use blanket purchase agreements, prime

vendors, International Merchant Purchasing Authorization

Cards (IMPACs), and local construction materials.

Improve

 Develop and procure a technology to detect and neutralize

explosive hazards at a safe standoff distance. Given the

threat of IEDs, mines, and ambushes, this is the single

most important thing that needs to be improved with the

greatest sense of urgency.

 Logistics should be simpler and more responsive.

Pre-positioned stocks of engineer supplies would make

engineers far more responsive and effective.

 Rebuild or replace old engineer equipment such as the

M113 armored personnel carriers, armored vehicle-launched

bridges, bucket loaders, water distributors, and small

emplacement excavators. Of note, water distributors are

absolutely essential for construction in the desert.

 Standardize force protection gear for all soldiers and

equipment, such as weapons mounts, improved body

armor, Kevlar® blankets, improved armor for high-mobility,

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and more

crew-served weapons.

 Develop and fund a secure cellular telephone system for

use on the battlefield. All units should deploy with satellite

nonsecure Internet protocol router (NIPR) systems for

reliable official communications and morale, welfare, and

recreation support.

12 Engineer October-December 2003
 All military equipment needs to be dual voltage.

 National Guard units must deploy with IMPACs and prepurchased spare parts (prescribed load list [PLL] and

authorized stockage list [ASL]).

Leader Development

Sustain

 Strong, positive, caring leadership works. We validated

our philosophy of leadership in training, deployment,

preparation for combat, combat operations, stability

operations, and support operations.

 A clear mission, task and purpose, and commander’s intent

are critical; then power down and let folks amaze you. Keep

teaching and rewarding this.

 Commanders must be forward and present on the battlefield.

Figure out the critical missions and locations, and then go

there.

 There is no substitute for “eyes-on” and face-to-face communications, especially in combat.

 Many leaders developed and nurtured strong and

productive relationships with Iraqi civil leaders. This must

be encouraged, taught, and expanded in the future.

 The Army grows and selects great battalion commanders.

 Leaders must take care of themselves with rest, food, water,

hygiene, and time to recharge their batteries. Otherwise,

they burn out.

 One-year tours are like an ultramarathon. Leaders must

establish a pace to finish the race strong. Balancing mental,

physical, spiritual, and social needs is key to thriving in a

grueling and dangerous environment. Mission comes first,

but strive to make time for training, maintenance, and officer

and noncommissioned officer professional development,

as well as physical training, chapel, sports, and events

such as movie nights, karaoke nights, and soldier talent

shows. Leaders must make time for fun! They must grow

better leaders and build a stronger team every day. Balance

is key to sustaining the force today in Iraq, as well as over

the long term for the future.

Improve

 All engineers must be builders. Basic and career course

curriculums must ensure that engineer leaders are prepared

to build.

 Engineer officers need more knowledge in contracting and

facilities management, as well as civil affairs, culture, and

language, especially during stability operations and

support operations.

 Work to develop even smarter, more flexible, adaptive, and

determined leaders who are comfortable in a volatile,

uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and dangerous

environment. Never assume that engineers will perform

only “engineer missions.”

 Leaders (especially at engineer group/brigade level and

above) need a better understanding of low-density EAD

units, such as FEST-As, FEDs, FETs, utility detachments,

prime power platoons, firefighters, divers, and well drillers.

 While deployed, fill empty Reserve Component platoon

leader slots with excess Active Component lieutenants.

 Leaders need to better prepare themselves and their troops

for extended deployments of one year or more. This is a

leadership challenge.

Personnel

Sustain

 Our people are everything. Most of our leaders understand

and live this.

 Engineer enthusiasm and can-do spirit, along with initiative,

flexibility, adaptability, dedication, professional expertise,

and team spirit were hallmarks of the campaign.

 Engineers displayed raw courage and bravery every day,

all over Iraq.

Improve

 Manage and pay better attention to low-density units from

the start.

 Keep unit integrity during deployments.

 Fix the Reserve Component replacement system; they

received no replacements during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

 Many units were not filled to authorized strength before

deployment. Strive to meet authorized manning levels.

 Management and rotation of captains is out of sync with

the needs of the field. New career course captains serve

on brigade and corps staffs before getting company

command. Once branch-qualified, they immediately depart

the theater and cannot be used on brigade- or corps-level

staffs, where their expertise is sorely needed.

Facilities

Sustain

 We did a good job of using captured Iraqi facilities, as well

as tapping into and developing Iraqi construction

capability.

Improve

 Before the fight, we must develop a comprehensive

strategic plan for postconflict engineering, base camps,

and force beddown. Simultaneously, we must streamline

and expedite approval and funding of contingency military

construction projects.

 Engineers are expected to be the experts on all aspects of

infrastructure, to include civil, military, and captured enemy

facilities. They need more training in these areas, as well

as in facilities and contract management.

 We need clear legal rules early on regarding the purchase

and/or construction of beddown facilities such as

containers and trailers.

 We must develop, procure, and deliver Force Provider

packages for deploying units.

 FEST, FED, FET, and prime power representatives must be

present during the early phases of planning and on the

ground early, located forward with the units they will

support.

October-December 2003 Engineer 13
14 Engineer October-December 2003

As the 16thEngineer Battalion arrived on the ground in

Baghdad, Iraq, the No. 1 priority for all units was force

protection. Units under 1st Brigade, 1st Armored

Division, occupied central Baghdad east of the Tigris River.

The major challenge facing units in the heart of the densely

populated city was finding suitable and defendable terrain for

forward operating bases (FOBs). This article reflects the impressions and experiences of a mechanized combat engineer

company commander. It also describes the engineer mission

three months into the deployment. Before deploying to the

U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, our unit was

unsure if we were going into high-intensity conflict (HIC),

stability operations, or support operations. As it turned out,

we are supporting all three. This article provides the military

engineering community—particularly lieutenants and

captains—some practical tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) used during Operation Iraqi Freedom and shows the

flexibility required to accomplish the many nontraditional

missions.

Task Organization

Charlie Company, 16th Engineer Battalion, is a

mechanized combat engineer line company with a

standard modified table of organization and equipment

(MTOE). With the available resources, stability operations

and support operations are challenging but not impossible.

The company did not task-organize in support of a task force

as we typically execute during HIC training. We remained under

the command and control of the engineer battalion. Missions

in this theater typically require a platoon-sized element.

Remaining under the engineer battalion allowed the company

to work throughout the area and support all task forces under

the brigade combat team. On several occasions, missions

required an operational control (OPCON) relationship of

engineer squads and platoons to the maneuver company teams

for support during raids and listening post/observation post

execution.

The most valuable resource we have is our M998 highmobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). To move

quickly and effectively in an urban setting, HMMWVs are

critical. M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) provide better

force protection and make a more forceful presence, but with

narrow streets, congested traffic, and low-hanging power lines,

the HMMWVs provide better mobility and flexibility. We were

supported by National Guard and Reserve combat engineers

with dump trucks, bucket loaders, wheeled cranes, and

additional HMMWVs. On many missions, these OPCON units

proved invaluable due to their lifting and hauling capabilities

and because they augmented our force protection strength.

Because of the threats of ambushes and improvised explosive

devices, the 1st Armored Division requires that convoys have

a minimum of two vehicles with at least two crew-served

weapon systems. As the threat and associated force protection

levels changed, some convoys required three or more vehicles.

This made it very difficult to execute concurrent missions.

Even though our current MTOE does not support it, units on

Force Protection

of Forward Operating Bases in Baghdad

By Captain Jason M. Railsback
October-December 2003 Engineer 15

a stability operations and support operations deployment need

an increase of at least two HMMWVs per platoon. Even with

the additional support from outside military units, many

missions still require host nation support.

Contracting and Host Nation Support

Agreat deal of the manpower and equipment resourcing

in Baghdad is contracted though local businesses.

There are many difficulties. In addition to the

language barrier, there are problems with paying for services,

ensuring that the service quality is acceptable, and ensuring

that the job is completed on time. The first step in contracting

is linking the right contractor to the job requirements. Once

the contractor is selected, you must escort him to the job site

and allow him to make an estimate. After an agreement on the

payment has been reached, the battalion must find resources

for the project. If the project is for an FOB, the funds come

from a battalion-level field ordering officer. If the project is

outside of an FOB (to improve Iraqi public services or for

emergencies), the funding is from the brigade commander’s

Emergency Response Program fund. All other contracts are

submitted though the division resource manager, who will

approve the overall project and forward it to the contracting

office. Contracting receives bids from local contractors and

selects the contractor. Once the price is agreed upon and the

funding is obtained, the local national contractor begins work.

The engineer company’s responsibility is to report the progress

of the project and ensure that standards are maintained. Once

the project is completed, the company will revisit the site,

ensure that all the work was completed to standard, and arrange

payment for the contractor.

Location

Charlie Company was responsible for FOBs in the oldest

and most built-up urban areas of Baghdad, east of the

Tigris River. Units either occupied the previous unit’s

structures or established new ones. The various facilities

included one of Saddam’s palaces, an amusement park on an

island, a bank, and many government ministry buildings.

Providing adequate force protection in these areas was

challenging.

Military vehicle selection for missions depends on the time

of day and the area. The HMMWV is optimal to maneuver in

downtown Baghdad, compared to the alternative—the M113

APC. During the day, the streets are virtually impassable in

certain areas. Streets designed to handle four lanes of traffic

are narrowed down to one direction by vendors moving their

carts into the road, closing off the outer lanes. Pedestrians,

automobiles, and donkey carts clog the streets. In some

sectors of the city, it can take more than an hour to move one

to two city blocks at midday.

Mission Planning and Execution

Constructing force protection in an urban environment

follows the same principles learned at the U.S. Army

Engineer School and the combat training centers

(CTCs). It is still the engineer lieutenant on the ground

coordinating linkup with the maneuver force, assessing the

situation, making a plan, and executing it. Serpentines and

fighting positions must still be proofed. Unlike at the Engineer

School and the CTCs, your work is tested the next day. You

know very soon if the barriers you constructed will prevent

drive-by shootings, car bombings, sniper attacks, or angry

mobs from interfering with FOB operations. Certain aspects of

working in Baghdad add a new complexity to the combat

engineer role. Many lessons on Class IV and barrier materials,

equipment, and emplacement were learned—and learned

quickly.

Construction Materials and Equipment

Initially the supply and resupply of Class IV materials was

an issue. Units from the 3d Infantry Division used whatever

was available for the immediate force protection requirement.

This included vehicles—both military and civilian—as barriers,

Iraqi “concertina/barbed wire,” rubble, and earthen berms. As

the battalion accepted the mission in East Baghdad, improvements were needed for a longer-term solution. Hesco®

bastions (see photo on page 14) and concertina wire became

the primary resources for temporary barriers and walls. Units

should be prepared to hit the ground with an initial combat

load of barrier materials and understand the terrain they may

occupy.

Hesco fill material is another issue when working in an

urban environment. Sources within the confines of a

concrete landscape are limited. Contracting through local

sources was crucial to mission accomplishment. Initially,

combat heavy engineers and corps wheeled engineer units

were not available to assist. Our battalion does have six

organic small emplacement excavators (SEEs), but they

could not fill the large number of Hescos required. Company

FOBs needed an average of 100 Hescos for their perimeter,

entrance gates, dismounted and mounted positions, and

serpentines at entrances. The SEE tractor can fill a Hesco in

about 10 trips as opposed to a 5 1/2-yard bucket loader that

can load three large Hescos at a time in only two trips. Hescos

proved to be an adequate temporary solution, but in hightraffic areas, they tend to break apart after vehicles cut corners

too sharply.

The battalion formed and supervised Task Force Rascal,

which consisted of 60 Iraqi civilians, one 5 1/2-yard bucket

loader, and two civilian 15-cubic-meter dump trucks. The Iraqi

workers would arrive on-site with loads of gravel or dirt and

refill from a pre-positioned dumpsite at the 16th Engineer

Battalion base camp (Camp Ultimo). On many occasions, fill

material was drawn from within the FOB where we were working

or from the immediate outer perimeter. This was a temporary

fix, but in some instances this created a mobility concern.

Digging in the city exposes water and sewer lines and creates

large amounts of dust. As the availability of Hesco bastions

ran short, the 3d Infantry Division’s Engineer Brigade

(distributor of Class IV supplies for the division) provided

55-gallon drums and other materials.
16 Engineer October-December 2003

We were able to find additional uses for these drums, other

than as clearing barrels and fuel reservoirs. By using them as

supports for 8-foot pickets, and also as a barrier filled with

rock, the nonstandard wall proved efficient and readily

available. This method of fencing was invaluable in concrete

terrain when the only alternative was using the SEE truck’s

hydraulic picket pounder to drive an 8-foot picket through the

highway pavement or sidewalk.

New Jersey barriers, better known as concrete highway

dividers, were initially in short supply. Measuring 9 feet long

by 3 1/2 feet high, they are perfect for the urban terrain and

were used primarily as serpentines to FOB entrances and traffic

lane dividers. The heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck

(HEMTT) with a crane can transport and emplace up to ten

barriers.

The SEE proved invaluable for FOB construction. The front

bucket easily moves concrete flowerpots (similar to ones used

at U.S. military facilities to impede traffic) to incorporate them

into the defense plan. We also used flowerpots to redirect

traffic and control movement on streets, sidewalks, and bridges.

Fortunately, the former regime used flowerpots throughout

the city for the same purpose, and they were in ample supply.

We simply relocated them for our benefit.

Based on location and available resources, the use of

Hescos around some perimeters was impractical. Initially, Bravo

Company, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment’s FOB

consisted of 300 meters of new cars that the previous unit had

parked around the compound and then disabled. Seeking a

better solution for force protection, the 1st Armored Division

commander required the removal and upgrade of any FOB

that used disabled vehicles. We hired an Iraqi contractor with a

crane and flatbed trucks to remove the disabled vehicles. Due

to the extensive frontage of the perimeter and the low supply

of Hescos at the time, we used storm water piping (6 meters long

by 1 1/2 meters in diameter) as barriers. These required a 30-ton

crane, either from an Iraqi contractor or a heavy engineer company,

to haul and emplace. The pipes will stop any attempt to ram or run

the perimeter of the compound and are excellent protection

from small arms and rocket-propelled grenade attacks.

Emplacement

The platoon and company leadership quickly learned that

part of terrain analysis was thinking like an urban traffic

engineer. As in other operations, assured mobility was

essential. Traffic flow had to be considered not only for

potential congestion but also for mission-execution planning.

Closing off all civilian traffic in the vicinity of an FOB would

be ideal for force protection. It would also assist in moving

equipment in the area and giving soldiers the battlespace to

work. However, during stability operations and support

operations and trying to return a city to normal, city infrastructure and civilian traffic mobility must enter into planning

considerations.

 The weather is an important consideration. The

temperature in June, July, and August can reach higher than

120 degrees Fahrenheit during the day. For soldiers

traveling in a military vehicle with body armor and Kevlar®,

the temperature far exceeds this. It is safer and equipment

efficiency/productivity is much higher if the unit operates

on a reverse-cycle schedule.

A barrier in front of the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad was constructed using 55-gallon drums with pickets

and concertina wire.
October-December 2003 Engineer 17

The Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. forces imposed a 2300 curfew on the Iraqi people. The local population

is out in the city and on the streets from 0800 until about 1600.

After that, most people in Baghdad return to their homes to

defend their property from looters. During the day,

differentiating between the friendly and the enemy may be

impossible until it is too late.

Banking District Missions

The missions we executed in the banking district help

illustrate the benefits of performing missions at night in

Baghdad. A platoon from 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment,

had the mission to occupy and guard a series of Saddam’s

former banks in the oldest and most congested area of Baghdad.

During the day, thousands of Iraqi people swarmed this platoon

FOB, most with the intent to exchange currency, but some

with the intent to do harm to each other and to the American

soldiers guarding and regulating traffic in the facility. Working

in this area in daylight was out of the question. We started

force protection upgrades around 2100. Local gangs spent

much of the night shooting at each other. Our vehicles moved

to the side of the road, closer to buildings, to avoid being hit

by the bullets that frequently whizzed up and down the narrow

streets. Imagine working the controls of a HEMTT cargo crane,

downloading New Jersey barriers, and stopping every 10

minutes to take cover. Once the shooting subsided, we returned

to the mission and stopped work only when the mission was

complete.

These experiences add definition to the term “combat

engineer.” Returning fire is difficult. Rarely do you see a muzzle

flash, and the source of the rounds is usually unseen. Echoes

make it extremely difficult to home in on the direction of fire.

Even though the shots were close enough to “pop” the sound

barrier and fill the air with the now-too-familiar cracking sound

of a bullet passing close by your head, we could not return

fire on a target.

On this site and others, FOB construction was driven by

immediate necessity. FOB force protection became a phased

operation: First, we built what we thought needed to be built.

Second, we assessed what reaction the enemy had to our

fortifications. Third, we developed controls based on the enemy

reaction. It was an ongoing process. A day after we completed

a Hesco and concertina perimeter at the banking district FOB,

an enemy combatant threw a pipe bomb over the wall, hitting

a tree the soldiers on guard were using for shade. The bomb

exploded at eye level, killing one soldier. The next day our unit

was back on-site with more wire, installing a guard tower and

cutting down the tree inside the perimeter with chainsaws. We

ensured that the guards were off the ground, eliminated

obstructions, and increased the perimeter standoff. We hired Iraqi

contractors to erect a 15-foot-high chain-link fence secured atop

the Hescos, preventing further hand-thrown ordnance attacks.

Working at night also has its drawbacks. Iraqi unwillingness

to work at night, rolling blackouts, and the lack of visibility are

just some of the concerns. Iraqi civilians contracted to haul fill

material and operate bucket loaders must be convinced to

work at night. They must keep the vehicles at their homes to

prevent theft. They are fearful of retribution due to contact

with American forces. Many of our contracted truck operators

received gunfire when leaving the work site. Iraq has rolling

electrical blackouts. The grid system cannot support 100

percent power to all of Baghdad, and power production cannot

meet the demand. To alleviate the strain on the utilities, officials

turn power grids on and off throughout the day. Entire city

blocks go dark for periods of two to four hours. Most work in

the city is performed under white light. Night vision devices

are used to spot snipers in windows and rooftops but overall

are ineffective due to the lights of the city.

Storm water

piping was used

as a barrier for

the perimeter of

the compound.
Nontraditional Combat Engineer Missions

Baghdad has a serious trash problem. Initially, all

government agencies shut down during the major assault and

occupation by U.S. forces. This included services such as

trash removal. The local people turned to dumping their waste

directly in front of their businesses or homes or on the highway.

Many of the locations we intended to use as FOBs had to be

cleared of debris first. The FOB site for Headquarters, 1st

Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, for instance, required the

removal of 26 dump truck loads of garbage. We took an Iraqi

contractor to the site, estimated the amount of debris, agreed

to a price and contracted for the removal, and provided security

during the removal process.

We also supervised the destruction of biowaste from a

hospital complex. The hospital’s incinerator was nonoperational, so the hospital staff deposited medical waste (to

include needles, body parts, and used bandages) directly in

front of the hospital. Moving the material posed a health risk,

even for the contracted labor force, so we used armored combat

earthmover teams to dig a large trench. All the waste was

pushed in the trench, soaked in JP-8 jet fuel and motor gasoline

(Mogas), and set aflame.

Another area of concern was the massive number of Iraqi

military vehicles in the city and surrounding area that had

been abandoned by Iraqi forces or destroyed by U.S. forces.

As engineers, we accepted responsibility for hulk removal.

Our battalion not only worked in the heart of the city but also

in the outlying areas consisting of farmland, orchards, and

irrigation canals. Again, the civilian population was used,

contracting crane support and flatbed trucks to haul more

than 100 vehicles out of the sector. Some of the vehicles

included SA-7 rocket launchers, T-70 tanks, and bridging

vehicles. Looters were quick to descend on these vehicles,

mainly with the intent of taking wiring, aluminum, and other

resources they could sell. We worked closely with 1st Brigade

and Canadian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel

to identify and supervise the removal of rockets and other

explosives. We then turned the hulks over to Iraqi contractors

18 Engineer October-December 2003

for removal. We also worked with EOD personnel to identify

caches of Iraqi Class V materials (mortars, rockets, bullets,

and grenades) and assisted in their disposal.

Conclusion

Combat engineers in Iraq adapted to the conditions and

met the challenges head-on. All the mission-essential

task list-based training conducted before deployment

could not have prepared us completely for the missions we

received upon arrival. Many of them are very different from

what we study at the Engineer School or during CTC rotations.

To prepare, units must emphasize command and control at the

platoon and squad levels, ensure redundancy of trained crews

on crew-served weapons, and license all soldiers on the

HMMWV.

As the Engineer School continues to train engineer leaders

and develop the training plan for the Future Force, we need to

add training on urban operations, stability operations, and

support operations. Engineers must cross-train on TTP used

by military police. New lieutenants given a fundamental

background on nonlethal tactics, traffic control points, crowd

control, and convoy operations would be better prepared to

lead an operation that is somewhere between HIC and stability

operations or support operations.

A typical mission requires the platoon leader to prepare,

brief, and execute convoy operations, maintain control of

crowds of curious spectators, and remain vigilant for those

who wish to do harm. Much of the success on-site came from

innovative and creative squad leaders and platoon leaders

who used initiative to work with limited resources to accomplish

the commander’s end state.

Regardless of the spectrum of conflict, U.S. forces need

force protection. Now our units operate from safe and secure

FOBs, taking the fight to the enemy. Units are able to focus on

offensive operations with their “backyards” secure.

Captain Railsback is commander of Charlie Company,

16th Engineer Battalion, Geissen, Germany.

Before 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry

Regiment, could use this area inside

the perimeter of its FOB for a motor

pool, 26 dump truck loads of garbage

had to be removed.
October-December 2003 Engineer 19

Upon completion of Phase III of Operation Iraqi

Freedom, the U.S. Army Engineer School determined

the need for a comprehensive review of engineer

issues. The forum for this was achieved from 3–5 November

2003, when senior leaders of the Engineer Regiment met in

Savannah, Georgia, in conjunction with the Savannah post of

the Society of American Military Engineers and the Army

Engineer Association Regional Conference. As an integral part

of the conference, a Warfighter track was established to give

leaders an opportunity to hear from those who participated in

Operation Iraqi Freedom and to discuss emerging issues for

engineer units and soldiers.

The conference began with presentations ranging from

operational planning down to the tactical execution of ground

combat. The intent was to have the operational perspective

set the foundation for tactical-level presentations. To examine

all aspects of the conflict, representatives from the sister

services and coalition partners presented their views of

engineer operations. The culmination of the conference was a

series of breakout sessions designed to stimulate discussion

and generate issues that need to be resolved for both present

and future engineer operations.

Colonel Charles Smithers, assistant chief of staff, C7

(Engineer), 3d Army/Army Central Command (ARCENT)/

Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC), and

Colonel John Lendrum, G3, 416th Engineer Command,

provided the operational-level presentations and

highlighted theater planning, the design of engineer force

packages, and the unique aspects of command and control

of Active and Reserve Component unit deployment. The

joint and multinational panel consisted of Colonel Michael

Boyd, U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel Neil Kanno, U.S. Air Force,

Captain William McKerall, U.S. Navy, and Colonel John

Shanahan, United Kingdom Royal Engineers, who

discussed engineering aspects from their services’

perspectives and joined in a panel discussion with members

of the conference. The tactical-level perspective was

provided by Colonel Gregg Martin, Commander, 130th

Engineer Brigade, and Colonel John Peabody, who

commanded the 3d Infantry Division’s Engineer Brigade.

This forum provided a close look at the tactical employment

of engineers on the drive to Baghdad.

The panel discussion provided a candid view of some of the

most critical engineer issues facing the Regiment today. The U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) involvement was detailed by

Major General Carl Strock, Director of Civil Works, USACE. His

presentation outlined the wide breadth of USACE involvement,

from support to the Coalition Provisional Authority in restoring

the basic infrastructure of Iraq, down to direct support of combat

forces on the battlefield. Breakout sessions were designed in a

round-robin fashion to ensure that all conference participants

were able to discuss each of the subject areas of battle command,

mobility, and construction.

In total, the Engineer School has formally captured roughly

sixty engineer issues taken from Operation Iraqi Freedom

lessons learned (Phases I through III). To address these issues,

the school has assembled an Operation Iraqi Freedom doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel,

and facilities (DOTMLPF) action officer board, with

representation from across the Maneuver Support Center. The

purpose of this board is to analyze engineer lessons learned

in detail and formally document recommendations for

improving the Regiment, utilizing the full DOTMLPF

framework. The ultimate goal is to implement actions to resolve

the majority of these issues or explain why an issue cannot or

should not be solved. As this board continues its work, it will

share periodic updates with the field and intends to publish a

formal document before ENFORCE 2004 (26-30 April).

As Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring

Freedom missions continue into the future, we encourage units

to keep sending relevant lessons learned and after-action

reviews to the Engineer School Center for Engineer Lessons

Learned (CELL). Submissions remain vitally important to

support the Current Force and to take into consideration as

we shape our Future Force. Unclassified information can be

sent to the CELL by e-mail to <reggie.snodgrass

@us.army.mil>. Classified information can be sent by secret

Internet protocol, routed (SIPR) e-mail to <massetga

@monroe.army.smil.mil>.

Lieutenant Colonel Drolet is Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Engineer School.

Major Masset is Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Engineer

School.

By Lieutenant Colonel Jack Drolet and Major Glen Masset

Capturing the Lessons of War -

The Engineer Perspective on

Operation Iraqi Freedom
20 Engineer October-December 2003

Operation Enduring Freedom

moves into its second year, and

the engineers in Afghanistan

have moved beyond initial-entry

operations. They have started to attack

some of the daunting general engineering and mobility challenges posed

by this arid and austere environment.

The 82d Airborne Division’s 307th

Engineer Battalion airfield repair team at

Kandahar International Airport has

introduced several construction initiatives in runway repair that will not only

prolong the lifespan of the deteriorating

airfield but also may change the way

contingency airfields are repaired in the

future.

One of the first problems that the team

noticed in July 2002 was that the concrete

runway repairs made by the first coalition

engineers to arrive at Kandahar were

causing the asphalt around those

patches to crack excessively. (See

Engineer, July 2002, page 8) The cracks

were due to the cold joint between the

flexible asphalt pavement and the rigid

Portland cement patches. While this

technique kept the runway open for the

first deployments and resupply, it created

unacceptable debris after the summer

relief in place of major combat forces.

This method of repair—aggravated by

extreme temperature swings between the

day and the night and extremely dry air—

did not provide a suitable long-term

solution.

To overcome the cracks in the asphalt

around the patches, the airfield repair

team initiated several successful material

and procedural changes that have been

approved by Air Force officials

throughout the area of operations. The

first significant method involved cleanly

cutting and removing damaged areas,

setting the concrete form inside the hole,

and then filling the resultant gap

between the asphalt and the Portland

cement patch with cold-patch asphalt.

The technique creates a flexible, easily

maintained joint and a repair that can

withstand thousands of sorties of

traffic with only minimal additional

maintenance.

The first step of the method is cutting

out and excavating the damaged areas

of asphalt. The key to this step is the

use of a concrete saw with a diamondtipped blade to create clean, linear cuts

and a skid steer loader to quickly

excavate the damaged asphalt down to

the subgrade. The subgrade is then

compacted and additional fill gravel is

added so that the concrete patch created

Innovative Engineers Pave

New Paths in Afghanistan

By Major Steven A. Baker

Task force engineers

inspect a damaged

section of asphalt.
October-December 2003 Engineer 21

will be 8 to 10 inches thick. The form is

cut and installed to create individual cells

that are typically no bigger than 300

square feet. Plastic sheeting is placed

over the gravel to prevent water required

for hydration from percolating through

the gravel. No. 5 rebar (12 inches on

center with lateral bracing that is 16

inches on center) provides additional

strength and minimizes cracking.

Finally, the site is ready for concrete

placement with Type I cement, a change

from the initial repairs that were done

with Type III cement. The summer heat

and lack of humidity caused the team to

switch to Type I cement. It provided a

mix with slower hydration but still

offered the strength required for an

airfield. The concrete is placed with an

M919 concrete mobile and worked with

standard tools and methods, including a

hand-operated concrete vibrator, provided and operated by the 769th Engineer Battalion from the Louisiana Army

National Guard.

To ensure that enough water is

available for hydration, sandbags are

placed over each new pad and watered

regularly. After several days of curing,

gravel is placed in the gap up to the level

of the existing asphalt and then coldpatch asphalt is added and compacted

to create a level surface for aircraft use.

Asphalt sealant is then spread over the

asphalt and the cold-patch to waterproof

the joint. The result is a durable surface

that can receive thousands of sorties, to

include C-5 Galaxy aircraft, with little or

no additional maintenance.

Kandahar is such an important

logistics hub in the region that the

amount of time the airfield can be closed,

or its usable threshold altered, is very

limited. This is especially true in the

summer when hot, thin air and a 5,000-

foot altitude force many aircraft to use

much of the total length of the 10,475-

foot runway. This, combined with the

fact that much of the runway is infected

with deep spider and alligator cracks,

requires rapid runway repair when the

pavement does fail. The solution to this

challenge was achieved after operational

testing. The result is a quick and effective

soil patch that requires minimal

maintenance, produces little debris, and

can be constructed in 2 to 3 hours by a

trained crew.

The early steps in this method mirror

those of a preplanned concrete patch. A

square or rectangular patch is cut and

excavated down to the level of the

subgrade. Then 2-inch slump concrete

is placed in 2- to 3-inch lifts, raked of

large aggregate, and covered with a thin

layer of coarse sand. This process is

repeated until the grade of the existing

asphalt pavement is reached.

The last step of the method

involves dust control. To

prevent “brown-out” conditions that hamper visibility,

EK 35®, a commercial dust

control agent, is spread over the

soil patches in several thin

coats until the agent begins to

pool. This nonflammable, noncorrosive binding agent not

only prevents brownouts, it

actually increases the durability

of the soil patch. The dust

control agent has been so

successful that it has been used

on many of the high-traffic

shoulder areas of the airfield

and on many of the helicopter

landing zones throughout

the Afghanistan area of

operations.

Offset framework, complete with vapor barrier, is ready for the arrival of the

concrete truck and crew.

A recently stabilized soil patch is prepared for an application of dust control agent.
22 Engineer October-December 2003

The advantages of this unique soil

patch technique are more than just speed

and durability. When the patches fail, as

they typically do after about 2,000

sorties, they fail in thin layers that tend

to crumble into a nonthreatening sandy

residue rather than into dangerous

pieces of gravel that could destroy an

aircraft engine. This technique does not

require cumbersome airfield matting to

be drilled into the existing runway

surface before aircraft can land. In July

and August 2002, more than a dozen

C-5s landed on these soil patches

without incident.

As a result of the success of these

durable soil patches and the outstanding

performance of the skid steer, the 307th

Engineer Battalion is reviewing its

current doctrine and equipment required

for the rapid runway repair mission. A

significant savings in the airframes

required for a light airfield repair

package mission could be seen if the skid

steers (after heavy-drop certification)

replace the current dozer—the deployable universal combat earthmover

(DEUCE)—and if the extremely heavy

runway repair matting was simply

deleted and replaced with additional

cement and finishing tools.

Another innovative construction

technique used at the Kandahar airfield

involved the close coordination of the

airfield repair team, the airfield manager,

and the U.S. Air Force. As the long-range

plan for the repair of the runway was

being jointly scripted, it became obvious

that some of the major repairs would

reduce the usable threshold of the

runway by several thousand feet due to

the position of the damaged sections.

This was unacceptable during the heat

of the summer because the heavily laden

aircraft needed as much runway as

possible to lift off.

Because Kandahar’s main runway is

148 feet wide, the team agreed it would

be feasible to offset the runway

centerline to the east and then to the west

to accommodate repairs on each

shoulder. This would keep them from

postponing much of the necessary

construction into the cooler weather of

the fall and winter when the threshold

could be reduced without affecting air

traffic. While this scheduling option

required the airfield repair team to paint

and repaint the runway centerlines, and

required the airfield manager to issue

numerous Notice to Airmen warnings, it

allowed the runway construction to

proceed so that much of the major

construction would be complete before

the onset of winter precipitation.

Major Baker is the executive officer

of the 307th Engineer Battalion, 82d

Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina. He recently returned from a

six-month tour in Afghanistan as the

Coalition Task Force C-7/Task Force

Panther engineer. His previous assignments include commander of A

Company, 307th Engineer Battalion,

and commander of the 82d Airborne

Division Advanced Airborne School. He

served in the 547th Engineer Battalion

in Germany and in Saudi Arabia during

Operation Desert Storm and with the

New York District Corps of Engineers

in New Jersey, Greenland, Albania,

Macedonia, and Kosovo. He is a

graduate of the United States Military

Academy and holds a master’s in civil

engineering from the University of

Florida.

An overhead view of Runway 23 shows that Federal Aviation Administration-approved reflective paint, plus a

recent application of asphalt sealant, can make a runway look new despite its age.
October-December 2003 Engineer 23

There are many mysteries hidden under the sand dunes

of the Iraqi desert, and soldiers of Alpha Company,

142d Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy), North

Dakota Army National Guard, had the opportunity to help

uncover five of them.

The land surrounding Peacan Base is littered with manmade sand hills intended to conceal Iraqi fighter jets. Many

soldiers have yearned for the chance to dig them out, but until

now they had no authorization. A team from the Iraq Survey

Group (ISG), consisting of American, British, and Australian

soldiers, was sent to the abandoned Iraqi air base where the

142d Engineer Battalion is located, with authorization to unearth

five of the preserved aircraft hidden there to study their

capabilities.

The team called on the engineers to help excavate the jets

to shorten the recovery process from possible months to just

days. Without the assistance of the engineers and their

equipment, the jets would have been dug out by hand, which

would not have been a good mission for any soldier in the

desert heat.

The project, completed in five days, was one of teamwork

and patience. The joint crews excavated one jet per day,

working from 0500 until noon. The work hours were crucial to

the mission, not only to prevent heat casualties but also to

avoid working around the aircraft when excessive heat creates

volatile conditions for the jet’s fuel and any ammunition that

might still be stored inside.

The aircraft, once uncovered from the sand, were towed

back to a hangar at the air base by a heavy equipment transport

trailer, and numerous ground guides

made sure the jets made it back in one

piece. Once within the secured perimeter,

the Russian-made fighter jets were then

either stripped of necessary parts or

parked to wait for transportation to the

United States for further research into

their power and capabilities.

The combined efforts of the coalition

forces showed the soldiers the endless

possibilities of working together.

Sergeant Stansbury is a member of

Alpha Company, 142d Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), North Dakota

Army National Guard.

Uncovering Mysteries

in the Iraqi Desert

By Sergeant Jodie Stansbury

A soldier from the 142d Engineer Battalion uses a Bobcat® to dig out the

wheels of a jet.
24 Engineer October-December 2003

Military action in Operation Enduring Freedom was

the first measurement of the concepts of integrating

environmental considerations in military operations

since the June 2000 publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-100.4,

Environmental Considerations in Military Operations. According to the manual, “National security strategy and

operational end states support lasting victories. End states

include environmental components.”1 In the first year of

deployment to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, U.S. forces faced

numerous challenges in meeting these end states related to

protecting the environment from the effects of the coalition

footprint and protecting the force from existing environmental

hazards. These hazards, in many cases, were the result of years

of inconsistent application of environmental laws, regulations,

and programs by the host nation. Without host nation laws

and regulations, U.S. forces were required to default back to

U.S. environmental policy requiring that all joint U.S. military

operations include effective environmental integration. U.S.

Army engineers on joint staffs and below are responsible for

incorporating environmental considerations into military

operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs).

However, it is the responsibility of soldiers to execute the

Army’s environmental mission, whether deployed or at their

home station. This article discusses Operation Enduring

Freedom environmental considerations as a command

guidance issue.

Levels of Environmental Consideration

Even though Department of Defense Directive

(DODD) 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of

Major Department of Defense Actions, specifically

exempts combat operations from meeting environmental

requirements, it was an assumption in the combatant

commander’s OPORD that press coverage and worldwide public

interests could scrutinize U.S. environmental security actions.

This assumption becomes reality if leaders at all levels fail to

recognize the impacts of their operations on the environment.

Joint Publication (JP) 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering

Support, states, “Joint Forces Commands (JFCs) should

demonstrate proactive environmental leadership, instill

environmental ethics, and promote environmental awareness

throughout the joint force.”2 Consideration for the environment

is nothing more than the integration and application of

environmental risk management incorporating all aspects of

the natural environment as they interact with the conduct of

military operations. This process can be as simple as conducting

oil spill battle drills or as complex as avoiding environmentally

sensitive areas. Thus, in the context of risk management,

environmental considerations should receive a minimum level

of thought no matter what conditions and constraints U.S.

forces operate under. Environmental considerations need not

become mission-constraining.

FM 3-0, Operations, states, “As missions change from

promoting peace to deterring war itself, the combination of

and transition between these operations require skillful

assessment, planning, preparation, and execution.”3

 This holds

just as true when considering the environment depicted in

Figure 1, page 25. It shows how the level of environmental

considerations changes as the intensity of operations

Environmental Issues Associated

With Operation Enduring Freedom

By Mr. Robert J. Chartier

A prescribed burn at the Baghram landfill sends

smoke from incomplete combustion blowing across

the base camp.

The leaking containers at right should be in the plasticlined pit at left. Unopened containers at left should be

stored elsewhere.
October-December 2003 Engineer 25

transitions from peacetime operations through the employment

of forces and back to peacetime operations. As operations

transition from peacetime to wartime, the opportunity to fully

incorporate environmental considerations decreases. However,

once in theater, there are still opportunities to incorporate

environmental considerations into daily activities whether forces

are employed in high-intensity conflict (HIC) operations such as

direct combat or low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations such as

peace enforcement. The shaded area of Figure 1 depicts an area

between pure LIC and HIC operations where the level of

environmental consideration may fluctuate within any given time.

The base camp is the most logical setting for this transition

to occur, because hostilities have likely decreased and force

protection levels and work priorities allow increased efforts in

other areas, such as the environment. The relationship between

Karshi Khanabad—the base camp in Uzbekistan—and those

in Afghanistan exemplifies this point. Karshi Khanabad

supported operations in Afghanistan and was not involved in

direct combat operations. Thus environmental considerations

were integrated into daily activities from the base camp design

stage to present-day operations.

In Afghanistan, the base camps at Khandahar and Baghram

progressed more slowly, because the primary concern was

force protection. As force protection infrastructure improved,

such as the establishment of a fixed perimeter, more effort was

focused on environmental issues. These issues included waste

stream and wash rack operations, construction of landfills,

and construction of hazardous waste and used oil collection

points. A disparity also existed between the base camps within

Afghanistan: Baghram was a more primitive camp than

Khandahar, so environmental initiatives had yet to be elevated

in the priority of work. However, environmental conditions

that presented an acute health hazard received the highest

priority at all base camps and were quickly resolved. This

included construction of consolidated landfills and information

messages to help soldiers avoid potential chemically contaminated sites.

Environmental Guidance

Environmental guidance was provided from three

command levels, each with varying degrees of success.

The combatant commander of U.S. Army Central

Command (ARCENT) issued Environmental Annex L,

Environmental Considerations, to the OPORD and directed

that environmental baseline surveys be conducted at the

proposed base camps. The coalition joint task force (CJTF)

commander issued an OPORD (mirroring the combatant

commander’s OPORD), a trifold environmental user’s guide, a

task force Contingency Environmental Guide, and an

environmental policy memorandum. The local base operations

(BASOPS) commanders also issued two policies governing

actions on the base camps.

ARCENT Guidance

Annex L, produced three months after the initial deployment

of forces, was written by the Joint Forces Command engineer

staff. This annex provided the groundwork for resolving

situations where real or perceived conflict existed between

environmental protection and mission accomplishment. The

annex directed that preservation of the natural environment

There were no controls over material placed in this

Baghram landfill.

Figure 1. Levels of Environmental Consideration

Environmental Considerations

in Full-Spectrum Operations
26 Engineer October-December 2003

should not be ignored in the execution of orders but that

environmental considerations would always be subordinate

to the preservation of human life and force protection. These

statements, and the publishing of the annex three months into

the initial deployment, made environmental considerations a

nonissue for the initial deployment forces. This presented a

challenge for leaders during relief-in-place operations because

follow-on forces continued to operate in the same manner as

the initial force even though Annex L existed. This was a result

of the nature of the relief-in-place operations and the use of

fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) that never required the review

of the annex.

Annex L contained very descriptive information and

requirements that would have helped follow-on forces if the

information had been disseminated effectively. The annex was

composed chiefly from the requirements in Army Regulation

(AR) 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement,

which provided extensive guidance through all phases of the

operation, from predeployment to redeployment. This included

requirements for assigning unit-level environmental coordinators; conducting predeployment training; obtaining

required manuals; and shipping adequate storage containers

and spill containment and cleanup materials. Commanders were

also required to provide familiarization training covering the

contents of Annex L, unit-level plans, and standard operating

procedures. This information could have prevented the waste

stream problems that occurred later in the deployment, including two lithium battery fires due to improper storage

procedures. Had they referred to FM 3-100.4, each member of

the staff would have had clear guidance on conducting their

respective missions in coordination with the commander’s

intent.

As the first in-theater measure, the combatant commander

requested that the Corps of Engineers and the Center for Health

Protection and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) conduct

separate surveys. The surveys detailed existing environmental

conditions at sites selected for base camps and were conducted

within the first four months of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Engineers conducted an environmental baseline survey (EBS)

to document existing environmental conditions for use in base

camp planning. When U.S. forces depart, the survey will also

be used as a basis for comparison against a site closure report

that documents the end state condition of the sites. U.S. forces

effectively become the caretakers of the sites and under

international law are subject to litigation for any environmental

damage not justified under the laws of war. Both the EBS and

site closure reports are critical documents that record activities

of U.S. forces and are maintained with the resident facility

engineer team, which doctrinally assumes the role of the

deployed public works directorate. Examples of an EBS and a

site closure report are available in FM 3-100.4.

CHPPM surveyed environmental conditions to determine

the potential for both short- and long-term health implications

on the force. This information was used to conduct a force

health protection risk analysis for each site with risk mitigation

procedures published as a FRAGO almost five months after

the last survey. The FRAGO reached the maneuver forces

much quicker and was more effective in providing environmental information than either Annex L or the policy

memorandums from the maneuver or BASOPS commanders.

A lack of secondary

containment structures at

this pump location allows

leaking fuel to contaminate the ground and

possibly the groundwater.

Improper disposal of lithium batteries presents a fire

hazard.
October-December 2003 Engineer 27

Figure 2. An information board at a base camp provides

environmental and safety information to newcomers.

CJTF Guidance

The next in-theater measure was the publication of CJTF

guidance documents aimed at maintaining a high level of

environmental quality during contingency operations. The

CJTF developed its guidance about ten months into Operation

Enduring Freedom, using Annex L, the EBS, and the CHPPM

survey. In addition, U.S. Air Force doctrine and reachback to

the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence were used,

because the resident expert in the CJTF engineer staff was an

Air Force officer who was most familiar with Air Force

procedures. As U.S. doctrine shifts to the Future Force, more

headquarters staffs will become joint services. Therefore,

commanders must be prepared to use all available assets and

work potential intraservice doctrinal differences to provide

the most adequate information to the force.

BASOPS Guidance

The final level of in-theater environmental guidance,

developed by the facility engineer team assigned to the

BASOPS, was directed at forces conducting life-support

activities on base camps. The environmental engineer assigned

to the team was tasked with developing and implementing this

guidance while working within force protection priorities

assigned by the CJTF and task force commanders. This was

often difficult, because no resident environmental representative was on the task force engineer staff to champion

environmental initiatives. This resulted in a disruption of

environmental information reaching maneuver units and

prevented environmental concerns from being addressed to

soldiers at the lowest level. In Khandahar and Baghram, the

BASOPS commander addressed these issues during the daily

battle update briefing, once they were elevated to his level.

Future plans called for incorporating this information into the

in-process briefing for soldiers and for conducting unit

environmental assessments. Karshi Khanabad provided this

information to soldiers in the in-process briefing and through

command information programs such as information boards

(Figure 2) and policy letters. Facility engineer teams that

deployed with an environmental engineer were better prepared

and more aggressive in developing and providing this

information to soldiers. The environmental engineer, often

without support, conducted small cleanup operations and

trained soldiers one-on-one as the situation arose. This

individual should be regarded as a valuable asset when

assessing mission-manning requirements.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army Engineer School is the Army proponent

for integrating environmental considerations into

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and military operations.

As the proponent, engineer leaders at all staff levels must be

prepared to champion mission-focused environmental

considerations as outlined in FM 3-100.4. Higher-level

guidance documents such as an overseas environmental

baseline guidance document or a foreign governing standard

are not detailed enough to provide useful information to

maneuver forces. Thus engineers at a minimum must ensure

that an environmental annex is developed and disseminated

to the force in the earliest stages of the operation. They must

also ensure that an environmental criterion receives the

appropriate visibility in the commander’s critical information

requirement. This information is necessary for leaders and

soldiers because they are likely to endanger themselves and

the environment unnecessarily. Ultimately, U.S. forces are

bound by an environmental ethic equal to that found in the

United States and should be provided the direction to act

accordingly.

Endnotes

1

 FM 3-100.4 Environmental Considerations in Military

Operations, 15 June 2000, p. 1-1.

2

 JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, 27

September 2001, p. xii.

3

 FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001, p. 1-16, 17, para 1-49.

References

AR 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement,

21 February 1997.

DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major

Department of Defense Actions, 31 March 1979.

FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001.

FM 3-100.4, Environmental Considerations in Military

Operations, 15 June 2000.

JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, 27

September 2001.

Mr. Chartier is an environmental training specialist at

the U.S. Army Engineer School’s Directorate of Environmental Integration, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
28 Engineer October-December 2003

I

n August 2002, German engineers expanded their equipment inventory

with another special vehicle. A representative of the German army chief of

engineers took over the Minebreaker, a

mine-clearing vehicle manufactured by

Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft

(FFG). Now, German engineers can clear

large areas of mines quickly and reliably.

Area clearance became an issue for

the first time during the International

Force peacekeeping mission in Kosovo

and Stabilization Force mission in

Bosnia, and later during the Kosovo

Force peacekeeping mission. The requirement was to quickly proof and clear

large areas that were possibly contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Only then would it be

possible to increase the safety of

friendly forces in the vicinity of airfields,

warehouses, and logistic transshipment

sites and along roads. Previously, the

Keiler armored mine-clearing vehicle had

been used for that purpose, but the

Keiler is a tactical vehicle for making fast

breaches through minefields under combat conditions. The vehicle provides a

safety lane 4.7 meters wide, milling the

ground in the lane down to a depth of

25 centimeters. The soil, including any

ordnance, is thrust to the side. Ordnance

that is not activated remains in an inert

state.

With the Afghanistan mission, the

International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) requirement of large area military

clearing was quickly brought back into

focus. The first contingency forces

used the Danish ISAF explosive

ordnance-clearing platoon, which was

equipped with a Hydrema mine-clearing

vehicle. However, when the Danish platoon withdrew, this capability was no

longer available.

In cooperation with the German Office of Defense Technology and Procurement, a market screening was performed.

Among the systems that were tested and

rated operational, the FFG Minebreaker

was the only system that was readily

available. A final test with live antitank

mines at the technical center of the German forces confirmed that the system

could clear up to 7.5 kilograms of TNT

without serious damage to the clearing

device. In preparation for their mission,

operators and maintenance staff were

familiarized with the Minebreaker during

company-sponsored training.

Next came the leap in the dark. Information about the conditions at Kabul

had been collected, preliminary doctrine

for Minebreaker operations had been

written, and logistic support had been

organized. Yet, we had to take a step into

the unknown with new equipment and a

new mission. This was quickly clear to

the advance team when they arrived in

Kabul on 4 September. There was a lot

of work to do before it was possible to

use the “Ferrari,” as the red Minebreaker

was nicknamed.

Because they had such short notice,

the Turkish managers denied access to

the predetermined clearing area at Kabul

International Airport. Other potential

areas were out of the question because

they were too small or because their

Clearing Large Areas in a Fast and Reliable Way: A New Engineer T Clearing Large Areas in a Fast and Reliable Way: A New Engineer Task

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sponfeldner

The chief of the Mine/Countermine Division at the German army

engineer school, second from left, accepts the first Minebreaker

manufactured by FFG.

Increasing Safet Increasing Safet Increasing Safety in Afghanistan Afghanistan
October-December 2003 Engineer 29

location made it impossible for the

Minebreaker to get there. As the

United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) had

also charged nongovernmental organizations with mine-clearing

tasks at the airport, activities had

to be precisely coordinated to avoid

getting in each other’s way. In order to get used to the soil on-site,

the Minebreaker team got the opportunity to clear the mine belt between the double fence rows

around the airport. It was a worthwhile task, since antipersonnel

mines were surface-laid every 2 to

3 square meters.

The arrival of the Minebreaker

on 6 September was a welcome

event. Within two days, the other

members of the crew arrived, and

the first clearing actions were

started. We did not anticipate the

tremendous amount of dust caused by

clearing operations in this area. From trials in Germany, we were used to small

dust clouds when working on sandy soil,

but nothing compared to what occurred

on-site. The driver sometimes could not

see at all. It was fortunate that an ordnance-clearing specialist had a Fox armored personnel carrier because this vehicle could direct the Minebreaker

driver. There was much room for improvement in the first few clearing lanes, but

the driver’s feel for the Minebreaker and

for the soil improved by the meter. Maintenance started after the operation. Removing the dust was the first order of

business.

On 14 September, the first real mission was to be carried out. All preparations had been completed, and the inner

fence of the mine belt was opened. At

1100, we were able to tackle the final section of the access road. At 1125, there

was the first detonation, followed by four

more in the next five minutes. Then we

had to postpone our work because Turkish medical support units took their

lunch break. When we returned from our

break, there were Afghan soldiers waiting with their rifles in firing position.

There was no misunderstanding this

gesture—the clearing work would not

continue on this site. Despite extensive

negotiations, it was not possible to reach

an agreement, so we ceased working.

At a meeting the next day, Afghan

representatives explained that the outer

mine belt was required for airport

security, and this was not the only critical section on the airfield. It was not apparent where clearing would be permitted. MACA objections that the Afghan

government had agreed to permit the

clearing of all mines were not accepted.

In cooperation with MACA, we found

new sites appropriate for Minebreaker

operations, and on 19 September, the

formal introduction of the Minebreaker

was held. A remarkable part of the mineclearing project was the cooperation between the German and Afghan forces,

who provided the transport vehicle for

the Minebreaker. So far, more than 15,000

square meters have been cleared and

more antipersonnel mines and some UXO

have been destroyed. The proofing of

the cleared areas is partly done by explosive ordnance-clearing specialists

who employ visual means immediately

after the Minebreaker operation and

partly by nongovernmental organization

workers with metal detectors. During the

proofing, explosive ordnance-clearing

specialists found only one live bomb

fuze. It was a solid metal body that could

not be broken by the Minebreaker, so

Turkish explosive ordnance-clearing

specialists disposed of it.

Despite adverse climatic and geologic conditions, the results of the clearing operations can be rated very highly.

Currently, clearing operations out of

Kabul International Airport are carried

out in the Kabul area as well as along

the road to Baghram. Another operational area covering 640,000 square meters

is in the vicinity of Baghram, where we

operate with U.S. Army units. If the

Minebreaker is used there, it will take

more than six months to clear the area.

Lieutenant Colonel Sponfeldner is the

section chief for mobility and mine clearance in the Department for Combat Development of the German army

Pionierschule at Munich. At the time this

article was written, he was in charge of

introducing the Minebreaker to the German ISAF contingent in Afghanistan. He

has served as a platoon leader, battalion

intelligence officer, and company commander of Pionier Bataillon 4 and as

company commander of Armored Engineer Company 140.

The Minebreaker arrives at Kabul International Airport on 6 September 2002.

(A version of this article was published in

Pionier News, the German Corps of Engineers magazine, Edition No. 5, December

2002.)
30 Engineer October-December 2003

Engineer support to civilian authorities during disaster

relief operations is one of the primary missions of U.S.

Army National Guard engineers. In today’s securitycentered operations, it has become more apparent that efforts

to “restore or recreate essential infrastructure” must be

properly coordinated, supervised, and maintained by qualified

officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to properly

represent the capabilities and professionalism of state military

department assets.1 As a leader assigned to an engineer

assessment team (EAT), you will make initial assessments of

disaster severity and help organize engineer work teams

(EWTs) to execute assigned missions. EATs must make the

immediate decisions on the ground that meet the intent and

guidance of their command or state task force.

Depending on the requirements of EATs, they must

coordinate, assess the situation, develop estimates, and report

findings to higher headquarters. The initial assessments can

be narrow or broad in scope, but estimates will give the

requirements for assistance to local authorities. Whether used

for civilian rescue in flood operations or debris cleanup after a

tornado or hurricane, EATs must be readily available and on

the ground as soon as possible to immediately address the

needs of local agencies.2

Civil Coordination

Civil coordination is an essential task for EATs as they

enter disaster areas. In most situations, EATs will

already have a point of contact for the area who will

give initial civil assessments, emphasizing areas where damage

is heavy or is in especially critical locations. This person will

continue to be the team’s primary contact unless the team is

handed off to another civil authority. You could coordinate

with local officials such as the mayor, county commissioners,

or elected officials; local authorities such as the sheriff or city

police; or local public works authorities such as the county

department of public works (DPW). Each of these resources

has different assets to assist you and can outsource other

assets as needed. It will be important to tour the area with the

point of contact and make notes on a map. Most National

Guard units maintain local maps for such occasions. Designate

areas of operation for both military and civilian workers so as

not to crowd work areas or impede traffic. Identify local medical

facilities, billeting locations, and possible contract meal sites

as well. This information will come in handy when your logistics

team comes in to help manage soldier care.

Note: Be sure to properly brief your officer in charge (OIC)

and NCO in charge (NCOIC) on their roles, duties, and chain

of command before their arrival. They will have to brief their

soldiers and prepare them for what they will be required to

do and what they may be up against. For example, upon

arrival at a tornado damage site, our initial duty was to

assist police dogs in the recovery of civilians killed in the

disaster. We also helped American Red Cross volunteers

comfort home owners and family members.

By Captain Thomas M. Turner

Engineer Assessment Teams

in Disaster Relief Operations
October-December 2003 Engineer 31

Civilian Resources

Use of local resources such as roads and dump sites is

normally coordinated with the point of contact. The

roads must be passable and designated for dump

routes. It is usually a good idea to set warning cones along

the roadside where vehicles will be turning into the site.

Warnings for civilian vehicles will slow traffic around the sites

and give team vehicles unrestricted access. It will also slow

team vehicles and designate the turns for transitioning soldiers.

The site itself should be easily accessible and allow multiple

vehicles to maneuver. Limited space for turning around can

cause delays and unwanted traffic around the sites. Identify

one dump site for construction materials and another for

vegetation, because it is usually not desirable to dump both

types of debris in the same location. Discuss this with the

point of contact, and discuss the use of a spreader at each

site. It will be important to your assessment if you are

responsible for spreading or piling the material at the dump

site. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Disaster

Guidebook contains checklists that can help with local dump

site selection and operation.3

 However, keep in mind that state

support planning is different from federal support planning,

so you probably will not have the resources that are usually

available to USACE or the Federal Emergency Management

Agency.

During an assessment, city, county, private, or corporate

assets may be designated to assist with the cleanup. It is your

responsibility to coordinate these assets and include them in

the assessment. The debris area will be located along city,

county, or private land. Each entity will have assets operating

along with the local authorities. Also, civilian aid agencies

such as the American Red Cross may be established in the

area to provide disaster assistance and comfort to victims.

The local DPW or private/corporate groups will manage most

of the equipment you will be interested in. Assets include

civilian hydraulic excavators (HYEXs), cherry pickers, loaders,

fork trucks, and trash trucks. Some county trash trucks are

self-loading with clamshells, which will most likely be used for

trash that civilians will gather in front of their homes or along

trash pickup locations.

Military Resources

I

nitial military support, other than organic assets, will come

from resources within the state military department. They

will assist in the procurement and use of fuel, parts, supplies, and services. The state military department will usually

put out a memorandum to units participating in state active

duty, providing communication guidance to request assistance

with purchase orders for just about anything needed for official

business.

Soldier Services

Other resources will help with soldier care. You must

plan for billeting, meals, medical treatment, and pay

during the operation. Billeting can be established by

convenience or through a contractor or charity. Convenience

billeting alludes to a local military facility such as an armory.

The logistics team will coordinate with a local hotel or motel to

establish contract billeting if it is available. However, contract

billeting will probably not be available due to the influx of

emergency services in the area. Therefore, if convenience and

contract billeting is not available, using local charities is

A civilian HYEX

loads debris after

an April 1999

tornado at Benton,

Louisiana.
32 Engineer October-December 2003

desirable. Local church, city, or county facilities can house

soldiers in a comfortable environment. Some church facilities

may also have recreation equipment/facilities and meals

available for emergency service and disaster relief providers,

which helps with morale and welfare. Rations can initially be

coordinated through your point of contact at an established

emergency services meal site, but it is better to identify a sole

contractor to provide continued rations in case the emergency

services move or discontinue operations.

Medical facilities must be coordinated between the state’s

National Guard health services department and the state

military department. Though the soldiers will be on state active

duty and under the state military department, the health

services department probably has a designated facility in the

area that it normally coordinates with. Check with them first to

ensure that the facility you use for medical care has dealt with

military services and accepts Workman’s Compensation

Insurance and the TRICARE Health Care Program. Also,

contact your risk management office and get the medical point

of contact so you can provide billing information to the facility.

Payroll should be coordinated weekly, ending on each

Wednesday or Friday. Usually, your full-time manning adjutant

or personnel services NCO will cut state active duty orders a

week at a time and submit them to the state military department

payroll section. These orders must be certified, faxed, or

e-mailed and the originals mailed to the payroll coordinator.

Your payroll section will print checks and mail them to your

location in about three to four working days. Managing the

payroll weekly will alleviate soldier hardship and keep better

accountability of soldiers.

Contracting

Contracting services is extremely important to continued

operations. Material and equipment identified or

stationed as part of a rapid-deployment package must

be maintained to ensure operational capabilities. The logistical

support team will contract items already discussed, such as

billeting and rations, but it will also manage operational support

items such as maintenance and special services.

Maintenance parts fall under state contracting but will be

handled through normal channels. The main difference is that

parts such as tires, belts, and hoses will be contracted through

a local vendor that maintains the size and durability required

for the equipment. Hardware items such as chainsaws must

either be contracted for initial or continued use during

operations or just contracted for service and repair if they are

organic to the unit. A local chainsaw center or hardware store

can provide the services if they accept state purchase orders.

Special services and equipment usually include nonorganic

items to assist soldiers. For example, in recent operations,

soldiers used face masks during tornado damage cleanup.

Debris, spoiled food, and spilled chemicals caused two cases

of respiratory infection, which caused unwanted downtime

and follow-up care. Soldiers may also need items such as ice,

gloves, safety equipment, and laundry services to maintain

safety, morale, and good hygiene.

Engineer Disaster Assessment

Problems with coordination and reporting to higher

headquarters prompted the development of the

Engineer Disaster Assessment (EDA). The EDA gives

EATs a reference to assist in the development of EWTs,

support personnel, and special equipment. The EDA is simple

and is broken into four sections: site makeup, load/haul

equipment, personnel, and specialty items.

Site Makeup

During the tour with the point of contact, identify the

number of disaster areas and plot them on your map.

Find out which areas you will be responsible for and areas

where the disaster path crosses city property. Once you have

determined the number of sites, you must name and rate their

Hurricane Lili caused widespread damage to civilian housing in October 2002.
October-December 2003 Engineer 33

priority based on the assessment

of the point of contact. If five sites

are identified, simply name them

Alpha to Echo and rate them 1 to 5.

Some areas may contain heavier

damage or may pose a future risk

to civilians. Let the point of contact

make this determination, then you

can report the information to higher

headquarters.

Sites may be divided into

multiple areas based on their

location and density. Grouping

smaller sites will assist in the

management and placement of

EWTs in built-up areas. EWTs can

usually manage about three to five

blocks of a housing subdivision in

one day. If the damage area is

greater than the ability of the EWT

to complete in one workday, then

the site must be divided and an

additional EWT must be requested. This is important for a

number of reasons: First, the civilians will continue to pile

debris near the street for the EWTs to pick up. Second, seeing

and coordinating with a particular EWT will help the civilians

properly manage debris flow and help control frustrations.

Third, it will assist the OIC/NCOIC with command and control,

logistical flow, and maintenance.

Site makeup also includes dump sites, entrance and exit

points, and routes. These items must be identified by the point

of contact and plotted on a map for reference and distribution.

The construction material and vegetation dump sites will

probably require a dozer on-site to pile debris and maintain

dump points. Make sure to include this in your EDA, and

plan for the possibility of moving these pieces of equipment

if needed.

You will also need to establish an equipment park and

maintenance area. Depending on your location, the point of

contact may advise the use of a county motor pool, but it is

more desirable to locate equipment near your billeting site or

near the debris areas. Local schools offer the best locations

for mass equipment storage and maintenance. You will find

that emergency services will use these areas as well, so be

sure to coordinate with your point of

contact. Ask about environmental

concerns and access to the area during

off-peak operations, which may restrict

use of the area.

Load/Haul Equipment

Load/haul refers to the use of

loading and hauling equipment. Both

depend on the unit table of organization

and equipment (TOE) and the availability of civilian assets. However, this

must not be the determining factor in

the EDA. When reporting, ask for

exactly the number of load/haul assets

needed based on your assessment. (See

figure on page 34.) In some cases, you

may need to use your best judgment

based on the number of assets available

at the time. Unit personnel can then get

additional pieces of equipment from

outside the unit, such as a state

Soldiers load debris after an April 2000 tornado at Minden, Louisiana.

A front-end loader clears away debris from road.
34 Engineer October-December 2003

mobilization and training equipment site or another unit, if it is

needed. Also, load assets should be matched to the appropriate

haul assets. If 5-ton dump trucks are requested, then ask for

2 1/2-yard loaders for them. Never ask for 5-yard loaders

unless you intend to move dirt. The 5-yard loader does not

have a clamshell scoop, which greatly enhances lift ability

when dealing with debris. Match 20-ton dump trucks with

military HYEXs or civilian assets such as cherry pickers. These

larger load assets have higher lifting ability to get into the 20-

ton dump bed. Without a ramp, 2 1/2-yard loaders do not have

the necessary reach.

Haul assets can be a mixture of military and civilian

equipment. To limit liability, it is best if military personnel load

military equipment and civilians load civilian equipment, but

do not assume that this will be the case. Haul capacity will

vary based on the type of debris and the experience and training

of the loader. The key is to ensure that no debris hangs out of

the dump bed, where it could damage property or injure

someone nearby.

Personnel

Soldiers selected for duty must have certain qualifications.

Foremost, they must be qualified on the equipment being used.

It is always a good idea to include disaster relief equipment as

part of the unitwide driver’s training program so that everyone

is qualified on at least a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled

vehicle (HMMWV), 2 1/2-ton cargo truck, and 5-ton dump

truck. Military occupational specialty (MOS)-specific

operators, such as heavy construction equipment and general

construction equipment operators, should be identified to

operate equipment such as HYEXs, loaders, 20-ton dump

trucks, and small emplacement excavators.

Soldiers must be available for duty for a minimum of one

week, usually Saturday through Friday. They must bring all

Estimating Load/Haul Assets Needed

Example 1 - Debris is spread across three blocks in a civilian housing subdivision and the dump site is 5 miles away. One EWT is

needed, with one 2 1/2-yard load asset. How many 5-ton haul assets are needed?

1. Enter the average mileage to the dump site(s): 5

2. Enter the load factor (Lf) for the single load asset available: one 2 1/2-yard loader with clamshell scoop

(2 1/2-yard loader Lf=1, HYEX Lf=1.3)

3. Enter the haul factor (Hf) for the type of haul asset needed: 5-ton dump trucks

(5-ton Hf=1.25, 20-ton Hf=1)

Complete the formula:

Mileage x 2 x Lf x Hf = _____ 5 x 2 x 1 x 1.25 = 2.5 or 3

Example 2 - The debris is spread across five blocks of a mobile home park and the dump site is 13 miles away. Based on the density

of damage and the work area, you determine that two EWTs are needed. There is one civilian HYEX and a private logging truck with a cherry

picker on the back available to you. There are no city or county haul assets on the site. How many 5-ton or 20-ton haul assets are needed?

Keep in mind your TOE (combat heavy) only authorizes the unit nine 20-ton dump trucks. The rest are 5-tons assigned to the line companies.

1. Enter the average mileage to the dump site(s): 13

2. Enter the load factor for the single load asset available: one civilian HYEX and one civilian cherry picker

(2 1/2-yard loader Lf=1, HYEX/cherry picker Lf=1.3)

3. Enter the haul factor for the type of haul asset needed: 20-ton dump trucks and 5-ton dump trucks

(5-ton Hf=1.25, 20-ton Hf=1)

Complete the formula for each asset:

HYEX with 20-ton dump trucks

Mileage x 2 x Lf x Hf = _____ 13 x 2 x 1.3 x 1 = 6.76 or 7

Note: Know your assets, and never assume that all of them are or will remain mission capable (MC). Assume that five are not mission

capable (NMC), and replace the 20-ton dump trucks with 5-ton dump trucks using a factor of 1.25. Example: Only four are MC and seven

are needed. You can simply take the remainder and multiply it by the applicable Hf; 3 x 1.25 = 3.75 or 4. You will require four 20-ton dump

trucks and four 5-ton dump trucks for a dump site 13 miles away.

Civilian cherry picker with 5-ton dump trucks

Mileage x 2 x Lf x Hf = _____ 13 x 2 x 1.3 x 1.25 = 8.45 or 9

All assets must be tracked to account for the number of loads hauled and to estimate the amount of debris removed. Units can use a

notepad, spreadsheet, or load ticket for load accounting. USACE has load accounting data elements as well as an example of a load ticket

in its Disaster Guidebook.

4

 Load tracking will help OICs and NCOICs ensure consistent work effort and enable them to establish process

improvements during the operation.

5 5

5

5

5

5
October-December 2003 Engineer 35

items needed to sustain them during

the week, such as a sleeping bag,

uniforms, and civilian clothes. In

addition, soldiers should bring

personal entertainment items to keep

them occupied after duty hours.

Estimates of the number of personnel needed are based on your

equipment and guidance from higher

headquarters. Initially, calculate the

number of drivers and assistant drivers

needed by multiplying the number of

haul assets by two. Then estimate two

operators per load asset. One soldier

will operate the equipment while the

other serves as a spotter. Factor in

soldiers needed to operate specialty

equipment such as chainsaws and add

an OIC, an NCOIC, a driver, and a twoperson logistical team to transport

meals and other items. Add all these

together, include MOS-specific information, and contact higher headquarters for maintenance

support. Usually, the maintenance warrant officer or motor

sergeant will tell you what they will do to support the operation.

Do not include the logistical support team or any other group

outside of the EWT control. Lastly, do not forget to assign a

medic or qualified combat lifesaver to each EWT, and ensure

that they inventory their aid bags before operations.

Specialty Items

Specialty items include generators, chainsaws, pioneer

trailers, tools, or any other specialty sets, kits, and outfits.

They also include all the things needed to maintain and service

the items mentioned. In areas where most debris is vegetation,

chainsaws are the best asset. If chainsaws are included in

your TOE, bring all of them and have those that are NMC

serviced on the state contract. An added necessity for each

haul asset is a set of branch shears to cut any loose vegetation

hanging outside of the dump bed. The logistical team assigned

to each site should maintain gas, water, two-cycle oil, bar oil,

and any other needed petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Everything else will be coordinated through your logistical

support team and either brought from the unit or purchased

for your use.

Conclusion

Unlike engineer construction projects, there is little

reporting, no completion certificate to get signed, and

no clearly defined completion date. You will find that

civilians will continue to place debris by the roadside long

after the military operation is completed. The duty of the EATs

and EWTs is to provide relief to local authorities and civilian

workers until they can handle the problem on their own, using

the equipment they have. Coordinate often with points of

contact and higher headquarters to keep soldiers informed of

current operations, and take the time to properly plan the EWT

effort so they can successfully assist in disaster relief.

Endnotes

1

 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C., 14

June 2001, page 10-5.

2

 CALL Newsletter 93-6, Operations Other Than War,

Volume II - Disaster Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

October 1993, Chapter 9.

3

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Disaster Guidebook,

Galveston District, Galveston, Texas, 1 April 1999. Appendix

D. <http://www.swg.usace.army.mil/em/mg/mguide.asp>.

4

 Ibid., Appendix H.

References

Louisiana National Guard Emergency Procedures

Operations Plan for Natural Disasters, Jackson Barracks, New

Orleans, Louisiana, 10 March 1993.

Army Regulation 500-60, Disaster Relief, 1 August 1981.

FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, Washington, D.C., 30

August 1999.

Captain Turner has served in the Louisiana Army National

Guard for more than 16 years. He currently is in the Active

Guard/Reserve as the plans officer and administrative officer

of the 528th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) in Monroe,

Louisiana. He has participated in three tornado damage relief

operations and one ice storm.

Soldiers use a cherry picker to load a dump truck.
I

n October 2002, Hurricane Lili made its way through

Louisiana, prompting National Guard involvement in

disaster preparation and relief. The 225th Engineer Group,

which includes four combat heavy engineer battalions— the

205th, 527th, 528th, and 769th—and the state’s other major

commands supported the operation. The operation was

divided into five phases: Phase I, alert and preparation at

home station; Phase II, movement to forward staging areas;

Phase III, employment into the area of operations; Phase IV,

deploy back to home station; and Phase V, recovery and

deactivation. Our battalion, the 528th, was assigned to an

area in Opelousas, in south-central Louisiana.

The 225th Engineer Group task-organized each engineer

battalion into two to three EATs and five EWTs, centrally

controlled by the group but supported by their parent units.

Later, the EATs were recalled, and the EWTs fell under the

control of the established state task force. The EATs were

made up of two soldiers—one officer and one NCO. Each

EWT totaled 23 soldiers (including a medic) and had the

following equipment: two HMMWVs, a HMMWV maintenance truck, five 5-ton dump trucks, two 2 1/2-yard loaders,

an M920 with trailer, and a small emplacement excavator (SEE).

EWTs were task-organized by the state task force, and the

teams were broken up and deployed to separate sites to

accommodate multiple needs. This method worked well for

the larger sites but created difficulties for smaller teams that

did not have the proper equipment for some tasks. In the

case of the smaller teams, the SEE trucks were not utilized to

their full potential because of their limited load capacity and

lift height. The larger teams usually arrived on-site with two

2 1/2-yard loaders and four 5-ton dump trucks, which were

very effective for debris removal. As this experience showed,

it is always a good idea to train teams to handle different

types of tasks and keep them together throughout operations.

If you must develop a table of distribution and allowances (TDA)

for EWTs, then create more than one TDA to handle large and

small tasks using compatible loading and hauling assets.

Our EWT was lucky in that it replaced a unit that was

moving to another site. All of the necessary contracts had

already been established and functioned well with only minor

coordination needed. Billeting was organized at the National

Guard Armory in Opelousas, which was well suited to handle

the number of soldiers and the EWT’s administrative needs.

Chainsaws became a problem due to serviceability and

the number requested (24) versus the 19 organic to our unit.1

Usually, we set up a contract with a local hardware store or

chainsaw retailer to provide service and support at larger

disaster relief sites. However, smaller sites did not have this

support and EWTs quickly ran into problems obtaining chains

and bar oil. Most of the 5-ton dump trucks were drawn from

mobilization and training equipment sites, which assisted in

equipment recovery and distribution. We also provided our

own fuel support with two heavy expanded-mobility tactical

truck (HEMTT) fuelers.

Most of the power was out in the southern part of the

state and cellular telephone usage was difficult because of

downed towers. However, we used state-issued 800-

megahertz radios and commercial telephones when they were

available. Most EWTs used small hand-held radios for close

communication between leaders and equipment operators.

We had to address issues of soldier care, including water

and meals. We had not sent water buffalos ahead to the area

of operations since we had been told that logistical support

would come from another battalion that would be collocated

with us. A problem was quickly identified when the other unit

moved south, but we were able to support our soldiers with

organic assets soon afterward. The lesson learned in this

situation was to not depend on another unit to support our

soldiers’ needs unless the unit will exercise total operational

control over them for the duration of the emergency. The

contract meals issue was resolved quickly by coordinating

with the vendor to lower the number of meals provided to the

site and coordinating with the state purchasing and contracting office to change the supported unit.

Overall, the relief operations went well, with normal

problems that were quickly resolved. Our battalion, and

others, received kind words from the communities that we

supported. We also took the time to recognize our soldiers,

who had done extraordinary work in support of the Hurricane

Lili Task Force.

The Hurricane Lili Task Force after-action review is

available in Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

format through the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security

and Emergency Preparedness, 7667 Independence Boulevard,

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806, <http://www.loep.

state.la.us>, or Office of the Adjutant General, ATTN: JFHQs

(J3), Bldg. #35, Jackson Barracks, New Orleans,

Louisiana 70146-0330.

Endnote

1 CALL Newsletter 93-6, Operations Other Than War,

Volume II – Disaster Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

October 1993, Chapter 6.

Disaster Relief After Hurricane Lili

By Captain Thomas M. Turner

36 Engineer October-December 2003
October-December 2003 Engineer 37

A question that surfaces frequently among combat

vehicle crewmen (CVC) is whether it is safe to wear

underwear made with synthetic fibers such as

polypropylene or polyester under the Nomex® CVC uniform.

The answer is no—it can be a safety hazard in a fire.

This includes the new moisture-wicking T-shirt the Army is

fielding. Nylon melts at about 480 degrees Fahrenheit, and

other synthetics melt at 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Heat transfer

through Nomex, which resists temperatures up to 700 degrees

Fahrenheit, could be high enough to melt these synthetic

undergarments.

An Army chief warrant officer quoted in the February 1995

issue of Flightfax, an Army aviation risk management

publication, regarding his experience when his aircraft caught

fire highlights this safety issue. “My chest, back, and buttocks

were spared from any burns at all due to the cotton underwear

that I had on. The burn literally went to where the underwear

was and stopped. If I hadn’t been wearing my Nomex protective

equipment and wearing it properly, there is no doubt in my

mind that I would very probably have either died in the fire or

died as a result of the burns I would have received.”

For protection, either wear underwear made of 50 percent

cotton and 50 percent wool or of 100 percent cotton. These

natural fibers won’t melt and will provide protection that will

keep the heat away from your body in a flash fire. Recommended items and their national stock numbers (NSNs) are

shown in the table.

Keep the Nomex CVC uniform clean. Oil, grease, or

household starch will cause the fabric to burn. Dry cleaning or

laundering to remove these contaminants will restore the

uniform’s fire retardant properties.

Don’t be the soldier who survives a vehicle fire only to find

yourself with melted polypropylene stuck to your skin. Worn

properly, the CVC uniform will protect you from burns should

the unexpected happen in your combat vehicle. For more

information on this subject or other CVC clothing and

individual equipment, contact the Assistant TRADOC Systems

Manager-Soldier at Fort Knox, Kentucky: Lieutenant Colonel

Craig Carson, at (502) 624-3519, DSN 464-3519 or e-mail

<craig.carson@knox.army.mil>; or Mr. Larry T. Hasty at (502)

624-3662, DSN 464-3662, or e-mail <larry.hasty

@knox.army.mil>.

Mr. Hasty is the deputy and senior technical advisor to

the Assistant TRADOC Systems Manager-Soldier at the U.S.

Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

By Mr. Larry T. Hasty

Drawers, 100% cotton, cold weather

8415-01-051-1175 X-Small

8415-00-782-3226 Small

8415-00-782-3227 Medium

8415-00-782-3228 Large

8415-00-782-3229 X-Large

Undershirt, 100% cotton, cold weather

8415-01-051-1174 X-Small

8415-00-270-2012 Small

8415-00-270-2013 Medium

8415-00-270-2014 Large

8415-00-270-2015 X-Large

Undershirt, flyers, man, Aramid

8415-01-043-8375 X-Small

8415-00-485-6547 Small

8415-00-485-6548 Medium

8415-00-485-6680 Large

8415-00-485-6681 X-Large

Drawers, flyers, Aramid

8415-01-043-4036 X-Small

8415-00-467-4075 Small

8415-00-467-4076 Medium

8415-00-467-4078 Large

8415-00-467-4100 X-Large

Gloves, combat vehicle crewman

8415-01-074-9428 Size 5

8415-00-074-9429 Size 6

8415-00-074-9430 Size 7

8415-00-074-9431 Size 8

8415-00-074-9432 Size 9

8415-00-074-9433 Size 10

8415-00-074-9434 Size 11

NSNs for Recommended Items

Wearing Synthetic Fiber Underwear

Under the Nomex®CVC Uniform
38 Engineer October-December 2003

As the Army transforms and expects to occupy a smaller

footprint in a theater, strategic base camp planning

.becomes critical. The current fragmented approach to

design, construction, and operation needs to be reengineered

to exploit information technology and integrate base camp

management throughout the life cycle. The U.S. Army Engineer

Research and Development Center (ERDC) has several ongoing

efforts to address different components of this challenge.

Current Situation

For planning base camps (intermediate staging, forward

operating, and forward staging), the Theater Construction Management System (TCMS) is the only

automated tool available to military engineers. TCMS,

developed by the ERDC Construction Engineering Research

Laboratory (CERL) in the 1980s, has been used successfully

but addresses only design and construction. Those responsible for theater engineering need the TCMS capability

plus a means to make intelligent life cycle base camp

sustainment decisions. This includes not only design and

construction planning but also force protection; environmental

considerations; health and safety issues; and base operation,

transfer, and closure.

Doctrine for the design of base camps is weak, although

field and technical manuals abound. Site selection techniques

are also less than ideal. There is a lack of general engineering,

environmental-baseline documentation, and sanitation input.

The design is for an initial standard, but it usually becomes a

temporary standard. The lack of strategic planning also contributes to high annual operating costs for base camps. For

example, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted during a

June 2001 visit that Camp Bondsteel costs $148 million per

year, which resulted in a memorandum to the Secretary of the

Army recommending that costs be reduced. Finally, bases take

time to deconstruct, and these activities can harm the ecosystem

if environmental concerns are not addressed.

An Integrated Process

CERL leads an ERDC project to develop planning

decision support tools that provide the forces with an

expedient forward infrastructure to meet requirements

for rapid deployment, minimal logistics tail, and safe haven.

These tools focus on the maximum use of locally available

materials, infrastructure, and utilities, resulting in a minimum

permanent footprint that meets functional, operational,

environmental, and other requirements. The intent is to provide

base camp-equivalent facilities within 15 days of troop

deployment.

A totally integrated base camp facility management decision

support tool would encompass general engineering,

environmental-baseline information, field sanitation, force

protection, and environmental issues over the life cycle of a

base camp. Shifting the focus from just initial design to

considering operation and maintenance, as well as environmental considerations, in an integrated life cycle manner is a

unique and logical way to manage base camps.

The main objective of integrated base camp management is

to accommodate a safe, healthy force able to accomplish the

assigned mission and maintain combat power. Integrated base

camp management will also—

Integrated Life Cycle

Base Camp Sustainment

By Mr. Richard M. Marlatt

Engineers and troops need a toolkit to help assess

existing infrastructure in theater.
October-December 2003 Engineer 39

 Reduce logistic packaging loads (such as fewer shipping

containers).

 Decrease costs for land restoration, land damage payments,

and equipment maintenance.

 Provide more efficient base camp layouts, improve force

protection, and reduce logistics footprint (economy of

force). Soldiers get an improved quality of life in theater

through rapid planning and time-phased logistics.

 Develop a five-phase base camp master plan within 24 hours

of receiving minimal site data.

 Provide the base camp master plan (including a bill of

materials) with the minimum construction logistics tail,

permanent footprint, and cost within 24 hours of obtaining

minimal site data.

ERDC currently has four ongoing projects to develop

information, systems, and processes to support this integrated

tool. Multiple agencies are involved in these developmental

efforts.

Base Camp Planning

Work on this tool began in fiscal year (FY) 01 at ERDC and

leverages aspects of the U.S. Air Force GeoReach initiative. A

contractor for the Air Force developed a base conceptual

planning system called Geographical Base Engineering Survey

Toolkit (GeoBEST). The ERDC work focuses on developing

sustainment models to rapidly assess mission needs and

generate facility requirements for adjacency, minimum standoff,

and utilities; constraint-based layout techniques that support

rapid base camp planning and dynamic reconfiguration; and

an underlying facility model that supports automatic explosive

threat analysis and environmental-baseline data.

The intent is to enhance the Air Force tool with decisionsupport technologies developed for conventional continental

United States (CONUS) facility planning, design, and

construction—as part of the CERL engineering automation

research—and with antiterrorist, logistics, and other military

engineering tools from the ERDC Geotechnical and Structures

Laboratory (GSL). This work is also being coordinated with

the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville,

Alabama.

GeoBEST will include interfaces to existing ERDC tools,

including the Antiterrorist Planner, TCMS/Army Facilities

Components System (AFCS), TeleEngineering Toolkit, Terrain

Modeling System, and Mobile Combat System–Engineer

(MCS–E).

This decision-support tool will help military engineers

develop a comprehensive list of facility and infrastructure

requirements and then decide where and how best to provide

those facilities using a three-dimensional, georeferenced map

of the site. The planner will be able to construct alternative

scenarios and compare the time, cost, and logistics required

to modify or upgrade existing facilities with the construction

of rapidly erectable temporary facilities.

Conventional Contingency Facilities

This ERDC project identifies Class IV reduction opportunities for conventional semipermanent construction.

Currently, the construction of buildings in theater takes too

long, costs too much, and ties up critical transportation

resources. Previous contingency operations (such as up to 24

months in duration) have shown that forward operating base

vertical construction materials constitute one-third of the Class

IV supplies.

Strategic base camp

planning tools will be

integrated into the

modeling and

simulation system of

systems.
40 Engineer October-December 2003

The South East Asia (SEA) hut, a commonly used semipermanent construction facility, is the initial case study for

this work. SEA huts use standard dimensional lumber and

plywood construction and have been built for base camps in

Vietnam, Kosovo, and Guantanamo Bay. They provide

adequate shelter against the weather and are a temporary

solution to housing forces for operations that exceed six months

in duration. However, this conventional construction requires

large quantities of Class IV supplies that generate logistical

problems.

ERDC is exploring optimum-value engineering and materials

substitution for designs that can reduce the Class IV burden.

Optimum-value engineering will eliminate unnecessary design

redundancies. Innovative materials substitution focuses on

researching standard and hybrid sections (such as engineered

wood composite) to develop new sections that inherit the

best properties of their components. From the research, various

design configurations will be generated and their subsystems

evaluated. The capacity of these subsystems will be assessed

against their construction weight, volume, and constructibility

requirements.

Contributors to be brought on board when appropriate

include the ERDC-GSL Base Camp Survivability Branch for

materials procurement knowledge, the U.S. Army Engineer

School for engineer training doctrine, the 412th/416th Engineer

Commands, the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion and/or

the Air Force RED HORSE Civil Engineering Squadron units

for combat construction doctrine and knowledge, the

Huntsville Center for logistics and forward operating base

requirements, and Kellogg, Brown & Root for practical

contractor experience.

In-Theater Infrastructure Assessment

One way to support rapid military deployment and reduce

the Class IV materials needed in theater operations is by using

or adapting the existing infrastructure. To ensure the adequacy

of this infrastructure, theater engineers need tools to locate,

inventory, and assess the condition of buildings and utilities.

As part of this effort, ERDC is studying the feasibility of using

remote assessment of the infrastructure to identify, sort,

prioritize, and make initial evaluations. Once on the ground,

the troops and engineers could perform more detailed

inspections using simplified methods, checklists, design and

material libraries, and a centralized reachback capability with

skilled engineers who assist in finding and resolving complex

problems.

The scoping phase of this project is looking at multiple

approaches that would help engineers and troops in the field

better use the existing infrastructure. A close look at lessons

learned from recent mobilization efforts will be an important

early step. Proponents within the Department of Defense will

be identified and invited to participate in a base camp workshop

scheduled to take place in FY04. The lessons learned,

workshop, and investigation of current standards and

promising technologies will focus the research efforts where

the most effective improvements can be made. The following

activities are being considered:

 Develop a database (or the framework and tools for

collecting the data) of existing infrastructure outside

CONUS.

 Establish infrastructure benchmarks based on local

practices.

 Develop applications of remote assessment technologies

for buildings and utilities.

 Develop assessment tools for engineers (building

component inventories, inspection checklists, guidance,

and self-contained reference materials).

 Develop assessment tools for soldiers (simplified methods).

 Produce standards for gathering information to optimize

use of the ERDC TeleEngineering Operations Center.

 Provide rapid restoration techniques for utilities and

buildings.

 Document innovative repair methods (such as using

indigenous resources).

 The findings will be used to focus research and development on tools that will assist in rapid theater inventory,

condition assessment, planning, and repair of existing

structures to meet the functional demands.

Utilities Technology Selection

During deployments, the Army establishes base camps in

a wide variety of situations. Site conditions, such as the status

of existing infrastructure and the environmental-baseline

assessment, affect how base camps can be deployed and how

utilities can be provided. Because each base camp scenario is

unique, the Army must depend on an array of utility technologies

to serve base camp needs. Selection is based on preexisting site

conditions, the environmental-baseline assessment, the number

of troops, and the duration of the stay.

“Integrated life cycle base camp management tools support

Army Transformation objectives by providing betterdesigned contingency facilities faster, with less logistics tail and a

smaller footprint, and at the lowest cost to ensure the soldiers’

comfort, health, safety, and combat readiness.”
October-December 2003 Engineer 41

Many in the armor and engineer communities—and

the Army community in general—perceive Active

Component (AC)-Reserve Component (RC)

assignments to be the “kiss of death” for their careers. Others

see them as a sign that they have done something wrong and

are no longer worthy of the more prestigious assignments,

such as small group instructor (SGI) at a branch school or

observer-controller (OC) at a combat training center. To dispel

this perception, the Armor and Engineer Branches even state

on their respective home pages, “The general rule is not if you

will serve, it’s more like when will you serve”1

 in an AC-RC

assignment and “Most officers will be assigned to a ‘3R’

(recruiting, Reserve Officer Training Corps, Reserve Component) assignment. The 3R assignment itself has no negative

bearing on promotion, schooling, and battalion command.”2

While there are some disadvantages to an AC-RC assignment,

we submit that these assignments are not career-enders and

that the rewards far outweigh the challenges. The intent of

this article is to address some of these challenges, highlight

some of the rewards, and perhaps change the perception of

AC-RC assignments across the force.

Within the AC-RC community, there are two different paths:

First, there is the resident training support battalion. These

units cover down with only one RC unit. Second, there is the

observer-controller/trainer (OC/T) battalion. These units

evaluate and assist in training several RC units within a

specified region. This article focuses on the training support

battalion.

Despite the negative connotations and personal feelings

regarding AC-RC assignments, they remain a necessary,

important, and rewarding aspect of the total Army assignments

process. First and foremost, the AC-RC program is congressionally mandated and requires the Army to “provide Active

Component advisors to Army RC units to improve readiness.

As a result, AC-RC assignments are placed first or second on

the priority list of fill.”3

 These assignments are also important

because the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

who fill them play important roles in the personal and

professional development of the supported RC units. Lastly,

these assignments help AC soldiers understand how the RC

functions. As we move more to an “Army of One,” it’s likely

that many AC leaders will either work for or have RC units

working for them in future deployments.

Since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and the drawdown

at its conclusion, the Army National Guard has continued to

play an increasingly larger role in the U.S. Army’s power

projection capabilities. The National Guard has

participated in Operations Southern Watch,

Northern Watch, Joint Forge, Joint Guardian, and

Deliberate Forge, to name just a few. In 2000, the

49th Armored Division took the lead in Bosnia for

Stabilization Force 7 Operation Joint Forge,

Multinational Division-North. This deployment

marked the first time since American soldiers

entered Bosnia in late 1995 that an Army National

Guard unit served as the headquarters element

and provided a troop component for this

peacekeeping mission.4

 National Guard units

continue to perform this mission today.

Since 11 September 2001, RC units have taken

on even larger roles, ranging from Homeland

Defense, to the United Nations Multinational Force

Observer Mission in the Sinai, to operations in

combat theaters of Operation Enduring Freedom

in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Currently, RC units provide the majority of

operational and theater-level logistical support and

maneuver control for combat operations. RC units

are the primary force running aerial port of

AC-RC in the 21st Century

(From an AC Perspective)

By Captain Jason Meharg and Captain Michael Konczey

National Guard troops conduct a map reconnaissance for an

upcoming training event with their resident trainer.
42 Engineer October-December 2003

debarkation operations in Uzbekistan. Similarly, RC units

provide the majority of transportation assets in Kuwait. More

significantly, follow-on forces for the next phase of Operation

Iraqi Freedom will include RC combat units in addition to the

many combat support and combat service support units already

in theater. The 39th Infantry Brigade (Enhanced Separate

Brigade), Arkansas Army National Guard, and the 30th Infantry

Brigade (Enhanced Separate Brigade), North Carolina Army

National Guard, recently received mobilization orders to deploy

to Iraq with 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Armored Division,

respectively.

Serving in an AC-RC assignment presents many challenges

and rewards. First, we work on a daily basis with the supported

RC unit. We work in their armories and live in the same

communities. Our mission is to—

 Provide military occupational specialty (MOS)-specific

training assistance to the leaders and soldiers of the unit.

 Focus efforts in planning, executing, and evaluating battlefocused training to improve the combat effectiveness of

the company/battalion/brigade and to reduce postmobilization training time.

 Perform duties as directed by the AC commander.

 Fill key vacancies and deploy with the unit, on order.

We assist the unit in planning, preparing, and resourcing

their training. We help ensure that their training is battlefocused and in line with the guidance issued by their higher

headquarters. We coordinate for outside support in the form

of OC/Ts for their externally evaluated lanes and annual

training. Often, we assist the OC/Ts in planning and resourcing

this training, as well as issuing the operations orders and

maneuver graphics for these exercises. We also play a vital

role in planning and preparing yearly training briefs that

culminate in annual training, combat training center rotations,

and/or real-world deployments. In short, we assist in the

planning, preparation, and execution of training at all levels for

the supported RC unit. Of course this helps the unit as well as

our own professional growth. Our bottom-line objective is to

ensure that the unit is ready to deploy when the nation calls.

As part of training the unit, we help educate the RC soldiers

and leaders we support. We teach officer and NCO professional

development and other classes; assist platoon leaders, platoon

sergeants, and junior NCOs in devising training for their

soldiers; and even have the opportunity to develop soldiers

on an individual level. In addition, we assist the supported RC

unit in training, evaluating, and validating platoon leaders,

platoon sergeants, and company commanders, focusing on

their ability to issue operations orders, conduct troop-leading

procedures, give after-action reviews, and conduct proper risk

assessments.

Our presence in these assignments is a delicate balance.

We are expected to be the subject matter experts in many areas.

Similarly, we are expected to share this expertise with the

supported RC unit with the expectation that they will

incorporate what is applicable. This does not always occur,

however, mostly because we are outsiders; we are not members

of the tight-knit RC family. It is important to keep in mind that

success in this assignment is measured in small bites. We

must establish our credibility—as with any new unit—and

cultivate a relationship of trust to be truly effective. Therefore,

we must maintain the technical and tactical competence that

is expected of us as professional officers and NCOs. We must

also maintain our doctrinal knowledge and stay current within

our respective branches (which can be difficult being located

in such far-removed locations). By doing all of these things,

we again benefit the unit as well as ourselves.

By and large, we work with a large, professional group of

soldiers. National Guard soldiers are consistently willing to

listen to new ideas from the training support battalion as well

as the OC/Ts and incorporate these ideas into their next

training event. They are motivated, patriotic, willing to do the

right thing, and ready to fight to protect America.

In addition to the opportunity to help make the National

Guard units better, one also gains a better—and necessary—

understanding of how the National Guard works. This

assignment gives firsthand insight into the constraints the

units face, as well as how competent they are despite how

little time they actually spend in uniform. When it comes to

external evaluations, either during monthly drills or annual

training, they are held to the same standard as AC units. The

biggest difference is the amount of quality training time

available to the RC unit. Like AC units, RC units still have

annual maintenance, mobilization, and inspector general

inspections, as well as individual common task training, Army

physical fitness tests, and weapons qualifications. But unlike

AC units, RC units are authorized 48 multiple unit training

assemblies (weekend drills) a year, resulting in just 24 eighthour days to conduct all of their administrative and training

requirements in preparation for their annual training.

Another advantage is the opportunity to assist in the

personal and professional development of soldiers, which is

always rewarding, no matter which patch they wear. Other

benefits include unparalleled family time and the opportunity

to further one’s civilian education.

National Guard troops review personal data before

deployment.
While AC-RC assig nme nts ha ve man y per son al and r------------------------.., 

professional reward s, they also have a few disadv antages. 

Often, we work in rem ote areas that lack the military support 

channels we. have grown accustomed to when living on or 

ncar a military installation.The re may be no military medical or 

dent al facilities, no commissary or post exchange, no military 

barb ers, and no military dry cleaners. Some live and work in 

communities that lack the TRICARE Health Care Program or 

TRICARE Prime Remote providers. Some live in areas with 

inadequate housing and schools for family members (situations 

tha t are being addressed). But most importantly, we miss out 

on the routine life on a military installation. Like recruiters, we 

lose the everyday camaraderie with our work groups, peers, 

and other Army famili es. 

As with any military assignment, there are good and notso-good aspects. AnAC-RC assignment has many more good 

points than bad , pro viding th e AC parti cipan t with 

opportunities not often ava ilable in other assignment s. The 

oppo rtunity to pr ofessionall y devel op by " rebluing" on 

do ctrine and tacti cs, techniques , and procedures; pursue 

c ivilian education; spend time with your family ; and live in a 

civilian community are once-in-a-career opportunities. Most 

importantly, you can have a huge imp act on the readiness of 

many soldiers who may be deployed, with little or no notice, 

to real-world missions all ove r the globe. AC-RC assignments 

are not a fad, nor are they anathema .The important thing is to 

keep such assignme nts in perspecti ve. Any assi gnment , if 

anal yzed enough, can reveal someth ing to complain about, 

but rememb er that we all chose to serve. Lastly, remember the 

lst Infantry Division 's motto: "No mission too difficult, no 

sacrifice too great, duty first." W 

Endnotes 

I Ar mo r Branch Web site at <h tt p si/Ywww. p e rscom 

online.army.mil/OParmorlarcpcold.htm> 

2 Engineer Branch Web site at -chup sr/rwww.pe rscom 

online.army.mil/OPeng/BQassign.htm > 

] Ar m or Branch Web site at <https i/Zwww.p erscom 

online.army.mil/ OParmor/arcpr old.htm> 

4 MAJ Ron Elli ot. '·49th Armored Division deploys to 

Bosnia." A rmyLiNK News Febru ary 15, 2000. 

• 

Captain M eha rg is the residen t trainer for the 239th Engin eer 

Company. A rkansas Army National Guard. An en gineer officer, he 

has se rved in various po sitions at Fort Carson, Colo rad o, and in 

Korea, where he co mmanded Headquarters and Headq uarter s 

Company, 44th Engineer Ba tta lion, 2d Inf antrv Di vision. 

Captain Konc zey is the operations officer f or the Integration 

Division. Comba t Training Center Directorate, at Fo rt Leavenworth, 

Kansas. He recently ser ved as the resident trainer f or Troop E, 

15Jst Cavalry Regiment, A rkansas Army National Guard. An arm or 

officer, he has serv ed III various position s at Fo rt Ril ey, Kansas. and 

Fort Ho od, Texas, where he commande d Alpha Company, 3-8 Cavalry 

Regiment, l st Cava lry Division. 

October-D ecemb er 2003 

( "Bas e Camp Sustainme nt," con tin ued from page 40) 

ERDC will prepare a matrix of base camp technologies that 

can provide utility services for water treatment and distribution, 

wastewater co llection and disposal, solid waste dispos al, and 

e lectrical-powe r ge ne ra tion under vario us de ployment 

scenarios. Info rmation in the ma trix comes from a study 

completed in FY02, deployment doctrine, agencies active in 

supporting Army depl oyments, and militar y and civilian 

individuals with deployme nt experience. The matrix includes 

existing technologies, technologie s under development, and 

commercial off-the-shelf technologies that co uld be adapted 

to deployment scenari os. 

Based on the matrix, ERD C will estimate the impact that 

existing technologies have on deployments and determine the 

potential impa ct of replacing ineffec tive technologies with 

more effective ones.Evaluation of this impact will be based on 

mission, deployment logistics, cost, sec urity, and quality of 

life for the soldi er. 

In the next phase of the research, ERDC will develop-or 

partner in the development of- techn ologies necessary to fill 

high-priority elements of the matrix. It is anticipated that 

technologies related to solid waste processing and wastewater 

sludge disposal will be developed. However, it is possible that 

other techn ol ogy ga ps wi th higher pri or ity will tak e 

precedence. Any new technologies developed will be fieldtested and valid ated before recomm endation . 

For this work, ERDC will consult or partner with other Corps 

of Eng ineers offices and lab oratories; the Soldier Support 

Center at Natick Laborat ories, Massachusetts; and the Air 

Force Research Laboratories at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. 

Conclusion 

I

ntegrated life cycle base cam p management tools support 

Army Transfo rmation objecti ves by prov iding betterdesigned contingency facilities faster, with less logistics 

tail and a smaller footprint, and at the lowest cost to ensure 

the soldiers' comfort, health , sa fely, and combat readiness. 

Through an integrated approach, environmental , communications, force protection , and other issu es can be considered 

simu ltaneo usly in plannin g and managemen t rather than 

piecemeal or after the camp is built. These tools will help ensure 

base camp sustainabiliry fro m design through disposal. 

W 

Mr. Marlatt is associate technical director f or facilities 

ac q uis ition and re vitaliza tion a t CERL in Champaign , 

Illin ois. Other contributors to this article are Kirk McGraw, 

Gary Gerdes. Stuart Foltz, and Jonathan Trov illion, all of 

CERL. 

Engineer 4 3 
44 Engineer October-December 2003

Mobility is Job No.1. Without it our forces will go

.nowhere. However, enemy forces throughout

.history have found numerous methods of blocking

roads, creating barriers, and limiting the movement of

advancing forces. In turn, great armies have conducted

combined arms breaching operations to overcome these

obstacles to press the fight and destroy the enemy. The

orchestration and execution of this task may be the toughest

job a maneuver commander will ever face. The purpose of this

article is to assess breaching operations based on lessons

learned at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin,

California, while also revealing the “Seven Breaching Habits

of Highly Effective Units.”1

In 1999, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

developed a trends-reversal program to review unit execution

of numerous mission-essential tasks. One task, combined arms

breaching, was high on the list for review and assessment.

TRADOC designated NTC Rotation 00-10 as a combined arms

breach-focused rotation and coordinated with the U.S. Army

Engineer School to assess negative trends in breaching

operations. This onerous task, executed by some tremendous

maneuver and engineer leaders, validated one thing—the trend

has not been reversed.

Combined arms breaching operations are difficult and

remain a negative trend. This is no surprise to warfighters

anywhere and is echoed by the Sidewinder (Combat Engineer)

Observer-Controller Team at NTC. Opposed combined arms

breaching, under fire, against a capable opponent like the NTC

Opposing Force (OPFOR), is tough but not impossible.

Field Manual (FM) 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching

Operations (formerly FM 90-13-1), says that breaching “is perhaps

the single most difficult combat task a force can encounter.”2

 The

May 2001 issue of Engineer indicates that it took the U.S. Marines

2.5 to 9.5 hours to clear two lanes through an Iraqi obstacle belt

during Operation Desert Storm.3 It took another 24 to 48 hours for

friendly elements to pass through the obstacle and continue their

movement toward the enemy. This was an unopposed breach

with the best available equipment, personnel, and planning and

had been rehearsed for weeks.

We can and must reverse this trend. Many rotational units

with great leaders, adequate equipment, and strong motivation

culminate at the breach and never pass combat power to

destroy the enemy. Some units never even get to the breach or

cannot identify where or how to breach. This is despite the

fact that breaching is the top deliverable for combat engineers

and brigade combat teams (BCTs) in mid- to high-intensity

combat operations. Combined arms breaching may be the

ultimate team sport, and success relies on the skill, techniques,

and training of all the players, not just the engineers.

Trends – What We See

First, I’ll present a quick review of the combined arms

breaching trends seen at NTC, based on observations

during the planning, preparation, and execution of

combined arms breaching operations. Repeated failures

occurred in:

Planning

 Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning, and

intelligence requirements are unfocused.

 Poor terrain analysis fails to answer the “So what?” question.

 Units fail to perform reverse breach planning.

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Magness

Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits

of Highly Effective Units of Highly Effective Units of Highly Effective Units

Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits Seven Breaching Habits

of Highly Effective Units of Highly Effective Units of Highly Effective Units
October-December 2003 Engineer 45

 The location selected for breaching depends largely on

weakness in the enemy’s defense, where its covering fires

are minimized.

 If friendly forces cannot find a natural weakness, they create

one by fixing the majority of the enemy force and isolating

a small portion of it for attack. 4

Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP): Conduct

detailed terrain analysis. Answer the “So what?” question.

We are beginning to see units leveraging the technological

advances of terrain visualization tools. The products from

TerraBase®, the Digital Topographic Support System, and

other visualization tools are just that—products. But with

analysis comes answers to the question that maneuver

commanders must demand: Where can we concentrate efforts

against an enemy weakness, and where are the enemy’s

covering fires minimized? If a weakness is not identified, where

must we create one? Where does the terrain facilitate the

positioning of support forces? Where is the enemy’s “red

zone,” and how can we stay out of it? The scheme of maneuver,

scheme of fires, task organization, and BOS focus await the

answers to these questions.

TTP: Plant the big fat tack (BFT). Mass on the point of

penetration. We use a BFT (an extraordinarily big-headed

pushpin) to help focus the planning and execution on the

point of penetration. It is a great tool to ensure focus at the

point where we must have massed effects. Take a look at your

plan—how many maneuver units are focused at that point? Is

every BOS focused at that point to ensure success? Is that

point an enemy weakness? If not, how are we creating one

there?

 When do we place the BFT? Early enough to ensure the

massed effects of maneuver, fires, and every other BOS. In

other words, before we finalize the friendly course of action

(COA).

Habit No. 1 – Mass Kicks A**!

Habit No. 2 – Focus on the Enemy Engineers.

Habit No. 3 – The “Orchestrated Ballet of Farm

Implements” Doesn’t Just Happen.

Habit No. 4 – Don’t Call Them Farm Implements!

Habit No. 5 – Obstacles Are Like Rivers; Learn to

Breach or Learn to Swim.

Habit No. 6 – Use All Available Smoke Assets;

Someone Is Always Watching.

Habit No. 7 – Breaching Operations in Restricted

Terrain Are Not “Business as Usual.”

Seven Breaching Habits of Highly Effective Units

 Units do not make detailed plans to set the conditions for

breaching.

Preparation

 Observers fail to provide detailed obstacle intelligence.

 Units fail to interdict enemy engineer defensive

preparations.

 Engineer and combined arms units fail to rehearse

adequately.

Execution

 Breach execution is unsynchronized.

 Maneuver forces lack mass and move forces into the breach

piecemeal.

 Maneuver forces “stumble” into obstacles.

 Engineers are not in position when conditions are set.

 Units fail to consider traffic control or expansion of lanes.

Habit No. 1 – Mass Kicks A**!

Quite simply, most units lack sufficient mass to succeed

in penetrating prepared enemy positions. Success or

failure can often be predicted at the line of departure

(LD) based on this fact alone. In fact, most brigade combat

team attacks will effectively mass no more than one company

team at the point of penetration. This is clearly not enough to

penetrate the prepared fortifications of an enemy who

conducts this defense mission three times to every one OPFOR

regimental attack. This enemy is good. We should expect no

less from our next enemy, wherever we may meet him. We

should expect complex obstacle fortifications with antitank

and antipersonnel mines, ditches, wire, booby traps, antihandling devices, and whatever else the enemy can muster.

Behind this line of obstacles, we can expect prepared fighting

positions for both vehicles and personnel with interlocking

fires, interior repositioning lines, and the massed effects of as

many forms of contact as possible. We should not expect to

be successful in this scenario without the massed effects of

fire, maneuver, and every Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

in the unit.

The standard for mass is articulated clearly in FM 3-34.2:

 Breaching is conducted by rapidly applying concentrated

efforts at a point to reduce the obstacle and penetrate the

defense.

 Massed combat power is directed against the enemy’s

weakness.

“I approve of all methods of attacking provided they

are directed at the point where the enemy’s army

is weakest and where the terrain favors them the

least.”

Frederick the Great

Q
46 Engineer October-December 2003

 Who (which BOS) is focused at the BFT? Who isn’t?

 Can we adjust the BFT location? Of course. As information

changes our understanding of the enemy, we will adjust

the BFT location. Use this to trigger a resynchronization of

the plan. Tactical operations center (TOC) battle captains

and executive officers must ensure that we have a battle

drill to confirm focus at the BFT through execution.

TTP: Isolate the point of penetration. Wherever we

penetrate the enemy, we must ensure that the remainder of the

OPFOR remains fixed. We do this with fires, close air support,

maneuver, and scatterable mines. We must do this, however,

without violating the principle of mass. The OPFOR has great

success in the offense, fixing its Blue Force (BLUEFOR) enemy

with motorized rifle companies and scatterable mines. The

OPFOR does so without significantly reducing its ability to

mass at the point of penetration. All too often, BLUEFOR units

commit battalion task forces to this task—often one-third to

two-thirds of their total BCT combat power.

TTP: Mass engineers at the breach. Breaching doctrine

basically requires one engineer platoon (with attachments) to

execute one lane. There is also a requirement for redundancy—

typically 50 percent. In a maneuver task force supported by an

engineer company, most of that company is required at the

breach. Develop a scheme of maneuver and a task organization

that masses engineers at this critical point. Identify triggers to

change task organization as required to mass engineers at the

breach and incorporate them into the decision support matrix.

Habit No. 2 – Focus on the Enemy Engineers

I

n postmission summaries at NTC, we often quote from

FM3-34.2: “An unverified enemy template can lead to

disaster because the force may aim an attack at the wrong

place. Units may deploy to reduce expected obstacles early,

wasting mission time to feel their way into nonexistent

obstacles; or they may blunder into an unexpected obstacle

or an enemy engagement area.”5 Attacking units routinely have

little or no knowledge of how the defending enemy is shaping

terrain with obstacles, and engineers are usually committed to

breaching operations with very little information on the

obstacles they are tasked to breach. It is this shaping of the

terrain that will tell the story of how the enemy is defending,

and where. Engineers, even enemy engineers, don’t lie. They

cannot—it simply goes against their nature. An obstacle on

the ground means something. It probably means that, were

you to back up to two-thirds of maximum effective enemy

weapons range (typically 1,200 to 2,000 meters), there will

probably be an enemy position. Terrain visualization tools

can help confirm or deny these locations (more “So what?”

questions).

Too often, we do little to find these enemy obstacles even

though they are the one component of the enemy defense

that can most easily be detected. They can be spotted during

the day or night and are most easily detected during the

construction of the obstacle. Men and machines are working,

vehicles with supplies are forward, and the terrain is changing

shape. Finding precise enemy positions, however, is very

difficult. Most OPFOR positions are occupied for only a brief

period during defensive preparation (position proofing,

rehearsals, security operations), and then not occupied again

until just before contact. Most R&S efforts focused on finding

the enemy in those positions are unsuccessful because the

enemy is simply not there.

TTP: Kill the enemy engineers. Enemy engineers will die.

Kill them. Position observers early to detect and disrupt the

enemy’s defensive preparations. Target bulldozers, caches of

construction material and ammunition, engineer soldiers and

equipment, and all obstacle emplacement activity. The enemy’s

ability to disrupt our attacking formations and reduce our

momentum is directly related to his ability to successfully

emplace his obstacles. He knows he cannot defeat the

BLUEFOR in a direct-fire battle without his battlefield shapers.

Deny him this advantage. Mine emplacement now is a lowrisk, high-payoff mission. We must reverse this, making it a

high-risk mission for enemy soldiers to employ mines. When

an enemy soldier gets the mission to emplace mines, he must

tremble with the thought of his impending destruction.

TTP: Find the obstacles. This cannot be just an engineer

reconnaissance task. This is something on which we must

focus combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), Stryker

vehicles, brigade and task force scouts, unmanned aerial

vehicles, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(JSTARS), and any other available “lookers.” Find the

obstacles to confirm or deny the enemy COA. Confirm the

proposed point of breach or penetration. Consider layering

reconnaissance assets by sending in initial forces to identify

obstacles, with subsequent forces to obtain (before committing

breaching forces) precise information such as—

 Obstacle location and type.

 Gaps and bypasses.
October-December 2003 Engineer 47

 Specific minefield composition, which may dictate what

breach assets to use and in what sequence.

 Soil conditions, which may indicate suitability for plowing.

We do not have the technology to detect buried mines and

many other low-cost, low-technology explosive devices.

Therefore we must compensate for this with TTP, task

organization, and focused reconnaissance. To be successful,

we must focus all available lookers to let us detect mining

activity and enemy obstacles before they are emplaced. (See

“Kill the enemy engineers” on page 46.)

Habit No. 3 – The “Orchestrated Ballet of Farm

Implements”6 Doesn’t Just Happen

FM 3-34.2 indicates that the “commander ensures

synchronization through proper planning and force

preparation. Fundamentals to achieve synchronization

are—

 Detailed reverse breach planning.

 Clear subunit instructions.

 Effective C2.

 Well-rehearsed forces.”7

The first two are fairly straightforward and are articulated

very well in our breaching doctrine. Reverse breach planning

works—do it! Determine the force ratios required on the

objective and work backward through the breach to the LD.

Assign clear tasks and purposes to all subunits with graphic

and fire-control measures and triggers that take the unit from

LD through the objective.

TTP: Command and control (C2). Ensure, as a minimum,

that the following are clearly addressed in the plan and then

rehearsed:

 Who determines that conditions are set?

 Who initiates the smoke (artillery and mechanical)?

 Who adjusts and controls the smoke?

 Who chooses the specific breach location?

 Who controls the breach assets?

 Who shifts suppressive fires?

 Who guides assault forces to the breach?

 How and when do we communicate this information, and

on what nets? How do we do this digitally?

 Who is the breach force commander, and have we resourced

him (without exceeding span-of-control considerations) to

be successful?

TTP: Conduct combined arms, mounted suppress, obscure,

secure, and assault (SOSA) rehearsals. You may be surprised

to see the “R” (reduce) missing from the breach fundamentals

acronym SOSRA. This is the one component that least needs

rehearsal. It is the bread-and-butter battle drill for the engineers,

but it is the one that has received the most attention when

units indicate that they have conducted rehearsals. Where

synchronization usually fails, and where rehearsals need the

most focus, is in setting the conditions (suppress, obscure,

secure) and in rapidly projecting combat power (assault)

through the breach and onto the objective. Make this the

focus of mounted rehearsals. Work through timing, triggers,

positioning, and the C2 issues identified in the previous

paragraph. Get the engineers to the breach, and they’ll do

fine.

Habit No. 4 – Don’t Call Them Farm

Implements!

We all (engineers, maneuver commanders, and Army

leadership) recognize that our breaching assets are

slow, old, and often inadequate for the assigned

breaching tasks. But they’re the best the Army gives us, so

make them work. Generally, engineer and maneuver leaders

fail to understand the capabilities and limitations of our

breaching systems, do not identify appropriate commitment

criteria for specific systems, and generally underestimate or

undersell the capabilities of the most powerful breaching force

on the combined arms battlefield—the sapper.

TTP: Fire the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC). The

lethality of the MICLIC should not be understated. It consists

of 1,950 pounds of composition A4 and is capable of defeating

most pressure-activated mines, clearing a 14- by 100-meter

lane. Unfortunately, until sappers go to NTC (or are deployed

to a combat theater), they generally have not fired a live

MICLIC. Continental United States-based units are authorized

only inert line charges, and even then not enough for one per

MICLIC crew. This is the equivalent of tank crews achieving

“qualification” having fired only practice rounds or, not having

fired one themselves, reaching qualification by watching their

buddy fire one. Needless to say, there are a host of issues

associated with the firing of 1,950 pounds of explosive attached

to 550 feet of cabling and electrical wiring. Work through them.

Consider the following:

 In the rough, broken terrain that will likely characterize much

of the ground surface on current and future battlefields,

slow down. Consider putting the MICLIC on a good road

or trail, or pick a point of breach that is suitable for the

speeds and launch angle you require (more “So what?”

questions for your terrain analysis).

 The MICLIC will destroy most pressure-activated mines in

the 14- by 100-meter lane. Some mines in the lane may be

unaffected by the blast effect of the charge. That is why we

proof, using either rollers, mine plows, or sappers. That is

also why we conduct detailed, specific reconnaissance at

“A poor plan, well rehearsed and violently executed,

is better than a perfect plan late and unrehearsed.”

General George S. Patton
the point of breach—to determine the type of mine and the

suitability of the MICLIC as a primary breaching system.

 Until the Army fields a better system, the MICLIC is still the

most capable breaching asset in the inventory that allows

breaching without exposing soldiers to the risks of

dismounted breaching operations. Know and understand

its capabilities and limitations, and find opportunities to

increase the tactical and technical proficiency of the soldiers

who use it.

TTP: Never underestimate the breaching capability of a

single sapper. There is no obstacle known to man, and certainly

none seen on the NTC battlefield, that cannot be breached by

an engineer soldier. We use mounted systems (MICLICs, tank

plows/rollers, armored combat earthmovers) to provide speed

or mitigate the risk to dismounted soldiers. There may be cases

where the sapper is the best available breaching option (rough,

restricted terrain, for example). And while there are certainly

implications for timing, if the sapper is the only available

breaching option, we should all be prepared to wait. The

alternative—mission failure—is much worse, of course. This

relates to the importance of gaining specific intelligence about

the obstacle at the point of breach before the sappers arrive.

Configuring an appropriate breaching package without losing

momentum depends on timely and precise information. Your

sappers demand it.

Habit No. 5 – Obstacles Are Like Rivers; Learn

to Breach or Learn to Swim

Our breaching tenets, while all appropriate, probably

should borrow a few bullets from FM 90-13, RiverCrossing Operations:

 Surprise.

 Extensive preparation.

 Flexible plan.

 Traffic control.

 Organization.

 Speed.8

If units viewed the obstacle as a river that requires the

passage of not just the lead maneuver formation but perhaps

the entire BCT, division, or corps on one or two narrow lanes,

perhaps we would be less inclined to “hand wave” the details

of the breach or to push the requirement to “execute the

breach” down to the lead task force or company team. There is

little margin for error. If successful, we might have one or two

14-meter-wide lanes through which to project combat power.

Smoke, dust, direct and indirect fires, scatterable mines, and

chemicals all further narrow this margin for error.

TTP: Avoid the frontal attack. While our doctrine indicates

that the frontal attack is the least desirable form of maneuver,

it is the one most frequently seen at NTC. Find a flank and

mass on it. Exploit a weakness or create one. Isolate the point

of penetration. BLUEFOR units rarely if ever surprise the

enemy but rather “telegraph” their intentions long before the

LD. Find a way to tell a deceptive story without losing the

ability to mass effects at the BFT. It’s no easy task but one

the OPFOR routinely executes. Use obscuration during

preparations and movement to, through, and beyond the LD

to make it difficult for the enemy to determine friendly

intentions.

TTP: Plan for traffic control. Get the military police into

the fight. Traffic control is a traditional task for military police

but one they rarely execute at NTC. There must be a trigger to

hand over the cleared lane from the breaching unit’s engineers

to follow-on military police and/or engineers. BCTs should

plan for a forward passage of lines if more than one unit is

passing through the lane. Consider detailed march tables with

graphic control measures, much like those for a river crossing,

that will facilitate the passage without losing momentum.

TTP: Shifts happen. Build flexibility into the plan. Most

plans do not survive first contact with the enemy, let alone

make it very far beyond the LD. Most units identify branch

plans for alternate COAs but generally fail to include BOS

implications as they develop these alternate plans. This is

also where the TOC battle drill that refocuses all BOS at the

revised BFT location must be in place. Regardless of where

we breach, all team members must be refocused at the new

breach location if it is to be successful.

Habit No. 6 – Use All Available Smoke Assets;

Someone is Always Watching

Of the breach fundamentals—SOSRA—the most

challenging may be obscuration. Mechanical smokers

(wheeled or tracked smoke generators) rarely create

the conditions necessary to allow maneuver formations to get

into position to breach. Units rarely identify triggers to

transition from artillery-delivered smoke to mechanical smoke

and even to hand-emplaced smoke (smoke pots). This is one

of the most critical components of the breaching operation

that needs synchronization and rehearsal.

TTP: Give a clear task and purpose to mechanical smokers.

Generally, orders to smoke units read like this: task—smoke;

purpose—to provide smoke. Chemical units need a specific

target (antitank systems, motorized rifle company- and platoonsized formations), location (north wall of the valley, map

coordinates NV123456), and desired effect (haze, blanket,

curtain) to better use their capabilities. Rehearse their

positioning within the formation as well as the triggers for

employment and transition from one task to the next. There

may be several: one to facilitate the movement of support

forces into position, another to ease breaching operations,

and perhaps a third to help assaulting forces moving through

the breach and onto the objective.

48 Engineer October-December 2003

“I’ve on many occasions wondered what it would be

like to be a real soldier...if only I was an engineer.”

General George S. Patton
TTP: Expend all ammunition. Most units identify

appropriate targets and triggers for artillery-delivered smoke.

Fewer use mechanical smokers during the approach to the

obstacle or at the breach. Very rarely do units employ smoke

pots and smoke grenades at the breach—perhaps because it

adds to what already is a complicated menu of tasks. Units fail

to do so at their own peril. Assume someone is watching and

use every available asset to create the necessary conditions

for committing soldiers to and through the breach.

Habit No. 7 – Breaching Operations in

Restricted Terrain Are Not “Business as Usual”

Too many units fail to account for the implications of

restricted terrain in the planning, preparation, and

execution of breaching operations. Units cannot

approach breaching operations in a defile as if it were an open

valley floor. The implications for breach timing, maneuver unit

positioning, observer positioning, and breach assets are too

critical to overlook. For those who have trained in “Mojavia,”

visualize breaching operations in Alpha or Bravo Pass, and

think about the applications for breaching in Korea, Kosovo,

or Afghanistan. FM 3-34.2 (Appendix D) is a good place to

begin to examine the implications of restricted terrain and to

develop unit TTP and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

TTP: Restricted terrain operations are slow. Plan

accordingly. The implications on the time required to maintain

suppression, obscuration, etc., while working through a defile

are tremendous and must be planned and rehearsed in detail.

These are often dismounted operations to clear high ground

and, quite possibly, to set support forces on the far side of the

obstacle. The terrain may restrict the ability to execute mounted

breaching operations, further adding to the timing challenges.

All of these details point to a slow, deliberate process.

TTP: Traffic control is critical. Not only is the river long,

it’s wide and deep. Because defiles may not allow for two-way

traffic and may extend for hundreds of meters, or even for

kilometers, there is even less margin for error as units move to

and through the breach. March tables are critical as are

deliberate controls for entering and exiting the breach area.

Making the “Seven Habits” Habits

The challenge for most units is how to translate these

habits into executable tasks. In a word—repetition.

Units that practice these TTP—incorporating them into

battle drills, SOPs, and mission plans—will develop these

breaching habits. Multiple repetitions with all members of the

combined arms team will make the successful execution of this

extraordinarily complex combined arms task more likely.

These habits are designed to facilitate success in the most

complicated scenario possible—breaching in contact. The goal

must be to set the conditions, according to these seven habits,

to breach out of contact with the enemy. Destroy every enemy

in and around the point of breach and every enemy that can

influence the point of breach—and then breach. Is this

scenario possible? Yes. Is it possible without multiple

repetitions and the total focus of every team member? Maybe,

but not likely.

Ultimately, however, these habits are the responsibility of

the breach orchestrator—the unit commander. Translate the

TTP and breach habits into clear guidance and intent that

focus the entire unit on penetrating the enemy and his

obstacles. And while the use of the seven habits will not

guarantee success at NTC or on any other future battlefield,

their application—coupled with the warrior spirit that our

soldiers consistently display—may help units begin to reverse

a negative trend and give our force the mobility it requires.

Lieutenant Colonel Magness is commander of the Detroit

District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. When he wrote

this article, he was assigned to the Sidewinder Team at NTC.

Endnotes

1

 Apologies to Steven Covey, author of The Seven Habits

of Highly Effective People, Simon and Schuster, New York,

NY, 1989. Combined arms obstacle breaching likely requires

effective people as well as effective units.

2

 FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, 31

August 2000, Introduction, p. 1-1.

3

 Colonel Michael K. Asada, et al, “The Grizzly: A System of

One,” Engineer, May 2001, p. 41.

4 FM 3-34.2, p. 1-11, para. 1-35.

5 Ibid., p. 1-5, para. 1-6.

6 Major Harry Green, “The Grizzly and the Wolverine:

Alternatives to an Orchestrated Ballet of Farm Implements,”

Engineer, August 1996, pp. 2-6.

7

 FM 3-34.2, p. 1-13, para. 1-46.

8

FM 90-13, River-Crossing Operations, 26 January 1998,

p. 1-4.

(Note: A variation of this article was published in the May

2002 issue of Armor. The author wrote it while assigned to the

Sidewinder Team at NTC. The opinions expressed are those of

the author and do not represent the official position of NTC.

Even though nearly two years have passed since they first

appeared in print, the lessons of the “Seven Breaching Habits

of Highly Effective Units” remain relevant. They are consistent

with the concept of assured mobility, as well as the lessons

learned on our most recent battlefields.)

October-December 2003 Engineer 49
50 Engineer October-December 2003

T.

he recently approved capstone engineer manual—Field

Manual (FM) 3-34, Engineer Operations—is now

accessible on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training

and Doctrine Digital Library. Several years in production, this

manual provides a holistic construct for engineer operations

within the current operational environment. It consolidates

FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, and FM 5-114, Engineer

Operations Short of War, and more importantly, links Joint

Publication (JP) 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations;

JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine

Warfare; JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering

Support; and FM 3-0, Operations, to our manuals. As the

Engineer Regiment moves forward from FM 3-34 with

implementing manuals, we must build into our doctrine a bridge

to the Future Force that will rapidly incorporate future concepts

and support the Current Force.

FM 3-34 Changes

Our capstone manual takes into account new concepts,

technologies, and requirements and recognizes that

the threat is continuously evolving. Written primarily

at the operational level of war, it is applicable to commanders—

both engineer and maneuver—at all echelons. It also

recognizes that we operate in an environment of continuing

transformation. Although it is a complete rewrite of engineer

capstone doctrine, some key changes are to—

 Establish an engineer mission-essential task list (METL).

 Codify assured mobility.

 Include field force engineering (FFE).

 Recognize maneuver support (MANSPT) as a

grouping of combat support functions.

Establish an Engineer METL

The Combined Arms Center published FM 3-0,

Operations, in June 2001. As part of this effort, it

established an Army METL to serve as an

operational expression of the Army’s core

competencies. It also directed Army units to

develop their battle-focused METLs in concert

with FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List. The

table at right shows the Engineer Regiment’s

METL, which directly supports the Army METL.

Codify Assured Mobility

We codified our role (with other branches) to

provide assured mobility to the force and

recognized the invaluable role of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) to our nation. For the first time, we link

the operational framework of FM 3-0 and the engineer

battlespace functions that support the maneuver commander

(combat, geospatial, and general engineering) into a construct

that allows the force to deploy, move, and maneuver where

and when it desires to accomplish the mission. Not to be

confused with the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) function

of mobility, assured mobility supports the maneuver

commander’s use of all elements of combat power to achieve

decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations across the full

spectrum of conflict. The four imperatives of assured mobility

are—

 Develop mobility input to the common operating picture

(COP).

 Select, establish, and maintain operating areas.

 Attack the enemy’s ability to influence operating areas.

 Maintain mobility and momentum.

These imperatives are integrated into the military decisionmaking process to achieve the commander’s intent. Achieving

assured mobility rests on applying its six fundamentals:

predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect. They

are all applicable from the strategic to the tactical level. They

are most clearly defined in Chapter 3 of FM 3-34, and suggested

resources to achieve each are shown in Figure 1 (which is

Figure 3-3 of FM 3-34 ). Note that several units used the assured

mobility construct with great success in planning and

executing Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A Bridge to the Future Force

By Lieutenant Colonel Reinhard W. Koenig

Doctrine Updates:

Army and Engineer Regimental METL

Army Tasks Engineer Regimental Tasks

Shape the Security Environment Shape the Security Environment

Respond Promptly to Crisis Respond Promptly to Crisis

Mobilize the Army Mobilize Engineer Forces

Conduct Forcible Entry Operations Support Forcible Entry Operations

Dominate Land Operations Support Assured Mobility to

Dominate Land Operations

Provide Support to Civil Authorities Provide Support to Civil Authorities

Provide Quality, Responsive Engineering Services to the Nation
Maneuver

Firepower Leadership Protection

Information

Attack Enemy’s

Ability to Influence

Operating Areas

Maintain Mobility

and Momentum

Select, Establish,

and Maintain

Operating Areas

Develop a

Mobility COP

Situational

Understanding

Neutralize Avoid

Predict Prevent Detect

October-December 2003 Engineer 51

Include FFE

For the first time, engineer doctrine recognizes the role of

the entire Engineer Regiment in the defense of our nation by

establishing FFE as a means to access its specialized engineer

capabilities. Particularly early in any contingency, FFE helps

to meet the challenge of filling the gap between engineer

requirements and assets on the ground. This is done through

the combination of reach and forward presence. Reach is the

ability of forward-deployed engineer elements to communicate

with nondeployed subject matter experts—particularly from

the seven research and development centers within USACE—

to develop and implement solutions to engineer issues from

tactical through strategic levels. The communication system

of choice for reach is the USACE-developed TeleEngineering

Toolkit. The system proved invaluable at every level during

Operation Iraqi Freedom. USACE also operates the TeleEngineering Emergency Operations Center to facilitate reach.

Forward presence is the deployment and application of

modular teams to support the joint force and Army service

component commander’s needs across the entire battlespace.

Drawn mainly from the Engineer Commands (ENCOMs) and

USACE, these teams are tailored to meet mission requirements:

 Forward Engineer Support Team – Main (FEST-M)

 Forward Engineer Support Team – Augmentation (FEST-A)

 Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST)

 Environmental Support Team (ENVST)

 Base Development Team (BDT)

 Infrastructure Assessment Team (IAT)

 Facility Engineer Group (FEG)

 Facility Engineer Detachment (FED)

 Facility Engineer Team (FET)

Appendix C of FM 3-34 describes the capabilities of each

modular team and provides operational guidance for planning

their employment.

Recognize MANSPT

MANSPT is the staff integration of the mobility, countermobility, and survivability BOS with the remaining BOS

elements focused on enabling assured mobility for the friendly

force. It focuses on enhancing tactical freedom of maneuver

and force protection using the assured mobility imperatives

and fundamentals as the framework. The Stryker Brigade

Combat Team (SBCT) currently uses a MANSPT cell that integrates the functions of the Engineer, Chemical, and Military

Police Branches, along with explosive ordnance disposal units.

FM 3-34 lays out the concept for MANSPT, recognizing it as

a future concept that is much broader than the SBCT and

encompasses the means to enable, enhance, and protect

freedom of action.

These are but a few of the major changes in the Regiment’s

capstone doctrine. Clearly the culmination of this effort has

brought engineer doctrine in line with joint and Army doctrinal

thinking and has provided the foundation and blueprint for

the Regiment’s future doctrinal efforts.

Figure 1. Imperatives of Assured Mobility and the Elements of Combat Power

(Figure 3-3 from FM 3-34)
52 Engineer October-December 2003

Figure 2. Current Status of Doctrinal Manuals
Did your unit move recently, or is your Engineer

Bulletin addressed incorrectly? To correct your

mailing address, send us the following information:

Old Address:

New Address:

E-mail: <pbd@wood.army.mil>

Telephone: (573) 563-4104, DSN 676-4104

Address: U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center,

ATTN: ATZT-DT-DS-B (Engineer), 320 MANSCEN

Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

65473-8929

October-December 2003 Engineer 53

Near-Term Doctrinal Changes

The Engineer Regiment maintains a doctrinal library of

64 products, the second highest number of any branch.

Keeping this diverse and often-technical library current

requires effort from across the Regiment. Currently, 42 of these

products need to be revised. (See U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Regulation 25-36, The

TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program, for more on

determining the status of a doctrinal product.) Included in this

effort is support to Joint Forces Command and TRADOC for

the upcoming consolidation of JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for

Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil

Engineering Support. The good news is that with the

publication of FM 3-34, we can begin work on the key

implementing manuals:

 FM 3-34.210, Mine/Countermine Operations (currently FM

20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations). Changes in the

contemporary operating environment, equipment

technologies, and doctrine make a complete revision

necessary. We will use lessons learned from ongoing

operations—and include improvements to sapper training

involving explosive ordnance—to make this document

relevant in the field.

 FM 3-34.250, General Engineering (currently FM 5-104,

General Engineering). Last published in 1986, this FM

needs to reflect the advent of FFE, updates to the engineer

planning process and joint and Army doctrine, and lessons

learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation

Iraqi Freedom.

 FM 3-34.11, Countermobility (currently FM 90-7, Combined

Arms Obstacle Integration, and FM 5-102, (Countermobility). The consolidation and update of the old

countermobility manual into FM 3-34.11 is almost complete.

A final draft version is available on Army Knowledge Online

(AKO), and comments are welcome.

 FM 3-34.230, Geospatial Operations (currently FM 3-34.230,

Topographic Operations). The revision of this FM will

reflect changes in organization, equipment, and lessons

learned from an extremely successful topographic effort

during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

 FM 3-34.112, Survivability (now FM 5-103, Survivability).

This FM update will reflect almost two decades of

advancement in technology and improvements to tactics,

techniques, and procedures.

Publication of these manuals is critical to the Regiment,

because they serve as the key implementing manuals to execute

our battlespace functions of combat, general, and geospatial

engineering. They also provide the doctrinal base for our

operational and technical doctrinal products. Numerous other

efforts are occurring throughout the Regiment. The U.S. Army

Engineer School is partnering with many organizations that

are stakeholders to produce doctrine that is timely and relevant.

Examples include—

 FM 3-34.251 (FM 5-116), Engineer Operations, Echelons

Above Corps.

 FM 3-34.465 (TM 5-332), Blasting Operations in Pits and

Quarries.

 FM 3-34.483 (FM 5-422), Prime Power Operations.

 FM 3-34.486 (TM 5-349), Arctic Construction.

 FM 3-34.280 (FM 5-490), Engineer Diving Operations.

If you would like to become involved with assessing,

reviewing, or writing any engineer publication, please contact

the Engineer School Doctrine Development Division at

<doctrine.engineer@wood.army.mil>.

Future Doctrinal Changes

Look for doctrine management to transform in the future.

Current initiatives at TRADOC include object-based

publishing and doctrine taxonomy initiatives that will

revolutionize the way we write, produce, and access Army

doctrine. More importantly, we must begin thinking now about

how and when to codify Future Force concepts into our

doctrine. With an initial operating capability of 2008, we must

begin developing engineer doctrine for the Future Combat

System in 2006 in order to provide the doctrinal bridge between

the Current and Future Forces. In the meantime, our current

doctrinal efforts must recognize transformation and integrate

emerging concepts and technologies as they are developed.

Only then will we be able to meet the doctrinal needs of the

Future Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Koenig is the Chief of the Doctrine

Development Division at the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Moving?
54 Engineer October-December 2003

One of the most effective NCO

leaders I have ever known was

First Sergeant Edwin Leahy,

Bravo Company, 79th Engineer Battalion,

based in Karlsruhe, Germany, with whom

I was privileged to serve from June 1984

to November 1985.

“Top” Leahy ran our company with a

spirit, enthusiasm, and competence that

was unmatched in my experience.

Thanks in large part to his phenomenal

leadership, Bravo Company excelled at

just about everything. It seemed that all

we touched turned to gold. The soldiers,

NCOs, and officers were fired up with a

can-do attitude and sense of pride. Our

achievements in war-fighting readiness,

training, maintenance, partnership,

sports, and community support were

usually rated “best in the battalion.” We

took care of our people and developed

them as future leaders. We had fun and

enjoyed our time together, whether in the

mud, dust, or snow at Grafenwoehr; on

the ranges or troop construction

missions; in the field; with our allied

partnership units; or on the athletic fields.

Although Top and I were truly a “team,”

there was never any doubt in my mind—

or anyone else’s—that Top Leahy was

“The Man.”

Let me describe Top Leahy. First, he

was an absolutely powerful presence. He

exuded confidence, strength, and

charisma. He looked old and mean, with

a full head of black hair that he slicked

back, 1950s style. He had “LOVE”

tattooed on one set of knuckles, “HATE”

on the other. He grew up in a rough part

of New Hampshire and spoke with a thick

Northeastern accent. Except for his tour

on “The Trail” and some time in jail, he

spent all of his Army time down in the

trenches, leading engineer soldiers. He

was a hard man.

Top was respected, admired, loved,

and feared—all at the same time. He

loved the company and his soldiers,

and no one dared to cross him or mess

with his company. His ability to quickly

cut through the fog and confusion of

events, competing priorities, and

complexities never ceased to amaze me.

It seemed that a hundred things could

be going on, then several crises would

hit simultaneously, and Top would instantaneously know what to do, how

to do it, and in which priority. He was

brilliant. He would run his solution by

me for input and concurrence, then we

would proceed from there. Despite his

tough exterior, he always took time to

explain his logic and thought process.

In short, he was a wonderful teacher

and coach who was developing and

mentoring “his” company commander, just as he had mentored his

previous commander, then Captain

Bob Derrick.

Totally dedicated to the company, the

troops, and the mission, Top came to

work early and worked a full day. He was

always on top of everything in the

company and always knew what was

happening throughout the battalion. He

maintained total “situational awareness” 24/7.

Although we did not have official

family readiness groups (FRGs) in those

days, Top and his wife did this informally,

but most effectively. Mrs. Leahy was the

“Company Mom.” She pulled together

the NCO, enlisted, and officer wives (the

company was all-male) on a regular basis

to talk business and have fun. The wives

became a tight-knit group and took care

of their own. She was originally from

France, so they had many fun excursions

across the border for shopping,

restaurants, and sightseeing. When the

company deployed, or when tragedy

struck, this paid off big time. To this day,

my wife says that this informal, close

group of wives was the most effective

FRG she has ever seen, and the beauty

of it was that they all wanted to get

together because it was so much fun.

Top always loved to have fun. He

spoke French and German and was the

most enthusiastic participant in

partnership activities that I have ever

seen. We trained with, did exchanges

with, and simply had fun with our allies.

Top never saw a partnership event that

he didn’t like. And I knew that once we

went out the door, it was going to be a

late night. Wisely, he always brought a

designated driver. We built a tremendous

amount of good will and truly enhanced

our interoperability, which would have

paid off in combat if we had ever fought

the “big one” in Central Europe.

Moreover, he included junior NCOs and

soldiers in these events, which was a

huge morale builder and one of his ways

of growing leaders.

By today’s standards, Top’s physical

condition was not as good as it should

have been. Although not a big fan of PT,

he was strong and robust and had

unlimited energy. There is no doubt that

he drank too much and ate too much

delicious—but high-cholesterol—foods,

and the two packs of unfiltered Camels he

smoked every day did not help his wind.

When I tried to convince him to change to

By Colonel Gregg F. Martin

Leadership the “Leahy Way”
October-December 2003 Engineer 55

a healthier lifestyle, his response was, “Life

is short, I’ve already lived longer than I

should have, and I actually like this stuff...

So thanks, Cap’n, but I ain’t changin’.” In

terms of more running and aerobic fitness,

his answer was, “Sir, I’ve been in combat,

and although I did sprint some short

distances from time to time, I never ran a

long distance anywhere. And if I’m ever in

combat again and need to get somewhere,

I won’t run! If need be, I’ll hijack a truck, or

cut some poor commie bastard’s throat and

take his. But thanks for your concern,

Cap’n. I appreciate it.”

In terms of technical and tactical

competence, there was none better. He

expertly ran the company with seeming

ease. He knew and could execute every

mission flawlessly—from weapons to

demolition, to construction, to maintenance. In tense situations, I saw him

leap into the fray (even if it was mud or

wet concrete)—with spit-shined boots

and starched fatigues—and take charge

to make sure that the mission got

accomplished to standard and that no

one got hurt. He taught and coached

through his personal example. There was

nothing he asked his troops to do that

he had not already done or wouldn’t do

again. And they all knew it.

Top always kept mission accomplishment, concern for his people, and loyalty

up, down, and sideways in perfect

harmony. He intuitively knew how to do

this and was a wonderful coach and

advisor to his young commander and

lieutenants. Given the operational tempo,

the number of competing priorities, and

the rapid changes that demanded

flexibility and adaptability, I would

sometimes hit the frustration level and

want to go do battle with folks up at

battalion. Top was marvelous in calming

me down and channeling my energy into

more productive venues (and keeping

his cap’n “from steppin’ on it”). On the

other hand, when it was time to do battle

with higher headquarters, Top let me

know, and we often went up to headquarters as a team. And when we did, we

rarely lost.

We developed our quarterly training

briefs together and briefed as a team from

handwritten butcher charts. Top knew

exactly how to orchestrate these in such a

way that he charmed the battalion commander and command sergeant major and

got them to grant Bravo Company much

of what we requested. He was brilliant and

a true master of how to be totally loyal to

me, his soldiers, the battalion commander,

and peers. Simultaneously, he could get

the battalion commander to love him and

the company and give us the resources

we requested.

What is the relevance of this story?

Top Leahy epitomized the NCO Creed.

When I think of professional

competence—tactical, technical, and

leadership—I think of his calibrated and

seasoned eyeball, evaluating any

situation thrown at him and instantly

knowing exactly what to do and how best

to handle it. When I think about how to

balance mission accomplishment with

the welfare of my troops, I often think of

Top Leahy. When I think about knowing

my soldiers, keeping them informed, and

being fair and impartial, I think of him.

Top Leahy showed me how to earn the

respect and confidence of my superiors

as well as that of my soldiers. His life

was an example of loyalty to those with

whom he served: “seniors, peers, and

subordinates alike.” He always took the

initiative and never compromised his

integrity or moral courage. He was

always totally candid, while also being

diplomatic when necessary.

In short, Top Leahy lived and

modeled—every day—what it meant to

be a professional NCO in the U.S. Army.

He and his NCOs in Bravo Company gave

me and my officers maximum time to

accomplish our duties, because we did

not have to accomplish theirs. First

Sergeant Edwin Leahy showed me—

through his life—what it means to be an

NCO, “The Backbone of the Army.”

(Note: First Sergeant Edwin S. Leahy

[1944-2003] passed away recently in

Rolla, Missouri. He is survived by his

wife Sandy, four children, one sister, and

five grandchildren. His protégés from

Bravo Company, 79th Engineer Battalion,

include—among a large number of great

Americans—Colonel Bob Derrick, who

went on to command the 307th Engineer

Battalion, the 20th Engineer Brigade, and

now the U.S. Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Command; and Lieutenant Colonel

Clarence “Dave” Turner, who currently

commands the 14th Engineer Battalion in

Iraq. To this day, the three of us are still in

awe of First Sergeant Leahy.)

Colonel Martin commanded the

Bravo “Bulldogs,” 79th Engineer

Battalion, from June 1984 to November

1985, in Karlsruhe and Grafenwoehr,

Germany. He currently commands the

130th Engineer Brigade, of V (U.S.)

Corps and CJTF-7, in Iraq.

First Sergeant Leahy with author, left, and his other company commander

(Colonel Bob Derrick, who was the Bravo Company, 79th Engineer Battalion,

commander before Colonel Martin) on the right, dedicating the 79th Engineer

Battalion plaque at ENFORCE 2002.
56 Engineer October-December 2003

T.

he resounding crash of rocket-propelled grenades

(RPGs) and the staccato report of several automatic

weapons were the first indications that things had

just taken a turn for the worse. It didn’t take long to figure

out that this was going to be ugly. Along the length of the kill

zone, the scene was one of smoke, flame, and bodies lying

about—the unmistakable sight of death and destruction. A

quick glance revealed that we were pinned down, under

highly accurate enemy fire, and had taken numerous

casualties. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had launched

a thoroughly successful ambush against a U.S. unit in the

central highlands of Vietnam.

I

.

n early May 1970, Delta Company, 815th Engineer

Battalion, assigned to the 937th Engineer Group, 18th

Engineer Brigade, and its sister unit, the 102d Engineer

Company (Construction Support), moved from the area around

Dak To and Kontum, in northern South Vietnam’s II Corps, to

an isolated base camp adjacent to the inconsequential village

of Phu Heip, near the village of Di Linh, Lam Dong Province.

Di Linh is situated roughly equidistant between the two

provincial capitals of Bao Loc and Dalat, astride national

highway QL-20. Dalat is the capital of Tuyen Duc Province

and was the home of the Vietnamese National Military

Academy and summer home for the president of South Vietnam.

This idyllic town had been a tourist destination during the

French colonial period. Dalat had a decent, well-maintained

airstrip and served as a logistical support base for U.S. units

in the area. Supplies and mail were shipped there for

distribution. The main class of supply was Class I. For Classes

III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) and V (ammunition), units

conducted major resupply convoys to the sprawling logistical

support bases at Cam Ranh Bay or Long Binh. A rudimentary

post exchange (PX) and Army post office (APO) were located

at the airstrip. These were a major attraction for the troops.

The resupply convoys were becoming routine events. “Ad

hoc” describes the composition, organization, and command

and control of recent convoys. Troops volunteered for the

somewhat dangerous task of convoy security for a variety of

reasons: It offered a break from the routine, a chance to see

some new scenery, and a chance to get away from our small

base. The troops could shop at the PX and use the APO.

There had been little enemy activity in the weeks leading

up to 21 May, a direct result and benefit of the allied incursion

into Cambodia. Consequently, volunteering for security duty

seemed like a safe bet. The security force consisted of no

more than 15 personnel. The security detail would provide the

“shotgun,” or truck commander in current parlance, for the

vehicles and also constitute the reaction force traveling in

trucks at the front and rear of the convoy. Gun trucks were

Bad Day at Dalat

By Colonel Larry Saul

“Wild Thing,” Delta

Company’s gun truck,

was equipped with

two .50-caliber

machine guns, a 7.62-

millimeter machine

gun, a six-barreled

7.62-millimeter

“minigun,” and a radio.

Past In Review
October-December 2003 Engineer 57

either 2 1/2-ton or 5-ton cargo trucks with locally fabricated

armored compartments mounted in the cargo bed. On occasion,

the armored compartment was the hull of an M113 armored

personnel carrier (APC). The trucks were usually armed with

four machine guns—a mix of 7.62-millimeter M60s and .50-

caliber M2s. On occasion, a 7.62-millimeter “minigun” was

mounted. The minigun was a highly effective weapon.

Designed for helicopter gunships, this electrically powered,

six-barreled weapon could fire 6,000 rounds per minute. When

fired, it made a terrifying sound. The NVA feared it.

The gun truck served several purposes. Obviously, it was

a source of heavy firepower. It could fight off enemy attacks in

ambush kill zones, allowing the other vehicles to clear out of

the zone. The drivers, truck commanders, and gunners were

brave men. The tactics employed, and the terrific firepower

they possessed, made them very attractive targets for deadly

and accurate enemy RPGs and machine gun fire.

We used a set pattern: the lead vehicle—an M151 1/4-ton

vehicle, better known as a jeep—would be the convoy

commander’s, who was nicknamed the “Charlie Charlie.”

Following that would be the 2 1/2-ton cargo trucks, the famous

“deuce-and-a-halfs.” These included both mess and supply

section trucks as well as the awesome gun truck.

Once the convoy was lined up for departure, it was standard

operating procedure for the Charlie Charlie to conduct a

convoy briefing. Incorporated in this briefing were the route,

radio call signs, procedures for reaction to enemy contact,

and the chain of command. On 21 May, no briefings were

conducted, nor were rehearsals or precombat checks performed.

We had become very complacent. This gross oversight would

have serious implications later that day.

In recent weeks, our area of operations had been very quiet;

the convoys had not encountered enemy activity. Closer to

Dalat, we came across more and more local people. Small

hamlets dotted the countryside. Woodcutters and farmers

populated the villages, especially in the flatlands at the base

of the mountains just outside the city. These peasants had

one desire—to live their lives peacefully despite the war raging

around them. Consequently, we saw more civilian vehicle traffic

in this area. Drivers had to remain alert to trucks, pedestrians,

farmers herding water buffalo, and youngsters playing near

the road. Everyone remained alert and on the lookout for any

possibility. As a result of the heavy foot and vehicle traffic,

our convoy slowed down considerably and then came to an

abrupt halt. Troops dismounted from the trucks and milled

about haphazardly.

The Charlie Charlie drove back from the front of the convoy

with the news that a civilian truck had swerved into the path

of our lead 2 1/2-ton truck, resulting in a collision. We waited

casually by our vehicles, not even bothering to take up

defensive positions, thinking there was no real threat of an

attack. We were lulled into the false security of thinking that

we were too close to Dalat for enemy action. Moments after

the Charlie Charlie drove off to inform the remaining vehicles

in the convoy of the situation, an enormous explosion of

rockets, command-detonated mines, and heavy automatic

weapons fire erupted.

The Charlie Charlie’s jeep came screaming back to our

position. It was apparent from the look of sheer terror on his

face that things had just taken a horribly ugly turn for the

worse. The gunner of the jeep’s pedestal-mounted M60 machine

gun was crumpled in a bloody ball. Small arms fire had riddled

the side of the jeep, severely wounding the machine gunner

and destroying the radio. In short order, we had suffered a

major attack and had lost a number of troops and the use of

our radio.

While lying in the protection of a roadside ditch, we were

able to look the length of the kill zone. From our position, we

could see the friendly side of the road, and the convoy’s trucks

scattered about haphazardly. A few were on fire and smoking

from well-placed RPG rounds. Several soldiers were lying in

the road. From the looks of it, most of them were dead. A few

could be seen moving, but when they did, a fusillade of enemy

small arms fire would engulf them. Above the sounds of the

enemy gunfire could be heard the unmistakable reports of the

gun truck’s heavy .50-caliber machine guns. If anything could

The high-pitched sound of the minigun’s 6,000 rounds

per minute struck fear into the hearts of the NVA.

The UH-1 “Huey” served as a workhorse in Vietnam.

At the scene of an ambush, casualties are loaded for

evacuation to a field hospital.
58 Engineer October-December 2003

break the enemy attack, it would be the overwhelming

firepower of the gun truck. At least twice, the truck drove into

and out of the kill zone. Our company gun truck, nicknamed

“Wild Thing,” was running back and forth, up and down the

road. One soldier dismounted from the gun truck, retrieving

the wounded and placing them in the relative safety of the

armored box of the truck. With complete disregard for his own

life, this young soldier pulled several wounded men to safety.

Sadly, we had no medics to treat the wounded. This was an

inexcusable omission.

The Charlie Charlie determined things were out of control

and that we could not survive for long in our precarious

position. He ordered us to retrieve the wounded closest to us,

then mount up into the remaining vehicles and move out. We

had his battered jeep and our overloaded 3/4-ton truck, plus a

number of the 2 1/2-ton trucks and Wild Thing. We drove

helter-skelter for Dalat.

 We raced through the streets of Dalat, knowing we needed

to get our wounded to the U.S. aid station quickly. Some of

them were desperate for immediate attention. The realization

that we needed to get back to the ambush site with additional

ammunition, manpower, and heavier firepower was undeniable.

We knew full well we had friends trapped in the kill zone.

While the medics tended to the wounded, we made final

preparations for the trip back to the kill zone. We were

reinforced with a platoon (-) of military police (MP) equipped

with V-100 armored cars and a gun truck. The MP platoon

leader took command and developed a plan.

The drive back down the mountain to the ambush site was

short. We used the time to double- and triple-check our

weapons, check ammunition, and make final

preparations. The tasks we needed to accomplish,

and the attention to detail required, helped keep the

anticipation and fear in check. There was no traffic

on the road from either direction.

We approached the kill zone, but when we were

within one or two kilometers of the ambush site, we

still could not hear any gunfire. As we drove around

the curve leading to the site, we saw that the civilian

truck that had collided with our 2 1/2-ton truck was

gone. The MP V-100 armored cars moved quickly

up to the near edge of the kill zone, near the spot

where we had initially deployed from the 3/4-ton

truck when the ambush started. The gun truck took

up a firing position with a field of fire down the

length of the kill zone.

The scene ahead was one of carnage. Lifeless

bodies could be seen lying in the road. Smoke and

the overwhelming smell of cordite hung over the

position like a pall. It was hell. The armored cars

and the gun truck were prepared to provide the dismounting troops with overwatching and suppressive fire.

It was obvious that the enemy was gone. Once

again, his hit-and-run tactics had worked very well. We had to

treat casualties and account for the soldiers we knew had

been trapped in the kill zone. We had several men wounded,

some grievously. Initial casualty reports stated that we had

two confirmed dead. Two great young Americans had died

while serving their nation. One of the fallen was a popular

young sergeant. Later, word spread of his heroic act of pulling

his wounded comrades into the gun truck.

Within a few minutes we accounted for all but one of our

troops, those killed or wounded. There was no sign of the

missing soldier anywhere. As is typical in any action, personnel

accountability is critical. We had to determine the status of

every member of the convoy force. As of that moment,

everyone focused on finding the missing soldier or his remains.

We were all horrified to think of what might have happened to

him. Typically, the Vietcong and NVA killed junior enlisted

men outright. No one wanted to ponder his fate. It was too

horrible to consider.

This had been a very successful day for the NVA. The

ambush had accomplished exactly what it wanted. For a very

short time, the NVA enjoyed a brief tactical victory, albeit on a

very small scale. The goal was to kill Americans, and it

succeeded. A few more American soldiers would be going home

in body bags.

Resupply convoys were an essential operation. There was

no alternative. Units had to conduct routine convoys to Dalat,

Long Binh, and Cam Ranh Bay. This was the only means of

getting large and outsized equipment and bulk supplies such

as fuel and ammunition. Convoys were, and remain, combat

operations and must be treated as such. Even today, units

Crewmen of “Wild Thing” frequently volunteered for dangerous

duty as machine gunners.
ambush. We could have minimized the effects of this

catastrophe with a proper rehearsal.

 A convoy is a combat operation. It requires detailed

planning, from predeparture to conclusion. Contingencies

must be anticipated and plans developed to meet any

possible enemy action.

 Failure to plan means that you are planning to fail. Should

you fail to consider the enemy, you deserve what you get.

The only happy ending of the 21 May 1970 fight came in

February 1973, when his NVA captors released the missing

soldier. His name was never identified on any prisoner of war

list, and he had long been given up for dead. His survival

surprised and elated everyone. The great young men of the

102d Engineer Company and Delta Company, 815th Engineer

Battalion, served their country with pride and distinction.

The vast majority did their job, served their tours, and returned

to civilian life. Today, they are middle-aged and have gotten

on with their lives.

Colonel Saul is director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously commanded the 10th

Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Artillery, Fort Drum, New York.

He was a sergeant in 1970 when he was assigned to Delta Company,

815th Engineer Battalion, 18th Engineer Brigade. He was

commissioned in the Field Artillery Corps through Officer Candidate

School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has served two assignments

with the British Army, as the exchange instructor at the Royal School

of Artillery, and as the U.S. Army liaison officer to the British Army

Staff College.

October-December 2003 Engineer 59

must plan, resource, rehearse, and conduct convoys, since

these are critical combat operations.

What lessons were learned from the events of 21 May 1970?

What conclusions could be reached? They were simple, and

all were leadership-related.

 German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel said more than a

half century ago that “in battle, death sanctions all faults.”

On 21 May, we had a lot of faults:

– No commissioned officer was detailed to lead the convoy.

– No clear chain of command was delineated.

– No operations order, rehearsal, or concept briefing was

prepared or conducted.

– No redundant communications systems were set up

within the convoy.

– No convoy briefing for the drivers, truck commanders,

or security force was conducted.

– No proper cross-leveling of noncommissioned officers

among the trucks was executed.

– No medic accompanied the convoy.

– No reaction plan in the event of enemy contact was

planned or executed.

– Neither precombat checks nor serviceability inspections

were conducted.

 Another Rommel dictum is that “the more sweat on the

training ground, the less on the battleground.” We failed

to conduct rehearsals or establish drills in the event of an

The Engineer Writer’s Guide

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general interest to engineers. Articles may share good ideas and

lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active

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Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate

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Send submissions by e-mail to <pbd@wood.army.mil> or send a

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60 Engineer October-December 2003

The stability operations and

support operations environment

is a unique one that challenges

engineer line companies and their

supporting elements. Over the last

decade, the American military has had

increased involvement in nationbuilding and peacekeeping efforts,

specifically in Bosnia and Kosovo. In

Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus is on

stability operations because of the

continuing threats to soldiers who guard

the perimeter, patrol outside the gates,

and conduct sentry duties. The support

soldiers most commonly found in a

headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) face much different

challenges. HHC commanders in

stability operations and support operations environments have much

greater flexibility than their maneuver or

combat brethren when it comes to

training, operations, and scheduling,

and they should make the most of that

opportunity. At issue are the female

soldiers not found in line companies, the

engineer reconnaissance team (ERT)

normally assigned to the intelligence

section, partnership possibilities with

allied units, and mission-essential task

list training conducted while deployed.

An HHC commander’s flexibility

extends beyond normal 9-to-5 working

hours and varies by section and military

occupational specialty (MOS). For

cultural reasons, female soldiers will be

in much higher demand. They will be

tasked to conduct personal searches of

women in the local civilian populace,

both at entrances to base camps and

during cordon-and-search operations

outside the wire. Ironically, these female

soldiers, who are not allowed in combat

arms branches, will likely be exposed to

greater risks and see more of the host

nation than their male counterparts with

whom they share an MOS. In a combat

engineer battalion, the HHC is the only

company with women and consequently

will bear the entire burden of these

taskings. The lesson learned is that

when drawing up the deployment roster,

it is absolutely necessary to take as many

females as possible—especially from the

lower enlisted ranks—since their unique

qualifications will be in high demand.

The mission rehearsal exercise, if

conducted, must prepare the female

soldiers for these tasks and the company

must be prepared to backfill their normal

duties through the cross-training of

comparable male soldiers.

For the remaining male soldiers, the

working environment will be almost like

that in garrison. The battalion and

company operations components will

run continuous operations in shifts, but

most other sections—such as maintenance, communications, and personnel

—will work a more-or-less regular duty

day unless their particular expertise is

required outside the wire. The line

companies work 24-hour operations with

platoons or squads on 6-, 8-, or 12-hour

shifts. While these line companies can

be entirely consumed by shift work and

patrols, an HHC can conduct Sergeant’s

Time Training and plan section-level, and

even limited company-level, training.

This additional training is productive for

several reasons: First, the company

PeacekeePing from an HHc PersPective

By Captain Ralan Hill and Captain Kevin Stoll
October-December 2003 Engineer 61

improves proficiency in deficient

mission-essential tasks. Second, the

extra downtime normally associated with

peacekeeping deployments is put to a

productive end.

Mandatory schooling requirements

also fit into the training scheme. While it

may not be the case in Afghanistan or

Iraq, in Kosovo it was much easier to

find slots for required schools such as

the Safety Officer Course, HAZ-11 and

HAZ-12 Hazardous Cargo Certification,

Logistics and Maintenance Supervisor

Courses, and Small Arms Maintenance

School. Being in a garrison-style

environment while the line companies

run 24-hour operations, HHCs derive a

training benefit from being deployed

that line companies do not experience.

When deploying to such an environment, going in with a concrete and

comprehensive training plan should

allow the company to redeploy with a

trained (T) rating in most missionessential tasks.

The same reasoning applies to

physical training (PT), which is easy to

conduct six days a week as a company

and individually by most soldiers in their

off time. They do so to remain in shape

and also because it helps alleviate

boredom. Soldiers may spend too much

time lifting weights in the gym and not

enough time running or doing other

cardiovascular activity, especially when

the weather is cold and wet. But with

appropriate supervision and planning,

most soldiers’ scores will increase an

average of 20 or 30 points. This will match

the fitness goals that should be set upon

arrival in the country. Working these

individual goals into a broader company

goal will help keep soldiers focused and

the company in shape. With the additional time, there is no reason not to

schedule weight-training instruction,

body fat composition assessment,

nutrition counseling, and dietary supplement classes into the PT program.

Incorporating these topics will ensure

that soldiers learn from their chain of command (rather than from reading

magazines), which should help prevent

injuries and illnesses.

Some combat engineer battalions

have an ERT composed of three to five

soldiers, a noncommissioned officer, and

some basic equipment. (See Engineer

July 2002, page 47.) This element

provides an even more critical and

functional role in a stability operations

and support operations environment.

The teams conduct all the standard

reconnaissance functions, especially

route and bridge reconnaissance, which

are often a critical aspect of the mission.

Classifying and reclassifying bridges in

the area will very likely become their

primary mission. All the new infrastructure development that accompanies

American military involvement in nation

building makes this task ever-present.

Invariably, each rotation wants to

reconfirm the work of its predecessors

and identify recently constructed or

upgraded structures. The ERT represents

the most effective and efficient tool for

accomplishing this. Because the

frequency of their trips allows them to

recognize changes when they occur, ERT

soldiers provide critical intelligence on

the surrounding atmosphere and the

feelings of the local inhabitants.

Soldiers in the ERT should become

experts with the Javelin antitank missile,

the Precision Lightweight Global

Positioning System Receiver (PLGR), the

Single-Channel Ground-to-Air Radio

System (SINCGARS), and all components of the engineer reconnaissance

kit. Their training should include not only

reconnaissance missions (bridge, road,

airfield, and obstacle) but also infantry

drills such as call-for-fire techniques and

land navigation. The explosive ordnance

disposal (EOD) company that is often

attached to engineers during stability

operations and support operations

rotations offers an ideal opportunity to

train the ERT. Sending the ERT as a

second security force with responding

EOD teams is a unique opportunity that

benefits all involved and builds the

engineer task force into a collective team.

These soldiers will probably go outside

the wire more often than any other team

or slice element in the battalion.

This is in sharp contrast to most of

the other soldiers in an HHC, who may

be outside the wire only twice: for arrival

and departure. The supporting elements

of an engineer battalion will find

themselves isolated on the base camp,

and this can be a significant problem if

not properly monitored. However, living

and working in a host nation within a

multinational task force can present

myriad solutions to the problem. These

solutions surface primarily in local

humanitarian work and joint training with

Soldiers receive salutes from children at an elementary school in Kosovo.
62 Engineer October-December 2003

other similarly deployed nations. Local

humanitarian work comes in all levels of

commitment and involvement that range

from one-day trips to a locally sponsored

school to projects that require months

of cooperative planning with local professional organizations. Even in the rare

instance when these missions do not

produce immediate and tangible results,

they are still “feel-good” missions that

are a boost to soldiers’ morale and

welfare.

Even with very little preparation, it is

great to get off post, and doing so helps

put a face on the American presence.

Such a face is an immeasurable benefit

to the overall message the military tries

to send. In the fall of 2002, one of the

most successful humanitarian work

projects was the construction of a fence

around an elementary school in Kosovo.

After coordinating the project through

the appropriate Kosovo force and local

authorities, 16 soldiers, local relief

workers, and students constructed a 100-

meter-long, 1-meter-high chain-link fence

around the school grounds. Actual

construction time, in sporadic rain, was

several hours, and the project culminated

in good will, motivated soldiers, and a

safer playground.

Partnership training with deployed

soldiers from other allied nations—such

as Britain, Russia, Greece, or Norway—

is another unique opportunity to take

advantage of during stability operations

and support operations. Unlike the

humanitarian efforts that lack military

training objectives, allied partnerships

are useful as joint-operations planning

and interoperability training events. We

cross-trained with the Royal British

Engineers based in Pristina and

conducted various training events with

a Russian sister unit from within the

American-led multinational brigade.

These events facilitated interaction

between engineers of different nations

and enforced the need for continued

information and technology sharing.

In addition to the inherent benefits of

additional engineer training, these

events provide a valuable morale, welfare, and recreational benefit. Sharing

stories, customs, and soldiering skills

allows personnel from different nations

to interact and derive the social benefits of a multinational event. Keeping

these training events informal and

allowing plenty of time for the soldiers

to interact with one another paid huge

dividends.

With all these possibilities, the HHC

role in a stability operations and support

operations environment is ripe with

uncommon opportunities for training and

operations. The stresses are different

from those in a garrison environment but

still parallel that environment far more

closely than in the line companies. By

avoiding the line company missiondictated shift schedule, it is possible to

find exciting and innovative means of

training soldiers, developing leaders,

and evading boredom—all while accomplishing the mission at hand.

Captain Hill is the executive officer

of Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 9th Engineer Battalion,

Schweinfurt, Germany. Previous

assignments include platoon leader and

company executive officer, 44th

Engineer Battalion, and platoon leader

and company executive officer, 9th

Engineer Battalion. He completed

Kosovo Force Rotation 4A from April

to November 2002.

Captain Stoll is the commander of

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 9th Engineer Battalion.

Previous assignments include platoon

leader, 2d Engineer Battalion; company

executive officer, 864th Engineer

Battalion (Combat) (Heavy); and

battalion maintenance officer, 9th

Engineer Battalion. He completed

Kosovo Force Rotation 4A from April

to November 2002.

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained, and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills.

 I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.

I am an expert, and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

Soldier’s Creed
October-December 2003 Engineer 63

Joint Readiness Training Center

(JRTC)

By Sergeant First Class Anthony S. Sparks

and Captain Jason D. Williams

“NCOs, the backbone of the Army, train, lead, and take

care of enlisted soldiers. They receive their authority from

their oaths of office, law, rank structure, traditions, and regulations. This authority allows them to direct soldiers, take

actions required to accomplish the mission, and enforce good

order and discipline. NCOs represent officer leaders. They

ensure their subordinates, along with their personal equipment, are prepared to function as effective unit and team

members. While commissioned officers command, establish

policy, and manage resources, NCOs conduct the Army’s daily

business.”

Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership

A prevalent trend at JRTC among rotational engineer units

is the platoon sergeant (PSG) not understanding his role and

exercising his authority to best influence the mission and ensure its accomplishment. The bottom line is that the PSG is

not getting into the fight and making a difference. In a light

environment, the engineer platoon habitually associates with

an infantry task force. Often, the three sapper squads are taskorganized in support of company maneuver teams and operate independently from the platoon headquarters element.

With the expectation of having no subordinates upon task

organization, the sapper PSG is faced with a constant dilemma—

knowing his organizational role and knowing where his leadership is needed most in the tactical environment. The following paragraphs address this concern and include observations and feedback from the engineer observer-controllers

(O-Cs) at JRTC.

Platoon Sergeant

The PSG is the senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) at

the platoon level. He is the principal advisor and mentor to the

platoon leader (PL). The PSG generally has 12 to 18 years of

Sapper Platoon Sergeant: Operating in a

Lightfighter’s Tactical Environment

military experience and is rightfully expected to bring that experience and mentorship to bear and influence quick, accurate

decisions that are in the best interest of the mission and the

soldier. The connection between the chain of command and

the NCO support channel is the senior NCO. Officers issue

orders through the chain of command, but the senior NCO

must know and understand the orders to issue effective implementing instructions through the NCO support channel. The

role of the PSG was best defined in TC 22-6 (replaced by FM

7-22.7 The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide): “When the

platoon leader is present, the platoon sergeant is the primary

assistant and advisor, with the responsibility of training and

caring for soldiers. In the absence of the platoon leader, the

platoon sergeant takes charge of the platoon.” This serves as

a guideline for the two basic combat functions of the sapper

PSG: PL/assistant platoon leader (APL) and assistant task force

engineer.

Platoon Leader/Assistant Platoon Leader

As the PL executes his duties as task force engineer participating in the maneuver task force military decision-making

process (MDMP), the PSG must take a proactive approach in

conducting parallel mission planning and preparation with his

subordinate squad leaders. This involves the active supervision and execution of platoon troop leading procedures (TLPs).

With the PL’s intent and the receipt of developing missioncritical information, the PSG can—

 Issue warning orders (WARNORDS) (as detailed as

possible).

 Make a tentative plan; assign critical responsibilities to

facilitate mission preparation, precombat checks (PCCs),

and rehearsals.

 Initiate necessary movement; coordinate task organization

changes or movement to a new patrol base or assembly

area.

 Conduct reconnaissance (map, route, objective).

 Complete the plan; implement changes based on the results of the reconnaissance and the approved scheme of

engineer operations from the MDMP.

 Issue the operation order (OPORD), if tasked by the PL.

 Supervise and assess; conduct leader precombat inspections (PCIs) and monitor rehearsals at the squad, platoon,

and combined arms levels.

Under the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time

available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), the maneuver commander’s guidance, and/or the PL’s instructions, the

PSG must be assigned a distinct role for the execution phase

of the operation. This may include serving as a PL/APL in a

platoon-level operation, maneuvering with an engineer main

effort squad, or battletracking in the task force tactical operations center (TOC) as the assistant task force engineer. The

goal is to find the combination and balance of engineer
64 Engineer October-December 2003

leadership that best supports the task force and allows the

engineer platoon to successfully accomplish the mission.

Assistant Task Force Engineer

The sapper PSG inherently must share the responsibility of

manning the task force engineer cell (TFEC). In the absence of

the PL, the PSG serves as the engineer Battlefield Operating

System (BOS) representative on the task force battle staff. His

duties include battletracking on current operations; maintaining communications and reporting with higher and subordinate headquarters; and managing critical engineer information—such as enemy and friendly minefields, route status

within the area of responsibility, and combat power. The PSG

must maintain an excellent situational awareness and possess

a strong knowledge of engineer systems, their capabilities

and doctrinal employment, and tactics. Ultimately, he must be

confident in his ability to execute his role as an engineer BOS

advisor to senior maneuver leadership.

Observer-Controller Observations

 The majority of engineer PSGs rotating through the JRTC

are “fast-tracking” staff sergeants (with 8 to 12 years of

military experience) who excelled as squad leaders in a tactical environment but are struggling to fulfill the responsibilities of a competent PSG. They have little to no experience in a TOC, do not possess the engineer doctrinal knowledge and understanding of task force-level operations, and

lack the confidence and credibility with the maneuver community to be a senior-level advisor.

 PSGs revert back to the mentality of just managing the

“beans and bullets” aspect of operations. This hinders the

PL’s ability to effectively manage the platoon’s timeline.

The PSG has little involvement in platoon TLPs; they are

left to the PL to execute upon completion of the task force

MDMP or pushed down to the squad leaders for decentralized execution.

 A “TOC avoidance” syndrome causes PSGs to push that

entire responsibility on the PL. This has been attributed to

a number of factors: there is no battle staff NCO course

qualification; the TOC is an unfamiliar environment that

might show the senior NCO’s “true” lack of experience

in the presence of his maneuver brethren; the PSG

simply wants to stay forward with the soldiers and where

the “real” fight is.

 The PSG rarely conducts battlefield circulation. This impacts his ability to gain the “pulse” of the platoon and

implement action when needs are not being addressed.

Soldier welfare and logistic concerns are often overlooked

when squads are task-organized away from the platoon

headquarters in various command/support relationships.

 The PSG often has a poor relationship with the PL. The

PSG shows little patience in coordinating with and

mentoring the junior lieutenant who has an incredible dual

responsibility as PL and task force engineer (often assigned

with less than 18 months of military service). This severely

strains the platoon’s ability to plan, prepare, and execute,

and it ultimately impacts the unit’s ability to support the

task force and accomplish the mission.

Summary

The PSG is the key assistant and advisor to the PL—both

as a task force engineer in the TOC and forward with the platoon on the battlefield. In the absence of the PL, the PSG

commands the platoon and acts as the senior engineer advisor to the task force. He is the driving force behind the platoon’s

prebattle preparation, and he must be ready to lead from the

front when called upon. The PL and PSG must work together

effectively to find a balance of leadership and position themselves accordingly to fight and win on the battlefield.

The following checklist of responsibilities serves as a guide

for the sapper PSG when determining where he is needed most

to influence operations and impact mission accomplishment:

 Assist and coordinate with the PL. The PSG should also

be prepared to assume the PL’s duties, as required.

 Execute TLPs and briefing orders in the absence of the PL.

 Become involved early in the planning process to provide

quality control in the execution of engineer missions and

logistical operations.

 Execute duties as the assistant task force engineer has

directed.

 Check on the welfare of the soldier as a second set of eyes

for the PL.

 Enforce standards and the tactical standard operating

procedure.

 Supervise platoon logistics, maintenance, communica-

` tions, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations.

 Lead, supervise, inspect, observe, and assess matters that

the PL designates.

Sergeant First Class Sparks is a light engineer platoon

senior NCO observer-controller. Previous assignments include PSG and squad leader, Charlie Company, 307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne); operations sergeant, 554th Engineer Battalion; and squad leader, 562d Engineer Company,

172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) and Alpha Company, 20th

Engineer Battalion (Corps) (Wheeled).

Captain Williams is a light engineer platoon senior

observer-controller. Previous assignments include commander, Bravo Company, 65th Engineer Battalion (Light);

brigade engineer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; adjutant, executive officer, and platoon leader, 588th Engineer

Battalion (Mechanized), 4th Infantry Division.
October-December 2003 Engineer 65

Live-fire operations at NTC are an excellent training opportunity for engineers. NTC is the only training environment in

the continental United States where units may regularly fire

the M58 high-explosive mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC).

Often, reverse planning based on the overwatching enemy

drives the unit to conduct a brigade-level breaching operation. This requires two lanes through a complex obstacle in

order to assault a task force onto the objective. Units often

choose to weight the brigade’s breach force with at least two

MICLICs to quickly create two lanes using explosive reduction techniques. This raises the question, “Should we reduce

at two points of breach simultaneously?” The MICLIC surface danger zone (SDZ), as well as the unit’s ability to conduct

rehearsals, should drive this decision. The answer to the question can be “yes.” However, units should consider the following points when planning and preparing for simultaneous explosive reductions:

MICLIC SDZ

The NTC-approved MICLIC SDZ (shown below) is based

on Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 385-63, Range

Safety, with each distance in the fragmentation zone rounded

up to the nearest 100 meters. The SDZ is divided into Area F;

the 30-meter radius around the MICLIC; and the fragmentation

zone of 500 meters forward, 200 meters to the rear, and 800 meters

to each side of the MICLIC. DA Pam 385-63 states who can be in

Area F and the fragmentation zone when the MICLIC is fired:

 Only the MICLIC, armored towing vehicle, and M1 tank

with mine-clearing blade or roller (if the unit chooses to fire

over a tank) may remain in Area F.

 Elements of the breach force and support force may be

inside the fragmentation zone but must be behind the

MICLIC firing line outside of Area F and must be “buttoned up.”

Points of Breach

With these mandatory control measures, units that conduct simultaneous explosive reductions must ensure that

points of breach are at least 800 meters apart. The reasons for

this are twofold:

 One enemy artillery-delivered scatterable minefield (200 by

800 meters) can close two lanes if they are not at least 800

meters apart.

 In the event of a misfire on one lane, the unit can continue

to create the second lane by dismounting engineers to

mark the lane and sending the assault force through to the

farside objective. In every type of misfire procedure for a

rocket or charge, the unit must wait 30 minutes before approaching the launcher or charge, if it has been deployed.

This means that within the SDZ, all vehicles must maintain

a buttoned-up status, and no vehicles can move forward

of the MICLIC firing line.

Summary

None of these procedures are specific to NTC and the NTC

exercise operating procedures. Leaders should consider them

during all phases of the operation whether it is a training or

combat operation. To adequately synchronize any combined

arms breaching operation, units must conduct full-force or, at

the very least, reduced-force rehearsals where clearance of

the SDZ and reporting procedures are adequately practiced.

This is vital to successfully reducing two lanes through an

enemy obstacle and maintaining the momentum of the brigade’s

attack.

The Sidewinder MICLIC Guide is available at <http://

www.irwin.army.mil/sidewinder/MICLIC%20WEB%20PAGE/

index.htm>. To obtain a copy of this guide in a compact disc

format, e-mail <sw04t@irwin.army.mil> and provide a valid

unit address.

POC is Captain Kirk Gibbs (SW03B), (760) 380-5151 or DSN

470-5151, or e-mail <sw03b@irwin.army.mil>.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Integration

By Captain Mark R. Faria

The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) field is quickly

becoming a more visible and effective force multiplier on the

battlefield. The role of EOD units is changing because doctrine now allows for a company or company (-) to support a

brigade combat team (BCT) (based on unexploded ordnance

[UXO] threat and saturation) instead of operating at echelons

above corps. Combat commanders are seeing the importance

of integrating EOD units and their capabilities into mission

planning. NTC is keeping pace with these changes, and current scenarios force EOD integration into the engineer battalion and BCT operations.

National Training Center

(NTC)

Simultaneous Explosive Reductions

By Captain Kirk Gibbs

Fragmentation Zone Area F

800 M

1600 M

700 M

500 M 200 M

30o 30o

30 M
66 Engineer October-December 2003

The EOD company commander serves as the theater EOD

staff officer, as well as a company commander, in smaller operations without an EOD battalion element in theater. Current

BCT-sized operations—such as in Bosnia and Kosovo and at

NTC—have an EOD company or company (-) attached to the

engineer battalion. This task organization must not impede

the EOD commander’s ability to discuss explosive-related issues with the BCT commander. It is vital that both the engineers and the BCT fully understand EOD capabilities. Two

critical integration issues have emerged: the location of the

EOD company (-) command post and EOD integration into the

military decision-making process (MDMP).

EOD Command Post Location

EOD doctrine does not direct that the EOD command post

be colocated with the brigade tactical operations center (TOC),

but there are many benefits to doing this. Trends at NTC show

that when the EOD command post sets up in the engineer/

brigade TOC, it can provide input into the risk management

process, incorporate EOD capabilities into the BCT fight, participate in the MDMP, integrate with all supporting elements

(such as civil affairs and military police), and battletrack to

determine the extent of UXO contamination on the battlefield.

Trends also show that EOD units operating out of the brigade

support area (BSA) seldom receive a task and purpose in support of the BCT fight. These units fall into a reactive mode

where they respond to UXO that are called in but remain reactive instead of proactive in incorporating EOD capabilities.

MDMP Integration

The EOD commander has two courses of action (COA) to

integrate into the MDMP:

 COA 1. The EOD commander briefs mission analysis and

provides visibility of UXO threat to the BCT as well as

how he can mitigate these risks. The benefit to this is that

no one understands EOD capabilities and limitations better than the commander. He can immediately request additional support such as security or haul assets if required.

The problem with this COA is that it takes the commander

away from his unit for long periods of time. EOD companies don’t have an executive officer to help run the unit or

participate in the MDMP.

 COA 2. The engineer battalion S3 or assistant brigade engineer (ABE) receives input from the EOD commander before each MDMP cycle and ensures that the input is brought

up to BCT level. The benefit to this COA is the experience

of the field grade officer who fully understands the MDMP

and the big picture of the BCT mission. Both he and the

ABE also have a habitual association with the BCT and

thus a better working relationship with the staff. This COA

also frees up a considerable amount of time for the EOD

commander to focus on his company. The limitations of

this COA are that the S3 is extremely busy, and his time in

the MDMP is somewhat limited. The ABE must not become so overwhelmed in engineer specifics that he forgets

about the EOD company. Both staff members must have a

full understanding of EOD capabilities to ensure a realistic

task and purpose for the EOD company.

Summary

The BCT and engineer battalion must consider EOD capabilities in support of their mission. EOD input into the MDMP

ensures the anticipatory use of assets rather than the reactive

use. This process is made possible by colocating the EOD

command post at the engineer and BCT TOC and allows the

EOD commander to accomplish his role as the theater EOD

staff officer.

For additional information on EOD operations at NTC, visit

the Sidewinder Web site at <http://www.irwin.army.mil/

sidewinder/index.htm>.

POC is Captain Mark R. Faria (SW18), (760) 380-5600 or

DSN 470-5600, or e-mail <sidewinder18@irwin.army.mil>.

Obstacle and Class IV/V Supply Point Support

Teams

By Major Michael W. Rose

Typically, BCTs have 24 to 36 hours to prepare a defense at

NTC. Given the time it takes to begin engagement area development, even relying primarily on scatterable mine systems

and special-purpose munitions versus conventional row mining, time is clearly the limiting factor for combat engineers and

the BCT. While the BCT can use brigade-directed obstacles in

conjunction with a directed scheme of maneuver to jump-start

the effort and train to rapidly conduct engagement area development, the best way to increase obstacle productivity is to

augment the engineers.

Support Teams

The goal of augmentation is to keep as many engineers as

possible executing tasks that require the most expertise instead of tasks that any soldier can execute. Units can achieve

this goal by providing support at the Class IV/V supply points

and emplacing minefield perimeter fence or other constructed

obstacles. While many units specifically task units to provide

this support in an order, adding the requirement and any additional coordinating instructions to the maneuver unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP) will greatly contribute to the

likelihood of getting support with the right leadership and

equipment. Figures 1 and 2 on page 67 show a sample SOP for

both obstacle and Class IV/V supply point support teams.

These SOP cards were developed by the 8th Engineer
Battalion, which habitually provides direct support to 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

Summary

Establishing support to defensive preparation in the SOP

and training to efficiently use properly led and resourced teams

to increase obstacle productivity is one procedure units can

adopt to help defeat the greatest enemy on the battlefield—

time.

October-December 2003 Engineer 67

“The loss of time is irreparable in war.”

—Napoleon

POC is Major Michael W. Rose (SW03), (760) 380-7005 or

DSN 470-7005, or e-mail <sidewinder03@irwin.army.mil>.

CARD 445 – Class IV/V Support Team

1. PURPOSE: The Class IV/V support team is a squad-sized

organization of soldiers who, on order, establish the task force (TF)

Class IV/V point and reorganize the combat configured loads (CCLs)

(throughput from corps level) into unit/obstacle-specific packages

and/or reconfigure CCLs for back haul or follow-on missions.

2. COMPOSITION: Each ground maneuver TF will resource one

Class IV/V support team consisting of the following:

 1 NCO (for command and control [C2]) and 7 soldiers

 Sleep gear and wet and cold weather gear

 3 five-gallon water cans

 Minimum of 1 meal, ready to eat (MRE) per soldier

 Transportation and commo for the team

 1 Engineer NCO who will provide a Class IV/V equipment package consisting of—

√ 10 pair of leather work gloves

√ 3 pair of metal strapping cutters

√ 2 pair of banding crimpers

√ 2 pair of banding rachet machines

√ 100 feet of 1/2-inch banding material

√ 50 each 1/2-inch banding clips

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

CARD 447 – Obstacle Support Team

1. PURPOSE: An obstacle support team (OST) is a platoon-sized

organization of soldiers trained in basic obstacle construction who,

on order, move forward to a designated task force (TF) engagement area to assist and augment combat engineer soldiers constructing the TF defensive plan. OSTs will construct single-strand

and triple-standard concertina fences, and dig holes for mines under the direction of an engineer NCO. These fratricide fences will

support the use of both conventional and scatterable munitions.

2. COMPOSITION: Each ground maneuver TF in 3d Brigade Combat

Team will resource one OST. Each OST consists of the following:

 30 soldiers (a minimum of 3 NCOs and a designated NCOIC)

 1 OST equipment package consisting of—

√ 5 picket pounders

√ 50 pair of leather work gloves

√ 5 long-handled shovels

√ 8 long-handled picks

 1 water trailer or 10 five-gallon water cans

 Individual weapons, night-vision devices, sleep gear, wet and

cold weather gear, and 1 meal, ready to eat (MRE) per soldier

 2 light medium tactical vehicles (LMTVs) (for transportation)

 1 C2 vehicle with operator

 2 company grade officer heavy expanded-mobility tactical

trucks (HEMTTs) with operators

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

BDE TF EN CO

 Coordinate linkup

with supported

TF.

 Verify or adjust

the linkup point

and time as

required.

 Verify that the

Class IV/V

support team is

properly manned

and equipped.

 Efficiently employ

the Class IV/V

support team and

report release to

the TF tactical

operations center.

 Provide a

standard

Class IV/V

support team

(see composition above)

when

specified in

the brigade

OPORD/

FRAGO.

 Execute linkup

of the Class

IV/V support

team as

specified in

the order.

 Identify all Class

IV/V support team

coordinating

instructions in a

published operational order

(OPORD)/fragmentary order(FRAGO)

to TFs.

 Include the following

in the coordinating

instructions:

- Adjustments to

composition

- Linkup point and

time

- Duration of

requirement

BDE TF EN CO

 Coordinate linkup

with supported

TF.

 Verify or adjust

the designated

linkup point and

time as required.

 Verify that the

OST is properly

manned and

equipped.

 Employ the OST

based on TF

priorities.

 Report release of

the OST to the TF

tactical operations

center.

 Provide a

standard OST

(see composition above)

when specified

in the brigade

OPORD/FRAGO.

 Execute linkup

of OSTsupport

team as

specified in the

order.

 Identify all OST

coordinating

instructions

in a published

OPORD/FRAGO

to TFs.

 Include the

following in the

coordinating

instructions:

- Adjustments to

composition

- OST linkup

point and time

- Duration of

requirement

Figure 1 Figure 2
Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted.

68 Engineer October-December 2003

ENGINEER UPDATE

Directorate of Training Development (DOTD)

Mission Training Plans (MTPs). Army leaders are responsible for training units to established doctrinal standards, and

evaluations of training are a key element in this process. The Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs)/MTPs are

the documents that hold the consolidated lists of tasks associated with units. This is a consolidated reference of the tasks,

conditions, and standards for each collective task that a type of unit is expected to perform.

The development process of an MTP begins with the Department of the Army (DA)-approved table of organization

and equipment (TOE). This document expresses the personnel and equipment authorized for a type of unit. The DA

mission statement is used, in conjunction with the TOE, to determine specified and implied mission tasks that should

be reflected in the MTP. These documents form the basis for the draft MTP. Modified TOEs (MTOEs) are not used

because of the frequency of changes and because MTOEs usually reflect changes in equipment and personnel, not

in doctrine. Each unit is given a TOE number to distinguish it from all other units. The number is devised so that a

unit’s MTP will align by the type of TOE it is under. An example is that a TOE with a 335F000 aligns with MTP

5-335-60.

 The Army no longer produces printed copies of MTPs, but they can be downloaded through the Reimer Digital

Library Services at Army Knowledge Online. (See page 69 for details.) It is important that leaders research the

information available and learn to navigate the site. There are two sections within the RDL Services that provide

access to MTPs, field manuals, and many other military publications. To find your unit’s MTP, enter RDL Services and

select Enter the Library or The Library. You will then see the two options available: Official Departmental Publications

and Commandant-Approved Individual and Collective Training Support Materials. Both sites contain MTPs. The difference is that MTPs found on the Official Departmental Publications site have been authenticated by the United States

Army Publishing Agency (USAPA). MTPs found on the Commandant-Approved site are final, approved documents

awaiting USAPA authentication to be loaded onto the Official Departmental Publications site. Your unit MTPs will be

found in one, or both, of these two locations. Select one of the locations. In the Type column on the left, highlight

Mission Training Plans if searching the Official Departmental Publications section. Highlight Bn. Ex. Eval. (battalion

exercise evaluation) if searching Commandant-Approved Trainin . Scroll down the list of schools in the School column

on the right and highlight Engineer. Click Submit. Select the ARTEP/MTP of your choice.

(Note: There is a new version of the RDL which is accessed through Army Knowledge Online. See page 69 for

details.)

If there is a problem with the contents of an MTP, you can submit a request for change by telephone, e-mail, or

regular mail. You will receive a reply within 24 hours of receipt of the comments. The proponent for engineer collective

training is the Engineer Warfighter Division, Warfighter Department, Directorate of Training Development.

POC can be reached at (573) 563-4102; DSN 676-4102; or e-mail <atztdtwf@wood.army.mil>. You may also mail

comments on DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms, to the U.S. Army Maneuver

Support Center, Directorate of Training Development, Warfighter Department, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 203, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929.

Standards in Training Commission (STRAC). DA Pamphlet (Pam) 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training, is

a product of the STRAC Council of Colonels (COC). The STRAC Working Group (SWG)—comprised of representatives from each of the Army proponents, all major commands (MACOMs), and the DA staff members—presents

issues affecting force modernization and readiness to the STRAC COC, which analyzes the issues, works possible

solutions, and prepares recommendations.

The standards and strategies contained in DA Pam 350-38 are reviewed biannually by the STRAC COC to identify

and correct any changes in the Army’s training strategy or the amount and type of training ammunition authorized for

each weapon system and training event. The results of the reviews, if approved, are reflected in DA Pam 350-38.

Requests for changes or questions can be addressed through your MACOM representative or the MANSCEN STRAC

manager.

POC is Mr. Bobby Skinner at (573) 596-0131, ext. 36243; DSN 676-6243; or e-mail <atztdtwf@wood.army.mil>.
Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). A CATS provides leaders with the Army’s overarching concepts to

develop training strategies for the Total Force at the institutional, unit, and self-instruction level. CATSs fully integrate

all elements of Active and Reserve Component training that will prepare the Army to fight across the entire spectrum

of military operations. It also supports the versatility required of a force projection Army. CATSs serve as the Army’s

format for efficiently and effectively managing training for units in the field and in the conduct of institutional training.

It provides a tool for identifying, quantifying, and justifying training resources required now and in the future.

CATSs provide a standardized, structured doctrinal training strategy that will train soldiers and units to standard.

It provides a means for managing and planning unit training and forecasting necessary resources. It captures the

tasks that are taught in institutions, in units, and through self-development and the resources required to train those

tasks to standard. A task-based, combined arms strategy also provides leaders with standardized guidance on the

frequency with which a task should be trained to achieve desired levels of proficiency to ensure readiness to meet

mission-essential task list requirements.

Units can access CATSs through the Standardized Automated Testing System (SATS), as well as on the Army

Training Support Center’s Reimer Digital Library. Access to CATSs can also be made through the CATS Web site at

<http://leav-www.army.mil/ctd/cats/faq.htm#whatiscats>. Many TRADOC proponent schools are loading CATSs on

their Web sites.

POC is Mr. Joe Toth at (573) 396-0131, ext. 37821; DSN 676-6243; or e-mail <atztdtwf@wood.army.mil>.

October-December 2003 Engineer 69

There is a new version of the Reimer Digital Library (RDL) that can be accessed through Army Knowledge Online (AKO).

If you are active Army, Army Reserve, National Guard, retired Army, or a Department of the Army civilian, you may access the

new Army Training Information Architecture-Migrated (ATIA-M) RDL for Army training and doctrinal publications using your AKO

User ID and Password.

1. To view documents online, go to <http://www.train.army.mil/>.

2. Read the disclaimer and then click on the Click here to go to your Training Homepage bar at the bottom.

3. Click on the Login button in the upper right-hand corner. (A Security Alert box will appear. Click OK. Another

Security Alert box will appear. Click Yes.)

4. Type in your AKO User ID and Password and click on Login.

5. Your name should appear at the top of the page. Next click on the My Account tab.

6. If you have not yet migrated your RDL permissions, there will be a paragraph at the top of the page with a hot link

to do so. Click on the link.

7. Click on the RDL Services tab.

8. Choose either Official Departmental Publications or Commandant Approved Training.

9. In the column on the left, highlight Any or one of the types of publications. Scroll down the list of schools on the

right and highlight Engineer.

10. Click Submit.

11. Scroll down the list to the publication of your choice.

You only need to migrate your RDL account one time. From that time on, you will be able to use your AKO User ID and

Password to download training and doctrinal publications from the new Web site.

If you do not already have an AKO account, please go to the Army homepage at <http://www.army.mil>. Look in the upper

right-hand corner, select Army Knowledge Online and create an account.

Accessing Army Training Publications Through AKO