ENGINEER
 The Professional Bulletin of Anny Engineers 

T 

July 2002 

Headquarters, t lY 


PB 562-3 Approved for pub n is unlimited. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

573-563-80801 DSN 676-8080 

COMMANDANT 

MG Anders B. Aadland 

563-6158 


aadlandaBwood.army.miI 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

BG Randal R. Castro 

563-6192 


casfior@wood.army.mil 

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR 

CSM Robert R. Robinson 

563-8060 


robinsoni@wood.army.mil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

COL John (Pat) Leake 

563-8080 


ieake, @wood.aimy.mii 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT - USAR 

COL Jimmy T. Fox 

563-8045 


fo,vj@wood.army.mil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT -ARNG 

LTC Robert McCabe 

563-6046 


mccaber@wood.army.mil 

CHIEF OF STAFF 

LTC Thomas E. O'Donovan 

563-711 6 


odonovant@woodarmymil 

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for ENGINEER COMBAT SYSTEMS 

COL John Holler 

563-4081 


ho/krj@wood.army.mil 

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE -TERRAIN DATA 

COL David Kingston 

563-4086 


kingstond@wood.army.mil 

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE 

COL James Rowan 

596-0224 


rowanj@woodarmy.mil 

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING 

COL Jeffrey LaMae 

563-4093 


lamoej@wood.army.mil 

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 

COL Robert S. Kirsch 

563-41 19 


kirschr@wood.army.mrl 

DEPARTMENTOF INSTRUCTION 

LTC Jeff Bedey 

563-4129 


bedeyl@wood.armymil 

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE 

LTC Anthony Funkhouser 

563-7537 


funkhousera Bwoodarmy.mil 

HUMANITARIAN DEMlNlNG TRAINING CENTEWCOUNTERMINE 

TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER 

Mr. Paul Arcangeli 

596-3869 


arcange/ip@ woodarmymil 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

ERIC K. SHlNSEKl 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: p"m 

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

CR13703 


Engineer (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by 

the U.S. Any Maneuver Support Center, 320 MANSCEN 

Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 654734929. 

Second Class postageis paid at Fort Leonard Wwd. MO, 

and additional mailing offices. 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to U.S. 

Army Maneuver Support Center, ATN: ATZT-DT-DS-B 

(Engineer), 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort 

Leonard Wood. MO 65473-8929. 

CORRESPONDENCE, letters to the editor, manuscripts, photographs, official unit requests to receive 

copies, and unit address changes should be sent to 

Engineer at the preceding address. Telephone: (573) 

563-4104, DSN 676-4104. Engineer's e-mail address 

is: bridgess@wood.army.mil. Our Internet home page 

is located at: http://www.wood.arrny.rnil/engrmag/ 

emag-hp. htrn. 

DISCLAIMER: Engineer presents professional information designed to keep U.S. military and civilian engineers informed of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. 

Views expressed are those of the authors and not 

those of the Department of Defense or its elements. 

The contents do not necessarily reflect official U.S. 

Army positions and do not change or supersede information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of 

news items constitutes neither affirmation of their 

accuracy nor product endorsement. Engineer reserves the right to edit material. 

CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to Engineerand the author. 

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION is targeted to all engineer 

and engineer-related units. 

PERSONALSUBSCRlPTlONSareavailablefor$18.M) 

per year by contacting tfle Superintendent of Documents, 

P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh. PA 15250-7954. Address 

changes for personal subscriptions should also be sent 

to the Superintendent of Documents. 
GINEER 

e Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers 

I] 	 July2002 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 32 PB 5-02-3 

! UNrrEDSTATESARMY FEATURES 

ENGINEERSCHOOL 4 Operation Enduring Freedom From the Military EngineerPerspective 

By Colonel Jerry T. Mohr, Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. "Fritz" Mucke, 


r 

l and Lieutenant Commander Donald L. Maconi 


! COMMANDANT 8 Repairing Runwaysand Clearing Mines in Afghanistan 


I Major Generai By Major Dennis J. McNulty 


I Anders B. Aadiand 


I 	 15 Combat EngineerCompany Commandand Control and the "Fighting 21C 

1' By Captain Thomas Burton and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H Magness 

i 

MANAGING EDITOR 20 Updating River-Crossing Doctrine: Who and When? 

I Lynne Sparks 	 By Colonel Thomas K. Littlefield, Jr. (Retired)

1 EDITOR 24 RapidAirfield Upgrade at Castle Assault Landing Zone 

' ' Shirley Bridges By First Lieutenant Nicholas Melin 

I 	 GRAPHIC DESIGNER 30 Partnership Training 1 	 Jennifer Morgan By Captain Daniel J. Meyers 

I 

32 The Euro NATOTrainingEngineerCentre: Your International EngineerSchool 

Front Cover: A C-17 By Major Frank Akins and Sergeant First Class Benjamin Addison 

takes offat the Baghrarn 34 The Real Army airfieid in Afghanistan. I By Lieutenant Colonel Monte R. Anderson (Retired) 

! Back Covers: Engineer 

I soidiers 36 Modernized Demolition Initiator Update 


I! By Sergeant First Class Jeffrey Venus (Retired) 


I ' 


38 65th Engineer Battalion Renovates Historical Engineer Castle 

1~ 	 By Second Lieutenant Fred Schwark 

I! 

.*:. 40 The Evolution of the EngineerForce: Part II , "..' 

I ",..:x<)3&+ 	 .-.. By Dr. Larry Roberts 

I 

8 DEPARTMENTS 

I! 


' 2 Clear the Way 47 CTC Notes - "Engineer ReconTeams" 


1 By Major GeneralAnders 8. Aadland By Captain Gerald Dull and Sergeant First Class 1 Danny J. Petersen (CMTC) 3 Lead the Way 


By Command Sergeant Major Roberf R. Robinson 49 Engineer Update 


29 Book Reviews 	 49 News and Notes 

31 	 The EngineerWriter's Guide 

37 	 PersonalViewpoint - "Improving theTechnical 


Skills of the Combat Heavies" 


By Sergeant first Class Carl L. Lindsay I1 
By Major General Anders B. Aadland 

commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

NFORCE 2002 was another pro- are extremely i~iiportant efforts that we 

fessionally rewarding opportunity Engineers must pursue. 

to get together with all our Engineer In the future and today. countermine 

Ic:~ilers from around our Regiment. While it remains one of the leading issues for our 

is always wonderful chatting with old friends Anny. This is pzticularly compelling for our 

whorn we haven'l seen for years. ENFORCE forces engaged in Operation Enduring also gives us super opportunities to roll up Freedom. We continue to work to develop 

our sleeves and, collectively. get down to the solutions for the nine and booby trap nitty-gritty of' out- Regiment's lnost i~nportant problems around the world. We will conand pressing issues. If you recall. the theme tinue to provide subject-matter expertise for the ENFORCE 2002 Conference was "FLI//- and mobile Irainiog teams to prepare our 

Spc(.rrir~~i flgi~le~~:~ - FOITEfor Chnilg~. " Sappers going into harm's way. We will also 

These words were chosen carefully: these colitinue to develop and brief, at DA level, words have great meaning. 

- requirements for materiel and trnining to 

Fell-Sprcfruf~i E~~~inee,-,s means that we 

are providing, and will continue 10 pru\,ide, the i.llllrii I.III~C01' 

engineering to the Nation-from combat enfi~lcerinz 10 

construction engineering to geosp;~tial engineering to 

e11vin)nmental engineering. Fc1ri.e ,fiw C/?OII,VPmeans that the 

Eosineer Regiment will aggressively lead the Trensformation 

to meet the needs of the Arnmy and the Nation. The "RrilSperrrrtm E~~,yinc(a,:r- Force ,fir Ci~an,qe" theme continues in 

this latest issue 01' ENGINEER. In this issue, you will find 

important and particularly relevant arlicles on our Sappers out 

front in Operation Enduring Freedom (0EF)-to il~clude 

repairing runways, clearinp mines, and perh~rniing rapid ailfield 

upgrade. Those or you still wondering about Transformation 

will find Dr. Larry Roberts' article "The Evolution of the 

Engineer Force: Part II" especially poignant. Engineers have 

always been in the forefront of chctnging to meel the nceds of 

our maneuver brethren and the Army. The Sapper warriors of 

today nj7d tomorrow must continue this. And in LTC(R) 

Anderson's article "Thr Rcal Army," he reinforces the fact 

that the lntlst important pat1 of our Ar~iiy is people. 

While the positive of ha\'e worn 

oft we have had little time to bask in that sunlight: we have 

been deeply engaged as the Army's Transturmation continues 

in high gear. Our Regiment is deeply involved in the training 

and de\,elnplnent of the Interim Force and the conceptual 

development and planning for the Objective Force. Recently, 

we have made important contributions to the role of maneuver 

suppon in the Objective Force. On 29 May 2002. the MANSCEN 

Commandants (Chemical, Engineer. and Military Police) briefed 

the CSA and the DA Requirements Review Council (RRC) on 

the Objective Force Maneuver Support Concept. Now 

maneuver support is one of the three key integrating areas of 

the Objective Force operational framework. As you know. these 

~- keep our forces mobile and safe and ensure 

111.1:~IIC Ohjcclive Force's combi~~ed-ar~iis maneuver Unit of 

Action (UAi will he able to overcome this threat in stride. 

As our Army continues to change, and with the personnel 

transitions t~,atsummer always brings, our Engineer 

continuesto change as well, To name a few of the key changes: 

,, bid farewell and thanks to LTC(P) Gary Johnston, Senior 

Engineer, Developlnents (DCD,: LTC 

Bill Duddleston, Doctrine Chief; and LTC Tom Cllapnlan, 

Engilleer School Chief of Staff, We a hearty ,.welcome 

aboard" to the illhound talenL,includillgLTC Pete Tabacclli, 

new EngineerDCD Chief over from DCD Concepts); 

LTC Bryan Watson, DCD Concepts: LTC Tony 

Funkllouser, Doctrine Chief; and LTC Toln O.Donovan, 

Engil,eer SchoolChief orStaff Theseare your new Schoolhouse 

warriors, Add them to your list of key contacts, Put lo 

work, Send theln cards and letters, Support them and count on 

support, T,,,=~ do lllings for you and the 

It has been a tremendous honor for me to havc served as 

your Co~nmandant for the past two years. I appreciate the great 

tcamwol.k and warrior spirit you, as Sapper leaders of the 

Regiment. have demonstrated. With the r81pid pace of change. 

this has been an excitingride. But the pace will not slow down 

soon, and the new leader has stepped ill to ensure the 

important bests are not missed, We all our hellrtiest 

to MG Bob Van Alltwerp, your new Cotnlnandant, 

is a gre;lt Sapper wa,Tior and leader who. aloJlgwith BG 

Randy Cast,.o Engineer School team, will 

accomplish llluch as the leader of this F~~~~for change,

welcome van, end ~ ~ as sapper d 6! ~ ~ ~

E"ayons! 

2 Engineer July 2002 
U.S. Arm), Engineer School 

want to hegin by thanking all of you 

who supported this year's ENFORCE 

I especially want to thank the Sergeant 

Major of the Army (SMA) for taking time 

out of his arduous schedule to be a pal* of 

the Council of Sergeants Major. His presence during our confereocc was historic, 

and the insights he has on what's important in our Army, its future, and the initiatives being worked were of great value to 

us all. Some might believe that the position of SMA is one of 

merely a figurehead that sy~nbolically represents the enlisted 

force. SMA Tilley de~nonstrates to (he entire Army that he is 

much more than that. He tirelessly works a multitude of issues 

that guide the future of our Army and impact quality of life, 

training. and standards in an extremely positive way. He is 

genuinely committed to our soldiers and this nation and is a 

great credit to our corps of nonconimissioned officers. 

oneof the of ENFORCE that is extremely impor. 

tant to the future of our ~~~i~~~~ is the interaction thatre. 

suits whell we all together on common ground. hi^ 

year proved to he beneficial because we were to 

extract recnmmendations on important issues such as professinnal and personal development for all soldiers, assign. 

lnent and training considerations, considerations, 

and force structure and equipment onearea 

ill particular was the feedback we collecte(~ and illcorpornted 

into the proponent guidance handbooks that we prepare for 

every centralized board proceeding. With the recomtnendations we receiXred from the Council of Sergeants Major. we 

were able to make some last-minute updates to the FY02 Sergeant First Class promotion hoard, which convened on 1 

June 2002. Although we will continue to review trends that 

affect promotion opportunities within the Regiment, it is important that all leadel-s review the proponent guidance posted 

on the Engineer School Weh page and offer feedback on 

Last year, we perforlned a groundbreaking ceremony for 

the Sapper Memorial as pan of our ENFORCE Conference. 

During this year's conrerence, we announced the new 

location of the rnen~orial and presented details on its construction. I am happy to report that constl-uction will begin soo~~. and 

the proposed completion date is 17 August 2002. In addition, the Army Engineer 

Association has begun contract negotiations for the Sapper statue that will he positioned at the entrance of the fi~cility. The 

events, and will he a great addition to the 

As you all know, the Army and this nawith the passing of SMA(R) Leon L. Van 

Autrcvc in March of this year. Those of 

you who knew Van (as his friends called him) know that he 

loved this country: was com~nitted to soldiers, their families. 

and their quality of life; and dedicated his life to making a 

difference. He was a very respected, articulate, profound nian 

whose love of life was infectious and transcended all he did 

and was a part of. In his memory. I have proposed that we 

honor an outstanding Engineer soldirr, the same way we do 

the Sturgis awardees, and present an annual award, named 

SMA(R) Leon L. Van Autreve. to our Regiment's most 

~utstanding Active and Reserve Component soldier (PVT 

thl" SPC). The Army Enpinleer Association has gained wonsorship for the award, and we will work diligently to ensure 

that it is ready for unveiling by next year's ENFORCE Conference. I have co~n~nunicated with Mrs. Rita Van Autreve, Van's 

widow, and she is \rery and excited about Our 

desire to do this. The award will be a great honor to those 

outflanding soldiers who truly represent our Regiment in 

everything they do across Our *Im?. 

1, closing, 1 want to ilnpress upon the importance of 


*e hard work you, your and soldiers do, and 


the hard work that goes on here at F~~~~ ~ ~ , , ~ ~
 wood, H~~ 

viml what we do collectivelyis to the future of our Regiment 

and the Amy! Engineers are literillly and the 

influence we have as a Regiment is evident all over the world, 

1 am proud to have been an Engineer and a Sapper for more 

than 30 years. And I'm grateful for the experiences that being 

an Engineer has brought to me and that I have shared with 

Inany of you, 

ESSAYONS-Engineers Lead the Way! 

~ 

July 2002 Engineer 3 
Operation Enduring Freedom 


From the Military Engineer Perspective 


By Colonel fern 7: Mohc Lieurenant Con~innrider Frederick A. ''Fritz'' Mucke, 

and Lieirtemnr Cornrnander Donald L. Moroni 

n l l September 2001, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) Engineer Division, and its equivalent 

staffs within component commands, began the 

daunting task of directing military engineer efforts for a war 

unlike any this nation has ever faced. Operation Enduring 

(OEF) required engineers to support a unique 

tingency operation that required extraordinary resourcefulness. Key OEF activities requiring engineer suppon included 

contingency planning, engineer unit deployment airfield repair 

and upgrade. mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearing, 

troop protection from environlnental hazards, base camp 

obstacle to meeting these challenges was the 

need for staff augmentation. This article discusses these 

engineer challenges and some of the lessons learned from them, 

Contineencv " Planning --

As the dust settled from the 9-1 I terrorist attacks, 

engineers immediately engrossed themselves in 

contingency planning. They evaluated the condition 

of alailable infrastructure in the area of responsibility and 

comoared this information with engineer assets and ca~abilities. 

including those of several units already deployedin the Middle 

East Gulf region. This helped CENTCOM planners select force 

bed-down locations. Using this information, they oversaw the 

deployment of engineers supporting OEF operations. 

.... 

Engineer Unit Deployment 

The initial deployment of OEF special operations 

forces into the area of responsibility did not include 

supporting engineer units. This shortfall became 

oh! lous as the demand for engineers quickly escalated. Some 

engineer forces already in the area revised deploylnents 

to support early OEF requirements. One such example was an 

Air Force RED HORSE unit that diverted from a programmed 

project in one countly- to a contingency tasking in another. 

AS OEF progressed past the initial special operations force 

stage, the flow of forces into the area increased significantly. 

TOsu~~ortthis.AirForceREDHORSEandPRTMEBEEF

engineer and prime power, and Navy Seabee units received 

deployment orders to OEF contingency installations to repair 

and upgrade airfields, construct base camps. and provide 

elect~icalpower. Anny engineer detachments relieved Air Force 

and Navy Seabee units to continue base construction, 

maintenance, and repair. Engineersfro~n sevenlcoalition partner 

nations also deployed into the area and supported runwayrepair, well-drilling, and fine-clearing projects. 

OEF engineer deployments overcame many obstacles to 

mission accomplishment. For example. limited construction 

materials and equipment hatnpered engineer missions. And 

additional short-fused taskings further strained engineer 

deployments, such as the construction 

erm holding facilities for 

Yet engineers persevered with 

innovation and determination. using 

unique materials and techniques to 

compensate for resource shortfalls. For 

example, Navy Seabees at Camp Rhino, 

lacking equipment to clear foreign object 

damage debris, brought back to life an 

old Russian street sweeper from a local 

junkyardand used it to clear debris from 

airfield runways and taxiways. Once 

azain, the engineer "can-do" spirit 

proved indomitable! 

Airfield Repair and Upgrade 

o support OEF in Afghanistan, 

warfighters needed airfields 

in several Central Asian counSoldiers perform runway repair work at Baghram airfield in Afghanistan. triei surrounding Afghal,istan and 
eventually within Afghanistan itself. These 

airfields would support fighter operations, 

logistical hubs, and Corce bed down. Because 

U.S. and Coalition forces had conducted only 

limited military operations in the region before 

9-11, the only airfields and bases available 

quickly enough to supportOEF were several 

fighter air bases of the former Soviet Union. 

The Soviets hastily constructed or expanded 

theseairfields during their 1980s Afghanistan 

campaign. They used precast concrete slabs 

without rebar and emplaced them over graded 

ground without a subbase. Years of neglect 

and conflict, as well as OEF air strikes, had 

damaged and deteriorated the airfields and 

the supporting utilities and ground transportation infrastructure. Thus, engineers 

"operationalized" seven such former Soviet A mine detection dog team proofs an area at the Baghram airfield. 

bases with significant infrastructure repairs 

and upgrades which established air operations for cargo 

(C-l30andC-17) and fighteraircraft. 

Initially, rapid runway repair was the project du jour for 

engineers. They patched numerous bomb craters, repaired spalled 

pavement, and laid AM-2 matting to get d~elds operational 

quickly. Amore innovative technique was theNavy Seabees' use 

of "gorilla snot" palliative to suppress dust and stabilize soil for 

a desert dirt airstrip. But traditional concrete repair techniques 

necessitated closing sections of runways for days, while waiting 

for freshly placed concrete caps and patches to cure. Engineers 

discovered an alternative to conventional rapid runway repair 

that drastically reduced runway downtime-harvesting 

undamaged slabs from unused areas of airfields to replace 

damaged slabs. By replacing these slabs during several 

consecutive nights, airfields remained operational with minimal 

disruption while undergoing pavement I-epair. 

The Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) 

performed pavement evaluation studies at each airfield. These 

studies provided analyses on airfield characteristics such as 

pavement strength and the number of passes a runway could 

endure before failing. The analyses also provided recommendations on runway, taxiway, and parking apron usage. 

Engineers used AFCESA studies to help determine the best 

use of limited engineering resources for airfield repair and 

maintenance. 

Friendly forces are now using airfields used by our former 

adversary. Engineers have determined that in order to minimize 

the need to rework bomb crater repairs, future airfield strikes 

should avoid bombing the most critical sections of enemy 

runways-the landing touchdown and turnaround zones from 

either end of the runway for C-130 and C- 17 aircraft. 

Even after engineers made these airfields marginally 

operational, they contained preexisting environmental 

contamination, and the Afghanistan airfields remained laden 

with mines and UXO. So before the engineers could construct 

base camps by the ailfields, they had to neutralize these hazards 

so the bases could supporr a significant population. 

Mine and UXO Clearing 

Acommon thread to every Afghan installation was the 

force protection requirement to "stay on the concrete" 

sincemines and UXO litteredeach location. Although 

delnilling ~ f ~ will h he a ~ ~ i ~ ~ separate 

hu,nanitarian.assistance initiative, OEF engineers had to 

imlnediately clear these hazards in areas where friendly forces 

were to liveand work, I,, addition to the bed-down andiperaling 

areas, engineers cleared adjacent areas to achieve enough 

standoff distances for force Drotection, 

Racing to stay ahead of arriving forces, U.S. military 

engineers initially deployed mine-clearing equipment and armor 

PI-otection kits for bulldozers, along with operators and repair 

parts. Then several of our OEF Coalition partners stepped up 

to the plate, providing mine-clearing equipment. operators, and 

maintenance teams. As specialized equipment mechanically 

cleared these areas, contracted mine detection dog teams were 

used to proof the areas. The effectiveness of these mine-clearing 

assets allowed U.S. engineers to concentrate their efforts on 

tent city construction. 

Environmental Engineering 

uring initial stages of OEF, planners faced time 

constraints and limited options regarding the 

selection of base locations, so operational planners 

were not always able todetermine the extent of environmental 

hazards at an installation before deciding to deploy forces there. 

Ideally, environmental engineers perform baseline surveys 

within 60 days of deployment to operating bases to document 

preexisting conditions before U.S. forces arrive, but this was 

not always possible in OEF. 

Engineers relied on the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency (NIMA) to provide environmental assessments of 

potential operating bases, based on imagery analysis. NIMA 

assessments were sometimes the only source of environmental 

information available and were therefore invaluable to OEF 

planners. 

July 2002 Engineer 5 
Damaged asbestos roof tiles present an environmental 

hazard. 

A\ U.S. forces flowed into these neu. OEF bases, some 

preexisting environmental hazards were discovered that could 

potentially impact ecological and human health: 

Petroleum-. oil-, and lubricant-contaminated soilsuncovered while constructing force protection berms. 

Exposed asbestos from damaged tiles and insulationfound while repairing and occupying existing structures. 

Low-level radioactive contamination4isco\'ered in soil 

during earthwork. 

Engineers used the U.S. Army Center for Health Protection and 

Preventive Medicine to help assess these hazards and develop 

mitigation actions. 

Like any military operation, OEF generated significant 

quantities of hazardous waste (HAZWASTE). including used 

oil. dead batteries, and waste fuel. HAZWASTE-disposal 

contracts for the remote forward installations could not be 

awarded in time to eliminate the need to accumulate and store 

significant amounts of the waste at bases. It took 7 months to 

award a HAZWASTE-disposal contract to a qualified contractor 

and provide the required formal notification to countries 

receiving the waste. 

Base Camp Construction 

As engineers made airfields operational and remediated 

minelLTX0 and environmental hazards. their focus 

shifted to base camp construction to support the 

increasing flow of forces. They erected tent cities throughout 

the area of responsibility, using Harvest Eagle. Harvest Falcon. 

and Force Provider kits to support the ever-increasing force 

bed-down requirements. 

CENTCOM engineers staffed and developed criteria for 

standardized guidance for planning and developing austere 

base camps and prornulgated them in the "USCENTCOM 

Contingency and Long-Term Base Camp Facilities Standards." 

These standards will allow components to forecast resource 

requirements and provide tenant units with a common 

expectation for base camp construction. 

CENTCOM Engineer Staff Augmentation 

The CENTCOM engineering staff during peacetime is 

seven officers and one enlisted administrative 

specialist. With an OEF operational tempo of 24-hour 

day5 7 days a week, the staff required augmentation from both 

mobilized Reservists and active-duty personnel on temporary 

duty. 

Working through the JI Directorate. the CENTCOM 

Engineer Division pursued staff augmentation. In addition to 

three assigned individual mobilization augmentee Reserve 

officers;CENTCOMexecuted its preexisting memorandums of 

understanding with service components for additional 

augmentees from both activeand Reserve units. At the peak of 

OEF, the staff grew more than threefold. Work spaces became 

crowded. but the help was welcome. 

Lessons Learned 

During the first 9 months of OEF. the CENTCOM 

Engineer Division learned the following lessons on 

contingency engineering: 

Deploy more eneineers earlier to support special operations 

forces and other operational units with equipment and skill 

sets to perform hasty construction. If such en,'nlneer assets 

could enter an area before the establishment of friendly 

operational airfields and without requiring helicopter 

support. they could quickly repair key airfields and establish 

air operations. 

Establish joint standardized guidance for planning and 

developing base camps, promulgated through a fnnnal yet 

user-friendly document. It must be staffed and promulgated 

well before a contingency develops, so that components 

Radioactive contamination was discovered during may quickly forecast resource requirements as a conearthwork. tingency kicks off. 

6 Engi11eer- hi/?2002 
A dozer operates in difficultCentral Asian terrain. 

Engage environmental and preventive-medicine personnel 

early in planning and operations to assess the risks to 

ecological and human health and safety and mitigate them 

as much as possible. 

Initiate the HAZWASTE-disposal contracting process as 

soon as possible, so that these services are in place when 

needed to minimize operational constraints. 

Summary 

Engineers faced many challenges and learned many 

lessons from OEF. Some were typical of any contingency,while others were unique to OEF. Regardless, 

CENTCOM engineers successfully met the challenges and 

therefore contributed significantly to our successful and 

ongoing Global War on Terrorism. Y 

CoioneiMohrserverlas chief of the U S. Cerirrai Command 

J4-Enginre!-Division at the time this nrticle was wrilten. He 

previo~rslycommanded the /ADEngineer Brigade. A graduate 

of the United States Military Academy, COL Mohr holds 

masrerk degrees in civil engineerin$ .from rile Uniljersity of 

lllinois arid nii1itar-r.arrs and srimcesfrom the Command and 

Gener-a1Staff College. 

urart-ntrrrr currrrrurrtrrrr ivrrr~nr,crvrr i;rlydnecr ~u,y\,".a. 

Nm~alRerenu,has.ceveraltour.~kvith Naval Corisrnrction Force 

(Seabee) ~rnits.He is currerrtly recalled to acriae dun at 

USCENTCOM,Lo,qi.ctic.s Direcrorare. EngineerDivision. LCDR 

Mircke troid.~[I rirosrrr :T degree ill e~ivirvnme~ital engirlee~ing 

porn the U~ri~zersinqf Tennessee and is a registeredprofrssional 

enqineer in Te~messeeand Alabama. 

Lieutenant CommanderMaconi, Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. 

Naval Re.7en.e. has senled in several Navai tours as borh an 

active-dun and Reserve offire,: He is currently r-ecailed to 

active duty at USCENTCOM, Logistics Direcrorare. Engineer 

Division. LCDR Macorri holds a macrer's degree in public 

adminisnutionfrom Troy Srarr University and is a regisiered 

professio~lalengineer in Florida. 

R Peter M. 

lnch 

.a,, 7. 

:. Naval Re 

-. -

serve, Env 

-. 

:Kelly, U.2 ?, Base De 

!r Division 

I ~ ~ I

ironmental 

,-

The following people in CENTCOM Engine~ 

were also lnvolved in wrlting this article: 

LTC Andrew W. Goetz, U.S. Army, Chief, PI&.., ,,, , 

tions Branch 

CD 

Bra 

LTL ~r~en t.aosaran, u.3. Hrmv neserve, rrans/uDerations Branch 

MAJ Patrick J 

Branch 

LCDR Kurt R. Gies, U.S. Naval Reser 

Development Branch 

YN1 Constance J. Pawton, U.S. Naval Reserve, crryrrreer 

Admin Branch 

ve, Base 

r--:---. 
Repairing Runways and 


Clearing Mines in Afghanistan 


B.Y Major Dennis J. McN~tlty 

Engineerforces are accomplishing a wide variety of tasks 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In 

Afghanistan, they have often been called on toperform 

n~issions that are outside of their normal mission-essential task 

lists. They have built latrines and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) 

holding areas, repaired runways, cleared large areas littered 

with mines, repaired water wells, and designed wastewater 

systems. Castle wearers, regardless of their unit affiliation or 

normal area of expertise, are considered subject-matter experts 

in all engineering tasks. And engineer leaders at all levels still 

need to be "jacks-of-all-h.ades" to be effective on the modem 

battlefield. 

Engineer units are learning valuable lessons in Afghanistan 

that should be examined for potential incorporation into future 

engineer doctrine, organizations, and materiel developments 

to enhance our current capabilities. And our engineers also 

acquired valuable information on the tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) required for clearing large areas that are 

heavily littered with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). 

This artidle will review the observations in these two areas and 

highlight lessons that were learned during a recent combinedarms assessment trip to Afghanistan. 

Engineer soldiers place concrete to repair a 

Runway Assessment, Tracking, Repair, 

and Equipment 

0

verall, U.S. Army engineerunits could repairrunways 

with their organic equipment, but they learned some 

valuable techniques. In addition, the U.S. Air Force 

RED HORSE units and their Britishequivalents introduced our 

engineers to some equipment that is optimal for rapid runway 

repair. 

Because of a lack of robust ground lines of communications 

(LOCs) in the areaof opention, maintaining air LOCs is a priority 

throughout the campaign in Afghanistan. A critical mission for 

engineer units is that of repairing, maintaining, and upgrading 

designated airfields. The two primary runways in Afghanistan 

are located at Kandahar and Baghram. Anny engineer units 

were able to keep these runways operating, hut they discovered 

that effective runway tracking techniques had to be established 

to effectively monitor the rapidly deteriorating runways. Our 

engineers also discovered that their organic equipment was 

not optimal for conducting repairs. 

Initial Runway Assessments 

A team from the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency 

(AFCESA) conducted initial assessments of the airfields at 

Kandahar and Baghram. The teams 

generally overestimated the capacity of the airfields. For example, 

assessment of the Kandahar airfield 

was that it could support 50,000 

passes by C-17s and 50,000 C-130 

passes after several craters were 

repaired and that the Baghram 

airfield could support 15,000 passes 

by C-17s and more than 50.000 

C-130 passes. When they received 

these reports, engineer planners were 

relieved that the airfields could support this amount of heavy traffic. 

However, for various reasons, neither 

of these assessments has been accurate. Once the initial repairs were 

made, the runways have continued 

to deteriorate to the point that they 

require daily maintenance. 

runway. 

X Engineer July 2002 
The premature failure of the Baghram 

airfield can he attributed in part to several 

passes ~nade by Russian IL-76 and AN-124 

aircraft-the first being about the size of a 

C-I7 and the second being among the la~.gest 

airframes in the world. There was no projection to use these large airframes on the 

airfields, but there was no way to limit the use 

of lwgcaircraft until the airfield failed and the 

Kabul airfield opened. The failure to support 

the number of paqses at the Kandahar airfield 

may be attributed to an elrant estimate during 

the assessment that the base was up to 12 

inches thick when actually then~nway hadvery 

sparse base material under some areas. 

Had the AFCESA reports been available to 

Army engineerunits before they deployed, the 

information would have helped the units 

prepare for their repair and maintenance 

missions. 

Runway Tracking Technique 

The method used for su~veying and assigning priorities for 

repair on a given runway was siinple but effective. Repair teams 

divided the runway into sections or grids, systematically 

numbered these sections, and then assessed the condition of 

each. Teams were assigned numbers or color codes that 

indicated each section's current condition. Sections with a 

number one or a red color had failed or were in poor condition 

and required immediate replacement. Sections assigned a two 

or amber color were in hettcr condition but needed to be 

monitored for eminent deterioration. Sections with a three or a 

green status were generally in good condition and were in no 

danger of failing in the near future. The nmways were monitored 

and reassessed periodically as they deteriorated. The Baghram 

airfield was constructed of 10-foot by 20-foot concrete slabs, 

so each slab became a monitored section. At Kandahar, the 

runway wassurfaced with asphalt and was tr:icked using station 

numbers. 

Runway Repair Technique 

The Air Force and British nlnway repair teams used a "slabharvesting" technique at the Raglirarn airfield. Small patches 

of damaged ninway were cut out, thc subbase was replaced 

and compacted, and the area was capped with undamaged slabs 

cut from unused areas of the runway or taxi areas. This 

technique required a large concretc saw-which U.S. Army 

units did not have-so they used precast slabs or placed 

concrete directly into the prepwed section. 

The aggregate to replace the base, or to make concrete if 

necessary, was procured locally. It was difficult to obtain early 

on because of the austcrc infrastructure and limited suppliers 

available, but this situation gradually improved. Type I cement 

was the only kind available in Afghanistan, so all Type III cement 

(needed for proper repair of the runway) and all cold patch 

July 2002 

-. 

, . . . : . I --- - ----.- .L 

Engineers construct a head wall. 

(needed to repair the asphalt at the Kandahar runway) had to 

be flown in. Keeping an adequate supply of these repair 

On hand was a 

R~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 

Three pieces of repair equipment were particularly critical 

when conducting the slab-hancesting repair technique': a forklift 

(for lifting and moving the replacement slabs into place): a 

concrete saw; and a small, highly maneuverable compactor. 

Since the U.S. Army units did not have the concrete saws 

required to cut concrete patches, they purchased two of them 

from the Air Force units when they departed. 

The Bobcat@ excavator was a very versatile and easily 

transportable piece of equipment. Small enough to be 

transported by a CH-47 helicopter as either an internal or 

external load, it was critical when repairs were needed at the 

airticld near Mazar-e Sharif, where fixed-wing aircrak could not 

land because of craters. In addition, a co~nmercial ditching 

machine was useful for trenching in lighting cabling to make 

the runway operational at night and fol-digging in other cabling 

and sewage lines. The combat heavy engineer battalion 

purchased these two pieces of equipment before it deploycd. 

The Army's repair capability was furthcr cnhanced when it 

purchased a small, portable concrete vibrator; a walk-behind 

vibrator). compactor; and an adjustable concrete screed from 

the Air Force. The Army units had manual hand tampers but 

found that the plate compactor attacli~nents on the Bobcat 

were easier to use and quite effective. In addition, the Bobcat's 

pavement-breaking attachment was Inore reliable than the 

breaker on the 250-cubic-feet-per-minute (cfm) trailer and the 

small emplacement excavators. The sweeping attachment of 

the Bobcat was useful for cleaning the runway after repairs 

were made. The Army has a nonadiustable 20-foot concrete 

screed, and soldiers conductccl manual screeding of repai1-s 

over 20 feet wide. The pneumatic concrete vibrators purchased 

Engineer 9 
from the Air Force orovided more maneuverabilitv and were Mine-and UXO-ClearanceOoerations 

more reliable than the ones for the 250-cfm compressor. 

A larger issue with engineer equipment in Afghanistan was 

the number of aircraft sorties required to transport it into and 

within the theater of operations-nearly half of the sorties 

allotted to transport the entire brigade task force. It must be 

noted that the combat heavy battalion deployed with less than 

half of its assigned heavy-construction equipment. Had the 

ailfields not been C-17 capable, moving the engineer equipment 

into Afghanistan would have been extremely dificult. if not 

impossible. As it was, several transloads were conducted, which 

resulted in separation of forces and equipment and delayed 

arrival of mission-critical pieces. Engineer equipment required 

67 intenheater and 22 intratheater C-I7 sorties to move into 

and around the theater. 

Because of the co~nplexitiesinvolved with air loading heavy 

engineerequipment, air-load planning is a must, even for units 

that do not traditionally move their equipment by air. 

Coincidently. the combat heavy battalion that deployed to 

Afghanistan had executed an air-load training eventjust before 

1I September. In the exercise, the battalion loaded a dozer, a 

grader, a bucket loader, and a roller. Unit personnel became 

familiar with shoring and tie-down procedures for heavy 

equipment. The battalion was fortunate in that the theater airlift 

control element (TALCE), which was subsequently assigned 

to assist the battalion during the actual deployment, was the 

same team that had assisted the unit during theair-load training. 

This ensured the rapid and efficient deployment of the battalion 

because theT.4LCE unit was already familiar with the battalion's 

nn,.inmant 

LessonsLearned 

Leaders should carefully scrutinize airfield assessments as early as possible, especially when they are 

surprisingly optimistic. 

Army engineer units operating in areas that depend 

on air LOCs need to be highly trained and properly 

equipped to perform rapid runway repair techniques. 

Bobcats with appropriate attachments are highly 

effective for repairing runways. 

Concrete saws; small, maneuverable compactors; 

and a forklift are essential pieces of equipment for 

runway repairs requiring slab harvesting, 

Runway repair equipment should be small and easily 

transportable by helicopters or C-130s since the 

runway needing repair may r ?n to large 

aircraft. 

Units should oractice air loadlna thelr equipment, 

preferable 

= Unit leade I 

adequate ,,. ,.,,. ,. ,. ,,, ..,.,,,,, ,,, ,, , ,,,, ,,,,- material-qualified personnel for air loading their 

equipmen 

-

with' an av 

,rs need to n,,mhor nf 

allable TAL 

ensure th 

9ir-ln"rl nls 

.? 

.CE unit. 

at their un Innarc nnrl 

its have ar h"7"rrlnllc 

Engineer units were faced with the daunting task of 

clearing literally thousands of mines and UXO from 

thousands of square kilometers of ground to make the 

immediate areas safe for occupation and use by Coalition 

fol-ces.The mine and UXO threat is extre~nelyhigh in Afghanistan, particularly in the areas surrounding the Kandahar and 

Baghram airfields. An estimated 8 million-plus mines and UXO 

litter the countryside. The Soviets used antipersonnel (AP) 

minefields to protect the airfields and left them in place when 

they departed. These minefields were fenced and generally 

well-marked. Subsequently, however, the locals have lifted 

many of the mines and replanted them in areas outside of marked 

minefields. Both the Taliban and Northem Alliance forces are 

suspectedof lifting mines and planting them in unmarked fields 

during their battles in and around the Baghram airfield. 

Mines located in the vicinity include the PMN. PFM. 

POM-Z, TM-62. MON-50, MON100, TS-50, TC-6, and YM-I. 

UXOinclude AO-2.5 and PTAB-2.5KO. whichare particularly 

prevalent, along with bombs with weights ranging from 200 to 

500 kilograms. In addition, unexploded U.S. BLU-97s. which 

were dropped during early offensive operations, have been 

found. The U.S. forces that deployed were generally wellinformed of the threat and the numbers and types of mines and 

UXO that they would encounter. At the time this article was 

written, there had been 10 mine and UXO incidents in 

Afghanistan. resulting in several deaths and severe injuries. 

Coalition engineers and explosive ordnancedisposal (EOD) 

units conducted clearance operations to make designated areas 

safe for use by Coalition forces. It is important to note that 

TitleX. USC: prohibits U.S. soldiers from conducting humanitarian demining operations. Demining and area clearance differ 

in that area-clearance operations render an area reasonably 

safe for an operational use, while demining operations give a 

very high level of assurance that all mines and UXO have been 

removed from a designated area. 

The procedures used to clear areas in Afghanistan mere 

based on several factors, such as the estimated threat of 

encounters. the pulpose of clearing, the type of terrain to be 

cleared. the type of clearing resources. and the time available. 

Generally, there were three methods of neutralizing mines in 

Afghanistan: manual. explosive. and mechanical. 

Manual Clearing 

The least preferred method, manual clearing involves 

manually moving or liftingmines or UXO out of the way. U.S. 

soldiers do not manually lift nines and, as this method involves 

the greatest amount of risk, it is not the preferred method of 

many Coalition force engineer units cither. Lifting techniques 

are used to recover whole mines intact to use as training aides 

after they have been rendered safe. Mines that contain an 

explosive which remains stable over a long period, have a 

relatively stable activation mechanism, and are well-exposed 

are candidates for manual liftine. PMN mines were the most 
common manually lifted mines. The Notwegian 

enginecr unit rendered several PMNs and 

PMN-2s safe in Afghanistan. 

Explosi\~e Clearing 

Clearing mines and UXO with explosives ,, . 

involves placing the explosives in close proximity - to the mines or UXO without disturbing them and , +-,;--

then blowing them in place. U.S. Anny EOD units :ye.?:%
 +., %5

and the Norwegian engineer unit also used a ;:a.&!- , , 	 - , , ,>..~ . technique called small-arms UXO disposal *, 

(SMUD). While not technically an explosive 

method, this technique involves shooting the mine 

or UXO at a precise location. The intent of this 

method is to separate the fuse from the explosive 

material before the fuse can be activated; however, 

the munition often explodes during this process. An MCAP dozer clears an AP minefield. 

The preferred rifles to use with the SMUD technique a1.e the mines, which were daisy-chninc(l togcthcr, without detonating 

SO-caliberBmett~ifle,the7.62-mjllimeterM23 MKSsniperrifle, them. The systctn worked as intended and lifted and pushed 

orthe5.56-millimeterMI6equippedwithascope.Themunition them off to the side. Soldiers from the combat heavy engineer 

must be clearly identified and exposed, and the shooter must battalion operated both dozers. The battalion received the annor 

know the preferred point of attack for particular munitions. The kits just before deploying and pcrtnanently installed them on 

shooter also must know the blast radius and the general fusing their dozers (a somewhat arduous task) once they arrived in 

and activation technique for particular munitions. Combat theater. In another clearing operation, the MCAP dozers 

engineers in the U.S. cannot use this method because they are unearthed 14 AP mines and detonated 5 of them. 

not equipped with SMUD rilles, nor are they perlnittcd to The armor plating of thedozers severely restricts the operator's 

dispose of UXO. Norwegian engineers effectively used this "ision so, during ,.learing operations,a grouml is 

technique with the SO-caliber and 7.62-millimeter rifles. In ,ta safe distance to guide the opcl.ator and observe the spoil for 

addition, they have a special .50-caliber weapons station on llncalT1ledmines or UXO, A dislldvontageof the MCAP dozer is 

selected iM113 armored personnel carriers, which allows a that after,-learing an i,,.ea, not is the recently ,-leared gl-ound 

dighlly modified -50-caliber ~nachinegu~~ to heaccurately aimed susceptible to becoming a quagmire, but a hen,, which may or 

and fired from inside the MI I3 by using a telescopic camera may not contain lnines remains to he ,-leared later, ~~~~h~~ 

site. The Norwegian engineers also were equipped with tiisadvantage is that when fillly equipped, the MCAP dozer can 

manpoltable ballistic shields, which they use to provide limited only hc transpolted (,,,a c.17 or larger aircraft unless it is 

cover while engaging UXO. dis:lssembled and transported as several separate C-130 loads. 

Mechanical Clearing Fluils.Three types of flails were used in Afghanistan. The 

hline-Clearingiim~or-Protected(hIC.AP)07 Dozer.Two Norwegians used the Hydrema 9 10 mine-clearing vehicle, and 

MCAP dozers with mine-clearing rakes were in the Jordanians and British used the Aardvark mine-clearing 

Afghanistan. To m~meuver in tighter areas where only AP mines vehicle-both considered medium flails. The United States had 

wele suspected. one of the dozer'^ mine rakes was replaced three miniflails. 

with a dozer blade. ~h~ dozers setoff mincs or Hyitlu~r~rr910. This flail, which isC-130 transportablein its 

windrowed rheln into herl,ls detonatins thcll,. The standar(1 configur~tion. was used with great success. It is 

MC.L\Pdozers were effective ;It clearillg to depth ~nounted on an articulating, wheeled vehicle which has one 

6 to 18 inches (15 to 45 centimeters). depending on the engine that provides power to the tlnil and one that provides 

soil conditions. The soil was usually loose enough to ellow thc power lo the vehicle's drive train. 

dozer to clear to at least 12 inches. Thc MCAP dozer could The Hydrema wasparticul;trly well-suited fnrthe terrainand 

withstand blast.: from AP mines with litlle or no damage. soil conditions in Afghanistan. The terrain was generally flat 

However, the enclosed cab intcnsificd the blast effects from and the soil was generally loose silt and sand with occasional 

detonation. and if operators detonated several ]nines in rapid areas of hard-packed caliche. This flail detonaled nulnerous 

succession. they had to be lelieved bccause of the percussion AP mines and received very little damage: it also detonated a 

effects they experienced. 	 Tlv-62 AT mine with minimal damage. The Norwegians reported 

~h~ l,litle.clearing I.akc c~,nj~igur;,lion was prderred that they had successfully tested the Hydrema on mines as 

conriguralion sincc it was more likely to onc:lrth and windrow I'lrge as the AT mine. 

the nines off to the side. In one clc;l~.ing operation, the MCAP The Noru,egians had two Hydremas in Afghanistan. They 

dozercquippcd with the ~ninc rake unearthed four antitank (AT) had modified one by installing oversized tire\. which gave the 
/r.\'is" Detection Means .. I-<< 1 Clearance operations generally depend on 

the ability to detect mines or UXO before they bJ t.,. 

, . . ''.. , -,#. are encountered. identify the location Conceptually, of each mine if you can first or UXO, the

.. " #. _I-'.. .s-? ..s risk to clearers is significantly reduced. 

_.* , -G 

^*- ". :& Because the ground around the Kandahar and I. Fr ,* Baghramairfields was littered with all typesof '$7
,$ 

... ,. , 

~, metal clutter. standard metal mine detectors 

-. - - were almost useless. So the primary methods 

- of detecting nines and UXO were visual and x$.7. .,. ~,-

- , .. with mine detection dogs. 4.; . . ~ 

..- - -.L' 

->:-.a. - ,... . ' Visual Detection. Many of the UXO were 

surface-laid and were easy to see in the sparse 

A mine detection dog and his handler proof an area. ground cover of the area. Most of the AP and 

vehicle better tlxction, especially in wct conditions. Unclcr 

normal conditions, the Hydrema is set to clear to I8 centimeters 

(7.2 inches) below the surface, but it can clear as low as 40 

centimeters (16 inches) at a much slower rate. The Hydrema's 

normal clearing rate is about 1,800 square meters per hour. In 

Afghanistan, the Hydrerna had a high operational I-eadiness 

rate. and the Nolwegians came with spare parts, mechanics, 

and support equipment. 

addition to its slower clearance rate 

MCAP dozer), a hig disadvantage of the ~ 

flails, is thzlt the ground is left in a 

to the 

~ d as 

that allows 

it to turn into a quagmire with only a small amount of rainfall. 

Another drawback of the Hydrema was that it generated a cloud 

o[ dust. ~h~ direction of clearing was often deterlnined by the 

direction of the wind, since the operator could not see when 

the dust blew hack on the vehicle. 

Aardvark. The JOI-danians and British used the Aardvark to 

clear mines in much the same way as the Hydrema was used. 

The partially tracked vehicle, which gives it better traction in 

rough or wet terrain, experienced a somewhat low operational 

readiness rating for two reasons: repair parts were not readily 

available, and U.S. mechanics, who were onFamiliar with the 

Aardvark, were the only mechanics available to maintain it. 

Therefore, it was hard to ascertain if the low operationalreadiness rating was due to the equipment reliability or if it 

lacked the proper repair support. 

Miniflnil. The U,S, engineers had three remotelycontrolled 

miniflails, but they were not vely effective in clearing mines, 

lnainly hecause they were one instance, the 

,,,iniflilil encountered twop~~ milles--one failed todetonate 

and the other detonated end rendered the lniniflail 

inoperative, lnabngit necessary toextract it fromthe wea, ~h~ 

consensus of was [hat they would not feel 

foltable walking into an area where the sole clearance method 

wasthe miniflail, H ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ thesmall sizeofthelniniflail lnadeit 

ideal for clearing in tight areas around buildings or along trails. 

Because it can be transported in a CH-47 or sling-loaded under 

a Blackhawk,the miniflail concept is ideal forextracting soldiers 

from minefields. 

12 Engirzeo. 

AT mines, however, were buried and very difricult to see. In 

lowel--threat areas, several Norwegian soldiers carefully walked 

the area and located surface-laid UXO before they flailed the 

area with the Hydrema. For obvious reasons, visual detection 

is the least preferred method. When the Norwegian engineers 

entered high-threat areas, they wore pneumatic air boots, which 

significantly redistributed their weight and reduced the pet-- 

square-inch pressure on the ground. 

Mine Detection 1)ogs. Eight teams of dogs and their handlers 

were ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . brought in from Bosnia and used successfully. The dogs 

alerted their handlers whenever they snlelled a mine or UXO. 

Once alerted, the handler pinpointed the mine by visual means 

0' by probing and then either marked or lnanuall~ neutralized it 

as appropriate. On one occasion. a dog even located a UXO 

buried several fect below the surface. The dogs were generally 

used to proof areas to be used for troop bed-down facilities, 

artcr the areas were flailed or plowed with the MCAPdoeer. 

A drawback of using dogs for mine detection is that the 

method is significantly slower than mechanical methods. Dogs 

are also affected envilonlnental conditions, For example, 

hot limits the an,oullt of time the dogs can work, of 

olid.~arch, [he lnine detection dogs at ~ ~worked about d~ 

4 hours in the early lnorning and then again for a shol., period 

in helate evening. the sul,lmer progresses and temperatulles 

",,,the number of hours that the dogs can work each day 

be significantly reduced-perhaps even to the point that they 

will be ineffective for clearing large areas. The temperature 

effects may not he as drastic in Baghram, where the higher 

elevation will keep temperatures moderate for a longer period. 

For obvious reasons. extreme levels of dust negatively affect 

a dog's ability to detect mines. Also, recent detonations in an 

area render it unsuitable for using dogs for several days because 

the explosi\.e meterial scents the area. The amount of moisture 

on the ground also affects the dog's ability to detect mines and 

UXO. As the ground dries, vapors from the explosives rise and 

concentrate above the munitions. Because ~ , of this, an optimal 

time 10 work dogs is shortly after a moderate rain as the ground 

beginning to dry outThe table at right sun~marizes the author's opinions of the 

advantages and disadvantages of the mine neutralization and 

July 2002 
*Advantages and Dlsadvantages of Neutral~zat~on and Detectton Methods 

I Neutralization Method I Advantaqes I 	 Dsadvanta~es 1 

MCAP Dozer 

Medium Flails 

Aardvark and Hydrema 

Miniflail 

Explosive 

SMUD 

I Detection Method 

I 

Visual 

Metal Detector 


Mine Detection Dog 


- Has a rapid clearance rate 


-Clears AP mines 


- Clears subsurface. but has no depth control 

- Mechanically reliable 

- Clears rough terrain 

- C-130 transpoltable 

- Offer depth control 

- Clear at a relatively rapid rate 

- Likelv to withstand AT blasts 

- Effective for mine extraction and MOUT areas 

- Highly transportable 

-	 Has a high probability of neutralization 


(if munition is seen) 


- Effective for point targets 

- Requires no direct soldier exposure 

- Effective for point targets 

( Advantages 

I - Easiest method 

- Can scan large areas 

- Highly effective for high-metal mines and UXO 

- Leaves uncleared berms 

- Not C-130 transponable 

- Causes severe percussion if AT mine detonates 

- Makes ground susceptible to becoming a quagmire 

- Slower than the MCAP dozer 

- Cause a large dust cloud 

- Make ground susceptible to becoming a quagmire 

- Less effective in rouah terrain 

- Allows minimal subsurface clearance 

- Has a slow clearance rate 

- Not effective against buried munitions 

- Requires direct soldier exposure 

- Not effective for large areas 

- Requires special training 

- Requires special equipment 

- Requires pinpoint detection 

I 	 Disadvantages 

I - Not effective for buried munitions 

- Only as good as the obsetveis visual acuity 

- Requires direct soldier exposure 

- Not effective with metal clutter or ferrous soil 

- Relatively slow 

- Requtres direct soldier exposure 

- Has a hiah success rate under ideal condittons - Relat~velv slow 

- Affected by environmental conditions 

- Requires intensive training 

* NOTE: The advantages and disadvantages shown above are based on the subjective opinion of the author and are intended to 

give the reader a comparative analysis of the various clearance methods used in Afghanistan. This is not intended to be a 

complete objective analysis. 

detection methods used in Afghanistan. The table is not 

intended to be a complete objective analysis of clearance 

methods. 

Clearance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

I

nareas where it was u~~clenr if mines or UXO were present, 

the preferred method for initially clearing was the MCAP 

dozer or the flail. The overall clearing TTP used to clear 

large areas was usually to combine at least two or three 

detection or neutralization methods to increase the probability 

that no munitions remained. One example already mentioned 

was using the MCAP dozer or the flail in bed-down areas and 

then proofing the area with dogs. This procedure became a 

problem when the flail or MCAPdozer detonated a mine. Then 

the dogs could not be effectively used for prooiing because of 

the scent from the explosio~i. In these situations, iftime 

permitted, the dogs returned a day or two later and reworked 

the area. When time was short, the MCAP dozer was used, 

followed by a visual inspection of the area by engineers. In 

low-threat areas, the Norwegians walked the area to conduct a 

visual inspection, used the flail, and then reinspected the area. 

Ju1.v 2002 

Area-Clearance Tracking and Control 

The task forces at each camp in Afghanistan effectively 

track area-clearance operations, but as of this writing. 

they had not established robust militaly mine action 

centers. These centers are needed to act as the single point of 

contact to collect information on the mineRTX0 threat in the 

surrounding areas, coordinate area-clearance activities, 

prioritize areas to be cleared, and keep a single updated map 

and database that contain all mine-clearing operations. 

At each base camp, engineers were responsible for tracking 

clearance operations and reporting which areas had been 

cleal-ed and where mines and UXO had been located. They 

have made contact with the local demining organizations and 

have maintained good communications with these organizations. However, insome circumstances, clearance procedures 

are not being tracked in enough detail to allow the areas to be 

turned over to a hnmanita~ian demining center upon conclusion 

of operations. To continue their operations, the humanitarian 

deminers need an exact description of the procedures and 

markings used in each area so that they can determine what 

further actions are required to certify that the area is cleared to 

Engineer 13 
Tier UI United Nations demining standards. As soon as possible 

after the immediate operational areas are cleared, mine-clearing 

participants need to meet and establish a milirary mine action 

center and ensure that procedures are established for reporting 

the current status and assigning priorities. The mine action 

center is responsible for establishing a master plan for clearing 

areas and for establishing standards for how these areas are to 

be cleared. Representatives from each clearance unit need to 

attend regularly conducted area-clearance meetings to repon 

the current Slams, update the group, and review the current 

priorities. 

Role of EOD Personnel and Sappers 

An observation made regarding the interaction 

of EOD personnel and engineer units in Afghanistan was that most of our Coalition partners embed 

their EOD personnel in theirengineer forces.And, in my opinion, 

some of the Coalition force engineers seemed to be more 

knowledgeable on threat mines and UXO and their internal 

workings than their U.S. counterparts. 

On the ground, U.S. EOD personnel and engineers communicated well with each other and worked well together. U.S. 

EOD units called the U.S. engineers whenever they encountered minefields, and engineers asked for EOD support 

when they encountered UXO. An EOD representative was 

usually in contact with the engineer staff on a daily basis and, 

at Baghram, an EOD staff representative worked directly inside 

the engineer staff cell. 

In some situations, EOD personnel were prefemed over 

engineers when it came to destroying weapons caches because 

of a fear that the caches would be booby-trapped. U.S. 

engineers (12Bs) currently do not receive booby trap training 

in basic or advanced individual training. Likewise, U.S. en,'weer 

officers receive no training on booby traps in the Officers Basic 

Course or Engineer Captain's Career Course. The Engineer 

School is working to alleviate this situation by initiating anew 

booby trap fainiliarization course at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. The course-which will train students in the 

rudimentary elements of booby trap recognition, detection. 

reporting, and clearance planning-will greatly enhance any 

previous training that soldiers may have had. It must be 

emphasized that the course will not make the students "experts" 

at booby trap clearance-nor is it intended to. Booby trap 

clearance operations are inherently dangerous and, as such, 

should always be conducted with the assistance of EOD 

technicians. --

The MCAP 

areas, esp

- -:-A --8. 

clearing la 

Norwegian 

they claim 

Mine detec .. .. 

-

rge areas. 

engineers 

-..A L-..-

Lessons Learned 

dozer was an effectivetool for clearing large 

ecially when the dozer was equipped with 

a lrurla raKe. 

Installing armor plating on a D7 dozer was an arduous 

task and limited the dozer's uses for other missions. 

The Norweaian Hvdrerna was highly effective in 

are equipped to conduct SMUD 

upwauurps ~IIUrmvc pneumatic mine boots, which 

are highly 8 

:tion dogs \n ing mines. 

units need TFP for estao~lsningmilitary mine action 

centers. 

U.S. engineers need booby trap training, need to be 

rnorefamiliar with the characteristics of various mines 

and UXO, and need to be prepared to react to mines 

and UXO properly when they are encountered. 

effective. 

fere effecti! . ... .. /e at detect 

.,.. 

Conclusion 

ngineers at both the individual and unit levels are 

accomplishing a wide variety of tasks and missions in 

Afghanistan, many of which are outsidetheir designated 

specialty areas or traditional missions. For example, light 

engineers built EPW holding areas, latrines, and guard shacks, 

while combat heavy units clearedlarge areas, conducted security 

operations, and made water wells and wastewater systems 

operational. 

1 One thing was clear: engineers-no matter what their 

unit affiliation or norn~alarea of expertise-were looked 

on as subject-matter experts in all engineering tasks. And 

it was evident that engineer leaders at all levels still need 

to be jacks-of-all-trades to he effective on the modem 

battlefield. w 

Major McNuIp is the exec~~tiveoflcer of the 577th 

Engineer Battalion, 1st Engineer Bri~ade.Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missonri. He was previously the 

operations officer, 5th Engineer Batralion, Forr 

Leonard Wood, Mi.~souri.A gradrrate of the United

I States Milita~yAcademy, MAJ McNuIn holds a master t 

degree in nlineral economics,~omthe Colorado School 

:.< of Mines. He traveled to Afghanistan as a member of a . . Combined-Arms Assessmenf Team led by the Centerfor 

Engineer soldiers build latrines. Amy Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

14 Engineer July 2002 
Field Manual IFM)71.1, Tuizk i~i~diW~~~~lrii~~i:cd injn11mCori7por7~Terun, provides the following definition of the 

responsibilities of the maneuver company second in 

co~nmand(21C): 

Assist the commander with command and control (C2). 

Ensure that accurate, timely tactical reports are sent to higher 

headquarters. 

Conduct tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and 

supporting units. 

Assist the commander in company troop-leading 

procedures. 

Prepare to assume command if necessary. 

All of these roles are critical and are designed to do one 

thing-help the maneuver commander command his company. 

Without the assistance of the 21C (typically the executive 

officer [XO]), the requirements and burdens of command in a 

warfighting scenario can he overwhelming. The 21C is the 

commander's right-hand man-his wingman-with a similar 

fighting platform (tank or Bradley) to fight forward and help 

command. 

Who fills this role in the combat engineer company? 

Rotation after rotation, battle after battle at the National Training 

Center, Fort Irwin, California, the answer continues to be the 

same-no one. Yet combat engineer companies are executing 

more combat missions as a warfighting headquarters-not 

simply as force providers and task-force-level staff integrators. 

We see engineer companies as the breach i'orce in task-forcelevel hrcaching operations. en:lneer companies in direct 

support to the task force during defense-in-sector preparations, 

and an economy-of-force element to conduct shaping 

operations during movements to contact. With increasing 

frequency, engineer commanders are commanding their 

companies-hut they al-e doing so without the assistance that 

their maneuver peers could not possibly fight without. The 

results, typified by the scenario in Figure 1, page 16, and 

amplified in the subsequent sections, includeBreakdown of C2 at the critical point of the fight-often the 

breach. 

Span of control issues--one leader working across the 

full width and depth of the task force's battlespace, 

orchestrating the combat operations for a variety of 

subordinate units with a variety of critical tasks. 

Minimal assistance provided to the com~nanderduring the 

planning, preparation. and preexecution phases of the 

mission. 

Reporting requirement-verload. One leader cannot be 

expected to manage at least three nets (typically en,'meer 

company command, maneuver task force command, 

engineer battalion command) simultaneously. 

Combat service support (CSS) issues--especially maintenance-ften take "center stage" and become the commander's close fight. 

m Succession of command-no one is prepared to take over 

the company should the commander be unable to continue. 

Jub 2002 Engineer 15 
''In ... circumstances - where experience provides few answers, 

commanders combine their experience, intuition, and judgment 

withI the recommendations of the staff and subordinates to 

create new stratem;- " 

Operations

The Dilemma a mobility reserve. During defensive operations, companies 

The National Training Center continues to highlight the consistently fight pure, typically in direct support to maneuver 

following observations and trends with respect to units.Engineertransition intoBradleyengineerfightingvehicles 

engineer company C2: (BEWs) will add combat power and capabilities to the task 

force that will make these arrangements even more likely. Engineer Durine offensive onerations. the engineer commander is 

With increasing frequency. we are seeing atransition from more likeiy to sene as'the breach force commander. As such, engineer conimanders functioning as task force mobility1 he is typical,y responsible for creating and marking lanes 

survivability (MIS) Battlefield Operating System (BOS) through or around obstacles, securing the neanide and farside 

integrators (dividing out resources and advising task force ,,fthe obstacle, defeating forcesthat can ,,lace immediate direct 

commanders) to warfighting company commanders in leaner fires on the area, and reporting lane statuses1 

(Ihree maneuver under Ihe Force XXI design) task locations. The reverse breach ~lannine -.Drocess, outlined in

forces. FM 3-34.2. Combined-Anns Breaching Operarions. often 

In offensive operations, task force commanders are results in a breach force (the engineer companylteam) with six 

increasingly likely to leverage the capabilities and leadership or more platoons, each with unique capabilities. Figure 2 depicts 

of the engineer commander as a breaching or shaping force or one possible organization for actions at the most critical point 

, , , ,.

;et 81445 hours. 

Engineer assets spread across . : 

the depth of the battlefield. 

...n... .".. ..a +. hi . . -

7 

.%"... 0L.I

.,I 

- - 

on the. battlefield for an attacking task forcethe breach. The engineer commander may 

have a tank or Bradley platoon to secure the 

point of breach, a mechanical smoke platoon 

to screen movement into and actions at the 

point of breach, two to three sapper platoons 

with attachments to reduce two lanes (with 

redundancy), and perhaps even a military 

police platoon to facilitate traffic flow around 

or through obstacles. The engineer company/ 

team may also include an assault and obstacle 

(A&O) platoon tasked with mobility or 

countermobility missions, to include mineclearing line charge (MICLIC) reload 

operations, lane improvement, Volcano 

emplacement, and other countermobility and 

survivability tasks associated with flank 

security or hasty defense. 

Is it any wonder that we continue to list 

breaching operations as the most complicated 

mission we ask our units to execute? By some measures, we 

have CI-eated a completely horizontal engineer company C2 

structure that, in many cases, contributes to the complexities 

at the breach. Add to these the requirements to synchronize 

indirect and direct fires (attached maneuver or organic " BEFV

systems) at this critical phase of the attack, and the friction 

approaches chaos! In most scenarios, the commander must 

execute all of this without his own unique, appropriately 

positioned command post (his command post is tied into the 

task force tactical operations center [TOC] along with his 

company XO, wherever that may be) and no wingman! 

Communications Overload 

While the engineer commander fights his company, the task 

force and engineer hattalion commanders are fighting their 

respective units and need continuous, accurate reports to be 

able to make decisions and keep their own higher headquarters 

informed. Typically this results in the requirement for the 

engineer company commander to monitor three FM nets 

(company conmand, task forcecommand, andengineerbanalion 

command) using only two radios. It cannot be done! Unfortunately, no one is forward with the commander to relieve 

him of some of these reporting requirements so that he can 

focus on his primary responsibility-fighting his company. 

CSS Challenges 

As engineer conlpanies fight, they expend resources like 

any other unit-and things break. Whether accounting for the 

unique requirements or organic and attached ~lnirs (MI fuel, 

fog oil resupply. MICLIC reload operations, or even Stinger 

missiles), or keeping a firm hand on the readiness of aging 

engineer equipment, CSS is not a "change-of-mission" event. 

Unfortunately, the leader who is the primary CSS planner and 

maintenance integrator in most combat engineer companies in 

gal~ison (the company XO) is typically not available to help 

orchestrate these critical tasks during combat operations. 

Figure 2. Breach force at the point of the breach 

Whether hy design or by default, the engineer company XO is 

-locked" inside the task force TOC, leaving only the company 

first sergeant and the company commander to plan, prepare, 

and execute the critical "Paragraph 4" tasks. WHERE IS THE 

HELP?~ 

Successionofcommand 

Who is the 2IC? Who has the situational awareness to take 

command should the commander be unable to continuc? Who 

is positioned on the battlefield to be able to do this without 

losing monientnm? Who has the fighting platform, the 

communications canabilities. the reauisite leadershin skills. and 

an adequate understanding of the plan to be able to "step up" 

if Answer-tz00nc' 

A Fightine 21C 

There are at least two possible courses of action (COAs), 

neither of which is easy nor perfect. Each has 

advantages and disadvantages and may require some 

"ou~side-of-the-box" thinking. Hopefully, the issues identified 

above are enough to make us all do so. Both COAs take into 

account that someone must fill the role of dedicated BOS 

integrator within the tdsk force TOC-and someone fiiitst till 

the role of21C. 

rna --.-A i

Use the XO as the fighting 21C while moving the A&O 

platoon leader inlo the task fol-ce TOC to senre as the assistant 

task force engineer (A/TFE)ltask force staff officer. The XO is 

the most senior and experienced lieutenant in the company, 

typically having served as a platoon leader and as a staffofficer. 

The XO is already the company's chief CSS and maintenance 

planner and coordinator. He is the actual 21C, already handles 

many of these 2IC duties when not deployed with the task 

force, and is arguably the leader most capable of assuming 

command when necessary. Observations at the National 

Training Center are that the A&O platoon leader is considerably 
engineer battlefield assessment, works with the task force ENBNCMD pxTS2 in developing the task force's situation template, and I TFCMD participates in the militaty decision-making process with 

the task force staff to help the commander integrate 

PR12 

- ? COCMD f1

Figure 3. Comrno configuration "A Way" 

unden~tilized. His assets-M9 armored combat earthmovers 

(ACES). armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs). armored 

vehicle-launched MlCLICs (AVLMs), atid Volcanoes-are 

generally not working for him hut are task-organi7ed with one 

of the line platoons. What remains could be led b!' the platoon 

sergeant. We submit that the task fol-ces will not. or do not, 

care who shoa:s up as the mFE-as lonp as that person is a 

dedicated. competent engineer staff officer. The A&Q platoon 

leader generally has an adequate understanding of his 

company's capabilities and should be able to work with (lie 

task staff to integrate engineers and the MIS BOS into 

thc task force scheme of maneuver. This is a paradig111 shift, 

but a manapeable one. (We said this would not he easy!) 

COA 2 

The A&O platoon leader serves as the fighting 2IC, and the 

XO stays in the TOC. This COA is clearly the easiest to 

implement. The XO continues to sen-e as most cu~~entlq do, 

integrating the BOS at the task force level. while the A&O 

platoon leader. currently underutilized. is empowered to help 

the commander command. With respect to CSS, most 

maintenance issues within theengineerco~npany are related to 

the A&O platoon. so its leader is already familiar with a large 

percentage of the critical logistics issues. However. the A&O 

platoon leader is not as experienced as the XO and is nor the 

actual 2IC. 

Discussion 

The divisio~i of labor between Lhe commander. fighting 21C. 

and engineer BOS integrator (ARFE) does not valy bet\\~een 

either COA. While the commanderstill has overall responsibility 

for commanding the co~npany and being a task force staff 

officer (task fol-ce engineer), he has a dedicated lieutenant to 

assist in each capacity. The commander gives the NTFE 

guidance and direction for the integration of the MIS BOS into 

the task force scheme of maneuver. The 21C has a primary focus 

of helping the commander command. assisting with leadership, 

discipline, employment, ti-aining. and sustainment of the 

company. 

The engineer BOS integrator fights from the task forceTOC. 

He assists the commander with the initial development of the 

' engineers into the task force's scheme of maneuver. He 

further assists with Lhe preparation of the task force 

engineer annex. conipany operations order, and en,' c71neer 

logistics planning in the task force sector. He monitors 

engineer preparation and execution status as all integral 

part of the task force TOC. 

' The fighting ?IC is responsible for ensuring that 

accurate and timely tactical reports are sent to both the 

supported task force and engineer battalion. He conducts 

tactical coordination with higher. adjacent. anti I 

?tipporting units; conducts additional niissions as 

required: assists the commander with troop-leading 

procedures: and, in conjunction with the first sergeant. plans 

and super\,ises the company CSS effort. Dul-ing the fight, he 

assists with C2 and ensures that tactical reports are sent to 

both higher commands (task force and engineer battalion) (see 

Figure 3). 

In both COAs. the AXIO platoon sergeant must be prepared 

to take over the duties of the platoon leader in the ficld. The 

platoonleader sel,,es either in the task force (COA I) or 

as the commander's wingman (COA 2).Most likely the senior 

and most capable of the available platoon sergeants in the 

platoon role is that of 

force/asset provider and CSS executor. 

Benefits of the 21C 

Afighting 21C provides value to more than just the 

engineer company comin;lnder. Reducing the numbcr 

of tasks the engineer company commander must 

i~ersoiioll?accomplish allows him to focus on the critical 

aspects of the company fight without sacrificing tasks critical 

to higher and adjacent units. While the commander may I'ncus 

on critical planningipreparatim issues such as company orders. 

precombat checks and inspections. and I-ehearsals. the 21C may 

he tracking unit statuses, planning and coordinating company 

CSS efforts. and assisting in troop-leading procedures. Since 

the 21C is familiar with the company scheme of maneuver that 

he helped the conim;lnder develop, he may be available to 

attend the brigade-combat-teamt-tea (BCT)-level MIS rehearsal, 

freeing thecommander to co~nplete his company and task force 

combined-arms rehearsals4efinitcly a win-win scen;irio! 

During the execution phase, the commander can focus on the 

cl-itical aspects of fighting his company. The 21C pushes combat 

reports (yes. this is another paradigm shift-engineer 

companies pushinz info~mation!) to the rask force andengineer 

battalion and coordinates supporting efforts such as 

mechanized smoke, air defense, or CSS, again allowing the 

commander to fipht his company. 

Similar to tank and mechanized infantry compdny 2ICs. our 

2IC priinarily focuses on integration with higher and adjacent 

units. Therefore, the task force and engineer batt a I '1011 
commanders get firsthand spot reports as the situation 

develops, regardless of how involved the commander is in the 

close fight. The improved situational awareness at task-fol-ce 

and engineer-battalion levels improves the abilities of both 

commanders to make decisions. The task force coinmander is 

better prepared to shift focus of supporting forces and commitment of assaultforces. Even more time critical is the engineer 

battalion commander's ability to shift engineer assets across 

the BCT to take advantage of successes or react to a lack of 

success. Both higher commands can now make better andmore 

timely recommendations to the BCT comn~ander. 

This delineation of duties frees the company first sergeant 

to focus on soldier preparedness. While the 21C focuses on 

CSS planning and synchronization, the first sergeant is able to 

supervise the execution of CSS operations. He may also find 

more time to help thecommander by supervising the company's 

execution of precombat checks and subordinate-unit rehearsals, in turn ensuring that the company is more prepared 

for the commander's inspections and higher-level rehearsals. 

Again, it is a win-win situation. 

Conclusion 

Afighting 21C is a force multiplier for the engineer 

company, maneuver task force, and engineer battalion. He frees up the company commander to focus 

on the decisive point of the company fight. He provides 

firsthand tactical reports to higher headquarters regardless of 

how busy the commander is. And the fighting 21C has the 

situational awareness to assume the fight if it becomes 

necessary. 

To fully develop duties and responsibilities for the 21C, we 

can stan by looking at how tank and mechanized infantry 

companies utilize their XO. Thus, FM 71-1 is a point of entry 

for this analysis. For duties and responsibilities of the engineer 

BOS integrator (mFE in the task force TOC), the description 

in FM 5-71-2, Armored Task Force Engineer Combat 

Operations, remains an excellent guide. These duties and 

responsibilities could be refined and trained during officer 

professional development and company lane exercises, then 

confirmed during integrated combined-arms training exercises. 

Each COA has relative strengths and weaknesses and is 

likely unit- and personality-dependent. We have not 

recommended a particular COA-just that you pick one. 

Hopefully, this discussion has convinced (or reminded) you 

that the C2 of combat engineer companies requires that 

someone fill the 21C role. Decide who this person is; determine 

appropriate employment tactics, techniques, and procedures; 

and stat7 practicing. The potential benefit to the company's 

wa~fighting capabilities and its integration within the task force 

and engineer battalion are too great not to move forward. 

company and task force M/S BOS truiner at the Nntional 

Training Center and commanded Alplzrr Con~pany, -317th 

Engineer Bnttalion. CPTBunon is a grad~rate of the University 

of Nevada and holds a master's degree in rivil engineering 

,from the University of Missouri. 

Lieutennizt Colonel Magness is the Detroit District 

Commander,for the U.S. Amy Corps of engineer,^. Previous 

assignments include engineer baftaliorz S3 truiner on the 

Sidewinder Team ai the National Training Center; brigade 

and battalion S3, 4th Infant? Division, Fort Hood, Texas; 

company comnmndec 16tlz Er7gineer Battalion, Isr Arnzored 

Division, Gennar~y; and platoon leader and battalion staff 

oSJicec 17th Engineer Batmlion, 2d Armored Division. LTC 

Magness is a graduate of the United States Militat>' Acaderny 

and the Comrnand and General Staff College and holds a 

master S degree from the University of Texas. 

Pariting Shots 

As indicated in this article, no COA for how we implement this is easy--or perfect. It is worth concluding with 

some "unconstrained tactics, techniques, and procedures for how we might implement this technique to 

maximize its potential: 

d 	 Identify the requirement for a dedicated engineer staff 

officer at the task-force level (like the 52 or the firesupport officer) and assign him to the maneuver 

headquarters for which he will work. Include the 

division cavalry squadron with this staffing reauirement. MIS intearation and terrain analysis are 

to be ava ~lable withit :uver staff 

function of task orgal e need to 

condition:;where th der is not 

command of his con I are impor tant-and 

should be fully resoi 

4 Adiust lieutenant career oroaresslon models to . 	 . account for the crit ical assig~ nment of IMIS BOS 

integration.Currently, engineer I~fficers spe nd almost 

no warfig hting time between platoon le ader and -" . ....A :' . .- . . -- - . .L- Gurllpal~y uur~c~~~er!u-~~ yuu atiGapc itla arytlment that 

A&O platoon leader (force provider), company XO 

(task force staff officer), and engineer battalion staff 

are not "trigger pullers." This is not unlike the 

artillery model-where lieutenants serve as firesupport integrators (company fire-support team) 

before moving to gun platoons. This gives lieutenants 

at least two warfighting assignments-platoon leader 

and compi 3ny XO. 

d !20cn,,rnn,,,,,,,, the 21C with an MI13 (and ultimately a 

BEFV). This obviously has huge implications. Is the 

appropriate number of Bradleys in an engineer 

company 9--or is it lo? We believe it is the latterTrain the Force! just as it is for tank (Ml) and mechanized infantry 

(M2) units 

Captain Burton is an irzsfrnctor at the Infantr)' School, 

Fort Berznirzg, Grot-gin. He previously served as an engineer 

July 2002 Engineer 19 
Updating Riuer-Crossing Doctrine: 

Who and When? 

q;-*:-. . . . 

when I re\,iewcil the firit ill.;iit 01 l.ir.ld.\ln~~unlI 1.\11 

.>-93.D<visi~'eForce: T1ir r2~7r?. bi Tilenrcr Operarions, one line early in the manual caught my 

attri~tion:"As a doctrine-based organization, the foundations 

of the Army's doctrine for full-spectrum operations are found 

in FM 3-0 (formerly 100-5), Operations."' This made me think 

of three things: 

FM 100-5 was the capstone document for doctrine 

throughout my career. Its importance to winning the Cold 

War ad many other hot conflicts, especially Desen Storm, 

cannot be underestimated. This quote about "doctrinebased organizations" and FM 100-5 reminded me just how 

important doctrine is. We are truly a doctrine-based 

organization and are only as good as our written foundation. 

Headlines in the Army Tin~esstated. "Rock BottomTraining Centers Repon They Can't Meet the Mission"' 

and 'Training Command the Hardest Hit in Manning Plan."" 

Our docmne is written at the training centers. If they aren't 

supported. our doctrinal base will not be updated. We will 

be stuck on a single step in the never-ending staircase of 

military evolution. My concerns were confirmed when I 

called the Engineer School and learned that its doctrine cell 

consisted of three people and was being reduced to two in 

the near future. 

I encountered a doctrine problem in the 2d lnfanuy Division 

concerning river-crossing operations. The essence of this 

problem was rafts versus bridges. 

Infai~t~ylh\1\1(>11dlld tllc IUlsI Airbor~ii'll~\~hi~n. [n these 

lizht orfa~iizations.rivcl- crossing wasn't on our missionessential task list. so we simply didn't train on it. The last time 

I planned and participated in major river-crossing operations 

was as a company commander in the 1st Armored Division 

during Reforger79. During my four-plusyean with this division, 

we conducted numerous river crossings. The primary lesson 

we learned with mobile assault bridges (MABs) and the "new" 

ribbon bridge was that you bridge as soon as possible. We 

rafted only when we couldn't get a bridge in quickly enough to 

support the maneuver commander'splan. There was some risk, 

but it was offset by the much greater buildup of combat power 

afforded by bridges. During Reforger 79. we went straight to 

bridging. Our combat power built up and quickly overwhelmed 

the opposing force-1st Tank seized and maintained the 

initiative until the end of the exercise. 

At the 2d Infanuy Division, I ran into thedoctrinal problemof 

rafts versus bridges. During a planning session. I commented 

that as a general rule I recommended rafting only when there 

were not enough assets to build a bridge. The response was, 

"This isn't our doctrine; we raftto build initial combat power and 

then transition to bridges." We discussed that the decision to 

bridge immediately was a situational decision based on the 

calculus of combat-power buildup and the level of risk the 

comm,mder was willing to accept. Even so, my audience still 

believed that rafting operations are a necessruy part of doctrinal 

river-crossing operations. They provided direct quotes from FM 

90-13. River-Gossing Operations, to support their argument. 

Rafts versus Bridges In reviewing FM 90-13. 1discovered that there were very - ~ 

few references to immediate bridge constmction. They were uring my last assignment as the engineer brigade limited to the following: commander for the 2d Infantry Division, I was very 

fortunate to have a bridge company as part of the "Cornrno~~der.~ ma)' considel-irnrnediare consrnrcrion ofa 

hi-igailc.My previous engineer assignments were with the 25th bridge dlrrit~gthis phase (Phase I1 - Assault Across the River) 

20 Engineer Jnl? 2002 
without ever conducting raffing operations. The advantage r Are less vulnerable to enemy air and indirect fire due to 


is thnt the combat power can be marsed on thefar shore at a their size and maneuverability. 


muchfaster rate. Tlie risk that the commander takes in making to assemble, 


rhis decision is that a larger amount of bridging assets is 


r Offer more flexibility in operation, particrrlarly in site exposed to ernemyfire before the elimination ofenern? indirect 

fires on rhe crossing area. "' selection and slrbsequent movement betuleen sites. 

"Since vehicles cross rivers much faster on bridges than r Can use eristirig road networks and banks where access 

on raffs, earh bridge assembly is desirable l?ut must be and exit routes are not aligned opposite of each othel: "'O 

weighed against the risk that the enemy can still bring indirect Consider the following- fires do~n onan immobile bridge. "' 

"A river crossing is a race between the crossing force and References on the need for rafting were much more numerous the enerny to mas.s connbat power on thefar- shore. The longer and included the following: the force takes to cross, the less likelv it %,ill succeed as the 

"Bridges replace or supplement rajls once enen~>~-obsen*ed enemy will defeat, in detail, the elements split b? the river: 

indir-ectjire is eliminated. "6 Speed is so important to crossing success that estraordinan 

measnres are jrrst;fied to nzaintain it. The commander must 

"The need lo get lank$ across the means the allow no interference with theflow of vehicles ar~d units once 

rajiing stage often begins before terrain on the far shore is the crossing llas uu 

secure to the planned (release line) RL. "' The calculus of force buildup is greatly enhanced by 

"Heaw r@s are prepared to irflnsport tanks and infantry immediate construction of bridges if the situation allows. To 

fighting vehicles to the far shore,for reinforcing thedismounted close a I gap on the ~ iwhere~ we routinely ~ , ~
 infanm: "" trained. with one conshuction site took about 90 minutes. At 


"Enem) bzdirecffire into the crossing ar-en will probablj this point, we could begin crossing vehicles at the rate of 200 

continue; howeve6 each crossing site within the crossing area an hour. If we initially built the two rafts that can be 

must be isolated from direct fire to enable the construction accommodated with a single centerline on a 150-meter gap, we 

and operation of rafrs. These rafts will then be used to could cross 14 MI tanks in 95 minutes. 

transport armored vehicles for rapid reinforcement of the ~i~~ ,,,inUtes after the bridge went into it began 

dismorrnted infant- rask.force. "' to exceed the crossing capability of the rafts. It could cross 33 

"Rafrs are usually the initial means fof- crossing fnon- vehicles every 10 minutes versus the two vehicles crossed by 


swimming vehicles-particularly tanh-n wide, rrnfordable the rafts. This is a significant payoff that must be considered 


rivers. It may be possible to bridge ir~rn~ediareb nfrer the 
 and not ignored due to the wording and structure of our 


assnrrlt across the river; however: raffing is r~ormallyfir,~t doctrine. (See the table on page 22 ror the vehicle-crossing 


because rajis- timelines.) 


.. 

. 

, .,<

-- : ~- s 

. 

~...,.., 
 ,- ---


-~-&<
 - :-:-> 

*C . - .. ,. 

'p..
,; .>: u~ %I%.,,,:.. 

-~----- ,.2.::. ., .. " , - '-:aU_ -

Members of the 50th Engineer Company 'Bridge the Gap!" 
mber 

v

of Vehicles 

I 


C 

Why doesn't our doctrine explain how to compare bridges 

to rafts and definitely say that going immediately to bridges is 

a serious option? My initial thoughts were that we were still 

using doctrine based on old time-intensive bridge systems. As 

a platoon leader, I had experience in building Class 60 and 

M4T6 rafts. For trained troops, building a Class 60raft capable 

of carrying an M60 tank took 50 minutes if the pontoons were 

preinflated and combat-loaded and 90 minutes otherwise. For 

Ihe equivalent M4T6 !-aft, it took 100 minutes.12 For both types 

of hridging. it took 3 to 5 hours to build the 150-meter bridge 

required for the Imjin River example." I believed that since it 

took so long for bridge construction. these bridge systems 

forced us to initially build rafts. This suspicion led me to the 

Military History Institute, where I reviewed all available rivercrossing publications beginning with one dated 31 January 

1941 to the present one dated 26 January 1998. 

As I reviewed the various manuals, I was surprisedespecially by the post-World War I1 publications. The 

manuals of the 1940s depended heavily on various rafts 

with the standard rafting operations followed by bridging 

operations. The first field manual I found that was totally 

dedicated to river crossing was FM 31-60. River-Crossing 

Operations, dated August 1952. Based on the date, I 

assumed that it incorporated lessons from World War I1 

and the initial lessons from the Korean War. Following are 

some of the more interesting quotes: 

"While it is desirable to delay [bridge] construction until 


the ~on~fructio~i 
 site is relativel)' safe from observed arti1ler)l 


fire, the responsible commander must evaluate the effect qf 


delaying erection on lzis mission against losses of rrained 


personnel nnd equipment. "" 


"Tl?e.follo~ving ,factors must be considered before heal?.- 


bridge construction is ordered: 


(I) 	The mission 

(2) 	The tactical and logistical srrpport required hy forces on 

the far side of the river 

(3) The amount of available and reserve hridging 

(4) The accuracy onrl inrensio of enem). air artacks ond 

arrilleppre on the bridge site. 

(5) 	Theprobable <ici~~gei-ofloss of rha hridgehend ifsi<fticient 

armor cannot he crossed until rhe bridge is in. 

(6) 	When additional bridging nmterial is unavailable, tlie 

effect on. tlie operation ij the bridge were (Ielesfroyed by 

the enemy 

(7) AvailahiliQ and use of smoke-generating equipment. "" 

"R<frs are an excellent means of putring rhe high-priorin. 

e.ssenria1 vehicles info the bridgehead during the i~~terval 

between the assnrrlt crossing and the conipletion qf bridges. 

1 

E~nploying nlen and equipment on raft consrrrrcfion and use, 

howeiar, may retard rhe buil<Iirig of bridges. It takes almost 

as long to build a rap and to put it into 

operation as it does to build a bridxe to 

spnn a stream which is 15Ofeet or less 

in width. "'" 

"Bridges are cu~istr-ucred qfrer the 

second objecrive (a position that 

e1iminafe.r the enemyk obsewedfires) is 

taken or errrlier if enemy artillery fire 

proves to be ineffective, has been 

rendered so, or has beer? neutralized "" 

Manuals up into the 1970s continued 

to reflect this more aggressive use of 

bridges, to include the 1972 vel.sion of 

FM31-60that I used withthe 1st Armored 

Division. It included the following 

information: 

"Fuilure to construct bridges earh, 

1st Brigade, 

~.

2d 

-

Infantry Division, 

--	

crossesrhe 

-

Imjin. 	 in the operation mas result m delayirig 
Tanks of the 1st Brigade continue to pour across the lmjin to 

exploit success. 

rlre advance beyond rhe rive,: This may allow the enemy time 

ra reinfor-ce with sufficient ~trertgth to delqorpre~~errt securing 

the bridgehead."'" 

"The initial advantage of speed in commencing operation 

of' raps may be mol-e than ofjier by the greater eficienc)' of 

bridges that can be placed in operation in a short time. 

Construcrion of bridges begins as early as possible. "'O 

"If sufficiott MAB equipn~ent is available, consideration 

must be given to employing it as a bridge early in the 

operation. Asse~nbly tinles are shorter when cornpared to other 

types offloat bridges. In addition, if enemy .fires should 

increase to a le~iel endangering rhe bridge, !he MAE anits 

crrn rapidly disengagc,,fronz one another and be recor~fijiured 

as raf.7 until the fires s~rbsidr.~~ 

I find it interesting that the older manuals address constructing bridges as soon as possible and go into more detail 

than our current manual does on considerations for omitting 

rafting. Going immediately to bridging should not be ruled out 

just because it is only addressed by four sentences in our 

doctrine. We need to emphasize the importance of rapidly 

building combat power and consider going straight to bridges. 

Immediate bridging operations should be a serious course of 

action for all river-crossing operations. The experiences gained 

during World War 11, the Korean War, and the Cold War shot~ld 

not be forgotten by current doctrine. They must be overtly 

reflected in our current doctrine for planning considerations. 

We cannot raise a new generation of sapper warriors who don't 

seriously consider all options. This is especially important since 

American large-scale river-crossing experience is rapidly 

shrinking. With only a handful of active duty bridge units, we 

have largely lost our "hands-on experience." This makes 

doctrine even more important. Future generations of engineers 

will depend on it. 

s-ary 

n the narrow scheme of things concerning river-crossing 

doctrine, we need to capture our experiences and include 

the considerations for going straight to bridging. We must 

make it a possible course of action and check the 

calculus to see if the benefits are worth the risk for the 

maneuver commander. Don't just ignore this option 

due to a doctrinal deficiency. As a doctrine-based 

organization, we must update our doctrine as our 

systems change, to provide more flexibility. Decision 

makers need to be empowered and not shackled with a 

doctrine that no longer fits the bill. Let's start the 

dialogue to help the Engineer School update our 

doctrine. 

Who.. . and when? Us.. . and NOW! Y 


Colonel Littlefield (now rerired) was assigned to 

the U.S. Army War College's Del~artrnent of Milirary 

Strateg] Planning, arul Operations when he wrote this 

article. He previously comma~rded the 2d Infarttry 

Division :r E~lgineer Brigade. A gradzrnfe of the Utrited 

States Militaq Accrcle~ity, COL Littlefield holds a rnusterS 

degree in operafions research/systems analysis from tlie Naval 

Postgraduate Scl!ool. He was ajoint special^ oflcer and is a 

registered professional erlgirzeer in the stare of Virginia. 

Endnotes 

'FM 3-93 (100-7), Decisive Force: The Army in Theater 

Operations, First Draft, July 2000. pp. 1-14. 

Sean D. Naylor, "Rock Bottom," Army Times, 11 

September 2000, p. 8. 

Sean D. Naylor, 'Training Command the Hardest Hit in 

Manning Plan", Army Jimes, 4 September 2000, p. 10. 

VM 90-13, River-Crossing Operations, 26 January 1998, 

p. 5-8. 

lbid, pp. 7-14. 

Ibid, pp. 7-13. 

'lbid, pp. 3-11. 


Ibid, pp. 5-6. 


Ibid, pp. 5-8. 


'O Ibid. pp. 7-9. 


" Ibid, pp. 1-6. 


j2 FM 31-60, River-Crossing Operations, 27 March 1972, 

p. 60. 

j3 
lbid, p. 67. 

'' FM 31-60, River-Crossing Operations, August 1952, 

para. 45. 

lbid, para 45. 

l6 lbid, para. 62. 

"Ibid, para. 63. 

FM 31-60, River-Crossing Operations, 27 March 1972, 

pp. 3-19. 

'9 lbid, pp. 3-28. 


"Ibid, pp. 3-28. 

B,y First Lieutenant Nicholas Melin 

22 Allgust 200.3 

The president orders the XXVIIIAirborne Corps and 82d 

Airborne Division to condrrct a noncombatant evacuation 

operation in one countrx while simultaneously providing 

support to an ongoing United Nations stabilih, operation. 

The 82d notjfies the 307th Engineer Battalion and its 

attached light equipment company, the 618th Engineer 

Company, during the mission analysis portion of the military 

decision-moking process. The division operations officer and 

the division engineer estimate that at least eight airfield.% are 

required to succe.ssful(y deploy the division's follow-on forces 

in theater: with one Interim Brigade Combat Tennz to urrive 

within 96 hour.% Further analysis shows that the host nation 

has only four operational airJelds in the area of operation 

and the Army must construct the rest. To meet the deployment 

timetable nnd handle the increased throughput of supplies, 

these ai6elds must be operational in I0 days. 

Joint Rapid Airfield Construction Program 

nfortunately, it typically takes more than 30 days to 

complete an ailfield construction project ofthis nature. 

Herein lies the issue confronting the Joint Rapid 

Airfield Construction (JRAC) program and the reason the618th 

Engineer Company deployed to Fort Pickett, Virginia, from 

August to September 2001. 

To meet the Chief of Staff of the Army's vision of deploying 

a combat-capable (medium) b~igade anywhere in the world in 

96 hours, a division in 120hours, and five divisions in theater 

in30days, theU.S. Army Corpsof Engineers,along with its Air 

Force counterparts, formed the JRAC program to look into the 

rapid construction and upgrade of airfields.'The three primary 

objectives of the program are to optimize airfield site selection, 

enhance airfield construction productivity, and incorporate 

advances in rapid soil stabilization.' Since the C-I7 Globemaster 

111aircraft was designed to carry oversize loads (such as the 

Ml A1 Abrams tank) and landon fo~ward, semiprepared (such 

as dirt) airfields, the team is specifically interested in 

constructing and upgrading C-17-capable airfield^.^ As the only 

light equipment airborne engineer company in the AI-my. the 

618th received the mission to upgrade Castle (formerly Woliju) 

assault landing zone (ALZ) atFo~t Pickett from C-130 toC-17 

specifications. Since there is such a limited number of C-17- 

capable, nonstabilized ALZs in the world. the company faced a 

24 Engineer 

1 Cl. . , . . . I . - I *--em,-: l.-.....-i I 

A soldier supervises operations on the field landing strip. 

considerable challenge. The 61 8th tested the feasibility of new, 

rapid airfield const~uction technology to be used in future 

construction operations. The lessons learned from this project 

may be useful to other construction units in the Corps of 

Engineers. 

Computer-Aided Earthmoving System 

hroughout the project, the 618th used a ComputerAided Earthmoving System (CAES) marketed by 

Caterpillar@. Developed originally for the mining 

indust~y. it has been available co~nmercially since June 1997.U 

CAES integrates site-planning and -design operations with 

construction to reduce costs and increase job-site efficiency. 

The system consists of onboard computers, Global Positioning 

System (GPS) receivers, data radios, a GPS reference station, 

and a radio network. The project designer and surveyors enter 

the design schematics into the command computer and map 

Jlrh 2002 
the design elevations for the site. Then they use a portable 

GPS to chart existing elevations. A comparison of the elevations 

reveals the cut and fill requirements for the project site. 

Although not the case during the deployment of the 618th, 

each piece of engineer equipment on the site should have a 

GPS and a computer terminal that transmits real-time updates 

of the site elevations. This allows project managers to track 

equipment activity and productivity daily. The GPS terminal 

mounted on the equipment shows the operator the site 

boundaries and the cut or fill required at any position. These 

features greatly decrease the requirements placed on surveyors 

during airfield construction. Normally, surveyors must stake 

out project boundaries and earthmoving requirements for the 

entire project. Using the CAES, equipment operators know their 

position on the site at all times and can move and shape earth 

to meet project requirements. 

For the Castle ALZ pro.ject, engineers from Caterpillar 

installed the CAES terminals on two 6138 scrapers and two 

deployable universal combat eilithmovers (DEUCES). Along 

with the radio network and reference station. the total cost of 

this system with traininr - and installation would normally be 

$350,000. The JRAC program, along with Caterpillar, used the 

Castle deployment to examine the applications of the GPS in 

rapidly upgrading an ALZ. 

Planning and Preparation 

Before the deployment to Fort Pickett, the 618th 

surveyors were already developing the airfield design. 

First. they conducted a topographic survey to map 

tlic c\isting ALZ. Surveyors also took soil samples from the 

ALZ and the two borrow sites and sent them to be tested at the 

U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), 

L - d 

Soldiers from 1st Platoon use a hand tamper to compact 

soil on top of dual 18-inch plastic corrugated culverts. 

Vicksbnrg. Mississippi. These tests identified the properties 

of the soil and its suitability for airfield construction. These 

tests must be conducted as early as possible since the quality 

of the soil is a primary factor in determining the earthwork 

required for the project. The results of the soil tests also 

established the optimum moisture content and the maximum 

dly density required to satisfy compaction criteria established 

by Engineer Technical Letter @TL)97-9. Another advantage of 

relying on ERDC to conduct the soil analyses 

was that ERDC could archive the data for future 

use, as well as coordinate for possible soil analysis 

training with the unit's surveyors and design team. 

After determining the dimensions and 

ele\lations, the surveyors designed the ALZ. 

Using info~iilation in ETL 98-5, they determined 

the requirements for a maximum aircraft on ground 

(MOG)2. C-17-capable ALZ (see table, page 26). 

The major changes required were to add 

turnarounds at each end of the runway. move the 

taxiway to allow for C- 17 wingtip clearance, and 

increase compaction. The surveyors then entered 

the design into the Terramodel'h' software. This 

design program allowed the head surveyor and 

ALZ designer to download the ele\,ations 

gathered during the survey and make the 

necessary alterations to the existing ALZ. The 

finished design provided the required elevations 

at each point along the runway and taxiway. 

On this CAES image of Castle ALZ, the bumper number of oneof the Integrating the CAES into the 618th reCAES-equipped DEUCES, LE202, is shown at the north end of the quired training for both operators and surveyors. 

runway. The surveyors spent a week working with 

July 2002 Engineer 25 
tical Dime 


lunway: 


Length - minimum 3,500 feet 

rn Overrun: ;- 300 feet on each end of the runway to the . , same st, anaaras 

Turnarounds - 165 feet wide by 180 feet Ilong (may t 


included in overrunS) 
 ,.,.... .

ju Tee? 
 .a. . 

width -I( feet 

graded are a -35 feet on each siae or runway ~,.. ,.,.- aeyono !snauloers 

Width of transitional area -70 ft I side beyor ld 

graded cirea 

was useful for this task. The equipment operators did not have 

to wait for surveyors to stake in the boundaries of the runway. 

Using the display terminal, operators followed the design 

boundaries and marked the area that needed clearing. 

After they completed the clearing and grubbing, the 618th 

established borrow and waste pits from which fill material could 

be moved to the i-unway and waste material stockpiled. Then, 

to reach the design grade, 2d Platoon cut and filled the runway. 

(Many places required fill inexcess of 2 feet.) Since the CAES 

has a horizontal accuracy of plus or minus 1 inches associated 

with earthmoving, it was possible to complete a large portion 

of the cut without grade stakes. However, to get the runway to 

standard, it was then necessary to shape and compact it to 

meet density and moisture requirements and allow for proper 

drainage. Because of the emor margin associated with the CAES, 

, .--:...A . .L *, -...:-.. . rn ~urly~~uuinal runway yraue crlarlye - 1.370r~~ax~rr~um 

per 200 feet 


rn Transverse grade of runway should 


minimum, 5% maximum 


Taxiway: 

rn Length -3,500 feet with turnarounds or the entire length 

of the runway 

I rn Turning radii - 90 feet rn shoulder width - 10 feet 

rn Longitudinal grade - 3%,with a maximum change of 

2% per 100 feet 

rn Runway clearance -280 feet from centerline of runway 

to inside shoulder of taxiway 

rn Taxiway clear area width - 70 feet 

rn Infield area - must be clear of obstructions 

it was not useful for the precision grading required to ensure 

that the runway met slope requirements. 

As 2d Platoon moved down the runway, the surveyors 

verified that the completed work metcompaction requirements. 

Using a nuclear densometel; they measured the density and 

moisture, and with a dynamic cone penetrometer. they 

confirmed California bearing ratio requirements. Where these 

measurements failed to meet the required standard, the soil 

had to be scarified (disked) and recompacted. 

I The final step was to grade the runway to ensure that it had 

a proper crown and drainage. Although the CAES was not 

useful during this phase of construction, the system's 

advantages allowed 2d Platoon to finish its portion of the 

project a week ahead of schedule. 

Supporting Effort: The Taxiway 

erhaps the most difficult assignment went to 1st 

Platoon to move the taxiway 40 feet to the west to 

JL allow wingtip clearance fo; the C-17 aircraft. This 

requil-ed installation of three IX-inch double culverts and a 

large amount of earthwork on the shoulders and clear area. 

The CAES dramatically reducedthe amount of time it took 

to locate the culverts. Instead of having to stake and restake 

them to ensure that they were straight and at the proper slope, 

the platoon used the CAES with the culvert design loaded into 

the system. The display terminal in the cab of the DEUCE 

showed the operator how much to cut within 3 inches. The 

surveyors then placed grade stakes and string lines to achieve 

the final grade and desired slope. By using the CAES, the 

experienced crew saved one day of work on each culvert. 

Another timesaving measure was that the platoon used 

compared plastic culverts rather than the standard concrete 

or corrugated metal pipes. They were light enough so that two 

people could carry a 20-foot section and could also easily attach 

multiple sections usingconnectable lips. A drawback of plastic 

culverts was that the slope had to be carefully checked because 

the plastic had a tendency to bend and distort. 

Clearing and grubbing the taxiway occurred concurrently 

with culvert installation. By using nonorganic D7 bulldozers 

representatives from Caterpillar to learn the setup and 

maintenance of the CAES. Then, the 618th conducted a fieldtraining exercise where sumeyors set 11p the CPS equipment 

and instructed equipment operators on using the colnputer 

displays in the equipment. With operators and surveyors welltrained, the colnpany was ready to deploy to Fort Pickett and 

build an airfield. 

Main Effort: The Runway 

To upgrade the ALZ to C-17 specifications. the 618th 

made numerous alterations to the existing C-130 ALZ. 

The main effort, which was assigned to 2d Platoon, 

was to upgrade the 4,100-loot runway. This included reshaping 

and compacting it and adding 165- by 180-foot turnarounds at 

both ends. But before this work began. it was necessary to 

repair theexisting C-130ALZ. 

The runway was overgrown with grass and had at least 6 

inches of organic material that needed to be grubbed. 

Additionally, to expand the clear and transitional areas on either 

side of the Innway to meet C-17 requirements meant clearing 

and grubbing a considerable area, to include trees. The CAES 

26 Engineer Jiilv 2002 
Surveyors determine the earthwork required for the project. 

and 621 R scrapers. it was fairly cask to clcar the necessary area 

to move the taxiway. The fill reqoirernents, howe\:er. were 

significant. 

The natural slope of the area around the taxiway required 

lifts of more than 5 feet in some areas. Moving enough earth to 

reach srade effectively eliminated any gains made from the 

quick installation of the culverts. ),fter completing [he 

earthmoving. tile platoon established drainage into and out of 

theculvens by the infield (the area hetu,een tile runway 

and taxiway) and the shoulders of the tasiwa!'. The taxiway 

was shaped and compacted in the same manner as the runway. 

The CAES made it possible to finish constmction five days 

ahead of schedule. 

Supporting Effort: The Tank Test Track 

and Road Extension 

The jd platoon was detached from the ALZ prq,ect to 

const,-,,c~ a l.s.lnile-long tank test track, a 0.25.11,ile 

ro:ld extension, and a helipad for ~~~t 

Pichett. Althoueh not involved with the ALZconstmction. these 

pro-iects were considered by the installation's chain ofcolnlnand 

as the main efron for the deployment. 

The site chosen for [he test track was next to Blackstone 

A~~~~p.irfield. wlren constructing the the location of 

the tank test track was used as the waste pit for the 

theorganic materials were heapedin thisarea. When 3dPlatoon 

stane,ju.orking on the test track, it was overgrown and looked 

like a patch of woodland. 

Not until the platoon cleared and grubbed the track did it 

becomeapparent that there would beaproblem with the amount 

of organic material in ,he soil. fn addition. the soil had 

insufficient slrengt~l meet the tile road. 11 

was of such poor quality that it had to he cut out to a depth of 

3 feet and replaced with clay from the borrow site at the ALZ. 

This necessitated hauling 2.000 cubic yards of soil over a 12-

mile route. Once the dirt was hauled in? the platoon was able to 

J~il?-7002 

compact the subgrade for the road and begin hauling the 3,500 

cubic yards of gravel needed for the surface of the track. 

The emergency road extension also pro\-ided some 

onexpectedchallenges. To ohtain proper drainage for the road. 

five 20-foot-long culverts were added to the test track and road 

extension. With no CAES assets on site, and a constantly 

evolving design concept. the platoon had to construct the 

road using the tedious staking method. This operation look 5 

days and verified the advantage of using GPS technology with 

culvenemplacement. 

Lessons Learned 

The Castle ALZ construction PI-o.iect demonctrated both 

advanrages and shortcomings of the CAES for use in 

rapid airfield construction: 

Ad! antages

.	As an enhanced surveying tool, the system worked \\ell. It 

allowed operators and supervisors to "see" prqiect 

boundaries. even during hours of limited visibility, and 

accurately map them usingengir~eerequipment.It cut down 

011 the direct sulveYor support required at the beginning of 

the project. thereby allowing the engineer urllt to nlass 

them at the main effort. 

.	Tliesystem was very useful when conducting shift-change 

briefs. The outgoing construction foremsln could easily 

show the construction officer and incoming construction 

foreman the prosress made during the day. Similarly. the 

c~~istmctionofficer could easily delineate the scope of work 

for the incoming construction foreman and equipment 

operators. It \\,as also helpful in giving an overu-ien; of the 

status of the project. 

.	The system was easy for ope]-ators to use, and it was not 

difficult to establish command and control from a centralized 

location- k~we\'er. lille of sight was required. 

.	The system was a valuable asset when placing cul\.ms. It 

allowed for accurate excavation without use ofgradcstakes 

until nearing the final excavated glade. 

Engineer 27 
A scraper performs cut and fill operations, 

The system was valuable for luge cuts and fllls in earthmoving operations. If in excess of 1 foot, the CAES allowed operators to move earth without grade stakes. And 

the display in the cab provided a visual indication of 

progress. 

Tracking the equipment across the entire job site made it 

possible to determine the overall progress of the project 

(volume of earthwork moved). However, since the system 

Conclusion 

using the CAES in the Castle ALZ 

upgrade provided a glimpse into 

the future of airfield construction. 

Tlie use of GPS technology to increase 

information available to operators had a 

definite effect on construction efficiency. 

Despite the fact that the 618th used only 

four mounted systems, the overall construction time on the ALZ decreased by 

five to seven days when compared to the 

forecasted duration of the project. 

Moreover, it was so essential in the construction process that maintenance and 

repair of vehicles with CAES equipment 

became a top priority. Although the 

technology itself does not solve all the 

challenges of JRAC, the CAES certainly decreases the time 

necessary to upgrade an ALZ. As shown during the project, 

the effect of terrain and weather on construction time is 

significant. The use of GPS for site selection could improve 

these areas. Soil stabilization of the dirt in ALZs will also 

decrease airfield maintenance throughout the duration of 

operations. In the future, the Castle ALZ at Fort Pickett could 

become a useful test location for JRAC. Y- was only installed on four pieces of engineer equipment, it 

was difficult to evaluatethe utility C~ESin tracking First Lieutenant M~linis working on a master's degree in 

individual equipment productrvity. civil engineering at Oxford University in England. He 

orevio~~slved 2d Platoon, 618th Enpineer Comoanv (Linht . .. - Shortcomings Equipment) (Airborne), in support of the 325th Airborne 

The utility of the system is only as good as the in. I~antr-)~Regiment. ILT Melin is a graduate of the United 

putted design. In one case, the design placement of a States Milita~yAcademy and hold.7 a bachelorS degree in 

culvert was incorrect. The error was not discovered until engineering. 

after the culvert was partially installed, which required 

additional labor to correct. Although this was a man-made 

error and not a product design, it reinforced the importance 

of quality control on a job site. It should also be noted that 

theCAES allowedthe 618th to rapidly correct the deficiency. 

The system was not useful in the final grading of the runway 

or taxiway. The error margin in the system was too great for 

the precision work required to successfully complete the 

project. 

It would be difficult-if not impossible-to use this 

technology (as cunently designed and implemented) during 

inihal-cntq operations in an immature theater of operations. 

However, it could be a valuable asset in a scenario where 

the initial airfield was capable of receiving air-land personnel 

and equipment, the lodgment had been secured, or the 

airhead had been expanded and had the infrastructure to 

support the use of laptop computers (from a tactical 

operations center or similar location). Automation support 

is about the only external requirement to make this system 

operational since the GPS reference station and radio 

receiversltransmitters are solar-powered, while the 

equipment-mounted systems are batteq-powered. 

' Jeb S. 1 

.my Corps 

Travis A 

'RAC) Ent 

< 

Endnotes 

Irtyla, =.I., nescarcrl uvil Engineer, ".a. 

Ar of Engineers, Engineer Research and 

Development (ERDC), Geotechnical and Structures 

L: licksburg, Mississippi 

1-17-3, Reception. -.-,...,, 

Movement, and integration, 17 March 1999. 

(J 

Tecrrnuruyy uernurrslratrurr, cnub I rp mepurl, 4 lvlay 

2( 

)rial Pamphlet, CATCi 

Aided Earthmoving System, 2000. 

Engineer Technical Letter 98-5, C-13C 

17 Contingency and Training Airfield Dimt 

C, 

- -

101. 

Caterpill 

riteria, Junt 

. Mann, Jo 

lanced Ea 

..-.-....A 

int Rapid 1 

rthmoving 

:. ---n 

liifield Con, 

Capabilit] 

-..- - struction 

I (EEC) . " ..... 

28 Engineer Jl~ly2002 
Book Reviews 


Tlre Anny, Br~gadier Geneml Harold W. Nelson. Editor in Chief. The Tho Soviet-Afghan lVar: How o Superpower 

Army Historical FouadationIHugb 1-autcr Levin Associates. Inc: Fought arrd Lost by Russian Geueral Staff (EdiArlington. Virginia, 2001. 352 psigcs. 600 iliustrations. fltor). Lcater W. Grau (Transistor). Michael A. 

The Army is a richly illitstrated historical nnvcrvicw of the United States Am~y prepared by 

the Army Historical Foundation. Its authors are 

largely retired senior militaly officers. many with 

a hackground in published military history. The 

volume covers such topics >is the role of the 

Anny in nntiowhuilding. lhe history of the Medal 

of Honor and other lnilitary decorations, the 

Army Schools. and tlie role of the Rese7i.c 

Components in the \\,an of the nation. AI sllul~. 

Ti,< Army. is nor an illustrated history of thc 

,\~III!. iitll .I i11s1011cill ovcrvie~, of SO~Caspects of the Army iind its 

niore tha~~2UO years of service to the United St;ttes. 

The volume has an itltroductoiy article hy scrving Army Chief of 

Staff. General Eric ti. Shinseki. and a concluding vrticlc hy Lieuteilitclt 

Colonel Clayton R. Newell. US. Anny. Retired. The former article deals 

with the Army Vision and its iissociation uith both the Arnly ol yestcrdny 

and the Army of the future. The latter srticlc docatnents soole of the 

cmerging technology that the Army is seeking to hring to the hartlefield. 

These bookend articles place the historicul material !lit" the content of 

the Army today and the future of the scrvice in the years ahead. 

One of the outstanding features of Ttir Am~yis the inclusion of 609 

photographs. reproductions oi military art, and other illustrations. Ths 

art is by such established military artists as Mort Kunstler, Don Troiani. 

Don Sliver. and Dale Gallon. The nrtwork by these and other ailists 

adds a colorful and dramatic aspect to the more common black and urhite 

photographs of the nineteenth and twmt~eth century Army that tnany 

readers are familiar will?. The reproductions of this military art are 

alrnust worth the price of the hook ;$lone. 

Altho~ghThr Army is written by those with Ihr reqoisile hiito~.ical 

trailling to produce an authoritative work. the hook does suffer from an 

nccasionvl error in accuracy. However. the errors in the text do not 

devact from the visual \,slue of the volume and the ovrral! story the 

authors and editors convey. Thr Aj-mj would make an excellent addition 

to thc huukshelves of the general reader or history buff. Those wanting 

more deplh to the areas covered in this volume can start with the 

professional reading materials noted in the Shrg~rsicd Rendi,,g portion. 

IIr Lnm D. Rohprri is ihc, US. ~nnyKjrRi,lco. Sr,roo, his[onor, 

For! LeoJmrd Wkori Missouri. 

Note From the Publisher: Purchasing Tlic Ai.rrly not only uill he 

of interest to readers hut also will directly hcnefit the Army Historical 

Foundation. which reccivcs a royalty on each hook sold. The Foundation 

is a nonprofit organization dedicated to thc preserviitioll and lpromotion 

of Army history and traditions. It directly snpports the hiitoricnl 

programs of the Anny and is an integml p;ln izt the building of a national 

Army museum. 

An,,r can hc from Army Historical 

GI~S(Translator). Foreword by Theodore C. 

hli~tilris. 

-	 The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) 1h;tr 

been called "the Soviet Union's Vietnam War." a 

conflict that pitted Soviet regalal's agais\t n relentless. elusive. and ultimzttrly uahent;\blc Af- . ghan gaerrilla force (the muji~hidcen). The lhit- 

:~l~tl-l~~li I~Io,)LII?IIII& across the war's decade tallied morc than 25.000 

tlctsd Soiicl s<ddir.i,. plus a great many more uiisu~lties. imd fu~.fh~r de-

~nol.nllrndit USSR on the verse of disintegration. 

In The .Soi,rei~A,(qhon Wnt:the Rusriim eencral staff takes 8 close 

critical look at the Soviet milirary'.i disappointing performa<,ce in that 

war in an effort lo better andrrstand what happened and why and what 

lessons should be taken from it. Lr\trr Grao 2nd Michael Grerr's expert 

English translat~on of the gener;ll itnff's nudy offers the very fir1 

publication in any language of thir ihnpor.tnnt and illumtnating work. 

Surprisingly. this was a study lht general staff never intended to 

write. initially viewing the wnl. in Afghnnisran as a dismal aherradon in 

Russian lnilitary history. The history of the 1990s has. of course. cornplelely demolished that hrlief. as evidenced by the Russian anny's suhnequent engagements with gocrl.illa forces in Chechnya. Arerhaijan. 

Tadjikistan. Turkmenist;ln. and elsewhcrc. As a lesult, Russian officers 

decided to take a cnuch closer look at the Red army's experiences in the 

~ f war.~ h ~ ~ 

The study presents thc Russiiln view of how the war started, how it 

progres~d. and lho\r, it ended: shows how a modern mechanized army 

o~.ganized and conducted a coutltergueirilla war; chronicles the inajor 

huttles itnd operations; and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics. 

strategy. doctrine. and organization across a wide array of inililal-y 

branches. Tlic editors' illcisive preface and commentary help ci,ntexto;tlire the Russian view and alert the reader to blind spots in the 

general staff's thinkirlg ahout the war 

This one-of-a-kind document provides n powerful case study on how 

ye1 another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false 

promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. The Red 

army had fought its war to in luilitary draw. hut that was not enough to 

stave off political defeat at home. 

This book is part of the Modern l~rrSiiaiier series. 

*bout N~~ ~ ~ ~ , , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , v ~ 

Lester W Gnu, n V~etnnm War veteran and retired U.S. Army lieutenant colanel. is nn analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at 

the Amy's Comhincd Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. He is 

also the editor atld uilnsl.ltor of The Benr Wnl Over the Moiriiiui,>: 

Snvier Co,!rhnr Z~ilrric.~ it, A,f~l~rrr~i.sro~z and Tku Ofher Side ofllzt. Moililloin: Mi8johiderrr Toclics irr [he Soricr-ALqhnr, Wnr. 

Foundation (701-522-7901 or hrt~~://~~~~~~~~:on~~~Iti.~~or~fi~d.o~~/J~ It is also ~i~l~~,~! A, G ~ . isa native ~ ~ of ~ siberis and a former intllc

availiihle through warehouse clubs. local bookstores. and online. Visit the ,molorizcd ,inc forcrS the So,,iet 

Foundiltiun's Wch sitc for inore information (hrrl~://~v~a~nhiia.co,tt). 

J~rly2002 	 Engineer 29 
- - 

By Captain Daniel J Meyers 

Ihc IIS .\r~ny'hlit Infantry 

I)IYI~IO~ En-~t~etrk4ri~:i.l~~. 

1L Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company (HHC), and Germany's 

Stah.skomponie. Pionieriehrbrigurle 60, 

have a unique partnership. Our focus is 

on building trust, camaraderie, and 

mutual respect at all levels-from the 

newest private to the brigadecommander. 

Through a variety of activities, ranging 

from combined-arms training to social 

events, we achieve a greater understanding of each other's capabilitiesan understanding that is beneficial and 

rewarding to both the soldiers and the 

organizations. Combining training opportunities causes an increase in e,s,,rit 

de corm and interooerabilitv. The events 

over the past decade in Europe confinn a 

strong need to understand each other's 

armies as we perform operations as 

multinational forces. Our partnership 

training has directly improved our 

readiness posture. 

For three consecutive years, Engineer 

Brigade's HHC has earned the title "Best 

Continuing Partnership" within the 1st 

Infantry Division. The competition is 

fierce, but quality andquantity of training 

make all the difference. The result of 

cohesive activities is displayed through 

awards, language skills and, most 

important of all, a better understanding 

, ., . 

. ,' .., --~.- .d 

A soldier fires the MG-1. 

of customs and traditions of the two 

Countries. 

Oneofthe primary points of emphasis 

in the partnership is the training and 

development of junior enlisted soldiers 

in both units. Our planning continually 

strives to provide them with opportunities to learn. We believe that training 

as partners strengthens the soldiers' 

desire to stay in the service and enhances 

their careers. 

Both German Unteroffiziers and 

American NCOs are provided the unique 

challenge of instructing soldiers from a 

foreign army. The language banier is just 

one hurdle that must be negotiated. Other 

difficulties include cultural differences 

- -1 


and a l:~k of fzlmilial-it!. with foreign 

weapon systems. 

Exchanging markslnanship techniques is one ingredient toward a 

successful partnership because it 

enhances interoperability. To earn the 

coveted Schuetien.shnur-in either 

bronze, silver, or gold-is a goal of each 

soldier. The German weapons qualification consists of three weapons, and 

soldiers must qualify on all three to earn 

theSchuetzen.shnur. Firing the pistol (PI) 

is an easy task, but the other two 

weapons-the G3 (equivalent to the 

M16) and MG-I machine gun-are 

tougher because their high caliber causes 

a powelful kick. 

Another area of concentration with 

our partnership unit is physical fitness. 

For U.S. soldiers, the goal is to "max" the 

Army Physical FitnessTest. While all do 

their best, not everyone can qualify for 

the badge. The same holds true for the 

Leisrungsnb.-eichen (German sports 

badge). Passing both tests is an indicator 

of excellent physical fitness. 

This year, not only did we train on 

both German and American weapons, 

but we also survived the rigors of a 

white-water river exercise, marched over 

several,mountain peaks. and competed ~ ~ 

A combined crossing of a water hazard In a vanety of sporting events. The NCOs 

30 Engineer Juiv 2002 
and officers, up to and including the foundation of our partnership. They are example is the white elephant gift 

brigade commanders and command the mechanisms that support our title exchange. Our partnership unit finds this 

sergeants major, led their soldiers with "Best Continuing Partnership" in the to be a very intriguing event. So this 

skill and decisiveness. They planned and division. past holiday season, each German 

executed training, met for equipment Ceremonies provide a good avenue soldier brought a gift so that he could 

demonstrations, and led their soldiers in to share traditions and customs. The participate. 

the celebrations that marked another Gelobnis (graduation) ceremony is a The 1st Infantry Division Engineer successful year. good example. We are invited to attend Brigade's HHC has a common bond with 

For the past two years, our units have the ceremony whereby German soldiers Stabskompanie, Pionierlellrbrigade 60, 

hosted an event called "Project are officially indoctrinated into the and we look forward to broadening our 

Teamwork." The concept is to provide Bundeswelzr, and our partnership unit partnership in the future. Statistics prove 

soldiers of both nationalities an is invited to our change-of-command that we have a powerful foundation. 

opportunity to train, challenge, and ceremonies. Solidarity is our core asset and will 

compete against other teams, using In addition to the soldier tasks of continue to provide stability and 

cooperation and collaboration. Com- weapons familiarization, physical fitness strength for years to come. 

prised of both Gennan and American evaluation, and ceremonial activities, we Id 

soldiers, the leams are presented with a shue experiences, leadership develop- Captnin Meyers is the battalior1 

series of obstacles or tasks, such as ment, award recognition. and cultural nzainterzance officer, 1st Infantry 

weapons assemblyldisassembly; first aid enlightenment. The friendships that Divirion Engineer Brigade, HHC, and 

procedures; nuclear, biological, and ensue are a byproduct of the continuous also serves us the brigade S3. He holds 

chemical agents; a grenade toss; and a training opportunities. a bachelor k degree in UI-ban planning 

water hazard. Each scenario forces the During the holiday season, we fro171 the University of New York at 

soldiers to think as a unit and conquer participate in each other's festivities. The Albany His next rluQ assignmer?t is the 

the obstacle 01-co~nplete the task through somber gatherings have given way to Captuin'.~ Career Course at Fort 

teamwork. These events foster the more upbeat parties. Perhaps the best Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

The Engineer Writer's Guide 

Engineerisaprofessional-developmentbulletin designed including yourfull name, rank, current unit, and job title; a 

to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas list of your past assignments, experience, and educawithin the Army engineer community. We include articles tion; your mailing address; and a fax number and comby and about officers, enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, mercial daytime telephone number. 

Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Include a statement with your article that your loWriters may discuss training, current operations and ex- cal securi~office has determined that the informaercises, doctrine, equipment, history, Personal viewpoints, tion contained in the article is unclassified, nonsensi- or other areas of general interest to engineers. Articles tive, and releasable to the public. we do not requirea 

may share good ideasand lessons learned or explore bet- hard copy of the clearance. (Engineer is available for 

ter ways of doing things. sale through the Superintendent of Documents.) 

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the wecannot guarantee that we will publish all submitactive voice. If they contain attributable information or quo- ted articles, ~h~~ are accepted for publication only after 

tations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate thorough review, ~fwe plan to use your article in an up- Text length exceed 2,000 coming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action- to keep US informed of changes in your e-mail address or 

type articles, reviews Of On engineer and telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are letters to the editor are also welcome. subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as 

Include photos (with captions) andlor line diagrams that editing for style. 

illustrate information in the article. Please do not include send submissions by e-mail to pbd@wood,army,mil illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of send a 3 lp-inch disk in ~ iword, along with ~ ~a 

them as a separate file. embed photos in double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to: Editor, Engi- PowerPoint. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid ex- neer professional Bulletin, 320 MANSCEN L ~suite~ ~ cessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a 210, F~~~~~~~~d wood, ~ i65473-8929, ~~ ~ resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a 

Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission, Note: Please indicate if your manuscript is being considered forpublication elsewhere. Due to the limitedspace per Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the issue, we normally do not print articles that have been accontent Of the article. include a ceptedforpublication by otherAnnyprofessionaIbulletins. 

July 2002 Engrneer 31 
THE EURO NATOTMINING 
 E'"W ,-,
 it E C 

ENGINEER CENTRE: 

YOUR INTERMTIONAL 

ENGINEER ICHOOL 

By Major Frank Akins and Sergeant First Class Benjamin Addison 

Since 1977, the Euro NATO Training Engineer Centre 

(ENTEC) in Munich. Germany, has provided engineer 

interoperability training to increase efficiency between 

military engineers of NATO and ~LFpartner nations during 

peacetime and war. The current focus is primarily engineering 

interoperability challenges within peace support operations 

from squad to division level. 

ENTEC is organized into four cells (see figure), which are 

powered by 14primary instmctors, ranging from sergeants first 

class to lieutenant colonels: 

a Tactics and Doctrine Branch-provides instruction 

pertaining to tactics and doctrine. including input for 

or Standardization Agreements (STmAGs). 

a 	MinelCountermine and Demolitions Branch-focuses on 

training related to minetcountennine equipment, mine and 

booby trap threat, and demolition equipment used and 

encountered by ENTEC member nations. 

. 	General Engineering Branch--concentrates on military 

bridging, engineer and constructionequipment, 

reconnaissance, and base camp construction. 

a 	 Military Engineer Consultancy-collects and catalogs 

current engineer lessons learned and provides them, upon 

request. to NATO nations. This cell is also an excellent 

source of information concerning national engineer force 

structures and organizations. 

Levels of Instruction 

ENTEC conducts four levels of course instruction per 

year: Insmctor's Course, Platoon Leader's Course, 

Company Commander's Course, and Battalion 

Commander's Course. ENTEC also provides mobile training 

teams to units upon request. 

Instructor'sCourse 

hi^ 2-week course is designed to and improve 

engineer interoperability at squad leader through platoon leader 

levels. It is the "bread-and-butter" course, encompassing a 

maximum amount of hands-on training with classroom 

instruction. When engineers complete this course, they can 

teach soldiers mine awareness, international explosives use, 

demolition target folder preparation, demolition mission 

handoverltakeover. barrier control and execution. international 

engineer lessons learned, and how to obtain international 

military engineer assistance on a moment's notice. 

Platoon Leader's Course 

This week-long course promotes and improves engineer 

interoperability at platoon and company levels by introducing 

officers and noncommissioned officers to engineer operational 

Hands-on booby traptraining facility 

32 Engineer 	 Jlrl? 2002 
ENTEC Cell Structure 

w 
 Deputy Director(US) 

Military Engineer 


Consultancy 


and tactical interoperahility challenges and how to overcome 

them. Through acombination of classroom and team inst~uction, 

map exercises, and hands-on training, students gain an 

understanding of the characteristics and capabilities of each 

ENTEC nation in demolition, bridging, comhat engineering. and 

construction equipment. Students become familiar with mine1 

countermine equipment employed across NATO and gain an 

understanding of correct policy and procedures for training on 

and employment of antitank and antipersonnel mines. This 

course is more tactically oriented and less technically focused 

than the Instructor's Course. 

Company Commander's Course 

This course promotes and improves interoperahility at 

company to battalion levels by introducing officers to the 

engineer operational and tactical procedures of all participating 

nahns. Instructors provide orientation to several forceprojection missions and discuss international lessons learned. 

Guest speakers from several ENTEC nations discuss experiences in combat and peacekeeping operations. The focnl point 

of this course is an in-depth map exercise that facilitales 

planning ti)r a multinational, out-of-sector mission, encouraging 

ofticers to solve complex problems in an international workinggroup environment. Students are introduced to common 

interoperability challenges and how to overcome them. They 

receive a brief orientation on demolitions, bridging, combat 

engineer, and construction equipment from each ENTEC nation 

and the important characteristics and capabilities of each. 

Various social functions during the course encourage students 

to interact with their multinational colleagues. 

Battalion Commander's Course 

This course promotes and impmves engineer interoperahility 

at battalion and brigade levels by introducing officers to the 

engineer operational and tactical pmcedures of all participating 

nations. Guest speakers discuss recent experiences in combat 

and peace-support operations and provide lessons learned. 

An in-depth map exercise on out-of-nrea contingency operations is the main vehicle of learning. The ENTEC staff 

introduces officers to common interoperability problems and 

how to overcome them. A guided tonr of Munich, museum 

visits, and a semiformal dinner increase interaction among 

officers from the various nations. There is also a VIP Day du~ing 

the course that provides an opportunity to meet with many 

nat~onal engineer school officials and bee some of the latest 

engineer equipment available on the worldwide market. 

Training Aids 

series of training aids increases multinational 

interoperability effectiveness: a 10-language Combat 

Engineer Dictionary CD, bilingual handbooks, aonestop .ource for international engineer lessons learned, an 

Engineer Platoon Leader's Handbook, and more. Instructors 

participate in NATO standardization working groups pe~taining 

to comhat engineering interoperability issues, as well as other 

activities to promote engineering intcroperahility. 

Other Activities 

The ENTEC staff supports NATO exercises around 

Europe. And ENTEC is the perfect off-site location for 

exercises and conferences. On request, ENTEC 

supports individual units or headquailers with mobile training 

teams, which are usually scheduled and approved a year in 

advance hut can react to short-notice requests in crisis 

situations. ENTEC's Web site at hrrp://~~:u~~.enrec~?t~~~~i

provides more information. 

Conclusion 

ENTEC offers a nnique opportunity to learn about 

international engineer interoperability and to make 

contacts and friends in the international community. 

All TDY and course fees are reimbursed for U.S. soldiers 

srationed in Europe. Course tuition fees are covered for U.S. 

soldiers stationed within the United States. The ENTEC staff 

meinhers invite you to visit the training center andjoin them in 

future classes and activities. 

Contact MAJ Akins at ji.ar~k.okins@~arc.7atc.arn~.y.mil or 

call 01149-89-95959482. Y 

Mojo, Akins is rhr depirn. dirrrror. of rl?~Erd,-o NATO Tminirrg 

Engineer Centre. He is a grfldunr~of tlic Co~wrnnd n,d Ge,zrrnl Staff 

Co~crsc and holds n mastcv!~rlqree in geolofi,.ki,dl engi,tr~,-ins. 

Sergeiin! Fir,xi Clar Aridison is rlrr srrtior U.S. i,isrrnctor or rhr 

Euro NATO Training Engin~ej- Co~rre.He has rrrre,rded !/he Baric and 

Adr,nnr.~d Noncommissioned Ofjcerr Co!trrpc, Prirnnry Lender 

Development Cour.se, Air Assn!rlr and Airbo,nr Courrer, and rhe 

Sapper Leader 5 Course. 

July 2002 Enxinew 33 
* 

B 

w 

Y 

.

-

B 

-

Bz 

rZ 

r,5
-

t 


Everyone talks about the "Real Army." but no one wereinthe flesh. These were tmen with inany ycarsolexpcrir.ncc 

knows where it is. Not renl1.y. 1 retired in 199Gafter inleadingandtrainingsoldiers,realsoldiel-s frornLheReal Amy. 

22 years in the Infantry Corps-and I thinkI spent my Nearly all were combat veterans, and most certainly knew the 

eriilrecareer lookingfor the Real hly, that mythical Holy Grail difference between the Real Amiy and the school environment. 

of professionalism. I never did find the ~~~l A ~ but ~ ~ , I studied hard to prepare myself, but 1 was becoming impatient 

somewhere on quest, I learned a thing or two about to find the Real Army. I longed to be in a unit where every 

professionalism. soldier was highly motivated and each man knew his duty-a 

place where the title "soldier" meant being proud, standing I my career as a cadet at West Point. was taught by tall, combat ready, lean and mean. That's what I wanted and, by some of the sharpest and brightest young captains of the cod, 1 meant to have it, 

military, many of them combat veterans of Vietnam. They were All too soon my military schooling ended, and I joined the the cadre I looked up to and who set the example for me to 82d Airborne Division. Rut that was not the Real Army. I was follow. I was reminded on numerous occasions that when I told by senior officers who must be privy to such knowledge. graduated and pinned on that butter bar, I would join the ranks It ,,, the late '60s, Drugs were a major problem, and we were 

of the Real Army. Those veterans, who surely knew of such coddling drug users and trying to rehabilitate them. Co~nbat 

things. assured me. in no uncertain terms, that the Real Army who had only a few months left to serve were '\holl. 

would be more demanding and less lorgiving of my igmrmce timers" with bad attitudes. New recruits were green and hardly and errors. My decisions would mean life or death for members knew basic skills, ~h~ division was understrength and 

of my platoon. It was, therefore, with some anticipation that I short on equipment. Even with my inexperienced eyes, I could 

looked forward to joining the Real Army. see that, indeed, this could not be the Real Army. 

After graduation, I went through a series of military Soon I was afirst lieutenant en route to the lOlst Airmobile 

schools-airbome,jumpniaster, rangr, and thelnfant~y Officers Division in Vietnam. I thought my search would soon be over. 

Basic Course-all designed to finely hone my skills and instill When I took over my new platoon, I discovered that it, too, 

in me the fighting spirit that I would need in the Real Army. was not the Real Army. It was a group of scared young men 

Much to my disappointment, I was informed that these schools just trying to keep from getting killed. They looked to me not to 

were not the Real Army. For that, I would have to wait. I was lead them to victory but to keep them alive long enough to take 

told this by some of the best NCOs in the Army. The cadre at that long flight back home. They did everything I asked them 

West Point had told me that such men existed, and here they to do, but they were not eager to reenlist. 

34 Engineer July 2002 
Morale was low and got even lower. The young men didn't 

hate the Vietcong or the Norlh Vietnamese and actually hoped 

they would not see one. They lived in fear, dlxnk whenever 

they could. and smoked a joint now and then when I wasn't 

around. But together we survived. We learned how to bring 

superior firepower to bear without exposing ourselves to enemy 

fire. We learned toconceal ourselves so well in an ambush that 

the enemy could not see us until it was too late. We learned not 

to bunch up on the trail. to move without any noise, and to 

keep our equipment operational. We looked out for each other. 

We all cried when one of us got a "Dear John" lettel-. We all 

cheered when one of us heard he was now a father. We 

celebrated when someone got his orders to go home. We shared 

our dreams and aspirations. My dream was to find the Real 

Army. We all made it back to the States. 

I returned to the 82d Airborne for two more years. Then I 

went to the Armor Ollicers Advanced Course at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky: on to graduate school: and back to Wcst Point as 

an instructor. I was nou: part of the elitecadre-and yet 1 had 

never seen the Rcal Amy. I almost gave up my search. All the 

other instructors talked about it. but no one had actually seen 

it. One armor officer said that lie almost saw it in Germany, hut 

it apparently had departed before he got there and never 

returned. We pretty much agreed that it was either in Gel-many 

somewhere or maybe in Korea. hut it cenair~ly was not stateside. 

SoGer~nanywas the next stopon my quest. I wouldsurely tind 

the Real Army in Germany. 

Ger~iiany was totally different than I had imagined. I was 

assigned to an infantry unit at Wildtlecken. The Cold War was 

still going strong in the late '70s. My battalion had a wartime 

inission to he the covering force for the hrigade. We expected 

high numbers of casualties. Wildflecken was within artille~y 

range of the E:~st German border, and we fully expected to he 

under fire from our billetingareu all the way to ourdeploy~nent 

positions. Our only hope would he early warning. We took our 

niission seriously. We trained in the field for weeks on end, 

once for 6 weeks straight. Eve~y day in tlie field meant 3 days in 

the motor pool, maintaining our equipment. T thought, "If this 

isn't the Real Army, we are in trouble." But things were not as 

they should have beeti. We still had drugs. The equipment was 

old. I was positive that I had an MI 13 with Patton's initials on 

it. There wele also personnel sholtages. It was pal-t of the 

"Hollow Artny" too Inany missions and not enough Inen and 

equipment. I began to suspect that this was not part of the Real 

Anny. 

My worst fears were confi~med. Seniol-NCOs who, of course, 

know of such things, told me that this was not the Real Army. 

Not any niore! Some had spent many years in Germany. All had 

heen to Vietnam and in stateside units. One NCO had been 

wound the world three times and to a world's fair, two circuses. 

and acounty fair. He knew everything, and he informed me that 

the Real Army no longer existed. It had died, unannounced, 

sometime hetween World War I1 and the Korcnn War. However, 

he had not actually been to Korea and, perhaps, a small remnant 

of the Real Army remained there. There was still hope. 

The Army in Germany wits in a metamorphosis. We 

concentrated on combating the drugs and made major headway. 

The Army moved to an all-volunteer Amy. combined with 

frequent and random drug testing and easier ways to get rid of 

drug users. The new recruits amived drug-free and with a 

positiveattitude. They were well-trained in basic soldierskills. 

We began to develop teamwork and a sense of unit pride. We 

went frommasteringplatoon operations tocompany-and then 

to battalion and task force-tactics. Soon we became proficient 

at brigade and division maneuvers. It was as irwe were heginning 

to create the Real Aliny ourselves. 

I went from Germany to the Command and Gener~ll Staff 

College at Foil Leavenworth, Kansas. After graduation, I stayed 

on as a tactics instructor for 3 ye;irs. It wiis not, of course, the 

Real Arniy. We invented an imaginary army that could do 

anything-attack, defend, envelop, withdraw. cross rivers, and 

pelform airmobile operations and urban fighting. You namc it, 

this army could do it. Of course. tlie studcnts had to plan for 

this dream army. It was always at 100 percent strength, 

sometimes 1 I0 percent. It had the latest equiplnent. sollie of 

which had not really heen fielded. There was no end to the 

supplies and logistics, as long as it was planned for and 

coordinated. It was the perfect anny--on paper. We werein the 

middle of developing the AirLnnd Baltle doctrine and 

supporting tactics. 

In 1984,l went from Fort Leavenworth to he the Inspector 

General of the 2d lnfant~y Division in Korea. It was my sincere 

hope to finally find thc Real Army. 1 was in a position to do o 

proper search. I inspected every unit in the division ;nrd was 

impressed by what I found. The soldiers ujere highly motivated. 

wcll-trained, and well-led. While thecold War was coming to n 

close in Europe, that was not ihc case in Korea. The 2d Division 

stood toe-to-toe with the North Kore;ln army, and every soldier 

understood his inission clearly. The divisioli was up to strength 

and well-equipped, with new equipment aniving every day. 

This was not the Army of the '60s or the '70s. Every soldier had 

volunteel-ed to he there. Drug use was way dou~n. Ithought 

that nt long last I had finally found the Real Anny, but it was 

not to he. Nearly one-third of the division's soldiers were Korean 

Augmentees-excellent Korean soldiers who spoke English. 

Most had been drafted and given a choice of serving with the 

Korean or the U.S. Army. That made the 2d Division unique, 

because noother unitwas made upof allied soldiers. Nodoubt. 

in the event of war with North Korea. these soldiers would be 

invaluable assets to the division. However, as configured. the 

2d Division could not deploy to any other theater of opel-ations. 

It was a stand-alone, one-of-a-kind unit. It was not the Real 

Army. 

In 1985.1 wils reassigned to the Pentngon, and 1 despaired 

of ever finding the Real Army. There, we tried to forecast what 

the Real Army of the future should be. hased on our own 

concept of what that might be. This was made more difficult by 

the ending of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, 

and the growing threat in theMiddle East. New equipment was 

(coiitiiiued on png~39) 
Iemslltiom

~~~ai~Re~
 Cgdata: 

By Ser~eo111 Firs! C'/(IS.Y Jeflif!? K~IIIIS (ReIir~d)

The Army is fielding the newest components to the 

Modemized Demolition Initiator (MDI) family-the 

MI51 and MI52 hooster assemblies. These cumponcnts are the materiel solutions for the restrictions placed 

on the MDI in 1998, which limited the operational uses of the 

MI I and MI6 MDl shock tubes. The MI I and MI6 will be 

phased out as they are replaced by the MI51 and M152. The 

new MDI cotnponents will give our soldiers the most modern 

pieces of equipment in the demolition itiventory and ensure 

that they have the competiti\se edge required on the battlefield. 

Background 

The MD1 was fielded in 1996. But testing 

indicated, and field commanders confirmed, that there 

were serious shortcomings. The problems center on a 

sin~nltaneity issue and the sensitivity of the high-strength 

blarting caps. In addition, field commanders raised issues 

concerning burying hi~h-strength blastin: caps and prepriming 

charges for transport to mission sites. Due to these shortcomings. on 3 December 1998, the Engineer School issued a 

Letter of Instruction that restricted the use of the MI 1 and 

MI6 MDI components until these issues were resolved. 

Description 

The MDI is used l'or standard military demolition 

missions. When first type-classified in 1996, the MDI 

had a safety limitation that prohibited thc. priming of 

underground charges with devices containing sensitive primary 

exploives. The MI51 and MIS2 booster assemblies overcome 

this limitation and the operational employment restrictions. The 

MI51 and MI52 consist of a booster, which contains only 

i~isensitive secondary explosives, and a length of low-powered 

detonating cord (5 grainslfoot versus 50 grainslfoot for high 

strength) with a high-strength booster in lengths of 10 feet and 

30 feet respectively. such, the low.powered detonating cord 

will not cut itself or other detonating cords if crossed. 

The boosters at the end of the MI51 and MI52 itssemblies 

look like blasting caps, but they are not blasting caps because 

they contain no primary explosives. Although the boosters 

have the same strength as #12 commercial caps, they can be 

treated like detonating cord because they contain only 

secondary explosives. The booster end piece (the part that 

looks like a cap) is added to the low-strength detonating cord 

to fit the system into standard military cap wells. 

36 Engineer 

These new compotients providc the same functionality as 

the MI I and MI6 blasting cap assemblies, but with expanded 

capabilities. The MI51 and MIS2 have been Fully tested in all 

primary missions, but there are no safety restrictions as there 

are on the MI1 and M16. Also, whe11 using the MI51 and 

M152, it is safe to preprime and caq the delnolirions. 

New Equipment Training 

The Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) Directorate of Training Development will ensure that 

all combat engineers receive new equipment training 

(NET), to include training on all MDI components and the 

MIS1 and MIS2 systems. Questions about NET should be 

directed to-

.StaffSergeantBobWatson.(573)596-0131.extension36299. 

~~otsonb@~~oodnrmy.mil

.Sergeant First Class Jeffrey Venus (Retired), (573) 596-013 I, 

37991, I.~llu.~j@,l.ood.~n,l~.n~il 

Future Demolition Modernization 

Progress does not stop: therefore, the Engineer School 

continues striving to reduce the weight and volu~ile of 

demolition systems to transition the Engineer Regiment 

to the lnte~im and Objective Forces. Future articles will descrihe 

the Demolition Modernization Plan for long-term Army 

requirements. which way presented in the Demolition White 

Paper sent to TRADOC and DA for approval. In the short term, 

improvements to the MDI will include versions of a new "minitube" system. The new components of the MDI will soon undergo develop~nental and operational testing. The target date for 

initial fielding of a new lightweight, low-volume minitube MDI 

system is the end of FY02. 

The point of contact for information on demolition issues or 

to relay concerns from the field is Sergeant First Class Jeffrey 

Venus (Retired), U.S. Army MANSCEN, Directorate of Combat 

Developments, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 141, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri 65473-8929; commercial (573) 596-0131. 

extension 37994; DSN 676-7994, e-mail venucj@woodam~.rni1. 

kd 


Sergeant First Class Venus was a conzbar developer,ti~r 

demolirion iterns nf MANSCEN when he wrote tlzis article. 

July 2002 
Persona1 Viewpoint 


lm~roving the Technical Skills of the Combat Heavies 


By Srrgeont First Cl(~ss Carl I<. L,iti(lr(~sI1 

hat do we expect of our cornbat heavy engineers in 

today's force? That question would have as many 

answers as people asked. Combat heavies 

h;lve bzen used extensively in humanitarian roles and in the 

Gulf War where they perfonned numerous tasks. In this article, 

I address the technical expertise that is expected of these units 

and what 1 believe is the true level ofexpertise. 

Combat heavy units have carpentry, masonry, plumbing, 

and electricill specinlists, as well as light and heavy equipment 

operators and construction supervisors. Looking at the makeup of construction units. you basically see a construction 

company. The prohleln we face is that soldiers have very little 

tcchnicnl proficiency to pe~folm the skills to the level necessary. 

Most of the experience in these units comes from the soldiers' 

background-for example, from a vocational school. While this 

is a good resource, it should not bc the crux of the technical 

expertisc. 

Wilh thc specialties that are in these units, the personnel 

should be able to accomplish any const~uction mission. While 

at their ho~ne base, the units could take on several troop 

construction projects if the technical skills were developed. 

With the cutbacks that the directorates of public works havc 

faced, these units could be valuable assets to the installations. 

Srcing the problem is easy; improving an existing asset to 

solvc the problem is the challenge. I would 1101 want lo present 

this solution as an overnight fix to this challenge but rather 21s 

an opportunity to use the asset that could prove to be 

invaluable. Some of the actions we could take to improve the 

technical proticiency of the combat heavies follow. 

The U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers (US ACE) offers several 

courses that would help improve the technical proficiency of 

the combat heavy soldiers and instructors. to include carpe11t1-y, 

masonry, plumbing, electrical. and earthwork. In addition_ an 

instructor certificaf on course would hclp 11s teach the materials 

during advanced individual tri~ining. USACE also offers 

advanced training that could be used to improve and enhance 

higher-grade skills at the hasic and advanced lioncommissioned 

officer's course levels. 

We should try to imnple~nent a Inore vocational style of 

uaini~rgfor soldiers. This would require a longer training period 

and possibly some civilian support. However, the technical 

expertise gained would be a huge benefit. Also, the time has 

come to upgrade our sets, kits, and outfits to reflect what 

industry today uses whcn constructing. The benefits of this 

improvement would far outweigh the cost involved. 

We also must better equip our hattalion construction 

inspectors so they can petforrn their mission. As a construction 

inspector for USACE in Korea. I ensured that the quality of 

work met the standards of the specifications and blueprints for 

USACE projects such as constructing barracks. company 

operation facilities. and battalion and brigade headquarters. 

As an inspector. I had a widc range of tools available, to include 

the technical expertise of USACE. Battalion construction 

inspectors should have the same tools at their disposal; in 

most cases, they coultl gct these through a local USACE office. 

Our inspectors could also attend advanced courses for 

certification, which would give us a better inspection process. 

It would i~icreasc the quality of work produced and give 

credibility to the work that 21 troop consuuction unit could 

perforln. 

Wc could use the USACE guide to develop specifications 

and testing procedures for troop construction projects. If these 

steps were taken, we could show the quality of work that is 

being performed and increase our value to the installation and 

the Army. And we should adopt the USACE safety manualEM 385-1-I-as our safety and health requirements manual to 

establish safety standards that are the same throughout our 

units and consistent with USACE standards. 

The biggest challenge that we face would also yield the 

grc:~tcst reward~nginee~s becoming a total team. Through 

the team-building process, units becolne more technically 

proficient, u,hich will prove to be an asset for USACE also. 

Occasionally, USACE has had trouble filling positions quickly. 

In Bosnia, for example. theNCOs who were USACE inspectors 

were raken from Korea and Japan to lill the positions until 

civilian inspectors could arrive. When USACE is shorthanded 

at a location, we would he able to provide temporary inspectors. 

This would be excellent on-thc-joh 11xining for the troop 

construction units and valuable assistance until the positions 

al-e filled. Another benefit from this training is that USACE 

would he training future cmployccs to hclp fill the ranks of 

construction inspectors and projcct engineers. 

We should not lose our focus: our mission in the combat 

heavies is to perform combat-engineering tasks, as well as the 

heavy construction missions required in a [heater of operations. 

I believe [hat at the same time we can become a more technically 

proficient unit and a greater asscl to the Army. I also believe 

that improving technical skills encompasses the synevgy that 

the Chief of Engineers is seeking-for when we look at these 

improvements, it is truly a win-win situation. 

Sergco,ir Fiur Clnss Li,rrlm? was o qunlin assurance repre 

scnrarive in rh~Far E(~srlisrricr. USACE, Cmp Homphrqs, Korea. 

whcr~he w~.ror(, rhis arriclr. He is now n plrrroon serpeanr in rhe 46th 

Etl,yirwer Rortrilio,i, Forr Polk, Louisiann. He holds art associare- in 

jierirrni stirdies fm?Cr>muronL'ni,~er-sin;ard is vvorkitrg toword n 

hucirc1or.i (icgwe bi hicsinrss rnnnrrpement. 
 

-- - 

-

-,-. 
 . 

.

..~~ 

. . e-T 

7 - w
 -* 

. .. .. '.-=-s* . ---,, , 

=gils.%eh 


-. 

P-C-( 

&.P -,-- .. . .~ m sp. 

---. .... 

.. . 

-

HJ' Second Lietrt~.rzant Fred SclzwarB 

S~xty-seven ycars ago. memlie.rs or the ?d Etlgineer 

Combat Regiment, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, began 

construction of an engineer castle to be part of a stadium 

on Rnlston Field. The structure served as a grandstand as well 

as a symbol of the Corps. Years of weathering and neglect left 

the castle in dire need of attention. 

In October 2001. veterans of the 25th Infantry Division 

(Light) met for their 60th anniversary reunior~ at Schofield 

Barracks. It was during this reunion that the 65th Engineer 

Battalion ran a rifle range for the veterans. who met and 

renunisced about their days at Schofield Barracks and the mighty 

castle on Ralsron Field. Whileon the range, two of theveterans 

-~.. 

~~ ,.. --, . -

don:~ted a few pictures of the hSt11 Englnecr Baital~iin from 

1941, standing tall in front of the castle. This sparked interest 

in renovating the castle. 

Members of Second Platoon, B Company. 65th Engineer 

Battalion. 25th Infantry Division (Light). volunteered to 

renovate this symbol of pride and began work on 28 December 

2001. First. they used scrapers and basic paint tools to remove 

the old paint. and then they used a pressure washer to get the 

rest of the paint off. Two weeks and almost 10 gallons of 

Engineer Red paint later. the castle had been brought back to 

life. The end product brilliantly reflects their hard u:ork, and 

the finished castle remains a testament to the soldiers who 

built it 67 years ago. 

In a special ceremony on 13 February 2002, 

three veterans of the 65th Engineer Battalion from 

1941 returned to Schofield Barracks to participate 

in the rededication of the castle. The veterans 

were in the 65th durinzone of the most turbulent 

times in American history. Months before the i . I infarnousday of 7 December. they stood tall with - 3 their con~wanies in front of the eneineer castle. L 

Not knowing what the future held for them. they 

their eventual deployment to the 

1 

The veterans' stories of duty. honor. and 

country rang nchord within the soldiersof today. 

Maunce Storck came to the ?d Engineer Repiment 

sol die!.^ paint the castle on Ralston Field. by way of the Maine National Guard. s,hich he 
Ins were de 

L never act1 

i,I gave up 

>.- ~ n~~~ 

s the Profe 

to describe 

ig students 

y, and one 

I rest easy i 

- ion, IOlsrAi 

fknfpDieisi, . .. J 

i from pagt 

\i.l .,"A R" 

signed to hz 

ally saw tt 

on ever fin ,,"" 

~ndlethe ne 

lere unlts c 

~dlngthe RI ". P 

w equipme' 

ome into h 

zal Army a1 

nt and tactic 

eing. After 

nd was tran ~ ~ ~. 

rersity, it w 

my was lik 

.-* ----c -

mobile Diui. 

7% Zdh!fu!tfr 

-z .L" r,..:. 

joined in April of 1937,just shy of his 15th birthday. In 1940,he 

was transferred tothe regular Army and assigned to B Company, 

3d EngineerRegiment, CamellusCappelluzzo, or a.Cappyx:to 

his comrades, joined the Army in July 1940at the age of 17.In 

November 1940,he was assigned to the 3dEngineer Regiment. 

Bing Kow was drafted in March 1941 in the second peacetime 

draft. After basic training, he also went to the 3d Engineer 

Regiment as part of a group of men who replaced those who 

had already been sent to the Philippines. In the fall of 1941, the 

Old Hawaiian Division was formed into the 24th and 25th 

Infantry Divisions. Ljkewise, the 3d Engineer Regiment was 

reorganized into the 3d Engineer Battalion, which supported 

the 24th Infantry Division, and the 65th Engineer Battalion, 

which supported the 25th Infantry Division. All three of these 

veterans became part of the newly formed 65th Engineer 

Battalion. 

This castle serves as a link between these warriors of the 

past and the soldiers of today. In October of 1941, the newly 

formed 65th Engineer Battalion had company pictures taken in 

front of the Ralston Field castle. Sixty years later, the 65th 

Engineers once again came to take company pictures at this 

castle. Although the original picture has faded with age, the 

same engineer spirit and determination are evident in both 

pictures. Essayons! 

The Engineer Castle History 

Strength, pride, heraldry, prestige, and honor. The castle 

remains the premier symbol of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. The medieval castle is inseparably connected with fortifications and architecture. In heraldry, 

the castle and the tower are often used on coats of arms. 

In this country, the term "castle" has been applied to the 

strongest of our early fortifications, such as Castle 

Pickney in Charleston, South Carolina, and Castles 

Williams and Clinton in New York Harbor. The castle is a 

highly stylized form without decoration or embellishment. 

The Army unofficially adopted the castle to appear on 

the Corps of Engineers epaulets and belt plate in 1840. 

Soon aftelward, the cadets at West Point-all of whom 

were part of the Corps of Engineers until the Military 

Academy left the charge of the Chief of Engineers and 

came under the charge of the Army at Large in 1866-

also wore the castle on their cap beginning in 1841. 

Subsequently, the castle appeared on the shoulder knot, 

on the saddle cloth, as a collar device, and on the buttons. 

Finally, in 1902 the castle was formally adopted by the 

Army as the insignia of the Corps of Engineers. Although 

its design has changed many times since its inception, 

the castle has remained the distinctive symbol of the 

Corps of Engineers. 

m 

Second Lieurenant Schwurk is tile Adjuta~zfof the 65th 

Engineer. Barfolio& Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 

,In Mechant, 

?on(DCSOP 

.L.. 1-

(The 

peYe,"pbu ..., -..ua.,, -,. New organ-

:s. 

But I 3 

year! S -

ferreu lU Keserve urllcrr lralnlng ass'gr 

A ssor of Military Science at a uni\ as 

hard :to my students what the Real A1 :e, 

havillg ilcv~~ >=enit myself. My only hope was tlrar unr; ur lily 

YOU" would take up my torch, search for the Real 

Arm day find it. Although I retired without ever 

fulfilling my quest, I now had time to reflect and put things into 

perspective, which is whal 2 I am told. And I have 

reached these conclusions 

There is no perfect ann,. ..-..--..y. Never was, never will 

be. ~h~t theoretical ~~~l ~ ~ ~ - ~ t 100 percent strength, 

with 100 percent new equipment, and that is 

well-trainedaoesn't exist except in military classrooms. 

,The Real Army is an ideal, a goal,It is what could be, You 

don,t seek it, you create it, It means being You canB~, 

A, of~ne-~oing your best, going the extra mile, 

and doing the extra push-ups, okay, so your unit is not the 

best. Why not? What are you doing about it? Will it be a 

better unit because of you? It had better be! 

It is all the Real A~my,every bit of it. There is only one 

Army, and you are in it. It may be like the five blind men 

feeling different parts of an elephant for the first time, but it 

is all one Army. It doesn't matter whether you areinEurope. 

Korea, Alaska, or stateside. It is not important whether you 

are airborne, ranger, mechanized, light infantry, armor, or 

aviation. It is the same Army doing the same mission. You 

arejust seeing a different part of the Real Army. It is all too 

real. 

The Real Army is the people in the Army. It is as true today 

as it was at Valley Foee. It ismade up of real people, fighting 

men and women. They are the greatest people on earth. 

Everywhere I sewed. I found real people doing a real job 

serving their country. I may have run out of fuel or bullets, 

or wished for better equipment, or thought the training and 

skills were lacking, but the people never once let me down. 

Not once! It was the soldiers who got the job done in spite 

of anv hardships. 

I ced that the hest-equipped, best-supplied, and 

ly will fall to pieces in aconflict if it doesn't have 

fie best I spent my whole career looking for the ~~~l 

~~~~~l~ to discoverthat it was always outside my 

tent, ledge that it will always be so. 

m 

Lteurenanr Lolone, mtaerson war as.~ignedlo rhe 82d Airbvnw 

rion, 1511:InJnnf~yBulruli~ ?N 

3d In, v Division, muithe Penla! S). 

He i., L, xr~~~a~~~r VJ II,C U,LIIB~ Sfares Military Acarlerrr.~,,,LC n,,,wr 

Oflc iCourse, on( ndand Gene. rre 

andl Irk rlegreefi Uni~:ersin: 

July 2002 Engineer 39 
The Evolution of the Engineer Forte: 


Bv DI:Lnriy Roberts 

This is the second of a two-part 

article. Part I (Engineec April 2002, 

paRe 44) covered force st?-uctut-e during 

World War I, the interwar period froin 

1919-3941, World War II, rrnd rl~e period 

from 1946-1950. Part II begins with force 

structure during the Korean War and 

coiztinues through the 20th ceizrup, to 

include Vieri~am, Desert Storm, and the 

Engineer Resrrricture initiative (ERI). 

Korea 

The outbreak of hostilitiesin Korea 

in June 1950 tested the new 

engineer structure. However, it 

was a flawed test. The first engineerunit?, 

especially the first units deploying to 

Korea from Japan, were severely 

undermanned and inadequately 

equipped. The postwar demobilization of 

the Army had cut deeply into the 

Part I1 


manpower of divisional and nondivisional organizations. It was not until 

1951 that engineer units in Korea had 

anything close to their authorized 

strength. Equipment available in the Far 

East was largely leftover from World War 

11 and in poor repair, if not totally worn 

out. New equipment from the United 

Stares had to compete with other items 

for space in the storage holds of naval 

transports. Korea was in every respect a 

"come-as-yoo-are" war. The American 

Army, and the Corps of Engineers, was 

not prepared for the conflict. 

There was one other aspect of the war 

in Korea that tended to blur any 

determination of the viability of the 

engineer force structure at that rime. 

Korea was not seen as the most 

strategically important areain the contest 

between the democracies and communism. Senior military co~nmanders and 

the National Command Authority 

continued to see Europe as the most 

critical strategic area. Indeed, a number 

of Army units. toincludeengineers, were 

sent to Europe during the period of 

hostilities in Korea to reinforce the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization and deter 

any Russian move to the west. This 

overtaxed the armed forces and forced a 

partial mobilization of Reserve Component units. 

It is possible, however, to glean some 

basic facts concerning engineer force 

structure from operations in Korea. First, 

the divisional engineer battalion, even 

with its post-World War 11 augmentation, 

was still not capable of handling the 

engineer work in the division. Numerous 

commanders in Korea noted the need to 

continue applying an additional combat 

engineer battalion asset to the support 

of the division. In some instances, this 

was for a specific operation, such as a 

river crossing. In most instances, it was 

to handle the massive amount of 

roadwork required. Unfortunately, the 

slow rate of deployments to Korea in the 

first 6 months of the war meant that there 

were often no additional battalions to call 

on. Those that did exist were often 

consumed by line-of-communication 

work. The 36th Engineer Combat Group 

spent its first 6 months in Korea 

performing the work of aconstruction or 

depot group at Pusan. 

The second fact was that the 

distinction between combat and construction units blurred or even dissolved 

due to ihe demands of the time. As has 

been noted, the 36th initially performed 

the duties of a construction group. 

Conversely, the 84th Engineer Construction Battalion built defensive 

positions in the Pusan Perimeter during 

Engineers sweep for mines in advance of armor in Korea. its initial days in Korea. Five of the 

40 Engineer July 2002 
construction battalions ultimatcly sent to 

Korea performed road- and bridgework 

in support of the three corps, a task more 

appropriate to a combat battalion-army 

or a specialized company, such as a light 

equip~nentor bridge company. 

In spite of thesefacts. the lessons and 

experiences of the conflict in Korea, the 

general engineer force structure, and the 

doctrine for employing engineer units 

changed little in the early 1950s. The next 

major shift in force structure would be 

occasioned by a perceived need to shift 

the Army to a force capable of fighting 

on an atomic battlefield. 

From Pentornicto ROAD 

n 1954. A~my Chief of StaffGeneral 

Matthew Ridgway directed a review 

of the Army's organizational 

sti-ucture with recommendations on the 

orga~zationof the Army from 19601970. 

He wanted a mobile force, capable of 

fighting on both atomic and nonatomic 

battlefields, that took advantage of new 

technology. A United States Army War 

College study recommended a total 

departure from the t~iangular division. In 

its place, the study recommended a small 

division of approxi~nately 8,600 men 

organized into five small, self-sufficient 

battle groups-a pentotnic division. The 

division would be completely air 

transportable. In spite of vigorous 

opposition, Ridgway's successor, 

General Maxwell Taylor, approved the 

study in 1956. When the Continental 

Army Command completedfinal workon 

the pentomic division, it had gmwn to 

more than 13.000 officers and men. 

However, it retained the focus on the five 

self-sufficient battle groups. 

The divisional engineer battalion was 

restructured into an organization with five 

lettered companies, each having two 

platoons. The battalion retained the 

bridge platoon but lost the assault 

platoon from the 1948 organization. In 

addition, each of the battle groups had 

an engineer platoon in the headquarters 

and service company of the battle group. 

This platoon was to furnish the pioneer 

engineer support (hasty repair of roads, 

trails, fords, and culverts), limited field 

fortifications and obstacle breaching, and 

demolitions support. The platoon had no 

heavy equipment. Bulldozers, cranes, 

graders, andother similarequipment were 

in the divisional engineer hattalion. 

Although the divisional engineer 

battalions contained five companies, one 

per battle group, doctrine maintained that 

some of these companies had to remain 

under the control of the division engineer 

for general work in the division area. 

The projected force structure for a 

corps increased by a combat engineer 

group and three associated battalions, 

totaling three and nine respectively. The 

corps also added a panel bridge company, 

a float bridge company, and a light 

equipment company. There was a 

corresponding increase at field army 

level. The Department of the Army added 

a three-battalion engineer construction 

group and additional construction 

support-dump truck units. The field 

army's camouflage company became a 

camouflage battalion The field army also 

retained its three-battalion combat 

groups. 

The increase in the. nondivisional 

engineer force reflected the orientation 

toward operations on a potentially atornic 

battlefield. The destruction of facilities 

and transportation possible in this type 

of environment required a robust 

engineer force. Doctrine still projected the 

reinforcement of divisional engineers by 

combat engineer assets at the corps. 

Construction engineering remained tied 

to the field army. 

By 1960, the Army had reorganized 

most of its divisions according to the 

pentomic concept. However, opposition 

to the concept remained strong. Some 

believed that the divisional structure had 

to besufficiently flexible to be tailored to 

certain tactical and geographical environments. A study entitled "RenrganizationObjective Army Divisions (ROAD) 

(1961-1965)" wascompleted, even while 

the Army was completing its transformation to the pento~nic structure. This 

approach. termed the ROAD concept. 

Pentornic Divison 

J~rly2002 Oigineer 41 
ROAO 

"on, 

I HHC MP CO DlVARllLLERY 

286 176 

II6-mm IIGWSP FA RN iCDlPl 

498 I.liCHI 

105 IT.PUOlEOl 

PLUS 


VARIOUS COMBIN&lIIIONIOr 


Divisional Base--ROAD Concept 

reflected a thought process much like that While the ROAD concept accepted advent of the combat engineer vehicle 

which prompted the creation of the the mixing of combat arms battalions negated the need for an assault 

"group" versus the regiment. All di- according to tactical or situational platoon in the HHC. The tremendous 

visions would have a common base of needs, the generally accepted structure increase in the number and weight of 

units, such as signal, transportation, and of a ROAD division had three combat divisional vehicles increased the need 

reconnaissance. However, the division's arms brigades. In a sense, this returned for bridging, hence the strengthening 

fighting elements-battalions and the Army to the triangular division. For of the battalion's bridging capabilities. 

brigades-would be added or deleted as the engineers, the ROAD division was Those units equipped with the mobile 

the tactical or geographical situation remarkably like the 1948 division.The floating assault bridge had slightly 

demanded. The ROAD concept was basic difference was that the ROAD fewer personnel than those using 

approved in late 1961. After delays divisional engineerbattalion had three either the M4T6 or the Class 60 

occasioned by the Berlin Crisis and the letter companies and a bridge company divisional bridge. 

Cuban Missile Crisis, the Army began in addition to the headquarters and UndertheROAD concept, most ofthe 

reorganizing its divisions. headquarters company (HHC). The Army's divisions were either armor or 

A3d Armored Division tank prepares to cross the Rhine River on a ILL,,LIlyllleerBattalion raft(1959). 

42 Engineer J~rly2002 
mechanized infantry. The airborne 

division was theonly organization at this 

echelon that was specialized. The 

airborne division engineer structure went 

through all of the various restmcturir~gs 

from 1948-1962. Following World War 11, 

the airborne divisional engineer battalion 

had three companies, each with three 

platoons of three squads. The headquarters company, in addition to normal 

signal and logistical personnel, had an 

equipment platoon and a bridge platoon. 

The aggrepate strength of the unit was 

753 officers and men. In the restructuring 

associated with the pentomic coocept, 

the battalion trimmed down to two 

companies with four platoons each. It lost 

its bridge platoon and 280 personnel 

slots. Unlike the infantry battle groups, 

the airborne battle groups did not have 

engineer platoons embedded in the 

group's headquarters company. With the 

ROAD reorganization, the battalion 

gained almost 100 personnel, with most 

of the gain going to battalion headquarters. The three line companies had 

three platoons with three squads each. 

There was no appreciable change in basic 

equipment. 

There were some changes in key 

nondivisional units. The engineer combat 

battalion-army (doctrine manuals now 

included corps) picked up a fourth 

company. In addition, the cornbat groups 

in thecorps and field army contained four 

battalions instead of the thee in previous 

force structures. While the number of 

groups per corps and field army declined 

to two and three respectively, the total 

number of combat companies at these 

levels actually increased. In addition, an 

engineer combat brigade headquarters 

was authorized at both corps and field 

anny levels. Construction had a minor 

increase in personnel with no change in 

either their structure or mission. 

Construction battalions and groups 

remained focused on the communications zone. Doctrinally, none were 

fourld in the corps or field armies. 

Vietnam 

The nation's involvement in 

Southeast Asia marked a test, of 

sorts, of the ROAD concept. 

July 2002 

Engineers descend from a Chinook helicopter in Vietnam. 

Generally, the threc-hrigade division W;IS 

seen as sufficiently flexible to adapt to 

the requirements of unconventional 

warfare. Attachment of supporting 

organizations, especially aviation units, 

was well within the spirit of the ROAD 

idea. However, the divisions that did 

deploy to Vietnam were largely mechauized or light infantry divisions. No 

armored divisions went to Southeast 

Asia, although smallerarmored units did 

serve in the lheater. The lst Cavalry 

Division, reorganized as an airmobile 

organization, was the only nonstandard 

unit of that size in the country. 

Vietnam cannot be seen as a total 

affirmation of the ROAD concept. This 

was due to the fact that the Army, 

especially the engineers, did not fight 

according to doctrine-even the 

emerging unconventional warfare 

doctrine of the time. The major reason 

for this was the limitations on the 

numbers and types of engineer units that 

could he deployed to Southeast Asia. 

Major General Robert Ploger, the senior 

engineer in Vietnam and first commandelof U.S. Army Engineer CommandVietnam, noted: 

"EcI,~.pia,lriirig /i,r the huildup nnd 

o/~erorionsin Vietrmm had little mot-e fo 

go on than tentative indications of the 

rzlmzber uf maneuver bartalions that 

might be deployed. Tl7rre w n no 

genernlly nccepfed tnrticcil concept, 

car7zpoign ylcrrt, or scheme uf logistical 

si~ppnrf rtpon whirk effecfiv o~gineer 

plnnnirrg could be bnsed." 

When senior leaders did begin 

to appreciate the magnitude of the 

engineer I-equirement, political decisions 

forced the to make nondoctrinal 

adjustments. At that time, 50 percent of 

the Army's engineers and engineer 

equipment was in the Reserve Components. However, the nation's leaders 

decided against a selective call-up of 

Army Reserve or National Guard 

personnel. This, coupled with the 

continuing demand for forces in Europe 

to deter the Warsaw Pact, meant that 

senior engineer officers had to send 

CONUS units to Vietnam in spite of their 

organizational type. Consequently, the 

engineer force in Vietnam, at its peak, had 

two brigade headquarters, six group 

headquarters4f which only one was a 

combat group headquarters-and 28 

Engineer-4.7 
nondivisional battalions. Thirteen of 

these battalions were combat battalions; 

the remaining 15 were construction 

This engineer force was in 

addition to Ihe Organic engineers of the 

seven and seven separate 

brigades deployed to Vietnam. 

The nature of operations in Vietnam 

tended to negate established engineer 

doctrine and its associated force 

structure. The need for both combat and 

construction engineer support meant 

that both combat and consuuction units 

did both tasks. The traditional practice 

of placing a combat engineer battalion in 

support of a division was also modified, 

In the first place, thesupporting battalion 

might he a construction battalion and not 

a combat battalion. Second, the tactical 

situation and the mobility offered by the 

helicopter could result in different 

battalions providing support at different 

times. 

MGPlogernotedthatmaneuverunits 

using helicopters were far more mobile 

than their engineers. Consequently, 

operational support came from whatever 

engineer unit was closest to the area of 

operations. Ploger went so far as to 

subdivide South Vietnam into operational areas for his groups. These 

groups, and their battalions, supported 

whoever entered their area. This was in 

addition to tasks directed by higher 

headquarters, such as improvements in 

-
 :+. -

-. 

... 

thelinesofcommunicationsandairfield 

construction. 

Airmobile were the major 

tactical innovations associated with the 

Vietnam War. The 1st Cavalry Division 

was the Army's first division structured 

around the airmobile concept. From an 

engineer standpoint, this division was 

analogous to the airborne division. 

Neither had the ability to move heavy 

equipment. Therefore, these engineers 

relied on light dozers and engineer 

equipment. The airmobile division 

engineer battalion was larger than its 

airborne counterpart by 150 men. The 

difference was found in a fourth letter 

company and an additional equipment 

platoon in the headquarters company. 

1975-1990 

A the istCavallyDivision 

had validated the 

concept and ensured its place 

in future force structures, the Army 

turned its attention back to Europe and 

heavy forces in the years following 

Vietnam. Thecontinuing perception that 

confrontation with the Soviet Union 

remained the greatest challenge 

explained part of this orientation. A 

second factor was the Yom Kippnr War, 

In the midst of the American Army's 

efforts to create lighter and more mobile 

forces, such as the 1st Cavalry. the 

Middle East erupted ia a conventional 

-3:; 

di "

4.-

-"==-. 

->-."\. 

.. , .... 

-..v 

7 

i;l.~, 

, w~-, 	 . ' .. .& *:.&? .. . . , 

... 

war characterized by armored and 

mechanized war on a level not seen since 

World War 11. 

In 1975, the Department of the Army 

directed the Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) to analyze the 

heavy division. The basic premise was 

that technology had been applied as 

"add-ons" rather than doctrinally 

incorporated into the structure and warfighting doctrine of the division. The 

advent of the "active defense*' concept 

reinforced theneed to reexanlinethe role 

and organization of the heavy division. 

The objective was to apply new technology, primarily in the form of new 

weapons and support systems, to 

achieve greater mobility, firepower, and 

maneuverability. The resulting Division 

Restructuring Study recommended 

several changes in the cotnposition of 

thedivision. Oneof therecommendations 

wasto re~novethe bridge company from 

the engineer battalion and 'love it the 

This "ggestion was 

puzzling. An increase in the weights of 

divisional equipment-especially 

vehicles-and lhe 'Ieed for 

greatermaneuverabilitylogica'lyargued 

"t-Ongly for the retention Of the bridge 

In addition, the 

divisional an obviousfacet of 

the Of "outnumbered," 

'hould have called for engineer assets. 

Parallel to this reevaluation of the 

heavy division was the Army's attempt 

to respond to the congressionally mandated requirement to alter the "tootb-totail" ration. A number of analysts and 

congressmen believed that the support 

forces in the Army had grow11 out of 

proportion to the combat forces. This 

reinforced the desire of General Creighton 

Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff in the 

early 1970s,toeliminate evetything in the 

active Army that did not contribute 

directly to the fighting force. The Corps 

of Engineers responded in two ways. 

First, it changed the designation of its 

construction battalions to "combat 

heavy battalions." Second, it shifted a 

,, *.. - number of corps and echelon-abovecorps support functions to the Reserve 

Light Assault Rafi Components. 
The fruits of the Division Restmc- transports. In this latter case, Starry had one standard platoon of two squads, 

turing Study were short-lived. In 1979, departed from one of the basic design a mobility platoon with ACEs and light 

General Don Starry took command of principles that had guided Army planners assault bridges, and a countermobility 

TRADOC. He rejected the idea of "active for most of the 20th century. Force plat0011 oriented to mines and antitank 

defense" in favor of a reorientation on structure had always had as its guiding ditches. 

offensive operations. This ultimately led principle the ability of the organization honically,alloftheefiortatdesign

to the advent of "AirLand Battle." With to perform its function in combat. Starry a motorized division that reflected the 

a new doctrinal philosophy, TRADOC added, or conceivably substituted, the latest techllological innovations came to 

reexamined the heavy division in an effort ability of the unit to get to the area of naught. l-he division's structure, and to 

known as Division 86. At the same time. operation. In this respect. Starry's action a degree its method of operation, 

TRADOC took on a directed task to was remarkahly similar to Army leaders depended on the acquisition of the new 

standardize infantry, airborne, and of the ~ost-~o~~~ War I period who equipment, such as assault guns and fast 

airmobile divisions. The issue here was sought to trim the division based on the attack vehicles, H ~the money for ~~ to field a force capable of rapid deploy- road space it occupied or the number of !he acquisition of those systems never 

ment, but with sufficient firepower and ships needed to get it overseas. In Ibis materialized. Consequently, the Army had 

resources to sustain itself in combat. As sense, Inobilit? was not the same as developedaspecific type ofdi\risionthat 

was the case in the Division Restruc- maneuverability: mobility was in fact it ultimately could not field because it 

turing Study, planners looked to deployability. could not purchase the equipment 

technology toadd new capabilities tothe This idea carried over into the next unique to that organization. 

combat force. phase of force design that came to be 

Althourh the Armv adooted a final known as the Amly ofExcellence. TC 1 Desert storm and the ERI

fonii3.for;he heavy di;isionin l982,the ' new Chief of staff. General John A. n late 1990i1ntl early 1991, the Amy 

actual conversion of armored divisions Wickham, wanted light divisions to be deployed a signiricant part of its 

was deferred until the mid-1990s. deployable three times faster than force structure to the Persian Gulf in 

Reductionsinpersonnelmadeitdifficult, existing infantry divisions. He also rcsponse to the invasion of Kuwait by 

ifnotimpossihle.tofiIIthel8.Mto20,000 wanted the light division to be totally Iraq. Tlre forces included armor. 

personnel slots in the various fomis of transportable in fewer than 550 C-I41 mechanized infantry. airborne, and 

the division. In addition, the new division sorties. Based on this criteria, planners airmobile organizations. Thcse units 

incorporated more than 40 new weapons designed a division of slightly more than brought with them a variety of oror pieces of equipment, some of which 10,000 men. The divisional engineer ganizational structures implemented 

were still in thedevelopinentalstage.The battalion had 3 14 officers and men, under the Division Restructure Study. 

solution was to adopt interim or- organized into a headquarters company Division 86, and Army of Excellence 

ganizationsu~itilsuchtimeasthemateriel and three line companies. At full programs. Most of these had heel1 

was nvailahle. The divisional engineer strength, each of the letter companies established todeal withaprincipal threat 

battalion reflected this approach. The had 63 officers and men. The head- of conflict in Europe against the Soviet 

structure called for an organization of quarters company had an assault and Union. Howcver.thedemiseoftheSoviet 

four letterconlpanies, a bridge company, barrier platoon with small etnplacernent Union cast larse questions about the 

and a headquarters company. The line excavators and M9 ACEs. Indeed, all of proper structure and colnposition of 

companies were authorized the M9 the unit's earthmoving equipnlent was Army units. 

armored combat earthmover (ACE). consolidated in the headquarters The engineer force that operated in 

Unfortunately, the M9 had not been coolpany. Southwest Asia was not one approved 

fielded.This,pluspersonnelconstraints. GeneralWickham'sdesiretoi-educeihe in the conventional force structure 

meant that interiln organizations with sizeoftl~elightdivisioncarriedovertothe process. Since the mid-1 980s. the 

reduced Inanpower (to include the airborne, airmobile, and motorized engineers had advocated a fundamental 

absence of the bridge and divisions. The engineer battalion was change to the 50-year I-ole of limiting 

substitute (often obsolete) eqlli~lnent reducedtoapproxi~natcly 4OOofticersand divisional cngineer assets to a battalion. 

be lhe norm for lhe foreseeable men for the airhorne and airmobile The Engineer School commandant 

future. bamlion.Themoto~izeddivisionengineers recognized the need for an engineer 

There was no final form for the "light" numbered 490. The engineer structure for brigade in the armored and niechanized 

divisions. Gel~eral Star[-y set a cap on the the motorized division represented a infantry divisions.This was initially called 

size of the unit at 14,000 personnel. In significant departure from traditional E-Force and would ultimately become 

addition, the new division would not designs. The battalion had three light and , ERI. This concept called for three divihave organic tank or mechanized infantry one heavy company. The light companies sional battalions under the command and 

units. More importantly, hespecified that had three, two-squad platoonsandaminel control of a divisional engineer brigade 

the unit had to he deployable in C-141 , counterminesection.Theheavy company commander. Although thc concept had 
arms, impede themovement of theenemy 

force, and construct those works which 

allow for the physical and logistical 

support of the field force. Technology 

has changed the physical characteristics 

and capabilities of the equipment the 

engineers use, but it has not altered the 

purpose of engineer work. 

The evolution of engineer forces in 

the last 80 years has shown certain 

recurring trends. First, the division has 

been the central focus for Army planners 

throughout the 20th century. For engineers, the capabilities and limitations 

of divisionalengineers have significantly 

affected the composition and structure 

of corps engineer units. Lackof sufficient 

organic engineers in the division has 

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover forced planners to push corps engineer 

been approved at several levels and had organizational structures and arriving at units into the divisional area to acbeen tested in various exercises, it had integrated recommendations. complish needed work. This has, in turn, 

not been formally adopted by the Amy. However, the ERI would suffer from forced the forward displacement of 

The Central Command commander the same circumstances that negated engineer units in echelons above corps 

approved the formation of ERI adoption of the two-battalion regiment to the corps area to cover requirements. 

"brigades" in four of the five divisions in the days following world war 11. A This constituted a "work-around" apdeployed to the Persian Gulf. Engineer continuing move toreducethe manpower proach that actually became codified in 

brigade commanders and staffs were strength of the Army and the application engineer doctrinal publications. The 

formed as ad hot organizations with of scarce resoul-ces to other programs, second fact is that while maneuver compersonnel drawn from a nllmber of such as ~nodertiization, prompted manders have generally clamored for a 

sources. In one case, the supporting continuing number of inactivations. In more engineers during combat operengineer group commander assumed ' addition, the reorientation of the Army ations, this need has often been forgotten 

command authority over the three from a forward-deployed force to a when postcontlict demobilizations and 

battalions in the division (the original reduced budgets required manpower ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . h ~ ~ ~ d f ~ ~ ~ ~ 

divisional engineer battalion and two high premium on the ability to deploy to caps on divisional and nondivisional 

corps assets). For the most part. the new a distant region in a reasonable amount units. Finally, engineer planners have 

divisional battalions were corps units. of time. had happened in the past, the generally based their organization 

While the ERI concept was successful, ability to meet certain deployment criteria structures on the nature and quantity of 

solne engineem suggested that an OP- became, in someinstances, afactor more work to be done in agiven area. However, 

erational environment was not the place important than the to perform Army planners have often been into test new organizational concepts and required missions or tasks once in the fluenced by the dictates of deployability 

that the hastily assembled divisional area of operations. and unique operational requirements. 

brigade command and control elements The pentomic division, and its focus on 

could have encountered significant Conclusion an atomic battlefield, was an illustration 

problems. The shortness of Operation For most of the 20th century, of the latter. 

Desert Storm meant that many of the engineers have tried to develop The challenge for engineer force 

potential problenis of the ERI did not force stnlctures that enable them planners in the future will be to educate 

have time to surface. to lneet their mission responsibilities. the senior Army leadership on the nature 

InMarch 1991,theAmyChiefofStaff Those responsibilities have remained and scope or engineer work across the 

approved the ERI for implementation relatively constant through time. While operational spectrum. These same 

across the Army. This constituted arather planners and developers from the 1920s, planners must then craft an engineer 

unique situation where the Corps had 1950% 1970s. and 1990s have used forcewith whatever manpower andequipdeveloped an organizational structure different terms or phrases to define ment resources the Army is willing to 

and "sold" it to the Army. Historically, mission requirements, the challenge of provide. Y 

engineer planners have been part of a the engineers has consistently been to Dr Robenr brhe U.S.An??).EngineerSrhooi 

larger group of individuals examining facilitate the movement of the combined historian or Fon Leonard Wood,Misrouri 

46 Engineer July 2002 
dismounted element's mission is to report all information 

required by the suppolled commander. according to the R&S 

plan. It reports directly to the supported unit's headquarters or, 

if par( of a mounted recon, it can relay inforination to the 

supporting mounted element. Generally, ERTs are tasked to 

locate and recon ob~taclesand restrictions along a route or a11 

axis. This article examines the steps necessary for obstacle 

reconnaissance. 

An ERT's purpose is to determine the best method to 

overcome the effects of obstacles. either thi-ough bypass or 

reduction. The ERT and engineer battalion must understand 

the five steps to a successful engineer recon mission: 

Combat Maneuver Detection. An ERT must help locate and evaluate obstacles 

and restrictions, and this begins during the brigade and/or 

task force intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

Edirnr'r Pore: ?he article bclobv describes u~ellLrefitzeiltr,crk.s, process. This process focuses the ERTon a particular named 

rechniy,res, ond p,vcedrrrt~sjilr rrsirig iirl ~rlgincer~~,r~nnai.~.sn~rcearea of interest (NAI) or obstacle to recon. The ERT combines rmrn (ERT) ~.liilefifihtiiig in i~,ti/)iirt/~ic~~ircd IC>-,-O~,Znf flw Cond>ut this effort the work conducted duringits troop.leading 

Mrr,zravrr-Triiiriitlg Ccnlo- (CMTCj. MOT?).<,rzgineer-com,na,~ilersbr procedures (usually a map recon) to identify all 

thc,field icse ii .si,niliir ERTcn,icepl lo i,ul>i.ov~fh~qu<,lily <fCngin?el' obstacles and restrictions within its area of operation. r-ero,i,inissnnce inJoi.,notioii <trill rrrorc ,Ji<ll~inrrsrntr ,,lobi/ii?/ It then uses this information to plan and conduct its mission. coirnt~nrrobili~/,r~~.itoinni~ili~ priorin i,~telli,q~nc~ rquirernentr into 

ihr ,sirl~l~onedtuiitt~I-PCOIIIIU~S.T~,Z~~ old ,x~,rveilIrinc~(R&S) i~/nn. .Area Security and Recon. Once the ERT detects an obstacle. 

Rcoders silorrld !(ride>-.~mndthnt ERR ow ,rot IPSOLITCL.~ in iozit it establishes an overwatch position and confirnms the enemy 

riioiI(fin1 t~rhl~sfor~~~~i:utiotz and eq~~i~~nr('nl nnd that rhe use oJ situation from the nearside. Once the enemy situation is 

ERTYis nor tni~glrtnr tlrr US Ann? Enfiinc,er School 0.7 n doctrinal confirmed, the ERT establishes an observation post 

n/~/~roocIi. Ccrmbrlx real h~novntioricornerpo~ntlrr,field and ofie,~ on (he farside to provide 360 degrees of security (he 

rilrns ituu ilcn-rriric. Bur we nerd to be disciplbzed b7 orrr [rl~pmocltso obstacle. 

thpse inr~ovirriorrscr~r,rpl~menranddo not un<lermineerirring rarrics. 

Ar nln.n,s. <I.(, encr>r,roKr our rendcr,~to conritirrr sub,nitri,,p orriclcs .Obstacle Recon. Once security is established. the ERT 

os rrtc11ortd share irlvo ihat build upon our wnrfighring skills. determines obstacle location and o~ientation:type of mine 

or obstacle; obstacle length and width; existence of enemy

Engineer Recon Teams cove]-age, including enemy strength, equipment, and fire 

power; and equipment necessary to reduce the obstacle. By Captain Ger<i/dL)LI// and Sergeair First Class Darrrij' J. 

Course of Action (COA) Selection. The ERT has four basic 

COA options: bypass (preferred), reduce the obstacle (least Engineer battalions deploy to the CMTC with the intent of preferred as it signiticantly degrades its abilities),support a using ERTs to gather engineer-specific intelligence on the breaching operation. or continue the mission, Initial battlefield. An ERT is an excellent asset when used guidance ibr COA options is generally found in paragraph 

three of the base operations order (OPORD)or in the R&S 

It is important to understand the conccpl of an ERT. given plan. After collecting the facts. the ERT leader analyzes that the current engineer force structure does not PI-ovide the COA and inission, terrain, troops, tilne availahlc, 

personnel dedicated for reconnaissance purposes. Although and civilian factors to select [he hest COA. 

a battalion may choose to use more assets for reconnaissance. COA Recom~nendationlExccution.After selecting a COA, the ERT is the base engineer recon element. Its arrival method the ERT leader either makes a recommendation to 

may vary from dismounted (air insertion or ground) to mounted higher headquarters or executes the COA. Many times he (wheeled or tracked). An ERT can vay froin thrcetofive people, will execute aCOA bascd on prior guidancefromthe OPORD. depending on whether they will be mounted or dismounted. A 

mounted recon consists of five people. An assistant recon To accotnplish these tasks, the ERT can be employed using 

team leader and a vehicle operator remain with the vehicle and one of three methods. The first method is to integrate the team 

the other three conduct the recon dismounted. The recon tear as part of the brigade intelligence-collection effort. This 

leader typically moves with the dismounted element. The einployinent concept may be ~isedwhen engineer scouts are 

mounted element's primary mission is to maintain com- not expected to workclosely with task force scouts or there are 
48 Engineer July 2002 

-

force scouts. Typically this is how the engineer battalions Gain and maintain enemy contact. Once contact is made, 

employ their ERTs at CMTC as they task-organize an ERT with the ERT must maintain it using all means available. 

a brigade recon troop (BRT). It requires the most involvement .~~~~l~~the rapidly,~i~~ is aprecious commodity; by the engineer battalion; it is also where units generally fail. soldiers be able to accomplish their tasks with a 

Because the engineer battalion is not very involved, the BRT of from higher headquarters, uses the ERT as observation posts or radioltelephone 

operators, since the BRT commander, without clear guidance, Besides executing the fundamentals, it is vital that the ERT 

uses the ERT to best support his mission. To avoid this problem, is able to effectively operate with brigade assets and task force 

the engineer battalion must ensure that the ERT is included in scouts in a habitual relationship. Trust and familiarity must be 

the brigade intelligence-collection plan by stating tasks in the developed at the home station before a rotation. In many 

R&S section of the brigade OPORD. It must also actively uack instances, a CMTC rotation is the first time the ERT has trained 

theERT's logistics status, position, and no-fire areas andensure with the BRTor task forcesconts. The soldien must also become 

that intelligence gathered by the ERT is disseminated. proficient in basic soldier tasks, including reporting, calling for 

The second method is to assign the ERT brigade's NAIs in fire, first aid, noise, light, and litter discipline. Finally, the 

a task force area of operation. The ERT then receives its members of the ERT must conduct ligorous physical training 

objectives through the engineer battalion via the brigade to ensure that they have the endurance to complete the 

OPORD. It is imperative that the ERT team leader links up with missions. 

the taskforce scout platoon leader and gets integrated into the Training is only part of the equation for a successful ERT. 

task force plan. He should attend all task force scout OPORD The soldiers must also have adequate resources to ensure 

briefings and rehearsals. success. First, if they are to insert by ground. they must have 

The third method is for the ERT to work under a task force's a vehicle-which can be either a high-mobility, multip~~rpose 

control. This requires the least amount of coordination and wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) or an MI 13A3.At the CMTC, the 

planning for the engineer battalion. The activities of the ERT HMMWV is the preferred mode of transportation as it offers 

fall on the task force engineer, who is now responsible for greater stealth, is less maintenance intensive, and can travel in 

using the ERT and integrating it into the R&S plan. He is also restricted terrain. Using an MI 13A3 is more desirable if the 

responsible for the ERT's logistics status, tracking its position requirements call for more personnel and equipment or the need 

on the battlefield, establishing no-fire areas, anddisseminating for SUrviVabilit~a higher prioritythe ERT's reports from the engineer tactical operations center Outfitting the vehicles and personnel with proper con?-

to the engineer battaI ']on. municntions equipment is vital to the ERT's success. The 

No matter which e~nploymentneth hod is chosen for the ERT, mounted element should have a ~ninimuniof two radios per 

selecting the proper personnel and equipment is critical to the vehicle. This allows them to act as a retrans or extend the range 

success of the ERT. When making these selections,the engineer of the dismounted element's radio systems. The ERT should 

battalion must be aware of the trade-offs in using assets in a also have a rnanpack for the dismounted soldiers. Weapon 

recon role as opposed to a maneuver-support role. The loss of systems should include an MK19 or M2 mounted on thevehicle; 

personnel and equipment can degrade the battalion's dismounted soldiers should have an M203 and a SAWiM60. 

capabilities. A primary consideration in selecting personnel rests Other recommended equipment includes night-vision devices. 

with the training required to make them successful at their task. a global positioning system, a laser i-ange finder, and a digital 

A large amount of time must be devoted to training, and the 

battalion staff and ERT ~nembersshould be trained in the six TheERT is an excellent asset if a unit can afford to resource 

fundamentals of tactical recon operations: it and understands how to use it. The ERT must be integrated 

into the R&S plan and home-station training with the BRT or Use maximum recon forces forward; do not keep them in task force scouts. If the ERT is equipped and properly used, it 

reserve. 

can be a combat multiplier through the intelligence it gathers.

.Orient on a recon objective. All person~ielshould under- ~h~ O~FOR CMTC uses the ERT effectively against [he

stand lhe purpose of a mission, which is found training units during every rotation, and we can do the same. 

in priority intelligence requirements, the R&S plan, and the 

commander's intent. Captain Dull is /he assistarit brigade en~ineerob,server/ 

Reponallinformationrapidlyandaccurately.TheERTneeds rontroller at CMTC. Previous assi~nmentsiizclude 

to report what it sees on the ground and not what it thinks rolnmandp,: Cn99th Engineer Battalion, and training officer; 

the higher commander wants to hear. lnforniation that an Engineer Brigrrrle, 4th Ii!fanrr-):Division. 

obstacle is not in a templated location is just as valuable as C,a,ys Petersen ir enRineer hatt,e,stnfl. information on where an ene'ny Or is NCO obsen~er/cont,olleror CMTC Previous assigni~wnrs located. inclutle combat engbteer vehicle cumman~lf,~; 82d Engiileer 

Retain freedom or maneuver. The ERT must be able to Brittalioi~,and A&O platoon .sergeon/, 58th Engiiieer 

maneuver on the battlefield. Company (OPFORJ. 
I I 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676~xxxxunless otherlvse noted. 

Directorate of Training (DOT) 

Counter-Booby Trap Course. On 28 May 2002, 18 Engineer Officer Basic Course students from Class 3-02, along with two 

first lieutenants from the 1st Engineer Brigade. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, participated in a pilot Counter-Booby Trap 

Course. 

The purpose of the 2-week course was to train personnel to recognize, detect, report, and plan the clearance of booby 

traps. Students were introduced to a wide range of counter-booby trap topics, including uses and principles; switches: 

recording, marking, and reporting; and recon. They participated in various practical exercises that incorporated classroom 

training into real-life scenarios, while providing an opportunity to plan various booby trap clearance operations and conduct 

clearance exercises. Students used trip wire feelers; titanium probes; ANIPSS-12 mine detectors; DA Forms 1355, Minefieid 

Record, and rolls of engineer tape for marking safe pathways. The intent of the course was not to turn lieutenants into subjectmatter experts but to expose them to the many aspects of booby traps and enhance previous training. 

The students were reminded regularly that all clearance missions should be conducted with the support of explosive 

ordnance disposal (E0D)-qualified soldiers. Tralned experts on post, including instructors from the Department of Instruction 

at the Maneuver Support Center and the Sapper Leader Course, enhanced the quality of the course while offering students the 

opportunity to learn about real-life experiences. The course was capped off by a visit from EOD personnel from Fort Polk, 

Louisiana, who offered search advice and fielded questions. 

Officials from the Directorate of Training Development are currently deciding on the course's future, making any necessary 

adjustments, and deciding at what level of leadership the course will be taught. 

POC is CPT John Clarke, 35582; DSN -5582; or e-mail clarkej@wood.army.mii. 

News and Notes 

UnitedStates Military Academy (USMA) and UnitedStates Military Academy PreparatorySchool (USMAPS) Appointments. 

USMA at West Point. New York, is the world's premier institute of leader development. Graduates not only receive a bachelor 

of science degree but also a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. They also gain practical leadership 

experience that is virtually unmatched in any other profession. 

Each year. USMA or USMAPS at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, offers admission to approximately 250 soldiers (Active, 

Reserve Component, and National Guard) and more than 100 militaly dependents. USMAPS prepares soldiers for success 

at USMA through an intensive curriculum focused on English and mathematics. 

To be eligible, a dependent must be the son or daughter of a military member in one of the following categories. First are 

career family members. These are members of an armed force (Army, Navy, Air Force. Marines, or Coast Guard) who are on 

active duty (other than for training) and who have served continuously on active duty for at least 8 years or who died while they 

were retired with pay or granted retired or retainer pay. Second are service members currently serving in the Reserve Component 

who are credited with at least 8 continuous years of service computed under Section 12733 of Title 10, United States Code (for 

example, at least 2,880 points). Third are Reservists who are entitled to retirement pay when they reach age 60, including 

those who have died. Applicants must be-

.U.S. citizens.

.Unmarried with no legal obligation to support dependents. 

High school graduates. 

Under 23 years of age before July 1 of the year entering USMA (under 22 years of age before July 1 of the year 

entering USMAPS). 

Of high moral character. 

Most importantly, the applicant must have a sincere interest in attending USMA and becoming an Army officer. 

Soldiers and dependents who meet the basic eligibility requirements, have achieved SAT scores greater than 1.000 or an 

ACT composite score of 20 or higher. and have earned good grades in a college preparatory high school curriculum are 

especially encouraged to apply. All application requirements must be submitted by 1 April 2003 to be considered for appointment 

to USMA or USMAPS in July 2003. 

POC is Captain Cliff Hodges at (DSN) 688-5780 or (845) 938-5780, e-mail: tc2324@usma.edu, or fill out the request form 

at htip://forms.admissions.usrna.edu/cb.