United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security,

International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

1:00 p.m., EST

Thursday,

March 12, 1998

DRUG CONTROL

Status of U.S. International

Counternarcotics Activities

Statement for the Record by Benjamin F. Nelson, Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues, National

Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be able to provide this statement for the record which

summarizes our observations on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to

combat drug production and the movement of drugs into the United

States. Specifically, this statement discusses (1) the challenges of

addressing international counternarcotics issues, (2) obstacles to

implementation of U.S. drug control efforts, and (3) areas requiring

attention to improve the operational effectiveness of U.S. drug control

efforts. The information in this statement is based primarily on our

February 1997 report, which was initiated at the request of this

Subcommittee.1

 (See also the list of related GAO products at the end of this

statement.)

Summary Despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal

drugs still flood the United States. Although U.S. counternarcotics efforts

have resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers, the seizure of large

amounts of drugs, and the eradication of illicit drug crops, they have not

materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States.

The United States and drug-producing and -transiting nations face a

number of obstacles in attempting to reduce the production of and

trafficking in illegal drugs. International drug-trafficking organizations are

sophisticated, multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S.

drug control efforts. As success is achieved in one area, the

drug-trafficking organizations change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts.

There are also other obstacles that impede U.S. and drug-producing 

and -transiting countries’ drug control efforts. In the drug-producing 

and -transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by

corruption, competing economic and political policies, inadequate laws,

limited resources and institutional capabilities, and internal problems such

as terrorism and civil unrest. Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly

resourceful in corrupting the countries’ institutions.

For its part, the United States has not been able to maintain a

well-organized and consistently funded international counternarcotics

program. U.S. efforts have also been hampered by competing U.S. foreign

1

Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27,

1997).

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
policy objectives, organizational and operational limitations, and the lack

of clear goals and objectives.

Since our February 1997 report, some countries, with U.S. assistance, have

taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs

into the United States. Among other things, these countries have taken

action to extradite drug criminals; enacted legislation to control organized

crime, money laundering, and chemicals used in the production of illicit

drugs; and instituted reforms to reduce corruption. While these actions

represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and

challenges remain.

There is no panacea for resolving all of the problems associated with

illegal drug trafficking, but based on our work over the past 10 years, we

believe U.S. efforts could be better organized and that implementation can

be improved. Thus, we recommended in our February 1997 report that the

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) develop a multiyear plan

that includes performance measures and long-term funding needs linked

to the goals and objectives of the international drug control strategy.2

 We

believe such a plan describing where, when, and how U.S. agencies intend

to apply resources would provide a framework for the overall U.S. effort.

In February 1998, ONDCP issued its 1998 National Drug Control Strategy

and specific performance measures linked to the strategy. We are

encouraged by ONDCP’s latest effort to outline specific performance

measures to assess the effectiveness of its strategy.

Background Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to be a

serious health problem in the United States. Under the National Drug

Control Strategy, the United States has established domestic and

international efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs.

Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent over $19 billion on

international drug control and interdiction efforts to reduce the supply of

illegal drugs.

The United States has developed a multifaceted drug control strategy

intended to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. The 1998

National Drug Control Strategy includes five goals: (1) educate and enable

America’s youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco;

(2) increase the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially lowering

drug-related crime and violence; (3) reduce health and social costs to the

2

Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
public of illegal drug use; (4) shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers

from the drug threat; and (5) break foreign and domestic drug supply

sources. The last two goals are the primary emphasis of U.S. international

drug control and interdiction efforts. These are aimed at assisting the

source and transiting nations3

 in their efforts to reduce drug cultivation

and trafficking, improve their capabilities and coordination, promote the

development of policies and laws, support research and technology, and

conduct other related initiatives.

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President to

annually certify which drug-producing and -transiting countries are

cooperating fully with the United States or taking adequate steps on their

own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established

by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances during the previous year.4

 On

February 26, 1998, the President issued his certification in which 

22 countries were certified; 4 were certified with a national interest waiver

(Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay); and 4 were denied

certification or “decertified” (Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, and Nigeria).

ONDCP is responsible for producing the National Drug Control Strategy and

coordinating its implementation with other federal agencies. ONDCP has

authority to review various agencies’ funding levels to ensure they are

sufficient to meet the goals of the national strategy, but it has no direct

control over how these resources are used. The Departments of State and

Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are the principle

agencies involved in implementing the international portion of the drug

control strategy. Other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

activities overseas include the U.S. Agency for International Development,

the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, various U.S. intelligence

organizations, and other U.S. agencies.

Illegal Drugs Remain

Readily Available

Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics

efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs

in the United States through the implementation of the National Drug

Control Strategy. Although they have achieved some successes, the

cultivation of drug crops has not been reduced significantly, and cocaine,

3

The major source countries for coca and cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The major source

nations for opium are Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Laos, Colombia, and Mexico. The major drug

transit areas include Mexico, the eastern Pacific, the Caribbean, and the nations of Central America.

4

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291j).

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
heroin, and other illegal drugs remain readily available in the United

States. According to a July 1997 report of the National Narcotics

Intelligence Consumers Committee,5

 cocaine and heroin were readily

available in all major U.S. metropolitan areas during 1996. The report also

states that methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the United States

have been increasing during the past few years.

Despite long-term efforts by the United States and many drug-producing

countries to reduce drug cultivation and eradicate illegal crops, the total

net cultivation of coca leaf and opium poppy has actually increased. While

the areas under cultivation have changed from year to year, farmers have

planted new coca faster than existing crops have been eradicated. For

example, while the amount of coca under cultivation in the primary

growing area of Colombia was reduced by 9,600 hectares6

 between 1996

and 1997, cultivation in two other Colombian growing areas increased by

21,900 hectares during this period. Overall, there has been very little

change in the net area under coca cultivation since 1988. At the same time,

the amount of opium poppy under cultivation increased by over 59,000

hectares, or by more than 30 percent between 1988 and 1997.

The amount of cocaine and heroin seized between 1990 and 1996 made

little impact on the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and on

the amount needed to satisfy the estimated U.S. demand. The July 1997

report by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee

estimates potential cocaine production at about 760 metric tons for 1996,

of which about 200 metric tons were seized worldwide. The remaining

amount was more than enough to meet U.S. demand, which is estimated at

about 300 metric tons per year.

Drug-Trafficking

Organizations Have

Substantial

Resources,

Capabilities, and

Operational Flexibility

A primary reason that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics

efforts are constrained is the growing power, influence, adaptability, and

capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their enormous

financial resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics personnel, and

operational flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations are a formidable

threat. Despite some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign

government law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal

5

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee is a multiagency U.S. government panel

that was established in 1978 to coordinate foreign and domestic collection, analysis, dissemination,

and evaluation of drug-related intelligence.

6

One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
drugs into the United States, drug-trafficking organizations have found

ways to continue to meet and exceed the demand of U.S. drug consumers.

According to U.S. agencies, drug-traffickers’ organizations use their vast

wealth to acquire and make use of expensive modern technology such as

global positioning systems and cellular communications equipment. They

use this technology to communicate and to coordinate transportation as

well as to monitor and report on the activities of government organizations

involved in counterdrug activities. In some countries, the complexity and

sophistication of their equipment exceed the capabilities of the foreign

governments trying to stop them. For example, we reported in

October 1997 that many Caribbean countries continue to be hampered by

inadequate counternarcotics capabilities and have insufficient resources

for conducting law enforcement activities in their coastal waters.7

When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking

organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes of

operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of their

illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have proven

successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland

transportation routes.8

 According to recent U.S. government reports, even

after the capturing or killing of several drug cartel leaders in Colombia and

Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon filled the void and adjusted

their areas of operations. For example, we reported in February 1998 that,

although the Colombian government had disrupted the activities of two

major drug-trafficking organizations, the disruption had not reduced

drug-trafficking activities and a new generation of relatively young

traffickers was emerging.9

Obstacles in Foreign

Countries Impede U.S.

Drug Control Efforts

The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source

of drug production and are transiting points for trafficking-related

activities to reduce the amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated

and to make the drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop

the production and movement of illegal drugs. While the United States can

provide assistance and support for drug control efforts in these countries,

7

Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

(GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

8

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10,

1993).

9

Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges

(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
the success of those efforts depends on the countries’ willingness and

ability to combat the drug trade within their borders.

Like the United States, source and transiting countries face long-standing

obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These

obstacles, many of which are interrelated, are competing economic,

political, and cultural problems, including terrorism and internal unrest;

corruption; and inadequate law enforcement resources and institutional

capabilities. The extent to which the United States can affect many of

these obstacles is minimal.

Drug Control Competes

With Other Economic,

Political, and Cultural

Problems

The governments involved in drug eradication and control have other

problems that compete for limited resources. As we reported over the

years, drug-producing countries’ efforts to curtail drug cultivation were

constrained by political, economic, and/or cultural problems that far

exceeded counternarcotics program managers’ abilities to resolve. For

example, these countries often had ineffective central government control

over drug cultivation areas, competing demands for scarce host nation

resources, weak economies that enhanced financial incentives for drug

cultivation, corrupt or intimidated law enforcement and judicial officials,

and legal cultivation of drug crops and traditional use of drugs.10

Internal strife in the source countries is another problem that competes

for resources. Two primary source countries—Peru and Colombia—have

had to allocate scarce funds to support military and other internal defense

operations to combat guerrilla groups, which negatively affects

counternarcotics operations. We reported that in Peru, for example,

terrorist activities had hampered antidrug efforts.11 The December 1996

hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima is an

example of the Peruvian government’s having to divert antidrug resources

to confront a terrorist threat. Although some key guerrilla leaders in Peru

and Colombia have been captured, terrorist groups will continue to hinder

efforts to reduce coca cultivation and efforts to reduce its dependence on

coca as a contributor to the economy. In 1991, 1993, and 1998, we reported

similar problems in Colombia, where several guerrilla groups made it

difficult to conduct effective antidrug operations in many areas of the

10Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

11The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991) and

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
country.12 Colombia has also encountered resistance from farmers when it

has tried to eradicate their coca crops.

Corruption Permeates

Institutions in Countries

Involved in Drug

Production and Movement

Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem impacting U.S.

and foreign governments’ efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Our

work has identified widespread corruption in Burma, Pakistan, Thailand,

Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and the countries of Central America and

the Caribbean—among the countries most significantly involved in the

cultivation, production, and transit of illicit narcotics.13

Corruption remains a serious, widespread problem in Colombia and

Mexico, the two countries most significantly involved in producing and

shipping cocaine.14 According to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia,

corruption in Colombia is the most significant impediment to a successful

counternarcotics effort. The State Department also reported that

persistent corruption within Mexico continued to undermine both police

and law enforcement operations. Many law enforcement officers have

been arrested and dismissed due to corruption. The most noteworthy was

the February 1997 arrest of General José Gutierrez Rebollo—former head

of the Mexican equivalent of DEA. He was charged with drug trafficking,

organized crime and bribery, illicit enrichment, and association with one

of the leading drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. In February 1998,

the U.S. embassy reported that three Mexican law enforcement officials

who had successfully passed screening procedures were arrested for

stealing seized cocaine—illustrating that corruption continues despite

measures designed to root it out. The government of Mexico

acknowledges that narcotics-related corruption is pervasive and

entrenched within the criminal justice system and has placed drug-related

corruption in the forefront of its national priorities.

12The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992);

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is Uncertain

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993); and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

13Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand (GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26,

1988); The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking

Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993); The Drug War

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993); Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had

Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994); Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction

Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996); and Drug Control:

Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

14Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182,

June 27, 1995) and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Inadequate Resources and

Institutional Capabilities

Limit Arrests and

Convictions of Drug

Traffickers

Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative

tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the

source and transiting countries. Although the United States can provide

assistance, these countries must seize the illegal drugs and arrest,

prosecute, and extradite the traffickers, when possible, in order to stop

the production and movement of drugs internationally. However, as we

have reported on several occasions, these countries lack the resources and

capabilities necessary to stop drug-trafficking activities within their

borders.

In 1991, we reported that the lack of resources and adequately trained

police personnel hindered Panama’s ability to address drug-trafficking and

money-laundering activities.15 Also, in 1994, we reported that Central

American countries did not have the resources or institutional capability

to combat drug trafficking and depended heavily on U.S. counternarcotics

assistance.16 In June 1996, we reported that equipment shortcomings and

inadequately trained personnel limited the government of Mexico’s ability

to detect and interdict drugs and drug traffickers, as well as to aerially

eradicate drug crops.17 Our more recent work in Mexico indicates that

these problems persist. For example, in 1997 the U.S. embassy reported

that the 73 UH-1H helicopters provided by the United States to the

Mexican military for eradication and reconnaissance purposes were of

little utility above 5,000 feet, where most of the opium poppy is cultivated.

Furthermore, the Bilateral Border Task Forces, which were established to

investigate and dismantle the most significant drug-trafficking

organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border, face operational and support

problems, including inadequate Mexican government funding for

equipment, fuel, and salary supplements for personnel assigned to the

units.

Other Obstacles

Inhibit Success in

Fulfilling U.S.

International Drug

Control Strategy

Our work over the past 10 years has identified other obstacles to

implementing the U.S. international drug control strategy: (1) competing

U.S. foreign policy objectives, (2) organizational and operational

limitations among and within the U.S. agencies involved, and

(3) inconsistent U.S. funding levels.

15The War on Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233, June 16, 1991).

16Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

17Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
U.S. Foreign Policy

Objectives Compete for

Attention and Resources

In carrying out its foreign policy, the United States seeks to promote U.S.

business and trade, improve human rights, and support democracy, as well

as to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. These

objectives compete for attention and resources, and U.S. officials must

make tough choices about which to pursue more vigorously. As a result of

U.S. policy decisions, counternarcotics issues have often received less

attention than other objectives. According to an August 1996

Congressional Research Service report, inherent contradictions regularly

appear between U.S. counternarcotics policy and other policy goals and

concerns.18

Our work has shown the difficulties in balancing counternarcotics and

other U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example, in 1990 we reported that

the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International

Development disagreed over providing assistance to Bolivia for the growth

of soybeans as an alternative to coca plants.19 The Agriculture Department

feared that such assistance would interfere with U.S. trade objectives by

developing a potential competitor for U.S. exports of soybeans. In 1995,

we reported that countering the drug trade was the fourth highest priority

of the U.S. embassy in Mexico.20 During our May 1995 visit to Mexico, the

U.S. Ambassador told us that he had focused his attention during the prior

18 months on higher priority issues of trade and commerce such as the

North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S. financial support

program for the Mexican peso. In 1996, the embassy elevated

counternarcotics to an equal priority with the promotion of U.S. business

and trade as the top priorities of the embassy, and it still remains that

way.21

In addition, resources allocated for counternarcotics efforts are

sometimes shifted to satisfy other policy objectives. For example, as we

reported in 1995, $45 million originally intended for counternarcotics

assistance for cocaine source countries was reprogrammed by the

Department of State to assist Haiti’s democratic transition.22 The funds

18International Drug Trade and Its Impact on the United States, Congressional Research Service,

96-671F, August 9, 1996.

19Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Is Competing With U.S. Agricultural

Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

20Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

21Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

22Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1,

1995).

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
were used to pay for such items as the cost of non-U.S. personnel assigned

to the multinational force, training of a police force, and development of a

job creation and feeding program. A similar diversion occurred in the early

1990s when U.S. Coast Guard assets in the Caribbean were reallocated

from counternarcotics missions to the humanitarian mission of aiding

emigrants in their mass exodus from Cuba and Haiti.

The United States terminated most of its efforts to address opium

cultivation in Burma, the world’s largest opium producer, because of its

human rights policies and the failure of the Burmese government to

recognize the democratically elected government.23

Organizational and

Operational Limitations

Hamper Drug Control

Efforts

The United States faces several organizational and operational challenges

that limit its ability to implement effective antidrug efforts. Many of these

challenges are long-standing problems. Several of our reports have

identified problems involving competing priorities, interagency rivalries,

lack of operational coordination, inadequate staffing of joint interagency

task forces, and lack of oversight.

For example, our 1995 work in Colombia indicated that there was

confusion among U.S. embassy officials about the role of the offices

involved in intelligence analysis and related operational plans for

interdiction.24 In 1996, we reported that several agencies, including the

U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had

not provided personnel, as they had agreed, to the Joint Interagency Task

Force in Key West because of budgetary constraints.25 With the exception

of a few positions that have been filled at the Task Force since then,

staffing shortfalls continued to exist when we reported in October 1997.26

Furthermore, we have reported that in some cases, the United States did

not adequately control the use of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and was

unable to ensure that it was used as intended. Despite legislative

requirements mandating controls over U.S.-provided assistance, we found

instances of inadequate oversight of counternarcotics funds. For example,

between 1991 and 1994, we issued four reports in which we concluded that

23Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia

(GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

24Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

25Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

26Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
U.S. officials lacked sufficient oversight of aid to ensure that it was being

used effectively and as intended in Peru and Colombia.27 We also reported

that the government of Mexico had misused U.S.-provided

counternarcotics helicopters to transport Mexican military personnel

during the 1994 uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas.28

Our recent work in Mexico indicates that oversight and accountability of

counternarcotics assistance continues to be a problem. We found that

embassy records on UH-1H helicopter usage for the civilian law

enforcement agencies were incomplete. Additionally, we found that the

U.S. military’s ability to provide adequate oversight is limited by the

end-use monitoring agreement signed by the governments of the United

States and Mexico.

We also found instances where lessons learned from past counternarcotics

efforts were not known to current planners and operators, both internally

in an agency and within the U.S. antidrug community. For example, the

United States initiated an operation to support Colombia and Peru in their

efforts to curtail the air movement of coca products between the two

countries. However, U.S. Southern Command personnel stated that while

they were generally aware of the previous operation, they were neither

aware of the problems that had been encountered, nor of the solutions

developed in the early 1990s when planning the current operation. U.S.

Southern Command officials attributed this problem to the continual

turnover of personnel and the requirement to destroy most classified

documents and reports after 5 years. These officials stated that an

after-action reporting system for counternarcotics activities is now in

place at the U.S. Southern Command.

Funding Levels Have

Complicated Drug Control

Efforts

From 1988 to 1997, the United States spent about $110 billion on domestic

and international efforts to reduce the use and availability of illegal drugs

in the United States. Of this amount, over $19 billion was expended on

international counternarcotics efforts supporting (1) the eradication of

drug crops, the development of alternative forms of income for drug crop

farmers, and increased foreign law enforcement capabilities ($4.2 billion)

and (2) interdiction activities ($15.3 billion). However, from year to year,

funding for international counternarcotics efforts has fluctuated and until

recently had declined. In some instances, because of budgetary

27Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991);

The Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991); The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991);

and The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

28Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
constraints, Congress did not appropriate the level of funding agencies

requested; in others, the agencies applied funding erratically, depending

on other priorities. The reduction in funding has sometimes made it

difficult to carry out U.S. operations and has also hampered source and

transiting countries’ operations.

For fiscal year 1998, the funding levels for counternarcotics activities were

increased. For example, the State Department’s international narcotics

control and law enforcement programs were fully funded for fiscal 

year 1998 at $210 million. However, without longer-term budget stability, it

may be difficult for agencies to plan and implement programs that they

believe will reduce drug production and drug trafficking.

Need for Long-Term

Plans That Include

Measurable Goals and

Objectives

There is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the obstacles posed by

drug-trafficking activities. International drug control efforts aimed at

stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related activities in the

source and transiting countries are only one element of an overall national

drug control strategy. Alone, these efforts will not likely solve the U.S.

drug problem. Overcoming many of the long-standing obstacles to

reducing the supply and smuggling of illegal drugs requires a long-term

commitment. In our February 1997 report, we pointed out that the United

States can improve the effectiveness of planning and implementing its

current international drug control efforts by developing a multiyear plan

with measurable goals and objectives and a multiyear funding plan.29

We have been reporting since 1988 that U.S. counternarcotics efforts have

been hampered by the absence of a long-term plan outlining each agency’s

commitment to achieving the goals and objectives of the international

drug control strategy. We pointed out that judging U.S. agencies’

performance in reducing the supply of and interdicting illegal drugs is

difficult because the agencies have not established meaningful measures

to evaluate their contribution to achieving these goals. Also, agencies have

not devised multiyear funding plans that could serve as a more consistent

basis for policymakers and program managers to determine requirements

for effectively implementing a plan and determining the best use of

resources.

We have issued numerous reports citing the need for an overall

implementation plan with specific goals and objectives and performance

measures linked to them. In 1988, we reported that goals and objectives

29Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
had not been established in the drug-producing countries examined and, in

1993, we recommended that ONDCP develop performance measures to

evaluate agencies’ drug control efforts and incorporate the measures in the

national drug control strategy.30 Under the Government Performance and

Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), federal agencies are required to develop

strategic plans covering at least 5 years, with results-oriented performance

measures.

In February 1998, ONDCP issued its annual National Drug Control Strategy.

The strategy contains various performance measures to assess the

strategy’s effectiveness. In March 1998, ONDCP issued more specific and

comprehensive performance measures for this strategy. In the near future,

ONDCP plans to publish a classified annex to the strategy which, according

to ONDCP officials, will be regional and, in some instances, country specific,

and will be results oriented. While we have not reviewed the 1998 Strategy

and its related performance measures in detail, we believe this parallels

the recommendations we have made over the years to develop a long-term

plan with meaningful performance measures. Additionally, the United

States and Mexico issued a bi-national drug strategy in February 1998, but

it did not contain critical performance measures and milestones for

assessing performance. ONDCP officials told us that they plan to issue

comprehensive performance measures for the bi-national strategy by the

end of the year.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our

statement for the record. Thank you for permitting us to provide you with

this information.

30Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities (GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988) and

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, 

Sept. 29, 1993).

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing

Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-103, Feb. 26, 1998).

Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing

Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Drug Control: Planned Actions Should Clarify Counterdrug Technology

Assessment Center’s Impact (GAO/GGD-98-28, Feb. 3, 1998).

Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and

Eastern Pacific (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

Drug Control: Delays in Obtaining State Department Records Relating to

Colombia (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-202, July 9, 1997).

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy (GAO/T-GGD-97-97, May 1, 1997).

Drug Control: Observations on Elements of the Federal Drug Control

Strategy (GAO/GGD-97-42, Mar. 14, 1997).

Drug Control: Long-standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts

(GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Customs Service: Drug Interdiction Efforts (GAO/GGD-96-189BR, Sept. 26,

1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-240, Sept. 19, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Activities in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-239, Sept. 12, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163,

June 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-182, June 12, 1996).

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the Caribbean

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171, May 23, 1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline

(GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in

Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

Review of Assistance to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-96-62R, Dec. 12, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Honduras: Continuing U.S. Military Presence at Soto Cano Base Is Not

Critical (GAO/NSIAD-95-39, Feb. 8, 1995).

Drug Activity in Haiti (GAO/OSI-95-6R, Dec. 28, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Antidrug Efforts in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley

(GAO/NSIAD-95-11, Dec. 7, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Drug Interdiction Issues in Latin America

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-32, Oct. 7, 1994).

Drug Control in Peru (GAO/NSIAD-94-186BR, Aug. 16, 1994).

Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little

Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Counterdrug Activities in Central America

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-251, Aug. 2, 1994).

Illicit Drugs: Recent Efforts to Control Chemical Diversion and Money

Laundering (GAO/NSIAD-94-34, Dec. 8, 1993).

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: The Office of National Drug Control Policy-Strategies Need

Performance Measures (GAO/T-GGD-94-49, Nov. 15, 1993).

Drug Control: Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable

Goals (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-14, Oct. 5, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control

Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept. 29, 1993).

Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off

(GAO/NSIAD-93-220, Sept. 1, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Drugs: International Efforts to Attack a Global Problem (GAO/NSIAD-93-165,

June 23, 1993).

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico

(GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

Drug Control: Coordination of Intelligence Activities (GAO/GGD-93-83BR,

Apr. 2, 1993).

Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and its Contribution to the War on

Drugs (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-04, Feb. 25, 1993).

Drug War: Drug Enforcement Administration’s Staffing and Reporting in

Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-93-82, Dec. 4, 1992).

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela

(GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5, 1992).

Drug Control: Inadequate Guidance Results in Duplicate Intelligence

Production Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-92-153, Apr. 14, 1992).

The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Policy and Agriculture: U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to

Andean Coca (GAO/NSIAD-92-12, Oct. 28, 1991).

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia

and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles

(GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991).

Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia

(GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

Drug Control: Impact of DOD’s Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow

(GAO/NSIAD-91-297, Sept. 19, 1991).

The War On Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233,

July 16, 1991).

Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase but Program

Effectiveness Is Unknown (GAO/GGD-91-10, Dec. 11, 1990).

Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Competing With

U.S. Agricultural Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

Drug Control: How Drug Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on

Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-90-133, June 4, 1990).

Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahamas (GAO/GGD-90-42, Mar. 8,

1990).

Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are Not Effective

(GAO/NSIAD-89-197, Sept. 11, 1989).

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Private Aircraft Are

Limited and Costly (GAO/GGD-89-93, June 9, 1989).

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Drug Smugglers Are

Limited and Costly (GAO/T-GGD-89-28, June 9, 1989).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia

(GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988).

Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
Related GAO Products

Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand

(GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26, 1988).

Drug Control: River Patrol Craft for the Government of Bolivia

(GAO/NSIAD-88-101FS, Feb. 2, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S.-Mexico Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication

Program (GAO/NSIAD-88-73, Jan. 11, 1988).

U.S.-Mexico Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-87-42, Aug. 5, 1987).

Status Report on GAO Review of the U.S. International Narcotics Control

Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-40, July 29, 1987).

Drug Control: International Narcotics Control Activities of the United

States (GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).

(711331) Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116 Drug Control
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