J-S71005-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDRE FIORENTINO,

Appellant No. 3103 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 24, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000309-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 18, 2017

Andre Fiorentino appeals from the judgment of sentence of twenty-five 

to fifty years incarceration imposed after a jury found him guilty of two 

counts each of aggravated assault – attempt to cause serious bodily injury, 

aggravated assault – attempt to cause serious bodily injury to an 

enumerated person, aggravated assault – attempt to cause serious bodily 

injury with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault – physical menace, person 

not to possess a firearm, and a single count of possession of a firearm with 

altered manufacturer’s number. We affirm. 

The facts underlying this matter are as follows. In the early morning 

hours of November 23, 2013, Appellant exited his mother’s home along 

Merchant Street in Coatesville, Chester County. At that time, Coatesville 
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police officers Joseph Thompson and Ryan Corcoran were patrolling 

Merchant Street in a marked police vehicle. Officer Thompson observed 

Appellant crouching near a parked car and decided to investigate further. As 

Officer Thompson approached Appellant he requested identification. 

Appellant turned away from the officer and attempted to flee. A short 

pursuit ensued. 

While chasing Appellant, Officer Thompson ordered him to stop and 

threatened to tase him. Appellant did not heed the officer’s warning, but 

rather, turned and fired a weapon at Officer Thompson. Both officers 

immediately drew their service weapons and returned fire, striking Appellant 

several times in the abdomen and legs. Appellant dropped his weapon as he 

collapsed to the ground. The officers approached Appellant, kicked the 

firearm out of his reach, and attempted to secure the area as people from 

the neighborhood began amassing in the street. 

Appellant’s injuries were treated at the scene by emergency medical 

technicians who arrived shortly thereafter. Appellant was then transported 

to Paoli Memorial Hospital’s trauma ward. As they extracted Appellant from 

the ambulance, the paramedics moved a pile of his clothing, which had been 

removed during treatment of Appellant’s injuries. A second firearm tumbled 

from the bundle. That firearm was taken into custody by an officer who had 

accompanied Appellant to the hospital. 
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Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with the 

abovementioned offenses as well as two counts of attempted murder. 

Appellant filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements made by him 

to Detective Joseph Nangle while hospitalized. He argued that Detective 

Nangle violated his rights under the 5th and 6th Amendments of the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

by engaging him in conversation in the absence of counsel after he had been 

formally arraigned and without the benefit of Miranda warnings.1 After a 

hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion by order of 

November 13, 2014. 

The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 

evidence of, inter alia, prior altercations wherein Officer Thompson 

discharged his service firearm. Subsequently, Appellant served a subpoena 

on the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) requesting access to Officer 

Thompson’s employment records, including investigation reports created by 

the agency’s Internal Affairs Division. The PSP filed a protective order 

seeking to preclude from discovery all department records. 

By order of March 6, 2015, the court directed PSP to turn over 

documents pertaining to a single prior incident involving Officer Thompson, 

but did not determine the admissibility of those documents at that time. The 

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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court denied discovery of the remaining documents. By order dated June 8, 

2015, the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude improper 

character evidence of Officer Thompson, and denied Appellant’s motion to 

introduce additional instances of misconduct by Officer Thompson. 

Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the aforementioned 

crimes. However, the jury did not reach a verdict on the two counts of 

attempted murder. The court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 

twenty-five to fifty years imprisonment on September 24, 2015. Appellant 

filed a notice of appeal on October 14, 2015, and complied with the court’s 

directive to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of 

on appeal. The court then authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion, which 

incorporated its orders of November 13, 2014, March 6, 2015, and June 8, 

2015. This matter is now ready for our review. 

Appellant raises four issues for our consideration: 

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress the statement pursuant to the Sixth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as 

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

 

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress under the Fifth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 9 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as protections 

provided pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant access 

to the entire file of former State Trooper/complaining 

witness Joseph Thompson. 
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IV. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense 

from introducing evidence of four prior police shootings in 

which police officer Thompson was responsible. Appellant 

has the right to cross-examine police officer Thompson 

regarding this evidence as the officer’s motive and bias to 

fabricate the circumstances of the shooting in this case. 

Particularly, Appellant should have been permitted to 

cross-examine Officer Thompson regarding the shooting 

that occurred in December of 2008, shortly after which he 

resigned from the State Police while that investigation was 

pending. 

A. [Appellant’s] right to cross-examine the witness 

regarding motive/bias is essential to his right to 

present his defense.

B. Evidence regarding this 2008 incident in conjunction 

with other evidence is admissible under 404(b).

C. Evidence regarding the 2008 incident and other 

incidents not precluded under Rule 608(b)(2).

Appellant’s brief at 7-8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this appeal 

should be dismissed since the notice of appeal indicated that it was taken 

from the conviction of June 29, 2015, as opposed to the judgment of 

sentence imposed on September 24, 2015. After identifying this procedural 

misstep, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not 

be quashed as interlocutory. Appellant did not respond within ten days as 

required by the rule to show cause. Nevertheless, he filed a subsequent 

response and a motion to correct the docket explaining that counsel had 

converted to an online system of receiving documents from the Superior 

Court which had created confusion within counsel’s office. In addition, 
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Appellant clarified that he had inadvertently included the wrong date on the 

notice of appeal, and requested that this Court correct the docket to reflect 

the appropriate date for the judgment of sentence. 

We observe that the appellate rules “shall be liberally construed to 

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every matter to 

which they are applicable.” Pa.R.A.P. 105(a). That rule further provides 

that this Court may, on its own motion, “disregard the requirements or 

provisions of any of these rules[.]” Id. It is clear from the briefs presented 

that Appellant is appealing from his sentence imposed on September 24, 

2015. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with respect to his imposition 

of sentence. He complied with Rule 1925(b), and the trial court issued its 

own Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s claims. Furthermore, the 

Commonwealth has not objected to Appellant’s mistaken notice of appeal, 

nor called for this case to be dismissed. Rather, the Commonwealth filed a 

brief responding to the issues raised in Appellant’s 1925(b) statement. 

Accordingly, we order that the docket be corrected to reflect that Appellant’s 

notice of appeal was taken from the September 24, 2015 judgment of 

sentence, and we will proceed to consider the merits of this case. 

As Appellant’s first two issues concern the denial of his motion to 

suppress certain statements, we set forth our standard of review at the 

outset. In cases involving a review of the denial of a defendant’s 

suppression motion, our standard of review
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is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, 

[the appellate court] is bound by [those] findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 

Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied 

the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to [] plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-527 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

The following facts, relevant to Appellant’s first two issues, were 

gleaned from the record of the suppression hearing. On November 25, 

2013, Detective Nangle approached Appellant in Paoli Memorial Hospital in 

order to determine if he was willing to speak to investigators prior to his 

arraignment, which was scheduled to occur later that day. Appellant 

informed Detective Nangle that he was represented by counsel and did not 

wish to speak with him. 

On November 27, 2013, Detective Nangle went to the hospital to 

inquire whether Appellant could be safely transferred to Chester County 

Prison in light of his injuries. While he was waiting for hospital staff to 
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provide that information, Detective Nangle entered Appellant’s hospital 

room. The detective greeted Appellant and proceeded to engage the 

correctional officer charged with guarding Appellant in conversation. While 

the two officers were talking, Appellant interjected and asked Detective 

Nangle whether all the guns involved in the incident would be tested. 

Detective Nangle assured him that they would be. After a brief pause, 

Appellant then stated that he recently received the Kel Tec 40, the firearm 

recovered from the ambulance, from another person. He added that he had 

possessed the revolver recovered from the crime scene for some time. 

Detective Nangle did not respond to Appellant’s statements, but rather, left 

the room shortly thereafter upon hearing from hospital staff that Appellant 

could not be moved at that time. 

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress 

the statements he made to Detective Nangle, without counsel present, 

pursuant to the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Section I, Article 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, and its 

Pennsylvania counterpart, attaches at the initiation of formal judicial 

proceedings against an individual by way of formal charge, preliminary 

hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Commonwealth v. 

Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 324 (Pa. 2011). Statements made by the individual 

after judicial proceedings have been initiated which are “deliberately elicited” 
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by police, without the individual making a valid waiver of the right to 

counsel, are deemed a contravention of this right. Id. We note that 

“deliberate elicitation” is not limited to police conduct which constitutes 

interrogation, but also, it will be found “in every instance where the police 

‘deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from [an 

individual].’” Id. (citation omitted). 

In this vein, Appellant alleges that Detective Nangle’s encounter with 

him in his hospital room was pretextual and designed to elicit incriminating 

statements. He posits that the detective was aware that Appellant was 

represented by counsel, and that Appellant had been arraigned two days 

prior. Alternatively, Appellant argues that his statements to Detective 

Nangle should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment 

protections espoused in Miranda, supra. The Fifth Amendment right to 

counsel attaches when an individual in police custody requests 

representation of counsel and is subject to police interrogation. Briggs, 

supra at 321-322. Moreover, “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda

refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 322 (citation omitted). 

Appellant maintains that Detective Nangle’s presence in his hospital room 

could have no purpose other than to elicit information from him. As 
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Detective Nagle did not provide Appellant with the requisite Miranda

warnings prior to their conversation, he concludes that his subsequent 

statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 

Upon review of the suppression record, we find the trial court did not 

err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Detective Nangle testified 

that his presence in Appellant’s hospital room was premised solely upon 

determining whether Appellant could be transferred to the county prison. 

Other than greeting Appellant and answering his questions regarding the 

testing of the firearms involved in his shooting, Detective Nangle neither 

spoke to, nor directly questioned, Appellant. The detective’s mere presence 

in the room does not amount to “deliberate elicitation” or “interrogation” as 

it was not clearly calculated to elicit a response from Appellant. Briggs, 

supra at 325 (finding no deliberate elicitation where the record did not 

evince that the trooper “deliberately utilized any methods designed to 

improperly induce [the defendant] to make a statement in the absence of 

counsel, such as making emotional appeals to conscience, discussing the 

facts of the case with him, or confronting him with evidence calculated to 

provoke a response[.]”). Rather, Appellant volunteered information to the 

detective without prompting as Detective Nangle spoke with the corrections 

officer stationed in his room. Hence, those statements were not afforded 

protection under the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on either claim. 
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Next, the Appellant assails the trial court’s order granting him only 

partial access to Officer Thompson’s state police personnel file. Appellant 

sought Officer Thompson’s personnel file in order to review past allegations 

of police misconduct, especially as it concerned certain prior incidents 

wherein Officer Thompson discharged his service weapon. The PSP, in turn, 

sought to quash Appellant’s subpoena duces tecum, and Appellant 

responded by filing an additional motion seeking disclosure of the PSP’s 

internal affairs investigative reports. The trial court granted each party’s 

motion in part, permitting Appellant access to the files related to a single 

prior shooting in December 2008. Appellant contends the court’s refusal to 

permit disclosure of the entire file was an abuse of discretion since the 

court’s in camera review of the files did not sufficiently ensure Appellant’s 

right to a fair trial. 

Evidentiary decisions are left to the trial court’s discretion and will not 

be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Hicks, 91 A.3d 47, 52 (Pa. 2014). In order to gain access to the personnel 

records of a police officer, “a defendant must first articulate a reasonable 

basis for his request; a criminal defendant is not entitled to a ‘wholesale 

inspection’ of investigatory files.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 

645, 661 (Pa. 2008). With regard to in camera review, “this Court has held 

that a defendant is entitled to court inspection of investigatory files only 
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where there is an articulable reason to believe that inspection would lead to 

the discovery of some relevant evidence.” Id. at 660-661. 

The trial court determined that Appellant had not sustained his burden 

of establishing a reasonable basis for requesting Officer Thompson’s PSP 

records. Despite that finding, the court nevertheless reviewed the records in 

camera. The records disclosed six incidents involving Officer Thompson. 

Three of those incidents did not involve a shooting, but rather, involved 

attempts by Officer Thompson to disable fleeing vehicles. Of the remaining 

three incidents, only one incident, occurring in December 2008, appeared 

“remotely relevant” to Appellant’s case. Order, 3/6/15, at unnumbered 4. 

Thus, “in an abundance of caution” the court permitted discovery of 

documents pertaining to that incident while reserving its discretion to 

determine their admissibility. Id. 

In so finding, the court distinguished three cases relied upon by 

Appellant: Commonwealth v. Shands, 487 A.2d 973 (Pa.Super. 1985), 

Commonwealth v. French, 611 A.2d 175 (Pa. 1992), and 

Commonwealth v. Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d 870 (Pa.Super. 1999). In those 

cases, access to police officers’ personnel files was premised upon 

allegations of police misconduct closer in time or related to the 

circumstances surrounding that defendant’s arrest. The trial court found 

that the incidents Appellant desired to review had occurred several years 
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before Appellant’s arrest, and thus, were not relevant to the circumstances 

surrounding his arrest. 

Instantly, Appellant subpoenaed the PSP in order to gain access to 

Officer Thompson’s personnel file after it was disclosed that the officer had 

been involved in a number of previous shootings. In his brief, Appellant 

relies on the same three cases distinguished by the trial court below. 

Instead of renewing his contention that he had a reasonable basis for 

reviewing those files, i.e. that the officer’s past misconduct was relevant to 

the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s arrest, Appellant now contends 

that such an evaluation is a matter of fairness, and that Officer Thompson’s 

past alleged misconduct must be studied from the perspective of a zealous 

advocate. We find no merit in Appellant’s position. 

The first such incident, occurring on June 6, 2006, involved a police 

intervention into a suspected drive-by shooting. The police had learned of 

the scheduled shooting and placed officers in position at the scene. The 

suspects fired shots, and the police, including Officer Thompson, returned 

fire during the ensuing pursuit. No one was injured. Subsequent 

investigation deemed Officer Thompson’s actions justified, and no charges 

were filed. The second incident occurred on January 21, 2007, during a 

traffic stop. Shots were exchanged between Officer Thompson and his 

partner and the driver and passenger of the vehicle. Again, the PSP found 

the use of force justified and no charges were filed. Finally, Officer 
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Thompson discharged his weapon a third time during a traffic stop on 

December 15, 2008, striking the passenger after that passenger reached for 

a gun. Again, the officer’s actions were found to be justified and no charges 

were filed. 

Appellant presented no reasonable and articulable basis for finding 

that access to Officer Thompson’s entire personnel record was warranted 

herein. Furthermore, the previous incidents involving Officer Thompson 

were far removed in time, and did not involve the circumstances surrounding 

Appellant’s arrest. Compare Mejia-Arias, supra (permitting review of 

officers’ personnel files for potentially exculpatory, non-privileged 

information where defendant was arrested by officers being investigated for 

falsifying warrants). Hence, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s denial of Appellant’s request for access to Officer Thompson’s entire 

PSP personnel record. 

Appellant also challenges the trial court’s preclusion of certain 

evidence related to Officer Thompson’s activities as a police officer on 

several bases. First, he contends that prohibiting the defense from crossexamining Officer Thompson regarding his alleged misconduct violated 

Appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Appellant maintains that 

the officer’s involvement in these events motivated the officer to fabricate 

evidence and testify falsely. Thus, Appellant concludes, the trial court erred 

in prohibiting him from questioning the officer about these incidents. 
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Determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence are reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 163 

(Pa.Super. 2016). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error of 

judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the 

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, 

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides a 

defendant with a constitutional right to conduct cross-examination of a 

witness in order to reveal any motive that the witness may have to testify 

falsely. This clause 

guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to 

be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right of 

confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as 

federal criminal proceedings means more than being allowed to 

confront the witness physically. Indeed, the main and essential 

purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the 

opportunity of cross-examination. Of particular relevance here, 

we have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in 

testifying is a proper and important function of the 

constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. It does not 

follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on 

defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution 

witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar 

as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 

limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, 

among other things, harassment, and prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 

only marginally relevant.
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Commonwealth v. Bozyk, 987 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa.Super. 2009) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Where the defense seeks to crossexamine a police witness regarding prior misconduct, that conduct must be 

related to the defendant’s underlying criminal charges and establish a 

motive to fabricate. Id. at 757. If the prior police behavior is unrelated to 

the present matter and irrelevant, “the trial court is permitted to restrict 

questioning on the prior incident.” Id. 

The trial court found that Officer Thompson’s prior conduct was 

unrelated to Appellant’s criminal charges and did not establish a motive to 

fabricate. It noted that Officer Thompson was not under investigation for his 

prior actions and that he was never disciplined for his role in those events. 

Specifically, the court found the 2008 incident collateral and irrelevant to the 

current proceedings. With regard to any other purported misconduct, the 

court concluded that it had no bearing on Appellant’s case. Hence, it found 

Appellant was properly precluded from cross-examining Officer Thompson 

concerning his police record. We find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that evidence of Officer Thompson’s past conduct, 

for which he was investigated but never disciplined, was collateral to 

Appellant’s defense, and therefore, relief is not warranted. 
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Second, Appellant claims that evidence pertaining to Officer 

Thompson’s supposed on-the-job misconduct was admissible under Pa.R.E. 

404(b).2 We observe, 

Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal 

activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in 

conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity. 

However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when 

offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and 

absence of mistake or accident. In determining whether 

evidence of prior bad acts is admissible, the trial court is obliged 

to balance the probative value of such evidence against its 

prejudicial impact. 

Sitler, supra at 163 (internal citation omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 404(b). In 

support of his position, Appellant emphasizes three other cases wherein 

Officer Thompson was alleged to have acted without reasonable suspicion. 

Appellant also notes two complaints filed by Coatesville citizens calling into 

question Officer Thompson’s activities. He claims that such evidence 

demonstrates a pattern of unconstitutional conduct, and thus, he should be 

permitted to introduce that evidence to establish Officer Thompson’s motive, 

intent, and a common scheme of violating citizen’s rights without reasonable 

suspicion. 

____________________________________________

2 We address the merits of Appellant’s contention, but note that no 

Pennsylvania court has found that the exceptions provided in Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(2) apply to prior bad acts committed by a party other than the 

defendant since those exceptions appear to concern the crimes charged. 
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The trial court characterized Appellant’s desire to proffer evidence of 

Officer Thompson’s conduct as improper character evidence, and thus, it was 

not admissible under Pa.R.E. 404(b). The court opined that, even if the 

evidence was offered for a permissible purpose under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), its 

probative value was outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice since the 

officer’s past actions had no nexus to Appellant’s case. We find the court did 

not abuse its discretion in barring introduction of this evidence. 

Instantly, Officer Thompson merely approached Appellant and 

requested his identification after witnessing him crouched by a vehicle. 

Thus, reasonable suspicion was not required to justify the encounter. See

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 147 A.3d 1200 (Pa.Super. 2016) (police 

officer request of identification was mere encounter and did not require 

reasonable suspicion). Appellant fled before a stop could be initiated and 

fired a weapon at the pursuing officers. Thus, past allegations that Officer 

Thompson acted without reasonable suspicion or engaged in other 

impropriety have no bearing on this matter. Thus, the court properly 

excluded such evidence. 

Lastly, Appellant asserts that evidence of Officer Thompson’s prior 

misconduct was admissible under Pa.R.E. 608(b)(2). Rule 608(b) states: 

(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except as provided in Rule 

609 (relating to evidence of conviction of crime), 

(1) the character of a witness for truthfulness may not be 

attacked or supported by cross-examination or extrinsic 
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evidence concerning specific instances of witness’ 

conduct; however, 

(2) in the discretion of the court, the credibility of a witness 

who testifies as to the reputation of another witness for 

truthfulness or untruthfulness may be attacked by 

cross-examination concerning specific instances of 

conduct (not including arrests) of the other witness, if 

they are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; but 

extrinsic evidence thereof is not admissible. 

Pa.R.E. 608(b). Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in finding that 

he sought admission Officer Thompson’s past acts as character evidence 

since such evidence was relevant to establish a pattern of conduct. 

According to Appellant, Officer Thompson’s course of conduct signified a 

motive to testify falsely in this case, and reflected his bias against Appellant. 

Thus, Appellant should have been permitted to cross-examine the officer 

regarding those specific instances in order to present a picture of the 

officer’s improper motive and bias as a whole, thereby impeaching his 

credibility as a witness.

Here, the trial court found that specific instances of Officer Thompson’s 

prior conduct were not admissible pursuant to Pa.R.E. 608 and we discern no 

abuse of discretion. The allegations of Officer Thompson’s past misconduct, 

whether viewed individually or as a whole, do not bear upon his character 

for truthfulness. His involvement in prior shootings and supposed failure to 

act with reasonable suspicion are not probative of his credibility and 

reputation for truthfulness. Hence, Rule 608 does not apply. 
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Application for correction of the docket granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/18/2017