ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT

Kevin P. McGoff

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT 

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

G. Michael Witte, Executive Secretary

David B. Hughes, Staff Attorney

Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________

No. 49S00-0910-DI-425

IN THE MATTER OF:

CARL J. BRIZZI,

Respondent.

_________________________________

Attorney Discipline Action

Hearing Officer Charles D. O'Connor

_________________________________

March 12, 2012

Per Curiam.

We find that Respondent, Carl J. Brizzi, engaged in attorney misconduct by making 

public statements as a prosecutor that had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 

adjudicative proceedings and a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the 

criminal defendants. For this misconduct, we find that Respondent should receive a public 

reprimand.

This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 

Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified 

Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties. 
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Respondent's 1994 admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary 

jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 

I. Background

A. The Commission's Allegations.

Respondent was the prosecuting attorney of Marion County, having been elected in 2002 

and re-elected in 2006. During Respondent's two terms, the Prosecutor's Office filed close to 

100 murder cases, including five death penalty cases. The Commission charged Respondent 

with the following two counts of misconduct relating to public statements concerning murder 

cases.

Count 1. Respondent conducted a press conference on April 10, 2008, announcing the 

filing of a murder charge against Bruce Mendenhall for the murder of Carmen Purpura, who was 

last seen at an Indianapolis truck stop. Mendenhall had murder charges pending in Alabama and 

Tennessee, and he had been previously convicted of murder in Tennessee. According to media 

reports, Respondent's statements included the following:

 DNA testing of blood taken from Purpura's parents matched blood inside the cab 

of Mendenhall's truck.

 "When the officer opened up the cab of the truck, you can imagine his surprise, 

because the cab of the truck was literally awash with blood." Purpura's blood 

"soaked" the seats of Mendenhall's truck.

 Enough blood matching the DNA of Purpura's parents was found inside the cab of 

Mendenhall's truck to determine that she could not possibly be alive. 

 The "DNA analysis of [the blood] shows that it's not just the blood of one victim, 

but the blood of several victims."

 The victims were shot after their heads were wrapped in plastic wrap and duct 

tape.

 A .22 caliber handgun used by Mendenhall in the killings was found in his truck.

 Mendenhall had admitted to the police when arrested that Purpura had been shot 

in the back of the head at the Indianapolis truck stop, then left inside a vehicle 

parked at a nearby restaurant, but that he denied being the murderer.
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 Respondent was confident that he had enough evidence to convict Mendenhall.

 Respondent was "working with the other jurisdictions to see the quickest way and 

the best way to punish [Mendenhall] with the ultimate punishment - a capital 

sentence."

Purpura's body has never been discovered. Nothing further has occurred in the Indiana 

prosecution because Indiana is deferring to the other states' prosecutions.

Count 2. On or about June 1, 2006, seven family members, including three children, 

were discovered murdered in their east side Indianapolis home. The County Prosecutor's Office 

issued a press release on June 6, 2006, after Desmond Turner and James Stewart were charged 

with the murders. The press release included the following:

Brizzi said, "According to the probable cause affidavit, Desmond Turner 

and James Stewart thought there was a large amount of money and drugs at 560 

North Hamilton Street. They weren't going to let anyone or anything get in the 

way of what they believed to be an easy score. There was no money in that house. 

There were no drugs. Seven bodies were carried out, including those of three 

children. I would not trade all the money and drugs in the world for the life of one 

person, let alone seven. Turner deserves the ultimate penalty for this crime."

Regarding the swiftness with which the death penalty was filed, Brizzi 

said "The evidence is overwhelming. There are several aggravators present, any 

one of which would merit the death penalty. To do otherwise would be a 

travesty."

The Charges. The Commission charged Respondent with violating the following Indiana 

Professional Conduct Rules:

Rule 3.6(a): "A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the 

investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement 

that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by 

means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of 

materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."

Rule 3.8(f): "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . except for statements 

that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the 

prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, 
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refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood 

of heightening public condemnation of the accused . . . ."

B. The Hearing Officer's Report. 

Count 1. The hearing officer concluded for several reasons that the Commission had not 

met its clear and convincing burden of proof that Respondent had violated the rules charged in 

Count 1. The following reasons are based on the hearing officer's perception of weakness in the 

evidence that Respondent actually made some of the statements at issue: 

 The statements that "the victims were shot after their heads were wrapped in plastic 

wrap and duct tape," that Respondent "was confident that he had enough evidence to 

convict Mendenhall," and "that a .22 caliber handgun used by Mendenhall in the 

killings was found in his truck" do not appear as a quotation and Respondent does not 

recall making these statements.

 Respondent's public comments, while serving as prosecutor, have been misquoted in 

the media on a number of occasions.

Hearing Officer's Report at 4, 6. The hearing officer also posited the following bases for his 

conclusion that Respondent had not violated the rules charged with respect to some of the 

statements: 

 The statements concerning DNA analysis, plastic wrap, a .22 caliber handgun, and the 

large amount of blood discovered were previously documented in the media and/or 

the probable cause affidavit. "Thus, these statements were based on publicly 

available information and are protected by the safe harbor provision in Rule 3.6(b)." 

 Although the statements about punishing Mendenhall with the ultimate punishment 

may not have been necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of 

Respondent's actions as prosecutor, and although Respondent knew or should have 

known the statements would be disseminated by means of public communication, the 

evidence does not meet the clear and convincing standard required to conclude that 

these comments had a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of 

Mendenhall or would materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding. 

Hearing Officer's Report at 13. 

Count 2. The Turner and Stewart cases involved Hispanic victims and African-American 

suspects, resulting in some racial tension in the community. Media coverage of the cases was 

constant and extensive, and news cameras were present for nearly all court proceedings. 
5

Eventually, the presiding judge, Judge Robert R. Altice of the Marion Superior Court, told both 

sides to stop commenting about the cases to the media, and the parties agreed. Judge Altice 

remained concerned about the potential publicity issue and maintained statistics concerning 

potential jurors who were questioned about pre-trial publicity and their knowledge of the cases.

While Turner's murder case was pending, additional charges of assault and battery on 

corrections officers were brought against Turner, which resulted in three jury trials occurring 

prior to Turner's murder trial. Judge Altice presided over each case, and Turner was convicted in 

each case. Turner ultimately waived his right to a trial by jury in the murder case in exchange 

for dismissal of the death penalty charge. Turner was convicted of the murder charges during a 

bench trial in October 2009. Stewart was convicted of murder at a jury trial in December 2009.

The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had not met its burden of proof 

concerning the charges in Count 2, reasoning:

 Although certain statements in the press release were not necessary to inform the 

public about the nature and extent of the Respondent's actions as prosecutor, the 

evidence was not clear and convincing to prove a substantial likelihood of 

heightening public condemnation of Turner and Stewart or of materially 

prejudicing an adjudicative proceedings in the matter. 

 The delay between the June 6, 2006, statements and the trial dates for Turner and 

Stewart (mid to late 2009) indicated an extremely low likelihood, if any, that 

substantial prejudice occurred. 

 Judge Altice had no knowledge of any statements alleged in Count 2 of the 

verified complaint until requested to testify in this matter. 

 Pre-trial publicity in the Stewart and Turner jury trials did not affect the court's 

ability to select unbiased jurors in Turner's three jury trials for battery or in 

Stewart's jury trial for murder. 

 Turner ultimately waived his right to a trial by jury in his murder case in 

exchange for dismissal of the death penalty charge.

Hearing Officer's Report at 10, 14. 
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II. Discussion

A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review. 

The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney misconduct by clear 

and convincing evidence. See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(14)(h); Matter of Siegel, 

708 N.E.2d 869, 870 (Ind. 1999). The review process in disciplinary cases involves a de novo

examination of all matters presented to the Court, including review not only of the Hearing 

Officer's report but also of the entire record tendered in the case. The Hearing Officer's findings 

receive emphasis due to the unique opportunity for direct observation of witnesses, but this Court 

reserves the right to make the ultimate determination. See Matter of Kern, 555 N.E.2d 479, 480 

(Ind. 1990).

B. Disputed Facts Regarding Respondent's Alleged Statements. 

Count 1. In Respondent's answer to the paragraph of the Commission's verified 

complaint setting forth the statements alleged in Count 1, Respondent stated he was without 

sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegation. Respondent testified that he did not recall 

making at least some of the specific statements alleged, and the hearing officer found that 

Respondent's public comments were misquoted in the media on a number of occasions. We 

defer to the hearing officer's conclusion that the Commission did not meet the demanding clear 

and convincing evidence standard that Respondent made the statements alleged in Count 1. For 

future guidance, however, the Court will address below the hearing officer's conclusions that the 

statements, if made, did not violate the rules charged. 

Count 2. The underlying facts relating to this count are, for the most part, undisputed. 

There is no dispute regarding the contents of the official press release at issue, and Respondent 

accepts responsibility for the content of all communications made by his staff and attorneys 

acting under his direction while he was serving as prosecutor. The primary factual issue is the 

extent to which those statements, if improper, were substantially likely to cause prejudice to the 

criminal defendants and/or to an adjudicative proceeding. After examining the results of jury 

questionnaires and other evidence, the hearing officer found that pre-trial publicity did not 

actually place Stewart or Turner in grave peril and it did not actually affect the trial court's ability 
7

to select unbiased jurors. Hearing Officer's Report at 14. We accept these findings that no 

actual prejudice resulted from Respondent's statements. For the reasons below, however, we 

do not agree with his finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove a substantial 

likelihood of heightening public condemnation of Turner and Stewart or of materially 

prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.

C. Actual Prejudice vs. Substantial Likelihood of Prejudice. 

In concluding that Respondent had committed no misconduct, the hearing officer

considered highly relevant his finding that the Commission made no showing that any of the 

criminal defendants suffered actual prejudice from the statements at issue. The rules at issue, 

however, do not require a finding that an otherwise improper statement cause actual prejudice

to a criminal defendant or to an adjudicative proceeding. Rather, Rule 3.6(a) requires "a 

substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," and Rule 3.8(f) 

requires "a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused." 

(Emphasis added.) Even if the passage of time, preventative measures by the trial court, and

other factors prevent actual prejudice from occurring in a particular case, it does not necessarily 

mean that a prosecutor's statements did not meet the "substantial likelihood" standard when 

made. In considering the propriety of a prosecutor's extra-judicial statement, the court 

determines the likelihood that a particular statement will cause prejudice at the time made, not 

whether, in hindsight, it actually worked to the detriment of a defendant. See Attorney 

Grievance Committee v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 571 (Md. 2003).

The following types of statements are rebuttably presumed to have a substantial 

likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding under Rule 3.6(d): 

 Statements concerning the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a 

suspect in a criminal investigation.

 Statements concerning the performance or results of any examination or test or 

the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented. 

 Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal 

case.
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 The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime unless there is included a 

statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the 

defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

Rule 3.6 applies to all attorneys, not just to prosecutors. See Matter of Litz, 721 N.E.2d 

258 (Ind. 1999) (defense attorney reprimanded for statements in letter published in newspapers).

Rule 3.8(f) "supplements Rule 3.6 . . . . In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's 

extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of 

the accused." Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [5]. "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 

justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations 

to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 

sufficient evidence." Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [1]. A prosecutor's opinion of guilt is particularly

likely to create prejudice, given that his or her words carry the authority of the government and 

are especially persuasive in the public's eye. See Gansler, 835 A.2d at 572.

Although we defer to the hearing officer's finding the Commission did not offer clear and 

convincing evidence that Respondent made the statements alleged in Count 1, for future 

guidance we note that a large part of alleged statements are of the type rebuttably presumed to 

have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding under Rule 

3.6(d). Regarding Count 2, we note that the press release did not include the required

explanation that a charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent 

until proven guilty, and much of the undisputed statements Respondent made in the press release 

are also of the type rebuttably presumed to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 

an adjudicative proceeding. We find nothing in the record to rebut this presumption in this case.

D. "Safe Harbor" for Information Contained in a "Public Record." 

Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(2) provides: "Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer 

may state . . . . information contained in a public record." The hearing officer concluded that the 

several of Respondent's alleged statements concerning the Mendenhall case would fall within 

this "safe harbor," reasoning:

 "Media reports from other states about the Mendenhall case were accessible on 

the Internet. Respondent searched the Internet for news stories about Mendenhall 
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because Respondent himself had little information about the multi-state 

investigation into the suspected slayings." 

 "Mendenhall's alleged use of a .22 caliber handgun in his murders was publicly 

documented and available as early as October 2007, six months prior to 

Respondent's press conference. The probable cause affidavit filed in the Marion 

County case discusses Mendenhall's suspected killings in other jurisdictions, and 

states that 'the evidence found in his truck including a .22 caliber weapon, all 

point to Mendenhall as the killer.'" 

 "The statements . . . concerning DNA analysis, plastic wrap and a .22 caliber 

handgun refer to information previously documented in the media. The 

Probable Cause Affidavit . . . discusses the .22 caliber gun, the DNA testing and 

the law enforcement officials' discovery of such a large amount of blood that they 

were able to determine that Ms. Purpura was no longer alive. Thus, these 

statements were based on publicly available information and protected by the 

safe harbor provision in Rule 3.6(b)." 

Hearing Officer's Report at 5-7, 13 (emphasis added, record citations omitted).

Media accounts. In Gansler, a prosecutor charged with making a number of improper

public statements about several murder defendants argued that some of the statements fell within 

the public record safe harbor. Because there was no settled definition of “public record,” the 

high court of Maryland construed the phrase as broadly as possible to statements made prior to 

its opinion. Thus, it found the prosecutor's statements of information in media reports and in 

police charges to be within the Rule 3.6(b)(2) safe harbor. However, the court determined that in 

the future, the phrase “public record” would refer only to public government records, i.e., the 

records and papers on file with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen would have 

lawful access. See 835 A.2d at 567-69.

We agree with the definition of "public record" set forth in Gansler, with the proviso that 

"on file" does not mandate such formalities as file stamping or entry on a case docket. A more 

expansive concept of a public record that includes the unfiltered and untested contents of all 

publicly accessible media would permit the public record safe harbor to swallow the general rule 

of restricting prejudicial speech. 
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Probable cause affidavit. A probable cause affidavit falls under the Gansler definition of 

"public record" so long as it is on file with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen has

lawful access. Cf. Muex v. State, 800 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (no cogent argument 

supported assertion that prosecutor violated Prof. Cond. R. 3.6 and 3.8. by public disclosure of 

DNA test results contained in probable cause affidavit). However, Gansler held, and we concur,

that to receive the protection of the public record safe harbor, a lawyer may not provide 

information beyond quotations from or references to the contents of the public record. See 835 

A.2d at 569. Moreover, we hold that a prosecutor must make clear that what is being disclosed 

is, in fact, the contents of the probable cause affidavit or other identified public document so the 

statements cannot be misunderstood to be the prosecutor's own opinion about the evidence or the 

suspect's guilt. 

With regard to the Mendenhall case, some of the alleged statements corresponded to the 

contents of the probable cause affidavit, but the alleged statements did not make clear that this

information was from the probable cause affidavit as opposed to a personal assessment of the 

matters. 

With regard to the press release about the Turner and Stewart cases, Respondent began 

by referencing the probable cause affidavit, but it is unclear where the content of the affidavit 

ended and Respondent's own assessment of the matters began. The transition certainly occurred 

by the time Respondent stated: "I would not trade all the money and drugs in the world for the 

life of one person, let alone seven."

E. Other "Safe Harbors" and Permitted Statements.

Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(2)'s list of "safe harbors" reads in full:

Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:

(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by 

law, the identity of the persons involved;

(2) information contained in a public record;

(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
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(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;

(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary 

thereto;

(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when 

there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to 

an individual or to the public interest; and

(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):

(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;

(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid 

in apprehension of that person;

(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and

(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the 

length of the investigation.

In addition, Rule 3.8(f) permits a prosecutor to make "statements that are necessary to 

inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate 

law enforcement purpose," even if they might heighten public condemnation of the accused. 

"Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe 

consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no 

legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public 

opprobrium of the accused." Prof. Cond. R. 3.8, cmt. [5]. The inevitable negative consequences 

are why the announcement of the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime is 

presumptively prejudicial unless accompanied by a statement explaining that the charge is 

merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. 

See Prof. Cond. R. 3.6(d). 

We do not fault Respondent or any prosecutor for wanting to share with the public 

information on the prosecution of serious crimes of great interest in the community. 

It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial 

and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial 

necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated 

about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. . . . On the 
12

other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of 

information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings 

themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and 

measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the 

conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. 

Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance 

in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

Prof. Cond. R. 3.6, cmt. [1]. In the cases at issue, there is no evidence that any of Respondent's 

statements were meant to serve such law enforcement purposes as protecting potential victims or 

apprehending suspected perpetrators still at large. Some of the information Respondent provided 

could have been properly communicated if framed within any of the "safe harbors" listed in Rule 

3.6(b). We conclude that in performing his important responsibility of apprising the public of 

the activities of his office, Respondent stepped beyond the bounds permitted by Rules 3.6 and 

3.8. 

F. Violations and Discipline. 

We accept the hearing officer's finding that the Commission failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence that Respondent actually made the statements alleged in Count 1. Although 

we have addressed the contents these alleged statements for guidance in future cases, we find in 

favor of Respondent on the charges of Count 1.

With respect to Count 2, to the extent that Respondent was repeating information in 

media accounts and the probable cause affidavit, we give him the benefit of a broad 

interpretation of the public record safe harbor, although the narrower interpretation set forth 

above will be applied to future statements. Some of Respondent's statements, however, fall well 

outside even these parameters, including the statements that Respondent would not trade all the 

money and drugs in the world for the life of one person, let alone seven, that Turner deserved the 

ultimate penalty for this crime, that the evidence was overwhelming, and that it would be a 

travesty not to seek the death penalty. We conclude that when these statements were made, 

Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that they would have a substantial likelihood 

of (a) materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter and (b) heightening public 

condemnation of the accused, and thus violated Professional Conduct Rules 3.6(a) and 3.8(f). 
13

Respondent has no disciplinary history. At the time he made the statements at issue, 

there was little precedent in Indiana or elsewhere defining the limits of Rules 3.6(a) and 3.8(f). 

We conclude that a public reprimand is appropriate for Respondent's violation of these rules.

III. Conclusion

The Court concludes that Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 3.6(a) 

and 3.8(f) by making public statements as a prosecutor that had a substantial likelihood of 

materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding and a substantial likelihood of heightening 

public condemnation of the criminal defendants. For Respondent's professional misconduct, the 

Court imposes a public reprimand. 

The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer 

appointed in this case is discharged.

The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to 

the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under 

Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further directed to post this opinion to the 

Court's website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this opinion in the bound 

volumes of this Court's decisions.

All Justices concur.