United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1998 QUADRENNIAL

DEFENSE REVIEW

Opportunities to

Improve the Next

Review

GAO/NSIAD-98-155

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277888 

June 25, 1998

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

This report discusses whether the Department of Defense’s force structure and modernization

assessments performed as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review examined alternative ways

of implementing the defense strategy. This information should be useful to your Committees in

understanding the basis for the force structure and modernization decisions reported by the

Department in May 1997 and in your deliberations about the future size and composition of U.S.

military forces. This report also contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and a

matter for congressional consideration that we believe could improve the structure and

methodology of future quadrennial defense reviews.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine

Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available

to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me on (202) 512- 3504.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose The Department of Defense (DOD) reported in May 1997 that its

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided a blueprint for a

strategy-based, balanced, and affordable program to meet defense needs

from 1997 to 2015. In response to requests from the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the

Chairman of the House Budget Committee, GAO assessed whether (1) the

QDR’s force structure and modernization assessments examined

alternatives to the planned force and (2) opportunities exist to improve the

structure and methodology of future QDRs. This is the second of three

reports that assess various aspects of the QDR.

1 GAO did not evaluate the

rationale for DOD’s proposed defense strategy.

Background In its May 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the

Armed Forces recommended that DOD lead a comprehensive strategy and

force review at the start of each new administration. In August 1995, the

Secretary of Defense endorsed performing a quadrennial review of the

defense program. Congress, noting the Secretary’s intent to complete the

first such review in 1997, required in the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 1997 that DOD report on a number of topics, including

the defense strategy; the force structure best suited to implement the

strategy; the effect of new technologies anticipated by 2005 on force

structure, doctrine, and operational concepts; and key assumptions used

in the review. It also authorized a National Defense Panel, comprising

national security experts from the private sector, to review the results of

the QDR and conduct a subsequent study to identify and assess force

alternatives. DOD completed the QDR in May 1997 and the Panel issued its

report in December 1997.

Much of the analysis performed during the QDR was conducted by seven

panels tasked to simultaneously review strategy, force structure,

modernization, readiness, infrastructure, human resources, and

information operations and intelligence issues. To assess force

requirements, the force structure panel (1) conducted an assessment that

modeled two major overlapping wars on the Korean peninsula and in

Southwest Asia in 2006, (2) examined the results of a smaller-scale

contingency operations assessment, and (3) led an assessment to examine

the capabilities of U.S. forces against a postulated regional great power in

2014. DOD also conducted an overseas presence analysis and several

individual service assessments of issues not specifically addressed in the

1

Quadrennial Defense Review: Some Personnel Cuts and Associated Savings May Not Be Achieved

(GAO/NSIAD-98-100, Apr. 30, 1998). Also, GAO will report on DOD’s implementation of QDR decisions

in the fiscal year 1999 Future Years’ Defense Program later this year.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

other force assessments. The modernization panel established task forces

to review a number of major planned modernization programs. Its goal

was to ensure that future U.S. forces will have equipment that leverages

new technology and supports the modern, joint capabilities cited in Joint

Vision 2010,

2

 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s vision for

transforming U.S. military capabilities. The panels briefed an Integration

Group, led by senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) and the Joint Staff, on the results of their assessments. A third tier,

the Senior Steering Group, co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense

and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was established to

oversee the process and make recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense.

DOD’s May 1997 QDR report calls for a U.S. defense strategy under which

the United States (1) continues to shape the strategic environment by

deploying forces permanently, rotationally, and temporarily; (2) responds

to a full spectrum of military operations ranging from deterring aggression

and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to

fighting and winning two major theater wars; and (3) prepares for an

uncertain future by responding to new emerging threats, including the

potential emergence of a regional great power or global peer competitor,

by investing in force modernization, exploiting the potential of advanced

technologies, and reengineering DOD infrastructure and support activities.

The QDR determined that the military force structure required to meet the

strategy would be very similar to that determined by the Bottom-Up

Review, DOD’s 1993 review of U.S. defense needs (see table 1).

2

Joint Vision 2010, DOD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

Table 1: DOD’s Bottom-Up Review and

QDR Force Structures

Service

Bottom-Up Review

(Planned fiscal year 1999)

Quadrennial Defense

Review

Army

Divisions-active

National Guard enhanced

readiness brigades

10

15

10

15

Navy

Aircraft carriers

Reserve carriers

Air wings-active

Air wings-reserve

Attack submarines

Surface combatants

11

1

10

1

45-55

127

11

1

10

1

50

116

Air Force

Fighter wings-active

Fighter wings-reserve

Bombers

13

7

Up to 184

12+

8

187

Marine Corps

Marine expeditionary forces 3 3

Source: DOD data.

The Secretary of Defense also established a goal to increase procurement

funding to $60 billion a year by fiscal year 2001. To achieve this

procurement goal and stay within a projected $250 billion defense budget

in constant 1997 dollars, the Secretary stated that he would reduce

infrastructure; cut almost 200,000 active, reserve, and civilian personnel;

and reduce funding for some modernization programs.

Results in Brief The QDR, while broader in scope and more rigorous in some aspects than

DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review of U.S. defense requirements, did not

examine some alternatives that would have provided greater assurance

that it identified the force structure that is best suited to implement the

defense strategy, as required by Congress. In addition, DOD’s

modernization assessment did not always reflect an integrated,

mission-focused examination of modernization alternatives. Several

factors, including the difficulty of obtaining internal consensus to examine

changes in the services’ planned force structure, the timing of the process,

limitations of DOD’s models, and concurrency in conducting force structure

and modernization assessments, hampered DOD’s efforts. Early, focused

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

preparation and changes to the QDR process could help DOD improve the

next QDR so that it may provide a more thorough examination of U.S.

defense needs.

The QDR’s force assessments built on DOD’s Bottom-Up Review analysis by

examining requirements for a broader range of military operations beyond

major theater wars and by analyzing the potential impact of some key

assumptions such as warning time and enemy use of chemical weapons.

However, only one of the three major force assessments—the major

theater war assessment—modeled any force structure alternatives.

Moreover, it only modeled alternatives to cut the services’ forces

proportionately by 10, 20, and 30 percent. The assessment did not examine

alternatives that involved targeted changes—for example, alternatives that

would reduce or increase only ground forces or air power or naval

forces—because DOD officials foresaw problems in obtaining service

consensus and DOD’s models are not sensitive enough to assess the effects

of some types of force structure changes. Moreover, although some

technologies consistent with Joint Vision 2010 were modeled, none of the

assessments fully examined the potential effects of new technologies and

war-fighting concepts on DOD’s planned force structure.

DOD’s modernization review examined some variations of the services’

procurement plans but did not include a thorough, mission-oriented

review of the mix of capabilities the United States will need to counter

future threats. DOD divided responsibility for analyzing major procurement

programs and investment issues among 17 task forces and directed them

to identify modernization options that would reduce or increase planned

funding for systems within each task force by up to 10 percent. This

approach may have helped focus task force participants on developing

options for replacing current systems, but it did not always provide a

mission focus that examined trade-offs or facilitated a fundamental

reassessment of modernization needs in light of emerging threats and

technological advances. For example, the capabilities used for the close

air support mission were examined by different task forces without an

overall assessment of mission needs. Also, the modernization and force

assessment panels conducted most of their work independently and

concurrently, which hampered their ability to explore linkages and

trade-offs between force structure and modernization alternatives.

DOD can provide a more thorough review of U.S. defense needs in the next

QDR by preparing early, improving its analytical tools, and considering

changes to the structure and design of the QDR process. DOD has not yet

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

developed a formal process to prepare for and coordinate activities related

to the next QDR. DOD has some QDR follow-on studies and model

improvement efforts underway. However, DOD can take other steps to

improve its analytical tools so it can better evaluate the impact of force

structure and modernization alternatives on future warfare and

smaller-scale contingency operations. Also, changes to the QDR process,

such as reducing some of the concurrency in the panels’ work and

fostering collaboration between the panels could strengthen DOD’s

analyses. Delaying the start of the next QDR until later in the next

presidential administration may also facilitate a more thorough review. If

Congress chooses to establish another independent panel of experts to

review defense needs, it may wish to require the panel to complete its

work prior to the next QDR to provide DOD with a broader set of

alternatives to consider.

Principal Findings

QDR’s Three Force

Structure Assessments Did

Not Examine Some

Alternatives

DOD’s assessment of two major theater wars built on the Bottom-Up

Review by modeling shorter warning time, the enemy’s use of chemical

weapons, and other factors. The assessment also modeled the potential

success of smaller force structures comprising 10-, 20-, and 30-percent

proportional reductions to each service’s combat capability. A 10-percent

force reduction, for example, equaled the loss of one Army division, two

Air Force fighter wings, one Navy carrier battle group, and appropriate

Marine and support forces. DOD concluded that the current force was

required to meet the two major theater war requirement but a force close

in size and structure to the current force would be successful in some

circumstances. DOD did not refine its assessment to determine whether

fewer or targeted changes to the services’ force structures could be viable

force options. DOD officials said they did not perform such analyses

because they would not have been able to obtain consensus on the force

changes among the services within the time available to complete the QDR

and because analyzing such alternatives would require a more sensitive

model than currently exists. Finally, although some advanced technologies

such as stealth assets and precision-guided munitions were modeled, DOD

did not analyze the effects of some other new technologies planned to be

available by 2006, such as digitized communications that enhance

situational awareness. Some service initiatives, such as the Army’s plans to

digitize divisions, are expected to be partially implemented during this

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

time frame. DOD officials stated they did not fully analyze the effects of

new technologies because DOD’s models are not fully capable of reflecting

their impact and because the services do not yet fully understand the

effects of such technologies on war-fighting doctrine.

DOD’s war game series called Dynamic Commitment examined the force’s

suitability to carry out a wide range of notional smaller-scale contingency

operations and major theater wars projected to occur between 1997 and

2005. The contingencies consisted of disaster relief, evacuations,

humanitarian relief, and other operations based on the history of the

number and types of such occurrences since 1991. Series participants

allocated forces to the operations based on military judgment. The

assessment confirmed that the projected force is sufficient in size to meet

projected requirements and that some capabilities already known to be

stressed will continue to be stressed in the future. Although the series

provided participants with some insight into the challenges of conducting

multiple, overlapping operations, it did not identify what force would be

best suited to meet these demands. Specifically, DOD did not use the series

to identify force structure alternatives that (1) might result in a better

balance between forces required for smaller-scale contingency operations

and major theater wars or (2) eliminate excess capabilities. Moreover, the

Joint Staff, which sponsored the effort, did not summarize the results of

the analysis.

DOD’s modeling of a notional conflict against a regional great power in 2014

tested the impact of different levels of modernization on the forces’ ability

to achieve success in a future war against such a power. However, it did

not examine alternatives that varied the mix of DOD’s planned

modernization programs to help identify the most cost-effective

investments. Also, it did not fully assess the potential impact of new

technology on future operational concepts and force structure. The

hypothetical scenario involved the United States, with allied support,

defending a nation from an invading adversary possessing significant

high-technology combat capability. The adversary’s capabilities were

extrapolated from intelligence data on a current major power experiencing

moderate economic growth after examining projected threat data for

several potential future adversaries. DOD modeled U.S. capabilities based

on its existing 1997 force structure and examined alternatives, including

forces modernized with systems included in DOD’s fiscal year 1998 Future

Years Defense Program projected through 2014 and on forces modernized

at one-third and two-thirds of the planned levels. Other excursions tested

the effects of enemy ballistic missiles and varying warning times. DOD

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

concluded that the more modernized the U.S. force, the lower the risk and

less time needed to defeat the enemy. DOD officials said they did not

analyze alternatives that varied the mix of DOD’s planned modernization

programs or assess the impact of new technologies on force structure

because they had limited time available, the services were uncertain about

how new technologies would affect operational concepts and force

structure, and the model used for this analysis lacked the sensitivity to

assess the effect of alternative force structures.

The force assessments helped senior DOD officials conclude that a

10-percent force structure cut across the board would result in

unacceptable risk in implementing the defense strategy. Senior officials

agreed on an overall path that made some personnel cuts and modest

force structure cuts to achieve savings that could be used to increase

modernization funding to $60 billion annually. Specifically, senior civilian

and military leaders agreed that the services would develop proposals to

reduce the equivalent of about 150,000 active personnel to save between

$4 billion and $6 billion. The services developed proposals to save about

$3.7 billion largely by streamlining infrastructure functions and by making

modest adjustments to force structure. Senior DOD officials identified

additional savings by restructuring or reducing quantities of some planned

weapon systems and reducing personnel assigned to defense agencies.

Methodology for

Modernization Review

Resulted in a Primarily

Budget-Driven Focus

DOD’s modernization review provided senior DOD officials with options for

buying major systems in the future, but the methodology for the review

resulted in a focus on budget-driven options rather than joint mission

assessments. DOD’s modernization panel identified 17 topics, such as

tactical aircraft, ships, theater missile defense, and ground forces. The

panel assigned these topics to task forces that independently analyzed

existing procurement plans for each group of systems based on their view

of the capabilities for Joint Vision 2010 and using the procurement funding

reflected in the 1998 Future Years Defense Program as a baseline. The

panel directed the task forces to consider increasing or decreasing funding

allocated to each group of systems by up to 10 percent as a means of

encouraging them to develop options to modify planned programs. For

example, the task force that evaluated tactical aircraft developed an

option that decreased the number of Air Force F-22s, Navy F/A-18E/Fs,

and Joint Strike Fighters, thereby reducing total funding for these aircraft

by $30 billion, or about 10 percent. Senior DOD officials considered these

options when reaching decisions to change some procurement plans.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

Neither the modernization panel nor the task forces that reported to the

panel took an integrated look at the mission impact of procurement

options or final decisions to determine if they resulted in the best system

mix. For example, the helicopter; tactical air; command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance; and other ground capabilities that might be used for the

close air support mission were evaluated separately without an overall

assessment of mission needs. GAO’s previous report on combat air power

commented on DOD’s need to examine the services’ procurement plans

from a joint mission perspective to better enable the Secretary of Defense

to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the merits of new investments,

and decide whether current programs should continue to receive funding. 3

Furthermore, modernization plans were reviewed simultaneously but

largely separately from force assessments, and the QDR modernization

decisions were not modeled in DOD’s regional great power assessment.

Preparing Early and

Considering Changes to

the QDR Process Can Help

Provide a More Thorough

Review

Although there is no current statutory requirement for another QDR, the

Secretary of Defense has endorsed the concept of a quadrennial review.

DOD could implement this commitment by taking several steps now to

prepare for the next QDR. The Secretary of Defense has not yet established

formal oversight at a senior level to facilitate preparation for the next

review. Assigning responsibility well in advance is needed to provide

sufficient time to complete numerous preparation tasks, including

analyzing lessons learned from DOD’s 1997 review and identifying a

strategy to improve and build on its principal analyses. While DOD’s 1997

QDR expanded on the analytical tools used in prior defense force analyses,

DOD recognizes that its models currently have significant limitations in

realistically modeling certain aspects of warfare such as command,

control, and intelligence. As a result, DOD has a significant effort underway

to improve its models for simulating major theater wars. However, DOD

also needs to determine how it can improve its analysis of requirements

for smaller-scale contingencies and longer-term threats. Moreover, DOD

will need to consider how new technologies and concepts available to U.S.

military forces will impact a wide range of military operations. Finally,

modeling the existing force structure prior to the QDR could provide a

baseline for comparing alternatives examined during the next QDR.

Opportunities may also exist to improve the QDR process. The force

assessment and modernization panels proceeded concurrently and did not

3

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177 Sept. 20, 1996).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

fully collaborate, which resulted in limited analysis of trade-offs between

modernization and force structure. For example, some defense experts

argue that spending money on technology such as stealth aircraft and

precision munitions should enable the United States to reduce force

structure. In addition, QDR participants provided different views on the

process used to develop the defense strategy. OSD officials noted that the

strategy review began in the fall of 1996 and proceeded smoothly.

However, some service officials and QDR panel members believe that the

panels experienced some confusion because DOD had a draft defense

strategy in January 1997, but did not finalize it until March 1997. Changing

the timing of the QDR process might also help the thoroughness of

analyses. The QDR was envisioned to begin immediately after the

presidential election to allow a new administration the chance to affect the

next budget cycle. Even though the 1997 QDR was performed by a returning

administration, many DOD officials told GAO the panels did not receive final,

top-level guidance until mid-January, after the new Secretary of Defense

was confirmed. As a result, DOD had only a few months to finalize the

strategy, complete its force structure and modernization analyses, and

make final decisions. It may be even more difficult to adhere to this

schedule following the 2000 election because there will be a change in

administration.

Congress might be able to assist DOD in identifying a broader set of options

to explore during the next QDR. In the National Defense Authorization Act

of 1997, Congress established an independent panel to assess the QDR and

report on possible force structure alternatives after the QDR was

completed. As an alternative, Congress might want an independent panel

assessment prior to the next QDR to encourage DOD to explore different

defense strategies, force structures, and modernization alternatives.

Recommendation The Secretary of Defense has endorsed the concept of a quadrennial

review of defense needs. To enhance the value of the next QDR, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of Defense assign responsibility for overall

oversight and coordination of DOD preparation efforts. Preparation tasks

should include identifying the analytical tools and data needed to support

force structure and modernization analyses, monitoring the status and

funding for efforts to upgrade DOD’s models, summarizing lessons learned

from the 1997 QDR, and considering the need for changing the structure

and timing of the QDR process.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

If Congress chooses to establish another panel of experts to provide an

independent review of defense needs, it may wish to require the panel to

complete its work prior to the next QDR. This approach could assist DOD in

identifying a broader set of options to examine during its review.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. I), DOD concurred

with GAO’s recommendation but disagreed with several of GAO’s

characterizations of the QDR effort. DOD’s comments and GAO’s detailed

evaluation of them are included in the report where appropriate.

Specifically, DOD agreed that the Secretary of Defense should assign

responsibility for overall oversight and coordination of DOD efforts to

prepare for the next QDR. DOD stated it is identifying the analytic tools and

data that will be needed for the next QDR and is improving existing tools

where shortcomings have been identified. It also stated that it is examining

areas of U.S. defense strategy that either were not fully explored in the QDR

or were raised by the National Defense Panel and has commissioned

internal and external studies summarizing lessons learned from the 1997

QDR. DOD also agreed that any mandated independent panel similar to the

National Defense Panel should precede the Department’s own QDR efforts.

However, DOD disagreed with GAO’s findings that (1) the QDR panel process

may have been hampered by its concurrency, (2) the modernization effort

was “budget driven”, (3) modernization and force structure decisions were

not integrated, and (4) beginning the QDR process later in a presidential

administration is a viable alternative to the timing of the 1997 QDR.

DOD observed that OSD and joint staff representatives had thoroughly

briefed all other QDR panels on the draft strategy and that any delays in

other panels’ work should not be blamed on the absence of a final

strategy. GAO’s report acknowledges that the draft strategy was circulated

to panel chairs in January 1997 and that some DOD officials see no need to

alter the timing of the strategy review. However, because some officials

perceived that the lack of a final strategy led to confusion, GAO believes

that DOD should consider this information in evaluating changes to the QDR

process. GAO also notes that the 1997 QDR was conducted under favorable

conditions in that many senior DOD officials were in place prior to the

November presidential election to begin work on the strategy and major

elements of the strategy remained the same. GAO believes that significant

concurrency between the strategy review and force structure and

modernization assessments could be more problematic for the next QDR,

which will be conducted by a new administration, particularly if senior

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

officials decide on a new strategy that alters key force planning

assumptions.

DOD also stated it disagreed that the force assessment and modernization

panels functioned as stovepipes and noted that the QDR structure allowed

each panel to focus on a tractable set of issues while enabling senior

leaders to evaluate and make decisions based on an integrated picture. GAO

notes that senior DOD officials considered broad trade-offs between force

structure and modernization at the macro level in determining which of

three paths to adopt to meet near- and long-term challenges. However, the

panels that provided input to senior officials did not fully examine

trade-offs between modernization and force structure. GAO believes that

more in-depth analysis of these issues would have enhanced the overall

value of DOD’s review and the alternatives presented to senior officials. For

example, DOD’s regional great power analysis modeled planned

investments, such as precision munitions and stealth aircraft, but did not

examine whether such technologies would permit a different force

structure.

DOD also said that GAO’s assertions that the QDR modernization options

were budget-driven and based solely on a plus-or-minus 10-percent rule

were inaccurate and noted that the primary factor influencing the

modernization analyses was the capabilities of current and planned

systems. GAO did not assert that the QDR modernization options were based

solely on a plus-or-minus 10-percent rule. Rather, GAO’s report specifically

recognizes that DOD’s modernization assessment was based on a number of

factors including Joint Vision 2010. However, GAO believes that DOD’s

guidance to the modernization task forces to consider increasing or

decreasing funding for planned programs by 10 percent, combined with its

stovepipe approach for analyzing groups of similar weapons systems, may

have limited the types of alternatives considered when compared with a

mission-oriented approach.

Finally, DOD believes that there are numerous disadvantages to conducting

the QDR later in a presidential administration, including that the Secretary

of Defense would have to submit two budgets before submitting one that

reflects the QDR’s results. GAO recognizes DOD’s concerns but continues to

believe that delaying the process would give a new administration the

benefit of more time to perform a more rigorous review before reaching

conclusions that will shape the future of DOD and its budgetary priorities.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Executive Summary

DOD also provided GAO with technical comments on the report and where

appropriate, GAO changed or clarified information in the report.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

16

DOD’s Process for Conducting the QDR 17

DOD’s Assessment of the Security Environment 19

The U.S. Defense Strategy 20

The QDR-Proposed Force Is Very Similar to the Bottom-Up

Review Force

20

The National Defense Panel Emphasized the Need to Prepare for

the Future

20

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21

Chapter 2 

Force Structure

Assessments Tested

Limited Alternatives

24

Major Theater War Assessment Explored a Few Force Structure

Alternatives

24

DOD’s Smaller-Scale Contingency Force Assessment Evaluated

the Sufficiency of the Planned Force

29

Regional Great Power Assessment Modeled Levels of

Modernization

32

Chapter 3 

Modernization Review

Did Not Reflect a

Mission-Oriented

Approach

37

Methodology for Modernization Review Resulted in a Primarily

Budget-Driven Focus

37

Integrated Analyses Needed to Identify and Assess Weapon

System Trade-Offs

40

Force Structure and Modernization Assessments Need to Be

More Collaborative

42

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Chapter 4 

Planning for the Next

QDR Can Help

Provide for a More

Thorough Review of

Defense Needs

44

DOD Needs to Take Early Steps to Prepare 44

DOD Should Consider Changing the QDR Process and Timing 48

Congress May Want to Consider Changes to National Defense

Panel Timing

50

Conclusions 50

Recommendation 50

Matter for Congressional Consideration 51

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 51

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 54

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 58

Tables Table 1: DOD’s Bottom-Up Review and QDR Force Structures 4

Table 2.1: Excursions Modeled in the Two Major Theater War

Force Assessment

27

Table 3.1: Modernization Topics and Types of Systems Reviewed 38

Table 4.1: Limitations of Current Theater-Level Simulations 45

Figures Figure 1.1: Diagram of QDR Organizational Tiers 18

Figure 2.1: Modernization Level of Regional Great Power Ground

and Air Forces

34

Abbreviations

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

JICM Joint Integrated Contingency Model

JWARS Joint Warfighting System Model

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

TACWAR Tactical Warfare Model

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In the early 1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted two major

defense reviews—the 1991 Base Force Review and the 1993 Bottom-Up

Review—to assess military force structure requirements in the post-Cold

War era. Following these reviews, Congress established the Commission

on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to determine the

appropriateness of current allocations of roles, missions, and functions

among the armed forces and make recommendations for changes. Among

its recommendations, the Commission called for DOD to conduct a

comprehensive strategy and force review at the start of each

administration, or every 4 years, to examine an array of force mixes,

budget levels, and missions to identify the best force mix. In August 1995,

the Secretary of Defense endorsed performing a quadrennial review of the

defense program. He expected to complete the first such review in 1997.

Congress, noting the Secretary’s intention to complete a Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) in 1997, identified specific reporting requirements

for the review in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1997.1

 Congress expected the QDR to review the defense strategy of the

United States and identify the force structure best suited to implement the

strategy. Specifically, the law required a comprehensive examination of

defense strategy; active, guard, and reserve component force structure;

force modernization plans; infrastructure; budget plans; and other

elements of the defense program. The law also required DOD to identify

how the force structure would be affected by new technologies

anticipated to be available by 2005 and by the changes in doctrine and

operational concepts that would result from such technologies. DOD issued

its report on the QDR in May 1997.

The law also established an independent, nonpartisan panel comprising

national security experts from the private sector, known as the National

Defense Panel, to review the results of the 1997 QDR and conduct a

subsequent study of force alternatives. Congress noted that it was

important to provide for an independent review of force structure that

extends beyond the time frame of the QDR and explores innovative and

forward-thinking ways of meeting emerging challenges. The National

Defense Panel issued its report in December 1997 as required by the

statute.

1

Public Law 104-201, title IX, subtitle B, sections 921-926.

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DOD’s Process for

Conducting the QDR

DOD began the QDR in November 1996 after the presidential election.

Although the President was reelected, the QDR was underway for

approximately 2 months before a new Secretary of Defense was confirmed

in January 1997. Following his confirmation, the Secretary provided

guidance to DOD officials concerning the defense strategy and budget

assumptions for the QDR.

The QDR included participation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD), the Joint Staff, the services, and the commanders in chief of the

combatant commands. DOD organized officials into three tiers that

ultimately reported to the Secretary of Defense (see fig. 1.1). The first tier

consisted of seven panels that were tasked to conduct analyses between

November 1996 and February 1997. The second tier, an Integration Group

led by senior OSD and Joint Staff officials, was designed to integrate the

seven panels’ results and produce a set of options to implement the

defense strategy. The third tier, the Senior Steering Group, cochaired by

the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, was to oversee the QDR process and make recommendations to the

Secretary of Defense.

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Figure 1.1: Diagram of QDR Organizational Tiers

Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Service Leaders

 QDR Steering Group

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs

 Integration Group

OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation 

OSD Strategy and Requirements 

OSD Acquisition and Technology 

Joint Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy

Joint Staff for Force Structure, Resources

and Assessment

 Strategy 

OSD Strategy 

and 

 Requirements

Joint Staff

 for Strategic

 Plans and Policy

 Information

 Operations 

 and Intelligence

OSD Command,

 Control, 

 Communications, 

 and Intelligence

Vice Director

 of the Joint Staff

 Force Structure

OSD Program

 Analysis and

 Evaluation 

Joint Staff for 

 Force Structure,

 Resources and

 Assessment

 Readiness

OSD Personnel 

 and Readiness

Joint Staff for

 Logistics

 Infrastructure

OSD Acquisition

 and Technology

Joint Staff for

 Logistics

 Modernization

OSD Acquisition 

 and Technology

Joint Staff for

 Force Structure,

 Resources and

 Assessment

Human Resources

OSD Personnel 

 and Readiness

Joint Staff for

 Logistics

Source: OSD.

To assess force structure requirements, DOD’s force structure panel

(1) conducted an assessment by modeling two major, overlapping wars on

the Korean peninsula and in Southwest Asia in 2006; (2) examined the

results of an assessment, led by the Joint Staff, of smaller-scale

contingency operations; and (3) led an assessment of the capabilities of

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U.S. forces against a notional regional great power in 2014. DOD also

conducted an analysis of overseas presence and several individual service

assessments of some issues not specifically addressed in the other

assessments.

The modernization panel established task forces to review a number of

major planned modernization programs. Its goal was to ensure that future

U.S. forces will have equipment that leverages new technologies and

supports the modern, joint capabilities cited in Joint Vision 2010, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s vision for transforming U.S. military

capabilities for the future.

DOD’s Assessment of

the Security

Environment

DOD’s QDR report states that although the threat of global war has receded,

the United States will likely face a number of significant challenges

between now and 2015. First, the United States will continue to confront

regional dangers, including the threat of large-scale, cross-border

aggression against allies in key regions by hostile states with significant

military power. Moreover, adversaries may use asymmetric

means—avoiding conventional military contact—to attack U.S. forces and

interests overseas and Americans at home. In addition, failing states may

create instability, internal conflict, and humanitarian crises.

DOD also concluded that the proliferation of advanced weapons and

technologies could increase the number of potential adversaries with

significant military capabilities and potentially change the character of

military challenges. Of particular concern are the spread of nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons; information warfare capabilities;

advanced conventional weapons; stealth capabilities; unmanned aerial

vehicles; and capabilities to access or deny access to space. Moreover,

U.S. interests will be challenged by a variety of transnational dangers, such

as terrorism, illegal drug trade, international organized crime, and the

uncontrolled flow of migrants. Finally, the United States will face threats

to the homeland from strategic arsenals, intercontinental ballistic missiles,

and weapons of mass destruction.

According to intelligence sources, it is unlikely that a “global peer

competitor” will emerge by 2015 with capabilities that could challenge the

United States as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Furthermore, it

is likely that no regional power or coalition will amass sufficient

conventional military strength in the next 10 to 15 years to defeat U.S.

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forces. However, it is possible that a regional great power or global peer

competitor, such as Russia and China, may emerge after 2015.

The U.S. Defense

Strategy

On the basis of DOD’s assessment of the global security environment

through 2015, the QDR report cited a defense strategy consisting of three

key elements: shape, respond, and prepare. The strategy states that the

United States must continue to shape the strategic environment by

promoting U.S. interests through a variety of means, including the

deployment of forces permanently, rotationally, and temporarily overseas.

The United States must also maintain the capability to respond to a full

spectrum of military operations ranging from deterring aggression and

conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to fighting

and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. The strategy

also cited the need to prepare for a future that may include the emergence

of new threats and/or a regional great power or global peer competitor by

investing now in force modernization, exploiting the potential of advanced

technologies, and reengineering DOD’s infrastructure and support activities.

The QDR-Proposed

Force Is Very Similar

to the Bottom-Up

Review Force

According to DOD, the force structure proposed by the QDR sustains the

forces and capabilities needed to meet the demands of the strategy in the

near term while also beginning to transform the force for the future. The

QDR endorsed a force structure that is very similar, although slightly

smaller, to that proposed by the Bottom-Up Review. The Secretary of

Defense also concluded that DOD should increase procurement funding to

$60 billion a year by 2001. To achieve this goal and stay within a

$250 billion projected defense budget in constant 1997 dollars, the

Secretary directed a reduction of DOD’s infrastructure, cutting almost

200,000 active, reserve, and civilian personnel, and a reduction in funding

for some modernization programs, such as the Joint Surveillance and

Target Attack Radar System and F-22, F/A-18E/F, Joint Strike Fighter, and

MV-22 aircraft.

The National Defense

Panel Emphasized the

Need to Prepare for

the Future

In December 1997, the National Defense Panel reported that the

challenges of the twenty first century will require fundamental changes to

national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by

2020. To make these changes, the Panel stated that the United States must

move more quickly to transform its military and national security

structures, operational concepts, equipment, and business practices.

Specifically, the Panel stated that DOD placed too much emphasis on

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preparing for the unlikely probability of two major theater wars because it

serves as a means to justify the current force structure. The Panel noted

that funds now spent on preserving forces could be better spent on

preparing for the future, thereby reducing the risk to long-term security.

The Panel also said that some of the services’ procurement plans did not

advance the transformation of current capability to that needed in the

future. It said the procurement budgets of the services remain focused on

systems that will be at risk in 2010 to 2020 instead of emphasizing

experimentation with a variety of military systems, operational concepts,

and force structures. The Panel estimated that $5 billion to $10 billion

annually is needed for initiatives in intelligence, space, urban warfare,

joint experimentation, and information operations. According to the Panel,

these funds should come from acquisition reform and cutting excess

infrastructure. However, if these reforms do not materialize, the funds may

need to come from reduced operating levels, a smaller force structure, or

cancellation of some procurement programs.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

In response to requests from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Chairman of the House

Budget Committee, we assessed whether (1) the QDR’s force structure and

modernization assessments examined alternatives to the planned force

and (2) opportunities exist to improve the structure and methodology of

future QDRs. Although we did not evaluate the rationale for the defense

strategy cited in the QDR report, we obtained briefings and had discussions

with officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Strategy and Requirements and the Joint Staff about its development and

content.2

 We also reviewed reports and interviewed officials in the

Defense Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council about

near-and long-term threats relevant to the strategy.

To evaluate the extent to which DOD’s three principal force structure

assessments—the two major theater wars, smaller scale contingencies,

and future regional great power—analyzed alternatives, we obtained

briefings, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials in OSD, the Joint

Staff, the services, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and the U.S. Central

Command. We also obtained and analyzed key assumptions used in these

force assessments, such as assumptions about warning time and level of

allied participation, and compared these assumptions with those used by

2

This office is now referred to as the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and

Threat Reduction.

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the Bottom-Up Review. Moreover, we discussed the rationale for the

assumptions with OSD, Joint Staff, and service officials.

To evaluate the reliability of computer-generated data produced by the

two campaign models used to assess forces during the QDR—the Tactical

Warfare Model (TACWAR) for the two major theater war assessment and the

Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM) for the war with a regional great

power—we examined the process DOD uses to validate the models and the

data DOD used as model inputs. We reviewed documents on the TACWAR

model from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis

Center as well as documents related to JICM. We also reviewed Defense

Modeling and Simulation Office documents and interviewed an Office

official on DOD’s process of model verification, validation, and

accreditation. In addition, we observed TACWAR demonstrations so that we

could better understand how the outputs are generated. Although we did

not review or validate the actual computer-generated data used as input to

the two models, we reviewed various estimates and conclusions that

flowed from that data. More specifically, we interviewed OSD officials

about the Joint Data Support System as well as DOD and RAND officials

about their verification and validation process and means for maintaining

data entered into TACWAR and JICM. Also, we evaluated the steps taken by

DOD to ensure the quality of data extracted from a major TACWAR data

source, the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, as well as other sources that

served as input. We believe this to be a reasonable approach to identifying

the strengths and limitations of these models and the data because

(1) there are credible sources within the defense community such as the

TACWAR users group, RAND, Defense Modeling Simulation Office, and

Coleman Research that evaluate the models and (2) running test data

through the models was not feasible for time and cost reasons.

To evaluate the extent to which the modernization review evaluated

alternatives, we obtained briefings and interviewed the cochairs of the

Modernization Panel from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition and Technology, Director for Strategic and Tactical

Systems, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also interviewed OSD, Joint Staff,

and service officials who supported the Modernization Panel, and we were

briefed on and reviewed documents related to the results of 7 of DOD’s 17

modernization task forces. Specifically, we reviewed results for theater

ballistic missile defense, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar

System, national missile defense, tactical aircraft, ship acquisition, Marine

Corps ground forces, and Marine Corps rotary wing forces. OSD officials

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and panel representatives did not maintain data on the total modernization

funding associated with each of the 17 task forces.

To determine whether opportunities exist to improve the structure and

methodology of future QDRs, we reviewed documents and interviewed

officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

and Requirements and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation,

concerning the 1997 QDR process. We drew on our analysis of the process

and implementation of the force assessment and modernization reviews to

identify and summarize factors that hampered DOD’s 1997 QDR process. We

also obtained information on studies initiated by DOD following the QDR’s

completion and on DOD’s plans to develop a new joint campaign model. We

discussed our observations with officials in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the

services and obtained their views on the design and implementation of the

QDR and ways to improve it.

We conducted our review from July 1997 to April 1998 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

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The QDR’s major theater war assessment, smaller-scale contingency war

game series, and future regional great power assessment used some

analytical tools different from those used in the Bottom-Up Review to

analyze a broader range of military operations and conduct greater

analysis of some key assumptions. These assessments concluded that the

current force structure was sufficient to meet the U.S. defense strategy.

However, only one—the major theater war force assessment—evaluated

any alternative force structures, and they were limited. Furthermore, none

of the assessments fully examined the impact of evolving technologies and

operational concepts on future force size and structure. As a result, senior

DOD officials recommended a force structure without examining some

alternatives that would have provided greater assurance that DOD complied

with congressional guidance to identify the best suited force.

Major Theater War

Assessment Explored

a Few Force Structure

Alternatives

According to the U.S. defense strategy, the United States must be able to

fight and win two overlapping major theater wars, preferably in concert

with regional allies. As part of the QDR force assessment analysis, DOD

modeled the sufficiency of U.S. forces to fulfill this requirement. This

effort was more extensive than the analysis done during the Bottom-Up

Review in that DOD modeled enemy use of chemical weapons, shorter

warning time, and some level of initial engagement in peacetime

operations. However, other than the current force, the only force

structures modeled were those resulting from 10-, 20-, and 30-percent cuts

equally proportioned to each service’s forces, according to Joint Staff and

OSD officials.

DOD Used the TACWAR

Model to Analyze Forces

Needed for Two Major

Theater Wars

OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Warfighting

Analysis Division of the Joint Staff’s Director for Force Structure,

Resources, and Assessment performed the two major theater war

assessment using the TACWAR model and data from the Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study. TACWAR is a theater-level model that assesses force

structures and resource allocations within the context of a joint campaign.

The model ran on a 12-hour battle cycle, and operators, using their military

judgment, could make periodic adjustments to the scenario to correct or

revise any results that appeared unrealistic. For example, the model

allowed units in a sector to move at their own speed. However, in a

realistic situation, units would travel together to protect each other’s

flanks. The operators could adjust the speed of the units to ensure that

they moved in concert. The results were then weighed against measures of

effectiveness drawn from the war game for the Bottom-Up Review. The

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Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study data came from a recent DOD effort to

assess deep attack requirements across the services. A key objective of the

study was to analyze weapon mix requirements for DOD’s planned force in

1998, 2006, and 2014 and determine the impact of force structure changes

on the weapons mix.

TACWAR was developed in the 1970s and has been revised several times.

While officials agreed that TACWAR is the best campaign model available at

this time, they also acknowledged that it has limitations. For example, it

models the ground campaign better than the air or naval campaigns. Also,

the model provides an aggregated look at the battlefield, which means it is

not very useful for identifying details of the impact of particular weapon

systems or force structure changes on the battle or the impact of some

new technologies and emerging operational concepts.

DOD officials used Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study data because they

concluded it was the most current and complete information available on

force structure, movement into theater, weapon system capabilities, and

target locations. Also, according to officials, given the short time frame

available to complete the assessment, it was important that the data was in

the necessary format for TACWAR and ready to use. The recently completed

study, according to one service official, was the most detailed and

comprehensive force and weapon mix analysis conducted by the defense

community. During the study, the services repeatedly reviewed and

revised the data to ensure its accuracy. As a result, while the services did

not participate directly in TACWAR’s major theater war assessment, OSD and

Joint Staff officials stated they were satisfied the services had sufficient

input to the data used in the analysis.

The Major Theater War

Analysis Required DOD to

Specify Threat, Scenario,

and Assumptions

To run the major theater war force assessment, OSD and the Joint Staff

made assumptions regarding the threat, battle scenario, and other factors.

The threat was based on the Defense Intelligence Agency’s projection of

Iraq and North Korea as aggressors in 2006. The scenario was taken from

defense guidance. It featured the first major theater war starting after a

warning period, followed by the second, overlapping major theater war.

Defense guidance also provided many of the operational assumptions for

the scenario such as warning times, separation times between the two

wars, equipment prepositioned in theater, call-up of reserve forces, allied

participation, access to overseas bases, and port and transportation

availability. However, other assumptions came from the war game analysis

used in the Bottom-Up Review. These included assumptions about the

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readiness of U.S., allied and aggressor forces; that some forces from the

first major theater war would be available for the second war’s

counteroffensive; and that some forces were already deployed overseas.

Since TACWAR cannot model command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance effectively, the

model was adjusted to degrade munitions effectiveness to represent these

projected capabilities, according to Joint Staff officials.

DOD Used Measures of

Effectiveness to Determine

Levels of Risk

The success of U.S. forces in the major theater wars was determined by

assessing the risk associated with each phase of the battle and the overall

campaigns. OSD and the Joint Staff identified several specific tasks as

measures of effectiveness in achieving the operational objectives for each

war. These tasks included minimizing allied losses, holding battle lines,

and affecting important targets. Operators measured the extent to which

these tasks were accomplished during each battle phase and for the war in

each model run. The operators were also able to gain insights about

critical requirements for battle success, operational abilities of each force,

and problems that may be encountered in each war.

DOD Modeled Force Sizes

and Some Other Factors

Once the base-case two major theater war scenario was established, OSD

modeled the sufficiency of DOD’s planned forces for 2006, including the

new or modernized weapons planned for purchase by that time, according

to OSD and Joint Staff officials. It also modeled several excursions based

on equally proportioned 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions to the forces.

For example, a 10-percent force reduction meant the elimination of one

Navy carrier battle group, one Army active division, and two Air Force

fighter wings, along with some Marine Corps and support units. The

20-percent reduction meant the Army and Navy would lose two units each

and the Air Force would lose four wings. With the 30-percent reduction,

the Army and Navy would lose three units each and the Air Force would

lose six wings. There would also be commensurate reductions in Marine

Corps and support units.

OSD and the Joint Staff also modeled other excursions from the base-case

two major theater war scenario. They included shorter warning time, the

enemy’s use of chemical weapons in both wars, and a combination of both

short warning and the use of chemical weapons. Each of these excursions

required DOD to make more assumptions in addition to those already made.

The shorter warning excursion assumed the U.S. forces were given fewer

days’ notice in advance of the start of the second war than in the base-case

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scenario. According to a Joint Staff official, the chemical excursion

modeled a realistic scenario for the U.S. force and allies, which was

neither a best nor worst case situation. This included assumptions about

weather conditions, the number and type of weapons, and delivery

methods. Information for this scenario was drawn from Defense

Intelligence Agency data on the type and number of weapons in the

enemies’ inventories and how the enemies would deliver those weapons.

Information such as dispersion rates and lethality of chemical agents

modeled came from the Army Chemical School. In many of the excursions,

OSD and the Joint Staff also modeled the impact of U.S. forces being

engaged in various types of operations around the world, such as

humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping operations, when the first major

theater war started.

The Joint Staff was responsible for modeling these excursions, analyzing

the results of the battles, and determining the risk levels to assign to the

battle based on the accomplishment of the specified tasks. As shown in

table 2.1, excursions were run for each of the different force levels—the

current projected force and 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions—using the

base-case two major theater war scenario. However, not all force levels

were modeled against all variables because, according to officials, the

resulting risks for some force levels would be too high.

Table 2.1: Excursions Modeled in the

Two Major Theater War Force

Assessment

Basic scenario

Chemical

attack Short warning

Chemical

attack/short

warning

Projected force X X X XX

10% reduction X XX

20% reduction XX XX

30% reduction XX

X=Excursion modeled.

XX=Excursion modeled included an assumption that some forces would be involved in peacetime

engagement at the outset of the first conflict.

Source: OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation.

The Assessment Identified

Risks to Making Broad

Force Cuts but Did Not

Explore Other Alternatives

U.S. forces won the two wars in every excursion modeled, but their

effectiveness in achieving all the specific tasks varied to the point that the

risks associated with some excursions were unacceptable, according to

OSD and the Joint Staff. As a result, DOD officials concluded that a force

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close in size and structure to the current one would be needed to win two,

nearly simultaneous major theater wars in concert with regional allies.

However, the analysis also showed that a slightly smaller force would be

able to win without a significant increase in risk in the base-case scenario.

When chemical weapons or shorter warning times were involved, the

current force was necessary to conduct these operations with an

acceptable level of risk.

Although the analysis showed that a slightly smaller force was able to

meet many of the two-war requirements without a significant increase in

risk, OSD did not refine the analysis to model other force reductions, like 

5 or 15 percent, to see if they would produce viable force options. They

also did not model alternatives that would have affected the services’

forces unequally, such as using a small reduction to one service’s forces,

but no reduction or even a slight increase to other services’ forces. An OSD

official stated that, given the time available to perform this assessment,

OSD would not have been able to obtain consensus among the services on

what smaller force reductions should look like or how unequal force

reductions should be taken. Also, OSD and Joint Staff officials stated that

the TACWAR model is not sensitive enough to effectively model slight

changes in forces. As a result, information on potential alternatives to the

current force was not available to the Secretary of Defense for

determining the best-suited force to carry out the strategy.

While the major theater war assessment modeled the modernized force

planned for 2006, which includes such things as stealth technology and

precision-guided missiles, DOD did not fully examine how new technologies

might affect future operational concepts or force structure. For example,

as a result of its Army Force XXI initiative, the Army plans to begin

fielding units that will have an enhanced situational awareness of the

battlefield through digital technology by 2006. Also, the Air Force has

proposed an alternative concept of operations using massive air strikes at

the beginning of a war, with more munitions than currently planned, to

rapidly halt the enemy’s advance and provide more time for a ground

buildup. Yet, neither was modeled during the major theater war analysis.

OSD and Joint Staff officials stated that they did not analyze the effects of

new technologies or concepts because the TACWAR model is not sensitive

enough to do so. They also stated that the services are not far enough

along in their understanding of how new technologies and concepts will

affect war-fighting doctrine.

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DOD’s Smaller-Scale

Contingency Force

Assessment Evaluated

the Sufficiency of the

Planned Force

According to the U.S. defense strategy, the U.S. military must be prepared

to successfully conduct multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingency

operations worldwide in any environment, including one in which an

adversary uses nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The QDR’s

primary assessment of the ability of U.S. forces to respond to such

operations was the Dynamic Commitment war game series. This series of

conferences and war games was designed to evaluate whether the planned

force was sufficient to meet the demands of the full range of military

operations from 1997 to 2005 and how engagement in smaller-scale

contingencies might affect the forces’ ability to respond to major theater

wars. While this assessment provided several insights into how forces

were allocated to a wide range of operations, it did not evaluate alternative

force structures to identify the force best suited to meet the demands of

the defense strategy.

QDR Went Further Than

Past Assessments in

Examining Requirements

for Smaller-Scale

Contingencies

During the QDR, DOD expanded on the Bottom-Up Review’s examination of

force requirements for smaller-scale contingencies. Smaller-scale

contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations

other than peacetime engagement activities but short of a major theater

war. These operations include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,

noncombatant evacuations, limited strikes, and disaster relief. DOD expects

the demand for such operations will remain high over the next 15 to

20 years and that these operations will pose the most frequent challenge to

U.S. forces through 2015. According to the QDR, U.S. forces must also be

able to withdraw from these contingencies, reconstitute, and then deploy

to a major theater war within the required time.

DOD Used the Dynamic

Commitment War Game

Series to Test the

Sufficiency of Forces for a

Range of Military

Operations

The Joint Staff developed the Dynamic Commitment war game series to

test whether the currently planned force structure was sufficient to

execute the range of potential military operations. The Joint Staff also

designed the series to help the services identify stress points—forces that

sustained high operating tempo in conducting multiple contingency

operations. Dynamic Commitment was not designed to evaluate the forces’

effectiveness, according to OSD officials. The forces were assumed to be

ready when called upon and effective in meeting operational requirements.

Two major theater wars were incorporated in the war game series to test

the forces’ ability to sufficiently respond when some forces were already

deployed to smaller-scale contingencies.

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During Dynamic Commitment, participants from the Joint Staff, combatant

commands (geographical and special operations), and service staffs

(including reserve components and the Coast Guard), allocated forces to

multiple, overlapping smaller-scale contingencies and major theater wars

forecasted over 9 years. Nearly 50 notional smaller-scale contingencies

were developed to illustrate the full spectrum of potential U.S. military

operations short of a war. The contingencies consisted of interventions,

shows-of-force, no-fly zone enforcement, maritime sanction enforcement,

disaster relief, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, and

humanitarian assistance. The contingencies were based on the type,

duration, and general frequency of such operations since 1991. Scenarios

were developed using defense guidance and combatant command

operational plans. Prior to the game, a concept of operations and list of

associated forces for each operation were approved by game participants

from OSD, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the services.

During the game, participants—primarily combatant command and service

planners—allocated forces to these sequential and sometimes

simultaneous military operations, considering the world situation and the

need to reserve forces to respond to other potential crises, including major

theater wars. While the participants generally allocated forces to a

contingency using the previously developed force list, they could change

the forces based on military judgment or sometimes their availability. For

example, in one case, U.S. forces were deployed to a large-scale

intervention when events in two other areas of the world became

concerns. Rather than send an Army air assault brigade to one of the two

areas as a show of force as originally planned, participants decided to

deploy Air Force fighters and a Navy aircraft carrier and hold the Army’s

one remaining uncommitted air assault brigade in reserve.

DOD officials had differing views about whether the force allocation

process in Dynamic Commitment resulted in the appropriate size and mix

of forces being allocated to military operations. According to some game

participants, there was a perceived need for each service to maximize the

allocation of its forces to justify them and avoid force reductions. As a

result, more forces than necessary may have been allocated to some

operations. However, Joint Staff officials asserted that the force

allocations during the game were appropriate, since they were generally

consistent with those used in actual deployments and each service was

there to ensure that others were not over-allocating their forces.

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Dynamic Commitment

Concluded That the

Planned Force Structure Is

Sufficient

As a result of the Dynamic Commitment war game series, DOD officials

concluded that the projected U.S. force is sufficient in size, though

stressed, to execute the defense strategy and that some forces already

known to be stressed would continue to be so. Another significant insight

was that sequential deployments to smaller-scale contingencies may have

a cumulative, negative impact on the all-volunteer force. The series

confirmed that high operating tempo remains an issue for previously

identified “low density/high demand” assets—those major platforms,

weapon systems, units, and personnel that are in continual high demand to

support worldwide joint military operations and that are available in

relatively small numbers. The series also identified other forces that were

in high demand, such as military police and Army signal units.

According to DOD, the series helped identify forces that services should not

cut and provided valuable insights into managing the force and the

challenges of responding to multiple, overlapping smaller-scale

contingency operations. Some service assets, identified as “low

density/high demand” assets, are managed by the global military force

policy, which establishes peacetime prioritization guidelines to assist

senior leaders in allocating these assets for crises, contingency operations,

and long-term operations. These assets include the Airborne Warning and

Control System; the EA-6B, electronic warfare aircraft; and civil affairs

units. According to Joint Staff officials, the Dynamic Commitment series

affirmed their value and gave the services insights into managing them.

The series also identified issues critical to ensuring that U.S. forces can

transition from smaller-scale contingencies to wars. For example, it found

that in the case of mobilization for a major theater war, the logistics of

redeploying forces already committed in various regions around the world

would be difficult and could seriously strain mobility and support forces.

Although they did not summarize the results to make force structure

recommendations or decisions based on the series, Joint Staff officials

said the analysis provided insights into which forces should not be cut. It

also made clear that there is much work still to be done in assessing the

impact and managing the demands of smaller-scale contingencies.

Participants also discussed the potential impact of weapons of mass

destruction and the consequences of limited theater access during the

series. According to Joint Staff officials, the pace of force deployment

slowed when chemical weapons were introduced. Also, the use of these

weapons raised the awareness of force protection and the advantage of

forces operating at a distance from the battle.

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Dynamic Commitment Did

Not Explore Any Changes

to Force Structure

While the Dynamic Commitment series did yield some insights, DOD did

not use it to identify or analyze any changes to DOD’s current force

structure. Evaluating alternatives might have led DOD to consider reducing

some combat or war-fighting capabilities and adding others more suitable

to the specialized needs of smaller-scale contingencies. Such alternatives

could help alleviate operating tempo problems while maintaining forces

capable of winning two major theater wars with acceptable risk.

Moreover, the services’ analyses of the Dynamic Commitment data

generally confirmed that certain parts of their forces were sustaining a

high operating tempo. Had the Joint Staff or OSD centrally analyzed the

data, they might have gained insights on how to better balance

requirements for smaller-scale contingencies and wars across all services

or identified excess or low-utility capabilities that could be reduced.

Regional Great Power

Assessment Modeled

Levels of

Modernization

To test the U.S. ability to defeat a regional great power in the 2010-2015

time frame, DOD officials believed it was important to analyze an aggressor

with greater capabilities than are currently anticipated for Iran, Iraq, or

North Korea. The regional great power assessment attempted to examine

this potential by modeling projected U.S. weapons and forces modernized

at various levels against a notional enemy. However, this assessment did

not analyze alternatives that varied the mix of DOD’s planned

modernization programs to help identify the most cost-effective

investments. Also, it did not fully assess the potential impact of new

technologies on future operational concepts and force structure. Even

though the services are exploring new doctrine arising from advanced

weapons, DOD officials believe that these efforts cannot be modeled yet.

Assessment Used a

Campaign Model to

Analyze Scenario and Data

Developed for the QDR

OSD considered using TACWAR to model the conflict between the invading

enemy nation and allied forces. However, much of the baseline data

needed for TACWAR to perform this assessment was not available in the

level of detail needed and would have taken 6 months to prepare. As a

result, OSD decided to use JICM, a multiple theater combat model developed

by RAND, because it requires less definitive data to model campaigns.

The scenario for the regional great power assessment involved an air/land

military conflict on a hypothetical continent in 2014. A large and

technologically advanced regional great power had invaded its weaker

neighbor to prevent its entrance into a fictional alliance. The United States

was allied with a medium-sized power that bordered the weaker nation.

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The U.S. objective was to repel the aggressor nation’s forces and push

them back to the pre-war border. OSD officials told us that they used this

scenario because they did not want to identify any particular country as

the focus of U.S. threat planning.

Developing the scenario required assembling large amounts of data that

were not readily available. OSD constructed the hypothetical scenario using

primarily Defense Intelligence Agency information regarding terrain,

forecasted orders of battle, and weapon systems of current major powers.

The enemy nation’s capabilities were extrapolated from intelligence data

on a major power after examining projected data for several potential

adversaries. Its capabilities included large numbers of armored vehicles

that were moderately technologically advanced. The intelligence

community’s projection of the threat data assumed a moderate level of

economic growth for the enemy nation. The United States committed

75 percent of its forces to this effort. U.S. forces consisted of those

projected for 2014, reflecting the services’ 1997 force structure and

modernization projections. The total number of U.S. and allied ground and

air forces employed were about 80 percent of the enemy’s, but U.S. and

allied forces possessed more advanced air and ground forces than the

enemy nation. (See fig. 2.1.)

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Figure 2.1: Modernization Level of Regional Great Power Ground and Air Forces

United States and Allied Forces Enemy Forces

Old/Current Advanced Very Advanced

Source: OSD.

According to OSD officials, several key assumptions were made for the

regional great power assessment. JICM assumed that each side had equal

intelligence on the activities of the other. In addition, it assumed that

projected mobility forces were available and in working order and that

support forces were ready and available. Success in a war with a regional

great power was based on assessing the extent to which U.S. and allied

forces accomplished specific tasks, such as minimizing allied losses and

moving battle lines, and returning the enemy to its pre-war border.

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Services Questioned Both

the Scenario and Computer

Model Used for the

Assessment

Service officials criticized the regional great power scenario for not

representing a full range of threats that would require a broader range of

joint war-fighting capabilities. For example, Navy officials told us that

main combat actions in the scenario occurred too far inland for naval

aviation to make an effective contribution to the war and allow

amphibious landings to be modeled at all. In general, maritime warfare

was depicted only in a separate, supporting mobility analysis. An Air Force

official stated that the proximity of the hypothetical continent to the

United States was favorable to airlift capabilities.

Like TACWAR, JICM is an aggregate model and not sensitive enough to show

the impact of other than major changes in force structure, according to

OSD officials. Also, service officials told us that JICM did not simulate their

forces’ capabilities well. For example, Army officials complained that the

theater-level focus of JICM modeled aircraft and air-delivered weapons

more accurately than ground forces. Therefore, the contribution of

different ground forces is not as clearly discernable as various types of air

power. An Air Force official said the use of the Air Force’s space assets

also could not be modeled with JICM.

Results of the Game

Confirmed the Benefits of

Modernization

According to OSD officials, the results of the assessment reassured them

that the 1997 modernization program was the correct one to follow for the

foreseeable future. They ran numerous excursions with varying levels of

modernization, warning time, and ballistic missile threat. In no excursion

were the United States and its allies in danger of losing the war. However,

DOD concluded that some excursions caused unacceptable levels of risk

that the United States and its ally would not achieve their specific tasks.

The regional great power assessment modeled four levels of

modernization: the 1997 force, the 1997 force extended to 2014, one-third

and two-thirds of the 1997 extended force. The results showed that the

more modernized the force, the faster the adversary was defeated, with

less risk. In addition, the results showed that most of the benefits gained

by modernization were achieved by the one-third modernized force.

Increased levels of modernization did not significantly affect the final

outcome of the war but did further reduce the risks.

JICM’s other excursions also provided insights, according to DOD officials.

Warning time before invasion of the victim nation by the adversary was

varied in several excursions. The results showed that the shorter the

warning time, the longer it took U.S. and allied forces to evict the

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adversary. Although the enemy possessed a missile threat in all

excursions, some excursions examined U.S. capabilities against an enemy

with a substantially increased missile threat. Officials viewed this robust

tactical ballistic missile threat as comparable to chemical weapons

employment. The results showed that enemy missile attacks delayed but

did not prevent the eventual allied victory.

Alternative Modernization

Mixes, Force Structure

Impacts, and QDR

Modernization Decisions

Were Not Modeled

DOD’s regional great power assessment did not examine alternatives to the

mix of modernization programs reflected in DOD’s 1997 program.

Moreover, neither force structure options nor the final modernization

decisions in the QDR report were analyzed in the regional great power

assessment. Like the major theater war assessment, OSD considered

analyzing reductions to the force by 10, 20, and 30 percent, but these were

not pursued for three reasons. First, OSD could not reach consensus with

the services on the nature of the reductions because the scenario took

place so far into the future. OSD officials told us that imposing reductions

to the projected force without agreement would strain the credibility of

this assessment with the services. Second, JICM models the campaign at

too aggregate a level to show how changes in the force structure may

make a difference in a conflict. Third, OSD officials decided to focus on

modernization rather than force structure because they thought senior

officials could benefit more from knowing the potential impacts of

modernization on future wars. Finally, despite the time frame for the

regional great power assessment, no innovations in doctrine or

operational concepts were modeled. OSD officials told us that the services’

exploration of new doctrine arising from advanced weaponry was not

mature enough to be modeled.

U.S. forces were modeled in large, proportional modernization slices, that

is, one-third, two-thirds, and full. There was no attempt to analyze varied

mixes of air, ground, and maritime modernization to test their

effectiveness. Although these slices were based on modernization plans,

varying the mix might have provided more insight into modernization

trade-offs.

Although the QDR modernization assessment was finished before the end

of the regional great power assessment, OSD did not model the

modernization decisions, saying that there was little interaction between

the two assessment processes and that they had insufficient time to

develop the data needed to model the results.

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DOD’s modernization review examined some variations of the services’

planned modernization programs but did not reflect a thorough,

mission-oriented approach to assessing the mix of capabilities the United

States will need to counter future threats.1

 The Modernization Panel’s

assessments were divided into 17 topics, such as theater air and missile

defense, tactical aircraft, and ground systems, and did not include formal

analyses of trade-offs among the topics. While DOD officials said they

considered Joint Vision 2010 capabilities, the review did not provide

adequate assurance that the decisions reached represent the best mix of

capabilities needed for a future in which emerging threats could generate

requirements that differ significantly from the current mix of U.S.

capabilities. Rather, the Panel’s work consisted mostly of developing

options to restructure some programs to provide a plan that DOD believes

can be implemented within an expected procurement budget of $60 billion

annually. Further, the Modernization Panel’s analyses were not fully

integrated with the work of the Force Assessment Panel. As a result, the

QDR did not sufficiently examine linkages and trade-offs between force

structure and modernization decisions.

Methodology for

Modernization Review

Resulted in a

Primarily

Budget-Driven Focus

In November 1996, DOD formed the Modernization Panel cochaired by

senior officials from OSD and the Joint Staff. The Panel was instructed by

OSD to evaluate the services’ modernization programs by looking at what is

needed to sustain the force with modern equipment and superior

technology. It identified 17 topics, grouped into three broad categories:

cross-cutting issues, equipment-focused issues, and technology and

acquisition issues. The topics and some of the systems examined are

included in table 3.1.

1

“Missions” are defined as those functions for which the systems are used such as close air support,

interdiction, intelligence operations, and electronic warfare.

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Table 3.1: Modernization Topics and

Types of Systems Reviewed Topics Systems

Cross-cutting topics

Defense of the United States Strategic forces, national missile defense,

other nuclear, biological, and chemical

threats

Theater air and missile defense Ballistic missiles and cruise missiles

Command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (C4ISR)

Joint surveillance and target attack radar

system, unmanned aerial vehicles

Space-based surveillance and warning Space-based infrared systems

Information assurance Defensive systems

Navigation warfare Global positioning system, global air traffic

management systems

Equipment topics

Ship acquisition strategies Aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and

submarines

Deep strike Army Tactical Missile System, Joint

Stand-off Weapon,

Hellfire and Hellfire Longbow missiles

Tactical aircraft F-22, F/A-18E/F, Joint Strike Fighter

Ground forces Maneuver, firepower, operational and

command and control systems, Crusader

Howitzer, Comanche Helicopter

Special operations forces Air, maritime; command, control,

communication, computer and

intelligence; and counter-proliferation

systems

Strategic lift and prepositioning System assessments were deferred for

further study

Rotary wing aircraft V-22, Comanche, Apache

Anti-armor munitions Close, medium and deep systems

Technology and Acquisition topics

Technology investment Not applicable

International cooperation opportunities Not applicable

Acquisition program stability Not applicable

Source: OSD.

A separate task force of service, OSD, and joint staff officials was assigned

to analyze each topic and arrive at a set of options. The objective of each

task force, according to DOD officials, was to propose affordable plans for

procuring systems that would modernize equipment and technology based

on their view of capabilities for Joint Vision 2010, maximize jointness, and

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minimize the time to develop them. According to Panel officials, affordable

meant that DOD assumed its procurement budget would increase to and

then remain at about $60 billion a year by 2000. As a result, task forces

were asked to examine the projected funding for systems beyond the

Future Years Defense Program to 2015, based on then-current

procurement plans, and determine whether systems or groups of related

systems were affordable in terms of whether they represented an

appropriate share of the procurement budget, given procurement plans for

other types of systems. For example, the tactical aircraft task force

developed options to reduce out-year funding requirements for tactical

aircraft systems because then-current procurement plans for the Joint

Strike Fighter, F-22, and F/A-18E/F would require a significantly larger

share of procurement funds than was allocated to tactical aircraft in 1998.

The task force examining the Navy’s ship acquisition program also

explored options to reduce out-year funding requirements. Allowing these

programs to go forward as planned would have required senior DOD

officials to decrease funding for other types of systems to maintain overall

procurement spending at $60 billion annually.

DOD was not able to provide the amount of planned funding for each of the

17 topics, but officials estimated that total annual procurement plans for

the systems amounted to approximately $40 billion, or about two-thirds of

DOD’s planned annual procurement budget. The task force did not review

some planned modernization efforts, such as antisubmarine and electronic

warfare or minor procurement.

The Panel directed the task forces to assess the acquisition plans reflected

in the fiscal year 1998 Future Years Defense Program and to consider

increasing or decreasing funding allocated to each group of systems up to

10 percent as a means of encouraging them to develop options to modify

planned programs. According to DOD officials, the task forces began

briefing their options to the Modernization Panel and to senior DOD

officials in February 1997. Neither the Panel nor the task forces made

recommendations; each only proposed options. Soon thereafter, the

Senior Steering Group directed the task forces to identify adjustments to

the fiscal year 1998-2003 budget based on the options; the programmatic

risk associated with each option; how the option would affect the

military’s capability to implement the defense strategy; the impact of the

option on the industrial base; and the statutory, regulatory, and other

external barriers to implementing the option.

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In general, DOD’s modernization decisions modified, but did not cancel,

service procurement plans. The Secretary of Defense described the

modernization decisions in the QDR as a modest reduction in some of the

programs to ensure that the total program is realistic and executable

within the budget. Some decisions decreased the number and delayed the

procurement of some systems, reducing associated funding. For example,

to sustain procurement of tactical aircraft systems at an affordable rate,

DOD reduced the Air Force’s plan to buy F-22s from 438 to 339 and delayed

its full production time line. The Navy’s plan to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs was

reduced to 785 with a provision to buy only 548, depending on the timely

success of the Joint Strike Fighter. And the number of Joint Strike Fighters

was reduced as well. In total, these changes reduced the services’

$270 billion funding estimate for these aircraft by over $30 billion, or more

than 10 percent.

Another task force examined the Navy’s shipbuilding program. The Navy

had planned to build up to 10 ships a year between 2004 and 2015, but that

would increase annual spending in those years to over $12 billion, well

above the fiscal year 2001-2004 average of $7.9 billion. After examining the

number of ships planned for 2015 and the associated annual shipbuilding

costs, the task force presented an option to reduce the 334 ships planned

for 2003 to 303 and thereby reduce the annual shipbuilding estimate to

between $8 billion and $8.8 billion. The task force suggested that the

annual savings in operating and support costs associated with maintaining

fewer ships could be used to increase the capabilities on new ships and

modernize existing ones.

Other modernization decisions proposed increases to investment in some

areas. For example, DOD increased its investments in biological and

chemical defense by approximately $1 billion and national missile defense

by about $2 billion. Furthermore DOD set aside $1 billion over the next 6

years for minor cost overruns and fund disruptions to ensure the stability

of modernization programs, according to DOD officials.

Integrated Analyses

Needed to Identify

and Assess Weapon

System Trade-Offs

The Modernization Panel’s stovepipe approach to analyzing the services’

procurement plans may have helped the task forces provide senior DOD

officials with budget-based options for changing planned system

modernization, but they did not provide an integrated look at how the

options or final decisions impact joint war-fighting missions. For example,

capabilities that might be used for the close air support functions, such as

helicopters, tactical aircraft, and C4ISR systems, were evaluated as separate

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topics by different task forces. We have previously reported on the

benefits of looking at modernization from an integrated mission

perspective.2

 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010

also focuses on the need to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint

war-fighting. Noting today’s smaller forces, the Chairman stated: “Simply

to retain our effectiveness with less redundancy, we will need to wring

every ounce of capability from every available source. That outcome can

only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of Service

capabilities.” Furthermore, he stated that technology trends will provide

an order of magnitude improvement in lethality that clearly offers promise

for reducing the number of platforms and the amount of ordnance

required to destroy targets. Citing budget realities, he also stated that DOD

needs to be selective in the technologies it chooses to invest in and will

have to make hard choices to achieve the trade-offs that will bring the best

balance, highest capability, and greatest interoperability for the least cost.

According to Modernization Panel officials, neither their panel nor the task

forces performed the type of integrated analyses of options across topics

that could facilitate modernization trade-offs. Some said that such a

perspective might have been provided by senior DOD officials at higher

tiers of the QDR organization when they examined the different

procurement options. Panel officials pointed to the senior officials’

decision to examine Army ground and Marine ground force systems

together rather than separately as evidence that at least some task forces

were asked to look across some topics. However, other officials did not

think that anyone systematically looked across the options to see their

impact on joint war-fighting missions.

In September 1996, just prior to the QDR, we identified the benefits of

evaluating modernization options from a joint perspective and the urgent

need for such information, given the hundreds of billions of procurement

dollars involved. In our report on combat air power, we concluded that

DOD is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence the

programs are justified because of their marginal contribution to already

formidable capabilities, the changed security environment, and less costly

alternatives.

In its comments on our report, DOD agreed that mission assessments can

improve understanding of military capabilities and limitations and are

important to decision-making, but asserted that it has mechanisms to

2

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program Budget Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).

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provide that perspective. We recognized steps by DOD to improve the

information available on combat requirements and capabilities through

studies, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and its 10 supporting

war-fighting capability assessment teams, but we noted that they had little

impact on weighing alternative ways to recapitalize U.S. air power forces.3

We also reported that while the individual services conduct considerable

analyses to identify mission needs and justify new weapon program

proposals, these needs are not based on assessments of the aggregate

capabilities of the services to perform war-fighting missions. Furthermore,

DOD does not routinely review service modernization proposals from such

a perspective. We believe that the QDR was such an opportunity and that

information on recapitalization alternatives and redundancies in

capabilities, developed from a joint war-fighting perspective, would have

been invaluable to decisionmakers who must allocate defense resources

among competing needs to achieve maximum force effectiveness. Without

such mission analyses, it is not clear whether DOD’s QDR modernization

decisions will simply replace current systems or buy the most effective

mission mix of new systems to respond to future threats.

Force Structure and

Modernization

Assessments Need to

Be More Collaborative

The QDR independent force assessment and modernization reviews were

both performed between November 1996 and February 1997 and,

according to DOD officials, did not fully consider the results of each other’s

work as bases for identifying potential trade-offs. Although senior DOD

officials considered broad trade-offs between force structure and

modernization at the macro level in determining which of three paths to

adopt to meet near- and long-term challenges, we believe that more

in-depth analysis of the relationship between force structure and

modernization issues would have enhanced the value of DOD’s review.

Modernization Panel officials said that the Panel’s task forces did not

consider changes in force structure in their deliberations. Furthermore, as

noted in chapter 2, the regional great power force assessment, which

evaluated the aggregate impact of modernization on force effectiveness in

a future war, modeled DOD’s fiscal year 1997 modernization procurement

plans. It did not model the QDR modernization decisions. Some Panel

officials suggested that a better linking of the two assessments could

improve the quality of the QDR, because changes in force structure could

affect the size of some procurements. Moreover, as suggested in Joint

Vision 2010, leveraging new technologies should increase defense

3

The 10 teams were strike; land and littoral warfare; strategic mobility and sustainability; sea, air, and

space superiority; deter/counterproliferation; command and control; information warfare; intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance; regional engagement/presence; and joint readiness.

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capabilities and could thereby offer opportunities to affect force structure.

For example, as part of its Army Force XXI future force transformation

initiative, the Army is designing, testing, and fielding new potentially

smaller division designs to capitalize on digital technology and give

commanders and soldiers better capability to gather and share

information.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted that we

characterized the QDR’s modernization options as “budget driven” and

based “solely” on a plus-and-minus 10-percent rule. While acknowledging

that the overall modernization budget was a central concern of the QDR,

DOD said that the primary factor influencing the modernization analyses

was the capabilities of current and planned systems. We agree that the

Panel’s guidance to the task forces in proposing alternatives based on

budget parameters was not the task forces’ sole consideration when

developing modernization options. In fact, our report specifically said that

the task forces were directed to develop options that would consider the

capabilities required for Joint Vision 2010, maximize jointness, and

minimize the time needed to develop them. However, we continue to

believe that the Panel’s methodology for the modernization review

resulted in a primarily budget-driven focus rather than a mission-oriented

approach. According to the Panel’s leadership and other participants,

proposing budget parameters of plus-or-minus 10 percent was the means

the Panel used to encourage the task forces to develop options for their

specific group of systems. These budget parameters were further evident

in the task forces’ options on tactical aircraft and other modernization

topics.

DOD cited the tactical aircraft decisions as an example where significant

technical or other capability advantages of next-generation systems over

current systems resulted in force structure-modernization trade-offs.

However, while the task force analyses of the F-22 resulted in an option to

reduce aircraft by nearly 100 (from 438 to 339), possibly changing the

future mix of tactical aircraft, DOD did not examine other options, such as

whether advanced technologies like stealth could reduce the Air Force’s

20 fighter wing force structure. Further, the reductions in F-18E/Fs and

Joint Strike Fighters were generally based on a proposal that fewer

aircraft would be sufficient to replace existing aircraft and affordable

within the budget, not because the Navy expects to reduce its force

structure by cutting the number of carrier fighter wings.

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Planning for the Next QDR Can Help

Provide for a More Thorough Review of

Defense Needs

DOD can enhance the value of the next QDR by providing formal oversight of

QDR preparation efforts, improving models and other analytical tools, and

considering changes to the QDR’s structure and design. The Secretary of

Defense has not yet established formal oversight at a senior level to

facilitate preparation activities for the next QDR, including completion and

coordination of follow-on studies to the 1997 QDR. Moreover, although DOD

has an effort underway to improve its theater war models to overcome

significant limitations in simulating intelligence and other capabilities, it

has not determined how to improve its analyses of other types of military

operations, such as smaller-scale contingencies and scenarios involving

longer-term threats. Changing the timing of the panels’ work, building

greater collaboration among some panels, and delaying the QDR until later

in the new administration’s term may also provide a more thorough

review. Finally, if Congress determines that a panel of experts should

provide an independent view of defense requirements, it might require the

panel to complete its work earlier so that DOD can consider the panel’s

views when conducting the QDR.

DOD Needs to Take

Early Steps to Prepare

Although there is no current statutory requirement for another QDR and

DOD has not taken formal steps to institutionalize a QDR process, the

Secretary of Defense has endorsed the QDR as a continuing process. OSD

officials who played a key role in DOD’s 1997 review stated that there is a

widespread assumption throughout DOD that the Department will conduct

another QDR following the 2000 election. DOD has some initiatives

underway that could help it prepare for its next review. For example, DOD

is working to improve some analytical tools and is performing some

follow-up studies to the QDR. These efforts could equip DOD to perform

valuable analyses of its planned force before the next QDR begins.

However, DOD has not yet developed plans to improve other tools and

analyses that could be important for the next QDR. Moreover, it has not

ensured that its efforts will be coordinated and completed in time for the

next review.

DOD Has Plans to Improve

Some, but Not All, of Its

Analytical Tools

DOD has efforts underway to improve some of the analytical tools used in

the 1997 QDR. It is developing a new campaign model, called JWARS and is

looking at ways to improve others, such as TACWAR, as well as supporting

data to alleviate some of the current campaign modeling limitations. We

did not identify comparable efforts by DOD to improve the analyses of

smaller-scale contingencies or conflicts with future adversaries who have

advanced technologies. Completing these efforts in a timely manner would

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Provide for a More Thorough Review of

Defense Needs

enhance the potential for the next QDR to provide better analyses of

alternatives.

According to DOD officials, JWARS is expected to improve DOD’s ability to

evaluate the forces’ effectiveness in combat operations. Documents

provided by the JWARS Office note that current theater-level simulations,

including TACWAR, have limitations that make them only “somewhat” or

“poorly/not at all” capable of simulating a number of combat activities 

(see table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Limitations of Current

Theater-Level Simulations

Activity

Somewhat

capable

Poorly or not at all

capable

Joint warfare X

Ground engagement X

Ground maneuver X

Air superiority X

Air and missile defense X

Strategic air X

Strike X

Naval surface warfare X

Naval anti-submarine warfare X

Naval mine warfare X

Naval amphibious operations X

Command, control, and communications X

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance X

Logistics combat support/combat service

support X

Weapons of mass destruction X

Special operations X

Source: JWARS Program Office.

DOD expects that, based on the current development and funding schedule,

which was planned to coincide with the next QDR, an initial version of

JWARS should be available for the next review. DOD expects this version to

be useful in analyzing the sufficiency of the force. Subsequent versions of

JWARS are expected to be capable of analyzing force and capability

trade-offs, force planning, and force structure design as well as system

alternatives, system trade-offs, and operational concepts.

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DOD’s Joint Analytic Model Improvement Program is another effort that

DOD has underway to improve its models. The objective of this program,

which is directed by OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, is to

determine how current models such as TACWAR should be improved. The

program is tracking and coordinating the models’ improvement schedules

with JWARS’ introduction.

Gathering and maintaining the large quantities of data needed to run the

models is another challenge DOD faces. In the past, DOD lacked a central

repository for data, forcing users to recreate data on threats, targets, and

other factors whenever they began a new study. DOD officials told us that

the Department has established the Joint Data Support System to centrally

store and update this data. The system will include information on U.S.,

allied, and enemy orders of battle, terrain, and weapon systems’

capabilities, in addition to other data developed for the Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study. This system will be linked to JWARS and will be easier

to update than current methods.

Although DOD has several efforts underway that should improve the quality

of its major theater war assessments for the next QDR, it has not

determined what improvements should be made to improve its

assessments of force requirements for smaller-scale contingencies.

Although DOD officials saw the Dynamic Commitment war game series as a

valuable exercise in examining the implications of a post-Cold War

environment in which smaller-scale contingencies may occur frequently,

DOD did not use the exercise to identify and examine force structure

alternatives. As noted in chapter two, the war game series was primarily

an exercise in allocating planned forces to military operations based on

participants’ military judgment. DOD does not have an effort underway to

analyze how Dynamic Commitment could be improved for the next QDR or

replaced by another analytical tool. Examining ways to improve the

Dynamic Commitment war game so that it can be used to identify and

examine force structure alternatives would be a valuable step in preparing

for the next QDR.

DOD also needs to determine how it can improve its analysis of

requirements for conflicts against future adversaries who may have access

to advanced technologies or employ asymmetric concepts of warfare. At

the same time, DOD will need to consider how to model new technologies

such as digitization that are expected to be employed by U.S. forces in the

future as well as the changes in operational concepts and doctrine that

could result from such technologies. As noted in chapter two, DOD’s

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regional great power assessment did not model changes in doctrine or

operational concepts that could result from technological advances or

place much emphasis on asymmetric warfare. In addition, DOD officials

built the database for the regional great power analysis during the 

3- to 4-months allocated for the QDR force assessments. According to OSD

officials this was a time-consuming process that reduced the time available

to examine alternatives to the programmed force. Preparing for the next

QDR by working with the intelligence community and other sources to

develop a database containing detailed information on future enemy and

allied capabilities, targets, and weapon performance could help DOD focus

its QDR assessment on examining alternatives.

Analyses of Planned

Forces’ Capabilities Can

Be Performed Before the

QDR Begins

As part of its preparation for the next QDR, DOD could run analyses of its

existing forces that could serve as the basis for comparison to force

alternatives caused by changes to strategy or other factors. During the

1997 QDR, DOD spent much of its time modeling the 1997 force’s ability to

fight and win two major theater wars, meet the demands of smaller-scale

contingencies, and fight a regional great power. Had these force

assessments been done as part of DOD’s preparation for the QDR, the time

could have been spent modeling alternative force structures, which might

have provided insights into the best-suited force.

Formal Oversight Might

Aid Preparation for the

QDR

DOD has not established formal oversight at a senior level to coordinate the

overall model improvements, follow-on studies, and other preparations for

the next QDR. Several offices in DOD are improving models and databases

and are performing follow-on studies to the QDR and the National Defense

Panel report on topics such as requirements for strategic lift,

active/reserve force mix, operations in a chemical environment, and

information technology. However, DOD has not issued guidance

establishing which office will monitor these efforts or determined how the

results of these efforts will be coordinated and integrated in the next QDR.

Such oversight might help to ensure that the efforts are completed in time.

DOD could also provide direction on issues such as the types of analyses to

be performed, the associated data requirements, who will provide the

analytical support, how lessons learned will be gathered and shared, and

time lines for completing the activities needed to support the next QDR.

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DOD Should Consider

Changing the QDR

Process and Timing

DOD also may be able to enhance the value of the next QDR by examining

options for changing the process DOD established for the 1997 QDR and

modifying the review’s timing. We identified the following observations for

potential improvements to the QDR process based on discussions with DOD

officials and our review of documentation on how the QDR process

worked.

Collaboration Among

Panels and the Sequencing

of the Defense Strategy

Should Be Examined

Although DOD officials modified the force structure slightly as a result of

the QDR, these decisions were not based on the three major force

assessments. The QDR report identifies three paths that DOD considered and

that included varying levels of modernization and force structure sizes.

However, some defense experts have criticized this framework as being

too simplistic in that two of the options—such as the option to maintain

the current force structure but forego DOD’s goal of increasing

procurement to $60 billion per year—were not options that DOD would

seriously consider.

Moreover, DOD’s force structure and modernization panels completed their

analyses separately and did not model trade-offs between modernization

and force structure. For example, DOD’s regional great power analysis

modeled DOD’s planned force with various levels of modernization but did

not examine whether a more modernized but smaller force would be

effective in defeating potential aggressors. According to some defense

experts, technologies such as stealth aircraft, precision munitions, and

digitized forces may enable the United States to reduce force structure in

the long term. DOD has several options for ensuring better integration of

modernization and force structure decisions. DOD could maintain separate

panels but provide guidance to ensure that the panels collaborate and that

trade-offs between force structure and modernization are examined.

Alternatively, DOD could establish one panel to analyze force structure and

modernization issues.

DOD officials expressed different views on the need to alter the timing of

the defense strategy review. DOD began developing the strategy early in the

QDR process and provided a draft of the strategy in January 1997 but did

not finalize it until March 1997, when the force structure and

modernization panels had completed much of their work. Several DOD

officials, including those responsible for drafting the strategy and OSD

officials who were responsible for leading the force assessments, did not

perceive the lack of an approved strategy as a problem because the

strategy was provided in draft to panel chairs. However, some service

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officials and panel members stated that the draft strategy was not widely

disseminated and that the lack of a final strategy led to confusion,

particularly since the Secretary of Defense changed during the QDR and the

new Secretary could have made significant changes to the strategy.

Delaying the Start of the

Next QDR May Result in a

More Thorough Review

The 1997 QDR began after the 1996 presidential election and was performed

by a returning administration—although a change in Secretary of Defense

occurred during the early months of the QDR. However, if the next QDR

occurs following the 2000 presidential election, DOD will have to conduct

its analysis while undergoing a change in administration. This may further

complicate DOD’s efforts to perform the QDR because of the large turnover

of senior DOD officials that may occur. Many DOD officials we spoke to

characterized the 6-month time frame for conducting the 1997 QDR as being

extremely tight given the complex nature and large number of issues, even

with relatively little turnover among senior personnel. Officials also cited

the short time frame as a key factor that limited the number and types of

alternatives assessed. Delaying the QDR from the first to the second year of

the presidential term is an option that would allow more time for an

administration to put its key senior people, including the Secretary of

Defense, in place; develop a defense strategy; prepare for the QDR; and

conduct appropriate analyses. Such a delay in starting the QDR might be

useful in providing a new administration with sufficient time to conduct a

comprehensive strategy review and have a good analytical basis for

making difficult choices among competing priorities.

Delaying the process for a year may have some disadvantages. Several OSD

officials stated they opposed a delay because it would postpone the

administration’s ability to impact the defense budget until well into a

president’s term. The current timing would allow QDR decisions made in

2001 to impact the president’s fiscal year 2003 defense budget. A QDR that

concludes in 2002 would affect the 2004 defense budget. Even if the review

were delayed, a new administration could still make some changes in the

2003 budget through the program, planning, and budgeting system.

However, a completed QDR may enable an administration to make more

fundamental changes.

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Congress May Want to

Consider Changes to

National Defense

Panel Timing

Congress has not enacted a permanent requirement for an independent

panel of experts to supplement DOD’s analysis of future defense

requirements. However, work by a congressionally chartered independent

panel, if conducted prior to the QDR, could be used to encourage DOD to

consider a wider range of strategy, force structure, and modernization

options. Conducting a fundamental reassessment of defense requirements,

as envisioned by the QDR, is extremely challenging for DOD, given that its

culture rewards consensus-building and often makes it difficult to gain

support for alternatives that challenge traditional ways of doing business.

As evidenced by the 1997 QDR force and modernization assessments, DOD

spent most of its analytical effort confirming that its current forces and

initiatives were adequate to meet future defense requirements and

restricting its analysis to “salami-slice” alternatives. By preceding DOD’s

own efforts, an independent panel similar to the National Defense Panel

could provide DOD with alternatives to analyze during the QDR.

Conclusions DOD could add value to the next QDR by establishing formal oversight,

improving its analytical tools, and making changes to the QDR’s structure

and design. Establishing formal oversight would reinforce the importance

of the QDR as an ongoing tool for assessing force structure and

modernization requirements and help to identify and establish priorities

for key preparation tasks. It could also provide an impetus for improving

DOD’s analytical tools to evaluate requirements for theater wars,

smaller-scale contingencies, and future warfare, including the potential

impact of advanced technology and new concepts of operations. In

addition, summarizing lessons learned from the 1997 QDR could enable DOD

to develop options to make the process more effective in the future.

Recommendation The Secretary of Defense has endorsed the concept of the quadrennial

review of defense needs. To enhance the value of the next QDR, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense assign responsibility for overall

oversight and coordination of DOD preparation efforts. Preparation tasks

should include identifying the analytical tools and data needed to support

force structure and modernization analyses, monitoring the status and

funding for efforts to upgrade DOD’s models, summarizing lessons learned

from the 1997 QDR, and considering the need to change the structure and

timing of the QDR process.

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Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

If Congress chooses to establish another panel of experts to provide an

independent review of defense needs, it may wish to require the panel to

complete its work prior to the next QDR. This approach could provide DOD

with a broader set of options to examine in its review.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense assign responsibility for

overall oversight and coordination of DOD preparation efforts for the next

QDR. DOD stated that it is identifying the analytic tools needed for the next

QDR and is improving existing tools where shortcomings have been

identified. It also stated that it is examining areas of U.S. defense strategy

and associated military capabilities not fully explored by the QDR or that

were raised by the National Defense Panel, in addition to commissioning

studies of internal and external lessons learned from the 1997 QDR.

Moreover, it concurred with our conclusion that there is no central

authority to ensure that follow-up efforts are integrated and that

centralization could improve QDR preparation efforts. DOD also agreed that

any mandated panel similar to the National Defense Panel should precede

the QDR.

DOD did not concur with our characterization of the QDR process in some

areas and with our recommendation to consider changing the timing of the

QDR. First, DOD stated that our draft was overly concerned with the benefit

of having the QDR’s panels report sequentially. For example, DOD noted that

the draft strategy had been briefed early in the QDR to the force assessment

and modernization panels and that they were told to base their

assumptions on this draft. DOD further stated that if panel members were

confused as to the final shape of the strategy, it should not be blamed on

the QDR process. Second, DOD wrote that our draft placed undue emphasis

on the force assessment and modernization panels acting as “stovepipes.”

DOD stated that the QDR’s structure allowed panels to focus on a tractable

set of issues and that the Integration Panel ensured that all the various

panel reports were combined into a coherent set of options. Finally, DOD

wrote that beginning the QDR process later in a presidential administration

would force the Secretary of Defense to wait two years before submitting

a budget that reflects an administration’s strategy, priorities, and program.

We believe that our characterization of the QDR process does not overly

stress the benefits of having panels report sequentially. We acknowledge

that DOD officials primarily responsible for drafting the strategy and

leading the force assessments believed that providing the draft strategy in

January 1997 and the final strategy in March 1997 did not pose a problem

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for the panels. However, some panel members perceived that the lack of a

final strategy earlier in the process led to confusion. We note that the 1997

QDR was conducted under favorable conditions in that many senior DOD

officials were in place prior to the November presidential election to begin

work on the strategy and that major elements of the strategy remained the

same. We believe that significant concurrency between the strategy review

and force structure and modernization assessments could be more

problematic for the next QDR, which will be conducted by a new

administration, particularly if senior officials decide on a new strategy that

alters key force planning assumptions. Therefore, we believe that DOD

should consider the need to finalize the strategy earlier in evaluating

changes to the QDR process.

In addition, while we agree that senior officials combined the work of the

panels into broad, macro level alternatives, the panels themselves lacked a

high degree of integration. For example, more collaboration between the

regional great power force assessment and modernization analysis,

possibly as a single panel, might overcome challenges to the timely sharing

of information and would have permitted DOD to explore force structure

versus modernization trade-offs. We acknowledge the benefit of breaking

down a giant task like the QDR into discrete issue panels. If the overarching

Integration Panel is the best means available for combining those panels’

reports into coherent options, it could benefit from collaboration

occurring at the lowest possible levels to make its work easier.

Finally, while we recognize DOD’s concerns regarding changing the timing

of the QDR to later in an administration’s term, we continue to believe that

the 1997 QDR faced challenges from its tight time-frame, despite the

benefits of a returning administration and speedy appointment of a new

Secretary of Defense. The next QDR will be performed by a new

administration. If the next QDR is delayed, it would allow the new

administration to appoint its senior defense leadership, develop a defense

strategy, prepare for the QDR, and conduct appropriate analyses. Our

observation does not seek to limit a new administration’s flexibility in

determining how and when to conduct the next QDR. Rather, it attempts to

give a new administration the benefit of more time to perform a more

rigorous review before reaching conclusions that will shape the future of

DOD and its budgetary priorities.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 52.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 52.

See p. 43.

See pp. 52-53.

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Janet A. St. Laurent, Assistant Director

Ricardo A. Aguilera, Evaluator

Ann Borseth, Evaluator

Craig A. Hall, Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel

Margaret L. Armen

Norfolk Field Office Richard G. Payne, Evaluator-in-Charge

Paul A. Gvoth, Operations Research Analyst

(701119) Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-98-155 Quadrennial Defense Review
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