United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Acting Secretary of the

Army

May 1998 DEFENSE

COMPUTERS

Army Needs to Greatly

Strengthen Its 

Year 2000 Program

GAO/AIMD-98-53

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-278864 

May 29, 1998

The Honorable Robert M. Walker

The Acting Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report presents the results of our review to date of the Army’s

program for solving its Year 2000 computer systems problem. The problem

results from the inability of computer programs at the year 2000 to

interpret the correct century from a recorded or calculated date having

only two digits to indicate the year. Unless corrected, this problem could

cause systems to malfunction or produce incorrect information when the

year 2000 is encountered during automated data processing. The impact of

these failures could be widespread, costly, and potentially debilitating to

Army and other Department of Defense (DOD) operations.

We performed this work as part of our review of DOD’s Year 2000 computer

systems efforts for the Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs

Committee; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the

Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology,

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; and the

Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III, House of Representatives. Our objectives

were to assess (1) the status of the Army’s efforts to identify and correct

its systems and (2) the appropriateness of the Army’s strategy and actions

to remediate its Year 2000 problems. This letter summarizes our concerns

and provides recommendations for addressing them.

Results in Brief The Army relies on computer systems for virtually every aspect of its

operations including strategic and tactical operations, sophisticated

weaponry, and routine business functions such as financial, personnel,

logistics, and contract management. Failure to successfully address the

Year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disable Army

mission-critical operations.

The Army has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote

sharing of information, and encourage components to make Year 2000

remediation efforts a high priority. It has also enlisted the services of the

Army Audit Agency (AAA), the Army Inspector General, and various

contractors to help evaluate component needs and identify areas that

could impact the successful completion of the Army’s Year 2000 program.

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However, it lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good

management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture

of its progress in remediating systems. For example, at the time of our

review, the Army

• did not have complete and accurate information on systems, interfaces,

and the costs and progress of remediation efforts,

• had not completed interface agreements and contingency plans, and

• had not determined how much testing capacity was needed and available.

Each of these problems seriously endangers the Army’s chances of

successfully meeting the Year 2000 deadline for mission-critical systems.

For example, without good status and cost information, the Army cannot

effectively (1) ensure that all its mission-critical systems are being

corrected, (2) identify areas where additional resources are needed,

(3) ensure that Year 2000 errors are not propagated from one organization

to another, or (4) assess whether systems have been certified as

compliant. Without prompt attention to interface agreements and

contingency plans, there is an increased risk that key interfaces will not

work and that core business processes will be adversely impacted.

Without knowing at the department level how much testing capacity is

needed and available, the Army will not be able to help acquire additional

resources in the event that insufficient capacity is available to meet its

needs. Together, these problems greatly increase the risk of failure of

some mission-critical systems and operations unless corrective actions are

taken.

Army officials recognize that improvements in the Year 2000 program are

needed and have recently taken actions directed at ensuring that the year

2000 does not pose a threat to the Army’s ability to execute its mission.

For example, in commenting on a draft of this report, the Army Chief

Information Officer (CIO) stated that, due to our audit efforts and those of

military audit agencies, he has required, through a policy memorandum,

that Army components (1) inventory all system interfaces and coordinate

interface agreements with interface partners, (2) complete contingency

plans, (3) certify the compliance of systems, and (4) provide more

complete and accurate systems data. The CIO also indicated that he is

scheduling individual Year 2000 progress reviews with senior-level

component managers during the April-May 1998 time frame to review their

efforts to fix Year 2000 problems. While we are encouraged by these

actions, until all corrective actions have been completed, the Army cannot

ensure that it will successfully meet the Year 2000 challenge.

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Scope and

Methodology

In conducting our review, we assessed the Army’s Year 2000 efforts

against our Year 2000 Assessment Guide.

1

 This guide addresses common

issues affecting most federal agencies and presents a structured approach

and a checklist to aid in planning, managing, and evaluating Year 2000

programs. The guidance, which is consistent with the DOD Year 2000

Management Plan2 and the Army’s own Year 2000 guidance,3 describes five

phases—supported by program and project management activities—with

each phase representing a major Year 2000 program activity or segment.

The guide draws heavily on the work of the CIO Council Subcommittee on

Year 2000, and incorporates guidance and practices identified by leading

organizations in the information technology industry. The phases and a

description of each phase follows.

• Awareness—Define the Year 2000 problem and gain executive-level

support and sponsorship. Establish a Year 2000 program team and develop

an overall strategy. Ensure that everyone in the organization is fully aware

of the issue.

• Assessment—Assess the Year 2000 impact on the enterprise. Identify

core business areas and processes, inventory and analyze systems

supporting the core business areas, and prioritize their conversion or

replacement. Develop contingency plans to handle data exchange issues,

lack of data, and bad data. Identify and secure the necessary resources.

• Renovation—Convert, replace, or eliminate selected platforms,

applications, databases, and utilities. Modify interfaces.

• Validation—Test, verify, and validate converted or replaced platforms,

applications, databases, and utilities. Test the performance, functionality,

and integration of converted or replaced platforms, applications,

databases, utilities, and interfaces in an operational environment.

• Implementation—Implement converted or replaced platforms,

applications, databases, utilities, and interfaces. Implement data exchange

contingency plans, if necessary.

To determine the status of the Army’s Year 2000 program and the

appropriateness of its strategy and actions for ensuring successful

completion, we evaluated DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

(OASD/C3I) efforts to provide Year 2000 support to the Army. We also

1

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997). The guide

was initially issued in February 1997 as an exposure draft.

2

Version 1.0, April 1997.

3

U.S. Army Project Change of Century Action Plan (Revision I, October 4, 1996).

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evaluated the efforts of the Army’s Office of the Director of Information

Systems, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4) to

manage and oversee Army components’ correction of the Year 2000

problem. The DISC4 Director also serves as the Army CIO. Specifically, we

obtained and reviewed from these offices pertinent Year 2000 guidance,

project and funding documentation, and date format requirements. In

addition, we reviewed the U.S. Army Project Change of Century Action

Plan to assess the level of guidance, roles, and responsibilities and target

milestone dates for the Year 2000 effort. Further, we met with Army

officials and analyzed their efforts to address the Year 2000 problem at the

Army Materiel Command (AMC)—one of the Army’s 17 major commands.

We also obtained a copy of the Army’s October 1997 Year 2000 inventory

database to evaluate its accuracy, reliability, and usefulness. The Army

relies on this database to monitor Year 2000 progress and as the source of

Army information input to the Defense Integration Support Tools. We also

reviewed segments of the Year 2000 database that AMC uses to manage its

Year 2000 program. However, because the results of limited data testing

showed that these Army databases were incomplete and inaccurate, we

could not and did not rely on the data to validate Year 2000 costs or the

numbers of systems reported as being in each Year 2000 phase. We also

obtained a copy of the U.S. Army Year 2000 Database User’s Manual and

discussed the specifics of database use and effectiveness with Army

officials.

In addition, we met with officials from the Logistics Systems Support

Center (LSSC), an Army central design activity with responsibility for

maintaining the software for the Commodity Command Standard System

(CCSS)—a large standard automated information system—to determine

whether LSSC officials were receiving Year 2000 guidance and other related

requirements issued by the OASD/C3I and the Army’s DISC4. We also

discussed with LSSC officials their progress and challenges they face in

solving the Year 2000 problem. Further, we compared the information they

maintained on their efforts with the information DISC4 and AMC are

maintaining for oversight purposes. Lastly, we obtained and analyzed

Army and AMC data to gain an understanding of the size, complexity, and

diversity of the Army’s Year 2000 organizational structure. To help ensure

that we were not duplicating other audit agency work, we met with

officials of AAA and the Army Inspector General to determine the

objectives and scope of their reviews of the Army’s Year 2000 problem. We

also discussed preliminary results of work performed on the Army’s Year

2000 inventory database with AAA officials.

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We conducted our work primarily at the Army’s DISC4 office in Fairfax,

Virginia; AMC Headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia; and LSSC in St. Louis,

Missouri. Our work was performed from November 1996 through February

1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. This work builds upon information included in a series of DOD

component-level Year 2000 reports that have already been issued,

including a related report on the Army LSSC.

4

 We requested and received

written comments on a draft of this report from the Chief Information

Officer of the Department of the Army. These comments are discussed in

the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section and are reprinted in

appendix II.

Background Many of the Army’s automated information systems and embedded

weapons systems are vulnerable to the Year 2000 problem, which is rooted

in the way dates are recorded and computed in automated information

systems. For the past several decades, systems have typically used two

digits to represent the year, such as “97” representing 1997, in order to

conserve electronic data storage and reduce operating costs. However,

with this two-digit format, the year 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900, as

is 2001 indistinguishable from 1901. As a result of this ambiguity, system or

application programs that use dates to perform calculations, comparisons,

or sorting may generate incorrect results when working with years after

1999.

Should the Army’s computer systems fail on the morning of the Year 2000,

Army operations at all levels could be impacted by the incorrect

processing of data, as well as corrupted databases, or even massive system

failures. In turn, this could result in such problems as weapons systems

failures, delays in supply shipments, faulty inventory forecasts, unreliable

budget estimates, and erroneous personnel-related information. The

problem could also lead to a degradation of the Army’s ability to maintain

a readiness posture by seriously slowing or curtailing its ability to sustain

the warfighters’ vital supplies and information.

4

Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight (GAO/AIMD-98-35,

January 16, 1998); Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000 Success

(GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997); Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year

2000 Issues (GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997); Defense Computers: SSG Needs to Sustain Year

2000 Progress (GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997); Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD

Systems Inventory Needed for Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997); Defense

Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000 Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12,

1997); Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000 Problem

(GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997).

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Like the other military services, the Army has adopted the DOD Year 2000

management strategy, which calls for centralized oversight with

decentralized execution of Year 2000 corrective actions. The strategy also

adopts DOD’s five-phased management approach for addressing the Year

2000 problem. The Army has assigned responsibility to DISC4 for overseeing

the Year 2000 effort and has charged it with facilitating the sharing of

information and best practices and with monitoring Army Year 2000

progress. DISC4 is the Army’s primary information resources manager and

its director also serves as the Army’s CIO. As of October 1997, the Army

Year 2000 Project Office had eight staff to oversee the Army’s Year 2000

program. Appendix I shows the Army’s Year 2000 organizational structure

and depicts the complexity and diversity of the Year 2000 program. It also

provides an example of the magnitude of the Year 2000 effort at a major

command level.

Current Status of the

Army’s Year 2000

Program

The Army began its Year 2000 program in December 1995 by establishing a

Year 2000 Project Office. Although an official charter was never

formulated, the Army Year 2000 Project Office was tasked with broad

responsibility for providing centralized oversight and management of the

Army’s Year 2000 effort. In March 1996, the Army approved an initial U.S.

Army Project Change of Century Action Plan. This plan, which was revised

in October 1996, formalized the Project Office’s responsibilities, which

include

• establishing Army-wide strategies and guidance for addressing the Year

2000 problem;

• overseeing Army-wide Year 2000 planning and monitoring progress;

• representing the Army in Year 2000 discussions with DOD and other

government agencies;

• developing a strategy for Army Year 2000 cross-functional resource

decisions;

• directing the establishment of Year 2000 emergency response teams

trained and capable of rapidly responding to and assisting with critical

operational systems that fail due to Year 2000 problems;

• chairing an Army Year 2000 Working Group to (1) investigate Year 2000

and cross-functional issues, (2) avoid duplication of effort, (3) identify and

share lessons learned, and (4) provide recommendations for Army-wide

improvement; and

• establishing and maintaining Army Year 2000 home pages (public and

restricted) that contain the Army Year 2000 systems database and serve as

a clearinghouse for Year 2000 information.

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At the time of our review, the Army Year 2000 Project Office had already

met many Year 2000 challenges. For example, the Project Office had

(1) developed an extensive Year 2000 plan that specified tasks, goals, and

milestones for each phase of Year 2000 corrective actions, (2) established

roles and responsibilities for performing the specified tasks, (3) provided

guidance to components for estimating Year 2000 costs, and (4) published

Year 2000 certification requirements. The Year 2000 plan was updated in

October 1996 and revised in January 1998.5

 The Project Office had

conducted six Army-wide data calls to accumulate important Year 2000

information from its components. Early in the awareness phase, it had also

established a baseline system inventory that was used to develop and

populate the Army’s current Year 2000 system inventory database. The

Project Office’s establishment of an Army Year 2000 home page enables

Army components to access systems inventory information. Throughout

the effort, the Project Office has maintained its Year 2000 awareness

campaign and has emphasized to Army organizations the need to report

Year 2000 information.

In early 1997, the Army took several actions to minimize the adverse

impact of the Year 2000 problem. The Army’s CIO requested that AAA help

evaluate component needs and identify areas that could cause Year 2000

failures. At the time of our review, AAA had completed Phase I of its

eight-phase audit coverage and was finishing detailed site work on Phase

II. During Phase I, AAA focused on component oversight and management

of Year 2000 issues and the accuracy, completeness, and utility of the

Army’s Year 2000 inventory database. In the next phases, AAA will assess

component progress in remediating, testing, and implementing systems.

This work will include determining the reasonableness of the Army’s plans

for Year 2000 testing and contingency planning. Also, the Army Inspector

General is charged with determining the impact of the Year 2000 on

personal computers and network hardware, local computer programs and

applications, and installation infrastructure6

 at the tactical unit and

installation level. Further, the Army reports that it has supplemented its

Year 2000 program with contractor staff that are to concentrate on

evaluating the Year 2000 compliance of Army infrastructure items, such as

telephone and network switching equipment.

5

As of January 8, 1998, the U.S. Army Year 2000 (Y2K) Action Plan (Revision II), was still in draft form;

however, components have been instructed to adhere to its requirements.

6

Installation infrastructure includes computerized devices such as traffic signals, elevators, security

systems, and heating and ventilation systems located on Army installations.

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In February 1998, the Army reported that it had 376 mission-critical

automated information and embedded weapons systems and 19,731

nonmission-critical systems. According to the Army, 120 mission-critical

systems needed to be repaired; all of these had completed the assessment

phase and most were in the renovation phase. In addition, 12,120

nonmission-critical systems needed to be corrected; a small number of

these were in the assessment phase and over half were in renovation. As of

February 1998, the Army estimated that it would cost $366 million to

address its Year 2000 problem. Specific totals reported by the Army are

shown in table 1. As discussed later in this report, we question the

reliability of this information.

Table 1: Reported Status of Army Year

2000 Efforts (as of February 14, 1998) Mission-critical

systems (376)

Nonmission-critical

systems (19,731)

Reported status of systems Number Percent Number Percent

Compliant 160 42.6 6,699 33.9

To be replaced before 2000 78 20.7 83 0.5

To be retired before 2000 18 4.8 829 4.2

To be repaired 120 31.9 12,120 61.4

Reported status of systems to be

repaired

In awareness phase 0 0 0 0

In assessment phase 0 0 67 0.5

In renovation phase 92 76.7 6,300 51.9

In validation phase 14 11.7 3,245 26.8

In implementation phase 10 8.3 2,505 20.7

Corrected 4 3.3 3 <0.1

Source: Army information reported to OASD/C3I. We did not independently verify this information.

Army Management of

the Year 2000 Project

Is Ineffective

Although the Army has taken a number of positive steps toward meeting

the challenges of the Year 2000 problem, it is not effectively managing its

Year 2000 project. First, it lacks complete and accurate information on

systems, interfaces, Year 2000 costs, and the progress of remediation

efforts. Until these data are complete and reliable, the Army will not have

the necessary foundation for managing the Year 2000 program. Second,

the Army is late in preparing interface agreements. As a result, there is

increased risk that key interfaces will not be corrected prior to the year

2000. Third, the Army is behind in developing contingency plans. Without

these plans, it will not be able to minimize the impact of Year 2000

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problems on operations. Fourth, the Army has not assessed how much

testing capacity is needed and available. As a result, it is missing

opportunities to help ensure that all mission-critical systems will be tested

before the Year 2000 deadline.

The Army Lacks Complete

and Accurate Information

Needed to Effectively

Manage Year 2000

Remediation Efforts

Our Year 2000 Assessment Guide, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

guidance, and DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan recognize that a key part

of the assessment phase is conducting an enterprisewide inventory of

information systems for each business area. This inventory should include

specific information, such as the business processes the systems support,

the potential impact on those business processes if systems are not

remediated on time, the schedule for remediation efforts, the identification

and descriptions of internal and external system interfaces, and the costs

of remediation. This provides the necessary foundation for Year 2000

program planning.

The Army lacks the accurate and complete data required to effectively

manage the Year 2000 effort. Specifically, we found that the

departmentwide systems inventory maintained by the Army Year 2000

Project Office is unreliable due to (1) poor design of the Army’s inventory

database and (2) lack of complete information on interfaces, costs, and

certifications of Year 2000 compliance. In addition, we reviewed the

inventory maintained by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and found

that the component lacked data on systems, costs, and funding.

Inventory Database Is Poorly

Designed

The Army’s inventory database consists of 139 data fields for each system,

including hardware make and model and system software; mission

criticality; system owners; the number of executable lines of source code;

cost estimates for repair or replacement; schedule for repair; business

impact; status certification; and core business areas supported by the

systems. Of the 139 data fields, 24 are binary; that is, they have possible

values of only “yes” or “no.” If any of these fields are left blank, they

default to a “no” answer, which may be incorrect. For example, if a system

has been designated as mission-critical, but the binary field for this

information is left blank, the inventory will show that the system is not

mission-critical. This logic flaw could lead to inaccurate information.

Although we did not determine the extent to which inaccuracies may have

occurred, Army Year 2000 Project Office officials and AAA considered this

to be a problem and believed that this flaw put the reliability of inventory

data into question.

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Interface Information Is

Incomplete

Although Army components have identified 1,009 system interfaces that

will be impacted by the Year 2000, the Army lacks most of the detailed

interface information it needs to monitor and oversee component efforts

to ensure that systems data can be exchanged effectively at the year 2000.

For example, detailed interface information describing the (1) transfer

media (e.g., satellite link, telephone dialup, or diskette), (2) frequency of

data exchange (e.g., real time or scheduled periodically), (3) security

classification (e.g., unclassified, confidential, or secret), and (4) whether

the interface is planned or currently exists had not been provided to the

Project Office for the vast majority of interfaces identified. Specifically, of

the 1,009 interfaces identified,

• 809 were missing data on transfer media,

• 915 were missing frequency of data exchange information,

• 917 were missing security classification information, and

• 911 did not identify whether the interface is planned or currently exists.

Cost Information Is Both

Incomplete and Unreliable

At the time of our review, the Army reported that it expected to spend

about $429 million to correct its Year 2000 problem. However, this

estimate was incomplete because (1) it did not contain cost data for all

noncompliant mission-critical systems and (2) it was not based on a

detailed cost analysis. Of the 143 mission-critical systems requiring repair

at the time of the October 1997 quarterly report, 45 percent had costs

entered by system managers and 52 percent had no costs entered into the

Army’s inventory database. The costs of the remaining 3 percent were

unknown and were not reported in the $429 million. However, for the

52 percent of the systems where costs had not been entered into the

Army’s inventory database by system managers, Year 2000 Project Office

staff computed the costs using the Gartner Group formula. This formula

recommends multiplying the number of lines of code to be converted by

$1.10 for automated information systems and by $8.00 for weapon

systems. DOD recommended that components use this formula early in

their Year 2000 effort to make a rough estimate of costs. However, this

rough estimate was to be refined by conducting a detailed cost analysis

based on more than 30 cost factors as the component progressed through

the assessment phase and more was learned about its systems and the

resources that would be required to fix them. These include such factors

as the

• age of systems;

• skill and expertise of in-house programmers;

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• the strategy that the agency is pursuing (strategies that involve keeping the

two-digit code, for example, may be much less expensive than those that

involve changing the two-digit code to a four-digit code);

• the clarity and completeness of documentation on systems;

• the availability of source code; and

• the programming language used.

The difference between an estimate based on a reliable analysis of data

collected during the assessment phase and an estimate based on the

Gartner formula can be significant. For example, using the Gartner

formula, in August 1996 the Army LSSC initially estimated that it would cost

$8.4 million to correct CCSS. When it conducted a detailed cost analysis in

April 1997 based on data collected during the assessment phase, it

estimated that it would cost about $12.4 million—almost 50 percent more

than the August 1996 estimate.

Recently, the Army Year 2000 Program Manager agreed that components

need to provide better cost estimates on Year 2000 remediation efforts and

indicated that some improvement had been made. For example, the

Program Manager told us that, in January 1998, the Project Office had to

calculate cost estimates for only about 30 percent of the components’

systems compared to calculating cost estimates for over 50 percent of the

components’ systems in October 1997. However, while progress is being

reported, in many cases, the Gartner formula is still being used to calculate

cost estimates.

Information Attesting to

Successful Completion of Year

2000 Efforts Is Lacking

To provide assurance that systems are thoroughly tested, properly

documented, and determined to be compliant, the Army is requiring that

components complete a compliance checklist of all mission-critical and

major systems at the conclusion of the validation phase. Once checklists

are completed, the components are to submit them to the Army Year 2000

Project Office. While the Army recommends that checklists also be

completed for systems that are not mission-critical or major, components

are not required to submit completed checklists for them to the Project

Office.

At the time of our review, the Army Year 2000 Project Office had not

received compliance checklists for any of the 832 mission-critical and

major systems contained in its Year 2000 database, including 344 systems

that components had identified as Year 2000 compliant. In addition,

although checklists are to be submitted to the Project Office after a system

has entered the implementation phase, completed certification checklists

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had not been received for 30 systems reported to be in the implementation

phase. Army officials recently informed us that as of March 31, 1998, 15

certification checklists had been received by the Year 2000 Project Office.

Information Is Also Missing at

the Component Level

We reviewed the systems database maintained by AMC—the command

responsible for developing, buying, and maintaining equipment and

supplies for U.S. soldiers and allies worldwide. AMC data have a significant

impact on the Army’s Year 2000 effort because AMC and its components

own approximately 93 percent of the systems the Army reported as not

being Year 2000 compliant. We found that the AMC database lacked

important data. For example, 328 of the 505 AMC systems needing Year

2000 remediation did not have repair cost estimates. One of these was the

Maneuver Control System—a mission-critical system used for planning,

coordinating, and managing battlefield tactical operations. As a result of

the missing cost data, AMC’s $196.7 million cost estimate for its Year 2000

remediation program was understated. We also found that another major

system, the Munitions Transportation Management System, which helps

ensure that correct supplies of munitions are efficiently and effectively

transported from port to port worldwide, was missing from the database

altogether.

All of these data problems seriously impair the Army’s ability to effectively

manage Year 2000 remediation efforts. For example, the Army cannot

monitor the progress of remediation efforts, identify areas requiring

greater management attention, or adequately analyze and prioritize

systems conversion or replacement. Without complete interface

information, the Army cannot ensure that Year 2000 errors are not

propagated from one organization’s system to another’s. Without good

cost information, the Army cannot make informed choices about

information technology priorities and determine whether other system

development efforts should be deferred or cancelled so that resources can

be freed to solve the Year 2000 problem. Without documentation on

certification, the Army cannot assess whether systems have been verified

as compliant.

Because the Army Year 2000 Project Office did not have effective

mechanisms in place to track whether system managers were providing

complete and accurate information and to follow up where they were not,

the Army is taking action to improve its oversight of Year 2000 efforts.

Specifically, AAA and the Army and DOD Inspectors General are engaged in

efforts to help determine the extent of data problems and validate the

accuracy and completeness of components’ information. In addition, in

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October 1997, the Army hired a contractor to improve the inventory

database by creating an Internet web-based version of the database on the

Army Year 2000 home page that is intended to be easier for the user to

update and download. Further, the Army CIO and the Army Chief of Staff

have been communicating to system managers the need to provide

complete and accurate data. While all actions have not yet been

completed, these efforts should help encourage better reporting on the

part of components and provide the more comprehensive and continued

oversight that is needed to establish a complete and accurate picture of

remediation efforts. However, the Army Year 2000 Project Office will still

need to continuously validate the data submitted by components to ensure

the accuracy, completeness, and currency of information in the Army Year

2000 database.

Army Does Not Have

Interface Agreements in

Place for All Critical

Systems and Activities

For system interfaces to work, both sending and receiving interface

partners need to know what to send and what to expect from the other.

For example, one system manager may choose to make a system Year

2000 compliant by expanding to a four-digit year date, while another may

choose to keep the two-digit format and use procedural code or sliding

windows as a strategy.7

 According to current DOD guidance, either fix is

acceptable, but both parties need to be aware of the differences and any

potential conflicts so that they can install the proper data bridge.8

Our Year 2000 Assessment Guide and DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan

recommend that written memorandums of agreement (MOA) with interface

partners be initiated during the assessment phase to allow enough time for

conflicts to be resolved. However, although the Army reports that all of its

mission-critical and major systems have completed the assessment phase,

as of January 1998, Army components reported that, of the 627 instances

where they had identified the need for interface agreements, only 366 MOAs

had been completed. In addition, while AAA is in the process of reviewing

the existence and quality of components’ MOAs, these efforts have not yet

been completed at all locations. Until all MOAs have been prepared and the

7

Procedural code is software that derives the correct century based on the two-digit year (e.g., any year

smaller than year 50 is a 2000 date and any year 50 or larger is a 1900 date). Like procedural code,

sliding windows derive the correct century based on the two-digit year, but the numeric constant used

to determine the century changes each year. Using the procedural code example above, in the current

year, 50 or larger would be a 1900 date, while next year, 51 or larger would be a 1900 date.

8

Bridging involves receiving information in one format, modifying it, and outputting it in another

format, such as receiving the year in two-digit format, adding century information through the use of

an algorithm, and writing the output in four-digit format.

Page 13 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
B-278864 

quality assessed by AAA, the Army is at risk that key interfaces will not

work.

The Army Has Not

Completed All

Contingency Plans

To mitigate the risk that Year 2000-related problems will disrupt critical

business operations, DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan, our Year 2000

Assessment Guide, and recent OMB directives recommend that agencies

perform risk assessments and develop realistic contingency plans for core

business functions during the assessment phase. Contingency plans are

important because they identify the manual or other fallback procedures

to be employed should systems miss their Year 2000 deadline or fail

unexpectedly in operations. Contingency plans also define the specific

conditions that will cause their activation.9

While the Army has issued guidance requiring that contingency plans be

prepared for all critical systems and activities, it has not yet completed the

development of these plans. As of January 1998, of its reported 344

noncompliant mission-critical and major systems, the Army reported that

contingency plans had been completed for 96 systems, no plans had been

completed for 82 systems, and the status of the remaining 166 systems was

unknown. Army Year 2000 Project Office officials recently informed us

that AAA is reviewing contingency plans as part of its Year 2000 reviews of

individual systems. While we view AAA efforts as a positive step, if the

Army does not ensure that contingency plans for all core business areas

are promptly completed and reviewed, it may not have enough time to

identify alternatives if replacement or repair schedules slip or systems do

not operate correctly. Thus, it will increase the risk of being unprepared to

carry out operational missions after the Year 2000 deadline.

The Army Is Not Assisting

Components in Identifying,

Obtaining, and Scheduling

the Use of Test Facilities

The validation (testing) phase of the Year 2000 effort is expected to be the

most expensive and time-consuming. For example, the Mitre Corporation,

the Gartner Group, and other industry experts estimate that testing will

account for 40 percent to 60 percent of the cost of the entire effort. Our

Year 2000 Assessment Guide cautions that agencies may need over a year

to adequately test converted or replaced mission-critical systems for Year

2000 compliance. Further, as both DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan and

our Year 2000 Assessment Guide state, the testing phase will be complex

since components must not only test Year 2000 compliance of individual

applications, but also the complex interactions between scores of

9

To assist agencies in managing the risk of potential Year 2000-induced disruptions to their operations,

we recently issued the Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning

(Exposure Draft) (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, March 1998).

Page 14 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
B-278864 

converted or replaced computer platforms, operating systems, utilities,

networks, databases, and interfaces. Moreover, in some instances,

agencies may not be able to shut down their production systems for

testing and, thus, may have to operate parallel systems implemented at a

Year 2000 test facility. Because of the length and complexity of the testing

phase and the potential that other test facilities may be needed, our Year

2000 Assessment Guide and DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan recommend

that agencies begin identifying the need for test facilities during the

assessment phase.

Army Year 2000 Project Office officials acknowledged that they must

know the Year 2000 testing requirements of Army components (e.g.,

equipment, facilities, personnel, and schedule) in order to ensure effective

and timely testing of all Army systems. Further, over a year ago, in

January 1997, Army Year 2000 Project Office staff recognized that there

may be competition for testing resources and agreed to evaluate the issue.

However, as of February 1998, the Army Year 2000 Project Office had not

yet assessed the situation even though all its mission-critical systems had

completed the assessment phase. Without knowing the testing

requirements of all Army components, the Army will not be able to

effectively schedule resources, prioritize demand, and acquire the

additional resources it may need to meet the demands of Year 2000 testing.

Conclusions The Army’s Year 2000 program is at risk of failure because the data

required to effectively manage correction efforts are inaccurate and

incomplete, interface agreements and contingency plans have not been

completed, and all testing requirements have not been determined. In view

of these problems, the Army has supplemented its efforts with AAA, the

Army Inspector General, and contractor services. However, these

initiatives are designed to identify systemic Year 2000 issues and assess

the progress made toward resolving them based on data provided, and do

not preclude the need for the Army Year 2000 Project Office to effectively

and efficiently determine whether system managers are providing

complete and accurate information and to ensure that they do. Also, until

the Army provides increased oversight of components’ efforts to plan for

contingencies, prepare interface agreements, and acquire needed testing

facilities, it cannot be assured that its mission-critical operations will not

be severely degraded or disabled as a result of the Year 2000 problem.

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
B-278864 

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army CIO to do

the following:

• Require by July 30, 1998, that all Army components (1) correct their

inventory databases, ensuring that they are accurate and complete,

(2) certify all claims of Year 2000 compliance and submit completed

certification checklists to the Army Year 2000 Project Office, (3) provide

reliable Year 2000 cost estimates that are based on a comprehensive

inventory and completed assessments of all mission-critical and major

systems so that priorities can be established and informed resource

trade-off decisions can be made, (4) prepare contingency plans that

include specific actions for ensuring the continuity of the Army’s critical

operations at the Year 2000, (5) prepare memorandums of agreement for

all identified interfaces, and (6) develop test plans and identify the need

for additional testing resources.

• Require by July 30, 1998, that the Army Year 2000 Project Office ensure

that the Army Year 2000 inventory database contains complete, accurate,

and current information on Year 2000 status. To accomplish this, the Army

Year 2000 Project Office should (1) correct known problems, including

erroneous database default values and (2) perform quality assurance

checks of the data prior to its use.

• Require that the Army Year 2000 Project Office continuously monitor

components’ progress in (1) identifying all systems interfaces and defining

key details of the data exchange between systems interfaces and

(2) preparing and implementing required memorandums of agreement.

• Require that the Army Year 2000 Project Office negotiate with other

entities to secure and schedule additional test facilities if components

determine that more test capacity is needed.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Office of the Army Chief

Information Officer (CIO) concurred with all of our recommendations and

indicated that, based on our review efforts and those of the military audit

agencies, actions are already in process to improve the Army Year 2000

program. For example, the CIO noted that, in a February 1998 policy

memorandum, he had directed components to (1) provide more complete

and accurate data on their systems, (2) ensure that all mission-critical and

major systems reported as compliant in the Army Year 2000 database are

certified and copies of the certification are provided to the Army Year 2000

Project Office, (3) ensure that all noncompliant mission-critical and major

systems are certified following renovation and testing, (4) complete

contingency plans for all noncompliant mission-critical and major systems

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
B-278864 

and core business areas, and (5) inventory all system interfaces and

coordinate interface agreements with interface partners. Also, the CIO

indicated that he had directed senior-level component managers to meet

with him during the April-May 1998 time frame to review progress in fixing

Year 2000 issues.

However, as the Army states, many of the actions are not yet complete.

Until actions to implement all our recommendations are completed, the

Army cannot ensure that it will transition smoothly into the next

millennium.

This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal

agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on

actions taken on these recommendations to the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform

and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A written

statement also must be sent to the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made

more than 60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority

Members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and its

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring

and the District of Columbia; the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate

Committee on Appropriations; the Senate Committee on Armed Services;

the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and

Technology, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; the

Subcommittee on National Security, House Committee on Appropriations;

and the House Committee on National Security. We are also sending

copies to the Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III, House of Representatives;

the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology); the Under Secretary

of Defense (Comptroller); the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence); the Army’s

Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications,

and Computers; the Commander of the Army Materiel Command; the

Army Inspector General; the Army Auditor General; the Director of the

Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. Copies

will be made available to others upon request.

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
B-278864 

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to our audit team by

Army officials and staff. If you have any questions on matters discussed in

this letter, please call me or Ronald B. Bageant, Assistant Director, at

(202) 512-6240. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Jack L. Brock, Jr.

Director, Governmentwide and

 Defense Information Systems

Page 18 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Page 19 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Army Year 2000

Organizational

Structure

22

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of the

Army

27

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

33

Table Table 1: Reported Status of Army Year 2000 Efforts 8

Figures Figure I.1: Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure 23

Figure I.2: The Army Materiel Command Organizational Structure 24

Abbreviations

AAA Army Audit Agency

AMC Army Materiel Command

CCSS Commodity Command Standard System

CIO Chief Information Officer

DISC4 Director of Information Systems for Command, Control,

Communications, and Computers

DOD Department of Defense

LSSC Logistics Systems Support Center

MACOM Major Army Command

MOA memorandum of agreement

OASD/C3I Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,

Control, Communications and Intelligence

OMB Office of Management and Budget

Page 20 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Page 21 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix I 

Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

As figure I.1 indicates, Year 2000 management and oversight efforts will

have to be coordinated among 17 major commands (MACOM)—each with a

complex and diverse organizational structure of its own—17 functional

proponents, 8 program executive offices, and 8 program management

offices. In addition, 65 project manager offices and 109 product manager

offices fall under the MACOM and program executive office umbrellas.

Figure I.2 shows the organizational structure of one major Army

command—AMC—in greater detail. To understand the complexity involved

in carrying out Year 2000 efforts at the major command level, consider the

following information provided by AMC:

• AMC employs more than 65,000 civilian and military employees at 285

locations worldwide.

• The command ranks in business volume with the top 10 corporations in

the U.S. and is responsible for about 50 percent of every procurement

dollar the Army spends.

• AMC manages about 500,000 computer applications, infrastructure devices,

and embedded systems. Of these 500,000,

• about 476,000 support the business systems infrastructure, such as local

area networks and desktop computers and

• about 1,700 support weapons systems, including the AH-64A Apache and

AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, the M1A2 Abrams tank

system and the M2/M3A3 Bradley fighting vehicle, the Patriot missile

system, and the Guardrail Common Sensor System used to support the

intelligence gathering capabilities of the Army’s RC-12 aircraft.

• AMC’s 138 logistics business systems include 1,023 system interfaces and

4,694 data bridges.

• AMC has given 149 individuals the responsibility to ensure that Year 2000

problems are resolved.

Page 22 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix I 

Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

Figure I.1: Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

Note: The organizational structure depicted above shows only the Army’s Year 2000 responsibility

and reporting relationships. It does not represent the Army’s broader direct command and control

environment.

Page 23 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix I 

Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

Figure I.2: The Army Materiel Command Organizational Structure

Page 24 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix I 

Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

The Army Materiel

Command Organizational

Structure: Key to

Acronyms

Major Subordinate Commands

USASAC U.S. Army Security Assistance Command

TACOM U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and

Armaments Command

STRICOM U.S. Simulation, Training and

Instrumentation Command

AMCOM U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command

CECOM U.S. Army Communications-Electronics

Command

IOC U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command

ARL U.S. Army Research Laboratory

SSCOM U.S. Army Soldier Systems Command

CBDCOM U.S. Army Chemical and Biological

Defense Command

TECOM U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command

Activities, Centers, and Depots

TARDEC Tank-Automotive Research, Development

and Engineering Center

ARDEC Armament Research, Development and

Engineering Center

ACALA Armament and Chemical Acquisition and

Logistics Activity

AVRDEC Aviation Research, Development and

Engineering Center

MRDEC Missile Research, Development and

Engineering Center

CMP Charles Melvin Price Support Center

CECOM RDEC Communications-Electronics Command

Research Development and Engineering

Center

SEC Software Engineering Center

CDAs Central Design Activities

AWRSC Army War Reserve Support Command

TYAD Tobyhanna Army Depot

RRAD Red River Army Depot

ANAD Anniston Army Depot

CCAD Corpus Christi Army Depot

LEAD Letterkenny Army Depot

SVAD Savannah Army Depot

SEAD Seneca Army Depot

SIAD Sierra Army Depot

(continued)

Page 25 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix I 

Army Year 2000 Organizational Structure

USADAC U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center

NRDEC Natick Research, Development and

Engineering Center

ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and

Engineering Center

UMAD Umatilla Chemical Depot

Separate Reporting Activities

LOGSA Logistics Support Activity

LIA Logistics Integration Activity

MEA Management Engineering Activity

AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity

ITSA Intelligence and Technology Security

Activity

SFA Surety Field Activity

IGA Inspector General Activity

ARO Army Research Office

IPSO Integrated Procurement Systems Office

SEL School of Engineering and Logistics

FAST Field Assistance in Science and

Technology

ICPA International Cooperative Programs Activity

AMC-E Army Materiel Command-Europe

EDCA Executive Director for Conventional

Ammunition

I&SA Installations and Services Activity

IPS Integrated Procurement Systems Office

AMEC Army Management Engineering College

Page 26 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 27 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

Page 28 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

Page 29 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

Page 30 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

Page 31 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of the

Army

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of the Army’s letter

dated May 6, 1998.

GAO Comment 1. The Army provided a number of clarifications to the report that we have

incorporated as appropriate.

Page 32 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

John B. Stephenson, Senior Advisor

Cristina T. Chaplain, Communications Analyst

Atlanta Field Office Christopher T. Brannon, Senior Evaluator

Kansas City/St. Louis

Field Office

Denice M. Millett, Evaluator-in-Charge

(511628) Page 33 GAO/AIMD-98-53 Army Year 2000 Program
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