Pe a c e keeping in Africa

B r i e f l y. . .

• T he Brahimi Report re p re s e nts the first systema t ic and compre he nsive effort to ide ntify and address the technical pro b l e ms with UN peaceke e p i ng missio ns and within

t he United Na t io ns’ Departme nt of Pe a c e ke e p i ng Opera t io ns. The confere nce partic ip a nts largely agreed that the report is, as one partic i p a nt said, “the most important

do c u me nt on peaceke e p i ng ever written.”

• T he Brahimi Report does not, ho w e v e r, address the most serious problem fa c i ng cont e m p o rary peaceke e p i ng missio ns: lack of int e r na t io nal political will.

• T he 1990s witnessed both the chang i ng na t u re of int e r na t io nal conflict and the gro wi ng need for peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns. Between 1948 and 1988 the UN undertook just

15 peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns aro u nd the world; between 1989 and 1999, that nu m b e r

jumped to 31.

• In 1999 the African cont i ne nt was gripped by 16 armed conflic t s, 7 of which were

wars with mo re than 1,000 battle-related de a t hs.

• C u r re nt l y, the United Na t io ns has four peaceke e p i ng missio ns in Africa: MINURSO in

t he Western Sahara, UNAMSIL in Sie r ra Leone, UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethio p ia, and

MONUC in the Demo c ra t ic Republic of the Congo .

• To da y, a distinct possibility exists that mo re civil wars, like those that gripped Sie r ra

L e o ne and Liberia du r i ng the ‘90s, will occur on the cont i ne nt .

• Despite the gro w i ng discussion of African affairs in Ame r ican fo re ign policy circ l e s,

t he United States is largely diseng a ged from security issues on the cont i ne nt .

• T he United States (and the rest of the Western na t io ns) is loath to contribute peacekeepers to African peaceke e p i ng missio ns.

• C o n f e re nce partic i p a nts agreed on the cont i nued importance of the de mo c ra t i z a t io n

p rocess in Afric a .

• C o n f e re nce partic i p a nts also agreed that the age nda put forth by the Brahimi Report

offers nu me rous points of entry for members of the int e r na t io nal community to promote conflict pre v e nt ion on the cont i ne nt .

I n t ro d u c t i o n

A p p rox i mately 50 partic i p a nts gathe red at the United States Institute of Peace on October 24 to discuss the United Na t io ns, the United States, and peaceke e p i ng in Africa in

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

The views ex p ressed in this report do not 

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not advo c a t e

specific policies.

February 13, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report pre s e nts the major questio ns and

t he mes bro u g ht to lig ht du r i ng the Un i t e d

States Institute of Peace confere nce “The

United Na t io ns, The United States, and Pe a c eke e p i ng Opera t io ns: Africa,” held on October 24.

T he confere nce was organized by the

I nstitute’s Research and Stud ies Pro g ram as a

o ne - day forum for leading polic y ma ke r s, 

d i p l o ma t s, and acade m ics to discuss the

“Report of the Pa nel on United Na t io ns Pe a c e

O p e ra t io ns” (known as the Brahimi Report).

This Special Report synt hesizes the pre s e nt at io ns and discussio ns from the confere nc e

with the major the mes covered in the Bra h i m i

Report. This report then places the mo s t

s a l ie nt points raised at the confere nce in the

b ro a der cont ext of peaceke e p i ng activities in

A f r ica toda y. It conc l udes with a brief discuss ion of partic i p a nts’ sugge s t io ns for mitig a t i ng

c o n f l ict on the cont i ne nt .

This report was written by Tim Docking, pro g ra m

of f icer in the Je n n i ngs Randolph Pro g ram fo r

I nt e r na t io nal Pe a c e.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 1

T he Brahimi Report 2

Expert Analysis of the 

B rahimi Report 3

S ho r t c o m i ngs of the 

B rahimi Report 3

C h a ng i ng Na t u re of UN 

Pe a c e ke e p i ng 3

C u r re nt State of Affairs in 

S u b - S a h a ran Afric a 4

C u r re nt Pe a c e ke e p i ng Opera t io ns 

in Afric a 6

U.S. Po l icy toward Afric a 9

C o nc l u s io n1 0
l ig ht of the re c e nt “Report of the Pa nel on United Na t io ns Peace Opera t io ns” (known as

t he Brahimi Report). The group inc l uded leading polic y ma kers and acade m ics in the

f ields of peaceke e p i ng, African stud ie s, and Ame r ican fo re ign policy (see the “List of Pa rt ic i p a nt s ” ) .

Out of these discussio ns eme rged a number of key points of cons e ns u s, important

a reas of disagre e me nt, and several funda me ntal questio ns that merit further inquiry. This

S p e c ial Report will synt hesize the pro c e e d i ngs from the discussion and briefly pre s e nt

s u g ge s t io ns for mitig a t i ng conflict in Africa. This report will also situate the pro c e e d i ng s

in a wider fra mework of policy issues, for exa m p l e, UN peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns, conflic t

in Africa, and U.S.-Africa re l a t io ns, in order to shed lig ht on the curre nt efforts to re fo r m

p o l icy and resolve conflict on the African cont i ne nt. 

T he October forum was part of the Institute’s cont i nu i ng effort to inform and stimulate dialogue on re s o l v i ng conflict in Africa. Inde e d, the experts assembled for the conf e re nce hig h l ig hted not only the importance of the Brahimi Report but also the need fo r

o rg a n i z a t io ns like the Institute of Peace to cont i nue to foster me a n i ngful re v iew of and

p o l icy de v e l o p me nt on peaceke e p i ng activities in Afric a .

While partic i p a nt comme nts were not for attribution, ma ny of their views are

ex p ressed in the fo l l o w i ng report. Ne v e r t he l e s s, no single idea or comme nt should be

ascribed to any one ind i v idual or to the U.S. Institute of Pe a c e. 

The Brahimi Report

In Ma rch 2000, the secretary ge ne ral of the United Na t io ns convened a high-level pane l

to conduct a tho rough re v iew of United Na t io ns peace and security activitie s. The 10-

person panel was chaired by the fo r mer minister of fo re ign affairs of Alge r ia, Lakhda r

B rahimi, and comprised of an int e r na t io nal cast of experts in the fields of peaceke e p i ng ,

p e a c e b u i l d i ng, de v e l o p me nt, and hu ma n i t a r ian assistance: Brian At w o o d, Colin Gra nde rson, Ann He rc u s, Ric h a rd Monk, Klaus Na u mann, Hisako Shimu ra, Vladimir Shu s t o v,

Philip Sibanda, and Corne l io Sommaruga. The panel undertook three mo nt hs of ex t e nsive re s e a rch that involved fie l dwork in Kosovo and drew upon mo re than 200 int e r v ie w s,

i nc l ud i ng discussio ns with every de p a r t me nt within the United Na t io ns. The panel was

given a stra ig ht fo r w a rd yet compre he nsive ma ndate: to pre s e nt a clear set of conc re t e

a nd pra c t ical re c o m me nda t io ns to assist the United Na t io ns to improve future peaceke e p i ng activitie s. 

In August, the panel published its report, a critical assessme nt of UN peaceke e p i ng

o p e ra t io ns. The Brahimi Report thus re p re s e nts the first compre he nsive attempt to assess

t he evolution and effectiveness of UN peaceke e p i ng missio ns over the years and to specify important ways to improve the UN Departme nt of Pe a c e ke e p i ng Opera t io ns (DPKO ) .

At the core of the report is a call for change. Inde e d, the report can be seen as a

da m n i ng critique of the UN’s “repeated fa i l u re” in its military int e r v e nt io ns over the past

de c a de. At one point, the report states blunt l y, “No amo u nt of good int e nt io ns can substitute for the funda me ntal ability to project credible fo rc e.” Following earlier sting i ng

a s s e s s me nts of UN fa i l u res in Rwanda and Sre b re n ica, the Brahimi Report is the mo s t

re c e nt attempt by the UN to shine the lig ht of self-criticism on itself in search of objective and cons t r uctive ana l y s i s.

T he report’s call for change is thus supported by a detailed blueprint for the cre a t io n

of an enhanced peaceke e p i ng struc t u re. In brief, the Brahimi Report exa m i nes every

aspect of UN peaceke e p i ng activitie s, from its curre nt capacities to fa r - re a c h i ng re c o mme nda t io ns for technical change within the 189-member Gene ral As s e m b l y. At the start

of the report the panel ma kes its conc l u s io ns clear: “The key cond i t io ns for the suc c e s s

of future complex opera t io ns are political support, ra p id de p l o y me nt with robust posture

a nd a sound peacebuilding strategy” (p. 1). Every re c o m me nda t ion that follows is

de s ig ned to ens u re that these three cond i t io ns are met in the future.

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute’s Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E.

L e l a nd & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean,

Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y.

• María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd 

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt ,

Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y • Colin L. Powell, S e c re t a r y

of State • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
Expert Analysis of the Brahimi Report

C o n f e re nce partic i p a nts praised the Brahimi Report for its utility, ho ne s t y, and fa r s ig hte d ne s s. The group largely agreed that the report is, as one partic i p a nt said, “The mo s t

i m p o r t a nt do c u me nt on peaceke e p i ng ever written.” Inde e d, while ma ny of the technical weaknesses of past peaceke e p i ng missio ns are well known, Brahimi re p re s e nts the

first systema t ic and compre he nsive effort to ide ntify and address pro b l e ms in the DPKO.

T he ge ne ral feeling of the group was perhaps best summed up by the fo l l o w i ng comme nt, “An ene my of peaceke e p i ng has always been ambiguity; this do c u me nt bring s

c l a r i t y. ”

Clearly these feelings are shared by the UN ge ne ral secre t a r y, Kofi Annan, who quic kly re s p o nded to the report’s re c o m me nda t io ns with his October 20 “Report of the Secretary Gene ral on the Impleme nt a t ion of the Report of the Pa nel on UN Pe a c e

O p e ra t io ns.” In it, the secretary ge ne ral characterizes the panel’s find i ngs as “frank yet

fa i r, . . . fa r - re a c h i ng yet sensible and pra c t ical,” and urges member states to appro v e

a nd support the report’s re c o m me nda t io ns. Annan goes on to eluc idate a plan of actio n

in order to coord i nate actio ns within the UN system and carry out the report’s re c o mme nda t io ns quic k l y.

Shortcomings of Bra h i m i

A l t hough the Brahimi Report has been widely praised for its technical me r i t s, confere nce partic i p a nts were quick to point out its fa i l u re to address the cent ral problem of

all peaceke e p i ng missio ns, that is, the lack of political will by key Western go v e r n me nt s

to support UN peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns. Inde e d, this the me became cent ral to the disc u s s ion and thus will be re t u r ned to later in this re p o r t .

A no t her area that was touc hed on in the Brahimi Report (and perhaps one that was

b e y o nd the ma ndate of the panel) but was not suffic ie ntly addre s s e d, accord i ng to some

a na l y s t s, was the corre l a t ion between unde rde v e l o p me nt and conflict. While empiric a l

e v ide nce on this cont ro v e r s ial point is mixe d, enough data now exists to establish causal

links between poverty and conflict and support Kofi Annan’s observation that “the

majority of wars today are wars amo ng the poor.” “The re is a ne e d,” one confere nce part ic i p a nt asserted, “to link conflict pre v e nt ion with effective de v e l o p me nt sche me s. ”

F i na l l y, confere nce partic i p a nts turned their attent ion to specific conflict zones in

A f r ica, in lig ht of the report: Would the technical and adm i n i s t rative impro v e me nts re co m me nded in Brahimi have ma de a differe nce in the way the United Na t io ns and the

West re s p o nded to re c e nt conflicts in Congo - B ra z z a v i l l e, Rwanda, or the Demo c ra t ic

R e p u b l ic of the Congo? The cons e nsus amo ng experts was: no. For in each of these crises

t he West lacked the will to act. Ho w e v e r, had the re c o m me nda t io ns cont a i ned in the

report been impleme nted prior to UN action in Soma l ia, Sie r ra Leone, and Mo z a m b i q u e

(all crises that elicited some Western re s p o nse), these conflicts could have been at least

m i t ig a t e d, ma ny partic i p a nts tho u g ht .

The Changing Nature of UN Pe a c e keeping Operations: 

The Rationale for Bra h i m i

An analysis of past UN peaceke e p i ng missio ns reveals a sharp inc rease in both the comp l exity and fre q u e ncy of missio ns since the end of the Cold Wa r. Between 1948 and 1988

t he United Na t io ns undertook just 15 peace opera t io ns aro u nd the world. Of the 15, only

t h ree missio ns received ma ndates that tra ns c e nded ceasefire verific a t ion and fo rce sepa ra t ion. Between 1989 and 1999, the number of peaceke e p i ng missio ns jumped to 31,

3

“The key conditions for the 

success of future complex 

o p e rations are political

support, rapid deployment with

robust posture and a sound

peacebuilding stra t e g y. ”

“An enemy of peacekeeping has

a l ways been ambiguity; this

document brings clarity. ”

Although the Brahimi Report

has been widely praised for its

technical merits, conference participants we re quick to point

out its fa i l u re to address the

c e n t ral problem of all

peacekeeping missions, that is,

the lack of political will by key

Western governments to support

UN peacekeeping opera t i o n s.
of which 24 involved ma ndates exc e e d i ng ceasefire observation and often involved the

much mo re complex and da nge rous tasks of weapons cont rol, re f u gee re l ief work, postc o n f l ict re c o ns t r uc t ion, election certific a t ion, and ma ny mo re difficult polic i ng and

e nc a m p me nt / de mo b i l i z a t ion activities (for mo re info r ma t ion, see the tables at

w w w. s t i ms o n . o rg / u n p k / p a ne l re p o r t / u n p k s t i ms o nd i s c u s s ion.pdf, pp. 8–9, pre p a red by

W i l l iam J. Durch of the Henry L. Stimson Cent e r, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.). 

T he ex p l o s ion of de ma nds for peacekeepers du r i ng the 1990s tested both the capab i l i t ies and re s o u rces of the United Na t io ns thro u g hout the de c a de. The unpre c e de nt e d

need for peacekeepers was complicated by the chang i ng role they would play. Mo re and

mo re fre q u e ntly peaceke e p i ng fo rces were called upon to int e r v e ne in hostile (that is,

no n - c o ns e ns ual) and da nge rous situa t io ns to protect besie ged populatio ns. Un fo r t una t e l y, in ma ny cases the org a n i z a t ion failed to meet these da u nt i ng challenges and UN

military fa i l u res seemed to become commo n p l a c e. 

To its credit, the Brahimi Report unde r s c o res this fact and describes the Un i t e d

Na t io ns’ inability to bring mo re men, mo ne y, and tho u g ht to the mission of peaceke e pi ng. The report thus reveals the ex t e nt to which today the UN Secre t a r iat is unde r - s t a f f e d

a nd unde r - f u nde d. At the time the report was completed (July 2000) the DPKO had only

32 military of f icers to plan, recruit, equip, de p l o y, support, and direct some 27,000 sold iers that comprised the 15 missio ns unde r w a y. UN police fo rces faced a similar situat ion: a staff of only nine police of f icers working out of UN he a d q uarters were called upon

to support 8,000 UN police in the fie l d. The report thus conc l uded that the DPKO adm i ni s t rative budget (which was equal to 1/50th of the field teams’ budget) was utterly ins u ff ic ie nt to support the teams in the fie l d.

T hese numbers illustrate a cent ral point of the report: that the United Na t io ns curre ntly lacks the re s o u rces to effectively fulfill its peaceke e p i ng mission. This point also

ma kes clear the UN’s lack of inde p e nde nce and inability to assume a leadership role in

i nt e r na t io nal crisis situa t io ns. Inde e d, confere nce partic i p a nts pointed out that the

United Na t io ns is a body that is in cons t a nt search of ma t e r ial and fina nc ial support and

c o he re nt political backing from member states.

A no t her factor cruc ial to the success of UN missio ns is the ongo i ng political support

of influent ial member states. While the Brahimi Report fails to address this final point ,

p a r t ic i p a nts drove ho me the funda me ntal importance of gaining int e r na t io nal support

( e s p e c ially from the United States) for UN missio ns. Pa r t ic i p a nts illustrated the cro s s -

c u t t i ng character of this issue: (1) “All the re c o m me nda t io ns cont a i ned in Brahimi fo r

i m p ro v i ng UN peaceke e p i ng activities de p e nd on the will of the U.S. Cong ress to fund

t he pro g ra m ,’’ (2) “The re is a cons i s t e nt unde rc u r re nt within the UN of dissatisfa c t ion and

d i s a p p o i nt me nt with U.S. fa i l u re to support the ins t i t u t ion,” and (3) this dy na m ic is

“e ro d i ng Ame r ica’s int e r na t io nal stand i ng.” 

In summa r y, the ra t io nale behind the Brahimi Report is thre e - fold: (1) to unde r s c o re

t he gro w i ng need for peacekeepers aro u nd the world, (2) to bring to lig ht the UN’s fa i lu re to ramp up adm i n i s t rative and logistical support of peacekeepers in the fie l d, and

(3) to propose a series of changes to improve the effectiveness of the DPKO. 

The Current State of Affa i rs in Sub-Saharan Africa

No w he re was the scope and int e nsity of vio l e nce du r i ng the 1990s as great as in Afric a .

While the ge ne ral tre nd of armed conflict in Euro p e, As ia, the Ame r ic a s, and the Midd l e

East fell du r i ng the 1989–99 perio d, the 1990s witnessed an inc rease in the number of

c o n f l icts on the African cont i ne nt. During this perio d, 16 UN peaceke e p i ng missio ns were

s e nt to Africa. (Three count r ie s — S o ma l ia, Sie r ra Leone, and Ango l a — w e re visited by

multiple missio ns du r i ng this time.) Furthe r mo re, this period saw int e r nal and int e r s t a t e

v io l e nce in a total of 30 sub-Saharan states (see table 1).

In 1999 alone, the cont i ne nt was plagued by 16 armed conflic t s, seven of which were

4

The explosion of demands fo r

peacekeepers during the 1990s

tested both the capabilities and

re s o u rces of the United Nations

t h roughout the decade.
Table 1. War and significant lethal violence in Africa, 1989–2000

Conflict state 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0

A l ge r ia c c c c c c d

A ngo l a c c c c c c a a , c c c

B u r u nd i d d c c d d d d d d

C e nt ral African Republic c

C h a d c c d d a d

C o mo ro s d d

C o ngo (Bra z z a v i l l e ) c d d

Côte d’Iv o i re d

Dem. Rep. Congo (Za i re ) c a , c a , c a , c a , c

D j i b o u t i c c

E r i t re a b b b a a a

E t h io p ia c c c a a a

G u i ne a d d

G u i ne a - B i s s a u c d

Ke ny a e e e

L e s o t ho a , d

L i b e r ia c c c c d c c d d

Ma l i e d d

Mo z a m b i q u e c c c

Na m i b ia b a a a

N ige r d d

N ige r ia e e e e

R w a nda c c c c c a , d a , d a , d a , d

S e ne g a l d d d d

S ie r ra Leone d d d d c c c c c c

S o ma l ia c c c c c c c c d d d d

South Afric a d e e e e

S uda n b b b b b b b b b b b b

U g a nda d d d d a , d a , d a , d a , d

Western Sahara b b b

Z i m b a b w e a a , e a , e

To t a l s 1 1 1 2 1 5 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 9 1 2 1 9 1 9 2 2

a — i nterstate war

b—war for inde p e nde nc e

c — h igh int e nsity int e r nal conflic t

d—low int e nsity int e r nal conflic t

e — major political or re l ig ious vio l e nc e

S o u r c e : S. Mullen and J. Wo o d s, Cohen and Woods Int e r na t io nal, Wa s h i ngton, D.C., Ja nuary 2001.

5
6

wars with mo re than 1,000 battle-related de a t hs (Journal of Peace Research, 37:5, 2000,

p. 638). In 2000, the situa t ion cont i nued to de t e r io rate: re newed heavy fig ht i ng

between Eritrea and Ethio p ia claimed tens of tho u s a nds of lives in the lead-up to a June

c e a s e f i re and ultimately the sig n i ng of a peace accord in December; cont i nued vio l e nc e

in the Demo c ra t ic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sie r ra Leone, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Uganda, and Nige r ia as well as the outbreak of new vio l e nce between Guinea and Liberia, in

Z i m b a b w e, and in the Ivory Coast have bro u g ht new hardship and bloodshed to the cont i ne nt .

I nde e d, the re was a cons e nsus amo ng confere nce partic i p a nts that the level of viol e nce pre s e nt in Africa today suggests that the cont i ne nt has re a c hed a na d i r. Furthe rmo re, the group agreed that the potent ial exists that mo re civil wars, like those that

gripped Sie r ra Leone and Liberia du r i ng the ‘90s, will occur on the cont i ne nt .

In add i t ion to the massive hu man suffering caused by war in Africa, confere nce part ic i p a nts pointed out that the long-term effects these conflagra t io ns will have on de v e lo p me nt are profo u nd. Conflict has alre a dy compounded a host of health, enviro n me nt a l ,

a nd econo m ic ills. A re c e nt report, “AIDS Epide m ic Update 2000” from the joint UN Prog ram on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Org a n i z a t ion (WHO), reported that

3.8 million people became infected with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa du r i ng the last year,

b r i ng i ng the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the re g ion to 25.3 millio n

or 8.8 perc e nt of the adult population. This year alone the pande m ic will claim the lives

of two million Afric a ns; one million mo re will die from ma l a r ia and tuberc u l o s i s. 

Experts at the confere nce agreed that amo ng the pletho ra of conflicts on the cont ine nt toda y, perhaps the worst and most int ractable war is in the DRC. Since 1998 this

c o n f l ict has involved the armed fo rces of nine differe nt states and at least nine re b e l

g roups (SIPRI Yearbook 2000). The complexity of this conflagra t ion, along with the vast

territory in play, was seen by the group as a key reason why not to get involved in the

c o n f l ict. Indeed no one ex p ressed ent hu s iasm or even suggested a strategy for politic a l

e ng a ge me nt in the Congo (although several partic i p a nts wonde red aloud, “Who will he l p

p ick up the pieces in the DRC or ano t her Rwanda?”). Fina l l y, it was agreed that the DRC

c o n f l ict will most likely cont i nue to limit the social, political, and econo m ic de v e l o p me nt

of cent ral and southern Africa for years to come.

In re v ie w i ng past UN missio ns to the cont i ne nt, the partic i p a nts agreed that UN successes in Na m i b ia, Mo z a m b i q u e, and South Africa du r i ng the 1990s probably did no t

receive due credit in the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y. Me a nw h i l e, UN fa i l u res (especially in

S o ma l ia ‘93 and Rwanda ‘94) became infa mo u s, and in the United States these calamit ies became emblema t ic of a “failed org a n i z a t ion” and pro v ided grist for UN bashers in

Wa s h i ng t o n .

As the de v a s t a t i ng confluence of econo m ic, health, and political pro b l e ms cont i nu e

to subme rge the cont i ne nt in poverty and conflict, the int e r na t io nal community will cont i nue to be called upon to act in Africa. With conflicts still ra g i ng across the cont i ne nt

a nd the threat of new outbreaks of vio l e nce in places like Zimbabwe, Ke nya, Nige r ia ,

G u i nea, and Ivory Coast, it is difficult to ima g i ne the need for peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns

d i m i n i s h i ng in the near future. The challenges for the United Na t io ns and the West visà-vis Africa are the re fo re mu l t i fo l d. 

S i nce the beginning of conflict in 1991, Sie r ra Leone’s population has suffered gre a t l y

at the hands of the ma ra ud i ng Revolutio nary United Fro nt (RUF). During nearly a de c a de

of fig ht i ng, the RUF has systema t ically killed and ma i med tens of tho u s a nds of Sie r ra

L e o ne a ns. At the start of the war, Sie r ra Leone’s army, with support from the Econo m ic

C o m munity of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military observer group, ECOMO G ,

t r ied to de f e nd the go v e r n me nt and beat back the re b e l s. 

C u r rent Pe a c e keeping Operations in Africa

S i e r ra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-pre s e n t )

The group agreed that the 

potential exists that more civil

wa r s, like those that gripped

S i e r ra Leone and Liberia during

the ‘90s, will occur on the 

c o n t i n e n t .

UN fa i l u res (especially in 

Somalia ‘93 and Rwanda ‘94)

became infa m o u s, and in the

United States these calamities

became emblematic of a “fa i l e d

o rganization” and prov i d e d

grist for UN bashers in 

Wa s h i n g to n .
7

T he fo l l o w i ng year the Sie r ra Leonean army toppled its own go v e r n me nt and he l d

power until February 1996 when it re l i n q u i s hed cont rol to the newly elected pre s ide nt ,

A h med Tejan Kabbah. Yet the military spent little time in their barra c k s, staging ano t her coup in May 1997, this time joined by the RUF. 

F o l l o w i ng ex t e nsive ne go t ia t io ns and nu me rous bro ken peace agre e me nt s, the UN

Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Sie r ra Leone on October 8, 1997

a nd authorized ECOWAS to ens u re its impleme nt a t ion through ECOMOG tro o p s. After the

c o nt i nued fa i l u re of ne go t ia t io ns and repeated attacks on ECOMOG fo rces by the RUF,

E C O MOG launc hed a military of f e nsive that led to the collapse of the junta and its ex p u ls ion from the capital, Freetown. On Ma rch 10, 1998, Pre s ide nt Kabbah was re i nstated as

p re s ide nt .

In June 1998, the Security Council established a UN Observer Mission in Sie r ra Leone

( U NO MSIL) that do c u me nted hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns and war atro c i t ie s. Yet fig ht i ng in

S ie r ra Leone cont i nu e d, and by Ja nuary 1999 the RUF held cont rol of much of the count r y s ide and most of Freetown. UNO MSIL personnel were evacuated befo re ECOMOG fo rc e s

again retook the capital. By May 1999, ne go t ia t io ns between the go v e r n me nt and re b e l s

w e re underway and on July 7, the cont ro v e r s ial Lomé Ac c o rds were sig ne d, cre a t i ng a

go v e r n me nt of na t io nal unity in Sie r ra Leone.

On October 22, 1999, the Security Council authorized the termina t ion of UNO MS I L

a nd the cre a t ion of the UN Mission in Sie r ra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much large r

m i s s ion with a ma x i mum of 6,000 military personnel, to assist the go v e r n me nt and the

p a r t ies in carrying out the pro v i s io ns of the Lomé peace agre e me nt. This group has been

steadily re i n fo rced since its cre a t ion and now carries a Security Council ma ndate to

i nc rease its numbers to 20,500.

Ne v e r t he l e s s, the UN mission has been plagued by missteps and fa i l u re. During the

s p r i ng and summer of 2000, several UN soldiers were killed and hu ndreds mo re were capt u red and held ho s t a ge by the RUF. Only through the du b ious support of Liberian stro ngman Charles Taylor (and the dra ma t ically mo re effective bilateral military int e r v e nt ion of

British fo rces acting outside of UNAMSIL) was the hu m i l ia t i ng episode bro u g ht to an end

a nd the UN pre s e nce re s c u e d.

In re c e nt mo nt hs, UNAMSIL has been hit with further bad news: Ind ia, source of the

l a rgest mu l t i na t io nal cont i nge nt, anno u nced the withdrawal of its 3,150 soldiers by Febr uary 2001 after several of its soldiers were killed and its comma nde r, Major Gene ral Vijay

K. Je t l e y, became involved in a dispute with the mission’s Nige r ian leade r s. Shortly after

this anno u nc e me nt the Jo rda n ian cont i nge nt, citing the cons p ic uous absence of We s tern soldiers in the mission, also anno u nced the de p a r t u re of its 1,800 soldiers by the

e nd of the year. 

T he impend i ng de p a r t u re of nearly half of the UN fo rces on the gro u nd in Sie r ra Leone

is a blow to UNAMSIL, and will leave Bang l a deshi troops and a new 800-member batt a l ion of Ukra i n ian troops as the sole no n - A f r ican actors involved in the mission. While

B a ng l a desh and Ghana have of f e red to replace the lost troops and ma i ntain the curre nt

level of 12,500, it looks unlikely that the Security Council and the secretary ge ne ral will

be able to inc rease the number of fo rces to the 20,000 mark. And ma ny Sie r ra Leone a ns

worry that the pull-out of the de p a r t i ng fo rces along with the start of the dry season—

t y p ically a time of int e nse fig ht i ng—will lead to mo re bloodshe d. To ge t he r, these event s

cast further doubt on the future of this important peaceke e p i ng missio n .

E t h i o p i a - E r i t rea (UNMEE, 2000–pre s e n t )

In August, the UN Security Council adopted Kofi Annan’s proposal to send a stro ng cont i nge nt of 4,200 Blue He l mets to oversee the impleme nt a t ion of the June 18 Algie r s

c e a s e f i re agre e me nt. This agre e me nt between Ethio p ia and Eritrea halted two years of

i nt e r m i t t e nt war that killed tens of tho u s a nd s. The treaty followed Ethio p ia’s fero c io u s

On October 22, 1999, the 

Security Council authorized the

termination of UNOMSIL and

the creation of the UN Mission

in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a

n ew and much larger mission

with a maximum of 6,000 

m i l i tary personnel, to assist the

g overnment and the parties in

carrying out the provisions of

the Lomé peace agre e m e n t .
Building a durable peace in the

Horn of Africa is yet to be

accomplished, although the

peace effort re c e i ved good new s

when both sides signed a

formal peace treaty on 

December 12 in Algiers.

8

May of f e nsive that pushed deep into Eritrean territory and fo rced a million Eritre a ns to

flee at a time when re g io nal dro u g ht thre a t e ned tho u s a nds of lives. 

T he United Na t io ns Mission in Ethio p ia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to mo nitor the cessation of ho s t i l i t ies in this border dispute, and the re de p l o y me nt of fo rces to

respective sides of a demilitarized zone. The UN mission of 4,500 is curre ntly de p l o y i ng .

B u i l d i ng a du rable peace in the Horn of Africa is yet to be accomplishe d, altho u g h

t he peace effort received good news when both sides sig ned a fo r mal peace treaty on

December 12 in Algie r s.

Congo (MONUC, 1999–pre s e n t )

T he 1997 ouster of Za i re’s long - t i me despot, Mobutu Sese Seko, bro u g ht Laure nt Ka b i l a

a nd his Rwandan backers to power in the new Congo. But fig ht i ng once again erupted

in August 1998 when re b e l s, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, accused Pre s ide nt Ka b i l a ’ s

go v e r n me nt of harboring Hutu militia who had fled Rwanda after committing ge no c ide

in 1994. 

On July 10, 1999, the DRC along with Angola, Na m i b ia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe came toge t her in Lusaka to sign a ceasefire agre e me nt to end ho s t i l i t ies in the

DRC. Cons p ic uous in their absence from the talks were several Congolese rebel gro u p s.

Ne v e r t he l e s s, the Security Council pro c e e ded with the peace process and in August 1999,

a u t horized the de p l o y me nt of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel to the capitals of

t he sig natory states and other stra t e g ic military locatio ns.

S i nce then the ma ndate of MONUC has grown to a ma x i mum de p l o y me nt of 5,537 military personnel, inc l ud i ng up to 500 military observers. Ne v e r t he l e s s, the UN Security

C o u ncil and Secre t a r iat have not pro c e e ded with this second phase de p l o y me nt due to

t he fa i l u re by Congo’s go v e r n me nt, re b e l s, and ne ighbors to impleme nt their commitme nts under the Lusaka Ag re e me nt. The war in the DRC thus cont i nues una b a t e d. 

Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991–pre s e n t )

T he mission to Western Sahara is the UN’s oldest on the cont i ne nt. This pro t racted conf l ict between Mo rocco and the Fre nte Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Ha m ra y de

Río de Oro (Po l i s a r io Fro nt) over a stretch of land southwest of Mo rocco began after the

w i t h drawal of Spain as colonial adm i n i s t rator in 1976. At that time, both Mo rocco and

Ma u r i t a n ia affirmed their claim to the territory, a claim opposed by the Po l i s a r io Fro nt. 

T he United Na t io ns became involved with seeking a peaceful re s o l u t ion of the conf l ict in the Western Sahara after fig ht i ng bro ke out between the Mo roccan army and the

A l ge r ia n - b a c ked Po l i s a r io Fro nt. By 1979, Ma u r i t a n ia had re no u nced its claims to the terr i t o r y, leaving the two sides to battle for cont rol. In coopera t ion with the Org a n i z a t io n

of African Unity (OAU), the UN secretary ge ne ral initiated a mission of good of f ices that

led to “settleme nt proposals” between the two sides that were accepted in August 1988. 

By 1991, a tentative ceasefire was established and the UN Security Council de c ided to

establish the UN Mission for the Refere ndum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The settleme nt

plan called for a re f e re ndum in which people of Western Sahara would choose between

i nde p e nde nce and int e g ra t ion with Mo rocco. At full stre ngth the mission was to consist of

a p p rox i mately 1,700 military personnel and a security unit of 300 police of f ic e r s.

Ac c o rd i ng to the settleme nt plan, the re f e re ndum was to take place in Ja nuary 1992,

but it was never he l d. At issue still for the two parties is the composition of the elect o ra t e. The United Na t io ns has tried to int e rc e de and facilitate the process of voter ide nt i f ic a t ion, but the exe rcise has been fra u g ht with pro b l e ms. Kofi Annan’s personal envoy

to the Western Sahara, Ja mes A. Baker III, cont i nues to seek a ne go t iated settleme nt

between the inde p e nde nc e - s e e k i ng Po l i s a r io Fro nt and Mo rocco, and UN-me d iated talks

on the re f e re ndum cont i nu e.

The mission to Western 

S a h a ra is the UN’s oldest 

on the continent.
The array of conflicts fa c i n g

Africans today is long . . . and 

p resents Western policy m a k e r s

with a daunting task: how to

design fo reign policy towa rd a

region with the breadth and

depth of socio-economic tro u b l e

and political instability that is

c u r rently found in Africa.

9

U.S. Po l i cy towa rd Africa 

C a t a l o g i ng cont e m p o rary conflict and tens ion in sub-Saharan Africa is a difficult task.

T he array of conflicts fa c i ng Afric a ns today is long (the risk of inc reased conflict re ma i ns

h igh in Alge r ia, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Ke ny a ,

L i b e r ia, Nige r ia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sie r ra Leone, Soma l ia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) and pres e nts Western polic y ma kers with a da u nt i ng task: how to de s ign fo re ign policy toward a

re g ion with the bre a dth and depth of socio - e c o no m ic trouble and political ins t a b i l i t y

that is curre ntly fo u nd in Afric a .

C o n f e re nce partic i p a nts agreed that the “lack of political will” by Western powers is

t he major impedime nt hinde r i ng the de p l o y me nt and success of UN peaceke e p i ng miss io ns in Africa. Yet as one confere nce partic i p a nt said, “It is just not he re in the Un i t e d

States whe re political leaders have to sell peaceke e p i ng missio ns to their populatio ns, it

h a p p e ns in all de mo c ra c ie s.” In short, few fo re ign leaders are willing to risk the loss of

s o l d iers in poorly understood lands whe re the re may be no perceived na t io nal stra t e g ic

or econo m ic int e re s t s.

The aversion to peacekeeping among the American military and policymakers

runs deep. American critics of peacekeeping missions, and of conflict prevention

programs in general, often chastise the United Nations for its unrealistic planning,

weak mandates, and feckless command and control procedures. For these critics the

ill-fated UN mission to Somalia (1992–94) confirmed their cynicism and became

emblematic of international peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, the death of 18 Army

Rangers in the streets of Mogadishu had a profound and traumatic effect on the

way American foreign policymakers in general looked at peacekeeping, especially in

Africa. 

S i nce the tra ge dy in Soma l ia, the tre nd has been for Western na t io ns to refuse to send

t roops into Africa’s hot spots. Jo rdan re c e ntly unde r s c o red this point when it ex p re s s e d

f r u s t ra t ion with the West’s fa i l u re to commit soldiers to the UNAMSIL mission as a re ason for the withdrawal of its troops from Sie r ra Leone.

A me r ica’s aversion to peaceke e p i ng in Africa also reflects bro a der U.S. fo re ign polic y

on the cont i ne nt. Africa occupies a ma rg i nal role in Ame r ican fo re ign policy in ge ne ra l

(a point hig h l ig hted by confere nce partic i p a nts). 

To da y, the fo u nda t ion of U.S. policy toward the vast sub-Saharan re g ion (with its 48

states) is being built on re l a t io ns with South Africa and Nige r ia. Secretary of Defens e

W i l l iam Cohen stressed the importance of these two re l a t io nships earlier this year on a

trip to Cape Town when he said: “South Africa and Nige r ia will be critical for the stability and the future prosperity of African na t io ns, . . . and we estimate that their partic ip a t ion in ma neuvers and joint tra i n i ng pro g ra ms, semina r s, exc h a nges in military

p e r s o n nel and also acade m ic exe rcises aimed at military/civilian re l a t io ns will stre ng t hen ties between these na t io ns” (Armed Forces Journal International 138:2, September

2000, p. 30).

Despite the appare ntly fruitful coopera t ion between the United States, South Afric a ,

a nd Nige r ia, the road ahead for bro a der U.S.-Africa re l a t io ns is unc l e a r. 

T he future for much of Africa looks bleak. As war and hu ma n i t a r ian disasters cont i nue to unfold across the cont i ne nt, they are accompanied by gro w i ng numbers of

re f u ge e s, spre a d i ng ins t a b i l i t y, and in some places ana rc hy. The rise of lawlessness and

stateless socie t ies in Africa brings the risk of the de v e l o p me nt of new terrorist and dr u g

ne t w o r k s. Weak econo m ic growth, the AIDS pande m ic, the de g ra da t ion of Africa’s phy sical enviro n me nt, and the spread of hu ma n i t a r ian crises in sub-Saharan Africa combine

to create a de p re s s i ng re g io nal portra i t .

Each of these re a l i t ies poses a unique threat to peace everywhe re on the cont i ne nt .

T hu s, confere nce partic i p a nts agreed: Given the me na c i ng socio - e c o no m ic setting in

A f r ica toda y, the United States must be enc o u ra ged to re - e ng a ge in both the Un i t e d

Na t io ns and African affa i r s.

Since the tragedy in Somalia,

the trend has been for We s t e r n

nations to refuse to send tro o p s

i n to Africa’s hot spots.

Despite the apparently fruitful

c o o p e ration between the United

S ta t e s, South Africa, and 

Nigeria, the road ahead fo r

b roader U.S.-Africa relations 

is unclear. 
1 0

C o n c l u s i o n

C o n f e re nce partic i p a nts were una n i mous in their convic t ion that the Brahimi Report is a

l a ndmark do c u me nt on the Ame r ican fo re ign policy scene. Not as a source of seminal theory or orig i nal analysis of peaceke e p i ng opera t io ns — i nde e d, much of what is cont a i ne d

in the report has been known and talked about for years—but ra t her for its stra ig ht fo rw a rd simplic i t y, cando r, and ability to synt hesize timely and urge nt issues. The re p o r t

s hould thus be seen as mo re than a plan for impro v i ng the technical capacity of the

D e p a r t me nt of Pe a c e ke e p i ng Opera t io ns; it is also a project aro u nd which the mu l t i t ude

of conc e r ned actors can coalesce to cons t r uct a unifying vision and effect change. In the

atomized and unharmo n ious world of int e r na t io nal polic y ma k i ng, one must seize upon

t he ra re opportunities to work toge t her and conc e nt rate re s o u rces in pursuit of a common go a l .

While confere nce partic i p a nts were unable to reach a cons e nsus on what next steps

s hould be taken by U.S. and int e r na t io nal polic y ma kers in support of Brahimi, nu me ro u s

re c o m me nda t io ns were put fo r w a rd. One fo r mer go v e r n me nt of f ic ial argued that a dire c t

causal link exists between poverty and conflict in Africa and advocated a re do u b l i ng of

a id and de v e l o p me nt efforts on the cont i ne nt by Western go v e r n me nt s. Others from the

a c a de m ic community suggested that the United States adopt a policy of selective

e ng a ge me nt in Africa that focuses on vital int e rests and achievable go a l s. Several part ic i p a nts re c o m me nded that U.S. polic y ma kers should cont i nue to stre ng t hen key Afric a n

a l l ies (such as Nige r ia and South Africa), support re g io nal org a n i z a t io ns (like ECOWA S

a nd SADC, the Southern African Developme nt Community), stre ng t hen the Ame r ic a n

e m b a s s ies and diploma t ic corps, collect better int e l l ige nce on the cont i ne nt, and bring

e c o no m ic and other pre s s u res to bear on warlord go v e r n me nt s. Although no ne of the s e

p roposals received unc o nd i t io nal support from the group, cons e nsus was re a c hed over

t he cont i nued importance of the de mo c ra t i z a t ion process in Africa. 

T he group also agreed that the age nda put forth by the Brahimi Report offers nu me rous points of entry for members of the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y. As the report states,

“ Pe a c e ke e p i ng and peacebuilding are ins e p a rable partners”(p. ix). The U.S. Institute of

Peace and other conc e r ned org a n i z a t io ns have a long s t a nd i ng re c o rd and ongo i ng prog ra ms that have taken conc rete steps toward conflict pre v e nt ion on the cont i ne nt. The

B rahimi Report both confirms the importance of this work and illuminates new areas of

ne e d.

The agenda put forth by the

B rahimi Report offers numero u s

points of entry for members of

the international community.

As the report sta t e s,

“ Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are inseparable partners. ”
Ja mes A. Sche a r

U.S. Department of Defense

Ka malesh Sharma

Permanent Mission of India to the 

United Nations 

T ho mas She e hy

House Committee on International 

R e l a t i o n s

D a v id Smo c k

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

W. R. Smy s e r

Georgetown University

S t e p hen Stedma n

S t a n ford University

W i l l iam Stuebne r

United Nations Association of the United

States of America

Toby Trister Gati

Akin, Gump, Strauss Hauer & Feld

Matt Va c a r ro

U.S. Department of Defense

Ka t hy Wa rd

U.S. Department of State

B a r b a ra Wie n

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

E r ic Witte

International Crisis Group

Ja mes Wo o d s

Cohen and Woods International

Ken Ya t e s

Jefferson Waterman International

I. William Za r t ma n

School of Advanced and International

S t u d i e s, Johns Hopkins University

1 1

Pa r t i c i p a n t s

J. Brian At w o o d

Citizens Energy Corporation

Kurt W. Bassuene r

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

D a n iel Benjamin

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

R ic h a rd Bogo s ia n

U.S. Department of State

D o n na Boltz

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

Allison Boyer

Cohen and Woods International

Holly Burkhalter

Physicians for Human Rights

Mark Clack

House Committee on International 

R e l a t i o n s

Roberta Cohe n

Brookings Institution

C hester A. Cro c ker 

Georgetown University

Pa t r ick Cro n i n

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

Tom Dempsey

U.S. Army War College

Steven A. Dimof f

United Nations Association of the United

States of America

Tim Docking

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

Carlos dos Sant o s

Permanent Mission of Mozambique 

to the United Nations

W i l l iam Durc h

Henry L. Stimson Center

Stewart Eldo n

Permanent Mission of the United

Kingdom to the United Nations

He a t her Flynn

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Paul Foldi

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

C h r i s t o p her Fomu ny o h

National Democratic Institute for 

International Affa i r s

Je ndayi Fra z e r

Harvard University

Pa t r ick Ha y fo rd

E xecutive Office of the UN 

Secretary General

Ha r r iet He nt ge s

U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

Herbert Ho w e

Georgetown University

Dennis Je t t

University of Florida

J udith Ka r l

United Nations Development Program

E dwin King Ha l l

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

A l ex Laska r i s

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Jeff Laure nt i

United Nations Association of the 

United States of America

E dw a rd Ma r k s

Center for Strategic and 

International Studies

R a y mo nd Ma r u t l e

Embassy of South Africa

Douglas Me rc a do

International Medical Corps

M i ke Miller

Office of Senator Bill Frist

S heila Mu r p hy

United Nations Information Center

Susan My e r s

Better World Campaign

C a t he r i ne O’Ne i l l

United Nations Information Center

Robert Oakley

National Defense University

Robert Orr

U.S. Department of State

A h me dou Ould-Abda l l a h

Global Coalition for Africa

F ra ncis C. Record

House Committee on International 

R e l a t i o n s

D o nald S. Rothchild

University of California at Davis
For mo re info r ma t ion, see our web site

( w w w. u s i p . o rg), which has an online

e d i t ion of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 6 6

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036