Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Hicks v. City of O’Fallon, 2019 IL App (5th) 180397

Appellate Court 

Caption

JEREMY HICKS and ISAIAH SAMPSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 

THE CITY OF O’FALLON, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Fifth District

No. 5-18-0397

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to 

publish allowed

Opinion filed

August 6, 2019

August 28, 2019

August 28, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 16-L-660; the 

Hon. Christopher T. Kolker, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jeremy A. Gogel, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellants.

Brian M. Funk, of O’Halloran, Kosoff, Geitner & Cook, LLC, of 

Northbrook, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 On November 11, 2015, an ambulance, driven by a paramedic employed by the City of 

O’Fallon, Illinois (City), was involved in a single vehicle accident.1 Plaintiffs Jeremy Hicks 

and Isaiah Sampson, a minor with cerebral palsy, were passengers in the ambulance and 

sustained injuries. Hicks and Sampson initially filed separate complaints, but the circuit court 

later consolidated the cases. 

¶ 2 The City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law because (1) there was a lack of evidence of willful and wanton conduct on the 

City’s part and (2) Hicks’s claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. 

Following the circuit court’s judgment in favor of the City, the plaintiffs filed a timely notice 

of appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. Background

¶ 4 On November 11, 2015, Richard Palmer and Terry Sill, two paramedics employed by and 

acting in their capacity as employees of the City, arrived at Sampson’s guardian’s home in 

Shiloh, Illinois, following a report of a seizure-like episode. It was determined that Sampson 

needed further care at Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital (Cardinal Glennon) in St. Louis, 

Missouri. Sill drove the ambulance while Hicks, Sampson’s uncle, sat in the passenger seat 

and Palmer rode in the back of the ambulance with Sampson. While driving westbound on 

Interstate 64 towards St. Louis, Sill lost control of the ambulance, struck wire barriers, hit water 

in a median, and ran off the road.2

¶ 5 On December 15, 2016, Hicks filed a complaint, alleging the City had negligently and 

carelessly (1) operated the ambulance at a speed greater than reasonable and proper with regard 

to traffic conditions and (2) failed to concentrate on driving, appreciate the road conditions, 

and keep a proper lookout.3 As a result, Hicks suffered pain and injuries to his head, neck, and 

back, as well as muscle and tissue damage and trauma. Due to his injuries, Hicks incurred 

numerous medical expenses. 

¶ 6 On January 24, 2017, the City filed a motion to dismiss Hicks’s claim with prejudice. The 

City claimed that Hicks had failed to file his complaint before the expiration of the one-year 

statute of limitations set forth in section 8-101(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental 

Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2016)). 

Shortly thereafter, Hicks filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The circuit 

1

While the complaints and other documents indicate that no accident took place on November 11, 

2015, the deponents testified that the accident occurred on November 17, 2015. The discrepancy is not 

relevant to the disposition of the appeal.

2

The plaintiffs asserted in their complaints that the ambulance struck a tree at the time of the 

accident. The deposition testimony, however, does not indicate that fact. Instead, Sill testified that he 

lost control of the ambulance and hit “wire barriers” after the ambulance swerved from the inside lane 

of the roadway. 

3 Hicks originally filed his claim against O’Fallon Shiloh Emergency Medical Services. On 

February 14, 2017, Hicks filed a motion for substitution of a party defendant to name the City of 

O’Fallon as the proper defendant. 
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court granted Hicks’s motion and determined, without explanation, that the City’s pending 

motion to dismiss was moot. 

¶ 7 On March 20, 2017, Hicks filed an amended complaint, alleging the City’s employee lost 

control of the ambulance, ran off the road, and struck a tree because the ambulance was 

traveling at an unsafe speed during heavy rainfall. Hicks also asserted that the “ambulance ride 

arose out of patient care to [Sampson],” and the City’s employees provided patient care to 

Sampson during the transport to Cardinal Glennon. Hicks argued that the City’s employees 

demonstrated an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for his and Sampson’s safety, thus, 

violating the duty they owed the plaintiffs. As a direct and proximate cause of the accident, 

Hicks suffered injuries to his head, neck, and back, as well as tissue trauma and damage. 

¶ 8 On April 13, 2017, the City filed a motion to dismiss Hicks’s amended complaint. The City 

asserted that Hicks’s claim was time-barred under section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act 

(745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2016)). The City argued that even though section 8-101(b) of 

the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(b) (West 2016)) created a two-year statute of 

limitations exception, it was limited to injuries “arising out of patient care.” According to the 

City, neither Hicks nor Sampson were patients of the City, and even if the term “patient” 

referred to persons being treated and transported by emergency personnel, Hicks’s injuries did 

not arise out of patient care because he was not “the person receiving care” in the ambulance. 

¶ 9 Following a hearing on the City’s motion to dismiss, the circuit court directed the City to 

file a reply in support of its motion on or before June 23, 2017, which the City timely filed. 

The City argued that Hicks’s argument had “absolutely no merit” because the Illinois General 

Assembly clearly delineated section 8-101(b) of the Tort Immunity Act to apply to patients 

receiving care in public hospitals, not to nonpatients riding in ambulances. Next, the City 

argued that Hicks, by his own admission, did not personally receive medical care at the time 

of the injury and was not injured as a result of negligent medical care. As such, the City asserted 

that the two-year statute of limitations period was inapplicable because Hicks’s injuries 

resulted from a traffic accident. 

¶ 10 On June 27, 2017, Hicks filed a response to the City’s motion to dismiss. Hicks, relying on 

Wilkins v. Williams, 2013 IL 114310, asserted that “[j]ust like it would be illogical to allow a 

third party a greater right of recovery than a patient as a result of the same occurrence, it would 

be illogical to allow a patient a greater right of recovery than a third party as a result of the 

same occurrence.” Specifically, Hicks argued that the City was liable for his damages because 

his injuries occurred while the City’s employee provided patient care to Sampson. That same 

day, the circuit court denied the City’s motion to dismiss. 

¶ 11 On July 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for certified questions under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017), requesting the circuit court certify the following 

questions for appellate review: 

“a. Whether the term ‘patient care’ set forth in 745 ILCS 10/8-101(b) applies to 

individuals riding, but not receiving medical attention, in an ambulance owned and 

operated by a municipality.

b. Whether the term ‘arising out of patient care’ set forth in 745 ILCS 10/8-101(b) 

applies to situations where an individual is injured as the result of a traffic accident 

while riding, but not receiving medical attention, in an ambulance owned and operated 

by a municipality.” 
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¶ 12 On July 17, 2017, the circuit court set a hearing for August 9, 2017, on the parties’ joint 

motion for certified questions. The record does not contain the circuit court’s order granting or 

denying the joint motion. 

¶ 13 On August 11, 2017, the City filed an answer to Hicks’s amended complaint. The City 

admitted that Hicks and Sampson were passengers in an ambulance that was involved in a 

vehicle accident on November 11, 2015. The City denied, however, the following: (1) the 

ambulance ride arose out of patient care to Sampson; (2) the City’s employees provided care 

to Sampson while transporting Hicks and Sampson to the hospital; (3) it was raining heavily 

during the transport and, given the conditions on the roadway, the ambulance was driven at an 

uncontrollable speed; (4) the City’s employee driving the ambulance lost control of the vehicle 

before it ran off the road and struck a tree; (5) as a direct and proximate result of the accident, 

Hicks sustained physical and emotional damages and incurred medical expenses; (6) the City’s 

employees acted in a willful and wanton manner; and (7) the City’s employees showed an utter 

indifference to or conscious disregard for Hicks’s safety in operating the ambulance. 

¶ 14 In addition to the City’s denials, it also asserted three affirmative defenses. Because the 

City was a local public entity, as defined by section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 

10/1-206 (West 2016)), the City stated the following: (1) Hicks was required to file his claim 

within one year of the alleged accident; (2) the City and its employees were not liable for the 

negligent operation of the vehicle, including transportation of a person to a medical facility; 

and (3) the City was not liable for the acts or omissions of its employees where no liability was 

present. The City requested immunity from liability and dismissal of Hicks’s amended 

complaint with costs. 

¶ 15 On November 3, 2017, Sampson, represented by the same counsel as Hicks, filed a 

complaint against the City, asserting that his ambulance ride to Cardinal Glennon arose out of 

patient care. According to Sampson, the driver operated the ambulance at an unsafe speed 

during heavy rain. As a result, Sampson sustained injuries after the driver lost control of the 

ambulance, ran off the road, and struck a tree. Shortly thereafter, Sampson filed a motion to 

consolidate his case with Hicks, which the circuit court granted.

¶ 16 A. Jeremy Hicks 

¶ 17 On February 1, 2018, Hicks testified to the following in a discovery deposition. Since 2010, 

Hicks had been an ad specialist at the East St. Louis Monitor newspaper. At the time of the 

deposition, Hicks had been looking for work as a welder, but his “injury actually inhibits me 

from seeking out anything else, because I have like these muscle spasms to where I can’t feel 

*** my hands.” 

¶ 18 Hicks explained that his mother called 9-1-1 on November 17, 2015, after Sampson had 

multiple seizures. Once the paramedics arrived, Sampson was placed on a gurney and wheeled 

to the ambulance. While seated in the passenger seat, Hicks viewed Sampson in the back of 

the ambulance with an oxygen mask across his face. The straps across Sampson’s chest were 

not strapped down completely because he was still having seizures. Hicks testified that the 

only communication he had with the paramedics was prior to departing when they told him to 

get in the ambulance if he was going to ride because, according to Hicks, “I guess [Sampson] 

wasn’t breathing properly or whatnot.” 

¶ 19 As the ambulance departed, it was dark outside, although the rain had lightened up. During 

the ride, Hicks texted on his phone and did not converse with the paramedics. The paramedic 
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operating the ambulance never turned on the emergency sirens or lights. When the ambulance 

entered Interstate 64 westbound for St. Louis, the rain “never completely stopped,” but it 

“slowed down *** to where it went from hard to not raining so hard.” Specifically, he testified 

that the rain had “lightened up” from the time the ambulance left the house to the time of the 

accident. 

¶ 20 As the ambulance came to the bottom of a hill on Interstate 64, just past Fairview Heights, 

Illinois, Hicks, still texting at the time, felt the ambulance slide to the right. When Hicks 

“looked over [at the speedometer],” Sill “was doing like 70 something. It was over 75, that’s 

for sure, but which wasn’t out of the ordinary because [Sampson] like was having seizures.” 

As the ambulance spun out, Hicks bounced around the front of the cab, hitting the passenger 

side window and door. Hicks noticed that a pickup truck had swerved to avoid the ambulance. 

After Hicks exited the passenger side door, his knees became weak, and he sat on the side of 

the road. Following the accident, Hicks complained of right shoulder pain and a headache. 

Hicks was later transported to St. Louis University Hospital and diagnosed with a pinched 

nerve in his neck. After he was discharged the next day, Hicks was referred to a pain 

management specialist. 

¶ 21 Following his initial hospitalization, Hicks visited the emergency room several times for 

steroid injections because his “arm gets numb or [his] hands start tingling,” and he is unable to 

fully rotate his back. Although Hicks attended physical therapy and received ongoing medical 

treatment, his injuries did not improve. Following the accident, Hicks was unable to run or 

play sports, particularly baseball, and he had difficulty standing for long periods of time, 

occasionally had trouble sleeping, and had problems lifting items with his right arm. 

¶ 22 On April 24, 2018, the depositions of Jeff Wild, Sill, and Palmer were taken. The following 

testimony was adduced.

¶ 23 B. Jeff Wild 

¶ 24 Wild testified to the following. Wild had worked for the City for 30 years, specifically, 26 

years as a police captain and 4 years in his current position as business manager of the City of 

O’Fallon EMS department. As business manager of the department, Wild ran the day-to-day 

operations and managed three supervisors. On November 17, 2015, two paramedics, Sill, who 

drove the ambulance, and Palmer, who had patient care responsibility, responded to a call prior 

to the accident at issue. The supervisor on duty was Jeremy Sherman. Wild noted that all 

paramedics were required to attend annual training on how to safely operate an ambulance. 

¶ 25 Wild testified that he had no reason to dispute that the ambulance was operated in adverse 

conditions. Wild stated that to prevent accidents in adverse conditions, the driver was to 

maintain a slower speed, although he was unsure whether a specific policy was in place. Wild 

further indicated that the City allowed family members to ride in the ambulance as long as it 

was approved by the department head. Here, prior approval did not take place; however, “it is 

a common practice for us to allow a family member to ride, especially going over to the City 

of St. Louis” to ensure safety of the patient at the hospital. Lastly, Wild noted that Sill had 

received a written reprimand on January 21, 2016, which was standard practice anytime an 

employee was involved in a single vehicle accident. Although Wild could not recall specifics, 

he remembered that the reprimand was later rescinded following timing issues with the 

investigation.
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¶ 26 C. Terry Sill 

¶ 27 Sill, a paramedic with 31 years of experience, had been employed by the City for 8 years 

at the time of the deposition. On November 17, 2015, Sill was driving an ambulance westbound 

on Interstate 64 from Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, for “five or six miles” when the accident 

occurred. Prior to the accident, Sill had used the windshield wipers intermittently, did not turn 

on the emergency lights or sirens, and did not see any puddling on the roadway. At the bottom 

of a hill, just past exit 157, Sill felt a sudden pull on the right side of the ambulance. Once he 

lost control, the ambulance first hit a wire barrier and then water in the median before it spun 

around crossways to the other lanes. Sill could not state the exact speed he was traveling, but 

he had “no reason to doubt that [he] was going the speed limit,” which was 65 miles per hour 

because he remembered driving with the flow of traffic. Sill believed he was driving at a 

comfortable speed and in control of the vehicle, and he did not experience any issues as he 

traversed down the hill. 

¶ 28 Following the accident, Sill checked on all passengers and then called for assistance. At 

that time, Hicks exited the ambulance from the passenger seat and laid down on the interstate 

before Sill assisted him to the back of the ambulance. Sill recalled attending training on the 

need to increase stopping distances when adverse conditions were present. Approximately two 

months after the accident, Sill was issued a written reprimand. 

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Sill did not believe a passenger in the front seat could see the 

speedometer. Instead, a passenger, “[a]t the very least,” could see “the very low end” of the 

speedometer. Sill indicated that, although he “immediately slowed down, took [his] foot off 

the gas, [and] tried to steer into it,” the ambulance spun around and hit a wire barrier fairly 

quickly because he was operating the vehicle in the inside lane. Sill believed he was traveling 

between “60 to 65 with the flow of traffic” on a roadway he had driven “all the time for many 

years.” Sill did not provide medical attention to Hicks or Sampson.

¶ 30 D. Richard Palmer 

¶ 31 Palmer, a paramedic with the City since 2014, testified to the following. On November 17, 

2015, Palmer provided patient care to Sampson for emergency medical services. Palmer 

indicated that a “fairly substantial amount” of rain had fallen in the days preceding the accident, 

and it had been raining “fairly well” when they arrived at the home in Shiloh, Illinois. The 

paramedics were informed that Sampson had experienced seizure-like activity followed by 

confusion. Cardinal Glennon was the chosen hospital, following Sampson’s guardian’s 

request, and Sampson was transported to the ambulance to “begin rendering further care,” 

specifically, oxygen, heart monitoring, and intravenous access. 

¶ 32 Palmer rode in the back compartment of the ambulance with Sampson. There was no 

window access, but Palmer remembered that “it had been raining substantially hard” when he 

got in the ambulance. The ambulance was traveling down Interstate 64 without emergency 

lights or sirens. When Palmer started to slide in the ambulance, he grabbed the right rail of the 

stretcher to protect Sampson. When the ambulance slid the opposite way, Palmer pulled 

himself on top of Sampson to protect him from debris. Palmer heard “a lot of crunching, just 

loud bangs and noises” before the ambulance eventually stopped. Once Sampson was carried 

out of the side door and transported to Cardinal Glennon by responding personnel, Palmer 

exited the vehicle. Sherman transported Palmer and Sill to Belleville Memorial Hospital where 

Palmer complained of severe pain, redness, and swelling in his left hand. 
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¶ 33 On cross-examination, Palmer did not believe it was possible for a front seat passenger to 

see the speedometer or look into the back compartment of the ambulance. Palmer did not 

provide medical attention to Hicks, and he did not observe Hicks’s claimed injuries at any 

point after the accident. 

¶ 34 On June 19, 2018, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Hicks’s 

claim was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 8-101(a) of 

the Tort Immunity Act and (2) Hicks’s and Sampson’s claims were barred because no evidence 

of willful or wanton conduct on the part of the City existed. 

¶ 35 On July 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a response to the City’s motion for summary judgment. 

The plaintiffs’ response reiterated the same arguments concerning the statute of limitations 

issue addressed in Hicks’s June 27, 2017, response to the City’s motion to dismiss. The 

plaintiffs asserted that “[b]ecause the transport of a patient constitutes the provision of medical 

services under Wilkins and because medical services constitutes [sic] patient care under 

Kaufmann, the remaining issue is whether a third party—such as a passenger in an 

ambulance—would be subject to the 2-year statute of limitations.” The plaintiffs also argued 

that Palmer, per his own deposition testimony, had provided patient care to Sampson in the 

ambulance. Thus, the City was liable for Hicks’s damages, to the extent his injuries were 

caused by willful and wanton conduct, because they arose out of patient care. Lastly, the 

plaintiffs argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding willful and wanton 

conduct—specifically, whether Sill was driving too fast given the conditions and whether the 

speed showed a conscious disregard for the plaintiffs’ safety. 

¶ 36 On July 17, 2018, the circuit court ordered the parties “to file further briefs regarding the 

statute of limitations issue if they so choose.” The court set a July 31, 2018, deadline for the 

City to file a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment and an August 7, 2018, 

deadline for the plaintiffs to file a surreply to the motion for summary judgment.

¶ 37 On August 1, 2018, the City filed its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. 

The City argued that the two-year statute of limitations, pursuant to section 8-101(b) of the 

Tort Immunity Act, arose out of claims relating only to patient care. Relying on Kaufmann v. 

Schroeder, 241 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2011), the City asserted that the two-year statute of 

limitations did not apply because Hicks was not a patient, that is, someone who received 

medical care. Rather, the City argued that “Hicks’ injuries arose solely out of a motor vehicle 

accident.” Moreover, in addition to the plain language of section 8-101(b), the City argued that 

the legislative history of the statute demonstrated that the two-year statute of limitations did 

not apply to the case at issue because the legislative purpose of the statute was “to cure an 

inequity between patients receiving care in a public hospital versus a private hospital.” 

¶ 38 Moreover, the City asserted that Hicks, in relying on Wilkins, incorrectly argued that 

because the phrase “ ‘medical services’ referenced in Section 3.150(a)” of the Emergency 

Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS Act) (210 ILCS 50/3.150(a) (West 2016)) applied 

to third parties, then the phrase “ ‘patient care,’ as set forth in Section 8-101(b),” also applied 

to third parties. The City requested the circuit court grant its motion for summary judgment 

and dismiss Hicks’s claim with prejudice. Alternatively, the City requested that the court 

certify the statute of limitations issue for interlocutory review before the appellate court. 

¶ 39 On August 3, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a surreply to the City’s motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that the City’s position “presumes that the EMS Act and Tort Immunity Act 

are ‘completely unrelated’ for purposes of this case.” The plaintiffs argued that the language 
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of the EMS Act was “broad enough to include other plaintiffs negligently injured by an act or 

omission resulting from the provision of emergency or nonemergency medical services,” as 

contemplated by Wilkins, 2013 IL 114310, ¶ 30. Likewise, the Tort Immunity Act applied to 

the nature of the services, not the recipient. The plaintiffs requested denial of the City’s motion 

for summary judgment. 

¶ 40 On August 13, 2018, the circuit court granted, without specific explanation, the City’s 

motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 41 II. Analysis

¶ 42 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in granting the City’s motion for 

summary judgment because the following genuine issues of material fact existed: (1) whether 

the City’s employee’s conduct was willful and wanton for operating the ambulance at an unsafe 

speed considering the wet conditions on the roadway at the time of the accident and (2) whether 

Hicks’s claim was timely filed. We address these contentions in turn. 

¶ 43 This case comes before us following the circuit court’s granting of the City’s motion for 

summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, 

depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, reveal there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016); see also General 

Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002). The decision to grant or deny 

summary judgment is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 411 (1993) 

(citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992)). 

¶ 44 The legislature has generally insulated public entities and the employees who operate 

ambulances from negligence liability for decisions made and actions taken while operating a 

motor vehicle in response to an emergency. 745 ILCS 10/5-106 (West 2016). Section 5-106 of 

the Tort Immunity Act provides the following: 

“§ 5-106. Except for willful or wanton conduct, neither a local public entity, nor a 

public employee acting within the scope of his employment, is liable for an injury 

caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue 

equipment, when responding to an emergency call, including transportation of a person 

to a medical facility.” 745 ILCS 10/5-106 (West 2016).

An important reason for “limited immunity is that if an ambulance operator is burdened with 

potentially devastating personal liability for actions taken in the course of responding to an 

emergency, it is likely that his or her performance would be hampered.” Hampton v. Cashmore,

265 Ill. App. 3d 23, 29 (1994) (citing Buell v. Oakland Fire Protection District Board, 237 Ill. 

App. 3d 940, 944 (1992)). If this general policy did not underlie section 5-106, “employee 

performance will certainly be hampered.” Buell, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 944 (citing Stephens v. 

Cozadd, 159 Ill. App. 3d 452, 458 (1987)).

¶ 45 In the case at bar, there was no dispute that Sill was a public employee in the midst of an 

emergency call within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act. As such, the plaintiffs had to 

present evidence that Sill operated the ambulance in a willful and wanton manner. 

¶ 46 Section 1-210 of the Tort Immunity Act defines “willful and wanton conduct” as “a course 

of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not 

intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or 
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their property.” 745 ILCS 10/1-210 (West 2016). The term “willful and wanton” includes a 

range of mental states, from actual or deliberate intent to cause harm, to conscious disregard 

for the safety of others or their property, to utter indifference for the safety or property of 

others. Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 235 (2007). Our supreme court has 

noted that willful and wanton conduct, unlike negligence, requires a heightened state of mind, 

that is, a “ ‘conscious and deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.’ ” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 449 

(1992) (quoting Bresland v. Ideal Roller & Graphics Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 445, 458 (1986)). 

¶ 47 In determining whether willful and wanton conduct exists in a given case, it is necessary 

to closely scrutinize the facts provided in the record. Hampton, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 30. Since 

the question necessarily turns on a question of degree, “ ‘a hard and thin line definition should 

not be attempted.’ ” Hampton, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 30 (quoting Lynch v. Board of Education of 

Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 430 (1980)). That is, under the 

facts of one case, “ ‘willful and wanton misconduct may be only degrees more than ordinary 

negligence, while under the facts of another case, willful and wanton acts may be only degrees 

less than intentional wrongdoing.’ ” Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill. 2d 417, 422 (1995) (quoting 

Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 275-76 (1994)). 

¶ 48 Whether conduct is willful and wanton is ultimately a question of fact. Young v. Forgas,

308 Ill. App. 3d 553, 562 (1999) (citing Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 326 (1995)). 

Nevertheless, a court may hold as a matter of law that a public employee’s actions do not 

amount to willful and wanton conduct where no other contrary conclusion may be drawn from 

the record presented. Young, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 562 (citing Urban v. Village of Lincolnshire,

272 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1094 (1995)). Summary judgment is proper where the acts of the local 

public entity cannot be characterized as willful and wanton conduct. Hampton, 265 Ill. App. 

3d at 31 (citing Dunbar v. Latting, 250 Ill. App. 3d 786, 793 (1993)). 

¶ 49 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot find that the 

evidence raises a question of fact relating to whether Sill’s conduct was willful and wanton 

when he traversed Interstate 64 on the evening of November 11, 2015, to transport Sampson, 

a pediatric patient experiencing seizure-like activity, to Cardinal Glennon. Although Hicks and 

Sampson are not required to prove their case at the summary judgment stage, they are required, 

nonetheless, to present some factual basis that would arguably entitle them to judgment. 

Olympic Restaurant Corp. v. Bank of Wheaton, 251 Ill. App. 3d 594, 603 (1993) (citing Lutz 

v. Goodlife Entertainment, Inc., 208 Ill. App. 3d 565, 568 (1990)). 

¶ 50 First, the evidence does not support a conclusion that Sill operated the ambulance with 

deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others. Hicks testified that the speedometer 

showed “70 something,” but he also stated that “[i]t was over 75, that’s for sure.” In contrast, 

Sill’s testimony established that he was driving with the flow of traffic and that he had “no 

reason to doubt that [he] was going the speed limit,” which was 65 miles per hour, on a roadway 

he had traversed “all the time for many years.” Even assuming Hicks’s testimony was accurate 

and truthful, “driving at an excessive rate of speed alone is not decisive as to the issue of willful 

and wanton conduct.” Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 45. Rather, “speed is only a 

single circumstance in the totality of the evidence presented to establish willful and wanton 

conduct.” Harris, 2012 IL 112525, ¶ 45 (citing Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 Ill. 168, 175-76 

(1943), and Murphy v. Vodden, 109 Ill. App. 2d 141, 149-50 (1969)); see also Bosen v. City of 

Collinsville, 166 Ill. App. 3d 848, 850 (1987) (although emergency vehicle entered intersection 
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at excessive speed, the totality of the circumstances nonetheless failed to show a conscious 

disregard or utter indifference to the safety of others on the part of the driver). 

¶ 51 Next, the plaintiffs argue that Sill’s failure to operate the ambulance at a speed below the 

speed limit violated the City’s policies and procedures, per Wild’s deposition testimony, that 

required an ambulance to be operated slower in adverse conditions than it might be otherwise 

in nonadverse conditions. First, we note that Wild testified that drivers were to maintain slower 

speeds during adverse weather conditions, although he was unsure whether a specific policy 

was in place. Moreover, our colleagues in the First District stated that a “[v]iolation of selfimposed rules or internal guidelines *** ‘does not normally impose a legal duty, let alone 

constitute evidence of negligence, or beyond that, willful and wanton conduct.’ ” Wade v. City 

of Chicago, 364 Ill. App. 3d 773, 781 (2006) (quoting Morton v. City of Chicago, 286 Ill. App. 

3d 444, 454 (1997)). Thus, a violation of the City’s policy, if one had existed at the time of the 

accident, would not alone constitute evidence of willful and wanton conduct.

¶ 52 Lastly, in cases involving an automobile accident, our appellate court has stated that 

demonstrating a reckless disregard for the safety of others “would include demonstrating that 

defendant had notice that would alert a reasonable person that a substantial danger was 

involved but failed to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances.” Valiulis v. 

Scheffels, 191 Ill. App. 3d 775, 789 (1989) (citing Hering v. Hilton, 12 Ill. 2d 559, 564 (1958), 

and Kirshenbaum v. City of Chicago, 43 Ill. App. 3d 529, 533 (1976)). Although testimony 

demonstrated that it had rained for several days before the accident, the record is devoid of 

evidence that Sill was aware of puddles of water on the roadway that presented a substantial 

danger. Sill testified that he had traveled “five or six miles” on Interstate 64 before he felt a 

sudden pull on the right side of the ambulance and lost control of the vehicle. Subsequently, 

the ambulance hit a wire barrier and then came into contact with water in the median. 

Additionally, Hicks indicated that the severity of the rain had “lightened up” from the time the 

ambulance left Shiloh, Illinois, to the time of the accident on Interstate 64. Thus, the record 

does not support a finding that Sill had notice of a substantial danger and failed to exercise 

reasonable precautions.

¶ 53 Based on the foregoing, as a matter of law, we find there was no willful and wanton conduct 

on the part of the City’s employees. As a result of our disposition of this issue, it is unnecessary 

to address the statute of limitations issue where resolution would have no bearing on the 

ultimate outcome.

¶ 54 III. Conclusion

¶ 55 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.

¶ 56 Affirmed.