Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A05-1607-JT-1753 | January 19, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Erin L. Berger

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.,

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the ParentChild Relationship of:

G.C., A.R., and B.R. (minor 

children);

E.R. (mother)

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

82A05-1607-JT-1753

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

82D04-1507-JT-1274

82D04-1507-JT-1275

82D04-1507-JT-1276

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] E.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parental-relationship with her 

children, G.C. (“G.C.”), A.R. (“A.R.”), and B.R. (“B.R.”), (collectively “the 

children”), claiming that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motions to 

correct error and for a new trial; and (2) the Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal 

or the reasons for placement outside Mother’s home will not be remedied. 

Concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the motions and that there 

is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to terminate the 

parent-child relationship, we affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mother’s motions 

to correct error and for a new trial.

2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 

termination of the parent-child relationship.

Facts

[2] Mother is the parent of G.C., who was born in August 2001; A.R., who was 

born in September 2008; and B.R., who was born in May 2012. In September 

2013, Mother and the three children had recently been evicted from their home 

and were living without electricity or water. Mother, who was suffering from

mental health issues and abusing alcohol and methamphetamine, physically 
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abused twelve-year-old G.C. She subsequently pled guilty to battery causing 

physical injury and was sentenced to probation.

[3] The three children were removed from Mother and placed in foster care after a 

failed family placement. Shortly thereafter, all three children were adjudicated 

to be Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). The trial court ordered Mother 

to: (1) participate in substance abuse and mental health treatment; (2) remain 

alcohol and drug free; and (3) secure and maintain adequate and stable housing. 

[4] Despite the trial court’s order, Mother continued to use alcohol, opiates, and 

methamphetamine. She was also unable to maintain stable employment. Her 

probation was revoked and she was incarcerated for five months.

[5] In July 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the 

two-day termination hearing held in February and March 2016, Mother 

testified that she had “never really been able to hold employment” and at one 

time had seven jobs in ten months. (Tr. 12). She also testified that she had 

“mental issues” and that she had “been an addict all [her] life.” (Tr. 12, 13). 

She further admitted that she had used marijuana two weeks before the 

termination hearing. In addition, according to Mother, she was living with her 

brother and his family, who lived beyond their means and were frequently 

evicted.

[6] DCS Family Case Manager Dashea Head (“FCM Head”), who worked with 

Mother until June 2015, testified that Mother had lived in various places from 

the time the children were removed until DCS filed the termination petition. 
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Specifically, Mother had lived with her brother, been homeless, and lived at the 

YWCA. She had also “been in and out of jail.” (Tr. 54). According to FCM 

Head, Mother had never been “able to hold down a job,” and she was 

dismissed from mental health treatment services because she had not complied

with the psychiatrist’s recommendations and had refused to take her prescribed 

medication. (Tr. 55).

[7] CASA Jennifer Bromm (“CASA Bromm”) testified that Mother’s living 

situation with her brother and his family was “chaotic and . . . dysfunctional.” 

(Tr. 68). Bromm further testified that “even given the extra time with this case, 

I don’t think there’s been any progress with providing a stable home for these 

children with the mother. She’s not shown that.” (Tr. 68-69). Further, 

according to Broom, Mother’s lack of participation in the mental health services 

“showed more instability because [Mother] was not able to attend on any 

regular basis.” (Tr. 69). Bromm recommended termination of Mother’s 

parental rights and testified that this was in the children’s best interest.

[8] In May 2016, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. Specifically, the trial court found that Mother was “unable to provide a 

long-term safe, secure, stable environment for the children due to her continued 

lack of housing stability, on-going substance abuse, and unresolved mental 

health issues.” (App. 54). Based upon this finding, the trial court concluded 

that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the 

children’s removal and the reasons for their continued placement outside the 

home would not be remedied because “the mother lack[ed] stability, 
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inappropriately self-medicate[d] and suffer[ed] from chronic mental health 

issues, which continue[d] to be untreated.” (App. 55). The trial court further 

concluded that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat 

to the children’s well-being because “the children lack[ed] stability and their 

mother [could] not adequately provide for their emotional and physical needs.” 

(App. 55). 

[9] Mother timely filed motions to correct error and for a new trial wherein she 

argued that “[f]ollowing the close of evidence in the trial, the Mother secured 

housing and employment and was successfully participating in other services.” 

(App. 56, 57). In the motion to correct error, Mother asked the trial court to 

issue new findings of fact which would “take into account [Mother’s] housing, 

employment, and efforts towards services.” (App. 57). In her motion for a new 

trial, Mother argued that evidence of Mother’s housing and employment and 

efforts to participate in services “would likely produce a different result at trial.” 

(App. 56). At the hearing on the motions, the State asked the trial court to deny 

the motions, which were not supported by affidavits. The State further argued 

that “based on the evidence at trial with her long history of instability and 

mental health issues . . . we don’t think that she’s able to provide a long term 

safe environment for her children.” (Tr. 103-04). The trial court denied both 

motions. Mother appeals the denial of these motions as well as the termination 

of her parental rights. 
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Decision

1. Denial of Mother’s Motions

[10] Mother first argues that the trial court erred in denying her motions to correct 

error and for a new trial. However, DCS correctly points out that Mother has 

not developed a separate argument specifically addressing the denial of these 

motions. She has also failed to support this issue with citations to authority. 

Mother has therefore waived appellate review of it. See Reel v. Clarian Health 

Partners, 855 N.E.2d 343, 345, n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that 

plaintiffs’ failure to develop their argument in their appellate brief or support it 

with citations to authority waived appellate review of that issue). 

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. We review a trial court’s ruling on

motions to correct error and for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. 

Wortkoetter v. Wortkoetter, 971 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (motion to 

correct error); Deree v. All American Shipping Supplies, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 1214,

1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, (motion for a new trial). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court including the reasonable 

inferences therefrom. Wortkoetter, 971 N.E.2d at 687. 

[12] Our review of the evidence reveals that these motions were based on Mother 

apparently finding housing and employment after the trial court issued its 

termination order. However, trial courts have discretion to weigh a parent’s 

prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before, or, in this case, 
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after termination, and courts may find that a parent’s past behavior is the best 

predictor of his or her future behavior. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 

2014). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motions.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Mother also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination 

of her parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and 

raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, 

the law provides for termination of that right when parents are unwilling or 

unable to meet their parental responsibilities. In re Bester, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 

(Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the 

parents but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999), trans. denied.

[14] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not weigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgment. Id. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining 

whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly 

erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly 

and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30.
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[15] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

[16] Here, Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the 

termination of her parental rights. Specifically, she contends that the evidence 

is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in her children’s removal or the reasons for their placement outside 

her home will not be remedied. However, the trial court also concluded that 

there was a reasonable probability that a continuation of the parent-child 

relationship posed a threat to the children’s well-being. Because the statute is 

written in the disjunctive, it requires the trial court to find only one of the 

subsection (B) requirements by clear and convincing evidence. In re L.S., 717 
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N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied. 

Standing alone, the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable 

probability that a continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to 

the child’s well-being satisfies the subsection (B) requirement, and we need not 

address Mother’s argument.

[17] However, because of the great interests at stake in termination proceedings, we 

choose to address Mother’s contention on the merits. In determining whether 

the conditions resulting in a child’s removal or placement outside the home will 

not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 

643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or 

placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable 

probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step 

requires trial courts to judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination 

proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and 

balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to 

determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or 

deprivation. Id.

[18] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that the children were removed from 

Mother because she was unable to provide them with safe and secure housing. 

She also had mental health issues and abused alcohol and drugs. At the time of 

the hearing, Mother was living with her brother and his family in a chaotic and 

dysfunctional environment. She had been dismissed from mental health 

treatment services because she had not complied with the psychiatrist’s 
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recommendations and had refused to take her prescription medication. Lastly, 

Mother was still using illegal drugs shortly before the termination hearing. This 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that DCS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside 

Mother’s home will not be remedied. There is sufficient evidence to support the 

termination.

[19] We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 

1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial 

court. 

[20] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.