Filed 2/10/16 P. v. Huynh CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN TAYLOR HUYNH,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B258509

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA094327)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Thomas C. Falls, Judge. Affirmed.

Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and 

Andrew S. Pruitt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
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Defendant and appellant John Huynh was convicted of first-degree premeditated 

murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) and an allegation that he personally used a deadly 

weapon, a knife, was found to be true (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He was 

sentenced to a term of 26 years to life in prison. Defendant appeals, challenging only the 

sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2001, when defendant was 17 years old, he killed his mother by stabbing her in 

the neck and subsequently slashing her throat and wrists. He then hired a day laborer to 

dig a hole in his backyard. He buried the body in the shallow grave, cleaned the blood 

off the walls, burned other evidence, and abandoned the home. He told everyone that his 

mother had returned to Vietnam. Nobody questioned defendant’s explanation, and he 

appeared to get away with murder until 2011, when guilt compelled him to walk into a 

police station and confess the crime. He then accompanied police officers to the scene, 

and showed them where he had buried the body. The coroner’s office excavated the 

grave, and discovered the victim’s skeletal remains exactly as defendant had described.

At trial, the prosecution relied on defendant’s recorded statements to police, both 

at the police station and at the crime scene, to establish defendant’s guilt. Defendant had 

admitted to police that he had argued with his mother in an upstairs bedroom. He ran 

downstairs to the kitchen and grabbed a kitchen knife and plastic garbage bag. He 

returned upstairs and put the bag over his mother’s head so she would not make a sound, 

although this was unsuccessful. He stabbed his mother in the neck repeatedly. He then 

placed her on the bed. She was still alive, so he cut her throat and wrists. He waited until 

she died. 

At trial, Defendant offered evidence that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder, 

and that he had been undergoing psychotic episodes both when he killed his mother and 

when he confessed to the crime. He also suggested that he had killed his mother in selfdefense, because she was an abusive parent who had attacked him with a metal rod. 

Contrary to his statement to the police that he had obtained the knife from the kitchen 
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downstairs, at trial defendant testified that the knife was simply at hand in the bedroom, 

and he had grabbed it instinctively to defend himself. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s 

finding of first-degree murder. “In determining whether the evidence was sufficient 

either to sustain a conviction or to support the denial of a section 1118.1 motion, the 

standard of review is essentially the same. [Citation.] ‘ “[W]e do not determine the facts 

ourselves. Rather, we ‘examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is 

reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. 

[Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1182-1183.)

DISCUSSION

A murder which is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” is murder of the first 

degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.) “ ‘By conjoining the words “willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated” in its definition and limitation of the character of killings falling within 

murder of the first degree the Legislature apparently emphasized its intention to require 

as an element of such crime substantially more reflection than may be involved in the 

mere formation of a specific intent to kill.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Boatman (2013) 

221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 (Boatman).) Deliberation “ ‘ “means careful consideration 

and examination of the reasons for and against a choice or measure.” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.] Premeditation ‘means “To think on, and revolve in the mind, beforehand; to 

contrive and design previously.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[T]he true test is 

not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

In considering whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 

premeditation and deliberation, courts consider three factors first set forth in People v. 
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Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15. These factors are: (1) planning activity; (2) motive; and 

(3) manner of killing. Traditionally, courts uphold findings of first degree murder when 

there is evidence of all three types, or extremely strong evidence of type (1), or evidence 

of (2) combined with (1) or (3). (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 32, disapproved 

on another point in People v. Drolin (2009) 40 Cal.4th 390, 421 fn. 22; Boatman, supra, 

221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) However, the Anderson factors simply set forth guidelines 

for analysis. (Boatman, at p. 1270.) “The Anderson analysis was intended as a 

framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an 

inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of 

considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the 

substantive law in any way.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.) If the 

Anderson factors are not present, a finding of premeditation and deliberation can still be 

upheld based on substantial evidence from which rational jurors could have found that 

the killing was the result of preexisting thought and the careful weighing of 

considerations. (Boatman, at p. 1270.)

We first consider the evidence of each of the Anderson factors. 

The first factor is planning. Defendant told police that he ran downstairs to obtain 

the knife and the plastic bag from the kitchen, then brought those items back to the 

bedroom where his mother was waiting. The act of obtaining a weapon from another 

location and bringing it to kill the victim demonstrates planning. (People v. Perez (1992) 

2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 547.)

The second Anderson factor is motive. All non-accidental killings have some 

degree of motive; what matters for the Anderson analysis is if there is evidence of a 

motive that supports an inference that the killing was the result of pre-existing reflection 

and careful thought, not a rash impulse hastily executed. (Boatman, supra, 

221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) Defendant told police that his mother had been a burden on 

herself and on him. He stated, “there was a huge boulder on my shoulder that was lifted 

when she passed.” Although not overwhelming, this is evidence of motive.
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The third Anderson factor is the manner of killing. If the defendant stopped in the 

middle of the killing to get another weapon or make a secondary attack, that demonstrates 

evidence of premeditation. (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1293.) In this case, 

defendant admitted that after stabbing his mother in the neck repeatedly, he slit her throat 

and wrists so that she would die faster. While defendant explained that this was an act of 

mercy in that he believed his mother was, at that point, past the point of no return, it can 

also be interpreted as a secondary attack which evidences premeditation. 

Other evidence supports a finding of premeditation, apart from the Anderson

factors. Evidence of a defendant’s conduct after the killing may constitute evidence of 

premeditation.1 Specifically, we can consider evidence “inconsistent with a state of mind 

that would have produced a rash, impulsive killing.” (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 

p. 1128.) In this case, after defendant attacked his mother, he did not seek medical 

attention for her or remorsefully admit his crime. Instead, he buried the body, cleaned the 

crime scene of evidence, and attempted to start a new life, something he apparently 

achieved for nearly 10 years. This is evidence from which the jury could conclude that 

defendant’s state of mind was not rash and impulsive but, instead, was cold and 

calculating. 

Because there was evidence of each Anderson factor, as well as additional 

evidence of premeditation in defendant’s post-murder conduct, the jury’s verdict was 

well-supported. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is based on his own testimony and 

his evidence of mental illness. The jury was free to disregard defendant’s testimony,

which contradicted his confession. As to defendant’s mental illness, “[a] finding of 

deliberation and premeditation is not negated by evidence a defendant’s mental condition 

was abnormal or his perception of reality delusional unless those conditions resulted in 

the failure to plan or weigh considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” 

(People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1270.) The jury was properly instructed 

 

1 Post-killing conduct may also be considered as part of the third Anderson factor. 

(See People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)
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on this point, and clearly concluded, on the evidence, that defendant’s mental illness did 

not interfere with his ability to premeditate the murder.2

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FLIER, J.

GRIMES, J.

 

2

 Defense witness Dr. Pantea Farhardi, a forensic psychiatrist expert, testified that 

based on her 2013 examination, defendant suffered from schizoaffective disorder. But 

Dr. Farhardi testified only that it was “possible” that defendant suffered from a mental 

disorder at the time of the 2001 killing. She also testified that she did not know what 

symptoms defendant may have had in 2001. The jury was free not to credit this 

inconclusive testimony and conclude that defendant’s premeditation was not affected by 

any mental disorder.