I 

108TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1875

To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 30, 2003

Mr. LANTOS (for himself, Mr. HYDE, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BEREUTER, and Mr. 

ACKERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations 

A BILL

To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United 

States, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Missile Threat Reduc5 tion Act of 2003’’. 

6 TITLE I—STRENGTHENING 

7 INTERNATIONAL MISSILE 

8 NONPROLIFERATION LAW 

9 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

10 Congress makes the following findings: 
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1 (1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles 

2 suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biologi3 cal warheads is accelerating across the globe. 

4 (2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for 

5 International Peace, more than 25 countries possess 

6 missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and 

7 capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. 

8 (3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing 

9 such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer 

10 of such missiles and their production technology to 

11 other countries, are directly hostile to the United 

12 States, its interests, and its allies. 

13 (B) Of particular concern in this regard is 

14 North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles 

15 and technology to countries in regions of instability 

16 and concern to the United States. 

17 (4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated 

18 in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic mis19 sile threat the following: 

20 ‘‘Emerging ballistic missile states continue 

21 to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy 

22 of the missile systems in their inventories—pos23 ing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, 

24 and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, 

25 U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats 
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1 from SRBM’s [Short Range Ballistic Mis2 siles]—primarily the Scud and its variants. 

3 Today, countries have deployed or are on the 

4 verge of deploying MRBM’s [Medium Range 

5 Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of 

6 targets at risk. 

7 ‘‘Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 

8 technologies, materials, and expertise—espe9 cially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean 

10 entities—has enabled emerging missile states to 

11 accelerate the development timelines for their 

12 existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to 

13 gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the 

14 case of the Chinese sale of the M–11 SRBM to 

15 Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the ex16 pansion of domestic infrastructures to poten17 tially accommodate even more capable and 

18 longer range future systems.’’. 

19 (5) The same CIA report also noted the fol20 lowing: ‘‘North Korea has assumed the role as the 

21 missile and manufacturing technology source for 

22 many programs. North Korean willingness to sell 

23 complete systems and components has enabled other 

24 states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier 

25 than otherwise would have been possible—notably 
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1 the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The 

2 North also has helped countries to acquire tech3 nologies to serve as the basis for domestic develop4 ment efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of 

5 the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, 

6 Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile tech7 nology.’’. 

8 (6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to 

9 abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the 

10 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where11 by adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to 

12 nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles, 

13 their constituent parts, and the facilities to manu14 facture them, especially ‘‘Category I’’ missiles, which 

15 at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload 

16 capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially 

17 suited for delivering nuclear weapons.

18 (7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to 

19 observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from, 

20 but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR. 

21 While this is a welcome achievement, it does not pro22 vide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain 

23 from the trade in missiles or missile technology. 

24 (8) On December 10, 2002, the White House 

25 released its ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
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1 of Mass Destruction’’, wherein it is stated that 

2 strengthening international nonproliferation controls 

3 on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon 

4 the missiles that can deliver them is the second of 

5 three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The 

6 National Strategy also states that ‘‘effective inter7 diction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to com8 bat WMD and their delivery means’’. 

9 (9) On December 11, 2002, the United States 

10 took control of an unflagged freighter that was at11 tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to 

12 Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen13 erally prohibited from transfer as Category I mis14 siles. 

15 (10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad16 herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case 

17 are not legally binding, and there is no binding 

18 international legal instrument that would prohibit 

19 shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph 

20 (9). 

21 (11) At Yemen’s request, the United States re22 leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles 

23 to Yemen. 

24 (12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White 

25 House press spokesman stated that existing inter-
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1 national law regarding halting the spread of missile 

2 proliferation could be strengthened. The new Na3 tional Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass De4 struction also commits the United States to support 

5 those regimes that are currently in force, and to 

6 work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance 

7 with, those regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a 

8 regime that the United States will seek to strength9 en. 

10 (13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 

11 testifying on February 12, 2003, before the Com12 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the 

13 following: ‘‘. . . [I]t’s pretty clear that the pro14 liferation regimes that exist in the world worked 

15 pretty well before, [but] they’re not working very 

16 well right now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up 

17 and says this is a dangerous thing and creates a set 

18 of regimes that will in fact get cooperation to stop 

19 those weapons, we’re going to be facing a very seri20 ous situation in the next five years.’’. 

21 (14) The MTCR has made an invaluable con22 tribution to restraint in the international trade of of23 fensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international 

24 controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a 

25 dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously 
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1 abide by the MTCR’s guidelines, and a binding legal 

2 basis for the United Nations and countries devoted 

3 to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary 

4 act to prevent, further proliferation of offensive bal5 listic missiles around the world. 

6 (15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the 

7 United States to promote the creation of new inter8 national mechanisms that would, in all future cir9 cumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding 

10 nations of the world the authority to interdict and 

11 prevent the transfer of such missiles. 

12 SEC. 102. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

13 It shall be the policy of the United States to seek 

14 a binding international instrument or instruments to re15 strict the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges 

16 of 300 kilometers or more that have a payload capacity 

17 of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding international 

18 instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a 

19 United Nations Security Council resolution, or other in20 strument of international law, and should provide for en21 forcement measures including interdiction, seizure, and 

22 impoundment of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic mis23 siles and related technology, equipment, and components. 
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1 SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 

3 should immediately introduce a resolution in the United 

4 Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the 

5 United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or al6 lowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent 

7 interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, 

8 missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or 

9 missile-related technology from North Korea. 

10 TITLE II—STRENGTHENING 

11 UNITED STATES MISSILE 

12 NONPROLIFERATION LAW 

13 SEC. 201. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi15 sion of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiv16 er, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a 

17 foreign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms 

18 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section 

19 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 

20 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under 

21 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a li22 cense shall be required, for a period of not less than 3 

23 years, for the export to that foreign person of all items 

24 controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export 

25 Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), 

26 as continued in effect under the International Emergency 
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1 Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the Export Ad2 ministration Regulations. 

3 (b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to 

4 a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the 

5 Committee on International Relations of the House of 

6 Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

7 and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Rela8 tions of the Senate that he has determined that—

9 (1) the foreign person has—

10 (A) ceased all activity related to the origi11 nal imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) 

12 of the Arms Export Control Act or section 

13 11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 

14 1979, as the case may be; and 

15 (B) has instituted a program of trans16 parency measures whereby the United States 

17 will be able to verify for at least a period of 3 

18 years that the foreign person is not engaging in

19 prohibited activities under those provisions of 

20 law referred to in paragraph (1); and 

21 (2) there has been an appropriate resolution of 

22 the original violation or violations, such as financial 

23 penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited 

24 items, or other appropriate measures taken to pre25 vent a recurrence of the violation or violations. 
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1 SEC. 202. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO2 LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PER3 SONS. 

4 (a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)(2) 

5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) 

6 is amended by striking ‘‘2 years’’ each place it appears 

7 and inserting ‘‘4 years’’. 

8 (b) PUBLIC INFORMATION.—Section 73(e)(2) of the 

9 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is 

10 amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 

11 ‘‘Such report may be classified only to the extent nec12 essary to protect intelligence sources and methods. If the 

13 report is so classified, the President shall make every ef14 fort to acquire sufficient alternative information that 

15 would allow a subsequent unclassified version of the report 

16 to be issued.’’. 

17 (c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—Any 

18 sanction imposed on a foreign person under section 

19 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 

20 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under 

21 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall 

22 be in effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date 

23 on which the sanction was imposed. 

24 (d) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub25 sections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c) 

26 shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a) 
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1 of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of 

2 the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in 

3 effect under the International Emergency Economic Pow4 ers Act, by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions 

5 that were committed by foreign persons on or after Janu6 ary 1, 2003. 

7 SEC. 203. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO8 LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPON9 SIBLE PERSONS. 

10 (a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a) of 

11 the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is 

12 amended by adding at the end the following new para13 graph: 

14 ‘‘(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person 

15 under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any govern16 mental entity that the President determines exercises ef17 fective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly 

18 facilitates the activities of that foreign person. 

19 ‘‘(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person 

20 under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that 

21 sanction on any other person or entity that the President 

22 has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may 

23 not be exported to that foreign person on account of the 

24 sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 
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1 to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that for2 eign person access to, such items. 

3 ‘‘(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period 

4 of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, 

5 by a United States person or within the United States, 

6 with any foreign person on whom sanctions have been im7 posed under this subsection. 

8 ‘‘(D) The President shall report on an annual basis 

9 to the Committee on International Relations of the House 

10 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela11 tions of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that 

12 engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign per13 son on whom sanctions have been imposed under this sub14 section that either—

15 ‘‘(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 

16 under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions 

17 have not been imposed; or 

18 ‘‘(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 

19 under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity 

20 had been carried out by a United States person or 

21 by a person in the United States. 

22 Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent 

23 feasible, but may include a classified annex.’’. 
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1 (b) DEFINITION OF PERSON.—Section 74(a)(8)(A) of 

2 the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) 

3 is amended to read as follows: 

4 ‘‘(8)(A) the term ‘person’ means—

5 ‘‘(i) a natural person; 

6 ‘‘(ii) a corporation, business association, 

7 partnership, society, trust, transnational cor8 poration, or transnational joint venture, any 

9 other nongovernmental entity, organization, or 

10 group, and any governmental entity; 

11 ‘‘(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent en12 tity of any business enterprise or other organi13 zation or entity listed in clause (ii); and 

14 ‘‘(iv) any successor of any business enter15 prise or other organization or entity listed in 

16 clause (ii) or (iii); and’’. 

17 (c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—

18 (1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT EN19 TITIES.—Any sanction imposed on a foreign person 

20 under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the Export Adminis21 tration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 

22 2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the 

23 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (in 

24 this subsection referred to as a ‘‘dual use sanction’’), 

25 shall also be imposed on any governmental entity 
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1 that the President determines exercises effective con2 trol over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly fa3 cilitates the activities of that foreign person. 

4 (2) OTHER ENTITIES.—When a dual use sanc5 tion is imposed on a foreign person, the President 

6 may also impose that sanction on any other person 

7 or entity that the President has reason to believe 

8 has or may acquire items that may not be exported 

9 to that foreign person on account of the dual use 

10 sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the in11 tent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to 

12 that foreign person access to, such items. 

13 (3) TRANSACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES.—The 

14 President may also prohibit, for such period of time 

15 as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by 

16 a United States person or within the United States, 

17 with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions 

18 have been imposed.

19 (4) REPORT.—The President shall submit on 

20 an annual basis to the appropriate congressional 

21 committees a report that contains the identity of any 

22 foreign person that engages in any transaction or 

23 activity with a foreign person on whom dual use 

24 sanctions have been imposed that either—
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1 (A) would be the basis for imposing dual 

2 use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for 

3 which such sanctions have not been imposed; or 

4 (B) would be the basis for imposing dual 

5 use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the trans6 action or activity had been carried out by a 

7 United States person or by a person in the 

8 United States. 

9 Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum 

10 extent feasible, but may include a classified annex. 

11 (5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 

12 (A) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ 

13 means—

14 (i) a natural person; 

15 (ii) a corporation, business associa16 tion, partnership, society, trust, 

17 transnational corporation, or transnational 

18 joint venture, any other nongovernmental 

19 entity, organization, or group, and any 

20 governmental entity; 

21 (iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent 

22 entity of any business enterprise or other 

23 organization or entity listed in clause (ii); 

24 and 
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1 (iv) any successor of any business en2 terprise or other organization or entity list3 ed in clause (ii) or (iii). 

4 (B) In the case of countries where it may 

5 be impossible to identify a specific governmental 

6 entity referred to in subparagraph (A), the 

7 term ‘‘person’’ means—

8 (i) all activities of that government re9 lating to the development or production of 

10 any missile equipment or technology; and 

11 (ii) all activities of that government 

12 affecting the development or production of 

13 aircraft, electronics, and space systems or 

14 equipment. 

15 (B) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

16 ‘‘United States person’’ has the meaning given 

17 that term in section 16(2) of the Export Ad18 ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 

19 2415(2)). 

20 (C) MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECH21 NOLOGY.—The term ‘‘missile equipment or 

22 technology’’ has the meaning given that term in 

23 section 11B(c) of the Export Administration 

24 Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)). 
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1 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to sanc3 tions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign per4 sons under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control 

5 Act, and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with 

6 respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, 

7 on foreign persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Ad8 ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as 

9 continued in effect under the International Emergency 

10 Economic Powers Act. 

11 TITLE III—Incentives for Missile 

12 Threat Reduction 

13 SEC. 301. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. 

14 (a) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE.—The President is au15 thorized to provide, on such terms as the President deems 

16 appropriate, the following assistance to countries that 

17 agree to destroy their ballistic missiles, and their facilities 

18 for producing ballistic missiles, that have a payload capac19 ity of 500 kilograms or more over a distance of 300 kilo20 meters or more: 

21 (1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms 

22 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763). 

23 (2) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the 

24 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et 
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1 seq.), notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of 

2 that Act (22 U.S.C. 2346(e) or 2420(a)). 

3 (3) Drawdown of defense articles, defense serv4 ices, and military education and training under sec5 tion 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

6 U.S.C. 2318). 

7 (b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Assistance au8 thorized under subsection (a) may not be provided until 

9 30 days after the date on which the President has pro10 vided notice thereof to the appropriate congressional com11 mittees in accordance with the procedures applicable to 

12 reprogramming notifications under section 634A(a) of the 

13 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1(a)). 

14 (c) LIMITATION.—Any assistance provided to a coun15 try under subsection (a) may not be provided in more than 

16 3 fiscal years. 

17 SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

18 (a) AUTHORIZATION.—There is authorized to be ap19 propriated to the President to carry out section 301 the 

20 sum of $250,000,000. 

21 (b) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 

22 to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) 

23 are authorized to remain available until expended. 
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1 SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN 

2 MISSILE DISARMAMENT. 

3 The President is authorized to provide technical as4 sistance in the destruction of any missile or facility for 

5 producing ballistic missiles, in any country that requests 

6 such assistance.

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