United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 29, 2019*

Decided September 3, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐3719

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JOHN L. WOODWARD,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

No. 3:18‐CR‐50033(1)

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

John Woodward, who had been convicted of possessing child pornography,

appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and, in

particular, challenges one of the special conditions imposed upon revocation. The

condition prohibits him from possessing sexually oriented or sexually stimulating

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐3719    Page 2

materials. The government concedes that the condition is vague, so we remand the case

to the district court to reconsider that condition.

After serving his sentence for possession of child pornography, Woodward

violated the terms of his supervised release. During a search of his apartment, officers

found material that they determined to be child pornography—the possession of which

violated Woodward’s supervised‐release condition prohibiting the viewing or

possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct (as defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2256(2)).

The probation office prepared a report that included proposed conditions of

supervised release. One of the conditions, special condition 15, sets forth what sexually

oriented material Woodward could not view or possess:

You shall not view or possess pornography and you shall not possess or

have under your control any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually

stimulating materials....

At sentencing, Woodward objected that the condition failed to supply guidance about

the specific sort of materials that he would not be allowed to view or possess. The court

overruled the objection:

Well, that’s a vagueness argument, and that may be a good argument, but

it is no different than pornography, what is pornography .... I think this is

appropriate to put in “sexually oriented” or “sexually stimulating.” We

would spend paragraphs trying to say what that is to take out the

vagueness. I will just say that I will have to determine that if it ever arises.   

The court then sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime term of

supervised release with various conditions, including special condition 15.

On appeal, Woodward argues that special condition 15 is unconstitutionally

vague and overbroad. He notes that we have previously rejected—on overbreadth and

vagueness grounds—supervised release conditions that limit the defendant from

possessing “sexually oriented” or “sexually stimulating” material. See United States v.

Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 194 (7th Cir.

2014). We similarly have rejected supervised release conditions that ban the possession
No. 18‐3719    Page 3

of adult pornography, which enjoys First Amendment protection. See United States v.

Shannon, 743 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2014).   

The government concedes the point on appeal, so we vacate this part of the

district court’s order and remand for a limited resentencing to clarify special condition

15. As we noted in Adkins:

We recognize the difficulty of drafting special conditions in this context.

We therefore emphasize that various options remain open, including (1)

defining the crucial terms in the existing special condition in a way that (a)

provides clear notice to Adkins (preferably through objective rather than

subjective terms), (b) includes a mens rea requirement (such as intentional

conduct), and/or (c) is not broader than reasonably necessary to achieve

the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(b), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D), see § 3583(d);

and (2) narrowing the scope of proscribed conduct, such as by (a) focusing

on child pornography, which federal statutes objectively define, see, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8), and/or (b) focusing on particular establishments such

as strip clubs, adult bookstores, and adult theaters.

743 F.3d at 196.

We VACATE special condition 15 of Woodward’s supervised release and

REMAND this case for further proceedings.