United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1997 MANAGING FOR

RESULTS

Critical Issues for

Improving Federal

Agencies’ Strategic

Plans

GAO/GGD-97-180

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

B-277715 

September 16, 1997

The Honorable Richard K. Armey

Majority Leader

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman, Committee on Government

 Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Livingston

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

There has been a groundswell movement in recent years toward

performance-based management in public sector organizations. The

federal government, as well as some state, local, and foreign governments,

has grappled with how best to improve effectiveness and service quality

while limiting costs.1

 As a result, those governments have implemented

reform agendas that have tended to include a common recognition that

improved public management was a critical part of the answer to meeting

demands for a government that performed better while economizing on

resources.

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, commonly referred

to as “GPRA” or “the Results Act,” was enacted as the centerpiece of a

statutory framework Congress has put in place to improve federal

management and provide a greater focus on results. The Results Act seeks

to shift the focus of government decisionmaking and accountability away

from a preoccupation with the activities that are undertaken—such as

grants and inspections made—to a focus on the results of those

activities—such as real gains in employability, safety, responsiveness, or

program quality. In crafting the Results Act, Congress understood that the

management changes required to effectively implement the Act would not

come quickly or easily.

1

See, for example, Managing for Results: Experiences Abroad Suggest Insights for Federal

Management Reform (GAO/GGD-95-120, May 2, 1995); Managing for Results: State Experiences

Provide Insights for Federal Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994); and Government

Reform: Goal-setting and Performance (GAO/AIMD/GGD-95-130R, Mar. 27, 1995).

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A key requirement of the Results Act is that agencies are to develop

strategic plans in consultation with Congress and to submit these plans in

final form to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by

September 30, 1997. On June 12, 1997, you requested that we review and

evaluate the latest available version of the draft strategic plans that were

submitted to Congress for consultation by cabinet departments and

selected independent agencies. As you requested, those reviews of

individual agencies’ draft plans (1) assessed the draft plans’ compliance

with the Act’s required elements and their overall quality, (2) determined if

the plans reflected the key statutory requirements for each agency,

(3) identified whether the plans reflected discussions about crosscutting

activities and coordination with other agencies having similar activities,

(4) determined if the draft plans addressed major management challenges,

and (5) provided a preliminary assessment of the capacity of the

departments and agencies to provide reliable information about

performance.

In developing those reports, we noted that Congress anticipated that it

may take several planning cycles to perfect the process and that strategic

plans would be continually refined as various planning cycles occur. We

also recognized that developing a strategic plan is a dynamic process and

that agencies, with input from OMB and Congress, were continuing to

improve their plans. A list of our reports, prepared in response to your

request, on the draft strategic plans of 27 cabinet departments and

selected independent agencies and related work appears at the end of this

report.

This report responds to your separate request that we (1) summarize the

overall results of our reviews of those plans; and (2) identify, on the basis

of those reviews, the strategic planning issues most in need of sustained

attention.

Scope and

Methodology

This summary report is based on our analysis of the information contained

in our reviews of 27 agencies’ draft strategic plans. To do those 27 reviews

and the related reports, we used the Results Act supplemented by OMB’s

guidance on developing the plans (Circular A-11, part 2) as criteria to

determine whether draft plans complied with the requirement for the six

specific elements that are to be in the strategic plans. To make judgments

about the overall quality of the plans, we used our May 1997 guidance for

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congressional review of the plans.2 We recognized in each instance that

the plans were drafts and that our assessment thus represented a snapshot

at a given point in time. To make judgments about the planning issues

needing attention, we also relied on other related work, including our

recent report on governmentwide implementation of the Results Act and

our guidance for congressional review of Results Act implementation, as

tools.3

Results in Brief At the time of our reviews of agencies’ draft plans, we found that a

significant amount of work remained to be done by executive branch

agencies if their strategic plans are to fulfill the requirements of the

Results Act, serve as a basis for guiding agencies, and help congressional

and other policymakers make decisions about activities and programs.

Although all 27 of the draft plans included a mission statement, 21 plans

lacked 1 or more of 5 other required elements. For example, two plans did

not contain long-term strategic goals that are to be the basis for directing

agencies toward the achievement of their missions, and six did not

describe approaches or strategies for achieving those goals and objectives.

Overall, one-third of the plans were missing two required elements; and

just over one fourth were missing three or more of the required elements.

Our reviews of agencies’ draft strategic plans also revealed several critical

strategic planning issues that are in need of sustained attention if agencies

are to develop the dynamic strategic planning processes envisioned by the

Results Act. First, most of the draft plans did not adequately link required

elements in the plans. For example, some of the draft plans did not

consistently describe the alignment between an agency’s long-term

strategic goals and objectives and the strategies planned to achieve those

goals and objectives. As we reported, these linkages are important if

strategic plans are to drive the agencies’ daily activities and if agencies are

to be held accountable for achieving intended results. Furthermore, 19 of

the 27 draft plans did not attempt to describe the linkages between

long-term strategic goals and annual performance goals. We have reported

that this linkage is critical for determining whether an agency has a clear

sense of how it will assess progress toward achieving its intended results.

2

Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review

(GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997).

3

See The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be

Uneven (GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997); GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997; and Executive Guide:

Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118,

June 1996).

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Second, long-term strategic goals often tended to have weaknesses.

Although the Results Act does not require that all of an agency’s strategic

goals be results oriented, the intent of the Act is to have agencies focus

their strategic goals on results to the extent feasible. However, several

plans contained goals that were not as results oriented as they could have

been. In addition, several plans also contained goals that were not

expressed in a manner that would allow future assessments of whether

they were being achieved. Further, in three plans, long-term goals were

not developed for major functions or activities, as required by the Results

Act.

Third, many agencies did not fully develop strategies explaining how their

long-term strategic goals would be achieved. For example, we found that

each of the plans could be strengthened if the sections on strategies

included, among other things, specific actions, planned accomplishments,

and implementation schedules. Also, the plans for most of the 27 agencies

did not reflect strategies for addressing key management challenges that

could affect the agencies’ ability to achieve strategic goals.

Fourth, most agencies did not reflect in their draft plans the identification

and planned coordination of activities and programs that cut across

multiple agencies. We recently reported to you on our work that suggested

that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread

throughout the federal government.4

 We noted that interagency

coordination is important for ensuring that crosscutting program efforts

are mutually reinforcing and efficiently implemented. However, our

reviews indicated that 20 of the draft strategic plans lacked evidence of

interagency coordination.

Fifth, our work suggests that the questionable capacity of many agencies

to gather performance information has hampered, and may continue to

hamper, efforts to identify appropriate goals and confidently assess

performance. We have reported that the lack of reliable data to measure

the costs and results of agency operations has been a long-standing

problem for agencies across the federal government.5

 Our work also has

shown that agency officials with experience in performance measurement

4

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap

(GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997).

5

High-Risk Areas: Actions Needed to Solve Pressing Management Problems (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-97-60,

Mar. 5, 1997).

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cited ascertaining the accuracy and quality of performance data as 1 of the

top 10 challenges to performance measurement.6

Finally, the draft strategic plans did not adequately address program

evaluations. For example, 16 plans did not discuss program evaluations,

and the discussions of program evaluations in the remaining 11 plans

lacked critical information, such as descriptions of how evaluations were

used in setting strategic goals and schedules for future evaluations.

Evaluations are important because they potentially can be critical sources

of information for ensuring that goals are reasonable, strategies for

achieving goals are effective, and that corrective actions are taken in

program implementation.

Background The Results Act is the centerpiece of a statutory framework Congress put

in place during the 1990s to address long-standing weaknesses in federal

operations, improve federal management practices, and provide greater

accountability for achieving results. Under the Results Act, strategic plans

are the starting point and basic underpinning for results-oriented

management. The Act requires that an agency’s strategic plan contain six

key elements: (1) a comprehensive agency mission statement;

(2) agencywide long-term goals and objectives for all major functions and

operations; (3) approaches (or strategies) and the various resources

needed to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a description of the

relationship between the long-term goals and objectives and the annual

performance goals; (5) an identification of key factors, external to the

agency and beyond its control, that could significantly affect the

achievement of the strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program

evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals and a schedule

for future program evaluations.7

In addition to the Results Act, the statutory framework includes the Chief

Financial Officers (CFO) Act, as expanded and amended by the

Government Management Reform Act of 1994; and information technology

reform legislation, in particular the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. Congress enacted the CFO Act to

remedy decades of serious neglect in federal financial management by

establishing chief financial officers across the federal government and

requiring the preparation and audit of annual financial statements. The

6

Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance (GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138,

May 30, 1997).

7

For a detailed discussion of the Results Act, see appendix I.

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information technology reform legislation is based on the best practices

used by leading public and private sector organizations to manage

information technology more effectively. Under the information

technology reform legislation, agencies are to better link their planned and

actual use of technology to their programs’ missions and goals to improve

performance.

Congress has demonstrated its commitment to the Results Act and

reinforced to executive agencies the importance it places on the full and

complete implementation of the Act. One such prominent demonstration

occurred on February 25, 1997, when the Speaker of the House, the

Majority Leader of the Senate, and other senior members of the House and

Senate sent a letter to the Director of OMB. The letter underscored the

importance that the congressional Majority places on the implementation

of the Results Act, noted a willingness on the part of Congress to work

cooperatively with the administration, and established expectations for

congressional consultations with agencies on their draft strategic plans.

Under the Results Act, those consultations are to be an integral part of

strategic planning. For example, consultations can help to create a basic

understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that

confront agencies and how those demands and available resources require

careful and continuous balancing. In the House, the consultation effort

was led by teams consisting of staff from various committees that focused

on specific agencies. In an August 1997 letter, the House Majority Leader

provided the Director of OMB with an overview of recent congressional

consultations and highlighted some recurring themes, such as the need for

interagency coordination. Although the consultation process in the Senate

has been less structured than the one in the House, a number of

consultations have been held there as well.

In addition to consulting with agencies, several House and Senate

authorizing committees also held hearings on draft strategic plans in

July 1997, which further underscored congressional interest in agencies

creating good strategic planning processes that support

performance-based management. For example, these hearings included

those held by the Subcommittee on Water and Power, House Committee

on Resources; the House Committee on Science; the Subcommittee on

Human Resources, House Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight; the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services; the

Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, House Committee on

Resources; and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.

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The Senate and House appropriations committees have been expanding

their focus on the Results Act as well. For example, the Senate

Appropriations and Governmental Affairs committees held a joint hearing

on the status of Results Act implementation, with particular emphasis on

agencies’ strategic planning efforts. The Senate Appropriations Committee

has included comments on the Results Act in its reports on the fiscal year

1998 appropriations bills. The report language has discussed the

Committee’s views on the status and quality of individual agencies’ efforts

to implement the Results Act and expressed the need for continuing

consultations, among other issues. In the House, the Appropriations

Committee has included a standard statement in its appropriations reports

that strongly endorses the Results Act. This standard statement notes that

each appropriations subcommittee “takes (the annual performance plan)

requirement of the Results Act very seriously and plans to carefully

examine agency performance goals and measures during the

appropriations process.”

Most Plans Lacked

Some Required

Elements

A significant amount of work remains to be done by executive branch

agencies before their strategic plans can fulfill the requirements of the

Results Act, serve as a basis for guiding agencies, and help congressional

and other policymakers make decisions about activities and programs.

Although all 27 of the draft plans included a mission statement, 21 plans

lacked 1 or more of the other required elements. Specifically, of the 27

draft strategic plans:

• 2 did not include agencywide strategic goals and objectives,

• 6 did not describe approaches or strategies for achieving those goals and

objectives,

• 19 did not describe the relationship between long-term goals and

objectives and annual performance goals,

• 6 did not identify key factors that are external to the agency and beyond

its control that could affect the achievement of the goals and objectives,

and

• 16 did not discuss program evaluations that the agency used to establish or

revise goals and objectives or provide a schedule of future program

evaluations.

Moreover, while all but six of the plans were missing at least one required

element, one-third were missing two required elements. Just over

one-fourth of the plans failed to cover at least three of the required

elements.

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Because most of the draft plans did not contain all six required elements,

Congress did not have access to critical pieces of information for its

consultations with the agencies on their draft strategic plans; and, if these

elements are not included in the final plans, federal managers will not have

a clear strategic direction upon which to base their daily activities. For

example, agencies whose plans lacked strategic goals and strategies for

achieving those goals will not have a solid foundation upon which to build

the performance measurement and reporting efforts that are required by

the Results Act. The incomplete or inadequate coverage of the six required

elements in the plans is an indication of the amount of additional work

necessary to fulfill the Act’s minimum requirements that agencies had to

undertake prior to the submission of strategic plans to Congress on

September 30, 1997.

Critical Strategic

Planning Issues Most

in Need of Sustained

Attention

Many agencies showed progress in developing comprehensive mission

statements upon which they can build strategic goals and strategies for

achieving those goals. A mission statement is important because it focuses

an agency on its intended purpose. It explains why the agency exists and

tells what it does and is the basic starting point of successful planning

efforts. However, our reviews of draft strategic plans for 27 agencies found

several critical strategic planning issues that are in need of sustained

attention to ensure that those plans better meet the needs of agencies,

Congress, and other stakeholders and that agencies shift their focus from

activities to results. These issues were:

• the lack of linkages among required elements in the draft plans,

• the weaknesses in long-term strategic goals,

• the lack of fully developed strategies to achieve the goals,

• the lack of evidence that agencies’ plans reflect coordination with other

federal agencies having similar or complementary programs,

• the limited capacity of agencies to gather performance information, and

• the lack of attention to program evaluations.

Most Plans Lacked Critical

Linkages

The majority of the draft strategic plans lacked critical linkages among

required elements in the plans. We have noted in our Executive Guide and

other recent reports that for strategic plans to drive an agency’s

operations, a straightforward linkage is needed among its long-term

strategic goals, strategies for achieving goals, annual performance goals,

and day-to-day activities. First, as prior work has shown, a direct

alignment between strategic goals and strategies for achieving those goals

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is important for assessing an agency’s ability to achieve those goals.

Second, we have noted that the linkage between long-term strategic goals

and annual performance goals is important because without this linkage,

agency managers and Congress may not be able to judge whether an

agency is making annual progress toward achieving its long-term goals.8

Linkage Between Goals and

Strategies

In several draft strategic plans, the agencies’ presentation of information

on strategic goals, objectives, and strategies made it difficult to determine

which strategy was supposed to achieve which goal or objective and what

unit or component within the agency was supposed to carry out the

strategy. For example, in the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) plan,

objectives were listed as a group under goals, followed by strategies,

which were also listed as a group. This presentation does not convey how

specific strategies would lead to achieving specific goals. In another

example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) listed

several areas of focus and operational objectives under each of its five

strategies, but if did not establish linkages among them or between the

strategies and the agency’s strategic objectives. Accordingly, although an

affiliation between specific strategies and objectives may exist, it was not

readily apparent from these agencies’ draft strategic plans.

In contrast, the Department of Education’s plan linked each strategic goal

to a set of objectives that were, in turn, linked to a set of strategies. For

example, the strategic goal to “build a solid foundation for learning” had as

one of its objectives, “every eighth grader masters challenging

mathematics, including the foundations of algebra and geometry.” Two of

the strategies listed under this objective were to develop and use a

national, voluntary test in mathematics as a means to encourage schools,

school districts, states, businesses, and communities to move toward

improving math curricula and instruction, among other things; and to

increase public understanding and support of mastering mathematics by

the end of eighth grade through partnerships with key education,

mathematics, and professional organizations.

Linkage Between Strategic

Goals and Performance Goals

As noted in our section on required elements, 19 of 27 draft plans did not

describe the linkages between long-term strategic goals and annual

8

See GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996; and GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997, as well as our reports on agencies’

draft strategic plans.

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performance goals.9 As we have reported, without this linkage, it may not

be possible to determine whether an agency has a clear sense of how it

will assess the progress made toward achieving its intended results.

However, some agencies made good attempts at providing this linkage in

their draft plans. For example, the Department of Education, the General

Services Administration (GSA), and the Postal Service10 used a matrix to

illustrate the linkages among their strategic goals, objectives, and the

measures that are to be reflected in their annual performance goals.

Linkage Between Component

Goals and Agencywide Goals

Our work on the draft plans found that clearly aligning required strategic

planning elements is especially important in those cases where agencies,

as allowed under OMB guidance, chose to submit a strategic plan for each

of their major components and a strategic overview that under the

guidance is to show the linkages among these plans, instead of a single

agencywide plan. A few agencies, including the Departments of

Agriculture (USDA), Labor, and the Interior, used this approach. USDA,

Labor, and Interior are large agencies with disparate functions that are

implemented by a number of subagencies. For example, USDA has 18

subagencies working in 7 different mission areas, such as farm and foreign

agricultural services and food safety and inspection service. None of the

three agencies adequately linked component-level goals to the agencywide

strategic goals. For example, their plans did not consistently demonstrate

how the components’ goals and objectives would contribute to the

achievement of agencywide goals. Furthermore, Labor’s overview plan did

not contain agencywide goals, even though the Secretary set forth

agencywide goals in recent congressional testimony.

Strategic Goals Often

Tended to Have

Weaknesses

Leading organizations we have studied set long-term strategic goals that

were an outgrowth of a clearly stated mission.11 Setting long-term strategic

goals is essential for results-oriented management, because such goals

explain in greater specificity the results organizations are intending to

achieve. The goals form a basis for an organization to identify potential

strategies for fulfilling its mission and for improving its operations to

support achievement of that mission. Congress recognized both the

importance and difficulty of setting results-oriented strategic goals. Under

9

An annual performance goal is defined in the Results Act as the target level of performance expressed

as a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement is to be compared. We have

noted that an annual performance goal is to consist of two parts: (1) the performance measure that

represents the specific characteristic of the program used to gauge performance and (2) the target

level of performance to be achieved during a given fiscal year.

10Unlike executive branch agencies, the Postal Service is not required to submit its strategic plan to

OMB and is not subject to the provisions of OMB’s Circular No. A-11, part 2.

11GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996.

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the Results Act, all of an agency’s strategic goals do not need to be

explicitly results oriented, although the intent of the Act is to have

agencies focus on results to the extent feasible.

Although most agencies attempted to articulate agencywide strategic goals

and objectives in their plans, many of those goals and objectives tended to

be weak. We often found that the draft plans contained goals and

objectives that were not as results oriented as they could have been. For

example, one of the Department of Veterans Affair’s (VA) goals, to

“improve benefit programs,” could be more results oriented if VA identified

the purpose of the benefit programs (e.g., to ease veterans’ transition to

civilian life). In contrast, GSA’s goals and objectives reflect a positive

attempt to define the results that it expects from its major functions. For

example, one of the goals in the draft strategic plan states that GSA will

become the space/supplies/telecommunications provider of choice for all

federal agencies by delivering quality products and services at the best

value.

In several plans, agencies expressed goals and objectives in a manner that

would make them difficult to measure or difficult to assess in the future.

Although strategic goals need not be expressed in a measurable form, OMB

guidance says goals must be expressed in a manner that allows for future

assessment of whether they are being achieved. One example of an

objective that was not measurable as written is the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA) goal “to promote valued, strong, and responsive

social security programs through effective policy development and

research.” This goal recognized that program leadership cannot be

achieved without a strong policy and research capability—the lack of

which we have criticized SSA for in the past. Yet, the goal itself and the

supporting discussion in the draft strategic plan were difficult to

understand and the results SSA expects were unclear. In addition, the goal

was not stated in a manner that allows for a future assessment of its

achievement.

Three plans were missing goals for major functions and operations that

are reflected in statute or are otherwise important to their missions. The

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) stated in its draft plan

that the plan’s goals relate to those activities that have HHS priority over

the next 6 years and that the goals did not cover every HHS activity.

However, we found that the plan made no mention of a major

function—that is, HHS’ responsibilities for certifying medical facilities, such

as clinical laboratories and mammography providers. The section on goals

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in the Agency for International Development’s (AID) draft plan also did not

fully encompass the agency’s major functions, because the section did not

specifically address some programs, such as assistance to Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union and Economic Support Funds, which

represent about 60 percent of AID’s budget. In addition, the Postal Service’s

draft plan did not contain goals and objectives for two major functions:

providing mail delivery service to all communities and providing ready

access to postal retail services.

Strategies Often Not Fully

Developed

In our reports on draft strategic plans, we noted that strategies should be

specific enough to enable an assessment of whether they would help

achieve the goals in the plan. In addition, the strategies should elaborate

on specific actions the agency is taking or plans to take to carry out its

mission, outline planned accomplishments, and schedule their

implementation. However, many of the strategies in the plans we reviewed

lacked descriptions of approaches or actions to be taken or failed to

address management challenges that threatened agencies’ ability to meet

long-term strategic goals.

Plans Frequently Lacked

Descriptions of

Approaches

Incomplete and underdeveloped strategies were a frequent problem with

the draft plans we reviewed. For example, the draft plan for the

Department of State did not specifically identify the actions needed to

meet the plan’s goals but rather often focused on describing the

Department’s role in various areas. For example, the Department’s first

strategy, “maintaining effective working relationships with leading

regional states through vigorous diplomacy, backed by strong U.S. and

allied military capability to react to regional contingencies,” did not

describe how the Department planned to maintain effective working

relationships or coordinate with the other lead agency, the Department of

Defense (DOD), identified in the strategy.

In some cases, such as in the plans of Justice and Energy, strategies

frequently read more like goals or objectives, rather than approaches for

achieving goals. Justice’s strategy to promote compliance with the

country’s civil rights laws and Energy’s strategy to maintain an effective

capability to deter and/or respond to energy supply disruptions did not

describe what actions the agencies planned to take to implement their

related goals. Instead, their labelled strategies sounded like additional

goals and objectives in that they discussed what the agencies expected to

achieve. In other cases, such as in the plans of HHS and Commerce,

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strategies read like program justifications. Under strategies for addressing

alcohol abuse, HHS’ draft plan states that “[t]he National Institutes of

Health conducts research and develops and disseminates information on

prevention and treatment effectiveness.” Under strategies for providing

technical leadership for the nation’s measurement and standards

infrastructure, the Commerce plan stated that the “laboratories of the

National Institute of Standards and Technology provide companies,

industries, and the science and technology community with the common

language needed in every stage of technical activity.” Without fully

developed strategies, it will be difficult for managers, Congress, and other

stakeholders to assess whether the planned approach will be successful in

achieving intended results.

Key Management Challenges

Often Not Addressed

One purpose of the Results Act is to improve the management of federal

agencies. Therefore, it is particularly important that agencies develop

strategies that address management challenges that threaten their ability

to meet long-term strategic goals as well as this purpose of the Act.

However, we found that most of the plans did not adequately address the

major management challenges and high-risk areas that we and others have

identified.12 For example, in our recent high-risk report series, we noted

that DOD has long-standing management problems in six high-risk areas,

including financial management, information technology, infrastructure,

and inventory management.13 However, DOD’s draft plan generally paid

little—and in one case, no—attention to high-risk management issues. We

also placed Medicare, one of the largest federal entitlement programs, on

our high-risk list, because of Medicare’s losses each year due to fraudulent

and abusive claims. For example, the recent audit of financial statements

performed by the Inspector General of HHS disclosed improper payments

of $23.2 billion nationwide, or about 14 percent of total Medicare fee for

service benefit payments. However, HHS’ draft plan did not address the

long-standing problem the agency has with Medicare claims processing.

Another management-related issue that presents a challenge to agencies is

ongoing and proposed restructuring of federal activities, which will likely

require adjustments to agencies’ management practices, processes, and

systems. For example, the administration has ongoing efforts to integrate

(1) the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency into one agency with the intent to better

serve the U.S. national interests and foreign policy goals in the 21st

12Since 1990, we have produced a list for Congress of areas that were identified, on the basis of GAO

work, as highly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

13High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1, Feb. 1997).

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century; and (2) certain shared administrative functions of State and AID.

However, State’s draft plan did not discuss how State planned to integrate

these agencies into its organizational structure or address substantive

support requirements for the reorganization.

Information Technology For many years, we have reported on federal agencies’ chronic problems

in developing and modernizing their information systems. Given the

government’s ever-increasing dependency on computers and

telecommunications to carry out its work, agencies must make dramatic

improvements in how they manage their information resources in order to

achieve mission goals, reduce costs, and improve service to the public.

Moreover, without reliable information systems, agencies will not be able

to gather and analyze the information they need to measure their

performance, as required by the Results Act. Yet most of the 27 plans did

not cover strategies for improving the information management needed to

achieve their strategic goals or provided little detail on specific actions

that agencies planned to take in this critical area.

In its draft plan, for example, DOD—which receives 15 percent of the

federal budget—did not explicitly discuss how it plans to correct

information technology investment problems. These problems led us to

place its Corporate Information Management initiative on our high-risk

list, because DOD continues to spend billions of dollars on automated

information systems with little sound analytic justification. Without such

discussions, Congress will not be able to assess the agencies’ planned

approaches for upgrading information technology to improve the agencies’

performance.

Furthermore, we have identified as high risk two technology-related areas

that represent significant challenges for the federal government: resolving

the need for computer systems to be changed to accommodate dates

beyond the year 1999, which is referred to as the “year 2000 problem”; and

providing information security for computer systems. Yet most of the

plans did not contain discussions of how agencies intend to address the

year 2000 problem, and none of the plans addressed strategies for

information security. For example, the draft plan of the Office of

Personnel Management (OPM) did not discuss the year 2000 problem even

though many of its critical information systems are date dependent and

exchange information with virtually every federal agency. In another

example, DOD’s draft plan did not specifically address information security

even though DOD recognizes that information warfare capability is one of a

number of areas of particular concern, especially as it involves

Page 14 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential opponents of the

United States.

OMB’s guidance stated that agencies’ strategies for achieving goals should

include a description of the process for communicating goals throughout

an agency and for holding managers and staff accountable for achieving

the goals. However, a few of the plans that we evaluated, such as those for

Education and SSA, indicated that agencies had developed, or are planning

to develop, approaches for communicating goals to employees or for

holding managers and staff accountable for achieving results. We noted

that assigning clear expectations and accountability to employees so that

they see how their jobs relate to the agency’s mission and goals can be

useful in implementing a strategic plan. It is especially important that

managers and staff understand how their daily activities contribute to the

achievement of their agencies’ goals and that they are held accountable for

achieving results.

Noteworthy Progress In contrast to the lack of strategies in most plans for addressing

management weaknesses, we found that a few plans had operational

strategies that indicated agencies are beginning to consider management,

financial, and information technology weaknesses that need to be

corrected to ensure that management practices, processes, and systems

support the achievement of agency goals. For example, Education took an

important step toward implementing results-oriented management by

outlining in its draft strategic plan changes needed in activities, processes,

and operations to better support its mission. To illustrate, Education’s

plan contained core strategies for the goal that schools are safe,

disciplined, and drug-free. These strategies included proposals for new

legislation, public outreach, improved data systems, and interagency

coordination. Energy and Education were among those agencies that

included agencywide strategies to address needed process and operational

realignments that would better enable them to achieve their missions. For

example, Energy’s plan discussed strategies that emphasize changing

contracting approaches to focus on results, contractor accountability, and

customer satisfaction.

Little Evidence Regarding

Interagency Coordination

As we recently reported, a focus on results, as envisioned by the Results

Act, implies that federal programs contributing to the same or similar

results should be closely coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent

and, as appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing.14 This means

14GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

Page 15 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

that federal agencies are to look beyond their organizational boundaries

and coordinate with other agencies to ensure that their efforts are aligned.

Our work has underscored the need for such coordination efforts.

Uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and

frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the

federal effort. Our recent report to you provided further information on

mission fragmentation and program overlap in the federal government.15

We have often noted that the Results Act presents to Congress and the

administration a new opportunity to address mission fragmentation and

program overlap.

OMB and Congress recognize that the Results Act provides an approach for

addressing overlap and fragmentation of federal programs. OMB’s guidance

stated that agencies’ final submission of strategic plans should contain a

summary of agencies’ consultation efforts with Congress and other

stakeholders, including discussions with other agencies on crosscutting

activities. During its Summer Review of 1996, OMB provided feedback to

agencies where it found little sign of significant interagency coordination

to ensure consistent goals among crosscutting programs and activities.

This feedback also underscored the need for such coordination. In an

August 1997 letter to heads of selected independent agencies and members

of the President’s Management Council, OMB reiterated the importance of

interagency coordination and stated that during the 1997 Fall Budget

Review, it intended to place a particular emphasis on reviewing whether

goals and objectives for crosscutting functions or interagency programs

were consistent among strategic plans.

Congress has also shown active interest in using the Results Act to better

ensure that crosscutting programs are properly coordinated. The

February 25, 1997, letter from congressional Majority leaders to the

Director of OMB outlined the leaderships’ interest in agencies’ strategic

plans addressing how the agencies were coordinating their activities

(especially for crosscutting programs) with other federal agencies working

on similar activities. In addition, the staff teams in the House of

Representatives, which were to coordinate and facilitate committee

consultations with executive branch agencies, often have asked agencies

about crosscutting activities and programs.

Despite this interest, we found that 20 of the 27 draft plans lacked

evidence of interagency coordination as part of the agency and

15GAO/AIMD-97-146, August 29, 1997.

Page 16 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

stakeholder consultations and that some of the plans—including those

from some agencies that are involved in crosscutting program areas where

interagency coordination is clearly implied—lacked any discussion of

coordination. For example:

• According to Energy, it does not have any crosscutting programs because

its functions are unique. However, our review of draft strategic plans

indicated areas of potential overlap concerning Energy’s programs. For

example, Energy’s science mission was to maintain leadership in basic

research and to advance scientific knowledge. The National Science

Foundation’s (NSF) mission included promoting the progress of science

and enabling the United States to uphold a position of world leadership in

all aspects of science, mathematics, and engineering. NSF’s plan also did

not discuss the possible overlap between the two missions. Another area

of potential overlap for Energy included environmental and energy

resources issues addressed by Energy as well as the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) and other agencies. Similarly, nuclear weapons

production issues involve Energy and DOD.

• The draft plan for HHS did not address coordination of alcohol and drug

abuse prevention and treatment programs, even though these programs

are located in several of its subagencies and in 15 other federal agencies.

These other agencies include VA, Education, Housing and Urban

Development, and Justice.

• In the June 27, 1997, consultation with congressional staff on OPM’s draft

plan, OPM officials said that they had not yet involved stakeholders,

including other federal agencies, in developing their strategic plan. Among

the organizations with which OPM must work to achieve its desired results

are the Interagency Advisory Group of federal personnel directors, the

Personnel Automation Council, the National Partnership Council, the

Security Policy Board and Security Policy Forum, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the

Federal Labor Relations Authority, and the Merit Systems Protection

Board.

Even if an agency’s draft plan recognized the need to coordinate with

others, it generally contained little information about what strategies the

agency pursued to identify and address mission fragmentation and

program overlap. For example:

• State’s draft plan recognizes several crosscutting issues but does not

clearly address how the agency will coordinate those issues with other

agencies. State and over 30 agencies and offices in the federal government

Page 17 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

are involved in trade policy and export promotion, about 35 are involved in

global programs, and over 20 are involved in international security

functions.

• Treasury’s draft plan listed as a strategy that it will “continue participating

in productive Federal, State, and local anti-drug task forces” but did not

provide any detail about which bureaus or other federal agencies would

participate in those task forces or what their respective responsibilities

would be.

• Even though it recognized the roles of other organizations, Labor’s draft

plan did not discuss how the agency’s programs could fit in with a broader

national job training strategy and the coordination required to develop and

implement such a strategy. In 1995, we identified 163 employment training

programs spread across 15 federal agencies, including Labor.16

• Commerce’s draft plan did not indicate how its emphasis on restructuring

export controls to promote economic growth complements or contrasts

with the strong emphasis of State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls and

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which are both responsible for

licensing exports overseas on safeguarding against proliferation of

dual-use technology.

Many Agencies’ Capacity

to Gather Performance

Information Is

Questionable

To efficiently and effectively operate, manage, and oversee activities, we

have reported that agencies need reliable information on the performance

of agency programs, the financial condition of programs and their

operations, and the costs of programs and operations. For example,

agencies need reliable data during their planning efforts to set realistic

goals and later, as programs are being implemented, to gauge their

progress toward achievement of those goals. However, our prior work

indicated that agencies often lacked information and that even when this

information existed, its reliability was frequently questionable.17

On the basis of our recent report on implementing the Results Act, we

found that some agencies lacked results-oriented performance information

to use as a baseline for setting appropriate improvement targets. Our

survey of federal managers done for that report suggested that those

agencies were not isolated examples of the lack of performance

information in the federal government. In this survey, we found that fewer

than one-third of managers in the agencies reported that results-oriented

performance measures existed for their programs to a great or very great

16Multiple Employment Training Programs: Major Overhaul Needed to Create a More Efficient,

Customer-Driven System (GAO/T-HEHS-95-70, Feb. 6, 1995).

17GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

Page 18 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

extent. The existence of other types of performance measures also was

reported as low. For example, of the managers reporting the existence of

such measures to a great or very great extent, 38 percent reported the

existence of measures of output, 32 percent reported the existence of

customer satisfaction measures, 31 percent reported the existence of

measures of product or service quality, and 26 percent reported the

existence of measures of efficiency.18

Our prior work also suggests that even when information existed, its

reliability was frequently questionable. In our report on the Department of

Transportation’s (DOT) draft plan, we stated that we had identified

information resources and database management as one of the top

management issues facing DOT. For example, the Federal Aviation

Administration, which is a component of DOT, may rely on source data that

are incomplete, inconsistent, and inaccurate for an aviation safety

database that is under development. In our report on the draft HHS

strategic plan, we stated that the agency had only limited data on the

Medicaid program, some of which were of questionable accuracy. Some of

these data problems stemmed from data originating in the 50 states and

the District of Columbia, which did not all use identical definitions for data

categories.

In addition to HHS, other agencies will likely have difficulties collecting

reliable data from parties outside the federal government. Some agencies,

such as Education, HHS, and EPA, planned to use or to strengthen

partnerships with outside parties; thus, those agencies will also need to

rely on those parties to provide performance data. During our recent

review of analytic challenges that agencies faced in measuring their

performance, agency officials with experience in performance

measurement cited ascertaining the accuracy and quality of performance

data as 1 of the top 10 challenges to performance measurement.19 The fact

that data were largely collected by others was the most frequent

explanation for why ascertaining the accuracy and quality of performance

data was a challenge. In our report on implementing the Results Act, we

also reported on the difficulties agencies were experiencing with their

reliance on outside parties for data.20

18GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

19GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 30, 1997.

20GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997.

Page 19 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

These experiences suggest that agencies face many challenges in gathering

reliable information and that it is important that agencies follow through

with the implementation of the CFO Act, the Clinger-Cohen Act, and the

Paperwork Reduction Act. These experiences also suggest that coherent

strategies for using or strengthening partnerships with outside parties

would also include a strategy for data collection and verification plans. To

Education’s credit, its draft plan recognized that improvements were

needed in these areas. For example, Education’s plan identified core

strategies for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operations

through the use of information technology, such as development of an

agencywide information collection and dissemination system. As another

example, EPA’s draft plan discusses the agency’s initiative to draft “core

performance measures” with the environmental commissioners of state

governments.

Program Evaluations Not

Adequately Addressed in

Most Plans

As we noted in our guide on assessing strategic plans, program evaluations

are a key component of results-oriented management.21 In combination

with an agency’s performance measurement system, evaluations can

provide feedback to the agency on how well an agency’s activities and

programs contributed to achieving strategic goals. For example,

evaluations can be a potentially critical source of information for Congress

and others in assessing (1) the appropriateness and reasonableness of

goals; (2) the effectiveness of strategies by supplementing performance

measurement data with impact evaluation studies; and (3) the

implementation of programs, such as identifying the need for corrective

action.

In our recent report on the analytic challenges facing agencies in

measuring performance, we stated that supplementing performance data

with impact evaluations may help provide agencies with a more complete

picture of program effectiveness.22 A recurring source of the programs’

difficulty in both selecting appropriate outcome measures and in analyzing

their results stemmed from two features common to many federal

programs: the interplay of federal, state, and local government activities

and objectives and the aim to influence complex systems or phenomena

whose outcomes are largely outside government control. Evaluations can

play a critical role in helping to address the measurement and analysis

difficulties agencies face. Furthermore, systematic evaluation of how a

21GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997.

22GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 30, 1997.

Page 20 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

program was implemented can provide important information about why a

program did or did not succeed and suggest ways to improve it.

In that report, we also said that evaluation offices can provide analytical

support for developing a performance measurement system. When asked

where they needed assistance in performance measurement, agency

officials were most likely to report that they could have used more

evaluation help with creating quantifiable, measurable performance

indicators and developing or implementing data collection and verification

plans. Under the Results Act, program managers may wish to turn to their

evaluation offices for formal program evaluations and for assistance in

developing and using a performance measurement system. However, we

have also reported that a 1994 survey found a continuing decline in

evaluation capacity in the federal government.

Although the Results Act requires agencies to discuss program evaluations

in their strategic plans, 16 of the draft plans we reviewed did not contain

such a discussion. Of the 11 plans that did contain a section on

evaluations, most of those sections lacked critical information specified in

OMB guidance, such as a discussion of how evaluations were used to

establish strategic goals or a schedule of future evaluations. Given the

importance of evaluation for results-based management and the

continuing decline in evaluation capacity, it is important that agencies’

strategic plans systematically address this issue.

Conclusion It is clear that much work remains to be done if strategic plans are to be as

useful for congressional and agency decisionmaking as they could be. We

found that agencies’ draft strategic plans were very much works in

progress. This situation suggests that agencies are struggling with the first

step of performance-based management—that is, adopting a disciplined

approach to setting results-oriented goals and formulating strategies to

achieve the goals.

As agencies continue their strategic planning efforts and prepare for the

next step of performance-based management—measuring performance

against annual performance goals—it is important that the agencies,

working with Congress and other stakeholders, address those strategic

planning issues that appear to need particularly sustained attention. Our

past work has shown that leading organizations focus on strategic

planning as a dynamic and continuous process and not simply on the

production of a strategic plan. They also understand that stakeholders,

Page 21 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

particularly Congress in the case of federal agencies, are central to the

success of their planning efforts. Therefore, it is important that agencies

recognize that strategic planning does not end with the submission of a

plan in September 1997 and that a constant dialogue with Congress is part

of a purposeful and well-defined strategic planning process.

Authorization, appropriation, budget, and oversight committees each have

key interests in ensuring that the Results Act is successful, because once

fully implemented, it should provide valuable data to help inform the

decisions that each committee must make. In that regard, Congress can

continue to express its interest in the effective implementation of the

Results Act through iterative consultations with agencies on their missions

and goals. Congress can also show its interest by continuing to ask about

the status of agencies’ implementation of the Act during congressional

hearings and by using performance information that agencies provide to

help make management in the federal government more performance

based.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

On September 3, 1997, we provided a draft of this report to the Director of

OMB for comment. We did not provide a draft to individual agencies

discussed in this report, because the drafts of the reports we prepared on

individual agency plans in response to your request were provided to the

relevant agency for comment. Those comments were reflected, as

appropriate, in the final versions of those reports.

On September 10, 1997, a senior OMB official provided us with comments

on this report. He generally agreed with our observations and said that the

report was a useful summary of the 27 reports we issued on agencies’ draft

strategic plans. The official also said that by identifying areas of

widespread compliance or noncompliance with requirements of the

Results Act, the report can be used to focus on those parts of plans that

may require further work.

The senior OMB official did, however, raise an issue regarding program

evaluations and the Results Act. He said that many strategic goals and

objectives included in strategic plans will not require a program evaluation

to help determine whether the goal was achieved. Thus, the absence of a

schedule for future program evaluations should not be the basis for a

categorical conclusion that a plan is deficient for this requirement. He also

said that process evaluations can be useful in defining why a program is

not working; they may be less instructive on why a program is succeeding.

Page 22 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

In his view, process evaluations are more aligned with the strategies

section of a strategic plan than with determinations of whether strategic

goals and objectives are being achieved. In addition, the OMB official said

that an evaluation of program impact is beyond the scope of the Results

Act and that agencies are not required or expected to define their goals or

objectives in terms of impact.

We note that the Results Act establishes two approaches for assessing an

agency’s performance: annual measurement of program performance

against performance goals outlined in a performance plan and program

evaluations to be conducted by the agency as needed. Although the Act

gives agencies wide discretion in determining the need for program

evaluations, the Act also requires that agencies report to Congress and

other stakeholders in their strategic plans on their planned use of

evaluations to assess achievement of goals. Therefore, although program

evaluations may not be necessary for determining whether every strategic

goal in the strategic plan is achieved, a fuller discussion of how

evaluations will, or will not, be used to measure performance is critical.

Without this discussion, Congress and other stakeholders will not have

assurances that agencies, as intended by the Act, systematically

considered the use of program evaluations, where appropriate, to validate

program accomplishments and identify strategies for program

improvement. Thus, in cases where an agency concludes that program

evaluations are not needed, we continue to believe that the agency’s plan

would be more helpful to Congress if it contained such a statement and

the reasons for the agency’s conclusion.

Moreover, the Senate report that accompanied the Results Act described

program evaluations in broad terms, specifically “including evaluations of

. . . operating policies and practices when the primary concern is about

these issues rather than program outcome.” In this context, program

evaluations are to be used to assess both the extent to which a program

achieves its results-oriented goals (outcome evaluations) and the extent to

which a program is operating as it was intended (process evaluation.)

Understanding how a program’s operations produced, or did not produce,

desired outcomes is critical information for agencies’ senior managers and

Congress to consider as decisions are being made about programs and

strategic goals.

Although the Act does not explicitly mention impact evaluations, it does

require programs to measure progress toward achieving goals and explain

why a performance goal was not met. Impact evaluations can be employed

Page 23 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
B-277715 

when external factors are known to influence the program’s objectives in

order to isolate the program’s contribution to achievement of its

objectives. Given the complexity of crosscutting federal programs as well

as state and local programs, we continue to believe that in some

circumstances, impact evaluations could be useful in helping to provide a

more accurate picture of program effectiveness than might be portrayed

by annual performance data alone or by other types of evaluations.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Minority

Leader of the House; Ranking Minority Members of your Committees;

other appropriate congressional committees; and the Director, Office of

Management and Budget. We also will make copies available to others on

request.

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please

contact me on (202) 512-2700. The major contributors to this letter are

listed in appendix II.

Johnny C. Finch

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 24 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Page 25 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix I 

Overview of the Government Performance

and Results Act

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is the primary

legislative framework through which agencies will be required to set

strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which

goals were met. It requires each federal agency to develop, no later than by

the end of fiscal year 1997, strategic plans that cover a period of at least 5

years and include the agency’s mission statement; identify the agency’s

long-term strategic goals; and describe how the agency intends to achieve

those goals through its activities and through its human, capital,

information, and other resources. Under GPRA, agency strategic plans are

the starting point for agencies to set annual goals for programs and to

measure the performance of the programs in achieving those goals.

Also, GPRA requires each agency to submit to the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB), beginning for fiscal year 1999, an annual performance

plan. The first annual performance plans are to be submitted in the fall of

1997. The annual performance plan is to provide the direct linkage

between the strategic goals outlined in the agency’s strategic plan and

what managers and employees do day-to-day. In essence, this plan is to

contain the annual performance goals the agency will use to gauge its

progress toward accomplishing its strategic goals and identify the

performance measures the agency will use to assess its progress. Also, OMB

will use individual agencies’ performance plans to develop an overall

federal government performance plan that OMB is to submit annually to

Congress with the president’s budget, beginning for fiscal year 1999.

GPRA requires that each agency submit to the president and to the

appropriate authorization and appropriations committees of Congress an

annual report on program performance for the previous fiscal year (copies

are to be provided to other congressional committees and to the public

upon request). The first of these reports, on program performance for

fiscal year 1999, is due by March 31, 2000; and subsequent reports are due

by March 31 for the years that follow. However, for fiscal years 2000 and

2001, agencies’ reports are to include performance data beginning with

fiscal year 1999. For each subsequent year, agencies are to include

performance data for the year covered by the report and 3 prior years.

In each report, an agency is to review and discuss its performance

compared with the performance goals it established in its annual

performance plan. When a goal is not met, the agency’s report is to explain

the reasons the goal was not met; plans and schedules for meeting the

goal; and, if the goal was impractical or not feasible, the reasons for that

and the actions recommended. Actions needed to accomplish a goal could

Page 26 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix I 

Overview of the Government Performance

and Results Act

include legislative, regulatory, or other actions or, when the agency found

a goal to be impractical or infeasible, a discussion of whether the goal

ought to be modified.

In addition to evaluating the progress made toward achieving annual goals

established in the performance plan for the fiscal year covered by the

report, an agency’s program performance report is to evaluate the agency’s

performance plan for the fiscal year in which the performance report was

submitted. (For example, in their fiscal year 1999 performance reports,

due by March 31, 2000, agencies are required to evaluate their

performance plans for fiscal year 2000 on the basis of their reported

performance in fiscal year 1999.) This evaluation will help to show how an

agency’s actual performance is influencing its plans. Finally, the report is

to include the summary findings of program evaluations completed during

the fiscal year covered by the report.

Congress recognized that in some cases not all of the performance data

will be available in time for the March 31 reporting date. In such cases,

agencies are to provide whatever data are available, with a notation as to

their incomplete status. Subsequent annual reports are to include the

complete data as part of the trend information.

In crafting GPRA, Congress also recognized that managerial accountability

for results is linked to managers having sufficient flexibility, discretion,

and authority to accomplish desired results. GPRA authorizes agencies to

apply for managerial flexibility waivers in their annual performance plans

beginning with fiscal year 1999. The authority of agencies to request

waivers of administrative procedural requirements and controls is

intended to provide federal managers with more flexibility to structure

agency systems to better support program goals. The nonstatutory

requirements that OMB can waive under GPRA generally involve the

allocation and use of resources, such as restrictions on shifting funds

among items within a budget account. Agencies must report in their

annual performance reports on the use and effectiveness of any GPRA

managerial flexibility waivers that they receive.

GPRA called for phased implementation so that selected pilot projects in

the agencies could develop experience from implementing GPRA

requirements in fiscal years 1994 through 1996 before implementation is

required for all agencies. When this part of the pilot phase concluded at

the end of fiscal year 1996, a total of 68 pilot projects representing 28

agencies were project participants. OMB also was required to select at least

Page 27 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix I 

Overview of the Government Performance

and Results Act

five agencies from among the initial pilot agencies to pilot managerial

accountability and flexibility for fiscal years 1995 and 1996; however, we

found that the pilot did not work as intended. OMB did not designate as

pilot projects any of the 7 departments and 1 independent agency that

submitted a total of 61 waiver proposals because, among other reasons,

changes in federal management practices and laws that occurred after the

Act was enacted affected agencies’ need for the managerial flexibility

waivers.

Finally, GPRA required OMB to select at least five agencies, at least three of

which have had experience developing performance plans during the

initial GPRA pilot phase, to test performance budgeting for fiscal years 1998

and 1999. Performance budgets to be prepared by pilot projects for

performance budgeting are intended to provide Congress with information

on the direct relationship between proposed program spending and

expected program results and the anticipated effects of varying spending

levels on results. However, we found that the performance budgeting

pilots are likely to be delayed. According to OMB, few agencies currently

have either sufficient baseline performance or financial information or the

ability to use sophisticated analytic techniques to calculate the effects that

marginal changes in funding can have on performance.

Page 28 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

General Government

Division, Washington,

D.C.

L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues,

(202) 512-8676

J. Christopher Mihm, Acting Associate Director, (202) 512-3236

Donna Byers, Project Manager

Allan C. Lomax, Senior Evaluator

Dorothy L. Self, Evaluator

Kiki Theodoropoulos, Senior Evaluator

Page 29 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 30 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 31 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 32 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Related GAO Products

Agencies’ Draft

Strategic Plans

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Agriculture (GAO/RCED-97-169R, July 10, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Commerce (GAO/GGD-97-152R, July 14, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Defense (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R, Aug. 5, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Education (GAO/HEHS-97-176R, July 18, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Energy (GAO/RCED-97-199R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Health and Human Services (GAO/HEHS-97-173R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/RCED-97-224R, Aug. 8,

1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of the Interior (GAO/RCED-97-207R, July 21, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Justice (GAO/GGD-97-153R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Labor (GAO/HEHS-97-172R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of State (GAO/NSIAD-97-198R, July 18, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Transportation (GAO/RCED-97-208R, July 30, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Treasury

(GAO/GGD-97-162R, July 31, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO/HEHS-97-174R, July 11, 1997).

Page 33 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Related GAO Products

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the U.S.

Agency for International Development (GAO/NSIAD-97-197R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the

Environmental Protection Agency (GAO/RCED-97-209R, July 30, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (GAO/RCED-97-204R, July 22, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the General

Services Administration (GAO/GGD-97-147R, July 7, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (GAO/NSIAD-97-205R, July 22, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the National

Science Foundation (GAO/RCED-97-203R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (GAO/RCED-97-206R, July 31, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Office of

Management and Budget (GAO/GGD-97-169R, Aug. 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Office of

Personnel Management (GAO/GGD-97-150R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the U.S.

Postal Service (GAO/GGD-97-163R, July 31, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Small

Business Administration (GAO/RCED-97-205R, July 11, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the Social

Security Administration (GAO/HEHS-97-179R, July 22, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Draft Strategic Plan of the U.S. Trade

Representative (GAO/NSIAD-97-199R, July 18, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on Federal Science Agencies

(GAO/T-RCED-97-220, July 30, 1997).

Page 34 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Related GAO Products

Financial Management: Indian Trust Fund Strategic Plan (GAO/T-AIMD-97-138,

July 30, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on Draft Strategic Plans of Five Financial

Regulatory Agencies (GAO/T-GGD-97-164, July 29, 1997).

National Labor Relations Board: Observations on the NLRB’s July 8, 1997,

Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/T-HEHS-97-183, July 24, 1997).

The Results Act: Observations on the Forest Service’s May 1997 Draft

Strategic Plan (GAO/T-RCED-97-223, July 23, 1997).

Results Act: Observations on the Department of Energy’s August 15, 1997,

Draft Strategic Plan (GAO/RCED-97-248R, Sept. 2, 1997).

Other Related GAO

Products

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission

Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997).

Managing for Results: The Statutory Framework for Improving Federal

Management and Effectiveness (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-97-144, June 24, 1997).

The Results Act: Comments on Selected Aspects of the Draft Strategic

Plans of the Departments of Energy and the Interior (GAO/T-RCED-97-213,

July 17, 1997).

Managing for Results: Prospects for Effective Implementation of the

Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/T-GGD-97-113, June 3, 1997).

The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide

Implementation Will Be Uneven (GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997).

Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance

(GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 30, 1997).

Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate

Congressional Review (GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997).

Performance Budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer Insights for GPRA

Implementation (GAO/AIMD-97-46, Mar. 27, 1997).

Page 35 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
Related GAO Products

Measuring Performance: Strengths and Limitations of Research Indicators

(GAO/RCED-97-91, Mar. 21, 1997).

Managing for Results: Enhancing the Usefulness of GPRA Consultations

Between the Executive Branch and Congress (GAO/T-GGD-97-56, Mar. 10,

1997).

Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Assist Congressional and Executive

Branch Decisionmaking (GAO/T-GGD-97-43, Feb. 12, 1997).

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance

and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996).

(410165) Page 36 GAO/GGD-97-180 Agencies’ Strategic Plans
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