[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-13174

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:15-cv-80486-BB

WILBUR VEASY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SHERIFF OF PALM BEACH COUNTY,

Ric L. Bradshaw, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 14, 2018)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Wilbur Veasy appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of his former supervisor, Sheriff Ric Bradshaw of the Palm Beach County 

Sheriff’s Office.

I.

Veasy was hired by the Sheriff’s Office in 1987 as a corrections officer for 

the Palm Beach County Jail.1

 Over the next 25 years he was subject to multiple 

disciplinary actions, including insubordination offenses in 1996, 2005, 2008, 2011, 

2012, and 2013. The last of those offenses resulted in his termination.

The Sheriff’s Office written policy states that an employee has four hours to

report to Internal Affairs to provide a urine sample after being randomly selected

for a drug test. If the employee refuses to submit, fails to appear when directed, 

refuses to sign any necessary consent forms, or tampers with a random test, he is 

subject to discipline, up to and including termination for a first offense. In

November 2011 the Sheriff’s Office stopped accepting urine samples at Internal 

Affairs and instead required all employees to travel to a third party, Coach Comp, 

for drug testing. On February 5, 2013, the secretary for the Sheriff’s Office 

Division of Internal Affairs notified Veasy that he had been randomly selected for 

a drug test. At that point, over 250 corrections employees had submitted to a drug 

test at Coach Comp. But the Sheriff’s Office written policy remained the same.

 1 Because Sheriff Bradshaw moved for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light 

most favorable to Veasy. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). 

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Unaware of the change, Veasy went to Internal Affairs for his drug test. 

When he arrived Sergeant Brett Combs ordered him to report to Coach Comp, but 

Veasy refused, arguing that under the written policy he was not required to use his 

personal vehicle to travel to a testing facility. He asked to drive an official vehicle, 

but Sergeant Combs refused. He then again ordered Veasy to report to Coach 

Comp in his personal vehicle. And when Veasy again refused, the matter was 

escalated to Sheriff Bradshaw, who gave Veasy two options: either drive to the 

test site in his personal vehicle or be placed on administrative leave. Veasy 

responded that his “2007 red four door Tacoma is not going.” Sheriff Bradshaw 

placed him on administrative leave. 

Internal Affairs conducted an investigation into the incident and concluded 

that Veasy had violated two office rules and regulations: (1) failing to comply 

with a direct order from investigators and supervisors, and (2) refusing to submit to 

a random drug test. Captain Frank Milo reviewed the results of the investigation, 

considered Veasy’s prior disciplinary history, and recommended termination. 

Sheriff Bradshaw agreed, and after a pre-disciplinary hearing Veasy was fired on 

April 13, 2013. 

Two years later he brought this employment discrimination suit, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1981 and 1983, alleging that Sheriff Bradshaw’s proffered reason for firing him 

was pretext for race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment 

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in favor of Sheriff Bradshaw, finding that he was entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. Veasy appealed, and we reversed and remanded. On remand, the 

district court granted Bradshaw’s renewed motion for summary judgment, finding 

that Veasy failed to show the Sheriff’s legitimate reasons for firing him were 

pretext for race discrimination.2

 This is Veasy’s appeal. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Alvarez 

v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Veasy contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment 

in favor of Sheriff Bradshaw on his race discrimination claim. Section 1981 

prohibits race discrimination in connection with the performance of a contract. 42 

U.S.C. § 1981(a); see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330–

34 (11th Cir. 1998) (reviewing discriminatory termination claim under § 1981). 

Because § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation by state actors of the rights 

 2 Veasy also brought a retaliation claim, which the district court disposed of in the 

Sheriff’s favor. Although Veasy references that claim in his issue statement and facts, he makes 

no mention of it in the argument section of his brief, so it is abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate 

Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014). 

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guaranteed under § 1981. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894–95 

(11th Cir. 2000).

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting 

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–

04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824–25 (1973), when evaluating discrimination claims under 

§ 1981 and § 1983. See Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep’t, 71 F.3d 801, 805–06 

(11th Cir. 1995); Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331. “Under that framework, the plaintiff 

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, typically by showing that 

she was a qualified member of a protected class” and that she was “subjected to an 

adverse employment action in contrast to similarly situated employees outside the 

protected class.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264. If she does, then the burden shifts to 

the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. 

Id. If it does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s 

proffered reason is actually pretext for discrimination. Id. 

We assume without deciding that Veasy has made out a prima facie case for 

discrimination. Sheriff Bradshaw articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for Veasy’s termination — that Veasy repeatedly refused to comply with a 

direct order from Sergeant Combs to go to Coach Comp for drug testing, and that 

incident was one in a long line of insubordination offenses. See Carter v. City of 

Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 584 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that an employer 

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“demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for firing an employee 

when he “point[ed] to several specific acts of insubordination” by the employee). 

That leaves pretext.

To prove pretext Veasy must show that Bradshaw’s proffered reason is so 

weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory that a reasonable 

factfinder could find the reason unworthy of credence. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. 

Employers may fire an employee for “a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based 

on an erroneous fact, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a 

discriminatory reason.” Chapman v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1031 (11th Cir. 

2000). Veasy argues that Bradshaw’s reasons are pretext because Veasy did not 

violate the written drug test policy, Bradshaw deviated from proper procedures, 

and Bradshaw treated more leniently two similarly situated white employees. 

Those arguments fail.

First, Veasy argues that he did not violate the Sheriff’s Office drug testing 

policy because he arrived at Internal Affairs prepared to give a urine sample, and 

that is all that the written policy requires. Although an employee who is 

terminated based on allegations of misconduct may demonstrate pretext by 

showing that he did not engage in the insubordinate conduct, see Muňoz v. 

Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000), Veasy was 

insubordinate. Even though the Sheriff’s Office written policy requires selected 

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employees to report to Internal Affairs, the office unofficially changed its policy a 

year and half before Veasy was selected. Veasy admits that he refused to travel to 

Coach Comp to take a drug test in compliance with that policy. He also admits

that he refused two direct orders from a supervisor in violation of a different rule.

Next, Veasy argues that Bradshaw violated Sheriff’s Office policies and 

procedures by considering his past conduct because the policy states that “[m]ajor

infractions that occurred more than three years prior to the current infraction 

should be disregarded” when making disciplinary decisions. Although 

“[d]epartures from normal procedures may be suggestive of discrimination,” 

Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir. 1985), Veasy has not shown 

that Bradshaw departed from the procedures laid out in the policy because the 

policy also requires supervisors to “be alert to prior misconduct which indicates a 

trend.” And in any event, two of Veasy’s past insubordination offenses had 

occurred in the three years leading up to his termination. 

Last, Veasy argues that Bradshaw gave preferential treatment to two 

similarly situated white deputies. Comparator evidence has relevance at the 

pretext stage. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). In 

determining whether employees are similarly situated, “it is necessary to consider 

whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct 

and are disciplined in different ways.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 

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(11th Cir. 1997). Neither of Veasy’s comparators was similarly situated.

The first deputy, like Veasy, refused a direct order from a superior to submit 

to a breathalyzer test after he was suspected of driving under the influence in his 

work-issued vehicle. And like Veasy, that deputy was terminated. But before the 

termination became final the Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association, a 

police union, intervened and presented extenuating circumstances for the deputy’s 

refusal. It negotiated a settlement on the deputy’s behalf, and instead of 

termination, he was suspended for 80 hours without pay. Bradshaw explained that 

he agreed to the settlement because he “thought there was some reasonable 

extenuating circumstance.” He also stated that the deputy “did not have any prior 

history of refusing a direct order. Any insubordination.” In contrast Veasy was

not a member of the union, did not offer to settle, and had an extensive history of 

insubordination.3

The second deputy comparator was asked to submit to a drug test after he 

was suspected of stealing narcotics. He responded that he could not because he 

 3 Veasy argues that Sheriff Bradshaw cannot rely on Veasy’s past conduct as a 

distinguishing factor because Bradshaw did not consider any evidence of past conduct at the time 

he made the decision to fire him. Veasy notes that in Bradshaw’s deposition the Sheriff states 

only that he fired Veasy for violating Sheriff’s Office rules. But that testimony does not mean 

that Bradshaw did not also consider Veasy’s prior history. Other evidence shows that Bradshaw 

reviewed, signed, and concurred in Captain Milo’s recommendation, which outlined Veasy’s 

disciplinary history and suggests termination “[b]ased on th[at] disciplinary history.” And 

Bradshaw later asserted that even if the police union had approached him he would not have 

rescinded Veasy’s termination because Veasy has a “record of discipline for other 

insubordination offenses.”

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was “en route to a [treatment] facility.” At first his superior told him to remain at 

his house, so that he could give a sample before leaving for treatment, but later the 

superior told him not to “worry about the urine sample, [and] just go to [his] 

treatment facility.” When he failed a drug test at the facility, he was disciplined for 

possessing a controlled substance without a prescription and for conduct 

unbecoming a member of the Sheriff’s Office. Like the first deputy, he had no 

history of insubordinate conduct. And unlike Veasy, he was not disciplined for 

refusing to submit to a drug test or failing to follow a direct order, but instead for 

failing a drug test. Those distinctions show that neither deputy was similarly 

situated to Veasy. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562–63. 

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Veasy, he has not 

shown that his termination was the product of race discrimination. The district 

court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Bradshaw.

AFFIRMED.4

 4 Veasy’s motion for leave to file a reply brief out of time is GRANTED. Sheriff 

Bradshaw’s motion to strike the reply brief is DENIED AS MOOT, and his motion to dismiss 

the appeal is DENIED.

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