TEBPROFESSIONALBULLaW PO3 ARbrIY KNUNEkWj 

! fiedquPrbaa,Dcpnkentofthhy April 1992 
By Major General Daniel W. Christman 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

In the last three years the world has undergone 

the most significant changes since the end of 

the Second World War. As the international environment evolves, so, too, do the United 

States's national objectives abroad. This evolution, in turn, impacts on the operations of the 

U.S. Army. 

The focus of this issue of ENGINEER is 

"nation assistance"--a term used to describe the 

concept by which the Army supports the U.S. 

Government's efforts to assist other nations and 

promote international stability. Major Hauck's article, which begins on page 11, explains nation 

assistance in general terms. As he states, nation 

assistance is not a new mission for the Armywe have conducted it throughout our nation's history. But the evolving strategic environment has 

caused us to take another look at this concept 

as a method for employing forces (as opposed to 

using force) to reduce the likelihood of international violence and conflict. 

Other articles address specific nation assistance activities undertaken by engineers in the 

field. These articles reflect the diversity of nation 

assistance-type operations, ranging from postwar reconstruction in Kuwait to Civic Action 

Team missions in Southeast Asia. 

The recently published 1992 National Militay 

Strategy reflects the monumental changes occurring throughout the world. This document contains the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 

input to the President and Secretary of Defense 

for their use in preparing strategic guidance for 

the armed forces. It identifies several forces that 

are currently changing the strategic security environment. They include, among others, the continuing struggle to improve human conditions 

throughout the world; the march toward 

democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America, 

and other parts of the world; and drug trafficking. 

These forces highlight the fact that our nation is 

now considering challenges very different from 

traditional cold-war threats. While strategic planners have addressed those issues in the past, 

their relative importance has increased enormously. Recommend that you read the new National Military Strategy document. It's short, but it 

provides an invaluable perspective on evolving 

national strategy. 

The Combined Arms Command, at Fort 

Leavenworth, continues to work on the revision 

of FM 100-5, Operations.The revised manual 

will expand, rather than change, doctrine in the 

1986 version. This expansion is the result of 

several factors, including the evolving strategic 

environment addressed earlier. Other factors include changes in technology, lessons learned 

from recent military operations, and recognition 

that our doctrine must better address strategy 

and operational art, as well as their linkage to 

tactics. 

As Leavenworth develops the new Operations, 

we at the Engineer School will begin revising FM 

5-1 00, Engineer Combat Operations. Engineer 

doctrine will keep pace with that of the rest of the 

Army, so that we can continue to provide the 

best possible support as active members of the 

combined arms team. It's truly an exciting time to 

be a soldier and an engineer! 

The 1992 Senior Engineer Leaders' Training 

Conference, or SELTC, gets underway about the 

same time that this issue of ENGINEER is published. The theme of this year's conference, 

'Shaping the Force for the 21st Century," is a 

subject of great interest at all levels of the Total 

Army. Those who attend the conference will hear 

presentations by the Chief of Staff of the Army, 

the Chief of Engineers, the FORSCOM and 

TRADOC commanders, and the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe. As always, 

SELTC provides an opportunity for the Army engineer community to come together to share 

ideas, renew old friendships, and build new 

ones. Hope to see you there! 
1

-	

WQ, rr: rle!Ai 

w 


T 	 Jr r 11 1 ' I' 

April 1992 	 Volume 22 PB 5-92-2 

UNITED STATES ARMY FEATURES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 2 Nation Assistance In Kuwait 

FORT LEONARD WOOD by Brigadier General Ralph V.Locurcio 

11 	Nation Assistance: An Evolving (But Not New) Concept 

by Major Boyd D. Houck 

COMMANDER/COMMANDANT 17 The Bridge Within A Bridge Major General Daniel W. Christman by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Craig, Major Theron L. Smith 

and Master Sergeant Richard W. Bates 

MANAGING EDITOR 29 Prime Power On The Battlefield 

Catherine Eubanks by Major Kenneth E. Cockerham 

FEATURES EDITOR 37 The Role of Joint Task Force-Bravo In Nation Assistance 

Phillip R. Howell, Jr. by Major Scott Brubaker 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 47 The Bullet Trap: Hastening The In-Stride Breach 

Jennifer C. Bolyard by Captain Stephen R. Hesler and Captain Ronald N. Light 

50 A Schoolhouse tor Xepon 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: by First Lieutenant Walter P. Cole 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 	 54 MOS Consolidation: Its Time Has Come! 

General, United States Army by Captain James A. Price 

Chief of Staff 55 	 Engineers Aid War On Drugs 

by Sergeant Galen R.Putnam Official: 

62 Observations From Just Cause 

by Captain Gordon J. Taras 

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secreta~y of the Army DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

Cover :In the aftermath of the Gulf 23 Book Review 66 Engineer Update 

War, workers repair high power lines 24 Engineer Problem 70 Past in Review 

south of Kuwait City. (Photo by Jonas 34 Personal Viewpoint 73 Bridge the Gap Jordon, SASPA, U.S. Army Engineer 

District Savannah) 	 43 Engineer Solution 

EWINEER (ISSN 0046-18690) is prepared quertsrly by me US Army En- af erpertlse. Vlem expressed are those of the sumar and do not necessarily 

gtneer School. AnN: ATSE-TOM-PB, Fort Leonard Wwd. MO 65473-6650. resect omctal Army or TRAWC pasittans, nor does the mntent change or super. 

sRond Class postage Is paid at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and eddiftond mailing seda inlormstlon hother amdal Army publlcations. ENGINEER reservesthe right omas 	 to edit material. 

PCeTMASTER;Send address changes to ENGINEER, the Pmfe~lonai Bul- CONTENT to not copyrlghtea. Matenal may bs reprinted it credit ls given lo 

letlo for Army Englnesr~ A m ATSE-TOM-PB Foit Leonard Wwd, MO 65473- ENGINEER and fie aumm 6650. 
 OFFtCYAL OISTRtBmON Is targeted to dl engineer ana engineer-related CORRESPONDENCE, lelmn to the editor, manuscrlpte, photqraphs, official - ~

unit requssCI to wive copie+ and "nil address changes should be sent to ENGINEER, st the prscedlng addregs Telephone: (314) 563-7535, AV 676-7535 PER3ONAL SUBSCRlPTlONS we avsiisble by mnfscting the Superintendent 

01 Document+ ATTN: Chief. Mail List Branch. Stop SSOM. Washington. DC 

OISCIAIMER: ENGINEER presents pmteslonat Informstion designedto keep 20402. Address changes tor persona subscdptlans should also be sent to the 

Army engineers Informed ot current and emerglq dwetopmenfs wllhlo their areas Superintendent of Documents. 

Engineer 1 
By Brigadier General Ralph V. Locurcio 

Tn the aftermath of Desert 

- Storm, the U.S Army Corps of 

Engineers played a centlalnle in 

reconstructing Kuwait's infrastmcture. The mission of reestablishing life support systems 

that provided for the safety and 

security of Kuwaiti citizens was a 

successful one, and may well be a 

model for the future. That is, 

~~~~i~~~ military assistance to 

third world countries, followed by 

nation assistance to restore interrial security and enable refom, or 

preferably, nation assistance in 

lieu of military assistance to accomplish similar objectives. What 

follows is an analysis of engineer 

activities in Kuwait that can be 

applied to future nation assistance 

operations. 

pkRarkqrol~nd nticipating extensive devustation from the Iraqi occupation and subsequent combat 

action, the Emir of Kuwait 

formed a government committee 

known as the Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Program (KERP) to 

manage recovery operations. 

With functions similar to the 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) in the United 

States, the committee was headed by Dr. Ibrahim A1 Shaheen, 

who was later named a national 

minister. 

After considering several 

private contractual options, Dr. 

Shaheen advised the Emir of 

Kuwait to ask President Bush for 

recovery assistance from the 

Corps of Engineers, with all costs 

to be reimbursed by the pvernment of Kuwait. The Corps had 

recent experience in natural disaster recovery after Hurricane 

Hugo and the San Francisco 

earthquake. Additionally, it had 

extensive experience working in 

the Middle East, along with 

knowledge of the construction environment and culture. Dr. Shaheen and his advisors assumed 

that Corps professionals could just 

as successfully apply their expertise to the devastation wrought by 

a military disaster. They were 

right. 

On January 14, 1991, as the air 

attack began end plans for the 

ground attack to liberate Kuwait 
were being finalized, the Cow 

signed a $45 million Foreign Military Salg (FMS) agreement with 

Kuwait to begin the pl.ocess of assistance. The Cm launched the 

recovery operation from its 'hnsab 

lantic Division Offce in Winchester, 

Virginia, formerly known as the 

Middle EastJAfrica Projects Ofice, 

which also provided ooxmmmd, control and logistical support throughout the operation. 

Following the liberation of 

Kuwait in February, the recovery 

task force, dubbed the Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office 

DRO), moved into Kuwait from a 

stagingareain SaudiArabia. Once 

in Kuwait, KERO operated under 

the local direction of the Defense 

Reconstruction Assistance Office 

(DRAO) which, in turn, reported to 

the Department of Defense (DOD) 

and the U.S. Ambassador to 

"A nation assistance 

task force cmot 

onerate in a A 


vacuum-even 

though. ..constrained 

by time..." 

Kuwait for guidance and direction. 

The KERO team entered Kuwait on March 4, 1991, to commence recovery operations. In the 

300days following liberation, this 

team, which averaged 140 American and 60Kuwaiti professionals, 

placed over $300million in repair 

work through contracts with 

major American and foreign construction firms. Working seven 

days a week and an average of 

12-14hours per day, they surveyed, repaired, and restored to 

operation major infrastructure 

systems and facilities such as the 

national network of 300 kilovolt 

(kv)electrical distribution lines. 

They also worked on elemid sub 

stations, water mains and pumping 

unitq the highway network, sanihy 

mains, twoseapork, the international airport, and more than 150 public 

schools. Other plojects included over 

750public buildings, including police, 

fq medid other service facilities, 

ministerial headqmrhs and some 

defense facilities. The details of the 

smpe and magnitude of this suful operation have been reported in 

saaal amounts by national and inMonal media 

What is more important for our 

Army today, considering the likelihood of future nation &ssklance 

oprations, is an amount ofthe major 

Above: Jlm Wong, Army Corps of Engineers, and Suhalla Maratl, a Kuwaltl englneer, Inspect electrical 

damage at All Al-Salem Air Base. (Photo by Jonas Jordan) 

Far Left: Eman Qaturba, a Kuwaltl observer and Captain Bob lrby Inspect power cables damaged by cluster 

bombs south of Kuwait City. (Photo by Jonas Jordan) 
nage Ass 

r 

iessment 0perations 

KERO 1

:ornmander 

Emergency Management Operations' $z~zg1 1 Contracting 1 I support I

mm 

Airport 

Public (L 

Stare Roads 

building^ 

I 3 Teams

1CEIARCH 1-METL ENG ?-EN 

1-STRUCT 

1-ME 

1-ELEC 

1-METL 

2-CE 

FIRE I 

.ENG 1-S1 

1st 

"ROT 

,n dudnp "recovery" phase 

Figure 1 

decisions and pmzsses which 

pverned assistance Wens in 

Kuwait. This article will deal with 

these subjects. In pticufar, the following will be owered: 

structure for a small dishict office. 

In short, volunteers from 

various Corps organizations 

would hopefully arrive in KERO 

and be comfortable with the working environment with only a situational orientation and very little 

training. Following this basic 

premise, KERO used two structural variations, each suited to the 

particular operations at the time, 

but both employing a common district headquarters structure. 

During the initial survey phase 

of the recovery, KERO field offices 

were set up according to Corps 

Emergency Management practice. 

Labeled Damage Assistance 

Groups (DAGs), each had a variable number of assigned Damage 

Assistance Teams (DAB), depending on the mission of each group 

Figure 1). For simplicity, DAGs 

were aligned with specific Kuwait 

Ministry sectors: buildings, 

roads, airport, electricity, water, 

ports, defense, and so on, according to prewar Kuwaiti management conventions. 

Adoption of these conventions 

simplified interface with the host 

nation because it made leaders 

and volunteers from these 

Kuwaiti ministry sectors readily 

available to work with KERO. 

This structure was used for about 

45 days while damage survey 

reports DSRs) were being completed and contractors were 

mobilizing. Actual construction 

during this time was minimal. 

During the subsequent recovery 

phase, when construction management became the dominant 

operational consideration, a more 

conventional Corps project management structure, with traditional resident offices to manage contractors in the field, was adopted 

(Figure 2). This helped ensure 

that project delivery and contract 

administration were accomplished according to the Corps' 

quality standards. 

Project managers PMs) were 

assigned to each ministry sector in 

order to coordinate with the appropriate Kuwaiti officials responsible for that sector. Managers 

were tasked with developing a 

program for each sector in order to 

control all projects for that sector, 

from concept to turnover. For 

example, all roads projects 

Organization and staffing of 

KERO 

Programming and budgeting 

for the recovery 

Contracting 

Logistics 

Political factors and partnership with the host nation 

Staffing 

Fnthe case of the KERO opera-

.. -tion, there was not much tie 

to organize, staff and train the initial task fom of approximately 140 

Corps employees. These personnel 

were experienced volunteers from 

various districts and divisions, who 

rotated to Kuwait on a three-month 

cycle. To minimize potential dysfunction and confusion caused by 

an unfamiliar organizational structure, a decision was made to use 

the habitual Corps organizational 
.:
 -. .-*,.- ,.>-

KEROIOrganizatlc 

Sabty 


Audit 


rpon 


,ads 


Schools ,rts 


.PI8 ,a,rernun rrur,,,,, rerovny ponmse. 

mation Mgt 

~nnel 

urce Mgt 

MOD HO 

Air Bass 

National 

operational governmental agencies in Kuwait to accomplish the 

normal budgeting actions necessary to fund a large-scale national reconstruction program. It 

didn't take long for KERO to 

obligate or expend the original 

$46.3 million FMS funding. 

Within 45 days, KERO was essentially out of funds and in 

need of additional authority to 

continue operations. 

Extremely cost conscious, as 

any nation would be in this situation, Kuwait requested an accounting of all funds on a monthly 

basis. Later, they asked for a complete financial summary prior to 

granting any request for additional funds. To meet those requests, 

an efficient method of managing 

and displaying project information and funding status had to be 

developed quickly Similarly, more 

than 1,000damage survey reports 

had served to inventory, record 

and quantify the damage, but a 

system of managing this information was needed. 

Using standard software packages and lap-top computers 

constituted the "roads sector program," which was the responsibility of one PM, who worked 

with the Kuwaiti official respnsible for roads. 

The PM established project 

priorities, developed project and 

program budgets, and decided 

project features and quality standards. Each PM also monitored 

progress through all technical 

phases (design, contracting, construction), reported on the progress of each project and theentire 

program, and supervised eventual 

project turnover. 

Purely technical phases of the 

project lifecycle mmhandled by the 

appropriate technical divisions within the KERO structure: Engineering 

Se~m(analysis,design, estimating, swications, value engineering, 

field consultation); Contractimg (contractpreparation, solicitation, rmiew, 

award, small business adminiitration), and Resident Oilices (construction management, contract administration, modifications, clairas m 

solution). Other pmfesional ele 

ments such as counsel, safe& and 

audit W~IE also pment on the 

KERO team to round out the pmffesFigure 2 

sional package and ensure timely 

project completion. 

All of the decisions pmved to be 

comt and advisable for future 

operations, but there were a few 

problem areas.For example, the conversion from DAGs to Resident Offim pmved somewhat pmblematic 

as new roles and mpnsibiities 

were sorted out. Similarl~ the de 

cision to lotate field level engineering prufessionals every three months 

was a diff~cult-but workable-+taffingconcept. 

On the other hand, rotation of 

key leaders such as deputies, 

divisionchiefs, resident engineers, 

the chief of pmject management, 

the resource manager, and the 

property book officer, proved extremely disruptive. In future 

operations, key personnel should 

be selected for the duration of the 

operation, or not less than a sixmonth tour with a minimum overlap of at least one week. 

Programming and 


Budgeting 


Tx7hen KERO began its W "

work, there &ere no ( operating on generator power, 
implemented a computerized 

project data base within a few 

days of their arrival in Kuwait. A 

substantial achievement, this 

data base allowed field engineers 

to add or modify project information as field work, estimates or 

construction was completed. This 

gave PMs a continuously accurate 

information base and the capability to manipulate the data as 

required to prepare budget documents and reports rapidly. 

Project data was sorted by the 

Kuwaiti ministry sector and 

presented to the appropriate ministry representatives for decisions 

on priority, timing, and scope. 

KERO PMs soon found that their 

counterparts, doing their best 

despite a lack of time, staffing, information, and facilities, were unable to respond quickly to such 

requests. 

working feverishly agahttime, 

KERO pm and engineers 

to organizea prioF 

itized yje item repair pmgram for 

each minishy, bd on their acquired understanding of the ministry's function and the known 

damage. The PMs then pwsented 

thee programs to the mpective 

ministry authorities for approval. 

Once a~~mved,individual Pm 

were or€Whed into a nationwide KERO repair Program and 

briefed to Dm0 and the KERP 

central committee for funding. This 

entire P- was accomplished in 

little more than one week for We 

augmented $212 million KERO 

budget for 1991-1992. 

Later, the KERP committee 

reserved the authority to adjust 

funding among Programs, but allowed KERO some flexibility to 

move funds within a program, 

provided the committee was 

notified. This process was summarized and reviewed in biweekly 

meetings with the KERP committee which also served to monitor 

progress, and add or delete 

projects. 

" 

project operations and funding 

transactions, it was necgsary for 

KERO and DRAO to hold weekly 

in-pmcess reviews OF%), similar to 

Corp monthly project dew 

boards. Again, the data which 

formed the basis for these reviews 

emanated from the project data 

base. This was manipulated to form 

project management summaries, 

bar chart program schedules, key 

project fact sheets and other management documents. This same 

automated system of reports was 

used to inform higher headquarters, 

DOD, the ambassador, Kuwaiti 

ministers, and other interested p 

ties on the status of and 

IIERO o~mtions. 

Overall, several salient features 

the budgeting operation should 

be noted for future operations. 

First, a computerized and flexible 

project management data base 

was needed from the very start of 

operations. This system enabled 

KERO managers to convincingly 

demonstrate their control of 

projects and costs. Secondly, 

KERO task force engineers were 

frequently close to the action and 

well versed in project details. Consequently, they were the best 

qualified personnel to develop and 

defend budget requests. 

Finally, frequent communications 

with host nation decision makers 

were established to obtain program 

decisions, of 

plans and operations, provide information, develop g~odworking Elations and establish credibility. A nation assistance task force cannot 

in a vacuum-en thou& 

they, and the host nation governmen6 may be constkmed by time 

as a result ofthe 

- Contractirig

qpeed and, later, control 

pi were the driving forces in 

all KERO contracting operations 

from the outset. KERO staffers 

planned for a 45-day competitive 

emergency contract awara cycle 

to be executed from Saudi 

Arabia. They were eventually 

forced to use a 10-day contingency plan when the war ended 

more quickly than expected. 

Working nearly around the 

clock and without specific 

knowledge of the conditions in 

Kuwait, the KERO staff, with 

their Kuwaiti counterparts, completed necessary project scoping, 

solicitation, prequalification, and 

proposal evaluation actions. They 

awarded eight letter contracts 

worth approximately $25 million 

within this extremely compressed 

time period. These letter contracts 

were further defined after mobilization, once the actual scope of 

the repair mission was known. 

To divide the work among the 

contractors, Kuwaiti projects 

were organized into either functional or geographic work sectors 

according to prewar work management conventions. Consequently, the eight contracts were 

divided among the following 

areas: general building repair 

(in three areas of the city); road 

repairs; sewerlwater pipe repairs; port surveys; electrical 

repairs, and specialized building 

repairs. Because this scoping followed pre-war conventions, the 

Kuwaiti government management structure was perfectly 

aligned to participate in decisions and to later take control of 

operations. 

Because these letter contracts 

were essentially cost-plus instruments, a precise method of controlling and documenting the flow 

of work to the contractor was required once construction operations began. For control and contract administration, the original 

DAGs were converted to standard 

Corps' resident offices once mobilization was complete and construction began in earnest. 

For the puqxee of passing 

s-c work requirements to the 

contractots, the DSRs preprd 

during the sumy phase were 
*,d 

..^,. , , w 

..p.;; .. ., . , . . ., . . . '% - C 


. -u- . .
 ." 

. . ?. .,. 

. . ,. ,,-. , . 

". 

... 

. -. .. 

< 

.. 

,-

. . +> -3..I 'C 

. . , -* . . .

, , 

, . 

%, . , 

. . 

I 

, -

Construction crews repair Nuiseeb Road near the Saudi border. (Photo by Jonas Jordan) 

wnverted into work ode~ These 

documents resided in the project 

data base. They were rwiewed and 

mcdified to define the exact scope 

and etimakd cast of work oders, 

and serve as the plans and specs 

during construction. They ultimately provided the basis for fmal 

negotiations on price and time. 

As the operation progressed, 

larger projects were individually 

advertised to enhance competition 

and encourage participation of 

both American and Kuwaiti small 

businesses. However, this conversion to individual competitive contracting was extremely difficult 

with the limited KERO staff. By 

this time, more than $100 million 

in cost-plus contracts, with well 

over 150 active modifications, 

were in progress. In addition, the 

time required to formulate, advertise, and award a competitive, 

fixed-price contract to an uncertain group of bidders was both 

risky and prohibitively time consuming for most applications. 

The system of dividing the 

country into work sectors served 

reasonably well during the early 

stages of the Kuwait recovery and 

kept the contractors geographically separated. However, in future 

operations this geographical 

orientation should be discarded 

after a brief period of construction. 

Additionally, more general contractors should be employed 

during the middle to later stages 

of the recovery to enhance competition. That is, if the projected 

work flow and funding can justify 

the cost of additional contractor 

mobilization. If this is possible, 

proposals for individual work orders could be offered to competing 

contractors for greater cost 

efficiency. 

As a rule of thumb, each general 

contractor must see a potential 

workload of $50 to $100 million to 

justify mobilization. In the case of 

Kuwait, the contracting operation 

was initially sized for a $50-$100 

million horizon, based on the best 

information available at the time 

and guidance from Kuwait. The 

eventual $300-$400 million workload could not have been forecasted accurately enough tojustify 

the riskof additional mobilization. 

In fact, as many as ten contracts 

were considered at one point, but 

the option was discarded because 

the cost of mobilization would 

have consumed an inordinate percentage of funds available for 

construdion. 

Another contracting method 

worthy of consideration is job 

order contracting. This method 

awards an indefinite delivery, 

general construction contract 

based on competitively bid, fixedunit prices. Actual quantities are 

specified in the field via delivery 

orders generated from damage 

survey reports or similar documents. The unit prices are fixed 

upon award, except for out-ofscope work, which is negotiated as 

a modification. 

In this case, the restrictions are 
up-front work involved in preparing the unit price contract 

specification for solicitation, award, and administration is time 

prohibitive unless this data is already available and computerized 

from prior work experience in the 

region. 

Second, as with other fixedprice contracting, the method 

presumes at least general knowledge of the scope, cost and 

availability of materials, labor and 

other factors which mitigate the 

risk of a fixed-price bid. In the case 

of Kuwait, even if the voluminous 

specifications could have been 

prepared and distributed in time, 

it is doubtful that contractors 

would have accepted the considerable risk of a fixed-price contract 

since virtually all pricing factors 

were unknown. 

In retrospect, it appears that 

some form of cost-plus contracting 

is inevitable in an operation such 

as this. The instrument must be 

flexible enough to shape the scope 

of the work as it becomes known, 

responsive enough to meet the urgency requirements of the crisis, 

and yet controllable enough to ensure cost efficiency. Stafing plans 

must consider these factors and 

allow sufficient government staffing for adequate contract supervision, administration, and-most 

certainly-audit. 

The role of auditors very early in 

the contract operations scenario 

cannot be overemphasized for 

cost-type contracting. While engineers are supervising contract 

execution, the auditors can shape 

the allowable range of contract 

overhead and specify the level of 

cost and pricing data required to 

support the contractor's costs. The 

sooner these parameters are established, the sooner an efficient 

flow of modifications, negotiations 

and eventual contract close outs 

can be established. 

Logistics 

Pngineers are not logis-

- A ticians, and even great and 

dedicated engineers cannot do a 

day's work, let alone several 

months of intensive work in a 

hostile environment, if they cannot eat and sleep properly For 

example, the valuable data base 

previously mentioned required 

computers, generators, copiers, 

paper, cartridges, and spare 

parts on a daily basis. In short, 

the success of an operation of 

this magnitude and duration 

revolves around the efficiency 

and effectiveness of its logistical 

operation. 

The KERO planning team, 

working with Transatlantic 

Division, had to assume that nothing would be available for use in 

Kuwait, except perhaps a building 

shell to serve as a shelter. Since 

KERO was an ad hoc TDA organization which did not exist 

prior to this operation, it had no 

organic equipment and no property book. Further, since all costa 

were to be borne by the Kuwaiti 

government, new equipment 

would have to be purchased on 

short notice with Kuwaiti funds 

and subsequently turned over to 

Kuwait when the mission was 

completed. 

Everything needed to sustain 

KERO operations for 30 days, 

from vehicles to copiers, and personal hygiene products to food and 

water, had to be purchased in 

Saudi Arabia in the same 10-day 

period mentioned earlier, and 

loaded on semi-trailers for the 

journey to Kuwait. It's hard to 

describe the expression on a local 

automobile dealer's face when a 

KERO purchasing agent walked 

into his showroom on 18January 

and purchased 62 4x4 vehicles for 

immediate delivery Overall, virtually nothing was forgotten in 

over 4,000 line items needed to 

support operations. 

As a result, theKERO team was 

operations almost immediately on 

arrival. However, even the best 

planned operation is not perfect. A 

rapid resupply base must be available to replenish critical items 

which cannot be found locally, or to 

satisfy new requirements which 

develop as the operation matures 

and changes. This function was accomplished by Transatlantic 

Division in Virginia, using commercial air cargo resources via a 

sister office in Dhahran, Saudi 

Arabia. 

Two aspects of this logistics tale 

deserve special consideration in 

future nation assistance operations. First and foremost, the 

equipment used by the team is 

host nation property and must be 

treated as such. Accountability, 

maintenance and repair, and the 

general condition of host government property are all key components of the image of quality 

performance which the task force 

seeks to leave behind. The reputation of the Corps and the U.S. 

Army is at stake. 

Similarly, the crisis situation 

notwithstanding, the hast government does not want a rag-tag outfit operating in its country, exposed to its own population and 

the world media. Both of these factors are political indicators of the 

strength of the host government 

and its recovery operation, and 

deserve careful monitoring. 

Translated into day-to-day operations, this means strict care of 

equipment and rapid attention to 

repairs, housekeeping, uniforms 

and the like. 

Another logistical consideration which deserves careful attention is "the cost of doingbusiness." Again, notwithstanding 

the crisis environment, the 

recovery operations must be sufficient for quality operations but 

not extravagant. 

In KERO operations, the target 

was to hold pure overhead casts to 

less than 10 percent of all expendi- 
tures. KERO engineering salaries 

were charged to projects as direct 

costs wherever possible. Consequently, actual overhead costs 

came in around 8 percent, which 

was eminently satisfactory to the 

Kuwaiti government. This figure 

does not consider the salvage 

value of approximately $2 million 

worth of vehicles and equipment. 

They will ultimately be returned 

to the Kuwaitis to produce a final 

overhead figure of around 7 

percent. 

Politics and Partnering 

There is no question that 

- - operations lke this have 

political overtones at all levels 

which must be carefully managed. 

Engineers are dealing with vast 

cultural differences which, in spite 

of the unbridled goodwill exhibited 

by all participants, could easily 

result in disagreements and lasting misperceptions. After all, aside 

from the humanitarian relief afforded by the nation assistance effort, the only lasting benefit for 

American national interests is the 

goodwill and lasting working 

relationships generated by the engineering management process. 

These are political rather than 

construction products. 

The first and foremost consideration for a lasting professional image was the quality of 

construction provided. Early on, 

during the heat of the crisis phase, 

there was tremendous political 

pressure to conduct only emergency repairs to facilities so that 

limited funds could be spread over 

many project areas. Experience 

has shown that for all but the 

smallest repairs to facilities, this 

tolerant 'krisis" attitude will subside long before the completion 

date of the work. 

Consequently, in the calm, postcrisis environment, the user may 

not recognize this emergency scop 

ing asquality construction, and he 

will complain bitterly that he has 

been served with shoddy work. 

Such problems need to be resolved 

immediately, on the ground, with 

the customer-preferably in his 

favor-rather than through administrative appeals. This is espe 

cially true for major programs 

which affect large groups of 

citizens, as these projects justifiably receive close scrutiny and 

media coverage. Here, a strong, 

involved, and active public affairs 

officer can ensure balanced 

coverage so that such problems do 

not receive undue attention. 

A corollary of this concerns 

project selectivity. All projects do 

not have equal value in light of 

U.S. political and national 

security objectives and values. 

The same is true for the host nation population. Progress will undoubtedly be reported by the 

American media, and consequently every project in the Corps pre 

gram must appear as beneficial to 

Americans as to the host country 

The validity of the support provided must always appear justifiable and humanitarian to the supported population, and to the 

American taxpayer. These media 

observers, who shape political 

decisions through public opinion, 

often will not give sufficient consideration to the intricacies of the 

project approval process. 

In general, projects acceptable 

for U.S. government construction 

will suffice for the host nation 

population. In other words, 

projects which support major 

population segments, versus 

those which satisfy the goals of 

special groups, are usually acceptable. 

On the other hand, planners 

should not be complacent and say 

"it's their money, they can do what 

they want with it." Some citizens 

of host countries may easily accept 

the use of government labor to 

work on private projects as one of 

the perks of high office. It may 

even be sanctioned legally, but 

such practice would never be condoned or understood in the US., 

and should be avoided. For example, work on private residences, ornate buildings, and VIP 

facilities should be avoided unless 

there is an overriding and unmistakable social value. In Kuwait, 

reconstruction of the national parliament involved very special and 

expensive construction and furnishings. But the overriding value 

of providing a necessary and 

suitable facility for the return of 

democratic government in Kuwait 

was universally acceptable in both 

the U.S. and Kuwait. 

As a general rule, U.S. forces 

should always be used for the 

"highest and best" purposes which 

afford the maximum positive 

image and the least risk, political 

or otherwise, to our government 

and our personnel. Projects which 

do not fill this criteria should be 

recommended for construction by 

private contractors working directly for the host government. 

Close cooperation with the U.S. 

ambassador and his staff will 

serve to provide the political sensitivity necessary to properly 

screen projects. 

A second consideration for construction managers is the political 

problem of "who's in charge" of the 

nation assistance effort. Clearly, 

the host nation must be in charge, 

and U.S. elements must keep this 

steadfastly in mind. This is not as 

trivial as it appears because engineering judgments, which we 

make routinely and frequently 

without asking, are often driven 

by our own cultural imperativeswhich may not be valid in the host 

nation. 

For example, Americans, as a 

general rule, value time more than 

money+pecially in crisis situations. Eastern cultures are much 

more patient. Cost and perceived 

value are more important than 

time, and this difference can cause 

major disagreements and the 

misperception that Americans are 

not good managers. 

Engineer 9 
A corollary to this example is 

the role of true partnership with 

host nation managers. In the case 

of Kuwait, the host nation 

managers were adamant about 

having a partnership with the 

Americans. This desire stemmed 

from their need to direct their own 

destiny in a professional way, and 

from their sincere desire to learn 

the American way of managing a 

project. 

True partnership was relatively 

easy to achieve in field engineering activities through the use of 

Kuwaiti volunteer engineers who 

were assigned to KERO. These engineers worked side by side with 

their American counterparts 

throughout the entire recovery 

operation and shared every experience. Consequently, the Kuwaitis and Americans developed a 

mutual understanding of each 

other, and from that came the 

respect and trust which formed a 

true partnership. 

That is not to say that problems 

didn't exist. There were many differences in work practices, compensation, privileges, and housing 

arrangements-all of which were 

potential areas for discord. These 

were discussed as each case arose 

and a conscious effort was made to 

ensure that both Kuwaitis and 

Americans followed the same 

rules and practices. 

At the managerial level, the 

partnership was equally important but harder to achieve because 

of the complexity of managers' 

responsibilities, and the time constraints on their respective 

schedules. The individuals involved had to make a concerted 

effort to include their counterpart 

in any and all decisions pertaining 

to the recovery program. 

This usually caused a time 

delay and additional discussions. 

But the time was well spent because it prevented later misunderstandings and delays during 

construction. In fact, in almost 

every case where consensus on 

10 Engineer 

policy was not achieved prior to a 

construction decision, there were 

misunderstandings and delays 

during the critical-and more 

costly--construction cycle. 

Finally, the task force commander can also expect considerable attention from DA, DOD and 

the U.S. Congress. These agencies 

all require current and accurate 

information on all operations to 

fulfill their responsibilities and 

answer constituent questions. 

Consequently, a comprehensive, 

rapid, and preferably automated 

reporting system must be developed early on. 

In Kuwait, both Transatlantic 

Division and the Defense Reconstruction Ass'itance Office (DUO), 

utilizing reports from KERO, interacted dimtly with these agencies 

to provide accurate information, 

answer inquiries and relay sensitivities to KERO. This allowed 

KERO to concentrate on engineering and construction activities rather than&ml cwdnation. 

Conclusion 

T o sum up the Kuwait ex-

,.perience in a few words is 

difficult. There were so many lessons learned that this article can 

only scratch the surface. Some 

general thoughts are important, 

however. 

First of all, as an intergovernmental operation, the Kuwait experience was a tremendous success. The humanitarian spirit of 

the participants easily bridged 

cultural and professional differences and paved the way for close 

cooperation and good working 

relations. What resulted from this 

cooperation was the prospect of a 

long-term relationship-based on 

trust and goodwill-that is probably more important than the 

operation itself. Of paramount importance to these excellent working relations was the responsive 

and accountable support of the engineering management structure 

in KERO. Budget documents and 

funds accountability were precise 

and convincingly accurate. This is 

of cardinal importance to the establishment of trust with the host 

nation. 

Second, a true and honest 

partnership in all engineering 

decisions eliminated potential 

misunderstandings which could 

easily have delayed construction 

and undermined the completion of 

key projects. 

Finally, free and open communications with all parties ensured that both U.S.and Kuwaiti 

government officials-and their 

constituents-understood exactly 

what was happening as the recovery progressed. 

The Kuwait recovery was a 

satisfying and professionally exciting experience for all who had 

the opportunity to participate. As 

an intergovernmental experience, 

it holds promise for future application, not only in the aftermath of a 

conflict, but potentially as a conflict management or conflict 

reduction mechanism which warrants serious consideration. y 

Brigadier General Locurcio is commander and division engineer of 

the Pacific Ocean Division, Army 

Corps of Engineers. He previously 

served in the Persian Gulf as commander of the Corps' Transatlantic 

Division's Kuwait Emergency 

Recovery Office IKERO). Other assignments included commander 

and district engineer of the Corps' 

Savannah District and PhiladeG 

phia District, and assistant director 

of construction at Army Corps of 

Engineers Headquarters. He has 

also served in several troop assignments in Germany and Vietnam. 

He is a graduate of West Point, and 

holds a master's degree in urban 

engineering from Purdue University. He is also a graduate of Command and General Staff College 

and the Army War College. He is a 

registered professional engineer in 

Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New 

Jersey. 
Nation Assistance: 


An Evolving (But Not New) Concept 


By Major Boyd D.Houck 

CCqT . . he nussron of the 146th Eneineer - Detachf - ment can be'broken down into four discernible areas. [The unit must] maintain the 

capability to deploy Mobile Training Teanis to provide military instruction in engineer-related fields ... 

be prepared to deploy Technical Assistance Teams 

capable ofprouiding assistance to the military and 

para-military forces of Latin America ... be equipped 

to prooide Civic Action Teams to assist the civilian 

population in nation building activities ... [andlprovide physical support setting up Special Forces 

Operational bases and furnish guidance to the 8th 

Special Forces Group command and staff.."' 

oes this sound like the current mission for a 

unit heading for Latin America in a few 

weeks? It is, in fact, extracted from an article on 

the 146th Engineer Detachment in the Summer 

1971 issue of ENGINEER magazine. While the 

Army's involvement in nation assistance (a term 

which evolved from nation building) is currently 

receiving a lot of attention, the concept is certainly 

not a new one. This article addresses the evolving 

concept of nation assistance. 

Nation assistance is not an engineer-specific 

term or even a purely military one. The concept applies to certain types of activities conducted by any 

United States government agency. Within the 

military, engineers are often mentioned in conjunction with nation assistance because of their unique 

capability to support it. Every arm and branch of 

the military, however, continues to make significant 

contributions to nation assistance. 

In general terms, nation assistance is cooperative action between the United States and another 

nation to promote internal development and the 

growth of institutions within that nation. The 

U.S. government conducts nation assistance 

Engineer 11 
these objectives contributes to 

stability both within the country and 

within the region. 

Though a lot is said and written 

about nation assistance, exactly what 

it consists of is still a subject of 

debate. The definition continues to 

evolve. The coordinating draft of 

Army Field Manual (FM) 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, contains the following proposed 

definition: 

'Wation assistance is political, 

economic, informational, and 

military cooperation between the 

United States and the government of 

another nation, with the objectiue of 

promoting internal development and 

the growth of sustainable institutions 

within that nation. This corrects conditions which cause human suffering, 

and improues the quality of life of the 

nation's people. Nation assistance is 

conducted to promote stability within 

the world, which is in the U.S. national interest, as well as for 

humanitarian reasons." . - ., 

,. . - .. 	 .4>- . Training and Doctrine Command 

-	 8, . (TRADOC) published TRADOC ~. Pamphlet 525-5, which is the umbrelUP 	 .- . la concept for AirLand Operations, on 

August 1, 1991. It contains the follow- -. . . .. 	 ing definition of nation assistance: 

v-----" -, I 	 I 

Engineers lower a submersible pump into a well casing on Tiger Island, (The primary supporting concept of 

Hnnrltwaactivities to promote stability within a specific 

country or region of the world. There are several 

key points related to this description of nation 

assistance. 

First, nation assistance is a cooperative effort between the U.S. and another nation. Next, "institutions" in the context of nation assistance is a very 

broad term. It ranges from national agencies such 

as the host nation's military, its ministry of public 

works, and so forth, to local organizations such as 

public education and health services. Finally, the 

host nation (in conjunction with the United States) 

must establish objectives for internal development 

that meet the needs of their people. These objectives may include the reduction of poverty, the equi. 

peacetime engagement that seeks to 

coordinate the use of all U.S. political, economic, informational, and 

militaly assistance for a host nation's program to 

promote stability, sustainable deuelopment, and institutional growth responsive to the people's needs. 

DOD, working in concert with other U.S. agencies 

and at the host nation's request, provides health, 

technical, management, and other assistance consistent with authorizing legislation to achieve the 

desired goals. Nation assistance emphasis is on 

developing host nation capabilities in hey areas by 

transferring skills to civilian and military sectors. 

These actions are integrated through the U.S. 

,,3 government's country plan. 

Both definitions include the concept that nation 

table distribution of the benefits of national assistance is a cooperative effort. This cooperation 

development, or taking steps to ensure continued must exist not only between the U.S, and a host naprosperity within the nation. The achievement of tion, but also between U.S. agencies operating 

12 Engineer 
Natlonal Guard englneers work on a blmk wall during construction of a school In Cornayagua, Honduras. 

within a country. Both emphasize the importance of 

nation assistance in responding to the needs of the 

host nation's people. They also address sustainable 

institutional and internal development, which 

result in increased stability. 

The primary objective of nation assistance is to 

promote stability in a country or region. Stability 

in this context is orderly change, not stagnation. In 

many developing nations, the government faces a 

major challenge in ensuring balanced development. 

If modernization and development do not improve 

the standard of living of all the nation's people, discontent may develop. 

Perceived inequity in the distribution of the 

benefits of national development may create an environment in which an insurgency may take root. 

While one should not view nation assistance purely 

as a counterinsurgency strategy, failure to develop 

the type of national environment a nation assistance program seeks to promote may create 

favorable conditions for insurgent activities. 

The concept of nation building, from which the 

concept of nation assistance evolved, refers to efforts to integrate the people of a developing nation. 

As one political science reference described it, 'Wation building is an architectural metaphor for the 

process induced within a state to integrate the 

country and tie the inhabitants together in a national fellowship.'" 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the term "nation building" was in common use, although the general concept had been in existence for many years. 5 The 

U.S. military participated in various roles in support of nation building, including building our own 

nation. In the late 1980s, a perception developed 

that the term "nation building" had negative connotations when addressing America's role in the 

development of emerging nations. It implied that 

the U.S. was building other nations in our own 

image, rather than allowing these countries selfdetermination in their development. 

Around the turn of the decade, "nation assistance" began gaining favor as a less pejorative 

term.l However, it is not uncommon to still hear 

"nation building" and "nation assistance" used interchangeably, even though there is a philosophical difference between the two terms. 

The lack of a clear-cut description of what activities fall into the category of "nation assistance" 

is an indication that the concept is still evolving. 

Some of the activities which nation assistance may 

encompass include some types of security assistance, disaster relief, humanitarian and civic 

assistance, combined exercises, and deployments 

Engineer 13 
.-I 

perception may weaken the local government and create (or aggravate) conditions 

which cause instability. 

Coordination Nation assistance activities must be 

-? coordinated efforts between the 

host nation and all U.S. agencies involved 

(Department of State, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, and so on). This coordination is essential to achieve the maximum 

overall effect rather than isolated accomplishments. Lack of a master plan 

may result in situations such as bridges 

with no roads between them, roads 

without bridges, or health facilities with 

no clean water supplies. 

To facilitate coordination, the U.S. 

ambassador's country team (working with 

the host nation) will develop a "country 

plan." A key member of this team is the 

United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID), an agency of the 

Department of State. Cooperation between military planners and USAID 

within a country will assist in developing 

a coordinated master plan for developmental assistance. The country plan contains 

a "vision" of what the U.S. and the host 

nation should do together. The host na- G. - tion must fully concur with this vision, as 

well as the method of achieving it, for 

nation assistance to be successful. In 

--- other words, the host nation must '8uy 

As part of another school project in Honduras, a soldier puts finishing in" to the program or it will become a 

touches on a door before installing it. unilateral effort rather than cooperative 

one. 

for training. The actual process for selecting, 

developing, and funding specific projects or 

programs is beyond the scope of this article. How- Expectations

ever, I will address some basic principles that 

apply to nation assistance. Expectation management is a key aspect of nation assistance. National development 

Image and Perception results in rising expectations on the part of the 

N populace. As the people of a nation see the benefits 

ation assistance activities should strengthen of development accrue to others, they will want 

the image of the national and local govern- more for themselves. While this is understandable, 

ments in the eyes of the populace. This increases it may not be possible for a government to meet the 

national unity and promotes stability. Nation assis- people's desires on a schedule that satisfies them. 

tance programs must be designed so that the per- Expectation management is essential in all host naception of the host nation's people (as well as the tions with which the U.S. deals. The government 

actuality) is that their government is the guiding and the people of the host nation must not be given 

force. A perception that the US, is imposing its any promises that the U.S. may not be able to fulwill in a region, rather than cooperating with the fill. To do so may cause unwarranted resentment 

nation's government, may create problems. Such a toward the U.S. 

14 Engineer 
Self-Help 

The obiectives of a nation assistance Droeram . - n mustmeet the needs of the people it is 

designed to help. A key point here is that a program should attempt to develop a host nation's 

capabilities, rather than simply provide a temporary solution to a problem (which may then require repeated involvement by the U.S.). 

For example, planners should plan and execute a 

bridge construction project in such a way that a 

host nation learns to build their own bridges, and 

not simply be the recipient of a bridge built by 

Americans. Also, the project design must take into 

account the skill and technology level of the 

recipients. 

The results of the program must be maintainable (structures or facilities) or sustainable 

(technologies or capabilities) by the host nation. 

Projects that make extensive use of local contractor support benefit the host nation in two ways. 

First, the material or service provided by the contractor contributes to the finished construction 

project, which is an asset to the local populace. 

Second, the ability of the host nation to conduct its 

own development is increased as contractors gain 

experience. 

Need 

Dlanners must carefully research projects Je which the U.S. will sipport as partof a nation assistance program. Projects should meet a 

genuine need. They should benefit the majority of 

the population in an area, not just a few individuals. The projects should not offend cultural 

or religious norms. They should make maximum 

use of local resources (subject to U.S. statutory 

limitations). 

Whenever possible, projects should be achievable 

in a short time frame. They should provide maximum visibility and credit for the local government 

and have a measurable impact. A completed project 

has greater impact if the local populace feels that 

it contributed to identifying the need for the 

project, and participated in completing it.7 

A Joint Venture 

Joint action by U.S. and host nation military 

and civilian personnel is a key part of reinforc. 

ing the concepts of U.S./host nation cooperation 

and transferal of capabilities from America to the 

host nation. Civic action projects in particular 

should be a joint venture. When U.S. forces and 

host nation personnel work together on a project, 

several benefits are gained. First, the local 

populace gains ownership of the finished product. 

The host nation military and civilians gain valuable skills (management, construction, and so 

forth). The people of the host nation see their 

government helping their society. Perceptions 

regarding the U.S. are improved. And American soldiers gain a better understanding of the host 

nation. 

Training Opportunities 

N	ation assistance activities in which U.S. 

militarv forces are involved will generallv - provide a training opportunity. This serves the 

dual purpose of improving U.S, relations abroad 

while maintaining a trained and ready force. The 

concept is not new, as this 1951example indicates: 

'Xssistance by Army Engineer units in a project 

such as this [the construction of a sports field] 

serves as a means of training for engineer equipment operation and materially enhances understanding between the United States Army and 

[local] communities. Some of the conditions under 

which this assistance is prouided to communities 

are: that the equipment is readily available; that it 

not be required for military projects; that the project 

be practicable; and that the community be willing 

to assist with hand labor and make the finished 

sports or lay area auailable to all youth who desire 

to use it.' $ 

When a U.S. military unit is involved in a nation 

assistance project during an exercise, the exercise 

objectives must be clearly defined. This will 

prevent confusion on the part of the U.S, participants anddisappointment on the part of the 

host nation. While all nation assistance projects 

should offer some training value to the U.S. forces 

involved, some projects will be more focused on 

training, and some on assisting the host nation. 

Local Governments 

t is essential that U.S. personnel executing nation assistance activities coordinate closely with 

the local government in their area of operations. 

This coordination will improve civil-military relations and reduce the chance of misunderstanding 

between U.S. forces and the local populace. The 

local government is best suited to address the 

needs and desires of the people. Americans must 

remember that they are guests in the host nation. 

They are there at the invitation of that country's 

government to provide cooperative assistance. 
Doctrine 

Although the U.S. Army has conducted nation 

assistance type activities for many years, 

there is currently no doctrine which specifically addresses it. FM 100-5, Operations, makes no mention of nation assistance. The Combined Arms Command (CAC, a doctrinal integrating center within 

TRADOC) is currently revising this manual. The 

new version will include nation assistance as part 

of Army doctrine. To facilitate this revision, CAC 

has published several versions of a nation assistance "enabling concept" to collect input from 

within the Army. 

FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity 

Conflict, contains the Army's doctrine for operations in low intensity conflict environments. While 

not specifically addressing nation assistance, it 

does contain many of the concepts that apply to nation assistance activities. Looking at engineer 

doctrine in particular, FM 5-100, Engineer Combat 

Operations, does not mention nation assistance by 

name. It addresses it in concept, citing "spreading 

government influence and encouraging national 

unity in developing countries."$ FM 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, provides engineer 

doctrine for operations short of war. It addresses 

nation sssistance in some detail, and contains 

many of the basic principles included in this article. This manual is currently in coordinating 

draft. 

Nation assistance will continue to be an important mission for the Army as we move toward the 

end of this century While the Army must prepare 

for its primary mission of fighting and winning a 

land war, it is in our interest to support activities 

which lessen the chance for armed conflict. Working cooperatively with other U.S. government agencies and host nations worldwide, Army engineers 

can continue to build a more stable world. Y 

Major Houck is a doctrine developer for the Engineer School's Directorate of Training and 

Doctrine. He previously served as a senior team 

leader and small group instructor for the Engineer 

Oficers Advanced Course. Other assignments include regimental engineer for the 2nd Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, maintenance oficer for the 18th 

Engineer Brigade, S-4 for the 79th Engineer Battalion, and company commander in the 94th Engineer Battalion. He is a graduate of the Combined 

Arms and Services Staff School. 

16Engineer 

'captain Dennis F. Pierman, 'Tmm South of the 

Border," The Engineer, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 

pp. 6-9. 

'u.s. Army Engineer Center, Field Manual 5-114 

(Coordinating Draft), . Operations Short of 

War Port Leonard Wc U.S. Army Engineer 

Center, May 1991), p. I-za. 

%.s.Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand 

Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand 

Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and 

Beyond Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1August 

1991),p. 48. 

%ernon Bagdanor ed., TheBlackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (New York, NY 

Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1987), p. 379. 

5~ookswritten in the 1960s and 1970s oq nation 

building. These include: 

R. Bendix, 2uilding and Citizenship 

(Berkeley, Cl sity of California Press, 1977). 

1,
Y.W. DeutsLll N.J. Foltz eds., Nation Building (New Yor ,k, NY: Atherton, 1963). 

.N. Eisen stadt and S. Rokkan eds., Building ,.. states ana ~ations, 2volumes (Beverly Hills, CA: 

Sage, 1974). 

The basic concept of nation buiIding has been in 

existence much longer. It "became prominent after 

the dissolution of European colonialism." (The 

Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions; 

p. 379) 

60ne example comes from the following source: 

Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, Chief of Engineers, "Security, Stability, Sustainability: Conditions for Peace," p. 6. This paper was presented at 

the National Defense University conference '%volving US Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean: Mutual Hemispheric Concerns and Opportunities for the 1990s," 15-16 November 1990. 

7~everalof these principles were drawn from the 

following source: Department of the Army, Field 

Manual 5-100, Engineer Combat Operations 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofice, 

22 November 1988), p. 91. 

'E.P. Hanifan, 'The Army Lends a Helping 

Hand," The Military Engineer, vol. XLIII, no. 294 

(July-August 1951): p. 279. 

'~ield Manual 5-100, p. 91. 
THE BRIDGE WITHIN A BRIDGE 

By Lieutenant Colonel John L. Craig, Major Theron L. Smith 

and Master Sergeant Richard W.Bates 

n the night of November 

12, 1990, a sand-laden 

snowplow attempted to cross a 

93-year-old single lane bridge in 

Port Byron, New York. The 

snowplow's blade struck a vertical member of the bridge structure, and a 40-foot section of the 

bridge's roadway collapsed into 

the Seneca River. The plow and 

its two crewmen, were sent 

careening 16 feet into the icy 

water. They were badly shaken, 

but not seriously hurt. 

The bridge, however, was 

another story. The 133-foot bridge, 

which served as the only access to 

Haiti Island (see map inset), was 

now useless. Several dozen 

families were left stranded on the 

island, and were cut off from heating oil, groceries, mail, and emergency services. 

As a temporary measure, a 

small flotilla of boats, rafts and 

canoes served as a stop-gap 

delivery and crossing service. 

Three days after the accident, 

Cayuga County engineers built a 

temporary foot path across the 

damaged bridge. But the path was 

only capable of supporting one 

person at a time. With the winter 

weather getting harsher every 

day, the residents of Haiti Island 

needed vehicular accass to their 

homes-and soon. 

Echo Company 

The day after the accident, 

an evening television newscast about the bridge caught the 

attention of Reserve infantry 

Major Tad Smith, the commander of E Company, 2nd Battalion, 391st Regiment, 98th 

Division (Training). Thinking 

that his unit might be able to 

help the residents of Haiti Island, Smith contacted John 

Ozolins, the county's highway superintendent. Ozolins, who hap 

pened to be an Army National 

Guard engineer officer, listened 

to Smith's rundown of Echo 

Company's bridging capabilities-which included Bailey 

bridge construction. 

Enthusiastic about Echo 

company's potential assistance in 

getting the bridge fixed, Ozolins 

told Smith that the New York 

State Department of Emergency 

Management, along with the 

state's Department of Transportation (DOT), owned several sets of 

M1 Bailey bridge parts. These 

parts, all World War Two surplus, 

were scattered throughout the 

state in several storage locations. 

If officials were to declare a state 

of emergency, those parts could be 

made available for the mnstruction of a temporary bridge to Haiti 

Island. 

Ozolins and Smith agreed to 

pursue the joint project, and 

started contacting appropriate officials and key personnel in both 

government and Army channels. 

On the Army side, an initial 

coordination meeting was held. 

Sergeant First Class Don Hoffman, Echo Company's most experienced Bailey bridge NCO, and 

Master Sergeant Richard Bates, a 

bridge specialist assigned to 

Readiness Group Seneca, served 

as the resident Bailey bridge 

"gurus" for the project. 

One week after the collapse, 

Hoffman and Bates, along with 

Echo Company engineers, 

visited the site. Hundreds of 
measurements were taken, 

along with an hour's worth of 

video tape of the bridge. 

Echo Company personnel then 

proceeded with a design proposal 

for the bridge. It was decided that 

a Class 30 bridge would be needed. 

The company decided to build an 

initial 140-foot double-single 

bridge (Class 8), with a later 

upgrade to a Class 30 doubledouble. (On completion of the 

upgrade, the New York DOT, perhaps because of the unusual nature of the project, conservatively 

rated the bridge as a Class 15). 

Ozolins made initial contact 

with other highway personnel, 

along with local and state officials, 

and scheduled an initial joint 

planning meeting. He also reviewed several considerations 

that would impact heavily on any 

bridge reconstruction efforts: 

The only accessible site for a 

replacement would be within 

the superstructure of the existing through-truss bridge. Its 

massive steel trusses and overhead bracing system remained 

in place, even with a 40-foot 

section of substructure missing. 

No one from the New York 

State DOT had ever built a 

Bailey bridge and launched it 

in a counterbalanced configuration. The standard DOT 

method was to assemble the 

bridge on the ground, and use 

large cranes to lift it into 

place. This was not possible at 

Haiti Island without first 

removing the existing bridge. 

While some of the Bailey parts 

were stored inside and were 

well maintained, most of them 

sat in open storage yards. 

These parts did not appear on 

any central inventory, and 

their condition was questionable. To compound these 

difficulties, the only DOT personnel who knew what Bailey 

bridge parts looked like had 

retired long ago. 
1.73 .~ . .Yj.

,Pi 

. ,.>:.*.,,., 8 

.< . .<:.I .. .,, . ,

~.

... , .,3%.-~ 

' . ?.">.~. . - ,-.. :=-*. 

- - Haiti Island Bridge the morning of November 13, 1990,theday after its failure. Forty feet of roadway 

collapsed into the Seneca ~iverwhen a snowplow struck one of the bridge's vertlcal beams. ~otethe 

partially submerged plow. (Photo by Craig Jackson, by permission of Syracuse Newspapers) 

The temporary foot bridge 

would be of little use in 

reconstruction efforts. It was 

only rated for crossing one 

person at a time, and no construction loads would be allowed. A close examination (including X-rays) of key support 

points on the old bridge indicated that some of the critical 

support bolts were at 25 percent of their original strength. 

Civil engineers had already 

placed cabling along the trusses to reinforce these bolts. 

The first planning meeting had 

more than 30 participants. Fkpre 

sentativa; included New York DOT, 

Waterways, State Emergency Management, law enfonzment and fm 

safety officials, and aides to StateAssemblyman Michael Nawlio. 

Echo Company personnel 

presented their proposed plan to 

the group, using a Bailey bridge 

Training Extension Course (TEC) 

tape to illustrate their proposal. 

Promises of support at the start of 

the meeting were followedby looks 

of disbelief as the briefing 

progressed. Because of the coming 

holidays and long-range weather 

forecasts, Echo Company personnel indicated they wanted to complete the bridge within the next 

two weeks. 

The civil engineers and state officials had serious doubts about 

the Echo Company plan-they 

simply didn't believe that building 

a bridge within a bridge was possible under the current circumstances. The were particularly skeptical when the Army 

engineers told them they not only 

could do it-they could do it in one 

weekend. 

However, state officials were 

willing to let the Army try. And, 

despite their concerns, they still 

offered their full support. Based 

on the company's briefing, the 

group gave their go-ahead to the 

project. Civilian authorities then 

formerly requested Echo Company's assistance through the office of the 98th Division commander, Major General Barclay 

Wellman. 

Significant preparation was required to support the operation. 

Some of the initial steps included: 

Alert and mobilization of Echo 

Company for an unscheduled 

drill weekend three weeks 

before Christmas-and one 

week before its regularly 

scheduled drill. 

Completion of a detailed engineer work plan that included 

site layout, team assignments, 

equipment requirements, and 

man-hours. 

Engineer 19 
(Side View) Area of collapse 

Sauth End ( > 

NOrIh 

End 

\\\\\\\U 

(Top View) It--38'+ 

Sie profile of Halti Island Bridge and gap 

m Location and inventory of 

Bailey bridge parts in three 

state storage sites (Syracuse, 

Buffalo, and Watertown). 

Transportation of more than 

170 tons of bridge parts to a 

staging area near the bridge 

site. 

Construction of an additional 

25 feet of backspace area at 

the north end of the near 

shore. Originally, the backspace dropped off sharply at 

75 feet from the near shore 

rocking rollers. The additional 

25 feet of construction area 

was needed to allow counterbalancing of the launching 

nose and other construction 

requirements. 

Final rehearsal. 

The Alert 

A telephonic warning order 

was issued to all Echo 

Company personnel on November 23, just ten days before construction was to begin. A written 

order was prepared the next day. 

At the same time, critical personnel were called to duty in advance of the main body. The final 

alert order came five days later, 

when the work plan and inventories confirmed the feasibility of 

the mission. Unit response was 

100 percent. 

The Work Plan 

Initially, the advance party 

was divided into teams, each 

with specific evaluation and coordination responsibilities. Team 

meetings were held daily in a 

command post established by 

Ozolins at the Cayuga County 

Highway Department. 

The first team worked with civil 

engineers hired by the state to 

determine suitability of the site, 

along with the bearing points of 

the proposed Bailey bridge. This 

team was also responsible for site 

safety. 

A second team was sent to the 

various New York DOT storage 

sites to examine and inventory 

Bailey parts. Assistance from DOT 

personnel was invaluable and 

made an almost impossible task 

relatively easy. 

While the company executive officer and first sergeant coordinated local support, equipment, 

services, and food, a third team 

began site preparation. Working 

with the county highway department, the team located and 

cleared a staging area for the incoming bridge components. A 

building site less than 100 feet 

from a major highway was cleared 

and secured. 

After being briefed about the 

100-footbackspace requirement at 

the bridge, a highway department 

crew used fallen bridge parts and 

hundreds of yards of gravel to create a 100-by-26-foot secured backspace area. 

The third team also identified a 

14-inch difference in height between the near and far sides of the 

bridge. When combined with the 

projected sag in the launch nose 

(63 inches in a 140-foot, doublesingle bridge with two launchnose links), the near-shore rocking 

roller assemblies needed to be 54 

inches ahove ground. 

This would ensure that the 

planned 140-foot double-single 

bridge would reach the rocking 

rollers at the 100-foot point on the 

20 Engineer 
-- 

Left: Echo Company engineers begin constructing 

the Bailev. Note the 54-inch 

cribsfor the nearshore rocking rollers. 

Below: The "bridge within a 

bridge" after completion of 

the project. 

, , ,.-

.. 1I/ .. 

. - - ".. . . 

" , , <j.. . . ! ;:. 1 .ti, ' - -,.. .*.. .,, ,,,.. . . .&:..' ,..: -'".$.$>? .. .., . I ' , , . :--:, . 

.. .

::39 -. , . , .~~. :'--'-.' , 

.- .,.- - - .'; ,,-.7: 


(,. 

.:8. ,y; 
-. ;-~*, .,' .,,,.

' 

-

. Z"..,. .. .

;

< 

'

- '..
 :.. ..':.,,'.. -i.l

--el*. 
 b
 '^. ~c: :r&<>.;- -+--& .-,,.- . 
 . .' . 
 .-. .,, 

, , , 

-- , . . ___<.__ - * 1= ,,>~L-.- , . 

A 

< -

dation that several Echo Company personnel be assigned to 

loosen and dismantle rusty parts 

needed for the project. 

Transportation 

Transportation was a threepart problem. Buses loaned 

to the project by the Port Byron 

School District did double duty 

They moved troops from home 

station (over 80 miles away), and 

ferried them from work sites to 

the American Legion Post, where 

. 

k 

original bridge, and not impact 

(touch down) on the original decking. This, in turn, would require 

another team to work with the 

highway department to prepare 

cribbing for the two rocking rollers 

and six construction rollers. 

Because of the lack of MI Bailey 

bridge manuals, the decision was 

made to use the M2 manual (TM 

5-277), with the assumption that 

there were no major differences 

between the two models other 

than width. The MI roadway 

width is 11feet, and the M2's roadway is 12 112 feet. 

Inventory 

After the decision was made 

to go with an initial 

double-single bridge (with future 

upgrade to a double-double), 

parts lists were compiled and 

given to the inventory team. The 

' team split up and traveled with 

DOT personnel to the three 

storage sites. The resulting inventory detailed not only the 

number and type of parts on 

hand-but their condition as 

well. The inventory process also 

resulted in the team's recommen- 
The following six observations all had a significant impacf on the mission, and 

shouldbe worthnotingbyother 

engineers involved in bridging 

projects: 

Preparations for bridge 

launching did not include a 

complete mock-up of the 

existing bridge during the 

Bailey bridge scale model 

construction. As a result, 

when a 50-ton crane was 

moved by barge to the far 

side of the site, with the intent of letting it carry the 

weight of the 47.5-ton 

launching nose, it was unusable. Failure to fully plan 

for clearing the overhead 

bracing system of the old 

bridge eliminated the ability 

to use the crane. 

As a result of the sag in the 

double-single bridge, the 

bottom panel pins, holes, 

and chord bolt holes could 

not be brought into alignment. This caused difficulties when panels were laid 

on top of the double-single 

panels during conversion to 

a double-double bridge. 

To solve this problem, a 

special alignment tool was 

fabricated. This consisted 

of a threaded rod 18 inches 

long and one inch in 

diameter (with national fine 

threads), and two 6-by-6-

inch, half-inch-thick steel 

plates with a nut on each 

end. The rod was put 

through the bracing frame 

bolt hole. A steel plate and 

nut were then attached to 

the ends of the rod, and the 

bolts tightened. This sewed 

to pull together the bottom 

of the sagging top panels, 

and bring nel pin 

holes and ,It holes 

into alignmenr. Lonversely, 

and as normally used, the 

chord jacks were used at 

the top of the panels to 

push the panels ap. 

bring the panel pi1 

into alignment. 

art, and 

Iholes 

A normal layour 

worked flawlessly. The only 

unusual part was that at 

100 feet from the nearshore, another set of rocking rollers had to be put on 

the old bridge decking to 

'catch" the launching nose. 

Care had to be taken so 

that the launching nose did 

not heavily impact the rocking rollers and do additional 

structural 

old bridge. 

The limiteu UII-SIL~UWKspace available for layout 

of equipment was adequate, but required detailed 

truck load plans to bring 

equipment from the staging 

area to the equipment 

layout site. 

damage 

A -- -:a. 

to the 

- ,.--,, 

A relearned lesson was that 

using chord jacks can be 

backbreaking work for such 

things as jacking the tops 

of panels apart in order to 

align bridge pin holes. A 

change in the gear ratio to 

improve the mechanical advantage would make the 

work much easier. 

Finally, don't give up when 

someone tells you it can't 

be done. Frequently, as 

shown at Haiti Island, it can 

be done. Live by the motto: 

"Essayons!" 

they ate their meals and slept. 

Tools and equipment were 

transported on 2 112-ton trucks 

borrowed from F Company, 2nd 

Battalion, 391st Regiment. 

Movement of the heavier bridge 

parts was handled by county highway department trucks and 

drivers. The county also provided 

material handling equipment for 

loading and unloading. 

Rehearsal 

The end result of all good 

planning - is the identification and elimination of obstacles 

to success. Regardless of how 

well prepared you might feel 

about a mission, without an adequate rehearsal, you're only half 

ready. 

Using dozens of photographs, 

hours of video tapes, and a scale 

bridge kit borrowed from the 

Training Audio-Visual Support 

Center at Fort Drum, team leaders conductedrepeated mission rehearsals. During these rehearsals, 

several problems were identified 

and resolved. These potential 

problems included on-site storage 

of bridge parts and tools, team 

assignments, and load plans for 

the movement of parts to the staging area. 

Construction 

ike most successful operations, there is little to say 

about the actual construction of 

the bridge-except to say that 

all went as planned. It was difficult to construct a Bailey 

bridge on rollers that were almost five feet above the 

ground. It turned out that the 

minimum backspace area was 

just that-barely adequate. An 

additional 20 feet would have 

made the job much easier. 

While not quite like threading- a needle, it's not easy to launch 

22 Engineer 
a 140-foot bridge through such 

a small opening. 

The original bridge's opening 

was only 13 inches wider at the 

transoms, and only 29 inches 

wider at the panels, than the 

Bailey being launched. 

Echo company began bridging 

operations at 8 a.m. on December 

1. At 2:30 p.m. the following day, 

the first vehicle drove across the 

bridge-within-a-bridge. It had 

been three weeks to the day since 

the bridge's collapse. After the 

preparatory work, it took Echo 

Company just 15 houn to '%ridge 

the gap." 

Three months later, the company returned to Haiti Island, and 

upgraded the bridge to a doubledouble configuration. And today, 

the bridge-within-a-bridge is 

called 'Xcho Bridge" by the residents of Haiti Island. Y 

Lieutenant Colonel Craig is chief 

of the Combat Arms Division for 

Readiness Group Seneca. He has 

previously served as a battalion 

executive officer and S-3, and 

has commanded four engineer 

companies. He holds master's 

degrees from Central Missouri 

State University and the University of Alaska. He is a graduate 

of Command and General Staff 

College. 

Major Smith is commander of 

Echo Company. He previously 

served in the New York Army 

National Guard as an infantry 

and Special Forces officer. He 

received his commission from 

Alfred University, and is a 

graduate of the Infantry Officer 

Advanced Course. 

Master Sergeant Bates served as 

the chief enlisted advisor for the 

Engineer Branch, Readiness 

Group Seneca, during the bridge 

project. He is now retired. He 

previously served as operations 

sergeant and a platoon sergeant 

for the 10th Engineer Battalion. 

He also served tuo combat tours 

in Vietnam. 

Book Reuiew 

First Acmss the Rhine, by Colonel 

David E. Pergrin with Eric Hammel, 347 

pages, Ballantine Books, New York, 

1990. 

Colonel Pergrin graduated from 

Pennsylvania State University in 1940 

with a degree in civil engineering. After 

graduation, he was commissioned a 

reserve second lieutenant in the Corps of 

Enginem. When called to active duty in 

April 1941, he reported to Fort Belvoir, 

Wrginia, for assignment to the Engineer 

Training School. Af€er several training 

assignments, Pergrin transferred to 

Camp Swift, Texas, where he joined the 

291st Engineer Combat Battalion, the 

unit First Acmss the Rhine is about. He 

wmte this book with Eric Hammel, a 

professional historian. 

COL Pergrin had two purposes for 

writing the book. First, he tells the history of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, hm its activation early in World 

War I1 until the end of that war in 

Europe in 1945. Second, he shows how a 

well trained, well led, and physically fit 

unit functions effectively in mmbat. 

COL Pergrin describes the formation 

of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion 

and its early days at Camp Swift. The 

unit initially oonaisted almost entirely of 

new soldiers and second lieutenants. 

While this presented many challenges, it 

also gave the battalion commander and 

COL Pergrin (then a major and the battalion executive officer) much flexibility. 

Junior enlisted men with potential were 

promoted rapidly Officers were rotated 

fmm position to position to determine 

which were best suited for each billet. 

During their time at Camp Swift, the 

chain of command stressed demanding 

and physically challenging training. 

Upon completion of training, the 291st 

received very high ratings in both unit 

training and physical fitness tests. 

When the unit was ordered to prepare 

for overseas movement to Europe, 

Pergrin, a 26year old major, assumed 

command. 

After the battalion arrived in 

England, MAJ Pergrin continued to 

stress demanding training. He emphasized mmmunications within the 

unit and independent decisions by junior 

leadera. Soldiem were crass-trained to 

perfonn more than one job within their 

squad. He continued to ratate ofAcers 

between pasitions. His goal was to ensure that when the battalion went to the 

mainland of Europe, each leadership 

position would be occupied by the mast 

qualified individual. 

For the remainder of the book the 

author describes theexploits of the 291st 

during its march ams Europe. Underlying themes include the soldiers' devotion to the unit and the initiative of 

the battalion's junior leaders. The 

battalion's involvement in two critical 

incidents are explained in detail. The 

first was the 291st' participation in the 

Battle of the Bulge, in December 1944. 

They established and maintained 

roadblocks and destroyed key bridges in 

the path of Kampfgruppe Peiper. These 

actions were critical in stopping the German breakthrough. 

The second incident concerned bridging the Rhine River. The battalion, with 

the assistance of several other engineer 

units, built the first float bridge acmss 

the river near the heavily damaged 

Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen Thisaction contributed to the successful 

penetration of the First Army into the 

heart of Germany. COL Pergrin describes the 291st' movement aaoss Germany until the E~pean war ended in 

May 1945. 

The author convincingly shows the 

relationship between training, leadership, and unit effectiveness in battle. 

COL Pergrin performed a great service 

to the Army by recording and prese~ng 

a first-hand history of the 291st. 

This book is applicable to today's 

Army. It reinforces the timeless concepts 

of challenging training, effective leadership, and team building, and their impacts on unit mmbat readiness. It also 

vividly portrays engineers in clase combat with the enemy (as both engineers 

and infantry) in modern warfare. I highly rearmmend this book to hy engineers and those in combat arms who 

may operate with engineers. 

By Major Boyd D. Houck, doctrine 

developer, US.Anny Engineer Schoul. 
~n~ineer Problem 

This is the last of four Engineer Problems dealing with breaching operations. The problems reflect 

concepts outlined inFM90-13-1,Combined Arms Breaching Operations, which was distributed in 

February 1991. Previous issues of ENGINEER included Engineer Problems on the following breaching 

operations: in-stride (Januaiy 1991),deliberate (April 1991).and assault (July 1991). This problem 

focuses on a covert breach. 

The scenario depicted in each problem illustrates specific teaching points on that type of breach. An 

excerpt from FM90-13-1 describes the characteristics of the breach and when it will be used. The 

problem-solving process is presented using the engineer estimate process and includes some key discussion points. 

Problern: You are the platoon leader of 36 platoon, Company A, 21st Engineer Battalion (3/A/21), attached to Task Force Bayonet, a light infantry battalion task force (TF). TF Bayonet's mission is to 

secure Objective (Obj) Polk, clear Sandt Road, and pass an armored task force (TF Steel) down Sandt 

Road to the east. As the task force engineer of TF Bayonet and the engineer platoon leader, you are 

to recommend a task organization of engineer assets to the task force commander. 

Task Orgilnirstion: TF Bayonet consists of one light infantry battalion, two stinger teams, and your 

sapper platoon. 

Enmy 

Terrain. Spur Ridge (Figure 1) is the dominant terrain feature in TF Bayonet's zone. Due to the dense 

vegetation on Spur Ridge, no significant advantage is achieved by securing the ridge, except for possible 

use in air defense operations. Thick vegetation and restrictive terrain prohibit cross-country movement in 

zone, and keep wheeled or tracked movement to existing roads and trails. Small streams cross the area. 

The terrain favors light lnfantly operations. 

Figure 1 

24 Engineer 
~n~ineer Problem 

Enemy Activity. Athreat alrborne regiment (-) is conducting a guard force mission in your division's 

sector. Four threat companies (-) from the airborne regiment are defending in your division's sect0r.A 

threat company (-) dug in on Obj Polk has been there for at least 90 hours, and their strength is estimated to be at 60 to 70 percent. The threat is armed wth assault rifles, medium machine guns, rocketpropelled grenades, and their organic BMDs, which are dug in. The threat on Obj Polk is in range of 

the regiment's mortar battery and a supporting regimental artillery group (RAG). 

Afour-man saooer team from vour lat to on was attached to the battalion scouts. Thev assisted in con- , , , , 

ducting reconnaissance of the battalion's infiitration lanes, roads in the task force sector, and Obj Polk. 

The reconnaissance team reported the following information to the tactical operations center TOC): 

8 No obstacles were found on the dismounted infiitration lanes. 


IObstacles were located on the three roads in the task force sector (Figure 1). 


I	Awireimine obstacle is positioned at a choke point on Hyland Road. it consists of 15 roils of concertina that are staked down with barbed wire, and a surface-laid TM-62M row anti-tank (AT) minefield. 

The minefield, which is located directly behind the concertina, is about 12 meters deep, goes completely across the road, and is tied into the trees on both sides. This wirelmine obstacle is secured 

by a two-man iistening/observation post (LPIOP). 

8 	 Morris Road has the same type of obstacle set up in two locations, approximately 500 meters apart. 

The recon team noted that the postioning of these two obstacles enables the two LPlOPs to secure 

them very effectively. 

8 	 Another wirelmine obstacle with the same configuration is approximately 1000 meters west of the 

objective on Sandt Road. It appears that at least one of the BMDs on the southern side of Obj Polk 

can observe and place direct fire on this obstacle. An LPIOP also secures this obstacle. 

I	A surface-laid row minefield of TM-62M mines is at the intersection of Hyland and Morris Roads. It 

consists of two rows with alternately spaced mines. Together, the two rows are about 100 meters 

long and 20 meters deep. The LPlOPs on both Hyland and Morris Roads and some positions on 

Obj Polk can observe this minefield. 

8 	 No anti-personnel (AP) mines were observed at any of the obstacles on roads in the sector. Ail of 

the observed mines were surfaced laid, and there was no indication that any had been buried. 

Objective Polk. Objective Polk is situated on very restrictive terrain that is covered with heavy 

vegetation. The southern end of the objective physically secures Sandt Road and prevents any 

vehicular movement on the road. A protective obstacle belt encircles Obj Polk. It consists of an AP 

minefield, a triple-strand concertina fence, and tanglefoot. The only significant break in this belt is 

where Sandt Road crosses the objective. 

The AP minefield is about 15 to 20 meters wide and lies from 20 to 75 meters in front of thefigmlng 

positions. Ail of the AP mines appear to be surface laid, and some have trip wires. The sapper (recon) 

team leader recognized one of three AP mines at the objective as a POM-Z mine. Trip wires attached to 

the POM-Z type mines are tied in with the concertina fence, and some are strung into the tangle foot. 

One type of mine he did not recognize is small, round, and fairly fiat. The mine appears to be about 

5 inches in diameter and 2 to 3 inches tali. It has a black cover, and something like a small stem sticks 

out about 1 inch on one side. The majority of mines in the AP minefield are of this type, and they are 

surface laid in a random pattern. 

The last visible, unrecognized type of mine is placed about every 30 to 50 meters around the 

perimeter, behind the tangle foot. These mines look like olive-drab dinner plates standing on end, and 

they are about 10 inches in diameter and 3 to 4 inches thick. The sapper team leader believes that 
~n~ineer Problem 

-i t 

they are some type of directional mine, due to their employment. 

The triple-strand concertina (TSC)fence is laid on the far side of the AP minefield. Metal pickets hold 

the rows in place. The fence is anchored with barbed wire, which is strung on top of the two base rolls 

of concertina and tied off either to the bottom of the pickets or to one of many trees on the objective. 

On the near side of the AP minefield is the tangle foot obstacle, which is about 10 meters wide. It is 

well camouflaged and is tied into the AP minefield. 

Two anti-vehicular wire obstacles and a point minefield block Sandt Road where it passes through the 

objective. These wire obstacles consist of 15 rolls of concertina that are staked down with barbed wire. 

They are about 70 meters apart. Between them is a surface-laid minefield that has about 10 TM-62M 

mines. Threat soldiers have been observed physically picking up these mines and moving them, allowing 

vehicles to come and go from the objective. These mines do not appearto have any anti-handling devices. 

The scouts found two places in the perimeter where dismounted patrols enter and exit regularly. One 

opening is located in the norih and one in the south. Once a patrol passes, a makeshift gate made of two 

Stacked rolls of concertina is slid back to close the opening in the TSC. Afootpath appears to have been 

trampled down in the grass by threat patrols passing through the other perimeter obstacles. 

The scouts counted six BMDs dug into hull defilade, oriented to the northwest. Single rolls of concertina appear to divide the objective into three sub-objectives. All of the fighting positions on the objective 

are well camouflaged and have at least 12 inches of overhead cover. 

Divisional long-range surveillance elements have located the threat's regimental command and control 

site in the eastern part of your division's sector. It is protected by six T-62s and five BMPs. This force has 

about a 20-minute response time to react to any of the four threat companies In your division's sector. 

nnission: Control of Objective Polk will allow your brigade to pass TF Steel through your battalion, and 

move down Sandt Road to attack the threat's regimental command and control site. The brigade 

commander's intent is for your task force to quickly secure Obj POI^, clear Sandt Road, and conduct a forward passage of lines of the armored task force. The attack must be conducted so that the armored task 

force can rapidly attack deep to destroy the threat command and control site before the threat can react. 

Cornmsnder's inteni: The critical elements of this operation are the silent infiltration of TF Bayonet 

and the total surprise of the threat on Obj Polk. When TF Bayonet initiates their assault on Obj Polk, 

they must control the southern end of the objective before the threat reacts. TF Bayonet must quickly 

secure Obj Polk, rapidly breach all obstacles on Sandt Road, and pass TF Steel to the east so they 

can attack the threat regimental headquarters. After passing TF Steel, TF Bayonet will clear the last 

threat elements from the northern end of Obj Polk. Remember, the timing and speed of TF Steel's passage are critical. 

Execution: The task force commander selects the scheme of maneuver shown on the Task Force's 

Operations Overlay (Figure 2, page 27) The operation forTF Bayonet will consist of four phases: 

Phase 1 - infiltrate into assault positions and continue interdictory fires. 

Phase 2 - Conduct a covert breach and assault to seize the south side of Obj Polk. 

Phase 3 - Pass TF Steel. 

Phase 4 - Complete seizure of Obj Polk. 

Phase One. TF Bayonet takes advantage of the restrictive terrain and darkness to infiltrate their force. 

The task force crosses the line of departure (LD) with company Ain the lead, followed by Companies C 

and B in echelon. Company A and one stinger team infittrate on lane North and occupy their assauk position. Companles C and B infinrate in echelon along lane Spur to assault positions C and B, respectively. 

The last stinger team moves with Company B and is left in posltion on Spur Ridge. Scouts locate bypasses to all obstacles and wait to link up and guide the companies into their assault positions. All three 

companies are prepared to conduct covert breaches of unexpected obstacles during Phase 1. 

26 Engineer 
Figure 2 

For the previous 48 hours, dlvision artillery assets have conducted interdictory fires, smoke, and illumination throughout the brigade sector. These fires randomly target all known threat obstacle sites 

and objectives. The fires began before the infiltration, and they will continue until the actual assault on 

Obj Poik begins. 

Phase 1 is complete when the three companies occupy their assauii positions 

Phase Two. 

- Company A occupies their ABF position and moves an element into position to breach the obstacle 

on Sandt Road. 

- Company C moves out of their assault position (Figure 3, page 28) and into the selected breaching 

locations on Obj Poik. 

- Company B moves into position so that, on order, they can pass through Company C and continue 

the attack on Obj Poik. 

- Divisional interdictory fires are shifted from the southern end to the northern end of the objective. 

These fires have continued for almost three days. The intent is that, after almost three days of interdictory fires, lifting and shifting them around or off the objective will not raise threat suspicion, and will 

help mask TF Bayonet's actions. 

- Company C conducts a covert breach on Obj Polk. They plan to use the southern path made by the 

threat dismounted patrols to enter and leave Obj Polk. The sappers who located this path will guide Company C soldiers to it. if the covert breach is detected. Company Awill execute direct and indirect fires on 

the northern end of the objective in order to isolate the southern part. When Company C begins its assault, ail planned suppressive and obscuring fires are initiated. These fires are directed at the northern 

end of Obj Poik to isolate the breach site and support the assaun force. 

- As the assaun begins, an element of Company A breaches the obstacle on Sandt Road and 

eliminates the LPIOP (overwatch) position. 
Figure 3 

- After the southern end of the objective is secured, Company A lifts its fires and Company B passes 

through to secure the rest of Obj Polk. 

Phase Three. On order, TF Steel passes through TF Bayonet on Sandt Road to attack and destroy 

the threat regimental command and control site. Aspeedy passage is critical to ensure the attacking 

force surprises the threat. TF Steel must pass through as soon as Sandt Road is open, during the final 

phases of the assault on the Obi Polk. 

The commander of Company C informs you that he will assault Obj Polk with two platoons. The task 

force commander asks you to recommend a task organization to support this mission. 

- ,?,,. A unit conducts a covert breach when stealth, surprise and quiet obstacle reduction 

techniques are required by the maneuver plan. 

[,,t,;~!~.7c.t,c,.? A covert breach applies some characteristics of the other three types of breaching 

operations (assault, deliberate and in-stride). However, the planning and execution fundamentals used 

to suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) are significantly different. Consequently, a covert 

breach must be separated from the other three breaching operations to ensure its success. 

me main difference is the criiical element of surprise required for a covert breach. In an assault, 

deliberate, or in-stride breach, the attacking force Immediately applies overwhelming combat power to 

overcome the threat. In a covert breach, the attacking force steakhip prepares lanes and positions for the 

assaun and support forces, taking care not to attract the threat's attention. The element of surprise delays 

threat reaction until the breach lanes are open and the assaun is in progress. 

In this problem, if the threat detects the covert breach, TF Bayonet is prepared to execute an assault 

breach. A key decision is where the assault breach will be initiated: Will the assault breach begin 

where the covert breach force is located, or will the covert breach force pull out and move to a different 

location? The transition from a covert to an assault breach must be explicitly rehearsed by all members of the combined arms team to ensure success. 

ENGINEER Solution on page 43. 

28 Engineer 
By Major Kenneth E. Cockerham 

who has responsibility for than this simplistic response indithe continuum of electri- cates-a fact of life that auicklv 

cal power on the battlefield? 

First asked by chief of engineers, 

Lieutenant General Henry J. 

Hatch, this question appears to 

have a straightforward answer: 

'Tactical units have tactical generators, all others rely on available commercial power." 

In reality, power requirements 

in the theater of operations are 

much more extensive and complex 

became apparent during the early 

stages of Operation Desert Shield. 

In fact, tactical generator (TACGENS) power and reliable commercial power are at oppositeends 

of the battlefield electrical power 

spectrum-and there is a large 

gap between the two. To fill this 

gap, the Army formed new prime 

power units to meet a host of critical electrical supply needs. 

Prime power engineers work with local Iraqi electriciansto restore power to 

Dihok, Iraq. 

The rift between TACGENSand 

commercial power occurs when 

commercial power is not available 

and TACGENS power is not suited 

for a particular application. It also 

occurs when commercial power is 

available but limitations on the 

existing distribution system preclude its desired use. 

An overview of the pros and cons 

of TACGENS and commercial 

power illustrates the need for the 

prime power units. 

TACGENS 

ACGENS power is well suitd Tfor use in remote areas for 

relatively light electrical loads. Such 

generators are available in sizes up 

to 200 kilowatt houm (kw).Some 

TACGENS are capable of being installed and operated in parallel to 

provide me power to a larger load. 

They are relatively small, light, 

mobile, and can be easily installed 

and operated They can be mnnected 

to provide a variety of output voltagq both single phase and three 

phase. TACGENS also provide a 

dust pmer source, since failure of 

one generetor doesn't cause widpread power failure. The disadvantap of tha generatom include: 

Limited output capacity. 

No long-term reliability. The 

yardstick for power system 

reliability is the ability to meet 

the power demands of all users 

without failure for a long 

period of time. TACGENS are 

not designed to be operated 

continuously for long periods. 

Engineer 29 
~. 

plants and distributed on a permanent transmission and distribution network called a power 

grid. Power plants may be of 

various types: hydroelectric, fossil fuel or nuclear-powered 

steam, gas turbine, or diesel. 

The major advantages of commercial power are high reliability 

and low maintenance (after construction of the grid). Commercial 

power is considered to be a highly 

reliable source of clean electrical 

power. "Clean" means that the AC 

I r Staff Sergeant 

I Kelly Revell, right, 

a prime power techniclan, makes adlustments to a 

power line whlle a 

Navy Seabee looks 

XI- on. 

Fluctuating power quality. 

Clean power maintains constant 

output voltage, frequency, and AC 

(alternating current) sinusoidal 

waveform over a wide range of 

load and usage conditions. TACGENS are susceptible to voltage, 

frequency and waveform deviations during load swings. 

Burdensome logistical requirements. TACGENS have significant maintenance and fuel requirements. 

Commercial Power 

Commercial power is produced by stationary power 

30 Engineer 

Less flexible. Commercial 

power is usually tied to previously developed, fixed facilities. Significant construction 

and materials are required to 

deliver commercial power to 

new locations. Extensive tech. 

nical expertise and skill are 

also required to connect commercial power to new users. 

U~lnerobility. Commercial 

power plants and their associated power grids are vulfrequency is constant and that 

voltage is relatively constant, even 

during sizable load swings. 

Once installed, commercial 

power requires little or no maintenance by the user. User fuel requirements are eliminated. Commercially produced power usually 

has enough capacity to carry very 

large electrical loads. 

Disadvantages of commercial 

power include: 

Regional availability. Commercial power is frequently 

not available in remote locations. In some contingency 

theaters, it may not be available at all. 

Prime Power in the Gulf 

The need for prime power 

support was recognized 

early in Operation Desert Shield. 

With the rapid development of 

the theater of operations, coalition forces required more and 

more power. To provide the 

needed electricity, war planners 

recognized that they needed soldiers with the technical expertise 

and equipment to expand the 

commercial power grid, and 

nerable to acts of sabotage. 

Because of their long expanses, transmission lines are 

particularly difficult to protect 

from this threat. 

Less Robust. Damage to power 

plants or to the power grid may 

cause extensive and widespread power outages. Repair 

of these damaged facilities can 

be time consuming. 

Voltage and frequency incompatibiliv. In some theaters, 

voltage andlor frequency of 

power are not 

compatible with the users' 

equipment. 
install and operate power plants. 

Initially, some desperately needed 

electrical work was amomplished by 

civilian mntrad labor. But skilled 

civilian manpower was scarce and 

expensive. Workers were also understandably reluctant to work very 

far forward because of the threat of 

hostilities. 

'Rm, contracted work was not 

very responsive because of lengthy 

contracting procedures. This situation was exacerbated by a shortage 

of military personnel who had the 

technical expertise to write electrical contract specifications. 

In late August 1990, Desert 

Shield planners sent a request to 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) for 

a unit which could accomplish the 

necessary electrical work. While 

acting on the request, FORSCOM 

found that no such specialized 

unit was prepared for the job. Only 

through extensive efforts on the 

part of the Prime Power Directorate of the Army Engineering 

and Housing Support Center 

(USAEHSC) (a USACE field operating agency) was a prime power 

unit designated and scheduled for 

deployment. 

Thisunit was the 535th Engineer 

Detachment, formerly a power 

generation unit, headquartered at 

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and 

commanded by Major (then Cap 

bin) Dale Knieriemen. 

In September 1990, a 16-man 

prime power team deployed to 

Desert Shield from Fort Bragg. 

The team consisted of elements of 

the 535th Engineer Detachment 

which had been stationed at Fort 

Bragg, Fort Monmouth and Fort 

Campbell. Personnel from the 

Prime Power Directorate at Fort 

Belvoir were also deployed with 

the unit. The team shipped 16 

750kw generators and a large 

quantity of power distribution and 

transformer equipment. Though 

the team arrived in theater far 

ahead of its equipment, it went to 

work immediately, expanding the 

commercial grid and delivering 

power where it was needed. 

But the tremendous demand for 

prime power services and expertise soon overwhelmed this small 

team. In November a second team 

from the 535th was deployed to 

reinforce the effort. This team, 

from Fort Benning, was made up 

of personnel from the 535th, and 

frum Detachment I1 and Detachment N, two TDA prime power 

detachments. 

Throughout Operation Desert 

Shield and well into Operation 

Desert Storm, these two prime 

power teams were the only soldiers in the theater of operations 

with the expertise and equipment 

to "bridge the gap" between TACGENS and commercial power. 

Since no doctrine existed which established control and utilization of 

prime power teams, the 535th 

commander found it necessary to 

educate other engineers on the 

mission, capabilities and role of 

his unit. He had to institute the 

proper command and support 

relationship which would allow 

him to support the entire theater 

with the small prime power force. 

Through trial and error, he and 

the theater engineer found that 

prime power units, to be most effective, must be retained as 

theater assets and work directly 

for the regional wartime construction manager (RWCMtthe senior engineer commander. 

The two prime power teams continued to carry an enormous 

workload throughout Desert 

Shield. In December 1990, the 

theater requested that two more 

prime power teams be deployed. 

The Prime Power Directorate of 

USAEHSC had anticipated this 

request and had already created 

Task Force Bravo Prime Power). 

The task force was made up of personnel from TDA prime power 

detachments at Fort Bliss, Fort 

Lewis, Fort Bragg, Fort Leonard 

Wood, and Germany. The task 

force was configured with two 16- 

man teams and a command and 

control headquarters. Its mission 

was to reinforce the 535th 

The prime power 

plant at the west 

heliport, Dhahran Alrbase, Saudl Arabla. 

Each generator 

produces 750 

kilowatts. 
-- - 

Detachment prime power teams. 

Conflicting deployment and 

transportation priorities delayed 

the deployment of Task Force 

Bravo until late February 1991. 

By the time Task Force Bravo arrived in theater on March 1,. 

Kuwait was liberated and the 

cease fire was in effect. 

However, the liberation of 

Kuwait did not diminish the 

theater's need for prime power sup 

port. Power was still required at 

Patriot missile sites, evacuation 

hospitals and major command and 

- Prime Power Scenarios -


Some theal er operath ons requir 

prime power assets Clecause ( 

location, speclalizea equ~pment, or 

other circumstances. The following 

scenarios highlight some situations 

where prime power is the best--and 

sometimes oni 

%.- as-... 2

St~uarron;HIII~PI tiullltltarlu arlu 

control headq~arteisis Isocated in a 

fixed facility irI the COP vIMZ (cornI- - munications zone). The facility i 

tuatlon: LI.S. Army E:vacuatlon 

)itals rely on organic 100kwh 

TAGGENS for power. After months 

of continuous running, the TACGENS' reliability ts diminished. 

Prime power units can install a replacc:merit power plant and distribution !system, al lowing 'the hospital's -P-.,m s.

TACGEIUDro be used for backup 

pow€ 

SI tuatlon: In the aftermath of 9,. ....-!A,- -a.:,>-. .-A-. . .A- .-- war, control centers. Elements of the powered by the commercial gric 1. merc:ial powel * was norI-existent. 535th, now reinforced by ?gsk Power must be provlded to suppo rt Prim,e power SIJldiers car I go in im- Force Bravo, were heavily involved 

in damage assassment and restoraunits located in temporary facilitie mediately behi nd iiberation forces, a
 close to the headquarters. Prim- assess damage to the power grld, tion of emergency power in Kuwait. 

Prime power experts were even 

called upon to pdcie power for 

power teams can tap into the corn I - repair backup generators in critical 

mercial facilities such as hospttals, airports, grid, design and i~istall an ex :- - -
-.A

pansion to the distributiurt SYWBIII, and government buildings, and re- the peace talks between coalition and Sded pou ~erto these 

SUP$ nd actiiitie s.They ca n 

store emerger icy power to these leaders and Iraqi representatives. critical facilities .They can then work 

'" With the war won, the theater's ","---.. with civilian enylllc;r;~= w make ex- also iable emen aency back ;-

up power to tne neaaquaners in the main effort quickly turned toward 

redeployment of troops and equip- pedic?nt repairs to large c ommercial 

event of commercial power outage. powc?r plants, c3nd bring 1:hem back ment. In April, the 535th returned 

Situatlon: Patriot missile bat- on lirie. to their home stations, and Task 

Force Bravo assumed respon- teries require continuous, reliable Sltuatlon: /in area SL~pport batpower for their systems. But they are talion (ASB), WIth many ol f its subor- sibility for prime power support to 

seldom deployed to areas with 

readily available commercial power. 

Their on-board TACGENS require 

dinate suppor t units, ot ccupies a the theater. New aerial ports of .. .. .- -. fixed facility in me LUMML. I ne embarkation were constructed at 

facility is powered from the commer- Dhahran and other sites, and 

clal grld. Due to overloaded circuits power was provided to these 

and substandard or nonexistent facilities by Task Force Bravo. 

host nation electrical safety codes, a Major new projects requiring 

heavy maintenance and repair. 

Prime power personnel can design. 

Install and ope able powe 'r 

system using hertz conI- serious electrical fire hazard is prime power expertise arose alverters, grec ncing th~e . . .. created. Prime power units have the most daily. These projects in- reliability of these crltlcal misslle - a*-..-

LliUlll ~lcal exper tise to evz hate and volved repair, maintenance and 

systems. fix this dangerous condltic)n. new construction of power disSltuatlon: Theater engineerS 

construct critical facilities such a 

tribution systems, as well as 

tuarion: Iraq1 forces aam- power production. In May 1991, life-suppott areas, prisoner of wa I or destroyed the infrastruc- when the overall redeployment 

camps, aerial ports of debarka of several Kurdish population 

tionlembarkation, equipment main - ers in northern Iraq. A sig- schedule was published, Task 

Force Bravo was slated for an

tenance and washfaciliiic 3s, and res nlficzmt element of the subsequent 

and recreation comple, :es. Thes~ 3 U.N. relief effort was the restora- t. -..--A are often constructed III SC~IIUU 3 tion of basic utilities, including .,.. areas. Prime power t eams cal electricai pol Ner. Prirr le power 

design and install power distributio~ teanis have the knob fledge of 

August redeployment. 

But in late May, Task Force 

Bravo was assigned to support the 

relief efforts of Operation Provide 

. .. . .. . Comfort. The task force executive systems for these facil ities. The power systems ana tne tecnnical .. . . officer and one NCO electrician 

can tap into a commerclai gr~d or expertise to assess the damage, 

install and operate power plants t(J and restore emergency power to 

produce large quantities of reliablc ? hospitals, water pumping stations ,.A
 electricity. an)" even entire cities. 

were sent to northern Iraq to 

repair a generator at a hospital in 

Zahko. They were also assigned to 

assess the need for additional 
-- 

prime power support. Initially expecting to be gone only a week, the 

two were kept busy for 54 days, 

During this time, they not only 

fixed the generator but also restored emergency power to several 

other critical facilities and the entire city of Dohuk, a community of 

over 320,000 people. 

As Task Force Bravo's scheduled redeployment approached, 

the theater recognized that it 

could not do without the services 

provided by the prime power 

teams. In June, the theater requested a prime power team to 

replace Task Force Bravo upon 

its redeployment. On August 1, 

1991, a prime power team from 

Fort Leonard Wood arrived in 

theater and assumed mission 

responsibility from Task Force 

Bravo on August 19. The team 

redeployed to home station in 

January 1992. 

Out of simple necessity, prime 

power teams were stationed in the 

Gulf theater of operations longer 

than any other engineer unit. No 

other unit had the technical expertise to perform the critical power 

missions handled by the teams. 

Lieutenant Colonel William Vogel, 

commander of the 864th Engineer 

Battalion (C)(H), said, "Prime 

power soldiers were absolutely the 

experts in power generation and 

distribution for the entire theater 

of operations. They accomplished 

~ .. 

.- .?-

~~..~.--

every mission given them. Their 

performance was magnificent. No 

one else could have provided the 

critical support and services they 

provided." 

Prime power soldiers were 

recognized as experts in their 

field. Prime power units completed more than SO0 power-related missions in the Gulf theater. 

They produced over 10 million 

kilowatt hours of reliable, commercial-grade electricity, using 

their organic equipment. Prime 

power units proved themselves an 

essential element of sustainment 

engineering operations. 

What's Next? 

The critical need to bridge 

the gap between TACGENS 

and commercial power was clearly identified in the Gulf War. The 

coordinating draft of FM 5-422, 

Engineer Prime Power Operations, is now under review. Other 

doctrinal literature and practices 

must also be updated to reflect 

the role and proper utilization of 

prime power assets across the 

operational continuum. 

Prime power doctrine also needs 

to be integrated into higher level 

doctrine and published in revisions of Field Manual (FM) 

5-104, General Engineering, and 

FM 5-116, Engineer Operations: 

Echelons Above Corps. It also 

Pilme power team 

,; 1

member Sergeant 

Sldl Hassaneodln 

opens a fused dlsconnect on a 

medium voltage dls- 

-- - - trlbutlon network 

needs to be included in new 

doctrinal publications such as FM 

5-114, Engineer Operations Short 

of War. 

The prime power organization 

must be tailored to support future 

military operations. On July 23, 

1991, the chief of engineers 

granted authority for the Prime 

Power Directorate of USAEHSC 

to reorganize into a provisional engineer battalion. This reorganization is the first step toward the 

formation and activation of a TOE 

(tables of organization and equip 

ment) prime power engineer battalion. This battalion will provide 

the technical expertise, equipment 

and manpower to close the rift hetween TACGENS and commercial 

power. 

Itshould also give asolid answer 

to General Hatch's question. Y 

&fajor Cockerham is currently writingprime power doctrine at the Engineer School on a detail assignment from the provisional prime 

power battalion. He preuiously 

sewed as ~~mmander of Task Force 

Bravo (Prime Power) in the 

War. Other assignments include 

commander of Prime Power Detachment XI; engineer advisor to Readiness Group Jachson, and compeny 

aecutioe officer and 

platoon ldr for the 4th ~~~i~~~~ 

Battalion. He holds a rnrnter's degree in electrical engineering fmm 

the Naval Postgradunte School. 
ERI Adds Agility to the Engineer Force 


By Lieutenant Colonel Roger 

engineers are on the 

Jbow wave of changes occurring within our Army's doctrine and 

organizations. Efforts by the Engineer School to make engineers 

fnll players on the combined arms 

team resulted in approval of the 

Engineer Restructure Initiative 

(ERI) by the Chief of StatT of the 

Army on 5 March 1991. This long 

overdue mrganization benefits the 

combined arms forces and will 

eventually be integrated into the 

Total Army 

Unfortunately, non-supportive remarks by engineer officers in the 

field and at higher level st&%, 

could undermine ERI as it is being 

implemented. These comments reflect a lack of understanding about 

the ERI reorganization. I feel we 

must all stop complaining, learn 

about the reorganization, work to 

make the transition mr smmthly, and document any shortfalls discovered during the prcws. 

w -

, nder the ERI concept, en- - gineers are organized in 

three distinct echelons: division, 

corps, and echelons above corps. 

These units have different type 

missions and organizations. Up 

front with the infantry and 

armor units are engineers "at the 

point of the spear." They are the 

7. Somerville 

the divisions, work in the division 

rear area, or work in the corps rear 

area. These corps combat engineers must be able to perform 

topographic, mobility, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment engineering missions. 

They are combat engineers with 

sapper skills, but they have more 

equipment and a larger organization to execute the tactical and 

more technical missions. 

Engineers at echelon abe cow 

are focused on the construction of 

airfields, ports, bridges, and mads. 

They provide sustainment engineering to units that sustain the 

fighting fonres. At times they will 

go forward into the corps or 

division rear areas to help the division sappers or corps combat engineers complete their survivability or sustainment missions. 

7 

n Southwest Asia (SWA) the 

. .Army proved it is a very 

lethal force. Once deployed into 

the area, it proved it could move 

quickly on the battlefield if there 

were no threat or terrain mobility 

restrictions. To keep up with this 

fast-moving lethal force, the engineers in SWA developed an ad 

hoc command and control structure using division and corps engineer assets. We have been 

doing the same things in Gertics shortfalls, and providing 

mobility to the force over expanded areas of operation. 

With ERI, we have a mechanized sapper battalion habitually 

associated with each division armored (mechanized) maneuver 

brigade. This sapper battalion 

commander is the brigade engineer. He will organize his headquarters to synchronize engineer 

missions throughout the depth of 

the brigade battlefield. His battle 

planning staff will be integrated 

into, and collocated with, the 

maneuver brigade battle staff. 

The battalion will have the 

capability to quickly integrate additional engineer assets into the 

brigade's operations. 

Also, a sapper company will 

habitually associate with an armored (mechanized) battalion 

task force. The training and wartime integration provided by this 

association will promote a better 

understanding of each unit's 

capabilities and the commander's 

intent in all operations. This is 

how most units preparing for 

training rotations at the National 

Training Center (NTC) or Combat 

Maneuver Training Center 

(CMTC) do it. ERI will now provide better engineer responsiveness and greater flexibility to engineer operations at the task force 

and brigade levels. 

-. sapper companies and battalions many for years. ERI fixes this L C . , :
 ;iJ,rj...C; r2r.; ?7.C,C.J ( .:. 

that "clear the way" and provide 

mobility for the maneuver forces. 

Combat engineers at corps have 

a broader mission based on the 

corps commander's intent in the 

fight. They may fight forward with 

34 Engineer 

command and control shortfall. 

In accordance with AirLand Battle (Future) or AirLand Operations, ERI organizations at 

division are focused on fixing the 

command and control and logis- 

-~.-

he new engineer brigade 

. . commander at division level 

is the division engineer (DIVEN). 

The sapper battalions organic to 

this engineer brigade are initially 
attached to their habituallv associated maneuver brigades. The 

division engineer will organize 

his headquarters to plan and 

synchronize all engineer missions 

conducted across the entire 

division's battlefield area. Representatives from the DIVEN headquarters detachment (HHD) will 

be at the division tactical command past and the main and rear 

command posts. 

Usually the division engineer will 

receive corp engineer units and 

direct the execution of their specific 

missions. These units may assist in 

setting up a delibewte defense, assist in conducting a deliberate 

breaching opration, provide additional support to a main effort, assist in conducting a river crosing, 

or provide sustainment engineering 

in the division rear area 

The corps engineer will influence the corps commander's 

fight by sending units to the 

divisions, or by employing them in 

the corps rear area. If a wrps combat engineer battalion is tasked to 

a division, it will almost always 

operate as a complete battalion, 

with the combat engineer companies receiving all orders from 

their parent headquarters. Corps 

combat support equipment companies may be attached to combat 

engineer battalions to provide additional horizontal construction 

capabilities, or they may be sent 

forward to supprt a division. 

Most combat heavy engineer 

battalions (which are more appropriately called combat construction battalions) will be organized at echelons above wrps. 

This does not mean they cannot 

work in the corps area. The 

division and corps engineers will 

request these units to support 

their requirements and missions. 

- . 1

~. ,~~:c~,t,<:~~l.. :;~121.,7djj~!<:~

- 114 isyin:)c

-he engineer battlefield mis- 

. . sions and associated critical 

tasks determine the eneineer - organization and equipment required in the new units. The sapper battalions will provide 

mobility and survivability (MIS) 

to the maneuver brigades. (Note 

that countermobility is considered a component of mobility 

in TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, 

"Eheprint of the Battlefield," a 

battlefield operating systems 

(BOS) model). These sapper battalions will be outfitted with 

vehicles and equipment that can 

keep up with the maneuver forces on offensive operations. They 

will also support the requirements to construct combat roads 

and trails for the maneuver forces and combat service support 

elements, and to place flank and 

frontal tactical obstacles. 

When the maneuver brigade 

transitions to the deliberate 

defense, corps combat engineer 

battalions and combat support 

equipment companies will move 

forward to assist the sapper battalion. They will provide additional countermohility, survivability, 

or sustainment engineering required in preparing the defense. 

Whon those missions are completed, corps units will move to 

other corps priorities. 

The armored division sapper 

battalions are new engineer organizations that focus on providing mobility. They are not organized the same as the old 

J-series division battalions. 

These sapper battalions improve 

the engineer command and control 

by integrating into the maneuver 

brigade, adding the flexibility engineers have been missing in the 

MI:S BOS. They can be task organized within the division just 

like any of the mechanized or armored battalions. They can 

receive other engineer units and 

quickly integrate them into the engineer work effbrt. 

The corps combat engineer battalions may receive any of the engineer missions. They must be 

balanced and flexible oreaniza- - tions that can move quickly 

around the battlefield to accomplish their missions. In most 

cases they will operate behind the 

brigade rear boundary, using the 

existing road network. Here the 

wheeled units will have a mobility 

advantage over the tracked units. 

We must ensure the corps combat 

engineer battalions retain the allpurpose, flexible engineer organizations that we had in the 

past and that have traditionally 

been the engineer combat multiplier on the battlefield. 

@ui!r?.i?c$ = L\qd rrr,l-~inr;

vr 

/CHombat developers at the 

2Engineer School used the 

ERI concept just described to 

produce a table of organization 

and equipment (TOE) for the 

units. FORSCOM or appropriate 

major commands then developed 

modified TOE (MTOE) organizations based on the projected 

resources available. 

Engineer commanders of field 

organizations will be challenged to 

make the MTOE structures work. 

It is essential that unit leaders exercise these MTOE to find their 

strengths and weaknesses, document them, and provide input to 

FORSCOM and the Engineer 

School. Let us know what works 

and what you need! 

Engineer commanders must. 

train their division and corps 

units and educate the Ammy about 

ERI. Remember, ERI is different-most engineer units do 

not have the same capabilities as 

before, and the sapper battalion in 

armored (mechanized) divisions is 

a new organization. The muscle to 

do rear area survivability and sustainment tasks for the division 

will come from the corps combat 

engineer units. Be aware that 

most of these corps units are 

located in Reserve Component 

Engineer 35 
forces. This will demand that 

division engineers better integrate 

Reserve Component units into 

their division's training cycle, 

which includes taking them to the 

combat training centers. 

Conclusion 

mhe opposina force (OPFOR) 

- .at the ~aiional Training 

Center has agility because of 

their command and control system, well trained soldiers, and 

well developed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). 

The divisions that trained and 

fought in Saudi Arabia had 

agility because they increased 

their command and control 

capabilities, and had time to 

train and learn their doctrine 

and 'TTP.With ERI,the engineer 

force will now add engineer 

agility to the maneuver force. We 

have taken a big step forward 

with our new organizations. The 

doctrine to fight is out in draft 

form, and we must train on it at 

every opportunity. 

We are now on the bow wave of 

changes in the Army with this improved command and control and 

integrated planning capability. 

Smaller organizations in the 

division will make it easier to 

move engineen laterally on the 

battlefield. Now it is up to engineers in the field to learn the 

doctrine, expand on the strengths 

of the new organizations, discover 

and document the difficulties, and 

develop workable solutions. Sap 

pers forward! 

Lieutenant Colonel Someruille 

is a supper who is currently 

chief, Tactics, Training, and 

Doctrine Division, at the Engineer School. He has served 

with the 177th Armored Brigade at the NTC, two tours 

with the 1st Armored Division, 

and one tour with the 82nd 

Airborne Division. He has a 

degree in civil engineering 

from Montana State University 

and is a certified professional 

engineer. 

The ENGINEER Writer's Guide 

We think engineers take a special pride in their 

profession, and ENGINEER is always looking for 

articles from readers who want to share their expertise, experience and ideas. 

If you're a potential contributing writer, here are a 

few 'kriter's guide" tips that should help steer you in 

the right direction: 

Articles can cover engineer training, operations or 

doctrine, engineer equipment, history, or other areas 

of general interest to an engineer readership. 

We're especially interested in articles that have a 

"how-to-do-it-better"' theme. For instance, we're not 

looking for articles telling readers how you conducted 

a routine field exercise. But if you think you have a 

"new-and-improved" way of conducting a tactical 

operation, training exercise, or other operational procedure that may prove helpful to other engineers 

that's what we need. 

Articles should generally come from contributors 

with first-hand experience with the subject being 

presented. 

Avoid theatrical writing styles like: "It was a dark 

and stormy night ...," or "...the soldier blazed through 

the jungle on his lumbering D7, providing a trail of 

freedom for the other vehicles ...." 

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in 

the active voice. 

Length should range between 2,000 and 4,000 

words, and the text should be typewritten and doublespaced. Generally, each such page will contain from 

36 Engineer 

200 to 250 words. 

Articles containing attributable information or 

quotations not references within the story should 

carry appropriate footnotes. 

Manuscripts must be original, unpublished, and not 

under consideration by another publication. Normally, 

you can expect a reply to your submission within two 

weeks after we receive it. 

All submissions are subject to editing. 

Contributors are encouraged to include black-andwhite photos, artwork, and/or line diagrams to help .

illustrate your article. 

Include your full name, rank, current unit and job 

title. Also include a list of your past assignments, 

experience and education, your mailing address, and 

daytime phone number-preferable Autovon. Send 

your articles to: Editor, ENGINEER Professional Bulletin, ATSE-TDM-PB,Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

65473-6650. 

If you have any questions about an article you're 

working on--or considering writing-give our features editor, Phil Howell, a call at DSN 676-7643, or 

commercial (31 4) 563-7643. 

We look forward to hearing from you. 

P.S. ENGINEER welcomes response from our 

readers. Letters regarding information in our 

magazine are published in our "Letters to the Editof 

department. Let your thoughts be heard. 
By Major Scott Brubaker 

vour unit has just been notified that it will 

- - deploy to Honduras. What now? Where do 

you start your planning? Is there anyone who can 

help? The answer to these and many other questions can be found at Joint Task Force-Bravo 

(JTF-B), a subordinate command of the United 

States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 

The purpose of this article is to discuss the missions and capabilities of JTF-B and how it assists 

deploying units to have successful training events 

in Central America. It is not intended as a definitive "how to" article, but as an overview of what 

you can expect and thin@ you can do to enhance 

your unit's deployment. 

Based in central Honduras at Soto Cano Air 

Base approximately 60 miles north of Tegucigalpa, 

the capital of Honduras, JTF-B is ideally situated 

to support all U.S. forces exercises. Soto Cano Air 

Base, home of the Honduran Air Force Academy, is 

located along the main north-south highway in Honduras and has the only C-5 capable runway in the 

country. The organization of JTF-B is shown 

below. 

Missions and Capabilities 

mhe JTF-B External Standing Operating Proce- 

- - dures (SOP) provides the following unclassified mission statement: "JTF-B exercises operational control of designated U.S. military forces and 

exercises area command responsibilities for all U.S. 

Joint Task Force-Bravo 

CQMMANDER i-I 

I Tenant unns 1 

*pa AVN 
,.. -2~ 


sr- - ~ 

military forces in Honduras to secure unity of effort in all operational missions, ensure compliance 

with command policy and to coordinate defense, 

security, logistics and the use of available facilities; 

ensures effective intelligence coordination to provide all U.S. forces with indications and warnings 

intelligence; acts as USCINCSO's directive 

authority in the field of logistics and coordinating 

authority in Honduras on engineering functions; 

plans and conducts jointicombined exercises in Honduras as directed by USCINCSO.. ." 

Restated, this simply says that JTF-B is responsible for providing the assistance to make your 

training in Honduras safe and successful. Key 

phrases are "providing ...assistance" and "your training." JTF-B will not do the planning for you, nor 

will they tell you exactly how to accomplish the 

project(s) you've been assigned. They will guide you 

through the maze of regulatory requirements and 

provide necessary resources. You will be expected 

to plan and execute your own training. 

The JTF-B primary staff, J-1(personnel), 5-2 (intelligence), 5-3 (operations), 5-4 (logistics), 5-5 (civilmilitary operations), and J-6 (communications), performs all staff functions normally associated with 

these positions. Some functions critical to your 

deployment are worth highlighting. 

Units deploying to Honduras operate in a low intensity conflict environment, which makes the J-2's 

24-hour-a-day intelligence and Indications and 

Warning (I&Wsupport extremely important. This 

support, along with the advice and guidance of 5-3 

Force Protection, will help ensure your unit's safety. 

Camp Guayacan, a 

700rnan basecamp In Honduras. Soldiers stationed at the 

r ~-.- camp were part of 

~~ .. Fuertes Carnlnos 91. 

The 5-3 consists of Operations, Plans, Exercises, 

Force Protection, and Air sections. 5-3Exercises is 

the first in-country contact for units deploying to 

Honduras and provides coordination with other 

staff sections as well as the Honduran government 

and military. Much of your unit's movement while 

in Honduras will be by air. The 5-3 Air provides assistance in planning for rotary and fixed wing 

aircraft support. 

Deployment and redeployment can be a daunting 

experience. The 5-4 guides unit planners through 

the maze of logistics requirements covering port 

operations, bulk fuel, customs clearance, and support from other JTF-B elements, the U.S. MILGRP, 

and the host nation. While exercising in Honduras 

provides training opportunities not available elsewhere, nation assistance is also part of the equation. This is the purview of the 5-5, which works to 

improve the Honduran quality of life and enhance 

the Honduran and U.S, government images. Assisting units to maintain communications in Honduras 

is the function of the J-6. This section provides incountry expertise on all communications systems including telephone, radio, and television. 

The special staff sections that are important to 

deploying units include the deputy chief of staff, engineer (DCSENG), contracting, the staff judge advocate (SJA), and the joint public affairs office 

(JPAO). While the remaining special staff sections 

are important to the success of any deployment, 

most units will have little contact with them. 

The DCSENG is responsible for all engineerrelated exercises, from lwo-week deployments for 
training to the engineer phases of JCS-sponsored 

exercises such as FUERTES CAMINOS and 

AHUAS TARA. The section allocates projects, assists with material acquisitions and equipment support, oversees quality control, and operates "Engineer Village." This area houses engineer units 

working on or near Soto Cano Air Base as well as 

units requiring temporary housing during deploymentlredeployment. 

Contracting is the point of contact for all incountry material, equipment, and service needs. 

They purchase materials locally that are unavailable through the supply system or required on 

short notice, lease vehicles and equipment, and contract for billets and messing in local hotels. The 

SJA assists units in negotiating real estate leases 

and settling claims against the U.S. government. 

Finally, the JPAO ensures deploying units get the 

media attention they deserve both at home and 

among the Honduran people. 

Subordinate elements of JTF-B are the Army Forces (ARFOR), the Air Force Forces (AFFOR), the 

Medical Element WDEL), and the 4th Battalion, 

228th Aviation Regiment. 

The ARFOR provides command and control of all 

U.S. Army elements in Honduras, including U.S. 

Air Force members of the joint staff, and works 

closely with deploying units for all in-country logistics support. The Joint Security Force (JSF) 

provides convoy planning assistance and escort 

vehicleslpersonnel when required. 

The AFFOR provides command and control of all 

U.S. Air Force elements in Honduras, except U.S. 

Air Force members of the joint staff. The base civil 

engineer (BCE) is responsible for operations and 

maintenance of all JTF-B facilities, much like an 

Army DEH. Most units deploying to Honduras will 

deal with the BCE only when assigned construction 

projects on Soto Cano Air Base or at other JTF-B 

remote sites. 

MEDEL is responsible for all medical and health 

activities for U.S. military personnel. They provide 

assistance in satisfying medical requirements prior 

to, during, and after deployment. The Preventive 

Medicine section provides initial preventive 

medicine briefings to all personnel arriving in Honduras. MEDEL also coordinates medical and dental 

unit deployments to treat people in remote areas. 

These medical deployments are often coordinated 

with engineer deployments to improve sanitation 

facilities for local citizens. 

The 4th Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, is a 

composite aviation battalion that provides UH-1H 

and UH-60 utility helicopters, UH-60 medevac 

helicopters, and CH-47 cargo helicopters. Its pilots 

are a valuable source of information on landing 

zones and airstrips throughout Honduras. 

Training In Honduras 

- ngineer training in Honduras generally falls under one of two categories: nation assistance projects or exercise-related construction. 

While the difference between the two is primarily a 

function of funding and beyond the scope of this article, the following provides a simplified description 

of the two broad categories. 

Nation assistance projects are those that enhance the quality of life for the Honduran people 

and provide viable training opportunities for U.S. 

forces. They are typically single service, short-duration projects including well drilling and buildinglrepairing schools, clinics, gymnasiums, community centers, and bridges. Nation assistance 

projects in Honduras fall under the "113 Rule" 

which simply means that the work force is 113 U.S. 

military, 113 Honduran military, and 113 Honduran 

civilian. 

The theory behind this rule is two-fold. First, 

human nature suggests that people tend not to appreciate and take care of things that are simply 

handed to them. Therefore, it makes sense to have 

local civilians involved, both to make them feel a 

part of the project and to teach them the skills to 

maintain it once completed. Second, having Honduran military participation suggests to the local 

population that their government, not just the 

U.S., is doing something for them which contributes to political stability. 

Exercise-related construction projects occur 

during JCS-sponsored exercises and are focused on 

supporting exercise training objectives which may 

or may not contribute to the Honduran quality of 

life. These projects tend to include more than one 

service and are of longer duration-sometimes, as 

in the case of EX FUERTES CAMINOS, a period of 

years. They include construction of basecamps, forward landing strips, roads, POL facilities, and logis. 

tics-over-the-shore (LOTS) facilities. It is important 

to note that' nation assistance projects are also constructed in conjunction with many JCS-sponsored 

exercises. 

Predeplopient 

vour unit has been notified that it will deploy 

. to Honduras and has been given authority to 

coordinate directly with JTF-B. Your first point of 

contact at JTF-B is the J-3 Exercise officer, who 

will provide JTF-B points of contact and try to 

answer any initial questions you may have. He will 

suggest dates for your initial site survey and explain USSOUTHCOM and JTF-B requirements for 

theater and in-country clearances. Although you 

will probably know what project(s) your unit has 

Engineer 39 
... 

, , . ..,. ,,. - * , 

// 

. . 


. ~ 


. .... > I,,-v .* . .~-- -


. ._i .. .." . .->._ . i.LS - , -.." ' IT -7 -
 ," 

. 

e-

. 

. . .\ * ~ . 

. -. e 

- .~ - . , II ".

An englneer finishes placing window frames in a new school bullding in 

Macora. Honduras. 

been assigned, you should also contact the 

DCSENG project officer for verification and status. 

The project officer can verify your equipment 

requirements. 

Generally, units working on vertical projects will 

only require tool kits and generators for power 

tools. Vehicles for hauling troops, materials, and 

small pieces of construction equipment, such as 

concretelmortar mixers and compactors, will be 

provided. On the other hand, units working on 

horizontal projects or projects requiring specialized 

equipment, such as well drilling and quarrying, 

will be expected to deploy with their equipment. 

The initial site survey mentioned earlier is critical to the success of your deployment. It is the first 

opportunity for an on-the-ground reconnaissance. 

You will meet and be briefed by the JTF-B staff, 

visit project sitds), verify bills of materials (BOM), 

and begin coordinating the details of your 

deployment. 

Ideally, you should schedule your survey 150-180 

days before deployment and plan for three to five 

days on the ground. Team size is up to you, but is 

limited by transportation and security considerations and must be coordinated with, and approved 

by, JTF-B. Once dates have been determined, the 

5-3 Exercise officer will coordinate your visit with 

40 Engineer 

the JTF-B staff. 

As soon as travel arrangements for your site survey have been confirmed, contact the 5-3 Exercise officer who will coordinate for your arrival. Make sure 

to travel via Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft. You will fly directly to Soto Cano Air Base and 

be met by a member of the JTF-B staff. Travel via 

commercial airline should only be considered as a 

last resort, otherwise you may experience lengthy 

customs delays at the civilian airport in Tegucigalpa. 

Once your site survey team has arrived at JTF-B 

and has a chance to settle in, you will meet the 

JTF-B staff and receive a series of briefings covering, among other subjects, JTF-B, the current 

threat, force protection, and preventive medicine. 

These briefings are important to safe training and 

will be required for every member of your unit immediately upon deployment. You should also call on 

the JTF-B commander to discuss your training objectives and gain an understanding of his 

philosophy on training in Honduras. Prior to your 

arrival, the JTF-B staff and subordinate elements 

will have completed their staff estimates, discussed 

your deployment, and will be prepared to discuss 

specific details with you. 

For example, the 5-2 and 5-3 Force Protection 

staffs will have analyzed the threat and 
coordinated with the Joint Security Force (JSF) 

commander for the appropriate security requirements. Air and ground transportation will have 

been coordinated as well as billeting, if required, in 

an approved safehouse. 

The 5-5 will have made initial contact with local 

officials and discussed the "113 Rule" with them. 

The DCSENG project officer will have developed a 

detailed project folder that includes a bill of 

materials, maps, detailed directions to the site, 

points of contact, special equipment requirements, 

and any significant site considerations. He will also 

be prepared to discuss tool and equipment requirements unique to your project(s). 

The 5-4 will have discussed transportation requirements with your higher headquarters and will 

be prepared to provide details about customs 

clearance and ports of entry for both personnel and 

equipment. Finally, the ARFOR staff will have identified virtually all of your in-countly logistics 

requirements. 

While conducting the reconnaissance of your 

project site(s), you will be accompanied by the 

DCSENG project officer, a Spanish speaking 5-5 representative, a JSF security element, and other required JTF-B personnel. At the project site you 

should discuss with local officials how Honduran 

civilian and military personnel will be incorporated 

into your work force. The regional military or police 

commander will provide jobsite security during your 

deployment, including movement to and from the 

project site($. It is important that you discuss 

security requirements with the unit commander 

tasked to provide the security. The JSF security element accompanying your survey party will assist 

you in ensuring all requirements are addressed. 

7 *,.. ., 

During the site survey you should also look carefully at proposed billeting and messing arrangements to ensure they meet your needs. When the 

location of project sites precludes units from being 

billeted at Soto Cano Air Base, other arrangements 

must be made. Due to security and health requirements, options are limited. While JCS exercise 

units generally live in temporary basecamps, that 

is usually not feasible for units working on nation 

assistance projects. These units can either stay at 

Honduran military installations or in approved 

hotels. Both offer advantages and disadvantages, 

but the decision will often be made solely on 

availability. One of the primary purposes of the site 

survey is for you to verify the scope of work and 

BOM. The best time to do that is during your 

project site reconnaissance. 

Once you're satisfied with the scope of work and 

BOM, the DCSENG project officer will requisition 

materials and special equipment through the 

ARFOR 5-4 and Contracting. Immediately after 

returning from your ground reconnaissance, take 

some time to think through everything you saw and 

heard. Ask questions about anything that's not clear. 

Prior to departing Honduras you will participate 

in a final coordination meeting with the JTF-B 

staff and subordinate units. This is the time to 

review your visit, identify unsettled issues, and ensure you know who is responsible for resolving 

them. Your final task hefore departing should be to 

outbrief the JTF-B commander. 

When time and funds permit, you should attempt to make a final coordination visit approximately 90 days prior to deployment. You will 

have had an opportunity to discuss your initial site 

survey with other members of your unit and 

Wlth the old school servIn9 as a backdrop, an engineer smooths the concrete foundatlon for a 

new school in the Honduran vlllage of El Corozo. 

Engineer 41 
incorporate their comments into your training plan. 

This final visit will allow you to meet with the staff 

one last time and ensure all the details agreed to 

during your previous visit are being finalized to 

your satisfaction. 

Deployment, Execution, Redeployment 

neploy your advance party one or two weeks 

- before the main body. The advance party 

should have sufficient personnel to ensure preparations are made for the arrival of the main body. 

This can make the difference between exercise success or failure. Tasks will include receiving equipment and baggage shipped from home station, coordinating required briefings with the ARFOR S-3, 

and conducting any last minute coordination. 

Preparations will also include receiving materials 

and equipment and preparing billets for the main 

body at the project site(s) or at Soto Cano Air Base. 

Depending on ports of entry and location of project 

sitek), it may also include arranging for air 

transportation and/or ground convoys to move 

troops and equipment. 

During your unit's deployment you will be expected to provide a liaison officer (LNO) (senior 

NCO or officer) who will represent you at Soto 

Cano Air Base. An engineer unit LNO is usually 

provided desk space in the DCSENG section. However, his or her primary staff responsibility is to 

the 5-3 Exercise officer. The LNO is responsible for 

coordination with the JTF-B staff to ensure all 

your needs are met and all required reports are 

submitted accurately and on time. Each morning, 

Monday through Saturday, he will attend the 

JTF-B command and staff meeting where he will 

brief your project status. The LNO will be important to the success of your deployment and should 

be one of your best people. 

Except for rare occasions, your main body must 

transit Soto Cano Air Base to inprocess before 

moving to your project site(s). This gives the JTF-B 

commander the opportunity to ensure all of your 

personnel receive the information they need for a 

safe deployment. Your soldiers will be welcomed by 

the JTF-B commander and receive briefings covering JTF-B, the current threat, force protection, 

reporting civil rights violations, and preventive 

medicine. Depending on the time of arrival and the 

location of project site(s), your soldiers could easily 

complete inprocessing, move to their billets, and be 

prepared to start work the day after they arrive. 

Once you've arrived at your project site(s), 

project completion is up to you. JTF-B will provide 

a Spanish speaker if there are none available in 

your unit. You will also be provided a security team 

of one or two military policemen to assist you in ensuring the Honduran security element is providing 

adequate protection. During your deployment you 

will be visited by the DCSENG project officer and 

quality assurance NCO as well as other members 

of the JTF-B staff. 

You will be required to maintain contact with 

the JTF-B command post 24 hours a day. Primary 

means of communications is secure tactical satellite (TACSAT) which the J-6 can provide. At the 

end of each day you will be required to account for 

all of your personnel and sensitive equipment and 

submit a report, called "Tubes Up," to the JTF-B 

command post. 

Prior to redeployment you will meet with the 

JTF-B staff to review and finalize plans to complete your project(s), turn them over to the users, 

and redeploy your unit to home station. If you've 

followed my advice and assigned LNO duties to one 

of your best people, this meeting will merely be a 

review of completed actions. If not, there will be 

some work to do. Redeployment will include cleaning and turning in equipment, turning over billets, 

preparing unit and personnel property for customs 

check, and getting your personnel back to home station. Before leaving Honduras, get your soldiers 

together and conduct an after action review. Capture comments and use them to prepare your after 

action report and prepare for future training. 

Summary 

onstruction training in Honduras can and 

&should be a valuable training event for your 

unit and personally rewarding for your soldiers. 

Whether deploying for six months in support of exercise FUERTES CAMINOS, or for two weeks to execute nation assistance projects, your unit will improve its readiness, provide much needed help to 

the Honduran people, and contribute to stability in 

Central America. Joint Task Force-Bravo is available with the experience and expertise to help ensure your training objectives are met and all of 

your soldiers return home safely. The commander, 

staff, and subordinate elements are committed to 

your success. w 

Major Brubaker is S-3 of the 589th Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood. He previously served 

as assistant deputy chief of staff (engineer), JTF-B, 

Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. Other assignments 

include senior team leader (instructor1 for the Engineer Officer Advanced Course, Army Engineer 

School; division engineer (FWD), 2nd Armored 

Division (FWD); ~KJOtours as a company commander; construction oficer, and platoon leader. He 

holds a bachelor's degree from the University of 

Maryland. 
~n~ineer Solution 

DEVELOP A SCHEME OF ENGlNEER OPERATIONS 

Step 1. Analyze relative ronlbaf power. This analysis of relative combat power is 

based on the situation template (Figure 1, page 24) and an engineer battlefield assessment of threat and friendly engineer capabilities. 

I	Threat engineer capabilify. No obstacle activity has been located from the line of 

departure (LD) to phase line (PL) Red. From PL Red to PL White, tactical obstacles in 

place are oriented to an armored force using the roads. All of the mines appear to be 

surface laid and under the 0bSe~ation of at least one LPIOP. These obstacles are in 

range of threat indirect fire assets. 

Protective obstacles on Obj Polk are extensive, but a clear picture of the objective 


can be created from intelligence gathered by your scoutlsapper element. You plan for 


the sappers attached to the scouts to link up with Companies A, B, and C before the 


companies begin their assaults. The sappers will inform the company commanders 


about preselected breaching sites, and threat strengths and vulnerabilities. You work 


closely with the battalion 52 to ensure that the situation template is accurate and 


up-to-date. 


I	Friena'ly mobility/survivability (M/S) capability For this problem, the assessment of 

friendly capability is based on the available mobility assets. TF Bayonet has your engineer platoon of 27 personnel. You have complete demolition boxes, satchel charges, bangalore torpedo kits, and bolt cutters. Each of the nine infantry platoons is 

capable of conducting limited breaching operations. Your sapper platoon has trained 

extensively with this battalion and can quickly integrate into the combined arms team. 

Step 2. /dent;@ missions a~ldaliocafe forces. in this step, use the reverse planning process to identify engineer tasks, working from Obj Polk back to the line of departure. Each time an engineer mission is identified, allocate the force needed to accomplish it. This is an unconstrained allocation. 

Lane North 

1. Assist in a covert breach of obstacles while infiltrating the task force. 

2. Clear the wirelmine obstacle on Sandt road, and mark the lane and position guides. 

Lane South 

1. Assist in a covert breach of obstacles while infiltrating the task force, 

2. Breach one footpath through protective obstacles on Obj Polk for each dismounted 


platoon. 


3. Assist in clearing bunkers and destroying BMDs, as required. 

4. Clear anti-vehicular obstacles off Sandt Road, and mark lane@) and position 


guides to pass TF Steel. 


As you allocate resources, you realize there are not enough engineer assets to conduct ail engineer mission support requirements. You bring this to the attention of the S3. 

Engineer 43 
He requests additional assets from the brigade, but tells you to complete the task organization on the assumption that no additional assets will be received. 

Step 3. Develop a sctlerne of engineer operations. The goal of this step is to integrate the following into the maneuver scheme of operations: force allocation, the execution of all engineer tasks identified in Step 2, and engineer priorities. The scheme 

of engineer operations is developed by working the maneuver plan from the line of 

departure, through the attack on Obj Polk, and to consolidation on the objective. When 

you 'bargame" the maneuver plan, keep in mind that all engineer tasks must be accomplished with the assets available. Experiment with different resource allocations, 

keeping in mind the commander's intent, the priority of effort, and TF Bayonet's 

mission. 

As assets become scarce, identify where mobility assets can reasonably be expected 

to complete several tasks. Do not forget mobility assets that are available in the 

maneuver force. Remember, you are the TF engineer, not just the platoon leader. 

Possible Scheme Of Engineer Operations 

Step 4. Balance force allocafiorrs 1vill7 avai1able assets. Infiltration lane South has 

priority. At the end of Phase 1, an engineer platoon is required at Obj Polk, and an engineer squad is required with Company A, on Sandt Road. The commander said that 

surprise and speed are critical to the covert breaches on Obj Polk, so the engineer effort 

at the objective is key. 

Company A will conduct detailed breaching rehearsals with the sappers before crossing the LD. Then, with assistance from the sapper team, they will breach the obstacle on 

Sandt Road. Consider using some of the sappers that went with the scouts. Those 

sapper's hard intelligence about the obstacle could simplify this breach for Company A. 

Two sapper demolition (demo) teams will work with Company C to clear bunkers and 

BMDs on the southern end of the objective. After the southern end is secured, the engineer effort will shift to passing Company B through Company C's breaches to continue 

the assault. The demo teams with Company C will shift to Company B's control to continue the assault on Obj Polk. 

Two engineer squads will be required to breach the obstacles on Sandt Road at the 

objective. One squad probably could complete this task, but speed in breaching these 

two obstacles to allow the passage of TF Steel is critical. Both obstacles must be 

breached and marked at about the same time. Infantry platoonsfrom Company C will 

assist in these breaches. 

Step 5 integrate yourplan into the maneuver course of acfion sketch. Prepare 

a statement describing the scheme of engineer operations. Your statement must include: 

. Task organization for the mission. 

m Engineer mission priorities for each phase. 

m How engineer assets will support the maneuver course of action. 
Engineer Solution 


I 


Figure4 

IVargarne and refine the engineer piair. Visualize the execution of the operation, 

from Phase 1 through Phase 3, through the eyes of the commander. Pay particular attention to any shortfalls with your plan. Be knowledgeable about all other staff members' 

plans, and ensure they are mutually supporting. Remember, this must be a combined 

arms plan. 

After the southern end of the objective is secured, Company B will be passing through 

to continue the assault. Securing the southern end of the objective (Figure 4) has two 

benefits. It will eliminate the overwatching fires on the obstacle located west of Obj Polk, 

and it will allow Company Ato eliminate the LP/OP and breach that obstacle. 

During the wargaming process, you identify a potential problem at the objective. After 

the southern end of Obj Polk is secured, your mission will shift to assisting Company B 

as it passes through Company C's breaches. Simultaneously, the demo teams must 

switch from Company C to Company B and continue the assault. Your other two sapper 

squads must breach the three anti-vehicular obstacles that block Sandt Road on Obj 

Polk, and pass TF Steel through to the east (Figure 5, page 46). To eliminate this potential problem, you decide to place yourself with Company C for the covert breach and to 

clear the obstacles on Sandt Road. Your presence will ensure the smooth transition of 

forces as they support this operation. 

,?r,:,7,-,r:lxcr;r! 2 czgtirsL>r' 7,-tfcjf; According to the commander's intent, the speed of 

the breach is key. Thus, the mobility tasks required to get onto the objective and clear 

Sandt Road are the first priority. Because Company C must conduct a covert breach into 

Obj Polk and clear the southern end of the objective, you recommend attaching two engineer squads plus two teams from a third squad to Company C (Figure 6, page 46). 

Company B requires.Wo demo teams, which will be picked up as Company B passes 

Engineer 45 
Flgure5 

through Company C's breaches. Company A requires another squad to breach the 

obstacle on Sandt Road, but assets are not available. Therefore, a sapper team that 

worked with the scouts will link up with Company Aand assist in the breach. If the sapper team fails to link up with Company A, previously developed and rehearsed contingency plans will be implemented. 

You will locate with Company C during the covert breach operation. By doing this, 

you can ensure the demo teams' transition is completed as planned, the vehicle lanes 

on Sandt'Road are cleared and marked, and that guides are in position to pass TF 

Steel through to their objective. 

Task Organization 

Figure6 I I 

This Engineer Problem/Soiution was submitted by Captain Scoti Lind, a writer/nstnictor in the 

Department of instruction at the Engineer School. He has previously served as an observer controller at the Joint Readiness Training Centec assistant division engineer, 6th I. D, (L) Alaska, 

and commander of A Company, 6th Engineer Banalion. 

46 Engineer 
The Ru&f Trap: 

Hastening the In-Stride Breach 


By Captain Stephen R. Hesler 

and 

Captain Ronald N. Light 
The bullet trap set, as tested at the 

National Training Center (NTC) and 

Fort Bennlng. Used by combat engineers in force-on-force exercises, 

the bullet trap proved easy to use 

and effective in clearing trip wires. 

learing trip wires complicates the already difficult 

and dangerous job of clearing 

minefields and other obstacles. 

The Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center 

(BRDEC), and Fort Benning's 

72nd Engineer Company have 

come up with an equipment 

proposal to make the job faster 

and easier. 

In April 1989, Frank Tucker, a 

civilian engineer at BRDEC, 

trained with the 72nd Engineers 

at the National Training Center 

(NTC) at Fort Irwin. His trip to 

the NTC was part of the Design 

Engineers Field Experience 

With Soldiers (DEFEWS) program. During his visit, Tucker 

recognized that the current 

method of clearing obstacles of 

booby trap wires was slow and 

dangerous. 

The current method of using 

grapnel hooks to clear trip wires is 

extremely slow. It takes an experienced engineer four to five 

throws to clear a 100-meter minefield of trip wires. The in-stride 

breach, probably the most challenging and difficult combined 

arms task, must be executed 

rapidly. 

Unfortunately, using a grapnel 

hook to clear trip wires nearly 

doubles the amount of time 

needed to conduct an in-stride 

breach. In addition, even with 

rigorous training, the cord attached to the grapnel hook 

routinely tangles, exposing the 

sapper team to additional enemy 

fire. 

In the quest for a "better mouse 

trap" for trip wires, we contacted 

Dr. David Stefanye, a senior 

48 Engineer 
"...The bullet trap takes the combat 

engineer one step closer to being 

able to match the momentum of 

modern mechanized warfare." 

scientist at BRDEC. Stefanye suggested usinga bullet trap to propel 

the grapnel out into obstacle 

areas. 

Commercial bullet traps are 

hollow metal cylinders about a 

foot long which slip over the muzzle of a weapon. True to their 

name, they "trap" a live round as 

it leaves the rifle bore, and are 

propelled forward by the force of 

the round. 

While the idea seemed to be 

workable, a couple of problems 

had to be solved. We recognized 

that using live rounds with a bullet trap would be impractical for 

training scenarios. First, they 

might pose a safety hazard to op 

posing forces during field exercises. Secondly, they had to be 

reusable (commercially available 

bullet traps are useless after one 

c..:--\
 Ilrlllg,. 

With the assistance of Steve 

Bennett, a design engineer at 

BRDEC, blank rounds provided 

a tentative solution. But tests 

with standard Army 

showed thev were not ~owerful 

enough to project the trap more 

than a few meters. However, a 

special high-powered blank 

manufactured by an Israeli company produced enough force to 

propel a 300-gram bullet trap 

more than 250 meters. After 

Bennett redesigned the trap 

to maximize its reusability 

and wire-catching capability, 

BRDEC again contacted the 

field test, and provide soldier 

comments on its usefulness. 

In January 1990, DEFEWS participants David Nelson and Mike 

Stumbaugh accompanied the 

72nd in field exercises at Fort Benning. In force-on-force exercises, 

the 72nd Engineers, Nelson, and 

Stumbaugh all found the device to 

be a success. 

Using the bullet trap to clear 

wire obstacles cut an engineer's 

exposure time by about 90 percent. They also found that the bullet trap could be fired "uttoned 

up" inside a tracked vehicle. This 

protected soldiers from enemy 

sh'~.pnel, small am, and chemical agents. 

extensive test the bullet trap came when the 72nd 

deployed with the 197th Infantry 

Brigade to the NTC in February 

1990. Mike Pocratsky, another 

DEFEWS participant, accompanied the unit. He brought with 

him four sets of the device, each 

consisting of a machined aluminum bullet trap and a packtray, 

which holds the attached nylon ..line. 

During force-on-force and live 

fire exercises, the 72nd Engineers 

successfully employed the new 

bullet trap. The trap proved to be 

a fast, safe, and reliable way of 

clearing obstacles of trip wires. 

The device is simple to use and 

inexpensive to produce. In addition, its use is not limited to engineers. Mechanized infantry 

and other combat units could use 

As a toal for conducting the instride breach, the bullet trap takes 

the combat engineer one step 

closer to being able to match the 

momentum of modern mechanized 

warfare. 

The bullet trap is currently undergoing further study by BRDEC 

and the Engineer School's Directorate of Combat Developments. 

Y 


Captain Hesler is attending 

graduate school at Loyola 

University. An infantry officer, 

he previously served as a research and development coordinator at BRDEC, Fort Beluoir. He also served as a 

company commander and staff 

officer with the 194th Armored 

Brigade, and as a platoon 

leader with the 1st Armored 

Division. He is a graduate of 

the Infantry Officers Advanced 

Course. 

Captain Light is attending 

graduate school at the Uniuersity of Virginia. He previously 

served as commander of the 

72nd Engineer Company, 197th 

Infantry Brigade, and as a 

company commander for the 

43rd Engineer Battalion. Other 

assignments include battalion 

S-4, battalion maintenance officer, and platoon leader. He is 

a graduate of the Engineer Officers Advanced Course, and 

holds a bachelor's degree in environmental sciences and tech72nd Engineers. The company the bullet trap with equal nical writing from Pennsylwas asked to give the device a I success. vania State University. 

Engineer 49 
By First Lieutenant Walter P. Cole 

-

or engineers, nation assistance missions pro- 

- - vide challenges that are unique to each 

country. Climate, the quality and availability of 

materials and equipment, and even the current 

political situation are all factors which can wreak 

havoc with even the most carefully planned construction schedule. 

When the Laotian government asked the United 

States for assistance in building rural schoolhouses, the 84th Engineer Battalion, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, took up those challenges. 

From December 1990 to May 1991, soldiers of 

the battalion were in Laos to conduct site surveys 

of three possihle school locations in Xepon, Xam 

Neua, and Muang Nong. This article covers the construction of a school in late 1991 at Xepon, Laos, 

about five miles from Vietnam. 

: ccess to Xepon was by a five and one-half 

hour ride over 130 miles of difficult roads 

50 Engineer 

,-

Air service to the site was not available. Entry to 

the school building site was made by constructing a 

one-half mile road (combat trail) from the main 

route. Transporting materials up this trail, especially under muddy conditions, later proved to be very 

difficult. 

The school site was covered with dense foliage 

and undergrowth which required clearing. Additionally, the site was suspected to contain unexploded 

ordnance from the Vietnam War. The site location 

provided easy access to construction water from the 

nearby Mekong River. 

.. <,.I .. .,>,,.,lJ;r,~,i,.-: , 

he design for the five-room, enclosed school 

- . (see diagram, page 52) had to consider the 

local availability of materials, and limited manpower, time and equipment. Fairly simple construction techniques were also required. No electrical fixtures or mechanical devices were requested. The 

final design included the following features: 
S Concrete slab on grade 

S CIP-reinforced concrete columns 

CMU block exterior and interior 

walls 

Wooden trusses 

S Corrugated metal roofing 

S Wooden doors and louvered windows 

The structure was single story and offered 2,500 square feet (100'by 25') of 

usable space. The five classrooms were 

divided by interior masonry walls. Based 

on this design, and experience from a previous team deployment in the country, 

the bill of materials @OM) was easily estimated and validated. Planning factors 

for construction outlined in TM 5-333 

were used to establish a 45-day construction period. 

3;'issinn Preparation 

F71he most critical part of mission 

- preparation was selection of the 

construction team. Soldiers from Charlie 

Company were selected for the mission, 

based on their proven construction skills 

and recent experience with similar construction on the Hawaiian island of 

Oahu. 

Team size was limited by the Laotian 

government to the minimum number of 

soldiers necessary to complete the schoolhouse within the scheduled time frame. 

The final team consisted of 12 soldiers, including a 

platoon leader, platoon sergeant, carpenters and 

masons, two communications specialists, and a 

Special Forces medic. 

The communications specialists were responsible 

for maintaining round-the-clock contact with the 

American embassy in Vientiane. They also 

provided a back-up communications link with battalion headquarters in Hawaii. The Special Forces 

medic, with his advanced medical training, was 

necessitated by the total lack of medical support at 

Xepon. 

Other preparations included renting two 

9-cubic-foot concrete mixers to be shipped along 

with the team's tool kits. Such mixers were not 

available in Laos, and a mobile, light-weight mixer 

was not on the unit's TO&E (tables of organization 

and equipment). 

Execution 

mhe advance party left from Hawaii on Septem-

.. ber 14, 1991. Their tasks included: 

Locating and purchasing all construction 

materials (except for louvered windows, which 

came from Hawaii). 

s Coordinating transportation of all materials to 

thesite and staging the materials. 

m Coordinating and validating the clearing and 

grubbing of the site. 

S Surveying the site for unexploded ordnance, 

with the assistance of the 6th Explosive 

Ordnance Detachment from Hawaii. 

Coordinating the movement of the main body 

and supplies into Laos. 

Establishing the base camp. 

Chlna 

Vientiane . 

Thailand 
Floor Plan 

From the outset, the project's planned schedule 

had to be changed. Previously coordinated transportation for the advance party fell through, which 

directly affected the party's ability to locate and 

procure materials. Fortunately, a hotel owner in 

the region assisted the team with their transportation needs--saving the project from serious delay 

Additional time delays were experienced in locating 

a bulldozer and letting a contract for its use in site 

clearing. Some difficulty was also experienced in 

finalizing the size of an accompanying Laotian 

security force, and settling their payment 

requirements. 

But these challenges were minor compared to 

the team's discovery that the central government 

had placed a ban on timber cutting. Since lumber 

of the sizes and quantities necessary for the project 

were not in stock at lumber yards, the ban 

threatened the entire project. Fortunately, the 

Laotian liaison assigned to the team worked with 

the mayor of Savannakhet to have the ban temporarily lifted for the project. All of these events 

caused a one-week delay in the start of 

construction. 

As soon as the main body and the construction 

materials arrived in Xepon, the remnants of a 

typhoon dumped heavy rain on the area for five 

straight days. Because of the site's remote location, 

with tents providing the only shelter, the use of 

power tools was halted during these rains. The construction schedule had to be revised once again. 

To make the best of the difficult circumstances, 

52 Engineer 

Schc 

v-... 

the team concentrated on preparing the pad and 

footers. This was made significantly easier by the 

amount of water that had soaked into the ground. 

During the Laotian dry season, the required 

earthwork would have required many hours of 

hard labor. With approximately 300 linear feet of 

footers to dig for the pad, this would have taken 

considerable time and effort. 

In addition to making it easier to dig, the unwelcome rain provided another unexpected benefit. 

The site didn't have its own water source for construction of concrete placements and other construction needs. The team had a water truck, but it was 

empty after two concrete placements of about 10 

cubic yards each. The heavy rains made the access 

trail impassable for the truck, and it was unable to 

reach the river to get more water. But rain had collected in the footing excavations. Using an electric 

water pump, the team collected this water for construction use over several days-until the truck 

could be refilled at the river. 

The early bout of poor weather forced the team 

to rethink all phases of the construction schedule 

to accommodate the possibility of more inclement 

weather. One such change was to complete all 

perimeter walls before beginning the interior walls. 

This allowed the roofing system to be completed as 

quickly as possible. Then, if more heavy rain or 

wind occurred, inside work on the building could be 

tackled under cover. 

While constructing the walls, the team came 

across the first of several material obstacles. The 
concrete blocks used for the school walls presented 

several challenges. The blocks in Laos are of relatively poor quality, and selection is limited. In 

Savannakhet, only 3-inch-thick blocks were available. These blocks tended to be brittle and dirnensions varied by as much as a one-half inch fmm 

block to block. Additionally, the height of these 

blocks was only 7 114 inches-three-eighths of an 

inch shorter than originally expected. As a result, 

the dimensions of the windows and doors of the 

school had to be changed. Field design change 

were also made in wall height and to the tie-in of 

the walls with the roofing system. 

Other problems were encountered with metal 

roofing and with plywood. The roof of the school 

was designed for 20 gauge corrugated metal, but 

the only roofing available in Laos was much thinner. So thin, in fact, that it could not support a 

person's weight, and dented easily when nailed to 

the wooden trusses. Extreme care was required to 

avoid such denting. It was also important to sequence roof construction to avoid any load on installed roofing panels. 

The thickness of available plywood also caused 

problems. In Savannakhet, the thickest plywood 

available was one-eighth inch. Because of its susceptibility to warping, this plywood was too thin to 

be used in the ceiling. As a result, the team had to 

special order three-eighths inch plywood from 

Vientiane. 

While these difficulties caused project delays, 

overcoming them with locally available solutions 

provided all members of the team with valuable experience in dealing with unexpected site problems. 

0bsal~:rtiorls 

'rnhe team used very little equipment to con-

- - struct the school. Major items included two 

concrete mixers, two 3kwh (kilowatts per hour) generators, an electric water pump, and various hand 

power tools. 

A significant challenge was placing more than 60 

cubic yards of concrete with only two small mixers 

and ten men. In the hot climate of Laos, concrete 

sets quickly, requiring a fast placement rate. Both 

mixers were operated simultaneously to maintain 

an adequate rate. This taxed the stamina of the soldiers, who had to repeatedly lift 110-pound bags of 

cement to keep the mixers charged. This operation 

required the use of the entire team, yet daiIy concrete placement never exceeded 15 cubic yards. 

With limited equipment and repair parts, maintenance was critical. Loss of any equipment could 

have caused failure of the entire mission. Roundthe-clock maintenance on all equipment was required to ensure continued operations. 

Complicating the maintenance problem was the 

poor quality of fuel in Laos. The low-grade fuel 

caused fouling of the spark plugs and fuel delivery 

systems. Constant cleaning of engine systems was 

required to overcome the problem. 

The small team was hit hard by personnel losses 

during the deployment. One soldier was lost due to 

an emergency leave, one was medically evacuated 

to Thailand because of illness, and three others contracted Dengue Fever. However, redoubled efforts 

on the part of the remaining engineers pulled the 

mission through. 

(Continued on page 61) 

- / me new SChOolhouS8 in 

/. Xepon, Laos. Despite --- many difficulties with 
, 

MOS Consolidation: 

The consolidation of Career 

Management - Field (CMF) 12

for comhat eneineers - continues to

he a major thrust in the Engineer 

School. Military occupation specialties (MOS) 12B, 12C, and 12F 

will consolidate into MOS 12B 

(Combat Engineer) beginning in 

the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 1994. 

This article supplements and up 

dates information presented in 

previous issues of ENGINEER 

(April 1991 and February 1992). 

The final concept approved by MG 

Christman on February 11,1992 will 

reduce the number of MOSs, improve upward mobility for soldiersin 

grades E-6 and E-7, and provide eonsistent promotion opportunities for 

all CMF 12 soldiers. Beginning in 

the 3rd quarter of FY 94-

- MOS 12B and 12F will become 

12B at the initial entry level and 

will continue as 12B through all 

skill levels of CMF 12 (see figure). 

- MOS 12C will track separately 

from the initial entry level through 

skill level 20. It will merge into 12B 

at skill level 30. 

- MOS 12Bwill consist of all CMF 

12MOSs from skill level 30 through 

skill level 40. 

Several time-consuming actions 

must occur before the consolidation 

can take effect. The Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel Integration 

(DCSPI) (formerly the U.S. Army 

Personnel Integration Center, 

USAPIC), is the coordinating agency 

responsible for officially effecting 

and documenting changes to CMFs. 

The DCSPI process adheres to 

Military Occupation Classification 

windows and takes about 18months 

to complete. During this process the 

DCSPI notifies the United States 

Recruiting Command (USAREC), 

who then implement a program to 

revise contracts, advertisements, 

and marketing used to recruit new 

Its Time Mas Come! 

CMFl2 Consolidation 

ANCOC 

soldiers. Concurrently, course design 

and development efforts at the Engineer Center and the publication of 

Soldier Training Publications require almost a year to complete. 

A plan is in place to ensure CMF 

12 soldiers receive proper resident 

training: 

The 12B10 (12B and 12F) soldiers 

will receive One Station Unit 

Training (OSUT) that is similar 

to current 12B training. The new 

course will provide additional 

training in vehicle operations, 

with emphasis on vehicles normally found in mechanized 

bat engineer units. 

The 12C10 soldiers will track 

separately and receive OSUT 

training similar to their current 

nmmam 

merged is the major change. 

The 12B30 BNCOC students 

will receive skill level 30 training on all bridging and combat 

engineering tasks taught in the 

resident course.

.~h~ CMF 12 *dvanced course 

(ANCOC) will remain as it is 

today. 

B~~~~ all MOS~merge at 

1,1 30, BNCOC trainingwillbe criti. 

cal, ?t, -ive &tation, heei&t 

BNCOC institutions must 

pmvlde training in all subid 

identified in the program of hwc. 

tion, without exception. Adtation 

is the critical gate for thisadion. 

The consolidation of CMF 12 will 

improve upward mobility for our engineer soldiers. Smart and efficient 

training will be critical to the suc- '~-

At the 12B30 level9 the Basic 

NCO Course (BNCoC) inelude Common Leader Training, 

technical skill levels 1 and 2 

54 Engineer By Captain James A. Price 

cess of the consolidation and to the 

on-going success of our soldiers and 

units. Engineer leaders must work 

together to make this happen, 

refresher training, and skill 

level 3 training. The addition of 

refresher training on tasks 

NCOs were not responsible for 

before 12B, 12F and 12C 

cVtainp~ceis chief of the course ~ ~~ ~ DOTD, ~ ~ at the h ~

Engineer School. Hepreviously sewed 

with the 16th Engineer Battalion and 

the 20th Engineer Brig&. 
Engineers Aid War on 


By Sergeant Galen R. Putnam 

Armed with dozers, graders 

and dump trucks, soldiers 

from the 39th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat) at Fort Devens recently 

played a vital role as part of the 

Department of Defense's (DOD) 

contribution to the President's 

National DN~ Control strategy. 

From July to October of 1991, 

the battalion's Alpha, Charlie and 

Headquarters Companies deployed to Arizona to build and 

upgrade border roads, and construct support facilities--such as 

helipads and training ranges-as 

part of Operation Borderline. 

The large-scale operation, 

which falls under the auspices of 

Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) (see 

accompanying article, inset), has 

provided a badly needed senrice to 

law enforcement agencies in the 

region. 

"The work that the 39th has 

done for us has been an absolute 

blessing,"saidTheoHudson,intelligence officer for the Border 

Patrol's Tucson Sector. The Border Patrol simply didn't have the 

funding, equipment or expertise to 

build the roads or facilities that 

the engineen have provided. To 

put it simply, the Army has 

changed the face of drug smuggling in these parts." 

At first glance it may not seem 

like it, but the key to interdicting 

drug smugglers and illegal aliens 

crossing the Mexico-Arizona border is a dusty road which has been 

carved out of the desert by the 

39th. To the untrained eye, it's a 

simple dirt road; but it is a vast 

improvement over the rugged trail 

that formerly meandered along 

the rusted, three-strand barbed 

wire Tence-often gaping with 

holes-which marks the international border. 

The Border Patrol not only uses 

the now-negotiable mad to patrol 

the expansive border with ease, 

but also to gather information on 

who or what has crossed the 

border. 

'The border road is terribly important. It is the fundamental 

For the 39th Englneers, the roadbulldIng enemy was elther 

Engineer 55 
element in our intelligencegathering effort. Everything else 

is based on that," said Hudson. 

The road tells us how much traffic 

is crossing and where. It's our 

number-one intelligence-gathering tool." 

The road is dragged daily, much 

like a baseball diamond, in order 

to keep it smooth. When the Border Patrol detects vehicle tracks or 

footprints crossing the road, they 

not only learn where border crossings are taking place, they can estimate who crossed and when. 

The idea is simple but effective, 

according to Hudson. ''First of all, 

since we know when the road was 

last dragged, we can approximate 

when the crossing took place. 

When we examine the footprints, 

we can get a good idea of who 

crossed. For example, if a large 

number of people crossed and 

there are children's footprints, in 

most cases that will be a group of 

illegal aliens coming across the 

border. If there are only one or two 

sets of prints and they appear to 

be men's-but the steps are very 

short-that might indicate someone carrying a heavy load. That's 

how a lot of drugs are smuggled 

across the border. People simply 

carry as much across as they can." 

By examining the footprints, the 

Border Patrol can estimate how 

many pounds of narcotics may 

have been carried across the border by multiplyingan average-size 

load of 40 pounds by the number of 

suspect tracks found. Most importantly, however, freshly-made 

tracks can lead agents to those 

who have crhssed illegally. 

Through trial and error and 

sheer persistence, smugglers continue to search for ways to foil the 

Border Patrol, even going so far as 

to strap carpet or foam rubber to 

their shoes to conceal their tracks. 

Thanks to the new border roads, 

such tactics will become increasingly unproductive for smugglers. 

'They've got a lot of tricks up their 

sleeves," said Hudson. 'But the 

improved road surface really gives 

us the upper hand." 

Hudson points out that although the Border Patrol possesses an array of high-tech detection 

equipment-including motion 

Charlie Company 

First Sergeant 

George J. Ruo 

ground-guldes a 

Bton truck 

during culvert 

construction. 

(Photo by Galen 

Putnam) 

sensors and night-vision gogglesthe road is still the most important 

tool they have. 'That's an awful 

long border. We can't just place 

agents or detection equipment 

along the border at random," he 

said. '?f we did that, we would 

spend 90 percent of our time chasing deer. By being able to determine where cmssings are taking 

place, we best know where to place 

our resources." 

Although it may seem to be 

easier to simply erect a solid barrier along the border, that can't be 

done for a number of reasons. 

'There is no way to keep people 

out," explained Hudson. 'We don't 

have the money to build or maintain a Berlin Wall-type of structure along the border. Nor do we 

have the manpower to adequately 

man that type of structure. The 

border is just too long. We also 

have to take international relations into consideration. The border is a very sensitive issue." 

With a wall out of the question, 

the Border Patrol is pleased with 

the additional interdiction capabilities the new road offers. 'The 
Army is doing an outstanding job, 

so good in fact, that I predict a 60 

to 70 percent reduction in drugs 

coming across the border in the 

areas where the engineers have 

put in the new road,"said Hudson. 

While the border roads will be a 

boon to the Border Patrol, the 

other projects that the 39th 

worked on will be just asvaluable. 

One of these projects is the recently completed Federal Law Enforcement Training Center range, 

built by the battalion's Headquarters Company in Marana, 

Arizona, near Phoenix. The range, 

which will be used by various law 

enforcement agencies, features a 

30-point pistol range with 50, 25, 

15, 7, and 3-yard firing lines-all 

with overhead cover. There is also 

a 360-degree, turn-and-shoot, 

combat-style range. A large support building was also provided. 

In preparing the range, the company hauled, placed, and compacted more than 20,000 cubic 

yards of material. In all, that 

comes to approximately 2,850 

dump truck loads of dirt. They 

finished the job in 30 days. 

The importance of the mission 

which his soldiers performed 

wasn't last on Lieutenant Colonel 

Kurt L. Kratz, commander of the 

39th. 'This isn't like an FTX or 

going to the NTC: you don't just 

leave and then assess how you've 

done afterwards," he said. "Here, 

we have actual customers who expected the Army to leave them 

with something they need." 

While the emphasis was to provide support to others, the 39th 

reaped benefits as well. 'We could 

have stayed in a hotel, rented our 

equipment, and worn yellow hard 

hats, but the Army and the taxpayers spend a lot of money to 

make sure that we can do our job 

under fir+with Kevlar on our 

heads." said Kratz. 'You can't hire 

a contractor when bullets are 

flying. That's why we did it this 

way. This is thekt passible training for an engineer battalion." 

They are indeed training in a 

realistic environment-the only 

things missing are the flying bullets. '%omen consists of a small 

compound of camouflage-covered 

tents ringed with barbed wire. The 

"doorman" wears, not a tux, but 

full battle gear-nd guests aren't 

welcome. At least the mess tent 

serves hot meals.. .sometimes. 

The desert projects have also 

provided opportunities for many of 

the battalion's soldiers to try different skills. 

"Since we don't have a great 

number of heavy equipment 

operators, we've cross trained 

many of our 12Bs. It's exciting for 

the guys to work on the heavy 

equipment," said Kratz. "Now 

they can step in and fill another 

important role if needed. That 

gives me tremendous flexibility as 

a commander and gives them a 

precious skill which is needed in 

the battalion." 

Although the deployment has 

been challenging at times, Kratz 
- - 

"The elements presented a challenge, but the guys really pulled 

together and did a great job," said 

Captain Mark Morin, the company commander. "Of course, 

safety was a major concern hecause of the elements, but thanks 

to our NCOs, we've had an outstanding safety record." 

After completing the range, the 

unit packed up and left the desert 

floor, heading 150 miles southeast-and 5,000 feet upinto the 

mountains near Naco, Arizona. 

There, the mission changed from 

vertical construction to roadbuildinz.- Said Morin, "The company adjusted well. Really, it's just like 

taking a hammer and pounding in 

an eight-penny nail, then switching to a ten-penny nail. The hammer is adaptable to both jobs." 

While building 6.2 miles of horder road near Naco was the crux of 

Soldlers from the 

39th reinforce a dlrt 

road after heavy 

rains damaged it. 

(Photo courtesy 

U.S. Border Patrol) 

der Patrol Station. 

'The soldiers have done an outstanding job," said First Lieutenant Mark Guevara, company 

executive officer. "They are very 

proud of the job they did, because 

they know it's a real-life mission. 

They know that the contribution 

they made will help save lives and 

stem the flow of drugs into the 

United States." 

Despite the work load, the 

spirits of the soldiers remained 

high. Said Specialist Darrel J. 

Freund, a heavy equipment operator, 'The guys have done an excellent job, as good or better than 

any civilian contractor can do." 

Alpha 

nuring the project, Alpha 

!1 company had been hivouacked on the outskirts of 

Nogales, Arizona, about a onehour drive southwest of Fort 

maintains that despite the 

hardships, it has been extremely 

worthwhile. 

"This has been a tremendous 

learning experience," he said. 'We 

took on a big mission and now I've 

got a lot of soldiers, NCOs and 

officers who will be leading battalions someday who have now 

seen that you can take something 

as big as this-and do it right! 

Something like this really makes 

you feel proud. Not only do we get 

great training, but we know that 

we are leaving something tangible 

behind." 

Headquarters Company 

maving perhaps the most 

- ..diverse mission of the 

battalion's companies in Operation 

Borderline, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company went from 

one extreme to the other, both in 

climate and ~roiects. 


Beginning in the mid-Arizona 
 A 
 ., 
 the company's joh in the moun- Huachuca. The company's mistains, it was also tasked to fabri- desert basin at Marana, the com- sion: build two roads and a 

pany encountered 115 to 120-de- cate 24 cement abutments for cat- weapons training facility. 

gree Fahrenheit temperatures tle guards, erect 300 feet of fence The roads+ne a border "drag" 

which forced them to work the at the Naco Border Patrol Station, road, the other an access road to 

"graveyard shift" while building and wire and install a lightingsys- the training facility-totaled more 

the firing range. tem at the Douglas, Arizona, Bor- than nine miles. Along the way, 

58 Engineer 
the engineers had to install 19 culverts, five fords, and seven cattle 

guards. 

The training faciiit~whiih will be 

used by the U.S. Customs Servioe 

and mnal law enfoment agenciq consists of a 100-meter rifle 

range with overhead cover, thm 50-

meter pistol ranges with overhead 

cover, and a support buii with 

classmoms and latrines, 

"Things went very well and 

everybody had adapted well to the 

field," said First Lieutenant Allen 

Brannan, company executive officer. "...what we did is such a shot 

in the arm for the law-enforcement agencies who are fighting 

the war against drugs, the soldiers 

really dug in and did a great job. 

They put aside the hardships and 

concentrated on doing the best job 

they could. They really took pride 

in what they were doing." 

That pride is particularly evident 

in the 90 peroent equipment online rate, achieved despite the constant punishment the desert work 

inflicts. On top of that, they did it 

at their own on-site, makeshift 

motor pool-without engineer sup 

port from Fort Huachuca. 

-

'You can't get the job done if you 

don't have the equipment to do it," 

said Brannan. 'The maintenance 

guys have really done a great job. 

They've really kept us ahead of the 

game." 

When it comes to building roads, 

however, getting the equipment 

into operational condition is only 

the beginning. It takes qualified 

heavy equipment operators to get 

the mammoth graders, rollers, 

dump trucks and other vehicles 

into the field to get the job done. 

Since the 39th is a combat engineer battalion, one asset they 

lack is a surplus of heavy equipment operatoea problem they 

solved through cmss training. 

'We did a lot of cross training," 

said Brannan. 'We got a number of 

our combat engineers trained and 

working on heavy equipment, 

which is something they rarely, if 

ever, get a chance to do. It was a 

good learning experience for 

everybody." 

Charlie 

Fn contrast to the hilly, almost 

..lush terrain near Nogales, 

.--.a . ,, 8 

%---

C 

where Alpha Company worked, 

Charlie Company found itself 

working along a long, straight, 

dusty, and lifeless stretch of border road. Besides fellow soldiers 

and equipment, the only other 

things around for miles were 

scrub brush, a few birds, and an 

occasional whirlwind. 

The engineers of Charlie Company began their mission near 

Douglas, Arizona, about an hourand-a-half drive southeast of Fort 

Huachuca. Their task was to 

upgrade 27 miles of border road, 

heading west from Douglas 

toward Naco. Along that stretch, 

they installed 18cattle guards, 10 

culverts, and eight fords. The unit 

was also tasked to construct a 60- 

by-60 foot concrete helicopter pad 

with marking lights and windsock, a grounding rod tiedown system, and a 150-foot sidewalk for 

the Border Patrol. 

Challenges included rains that 

washed out portions of newly completed road. 'We were flexible 

from the start, so the rains really 

didn't set us back at all," said company commander Captain Tom 

Anhut. 'We turned it into a 

-	 A Border Patrol 

vehicle smooths a 

border road. The 

next morninq, 

-". footprints across 

- I the smooth dirt will 

I 	

Indicate a likelv 

Illegal crossing. 

(Photo courtesy 

U.S. Border patrol) 

Engineer 59 
learning experience so, ina way, it 

was actually beneficial." 

After completing the work near 

Douglas, Charlie packed up and 

relocated to Naco, where they 

started work on another stretch of 

border road. Here, the mission 

was to head west to meet Headquarters Company, which was 

upgrading the road in an easterly 

direction from their location in 

Palominas. 

'This was a great training opportunity for the company," said 

Anhut. '%eing 2,500 miles from 

home in the field for two-and-ahalf months gave us an unparalleled chance to evaluate our young 

leaders and for them to show what 

they can do." 

Despite the grueling work and 

the length of the deployment, 

many of Charlie's soldiers remained upbeat, and said they 

were glad to make a contribution 

to the war against drugs. 

On a job site during the deployment, Corporal James Conley, an 

engineer mechanic, perhaps 

summed upthe Operation Borderline for the soldiers of the 39th: 

Y3eing down here is for a good purpose, a good cause. Even though 

this is keeping me away from my 

family, it's worth it to me because 

I'm so much against drugs. Most of 

the guys here feel the same wayespecially guys with kids.We don't 

want our kids to be exposed to 

drugs, and this is just one way 

that we can help make sure that it 

won't happen." Y 

Sergeant Putnam is a photojournalist assigned to the U.S. Army 

Intelligence School, and is stationed 

at Fort Devens. He is a graduate of 

the Department of Defense Infonation School's photojourna2ist and 

editor courses. 

Sergeant Putnam's article is 

reprinted with permission 

from the Fort Devens post 

newspaper, TheDispatch. 

By Colonel c 

'oint Task Force Six (JTF 

b was established in Novemt 

1989 at the direction of t 

Secretary of Defense. its missi 

Is to employ forces and cond! uct 

training in support of federal, sta te, 

and local law enforcement agt ?ncies throughout the Southwest border region in order to help counter 

the flow of illegal drugs into the 

United States. 

That mission is no small undert; aking. The Task Force's area of ope rations includes the four border stat tes 

of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, a 

Californiea land area of more th 

600,000 square miles. 

JTF-6 is headquartered at Fort 

Bliss, Texas, and is underthe control 

of an Army brigadier general. The 

headquarters staff is responsible for 

the planning and coordination of all 

military support requested by law 

enforcement agencies. if operational support is appropriate, the task 

force identifies the unit which will 

provide the support, ensures the unit 

is operationally ready to deliver thc 

support, and exercises control of the 

unit conducting the mission. 

During its first year of operation, 

JTF-6 planned and coordinated 

more than 200 requests for support 

from 30 different federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies. To 

date, that figure has grown to more 

than 525, in support of more than 

180 different law enforcement 

agencies. 

Support provided to law enforcement agencies included engineer 

construction and repair, ground 

reconnaissance and suweiiiance, 

terrain denlal, transportation, sensor 

and signal interception, the training 

of law enforcement officers in 

military related skills, and the loan of 

tary equipment and personnel. 

ingineer support to drug law en- 

:ement agencies presents some 

que challenges. in addition to 

providing coordination between the 

requesting agency and Army units, 

the JTF-6 staff engineer must also 

ensure that the Army meets all 

provisions of the various environmental laws. These include the Na- 

+iniai ,,", Environmental Protectlon Act, 

the National Historic Preservation 

~ct ,the various Threatened and Endarigered Species Acts, the Native 

erican Graves Protection and 

3atriation Act, the Native AmerI Religious Freedom Act, and AR 

200-2. 

Compliance with these laws is 

coordinated through the four Army 

Corps of Englneer Districts that 

cover the border states. In addition. 

rights of entry must be obtained from 

all affected landowners, memorandums of agreement developed for 

state and public land access, and 

applications made for Section 404 

?an Water Act) permits. 

:inally, the requesting agency 

st pay for materials required for 

,,,, mission. The engineer staff assists them with developing a bill of 

materials, contracting, and in some 

cases, even locating funding. 

The assistance process begins 

with a support request forwarded 

from the requesting drug law enforcement agency to Operation Alliance. Alliance, collocated with JTF6, is a coordinating agency manned 

by representatives of the various 

federal, state, and local drug law 

enforcement agencies. 

Operation Alliance reviews the request and forwards it to JTF-6. The 

staff engineer receives the request 

and coordinates a site visit for an 

60 Engineer 
inltlal assessment. These 

ing assessments are frequenr~y 

farmed out to units possessing the 

required capability (horizontal or 

vertical), or to Engineer Officer Advanced Course students during their 

seventh eighth weeks of 

training. 

Once ,.,,.-.ed, these estimates 

provide the planning details needed 

by JTF-6 to determine If the work 

can be performed by military engineer units. Be fore a mi: ;sion can 

be accepted for executior1, it must 

provide mission essential task list .. ... training for the unit, provlae a oenetlt 

to the nation's counter-drug effort, 

and the requestor must be able to 

provide the necessary funds for 

materials. 

A successful Initial site visit 

leads to a follow-on detailed site 

visit by members of the Army unit 

most ilkely to be assigned the 

project. Following the initial site 

visit, all of the various environmental studies, agency coordinations, and real estate actions are 

also initiated. During the follow-on 

site visit, a bill of materials will be 

developed for the customer's 

review. It will provide the unit the 

information it needs to prepare a 

detailed operations order. 

Needless to say, this can be a 

complex, torturous process which 

can be easily halted along the way 

by environmental concerns, uncooperative landowners, or the discovery of archaeological sites. 

During the past year, JTF-6 has discovered more than 140 previousiy 

unknown historical sites, more than 

half of which were eligible for inclusion in the National Register of 

Historic Places. Projects had to be 

designed to avoid any impact to 

these sites. Likewise, the task force 

has discovered a number of 

threatened and endangered species 

along the border. 

In the end, it has all proved exceptionally rewarding. Engineers have 

improved nearly 200 miles of border 

roads. constructed seven ranges, 

several operatior IS centers, seven . ..A .,~- helipads, listening ana oos ewation

~.~. posts, boat lauc rich ramp!s, elgnr. 

miles of border fence rep air, and 

numerous other pIrojects. 

The road projects have increased 

access to the border, reduced 

response times to triggered sensors, 

reduced wear and tear on vehicles. 

and contributed to over $100 million 

worth of drug seizures. The fence 

project in California has increased 

drug seizures by 154 percer ~t,illegal 

alien arrests by 228 percc ?nt, and 

reduced incidcPnts of vehicle . .. , . damage due to rOCK tnrowlng trom 

352 in 1990 to less than 20 in 1991. 

The project also reduced crime in 

neighboring communities by more 

than 40 percent. Additionally, the law 

enforcement agencies have been 

appreciative, Army soldiers receive 

excellent training, and taxpa lyers are 

saving money. 

To date, support ha!s been 

' "

provided by Army, Marine, a na Navy 

units, both Active and Reser ve Components. The participatin g Army 

units include the 39th Engin_-. eer Rattalion, 52nd Engineer Battalion, 34th 

Engineer Battalion, 46th Engineer 

Battalion, 43rd Engineer Battalion, 

30th Engineer Battalion, 92nd Engineer Battalion, 244th Engineer 

Battalion, 62nd Engineer Battalion. 

and the 37th Engineer Battalion. 

The chance to improve military skllls 

while supporting law enforcement 

officials is providing unique challenges and unrivaled opportunfties to 

the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

Marines working for JTF-6. 

Acting under Congressional 

authority--while complying with a 

long-standing legal tradition of noninterference in civilian law enforcement--the military has been able to 

provide responsive, quality support 

to the anti-drug effort. And JTF-6 

and Army engineers are playing a 

crltlcal role in the national effort to 

secure a drug-free America. 

Colonel Woodbury is chief of engineers for JTF-6. 

(Continued from page 53) 

Despite the unexpected problems, 

from poor weather to substandard 

materials, the mission was a success. By working from daybreak 

until early evening every day, the 

school was completed in 29 days. It 

was formally turned over to the 

government in a dedication ceremony on November 19. This turnover date met the original completion milestone established prior to 

any construction delays. 

The cost breakdown for the 

Xepon schoolhouse mission includes: 

Equipment Cost 

Deployment $50,000 

(Military Airlift Command) 

Retrograde 13,000 

(Military Airlift Command) 

Personnel 

Per Diem 15,000 

Travel 13,000 

Materials and Service 

Lumber 2,100 

Hardware 6,800 

Block 1,700 

Sand & Gravel 450 

Lime 100 

Land Clearing (Dozer) 600 

Plywood 1,100 

Gas 650 

Caulk 200 

Truck Loading Labor 850 

Truck Transportation 9,300 

Water Truck Rental 2,600 

Currency Conversion 250 

Total $117,700 

C.onclu~icn 

TThe Xepon mission was a com-

. . plete suocess. The engineer 

training was first-rate, and the Army 

served an important role in fostering 

good relations with Laos. But in this 

small part of the "everybody-wins" 

nation assistance program, the real 

winners are the children of Xepon. 

w 


First Lieutenant Cole is a platoon 

leader with Charlie Company, 84th Engineer Battalion. He p~vwuslyserved 

as a staff officer for the 25th Inktry 

Division's assistant diuision engineel: 

He is a gmduate of West Point, and the 

Engineer Oficers Basic Course. 

Engineer 61 
Qbservations From 


By Captain Gordon J.Taras 

while the "lessons learned" swtlieht . " remains on Desert Storm, valuable observations 

are still being gleaned from 

Operation Just Cause in Panama. 

The Engineer School has collected the comments of soldiers 

who participated in the operation, 

and the information is now being 

evaluated for use in updating engineer doctrine. However, many of 

their observations can be used 

now by engineer leaders. 

This article will provide some of 

the engineer experiences and 

recommendations that resulted 

from Just Cause. These observations should be helpful in preparing units for rapid deployment, 

direct combat, and civil-military 

operations. 

Are You 	Prepared To 

Go? 

continuing problem in all 

Adeployments is a shortage 

of airframes. Most units have 

standing operating procedures 

(SOPS) specifying a light package 

of equipment. However, during a 

hectic deployment, it is sometimes difficult to convince the 

maneuver commander that engineer equipment also needs to 

have some measure of priority. 

Make sure that engineer assets 

are included in battalionltask 

force plans for deployment, and 

are prioritized by the mission essential task list (METL).Mass 

is usually the governing factor 

in load planning, but engineerassisted maneuver and sustainment are also critical tasks. 

Sleep is always an issue, both 

during realistic training and actual combat. It's important to plan 

for lack of sleep so soldiers can 

mentally prepare themselves to 

cope with it. In other words, it's a 

lot easier for soldiers to accept that 

they will get no sleep in the next 48 

or 72 hours, than to be left wondering if a sleep plan is in the works. 

There's a lot going on during a 

deployment-but there will be a 

lot more happening once your soldiers hit the combat zone. 

To give more time to your soldiers, try not to 'bver brief." Concentrate briefings on your soldiers' 

area of operations and area of interest. It's an unnecessary distraction and waste of time to track 

every action in the theater of 

operations. Better that they get 

some rest while they can+r at 

least have the peace of mind to 

know what level of fatigue they 

will have to cope with. 

Are You Prepared To 


Fight? 


Adfter iers said they needed more 

the operation, some soltraining in combat skills The first 

of these is MOUT (military operations on urbanid terrain) training. 

Citifs are the centers of transprtation and gwernment. They are also 

the ports of entry for your resupply 

During a rapid deployment situation like Just Cause, these are the 

first places that must be secured. 

Make sure MOUT training is included in your training schedule. 

Also, don't forget that MOUT 

operations are often complicated by 

the presence of civilians. ?ky using 

some of your soldiers as mock 

civilians during MOUT training. 

62 Engineer 
Combat engineers place wire obstacles around the U.S. Embassy during Operation Just Cause. 

these are addressed in FM 90-10 

and FM 90-10-1, most MOUT 

training sites do not include these 

obstacles in training. Insist on 

realism during your unit's urban 

combat training. 

One obstacle not mentioned in 

the manuals is chain-link fencing. 

Engineer units in Panama found 

that simple, garden-variety chainlink fence is a significant obstacle. 

One solution used under fire was 

Bangalore torpedoes placed vertically against such fencing. 

Soldiers also felt tunnel clearance needed more training emphasis. The following are just a 

few tunnel clearance techniques, 

derived from The Tunnels of Cu 

Chi,by Tom Mangold and John 

Penycate: 

Obstacles generally unique 

MOUT combat presented unfamiliar tasks for some engineers. 

Cars, rubble, and trash often litter 

the MOUT environment. While 

Keep five meters apart within 

the tunnel-or within sight 

each other 

Leave one soldier at each intersection 

Avoid using grenades and 

demo while in tunnels (explcsives rob your oxygen) 

Exit with a visual signal (flag 

or rifle)-not your head 

Use infrared light with night 

vision goggles in tunnels 

MOUT vehicle hardening also 

needed work, and Vietnam era lessons learned suggest the following: 

Line vehicle cabs with flack 

vests and sandbags (include 

Protect troop compartments 

with sandbags 

Have a rear gunner in each 

vehicle 

Soldiers also felt they needed to 

be more familiar with the effects of 

weapons on the MOUT environment, inciuding: 

Wood frame structures 

Concrete block 

Mass concrete 

Sandbags 

Vehicles 

m Chain-link fence 

Glass 

~~t~~a tunnel with a minimum of three soldiers 

m Leave two soldiers at the 

entrance 

Engineer 63 

doors, windows, floorboards, 

and seats) 

Protect engines, drive trains, 

and tires with flack vests 
An Army bulldozer takes part In clean-upoperations after the malnflghtlng was over. 

Are You Prepared To I needed more experience in light I ment, these officers could buy the - Stay? vertical construction. Potential needed tools and supplies. 

sources of vertical construction / Many leaders said their soldiers 

I training include: nitial assault forces should 

not expect early relief by fol- .Correspondence courses 

low-on units. If the initial com- .Tpoop COllStruCtion 

bat actions are successful, units 

will transition to stability opera- I rn Barracks maintenance - - tions. Combat engineers will per- m Range facility improvement form civil assistance tasks as 

soon as the fighting winds down. Soldier apprenticeship to the 

These tasks include: / local DEH (Directorate of 

Engineering and Housing) Repair airfields (also a combat 

task) As follow-on engineer activities 

.Restore power, water, and 

sewage systems 

were initiated in Panama, units 

experienced a shortage of hand 

tools. Commanders should explore 

Remove trash 

Clear combat debris from 

mads 

In supporting such operations, trained and authorized to serve as 

Just Cause engineers felt they purchasing officers. On deploythe possibility of purchasing hand 

tools at home station, and assembling tool kits for future deployments. These tools could be sent 

Provide facilities and utilities 

to civil relief organizations 

do nothave enough training with 

unexploded ordnance. The Explosive Ordnance CEO) Reconnaissance Course can provide valuable 

training in this area. All explosive 

ordnance detachments offer this 

40-hour certified course. All 

military policemen are required to 

attend the course-why not all 

engineers? 

Graduates of the course are 

qualified to identify and mark all 

EO. In combat, they areauthorized 

to destroy EO (in place) up to 90 

millimeter. In Just Cause and 

Desert Storm, engineer units 

destroyed massive amounts of 

EO-but some mistakes were 

made. This course will give soldiers first-classtraining on EO and 

help prevent accidents. Of course, 

destmction of large ordnance and 

ammunition stockpiles should be 

left to EO detachments. 

on one of the resupply pallets. 

Another option is to arrange to 

have a couple of your officers 

64Engineer 
Just Cause operations also 

pointed out that commanders of Engineer School Directory corps level engineer assets need to 

analyze their METLs for rapid 

deployment and low intensity conflict GIC). In such operations, initial battlefield requirements call 

for small team missions over wide 

areas. This is primarily because 

immediate combat tasks are a 

higher priority than sustaiiment 

tasks. 

As the battle settles and 

brigades start planning for follow-on missions, corps level assets will be relieved from attachment to forward combat units. 

These assets will then be allowed to reorganize for platoon 

and company missions. However, there will still be a need 

for small slices of equipment. 

Commanders must train junior 

leaders to expect-and cope 

with-a wide variety of missions. 

The Engineer School, in coordination with the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, is now addressing many of these issues by updating doctrine, training, and 

equipment. Engineers having additional comments or suggestions 

should send them to: The Engineer School, Directorate of 

Evaluation and Standardization, 

ATTN: ATSE-ESA (Captain 

Taras), Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

65473, or call DSN 676-5317 or 

(314) 563-6317. Y 

Captain Taras is an evaluation 

officer with the Engineer 

School's Directorate of Eualuation and Standardization. He 

previously served as a liaison 

officer, division tactical command post engineer, and 

platoon leader in the IOlst Airborne Division. He is a 

graduate of the Engineer Officers Advanced Course. He 

received his commission from 

West Point. 

Command8nt 

MG Daniel W. Christman 

ATSE-2 

DSN 676-611 6 

(314)563-6116 

Engineer Center Command 

Sergeant Malor 

CSM Richard N. Wilson 

ATZT-CG-SM 

DSN 676-61 49/61 51 

(314)563-6149161 51 

Assistant Commandant 

BG Joe N. Ballard 

ATSE-AC 

DSN 676-71 17 

(314)563-7117 

Depufy Assistant Commandant 

COLHenry S. Miller, Jr. 

ATSE-DAC 

DSN 676-6330 

(314) 563-6330 

Directorate of Tralnlng and 

Doctrine (DOTD) 

Director 

COL Robert N. Martin 

ATSE-TD 

DSN 676-7740 

(314)563-7740 

Sergeant Major 

SGM Donald E. Rasmus 

ATSE-TD 

DSN 676-7528 

(314)563-7528 

Directorate of Evaluation and 

Standardization (DOES) 

Director 

LTC(P) William T. Maddox 

ATSE-ES 

DSN 676-5270 

(314) 563-5270 

NCOlC 

MSG Archard Unley 

ATSE-ES 

DSN 676-5310 

(314) 563-531 0 

Dlrectorate of Combat 


Developments (DCD) 


Director 

COLFrederick J. Charles 

ATSE-CD 

DSN 676-7955 

(314) 563-7955 

Sergeant Major SGM Serbrempster Hewin 

ATSE-CD 

DSN 676-7880 

(314) 563-7880 

Department of Instruction 

(DOI) 

Director 

COL Charles R. Hugglns 

ATSE-Dl 

DSN 676-5683 

(314)563-5683 

Sergeant Major 

SGM Audiey G. Hendon 

ATSE-Dl 

DSN 676-5752 

(314) 563-5752 

Engineer Personnel 


Proponency Office (EPPO) 


Director 

LTC R. 0.Buck 

ATSE-EP 

DSN 676-6337 

(314) 563-6337 

Sergeant Major 

SGM John Cooper, Jr. 

ATSE-EP 

DSN 676-5354 

(314) 563-5354 

Engineer 65 
eAs 

I ENGINEER UPDATE 

Defense Sysfem Network (DSN) numbers are 676-XXXX and commercial numbers are (314)563-XYXY unless otherwise not&. 

Directorate of Training MOS 52E Self-Development Tests (SDT). The FY 93 SDT will test only the 

and Doctrine 	 Soldier Training Publication (STP) tasks in subject areas I, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 22. 

These subject areas and tasks are in the three 52E STPs dated August 1988. 

Questions will be taken from the references listed at the end of the task summaries. All organizations with 52E NCOs should ensure their library includes 

these references. POC is Jim Evans, -7510. 

Preliminary Self-Development Test Scores (SDT). Analysis of Army-wide 

scores on the SDT show that NCOs are scoring significantly lower on the Training segment than on the Leadership and MOS Specific segments. While no 

engineer soldiers' scores were available for comparisori, NCOs may want to 

spend more time preparing for the Training part of the SDT. POC is Jim Evans, 

-7510. 

Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). Engineer unit CATS is 

scheduled for distribution as a special publication in May. Units are requested 

to use their respective strategy and provide feedback to DOTD on DA Form 

2028 before September 30. ARTEP 5-402-33 (Engineer Brigade and Group 

Headquarters), the first MTP to incorporate CATS, will be fielded in the 3rd 

quarter of FY 93. POC is CPT Frank Barry, -7594. 

Directorate of Combat AN/PSS-12 Hand Held Metallic Mine Detector fielded. Distribution of the 

new ANIPSS-12 hand held mine detectors began on March 20, 1992. The U.S. Deve~opments(DCD) 	 Army Troop Support Command has awarded a contract to purchase the 

Schiebel mine detector, which will replace the aging ANIPSS-11 model. The 

first units equipped will be the 27th, 37th, and 307th Engineer Battalions, Fort 

Bragg; the 13th Engineer Battalion, Fort Ord; and the 326th Engineer Battalion, 

Fort Campbell. POC is SFC Michael Craig, -7993. 

ANIPSS-12 Hand Held Metallic Mine Detector 

lllurtratlon by Richsrd vonnaeger 

66 Engineer 
MICLICDracked Trailer Upgrade. The U.S. Army Tank and Automotive 

Command has accepted the first three tracked trailer kits that will be used to 

upgrade modified M200 trailers. The 24th ID (mech), the first unit to be 

equipped, is scheduled to receive their upgraded trailers by May. Other units 

scheduled to receive the tracked trailers are (in order of priority) the 1st Cav 

Div, 3d ACR, 3d ID (mech), 1st AD, 11th ACR, V Corps, 2d ID, and 1st ID 

(mech). Additional tracked trailers will be designated for the Engineer School, 

the Ordnance School, and the National Training Center, Fort Irwin. POC is CPT 

Jon Siltala, -7323. 

MICLIC/Tracked Trailer 

lllurfiation by Tmmy MorrK 

Field Assistance in Science and Technology (FAST) Program. Field 

Commanders can use the FAST program to get solutions to technical materiel 

problems. The program provides a link between soldiers in the field and scientists and engineers in the Army's research, development and engineering 

centers. In its 5 years of existence, the program has documented many successes, including development of a gun tube exerciser for tanks in storage. For 

information, call your science advisor or FAST Headquarters at DSN 354-5482, 

or (703) 664-5482. POC is Merrill Stevens, -7500. 

Systems Engineering. The Engineer Center makes every effort to purchase 

equipment and field systems that are dependable, easily maintained, and free 

from hazards to operators and maintenance personnel. But no system can be 

designed for every possible environmental condition or operational scenario. 

We need feedback from field personnel about problems encountered on the 

job. Report potential hazards or design flaws in engineer equipment to your 

Safety Engineer (-7346) or Reliability Engineer Team (-796917976). Your input 

will be incorporated into the design process for a new system, or used to 

develop countermeasures to fix the problem. POC is Mark Totzke, -7346 
Department of 

Instruction (DOI) 

Engineer Personnel 

Proponency Office 

(EPPO) 

Unit Designation Terminology Changes. Unit designations have changed 

as a result of the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERi). Field Manual (FM) 101- 

5-1 (Operational Terms and Symbols, dated 1985) will be updated when FM 

100-5 is rewritten in 1993. Until the revised FM 100-5 is available, field units 

should use the following unit designations: 

Division engineers (DIVEN) units: 


Sapper battalion (put type of unit) 


Sapper company (put type of unit) 


(Unit types are: armored, airborne, airassault, light) 


Corps engineer units: 


Combat engineer battalion (put type of unit) 


Combat engineer company (put type of unit) 


Combat support equipment company 


Bridge company (put type of unit) 


(Unit types are: mechanized, wheeled, ribbon, MGB) 


The term "Armored" replaces "Heavy" in maneuver unit designations (TRADOC 

PAM 525-5, 1 August 1991, page 10). We now have armored battalions, light 

battalions, and arrnoredtlight operations. POC is MAJ Kenneth Dobbins, -5802. 

River Crossing Terminology Changes. The Combined Arms Center has 

agreed on terminology for FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations. The manual is 

scheduled for distribution in the 4th quarter of FY 92. A river-crossing operation 

will have four phases: Advance to the river, assault crossing of the river, advance from the exit bank, and secure the bridgehead line. Three forces will be 

involved: 

Bridgehead force - responsible for seizing and securing the bridgehead. 

Support force - responsible for providing direct and indirect fires to the 

bridgehead force and controlling the crossing area. 

Breakout force - responsible for passing through the bridgehead to continue 

combat operations. POC is LTC Allan Carroll, -5807. 

Doctrinal Writers Request Ideas. If you have a system, drill, or workable 

idea to share, send it to the DO1 staff. Good ones may be included in future 

doctrinal field manuals. Send suggestions to U.S. Army Engineer School, Ann: 

ATSE-Dl-TT, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. POC is LTC Allan Carroll, -5807. 

Army Divers Needed. The Army is seeking volunteers for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 006 (Diver). Soldiers who qualify and graduate from the 

Navy Diving and Salvage Training Center will be assigned to Engineer Diving 

Detachments. These detachments provide specialized undetwater support for 

all missions in the Army theater of operations and are presently located in 

Europe, Panama Canal Zone, Korea, and Fort Eustis, Virginia. 

Diving detachments are capable of diving operations involving scuba (selfcontained underwater breathing apparatus) and deep sea surface supplied air 

equipment. Due to the hazardous operating environment, divers receive 
an additional $110 special pay. To apply, soldiers must comply with criteria 

outlined on the Marine Diver Training Application (DA Form 50304, Nov 90). 

For more information, call the Army Liaison Office, Naval Diving and Salvage 

Training Center, DSN 436-5261. POC is SFC Don Eelman, -5706. 

DA Pam 600-3 Revised. Publication of the revised DA Pam 600-3, "Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management," is scheduled for the 

4th quarter of FY 92. The updated pamphlet will clearly define the standards of 

qualification at each grade, delineate key branch assignments in addition to the 

traditional "command track," and illustrate typical Reserve Component developmental patterns and requirements. POC is LTC Buck, -6337. 

EOAC-RC Program Changes. The Engineer Officers Advanced Course-RC 

(EOAC-RC) will change from four phases to two phases in October 1993. Effective October 1, 1992, officers will be unable to enroll in the four-phase 

EOAC-RC program. Officers currently enrolled will have until September 1993 

to complete any remaining phases of the four-phase program. Those who fail to 

do so will be required to take the new two-phase course. This means that work 

done in the old course cannot be carried forward to the new course. 

The new EOAC-RC will consist of Phase I, Correspondence; and Phase II, 

Resident. Officers must be at least a first lieutenant to enroll, and will have two 

years from the date of enrollment to complete the work. The new course is 

designed so that knowledge gained during the correspondence phase will be 

reinforced by practical exercises conducted in the resident phase. 

Enrollment for Phase i (Correspondence) of the new course will begin in 

January 1993. Phase I will contain 120 hours of correspondence studies and 

will be a prerequisite for attendance at Phase II. 

Training for the new Phase II (Resident) EOAC-RC will begin in October 

1993. Phase II will be two weeks of resident training at the Engineer School. 

The Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) catalog, DA PAM 351- 

20, and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) will 

be updated to reflect the new course requirements. 

POC is COL Shoff, -6336. 

Engineer RC Weekend Refresher Classes Cancelled. The Engineer 

School will not conduct engineer RC weekend refresher classes in FY 92. 

Those refresher topics generally are available to the RC through their respective Readiness Group or Engineer Team. 

A 5-day engineer staff refresher course will be taught at the Engineer 

School on September 14-18, 1992. Units can obtain seat quotas for this 

course by calling the Deputy Assistant Commandant-RC office (Ms. Holland) at -774216336. Address questions concerning course content to the 

Department of Instructions (CPT Singleton), -5747. Address questions concerning Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC~) to the Directorate of Training and Doctrice (MAJ Davison), -7522. POC is MAJ 

Davison, -7522. 

Reserve Component 

(RC) 


Engineer 69 
Pnsf in Review 


Csr~s +. Rebuilt Greek lInfras'3;mr~ture


"150 help fi-iendly nations help themselves" 

By Dr. Paul Walker 

when the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers has engaged in 

major international activities during 

the post-World War I1 era, it has 

used its district organization as a 

model to manage the work. The approach is firmly grounded on experience. The Corpr' involvement in 

Greece between 1947 and 1949 set 

the pattern. 

At the end of World War 11, Greece 

stood in virtual ruin. During the Ger1 KNU PnbL oNniiLD 2 BNSDOdN nlRFEL0 

3 KAV~LL~ nnFiLo 


4 ~OZANnlniiLr 

5 SiOtS nIRIIELO 

6 LhR551 nirFlFL0 

7 *C.SS~NnlnilcLo 

8 AGIIINION iliRF'FLD 

9 6iiTSKh dllRF:ELD 

BRIOGES,TUNNELS 

I BRALLO TUNNEL 

2 ERbLLO BRIDGE 

3 bSS0POS BRIOGE AND TUNNEL 

4 6OZ?OOPOT&UOS BRIDGE 

S VbOD&ROV&SSI BRlDGE 

6 COULOUlla slllOGE 

man oecupation, which lasted until 

October 1944, the economy nearly mllapsed. Allied bombing raids 

destroyed miles of railroads and 

devastated the major port cities of 

Salonika, Volm, and Piraeus. A combination of hew military traQic and 

neglect leR the country's highway network in a precarious mndition. Then, 

as the Germans withdrew, they blew 

up bridges, highways, and portions of 

the 4-mile-long Corinth Canal, which 

was a vim link between Athens and 

the Adriatic Sea. 

Britieh troops entered Greece and 

restored the monarchy as the Germans left, but conditions scarcely improved. Astrongcommunis~ed Greek 

underground had formed during the 

war, survived, and challenged sup 

porters of the king. Unable to manage 

the situation, British officials informed the United States that they 

intended to withdraw by April 1.1947. 

The threat of dvil war and the possibility of a communist takeover mnvinced President Harry ?hunan that 

America had to act quickly. In March 

the President asked Congress for $400 

million in aid for Greece and 'hrkey. 

''It must be the policy of the United 

States," he argued in what became 

known as the Truman Doctrine, 'b 

support free peoples who are misting 

attempted subjugation by armed 

minorities or by outside pressures!' 

The primary way to accomplish this, 

he concluded, was "...through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly 

political processes!' 

Congress wasted little time. On 

May 22, President Truman signed an 

Interim Aid Bill establishing the 

American Mission for Aid to Greece 

(AMAG).Less than a month later, expanding on the principles of the 

*man Doctrine, Secretary of State 

George Marshall proposed his plan for 

long-term economic recovery for all 

European nations. By spring 1948, 

the Marshall Plan waa channeling 

dollars to Europe through the Emnomic Cooperation Administration. 

Some of the money supplemented 

AMAG funds for Corps projects alCorps of Engineers prolects in the Grecian reconstructlon program, 1947-1949. ready underway. 


(Map reprint from 1949 Military Englnee~) To addreas the immediate crisis in 


70Engineer 
The Dedge Poseldon (rlgM center) at work clearing the Corinth Canal. (Photo courtesy 

USACE Office of History, Research Collection) 

Greece, AMAG focused on restoring 

the ports and transportation system. 

As word spread in late spring 1947 

that the program would include wnstruction projects, the State Department received nearly 100 inquiries 

from interested American firms. Lacking experience in contractingand construction, the State Department 

sought advice from the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, an agency with a 

proven record in contracting and wnstruction management. 

AMAG's Reconstruction Division 

and the Corps weeded the list of 

qualified contractom down to 26 but 

agreed that joint ventures would be 

the most effective approach. The two 

organizations cooperated closely 

during contract negotiations, and two 

contracts were finally awarded. The J. 

Rich Steers Company and Grove-Wi1- 

son-Shepherd and Kruge, as the joint 

venture Steers-Grove, would 

reconstruct port facilities and clear 

the Corinth Canal. Guy F Atkinson 

Company, Johnson-Drake and Piper, 

and Starr-Park and Freeman, as the 

joint venture Atkinson-Drake-Park, 

would reconstruct highways, railroads, railroad bridges and tunnels, 

and airfields. 

When State Department representatives met with the Office of the 

Comptroller General, they discovered 

that these mntracts required an extensive construction organization and 

numerous accountants to provide the 

required level of oversight. They concluded that administering and supervising the contracts was also ajob for 

the Corps of Engineers. 

To manage the mnshudion ~oogram 

the Corps used its pmven district or-

-tion, including some seven nrea offioes. The Gredan Disbict, with headquartem in Athem, was orgnnized as 

part of the North Atlantic Division on 

August 1, 1947. 'Ihe district drew personnel largely fium existing organi7ations Colonel David W Griff~ths 

I& his pition as Galvgton District 

commander to bemme the Wet engineer in Athens. 

District personnel went to work immediately with contractor personnel 

and the Greek Ministry of Public 

Works. The contractors successfully 

recruited Greek nationals but had difficulty attracting American contract 

supervisors because of the unstable 

political conditions in Greece. At the 

peak of the recovery effort, government and contractor forces totaled 

629 Americans and 12,131 Greeks. 

The reconstruction program initially was scheduled to be completed in 

one year, and a demobilization plan 

was in place early. However, guerrilla 

activity, unusually severe winter 

weather, and additional new projects 

resulted in extensions through March 

1949. Real and threatened guerrilla 

attacks were a major problem that 

resulted in about 214 incidents involving loss of life and construction time. 

Contractors also had difficulty obtaining equipment and supplies. They 

amassed the necessary materialsmore than 5,200 pieces at the 

peak of construction-by combining 
items procured in the United States 

and Greece with items loaned by the 

Greek government. 

The first reconstruction project was 

at Piraeus, a key port city that served 

as Athens' harbor. As elsewhere, 

damage there had resulted from a 

combination of intense British and 

American air raids and calculated 

demolition by retreating German forces. Germans destroyed or damaged 

most of the 3,300 meters of concrete 

quay walls and used machinery, steel 

girders, and debris to block key points 

in the harbor. Gone were a grain silo, 

conveyor system, warehouse, and 

equipment which served the port. 

Steers-Grove, with the Knappen 

Engineering Company as consultants, 

began repairs on November 18, 1947. 

By December 1948, they had reconstructed 2,100 meters of quay walls. 

In the same ll-month period they 

removed 16,000 cubic meters of debris 

and placed 4,674 cubic meters of concrete to make the port's two dry docks 

operational. Dredging was a cooperative effort. The Grecian District wnfined itself to the area around the 

quay walls, while the Ministry of 

Public Works dredged the rest of the 

harbor. Steers-Grove completed 

similar, but less extensive work at the 

ports of Volos and Salonika, on the 

Aegean sea in central and northern 

Greece. 

The Corinth Canal presented one of 

the greatest challenges. Only 7 

kilometers (about 4 miles) in length, 

the canal could save shippers about 

200 kilometers on the trip from eastern to western Greece. Damage 

rendered by the retreating Germans 

was severe. Explosions triggered at 

two points dumped 645,000 cubic 

meters of earth and rock into the 

canal. Other debris included a duplex 

highway-railway bridge, 130 railroad 

boxcars, six locomotives, mines, and 

the 3,400-ton steamship Vesta, which 

had been wrecked and sunk in the 

canal. Lack of maintenance had affected the entrance breakwaters, and 

the channel was heavily silted. 

Work to repair the canal began in 

October 1947. The silt and debris 

removal effort required special equipment and had to be timed to support 

the overall excavation schedule. 

Steers-Grove used dredges, floating 

derricks, tugs, and dump swws in the 

cleanup effort. When full-scale traffic 

resumed in December 1948, a total of 

321 ships carrying 58,838 tons of 

cargo cleared the waterway that 

month. 

Atkinson-Drake-Park undertook 

road, bridge, and tunnel repair and 

eventually airfield construction. The 

highway networks presented a significant challenge. At the end of the 

war, most major highways were impassable. Ninety percent of the 

bridges and culverts had been 

destroyed. Contractors used nearly 

30,000 tons of asphalt and more than 

650,000 tons of aggregate to restore 

and surface 1,216 kilometers of highway. As district engineer Grifiths 

noted, the job was a worthy accomplishment "considering the mountainous topography, the unprecedented cold and snow...and the 

insecure conditions in all field areas." 

The Greek Ministry of Public Works 

simultaneously constructed highway 

bridges and secondary roads and later 

completed surfacing at several Corps 

projects. 

Atkinson-Drake-Park was also 

responsible for reconstructing twelve 

steel railroad bridges, two tunnels, 

and a highway bridge. After this 

work was underway, the Greek Air 

Ministry requested that ten airfields 

be included in the Corps' contract. 

That effort involved new air strips 

end control towers as well as repairs 

and improvements to existing runways and administration buildings. 

In Greece between 1947 and 1949, 

the Corps of Engineers played a significant role in carrying out the 

United Stabs' initial post-World War 

I1 assistance programs involving 

direct economic aid. The goal was to 

rebuild the national infrastructure, 

which would provide the basis for 

economic recovery and political 

stability Dedicated to containingcommunism, American policymakers 

believed the future of the entire 

region was at stake. 

While the engineers' work was only 

part of AMAG's total aid program, it 

was a most visible part that was appredated for many years. Once Corps' 

contrack were completed, the district 

organization closed down. Thus the 

Corps demonstrated very early that it 

could put together an effective organization rapidly and disband it just 

as quickly. 

Beginning in the early 1950~~ the

Corps returned to the Mediterranean 

region as part of economic aid and 

more ambitious military assistance 

and reimbursable programs. Over the 

ensuing decades this included 

programs in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 

Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

North Africa, as well as Greece. In 

nearly every instance the Corps employed many of the same approaches 

evident in their initial effort in 

Greece: use of the engineer district 

organization, provision of technical 

assistance in conjunction with ewnomic aid, and training indigenous 

contractors and workers to perform as 

much of the work as passible. The 

total effort was designed to help 

friendly nations help themselves. 

Today, the Corps is involved in 

numerous international activities in 

support of CINC South, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and Voice of 

America. The Corps does not possess 

separate program authorities and 

funding for international work, but 

stands ready when deemed appropriate to become involved in additional projects. 

DI:Walker is chiel; Office of History, 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Fort Beluoir; Xrginia 

Sources: 

Dod, Karl C., "Overseas Military 

Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 

1945-1910," unpublished manuscript, 

Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

Griffiths, D.W., "Reconstruction in 

Greece,"Military Engineer, XLI (JulyAugust 1949): 252-257. 

72Engineer 
6 I 

FBRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Richard N. Wilson 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

r\s Army leaders struggle with the build-down, 

/ many Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) are 

struggling with career decisions. Now more than ever, 

many NCOs are asking what they can do to remain 

competitive throughout their Army careers. 

The promotion board for sergeants first class 

recently identified criteria used to select the "best 

qualified" candidates for promotion. An analysis of 

their selection process provides valuable insight into 

career planning and promotion opportunities. 

The board used evaluation reports (NCOER) as a 

tool when selecting individuals for promotion. Concise, hard-hitting, factual ratings with bullet-type comments carried the most weight. For example, scoring 

300 on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) was a 

bullet of excellence. Conversely, vague, wordy, meaningless, or unsubstantiated ratings carried little weight 

and tended to penalize a soldier. 

Senior raters' comments on an NCOER concerning 

the soldier's "potential" were a key factor in an assessment, but were included in only 50 percent of the 

records. However, a "nonconcurrence" by a reviewer 

adversely impacted a rating because of the higher 

rank and experience of the reviewer and because 

that option is seldom used. 

Successful completion of appropriate Noncommissioned Officers Educational System courses was 

another key factor. Selection for a course indicated a 

soldier's potential, and graduation signaled competence. College credits were not a requirement for 

selection, but the presence (versus absence) of 

credits did become a factor. Given the Army's goal for 

post-secondary education, NCOs must show initiative 

through a program for self-development. 

The board looked for leadership positions and compliance with DA guidance to clearly define responsibilities in terms of soldiers, material, equipment supervised, and special duties. An NCOER that 

adhered to this guidance provided a much stronger 

picture of the soldier's training and experience. 

Several "show stoppers" that can effectively end or 

severely hinder a soldier's career were identified. 

These included failed skill qualification tests (SQT), 

exceeding weight standards, letters of reprimand, and 

misconduct offenses under UCMJ. 

The board critically evaluated issues surrounding 

values, ethics, and discipline in the NCO Corps. 

Recent incidents, especially those occurring in an 

NCO's present grade, affected the rating. The use 

and abuse of alcohol was the most damaging problem. Driving under the influence (DUI) was the 

detrimental factor that eliminated most otherwise fully 

qualiied NCOs from the promotion list. 

Inconsistent enforcement of standards was apparent in some records, and the board raised serious 

questions about the validity of "meeting height/weight 

standards" in accordance with Army Regulation 

600-9. For example, records showed that some 

NCOs' height increased as their weight increased, 

and decreased as their weight decreased. Also, some 

photographs did not support the statement "meets 

body fat standards." This area needs fixing! NCOs 

must meet screening weight and body fat criteria and 

appear fit. 

Photographs remain a powerful tool. Lack of a 

photograph, when coupled with questionable 

heighweight status, conveyed a negative impression 

and typically prompted an inquiry. 

Physical fitness and weight control are areas 

where many NCOs need improvement. Analysis of 

promotion board decisions indicate that exceeding 

the standards for physical fitness benefitted an individual, while poor performance lowered the overall 

assessment. 

The board recommends the following criteria for 

NCOs and their leaders: All newly promoted NCOs 

should sewe 12 months in a leadership position and 

attend the next higher leadership school before being 

assigned outside their career management field. 

Also, special duty assignments should not exceed 4 

years (i.e, drill sergeant, instructor duty, ganison staff, 

readiness duty, or back-to-back TDA assignments). 

After 4 years, these assignments become a detrimental factor, not an enhancing one. 

Our ability to sustain a high-quality force during this 

period of diminished advancement opportunities is a 

challenge facing all combat arms leaders. We, as engineer leaders, can help meet this challenge by 

educating our NCO Corps about factors affecting their 

careers. We must guide and support our NCOs as 

they face the challenge of a smaller but more 

demanding Army. 

Engineer 73 
DEPARTMENTOF THE AR.... 

MOLNEER PROFEsaoNAL Bum 

US ARMY ENGINEER SCIKK)L 

Am: ATSMDY-W 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY I ISSN 0048-7688 I 

FORT LEONARD WOOD, YO 

USPSs22-390 

ORIULlUsWEIll