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SJC

- 12475

COMMONWEALTH v s . ADRIAN T

. LOYA

.

Barnstable. November 8, 2019.

- February 6 , 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.

Homicide

. Criminal Responsibility

. Insanity

. Practice, Criminal , Capital case, Instructions to jury, Request for jury instructions, Acquittal by reason of insanity.

I ndictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2015.

The case s were tried before Gary A. Nickerson , J.

Theodore F. Riordan ( Deborah Bates Riordan also present) for the defendant

. Elizabeth A

. Sweeney , Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

LENK, J. On February 5 , 2015, the defendant broke into

Lisa Trubnikova 's home . He confronted her in the bedroom, where
she lay beside her wife, Anna Trubnikova

. 1 The defendant shot

1 Because Lisa Trubnikova and Anna Trubnikova share a last name, we refer to them by their first names.2

both women, killing Lisa and wounding Anna. Before finally
surrendering to police, the defendant also shot and wound ed a responding police officer, Jared P. MacDonald.

For more than one year, the defendant had been obsessed

with kill ing Lisa , and in turn being killed by police

. The
defendant eventually reduced this intended murder

- suicide in a
detailed, written plan labeled "Operation Purple Rebel" in his

electronic files. A t trial, the defendant argued that t his

obsessive and self

- destructive plot showed that the killing was

not born out of malice ; rather, he was mentally disturbed

.
Counsel unsuccessfully claimed tha t a mental disorder cau sed the

defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and

commit th e crime. On appeal, t he defendant contends that our

current law on criminal responsibility made this defense no t

viable , and t herefore, because he was deprived of his only
defense, a new trial is required

. Alternatively, the defendant

asks us to reduce the verdict, pursuant to our authority under

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

We discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the
conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction s .
1. Background

. a . Facts

. We recite the facts as the
jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion.3

The defendant first met Lisa in 2011 , wh en they served
together in the United States Coast Guard at a base in Kodiak ,
Alaska

. They worked together in a n information t echnology

office , and they developed a fast friendship.

Their relationship took a dramatic turn in September of

2012 f ollowing an incident at Lisa's hom e. According to the
defendant, Lisa invited him ov er to have drink s and watch some

vide o recording s . Whil e he was there, however, Lisa became

intoxicated and attempted to seduce him. Although Lisa had no

sexual contact with the defendant , this incident affe cted him so
deeply that he would later refer to it as a "rape of the mind."

The defendant eventually reported t h e encounter to his
superiors

. In June of 2013, he was transferred from Kodiak to
Chesapeake, Virginia. On the day he arrived at his new base , the Coast Guard issued the defendant a "Page 7" reprimand for

his role in the in cident a nd ordered him to cut off all contact

with Lisa a n d her wife Anna

. The def endant was shocked and
refused to sign the letter acknowledging the outcome of the
Coast Guard's investigation

. He felt wronged , and this feeling
turned to anger

.
These events coincided with a deterioration of the

defendant's mental health. He became depressed, started taking
Benadryl to help him sleep , and lost interest in the few

activities that previously had interested him, such as playing4

video games

. The def endant also began to harbor a hatred for

the woma n he blamed for his misfortune: Lisa. As his life

seemed to unravel around him, the defendant ultimately decided
that he no longer wanted to live . He did not want to die,
however, without seeking vengeanc e . Therefore, he resolved to

take Lisa's life

. Over the following months , the d efendant meticulously
planned his killing. Through the I nternet, he learned that Lisa

a nd A nna had relocated to the town of Bourne on Cape Cod. In
October of 2014, he travel ed to Massachusetts and set up hunting

cameras outside their new home to confirm that Lisa was living

there. When he returned home, h e also began playing shooting

games with plastic replica weapons , using plastic bullets , 2 to
gain more experience with wieldin g weapons in a combat

situation. In the midst of these preparations, the defendant

document ed his troubled history with Lisa, the downward spiral

of his professional and personal life, and his plot to kill Lisa

in a 250

- page manifesto entitled " The Wrath of Loya ." 3 After

2 The defendant obtained these weapons, sold for use in casual and competitive games, from a commercial manufacturer.

3 The electronic file containing the manifesto was titled

" The Loya Wars

. " The titles were reference s to the science fiction television and movie series Star Wars and Star Trek , respectively. Both series featured prominent ly in other aspects of the crime, including insignia the defendant wore during the5

months of planning, he ultimately decided to carry out the
killing on February 5, 2015 , his thirty

- first birthday.

On February 1, 2015, t he defendant left his home in

Ches a peake, Virginia , and began making his way to Massachusetts.
He arrived on February 3 , 2015, checked into a l ocal hotel , and
prepared for the fatal encounter. His original plan w as to

attack Lisa at her house , force her to confront what he had
become, and stab her in the heart. 4 He did n ot intend to harm

Anna

. The defendant originally planned to cover Anna's ears
with "ear protection" so that she would not have to hear any
sounds that Lisa might make as she was dying. Once Lisa was
dead, the defendant then would provoke a firefight with police

so that they would shoot and kill him

.
The defendant arrived at Lisa's house shortly before 2 A

. M

. on February 5, 2015. 5 He parked his vehicl e across the road
approaching her house , and set it on fire to obstr uct po lice

shooting. Dr. John Daignault identified these references as further evidence of the defendant's delusional disorder.

4 Many details of the defendant's planning and the
com mission of the crime come from his statements to police. As Dr. Martin Kelly , an expert called by the Commonwealth , noted, the defendant's recollection of these events was unusu ally precise

. Kelly identified this "Eidetic memory" as further evidence of the defendant's mental disorder.

5 Most of the following encounter was captured on video recording by a body camera that the defendant strapped to his chest. An edited version of this recording was played at trial, and the entire recor d ing was entered as an exhibit.6

access . He also set up smoke grenades, noise makers, and fake
explosive devices to further delay first responders

. Having
staged the scene, the defendant breached the door to Lisa's

ho use by shooting the lock off with a shotgun. Once inside , he
made his way up the stairs to her bedroom.

T he defendant found Lisa and Anna in their bed. He ordered

them to separate , threw hand cuffs at the m , and demanded t hat
they put on the cuffs

. T he women screamed and asked who he was
and why he was in their ho use . The defendant pulled off his
mask, revealing h is identity

. Lis a and Anna recognized him , and

Lisa shouted his name

. The defendant responded , " S ee what you

did to me" and " T his is what I've become because of you."

Lisa apologize d to the defendant and said that she never

meant to hurt him. Both women pleaded with the defendant and
promised that they would not tell anyone if he left them in

peace . Face

- to

- face with Lisa , the defendant froze, unsure of
how to proceed

. With the defendant momentarily distracted , Lisa and Anna
attempted to shield themselves with their mattress. T he

defendant exclaimed , " W hat do you think you're doing?" Now

ref ocused on completing his "mission , " h e drew his pistol and

fir ed fifteen shots through the mattress in Lisa's direction

. Eleven bullets struck Lisa, killing her in a matter of seconds.7

F our bullets struck Anna

. The defendant heard gurgling sounds

from Lisa's direc tion, and he concluded that she was dying

.
With his primary objective complete d , the defenda nt

intended to die at the hands of th e police. He went back

outside , retrieved a rifle that he previously stashed in a snow

bank , a nd prepared to engage with responding officers. Soon
thereafter, he saw the silhouette of an approachin g police
officer, Jare d M a cDonald

. The defen dant fired four shots at

MacDonald; one struck him in the spine

.
The defendant t hen retreated behind the victim s ' house to

wait for more officers to come and end his life

. As the minutes
slipped by, however, the defendant's resolve to kill himself

weakened , and he decided to give himself up. He discarded his

weapons, approached the officers with hands raised, and was
taken into custody.

b

. Procedural h istory

. On July 1, 2015, the defendant was
indicted on thirty counts, includi n g murder in the first degree
for the shooting death of Lisa

. 6 Trial commenced on August 28,

6 The other indictments against the defendant were three counts of assault with intent to murde r; three counts of aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon ; two counts of armed home invasion ; two counts of armed assault in a dwelling; three counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony ; two counts of arme d kidnapping with bodily injury ; one count of burglary and assault on an occupant ; one count of burning a motor vehicle ; one count of possessing a hoax device ;8

2017. From the beginning of the trial , d efense counsel
acknowledged that this case was not a "whodunit

. " 7 Rather , the
key issue at trial was whether the defendant was criminally
responsible for his actions.
Four medical professionals testified concerning the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting

. Each
expert opined as to whether the defendant met the sta ndard to

establish a lack of criminal responsibi lity set out in

Commonwealth v. McHoul , 352 Mass. 544, 546

– 5 47 (1967) : "A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of

such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law" (citation omitted).

Two witnesses testifie d that the defendant had been
criminally responsible, and two testified that he had not. Dr.

David W. Holtzen, a forensic psychologist at Bridgewater State
Hospital , was asked by the Commonwealth to perform competency

one count of assault and battery on a police officer ; and ten counts of possessing a large capacity feed ing d evice.

7 Indeed, defense counsel stated the same in an extensive interview he gave to the Cape Cod Times on the day before trial began. The judge took pains to comment on this interview during empanelment, and to make sure that the arti cle was preserved in the record

. Exposure to m edia coverage was, appropriately, a subject of individual voir dire.9

and criminal responsibility examinati ons of the defendant. He

testified that the defendant had not been suffering from any
mental disorder or illness at the time of the killing. Dr.

Judith Edershein , a forensic psychiatrist based at a large
teaching hospital , 8 was engaged by the Commonwealt h to reach a
determination whether the defendant had been criminally
responsible by reviewing the records and other experts'
opinions , but she was precluded from speaking with the

defendant

. 9 She testified that a lthough the defend ant had at
least one personality disorder, it did not render him incapable
of conforming his conduct to the law or appreciating the
wrongfulness of his actions.

Another of the Commonwealth's witnesses , Dr. Martin Kelly , a practicing psychiatrist also at a la rge teaching hospital,

interviewed and examined the defendant three times , and reviewed
records and the police reports

. Kelly testified that the

defendant had high functioning Asperger's Syndrome , a disorder

on the "au tism spectrum," and that the conditio n was "hardwired"

8 Dr. Judith Edershein also testified that she had graduated from Harvard Law School and become an attorney prior to entering psychiatry and ultimately becom ing an assistant professor of psychiatry.

9 Edershein was retained in December of 2016 , after the Commonwealth's first expert, Kelly, completed his report

. Edershein did not formally request to interview the defendant until May of 2017, at which point her request was denied by defense counsel.10

in the brain, not something that is acquired, readily amenable

to treatment, or "episodic ." Kelly considered and rejected
diagnoses of schizoid personality disorder , major depressive

disorder , and delusional disorder

. Based on his evaluation of

the defendant and having examined the records, including the
police reports, Kelly concluded that the defendant "suffered
from a mental disease; and that as a result of that mental
disease, he lacked t he substantial capacity to confo r m his

conduct to the requirements of the law. "

T he defendant called a single expert , Dr. John Daignault , a forensic psychologist , who previously had been the clinical
director of Bridgewater State Hospital

. Daignault determined

that the defendant had not been criminally responsible for his
actions on the night of the shooting , but concluded as well that

the defendant suffered from a delusional disorder and di d not

suffer from Asperger's Syndrome

.

A fter deliberating over the course of three days, the jury

convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on

theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or
cruelty . The jury also found the defendant guilty o f twenty

eight of the twenty

- nine other indictments

. He was found not
guilty of arme d assault with intent to murder. The defendant

filed a notice of appeal i n September 2017.11

2. Discussion

. Before us, the defendant argues that a new trial is required because our current law regarding criminal
responsibility deprived him of a meaningful defense

. The

defendant c ontends that the trial judge committed reversible
error by denying two motions the defendant filed to remedy these

flaws . On e motion proposed a verdict slip that presented the
jury's decision in a series of yes - or - no qu estions , in addition
to a general verdict o f "guilty , " "not guilty , " or "not guilty,

lack of criminal responsibility. " The other motion asked the
judge to instruct the jury to con sider a verdict of "guilty but
not criminally responsible " rather than "not guilty, lack of
criminal responsibility." As a ppellate counsel acknowledged at
oral argument, both motions advocated for a departure from our current law regarding the defense of a lack of criminal

respons i bility. We decline to adopt the defenda nt's recommended
changes , and discern no error in the trial judge's decision to
deny these motions.

a . Verdict s lip s . At the beginning of trial, counsel

filed a motion requesting that the verdict slips include several

yes - or - no questions on whether the Commonwealth had met its

burden. 10 Ultimately, however, t he defendant expressed

10 By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the following language:12

satisfaction with the verdict slip s , drafted by the judge , that
omitted these questions . Therefore, as the parties agree , any error in the judge's de cision to deny the motion is unpreserved

and would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a

" 1. Has the government proven that the Defendant committed the act of an u nlawful killing of a human being without justification?

" __________Yes __________No

" If the answer to the above is yes, proceed to Question 2.

" 2. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable doubt that the Defendant, at the time of such kil ling, was not suffering from a mental disease or defect?

" __________Yes __________No

" If the answer to this question is no, proceed to Question 3. If the answer is yes, proceed to Question 4.

" 3. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable doubt that such mental disease or defect did no t affect the Defendant so that [ he ] was unable to ap preciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law?

" __________Yes __________No

" . . .

"4. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable doubt that at the time of the killing that the Defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or Defect that reduced his capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his co nduct or to conform [his] con duct to the requirements of the law?

" __________Yes __________No "13

miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Garcia , 470 Mass.
24, 40 ( 201 4 ).
"[W]e review these claims to determine whether there was
error and, if so, wheth er it created a substantial likelihood of
a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v. Brown , 477 Mass.
805, 814

– 8 15 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). "In
analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard, we

review the evidence and cas e as a whole and consider whether any
error made in the course of the trial was likely to have
influenced the jury's conclusion." Commonwealth v. Berry , 457
Mass. 602, 618 (2010) , S

. C ., 466 Mass. 763 (2014)

. Where there
is no error, this court need not reach the question of
prejudice . See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes , 459 Mass. 194, 207
(2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error).

The defendant's motion most fairly is read as a motion for
special questions p ursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (c) , 378
Mass. 897 (1979)

. 11 S pecial questions are "rarely resorted to in

criminal trials. " Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs.,

11 Alternatively, the defendant's motion could be interpreted as a motion for a "special verdict , " i.e., one that "involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but only a statement of facts the jury have found from which the judge determines the appropriate judgment." Commonwealth v . Licciardi , 387 Mass. 670, 675 (1982). Only general verd icts are permitted in criminal trials. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a ) , 378 Mass. 897 (1979) ; Licciardi , supra (recognizing that Massachusetts r ules of c riminal p rocedure eliminated special verdicts in criminal trials).14

Inc. (No. 1) , 389 Mass. 902, 916 ( 1983), quoting Commonwealth v.

Lussier , 333 Mass. 83, 94 (1955)

. Although they sometimes may "aid in the disposition of a case," Commonwealth v. Licciardi , 387 Mass. 670, 676 (1982), the decision to issue them typically

is "discretionary with the judge." Dane Entertainment Servs.,

In c. (No. 1) , supra , quoting Lussier , supra . W e have required
special questions only whe re they are necessary to ensure that,
should a jury convict a defendant of an offense, they are

unanimous as to the theory of that offense

. Compare

Commonwealth v. Santos , 440 Mass. 281, 287

– 288 (2003 ) (whe re Commonwealth pursues multiple theories of murder in first
degree, verdict slip must indicate unanimous theory of
culpability) , with Commonwealth v. Shea , 460 Mass. 163, 175
(2011) (no special question ne cessary whe re Commonwealth pursue d
only one theory of m urder in first degree) , and Commonwealth v.

Arias , 78 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 433 (2010) (no special question
required on different methods of committing assault by means of
dangerous weapon)

.
We discern no comp elling reason to require special
questions whe n the jury consider criminal responsibility. 12
Although the criminal responsibility defense presents special

12 We do not decide whether , in other circumstances, special questions may be required for some purpose other than to ensure the unanimity of a verdict.15

problems for a jury, see part 2.b, infra , it is unclear how yes or - no questions on the Commonwealth's burden would help the jury

to deliberate fairly on this issue

. Indeed, such question s are

at least as likely to steer the jury towards a verdict of
guilty. See Licciardi , 387 Mass. at 676 , quoting Commonwealth

v. Golston , 373 Mass. 249, 260

- 261 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1039 (1978) (special questions " must avoid any ' t endency to
lead the jurors step by step to a verdict of guilty ' ")

. See

United States v. Spock , 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969 )
("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict
of guilty t han to approach it step by step ")

. To the extent

that a jury may require additional guidance on how to consider

whether a defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the proper
source of that guidance is the jury charge. See Commonwealth v.

Wolfe , 478 Mass. 142, 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) ("t he
long

- standing principle that the jury are presumed to fol low the
judge's instructions

. . . lies at the v ery heart of our justice
system " [citation omitted] )

. Thus, the judge di d not abuse his discretion in denying the

defendant's motion for special questions to which he was not

entitled

.
b

. Jury i nstructions

. In addition to his motion for
special questions, the defendant filed a "Motion to Permit the
Jury to Consider Whether the Defendant is Guilty But Insane ."16

Through this motion, he requested that the jury consider a
verdict of "guilty but not criminally res p onsible," rather than

the verdict set forth in the then

- existing model instruction,
"not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility ." S ee Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 11 (2013).
At the charge conference, however, defense counsel did not
renew this request , a nd ultimately dec lared himself satisfied
with the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility

. We
therefore review the judge's decision to deny this motion for a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice

. See Brown ,
477 Mass. at 814

– 8 15.
The defendant argues that the option of finding him "guilty
but not criminally responsible" was necessary in order for the
jury fairly to consider the role that mental illness played in

his crime s . The defendant maintains that, to the a verage juror,
a finding of "not guilty" is tantamount to a finding of factual

innocen ce . In addition to potentially confusing the jurors, the
defendant argues, this formulation requires them to
compartmentalize their knowledge of the defendant's actions and
separately to consider if he nonetheless was not guilty. The

defendant contends that , given the particularly egregious acts17

in this case, asking the jury to equate the defendant with the

term "not guilty" was simply unrealistic

. 13

Without discoun ting the se concern s , we conclude that the

instruction the defendant requested was not warranted.
Instructing the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but not
criminally responsible" would be incon sistent with our long

standing jurisprudence on criminal respon sibility. As the
defendant acknowledged at trial , he can point to no
Massachusetts authority that support s his requested langu age . Furthermore, the defendant's requested instruction would
invite unnecessary confusion. A verdict of "guilty but not
criminally responsible" is an oxymoron: if the Commonwealth is

unable to prove a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a

13 " [ E ] xperience in this Commonwealth has shown that it is most difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of insanity." Commonwealth v. Keita , 429 Mass. 843, 854 (1999) , overruled on an other ground by Commonwealth v. Lawson , 475 M ass. 806 (2016)

. Jurors' objection s to the criminal responsibility defense , particularly in the homicide context, are well

documented outside the Commonwealt h as well

. See Brooks, Guilty by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense Demands a Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire , 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1183, 1202

- 1203 (2013); Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty

- First Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 Ind. L.J. 1479, 1487

- 1488 (2006)

. This resistance may stem from suspicion s that defendants malinger, and that the expert testimony on which a criminal responsibility defense depen ds is susceptible to bias. S ee Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1575

- 1577 (2007). In any event, it is clear that jurors do not easily reach the " chilling determination that the defendant is
an insane killer not le gally responsible for his acts." Commonwealth v. Mutina , 366 Mass. 810, 822 ( 1975 ).18

reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty. See Commonwealth

v. Bruneau , 472 Mass. 510, 517 (2015); Golden , petitioner , 341
Mass. 672, 674 (1961) (affirming " the undoubted premise that one
acquitted by reason of insanity has been found guilty of no
crime"). To make sense of this instruction, the jury would have
to parse the difference between factual "guilt" in the context
of criminal responsibility and legal "guilt" as it applies to
the charges as a whole. Particularly in light of the other
complications that the jury face when considering criminal
responsibility, it would be unwise to add this compl exity to the
equation.

Th e nomenclature the judge used, "no t guilty by lack of
criminal responsibility," was proper. This language has deep

roots in our common law. See Commonwealth v. Green , 17 Mass.
515, 515 (1822) (defendant "found not guilty, by reason of
insanity" ). 14 We recently affirmed this formulation in our Model
Jury Instructions on Homicide. See Model Jury Instr uctions on

Homicide 10

- 11 (2018). The L egislature similarly has employed , and thereby sanctioned, this language. See G. L. c. 123, § 16

( establishing commitment procedures for those found " not guilty by

14 We since have moved away from the formulation "by reason of insanity , " see Commonwealth v. Goudreau , 422 Mass. 731, 738 (1996) (Appendix), in favor of "by reason of a lack of criminal responsibility." See Model Jury Instr uctions on Homicide 10

- 11 (2018)

.19

reason of mental illness or mental defect"). It was not error for
the judge to rely upon this well

- established formulation.
Viewing the entire jury charge in light of the evidence at

trial , it is clear that the issue of criminal responsibility was
properly and fully before the jury

. The judge accurately
explained the law on criminal responsibility befor e commencing

to instruct on the numerous specific offense s with which the

defendant had been charged

. When discussing each offense, the
judge again reminded the jury that even should they find that
the elements were met, they still had to conside r whether the

defendant was criminally responsible. 15 These instructions
informed the jury that they could rec ognize that the defendant

had committed unlawful acts, but still find him not guilty by

r eason of lack of criminal responsibility. 16

15 The judge also informed the jury that they could consider the role that mental illness might have played in the defendant's ability to f orm the requis ite intent for certain offenses

.

16 To the extent that a defendant may seek further clarification in future cases, a better practice would be for the judge to provide an additional instruction on the relationship between criminal responsibility and factual guilt. An appropriate instruction would mirror the language we sanctioned in Commonwealth v. Odgre n , 483 Mass. 41, 52 (2019 ):

" If you are satis fied beyond a reasonable doubt

. . . that the defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the Commonwealth

. . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." This language would clarify that a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility necessarily includes a conclusion that20

With these in structions in hand, the jury were well
equipped to consider the evidence from both sides that bore on

the defe ndant's responsibility: the o pinions of four expert

witnesses ; 17 the vi deo recording of the defendant's planning and

commission of the offense ; the defendant's recorded statements
to police; and the defendant's manifesto

. The jury deliberated
over a period of three days before reaching their verdict s . In

sum, t he defendant was not d eprived of a meaningful defense; the
jury rejected it.

c . Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E . Having reviewed the
entirety of the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E , we are left with no doubt that mental illness played a
central role in this crime. Nonetheless, although the defendant
presented " substantial evidence supporting his insanity
defense, " Commonwealth v. Brown , 449 Mass. 747, 773 (2007) , we discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E . Mental illness does not equate with the absence of
criminal responsibility. The jury could properly credit the
opinions of Edershein and Holtzen that, assuming the defendant

the defendant committed the act that constitutes the charged offense. See id

. at 52

- 53 ; Commonwealth v. Bruneau , 472 Mass. 510, 517 (2015) (not guilty by reason of criminal responsibility verdict " is unlike an acquittal because it includes a finding that the defendant committe d the criminal act ")

.

17 In addition to the witnesses' testimony, by agreement of the parties, e ach expert 's report was introduced as an exhibit.21

suff ered from a qualifying mental disorder, he nonetheless was

able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the
wrongfulness of his brutal actions. Their testimony provided
sufficient support for the jury's verdict. On similar facts, we

have conc luded that , " [s] ince the issue of the defendant's
criminal responsibility was f ully and fairly before the jury [,]

. . . justice does not require t hat their verdict be

disturbed.'" Brown , supra , quoting Commonwealth v. Lunde , 390
Mass. 42, 50 (1983) . We likewise conclude that this verdict was
consonant with justice.
Judgments affirmed

.