B\ Mnjoi- (;~ilerlil Robe,-[ B, l;1oii2er.~ 

Commaridci~irii,US.Arti~y Engineer School 

hese are exciting times for engineers as we approach 

the new millennium. This year has been designated 

the "Year of the Maneuver Suppoti Center" 

(MANSCEN) here at Fon Leonard Wood. During the next 

eight months. the Military Police and Chemic;d Schools will 

complete their moves from Fort McClellan to Fort Leonard 

Wood. The collocation of the Engineer. Military Police, and 

Chemical Schools under MANSCEN creates a world-class 

joint training facility for soldiers. sailors, airmen, and marines. 

MANSCEN maximizes resources. estnhlishes a framework 

for integrated training. crates synergy among the branches. 

and promotes joint service training. Approximately $220 

million wonh of new buildings and ranges. which will 

increase both tlie quality and quantity of training conducted 

here on post, are nearing completion. We continue to seme as 

a showc:~se fol- TRADOC's base realignment initiative. In an 

era that requires cohesive joint opelatioos among the services 

in response to crises around the world, we continue to define 

TRADOC's slogan "Where tomorrow's victories begin." 

General Reimer's visit to Fort Leonard Wood in January 

went very well. He viewed Initial Entry Training activities 

and ongoing construction in support of MANSCEN. and he 

received a briefing covering TRADOC's suppo~t to 

Homeland Defense. At the conclusion of that briefing, 

General Rei~iler approved Fult Leonard Wood as 

TRADOC's Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense. 

Tlie center will "stand up" on I October 1999 and take 

advantage of the synergy created by the collocation of the 

three schools under MANSCEN. 

Why establish this center at MANSCEN? be cause^ 

W It is ideally located and orranized to support DTLOMS 

(doctrine, training, leader development, organization, 

materiel, and soldiers) integration requirements. 

W 	 No other installation hrings subject matter experts, 

training. and battle lab facilities together- as well as Fort 

Leonard Wood. 

W 	 It exemplifies the kind of synergy we sought when 

MANSCEN was formed. 

The Homeland Defense mission is to develop and 

integrate doctrine, training. and materiel requirements in 

support of the newly formed Rapid Assessment and Initial 

Detection (RAID) teams, which were authorized and funded 

in the FY99 defense hill. These teams will operate in direct 

support of civilian first responders. and each falls under the 

command and control of the adjutant general of the state in 

which the team resides. Thc ten teams being fielded across 

tlle United States are aligned with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) regions. In addition, the 7th 

Military Support Detachment RAID tea111 is being activated 

and will reside at Fort Leonal-d Wood. It was designated a 

pilot program by the Army Chief of Staff and must be fully 

mission capable no later than Janua~y 2000. An article 

describing the Homeland Defense missiori and the RAID 

teams will be published in the April I999 issue of Engineu,: 

The regiment continues to work on redistributing Bradley 

fighting vehicles (BFVs) to engineer battalions that support 

mechanized and arniored divisions. It is desirable to have 

engineers in armored vehicles that provide the same degree of 

mobility, protection, and survivability as that provided on the 

maneuver platforms they support in the close fight. Currently 

we are attempting to retain BFVs in the 588th Engineer 

Battalion, 4th Infantry Division. The retention of BFVs in tlie 

588th will provide an experimental baseline to further refine 

doctrine, tactics, techniques. procedures, and organizational 

designs in the future. A white paper justifying the need tor 

BFVs appears on page 1 1 

This year's ENFORCE Conference is scheduled for 25 

April-1 May. The 1st Brigade is planning to present another 

outstanding tactical twilight tnttoo in celebration of our engineer 

history. I'm sure it will he a highlight of the conference. The 

theme for this year is "Joint Engineers: America's Total 

Engineer Force for the Next Millennium." Mark your 

calendars; we hope to see yon here at Fo~t Leonard Wood. 
v

-	 w 


r 	 I ' 

March 1999 Headquarters,Departmentof the Army Volume 29 PB 5-99-1 

I 

UNITED STATES ARMY FEATURES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 2 Mine Warfare and Counterinsurgency:The Russian View 

By Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Lester W Grau 

COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT 7 	 EngineerICivil AffairsTeams Enhance Peace Support 

Major General Robert B. Flowers 	 Operations 

By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Toomey and Major William 

R. Buckley Jr. 

MANAGING EDITOR 11 	Why Engineers Need the Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

Catherine Eubanks 	 By Major Darrell Strother 

FEATURES EDITOR 12 	Force-Protection Measures in Bosnia 

Shirley Bridges 	 By Captain Frederic A. Drummond 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 17 	 Engineers, Army After Next, and Military Operations in 

Urban Terrain Jennifer Morgan Bv Jeb Stewart 

20 Bridging Shortfall: Lines of Communication Bridging 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: By Captain Kevin A. Brooks 

DENNIS J. REIMER 24 Army Performance Improvement Criteria Strengthen OSUT 

and AIT Engineer Battalions 

General, United States Army By Lieutenant Colonel Allen C. Estes and First Lieutenant Ricky 

Chief of Staff J. scon 

27 Ammunition Forecasting forTask Force Operations 

Official: By Captain Jared Ware 

32 Civil Disturbance Operations for Mechanized Engineer 

Battalions 

By Captain Mark A. Geraldi 

JOEL 6.HUDSON 36 	 Robots Clean Up the Cold War Mess 

Administrative Assistant to the 	 By Mark D. Kessinger 

Secretary of the Army 39 	Gaining Distance Education 

05505 

By Captain Tim Wallace 

Front Cover: Engineers from A Companies, 

20th and 40th Engineer Banallons, 1st Cavalry 

Division, reinforce a damaged timber trestle I DEPARTMENTS bridoe with an AVLB at Base Carno Demi. 


~o&ia-~erze~ovina. Photo by capfain ~a" Inside front cover: Clear the Way 


Dolwick, U.S. Army Engineer School. 31 PERSCOM Notes 47 Engineer Update 

Back Cover: Historical example of the Army 42 CTC Notes 49 Lead the Way 


value "Selfless Service." 


ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by the U.S.Army Engineer within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional 

School, 320 Engineer Loop. Sune 210. Fort Leonard Wwd. MO 654758929. Second deveiopment. Views expressed are those of the author and not those of the 

Class postage is paid at Fon Lwnard Wood. MO. and additional mailing offices. Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect 

ontcial U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in other U.S. 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to ENGINEER Magazine. 320,Engineer iirmy publications. used news (terns constitutes neither anirmation of their accuracy LOOP,Suite 210. Fort Leonard Wood. MO 65473-8929. nor product endacrement. ENGINEER reserves the right to edit material. 

CORRESPONDENCE, leners to the editor, manuscripts, photographs, onicial CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to 

unlt requests to iecelve copies, and unit address changes should be sent to ENGINEER andthe 

ENGiNEER at the orecedino address. ~ ~ 
 Teleohone: 15731 563-4104. DSN 676-4104. ~ ~. ~ ~ ,~~, ~ ~


ENGINEER3 e-ma/ addressis: eubanksc@wood.armym#t. Our internet home page OFFlCiAL DISTRIBUTION is largeted to all engineer and engineer-related units. 

s -'el 4 nnp rnwoo0 armv m Eb.GRMAG e7ag.lo ntln ' ilt ISOhAL SJRSCIlII'TIONS are am aole ~y mfdcfrgI-? 5.pr, oldlr1 1 

DISC.AlMFR FNG NFFR l,rr<e-f~ p~otess 3na nlorrnal >n OCI qn., I rc ...i Ux .mells PO h k J71~151.Pmzarqn P4 15250'950 AJYrrs :!u'jc.8 r I1%'~..1"1 

L S in !.>fy nt#tlu,* ,n mqnrr.5 n~nmeoo' c.-en. a-0 enes ,.c.r op~nv ::x ill '' : .nu. 11.4 -1 u,acnl loins- Sue, nenlenl $1 D,c.rrenl, 

March 1999 	 Engineer I 
Mine. WarFare. and Counterinsurqencq: 
 . . The Russian View 


By Liautmnnt Colonel (Retired)Lcsfpr W Grau 

The Soviet Army trained and pre- on Russia's own territory. Instead of discusses the SovietiRussian experipared for a "Third World War." swift wars of maneuver and massed ence with land mines in Afghanistan 

This war would involve large- combat power, those conflicts were pro- and Chechnya and lessons they learned 

scale nuclear exchange andlor conven- tracted civil wars that were fought in from those conflicts. 

tional maneuver, where modern, fast- mountains, forests, and cities. 

moving armored forces probe for enemy While armies must train and prepare Afghanistan weak spots, break through enemy for the most dangerous future conflict, 

defenses using massed or nuclear anil- they should also train and prepare for Mines are used differently in 

lery strikes and the shock action of the more likely future conflicts. Some guerrilla wars than in convenarmor, and then drive deep into the Russian military theorists think their tional wars. Whereas the 

enemy rear area to fight the deep opera- armed forces are more likely to fight 40th Army used millions of land 

tion. While this vision may still apply to guerrilla or local wars than world wars. mines in Afghanistan to protect 

a future war, military theo~ists in the The force structure, weapons, equip- munist installations and deny the muja- Russian Ground Forces are considering ment. tactics, training, and military the- use of their lines of 

their last two large-scale conflicts-in ory required to counter an insurgency munication, the mujahidcen their 

Afghanistan and Chechnya-and draw or fight a local war differ from those limited number of mines more selecing some conclusions about other possi- required for a world war. As Russian tively and pn,bably more effectively, ble types of future war. I I military theorists gather data and The mujahideen antitank mines ranged Soviet military theorists envisioned develop tactics and methodologies to from to a variety of foreign. 

war on the rolling plains of nonhem fight local wars and counter insurgen- designed and .manufactured mines, Europe or in the high Manchurian plains cies, one of their interests is to prepare These designs included the Soviet TM. 

near China. Instead, their last two con- sappers and other forces to deal with 46, the Italian TC-2,5 and TC-6.1, the 

flicts were fought in lugged mountain- land mines in these conflict^.^ The U,S, M19. the British Mark and Mark 

ous ternin against irregular forces. One applications of land mines in world 

,,and the Belgian Hs5 and M3 

conflict occurred on the soil of a neigh- wars, local wars, and guerrilla wars are mines. Their antipersonnel mine 

boring counw. and the other was fought distinct and different. The following tory was primarily Soviet PMN, - I I I 	 POMZ-2, and MON-50 mines but also 

included the Italian TS-50, the U.S. 

M18A1, and the British P5 MKI. Many 

of these mines were manufactured in 

Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, and china? 

Mine Effects 

. 

Table 1 shows the Soviet 40th 

Army's personnel and vehicle 

losses to mines during their war in 

Afghanistan. As shown, the mujahideen 

did not have many mines when the war 

started but soon obtained them. Soviet 

deaths to mines initially were high until 

they developed countermeasures to cut 

their losses. Their countermeasures 19801981 1982198319841985198619871988 included issuing flak jackets, sandbagging and reinforcing vehicle floors, and 

Personnel Vehicles riding on top of armored vehicles. DisTable 1. Soviet 40th Army lossesto mine-personnel killed in action and semination these countermeasureswas 

vehicles destroyed5 

2 Engineer 	 March 1999 
pall of the in-count~ytraining conducted 

by the 45th Separate Engineer Regi-

~nent.~After these countermeasures 

were in~plemented.the number of deaths 

from mines fell but the numher wounded 

by mines rose. Vehicle losses spiked in 

1984 and I985 during the heaviest ki&ting in the war and fell as the Soviets prepared to withdraw. 

Table 2 sho\*,s the number of mines 

captured by the Soviet 40th Army as well 

as the number detected and disarmed or 

destroyed. The Soviets captured far more 

mines before the inujahideen could 

deploy them than they found during 

mine-clea~ingactivities. 

Soviet Wounded 

0

f the 620,000 Soviet personncl 

who served in Afghanistan. 

14,453 were killed or died from 

woundsl accidents, or disease. That is 

2.33 percent of those who served. An 

additional 53,753 (8.67 percent) were 

wounded or injured.7 In the early part 

of the war. twice as many Soviet soldiers were wounded by bullets as by 

shrapnel, but by the end of the war, 2.5 

times as many were u.ounded by shrapnel as by bullets. The percentage of 

multiple and combination wounds 

increased about four times over the 

course of the war. while the percentage 

of serious and critical wounds increased two times. Land mines were 

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 

Mines Cleared Mines Captured 

Table 2. Number of mujahideen mines cleared and captured by the 

Soviet 40th Army, 1980-1988.~ 

the primary reason for the increase in mujahideen guerrillas had rifles hut few 

serious and critical wounds. The num- mortars or land mines. As the war prober of soldiers wounded by land mines gressed. guerrillas captured or re-ceived 

increased 25-30 percent over the course these weapons and, consequently. the 

of the warx Table 3 reflects this change. type and nature of wounds changed. 

The first two lines of the table total 100 Soviet medical evacuation techniques 

percent. For the percentage of single improved during the war, enahling more 

wounds, subtract the percentage of critically wounded soldiers to survive. 

multiple and comhination wounds (line The figures in Table 4, which show the 

3) from 100 percent. For the percentage number of wal- dead and wounded for 

of light and moderate wounds, subtl-act ' the Soviet 40th Amy by year, reflect 

the percentage of serious and critical their improved evacuation techniques. 

wounds (line 4) from I00 percent. As the table indicates, the ratio of 

During the early years of [he war, the dead to wounded Soviet soldiers 

Type of Wound 

Percent from bullets 

Percent from shrapnel 

Percent of multiple and combination wounds 

Percent of serious and critical wounds 

Table 3. Type and severity of wounds as a percentage of total hostile fire and mine wounds15 

/ Wounded 1 - 1 3813 1 3898 1 6024 4219 7786 / 8356 1 7823 5008 3663 1 144 1 

Year 

Dead 

Table 4. Soviet 40th Army war dead and wounded in Afghanistan, 1979-198915 

March 1999 Engineer 3 

1979 

86 

1980 

1484 

1981 

1298 

1982 

1948 

1983 

1446 

1984 

2343 

1985 

1868 

1986 

1333 

1988 

759 

1987 

1215 

1989 

53 
Location of Wound 

I (percent) 

Cranium 

Backbone 

and 

and 

brain 

spinal cord 

4.9 

0.1

41 

1 I Face and jaw I 1.4 

Otolaryngologic (ear, nose, and 

throat) 

Chest 

1 Stomach and pelvis 1 7.8 

Table 5. Location of wounds by percentage over time1= 

improved over time from roughly 1:3 

to 1 :S.with an overall ratio of 136. 

By comparison. the Russians state that 

the ratio of dead to wounded U.S. soldiers during the Vietnam War was 1:5.' 

Despite the increased severity of 

wounds. more wounded Soviet soldiers 

survived. Changes in medical procedures apparently improved the soldiers' 

survivability rate.'' 

Changes in the location of wounds 

reflect the acquisition of modern amlaments by the guenillas. Table 5 sho\+.s 

the location of the wounds and their percentage of frequency for the first and 

last full years of the war The increase in 

head and neck injuries is consistent with 

shrapnel injuries from mines and mortars and matches the increase of these 

types of weapons in the mujahideen's 

arsenal. The table is incomplete-the 

source provided general figures of 

wounds to upper extremities of 25.4 

Location of 

percent. to lower extremities of 37.9 

percent, and for thoracic and abdominal 

wounds of 1.7 percent without reference to any change over time. Still. figures in the table reflect an increase in 

injuries that is consistent with those 

caused by shrapnel from mines and a 

decrease in wounds to the chest. stomach. and pelvis. The decrease probably 

is due to enforced wearing of flak jackets and the issue of some improved flak 

jackets. 

Table 6 compares the percentage of 

wounds by location for the Great Patriotic War (Soviet soldiers wounded in 

their war with Germany during World 

War 11). Vietnam (U.S. wounded), 

Afghanistan (Soviet wounded), and 

the fighting in Chechnya (Russian 

wounded). Differences in the percentage of wounds by location partly reflect 

the type of terrain on which each war 

was fought, the training and skill of the 

conlbatants, and the type and degree of 

individual protection available. 

Chechnya 

Fronl the beginning of the conflict 

in December 1994 until the summer of 1995. Chechen forces seldom used mines against the Russian 

forces. In July or August 1995, 

Chechen forces began using mines regularly and they continued to use them 

until the end of the conflict in 1996. 

The Chechens did not enlploy many 

conventional mines but improvised 

them using artillery rounds. aviation 

munitions, grenades. and other explosives. They also employed captured 

Russian mines, including directional 

mines, which they mounted off the 

ground to explode on the flanks or 

above vehicles and personnel. Most of 

the Chechen mines were laid on or 

Afghanistan Chechnya-1995 

Wound War (Russian) States) (Russian) (Russian) 

Head and Neck 

I Chest I 9 5 I 

Legs 37 36 I 

Table 6: Percentage of wounds by location in various warsq5 

4 Engineer March 1999 
r\ 


1 


-


1.Tank with mine mller. 

2. Minedetection group with dogs 

and their search panern. 

3. Sappes clear road flanks. 

4. Sapper* with electronic mine 

detectors clear a road. 

5. Detachment commander. 

6. Covering force. 

7. Sappers moving with flank securily 

elements. 

Distance Is In meters (m). 

Contemporary Russian formation for clearing roads 

adjacent to roads and highways." As a 

result of their experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the Russian sappers have developed new techniques 

for clearing roads in a counterinsurgency. Descriptions of some techniques follow. 

Russian Road-Clearing 


Techniques 


ARussian motorized rifle regiment normally is given responsibility for clearing roads. If the 

entire regiment will physically move 

on the road, the regiment constitutes 

a movement support detachment 

(00kn)ad obespechwa dvizhcniya), 

which includes a tank with a mine 

roller, a sapper squad mounted on a 

BTR (wheeled personnel canier), and 

scouts and mine-clearing personnel. The 

00D moves in front of the regiment 

and clears the road. If the regiment is 

responsible for clearing and securing a 

portion of a road on a long-term basis 

(such as protecting lines of communication in Afghanistan or Chechnya), the 

Russians deploy a mine reconnaissance 

detachment to check the section of road 

that the regiment maintains. The mine 

reconnaissance detachment nomlally 

consists of a tank with a mine roller, a 

sapper squad mounted on its BTR, and a 

covering force mounted on two or three 

BMPs (tracked armored personnel carriers). As they move, the tank uses its 

main gun to blast any suspicious objects, 

such as piles of trash or bumed-out vehicles. The sappers must be particularly 

alert in areas where the enemy might 

employ command-detonated mines. 

After the regiment's section of road is 

cleared, the regimental commander 

reports this fact to his higher headquarters. No convoy movement is allowed 

on the road until all commanders have 

reported that their sections are cleared.'' 

So-called "green zones" were a constant source of trouble in Afghanistan. 

A green zone is an agricultural area of 

gardens and vineyards that is bisected by 

a network of inigation ditches. In 

Afghanistan, green zones provided concealment for guerrilla forces and were 

practically impassible for vehcles. The 

green zones in many parts of the country 

bordered highways and provided optimum sites for ambush. Antitank mines, 

antipersonnel mines, and commanddetonated mines were easily concealed 

in the edges of green zones, where 

ambush parties and snipers preyed on 

dismounted scouts and sappers. 

The Russians now recommend the 

formation shown in the figure above 

for clearing roads. A tank or BMP 

pushing a mine roller moves in front of 

the formation. On its flanks and 

slightly ahead move dismounted 

~notorized riflemen and sappers with 

electronic mine detectors, who clear 

snipers and ambushes. The mine 

detection group, equipped with minedetection dogs, follows some 40 or 50 

meters behind the tank. They carefully look for mines on the road and 

road shoulders. Sappers with electronic mine detectors move on the road 

about 15-20 meters behind the minedetection group. Walking on the right 

and left sides of the road, two or three 

sappers with electronic mine detectors 

and mine probes clear an area about 

20-40 meters on the flanks of the road. 

A covering force of dismounted 

motorized riflemen follow the sappers 

who clear the Ranks. The BTR and 

BMPs follow the dismounted parry 

and the mine reconnaissance detachment commander (usually a platoon 

leader), who controls the activity from 

the middle of the formation. The average clearing speed of such a formation 

is about two kilometers per hour." 

The vulnerability of the sappers to 

March 1999 Engineer 5 
snipers and ambush in Afghanistan 

and Chechnya was a problem for the 

SovietsiRussians. This formation protects the sappers with both dismounted 

infantry and vehicle-mounted directfire weapons. 

In addition to using dogs, electronic 

mine detectors, and probes. Russian 

sappers are taught to look for signs of 

soil disturbance, soil discoloration. 

dents or depressions on the earth's surface, and other signals. Such signals 

include tunneling, broken branches and 

debris, trash associated with mines or 

demolitions, trip wires, wire leading 

away from the site, patches in road 

work, loose cobblestones, or other indications of mining. 

When a member of the detachment 

finds a mine, the detachment stops and 

the finder marks the mine's location 

with a small red flag. The detachment 

commander and an experienced sapper 

move to the site and examine the mine. 

If the commander decides to destroy it, 

every member of the group draws a circle on the ground where he is standing 

and marks it with the first letter of his 

last name and whatever else is necessaly to find it again. All the members 

except the one-man demolition party 

then move behind the armored vehicles 

or into a ditch for protection. The demolition party places an electrically 

primed charge on the mine, moves to a 

safe location, and detonates the charge. 

After the mine blows up. group members return to their last location and 

resume the search. I" 

If the commander decides to disarm 

the mine, a single sapper is given the 

mission. He carefully examines the 

area within a radius of at least 1.5 

meters around the mine for other 

mines, trip wires. or detonator wires. 

Then he carefully scrapes the concealing layer off the mine; exposes the 

sides of the mine; and looks for antilift 

devices, other mines underneath the 

first, and booby traps. He removes the 

mine fuze and uses a grappling hook 

and rope to pull the mine from the 

hole. He then examines the hole to 

check for additional mines. Disarmed 

mines are collected for destruction or 

evac~ation.'~ 

The Dangerous Road Ahead 

Although international efforts are 

underway to ban the use of 

mines in future conflicts, they 

will remain a constant feature of insurgencies. Mines are cheap, easy to manufacture and deploy, and provide an 

effective countermeasure to a modern, 

mechanized force. Guerrilla forces 

often operate outside the parameters 

and without the protection of international law. Thus, a guerrilla force may 

find that the efficacy of mines outweighs their prohibition by international treaty-particularly if the 

guerrilla force does not represent the 

state and is not signatory to the treaty. 

Countering mines increases the logistics burden on a force-from the necessity to cany additional equipment and 

clearing personnel to the need for additional medicill and mortuary services. 

Mines that wound rather than kill are 

more efficacious since every wounded 

soldier ties up many support and medical 

personnel. Mines also rob a modem 

mechanized force of its high-speed 

mobility and reduce the rate of movement to the speed of a cautious sapper. 

For these reasons, the problem of countering mines will remain a constant for 

armed forces well into the next Century. 

Consequently, modem armies 

should train to deal expeditiously with 

mines placed by irregular combatants. 

If a modem army is not trained to deal 

with this form of mine warfare, it may, 

like the Soviets and Russians, find its 

tempo reduced to that of a cautious dis 

mounted sapper picking his wa. 

through rough country controlled h: 

indigenous guerrillas. L 

MI: Grau is a military anal~t at th 

Foreign Military Studies Ofice at FOI 

Leaven~wrth, Kansas. He is a Ketnar 

combat veteran, retired infantry lieu 

tenant colonel, and Soviet Foveign Are 

Oficer: Mr Grau holds a master 

degree from Kent State University. 

Endnotes: 

h his article foi~ows the convention 

at "Soviet" refers to the period before 

e breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 

id "Russian" refers to the period after 

e breakup. 

co dam Nizhalovskiy, "Na dorogakh 

hechni" [On Chechnya's roads], 

rmeiskiy sbornik [Army Digest], Janury 1997, page 27. 

3~ussian General Staff material cur- 

?ntly being translated for a book by the 

uthor. 

4~etr Antonov, "Chemu uchit opyt" 

Yhat does experience teach?], Armeykiy sbornik [Army Digest], January 

997, page 35. 

5~leksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya I 

'oblest' Algana [The tragedy and valor 

f the Afghanistan veteran], Moscow: 

;kona, 1995, Appendix. 

lbid. 

'G. F. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnostl 

nyat rhe secret seal is removed], 

IOSCOW: Voyenizdat, 1993, pages 401- 

05. A portion of this article is taken 

.om "Handling the Wounded in a 

:ounter-Guerrilla War: The SovietIRusian Experience in Afghanistan and 

:hechnyaU by Lester W Grau and Willrm A. Jorgensen, published in U.S 

Irmy Medical Department Journal, 

knuary-February 1998. 

8~. A. Nechaev, A. K. Tutokhel. A. I. 

iritsanov, and I. D. Kosachev, "Meditsinkoe obespechenie 40-1 armii: Tsifry i 

aMy" [Medical support of the 40th Army: 

:acts and Figures]. Voenno-meditsin-

:kiy zhurnal [Military medical journal, 

erea after VMZ], August 1991, page 4. 

9~ G. Brusov and V. I. Khrupkin, 

Sovremennaya ognestrel'naya travma' 

Modern bullet- and shrapnel-induced 

rauma], VMZ, February 1996, page 26. 

-he Russian source of U.S. statistics is 

~nknown. 

l0~eaders interested in the medica 

reatment of mine casualties are 

jirected to "Guerrilla Warfare and Lanc 

Mine Casualties Remain inseparable 

by Lester W. Grau, William A. JOI 

gensen and Robert R. Love, Army Me1 

ical Department Journal, Octobe 

December 1998, pages 10-16. 

I~izhalovskiy,pages 27-29. 

"~ikhail Firsov. "Nepisanye pravil: 

[Unwritten rules], Armeyskiy sborn 

[Army digest], January 1997, page 30. 

I3~irsov, page 30. 


I4lbid., pages 30-31. 


151bid. 


March 1999 
Engincer/Civil Affairs Teams 


Enhance Peace Suuloort Owerations 


By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J Toomey and Major Willirrr?i R.R~~ckleyJI: 

Whether the mission is to deliver humanitarian aid 

in Somalia, foster development of democratic 

institotions in Haiti with the United Nations 

force, or ensure peace and stability in Bosnia as part of the 

NATO Implementation ForceIStabilization Force (IFOR1 

SFOR) engineer and civil affairs (CA) units are necessary 

for successfill peace support operations. 

This article describes how engineer and CA units can 

develop positive working relationships and enhance their 

contributions to any mission. Included are examples of 

successful opel.ations and some guidelines to maximize 

these unit$' combined capabilities. 

The Challenge 

Asipnificant challenge in many peace support 

operations is that they occur in areas with an 

immature or destroyed infrastructure. Tmnsportation networks are either rudimentary, as in Somalia or 

Haiti, or destroyed. as in Bosnia. Utilities often are disrupted 

or deficient. The lack of a suppowable infrastructure limits 

sustainment of the peace support force and hinders 

I 

humanitarian aid, economic regeneration, and the de. 

veloplnentof democratic institutions, 

~ ~ ~ istthat military h ~forces ~within peace 

support operations normally in conjunction with the 

host na~ion; with governmental agencies, such as the 

~ ~ of state; ~ or with ~ nongovernmenral ~ organ. t ~ 

izntions, such as the World Bank and the European Union. 

~l~~~~ often not affiliated with the united 

states may have and tirne lines that are not in 

synch with forces. ~h~~-~f~~~, fostering is a

continual and complex challenge during peace support 

operations. In nations with shattered econornic and 

democratic institutions, the peace support force is often 

charged with encouraging stability and restoring democraticbased "normalcy:' 

Complementary Capabilities 

To counter these challenges, engineer and CA units 

bring complementary capabilities to the peace support 

"battlefield." 

Bosnia-Herzegovina I

....' 

0 

Damagedtminedtrack 

Basci 

I 

The Bosnian rail situation in January 1996 

i 

March 1999 E~~ginr~r 7 
Engineer Clnits 

Engineers are infrastmcture experts. They provide 

military forces with mobility and survivability support, 

particularly during early stages of an operation. Engineers 

open and construct roads; restore bridges, airfields, and 

heliports; and open lines of communication. Depending on 

the force package, specialized well-drilling, quarrying, and 

other units are included. 

Engineer units have design and project management 

capabilities that are vali~ahle to civil organizations. Engineers can take the lead in demining programs. Depending 

on the situation, they may remove mines to support military 

forces and assist civilian demining programs. 

Civil Affairs Units 

Civil affairs units also bring a wealth of expertise to the 

theater. These units are concentrated within the U.S. Army 

Reserves. CA units have personnel skilled in a myriad of 

professions, skills, and occupations, some of which ;Ire not 

available within the Active Component. Civil and electrical 

engineers, telecommunications specialists, doctors, veterinarians, farmers, and lawyers are some of the skills that CA 

units bring to the force. 

CA units typically are task organized to support specific 

mission requirements. Their mission and force structure 

depend on the degree to which military forces are required to 

operate in-country institutions. Support can range from a 

complete "hands-on" approach, similar to that required in 

Germany and Japan after World War IT, to liaison and 

coordination with existing governments, similar to 

operations in Bosnia. CA units in Bosnia provide military 

forces with essential coordination with host nation 

governments, government organizations, and nongovernment organizations. Liaison officers are stationed 

with key players, such as the host nation, U.N. organizations, 

8 Engineer 

Engineer forces perform 

valuable service during 

peace support operations. 

and the World Bank. Where appropriate, these soldiers 

provide NATO and the organizations to which they are 

attached with information on one another's operations, goals, 

and objectives. They are conduits for information flow in 

both directions and can build interpersonal relationships 

needed to coordinate between organizations with no formal 

connections and that may answer to national authorities with 

differing goals and priorities. 

Mutual Support 

Engineer and CA units should support each other during 

peace support operations and execute combined 

initiatives. Military engineer resources and efforts 

normally are focused on direct support to the combinedljoint 

team and have a distinctly military flavor. CA personnel can 

serve as a lubricant to facilitate this engineer work. Engineers 

seldom work in a vacuum during peace support operations, so 

it is necessary to establish and foster relationships with local 

contractors, host nation governments, and various international 

organizations working in the area. The CA personnel serve as 

liaison officers, open lines of dialogue, and represent the 

command's position. Their liaison skills may be especially 

helpful when establishing long-term rapport with host 

governments to facilitate military engineers' access to real 

estate and locally controlled resources. 

CA personnel can also provide economic and political 

analyses. As engineers develop courses of action, CA forces 

can provide assessments and projections that facilitate the 

military decision-making process. Country studies and 

infrastructure assessments can be very helpful and should be 

considered valuable resources. 

Engineers can support CA operations. Direct support may 

take many forms hut normally is in terms of engineer 

assessments and design work. A good practice is to include 

March 1999 
engineers as part of CA assessment teams for infrastrucrure 

surveys. These engineers contribute technical expertise and 

ensure that the surveys support engineer efforts. When 

resources are scarce, engineers !nay also provide physical 

support. A small amount of engineer effort, such as grading 

a road or rehuilding a wooden bridge, can pay great 

dividends. CA teams can maximize the use of such residual 

engineer effort h? identifying low-cost. high-payoil'targets. 

Examples 

The authors acquired firsthand experience in 

exercising engineerlcivil-affairs cooperation while 

serving with the SFOR. NATO Headquarters. in 

Sarajevo. Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Combined Joint 

Engineer (CJENGR) and the Civil-Military Com~nission 

(CIMIC) Task Force routinely cooperated to facilitate 

engineer support to SFOR military operations and CA 

reconstruction objectives as a means of promoting economic 

regeneration. 

Operating in teams, CJENGR and CIMIC personnel 

established strong liaisons with each other and coordinated 

both plans and operations. The CJENGR was a 

multinational organization, while the CIMIC Task Force 

was a U.S. organization that worked through the 

multinational CJ9 (the staff section responsible for civilmilitary operations). For numerous reasons. it was not 

practical to simply integrate a CIMIC brigade into the 

NATO headquarters. This was a potential problem. because 

U.S. civil-military doctrine is much more defined than that 

of most of our NATO allies. To enhance cooperation, the 

chief of CJ9 allowed the CIMIC Task Force to pursue 

missions within the overall SFOR and civil-military 

campaign plans. For the most pan, CJENGR worked 

directly with the CIMIC Task Force's Joint Civil 

Commission (JCC). The JCC comprised the bulk of 

engineer and infrastructure expertise within the ClMlC Task 

Force. 

A primary. component of success was ensuring that the 

engineer and civil-military campaign plans were synchronized with the theater campaign plan and with each other. 

The engineer campaign plan listed thl-ee primary goals: 

Support military operations. 

Promote effective demining. 

Improve civil infrastructure. 

The last two goals correlated directly with CA actions. 

Engineers were major contributors to the CA planning 

process, while CA personnel participated as members of the 

CJENGR-led SFOR Infrastructure Steering Group. The 

steering group brought many agencies together to establish 

theater-wide engineer policies and construction priorities. 

March 1999 

'i -

A Hungarian engineer works on the bridge 

at Basci. 

Within the steerins group, the CIMIC Task Force provided the 

civil perspective to an organization that had no civilian 

component. The task force also provided the NATO engineer 

officers, who had minimal contact with civil-military 

operations, with resources they could access through their 

CIMIC teams. 

Of major importance to the success of operations in Bosnia 

was the network of liaison officers the CIMIC Task Force 

established with the host nation and various international 

organizations such as the World Bank. The liaison officers 

helped facilitate engineer initiatives, identify potential highpayoff projects. gain access to resources. and promote 

engineer activities. 

The CJENGR staff routinely consulted with the CIMIC 

Task Force and appointed a liaison officer to seive as the 

primary point of contact for CA actions. Working through the 

Engineer Plans Office. this officer oversaw coordination of 

engineer support to CA initiatives. 

T~I-eeinitiatives portray the outstanding mutual support 

fostered at theater Ie\.el and illustrate the varied scope of 

engineerICA actions undertaken: the bridge replacement 

program. the strategic rail program, and the Basci village 

construction. 

Bridge Replace~nent Program 

Situation: From 1995 to 1997, to promote freedom of 

movement for military forces, SFOR and its predecessor. 

IFOR, installed nulnerous NATO-owned military equipment 

bridges to replace bridges destroyed on main supply and 

Engir~eer9 
movement routes throughout the country. In late 1996 and 

early 1997, international organizations began funding the 

repair or replacement of damaged or destroyed bridges to 

rcplace the NATO military equipment bridges. The 

challenge was to facilitate br-idge repair arid replacementa major move toward economic regeneration-while 

maintaining full freedom of movement for SFOR. The 

CIMlC Task Force, which focused on developing civil 

institutions, un-hesitatingly endorsed the proposal. However, 

CJENGR, ever mindful of military requirements to keep 

routes open for military traffic, insisted that all routes 

remained open. The solution exenlplifies the cooperative 

approach between the two organizations. 

Solution: Convinced that civilian-led bridge repair was 

the eventual long-term solution, the CJENGR considered 

bypasses for each of the bridges, which would ensure full 

freedom of movement for SFOR once the military 

equipment bridges were removed. Since no NATO funding 

existed to upgrade bypass routes, the CIMIC Task Force 

coordinated with international donors to incorporate bypass 

upgrades in their funding. The CIMIC Task Force and the 

CJENGR worked closely with local transportation 

directorates to ensure that construction schedules meshed 

with the CJENGR's ability to remove the equipment bridges 

and provide site clearance. By working together, the 

CJENGR and the ClMIC Task Force took this process a step 

further. They worked togethel- to select sites to place bridges 

displaced by new construction. Most of these sites had great 

civil benefits and helped enhance SFOR's image as a 

positive force within the country. 

Stralcgic Rail Proerarll 

Situation: Before the conflict, rail was the primary mode 

of long-distance transportation in the Balkans. The conflict 

destroyed much or the mil system (Engineer, July 1998, 

pages 2-6) however. and by 1996 rail traffic was only 15 

percent of prewar levels. Large stretches of the network were 

literally torn apari. In particular, tliere was no rail access to 

the mineral-rich Tuzla Valley. Before the war, this area was 

linked to the Sava River port of Brcko and to ports along the 

Danube in Croatia and Hungary. In a region with an 

estimated 70-percent un-employment rate at the start of 

1997. the CIMIC Task Force estimated that restoring the link 

between the T~lzla Valley and Europe would immediately 

create 1,200 jobs and inject a minimum of $4.6 million per 

annum into the depressed area. Restoring regional economic 

vitality is a key component of developing stability and 

fostering democratic institutions. Encouraging rail traffic 

across the Bosnian-Croatian border was a positive step in 

normalizing relations within the divided region. 

Solution: Over the course of several months, the 

CIENGR-CIMIC team worked closely with SFOR's 

political advisor to develop a program to repair most of the 

main rail line. Following the CJENGR's technical assessment 

of the line between Tuzla and the Hungarian border, the 

CJENGR-CIMIC team developed initiatives to repair it. A 

key element was usillg the U.S. Agency for international 

Development (USAID) as a funding source for materials and 

construction contractors. As a healthy investor in the region, 

USAID provided funds for the 52.5 n~illion rail-highway 

bridge at Brcko and pledged more than $2 million for 

additional work along the line. With the CJENGR's encouragement, the Italian government deployed the Italian 

Railway Engineer Regiment to constluct the line between 

Tuzla and Brcko using materials provided by USAID. In 

Croatia, a series of negotiations chaired by the CJENGRClMIC team led to Croatian Rail and the Hungarian 

government repairing much of the line between [he Croatian 

border and Hungary. By late 1997, a serviceable rail line 

existed from the Dalmatian Coast to the main European line 

in Hungary. Although some political obstacles still restrict 

full traffic. the necessary infrastnlcture is in place. 

Rasci Village Constl.uction 

Situation: The village of Basci, located southeast of 

Sarajevo near the International Entity Boundary Line, was 

ravaged and abandoned during the fighting. Due to its 

proximity to the boundary and the willingness of its residents 

to retuln, the United Nations High Co~nmissio~i for Refugees 

(UNHCR) considered Basci an ideal place to spearhead the 

refugee-return program. Funding was available from various 

sources to purchase modolar buildings as housing for 

returning residents. However, routes into the area needed 

repair, and two small bridges on the road leading to the 

village were destroyed. Although local contractor support 

was not costly, it was limited. Using military engineers to do 

Ihe work was an attractive option. 

Solution: Workng as a team, CJENGR and CIMlC Task 

Force representatives, via the ClMIC Task Force's UNHCR 

liaison officer, scheduled NATO military engineers to repair 

the 2,100-meter road and construct two military load class 40 

bridges of 6.5 and 6.9 meters, respectively. The troops 

assigned to complete the mission were members of the 

Hungarian Engineer Contingent. Because NATO funding did 

not cover the cost of materials (about $8,000). the CIMlC 

liaison officer obtained funds from the United Nations. 

Guidelines 

The following guidelines will help maximize engineer1 

CA cooperative capabilities. 

B 	Recognize complementary capabilities. Engineer and 

CA personnel must be familiar with each other's 

capabilities and organizations. Since engineer and CA 

(Continued on puxe 38) 
On July 28, 1997, tlfe U.S. Ar.nr)> implementing this strategy. Both plat- solidated support for infantry, armor, 

Engineer Scirool submitted 017 opera- forms are designed to accomplish their and engincer forces. Efficiencies cretionnl concept to Troining arld Doc- rcspective breaching and bridging mis- ated by equipment interoperability and 

11,ine Corlrmand to replace the MII3A3 1 sions while the soldiers on them remain commonality can ~narkedly enhance the 

En~ir~eer Sq~rad Vehicle w.it11 the undcr annor protection. CSS force's ability to sustain the BCT. 

Bradley - the Engineer Brudley Figlzt- Thc Maneuver Support Battle Lab Just the reductions in the Prescribed 

ing IVel~icle. In October 1998, h.lajor (MSBL) conducted an experiment Load List and Authorized Stockage List 

General F101ver:r asked the school to under the Concept Experimentation and the increases in BFV mechanics 

develop u white paper urticulating whj, Program (CEP) in 1998 to evaluate the within the BCT will significantly ease 

engir~eers need to he rnounted in a BFV. Results from the CEP experiment the sustainment challenge. 

Bradley, .so /lie entire regiment can clearly demonstrate the requirement to i A high degree of lethality is a key 

speak >r,it11 orje voice. Major DarreN find a more mobilc and survivable plat- 1 requirement of the current and future 

Strother, then chief of the Collecti~~e form for combat engineers than the force, and it involves more than maneuAnalpis Branch, took the lead in MI 13. While the MI 13 will continue to ver and the application of firepower. 

developing tlz~following ivliire paper,. have a place in the Engineer Regiment, Lethality is obtained from the syncr- 

-- divisional combat engineers must be gisrn of force agility, technologically 

mounted in the ~~lost survivable plat- superior weapons, sound doctrine, and 

The world has entered a period form available if they are to ensure the realistic training that emphasizes the 

of radical and often-violent mobility of the offensively oriented integration and synchronization of the 

change. The threats are more Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Today BCT. 

diverse and less predictable. Today's that platfom~ is the BFV. Engineers cannot afford to be the 

threat vehicles and weapons are more The Infantry School has already weak link in the combined arms team. 

lethal than those available during any demonstrated improvements the BFV New and rcadily available weapon 

other period in our history. Amy corn- offers in the areas of cross-country advancements combined with the wlbat engineers require a modernized mobility, target acquisition, weapons nerabilities of the MI 13 exposed during 

squad vehicle to enhance their speed, ranges, night operations, and the poten- Operation Dese~t Storln lnean that comversatility, and survivability as they tial for technology enhancements. The I bat engineers are lnou~ited in the most ' provide necessary mobility and coun- MSBL B~adley CEP demonstrated how easily defeated vehicle used to conduct 

tennobility support to maneuver forces the spced, increased annor, and tire- the close fight. When engineers are 

during the close fighl. The leading con- power of the BFV allowed combat mounted in BFVs, the situation changes 

tender to assutile this modernization engineers to work, maneuver, and pro- completely. The advantages offered by 

role is the Bradley fighting vehicle tect themselves simultaneously. The the BFV allow engineers to move as an 

(BFV). The long-tenn solution is to turret and main gun have proven integrated, survi\,ahle member of the 

codevelop a future engineer squad vari- extremely valuable to combat engi- BCT and have all the assets necessary 

ant of the future infantry vehicle. neers, and the BFV provides increased for success. Retention of three addiThe Army and the neth hods by commonality, lethality, and versatility tional battalions of BFVs in the division 

which we conduct warfare are con- , to the BCT. during this time of force reduction 

stantly changing. Anny Warfighting Analysis reinforces the commonal- increases the overall lethality of the 

Experiments (AWE), the development ity available to the BCT from the engi- force. 

of Force XXI,continuing rorce reduc- neers' transition to the BFV. Engineer The engineer M 1 I3 has become distions, and the combat service support and infantry soldiers are intermixed on tinguishable on the battlefield as a 

(CSS) redesign effort reflect these the battlefield and often rely on one result of fielding such systems as the 

changes. To support them, the Engineer ' another for CSS. The nature of Force Bradley linebacker, the command and 

Regiment has adopted a strategy that XXI and the CSS redesign requi~e us to control vehicle, and the fire support 

shifts from mechanized to armored reduce the logistical demand of the team vehicle. The enemy can easily tarwarfare. The MI-based Grizzly and the force. It is not unthinkable that the ' get our engineers, while friendly forces 

Wolverine are the first two examples of ongoing CSS redesign will lead to con- (Continued onpage 35) 

March 1999 Engineer I I 
T 1 he lethality of modem 

and Third World weapon Checkpoint Design* systems makes the future 

tile 

battlefield 

environment. 

an increasingly 

whether during 	

hos- 

, 	

A crrr-servd a a command Q p. 

peacekeeping, peace enforce-


ment. or was. For this iwson pro- ~- l"di"id"il, 


Fighting Poritionr 

tecting the force should he a 

commander's number one piiority. Have you ever had or used 

these excuses when instituting /---.

force protection: "I don't have 

time for force protection," "I 

don't ha\-e enough money or 

materials for force prntection." "I 

don't have enough personnel to 

fill sandbags:' or "I don't need to 

woq about force protection. the 

engineers take care of it? Our 

soldiers are our most precious Double-nandard roncsnina

asset: we must provide them the ~ s ~drums ~ tie f byl cab#e ~ ~

best equipment. technical guidance. and leadership when estahlishing force-protection measures. 

An effective force-protection 

prosram consists of both indi- Figure 1 

vidual shills and collective 

tasks. Soldiers should he trained continually on force- the lowest level. Understanding fundamental proceduresprotection techniques. Since these critical tasks are perishable, such as requirements for overhead cover. proper emplacethey ~iiust be sustained through realistic training and evaluated ment of sandbag revetments, and capabilities of indi\:idual 

routinely. Leaders should learn force-protecrion techniques and crew protective systems-is essential to ensuring system 

while attending basic and advanced institutional training safety. In mot cases, combat engineers do not have the 

courses. Understanding the basic fundamentals of sunivahil- time or the soldiers to construct a base camp and impleit? and general engineering in peacekeeping. peace enforce- ment force-protection nleasures for other units. They norment. and war scenarios is essenti;ll for all combat arms and mally assist maneuver commanders or base camp mayors in 

combat senice suppott leaders. formulating force-protection plans. Engineers provide techniThis article describes a systematic way to protect soldiers cal and tactical advice and quality control for emplacement of 

and equipment. It challenges leaders to understand the fun- force-protection structures. including earth revetments. wire 

damentals of general engineering as it applies to force pro- obstacles. and fighting positions. 

tection. We must keep an open mind and be creative when 

working with force protection. A Systematic Approach 

Force-Protection Measures 	 urlng Operation Joint Endeavor. a systematic ap- -proach was developed and implemented to monitor 

Force protection of troop livine areas. headquarters ele- force protection in Bosnia. When the. operation began, 

ments, weapon storage areas. and communication fi~rce protection was first on every commander's mind. After 

assets niust be considered when planning any opera- the initial thrust of U.S.combat forces into Bosnia, however. 

tion. Developing force-PI-otection measures begins by edu- it became apparent that most units had changed their focus to 

cating everyone in the chain of command from the highest to completing missions that supported the peace pl;~n. 

12 Ell~irleer 	 March 1999 
- - 

Task Force Eagle mandated 

that each unit use three 

tiers when constructing forceprotection systems. The three 

Gers were of 1st Armored 

Division's tactical SOP and 

were used during several field 

exercises before Operation Joint 

Endeavor began. Part of Tier Il 

includes the checkpoint design 

established hy the 1st Armored 

Division Engineer Brigade (Figure I). The guidelines were 

briefed and each unit was 

expected to meet these standards 

(METT-T dependent). 

Tier I - consists of triplestandard concertina around the 

base camp, prefabricated This protective bunker collapsed due to improper sandbagging. fighting positions in place and 

sandbagged, and established 

checkpoints. 

Tier 11 - consists of Tier I plus sandbagged protective 

bunkers. 

Tier 111 - consists of Tiers I and I1 plus trip flares, guard 

towers, perimeter lighting, and ballistic protection (fuel 

farms and helipads). 

The Base Camp Coordination Team monitored the forceprotection tiers. This team worked directly for the Assistant 

Division Commander for Support and reported its findings 

monthly. Each engineer battalion reported force protection 

in its assigned sector to the Engineer Brigade, which then 

reported to Task Force Eagle. This is a very systematic way 

to approach and monitor a complex mission. 

Bunkers 

D'ling lhe Persian Gulf Wq "Idiers were 

killed when designed bunkers collapsed. 

The photo shows a 'ghting position that 

lapsed next to a re fabricated constructed fighting position. 

The fighting position in the hackground was sandbagged by 

the tenant unit. When engineers it, found lhat 

it was unsafe. Engineers directed the tenant unit to reconsmct the sandbags, labor that could have been used elsewhere had lhe bunker properly 

A collapsed protective bunker is a command problem. 

Before a soldier steps into a bunker system, the chain of 

command protect troops by ensuring 

requirements are met: 

.Plan and select sites for fighting positions. 


.properly design, construct, and certify hunkers accord. 


ing to FM 5-103, Survivability.

.Provide the correct quality and quantity of const~ction 

materials (sandbags, lumber, etc). 

W Plan for maintenance and inspect the bunkers periodically. 

March 1999 

.Constantly supervise the construction. 

Get technical advice from engineers as required. 

During Operation Joint Endeavor, the Army invested considerable money in force protection. Commanders were held 

accountable for their force-protection ?tatus and were required 

to brief force protection daily. In spite of this command attention, some units installed unsafe fighting positions, checkpoints, and protective bunkers. 

Standard Design 

When several types of protective systems appeared 

throughout the Task Force Eagle sector, the Engineer Brigade commander decided to enforce a single standard. Various designs were sent to engineer units and 

nlaneuver commanders. Base camp mayors were asked to disassemble all questionable protective systems. The 16th Engineer Battalion was tasked to develop an aboveground fighting 

oosition. guard bunker. and ~rotective bunker. Combat eneikeers, assisted by maneuver lommanders and base camp mayors, ordered these protective systems based on their security 

plan, Engineers delivered protective systems to each base 

camp and provided technical guidance on the proper subgrade 

and emplacement, The base camps provided manpower to fill, 

lay, and tamp sandbags, 

Using the team, one concept, engineers built 

safe prefabricated fighting positions, protective bunkers, and 

guard bunkers and supervised quality control. Engineers 

inspected each protective system periodically to ensure that 

the system remained structurally sound and was maintained 

by the tenant unit. Based on my experience during Operations 

Desert ShieldIDesert Storm and Joint Endeavor, most soldiers 

are not trained to properly construct fighting positions with 

sandbag revetments. Failing to tamp the sandbags or laying 

them incorrectly presents a safety hazard. 

Engineer 13 
Pros and Cons of Consolidated Assembly 

pros Cons 

Unity of command and control, with one person in charge (OIC). Not all companies can provide the same solContinuity and experience improve production. diers all the time. 

Simplifiessupply and logistics coordination. Depletes resources more quickly. 

One standard for all products, since each company has force- Transportation may not be available to meet 

protection experience. production times, and production may stop 

Experienced soldiers increase productivity due to lack of space. 

Safety, quality control, and quality assulance ensured safe 

positions. 

Masses both soldier support and vehicle support (Support Platoon), so 

no one company suffers the loss of 30 soldiers. This allows companies 

to continue with other missions. 

Increases the availability of serviceable tools and equipment. 

Battalion sets priorities, so there is no question as to where assets go. 

Sandbags Uniformly tamp each sandbag with a flat object (such as - a 6x6 board) to force out all air pockets and make the

Every leader should use FM 5-103. They must under- wall more stable. 

stand the basic fundamentals of sandbagging, which is 

a key component of the bunker system. The manual Repiace sandbags if they are punctored. 

describes six steps in sandbagging revetments: The Task Force Eagle commander made force-protection

. inside out. If not turned inside out. they construction the priority for all units because of the underlying 

lose strength. threat of terrorism. Task Force Volturno wac tasked with the 

Fill sandbags three-fourths full with an earth or dry soil 

cement mixture and tie the choke ends. 

Tuck in the bottoni corners of the bags after they are 

filled. 

m Construct the bottom row of sandbags by placing all 

bags as headers. Build the sandbag wall using alternate 

rows of stretchers and headers with joints broken 

between courses. The top row of the sandbag wall has 

only headers (FM 5.103). 

Poor Bunker Construction 

construction and prefab~icationof force-protection systems for 

12 base camps in the Tuzla Valley and other sites throughout 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each company was responsible for four 

base camps. It soon became clear that several base camps 

required large quantities of fighting positions and bunkers. Initially each company constructed its own positions. but with 

some base camps requiring 1not.e than 50 fighting positions. a 

consolidated production site was needed (Figure 2). 

The task of planning. organizing, and constructing this 

facility was given to Alpha Company, 16th Engineer Battalion. 

The Assault and Obstacle Platoon established a prefabricated 

Good Bunker Construction 

Protect~veo!.n<ers located beh~nclthe 16th Engineer 

Battallon tact cal operations center at Camp Bedrock. 

hi^ bunker was not built using the basic fundamentals These bunkers present a neat and uniformappearance, 

of sandbactaina. Sandbaas were laid incorrectlv. which and load bearing is distributed. 

presents a-iafety hazard: 

14 Engineer March 1999 
Hesco-Bastion Concertainer Defense 

During Operation Joint Endeavor, a new forceprotection system was introduced to combat 

engineers in Bosnia: the British-developed 

Hesco-Bastion concertainer defense wall system. The 

concertainer wall sections are constructed from 

geotextile-lined galvanized wire mesh panels that are 

connectedwith a spiral of galvanizedwire mesh hinges. 

When the wall expands, it forms an array of linked, selfsupporting cells. When the cells are filled with earth, 

sand, snow, etc., they provide ballistic and blast 

protection. Once erected and filled, the cells can 

withstand a 155-millimeter high-explosive blast detonated from a distance of five feet. To provide flexibility, Disadvantages. Concertainer wall sections have 

the wall sections are designed in several sizes. The some disadvantages: 

sections we used were 10 meters long by 1 meter wide .They are not in the supply system, by 1.37 meters high. w They are hard to recover once used. 

Applications. Concertainer wall sections can be w Heavy engineer equipment, such as a bucket loader 

used to construct- or a small emplacement excavator, is required to fill 

the bastions. 

w Protective bunkers 

w Aircraft and headquarters revetments 

w Shelter and observation posts 

w Fuel points 

Availability. The company can produce 2,100 10-

Advantages. concertainer wall sections offer the meter sections per week. They are shipped on NATO 

following advantages: pallets, five to a pallet. 

The Hesco-Bastion concertainer wall system saved 

w They require less construction time than sandbags. engineers a considerable amount of time when 

w They can be stacked higher than sandbags. implementing force protection in Bosnia. Units dew They can withstand stronger blasts than compara- ploying on peacekeeping or peace-enforcement 

ble amounts of sandbags. missions need a system that is easily deployable and 

They provide immediate visual protection. provides sufficient protection for soldiers. The HescoBastion is an outstanding system with many The containerized system is easy to stack and 

haul. applications. 
Two-Man Fighting Position 

4' X 8' i314" Plywood 4' x 8' X 314' Plywood 

4" X 4" 

6 5" 

1-4' r 8' x 314" plywoad 


2-2" x 12" x 10' 


1-2"x 12" x 54" 


8-2" x 12" 1 4' 


4-2"x 12-x 8' 


llb. 9'' Spike* 


llb-Ill5 penny nails 


llb-m penny nails 


Figure 3 

construction yard known as "Slate" on Camp Bedl-ock, and 

it began mass producing force-protection systems. The first 

phase in the building process was to develop the work site. 

Due to limited resources, two medium tents were used. The 

constmction site was divided into four areas: 

W Download and storage 

W Ripping and cutting 

W Prefabrication 

Assembly and rough cutting 

Each area was run and siulultaneOusfy. 

With the building area construction complete, "Slate Construction" was horn, and the next phase began. The need for 

rapidly available, quality force protection required 24-hour 

operations. Each company in the task force supplied five 

soldiers, who worked in two 12-hour shifts with 15 soldiers 

per shift. We established four teams, each run by the same 

NCOlC to ensure continuity. Alpha Company supplied the 

NCO foreman for each team, and the other companies 

rotated soldiers through due to their mission 

The teams were- 

~~~l teamponeNCO two soldiers with one or two 

HEMTs with forklifts. The team hauled wood from the ~4 

yard to the assembly area, coordinated with the S4 to obtain 

materials, and delivered fighting positions to the site or 

helped the support platoon load them. 

Rippingkutting team-onsisted of two NCOs to operate saws and two soldiers to carry wood. The team had two 

circular saws, but a radial arm or table saw would have been 

helpful. The team cut wood for the prefabrication operations, ensured that the standard template for cutting was followed, provided quality control for cutting operations, and 

determined the cutting order and overall control operations. 

Prefabrication team-consisted of one NCO and three 

soldiers. The team assembled fighting position components. 

16 Engineer 

constructed walls and roofs, and moved prefabricated parts to 

the assembly area. 

Assembly team--consisted of one NCO and two soldiers. 

The team assembled the fighting positions and packaged them 

for shipment. 

The materials used to construct the fighting positions and 

bunkers varied significantly. The battalion S4 requested the 

required lumber, hut dimensions often varied due to the many 

suppliers. Most of the cutting and assembly was done in the cutling and prefabrication tents. Because of their size, bunkers were 

assembled outside in the assembly area. Initially the priority 

went to fighting positions (Figure 3). but as base camps became 

more secure,personnel bunkers became more imponant, 

DOIt Right 

Before any protective system is constructed, officers and 

NCOs should attend a class given by the engineer team 

supporting their base camp on proper emplacement 

procedures. During Operation Joint Endeavor, we found that 

most leaders had no idea there is a systematic way to lay sandbags, build bunkers, or use Hesco-Bastions (see page 15) to 

augment sandbagging. After officer and NCO training, there 

Was a noticeable improvement in the placement, uniform 

appearance, and structural soundness of the sandbag revetments. Teach leaders first, then the soldiers, and never accept 

a substandard sandbag wall. The lives of our soldiers depend 

0" it. hi 

Capmin Drum~nond is the assistant enginerr battolio~z 

operations trainer at rite National T,.aining Centpr; 

For1 Irwin, California. His e-rllnil address is: 

sw03a@irrv;,l.army.nt;/.H~previously so,,ed command[,,. 

of Company A, 16th Ensirleer Battalion, I3Orll Enginper 

~~i~~&, in sllpport of the lst ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i , ~. during ~ id~ ; 

Operation Joint Endealior: CPT D,ummond is a graduate of 

the Universil? of Nebraska at Kea~ne?. 

March 1999 
and Hllirtary ~~IIIRIQ~Sin MrhaflTerraiin 


By Jeb Stewart 

The Army After Next (AAN) project is a series of 

studies on future warfare that frame issues vital to 

the development ofthe U.S. Army. The studies are in 

formats suitable for integration into TRADOC combat 

developments programs.' With a 30-year focus, the AAN 

process begins about 2025 and describes requirements 

beyond the cuilent Force XXI development. When 

executing the 1998 AAN campaign plan, futurists focused 

the force design on "mechanized airmobility." This particular concept was an area of concern for engineers. 

Engineers and AAN 

The concept of mechanized airmobility envisioned 

the convergence of air and armor attacks on an 

objective. The concept described a very fast 

opcrational tempo to disrupt enemy coherence. The critical 

materiel part of mechanized airmobility was a single ground1 

air combat system, the Aerial Infantry Fighting Vehicle. In 

this idealized AAN vision, enemy obstacles, inundated areas 

with low trafficability, and conflict-induced rubble were of 

Pushing rubble in 

France in 1944-01dfashioned MOUT. 

little concern because the futurists assumed mechanized 

airmobility would free maneuver forces from the ground 

approach to the objective. In this concept, AAN strike forces 

would simply cross deadly zones by flying over them.' 

Since their work in a~ticulating the initial concept, the 

AAN community has determined that the Aerial Infantry 

Fighting Vehicle was "neither technologically nor operationally feasible."' Consequently, the mechanized airmobility concept has been put on the shelf while other 

organizational structures are examined. This action was a 

lucky break for Army engineers because, when engineer 

leaden saw the first papers and briefings, they were appalled 

at the dismissive intent toward terrain and ground mobility. 

For engineers, this aspect of the initial AAN project clearly 

seemed to he "a stretch" that denied laws of physics. The air 

mechanization concept could have had a pernicious effect if 

applied to midterm mobility doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers. Since AAN 

was designed to mesh with TRADOC's requirements determination process, there was ample cause for concern. 
can rather easily thwart a sophisticated heavy force that is 

"Future land combat units will 

exploit terrain by maneuvering for 

tactical advantage within the folds 

and undulations of the earth's 

surface without suffering the 

restrictions imposed on speed and 

mobility by contact with the ground 

when conducting movement or 

being inserted into a battlespace." 

"Forging Possibilities into Reality" by 

BG Buckley, LTC Franke, 

and A. Fenner Milton 

Military Review, Mar-Apr 1998 

trained and equipped for high-speed lnaneuver warfare. AAN 

war games have confirnied tl~isdilemma. To resol\,e it. 

engineer operations must he a key element of the decisive 

military force in urban areas. 

The lead fix MOUT will rcniain thepu~vicwof the U.S. Army 

1nf;lntry Center and Scliool, and engineers will support them. 

Fuhlre MOUT operations are likely to include many of the same 

delibcratc, slow, and painstaking tasks perfanned historically. In 

past operations, as when U.S. Amly forces cleared Japanese 

troops from Manila in \\'orld War 11, enginccrs in combined arnis 

task forces concentrated on mobility and cnuntcrmohility 

missions. The engineer component primarily reacted to the 

immcdi;~teneeds of thc task force. In those operations, engineers 

werc called upon to clear rubblc. perform demolition work, create 

breaches in stluchlres, and repair infrastmclure to support 

military uses. Those samc tasks are likely to be import:mt in 

filmre ope~~tions. 

Fortunately. the AAN concept is young and has much ~~~i~~~~~~ can and sllould increase their role in MOUT. 

mom for de\'elopment The 1998 Arm? After Next Repol? expanding the doctrinal focus to include MOUT, many critical 

to the nny Chief of Staff indirectly shows that ground elements of future operations are easily cnvisioncd. Some 

mobility concerns havc replaced some of the early engineercontrihrltionsareenthusiasm for mechanized airmobility. From the cngineers' Applying infomation technologies, specifically three- perspective, this chanee is a step in the right dircction. dilnensional terrain visualization of abovc- and belowgniund strucnlrcs and infrastruchlres. Exatnples includc Engineers and RlOUT database storagc and displays of city streets. power grids, 

During AAN war games. one phenomenon emerged water and scwage systems, ~nanholes,subways, etc. 

timc atier timc and in war same atier war game: To .predidive Inodeling of materials. strengths for precise 

avoid certair defeat by the AAN Strike Force, the and mcasured weapons effects and to establish mobility 

errerny went into and occupied a city. When that happened. platfomis ,i.e.. rooftop landing zones. 

the battle tcmpo became what General Kmlak, Commandant Rapid, nonexplosive breaching of walls and similar 

of the U.S. Marine Corps, calls the "three-block battle." obstacles for soldiers and equipment. 

AAN operalional tempos promptly collapsed, and the .Teleoperations and semiautononious or autonomous initiative went to the enemy. Engineers have always heen a clearing of booby traps and mincsirnunitions using small 

key component of the military operations in urban terrain robots. 

(MOUT) force, and this seemingly unsolvable MOUT 

.Acquiring and providing targeting infonnation for srnart dilcmnia calls for an engincer solution. MOUT situations 

weapons designed to penetrate a designated point within a 

present a succession of mixcd civil engineering and close structure. 

combat problems. Therefore, the engineer component of 

AAN looks like a good "mission fit." Preparing templates of enemy weapons effects that 

include predictive structural strengths fcir friendly Armies traditionally have tried to avoid combat in cities. survivability. but in the 21st century we ~i,illoperate in built-up areas. To 

do so and minimllmcasualties and co,lateral Ensuring the use of infrastnlchlre services, such as elecdamage, we must enhance our means to apply modem Army tricity, water, and transportation hubs, for friendly forces 

and denying them to the enemy. XXI engineering skills to a full spectru~nof urban sihlations. 

Military forces in urban areas may be applied toward a wide .Developing a "tool kit" for combat in cities. 

variety of missions, including peacekeeping and peace An increased role for Amiy cngineers in MOUT will 

enforcement, combating domestic terrorism and the use of enhance the convergence of combat, construction, and 

weapons of Inass destruction, and evacuating non- topographic engineer units and missions. For example, the 

combatants. The ability to apply appropriate military force capability to prepare three-dimensional urhan terrain 

in built-up areas is difficult-a politically astute adversary visoalization products requires such skills as combat 
--- 

soldiering, civil engineering, city planning, architecture; and 

the ability to create graphic information systems. A 

strengthened engineer role in MOUT seems especially well 

suited for light engineer forces. 

Suggested tasks to support an increased role for Army 

engineers in MOUT follow: 

Doctrine. Engineer School personnel develop MOUTspecific tactics, techniques, and procedures for mobility, 

countermobility, general engineering, and topographic 

engineering, and provide input to FM 90-10-1, An 

Infintryinan's Guide to Urban Con7bai. 

Training. Engineer School personnel identify MOUTrelated tasks for unit Mission Training Plans and add MOUT 

iustmction to One-Station Unit Training courses. School 

personnel develop training to fully utilize Fort Leonard 

Wood's MOUT facility, which is being constructed for both 

military police and engineer requirements. 

Leader Development. Detennine MOUT training needs 

for engineer officer basic and advanced courses. 

Organization. No immediate or direct impacts on 

organizational structure are identified, but units will consider 

MOUT training when preparing their Mission Essential Task 

Lists. 

Materiel. The development of equipment specifically for 

MOUT represents something of a problem. Specialized 

equipment can save lives, but more equipment leads to 

higher training and maintenance requirements and, if we are 

not careful, to heavier burdens for soldiers to cany. We must 

consider these factors when building our MOUT tool kit. We 

should examine equipment used by police and fire 

departments. 

Soldiers. Evaluate the "soldier's burden" in MOUT by 

testing extremity body armor and an appropriate mix of 

ammunition itcms. Consider physical factors as well as 

training overload factors when designing equipment. Think 

about the old Army joke, "100 pounds of ultra-lightweight 

equipment." 

The following MOUT lessons leanied, prepared 

following the mission to Panama during Operation Just 

Cause, apply to engineers: 

Engineers should have scheduled opportunities to practice live-fire demolitions and breaching techniques in 

realistic training situations. 

Engineers should have employed obstacle systems in 

sewers to hamper enemy use of underground passageways. 

Engineers could have employed claymore mines more 

effectively in urban situations. 

Engineers should have removed stairways to hamper 

enemy use. 

Engineers should have reinforced ground floor areas to 

provide for increased blast protection. 

Soldiers in a four-man stack outside a building at Fort 

Benning's McKenna MOUTTraining Site. 

Looking Ahead 

nhancing the capabilities ofAmy engineers for MOUT 

is fully warrantcd and justified. The trend toward 

MOUT seems irreversible--the U.S. military's next 

conflict probably will resemble past conflicts in Hue, Beirut, 

Belfast, Sarajevo. Mogadishu, and Chechnya more closely 

than Operation Desert storm4 The Army must continue to 

develop future MOUT capabilities to sustain its reputation as 

the "world's finest sustained fighting-in-cities force." It is not 

because we seek decisive engagements in complex urban 

terrain or want to fight in cities. The reason for developing this 

capability is simply to deny advantages to and influence the 

perceptions of a potential adversary. When an adversary 

realizes that an urban environment offers no benefits and will 

become the graveyard of his military power, the enemy 

commander will be inclined to avoid urban areas. Our 

capability to defeat him in the city must be so overwhelming 

that we influence his tactical choices. The advantage must be 

ours. The U.S. Army vitally needs these capabilities, and 

engineers are a major contributor to this fight. Id 

Jeb Stewart is a milituy engineer developnzent analyst 

wit11 the Directorate of Contbat Developnzents, U.S. Army 

Enginer School. 

Endnotes: ' "Knowledge and Speed," July 1997 report to the Army 

Chief of Staff. 

Suggested by the article, "Tomorrow's Army: The 

Challenge of Nonlinear Change," by LTC Antulio Echevania 

11, Parameters, fall 1998. ' Summary Report, Integrated Idea Team on Operational 

and Tactical Mobility, December, 1997. 

From remarks by Secretary of Defense Cohen, cited in 

MOUT: /he Showslopper, Proceedings, Febmary 1998. 

March 1999 Engineer 19 
By Caproin Kevin A. Brooks 

"... rite US. Arrn~ is riot ns ~.e// etlrripped (i.5 it r~zi,qlrt he lo 

c~~~z.~rrrrct.foil~~~~~-o~z, /or+-sporz ,/i.~ed bri(/~i~i,?. Mow erit/>iz~tsic ir cicnrly ne~drd in tizis rriro to /zplp oi.errori7e nhor 

coirld, irt N d({kr.ent scennrio. be a ~erinrrs sltortrorni~ig." 

Dl: Mortirr J. Foil, 

Sri~nreA~I'~.cDI- to CiltC USAREUR LC Scl.ertri7 A17~1y 

"Tiic Ribbon BridSe in Perrc.ekeepirz,q Ope,-ntio,zsU 

The 41-rrry Engirtact: Air,y~rr 1997 

During the past 20 years, the U.S. Army has changed 

from a forward-deployed. defense-oriented force 

structured around the old NATO general defense 

plans to a force-projection-based force capable of tremendous strategic and tactical agility. We have endorsed the theory of maneuver earf fare-the domination of our opponents 

by obtaining positional advantage and conducting sequential 

operations at a pace faster than they can implement counteractions. This evolution has been accompanied by development of a wide range of combat systems that make such fastpaced operations possible, including the MIAIIA2 Abrams 

tank and the M2M3 Bradley infanfry fighting vehiclelcavalry fighting vehicle. The battlefield mobility these systems 

offer can be decisive on the modem battlefield ...ifwe can 

deliver rhem to, and sustain rhem on, that battlefield. Our 

ability to meet this key requirement is currently deficient in 

20 Engineerterms of our capability to conduct river- and dry-gapcrossing operations. 

This situation is reminiscent of one faced by another generation of engineers in 1939. Duling the months preceding 

World War 11. new tanks were developed that weighed up to 

35 tons. such as the M3 Grant and M4 Sherman tanks. This 

heavy equipment posed problems for an engineer force that 

had just replaced its Civil War-era 7 ID-ton ponton bridges 

with 10- and 20-ton-capacity bridges.' By 1944. increasingly 

heavy tanks required a 50-ton-capacity structure, which was 

satisfied by a combination of modified steel treadway floating bridges and Bailey fixed bridges.' 

The observation in 1939 that "...engineers ...were aware of 

the inadequacy of their own bridging equipage and acknowledged that they were unprepared..:" is as true today as it was 

then. Engineers know that current tactical bridging systems 

cannot handle the increased loads of our newest equipment, 

such as the MIAIlA2, except under "caution" or "risk category crossings that decrease the crossing rate. None of our 

systems can handle the MlAliheavy equipment transporter 

(HET) combination at military load class (MLC) 96W over 

any but the shortest of gaps or, for float bridging, at lowstream velocities. We can marginally support a heavy-force 

river or gap assault crossing, even though it is under restrictions that affect the crossing rate. However, we cannot provide appropriate bridging support to establish and maintain 

lines of communication (LOC) for continued operations. 

March 1999 
Current Status 

Doctrine concerning river- and gap-crossing operations is scarce except for information provided for 

assault crossings in FM 90-13. River-Crossing 

0))erutions. Rear-area bridging operations are not well 

explained in any doctrinal publication, although ARTEP 5- 

145-32-MTP, Mission Training Plan ,for lli~ F7gineer. 

Bridge Contpan?: includes a partial doctrinal framework for 

conducting such operations. Based on this information, gapand river-crossing operations can be divided into three 

broad, and sometimes overlapping, categories: 

Assault crossings conducted under close combat conditions maintain the momentum of maneuver forces or 

initiate offensive operations. The ribbon bridgelraft and 

the armored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB) are used 

to conduct these operations. Beginning in 2000, the 

AVLB is scheduled for replacement by the Wolverine 

heavy assault bridge, which has an increased capacity 

and a longer span. 

Whenever possible, temporary forward fixed bridging 

(sometimes called "follow-on bridging") replaces 

assault-crossing equipment remaining in the brigade 

and division rear areas as maneuver forces advance. The 

temporary hridging frees the assault assets for future 

operations. The medium girder bridge (MGB) is our 

only forward fixed-bridging system. 

Within the corps rear area and communications zone, 

long-term LOC bridging is installed to support thc sustainment effort. The MGB and ribbon bridges are 

replaced where possible to free assets for use in forward 

areas. The current LOC bridge, the M2 Bailey, is a widened derivative of the original Bailey bridge procured 

by the U.S. Army in 1941.4 The ribbon bridge also can 

be used. However, its usefulness as a LOC bridge is 

limited because LOC traffic is predominantly nontactical, the bridge requires extensive anchoring systems and 

maintenance. and this asset should remain available for 

assault requirements. 

Engineers supporting Task Force Eagle executed the Sava 

River crossing in Bosnia in December 1995. This operation 

illustrates the Engineer Regiment's ability to conduct and 

maintain a crossing on a long-term basis. The maneuver 

force could cross on the ribbon bridge, although movement 

was slow due to the bridge's limited capacity to handle the 

MIA1 (MLC 70T). However, the increased logistical support traffic that followed caused problems because much of 

it was nontactical and included heavy, multiaxle wheeled 

equipment. Significant effort was required to modify and 

maintain the stnlcture to support the increased loads until a 

second bridge, which allowed two-way traffic, was completed on 17 January 1996. 

As the science advisor to the Commandel- in Chief U.S. 

Army Europe and Seventh Army stated, "The ribbon bridge 

was designed to provide a quick means of crossing wet gaps. 

It was not conceived as a permanent bridge on a main supply 

route."' It would have been desirable to quickly replace the 

ribbon bridges with fixed bridges, but the MGB and Bailey 

bridges in our inventory could not replace the destroyed spans. 

The only solution was to obtain a commercial bridge. The 

Arn~y procured an advanced panel bridge, a Bailey bridge 

derivative manufactured by a British film (Mabey &Johnson). 

Allowing for the time required to procure this bridge was 

acceptable in Bosnia, but such a delay could be catastrophic in 

a high-intensity combat environment. 

New Initiatives 

The engineer community is aware of our shortfall in 

bridging capabilities. The ribbon bridge was not 

designed to handle MLC 70T tanks, much less MLC 

96lV wheeled traffic. The MGB is limited by its capacity, in 

terms of span and loading, and its exotic alloy construction. 

The alloy prohibits significant field maintenance and contributes to metal fatigue problems that require frequent inspections and management of the total volume crossing over 

structures. The current M2 Bailey system is unchanged from 

its World War I1 design and is too narrow to support modern 

traffic, especially the MIA2lHET combination. Its span and 

load capabilities are deficient (the almost universally mistrusted cable reinforcement system is unavailable), and the 

lack of available M3 conversion sets and reinforcing chords 

precludes panel-pier or multispan construction. 

The U.S. Army Engineer School has initiated several programs to remedy our bridging shortfalls. Programs that will 

impact LOC bridging include the following: 

Heavy Dry Support l%ridgr (HDSBJ. Currently under 

development, this $177 million program will provide 32 

mechanically erected bridge sets capable of crossing MLC 70T 

and MLC 96W traffic over gaps of 40 meters. Originally 

described as a LOC bridge, it has steep ramps and no guardrail, 

which makes it more suitable for tactical rather than logistical 

traffic. Depending on funding, initial fielding is projected for 

the year 2002, with procurement completed in 2010.~ 

Rlultirolr Bridge Company (ICIRKC). This program 

involves replacing current MGB and ribbon bridge companies 

with new, dual-role bridge companies. The interim structure 

provides each MRRC with MGB and ribbon bridge sets. ln the 

final configuration, these units will be equipped with the 

HDSB and improved rihbon bridge, with transportation provided by the new common bridge transpolter (CBT), a derivative of the HEMTT (lieavy, expanded-mobility, tactical truck). 

Of the 16 MRBCs scheduled for our Total Force, seven will be 

allocated to the National Guard, live to the Reserve Component, and four to the Active Component. Transition to the 

interim structure has been hampered by a Lack of equipment, 

especially in the Reserve Components. 

Improved Ribbon Bridge. This modified ribbon bridge 

has an increased capacity (MLC 70T normal. MLC 96W caution) and articulated ramp bays that accommodate bank 

heights up to 2 meters. This program is still in the feasibility 

analysis stage of development. It is not optimized for LOC 

traffic. 

March 1999 Engineer 2 1 
I 

Training 

Leader Development 

Organization 

Materiel 

Soldiers 

Comparison of the HDSB to an Advanced Panel Bridge 

meters; simple span, single lane only. 

Simplified crew training. Minimum training required, if familiar with M2 

Bailey. 

Simplified leader requirements; no construction calculations. Experienced leaders required; tabular 

design system. I 

Requires 14 personnel. Requires 60 to 80 personnel, but no more 

than 30 working at one time. 

I Supporl requlrea for 9 loads (6 CBTs 3 pal- Requ~res12 CBTs or PSTs or c.,rrcnt TOE 

let zed load system transporters (PLSTsl; ( mechanical erection. 

05463L MGB Ba ey Company (32 5-ton I dump trucks); manual erection. I 

Requires 1.5hours to emplace; mechanical Requires 8 to 12 hours to emplace; manual 

erection. 

When teamed with the pending procurement of the Wolverine heavy assault bridge, these proposed programs eventually will satisfy our assault and forward fixed-bridge 

requirements. The HDSB, once considered the solution for 

all our fixed-bridge needs. will replace the now-inadequate 

MGB system. The question is. how will we meet our forward 

fixed-bridge requirements until the HDSB is fielded in the 

2002-2010 time frame? What happens if the HDSB procurement plan is delayed or cancelled? 

Even with the HDSB, our LOC bridging capabilities will 

remain seriously deficient. The HDSB design is not optimized for the LOC role. and its relatively high cost prohibits 

purchase in sufficient quantities to meet war stockage 

requirements. So, how will we address our LOC bridging 

requirements now and in the future? The Engineer School is 

preparing an Operational Requil-ements Document to identify specific needs in this area. But there is an affordable. 

Feasible alternative to a time-consuming and expensive new 

LOC bridge system development program. 

An Interim Solution 

- .S. Am~y engineers need a solution to the bridging 

shortfall that can be implemented in a timely manner 

and that does not depend on outside support. 

Because of procurement time, it took more than three 

months for the Army to replace the Sava River float bridges 

with the com~uercial fixed bridge we were forced to use, and 

vendor support was required to erect it. One possible solution is to purchase a limited quantity of proven, commercialoff-the-shelf advanced oanel brideine to reolace the old M2 u 
- Bailey systems retained in Reserve Component panel bridge 

companies. This solution will ensure our ability to conduct 

limited fixed and LOC bridging operations on short notice 

without depending on external support. 

Army engineers also need to maximize the use of available 

erection. 

bridge systems that are based on modified Bailey designs and 

that use modem alloy steels are available from various manufacturers. They have increased roadway widths and longer span 

lengths at a greater load capacity than the old M2 Bailey bridge 

systems. NATO and multinational forces in Bosnia have 

installed 2.5 advanced panel bridges when the Bailey systems 

proved to be inadequate. The durability of advanced panel 

bridges has been proven repeatedly, and they are often used as 

pelmanent replacement bridges in the civil sector. Adding these 

new systems to our four panel bridge companies will provide a 

source of "in house" LOC bridging expertise that can be used 

in contingency operations. It will avoid reliance on support 

from vendors or the Engineer School. 

Required Capal~ilities. A new LOC bridge system 

requires the following capabilities: 

.	Sufficient width and load capacity to handle logistical 

traffic. The delining system should be the MIA2HET 

comhination, which requires a roadway that is 3.7 meters 

wide and an MLC 96~. 

Ability to span at least 40 meters at design load capacity 

(MLC 96W) without using a multistory design. This 

capability is based on the HDSB requirement. Since 

NATO requires a capacity of MLC 105W (apparently 

based on the old British Chieftan MBT and HET), the 

structure should be capable of supporting this requirement under a "caution" category crossing. 

Minimal specialized training requirements for soldiers 

experienced in standard Bailey bridge erection. 

.Low procurement, operation, and maintenance costs. 

. availability,

.Packaging configuration that supports rapid strategic 

deployment. 

fixed-bridge assets. There is no need to "reinvent the wheel" to 

solve this problem when available systems will meet our Advanced Panel Bridge. Advanced panel bridge systems 

needs. The proposed solution is economical and makes the meet all of these requirements. Using the Am~y's standard 

best use of limited assets. Commercial-off-the-shelf panel DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leader development, organiza22 Engineer 	 March 1999 
Double story MLC 70T Bailey bridge erected in June 1998 as a temporary replacement bridge 

at Fort Pickett,Virginia, by the 1031st Engineer Company (Panel Bridge),Virginia Army 

National Guard. 

tion, materiel, and soldiers) model, a comparison of a sample 

advanced panel bridge system and the HDSB is shown in the 

table on page 24.7 

Amly engineers must be prepared to support maneuver 

forces across the entire conflict spectrum, from domestic support to high-intensity conflict. Purchasing a limited quantity 

of advanced panel bridge sets and providing them to the 

Reserve Component panel bridge companies ensures an 

immediute interim fixed-bridging capability until the HDSB is 

fielded. It provides some degree of insurance against delays to 

that program and a viable LOC bridging capability to complement the HDSB in its forward fixed-bridge role. Because 

other high-priority engineer systems may compete for very 

limited funding, program delays are possible (the engineer 

portion of the Army's research. development, and acquisition 

budget thmugh FY 2006 is estimated to be only 0.06 percent).' For an estimated cost of $8 million, we could equip the 

four remaining panel hridge companies with advanced panel 

hridge systems and pre-position 12 additional sets overseas as 

contingency stockage. This is approximately the same cost as 

1 112 sets of HDSB. 

Reserve Component panel hridge companies are our primag LOC bridging asset. The bridging mission can be 

trained during weekend drills and, except for individual specialists at the Engineer School, these units are our last source 

of panel bridging expertise. These units have proved their 

ability to successfully accomplish this mission during numerous local disaster response and operational support missions. 

And since they are already our initial response force for 

domestic disasters, advanced panel bridging will enhance our 

capabilities in this important area as well. The companiesalready manned, trained, and ready-are a potential asset that 

is being largely wasted because their bridges are inadequate. 

Revitalizing this asset by acquiring advanced panel bridging 

offers an economical, practical, timely, and effective solution 

to our LOC bridging problem. 

Repeating History 

The bridging dilemma we faced in 1939 was solved in 

part by procuring the Bailey bridge. It would be a fitting tribute to Sir Donald Bailey and his timeless 

vision of an efficient, portable bridging system if the solution 

to our current LOC bridging problem repeats history in the 

form of an advanced, modernized Bailey system that 

allows us to accomplish our mobility support mission into the 

next millennium. Y 

Captain Brook is the S3, Engineer Brigade, 28th Infanrr-J 

Division (Mech), Virginia Army National Guard. Previous 

assignments include S3, 1030th Engineer Barfalion, and 

Commandel; 1031st Engineer Comparq, (Panel Bridge), 

Virginia Anny National Guard; and acrive dur)'platoon leader 

and company XO, 13th Engineer Company (CS) and 1Ytl1 

Engineer Battalion (Cbt). CPT Brooks ho1d.s a bachclor'.s 

dcgree in civil engineering from Virginia Military Ir~sriture. 

Endnotes: ' Falk, Dr Martin J., "The Ribbon Bridge in Peacekeeping Operations," Tile Army Engineer,August 1997, p. 38. 

Hearings on Military Establishment Appropriation Bill. 1940. 

HR, 76th Congress, 1st Session, 1 February 1939, p. 393% as cited in 

United Stores Atmy in World War 11: Tlze Corps of E,tgi,werr:T,nops 

and Equipment, by Coll, Blanche D.; Keith, Jean E.; and Rosenthal, 

Herben H., USGPO, Washington. D.C., 1975. pp. 3649. 

"011, et al, pp. 486-497. 

Ibid, p. 37. 

Ihid. p. 51. 

"alk, p. 38. '

HDSBdata obtained from U.S. Army Engineer School slide presentation on bridging developments provided to the author on 20 

December 1996. 

'See note 6 regarding HDSB data. Compact 200 data courtzsy of 

the manufacturer, Mabey & Johnson. 

Allen, James L., "Engineers in the Future Army," Engineer, 

Novemher 1997, p.44. 

March 1999 Engineer23 
Amy Performance Improvement Criteria 

Strengthen OSUT and AIT Engineer lattalions 

By L~eutenarzt Colonel Allen C. Estes and First Lieutenrrnt Rick} J. Scott 

The Army Performance Improvement Criteria (APIC) 

process is a method of self-assessment that is an 

integral part of the Army Communities of 

Exccllencc program. APIC is based primarily on Malcolin 

Baldrige National Quality Award criteria, which are 

commonly used by America's best corporations to achieve a 

competitive advantage. The goal of APIC is to establish and 

maintain a systematic process to review and analyze relevant 

performance measures against established standards. The 

focus is on continuous improvement and customer 

satisfaction. The 35th and 169th Engineer Battalions, from 

the 1st Engineer Brigade at Fort Leonard Wood, have 

embraced the APIC process to improve one-station unit 

training (OSUT) and advanced individual training (AIT) for 

engineer soldiers. 

Mission 

The 35th and 169th si~nultaneously conduct two 

separate training missions. Each battalion is 

comprised of three OSUT companies and one AIT 

company. OSUT co~npanies conduct basic combat training 

and advanced individual training in a combined 14-week 

cycle to produce high-quality Career Management Field 

(CMF) 12 soldiers (12B Combat Engineers and 12C Bridge 

Crewmembers). AIT conlpanies conduct training for seven 

engineer milita~y occupational specialties (MOSs) and one 

ordnance MOS (628 Construction Equipment Mechanic) in 

CMFs 51 and 63. The engineer MOSs are SIR Interior 

Electrician, SIT Technical Engineer Specialist, 62E Heavy 

Construction Equipment Operator, 62F Crane Operator, 62G 

Quarrying Specialist, 62H Concrete and Asphalt Equipment 

Specialist, and 621 General Construction Equipment 

Operator. AIT cycles range from six to 18 weeks. 

The APIC Process 

using the APIC process to improve performance, 

training, and quality required that we answer the 

following questions: 

24 Engineer 

W 	 How do we know when we have provided adequate initial entry training (IET) to soldiers? 

W 	 What core processes determ~ne this baseline, and how 

can they be measured? 

W 	 How do our results compare with those of other Army 

units that perform the same or similar missions'? 

W 	 Who are our customers, and are they satisfied with the 

soldiers we send them? 

The APIC process starts with identifying a unit's core 

processesthose tasks that soldiers must perfonn well for 

the organization to be successful. Core processes for OSUT 

companies are soldier performance in basic rifle marks- 

~lianship (BRM), hand grenades, the Anny Physical Fitness 

Test (APFT), attrition, safety, End-of-Cycle Test (EOCT), 

End-of-Cycle Comprehensive Test (EOCCT), weight control, 

discipline and motivation, and Army values training. Core 

processes for AIT companies are soldier performance in the 

APFT, attrition, safety, weight control, discipline and 

motivation, Army values training, and MOS course 

performance. Some of these processes are measured more 

easily than others. 

Many variables other than core processes indicate a unit's 

performance, including the number of Articles I5 per cycle, 

barracks quality, field training exercise performance, drill 

and ceremony scores, cadre APFT results, drill sergeant 

certification, trainee abuse allegations, post inspection 

results, sports programs, and award competitions. While 

these are important, the APIC process focuses on variables 

that detennine if soldiers are trained, disciplined, physically 

fit, motivated, and ready to make an immediatc contribution 

to their new units. 

Several periodic internal assessment mechanisins enable 

the 35th and 169th Engineer Battalions to continually 

monitor performance. At the battalion level, cadre afteraction reviews, weekly command and staff meetings, 

weekly training meetings, quarterly training briefs, 

quarterly reviews and analyses, safety council meetings, 

and quarterly training status reports play a crucial role in the 

March 1999 
APlC process. The 1st Engineer I 

Brigade helps battalions monitor 

performance by using similar BRM Hit Average 33 1
 mechanisms at a higher level. 

Performance Assessment 

Core processes arc measured and 29 

Battalion Goal: 28 Hits 28.2 

tracked over time to assess 11 \ 

_ 

, 

_ _ _ _ -_ - _ _ _ ------ -

,' 

--

7

-I_'..---- . 

performance, improvement, and A.., 26 \ b- - - - - - - - 27--h& - 22 

27 / ,-. 
 trends. Figure 1 shows BRM hit - - -27- ---- - - - - - ?6.5 

averages from the first quarter of 1997 25 1 26 Brigade Goal: 26 Hits 

through the fourth quarter of 1998. A 

soldier must hit 23 out of 40 targets 23 -L- -, - during record fire to qualify on the MI6 ?ST97 2ND97 JRDW OTH97 IS788 2N098 3RD98 4TH98 

rifle. The brigade and battalion goals of Figure 1

26 and 28 hits, respectively, form a band 

of excellence that we try to maintain. An 

average above 28 hits indicates a IET APFT Battalion Average tremendously successful cycle. Finttime "go" and end-of-day "go" rates are 250- Battalion Goal: 240 Points 

tracked as additional performance I_______________-___-------------

measures. 230' *-/i<240xb----i 230 230 233 230 - Figure 2 shows the final APFT //&---- ?26--22h -------_------------

averages over a three-year period. 2101213 Brigade Goal: 215 Points 

Again, the battalion and brigade goals 

provide a hand of excellence where any 

average above 240 points is 

outstanding. The final APFT average 

tells only half the story. We recently 

tracked the initial diagnostic APFT 

averages, which indicate consistent 

improvement of more than 100 points 

during the 14-week cycle. Some trends 

tend to be cyclical. For example, winter I 

classes do not perform as well on the Figure 2 

APFT as summer classes, which are 

filled with recent high school graduates. Winter trainees Customer Satisfaction 

often shoot better, because classes are smaller and drill Since custonier satisfaction is an integral part of APIC, 

sergeants can provide more individual attention. We custolner feedback is vely important. The battalions' 

measure other core processes in a similar manner. internal customers are the IET soldiers they train; their 

To Prevent requires that external customers are the active, reserve and National Guard 

units compare their results against other units that perform engineer units that receive these soldiers. ~~~~~~l feedback is 

the same or similar missions. In comparison with armor provided through trainee sensing sessions, afier.action 

OSUT units at Knox and infantlyOSUT units at Fort reviews, trainee letters to the commander, and surveys. 

Benning, Fort Leonard Wood engineer soldiers attain ~~~i~~~ surveys provide the most objective and systematic roughly the same Or better results. Comparisons of "Ine feedback. Soldiers respond to questions regarding quality of 

mission results are difficult to make, because ranges are life, the soldierization process, and training. ~h~ surveys are 

different or tests are conducted in a different manner, but the organized in question and Likert Scale Figure 3, page 

approach is to determine which units perfom best and adopt 26, summarizes fhe soldiers' response to quality-of-life issues 

their good ideas. from the second through the fourth quarters of 1998. Out of I0 

March 1999 Er~gineer25 
precautions, training that soldiers like most 

and least, availability of cleaning supplies, 

Trainee Survey and quality of physical training. 

Quality of Life The primary method of obtaining external 

feedback is through sltrvevs sent to engineer 

1 5,47 A...7 I units throughout ~otai Army Force that _.___...+-------- '4.8 reccive our IET soldiers. In 1997, we sent 4.5 f "' 

a{..- 4.3 

.---- . '4.2 4 = Agree 	 surveys to commanders of all active duty 

engineer units that receive 12B and 12C 

3.5 - 3 = Partially agree soldiers. In 1998, we distributed surveys to 

2 = Disagree all com~nanders and conitnand sergeants 1 =Strongly disagree major in the Total Anny Force who receive 

( 	 ,J L.3 2.5 1 128 and 12C soldiers. More than 40 percent 

responded to the surveys each year, and 

Figure 4 shows the results. Our conclusion is 

that physical fitness must remain our top 

I can go to church,no one bothers me if I do. -- training priority. 

- me barrackswere maintained in a clean and safe manner. 	 In 1999, ail engineer itnits with CMF 12 

- Soldiers were given access to the dayroom duringthe cycle. and CMF 51 soldiers will receive surveys. ' L - Quartermaster - -

laundly was a convenient and cost-effective Survey results will be available at the ---__--__- -~-

ENFORCE Conference at Fort Leonard 

I Figure 3 Wood in April. 

Conclusion 

Field Unit Feedback A	PIC has helped the 35th and 169th 

Engineer Battalions more accurately 

mmm tneasure and itnprove their perfonnance, but much work remains to he done Active Active Total 

Engineer Engineer Army in this process of continuous improvement. 

Units Units Force 

FY97 FY98 FY98 	 Physical Initiatives for FY99 includc additional 

-

Quslih, - Indicators Score Score Score Fitness systematic coordination with other OSUT 

Adapting well 2.07 2.32 1.88 #I 

Team oriented 2.27 2.67 2.34 Training units for benchmarking; more MOS-related 


Neat appearance 2.44 2.28 1.95 i)Priorlty pcrfurmatlce indicators for A students;
 Disciplined 2.48 2.57 1.98 

Motivated including off-site AIT companies in Gulfport, 
 2.50 2.17 1.81 


Mentally tough 3.04 2.84 2.36 Mississippi, and Shepard Air Force Base,
 Know combat skills 3.26 2.47 1.94 

Physically fit 3.48 3.21 2.60 Texas, in the APIC process; and incorporating 

L-7 perfonuance measures for values taining and 

1-Excellent 2-Good 3-Above average weight control. The APTC process. which 

4-Below average 5-Poor America's 	 incorporatestop-performing management techniques companies, used helps by

en~ineer training units provide the force with 

Figure 4 the best possible new soldiers. Y 

I,iip,ir~nnnt Colonel Estez command,^ the 

quality-of-life questions, Figure 3 shows the two questions 169th Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood. Previous 

that yielded the best and worst responses over time. The as.signmenrs incl~ule S3. 36th Engineer Group; and S3. 43rd 

numbers ranging from 5 (good) to I (poor) mean little by Enginrer Rattaliorl. LTC Eslrs is a gmu'uare of tl~e United 

themselves. Comparing the numbers to various other Stares Milirary Academy and holds a doctorrrte in civil 

quality-of-life issues over time provides leaders with engineerinjifrom the University of Color(ldo. 

valuable input on whcrc to focus more effon. Trainee Lieutenant Scott is the operations oficer for the 169th 

surveys also address areas such as the quality of dining Engineer Bnttulion. He is a graduate of tlw Engirleer Officer 

facilities and field chow, quality of medical trzatment, Basic Course and ho1d.s a master'.^ dexree in ~nnnagnnent 

quality and quantity of training aids, assessment of safety from Webste-r U~iiver.~it)r 

26 Fnzineer 	 March 1999 
Ammunition Forecasting for 


Task Force Operations 


By Captain Jared Ware 

At 0130 hours, the task force support platoon leader 

drives toward tlze brigade support area. Following 

clzemlights between the corzcertina wire into the 

arm, he asks the gate guard for directions to the Class IV/ 

Class V pickup point for the task force. The guard points to 

the south and say, "That way, sir; about 150 meterc, right 

next to the covered HEM7'TN 

Aflerfinding the site, the platoon lender discovers that the 

Class IV/Class Vpoint does not have the right ammunitiorz. 

There are no MICLIC reloads on hand and on/)' a few AT4s 

and Dragons. There are too nznny high-explosive mortar 

round.^ and not enough snzoke rounds. Tile platoon leader 

asks tlze C1a.r~ IV/Class VNCO why the ammunition courzt is 

not what he needs j%r the uj7conzing mission, and the NCO 

replies, "Sir; each task force gets an eq~ml amount of 

ammunition." 

"But our task force is the main effort for tomorrow's 

attack, sergeant," answers tlze platoon leader. 

"Sorry, lieutmant, but the Brigade S4 gave me tlze logistics plan, and this is what you get Besides, you never sent in 

an ammunition statirs report." 

As the support platoon personnel load the ammunition, 

the platoon leader wondet-s why Task Force Eagle received 

so much ammunition (fthey are in reserve. He also wonders 

how he's going to explain the improper nzir of ammunition to 

the task force commander at the morning operations brief. 

This article provides information to fix task-force-level 

ammunition forecasting problems, tt defines ammunition 

terms and describes how planners can accurately forecast 

ammunition requirements for combat operations. 

Terminology 

A mmunition consists of bullets, rockets, demolitions, 

mines, and associated munitions. Ammunition supply is based on a required supply rate (RSR) and a 

controlled supply rate (CSR). According to FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), page 6-8, the 

RSR is the estimated amount of ammunition required to sustain operations, without restrictions, for a specific period. 

The rate is determined by forecasting ammunition requirements based on the mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time 

available (METT-T). RSRs are besed on weapon density for 

a given unit. RSRs can he developed by several methods, but 

March 1999 

the accuracy of the calculations varies from method to 

method. The CSR is the rate of ammunition that can be supported for a given period based on ammunition availability. If 

a support unit cannot supply a specific type of ammunition 

based on the forecasted RSR, then it imposes a CSR to limit 

the distribution of that type of ammunition. The CSR may be 

less than the RSR; the optimum situation is when the RSR 

equals the CSR. 

Combat load is the ammunition required by each combat 

system and the individuals assigned to that system. Also 

called the minimum initial issue quantity, a combat load is a 

standard measure used throughout the Army and provides the 

baseline upon which units develop their basic loads. Class V 

loads can be calculated per system, per individual, or per unit. 

Basic load is the command-determined quantity and type 

of munitions carried by an individual, unit, or combat system. 

A unit basic load is the amount of ammunition needed to initiate combat operations and can be moved in a single load by 

a designated unit. 

Responsibility 

I

n a task fol-ce environment, the S3 should forecast and 

determine ammunition requirements. Slice elements, 

such as engineer, military police, and chemical units, 

should provide input to the task force S3 for their specific 

requirements. The S4 then sources these requirements, which 

normally are based on the mission, its duration, weapon systems used, and the number of personnel in the task force. The 

task force S3 often allows the S4 to determine and source 

ammunition requirements without input from slice elements. 

When that happens, the elements may not receive the ammunition needed to complete their combat missions. For example, engineers need mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) 

rockets and reloads for mobility missions and Volcano munitions for countermobility missions. Field artillery units use 

155-millimeter smoke rounds for breaching operations. and 

they need scatterable mines for defensive missions. 

Both FM 5-71-2 and 5-71-3 describe a general concept of 

Class V consumption but don't provide enough information 

to actually develop a thorough Class V forecast. FM 5-71-2, 

Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations, page 6-4, 

states that "Class V material is based on reported expenditures submitted to the field trains by the first sergeant." This 

manual discusses ammunition expenditures, but it only 

addresses replacing Class V expenditures rather than foreEngineer27 
casting mission requirements. FM 5-71-3 is the only engineer manual that discr~sses forecasting requirements for 

engineers. 

Problems 

The problems that planners encounter when forecasling ammunition requirements stem from a number of 

sources. 

H 	 Some planners at the task-force level micunderstand 

ammur~ition forecasting. Establishing a unit basic load 

from a tactical SOP is a good starT, but that provides 

only enough ammunition to initiate a mission, not sustain it. 

H 	 Establishing an RSR is difficult due to the forecasting 

tools available. RSRs often are a "best guess." based on 

the task force planners' experience. 

H 	 Units must prioritize ammunition requirements because 

the haul capacity at the company level and below is limited. Most ammunition is carried on vehicles organic to 

the company, such as MIA2 tanks. M2A3 Bradley 

fighting vehicles: MI 13 armored personnel carriers, 

HMMWVs, and cargo trailers. 

OPLOG Planner 

FM 9-6, M~~rziriorzsSn/)l)ot.t in Tl~earer 0p~rarion.s. 

chapter 3, page 1-3, states. "An automated tool called 

the Operational Logistics (OPLOG) Planner is the 

authorized method for determining munitions planning data 

at all levels." It is a good tool for forecasting engineerspecific ammunition requirements and can be used to establish an RSR for engineer ammunition. Based on the mission, 

the OPLOG Planner creates an ammunition consumption 

report that shows the type of ammunition required for a specific type of operation, battle intensity, and duration. From 

this report, engineer planners can forecast ammunition 

requirements. A simplified version of the process follows: 

1. Determine the engineer unit by source reference code 

(SRC). unit identification code. tvoe. size. and name. 2. 


2. Assign the englneer unit a "task force" name such as 

"203-EN BN." 

3. Assign the unit to the "task force" by SRC and quantity (type a "I" next to the SRC). 

4. Determine the use of mission parameters or custom 

parameters and modify them. 

5. Create an order. such as "Order I-I," and assign the 

engineer unit to it. 

6. Determine the type of operation. intenqity, and ~iumher 

of days for the operation. 

7. Select the data according to the area of operation (mission, duration, and posture). 

8. Prepare the consu~nption report and the ammunition 

1-epolt. 

9. Print the reports (to a file, screen, etc.) and analyze 

them according to the mission. 

10. Divide by the quantity of weapon systems in the unit 

(ignore line item ~iumbers [LINsl that are not in the unit). 

Mission parameters are based on a number of factors specific to the mission and area of operation. The figure on page 

29 shows various parameters for combat operations. 

Table 1, page 29, is an estimated ammunition consumption 

report for an engineer battalion, heavy division. The document lists data such as the mission, intensity, duration, LINs 

and quantity of weapon systems, and Department of Defense 

identification codes (DODICs) for associated ammunition. It 

also lists weights associated with each DODIC as a planning 

factor for transportation. Table 2, page 30, shows the total 

ammunition consumption for an engineer battalion in the 

attack phase. (OPLOG Planner also calculates for defensive 

and reserve missions.) Although no[ shown in Table 2, the 

anln~unition report includes the DODIC Summary Report for 

the engineer battalion. the Phase DODIC Summary Report, 

the Phase Total Report, and the Order DODIC Summary. 

These reports are useful if an operation has more than one 

phase or if more than one unit provides input to the ammunition forecast. The I-eports also contain information needed to 

forecast initial ammunition requirements for engineer units in 

a task force. 

OPLOG Planner allows the user to build task force models, 

which add multiple units to the report. However, planners 

should analyze the information carefully, because the calculations often produce extremely high consumption rates for 

units that do not use the amount of ammunition estimated for 

their combat mission. For example, the program recognizes 

that all M16A2 rifles in a task force fire at the same rate. This 

is equivalent to putting an entire task force's M16A2s on line 

and firing the rifles at maximum rate. To forecast accurately, 

planners should ru11 the program for individual units and their 

specific missions rather than "grouping" the units as a task 

force. 

Drawbacks 

Although OPLOG Planner is a good planning tool, it has 

some drawbacks. ltH 	 Does not forecast for most engineer units below the battalion level. Engineer planners must perform an extra 

"allocation" step to forecast Class V requirements for an 

engineer company by separating the company's forecast 

from the battalion's. 

H 	 Does not account for ce~tain types of Class V supplies. 

Engineer Class V munitions not accounted for in OPLOG 

Planner include the Modular Pack Mine System (DODIC 

K022). 

Does not calculate consumption rates for the MICLIC or 

the MK19 grenade machine gun. It lists the basic loads 

for these systems but does not calculate additional 

ammunition requirements for these situation-dependent 

munitions. 

H 	 Generates Volcano consumption rates but lists the individual mine consumption rate instead of the canister consumption rate. 

28 Engineer 	 March I999 
Parameter Set: -> Defense-Succeeding Days-Light 

Description-> 

Class I-> 

Class I!-> 

Class Ill-> 

Class IV-> 

Class V-> 

Class VI-> 


ClassVIII-> 


Water-> 


Parameter Set: -zProtracted-Reserve 

Description-> 

Class I-> 

Classll-> 

Ciass Ill-> 

Class IV-> 

Class V-> 

Class VI-> 


Class VIIi-> 


Water-, 


Defense Combat Posture; Succeeding Days: Intensity: Light 

A: 1, B: 0. T. 1, MRE: 1, LRP-I: N, HCP1:Y. HCPZ: Y, RICW: N 

Theater: NEA 

Profile: CONUS 

Banier: Y, Construct1on:Y 

Rate: NEA DIV 

Posture: Delense:Succeeding Days: Intensity: Light 

Use [YINI: N. Climate: 

Echeion: ECH 1 & 2 (DIV), Theater: MRC-W 

Echelon: Division. C1imate:Ternperate 

Combat Posture: Protracted: Intensity: Reserve 

A: 1, 8:0. T: 1. MRE: 1. LRP-I: N. HCP1:Y. HCP2:Y. RICW: N 

Theater: NEA 

Profile: Europe EAC 

Barr~er:Y, Construction:Y 

Rate: NEA DIV 

Posture: Protracted Period: Intensity: Reserve 

Use [YINI: N. Climate: 

Echelon: ECH 1 & 2 (DIV), Theater: MRC-W 

Echelon: Division. Clima1e:Tempemte 

Combat mission parameter sets. (Note the change in parameter set ->) 

Phase: 1 Phase Length: 1.00 Days 

Task Organization: Engineer 

Parameter Set: Attack: Succeeding Days; Moderate 

Rate: NEA DIV 

LIN ON Weapon DODIC 

Nomenclature 

Posture: Attack; Succeeding Days 

Intensity: Moderate: Strength: 100 percent 

Unit: 05335L000 Engr Bn, Hvy Div 

QV: 1, Sir. 444 

DOOlC 


Nomenclature 


C18234 28 Carrier Personnel Full TR A576 CTG CAL .SO M8 

1049 6 Carrier Cargo: Tracked 6 A576 CTG CAL 50 M8 

011538 4 Carrier Command Past: LIG A576 CTG CAL .SO M8 

D30897 6 Dispenser Mine: MI39 (HTL) KO45 Mine, XM87, Volcano 

E56578 6 CEV FT 165 mm Cannon M728 A131 7.62 mm 4 Ball, 1 TRA 

CBT Rounds Weight Cube 

Load 

50,400 1,786 696.60 893 

5.400 383 149.27 1.91 

3.600 255 99.51 1.28 

960 1,018 44,797.72 2,51478 

21,600 1,112 111.21 2.22 

Table 1 . OPLOG Planner estimated ammunition consumption report for an engineer battalion, heavy division 

March 1999 
Unit Total for Engr Bn, Hvy Div DODlC DODiC Nomenclature Rounds Weight 

(Ib) 

Cube 

Weighl (ibs):52.56034 

Short tans: 26.28 A059 5.56 rnm Ball M855 10 9,797 489.83 9.80 

PoundsiMan-day 118.38 A063 5.56 mrn Tracer M856 3.740 149.40 3.74 

A064 5.56 mrn Ball-ITRL 0 0 0 

Table 2.Total ammunition consumption for an engineer battalion in the attack (OPLOG Planner). 

Solutinn 

These problems can be corrected by using OPLOG Planner ammunition factors with a spreadsheet program, such as 

Microsoft Excel, to forecast ammunition requirements. After 

downloading OPLOG Planner text tiles to a disk, the files 

can be reopened in the spreadsheet program. The user can 

"manually" separate the amount of ammunition forecasted 

for an engineer battalion and express it as an engineer company fol-ecast in the spreadsheet format. The user can then 

input DODICs into the spreadsheet that are not accounted 

for by OPLOG Planner. Engineer planners can use OPLOG 

Planner consumption rates from the spreadsheet to determine ammunition forecasts for MICLICs and MK19s. For 

example, OPLOG Planner determines Volcano consumption 

in terms of individual mines. Volcano reloads can be accurately forecasted by dividing the OPLOG Planner consumption rate by a factor of 6, which is the number of canisters in 

each Volcano DODIC. 

Engineer Forecasting 

Forecasting ammunition requirements for combat operations is an integral part of the engineer planning process and should be included in the Engineer Estimate. 

After receiving a mission, engineer planners know the type 

of operation the unit will perform. During the battlefield 

assessment and intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 

engineer planners determine the enemy's capabilities. These 

analyses indicate the types of targets to expect and the battlefield conditions. From this information, the planner develops a tentative list of ammunition the unit will need for a 

mission. In analyzing engineer missions, planners further 

determine which parameters impact the mission (figure, 

page 29). 

While developing the scheme of engineer operations 

(SOEO), planners determine which engineer assets to use in 

the mission. FM 5-71-2, pages 3-10 and 3-11, states that 

"There are some specific considerations that the engineer 

staff officer should consider as he develops his SOEO." 

These include task force breaching capabilities and adequate 

fi1.e-control measures to support breaching. Engineer planners should coordinate with the fire-support officer for artillery fire as related to the task force mission. If the mission 

requires scatterable mines, engineer planners forecast the 

ammunition needed to achieve the desired obstacle effect. 

Field artillery munitions that are important to engineers 

include the area denial artillery munition (long duration) 

(DODIC D501), the area denial artillery munition (short duration) (DODIC D502) and the remote antiarmor mine-(long 

duration) (DODIC D503). 

After developing the SOEO, engineer planners determine the 

types and quantities of ammunition the unit needs to accomplish the mission. They use OPLOG Planner and a spreadsheet 

program during the wargaming and refining phase of the Engineer Estimate. After engineer planners mn OPLOG Planner for 

each possible course of action (COA) and analyze the results, 

they forecast ammunition requirements for each COA. The 

forecasted requirements are used as criteria to determine which 

COA to recommend to the commander. After he decides on a 

COA, the OPLOG Planner results for that COA are used as the 

engineer ammunition forecast for the mission. Give a copy of 

the results to the task force S4 and the support platoon leader to 

ensure that the engineer-specific ammunition forecast is 

included in the task force logistics plan. 

Tools 

Forecasting engineer ammunition requirements for combat missions is an important job for planners who work 

in a task force environment, where engineer companies 

may use a variety of Class V items depending on the mission. 

It is the task force engineer officer's responsibility to forecast, 

determine. and source engineer ammunition requirements. By 

understanding the basic ammunition terms and definitions. 

engineer planners can formulate a plan to accurately forecast 

Class V requirements. The Engineer Estimate will alleviate 

some forecasting uncertainties. Using OPLOG Planner to 

forecast initial ammunition requirements and a spreadsheet 

program for additional requirements lead to an accurate engineer ammunition forecast. This forecasting process provides 

engineer planners the fundamental tools to forecast the 

proper type and amount of ammunition needed to complete 

their assigned combat missions. kl 

Captain Ware is commander of A Company, 249th Engineer 

Battalion (Prime Power), Fort Lxwis, Wushington. Previous 

assignments include Joint Operation Plcmizing and Execulion 

System (JOPES) Officer: G3, Eighth U.S. Arni): Korea; and 

platoon leader and executive oficer; 70th Engineer Battalion, 

Fort Riley, Kansas. CPT Ware is a graduate of the U.S. 

Military Academy and holds a master's degree in engineering 

management,from the Univer.sity of Missouri-Rolla. 

30 Engineer March 1999 
By Sergeant Major Jay Florance 

When the 'Ornrnand sergeant ma~or'sergeant major 

list was in December lgg8, many "Oncommissioned officers (NCOs) had their day brightened, 

as they became the new senior enlisted leadership for our 

Army.They deserve our congratulations. Army promotion 

always try to promote the best NC0s3 and they 

usually do. But we know that some excellent soldiers are 

not promoted simply because their Noncommissioned 

Officer EvaluationReports (NCOERs) are weak Or 

unclear During my two years of duty at PERSCOM, I 

have reviewed the records of every engineer NCO. I am 

taking this opportunity to pass along my thoughts about 

what results in promotion selection. 

On the whole, NCOERs don't paint a picturethat 

helps the promotion board select the best candidates. 

There are three Or four NCOs who have had 

stellar careers or unique events that clearly place them in 

the upper percentile of their grade and military 

occupational specialty. Such events include being 

selected Drill Sergeant of the Year or Soldier of the Year. 

But only a few soldiers achieve those high standards, and 

there is a huge bubble of soldiers grouped in the middle 

who compete for promotion. 

The NCOER is the key to who gets promoted, but 

many of them don't say anything substantial. The words 

may be there, but they lack significance. Phrases such as 

"Leads from the front,""Places unit goals above his own," 

or "Consistently demonstrates sound judgment" do not 

relate to promotion. Nor do they say anything significant 

about the soldier's performance Over the past to 

months. If promotion board members read those or 

similar comments on 50 NCOs and only 30 NCOs can get 

promoted, which 30 should they select7 The following 

recommendations will help rating officials prepare strong 

NCOERs that send the intended message. 

Raters: Part Illd, Area of Special Emphasis, should 

relate to the event that occurs during the rating period. It 

may be a rotation at the National Training Center or the 

Joint Readiness Training Center, a deployment, or a field 

training exercise, etc. Since this is the most important 

event of the rating period, gear the first comment in each 

rated area on the back of the NCOER to it. If a rater 

includes the event on the front of the NCOER but does 

not add comments about it on the back. the reader may 

assume that the soldier's performance was less than 

successful. Excellence and success, or lack of success, 

should be clearly identifiable based on this key event. 

Describe day-to-day events or performance in the second 

and following bullets. 

Ratersshould also consider other factors, When listing 

three positions for future duty, donst forget about 

observerlcontroller (OC) duty at a combat training center. 

We need lo know which NCOs to place in these key 

positions and don%, want to guess! Recommend only your 

best NCO for an OC position. Also, staff sergeants should 

rate other staff sergeants only when absolutely 

necessary! ~h~~ normally do not provide a strong 

description of duty performance and generallyrate the 

soldier lower than a more experienced NCO would. 

Finally, understand that if you rate a soldier "fully capable" 

rather than the best; that soldier probably will not 

get promoted. If your NCO is not the best, why isn't he? 

Have you counseled the NCO on what is needed to 

become the best? Do you have a best? 

Senior Raters. Weigh in with your comments! 

whether you realize it or not, senior raters really drive the 

Platoon leaders: Who is your best squad 

Company commanders: Who is your best platoon 

sergeant? Battalion commanders: Take a bow-you do a 

great job statingwho your best first sergeant is.prepare a 

bullet for each area, performance and potential.Too many 

NCOERs have conflicting messages, For example, if the 

comment to perform duties as first is 

paired with a potential rating of ,e2rthe NCO will not be 

selected.That combination raises the question of how an 

NCO can be ready without a potential of When 

company commanders do not indicate who their best 

platoonsergeant is, soldier probably not get 

promoted. D~~~~shortchange your best NCO! ~fyou donat 

identify your best NCO, his chance for promotion is about 

one in 50. 

This is my last PERSCOM Note, since Iam preparing 

to move to Germany, It has been an honor to be the 

Engineer Branch sergeant major for the past two years, 

Sergeant Major Fillmore will arrive in May, and sure 

she will continue to take care of the Engineer Corps, 

Sergeant Major Florance serves as the Engineer 

Branch sergeant majorat PERSCOM. His e-mailaddress 

is florancj@hoffman.army.mil. 

March 1999 Engineer 31 
By Captairl Mark A. Geruldi 

With the proliferation of operations other than war 

(OOTW), civil disturbance 

missions are no longer owned solely by 

light infantry battalions. Correctly 

employed, mechanized combat engineers can be major players in Future 

OOTW deployments. For example, 

units currently deployed to Bosnia have 

faced and probably will continue to 

face civil disturbance scenarios in that 

theater. 

Thc 1st Cavalry Division's 8th Engineer Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, 

demonstrated the effectiveness of a 

mechanized engineer battalion in such 

a role when it deployed to Panama for 

Operation Safe HavedSafe Passage 

during 1994 and 1995. As a line 

platoon leader, I was an active partici- extretnely violent riot. More than 200 

pant in this innovative role for combat U.S. military personnel were injured, 

engineers. This article details the task with 18 of them hospitalized. The 8th 

organization and deployment, the spe- Engineer Battalion's role was to reincialized equipment, and the training force the severely oumumbered and 

and tactics that a mechanized engneer , underequipped joint task force solbattalion must employ to conduct ef- diers, marines, and airmen guarding the 

fective civil disturbance operations. camps. 

I The battalion began its notification 

Task Organization and sequence at 1600 hours on 1 1 Decemher 1994. My company held its tirst 

Deployment muster formation for this "Drawn 

Saber" alert (a muster in field uniform 

The United States constructed with the remainder of the gear packed 

four camps in Panama to house in duffel bags) two hours later, which is 

Cuban refugees while the). the division standard. The company had 

awaited entry into the United States, in a bigade-level sea 

On 7 and 8 December, 1,000 of more deployment readiness exercise six 

than 8,000 refugees escaped during an months earlier, so the squad leaders had 

Sappers from the 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company, 8th 

Engineer Battalion, conduct tent-clearing operations as part of their civil 

disturbance training during 

Operation Safe HavenISafe 

Passage.The soldiers are in 

a modified uniform (no 

blouse) for this training due 

to the extremely hot and 

humid weather. 

32 Engineer Mar-ch 1999 
' little difficulty in directing the initial line platoon leaders to conduct a recon- employed riot-control agents. Soldiers 

steps of the deployment preparation naissance of the four refugee camps and wore flak jackets and leather gloves for 

while the commander briefed senior the one confinement facility known as , additional protection. We reinforced 

leaders. "Camp 5." Our recons focused on the I our shields with 100-mile-an-hour tape 

To suppoll Operation Safe Havelli standard military aspects of terrain- along the edges and placed two strips 

Safe Passage, we modified our basic OCOKA (observation and fire, cover in an "X"pattern across the front. The 

task organization. The two line pla- and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, entire ensemble was hot but offered 

toons in each company were the focus and avenues of approach). We noted excellent protection. 

of the battalion's effort. Soldiers from such things as fields of fire (the rioters We removed the lanyards on the 

the assault and obstacle platoon aug- inflicted most of the injuries by throw- batons because our soldiers were not 

mented the line platoons to bring them ing jagged stones found along this part experts in their use and risked being 

up to their full 29-man strength. Each of the canal), areas in which our troops pulled into a rioting crowd if the lanline platoon also deployed all four of could take cover from such projectiles, yard was attached to their wrist and refits MI 13 annored personnel carriers and conccaled areas that refugees could ugees grabbed the baton. We also 

(APCs), a HMMWV, and all other pass through or ambush from. We also carried four flexicuffs on the elastic 

modified table of organization equip- recorded locations of natural obstacles snap loops of our flak jacket shoulder 

ment. The commander attached the and potential man-made barriers that pads. The cuffs were prethreaded so we 

remaining soldiers from the assault and rioters could hastily erect, key terrain could quickly take them off to restrain 

obstacle platoon to the company head- such as choke points (one camp a rioter. The ammunition pouch on our 

quarters section to form a small trans- entrance was through a constricted can- pistol belt held additional flexicuffs. 

portation section. The assault and yon), and avenues of approach for dis- Each of the two grenade pouches of the 

obstacle platoon leader served as liai- mounted troops and APCs. Since we ammunition pouch contained a pepper 

son to the local U.S. infantry battalion were the only mechanized unit in Pan- spray bottle (with a 10-foot range). 

(5-87th Infantry) after we arrived. The ania, we conducted several bridge clas- Soldiers at team leader level and 

headquarters section deployed the sifications and constructed an im- abovc, track commanders, and drivers 

remaining three HMMWVs, a 5-ton provised bridge over aboveground also had night vision goggles, which 

cargo truck, and a HEMMT (a heavy, plumbing for one camp. usually were storcd in the squad APC. 

expanded-mobility tactical truck). The Since we did not know how volatile 

combat engineer vehicles (CEVs), the situation was, soldiers deployed 

armored vehicle-launched bridges Specialized Equipment and with an MI6 and bayonet, but we left 

(AVLBs), and armored combat earth- Modifications thc M249 squad automatic weapons 

movers (ACES) remained at the home 1 behind. As soon as a forward base 

station. ivil disturbance operations re- , camp was established along the PanThe company loaded its vehicles c quired us to either modify exist- ama Canal, we pennanently stored our 

and equipment onto C-5 Galaxies and ing equipment or acquire new rifles in the field anns room. Once in 

C-141 Starlifters and left Fort Hood by equipment. At Howard Air Force Base, country, we drew one riot shotgun per 

2200 on 12 December. The main body our supply scrgeant issued each soldier squad. We used birdshot in these wcapof the battalion, with full field gear and a complete set of riot gear that included ons, which could be fatal at close range 

personal sensitive items, departed later shin guards (the same type that baseball (1 0 meters or less) but not at 

that evening. This was the largest airlift catchers use), a Plexiglas shield, a longer distances. Platoon leaders carof mechanized forces since Operation Plexiglas face visor that attached to the ried 9-millimeter pistols. Local miliDesert Shield. kevlar, and a 3-foot wood baton. The tary police conductcd ranges for both 

We arrived at Howard Air Force main purpose of this gear was to protect pistols and shotguns to improve our 

Base, Panama, on the morning of 13 , against projectiles such as rocks or tent proficiency on these weapons. They 

December. The joint task force head- poles that the rioters sharpened and remained in the arms room except 

quarters, known as Joint Task Force , used as spears. We donned the gear when we deployed to a camp. 

Safe Haven, informed us that the riots ' when we moved large numbers of refu- Other platoon equipment included 

had ceased and all but 10 of the escap- gees from one camp to another or were mine detectors, which were used when 

ees had been apprehended. Initially we searching the camps for buried caches 

were to serve as a mechanized quick- wore a stripped-down pistol of homemade weapons. Each platoon 

reaction force that could project from belt with a 2-quart canteen on our backs also brought five single-channel, 

our jungle base camp to quell any new and had protective masks that hung on ground-to-air radio systems (SINCflare-ups by the Cuban refugees. our front sides over the groin. The posi- GARS), which were taken from home 

Based on the clarified mission and tion of the masks served two purposes: station ACES and CEVs. We configsituation, the commander directed both protection and accessibility in case we ured them as manpacks so each leader 

March 1999 Engineer 33 
I I 


Rioters Rioters
 I I 


Platoon On-Line Platoon Echelon (Right) I I 


Figure 1. Dismount formations 

in the platoon could maintain commu- disturbance operations. After a few days, 

nications with the tracked vehicles the battalion nnd company adopted a 

while dismounted. 1 more for~nal civil disturbance operations 

We also modified the APCs to better mission essential hsk list (METL), 

suppol-1 the mission. Since it was a riot- which focused our training. It followed 

control mission, we did not deploy our ' the natural progression fioln individual 

M2 machine grins from Fort Hood. We and squad tasks to platoon and company 

removed ail external attachments from for~nations and included rules-ofthe APCs-such as pioneer boxes, tow engagement training at all levels. 

cables, and oil cans-so rioters could We practiced quick-reaction force 

not swarm the vehicle and use them as alerts several times a day. The comweapons. We also taped over the cxtcr- pany standard was to roll out of camp 

nal handle of the onboard fire extin- fully geared within 20 minutes of notiguisher. Some of the refugees had prior fication. To accomplish this, each 

military service and could try to disable squad laid their gear on sheets of plyan APC. (During the initial riot, a rioter wood outside their tents, and we parked 

turned off the ignition of a passing the APCs next to the bivouac area. 

MMMWV.) Drivers kept both the Joint Task Force Safe Haven conengine compartment and fuel cap com- , structed two mock-up camps for trainbat locked at all times. We also ing, and we conducted an exercise at 

mounted two rolls of concertina around one site using otherjoint task force solthe exhaust stack of each APC and diers as opposing forces. This benefistored pickets inside the vehicle. We I cial exercise exposed us to some of the 

used this harrier material for hasty fnlstrations typical of civil dish~rbancc 

roadblocks. Inside each tracked vehicle ' operations, especially the incessant 

we stockpiled two cases of MREs , jeering of rioters and continuot~s bar- 

(meals, ready-to-eat) and a 5-gallon rage of projectiles. 

water cooler. I We developed a series of tactics to 

use whcn dismounting troops near 

rock-throwing rioters. These formaTraining and Tactics tions allowed us to dismount and 

assemble into riot-control t'onnations 

pon arriving in Panama, we ini- out of direct fire (Figure I). Drivers 

tiated individual and squad- drove buttoned up so they were folly level training for such areas as protected from threats such as gasoline squad fonnations and use of the haton fire bombs. 

and shield. A lnilitaly police lieutenant .knother mission was to serve as a 

deployed with our battalion to serve lnobile roadblock if the refugees broke 

as a subject matter expert in civil out. The tactic we developed involved 

34 Engineer 

tying ~ - into the impenetrable vegetation 

that grew on either side of every road. 

Two squads pulled into a predesignated 

site and strung triple-standard concertina across the road. Dismounted troops 

stood behind the wire to prcvent escapees from creating a breach, and we 

positioned APCs behind the soldiers as 

a final backstop. 

The APCs were positioned in a Vee 

formation to create a gate effect on the 

road (Figure 2, page 35). If the wire did 

not hold the rioters. the soldiers could 

retrograde through the gap between the 

tracks, and the APC would reseal the 

hole. This allowed soldiers to make a 

second stand from the top or behind the 

vehicles or remount the APCs and button up if the crowd was too large. We 

also developed an obstacle plan for key 

avenues of approach. At critical choke 

points, we erected tanglefoot on the 

shoulders of the road and 1 I-row wire 

obstacles. For the I I-row obstacles, we 

securcd concertina on only one side and 

kept it coiled so the road remained open 

but could be rapidly sealed off. The 

only difficulty with the obstacles in 

remote areas was that they soon fell 

prey to scavengers. 

To relieve monotony after several 

weeks of continuous civil disturbance 

operxtions training, we conducted jungle survival training and dismounted 

patrolling with the 5-87th lnfantly Battalion "Light Fighters." We also ran an 

MI6 range and a 50-foot rappelling 

tower for the company. Thesc training 

events were critical in maintaining and 

improving esprit de corps. 

Unit Succcss 

hroughout the three-month deployment to Panama, our cornpany had no Cuban refugees 

escape and no riots cnlpt. The deploylnent concluded with Operation Safe 

Passage, which entailed moving the refugees from our camps to Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. This phasc of the deployment also was without incident. 

The unit's successes were largely 

due to the adaptation of our mechanized 

engineer battalion to conduct effective 

March 1999 
Rioters I I 


Engineer Dismounts 

Impenetrable 


Vegetation 


I I 


Figure 2. Hasty roadblock 


civil disturbance operations. For exam- Honing in on these basics is an effecple, the focus on the line platoons was tive way for a mechanized engineer batcritical in building a highly mobile, talion to adapt to civil disturbance 

quick-reaction force. The APCs of- operations. Correctly employed, combat 

fered a level of protection that light engineers can be major players in future 

forces do not have and pe~mitted us to OOTW deployments in any environdismount close to rioters without fac- ment, whether it is the jungles of Paning a hail of stones. The protective ama or the lugged tenain of Bosnia. 

equipment and array of weapons pro- Y 

vided the flexibility to respond to vary- Captain Geraldi is tlze 1st Brigade 

ing levels of violence by rioters. The engineer; 1Olst Ail-borne Division (Air 

tiered training plan and realistic train- Assault), 326th Engineer Battalion, 

ing events rapidly built up the sol- Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He previously 

diers' ability and confidence in this served a. a platoon leader and a comotherwise foreign mission. Finally, oc- pany XO, 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st 

casional adventure training provided Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. 

the variety necessary to maintain the CPT Geraldi holds a master's degree in 

soldiers' morale during this extended engineering management froin the Unideployment. versity of Missouri-Rolla. 

Moving? 


Did your unit move recently, or is your Engineermagazine addressed 

incorrectly? To correct your mailing address, send us the following information: 

Old address: New address: 

E-mail: eubanksc@wood.army.mil 

Phone: (573) 563-4104 

Fax: (573) 563-4001 

Address: Engineer Professional Bulletin 

Directorate of Training Development 

320 Engineer Loop, Suite 210 

Fort Leonard Wood. Missouri 65473-8929 

(Continued from page I I) 

may have difficulty recognizing the 

MI13 as friendly. This dilemma is 

evidenced by the consistently high 

losses of engineers to enemy contact 

at the combat training centers, the 

fratricide of engineers from the 82nd 

Engineer Battalion during Operation 

Desert Storm, and the recent training death of MI 13-mounted engineers at the National Training Center. 

The vulnerability of the MI 13 to most 

weapons on the battlefield, its lack of 

firepower, the difficulty friendly 

forces have in recognizing the MI13 

as friendly, and the fact that our mission places engineers forward of 

friendly defensive positions and in the 

gauntlet of fires during breaching 

operations create a deadly combination. It leaves engineers with a recipe for mission failure and fratricide. 

Engineers mounted in BFVs offer 

the BCT increased versatility. When 

mounted in Ml 13s, engineers cotnmand and control mobility and countermobility assets but must rely on 

maneuver forces for protection. This 

requirement often drains the alreadystretched firepower of infantry and 

annored forces. As the structure of the 

division is reduced, this burden will 

increase. Engineers in BFVs can protect themselves during movement and 

can provide their own protection during obstacle reduction. In the defense, 

engineers in BFVs can relieve infantry and armored forces from the need 

to escort the Volcano because they 

will have the firepower needed to 

accomplish the mission. 

The transition from the MI 13 to 

the Bradley fighting vehicle will dramatically improve the survivability, 

lethality, and versatility of combat 

engineers during the close fight. It 

also will create the commonality 

required to effectively streamline the 

CSS system and provide a platfonn to 

launch combat engineers into the 

future. Clearly, combat engineers 

must rapidly transition to the Bradley 

fighting vehicle to support overall 

mission accoinplishment now and 

well into the 21st century. Y 

March 1999 Engineer 35 
IF 

B? Mnrk D. Kes~i~r~er 

eali'ul tli;~t Hitler's Germany mi_eht invent the world's 

first atomic homb. the Llnited Sttltes beyn the 

Manhattan Project in 1942 to secretly build the honlb 

before the Gel-nii~ns. In less than thl-ce years. we successfully 

built hoth uranium and plutoniuni homhs. During that time. 

the L1.S Army COIFSof Engineers managed the construction 

of~nonument;~l plants to cnrich ur;lnium, production reactors 

to make plutonium. and reprocessing plants to extract 

plutonium from tlie reactor fuel. On 6 Aupust 1945. the 

Unitccl States dropped a uranium homb (called Little Boy) 

on Hiroshima. Japan. ;rnd on 9 August we droppcd a 

plutonium homb (called Fat Man) on Nagasaki. Japan 

sul-rendered 23 days later. 

Following World War 11. relations between [he United 

States and Russia were strained, ;rnd with an impending 

threat from the Soviets, the Cold War began. Over thc next 

live decades. the United States spent an estimated 8300 

billion nianuf:icturing nuclear weapons. This ended in 1991, 

when the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union brought an 

abrupt end to the nuclear arms race and the Cold War. 

Now. the Corps of Engineers is assisting the Department 

of Energy (DOE) in deconta~ninating and decommissioning 

portions of the nation's vast nuclear weapons sites with the 

help of robots. 

The Cold War Legacy 

Like most industrial and manufacturing operations, the 

production of nucleal. weapons has generated wastes. 

But unlike other wastes. these have unique radiation 

hazards. In the late 1980s. all major facilities in the n:ttion's 

nuclear weapons complex were shut down temporarily. 

Because the end of the Cold War was so sudden. many 

facilities were not closed properly. Much of their wastes 

I-email1 in tenipol.ary storage and pose environmental and 

health risks. The DOE currently owns and maintains more 

than 2.000 contan~inated huildings that will requil-e decontamination and decomniissioning. It also must remediate 

about 2.700 nietric tons of spent fuel. I00 million gallons of 

high-level waste (enough to fill 10.000 tanker trucks). 100 

metric tons of plutonium. and 5501000 nietric tolls of 

contaminated metal. 

In its 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Repon. 

the DOE estimated that it would take 75 years and $227 

billion to clean up the nuclear weapons complex. Because of 

this enurmous price tag, in June 1997 the DOE intmduced its 

"2006 Plan." Fommerly called the "Ten Year Plan." it orpes 

the use of innovative technologies, processes, and thinking to 

clean up many of tlie sites by the year 2006 at a cost of about 

Y 120 hillion. 

Interagency Agreement 

he DOE'S Federal Energy Technology Center (FETC). 

located in Morgantown, \b2cst Virginia, and 

Pittshur~li. Pennsylvania. ha? the lead lilr developing 

innovative trchnolo~,y to decontaminate and decommission 

the nation's nuclear weapons complex. In 1995, the FETC 

executed an interagency agreement with the Army that allows 

the Corps of Engineers to assist the DOE in a \ariety of areas. 

including cleanup of tlie nuclear weapons complex. The 

Cnrps Huntington. West Virginia, district serves as the 

AI-my's program director for the ageement. It assigns work to 

the Corps district tl~nt is nearest to the DOE project, if that 

district has the necessary expertise and I-esources. 

I'rojects 

The Corps played a major role in building the nuclealweapons complex in the 1940s. and now it is a vital pan of 

the team that is decontaminating and decommissioning theye 

facilities. Currently. the Corps is helping thc FETC dccontaminate and deconimission a portion of three sites: the 

Chicago Pile 5 Reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory; 

Fernald's Plant I ncar Cincinnati; and Hanford Reservation's 

C-Reactor near Richland, Washington. 

Chicago Pile 5 Reactor. This heavy-water, uraniumfi~cled, thermal reactol. operated for 25 years before shutting 

down in 1979. Decontaminating and deconimissioninp the 

reactor includes removing the reactor core and thc hiologic;ll 

shield structure, decontaminating the rod storage area, and 

dismantling the stmcture. 

Fernald. At this plant, uranium orc was milled for 

distribution to other nuclear weapons sites. The work 

generated low-level radioactive dust, which settled ovcr 

much of the 1.000-acre site. 

C-Reactor. This full-scale surplus PI-oduction reactor was 

constn~ctcd rapidly in 1951 to respond to increased tensions 

in the Cold War. The reactor struted up in November 1952 

and operated until April 1969. The C-Reactor was scheduled 

to he the first of eight reactors 31 Hanford to be dismantled. 
However, due to site priorities and limited 

resources, the DOE is exercising the option 

to maintain the reactor in safe storage for 75 

to 100 years before final disposition. 

New Projects. Four new cleanup projects 

are getting underway: at Mound, Ohio; the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 

Mexico; the Savannah River National 

Laboratory in South Carolina; and the Idaho 

National Laboratory. 

FETC's ultimate goal is to demonstrate 

innovative technologies and processes and 

facilitate their acceptance and deployment 

for repetitive and reliable uses across the 

nuclear weapons complex. The Corps 

provides management support and cost 

engineering services to determine the performance and cost effectiveness of these 

technologies and processes. 

Robots are an example of innovative The Mobile Automated Characterization System can 

technology that is used successfully to clean detect alpha and beta contamination on floors. 

up nuclear weapons sites. This equipment 

includes the following: 

Mobile Automated Characterization 

System (MACS). The MACS is a banerypowered, autonomous robot with a laser 

positioning system. It can detect alpha and 

beta contamination on floors and perform 

long-term surveillance and maintenance 

tasks. Because it is operated from a remote 

location, the MACS reduces worker exposure and provides accurllte characterization data. (See top photo.) 

Rosie Remote Work System. A remote 

mobile work system called Rosie provides a 

telerobotic, mobile platform from which 

other robotic tools can be deployed for a 

variety of demolition and decon-tamination 

tasks. At the Chicago Pile 5 Reactor Project, 

Rosie broke up high-density concrete in an 

hour. In comparison, it would take several 

days for workers using jackhammers to 

complete this task. (See bottom photo.) 

Dual-Arm Work Platform (DAWP). 

The DAWP has two hydraulic manipulator 

arms that are mounted on a hydraulic 

positioning base. Equipped with a circular 

saw, it cut up large sections of the Chicago "Rosie" performs manual dismantlement, waste handling, 
 Pile 5 Reactor, removed contaminated lead and packaging using standard handheld tools. 


March 1999 Engineer 37 
coniplex, to safely and effectively decontaminate and 

dismantle these facilities may be an even greater 

challenge. This endeavor will require an enonnous 

level of commitment and cooperation from fovernmental agencies, federal and state regulators, industry, 

academia, and the public. We must safely accomplish 

the enom1ous undertaking of cleaning up the 

aftermath of the Cold War To do so, we must use 

ingenuity to develop and modify robots that can work 

effectively on delicate and heavy decontamination and 

dismantling tasks in highly radioactive environments. 

For tnore information, contact Mark D. Kessinger, 

the Army's National Program Manaper, at (304) 529-

5083 or at ~~~arkkQ~ni~il.orl~.asirce.ar~~z?.~nil. m , . - $ 

. LCL- M% Kessi~~geri.7 I/?P Corps qf E~~gineersNatil~nni 

The Dual-Arm Work Platform can be mounted on deployment Program Manager for srrl~pori to the Department of 

devices such as Rosie-C, overhead cranes, telescoping booms, Energ?'.? Federul Eneyq,~ Techrrolog). Center Previous 

and remote vehicles. 

panels, and dismantled graphite bricks. This equipment can 

accept a variety of tooling configurations, and its remote 

removes workers from high-radiation environ. 

ments. (See photo above.) 

Lessons Learned 

The United States' unleashing of the fundamental 

power of the universe with the atomic bomb is one of 

the greatest accomplishments of our time. Although it 

was an enormous challenge to build the nuclear weapons 

(Continrrcd from page 10) 

task organizations are mission-specific, knowledge beyond generic capabilities is required. This knowledge is 

critical when forecasting the support available from each 

organization. 

W 	 Encourage cooperation at the lowest level. In peace support operations, people on the ground are closest to the 

prohlern, usually have the greatest insieht, atid often make 

the greatest contributions. They should not be hindered by 

unnecessary bureaucracy and should have the flexibility to 

create ad hoc relationships. 

W 	 Carefully assess resources. Specify "who will provide 

what" in an operation. Military engineers often have more 

manpower and equipment resources than discretionary 

funding, while CA teams have access to funding sources. 

To avoid half-finished projects that may be viewed negatively, assess all resources when developing a plan. Close 

coordination with logistics and transportation personnel is 

very important. 

W 	 Link with the information campaign. The success of both 

engineer and CA activities is magnified when woven into an 

information campaign. Doling peace support operations, 

the perception of the force-by the host nation, the intemaassignme~!t.s include C[II-JIS liaison ro the Del~nrt~~?.ent 

of Energy and mfiineering staff .sl~eciali,sf lvith rhe 

Great Lokes nnd Ohio River Division in Cincinnati. Mr 

Kes.cirz,qer holds u ~nnsrer's dofi~-ee in en,qirzeerirtg 

~nana,~~me~?r,finnz Wi~.sf Vir~inia Univer.~in: 

Reference: 

Closinp tlze Circle on tire Sr>litrinn of the Arorn. U.S. ., 

Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, second printing, january1996. 

Allphotos courtesy DeparNttrst of Energy. 

tional com!nonity. and at home-as a contributor to peace 

and stability is advanced by publicizing CA and engineer 

contributions. 

A Final Word 

As our Army becomes engaged in more and more peace 

suppo~t operations, we will continue to face unforescell 

challenges and seek to solve complex issues that go 

beyond the realm of traditional military solutions. Engineer and 

civil affairs leaders niust recognize that they have rnut~~ally 

supporting capabilities and look to fose a cooperative spirit. 

Through cooperation, these two organizations call magnify their 

separate contributions toward achieving the force's objectives. 

m 

Lieutenanr Colonel E~orne?, U.S. Amzy Cops of Engineer-s, 

con~mnnd.~the 141h E118ineer Ro~talir~n (C), or For/ Lewis, 

Washbtgrox He previoruly served as SFORS Chiej Engir~eer 

Plans, in Sarajevo. Bosnin-Herre,qovina. LTC E~i,ome? i.r n 

gra~luafeof the U.S. Milifor? Acad[,ntj. 

Major Buckley is o reserve civil affnirs oflicer and president 

of Bay Colorzy Engineering. Onsed in Foxboro, Massachuserrs. 

He recenrlj served as a leadin,? me1n6cv of rhe Joinr Civil 

Commi.~sion in Snrnjevo, Bo.snio-Herseguvina. MAJ Buckley is 

rr groduate qf rhe US. Milifng.Acade~~~?. 
Gaining Distance Education 


By Captain Tim Wnllace 

Earning college credits is a challenge for most soldiers. 

Finishing a degree or just earning promotion points is 

a difficult goal for several reasons. Many soldiers do 

not have a Hexible schedule that allows them to attend 

classes for a 16-week semester. Schools that are located near 

military posts and that cater to soldiers often have a limited 

number of academic programs. Constantly moving around 

the world makes it hard to earn ellough credits from one 

institution to graduate, and transferring credits may be 

impossible because of different academic standards among 

colleges and universities. 

Soldiers can overcome these challenges by enrolling in 

distance learning programs that let students earn credits without attending on-campus classes. Before taking my first 

niultimedia-based distance education class from the University of Missouri-Rolla, I was skeptical of nontraditional education. I have since become a proponent of this new 

alternative to classro(~m learning. 

Changes 

istance education has come a long way in the past few 

years. There are still advertisements on TV or the 

backs of magazines for col~espondence schools that 

are not accredited or approved for tuition assistance and offer 

classes that lead only to a diploma or certificate. Now, however, many state universities and private colleges - offer fully 

accredited associate's, bachelor's, and master's degrees with 

no on-camnus attendance reauired. As the economv changes - and education becomes more expensive, colleges and universities are changing their methods and policies to accommodate busy people who work and continue their education 

simultaneously. Even some of the most exclusive schools, 

such as Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of TechMarch 1999 

nology. and Duke University, recognize the importance of 

serving nontraditional students. Peterson's Education and 

Career Center lists hundreds ol schools on its web site that 

offer associate degrees in 65 areas of study, bachelor's degrees 

in 73 areas, master's degrees in 74 areas, and doctorate de, orees 

in three areas. There is a degree program to fit almost everyone's interests. 

In addition to individual schools, several consortiums are 

forming around the country. The National University Degree 

Consortium consists of 13 accredited state universities that offer 

more than 1.000courses, 16 bachelor's degrees, and 3I graduate 

degrees. In the summer of 1998. Western Governors University, 

a consortium of universities from 15 western states and Guam, 

opened its virtual doors to offer numerous degree programs to 

students "by focusing only on the skills and knowledge areas 

that they need." They call this "competency-based education:' 

Na~ional Technological University, which offers advanced 

degrees to engineers, scientists, and technical managers, currently has 14 Master of Science degree programs taught by frlculty from 48 leading engineering schools. National Technological University demonstrates its commitment to the busy 

working professional by offering its courses continuously rather 

than adhering to a semester or quarter calendar. For this convenience, students can expect to pay more than $600 per credit 

hour. This is expensive; however, the university is approved by 

the Veterans Administration for tuition assistance. 

Communication Technologies 

0

ff-campus students use a variety of communication 

technologies for course delivery. such as videotapes, 

videoconferencing, the Internet, teleconferencing, and 

con-espondence. School administrators understand the benefits 

of student-teacher interaction and use a variety of means to 

En~ineer39 
maximize the time students have to interact with instructors 

and classmates. 

Videotape 

he most common delivery system for distance learn. 

ing is videotape. Classes are videotaped during a noron-calnpus class, and copies of the wpe are sent 

to off.campus students, M~~~ schools guarantee 

the day after the class to ensure that distant students have 

tilne to assignnlents. F~~ most classes, 

requirements are identical to those for 

campus students. 

Videnmnferenre . . -. ---.... .-. .--

any schools set up remote sites so can use videoconferencing for classes. The University of Kenlucky and Old Dominion University in Norfolk, 

Viginia, offer classes by satellite to many off-campus loca 

lions throughout the country. These are the same classes that 

are taught at the maill campuses. and students have the 

opponunity to ask questions and participate in class discussions iust as on-camous student do. Off-camous locations 

are at cotnmunity colleges, libraries, hospitals, military 

hases. and corporate sites. The University of Kentucky has 

13 off-campus sites throughout the state and offers programs 

of study in seven undergraduate and graduate disciplines. 

Old Dominion University has 40 sites across the country and 

offers I I degree programs 

Internet 

The Internet is the fastest growing media used by 

schools to deliver classes. The Career and Education 

Editor of Peterson's says that 92 percent of colleges 

with distance education programs say they plan to use the 

Internet to a greater extent in their programs. City University 

in Bellevue, Washington, offers several electronic distance 

learning programs on the Internet using the university's online instructional center, City University currently offers 

more than 50 programs ranging from associate's to master's 

degrees in a wide variety of fields. 

Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale. Florida, uses several communication technologies to deliver 

classes to their distance education students, but the Internet 

is the core to most of their classes and degree programs. In 

addition to communication among students in chat rooms 

and real-time electronic classroom online forums, students in 

advanced degree programs attend quarterly weekend conferences at the Fort Lauderdale campus. Nova Southeastern 

University's distance education offerings are almost exclusively for master's and doctorate degrees, and they have 

numerous programs in different areas of computer and infol--

mation sciences. 

40 Engineer 

Schools use varying levels of advertising to generate interest in their distance learning programs. Some advertise entensively, have a dedicated staff to assist students. and have 

detailed web sites nacked with infomlatioo. For other schools. 

distance education is not a priority, and the information that is 

may be to find. 

The University of Phoenix has an informative web site 

geared toward assisting militltry members. Currently 40 percent of full-time students in its Center for Distance Education 

are militay personnel. The university offers six undereraduate 

and five graduate degrees. Tuition is $365 per credit for undergraduate classes and $460 for graduate classes. Other schools 

with easy-to-follow weh sites, such as Brigham Young University and the University of North Dakota, offer degrees but 

require students to attend one- to thl-ee-week seminars or labs 

during the summer, Brighalnyoung University offers a broad. 

based, flexible Bachelor of Independent studiesdegree and 

charges 579 per credit hour, walden university of B~~~ 

Raton. Florida. offers master.s and degree 

programs in education, and psychology geired 

toward wol.king professionals and allows students to complete 

programs at their own pace, 

Rnrrineerinrr -.. ... .. .. -nerrrees . -... -

he University of North Dakota is the only school I have 

found that offers undergraduate engineering degrees 

that are fully accredited by the Accreditation Baal-d of 

Engineering and Technology. 

Of particular interest to Army engineer officer? are pro- . -

grams that offer advanced engineering degrees. The University of Alabama's College of Continuing Studies offers 

graduate degrees in seven engineering disciplines. such as 

aerrospace engineering and environmental engineering. During 

the spring term of 1999, the university will offer 41 graduate 

engineering courses. Another university with extensive graduate engineering programs is the University of Idaho, which 

offers 10 Master of Science and Master of Engineering 

degrees and more than 80 courses each semester. Both the 

University of Alahama and the University of Idaho offer thesis 

and nonthesis options to their graduate degrees and require no 

on-campus classes. 

Auburn University offers master's dcgrees in eight engineering lields but requires students to pass on-campus oral 

examinations at the co~npletionof their studies. Auburn also 

offers a program that culminates in a Master of Business 

Administration degree. 

Getting Started 

With all these opportunities available, it may be difficult to decide where and how to get more information. I started with commercial search engines like 

Yahoo and Alta Vista on the Internet. They offer so much 

information that its difficult to search through it. A more helpMai~h1999 
Resources 

University 

Stanford University 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Duke University 

Peterson's Education and Career Center 

National University Degree Consortium 

Western Governors University 

National Technological University 

University of Kentucky 

Old Dominion University 

University of Alabama's College of Continuing 

Studies 

University of Idaho 

Auburn University 

lnternationi sn for Cont inuing Eng 

Education 

Nova Southeastern Ur 

Walden University 

ful site is Peterson's Career and Education Center, which has 

information on available programs hut does no! have links to 

the various universities. 

The International Association for Continuing Engineering 

Education is a nonprofit organization with the objective of 

"supporting and enhancing lifelong technical education and 

training and advanced engineering education worldwide." It 

has dozens of links to universities and related sites in several 

countries. The home pages of the consortiums mentioned 

above offer links to their supporting universities and can usually take you directly to the distance education department. 

The most helpful and comprehensive site that I have 

found is at http://www.disted.com. It contains an enomous 

amount of information from other nontraditional students, 

professional educators, and authors. Almost any topic in the 

distance education sphere is discussed on this site. 

Several books offer suggestions and infomation. CampusFree College Degrees by Marcie Kinser Thorson covers 

many programs in depth and only discusses legitimately 

accredited programs. An overview of John Bear's book 

Bear's Guide to Earning College De~rees Nontraditionall)~ 

can be found at http://www.degree.net. The complete text of 

Steve Levicoff's book Name It and Frame It is at hftp:i7 

training.loyola.edu/cdld/nifi.
 html. 

March 1999 

Web Site 

http://w-scpd.stanford. edu/ 

I http://web.mit.edu/sdm/www 

http://www. fuqua.duke. edu/progmrns/gemba 

hnp://wwpetersons.com 

I http://www.ntu.edu

I

I http://w.uk~edu/DistanceLearning/ http://w.odu.edu/-sbh/ttn 

I 
 http://bama.ua.edu/-disted/ 


I

/ http:/h. uidaho. edu/evol http://www.eng.auburn.edu/deparirnent/eop/ 

soli. hut fi/oi 

These Internet sites show the abundance of information 

available on distance learning. The dimcult part is deciding 

which programs are most applicable to your situation. "The 

Consumers Guide to Choosing College Courses on the 

Internet" (http://www.drake.edu/iaiculconsum~r~uidehtml) 

can help make that decision. It also offers other links and postal 

addresses that may be useful. 

Finding and enrolling in a distance education program may 

seem overwhelming. However, by using resources on the 

Worldwide Web and at military education centers, prospective 

students should find an option that fits their needs. Students 

may also find that distance education is not merely an acceptable alternative for traditional schooling, but the best means 

available anywhere to meet the needs of today's growing population of nontraditional students. Y 

For more information, e-mail CPT Wallace at wallace~woodarmy.mil 

Captain Wallace is a small-group instructor for the Engineer 

Ofjicer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Engineer School. Previous 

assignments include Commnder; B Company, 23rd Engineer 

Battalion, 1st Amred Division; plans ofice& JTF-B DCSENG, 

Honduras; and platoon leader; executive oficer; and batralion 

staff in the 27th Engineer Bartalion, Fori Bragg. North Carolina. 

Engineer 41 
Battle Cornmanti :ziniiri: i'ropram (BCTP) 

Synchronizing the Plan: The Orders 


Crosswalk 


By Lientenailt Colo~zel Rorz Light 

According to FM 101-5, Stnfl Or~anizorioi~ and 

0perrrIio11.v.the chief of stafflexecutive officer (XO) bears 

the responsibility to ensure that war-fighting plans are 

integrated and synchronized. The XO also ensures that the 

staff "integrates and coordinates its activities iirlm~aily, 

~~errically(with higher headquarters and subordinate units). 

and horizontally (with adjacent units)." 

The XO can significantly affect the synchroniration of 

staff plans and orders during the conduct of the militat-y 

decision-making process (MDMP). The orhnr cross~valk is 

a tool to do this. The ~nethodology is simple, and the results 

usually are startling. Units that conduct their own orders 

crosswalks can dramatically improve battlefield synchronization of the engineer effort. In effect, the orders 

crosswalk is a tool to incoporate discipline in the MDMP. 

While preparing an orders crosswalk is relatively 

straightforward, it requires time and an experienced eye. 

Whoever prepares the crosswalk must have both the 

experience to understand the "big picture" and the tenacity 

to ferret out the details of the scheme of engineel- operations. 

Doctrine suggests that the person for this task is the XO. 

Others can be trained to pelform the orders crosswalk; 

howeve]., and it may be preferable if someone not involved 

with the orders preparation conducts the crosswalk. The 

important point is that the crossu,alk is performed. 

Moreover. the earlier the orders crosswalk is performed the 

better. I1 is best to completes the crosswalk before the order is 

published. 

During the orders crosswalk, look for two things. First, 

does your base order mirror the direction, guidance, 

reslrictions, constraints, and lasks presented in your higher 

headquarters' base ordel: especially the commander's intent? 

Second. is you]- operations order synchronized throughout all 

battlefield oper-ating systems (BOS) areas and annexes? As 

you review the orders, list any disconnects you find. 

The firs1 step in conducting the crosswalk is to thoroughly 

read the higher headquarters' order. Starting with the base 

order, highlight or tab anything to do with engineers. Look 

for both implied and specified tasks. You must clearly 

understand what your higher headquarters will do and what it 

wants your unit to do. Next read your unit's base order. It 

should nest with the higher headquarters' intent and scheme 

of maneuver. Afler reviewing the two base orders for nesting 

and consistency, go to the annexes in your order. 

The XO frequently directs a unit to "reduce the size of its 

order," but most orders remain fairly hefty. While a review of 

all annexes is not required, a thoroush crosswalk requires that 

at leas1 the following annexes in both the higher headquarters' order and your order be reviewed: 

1. Stall the review with Annex A, R7sk Or~anijution. 

Note all engineer units and prepare a "mass balance" 

worksheet of them. This is merely an accounting of all 

engineer units. For example, if the 123 Engineer Battalion is 

listed in the task organizalion as "123 En BN (-)," locate the 

detached units. After you have located all allocated assets, 

move on. During this and all succeeding steps. correct 

disconnects as you go. If you wait to perform the orders 

crosswalk after [he 01-der is published, you will have to issue 

a fragmentary order to correct disconnects. 

2. Annex B. Intelligence. Focus on terrain analysis and 

the effects of terrain. What your intelligence officer and the 

higher headquarters' intelligence officer say about terrain 

must complement each other. if not match. Next check to see 

what the enemy capabilities are. especially with respect to 

engineers. Again, the analyses should be similar. You can 

improve the likelihood of this il your S2 volunteel-s to work 

with the G2 staff in developing the division intelligence 

annex and borrows liberally from their work. As before, seek 

to resolve all disconnects. Note what you read in this annex 

and in the others that follow and compare that information 

with information in Annex F, Engineer, later. 

3. Annex D, Fire Sllpl~ori. By now you should begin to 

see how well the staffs have synchronized the orders, both 

within your unit and with your higher headquarters. Key 

things to focus on are the allocation of ADAMlRAAM and, 

more importantly, authority for these and all other scatterable 

mine systems and special-purpose munitions. You should see 

some annotations regarding the use of GATOR mines and 

smoke. 

42 Engineer Murch 1999 
4. Annex E, Rlcles of Engagement. This annex frequently 

is not synchronized with the subordinate unit's order. Key 

disconnects often include the authority and approval process 

for scatterable mines. the use of antipersontiel mines, the 

destruction of key roads and bridges, and restrictions on the 

use of obstacles. Crosswalk this annex with Appendix 4 

(Legal)of Annex I. Service Snpport. 

5. Annex F. E11,qineer.If you have reviewed the annexes 

listed above, you know how well the staff has synchronized 

engineer operations by the time you read Annex F. Key 

areas include the effects of terrain and weather, enemy 

engineer capabilities, scatterable mine authority and use 

(including all scatterable mines!), priority of support and 

effort (this should match with the base order), the controlled 

supply rate and required supply rate (CSRRSR) of key 

munitions, the designation of obstacle zones and effects, and 

the use of host nation assets. The engineer overlay 

(Appendix 1) should have the same graphics as the 

operations overlay. Also, environmental considerations in 

Appendix 2 should be synchronized with Appendix 4 

(b'qol)of Annex I, Service Support. 

6. Annex G, Air Defense. Review this annex for 

appropriate air defense support, especially during layescale breaching or bridging operations. Tf air defense 

artillery (ADA) units are task organized to engineers in 

Annex A, make sure this information is in Annex G. 

7. Annex I. Service Slrppofl. Apart from Annex E, this 

annex usually has the most synchronization problems. Cross 

check the CSRIRSR for critical munitions (for example, 

scatterable mines, MlCLlC rockets, etc.). Note which main 

supply routes (MSRs) are "priority" MSRs. Engineers 

maintain them, but other units (ADA, military police, and 

combat service support) both support and complicate this 

maintenance effort, so a well-synchronized plan is essential. 

If Class IVN (obstacle) supply points are established in 

Annex F, Engineer, make sure the locations match. Next, 

consider the engineer mission and assets needed to 

accomplish it. Is there a plan for Class IVN (obstacle) 

distribution? Do engineers have any priority for 

maintenance'! These and other questions will occur to you if 

the overall mission is clearly understood. Look for answers! 

For example, during a river-crossing operation, you would 

expect to see some priority of maintenance for bridge 

erection boats and assault float bridges. If you don't see any 

priority for that maintenance, now is the time to fix it-not 

after you cross the line of departure. Before leaving Annex 1, 

crosswalk it with Annex N, Rear Operations, and look for 

disconnects regarding the priorities for MSRs. 

8. Annex J, Nuclcur; Biological, and Chemical (NBC). 

A quick review of this annex should indicate if the engineer 

and chemical staffs are talking. Look for integrated smoke 

plans (especially during breaching operations and river 

crossings), locations of decontamination sites (where 

engineers typically are tasked to dig sumps), and so on. We 

must take the lead in synchronizing our plans with the 

chemical staff as we establish the maneuver support 

concept. 

Depending on the operation, you will check the remaining 

annexes by exception. In all cases. review them for tasks 

specified or implied for engineers. Although all tasks for units 

should be listed in the base order, you may be surprised at how 

many appear only in the annexes. Work with the appropriate 

staffs to list all tasks in one place-this is an important step to 

synchronize operations. 

After completing the above review, analyze your notes. You 

probably found some minol- disconnects, and you may have 

found some that could lead to fratricide, wasted effort, or a 

failed mission. Resolve all disconnects. 

This completes the orders crosswalk process. It always 

takes effort ...but it is always worth the effort. 

Li~utefiunr Colr~~zcl Light is an obser~~er/conrrolIcr for tlze 

Battle Contnwnd Truining Progrurn at Fort Leav~n~~orth. 

Kansu.~.He IIIPI'~OIIS~~ served as the S3 and XO uf the 168th 

Engirzeer Bnlrolion, 3rd Brigade, 2d Ir?fanrr)~ Division. Fort 

Leuis, Wasl~in~ton. A 

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER 

Yational Tr:.;i,irl;: '..'ir!a?cr(NTC) 

48-Hour Volcano Mines on the NTC Rattlefield 

By Licffterrunr Colonel Davcd Harrcen and Major Fred Erst 

Current Army doctrine does not provide the Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) commander authority to execute 

scatterable munitions. This authority is retained at corps and 

division levels but may be delegated. Both levels usually 

delegate responsibility for conventional minefield emplacement to the BCT. When this aspect is combined with the 

world's current attitude against the use of conventional 

"dumb" mines (those without self-destructing capability), it is 

clear that the expanding use of special purpose "smart" 

munitions and scatterahle mines with self-destlucting or 

command-detonating capability will change the way 

engineers shape the battlefield. 

Units training at NTC previously used 4-hour scatterahle 

mines such as Volcano, MOPMs, and ADAMRAAM with 

approval authority from the division and corps. The focus of 

that training was to develop tactics, techniques and procedures 

(TTPs)for employing 4-hour scanerable mines as situational 

obstacles. In 1998, NTC began training brigades to employ 

48-hour Volcano minefields. Since then, brigades have begun 

to improve the integration of this lethal weapons system into 

the BCT military decision-making process (MDMP). Now it 
is essential that engineers drive the development of ?TPs to 

expand the use of 48-hour Volcano and other scatterable 

assets at the brigade level. 

Using 48-Hour Scatterable Mines to Support 

the Brigade Fight 

Recent rotations have shown that brigades have difficulty 

employing 48-hour Volcano minefields as tactical obstacles 

on the NTC battlefield. Unfortunately. this problem is 

compounded by decreased productivity in the conventional 

obstacle effort. While Force XXI is driving changes in Army 

doctrine and organizations, war fighters must transition their 

countermobility efforts from reliance on conventional 

minefields to significant use of special purpose munitions 

and scatterable mines to shape the brigade fight. Engineers 

are expected to be dynamic and lethal. Their ability to plan, 

prepare, and execute 48-hour scatterable mines and special 

purpose munitions is essential in supporting the BCT. To 

effectively plan and execute those mines and munitions, 

engineer and maneuver units must train together to optimize 

their capabilities and minimize their limitations. 

To better develop the use of 48-hour scatterahle mines 

and special purpose munitions, engineers need to focus their 

efforts in the following areas: 

W Command and control (C2) and emplacement authority. 

48-hour Volcano minefield procedures. 

Scatterable minefield integration in brigade planning, preparation, and execution. 

C? and limplacrmrnt -\utl~ority 

FM 20-32, Mine/Counrermine Ol>cration,s, states that the 

corps commander bas emplacement authority for all 

scatterable minefields within his area of operations. Current 

doctrine also states that for ground- and artillery-delivered 

scatterable mines with a self-destruct time of 48 hours or 

less. the corps commander may "...delegate emplacement 

authority to division level, who may further delegate to 

brigade level, who may then further delegate to task force 

level." There is a perception within the force, however, that 

the corps commander will retain rather than delegate 

emplacement authority for scatterable mines with a selfdestruct time greater than 4 hours. As a result, while 

divisions may use 48-hour scatterable minefields during 

command post exercises and computer simulations, most 

brigades typically execute only 4-hour scatterable mineficlds 

during field training exercises at home station. 

As engineers become more reliant on scanerable mine 

systems to achieve intended obstacle effects on the Force 

XXI battlefield. scatterable mine C2 and emolacement 

authority must change. While theater and corps comnmders 

should maintain overall obstacle emplacement authority, 

division and brigade commanders need the flexib~lity and 

lethality that 48-hour scatterable mines provide. A 

reconiniended solution is to provide 48-hour scatterable 

44 Engineer 

mine C2 and employment authority to the division 

commander and provide 4-hour scatterable mine employment 

authority to the brigade commander, based on the theater and 

corps commanders' obstacle plans. These changes allow 

maneuver commanders to more rapidly use their scanerable 

mine capabilities and engineers to maximize their obstacle 

effort. 

48-Hour \'olrano Rlinefield Procrdurt,~ 

At NTC, the operations order (OPORD) for the 52nd 

Infantry Division (Mechanized) states that the division 

retains emplacement authority for all 4-hour scatterable riline 

systems and corps retains authority for all others. It also 

states that the BCT may request authorization to emplace 48- 

hour Volcano minefields by exception. Thc technique NTC 

uses to train brigades to synchronize the execution of 48-hour 

Volcano minefields with the corps and division fight is 

simple. In addition to obstacle-control graphics, the division 

OPORD also specifies a no-later-than (NLT) execution datetirne-group (DTG) for the maneuver hrigade to emplace all 

48-hour scatterable minefields. This method ensures that the 

brigade's 48-hour scatterable minefields do not interfere with 

future corps and division operations. It also drives obstacle 

siting and integration as an issue for BCT and task force 

commanders early in defensive preparations. 

During force-on-force operations at NTC, brigades are 

authorized one Volcano load (160 canisters) per ground or air 

Volcano system per mission. During the live-fire defense, the 

allocation is doubled to two loads per Volcano system up to a 

maximum of eight loads. This allocation provides the brigade 

the opportunity to employ several air and ground Volcano 

loads in the 48-hour mode. However, the brigade must 

comply with the following approval procedures and doctrinal 

requirements before executing any 48-hour Volcano 

minefield: 

W Submit a request and receive approval for planning all scatterable minefields through the G3, 52nd ID, to the assistant 

division engineer (ADE). 

W Emplace 48-hour Volcano minefields before the NLT execution DTG. 

Complete a four-sided fratricide fence before cnecuting any 

48-hour Volcano minefield that is emplaced behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT), according to FM 20-32. 

This typically is either a single-coil conccrtinv or two-slrand 

cattle fence. Units have the option to fence the obstacle 

group or fence each 48-hour Volcano minefield separately. 

I 	After receiving approval to plan and complete the frabicide 

fence, the brigade may execute 48-hour Volcano ninefields 

subject to final division notification and the scatterable mine 

warning (SCATMINWARN) procedure. 

Sfattel.nblc Minefield Intcbgratinn in Rrieade Plarrning, 

and Execution 

During defensive operations, brigade personnel have 

difficulty synchronizing the execution of 48-hour Volcano 

March 1999 
- - 

minefields. This is because they do not adequately 

understand the amount of manpower. materiel. and time 

needed to site and build the fratricide fence and emplace the 

48-hour Volcano minefields before the NLT execution DTG. 

Inadequate detailed reverse planning. ineffective time 

management. and the late arrival of Class IVN materials 

needed for fratricide fence construction usually cause most 

brigades to execute only a fraction of the 48-hour Volcano 

minefields possible. This shortfall often is compounded by 

the brigades struggle to conduct task force Class IVIV point 

operations? Class lVlV haul, and manpower management. 

which typically consume many hours of obstacle production 

time. Late in the rotation, during the live-fire defense in 

sector. the BCT finally will commit enough additional 

manpower to enlplace fratricide fences for the 48-hour 

Volcano minefields. Ironically, on the few occasions when 

engineer companies receive manpower augmentation from 

the task forces (usually infantry or tank loaders), the 

augmentees do not come with the companyitsam small-unit 

leadership needed for effective supervision. Then the 

engineer company leadership has the additional responsibility to manage the attached manpower as well as 

provide life support, security, and transportation. This added 

responsibility often hampers 48-hour Volcano execution 

before the NLT DTG. because the required amount of 

fratricide fencing is not constructed. 

Planning and Preparation. Improvements to the 

MDMP must begin at the brigade mission analysis briefing. 

The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) should identify 

potential targeted areas of interest as part of his terrain 

analysis and discuss obstacle requirements versus shortfalls 

as pan of the friendly capabilities portion of his en; weer 

hattlefield assessment brief. At the mission analysis brief, 

the ABE should provide the brigade commander a written 

"Commander's Card that describes friendly engineer 

capabilities and requirements. During the commander's 

guidance. the ABE must ask the brigade commander to 

discuss his intent for employing scatterable mines and 

special purpose munitions. The brigade commander should 

discuss intended obstacle effects on enemy maneuver, the 

allocation of scatterable mineslspecial purpose munitions to 

support hoth the brigade's deep fight and the close fight. and 

the priority of emplacement of scatterable mines for 4-hour 

and 48-hour duration. 

To improve integration with the BCT scheme of 

maneuver, the ABE must ensure that planning for 

scatterahle mines is an integral part of developing the 

brigade's course of action. During the war-gaming step of 

the MDMP, targets for scatterable mines are integrated with 

direct and indirect fires throughout the depth and width of 

the battlefield for each enemy and friendly course of action. 

Engineer can use a sketch to assist the commander in 

effectively visualizing the scheme of obstacles and the 

location of observers, triggers, named areas of interest, 

targeted areas of interest, emplacement assets, and units 

covering the obstacle with direct or indirect fires. The ABE 

March 1999 

must develop arid brief a detailed brigade countermobility 

time line that includes the brigade commander's critical 

information requests (CCIR). which serve to synchronize 48- 

hour Volcano execution. 

Finally. engineers must improve task force ownership of 

brigade-directed 48-hour scatterahle minefields by stating 

specified tasks for subordinate maneuver units in the main 

body of the brigade OPORD and in the Engineer Annex. 

Specified tasks include execution and overwatch responsibilities and manpower and Class IVlV requirements. 

Execution. To improve scatterable mine execution, task 

forces may refine the brigade plan. They may submit requests 

for additional scatterahle minefields through the brigade to the 

division. During engagement area development. obstacle 

integration for both conventional and scatterahle minefields 

begins during ohctacle siting. However. obstacle siting of 48- 

hour Volcano minefields by engineers. the maneuver company 

team, and the fire support officer musi he the commander's 

priority due to their NLT execution times. The company team 

and engineer platoon must work together to position each 

scatterable minefield in the obstacle group osing the direct fire 

plan and the initial obstacle group design. Based on the 

terrain. the company team commander and the engineer 

platoon leader should adjust obstacle locations to ensure that 

the obstacle group is covered by direct tires and the ohstacle 

design is consistent with the task force commander's intent. 

The obstacle siting procedure described in FM 90-7. 

Combined Arn1.~ Oh~ta~le Ifirrgration, serves as an effective 

guide. 

Similarly. "ownership" of an obstacle group by the 

company team begins with ohstacle siting and continues 

through obstacle turnover. While an obstacle group is 

emplaced by the engineer platoon, the actual "owner" is the 

company team o\'erwatching the obstacles. The company 

team should provide security and manpower for fratricide 

fence construction and reload or mine-dump operations. This 

technique allows the engineer platoon to focus on its primary 

mission of emplacing minefields. It also allows the company 

team to account for, equip, transport. and supen~ise its 

personnel. It enables the company team to better prepare for 

obstacle turnover and lane closure during the battle and to 

recover fratricide fencing after the fight. when the scatterahle 

mines self-destruct. Ownership ensures that the company team 

remains involved in obstacle construction and results in better 

integration of the direct and indirect fires needed to achieve 

the intended obstacle effect on enemy maneuver. 

Specific actions for the successful integration of 48-hour 

Volcano minefields follow. 

C,ll I c,erPI'o,,ideeCXlli c,ol,Ce 

H Allocate and prioritize resources for conventional and scatterable mines and special purpose munitions. 

H Shape the brigade fight and the task-force fight. 

Determine employment requirements for 4.hour and 48.hour 

scatterable mines. 

Engineer45 
W Specify 48-hour scatterable niinefields as brigade-directed 

obstacles or allocate them to an obstacle belt to achieve a 

specific effect. 

W Discuss the effects that scatterable mines have on the brigade's repositioning and counterattack plans. 

W Array maneuver companies and tenative obstacle groups 

against enemy battalion-sired mobility corridors. 

W Establish priorities for countermobility efforts 

W Allocate resources for-

- Firepower (direct and indirect). 

-Manpower (engineers and dismounts for fratricide fence). 

-Materiel (Class IVN, scatterable ~ninesispecialpurpose 

munitions. Volcano). 

-Time. 

Krigarle slr~ffc~.vtubli.~kr~ o~vnerrlril~nf oh,stocle,s in the 

OPVRD 

W Establish ownership of obstacles in the subunit instructions 

of the OPORD. Specify the brigade or task force responsible for obstacle emplacement and overwatch for obstacle 

belts, brigade-directed obstacles, and situational obstacles. 

W Direct task forces to submit thcir obstacle plans so the brigade can prepare and disseminate a consolidated obstacle 

overlay. 

W Direct task force manpower support for fratricide fence 

constructio~l. 

W Establish task force responsibilities for obstacle turnover, 

security, and lane closure. 

W Specify task force rcsponsibilitien for ohctacle recovery 

and battlefield restoration. 

Submit the task force obstacle plan to the brigade NLT 

DTG. Include the obstacle group overlay, the obstacle enecution matrix, and counter~nobilitylsurvivabilitytime lines. 

W Track the status of Class IVN materiel, the palletized load 

system (PLS) racks, material handling of equipment. haul 

assets, and lnanpower support. 

W Establish 48-hour Volcano NLT emplacement times forApproval for planning, execution, and SCATMlNWARh's. 

-Equipment and material on hand (Volcano, Volcano 

loads, and fratricide fencing). 

-Obstacle siting completion. 

-Fratricide fence completion. 

-Volcano minefield execution. 

Future Requirements. The current Volcano system 

provides the engineer force only 4-hour. 48-hour, and 15-day 

self-destruct times. These self-destruct times often limit the 

engineers' ahility to achieve the maneuver commander's 

intent. On the fluid battlefield of the 2lst century, the need for 

intermediate self-destruct times would significantly enhance 

the effectiveness of scatterable mines in suppoll of the BCT 

fight. Current battle rhythm and our iinploved ability to 

solidify operational plans at the brigade and task force levels 

support the creation of 12- and 24-hour self-destmct options. 

Scatterable mines and special-purpose munitions should be 

developed with 12-and 24-hour dul.ations and an immediate 

self-destruct capability to provide that flexibility to the 

brigade. Engineer trainers at NTC also recommend that 

authorization for the employnient of 12-hour scatterable 

mines and special purpose munitions reside with the BCT 

commander. 

Conclusion 

To successfully shape the Force XXI battlefield, engineers 

must drive the transition from conventional minefields to the 

employment of 48-hour scatterable minelields and special 

purpose munitions at the brigade level. When integrated with 

dil-ect and indirect RI-es,scatterable mines and special purpose 

munitions provide the BCT the lethality and time needed to 

acquire and destroy enemy targets. As Force XXI engineer 

battalions are reduced in size, these mines and munitions 

provide the rapid emplacement capability needed to accelerate 

obstacle production. The self-destruction capabilities of 

scatte~ablemines and special purpose munitions reduce the 

long-term impacts of these minefields. 

At NTC, the Sidewinder Team remains committed to 

maintaining conventional minefield skills and developing 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning, preparing, 

and executing scatterable mines. Through these efforts we 

will improve the hrigade combat team's ability to conduct 

successful combat operations. 

Lieutenanr Colonel Hnrisen is the .senior erigincer frr~inerar 

rhe Nation01 Trainb7,y Cenles fi~rtI~win.Calrfnrnia. Hc 

previously served as conimruzdo-of rhe 20111En~ineerBaftrrlion. 

1st Cavnlr), Di!d.~ioti,Fort Hood, Texcr.r. 

Mojor Er.sr is fie assistoni brigade err~ineer!miner at rhe 

N~rtionalhirring Cenrer: Forr Irwin. Culifnrnin. HPpreviou,sl~~ 

senzed os o conzp~r:?coninzarirler of the 10th Enyineer.Batrulion, 

3rd Infont? Division, Fort Sfewart. Georgia. 

46 Engineer March 1999 
ENGINEER UPDATE 


Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and DefenseSystem 


Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless othewise noted. 


ENFORCE XXI-99.The theme for this year's conference is "Joint 

Engineers: America's Total Engineer Force for the Next Millennium." 

Scheduled for the week of 26 April through 1 May, the conference 

will include numerous breakout sessions, tactical demonstrations, 

and dynamic displays. Registration information will be mailed in 

March. POC is CPT Elita Perusek. -7015. 

Directorate of Combat Developments Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Cyclic Review. 

(DCD) 	 The following TOE will undergo cyclic review for the Consolidation 

TOE Update (CTU). Request appropriate units review theirTOE and 

submit comments regarding their concerns by the dates shown. 

Comments not in line with the mission of the review (minimum 

mission-essential wartime requirements) will not be considered. 

October 1999 CTU 

TOE No. Consolidated Unit 

05413LOOO Engineer Company, Construction Support 

05423LOOO Engineer Company, Combat Support 

Equipment 

05424LOOO Engineer Company, Dump Truck 

05434LOOO Engineer Company, Pipeline Construction 

05473LOOO Multirole Bridge Company 

Comments due by 15 July 1999. 

April 2000 CTU 

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, Engineer Battalion 

Quarry Team 

Headquarters Well-Drilling Team 

Well-Drilling Team 

Engineer Heavy Diving Team 

Engineer Light Diving Team 

Real Estate Team 

Utilities (4000) Team 

Topographic PlanninglControl Team 

Terrain Analysis Team (Heavy) 

Command and Control Team (DS) (Heavy) 

Terrain AnalysisTeam (Light Infantry 

Division) 

Comments due by 15 December 1999. 

To obtain a copy of a TOE undergoing review, send an e-mail 

request to Tom Knotts (knottst@wood.army.mil) or Garry Hamlet 

(hamletg@wood.army.mil).POC isTom Knotts, -6139. 
M917A1 DurnpTruck. Fieldingfor the M917A1 dump truck began in 

April 1998 with Reserve Component units leading the way. The 

M917A1 is a nondevelopmental item for U.S. Army, Army Reserve, and 

National Guard units. The commercially designed 6x6 truck has a 

conventional cab, diesel engine, automatic transmission, two-speed 

transfer assembly, and antilock brakes. With a curb weight of 29,454 

pounds (Ib) and a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 68,000 lb, the 

truck operates on both JP-8 and standard Army diesel fuel. The 

M917A1 shares the same basic chassis as the type-classified M916A1 M917A1 DumpTruck

truck tractor. However, component upgrades to the transmission, 

transfer, and suspension systems accommodate production changes 

and an engine change to comply with current U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency regulations. Added subsystems include a cab airconditioner and central tire-inflation system.The heavy-duty steel body 

holds 14 cubic yards of material and has an 18.5-ton rating. Its doubleaction hoist system can be powered up and down from inside the cab. 

Other key features areAir-transportableon C-17 and C-5aircraft. 

20-inch fording capability. 

300-mile range at 40 mph at GVWR. 

Air-actuated tailgate. 

Material control system (on selected vehicles). 

Chemical-agent-resistantcoating painted in a camouflage pattern 

POC is CW4 Bobby Russell, - 4074. 

Accession Board for MOS 215D, Terrain Analysis Technician. Engineer Personnel Proponency 

Eligible applicants are needed for an accession board scheduled to Office (EPPO) 

convene in July 1999 to access two vacancies. To date, no applicants 

meet the minimum requirements for this board. EPPO's home page 

was updated in December 1998 to reflect the need for eligible noncommissioned officers (NCOs) (grade E-5 or above) to apply for this 

MOS. Minimum requirementsfollow: 

General Technical (GT) score of 110 or higher. 

Sergeant (P) or higher. 

81T MOS (previously 81Q). 

4 years of experience in 81Q MOS 

1 year of experienceat division level 

1 year of supervisory experience. 

Successfully completed the Basic Terrainrropographic Analysis 

Course. 

Successfully completed the Advanced Terrainrropographic Analysis 

Course. 

m Current background investigation (within 5 years) required if 

appointed. 

The Recruiting Command at Fort Knox has sent a letter to eligible 

81T NCOs encouragingthem to consider a career as aTerrain Analysis 

Technician. POC is CW4 FredTressler, -4088. 
@- Lead the Way 

I_ 

By CommandSergeant Major Robert M. Dils 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

One Corps, One Regiment, One Team 

Over the last year and one-half, I have had the 

pleasure and the honor of serving as your proponent 

command sergeant major (CSM). During this time, CSM 

Ed Lugo, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and I have built a 

solid team with our organizations. CSM Lugo has been a 

valuable advisor and supporter, and together we have 

initiated many new programs and ideas.We have traveled 

together many times to visit units and meet with soldiers 

and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). We have 

demonstrated to our regiment that we are one team and 

have worked hard to improve the Engineer Regiment's 

relationship with Active and Reserve Component units 

and soldiers. CSM Lugo represents us well as an 

engineer soldier and Major Army Command (MACOM) 

command sergeant major. He is dedicated to making our 

regiment more effective and to improvingthe quality of life 

of our soldiers, civilians, and families. I appreciate our 

teamwork and look forward to a great year as we resolve 

the many challenges before us. 

ENFORCE XXI - 99 

The 1999 ENFORCE Conference is just around the 

corner-it is scheduled for 25 April-1 May. All of us at the 

U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood are 

working hard to make it the best ENFORCE Conference 

ever. The soldiers of the 1st Engineer Brigade are busy 

practicing and rehearsing their tattoo, which will be 

superb. Command sergeants major who come to the 

conference will be housed in the new Maneuver Support 

Center Noncommissioned Officers Academy billets. 

These billets are state-of-the art and very impressive. 

Packets for the conference will be mailed in March. For 

more information and the proposed CSM conference 

itinerary, visit the ECCSM's home page (http:/I 

www.wood.army.mil). Send us your key issues now, and 

we will present responses at the conference. Your 

feedback can help us improve the force structure, 

equipment, doctrine, and training that we provide for 

engineer soldiers. 

Recruitment 

The Army and the Englneer negiment need your help. 

The effort to recruit soldiers for our Army is currently 

experiencing some rough times. The economy is do~ng 

very well, the United States has close to full employment, 

recruiting standards are at an all-time high, and many 

citizens perceive that America currently has no enemiesthe reasons go on and on. U.S. Army recruiters are doing 

all they can to enlist high-quality,fully qualified soldiers into 

the Active and Reserve Components. Last year's delayed 

entry program account is almost zeroed out, and citizens 

who want to enlist and ship to training immediately are not 

signing up. As a result, Army training seats are not being 

filled and Army units are feeling personnelshortages.These 

shortages will continue to grow if we do not help. It is our 

responsibility, because it is our Army and our units that will 

be hurt. Here are some things you can do: 

Encourage high-qualityyoung Americans you know to 

consider military service in a component of the U.S. 

Army.The benefits and cash and educational bonuses 

offeredto enlistees have never been higher. 

Visit your local Army Recruiting Office. Offer encouragement and tell the recruiters how valuable they are. 

Offer your support and your unit's support. 

Call or visit your local U. S. Army Recruiting Company 

or Battalion Headquarters and offer your support and 

your unit's support. 

Support the local high school's Junior Reserve Officer 

Training Corps (JROTC) program. Visit them and help 

all you can. 

Encourageyour best NCOs to serve a tour as an Army 

recruiter. Recruiters work hard, but the work is very 

rewarding.The service recruiters provide to our Army 

cannot be overemphasized. 

Thank you for helping with this very important issue. 

We are one team. 

NCOES Standards 

Recently we have seen an increase in the number of 

unqualified NCOs who arrive at the Sergeant George D. 

Libby NCO Academy for Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System (NCOES) courses and the Drill 

Sergeant School. Some are overweight, cannot pass the 

Army Physical FitnessTest, and have "temporary" profiles. 

Out of 380 soldiers who came in January to attend the 

Primary Leadership Development Course, Basic and 

Advanced NCO Courses, and Drill Sergeant School 

classes, we had to send 50 home. This action results in 

wasted funds, demoralized NCOs, and vacant school 

seats that could have been used by fully qualified soldiers. 

Properly prepare your NCOs for school and check their 

qualifications thoroughly. We appreciate your support for 

this critical issue. 

Great News on the Wolverine 

Production of several MIA2 chassis for the Wolverine is 

ongoing in Lima, Ohio. In addition, bridges for these 

Wolverines are enroute to the factory.This critical engineer 

combat system is a great success story. The Wolverine's 

success is due to the hard work of Engineer School staff, 

numerous Army staff organizations, industry, and field 

units.Thanks to you all for a job well done. 
MY VALUES 


Selfless Service 


"Whatyou have chosen to do foryour country by devoting your 1tfe to the srroice 

of your country is the greatest contribution any man could make." 

President John F. Kennedy - 1961 

Operation Snowbound 

During the winter of 1949. the upper Plains states were hit by a blizzard of historic 

proportions. Snow ranged in depth from 30 to 70 inches and, driven by high winds, drifted 

to depths of 20 to 30 feet. The hard-hit area encompassed more than 190,000 square miles. 

More than 1,000,000 people and 10,000,000 head of livestock were threatened. The 

Missouri Division of the Corps of Engineers led the F i Amy's "Disaster Force 

Snowbound.' In conjunction with state and federal agencies, other services, and the 

National Guard, the engineers sought to dear major transportation routes, rescue trapped 

motorists, bring emergency supplies to isolated homes, and deliver forage for starving 

livestock. BattUng high winds and temperatures of 35 degrees below zero, equipment 

operators and other staff worked 15- and 24hour shifts. More than 2.200 billldozers were 

used to clear 115,048 miles of road. Property and countless lives were saved from 

destruction by the deadly, frigid assault by nature. 

PIN: 07706WOO