PRESENT: All the Justices 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 070720 JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 April 18, 2008 

VICKIE H. BARKER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

The Comptroller of the Commonwealth of Virginia 

(“Comptroller”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court 

of Pittsylvania County that made an award to Vickie H. Barker 

under Code § 9.1-402(A) as well as health insurance premiums 

and benefits pursuant to Code § 9.1-401. The Comptroller 

contends that the circuit court erred in making any award under 

Code § 9.1-402, and consequently, in making an award under Code 

§ 9.1-401. In the alternative, the Comptroller argues if any 

amount is payable under Code § 9.1-402, an award can only be 

made pursuant to former Code § 9.1-402(B).1 For the reasons set 

forth below, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

 1

 Code § 9.1-402 was revised in 2006 redesignating the 

subsections and adding additional language to the statute, 

although the operative language at issue here was not revised 

by those amendments. The 2006 amendment inserted a new 

subsection B and redesignated former subsection B as subsection 

C. See 2006 Acts ch. 878. We will reference the statutory 

provisions as they existed before the 2006 amendment, as those 

were the operative provisions at the time this case was filed. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

This case arises under the Virginia Line of Duty Act, Code 

§ 9.1-400 et seq. (the “Act”). Barker is the surviving spouse 

of Terry Lee Barker, Sr. (“Decedent”), who died on December 8, 

2004 from a cardiac arrest while driving his police vehicle in 

the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff with the 

Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Department. Before the Decedent 

began his employment with the Sheriff’s Department, he 

submitted to a pre-employment physical examination which 

“listed a diagnostic data etiologic reference to diabetes and 

hypertension,” but “there was no finding of heart disease.” 

The death certificate listed Decedent’s cause of death as 

atherosclerotic heart disease. 

Barker filed a claim for death and health insurance 

benefits with the Comptroller pursuant to the Act. The 

Comptroller denied Barker’s claim, stating that Decedent’s 

“pre-employment physical revealed that he suffered from 

hypertension prior to being hired by the Pittsylvania County 

Sheriff’s Office. Therefore, the presumption clauses [of Code 

§ 65.2-402] do not apply and I must deny your request for line 

of duty benefits.” Barker then filed a complaint in the 

circuit court pursuant to Code § 9.1-405 for review of the 

Comptroller’s decision. In her complaint, Barker contended she 

was entitled to line of duty benefits under the Act by virtue 

2
of the presumption in Code § 65.2-402. The Comptroller 

responded, and the circuit court elected to decide the case 

based on the pleadings after the parties agreed the facts were 

not in dispute. 

By letter opinion, the circuit court adopted Barker’s 

proposed findings of fact which included a summary of 

Decedent’s medical history, a summary of the de bene esse

deposition of Richard A. Schwartz, M.D., who was qualified as 

an expert in the area of medicine and cardiology, medical 

records from Decedent’s pre-employment physical examination, 

and medical and investigation reports relating to Decedent’s 

death. A specific finding of fact was that the Decedent “died 

on the job from a cardiac arrest, and the Report of 

Investigation by [the] Medical Examiner listed his cause of 

death as atherosclerotic heart disease.” 

Investigator Lonnie F. Craft from the Department of State 

Police completed the investigation report for Barker’s claim 

pursuant to Code § 9.1-403. Craft’s report indicated that on 

December 8, 2004, Decedent was “repositioning a surveillance 

camera at an area where deer carcasses were being dumped.” 

This task involved jumping across a four-foot ditch while 

carrying a fifty-pound battery. After completing this 

assignment, Decedent was driving his police car, with another 

officer as a passenger, when he “suffered a heart attack” and 

3
died later that day. According to the investigation report, 

“[t]he facts determined during this investigation indicate that 

this death was line of duty related.” Dr. Schwartz testified 

that the cause of Decedent’s death was “coronary artery 

disease” commonly known as a “heart attack,” and that 

Decedent’s pre-employment physical examination revealed “no 

pathologic evidence of hypertensive cardiac disease.” 

The circuit court’s letter opinion stated the court had 

considered the evidence, the findings of fact and memoranda of 

the parties, and determined that “the Comptroller has 

misinterpreted the plain language of [Code § 65.2-402].” 

Assuming, but not determining, that [Decedent] was 

found to be suffering from hypertension at the time 

of his physical, Barker is still entitled to the 

presumption. At the time of his physical he was free 

from respiratory diseases, cancer and heart disease. 

He did not die of hypertension. He died of 

atherosclerotic heart disease. Since [Decedent] died 

from [h]eart disease, not hypertension, Barker is 

entitled to the presumption afforded by [Code § 65.2-

402(B)]. 

The circuit court concluded by stating that “Barker is entitled 

to the benefits resulting from the death of [the Decedent] 

while in the line of duty.” The circuit court then entered a 

final order on January 11, 2007, which incorporated the letter 

opinion and gave judgment in favor of Barker for $75,000 under 

Code § 9.1-402(A). The judgment also directed the Comptroller 

to reimburse Barker for “all of her paid health insurance 

4
premiums since the death of her husband” and “to secure and 

provide health insurance benefits available to . . . a spouse 

of a deceased employee covered by the Line of Duty Benefits 

Plan of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” We awarded the 

Comptroller this appeal. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation 

and is subject to de novo review by this Court. Wright v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 77, 80-81, 655 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2008). 

When interpreting statutes, courts “ascertain and 

give effect to the intention of the legislature.” 

That intent is usually self-evident from the words 

used in the statute. Consequently, courts apply the 

plain language of a statute unless the terms are 

ambiguous, or applying the plain language would lead 

to an absurd result. 

Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 

(2006) (citations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, the Comptroller makes four assignments of 

error. First, the Comptroller contends that the circuit court 

erred when it awarded $75,000 to Barker pursuant to Code § 9.1-

402(A). Second, the Comptroller argues the circuit court erred 

by granting Barker “the presumption offered by Code § 65.2-402 

. . . because [Decedent] was diagnosed with hypertension at his 

pre[-]employment physical examination.” Additionally, the 

Comptroller contends the circuit court “erred in failing to 

5
afford the proper weight to the interpretation of [Code] 

§§ 65.2-402 and 9.1-402(A) and (B).” Finally, the Comptroller 

posits that the circuit court erred by awarding Barker health 

insurance benefits under Code § 9.1-401. 

We first address the Comptroller’s assignment of error 

regarding the circuit court’s “fail[ure] to afford the proper 

weight to the interpretation of [§§] 65.2-402 and 9.1-402(A) 

and (B) by the . . . Comptroller.” Although “the practical 

construction given to a statute by public officials charged 

with its enforcement is entitled to great weight by the courts 

and in doubtful cases will be regarded as decisive,” Southern 

Spring Bed Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 205 Va. 272, 275, 136 

S.E.2d 900, 902 (1964), “when an issue involves a pure question 

of statutory interpretation, that issue does not invoke the 

agency’s specialized competence but is a question of law to be 

decided by the courts.” Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. 

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 442, 621 S.E.2d 78, 88 (2005). The 

circuit court’s review of the Comptroller’s decision solely 

involved matters of statutory interpretation and did not rely 

on the Comptroller’s “specialized competence.” Id. Thus, the 

circuit court was not required to give any weight to the 

Comptroller’s interpretation of the statute, and the assignment 

of error on this issue is without merit. 

6
A. Application of Code § 9.1-402(A) 

 The Comptroller contends that Barker was not entitled to 

receive an award under Code § 9.1-402(A), and the circuit 

court’s judgment making that award is reversible error. The 

Comptroller argues that the evidence failed to establish a 

direct or proximate causal connection between Decedent’s death 

and any employment-related work performed by Decedent which 

caused his death. In the absence of that evidence, the 

Comptroller contends Barker failed to prove a claim under Code 

§ 9.1-402(A) as a matter of law because Decedent’s “death 

merely occurred while he was working, but was not the immediate 

result of the work he was performing.” 

Barker responds that “[t]he evidence establishes and the 

[t]rial [c]ourt found that [Decedent’s] death was the direct 

and proximate result of the performance of his duty.” Barker 

insists that the presumption of Code § 65.2-402(B) applies to 

the court’s analysis of benefits payable under Code § 9.1-

402(A), and that Barker was therefore entitled to receive the 

$75,000 award.2 We agree with the Comptroller and hold that the 

circuit court erred in making an award to Barker pursuant to 

Code § 9.1-402(A). 

 2

 The 2006 amendment to Code § 9.01-402 inserted a new 

subsection (B), which entitles a claimant to receive an award 

of $100,000 if the deceased’s “death occurred on or after 

January 1, 2006.” 

7
Code § 9.1-402(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he 

beneficiary of a deceased person whose death occurred . . . 

while in the line of duty as the direct or proximate result of 

the performance of his duty shall be entitled to receive the 

sum of $75,000.” Code § 65.2-402(B) provides, in pertinent 

part, 

Hypertension or heart disease causing the death of 

. . . sheriffs and deputy sheriffs . . . shall be 

presumed to be occupational diseases, suffered in the 

line of duty, that are covered by this title unless 

such presumption is overcome by a preponderance of 

competent evidence to the contrary. 

Subsection (D) of that statute provides, in pertinent part: 

The presumptions described in subsection . . . B 

. . . of this section shall only apply if persons 

entitled to invoke them have, if requested[,] . . . 

undergone preemployment physical examinations that 

. . . found such persons free of respiratory 

diseases, hypertension, cancer or heart disease at 

the time of such examinations. 

 The circuit court made the Code § 9.01-402(A) award based 

on its conclusion that the Comptroller “misinterpreted the 

plain language of § 65.2-402.” The circuit court did not, 

however, explain its rationale for determining why or how the 

court applied the presumption of Code § 65.2-402 to effect an 

award of benefits to Barker under Code § 9.1-402(A). 

Code § 9.1-402(A) permits an award only when a qualifying 

deceased person died “while in the line of duty as the direct 

or proximate result of the performance of his duty.” The plain 

8
language of the statute thus requires proof of two distinct 

conditions precedent for a Code § 9.1-402(A) award: the death 

must have occurred (1) “while in the line of duty” and (2) “as 

the direct or proximate result of the performance of his duty.” 

Evidence presented by Barker confirmed that the Decedent died 

in the “line of duty,” and the Comptroller concedes that is 

correct. Thus, we need consider only whether the second 

condition precedent was met. 

To make a Code § 9.1-402(A) claim, the claimant must 

adduce proof of “the direct or proximate result of the 

performance” of duty as the cause of death, and the presumption 

under Code § 65.2-402 is of no aid in that regard. There is 

simply no nexus between the presumption of a statutory medical 

condition under Code § 65.2-402 as a cause of death and whether 

the death was “the direct or proximate result of the 

performance” of a duty. Even if the presumption applies, it 

would only prove that the Decedent died from one of the 

statutory medical conditions while in the line of duty. That 

presumed fact proves nothing in relation to the required Code 

§ 9.1-402(A) condition precedent of death “as the direct or 

proximate result of the performance” of the deceased person’s 

law enforcement duty. Thus, to the extent the circuit court 

made the Code § 9.1-402(A) award based on the presumption under 

Code § 65.2-402, it was erroneous. Accordingly, Barker cannot 

9
benefit from the presumption afforded by Code § 65.2-402 in her 

claim under Code § 9.1-402(A). 

Barker contends, in the alternative, that the Code § 9.1-

402(A) award by the circuit court was not erroneous because the 

circuit court “found as a matter of fact that [Decedent] died 

from cardiac arrest while in the line of duty” and “[t]he 

immediate temporal proximity between [Decedent’s] labor while 

in the performance of his duty and his heart attack[,] is 

sufficient evidence of the causal connection between 

[Decedent’s] death and the performance of his duty.” Barker’s 

contention fails, however, because the circuit court did not 

hold the Decedent’s death was “the direct or proximate result 

of the performance of his duty,” and the evidence in this 

record would not have supported such a determination. 

Proximate cause “is that act or omission which, in natural 

and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening 

cause, produces the event, and without which that event would 

not have occurred.” Doherty v. Aleck, 273 Va. 421, 428, 641 

S.E.2d 93, 97 (2007) (citations omitted). Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines “direct cause” or “proximate cause” as “[a] 

cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability” and 

“[a] cause that directly produces an event and without which 

the event would not have occurred.” Black’s Law Dictionary 234 

(8th ed. 2004). 

10
Barker’s contention that the circuit court found the 

direct and proximate cause of Decedent’s death to be the 

performance of his law enforcement work is inaccurate. The 

circuit court’s only finding was that Decedent “died on the job 

from a cardiac arrest,” and that finding made no connection to 

proximate cause. Barker points to no other place in the record 

to support a finding by the circuit court of direct and 

proximate causation. 

 Barker further argues, though, that the evidence in the 

record supports a holding that Decedent’s law enforcement 

duties on the day of his death were the direct and proximate 

cause of his death. Barker argues that Decedent’s death while 

on duty and which occurred at some point after he carried a 

fifty-pound battery and leapt across a ditch, is evidence of 

the causal connection required by the statute. We disagree. 

While “[t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an 

event,” Doherty, 273 Va. at 428, 641 S.E.2d at 97, the 

condition precedent of Code § 9.1-402(A) requires proof that 

the causal event was the proximate cause of death. The 

evidence in this record fails to prove any law enforcement duty 

activity of Decedent was a proximate cause of his death, much 

less the proximate cause. The record contains no medical 

evidence establishing any causal connection between Decedent’s 

cause of death and his law enforcement activity. Neither is 

11
there any nonmedical evidence which establishes the law 

enforcement duties as the proximate cause of death. At best, 

Barker’s evidence is that at some point before he died, 

Decedent crossed a ditch carrying a heavy weight. This 

anecdotal event can only be connected to Decedent’s later death 

by mere speculation, which fails to prove any direct and 

proximate cause relationship. See Cohn v. Knowledge 

Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 369, 585 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2003) 

(citation omitted) (“evidence proving a causal connection must 

be ‘sufficient to take the question out of the realm of mere 

conjecture, or speculation, and into the realm of legitimate 

inference’ ”). 

Barker’s evidence thus failed to prove the required Code 

§ 9.1-402(A) condition precedent that Decedent’s performance of 

his law enforcement duty was the direct or proximate cause of 

his death. This failure of proof is conclusive as to Barker’s 

claim for benefits pursuant to Code § 9.1-402(A). Accordingly, 

the circuit court erred in awarding Barker $75,000 pursuant to 

Code § 9.1-402(A). 

B. Code § 65.2-402 

Although Barker was not entitled to receive a $75,000 

award under Code § 9.1-402(A), we must determine whether she is 

nonetheless entitled to a $25,000 award under Code § 9.1-

12
402(B).3 Under subsection (B), a claimant is entitled to an 

award when the deceased person’s death “arose out of and in the 

course of his employment” and is “[s]ubject to the provisions 

of . . . § 65.2-402.” The Comptroller concedes Decedent’s 

death arose out of and in the course of his employment as a 

deputy sheriff. The issue is whether the Code § 65.2-402 

presumption applies. 

The Comptroller assigns error to the circuit court’s 

judgment that Barker is entitled to the presumption set forth 

in Code § 65.2-402(B). Even though the circuit court 

erroneously interpreted the presumption as applicable to a Code 

§ 9.1-402(A) award, the holding that the presumption is in 

effect as to the Decedent would apply to substantiate a Code 

§ 9.1-401(B) award. The Comptroller contends on appeal, as he 

did in the circuit court, that “[m]ere presence of a listed 

condition precludes application of the presumption afforded by 

Code § 65.2-402(B).” The Comptroller argues the Code § 65.2-

402(B) presumption is limited by subsection (D) of that statute 

which requires that a decedent have been found in his preemployment physical to be “free of respiratory diseases, 

hypertension, cancer or heart disease at the time of such 

examinations.” 

 3

 The circuit court did not address an award under Code 

§ 9.1-402(B) since it made an award under subsection (A). 

13
The Comptroller contends that because the statutory 

conditions (respiratory diseases, hypertension, cancer or heart 

disease) are listed in the disjunctive, the presence of any of 

those conditions in the pre-employment physical examination 

negates the application of the subsection (B) presumption. 

“[A] diagnosis of hypertension in a preemployment physical 

. . . precludes application of the presumption provided by Code 

§ 65.2-402(B)” regardless of the medical condition that 

actually caused Decedent’s death, according to the Comptroller. 

Thus, even though Decedent’s death “arose out of and in the 

course of his employment,” Barker cannot prevail in a Code 

§ 9.1-401(B) claim because Code § 65.2-402 does not apply, in 

the Comptroller’s viewpoint. 

Barker responds that the “use of the disjunctive ‘or’ in 

[Code § 65.2-402(D)(iv)] strongly suggests that an employee’s 

pre-employment physical need not find the employee free of all 

the listed conditions . . . to recover compensation for a 

condition with which the employee was not diagnosed in the preemployment physical.” Barker contends that this Court’s 

decision in Berry v. County of Henrico, 219 Va. 259, 247 S.E.2d 

389 (1978) confirms that a claimant is entitled to the benefit 

of the presumption when the pre-employment examination “fails 

to make a positive finding of the disease which subsequently 

brings about the disability or death” of the employee. 

14
(Emphasis in original.) Barker also cites cases from the 

Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission and other 

jurisdictions which hold that the statutory presumption applies 

when the pre-employment physical examination reveals no 

evidence of the later fatal condition.4 Barker contends “[n]o 

legal basis exists for permitting the [Comptroller] to reject 

the Line of Duty benefit for Barker based upon an equivocal 

diagnosis of hypertension on June 12, 1996, when her husband 

died of a massive heart attack in 2004.” We agree with Barker. 

The circuit court held in its final order that because 

Barker died from heart disease and not hypertension, he was 

entitled to the presumption provided in Code § 65.2-402(B). 

[Decedent] underwent the requisite preemployment examinations, was employed by the 

Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Department, and served 

from 1996 until his death on December 8, 2004, while 

on duty. Assuming, but not determining, that 

[Decedent] was found to be suffering from 

hypertension at the time of his physical, Barker is 

still entitled to the presumption. At the time of 

his physical he was free from respiratory diseases, 

cancer, and heart disease. He did not die of 

hypertension. He died of atherosclerotic heart 

 4

 Two cases cited by Barker include Arnold v. City of 

Norfolk Sheriff’s Office, VWC File No. 197-62-80, 2002 WL 

31941591 (Workers’ Comp. Cmm’n 2002) (ruling that Berry

requires application of the presumption when the pre-employment 

physical examination fails to make a positive finding of the 

disease which subsequently brings about the death or disability 

of the employee); and Florida v. Reese, 911 So.2d 1291, 1291-92 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (interpreting similar statute and 

concluding presumption applied when the pre-employment physical 

examination revealed “no evidence of the later disabling or 

fatal condition”). 

15
disease. Since [Decedent] died from [h]eart disease, 

not hypertension, Barker is entitled to the 

presumption afforded by [Code § 65.2-402(B)]. 

The principle we explained in Berry is applicable to the 

case at bar and supports the judgment of the circuit court. In 

that case, Ray C. Berry, a firefighter, suffered an acute 

myocardial infarction while off duty. Id. at 261, 247 S.E.2d 

at 390. Prior to his employment, Berry submitted to a physical 

examination which revealed “no evidence of hypertension or 

arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease.” Id. After Berry 

suffered his heart attack, his employer’s doctor provided 

expert testimony that his heart attack was “not an occupational 

disease arising from his employment as a fireman.” Id. at 262, 

247 S.E.2d at 391. The expert also testified that Berry’s preemployment physical examination revealed several risk factors, 

including Berry’s family history of heart trouble, smoking and 

weight problems, and concluded that Berry was not free from 

heart disease at the time of his pre-employment physical 

examination. Id. at 263, 247 S.E.2d at 391. 

Based on this evidence, the Industrial Commission denied 

the statutory presumption because the “evidence fail[ed] to 

prove that the claimant was free of the condition prior to 

16
making his claim.”5 Id. at 264, 247 S.E.2d at 391. This Court 

disagreed and held: “we think it clear that the General 

Assembly intended the presumption to apply in those instances 

where an examination conducted under the direction and control 

of the employer fails to make a positive finding of the disease 

which subsequently brings about the disability or death.” Id. 

at 264-65, 247 S.E.2d at 392 (emphasis added). 

We reiterated this holding in Garrison v. Prince William 

County, 220 Va. 913, 265 S.E.2d 687 (1980). In Garrison, 

George Garrison was employed as a deputy sheriff and underwent 

a pre-employment physical examination which showed he was in 

good health, but Garrison’s testimony revealed he knew before 

taking the job that he suffered from high blood pressure. Id. 

at 916, 265 S.E.2d at 688-89. Over the course of several 

 5

 Berry sought the presumption of former Code § 65.1-47.1, 

worded similarly to the presumption Barker seeks under Code 

§ 65.2-402, which stated in pertinent part: 

The death of, or any condition or impairment of health of, 

salaried or volunteer fire fighters caused by respiratory 

diseases, and the death of, or any condition or impairment 

of health of, salaried or volunteer fire fighters . . . 

caused by hypertension or heart disease, resulting in 

total or partial disability shall be presumed to be an 

occupational disease suffered in the line of duty that is 

covered by this Act unless the contrary be shown by 

competent evidence; provided that prior to making any 

claim based upon such presumption, such salaried or 

volunteer fire fighter shall have been found free from 

respiratory diseases, hypertension or heart disease, as 

the case may be . . . by a physical examination. 

17
years, Garrison sought and received medical treatment for 

hypertension, and eventually his doctor “advised him to curtail 

his work activity.” Id. at 916, 265 S.E.2d at 689. Garrison 

then sought recovery for lost wages due to hypertension, and 

the Industrial Commission refused his claim and ruled that the 

statutory presumption did not apply based upon Garrison’s preemployment knowledge that he had high blood pressure. Id. at 

916-17, 265 S.E.2d at 689. We reversed and applied our 

reasoning in Berry “that ‘the General Assembly intended the 

presumption . . . to apply in those instances where an 

examination conducted under the direction and control of the 

employer fails to make a positive finding of the disease which 

subsequently brings about the disability or death’ of a 

claimant.” Id. at 919, 265 S.E.2d at 691. 

Code § 65.2-402 has been revised since our decisions in 

Berry and Garrison to remove the language “as the case may be,” 

included in former Code § 65.1-47.1. The Comptroller cites the 

General Assembly’s removal of the phrase “as the case may be” 

when it amended and renumbered Code § 65.1-47.1 to become Code 

§ 65.2-402, as well as other statutes which use that phrase, 

for the proposition that any listed disease discovered in the 

pre-employment physical examination would preclude the 

presumption, regardless of the disease or condition which later 

causes the death. The Comptroller asserts “[i]f the General 

18
Assembly had intended for the . . . presumption to be 

inapplicable only when the employee dies from the exact same 

disease as was diagnosed at the preemployment examination, then 

it would have used the phrase ‘as the case may be’ or a similar 

phrase.” 

We find no significance in the use or deletion of the 

phrase “as the case may be” in the applicable statute. It 

appears to carry no substantive meaning, contrary to what the 

Comptroller asserts. The plain language of Code § 65.2-402(D) 

is in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive, and indicates the 

listed medical conditions are to be considered separately. 

Moreover, the Comptroller’s proposed interpretation of the 

statute does not further the purposes behind the statute, nor 

does the phrase “as the case may be” change the analysis of our 

holdings in Berry and Garrison. 

The Comptroller’s interpretation of the statute would 

prohibit an applicant who, for example, is diagnosed at a preemployment physical examination with a disease such as an 

operable form of melanoma, from receiving the benefit of the 

presumption when that same employee later suffers an unrelated 

heart attack. Clearly the two diseases are unconnected, and we 

have previously and consistently interpreted the statute in 

such a way as to allow the presumption when the pre-employment 

19
physical examination fails to reveal the disease which later 

brings about the disability or death. 

Reading the statutory language “free of respiratory 

diseases, hypertension, cancer or heart disease” in the 

disjunctive provides for an interpretation that comports to the 

General Assembly’s intent in enacting the presumption. See

Dinwiddie County Sch. Bd. v. Cole, 258 Va. 430, 436, 520 S.E.2d 

650, 653 (1999) (“[S]hould doubt remain, [the claimant] is 

entitled to the benefit of the doubt [because t]he provisions 

of the Workers’ Compensation Act ‘should be liberally construed 

to carry out [its] humane and beneficial purposes.’ ”) 

(citation omitted).6 Thus, the Decedent’s diagnosis of 

hypertension in his pre-employment physical examination is not 

a bar to the application of the statutory presumption because 

 6

 The Comptroller’s only caselaw support for his position 

are two unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals, Allen v. 

City of Norfolk Police Dep’t, Record No. 0897-97-1 (Aug. 26, 

1997) and Brown v. Loudoun County, Record No. 2138-96-4 (April 

1, 1997). Neither helps the Comptroller. In Allen, the record 

showed a direct causal link existed between the claimant’s preemployment physical examination and the disease he later 

suffered. Record No. 0897-97-1, slip op. at 4. In Brown, the 

pre-employment physical examination revealed “probable” 

hypertension, and the claimant was denied the benefit of the 

presumption for his claim of work-related hypertension. Record 

No. 2138-96-4, slip op. at 2-3. In both Allen and Brown, the 

disease diagnosed in the pre-employment physical examination 

was the same disease suffered by the claimant who sought the 

presumption. Allen and Brown are thus consistent with our 

holdings in Berry and Garrison. 

20
his death by heart disease was a separate and different medical 

condition. 

We hold that the presumption set forth in Code § 65.2-

402(B) applies. Accordingly, Decedent’s death “shall be 

presumed to be [an] occupational disease[], suffered in the 

line of duty, that [is] covered . . . unless such presumption 

is overcome by a preponderance of competent evidence to the 

contrary.” Based on the record before us, the Comptroller 

failed to overcome this presumption. Consequently, Barker is 

entitled to recover $25,000 pursuant to Code § 9.1-402(B). 

Indeed, the Comptroller concedes that if Barker has a valid 

claim under the Act and the presumption applies, then Barker 

“is entitled to a payment of $25,000.” 

C. Health Insurance Benefits 

The Comptroller also assigned error to the judgment of the 

circuit court awarding health insurance benefits to Barker 

under Code § 9.1-401. However, the Comptroller conceded on 

oral argument that if Barker is entitled to an award under Code 

§ 9.1-402(B), then she is also entitled to the award of health 

insurance benefits. As we have determined Barker is entitled 

to the Code § 9.1-402(B) award, the circuit court did not err 

in awarding her health insurance benefits under Code § 9.1-401. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

21
22

We will therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment 

which awarded Barker $75,000, but will enter judgment for 

Barker in the amount of $25,000 under Code § 9.1-401(B). We 

will also affirm the circuit court’s judgment awarding health 

insurance benefits to Barker under Code § 9.1-401. 

 Affirmed in part,

 reversed in part,

and final judgment.