NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0227n.06 F iled: Marc h 24, 2009 Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
P AUL WHITEWO OD, P laintif f-App ellant Cross-Appellee,
v. ROBERT B OSCH T OOL CORPORATION, Defendan t-Appellee C ross-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WE S TE RN D IS TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY

BEF OR E: G UY , C LA Y, and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. This i s a d i versity contra cts ca se that examines the validity of a rete ntion and sever ance ag ree ment alleg edly rea ched be tween a

n employ er a

nd employ ee. A fter a jury returne d a ver dict aw ar d ing Plaintiff Paul Whitewood $31,875, Whit ewood a ppeals the district court’s Oc tober 6, 2006 judg ment t h at gra nted par tial summary

judgme nt to Robert Bosc h Tool Corporation (“ Bosc h”) a nd dismiss ed Whitewood’s claims f o r liquidated dama g es
and a tto rney ’s fees un de r K e ntu c ky Re vis e d St a tut e s ( “ KR S” ) § 33 7. 38 5. B os c h s ub mit s a
cross-a ppeal, c halleng ing the court’s de termination that the par t i es h ad not rea ched a n enfor cea ble set t l em ent ag ree ment and the c ourt’s re fusal to submit a proposed jury instruction relating to re

jection of a

n offe r. F or the re asons that foll ow, we AF F IRM the judg ment of theNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-2- distr i ct co urt with respe ct to the cour t’s dismiss al of Whitewood’s cla ims under KRS § 337.385 and its ruling that the parties ha d not rea ched an enf orce able se ttlement ag ree ment. Howeve r,
we RE VE RSE the co u rt’s judg ment with respec t to the court’s re fusal to submit Bosch’s proposed jury

instruction and REMAND fo r a ne w tri a l. BACK GR OUND A. P roce dural Hi story On October

1 4 , 2 0 0 4 , Pa

u l W h it e w o o d

f il e d s u it a g a in s t R o b e rt B o s c hT o o l C o r p o r a ti o n, alleg ing br eac h o f co n t ra ct and unpa id wag es, liquidated dama g es, and attorney ’s fe es pursua nt to KRS § 337.385. Bosch re moved the ca se to fede ral c ourt based on dive rsity jurisdiction. Whit ewood amended his compla i n t and both parties filed motions for summary judgme nt. On October

6, 2006, the di s t ri ct co urt g rante d Bosc h partial summary judgme nt and dismiss ed Whit ewood’ s claims for liquidated damag es and attorney ’s fee s under KRS § 3 3 7
. 3 85. The c ourt denied the other dispositive motions. A jury trial was se t for January 8, 2007, but was adjourne d whe n a t en t at ive settlement
was re ache d on the mornin g trial was se t to beg in. The district court e ntere d an orde r dismissing the ca se as se ttled with leave to re instate the ca se on the doc ket if the settlement was not consummated. A dispute a rose a s to t h e t er m s of the settlement a nd Whit ewood f

iled a motion to enforc e the se ttlement agr ee m en t
. The c ourt held a he aringto addre ss the dispute, and on J anuary 2 6 , 2 0 07, it vacate d its previous order and re instated the ca se on the trial doc ket. B osch filed its own motion to enforce what it believed to be the t er m s o f the settlement ag ree ment, but the district court de nied that motion as well.Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-3- The case proce eded to tr ial ag ain, and on Marc h 14, 2007, the jury returne d a verdic t for Whit ewood f

or $31,875. B osch filed a motion for J udg ment N.O.V., an d t h e dis trict court denied the motion, awa

rding Whit ew o o d p re

j u dg ment interest at the r ate of 8% per annum. Whit ewood f

iled a motion to amend or c orre ct the orde r deny ing the motion for J udg ment N.O.V. a nd filed a notice of a p p ea l o n S ep tember 27, 2007. This Court dec lined jurisdiction and returne d the ca se to the district court f or disposition of the pending motion. On Novembe r 1, 2007, the district cour t entere d a final order de nying Whitewood’s motion to correc t or clar ify the judg ment. Bosc h timely filed a notice of cr oss-appe al, and Whit ewood timely

filed an a mended notice of appe al. B. Sub stantive F acts The district cour

t summar i z ed t h e s u bstantive fac ts pertaining to this case in its order g rantingin part and de nying in pa rt the p ar t i es ’ m o tions for summary judgme nt. W

hitewood v. R o b ert Bosch Tool Corp. , 2 0 0 6 U
. S. D is t. L E X I S 7 3 2 3 2 ( W. D
. K y . O c t. 3 , 2 0 0 6 )

. B e c a

u s e we
acc ept those fa cts unless they are cle arly

err oneous, see TransAmeric a Assur. Corp. v. Settlement Capital Corp. , 489 F.3d 256, 259 ( 6th Cir. 2007), and bec ause this case does not turn on disputed factual issues, we have ac cepte d the district court’s r endition of the fa cts as provide d below: Paul Whi tewood is [an] elec trical e ng ineer . Def endant hire d him as a cor porate quality

mana ger and re located him to L ouisvill e. He re po rt e d for w or

k at V e rm on t A me ri c an in July 20 01 . In e arl y 20 02 , D e fe nd ant a

nn ounc e d it s in te nti on

to c los e L ou isv ill e op e ratio ns by

e arl y 20 04 . Pl a int if

f c on te nd s th a t a ft e r t

he pu bli c announce ment, he eve ntually rec eived a writ ten offe r of a sever ance and r etention pac kag e date d J anuar y 27, 2003. Plaintiff reg arde d th e r e te n ti o no f

f e r a s a p r o mi s e to p ay

h im if h e s ta y ed throug h a spec ific time (end of Quart er 1, 2004). PlaintiffNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-4- un derst oo d th a t he wo uld be re qu ir e d to sig n a

re le a se of

a ll c la ims as to Def

endant. Plaintiff stay ed on and c ontinued to work for Def e n d an t. H e r e c e iv e d

ana me n d e d

r e te n ti o no f

f e r o nM ay 1 3, 2003, incre asing the bonus by a flat $ 10,000 and also ref lecting the small raise he had been g iven af ter the January

27, 2003, bonus of fe r. He c on tin

ue d to wo rk

fo r B os c h b e c a

us e he be lie ve d th a t if he satisfa ctorily

completed the r etention per iod and s igne d a re le a se , h e wo uld

re c e ive the inc re a se d b onus . Plaintiff first saw the Sepa ration Ag ree ment around Ma rch 15, 2004, when he was first prese nted with it for sig ning. I n particula

r, Plaintiff had a que stion with t he provision in the Separ ation Ag re e me nt t

hat “ W hi tewoo d w ill no t r e a pp ly fo r a po sit ion wi th RBTC or with any

of its affiliated, r elated or subsidiary c omp an i e s . ” H e b e l i e v e d t h a tt h e p r o v i s i o nm i g h tp r e v e n th im from g oing to wor

k for a ny one else beca

use he did not know what companies he could not apply to. He also objec t ed beca use the restric tion was “ope n fore ver a n d a day

on any and eve ry definition and any

future ac q u i sition, affiliation, or whateve r the oth er wor d w a s, wi tho ut t ho se e ve n d e fi ne d. ” He e xpla ine d th a t, i f Bosc h had at lea st provided him with a list of what compan ies he would not be able to a

pply to, he would have b een able to make a proper decision on whether to g o ahea d and sign the S ep ar ati on Ag ree ment to resolve the impasse

. Plai n tiff took his conce rns to Gale G entry in Defe ndant’s HR depar tment. He was n o t helpful. Fina lly , Fr eder ick A. Stuart, Vice Pr e sid e nt L a

bo r R e latio ns and Emp loy me nt, re sp on de d th a t, “You’ ll e it

h e r h av e to a c c e p t t

h e a g r e e me n t a s w r itte no r p r o c e ed without the benef

it of the ag ree ment.” Plaintiff fe lt t h at after doing what he ha d been a sked to do and a fter c omply ing w ith all of the conditions of the bonus document, B osch was t el l i ng him, “if y ou don’t sign some thing be y ond wh at we ha d asked you to do, y ou g et nothing.” By

Marc h 3 0 , 2004, Plaintiff had consulted a n attorney and informe d Def

endant that h e would not sig n. Def endant imme d iate ly

r e p li e d , r e

je c ti n g Pe ar lm an ’ s e f

f o rt, an d a dv ising “Mr. Whitewood chose to refuse the sepa ration pac kag e, and w e n o w co n s ider the matter closed.” On Octobe r 14, 2004, Plaintiff fi le d s uit in the J effe rs on

Cir c uit Court . D e fe nd ants re mov e d to [federa l] [c] ourt. Plaintiff’s primary claim sounds in contra ct. He say s t h at De fenda nt cre ated this contra ct by its offer me morialized in writing date dNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-5- J anua ry 27, 2003, which promised a specific “seve ranc e and re t en t i o n b o n u s ” i f P l ai n t i ff re m ai n edwi t ht h e c o mp an y t h ro u gh Marc h 3 1, 20 04 . [. .
. .] Pla int if f’ s se c on d c la im i s th a t he is entitled to unpaid wag es, double damag es an d attorney ’s fe es pursuant to KRS 337.385. W hitewood , 2006 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 73232 at 2-10. The c ase pr ocee ded to trial

. Bosch reque sted an instruction that it had pre pare d reg arding the leg al standar d s g overningthe ac cepta nce or reje ction of an of

fer , but the district court declined to pr ovide the propose d instru ct i o n . On Marc h 14, 2007, the jury returne d a ver dict for Whit ewood in the amount of $31,875, and this appea l followed. DI SCU SSIO N I. The grant of p artial sum m ary judgm ent to Bosch A. Stand ard of Review Th is C ou

rt re vie ws de novo the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt and resolution of leg al questions , but a c c e pts the dis trict court ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s unle ss c le arl y
err oneous. TransAmerica Assur. Corp. , 489 F.3d at 259. B. Ana lys is Whit e w o o d ar g u e s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r r e d in d e te r

mi n in g th a t h e w a s e xempt from
c ov e ra g e un de r K

RS § 3 37 .3 85 be c a

us e the c on te xt of

the statut e requ ire s a

c on c lus ion

that he is entitled to rec over attorney ’s fe es and be cause the district co u rt ’s re ading of the statute w as unconstitutional. The fac ts surrounding this iss ue ar e lar g ely undisputed, and re s o l u t i o n o f t he issue turns on a leg al interpre tation of the re levant statutes.

1 . T h e r el ev a n t s ta tu to ry s ch emeNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

KR S § 3 37 .3 85 a lso pr ov ide s th a t, “ if , in any a c tio n c omm e nc e d to re c ov e r s uc h unp a id 1 wag es or liquidated da

mag es, the e mploy er shows to the satisfaction o f the c ourt that the ac t or omission giving r ise to such ac tion was in good f aith and that he ha d rea sonable grounds for be lie vin g that hi s a c t or omi ssi on wa s no t a vio latio n of KR S 33 7. 02 0 to 33 7. 28 5, the c ourt may , in its sound discretion, awa

rd no liquidated damag es, or awa rd any amount there of not to e x cee d the amount specifie d in this section. Any ag ree ment betwee n such employ ee a nd the employ er to wor

k for less than the applicable wag e ra te shall be no defe nse t o such action

. . . .” Id. The district cour t declined to a ddress the issue of whether Bosc h acte d in good f

aith beca use it determined that Whit ewood wa s exempt under the plain languag e of the statute.
-6- Under KRS § 337.385, an employ ee ma y be entitled to liquidated damag es, costs, and
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s if

he is d e nie d c omp e ns a tio n to wh ic h h e is e nti tle d. Th e statut e pr ovid es, in pe rt ine nt p art , th a t:

Em plo ye r ’s lia bili ty-- Unp aid wage s a nd liq uida te d dam ag e s. ( 1 ) A n y e mp l o ye r

w h o p ays any e m

p loy ee l es s than wag es and overtime c ompens ati on to which such e mploy ee is e ntitled under or by v i rt u e o f KR S 337.020 to 337.285 shall be liable to such e mpl oy e e a ff

e c te d f or th e fu ll amou

nt o f s uc h w a g e s and

ov e rt ime com p e n s a ti o n , le s s an y a mo u n t a c tu a ll y p a id to s u c h e mp lo y e e by the employ er, f

or an a dditiona l equal amount as liquidated damag es, and for costs and such rea sonable attorney ’s fees as may be a llo we d b y

the c ourt
. Ky . Re v. Stat. A nn § 33 7. 38 5 ( 20 08 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e te rm “ e mpl oy e e ” is d e fi ne d in 1 KR S § 3 37 .0 10 (2 ), wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t:

As used in . . . KRS 3 3 7
. 3 8 5 . . . , unless the contex t requires oth e rwi se : (a) “E m p loy ee” is any person e mploy ed by

or suffe red or pe rm itt e d to wo rk

fo r a n e mpl oy e r, but shall not i nclude : . . . [ a] ny individual employe d i n a . . . pr ofe ssi on al c ap ac ity , . . . as the terms ar e def

i n ed by administrative re g ulations of the executive direc tor. Ky . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 337.010(2) (2008) (empha sis added).Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

Be cause jurisdiction in thi s case is based on diver sity of ci t i z enshi p, this Court applies 2 Ken tu c ky la

w in a c c o r d an c e w it

h th e c o n tr o ll in g d e c is io n s o f th e K e n tu c ky Su p r e me Co urt when interpre ting Ke ntucky

statutes. See Bove e v. Coopers &Lybrand C.P.A. , 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001). Howe ver, “[i] f the state supreme court has not yet addre ssed the issue prese nted, this Court mus t pr e d i c th o w i tw o u l d r u l e , b y l o o k i n g t o ‘ a l l av a i l a

b l e d a t a , ’ i n c l u d i n g s t a t e a p p e lla te decisions.” Id. (q u o t i n g Kingsley Assocs., Inc

. v. Mol l PlastiC rafters, Inc. , 6 5 F .3 d 4 98 , 5 07 (6 th Cir. 1995)). -7- Th e re fe re nc e d a dmi nis tr a tiv e re g ulatio ns de sc ri be “ pr of e ssi on a l emp loye e s” un de r K RS § 3 3 7
. 0 1 0 (2 ) as employ ees who perf orm work requiring knowledg e of an advanc ed ty pe in a field of sc ience or lea

rning , and g o on to say

that a fie ld of science or le arningincludes the traditional profe ssion of eng ineer ing. 803 K y . Admin. Reg . 1:070 §§ 4(1)(b) and 4(2) (c) (2007). As part of

its analy sis of Whi tewood’s e ligibility for the r emed i es s et fo rt h in § 337.385, the dis tr ic t c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s: Pla int if f wa s a pr of

e ssi on a l e le c tr ic a l e ng ine e r. He wa s ini tiall y eng ag ed i n the desig n and manuf actur e of tools and e arne d over $1 00 ,0 00 annua l sa lary

wi th a dd iti on a l bo nu se s. As a c or po rate qu a lit y m an a g e r , h e w o r

k e d w i t ho t h e r

m anu f a c tu r i n g f a c i l i t i e s to sa tis fy requ ir ement s o n “ c orpo ra te me tr ic s f orqu a lit y perf ormanc es.” In perf

orming these t asks, he use d his eng ineer ing sk ill s, his ana ly

tic sk ill s and con side ra

ble ind e pe nd e nt j ud g me nt t o succe ed in his work. He supervised othe rs and made employ ment decisions. Althoug h he maintained his same job titl e un t i l t he end, he super vised few er e mploy ees. W hitewood , 2006 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 73232 at 9-10. Whit e wo od do es no t app e ar t o d isp ute the se fac tual finding s and they should be cre dited. See TransAme r i ca A ssur. Corp. , 489 F.3d at 259. The dis t ri ct co urt went on to conc lude that Whitewood, as an e ng ineer , is an exempt professional
e mpl oy e e wh o c ou ld n ot reco ve r u nd e r K RS § 3 37 .3 85 . T he c ourt ba se d it s c on c lus ion

larg e ly upon the plain languag e of KR S § 337.385, and the de finition of its relevant ter ms in § 33 7. 01 0( 2) and

the a sso c iate d a dmi nis tr a tiv e re g ulatio ns . 2Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-8- 2. The “requires other wi se” provision of KR S § 337.010 Whit ewood f

irst contends that the district cour t failed to apply

rele vant and c ontrolling Kentucky case law when it de termined that he was exempt fr om c overa g e under KRS § 3 3 7.385. He argue s th a t He a l t h care of Lousiville v. Kiesel , 715 S.W .2d 246, 248 (Ky . Ct. App. 1986) is the sole re ported Ke ntucky authority interpre ting the r eleva

nt statues an d t h at under Kie se l, the “de finitional ex clusion of ‘e mploy ee’ author i z ed in KR S § 337.010(2)(a )(2) is not applica b l e t o § 337.385 beca use the c ontext of KRS § 337.385 require s otherwise.” (Whitewood Br . at 8.) Whit ewood’ s rea ding of Kie se l is misguided. In Kiesel , a d e f e n d an t h e a lthc are
or g anizatio n app eal e d a

jud g me nt a

wa rd ingdama g e s, a tto rn e y

fe e s, and

c os ts und e r K

RS § 33 7. 38 5 f

or the de fe nd ant’ s f

a ilure to p ay

a g re e d- up on

be ne fi ts t o a

docto r emp lo y ed a s a medical dire ctor. Discussingand ap ply ing K RS §§ 337.385 and 337.010, the court dete rmined th a t t h e p la intiff do c to r

w a s ane mp lo y e e e n ti tl e d to r e c o v e r

u n d e r th e s tatute b e c a

u s e th e c o n te xt “re quire[d] o therwise.” Id. at 248. Without elabor ating upon why the context “require d otherwise,” the cour

t stated that “it is just as unlawful to fail to pay or to with h o l d a p ar t of the salary of an ex ec u t i v e, adminis trative, super visory or prof essional employ ee a s it would be to do so in the case of an y o t h er t y pe of e mploy ee.” Id. Whil e Kie se l does support the proposition that, in a g iven ca se, an o t h erwise exempt employ ee c an re cover under K

RS § 337.385
no tw ith sta

nd ingthe limit ati on s stat e d in § 3 37 .0 10 if

the c on te xt “r e qu ir e s o the rw ise ,” the re is no evidenc e of a

unique context that warra nts an exception from the statutory provis ions in the instant case.Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-9- Moreove r, Whitewood’s broade r statutory argu m en t l ac ks merit. Whit ewood a rgues that “the context of KRS 337.385 ‘re quires other wise’ than to e x empt employ ees like Whitewood from its remedie s.” (Whitewood B r. at 8 (empha sis added).) I t is unclear how the context of a sta tute can “ require otherwise” than to exempt employ ees like Whitewood whe n the re levant
s t at u t o ry s ch em e s p ec i fi ca l l y

ex em p t s p ro fe s s i o n al em p l o y ee s s u ch as en gi n ee rs fr o mco v er age under § 337.385. Whitewood’s prof fer ed re adingwould rende r § 337.010’s e x clusion of profe ssional employ ees me aning less and would contr adict the plain languag e of that statute. The more logic al re ading of the “ requires otherwise ” provision of KRS § 337.010 is that t h e l i m i t ati ons § 337.010 can be overc ome when the context and equities of a pa rti c ula r c as e
re qu ir e that an e mpl oy e e be e nti tle d to the re me die s se t f or th i n § 33 7. 38 5. Th is r e adin g is i n line with Ra wlin gs v . B re it , 2005 WL 1415356 at *6-7 (K y . Ct. App. J une 17, 2005), where the K e n tu c ky Co u rt o f A p p e a ls f

o u n d th a t t h e p la inti f

f a tt o r n e y s w e r e p r e c lu d e d

f r o m r e c o v e r ing under K R S § 3 3 7
. 3 8 5 based on the definition of employ ee f ound in § 337.010(2)(a )(2) , and
re je c te d th e argume nt t

hat Kiesel

re qu ir e d a

di ffere nt o utc ome . Asim ila r r e su lt w a s r e a c he d in Ha e be rlev . M

c Call, Curre ns , To

pe r &Tho mp so n, P. S. C. , 2 00 7 WL 12 01 58 7 at *8 (K

y . Ct
. App., April 20, 2007), whe re the cour t held that a dentist was a n exempt employ ee unde r §Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

A number of

district courts applying K entucky law t o i n t erpr et the statutes at issue have 3 elec ted to f

ollow suit with Ra wlings and Ha e be rle , d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Kiesel as a case that provided “ no explanation for its deviation from the s trictures of KRS § 337.010(2), but simply found that under the fa cts befor e it ‘the context require[d] ot herw ise.’” Sta the rs v . I c e Cre am Di

str ibs . o f E v an sv ill e , L L C , 2 0 0 7 U
. S
. D i s t
. L E X I S 8 3 4 8 5 ( W
. D
. K y . N o v . 8 , 2 0 0 7 ); see al

so Ro by v . M ids tates I nd us . Group , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 50694, 4-5 (W .D. Ky
. J uly 6, 2007) (“The contex t of t he case at hand do e s n ot c omp e l us to d e viate fr om § 337. 01 0(2 )’s e xemp tio n o f o uts ide sa le sme n. ” ); Hodak v

. Madison Capital

Mgmt ., 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 35248 (E.D. Ky

. May 14, 2007) (“Finding that the context d o es n o t re q u i re othe rwise in this situation, the Court elects to follow the lead of the Ra wlin gs court a

nd base its dec ision on the statutory definition of employ ee.” ) -10- 33 7. 38 5, and

the S up re me Court

of Ke ntu c ky

de nie d d isc re tio na

ry re vie w o f t

he c a se . Th e se

3 decisions ar e more consistent with the plain lang uag e of K RS §§ 337.385 and 337.010. For all of these r easons, we conclude that t h e district court did not err when it re

jected Whit e wo od ’s statut or

y argume nt. 3. Whi te wood’ s st at e c ons ti tu ti ona l ar gum e nt Whit ewood a lso ar gu es that the application of KRS § 337.010 to ex clude him from
cover ag e under

§ 337.385 raises c o n s t i t u tional issues that should be avoided. He submits t hat the district court’s holdingwill cause some e mploy ees to be treated diffe rently t h an other employ ees f

or purpose s of prompt pay claims, and that this implicates th e equal protec tion g uara ntees of Sec tion 59 of the Kentuc ky Constit ution. L ooking, as we are require d to do, to the Kentucky courts for g uidance , we co n cl u d e that Whit ewood’ s argument lacks mer it. As Bosch c o rr ec t l y n o tes, the Ra wlings and Ha e be rle C o u rt s found no er

ror in excluding a

class of e mploy ees like Whitewood fr om rec overingunder the statut e s, and

the Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court

de nie d d isc re tio na

ry re vie w o f t

hat is su e in Ha e be rle . Moreove r, the Ke ntucky Supreme Court has state d that KRS § 337 is t he Ke ntucky
e qu iva le nt t o th e F a ir

L a bor S tand ard s A c t, 2 9 U .S. C. § § 2 01 -2 19 , w hic h in c lud e s th e sameNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-11- classifications and was dee med an a ppropriate ex er ci s e of leg islative power in United States v. Darby , 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See City of Louisvill e, Div. of Fire v . Fire Serv . Managers Ass’n by & Thr ou gh Kae lin , 212 S.W .3d 89, 92 (Ky . 2006). All of these case s supp o rt a co n cl u s i on that the Ke ntu c ky

c ourt s w ou ld d e e m th e statut e c on sti tut ion a l. I n s um, be c a

us e Whit e wo od ’s state c on sti tut ion a l argume nt f a ils , a nd be c a us e Whi te w o o d ’ s c a s e d o e s n o t p r e s e n t a c o n te xt th at r e q u ir e s a d if

f e r e n t r e s u lt , w e h o ld that the d i s t r i c tc o u rtd i d

n o te r r i nd e t e r m i n i n g t h a tW h i t e w o o d i s p r e c l u d e d

f r o m r e c e i v i n g a t t o r

n e ys fee s, costs, and liquidated dama g es under KRS § 337.385. II. The e nfor c e abi lit y o f the se tt le m e ntag r e e m e nt A. Stand ard of Review To the extent that a district court m ak es fi n d i n g s of fa ct that par ties had agree d to the te rm s o f a

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, thi s Co urt revie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s und e r t he c le arl y
err o neous standar d. Therma-Scan, I nc. v. Therm oscan, Inc

. , 217 F.3d 414, 419 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Otherw ise, this Court uti liz es the a buse-of -discre tion standard in re viewingthe district court’s deter mination of whether

to enforc e the se ttlement ag ree ment. Id. B. Ana lys is On cr oss-appe al, B osch ar g ues that the pa rties ex ec u ted a va lid settlement ag ree ment and that the district court a

bused its discretion by

failing to enforc e it. The fir st scheduled tri al o n this matter was a djourned whe n a tentative se ttlement was
re a c he d on the da

y of tr ia l. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d an or de r dis mis sin g the c a se as s ett led wi th le a ve to r e ins tate the c a se on the do c ke t if

the se ttl e me nt was no t c on summate d. A d isp ute aro se as to the terms of the settlement ag ree m en t an dWhit ewood f iled a motion to enforc e theNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-12- a g re e me nt. I n hi s mo tio n, Whit e wo od argue d th a t w he n B os c h u se d th e te rm “ c ur re nt” to descr ibe t h e subsidiaries to which Whitewood could not re- apply and def ined those as c ompanies affiliated with Bosch a s of J anuar y 8, 2007, Bosc h “sig nificantly incre ase[d] t he number

and
natur e of the ‘p re c lud e d c omp anie s’ on the lis t of

c ur re nt c omp anie s w hic h it agreed to produce .” (Joint Appendix “J.A.” at 111
. ) He ar gu es that the list of “cur rent” subsidiaries that was initially

ag ree d-upon included only those companie s aff

iliated with Bosch a s of Marc h 31, 2004. Eac h party

proposed languag e in a n at t em p t to clarify the disputed clause , but the parties
c ou ld n ot a g re e to t

he te rm s. The c ourt held a he aringto addre ss the dispute and on January 26, 2007, i t conclude d that the par ties could not ag ree upon settlement, vac ated its previous orde r, and r ei nstated the c ase on the trial docket. Bosc h argues that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, be ca u s e the parties ha d rea ched a

valid ag ree ment, and subm its that W hitewood was attempting to exit t he ag ree ment by

raising a “hy

per- technica l” dispute about the wor d “cur rent.” B os c h’ s c ha

ra c te ri zat ion

of the po int a s “ hy per-tec hn ic a l” is c on tr a dic te d b y its re fu sa l to compromise on the de finition of the term

. Fur ther, the issue r elates ba ck to the par ties’ orig inal
c on fl ic t; Wh ite wo od ’s state d c on c erns w iththe or ig ina l Se pa ra tio n A g re e me nt s te mme d, a t le a st in part, fr om his uncertainty reg ardingthe companie s to which he c ould appl y . T h is Court has held t h at wh en parties have r easona ble diffe renc es in interpre tation and ca n not rea ch agree ment over the meaningof a c lause in a te ntative a gre em ent, t here is no “meetingof the minds” on the ag ree ment, and the p u rp o rt ed agre ement should be disre g arde d. Therma Scan , 217 F.3d at 420 (holding that it was an a

buse of d i s cr et i o n for the district c ourt to impose one par ty ’s ver sion of the se ttl e me nt u

po n th e oth e r whe n th e te rm s w e re dis pute d) ; se e als o F re ar v . P .T. A. In du s. , 103Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-13- S.W .3d 99, 105 (Ky . 2003) (re cogni z i n g that an ambiguous ag ree ment is “one c apable of more than one diff

ere nt, rea sonable interpr etation.”) . Co n s eq u en t l y , beca use the pa

rties ea ch off

er a viable and c onflicting interpre t ati on of the ter ms of the ag ree ment, we hold that the district cour t did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

re fu sin g to e nf

or c e the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. III . Jur y I nst r uc ti ons A. Stand ard of Review Th is Court

re vie ws a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re fu sa l to g ive a re qu e ste d ju

ry ins tr uc tio n f or a bu se of discre tion. Tompki n v. P h i l i p Morr is USA, Inc. , 362 F.3d 882, 901 ( 6th Cir. 2004). “A district court’s re fusal to g ive a jury instr u ction constitutes reve rsible er ror if ( 1) the omitted instruction is a co rr ec t statement of the la w, (2) the instruction is not subs tantially cover ed by other de li v er ed ch arge s, and (3) the fa ilure to g ive the instruction impairs the re questing party ’s theory of the c ase.” Id. “ A j ud g me nt m ay be reve rse d on ly if

the ins tr uc tio ns , v ie we d a s a whole, we re co nfusing , misleading , or pre judicial.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). B. Ana lys is On cr oss-appe al, B osch cha lleng es the district cour t’s ref usal to provide the jury

with an instruction relatingto the reje ction of an of fer . Bosc h reque sted the followinginstruction: Whit ewood’ s power to a cce pt Bosch’ s offe r o f a s ever ance and rete nti o n p ackag e may be ter minated by : (1) his reje ction, repudiat i o n, or counte r-of fer ; . . . . I f y ou find that Whit ewood manifested a

n intentio n n o t t o acc ept B osch’s off ers . . . be fore rende ri n g the invited perf ormanc e, then you must find that Whit ewood rejec ted those off ers be fore acc eptanc e. I f y ou find fr om t he evide nc e that Whi te wo od manif e ste d a n inte nti on

to reje ct o r r e p u d iate B o s c h ’ s o f f e r , th e n h is a c ti o n s ar e a r e je c ti o n of Bosc h’s offe r and you should enter a verdic t for B osch . . . .Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

There is a dea

rt h of published Kentuc ky law re lating to this issue. Howe ver, in Bailey v

. 4 V& O Press Co. , 770 F.2d 601, 604 ( 6th Cir. 1985) this C ourt noted that re statements of laware persua sive authority in dive rsity case s. I n Ha rg is v . B aiz e , 168 S.W .3d 36, 47 (Ky . 2005), and UPS v . R ic k e rt , 996 S.W .2d 464, 473 (Ky . 1999), the Ke ntucky Courts cited to the Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac t as authority

. -14- (J.A. at 151.) Th e dis t r i c t c o u rt d e c l i n e d t o p r o v i d e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , e xp l a i n i n g t h a t “ y o u c an ’ t r e j e c t a unilatera l o ff

er ” and that “[Bosch’s] unilatera l offer was we are g oing to pa

y y ou to show up for work, a nd if y ou show up until a date c erta in and y o u s i gn t h e agree ment . . . we pa y y ou $30,000. No one ha s ever disputed that . . . .” (J.A. at 218.) To establish that the court err ed in omitt ing the instruction, Bosch must first esta blish that th e o mi tt e d in s tr

u c ti o n is a c o r

r e c t s tate me n t o f th e law. Se e Tom pk in , 362 F.3d at 901. The Restatement (Sec ond) of Contra ct s , § 53(3), pr ovides that “[w]here an of fer of a pr omise invites
acc eptanc e by

perf ormanc e and doe s not invit e a pr omissory acceptanc e, the r ender ing of the inv ite d p e rf

or manc e do e s n ot c on sti tut e an a c c e pta nc e if be fo re the of

fe ro r p e rf or ms h is p ro mis e the offer ee m anife sts an intention not to accept.” Bosc h’s proposed instruc tion, which asks the 4 jur y to c on sid e r whe the r Wh ite wo od “ manif e ste d a n inte nti on

no t to a c c e pt B os ch’s off er[, ]” i s consistent with this l anguag e and w e conc lude that it was a c orre ct statement of the law. Second, B osch must establish that the omitted inst ruct i o n was not substantially cover ed by other de livered c harg es. Tom pk in , 362 F.3d at 901. The c ourt provided the f ollowing i n s t r u c t i o n , w h i c h w a s t h e o n l y s u b s t an t i v e c o n t r a c tl aw p r o v i d e d t o t h e j u r y: INSTRUCTION NO. 1 Plaintif f contends that the Sepa

ration Ag ree ment, which he re fu s ed to sig n, constitutes a new c ondition or additional materialNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-15- r e qu ir e me n t to th e s e v e r an c e an d r e te n ti o n p a c k a g e o f f e r e d by Bosc h in ear ly

2003. I f the Sepa

ration Agr eement is a new condition or an a dditional material re quirement, then Plaintiff wa s within his rights to ref

use to sign it, and is e ntitled to the severa nce be n e f i t s p r o m i s e d

. H o w e v e r , i f t h e S e p ar a t i o n A g r e e m e nt i s within the meaningof the re lease co n d i t i ons of the orig inal offe r, then Plaintiff’s re fusal to sig n it ex cuses De fenda nt’s further perf ormanc e. Question 1: Do y ou believ e from the evidenc e that the rea pplication prohibition in parag raph one of the Sepa ration Ag ree ment is a new or additional materia l re quirement to the s e v e r an c e o f

f e r c o m m u n i c a t e d

b e t w e e nJ anu ar

y an d M ay 2 0 0 3 ? (J.A. at 158.) The jury ’s ver dict form then pr ovided: VERDICT F ORM Answer to Question 1:

_____ Ye s , an d we the jur y awa rd Paul Whit ewood damag es for withheld sever ance and re tention pay in the amount of $31,875. OR _____ No, and we the jury find for the Def

endant, R o b er t Bosch To ol C or p. , a nd awa rd the Pla int if

f, Pa ul Wh ite wo od , n o d a ma g e s. (J.A. at 160.) Viewingthe cour

t’s instruct i o n t o gether

with the verdic t form, it becomes c lear that the jury was not aske d t o co n s i d er whether Whitewood manife sted an intent to reje ct B osch’s unilatera l of

fe r. I n s tead, the instruc tions focus upon whethe r B osch imposed an a dditional require ment when it adde d a re application provision, and pr ovided t h at Whit ewood wa s justified in refusingto sign the a g ree ment if it did so. W e ther efor e conc lude that the omitted instruction

w a s n o ts u

b s t an t i a l l y c o v e r e d

b y t h e i n s t r

u c t i o n s p r o v i d e d

t o t h e j u r y.Nos. 07-6188, 07-6355

To be sure , the jury

could have found, eve n with the proff ere d instruction, that Whi tewood’s 5 actions we re a

n attempt to clarify

the ag ree men t an d /or that he did not reje ct the unilater al offe r. The jury also could have found that Whitewood perf ormed unde r the co n t ra ct before a ny alleg ed reje ction occur

red. H oweve r, t hese are fac tual deter minations. The im portant poi nt is that the jury did no t c on sid e r whe the r White wo od re je c te d th e of

fe r, an is su e that li ke ly

c on sti tut e d B os c h’ s mo st viable def ense. -16- Th ir d, B os c h mu st e sta

bli shtha t f a ilure to g ive the re qu e ste d in str uc tio n im pa ir e d it s theory of the c ase. Tom

pk in , 362 F.3 d at 901. We find that it did. Bec ause the defe nse provided evidenc e that Whitewood reje cted t h e s ev era nce a nd rete ntion offer s made to him, the lack of an ins tr uc tio n r e g ard ing re

je c tio n o f a

n o ff e r h ind e re d it s a

bil ity to a rgue tha t th e of fe r w a s, in f

a c t, reje cted. With the proposed instructions an d u n d er the fac ts before the jury , the jury could have
re a so na bly c on c lud e d th a t Whi te wo od re je c te d B os c h’ s o ff

er or pr of fe re d a c ounte r- of

fe r, and if it d id s o , it c o u ld n o t h av e p r o p e r ly

f o u n d th a t B o s c hb r e a c h e d

it s contra ct withWh it e w o o d

. We 5 there fore conclude that the fa ilure to deli v er an i nstruction on reje ction of an of fer impaired Bosc h’s t h eory

of the c ase a

nd that the re sulting instructions, viewed a s a whole, w ere “conf using, misleading , or pre

judicial” as r equire d in Tom pk in , 362 F.3d at 901. Whil e the district cour

t was not requir ed to provide the entire instruc tion s ubmitted by B o s c h , t h e c o u rtw a s r e qu i r e d t o , an d d i d n o t , g i v e th e j u r

y some in s tr

u c ti o n o n the leg al conc ept of re jection of a

n o ff er t o put that issue before the jury . Consequently , beca use we find that (1) the omi tte d in str

uc tio n is a

c or re c t st a te me nt o f t

he law, (2 ) th e in st ruction w a s n ot s ub sta nti a lly
cover ed by

other de livered c harg es, and ( 3) the fa ilure to g ive the instruction impai re d Bosc h’s the or y of the c a se , w e fi nd

tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n a

nd c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e
err or. See id. CO NC LU SIONNos. 07-6188, 07-6355

-17- For the re asons stated a

bove, we AF F IRM th e ju d g me n t o f th e d is tr ic t c o u rt w it hrespe ct to the court’s dismiss al of Whit ewood’ s claims under KRS § 337.385 and its rulingt h at the parties ha d not rea ched a n enfor cea

ble settlement ag ree ment. Ho wever, we RE VE RSE the court’s judg ment with respec t to the court’s re fusa l t o s u b m it Bosch’ s proposed jury instruction and REMAND fo r a

ne w tri a l.