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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-3121

R ORI C G I B B S

, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

B R O O KE L OMA S

, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Western Di stric t o f Wi sconsi n. No. 3: 12 -cv-00 78 9- slc — Ste phe n L. Crocke r , Magistrate J udg e.
A RGU E D J ANUAR

Y 23, 2014

— D E C I D E D J UN E 17, 2014

Before P O S N E R and R I P PL E, Circ uit Judges , and G I L B E R T , District Judge. *
R I P PL E, Cir cui t Judge. Offi cer Broo ke Lomas, a poli ce offi cer in Madis on, W i scons in, responded to a complaint that a man
w as driving thro ugh downtown Madis on whi le holding an unholstered gun in the view of other driv ers. After locatin g the

The Hono rab l e J. Phil Gil b ert, of the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the * So uthern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n.2 No. 13-3121
indi vidu al, Ror i c Gibbs, she i ssu ed a mi sdemeanor ci tation for di sorder ly conduc t and searched hi s car
. The ci tation w as later di smi ssed, and Mr

. Gibbs then brought thi s acti on under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 again st Offi cer Lomas. Mr

. Gibbs alleged that the
arr est and search had violated hi s Four th Amendment right to be free from unre a so nable searches and sei zures. Offi cer Lomas mov ed for sum mary judgment on the basi s of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. The di stric t co ur t deni ed her motion. W e now re verse that deter minati on. Ev en i f Mr

. Gi bbs had a consti tutional right to be free from thi s arr est and search, that right w as not clearly establi shed a t t he tim e of Offi cer Lomas’s acti ons. The di stric t courtshould h av e gr anted her mot i on.

I BACKGRO UND A. Becaus e thi s i s an interlo cutory appeal from a d e ni al of
sum mary judgment b ased on quali fi ed i mmu ni ty , w e recount the facts as “asserted by the plainti ff” or as “ a ssumed by the di stric t court.” Jewett v
. Anders , 521 F .3d 818, 819 (7th Ci r
. 2008). On July 15, 2012, T

rav i s and Kather ine Gruchow w ere driving thro ugh Madis on, Wi scons in. The Gruchows saw a y oung man in a red Jeep Chero kee; he w a s ho lding near hi s head what appeared to be a handgun. The barrel w as poin ted at t he ce i ling of the Jeep. Mr s. Gruchow called the nonemerge ncy numb er for the Madis on P olic e Department. She to l d d isp a tch that she and her husband “saw [a] man driving wi th a handgun in his ca r , so w e just thought w eNo. 13-3121 3
should repo rt i t.” The di spatch offi cer a sk e d whether the 1 driv er w as threat ening any one. Mr s. Gruchow replied, “[N]o, he w as driving—w e couldn’t tel l i f i t [ the gun ] w as real or not.” She sai d that the driv er had the gun “up in the ai r when 2 he w as driving, kin d of at hi s si de.” Mr s. Gruchow t o l d 3 di spatch that the man had parke d at Dexter ’s Pub , and she prov i ded a descri ption of the driv er and the v ehi cle, inclu ding the v ehi cle’s li cens e plate numb er
. She sai d that t he driv er
w ent into the bar

, whi ch she thought “seem[ed] a li ttle off.” 4 Di spatch asked again i f the driv er w as threat ening someone or poin tin g the gun. Mr s. Gruchow sai d no, but that he had been “speeding really fast.” 5 Dexter ’s Pub i s l o ca ted on Offi cer Lomas’s beat. Di spatch there fore advis ed her of the repo rt, giving her a descri ption of the indi vidu al and of the Jeep and tellin g her that the indi vidual “had a gun on hi m” but that “nothin g w as threat ened wi th

R.2 3 ( Distri ct Ct. Op.) at 3 (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 1

Id

. (seco nd alter atio n in o ri ginal) (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 2

Id

. (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 3

Id

. (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 4

Id

. (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 54 No. 13-3121
the w eapon.” Di spat ch a l so stated that the man mi ght be 6 “armed in the bar .” Offi cer Lomas drove to Dexter ’s Pub and, 7 whi le en ro ute, called the Gruchows

. Mr s. Gruchow told Offi cer Lomas that whi le she and her husband w ere stopped at a red li ght, she had seen the driv er o f t he v ehi cle in the next lane holding a bl a ck handgun near hi s head, poin ted at the cei ling. She and her husband had follow ed the Jeep to Dexter ’s and, duri ng the course of that driv e, saw the driv e r ho l d t he gun up and poin t i t at the cei ling a second tim e. Mr s. Gruchow told Offi cer Lomas that the sus pect w as driving “ ba d l y ,” speci fi cally that he had accelerated qui ckly from a red li ght. 8 Mr s. Gruchow stated that i t di d not a p p e a r as though the d r i v er w as going to harm hi mself

. At her deposi tion, Offi cer Lomas recalled that, at the tim e she spoke wi th the Gruchows, she t hought i t w as “v ery unus ual” for someo ne to driv e wi th
a gun in hi s hand instead of havin g i t “holstered or in the tr unk
or back seat.” 9 When Offi cer Lomas arr i v ed at Dexter ’s, he r superi or , Ser geant Bri an Chaney, al ready w as there. O ther o ffi cers also
arr i v ed on the scen e
. The offi cers deci ded to look at the Jeep,

Id

. (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 6

A udi o reco rdi ng: Dispatch call s (Jul y 15 , 2 01 2) (o n fi l e wi th cour t). 7

R.1 2 ( Lo mas Dep.) at 3. 8

Id

. 9No. 13-3121 5
whi ch w as p a r k e d a nd unoccupi ed, to see i f a w eapon w as vis i ble. How ev er

, before they di d so, Mr

. Gibbs w alked out of the bar

. Mr

. Gibbs matched the physi cal descri ption that the Gruchows had prov i ded to Offic e r Lomas. Ser geant Chaney instructed Mr

. Gibbs to show hi s hand s, t urn aro und and put hi s hands on the bui lding w all. Mr

. Gibbs compli ed wi th these
or ders. Offi cer Lomas then handcuffe d M r
. Gibbs, and Ser

ge a nt C h a ney fri sked hi m for weapons. During thi s intera c ti on , Mr

. Gibb s t o l d the offi cers that he w as the driv er of the Jeep. Offi cer Lomas then placed Mr

. Gibbs in the back of a squad car
. Whi le Mr

. Gibbs w as in the squad car , Offi cer Lomas called the Gruchows a second tim e. Accordi ng to Offi cer L omas, Mr s. Gruchow added to her earlier statement that “she w as di sturbed by the behavi or .” Offi cer Lomas recalled that 1 0 Mr s. Gruchow stated that ini tiall y s he w as reluctant to call polic e becau se she knew that the state had j us t pass ed new concealed
carr y laws, but that based on the driving behavi or and t he holding the gun vis ibly in t he v ehi cle, t hey [the Gruchows ] thought i t w as enough to w arr ant a call to polic e to hav e i t checked out. [1 1 ] Af t e r thi s conv ersation, Offi cer Lomas explain ed to Mr

. Gibbs that he w as being detain ed be ca us e someone had seen him driving hi s v ehi cle and pointi ng a gun at the cei ling

Id

. at 5. 1 0

Id

. 1 16 No. 13-3121
of the car
. She also informed him o f hi s rights under Miranda
v
. Ar i zo n a, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After hearin g hi s rights, Mr

. Gibbs told Offi cer Lomas that he had air so ft g un s in hi s car
. Ai rsoft guns are replic as of fi rear ms; they usu ally hav e the
same color

, di mensi ons, w ei ght and markings as real fi rear ms. Mr

. Gi bbs explain ed that he w a s on hi s w ay home from an ai rsoft ev ent, where he had been a refer ee, when a fri end called and su gge sted that t hey meet atDexter ’s for a drink. The parties di sagree as to whether , during the course of thi s conv ersation, Mr

. Gibbs consented to Offi cer Lomas’s search of the Jeep. Offi cer Lomas stated that duri ng her di scu ssi on wi th Mr . Gibbs, he had consented to her l ook ing in the J eep for t he
a i rsoft w eapons. By contrast, Mr

. Gibbs testifi ed that 1 2 Offi cer Lomas had asked for permi ssi on to search hi s Jeep, but he had deni ed i t. He sai d that he had offered to get the i tems 1 3 for her but that he had refused her reque st t o se arch the

v ehi cle. In any ev ent, Offi cer Lomas searched t he Jee p and

1 4 found an ai rsoft shotgun, an ai rsoft handgun and a pla sti c kni fe. She stated t hat the handgun w as vis ible just b y looking in t he window of the Jeep. She too k the ai rsoft handgun and placed i t in her sq ua d car becau se she beli ev ed that i t w as evidenc e of a di sorder ly conduct vi olation.

Id

. at 6. 1 2

R.1 5 (Gi b b s Dep.) at 16. 1 3

At the summa ry judgment stag e, we take Mr. Gibb s’s v ersi on of events 1 4 as true and ass ume that there was no consent.No. 13-3121 7
After the search, Offi cer Lomas di scu ssed the s i tuation wi th Ser geant Chaney, and they deci d e d t o i ssu e Mr

. Gibbs a
m i s demeanor ci tation for di sorder ly conduc t. Mr

. Gibb s s i gne d the ci tation to ackno wledge that he had receiv ed i t and that it
w as explain ed to hi m. He then w as released. Accordi ng to the law enf or cement repor t, the enti re interaction las ted appro ximately thi rt y minutes; Mr

. Gibbs say s i t too k about an hour

. Th e ci tation w as later di smi ssed pursuant to an agr eeme nt made by Mr

. Gibbs ’s lawy er and the assi stant di stric t atto rney and approv ed by a state j udge.

B. On October 31, 2012, Mr

. Gibbs brought thi s acti on again st Offi cer L o ma s un d er 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He di d not name as defendants any of the other offi cers who had been present in the pa r k ing lot at Dexter ’s Pub

. He sought damages and declarator y relief, allegin g that he had been ar r e sted wi thout probable caus e and that hi s car had been searched wi thout a
w arr ant, in violati on of hi s rights under the Four th Amendment as made appli cable to the states thro ugh the Fo urteent h Amendment. The Gruchows , O ffi cer Lomas and Mr

. Gibbs g a ve deposi tions

. Offi cer Lomas then mov ed for sum mary judgment. In supp or t of her motion, Offi cer Lomas ar g ued to the di stric t court that her acti o ns conformed to the Constituti on becau se she had pr obable cause t o arr est M r
. Gibbs for di sor
derly conduc t un d e r Wi scons in state law

. She too k the view that, despi te a recent statuto ry amendmen t th a t e xe m p ts ( in the absenc e of “other facts and ci rcums tances that indicate a8 No. 13-3121
cri minal or mali ci ous intent”) “loadi ng, carry ing, or g o ing armed w i th a fi rear m” from the catego ry of ci table di sorder ly conduc t, see Wi s. St at. § 947.01(2), the tot ali ty of the ci rcumst a nces here—t hat Mr

. Gibbs w as driving fast on ci ty st r e e t s wh ile pointin g an unholstered gun at the cei ling of his car—gav e her prob a bl e ca use to arr est and ci te Mr

. Gibbs

. Consequently

, she maintai ned, the search of the car w as consti tutionally permi ssi ble as a search inci dent t o arr est. Alter nati v ely

, Offi cer Lomas sub mi tte d that she w as entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty becau se, at the tim e she acted, any consti

tutional right that had been violated w as not clearly establi shed. The di stric t court deni ed Offi cer Lom a s’s motion. In i ts view , “the facts known to Lomas at the tim e w ere not suffi ci ent to w arr ant a belief that Gibbs had commi tte d di sorder ly conduc t,” and, there fore, Offi cer Lomas di d not hav e probable
caus e to arr est Mr

. Gibbs

. I n a r riving at i ts deci si on, the 1 5 di stric t court focus ed on the recent amendmen t to Wi scons in’s di sorder ly conduct statute: “Although seeing a person hold a gun in a ca r l i kely w ould alarm many people, and may w ell hav e been a rar e si ght befor e t he pass age of the [statute], the St ate of Wi sc on s in has speci fi cally i mplemented a right to carry fi rear ms openly and has explic i tly exempted such behavi or from prosecuti on.” The di stric t court conc luded that the 1 6 issuance of the ci tation consti tuted the violati on of a clear l y

R.2 3 at 1

. 1 5

Id

. at 10

. 1 6No. 13-3121 9
establi shed co nsti tutional right becau se a reasonable poli ce offi cer i n the same ci rcums tances as Offi cer L omas w ould not beli ev e that she had probable caus e to arr est Mr

. Gibbs

. Ther e fo re, the di stric t court held that Offi cer Lomas w as not entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Offi cer Lomas tim ely appealed.

II DISCUSSION A. On appeal, Offi cer Lomas contends, as she di d in the di stric t court, that she d i d not violate Mr

. Gibbs ’s consti tutional rights and, ev en i f she di d, t ho se rights w ere not clearly establi shed when she acted. Accordi ngly , she ur g e s, she i s entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. For the reasons set fort h in thi s opin i on, w e beli ev e that t he re i s merit in Offi cer Lomas’s sub mi ssi on. W

e fi rst addre ss s ev eral t hreshold matter s.

1. Our appellate j uri sdi cti on i s secu re. “[A] di stric t court’s deni al of sum mary judgment usu ally i s an unappealab le interlo cutory or der ... .” Jewettv. Anders , 521 F .3d 818, 821–22 (7th Ci r
. 2008). How ev er , there i s a w ell-establi shed exception to thi s gener al rule under the collateral or der doctrine where
a party challen ges a di stric t court’s deter minati o n t hat a government offi ci al i s not entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Mitchell v
. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985). Of course, when
w e exer ci se thi s jurisdi cti on, w e hav e authority only ov er10 No. 13-3121 appeals inv olving “abstract i ssu es of law ,” Johnson v
. Jones , 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995), i .e., those in whi ch a di stric t court has deci ded, as a ma t t e r o f law , whether a giv en set of facts demonstrate s that a violati on of a clearly establi shed consti tutional right has occurred, see Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 52 7

– 3 0

. S e e also Boa rd v
. Farnham , 394 F .3d 469, 476 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 05). W e do not hav e, by contrast, jurisdi cti on ov er appeals from di stric t cour t o r ders reg ardin g “‘evidenc e suffi ci ency ,’” i .e., those in whi ch a di stric t court has asses sed whether a party has produced suffi ci ent evidenc e to c re a te a genu ine i ssu e of tr i able fact w arr anti ng tr i al on the merits

. S e e Johnson , 515 U.S. at 313–18. Here, Offi cer Lomas’s appeal clearly falls wi thi n the fi rst ca t e gor y: She sub mi ts that, ev en consi dering the facts in t he li ght most fav or able to Mr

. Gibbs, those facts do not amount to a clearly establi shed consti tutional violati on. Therefore , mindfu l of the li mi ts of our jurisdi cti on, w e mus t construe all facts and inferences in fav or of Mr

. Gibbs and exami ne only the “purely legal ques t io n” of whether those facts “make out a violati on of clearly establi shed law .” Huff v
. Reic hert, 7 4 4 F .3d 999, 1004 (7th Ci r . 2014) (internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

2. The standard of rev i ew i s also w ell establi shed. W e rev i ew de nov o the deni al of a motion fo r summary judgment on quali fi ed i mmu ni ty gr ounds. Fin dlay v
. Len dermon , 722 F .3d 895, 899 (7th Ci r . 2013).No. 13-3121 11
In conduc tin g our r e view , w e do not ev aluate the
w ei ght of the evidenc e, judge the cr e d ibi li ty of wi tnesses or deter mine t he ult i mate tr uth of the matter ; rat her

, w e deter mine whether ther e exis ts a genuine i ssu e o f t r i able fact. Anderson v
. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 9 1 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment i s proper i f “the pleadings, deposi tions, answers to interr ogat ories, a nd admi ssi ons on fi le, tog ether wi th the affi davits, i f any

, show that there i s no genuine i ssu e as to any material fact and that the mov ing part y is entitled to a j udgment as a matter o f law .” Jewett , 521 F .3d at 821 (quoti ng Magin v
. Monsanto Co. , 420 F .3d 679, 686 (7th Ci r
. 2005)); see a lso Fed. R. Ci v
. P

. 56; Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

B. Hav ing completed our exami nati on of the pert inent threshold i ssu es, we now come to the merits of Offi cer Lomas’s quali fi ed i mmu ni ty defense.

1. W e fi rst examine the requirements of the quali fi ed i mmu
ni ty doctrine that Offi cer Lomas maint a ins prot ects her from exposure t o tr i al and li abi li ty fr om damages. “Section 1 9 8 3 allows ci tizens whose consti tutional rights hav e been violated by p ub l ic offi ci als to sue those offi ci als in12 No. 13-3121
their indi vidu al capac i ties .” Flem ing v
. Livin gston Cnty., Ill. , 674 F .3d 874, 878 (7th Ci r
. 2012). In responding to such an acti on, a publi c offi ci al may rais e the affi rmativ e defense of qu ali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Jewett , 521 F .3d at 823. Quali fi ed i mmu ni ty “prot ects government offi ci als from li abi li ty for ci vil damages insofar as their condu ct does not v i olate clearly establi shed s tatut or y or consti tutional rights of whi ch a reasonable person w ould hav e know n. ” Pearson v

. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotat i on marks o mit ted). Thi s doctrine balanc es competi ng concerns: On one hand, i t prot ects a government offi ci al’s abi li ty to func tion wi thout the threat of di straction and li abi li ty , see Richardson v
. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1997); and, on the other

, i t affords members of t he publi c the abi li ty to “vind i cate consti tutional violati ons by government offi ci als who abus e their offi ces,” Jewett , 521 F .3d at 822 (int e r na l quotat i on marks omitted). Determin ing whether a defendant state offi cer i s entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty inv olv es tw o inq uir i es: “(1) whether the facts, take n in the li ght most fav or able to the plainti ff, make out a viola t io n of a consti tutional right, and (2) whether that consti tutional right w as clearly est abli shed at the tim e of the alleged violati on.” W

illiams v
. City of Chicago , 733 F .3d 749, 758 (7th Ci r
. 2013). If either inqui ry i s answered in the negativ e, the defendant offi ci al i s entitled to sum mary judgment. W e a re permi tte d to address the tw o prong s of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty in ei ther or der

. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236

. Wi th thi s backgro und, w e now turn to the facts presented by the r ecord.No. 13-3121 13
2. Mr

. Gibbs clai ms that, by arr esti ng hi m for di sorder ly conduc t, Offi cer Lomas violated hi s Four th Amendment right to be fr ee from unreasonable seizu res. “‘False arr est’ i s shor thand for an unreasonable sei zure prohibi ted by t he Four th Amendment.” Gon za l ez v
. V ill. of W

. Milwaukee, 671 F .3d 649, 655 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Because t he presence of probable caus e makes a w arr antless arr e st r easonable under the Four th Amendme nt, “the exis tence of probable caus e i s an absolute defense to a § 1983 clai m for f alse arr est.” Gutierrez v. Kermon , 722 F .3d 1003, 1007 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Accordi ngly , Offi cer Lomas sub mi ts that the recor d establi shes that she had probable caus e to arr est Mr

. Gibbs for di sorder ly conduc t. W e mus t ev a luate that submi ssi on. “An offi cer has probable caus e to make an arr est only when the fact s an d ci rcums tances wi thi n hi s knowledge and of whi ch he ha s reasonably tr ustw or thy information are suffi ci ent to
w arr ant a prudent person in beli eving that the sus pect has commi tte d an offense.” Reher v
. V ivo , 656 F .3d 772, 776 (7th Ci r
. 2011). In maki ng thi s asses sment, w e ask whether , giv e n t he “tot ali ty o f the ci rcums tances,” a reasonable offi cer w ould beli ev e that the sus pect had commi tte d a cri me. Jones v
. City of Elkhart , In d

. , 7 3 7 F .3d 1107, 1114 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (internal quotat i on m ark s omi tte d). “W e do not consi der the subjectiv e motiv ations of the offi cer .” Id. Where, as here, part of the offi cer’s probable caus e analysi s i s based on an informant’s tip,
w e hav e stated that “as lo ng a s a reasonably credible witnes s or vic tim informs the poli ce that someone has commi tte d a cri me, or i s commi tting[] a cri me, the offi cers hav e probable14 No. 13-3121

caus e.” Mat thews v
. City of E. St. Louis , 675 F .3d 703, 706–07 (7th Ci r . 2012) (internal quot ation marks omi tte d). Our present task, there fore, i s to deter min e whether the tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances, as known to Offi cer Lomas at the tim e she arr ested Mr

. Gibbs, gav e her probable caus e to beli ev e that Mr

. Gibbs had commi tte d the cri me of di sorder ly conduc t. At the tim e that Mr

. Gibbs w a s ha ndcu ffed and placed in the back of the poli ce v ehi cle, Offi cer Lomas knew the following, 1 7 based on the call from di spatch and her personal p ho ne conv ersation wi th Mr s. Gruchow: (1) Mr s. Gruchow had called di spatch to repo rt a man driving thro ugh Madis on w i th what look ed li ke a black handgun; (2) Mr s. Gruchow saw the man holding the gun near hi s head, po int e d a t the ro of of hi s car , whi le stopped at a red li ght; (3) the man w as dri ving “badl y” and had accelerated qui ckly from the red li ght; (4) whi le driving, the man rais ed the gun and pointed i t at the ro of of hi s car a seco nd t i me; (5) the man had not threat ened any one or anythin g wi th the gun; (6) the man parke d at Dexter ’s Pub and may hav e enter ed th e bar armed; (7) the Gruchows had

As a prel i minary mat ter, we note tha t b oth partie s ass ume tha t there was 1 7

an arrest as opp osed to an i nv esti gatory detenti on. T he d i stric t cour t pro ceed ed on th e same b asis. A l though nei ther the parti es nor the distri ct cour t i denti fi ed, with any speci fi c i t y, the poi nt at which an arrest too k pl ace, the partie s appear to ass ume tha t the arrest occ urred when Mr. Gibb s was han dcuff ed and p l aced i n the b ack o f a pol i ce v ehic l e. See Appe l l ee’s Br. 7– 8 ( explaini ng wha t O ffi cer Lo masknew at tha t po i nt in ti me); Repl y Br. 3– 8 (same); cf. Monroe v. Dav is , 71 2 F.3d 11 06 , 11 15 (7 th Ci r. 20 13 ) (noti ng tha t pl acing an i ndivid ual i n han dcu ffs might i ndic ate tha t a custodi al arrest has occ ur red)

. We sha l l preter mit an extens i v e di scussio n of this poi nt b ecause, in our v i ew, the mat ter i s not outco me deter minative i n this cas e.No. 13-3121 15
p r ov i ded a detailed descri ption of the man and hi s v ehicl e ; (8) a v ehi cle matchi ng the descri ption w as par ked at Dexter ’s Pub ; (9) a man matching the descri ption e x it ed Dexter ’s Pub ; and (10) when confront ed by the poli ce o ffi cers, the man sai d that he o wn ed the relev ant v ehi cle. M r
. Gibbs does not arg ue that the Gruchows w er e un r e l i able or that they were not reasonably credi

ble wi tnesses, nor d o e s he challen ge that Offi cer Lomas knew the foreg oin g information at t he tim e of hi s arr est. He only challen ges the legal si gni fi canc e of the facts recounted. Whether t hese fac ts gav e Offi cer Lomas probable caus e to arr est Mr

. Gibbs depends on the elements of the cri me of di sorder ly conduct. See Abbot t v. Sangamon Cn ty., Ill. , 705 F .3d 706, 715 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (“The exis tence of probable caus e or arg uable pro bable cause depends, in the fi rst instance, on the elements of the predic ate cri mina l offense( s) as defined by state law .”). Wi scons in’s di sorder ly conduct statute pro vides : (1) Whoev er

, in a publi c or priv ate place, engages in violent, abus ive, indecent, profane, boi stero us, unreasonably loud or other wi se di sorder ly conduc t under ci rcums tances in whi ch the conduc t tends t o caus e or provoke a di sturbance i s gui lty of a Class B mi sdemeanor

. (2) U nl ess other facts and ci rcums tances that indi cate a cri minal or mali ci ous intent on the part of the person apply

, a person i s not in violati on of, and may not be charge d wi th a violati on of, this secti on for loadi ng, carry ing, or going armed wi th a fi rear m,16 No. 13-3121
wi thout reg ard to whether t he firearm i s lo aded or i s conc ealed or openly carr i ed. Wi s. Stat . § 947.01. There i s l it t le questi on that i f w e analyzed thi s case solely under sub secti on 947.01(1), Offi cer Lom a s w ould hav e had probable c ause to arre st Mr

. Gibbs

. There are t w o elements to
a typical di sorder ly conduc t offense in Wi scons in: (1) “that the defendant engaged in violent, abus i v e, indecent, profane, boi stero us, unreasonably loud, or si mi lar di sorder ly conduc t” and (2) “that the defendant’s conduc t occurred under ci rcumstances where such conduc t tends to caus e or provoke a di sturbance.” State v
. Schwebke, 644 N.W .2d 666, 674 (Wi s. 2002) (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). The Wi scons in courts hav e interpr eted the phrase “si mi lar di sorder ly conduc t” broadly to mean “conduc t of a t y p e not prev i ously enumerated but si mi lar there to in havin g a tendency to di srupt goo d or der and to provoke a di sturbance.” Id

. (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Cert ainly

, driving qui ckly down ci ty street s, holding an unholstered gun—of any kin d or wi th any lev el of destruct ive ca paci ty—in view of other driv ers, i s conduc t wi th a tenden cy t o d isrupt publi c peace and cause t he publi c t o fear for its s afety

. See id. at 676. Mr

. Gibbs nev ert heless arg ues that Offi cer Lomas di d not hav e probable caus e to arr est M r
. Gibbs becau se sub secti on 947.01(2) prov i des that a bsent “facts and ci rcums tances that indi cate a cri minal or mali ci ous intent,” an indi vidu al cannot be ci ted for di sorder ly conduc t “for loadi ng, carry ing, or going
a r med with a fi rear m, without reg ard to whether the fir e a r m i s loaded or i s conc e a l ed or openly carried.” In Mr

. Gibbs ’sNo. 13-3121 17
view , Offi cer Lomas should hav e realized that thi s li mi tation
on the more gener al language of the statu t e exempted hi s acti ons from the ambi t of t he statute. Subsecti on 947.01(2) w as enacted in 2011 as part of a large r a ct that expanded concealed carry rights in Wi scons in. Th e 1 8 Wi sconsin courts hav e not y et answered i mport ant questi ons about thi s sub secti on, such as whether the type of conduc t at i ssu e here i s “carry ing” or “going armed” or i s more proper ly catego rized as unprotecte d conduc t puni shab le under the di sorder ly conduct statute. 1 9 The di stric t court held that, in li ght of sub secti on 947.01(2), Offi cer L o mas could not hav e had probable caus e to arr est Mr

. Gi bbs becau se she had no evidenc e that Mr

. Gib bs w as

See Act of Ju l y 8 , 2 01 1, § 86 , 20 11 Wi s. Sess. Laws 6 68 , 68 5 (co di fi ed at 1 8 Wi s. Stat. § 9 4 7 .01 (2 )) (2 01 1 Wi s. Act 35 , § 86 ); see also United States v. Williams , 731 F .3d 678, 692 (7 th Ci r. 20 13 ) (Hamil ton, J., concurr i ng i n part and concur ri ng i n the judgment); Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee , 67 1 F.3d 64 9, 65 4– 55 (7 th Ci r. 2 01 2)

.

The partie s di spute the signi fi cance of the fact tha t the weapo ns here 1 9 were not “fi rearms” b ut airso ft wea pons. In deter mini ng whether she had pro b ab l e cause to arre st M r
. Gi b b s, we are conce rned onl y with the reasonab l eness of Offi cer Lo mas ’s ar r e st o f Mr. Gibb s and, i n particul ar, with the extent of her knowl edge. When she arrested Mr. Gibb s, she knew tha t an i ndivid ual had b een using wha t l oo ked l i ke a fi rearm i n an unusua l
or alarming way
. Pub l i c safety demands tha t of fi cers respo nd expedi ently to such threats as i f the weapon were real. Mrs. Gruchow’s di scussio n with Offi cer Lo mas certai nly pro v i ded Offi cer Lo mas with enough i nfor mati on to b el i eve, reasonab l y, that the weapon wasreal

.18 No. 13-3121
acting wi th a cri minal or mali ci ous intent. The court contrasted M r
. Gibbs ’s behavi or wi th other conduc t that, in i ts view , mi ght amount to di sorder ly conduc t under sub secti on 947.01(2), such as “i f Gibbs had placed hi s hand on the tr i gge r , o r ha d poin ted the gun at someone or something besi des t he
ro of of hi s own ca r

, o r had done anythin g at all that could reasonabl[y] be construed by an observ er as a ny so rt of atte mpt to hurt hi mself or to threat en other s.” Ultim ately , the 2 0 di stric t court held that “the facts known to Offi cer Lomas at the tim e she too k Gibbs into cus tody w ould not lead a reasonable person to beli ev e that Gibbs had violated the newly-amen ded di sorder ly conduc t statute.” It w ent on to hold that “i t w ould 2 1 hav e been apparent to a reasonable offi cer that Offi cer L omas had no reasonable basi s for arr esti ng Gibbs ” and w as there fore not entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. Whether the Supreme 2 2 Court of W i scons in w ould take t he same vi ew o f t he scope o f the statute i s open to serious qu esti on. W e t hink i t w ould be i mprudent to base our deci si on o n specu lation about t he appropr i ate scope of the Wi scons in statute. In our view

, the se co nd secti on of the di sorder ly conduc t statut e poses si gni fi cant interpr etat i v e problems that
are be st answered by the Supreme Court of Wi scons in.

R.2 3 at 1 0. 2 0

Id

. 2 1

Id

. at 15 –1 6. 2 2No. 13-3121 19
Including the conduc t at i ssu e here wi thi n the scope of sub section 947.01(2 ) w ou l d no doubt hav e si gni fi cant rami fi cati ons on i ssu es o f stat e and muni ci pal g ov ernance in mat ter s o f publi c safety

. In thi s a g e o f “ro ad rag e” and si mi lar moto ris t mi sbehavior , an indi vidu al’s driving aro und at a hi gh speed whi le holding an unholstered w eapon in plain view of other moto r i sts rais es seri ous i ssu es of publi c safety

. Whether such acti vity constit ut es merely “carry ing[] or going armed” should be deci de d , i f at all possi

ble, by a state court far more fami li ar wi th the exigenci es of state and local governanc e and far more fami li ar wi th the legis l ativ e practic e of i ts state. If i t w ere necess ary to construe the problematic statuto ry languag e in o r der to resolv e thi s case, w e w ell mi ght consi der using th e certifi cati on privi lege accorded to us by the Wi scons in legis lature. How ev er

, such a necess i ty i s not upon us since the 2 3
se co nd prong of the establi shed quali fi ed i mmu ni ty analysi s affords a soli d basi s for deci si on. “[I]t i s apparent that the

Wi s. Stat. § 82 1.0 1 ( “ T he su p r eme cour t may ans wer questio ns of l aw 2 3 certi fi ed to it b y the supreme court of the Uni ted States, a cour t of appeals ofth e U nited States o r the hi ghest appell ate cour t o f a ny other state when requested b y the certi fyi ng cour t i f there are i nv ol v ed i n any pro c e e di ng b efo re i t questio ns of l aw of this state which may b e deter minative of the
cause then pendi ng i n the certi fyi ng cour t and as to which i t appears to the certi fyi ng cour t there i s no contro l l i ng prece dent i n the deci sio ns of the supreme cour t and the cour t of appeals of this state.”); cf. Ci r. R. 52 (a) (“ When the rul es of the highest co urt o f a state pro v i de f or cer tif i catio n to tha t cour t b y a fed eral cour t of questio ns arisi ng under the l aws of tha t state which wil l control th e outco me of aca se pending in the fed eral cour t, thi s cour t, sua sponte or on moti on of a party, may certi fy such a questio n to the state cour t i n accord ance with the rul es of tha t cour t, and may stay the case i n this co urt to awa i t the state co urt’s deci sio n ofthe questio n certi fi ed.” ).20 No. 13-3121 alleged right at i ssu e [w as] not clearly establi shed” at the tim e Offi cer Lomas acted. Catlin v
. City of Wheat on , 574 F .3d 361, 365 (7th Ci r . 2009). W

e hav e stated: The relev ant inqui ry in deter mining whether a right i s clearly establi shed i s whether i t w ould hav e been cl ear to a reasonable offi cer that hi s conduc t w a s unlaw ful in the si tuation the offi cer confronted. Where the law i s open to interpr etat i on, quali fi ed i mmu ni ty prot ects poli ce offi cers who reasonably interpr et an unclear statute. Reher, 656 F .3d at 775 (ci tation omi tte d). As w e noted in Abbo tt, 705 F .3d at 714, “[t]he probable-caus e standard inher e nt ly allows ro om for reasonable mi stakes.” See Bri n egar v
. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). Here, w e deal wi th the questi on in the context of a false arr est sui t where the defendant offi cer has the added lay er of prot ecti on of quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

. In thi s si tuation, w e ask whether a reasonable police o ffic er in the defendant’s shoes coul d ha v e beli ev ed that probable caus e exis ted. W e ar e convin ced that Mr

. Gibbs di d not meet hi s burden of refutin g Offi cer Lomas’s quali fi ed i mmu ni ty defense ei ther by “i denti fyi ng a closely analogo us case or by persuading the
co ur t that the [offi cer’s] conduc t [w a]s so egr egious and unreasonable that, notwi thstanding the lack of an a nalogo us deci si on, no reasonable o ff i cer could hav e thought [s] he w as acting lawfu lly

.” See Abbo tt, 705 F .3d at 7 23–24. Instead of i denti fyi ng an analogo us case, Mr

. Gibbs —li ke the di stric t cour t—points to an informal Advis or y Memor andum by the Wi scons in Att or ney General entitled, “The Inter play Betw eenNo. 13-3121 21
Art i cle I, § 25 Of The Wi scons in Constituti on, The Open Carr y Of Firearms And Wi scons in ’s D i s or d e rly C ond uct St atute, Wi s. St at. § 947.01.” Memor andumfrom J.B. V an Ho llen, A tto rney Gen., to Wi s. Di st. Att or ney s, De puty Di st. Att or neys & A ssi stant Di st. Att or neys (Apr

. 20, 2009), availab le at http://www

.doj .state.wi .us/s i tes/default/fi les/2 0 0 9

- ne w s/fin alopen-carry -memo-2009.pd f. The Advis or y Memor andum st ates that “the mere open carry ing of a fi rear m by a p e r so n, absent addi tional facts and ci rcums tances, should not result in a di sorder ly conduc t charge.” Id. at 1, ¶ 1

. Th e Advis or y Memor andum i s not, of course, the sort of defini tiv e statement of the law by the courts t ha t w o uld make a consti tutional violation “clearly establi shed.” Mor e i mport antly , the 2 4 memorandum fai ls to support M r
. Gibbs ’s posi tion becau se i t speci fi cally ackno wledges, “Ev en when an act faci ally resembles the exer ci se of a prot ected right, the facts and ci rcumstances of a case may giv e ris e to a di sorder ly conduc t charge.” Id. at 3, ¶ 5. Notably

, the memorandum prov i ded an example: “[A] person openly c arr yin g a holster ed handgun on hi s own proper ty whi le doin g lawn w or k s hould not fac e a di sorder ly conduc t charge. If, how ev er , a person brandi shes a handgun in publi c, the c onduct may lose i ts consti tutional prot ecti on.” Id. at 4, ¶ 7. Far from clearly establi shing that Mr

. Gibbs ’s conduc t
w as not i llegal, the memorand um leav es open the di stinct possi bi li ty that Mr

. Gibbs’s conduc t here mi ght be character

The Adviso ry Memo randum was publi shed i n 20 09 , wel l b efo re 2 4 sub secti on 94 7.0 1( 2) was enacted. Theref or e, i ts rel evanc y to the new di sord erl y co nduct statute is questi onab l e.22 No. 13-3121
i zed as the equ i v alent of “b randi sh[ ing] a handgun in publi c” and therefor e consti tute dis or derly conduct. Id. As w e hav e noted earlier , the mere addi tion of sub secti on (- 2) to secti on 947.01 hardly makes the law “clearly establi shed.” The Wi scons in courts hav e y et to interpr et key ter ms o f t he sub secti on, such a s “going armed wi th” and “cri minal or mali ci ous intent.” Nor i s t hi s t he sort of case where Offi cer Lomas’s condu ct
w as so egr egious as to be recog ni zed univ ersally by law
e n forcement offi cers as unlaw ful. Rather , as w e hav e s u gg e s te d earlier , a reasonable poli ce offi cer—i ndeed, a reasonable court—could beli ev e that, under the facts described abov e, far
more than the statuto rily exempted acti vity of “l o a d ing, carry ing, or going armed wi th a fir earm” w as taking place. Despi te Mr

. Gibbs ’s repeat ed contentions that he w as “just driving,” he obviously was doing more than that. I nd e ed, hi s conduc t also w as suffi ci ent for a reasonable offi cer t o co nclu de—in the absenc e of any gui dance from the Wi sconsin co urts—that a cri minal or mali ci ous intent w as p re s e nt, thu s re m ov in g a ny p ro tection that sub secti on 947

. 0 1 ( 2 )
w ould other wi se hav e giv en Mr

. Gibbs

. For example, Wi sconsin state law prohibi ts fi ring a gun from a v ehi cle, see Wi s. St at. §§ 167.31(2)( c), 941.20(3), and an offi cer who receiv es a tip that
an indiv i dual w as vis ibly handling an unholstered w eapon whi le speeding may beli ev e reasonably that the indi vidu al had the intent to violate that prohibi tion. Wi scons in also prohibi ts enter ing a bar wi th a handgun under mo st ci rcums tances, see Wi s. St at. § 941.237 (2 ), a nd the facts known to Offi cer Lomas when she arr ested Mr

. Gibbs may hav e suggested that he hadNo. 13-3121 23
the intent to violate thi s st a tute. Apart from these statuto rily based exampl e s of how the facts of thi s case may hav e indi

cated a speci fi c cri minal intent, i t i s also reasonable to interpr et these facts as indi cating a more gener al mali ci ous intent. Based
on the facts known to Offi cer Lomas about Mr

. Gibbs ’s behavi or , i t w ould hav e tak en no more t han an adjustment of hi s hand posi tion before the gun w as poin ted out the window of hi s v ehi cle or ev en at hi mself

. A reasonable offi cer in Offi cer Lomas’s s hoes could hav e interpr eted Mr

. Gibbs ’s conduct as motiv ated by an in tent t o harm hi mself or other s. In sum, ev e n if O ffi cer Lomas w as mi staken in beli eving that she had probable caus e to arr est Mr

. Gibbs, such a mi stake
w as reasonable in li ght of the fa ct s and ci rcums tances of thi s case and in li ght of the undev eloped case l a w r egar ding sub secti on 947.01(2). Consequently , contrar y to the conclu si on of the di stric t court, Offi cer Lomas w as entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty fo r her arr est of Mr . Gibbs

.

3. Mr

. Gibbs also contends that the search of hi s car by Offi cer Lomas violated hi s Four t h Amendment rights. The Four th Amendment prohibi ts, wit h li mi ted exceptions, w arr antless searches. See Arizona v
. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). How ev er , “[a]m ong the exceptions to the w arr ant requirement i s a search inci dent to a lawfu l arr est.” Id. ; Peals v
. T erre Haute Police Dep’t, 535 F .3d 621, 627 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Under the search-inci dent-toarr est exception, law e nf or cement may search a v ehi cle “inci dent t o a recent occupan t’s arr est

... (1) i f the arr estee i s wi thi n reaching di st a nc e of the v ehi cle duri ng the search, or24 No. 13-3121 (2) i f the poli ce hav e reason to beli ev e that the v ehi cle contai ns evidenc e relev ant to the cri me of arr est.” Davis v
. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2011) (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Here, the search w as conduc ted becau se Offi cer Lomas had reason to beli ev e that t he v ehi cle contained evidenc e relev ant to the cri me of arr est—namely , the w eapon that Mr

. Gi bbs had been holding whi le driving thro ugh Madis on
. Mr

. Gibbs ’s entire arg ument reg ardin g the search i s that becau se the arr est violated hi s clearly establi shed consti tutional rights, the search also violated those rights. He makes no other arg uments. Sinc e
w e hav e held that a reasonable offi cer in Offi cer Lomas’s shoes
co uld hav e deter mined that she had the authority to arr est Mr

. Gibbs, i t follows t hat su ch a r easonable o ffi cer also could
co nc l ude that she had the authority to search the v ehi cle inci dent to that ar rest. 2 5 Consequently

, w e hold tha t the search of Mr

. Gibbs ’s
v ehi cle for the w eapon inv olv ed in the offense of arr est di d not violate Mr

. Gibbs ’ s clearly establi shed rights, and Offi cer

An alternative b asis fo r fi nding Offi cer Lo mas ’s actio ns to b e withi n the 2 5 b ounds of the Co nstituti on i s the “automo b i l e exceptio n” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requir ement. Offi cer Lo mas coul d s ea rch Mr. Gibb s- ’s Jee p b ecause she had pro b ab l e cause t o b el i eve tha t she woul d fi nd evidence of i l l egal activity (the han dgun) i n the car. See, e.g. , Arizona v. Gant, 55 6 U.S

. 33 2, 34 7 (2 00 9) ; United States v. Ross , 45 6 U.S

. 79 8, 80 6– 07, 82 5 (1 98 2) ; Carroll v. United States , 26 7 U.S

. 13 2, 14 9, 15 3– 56 (1 92 5) ; United States
v. Washbur n , 38 3 F.3d 63 8, 64 1 (7 th Ci r. 20 04 ) (rec ogni zing tha t the “automo b i l e exceptio n” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requir ement all ows “a warrantle ss search of a v ehic l e to b e conduc ted so l ong as there i s pro b ab l e cause to b el i eve i t c o nt ai ns contraband or evidence of i l l egal activity”)

.No. 13-3121 25
Lomas i s entitled to i mmu ni t y fr o m su i t for her search of the

v ehi cle.

Conclus ion W e find i t unnec essary to deci de whet her Offi cer Lomas violated Mr

. Gibbs ’s consti tutional rights to be free from arr est for di so rder ly conduc t and to be prot ected again st a search inci dent to that arr est becau se any co nstituti onal rights i mpli cated w ere not clearly est a bl i shed at the tim e of Offi cer Lomas’s acti ons. Ther efore, Offi cer Lomas w as entitled to quali fi ed i mmu ni ty

, and the di stric t court err ed in denyi ng her motion for sum mary j udg ment. Accordi ngly , w e rev erse the deci si on of the dis tr i ct court and re mand for further pr oceedings consi stent wi th thi s opin i on. Offi cer L o ma s may recov er her costs in thi s court. REVERSED and REMANDED