Transforming Defense 

National Security in the 21st Century 

Report of the 

National Defense Panel 

December 1997 
This document is also available on the Internet at http://www .dtic.millndp 
'. 

Philip A. Odeen 

Chairman 

The Honorable 

Richard L. Armitage 

General, USMC (Ret.) 

Richard D. Hearney 

Admiral, USN (Ret.) 

David E. Jeremiah 

The Honorable 

Robert M. Kimmitt 

Doctor 

Andrew F. Krepinevich 

General, USAF (Ret.) 

James P. McCarthy 

Doctor 

Janne E. Nolan 

General, USA (Ret.) 

Robert W. RisCassi 

NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL 

1931 JEFFERSON DAVIS HWY 

ARLINGTON, VA 22022-3805 

Honorable William S. Cohen 

Secretary of Defense 

1000 Defense Pentagon 

Washington DC 20301-1000 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

We are pleased to provide the report of the National Defense Panel, 

"Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21st Century." This report 

is in accordance with Section 924 of the Military Force Structure Act of 1996. 

Our report focuses on the long-term issues facing U.S. defense and 

national security. It identifies the changes that will be needed to ensure U.S. 

leadership and the security and prosperity of the American people in the 

twenty-first century. We are convinced that the challenges of the twenty-first 

century will be quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the 

Cold War and require fundamental change to our national security 

institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020. 

To meet those challenges, we believe the United States must 

undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security 

structures, operational concepts and equipment, and the Defense 

Department's key business processes. We recognize that much is already 

being done in this regard and that you are committed to significant change. 

However, based on our deliberations, it is our view that the pace of this 

change must be accelerated. 

The transformation we envision goes beyond operational concepts, 

force structures, and equipment. It is critical that it also include procurement 

reform and changes to the support structure, including base closures, as you 

pointed out forcefully in your Defense Reform Initiative. 

Finally, bringing together all the elements of our national power will 

demand a highly integrated and responsive national security community that 

actively plans for the future--one that molds the international environment 

rather than merely responds to it. Defense needs to continue building on the 

Goldwater-Nichols reforms and extend that sense <?f jointness beyond the 

Department to the rest of the national security establishment and to our 

friends and allies abroad. 
The Panel has drawn on the creative thinking of many elements of the military 

community, other government agencies, experts on defense and national security, as 

well as business leaders. In particular, I want to thank you for the cooperation we 

received from you, other senior officials, civilian and military, and others in the 

Department. We also drew on the valuable insights provided by studies such as that of 

the President's Commission on Roles and Missions and the President's Commission on 

Critical Infrastructure Protection. Our report builds on the findings of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, but it looks further into the future and places much more emphasis oh 

the transformation strategy that we consider essential to safeguard our security twenty 

years from now. 

We have not attempted to provide all the answers. Rather, our intention is to 

stimulate a wider debate on our defense priorities and the need for a transformation to 

meet the challenges of 2020. Such a debate will be critical in building the necessary 

support of the Congress and American people for the extensive changes that must be 

made. We hope that our report will help to build a strong consensus for transforming 

the national security structure to meet the challenges of the next century. If we achieve 

that, we will have fulfilled our mission and our commitment to you, the Congress, and 

the American people. 

Sincerely, 

~ao~ 

Philip A. Odeen 

/ 
J 

,; 

NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL 

r~aob-- Mr. Philip A. Odeen 

Chairman 

Honorable Richard L. Armitage 

Admiral David E. J 

USN (Ret.) 

.~eE.Nolan ~~·~ 

General Richard D. He ey 

USMC (Ret) 

Honorable 

'Ko~. Robert k~ M. Kimmitt 

'"\ . \\ - General Robert W. RisCassi 

USA (Ret.) 
NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL STAFF MEMBERS 

Professional Staff 

Honorable Christopher Jehn, Executive Director 

Michael Munson, Deputy Executive Director 

James R. McDonough, Editor-in-Chief 

Patti Benner Antsen 

Michael Bruhn, LTC, USA 

Doug Crowder, Capt, USN 

David A. Deptula, Col, USAF 

Brian K. Dickson 

M. Bruce Elliott, COL, USA 

Jennifer A. George 

John P. Good, Maj, USAF 

Carol A. Haave 

Timothy P. Hagan, LCdr, USN 

Hal Hagemeier, Col, USAF 

Sieg Hildebrandt, COL, USA 

John J. Holly, Col, USMC 

W.R. Jones, Col, USMC 

Gerald D. Larson 

Joseph G. Lynch 

Edward Mahen, Col, USAF (ret) 

Judyt Mandel 

Rick "Slug" McGivern, Maj, USAF 

Chris Seiple, Capt, USMC 

Timothy L. Thorson, LtCol, USMC 

WilliamJ. Troy, LTC, USA 

Allen Youngman, COL, ARNG 

Administrative Staff 

Niels Andersen, Maj, USAF, Director of Administration 

Angela Rogers, Deputy Director of Administration 

James E. Harris, GySgt, USMC, Office Manager 

Jennifer S. Cheathem, SGT, USA 

Gloria G. De San tis 

Jonathan E. Jones, MSgt, USAF 

Donald Kinder, YNl, USN 

.Diane Long 

Leticia T. Spaght 

Faith Young 
CONTENTS 

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

The World in 2020 

Key Trends 

Geopolitical Trends 

Demographic and Social Trends 

Economic Trends 

Technology Trends 

Alternative Worlds 

Implications 

Operational Challenges to the Military 

Power Projection 

Information Operations 

Space 

Urban Operations 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Transnational Threats and Challenges 

U.S. National Security in 2020 

National Security Imperatives 

National Survival 

Global Economic and Political Stability 

Domestic Security 

Alternative Strategies for the 21st Century 

Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

Homeland Defense 

Regional Stability 

Projecting Military Power 

.Handling Lesser Military Threats 

Effective Urban Operations 

Space Operations 

Maintaining U.S. Information Superiority 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Force Capabilities 

Conventional Forces 

Force Characteristics 

5 

5 

5 

6 

7 

7 

8 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

14 

15 

16 

19 

19 

19 

19 

20 

20 

23 

25 

29 

33 

36 

36 

38 

41 

42 

43 

44 

44 
All Forces 46 

Land Forces 47 

Sea Forces 47 

Aerospace Forces 47 

Strategic Nuclear Forces 50 

Reserve Components 52 

The Army and Its Reserve Components 52 

A Transformation Strategy 57 

A Broad National Security Approach 60 

Alliance Structures 61 

The Intelligence Structure 63 

The Interagency Process 66 

Institutionalizing Innovation, Experimentation, and Change 68 

Transforming the Unified Command Plan 71 

Transforming the Industrial Base 74 

Encouraging Innovations 74 

The Acquisition Process 75 

Mobilization 77 

Transforming Infrastructure 79 

The Infrastructure Problem 79 

Principles of Infrastructure Management for 2020 80 

Improvement Opportunities 81 

Resource Management 81 

Installations and Personnel Support 83 

Industrial and Engineering Support 85 

Future Vision 85 

Conclusion 87 

Glossary 89 
... 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The United States enters the new millennium as the preeminent political, 

economic, and military power in the world. Today we are in a relatively secure interlude 

following an era of intense international confrontation. But we must anticipate that future 

adversaries will learn from the past and confront us in very different ways. Thus we must 

be willing to change as well or risk having forces ill-suited to protect our security twenty 

years in the future. Only one thing is certain: the greatest danger lies in an unwillingness 

or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of the next 

century. 

The United States needs to launch a transformation strategy now that will enable 

it to meet a range of security challenges in 2010 to 2020. Yet we must do this without 

taking undue risk in the interim. This transformation promises to be complex. We 

cannot know the full extent and nature of future challenges. Yet, we must make critical 

decisions and choices entailing significant investments of resources and energies. 

The Future Operational Environment 

We can safely assume that future adversaries will have learned from the Gulf 

War. It is likely that they will find new ways to challenge our interests, our forces and 

our citizens. They will seek to disable the underlying structures that enable our military 

operations. Forward bases and forward-deployed forces will likely be challenged and 

coalition partners coerced. Critical nodes that enable communications, transportation, 

deployment, and other means of power projection will be vulnerable. 

Our domestic communities and key infrastructures may also be vulnerable. 

Transnational threats may increase. As recently stated by Secretary Cohen, the 

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery means will 

pose a serious threat to our homeland and our forces overseas. Information systems, the 

vital arteries of the modem political, economic, and social infrastructures, will 

undoubtedly be targets as well. The increasing commercialization of space makes it . 

feasible for state and nonstate actors alike to acquire reconnaissance and surveillance 

services. 

. . 

In short, we can expect those opposed to our interests to confront us at home and 

abroad-possibly in both places at once-with asymmetrical responses to our traditional 

strengths. 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 

Near-term Implications 

Defense choices invariably entail risk; the only question is where we take the risk. 

A significant share of today' s Defense Department's resources is focused on the unlikely 

contingency that two major wars will occur at almost the same time. The Panel views 

this two-military-theater-of-war construct as, in reality, a force-sizing function. We are 

concerned that, for some, this has become a means of justifying current forces. This 

approach focuses significant resources on a low-probability scenario, which consumes 

funds that could be used to reduce risk to our long-term security. The Panel believes 

priority must go to the future. We recognize that, in the near term, the United States 

cannot ignore the threats posed by Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf and North Korea in 

Northeast Asia. However, our current forces, with the support of allies, should be 

capable of dealing with both contingencies. 

The Range of Challenges 

The types of missions our military and related security structures will be required 

to perform in 2010-2020 remain largely unchanged but the emphasis is likely to change. 

Maintaining regional stability is probably foremost among them, for the best way to 

forestall military challenges to the United States is to foster a stable international system. 

This demands full interaction with regional partners and alliances through diplomatic 

efforts as well as the full integration of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military activities. 

We must be able to project military power and conduct combat operations into 

areas where we may not have forward-deployed forces or forward bases. In particular, 

we must have the ability to put capable, agile, and highly effective shore-based land and 

air forces in place with a vastly decreased logistics footprint. Smaller force structures 

will be the norm, an evolution that must parallel the development of new operational 

concepts. Regular deployments to far-flung areas of the globe, from open deserts to 

confining urban terrain, therefore, are something we should expect. These deployments 

must not be viewed as a detraction from our traditional missions, but as a central element 

of the responsibilities of the future. 

Just as deployments abroad are key to a stable international environment, an 

adequate defensive structure at home is crucial to the safety of our citizens and 

well-being of our communities. One of the salient features of U.S. security in 2010-2020 

will be a much larger role for homeland defense than exists today. 

Effective deterrence of potential nuclear adversaries can be maintained at the 

reduced levels envisioned by START III and beyond. Over time, the focus of our efforts 

to deter nuclear attacks against the United States, its allies, and interests may change 

substantially from that of today. Deterrence of attack as the central focus of nuclear 

policy already is being supplanted by the need to manage-identify, account for, and 

safeguard against-the proliferation and possible use of nuclear and other weapons of 

ii 
, 

----------------------------Executive Summary 

mass destruction. Traditional U.S. nuclear policies may not be sufficient to deter nuclear, 

chemical, or biological attacks by a rogue state against U.S. allies and coalition partners. 

In regard to maintaining U.S. information superiority, we will need to integrate 

existing and new information systems while exploiting commercial technology. We must 

also have effective defensive and offensive information capabilities. We will need to 

recognize that the U.S. lead in space will not go unchallenged. We must coordinate the 

civil, commercial, and national security aspects of space, as use of space is a major 

element of national power. 

Force Capabilities 

Our military is superbly equipped, led, and trained and is blessed with 

magnificent men and women. We must never forget that our people in uniform have 

been the core of our strength in the past. They, more than any hardware system, form the 

real defense capability of today and tomorrow. Under no circumstances should we 

reduce the quality or training of our people. The technology revolution and advanced 

weapons we seek to embrace will be for naught if we take our military and civilian work 

force for granted. 

It is clear, however, that in the 2010-2020 time frame our military forces will 

need capabilities very different from those they currently possess. We are on the cusp of 

a military revolution stimulated by rapid advances in information and information-related 

technologies. This implies a growing potential to detect, identify, and track far greater 

numbers of targets over a larger area for a longer time than ever before, and to provide 

this information much more quickly and effectively than heretofore possible. Those who 

can exploit these opportunities-and thereby dissipate the "fog of war"-stand to gain 

significant advantages. 

Current force structures and information architectures extrapolated to the future 

may not suffice to meet successfully the conditions of future battle. Automation and 

systems architectures capable of disseminating information to widely dispersed and 

dissimilar units and integrating their actions will be key. We will need greater mobility, 

precision, speed, stealth, and strike ranges while we sharply reduce our logistics footprint. 

All operations will be increasingly joint, combined, and interagency. Furthermore, the 

reserve components will need to be fully integrated with active forces. 

Legacy systems procured today will be at risk in 2010-2020. We must carefully 

scrutinize their utility for future conflicts as well as for peacetime military operations. 

Joint Vision 2010 and the visions of the services contain many of the capabilities we need 

in the future. However, the procurement budgets of the services are focused primarily on 

current systems and do not adequately support the central thrust of their visions. In light 

of these factors, the Panel questions the procurement plans for Army equipment, Navy 

ships, and tactical aircraft of all services. 

iii 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 

Reserve and Guard units must be prepared and resourced for use in a variety of 

ongoing worldwide operations. They will play an increasing role in a variety of these by 

relieving active units and reducing the operational and personnel tempos of frequent and 

lengthy deployments. 

While the other services have successfully integrated their active and reserve 

forces, the Army has suffered from a destructive disunity among its components, 

specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the 

Army nor the country well. The Panel strongly believes the rift must be healed and 

makes a series of recommendations toward that end. 

A fully integrated total force requires a common culture to engender unity of 

thought and action. Shared operational and training experiences, common educational 

opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders among active and reserve components, 

the different services, coalition partners, and national and international agencies will 

serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce a common ethic. 

Transformation Strategy 

Transforming the armed forces into a very different kind of military from that 

which exists today, while supporting U.S. near-term efforts, presents a significant 

challenge. Beyond Defense, we must also transform the manner in which we conduct 

foreign affairs, foster regional stability, and enable projection of military power. 

It is important to begin the transformation process now, since decisions made in 

the short term will influence the shape of the military over the long term. The Defense 

Department should accord the highest priority to executing a transformation strategy. 

Taking the wrong transformation course (or failing to transform) opens the nation to both 

strategic and technological surprise. 

Transformation will take dedication and commitment-and a willingness to put 

talented people, money, resources, and structure behind a process designed to foster 

change. Greater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a variety of military 

systems, operational concepts, and force structures. The goal is to identify the means to 

meet the emerging challenges, exploit the opportunities, and terminate those approaches 

that do not succeed. It will take wisdom to walk the delicate line that avoids premature 

decisions and unintended "lock-in" with equipment purchases, operational concepts, and 

related systems· whose effectiveness may quickly erode in a rapidly changing 

environment. 

At the core of this effort should be a much greater empha,sis on jointness, building 

upon the legacy of Goldwater-Nichols. However, competition among the services can 

assist in determining how best to exploit new capabilities or solve emerging challenges. 

It takes a considerable amount of time, a decade or two, to play out an effective 

transformation. Indeed, even those military systems that are placed on a "fast track" for 

development and fielding often take ten years or more to reach forces in the field .. Time 

iv 
----------------------------Executive Summary 

also is required to determine how best to employ new military systems, and to make the 

appropriate adjustments in the force structure. 

We must look beyond the challenges for defense and assess the relevance of the 

National Security Act of 1947 for the next millennium. This framework served us well 

during the Cold War, but we must objectively reexamine our national security structure if 

we intend to remain a world leader. Interagency processes, both international and 

domestic, must be reviewed and refined to provide the National Command Authority and 

the American people with an effective, integrated, and proactive organization. 

We must also look closely at our alliances to ensure they are adjusting to the 

changing environment. As we work hard to establish mutual trust and commitment with 

our allies, we must be willing to sacrifice for common goals. Alliances have been and 

will continue to be a two-way street. 

Our intelligence st{l!cture faces immensely more complicated tasks than during 

the Cold War. Asymmetric threats pose particular difficulties. Information technologies 

are a two-edged sword of both tremendous opportunities and vulnerabilities. The various 

facets of the intelligence community must merge their efforts and information, handle 

highly complicated technical challenges, ensure all parts of the intelligence gathering 

apparatus are robust, and work to ensure their products are easily accessible and meet the 

needs of the warfighter. 

The Panel has identified areas in the Unified Command Plan where seams might 

hinder the effectiveness of our forces. We recommend that an Americas Command be 

created to address the challenges of homeland defense as well as those of the Western 

Hemisphere. A Joint Forces Command would be the force provider to the geographic 

CINCs, address standardization among the various Unified commands, oversee joint 

training and experimentation, and coordinate and integrate among the networked service 

battle labs. A Logistics Command would merge necessary support functions that are now 

divided among various agencies. Space Command would expand to absorb the domain 

of information. 

Infrastructure 

Fundamental reform of the Defense Department's support infrastructure is key to 

an effective transformation strategy for the years 2010-2020. Today, the Department of 

Defense is burdened by a far-flung support infrastructure that is ponderous, bureaucratic, 

and unaffordable. Unless its costs are cut sharply, the Department will be unable to 

invest adequately for the future. The Panel supports the initiatives .Put forward by the 

recent Def~nse Reform Initiative. However, the Panel believes ev~n more can and should 

be done. 

Meaningful reform of the support infrastructure is not possible unless the 

Department establishes a more effective and business-like approach to resource 

management. To that end, the Panel recommends that the Department continue its efforts 

to reform the acquisition process as well as to rethink the Planning, Programming, and 

v 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 

Budgeting System (PPBS) to make it less burdensome and more receptive to innovation 

and change. 

Accurate cost information is also a prerequiSite for cost-effective resource 

management decisions. Without good cost data, Defense managers have difficulty 

identifying inefficient practices and unwittingly make suboptimal resource allocation 

decisions. In addition, the Department must work with Congress to relax "color of 

money" restrictions. 

The Defense Reform Initiative recommends competing 150,000 positions across 

Defense. We endorse this plan, but recommend expanding it to the 600,000 military and 

civilian personnel who perform commercially oriented support tasks. 

Industrial Base 

In corning decades, the United States can only preserve its current technological 

advantage through time-based competition. The Department of Defense needs to provide 

industry with incentives to innovate so that we may maintain a qualitative technology and 

systems edge so that the United States will continue to be preeminent in military 

technology. Rather than being reactive, we should make our military acquisition process 

proactive. The Department must work with Congress to devise new rules and procedures 

that encourage technology development, rather than large production quantities, in order 

to recover cost and profit. This may create unit cost "sticker shock" unless we shorten 

the development cycle to lower development costs. But reduced production quantities 

will reduce total program cost, the real measure of the cost to the nation. 

A close examination must be made of industrial mobilization programs. Much of 

the existing requirements and structures are predicated upon maintaining or overseeing an 

industrial and manpower mobilization base for a Cold-War era contingency. This 

approach and associated overhead is clearly inappropriate to the relatively short wars we 

expect in the future. Further, this mobilization approach is clearly inappropriate, given 

the short technological life-cycles we experience today and certainly will experience in 

2010--2020. 

Installations 

The Panel strongly endorses the infrastructure recommendations within the 

Defense Reform Initiative, whi~h stated that there is sufficient surplus capacity for t~o 

additional BRAC rounds. Indeed, we believe there may be even more excess capacity 

that could be identified, should a review be done from a joint-base perspective. 

Therefore, the Panel strongly recommends that two BRAC rounds be conducted earlier 

than the current 200112005 Department proposal. The object is to transform the base 

structure from an impediment to a cost-effective enabler of readiness and modernization 

The services should also reconsider the traditional concept of the military base. 

Rather than using on-base housing, commissaries, and other support services, military 

vi 

I 
----------------------------Executive Summary 

personnel would receive additional compensation. This shift would allow the services to 

reduce their on-base infrastructure, while increasing the benefit received. 

The Cost 

The issue of how to fund this transformation in this fiscally constrained 

environment is no small challenge. The Panel estimates an annual budget wedge of 

$5 to 10 billion will be needed to support a true transformation. This money would fund 

initiatives in intelligence, space, urban warfare, joint experimentation, and information 

operations. In the absence of additional defense funding, the transformation could best 

be funded by infrastructure and acquisition reform. If these reforms are not forthcoming, 

it will be necessary to reduce Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO), cancel acquisition 

programs, or reduce force structure and end strength. There will be no easy answers, and 

difficult choices must be made. 

Conclusion 

In the increasing! y complex world that we foresee, the Department of Defense 

and its armed services cannot preserve U.S. interests alone. Defense is but one element 

of a broader national security structure. If we are to be successful in meeting the 

challenges of the future, the entire U.S. national security apparatus must adapt and 

become more integrated, coherent, and proactive. 

Implementing the transformation described in this Report promises to be complex 

and will require careful balance to preserve our current security interests. It is our belief, 

however, that if we refuse to change in a timely manner we could be fundamentally 

unprepared for the future, and put at risk the safety of future generations of Americans. 

We have the time and the opportunity to adjust. But we cannot equivocate. We must 

begin now. 

vii 
INTRODUCTION 

The United States enters the new millennium as the preeminent political, 

economic, and military power. Our military in particular is superbly equipped, 

led, and trained and blessed with magnificent men and women in its ranks. For 

the near term, we are unlikely to see an opponent who can successfully counter 

our military strength directly. 

Looking back from 2020: 

Different opportunities and 

challenges; unanticipated 

asymmetries 

Our military forces today are organized 

according to current threats. But today' s threats 

are not necessarily the ones we will see in the 

future. Unless we are willing to pursue a new 

course, we are likely to have forces that are 

ill-suited to protect our security twenty years in 

the future. Our future adversaries will learn from the past and will likely confront 

us in very different ways. New challenges will surely emerge. Even a regional 

power with a relatively modest defense budget could alter its force posture and 

operational concepts to present us with significant problems by avoiding our 

strengths and attacking our weaknesses. 

Therefore, we must begin to change now or risk being caught unprepared. 

The very context of war and battle could change dramatically over the next 

generation as enemies find ways to deny us access to contested regions, attack our 

information systems, and strike at our deployed forces or citizens with chemical 

and biological weapons. They will seek asymmetric means to overcome our 

forces and our will. If we fail to anticipate such new challenges and if we fail to 

change commensurately over the next twenty years, our ability to protect U.S. 

interests will inexorably erode. 

The current era, therefore, offers us a great paradox. On the one hand, we 

are in a relatively secure interlude following an era of intense international 

confrontation. On the other hand, we are uncertain about the nature and form of 

emerging risks. One certainty, however, is clear: the greatest danger lies in an 

unwillingness or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the 

challenges of the next century. 

The United States needs a transformation 

strategy that enables us to meet a range of Transformation Strategy: · 

security challenges in 2010-2020 without taking U.S. forces must changeundue risk in the interim. Implementing such a a process that must begin now! 

transformation will require a delicate balance. If 

we transform ourselves too quickly, we may inadvertently dismantle elements of 

our military that have kept us safe all these years and still have to play a role. But 

the Panel strongly believes that if we fail to begin the transformation now, we 

could be fundamentally unprepared for the future, and the security of future 

generations of Americans will be at risk. 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 5

tCentury ------------

This transformation promises to be complex. We must recognize that we 

cannot know the full extent and nature of future challenges, emerging threats, or 

even the pace of change in technology. Yet we must make critical decisions and 

choices entailing significant investments of resources and energies. The easiest 

path would be to increase the defense budget by several billion dollars annually to 

fund the necessary transformation while simultaneously maintaining a defense 

structure and military strategy to meet near-term challenges. In an era of 

increasing fiscal austerity, however, such budget increases are unlikely. 

If increased funding is not feasible, we can do one or some combination of 

the following: 

• Mount a major effort to streamline support costs and infrastructure; 

• Rethink today' s defense posture with its focus on two regional 

conflicts; 

• Develop new operational concepts to employ currently planned forces 

exploiting asymmetric advantages and reducing the number of 

required forces; 

• Reduce readiness and manpower levels; 

• Reduce Defense participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian 

activities; 

• Cancel one or more major weapon systems and reorder service 

acquisition plans, accepting some increased near-term risk. 

No matter which course we choose, it is clear that in the increasingly 

complex world that we foresee, the Department of Defense alone cannot preserve 

U.S. interests. Defense is but one element of the broader national security 

structure. If we are to succeed in meeting the challenges of the future, the entire 

U.S. national security structure must become more integrated, coherent, and 

proactive. The national security structures laid out by the 194 7 National Security 

Act have served us well over the past fifty years. It is time, however, to think 

through what changes are necessary ~d to update accordingly. 

Additionally, we must not ignore the role of our alliance partners. We 

share many interests and have similar security challenges. The United States 

should not expect to ensure its security unilaterally and must have the active 

support and involvement of our allies. In some cases we must be prepared to act 

alone, but in almost all cases we will be more effective if we work within a 

coalition. 

2 
----------------------------Introduction 

This Report will review the critical issues, challenges, and threats we 

believe will emerge over the next ten to twenty years. Our response will be 

influenced by key global trends, their potential manifestation in four hypothetical 

worlds possible in the years 2010-2020, and how the United States might adapt to 

meet its future security needs. 

We then describe how a range of operational challenges will affect our 

future security requirements: security of the homeland, support for regional 

stability, the projection of military power, protection of our space and information 

assets, and deterrence against attacks by weapons of mass destruction. We then 

consider the corresponding military capabilities that would enhance our ability to 

meet our security needs. 

Finally, we focus on the specifics of a transformation strategy for our 

military. We examine the process of experimentation and change leading to new 

force structures, platforms, operational concepts, and doctrine; consider what 

revisions might be necessary in the unified command plan that delineates 

geographic and functional responsibilities of the uniformed services; review 

Defense infrastructure and support systems; and consider how to best shape our 

national security arrangements for the twenty-first century. 

It is our hope to engender a broad and informed debate of national 

security. Toward that end, this Report will provide a series of recommendations 

to move us, as a nation, forward to a more secure future. 

Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo 

thefatigueofsupporangiL 

, -Thomas Paine, 1777 

3 
THE WORLD IN 2020 

KEY TRENDS 

The United States enters the new millennium facing challenges very 

different from those that shaped our national security policy during the almost 

fifty years of the Cold War. The dynamics of four key trends, parallel and 

interrelated, are driving change: 

• The geopolitical revolution that prompted the collapse of the Soviet 

Union and that will see the emergence of China as a major regional 

and global actor; 

• Demographic and social pressures on potentially volatile social 

systems; 

• The emergence of a global, interdependent marketplace that affects the 

well-being of virtually every nation and society; and 

• The technological revolution that is transforming advanced industrybased economies into information-based economies and that promises 

to effect a revolution in military affairs. 

All of this must be related to actions taken by the United States. The 

decisions we make today about what we stand for as a nation and our place in the 

international system will have tremendous implications, not just for our future, 

but for the future of people everywhere. 

Geopolitical Trends 

The political ramifications of the Soviet empire's collapse are likely to 

continue into the twenty-first century, even as groups of states seek to join 

together in regional or other 

interstate arrangements to A Changing World: 

further common political Political decisions of the twentieth century may define 

and economic interests. the environments of the twenty-first century 

The ethnic and · national 

pressures for independence • New ethnic-cultural-religious polarization 

and sovereignty that the • National boundaries redrawn 

collapse . of the former • Powerful nonstate entities 

Soviet Union released may well continue over the next several decades, 

reconfiguring the landscapes of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Conflict based upon 

race, religion, political ideology, or economic status will continue to 

exert internal and external pressures on many nations. At the same time, the role 

and importance of nonstate actors-whether they are international humanitarian 

5 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 5

tCentury -------------

providers and multinational corporations, or bands of criminals and illegal drug 

traffickers-will exert growing influence on the global community. 

These developments have implications for our approach to security 

arrangements, alliances, and international agreements on everything from 

nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to trade and the environment. 

We will continue to honor what has been a strong obligation: to support our 

historic European and other long-term allies and partners, both bilaterally and as a 

part of NATO. Increased interaction between NATO and the countries of Eastern 

Europe and newly independent states invites military and eco~omic cooperation 

that can have profound effects on world stability and long-term U.S. military 

requirements. 

Our involvement in Asia will likely increase and change over time, 

making our alliances and relationships in this region even more important. We 

envision a reconciled, if not a unified, Korean peninsula-an eventuality that has 

significant security implications for the United States as well as for our relations 

with Japan and China. China and India, with their growing populations and 

economies, promise to be increasingly important to our strategic interests. 

We will continue to be involved in regions that control scarce resources, 

such as the Middle East and the emerging Caspian Sea areas for oil, as we try to 

hedge our own and our allies' resource dependencies. We will also continue to be 

involved with the nations of Africa in areas of mutual interest. 

Neither can we overlook the importance of those who share our borders 

and our hemisphere-Canada, Mexico, Central and South America, and the 

Caribbean nations. Developments in these countries can have a profound effect 

on our security and economic well-being. 

Demographic and Social Trends 

Paralleling and influencing these political developments are social and 

demographic trends that threaten to 

outstrip the ability of many A Changing People: 

countries to adapt. These include Adapting to a Changing World Population 

rapid population growth in regions • Uneven and rapid population growth 

ill-prepared to absorb it, refugee • Migration to resources 

migration and immigration, • Challenge to provide basic necessities 

chronic unemployment and 

underemployment, and intensified competition for resources, notably energy and 

water. 

The impact of burgeoning population growth will not be evenly distributed 

over the globe. The world's poor and developing countries face the greatest rates 

of population increase and the concomitant challenge of providing jobs, health 

6 
-----------------------The World In 2020 

care, decent living conditions, and requisite social services. This challenge will 

be especially serious in urban areas, which are already experiencing acute 

shortfalls in services. Such developments may trigger recurrent humanitarian 

crises characterized by famine and disease that could require military involvement 

and other responses by the international community. Conversely, it should be 

noted that the slowing of population growth-and even declines-in other parts 

of the world will create economic challenges, including strong downward 

pressure on defense spending in most European countries and Japan. 

Economic Trends 

Closely tied to the challenges developing from these demographic and 

social trends are the effects of the expanding global marketplace. U.S. citizens, 

businesses, and nongovernment organizations will move into every comer of the 

globe, including those areas "off-limits" during the Cold War. Multinational 

corporations will continue to gain economic power and political influence, posing 

opportunities and challenges for diplomacy and other aspects of international 

relations. Economic sanctions, for example, may be more difficult to implement 

and enforce, given the multinational character of global corporations. 

At the same time, the flow of private capital into the less-developed world 

can be a force for positive change. The explosion of communications and 

information accessibility will influence political, cultural, and economic patterns, 

perhaps profoundly. Critical resources such as water or arable land may become 

scarcer than oil, exacerbating political, economic, and ethnic tensions. However, 

access to oil in the Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and elsewhere will likely remain critical 

to global economic stability. Finally, perceived disparities of wealth, where vast 

riches are controlled by a relatively few countries, could also create tension and 

present political and moral challenges for governments. 

Technology Trends 

Technology will play an ever-increasing and imperative role in America's 

security policy and programs in the future. Robotics and unmanned vehicles will 

become a part of everyday life, both in the military and society at large. 

Nano-technology has the potential to radically alter _everything ·from computer 

systems to the way we construct household goods and spacecraft. Information 

technologies, as will be discussed, will play- a preeminent role, with offensive and 

defensive manifestations. Technological advances will also lend themselves to 

even more lethal and destructive weapons. In the hands of rogue states and 

terrorist or criminal groups, foreign or domestic, new weapons offer frightening 

prospects to our country. 

In short, we are in the early stages of a revolution in military affairs-a 

discontinuous change usually associated with technology but also representing 

social or economic changes that fundamentally alter the face of battle. The rapid 

7 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 5

tCentury ------------

rate of new and improved technologies-a new cycle about every eighteen 

months-is a defining characteristic of this era of change and will have an 

indelible influence on new strategies, operational concepts, and tactics that our 

military employs. If we do not lead the technological revolution we will be 

vulnerable to it. 

ALTERNATIVE WORLDS 

To appreciate the range of security 

considerations in 201 Q-2020, the Panel hypothesized The future is hidden even from the men who four different and plausible futures of the world. While make it. 

we do not argue that any one of these future worlds -Anatole France 

will actually occur, their description and articulation 

.help to identify the principal factors that could drive change worldwide in the next 

two decades. Although we recognize that "wild cards"-such as environmental 

disasters, wars, epidemics, and technological breakthroughs-can radically alter 

the international security environment, we focused on creating worlds that reflect 

various manifestations of the trends discussed previously. Each hypothetical 

world is briefly described below: 

1. The first world, Shaped Stability, describes an environment in 

which international cooperation on economic development and security issues has 

created a relatively stable international order. The world's wealth is greater and 

more evenly distributed. The rise of such transnational challenges as terrorism, 

organized crime, and environmental degradation has created broad public 

understanding of the importance of cooperative security arrangements. As a 

result, the American people have accepted vigorous engagement abroad as 

essential to their security. For example, the deterrence arid prosecution of 

international crime has required U.S. law enforcement agencies, the intelligence 

community, the military, and various international government and 

nongovernment police institutions to collaborate regularly. Partially as a 

consequence of this cooperation, the rule of law is increasingly accepted 

international} y. 

Nevertheless, this world is not without its continuing frictions. These 

frictions include demographic pressures, shortages of natural resources, weapons 

proliferation (including weapons of mass destruction), ~d continuing ethnic and 

national tensions. Although somewhat ameliorated by global prosperity, these 

tensions exist in isolated pockets of the developing world, occasionally spilling 

over into the developed world. The U.S. military's principal role as an instrument 

of national security is to augment diplomatic, economic, and political efforts and 

protect against their failure. 

2. The second world, Extrapolation of Today, is a baseline projection 

of today' s uncertainties into an increasingly competitive and politically diverse 

world. Although the global economy continues to expand, some countries remain 

8 
-----------------------The World In 2020 

disadvantaged. Economic expansion is most pronounced along the Pacific Rim, 

where China has become the key economic and political state in the region. India, 

with a larger middle class and possibly a greater population than China, is also 

important. Some rogue states, as well as nonstate actors, have acquired the means 

of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The American homeland cannot be 

viewed as a sanctuary from their use. Although the United States is still the 

leading world power, its sustained political-economic-military dominance is 

uncertain. 

3. The third world, Competition for Leadership, enviSions a 

traditional balance of power world in which a hostile regional alliance (or 

possibly a single nation) is rising to challenge the United States. As a result, the 

United States adapts existing security relationships and enters into new alliances 

and trading partnerships to balance and, if necessary, counter these challenges. 

An all-Asia trading bloc has been formed in the Far East. A new alliance of 

South and Southwestern Asian nations has formed, centered on opposing the 

political, economic, and cultural influence of the West. Increased military 

spending worldwide and regional arms races are prominent features of this world. 

Moreover, many states have acquired weapons of mass destruction and the means 

to deliver them. Although ethnic and humanitarian tensions still exist, their 

relative significance in the international system has been reduced owing to the 

resurgence of nation-state conflict. 

Clearly recognized emerging threats foster public support for the 

expansion, and use, of military power. The U.S. military must now plan for the 

possibility of major combat operations against powerful enemies capable of 

quickly concentrating force against our interests within critical security regions. 

The military must also position itself to defend the homeland against attacks, the 

most likely being covert introduction of weapons of mass destruction, attacks by 

ballistic and cruise missiles, or information systems disruption. 

4. The fourth world, Chronic Crisis, describes deteriorating global 

economic conditions coupled with the breakdown of international institutions. 

Weakened nation-states, nonstate organizations, and coalitions fight over scarce 

resources. Alliances are fluid, unpredictable, and opportunistic. Nationalism and 

ethnic hatreds have formed violent independence movements in Asia, South Asia, 

and the Middle East. Pivotal states are in crisis. Virtual narco-states (host states 

dominated by drug organizations) exist in regions of South America and 

Southeast Asia. Weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are 

widely available. Unchecked massive migrations and failing municipal 

infrastructures accelerate urban chaos. The United States is in danger of losing 

much of its will and ability to influence international events. 

The American public-perceiving little chance of influencing the chaos 

abroad-is preoccupied with domestic security as nonstate actors increasingly 

9 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21stcentury -------------

penetrate the United States with illegal drugs, terrorism, weapons of mass 

destruction, and transnational crime. 

IMPLICATIONS 

In considering these trends and the various worlds and possible strategic 

environments we may face, several implications emerge. The nation-state, 

although still the dominant entity of the international system, is increasingly 

affected by the growing power of multinational corporations and international 

organizations, transnational encroachments on national sovereignty, and 

demographic pressures that stress the abilities of governments to meet their 

citizens' needs. New alliance structures may develop that reflect concerns about 

these evolving challenges, while less· relevant alliance relationships will decline. 

Technology, geopolitical developments, and economic and social trends may 

fundamentally alter the realities of today. 

The range of possible outcomes is 

wide and impossible to predict with any The World in 2020: 

certainty. Each will present unique IMPLICATIONS 

conditions, many very different from those of • 

today. The central challenge to our defense • 

structure, therefore, is to move forward in a • 

Hedge against uncertainty 

Curtail the outdated/less useful 

Explore new concepts 

manner that enables us to respond effectively • Adapt over time 

to whatever does occur. This strongly ..._ ___________ _. 

suggests a hedging approach to preparing for the future. We must maintain 

adequate current capability as we adapt. As we learn more about new ways to 

apply military power, we can shift the emphasis of our forces while curtailing 

outdated or less useful forces and operational concepts. As time passes we will 

learn more about evolving challenges and competitors while continuing to adapt 

our forces accordingly. 

The U.S. military must not go through this transformation alone. Our 

entire national security establishment and our alliance relationships must change 

in parallel if we hope to sustain global stability through regional partnerships. 

Alliance structures, both formal and informal, will grow in importance and should 

be viewed as essential ingredients to regional stability. For example, we must 

encourage China to be a 

constructive member ·of the The World in 2020: 

international community even as The required military transformation must be 

we balance the security needs of done within the context of a parallel review of the 

our allies with the concerns of entire national security establishment. 

China. We must encourage 

Russian stability as well. At the same time, we may face new regional 

competitors that threaten U.S. ability to influence events in regions of vital 

interest. Above all, we must recognize that while protecting traditional interests 

(nuclear deterrence, support of alliance structures, protection of critical resources, 

10 
I 

-----------------------The World In 2020 

the safety of Americans abroad, etc.), an entire new array of operational 

challenges is emerging that our forces of 2010-2020 must be able to handle. 

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE MILITARY 

Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the U.S. military has had 

several successes, perhaps best illustrated in the overwhelming Gulf War victory 

in 1991. These successes were earned by dedicated professionals who learned 

from past mistakes and implemented new training and operational concepts and 

technological advantages to allow us to meet and master these challenges. As we 

enter a new era, we will face a new and demanding set of challenges that will 

require us to transform our military and elements of our national security system 

to meet them. 

We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries have learned from 

the Gulf War. They are 

unlikely to confront us 

THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT 

conventionally with mass An adaptive adversary: 

armor formations, air exploiting his strengths-attacking our weaknesses 

supenonty forces, and • 

deep-water naval fleets of their • 

own, all areas of • 

overwhelming U.S. strength • 

today. Instead, they may find • 

• new ways to attack our 

• interests, our forces, and our 

Attack our will to fight 

Employ imaginative tactics and techniques 

Deny access to forward locations 

Exploit WMD technology 

Target fixed installations and massedformations 

Move the fight to urban areas 

Combine approaches for even greater synergy 

citizens. They will look for ways to match their strengths against our weaknesses. 

They will actively seek existing and new arenas in which to exploit our perceived 

vulnerabilities. Moreover, they will seek to combine these unconventional 

approaches in a synergistic way. 

We should recognize that potential competitors will seek every advantage. 

Their forces almost certainly will not be a mirror image of ours. They may 

attempt to: 

• Employ military tactics that cause high casualties among U.S. forces 

and civilians to raise the c~st and possibly deter U.S. involvement; 

• Tum to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles 

to neutralize forward ports, bases, and .prepositioned assets and to 

inflict heavy casualties on us and our allies; 

• Attack our information systems, seeking to debilitate them; 

11 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21stcentury -------------

• Counter our control of the sea by seeding key straits and littorals with 

large numbers of mines and by subjecting any forces therein to missile 

salvos; 

• Counter our control of the air with speed-of-light weapons and 

extensive anti..:aircraft systems; 

• Target fixed installations and 

massed formations within the 

range of their weapons and 

seek greater stand-off ability 

with those systems; 

As flowing water avoids the heights and 

hastens to the low lands, so an army 

avoids strength and strikes weakness. 

-Sun Tzu 

• Attack the underlying support structures-both physical and 

psychological-that enable our military operations; 

• Deny us access to key regions and facilities; 

• Use terror as a weapon to attack our will and the will of our allies, and 

to cause us to divert assets to protect critical installations, 

infrastructures, and populations. 

The most pressing challenges of the future-and · therefore potential 

asymmetric areas that our enemies will try to exploit-are summarized below. 

Power Projection 

The cornerstone of America's continued military preeminence is our 

ability to project combat power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread 

areas of the globe. Much of our power projection capability depends on sustained 

POWER PROJECTION 

DEMANDS for power projection continue 

to increase 

CHALLENGES to power projection 

continue to increase 

access to regions of concern. Any 

number of circumstances might 

compromise our forward presence 

(both bases and forward operating 

forces) and therefore diminish our 

ability to apply military power, 

reducing our military and political influence in key regions of the world. For 

political (domestic or regional) reasons, allies mi.ght be coerced not to grant the 

United States access to their sovereign territory. Hostile forces might threaten 

punitive strikes (perhaps using weapons of mass destruction) against nations 

considering an alliance with the United States. Thus, the fostering and nurturing 

of allies and alliances, as well as our ability to protect our allies from such threats, 

will be an important factor in our future ability to project combat power anywhere 

in the world. 

12 

/ 

( 

, I 
-----------------------The World In 2020 

Even if w_e retain the necessary bases and port infrastructure to support 

forward deployed forces, they will be vulnerable to strikes that could reduce or 

neutralize their utility. Precision strikes, weapons of mass destruction, and cruise 

and ballistic missiles all present threats to our forward presence, particularly as 

stand-off ranges increase. So, too, do they threaten access to strategic geographic 

areas. Widely available national and commercial space-based systems providing 

imagery, communication, and position location will greatly multiply the 

vulnerability of fixed and, perhaps, mobile forces as well. 

At the same time, constraints on forward-basing (i.e., infrastructure 

outside the continental United States: ports, installations, prepositioned 

equipment, and airfields) and advanced technologies threaten to impede our 

access to key regions. Geographic realities are putting greater demands on power 

projection capabilities. For example, as oil and gas fields in Central Asia gain in 

. strategic value, we may need to project power greater distances, farther from 

littorals or established bases. Political realities also drive our standoff options. 

As we attempt to protect our own forces, we are left with a dilemma: our allies, 

whom we are trying to protect, will remain exposed-a situation that requires new 

provisions for their defense. Adaptive enemies, emerging technologies, greater 

distances, and altered alliance relations will present new conditions to U.S. 

military forces that must be mastered if we are to maintain our current ability to 

project power. 

Information Operations 

The importance of maintaining America's lead in information systemscommercial and military--cannot be overstated. Our nation's economy will 

depend on a secure and assured information infrastructure. These systems are 

also instrumental to the success of military operations. As we learned in the Gulf 

War, significant advantages 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS in situational awareness 

A future opponunity, competition, and vulnerability translate directly into 

-all at once significant advantages on the 

battlefield. As a result, 

information operations are likely to be crucial to the course of future conflict, 

challenging us, and our allies, in both offensive and defensive ways. 

-Already, the commercial development of information technology is so 

widespread, accessible, and cheap that it promises to create both opportunities and 

risks for our nation. For example, access to, and the meaningful synthesis of, 

information will be a key aspect of relations among states and nonstate actors, in 

peace, crisis, and war. The entity that has greater access to, and can more readily 

apply, meaningful information will have the advantage in both diplomacy and 

defense. More ominously, this information arena will also create new 

vulnerabilities as we depend more and more on computer systems and 

13 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 5

tCentury ------------

telecommunications to manage financial operations, public utilities, and other key 

elements of economic systems. 

Effective use of information superiority demands that we move rapidly to 

the next level of "jointness" among the uniformed services: full commonality of 

U.S. military information systems. This commonality must be interoperable with 

the information systems of our allies as well, if we are to reap the advantages of 

coalition operations. 

Given the importance of information-in the conduct of warfare and as a 

central force in every aspect of society-the competition to secure an information 

advantage will be a high-stakes contest, one that will directly affect the continued 

preeminence of U.S. power. 

Space 

Given the importance of space-based capabilities to information 

operations, our ability to operate in space, support military activities from space, 

and deny adversaries the use of space will be key to our future military success. 

In the near term, a wide variety of commercial and international initiatives will 

make space much more accessible. As the costs of launching payloads into space 

are substantially reduced, the use of space for civil, commercial, and military 

purposes will quickly expand. Consequently, our ability to control operations on 

the land, sea, and air will depend to an increasing extent on our access to space. 

• 

• 

• 

SPACE 

An opportunity for us 

AND our adversaries 

A lead we cannot lose 

An asset we must 

protect 

We must anticipate that our enemies will 

seek to use commercial remote-sensing and 

communications satellites, along with space-based 

timing and navigation data, to accurately target U.S. 

forces with high degrees of accuracy. In tum, they 

will seek to degrade our abilities to track and target 

them. If we do not control the military utility of 

space, the advantages we now hold in information 

operations and more traditional military operations could be put at risk. 

Therefore, in addition to exploiting space for our own benefits, we must protect 

our space assets to include our commercial assets and deny our enemies the 

opportunity to gain military advantages through their use of space. 

Urban Operations 

A particularly challenging aspect of the future security en.vironment will 

be the increasing likelihood of military operations in cities. Demographic trends 

in the less developed regions of the world are creating more and more sprawling 

urban and suburban complexes characterized by a significant increase in younger 

populations and decaying infrastructures. At the same time, political, financial, 

informational, and cultural developments are making cities more integral to 

14 

/ 

( 
-----------------------The World In 2020 

relations among sovereign nations. The new terrain of the "megacity", unfamiliar 

to modern-day forces, is not the open terrain on which much of our conventional 

superiority is predicated. We must also expect to be involved in cities while 

conducting such contingencies as humanitarian and disaster assistance, 

peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. 

Cities challenge our ability to project power and mount military 

operations. Urban control-the requirement to control activities in the urban 

environment-will be difficult enough. Eviction operations-the requirement to 

root out enemy forces from their urban 

strongholds-will be even more URBAN OPERATIONS 

challenging. Urban operations have Prepare now: 

historically required large numbers of 

troops while diluting technological 

advantages, making for extremely tough 

fighting. Urban structures and human 

densities vastly. complicate targeting and 

maneuvering. Many of our current 

Contingencies 

• Urban control 

• Urban defense 

• Eviction operations 

• Targeting and strike 

Conditions weapons are often ineffective in urban 

• environments because of trajectory • 

Noncombatants 

Skyscraper "jungles" 

Vital infrastructure 

Government institutions 

limitations, built-up areas, subterranean • 

passages, and unobservable targets. Our • ability to employ force could be ._. ___________ ..... 

significantly hampered by the proximity of noncombatants, vital infrastructures, 

and government and nongovernment institutions. 

We should make every effort to avoid conducting urban operations 

unilaterally. Allies, particularly those in the affected region, will likely be 

instrumental to mission success and eventual transition back to peacetime 

conditions. Civil-military operations will be fundamental to the aftermath of such 

battles. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the 

means to deliver them (to include missiles) poses a serious and growing threat to 

• 

• 

• 

• 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Proliferated 

Available 

Affordable 

Simple 

Vulnerability of citizens 

at home and troops abroad 

15 

the people and interests of the 

United States. The threat is 

qualitatively different because of 

its potential to do extreme 

damage, physical and 

psychological, with a single 

strike. Due to their availability, 

relative affordability, and easy 

use, weapons of mass destruction 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21stcentury -------------

allow conventionally weak states and nonstate actors to counter and possibly 

thwart our overwhelming conventional superiority. 

These weapons threaten security at home. The 1995 use of sarin gas in the 

Tokyo subways stands as a stark and ready reminder of the chemical threat. 

Biological weapons are an even more serious problem. For example, they could 

be readily introduced into mass transportation systems and quickly spread to 

thousands of people with devastating consequences. Small nuclear devices 

smuggled into population centers could also produce thousands of casualties. 

Abroad, such weapons challenge our ability to project combat power. 

Their use, or threat of use, could deter allies from granting the United States 

forward operating areas and degrade or impede the ability of our forces and allies 

to effectively complete the mission at hand. Campaigns could be waged by our 

enemies in several venues: from driving wedges among our allies to direct use 

against American forces in a region to retribution against communities within the 

United States. 

To address the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction, the 

United States will need a comprehensive approach that begins with excellent 

intelligence actions to prevent or slow proliferation, to protect our forces and 

citizens from attack, and to deal with the consequences of such an event, at home 

or abroad. Collectively, efforts like these would begin to form the basis of a 

sufficient weapons of mass destruction deterrence policy for the twenty-first 

century. The capability to manage the consequences of such weapons of mass 

destruction, in particular, will be an important tool in strengthening deterrence by 

denying an adversary the political and psychological benefits of use. As we did 

with the Cold War nuclear threat, we must invest in preparing for the 

"unthinkable." Consequence management will require effective coordination 

among local, regional, national, and international agencies and organizations, both 

here and overseas. We must take care to ensure that the proper training facilities 

are available, such as the Center for Domestic Preparedness in Alabama. 

Transnational Threats and Challenges 

Transnational challenges and threats, . by definition, reside in more than 

one country and require a 

multi-partner response. They 

range from information, space, • 

and weapons of mass destruction • 

-attacks to problems that might 

become security threats • 

(e.g., environmental disruptions, 

pandemics, and mass migrations). 

16 

TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES 

The effect felt at home and abroad 

A challenge that crosses borders and confuses 

jurisdictions 

A response requiring the attention of all 

Domestic and foreign governments 

- Nongovernment organizations 

I' 

I 
-----------------------The World In 2020 

These challenges are real. Terrorists, foreign and domestic, state and 

nonstate, have already demonstrated the ability to strike at us at home and abroad. 

Their sophistication, access to technologies that could include weapons of mass 

destruction, and frequent state sponsorship give them great potential to do us 

harm. 

Criminal enterprises, to include the illegal drug trade, are also detrimental 

to the well-being of our society. Their access to enormous amounts of money 

allows them to purchase the goods and services they need . to penetrate our 

communities more effectively and put our citizens at risk. With ties to rogue 

states, corrupt public officials, and terrorist organizations, these criminal entities 

could present a significant challenge to our domestic security. 

In short, the increasing erosion of the sanctity of international borders as 

barriers to the challenges described above will force us away from our existing 

paradigms; in response, international cooperative agreements, intelligence 

systems, consequence management structures, and a variety of intergovernmental 

jurisdictional and legal procedures will have to be developed and adapted. 

17 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN 2020 

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES 

In a world characterized by these key trends and future challenges, we 

must preserve the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the 

United States with its values, institutions, and territory secure; protect the lives 

and personal safety of Americans at home and abroad; and provide for the wellbeing and prosperity of the nation and its people. These concepts can be 

summarized by the following imperatives. 

National Survival 

Protecting the United States from 

any threats to its survival as a nation NATIONAL SURVIVAL 

remains the primary role of our military • Threats of physical destruction 

forces. In terms of the immediate physical • Threats to undermine economy, 

destruction of the country, weapons of institutions, and values 

mass destruction, particularly nuclear 

weapons, remain the primary threat. Therefore, we must maintain the appropriate 

offensive and defensive capabilities to protect and defend against the coercive 

threat or actual use of these weapons. At the same time, threats that would 

destroy or undermine our economic viability, institutions, and values, while 

perhaps taking longer to have an effect, are ultimately as dangerous. 

Consequently, our military capabilities must also be able to assist in protecting the 

nation from threats such as drug trafficking or assaults such as cyber-terrorism on 

our information or economic infrastructures. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Global Economic and Political Stability 

The United States remains· a world military and economic superpower. 

GLOBAL STABiliTY 

Cooperative relationships with friends 

and allies 

Expanded free market arrangements 

Free flow of information . 

lnteroperability with allies 

Our national interests are enhanced 

by global stability. The main threats 

to global stability are wars, 

international terrorism, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, and the destabilizing . 

effects of demographic, economic, 

and social trends as discussed 

previously. These threats pose challenges that require an effective response from 

all elements of the national security establishment, including robust and 

specialized military capabilities. 

19 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 

Cooperative relationships with other nations, especially our friends and allies, are 

essential to maintaining global stability. Such relationships promote global 

interdependence, ensure orderly political arrangements, and bolster the rule of 

law. Cooperation increases our access and ability to influence and promote 

stability, democratization, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and humanitarian 

efforts. Central to this cooperation is expansion of free market arrangements into 

all regions of the world. At the same time, we must promote and sustain U.S. 

technology in ways that cultivate the advancement of U.S. scientific and 

commercial development while maintaining interoperability with our allies. 

Finally, we must foster the free flow of information to promote national security 

and economic prosperity, reduce tensions, and promote international cooperation. 

Domestic Security 

DOMESTIC SECURITY 

• Safety 

• Protection 

• Preparedness 

... peace of mind at home ... 

Ultimately, Americans must feel secure and 

safe in their own country. Beyond its 

responsibility to secure our borders against attack, 

the Department of Defense must be able to assist 

civil authorities against a variety of threats to lives 

and property in the United States, regardless of 

their source. 

These imperatives cannot be considered in isolation. They are interrelated 

and mutually reinforcing, each contributing to the overall security of the 

United States. We must recognize that pursuing these imperatives may directly 

conflict with the interests of other states, groups, and individuals. Consequently, 

we acknowledge that security is a dynamic process that changes and adapts to 

strategic realities. 

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE 21 8

T CENTURY 

The Panel discussed a wide range of alternative strategies ranging from 

those that depicted the United States as relatively withdrawn from military and 

political inv~lvement in the international system (but heavily engaged 

economically) to those that saw the United States as broadly engaged. In the 

latter case, one variation depicted the United States as heavily dependent on the 

military cooperation of allies and coalition partners to assert effective military 

power abroad. Another variant witnessed the United States as heavily dependent 

upon unilateral military action in virtually every region of the globe. In all cases, 

the United States was portrayed as being prepared and able to defend its 

homeland, although the degree of threat was varied. 

It was the Panel's judgement, however, that selecting a strategy 

appropriate for twenty years hence was not possible or desirable. Events and 

circumstances at that time will drive the decisions of the U.S. leadership. 

Therefore, we believe that the best way to ensure our future security is to provide 

20 
U.S. National Security in 2020 

a process for developing the tools and concepts necessary to implement whatever 

the most appropriate strategy might be at that time. What did become clear in our 

discussion is this: our current course is unlikely to produce the military 

capabilities necessary to meet the range of challenges we foresee in 2010-2020. 

The Panel considered operational challenges the United States may face in 

light of current U.S. force structure and strategy, as well as that posited by the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While the Panel acknowledges that many 

of today's legacy systems will play a role in deterring and responding to threats to 

U.S. interests, we believe that the current and planned structure, doctrine, and 

strategy-that is to say, our current security arrangements-will not be adequate 

to meeting the challenges of the future. 

The force structure of the future must have the ability to respond 

effectively to some of the new challenges: 

• Information attacks; 

• The use of weapons of mass destruction--especial! y against 

civilian and commercial targets; 

• Space operations; 

• The absence of access to forward bases; 

• Deep inland operations; 

• Mass population problems such as urban operations and mass 

refugee or epidemic crises. 

Therefore, the Panel focused on the need for a transformation strategy and 

how best to prepare our security structures now for the unknowns of the 2010-

2020 time frame. In the pages that follow, we consider the range of challenges 

the United States will have to meet, the capabilities we will need, and how to 

obtain them. 

The Strategy for the future: 

TRANSFORMATION 

• Develop the process to produce t/J,e tools and concepts to 

engage the future 

• Change defense structure to match emerging challenges 

• Develop concepts that embody the total force 

21 
, 

MEETING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF 2020 

Current defense strategy states that U.S. forces should be capable of 

fighting two regional wars at almost the same time. Potential threats in North 

Korea and Southwest Asia define the type of threat we may confront. This 

two-theater war concept is predicated on the belief that the ability to fight more 

than one major war at a time deters an enemy from seeking to take advantage of 

the opportunity to strike while the United States is preoccupied in another theater. 

Moreover, this posture dictates that, should the second enemy strike,. we would 

swiftly deploy the necessary forces to defeat the second aggressor while 

continuing to successfully engage the first. 

The Panel agrees fully that the United States cannot afford to ignore the 

near -term threats posed by Iran and Iraq in the Persian .Gulf and North Korea in 

Northeast Asia. Our current forces, however, with the support of allies, should be 

capable of dealing with Iraq, which still poses a serious threat to the region and 

appears intent on acquiring an offensive WMD capability. The risks in Korea 

remain high, but the challenge in that theater is unique: a large, well-concealed 

force with extensive artillery and rocket forces and likely armed with chemical 

and possibly biological and nuclear capabilities. Forward bases could be put at 

risk, limiting the ability to deploy forces into Korea and sustain them. We must 

continue to work with South Korea to cope with this threat while we attempt to 

moderate it by political and economic means. As long as we retain the ability to 

introduce forces into the region, we have adequate combat power within the 

present force structure to deal with this threat. As a result, it is our judgment that 

our current force structure is sufficient for the regional threats that we see today. 

The Panel views the two-military-theater-of-war construct as a forcesizing function and not a strategy. We are concerned that this construct may have 

become a force-protection mechanism--a 

means of justifying the current force Current Two· Theater Construct 

structure--especially for those searching • A sizing mechanism for the past 

for the certainties of the Cold War era. • A concern for today 

This could leave the services vulnerable if • An inhibitor in reaching tomorrow 

one of the other major contingencies 

resolves itself before we have a 

transformation strategy in place, a strong 

Accept transitional risk 

Emphasize long-term security 

demand for immediate, deep, and unwise cuts in force structure and personnel. 

The two-theater construct has been a useful mechanism for determining 

what forces to retain as the Cold War came to a close. To some degree, it remains 

a useful mechanism today. But, it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the 

capabilities we will need in the 2010--2020 time frame. 

23 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 

The issue is not whether the current posture is useful. The real issue is 

where we are willing to take risk. The current posture minimizes near-term risk at 

a time when danger is moderate to low. A significant share of the Defense 

Department's resources is focused on the unlikely contingency that two major 

wars will break out at once, putting greater risk on our long-term security. While 

we cannot identify future threats precisely, we can identify the challenges. Our 

priority emphasis (including resources) must go to the future. 

Therefore, the Panel concludes (without understating today's security 

construct) that the Defense Department must move beyond its current focus to 

pursue a transformation strategy that safeguards our qualitative edge now and in 

the future. Incorporated in those efforts must be careful consideration of the 

forward deployed and forward presence arrangements and, most important, our 

relationships with allies in various regions of the world. 

The scope of the missions that the Department of Defense must be 

prepared to undertake does not appear at first glance to be radically different from 

the past: regional stability, 

homeland defense, projection 

of power, space operations, 

strategic deterrence, and • 

maintatntng information • 

superiority-all missions that • 

the U.S. military has done 

FUTURE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

MISSIONS 

Missions remain largely unchanged 

Emphasis among missions changes 

Specific challenges within those missions may be 

radically different 

before to a greater or lesser extent. What makes these missions different today, 

and especially in 2010-2020, is that the nature of the challenges is changing. 

Executing missions will be more complex, and there will be a greater need for 

cooperation with other instruments of national power, as well as with allies and 

coalition partners. Underlying all of these missions and linking them together is 

the growth in information technology, which creates opportunities and problems 

that we are just beginning to comprehend. 

The combined effect of new and evolving challenges to our national 

security is profound. It demands a new approach to defense. It suggests that 

without significant change in our national security structures and processes, we 

face the grave risk that we will be unprepared for the future. The primary focus 

of our preparation for these future challenges is outlined below. 

24 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

HOMELAND DEFENSE 

Protecting the territory of the United States and its citizens from "all 

enemies both foreign and domestic" is the principal task of government. The 

primary reason for the increased emphasis on homeland defense is the change, 

both in type and degree, 

POTENTIAL HOMELAND VULNERABILITIES in the threats to the 

Cold War- Strategic Nuclear Attack by Superpower 

Today and Tomo"ow- Nuclear Attack by ? ? ? ? 

PLUS 

Terrorism 

Information Warfare 

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles 

Transnational Threats 

Attacks on Critical Infrastructure 

America may not be any more or less safe than before, 

but the challenges to its safety and security will be very 

different 

United States. Besides 

the enduring need to 

deter a strategic nuclear 

attack, the United States 

must defend against 

terrorism, information 

warfare, weapons of 

mass destruction, 

ballistic and cruise 

missiles, and other 

transnational threats to 

the sovereign territory 

of the nation. In many 

of these mission areas, 

the military will 

necessarily play the leading role; however, many other threats exist which will 

require Defense to support local law enforcement agencies, as well as a host of 

other federal, state, and local entities. 

Threats to the United States have been magnified by the proliferation of, 

and the means to produce and deliver, weapons of mass destruction. The 

increasing availability of relatively inexpensive cruise missiles and the capability 

to fabricate and introduce biotoxins and chemical agents into the United States 

means that rogue nations or transnational actors may be able to threaten our 

homeland. Along with the growth of delivery systems, the technology needed to 

create warheads housing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons has also 

proliferated. The complexity of the WMD challenge lies in the number of 

potential enemies who have access to, and may choose, this asymmetric means of 

attacking the United States in an effort to offset our conventional strengths. 

An integrated set of active and passive measures for deterring and 

defending against the use of weapons of mass destruction is needed. These 

measures must involve a r~ge of federal departments and agencies which, in 

tum, must incorporate the state and local levels of government in their planning. 

Effective missile defense may also reduce the risk of a limited missile 

strike and deter blackmail attempts by those who would seek to thwart U.S. 

military and diplomatic actions. Even if our abilities to defend against large-scale 

25 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

nuclear attack remain inadequate, we must retain the option to deploy, if 

necessary, a missile defense capable of defeating limited attacks. 

Although not seriously considered since the late 1950s, coastal and border 

defense of the homeland is a challenge that again deserves serious thought. We 

see no clear and present danger of an invasion by an armed force; however, the 

apparent ease of infiltration of our borders by drug smugglers, illegal immigrants, 

and contraband goods illustrates a potentially significant problem. It suggests that 

terrorist cells armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons could also 

infiltrate with little difficulty. Better coordination between those national 

agencies charged with gathering intelligence outside our borders and with those 

charged with protecting our citizens and territory will be an absolute requirement. 

Coordinated intelligence, when coupled with the close integration of efforts by the 

Navy, Coast Guard, other government agencies, and local authorities, should be 

able to stop the majority of those who would cross our borders for illicit purposes. 

No defense will ever be so effective that determined adversaries, such as 

terrorists bent on making a political statement, will not be able to penetrate it in 

some fashion. This is perhaps even true in the case of a regional enemy who 

threatens to execute WMD attacks on the U.S. homeland employing organized 

infiltration forces. Even the threat of such attacks could seriously impair our 

power projection operations, especially if our political leadership felt compelled 

to accord the enemy's homeland sanctuary status from attacks by U.S. forces. 

Managing the consequences of an attack by WMD or other mass 

casualty-producing devices will . require action from all levels of government. 

Although "first responders" will take the lead (assuming they are still viable) in 

the vast majority of cases, the Department of Defense must be prepared to assist. 

Preparation will be the most effective form of assistance. The Panel recommends 

that the National Guard together with the Army Reserve be prepared to: 

• Train local authorities in chemical and biological weapons detection, 

defense, and decontamination; 

• Assist in casualty treatment and evacuation; 

• Quarantine, if necessary, affected areas and people; and 

• Assist in restoration of infrastructure and services. 

The U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense should work closely 

to ensure that new classes of cutters are outfitted with a combat systems suite that 

gives these ships a robust capability in support of homeland defense, including 

such missions as drug interdiction, immigration control, and anti -transnational 

crime operations. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of 

26 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

Defense should investigate the feasibility of providing some U.S. Coast Guard 

ships with a capability to assist in the cruise missile defense of the homeland. 

Information systems are rapidly becoming the key components of the 

nation's infrastructure. At the same time, our competitors will likely redouble 

their efforts to use our increasing dependence on information systems against us. 

The potential for an enemy to use attacks on information infrastructures as a 

means of undermining our economy and deterring or disrupting our operations 

abroad is of increasing concern. As the threats to commercial and defense 

information networks increase, the defense of our information infrastructure 

becomes crucial. The Department of Defense's reliance on the global commercial 

telecommunications infrastructure further complicates the equation. Our response 

to information warfare threats to the United States may present the greatest 

challenge in preparing for the security environment of 2010-2020. The threat is 

diffuse and difficult to identify. Consensus on how to guard against it is difficult 

to establish. The recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical 

Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) should be the foundation of our future 

information security program. According to the Commission, the United States 

must begin to: 

• Declare a policy and build international consensus on protecting 

critical infrastructure; 

• Strengthen the protection of targets within the infrastructure and deny 

access to those who wish to disrupt its use; and 

• Share information on threats, conduct analysis of vulnerabilities, and 

issue warnings of potential attack. 

The Department of Defense must play an active role in the process 

envisioned by the Commission and its responsibilities should be made clear. 

Although information systems are only a small part of a much larger 

infrastructure, the Department of Defense must take the initiative in developing 

the techniques and procedures required for information security. 

The terrorist threat to the United States is a complex issue which, as it 

encroaches upon U.S. territory, transitions from a Defense and State activity to 

one managed pdmarily by the Department of Justice or local law enforcement 

agencies. To date, the hand-off of responsibilities and sharing of intelligence on 

known and suspected terrorists has not been properly delineated and may, in some 

areas, be.dysfunctional. It is not envisioned that Defense would ever take the lead 

in combating terrorism in the United States. The Defense Department must be 

prepared, however, to advise and assist law enforcement agencies in actions taken 

by the nation against terrorism. A key element in that assistance must be the 

sharing of information on both national and international terrorist organizations 

and their activities. 

27 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

The security of our society and our citizens must be a primary concern. 

The emergence of new threats that have both the means and the incentive to strike 

at our homeland necessitates a heightened degree of readiness by our national 

security structures, to defend against such attacks and to minimize and contain the 

harm they might cause. 

Homeland Defense 

The Panel recommends: 

• Develop integrated active and passive defense measures against the use of WMD. 

• Develop and retain the option to deploy a missile defense system capable of 

defeating limited attacks. 

• Incorporate all levels of government into managing the consequences of a 

WMD-type attack. 

• Prepare reserve components to support consequence management activities. 

• Support the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical 

Infrastructure Protection. 

• Use Department of Defense assets to advise and assist law enforcement in 

combating terrorist activities. 

28 

/ 
I 

--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

REGIONAL STABILITY 

U.S. national security is directly related to the stability of regions far from 

our shores. It follows, then, that a major focus of our national security policyindeed, a principal role of not only our military forces but of all our components 

of international influence-should be maintaining and strengthening regional 

stability. 

The challenges the United States faces in 2010-2020 are likely to be even 

more complex and multi-dimensional than those of the second half of the 

twentieth century. While some of those 

challenges may threaten U.S. interests 

directly, a far greater number will test 

U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, 

and intellectual resourcefulness to avert 

REGIONAL STABiliTY 

Demands continued interaction 

with regional panners and alliances 

through diplomatic effons 

and prevent crises that require the 

intervention of our armed forces. The Requires the constant integration of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military efforts we and our allies invest in activities 

helping to defuse regional or local 

tensions, promoting sustainable economic development, nurturing the rule of law 

and human rights, or alleviating human suffering can produce substantial savings 

by eliminating the need to deploy military forces to the afflicted regions. U.S. 

efforts to promote democratic reform and market economies in the countries of 

East and Central Europe and Newly Independent States have made a contribution 

to the relatively peaceful evolution of those states and their reintegration into the 

international political and economic community. Thus, a proactive policy to 

foster regional stability, far from being a lesser mission, should be viewed as an 

essential component of U.S. national security. The evolution of a more secure 

and predictable environment will allow the United States to promote its interests 

globally without employing military forces as often as we do today, and should be 

central to our security strategy. 

During the Cold War, regional issues were heavily influenced by our 

policy of containment of the Soviet Union. The United States and the 

Soviet Union vied with one another for their respective spheres of influence, but 

their competition also kept some regional instabilities (e.g., the former 

Yugoslavia) in check. Today, the problems are more c~mplex and intertwined: 

• Expanding U.S. economic activity has increased existing interests 

or led to new interests in different regions; 

• Competition for regional influence now involves nongovernment 

and international organizations in addition to state actors; and 

• Ethnic, nationalistic, or political complexions of regions have 

changed because of changes in the geopolitical landscape. 

29 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

Responding to regional stability challenges will entail a broader and more 

integrated application of the various elements of national power and international 

cooperation than exists today. Today' s forward-based and forward-deployed 

forces play an important role in enhancing regional stability. However, they 

should not be the primary resource in this critical area. 

The most effective tool should be diplomacy. Diplomacy can help shape 

the environment and establish the preconditions for successful use of other 

national security tools. The responsibility for stability in a region should fall first 

on nations in the region, or on regional organizations. Diplomatic efforts should 

encourage proactive measures that promote regional stability, focusing on those 

nations whose interests are compatible with ours. To do this in the fractured 

post-Cold War world requires more robust diplomatic capabilities than we budget 

for today. 

Alliances also play a key role in solving regional stability problems. Our 

partners in these alliances are closer than we to the regional problems, and their 

historic ties to the specific issues can sometimes be used to advantage. We must 

preserve ties with our Cold War great-power allies (e.g., United Kingdom, 

Germany, France, Japan, Korea, and others), while encouraging great powers who 

are not allied with the United States (i.e., Russia, China, and India) to embrace 

emerging forms of cooperation while dissuading them from following paths that 

could lead to military competition. 

The success of future military alliances or coalitions will depend on a 

degree of cooperation that goes beyond a "division of labor." It will require 

developing and implementing common doctrine, training, and the ability to 

operate smoothly as a combined, integrated force, much as the U.S. military 

services operate jointly today., 

Cooperation in the area of armaments will also be a factor in alliance 

relations, starting with cooperation at the research and development level-with 

appropriate attention to sharing economic benefits and jobs-and including 

sharing the risks and costs of experimentation and procurement. Past cooperation 

has some successes as well as some failures. Cooperative development efforts 

based on ties (including cross-investments) between companies are more likely to 

succeed than government-to-government agreements. They should be 

·encouraged. Such cooperation in joint development and sales can produce 

sizeable cost savings for the United States and its partners, as well as draw on the 

considerable intellectual and industrial capacities of allied countries. 

Beyond diplomacy and alliances, economic tools are powerful means to 

influence the regional environment. In many instances, economic problems in a 

country or a region cause instability. The United States, in concert with its 

economic partners and international financial and development organizations, can 

address specific regional economic problems in ways that promote stability. For 

30 

,./ 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

example, trade, economic aid packages, or other incentives not only open doors to 

economic cooperation on a bilateral or regional basis but also can offer a sound 

foundation for political dialogue and security cooperation. 

While we may not prefer the U.S. military to be the first response to 

regional crises, the Department of Defense will continue to be committed to 

peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions in support of U.S. national 

interests. These missions, which are best accomplished in coordination with other 

nations, will likely involve nongovernment and international organizations whose 

integration into operational environments must be carefully developed. Advance 

planning should identify clear interrelationships, responsibilities, and, when 

appropriate, lines of authority. 

The challenge confronting U.S. military planners is that the forces, 

training, and equipment used to maintain ready power projection capabilities do 

not necessarily lend themselves to the requirements of stability operations. The 

unpredictable and unique challenges generated by regional crises often require 

forces tailored to fit specific requirements. This will likely entail restructuring of 

some forces now focused on regional conflicts to conduct these less demanding 

but more likely contingencies. Reserve forces, for example, can provide skills 

that stem from their civilian specialties. Greater use of the reserve components to 

substitute for active units may also alleviate the operational and personnel tempo 

pressures on the active components and enable them to maintain their readiness 

for other missions. 

Clearly, the complexity of meeting the challenges of regional stability 

demands the use of all the 

elements of national powerdiplomatic and economic as well 

as military. A key question is how 

to integrate them effectively, both 

within the U.S. government and 

with our allies. Done well, it will 

enable the United States and its 

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE 

Involvement of all our national tools early may 

prevent the over-reliance on military force later 

Emphasize INTEGRATION of U.S. tools and 

PREVENTION of regional instabilities 

allies to influence and shape future security environments to our mutual benefit. 

In keeping with this approach, we should look to agencies that 

traditionally have had a domestic focus to play a larger role in international 

affairs. The Coast Guard, for example, could be a model for navies in other parts 

of the world. The Coast Guard participates in numerous international search and 

rescue cooperative· programs and engages in other international activities that 

build trust and strengthen military-to-military ties with other countries. Outfitted 

with updated and adequate combat systems, the Coast Guard could make a 

stronger contribution to U.S. regional stability efforts in coordination with the 

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). We recommend that the Department of Defense 

and the Coast Guard move to establish appropriate Memoranda of Understanding 

31 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

with the regional CINCs to more closely couple Coast Guard international 

activities to Commander-in-Chiefs regional stability programs. 

The current approach to addressing national security engages the 

Department of Defense and services too often and too quickly in situations that 

should have been resolved by non-military means. Failure to devote adequate 

attention and resources to promoting regional stability and security increasingly 

results in the use of military forces to restore social normalcy in areas not central 

to U.S. strategic interests, such as Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Put in a more 

positive way, by strengthening our diplomatic, political, economic, and other 

assistance efforts, we may be able to prevent the breakdown of order, which 

requires the use of military force. 

In this regard, we should also pay more attention to interagency 

representation overseas. Representatives from other than the Defense Department 

JOINTNESS 

Extend the spirit and intent of 'jointness • 

beyond U.S. forces 

to 

the U.S. interagency process and 

to inter-alliance venues 

should be assigned to CINCs. 

Similarly, Defense representation at 

embassies in important countries must 

be carefully considered. The Defense 

representative should ·be a senior 

officer or civilian with interagency 

and joint experience and should 

represent the Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 

a whole. 

Regional Security 

The Panel recommends: 

• Restructure some units to deal with smaller scale contingencies such as stability 

operations. 

• Substitute reserves for active units to alleviate PERSTEMPO pressures driven by 

regional security concerns. 

• Develop greater interoperability with alliance partners in the areas of doctrine, 

training, operational techniques, and R&D efforts. 

• Incorporate other government agencies, such as the Coast Guard, into CINC 

regional security planning. 

• Involve all agencies of the national security apparatus as an integrated team. 

32 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

PROJECTING MILITARY POWER. 

Projecting military power will continue to be a central element of U.S. 

defense. strategy. As a global power the United States will employ all the 

instruments of power--diplomatic, political, economic, and military-to fulfill its 

obligations and protect its national interests. The skillful application of these 

instruments will not only protect our interests and those of our allies, but will do 

so short of war. However, if armed aggressors threaten our interests, we must ·be 

prepared-preferably in concert with our allies, but alone if necessary-to 

respond with sufficient military power to defeat them. 

To meet future requirements to project military power and conduct combat 

operations, the United States must transform the present force, taking advantage 

of new technology, operational 

concepts, and force structures. Major 

combat operations in the future may 

well require forces and systems that are 

legacies (e.g., mechanized forces, naval 

surface combatant, short-range fixed 

and rotary-wing aircraft) of those 

currently in use. However, the 

POWER PROJECTION 

Project military power into critical areas: 

• More rapidly 

• Absent forward access 

• With smaller units and footprint 

• With greater lethality 

cutting-edge ability to accomplish U.S. national security objectives will come 

from new approaches and new thinking about power projection and asymmetric 

warfare capabilities. The depth and breadth of the capabilities needed are only 

now becoming apparent, but we can foresee the broad requirements. 

We must be able to project military power much more rapidly into areas 

where we may not have stationed forces. The ability to project lethal forces-in 

the air, on the sea, or on the land-will be essential. Toward that end, our ability 

to project combat power anywhere in the world will require new technologies, 

operational concepts, and capabilities to meet the new challenges. First among 

these new challenges is the need for a much smaller force "footprint" 

characterized by fewer but more capable attacking troops and platforms supported 

by an even smaller logistics element. Priority challenges will also include an 

enhanced military responsiveness distinguished by its increased range of 

employment and resulting in reduced exposure of our forces. 

In short, we must radically ·alter the way in which we project power. 

Projecting military power on short notice into the backyard of a major regional 

power is an inherently demanding enterprise. This is particularly true when that 

enemy is willing to accept vastly more casualties than the United States. In this 

situation, there is a high premium on forces that can deploy rapidly, seize the 

initiative, and achieve our objectives with minimal risk of heavy casualties. 

Forward-deployed land forces would have to operate dispersed. They 

would not operate from a few fixed bases characterized by "iron mountains" of 

33 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

supplies, but would rather rely on a combination of numerous small, dispersed 

supply points. Along with dispersion, ground units would emphasize speed to 

facilitate the ability to concentrate rapidly for close combat as required. They also 

may operate in smaller units that place great emphasis on seeing deep (through 

Special Operations Forces and deep-reconnaissance teams, along with 

reconnaissance helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles). These units would be 

integrated into the U.S. reconnaissance architecture, which would also comprise 

constellations of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicle "grids." Employing 

rocket artillery, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and attack helicopters, these 

units would both emphasize extended-range precision strikes and support similar 

strikes by air and sea forces. Concentrating ground forces, either to seize or to 

control certain kinds of terrain (e.g., urban areas), may prove exceedingly 

challenging in this environment. 

Maritime forces would rely more heavily on a "distributed" and networked 

battle fleet that would comprise, along with carriers, extended-range precision 

strike forces based on surface and submerged combatants, including submarines, 

arsenal ships, land-attack destroyers and integrated amphibious forces. The naval 

expeditionary power projection fleet would employ both short-range aircraft, 

maneuver forces, and reconnaissance and strike unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Maneuver forces would employ systems that would insert forces to strike or seize 

objectives while avoiding an enemy's defenses. 

Air forces would place greater emphasis on operating at extended ranges, 

relying heavily on long-range aircraft and extended-range unmanned systems, 

employing advanced precision and 

brilliant munitions and based outside POWER PROJECTION 

the theater of operations. Aircraft, Exploit our own offensive asymmetries 

unmanned aerial vehicles, and 

unmanned combat aerial vehicles operating in theater could stage at peripheral 

bases outside enemy missile range, or on Mobile Offshore Bases or carriers. 

Great reliance would be placed on aerial refueling to extend aircraft range, and 

perhaps on multiple, austere bases in theaters where "touch-and-go" refueling and 

rearming could take place. 

Such a force would be fully joint and increasingly combined, engaging in 

multidimensional (i.e., integrated ground, sea, and aerospace) and, where 

possible, multinational operations at close and extended ranges. It would be fully 

integrated through a global, distributed reconnaissance and intelligence 

architecture composed of satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, and 

infiltration forces. Unmanned systems would likely provide a growing proportion 

of airborne reconnaissance and strike forces. 

Power projection operations would focus on disabling the enemy's 

strategic center of gravity (including his warmaking potential and military forces), 

and occupying key terrain. In general, we must be able to rapidly target and 

34 
access whatever an adversary values most, the loss of which would render him 

either unable or unwilling to continue his hostilities. This has always been an 

objective in war, though very difficult to achieve, given war's uncertainties and 

frictions. Toward that end, we should try, so far as possible, to stop aggression 

through our own strategic initiative and control of,the battlespace. Accomplishing 

this will likely require the simultaneous execution of a range of 

operations--conducting extended-range precision strikes, seizing control of space 

and information superiority, exercising ground and sea control, and providing 

missile defense. 

Along with the, asymmetric U.S. military advantages noted above, our 

forces will also have to operate and organize differently for power projection in 

order to achieve the following objectives: 

• Inserting and extracting forces in the absence of forward bases; 

• Forward-deploying forces prior to a conflict if forward bases are 

available, but at risk; 

• Resupplying forward forces through airlift and sealift operations when 

access to forward ports and airfields is at risk; 

• Seizing and controlling key terrain (including urban terrain) if our 

ground forces must operate dispersed; 

• Achieving air superiority against an enemy's missile force-ballistic 

and cruise, as well as air-to-air and surface-to-air threats; and 

• Defending key regional coalition partners against enemy missile 

strikes. 

The visions of the various services contain many of the capabilities 

outlined above. However, the procurement budgets of the services do not 

adequately reflect the central thrust of their visions. 

Meeting the power projection 

challeJ?.ge will require aggressive Concentration on effects, not destruction 

transformation. This process may 

present some risk in the mid-term as the force transitions from the combat 

capabilities of the post-Desert Storm era to those demanded in the 2010-2020 

security environment. The risk is moderate, however, and acceptable, given the 

capability of the current force and the improbability of a hostile competitor 

making a decisive technological leap ahead in the near term. Furthermore, risk is 

likely to decline as we develop and deploy new capabilities. The longer we delay 

action, however, the greater the risk. Key to managing the risk of a major conflict 

while we transform the force is that at any point in the process we retain the 

35 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

means to conduct major combat operations and, more important, that potential 

adversaries understand that we have this capability. Successful power projection 

requires more than robust lift and the ability to wage effective operations against 

major regional threats. It requires other capabilities, described below. 

Handling Lesser Military Threats 

In our transformation efforts we must also provide the capabilities 

required for other emerging challenges. In many cases, the training and 

equipment used to 

prepare forces for LESSER THREATS 

major combat • Some overlapping capabilities with major combat operations 

operations will also • Many unique and specialized capabilities 

be able to handle • . Anticipated critical contributions from allied capabilities 

these challenges. Potential for significant contribution from the reserve components 

However, unique 

and critical military capabilities demand specialization. In addition, these 

challenges may well present difficult operational environments (urban 

deployments, chemically or biologically contaminated locales, major refugee 

flow) that do not fit easily the way our forces are currently structured. A partial 

solution to this dilemma may come from the reserve components (described in 

detail later in the Report). The specialized skills that reside in the reserves can 

make a significant contribution in tailoring our contingency forces to deal with 

emerging challenges to our security. It is also critical that we seek allied military 

support in these situations. In almost all cases, a coalition approach is clearly 

preferable to the United States operating alone. In some cases, our allies or 

regional organizations may be in a position to handle lesser contingencies without 

significant U. S. involvement. Nonetheless, the United States, both today and as 

is likely in the future, will possess some unique capabilities, such as transport and 

command, control, communications, and intelligence. Therefore, U.S. support 

will likely be in demand even when allies bear the brunt of the military 

operations. 

Effective Urban Operations 

Urban environments will present 

military forces. The maze of 

streets, crush of population, and 

complex of buildings and vertical • 

and subterranean constructions • 

present a d~manding landscape that • 

has the capacity to absorb ground • 

forces, confound the effectiveness • 

of stand-off weapons, and slow 

operations to a virtual standstill. 

36 

particularly thorny problems to our 

URBAN OPERATIONS 

Specialized weapons 

Tailored intelligence and communications 

Sophisticated operational co~cepts 

Civil-military and interagency coordination 

Joint and allied force integration 

Increase priority; expand efforts 

( 

.--

1 
, 

, 

--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

Even peacetime operations tend to be complicated and hazardous in an urban 

habitat. 

Although we might prefer to avoid urban situations, mission requirements 

in peace and war may not allow this preference. We need to develop intelligence 

systems and military capabilities that enable the effective control (or eviction) of 

regular enemy forces from urban terrain. Furthermore, we must do so without 

putting at risk friendly forces or noncombatants, while being careful not to 

destroy critical infrastructures that will be essential to post-hostility recovery. 

Finally, urban operations will require sophisticated operational concepts, civilmilitary and interagency coordination, new force structure elements, and 

integrated efforts by joint and allied forces. Emerging technologies will change 

the characteristics of the urban battlefield and thus our concepts for fighting there. 

In recent years the Department of Defense has focused research and 

development effort on urban warfare issues, and the services, especially the 

Marines, are developing new and better ways of fighting in cities. These efforts 

should be encouraged and expanded now if we are to successfully meet the 

·challenges of the future. 

Projecting Military Power 

The Panel recommends: 

• New approaches and thinking about power projection and our asymmetric 

capabilities. 

• Smaller forces with greater lethality supported by leaner logistics. 

• Widely dispersed ground units characterized by speed of execution and ability to 

concentrate at strategic points. 

• Small units such as special operations forces and other ground teams specializing in 

deep reconnaissance. 

• Distributed and networked battle fleets from which air, land, and sea attacks are 

launched. 

• Air forces with greater emphasis on operating at extended ranges with tactical air 

and long-range aircraft and unmanned aerial systems. 

• Both offensive and defensive measures to reduce WMD vulnerability of deployed 

forces. 

• Expanded research and development focused on urban warfare issues. 

37 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

SPACE OPERATIONS 

Unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic interest of the 

United States. The next twenty years will see dramatic expansion of space 

operations for a variety of purposes. We are in an era similar to the early 

development of aviation, in that breathtaking opportunities are there for those who 

can envision the possibilities and who possess the skills and determination to act 

upon them. 

Commercial use of space is expanding quickly, and on a global scale. In 

the next ten years, more than 1,000 satellites are projected to be launched. This 

represents a total investment (including all related services) of more than one-half 

trillion dollars. The majority of these satellites will be commercial. In 1996, for 

the first time in history, commercial launches exceeded government launches. 

Worldwide today more than 1,000 companies develop, manufacture, and operate 

space systems. Many of these companies are in the United States. 

Our enemies, however, will seek to develop their own space capabilities or 

to gain access to space-derived products. The explosion in the commercial use of 

space will afford them the opportunity. As the costs of getting to space and 

operating there decline-and we expect that they will-not only will we see more 

satellites in space, but more military organizations will have the means to access 

them. 

Military competitors will seek ways to reduce our current advantages. As 

competition increases, business will turn to government for protection. Some 

protective measures may take the form of regulations or treaties, but as the "flag 

follows trade," our military will be expected to protect U.S. commercial interests. 

Space power is an integral part of the revolution in military affairs and a 

key asset in achieving military advantage in information operations. For the 

military, space is the information battle's high ground. The United States cannot 

afford to lose the edge it now holds in military-related space operations. 

Despite our strong position, our space program has vulnerabilities. The 

small number of U.S. launch installations and present launch processes increase 

our vulnerabilities and costs of accessing space. Our assets in space are also 

vulnerable and they lack the ability to detect attack. Our protection and denial 

capabilities are rudimentary, limited to encryption of communication links, some 

degree of hardened electronics, and enough redundancy to guard against 

catastrophic loss of capabilities. Denial of enemy space capabilities is largely 

limited to neutralizing enemy ground installations employing conventional or 

special operations forces. 

Greater accessibility to space by our competitors will strongly influence 

the struggle for advantage in military operations. For example, an adversary 

38 

/ 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

could use commercial or third-party national remote-sensing and communications 

satellites, along with space-based navigation data, to help identify or target 

forward-deployed U.S. forces and fixed facilities such as ports, airfields, and 

logistics centers. Therefore, we must take steps now to ensure we have the 

capability to deny our enemies the use of space. 

In short, developments in space will both challenge our military and offer 

it opportunities. Our defensive efforts should extend to ground stations that 

enable and support operations as well as to the satellites themselves, .which will 

require the hardening or shielding of electronics against interference. We should 

develop sensors to determine the source and type of interference we might see 

applied against us so that we can take steps to mitigate its effect and attack the 

source. We must substantially improve our ability to conduct surveillance of 

space objects in order to maintain our situational awareness and adjust operations 

accordingly. And we must be prepared to deny applications that support 

adversary military operations. 

To capitalize on the 

opportunities that space lends to SPACE OPERATIONS 

military operations, we must • Emphasize coordination policies 

maintain our lead. We have a (civil/commercial/national security) 

strong foundation on which to • Incorporate innovative commercial 

build. We should emphasize 

policies and strategies needed to • 

coordinate the civil, commercial, • and national security sectors of • 

space. For example, we should be 

able to better integrate Defense • 

practices 

Investigate advantages and vulnerabilities 

of commercial assets 

Improve space-asset surveillance 

Improve asset protection (ground stations 

and space platforms) 

Develop a robust science and technology 

Department and intelligence program 

community operations. We must • Develop improved models and simulations 

take advantage of increasingly • Train commanders and educate national 

decision makers on space-based 

capabilities innovative commercial practices 

and continually investigate the 

advantages and vulnerabilities that Fully exploit the opportunities of space 

Proactively address associated vulnerabilities commercial investments in space 

will bring. We should accurately incorporate them into our long-range planning 

and integrate them into routine operations. We should also examine innovative 

applications such as paying for modifications that will make commercial systems 

more useful in crises. Furthermore, we should seek to secure the cooperation of 

private industry in addressing national security implications in space. 

We need to develop a robust space science and technology program that 

incorporates more experimentation, giving priority to technologies for which there 

is no commercial market to support innovation and the fielding of the capabilities 

we will need to meet emerging challenges. We need better simulation models to 

use in our analyses~ war games, exercises, and training. We must educate our 

39 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

various commands, services, and related national security actors on what 

capabilities space affords them. The outcome of all this should be better 

operational concepts and new space capabilities (including better situational 

awareness and improved precision strike). With the right focus, we can maintain 

our lead in space and protect against any vulnerability that might cost us an 

advantage in military operations. 

Space Operations 

The Panel recommends: 

• Emphasize policies and strategies to coordinate civil,_ commercial, and national 

security sectors of space. 

• Take steps to ensure the capability to deny enemies the use of space. 

• Improve the capability to conduct surveillance of space objects. 

• Develop the capability to protect space assets and related ground stations. 

• Improve the capability of related ground stations 

• Develop a robust space Science and Technology program. 

40 

. ( 

I" .. 
--------------- Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020 

MAINTAINING U.S. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 

Essential to maintaining information superiority will be the development 

of a "knowledge system" that meaningfully synthesizes existing and new 

information systems. Toward that end, there are two imperatives to maintaining 

U.S. information superiority. 

First and foremost, we must be able to exploit advances in commercial 

technology. Given that commercial technology is ubiquitous, we will have to 

develop the means to exploit it (i.e., transform technology into military capability) 

more quickly than our military competitors. We must also recognize that our 

ability to exploit information technologies to create systems architectures--the 

integration of forces and platforms-is likely to be a future core capability. 

Second, we must have effective defensive and offensive information capabilities. 

Not only must we be able to defend our systems against cyber-attack, but we must 

also be able to discern the origin of cyber-attacks and provide a commensurate 

response. 

Information Operations 

The Panel recommends: 

• Develop the ability to transform and exploit technology into military capability 

more rapidly. 

• Exploit information technology to integrate forces and platforms more 

effectively. 

• Develop effective defensive and offensive information capabilities. 

41 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Weapons of mass destruction are an expanding threat. As a result, our 

operational concepts 

must stress preventive 

measures including 

enhanced intelligence 

operations, an adequate 

homeland defense, the 

means to manage the 

consequences of a 

serious attack within 

As the new millennium approaches, we face the very real 

and increasing prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate 

armies, terrorist groups and even religious cults will seek to 

wield disproportionate power by acquiring and using these 

weapons that can produce mass casualties. These are 

neither far-fetched nor far-off threats. 

-Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen 

the United States or against our interests abroad, and force dispersion with a 

limited logistics footprint, as well as defenses for our forces and the ability to 

project power in the absence of forward bases. 

The days of the six -month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bases are 

almost certainly gone forever. WMD will require us to increase dramatically the 

means to project lethal power from extended ranges. We cannot assume, 

! 

however, that such measures will, in and of themselves, protect our forces. We ; 

must also develop appropriate defensive measures integral to our deployed forces. 

Even more efficient and lighter protective gear will be required. Vaccinations 

will be the norm, and detection capabilities must be our highest priority. 

Furthermore, we must· provide a conventional, non-nuclear deterrent 

capability against the use of weapons of mass destruction. The above described 

measures will form the basis of a conventional deterrence as potential adversaries 

recognize that we are not only capable of striking them from outside their WMD 

range, but that we are also capable of operating within a contaminated 

environment. It must be absolutely clear that the United States will respond 

decisively if weapons of mass destruction are employed against our homeland or 

against our forward-deployed forces. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The Panel recommends: 

• Develop appropriate defense measures organic to our deployed forces. 

• Give highest priority to detection capability. 

• Provide a conventional, non-nuclear deterrent capability against the use of 

weapons of mass destructi0n. 

42 

/ 
FORCE CAPABILITIES 

Does the U.S. military run the risk of being unprepared for the challenges 

of 2010-2020? It could, if we are on the cusp of a military revolution. 

Joint Vision 2010 argues that the future will find the U.S. military operating in an 

environment of uncertainty, faced with very different kinds of challenges than 

those encountered in the Cold War or the Gulf War. It notes, "Accelerating rates 

of change will make the future environment more unpredictable and less stable; 

presenting our armed forces with a wide range of plausible futures." 

Much of this change will be stimulated by rapid advances in information 

and information-related technologies, which are transforming societies and 

businesses, and which seem likely to effect comparable changes in military 

organizations. Joint Vision 2010 states that "the emerging importance of 

information superiority will dramatically impact how well our armed forces can 

perform their duties in 2010." 

In fact, this military revolution is characterized, in part, by a rapidly 

growing potential to detect, identify, and track far greater numbers of targets, over 

a larger area, for a longer time than ever before, and to order and move this 

information much more quickly and effectively than ever before. This seems 

likely to produce a very different kind of competition between "finders" and 

"hiders" than we have seen in the past. Reconnaissance architectures, comprised 

of satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, remote sensors, and individual soldiers, 

among other elements, may be able to help create a condition of information 

superiority in which the adversary's forces and infrastructure are clearly 

identified, while friendly forces remain shrouded from the enemy. In military 

parlance, such an architecture could dissipate some of the "fog" of war for those 

who can exploit it to achieve information superiority. 

On the other hand, the "hiders" will seek to frustrate the efforts of the 

"finders" through a variety of means, including strikes against the reconnaissance 

architecture and passive measures such as stealth, electronic countermeasures, and 

the dispersion, cover, and concealment of forces. Thus, while it will be important 

to seek information superiority to realize the enormous boost it could provide to 

military force effectiveness,- this condition will not be easily achieved. 

That being said, the importance of creating as much of a favorable 

information "gap" between friendly and enemy forces as possible is highlighted 

by the changing character of the competition between the offense and the defense. 

The emerging military revolution also is characterized by the potential to engage a 

far greater number of targets, over a far greater area, in far less time, and with 

much greater lethality, precision, and discrimination than ever before. Combined 

with information superiority, such a capability could be an instrument of decisive 

advantage for the force that possesses it. 

43 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

In summary, the emerging military revolution seems destined to present 

the U.S. military with challenges and opportunities that are fundamentally 

different from those of today. 

CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

Given the Panel's vision of the future battlespace-the result of the 

previously discussed revolution in military affairs, geopolitical, socio~economic, 

and demographic trends, potential 

asymmetric threats, and the new and FUTURE CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

emerging operational military • 

challenges-we can expect significant • 

differences in the characteristics of • 

our forces. Consequently, it is • 

insufficient to predicate future • 

• capabilities on what is needed today. • Such current organizational structures • 

(e.g., "above-the-line" forces defined • 

as divisions, wings, Marine • 

Expeditionary Forces, and carrier 

Systems architectures 

Information system protection 

Information operations 

Automation 

Small logistics footprint 

Mobility 

Stealth 

Speed 

Increased operational and strike ranges 

Precision strike 

battle groups) and the current and planned weapons systems will be required in 

some forces to maintain our military capability, but alone they do not necessarily 

prepare us for future challenges. The transformation to a force for 2010-2020 

should not be dominated by efforts to modernize legacy systems that will have 

much less utility in the future. 

Force Characteristics 

The Panel believes that relative to today's forces, the U.S. military of 

2010-2020 should place far greater emphasis on the following characteristics: 

• Systems Architectures. Information technologies could dramatically 

enhance the ability to integrate the actions of widely dispersed and dissimilar 

units. Such systems architectures would enable highly distributed, network-based 

operations; 

• Information System Protection. The defense of our commercial and 

military· information architecture will be critical and will allow· us to protect our 

forces and our platforms from the enemy's reconnaissance efforts. New means to 

protect information systems and identify the origin of cyber-attacks must be the 

·highest priority. Today, we are vulnerable; 

• Information Operations. Significant improvements . in the 

application of military force will be achieved by electronic strike capability. We 

need to develop the ability to insert viruses, implant "logic bombs," conduct 

44 

/ 
r 

Force Capabilities 

electromagnetic pulse and directed energy strikes, and conduct other offensive 

electronic operations; 

• Automation (to include the migration into space and unmanned 

platforms). The major advantage automation gives us is speed. Given that time 

will be an increasingly scarce resource in future warfare, automation-aided 

operations can temporarily compress operations; 

• Small Logistics Footprint. Not only do we require lighter, more 

mobile forces, but we also require lean logistics. There may be no secure rear 

areas. A smaller logistics· footprint will represent less of a target and, at the same 

time, less of a strain on indigenous infrastructures and our own strategic air and 

sea lift; 

• Mobility. The ability to move our forces rapidly and in the right 

configuration is key to their effectiveness. Most importantly, the greater their 

mobility, the greater their protection; 

• Stealth. Increasingly, any force that can be seen is likely to be hit. 

The best protection, therefore, is not to be seen. At the same time, the ability to 

avoid detection affords the opportunity for tactical surprise-which in turn can 

allow for strategic and operational surprise. The stealth embodied in our planes 

and submarines today will be increasingly important for our air, sea, and ground 

forces tomorrow; 

• Speed. Given advances in the speed of information flow and 

communications, the unfolding and duration of critical engagements-indeed the 

tempo of war itself-have shrunk dramatically. The rate at which we can 

mobilize, deploy, set, act, and reset for any action-preemptive or reactive-will 

likely be fundamental to success; 

• Increased Operational and Strike Ranges. We will need increased 

ranges to ensure the safety of our forces and their ability to achieve desired effects 

from disparate locations. Greater ranges will also offset the growing vulnerability 

of forward forces; 

• Precisio~ Strike. Precision weapons will enable the use of far fewer 

platforms, with no loss in force capabilities. Precision and the ability to 

discriminate among targets near each other will limit collateral damage. 

These characteristics, while important to the capabilities we will need in 

the 2010-2020 time frame, are not in and of themselves enough to ensure 

long-term utility of weapons systems, platforms, and organizational structures. 

Concentration of effects, 

not .forces 

45 

Force packages must be applied in a joint and 

combined environment, interoperable with all of 

the components involved in security operations. It 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

is through the synergistic concentration of effects, not by the assembling of force 

packages in one locale, that we must dominate our enemies. 

If these characteristics comprise a template for our future forces' success, 

the question remains whether we currently are developing the right systems, 

operational platforms, and organizational structures to dominate and prove 

victorious in the future. The Panel suggests that the specific examples below 

represent the kind of actions we should take to transform our military to meet the 

challenges of the future. 

All Forces 

• Shift funds from upgrade of legacy systems to new systems 

focused on meeting the challenges of 201 0-2020; 

• Place more emphasis on directed energy, electromagnetic energy, 

and cyber-weapons; 

• Enable greater speed, and penetration capability for Special 

Operations Forces to preempt or resolve terrorist activity or WMD 

threat; 

• Provide more near-zero miss, long-range, stealthy cruise missiles, 

brilliant munitions, and submunitions in lieu of dumb weapons; 

• Integrate ballistic and cruise missile defense to protect forces (both 

point and area targets), theaters, and regions; harmonize land- and 

sea-based missile defenses (i.e., ballistic and air breathers) in an 

effort to eliminate duplicative systems; 

• Establish a distributed user-friendly global information system that 

includes a broadcast architecture; 

• Create a "distributed," in-theater logistics structure in lieu of "iron 

mountains" (large stockpiles); 

• Provide the ability to project significant power from forward 

deployed areas, as well as the United States, within hours or days 

rather than months; 

• Explore new air and sealift concepts emerging in the commercial 

world; 

• Accelerate network-centric operations linking sensors and 

weapons; 

• Replace individu~ service component-unique systems with 

integrated, joint command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; 

• Structure less manpower-intensive forces; 

• Create highly networked forces able to see the battlespace in near 

real time and to dynamically task and control forces. 

46 
Force Capabilities 

Land Forces 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Become more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with 

greater urban operations capability; 

Reduce systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to 

lighter, more agile automated systems; 

Evolve to lighter, greater range, more lethal fire-support systems; 

Develop the twenty-first century tank to be a unique vehicle 

relying on speed, agility, and hyper-velocity gun technology for 

operational effectiveness (the Panel's view is that 30-35 tons is the 

appropriate weight range); 

Move beyond Force XXI to CONVENTIONAL FORCES 

incorporate the concepts Consolidate gains from Force XXI and 

embodied in Army After move directly to Army After Next (AAN) 

Next; 

Restructure above-the-line units, which evolve to smaller 

operational elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality; 

Move toward advanced vertical lift systems versus service-life 

extensions of current rotary-wing aircraft. 

Sea Forces 

• Move toward small-signature ships capable of providing sustained 

long-range, precision firepower; 

• Design ship production to allow rapid incorporation of latest 

technology; 

• Provide greater quantities of small unmanned underwater vehicles 

to augment and extend the reach of submarines; 

• Construct follow-on carriers to capitalize on short take-off, vertical 

landing; unmanned aerial vehicle; and unmanned combat aerial 

vehicle aircraft characteristics with attendant reduction in size and 

personnel; 

• Consider sea-based mobile off-shore bases to provide access in 

situations where forward bases are unavailable or at risk to 

prepositioned forces; 

• Provide insertion vehicles incorporating the latest technologies to 

extend the reach of the maneuver component of the naval power 

projection forces. 

Aerospace Forces 

• Ensure a proper mix of short- and long-range aerospace forces to 

enable optimal strike operations; 

Move toward fewer numbers of short-range aircraft 

providing increased delivery capacity with smaller, but 

more accurate weapons ; 

47 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

• 

• 

• 

Explore new approaches to long-range, precision delivery 

vehicles; 

More distributed satellite systems to provide redundancy and 

survivability of command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 

Short-take-off-vertical-landing aircraft on wide array of airfields, 

ships, and sea-based platforms; 

Increase ground surveillance capability . 

48 

r 

/ 
Force Capabilities 

Near-Term Implications 

Applying the above principles and in view of the services' future visions and concepts, the 

Panel does not follow the logic of several of the services' procurements. 

• With regard to land forces, the Panel questions continuing the upgrade of the MlAl tank 

and the continuing evolution of the main battle tank beyond its current capabilities, as well 

as the projected numbers of Crusader and Comanche. Although the Panel recognizes the 

potential capabilities of these systems and the valuable results of the Force XXI and 

Advanced W arfighting Experiment initiatives, it believes that future requirements would 

best be met if the Army consolidates and limits their applications. These capabilities 

should be deployed to III Corps and the forward-based forces-as a risk mitigation 

capability-while transitioning the balance of the Army (force structure and programs) to 

the Anny After Next concept. These actions and others will require a redesign of the 

Army's force structure and concomitant acquisition programs, which may result in end 

strength savings. 

• In regard to the Navy, the Panel disagrees with the decision to terminate the arsenal ship 

test bed. The value of a test bed to support a major warfighting transition was clear in the 

use of the NORTON SOUND to support the Navy's introduction of surface-to-air 

missiles. Given the characteristics the Panel believes necessary for future forces, a new 

hull form should be built for testing and to serve as a platform for a number of topside 

antenna configurations and weapons systems. The Panel also believes that the Navy 

should look closely at accelerating the transformation to the CVX class of carriers in lieu 

of procuring additional Nimitz class CVNs and converting one or more of the four Trident 

SSBNs coming out of strategic service to alternative missions. 

• On the issue of tactical air, the Panel notes the cost over the lifetime of all three current 

programs and questions the total number of planned aircraft buys and the appropriate mix 

of systems in 2010-2020. With respect to the F/A-18E/Fs and Joint Strike Fighter, the 

Panel supports Secretary Cohen's plan to continue to evaluate the ultimate numbers and 

mix ofF/A-18E/Fs procured dependent upon the ultimate capability, cost, and schedule 

successes of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Panel further believes that the services must 

demonstrate how these two systems, and the F-22, can operate effectively in the 2010-

2020 environment, which will be characterized by new challenges to our power projection 

capability. 

• The Panel remains concerned about the near-term ground surveillance capabilities and 

recent programmatic decisions (i.e., reducing the JST ARS buy). 

49 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 

The demise of the Soviet Union has dramatically altered the strategic 

landscape. Although tensions with Russia have eased, Russia retains numerous 

nuclear weapons. Russia is placing greater doctrinal emphasis on its nuclear 

forces, investing the necessary funds to keep their land based missile forces viable 

at a time when its conventional military forces are in decline. 

Simultaneously, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing 

missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Its current arsenal is smallseveral hundred--compared with that of the United States and Russia, but China 

has the capability to be a more significant nuclear power by 2010-2020. 

The key task for U.S. nuclear policy in the first decades of the twenty-first 

century will be to deter attacks against the United States and its allies, discourage 

the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear 

weapons, and promote efforts to achieve 

balanced and stabilizing reductions in 

nuclear arsenals. Progress in U.S.-

Russian arms control is currently stalled 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Emphasis of deterrence should move from 

sheer numbers to strategic equilibrium 

because the Russian Duma has not yet ratified START II. However, retaining 

nuclear arms at current levels for an extended period is not in the U.S. interest. 

Those levels will be expensive to maintain and do not facilitate the transformation 

process essential to respond to future threats. 

Among the considerations critical to shaping future nuclear policy will be 

the need to take account of possible shifts in China's nuclear policy, the fate of 

the Russian nuclear arsenal, and the possibility that other states, including some 

hostile to the United States, may acquire nuclear weapons. Ensuring that there is 

a strategic equilibrium among Moscow, Beijing, and Washington will be 

important to our future security. That does not mean, however, that we will need 

large numbers of nuclear weapons. Effective deterrence of potential adversaries 

can be maintained at the reduced levels envisioned by START III and beyond. 

Over time, the focus of our efforts to deter nuclear or conventional attacks 

against the United States, its allies, and interests may differ substantially from that 

of today. Deterrence of attack as the central focus of nuclear policy is already 

being supplanted by the need to manage-identify, account for, and safeguard 

against-the proliferation and possible use of nuclear and other weapons of mass 

destruction. Such efforts are already part of the cooperative threat-reduction 

initiatives undertaken by the United States and other concerned countries, and 

they will have to be continued as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat.· Arms 

control and nonproliferation agreements-such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty, the · Chemical Weapons Convention, and a strengthened Biological 

Weapons Convention-will also play an important role in reinforcing the 

foundations for a more stable security system at lower levels of armaments. 

50 

(" 

I 
Force Capabilities 

Traditional U.S. nuclear policies may not be sufficient to deter nuclear, 

chemical, or biological attacks by a rogue state against U.S. allies and coalition 

partners or forward bases and staging areas to which we seek access. It is 

unlikely, moreover, that our nuclear forces would deter nonstate actors (terrorists, 

criminals, or others) who seek to coerce or punish the United States or its allies. 

It is in the best interests of the United States, Russia, and the international 

community that the United States and Russia move as rapidly as possible to 

START ill. We should also consider the potential of non-nuclear weapons to 

strengthen deterrence. Advancing military technologies that merge the 

capabilities of information systems with precision-guided weaponry and real-time 

targeting and other · new weapons systems may provide a supplement or 

alternative to the nuclear arsenals of the Cold War. 

Finally, U.S. security considerations must account for the potential risk 

posed to the U.S. homeland by existing nuclear weapons in other countries. 

Defense systems should defend against a limited attack by a rogue state or 

terrorist, but they will not be effective against the large nuclear arsenals that 

already exist in Russia and may exist in China and elsewhere. Defensive systems 

will be more effective if they are coupled to arms control agreements that limit 

offensive capabilities. Given the evolving threat and continued improvement of 

our missile defense technology, a hedging strategy, rather than immediate 

deployment of a missile defense system, is a sensible approach. But, it is 

important that we proceed in a way that permits rapid deployment if threats 

should develop and our technologies mature. 

Strategic Forces 

The Panel recommends: 

• Maintain support for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. 

• Move to START-III as soon as possible. 

• Couple defensive systems with arms control agreements. 

• Sustain stockpile stewardship programs to support Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

51 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

RESERVE COMPONENTS 

The reserve components serve as an increasingly important element of our 

armed forces. These citizen-soldiers ensure the involvement of the American 

people in our nation's security. Moreover, their military skills are often enhanced 

by their experiences within the civilian sector (e.g., engineering, construction, 

communications, police, aviation, civil affairs, and medical). 

The reserve forces today play an increasing role in a variety of military 

operations worldwide, relieving active units and reducing both operational and 

personnel tempos of frequent and lengthy deployments. Indeed, in some cases 

they supply the entire force structure for specific missions. The Panel expects that 

this role will be expanded. Reserve and Guard units must be prepared and 

resourced for use in a variety of ongoing operations. Given this, the Department 

should consider establishing the funding priorities for specific Guard and Reserve 

programs based on the amount of total force mission capability they provide. The 

Congress determines funding priorities today. 

Not only will reserve forces augment and complement the active forces 

overseas in missions ranging from combat to peacekeeping to regional stability 

and contingency operations, but they will increasingly be involved in containing 

threats here at home. As noted, homeland defense is a mission of growing 

importance for our military forces. The reserve components, especially the Army 

Guard, will play a key role in this mission. Effectively organizing and training 

the appropriate reserve assets to meet the 

homeland defense mission will not only More 'active' reserve components 

provide the United States with a more 

effective deterrent, but it also will provide a quicker and more comprehensive 

response to crises should they occur. However, concerns over posse comitatus 

must be addressed. 

In any event, the reserve structure must recognize the authority of the 

Service Secretary for the reserve components under Title 10, as well as the 

Service Secretary's responsibilities for the Guard under Title 32. This 

relationship works best in an atmosphere of trust between the active and reserve 

components in their common commitment to the security of the United States. 

The Army and its Reserve Components 

While the other services have continued to increase the integration of their 

active and reserve forces, the Army has suffered from a destructive disunity 

among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National 

Guard. This rift serves neither the.Army nor the country well. The Panel strongly 

believes the rift must be healed and makes a series of recommendations toward 

that end. 

52 
, 

Force Capabilities 

As the Army undertakes its transformation, reductions in both the active 

and reserve components can be expected. Such reductions must be the product of 

deliberations by the reserve components, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the 

Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense. Neither the active nor the 

reserve components should benefit at the expense of the other. Both must be 

committed to meeting the security needs of the nation. 

To enhance the capability of the Guard as a component of the total force, 

we recommend the following. Many of the principles embodied in these 

recommendations pertain to all components of the Army, as well as to some of the 

other services, and are discussed elsewhere in the Report. 

First, a series of changes should be made to the Guard's combat units: 

• Some portion of the Army National Guard's divisional combat 

(including combat support) units should become part of active 

divisions and brigades. Infantry and mechanized battalions, for 

example, would be integrated as organic units of the active divisions 

and would deploy with them. The active component commander 

would be responsible for their combat readiness and training; 

• Given the changing character of warfare and the threats we face, 

Guard divisions should begin now to organize under the concepts 

proposed in Anny After Next. The utility of reorganizing the active 

and reserve division structures is discussed elsewhere in this Report; 

• The enhanced brigades should report to an active Army command. 

The active commander would have clear responsibility and authority 

to oversee training and to ensure the brigades meet their readiness 

goals; 

• The Guard should develop selected early-deploying units that would 

join the active component. These units do not now exist but they 

could be built around technologies embodied in line-of-sight-anti-tank 

and high-mobility, artillery-rocket system technologies. Formed as 

battalions, they would be valuable components of the total force. They 

should be prepared to deploy directly from home stations without 

· extensive post-mobilization training to reinforce ·early-deploying 

active units. This implies additional full-time manning requirements 

and offers an opportunity to exploit the concept of an integrated 

active component/reserve component unit; 

53 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

• Lighter, more agile forces will play a key role in future combat. Fewer 

armored forces will be needed. They are simply too heavy to get into 

the fight in a timely manner and require too much logistical support. 

Both the active and reserve components should decrease the number of 

armored units; 

• As planned, portions of the current combat forces should be converted 

to combat service and combat service support units. The ratio between 

support and combat units in the total force should be adjusted to reflect 

the actual needs of the Army in meeting its mission requirements; 

• In addition to augmenting and supporting active forces for major 

theaters of war, reserve support units play a vital role in shaping the 

international environment. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, 

and similar missions are also important. Some additional reserve or 

Guard units may be needed to reduce pressure on the active Army. 

Second, the Army Guard should provide a smaller Strategic Reserve: 

• The Strategic Reserve units should have clear peacetime missions such 

as support· for combined operations in Southern Command or 

Partnership for Peace training in Eastern Europe. It is the Panel's 

judgment that the Guard should assume the entire U.S. Army South 

(USARSO) mission; 

• To ensure their continued affordability, the modernization of these 

forces-accomplished largely through cascading--can be slower than 

that of higher priority units so long as their equipment permits 

interoperability with active forces and their employment is in 

accordance with doctrine. 

Third, homeland defense will be a much more important mission in the 

future: 

• The National Guard should continue to provide general-purpose forces 

to give prompt military support to civil authorities. These forces may 

need specific additional training--similar to that developed _for 

response to civil disturbance during the 1960s and 1970s-but their 

primary mission should remain to fight with active forces in combat 

contingencies; 

54 
I 

' 

Force Capabilities 

• The National Guard should also provide forces organized and 

equipped for training of civil agencies and the immediate 

reinforcement of first-response efforts in domestic emergencies. They 

would focus on management of the consequences of a terrorist attack 

(to include weapons of mass destruction) and natural disasters. They 

must also be prepared to defend critical infrastructure, including 

information infrastructure; 

• As new homeland defense missions develop (e.g., National Missile 

Defense and information warfare), the Guard should be used in lieu of 

active forces wherever possible. 

Finally, the Army Reserve must continue to be adjusted as the Army's 

total force needs change: 

• The Army Reserve has undergone a significant transition over the past 

several years, shifting their forces to combat service support as well as 

playing a much more active role in peacetime missions. Steps--to 

include some restructuring of the Reserve--need to be taken now to 

reduce the Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) problem for certain high 

demand units; 

• The current Army Reserve Institutional Training Divisions should be 

reviewed to ensure that their structure and responsibilities are 

consistent with the needs of the Army as it transforms. 

A total force, fully integrated, requires a common culture to engender 

unity of thought and action. Shared operational and training experiences, 

common educational opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders between the 

active and reserve components serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce a 

common ethic. 

These initiatives will enhance the land component's contribution to our 

defense. Moreover, they will enable the active Army to engage in the vigorous 

program of experimentation called for in the Panel's transformation strategy. 

Reserve· Components 

The Panel recommends: 

• Expand reserve component roles for use in a variety of ongoing operations. 

• Restructure to reduce current reserve component PERSTEMPO. 

• Assign reserve units to selected homeland defense missions. 

• Assign selected units of the National Guard at battalion and lower levels to active divisions and 

brigades. 

• Maintain equipment interoperability among active and reserve component units. 

• Assign consequence management responsibilities to National Guard units. 

• Prepare reserve component officers for command positions in the proposed Americas Command. 

55 
A TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY 

Today, national security leaders face a challenge that is unprecedented: 

transforming the armed forces into a very different kind of military from that 

which exists today. Simultaneously, national security leaders must sustain the 

military's ability to play a very active role in supporting U.S. near-term efforts to 

preserve global stability within a national security strategy of engagement and 

enlargement. · 

Why the need for a transformation strategy? Defense enters this era of 

geopolitical and military-technical transformation within an environment of 

declining resources. There is the risk that if the wrong transformation course is 

chosen (or if no attempt is made to transform), the Department of Defense will 

find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy its way out of its mistakes. Moreover, it 

is important to begin the transformation process soon, since decisions made in the 

near-term will influence the shape of the military ove~ the long-term. Put another 

way, it is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. military twenty years hence is 

already being formed by decisions being made today. 

Consequently, the Defense Department should accord the highest priority 

to executing a transformation strategy for the U.S. military, starting now. The 

Department should begin by recognizing that revolutions in military affairs are 

characterized by an increased risk of strategic surprise, such as occurred with 

submarine warfare early in this century and which might occur again with the 

onset of information warfare, competition in space, and the changing character of 

power projection. 

For a start, the military services will have to tap into rapidly advancing 

technologies to develop new military systems that can be applied within the 

framework of new operational concepts executed by new kinds of military 

organizations: It is this combination of technology, emerging military systems, 

new concepts of operation and force restructuring that often produces the 

discontinuous leap in military effectiveness characteristic of revolutions in 

military affairs. Greater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a 

variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force structures. The goal 

would be to identify those that are capable of solving the challenges that emerge 

or th~t are capable of exploiting opportunities--our asymm~tric advantage-and 

to eliminate those which are not. The end result would find the U.S. military 

having created strategic "options" on a range of military capabilities. These 

options could be used both to dissuade prospective competitors from undertaking 

aggressive military competition and, in the event dis·suasion or deterrence fails, to 

exercise one or more of these options to prevail in such a competition. 

Transformation will take dedication and commitment-and a willingness 

to put money, resources, and structure behind a process designed to foster change. 

Most of all, it will take wisdom to walk the delicate line between avoiding 

57 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

premature decisions and unintended "lock-in" with equipment purchases, 

operational concepts, and related systems whose effectiveness may erode 

precipitously in a rapidly changing conflict environment. Choosing the right 

alternatives, as threats become clear and technology proves out, must be the goal. 

Effecting a military transformation will require a much greater role for 

jointness. It may also encompass greater competition among the military 

services, not less. Congress and many military reformers have decried-in many 

cases, quite rightly-the amount of overlap and redundancy that exists among the 

four military services. However, competition among the services can assist in 

determining how best to exploit new capabilities, or how to solve emerging 

challenges. This kind of competition should be encouraged. In the case of the 

power projection challenge, for example, it is not clear whether the solution is to 

be found in Air Force long-range precision strikes; strikes from a Navy task force 

composed of a "distributed" strike force-carriers, arsenal ships and Trident 

"stealth battleships" fitted with hundreds of vertical launch systems for long-range 

precision guided missiles; Army forces employing long range missiles and 

weaponized, unmanned aerial vehicles; Marine "infestation" teams calling in 

long-range precision fires; integrated theater missile defenses; or a combination of 

these capabilities, or perhaps something quite different-all linked by a global 

command and control information architecture relying heavily on our assets in 

space. 

What emerges from earlier periods of transformation, whether it be the 

development of naval aviation, or the exploitation of ballistic missiles, is that they 

take a considerable amount of time, at least a decade, and often closer to two, to 

play out. Indeed, even those military systems that today are placed on a "fast 

track" for development and fielding often take ten years or more to reach forces in 

the field. Additional time is required to determine how best to employ the new 

military system, and to make the appropriate adjustments in the force structure. If 

that is the case, then senior Defense Department leaders must begin now to 

develop and execute a transformation strategy to prepare for the very different 

kinds of challenges they see confronting the armed forces over the long-term 

future. 

The issue of how to fund this transformation must be addressed. In this 

fiscally constrained environment, there are significant risks to the Quadrennial 

r 

Defense Review's (QDR) goal of $60 billion for modernization funding. In its /, 

review of the FY98 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), the General Accounting 

Office (GAO) found that the Defense Department has not met its procurement 

goals for the fourth straight year. There are several reasons th~t indicate this trend 

is likely to continue. The increase in Operati~ns and Maintenance (O&M) 

spending coupled with the decreasing size of the Defense budget has "crowded 

out" procurement spending. The migration of procurement funds to pay for cost 

overruns and increased OPTEMPO continues, exacerbating the procurement 

shortfall. Additionally, Congress's unwillingness to approve any further base 

58 
.· ·~ . A Transforrna~ion Strategy 

closure rounds has created additional risk to Defense's future ability to fund 

procurement efforts through infrastructure reform. 

Acquisition reform is helping the Department meet its funding problems, 

but most savings have been used to meet needs of current programs, indicating 

that few funds will be available for other programs. New acquisition programs 

have been aggressively budgeted, counting on acquisition reform, making 

additional savings unlikely. As a result, Defense's ability to fund the QDR force 

is at risk. While continuing to reduce infrastructure and achieve greater efficiency 

in the acquisition process is necessary, it is not clear that it will be adequate to 

provide the requisite resources to fund the transformation to a force equipped and 

organized to handle the challenges of 2010-2020. 

The Panel estimates an annual budget wedge of $5 to 10 billion will be 

required to support this transformation strategy. This money funds such 

initiatives as intelligence, space, urban warfare, joint experimentation, and 

information operations. In the absence of additional defense funding, the 

transformation could be funded by infrastructure and acquisition reform, reducing 

the operational tempo associated with non-warfighting activities, canceling 

acquisition programs, or reducing force structure and end strength. There will be 

no easy answers, and difficult choices must be made. Some near-term investment 

challenges must be solved to ensure we can provide the necessary resources. 

In this final section of our report we address several recommendations for 

how we can begin the transformation of our security structure from where we are 

today to where we need to be in the future. Our outline for this process involves a 

wide variety of issues and subject areas. First we articulate the need for a broad 

national security approach to include a review of how we approach and 

incorporate our allies; the increasing importance of our intelligence community, 

particularly human intelligence (HUMINT) and analysis; and the need for a much 

stronger and more effective interagency process. Second, we believe that a 

formal system of experimentation within the Defense Department must be 

implemented. Third, we propose revisions to the Unified Command Plan. 

Fourth, we discuss the need to transform the industrial base. Finally, the Panel 

recommends that the Defense support structure and infrastructure be 

fundamentally reformed. 

59 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

A BROAD NATIONAL SECURITY APPROACH 

The National Security Act of 1947 codified the transformation of the 

United States from an isolationist power to the world's preeminent global power. 

It created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Act's 

organizational changes reflected America's conscious decision to bear the mantle 

of global leadership in the coming Cold War. 

The challenges the United States will face in the twenty-first century differ 

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE 

National Security Act of 1947 provided legislative 

basis for the Cold War, BUT ... 

opportunities and challenges of twenty-first century 

will be very d~fferent than those of the Cold War 

substantially from those of 

the Cold War. The collapse 

of the Soviet Union and the 

demise of the Warsaw Pact 

changed the major fault lines 

of the international political 

system. At the same time, an 

ongoing technological revolution has restructured global politico-economic 

patterns and promises to alter dramatically military operations and the character 

of warfare. Increasingly sophisticated weapons promise to proliferate advanced 

warfighting capabilities to anyone with the money to buy them. Existing and 

emerging security challenges are occurring in an international environment where 

commercial, financial, cultural, and communication links often transcend 

geographic borders. 

New national security interests-especially those dealing with space, 

cyberspace, and informationare vulnerable to attack by NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 

other than military means and 

• must be protected. The lines • 

between domestic and foreign • 

policy, intelligence and • 

Vulnerable to unconventional attack 

Blurs military/law enforcement line 

Respects no boundaries 

Requires international cooperation information, political and .... _________________ .. 

economic agendas, and military and law enforcement activities will become 

increasingly blurred. Many emerging challenges respect no national boundaries 

and require international cooperation to resolve. 

New technologies have diminished the importance of geographic distance 

but increased the importance of time-and, consequent! y, the ability to respond 

quickly to emerging problems. In such an environment, being able not only to 

respond, but also to anticipate and to defuse problems before they reach the point 

of conflagration, will be more important than ever before to our national security. 

Today, American military forces aid cholera-infected refugee camps; Marines and 

National Guardsmen intercept illegal drugs on America's southwestern border; 

and uniformed Americans separate the warring parties in the Balkans while 

diplomats, businessmen, and private volunteer agencies try to restore political 

0 

60 
A Transformation Strategy 

order. The future promises to present our national security structure with similar 

challenges. 

We must assume that we are vulnerable to a variety of threats--both 

military and non-military in nature. We must find a variety of means to foster the 

resolution of conflicts, preferably before they occur. High on our list must be a 

way to achieve some measure of control over the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. To some degree--with Russia, the new independent states, and 

North Korea-we have made some progress in this regard. But this agenda of 

"preventive defense" needs further articulation and expansion. 

Although the security challenges we face are more diverse, and complex 

international operations are becoming the norm for our defense forces, our policymaking institutions remain largely as they were during the Cold War. They are 

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE 

Funding shortfalls and coordination gaps among 

U.S. government agencies impede U.S. crisis 

response 

largely reactive, highly 

compartmentalized, inward! y 

focused on their own nusstons, 

and only loosely connected to one 

another. The national security 

apparatus established fifty years 

ago must adapt itself as it takes on a growing list of new challenges and 

responsibilities. It so far has been unable to integrate smoothly the resources and 

organizations needed to anticipate and mold a more secure international 

environment. It has yet to take full advantage of new technologies and the 

contributions that nongovernment organizations, including businesses and private 

voluntary groups, and our allies and friends around the world, can make to 

national security. 

This broader approach to national security must look at the best way to 

change and integrate alliance structures, the intelligence structure, and the 

interagency process to better employ our forces and capabilities to meet the 

challenges of the future. 

Alliance Structures 

Our Cold War alliance structure served the United States well in 

countering the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. Historically, the 

United States expects certain things from alliances-legitimacy and reliability 

(political as well as military), augmentation of 

our military capability, access to forward bases, 

host nation support, and the benefits of pooling 

manpower and sharing technology, production 

capacity, and intelligence information. While 

ALUANCES 

Regional stability through 

regional partnering 

these expectations remain, the demise of the Soviet Union and the diffusion of 

traditional alliance interests raise fundamental questions about the future of U.S. 

alliance relationships. 

61 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

The Panel believes alliances will continue to be a vital component of U.S. 

security in the future, notwithstanding our need to maintain some capability for 

unilateral military action. Future "alliances," however, will be different from 

those of the Cold War. The internal relationships, geographic focus, and formal 

structures of alliances must adapt to a new security environment defined by 

changes in the geopolitical situation, military capabilities, and economic 

circumstances. 

The ongoing geopolitical transformation of the post -Cold War world, 

while greatly diminishing the overarching, global threat posed by the Soviet 

Union and the uncertainties about Russia's future direction, has generated diffuse 

regional threats, some of which may coalesce into major regional opposition to 

U.S. interests. At the same time, the absence of a major, clear, and common 

threat may weaken the basis for the relative stability of past alliance structures. 

Without the perception of real danger to mutual national survival, the 

commitment to collective defense could be diluted to the level that existed during 

the League of Nations. 

Closely linked to the new geopolitical landscape are changing military 

realities. Militaries are transforming themselves and thus creating uneven and 

divergent capabilities even among traditional allies. Communication and other 

interoperability requirements may become increasingly difficult, even while 

coalition operations (or operations stemming from ad hoc alliance structures) 

become more prevalent. The U.S. military will have to seek new avenues for 

interoperability training with an increasing number of actual and potential allies. 

These changes in alliance structure will like I y occur in an increasing! y 

resource-constrained environment. In the past, the United States could afford to 

underwrite any alliance. Although the U.S. economy is still the strongest in the 

world, our share of global wealth relative to that of our major allies has declined 

significantly since the early days of the Cold War when our current alliances were 

formed. 

As a result, fiscal burden-sharing will play a greater part in defining our 

ALLIANCES 

International arms cooperation 

encourages and complements 

coalition activities 

multilateral and bilateral relationships. 

International arms cooperation can help 

promote this trend and will also help promote 

efficiencies in an era of constrained defense 

budgets. Closer links between the 

United States and overseas defense and 

. aerospace corporations, especially with those in Europe, can serve both our 

interests and those of our allies. 

But the United States must move beyond traditional alliance structures if it 

is to meet new security challenges effectively. Although we will maintain and 

62 

I 
A Transformation Strategy 

enhance our long-term, formal alliances, other alliance-like structures will likely 

become the operational norm. 

Alliance-like structures-often called "coalitions of the willing"-will be 

temporary and their formation ad hoc. Their creation may improve U.S. access to 

a region but will not necessarily increase U.S. presence. Ad hoc coalitions will 

come in different forms. For example, in the Gulf War and recent humanitarian 

operations in Africa, coalitions were created in the absence of an existing regional 

alliance structure. The Bosnian experience generated special arrangements to 

incorporate Russian forces into a NATO-orchestrated operation. Another 

alternative to traditional alliances is bilateral or regional agreements o·utside of 

formal alliances, such as those used to combat narco-terrorists in Latin America. 

Cooperation with transnational commercial organizations may serve as an entirely 

new avenue for increased regional stability. The effectiveness of many, if not 

most, of these approaches depends on a deliberate effort to work with prospective 

allies and coalition partners before crises unfold. Only then can the foundation 

for successful operations be in place. 

As the formal alliance structures of the past evolve, our ability to operate 

with formal allies or ad hoc coalition partners, or to cooperate with 

nongovernment or international organizations, will depend increasingly· on 

professional relationships at all levels. To develop these relationships, we must 

create more opportunities for our military forces to work with allies and potential 

coalition partners before crises develop. 

As we consider the changing character of alliances in the future, we must 

not lose sight of their purpose: th~y must improve not only our security, but also 

the security of our allies. It cannot be a one-sided relationship. An alliance works 

where there is mutual trust and commitment and willingness to sacrifice for 

common goals. Not understanding this concept has led some nations in the past 

down a path to defeat and destruction. In international relations, altruism works 

best when instigated by self-interest. 

The Intelligence Structure 

The new and broadened difficulties that . will confront intelligence 

collection over the next twenty years are greater than ever before. The task facing 

the United States is· to determine the intelligence requirements in the world of 

2010-2020. In a general sense, we will need the same types of information we 

use today. We will still want to answer what, where, when, how, and why-the 

more detailed and accurate the answer, the better. However, the security 

environment of 2010-2020 will change the context of these questions. 

The United States will not have the luxury of focusing most of its 

intelligence assets on a single threat, as it did in the Cold War. Disparate threats 

and geopolitical shifts will produce uncertainty and diffusion of effort. 

63 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

Intelligence collection and analysis must also cover Third World countries. 

Frequently these are the countries where U.S. forces are called for humanitarian 

or peacekeeping missions, and where protection of our forces will become 

increasingly more difficult. At the same time, our national priorities will 

constantly change as new crises and competitors emerge. As a result, we will 

need to anticipate threats from a multiplicity of sources even as we deal with a 

host of current concerns. 

Asymmetric threats will be particularly difficult to guard against. 

Transnational problems and the proliferation of advanced technology and 

weapons of mass destruction will further exacerbate the difficulty of isolating and 

tracking various threats. A dramatic decrease in our ability to provide 

decision-makers or potential victims with adequate warning could result. With 

American citizens increasingly exposed at home and abroad, such a shortfall 

could be disastrous. 

Advances in information technologies may be a double-edged sword in 

this new intelligence environment. Improved information systems offer 

intelligence structure benefits that could significantly increase our ability to 

produce the necessary intelligence. These systems offer better ways to acquire, 

analyze, and disseminate information, thereby reducing uncertainty and allowing 

more timely and accurate decisions at all levels. 

Yet, information technology has serious vulnerabilities. Our reliance on 

these systems makes them attractive targets for deceptive information. Also, we 

risk becoming over-reliant on this intelligence tool and the sheer volume of 

information creates the possibility of information overload if the proper filters are 

not in place. Leaders at different levels need corresponding amounts of detail. 

Too much or the wrong type of intelligence to the wrong person can paralyze or 

mislead decision-making. 

The Panel believes that certain changes to our intelligence structure and 

capabilities are necessary if we are to leverage intelligence means and 

information. Timely dissemination of accurate and complete information to the 

warfighter is key. Improvements can be made in the collection, processing, 

analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. 

First, the intelligence process must include integrating technologies 

(especially space-based capabilities), reducing the overlap in intelligence efforts 

among agencies (without sacrificing the redundancy necessary to safeguard 

capability), eliminating. artificial bureaucratic boundaries that debilitate tbe 

dissemination of information, and allowing for surge capacity in times of multiple 

crises. Beyond lowering barriers among our own agencies and departments, we 

must consider how to share data with nations beyond traditional alliance 

structures. Our intelligence relationships abroad should reflect the realities of 

64 
A Transformation Strategy 

today and tomorrow, rather than relying solely on relationships that served us well 

in the Cold War and before. 

Along with improved data sharing, our intelligence structure must use the 

best technology available to create nodal links that disseminate information and 

facilitate analysis. These information filters must then aid in analyzing raw data, 

and information must be archived digitally so that users can easily and rapidly 

retrieve it. At the same time, the proliferation of this technology to potential 

enemies promises to increase the difficulty for our collection efforts. 

Second, we must improve our ability to collect against technically 

sophisticated targets. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) will be 

critical to our understanding ofWMD proliferation in the twenty-first century. 

Third, we must determine what space, air, maritime, and land-based 

platforms will best accomplish specific intelligence collection missions. 

Commanders must be confident about having access to intelligence generated by 

systems they do not control. At the same time, we must ensure that those assets 

are reliable and available. 

Finally, considering the range of tools available to the United States to 

cope with intelligence requirements over the next twenty years, the Panel 

underscores the critical importance of revitalizing human intelligence (HUMINT) 

to include the need for military personnel with extensive regional knowledge and 

language skills. Given our lack of experience in and knowledge about certain 

countries, regions, and groups, HUMINT can provide local data that may prove to 

be crucial, particularly in helping our leaders understand the intent behind 

capability. The effective use of HUMINT will help our leaders take the 

appropriate actions to diffuse conflict and promote regional stability. If conflict 

should occur despite our best efforts, then HUMINT will complement our other 

means of intelligence to assist commanders in conducting operations rapidly and 

decisively. 

Revitalizing HUMINT requires the United States to invest in robust 

capabilities. Such capability will not be achieved overnight; the skills and 

. relationships necessary for effective HUMINT take years to develop. This long 

lead-time underscores the urgency of defining the requirements and meeting them 

now. 

65 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

The Interagency Process 

The ability to anticipate and shape changes in the international 

environment requires a forward-looking national security strategy and effective 

organization for implementing it. This in tum requires a high degree of 

integration of resources and political commitment. To make such changes will 

require significant alteration in the current national security apparatus and the way 

we do business today. Among the changes that need to be made toward that goal 

are: 

• Undertake a thorough national security strategy review to determine if 

existing structures and procedures are appropriate to twenty-first 

century needs. The "21 ~ Century Security Strategy Group," 

established in H.R. 2266, is an important step in this direction; 

• Expand the statutory members of the National Security Council to 

include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General; 

• Create an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and 

military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the 

national security structures. Such a cadre would be similar in spirit to 

the "joint" experience envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

Attention should be given to their education, development, and career 

development. A certain number of "interagency" slots should be 

identified within the national security community, including domestic 

agencies that have foreign affairs responsibilities (e.g., Justice, 

Commerce, Energy) and staffed by the interagency cadre. Assignment 

of allied and other foreign nationals from countries with wh~m the 

United States has security cooperation arrangements should also be 

considered on a reciprocal basis; 

• Establish a national security curriculum, combining course work at the 

National Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training 

Center, with a mix of civilian, military, and foreign students to receive 

training and education in strategic affairs; 

• Establish a fully integrated national crisis center to consolidate foreign 

policy, intelligence, military representatives,· and domestic agency 

personnel, including liaison with state and local authorities; it should 

include "hotline" links to allies and major regional powers, 

international organizations, and nongovernment organizations; 

• Develop a unified, multimedia communication system (both secure 

and unclassified) to overcome the lack of interoperability of today' s 

systems. Such a system would facilitate the real-time exchange of 

information necessary for decision-making and coordination in the 

66 
' 

A Transfonnation Strategy 

complex security environment of the future. Plan to extend that 

system to local and regional domestic government agencies as well as 

to key allies; 

• Improve coordination between State and Defense Department 

geographic and functional bureaus and unified commands to 

harmonize and integrate regional coverage and policy implementation; 

• Modify current legislation to streamline the transfer of funds within 

and among agencies in the national security community, allowing 

decision-makers to provide resources to the agency or agencies best 

suited for the task; 

• Establish an interagency long-range, strategic planning process to 

ensure the long-term consequences of near-term decisions are taken 

into account. The process should be supported by long-range strategic 

planning cells in the National Security Council staff, the Departments 

of State and Defense, and other relevant departmepts and: agencies. 

A Broad National Security Approach 

The Panel recommends: 

• Adapt future alliances to a new security environment. 

• Investigate new avenues for interoperability, including closer links between 

U.S. and overseas defense companies. 

• Ensure timely dissemination of accurate and complete information to the 

warfighter. 

• Revitalize human intelligence (HUMINT). 

• Review the entire national security structure to better anticipate and shape 

changes in the international environment. 

• Expand the statutory members of the NSC. 

• Establish a cadre of interagency professionals. 

• Establish a fully integrated, national crisis center. 

• Develop a unified, multimedia, communications system. 

• Streamline the transfer of funds within and among agencies. 

67 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOVATION, EXPERIMENTATION, AND 

CHANGE 

Far from complete, the broad inquiries into the character of future conflict 

being pursued by a number of agencies and service components suggest that there 

are fundamental changes on the horizon that need to be understood. Conflicts in 

the infosphere and space, for example, will have dramatic impacts on traditional 

means of conventional combat. These impacts, as well as others mentioned in 

this Report, cannot be separated from the considerations of conducting future 

wars. 

We can try to understand the future through a variety of approaches. We 

have already begun extensively to "wargame" (i.e., "play out" different and 

random scenarios in a conference-type atmosphere) the future. But some things 

can only be revealed in "the field." Practical experimenting allows us to 

experience what may only be theorized at the discussion table. It is only through 

field exercises, primarily joint in nature, that we can adjust and iron out problems 

before they occur in actual combat. 

It is possible to explore future concepts now, using well-planned and 

resourced exercises, surrogate and real technologies, and advanced distributed 

simulation. Although each service may be interested in doing experiments to 

examine its own role in the future, the real leverage of future capabilities from 

experiments is in the joint venue. 

This type of experimentation and follow-through will only be found in an 

energetic and innovative laboratory that tests operational concepts, doctrinal 

innovations, and new forces and equipment in a field environment under realistic 

conditions. As discussed in the following section on the Unified Command Plan, 

the Panel recommends the creation of a Joint Forces Command, which would be 

given appropriate resources, requirement authorities, and forces (detailed by the 

individual services) and expected to create challenging scenarios and regular field 

exercises conducted under the aegis of a Joint Battle Lab. The Joint Battle Lab 

would be subordinated to the Joint Forces Commander. 

• At the head of this 

institutionalized 

experimentation process 

would be an accountable 

Joint Battle Lab 

headquarters. 

INSTITUTIONALIZING CHANGE 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Exercises would take place 

at joint national training 

centers-part of which would be 

accommodating all of the services. 

68 

Joint field tests essential 

Joint Forces Command responsible 

Joint Battle Lab headquarters 

established 

Integrate service battle labs 

Establish joint national training 

centers 

a Joint Urban Warfare CenterI 
A Transformation Strategy 

• The exercises, utilizing scenarios developed by a Joint Concept 

Development Center (JCDC), would be based on the emerging 

challenges of 2010-2020 identified by the Panel. The staffing of 

J CDC and joint battle labs should be under the same parameters that 

identified the Joint Staff Officers in Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act. The JCDC would monitor exercises, to include determining new 

measures of merit (or effectiveness) for forces engaged in such 

exercises. The JCDC would also evaluate the adequacy of current 

analytic methodologies, models, and simulations. This would address 

a serious shortcoming identified by the Panel in its report on the 

Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Maximum use should be made of the services' battle laboratories. Current 

JOint warfare centers-the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC), the Joint 

Command & Control Warfare Center (JC2WC), the Joint Warfighting Center 

(JWC), and the Joint Doctrine Center (JDC)-would report to the Joint Forces 

Commander. 

These centers would assist in the development of scenarios, new 

strategies, task force objectives, and desired outcomes, measures of 

merit/effectiveness, analysis of experimentation results, and the development of 

follow-on experiments. Furthermore, regional unified commanders-in-chief 

(CINCs) and the Joint Chiefs should endorse cross-service cooperation and the 

use of service battle labs, test ranges, development laboratories, and training 

facilities, where possible, to advance the joint warfighting effort. 

The Joint Forces Commander would submit an annual report to the 

Secretary of Defense detailing the conduct of joint exercises, including their 

number, forces involved, the operational challenges they faced, the exercise 

results, and the effect of the exercise on the transformation process, to include 

recommended changes in force structure, doctrine, and resource allocations. 

These recommendations do not seek to limit individual service innovation 

in any way. Such service-specific innovation is a key component of the military's 

transformation strategy. For example, the services would experiment with such 

weapon systems as the arsenal ship, which, once certified, would be tested in the 

broader joint arena. The Joint Forces Command and the associated steps 

recommended above offer a systemic, joint environment in which to develop the 

integration of all of the components of a joint campaign. 

The U.S. military today has a commanding advantage in military 

capability. But in a period of great geopolitical and military-technical change and 

uncertainty, it is far from clear that this advantage will be sustained over the long 

term. If, as seems likely, we are in the early stages of a revolution in military 

affairs, it will yield new challenges for the U.s~ military and new opportunities. A 

69 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

successful transformation strategy . must provide for frequent and large-scale 

(i.e., at the operational level) experimentation in potentially new ways of war, 

effecting meaningful and appropriate change in operational concepts, force 

structures, military systems, and budgets. 

The Panel believes that the Secretary of Defense should consider 

providing MFP 11-type authority to ensure the Joint Forces Commander's ability 

to support the experimentation program. 

Institutionalizing Change 

The Panel recommends: 

• Create a Joint Battle Lab for experimentation and joint exercises. 

• Establish a Joint National Training Center. 

• Establish a Joint Urban Warfare Center. 

• Establish a Joint Concept Development Center. 

• Integrate existing service battle labs and facilities. 

70 
A Transformation Strategy 

TRANSFORMING THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 

The Panel's concept of transforming our forces to address challenges 

during the next twenty years will require institutional and organizational changes. 

Recognizing the need to maintain regional stability, defend the territorial integrity 

of the United States, and exploit new warfighting capabilities, the Panel 

recommends changes to the Unified Command Plan. They include significant 

changes to the functional commands to incorporate new mission capabilities and 

some restructuring of the geographic commands. 

In its 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed 

Forces recommended key underlying principles to guide the Unified Command 

Plan. They included the ideas that geographic responsibilities should correspond 

to the strategic interests of the United States; that sufficient land, air, and sea area 

be included in each geographic command to allow the commander the means to 

meet his responsibilities; that the distinctions between geographical and 

functional commands be maintained; and that no seams exist that might split areas 

of strategic interest. The National Defense Panel endorses those principles and 

used them to determine its recommendations for realignment of the commands. 

The Commands would be adjusted as follows: 

• Strategic Command would continue to meet its current 

responsibilities as long as nuclear forces remain an essential element 

of our strategy. 

• Special Operations Command would continue to perform critical 

missions to maintain global stability and counter evolving challenges 

by transnational threats, including weapons of mass destruction. We 

expect a modernized Special Operations Forces will play a key role in 

containing the transnational threats to U.S. interests, both at home and 

abroad. 

• Joint Forces Command would be the common force provider of 

combat-ready forces to all other commands for joint and combined 

operations. This command would be responsible for the force 

readiness and training of all active and reserve components based in 

·the United States. This command would be responsible for developing 

and validating joint doctrine for the approval of the Joint Chiefs; 

conducting joint experimentation; directing joint battle laboratories; 

and overseeing other joint innovation and experimentation efforts 

described elsewhere in this Report. The Joint Forces Command is 

responsible for all joint modeling, simulation, analysis, and concept 

development. The command is responsible for driving the 

transformation process (joint requirements approval) for U.S. forces. 

Since Joint Forces Command provides forces to all other commands, it 

71 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

must ensure that the provided forces possess the appropriate cultural 

and political awareness of the specific regions to which they will be 

deployed. 

• Logistics Command would provide global logistics, transportation, 

and asset visibility operations. This command would improve our 

ability to more. rapidly project forces with smaller logistic footprints, 

to leverage industry innovations, and to improve and reengineer 

business practices. This command, providing common supply items, 

global distribution, and transportation services, would integrate the 

transportation missions of Transportation Command and the logistic 

missions of the Defense Logistics Agency. 

• Space Command would expand the use of space and information to 

implement a vision of global awareness, integrated space operations, 

and information superiority. CINCSPACE would be responsible for 

providing global infrastructures for the geographic commands. The 

Defense Information Systems Agency would be transferred to Space 

Command and become one of its subordinate commands. Space 

Command would be responsible for managing information 

infrastructure on a global scale and providing support and immediate 

access by combat commanders. 

The five geographic Unified Commands would be adjusted as follows: 

• Americas Command would include the United States, Canada, 

Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and all of South 

America. The Americas Command would be responsible for the ocean 

approaches to the United States throughout the Maritime and Air 

Defense Zones. Its primary missions would be to defend the Americas 

from foreign threats, deter the use of weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States, and build cooperation among the nations of 

North, Central, and South America. Southern Command would be a 

subordinate command. A Homeland Defense Command, also a 

subordinate command, would be created for such missions as 

augmenting border security operations, defending North America from 

information warfare attacks and air and missile attacks, and 

augmenting· consequence management of natural disasters and terrorist 

attacks. The North American Aerospace Defense Command would be 

transferred from CINCSPACE to CINC Americas Command. United 

States Atlantic Command would be disestablished. The responsibilities 

of Supreme Allied Commander (Atlantic) logically would be assumed 

by the commander of the Atlantic Fleet. The Panel recommends that, 

given the essential role of the Guard and other reserve components in 

these commands, the Deputy Commander Americas Command or 

Commander, Southern Command or Commander, Homeland Defense 

72 
A Transformation Strategy 

Command be drawn from the reserve components. To reflect the 

broader scope of responsibilities and establish a clear chain of 

command, the Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) mission 

should be transferred from the Department of the Army to the 

Americas Command. 

• European Command would be extended to include Russia, Estonia? 

Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and 

Azerbaijan. European Command would also assume responsibility for 

Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. 

• Central Command, focused on the oil sources of the Persian Gulf and 

the Caspian Sea, would include its current responsibilities less 

Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan and would expand to include 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 

• Pacific Command would maintain its current responsibilities and 

assume responsibility for Pakistan. 

Transforming the Unified Command Plan 

The Panel recommends: 

• Maintain Strategic Command and Special Operations Command. 

• Create Joint Forces Command to provide combat ready forces for joint and 

combined operations. 

• Eliminate U.S. Atlantic Command. 

• Create Logistics Command to provide global logistics, transportation, and asset 

visibility operations. 

• Add the information support mission to the responsibilities of Space Command. 

• Create Americas Command; subordinate Southern Command. 

• Realign European, Central, and Pacific Commands. 

73 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

TRANSFORMING THE INDUSTRIAL BASE 

In the twenty-first century, the United States will depend increasingly 

upon a global technology base for the product and process technologies needed 

for the development of future defense systems. This technology base will also 

have a strong commercial orientation, since civilian technologies are likely to 

offer their services to the highest bidder. Efforts to restrict the flow of technology 

across sovereign borders will be increasing difficult. The Panel believes that 

broad-based technology control regimes are likely to be futile, while control of 

specific military-unique technologies will become more important. 

The Panel recognizes that a world that provides all nations with more or 

less equal access to defense-related technologies poses special challenges for the 

United States, which will continue to base its national strategy and global position 

on the technological superiority of its military forces. In coming decades, the 

United States can only preserve its current technological advantage through timebased competition: the ability to rapidly develop and deploy military applications 

of commercial technologies. System-development lead times, which now average 

well over a decade or more for major systems, must be dramatically reduced. 

Failure to make significant progress in this area will jeopardize our technological 

edge, a key component of our national strength. 

The Department of Defense 

also must devote adequate research INTEGRATE TECHNOLOGIES 

and development resources to • Pursue Commercial-Off-The-Shelf(COTS) 

establishing and preserving the opponunities 

nation's preeminence in the design, • Exploit dual-use technology 

integration, and operation of • Identify and protect military-unique needs 

"systems of systems," or systems 

architectures. In an age of "technology leveling," leadership in system 

architecture is likely to become a key source of national advantage. Leading-edge 

capabilities in this area are a prerequisite for the full implementation of the 

revolution in military affairs. A current U.S. advantage is the integration of 

commercial dual-use technology with military unique technology. Continuing to 

advance these military-unique technologies is critical to maintaining military 

superiority and preventing technological surprise. 

Encouraging Innovations 

In recent years, the U.S. defense industry has undergone a dramatic 

restructuring, resulting in the emergence of a small number of large contractors 

with diverse and extensive technology capabilities. These large corporations have 

the resources and capabilities to play an instrumental role in making the 

revolution in military affairs a reality. However, the Department of Defense 

should take appropriate measures to ensure that these firms remain subject to 

adequate competitive forces, a key to efficiency and innovation. 

74 
, 

A Transformation Strategy 

Innovation is not an automatic product of R&D activity organized under 

labels like Skunkworks or Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 

(ACTDs). The engine for innovation has often involved the existence of a wellunderstood challenge arising from: 

• An external threat (e.g., the Soviet Union in the past); 

• An unsolved state of the art critical mission/requirement 

(e.g., detecting quiet submarines); 

• An unexploited breakthrough technology having vast military 

potential (e.g., SAR imagery); 

• A company's motivation to win a competitive procurement; or 

• Intra-company incentives such as budget, prestige, promotion, 

or perks. 

When these challenges for innovation exist and are publicly recognized, 

the best engineers and scientists flock to the defense industry; when the 

challenges are lacking or clouded, the commercial world attracts the best 

engineers. We need to foster innovation to meet the emerging challenges of 

2010-2020. The Department of Defense therefore has to develop an acquisition 

environment that both rewards innovation and penalizes pedestrian efforts and 

products. 

The Acquisition Process 

A responsive, efficient acquisition process is also an essential element of 

the transformation s~ategy. Over the course of the Cold War, the Defense 

Department developed a complex and lengthy process to acquire new weapons. 

In order to validate a new requirement one must demonstrate a new threat to be 

countered. The process is optimized to avoid error, rather than encouraging the 

exploration of new concepts and ideas. 

As noted above, the Panel recommends an acqutsttlon strategy that is 

designed to foster innovation and to enable new technology to get to the field 

quickly. It would direct development and fielding of a small number of units of 

new weapon systems, avoiding large infrastructure investments and long, high 

rate production runs until new systems are validated.· 

Ultimately, Defense must reform the way it acquires systems. An 

important element of this would be heavier reliance on commercial practices 

including off-the-shelf technology. This requires further modifications of the 

acquisition regulations. 

75 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century------------

Joint tests, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), .and 

other experiments will serve aS the front end of this process in most instances. 

The system must permit us to quickly produce small numbers of promising new 

platforms and equipment, modifying them as we employ them, but providing our 

forces with significant cutting edge military capability. 

Department of Defense procurement rules should also be reviewed to 

ensure that all competitive levels, including smaller and start-up firms, are able to 

participate in the defense marketplace. The involvement of these companies, as 

well as foreign firms (especially those partnering with U.S. firms), in the 

competitive process for meeting Department of Defense research and 

development and procurement requirements can be an important source of 

innovation for the Department of Defense in the coming century. 

But today's acquisition process is the product of fifty years of Cold War. 

It is a complex and lengthy process and is consciously reactive. Our current 

acquisition approach is predicated upon a Cold War wartime footing reinforced 

by the Korean and Vietnam Wars. We should be operating today under peacetime 

rules. Historically, during peacetime, large-scale production commitments are 

made under four conditions: 

• War is perceived as imminent and the country is determined to 

field the best available weapons in quantity, (e.g., the WWII 

decision to build 50,000 aircraft per year); 

• A technological plateau is reached, and no potential adversary 

could field a "trumping" system, (e.g., the Dreadnought class 

battleship); 

• A current design is so successful that it can be evolved to meet 

new requirements, (e.g., the F-4 Phantom series); or 

• We face block obsolescence of a key system. 

The Department of Defense needs to provide industry with incentives to 

innovate so that we may maintain a qualitative technology edge so that the 

United States wilr continue to be preeminent in military technology. Rather than 

being reactive, we should make our military acquisition process proactive. The 

Department must work with Congress to devise new rules and policies that 

emphasize technology development and de-emphasize the ·Deed for large 

production quantities in order to recover cost and profit. This may create "sticker 

shock" on a unit-cost basis but if we can shorten the development cycle, 

development costs will be much lower. Moreover, reduced production quantities 

will reduce total program cost, which is a more relevant measure of the cost to the 

nation. 

76 

; 

/' 

/ 

) 

~( 

/ 

I / 
A Transformation Strategy 

Mobilization 

Closely related to the Cold War acquisition process is the manner in which 

we have .treated mobilization in our planning processes with respect to forces, 

acquisition, infrastructure, and manpower. A mobilization system that allows us 

to call up forces and simultaneously produce the industrial means with which to 

conduct war has been a great strength of the United States. Its meaningfulness in 

the 2010-2020 time frame, however, is unclear. Technology, commercial 

developments, required manpower skills, transnational interrelationships, and the 

phenomenal expansion of information capabilities bring into question the 

applicability of traditional mobilization structures. 

First of all is the question of balance. Within DoD programs, careful 

review will find that we make mobilization provisions for some items while 

others, notably new acquisitions and readiness, go begging for resources. In our 

future environment, it is more important to have a weapon on hand in adequate 

quantities than to have the capability available to produce that weapon six months 

or a year later. 

Second is timeliness. Should a hostile peer competitor emerge, then we 

should make appropriate policy decisions at that time, including mobilization 

preparation within a sufficient lead-time, in order to be ready if hostilities break 

out. 

Third is rele\_'ance. In these times of rapid technological advancement, 

neither stored weapons, materials, parts, nor manpower are necessarily relevant to 

the mobilization needs of future warfare. 

Fourth is synchronization. Both equipment and manpower should be 

available for mobilization to satisfy CINC warplans. It makes no sense to have 

manpower assigned to mobilization units if there is no equipment nor to provide 

equipment for mobilization purposes without the manpower or without sufficient 

equipment for active components. 

Given these four criteria, the Panel believes that Defense should scrub 

through programs and reconstitute policy and programming requirements to 

eliminate unnecessary cost associated with obsolete mobilization concepts. 

77 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

Transforming the Industrial Base 

The Panel recommends: 

• Achieve and maintain technological superiority through time-based 

competition. 

• Pursue commercial-off-the-shelf opportunities. 

• Exploit dual-use technologies. 

• Identify and protect military-unique technologies. 

• Encourage new enterprises (as well as established frrms) to develop innovative 

ideas-and penalize pedestrian efforts. 

• Develop new rules and procedures that emphasize technology development and 

de-emphasize large production quantities. 

• Review mobilization policy for balance, timeliness, relevance, and 

synchronization. 

78 
A Transformation Strategy 

TRANSFORMING INFRASTRUCTURE 

The Infrastructure Problem 

Fundamental reform of the Defense Department's support infrastructure is 

key to an effective transformation strategy for the years 2010-2020. Today, the 

Department of Defense is burdened by a far-flung support infrastructure that is 

ponderous, bureaucratic, and unaffordable. Unless its costs are cut sharply, the 

Department will lack the funds to invest in the future. 

To a large extent, the Department of Defense support structure is a 

holdover from the Cold War. It consists of an extensive network of facilities, 

headquarters, and agencies located 

primarily in the continental INFRASTRUCTURE-THE PROBLEM 

United States that support combat 

forces and other deployable units. 

The support infrastructure includes 

Excessive Cold War infrastructure costs divert 

resources from modernization and readiness 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, joint and service headquarters 

organizations, defense agencies, industrial and engineering activities, distribution 

depots, commissaries and exchanges, medical facilities, dependent schools, and 

other support assets. Much of the structure is predicated upon maintaining an 

industrial and manpower mobilization base inappropriate to the relatively short 

wars we expect in the future or the short technological life-cycle we experience 

today and certainly will experience in 2010-2020. 

The Department of Defense spends too much on this infrastructure and 

receives too little for the investment. According to the General Accounting 

Office, the Department devoted $146 billion in FY97, almost 60 percent of total 

budget authority, to defense support activities. The proportion of departmental 

resources devoted to infrastructure support has increased in recent years, since 

force structure reductions have significantly outpaced the decline in the support 

structure. This imposes a financial drain, undermining the fundamental viability 

of the nation's combat forces. Excessive support costs divert funding from 

procurement and research and development, and barring reform, the Department 

will almost certainly lack resources to fully implement planned modernization 

programs and fund other needed investments. 

Moreover, Defense support 

services are often inferior to those SUPPORT SERVICES-THE PROBLEM 

available in the private sector. For 

example, compared to commercial, 

world-class customer support 

organizations, the Defense supply 

Department of Defense support services are 

often inferior to those in the private sector 

time-tracking-quality-spares 

system takes too long to deliver parts to its customers, fails too frequently to 

properly fill orders, and has difficulty tracking items in transit. Department 

depots take much longer than commercial maintenance facilities to repair aircraft, 

79 

-------------·-
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

and tend to deliver those aircraft in less reliable condition. Because of chronic 

lack of maintenance resources, the Department's housing stock has significantly 

deteriorated, affecting the quality of life of thousands of military families. 

Defense initiatives to improve support services and consolidate its 

infrastructure often have been fragmented or incomplete. For example, the base 

realignment and closure process (BRAC) has resulted in the scheduled closure of 

ninety-seven major domestic bases-representing only twenty-one percent of 

installation capacity, compared to a Department force structure drawdown of 

more than thirty percent. Despite some progress in contracting out commercialoriented functions, many support functions, such as data processing, equipment 

maintenance, individual training, and dependent medical care, continue to be 

performed by hundreds of thousands of government personnel despite any 

compelling military rationale for this in-house overhead. 

Department of Defense managers have little personal incentive to 

aggressively pursue opportunities for infrastructure streamlining and cost 

reduction. Such actions are often unpopular among the local workforce, and the 

Comptroller frequently seizes projected savings before efficiencies are realized. 

Thus, the current system is heavily biased against innovation and change-and 

encourages the continuation of inefficient and ineffective business practices. 

Principles of Infrastructure Management for 2020 

The Panel supports the infrastructure initiatives put forward in the recently 

published Defense Reform Initiative. However, the Panel believes more can and 

should be done. The Department should shift its strategy for reforming the 

defense support structure to a "bottom-up" approach that empowers managers at 

all levels with greater capability and authority to make common-sense decisions 

for the benefit of the Department. The following are key elements of this new 

paradigm: 

• Cost Visibility/ Accuracy: Accurate cost information is a 

prerequisite for improved resource allocation decisions. The 

Department should develop financial systems that help 

managers identify inefficient practices and target areas for 

process improvement; 

• Positive Incentives: The Department of Defense must 

establish credible mechanisms to ensure that at least a portion 

of the savings achieved through streamlining efforts is retained 

by the local organization for its own use, and that "savings" are 

not taken from activities before reforms are fully implemented; 

• Choice and Competition: Choice and competition motivate 

individuals and organizations to seek innovative approaches to 

80 
A Transfonnation Strategy 

meeting customer needs. Increasing the role of competitive 

forces in the delivery of support services would be essential to 

achieving lower costs and improved service quality; 

• Resource Flexibility: Under current budget rules, Defense 

managers have little flexibility to shift resources to make 

common-sense trade-offs or to respond to unanticipated 

requirements. Greater flexibility in resource management 

would encourage innovation and process improvement 

throughout the Department; 

• Civil/Military Integration: Defense personnel should be 

integrated into their local communities, using commercial 

services to the maximum extent. This departure from the 

traditional concept of the isolated, self-sufficient military base 

gives military personnel greater responsibility for their own 

affairs and fosters civilian society's understanding of the 

military. 

Improvement Opportunities 

To develop a more responsive and cost-effective support structure, the 

Department of Defense must apply the above broad principles to key components 

of the defense infrastructure. While many of the issues discussed below are 

contentious, the Panel urges the Department and Congress to establish a 

partnership to develop and aggressively implement far-reaching reforms. Priority 

areas for improvement include resource management, force management, 

installations and personnel support, and industrial and engineering support 

Resource Management 

The Department's approach to managing its resources requires 

fundamental restructuring. The current process trivializes management, forcing 

officials to spend most of their time and energy on relatively unimportant 

problems. Meaningful reform of the Department of Defense support 

infrastructure is not possible unless the Department establishes a more effective 

and business-like approach to resource management. 

PPBS: The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) has 

evolved into a rigid and bureaucratic process that has transformed Pentagon 

operations into an endless series of budget drills-to the detriment of strategic 

planning and sound management. A large portion· of the Secretary and service 

headquarter staff positions exist primarily to support the cumbersome process. 

Moreover, the system "locks in" the services to programmatic and funding 

decisions several years in advance-regardless of changing circumstances. The 

Panel recommends that the Department fundamentally reorganize its planning, 

81 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

programming, and budgeting processes to enhance its agility, efficiency, and 

effectiveness. 

In particular, planning needs more focus. Since its creation in the early 

1960s, critics have pointed out that the first 'P' is silent. To this end, the Panel 

recommends the establishment of a disciplined long-range planning process that 

extends beyond the FYDP. Currently, the Defense Department does not have a 

long-range plan to merge fiscal reality with Congressional, service, CINC 

requirements, and future plans. Fis~al rigor does not extend beyond the period of 

the FYDP. At a minimum, the services must be held to reasonable degrees of 

rigor in the out-year program. The force structure each service plans to support 

must be sustainable within its budget share, as allocated by the Secretary of 

Defense. 

"Color of Money": The Department of Defense must work with 

Congressional support to eliminate or relax "color of money" restrictions. 

Currently, budget rules require the Department to assign funds to numerous 

separate accounts and subaccounts. To make cost-effective decisions and respond 

to changing needs, Department of Defense managers need the flexibility to shift 

funds between accounts. Instead of highly detailed budgets, local organizations 

should only be required to spend minimum funds in various program categories 

and be able to devote the remaining resources to areas that are most likely to 

maximize mission effectiveness. 

Cost Visibility: Access to accurate cost information is a prerequisite for 

cost-effective resource management decisions. Today, Department accounting 

systems are designed to support the Federal budget process and control 

obligations. They provide little insight into the true costs of operating defense 

installations or delivering specific support services. Without good cost data, 

Defense managers have difficulty identifying inefficient practices and unwittingly 

make suboptimal resource allocation decisions. 

In many respects, the establishment of reimbursable funding mechanisms, 

such as the Working Capital Funds (WCF), represents an effort on the part of the 

Department of Defense and the military departments to provide improved cost 

visibility for both customers and suppliers of support services. However, the 

WCF rates do not accurately reflect the cost of service delivery, since they often 

include substantial surcharges and are subject to administrative manipulation. In 

addition, the Defense customer usually has no choice but to buy from the 

monopoly provider, further reducing the value of WCF. 

The Panel recommends that the Department accelerate the deployment of 

financial management systems in Defense support organizations with strong 

activity-based costing capabilities. Such systems enable managers to understand 

true costs, identify inefficient practices, and target areas for process improvement. 

The WCF should also be restructured to more accurately reflect full service costs, 

82 
A Transformation Strategy 

which would improve ,resource management decisions. 

Although the Defense Reform Initiative recommends competing the 

150,000 positions, the Department employs approximately 600,000 military and 

civilian personnel who perform commercial-oriented support tasks that have little 

direct impact on military preparedness. In many cases, private vendors could 

provide these support services more cost-effectively. To transform the defense 

infrastructure, the Panel believes the Department should subject all commercialoriented positions to public versus private competition. On the baSis of past 

experience, when such functions are competed, the Department saves an average 

of 30 percent--even if the government entity wins the competition-and service 

improves. It is estimated that opening all of the Department of Defense's 

commercial-oriented positions for competition would result in recurring annual 

savings of $10 billion. We recognize that some of these savings have already 

been included in the Defense program but are convinced that further substantial 

savings can be made. To achieve these savings, improvements in the competitive 

process are needed to provide a level playing field. 

Installations and Personnel Support 

This infrastructure category includes the Defense facilities and services 

devoted to the day-to-day support of uniformed personnel and/or their 

dependents: government housing, base support services, dependent schools, 

commissaries and exchanges, and medical services. Military retirees and their 

families may also benefit from these support services. 

New ''Base" Concept: Traditionally, the Department of Defense has 

operated its major domestic bases as relatively isolated, largely self-contained 

military communities. A paternalistic culture that provides on-base housing, 

health care, entertainment, education, and family support services to military 

personnel, their dependents, and nearby retiree families has been the result. 

This approach may have been appropriate when U.S. military forces 

typically were based in isolated and/or frontier environments. However, most 

military bases are now located in areas with vibrant civilian communities that 

offer a full range of support services. Military personnel already depend on the 

local economy for many services; for example, two-thirds of military families live 

off the base. This network of full-service installations is expensive to operate and 

maintain--especially during periods of force structure reductions. 

In the view of the Panel, the services should reconsider. the traditional 

concept of the military base. Rather than using on-base housing, commissaries, 

and other support services, military personnel would receive additional 

compensation. This shift would allow the services to reduce their investment in 

on-base facilities and services, permitting an increase in the benefit provided. 

According to a recent Center for Naval Analyses study, military personnel 

83 
Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century -------------

currently living in on-base housing could significantly improve their quality of 

life if the Defense Department allowed them to use housing construction and 

maintenance funds to find their own accommodations in the civilian economy. 

The integration of military personnel into the local community may also foster 

greater individual responsibility and a civilian society's greater appreciation of the 

military. 

Installation and Facility Consolidation: To reduce the cost of 

maintaining the defense infrastructure, the Department of Defense must minimize 

the number of surplus facilities and 

installations under its direct control. EXCESS BASES 

While four previous base • Support the Defense Reform Initiative for 

realignment and closure (BRAC) two additional BRAC rounds 

rounds have reduced installation • Accelerate base closure schedule 

capacity by twenty-one percent, 

base consolidation has not occurred as rapidly as the reduction of force structure, 

personnel, or workload. Recurring savings from previous closure rounds have 

averaged about $1.4 billion, with up-front investment costs (relocation, 

environmental clean-up, etc.) totaling about $4 billion per round. 

As the Defense Reform Initiative stated, recent analyses indicate that there 

is sufficient surplus capacity for two additional BRAC rounds, equal to the 

average of the previous rounds. However, these calculations are based on the 

continuation of a service-oriented base structure that maintains extensive 

duplication across military departments. The Panel strongly endorses the 

conclusion that the move toward joint installations-such as the development of 

joint industrial activities, R&D facilities, or test ranges-would make possible 

further major consolidations of the defense infrastructure. This movement should 

be expanded to include joint operational bases (e.g., joint air bases), which we 

believe will result in the identification of even more over-capacity. 

Recently, Congressional concerns regarding the integrity of the baseclosure decision process have precluded further consolidation. The Panel strongly 

urges Congress and the Department to move quickly to restore the base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) process. The next round might be preceded by 

an independent, comprehensive inventory and evaluation of all facilities and 

installations located in the continental United States. This review would provide 

the basis for a long-term installation master plan that aligns infrastructure assets 

with future military requirements, and provides a framework for investment and 

reuse strategies. This approach would depoliticize the base-closure issue to the 

extent possible and establish a common reference point for future clostJre 

decisions, thus enabling base closures earlier than the current 200112005 

Department proposal. 

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A Transformation Strategy 

Industrial and Engineering Support 

Industrial and engineering support, the largest infrastructure category, 

includes the naval shipyards, maintenance depots, research laboratories and test 

ranges operated by the military departments. This category also includes the 

supply depots operated by the military departments and Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA). 

Depot maintenance: The Department of Defense is not an efficient or 

effective manager of industrial activities and should get out of this business to the 

extent possible. The Panel urges the Congress to provide legislation that removes 

statutory barriers to a greater private sector role in Defense depot maintenance. 

For example, the Department should continue to seek the revision of 10 U.S.C 

2464 and 10 U.S.C 2466 to allow capable and reliable contractors to perform 

mission-essential depot maintenance work. Restrictions, such as the 50150 

requirement, should be removed because these mandates result in inefficient 

allocation of Defense maintenance resources. The Department of Defense should 

accelerate public vs. private competitions for existing systems, ensuring a level 

playing field for all bidders, and move to contractor logistics support for new 

systems. Some residual, organic depot capability should be retained to maintain 

legacy weapon systems, which the private sector can or will no longer support. 

Defense Labs: A series of studies over the past few years have 

demonstrated the need for a substantial restructuring and reduction in the size of 

the Defense laboratory system. These proposals should be implemented 

promptly. 

Future Vision 

In the twenty-first century, as velocity increasingly dominates mass, the 

Department of Defense must embrace a new paradigm for providing effective 

combat support services. This approach must fully leverage the capabilities, 

technologies, and business practices of the commercial sector, adapted to the 

unique mission and special 

circumstances of the military INFRASTRUCTURE-KEY OBJECTIVE 

environment. The result will be a Transform infrastructure from an impediment 

lighter, leaner, more flexible to a cost-effective enabler of readiness and 

defense infrastructure that ensures modernization 

military readiness at significantly reduced ~------------------------------~ costs. 

To achieve this vision, a fundamental transformation of support structure 

functions must be a priority. Such a transformation can be achieved only if the 

Department of Defense and the military departments are willing to consider 

dramatic changes that fully leverage innovative business practices and 

technologies. Without fundamental change, the defense infrastructure will 

continue to divert precious resources from modernization and readiness, and 

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Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century-------------

ultimately threaten the ability of the United States to utilize military power in 

support of national security objectives. 

Transforming Infrastructure 

The Panel recommends: 

• Support infrastructure proposals of the Defense Reform Initiative. 

• Reduce or eliminate Cold War infrastructure without delay. 

• Develop financial systems that give commanders cost visibility. 

• Change the budgeting process to create incentives to foster savings initiatives. 

• Pass legislation to allow flexibility in resource reallocation. 

• Revamp PPBS to facilitate innovation and change. 

• Compete all commercial-oriented activities. 

• Consider the "New Base Concept." 

• Accelerate and expand the scope of BRAC 2001/2005. 

• Develop a Department of Defense Installation Master Plan. 

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CONCLUSION 

In the increasingly complex and dynamic world that we foresee, the 

Department of Defense and its armed 'services alone cannot preserve U.S. 

interests. Defense is but one element of a broader national security structure. If 

we are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, the entire U.S. 

national security apparatus must adapt to become more integrated, coherent, and 

proactive. 

Although aggressively transforming our military may present some risk, 

the Panel believes that risk is both acceptable and manageable. At any point 

during this transformation process, we should be able to handle any and all major 

combat operations-and make it apparent to a potential adversary that we can, 

and will. 

Implementing a transformation such as described in this Report promises 

to be complicated and will require a delicate balance. We must be careful not to 

dismantle elements of the current structure that are still applicable to near-term 

challenges. The Panel believes that if we refuse to change in a timely manner, 

however, we risk being fundamentally unprepared for the future, thereby putting 

in question the security of future generations of Americans. We have the time 

and the opportunity to adjust. But we cannot equivocate. We must begin now. 

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GLOSSARY 

AAN Anny After Next 

above the line force structure The force structure (including numbers, strengths, and 

composition and major items of equipment) for the Armed 

Forces at the following unit levels: 

-, asymmetric 

AWE 

BRAC 

centers of gravity 

CINC 

CINCSPACE 

CJCS 

(A) In the case of the Anny, the division. 

(B) In the case of the Navy, the battle group. 

(C) In the case of the Air force, the wing. 

(D) In the case of the Marine Corps, the expeditionary 

force. 

(E) In the case of special operations forces of the Anny, 

Navy, or Air Force, the major operating unit. 

(F) In the case of the strategic forces, the ballistic missile 

submarine fleet, the heavy bomber force, and the 

intercontinental ballistic missile force. 

The property of being dissimilar in nature to its counterpart; 

not a mirror image. In military parlance, the opposition of 

two unlike forces who seek to gain advantage over the 

other by differing applications of power. 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

Base realignment and closure 

Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which 

a military force derives its freedom of action, physical 

strength, or will to fight. 

Commander In Chief 

Commander In Chief, U.S. Space Command 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

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Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century---------------

counterproliferation 

cvx 

cyber-assault 

cyberspace 

cyberterrorism 

deterrence 

The full range of actions by the U.S. government to deter, 

delayt halt, or roll back the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.· 

Counterproliferation efforts are associated with the 

following seven functional areas: 1) proliferation 

prevention; 2)strategic and tactical intelligence; 3) 

battlefield surveillance; 4) counterforce; 5) active defense; 

6) passive defense; 7) counterterrorism. 

Future class of aircraft carrier 

Attacks on or through cyberspace 

1. The Global Information Infrastructure. 2. That aspect of 

the area of conflict composed of the electromagnetic 

spectrum and non-human sensing dimension in which 

stealth-masked forces either stage attacks or seek refuge 

from them. 

Acts of terrorism committed through cyberspace. 

The prevention from action by fear of consequences 

brought about by the existence of a credible threat of 

unacceptable counteraction 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoD Directive 51 00.1 The document that promulgates the responsibilities and 

functions of the Department of Defense. 

FYDP Future Years Defense Program 

GAO General Accounting Office 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 Legislation for defense reform championed by Senator 

Barry Goldwater and Congressman Bill Nichols that sought 

to bestow greater autonomy and responsibility to the 

warfighters ·le~ding the unified and specified commands. 

More particularly, it emphasized the civilian authority of the 

Secretary of Defense, improved military advice provided to 

the President and the National Security Council, and 

placed clear responsibility on the commanders of the 

unified and specified combatant commands to the 

President through the Secretary of Defense. The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the service chiefs were 

specifically omitted in this chain of command. 

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HUM INT 

' information infrastructure 

information operations 

information superiority 

information warfare 

Infrastructure 

11 iron mountainsn 

JCDC 

littoral 

nano-technology 

narco-state 

narco-terrorism 

Human Intelligence 

Linkages of individual information systems in a myriad of 

direct and indirect paths that transcend indust~, media and 

the milita~ and include both government and nongovernment entities. 

Actions taken to affect adversa~ information and 

information systems while defending one's own information 

and information systems. 

The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an 

- uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 

denying an adversa~'s ability to do the same. 

Information operations conducted during time of crisis or 

conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a 

specific adversa~ or adversaries. Also called IW. 

A term generally applicable to all fixed and permanent 

installations, fabrications, or facilities for the support and 

control of milita~ forces. 

Large stockpiles of armaments and munitions. 

Joint Concept Development Center 

A zone of milita~ operations along a coastline, consisting 

of the seaward approaches from the open ocean to the 

shore which must be controlled to support operations 

ashore, as well as the landward approaches to the shore 

that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. 

The art of manipulating materials on an atomic or 

molecular scale to build microscopic devices. 

A count~ dominated by drug organizations 

Terrorism financed by or conducted to further the aims of 

drug traffickers. 

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National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act of 1947, (P.L.80-253) 

established the intragovemmental structure for managing 

the national security needs of the post-war environment. 

The Act defined the post-war military services, created an 

independent Air Force, established the Department of 

Defense, and created the Central Intelligence Agency. It 

also created the National Security Council, under the 

chairmanship of the President. 

NATO 

non-proliferation 

pandemic 

.. posse comitatus~~ 

PPBS 

proliferation 

QDR 

R&D 

rogue state 

salvo 

sanctuary 

SAR 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Actions, programs, and initiatives to prevent or slow the 

spread of WMD technology, equipment, and materials. 

(see counterproliferation) 

Epidemic over a wide geographic area: e.g. pandemic 

influenza. 

The 1868 Posse Comitatus law prohibits the Army and Air 

Force from engaging in domestic law enforcement; a longstanding order from the Secretary of the Navy extends that 

prohibition to the Navy and Marine Corps. 

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 

The spread of WMD and associated technologies 

Quadrennial Defense Review 

Research and Development 

A country engaged in behavior counter to the norms of 

international security, such as supporting terrorism or 

developing weapons of mass destruction. 

The simultaneous firing of a number of weapons at a given 

target. 

A nation or area near or contiguous to the combat area 

which by tacit agreement between the warring powers is 

exempt from attack and therefore serves as a refuge for 

staging, logistic, or other activities of the combatant 

powers. 

Synthetic Aperture Radar 

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sarin 

special operations 

Special Operations Forces 

START II 

START Ill 

stealth 

Nerve poisoning gas of organic phosphorus compound 

developed by the Nazis in the Second World War. Pure 

sarin is colorless and odorless and is described as 500 

times as toxic as potassium cyanide. 

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and 

equipped mil ita~ and paramilita~ forces to achieve 

milita~, political, economic, or psychologic~! objectives by 

unconventional milita~ means in hostile, denied, or 

politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted 

during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, 

independently or in coordination with operations of 

conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Politicalmilita~ considerations frequently shape special operations, 

requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques 

and oversight at the national level. Special operations 

differ from conventional operations in degree of physical 

and political risk, operational techniques, mode of 

employment, independence from friendly support, and 

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets. 

Those active and reserve component forces of the milita~ 

services designated by the Secreta~ of Defense and 

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct 

and support special operations. 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. Nuclear arms 

reduction treaty between Russia and the United States. 

Signed between the United States and the USSR in July 

1991, it would reduce strategic nuclear forces to 3,ooo3,500 on each side. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and 

consent to ratification of the Treaty in 1996. The Russian 

Duma is considering the treaty for ratification. 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Ill. Follow-on 

negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals below levels under 

consideration in the START II agreement. A proposed 

agreement in March 1997 would reduce levels to 200Q2500 warheads on each side. 

Technology that minimizes the observable aspects of a 

piece of milita~ equipment, including radar and infrared 

signature, visibility, and sound. 

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Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century---------------

transnational threats 

UCP 

unconventional warfare 

Unified Command 

WCF 

WMD 

Threats or challenges which 1) stem from and have effects 

across more than one state; 2) are a function of the 

changing balance between the nation-state's capacity and 

authority to use force and that of non-state entities; and 3) 

involve the actions of non-state actors in terrorism, 

organized crime, drug trafficking, and weapons 

proliferation. 

Unified Command Plan. The document, approved by the 

President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified 

combatant commanders; establishes their missions, 

responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general 

geographical area of responsibility for geographic 

combatant commanders; and specifies functional 

responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. 

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 

normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by 

indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, 

equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by 

an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other 

direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine 

operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, 

sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. 

A command with a broad and continuing mission under a 

single commander and composed of significant assigned 

components of two or more Military Departments, and 

which is established and so designated by the President, 

through the Secretary of Defense with 'the advice and 

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Working Capital Fund. A revolving fund established to 

finance inventories of supplies and other stores, or to 

provide working capital for industrial-type activities. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. This usually refers to 

chemical,. biological, and nuclear weapons and the missiles . 

capable of carrying them. Sometimes radiological 

weapons are also included. 

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