THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

INTERDICTION ---- ----- 

J gos 1960 - 1968 

Jacob Van Staaveren 

Air Force 

History 

Washington. D.C. 

1993 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Van Staaveren, Jacob. 

Interdiction in southern Laos, 1960-1968 : the United States Air 

Force in Southeast Asia / Jacob Van Staaveren. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975-Aerial operations, American. 

2. United States. Air Force-History-Vietnamese Conflict, 

1961-1 975. 3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975-Campaigns-Laos. 

4. Laos-History. I. Title. 

DS558.8 .V36 1992 

p. 358 cm. 

959.704 ’ 348-dc20 92-28507 

CIP 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. Government Printing Office, 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces from 

North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and 

supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web 

of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet 

Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began 

with photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in 

Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in 

southern Laos. 

U.S. Air Force leaders and aircrews flying interdiction missions over 

Laotian territory faced a unique set of challenges. Their efforts were 

plagued by political controversies, daunting weather, rugged terrain, a 

tenacious foe, and above all a bewildering array of rules of engagement 

limiting the effectiveness of air operations. Interdiction in Southern 

Laos, Z960-Z968 examines this complex operational environment. Many 

of these issues-particularly those relevant to conducting a politically 

sensitive, limited war from foreign bases, with a commitment to 

minimizing civilian casualties-are still relevant today and for the 

foreseeable future as the modern Air Force meets its responsibilities in an 

ever-changing global environment. 

Richard P. Hallion 

Air Force Historian 

... 

111 

Preface 

Of the diverse American military actions instituted from 1960 to 

1973 to prevent the spread of communism in the Indochina peninsula, 

none were more complex than those in Laos. There, two highly restricted 

air and air-ground wars were fought. One was waged in the north to 

assure the independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality of the 

Laotian government, guaranteed by the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements. The other was waged in the south to arrest the infiltration of 

manpower and supplies from communist North Vietnam to the Viet 

Cong insurgents in non-communist South Vietnam. This volume addresses the first phase of the latter war, 1960 to January 1968. It focuses 

on the activities of the United States Air Force in carrying out a variety 

of mandated anti-infiltration measures. 

Among the complexities of warfare in Laos discussed, one deserves 

mention from the outset. This is the role of a series of American 

ambassadors to Laos who were fated to serve as the principal American 

military as well as political representatives in that country. Their unique 

position stemmed from the two Geneva agreements that forbade the 

Laotian government from entering into any formal foreign military 

alliance. The practical effect of these agreements, which the Lao 

government largely honored during both wars within its borders, was to 

preclude the establishment of American and allied military headquarters 

and bases in Laos. In consequence, virtually all Air Force and other 

American and allied operations in Laos were normally launched from 

bases in neighboring Thailand and South Vietnam. The U.S. military 

commanders in the two countries obtained Lao government approval for 

these operations through the American ambassador in Vientiane. 

The first phase of American military operations in Laos (1960-1963) 

was chiefly confined to determining the magnitude of North Vietnamese 

manpower and supply infiltration into South Vietnam. This was done by 

periodic Air Force photo-reconnaissance missions, small air-supported 

ground probes into the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail by U.S.-trained 

Laotian tribesmen living in South Vietnam, and limited border patrolling 

by U.S.-trained South Vietnamese personnel. Because of the monsoon 

weather, the largely jungle terrain, and North Vietnamese concealment 

efforts, the extent of infiltration was hard to ascertain. Nonetheless, 

intelligence analysts concluded that annually the North Vietnamese were 
sending to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam 4,500 to 12,000 personnel 

plus an unknown amount of weapons and supplies. 

Meanwhile, from May 1963 onward, political and military instability 

in South Vietnam grew. On November 1, 1963, it culminated in the 

overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem by a military junta, exacerbating 

the infiltration problem in southern Laos. Encouraged by the turbulence 

in its southern neighbor, the North Vietnamese stepped up their 

manpower and supply flow to the Viet Cong. The United States 

embarked on a series of expanding but still small-scale actions. Among 

them was the dispatch of a special Air Force unit to Thailand to furnish more training to the fledgling Royal Laotian Air Force and to the 

Royal Thai Air Force as well. The United States also began regular Air 

Force and Navy tactical reconnaissance over Laos with accompanying 

armed escorts. It accelerated the recruitment and training of Laotian 

roadwatch and other information-gathering personnel within Laos and 

South Vietnam for probes into the trail. And it encouraged the Royal 

Laotian Air Force to interdict selected infiltration routes more frequently. 

Air Force and Navy aircrews flying reconnaissance were not free 

agents. Administration authorities in Washington and the American 

embassy in Vientiane imposed an intricate web of air restrictions. These 

limited the number of sorties that could be flown, the territory that could 

be covered, and the targets that could be struck by the armed escorts. 

The curbs sprang from a cardinal element of American foreign policyto keep Laos from becoming a primary theater of military operations. 

The aim was to avoid draining resources from the concurrent but higher 

priority air and ground operations against the communists in South 

Vietnam, and (beginning in 1965) from the ROLLING THUNDER bombing 

operations in North Vietnam. 

When manpower and supply infiltration through southern Laos 

failed to diminish in 1964, the United States secured the Lao government’s approval to expand the anti-infiltration effort. It launched in 

December of that year a limited Air Force and Navy interdiction 

campaign against fixed targets and infiltration routes throughout Laos. 

The principal purpose of these strikes was to signal the Hanoi government c? greater military pressure to come, unless Hanoi ceased supporting the insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam. When the signal was 

not heeded, the United States in April 1965 inaugurated a day-and-night 

Air Force and Navy interdiction campaign in southern Laos while 

continuing a separate program in the north. 

vi 
By now it was evident that the two air wars in Laos, the concurrent 

American and allied operations in South Vietnam, and the recently begun 

bombing program in North Vietnam would not induce the Hanoi 

government to come to the conference table soon. Thus more military 

pressure began to be applied in all areas. In southern Laos during the 

last half of 1965 and throughout 1966 and 1967, initial air and 

air-ground programs expanded and new ones were introduced. This 

resulted in intensified attacks on enemy troops, trucks, logistic and 

antiaircraft sites, bridges, and many other targets. Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers, already engaged in South Vietnam, began striking 

enemy redoubts near the South Vietnamese border. As the relatively 

small, separate air and air-ground programs evolved, each received a 

nickname: LEAPING LENA, BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, TIGER HOUND, 

CRICKET, GATE GUARD, TALLY-Ho, SLAM, SHOCK, POPEYE, and IGLOO 

WHITE. 

The challenge to air commanders and aircrews in conducting these 

programs was considerable, for among the Indochina states, Laos had 

the harshest physical environment. The monsoon weather virtually 

assured that any given day, pilots and other crewmembers would 

encounter rain, drizzle, overcast, or fog. On a clear day they were likely 

to encounter smoke and haze from native slash-and-burn farming and 

fires from bombings. The jungle terrain of the mountains and the valleys 

further obscured much of the route and trail system. These conditions, 

making so difficult the task of pilots and aircrews in flying combat 

missions in daytime, compounded the problem in finding and striking 

targets at night. In addition, the airmen had to contend with a wily 

enemy who traveled under the cover of darkness and was adept at 

speedily repairing bombed routes, trails, and bridges; building bypasses; 

and extending his routes and trails. The airmen also had to comply with 

a bewildering array of ever-changing air restrictions imposed by higher 

authorities to minimize the danger of causing civilian casualties and 

over-escalating the air war. 

As the infiltration effort continued in 1967, American officials 

believed that the major objectives in Laos were being achieved. Militarily, Laos remained a secondary theater of operations. The neutralist 

Vientiane government had not succumbed to the communist-led insurgency in the north. The anti-infiltration campaign appeared to exact an 

unremitting toll of enemy personnel and supplies moving down the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail. But in the closing weeks of the year, there were ominous 

signs that the anti-infiltration programs had not prevented a steady 

vii 
buildup of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese strength in South Vietnam. 

This was confirmed by developments in January 1968. In mid-month, 

communist troops began an envelopment of the U.S. Marine Corps base 

at Khe Sanh in the northwestern part of the country. This was followed 

at month’s end by the onset of a major Tet offensive against the 

country’s largest cities and American and South Vietnamese airfields and 

other military bases and installations. 

In describing the anti-infiltration campaign until January 1968, this 

volume notes particularly the many restrictive air rules associated with 

each evolving air and air-ground program. It also shows how the United 

States Air Force performed its mission using specially equipped aircraft, 

applying and experimenting with new interdiction technology, and 

devising new air tactics and techniques. 

A subsequent volume will complete the story of United States Air 

Force operations in the anti-infiltration campaign in southern Laos from 

February 1968 until the end of the war in 1973. 

Jacob Van Staaveren 

viii 
United States Air Force 

Historical Advisory Committee 

(As of July 1, 1992) 

Professor Roger E. Bilstein 

University of Houston - 

Clear Lake 

Col. Donald S. Lopez 

USAF, Retired 

National Air and Space 

Museum 

Dr. Christopher J. Bowie 

The RAND Corporation 

Lt. Gen. Charles G. Boyd 

Commander, Air University 

Professor Wayne S. Cole 

University of Maryland - 

College Park 

Lt. Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer 

Superintendent, USAF 

Academy 

Mr. Felix C. Lowe 

Smithsonian Institution Press 

Dr. Peter Paret 

Institute for Advanced Study 

Ms. Ann Petersen 

The General Counsel, USAF 

Gen. Bryce Poe, I1 

USAF, Retired 

Air Force Historical 

Foundation 

ix 

The Author 

Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this volume while serving as an historian 

with the Office of Air Force History. He holds a B.A. degree from 

Linfield College, Oregon, and an M.A. in history from the University of 

Chicago. From 1946 to 1950, Mr. Van Staaveren served with the Allied 

occupation forces in Japan, initially as an adviser on civil reforms and 

then as an historian preparing studies on Japanese economic reforms. 

During the Korean War, Mr. Van Staaveren documented the air 

operations of Fifth Air Force. In 1953 he transferred to United Nations 

Command and Far East Command, where he prepared reports on the 

implementation of the Korean armistice, military and economic assistance to South Korea, and assistance to non-communist forces in 

Indochina after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Returning to the U.S. in 1956, 

the author served briefly with Strategic Air Command and the National 

Security Agency and joined the USAF Historical Liaison Office (predecessor of the Office of Air Force History) in 1960. Until his retirement in 

1981, he wrote numerous studies on the USAF missile program and the 

war in Southeast Asia. He is a co-author of The United States Air Force 

in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An Illustrated Account, published by the 

Office of Air Force History in 1977. 

xi 

Contents 

Page 

Foreword ................................................... 111 

Preface. .. .. .. . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . . .. . . . .. .. . .. ... .. . ... v 

... 

I. Early Efforts to Reduce North Vietnamese Infiltration 

11. Expansion of Counterinfiltration Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

111. The Beginning of the STEEL TIGER Program.. . , . . . . . . . . . . 

IV. Expansion of the Aerial Anti-infiltration Campaign, 

Through Laos ....................................... 1 

27 

53 

July-December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 

V. New Aerial Programs and Tactics Against Infiltration, 

VI. Further Increase in Enemy Strength and Additional Air 

Programs, July-December 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 

January-May 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VIII. Auguries of Eventual Victory Against Infiltration, 

July 1967-January 1968 .............................. 229 

IX. Inauguration of the Sensor-Oriented Anti-Infiltration System 

(IGLOO WHITE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 

X. Prelude to Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 

January-June 1966 ................................... 107 

151 

VII. Renewed Hope in the Anti-infiltration Effort, 

195 

Epilogue.. . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. 293 

Appendices 

1. U.S Tactical Sorties Flown in Laos, December 14, 1964- 

December 31, 1967.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Transportation and Other Targets Destroyed and Damaged 

in Laos, December 14, 1964-December 13, 1967.. . . . . . . . 3. Bomb, Rocket, and Other Ordnance Expenditures in Laos, 

December 14, 1964-December 31, 1967 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

297 

298 

299 

... Xlll 
Page 

4. USAF Aircraft Losses in Laos, February 1962-February 1, 

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 

5. North Vietnamese Infiltration into South Vietnam, 1959-1967 301 

Notes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . Glossary.. ... .. ... .. ... .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..... . Bibliographic Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

303 

335 

345 

Photographs 

Page 

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara meets with President Johnson, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Dean Rusk, and John McCone; 

Lt. Gen. Joseph Moore, Commander of 2d Air Division, and 

Gen. Hunter Harris, Commander of PACAF, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . Reconnaissance photo of North Vietnamese convoy along Route 23 

Camouflaged trucks alongside a highway in Laos, February 1966. . Gen. William W. Momyer, Seventh Air Force Commander; RF-101 

Voodoo takes off from a base in Thailand, December 1966. . . Mu Gia Pass petroleum storage area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . Gen. William C. Westmoreland, MACV Commander, and Marine 

Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., 111 MAF Commander; USAF 

F-105 Thunderchiefs, based in Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . A truck convoy headed south towards Mu Gia Pass; Reconnaissance photo of a truck along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.. . . . . . . . An acoubuoy acoustic sensor; An airman loads a sensor aboard a 

CH-3 helicopter.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A spikebuoy implanted in the forest floor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

81 

83 

84 

210 

211 

212 

213 

280 

281 

Page 

3 

18 

31 

41 

Laos, Administrative Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . Viet Minh, Pathet Lao and Forces ArmCes Royame Dispositions, 

Tchepone Area, August-September 1963. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LEAPING LENA Operation Area, June 24-July 2, 1964. . . , . . . . . . . . Principal Routes in Southern Laos, 1964.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

xiv 
Page 

Routes and Areas Struck in First BARREL ROLL Missions. December 1964 ............................................. 45 

BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER Sectors. April 1965 ............. 60 

USAF Aircraft at Thai and South Vietnamese Bases. May 10. 1965 64 

Infiltration Routes. 1965 ...................................... 71 

Wings. Support Groups and Other Units. October 18. 1965 ....... 90 

STEEL TIGER and TIGER HOUND Interdiction Areas. December 5. 

1965 .................................................... 99 

Principal CRICKET Routes. January 1966 ....................... 109 

GATE GUARD Operational Area. May-July 1966 ................. 119 

TALLY Ho Area and Route Package I .......................... 154 

CRICKET Operational Area. July-December 1966 ................ 171 

MSQ-SKYSPOT Radar Sites and Radii. April 1966-April 1967 ..... 179 

Air-Supported SHINING BRASS Probes into Laos. October 1965- 

June 1967 ............................................... 200 

Zoned Armed Reconnaissance Areas. March 2. 1967 ............. 221 

Ho Chi Minh Trail ........................................... 234 

Distribution of U.S. Tactical Sorties in Northern and Southern 

Laos. December 1967 .................................... 245 

Charts. Tables. Diagrams 

Page 

272 

276 

278 

Communications Data Management DUTCH MILL Facility ........ Aircraft Supporting IGLOO WHITE ..................................... Air-Supported Infiltration Interdiction Concept .................. 

xv 

Interdiction in 

Southern Laos 

1960-1968 

Chapter I 

Early Efforts to Reduce North 

Vietnamese Infiltration through Laos 

The Geneva agreements of 1954, ending French control over 

Indochina, left the Kingdom of Laos a very fragile country, ruled by 

contesting factions. The Vientiane government, headed by Prime Minister 

Souvanna Phouma, was an uneasy coalition of neutralists, led by the 

prime minister, and communist-oriented Pathet Lao (PL) with Souvanna’s half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, serving as its “nominal” 

military and political leader. There were separate military groupings with 

the neutralists controlling the Royal Laotian Army (shortly renamed the 

Forces Armees du Royaume or FAR) and a Pathet Lao army occupying 

two northern provinces, Houa Phan, also called Samneua, and Phong 

Saly. The population of three million included a small, French-educated 

elite and numerous diverse, illiterate tribal groups who lived in isolated 

jungle and mountainous areas. 

The United States supported but did not sign the 1954 Geneva 

agreements. It nevertheless believed that the free world’s interest required 

keeping Laos and two other newly created Indochina states, South 

Vietnam and Cambodia, outside the orbit of Communist North 

Vietnam,* China, and the Soviet Union. The provisions applicable to 

Laos forbade the Vientiane government from entering into any foreign 

military alliance, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops except a 

Frcnch military training mission, and limited the types and amount of 

military equipment that could be used by the small Royal Laotian Army 

of 10,000 men. Also established was an International Control Commission consisting of Indian, Canadian, and Polish representatives to ensure 

compliance with the provisions.’ 

Given Laos’s weaknesses, the impreciseness of some of the agreement’s provisions, and the suspicions in Washington of the intentions of 

Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow, enforcement of the agreements to assure 

‘Officially named the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or DRV 

1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Laos’s neutrality promised to be difficult. With few exceptions, the 

Pathet Lao barred the International Control Commission from entering 

its occupied areas, and Hanoi made no significant withdrawal of its 

North Vietnamese cadres engaged in training, equipping, and supporting 

their Pathet Lao allies. Deeply concerned with these developments and 

desiring to prevent further spread of communism in Asia, the United 

States established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization on September 

8, barely seven weeks after the conclusion of the Geneva pacts. Signed by 

eight nations,* the treaty contained a protocol that brought the three new 

Indochina states, who were not signatories, under the treaty’s protection. 

Additionally, the United States on January 1, 1955, opened an operating 

mission in Vientiane to provide Souvanna’s government with direct 

economic assistance. In the ensuing months the United States gradually 

took over from the Frencht the training and equipping of the Laotian 

Army and the minuscule Laotian Army Air Force later renamed the 

Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF).’ 

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Washington persevered 

in supporting a neutral Laos in a volatile political and military 

environment. Souvanna’s government was threatened not only by the 

Pathet Lao but by a rightist faction whose principal leaders were Brig. 

Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, Phoui Sananikone, and Boun Oum na Champassak. Souvanna Phouma resigned as prime minister on July 23, 1958, and 

was replaced by Phoui Sananikone. Prince Tiao Somsanith became prime 

minister following elections held in April 1960. In August, a dissident 

paratroop captain, Kong Le, and his troops overthrew the rule of Prince 

Tiao Somsanith, and Souvanna Phouma was once again named prime 

minister. After Souvanna’s reinstatement, fighting broke out among the 

various factions, and the Soviet Union manifested its growing interest in 

Laos. The Soviets first furnished military airlift to Kong Le’s forces, who 

became allied with the Pathet Lao before going back to the neutralist 

side, then extended airlift support to the Pathet Lao and the North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA).$ The State Department adjusted to the swiftly 

shifting political winds. When General Phoumi, head of the rightist 

faction, threatened to pull the United States deeper into the 

‘Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Kingdom of 

Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty went into force on February 

19, 1955. 

+Most of the French moved from Vietiane to an air base at Seno. 

‘Until 1956, North Vietnamese guerrillas and troops were called Viet Minh (VM); 

thereafter, more properly, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or People’s Army, Vietnam 

(PAVN). Although the abbreviation VM appears in many documents after 1956, for 

consistency this study will use only the abbreviation NVA. 

2 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

conflict, State switched its backing from the rightists to the reconstituted 

neutralist regime headed by S~uvanna.~ 

Meanwhile, authorities in Washington quietly strove to build up the 

royal government’s FAR and air force without upsetting the 1954 Geneva 

agreements. Prohibited from establishing a formal U.S. military command in Laos, it shifted responsibility for aiding the Laotian forces to 

the American embassy in Vientiane. The embassy soon acquired the 

accoutrements of a command headquarters while a succession of American ambassadors donned a military, in addition to their ambassadorial, 

chapeau. The ambassadors maintained a low public military profile by 

dispensing advice and training through a Programs Evaluation Office, 

employing scores of economic aid and other officials. Other U.S. 

strategems included conducting paramilitary operations and aerial reconnaissance of PL/NVA activities using Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 

RT-33s and other air~raft.~ 

American intelligence activity in Laos at this time consisted chiefly 

of recruiting and training small teams of Laotian tribesmen for maintaining surveillance from different locations of PL/NVA troop and supply 

dispositions and movements. Most of the available teams were assigned 

to the northern part of the country, but a few operated in the Laotian 

panhandle. They were sent to a surveillance point, usually on foot but 

transported occasionally by an American helicopter. From there they 

walked if necessary to other designated locations, made their observations, and again departed on foot or by helicopter. Generally, the 

American overseers of these operations (nicknamed HARDNOSE) did not 

rank team performance highly. They believed team leaders demonstrated 

little vigor for their assignments, providing only a paucity of information 

about communist troop, supply, and support sites and Viet Cong 

crossing points from North Vietnam into Laos.’ 

Larger-scale operations began in 1962, when American overseers 

assumed responsibility for training, equipping, and advising a Meo tribal 

army headed by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao. The same year it launched a 

paramilitary program against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Expanded 

recruitment and training of Laotian tribal teams to report on North 

Vietnamese infiltration through southern Laos and to select targets for 

air strikes did not begin until 1965.6 

In the spring of 1961, the PLINVA, with the support of Kong Le’s 

troops, launched an offensive against government forces in the Plain of 

Jars in northern Laos, and simultaneously extended their control in 

sectors of central and southern Laos. This development, coupled with 

rising American apprehension over more North Vietnamese support for 

the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, impelled the new administration under President John F. Kennedy to assist the Vientiane 

4 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

government more openly. In April the U.S. Embassy’s Programs 

Evaluation Office was converted into a U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG), and in October, Kennedy sanctioned limited 

United States Air Force (USAF) reconnaissance of communist activities 

in both countries. Four USAF RF-101 Voodoos (known as PIPESTEM) 

began operations from Tan Son Nhut Airfield in South Vietnam. After 

flying 67 missions in 37 days, they were replaced in early November by 4 

other USAF RF-101s (called ABLE MABLE), emplaced at Don Muang 

Airport outside Bangkok. By the end of the year, ABLE MABLE aircraft 

had logged 130 sorties, and they continued their reconnaissance missions 

into 1962. The RF-101s and the photoprocessing units deployed with 

them provided U.S. agencies in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington for 

the first time with some photographic evidence of PL/NVA activities and 

the Democratice Republic of Vietnam’s supportive role.’ 

The early 1961 PL/NVA offensive, which exacerbated the political 

tensions in Laos, had international repercussions. It impelled Great 

Britain and the Soviet Union, who had co-chaired the 1954 Geneva 

agreement, to propose a cease-fire and another conference in Geneva to 

settle Laos’s internal problems. The concerned powers were amenable, as 

were the three Laotian political groups headed by the rightist Phoumi 

Nosavan, the neutralist Souvanna Phouma, and the communist Souphanouvong. There followed months of negotiations between the contending 

Laotian factions, another military crisis at Nam Tha, a show of military 

force in Thailand by Southeast Asia Treaty Organization members, and 

protracted debate in Geneva and elsewhere before the fourteen-nation 

body agreed, on July 23, 1962, to the Declaration on the Neutrality of 

Laos. This provided for a tripartite coalition Government of National 

Union with rightists, neutralists, and communists sharing power. Generally, the new agreement reaffirmed the 1954 objectives of a neutral, 

non-aligned Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and supervision of 

the agreement by the International Control Commission.’ 

In accordance with the neutrality declaration, the United States 

shortly withdrew its Military Assistance Advisory Group from Vientiane 

and in December 1962 terminated USAF ABLE MABLE RF-101 photoreconnaissance operations after the aircraft had flown 720 missions over 

Laos and South Vietnam. A series of USAF RB-26 low- and mediumaltitude night reconnaissance missions (nicknamed BLACK WATCH), 

flown from May 29 to July 21, 1962, over the 2 countries, was not 

resumed. During the 8-week period the RB-26s had flown 50 missions. 

The Air Force was distressed by Washington’s decision to end photo 

reconnaissance over Laos in the absence of any other direct means to 

check on communist compliance with the declaration’s provisions. 

5 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Unfortunately, the mutual suspicions between the United States and 

its communist adversaries over each other’s activities in Laos were 

unallayed. Washington continued to assist General Vang Pao’s guerrilla 

army, now numbering between 14,000 and 18,000 men, and Kong Le’s 

neutralist troops. Hanoi, with Peking’s verbal support, refused to 

withdraw most of its troops from Laos. Each accused the other of 

undermining the declaration. The International Control Commission 

remained largely impotent. In Vientiane the tripartite coalition deadlocked over the distribution of cabinet posts, and fighting resumed 

between PL/NVA troops and the government’s FAR, Kong Le’s 

neutralists, and Vang Pao’s guerrillas. The United States and communist 

powers again stepped up materiel shipments to their respective allies. By 

the spring of 1963 the combatants were prepared for more large-scale 

fighting in and around the Plain of Jars.’ 

By now, American aid for Laos was overshadowed by similar but 

substantially greater aid for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), led by 

President Ngo Dinh Diem whose Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

(RVNAF) were battling Viet Cong insurgents. Direct U.S. support for 

French-held Vietnam began in 1950 when State and Defense Department 

officials established a MAAG in Saigon. After the south achieved de 

facto independence following the 1954 Geneva agreements, the Viet Cong 

threat to the nascent Diem regime impelled Washington to provide more 

direct military assistance. As noted earlier, the Kennedy administration in 

late 1961 authorized USAF PIPESTEM and ABLE MABLE RF-101 reconnaissance of South Vietnam and more U.S. combat advisory training for 

the RVNAF. The Air Force’s advisory contribution, sent in November of 

that year, was a counterinsurgency detachment. Commonly known as 

FARM GATE, the detachment consisted of 151 officers and men, 8 T-28s, 

4 SC-47s, and 4 RB-26s, and it was commanded by Col. Benjamin H. 

King. The FARM GATE crews quickly began training the Vietnamese Air 

Force (VNAF). 

Early 1962 witnessed further expansion of the U.S. combat advisory 

activities in South Vietnam. In February, Washington officials established a United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(USMACV) in Saigon with Lt. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, United States 

Army (USA), as commander (COMUSMACV). Attached was an Air 

Force component, 2d Advanced Echelon (ADVON) (renamed 2d Air 

Division in October 1962), headed by Brig. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis, and 

which included the FARM GATE detachment. Anthis also served as chief 

of Air Force Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 

(MAAGV), which gradually became an integral part of USMACV. Army 

units were also controlled by USMACV. The U.S. Navy was represented 

in the Indochina theater by the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), headed by 

6 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

Adm. John H. Sides, United States Navy (USN), and a component, 

Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. William A. Schoech, USN." 

Overseeing service activities in the Indochina theater was the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Adm. Harry D. 

Felt, USN, headquartered in Honolulu. Like USMACV, Felt's Pacific 

Command (PACOM) was a unified one with three components: 

PACFLT; the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), headed by Gen. Emmett 

O'Donnell, Jr.; and the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC). The 

Air Force's command chain in the Pacific ran from PACAF to 

Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Force Base, the 

Philippines, to 2d ADVON (later, 2d Air Division), an arrangement that 

would remain in effect until April 1, 1966, when the 2d Air Division 

became Seventh Air Force and was assigned directly to PACAF. 

Throughout the war, 2d Air Division/Seventh Air Force also remained 

concurrently a component of USMACV, which was a sub-unified 

command under PACOM." 

During 1962, the Kennedy administration sent additional military 

personnel and units to upgrade the Diem government's RVNAF military 

and pacification programs. Although American support to Saigon was 

considerably more overt than to Vientiane, it was nonetheless characterized by restraint to avoid a fatal breach of the Geneva agreements and 

a sharp confrontation with Hanoi and its Soviet and Chinese allies.12 

American assistance to the Diem regime included support for border 

control of South Vietnam's 900-mile boundary with Laos and Cambodia 

to reduce the flow of manpower and supplies from the Democratic 

Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the Viet Cong. However, three-fourths of 

the boundary lay in rugged terrain-the remainder was in the delta 

region-and the overall geography and climate of the area posed 

formidable difficulties in countering enemy infiltration. 

Most of Laos's 91,400 square miles consisted of jungle-covered 

mountains, some rising to about 9,000 feet in the north and 5,000 feet in 

the south. Tropical rain forests of mixed evergreens and deciduous trees 

abounded. Other trees were second growth bamboo, wild banana, and 

scrub, and much of the ground was covered with tall tough grass called 

tranh. The country had a very rudimentary transportation system of 

small, poor roads and trails, but it also had an extensive network of 

streams and rivers of which the Mekong was the largest and most 

famous. There was no rai1r0ad.I~ 

To infiltrate men and supplies to South Vietnam, the DRV relied on 

the eastern sector of Laos contiguous to southern North Vietnam and 

northern South Vietnam, an area popularly known as the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail. This was a latticework of roads, trails, tracks, and waterways 

along the western slope of the Annamite Mountain chain and the 

7 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

adjacent hilly country. There were numerous valleys between rugged 

mountain passes with elevations of 4,600 to 5,600 feet. Roads generally 

followed valleys and were often parallel to navigable rivers which served 

as alternate routes. 

A crude approximation of the trail was used in World War 11 by 

anti-Japanese guerrillas (called the Viet Minh) who traversed the jungle 

mountains between Tonkin (North Vietnam) and Saigon. In their war 

against the French after 1945, the Viet Minh again used the tortuous 

jungle trails and tracks until French control of the Vietnamese coast 

weakened, enabling them to use the seacoast more freely. Three-month 

journeys over the land routes were not uncommon. 

After the French defeat in 1954 and the division of Vietnam at the 

17th parallel, the trail became the main route for DRV agents and 

communist-indoctrinated South Vietnamese “returnees”* en route to 

South Vietnam. By the early 1960s, the network of trails near the 

Laos-South Vietnam border leading to Viet Cong camps in southeastern 

Laos evolved into a dry-season truck route. Until 1964, vehicles were 

confined to relatively poor roads-such as Routes 12 and 8 through the 

Mu Gia and Nape Passes respectively-to Thakhek, on the Mekong 

River, and then to Tchepone (via Routes 13 and 9), or to southern Laos 

(via Route 23). There were only trails directly south of Mu Gia to 

Attopeu and the Cambodian border, and there was no route open to 

truck traffic since Thakhek was then held by troops of the Lao 

government’s army (i.e., the FAR). Roads averaged eight to twelve feet 

wide, trails about three feet. Generally, the trails were not visible from 

the air except at isolated spots such as stream crossings, or in savannah 

areas (open grassland or tranh with scrub and scattered tree^).'^ 

For U.S. airmen who would spend nearly fourteen years flying 

reconnaissance and strike sorties over Laos, the country possessed not 

only a forbidding terrain, but its weather presented a formidable 

challenge. The climate, like that of Burma and Thailand, was characterized by two major seasons: the annual southwest monsoon from about 

mid-May to mid-September and the northeast monsoon from midOctober to mid-March. The two seasons were separated by a short 

‘The returnees were among the 87,000 Viet Minh troops and 43,000 civilians and 

dependents that elected to go from South to North Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva 

agreements. After integration into the NVA, some of the southerners were sent back to 

South Vietnam in the late 1950s as leadership cadres to assist the Viet Cong insurgency, 

while others were integrated into regular NVA divisional units that entered the South at a 

later date. [Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York, 1963), pp 358-59; Joseph J. 

Zasloff, The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency (RM-4140-PR, Santa 

Monica, 1964), pp 32-33.] 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

transitional period, mid-March to mid-May and mid-September to 

mid-October. The southwest monsoon brought heavy and frequent 

precipitation, overcast, high humidity, and tropical temperatures except 

at the higher elevations. Roughly seventy percent of the annual precipitation in Laos, averaging fifty to one hundred inches a year, fell in this 

period. The heaviest rainfall was in July and August. The northeast 

monsoon brought a relatively dry season with less rain, somewhat ,lower 

temperatures and humidity, and clearer skies. Nevertheless, pilots would 

often encounter a mixture of fog, overcast, and then clear visibility. Poor 

flying conditions existed mostly in the mornings when visibility was 

reduced below two and a half miles by fog before burning off a few 

hours later. In the dry season, when good flying weather often prevailed, 

many areas of Laos were enveloped in smoke, dust, and haze as a result 

of a Laotian practice of slashing and burning vegetation to clear land for 

cultivation. l5 

Thus Laos’s terrain, particularly the border region with South 

Vietnam, and its climate severely handicapped U.S. and RVN officials 

responsible for gathering information on and countering North Vietnam’s infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In the early 1960s, U.S. 

agencies addressed the problem in numerous studies and reports, usually 

in conjunction with overall assessments of Saigon’s political and military 

difficulties. 

As already noted, shortly after assuming office in January 1961, the 

Kennedy administration stepped up actions to blunt communist advances 

in Laos and South Vietnam. Officials believed that the upsurge in Viet 

Cong activity began after a meeting of the Central Committee of the 

North Vietnamese communist party in Hanoi on May 13, 1959, when it 

vowed publicly “to smash” the Diem regime. Following this decision, the 

Viet Cong “significantly increased [its] program of infiltration, subversion, sabotage, and assassination designed to achieve this end.” In April 

1961 Kennedy approved additional aid for the Diem regime to enable its 

armed forces among other things 

to increase . . . border patrol and insurgence suppression capabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by instituting regular aerial 

surveillance over the entire frontier area, and by applying modern technological 

area-denial techniques to control roads and trails along South Vietnam’s borders. 

The magnitude of the infiltration was not spelled out, but in June 

President Diem wrote President Kennedy asking for more aid. Diem 

claimed enemy documents obtained in a recent military operation along 

Route 9 from Laos to South Vietnam contained “definite proof” that 

9 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

2,860 armed agents had infiltrated over the preceding 4 months.* While 

some high-ranking officials were skeptical about the preciseness of the 

figure, they nonetheless viewed infiltration as a serious problem. In 

September 1961, for example, Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., in 

Saigon, and the State Department believed there was “increasing 

infiltration” from the DRV, principally manpower, not only through 

Laos but through the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, and 

by sea.16 

The facts were hard to come by. On October 5, 1961, a special 

national intelligence estimate concluded that only a small part of the Viet 

Cong main force, then estimated at about 17,000, came from outside 

South Vietnam. Of these, 80 to 90 percent were recruited locally, and 

there was little evidence that the Viet Cong relied on external supplies. 

However, a month later, Maxwell D. Taylor, former Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and now military representative to President 

Kennedy, returned from a special mission to South Vietnam. He 

considered the infiltration problem sufficiently important to warrant 

helping the Diem regime organize a border ranger force for a long-term 

campaign on the Laotian border against Viet Cong infiltrators. Taylor 

also urged assisting Diem’s counterinfiltration efforts with air reconnaissance, airlift, special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques.? l7 

The Kennedy administration’s growing alarm over infiltration impelled the State Department to issue a white paper in December 1961. 

The document alleged that a Hanoi-based Central Research Agency with 

branches in Laos and South Vietnam “was responsible for sending agents 

and supplies to the South by sea, across the demilitarized zones, and 

along the mountain trails through Laos.” The State Department published excerpts of confessions by a few Viet Cong soldiers who had 

entered South Vietnam by land and sea routes.” 

The bulk of infiltration data was compiled by U.S. Army advisory 

and intelligence units (principally by MACV after its establishment in 

February 1962), but throughout 1962 and early 1963 the data was 

fragmentary and assessments of its importance conflicting. MACV 

reported the capture of increasing amounts of Chinese, Soviet, and some 

Czech small arms and ammunition from the Viet Cong in the last half of 

“Later, MACV intelligence calculated that about 5,843 infiltrators entered South 

Vietnam in 1961, of which only 4,486 could reliably be confirmed. [The Senator Gravel 

Edition, The Pentagon Papers, 4 vols. (Boston, 1971), 11, 60; DIA Bul 135-64, Jul 14, 

1965.1 

+Basically, Taylor’s recommendations constituted a high-level endorsement of counterinfiltration actions approved by Kennedy in April and already under way by the U.S. 

MAAG in Saigon. 

10 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

1962, but compared with total enemy materiel found, the external aid 

was small. In contrast with the Air Force’s view, MACV said there had 

been virtually no aerial observation of infiltration (i.e., by the USAF 

RF-101 missions from October 1961 to September 1962) along the 

Laos-South Vietnam border, and that most confirmatory evidence 

depended on low-level agent reports. The evidence frequently did not 

reach MACV until five or or six months later. On the other hand, belief 

persisted that infiltration was an important factor in explaining Viet 

Cong advances. “We are not unmindful of the fact that pressure on 

South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration through the Laos 

corridor,” testified Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the 

House Armed Services Committee early in February 1963.19 

The next month, Michael V. Forrestal, a presidential aide, and 

Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 

the State Department, after a visit to South Vietnam, downgraded the 

importance of infiltration. In a report to President Kennedy, they noted 

that despite alleged losses of 20,000 killed* and 4,000 wounded over the 

past year, the insurgents were still able to field about 23,000 regular 

forces, 100,000 other military, and unknown thousands of sympathizers. 

The figures suggested that the Viet Cong “are able to obtain an adequate 

supply of recruits and large quantities of food and other 

supplies . . . from the villagers of South Vietnam.” The report claimed 

that infiltration by sea had been “effectively blocked” since early 1962. 

Whatever supplies delivered by land were in meager quantities, and 

there seems no doubt that trails have so far been used for specialized equipment 

such as radios, for medicines; and perhaps a few automatic weapons, although no 

weapons have yet been captured which could proved to have been brought in after 

1954. Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet Cong could continue the 

war effort at the present level, or perhaps increase it, even if the infiltration routes 

were completely closed. 

As for manpower infiltration, the report asserted that “captured 

documents, POW [prisoner-of-war] interrogation, evidence gathered by 

patrolling, and other intelligence indicates [sic] that 3,000 to 4,000 Viet 

Cong at the most have come over the . . . Ho Chi Minh trails since 

January 1962.”20 

‘Such estimates by the South Vietnamese, to say the least, were viewed with 

considerable skepticism by U.S. officials. In their report to Kennedy, Forrestal and 

Hilsman observed, “NO one really knows . . . how many of the 20,000 ‘Viet Cong’ killed 

last year were only innocent or at least persuadable villagers.” 

11 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Later, MACV intelligence analysts, generally revising manpower 

infiltration figures upward, compiled the following annual totals of 

infiltrators, noting the number of confirmed, including probables, and 

the unconfirmed or possibles:* 

INFILTRATORS 1959-60 - 1961 1962 1963 

Confirmed 1,800 4,166 5,630 4,486 

-- 

Unconfirmed 2,756 1,677 73045 3,207 

TOTAL 4,556 5,843 12,675 7,693 

The figures indicate that intelligence analysts were unable to confirm 

about forty-eight percent of the estimated total infiltrators for these 

years, or determine how many infiltrators were South Vietnamese 

returnees and indigenous North Vietnamese. The Defense Intelligence 

Agency in Washington believed the 1959-1960 and 1962 figures were 

possibly overstated. The sudden rise in infiltrators in 1962 could be 

ascribed to overreliance on inaccurate South Vietnamese reporting or to a 

sudden change in criteria in counting infiltrators. MACV’s explanation 

for the radical drop in infiltration in 1963 was that most South 

Vietnamese veterans of the French war in Indochina (i.e., the southern 

returnees) had now rejoined the Viet Cong and that Hanoi was sending 

its own draftees.f21 

Meanwhile, the United States assisted the Diem regime in developing 

counterinfiltration forces. In October 1961 the U.S. MAAG in Saigon 

completed an air-ground infiltration plan, and the RVNAF Joint General 

Staff (JGS) approved it in December. Using the plan as a guide, and 

U.S. Army Special Forces personnel began training elements of the Army 

of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), rangers, and the Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group (CIDG) (an American-directed group of irregulars outside 

‘Beginning in October 1963, MACV established three basic criteria for determining if a 

NVA unit or group was in South Vietnam. Its presence was confirmed if verified by two 

NVA prisoners of war (POWs) or returnees; probable if verified by one POW or returnee 

and a captured document; and possible if based on data evaluated as possibly true but not 

supported by evidence from a POW, returnee, or captured document. Generally, MACV 

considered the “probables” confirmed. As the war progressed, the criteria was not rigidly 

adhered to. [M. G. Weiner, J. R. Brom, and R. K. Koon, Infiltration of Personnel from 

North Vietnam, 1959-1967 (RM-5760-PR, Santa Monica, 1968) (hereafter cited as Rand 

Memo on NVN Infiltration, 1959-1967); Harkins Fact Book (MACV Fact Book 57), Jun 

64, Tab B.] 

‘In July 1965, MACV estimated total 1964 infiltration at 8,285 with 4,976 confirmed 

and 3,274 unconfirmed. Later, MACV again boosted the infiltration figures slightly upward 

for the period 1959 through 1963, but substantially raised the 1964 figure to 12,424 

(presumably all confirmed). For a discussion of the vagaries of the infiltration estimating 

process from 1959 to 1967, see Rand Memo on NVN Infiltration, 1959-1967, pp 40-49. 

12 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

of the RVNAF which included many Montagnard tribesmen)* for 

border-control operations. The MAAG’s role in cross-border training 

was gradually transferred to Headquarters MACV after the latter’s 

establishment on February 8, 1962.+ However, the transfer of CIDG 

training responsibilities to MACV, ordered by Secretary McNamara, was 

not completed until November 15, 1962. 

By March 1963, the Saigon government’s border-control force 

consisted of about 5,000 ARVN, ranger, and CIDG personnel deployed 

within 12 miles of South Vietnam’s borders in 103 outposts ranging in 

size from platoons to battalions. The force included a number of special 

teams, composed of South Vietnamese Montagnards who had many 

kinsmen in Laos, trained to conduct incursions up to 6 miles inside Laos 

to collect intelligence and to interdict enemy personnel along segments of 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Generally, MACV military trainers considered 

initial border-control operations not very effective, citing the poor 

performance of many recruits and the inadequate way they were 

organized by the RVNAF. The operations were also limited upon the 

insistence of the State Department. Concerned about the political fallout 

from untimely border incidents, State persuaded the Saigon government 

on November 15, 1962, not to conduct ground or VNAF air operations 

within 6 miles of South Vietnam’s borders with Laos and Cambodia 

without Washington’s prior approval. MACV, working on plans for 

more effective border control, considered the restriction “completely 

incongruous” as did the RVNAF Joint General Staff.22 

The low-key counterinfiltration activity was undertaken in conjunction with gradually expanding U.S. military support for the Diem regime. 

In March 1963, the combat advisory forces in South Vietnam totaled 

about 13,000 Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy personnel. The aid 

included a wide array of weapons, equipment, aircraft, and supplies to 

battle Viet Cong insurgents now numbering an estimated’ 23,000 regular 

troops, 100,000 militia-type supporters, and thousands of sympathizers 

despite alleged high casualties inflicted by the RVNAF.’ The Air Force 

was represented by about 3,200 airmen, 2 squadrons of C-123 transports 

(a third squadron would arrive soon), a FARM GATE unit grown to 41 

*In addition to counterinfiltration activities, CIDG recruits were used in South 

Vietnam’s youth programs, in civic action, and in commando units. [Jacob Van Staaveren, 

USAF Plans and Policies in Vietnam, 1961-1963 [The Air Force in Southeast Asia] 

(Washington, 1965), pp 29-30.] 

“MAAG was eventually merged with MACV beginning May 15, 1964. [Hist, MACV, 

$As indicated earlier, the Saigon government claimed the Viet Cong lost 20,000 killed 

and 4,000 wounded from about February 1962 to February 1963. [Gravel Pentagon Papers, 

11, 717.1 

1964, pp 10-14.1 

13 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

aircraft-principally T-28s, B-26s, RB-26s, and C-47s-6 ABLE MABLE 

RF-lOls, and other supporting aircraft. Most units were emplaced on 

South Vietnamese bases although a few were stationed in Thailand. The 

Army and Marines possessed helicopters and other aircraft, and offshore 

lay PACFLT’s carrier force. 

In Laos, as a result of the Geneva agreements of July 23, 1962, U.S. 

military assistance remained at low ebb, including suspension of USAF 

reconnaissance. With an upsurge in PL/NVA operations including 

infiltration in the spring of 1963, the United States cautiously began to 

increase its support for the Vientiane government. Simultaneously, it 

provided more resources for Government of Vietnam border surveillance 

and control, optimistic that Saigon, finally, was “beginning to win the 

war . ’ ’23 

The U.S. policy of supporting but also restricting border-control 

operations irritated the RVNAF Joint General Staff. In April 1963, 

against the State Department’s wishes, the JGS announced new border 

operational rules that allowed the ARVN to probe within six-tenths of a 

mile of the Laotian or Cambodian borders and to the border line where 

it was clearly marked by a river, a road, or some other geographical 

feature. In the north, the ARVN could patrol to within six miles of the 

demilitarized zone. VNAF aircraft were permitted to fly to the Laotian 

and Cambodian borders only if the borders were clearly marked. If not, 

aircraft had to remain one mile from the borders if a mission was 

controlled by a forward air control (FAC) aircraft, and three miles 

distant if flying without one. In addition, the JGS shifted operational 

control of border surveillance and related activities to RVNAF corps 

commanders. Despite a warning from Ambassador Nolting and General 

Harkins (acting on State Department instructions) that untimely border 

violations could jeopardize common U .S.-RVN interests, Saigon’s generals placed the new border-control rules in effect on May 1, 1963.24 

Convinced that U.S. aerial reconnaissance was also needed for the 

counterinfiltration program, Gen. Emmett O’Donnell,* Commander in 

Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) in Honolulu proposed to 

Admiral Felt on April 30 a USAF aerial survey of South Vietnam’s 

borders with Laos and Cambodia. He believed this would assist detection 

of infiltration, correct map inaccuracies, and provide other civil and 

military benefits. But authorities in Washington, unwilling to risk a clear 

breach of the Geneva agreements of 1962, were not ready to reintroduce 

‘General O’Donnell served as CINCPACAF from August 1, 1959, to July 15, 1963. 

He was succeeded by Gen. Jacob E. Smart who served from August 1, 1963, to July 31, 

1964. 

14 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

USAF aircraft over Laos. They permitted, however, an additional 

buildup of South Vietnam's border-control forces. On May 6, at a 

conference in Honolulu attended by McNamara and other ranking 

military and State Department officials, it was decided the force would 

be increased substantially, from about 5,000 to 8,000 personnel, although 

General Harkins doubted if it could do more than hinder infiltration. 

However, Roger Hilsman, now Assistant Secretary of State for Far 

Eastern Affairs,* was more optimistic about organizing and training the 

ground forces for effective anti-infiltration operation^.^^ 

The conferees at Honolulu also discussed the feasibility of ending 

infiltration by applying more military pressure on the Hanoi regime by 

striking, for example, eight important North Vietnamese targets. Defense 

Secretary McNamara opposed air strikes at this time but believed 

Admiral Felt should include this option in his contingency planning. He 

favored a less volatile policy, ordering a step-up in sabotage activities' 

against the DRV as a means of warning its leaders more pressure could 

be applied.26 

Meanwhile, the communists gave no indication they were prepared 

to retrench militarily. On the contrary, after some territorial gains in the 

Plain of Jars region in northern Laos in the early months of 1963, they 

expanded their control of the eastern sector of the central and southern 

panhandle. Possessing a few, small, Soviet-built transport aircraft, they 

made preparations to fly in men and supplies to areas close to the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail. In May they completed building 2 airstrips near the 

South Vietnamese border somewhat south of Tchepone, and were 

engaged in rehabilitating an airfield once used by the French near 

Chavane, and constructing a new airfield not far from Saravane. From 

Lao intelligence sources, American officials learned that Pathet Lao 

agents on the left bank of the Kong River north of Attopeu had recruited 

in April and May local Laotians to transport supplies. About 300 of 

them, after returning to their villages, revealed they had carried wooden 

cases with unknown contents from Chavane to a supply area at Sam 

Luang. Later, the Americans learned that 500 other villagers had been 

'Hilsman was appointed to his new post in April 1963. 

'After the end of the French Indochina war in 1954, the United States attempted to 

undermine support for the new communist Hanoi regime by sponsoring low-level covert 

operations. It organized, trained, and equipped anti-communist Vietnamese who committed 

acts of sabotage such as contaminating the oil supply of a bus company, disrupting rail 

transportation, and distributing leaflets designed to create disaffection among the populace. 

[See The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times (New York, 1971), pp 

53-66.] Larger and harder-hitting covert operations against the DRV began under the aegis 

of CINCPAC's Operation Plan 34A on February 1, 1964 (discussed later). 

15 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

recruited and conveyed similar types of wooden cases from Sam Luang 

towards South Vietnam.27 

The foregoing and similar reports triggered further high-level discussions in Washington, culminating in June 1963 in the completion of a 

U.S. three-phase plan to augment counterinsurgency activities in Laos. 

On the 19th, President Kennedy approved Phase I. This assured more 

direct aid to Lao FAR, neutralist, and General Vang Pao’s guerrilla 

forces, an upgrading of Lao intelligence (including recruiting more Kha 

tribesmen for intelligence collecting), and equipping of the RLAF with 

larger T-28s in exchange for their T-6s. Additionally, Phase I sanctioned 

expansion of Government of Vietnam (GVN) border patrols to collect 

intelligence on the PL/NVA and to attack NVA troops entering South 

Vietnam.28 

In the ensuing weeks evidence of a larger PL/NVA buildup around 

Tchepone (in enemy hands) and a threat to Attopeu farther south 

prompted President Kennedy on July 30 to approve stronger Phase I1 

measures that were incorporated in National Security Action Memorandum 256 issued the same day. The document encouraged FAR and 

neutralist troops and the RLAF, using T-6s and newly acquired T-28s, 

to conduct selective operations against the PL/NVA, and authorized 

expansion of intelligence collecting by tribesmen in Laos,* attacks by 

GVN border patrols against DRV infiltrators,+ and stepped-up sabotage 

of enemy bases in northern Laos and North Vietnam. However, only the 

Department of State, with Department of Defense concurrence, would 

determine when provisions of National Security Action Memorandum 

256 should be carried out with maximum impact on the enemy. Later, 

tougher Phase I11 measures would be di~approved.~’ 

Because the RLAF’s acquisition of more T-28s and American 

recruitment of more tribal roadwatch teams would take time, National 

‘By July 1963 about 400 Laotian tribesmen had been recruited for intelligence 

collecting. Trained by American intelligence personnel in camps near Savannakhet and 

Pakse in southern Laos, they observed PL/NVA dispositions and movements near or along 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, their primitive backgrounds made training difficult and 

their intelligence collection was accordingly limited. [Intvw, Lt Col Robert G. Zimmerman, 

Oral Hist Br, Albert F. Simpson Hist Rsch Cen, with Col Robert L. F. Tyrrell, former 

AIRA, Vientiane, May 12, 1975; memo, Henry L. T. Koren, Dept of State (FE/SEA), to 

Roger Hilsman, Asst SECSTATE for Far Eastern Affairs, subj: Meeting on Laos, Jul 27, 

1963.1 

+By July 1963 MACV military trainers had organized the 5,000-man-plus bordercontrol force into 2 active Montagnard tribal units of 18 men each, 5 ARVN companies of 

151 men each, and 10 specially trained ARVN ranger companies. About 150 Montagnards 

had undergone some cross-border training but most were not yet assigned to organized 

units. [Memo, Koren to Hilsman, Jul 27, 1963.1 

16 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

Security Action Memorandum 256 could not be implemented immediately. This enabled the PL/NVA in August 1963 to continue their 

buildup in the Tchepone area relatively unhampered. The buildup 

threatened not only FAR control of the Seno-Savannakhet, SaravaneBolovens Plateau, and Attopeu areas, but portended the establishment of 

a major base to support infiltration in this sector of the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail. For example, U.S. intelligence had learned recently of the 

movement of from 80 to 160 vehicles on Route 12A between Mahaxay 

and Muong Phine, and on Route 9 between Muong Phine and Ban 

Dong. Muong Dong, southeast of Tchepone, was a suspected logistic 

terminus for truck convoys carrying troops and supplies destined for the 

Viet Cong. There were new reports that the DRV, using Soviet-built 

Ilyushin (1L)-12 and -14 transports, was landing troops and supplies at 

the 3,600-foot Tchepone airfield and paradropping supplies to units in 

the vicinity of Muong Sen, Muong Nong, and some rest stations along 

the trail. But it was difficult to determine the size and precise location of 

the enemy’s presence in these areas.30 

In August, Col. Thao Ma, Commander of the RLAF, which was 

headquartered at a base near Savannakhet, reported that his six T-28 

pilots, flying from the same base, had uncovered a large enemy camp 

about 16 miles west of the Tchepone airfield and 1 1/2 miles west of the 

junction of Routes 9/23. He believed about 750 enemy personnel were in 

the area, a force equivalent to a battalion and a half. The pilots had also 

reported 7 or 8 possible enemy structures. Another Lao report placed 

about 1,000 NVA and 500 local recruits near the Tchepone airfield. Col. 

Thao Ma wanted to launch a patrol with his T-28s to intercept, if 

possible, enemy aircraft and to strike the camp. But the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane, Leonard Unger,. opposed for the time being any Lao 

and supporting South Vietnamese operations or American ‘‘mopping 

up’’ against key PL/NVA targets, fearing “unwanted reactions” from 

Hanoi. The State Department backed Unger’s position and, in any event, 

believed joint Lao and South Vietnamese air and ground operations 

should be preceded by improved intelligence collection and an exchange 

of military liaison officers between the Vientiane and Saigon 

governments .31 

Meantime, in conjunction with high-level discussions in Washington 

on expanding communist activity in both Laos and South Vietnam, the 

joint chiefs asked Admiral Felt’s views about the feasibility of a joint 

*Appointed ambassador to Laos on July 3, 1962, Unger would serve in this post until 

December 1, 1964. 

17 

EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

FAR, neutralist, and GVN assault on Tchepone if and when Washington’s “political climate” was favorable. After conferring with General 

Harkins who, in turn, consulted with the Air and Army attaches in 

Vientiane and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Felt on September 11 sent to 

the service chiefs four military options for attacking the enemy in the 

vicinity of Tchepone and Muong Phine. The first would consist of air 

strikes by the RLAF, the VNAF, and USAF’s FARM GATE aircraft; the 

second, hit-and-run attacks by American-led Laotian and South Vietnamese units of company- and battalion-size that would enter the combat 

area by land, helicopter, and parachute with support from the three 

separate air arms; and the third, a major air and ground assault by 

Laotian and South Vietnamese troops with the Laotians occupying 

Tchepone and Muong Phine. The fourth option would be like the third 

except that the South Vietnamese would occupy the two towns and in 

addition keep the enemy from using Route 9 east of Lao Bao. 

Prior to conducting any military operations, Felt recommended 

launching an intensive intelligence-collecting effort, including low-level 

U.S. aerial reconnaissance, to determine more precisely the enemy’s 

dispositions. American and allied forces could then proceed with option 

one, following up with option two and, if necessary, one of the last two 

options. Strong military action was mandatory “to definitively turn off 

the Tchepone [infiltration] faucet.” He said the United States and its 

allies should seize and hold the Tchepone area and its routes to Muong 

Phine and Muong Nong. An ARVN division, with air support, was 

probably needed for this task. In addition, U.S. and allied air commanders should be prepared to interdict constantly the routes and bases 

leading to or in support of the enemy concentrations in these area. 

Aware that his proposals risked large-scale counteraction by the North 

Vietnamese, the Chinese, or both, the PACOM commandcr said the 

United States should be willing to execute either of two air and ground 

contingency plans prepared by his headquarters: Operation Plan 99-63 

for stabilizing the situation in Laos, and Operation Plan 32-64 for the 

defense of mainland Southeast Asia. 

In support of his military recommendations, Felt said a number of 

recent PL/NVA actions in southern Laos were cause for concern. One 

was the shooting-down on September 5, 1963, of a C-46 with three 

Americans and four Asians aboard while airdropping rice to a FAR 

battalion in the vicinity of Tchepone. A search and rescue effort by an 

American helicopter for the seven personnel* was frustrated by intensive 

‘Later, the Pathet Lao radio announced that five crewmembers, including one 

American, survived the crash and would be brought to trial. This triggered a debate in the 

19 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

antiaircraft (AA) fire from the crash area. This appeared to signify that 

the PL/NVA intended to keep the Tchepone and Muong Phine areas 

closed off to Laotian or South Vietnamese forces.32 

In Washington the administration did not share the PACOM 

commander’s view that a crisis was growing. Officials such as Hilsman; 

W. Averell Harriman, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; 

and Michael V. Forrestal, a senior member of the White House national 

security staff; found Felt’s air and ground options unpalatable. In 

Vientiane, Ambassador Unger was convinced that air strikes on enemy 

infiltration would be counterproductive and that ground action was not 

possible at this time. Souvanna Phouma, he observed, would not be 

inclined to approve the presence of foreign troops on Laotian soil, and 

their use in any event would violate the 1962 Geneva agreements on 

Laos’s neutrality. Confronted with such opposition, the joint chiefs on 

October 26 officially sent Admiral Felt’s recommendations to Secretary 

McNamara for use only in further State and Defense Department 

discussions. The chiefs indicated their general support, however, for 

Felt’s relatively low-level military options, beginning with more intensive 

intelligence collection using aerial reconnaissance and U.S.-led South 

Vietnamese ground probes into the Laotian panhandle. These would be 

followed by small-scale, air-supported hit-and-run attacks by Laotian or 

South Vietnamese units as proposed in option 

McNamara held the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in abeyance. 

However, a series of new enemy activities in South Vietnam and Laos in 

the ensuing weeks impelled the Defense secretary to recommend, and the 

president to approve, a more concerted intelligence-collecting effort in 

Laos and North Vietnam. Included were the use of aerial reconnaissance 

and other limited measures against the communists in the two countries. 

In the remainder of September and throughout October 1963 the 

PL/NVA problem in southern Laos was subordinated to the spiraling 

political and military crisis in Saigon. Official U.S. statements about the 

Diem regime’s “progress” in defeating the Viet Cong were suddenly 

overtaken by the reality of Saigon’s internal disintegration. Buddhist 

riots, beginning in May 1963, had triggered a series of politically 

destabilizing events that reached flashpoint on November 1, 1963, when a 

military junta, led by Maj. Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh, in a coup d’ttat 

assumed control of the government after killing President Ngo Dinh 

Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Although the U.S. government 

United States and the United Nations about the treatment of prisoners of war captured in 

Laos. [Msg, USUN to SECSTATE, 71, Sep 26, 1963; msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Paris, 

1988, Oct 19, 1963.1 

20 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

tacitly supported the coup in the hope that the new Vietnamese leaders 

would prosecute the war more effectively, it disapproved strongly of the 

killing of President Diem and his brother. The change in Vietnamese 

rulers did not have the desired salutory result. In fact, it further 

weakened the Vietnamese war effort, including the performance of the 

RVNAF which had, in truth, been waging an ineffectual struggle against 

the Viet Cong and DRV infiltration despite considerable American 

assistance. 

Official Washington experienced its own political trauma on November 22 when President Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President 

Lyndon B. Johnson, succeeded to the presidency. Only four days after 

taking office, Mr. Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 273, largely a restatement of American policy in South Vietnam, to 

underscore the continuity of support for that country under a new 

administration. The document prescribed more economic and military 

assistance for the new Minh government and solicited plans from the 

Joint Chief of Staff to step up clandestine warfare against North 

Vietnam and to conduct cross-border incursions up to thirty-one miles 

into Laos against infiltration.* As justification for such measures, the 

national security action memorandum directed the State Department to 

prepare another public report on how the Viet Cong was controlled, 

maintained, and supplied from the north by infiltration through Laos 

and other channels.t34 

The president also sent Secretary McNamara to Saigon to confer 

with General Harkins, the MACV Commander, and Henry Cabot Lodge, 

Jr., who had succeeded Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., as ambassador in 

August 1963. In his trip report the Defense secretary observed that 

infiltration of men and equipment from the DRV passed through the 

Laotian and Cambodian corridors, the Mekong River waterways, from 

Cambodia, and possibly by sea and the tip of the delta. To counter this 

flow he doubted if cross-border operations from South Vietnam into 

Laos on the scale desired by U.S. officials in Saigon would be either 

politically acceptable or militarily effective. He recommended stepping up 

activities against the DRV with psychological impact such as sabotage 

and intelligence collection in Laotian border areas by Laotian tribesmen. 

'In partial support of National Security Action Memorandum 273, MACV in 

December completed two plans which became the basis for further counterinfiltration 

planning early in 1964. See Chapter 11. 

+Entitled Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to 

Conquer South Vietnam, the report was not issued until February 1965 by the Office of 

Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The findings echoed those 

in the white paper issued by the State Department in December 1961 (discussed earlier). 

21 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

He also directed the immediate mapping of the Laos-Cambodia-South 

Vietnam borders to obtain data on infiltration routes, this to be done by 

high-flying U-2 reconnaissance planes from the Air Force’s Strategic Air 

Command (SAC).35 

On February 13 a SAC detachment of three U-2 aircraft, under the 

code name LUCKY DRAGON, began mapping selected border areas of 

Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, averaging about 

two sorties per day. Assigned to SAC’S 4080th Strategic Wing, the 

aircraft deployed from the United States initially to Clark Air Base, the 

Philippines, and transferred on March 5 to Bien Hoa Air Base in South 

Vietnam. U-2 photography was processed by a SAC detachment at Clark 

until early April 1964 when the detachment moved to a new facility, 

shared by PACAF’s 13th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron, at Tan 

Son Nhut Airfield in South Vietnam. SAC exercised operational control 

over the facility, however. LUCKY DRAGON was the first reconnaissance 

program over Laos permitted by authorities in Washington since it 

discontinued the USAF tactical RF-101 missions in December 1962 in 

compliance with the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 

1 962.36 

Nevertheless, the joint chiefs considered the foregoing measures 

insufficient to deal with infiltration in Laos or the deepening crisis of the 

Saigon government, now ruled by another junta headed by Maj. Gen. 

Nguyen Khanh. On March 2 with Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force 

Chief of Staff, serving as acting JCS chairman in the absence of General 

Taylor, the chiefs asked McNamara among other things to permit U.S. 

tactical, low-level, aerial reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam to 

supplement U-2 photography; increased border-control measures; and 

more energetic actions against the DRV. They urged air strikes by the 

Vietnamese Air Force, possibly augmented by the USAF combat advisory 

FARM GATE unit based in South Vietnam. General LeMay in preceding 

months had been the JCS’s chief advocate for using air power to destroy 

vital DRV targets and to convince Hanoi’s leaders to cease their support 

to the Laotian and South Vietnamese insurgent^.^^ 

On his return to Washington, General Taylor, who disagreed with 

some of the JCS’s recommendations of March 2, withdrew the memo 

and sent McNamara a new one reflecting more accurately his views. He 

considered it premature to bomb the North. Meanwhile, there was no 

lessening of high-level concern over unabating communist activity in 

South Vietnam and Laos. In March, McNamara flew to Saigon to confer 

with General Harkins and Ambassador Lodge. The Defense secretary 

returned to Washington with new proposals to strengthen the Khanh 

government and counter the DRV in the two countries. Infiltration 

through Laos, he informed the president, was evidenced by improved 

22 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

weapons captured from the Viet Cong such as Chinese 75-mm recoilless 

rifles, heavy machineguns, 90-mm rocket launchers and mortars, and 

large quantities of ammunition and chemicals to produce explosives. To 

improve detection and reduce the weapons and supply flow from China 

through North Vietnam and Laos, he recommended tighter border 

control. 

Accepting most of Secretary McNamara’s suggestions, the president 

issued National Security Action Memorandum 288 on March 17, 

authorizing twelve new measures to aid the overall war effort in the 

Indochina theater. Ten were designed to strengthen the Khanh regime 

internally. The eleventh would permit continued high-level SAC U-2 

mapping missions along South Vietnam’s borders, the “hot pursuit” of 

the Viet Cong into Laos if necessary, and more limited (MACVorganized) South Vietnamese ground reconnaissance operations into Laos 

with the proviso that any units of battalion size or larger required the 

approval of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The twelfth measure 

directed military commanders to prepare to launch, on seventy-two 

hours’ notice, a wide range of border-control actions inside Laos and 

Cambodia, and on thirty days’ notice a program of “graduated overt 

military pressure against North Vietnam.”38 

Meanwhile, there were new efforts to enlarge the RLAF, now 

possessor of six T-28s. Ambassador Leonard Unger in Vientiane, 

preoccupied with preserving Laos’s neutrality, cautiously supported a 

stronger RLAF only to assist Lao ground forces in their see-saw battles 

with PL/NVA forces in northern Laos. He took a dim view of 

unleashing the T-28s along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hit enemy targets, 

fearing a strong military riposte from Hanoi. Air Force officers, notably 

General LeMay, considered Unger’s proposals of aid for the RLAF too 

modest. LeMay advocated more U.S. and Vietnamese assistance for the 

Lao air arm so it could attack roads leading toward South Vietnam. His 

views were reflected generally in a JCS recommendation of March 11 to 

Secretary McNamara urging a RLAF capability for offensive as well as 

defensive operations. The joint chiefs believed the RLAF commander 

should assign first priority to striking enemy convoys entering the 

country and second priority to destroying hard-to-repair roads and 

bridges, with the Air Force assisting by flying low-level reconnai~sance.~~ 

Frequent use of the RLAF against North Vietnamese infiltration 

would not be possible until after more aircraft and pilots were available, 

a decision that would rest with high administration officials rather than 

the service chiefs. To improve the RLAF’s operations, McNamara on 

March 5 directed the assignment of an Air Force T-28 detachment to 

Thailand to step up the training of both Lao and Thai air forces (the 

agreement of July 23, 1962, on Laos prohibited the stationing of U.S. or 

23 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

other foreign troops in the country). The Air Force moved swiftly. At 

Hurlburt Field in Florida, the Special Air Warfare Center organized 

Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, under the command of Maj. 

Drexel B. Cochran, which deployed to Udorn Airfield with four T-28s 

and forty-one personnel. Nicknamed WATER PUMP, the detachment 

became operational on April 1, 1964. CINCPAC assigned operational 

control directly to Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore’s* 2d Air Division at Tan 

Son Nhut Airfield in South Vietnam. Besides training Lao and Thai 

airmen (the emphasis would be on the former), the detachment provided 

logistic support to the RLAF and was alerted, if ordered, to transfer its 

aircraft directly to the Laotians or to fly them for covert missions against 

the communists in Laos4’ 

Detachment 6 had no sooner launched its training program when 

two crises drew the United States deeper into Laos’s internal affairs. The 

first occurred on April 10 when a rightist faction of the Government of 

National Union again attempted a coup to replace Prime Minister 

Souvanna Phouma. American officials acted quickly to restore things as 

they were. The second crisis derived from the first. Taking advantage of 

the political disarray in Vientiane, the Pathet Lao in mid-May stepped up 

military operations against neutralist Kong Le’s forces and shortly 

captured the Plain of Jars. Souvanna Phouma asked for more U.S. 

assistance. Responding affirmatively, US. authorities for the first time 

released to the RLAF munitions and other supporting resources to permit 

air strikes on communist positions, When the RLAF attacks proved 

unequal to the task,+ more were laid on shortly by Udorn-based T-28~.~~ 

In Washington, State and Defense officials now believed the upsurge 

in communist activity warranted an additional response. After obtaining 

Souvanna Phouma’s consent and the reluctant acquiescence of Ambassador Unger, who agonized constantly over the international consequences 

of losing American airmen in Laos, the officials authorized temporarily 

the resumption of U.S. tactical aerial reconnaissance as previously 

recommended by the JCS. Unlike the earlier tactical USAF operations 

terminated in December 1962, these flights would be conducted at 

low-level. Their aim was to assist the commanders of the Lao government’s FAR units by disclosing enemy positions and movements, and as 

a “show of force,” to impress upon communist leaders in Laos and 

South Vietnam America’s concern. General Taylor, the JCS Chairman, 

‘General Moore succeeded Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis as 2d Air Division commander 

on January 31, 1964. 

+The emergency expedited further expansion of the minuscule RLAF. By early June 

1964 it possessed twenty-three pilots, twenty T- and RT-28s, thirteen C-47s, and eight 

liaison aircraft. [Anthony, Chap IV.] 

24 
EARLY EFFORTS TO REDUCE INFILTRATION 

directed Admiral Felt on May 19 to launch the program, called YANKEE 

TEAM, along specified infiltration routes leading from North Vietnam 

through Laos into South Vietnam, and against the Ban Thay military 

installation east of Muong Phine. He barred overflights of North 

Vietnam and the area west of 105 degrees in Laos. Admiral Felt, in turn, 

assigned the first mission to General Moore who scheduled four ABLE 

MABLE RF-101s of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron based at 

Tan Son Nhut Airfield, South Vietnam, the same day (May 19).*42 

On the 21st the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered another reconnaissance 

mission that was flown immediately by both Air Force RF-101s and 

Navy RF-~As, the latter from the carrier Kitty Hawk. On the same day, 

Admiral Felt designated the MACV commander, coordinator of the Air 

Force-Navy reconnaissance missions, a responsibility quickly redelegated 

by COMUSMACV to General Moore, 2d Air Division Commander. The 

State Department publicly announced that the Laos government had 

requested the missions to assist the International Control Commission in 

documenting Pathet Lao violations of the 1962 Geneva agreements. The 

public acknowledgment did nothing to diminish the political sensitivity of 

the reconnaissance operations. High Washington officials, through the 

JCS, dictated the type of aircraft and cameras that should be used, and 

interjected themselves in other planning details normally left to the 

discretion of air commander^.^^ 

On May 26, the JCS ordered a “continuing program” of low-level 

reconnaissance over Laos to: provide intelligence for friendly ground 

forces; assess RLAF T-28 bombings; determine the extent of troops and 

materiel moved from North to South Vietnam via Laos; give “a 

psychological shot in the arm” to Lao and other allied forces in 

Southeast Asia; and demonstrate American resolve to support the 

neutralist government of Laos. Overflights of North Vietnam continued 

to be prohibited, but the stricture against flying west of 105 degrees in 

Laos was removed. With the aerial photography obtained in subsequent 

weeks and months, intelligence personnel were able to identify numerous 

infiltration routes or route segments. Estimates of enemy manpower and 

supply infiltration, however, were based principally on interrogation of 

‘The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) deployed initially to Tan Son Nhut 

on May 1, 1963. [Robert F. Futrell, A Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in 

Southeast Asia, 1950-1968 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1969), p 34.1 With the 

inauguration of BLUE TREE reconnaissance of North Vietnam in March 1965, the Thai 

government approved the deployment of four 15th TRS RF-101s to Udorn Airfield at the 

end of that month. Designated GREEN PYTHON, the Udorn-based reconnaissance unit was 

soon augmented, and its aircraft flew missions over both Laos and North Vietnam. 

[William H. Greenhalgh, Jr., “U.S. Air Force Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, 

1960-1975,” manuscript (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1977), p 182.1 

25 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

captured or defecting Viet Cong and documents found by the ARVN 

during their attacks in enemy territory.4 

In early June, shortly after the annual southwest monsoon rains 

began, the PL/NVA ceased large-scale assaults on government forces in 

northern Laos. However, some observers were inclined to attribute the 

slowdown to RLAF and U.S. air operations rather than the weather. 

Ambassador Unger believed the operations had sent to the PL/NVA 

leaders America’s “signal” of deep concern about violations of Lao 

neutrality. Kong Le (now a general), whose troops were routed temporarily from part of the Plain of Jars area in mid-May, averred that 

without air support the troops would have been lost. General LeMay was 

most effusive about the contribution of air power. He was convinced 

that the RLAF’s operations by U.S.-trained Lao pilots had “paid off.” 

He said that YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance had raised the morale of 

friendly Laotians and furnished valuable data on the DRV’s infiltration 

activities into Laos and South Vietnam. Ensuing events demonstrated, 

however, that some of the aerial accomplishments were only transitory 

and that the communist leaders paid scant recognition, if any, to 

America’s aerial “signal. ’’45 

26 
Chapter I1 

Expansion of 

Counterinfiltration Activities 

In June and July 1964, events propelled the United States-and the 

Air Force-into deeper military involvement in both northern and 

southern Laos. On June 6, communist antiaircraft fire downed a Navy 

YANKEE TEAM RF-8A near Xiengkhouang. The pilot, Lt. Charles F. 

Klusmann, was captured.* President Johnson, with Prime Minister 

Souvanna’s approval, quickly ordered fighter escorts for the reconnaissance aircraft with pilots henceforth authorized to return enemy fire. The 

next day, while the Navy was flying another reconnaissance mission, 

communist gunners scored once more. They downed an escorting F-8, 

although the pilot, Comdr. Doyle W. Lynn, was rescued by an American 

helicopter. At the strong urging of General LeMay, the president ordered 

escorting aircraft to precede reconnaissance missions and “neutralize” an 

AA area before a photo run.’ 

To assure escorts for the Air Force’s YANKEE TEAM RF-lOls, the 

JCS on June 8 directed a detachment of 8 F-100s of the 510th Tactical 

Fighter Squadron (TFS) of the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) to 

deploy from Takhli Air Base (where they had just arrived from the 

States) to Tan Son Nhut Airfield. From there the Super Sabres flew their 

first combat mission on the 9th against the offending enemy gun 

positions near Xiengkhouang. The aircraft dropped two 750-pound 

bombs and fired fifty-seven 2.75-inch rockets into the target area. On 

June 13 the Air Force directed the F-100s transferred to Da Nang 

Airfield from where they flew escort as needed. General Moore ordered 

the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing to place as soon as possible 2 Super Sabres 

on constant alert and prepare to put 2 others on 15-minute alert and 4 on 

1-hour alert. YANKEE TEAM escort aircraft would engage increasingly in 

combat in subsequent months, especially in the Laotian panhandle. In 

expectation that more U.S. reconnaissance, escort, and other aircraft 

‘Lieutenant Klusmann successfully escaped from his captors on August 21, 1964. 

27 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

would be shot down by enemy ground fire, the 2d Air Division and Air 

America augmented their search and rescue capabilities2 

The Air Force’s command structure for the air war in Laos was also 

changed to accede to Thai government objections to having Thai-based 

USAF aircraft operationally controlled from 2d Air Division headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Airfield in Saigon. In late July, General Moore 

established Headquarters, Deputy Commander for 2d Air Division, 

Thailand/Laos,* an air operations center (AOC) and a control and 

reporting post (CRP) at Udorn Airfield. Col. Jack H. McCreery was 

appointed deputy commander .+ Secure communication links now existed 

to the 2d Air Division’s air operations centers in Saigon, to Thai bases 

with USAF tenants, and to the RLAF AOC in Vientiane. Colonel 

McCreery, as General Moore’s deputy, technically could exercise operational control of any combat operations using Thai-based USAF aircraft. 

Administrative and logistic support was provided by Detachment 2, 35th 

Tactical Group, established at Udorn in June.3 

From the outset, the task of Colonel McCreery was sensitive and 

difficult. He was asked, in effect, to serve two masters whose views on 

air requirements, priorities, and operations were often far from congruent: Ambassador Unger and his air attach6 and embassy staff in 

Vientiane, and General Moore, the 2d Air Division Commander in 

Saigon. (Headquartered in Saigon, Moore served as component commander to Gen. William C. Westmoreland, USA, who had assumed 

command of MACV on June 20, 1964.) Westmoreland’s principal 

responsibility was to contain the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, 

and his interest in Laos was largely confined to the southern panhandle 

where North Vietnamese infiltration was on the rise. Thus McCreery and 

his successors had to deal constantly with Vientiane’s and Saigon’s 

competing aircraft demands. 

This built-in conflict was exacerbated with the beginning of the 

ROLLING THUNDER interdiction in North Vietnam in March 1965, the 

STEEL TIGER assault on enemy infiltration in Laos in April, and later 

aerial anti-infiltration programs in that country. The Thai government 

had to clear all USAF deployments into and out of Thailand and all 

operations involving the use of Thai-based USAF aircraft. Consequently, 

*In November 1964 the deputy commander’s headquarters was redesignated Deputy 

Commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force. It became Deputy Commander, 

Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force, after the Seventh Air Force replaced the 2d Air 

Division on April 1, 1966. 

’Colonel McCreery was succeeded in May 1965 by Brig. Gen. John R. Murphy. 

Murphy retained this post until January 6, 1966, when he was followed by Maj. Gen. 

Charles R. Bond, Jr. Bond served until March 31, 1967, when he was replaced by Maj. 

Gen. William C. Lindley, Jr., who held his position until May 31, 1968. 

28 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

McCreery and his successors also had to keep the American ambassador 

to Thailand and his staff fully apprised of air planning for Laos and 

North Vietnam. Despite the complexity and frequently controversial 

nature of its task, the deputy commander position gradually became a 

workable mechanism for funneling the air requests and views of the 

American ambassadors in Vientiane and Bangkok to the air commander 

in Saig~n.~ 

Meanwhile, the search continued for more and better air targets, 

especially in southern Laos. In Vientiane, the American intelligence 

personnel had begun to organize fifteen to twenty teams of Laotian 

tribesmen and planned to equip them with radios to speed up their 

reporting of enemy targets underneath Laos’s jungle terrain. The teams 

would be airlifted to observation points stretching from north of 

Saravane southward towards the Cambodian b~rder.~ 

General Westmoreland likewise desired to launch ground surveillance 

of parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail from South Vietnam, as developing 

monsoon weather promised to reduce the effectiveness of YANKEE TEAM 

photo-reconnaissance missions. He planned to use local Laotians or 

Vietnamese and supply them with logistic support. There was no other 

way, he believed, to detect with precision communist positions, supply 

areas, and infiltration movements. He possessed two cross-border plans, 

numbered 98-84 and 98A-64, for overt and covert activities. Completed 

initially in December 1963, the plans outlined three kinds of operations: 

intelligence collection; harassment of communist units and their infiltration routes by air, ground, or both; and “hot pursuit” of the Viet Cong 

from South Vietnam into their Laotian redoubts, by ARVN and 

supporting American combat advisory personnel and units. The plans 

envisaged small and large search forays no more than thirty-one miles 

into selected areas of the Ho Chi Minh Trail below the 17th parallel. 

There would be a concerted enlistment of as many South Vietnamese 

Kha, Meo, and other tribesmen as possible to serve as guides, informers, 

sabotage teams, and security personnel. The cross-border teams would be 

supported by U.S. military and intelligence resources in South Vietnam 

and Thailand, occasionally by American advisory personnel in a noncombat role, and by the VNAF. MACV would exercise overall control of 

and coordinate with the RVNAF in conducting these operations.6 

MACV’s plans for ground counterinfiltration operations received 

additional high-level endorsement in early spring 1964. In support of 

Secretary of Defense McNamara’s recommendations, the president ordered military commanders to launch on seventy-two hours’ notice 

extensive border control activities in Laos and Cambodia, and on thirty 

29 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

days’ notice graduated military pressure on North Vietnam.* In early 

April, Ambassador Unger secured Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s 

assent to “modest cross-border operations” from South Vietnam into the 

Laos panhandle except in populated areas.7 

The ensuing weeks witnessed more preparations for a thrust into the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail. MACV reviewed alternate choices of personnel: 

ARVN Special Forces; a combination of ARVN Special Forces and 

Montagnard tribesmen with the ARVN providing leadership; or solely 

Montagnards (as previously). Initial patrols could enter the trail by 

parachute, helicopter, or on foot and leave either by helicopter or on 

foot. After Saigon government approval, personnel training time would 

require roughly four to eight weeks depending on the type of recruits 

selected. Leadership and good communications would be a prerequisite 

for success. MACV’s Studies and Observations Group (SOG), established 

initially on January 24, 1964, as a special office for covert activities,+ 

was assigned to complete the planning of and to conduct the operation as 

soon as the joint chiefs flashed the order to do so.* 

In early May, Washington signaled Vientiane and Saigon to proceed 

with a very limited intelligence-collecting operation without direct U .S. 

support. MACV quickly readied five eight-man patrol teams composed 

of South Vietnamese Montagnard tribesmen with Vietnamese Special 

Forces (VNSP) personnel serving as leaders, and selected several landing 

areas along Route 9 in the Muong Phine-Tchepone region of the 

panhandle. Known as LEAPING LENA, the Phase I scenario called for 

parachuting the radio-equipped teams to their respective landing areas by 

unmarked VNAF-piloted aircraft. The teams were expected to remain in 

enemy territory up to thirty days and counseled to observe in daytime, 

move at night, report their observations by radio, request aerial resupply 

if necessary, and depart on foot or by helicopter. After studying their 

intelligence, MACV would launch larger Phase I1 cross-border operations 

to interdict the PL/NVA lines of communication. 

The first team was airdropped on June 24, three more the next day, 

and the fifth on July 2. LEAPING LENA was virtually a total failure. One 

team was lost and never communicated, the second was captured when it 

landed in an enemy-held village, and three remained in radio contact 

*See Chapter 1. 

‘SOG’s mission was to intensify programs of harassment, diversion, political pressure, 

capture of prisoners, physical destruction, intelligence collection, and propaganda against 

North Vietnam or its troops in Laos. Each action had to have prior approval of the 

Secretaries of State and Defense and the White House. [Hist, MACV, 1964, Annex A, p 

A-I; Gen. William C. Westmoreland, USA, Ret, A Soldier Reports (New York, 1976), pp 

106-07 .] 

30 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

until July 9 when all communications ceased. Only six of the forty 

paratroopers succeeded in returning on foot to South Vietnam, bringing 

back low-level intelligence of little value. They said that the populace in 

the PL/NVA-controlled area, fearing reprisal, would give them no 

assistance. Apparently discounting this problem, MACV officials judged 

that the teams failed to make bold and deep penetrations into enemy 

territory because the South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel lacked 

leadership and the team members discipline. The airdrops from unmarked VNAF-piloted aircraft were also considered unsatisfactory. 

Washington officials, likewise optimistic that the initial problems could 

be overcome, approved a second LEAPING LENA operation beginning 

August 1 with the proviso, recommended jointly by MACV and 

CINCPAC, that a U .S. observer-jumpmaster accompany each VNAF 

aircraft. But continuing personnel problems resulted in the cancellation 

of the August operation. Later that month Montagnard trainees revolted 

against their South Vietnamese trainers at Nha Trang, South Vietnam, 

aborting the entire pr~ject.~ 

MACV concluded that more direct American participation was 

imperative for a successful intelligence-gathering operation into enemyheld routes or border areas. In fact earlier studies on such participation 

culminated on June 27, 1964, in State and Defense approval for the first 

time of joint U.S./GVN planning for covert and overt cross-border 

operations. The operations would not only be for the purpose of 

gathering intelligence but would attempt to disrupt the movement and 

reinforcement of PL/NVA forces in the event they launched an offensive 

in the panhandle (in the vicinity of Attopeu), and interdict infiltration 

routes and destroy facilities supporting infiltration into South Vietnam. 

Better trained South Vietnamese teams would be accompanied by a few 

U.S. Army Special Forces advisers, and supported by U.S. airlift into 

and out of Laos and for resupply. However, State and Defense officials 

forbade the use of the USAF combat advisory FARM GATE squadron 

based in South Vietnam or other U.S. fighter aircraft to strike 

communist targets in support of this type of operation." 

In late June, about a week after succeeding General Harkins as 

MACV Commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland met with Gen. 

Tran Thien Khiem, Chief of Staff of the Joint General Forces (JGF) of 

the RVNAF, to discuss joint operations. They agreed newly trained 

South Vietnamese personnel should, as first priority, attempt to counter 

Viet Cong activities. Any impact of such operations assisting the Lao 

government in its struggle against the PL/NVA would be a "bonus." 

They examined several military options: six- to eight-man teams composed exclusively of Vietnamese Special Forces for covert or overt 

attacks, VNAF strikes on targets uncovered by cross-border teams or by 

32 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

aerial reconnaissance, and VNAF airlift supported as necessary by USAF 

airlift.” 

Saigon’s interminable domestic difficulties, however, foreclosed 

proceeding with any operations for the time being, although planning 

continued. Military planners in Vientiane and Saigon also devised a 

“three bridgehead” concept to stop infiltration. This called for Vietnamese Special Forces, ranger, airborne, or other units, with extensive 

American air, ground, and logistic support, to establish bridgeheads at 

strategic points in Laos. But the bridgehead concept likewise floundered. 

Ambassador Unger, concerned about the political impact of American 

military participation in Laos, wanted operations restricted to shallow 

penetrations of the Laotian panhandle with a minimum of aerial support 

and resupply requirements. In Saigon, some U.S. officials feared the 

sizable bridgehead operations would divert resources needed for South 

Vietnam’s pacification program, and create a control problem if the 

VNAF alone was authorized to support them.” 

Military planners next contemplated an American-supported attack 

against infiltration in southern Laos, fitting in with the bridgehead 

concept. Two or three battalions of Laotian tribesmen would be 

reinforced by paramilitary or ranger personnel and backed by close air 

support. They would cut across Laos toward Muong Phalane near the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail while another Lao unit, supported by the ARVN 

from South Vietnam, would advance westward toward the Muong 

Phine-Tchepone segment of Route 9. Both would harass and sabotage 

enemy redoubts and infiltration movements. Again Unger opposed the 

proposal, arguing that operations of such magnitude could not be 

hidden. Furthermore, they required assurances to the Lao and South 

Vietnamese governments that if a PL/NVA counteraction threatened to 

overwhelm their personnel, the United States would furnish air or ground 

forces to extricate them. l3 

In the ensuing weeks other efforts in getting cross-border operations 

off the planning boards also failed, despite the issuance of National 

Security Action Memorandum 314, approved by President Johnson on 

September 10, 1964. The memo authorized more U.S./Lao discussions 

on limited GVN air and ground operations against infiltration in Laos. It 

also required an endorsement of such action at the first meeting of the 

Coordinating Committee for U.S. Missions Southeast Asia (SEACOORD) on October 8 in Saigon.* On October 23, Westmoreland 

‘SEACOORD was established in 1964 by Maxwell Taylor, recently appointed ambassador to Vietnam. Its purpose was to improve the coordination of U.S. political and military 

policies in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Membership consisted of the U.S. 

33 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

informed the joint chiefs that a successful ground thrust into the Laotian 

panhandle could not be made until early 1965. The delay stemmed from 

the GVN’s recent training difficulties with Montagnard tribesmen (picked 

to conduct incursions across the border), more destabilizing personnel 

changes in the Vietnamese military high command, and a plethora of 

unresolved internal political and military problem^.'^ 

Failure to translate cross-border plans into action left information 

gathering on communist activity in Laos largely to tactical YANKEE 

TEAM reconnaissance and SAC’S LUCKY DRAGON U-2s despite the heavy 

monsoon weather. A steady albeit restricted pattern of photo-taking was 

under way. For example, during a five-week period from June 19 

through July 24, 1964, PACAF and PACFLT completed thirty-seven 

YANKEE TEAM missions, with seven others aborted because of weather or 

camera malfunctions. While some missions covered the panhandle, most 

were sent to the Plain of Jars area or along routes leading thereto in 

support of FAR and neutralist forces. SAC’S U-2s flew twenty-eight 

sorties in the same time span, mapping and targeting the border regions 

between Laos and South and North Vietnam. 

Considerable photography was turned over to the RLAF to assist its 

T-28 close air support and interdiction operations, but the photos often 

contained insufficient detail and target resolution. This was partly due to 

Secretary McNamara’s injunction requiring YANKEE TEAM aircraft to fly 

at medium altitude (roughly 10,000 feet) to avoid losses. Air Staff and 

Joint Staff proposals to fly reconnaissance well below 10,000 feet to 

obtain more detail of targets and target areas were usually turned down 

by the Defense secretary. State, Defense, and White House approval of 

each YANKEE TEAM mission, he said, would remain in effect, with 

exceptions considered solely on a case-by-case basis. l5 

Although YANKEE TEAM’S recently assigned escort aircraft were 

permitted to fire back if fired upon, there was no authorization per se 

for escorts to attack infiltration targets. Weighing alternatives, U.S. 

officials in late July 1964 again considered using the VNAF in panhandle 

operations. They hoped this might defuse a recent threat by Saigon’s 

generals, including Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the VNAF’s colorful 

commander, to strike the North alone if the United States was unwilling 

to do so. But Ambassador Unger strongly opposed unleashing the VNAF 

in Laos. He insisted the air strikes would prove only marginally effective, 

create more political and military problems for Souvanna Phouma’s 

ambassadors to the three countries, MACV and PACOM commanders, and officials of 

other U.S. agencies concerned with the war in Southeast Asia. In the absence of key 

officials, their representatives attended the sessions. [Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 21-22.] 

34 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

government, and strain America’s relationships with the Soviets, the 

British, and the Canadians, all of whom were involved in Laotian affairs 

as a result of the 1962 Geneva agreements.*16 

The possibility that the administration might reverse course and 

adopt a bolder air policy in Southeast Asia was suggested on August 5 

when, in response to an attack on a U.S. destroyer in the Gulf of 

Tonkin, U.S. Navy carrier fighters conducted the first strike of the war 

against North Vietnam. Simultaneously, the United States deployed more 

military units to the war zone. Pacific theater shifts brought fifty 

additional USAF aircraft (B-57s, F-l02s, RF-101s) to South Vietnam 

and twenty-six (F-100s, F-l05s, KB-50s) to Thailand, while other 

aircraft (F-l05s, C-130s) went to bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the 

Philippines. The U.S. Army and Marines dispatched selected ground and 

aviation units, and the U.S. Navy added a carrier and other ships to the 

Seventh Fleet stationed in waters not far off North Vietnam. On August 

10, the U.S. Congress strengthened the president’s hand to deal firmly 

with the crisis by passing a Southeast Asia resolution (popularly called 

the Gulf of Tonkin resolution), urging him to take “all necessary 

measures” to repel any armed attack against U.S. forces and “to prevent 

further aggre~sion.”’~ 

To the dismay of Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., PACAF Commander,+ 

Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr.,S the joint chiefs, and other officials, 

the president barred followup air strikes. Mr. Johnson’s concern, and 

that of his principal advisers, was that further heavy blows might trigger 

a North Vietnamese and/or a Chinese response beyond the capability of 

the Saigon government to handle, or encourage the Soviets to apply 

pressure on the United States elsewhere. Laos’s political and military 

posture was even less likely to withstand more external pressure. As a 

result the administration opted in the coming weeks and months for a 

continued relatively “low-risk” policy in both countries. l8 

Nevertheless, the Tonkin Gulf incident stimulated more planning by 

the various military commands and the Saigon and Vientiane embassies. 

They searched for ways to apply other punitive measures against the 

communists within low-risk guidelines. One alternative, previously recommended, was to ask Brig. Gen. Thao Ma,5 the RLAF Commander, to 

strike panhandle infiltration targets. On August 3, Thao Ma had 

informed Col. Robert L. F. Tyrrell, the U.S. air attache, who was 

‘See Chapter I. 

+Cen. Harris succeeded Gen. Jacob E. Smart as CINCPACAF on August 1, 1964. 

$Admiral Sharp, previously CINCPACFLT, succeeded Admiral Felt as CINCPAC on 

“ha0 Ma was promoted from colonel to brigadier general in the spring of 1964. 

June 30, 1964. 

35 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

visiting Savannakhet, that he was considering using RT- and T-28s to fly 

reconnaissance and to strike bridges, supply depots, and other targets in 

that area. A conclave of U.S. officials from Vientiane, Saigon, MACV, 

and Bangkok discussed Thao Ma’s offer at Udorn on August 18, and 

drew up a tentative plan for the RLAF to strike twenty US.-designated 

targets (shortly increased to forty) south of Mu Gia Pass. PACAF’s and 

PACFLT’s escort aircraft (which could fire back if fired upon) would be 

enlisted in a disguised supporting role, striking targets beyond the 

capability of the RLAF or too heavily protected by enemy antiaircraft 

emplacements. l9 

Ambassador Unger discouraged proceeding with the plan citing, as 

usual, political reasons. The Vientiane government was fairly amenable 

to such operations, he said. Still, it was reluctant to undertake them at 

this time while new tripartite talks between rival political factions in Laos 

(i.e., the rightist, neutralist, and communist) were under way. Furthermore, Vientiane would expect the United States to use planes and troops 

to assist Lao ground forces if the attacks triggered reprisal military 

action by Hanoi in Laos.20 

Despite Unger’s opposition, discussions on possible panhandle 

strikes continued because of the Saigon government’s continued ineffectual military operations against the Viet Cong. This triggered at the 

beginning of September 1964 another high-level meeting in Washington 

attended by Ambassador Taylor and other presidential advisers. Their 

deliberations produced National Security Action Memorandum 3 14, 

issued by President Johnson on September 10. It again directed more 

small, covert actions against North Vietnam and discussions with Lao 

officials on permitting limited South Vietnamese air and ground operations, RLAF air strikes, and U.S. armed reconnaissance against the 

communists in the Laos corridor. The “first order of business,” 

however, was to “strengthen the fabric of the Government of South 

Vietnam.” The joint chiefs supported the proposals, although General 

LeMay and Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the United 

States Marine Corps (USMC), desired stronger measures. Asserting that 

“time is against us,” the two service leaders recommended countering the 

next “significant” Viet Cong incident in South Vietnam (such as a 

battalion-size attack) with a retaliatory U.S. and VNAF air strike against 

North Vietnam in accordance with a recently developed ninety-fourtarget plan. *2 

‘A four-phase air attack plan against ninety-four of the most important military targets 

in North Vietnam. Prepared by the JCS in the summer of 1964 and frequently revised, the 

plan was officially sent to McNamara on August 24, 1964. 

36 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

On September 11, during a meeting in Saigon, U.S. officials in 

Saigon and from Vientiane and Bangkok spelled out the Laotian options 

for administration leaders. If the principal aerial objective in Laos was 

psychological, they said, RLAF T-28 strikes plus some Air Force-Navy 

YANKEE TEAM armed reconnaissance (e.g., against five bridges) would 

suffice. If the objective was military, then substantially larger strikes by 

USAF FARM GATE and other aircraft and by the VNAF were essential. 

The conferees agreed that initially a mix of RLAF and YANKEE TEAM 

strikes would appear adequate. They also discussed cross-border operations, disagreeing whether U.S. advisers should accompany the Vietnamese teams.” 

On September 29, Ambassador Unger presented the latest American 

proposals for RLAF panhandle interdiction to Souvanna Phouma. 

Souvanna agreed reluctantly after Unger (following State Department 

instructions) assured him the strikes would be primarily psychological to 

apply more pressure on Hanoi. They would also demonstrate America’s 

serious concern over infiltration and violation of the 1962 Geneva 

accords, and would neither sacrifice operations along Route 7 in 

northern Laos (where Souvanna anticipated another enemy dry season 

offensive) nor require the use of South Vietnamese planes. Unger 

avoided discussing supplementary PACAF and PACFLT YANKEE TEAM 

strikes in view of the prime minister’s prior authorization for these 

aircraft to conduct retaliatory, suppressive fire against enemy antiaircraft 

guns. The ambassador recognized that operational rules could be mildly 

stretched to make such attacks supportive of the RLAF.23 

After securing Souvanna’s consent for the RLAF portion of the 

program, U.S. authorities strove to get the operations under way as soon 

as possible. The Lao air arm’s current inventory of thirty-three RT- and 

T-28s required augmentation, as General Thao Ma indicated he needed 

at least fifteen strike aircraft to carry out panhandle interdiction. Ten 

normally were based at Savannakhet and shuttled frequently to Wattay 

Airfield near Vientiane for operations in northern Laos. The rest were at 

Udorn, employed for training RLAF pilots and for operations in 

northern Laos. But more were on the way. On August 14, Secretary of 

Defense McNamara had instructed the Air Force to withdraw twenty 

RT-28 trainers from storage to convert them to fighters, and in late 

September Unger asked General Moore to turn over to the RLAF all 

T-28s in excess of the VNAF’s needs (the VNAF was transitioning from 

T-28s to A-~Hs).’~ 

In early October, Colonel Tyrrell, the Air Force attache, and Col. 

William Law, the U.S. Army attache in Vientiane, met with members of 

the FAR General Staff and the RLAF to smooth out details of the 

impending air program. Playing a key role in the program’s preparation, 

37 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Tyrrell had learned earlier that the FAR ground commanders in the 

southern Laotian panhandle, while lukewarm about “stirring anything 

up” in their sectors, nonetheless would not oppose the air operations. An 

initial list of twenty-two MACV-selected targets was pared down to 

thirteen for the RLAF. Several targets were judged too hazardous for 

General Thao Ma’s pilots, being either too close to a MiG base near 

Hanoi or heavily protected by antiaircraft guns. 

The air plan approved by Ambassador Unger called for launching 

strikes about October 15. If weather permitted, the RLAF would fly 

eighteen sorties daily for eight days against thirteen targets. Air Force 

jets would fly cover to guard against a possible North Vietnamese Air 

Force (NVAF) MiG attack while the RLAF struck four targets close to 

the DRV border. Three additional targets consisting of a barracks area 

near Tchepone, the Nape highway bridge, and the Ban Thay military 

area-all surrounded by flak guns-would be struck by the RLAF with 

the assistance of USAF YANKEE TEAM escort aircraft. After finishing off 

the thirteen targets, the RLAF’s T-28s would fly armed reconnaissance 

against enemy trucks, logistic convoys, or other targets of opportunity.2s 

Despite his support of the air plan, Unger remained disquieted about 

the upcoming air and ground operations in the panhandle. There should 

be no illusion, he advised his peers in Washington on October 6, that of 

all actions under consideration, a “military venture” by the Lao, the 

Vietnamese, and the Americans was “most likely” to trigger strong 

enemy responses and draw the United States into a deeper commitment 

in Laos. He was particularly troubled by a contemplated (but not yet 

approved) ground thrust by either FAR or South Vietnamese troops into 

certain areas around Tchepone as a follow-on to RLAF1U.S. air strikes 

in the panhandle. In his view, this would constitute an incursion into 

territory indisputably held by the Pathet Lao at the time the 1962 Geneva 

accords were signed. Apparently troubled by Unger’s warnings, President 

Johnson on October 7 barred the employment of USAF aircraft for 

cover or strikes and indicated he would also withhold approval of any 

cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos. He backed the 

planned RLAF attacks against enemy facilities and infiltration in the 

panhandle, however, and urged they begin as soon as possible. He 

believed the RLAF should keep its strikes in line with its capabilities 

(i.e., avoid the dangerous targets such as the Mu Cia Pass area) and 

spread them out over a period of weeks.26 

The president’s decision deeply upset members of the SEACOORD 

(meeting formally for the first time in Saigon on October 8), as well as 

the joint chiefs, General Westmoreland, and Admiral Sharp. All asserted 

the importance of direct U.S. support for the planned RLAF panhandle 

strikes and cross-border operations and objected to the ban against 

38 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

striking certain targets. The upshot of a dialogue on these matters saw 

Washington authorities retreat but little from their position. They 

sanctioned a USAF combat air patrol (CAP) against MiGs for RLAF 

strikes near the North Vietnamese border, but prohibited CAP aircraft 

from conducting suppressive fire against enemy antiaircraft installations 

except while supporting a search and rescue operation for downed pilots. 

They further banned an RLAF strike on Mu Gia Pass (determined to be 

700 yards within the North Vietnamese border), or on Mu Gia Station 

(located barely inside the Laotian border).* A Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) analysis of the Mu Gia Station area, Washington said, 

showed no signs of enemy activity as the Lao had ~laimed.~’ 

The president’s injunction against an RLAF strike on Mu Gia 

Station-the first scheduled RLAF mission in the Laotian panhandlearrived too late. On October 14, Gen. Thao Ma led a flight of four 

T-28s against a military storage target about six miles south of the 

station, and a second flight of three T-28s hit buildings within the 

station’s perimeter. A third flight of four T-28s also aimed at the 

buildings. Air Force F-100s from Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam, 

flew MiG combat air patrol, and an RF-101 with two escorts followed to 

assess the results. Several other strikes on targets followed. There was 

some confusion about initial strike achievements. The air attachk’s 

reading of poststrike photos and pilot debriefings suggested “excellent” 

results with individual targets destroyed upwards to sixty, seventy, eighty, 

and ninety percent. Some DIA interpretations, conversely, revealed that 

the RLAF aircraft missed or inflicted little damage on some targets. 

Photo personnel in Saigon eventually confirmed that about ninety-five 

percent of the targets within Mu Gia Station were destroyed. In any 

event, Ambassador Unger did not consider this a serious problem. If the 

RLAF missed some targets, he saw no reason why a strike could not be 

rescheduled.28 

As the RLAF’s attacks began, FAR General Bounpone Makthepharak, Commander of Military Region (MR) I11 in central Laos (which 

included Savannakhet where the aircraft were based), launched a 

VICTORIOUS ARROW attack against PL/NVA forces in his region. He 

planned to capture Muong Phine and Tchepone in concert with GVN 

troops moving westward from South Vietnam toward these two areas. 

No GVN operations materialized, for by now Westmoreland had 

informed Washington that cross-border operations were not feasible until 

*The two were segments of the same key infiltration route, distinguished chiefly by the 

fact one was inside North Vietnam, the other inside Laos. Besides the road net, both 

contained suspected supply storage buildings and areas. 

39 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

early 1965. Bounpone’s plan fizzled but not before about 200 of 450 

planned panhandle sorties were diverted to VICTORIOUS ARROW, which 

in the end turned out to be a spoiling attack.*’ 

Thus the RLAF flew intermittent rather than sustained operations 

against Ho Chi Minh Trail targets, consisting largely of supply and other 

military areas, huts, buildings, and bridges. Between October 14 and 

November 2 the RLAF struck all thirteen MACV-selected targets plus 

three of its own. It made ten restrikes, inflicting various degrees of 

destruction and damage. 

American officials in Vientiane and Washington maintained close 

oversight of the RLAF panhandle program to avoid a possible strong 

North Vietnamese riposte to an accidental bombing within its borders. 

They relaxed a few restrictions. The Nape bridge on Route 8 (an entry 

point from North Vietnam into Laos) and the Ban Thay military areas, 

both originally reserved for USAF air strikes, were struck by RLAF 

T-28s in late November, the attacks supported by USAF aircraft on MiG 

combat air patrol. Twelve T-28s dropped half of the bridge’s 305- by 

12-foot steel truss into the water. There was only one RLAF restrike. 

Conducted without U.S. approval, Thao Ma’s pilots once more hit 

targets within the Mu Gia Station area. After several weeks of operations, the overall impact on the communists of the RLAF’s attacks on 

trail targets was unknown. U.S. analysts assumed that they had impaired 

infiltration movements and made things uncomfortable for the communists in the area.3o 

Meanwhile, insufficient aircraft slowed the tempo of operations. 

Although the RLAF possessed about thirty-one fighters in late October 

(thirteen at Savannakhet, eighteen at Udorn), not all Udorn-based 

aircraft could fly interdiction. Some were reconnaissance models while 

others were out of commission for repair, leaving just five or six 

available for launching attacks from Udorn (via Wattay Airfield near 

Vientiane).* To bolster the RLAF’s inventory, Defense Secretary McNamara ordered the Air Force to transfer another dozen T- and RT-28s 

from the VNAF, these aircraft transitioning into the force in subsequent 

weeks. 

Concurrently, the services continued to seek presidential approval 

for letting U.S. aircraft supplement RLAF operations, their efforts 

invigorated on November 1 by a devastating Viet Cong attack on U.S. 

aircraft at Bien Hoa Air Base in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland, 

Ambassador Taylor, Admiral Sharp, and the joint chiefs urged an 

‘Udorn was also the home of the USAF WATER PUMP detachment which trained and 

provided maintenance and logistic backup for the RLAF. 

40 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

immediate U.S. reprisal strike on North Vietnam as well as YANKEE 

TEAM escort strikes on selected targets near Tchepone, Ban Thay, and 

two bridges in southern Laos. SEACOORD officials, meeting on the 5th 

in Saigon, likewise backed YANKEE TEAM attacks on Lao corridor 

targets, but the Johnson administration opposed retaliatory action in 

North Vietnam or Laos until South Vietnam achieved some semblance of 

political stability.31 

As a result, the RLAF continued its interdiction of panhandle 

targets supported only by YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance planes and their 

escorts. The reconnaissance missions generated another crisis in the latter 

part of November when enemy ground fire downed two USAF aircraft, 

first an F-100, then an RF-101.32 

With the loss of the F-100, Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., the PACAF 

Commander, demanded a retaliatory USAF strike with napalm and 

CBU-2A” munitions on enemy targets near Mu Gia Pass, believing their 

proximity to North Vietnam’s border would enable Hanoi to “get the 

message.” But Admiral Sharp, apparently sensing the unlikelihood of 

high administration approval, withheld Harris’s request. With the shootdown of the RF-101, however, the PACOM commander personally 

recommended to the JCS a retaliatory strike. The joint chiefs also 

backed retaliation, but Washington, as usual, turned aside the requests 

for punitive strikes as they had escalatory overtones.33 

In the meantime, Ambassador Unger halted all YANKEE TEAM and 

SAC LUCKY DRAGON U-2 missions over Laos until the joint chiefs 

completed a review of the reasons for the downing of the two 

reconnaissance aircraft. The joint chiefs shortly attributed the loss of the 

RF-101 to a violation of operational rules, although this was not exactly 

correct. The PACAF commander in chief, for one, insisted no published 

rules had been violated. The facts were that no one in the State or 

Defense Departments, the JCS, or on the commander in chief, Pacific 

Command, staff had ever defined precisely medium- or low-level 

reconnaissance. The joint chiefs had merely called medium altitude that 

above which hostile ground fire would not be expected, and CINCPAC 

had permitted low-level missions in areas where the risks from ground 

fire were considered acceptable, usually leaving the decision up to 

operational commanders. 

The service chiefs attempted to settle the matter by defining medium 

altitude as 10,000 feet above ground level (AGL) and, in accordance with 

the previous policy (noted earlier), said they would consider a lower 

‘This cluster bomb unit upon ground impact expelled 250-grain steel spheres (popularly 

called bomblets) into the air. 

42 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

altitude for reconnaissance aircraft on a case-by-case basis. Unger, 

dissatisfied, proposed more stringent flight requirements, insisting that all 

U.S. military pilots flying in Laos conform to procedures in the Foreign 

Clearance Guide,* maintain a 10,000-foot altitude, submit flight plans 3 

days before takeoff, and await final approval from the air attachk’s 

office in Vientiane. 

Unger’s proposed strictures, however, were not adopted. The war’s 

exigencies in the ensuing days dictated a relaxation rather than a 

tightening of operational rules in both Laos and North Vietnam.34 

In late November 1964, Ambassador Taylor warned Washington 

that South Vietnam’s continuing political and military problems required 

more action against the communists. Asserting that the United States was 

playing a “losing game” in South Vietnam, he outlined several military 

options. At the bottom of the escalation ladder were intensified covert 

and anti-infiltration operations in North Vietnam and reprisal bombings 

(i.e., tit for tat) for Viet Cong depredations. Proceeding upward from 

this level, the United States could slowly add heavier bombings. 

Simultaneously, greater participation in operations in Laos would demonstrate to Saigon America’s willingness to share the risks of a larger 

war with the North.35 

Before the month was out, Taylor conferred in Washington with 

President Johnson and his advisers. In the course of the discussions, 

Taylor proposed and the president approved a two-phase military 

program to arrest further communist advances in the war. Phase I, 

lasting thirty days, would consist of heavier air strikes mainly against 

infiltration in the Laotian panhandle and intensified, covert, Operation 

Plan 34A operations against North Vietnam largely by U.S.-trained 

South Vietnamese. The air strikes, carried out by RLAF T-28s, would be 

supplemented by U.S. armed reconnaissance missions. The objective was 

more psychological than military, to warn Hanoi of American strength. 

After thirty days, the United States could continue the armed reconnaissance missions or take other measures to signal Hanoi. For example, it 

could withdraw American dependents from South Vietnam or conductfor the first time-air strikes in the North, a short distance above the 

demilitarized zone. 

If Hanoi failed to heed the military warnings, the United States 

would launch, with the president’s approval, Phase I1 operations. These 

would consist of U.S./VNAF coordinated strikes on the southernmost 

sector of North Vietnam, and increase in weight and tempo over two to 

‘A publication of the Defense Mapping Agency covering requirements for aircraft and 

personnel entering foreign countries. It contains information, for example, on aircraft 

clearances, uniforms, immunizations, passports and visas, quarantine, and customs. 

43 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

six months until all significant targets in the country were hit. Meanwhile, the administration could exert other pressures, such as mining or 

blockading the North’s seacoast, while simultaneously seeking to negotiate an end to the conflict. Taylor’s personal view, shared by the joint 

chiefs, was to bomb the North sooner rather than later. Still, he found 

neither the president nor most of his advisers ready to abandon the 

dictum that insuring a stable government in Saigon should precede an 

attack on the North.36 

After the president approved Phase I, the joint chiefs prepared a 

plan providing for two initial armed reconnaissance missions against 

targets of opportunity along segments of Routes 8, 12, and 121 in the 

Laotian central panhandle, with enemy barracks and military strongpoints earmarked as secondary targets. The plan enjoined air commanders to limit each strike mission to no more than four aircraft, use 

conventional ordnance (excluding napalm), allow at least three days 

between missions, remain two miles from the North Vietnamese border, 

and launch no strike missions from a Thai air base. Nevertheless, they 

were authorized to dispatch combat air patrol, search and rescue, and 

poststrike reconnaissance aircraft as necessary. The sensitivity of the 

proposed program was underscored by Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Cyrus R. Vance who briefed a select “Committee of NSC Principals” on 

Phase I on December 12. The committee would oversee and control 

virtually every facet of the new air program nicknamed BARREL ROLL. 

Meanwhile, Taylor discussed the Phase I and I1 proposals with 

Government of Vietnam leaders, and on December 10 William H. Sullivan (appointed on November 25 to succeed Unger as U.S. Ambassador 

to Laos) secured Souvanna Phouma’s consent, provided there was no 

publicity, to fly U.S. armed reconnaissance in the panhandle. The prime 

minister exacted a quid pro quo, requesting missions along Route 7 in 

the Plain of Jars in northern Laos, his principal area of interest. He also 

asked that Colonel Tyrrell and General Thao Ma coordinate U.S./RLAF 

actions. 37 

On December 12, Admiral Sharp alerted Generals Westmoreland 

and Moore and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the PACFLT Commander, 

before launching BARREL ROLL. The first mission was flown on the 14th 

by 4 Da Nang-based USAF F-105 Thunderchiefs laden with 750-pound 

bombs, CBU-2A bomblets, and AGM-12 Bullpup missiles. Accompanying the strike aircraft were 4 Da Nang-based F-100s for combat air 

patrol, 1 RF-101 from Tan Son Nhut for poststrike reconnaissance, 2 

Korat-based F-105s for escort, and 2 refueling KC-135 tankers. The 

pilots flew along Route 8 and near the Nape bridge (hit on November 

21), spotting a vehicle on an apparent nearby sunken bridge serving as a 

bypass. One F-105 aimed 6 of its 750-pounders on the vehicle-bridge 

44 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

target, but the bombs fell between the 2 bridges. The other 3 fighters 

struck secondary targets with results obscured by cloud cover. The 

mission encountered no enemy ground fire. 

Seventh Fleet went into action on the 17th with F-8 pilots searching 

for targets of opportunity in the central panhandle. Finding none, they 

hit a secondary target, a bridge about 2 miles east of the junction of 

Routes 8 and 12, dropping thirty-two 250-pound bombs of which only 

1/2 exploded because of malfunctioning solenoids in 2 of the aircraft. 

The strike cut the road west of the bridge and destroyed 8 buildings east 

of it, although the bridge sustained no major damage. Again, the pilots 

experienced no enemy fire.38 

Ambassador Sullivan faulted the first two BARREL ROLL missions 

for insufficient coordination with Vientiane. There was an eight-hour 

delay in informing Colonel Tyrrell of the initial launch to assure 

prepositioning of Air America search and rescue helicopters and to avoid 

conflict with RLAF operations. Secondly, bomb damage assessment of 

PACFLT-destroyed buildings suggested they might have been civilian 

dwellings. Sullivan insisted on U.S./RLAF agreement on what constituted authorized targets. Admiral Sharp, concurring, directed that future 

targets of opportunity show “unmistakable” military activity of a 

transient or mobile nature, or a connection with attacks on clearly 

identified military convoys and military personnel. He appointed General 

Westmoreland coordinating authority for all future BARREL ROLL 

missions and asked him to follow proven YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance 

procedures which by now were well under~tood.~~ 

For the second week of armed reconnaissance, the joint chiefs 

recommended and a committee of the National Security Council approved heavier air strikes on Route 23 south of the junction of Routes 12 

and 23 up to the southern limit of the area controlled by the PL/NVA. 

As a concession to Souvanna Phouma, a second mission would cover 

Route 7 between Nong Pet and Nong Het (a supply area) in northern 

Laos but avoid the heavily defended Ban Kan bridge. PACAF flew the 

missions on December 21 and 25, 1964. Pilots found no enemy traffic 

along Route 7 but loosed fire against active antiaircraft batteries in the 

Ban Kan bridge area. The mission along Route 23 was carried out by 

four F-105s. Spotting no enemy traffic, the Thunderchiefs attacked a 

37-mm antiaircraft site near Ban Langkhang and the Tchepone barracks 

(the secondary target) but missed the buildings. For the third week of 

operations, PACFLT flew-missions on December 30, 1964, and January 

2, 1965. The planes concentrated on Routes 9, 12, and 121 and 

secondary targets (all in the panhandle), destroying and damaging some 

barracks and buildings suspected of containing supplies. Concurrently, 

General Thao Ma’s RLAF T-28s flew occasional strikes against infiltra46 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

tion in the panhandle. On December 24 they began to lay on about six 

armed reconnaissance sorties per day.40 

As there was no public or other reaction from Hanoi after the first 

half-dozen BARREL ROLL missions, high officials concluded that the 

strikes had failed to send a signal of American strength and warning of 

heavier military action. The Defense Intelligence Agency speculated that 

the communists apparently were unable to distinguish between attacks 

conducted under the aegis of BARREL ROLL on the one hand and the 

RLAF and YANKEE TEAM on the other. Between October I and 

December 30, 1964, the RLAF had flown 724 sorties and YANKEE TEAM, 

170 missions.” 

Ambassadors and military officials attending another SEACOORD 

conference in Saigon on January 6 and 7, 1965, agreed BARREL ROLL 

had not achieved its primary purpose. Nonetheless they were convinced it 

had a salutary effect on the war effort insofar as it improved Lao and 

Thai morale, provided training and terrain familiarity for pilots, caused 

some defections of Pathet Lao troops and civilian laborers, forced enemy 

dispersal or abandonment of fixed facilities, and disrupted the PL/NVA 

counterattacks at Muong Soui and elsewhere-although not all of these 

results could be easily verified. Despite the DIA assessment, the 

SEACOORD conferees believed that the air operations would not be 

unnoticed in Hanoi and Peking. They were gratified by Moscow’s 

forebearance, interpreting it as a willingness to ignore the new air 

program so long as the United States did not advertise what it was doing 

in ~aos.+~l 

‘From May 15 through December 1964, PACAF and PACFLT flew a total of 880 

YANKEE TEAM missions consisting, respectively, of the following: photo, 214 and 198; 

escort, 118 and 171; weather, 98 and 81. PACAF missions totaled 430, PACFLT 450. One 

hundred fifteen aircraft assigned on 56 missions received enemy ground fire. Eleven were 

hit and 4 were shot down, PACAF and PACFLT each losing 2. [Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, p 

272.1 Recordkeepers failed to translate missions into sorties as they did for the RLAF. 

+The last observation appears to have been quite accurate. More than four and a half 

years later, Ambassador Unger’s successor, William H. Sullivan (later Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), explained the Soviet’s forebearance 

of U.S. violations of Laos’s neutrality: “A senior Soviet official, for example, has said that 

insofar as he reads things in newspapers or hears statements and allegations about U.S. 

operations, he does not have to take any official cognizance of them. But if they are made 

directly by U.S. officials he does have to take cognizance of them, and this will color, to 

some extent, the Soviet attitude toward Souvanna Phouma’s neutrality and toward . . . the 

understandings which underlie the agreement between ourselves [i.e., the United States] and 

the Soviets for the neutrality of Laos.” [Hearings before the Subcommittee on United 

Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, 

Statement by Mr. William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 

and Pacific Affairs, on Oct 20, 1969, 91st Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1970), pt 2, p 399.1 

47 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Still, the main purpose of BARREL ROLL-to signal American 

strength and willingness to apply more military pressure-seemed lost on 

Hanoi’s leaders. Thus, as Phase I ended in early January 1965, the joint 

chiefs clamored for a harder-hitting BARREL ROLL program. They urged 

more frequent and extensive armed reconnaissance, less restraint in 

selecting targets, and relaxation of Thai government restrictions on flying 

USAF strike missions from Thai bases. Washington’s top officials, 

insisting on maintaining at least the facade of the 1962 Geneva 

agreements in Laos, were unwilling to risk such unfettered air operations. 

They also opposed expanded armed reconnaissance until the new Saigon 

government under Premier Tran Van Huong demonstrated more strength 

and a capability to withstand a possible Viet Cong/DRV military 

counterthrust .42 

However, administration overseers permitted a few changes in 

BARREL ROLL. After they authorized limited night missions, a USAF 

C-123 flareship and four F-100 Super Sabres combined to fly the first 

one along Route 7 in northern Laos. On January 13 the 2d Air Division 

was assigned to fly the largest day mission thus far. Sixteen F-l05s, plus 

accompanying aircraft, struck the Ban Ken bridge, also on Route 7. The 

bridge was completely destroyed, but enemy ground fire downed an 

F-100 and an F-105. Both pilots were rescued.43 

The next BARREL ROLL mission, again against infiltration in 

southern Laos, was flown by PACFLT’s A-1Hs on the night of January 

15-16 but with unhappy repercussions for air commanders. Straying off 

course about 25 miles from Route 23, the A-1Hs accidentally hit Ban 

Tang Vai village in Savannakhet Province, destroying 5 houses, partially 

destroying 7 granaries, and reportedly wounding 5 civilians and 5 Lao 

military personnel. The attack left a large bomb crater in the middle of a 

rice paddy 1,500 yards from the village. General Thao Ma was highly 

upset, and Ambassador Sullivan, with sharp words about “undisciplined 

pilots,” halted temporarily further night missions. An investigation 

revealed that casualties had been overstated-only 4 villagers were 

slightly injured. 

With U.S. officials anxious to maintain BARREL ROLL’S “signal 

sending” momentum, Sullivan lifted the night bombing halt but at a 

price. General Thao Ma restricted further U.S. operations to a region 

south of Route 9 to an area east of Muong Phine, leaving Route 23 

south of Route 9 to the RLAF. He reminded American pilots that 

campfires (which attracted Navy pilots to Ban Tang Vai) did not 

automatically mean the presence of communists. Admiral Sharp reemphasized the importance of BARREL ROLL operating rules issued in 

December 1964, confining strikes to “unmistakable” military activity or 

48 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

installations and requiring adherence to YANKEE TEAM procedures and 

COMUSMACV coordination with Vientiane.44 

Despite the Ban Tang Vai incident and the resulting constriction of 

the BARREL ROLL area, the services continued to urge a less restrained 

BARREL ROLL program. A veritable blizzard of communications between 

Vientiane, MACV, 2d Air Division, PACAF, PACOM, and Washington 

throughout January and February argued the case for expanding or 

improving the efficiency of BARREL ROLL operations. Among the 

recommendations in which administration authorities evinced some 

interest was stepping up night operations. 

Secretary of Defense McNamara wondered if it was possible to 

locate enemy vehicles at night using aircraft equipped with infrared 

sensors, and queried the services about their resources in the Indochina 

theater for this type of operation. The Air Force at this time possessed 

four South Vietnamese-and Thai-based B-57s, all with infrared equipment and two with day-night optical cameras. It believed it could develop 

vehicle-detection techniques using these aircraft in conjunction with 

improved navigational aids. For general night operations, the Air Force 

also had C-123 and C-130 flareships for use with accompanying strike 

B-57, F-100, and F-105 aircraft. The Army owned infrared-equipped 

OV-1 Mohawks, presently used in South Vietnam, and the Navy had 

Skyraider A-1Hs and a newly developed A-6A (scheduled to enter its 

inventory in the spring of 1965) for night armed reconnaissance. Because 

of weather and jungle terrain, Admiral Sharp opined that at best, night 

missions would only be complementary to more productive day 

missions.45 

As no order was issued stepping up night armed reconnaissance, the 

missions continued intermittently, but air commanders made some 

progress in getting approval to strike fixed secondary targets at night. 

Two USAF weather-aborted night missions on January 23 in northern 

Laos underscored a requirement for secondaries if night missions were 

not to be wasted. Desiring to avoid “short rounds” (accidental strikes on 

friendly troops or civilians) Ambassador Sullivan was reluctant to 

approve hard-to-find targets, but Washington’s defense officials in early 

February acquiesced to service requests for strikes if there were adequate 

safeguards. They approved an intricate system of selecting and verifying 

targets drawn from two lists prepared by Sullivan’s and Westmoreland’s 

staffs, one for armed reconnaissance, the other for fixed secondaries. 

General Thao Ma would approve targets for the Lao government, but 

State and Defense officials insisted on reviewing and approving them. 

The officials also decided that requests for using jet aircraft against 

targets developed by FAR troops, tribal roadwatch teams, and contract 

(Air America) pilots should rest with the RLAF and not, as General 

49 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Moore and Ambassador Suilivan proposed, with an Air Force-embassy 

planning group at Ud~rn.~~ 

In late January 1965, a series of crises in northern Laos also failed 

to persuade State and Defense to significantly increase the scope and 

tempo of BARREL ROLL operations. One was the beginning of the 

PL/NVA’s long-awaited dry season campaign against the FAR and 

General Vang Pao’s Meo forces. A second was another attempt by a 

rightist faction headed by General Phoumi to take over the government 

in Vientiane (the coup failed), The third was the RLAF’s accidental loss 

of ten aircraft, nine of them T-28s, in an explosion at Wattay Airfield 

near Vientiane. (All the aircraft were shortly repla~ed.)~’ 

In early February, however, two incidents in South Vietnam-rather 

than in Laos-finally evoked an important change in U.S. air policy, 

although not immediately in BARREL ROLL operations. Using demolition 

charges and mortars, small groups of Viet Cong on the 7th attacked an 

American barracks and a U.S. Army airfield near Pleiku, South 

Vietnam. They killed 8 U.S. soldiers, wounded 104, and destroyed 5 

Army UH-1B helicopters, 2 CV-2 transports, and 3 USAF 0-1Fs. With 

the complete support of all of his advisers, President Johnson ordered a 

retaliatory air strike against selected North Vietnamese targets. With the 

code name FLAMING DART, the strike was carried out swiftly by Navy 

and Air Force-supported VNAF aircraft. On the loth, another Viet Cong 

attack on American barracks near Qui Nhon, costing 23 American and 7 

South Vietnamese lives, triggered a second Navy- and USAF-supported 

VNAF strike called FLAMING DART II.48 

While the president and his advisers awaited the reaction of Hanoi, 

Peking, and Moscow to the aerial ripostes, the services urged continuing 

the assault on the North and stepping up operations in Laos. General 

Moore recommended an “overwhelming blow” on MiG bases to forestall 

a possible MiG challenge to further FLAMING DART strikes or YANKEE 

TEAM and BARREL ROLL operations. Admiral Sharp, in addition to 

backing a followup aerial assault and more covert pressures on the 

North, advocated medium- and low-level reconnaissance of all infiltration routes in southern Laos, direct U.S. air support for Lao government 

FAR troops and the RLAF, and a PACAF strike at the key border 

infiltration point at Mu Gia Pass.49 

The White House again resisted these pressures-but briefly. After 

the joint chiefs drafted an eight-week as well as other interdiction 

scenarios, President Johnson on February 19 approved a gradually 

escalating air program called ROLLING THUNDER beginning with strikes 

on military targets in southernmost North Vietnam. Saigon’s unresolved 

political problems and bad weather, however, delayed ROLLING THUNDER’S debut until March 2, when an armada of 104 USAF strike and 

50 
EXPANSION OF COUNTERINFILTRATION 

support aircraft and 19 VNAF A-1Hs struck military targets at Quang 

Khe and Xom Bang.” 

With the decision to bomb North Vietnam, General Westmoreland 

asked the JCS to obtain higher approval, if possible, to permit 

consolidation of YANKEE TEAM, BARREL ROLL, and ROLLING THUNDER 

into a single air program. However, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, 

informed of the request through Ambassador Sullivan, vetoed the 

proposal. He believed it would further weaken his policy not to let 

Laos’s territory and air space be used against the North, provoke Hanoi 

to send more NVA troops into Laos, and jeopardize his neutralist role, 

presently supported by the Soviets who, in turn, were in a position to 

restrain Hanoi from sending more manpower into Laos. Ambassador 

Sullivan agreed with these arguments as did Washington officials, 

although the latter had additional reasons for not consolidating the air 

programs, such as the fear of Chinese intervention in the war. Despite 

the political objections, Westmoreland and other military commanders 

were convinced heavier military pressure against the communists was 

needed in the Indochina theater, including expanded counterinfiltration 

measures. 51 

51 

Chapter III 

The Beginning of the 

STEEL TIGER Program 

The U.S. decision in February 1965 to inaugurate a regular bombing 

program of North Vietnam was taken amidst more evidence of DRV 

manpower infiltation. MACV intelligence believed that about 7,000 

additional DRV troops* had joined the Viet Cong during 1964, 90 

percent of them draftees of North Vietnamese origin. There were darker 

forebodings in the discovery that elements of several regular DRV army 

regiments had arrived in South Vietnam’s northernmost provinces in 

December 1964. ’ 

Because the limited RLAF/YANKEE TEAM and BARREL ROLL 

operations had failed to have a measurable impact on infiltration or to 

signal Hanoi into restraint, U.S. military commanders welcomed the 

ROLLING THUNDER program. But the restrictions placed on ROLLING 

THUNDER also made it questionable if the new air program could 

persuade Hanoi quickly to reduce or halt its assistance to the Wet Cong. 

In Honolulu on March 11, during another review of the war, U.S. 

officials continued to weigh counterinfiltration proposals. The Army’s 

solution was to “isolate the battlefield” by inserting a corps of three to 

five U.S. divisions across South Vietnam and the Laotian panhandle to 

the Mekong River. John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(International Security Affairs), predicted the rejection of such advice by 

higher authorities unless convinced that victory could not be won any 

other way. 

Air Force and Navy commanders, as in past months, urged the use 

of more air power. Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Deputy Commander of PACAF, Maj. Gen. Theodore R. Milton, Commander of the 

Thirteenth Air Force, and Admiral Moorer, the PACFLT Commander, 

singly and jointly proposed continuous (as against intermittent) day-andnight operations against the communists in South and North Vietnam 

‘By July 1965, MACV had revised this figure to 8,250 infiltrators in 1964 of which 

4,976 were listed as confirmed and 3,274 as unconfirmed. [DIA Bul 135-65, Jul 14, 1965.1 

53 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

and fewer constraints on the YANKEE TEAM and BARREL ROLL programs 

in Laos. For example, Milton underscored the importance of flying 

low-level, single-pass reconnaissance over targets to obtain better prestrike and poststrike photography, and Moorer wanted authority for air 

commanders to conduct restrikes as necessary. McNaughton was sympathetic and even supportive of some requests but warned of Washington’s 

sensitivity to two factors: the danger of involving the Soviet Union by 

escalating the air war, and the aircraft losses that would inevitably 

accompany stepped-up air activity.2 

Frustrated by the many air constraints, General Harris, PACAF 

chief, asked Admiral Sharp several days later to impress again upon 

Washington officials the necessity for prestrike photography through 

flying low-level reconnaissance in Laos. Agreeing with Harris but 

mindful of McNaughton’s assessment of administration thinking, the 

PACOM commander said it was untimely to submit another request for 

relaxing reconnaissance operating rules.3 

Meanwhile, in Vientiane, Sullivan was devising another air program 

for Laos, hopefully more effective but still within U.S. and Lao 

government-imposed constraints. The “steady signal” intended for Hanoi failed, in his estimate of BARREL ROLL, because of the United 

States’ propensity “to jump around too much” in its objectives. 

Accordingly, he informed Washington on March 6 that the embassy and 

MACV were completing a traffic “chokepoint” plan against communist 

supply infiltration into South Vietnam before the dry season ended (i.e., 

about mid-April). This envisaged rebombing of vital traffic points and 

bombing saturation of selected routes by armed reconnaissance aircraft, 

especially at night, to create a backup of enemy supplies. Thus exposed, 

the supplies could be attacked, slowing logistic movements. The ambassador proposed starting the chokepoint program shortly, before the onset 

of the monsoon rains in the latter part of April. 

Admiral Sharp supported Sullivan’s concept with a qualification. 

Noting the forty-eight-hour lapse required between BARREL ROLL missions, he expected the communists to take advantage of it by clearing 

away ordnance-especially delayed-fuze bombs-from interdicted roads 

and traffic points and by repairing road damage. From the standpoint of 

effectiveness, the PACOM commander believed that strikes of fixed 

targets such as supply dumps would be more promising. At bottom, his 

views were fairly congruent with those of Sullivan, who had no objection 

to striking fixed targets along with chokepoints. The thrust of the 

ambassador’s position was that BARREL ROLL’S objective could best be 

served by a well-orchestrated series of strikes on related targets rather 

than by random attacks as in the past.4 

54 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

On March 12, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Emory C. Swank, in a 

briefing for Souvanna Phouma on the ambassador’s proposed program, 

said eight chokepoints were under consideration. Five were on Routes 6, 

7, and 65 in northern Laos (an area of greatest concern to the prime 

minister) and three were in southern Laos. The latter included the Nape 

and Mu Cia Passes near the North Vietnamese border, which had 

already been struck, and the third was on Route 23. After looking at a 

map of the routes, Souvanna gave his a~sent.~ 

Sullivan had informed the State Department that his program 

initially would involve strikes that were limited to about four chokepoints, bomb “reseedings,” and three or four armed reconnaissance 

missions per week along key routes with fixed installations serving as 

secondary targets. State said it could support this air tempo but advised 

that there was difficulty in “holding the line” against service pressure to 

increase the scale and frequency of missions. Its currrent stance was to 

approve a maximum of four day and two to four night strike sorties per 

day. The JCS, in contrast, was proposing a biweekly (as against the 

present weekly) Laotian air program consisting of seven day and seven 

night missions daily without limiting the number of aircraft per mission, 

and a reduction from forty-eight to twenty-four hours of the “sterile” 

period between missions.* State solicited Sullivan’s guidance on maintaining a low-key, carefully controlled air program.6 

In reply, Sullivan stressed the importance of conducting systematic 

chokepoint strikes at key locations on vital road infiltration routes 

without diverting aircraft to other enemy supply areas as in the past. 

Noting the State Department’s anxiety about a somewhat accelerated 

Laotian air program, the ambassador said only Washington’s highest 

officials could determine the extent to which the program might strain 

the toleration of the Soviets and the Poles.+ He said he supported 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s objective of not forcing the Soviets to 

equate their position with the Chinese and North Vietnamese, especially 

if the administration hoped to use Moscow as a lever with Hanoi in 

ending the present military confrontation in Indochina.’ 

Sullivan’s chokepoint scenario was overtaken, however, by the 

return to Washington from South Vietnam on March 14 of Gen. Harold 

K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff. Sent by the president at the beginning 

of the month to conduct a new study of the Saigon government’s 

‘On March 23, Washington’s top civilian authorities acceded to a part of this request 

and reduced the time lapse between missions to twenty-four hours. [Msg, JCS to 

CINCPAC, 2322082 Mar 65.1 

’In reporting on infractions of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, the Polish 

representatives of the International Control Commission normally sided with the PL/NVA. 

55 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

military, economic, and pacification progress, General Johnson submitted to the president and his advisers a pivotal twenty-one-point program 

for blunting the communist challenge against Laos as well as South 

Vietnam. Most of his recommendations sought to shore up Saigon’s 

faltering military and economic efforts. But he also urged stepping up 

ROLLING THUNDER strikes in North Vietnam, confining BARREL ROLL 

operations to northern Laos, and creating a new air program for 

attacking communist infiltration in the southern panhandle.’ 

The president approved most of the recommendations the next day 

and on March 20 gave the go-ahead for a new Laotian air program. He 

enjoined the services to exert “maximum effort” against infiltration 

through Laos into South Vietnam. Known as STEEL TIGER, the program 

had first claim on Air Force and Navy aerial assets for Laos. BARREL 

ROLL operations would be confined to northern Laos. The military 

services, needless to say, applauded the decision to allocate more air 

power against infiltration.’ 

Sullivan reluctantly supported the president’s decision, then hastened 

to send the State Department some advice. As the STEEL TIGER program 

evolved, he said, American military interests should not take precedence 

over the need to preserve Laos’s neutral status. The new U.S. air 

undertakings could not be accomplished without Souvanna Phouma’s 

full cooperation. To retain his confidence required absolute frankness 

with him, a congruence of U.S. operations and Laotian interests, careful 

coordination of American and Laotian activities, and assurance that air 

operations would be carried out meticulously with pilots aborting 

missions, for example, rather than inflicting damage on friendly villagers. 

The last was most important. Because Laos was not North Vietnam and 

the Viet Cong had not occupied territory as in South Vietnam, the 

United States was not completely free to attack all targets. 

Further, Laos was a friendly country where villagers and guerrillas 

were assets, and where the embassy’s country team performed as 

paymaster and quartermaster for guerrillas, gave orders, and directed 

operations. This meant that the United States had to “bend over 

backwards” in executing its military mission to maintain the political 

foundations of its activities and refrain from trying to maximize its 

military opportunities. The American decision not to use napalm in Laos 

was another example of the type of self-abnegation required. lo 

On March 23 the JCS instructed the PACOM, PACAF, and 

PACFLT commanders to submit an operational plan for the first two 

weeks of STEEL TIGER activities. Numerous service operational and 

coordination matters needed resolution, and these were tackled during 

another SEACOORD conference at Udorn on March 27. Attendees 

included members of Vientiane’s country team headed by Sullivan as 

56 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

chairman, and representatives from the American embassy in Bangkok, 

the 2d Air Division, MACV, and Air America. The conferees quickly 

agreed to demarcate BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER boundaries from 

east to west at about 18’30” latitude or just below Nape Pass, although 

a special message soon directed a more precise delineation. As in the 

past, COMUSMACV would coordinate (through the 2d Air Division) all 

PACAF and PACFLT operations, possibly adding the RLAF. General 

Thao Ma, the RLAF Commander, desired to place one or two RLAF 

officers at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) who 

would establish a direct communication link with his headquarters at 

Savanakhet. Representatives of the 2d Air Division and MACV said they 

would look into the possibility of creating the link. 

The conferees agreed the 2d Air Division should continue to assume 

primary responsibility for search and rescue operations using HH-43 

Huskie helicopters based at Nakhon Phanom and two other Huskies, one 

based at Paksane in east-central Laos and the other at Pakse farther 

south. To increase helicopter radius, stocks of JP-4 fuel would be 

prepositioned at key refueling sites in the panhandle. 

The conferees agreed to “crank in” roadwatch team locations within 

the STEEL TIGER area in strike planning documents at the embassyMACV level. As the teams moved into and out of enemy areas, strike 

plans would be revised accordingly. (In practice the embassy staff would 

firmly control all team and target clearances in the STEEL TIGER area, 

much to the frustration of the Air Force.) The RLAF was assigned a 

segment of Route 92 and other routes and areas in the vicinity of 

Saravane, where several FAR units were engaged in reconnoitering. This 

would avoid accidental U.S. air attacks on friendly troops. FAR Maj. 

Gen. Phasouk Somly, Commander of Military Region IV, delineated the 

U.S. and FAR strike areas on a map. 

In a review of the BARREL ROLL program, Sullivan requested a 

more rapid air response system to reduce procedural delays in obtaining 

strike clearances for Air Force and Navy aircraft. He wanted on-call 

USAF aircraft at Udorn to hit preselected targets and those spotted by 

roving roadwatch teams, some of which would receive radios within 

thirty days for flashing their findings to 2d Air Division. To make better 

use of aerial photography, Sullivan further suggested processing all 

YANKEE TEAM photos at Udorn, where they could be collated with other 

intelligence data. Finally, he solicited administration approval to allow 

PACAF and PACFLT weather aircraft to take targeting photos during 

their weather missions.” 

Sullivan’s objectives widened a growing breach between the ambassador and his planners, on the one hand, and the Air Force and Navy on 

the other, over the use of reconnaissance, strike, and other aircraft in 

57 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Laos. With tribal teams engaged in ground reconnaissance, officials 

desired quick air reaction to team-designated targets. But 2d Air Division 

and PACFLT, in accordance with general air priorities established by 

McNamara, were enjoined to give aerial precedence first to close support 

in South Vietnam, then to targets in North Vietnam. Thus Moore was 

reluctant to assign or “dedicate” any aircraft to Vientiane’s targeteers. 

Nonetheless, Sullivan insisted, and Moore shortly stationed a small 

number of F-4 and F-105 on-call aircraft at several Thai air bases.* As 

air needs in northern and southern Laos expanded in the ensuing 

months, the tug-of-war between Vientiane and the 2d Air Division over 

the use of aircraft in Laos would heighten. Because the 2d was a 

component of MACV, Westmoreland invariably was a major participant 

in the dispute.’* 

On March 30, Sullivan briefed Souvanna Phouma on American 

plans to intensify air operations in southern Laos. The prime minister 

assented, provided US. officials maintained close air liaison with 

General Thao Ma and briefed him periodically on strike results. He also 

underscored the importance for American airmen to avoid civilian 

casualties when bombing in heavily forested areas or during bad 

weather.I3 

The next day CINCPAC dispatched the first STEEL TIGER operational order to his component commanders, directing them, beginning 

April 3, to conduct U.S. armed reconnaissance and interdiction against 

selected infiltration routes and facilities in southern Laos. The order 

directed armed reconnaissance missions against 

enemy targets of opportunity . . . defined as military vehicular and troop 

movements and active AA (guns manned or unmanned) spotted on or within 200 

yards of roads designated for armed recce missions . . . . Camp fires and civilian 

habitations will not be attacked. Fixed installations will be struck only in 

connection with attacks on clearly identified military convoys and military 

personnel, or when pre-briefed as primary and secondary interdiction target. 

Unexpended ordnance should be dumped in free strike zones as announced by 

COMUSMACV. 

Individual mission aircraft will avoid areas of heavy AA concentration unless 

[the] concentration is [a] target for [an] attack by [an] appropriate size force and 

will not approach [the] NVN [North Vietnam] border closer than two miles unless 

directed differently. 

*At three Thai air bases in May 1965, four USAF BANCO F-4Cs and four WHIPLASH 

F-105s were placed on alert for Laotian targets. 

58 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

The directive eased some of the flying restrictions in Laos heretofore 

encumbering U.S. airmen. It permitted them to fly more pre-mission 

visual reconnaissance aircraft equipped with side-looking airborne radar 

and infrared, and to support more weather, pathfinder, flare, and search 

and rescue operations. COMUSMACV, as coordinating authority 

(through the 2d Air Division), would prescribe the frequency and 

sequence of missions; ensure no conflict with Plan 34A covert air 

activities against North Vietnam; work out with the American embassy in 

Vientiane the timing, routes, and targets for STEEL TIGER; and plan with 

the American embassy in Bangkok the use of Thai-based (USAF) 

aircraft. PACAF and PACFLT commanders were assigned more operational authority. They could select the type of aircraft deemed most 

suitable for STEEL TIGER missions, fly an unrestricted number of 

missions daily to create chokepoints or to “reseed” the Nape Pass or 

other approved infiltration routes, and use “optimum” unclassified 

ordnance. The ban against using napalm in Laos, unless waived by the 

ambassador, remained in effect.14 

STEEL TIGER was but one of several new military programs 

approved by President Johnson in the latter half of March 1965 to 

contain the insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam. The administration’s intent was to mesh STEEL TIGER loosely with ROLLING THUNDER 

(just begun) and with stepped-up air and ground action in South 

Vietnam, as more Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army units deployed to 

the war theater. All of the new military (and economic) actions were 

officially sanctioned by National Security Action Memorandum 328, 

dated April 6, 1965.15 

On April 3, STEEL TIGER operations began as planned. PACAF led 

off with a 2-mission night operation, each mission consisting of 1 

navigation and flare-carrying C-130 BLINDBAT accompanied by 2 strike 

B-57s. Scanning several routes under the glare of 126 flares, the pilots 

reported no significant sighting of enemy traffic. The next day PACAF 

sent 7 B-57s and 3 escorted RF-101s (for reconnaissance) in a daytime 

attack on Mu Gia Pass on the Lao-North Vietnamese border. The 

tactical jet bombers cratered a road and reseeded other routes with 

bombs. On April 5, 4 strike and 4 support F-100 Super Sabres (the latter 

for MiG combat air patrol) plus 2 RF-101s flew daytime armed 

reconnaissance over 3 routes and hit the Ban Phanop supply depot. The 

planes dropped seven 750-pound general purpose bombs and expended 4 

rockets on a building in the depot area. PACAF dispatched its F-105 

Thunderchiefs on their first STEEL TIGER mission on April 11 against 2 

routes and a military site at Ban Langkhang. 

PACFLT’s first STEEL TIGER mission, on April 5, employed five 

A-1Hs for strike, two F-8Ds for flak suppression, and two F-8s for 

59 

BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

combat air patrol plus other support aircraft to create a chokepoint on 

Route 23. In the ensuing week (i.e., through April 12) the two services 

flew daily missions over the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail, interspersing 

their armed reconnaissance with chokepoint, road cut, or secondary 

target strikes. The last consisted chiefly of known or suspected military 

and supply areas, truck stops, and, in one instance, a Pathet Lao-held 

airfield near Tchepone, which was attacked on April 8.16 

Pilots sighted only a few enemy trucks during the first half of April 

but observed more later that month. On the 18th, PACFLT airmen saw 

eight to ten trucks in one convoy and sixteen to twenty-two in another. 

Roadwatch teams, now furnishing more information on truck movements, believed the enemy had developed a shuttle system between fixed 

supply points. For example, on April 22 the teams reported sixty-five 

trucks moving north, twenty-nine south and the next day eleven moving 

north and twenty south. 

Although pilots interdicted some trucks, jungle terrain or weather 

often obscured results. Uncertainty of bombing results also applied to 

strikes on such secondary targets as buildings, military and supply areas, 

chokepoints, and road cuts. The communists were able to nullify some of 

the bombing impact by quickly clearing chokepoint areas or constructing 

bypasses near severed roads. They made air operations more hazardous 

by placing more antiaircraft weapons around vital logistic areas such as 

the Nape and Mu Gia Passes, two key entry points from North Vietnam 

that soon became primary targets. Nonetheless, some intelligence analysts 

believed the air strikes slowed supply infiltration by forcing the PL/DRV 

to divert more people to road clearing, detour to poorer secondary routes 

over more difficult terrain, and substitute manpower for vehicles. 

By April 29 the two services had flown 791 STEEL TIGER sorties of 

all types. Each service flew about the same number of night sorties with 

PACAF relying on its C-130/B-57 flare and strike aircraft. For daylight 

strike missions PACAF after mid-April employed chiefly its Thai-based 

F-105 Thunderchiefs. l7 

STEEL TIGER operations had scarcely begun when Secretary McNamara on April 12 discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff how to make 

current air programs more effective against the PL/NVA in Laos, and to 

slow down DRV infiltration into South Vietnam. The joint chiefs 

recommended and McNamara quickly approved the transfer of some of 

his authority over the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER programs to the 

JCS and Admiral Sharp, and the further relaxation of certain operating 

rules. Consonant with this decision the joint chiefs on April 17 

authorized Sharp to strike validated, fixed, and secondary targets at 

night as well as in daytime (after coordinating with PACAF and 

PACOM on how to achieve “optimum results”). He was further 

61 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

permitted to create or reseed chokepoints in selected areas, and to crater 

specified roads in uninhabited regions. Also, in the absence of suitable 

night targets in Laos, he was allowed to drop unexpended ordnance on 

Viet CongINorth Vietnamese forces in free-strike zones in South 

Vietnam or on Hon Gio (Tiger Island), a DRV military stronghold off 

the North Vietnamese coast slightly above the 17th parallel. Air 

commanders could use all available conventional ordnance in Laos except 

napalm. To speed decisionmaking for the two major Laotian air 

programs, the service chiefs shortened from fourteen to seven days the 

period between the issuance of their periodic operational guidance (which 

would be broadly retained), and their final approval to launch aircraft. 

They also instructed the PACOM commander to work with Ambassador 

Sullivan in preparing more anti-infiltration measures. ’* 

The foregoing measures were heartily endorsed on April 21 at 

another SEACOORD meeting in Saigon, attended by Graham A. Martin 

(Ambassador to Thailand), Ambassador Sullivan, Deputy Ambassador 

U. Alexis Johnson (from Saigon), Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland, and other officials. They agreed, however, that one rule could not 

be easily relaxed. This was the twenty-four-hour advance notification by 

2d Air Division (through the deputy commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force at Udorn) to the Bangkok embassy of all Thai-based 

USAF aircraft scheduled for strikes in Laos. Ambassador Martin 

emphasized the importance of keeping the Thai leadership fully informed 

of these operations. The overall impact of the new STEEL TIGER 

operations and the stepped-up BARREL ROLL and ROLLING THUNDER 

programs, the conferees believed, had “markedly” raised the morale of 

the Laotians and South Vietnamese. 

On May 3, Sullivan authorized air strikes on approved secondary 

targets first, if pilots chose to attack them before flying armed 

reconnaissance. He approved the change after he learned that PACAF 

pilots, with several weeks of experience, could fly armed reconnaissance 

missions more effectively if their strike aircraft (still mostly F-105s and 

B-57s) could quickly dispense their normal load of six 750-pound bombs 

on a secondary target. The pilots said the bombs were frequently 

dropped in haste because of low fuel when flying armed reconnaissance 

and, in any event, the 750-pounders were not the best ordnance for that 

type of mission. Colonel Tyrrell, the air attache, convinced the ambassador that after dropping their heavy ordnance loads, aircraft could 

maneuver better and would have sufficient rockets and cannon ordnance 

for flying the high-priority armed reconnaissance mi~sions.’~ 

The accelerated strike programs in Laos and North Vietnam 

inevitably increased the demand for more photo reconnaissnce in both 

countries, a demand that could best be met by locating some RF-101 

62 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

Voodoos on a nearer Thai base. On the 6th of March, an advance party 

of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron arrived at Udorn and on 

the 31st were joined by four of the unit’s Voodoos. Nicknamed GREEN 

PYTHON, the unit flew its first YANKEE TEAM mission over Laos on 

April 1 and the next day, by order of the JCS, carried out its first 

mission over North Vietnam. The latter, known as BLUE TREE, inaugurated a new reconnaissance program with missions limited to target areas 

below the 21st parallel. After the Thai government on May 1 approved 

the deployment of a maximum of twelve RF-101s at Udorn, six more 

aircraft were quickly flown to the base. These, plus the first four and a 

spare, gave 2d Air Division eleven Thai-based aircraft for the expanded 

reconnaissance needs in Laos and North Vietnam. Later, more aircraft 

would join the GREEN PYTHON unit.20 

With Secretary McNamara and all service commanders desirous of 

using the latest reconnaissance technology against infiltration,* MACV 

on May 11 introduced into the YANKEE TEAM program for testing a 

single OV-1C Mohawk aircraft specially equipped with infrared instruments. (Similar tests had been conducted with the Mohawks in South 

Vietnam since 1962.) Under the code name RED HAZE, the Mohawk, 

usually accompanied by OV-1A armed escorts, flew at about 150 feet 

above ground level over selected areas in southern Laos. The initial test 

ended on May 25. While the infrared photography was of high quality, 

Army coordination with Air Force-using units was not, thus vitiating 

much of its value. The Air Force considered the Army’s use of the 

infrared-equipped Mohawks an unwarranted intrusion into the Air 

Force’s traditional reconnaissance role and mission.2’ 

Meanwhile, Westmoreland asked for and Sullivan approved the 

stationing of a number of USAF aircraft on strip alert to strike fleeting 

targets, particularly trucks. In the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER 

programs, the ambassador agreed to operations against “targets of 

opportunity,” RLAF-approved fixed targets, and targets within 200 

yards of either side of approved routes to protect roving tribal roadwatch 

teams. After the Thai government assented to the basing of USAF 

aircraft for these operations, details were worked out between the 2d Air 

Division deputy commander at Udorn and the air attach& at Vientiane 

and Bangkok. As a result, four USAF BANGO F-4Cs were put on 

fifteen-minute strip alert at Ubon RTAFB. Shortly thereafter four 

WHIPLASH F-105s were similarly placed at the Thai bases of Takhli and 

Korat. Control over the aircraft was given to the deputy commander, 2d 

Air Division. But as usual, final target approval rested with the Vientiane 

‘See Chapter 11. 

63 

BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

embassy and was granted through the air attach6. Operating rules 

required the aircraft to be under a forward air controller when striking 

targets selected by the roadwatch teams. To avoid wasting sorties, air 

attache’s would designate secondaries if pilots could not find their 

primary targets.22 

BANGO aircraft made their debut on May 9 in support of an RLAF 

attack on an armored column of enemy tanks, trucks, and jeeps in the 

Plain of Jars region. After the T-28s reportedly destroyed two tanks and 

five trucks, RLAF pilots, hoping for a bigger kill, asked for USAF 

assistance. An hour later the BANGO Phantoms arrived and, with the 

T-28s marking the targets, destroyed two more tanks and damaged two. 

Pilots reported heavy ground fire with one hit on an RLAF aircraft 

which returned safely to its base. The chief air attach6 considered the 

USAF response, coordination, and mission results excellent. The first 

WHIPLASH F-105 strike took place on May 23 against an enemy village. 

A VICTOR CONTROL C-123 with a Lao observer aboard served as 

forward air controller. Expending fifteen 2.75-inch rockets and 20-mm 

ammunition, the Thunderchiefs set two buildings afire and inflicted other 

damage on about thirty percent of the target area.23 

As BANGO and WHIPLASH strikes continued, operating strictures 

lessened. In addition to hitting fleeting and RLAF-designated fixed 

targets, the on-call aircraft were scheduled for close air support (for FAR 

and General Vang Pao’s ground troops), and search and rescue. Only 

certain U.S. and Lao military officers and officials could request 

fast-reacting aircraft. Thai government officials, as noted earlier, monitored these and other Thai-based operations closely, demanding one-day 

advance notice of the number of USAF aircraft on strip alert and 

prompt reports on strike results. They also insisted on strike control by 

the air support operations center (ASOC) at Udorn rather than by the 2d 

Air Division’s headquarters in Saigon. The WHIPLASH F-105s had been 

earmarked chiefly for infiltration targets in the STEEL TIGER sector. 

During the ensuing weeks, however, more of them flew in the BARREL 

ROLL area at the request of officials in Vientiane.24 

On May 19, Ambassador Sullivan approved CINCPACFLT’s 

request to fly its carrier-based aircraft over North Vietnam while en route 

to Laotian targets. The aircraft were already engaged over the North for 

the ROLLING THUNDER program, and the overflights shortened flying 

distance to Laotian targets by 60 to 160 miles. This reduced the number 

of aerial refueling tankers required for these missions and afforded 

additional air routes into and out of Laos. The latter advantage promised 

to complicate air defense for the communists, and allow pilots, when 

unable to hit their primary targets in Laos, to hit secondary targets in 

North Vietnam.25 

65 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Another change promising to enhance the anti-infiltration effort was 

State and Defense concurrence on June 25 of Sullivan’s request to 

rescind the two-mile buffer zone in Laos along the North Vietnamese 

border. After Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma agreed, the requirement 

was deleted on July 19. The buffer zone had been mandated by the JCS 

in December 1964 at the prime minister’s request to avoid linking 

military operations in Laos with North Vietnam, and to preclude 

accidental bombing of the North by aircraft flying over Laos.* As with 

other operating rules, earlier caution was giving way to the practical 

demands of expanded aerial warfare.26 

The gradual relaxation of air operational rules in the spring of 1965 

unfortunately was accompanied by several short-round incidents. On 

May 11 two Navy aircraft struck two civilian buses west of Muong 

Phalane in the Laotian panhandle. Fourteen Lao citizens, principally 

women and children dependents of Lao military personnel of Group 

Mobile (GM)-15,+ were killed and forty-one wounded. Ambassador 

Sullivan ordered COMUSMACV to halt all STEEL TIGER operations 

immediately until “all our gears are meshed,” and to prepare condolence 

messages for Lao authorities. 

Because the strike occurred in excellent weather on 2 clearly marked 

buses (one painted white and blue), 40 miles beyond the westernmost 

authorized air operations boundary, Sullivan attributed the error to 

inadequate pilot briefings rather than to navigational miscalculation. 

After conferring with Souvanna Phouma and receiving fresh assurances 

from Admiral Sharp that air strikes would be more carefully controlled, 

he permitted the resumption of STEEL TIGER operations 8 days later. 

Meanwhile, he asked air commanders to impress on their pilots the 

sensitivity of the air programs, instruct them to abort their missions if 

they became disoriented, and arrange more thorough briefings for 

American airmen by General Thao Ma and other RLAF officers on 

Laotian terrain and the location of friendly troops and inhabitants. 

Sullivan reduced somewhat the STEEL TIGER boundary for U.S. 

air~raft.~’ He assigned exclusively to the RLAF the area closest to the 

Vietnamese border until 0600 daily, with U.S. aircraft allowed to operate 

there the remainder of the day. Operations in the northern part of the 

STEEL TIGER area remained unchanged. The ambassador reminded all 

commanders of the pertinent STEEL TIGER operational rules which 

prohibited air strikes beyond 200 yards on either side of a road, and on 

fixed and secondary targets and roads unless specifically approved.28 

*See Chapter 11. 

‘A FAR military unit. 

66 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

Unfortunately, Sullivan’s admonitions did not end the short rounds. 

Two more took place on May 22, also in clear weather. The first was 

again committed by Navy jets near Muong Phalane in the panhandle 

where they struck the same Laotian military unit victimized only eleven 

days before. Two personnel were killed (including the company commander) and eight wounded. Expressing loss of confidence in the ability 

of pilots to identify their positions by terrain navigation, Sullivan once 

more halted all STEEL TIGER operations in the area pending the 

establishment of new air control procedures. He was informed that some 

high-ranking FAR officers were beginning to suspect treachery or blamed 

General Thao Ma, the RLAF Commander, for failure to assure bombing 

safety. The danger of reprisal against Americans was sufficient to impel 

Thao Ma to post security forces temporarily around some U.S. 

 installation^.'^ 

The second short round that day was committed by Air Force jets 

flying combat air patrol in northern Laos near Muong Nga during a 

search and rescue operation for a downed USAF pilot. The pilots 

erroneously opened fire on a building occupied by FAR and other 

personnel, leaving thirteen dead and nineteen wounded-the worst aerial 

mishap thus far in Laos. Sullivan determined quickly, however, that 

blame lay not with the USAF pilots but with another officer whom he 

had assigned to the rescue effort and who, without authority, ordered the 

attack on the buildings “to strike fear in the heart of the enemy.” The 

ambassador accepted full responsibility for the in~ident.~’ 

Nevertheless, Sullivan halted all STEEL TIGER reconnaissance missions from May 22 until June 7 and used the interval to work out more 

stringent operational rules with U.S. air commanders and General Thao 

Ma. Afterwards, Sullivan set more constricted boundaries for the STEEL 

TIGER area. Armed reconnaissance pilots could attack “clearly identifiable” military convoys, vehicles, and troops within 200 yards on either 

side of the road. Strikes on fixed installations, however, were prohibited 

unless associated with an attack on troops or similar military targets. 

Targets to the north, west, and south of the new boundaries could be 

struck only after obtaining Vientiane’s consent. Sullivan also placed off 

limits a segment of Route 9 where there were friendly troops. 

The ambassador laid down other rules. Unless scheduled otherwise, 

all American aircraft overflying Laos had to maintain a minimum 

altitude of 10,000 feet and avoid the friendly towns of Savannakhet, 

Pakse, Saravane, Vientiane, and Paksane. Within the STEEL TIGER 

boundary, YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance aircraft were ordered to observe a minimum of 5,000 feet with requests for lower altitude missions 

to be determined by the ambassador and his staff on a case-by-case 

basis. Finally, when STEEL TIGER operations resumed on June 7, 

67 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

PACAF and PACFLT pilots were given further instructions. Upon 

entering Laotian air space, they were to check in with the radar aircraft 

control station at Nakhon Phanom using the code word INVERT, stay in 

contact throughout their missions, and keep their identification beacons 

turned 

As an additional precaution, Sullivan told all air commanders and 

operational personnel to review 2d Air Division Operation Plan 502-55. 

The plan forbade firing on inhabited areas by aircraft flying combat air 

patrol for rescue operations until it was “reasonably clear” that the 

enemy intended or was taking hostile action. To assuage the concern of 

Lao government officials, Colonel Tyrrell, the air attachk, flew General 

Thao Ma, and the FAR commander of the area that included Muong 

Phalane, to Nakhon Phanom to show them the “positive control” of the 

aircraft radar control station there. The Lao generals were also flown to 

PACFLT’s carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin where they discussed air 

control procedures with Navy air crew^.^^ 

On June 5, 1965, Ambassador Taylor dispatched to Washington 

another report on the deteriorating political and military situation in 

South Vietnam. Warning that the Viet Cong still retained the initiative in 

the war and were getting stronger through recruitment and infiltration, 

he asked for more U.S. ground and air reinforcements to contain their 

advances. This and other assessments pointed to an unabated military 

decline. STEEL TIGER air operations, now in their third month, had not 

yet slowed the DRV’s manpower and supply transfusions to the Viet 

Cong through Laos.33 

Clearly, the obstacles to successful interdiction in the Laotian 

panhandle were more formidable than military commanders foresaw. 

STEEL TIGER, like its predecessor BARREL ROLL, was a limited and 

politically controlled air program, and the gradual relaxation of its 

operating rules in the preceding weeks was partially offset by the 

restrictions which followed the short rounds. Pathet Lao troop strength 

in Laos, like the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, was growing and totaled 

nearly 30,000 by June 1965. With allied North Vietnamese Army forces, 

it controlled larger areas of north, central, and southern Laos than 

before, facilitating infiltration movements. The jungle terrain hid most of 

the enemy’s activities, and the worsening drizzle, rain, and overcast as 

the annual southwest monsoon arrived in late April further reduced pilot 

visibility. Air Force and Navy commanders and officials in Vientiane 

deliberated constantly over ways to surmount these problems.34 

In their studies of U.S. air operations in Laos, PACOM’s analysts 

reviewed the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER programs from January 1 

through June 18, 1965. They noted that of 325 PACAF and PACFLT 

missions flown, 156 performed armed reconnaissance with 78 of these 

68 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

also striking secondary targets such as bridges, military areas, or 

chokepoints. Eight missions concentrated on military areas only. A 

summary of air attacks on enemy trucks, prepared by the analysts, 

disclosed that in one month (April 24-May 24) 179 trucks were sighted 

and attacked with an estimated 51 destroyed or damaged. If compared 

with the aggregate antitruck sorties flown, it took an average of 6 sorties 

to destroy or damage a truck. The analysts were uncertain why truck 

sightings dropped after May 24, attributing this to either more successful 

communist evasion tactics or to fewer movements-though the latter 

could not be squared with reports of continued infiltration into South 

Vietnam. (Inexplicably, they neglected to mention the impact of monsoon weather.) Nor had the tactic of cutting roads and creating 

transportation chokepoints produced truck lines or supply stockpiles that 

could readily be interdicted. Yet PACOM’s analysts were far from 

disheartened. They were convinced the daily air strikes were forcing the 

communists to divert more and more manpower for road and bridge 

repairs to sustain their vital logistic movements through Laos into South 

~ietnam.*~’ 

A PACAF analysis emphasized how monsoon weather handicapped 

pilots in detecting targets and observing secondary fires after an attack. 

In sixty-one Air Force missions flown over one two-week period, pilots 

sighted and attacked only three trucks. PACAF candidly admitted that 

the amount of supplies destroyed, while unknown, was probably limited. 

This, plus the enemy’s propensity to travel mostly at night, made STEEL 

TIGER’S efficacy “questionable,” suggesting it might be wiser tactically 

to concentrate on striking supply areas rather than trucks. 

As first priority, PACAF believed that, along specified routes, U.S. 

air assets should systematically destroy known and validated RLAF fixed 

targets, such as truckstop, vehicle maintenance, and supply points. The 

strikes should start in the south, move toward northern Laos, and be 

conducted over two or three weeks to frustrate communist resupply from 

rear areas. Second priority should stress, in coordination with the RLAF, 

more quick reaction and close support missions against targets of 

opportunity based on the best intelligence possible. The strip alert 

‘Defense Intelligence Agency analysts in Washington were convinced that aerial 

operations had numerous indirect benefits. In June 1965 they had concluded that air strikes 

had kept the PL/DRV from taking their annual “bite” of government territory in northern 

Laos and enhanced Lao and Thai morale. The strikes forced the communists to dismantle, 

disperse, and camouflage many infiltration-supporting facilities, to move trucks more 

slowly and at night over roads, to employ more human portage, and to levy manpower 

requirements on the local populace to repair roads and trails (thus creating an abrasive 

relationship with the workers). [DIA Bul 109-65, Jun 7, 1965, pp F(1) and F(2).] 

69 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

BANGO F-4Cs, presently using only twenty-five percent of their potential 

flying time, were available for this purpose. Finally, third priority 

missions should be earmarked for armed reconnaissance and chokepoints, with the former limited to roads and rivers as follow-on strikes 

against fixed targets, and the latter conducted after attacking bridges, 

fords, and ferries. At bottom, of course, PACAF strongly adhered to the 

Air Force view that the military situation in South Vietnam could be 

turned around most easily by heavier bombing of North Vietnam rather 

than by introducing more American troops into the jungles and 

mountains of South Vietnam.36 

Ambassador Sullivan wondered if radically new measures might not 

be justified against infiltration, due to poor weather and the impenetrable tree canopy in the panhandle “which high-speed, high-flying jets 

literally cannot see through.” While on an inspection visit to Savannakhet about June 20, Sullivan and Tyrrell visited a segment of the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail captured recently by FAR Maj. Gen. Phasouk Somly. During 

a one-mile ride down the trail, the ambassador averred he was 

“astounded” by its two-truck width and the heavy jungle canopy 

overhead. He said it was a “thoroughly passable road,” even as the 

rainy season began, and open to the skies only in two small places. To 

find and interdict enemy trucks under such conditions, he observed, 

might require massive defoliation, infrared rather than visual reconnaissance for bombing, and saturation strikes to create major chokepoint^.^' 

Admiral Sharp believed Sullivan’s suggestions would prove relatively 

ineffective against fleeting targets such as trucks. He was inclined to 

agree with PACAF’s recommendation that the most useful tactic in the 

monsoon season was to hit fixed targets and allocate fewer sorties to 

armed reconnaissance, road cratering, and chokepoints. Generally, he 

took a glum view of achieving much by air strikes because of the 

monsoon weather and the difficulty of finding enemy bivouac areas, 

truck parks, and supply dumps under jungle growth-agreeing with 

Sullivan on the dimension of the problem. 

In contrast, General Westmoreland, while conceding that armed 

reconnaissance had not yet accomplished much, wanted to continue the 

missions as an adjunct to striking RLAF fixed targets. This would assure 

daylight surveillance of enemy lines of communication, enemy harassment, and sortie economy. Unlike PACAF, he wished to strike all 

validated RLAF targets first, regardless of location, rather than along a 

geographical south-to-north direction over a two-week period. Until 

unrestricted aid and ground operations were authorized in Laos, he said 

it was necessary to follow a “preplanned controllable track” and be as 

responsive as possible to available intelligen~e.~’ 

70 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Simultaneously, Westmoreland kept pressing Admiral Sharp and the 

JCS to approve Army-devised air-supported ground reconnaissance and 

ground operations against infiltration. As the Viet Cong’s fortunes rose 

and Saigon’s fell in the spring of 1965, the Army expanded its 

anti-infiltration planning to include using ground troops, despite the 

military and political risks in such operations. The abortive LEAPING 

LENA venture into the Laotian panhandle a year earlier, using only 

Montagnard tribesmen and South Vietnamese Special Forces, underscored the difficulty of this type of activity. The consensus was that any 

renewed effort sanctioned by the American ambassador in Vientiane and 

high Washington officials would require direct American participation. 

The U.S. Army’s anti-infiltration proposals, under preparation for 

many months, demanded substantial ground forces. One plan called for 

a manned defense line in northern South Vietnam and in Laos at the 

17th parallel with four to six American and allied divisions. A second 

plan specified an American three-division thrust from Thailand into the 

Laotian panhandle toward Tchepone. In the spring of 1965, McNamara, 

Taylor, and other officials judged both proposals impractical for the 

time being. They cited the huge manpower requirements, the magnitude 

of the logistic and political problems, and the hostile weather and terrain 

in ~aos.~~ 

A relatively new MACV idea, reviewed at a SEACOORD meeting in 

Bangkok shortly after mid-April 1965, called for reconstituting a dozen 

Kha tribesmen guerrilla companies. These were initially organized by 

U.S. Army Special Forces for activity in the Bolovens Plateau area in 

1962, to interdict the PL/DRV in the panhandle with the backing of 

U.S. Special Forces and Thai-based USAF aircraft. The reconstituted 

Kha units would serve as a nucleus to recruit upwards of 3,000 to 4,000 

other tribesmen in designated guerrilla warfare operational areas. Sullivan deemed the project “totally unrealistic,” as the Bolovens tribesmen 

were very primitive and “civilizations removed” from the Meo, Rhade, 

or Jarai tribes in Laos, and accustomed to the crossbow rather than 

firearms. “It is far-fetched,” he told Westmoreland, “to think of 

storming the Ho Chi Minh Trail, with a bare-bottomed bunch of these 

boys.” A serious intent to break up the real marrow of the trail, where 

the communists protected it with battalions, Sullivan warned, required 

thinking in terms of regiments and divisions, not tribal assets.40 

Two other MACV concepts were GOLDEN EAGLE and SHINING 

BRASS. GOLDEN EAGLE was an offshoot of a proposed U.S.-Thai 

bilateral defense plan. It envisaged U.S. Special Forces, with USAF 

support from Thailand, penetrating Laos to the Bolovens Plateau and 

from there conducting forays against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. SHINING 

BRASS, outlined in March 1965, called for U.S./GVN Special Forces, 

72 
BEGINNING OF STEEL TIGER 

with South Vietnamese-based USAF support, to make incursions into the 

trail from South Vietnam. The aim would be to collect hard intelligence 

on infiltration, designate targets for air strikes, and harass the enemy. 

Westmoreland considered the capability of the tribal roadwatch teams in 

Laos, already engaged in intelligence collecting and targeting, too 

limited. He observed that the teams were assigned to just a few key 

areas, furnished very little data on fixed enemy targets, and did not 

reconnoiter Lao territory contiguous to South Vietnam.4’ 

Sullivan was inclined to support SHINING BRASS if the teams entered 

by land rather than being paradropped by aircraft or helicopters (as 

provided by the MACV concept), restricted their activity initially to two 

specified zones, advanced no farther into Laos than six miles, and stayed 

no more than ten days. He also opposed any paradrops of American 

advisors in the upper part of Route 9, because it was strongly controlled 

by the communists. 

Although Westmoreland needed the ambassador’s support, he believed the latter’s strictures would gut the SHINING BRASS concept. The 

physical obstacles to sending teams into Laos on foot were so great that 

the teams would have virtually no time for reconnoitering and targeting 

in an infiltration zone. Consequently, he advised Admiral Sharp and the 

JCS on May 12 that unless Sullivan accepted his basic concept and 

withdrew his objections to helicoptering cross-border teams with U.S. 

advisers in and out of Laos, the entire project should be scrapped. If 

approved, he would limit entry initially to two zones as desired by 

~ullivan.~* 

Admiral Sharp endorsed Westmoreland’s concept as did the joint 

chiefs. Hoping to expedite a favorable decision on the matter, the chiefs 

sent McNamara a modified SHINING BRASS concept (called Phase I) as a 

basis for further planning. But the Defense secretary, the State Department, and other high officials remained wary of authorizing SHINING 

BRASS until convinced that Sullivan fully accepted the principle of 

employing joint American and South Vietnamese Special Forces teams 

for obtaining target intelligence and possibly attacking the enemy on the 

ground.43 

Westmoreland, trying another tack, sent Admiral Sharp and the JCS 

on July 5 a detailed Phase I SHINING BRASS plan. This called for using 

at first only two Special Forces teams (each consisting of eight ARVN 

personnel and two US. Army advisers) launched from Kham Duc 

airstrip in South Vietnam to Dak Prou and Dak To, both on the edge of 

the Laos border. The teams would enter Laos from these two bases and 

pick out enemy targets for air strikes, reporting them by special radios 

hooked into a complex Air Force-Army communications system. The 

operations would be sufficiently small-scale to make aerial resupply 

73 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

unnecessary. The MACV commander saw the project as low risk and 

likely successful, thereby instilling confidence in team members. Additional SHINING BRASS teams would follow. He thought of organizing 

initially about ten teams. 

However, State and Defense officials continued to feel uneasy about 

the political and military ramifications of SHINING BRASS. Two more 

months of discussions took place between Sullivan, Westmoreland, and 

the State and Defense Departments. Finally, the JCS was allowed to 

flash the “go-ahead” for the first limited SHINING BRASS missions. In 

the interim, the energies of administration authorities were focused on 

planning for and beginning direct US. combat intervention in South 

Vietnam. There, the Viet Cong were threatening to overwhelm the 

RVNAF and prevail over most of the country.44 

74 
Chapter IV 

Expansion of the Aerial 

Anti-infiltration Campaign 

July-December 1965 

On June 7, 1965, General Westmoreland warned Admiral Sharp and 

the joint chiefs that only American and third-country reinforcements 

could check the rapidly rising Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army 

strength in South Vietnam. Administration authorities, however, were 

not yet ready to “bite the bullet” and order more large-scale deployments of men and materiel. After the Saigon government’s travails 

mounted in the ensuing weeks, Ambassador Taylor on July 11 insisted 

on the immediate dispatch of more American air, ground, and naval 

units to prevent the government’s collapse. Underlying Taylor’s request 

was MACV’s latest estimate of enemy strength. This credited him with a 

force of 175,000 to 195,000 men in the following principal categories: 

combat troops, 47,000;” regular combat support forces (including guerrillas), 18,000; irregular support personnel, 80,000; and political activists, 

30,000. About 20,000 men were not identified.’ 

With delay no longer possible, President Johnson sent Secretary 

McNamara, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, JCS Chairman, and their 

aides to Saigon on July 16 to review with Westmoreland and Taylort the 

military situation and determine deployment schedules for additional 

U.S. units. In their briefings for the McNamara party, MACV officials 

attributed recent enemy success to a large influx of Hanoi’s troops 

among the estimated 5,000 northerners who entered the South in the first 

half of 1965. Intelligence analysts had confirmed the presence of the 

lOlst Regiment of the NVA’s 325th Division in Kontum Province. They 

expected to verify shortly the presence of the 18th Regiment in the same 

‘Taylor raised this figure to 48,500 men, calling them “main and local force” combat 

personnel that included 68 confirmed battalions. 

+Also present was Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who succeeded 

Taylor as Ambassador to Vietnam after Taylor left Saigon on July 30. This was Lodge’s 

second tour as ambassador there. 

75 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

province, and assumed the 95th Regiment was in the South, though no 

member had been captured thus far.*2 

With respect to enemy logistic activities, MACV officials noted that 

in the first half of 1965, American and South Vietnamese troops had 

uncovered about thirty-seven tons of military supplies in several caches. 

The discoveries suggested that the VC/NVA had hidden in secure areas 

about a year’s supply of small-caliber ammunition. The enemy had also 

introduced a “new family” of 7.62-mm weapons with repair parts and 

ammunition. Another sign of his bountiful combat stores had been 

illustrated during a two-day battle at Dong Hoi in South Vietnam, where 

three Viet Cong battalions fired an estimated eighteen or more tons of 

ammunition. 

MACV and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials were 

uncertain, however, about the quantity of Viet Cong (VC) supply 

shipments from outside of South Vietnam. One estimate, prepared in the 

OSD, indicated less than nine tons per day entering the South through 

Laos, but General Wheeler guessed the daily total to be about fourteen 

tons. McNamara accepted the latter figure. The Viet Cong’s ability to 

fight with limited resources was perplexing. “It is amazing to me,” said 

Ambassador Taylor, “how the VC [Viet Cong] can bring all their people 

into the country and support them with so little effort when we have 

such a hell of a time supporting ours.” The Defense secretary agreed.3 

In their assessment of STEEL TIGER operations, MACV officials 

believed that the bombings had restricted overland infiltration of men 

and supplies only to a “limited degree.” Still, the bombings, together 

with air-supported tribal roadwatch activities, ROLLING THUNDER, and 

American support of South Vietnam forces, might convince Hanoi’s 

leaders they could not win. Only the creation of “this frame of mind,” 

the officials believed, would eventually end the infiltration. 

McNamara, conversely, remained skeptical about air power’s capability to cut off much of the enemy’s supply flow into South Vietnam. 

The Viet Cong’s supply needs, he observed, few in the past, were not 

large at present and probably would not be substantial in the future. 

Consequently, aerial attacks would not cut into VC logistics “to a 

damaging degree.” Nevertheless, he did not advocate stopping the 

bombing and underscored again the importance of winning the war in 

‘Later, Westmoreland would claim that the first North Vietnamese Army regiment to 

enter South Vietnam (the 95th) arrived in Kontum Province in December 1964, and was 

joined within the first two months of 1965 by the 32d and lOlst Regiments. In the same 

period, the North Vietnamese 6th Regiment was activated in Quang Tri Province. [Adm U. 

S. G. Sharp, USN, and Gen W. C. Westmoreland, USA, Report on the War in Vietnam 

(As of 30 June 1968) (Washington, 1969), p 107.1 

76 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

the South where the United States would have to send “a lot more 

men.” He insisted that there should be “no bombing in Laos or North 

Vietnam if we can use that sortie effectively in the So~th.”~ 

General Westmoreland believed that the United States should step 

up in the ensuing months the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER programs 

from about fifty to sixty-eight sorties per day. He also favored reducing 

the restraints on pilots by creating a number of free-strike zones, wherein 

they could attack any suspected enemy stronghold, and allowing them to 

search for targets in either Laos or North Vietnam while flying a single 

mission. McNamara made no immediate decision on these proposals.’ 

On July 20, upon his return from Saigon, McNamara sent the 

president his recommendations for augmenting American military forces 

in Southeast Asia. He had little to say about the war in Laos but 

observed: “There are no signs . . . we have throttled the in-flow of 

supplies . . . or can throttle the flow while [Viet Cong] materiel needs are 

as low as they are; indeed, more and better weapons have been observed 

in VC hands.” 

Eight days later the president announced that American strength in 

South Vietnam would rise almost immediately from 75,000 to 125,000 

men and include appropriate air and logistic units. More would be sent 

as requested. Additional Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy units began 

deploying quickly to the war theater.6 

Meanwhile, monsoon weather kept anti-infiltration operations in 

Laos at a moderate level. In the STEEL TIGER area, air commanders 

directed numerous missions against 0 major chokepoints with Mu Gia 

and Nape Passes on the North Vietnamese border receiving the lion’s 

share. In a typical strike, PACAF’s F-105s on July 16-17 dumped 18,000 

pounds of ordnance on each of the passes (comparatively, PACAF’s 

larger aircraft were able to drop considerably more ordnance in Laos 

than carrier planes). Mu Gia Pass bore the brunt of the chokepoint 

attacks. Besides creating new or reseeding old traffic chokepoints with 

bombs, U.S. pilots struck many small bridges (there were hundreds in 

Laos ranging from 16 to 60 feet in length),” scores of military and supply 

areas, structures, and antiaircraft sites. As previously, pilot reports were 

the main source of strike results, the jungle terrain and weather 

precluding much timely and usable poststrike photography. 

‘Bridges in Laos do not fit the western concept of bridges. Most were of flimsy 

construction, short, footpath-wide, and easily replaced or bypassed. In subsequent months 

Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots claimed they destroyed or damaged hundreds of 

bridges. Because of the difficulty of poststrike verification, bridge statistics must be viewed 

with caution. 

77 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

The monsoon weather prevented many PACAF pilots from reaching 

their targets. In addition, poor weather often forced pilots to abort their 

missions after launch or to seek secondary targets, and thus hampered 

KC-135 refueling operations for strike aircraft.’ 

In contrast with other PACAF pilots, those flying the BANGO F-4Cs 

and WHIPLASH F-105s on strip alert in Thailand managed to increase 

several-fold their sortie pace. They had trouble finding good targets, 

however, and beginning in August relied mostly on tribal roadwatch 

target selections in the BARREL ROLL sector. Thus few WHIPLASH 

missions were flown along infiltration routes in the STEEL TIGER sector 

as originally intended.8 

As scheduling and target verification procedures for BANGOWHIPLASH missions were unduly complex, Colonel Tyrrell and Col. Paul 

A. Pettigrew, who succeeded him in July 1965, simplified the procedures 

where possible. They arranged, for example, for the deputy commander, 

2d Air Division, at Udorn to order immediate photo-reconnaissance 

missions to verify targets selected by the roadwatch teams.’ 

The roadwatch teams were providing important information on 

enemy infiltration. They reported, for example, no traffic north of 

Muong Phine on Route 23 between May 26 and mid-July nor on a 

southern stretch of Route 92 northeast of Saravane since May 5. On the 

other hand, they spotted truck movements on another segment of Route 

92 from where supplies were believed portered into South Vietnam. In 

one instance, they saw cargoes of foodstuffs and ammunition (for 62-mm 

and 82-mm mortars). Between June 1 and August 19, the teams counted 

about 22,000 troops traveling on the Muong Sen-Muong Phine segment 

of Route 23, two-thirds of whom appeared to be North Vietnamese who 

entered Laos presumably through the Mu Gia Pass. Yet the aggregate of 

the teams’ reports over 2 1/2 months suggested that most of the troops 

were probably Pathet Lao.*” 

There was other evidence, however, suggesting more North Vietnamese were traveling south or worked in concert with the Pathet Lao to 

resupply the Viet Cong than met the eyes of the roving roadwatchers-or 

friendly villagers who also provided information. 

At the end of August, analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency 

were mystified by intelligence indicating PL/NVA work on roads and 

trails along a portion of Route 12 south of Mu Gia Pass. Because this 

*The tribesmen were possibly in error, unaware that certain elite North Vietnamese 

units assigned to duty in Laos were issued Pathet Lao uniforms as they entered Laos. [See 

Michael Horrocks and David A. McCormack, “Distinguishing the Pathet Lao from the 

North Vietnamese in Laos,” manuscript (Washington, 1976).] 

78 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

area was bombed by Air Force and Navy planes about three times per 

week and considered “impossible for vehicles . . . and dangerous for 

those on foot,” the analysts at first believed that the enemy was engaged 

in a ploy to keep air strikes focused on the roads and trails while they 

used other new bypasses for moving men and materiel southward. 

In September, however, DIA and PACOM intelligence reports 

confirmed the existence of more road and trail construction, preparatory, 

it was clear, for expanded supply movements at the end of the monsoon 

season. On the basis of this and other data, PACOM judged that the 

NVA infiltration system, presently comprising more than 4,000 military 

personnel (organized into quartermaster and transportation units) and 

about 6,000 porters, could maintain a flow of 3 to 6 tons of supplies per 

day over a steadily improving road and trail network.” 

Besides fragmentary ground intelligence reports, most knowledge of 

the enemy’s doings in the panhandle depended on Air Force and Navy 

YANKEE TEAM tactical and LUCKY DRAGON U-2 photo-reconnaissance 

missions. But reconnaissance needs for the ground war and better flying 

weather in Laos’s BARREL ROLL area combined to restrict reconnaissance 

of the roads and trails in southern Laos. As in recent months, Air Force 

RF-101s of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Udorn and 

Tan Son Nhut flew most of the tactical sorties.12 

To obtain more data on the enemy’s infiltration routes, General 

Westmoreland in late July asked higher authorities to allow more U-2 

photography for the STEEL TIGER area. The U-2 photos, he said, were 

generally superior in resolution to those taken by tactical aircraft, and if 

the aircraft were allowed to fly at a lower altitude, say about 30,000 feet, 

photography would be even clearer. 

PACOM and Washington officials jointly approved the MACV 

commander’s request but forbade missions as low as 30,000 feet lest the 

aircraft be detected. By late August the U-2s were covering more 

MACV-designated target areas in STEEL TIGER. Personnel at the 

National Photographic Interpretation Center furnished the data 

readouts. * l3 

Meanwhile, Admiral Sharp asked PACAF, MACV, and the United 

States Army, Pacific, for further recommendations to improve detection 

of communist movements in the Laotian panhandle. The struggle in 

South Vietnam, he said, made the anti-infiltration STEEL TIGER opera- 

‘Competing needs for U-2 and tactical reconnaissance missions over Laos, North 

Vietnam, and South Vietnam were resolved in meetings in PACOM’s Photo Requirements 

Intelligence Board. Established in May 1965 with membership from all service reconnaissance agencies, the board met monthly or oftener to review all Southeast Asia reconnaissance coverage and requirements. [Hist, CINCPAC, 1965, 11, 434.1 

79 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

tions vitally important. “We must not allow the relatively well-defined 

targets along established routes,” he said, “to divert us from the difficult 

and frustrating task of finding and destroying the concealed Communist 

logistic and personnel pipeline through southern 

PACAF proposed using more of its RF-101s to obtain visual 

reconnaissance. By dispatching the aircraft from dawn to dusk, pilots 

would familiarize themselves with the terrain and become more selective 

in finding and photographing targets. To avoid alerting the communists 

to the special visual reconnaissance effort, other Voodoos would concurrently fly over important lines of communication. BANGO-WHIPLASH 

aircraft would conduct strikes, accompanied by an RF-101 to serve as 

forward air controller and obtain bomb damage assessment. This 

arrangement would ensure more use of the fast-reacting USAF BANGO/ 

WHIPLASH fighters whose current 2.34-sortie-per-day rate, in PACAF’s 

opinion, was much too 10w.I~ 

General Westmoreland dismissed PACAF’s proposals outright, asserting that visual reconnaissance over dense jungle canopy could be 

performed best by light, slow-flying aircraft rather than by fast jets. 

During a SEACOORD meeting on July 23-24, 1965, the MACV 

commander again stressed the need for small, nonjet aircraft and said he 

planned to request five 0-1E Bird Dogs which appeared admirably suited 

to conduct “eyeball” reconnaissance. 

However, Westmoreland’s plan to use Bird Dogs, supplied largely 

from Army stock in the States but flown by Air Force pilots, at once ran 

aground of objections from General Thao Ma and his fellow RLAF 

officers. They insisted the designated areas for 0-1 operations were so 

heavily forested U.S. pilots would see little of the enemy, certainly not 

more than Laotian T-28 pilots, and the aircraft would be vulnerable to 

small-arms fire. Thao Ma was convinced his pilots adequately covered 

the areas, and after the monsoon weather abated in four to six weeks he 

planned to step up day and night missions. Further, the general had to 

contend with the skittishness of FAR ground commanders about having 

fast-flying jets bomb targets discovered near FAR troops by the 0-1s. 

The RLAF commander stressed repeatedly, “We can’t afford any more 

[bombing] mistakes.” Efforts by Colonel Tyrrell to change Thao Ma’s 

mind about using the aircraft failed. The RLAF commander did make 

one concession. He would let American officers debrief his pilots to 

elicit, if possible, more details about enemy sightings along the routes 

presently covered by his air force.I6 

In view of Thao Ma’s stance, representatives of MACV, 2d Air 

Division, and the American embassy in Vientiane met on September 17 

at Udorn to determine how to introduce the Bird Dogs in the 

southernmost sector of the panhandle so as to accelerate the tempo of air 

80 
KEY DECISIONMAKERS. Above: Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (center) 

reported to President Johnson after his 1964 trip to Vietnam. At the meeting were 

(left to right) Gen. Maxwell Taylor, JCS Chairman; Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; 

and (standing) John McCone, CIA Director. Below: Lt. Gen. Joseph Moore, 

Commander of 2d Air Division, and Gen. Hunter Harris, Commander of PACAF. 

1965. 


Camouflaged trucks from North Vietnam are hidden alongside a highway in Laos. Trucks can 

and center. (RF-101 reconnaissance photo, February 1966.) 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

strikes on enemy targets there. The solution, they agreed, was to station 

the aircraft at South Vietnamese bases near the Lao border, employ 

USAF pilots as forward air controllers, but leave target verification to 

Lao observers who would occupy the rear cockpit of the 0-1s. The task 

of enlisting Laotian airmen for this duty was left to the Vientiane 

embassy. Thao Ma was eventually persuaded to accept this arrangement, 

and it was put into practice upon the inauguration of a new air program 

(known as TIGER HOUND) on December 5. 

Further, to simplify somewhat its complex target validation procedures, the American embassy in Vientiane placed all RLAF-approved 

targets in three categories: First were targets to be struck as soon as 

possible and militarily important targets previously struck but only 

partially damaged. Next came targets that would require prior Vientiane 

approval, consisting of targets under construction or nearing completion; 

minor targets previously bombed, abandoned, or dismantled; and targets 

not in any of the above types but retained on the target list. Finally, 

there were “hold” targets that could not be struck under any circumstances. If their status changed, they would be placed in one of the other 

two categorie~.’~ 

To maintain proper records of the embassy’s different target 

categories, the 2d Air Division in late July set up an automated targeting 

system using an IBM 407 printer and associated equipment. The division 

also formed on September 15 a target information center (TIC) in its 

intelligence directorate to handle the expanding flow of photography on 

Laos and North Vietnam from all of the services. Staffed by personnel 

of the 13th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and the 2d’s intelligence 

directorate, the TIC was soon producing a large volume of target 

nominations for Vientiane. 

Nevertheless, targeting problems remained. One was the inordinate 

amount of time-roughly ten days to six weeks-to obtain fixed-target 

approval from Vientiane, despite frequent PACAF and MACV entreaties 

to speed up the process. Another was the distribution by different 

agencies of annotated target prints or target descriptions, thereby 

creating diverse target lists. As a remedial measure, CINCPAC directed 

the 2d Air Division to assume full responsibility for target annotations, 

publishing weekly updated lists of target nominations and approvals, and 

distributing them to seventeen agencies. This eased but did not cure the 

problem, for the root cause was the rapidly changing status of enemy 

lines of communication, and the plethora 3f agencies engaged in 

gathering and interpreting targeting data. Therefore, CINCPAC in 

September arranged for the publication in Washington of a national 

Joint Operation Graphic to serve as the authoritative map of Laos. 

Distribution of the Graphic began in November 1965.’* 

85 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Vientiane also decided in midyear to make additional infiltration 

targets available to Air Force and Navy pilots by authorizing more armed 

reconnaissance over several routes in both the BARREL ROLL and STEEL 

TIGER sectors. Within the STEEL TIGER sector, pilots were allowed to hit 

Route 92 from its junction with Route 9 southward. The region east of 

Route 9 and south of 92 to the DRV border had been interdicted 

previously, but was placed off limits to U.S. aircraft in May 1965 after 

an accidental (short-round) strike against friendly Laotian troops. Since 

then, General Thao Ma and his RLAF pilots had photographed the route 

more frequently and attacked the area with T-28s. In re-sanctioning 

American air operations along Route 92, the RLAF commander warned 

that he wanted no more bombing errors and, as a precondition to 

resuming their missions, he insisted U.S. airmen take a familiarization 

“Cook’s tour” of the heavily jungled route in an RLAF C-47. After 

some delay the tour was conducted in the first half of October with the 

2d Air Division and PACLFT each selecting one photo interpreter and 

one photo and five armed reconnaissance pilots experienced in flying 

YANKEE TEAM and STEEL TIGER mission^.'^ 

Another change agreed to by representatives of the air attache’s 

office, embassy, and MACV on September 7 allowed pilots flying armed 

reconnaissance to begin random cratering of roads and road segments 

except those running through villages or in off limits areas. The air 

attache would apprise the PACAF and PACFLT commanders of the 

prohibited targets and areas.20 

In September, at General Thao Ma’s request, American embassy 

officials agreed to furnish additional firepower for the RLAF’s close 

support and anti-infiltration operations. Air commanders would make 

available some of USAF’s BANGO, WHIPLASH, or STEEL TIGER aircraft 

with the latter diverted as necessary from their regular missions. Under 

the procedures worked out by the U.S. air attach6 and RLAF representatives, some RLAF T-28 pilots would specialize in marking targets and 

others, flying T-28s in a PATHFINDER role, would lead U.S. strike 

aircraft to a target or cancel a proposed strike if circumstances 

dictated .*‘ 

The services did not agree on the wisdom of this and some other 

changes. Nor did they agree among themselves on the value of armed 

reconnaissance. Whereas the Navy and MACV considered it very useful, 

PACAF insisted that the most economical use of each sortie occurred 

whenever pilots struck targets of opportunity while on the way to and 

from a fixed prebriefed target. 

It was also PACAF’s view that first priority should be assigned to 

destroying fixed targets such as enemy supplies, parked vehicles, maintenance equipment, and ammunition (relying chiefly on BANGO/WHIP86 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

LASH aircraft). Second priority would go to the systematic destruction of 

bridges, ferries, and improved fords. And last priority was to encompass 

armed reconnaissance of roads, rivers, and trucks in conjunction with 

and after strikes on other fixed targets.22 

Armed reconnaissance could be improved, PACAF advised PACOM, if the enemy’s supply lines could be viewed as “a total entity 

rather than [as] an individual country problem.” ROLLING THUNDER 

pilots should reconnoiter the entire length of enemy routes from North 

Vietnam into Laos rather than attack a few preselected Laotian routes or 

fixed targets as at present.* Although PACOM was sympathetic to this 

suggestion, it was evident that Washington officials were still firmly 

committed, for political reasons, to keeping Laotian air programs 

separate from those in South and North Vietnam.23 

In a separate but related debate on improving interdiction against 

infiltration, Westmoreland again tried to persuade Ambassador Sullivan 

and administration officials of the merits of his ground-oriented SHINING 

BRASS and GOLDEN EAGLE concepts. As noted earlier, the first called for 

intelligence-gathering and air-targeting forays against the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail from South Vietnam, the second from Thailand. Both concepts 

obviously required substantial U.S. Army and Air Force support. 

Sullivan still entertained deep reservations about launching largescale ground incursions into Laos as did administration officials with 

whom he conferred during a visit to Washington in July. The incursions, 

he said, would be contrary to Souvanna Phouma’s policy of not allowing 

foreign troops on Laotian soil, and could lead to a collapse of the 1962 

Geneva accords on Laos’s neutrality. There was also danger of the 

incursions ballooning into an endless American and allied troop commitment in Laos. The airlifting of U.S.-led South Vietnamese teams into a 

selected infiltration zone and their resupply and withdrawal appeared to 

be very hazardous. The capture of team members, the ambassador 

feared, would “leave egg on our face.” Shallow air-ground probes, on 

the other hand, would be less fraught with political problems.24 In view 

of Westmoreland’s persistence on the issue, Sullivan finally agreed to 

support limited cross-border, resupply, and evacuation missions with 

BANGO F-4Cs providing air strike support. This enabled SHINING BRASS 

planning to move slowly toward approval in Vientiane and 

Washington. 25 

‘PACAF’s proposal was not unlike General Westmoreland’s recommendation of 

February 1965, also rejected in Washington, for combining BARREL ROLL, YANKEE TEAM, 

and ROLLING THUNCER operations into a single air program. 

87 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

GOLDEN EAGLE, despite its approval for “planning purposes’’ by 

SEACOORD representatives in Bangkok on July 23-24, 1965, could not 

overcome its larger political and logistical handicaps. Besides the 

previously cited objections, Sullivan saw that the FAR generals in 

southern Laos disliked the Thais. Furthermore, the ambassador expressed 

irritation over the apparent efforts by the commander, United States 

Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) and 

COMUSMACV to convert GOLDEN EAGLE from a contingency plan into 

an operational plan without his approval. He characterized the concept 

as a “nonstarter” except in case of an extreme military urgency in Laos 

or until there was a vast change in the political complexion of Southeast 

Asia. After several more months of debate, GOLDEN EAGLE was 

abandoned, although discussion of it surfaced periodically in subsequent 

years .26 

Meanwhile, Sullivan and his staff in Vientiane decided to obtain 

more intelligence on enemy strength and infiltration as well as uncover 

more air targets by organizing and fielding more local roadwatch teams. 

The teams would extend their road and trail watches cautiously to avoid 

any strong North Vietnamese counteraction in Laos. Admiral Sharp 

recommended making the surveillance teams more mobile, as opposed to 

the current practice of assigning them largely to static positions to 

observe enemy units. He wanted the teams in Laos, especially those 

north and south of Route 9 and east of Route 92, to uncover more 

targets for U.S. and RLAF aircraft. The obstacles to sending them there 

were formidable. This was a very rugged area under tight communist 

control, and the teams would be quite far from their supply bases. 

Nevertheless, Sharp in September asked General Westmoreland to send 

the initial SHINING BRASS teams into the area (after they received their 

go-ahead), even though the initial operations would probably be quite 

small.’’ 

Meanwhile, a photo readout on September 12 disclosed more enemy 

troops and activity in a sector near the South Vietnamese border. 

Alarmed, MACV, 2d Air Division, and Vientiane embassy officials 

decided to unleash 50 to 100 strike sorties against the targets in the first 

half of October. They further agreed to form four free-strike zones in 

enemy-held sectors and recommended the launching of several newly 

organized SHINING BRASS teams into Laos to reconnoiter segments of the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail near the South Vietnamese border.’* 

However, the proposed air strikes, approved in Washington on 

September 24, were canceled because of several more bombing errors. On 

the 29th, two PACFLT A-1H Skyraiders, off-course about thirty miles 

for undetermined reasons, struck a target southeast of Thakhek. The 

next day PACAF airmen committed a more serious error. Four F-105 

88 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

Thunderchiefs, mistaking fish traps across a river for a pontoon bridge, 

strafed a prohibited area near the South Vietnamese border, wounding 

two villagers and some buffalo. On October 1, because of improperly 

annotated maps, several Thunderchiefs erroneously made three separate 

strikes on a bridge,* also in a prohibited area.29 

Ambassador Sullivan suspended at once all armed reconnaissance 

operations in STEEL TIGER including strikes on secondary targets by 

aircraft on ROLLING THUNDER missions. Colonel Pettigrew assumed the 

thankless task of spending “three uncomfortable hours” with General 

Thao Ma who asked why American aircraft made navigational errors 

despite “positive” control by the INVERT and PANAMA groundcontrolled intercept stations (at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB and Da Nang 

Air Base, South Vietnam) and assurances no villages or unauthorized 

targets would be struck.30 

An Air Force investigation officer later ascribed the September 30 

incident to human error. The 2d Air Division meanwhile informed 

MACV that navigation aids could assure precise guidance to a target 

area, but it took pilots to positively identify routes and specific targets. 

Unfortunately, pilots were often bedeviled by the similarity in appearances of different jungle areas, bridges and fishtraps, friendly villages 

and enemy military areas, and roads, trails, and tracks. The division 

believed that a remedy was to use more RLAF T-28 forward air control 

pilots who would know the terrain and in case of mishaps assume 

responsibility for them.31 

During the bombing suspension extra PACAF and PACFLT sorties 

were diverted to the BARREL ROLL region. On October 6, Sullivan 

permitted STEEL TIGER operations to resume but within narrower 

boundaries. The ambassador and Sharp separately admonished U.S. 

pilots to avoid future bombing errors lest they jeopardize continuation of 

the Laotian air programs.32 

When STEEL TIGER operations continued to be circumscribed 

throughout October, MACV’s long-planned SHINING BRASS concept 

against communist infiltration into South Vietnam was finally translated 

into action. On September 20 the joint chiefs informed Westmoreland 

that the concept was approved “in principle,” and he could begin with 

Phase I operations. The chiefs laid down stringent rules. SHINING BRASS 

teams accompanied by U.S. advisers should enter Laos by land from 

South Vietnamese bases at Dak To and Dak Prou. Initial team 

penetrations into Laos should not exceed twelve miles. Teams assigned to 

‘Four PACAF F-4s accidentally hit the bridge the first time on September 15 but 

without serious repercussions. 

89 

EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

enter two designated areas should not try to link up. Helicopters were to 

be used solely for ferrying in additional needed personnel, and for 

resupply and evacuation. Only USAF BANGO F-4 Phantoms on strip 

alert should be employed to strike targets uncovered by the teams. The 

JCS requested forty-eight hours’ advance notice of a team launch plus 

progress and final reports of each team’s accomplishment^.^^ 

CINCPAC’s order implementing the SHINING BRASS operation, 

dispatched on September 29, spelled out the broad service responsibilities. The Air Force would provide most of the aerial support for the 

teams as they entered or were lifted out of designated areas, and for 

resupply and search and rescue missions. The specific assignments of the 

Air Force and other agencies were listed in 2d Air Division Operation 

Order 433-65. The document specified a very complex melding of Air 

Force and Army communication and air support systems. Team requests 

for an air strike would pass by voice and telegraphy through Kham DUC, 

the forward operating base, to the Military Assistance Command Studies 

and Observations Group (MACSOG) command and control center and 

an Air Force direct air support center (DASC), both at Da Nang. The 

DASC would establish a time on target (TOT) based on the time the 

request was received plus one hour, flashing the information to the 

tactical air control center (TACC) at Udorn. The latter would instantly 

solicit the Vientiane embassy’s approval and inform the TACC at Ubon, 

where USAF BANGO F-4Cs were on strike alert. After receiving 

Vientiane’s approval, the TACC at Ubon would issue the “execute” 

order. 

The BANGO fighters would rendezvous near the target area, then 

contact a USAF 0-1 forward air controller. While maintaining communication with the SHINING BRASS team, the FAC would mark the area 

with a smoke bomb. After the BANG0 aircraft made their strike, the 

FAC would ask for team confirmation if the bombs fell near-within 100 

yards-of the target. If the aircraft could not make a strike for any 

reason, they would hit an alternate target somewhere in the STEEL TIGER 

sector. 

Only airmen briefed at MACV headquarters on October 11 on the 

SHINING BRASS concept were permitted to fly the first FAC and BANGO 

missions. Subsequent missions required the use of airmen briefed on, or 

conversant with, SHINING BRASS’S aims. General Moore in Saigon 

exercised command and control, while his deputy at Udorn would 

scramble and control the BANGO fighters.34 

The first SHINING BRASS team launches into Laos were preceded by 

three training missions to the edge of Laos’s border with South Vietnam. 

These were conducted in mid- and late September and the second week in 

October. Each team, composed of three to six U.S. Army and about 

91 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

eleven South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel, was airlifted into a 

designated location by two VNAF CH-34 helicopters from an airstrip at 

Kham Duc, just inside South Vietnam. Reconnoitering their respective 

areas, the teams found ample evidence of the enemy’s presence: food, 

supply caches, bivouac areas, buildings, personnel, and trails. When one 

team called for a strike, Vietnam-based USAF aircraft quickly hit targets 

selected by the team and marked by an airborne USAF FAC. The results 

were adjudged “excellent” with buildings and storage caches destroyed. 

The coordination between ground and airborne FACs and between an 

airborne FAC and the strike aircraft also proved highly satisfactory. 

After an initial strike, the ground FAC made a fifty-yard correction of a 

target for other aircraft.35 

Phase I of SHINING BRASS was scheduled to begin on October 15, 

but bad weather postponed the first launch. Clear weather returned on 

the 18th. A team of eleven South Vietnamese and several U.S. Army 

advisers then flew by VNAF CH-34 helicopter to a landing zone about 

two and a half miles from the designated target area. They were 

accompanied by an Air Force forward air controller and two USAF 

strike aircraft. Scouting enemy territory on foot, the team found an 

extensive encampment and supply storage base. During a brief skirmish 

with some communist troops, the South Vietnamese scout leader was 

killed. Nonetheless, the SHINING BRASS unit stayed in the target area for 

three more days before being heli-lifted out early on the 22d.36 

During its three-day foray, the team made several requests for air 

strikes, but weather canceled all air operations in the vicinity until 

November 1. Then, because the communists appeared to have firm 

control of the territory and the support of local Montagnards, MACV 

ordered a special, large-scale STEEL TIGER attack on team-designated 

target areas. This was carried out by thirty-eight USAF F-4Cs and 

F-105s from Thailand with a USAF 0-1 FAC controlling the assault. 

About half of the bombs of sixteen aircraft were fuzed for delayed 

exlosions upwards to thirty-six hours. Strike pilots observed numerous 

fireballs and explosions, and the FAC pilot reported many of the enemy 

were killed. Trees and jungle foliage, however, obscured most of the 

results. Bomb damage assessment eventually confirmed some destruction 

in about ten percent of the target area including six underground 

bunkers, but the photos also revealed that eight nearby bunkers were 

undestroyed. Ambassador Sullivan, who had not been enthusiastic about 

the SHINING BRASS program, now informed Washington that the initial 

operations were “a good beginning.” As team tactics were perfected, he 

said, the incursions promised to make the Laotian panhandle “rather 

uncomfortable for the Viet~.”~~ 

92 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

The second SHINING BRASS team, with launch delayed by weather 

until November 2, was airlifted to an area just within South Vietnam for 

reconnoitering a border target area. A brief skirmish with the communists erupted in which two enemy were killed. The team asked for a 

strike, flashing the coordinates to a USAF forward air controller, and 

was then swiftly airlifted out. 

The first strike, again controlled by an Air Force FAC, was made by 

three USAF aircraft. On the basis of quick visual reconnaissance, the 

controller reported the destruction of one bridge and six buildings, 

damage to two buildings, and two secondary explosions. In an attempt to 

destroy what proved to be a major enemy installation with bivouac areas, 

buildings, troops, bunkers, vehicles, weapons, and motorable roads, 

MACV ordered 2d Air Division to make a special STEEL TIGER strike. 

This was executed by B-57s on November 5. Between November 3 and 

11, eighty-three sorties were flown against the target located by the 

SHINING BRASS team. No interpretable poststrike photography was 

obtained, but USAF FAC pilots reported four weapon positions, two 

caves, and thirty structures destroyed, twenty-one structures damaged, 

and eight secondary explosion^.^^ 

To MACV’s analysts, the air-supported SHINING BRASS operations 

confirmed the NVA’s substantial and menacing presence near the South 

Vietnamese border. There was more supporting evidence of the expanding infiltration threat in a Defense Intelligence Agency study, completed 

in late October, describing 150 miles of roads flanking South Vietnam’s 

border for 90 miles south of the demilitarized zone. This distance was 

about 55 more miles of road than a year earlier, and included the 

extension of most of the infiltration routes such as 23, 92, and 165. 

These and other routes had also been repaired and camouflaged during 

the rainy season just ending. 

The foregoing and other intelligence data obviously portended 

stepped-up VC/NVA military operations in South Vietnam in the coming 

dry season by combat and supporting units whose aggregate strength now 

appeared to range from 216,000 to 236,000 personnel. About 58,500 were 

considered combat troops, about 10,000 more than estimated 4 months 

earlier. Although the bulk of manpower, as always, consisted of the Viet 

Cong, MACV believed it included 3 regiments of the NVA’s 325th 

Division and elements of possibly two other regiments. Apprising 

Ambassador Sullivan of the communist strength, Westmoreland stressed 

the importance of striking hard 7 main routes if the NVA’s manpower 

and supply movements into South Vietnam were to be reduced.39 

Sullivan readily agreed with Westmoreland’s assessment. The principal difficulty, however, was convincing General Thao Ma to remove air 

restrictions near the South Vietnamese border imposed after the aerial 

93 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

short round of September 30, 1965. The general insisted on seeing 

photographic evidence of the enemy’s buildup, although detailed proof in 

some instances could be discerned only by a trained photo interpreter. 

On November 3, during a meeting with Colonel Pettigrew, Thao Ma 

relented and agreed to permit U.S. air strikes again in the former off 

limits areas on several conditions. Airmen must bomb with “extreme 

care,” inform him sufficiently in advance to preclude U.S. and RLAF 

aircraft from striking the same areas at the same time, and establish a 

communication net to enable the RLAF to inform PACAF and PACFLT 

units of the location of friendly forces. He also asked for USAF and 

USN liaison officers at Savannakhet who could communicate directly 

with their respective headquarters, and the right to review plans for air 

operations prior to reaching a final agreement. Except for stationing 

liaison officers at Savannakhet (Pettigrew hoped to persuade Thao Ma 

otherwise), American officials believed they could meet the RLAF 

commander’s numerous req~ests.~’ 

Another meeting between the general, Pettigrew, and Sullivan on 

November 7 resulted in a decision to conduct joint U.S./RLAF reconnaissance and strike operations. The RLAF commander said he would 

move his aerial staging base for attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail from 

Pakse to Saravane. The latter was closer to important target areas and 

would permit him to double the T-28 sortie rate. PACAF would assist in 

enlarging the airfield at Saravane. Sullivan quickly solicited Westmoreland’s support for these arrangements, asserting they were necessary to 

attain American objectives in Laos.*4’ 

Although General Thao Ma was the principal negotiator for the 

above changes, final approval rested with Souvanna Phouma. This was 

obtained on the 14th after Sullivan showed him maps, photos, and other 

materials on the enemy’s buildup. The prime minister also sanctioned 

defoliation along several key enemy routes. Sullivan and Thao Ma, in 

another meeting, agreed to let the U.S. Air Force and Army attaches and 

representatives of the RLAF and FAR General Staff work out the details 

on expanding U.S./RLAF air activities. Before the day was over the 

ambassador informed Westmoreland, Sharp, and the Air Force and Navy 

air commanders that, with one exception, previous restrictions on STEEL 

TIGER operations were lifted “effective immediately” and directed them 

to conduct aerial attacks around the clock. Only a segment of Route 9 

“US. officials, it is clear, believed that giving the general some 0-1Es and improving 

Saravane airfield, with PACAF providing about $lOo,OOO for its upgrading, was not an 

exorbitant quid pro quo for obtaining his permission to resume bombing in the formerly 

prohibited area. 

94 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

from the junction of Route 92 to the South Vietnamese border, 

controlled by friendly forces, remained off limits to U.S. aircraft. 

“Previous attacks here,” Vientiane warned, “caused the suspension [of 

STEEL TIGER operations] and, if attacked again would probably jeopardize operations indefinitel~.”~~ 

There was an immediate spurt in STEEL TIGER interdiction. With the 

abatement of poor weather, strike operations increased in scope and 

tempo during the ensuing weeks.43 

Concurrently, the Vientiane embassy, MACV, and 2d Air Division 

officials took several actions to enable pilots to identify more easily 

armed reconnaissance routes and target areas, strengthen the RLAF, and 

prepare for B-52 operations. One significant change was MACV’s 

creation of six armed reconnaissance zones in eastern Laos. BARREL 

ROLL was divided into A, B, and C sectors, and STEEL TIGER into D, E, 

and F. The F sector was shortly subdivided into an F and G sector.* The 

A through G sectors left about half of western Laos, north to south, 

outside of the approved armed reconnaissance areas. Validated RLAF 

targets, such as small bridges and supply sites, however, could still be 

struck in Laos regardless of location.44 

On November 20, MACV directed the transfer of five 0-1E Bird 

Dog aircraft (of a total of ten desired by General Thao Ma) from Army 

holdings to USAF’s Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Squadron, at 

Udorn. The squadron’s pilots would first train a number of Lao airmen 

to fly visual reconnaissance and serve as forward air controllers. Later 

the squadron would equip the RLAF with several of the Bird Dogs.45 

To bring more air power to bear against infiltration, especially on 

areas adjacent to the five northernmost South Vietnamese provinces, 

Westmoreland in early November proposed saturation bombing by SAC 

B-52s. Sullivan concurred, providing Washington authorities gave “iron 

clad” assurances of no publicity. The joint chiefs backed the proposal. 

Accordingly, the MACV commander submitted his first request for a 

B-52 strike in Laos on November 23, designating an enemy-infested 

jungle area on the border of the provinces of Thac Hiet in Laos and 

Quang Tin in South Vietnam. There were no known villages or friendly 

troops within two and six miles, respectively, of the target area. 

Although hit previously by tactical aircraft, the enemy redoubts were 

very extensive and appeared suitable for a saturation attack. However, 

State and Defense did not flash their approval until early December, and 

the first attack followed shortly thereafter. 

‘In airman’s parlance, these sectors were called Alpha, Bravo, (briefly Cocoa) Charlie, 

Dog, Echo, Foxtrot, and Golf. 

95 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Westmoreland also proposed striking the VC/NVA in Cambodia 

border areas with B-52s, tactical air, and artillery, taking precautions not 

to hit Cambodian troops. He said the display of enemy strength during a 

recent battle in South Vietnam (SILVER BAYONET) and intelligence data 

assembled by the DIA made it “perfectly clear” the Cambodian 

sanctuary contained motorable infiltration routes, command centers, and 

training and supply bases similar to those in Laos. The State Department 

weighed the possible political repercussions of an attack, then deferred a 

decision on the matter until it received “more concrete evidence” of 

enemy infiltration through Cambodia.46 

Another plan under study by the MACV commander and his staff 

would concentrate more tactical air strikes against enemy routes, trails, 

and redoubts in the southeasternmost section of Laos next to the South 

Vietnamese border. The plan was translated into a new concept 

christened TIGER HOUND by General Westmoreland. The “TIGER” 

connoted aggressiveness and “HOUND” for smelling out the enemy. The 

concept would extend the “in-country” or South Vietnamese war into 

this small sector of Laos and rely on Navy and South Vietnam-based Air 

Force and Marine air~raft.~’ 

TIGER HOUND would try to combine in one program the air tactics 

and techniques developed thus far in Laos and South Vietnam. USAFpiloted, low-flying, 0-1 Bird Dog FACs, with Lao observers aboard, 

would control the air strikes. There would be a concerted effort to 

uncover more enemy targets from the air visually and by photography, 

and by use of Air Force and Army aircraft equipped with infrared and 

side-looking airborne radar; by defoliating jungle growth along selected 

routes; and by sending more data-gathering MACV SHINING BRASS 

teams into the trail. The 0-1 FAC pilots would gather much of the 

visual information and by frequent missions become familiar with the 

enemy’s route and trail structure and supply bases. A highly sophisticated communication system between the forward bases in South 

Vietnam and the 2d Air Division’s facilities at Udorn, Savannakhet, and 

Vientiane would assure fast air strikes on target^.^' 

General Moore, concerned that Westmoreland’s concept would 

superimpose a new air program upon an existing complex command and 

control system in Laos, suggested employing only the 2d Air Division’s 

tactical air control system (TACS) for the impending TIGER HOUND 

program. The TACS, he said, had the expertise, communications, and 

other assets to handle the operations and to coordinate Air Force and 

Army aircraft in the search for new targets. After considering Moore’s 

proposal and the views of Army Brig. Gen. John K. Boles, Jr., Director 

of the Joint Research and Test Activity in Vietnam, the MACV 

96 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

commander decided to rely on a meld of Air Force and Army command 

and control systems, using the best features of both.49 

Meanwhile, TIGER HOUND planning was jolted by another spate of 

short rounds, all but one in southern Laos. Two flights of USAF F-105s 

accidentally dropped ordnance close to Khangkhai near the Plain of Jars 

on November 20 but caused no significant damage.* More serious was a 

strike the next day by USAF B-57s attempting to hit a bridge over the 

Kong River near Attopeu in the panhandle. In 2 passes ordnance hit a 

jeep station wagon, destroyed several houses and a Buddhist temple, 

killed a monk, and injured civilians. Further mishaps in the panhandle 

took place on November 24 and 30 and December 1, 1965. Navy jets 

aimed at an automatic-weapons site at Pak Bong but destroyed several 

buildings and killed another monk. The November 20 incident was 

attributed to target misidentification because of broken cloud cover, the 

B-57 mis-strikes to unknown causes, and the Navy mishaps to efforts to 

strike a RLAF-designated target too close (about 500 feet) to buildings. 

Issuing his customary warning about jeopardizing the air war in 

Laos, Sullivan moved the bombline away from Pak Bong and informed 

Moore and Westmoreland that “someone is not getting the word or else 

[the] word is being conspicuously ignored.” Brig. Gen. George B. Simler, 

the 2d Air Division’s Chief of Plans and Operations, likewise warned 

airmen of the sensitivity of Laotian operations, the importance of not 

expending munitions outside of approved areas, and said there was “no 

excuse” for doing 

The short-round incidents did not halt TIGER HOUND planning. On 

November 28-29, while conferring in Saigon with MACV and embassy 

officials on the war’s progress, McNamara endorsed the program.+ 

MACV briefers informed him there was no abatement of enemy 

infiltration and that in October, as monsoon weather was ending, an 

estimated 1,500 enemy personnel passed through Laos on their way to 

South Vietnam. The figure was expected to soar to 4,500 monthly during 

the dry season. The briefers offered no estimate of enemy supply tonnage 

entering the South but believed it was substantial. The DRV’s capability, 

they said, was about 234 tons per day with about 195 tons moving on 

Laotian routes, 25 tons through Cambodia, and 14 tons by sea.51 

After McNamara departed for Washington, TIGER HOUND preparations moved into high gear. The Air Force and Army agreed to provide 

ten O-1E’s each for FAC operations. Army offered to make available 

‘This was not far from the Plain of Jars and was the site of Pathet Lao headquarters 

+Officially, the administration approved TIGER HOUND on December 3, 1965, after 

and a Chinese mission that were erroneously attacked once before in November 1964. 

McNamara returned to Washington. 

97 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

thirteen OV-1 Mohawks fitted with forward-looking infrared and sidelooking airborne radar to search for lucrative enemy targets at night. 

Also, the Air Force planned to introduce for the first time in Laos a 

C-130 airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) to 

assist in controlling and coordinating air strikes. Because of the presence 

of friendly Lao and tribesmen in parts of the TIGER HOUND zone, 

Sullivan promised Lao officials that the United States would maintain 

stringent controls over air strikes. Only RLAF officers assigned to the 

Savannakhet air operations center or as observers aboard a C-130 

ABCCC and USAF-piloted O-1E’s would possess strike authority. The 

arrangement was patterned roughly after the control system in South 

Vietnam where a province chief or his representatives officially authorized air strikes within a province.52 

On December 4, Westmoreland assigned to General Moore “complete responsibility for the planning, scheduling, and conduct of STEEL 

TIGER and TIGER HOUND operations” (in contrast, YANKEE TEAM 

reonnaissance would remain a MACV/2d Air Division coordinated 

effort). He also directed Moore to establish an Air Force/Army/Marine 

Corps TIGER HOUND Task Force to complete the planning and to 

coordinate all of the air resources for the new anti-infiltration air 

program. On the same day, Souvanna Phouma assented to the use of all 

available American aircraft to counter communist infiltration but, as in 

the past, insisted on no publicity. He likewise approved the installation 

of two new mobile USAF tactical air navigation (Tacan) systems, one 

near Saravane in southern Laos and the other near Na Khang in northern 

Laos. Both Tacan systems were installed in early 1966.53 

General Moore quickly appointed Air Force Col. John F. Groom to 

head the TIGER HOUND Task Force. Colonel Groom established one 

headquarters at Tan Son Nhut and another at Da Nang, assigning FAC, 

communications, and intelligence personnel to the latter. FAC pilots (all 

Air Force) would fly from Da Nang and from four Army Special Forces 

airstrips: Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, Kham DUC, and Kontum. Air Force 

C-130 ABCCCs would be stationed at Da Nang Air Base. Capt. Roy C. 

Dalton, an assistant air attache, was assigned to RLAF headquarters at 

Savannakhet to serve as liaison officer. His duties were to advise General 

Thao Ma on air operations, ameliorate his difficulties with local FAR 

ground commanders, arrange for USAF strikes and other support for the 

RLAF, and teach RLAF officers FAC procedures and T-28 gunnery 

tactics. 54 

Concealment from public purview of what promised to be the largest 

air program in Laos thus far would not be easy. Sullivan counseled his 

Washington superiors to exercise prudence in their statements. Disclosure 

of the American air activities, he warned, could result in their suspension 

98 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

“with imponderable consequences for the lives of U.S. forces in 

Vietnam.” High Defense Department officials separately enjoined all of 

the military services to maintain “absolute secrecy.”55 

The first TIGER HOUND missions were flown on December 5. On the 

16th, USAF-piloted 0-1E forward air controllers (call sign HOUND DOG) 

began flying visual reconnaissance missions and guiding PACAF F-103, 

BANGO F-4Cs, and PACFLT and Marine strike aircraft to numerous 

targets. Only a few Lao observers were available for duty aboard the 

0-1E Bird Dogs, but more were recruited in subsequent weeks. Joining 

the aerial assault shortly were several USAF AC-47 gunships, which 

besides their attack role served as flareships and FACs for other aircraft. 

They were the first elements of USAF’s 4th Air Commando Squadron 

that had recently arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in South Vietnam.* 

Also doubling as target-seeking FACs and fighter aircraft were USAF 

A-1E Skyraiders and Army OV-1 Mohawks fitted with forward-looking 

infrared and side-looking airborne radar. MACV’s SHINING BRASS 

teams, now launching more ground reconnaissance probes into the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail, likewise pinpointed targets. 

A USAF ABCCC C-130 circulating overhead provided coordination 

and control of all TIGER HOUND aircraft. Two RLAF officers aboard the 

airborne command and control airship validated targets instantly or, if in 

doubt, called the RLAF’s air operations center in Vientiane or Savannakhet to determine the status of targets. Under favorable conditions the 

communication system enabled the RLAF observers to receive replies in 

minutes. 

Many initial targets were selected from photography taken by 2d Air 

Division reconnaissance aircraft shortly before December 5 over the 

roughly 90-mile-long TIGER HOUND corridor. The targets comprised one 

large area containing 110 enemy installations that included hundreds of 

huts for housing as well as other facilities. Under the previously 

established RLAF target system, newly fixed targets were placed in 

Category A, B, or C. The C category was the most sensitive and off 

limits to attack unless specifically approved by high Lao or U.S. 

authorities. As 0-1 forward air controllers learned how to spot signs of 

the enemy’s presence in the jungle terrain, the number of A targetsthose that could be struck immediately-rapidly expanded. On December 

‘The AC-47s of the 4th Air Commando Squadron were preceded in late 1964 by two 

other gunships sent to South Vietnam for testing and evaluation. For a discussion of the 

development, testing, and use of gunships in Southeast Asia, see Lt. Col. Jack S. Ballard, 

Development and Employment of Fixed- Wing Gunships, 1962-1972 [The Air Force in 

Southeast Asia] (Washington, 1982). 

1 00 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

5 there were 29 and by January 12, 1966, there were 69, of which 56 had 

been struck.56 

To improve visibility, 2d Air Division began on December 6 to 

defoliate selected routes and trails in the TIGER HOUND sector. Two 

RANCH HAND UC-123s did the spraying.* On the loth, twenty-four 

B-52s from the 3d Air Division on Guam carried out their first strike on 

suspected infiltration targets contiguous to the South Vietnamese border. 

Refueled by SAC KC-135 tankers, the aircraft dropped BLU-3B 

bombletst and 750-pound general purpose bombs. As there were no 

followup ground patrols of the bombed area, results were 

~ndetermined.~’ 

American efforts to keep a veil of secrecy over TIGER HOUND 

operations failed. On December 13 the New York Daily News reported 

that U.S. day-and-night air operations over Laos had risen fifty percent, 

would be stepped up shortly, and aircraft were spraying defoliants along 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A week later, The Washington Post disclosed the 

first B-52 strike in Laos and predicted there would be more. Washington 

officials had “no comment” and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma 

characterized the news reports of heavier bombing against infiltration as 

“fabrications.” Embarrassed by the news leaks, Ambassador Sullivan 

asked Washington not to sanction further B-52 strikes until he could 

assure the prime minister there would be no publi~ity.~~ 

From December 6 through 31, 1965, the services flew 809 tactical 

strike sorties in the TIGER HOUND program, the Air Force flying 384 

(333 in daytime, 51 at night), the Marines 325, and the Navy 100. The 

Air Force’s principal nightime weapon remained the C-130/B-57 combination. Marine and Navy aircraft likewise flew numerous night missions. 

Overall, TIGER HOUND operations at first produced few verifiable 

results, although pilots believed their strikes were occasionally successful. 

Colonel Groom, the TIGER HOUND Task Force chief, summed up the 

first few weeks of the campaign: 

During . . . December and part of January, we concentrated most of our efforts 

on . . . fixed RLAF targets. Frankly, we weren’t getting a lot out of them-we 

were getting many secondary explosions, indicating that we were getting supplies 

and ammo. However, we didn’t see much truck traffic or evidence that the Viet 

‘For a discussion of defoliation operations in Laos, see Capt. William A. Buckingham, 

Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: The U.S. Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 

1961-1971 (Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1982). 

‘These were small bombs in a cluster bomb unit. About 62,836 bomblets were dropped 

in this first mission. [Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 65, 11, 284-85.1 

101 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Cong were using the Ho Chi Minh Trail for this purpose . . . . The FAC’s were 

discovering during the day evidence of this traffic . . . tire prints along the roads, 

dust . . . on the trees, but we did not see any traffic at all. If you look at the 

statistics you’ll find out that, probably in December, we saw or hit something like 

a dozen trucks. 

It became readily apparent to us that the enemy was moving everything at night, 

so we started a night program with fighter aircraft using their own flares. 

However the fighters [were] limited to the number of flares they [could] carry, the 

time they could stay on target [so the] program at night was more a harassment 

type of thing rather than [finding] good targets and hitting them.59 

Concurrently, MACV’s SHINING BRASS teams made occasional 

shallow forays into the Laotian border area from South Vietnam to 

uncover targets for TIGER HOUND aircraft. By year’s end, eight teams 

were available, and others were in training. Westmoreland considered the 

ground probes into Laos sufficiently effective to warrant aligning the 

authorized SHINING BRASS geographical area with the larger TIGER 

HOUND boundary. He also wished to begin airlifting SHINING BRASS 

teams into Laos by helicopters (presently, helicopters were authorized 

solely for lifting out or resupplying the teams). Authorities in Vientiane 

and Washington considered both requests premature. 

In the STEEL TIGER area west and north of the TIGER HOUND 

boundary, Air Force and Navy aircraft in late 1965 also flew an 

ascending number of sorties against RLAF-validated and armed reconnaissance targets. In October the total was 471, in November 901, and in 

December 2,088. 

To intercept more enemy night traffic, the Air Force gradually 

assigned more aircraft to nocturnal operations: flare-carrying F-4Cs and 

B-57s, and combinations of C-130dB-57~ and B-66s/F-l05s. The latter, 

in which the B-66s carried the flares, were first used earlier in the year in 

the ROLLING THUNDER program in North Vietnam. More night-capable 

reconnaissance planes were flown in Laos. The nine RF-4Cs that arrived 

at Tan Son Nhut on October 30 featured side-looking airborne radar, 

forward-looking infrared, and day and night cameras. They flew their 

first mission over Laos on December 16. In the same month, four 

RB-57s and three RB-66s used their night photo and infrared equipment 

over the trail. Plagued by poor weather or equipment malfunctions, these 

aircraft in the beginning secured little usable data on the enemy’s 

dispositions or infiltration.60 

TIGER HOUND as well as other air and ground operations throughout the war theater were halted by President Johnson at 1800 on 

December 24, 1965, to permit the observance of a thirty-hour Christmas 

truce. The order sanctioned combat only if a critical situation arose. In 

102 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

Laos, just USAF F-4C BANGO and F-105 WHIPLASH aircraft and Navy 

carrier planes could respond to an emergency. 

Ambassador Sullivan and air and ground commanders vigorously 

opposed the bombing halt, which soon stretched to thirty-seven days 

while American officials, in a blaze of public and private diplomacy, 

tried to entice the Hanoi regime to the negotiating table. Sullivan 

particularly objected to linking a bombing halt in North Vietnam with 

military operations in Laos “where Hanoi never admits it is fighting 

anyway.” Persuaded, the president allowed BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, 

and TIGER HOUND operations to resume in Laos on Christmas Day. By 

December 28, Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots were again flying 

regular missions for all three programs, averaging about one hundred 

strike and armed reconnaissance sorties per day for the TIGER HOUND 

sector.61 

What had the Air Force and Navy aircrews accomplished against 

infiltration in Laos by the end of 1965? An assessment was not easy. As 

has been stressed, weather and jungle terrain made it difficult for pilots 

and photo analysts to determine the results of most air strikes. 

Nonetheless, a rough estimate was compiled by Air Force statisticians on 

DRV attrition in three target categories in the BARREL ROLL, STEEL 

TIGER, and TIGER HOUND programs as of December 23, 1965: 

AIRCREWS VEHICLES STRUCTURES BRIDGES 

Destroyed 

USAF 

US Navy 

67 494 143 

41 218 58 

Total 108 712 201 

Damaged 

USAF 44 328 60 

US Navy 71 143 114 

Total 115 47 1 174 

The air operations further took an undetermined number of enemy lives 

in both northern and southern Laos.62 

There was no reliable evidence, however, that the air programs had 

reduced the movement of enemy manpower toward South Vietnam. On 

the contrary, MACV’s analysts reported that infiltration was not abating 

103 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

but increasing. An estimated 26,188 new personnel* had arrived in the 

South in the past 12 months to augment Viet Cong units. This was 

slightly more than twice the 1964 total. Ninety percent were believed to 

be North Vietnamese, the remainder southern returnees. More and more 

were members of regular NVA regiments. Most of the infiltrators entered 

through southern Laos, the rest crossed the demilitarized zone, used 

Cambodian routes (although “hard” evidence was lacking), or arrived by 

sea.63 

In South Vietnam the battle tempo underscored the elusiveness of 

victory. Despite losses estimated at 35,000 killed and 6,000 wounded, the 

VC/NVA combat and combat support forces and other support personnel totaling about 229,700t waged conventional, guerrilla, and political 

war against a formidable array of air-supported South Vietnamese, 

American, and allied troops and paramilitary units. These numbered 

about 674,000 at the end of 1965.” The fact the communists were not 

wanting in weapons, ammunition, and other supplies attested to their 

ability to transport large quantities of war materiel to battlefield areas, 

although the amount was very difficult to determine.’ Laotian roadwatch 

teams and other intelligence sources reported a rising number of 

supply-laden trucks moving southward along key Laotian routes. Although Air Force, Navy, and-beginning in December 1965-Marine 

Corps pilots were beginning to find and destroy more trucks and 

structures, the extent of the enemy’s supply losses could only be 

guessed.64 

“Months later, MACV and RAND analysts reviewed more data. They boosted the 1965 

infiltration total to more than 36,000, a 3-fold increase over 1964. [M. G. Weiner, J. R. 

Brom, and R. E. Koon, Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam: 1959-1967 

(RM-5760-PR, Santa Monica, 1968), pp 43-45,] 

+About 39,000 of this total were believed to be political cadre. [Hist, MACV, 1965, p 

268.1 

*At the end of December 1965 the Saigon government’s regular forces totaled about 

197,600 and the Regional, Popular, and Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel about 

297,000. American forces numbered around 184,300 and allied troops about 22,300. [Hist, 

MACV, 1965, pp 269, 272.1 Additionally, there were some 14,000 American military 

personnel in Thailand, mostly Air Force, and 205 aircraft. There was in addition the 

Seventh Fleet’s carrier task force in the Gulf of Tonkin. [Van Staaveren, WAF Plans and 

Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965, pp 90, 92.1 

+A study by the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1967 speculated that during the Laotian 

dry season (September 1, 1965, to March 31, 1966) the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

succeeded in moving into South Vietnam through the Laotian panhandle a daily average of 

about thirty truckloads of supplies weighing around ninety tons. [Effects of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967), p 79.1 This was far above earlier MACV 

tonnage estimates. 

104 
EXPANSION OF AERIAL CAMPAIGN 

Nevertheless, Air Force and other military commanders were far 

from disheartened. They believed a further increase in air sorties and the 

adoption of new air programs, tactics, and weapons in the ensuing 

months would inflict sufficient pain on the communists in Laos and 

South and North Vietnam to impel them to end their “aggression” 

against the South Vietnamese government and people. 

105 

Chapter V 

New Aerial Programs 

and Tactics Against Infiltration 

January-June 1966 

The first half of 1966 witnessed continued expansion of the 

anti-infiltration campaign in Laos. As the year began, an administrationdirected bombing moratorium over the North was under way to induce 

Hanoi’s leaders to begin negotiations on ending the war. The moratorium released many Air Force and Navy aircraft for additional missions 

in Laos. From 3,023 attack sorties flown in December, the total rose to 

8,000 in January with most strikes against targets in the central and 

southern panhandle. When ROLLING THUNDER operations resumed on 

January 30, the Laotian attack level declined to 5,232 attack sorties in 

February, a figure still considerably higher than in December. 

Drier weather along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the inauguration of 

new air programs combined to increase the pace of the air and 

air-ground assault against enemy movements. During January the Air 

Force, in coordination with the American embassy in Vientiane, launched 

a CRICKET program against truck traffic and other targets in central 

Laos. In March the Air Force and MACV teamed up to interdict a newly 

discovered east-west infiltration artery in southernmost Laos designated 

Route 110. Commonly called the Sihanouk Trail because it ran through 

the northeastern tip of Cambodia, the route ended near the South 

Vietnamese border. In May the southernmost sectors of Laos and North 

Vietnam came under a special air assault known as GATE GUARD. In 

addition, the Air Force began a psychological leaflet program and 

integrated SAC B-52 and defoliation operations into the overall antiinfiltration effort in Laos.’ 

The CRICKET program, which began on January 21, 1966, evolved 

from discussions among representatives of 2d Air Division, MACV, and 

the Vientiane embassy’s air attache. CRICKET witnessed the first meshing 

of Thai-based USAF 0-1 forward air controllers and tribal roadwatch 

teams. Pilots of the low- and slow-flying 0-1 Bird Dogs had demonstrated in TIGER HOUND their superiority over speedy jets in spotting targets 

107 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

in jungle terrain and in directing Air Force, Navy, and Marine strike 

aircraft to them. The tribal roadwatch teams would augment the search 

for enemy trucks, truck parks, and supply sites underneath the jungle 

canopy. Team reports of targets would be sent to the 0-1 FAC pilots for 

verification and, if found valid, marked for attack.’ 

By the beginning of 1966, eight roadwatch teams were reporting on 

enemy movements between Mu Cia Pass and Route 9. Vientiane speeded 

the flow of roadwatch data and embassy requests for interdiction and 

close support to the deputy commander’s headquarters at Udorn, now 

headed by Maj. Gen. Charles R. Bond, Jr.*3 

The Air Force’s 0-1 aircraft belonged to Detachment 1 of the 505th 

Tactical Control Group at Nakhon Phanom, established at this Thai base 

on January 17, 1966. Commanded by Capt. Harry J. Pawlak, Jr., the 

detachment initially possessed five Bird Dogs, five pilots, and thirteen 

maintenance, communication, and administrative personnel. The pilots 

flew their first combat surveillance mission the next day. As in FAC 

operations in the TIGER HOUND program, an English-speaking RLAF 

observer sat behind the USAF 0-1 pilot to assist him in verifying targets 

and to authorize air strike^.^ 

The Cricket boundary was roughly 200 nautical miles from Nakhon 

Phanom, the range dictated by the capability of the small, single-engine 

0-1s. The forward air cont ollers flew their early missions mainly along 

routes that extended south of the Nape and Mu Gia Passes. As a 

secondary mission, the FACs flew support for FAR troops engaged in 

their see-saw battles with the PL/NVA in the northern sector of the 

STEEL TIGER zone.5 

By February 3, slightly more than two weeks after they began flying 

visual reconnaissance and FAC missions, the forward air controllers had 

tallied 118 sorties. Pilots reported killing scores of the enemy, destroying 

or damaging many trucks, antiaircraft positions, and structures, and 

triggering numerous secondary explosions. PACAF intelligence judged 

the initial operations “exceedingly effective” and expressed confidence 

that the assignment of more 0-ls, greater pilot and observer familiarity 

with the jungle terrain, and faster strike aircraft reaction to 0-1 and 

roadwatch targeting promised “even greater impact against infiltration of 

materiel and supplies into the lower panhandle of Laos and . . . RVN.”6 

‘General Bond assumed his post on January 7, 1966, with Brig. Gen. John R. Murphy 

becoming Assistant Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force. When the 

Seventh Air Force succeeded the 2d Air Division on April 1, 1966, Bond became Deputy 

Commander, Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force. 

108 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

This preliminary assessment of CRICKET proved, however, to be 

overly optimistic. Although the FAC pilots could readily divert Air Force 

or Navy aircraft to validated targets or target areas, roadwatch team 

intelligence on the enemy’s whereabouts was rarely timely, Team reports 

were not sent directly to the pilots but transmitted through other 

communication channels to the Air Force’s air attach6 office in Vientiane, or to the 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force headquarters at 

Udorn from where they were retransmitted to the FAC pilots. It was a 

five-step procedure, often consuming ten to twelve hours. A roadwatch 

team would report sighting, for example, a truck convoy and give its 

location, approximate speed, and direction. At first light, a USAF 

reconnaissance aircraft, usually an RF-101, would photograph the likely 

stopping point of the convoy. Photo interpreters in the intelligence 

section of the 2d Air Division/Thirteenth Air Force headquarters would 

try to pinpoint the convoy’s location. After the coordinates and any 

supporting data were passed to the detachment, the FAC pilot (code 

name GOMBEY) visually searched for the convoy. If he saw it, he flashed 

a request for a strike by Air Force or Navy aircraft already airborne or 

on alert on an air base or ~arrier.~ 

CRICKET operations expanded on February 8 when five more O-ls 

and six USAF pilots arrived at Nakhon Phanom. During the month, the 

O-ls were given a new mission: dropping tetrahedrons or road spikes 

along the roads to harass the drivers of trucks and other vehicles. Results 

could not be determined immediately.’ 

Late in February, four USAF AC-47 Spooky gunships, employed 

first in South Vietnam and in the TIGER HOUND program in southeastern 

Laos, augmented CRICKET operations. They were assigned exclusively to 

night missions because of their capability to fly as flareships, gunships, 

and FACs. They could also loiter for several hours. As in the 0-ls, Lao 

observers (when available) were aboard to validate targets, authorize 

strikes, and obtain strike verification from Vientiane or Savannakhet.’ 

The first CRICKET AC-47 night mission was flown on March 1. The 

gunship’s crew dropped 21 flares and expended about 13,000 rounds on 

road-construction personnel, 5 trucks, and a truck park. The AC-47s, 

along with other Air Force and Navy aircraft, also concentrated on 

destroying about 50 small bridges. Roadwatch teams had reported 

convoys, some consisting of 25 trucks, moving through the night. The 

truckers usually began their southward journey at dusk but occasionally 

as early as two in the afternoon. When not attacking bridges, the aircraft 

searched for and attacked trucks and road-repair and construction 

personnel, to demoralize them and slow their work.” 

By early March, the Americans had equipped several roadwatch 

teams with Hark-1 and Hark-2 ground-to-air communication sets that 

110 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

permitted direct reporting to either 0-1 or AC-47 FACs if the aircraft 

had a bilingual native observer aboard. Although the system promised to 

expedite calling in flare and strike aircraft, it was plagued at first with 

communication problems. There was also confusion about the use of the 

right frequencies. Intelligence personnel of 2d Air DivisiodThirteenth 

Air Force managed a partial solution to the problem for night operations 

when the enemy was most active. The ground teams were given a time 

schedule for flashing twice nightly a report on enemy dispositions or 

activities to an overhead gunship (the O-ls normally did not fly at 

night). The observer translated the data for the gunship’s gunners who 

would then attack the target. In addition to shortening strike reaction 

time, the ground-to-air communication system was expected to boost the 

morale of the roadwatchers, improve their motivation, and make them 

feel useful. Some teams were known to have sent false reports on enemy 

movements after having withdrawn from their assigned routes to less 

hazardous areas and more comfortable quarters. The Air Force strove to 

make the ground-to-air system more efficient in the ensuing months.” 

The gunships did not confine themselves exclusively to the CRICKET 

area but also flew over roads and trails in other sectors of STEEL TIGER. 

To permit full nighttime operations, one gunship took off at 1800 each 

evening, a second at midnight. To acquire a target, aircrews dropped 

flares in a suspected area, turned around to conduct an attack or, 

reverting to a FAC role, called in Air Force or Navy strike aircraft.” A 

typical CRICKET daily intelligence summary of March 29, 1966, illustrates 

the multipurpose role of the Spooky AC-47s: 

On night of 27 Mar Cricket AC-47 (Spooky 41/43/42) flew armed recce in 

[Cricket]. A. Spooky 41 was unable to establish contact with roadwatch teams. 

6000 rounds 7.62 were expended on RLAF Tgt Nr [target number] 109. No 

damage was visible. 6000 rounds was expended on a truck sighted at XD 0205 and 

over surrounding area. No BDA [bomb damage assessment]. B. Spooky 43 did not 

attempt team contact. RLAF Tgts [targets] 109 and 548 received 7500 and 3000 

rounds. No BDA. Flares were dropped over RLAF Tgt 527, truck park, but no 

probable tgts were sighted. C. Spooky 42 was unable to contact first 2 teams on 

prearranged schedule. Acft then went to area where Spooky 41 had sighted a 

truck. Upon arrival a 2 mile convoy was sighted moving south on Rt 911. 6000 

rounds were expended. Many trucks pulled off highway. Spooky and Blindbat 

(C-130 flareship) directed AF and Navy fighters onto tgts. No BDA from Spooky 

(who has requested API [armor piercing incendiary] ammo be provided). Several 

secondary explosions from fighter strikes.’’ 

Since the O-ls were the backbone of both CRICKET and TIGER 

HOUND operations, PACAF, MACV, and other officials quickly wanted 

more of them for the counterinfiltration program. Ambassador Martin in 

111 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Bangkok obtained State Department and Thai government approval to 

station a complete USAF tactical air support squadron at Nakhon 

Phanom.14 As a result, the 2d Air Division on April 1 sent twelve more 

O-ls and twelve pilots to the air base, bringing Detachment 3’s aircraft 

total to twenty-three O-ls and three AC-47s. The detachment was 

inactivated and the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron activated on June 

1 with twenty-two aircraft, twenty-five pilots, and associated maintenance personne~.’~ 

In the meantime, USAF 0-ls, AC-47s, and roadwatch teams 

continued their search for enemy trucks, truck parks, suspected or 

known troop and supply areas, and other RLAF-validated targets. Air 

Force and Navy pilots believed they were inflicting considerable attrition 

on the southward-moving communists. General Moore was especially 

encouraged by forward air controller performance both in CRICKET and 

in TIGER HOUND. In March 1966, he urged CRICKET O-ls to request 

strike aircraft directly from the TIGER HOUND ABCCC whenever USAF 

aircraft were not on ready-alert at Thai bases. l6 

Nonetheless, a variety of problems continued to mar CRICKET’S 

effectiveness. The Lao observers who flew with USAF 0-1 and AC-47 

FACs were often of marginal value in verifying targets or securing strike 

authority. Most had no previous air training, suffered from air sickness, 

and spoke poor English. The last was a major shortcoming. As a 

consequence, American officials in Vientiane made arrangements to 

substitute twelve pilot-trained translators more fluent in English. The 

changeover was time-consuming.” 

The vulnerability of the AC-47 gunships to stepped-up enemy 

antiaircraft fire was also a serious matter. Lt. Gen. Hewitt T. Wheless, 

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, suggested introducing a small 

number of recently modified, more durable, twin-engine B-26s. He said 

their range, speed, endurance, and their capability to carry flares and 

several types of ordnance, made them unusually suitable for a hazardous 

air environment. General Harris, the PACAF Commander, agreed. After 

obtaining the approval of Sullivan, Westmoreland, Sharp, and the JCS, 

the B-26Ks replaced the gunships in June 1966.’* 

For many FAC pilots, the 0-1 Bird Dog’s performance in the 

CRICKET area likewise left much to be desired. The aircraft weighed 

about 2,800 pounds, 400 in excess of original design. It climbed slowly, 

flew at low speed, possessed short endurance and, like an AC-47, was 

quite vulnerable to enemy ground fire. Armor-plating around the engine 

was not possible because of the aircraft’s excessive weight. The automatic 

direction finder was unreliable and the communication system inadequate 

for the assigned task of communicating with tribal roadwatch teams. 

112 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Unlike the AC-47s, the O-ls could not be replaced at once. A successor 

aircraft, the 0-2A, would not become available until late 1967.*19 

The aerial tactics in CRICKET and other counterinfiltration air 

programs were found wanting. Col. James P. Hagerstrom, the director 

of the air control system at Udorn saw in CRICKET’S execution a 

propensity by Air Force and Navy pilots to “drop a few bombs here, a 

few bombs there, a few bombs over there.” He proposed concentrating 

tactical bombing where it would do the most good-in the areas directly 

south of the Nape and Mu Gia Passes in Laos, before supplies along the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail spread out into a maze of roads and trails. “Unless 

it’s done here,’’ he said, “[we’re] never going to succeed,’’ for 

once the supplies get out of the [supply] arteries and into the capillaries, it 

becomes literally impossible to get them. And as long as you have “X” amount of 

airpower to apply, you ought to apply [the] airpower at the point where you get 

the greatest return . . . right adjacent to where the passes come in from North 

Vietnam. 

He was confident twenty-four-hour bombing and strafing attacks on 

supply areas against trucks, truck parks, and supply-carrying natives was 

possible. This meant combining all air- and ground-targeting intelligence and finding targets at night by infrared and starlight-scopet 

reconnaissance. But such an approach was not possible until an Air 

Force, rather than an Army commander (i.e., COMUSMACV), headed 

the air programs and determined how and where air power could be used 

most profitably. Without this command change, he feared the Air Force 

would be blamed for not being able to interdict the communist logistic 

system successfully. The Army might then employ more ground troops to 

“do the job.”20 

Finally, as in other interdiction efforts, CRICKET’S efficacy was 

eroded by the speed with which the enemy’s crews repaired bomb 

damage. FAC pilots estimated 1,000 local workers (in addition to NVA 

construction units) were in the CRICKET zone, constantly improving and 

extending infiltration routes and trails. Pilots observed an expanding 

network of trellises over segments of Route 911. After the jungle vines 

‘Despite the 0-1’s shortcomings, the demand for FAC aircraft in Southeast Asia 

remained so high that upon arrival the 0-2As supplemented rather than replaced the O-ls. 

The more versatile OV-10 FAC aircraft would not get to the war theater before 1968. 

+The starlight scope was an image intensifier that used reflected light from the stars or 

moon to identify targets. The scope was originally used by ground forces in night 

operations in South Vietnam. It was first used in Laos in an AC-47 gunship during the 

defense of Attopeu in early March 1966 (discussed later). 

113 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

and foliage interwove with the trellises, they noted, it would be very 

difficult to find the routes, especially after monsoon weather began to 

subside in September 1966.21 

Painfully aware of the foregoing problems, Lt. Col. Robert L. 

Johnson, Detachment 3 Commander-who would head the 23d Tactical 

Air Support Squadron upon its activation on June 1-convened a 

CRICKET tactics board to determine if operational improvements were 

possible. The board’s findings were endorsed by Colonel Johnson and 

General Bond, Deputy Commander at Udorn, and sent to Headquarters 

Seventh Air Force. They confirmed that the CRICKET air program was 

considerably less effective than at first believed. This was ascribed to 

poor air targeting procedures, the insufficiency of delay-fuze bombs, the 

communists’ ability to repair quickly its roads, trails, and bridges, and 

other previously enumerated reasons. The board recommended nearly a 

dozen remedial measures such as more judicious selection of traffic 

chokepoints and other targets, twenty-four-hour aerial surveillance of 

important routes, the use of more delay-fuze bombs, defoliation of 

jungle growth along routes and trails, and expanded tribal roadwatch 

targeting and air strike operations. As all had been previously tried or 

were under consideration, Brig. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, Seventh Air 

Force intelligence chief, replying on behalf of his headquarters, found 

nothing original in them. He said that some problems, like the 

insufficiency of delay-fuze bombs, were obviously contingent on greater 

production.22 

Colonel Johnson meanwhile encouraged his Bird Dog pilots to 

employ tactics as commensurate as possible with the board’s recommendations. The CRICKETS made a major truck “kill” on June 16 when they 

found and directed strikes on a convoy of enemy trucks trying to cross 

through a traffic chokepoint. Fourteen trucks were destroyed. Although 

the pilots believed that their revised tactics were significantly slowing the 

movement of enemy supplies and manpower, the evidence was hard to 

confirm. For the annual monsoon rains were now sweeping through the 

CRICKET zone and elsewhere in Laos, compelling the North Vietnamese 

to make their seasonal infiltration shift into South Vietnam eastward 

through southern North Vietnam and the demilitarized 

As in the CRICKET and STEEL TIGER operations, the TIGER HOUND 

assault against North Vietnamese infiltration intensified in the early 

weeks of 1966. By the end of January, the services were flying slightly 

more than 100 sorties a day against fixed targets and on armed 

reconnaissance. Combat sorties totaled 4,283 since the program’s inception on December 5, 1965, with the Air Force flying about 40 percent, 

the Navy 38 percent, and the Marines 22 percent. The TIGER HOUND 

Task Force had been augmented. In the task force headquarters at Tan 

114 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Son Nhut there were now 17 officers and airmen (9 USAF, 7 Army, 1 

Marine), and at Da Nang and the airstrips at Kontum, Kham DUC, Khe 

Sanh, and Dong Ha there were 78 officers and airmen (73 USAF, 4 

Army, 1 Marine).24 

Since the beginning of TIGER HOUND, Air Force and Navy pilots 

made a concerted effort to fly more sorties at night, when the enemy’s 

travel was heaviest. Although the Navy in the beginning flew more night 

sorties than the Air Force, the latter gradually enlarged its nocturnal 

operations. Early in January, it began scheduling one rather than several 

B-57s at a time with longer loitering C-130 Blindbat flareships, thereby 

stretching out route coverage time, and it boosted from six to ten the 

number of flare-equipped B-57s dispatched on single armed reconnaissance missions. After mid-January, more flare-equipped F-4Cs began to 

fly regular night armed reconnaissance. However, a shortage of C-130s 

and flares, because of their higher-priority use in South Vietnam, 

prevented the Air Force from scheduling uninterrupted dusk-to-dawn 

missions. 25 

Most Air Force, Navy, and Marine strike sorties, as previously, 

remained under FAC control. An Air Force ABCCC C-130 coordinated 

and controlled all of the aircraft in the TIGER HOUND operational area. 

With two Lao observers aboard, the aircraft communicated by single 

sideband radio with the India and Mohawk air operations centers at 

Vientiane and Savannakhet. When the C-130 was grounded for repairs, 

an EC-121 based at Tan Son Nhut served as a substitute control ship.26 

The additional air resources assigned to TIGER HOUND operations 

inevitably swelled reported strike results. In January 1966, for example, 

pilots hit 72 RLAF-validated targets and 182 others. Cratering and 

seeding 180 road segments, they caused 22 landslides and 120 secondary 

explosions. Huts and other structures in enemy territory were major 

targets, with pilots claiming 361 destroyed, 202 damaged, as well as 28 

bridges destroyed and damaged. The much-sought enemy supply-laden 

trucks continued to be elusive, with just 14 claimed destroyed and 5 

damaged despite their frequent detection by night photography and 

roadwatch teams. The statistical compilations included a fair number of 

restrikes on targets where the communists appeared to be quite active or 

where they had rebuilt or restored a bombed area.27 

As TIGER HOUND sorties expanded, they drew more enemy fire. On 

January 5 a Viet Cong mortar attack destroyed an 0-1 at the TIGER 

HOUND forward operating base of Khe Sanh. Ten airborne aircraft were 

hit during the month with four downed. On the 14th, gunners bagged an 

Army OV-lB, and so seriously damaged a Navy A-4C that the pilot was 

forced to eject near his carrier. Fortunately he was rescued. On the 16th, 

small-arms fire destroyed an Air Force F-4C, but the two-man crew was 

115 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

picked up. On the last day of January, a Navy A-lH, having sustained 

battle damage, made an emergency crash landing at the Saravane airstrip 

in the panhandle. Although the pilot survived, the Skyraider’s unexpended ordnance created a hazardous political as well as military situation. 

Consternation reigned among Vientiane embassy personnel lest newsmen 

discover and report the plane’s presence on Laotian soil, thereby 

jeopardizing the July 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos’s neutrality. 

Eventually, the ordnance was safely unloaded, the plane quietly dismantled, and its parts flown out of the country without publicity.28 

In February, after more C-130 Blindbats and flares were allocated 

to Laos, the Air Force’s TIGER HOUND night missions rose steeply. The 

Blindbats and accompanying strike aircraft were put on two 6-hour 

shifts, the first from 1800 to 2400, the second from 2400 to 0600. In the 

first 2 weeks of February, 117 of a total 704 USAF strike sorties were 

flown at night. The FACs and strike aircraft quickened their night 

surveillance of segments of Routes 9 and 92 and those running south of 

Tchepone. Both Navy and Marine Corps sorties were also mounted. All 

3 services were now claiming more trucks and other enemy targets 

destroyed and damaged.29 

With the assignment of further aircraft to TIGER HOUND operations 

(about seventy percent of all strike sorties in southern Laos were soon 

allocated to the program), and with round-the-clock coverage of infiltration routes, the Air Force ebulliently believed it could at long last 

seriously curb DRV vehicular infiltration into South Vietnam. It was all 

a matter of tactical innovation with a variety of air~raft.~’ The chief of 

the TIGER HOUND Task Force described the operations: 

Recognizing that the photo ships [i.e., Air Force and Navy Yankee Team 

reconnaissance aircraft] were going over [the routes] at random and getting trucks, 

we . . . followed the same tactics. We would have F-~C’S, for example, with 

CBU’s [cluster bomb units], make straight and level runs along roads that we 

knew were open and were being traveled. And we would drop flares, and have 

them drop in the areas, and we got many secondary explosions . . . the following 

day there was evidence that we had gotten quite a few trucks that way. 

We still weren’t satisfied with this kind of . . . program. We refined it further 

by adding the [Army] Mohawk-OV-1B aircraft-which is SLAR [side-looking 

airborne radar]-equipped. . . . It has immediate read-out capability for moving 

targets. So at the present time we have a team, consisting of the C-130 with flares, 

the OV-1B with a moving target capability, and strike aircraft operating as a 

package. The SLAR aircraft [pilot] will move up and down the roads, if he gets a 

moving target indication, he will mark the target with a flare. In turn, the C-130 

will pick up this particular coordinate, light up the area, and call in aircraft to hit 

116 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

the targets. We try to keep almost a 24-hour pressure-surveillance and attackon the area, route 9, 92, Tchepone [and] down south. 

In addition, we are using the AC-47’s in Tiger Hound.31 

Service claims, particularly Air Force, of enemy trucks destroyed 

and damaged continued to soar. In March the total was 344 and in April 

673, with the Air Force claiming 540, the Navy 31, and the Marine Corps 

102. On April 27 the Seventh Air Force “celebrated” its 1,000th truck 

destroyed since the inauguration of TIGER HOUND on December 5, 1965. 

Impressed by the reported high truck “kills,” Ambassador Sullivan 

opined that the enemy could “ill afford to take losses of this magnitude 

on a regular basis.” Concurrently, the 3 services were also destroying 

and damaging numerous structures, bridges, and antiaircraft sites, and 

making hundreds of road 

General Westmoreland took a more somber view of TIGER HOUND’S 

combat statistics and achievements. He saw no significant abatement of 

DRV infiltration into South Vietnam or serious casualties among road 

and trail repair crews in Laos. Claiming the campaign was “somewhat 

less” than fifty percent effective, he sent Chief of Staff Gen. John P. 

McConnell in early May a summary of air “lessons learned” in southern 

Laos. The principal lesson was one long obvious to U.S. airmen-the 

need for twenty-four-hour interdiction regardless of terrain or weather. 

To achieve this, he suggested that the Air Force improve the training of 

pilots flying armed reconnaissance (presently accounting for twenty-five 

percent of all enemy attrition in Laos), and of forward air controllers, 

air liaison officers, and photo interpreters. Westmoreland further suggested the coordination of data from target acquisition radars, sensors, and 

starlight scopes and the use of general purpose, napalm, cluster bomb 

unit (CBU), and “route denial” ordnance.33 

McConnell, who needed little advice on the subject, replied that 

more than a third of current 0-1 pilot training was devoted to visual and 

photo reconnaissance, and forward air controllers and air liaison officers 

generally received considerable training in mapreading. To enhance night 

air interdiction, he noted, the Air Force was engrossed in OPERATION 

SHED LIGHT, an “umbrella” for three separate but related research 

programs. One was PROJECT TROPIC MOON, using four TV-equipped 

A-lEs, and the second was PROJECT LONESOME TIGER, using a B-26K 

fitted with forward-looking infrared. Operational testing of both would 

begin in October 1966. The third was OPERATION BLACK SPOT which 

employed two radars and TV- and infrared-equipped C-123s carrying 

special cluster bomb unit ordnance dispensers. McConnell cautioned that 

117 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

target acquisition in bad weather was “one of the most difficult 

problems we face.” Although better radars were under development and 

a new Loran D navigation system would improve interdiction, more 

research was necessary to acquire the technology for hitting fleeting 

targets at night. Until it became available, the Air Force would use 

existing systems, including the recently installed MSQ-77 COMBAT 

SKYSPOT radar.*34 

Concurrently with the CRICKET operations in the northern STEEL 

TIGER sector, the Air Force and Navy on May 1 inaugurated a GATE 

GUARD aerial program that overlapped the Laotian boundary to include 

part of the Route Package I areat of southern North Vietnam. The 

rationale for GATE GUARD was to set up interdiction “gates” to block, if 

possible, enemy traffic at strategic road points. The geographical area 

extended from the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel northward 

roughly to a line running just below Vinh (between the 18th and 19th 

parallel) and across into the northern STEEL TIGER sector. The major 

target was enemy truck traffic. Important roads earmarked for GATE 

GUARD included segments of Routes 23, 911, and 912 in Laos and 

Routes lA, 101, 102, and 103 in southern North Vietnam.35 

Patterned after the TIGER HOUND program, GATE GUARD operations began along the Laotian routes and, as the southwest monsoon 

intensified in Laos, moved eastward into Route Package I. The Air Force 

employed C-130 ABCCCs, A-1Es for visual reconnaissance, RF-101s for 

flash photography, plus other reconnaissance aircraft equipped with 

infrared and side-looking airborne radar. Also used were C-130 Blindbats working with F-105 and other aircraft. The proliferation of enemy 

antiaircraft guns (some radar-controlled) and possible SA-2 missile sites 

in Route Package I prompted the Air Force to use F-100Fs and RB-66s 

as well. These planes carried equipment for detecting or neutralizing gun 

and missile radars.36 

Even though pilots believed they destroyed or damaged a fair 

number of enemy trucks at night, especially in Route Package I, several 

unanticipated problems led to GATE GUARD’S early termination. FAC 

pilots found reconnoitering over some of the major roads too hazardous 

for their slow-flying 0-ls, and strike pilots discovered that cratered 

*See Chapter VI for a discussion of the MSQ-77 radar system and its installation at 

South Vietnamese and Thai sites. 

+To improve Air Force and Navy coordination in the ROLLING THUNDER operations in 

North Vietnam, Admiral Sharp in December 1965 divided the North into six Route 

Packages. Route Package I consisted of the southernmost sector of the North Vietnamese 

panhandle. [Air Operations Against North Vietnam (Washington, 1966), Annex D to App 

.4 to Sec 11, pp 8-10, 190.1 

118 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

roads, especially along the flat coastal plain, were easily repaired or 

bypassed. Few truck parks could be attacked as the NVA usually left 

their vehicles inside of towns and villages, aware that American pilots 

were prohibited from striking civilian targets. Most important, a sudden 

shift in NVA infiltration through a corner of North Vietnam and across 

the demilitarized zone indicated that another specialized air program was 

needed against this sector. Known as TALLY Ho, it would be launched 

on July 20, 1966.*37 

Meanwhile, Seventh Air Force and MACV worked to improve the 

coordination between TIGER HOUND operations and the air-supported 

SHINING BRASS forays into the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By a new procedure 

a SHINING BRASS team would send its request to the Air Force’s C-130 

ABCCC (call sign HILLSBORO) via a supporting forward air controller. 

The request would include the statement, “This is a GOLDEN EARRING 

mission, I ant in contact.” “GOLDEN EARRING” meant the SHINING 

BRASS team had selected a target and had confirmed the enemy’s 

‘See Chapter VII. 

119 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

presence at the given coordinates. “I am in contact” signified the team 

was in the target area and its position was known to the FAC. The 

ABCCC would receive the strike request and retransmit it to the proper 

approving authority. After strike approval the ABCCC would either 

divert available airborne aircraft or ask for a special air mission.38 

Nine SHINING BRASWTIGER HOUND missions had been carried out 

by January 24, 1966, but some operational kinks remained. For example, 

on the night of January 6-7, 1968, SHINING BRASS team OHIO, emplaced 

near an infiltration point, heard enemy voices and vehicles and observed 

personnel movements. Desiring to assure an accurate strike, a U.S. team 

member, after lift-out of the team, flew over the same area with a USAF 

forward air controller to obtain a precise fix. He succeeded in pinpointing the area, instructed the FAC to call in aircraft, but a communications 

break prevented the request from reaching Vientiane’s target validation 

center. As a result, the mission was scrubbed.39 

SHINING BRASS team MAINE on February 17-18 had more luck. 

Reaching another trail segment, the team observed 16 personnel in one 

area and about 50 in another, which suggested that the enemy was 

concentrated in the region. A TIGER HOUND strike was requested. Two 

USAF A-1Es arrived promptly to drop 100- and 250-pound bombs and 

to strafe the locations. Except for 2 secondary explosions, results could 

not be determined, however.40 

Between February 27 and March 1, SHINING BRASS teams IDAHO 

and DAKOTA reconnoitered separate but adjacent areas in Laos across 

from Kontum Province in South Vietnam. They sought to determine the 

extent of a strike on a “Kontum 2” target but found only a few craters 

and no discernible damage to the enemy. Most of the B-52 bombs had 

detonated in the overhead tree canopy, with but a few striking the 

intended target area. 

Encountering the NVA, both teams called in TIGER HOUND aircraft. 

IDAHO’S request brought in 6 Navy and 4 USAF planes that bombed the 

area and strafed it with 20-mm cannon fire. DAKOTA came upon an 

NVA waystation with about 15 to 20 huts, 15 bundles of punji sticks (30 

to a bundle), and spotted about 10 personnel. In a brief firefight, the 

team wounded 2 members of the enemy unit, which withdrew. Before 

NVA reinforcements arrived, the DAKOTA team burned several huts 

including one holding more than 600 pounds of rice, then just before 

leaving called in TIGER HOUND aircraft. Eight Air Force and 4 Navy 

planes responded with bombs and rockets, but the results were 

~nknown.~’ 

By March, other SHINING BRASS teams, (IOWA, TEXAS, KANSAS, 

and OREGON) were entering select areas of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The 

120 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

earlier extremely long time lapses between a team’s request for TIGER 

HOUND aircraft and a strike had been reduced to 30 to 40 minutes. The 

month’s major operation was triggered by SHINING BRASS team MAINE, 

which stumbled upon several huts containing, variously, several wrapped 

75-mm pack howitzers, binoculars, six 100-foot lengths of rope, and 

other items. The team found more huts, structures, and a well-built trail 

in 2 other nearby locations. Guided by a fire set by the team, 20 aircraft 

blasted the area with 500-pound bombs and strafed it, destroying an 

estimated 6 unpacked 75-mm howitzers, 2 huts, and causing one 

secondary explosion. Judging that the area was probably a major enemy 

installation, the team recommended it be targeted for a B-52 ARC LIGHT 

strike.42 

At times SHINING BRASS teams engaged the enemy accidentally or 

by design. Some officials, however, believed that the teams should not 

provoke firefights, which usually ended their high-priority intelligence 

gathering and targeting missions. Aware of the team incursions, the NVA 

began lying in wait for them, coordinating their patrols, using decoy 

tactics, and stepping up their automatic-weapons fire. Upon helicopter 

lift-out of team MAINE on March 19, for example, heavy automaticweapons fire was aimed at a forward air control aircraft and the 

departing helicopters. An accompanying Army UH-1 B helicopter that 

returned fire believed it succeeded in silencing one of the automaticweapons positions.43 

By April, May, and June 1966, SHINING BRASS operations had 

become routine with the teams reconnoitering and targeting about six 

locations a month for air strikes, and gathering more data on the 

enemy’s infiltration activities. Aircraft destroyed numerous huts and 

other structures, grain and other supplies and suspected supply areas, 

troop rest or encampment areas, and similar targets. There were 

occasional firefights resulting in enemy casualties. The exact amount of 

destruction and damage inflicted during the TIGER HOUND air strikes 

remained, as usual, difficult to assess, although the presumption was that 

it was considerable. The operations were believed worth the effort. 

Usually, no prisoners were taken, but team IOWA at the end of May 

succeeded in capturing and bringing back two members of an NVA 

regiment .44 

As the tempo of SHINING BRASWTIGER HOUND operations rose in 

the first half of 1966, General Westmoreland urged Vientiane and 

Washington to sanction airlifts of larger, US-led battalion-size SHINING 

BRASS “exploitation forces” into selected areas of the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail. In addition to intelligence gathering and air targeting, the 

exploitation forces would aggressively attack and harass the enemy along 

the trail with Air Force and other TIGER HOUND aircraft in support. The 

121 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

proposal touched off another abrasive argument with Ambassador 

~ullivan.~~ 

Developed in late 1965, Westmoreland’s exploitation force concept 

envisaged training and equipping 540-man battalions composed of South 

Vietnamese Nung tribesmen. The MACV commander directed in December 1965 the equipping of 1 battalion and in January 1966 recommended equipping 2 more. He desired to activate all 3 battalions on 

March 3, June 1, and June 30, respectively. Until Sullivan as well as 

State and Defense officials in Washington approved, the battalions 

would attack infiltration solely within South Vietnam near the Laotian 

border.46 

General Harris, the PACAF Commander, supported the exploitation 

force concept to uncover new targets for tactical air strikes. Admiral 

Sharp likewise backed it and solicited Joint Chiefs of Staff 

endorsement .47 

Sullivan’s initial reaction was totally negative. Never enamored of 

SHINING BRASS activities, which he characterized essentially as “an eagle 

scout program devised by some extremely well-motivated young men,” 

he construed the TIGER HOUND air and the SHINING BRASS ground 

reconnaissance programs as inherently incompatible. The first, he said, 

attempted to saturate a designated enemy area by air; the latter desired 

to cover the same area by patrolling foot soldiers. They were competing 

concepts that often generated interservice rivalry. In one instance, he 

observed, a SHINING BRASS representative complained to him about 

giving their target to the Air Force, thus depriving SHINING BRASS 

personnel of their “brownie points.” 

Sullivan had other objections. Each 540-man exploitation force 

required the leadership of 30 to 40 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel, 

a number that would run head on into Souvanna’s well-known aversion 

to having foreign troops on Laotian soil. He doubted if the prime 

minister could withstand the “international heat” if the size of the force 

and the number of accompanying Americans became publicly known. 

The ambassador predicted that the chances of Souvanna approving the 

battalions were “absolute zero.” He warned Washington against using 

them without Souvanna’s approval and the danger of some Americans 

being captured by the NVA. This would seriously undermine the prime 

minister’s credibility and make it very difficult to secure his consent later 

for more significant military programs.48 

The State Department supported Sullivan’s position but left the door 

ajar for a final decision pending further discussion of the exploitation 

force concept at the JCSIOSD level and at a SEACOORD meeting 

scheduled for January 24-25 in Bangkok.49 

122 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

At the Bangkok conclave, Westmoreland and Sullivan sparred again 

over the exploitation force proposal with the ambassador raising new 

objections. He stressed the need to “play square” with Souvanna, the 

likelihood of lesser DRV military and political repercussions arising from 

the use of small SHINING BRASS teams rather than large exploitation 

forces, and the recent furor in the United States created by reports the 

administration contemplated sending ground troops into Laos. However, 

if the MACV commander insisted on using the Nung tribesmen against 

infiltration, Sullivan urged that they be trained in Laos, be nominally 

attached to FAR Maj. Gen. Phasouk Somly’s Military Region IV, and 

attack the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the west. Westmoreland considered 

these conditions ~nworkable.~’ 

As the two officials were unable to make a joint recommendation, 

Washington let the exploitation force concept languish in the ensuing 

months. The impasse lasted until May 24 when Sullivan finally assented 

to the use of Nung tribesmen if they were organized into platoon rather 

than battalion-size units, and accompanied by no more than three 

American Army Special Forces advisers. He laid down other strictures on 

the use of the platoons: no more than four missions per month, a 

maximum six-mile penetration into Laos, a limit of five days on 

operations in enemy territory, and employment of the same helicopters 

for delivering the platoons to and from a target area. Further, Westmoreland would have to send to the Vientiane embassy a forty-eight-hour 

advance notice of intent for a platoon launch, abstain from the first 

launch until June 7, abide by the existing rules, and include platoon 

incursion plans in the regular monthly SHINING BRASS operations 

schedule.51 

Admiral Sharp and the JCS endorsed the agreement which would 

signify the beginning of Phase I1 of the SHINING BRASS program. 

McNamara consented on June 16, stipulating that he and Secretary Rusk 

should be informed of all MACV Phase 11, intent-to-launch messages to 

Sullivan. Until the results of the platoon-size operations could be 

evaluated, Westmoreland’s planning for still larger air-supported crossborder units, designated Phase I11 of the SHINING BRASS program, was 

put on the shelf.52 

With Vientiane’s and Washington’s approval in hand, Westmoreland 

sent his first platoon exploitation force to the Ho Chi Minh Trail on 

June 26. Entering a predesignated area that had been reconnoitered, as 

required, by a SHINING BRASS team, the platoon quickly destroyed 

twenty-five huts and other structures. The only strike support was 

provided by four UH-1B Army armed helicopters that destroyed 

forty-two water buffalo. Thus began another air-ground program to 

123 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

augment the intelligence gathering, targeting, and harassing operations 

against enemy infiltration in southeastern Laos.53 

The period also witnessed the beginning of limited U.S. air and 

covert ground reconnaissance operations against a new west-to-east 

infiltration route beginning in the southernmost STEEL TIGER sector. 

Brig. Gen. Oudone Sananikone, the FAR Chief of Staff, informed 

American officials of the new route in late March. It ran from the 

southern extremity of Route 96, part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, east for 

about sixty miles connecting with roads in the northernmost tip of 

Cambodia, thence into Kontum Province in South Vietnam’s I1 Corps 

Tactical Zone. General Thao Ma christened the new artery the Sihanouk 

Trail, and U.S. intelligence designated it Route 1 

General Thao Ma’s T-28s quickly began flying over the Laotian 

portion of the route. General Westmoreland also wanted to use U.S. 

aircraft for route surveillance on the Cambodian as well as the Laotian 

segments. Higher authorities swiftly approved missions in Laos but not 

in still-neutral Cambodia. In late May, USAF AC-47s flew their first 

night missions over the Laotian segment of Route 110. U.S. guidelines 

forbade the gunships from venturing closer than four nautical miles of 

the Cambodian border or endangering FAR troops encamped near the 

road.55 

Because of a paucity of information about the DRV’s truck 

movements and other logistic activities along and near Route 110, 

General Westmoreland also ordered limited ground reconnaissance of the 

route. Special guerrilla units of MACV’s Studies and Observations 

Group were tapped to make the ground survey. The first guerrilla 

penetration into the area on May 26 was stymied by bad weather and the 

presence of too many enemy troops, but that same day a unit reached a 

segment of Route 110 between Kong My and Muong May to look for 

truck traffic and to mine the road. Seeing no traffic, the guerrillas 

planted eight antivehicular and thirty-two antipersonnel mines on the 

road segment, booby-trapping them to prevent their removal without 

exploding. The unit was then whisked out by heli~opter.~~ 

Air reconnaissance in subsequent days failed to confirm if any of the 

mines had been disarmed or exploded. A second guerrilla unit was 

therefore sent into the area and reached Route 110 on June 2. The unit 

detected no evidence of exploded mines and destroyed trucks, but 

discovered a new wooden bridge and corduroy surfacing on a nearby 

trail. 57 

A Laotian roadwatch team was likewise sent into the route’s mined 

area and saw no truck traffic. Nor did further U.S. air reconnaissance 

detect any. Westmoreland’s plan to have the RLAF fly daily missions 

124 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

over the same route segment did not pan out when General Thao Ma, 

the Laotian air chief,* became embroiled in a local political and military 

controversy. Some FAR high command members accused Ma of using 

his T-28s more frequently for the convenience of the Americans than for 

FAR ground forces. With the RLAF T-28 strike force temporarily 

unavailable and U.S. reconnaissance unprofitable, Westmoreland suspended aerial action against Route 110 until October 1966. Then on the 

basis of fresh reports of extensive logistic movements along the route and 

a nearby supply buildup, Seventh Air Force tactical aircraft and Strategic 

Air Command B-52s conducted their first two air-ground SLAM (Select, 

Locate, Annihilate, Monitor) strikes against the area.58 

Not all operations in the STEEL TIGER area were scheduled strictly 

for anti-infiltration armed reconnaissance and against RLAF-approved 

fixed targets. Air Force and Navy aircraft at times flew in support of 

FAR units encamped near the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

In early March, Generals Thao Ma and Phasouk Somly requested 

special USAF assistance to defend the city of Attopeu which was being 

threatened by the NVA. The North Vietnamese already controlled Muang 

Kao and Ban Fangdeng, two towns east of the city. The two generals 

were convinced the foe planned to capture Attopeu and the surrounding 

area to set up an alternate supply route using the Mekong River’s 

tributaries through Cambodia to southernmost Laos and the delta region. 

RLAF T-28s and Air Force and Navy aircraft had made intermittent 

daylight attacks on the communist positions near Attopeu, but the enemy 

troops were veterans, unafraid of daytime attacks and well dug-in. Their 

propensity to attack FAR troops mostly at night alarmed Thao Ma and 

Phasouk who wanted special Air Force night strikes to stop them.59 

The two Laotian officers initially appealed for aid to Capt. Jack B. 

Ryan, an assistant air attache at Savannakhet, who instantly relayed their 

request to the headquarters of the 2d Air Division deputy commander in 

Udorn. Advised of the threat to Attopeu, General Westmoreland asked 

Sullivan to allow the use of some TIGER HOUND aircraft in the area, but 

the ambassador held up the request and refused to solicit the approval of 

FAR authorities in Vientiane. While Westmoreland was perplexed, it 

appeared that Sullivan was unhappy with the trend towards employing 

more and more sorties for the counterinfiltration program in the 

*For further details of Gen. Thao Ma’s political problems in May and early June 1966, 

see Anthony, “A Military History of the War in Northern Laos, 1945-1968,” Chap IX. 

125 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

panhandle at the expense of adequate support for BARREL ROLL. Hence 

he was not about to permit the diversion of many aircraft to the south, 

whatever the crisis.*60 

After pondering the problem, the American ambassador authorized 

some token air support. This consisted of the temporary deployment to 

Savannakhet of two AC-47 gunships from Tan Son Nhut Air Base for 

night operations, and of two 0-1Fs from Nakhon Phanom for daytime 

visual reconnaissance. The aircraft were requested by Col. James R. 

Carter, the Director of Operations, and Col. James P. Hagerstrom, the 

TACC Director, both at Udorn.61 

The military forces around Attopeu at the beginning of March 

consisted of about 3 FAR battalions in a defensive posture, and 6 NVA 

battalions. The FAR troops were demoralized. In a recent firefight with 

the NVA, a FAR unit had been badly mauled, losing 200 soldiers killed 

and 100 wounded. The killed included 2 majors, both assistant battalion 

commanders. 

As the threat to Attopeu seemed imminent, RLAF T-28s, again 

available, began striking enemy positions on March 3. The first USAF 

AC-47 gunship (Spooky 41) went into action the next evening. The crew 

included two RLAF officers serving as observers and mission coordinators. Also aboard the gunship was a newly developed starlight scope, a 

light-intensifying four-power scope previously used by American ground 

troops in South Vietnam for night operations. Colonel Hagerstrom 

wanted the scope tested in Laos.63 

The gunship pilot began his initial mission at 1650 on the 4th, but 

encountering radio problems and uncertain about the disposition of 

friendly and enemy troops, he landed at an airstrip for further briefings. 

At 2005 the gunship was airborne again and crewmembers shortly found 

some of the enemy along the road between Attopeu and communist-held 

Muang Kao, ten miles east. The gunners strafed the road but were 

unable to assess the results of the attack. As the plane continued to 

orbit, its navigator spotted something interesting. According to the pilot, 

Maj . George W. Jensen: 

‘As noted earlier, Westmoreland and Sullivan were constantly at loggerheads over the 

relative air priorities in the war. As Westmoreland put it in a message to Admiral Sharp, 

“I’ve pointed out to Ambassador Sullivan . . . it must be clear that . . . SVN [South 

Vietnam] and the contiguous areas of Tiger Hound, Steel Tiger, and [Route Package] I [in 

southern North Vietnam] remain as higher priority commitments.” [Msg, MACV to DIA, 

CINCPAC, 1014402 Mar 66; Anthony, “A Military History of the War in Northern Laos, 

1945-1968,” Chap IX.] 

126 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

While we were orbiting, after hitting the road, the navigator, who was in the 

rear at the main cargo door, sitting there-he was tied in by rope-spotted 

between 150 and 200 VC [Wet Cong], or what we found out to be VC, in the rice 

paddies between the two known areas of the friendlies and the unfriendlies. Kind 

of in a no-mans land. . . . he was using the Starscope. We did not drop flares: 

there was a good moon out. There was a minimum of haze at that time and the 

Starscope really worked to full advantage. He saw these personnel moving on the 

ground. I called back and asked if they by chance had an operation out there that 

was utilizing these people and if they were friendlies. They came back and said 

that they had no operation, that these people were fair game-so we hit them! 

The navigator was surprised to see enemy movements so well 

through the starlight scope. As the troops appeared to be marching 

toward Attopeu, the minigunners opened up. After they had expended 

1,500 rounds, 2 of the miniguns aboard Spooky 41 jammed. On the 

ground, the troops had darted from the road and hid in nearby trees 

which were also sprayed by the working miniguns. About 100 troops 

were seen entering a pagoda, forcing the aircrew to withhold fire. Upon 

receiving clearance to attack the pagoda and surrounding area, they 

poured in another 3,000 rounds. The gunship kept orbiting and began 

attacking various targets, experiencing all the while electrical problems 

that did not interfere with the firing. Flares, dropped by the aircrew, lit 

up the battle area.64 

The minigunners expended about 13,500 rounds before Spooky 41 

left for Nakhon Phanom and was replaced at 2215 by another gunship 

(Spooky 43). The latter, minus a starlight scope, orbited over the battle 

area for the remainder of the night, dropping flares and firing into 

suspected enemy positions. Uncertainty over what gunship fire achieved 

during the night was dispelled early on the morning of March 5 when 

Capt. Benn H. Witterman, Commander of Detachment 3 of the 505th 

Tactical Control Group at Nakhon Phanom, and Capt. Gary D. Cool 

flew over enemy positions in an 0-1 Bird Dog. They counted no less 

than 52 dead troops. Captain Witterman described the scene around the 

rice paddy and in the nearby ditches: 

So Captain Cool and I went up, and we went around and we found the original 26 

bodies, and then by God, we found another 26 bodies, all laying out in a relatively 

open area, in a paddy. Uh . . . these paddies are kind of divided up by small 

shallow canals, and of course in the dry season they were all dried up, so they 

were just like ditches, and these people were strung out in the ditches, and that’s 

where they apparently had been spotted . . . and about a half dozen were right in 

the open in the paddies, sprawled out, and in several places you could see spots 

where obviously a body had been laying, and bled a lot, and then they pulled it 

away.65 

127 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Witterman and Cool flew over the region for 45 minutes without 

drawing enemy fire, suggesting that the previous night’s operations had 

also knocked out local air defenses. Additional daytime U.S. and RLAF 

strikes on the 5th virtually destroyed Ban Fangdeng and other buildings 

in the area.66 

Generals Thao Ma and Phasouk, the assistant air attach6 at 

Savannakhet, and USAF commanders and officers associated with the air 

defense of Attopeu were extremely pleased with the air operations, 

especially the performance of the two gunships. The threat to the city 

was contained. General Thao Ma claimed that the USAF strikes had 

boosted the morale of local FAR troops. General Bond, Deputy 

Commander, 2d Air DivisiodThirteenth Air Force, praised the gunships’ 

performance and informed the 14th Air Commando Wing commander 

that poststrike data indicated no less than 100 enemy troops were killed 

by air-possibly as many as 250-and many others were wounded. 

Colonel Hagerstrom was particularly elated over the performance of the 

Spooky 41 gunship which, he believed, had broken the back of an 

estimated 800-man enemy force. He saw in the operation a lesson, “not 

to fight a war of attrition, infantryman versus infantryman, but to let air 

power destroy the enemy.”67 

The importance of close air support for FAR and Lao guerrilla 

forces had been demonstrated frequently, of course, in the vicinity of the 

Plain of Jars and elsewhere in northern Laos. But the battle for Attopeu 

underscored the potential of starlight scope-equipped AC-47 gunships at 

night where enemy ground defenses were not too lethal. Over the long 

run, however, the air-to-ground attacks near Attopeu were only a brief 

costly interlude in the DRV’s expanding use of infiltration routes and 

trails in southern Laos and northern Cambodia. 

Inevitably, the rising tempo of STEEL TIGER, CRICKET, and TIGER 

HOUND operations over Laos’s jungles and forests produced another 

series of aerial mishaps. On December 31, Air Force planes struck a 

civilian target near Saravane, causing civilian damage and casualties. In 

the first week of January 1966, unidentified propeller aircraft hit several 

nonapproved targets and target areas. They destroyed the village of Ban 

Kagnak, damaged the village of Ban Kengxai, and dropped bombs north 

and south of the village of Ban Sok. Many villagers of these bombed 

areas in Military Region IV sought refuge in nearby forests and caves in 

the daytime. Some headed toward Attopeu hoping to find safety there. 

Later in the month there were more serious mis-strikes against friendly 

personnel in Military Region IV. Presumably, jet aircraft killed three and 

wounded seven in one strike, and in another killed four and wounded 

nine. The latter occurred during an accidental attack on a small FAR 

airfield designated as a short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) site.68 

128 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Investigations launched by 2d Air Division, Seventh Fleet, and 

embassy officials established that the December 3 1 mis-strike southeast 

of Saravane resulted from the transmission of the wrong target coordinates to the AC-47 FAC, and because the target resembled the validated 

one. Responsibility for the other short rounds could not be fixed 

immediately. Air Force and Navy flight records could not be correlated 

with the incidents, suggesting that reports on the day and time of the 

strikes, type of aircraft, coordinates, ordnance employed, and extent of 

damage were not entirely accurate. Other possibilities were that jet and 

AC-47 pilots unknowingly committed navigation errors, or engaged in 

unauthorized attacks.69 

In conjunction with the investigations, Emory C. Swank, the Deputy 

Chief of Mission in Vientiane, and Colonel Pettigrew met on January 11 

with Lao military and civil officials in Saravane, Attopeu, and Pakse, all 

near the villages or areas where the short rounds took place. Although 

the Lao officials appreciated the American aerial effort, they expressed 

deep concern about the safety of the populace. General Thao Ma 

personally asked the 2d Air Division and Seventh Fleet air commanders 

through Colonel Pettigrew to avoid striking villages not clearly marked 

as friendl~.~' 

Perturbed as always by mis-strikes, Ambassador Sullivan on January 

14 narrowed the STEEL TIGER operational boundary to the southernmost 

sector of Laos. He believed this would minimize navigational errors while 

keeping the most important military areas open to bombing. He looked 

forward to the full activation in southern Laos of a new tactical air 

navigation system that had been recently installed at Phou Kate south of 

Saravane.* This would let him cancel the temporary aerial restrictions in 

a vital infiltration sector.71 

Although tactical air navigation systems in northern and southern 

Laos were indispensable, they could not prevent human error. On 

February 5, 1966, a flight of two Air Force F-4Cs, diverted from a 

BARREL ROLL mission, accidentally struck the town of Muong Hiem in 

Xiengkhouang Province in northern Laos, the headquarters of one of 

neutralist Brig. Gen. Kong Le's battalions. The strike killed twelve 

friendlies and wounded thirty-seven. Investigation disclosed that the 

pilots believed they were attacking moving vehicles on a road, an error 

*An Army helicopter lifted the tactical air navigation system from Ubon Air Base to 

the Phou Kate site on January 9, 1966, and testing got under way two days later. The site 

was manned by USAF technicians [Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPACAF, 020800 Jan 

66; 2d AD to 1st MbI Comm Gp, Clark AB, 0609112; AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 

0605452 Jan 66; CINPAC to JCS, 1103402 Jan 66.1 

129 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

attributed to the flight leader’s failure to update area targeting data and 

to secure target c~nfirmation.~~ 

More serious politically were two mis-strikes in the panhandle on 

February 23. The first was committed by a flight of several Air Force 

F-105 Thunderchiefs about 30 miles west of the authorized western 

STEEL TIGER boundary in Military Region 111. They attempted to crater 

with 750-pound bombs a segment of Route 9 within 5 miles of Muong 

Phalane. Shrapnel from about 10 bombs dropped by 2 Thunderchiefs 

demolished the command post of the FAR’S Group Mobile 15, the same 

unit struck accidentally by Navy aircraft in April 1965. Surprisingly only 

1 soldier was killed and several wounded, although considerable weapons, ammunition, clothing, and other materiel were destroyed. Shortly 

afterwards, about 10 miles northeast of the first incident, 3 more F-l05s, 

apparently aiming at a ford across a small stream, struck near Ban Na 

Ka Pat village, killing a woman, injuring a boy and girl, and destroying 

15 dwellings including a rice storage building.73 

Because of the attack on the FAR command post, General Thao Ma 

requested and Sullivan agreed to suspend all armed reconnaissance and 

strikes on RLAF-validated targets in the STEEL TIGER sector except those 

under FAC control. On February 25 he modified the restriction, barring 

all flights below 18,000 feet within a 35-mile radius of Muong Phalane 

except for attacks on prebriefed, RLAF-validated targets. All aircraft, 

including those assigned to YANKEE TEAM missions, were instructed to 

avoid Muong Phalane by as great a distance and at the highest altitude 

practicable. Two RLAF fixed targets near the town were placed off 

limits .74 

An investigating team that included Colonel Pettigrew and 2d Air 

Division and RLAF officers visited the former Group Mobile 15 

command post. To their chagrin, they found a placard in front of a 

bombcasing that roughly translated read: “This material, while meant 

for the Communists, is being used in practice on us.” The FAR 

command post commander and his fellow soldiers were anything but 

friendly. Colonel Pettigrew expressed the usual condolences and assurances that mis-strikes would not occur again. The investigators left 

behind an American forward air controller with a radio as insurance 

against another air strike in the area, to ease tensions, and rebuild 

confidence among the Lao troops. Efforts were undertaken quickly to 

make restitution to* and win the allegiance of the villagers of Ban Na Ka 

Pat who had recently been associated with the Pathet Lao.75 

‘To Ambassador Sullivan’s considerable irritation, making quick U.S. restitution for 

Laotian lives lost and property destroyed and damaged because of air strikes was a political 

“ball of wax.” He wanted the Air Force and Navy to have authority to make solatiurn 

130 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Although he decried the bombing of wrong targets, General Westmoreland was highly disenchanted with Sullivan’s decision truncating 

STEEL TIGER operations. “We cannot . . . afford to stop a major 

portion of our operations,” he said, “while conducting an investigation.” He warned that a slowdown or halt in STEEL TIGER interdiction 

would encourage the enemy to step up infiltration of men and supplies.76 

Sullivan responded only partially to the MACV commander’s 

concern. He lifted the ban against armed reconnaissance within a 

thirty-five-mile radius of Muong Phalane, but stipulated future air 

operations within the area had to be FAC-controlled. The main problem, 

he said, was how to persuade Souvanna Phouma and General Thao Ma 

that the benefits derived from armed reconnaissance in the STEEL TIGER 

sector outweighed the loss of life, property damage, and psychological 

burden of repeated attacks on friendly villages and positions. Souvanna 

was “at a loss to understand” why bombing errors took place after the 

new tactical air navigation system at Phou Kate became operational. 

The ambassador further informed Westmoreland that he and other 

embassy personnel had “growing misgivings” about the efficacy of 

armed reconnaissance without forward air controllers in the STEEL TIGER 

area west of the TIGER HOUND boundary. A cursory review of such 

missions-in contrast with TIGER HOUND operations and attacks against 

validated fixed targets in the STEEL TIGER area-revealed that most 

ordnance was used for road cratering and seeding and “may have at best 

a marginal impact on enemy operations.’”’ 

There were two more short-round incidents in March. On the 2d, 

unidentified aircraft hit a restricted area near a small FAR airstrip (called 

STOL Site 48),* and on the 5th, two USAF A-1Es accidentally attack a 

Laotian army site while bombing along a route in the panhandle. The 

incident was ascribed to failure of the pilots to recognize landmarks and 

their belated discovery after expending ordnance that they were in a 

restricted area. Ambassador Sullivan quickly halted further air operations 

in a ten-mile radius around STOL Site 48.78 

At this juncture, the State Department’s deep concern lest the short 

rounds undo the entire American air program in Laos impelled U. Alexis 

payments as necessary to war victims with the Air Force serving as executive agent. But the 

Air Force insisted it could not do so as the war in Laos was only technically a “combat 

situation.” In early February 1966, State finally set aside 18 million kip from counterpart 

funds to be administered by the Lao government for payment by provincial governors to 

claimants and waived auditing requirements. [Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

CINCPAC, 0805002 Feb 66; SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, CINCPAC, 527, 0814522 

Feb 66.1 

*In the early 1960s numerous small FAR airstrips or short-takeoff-and-landing sites 

were numbered to assist in identification. 

131 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to bring 

the problem directly to the attention of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. Despite strict rules of engagement and the 

installation of navigational aids in Laos (including the new system at 

Phou Kate), Johnson observed, “the number of serious incidents of air 

strikes on friendly and [other] targets seems to rise.” “Aside from the 

loss of life and property,” he said, “we have to consider [the] problem 

of loyalty of Laos military units and continued loyalty of villagers to 

Souvanna Phouma.” While acknowledging the difficulties and risks 

facing pilots, State’s deputy secretary nonetheless hoped Vance could 

find some way of “sharply reducing” the costly mistakes “so that their 

continuation does not jeopardize our larger interest.” He solicited any 

suggestions or actions that might prove helpful.79 

The joint chiefs, asked to comment on the State Department’s 

concerns, were less alarmed. “It is a lesson of history,” they informed 

Secretary McNamara at the end of March, “there will be some friendly 

casualties in an active combat area, and no feasible restrictions or rules 

or procedures could guarantee this.” In fact they forecast more short 

rounds, although the short-round rate in the past 6 months showed a 

“substantial downward trend.” The rate per 1,000 sorties had been 

reduced from about 5 in the first quarter of 1965 to about 0.4 at 

present-a 35-fold improvement.*’ 

Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, also requested an 

accounting of the air mishaps from the Air Staff. In mid-April, Gen. 

William H. Blanchard, Vice Chief of Staff, submitted a list of incidents 

blaming the Navy for nine and the Air Force for seven. The investigations disclosed, said Blanchard, that no causes could be found for seven 

of the ten incidents prior to November 1965 and that some alleged 

mis-strikes were in approved target areas. The chief cause for short 

rounds was misidentification of targets, followed by navigation errors 

(the latter were being reduced by the installation of more navigation 

aids). The transmission of erroneous target coordinates caused one short 

round.81 

Sullivan’s tightening of the air rules and the glare of high-level 

attention had their impact. In the ensuing weeks, they injected more 

caution into strike planning and operations in Laos. Mis-strikes could 

not be completely avoided however. The reason lay in pilots’ being 

constantly enjoined to hit many small fixed and fleeting targets in jungle 

terrain under adverse weather and atmospheric conditions. In the months 

to come, there would be more mis-strikes followed by new restrictions. 

Supportive of the tactical STEEL TIGER, CRICKET, and TIGER 

HOUND counterinfiltration operations in southern Laos were B-52 

strikes. Because the Lao government had not been officially informed of 

132 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

American intent to use the superbombers, publicity engendered by the 

first strike on December 12, 1965, impelled Ambassador Sullivan to 

cancel temporarily plans to conduct more, 

By January 1966, U.S. planning to resume B-52 strikes on targets 

contiguous to South Vietnam’s five northernmost provinces had resumed 

with caution. Sullivan wished to avoid official waffling with a simple 

“no comment” from Washington as in the wake of the strike of 

December 12, 1965. Unless bombing secrecy was assured, the ambassador 

saw no alternative but to frankly ask Souvanna Phouma’s approval of 

B-52 operations “ with . . . considerable prospect . . . [his] concurrence 

will be withheld.” After the press flap about the December 12 bombing 

subsided, Sullivan was hopeful he could persuade Souvanna to accept the 

bombers to supplement the tactical air programs in Laos.82 

General Westmoreland agreed and relayed to Admiral Sharp the 

request for “appropriate assurances” from State and Defense officials to 

conform with Sullivan’s adamant insistence on B-52 bombing secrecy in 

Laos. In the days that followed, the MACV commander sent to 

Washington a list of proposed B-52 targets astride the Laotian-South 

Vietnamese border.83 

Like tactical operations, those of SAC B-52s were far from simple, 

with the Air Force largely excluded from substantive decisionmaking. 

The superbombers had been conducting strikes in South Vietnam since 

June 18, 1965. Their targets were selected by MACV’s Combined 

Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), reviewed by MACV’s 5-2 (Intelligence) and 5-3 (Operations), submitted to the MACV commander for 

approval, and then sent to Washington for final review by the JCS, State 

and Defense, and more often than not by the White House. While the 

target selection was under way, the ARC LIGHT section of the combat 

center, which included USAF personnel, determined the size of mission, 

train length of bombs, axis of attack, and other operational details for 

prospective targets recommended by ground commanders and Air Force 

and Army targeting analysts. However, the system bypassed 2d Air 

Division and Strategic Air Command as well as a five-man SAC liaison 

office assigned to 2d Air Division early in 1965 to schedule KC-135 

refueling tankers for USAF tactical aircraft. Final approval of all SAC 

strikes was vested in Washington but on March 15, 1966, was given 

jointly to PACOM and SAC. 

From the inception of B-52 operations in Laos on December 12, 

1965, controls were very tight. Westmoreland and his CICV normally 

recommended the targets, but the ambassador and his staff exercised 

final target approval. The ambassador and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

jointly shared final strike authority. Upon strike approval, SAC’S 3d Air 

Division secured the concurrence of the SAC commander in chief before 

133 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

dispatching the B-52s from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and 

KC-135 refueling tankers from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. SAC 

bombing of North Vietnam that began on April 12 was equally sensitive, 

with Admiral Sharp and the JCS playing the dominant decisionmaking 

roles. They coordinated, of course, with the State and Defense Departments and the White House. The eventual arrival in Saigon on January 

8, 1967, of a nine-man SAC advanced echelon* would not basically alter 

SAC'S limited authority in approving targets for its own bombers.84 

To resume B-52 bombing in January 1966, Westmoreland picked a 

target area bisecting the borders of Laos and Quang Nam Province in 

South Vietnam. The area (designated QUANG NAM 10) contained known 

and suspected enemy troops, supply depots, and rest areas. Sullivan 

recommended and the State Department approved an ARC LIGHT strike 

with time on target set for 0345 on January 14. Overflights of Cambodia 

were forbidden. Operation OCEAN WAVE was flown as planned by 24 

B-52s. Each carried twenty-four 750- and twenty-seven 500-pound bombs 

(napalm was still prohibited in Laos), with refueling by Okinawa-based 

KC-135s. Four F-4C Phantoms from the 390th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Da Nang Air Base furnished combat air patrol, and 2 others stood 

5-minute ground alert. Some of the bombers flew cover strikes on targets 

on the edge of Quang Nam Province. All aircraft returned unscathed. 

There were no news leaks. Strike results were unavailable, however, 

because the target was in a communist-controlled jungle area which 

precluded ground reconnai~sance.~~ 

In February, two more ARC LIGHT missions were flown astride the 

Laos-South Vietnamese border. The first (WEST STREAM) had twelve 

bombers strike target Quang Tri 5 situated opposite the province of the 

same name. A cover strike followed within the province an hour and a 

half later. The second mission (BACK ROAD) took place on February 27. 

Twenty-seven bombers attacked targets contiguous to Kontum Province. 

The results of the first mission were unknown, but after the second 

mission, MACV at once dispatched a SHINING BRASS team into the 

struck area. Team members found little sign of damage. The bombs had 

landed in only about thirty percent of the intended target area. While 

some craters were noted, most bombs had detonated in the trees above. 

In another target area, team members detected evidence of previous 

tactical as well as some B-52 damage.86 

"Assigned to Headquarters Seventh Air Force, SAC ADVON absorbed the initial 

five-man SAC liaison office. The SAC ADVON's principal task was to provide technical 

advice on B-52 bombing and KC-135 refueling tanker operations. [Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, 

I, 183.1 

134 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

The Guam-based B-52s in March flew five missions against enemy 

concentrations near the South Vietnamese border. Three consisted of 

twelve aircraft each, and two of fifteen aircraft each. As with most other 

strikes, there was no ground followup, and the results of the attacks 

could not be assessed. Nevertheless, Westmoreland and other MACV 

officials again assumed that the missions contributed to the U.S., 

RVNAF, and allied military effort against the VC/DRV units in the 

neighboring South Vietnamese province^.^' 

The fact that SAC bombings in Laos had elicited little publicity 

encouraged Westmoreland, at a conference of Sullivan and military 

commanders at Udorn on March 8, to recommend a B-52 assault on 

both sides of Mu Gia Pass on the Laos-North Vietnamese border above 

the 17th parallel. He said that about 75 percent of all truck traffic into 

Laos rolled through Mu Gia, and Air Force and Navy tactical air strikes 

had been unable to reduce it. The DRV was energetically defending the 

pass, having emplaced close to 300 antiaircraft sites in the area. Finally, 

U.S. intelligence indicated that the Soviets were about to unload 

truck-mounted 140-mm rocket launchers for the first time from their 

ships in Haiphong harbor. Boasting a range of 4 to 5 miles, these 

weapons were undoubtedly destined for South Vietnam and in all 

likelihood would. be transported through the Mu Gia Pass. If the 

launchers reached the enemy in the South, they would pose a new threat 

to American bases.88 

In response to Westmoreland’s proposal Maj. Gen. William J. 

Crum, the 3d Air Division Commander, soon sent to the MACV 

commander a plan for conducting a series of B-52 strikes on road 

segments on both sides of the pass. Noting the inability of tactical 

aircraft ordnance to prevent DRV and Lao road crews from making 

repairs or creating bypasses in a few hours after an attack, the plan 

proposed using the B-52s to drop large numbers of variable fuzed bombs 

at irregular intervals. The location of the road segments would permit 

bombing by MSQ-77 radar.89 

Westmoreland found General Crum’s plan satisfactory, but securing 

the approval of Ambassador Sullivan and Washington officials to strike 

the North Vietnamese as well as the Laotian side of the pass was another 

matter. In the coming week the MACV commander explored his 

proposal further with Admiral Sharp, SAC Commander Gen. Joseph J. 

Nazzaro, and General Wheeler. Sharp strongly backed the proposed 

bombings. Observing that MACV had reported at least 800 enemy trucks 

in February moving through the pass, he was convinced that a B-52 

attack on the North’s Route 15 leading to Mu Gia would cause heavy 

landslides and block traffic. He further believed that 4 near-simultaneous 

attacks on targets near South Vietnam’s Quang Tri Province would 

135 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

afford sufficient “cover” for bombing the routes on the Laotian side of 

the pass. Wheeler, after conferring with high administration officials, 

obtained tentative approval for the dual assault but noted 2 troubling 

problems. One was domestic and international opinion that would likely 

construe the first ARC LIGHT bombing of North Vietnam as an 

escalation of the war. The other was uncertainty whether the attack on 

the Laotian routes, about 75 miles above the demilitarized zone, could be 

kept secret despite cover strikes somewhat farther south.” 

Ambassador Sullivan doubted if Sharp’s suggested cover strikes for 

the Laotian routes would prove credible. More important, he noted that 

Souvanna Phouma was still in the dark about ARC LIGHT operations in 

Laos near the South Vietnamese border. The ambassador informed 

Washington that in this instance the prime minister should be consulted. 

Although his response could not be predicted, it could possibly be 

adduced from his position on the evening of March 30 when he “reacted 

negatively” to a suggestion that B-52s should be used in defense of 

Attopeu in the Laos panhandle.” 

Wishing to accede to Westmoreland’s urgent request for saturation 

bombing of Mu Gia Pass, high administration authorities decided to “let 

sleeping dogs lie” and not consult Souvanna Phouma (he would not be 

informed of ARC LIGHT operations in Laos until September 1966).* And, 

at the ambassador’s insistence, the strikes would be limited only to 

targets on North Vietnam’s side of the pass. On April 8, the JCS 

dispatched an ARC LIGHT execution message to Admiral Sharp and 

General Nazzaro, although the bombing did not occur until four days 

later .92 

Thus, on April 12, under the program ROCK KICK 11, the ARC 

LIGHT bombers flew their first mission against the pass in North 

Vietnam. A total of 30 bombers and 30 KC-135 refueling tankers-the 

latter had been weathered out on their home base on Okinawa-took off 

from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. Each bomber carried twenty-four 

1,000-pound bombs internally and twenty-four 750-pound bombs externally. All bombs were set for subsurface burst except thirty 1,000- 

pounders affixed with long-delay fuzes. Upon reaching their targets, 29 

bombers (1 bomber’s radar malfunctioned) released their ordnance from 

35,000 to 37,000 feet over DRV territory on both sides of the pass. The 

ARC LIGHTERS carpeted a 3-mile segment of Route 15.93 

‘As indicated earlier, with the exception of the first B-52 assault in Laos on December 

12, 1965, later ARC LIGHT sorties in the country were officially added to those flown in 

South Vietnam. Separate ARC LIGHT sortie reporting for Laos did not begin until January 

1967. [USAF Management Summary Southeast Asia, Jan 7, 1967, p 24, and Feb 3, 1967, p 

40.1 

136 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

American newsmen, citing official briefings in Saigon, characterized 

the attack as the biggest single bombing mission of the Indochina war 

and the largest since World War 11. Observing this was the first use of 

the superbombers in the North, newsmen predicted more strikes. A few, 

quoting “usually reliable sources,” reported that the superbombers had 

hit the Laotian side of Mu Gia Pass. In this instance the sources, 

unaware that a closely held decision was made not to bomb Laos 

territory opposite the pass at this time, were ~nreliable.~~ 

Saigon press spokesmen publicly claimed the raid was a “marked 

success,” having caused huge landslides leading to the pass. Barely 

twenty-four hours after the attack, however, visual and photo reconnaissance confirmed the communists were again shuttling traffic through the 

historic gateway into Laos. On the 17th, upon receiving reports of more 

traffic sightings, Westmoreland asked higher authorities to permit Air 

Force and Navy tactical attacks immediately following the next ARC 

LIGHT assault. To assure accuracy, he recommended using the Air 

Force’s B-66/F-105 “buddy-bombing” technique developed over North 

Vietnam. Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Sullivan supported the request, the latter noting reports of another step-up in DRV infiltration 

through the emplacement of more antiaircraft weapons in the Mu Gia 

Pass area.* The antiaircraft threat was underscored on April 19 when 

enemy gunners near the pass shot down two more American fighters. 

General Crum in Guam also wanted another crack at the infiltration 

target. Because of a blurred radar image induced by the accident of 

terrain, ROCK KICK I1 had been marred somewhat by bombing inaccuracies. Crum assured Westmoreland the SAC pilots would do better on a 

second try. Even the slight off-target bombing on the first mission had 

left road slides and some temporarily trapped trucks vulnerable to 

follow-on tactical aircraft. 

Washington wished to defer sanctioning immediately a second ARC 

LIGHT attack until the outcome of ROCK KICK I1 could be properly 

evaluated. But on April 20, Westmoreland recommended shelving further 

study of ROCK KICK 11, because current Air Force and Navy tactical 

attacks on Mu Gia.Pass had obscured its results. With some reluctance, 

Washington agreed and finally approved another ARC LIGHT strike for 

April 27.95 

This second B-52 operation against the pass went more smoothly 

than the first. SAC crewmen possessed better targeting data, the 

‘By the spring of 1966, there were 300 antiaircraft sites in and around Mu Cia Pass. 

[PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 38-65, Sep 17, 1966, p 13; msg, COMUSMACV to 

ArnEmb Vientiane, 1000092 Jun 66.1 

137 
INTERDlCTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

operational aiming points were more easily identified, and all aircraft 

delivered their ordnance as planned. Westmoreland sent SAC personnel a 

congratulatory message. The only untoward incident occurred when two 

SA-2 missiles launched from a site not far from the pass scored a hit on 

a USAF tactical escort but did not down the plane.96 

Poststrike aerial photography showed thirty-two craters along North 

Vietnam’s Route 15 near the pass. But commanders were chagrined to 

note that after a lapse of only eighteen hours, all of the craters were 

filled and enemy trucks were again able to use the road into Laos.97 

To Westmoreland the rapidity with which the communists reopened 

the pass signaled the importance they attached to this traffic artery and 

fully justified further U.S. bombing to keep it closed. He urged a new 

series of B-52 bombings on both sides of the Mu Gia entry point. These 

would be followed quickly by tactical attacks on backup traffic and road 

crews and by airdrops of leaflets warning road-repair gangs of the danger 

in continuing their labors. With the annual southwest monsoon 

approaching, the MACV commander believed the pass should be struck 

frequently while weather permitted. Then heavy rains would fill bomb 

craters and frustrate truck travel.98 

Sullivan and Sharp, however, now interposed objections against 

further ARC LIGHT strikes on the pass. Sullivan fretted about the danger 

of publicity in striking the Laos side of Route 15 and whether he should 

consult Souvanna Phouma. He questioned the efficacy of the B-52s, 

their waste of scarce munitions on not very lucrative targets that could be 

readily struck by FAC-controlled tactical aircraft, the safety of a 

roadwatch team near one of several newly proposed targets, and the 

accuracy of the bombers. He noted that on the night of April 25/26 

along the Laos-South Vietnam border, B-52s had bombed through a 

Navy mission apparently working over an identical target.99 

Sullivan’s denigration of ARC LIGHT effectiveness raised the hackles 

of military officials. Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin of the JCS relayed the 

ambassador’s dispatch to USAF Lt. Gen. Paul S. Emrick, PACOM’s 

Planning Chief, asserting that it “gives you a rough idea of how the 

amateur field marshal is doing.” Westmoreland took personal umbrage, 

finding Sullivan’s views “disturbing” by their “inference on judgment, 

decisions, and execution of military operations” concerning the B-52s, 

and were “obviously” based on inaccurate assumptions and misinformation. He stoutly defended his proposal to unleash the superbombers 

again on Mu Gia, insisting among other things they would come no 

closer than four miles to the nearest roadwatch team. He noted SAC 

bombers occasionally had bombed safely within one mile of friendly huts 

and villages and within two miles of friendly maneuvering troops.’00 

138 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Admiral Sharp opposed further B-52 bombings of Mu Gia Pass for 

three reasons: their cost, especially in the use of ordnance now in short 

supply; their demonstrated ineffectiveness in cratering roads and blocking 

traffic; and their vulnerability to SA-2 missiles apparently now being 

installed in the vicinity of the pass. Clarifying his second objection, he 

said that by traveling only ten miles-per-hour at night, the DRV could 

readily send through Mu Gia an average of fifty trucks with one hundred 

tons of supplies to and from distant points in minimum time. As for the 

missile threat, the PACOM commander observed that available tactical 

aircraft were unable to give B-52 pilots adequate warning of an SA-2 

firing, thus leaving the superbombers, which had limited maneuvering 

capability, without adequate protection. The major success in countering 

the SA-2 missiles to date in North Vietnam, he said, had not been the 

result of finding and destroying them on the ground nor because of 

electronic jamming. Rather, it was due to the defensive tactics of tactical 

aircraft who were able to “evade missiles either as a result of ELINT 

[electronic intelligence] warning or alert eye-ball vigilance.” Further, 

Sharp believed that the primary B-52 mission should consist of finding 

and destroying war-making materials, not blocking routes. lo’ 

Westmoreland remained unpersuaded. In the following weeks he and 

Sharp remained locked in a verbal battle over the issue. The MACV 

commander marshaled various arguments for resuming the bombing of 

Mu Gia Pass. Among them was the rising number of enemy personnel in 

Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, and thus the need to attack before 

the heaviest monsoon rains began in June. He believed the bombers 

could avoid SA-2 missile radars if they flew to their targets at low 

altitude, taking advantage of terrain shielding.Io2 

Considering low-level B-52 missions out of the question because of 

the enemy’s heavy antiaircraft concentrations in the target areas, Admiral 

Sharp reaffirmed his objections against employing the bombers for road 

cratering. Ambassador Sullivan adhered to his earlier view that cover 

strikes for ARC LIGHT bombing of Laotian routes so far above the 

demilitarized zone could not be concealed indefinitely. Hence Souvanna 

Phouma should be consulted if the routes were to be rebombed. 

Persuaded by Sharp’s arguments and still disinclined to discuss ARC 

LIGHT bombing with the prime minister, Washington authorities refused 

to accede to Westmoreland’s request. Mu Gia Pass would not be struck 

again by the bombers until December 12, 1966.’03 

Meanwhile, no major debate arose over continuing the unpublicized 

B-52 strikes on communist troop bivouacs, rest areas, truck parks, 

road-construction and supply sites, and other targets opposite the 5 

northernmost South Vietnamese provinces. For the first 6 months of 

1966, the ARC LIGHT bombers flew 406 sorties in Laos, mainly in April 

139 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

through June. An average mission consisted of 9 to 12 aircraft, 

sometimes as many as 18. The tropical terrain as usual prevented most 

strike damage assessment, but some prisoner-of-war reports suggested the 

heavy bombings hurt enemy morale. Since these operations were covered 

by near-simultaneous strikes on targets just inside the South Vietnamese 

border, they drew little attention from the news media. Secrecy within 

the services was kept by adding the ARC LIGHT Laotian sorties to those 

flown within South Vietnam.Io4 

Ambassador Sullivan and his staff continued their close oversight of 

the B-52 operations in Laos, often nonconcurring in Westmoreland’s 

strike requests. Between May 27 and July 5, for example, the ambassador vetoed for various reasons 25 proposed ARC LIGHT missions totaling 

216 sorties. In most instances, the targets were too far (9 to 25 miles) 

from the South Vietnamese border, too close to population centers or 

tribal roadwatch teams, or of doubtful validity. That Washington 

authorities upheld Sullivan’s objections irritated Westmoreland. He 

believed that the B-52 requirements in Laos were overriding, and the 

arguments for disregarding them were invalid or unimportant. The 

disagreement over the use of the bombers intensified in the succeeding 

months.”’ 

In addition to their frustrations over tactical and B-52 restraints on 

attacking enemy infiltration in Laos, air commanders were deeply 

concerned about dwindling supplies of certain types of ordnance and 

fuzes. The problem was theater wide. 

The most compelling need was for area-denial ordnance. A shortterm remedy, widely employed, was to use time-delay fuzes on available 

ordnance, but there was a fuze shortage. New types of area-denial 

ordnance, such as antipersonnel mines (nicknamed DRAGONTOOTH and 

GRAVEL) were months away from mass production.*106 

Interdiction was also hampered by a shortfall of CBU-2s and 500- 

and 750-pound bombs. The huge B-52s in particular had a voracious 

appetite for the 750-pounders. Other reasons were the late arrival of 

munitions and the civil strife at Da Nang in the spring of 1966 that 

delayed unloading of a ship with vital ordnance supplies. Air Force 

planes were called upon to redistribute munitions. lo’ 

The impact of the ordnance shortage was manifested in various 

ways. The 2d Air Divisiont believed strike effectiveness was reduced 

whenever pilots could not select “optimum” bombs for particular 

targets. In early February, Admiral Sharp, whose headquarters was 

‘For a discussion of DRAGONTOOTH and GRAVEL mines, see Chapter IX. 

‘This unit would be replaced by Seventh Air Force on April 1, 1966. 

140 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

studying the problem, set new tentative sortie levels for B-52 and tactical 

aircraft based on existing ordnance inventories and expected shipments. 

He restricted the monthly B-52 sortie level in South Vietnam and Laos to 

400 through March 30; 450 through June 30; and 600 for the remainder 

of the year. He limited tactical attack sorties to a maximum of 3,000 a 

month for the BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, CRICKET, and TIGER 

HOUND operations. However, he authorized General Westmoreland to 

divert more sorties from South Vietnam to the TIGER HOUND program if 

new suitable targets were found. The RLAF’s ordnance use was also 

drawn down. Early in the year Ambassador Sullivan requested 5,000 

more 500-pound general purpose bombs for the RLAF, but when 

allocated only 2,800, he had to ration the available supply.1o8 

Generals Moore and Westmoreland agreed by April 1966 that the air 

ordnance shortage created an “emergency situation.” The MACV 

commander informed Deputy Secretary Vance, who visited Saigon later 

in the same month, that the services had only 73 percent of the bombs 

and 33 percent of the CBU-2 munitions needed to carry on the separate 

air wars in Laos and South and North Vietnam. Westmoreland stressed 

that from April 4 through 7 the munitions pinch forced the Air Force to 

cancel or not schedule 233 tactical sorties, and on April 8 to withhold 

scheduling 134 sorties. Io9 

Remedial actions were under way, however. More redistribution of 

bombs took place during April and May with PACFLT sharing its more 

ample supplies with PACAF. The administration purchased previously 

US-sold iron bombs from Germany and shipped bombs from other 

American bases directly to the war theater. An Office of the Secretary of 

DefenseIJoint Chiefs of Staff team was dispatched by McNamara to 

Honolulu and Saigon to work out with PACOM and MACV staffs an 

air sortie and munition expenditure schedule. On May 24, McNamara 

approved a tentative combat sortie allocation program for Laos and 

North Vietnam for the last 7 months of the year. Monthly sortie totals 

(USAF, Navy, Marines, and VNAF) would rise from 28,055 in June to 

33,337 in December 1966. Service aircraft were assigned temporarily an 

average load of roughly 1.66 tons of ordnance per sortie using preferred 

ammunition. The Defense secretary questioned whether the services could 

expend profitably more than 60,000 tons of air ordnance per month on 

targets in Laos and North Vietnam. Admiral Sharp likewise believed the 

services often used more ordnance than targets warranted, especially in 

Laos. *’ lo 

‘Admiral Sharp had expressed such views in 1965 and was probably further influenced 

by the tentative conclusions of the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group working paper 

141 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Study of the above and related problems went on in subsequent 

weeks, culminating in another OSD/JCS/PACOM conference at Honolulu during July 1966 on ordnance expenditures and air sortie rates. 

Supported by Admiral Sharp, McNamara vetoed a proposal by Gen. 

John P. McConnell and the other service chiefs to allow aircraft to carry 

full (i.e., optimum) loads for all sorties to assure best use of aircraft. 

Instead, the Defense secretary in effect redefined optimum loads as 

meaning loads based solely on mission and target requirements. He 

opposed both the common practice of maximum ordnance-loading of 

aircraft because of their size, and light-loading them to achieve higher 

sortie rates.* Using this and other guidance, OSD/JCS/PACOM planners 

worked out a revised ordnance expenditure and air sortie rate formula 

for the remainder of 1966, subject to changing circumstances.”’ 

From their Washington vantage points, neither McNamara nor 

McConnell considered the ordnance shortage as critical as did the field 

commanders. The Defense secretary, believing the problem was partly 

production but chiefly maldistribution, took steps to remedy both. 

General McConnell offered his assessment of the ordnance shortage 

before a Senate subcommittee on May 9: “In my opinion,” he said, 

“[military commanders] did not need to cancel any sorties if they had 

been more diligent about what they were doing and had shown a little 

more imagination.” They were short of certain types of bombs and 

bomb components on a couple of bases and “stood down” or canceled 

only 470 out of a possible theater-wide 29,000 combat sorties. Thus the 

situation did not amount to anything “except . . . a lot of excitement” 

that could have been remedied by better munitions management.”* 

Field commanders and pilots nonetheless found the lack of many 

types of bombs and bomb components severely frustrating, whether due 

to real shortages or maldistribution. The problem was one more 

encumbrance to air operations, chiefly in Laos but also in North and 

South Vietnam, against an elusive and determined foe who infiltrated 

issued in January 1966 that stated in part: “For all the programs in Laos, the point of 

diminishing returns appears to have been passed-that is-that the rate these programs are 

producing militarily significant results is increasing at a lesser rate than the sortie effort. 

It’s not implied . . . more sorties will not produce increased results; rather that a large 

sortie increase is likely to produce a relatively small increase in results.” [Ltr, Col Philip 

Brooks, Dir/Tac Eva1 Cen, Seventh Air Force, to CINCPAC, subj: CINCPAC Scientific 

Advi:ory Group Working Paper, Feb 7, 1966, Atch 1.1 

While not acknowledged, Air Force and Navy commanders were locked in a “sortie 

race,” particularly in the Rouing THUNDER program over North Vietnam, with each 

service claiming it was flying more than half of the sorties over the North. [Msg, Harold 

Brown, SAF, to Cyrus R. Vance, DEPSECDEF, n.d. [cu. Nov 661, subj: Answers to 

Deputy Secretary Vance’s Questions Concerning the Hise Report (Nov 66).] 

142 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

men and supplies into South Vietnam without abatement. By the end of 

May 1966 there were signs of improvement, although a shortage of bomb 

components persisted, mainly for USAF operations. By September 1966, 

shipments of ordnance to Southeast Asia were up twenty-four percent as 

against a rise of just two percent in ordnance expenditures. Most of the 

“excitement” over the ordnance problem had ended by then, but the 

shortfall of certain critical bomb components was not overcome for 

many more 

Concurrently with the “flap” over the insufficiency-or maldistribution-of ordnance in the first half of 1966, another long-simmering 

ordnance problem affecting air operations in Laos was quietly settled. 

This was the use of napalm. Except for extreme military emergencies, 

such as extricating FAR troops from a battle or to ensure the success of 

a search and rescue mission, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had 

opposed the use of napalm in Laos since the early 1960s. Ambassador 

Sullivan and Washington authorities upheld his wishes.* 

Field commanders and the JCS, the latter as recently as January 

1966, had without success urged higher authorities to persuade the Laos 

government to rescind its ban on the use of napalm. Finally, after 

Generals Moore and Westmoreland made another spirited request to use 

napalm as an anti-infiltration weapon, Ambassador Sullivan asked 

Washington in March 1966 to review its ordnance policy. He said that 

General Moore had proposed delivering napalm solely by FAC-controlled 

strike aircraft in the STEEL TIGER area against enemy targets and had 

assured him that villages and friendly areas would not be struck. Sullivan 

said that General Thao Ma, the RLAF Commander, also desired to make 

napalm available to his T-28 pilots.114 

Defense and State officials reviewed ordnance policy and eventually 

agreed to authorize napalm if Souvanna Phouma had no objection. 

Sullivan shortly persuaded the prime minister to withdraw his longstanding opposition to its use. Souvanna stipulated that napalm should 

be used principally against enemy trucks. Following strict Washington 

guidelines, Air Force and Navy pilots flew their first napalm mission in 

Laos during the closing hours of March. They attacked RLAF-validated 

targets in the STEEL TIGER sector. In early April, Washington officials 

obtained clarification of Souvanna’s views. They then authorized napalm 

*Washington’s basic napalm instruction, issued on July 23, 1964, stated in part that it 

was the ambassador’s policy “to prohibit use of napalm without prior authority from 

[State Department] except in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a 

situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken 

would otherwise fail. Souvanna’s concurrence of course continues to be required.” [Msg, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1403472 Mar 66.1 

I43 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

attacks “on those targets of opportunity defined in the rules of 

engagement located by CRICKET, SPOOKY, and TIGER HOUND FACs 

[i.e., by USAF-piloted 0-1s and AC-47s] which are jointly approved by 

[the] Ambassador and RLG authority.” Besides RLAF-validated targets 

and “motorized vehicles,” the targets included automatic weapons and 

antiaircraft positions that fired on U.S. aircraft. But several weeks 

elapsed before Souvanna permitted General Thao Ma’s RLAF pilots to 

use napalm.115 

Thus another long-imposed restriction on air operations in Laos in 

general and against infiltration in particular was rescinded.* Though U.S. 

air commanders were convinced they could do a better job with an 

“optimum” ordnance such as napalm, its use in the following weeks and 

months seemed to have little if any discernible impact on reducing the 

movement of DRV manpower and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

Despite inadequate ordnance, stringent B-52 and tactical air restrictions, and other problems, there was little doubt the separate Laotian air 

programs were making Hanoi pay a “price” for its infiltration through 

Laos. But was the air impact significant? As noted earlier, some 

commanders were convinced it was. On the other hand, there was 

considerable evidence the DRV was having little difficulty in keeping its 

lines of communication open.+ 

One significant development was the DRV’s rapid extension of its 

road and trail network. Under way since the early 1960s, Hanoi was now 

diverting much more materiel and manpower to this effort. In the first 

quarter of 1966, PACAF intelligence believed the DRV had added about 

110 miles of new or improved roads to sustain truck traffic. In March 

and April, the MACV commander warned Ambassador Sullivan the 

communists would make maximum use of the Laotian lines of communication for the rest of the dry season (roughly to mid-May) and use the 

coming monsoon season for stockpiling materiel for later movement 

through Laos into South Vietnam.’I6 

By the end of June, the Defense Intelligence Agency credited the 

DRV with having about 600 statute miles of truck-sustaining roads in the 

infiltration corridor. At least 200 miles of roads were believed sufficiently 

well built to support year-round truck operations. Road durability was 

constantly improved as DRV engineering units used crushed rock and log 

‘See Anthony, “A Military History of the War in Northern Laos, 1945-1968,” Chap 

+For a detailed analysis of DRV infiltration tactics see Weiner, Brorn, and Koon, 

IX. 

Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam, 1959-1967. 

144 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

corduroy surfacing on many road segments, particularly along Routes 23, 

92, and 91 1 

It was far harder, however, to find out the number of trucks used 

by the DRV along the rapidly expanding road net in southern Laos. In 

early June 1966, CINCPAC informed the JCS that a special intelligence 

study showed the DRV had about 1,200, half of them operational, in 

southern North Vietnam between 19” 30’ north latitude and the 

demilitarized zone. Reports from roadwatch teams in Laos suggested the 

communists owned more than 600 trucks with 400 plying the routes in 

the southern panhandle. Of the latter, it appeared only 200 were 

operational at any one time. Admiral Sharp said these figures constituted 

“the best estimate from available evidence.” He made no effort to 

square these numbers with recent service claims that “hundreds” of 

trucks had been destroyed and damaged in the STEEL TIGER, CRICKET, 

and TIGER HOUND air programs.’I8 

Eventually, U.S. intelligence learned that the movement of DRV 

trucks, personnel, and other transportation-related activities along the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail was controlled by the 559th Transporation Division 

of the Rear Services Directorate of Hanoi’s Ministry of Defense. The 

559th’~ responsibilities were all-encompassing. It set up a system of 

vehicular waystations, truck parks, repair points, and shelter areas, and a 

chain of liaison stations, guides, food and distribution activities, and 

communications. It built new roads and trails and repaired old ones. 

Finally, it furnished security for the overall transportation system.”’ 

Inasmuch as the DRV’s trucks hauled the bulk of war materiel from 

North to South Vietnam, it was apparent that the 559th’~ major task was 

to keep them moving along improved and lengthened roads, and safe 

from air strikes. By mid-1966 there had emerged from prisoner-of-war 

interrogations and other intelligence sources a fairly clear picture of how 

this was done. Most truck convoys were quite small, and each truck 

usually had two drivers to alleviate fatigue and assure convoy security. 

During truck stops, drivers parked their vehicles in groups of three or 

four. If aircraft approached, antiair monitors by special signals halted at 

once all vehicles, or the drivers darted into any available alternate route 

away from the main one. Drivers often waited up to an hour after the 

last aircraft departed before resuming their journey. The air attacks 

appeared to slow truck movements, especially in Laos where the average 

truck speed was placed at five to eight miles-per-hour versus nine to 

twelve miles-per-hour in southern North Vietnam. 120 

At water crossings, trucks were ferried by a priority system, often 

from one nearby truck park to another. Most trucks were painted green 

or used green tarpaulins to better escape air detection. Many of them 

were garnished with foliage and other vegetation to break the outline of 

145 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the vehicle and reduce the chances of being seen. Truckstops and transfer 

points were often three miles off a main road.12’ 

New radio-equipped “Polish Star 66” trucks arrived in North 

Vietnam in late 1965 and were first spotted on the roads in southern 

Laos during March 1966. Radios in truck convoys speeded warnings of 

an air attack and gave drivers more time to seek cover.122 

Even though trucks transported most supplies by 1966, MACV’s 

intelligence sources often reported supply movements by bicycles, oxcarts, riverboats, and human porters. Porters were best for short hauls 

when weather or bomb damage temporarily halted truck travel. Nontruck 

means nevertheless accounted for the movement of a very small 

percentage of war materiel. A RAND* study calculated that a truck 

could carry 20 times more than an oxcart, 100 times more than a bicycle, 

and 300 times more than a porter.Iz3 

As for infiltrating NVA personnel, they traveled mostly on foot and 

entirely by day along the many jungle-covered trails through Laos into 

South Vietnam. Moving at 1 to 3 miles an hour, they stopped to eat and 

rest at numerous “comrno-liaison” stations along the way. The average 

unit was a battalion traveling by companies. Each company had a guide 

and sometimes runners out front of the march. Spacing on the trail 

varied but around 100 yards between companies was often the rule. Strict 

discipline prevailed. Personnel were forbidden to talk about their travel 

or location with those they met on the trail, or with the wounded moving 

northward. They were warned to avoid unnecessary noise and leaving 

litter. If aircraft appeared they stood still, lay down, or moved off the 

trail. They did not fire at aircraft.’24 

To conceal their truck and personnel movements, the North Vietnamese were expert at camouflaging their routes and trails. Their trellis 

construction was very extensive. Binding tops of trees together, they 

covered their truck, supply, and other installations. Any damaged jungle 

cover for trails was replaced with new foliage. Foliage was also scattered 

along well-worn tracks and paths that might be detected from the air.125 

The deceptive practices of the enemy were numerous. To cross rivers 

and streams they used floatable spans (hidden by day) or underwater 

bridges. Communication workers strung telephone wires on five-foot 

poles along trail segments, the poles’ short length creating a shadow too 

small to be seen from the air. After a strike, trail personnel often threw 

gasoline-soaked rags along the side of roads to make attacking pilots 

believe they had destroyed or damaged several trucks.126 

*Research and Development (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.) 

146 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

Where possible, the North Vietnamese hid their supplies in caves, 

some large enough for trucks to enter, park, and turn around after 

unloading. In some areas along the trail they removed Pathet Lao troops 

and civilians to enhance route security.'" 

To maintain and improve their logistic routes in North Vietnam, 

DRV personnel relied heavily on sympathetic communist countries. For 

example, they used East German pontoon bridges, Soviet steel beams, 

and Chinese bridge-building materials. These and other resources eased 

the construction of underwater bridges across streams and relieved the 

use of ferries at key river transportation points.'28 

By 1966 the foe had also assembled a sizable engineering and labor 

force along the Laotian road and trail system. The U.S. on May 1 

estimated there were throughout Laos 39 NVA engineering battalions and 

24,800 laborers. About 16,000 laborers were assigned to maintaining the 

trail. This figure omitted villagers impressed into the work force. Some 

engineering battalions had only North Vietnamese personnel, others 

included Laotians. Buildings for housing workers and for construction 

and other supplies were widely dispersed. 

Much road and trail work was done by simple tools such as shovels, 

hoes, and axes. But by mid-1966 there was evidence that the engineering 

force had on hand more heavy equipment such as bulldozers and 

graders. Road repair was done chiefly at night. Repair crews worked 

energetically after an air strike and often could reopen a road to traffic 

in a matter of hours. One roadwatch team located south of Mu Gia Pass 

reported that road and trail workers needed few outside food supplies. 

There was plenty of game and even in the dry season an abundance of 

rainfall for growing 

Protecting the trail from attack by the expanding STEEL TIGER, 

CRICKET, and TIGER HOUND air programs was a growing array of 

defense sites. The largest concentration was in and south of Mu Gia 

Pass. PACAF in early April 1966 listed 32 occupied antiaircraft sites and 

54 automatic-weapons ones. The former contained forty-eight 37-mm 

(and possibly some 57-mm) guns, the latter an undetermined number of 

7.62-, 12.7-, and 14.5-mm weapons. In early June the Seventh Air Force 

pushed the antiaircraft estimate upward to 302 sites. The second largest 

concentration was in the vicinity of Tchepone where 14 occupied sites 

held twenty-seven 37-mm guns and 21 automatic weapons. Some recently 

arrived 37-mm guns were emplaced in both new and formerly unoccupied 

sites. A third well-protected area was south of the Nape Pass where the 

NVA had emplaced an undetermined number of antiaircraft guns and 

automatic weapons. Two other important antiaircraft and automaticweapons sites were situated in the Plain of Jars and Samneua regions in 

northern Laos.'30 

147 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Compared with North Vietnam, the enemy defenses along the Ho 

Chi Minh Trail were relatively light. They were nonetheless lethal and by 

mid-1966 had downed many Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army 

aircraft. They had driven the AC-47 gunships out of the CRICKET 

program and made 0-1 FAC operations in the CRICKET and TIGER 

HOUND programs increasingly hazardous. 

The energetic North Vietnamese took full advantage of the jungle 

terrain, weather, and night, camouflaged many roads and trails, kept 

careful convoy control, and used other techniques. They not only 

minimized their air strike losses but accelerated the flow of personnel and 

supplies into South Vietnam during the first half of 1966. In late April, 

Brig. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, USA, MACV Intelligence Chief, 

revised the infiltration rate from 6,000 to 7,000 men per month for the 

first quarter of the year. He observed that this was the equivalent of 

11 1/2 battalions. He predicted that the communist force would contain 

140 battalions by mid-1966 and 159 battalions by the end of March 1967, 

figuring in Viet Cong locally recruited as well as losses. Alarmed by the 

enemy’s manpower buildup, General Westmoreland warned Ambassador 

Sullivan that the 3 and possibly 5 regimental formations in Quang Tri 

and Thua Thien Provinces posed “an immediate threat” to the security 

of the area.13’ 

Determining the extent of DRV supplies entering South Vietnam was 

far harder. General McChristian believed the enemy could move 308 tons 

of supplies a day, with 269 tons transiting the trail, 25 tons through 

Cambodia, and 14 tons by sea. Assuming the VC/NVA fought an 

important battle 1 day in 7, these supplies seemed sufficient to sustain 

140 battalions. McChristian assumed (wrongly, events would show) that 

the DRV could not support a force of 159 battalions, for at that level 

personnel and logistic losses would surpass input. The intelligence chief 

ascribed Hanoi’s accelerated infiltration to its need to maintain “strategic 

mobility” in the face of a larger buildup of US., RVNAF, and allied 

forces in South Vietnam, and to assure a military and psychological 

victory. He was sure Hanoi thought a drawn-out war of attrition would 

add to America’s war weariness and willingness to negotiate on more 

favorable terms.132 

McChristian was not at all sanguine about halting enemy use of and 

infiltration through Cambodia, if and when Washington authorities lifted 

the ban on interdicting that country’s lines of communication and other 

targets. He cited Cambodia’s 460 miles of delta coastline and its 

numerous rivers and canals on which extensive commerce flowed towards 

South Vietnam. Moreover, the local populace appeared passively to 

accept the presence of North Vietnamese in the border areas. Therefore, 

North Vietnam’s present 35-ton-per-day logistic flow through the country 

148 
NEW AERIAL PROGRAMS AND TACTICS 

would no doubt rise. He believed the United States could do little to curb 

the enemy’s Cambodian activities in support of the insurgency in South 

Vietnam. 133 

149 

Chapter VI 

Further Increase in Enemy Strength 

and Additional Air Programs 

July-December 1966 

By July 1966, the military situation had not basically altered. There 

was no sign that the evolving air and air-ground anti-infiltration 

programs had weakened communist forces in South Vietnam. In fact the 

latest special national intelligence estimate showed that the influx of 

enemy manpower and supplies into South Vietnam was still exceeding 

losses. Deeply concerned, American air and ground commanders devised 

new anti-infiltration programs and expanded several already under way. 

A shift in enemy infiltration from southeastern Laos eastward 

towards the demilitarized zone and southern North Vietnam into the 

South’s I Corps impelled MACV and the Seventh Air Force to 

commence on July 20 a TALLY Ho air campaign. Manpower, aircraft, 

and command-and-control resources of the Seventh Air Force’s TIGER 

HOUND Task Force were enlisted for this program. In October the two 

commands launched a SLAM air-ground operation that witnessed the use 

of more SHINING BRASS units with supporting U.S. and RLAF tactical 

and SAC B-52 strikes against enemy concentrations farther west into the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail opposite the south’s I Corps. Concurrently, CRICKET 

and other air operations in the STEEL TIGER sector were stepped up. 

Under prodding by the Seventh Air Force, MACV, and PACOM 

commanders, the Vientiane embassy and Washington relaxed somewhat 

the air rules in Laos. 

Although the services remained doggedly optimistic about the 

anti-infiltration programs in Laos and the war’s progress in general, 

resiliency of VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam-despite frequent and 

heavy losses-was indisputable. The size of combat units and the 

intensity with which they fought pitched battles-when they chose to 

fight-increased rather than diminished. As a consequence, the United 

States continued to deploy more air, ground, and navy units into the 

country to support the embattled South Vietnamese services. After 

months of debate, Washington permitted Air Force and Navy aircraft 

151 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

from the end of June through July to attack the major petroleum, oil, 

and lubricants (POL) storage facilities in North Vietnam. The aim was to 

inflict more “pain” on the country and persuade its leaders to reduce 

infiltration and negotiate an end to the war. 

Despite the POL strikes and repeated interdiction of the North’s 

routes elsewhere in North Vietnam and Laos, Hanoi signaled no change 

in its infiltration activities or military policy. At the end of July, an 

intelligence report indicated that the DRV appeared to believe “that 

its transportation system will be able to withstand increased air attacks 

and . . . maintain an adequate flow of men and supplies to the South.” 

This judgment would not be seriously challenged in the months to come.’ 

The magnitude of the DRV’s infiltration shift eastward and along 

the southern portion of North Vietnam’s Route Package I was not fully 

appreciated until July 12, 1966, when General Westmoreland and the 

RVNAF chief of staff visited South Vietnam’s I Corps. There they 

reviewed intelligence on the enemy threat with Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, 

the I Corps Commander, and Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC, 

Commander of the I11 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) at Da Nang. 

All agreed there was “ample evidence” that major units of the NVA’s 

324B Division, composed of 8,000 to 10,000 men, had crossed the 

western and central sectors of the demilitarized zone. These units were 

now in Quang Tri Province and threatening Thua Thien Province. 

Nearby in the vicinity of Tchepone, Laos, was an additional sizable 

enemy force encompassing 6 battalions, 2 regiments, and many supply 

redoubts. Despite the poor weather in the area, it seemed this force stood 

ready to reinforce the 324th B Division.2 

Westmoreland attributed the DRV’s decision to enter the South 

through the demilitarized zone to the current southwest monsoon weather 

in Laos and the “successful TIGER HOUND program” launched in 

December 1965. Though recently doubtful of TIGER HOUND’S value,* he 

now thought the program had disrupted truck and other enemy movements along routes and trails in the southeasternmost part of the 

c~untry.~ 

However, the MACV commander believed the new enemy threat 

needed a modified TIGER HOUND program. With his staff he devised a 

new concept (TALLY Ho) and asked Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, the 

new Seventh Air Force Commander,+ for an operational plan. Momyer’s 

staff quickly prepared one and briefed Westmoreland on July 19. The 

*See Chapter V. 

tGeneral Momyer succeeded General Moore as Seventh Air Force commander on July 

1, 1966. 

152 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

plan called for using the TIGER HOUND Task Force, its USAF and 

Marine Corps air units based in South Vietnam and, if available, U.S. 

Navy and VNAF aircraft. The principal interdiction area would be the 

southernmost sector of Route Package I in North Vietnam between the 

demilitarized zone and a point about thirty miles north at the Dai Giang 

River, just below Dong Hoi. It was a more constricted boundary than 

drawn for the short-lived and recently terminated GATE GUARD program. 

TALLY Ho would supplement the ROLLING THUNDER operations 

under way in Route Package I and assist a Marine task force and the 1st 

Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam that had just mounted 

a series of counterattacks against the enemy below the demilitarized 

zone. The ground operations at their peak in late July and early August 

pitted about 8,000 Marines and 3,000 South Vietnamese against all 3 

regiments of the NVA’s 324B Division. The battles were the most violent 

waged thus far in South Vietnam.4 

There would also be special air operations in the southern part of 

the demilitarized zone and just below the zone in South Vietnam. These 

would be carried out by TIGER HOUND aircraft equipped with sidelooking airborne radar and infrared and by the I11 Marine Amphibious 

Force, to be supported as need be by the Seventh Air Force. Liaison 

between the I11 MAF and Seventh Air Force would be close.5 

The TIGER HOUND Task Force, made up of Air Force, Marine, and 

Army personnel and aircraft, was now commanded by Col. I. B. “Jack” 

Donalson.* He reported directly to Col. Carlos M. Talbott, Deputy 

Director of the Seventh Air Force’s Tactical Air Control Center. Formed 

in December 1965, the task force still had many experienced personnel 

assigned or attached to air units at the TIGER HOUND bases of Khe Sanh, 

Kontum, Dong Ha, and Kham Duc. Many of the same aircraft would see 

service: C-130 ABCCSs flying twelve hours in the daytime and using 

TIGER HOUND call sign HILLSBORO for coordinating TALLY Ho and 

TIGER HOUND, 0-1E Hound Dog forward air controllers to perform 

visual reconnaissance and call in air strikes, and Blindbat C-130s for 

navigation and flaredropping for nighttime strikes by the accompanying 

combat aircraft. TIGER HOUND operations in southeastern Laos would 

be scaled down to fifteen or twenty sorties per day.6 

Although the execution of TALLY Ho would be similar to that of 

TIGER HOUND, pilots assigned to the new program would be confronted 

by more hostile and less mountainous terrain. The Route Package I area 

bristled with antiaircraft sites containing numerous 37- and 57-mm 

*Colonel Donalson had recently succeeded Colonel Groom as the TIGER HOUND Task 

Force commander. 

153 

RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

radar-controlled guns, and there were several suspected SA-2 missile sites 

not far above the demilitarized zone. The many roads running along or 

near the flat coastal plain promised to lessen the results of road cutting 

and cratering. The region was also dotted with many small towns and 

villages. These were frequently used as truck, supply, and troop 

sanctuaries by the North Vietnamese who were aware that American 

pilots were forbidden to attack civilian targets. Nonetheless, Westmoreland was optimistic about TALLY Ho’s prospects, with round-the-clock 

surveillance of, and strikes on, enemy targets, continued TIGER HOUND 

attacks in Laos, and American and South Vientamese patrols of major 

rivers and waterways in South Vietnam.* He forecast that the new air 

program could have a “decisive effect” on the enemy’s ability to sustain 

his present level of military activity.’ 

TALLY Ho operations began on July 20. The initial Air Force and 

Marine missions soon averaged eighty-two daylight and night sorties 

every twenty-four hours. Supplementary TALLY Ho strikes often came 

from USAF and Marine aircraft diverted from their primary ROLLING 

THUNDER, BARREL ROLL, and STEEL TIGER targets due to bad weather.8 

Beginning with their first day of operations, USAF’s 0-1E forward 

air controllers experienced considerable poor weather. One of them, 

Capt. John R. Clyde, had difficulty in determining his position, and 

soon discovered he was flying north and northwest of his designated 

area. He further encountered, as did other FACs, intense antiaircraft fire 

and a problem not heretofore experienced in TIGER HOUND-turbulence. 

He explained it as follows: 

This is some of the worst turbulence I’ve experienced in the 0-1. You get all sorts 

of crazy currents coming down off the mountains. You have a lot of trouble 

trying to climb. You add climb power to the aircraft, try to pull the nose up, and 

you have 500 feet per minute descent with climb power on and nose pulled up at a 

50 degree angle. In some of these areas, it’s awfully hard to FAC. It affects the 

A-1s and a lot of other aircraft, too.’ 

Despite the bad weather, some FACs found lucrative targets. Capt. 

Calvin C. Anderson, another 0-1E FAC pilot, recalled his first TALLY 

Ho target: 

We started out at a minimum altitude of 1500 feet, using binoculars. We didn’t 

use binoculars in Tiger Hound but they . . . proved very effective in Tally Ho. On 

*Inaugurated on December 18, 1965, and designated GAME WARDEN, the program of 

river and waterway patrols consisted largely of intercepting watercraft suspected of carrying 

personnel or supplies to the VC/DRV forces in South Vietnam. 

155 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the first day out Capt Don Curtiss, Hound Dog 72, and myself flew up to fragged 

target 412, and we looked the target over. There was a well-used trail coming 

down to the river, and it seemed like smaller trails were diverted to foot trails. SO 

we put a flight in-Hound Dog 72 did-and we uncovered a lot of stores, actually 

just south of 1412, and we decided to open it on up further to the south. After 

putting in a couple more flights, we uncovered numerous stores. We also got two 

structures and two trucks. As it turned out, we didn't realize that we had found 

such a large number of stores and didn't really concentrate the rest of the days 

[sic] activity on this target, which we should have done. The recce mission next 

day showed they had moved most of it out, including the part we had destroyed. 

As with all new air programs, a web of restrictions bound Air Force 

and Marine pilots. These curbs were slowly relaxed as the days and 

weeks passed. USAF forward air controllers, for example, were at first 

prohibited from conducting visual reconnaissance and calling in air 

strikes within the demilitarized zone-even if fired upon. When this ban 

was lifted, the FACs to no one's surprise detected many signs of the 

NVA's presence within the demilitarized zone, and confirmed that the 

enemy's north-south Route 102 was a key infiltration artery. The route 

and adjacent trails running into the demilitarized zone sported extensive 

trellises, and there were numerous huts and structures in the area. Several 

were attacked on July 24 and 25.'' 

TALLY Ho airmen scored a major success on July 25-26. Lt. Col. 

Edward G. Abersold, the TALLY Ho Advanced Commander at Dong 

Ha, who now and then flew as a FAC, had seen several revetted storage 

crates and stacks in the open about 4 miles above the demilitarized zone. 

He therefore reconnoitered more thoroughly north of the zone along 

with Maj. Robert T. Smyth, chief of a FAC detachment at Dong Ha. 

Spotting what looked like 3 trucks, they called in an air strike. The 

bombs blew the foliage off the suspected target, revealing a stack of 

supplies about 200 feet long, 10 feet high, and 10 feet wide. It turned out 

to be an ammunition dump. Abersold and other FACs at once called in 

more Air Force and Marine strikes-about 50 during the day-from 

bases at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Cam Ranh Bay, and Pleiku in South 

Vietnam. Major Smyth reported: 

This was by far the largest ammo dump that I have ever seen. All FACs put 

strikes in on this area, an extremely large one. A very lucrative target. We put air 

in on it all day long up until 1900 or 1930 hours. We were getting large 

secondaries. One secondary every 15 or 20 seconds. On the next day, we went 

back and found another part of the dump and it was also extremely lucrative. 

During a day and a half of bombing, an estimated 200 secondary 

explosions were tallied as 100 or more tons of ammunition blew up." 

156 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

Concurrently, in OPERATION HASTINGS the I11 Marine Amphibious 

Force with Seventh Air Force support was routing the 324B Division near 

the demilitarized zone. The operation ended on August 3, and remnants 

of the division withdrew across the zone. With the 324th presumably 

dependent on the destroyed ammunition, airmen believed that their 

strikes contributed to the withdrawal. This could not be conclusively 

proved, however. Shortly afterwards, Captain Anderson called in air 

strikes to destroy a dozen or so communication shacks and poles running 

into the zone.I2 

TALLY Ho night operations were held in abeyance until the second 

week of the program. Then six 0-1E sorties were flown on three nights, 

but further flights were canceled when the TIGER HOUND command and 

control system (a meld of Air Force and Army systems) failed to track 

all aircraft. As the moving force behind using O-ls at night, Colonel 

Abersold believed the aircraft had great night potential if pilots used 

binoculars or a starlight scope (the latter by an observer in the rear 

cockpit). During their few night missions the FACs could discern sizable 

nighttime enemy travel along the routes. But Abersold found too many 

fighters, armed reconnaissance, and flaredropping aircraft “flying 

around” without proper coordination. He said, “A couple of times I was 

flying along at night over Route 101, and a fighter came along and 

dropped six flares right over me. I made a pretty good target. So that’s 

why we discontinued it [i.e., the 0-1 night mission^]."'^ 

Colonel Abersold’s efforts to get the 0-1 night program reinstated 

proved unsuccessful until August 28 when Colonel Donalson once more 

allowed use of the O-ls but solely for night visual reconnaissance. An 

initial 0-1 night report covering August 28-September 1 showed that the 

pilots had spotted twenty-nine trucks-only one moving with lights on. 

Most appeared to be traveling at speeds up to thirty miles an hour.14 

As originally planned, the VNAF’s A-1Es were injected into TALLY 

Ho operations in late July and tasked to hit targets in the western sector. 

Yet after just twenty-eight sorties, General Momyer withdrew VNAF 

participation, since the A-1Es were not under forward air control and 

complicated the already tangled command and control system over the 

TALLY Ho area. Beginning August 3, some B-52s likewise struck the 

TALLY HO region, but these strikes were confined to the demilitarized 

zone. They were not strictly in support of TALLY Ho but of the Marine 

Corps’s OPERATION HASTINGS then coming to a close. The superbombers during August flew a total of six sorties in and around the 

demilitarized zone. The Marines meanwhile pushed their “spoiling” 

operations in I Corps to frustrate an obvious communist bid to move in 

force into South Vietnam and maybe capture Dong Ha and Quang Tri.’’ 

157 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Even so, the expected huge enemy offensive did not materialize in 

subsequent weeks. By October the annual northeast monsoon weather 

began to sweep over North Vietnam and turned the TALLY Ho area into 

a big “mud-puddle.” Conversely, in Laos the southwest monsoon was 

abating. With clearing skies and drier roads, air commanders started to 

shift most of their resources back to the TIGER HOUND region in Laos.16 

In spite of deteriorating weather, some TALLY Ho operations went 

on. By November 30, 1966, air analysts had recorded the results of the 

program since its inception on July 20: 

Destroyed Damaged 

Trucks 72 61 

Structures 1,208 624 

Watercraft 85 132 

AA artillery/ automatic weapons positions 22 92 

In addition, the airmen figured they had killed 139 North Vietnamese troops by air; cut, cratered, and seeded 339 roads; created 6 

landslides; and caused 1,414 secondary explosions. l7 

At the same time, a Seventh Air Force status and analysis report of 

sundry US. air programs disclosed that “high speed” vehicular traffic 

along the lines of communication in the TALLY Ho, Route 1, and TIGER 

HOUND areas was no longer possible. On the other hand, the report said 

the flow of enemy troops and supplies through the demilitarized zone 

and into South Vietnam was far from arrested. In fact the communists 

displayed “considerable determination and ingenuity” in using bypasses 

and fords, making minimum road repair, and traveling under the cover 

of night and bad weather. Trucks still carried the bulk of supplies 

through southern North Vietnam to the demilitarized zone thence to the 

STEEL TIGER area in Laos.” 

Nonetheless, General Westmoreland and other commanders deemed 

the TALLY Ho program sufficiently worthwhile to warrant its continuance. The tempo of operations lessened as expected because of monsoon 

weather, while it quickened in the TIGER HOUND and STEEL TIGER 

sectors of Laos where drier weather prevailed. Then in early 1967, TALLY 

Ho gradually lost its identity when it merged into the regular interdiction 

campaign in the demilitarized zone and in Route Package I of southern 

North Vietnam.lg 

As the heavy rains abated in Laos and the enemy shifted his 

infiltration from the TALLY Ho region to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 

Seventh Air Force and MACV decided to try the SLAM interdiction 

program. SLAM envisaged a concentration of greater force against 

elements of the North’s 324B Division in Quang Tri Province and the 

158 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

southwest corner of the demilitarized zone. Included would be Air Force, 

Navy, and Marine tactical aircraft as well as SAC B-52s, Army and 

Marine artillery, and Navy gunfire. But changing circumstances forced 

Westmoreland to first experiment with SLAM in southernmost Laos along 

the west-to-east Route 110. Known as the Sihanouk Trail, it ran eastward 

through the northern tip of Cambodia into South Vietnam.” 

The SLAM scenario comprised three overlapping phases. Phase I was 

to be devoted to intelligence collection using reconnaissance aircraft 

fitted with infrared, side-looking airborne radar, and forward-looking 

infrared. Visual reconnaissance would stem from 0-1s and other FAC 

aircraft and from Meo roadwatch and MACV SHINING BRASS teams. 

Phase 11 would consist of more reconnaissance to pinpoint the enemy’s 

engineering and construction sites, supply points, staging areas, waystations, and other targets. Also included would be air-ground strikes on the 

targets. In Phase 111 the key target areas would be designated “SLAM,” 

triggering large-scale tactical and B-52 attacks. These were to be 

followed by intensive aerial photo and visual reconnaissance together 

with reconnoitering of the struck area by SHINING BRASS teams. The Air 

Force would furnish air support for these teams which upon lift-out 

would leave behind landmines and boobytraps. In addition the USAF 

strike aircraft were to sow the SLAM zone with more landmines. If 

possible, air-supported SHINING BRASS platoons or special guerrilla units 

might be inserted in a SLAM area to assault the enemy. 

The first SLAM strikes came in October with Ambassador Sullivan 

and his staff exercising their usual close oversight of the targeting. The 

first mission was preceded by USAF air photo and MACV SHINING 

BRASS ground reconnaissance of a sector near Route 110, about two 

miles in radius. On the ground team’s recommendation after lift-out, the 

B-52s made a SLAM I attack. This was swiftly followed by Seventh Air 

Force tactical strikes and propaganda leaflet drops. As no team entered 

the bombed area, results of SLAM I were unknown, but commanders 

were convinced that the enemy lost men and supplies.” 

The second SLAM strike took place on October 13, again close to 

Route 110 where SHINING BRASS teams had observed the bivouacs of two 

battalions and two enemy companies repairing a bridge and building a 

bunker. One team secured useful information by wiretapping enemy 

communications. After this team airlifted out on October 7, a second 

team was inserted in the same area on the llth, its arrival supported by 

six USAF and two armed Army UH-1B helicopters. Following further 

reconnoitering, the second team judged there were sufficient communists 

in the area to warrant a SLAM I1 strike, which was quickly executed. 

Once more the B-52s led off and plastered the enemy position as did 

Seventh Air Force tactical aircraft. A SHINING BRASS team penetrated 

159 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the area the same day to perform bomb damage assessment. It failed to 

reach the struck area but found nearby an active bunker, unused 

trenches, and eighty-five live enemy troops. Responding to the team’s 

request, four USAF and two armed Army helicopters attacked with 

undetermined results. Suddenly finding its position hazardous, the team 

was airlifted out the same day.” 

In diverse ways the TALLY Ho and SLAM operations augmented the 

CRICKET, STEEL TIGER, and TIGER HOUND programs, with the Seventh 

Air Force supplying most of the supplemental air power. By the summer 

of 1966, about ninety percent of the Seventh’s strikes in central and 

south-central Laos were flown by its Thai-based aircraft. In contrast, 

operations in southernmost STEEL TIGER, TIGER HOUND, and TALLY Ho 

relied chiefly on South Vietnamese-based Air Force and Marine aircraft 

as well as Navy carrier planes. Together, the Air Force and Navy were 

flying many more sorties against infiltration and fixed targets throughout 

North Vietnam. All of the services, and especially the Air Force, took 

part in interdiction and close support operations in South Vietnam.23 

As in previous months, the bulk of surveillance sorties were carried 

out by USAF 0-1 FACs who called in and controlled hundreds of Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine strike aircraft. The majority of the night 

missions were flown by USAF A-26Ks (call sign NIMROD),* F-4C 

Phantoms, and C- 130 flareships. Around-the-clock operations saw 

greater use of the MSQ-77 COMBAT SKYSPOT radar when a new site 

opened at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB in June.t24 

Air strikes, despite the heavy monsoon weather, appeared to be 

taking a steady toll of enemy resources, leading some Air Force officials 

and analysts to believe, the anti-infiltration campaign was beginning to 

“pay off.” From July through September, USAF strikes in STEEL TIGER 

reportedly destroyed and damaged seventy-three vehicles, twenty-one huts 

and other structures, twenty-seven rivercraft, and twenty-two antiaircraft 

sites. Strike pilots also made eighty-six important road cuts and reported 

*Redesignated A-26K for political reasons. The World War I1 B-26 Marauder was 

built by Martin. After the war, a Douglas-built plane was similarly designated B-26. Then 

after extensive modification for counterinsurgency operations, the aircraft was designated 

B-26K. Because the “B” for “bomber” signified to Thai authorities an offensive-type 

aircraft, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown ordered the aircraft to be redesignated A-26K. 

The “A” designation, along with “0” and “F” on other USAF aircraft, could signify 

defensive-type operations. [Melvin F. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966 (Project 

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967), p 58.1 

tAs noted earlier, MSQ-77 radar enabled pilots to navigate more accurately to their 

targets at night or in bad weather. For details on USAF night operations in Laos and South 

and North Vietnam, see Maj. Victor B. Anthony, Tactics and Techniques of Night 

Operations, 1961-1970 [The Air Force in Southeast Asia] (Washington, 1973). 

160 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

about sixty-one secondary explosions. A high point of the operations 

occurred on August 19-20 when TIGER HOUND pilots attacked a truck 

park on the Sihanouk Trail. Aided by USAF 0-1 forward air controllers, the pilots destroyed or damaged seventeen trucks.25 

The enemy came under closer surveillance and heavier attack during 

the better weather of late September and early October. From October 10 

to 14, Secretary McNamara and other high Defense and State Department officials visited Saigon. In briefing them, Brig. Gen. Carlos M. 

Talbott, Deputy Director of Seventh Air Force’s Tactical Air Control 

Center, praised the achievements of the TALLY Ho program in southernmost North Vietnam. He said, “the combination of intensified [USAF] 

aerial reconnaissance flown from Thailand and [the] measured interdiction efforts have stalemated the enemy in his efforts to move through 

STEEL TIGER into his LOC [lines of communication] network further to 

the south in Laos.’’ 

Highest praise was reserved for TIGER HOUND, begun in December 

1965. Air strikes under this program plus those flown in STEEL TIGER 

seemed to explain why the DRV abandoned the Ho Chi Minh Trail as 

the main supply artery and shifted more infiltration through the 

demilitarized zone.26 

Seventh Air Force analysts also saw a favorable trend in the decline 

in truck sightings and trucks destroyed and damaged in the DELTA and 

ECHO sections of STEEL TIGER during the last two months of 1966. They 

attributed reduced enemy truck movements to stepped-up day-and-night 

aerial surveillance, offering this data for the DELTA and ECHO sect01-s:~’ 

Trucks 

Sorties sighted Trucks Trucks 

flown by air destroyed damaged 

November 1,311 285 9 82 

1966 

December 1,587 268 85 69 

1966 

Despite the operational problems involved, the STEEL TIGER and 

TIGER HOUND areas absorbed an unusually large number of strike 

aircraft diverted from the BARREL ROLL and ROLLING THUNDER 

programs. No less than 1,500 of these sorties were used in southern Laos 

during November and December 1966. About 950 of them were USAF 

diverts and the rest Navy, mostly from ROLLING THUNDER.^* 

The stiffest challenge for the USAF 0-1 forward air controllers was 

to quickly find targets for the surplus aircraft arriving at random over 

the two areas. Time and again the FAC pilots had to cease their own 

161 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

target searches in order to guide the suddenly arriving fighter-bombers to 

suspected enemy truck, troop, and supply sites. Navy aircraft were 

especially carried less fuel, and thus had lower loiter time than Air Force 

planes. Many of the diverted missions had unsuitable ordnance or 

ordnance fuzes for their secondary targets. Consequently, the damageper-sortie ratio dropped steeply and much ordnance was wasted.29 

The problem of too many diverted aircraft seeking too few 

worthwhile targets in Laos* persisted and placed a heavy strain on all 

USAF FAC pilots. Another short-round strike in subsequent weeks 

resulted in tightened forward air control, adding to the FAC workload. 

This led the Seventh Air Force to request substantially more FAC 

aircraft to meet its expanding needs in Laos.30 

The satisfaction air commanders derived from having sufficient 

strike forces-except specialized aircraft-was tempered, because they 

could not use them as they desired. To be sure, Vientiane and 

Washington slowly rescinded or rendered less onerous some of the 

restrictions. In mid-September, for example, Vientiane’s air attach6 

office eased the rule on hitting rivercraft on Laotian rivers and streams. 

Pilots under FAC control could strike certain types of boats and barges 

suspected of hauling military cargoes, if they were on a waterway or 

beached within the STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance boundaries. But 

attacks on long narrow-beam boats, presumably engaged in nonmilitary 

traffic, were still pr~hibited.~’ 

With strong support from General Momyer and other Air Force 

commanders, General Westmoreland constantly entreated Vientiane and 

Washington to reduce aerial constraints and give commanders more 

flexibility in conducting their tactical and B-52 missions. To the MACV 

commander, Sullivan was the major obstacle to granting more military 

freedom of action in Laos. Their relationship was often abrasive. The 

ambassador would brook no diminution in his authority as the chief 

American military as well as political authority in Laos. Yet he gradually 

acceded to Westmoreland’s “aerial flexibility” arguments.32 

Westmoreland usually submitted single-item requests to reduce 

restrictions in the CRICKET, TIGER HOUND, or STEEL TIGER areas. In 

*The problem also highlighted the fact that, unlike the experience of World War I1 or the Korean War, the United States by late 1966 possessed a surfeit of tactical strike 

aircraft. General Momyer, for one, had no complaints on this score. During a briefing at 

an Air Force commanders’ conference in December 1966, he observed: “Our air forces are 

adequate for the job. This may sound surprising that any field commander says that he has 

enough because generally he wants to fight for the record, and in fighting for the record, 

he wants to be sure that history doesn’t stand him short.“ [PACAF Commanders’ 

Conference Summary, Dec 66.1 

162 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

late September, however, he proposed an overall relaxation of air 

prohibitions: 

At the beginning of Tiger Hound . . . operations in Dec 1965, restrictions on 

air operations in the Laotian panhandle were compatible with the situation then 

existing. The locations of enemy troops and friendly indigenous personnel often 

were in doubt; the technique of systematic visual recce [by USAF FAC’s] and air 

control by airborne FAC’s was just beginning; and the necessary aids to 

navigation were in the process of installation. At about the same time, a change in 

restrictions permitted strikes on targets of opportunity within 200 yards of an 

identifiable motorable route or trail. In Apr 66, rules of engagement were changed 

to allow use of napalm against specified targets under FAC control. 

In Jun 66, authorization was received to conduct Sky Spot strikes during all 

weather conditions, day or night, and to drop the air-delivered land mine Gravel 

against specified targets and areas. 

The latest relaxation of restriction [during September 19661 was clearance to 

strike, under positive control, large military type boats and barges on rivers or 

beached on shores within the [Steel Tiger] armed recce area. 

The loosening of restrictions in the past 9 months, Westmoreland 

noted, led to “increased effectiveness” of air operations. Even so, the 

enemy was taking advantage of American restraint by placing truck 

parks, storage facilities, and other installations more than 200 yards from 

motorable trails, and moving supplies by bicycles and porters on trails. 

Furthermore, the evolution of new interdiction concepts such as SLAM 

dictated more frequent revision of STEEL TIGER air rules. The MACV 

commander suggested many rule changes. He wanted special operating 

areas set up where pilots could strike at the enemy without obtaining 

prior target validations or being under FAC control (the recent installation of more navigational aids made FACs unnecessary in some areas). 

He asked for authority to strike closer to roadwatch teams or other 

friendly Laotian units, and to extend the permissible strike area along 

each side of motorable roads from 200 to 500 yards. He also recommended the creation of several bombing zones for napalm jettisoning, 

and more latitude for pilots to return hostile ground fire.33 

Sullivan’s initial response sounded negative. “We cannot,” the 

ambassador said, “expect to obtain concurrence of this non-belligerent 

[Laotian] government to procedures that are less specific than those 

required in [the] belligerent territory of SVN [South Vietnam] .” He 

insisted on retaining the “greatest degree of safeguard” against bombing 

errors, then with minor modifications approved several of the proposed 

changes and suggested alternate ways of giving strike pilots more latitude 

in attacking the enemy. Sullivan vetoed, however, the proposal to extend 

163 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the permissible strike area beyond 200 yards on either side of a 

motorable road. He left to further study the establishment of napalm 

jettisoning areas but suggested where they might be located.34 

The Seventh Air Force and MACV swiftly translated Sullivan’s 

guidelines into more flexible revisions in STEEL TIGER rules of engagement. Briefly, the revised rules established several new operational areas 

for armed reconnaissance over roads, trails, and rivers without requiring 

FAC control (after radar or tactical air navigation confirmed aircraft 

were in the designated areas). Strikes were authorized on villages in 

designated areas if they were RLAF validated targets or the source of 

hostile ground fire. Also allowed were strikes within one nautical mile of 

friendly Meo roadwatch teams or other units within designated areas.35 

In mid-November, after two instances in the TIGER HOUND area 

where the absence of USAF FACs prevented strike aircraft from 

attacking “fleeting” trucks, Westmoreland again asked Vientiane to 

waive the forward air control requirement for such targets. With drier 

weather along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and faster communications 

between Meo roadwatch teams and USAF aircraft, he forecast more 

instant truck-sighting reports. The Seventh Air Force, he said, needed 

“maximum flexibility” to respond immediately against fleeting “trucks, 

trailers, bulldozers, and . . . mobile construction [items] found on or 

within 200 yards of a motorable road within the STEEL TIGER area.” 

Emory C. Swank, Deputy Chief of Mission (acting for Sullivan who was 

hospitalized) acceded to the request. On November 16 the Seventh Air 

Force flashed to all units concerned the waiver for forward air control 

strikes against vehicles “on or within 200 yards of a motorable road.”36 

Both Vientiane and Washington nonetheless insisted on retaining a 

“pro forma” requirement for RLAF observers aboard USAF C-130 

ABCCCs and USAF FAC aircraft to verify targets and authorize air 

strikes.* Instituted when TIGER HOUND started in December 1965, the 

observer requirement aboard the ABCCCs lapsed for a while in July 

1966 apparently due to General Thao Ma’s (and thus the RLAF’s) 

deepening difficulties with the Royal Laotian Army generals. The Air 

Force agreed to the withdrawal of the two observers normally aboard the 

aircraft, if they would be returned on short notice after the monsoon 

weather abated and more targets appeared in TIGER HOUND and STEEL 

TIGER. September brought better weather and more targets, so the 

Seventh Air Force sought Vientiane’s help in getting the observers back 

*In practice the RLAF and other Asian observers on USAF aircraft did 

“verifying” or “authorizing” of target strikes. When competent in English, they 

useful in translating intelligence data from tribal roadwatch teams or FAR patrols. 

little 

were 

164 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

aboard the ABCCCs. But still preoccupied with the army chieftains, 

Thao Ma proved unresponsive. Absence of the observers caused cancellation of several SHINING BRASS operation^.^' 

The observer problem remained unresolved in the first part of 

October as General Thao Ma’s position in the Royal Laotian military 

command grew uncertain. A coup against the FAR General Staff on 

October 21 by Thao Ma and twenty-five of his pilots failed, and they 

fled with most of their planes to Thailand. All RLAF activities were 

suspended for about three weeks.* During the interval, some of the 

SHINING BRASS and CRICKET WEST operations were cut back or canceled 

for want of observers for the USAF C-130 ABCCCs and the O-ls of the 

23d Tactical Air Support Squadron.38 

After the dust settled on October 27, Seventh Air Force once more 

sought Vientiane embassy assistance to obtain observers for the O-ls and 

the C-130 ABCCCs. In mid-November the FAR General Staff on behalf 

of a newly reconstituted RLAF, headed by Brig. Gen. Sourith Don 

Sasorith, approved their reinstatement. This followed an agreement 

between the embassy and the FAR generals assuring observer accommodations and pay at Da Nang Air Base, where the USAF C-130 ABCCCs 

were based.39 

In mid-July the fear of U.S. air and ground commanders that the 

VC/NVA planned a “monsoon offensive,’’ spearheaded by Hanoi’s 

324B Division with troop and supply support from Laos, spurred MACV 

to step up SHINING BRASS operations. Despite monsoon weather, nine 

air-supported SHINING BRASS teams probed enemy positions along the 

HO Chi Minh Trail between July 11 and 30.40 

As previously, the teams were airlifted into and out of the SHINING 

BRASS operating area by VNAF pilots flying CH-34 helicopters. Air 

Force TIGER HOUND aircraft and Army UH-1B armed helicopters 

provided cover.41 

August witnessed twelve SHINING BRASS team forays. While reconnoitering from August 7 to 9, Team IOWA triggered a large air response 

by twenty-three TIGER HOUND aircraft and fourteen Army armed 

helicopter sorties. The attacks destroyed fifty-nine huts or structures, 

caused an unknown number of enemy casualties, and set off four 

secondary explosions. The team took part in several ground actions, 

killing three of the enemy. In what was now standard practice, the team 

emplaced many M-14 antipersonnel mines along road and trail segments. 

*For a discussion of General Thao Ma’s ill-fated coup, see Maj. Victor B. Anthony, 

“A Military History of the War in Northern Laos, 1945-1968.” 

165 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Still fearing an enemy “monsoon offensive,” MACV sent another dozen 

air-support SHINING BRASS teams into the trail area during September.42 

To ensure team safety or for intelligence reasons, SHINING BRASS 

teams occasionally captured personnel for interrogation about enemy 

dispositions and infiltration activities. As noted earlier, Team IOWA at 

the end of May returned with 2 members of an NVA regiment. During 

July 30-August 1, Team TEXAS brought back 2 local women, who 

revealed that about 100 communist troops were transporting southward 

supplies produced in a nearby valley. At some point, the Viet Cong 

picked up the supplies and moved them to a redoubt. Probing from 

August 7 to 9, Team IOWA bagged 2 prisoners.43 

Platoon-size exploitation forces augmented the intelligence-gathering 

and collection of the regular nine-to eleven-man SHINING BRASS teams.* 

These platoons launched their first mission in late June 1966. Like the 

teams, they ambushed the foe, destroyed huts and materiel, and planted 

antipersonnel mines before being airlifted 

In the last three months of 1966, nine to eleven SHINING BRASS 

(SPIKE) teams and two or three HORNET FORCE platoons were airlifted 

each month into and out of the authorized operating areas. Many probes 

and the accompanying air strikes directly supported American and allied 

operations just across the border in South Vietnam. Others concentrated 

solely on gathering intelligence and emplacing antipersonnel landmines. 

Not all targets were struck by Air Force, Navy, and Marine TIGER 

HOUND aircraft. In October, B-52s began to be used in the SLAM 

program. The maiden mission followed a ground reconnaissance probe 

of enemy redoubts by SPIKE Team COLORADO from October 3 to 7. 

Concluding it had chanced upon a large enemy area, the team recommended a B-52 saturation attack which was conducted as SLAM I 

immediately after the team’s lift-out on the 7th.45 

To assist in resolving a drawn-out debate on the value of B-52 

saturation strikes, HORNET FORCE platoons completed bomb damage 

assessment of areas struck by the B-52s. As in earlier cases, there was 

scant evidence that bombs injured humans or animals. Surveying the 

struck area just thirty minutes after the B-52 bombing, one platoon 

found craters less than a foot in diameter. It noted that bombs had 

impacted widely at the northern end and narrowly at the southern end of 

the target area. Heavy brush blowdowns measured five feet in diameter 

*On October 3 the US.-led SHINING BRASS teams were renamed SPIKE teams, and on 

November 7 the exploitation-force platoons were redesignated HORNET FORCE. Also on the 

7th, the MACV commander assigned the code names HAVOC FORCE and HAYMARKET 

FORCE to company- and battalion-size probes into Laos if and when they were undertaken. 

[Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0710182 Nov 66.1 

166 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

and light brush blowdowns up to seven feet in diameter. The platoon 

discovered three bomb duds but was not sure when they were dropped.46 

A second platoon was inserted between September 2 and 5 near an 

area saturated by 576 BLU-3 bomblets dropped by 5 B-52 ARC LIGHT 

bombers. The platoon found 2 types of craters. Some were round 

shallow holes with vegetation blowdown extending 3 to 6 feet among 

trees and 12 to 14 feet in grass or bamboo. Others were banana shaped. 

Trees 3 feet from bomb craters sustained shrapnel scars up to 9 feet 

above ground. Those 12 feet distant had scars running upward to 12 and 

18 feet. Shrapnel damage could be seen 66 feet from the point of impact. 

All of the CBUs seemed to have penetrated the jungle canopy and 

exploded on the ground. The platoon found one CBU dud. Again, there 

was no evidence the bombing had harmed the enemy.47 

On October 13 a third platoon reconnoitered an area after a B-52 

SLAM strike but saw few signs of enemy attrition. The platoon did 

discover an active bunker and a network of unused trenches near the 

bombed area. Six TIGER HOUND aircraft and two Army armed UH-1B 

helicopters responded to the platoon’s request for a tactical strike. They 

blasted the bunkers and trenches where eighty-five of the enemy were 

dug in.48 

The stepped-up SPIKE and HORNET incursions into the trail area 

were challenged by NVA troops lying in ambush. This triggered more 

firefights and friendly casualties, forcing many teams to withdraw 

quickly. Hurriedly lifted out on July 30, Team MONTANA left missing in 

action two U.S. Army Special Forces team leaders and three tribesmen 

after a fast exchange of fire within thirty feet of an enemy force. Eight 

of nine SPIKE probes in October required emergency lift-out from enemy 

fire, and delivery helicopters were hit more often. Early in the month, a 

team was sent to the trail to secure intelligence and search for targets in 

support of General Walt’s I11 MAF operation in Quang Tri Province in 

South Vietnam. Probing about three and a half miles from the South 

Vietnamese border, this team was ambushed by the NVA. It lost three 

Americans and three tribesmen killed or captured. An interpreter 

survived. In November a team tribesman was wounded during a 

confrontation with the enemy, and in December two tribesmen were 

wounded in another engagement.49 

Supported by TIGER HOUND aircraft, USAF search and rescue 

operations often brought out dead or wounded SHINING BRASS, Air 

Force, or other personnel shot down or killed on the ground by the 

enemy. On November 8 a USAF 0-1 with a FAC pilot and a SHINING 

BRASS observer aboard (to help pinpoint an enemy target) was downed 

by ground fire. A USAF search and rescue aircraft saved the observer 

while a SPIKE team recovered the body of the pilot. The largest rescue of 

167 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the year was undertaken early in December when a DELTA* ground 

reconnaissance team accidentally wandered from South Vietnamese 

territory into Laos. A clash with the communists left two U.S. Army 

Special Forces personnel and two South Vietnamese tribesmen dead or 

missing. Two tribesmen were rescued. During the search for DELTA team 

survivors, the foe shot down an Army UH-1B helicopter on the Laotian 

side of the border, killing all five American crewmen aboard. A SPIKE 

team supported by TIGER HOUND aircraft eventually recovered all the 

bodies.50 

Meanwhile, the bullets-and-bombs anti-infiltration activities were 

enlivened by the psychological warfare tactics of the antagonists. A 

SHINING BRASS platoon saw signs in Vietnamese above the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail reading, “Chase Americans from Vietnam.” The MACV-directed 

units kicked off a counteroffensive in December. They stuck banners and 

posters above or next to certain routes, warning the NVA that travel 

along the trail “meant certain death.” The war of signs made no 

discernible difference in the trail operations of either side during the 

following month^.^' 

The Army’s growing use of armed UH-1B helicopters for close 

support of SHINING BRASS units continued to fan the argument over 

roles and missions between the Air Force and Army. The Seventh Air 

Force tried to resolve the problem by telling subordinate commanders 

that the use of armed helicopters was justified by the unique trail 

operations-so long as they flew in “a permissive environment” (that is, 

where the ground-fire threat was minimal). Many USAF personnel 

nonetheless remained convinced that the Army helicopters preempted the 

Air Force’s close support role.52 

A typical mission allowed two hours for team insertion with an Air 

Force forward air controller and two USAF A-1Es flying cover. If the 

mission was forced to cancel, the aircraft were released for other 

operations. If team insertion was rescheduled for later in the day, the 

armed helicopters flew escort and suppressed enemy ground fire. After 

the team landed in a designated area, the transport and armed copters 

returned to a base camp-usually fifteen to twenty minutes flying time 

away-and stayed on alert to evacuate the personnel in case of an 

emergency. If the team remained in place, a USAF FAC flew over their 

positions twice daily or more often, if necessary, to coordinate any team 

strike requests. The armed copters were also available if no Air Force 

TIGER HOUND combat aircraft were nearby. SHINING BRASS personnel 

*Similar to the SPIKE teams, DELTA teams operated solely within South Vietnam’s 

borders. 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

showered the Air Force with praise, characterizing the support into and 

out of enemy territory as “excellent.”53 

By the end of 1966, MACV had sent into the trail 124 small- and 13 

platoon-size SHINING BRASS units. TIGER HOUND planes, largely Air 

Force, flew 970 direct support sorties. MACV analysts judged that these 

operations killed 104 enemy personnel, destroyed 58 supply caches, 

destroyed or damaged 740 huts and other structures, and triggered 80 

secondary explosions that undoubtedly took a further toll of enemy lives 

and supplies. The SHINING BRASS units selected targets for more than 

100 B-52 ARC LIGHT sorties that inflicted undetermined but presumably 

considerable attrition on communist troop and supply concentration^.^^ 

Were the foregoing operations worth the resources put into them? 

As with preceding anti-infiltration programs in Laos, judgment was 

divided. Generally, the service commanders, the JCS, the DIA, and some 

high Department of Defense (DOD) officials believed the SHINING 

BRASS-TIGER HOUND program was essential. They backed its continuance, since it obviously inflicted losses on the enemy and forced him to 

divert manpower to defend himself against these air-ground intrusions. 

The DIA stressed the program’s intelligence value, informing the 

president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in September 1966 that 

SHINING BRASS “is the only DoD . . . activity effectively operating in the 

Laos panhandle and [is] extremely important in the collection effort 

against NVA/VC infiltration routes through South Vietnam.” This 

enabled the agency and MACV to obtain more precise data on enemy 

facilities and dwellings in the panhandle, and assisted both organizations 

in making better estimates of enemy strength, the status of infiltration 

routes, the location of assembly points, and the kind of tactics used to 

bring supplies and weapons into the South. The DIA, MACV, and the 

services all backed deeper air-ground probes into the 

Ambassador Sullivan, conversely, was unimpressed by SHINING 

BRASS’S claimed achievements. Skeptical of the program since its 

inception in late 1965, he considered the air-supported ground probes 

into the trail unprofitable. He was deeply concerned about the political 

consequences if the North Vietnamese captured American or South 

Vietnamese personnel and helicopters deep within Laos. Leonard Unger, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was more 

supportive and acknowledged the intelligence and harassment value of 

the program. But he agreed with Sullivan on the political risks entailed 

with extending SHINING BRASS farther into Laos. Such operations not 

directly related to the safety of American forces in South Vietnam 

outweighed their military ju~tification.~~ 

In early 1967, however, the results of SLAM I11 in southernmost 

Laos (the largest Air Force supported SHINING BRASS operation thus far) 

169 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

would change Sullivan’s and Unger’s minds about the need for attacking 

enemy infiltration targets deeper in the panhandle.* 

Like SHINING BRASS, CRICKET operations in central Laos over the 

last half of 1966 expanded despite the manifold problems encountered 

during the early months of the air-ground program. Two small, new 

CRICKET zones were formed, CRICKET WEST and CRICKET WEST 

FRINGE. A small unit of Douglas A-26K light bombers, recently based at 

Nakhon Phanom, began on July 1 a ninety-day night combat test against 

communist trucks. A new MSQ-77 radar bombing system at Nakhon 

Phanom became operational. And Vientiane commenced to field more 

tribal roadwatch teams, to obtain more intelligence on enemy truck 

movements and supply sites for use in air strike planning. 

As expected, FAC and other pilots found that from July through 

September NVA logistic movements had slowed because of the heaviest 

annual monsoon rains during these months. Although the magnitude of 

communist infiltration southward was hard to ascertain, there was 

enough intelligence to show it was not small. MACV in time proved that 

the enemy’s personnel and supply flow towards South Vietnam’s I Corps 

was greater than it a~peared.~’ 

The roadwatch teams regularly counted porters, pack animals, and 

trucks along roads and trails. They noted war traffic, believed to consist 

of enemy supplies, moving along the Ngo River south and east along the 

Bang Fai River toward Mahaxay in south-central Laos. The teams 

detected the heaviest truck traffic in and near the Mu Gia Pass and along 

Routes 911 and 912.58 

As in the past, the results of air strikes on trucks and other targets 

were hard to pin down. Still, there was a consensus that daily air 

surveillance and strikes along the routes and trails slowed if it did not 

stop the NVA’s logistic flow and caused some attrition of personnel, 

trucks, and supplies. The size of air surveillance and strike operations in 

the CRICKET zone can be seen in the sortie statistics from January 1966 

(when the program began) through September 1966. Air Force 0-1 

forward air controllers of the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron flew 

2,292 visual reconnaissance sorties and 1,415 strike control sorties. Each 

USAF FAC flew about 90 hours a month. As in all air programs, 

CRICKET had its cost. The Air Force in roughly 9 months lost 7 planes 

and 5 pilots with 5 of the aircraft downed by enemy gunners. The losses 

included one of the Douglas A-26Ks that began operations in late June. 

Aircraft malfunctions downed 2 other planes, one an A-26K.59 

*See Chapter VII. 

170 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

More Meo roadwatch teams were fielded when the monsoon weather 

abated in October 1966, and CRICKET operations accelerated. In November-December 1966, CRICKET FACs were busier than ever as the onset of 

the northeast monsoon sent Air Force and Navy strike aircraft from 

TALLY Ho and ROLLING THUNDER to Laos. For example, the forward 

air controllers in December handled more than 2,000 strike sorties. 

Furthermore, the RLAF had recovered from the ill-fated coup attempt 

by General Thao Ma, flying 65 T-28 strike sorties in support of 

 CRICKET.^ 

Pilots went on reporting the destruction or damage of numerous 

enemy trucks, supply sites, and their targets; but the jungle terrain and 

weather impeded verification. The compiling and assessing of air strike 

results were further hampered by the frequent diversions of strike planes 

from one air program to another. Yet in general the air commanders 

agreed that CRICKET was worthwhile.61 

By July 1966 it was clear that not all NVA personnel and supplies 

moving through the central Laotian panhandle were destined for South 

Vietnam. Reports from USAF 0-1 forward air controllers, Meo roadwatch teams, and FAR Group Mobile 12 revealed that masses of enemy 

troops were heading toward Mahaxay and nearby Thakhek [a town on 

the Mekong River opposite Nakhon Phanom RTAFB]. FAR Group 

Mobile 12 was positioned to defend Thakhek. Intelligence analysts 

believed that enemy forces planned to capture the town. Such an 

eventuality threatened to cut Laos in half and portended more NVA 

support for the insurgency in northeastern Thailand.62 

Deeply disturbed by the development, Ambassador Sullivan at once 

set up a new interdiction zone in central Laos. Known as CRICKET WEST, 

it comprised a five by fifteen nautical mile area east of Thakhek. Both 

US. and RLAF airmen would fly surveillance and interdict the communists in this zone. Lao pilots were scheduled to fly upwards of eighteen 

interdiction and close support sorties per day.63 

With so many FAR troops and friendly Laotians in the CRICKET 

WEST zone, Sullivan laid down stringent operating rules. These required 

U.S. and RLAF combat pilots to validate their targets, either by an 

airborne forward air controller or by the air operations center at 

Savannakhet where RLAF officers and the assistant U.S. air attach6 kept 

logs of permissible targets and target areas. Pilots were exempt from this 

rule only if they relied on MSQ-77 radar for bombing accuracy, or if 

they received ground fire. When fired upon, pilots could retaliate 

immediately. The Seventh Air Force issued detailed guidance on applying 

the CRICKET WEST rules. In a separate action and with Vientiane’s concurrence, Seventh transferred four RLAF-validated targets in the area 

172 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

formerly assigned C priority (off limits to attack) to A priority, which 

permitted pilots to hit them instantly in accordance with the air rules.*64 

As CRICKET WEST operations got under way, RLAF observers flew 

with USAF FAC 0-1 pilots to help verify targets and call in air strikes. 

As in other air programs, there was a chronic language problem. The 

first two assigned observers could not communicate with USAF pilots 

aside from giving simple “yes” and “no” answers to questions. Hence 

several observers better versed in English were put in USAF aircraft or 

sent to ground sites. They communicated by mobile radio with the 

non-English-speaking Laotians.65 

The initial major CRICKET WEST operations started on July 24 after 

communist gunners downed one of several Laotian T-28s supplying close 

support to a FAR unit trying to protect Thakhek. The unit flashed a 

request for Air Force assistance to the Savannakhet air operations center. 

Two USAF 0-1s arrived on the scene and saw the FAR confronted by 

about 2,000 PL/NVA troops. An appeal for more aircraft, approved by 

a CRICKET control officer, brought numerous USAF fighters to the battle 

area. Thirty-eight F-105s and one A-26K dropped about 150,000 pounds 

of munitions and strafed with 20-mm fire. The RLAF T-28s completed 

19 combat sorties. The results appeared very promising. The FAR 

commander reported at least 35 enemy personnel killed, 50 wounded, 

and heavy destruction of weapons and positions.66 

When new enemy troops were detected in the vicinity of the 

CRICKET WEST zone, Ambassador Sullivan hastily authorized fresh 

USAF/RLAF attacks in the area, at once named CRICKET WEST FRINGE. 

The RLAF flew the majority of the sorties, about eighteen a day. Air 

Force forward air controllers of the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron 

as a rule flew two sorties a day, one in the morning and one in the 

afternoon. 67 

If extra air support were needed, the Air Force could respond with 

alacrity. On September 27, for example, about 400 communists near 

Thakhek again threatened to overrun the Group Mobile 12 unit 

defending the area. Several A-26Ks under 0-1 forward air control 

dropped general purpose bombs and bomblets and strafed the enemy 

positions including a cave where many had hidden. The air assault saved 

the FAR unit from possible defeat. An after-action FAR estimate 

suggested that up to 80 percent of the communists were killed.68 

During late October, in the aftermath of General Thao Ma’s failed 

coup that stopped RLAF operations, Lao observers on USAF FAC 

*For a discussion of guidelines for establishing A, B, and C priority targets, see 

Chapter IV. 

173 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

aircraft were withdrawn. The absence of Laotian funds precluded quick 

reinstatement of the observers, so CRICKET WEST and CRICKET WEST 

FRINGE operations were suspended. The financial and other troubles 

were not overcome until December 6, when the observers went back into 

USAF aircraft and flights in the two sectors resumed.69 

Together with CRICKET and CRICKET WEST FRINGE activities, a 

USAF A-26K tactical bomber unit started supporting CRICKET operations in central Laos. The unit's 8 aircraft, 12 pilot-navigators, and 142 

support personnel arrived at Nakhon Phanom from England Air Force 

Base, Louisiana, in early May to replace USAF AC-47 gunships that had 

become too vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. The unit was attached to the 

603d Air Commando Squadron on March 8, 1966, to train Lao and Thai 

pilots and airmen for counterinsurgency in Laos and Thailand.* Commanded by Lt. Col. Albert R. Howarth, the men were designated 

Detachment 1 of the 603d Air Commando Squadron, and their aircraft 

became known as Big Eagle.70 

The long-loitering, twin-engine A-26Ks carried a large assortment of 

rockets and bombs as well as 7.62-mm and SO-caliber machineguns. 

These aircraft began flying largely copbat orientation missions on June 

21, using call sign NIMROD. (This quickly became the popular name for 

the heavily modified bomber.) In the first ten days, enemy antiaircraft 

fire shot down one of the A-26Ks and damaged two others. This led to 

the bombers being switched to night operations.+ Then General Harris 

and other USAF commanders decided, and promptly secured permission, 

to night-test the bomber (which could carry its own flares) for ninety 

days beginning July 1. Test operations would focus on enemy trucks, but 

troop and supply concentrations would not be immune. When not 

searching for their own targets, pilots would rely on target intelligence 

generated by other Air Force sources or Meo roadwatch teams.71 

The NIMROD night combat tests proceeded through the end of 

September under unusually adverse conditions. The pace of enemy truck 

movements had slowed sharply due to the monsoon weather, providing 

fewer targets. Flying conditions were at their worst in midyear. Between 

July 29 and August 12, for example, the rain or overcast canceled 

forty-six sorties. 

Nonetheless, the light bombers flew virtually every night throughout 

the CRICKET operational zone, bombing and strafing known or suspected 

*The 603d Air Commando Squadron incorporated the initial USAF WATER PUMP 

?For more technical details of A-26 operations, see Anthony, Tactics and Techniques 

training detachment deployed to Udorn RTAFB in March 1964. See Chapter I. 

of Night Operations, 1961-1970, pp 97-107. 

174 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

truck and other enemy concentrations. At the end of the test, Colonel 

Pettigrew concluded that the A-26Ks had achieved an “excellent degree 

of success.” Whether flying reconnaissance or loitering, they possessed 

distinct advantages over faster-flying Air Force and Navy jets. Test 

analysts calculated that a single NIMROD could cover the same target area 

as six jets, as each jet was limited to about forty minutes loitering time. 

For combat stretched out over twelve hours (at night), they believed six 

A-26Ks could cover the same target area as thirty-six separately launched 

jets. Moreover, not one bomber was lost during the ninety-day test.72 

Ambassador Sullivan was also impressed by the night tests and the 

general versatility of the light bombers. Earlier, he had relaxed CRICKET 

strike rules somewhat to permit the A-26Ks to attack targets without 

FAC control, the only combat aircraft free to do so in the CRICKET 

zone. Anticipating an upturn in communist night truck traffic now that 

monsoon weather was abating, the ambassador wanted eight more of the 

bombers for night operations. He offered in return to release eight 

AC-47 gunships, still performing night interdiction over the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail, because of their vulnerability to heavier ground fire. Four 

had already been shot down.73 

Praise for the NIMROD bombers was not unanimous, however; 

General Momyer, Seventh Air Force Commander, objected to the 

dispatch of more A-26Ks. Taking the long view, he claimed that the 

progressively intense enemy antiaircraft fire made no prop planes safe in 

Laos, and he wished to replace them all with jets. He expressed 

reservations about the findings of the recently completed combat night 

tests. Entering the debate, Admiral Sharp sided with Sullivan. Conceding 

that the test results were probably preliminary, he still deemed them 

sufficiently valid to justify deploying more of the bombers to Nakhon 

Phanom. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain higher-level 

authority to do so. Supportive of Sharp’s request, the chiefs programmed 

five more A-26Ks for deployment in January 1967, but McNamara 

withheld his approval, siding in effect with Momyer. Yet at Sullivan’s 

repeated urgings-with support from lower-level Air Force tactical 

commanders-the Defense secretary in mid-1967 let several additional 

bombers deploy. The Sullivan-Momyer controversy over prop versus jet 

aircraft would continue.74 

In the meantime, the NIMROD bombers remained at Nakhon 

Phanom to satisfy the needs of commanders appreciative of their 

performance. Confronted by a sudden PL/NVA buildup in the BARREL 

ROLL area, Colonel Pettigrew, General Bond (Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force Deputy Commander at Udorn), and Vientiane agreed 

on October 25 to divert some A-26K sorties from CRICKET to BARREL 

ROLL. They arranged for a temporary quickening of BARREL ROLL 

175 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

operations using four A-26K, twelve A-lE, and eighteen F-105 USAF 

sorties daily. At the same time, the conferees decided to cancel on 

November 1 the Air Force’s BANGO/WHIPLASH strip alert operations 

from Thai bases that had begun in April 1965. The decision was based 

on the premises that “dedicating” strip alert aircraft for targets in Laos 

was unnecessarily expensive, and that aircraft diversions or quick 

re-scheduling of missions could furnish enough fast-reaction strike^.^' 

Thus, by the end of 1966, the A-26Ks were still flying chiefly night 

missions in the BARREL ROLL and CRICKET programs, their future status 

to be determined in 1967. 

The virtually exclusive use of A-26K NIMRODS fornight missions was 

just one measure for improving the CRICKET program. Another was 

greater employment of the tribal roadwatch teams. Convinced of their 

importance in intelligence gathering and targeting, American officials 

began fielding more teams in anticipation of expanded NVA infiltration 

through central Laos in the next dry season (October 1966-May 1967).76 

By the end of October, the Americans possessed about 40 deployable 

teams, and the goal for the end of January 1967 was about 50. Team 

infiltration surveillance was being extended to areas and routes heretofore not covered. In addition, American intelligence personnel were 

recruiting and training Laotian tribesmen for paramilitary operations in 

the CRICKET as well as other panhandle sectors. Some units were trained 

for firefights while searching for aerial targets, enemy documents, or 

taking prisoners of war for interr~gation.~~ 

Some FAR units likewise patrolled the CRICKET area, and American 

officials encouraged the FAR to enlarge such ventures. There were 

separate American and Laotian activities as well, to extract added 

information on enemy locations and movements from refugees and 

returnees around Thakhek, Savannakhet, and Pakse farther ~0~1th.~~ 

The expansion of roadwatch operations as well as other antiinfiltration programs in Laos made closer coordination between all of the 

concerned agencies mandatory. During September, representatives from 

Vientiane’s air attach6 office, the deputy commander, Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, MACV, and Vientiane agreed to hold weekly meetings 

to discuss targeting, the distribution of air resources, and related matters. 

The first meeting, on October 11, was chaired by the director of 

intelligence, Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force. Representatives of 

Seventh Air Force tactical units engaged in Laos, and the RLAF were 

added shortly as attendees.79 

In November 1966, Hark-1 and Hark-2 ground-to-air communication sets were furnished the ground teams. They enhanced the coordination of roadwatch targeting and Seventh Air Force strike operations in 

Laos. Hark-1 was for sending communications, Hark-2 for receiving. 

176 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

The sets were of two basic types. One used voice code that enabled a 

team reporting from a route segment to relay its findings to an 

English-speaking Laotian agent at an observation post. The agent in turn 

would relay the findings to one of several Americans stationed at various 

panhandle sites, who would direct FAC, flare, or strike aircraft to a 

target or target areas. The second type (PEACOCK) used an electronic 

code and enabled illiterate team members to send reports of truck 

sightings or other targets directly over their Hark-1 sets to aircraft. To 

better receive the data sent by voice or electronic code, Seventh Air Force 

on December 5-in the absence of sufficient C-130 ABCCCs-introduced into Laos a specially equipped RC-47 communication relay 

aircraft. The RC-47 flashed the data through the Savannakhet air 

operations center to the Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force. The 

tactical air control center then contacted USAF FAC, flare, or strike 

aircraft 

Much to the chagrin of Vientiane’s officials, operational shortcomings persisted in spite of the closer meshing of roadwatch team targeting 

with Seventh Air Force tactical aircraft. “Real time” reporting still 

lagged. In theory the ground-to-air communication contact was possible 

in two minutes. But in practice, it was fifteen to seventeen minutes or 

more before Seventh Air Force aircraft arrived over a targeted area to 

confirm a target visually, then conduct a strike. 

Another persistent problem was too few English-speaking Laotians 

aboard FAC, flare, ABCCC, or strike aircraft to translate roadwatch 

team findings. In fact most aircraft still had to fly without them. Lastly, 

the Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force deputy commander and the 

STEEL TIGER Task Force commander (who assumed his post at Udorn in 

January 1967) were both required to refer a final decision on aircraft 

allocations to General Momyer’s Seventh Air Force headquarters in 

Saigon. As MACV Deputy Commander for Air, Momyer had to weigh 

daily Vientiane’s strike requests against higher priority targets in South 

and North Vietnam. The competing needs of roadwatch targeteers and 

Seventh Air Force’s strike priorities defied solution.81 

Inevitably, the expanded roadwatch team activities in the CRICKET 

program imposed heavier airlift demands on USAF UH-1F and CH-3C 

helicopters based at Nakhon Phanom or Udorn in Thailand. Though 

originally earmarked for counter-insurgency training of the Royal Thai 

Air Force, these helicopters were often diverted to ferry roadwatch teams 

to and from designated areas and to do the same in southern North 

Vietnam under the aegis of an Operation Plan 34A program. However, 

as roadwatch activities expanded, the use of USAF Thai-based copters 

was caught up in a highly complex and controversial debate. 

177 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

At the same time, CRICKET operations in central Laos during the 

last half of 1966 were highlighted by the inauguration of MSQ-77 radar 

strikes. Designed to allow greater bombing accuracy at night and in bad 

weather, the radar system COMBAT SKYSPOT* was introduced in South 

Vietnam in April 1966 and at Nakhon Phanom where it was activated on 

June 3.+ At the end of the month, the Vientiane embassy authorized Air 

Force and Navy aircraft to use the radar in striking targets validated by 

the RLAF, FACs, or the embassy air attach& The first MSQ-77-directed 

strike in Laos was made by USAF aircraft on July 6. With a maximum 

line-of-sight range of 200 nautical miles at 30,000 feet, aircraft could also 

use the system to strike a number of BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER 

targets above and below the CRICKET zone.82 

Hailed as a significant navigation aid for finding and striking with 

more accuracy jungle and weather-hidden targets (especially at night), 

USAF and Navy airmen lost no time in adopting COMBAT SKYSPOT. By 

August 18, a total of 350 ordnance-dropping SKYSPOT sorties had been 

flown in CRICKET and other STEEL TIGER areas. But there was a paucity 

of bomb damage assessment of the radar-directed strikes. 

Concerned, Admiral Sharp asked General Harris to furnish comprehensive data on MSQ-77 strike results. He was especially interested in 

forty-four sorties aimed at RLAF-validated Target 79, a narrow road 

segment on Route 912, one of the key infiltration routes in the Laotian 

panhandle. PACAF analysts, after reviewing numerous CRICKET FAC 

visual reports, concluded that the new radar system still fell short of 

assuring pinpoint bombing.83 

Nonetheless COMBAT SKYSPOT surpassed other bombing radar systems. By the end of 1966, experience acquired through 10,000 MSQ-77- 

controlled strike sorties in Laos and South and North Vietnam disclosed 

that bombing misses were averaging 300- to 350-feet, with larger misses 

occurring only rarely because of human error or radar malfunction. 

SKYSPOT’S greatest advantage was the intended one: to assure more 

bombing accuracy at night and in bad weather than previously. It thus 

complemented rather than replaced visual or other airborne bombing 

*The system was first called SKYSPOT then COMBAT PROOF and finally COMBAT 

SKYSPOT. It was basically an MSQ-35 bomb scoring radar converted into a strike-directing 

radar system. 

tThe first two units were activated at Bien Hoa and Pleiku in South Vietnam in April 

and May 1966, respectively; at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and Dong Ha, South Vietnam, 

in June 1966; and at Da Lat and Binh Thuy, South Vietnam, in September 1966 and April 

1967, respectively. [Maj Richard A. Durkee, Combat Skyspot (Project CHECO, Hickam 

AB, Hawaii, 1967), p 6.1 

178 
MSQ - SKYSPOT 

Radar Sites and Radii 

April 1966 - April 1967 

0 SKYSPOT 

@-Mile Radius wI~out ksmn 

100-Mile Radius wiul B~~CO~ 

0 ~oo-~~liius WlUl Grn"nd 

0 50 75 150 llB* 

0 50 75 ISOKIIomtem 

+ CHINA 

NORTH 

VIETNAM 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

systems.* In the wake of several unfortunate short rounds or bombing 

errors in early 1967, the Air Staff, PACAF, and Seventh Air Force 

would redouble their efforts to improve night and all-weather operations 

in Laos and North Vietnam.t84 

The rising demand for Thai-based USAF helicopters to support 

roadwatch operations in Laos and southern North Vietnam was warmly 

debated by Saigon and Washington officials in late 1966. The helicopters 

were sent initially to Thailand in April 1966, when the administration 

directed the Air Force to dispatch four UH-1Fs and several “Jolly Green 

Giant” CH-3s with crews and maintenance personnel from South 

Vietnam to Nakhon Phanom. The mission of the helicopter units was to 

train the Royal Thai Air Force in counterinsurgency and thus help the 

Thai government deal with the insurgency in northeast Thailand. Fresh 

copters came, and by September 1966 there were ten UH-1Fs and fifteen 

CH-3s, the bulk of them at Nakhon Phanom and a few at Udorn. 

Except for the original UH-lFs, all were assigned temporarily to assist 

the Thais. 

The State and Defense departments assumed that the RTAF counterinsurgency training could be completed in ten months. They therefore 

ordered on June 16, 1966, that all USAF helicopters be withdrawn from 

Thailand by January 31, 1967.85 

However, after the helicopters and their USAF aircrews deployed to 

Thailand, they found themselves inexorably drawn into more than 

training activities. From time to time they took part in the Thai 

government’s counterinsurgency program. On August 8, 1966, for 

example, eight UH-1Fs and a CH-3 airlifted 350 Thai police and army 

troops from Udorn to Sakon Nakhon in northeastern Thailand where 

they occupied positions surrounding an insurgent area. Also, copter units 

were called upon more frequently to provide support (code name PONY 

EXPRESS) for tribal intelligence-gathering and targeting operations in 

southern Laos and North Vietnam. By late in the year, the units were 

repeatedly used to assist in search and rescue activities for American, 

Laotian, and South Vietnamese pilots downed in Laos.86 

Not surprisingly as the withdrawal date of January 31, 1967, 

approached, USAF commanders and officers associated with the diverse 

programs viewed with mounting dismay the impending loss of all 

helicopters. Service interest also dictated retaining the copters, for all the 

*For further discussion of MSQ-77 operations in Southeast Asia, see Durkee, Combat 

Skyspot, and Anthony, Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961-1970, pp 

203-06. 

?See Chapter VIII. 

180 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

officers believed that the Air Force deserved a larger role in the currently 

Army-dominated special air warfare field. Ambassador Sullivan, intent 

on expanding CRICKET operations, backed the Air Force position. “All 

this augmentation [in roadwatch activity] has been possible,” he said in a 

personal appeal to McNamara, “[because of] CH-3 Pony Express 

helicopters.” If the copters were withdrawn, he warned, “we [will] have 

to revert to our previous [lower] levels of activity in the [Laotian] 

panhandle.” He sent a similar message to Secretary 

Notwithstanding the “military necessity” argument, there were 

countervailing views. In Bangkok, Ambassador Martin thought it unwise 

for the United States to involve itself more deeply in the Thai 

government’s counterinsurgency program. He said that “with some 

struggle” the Thais could manage their own helicopter training and 

counterinsurgency. There was the further sensitive issue of using Thai 

bases as a springboard for covert copter operations in Laos and North 

Vietnam. 88 

At the same time, Ambassador Sullivan’s spirited insistence on 

retaining the helicopters impelled McNamara to back off from his 

original withdrawal order. He said he would be “receptive” to detailed 

justification for retaining helicopters in Thailand for special operations in 

Laos and North Vietnam. After studying the Air Staff paper on the 

matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at once offered arguments to keep nine 

or ten CH-3s in Nakhon Phanom. General McConnell, in a personal 

memo to McNamara, adopted Admiral Sharp’s tactic of urging as a 

minimum the retention of the original UH-1Fs at Nakhon Phanom for 

“out country” airlift.89 

On January 19, 1967, the Defense secretary made his decision. He 

accepted the Sharp-McConnell recommendation to keep the four UH-1Fs 

at Nakhon Phanom for use in Laos and North Vietnam and barred their 

use in any fashion for Royal Thai Air Force counterinsurgency training 

or operations. As a consequence, the twenty-one remaining helicopters 

were returned at the end of the month to their parent organizations in 

South Vietnam. But their departure would prove only temporary. Late in 

the year, a dozen CH-3 Jolly Green Giants were once again in Nakhon 

Phanom, this time to support the new IGLOO WHITE sensor-oriented 

anti-infiltration program.go 

With the onset of the TALLY Ho program in southern North 

Vietnam on July 20, General Westmoreland wanted to step up B-52 ARC 

LIGHT bombings in southern Laos and spread them into the western 

demilitarized zone and DRV territory just above the zone. His justification was the same as for launching TALLY Ho operations: the infiltration 

of major elements of the NVA’s 324B Division through the western 

demilitarized zone into South Vietnam’s northern I Corps, and the 

181 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

presence of large, unidentified enemy troop and supply resources near 

Tchepone, poised to reinforce the 324B Division. He believed a communist “monsoon offensive” was imminent.g1 

A year of B-52 close support and interdiction bombing in South 

Vietnam* and limited strikes in Laos had convinced Westmoreland (but 

not Seventh Air Force)+ that the SAC bomber was the most pivotal, 

single weapon in the American arsenal for waging jungle warfare. 

Ground commanders in particular were impressed by the bomber’s 

firepower and wanted more of it. As a SAC assessment noted: “An 

infantryman could always use more heavy artillery and to him that is 

what the B-52’s were.” By mid-1966, the MACV commander had 

become highly assertive in his requests for more ARC LIGHT sorties in 

South Vietnam, Laos, and border areas. His desire to extend the 

bombings westward in Laos on targets uncovered by MACV SHINING 

BRASS units conflicted, however, with the Vientiane embassy’s and 

Washington’s policy to restrict SAC missions close to South Vietnam’s 

border to assure concurrent cover strikes in that country. B-52 bombing 

of the demilitarized zone and North Vietnam posed separate political 

problems.92 

To help blunt the expected enemy monsoon offensive in South 

Vietnam’s northernmost Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, Westmoreland singled out eleven targets near Tchepone for the ARC LIGHT 

bombers. They were part of a lengthier list of MACV targets Ambassador Sullivan previously refused to approve because all were six to sixteen 

miles west of South Vietnam’s border. Such distances made questionable 

the ability to maintain the secrecy of the B-52 operations in Laos by 

flying cover strikes inside South Vietnam. The ambassador also objected 

to several targets because they were near populated areas or roadwatch 

teams. In a few cases the target data was outdated. The most sensitive 

issue, however, was Souvanna Phouma’s official ignorance of the secret 

ARC LIGHT operations in Laos.93 

Convinced that none of the above factors were very compelling, the 

MACV commander cited military reasons why the Tchepone targets 

should be struck: 

A route traffic analysis shows that the rainy season has had a decided impact 

on the load capacity of the roads which, in turn, has caused the pile up of supplies 

*SAC ARC LIGHT bombing of South Vietnam began June 18, 1965. 

?As noted earlier, all substantive decisions on targeting for and use of SAC B-52 

bombers in Laos were made by General Westmoreland, in coordination with Vientiane and 

Washington. The Seventh Air Force commander had no voice in these decisions, and 

CINCSAC’s role was heavily circumscribed. See Chapter V. 

182 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

stored in the target areas. Without exception, visual reconnaissance has provided 

additional information on supply storage in each target [area]. In addition, 

fording is very difficult, if not impossible [at] the Xe Bang Hieng River at 

Tchepone and the Xe Pon River at Ban Dong. Ferry systems are in use at both 

locations which further reduces supply flow and as a result increases storage 

requirements along the routes. 

Keeping restrictions on the use of B-52 bombers in this area, 

Westmoreland said, gave the enemy a “safe sanctuary” in Laos close to 

South Vietnam’s Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in I Corps. Even 

though he could use tactical air on the Laotian targets, it was “beyond 

the capability of tactical air” to destroy them. Only the SAC bombers 

could impede the supply flow into I Corps and thwart the NVA from 

opening another offensive in that sector.94 

Having received no favorable response from his superiors, Westmoreland asked for and Sullivan assented to a meeting at Udorn on July 

19. There the MACV commander underlined again the value of 

saturation bombing of the enemy troops and supplies near Tchepone that 

threatened the security of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. He 

stressed the “outstanding” accuracy of the B-52s day or night from 

about 32,000 feet. The only significant political fallout from an ARC 

LIGHT attack, he said, would consist of Pathet Lao propaganda blasts 

and protest letters to the International Control Commission. 

Sullivan was unpersuaded. He asserted that any extension of the 

bombing into Laos needed Souvanna Phouma’s consent. The ambassador agreed to ask Souvanna (Washington willing) but warned that the 

latter’s negative response could halt the surreptitious ARC LIGHT 

bombings. Souvanna was abroad at the moment but was expected to 

return to Vientiane about July 25. 

In summarizing the Udorn meeting for State, Sullivan said he was 

willing to solicit the prime minister’s permission to attack the Tchepone 

targets solely because of “Westy’s strong presentation” of their importance and conviction that tactical air was not adequate for the task.95 

After consulting with his administration colleagues, Secretary Rusk 

still frowned on a Sullivan-Souvanna meeting on the subject, thus leaving 

the Tchepone targets unapproved for SAC bombing. Also left hanging 

was a sensitive ARC LIGHT request to bomb supply and other targets 

adjacent to the North Vietnamese border, about nineteen miles above the 

demilitarized zone. A concurrent strike in South Vietnam seemed 

unrealistic, and a concurrent strike on DRV soil opposite the Laotian 

targets raised another political question. Up to now, Washington had 

allowed just two ARC LIGHT missions on the North, both in April 1966 

on road and trail approaches to the Mu Gia Pass.96 

183 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Westmoreland persisted. On August 2 he revalidated the 11 

Tchepone targets and proposed striking them with 216 ARC LIGHT 

sorties. This type of saturation bombing, he averred, was crucial to the 

continued success of allied air and ground operations underway in South 

Vietnam’s I Corps. He said no target was closer than 4 miles to a 

Laotian roadwatch team or 3 miles to a populated area.97 

In the briefings and messages that followed, Westmoreland kept 

underscoring the danger of a monsoon offensive by the North’s 324B 

Division, and the need to blunt it with B-52 strikes. More air power was 

a must. He credited recent TIGER HOUND strikes and monsoon weather 

with preventing the communists from developing a serious offensive and 

resupplying their units adequately in South Vietnam through the demilitarized zone. The launching of the TALLY Ho program on July 20 

against routes in North Vietnam just above the demilitarized zone had 

also been helpful in checking the enemy. The 324th posed a greater 

challenge, and the likelihood of the division’s beginning a monsoon 

offensive was “no myth.” It was solidly based on intelligence from a 

recently defected Viet Cong lieutenant colonel who had held a “a key 

planning assignment” and forecast a VC/NVA drive to capture Dong Ha 

and Quang Tri in the northern I Corps region. The next two months 

promised to be “critical” with American forces “strained to the utmost” 

in sustaining spoiling operations. The B-52s would play a paramount 

role if restrictions on their use-in Laos, the demilitarized zone, and the 

DRV area just above it-were relaxed. 

ARC LIGHT operations, Westmoreland said, were “a major innovation of the war,” giving a ground commander “an unprecedented 

advantage over the enemy and a means to deter or counter the Asian 

tactic of employing mass formations on the battlefield.” Their psychological impact, while not precisely measurable, was impressive. VC and 

NVA captives and returnees repeatedly stated that “they fear B-52 

strikes more than anything else.” This alone attested to “far more 

effective results than are generally realized.”98 

Westmoreland’s urgings on behalf of more B-52 bombing in Laos, 

the demilitarized zone, and North Vietnam had by now become deeply 

intertwined with plans to beef up the current 30-bomber force in Guam, 

presently generating 400-plus sorties a month largely in South Vietnam. 

Tentatively, the next increment would boost the bomber force to 50, then 

to 70 bombers, the latter number to support an 800 monthly sortie rate 

throughout the war theater. Also being considered was forward basing of 

some bombers to shorten the approximately 12-hour round-trip flight 

184 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

between Guam and targets in Southeast Asia. A decision to base part of 

the ARC LIGHT fleet in Thailand would be made in early 1967.*99 

In late August, Vientiane and Washington officials gradually acceded to the bombing of four new formerly sensitive infiltration targets 

in Laos. Sullivan first approved two targets opposite Thua Thien 

Province, the area of greatest concern to Westmoreland. The ambassador 

did not approve two targets farther south opposite Kontum Province and 

astride the Sihanouk Trail (Route 110)’ since they were around fifteen 

and a half miles from the South Vietnam border. The Sihanouk Trail 

targets, Sullivan said, were within “bombing earshot” of Attopeu, 

making it difficult if not impossible to deny a B-52 strike. Then, too, a 

strike posed a danger to a roadwatch team set to conduct surveillance 

near the town. Yet a few days later he suddenly gave the green light for 

an ARC LIGHT assault on the targets. He specified that it be carried out 

before September 1, the embassy be informed forty-eight hours in 

advance to make sure no roadwatch or other special teams were in the 

area and only BLU-38B munitions be dropped. SAC swiftly struck the 

targets. loo 

Then at the beginning of September, officials in Washington 

signaled a possible change in mind about ARC LIGHT bombing of the 

demilitarized zone and the DRV area above it. Secretary Rusk explained 

that SAC bombing of the two areas had been forbidden until now lest it 

be construed “in some circles” as military escalation and maybe a 

“softening up” for more direct allied ground attacks. B-52 bombing of 

the zone was especially sensitive. It could jeopardize the Saigon government’s current diplomatic initiative to have the International Control 

Commission take up the issue of the DRV’s use of the zone, and to form 

a special joint commission to oversee the zone’s neutrality (as intended 

by the 1954 Geneva agreements). Rusk was nonetheless willing to 

consider employment of tactical air in the zone’s northern sector if there 

were “positive lucrative targets.” McNamara endorsed Rusk’s decision 

and left open the possibility of B-52 strikes in this area in the event of 

military developments of a “highly critical nature.””’ 

A greatly encouraged Westmoreland in mid-September sent Admiral 

Sharp and the JCS the latest intelligence on the communist threat in the 

demilitarized zone and the Laotian border area closest to South 

Vietnam’s two northernmost provinces. He set forth his plans on how to 

deal with it. With the danger at “flash point” in and right above the 

zone, he would have B-52s “open up” the jungle canopy then send in 

more ARC LIGHT bombers and tactical aircraft to pound the foe’s troops 

*See Chapter VII. 

185 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

and supply redoubts. In Laos, just west of the Quang Tri and Thua 

Thien Provinces, he would try to beat the enemy by bringing to bear all 

available B-52s and fighter-bombers in the SLAM air-ground plan.* SLAM 

operations could likewise be applied to other targets in Laos opposite 

South Vietnam’s I Corps boundary. He foresaw a probable VC/NVA 

attempt to “liberate” the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, and 

to inflict heavy casualties on the allies.”’ 

Westmoreland also warned Vientiane and Washington of the chance 

of another major communist infiltration push through the Laotian 

panhandle as the southwest monsoon abated and the condition of roads 

for truck traffic improved. To blunt the drive, the MACV commander 

wanted closer coordination between MACV and Vientiane’s military 

planning and programs. The working relationship between his headquarters and the Vientiane embassy, he noted, was inadequate. For example, 

without informing MACV, Vientiane sometimes emplaced roadwatch 

teams in areas already targeted by the TIGER HOUND Task Force in 

southeastern Laos.lo3 

To talk over these and other matters, Westmoreland, Ambassadors 

Sullivan and Martin, Momyer, and Vientiane’s air and army attach6 met 

at Udorn on September 16. Sullivan agreed at the meeting to send an 

embassy delegation to MACV headquarters. It would work on bettering 

coordination of the multiple anti-infiltration programs in Southern 

Laos-CRICKET, TIGER HOUND, roadwatch teams, SHINING BRASS 

teams, and the new SLAM program when approved. The need for 

additional ARC LIGHT sorties in Laos was intensively debated. Westmoreland and Momyer predicted that the DRV would begin in midOctober to send a “high volume of goods” through central and southern 

Laos and speed repair of roads. The logistic effort would be blunted in 

part by bombing big supply stockpiles just inside the North Vietnamese 

border with B-52 and tactical aircraft. The heaviest strikes would center 

on the approaches to Mu Gia Pass in North Vietnam (two B-52 missions 

had been flown in this area in April 1966) and along Route 912 barely 

below the pass in Laos. Of course this meant overcoming Washington’s 

general aversion to ARC LIGHT bombing and in particular its fear of 

SA-2 sites in and around Mu Gia Pass. Sullivan backed these proposals 

in his summary of the meeting for the State Department, but said he was 

aware of the “many factors” inhibiting the use of bombers.Io4 

The Udorn meeting turned out to be another showdown of sorts 

between Westmoreland and Sullivan. The question was who should have 

preeminent command authority over the proliferating U.S. air and 

*The first SLAM strike took place on October 7, 1966. 

186 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

ground programs in Laos. The MACV commander well knew how 

Sullivan jealously guarded his ambassadorial prerogatives and took great 

pride in his military as well as diplomatic responsibilities in the war. 

Since the ambassador’s return from Washington in July 1966 he had, in 

Westmoreland’s view, involved himself more deeply than previously in 

military matters, appearing at times to be “going off [on] a tangent.” 

The MACV commander was convinced his authority should extend to 

programs “involving routes of communication through Laos leading into 

the battlefield in South Vietnam.” When Sullivan dissented from this 

view, Westmoreland replied it would be “amazing” if the United States 

won the war in Southeast Asia in view of the diffused military 

responsibilities and warned that if the MACV-Vientiane command 

relationship worsened, he might have “to make representation” at the 

highest governmental levels. The solution, he said, might lie in appointing a military commander for Southeast Asia with ambassadors serving 

as political advisers. He believed he could live with the problem for the 

time being, but the question was, “how long?”105 

While Sullivan’s military views were more often than not pivotal, 

final approval for loosing the ARC LIGHT bombers on new Laotian 

targets reposed in Washington. After a far-reaching interagency review, 

Secretary Rusk on September 13 gave the go-ahead for the ambassador 

to seek Souvanna Phouma’s sanction to bomb several targets near 

Tchepone. All lay nine or more miles west of South Vietnam’s border. 

Rusk counseled Sullivan to accent certain points in his talk with the 

prime minister. The B-52s would fly only at high altitude; use the same 

type ordnance as tactical aircraft; avoid villages, towns, and other 

populated areas; and bomb safely within one to two miles of friendly 

troops or civilians (as had been consistently done in South Vietnam). In 

addition the United States would stick to its “no comment” policy 

concerning other military operations in Laos. 

Upon meeting with the prime minister in mid-September, Sullivan 

asked permission to bomb eight of the original eleven key targets in the 

vicinity of Tchepone. Souvanna assented, provided that American pilots 

made “no mistakes,” that the bombing was accurate, and that it not be 

disclosed publicly. He planned to conceal for the present his decision 

from General Thao Ma and the FAR General Staff. To allay Souvanna’s 

concerns, the ambassador portrayed the “general operating accuracy” of 

the MSQ-77 bombing system presently used in South Vietnam. He 

affirmed there would be cover strikes on South Vietnamese targets and 

promised to give advance notice of all missions. 

Summarizing his meeting for Washington’s officials, Sullivan said 

Souvanna doubted that the United States could keep SAC bombings 

secret but was willing to test the security effort. Agreeing with this 

187 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

observation, the ambassador said that preventing bombing leaks “will be 

of major importance in determining whether or not there will be 

subsequent permission for other strikes of this nature.” To assure 

security, he recommended keeping separate categories for the ARC LIGHT 

strikes in Laos: Category I for strikes conducted near South Vietnam’s 

border without Souvanna Phouma’s knowledge, and Category I1 for 

strikes approved by the prime minister. “I need not stress,” Sullivan 

concluded, “how sensitive these strikes will be, not only in relation to 

[the] future of our program but also in terms of Souvanna’s international 

posture on [the] eve of his appearance at [the] U.N. General 

Assembly. ” lo’ 

When incorporated in a basic ARC LIGHT operations order issued by 

CINCPAC, Category I targets were defined as those having prior 

approval of the Saigon government and the American embassy at Saigon 

for attacks in the vicinity of the South Vietnam border. Such targets 

were to require no more than a three-nautical-mile penetration of 

Cambodia. or the slightest feasible penetration of the demilitarized zone, 

North Vietnam, and Laos. The targets were to be located no closer than 

two miles to friendly combatants and no nearer than one mile to any 

noncombatant dwelling. All targeted areas should be free of monuments, 

temples, or other landmarks likely to cause political problems if hit. 

COMUSMACV would have operational authority over Category I 

targets. Category I1 targets and target areas were those in the northern 

demilitarized zone, Route Package I of North Vietnam, and those 

beyond three nautical miles into Laos and Cambodia. COMUSMACV 

had to request strike permission at least twenty-four hours in advance, 

and only higher authorities in Washington could approve such operations. The foregoing guidelines would not vitiate the right of the 

American ambassador in Vientiane to approve or oppose planned strikes 

in Laos.”’ 

Meanwhile, Sullivan immediately advised Westmoreland and Sharp 

of Souvanna’s clearance to strike eight targets near Tchepone, and 

authorization to do so was shortly received. An area normally occupied 

by a roadwatch team posed the sole problem. Since the absent team 

would be reinserted by October 1, the target should be struck before that 

date. 

At about the same time, Washington officials acceded to Westmoreland’s frequent requests to commit the SAC bombers against the 324B 

Division’s troop and supply redoubts and movements in the demilitarized 

*Surreptitious ARC LIGHT bombing of Cambodia was contemplated at this time but 

not authorized until March 1969. 

iaa 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

zone and the DRV area just above it. The bombings began quickly. 

From September 15 to 26, SAC flew eight missions in the southern half 

of the demilitarized zone. One was astride the zone, two were in the 

northern half of the zone, and four were in North Vietnam proper. The 

bombings supplemented the current TALLY Ho air strikes in the 

southernmost sector of the North’s Route Package I and the heavier 

operations of ARC LIGHT, Seventh Air Force, and I11 MAF just below 

the demilitarized zone.’ lo 

When a special International Control Commission team finally 

investigated violations of the demilitarized zone’s “neutrality,” MACV 

suspended ARC LIGHT strikes within the zone on September 26. The 

investigation failed to slow the North’s infiltration through the zone and 

into South Vietnam’s Quang Tri Province. Hence American officials 

approved on October 13 a resumption of B-52 and tactical bombing. 

Then ten days later, after intelligence reports showed SA-2 surface-to-air 

missiles emplaced in the area, ARC LIGHT bombing was suspended. 

Tactical bombing was allowed to continue. ‘‘I 

By the end of September, Generals Westmoreland and Walt still 

looked for a major communist offensive right below the demilitarized 

zone, but it failed to materialize. This was ascribed to the constant B-52, 

Seventh Air Force, and Marine spoiling operations in I Corps, Laos, the 

demilitarized zone and the DRV area just above it. A remarkable dual 

ARC LIGHT bombing policy prevailed in Laos. There were deep bomber 

penetrations inside the country conducted with Souvanna Phouma’s 

concurrence, while bombing near South Vietnam’s border continued to 

be carried out without his official consent.’12 

During the remaining months of 1966, B-52 bombing rules underwent no substantive changes. Monthly bombing sorties in Laos were as 

follows: July, 18; August, 40; September, 49; October, 66; November, 

77; and December, 42.” Sullivan maintained hawk-eyed scrutiny of all 

target requests. He enjoined commanders and Washington officials again 

to keep strict bombing secrecy, a policy that surprisingly appeared quite 

successful, since in recent months the press seldom alluded to Laotian 

ARC LIGHT missions. But in early 1967 the news media would give 

unwanted publicity to the Laotian B-52 strikes. ‘I3 

*There were 406 ARC LIGHT sorties flown in Laos during the first half of 1966 and 11 1 

reported for January 1967. Thus, it appears that probably for security reasons the sorties 

for the last half of 1966 were underreported. This assumption is further based on the 

worsening military situation in South Vietnam’s I Corps in the last half of the year, 

requiring more SAC sorties in the Laotian border areas. The sorties were presumably added 

to B-52 totals for South Vietnam. 

189 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Washington approved no more B-52 bombing of the demilitarized 

zone or North Vietnamese border areas until December 1966. Then nine 

missions were flown in the zone and four on DRV soil a bit above>. On 

the 12th, SAC received the green light to bomb the approaches to Mu 

Gia Pass, sixty miles above the zone. Nine sorties were flown immediately to slow the flow of NVA personnel and supplies through this major 

infiltration artery feeding into the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In contrast to the 

missions in Laos, those flown in the demilitarized zone and North 

Vietnam were fully publicized.lI4 

Thus, by year’s end, Westmoreland had wrenched from Sullivan and 

Washington officials permission to extend ARC LIGHT bombing deeper 

into Laos and nearby border areas. He had in addition convinced the 

ambassador of the need for closer MACV-embassy coordination. Still 

wanting was authority for the MACV commander to deploy the B-52s in 

various geographic areas as often and as swiftly as he desired. 

What did the ARC LIGHT strikes accomplish in Laos and border 

areas during the last half of 1966? How many troops were killed? How 

many tons of supplies were destroyed? Could not Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps tactical aircraft have achieved the same results-and with 

less ordnance? Similar questions were being asked about the B-52s in 

South Vietnam that performed both interdiction and close support. 

The use of B-52s in Laos kept alive within the Air Force the issue 

between “saturation” bombing by strategic-type bombers and bombing 

by smaller, tactical aircraft. The debate had arisen in early 1965 when the 

administration ordered SAC bombers deployed to Guam and began using 

them in South Vietnam and Laos in June and December respectively. By 

mid- 1966 the debate had escalated as General Westmoreland-ironically 

an Army commander-became the B-52’s leading advocate. He demanded more of these bombers to step up the strikes on communist 

troop and supply redoubts in Laos and in South and North Vietnam.lI6 

As in the past, the Air Force was not of one mind on the usefulness 

of SAC bombers in jungle warfare. In July 1966, Col. Francis R. 

Cappelletti, Chief of the Targets Division in Seventh Air Force, analyzed 

371 SAC missions including 50 in Laos. He discovered little hard 

evidence to support the alleged damage inflicted on the communists by 

the bombers. Although numerous poststrike ground sweeps of SACbombed areas had been completed in South Vietnam and Laos (with 

MACV’s SHINING BRASS teams doing the Laotian ones), the troops 

detected limited data because of heavy jungle vegetation and the danger 

from booby traps and other hazards. At best the data commonly 

disclosed a certain number of enemy trenches or bunkers (of an unknown 

total) destroyed or caved in, and a certain quantity of rice and other 

supplies (again of an unknown total) destroyed or captured. Aerial bomb 

190 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

damage assessment was likewise hampered by the jungle terrain and 

aircraft altitude. Typical reports read, “Visual reconnaissance indicated 

no visible military damage,” “fog and weather delayed visual reconnaissance,” or “no significant military damage was noted.” Aerial photography produced even less evidence, as a rule showing just the number of 

bombs hitting inside or outside of a target area.’17 

Colonel Cappelletti’s analysis also cast doubt on Westmoreland’s 

claim that ARC LIGHT bombings had an important psychological impact 

on ralliers, captives, and refugees. The targeting chief found no statistical 

basis for attributing defections or bombing fear to B-52s as against 

tactical bombing because 

evaluation of the effectiveness of B-52 strikes remains an unknown quantity. The 

merits of employing such a strategic weapons system against the types of targets 

that have been selected are still debatable. The expenditure of ordnance by B-52’s 

does not appear to be justified either on the basis of target selection . . . or on the 

basis of BDA [bomb damage assessment] which presumably should provide 

justification for subsequent 8-52 strikes. 

Colonel Cappelletti concluded that 

several hundred tons of bombs are dropped into a small area, and are perhaps 

wasted, whereas the same tonnage could be parceled out among a greater number 

of fighter bomber sorties tailored and directed against a wider spectrum of targets. 

Furthermore, in the latter instance, there is a much better probability of acquiring 

meaningful BDA, and thus rendering a more substantive evaluation of effectiveness of tactical air forces in this theater. 

Once, many targets such as base camps were considered suitable for 

B-52 bombing, he noted. Now they were so small as to warrant solely 

tactical attacks. Few good B-52 targets were left in South Vietnam.”’ 

General Momyer, Westmoreland’s Deputy Commander for Air, 

agreed. “I think you would have to conclude the B-52’s have been 

relatively ineffective,” he informed General Harris, 

I have flown over many B-52 strike areas and looked at the results in detail. There 

has been no killing of large bodies of enemy troops, no destruction of quantities 

or enemy materiel, and no denial of territory to the enemy. . . . How many troops 

they had in the area when they departed and what their mission may have been is 

a good question. 

There has been a continuous follow-up of B-52 strikes with visual reconnaissance 

and photographic coverage on the target area . . . . We have yet to uncover any 

major target complexes for exploitation.”’ 

191 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Thus “from an airman’s view” he considered B-52 targets of 

questionable worth. He conceded only that from Westmoreland’s perspective the bombers should be used in the same manner as the 

long-range artillery “to suppress what may or may not be a suspected 

enemy concentration or supply area. That the bombers “spoiled” a 

would-be attack was only a presumption. 

Momyer opposed a further buildup of the SAC force to boost the 

B-52 sortie rate. He desired to hold the line at the present 2 squadrons 

(30 aircraft) to fly about 150 sorties a month. Nor did Westmoreland 

deem it essential to reduce ARC LIGHT “reaction time” for strikes, since 

the bombers were no substitute for faster-reacting tactical aircraft or 

artillery. He supported basing some bombers closer to the war theater 

simply to cut flying hours and tanker refueling needs.’” 

There was, however, an opposite USAF view that generally supported Westmoreland’s desire to quicken the tempo of ARC LIGHT bombing. 

Brig. Gen. George B. Simler, Seventh Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Plans and Operations from April to July 1966, believed the 

superbombers had a role to play in Southeast Asia. He underscored their 

need in Laos against storage areas which lent themselves to area 

bombardment, judging it inefficient to use tactical aircraft for such 

targets.’” Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., Air Force Director of Plans, 

likewise favored more ARC LIGHT bombing in the war theater. It came 

as no surprise to him that Westmoreland thought the SAC bombers to be 

the “greatest single innovation of the war.” ARC LIGHT bombing, Clay 

said in September 1966, “has given ground forces a kind of fire 

support . . . no other Army has ever had.” 

By way of example, the smallest flight of B-52’s, three aircraft, can deliver 

188,068 pounds of ordnance with a 5W-fOOt CEP [circular error probable] within 

two minutes from start to finish-anywhere in Southeast Asia. By way of 

comparison, all fifteen U.S. 175-gun battalions in the U.S. Army (176 guns total) 

could only deliver 81,000 pounds of ordnance within two minutes. There are only 

two of these self-propelled 12-gun battalions in all of South Vietnam. They are 

limited to 30 n.m. range, and can fire a projectile which weighs about 150 pounds. 

It is also easy to see that naval gunfire, with its limitations, could not begin to 

compare with even a minimum Arc Light mission. 

General Clay suggested the use of more SAC bombers in Southeast 

Asia-and not merely for interdiction. It was his belief that the bombers 

also constituted “the best case that can be made to demonstrate the 

versatility, flexibility, responsiveness, and unique lethality of the manned 

strategic force and the need for a follow-on advanced strategic 

aircraft. ’’ ’” 

192 
RISE IN ENEMY STRENGTH 

By late 1966, there was no longer any question whether ARC LIGHT 

bombing would be beefed up in Laos and South and North Vietnam. 

While visiting Saigon in October to review the war’s progress and plan 

for additional U.S. and allied military needs, Secretary McNamara said 

he would back Westmoreland’s desire to augment the bomber force. He 

sanctioned an increase in the bomber fleet on Guam from 30 to 50 

aircraft and the deployment of more refueling tankers to support 650 

ARC LIGHT sorties monthly. The Defense secretary seemed to have been 

convinced by MACV briefers that B-52s, like tactical aircraft, could 

provide effective close support for ground troops. But he was less certain 

about the bomber’s interdiction impact on the enemy, asking the Air 

Force to devise a more sophisticated way of measuring it. Despite this 

reservation, he further approved in November a B-52 force of 70 

bombers on Guam to assure an 800 monthly sortie rate by February 1, 

1967. And he endorsed planning for forward basing of some of the 

aircraft, although the final decision to emplace them at Sattahip, 

Thailand (later U-Tapao RTAFB) was not made until early 1967.’23 

193 

Chapter VII 

Renewed Hope in the 

Anti-Infiltration Effort 

January-May 1967 

In truth, the debate over B-52 effectiveness as well as other 

anti-infiltration programs was academic to McNamara. In contrast to Air 

Force, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Pacific Command, and 

Joint Chiefs of Staff assessments, he did not expect the programs to 

seriously reduce VC/NVA capability or induce Hanoi to come to the 

negotiating table. Yet, he did not go against military and other domestic 

pressures by recommending an end to B-52 or tactical bombing in the 

North. 

The Secretary of Defense believed that pressures to escalate the 

bombing in Laos and North Vietnam could be lessened by proceeding 

with a combined linear and limited air-supported anti-infiltration barrier 

that had been under Defense Department study for many months. The 

linear portion would be built in western South Vietnam just below the 

demilitarized zone. The air-supported portion consisting of enemyidentifying acoustic and seismic sensors would be placed at key points on 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos. Convinced that the barrier 

concept was superior to existing air programs, McNamara in September 

1966 ordered the military services to start the project.* 

Air Force commanders at first opposed the barrier concept and 

defended present anti-infiltration programs. They faulted the latter 

mainly because of the curbs placed on air power that augured for a more 

protracted conflict. “As long as we fight within the current dimensions 

of [existing] policies,” said General Momyer at an Air Force commanders’ conference near the close of 1966, “we are going to have to look at 

results produced over a long period of time rather than any dramatic 

accomplishment that will come from the single employment of the 

force.” ’ 

*See Chapter IX. 

195 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Brig. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, Seventh Air Force Director of 

Intelligence, had a blunter explanation of why aerial results were limited 

and American forces were not doing better in Southeast Asia. The 

reason, he said, was the 

steady-by-jerks charter we are operating under, whereby the number, quality, and 

location of targets are metered out by targeteers employing a unique set of 

thought processes, the essence of which is: give the enemy the maximum time to 

think out his counteraction, the maximum time to solicit outside help, and permit 

no action that would prevent [the enemy] from receiving such help.’ 

Air Force commanders and pilots of course realized they had to 

fight the war within the established air rules. This they continued to do 

while frequently recommending ways to improve current programs, such 

as employing new tactics, developing better munitions, and flying more 

vigorous and less restrictive operations against enemy infiltrati~n.~ 

General McConnell urged his Southeast Asia commanders to use 

area-denial ordnance whenever possible, and to maintain round-the-clock 

surveillance of and strikes against infiltration roads and trails in both 

Laos and North Vietnam. The Air Force chief also said he planned to 

install more COMBAT SKYSPOT MSQ-77 radar facilities to perfect 

theater-wide air navigation and bombing, and to test POPEYE, a 

cloud-seeding, rain-inducing program in Laos. McConnell hoped that all 

of these actions would eventually mesh with the anti-infiltration barrier 

system presently under development. Despite opposition to the system at 

the outset, all USAF commanders were now supporting it.4 

During a meeting at Udorn on January 14, 1967, attended by 

Generals Momyer and Westmoreland, Ambassador Sullivan and others, 

Momyer and his aides said that despite many air constraints, the current 

anti-infiltration effort was making headway. For example, air attacks 

destroyed and damaged more enemy trucks between December 6, 1966, 

and January 10, 1967, than in the same thirty-five-day period during 

1965-66. The Seventh Air Force commander unveiled a new, seven-day, 

ARC LIGHT B-52 interdiction plan for Laos. It called for two B-52s to 

fly nightly against a pair of targets in the STEEL TIGER or TIGER HOUND 

sectors, in conjunction with USAF tactical strikes and photo and 

side-looking airborne radar reconnaissance. Both Sullivan and Westmoreland evinced keen interest in the plan but withheld immediate approval. 

They wanted to clarify the decisionmaking process, obtain assurances 

that no friendly Laotians would be in the proposed target areas, and 

determine how the requirement for cover strikes in South Vietnam could 

196 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

be met. The ambassador further believed that the proposal should be 

discussed with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. 

The conferees did agree to conduct more SHINING BRASS 

intelligence-gathering and targeting probes, SLAM air-ground operations, 

and to expand tribal roadwatch team targeting now that more teams had 

the Hark-1 and Hark-2 communication sets. Largely at Ambassador 

Sullivan’s insistence, the conferees decided to retain the A-26Ks for night 

strikes on enemy trucks and other infiltration targets. General Momyer 

nonetheless felt that the aircraft were obsolescent, too vulnerable to 

enemy ground fire, and should be replaced by jet fighter^.^ 

The need for greater air and air-ground operations was highlighted 

on January 21 when the Saigon embassy informed Sullivan that an 

estimated 7,000 North Vietnamese were now entering South Vietnam 

monthly, mostly through Laos.’ Admiral Sharp added a gloomy prognosis. He told the JCS on the 25th that no single measure could stop 

infiltration as the DRV had too many alternate land, river, and sea lines 

of communication available in the war zone. He said infiltration could 

most readily be checked by striking the North’s key targets and closing 

its ports. Since high administration officials were still loathe to take this 

oft-repeated recommendation seriously, theater commanders had no 

alternative but to expand the operations already under way. During the 

first 6 months of 1967, they intensified SLAM operations, SHINING BRASS 

probes, night interdiction, and other new programs.6 

The discovery on January 25 that east-west Route 110 (the Sihanouk 

Trail) in southern Laos had become a major supply artery for the South 

Vietnamese insurgents afforded an opportunity to enlarge the SLAM 

concept, first used in October 1966. 

In forwarding this finding to the joint chiefs, Admiral Sharp 

believed that a target complex near the Sihanouk Trail (about fifteen 

miles west of South Vietnam’s Kontum Province) met the SLAM criteria. 

Urging approval of SLAM 111, he asserted that it offered “the most 

extraordinary and golden opportunity rarely presented to inflict severe 

damage on the enemy.”7 

Vientiane and Washington quickly signaled their go-ahead for SLAM 

111. Seventh Air Force performed extensive prestrike photo reconnaissance of the target complex, then on January 30 and 31 commenced a 

coordinated B-52 and tactical air assault. A TIGER HOUND C-130 

ABCCC controlled the planes. The B-52s flew two fifteen-aircraft 

*Later, MACV intelligence analysts concluded that the total confirmed, accepted, and 

possible DRV infiltrators into South Vietnam had totaled only 4,100 in December 1966, 

5,OOO in January 1967, and 5,200 in February 1967. [Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

SECSTATE, et al, 0106262 Dec 67.1 

197 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

missions with separate, concurrent cover strikes in South Vietnam. 

Poststrike USAF reconnaissance followed at once. Meanwhile, three 

separate HORNET platoons were heli-lifted into the target complex, one 

on the 30th and two on the 31st. They did bomb damage assessment and 

pinpointed more targets for air strikes.8 

In the ensuing days, VNAF helicopter pilots inserted several SPIKE 

teams to reconnoiter the area and call in additional USAF aircraft. For 

example, SPIKE Team MAINE was airlifted in on February 2. Spotting 

eighty-five enemy troops carrying AK-47 automatic rifles, the team 

requested a strike, and five USAF planes responded. On February 3 and 

5, HORNET platoons DELTA and ECHO entered the bombed area and 

found numerous 60- and 90-mm mortars and 12.7-mm (.50-caliber) 

ammunition. After destroying part of the ammunition cache, they asked 

for air support. Three USAF aircraft further blasted the cache, setting 

off thirty-five secondary explosions. The ECHO unit ran into trouble, 

becoming trapped temporarily by two communist companies. It was 

saved by the timely arrival of Air Force planes that plastered the foe with 

napalm, killing and wounding an unknown number. This stemmed the 

assault long enough for helicopters to extract the unit. The operation 

cost ECHO one American and two Vietnamese killed and two Americans 

and nine Vietnamese wounded.’ 

By February 7, pilots had observed more than 180 secondary 

explosions following bomb drops, and there were more HORNET reconnoitering forays into the struck area during the next 2 days. By now, the 

aggregate intelligence from USAF photo and visual reconnaissance (the 

latter by USAF 0-1 FACs) and the SPIKE and HORNET units fully 

confirmed the existence of a widely dispersed enemy troop and supply 

complex, considerably larger than first realized. In fact the target area 

extended farther south of Route 96 than expected, well beyond the reach 

of probing Meo or FAR roadwatch teams. Westmoreland meanwhile 

informed Sharp: “The results of the operations thus far indicated SLAM 

I11 has severely damaged the enemy supply system in southern Laos.”l0 

SLAM I11 officially ended on February 13, but air-supported HORNET platoons kept up their reconnoitering. During February 10-27, 8 

platoons were heli-lifted into and out of the target complex by VNAF 

CH-34s augmented at times by USAF CH-3s of the 20th Air Commando 

Squadron. These air-ground operations apparently slowed North Vietnamese Army movements along Route 110, but by March 23 there was 

ample evidence that the infiltration tempo was again rising. Seventh Air 

Force accordingly stepped up its attacks, pounding the complex with 110 

sorties between March 23 and April 4.” 

After HORNET platoons reported virtually “no end to the supplies,’’ 

Westmoreland kept pressuring Washington officials to extend perma198 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

nently the SHINING BRASS boundary beyond the present seven-mile line. 

Declaring the SLAM concept fully validated, he demanded authority to 

organize more SPIKE teams and HORNET platoons. “It has been 

demonstrated,” he said, “that the multiple ground reconnaissance 

elements are ideally suited for these missions because of their ability to 

protect themselves in areas of high enemy activity.” The SLAM observations had also proved “that ground units . . . inserted at widely 

separated points were necessary to develop . . . targets properly.”’2 

SLAM I11 operations had no sooner ceased than Seventh Air Force 

and MACV started SLAM IV farther north in Laos along the northern 

end of Route 922 that ran into South Vietnam’s A Shau Valley just 

across the Laotian border. This too became a sizable air show with 

Seventh Air Force contributing 1,526 tactical sorties and Strategic Air 

Command 256 ARC LIGHT strikes. Like SLAM 111, the bombings touched 

off several hundred secondary explosions and fires and killed 177 of the 

enemy. 

The SLAM strikes helped pave the way for enlarged SHINING BRASS 

operations. Once the sole strong proponent of the program, Westmoreland by January 1967 had acquired new allies. Sullivan, while visiting in 

Washington, asked the service chiefs to back the MACV commander’s 

recommendations to push the SHINING BRASS boundary deeper into 

Laos. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far 

Eastern Affairs, also withdrew his earlier objections to the program’s 

expansion. In the wake of the first few SLAM I11 strikes, Admiral Sharp 

stressed his SHINING BRASS support in a vibrant endorsement to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. He said air-ground operations into a greater area would 

enable the program “to become a major intelligence asset to COMUSMACV’s efforts to counter infiltration through Laos,” for 

the Shining Brass concept is based upon detailed need to obtain intelligence in an 

area . . . extremely vital to operations in SVN [South Vietnam]. The enemy does 

not recognize the SVN/Laos border as does the U.S.; in fact, the enemy uses this 

area as a sanctuary. Only through the recent, specially authorized deep penetrations of SHINING BRASS teams [i.e., via SLAM 1111 has a terminus of the major 

infiltration route through Laos into SVN been discovered . . . . This area includes 

numerous enemy troops and a major storage area. Continued deep penetration 

throughout the SHINING BRASS zone is certain to uncover similar targets. As major 

targets are located, they can be destroyed. 

Sharp wanted to extend the SHINING BRASS area in the northern 

sector opposite Quang Tri Province from three to twelve miles, and 

farther south up to twenty-five miles. He recommended using several 

199 
LAOS 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

HORNET platoons in a single reconnaissance mission to gather “hard” 

target intelligence for SAC B-52 and Air Force and Navy tactical 

aircraft.I4 

Administration officials-notably President Johnson-were intent on 

keeping the war in Laos at low boil. They were therefore reluctant to 

sanction deeper SHINING BRASS probes into the trail. Yet in February the 

president changed his mind. The catalyst was another remarkable display 

of Hanoi’s logistic skill during a bombing truce to celebrate the annual 

Vietnamese lunar holiday Tet from February 7 to 11 .*I5 

The United States agreed to a truce of four days; the VC/NVA 

wanted seven. Once the truce began, however, it was extended to five 

days and eighteen hours. This was out of deference to Soviet Premier 

Aleksei N. Kosygin, who visited London in February to confer with 

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on the war and other matters. Not 

until the Soviet leader was airborne for Moscow and after Hanoi again 

signaled it was in no mood to talk or negotiate did President Johnson 

permit Air Force and Navy bombers to renew their strikes on North 

Vietnam. l6 

Taking advantage of the bombing respite, the DRV set out on a 

day-and-night logistic push toward South Vietnam. Seventh Air Force 

analysts figured that the North Vietnamese were hauling supplies 

overland at the rate of about 200 trucks a day. Allowing 3 tons per 

truck, this would let the present 4 Viet Cong combat divisions fight for 4 

more years, and the North Vietnamese Army’s 4.3 divisions for more 

than a year.” 

Three days after the DRV’s prodigious supply movement began, the 

Seventh’s analysts drew two contrasting conclusions. First, the supply 

movement attested to the extent the air campaign in North Vietnam and 

Laos had hurt the enemy badly, “probably to a far greater degree than 

we have previously estimated.” Second, the magnitude of the resupply 

task and “the energy and determination” with which Hanoi carried it 

out signified it had “no intention of giving up its support of the war in 

the foreseeable future.” Both conclusions, the Seventh said, punctuated 

“the importance of continuing and, if possible, intensifying the current 

programs of air strikes against DRV, and [pointed] up the futility of 

a . . . cessation of the bombing program without an equivalent 

deescalation by the other side.”18 

As planned, Air Force and Navy visual and photo reconnaissance, 

U.S. and Vietnamese observers aboard boats and ships, and scattered 

*Washington and Hanoi since May 1965 had declared periodic bombing truces for 

political and propaganda purposes. 

20 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

roadwatch teams were busy. They closely monitored Hanoi’s supply flow 

along key roads and trails, rail lines, waterways, and through the Mu Gia 

Pass on the North Vietnamese-Laotian border. Their principal focus was 

on the area from the 19th parallel southward to below the 18th parallel. 

Seventh Air Force aircraft radioed reconnaissance findings periodically to 

MACV and PACOM, the latter consolidating the data for the JCS and 

Washington’s intelligence and other agencies. l9 

PACOM’s “wrap-up” of the DRV’s bomb-truce logistic push 

highlighted how poor weather often hampered visual and photo observation. Thus, many reports were sketchy. Duplicate enemy truck, watercraft, and other data was eliminated insofar as possible. Significantly, 

there was virtually no information on the cargo of DRV trucks and 

watercraft. This did not deter PACOM analysts from concluding that the 

DRV had transported between 22,300 and 25,100 tons of supplies’ from 

the North to points below the 18th parallel. Around 4,300 to 7,100 tons 

probably went by truck with the remainder going by watercraft. Analysts 

also decided that the DRV had coordinated its waterborne logistics with 

truck movements in 2 areas-the Mu Gia Pass and the coastal routes. 

There seemed to have been large-scale offloading and onloading between 

trucks and watercraft along the coastal routes. It was clear that the DRV 

had planned carefully its logistic “free ride” beginning February 8, by 

positioning watercraft, pontoon bridges, and equipment, and by repairing its roads and bridges.20 

President Johnson and his chief advisers were dismayed by the 

magnitude of Hanoi’s transportation capability and its continued rejection of all proffered peace overtures until bombing stopped “unconditionally.” Predictably, the joint chiefs, field commanders, and Sullivan 

sharpened their requests for authority to apply heavier air pressure on 

the NVA in Laos and North Vietnam. Westmoreland complained bitterly 

about the restrictive airpower rules. He especially scored the prohibitions 

against attacking construction or road-repair crews beyond 200 yards on 

either side of a road, bombing targets without the use of MSQ-77 radar, 

using napalm except on RLAF-designated targets, employing B-52 strikes 

in daytime, and a wider boundary for the SHINING BRASS air-supported 

ground forays into the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” 

Impressed by Hanoi’s logistic strength and transportation resourcefulness, President Johnson finally assented on February 22 to a series of 

*MACV’s initial report estimated more than 2,200 enemy trucks and 702 watercraft 

were sighted heading south between the 19th and 17th parallels and that the DRV may have 

moved 6,600 tons by truck and 30,000 tons by watercraft. As in PACOM’s report, there 

was “no evidence” as to the nature of the cargoes. [Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

1411552 Feb 67.1 

202 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

new SHINING BRASS and other military measures. For SHINING BRASS he 

approved an overall western extension of the boundary to twelve miles 

(from three miles in the northern and seven and a half miles in the 

southern sectors of the boundary). The president also allowed the use of 

Army and Air Force helicopters to ferry upwards of three separate 

HORNET Force platoons simultaneously, if needed to reconnoiter and 

attack enemy troop, truck, or supply redoubts. He further partially 

redelegated authority from State and Defense jointly to CINCPAC and 

Vientiane for air-supported SHINING BRASS missions, and he gave a 

tentative go-ahead for a rain-making POPEYE program initially tested in 

late 1966 and again in early 1967. 

Concurrently, the president approved more targets for Air Force and 

Navy bombing against North Vietnam. These were in conjunction with a 

new ROLLING THUNDER Program 54 plus several unbombed targets in 

Program 53. Included were four powerplants and one steel plant, 

selective mining of inland waterways and estuaries south of the 20th 

parallel, and naval gunfire against coastal targets and shipping between 

the 20th parallel and the demilitarized zone. Lastly he sanctioned South 

Vietnamese-based Army and Marine artillery fire on valid targets in 

Laos, the demilitarized zone, and in North Vietnamese territory just 

above the zone.” 

With the foregoing authority, Westmoreland and Momyer quickly 

took steps to send stronger SHINING BRASS units deeper and more often 

into southern Laos. The number of seven- to nine-man SPIKE ground 

reconnaissance teams would grow from twenty to thirty to sustain up to 

forty-two missions a month. The Army’s UH-1 helicopter gunship and 

the VNAF’s 83d Squadron CH-34 copter fleets would be beefed up, the 

latter from eighteen to twenty-four craft. For the moment, the number 

of HORNET platoons would stay the same. The two commanders 

anticipated no basic change in tactical air support procedures. “Support 

provided through the [Air Force’s] Tiger Hound [Task Force],” Westmoreland observed, “has been most aggressive and responsive with 

exceptional results, and will be a major factor contributing to the success 

of the . . . operations.” The total number of supporting tactical air 

sorties would rise in proportion to the frequency of forays by SHINING 

BRASS teams and platoons, and the expanding need to protect them.23 

Along with deeper air-supported SHINING BRASS penetrations, General Momyer wanted to augment the operations with a seven-day strike 

concept. Although he had briefed Sullivan and Westmoreland on the 

concept in mid-January, not until late February did he receive their 

qualified approval. Momyer’s plan called for several missions nightly on 

selected trail targets by a pair of B-52s. The ARC LIGHT bombings would 

be interspersed with tactical air strikes and reconnaissance (USAF photo, 

203 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

FAC visual, and Army OV-1B side-looking airborne radar). A third of 

B-52 ordnance would be bombs with time-delay fuzes. Additional 

missions would be flown as new targets were uncovered. There would be 

numerous cover strikes just across the border in South Vietnam.24 

Through the SAC ADVON office in Saigon, the SAC commander in 

chief and the 3d Air Division commander urged assigning to tactical 

aircraft all B-52 missions requiring less than a full B-52 ordnance load, 

concentrating each fully loaded bomber on a single target. Westmoreland 

suggested reducing the number of cover strikes because of their huge 

cost. He believed one strike midpoint between the first and last ARC 

LIGHT bombing each night in Laos would suffice.25 

Sullivan dismissed the cost argument out of hand, noting acidly that 

he and others in Vientiane might be harboring “the errant notion that 

the whole ARC LIGHT program seems to have a mighty high price tag 

relative to the results achieved.” More concisely, he said cover strikes 

were a must in view of recent Pathet Lao and Soviet public and private 

charges that American B-52s were bombing in Laos. He nonetheless 

promised to consider the MACV commander’s suggestion of a “midpoint strike,” if the launch and recovery of all ARC LIGHT sorties 

(well-known to “unfriendly observers”)* could be arranged to correspond with US.-announced or observable bomber movements from and 

to Guam.26 

Trying to tie in the ARC LIGHT bombers more closely with the lines 

of communication interdiction program, General Westmoreland on 

February 24 proposed launching an initial bombing test against six 

targets in the STEEL TIGER and TIGER HOUND areas. He sent Vientiane a 

detailed description of each target, and attested none would endanger 

friendly troops or citizens, national monuments, shrines, or temples. 

After Sullivan and his staff scrutinized target photography, they signaled 

a “go ahead” for strikes between March 4 and 14 only. This would 

permit withdrawing roadwatch teams in or near some of the targets, and 

reinserting them promptly after the 14th. The ambassador as usual 

coordinated his approval with State and Defense officials in 

Washington.27 

Despite approval, other air priorities and weather ruled out immediate testing by Seventh Air Force. The first test was ultimately 

conducted on March 10, 1967. Six B-52s and six F-4Cs made nighttime 

strikes; in addition, five reconnaissance sorties were flown-two USAF 

infrared, two OV-1B side-looking airborne radar, and one visual. In 

*This was in reference to the Soviet radio- and electronically equipped trawler that 

monitored all SAC bombers leaving and returning to Guam. 

204 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

their preliminary strike report, Seventh Air Force analysts characterized 

strike results as “excellent.” The B-52 and tactical missions were flown 

as planned except where last-minute intelligence dictated modifications in 

the target area. 

Implicitly endorsing Seventh Air Force’s preliminary report, Westmoreland asked that the March 14 deadline be extended to complete the 

one-week test and to start a second one for eight consecutive days.” 

Sullivan turned down the request, saying that roadwatch teams had 

to reenter the ECHO sector to assess initial strike results and to gather 

more infiltration intelligence. The data for evaluating the just-completed 

missions, he said, “strikes us [as] skimpy to date.” He added that before 

pulling out the teams to permit further test bombing, he wanted to study 

the team reports to see if an additional series of strikes was ~orthwhile.~~ 

In early April, Sullivan agreed to another series of B-52 bombings 

against two targets in STEEL TIGER’S ECHO sector during April 5 through 

11. The Seventh Air Force and SAC carried them out within the specified 

time limit. To determine if the test bombings justified a regular ARC 

LIGHT program in the area, Sullivan asked how many trucks were being 

destroyed and damaged, the impact of the bombing on infiltration, and 

other questions associated with the operation^.^' 

Seventh Air Force and MACV analysts soon sent Sullivan an 

assessment based on B-52 and FAC crew briefings, photography, and 

data on VC/NVA activity. They said that the strikes seemed to have 

closed temporarily the struck lines of communication, cut truck sightings 

by one-third, and forced the DRV to enlarge its antiaircraft defenses in 

the area. The last underlined the importance of routes and trails for 

infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam. The assessment, however, 

lacked precise statistics on the number of trucks destroyed and 

damaged .3’ 

Westmoreland promised to prepare a more thorough evaluation of 

B-52 bombing on enemy trucks after roadwatch teams had reconnoitered 

the test area. Even so, Sullivan was reluctant to open up the STEEL 

TIGER and TIGER HOUND sectors to more frequent and intensive ARC 

LIGHT operations. He desired instead more tactical reconnaissance and 

air strikes but found it increasingly difficult to get them from General 

Momyer, Seventh Air Force commander. In view of conflicting priority 

claims, Momyer deemed it more profitable to hit targets detected by Air 

Force visual or photo reconnaissance rather than Vientiane-developed 

targets. There was also a practical reason for not honoring many 

roadwatch team requests. This was the danger of striking friendly villages 

or personnel close to targets difficult to verify from the air, followed by 

official reprimands and further strictures on operations. Sullivan and his 

staff were nevertheless convinced that more strikes on roadwatch205 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

generated targets were feasible and necessary, and they fashioned a 

SHOCK program to persuade the Seventh Air Force to provide them.32 

A SHOCK strike was preceded by several preparatory steps. The first 

consisted of assembling a lucrative target “package,” for example, a 

road segment heavily used by the enemy and flanked by nearby truck 

parks and supply sites. The package was then briefed to representatives 

of the Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force deputy commander, Air 

Force attach&, RLAF, and other concerned agencies at a weekly 

targeting meeting, with photography and other intelligence data dramatizing the importance of the targets. Afterwards, the ambassador and 

Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force deputy commander signified 

their approval by sending a written request for strikes to Seventh Air 

Force and an information copy to the State Department. The Seventh 

Air Force commander (Momyer) was asked to include the targets in his 

high-priority strike list.33 

The first SHOCK target package was based on intelligence data 

gathered for many weeks along the west-to-east Route 110 (Sihanouk 

Trail). Between January 7 and mid-March, tribal roadwatch teams had 

counted 130 enemy trucks shuttling along the route. On three occasions 

they spotted 40 to 60 cargo boats plying the Kong River and 200 drums 

of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and other cargo placed along the river 

bank. Laotian intelligence observers stationed with a FAR artillery unit 

furnished further data of VC/NVA movements in the area. A windfall of 

intelligence came from a DRV supply officer who defected to the 

Americans on April 21. He confirmed the locations of many supply and 

truck sites previously pinpointed by U.S. and Laotian sources. He 

estimated that about 1,200 tons of supplies moved over Route 110 each 

month.*34 

The defection expedited planning for the first SHOCK operation. 

Assuming the North Vietnamese would soon learn of their supply 

officer’s defection and try to disperse their stockpiles, Sullivan obtained 

Souvanna Phouma’s permission to lay on a special air assault. He next 

flashed the targets to General Momyer in Saigon, proposing about thirty 

day-and-night sorties for four days. “I hope you will personally clear 

[the request] expeditiously,” Sullivan asked, “since this is some of the 

*Secretary of State Rusk was highly impressed with the DRV supply officer’s 

information. He observed that it provided some of the most convincing evidence available 

on North Vietnam’s use of southern Laos and Cambodia as a supply route. Analysts at 

USARPAC later believed the defector’s 1,200-per-month supply estimate was considerably 

overstated and that about 500 tons a month was a more accurate figure. [Msg, USARPAC 

to CINCPAC, 2801182 May 67; CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, May 

13, 1967.1 

206 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

best intelligence on lucrative targets we have obtained to date.” Momyer 

agreed to come up with the sorties and to accelerate photo reconnaissance of the area. Admiral Sharp backed the attack proposal and 

instructed Westmoreland to alert other air units under his control for 

flying additional strikes.35 

Preparing for the assault, Seventh Air Force divided Route 110 into 

three targeting sectors. All would be under the control of USAF 0-1 

forward air controllers. Sector 1, closest to the Cambodian border, was 

allocated to the RLAF, Sector 2 to USAF and RLAF propeller-driven 

(prop) aircraft, and Sector 3 to any type of USAF or RLAF aircraft. 

Due to the size of the planned SHOCK I, two more USAF 0-1s were 

deployed to Pakse airfield and a USAF command post was set up at 

Attopeu. The command post would keep in touch with the 0-ls, a 

C-130 ABCCC, and the air attach6 offices in Savannakhet and Vientiane. The key targets were stocks of military supplies, communist 

vehicles and equipment, and seventy-three known antiaircraft weapon 

positions along Route 110 in the designated area. Planners hoped the air 

strikes would disrupt traffic on the route.36 

SHOCK I started at 0930 on April 27, and during the operation 

Seventh Air Force aircraft flew 164 sorties. Although conceived as an 

around-the-clock activity, only 34 sorties were flown at night, since 

darkness and terrain were inhibiting factors. Nonetheless, an initial 

assessment convinced the air attach6 that SHOCK I was a success and 

presumably destroyed much of the enemy’s military stocks and disrupted 

his lines of communication. The air attach6 also believed that the 

operation underlined the “profitable exploitation of joint Air Attacht, 

and USAF intelligence” during air planning session^.^' 

SHOCK I was not without its shortcomings. The air attach6 thought 

that Route 110 could have been completely closed had delay-fuzed 

ordnance been available. The RLAF T-28s did not participate, apparently because the FAR General Staff failed to send clear-cut orders on 

the RLAF’s proposed bombings to Maj. Gen. Phasouk Somly (Commander of Military Region IV in which Route 110 was located). Then, 

too, the operation would have been more profitable had it run for eight 

to ten days. This would have given 0-1 FACs more time to learn the 

target area and the Meo roadwatch teams more time to evaluate strike 

results. (The teams had been emplaced too far west of the target area to 

make a fast evaluation of the bombings.)38 

With the foregoing “lessons learned” in mind, air attach6 and 

embassy analysts planned the next SHOCK attack to run 8 days. The same 

type of planes would be scheduled-USAF 0-1 FACs, C-130 ABCCCs, 

USAF and RLAF strike aircraft, and Blind Bat C-130 flareships to assist 

night strikes on targets and road-repair crews. Strike aircraft would again 

207 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

rely on MSQ-77 radar. SHOCK I1 got under way on May 20 and ended 

on the evening of the 27th. Air Force pilots flew 148 sorties and the 

RLAF 41, all without losses to enemy fire. The joint operation destroyed 

23 structures, 30 boats, and 6 trucks. It made 20 road cuts, caused 

landslides that severed Route 110 in 3 places, created 27 secondary 

explosions, and 8 secondary fires. During the 8 days a FAR artillery unit, 

stationed on the southern tip of the Bolovens Plateau southwest of 

Attopeu near Route 110, claimed sinking 10 enemy boats on the Kong 

River. 39 

Owing to the onset of monsoon weather, SHOCK I1 at first was 

assessed less rewarding than SHOCK I. But several days later Sullivan 

believed otherwise and reported that air and ground observers had seen 

no movement on Route 110 since the operation. The combination of 

intensive air strikes and heavy rains, he concluded, “has at least 

temporarily crippled this supply artery.” If the heavy rains continued, 

the enemy might find the cost of opening Route 110 prohibitively high 

and shift to pack animals, porters, and bicycles.40 

In another attempt to slow enemy infiltration, the Seventh Air Force 

in early 1967 stepped up its night operations.* Although the number of 

night sorties in past years had gradually risen, mountainous and jungle 

terrain and weather remained formidable obstacles to finding and 

striking the elusive enemy. Night as well as day operations were further 

circumscribed by the complex array of air rules to prevent short rounds 

or mis-strikes against friendly troops, personnel, and villages. When such 

incidents occurred, the Vientiane embassy often imposed more stringent 

strike rules. 

By the time of the dry season in Laos during late 1966 and early 

1967, the Seventh Air Force had rapidly progressed in night flying. The 

Seventh possessed more and better-equipped aircraft, navigation aids, 

and pilots with sharpened night enemy-detection skills. Much valued for 

night operations was the starlight scope, a light-intensifying device for 

finding the foe. Developed by the U.S. Army, it was tested and adopted 

by the Air Force in South Vietnam starting in 1965. The scope made its 

debut in Laos aboard a USAF C-47 gunship during the battle for 

Attopeu in March 1966.+ From then on, Seventh Air Force outfitted 

*For a detailed account of night operations in Southeast Asia, see Anthony, Tactics 

and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961-1970. 

?In May 1966, two months after the battle for Attopeu, the Air Force placed an order 

for 198 scopes with the Army. Hard-pressed to meet its own needs, the Army slashed the 

order deeply. This impelled the Air Force to begin starlight scope development on its own. 

Lt Col Ralph A. Rowley, FAC Operations, 1965-1970 [The Air Force in Southeast Asia] 

(Washington, 1975), p 102. 

208 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

more aircraft with the hand-held monocular device. By early 1967, it 

owned fifty-seven scopes for theater-wide use. They were being installed 

in various aircraft, chiefly 0-1F Bird Dogs (used mostly as FACs), 

T-28Ds, C-123 Blindbats, and C-123 Candlesticks. Along the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail, the scope instantly proved its value in spotting the enemy 

from the air on moonlit nights. It could also detect enemy trucks 

traveling with dimmed headlights, normally not visible from the air.41 

Besides the starlight scope, Air Force pilots had learned to use their 

A-26K NIMRODS and other propeller-driven aircraft to better advantage. 

First night-tested during the last half of 1966 in conjunction with the 

CRICKET program in central Laos,* the A-26Ks were adjudged particularly suited for finding and hitting enemy trucks. By the end of the year, 

they were likewise used to a limited extent for close support in the 

BARREL ROLL sector. When not seeking out their own targets, they 

turned to 0-1 FACs and roadwatch teams for targeting. General 

Momyer, as noted earlier, had branded the NIMRODS obsolescent because 

of the heavier antiaircraft fire, but Ambassador Sullivan staunchly 

defended their usefulness. So did Col. Harry C. Aderholt, who arrived at 

Nakhon Phanom on December 9, 1966, to assume command of the 

LUCKY TIGER 606th Air Commando Squadron (Composite) to which the 

A-26Ks were assigned.+ Aderholt urged the continued use and augmentation of the A-26K force. He also succeeded in diverting to STEEL TIGER 

operations a number of T-28Ds that had been assigned to the 606th for 

training the RTAF. The T-28Ds (call sign ZORRO) started flying daylight 

sorties in STEEL TIGER on January 9, 1967. The ZORRO carried two 

.50-caliber machineguns and several types of ordnance. It possessed 

communications for flying ground-controlled intercept and MSQ-77 

SKYSPOT radar missions, and for contacting roadwatch teams, airborne 

and ground forward air controllers, and ABCCC aircraft. Aderholt 

believed that the ZORRO could produce about eight sorties a day without 

impairing RTAF training needs. After the loss of one aircraft, however, 

the T-28Ds were switched to night missions. Like the A-26Ks, they could 

carry their own flares.42 

*See Chapter VI. TLUCKY TIGER was the code name assigned to a high-priority USAF project approved 

by the JCS in January 1966 to augment the RTAF’s special air warfare capability in 

Thailand in order to deal with a growing insurgency in the northeastern part of that 

country. As noted earlier, the 606th Air Commando Squadron was established at Nakhon 

Phanom on March 8, 1966, to consolidate and enlarge the USAF training of the RTAF, 

and christened the LUCKY TIGER squadron. Some of its aircraft and helicopters were 

gradually diverted to combat operations in both the BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER sectors 

while continuing the training of the RTAF. See Warren A. Trest, Lucky Tiger Special Air 

Warfare Operations, 2 vols (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967), I, Chap I. 

209 
Right: Gen. William W. Momyer, Seventh Air Force Commander (July 1966July 1968). 

Responsible for allocating aircraft 

sorties in Vietnam and Laos, 

Momyer preferred to hit targets 

generated by Air Force reconnaissance rather than official requests from Vietiane. Below: An 

RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance 

aircraft lands at its base in Thailand, December 1966. 
MU GIA PASS STORAGE AREA. In this critical border zone, North Vietnamese trucks de

gasoline for use by truck convoys headed south along Route 15, February 1967. 
Gen. William C. Westmoreland, 

MACV Commander (left), and 

Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman, 

Jr., Commander of the I11 MAF. 

USAF F-105 Thunderchiefs, based in Thailand, flew strike, armed reconnaissance, 

and strip alert missions during STEEL TIGER, TIGER HOUND, and CRICKET operations. 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

February 1967 began, the night sortie rate in the upper part of the 

STEEL TIGER area-known as STEEL TIGER NORTH-had climbed from 

sixteen sorties per night to twenty-seven thence to thirty-one. These were 

mainly flown by A-26Ks and T-28Ds plus occasional F-4C night 

fighters. Though fitted with their own flares, the NIMRODS and ZORROS 

often worked with the C-130 Blindbat flare ship^.^^ 

In another innovation, the Air Force commenced in mid-February to 

regularly field several hunter-killer teams consisting of starlight scopeequipped 0-1 Bird Dogs and T-28Ds. All flew out of Nakhon Phanom. 

The black-painted O-ls had a crew of two, one at the controls and the 

other navigating and operating the scope. Flying ahead of the armamentladen ZORRO, the Bird Dog dropped flares when it spotted a truck, 

sampan, or other target. The first results against trucks were judged 

impressive, and estimates of truck attrition rose.44 

By March 1967 the 606th Air Commando Squadron had 10 A-26Ks 

and an equal number of T-28Ds. The NIMRODS flew 2,004 sorties over 7 

months (July 1966 through February 1967) and were credited with having 

attacked truck parks 1,223 times. Aircrews claimed to have destroyed 275 

trucks and damaged 246 in the parks or on roads, and to have destroyed 

or damaged 47 gun positions, 227 structures, 823 bivouac areas, and 21 

boats. They cut 502 roads and killed 492 troops. The various strikes 

touched off 1,033 explosions. Communist ground fire destroyed 3 

NIMRODS and damaged 25; one was lost in an accident. In less than 2 

months (January 9 through February 1967) the T-28Ds had completed 

455 sorties, claiming 42 trucks destroyed and 68 damaged. The crews 

further claimed to have destroyed or damaged 5 enemy gun positions, 2 

structures, 1 bivouac area; created 67 secondary explosions and 65 

secondary fires; and made 32 road cuts. One ZORRO was lost to enemy 

fire and 3 received battle damage.45 

On March 10 the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron began 

assigning eight starlight scope-equipped 0-1 s solely to night targethunting missions, at the same time cutting back on Bird Dog daylight 

operations. The O-ls had been scheduled for replacement in the war 

theater around June 1967 when the first of the new, twin-engine, 0-2A 

aircraft were expected to arrive. Nevertheless, the overriding need to 

generate more night missions compelled the Seventh Air Force to keep 

the Bird Dogs and supplement their operations with the incoming 0-2As. 

Ambassador Sullivan praised Seventh’s decision.46 

Another night concept (HUB AND WHEEL) was devised by Seventh 

Air Force in March 1967. It entailed several night B-52 strikes on 

probable chokepoints (hubs). Afterwards, USAF 0-1 or other forward 

air controllers flew visual reconnaissance over the spokes of the wheel 

(the routes into and out of the chokepoint or hub area). If the controllers 

214 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

saw a possible target, they called in USAF tactical air. Many times 

flare-carrying C-130 Blindbats and C-123 Candlesticks teamed with BIG 

EAGLE A-26Ks or USAF T-28D ZORROS (or both) to conduct the 

nocturnal mission^.^' 

The Seventh Air Force attempted to improve strike responsiveness 

further in the proliferating air and air-ground programs in the CRICKET 

and STEEL TIGER sectors by establishing on March 6, 1967, a STEEL 

TIGER Task Force at Nakhon Phanom with Col. Walter B. Forbes as 

commander. Forbes and his staff at once set about coordinating more 

closely the activities of the intelligence-gathering and interdiction units 

located at the base. Included were the 56th Air Commando Wing, the 

23d Tactical Air Support Squadron, the tactical unit operations center of 

the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. Although nominally in control 

of air units operating from Nakhon Phanom, Forbes usually relayed 

strike requests through the Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force 

Deputy commander to Seventh Air Force headquarters, where General 

Momyer worked them into his theater-wide priority list. Not infrequently, however, Forbes’s task force diverted strike aircraft to suddenly 

discovered truck parks, supply storage sites, and other transitory targets. 

This was particularly true of those sighted by roadwatch teams. The task 

force’s presence at Nakhon Phanom let the staff analyze air strike results 

more thoroughly than was often possible at Udorn or Saig~n.~’ 

Forbes’s coordinating task shrank in late July 1967. By then the 

air-ground communications system in Laos had improved and more 

USAF EC-130 ABCCCs were available. Roadwatch targeting reports 

from southern Laos were now sent directly from the Savannakhet air 

operations center to the airborne EC-l30s, thus bypassing Nakhon 

Phanom. On November 15, 1967, as the testing of an air-supported 

anti-infiltration system in Laos was about to begin, some of the task 

force’s functions were merged into the recently organized TASK FORCE 

ALPHA Infiltration Surveillance Center at the same base. Forbes became 

TASK FORCE ALPHA’S director of operations.* The STEEL TIGER Task 

Force office continued to operate under Col. John E. Madison as the 

new commander.49 

The proliferation of anti-infiltration programs early in 1967 was 

accompanied by an increasingly strident controversy between targeteers in 

Laos and Momyer’s Seventh Air Force over air strike responsiveness. 

The officials argued that the expanding, radio-equipped roadwatch teams 

were finding more and better targets, but Seventh too often failed to 

dispatch the air~raft.~’ 

*See Chapter IX. 

215 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

From his Saigon vantage point, Momyer viewed the relationship 

differently. To him the scheduling of aircraft for higher priority targets 

in South and North Vietnam took precedence over air requests in Laos. 

Furthermore, he was concerned about the incredibly complex targeting 

system that had evolved in Vientiane and at Thai bases. By March 1967 

there were eighteen roadwatch teams equipped with Hark radios, but 

they could report directly to USAF 0-ls, A-26Ks, RC-47s, EC-130 

ABCCCs, and C-123s only when English-speaking Laotians were aboard. 

Few bilingual personnel were usually available. Several teams reported 

solely to EC-130 ABCCCs (which the Air Force considered the best relay 

aircraft), and six teams continued to report through the air liaison 

section at Udorn through a Volpar relay aircraft. (This was a Beechcraft 

Super Turbo 18 used in the absence of sufficient USAF relay aircraft in 

Laos.) Teams with other than Hark radios still reported their target 

findings laboriously to stations at Savannakhet and Pakse. From there 

the data had to be relayed to the air liaison section at Udorn before it 

entered USAF communications channels. Finally, Momyer believed the 

Air Force-not the embassy-should control targeting in Laos.” 

His strong conviction regarding targeting, and the availability to him 

by early 1967 of more and better-equipped aircraft, diminished his 

dependency on embassy targeting. 

Laos’s climate and terrain also contributed to the dispute. Too often 

target information was late because of atmospheric conditions or the 

absence of a communication channel. In addition the jungle canopy, 

weather, and darkness conspired against confirming visually from the air 

many targets detected by roadwatch teams. “It is difficult if not 

impossible to find trucks through the canopy in most cases,” Momyer 

said. Terrain, weather, and darkness similarly hindered assessment of 

bomb damage from air strikes. Fires and secondary explosions, however, 

often suggested that more trucks were destroyed and damaged than were 

reported. No truck “kills” could be claimed without visual or photo 

verification. It was accordingly more rewarding for the Air Force to 

locate its own trucks and other targets visually or by photography to 

strike them, and to make its own poststrike as~essment.~~ 

The simmering dispute did not mean that Momyer refused to supply 

air resources for all air requests; rather he did not honor as many as 

embassy personnel wished. More roadwatch teams for intelligence 

gathering and targeting throughout Laos were formed. As more teams 

were given Hark-1 and Hark-2 radio sets, reporting improved. A new 

communications center at Pakse cut real-time reporting of enemy trucks 

and other targets to an average of sixteen minutes.53 

In June several teams were furnished RT-2 radio packs to further 

reduce real-time reporting of enemy targets between the teams and 

216 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

EC-130 ABCCCs or RC-47s. Carrying treetop antennas, the first teams 

with RT-2s worked selected areas of Route 2 in the BARREL ROLL sector 

and in the panhandle near Mu Gia Pass, from where DRV truck traffic 

moved southward despite the monsoon weather. In mid-June, eight more 

RT-2-equipped teams were stationed along Routes 110 and 96 in 

southernmost Laos to count trucks and pinpoint other targets. When in 

July the RC-47s flying in daytime were replaced by freshly arrived 

EC-130 ABCCCs, they served as communications relay aircraft at 

night .54 

Accidental bombings or short rounds of friendly troops, civilians, 

and villages-the bane of Air Force and other US. airmen-were 

relatively few in southern Laos from mid-1966 to early 1967. The five 

bombing incidents investigated during this period occurred on September 

29, November 2 and 25, and January 14 and 29. They elicited Vientiane’s 

concern but no imposition of new operational rules. The bombing 

incident of September 29, 1966, was never resolved. Investigators could 

only confirm that “two white jets” dropped six bombs on the edge of 

two small villages, and that five injured villagers were evacuated by a 

“big helicopter.” Bomb craters and fragments attested to the accidental 

strike, but intensive study of frag orders and pilot debriefings failed to 

fix service blame.55 

The accidental strafing of a friendly area on November 2, causing 

damage and a few injuries, occurred during a night mission by two 

Seventh Air Force A-1Es flying with a C-130 flareship. The incident 

took place a short distance outside of the authorized FOXTROT area of 

STEEL TIGER. While obtaining a fix on moving enemy vehicles, a strong 

northerly wind carried the aircraft beyond the permissible strike boundary. The November 25 strafing of a friendly truck ensued on Route 13 

south of Thakhek, about twenty-five nautical miles outside of the STEEL 

TIGER operating area. There was no damage except to trees, but the 

aircraft were far off course despite their nearness to the Invert radar and 

tactical air navigation (Tacan) aids at Nakhon Phanom. This fact 

brought a warning from Ambassador Sullivan to place all armed 

reconnaissance in the STEEL TIGER area under FAC control.56 

Sullivan did not invoke his threat immediately or in January 1967, 

when several USAF aircraft mistakenly struck the village of Ban Na 

Muong in central Laos (on the 14th and around the 29th). The first 

strike killed a roadwatch team member, the second killed two villagers, 

wounded three, and demolished various huts and structures. Since the 

villagers had been very supportive of the roving teams, U.S. officials 

were keenly distressed over the incident. Colonel Pettigrew, the air 

attacht, strongly enjoined combat crews to adhere to the rules of 

engagement and not attack a village unless fired upon-there being many 

217 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

friendly villages within the STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance areas.57 

Neither repeated appeals nor warnings from air commanders in 

Vientiane could surmount the multiple obstacles to completely error-free 

aerial campaigns in Laos. Among them were the hazards of weather, 

heavy jungle and mountainous terrain, similarity in targets, an elusive 

foe, too few navigational aids to handle approximately 5,500* strike 

sorties per month, and a spider’s web of rules of engagement for certain 

targets and different geographical sectors. On February 13 one more 

unfortunate short round took place in the STEEL TIGER sector. Three 

USAF F-lO5Ds of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing were looking for a 

highway bridge about 24 nautical miles northeast of Muong Phalane. 

They accidentally hit the town, killing 3 villagers (one a 5-year-old girl), 

wounding 9, destroying 11 buildings including a school, and damaging 30 

other huts and structures. While USAF aircraft rushed the wounded and 

their families to Korat for treatment, Sullivan decided that action was 

warranted. He placed a 10-nautical-mile radius of Muong Phalane off 

limits to all U.S. aircraft and imposed a minimum 15,000-foot ceiling for 

all aircraft flying in the vicinity. In past major short-round incidents, the 

ambassador had ordered a standdown of all air operations. Since in this 

instance there was no publicity of the bombing, he decided to await the 

completion of an in~estigation.~’ 

Sullivan explained why Muong Phalane and the surrounding vicinity 

should remain temporarily off limits to American planes. The “accidental bombing of Muong Phalane,” he said, 

had caused considerable emotional reaction in Laos, not only among residents of 

[the] area concerned, but also in higher echelons of [the] RLG [Royal Laotian 

Government]. In part, this is because [the] same area has been bombed in error at 

least three times previouslyt and, in part, . . . because error has occurred despite 

our . . . elaborate assurances of positive controls by radar, TACAN [tactical air 

navigation aids], and other devices.59 

An investigation by a USAF team ultimately disclosed that the 3 

Thunderchiefs dropped sixteen 750-pound general purpose bombs in the 

middle of the town. Six exploded on impact and those with time-delay 

*This was the approximate total flown in January 1967. Specifically, 530 strike sorties 

were flown in BARREL ROLL and 4,959 were flown in the STEEL TIGER and TIGER HOUND 

sectors. The aerial tempo was only slightly below that for ROLLING THUNDER forJanuary 

1967 where 6,633 U.S. strike sorties were flown. [Hist, CINCPAC, 1967, 11, 638, 667.1 

?In fact Muong Phalane and vicinity had been erroneously bombed five or six times in 

recent years. 

218 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

fuzes after impact. Two unexploded bombs were not found until July 13. 

Two additional unexploded bombs were discovered 5.6 miles outside of 

Muong Phalane.60 

Because several bombs were not located immediately, the village 

stayed evacuated. As the bomb search progressed, a phalanx of American and Lao government officials descended on the village to survey the 

damage. In this group were Colonel Pettigrew, many Seventh Air 

Force/Thirteenth Air Force officials, representatives of the U .S. Agency 

for International Development office in Vientiane, members of Lao 

government ministries, and the commanders of the RLAF and the I1 and 

111 Military Regions.61 

The Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force prepared the official 

report of the incident. “It is apparent,” the report said, that the 

flight lead made an error in his outbound tracking . . . . [A] few 360 degree turns 

would have caused him to stray 20 miles off course. Winds at this altitude were 

reported to be from the west (290 degrees) at 12 [knots] which would have moved 

him away from the drop area. Visibility of 3 to 4 miles should have forced him to 

stay near his original sighting. It is our educated guess that [the] pilot 

inadvertently tracked outbound on a heading of 219 to 131 [degrees] and sighted a 

similar type target which [by] sheer coincidence was approximately the same 

distance out from CH 89.’ In his eagerness to destroy the bridge he failed to 

adequately identify the target area before proceeding to drop his bombs. 

As a result, General Momyer directed General Bond, Deputy 

Commander of Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force to reprimand 

and relieve the flight commander.62 

To protect Muong Phalane against future accidental air strikes, 

Sullivan shortly proposed tethering to the bridge by two 200- to 300-foot 

cables a metallic-coated, helium-filled balloon, 15 feet in diameter. The 

balloon should be visible, he opined, in daytime and detectable by radar 

at night or during poor visibility. For added insurance, he directed 

painting the bridge yellow and embossing the town’s name on top of a 

new school being built by the bridge to replace the one destroyed by 

bombs. The ambassador conceded that his proposals might appear “in 

the far-out category’’ but hastened to add: “strange things occur in this 

land of a million elephant^."^^ 

General Momyer strongly objected to hoisting a balloon from the 

bridge of the ill-fated town, citing the lack of assurance it would fly in 

all types of weather and the hazard it would create for airmen during 

*Tactical air navigation channel 89 at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. 

219 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

limited visibility. He proposed instead, and Sullivan readily agreed, to 

emplace a mobile tactical air navigation radar near the town to improve 

air control in the region. The unit was airlifted from Udorn to an RLAF 

airstrip near Muong Phalane before the end of March, becoming 

operative early in April. It was designated Lima Site 61. In December a 

NVAIPL force would destroy it.*@ 

Meanwhile, Sullivan and his air attach& and Agency for International Development officials labored to make adequate restitution to and 

assuage the fears of Muong Phalane’s inhabitants. The most difficult 

task, however, was dealing with pressures from Souvanna Phouma and 

other Lao officials to further tighten the operational strictures on 

American aircraft flying in Laos. That the town and vicinity had been 

attacked five or six times in the past three years heightened Laotian 

vexation and concern. Some Lao officials wanted all air strikes in Laos 

controlled by FACs. But after General Momyer listed the many 

operational complications this would entail, the ambassador opted for 

somewhat less onerous rule tightening.65 

On March 2, Sullivan rescinded the armed reconnaissance line in 

STEEL TIGER and realigned the 4 STEEL TIGER interdiction areas (ECHO, 

DELTA, FOXTROT, and GOLF) into 4 zones. Zone I was the TIGER 

HOUND region and required no change in the rules of engagement. It was 

renamed, however, the TIGER HOUND Special Operating Area. Pilots 

could continue to fly armed reconnaissance along all roads, paths, tracts, 

and rivers. Zone I1 remained a STEEL TIGER armed recon area where all 

targets of opportunity within 200 yards on each side of a motorable road 

or trail outside of villages could be attacked day or night. Fixed targets 

and targets of opportunity beyond the 200-yard limit could be struck 

only if they were Royal Laotian Air Force A or B targets.+ Prior 

approval was needed by the air attach6 (or his representative) in 

Vientiane or Savannakhet, by a forward air controller, or by a RLAF 

observer aboard an ABCCC aircraft. In addition, any weapon site firing 

on or a searchlight aimed at an aircraft could be hit without prior FAC 

approval, and MSQ-77 radar could be used at any time to assist strike 

aircraft in attacking properly approved targets. Zones III and IV were 

likewise STEEL TIGER controlled areas. Zone 111 demanded FAC or 

MSQ-77 control for striking either fixed or fleeting targets. Zone IV 

required both the approval of the ambassador and a forward air 

controller .66 

*See Chapter X. 

?Priority A targets took precedence over B targets. For a discussion of Royal Laotian 

Air Force A, B, and C target categories, see Chapter IV. 

220 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Unhappily, Sullivan’s hope of keeping restrictions to a minimum 

was shattered the same day by the worst bombing accident thus far in the 

war. Two F-4C Phantoms of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, released 

from an airborne FAC to conduct armed reconnaissance in the TIGER 

HOUND area, mistakenly crossed the border into South Vietnam. They 

aimed their ordnance at several trucks believed parked under a tree along 

a road. The pilots expended 6 general purpose bombs, 4 rockets, and a 

number of CBU-2 bomblets. The ordnance hit and destroyed 60 to 70 

percent of the village of Lang Vei and left a high human toll-83 

civilians killed, 176 wounded. Once again a short round was attributed to 

navigational error induced by poor visibility, approaching sunset, the 

inoperative Tacan instruments of the flight leader, and the wingman’s 

misinterpretation in reading his plane’s in~truments.~’ 

The Lang Vei incident reverberated in the highest councils in 

Vientiane, Saigon, and Washington, raising anew questions of bombing 

accuracy. Although deeply concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff nonetheless argued against imposing new strictures on the aerial anti-infiltration 

programs. Seventh Air Force, they observed, had taken disciplinary 

action for the Muong Phalane bombing. Pacific Command’s operating 

rules and procedures-short of human or mechanical failure-appeared 

adequate. To keep the short-round problem in perspective, the service 

chiefs pointed to the continued decline of incidents per 1,000 sorties 

flown: from 5.0 in the first quarter of fiscal year 1965 to 0.14 in March 

1966, and to 0.01 at present.68 

Even so, General Momyer felt compelled to place all U.S. strike 

missions in Laos under temporary FAC control and to adjust the air 

strike rules. He listed all of the nonjet planes authorized to operate as 

forward air controllers: 0-ls, T-28s, A-26s, A-lEs, and if they carried 

flares for night operations, C-47s, C-123s, and C-130s. He forbade the 

T-28s and A-1Es from flying as FACs unless there was a navigator 

aboard. Only 0-1 FACs could fly totally without restrictions day or 

night. He insisted all FAC aircrews use the 1:50,000-type charts of their 

operational areas and whenever possible cross-check their positions with 

radar and other navigational aids. The Seventh Air Force commander 

further urged his subordinate commanders to make certain that aircrews 

were well informed. They needed to know the geographical areas under 

FAC control, FAC procedures, rules of engagement, weather patterns, 

the location of enemy antiaircraft defenses, and the kind of munitions 

normally carried by, and the capabilities of, all strike aircraft. Lastly, he 

demanded that aircrews fully understand the need for “positive target 

identification’’ and “the serious consequences of mis-identification of 

targets. ”69 

222 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

The Seventh Air Force commander on March 18 dispatched another 

letter to all tactical wings, reiterating the need for the “utmost 

professionalism” in identifying and acquiring targets. When in doubt, he 

ordered, “don’t 

The anguish of air commanders, Vientiane, and Washington was far 

from over. Air Force jets on the 21st again accidentally dropped bombs 

near Muong Phalane. The flight leader was searching for a target of 

opportunity in North Vietnam. But weather and navigational aid 

problems plus low fuel prompted him to cross the border and drop his 

ordnance on what seemed to be an uninhabited jungle area. He did not 

know how close he was to Muong Phalane or that there were friendly 

Laotian troops near the bombed area. Fortunately, there were no 

casualties or bomb damage.’’ 

Two days later, 6 F-105s on a North Vietnamese mission crossed the 

border and struck the village of Ban Chom Thong with twenty-four 

750-pound bombs. A second flight of 2 aircraft dropped twelve 500- 

pounders. The short round killed 3 villagers, wounded 33 (3 of them 

seriously), and destroyed more than half the village and a bridge within. 

Sullivan sent his regrets to Momyer saying that the recurring errors 

caused “as much grief to you as to me.” He tried with apparently little 

success to placate Souvanna Phouma. “Since this village is nearly 40 

miles from the nearest authorized RLAF target,” he told Momyer, “it’s 

very difficult for [Souvanna] as a layman to understand how such an 

error can happen, and very difficult for me as a layman to explain it.” 

The ambassador conveyed the prime minister’s request to top military 

commanders, asking them to counsel their pilots to abort if they were 

unsure of their targets. Embassy and Seventh Air Force/Thirteenth Air 

Force personnel once more shouldered a familiar task. They assisted the 

wounded, made arrangements to rebuild homes, paid damage claims, and 

tried to repair the political damage (characterized by Sullivan as possibly 

‘‘irreparable”) .72 

With Sullivan’s assent, Admiral Sharp now “lowered the boom.” 

On April 5 he ordered total USAF FAC or MSQ-77 control for all air 

strikes in Laos. He said that “if there is any doubt on the part of FAC’s, 

strike pilots, or other personnel concerning the validity and identification 

of a target about to be struck, the strike will be suspended until adequate 

verification has been e~tablished.”~~ 

This was not the end of the matter. Sullivan decided to impose a few 

more rules of his own. The ambassador observed that the last three short 

rounds (at Lang Vei, near Muong Phalane, and Ban Chom Thong) were 

committed by pilots who thought they were over North Vietnam. He 

accordingly asked air commanders to put off limits specific Laotian areas 

(north and south) harboring friendlies or devoid of enemy activity, and 

223 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

to impose a 15,000-foot altitude for aircraft flying over them. The 

directive also restated earlier rules requiring pilots to avoid a 25-nauticalmile radius or maintain a minimum 15,000-foot altitude over Savannakhet, Saravane, Pakse, Attopeu, Thakhek-and more recently-Muong 

Phalane. The towns of Khangkhai and Samneua were to be strictly 

avoided. 

In addition the ambassador placed several areas in BARREL ROLL 

and STEEL TIGER off limits, defining the areas by coordinates. One 

STEEL TIGER area was exempt if “positive radio control” was maintained between roadwatch teams and an Air Force FAC or ABCCC. The 

exemption was to ensure that the intelligence-gathering and targeting 

roadwatch teams would not have to curtail their operations. Sullivan 

deemed these teams, now growing in numbers and roaming in ever-wider 

areas along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to be especially effective. The 

Seventh Air Force swiftly sent the ambassador’s instructions throughout 

its command and to other agencie~.’~ 

In late April the air attach6 further tightened the already formidable 

and complex rules of engagement. He sent commanders additional 

Vientiane embassy-imposed guidelines for validating targets and employing forward air controllers in both the STEEL TIGER and BARREL ROLL 

areas. Hereafter, only these agents or agencies were authorized to 

validate targets in Laos-the chief air attach6 and the assistant air 

attache in Vientiane and Savannakhet respectively, Lao-based BUTTERFLY 

FAG,* Lao observers, and Lao roadwatch team chiefs. The Lao 

observers were RLAF members who served aboard 0-1 FAC aircraft of 

the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron or C-130 ABCCCs (daytime call 

sign HILLSBORO). 

Nor was this the end of the dizzying guidelines. The air attache 

specified that the Lao observers could validate targets for prop or jet 

strike aircraft in the new STEEL TIGER Zones I, 11, and 111, in CRICKET 

WEST, and along Route 110. But in CRICKET WEST FXINGE they could 

validate targets solely for prop aircraft. The Lao roadwatch team chiefs 

acted as ground FACs only when they had direct ground-to-air communications with USAF FACs flying overhead. As before, all Laotian villages 

*BUTTERFLY FACs were a special breed of air controllers. Unlike CRICKET FACs, they 

were U.S. enlisted men or nonrated officers who worked for the embassy rather than the 

Air Force. They sat in the right-front seat or backseat of U-6, U-10, or other FAC 

aircraft, using a backpack radio to try to keep in touch with friendly Laotian ground units 

or at least know where they were. BUTTERFLY FACs worked wholly in the BARREL ROLL 

area to forestall the many short-round bombing incidents that were plaguing the Air Force 

throughout Laos in early 1967. [Anthony, “A Military History of the War in Northern 

Laos, 1945-1968,” Chap X, p 33.1 

224 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

were off limits to air strikes unless the air attach6 or embassy validated 

them as targets, or if pilots “positively” determined that hostile firing 

was coming from within the ill age.'^ 

Meantime-and perhaps not surprisingly-Sharp and other PACOM 

officials wondered if the tangled skein of air rules might undo the 

numerous air programs in Laos. They asked the MACV commander if 

the April 5 directive mandating complete FAC and MSQ-77 control of 

all strikes had caused “some reduction of the interdiction effort.” They 

requested a full report.76 

Westmoreland replied that the directive had “not had a significantly 

adverse effect on air interdiction operations.” Momyer generally concurred. He noted that prior to Sharp’s April 5 edict, most TIGER HOUND 

strikes were already under FAC or MSQ-77 control. So were the 

majority in STEEL TIGER, but not to the extent they were in TIGER 

HOUND. Forward air controllers were scheduled “judiciously” with 

MSQ-77 as “backup,” and ABCCC aircraft usually diverted strike 

aircraft from areas where there were no FACs. However, the Seventh Air 

Force commander had a caveat. His strike pilots could not always 

retaliate quickly against automatic weapons or antiaircraft artillery fire 

or against AA searchlight positions. The last was a fresh threat recently 

experienced by his pilots 1.5 miles south of Route 110, at Mu Gia Pass, 

and along Route 922 in the TIGER HOUND Special Operating Area. 

Momyer asked PACOM to waive the April 5 directive to allow pilots to 

counter at once the enemy’s hostile actions.77 

Admiral Sharp agreed to do so. On April 25, he permitted air strikes 

without FAC or MSQ-77 control when automatic weapons or AA 

artillery positions were “observed to be firing” within STEEL TIGER 

zones I, 11, and 111, and BARREL ROLL armed reconnaissance areas. The 

waiver also applied to “big intensity antiaircraft” searchlights obviously 

tracking aircraft. Finally, he lifted the FAC requirement for a portion of 

Route 110 in southernmost Laos, recently classified as a new major 

enemy infiltration route (running through a tip of Cambodia) into South 

~ietnam.~~ 

The April 5 directive was modified anew in early May, following 

further reports from Momyer and Harris and their staffs. These 

underscored the difficulties the FAC and MSQ-77 requirement imposed 

on Seventh Air Force pilots as they attempted to keep sufficient aerial 

surveillance over and strike a mounting volume of enemy truck traffic 

pouring through the Mu Gia Pass area. The restriction likewise hampered 

fast diversion of RoLLing THUNDER aircraft to secondary targets in 

Laos, and adequate counteractions to meet the yet-expanding antiaircraft 

threat. As a consequence the PACOM commander, with Sullivan’s 

approval, waived the FAC and MSQ-77 order for air operations on 

225 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Routes 23A, 1202, and 1201, from their intersection with Routes 911 and 

23 north to the North Vietnamese-Laotian border. Pilots, however, had 

to fix their positions “positively” by radar or Ta~an.’~ 

As the numerous anti-infiltration programs were modified or expanded, with but limited success, high officials tried a more exotic method to 

slow enemy movements through southern Laos. This was rainmaking. 

The project had the virtue of being small and cheap. 

Upon hearing about rainmaking, the joint chiefs promptly gave it 

their blessing. On August 10, 1966, they informed Admiral Sharp and 

General Westmoreland and their staffs: 

Based on results to date of a joint program conducted by the Navy and the 

Environmental Sciences and Services Administration (ESSA), ODDR&E’ has 

proposed that it may be possible to markedly increase the rainfall and possibly 

extend the rainy season in selected portions of the TIGER HOUND area, thus 

causing further deterioration of vehicle infiltration routes. 

The chiefs explained that the cloud-seeding materials, nontoxic to 

vegetation or wildlife, were available, as was equipment to dispense them 

from an aircraft. A small team from the Naval Ordnance Training 

Station at China Lake, California, could train aircrews in materialsdispensing in one or two weeks. In the war theater, cloud seeding would 

require two tactical aircraft and trained aircrews. The aircraft should fly 

twenty cloud-seeding missions per month. The annual southwest monsoon weather still sweeping over Laos would abate soon. The project 

should therefore begin prior to mid-October 1966, preferably as early as 

mid-September .*O 

Sharp speedily solicited Westmoreland’s views. The MACV commander pressed for launching a test program (FLAT TIRE, renamed 

POPEYE) without delay. If cloud seeding extended the rainy season 

significantly, Westmoreland predicted that the deteriorating vehicle 

routes would “slow infiltration to the speed of marching troops and 

possibly divert [the] enemy to more extensive use of sea routes.” Sharp 

agreed as did the joint chiefs. On September 17, Secretary McNamara 

gave the green light for “an operational evaluation of the concept.”81 

Inasmuch as POPEYE promised to be a small independent project, 

officials and commanders could move with alacrity to get it under way. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense would assume responsibility for 

high-level coordination with the White House and State Department; the 

*Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

226 
RENEWED HOPE IN ANTI-INFILTRATION 

chief of naval operations would serve as executive agent for the services; 

and CINCPAC was empowered to designate the air unit exercising 

operational control. In Laos the key U.S. official, as always, was 

Ambassador Sullivan who would monitor cloud seeding and coordinate 

the project with the Lao government. He was nonetheless reluctant to tell 

Souvanna Phouma about the project right away, noting that the prime 

minister was not likely to believe the Americans could localize rainfall. 

The ambassador in addition invoked a personal objection-if POPEYE 

worked and there were floods, he would be most reluctant to take the 

blame. Sullivan called for forty-eight hours’ advance notice of all test 

flights and reports on their test results.82 

The test scenario envisaged experiments lasting 30 to 45 days in 

September and October. They were to be held above the Kong River 

watershed that passed through parts of the STEEL TIGER and TIGER 

HOUND sectors. About 50 clouds would be seeded, 30 by “active” 

material consisting of silver iodide smoke, and 20 by inert smoke. The 

materials would be injected into moisture-laden clouds by a “Sweet Pea” 

Very Pistol using a 1.5 inch by 3.75 inch cartridge. The silver iodide fuze 

shot from the Very Pistol would burn during a fall of about 4,500 feet. 

Upwards of 3 aircraft would be used. Flying variously at 20,000 to 

25,000 feet, they would release the silver iodide active and inert 

materials.83 

On September 13 a PACOM conference firmed up the personnel, 

aircraft, and support requirements for POPEYE. These would be provided 

by PACAF and I11 MAF. CINCPAC decided to pass operational control 

of the project to COMUSMACV who in turn redelegated it to Seventh 

Air Force. According to an operational plan hastily drawn up, Seventh 

would among other things furnish three F-4Bs from the 35th Tactical 

Fighter Wing for cloud seeding, two WC-130Bs of the 54th Weather 

Squadron, as well as two A-1Es and two 0-1 forward air controllers. 

The FACs would fly near seeded clouds to record weather data. If 

needed, the I11 MAF would supply up to six A-4Es for cloud seeding 

together with billeting for eight personnel from the Navy’s test center at 

China Lake. The commander of the Naval Ordnance Training Station at 

China Lake would serve as test director. Starting in late September, the 

tests would be carried out in two phases with Phase IA constituting 

experimentation and e~aluation.~~ 

To run the tests, the Seventh Air Force set up a small special 

Seventh Air Force POPEYE task force. Test Phase IA, which commenced 

on September 23 and went through October 3, developed proper aircraft 

coordination and seeding procedures. The actual seeding tests (Phase IB) 

began the next day. A typical mission summary of a cloud-seeding 

operation read as follows: 

221 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

6 Oct 66. Conducted Popeye flight 06. Launched C-130, two A-lEs, and one 

F-4B on order. Scrambled one F-4B. Test area very humid at all altitudes. Good 

natural cloud development to 18,000 feet. Light winds aloft. Case 1 (NW area B) 

and case 3 (SE area C) were seeded clouds. Both developed large towers, heavy 

precipitation. A target of opportunity (center area B) was seeded with two Very 

Pistol flare units from the C-130. It grew and precipitated. Test director correctly 

identified treatment in all three test cases.85 

Fifty-six cloud-seeding tests were conducted during Phase IB that 

ended on October 27, six more than the planned fifty to allow for the 

disqualification of a few. Forty-eight of the task force tests (85.7 percent) 

were judged successful. The figure was based on recorded data and 

ground observer reports in the test area in Laos. Buoyed by the findings, 

the task force saw “strong evidence” of possible broader application of 

weather modification. Cold fronts during the crachin (or drizzly) periods, 

for example, might be interrupted. In fact the task force believed the 

investigation of this technique might in the end prove more important 

than merely seeding clouds to stimulate rainfall.86 

Generals Momyer and McConnell supported the test results. So did 

the 1st MAF commander who informed McNamara the tests “exceeded 

expectations,” and expressed “high confidence” the monsoon weather 

could be extended indefinitely not only in parts of Laos but in North 

Vietnam. Admiral Sharp likewise saw weather modification as “a 

valuable technical weapon.” He said the Mu Gia, Nape, and Barthelemy 

Passes on the Laos-North Vietnam border seemed “susceptible to the 

cloud seeding technique” for protracting monsoon weather. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on December 5 endorsed the findings and sent them to 

McNamara. Simultaneously, they approved cloud seeding on a regular 

basis.” 

However, Secretary Rusk’s deep reservations about POPEYE led 

McNamara to withhold approval of the Seventh Air Force’s plan. Still, 

he congratulated the services for carrying out the controlled experiment 

in “a truly professional manner,” and in the best tradition of in-house 

laboratories. 88 

But POPEYE was not discontinued. Because President Johnson in 

late February had shown his support for more work on the rain-making 

project, McNamara instructed the secretary of the Navy to establish an 

interagency environmental research unit. It would play a vital role, but 

overall direction would rest in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

under the director of defense research and engineering. At about the 

same time, the administration decided to begin an operational weathermaking phase in Laos that would continue until July 5, 1972.89 

228 
Chapter VIII 

Auguries of Eventual 

Victory Against Infiltration 

July 1967-January 1968 

By June 1967, southwest monsoon weather again restricted enemy 

movements and air interdiction in central and southern Laos. The TIGER 

HOUND Task Force’s air resources had shifted eastward to the drier 

TALLY Ho and Route Package I area of North Vietnam, where Hanoi 

had stepped up its southward transit of men and supplies. 

The seasonal air shift, however, did not end the search for and 

strikes against enemy trucks, watercraft, and other targets in the Laotian 

CRICKET, STEEL TIGER, and TIGER HOUND areas. But the sortie level 

was low. Most aircraft were controlled by COMBAT SKYSPOT MSQ-77 

radar and flew armed reconnaissance along selected routes when weather 

permitted. Meanwhile, Seventh Air Force and MACV drafted plans for 

more intensive air and air-supported ground operations against heavier 

DRV infiltration.’ 

Still hopeful of reducing communist truck and other supply deliveries through southern Laos, the Seventh Air Force in August readied a 

new interdiction and assessment plan. The plan called for a heavy aerial 

offensive along the trail beginning November 1, 1967, when the heaviest 

monsoon rains would be over. Seventh Air Force expected a sharp 

upturn in enemy infiltration due to the recent expansion of U.S. Navy 

SEA DRAGON operations (including naval gunfire) against North Vietnam’s coastal waterborne and other traffic, and ongoing construction of 

an anti-infiltration strongpoint obstacle system (SPOS) just below the 

demilitarized zone. Both measures would likely impel Hanoi to rely more 

on Laos’s southern lines of communication. 

To attack a larger traffic volume in STEEL TIGER and TIGER 

HOUND, the Seventh Air Force plan postulated the use of more and 

better-equipped aircraft and, for the first time, acoustic and seismic 

sensors to detect the enemy. There were to be additional C-130 ABCCCs 

(for a total of seven), new 0-2A FAC planes (which began arriving in 

Southeast Asia in June 1967), and SHED LIGHT aircraft (long under 

229 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

research and development) to afford nighttime battlefield illumination. 

Seventh also envisioned greater use of Army OV-1 Mohawks with their 

side-looking airborne radar to accompany USAF hunter-killer aircraft 

teams and improved starlight scopes for enemy night detection. The plan 

put great store in the sensor-oriented anti-infiltration system to find on a 

real-time basis many more targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Formed at 

Nakhon Phanom on March 6, 1967, the STEEL TIGER Task Force would 

be absorbed by the new system and become TASK FORCE ALPHA. The 

new USAF unit set for testing in late 1967 was to be the operating 

agency of the infiltration surveillance center (ISC) at Nakhon Phanom.’’ 

In the meantime, Admiral Sharp and his staff had drawn up a 

second plan to curb enemy movements through southern North Vietnam, 

the demilitarized zone, the Cambodian border area, and southern Laos. 

This one envisaged the use of such advanced items as the starlight scope 

and Mk-36 Destructor munitions in stepped-up Air Force and Navy 

assaults on waterborne traffic, strikes against a “full spectrum of 

targets” in the Hanoi-Haiphong region, and the closing of Haiphong 

harbor to shipping from the Soviet Union and other countries. But there 

was no prospect of securing the plan’s approval by high Washington 

officials who were not about to countenance a drastic change in the 

war’s ~trategy.~ 

General Westmoreland and his staff, on the other hand, still desired 

a large, ground-oriented, anti-infiltration push into southern Laos. 

MACV headquarters by early 1967 had hammered out two plans for the 

1967-68 dry SeaSOn-PRAIRIE FIRE I11 and SOUTHPAW (an extension of 

which was called HIGH PORT).+ With Sharp’s approval, MACV planners 

proposed in PRAIRIE FIRE I11 to recruit and train as many as 3,000 hill 

tribesmen (Khas) living on both sides of the Laotian-South Vietnamese 

border. Familiar with the local terrain, the Khas would complement the 

Vientiane embassy’s roadwatch team a~tivities.~ 

There was a second reason why Westmoreland solicited the approval 

of his SOUTHPAW and HIGH PORT concepts. The MACV commander 

pointed out that small SPIKE and HORNET units could not carry 

sufficient ordnance for self-defense or enough landmines for emplacement on the trail. This could be remedied, he said, by employing a 

reinforced airborne or ranger battalion from the Army of the Republic 

*Development of this system is discussed in Chapter IX. 

‘On March 1, 1967, the code name of MACV’s probes into the Ho Chi Minh Trail was 

changed from SHINING BRASS to PRAIRIE FIRE. [Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 

2521072 Feb 67.1 Phase I consisted chiefly of seven- to nine-man teams that began 

cross-border probes in October 1965. Phase I1 featured platoon-size probes that commenced 

in June 1966. 

230 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

of Vietnam. The battalion could be heli-lifted into Laos and supported 

by helicopter gunships, Air Force TIGER HOUND strike aircraft, and 

While engaged in search-and-destroy missions within the PRAIRIE 

FIRE operating boundary, the battalion would be aided by reinforced 

SLAM tactical and B-52 strikes. The strikes would be controlled by the 

senior FAC and task force commander at a forward operating base in 

South Vietnam, coordinating with the TIGER HOUND Task Force and a 

PRAIRIE FIRE liaison officer at Seventh Air Force headquarters. Phase I1 

of SOUTHPAW (HIGH PORT) would introduce an ARVN division. Largely 

controlled by the South Vietnamese, the division with U.S. air assistance 

would focus on destroying DRV troop and supply redoubts in SLAMdesignated sections of the traiL5 

Ambassador Sullivan and his intelligence staff stoutly opposed all 

three concepts. They especially disliked PRAIRIE FIRE I11 which required 

the recruitment of 3,000 Kha tribesmen, despite its endorsement by the 

JCS and high defense officials. The ambassador was willing to let the 

tribesmen cooperate on their own without U.S. aid, but, if not, he 

believed the concept should be dropped. He scored MACV’s proposed 

recruitment of the tribesmen as “purely out of the opium pipe.” Perhaps 

the only way MACV and Defense officials could be convinced of the 

concept’s folly was to “try and demonstrate . . . failure.”6 

Sullivan also thought PRAIRIE FIRE I11 unrealistic because of 

personnel shortages in the current small PRAIRIE FIRE operations. 

Consequently, only a fraction of the authorized missions into the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail could be executed. Admiral Sharp had criticized the waste of 

manpower in the war. The ambassador therefore urged the State 

Department to block the PRAIRIE FIRE I11 concept at the Washington 

level and convince the PACOM commander to convert HORNET forces 

into smaller SPIKE teams.’ 

There was more pulling and hauling between MACV, Vientiane, 

Honolulu, and Washington before the PRAIRIE FIRE Ill concept was 

abandoned. Officials meanwhile discussed the merits of the SOUTHPAW 

and HIGH PORT concepts. As Westmoreland was adamant about 

proceeding with SOUTHPAW, the talks continued well into the summer of 

1967.’ 

Admiral Sharp in July and the joint chiefs in August agreed with 

Sullivan that the SOUTHPAW concept was not feasible. SOUTHPAW’S 

insertion of ARVN troops into Laos, they concluded, would elicit a 

strong DRV military reaction, increase American involvement, overextend the RVNAF’s resources, and divert substantial support from South 

Vietnamese programs-tactical and B-52 air, heli-lift, artillery, and 

logistic. Nor could American forces extricate, if necessary, an ARVN 

B-52s. 

23 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

battalion from Laos without publicity. After Secretary McNamara 

acceded to these arguments at the end of August, the SOUTHPAW and 

follow-on HIGH PORT concepts were shelved. Three and a half years 

later, however, a variation of the two concepts was revived when South 

Vietnamese troops (drawn from a ranger, airborne, and an infantry 

division) plus mechanized elements and U.S. air support launched LAM 

SON 719 into the trail. The nearly two-month campaign cost both sides 

dearly, but it slowed infiltration briefly and thereby aided the pacification and the Vietnamization programs then under way in the South.g 

Although Westmoreland failed to sell his PRAIRIE FIRE I11 and 

SOUTHPAW concepts, he succeeded in September in extending the 

southern part of the PRAIRIE FIRE boundary slightly beyond the previous 

twelve miles from South Vietnam's western border, and in achieving 

several other new border alignments." 

Along with the planning for air-ground operations over the coming 

dry season, U.S. aircraft cut roads and hit whatever enemy targets they 

could find on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the seasonal monsoon weather 

having induced the DRV to hold back temporarily the southbound 

journey of supplies (mainly by trucks and watercraft). Seventh Air Force 

flew the majority of strike sorties in STEEL TIGER, as the Navy and 

Marines had shifted most of their anti-infiltration effort to the TALLY 

Ho section of Route Package I in southern North Vietnam. The heaviest 

STEEL TIGER strikes were in the ECHO and Fox sectors which contained 

the principal infiltration routes between Mu Gia Pass and Tchepone. 

The low combat tempo had no major effect on the conduct of 

operations. Propeller-driven aircraft as in the past accounted for many of 

the sorties. Participating were T-28 ZORROS, A-26K NIMRODS, C-123 

Candlestick flareships from the 606th Air Commando Squadron (Composite), A-1Es of the 602d Fighter Squadron Commando, and 0-1 Bird 

Dog forward air controllers belonging to the 23d Tactical Air Support 

Squadron. The aircraft also flew in the BARREL ROLL area of northern 

Laos and from time to time attacked targets in southern North Vietnam. 

The only new tactical change was Seventh Air Force's use of more 

Phantom F-4Cs and Ds in southern Laos. Though 0-1Fs still controlled 

numerous strikes, the monsoon weather dictated extensive pilot use of 

MSQ-77 SKYSPOT radar." 

Seventh Air Force planes flew many more night combat sorties than 

heretofore, concentrating on truck traffic along routes south of Mu Gia 

Pass in STEEL TIGER. These numbered 341 of 1,007 total day and night 

strikes in that area in June, 325 of 910 in July, and 326 of 810 in 

August. To bolster night flights, Seventh Air Force in July augmented its 

A-26 night fighter unit from 8 to 12 aircraft, then assigned all of the 

NIMRODS to a newly created 609th Air Commando Sq~adron.'~ 

232 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

Air operations from June through September were highlighted by 1 

SHOCK and 2 SLAM strikes just outside of the STEEL TIGER area. The 

SHOCK operation was aimed, as were 2 earlier ones, against the east-west 

Route 110 (Sihanouk Trail) in southernmost Laos that had grown in 

importance as a truck route since early 1967. The route’s 60 miles carried 

an estimated 1,OOO to 1,200 tons of supplies a month, with the DRV 

using about 140 trucks for shuttling operations. Road-construction crews 

were building a link between Route 110 and Route 96, probably to 

facilitate the shipment of rice from Cambodia to VC/NVA troops in 

Laos and South Vietnam. Rice stockpiles were detected at 10 sites on the 

western end of Route 110 (although there was a paucity of “hard 

evidence” that military arms from Cambodia were being transported 

along the route). The Kong River, Bang Fai (River), and other nearby 

waterways also carried supplies toward South Vietnam. l4 

In June 1967, photo reconnaissance and reports from road and river 

watch teams and ground patrols revealed a sharp upswing in the number 

of men and quantity of supplies moving not only on Route 110 but on 

the Kong River towards an area northeast and east of the Bolovens 

Plateau. During 19 of 30 days from mid-May to mid-June, friendly 

observers counted no fewer than 500 boats and motorized rafts loaded 

with personnel and supplies. In addition, the NVA had dispatched 5 

fresh battalions into the nearby Bolovens Plateau, endangering the FAR 

units operating there (within Laos’s Military Region IV). The FAR 

military capability was very modest. The Laotian troops had been unable 

to cut traffic on Route 110 and could not engage the North Vietnamese 

without considerable air s~pport.’~ 

Uneasy about the new communist troop presence and accelerated 

supply activity, Ambassador Sullivan and the intelligence staff at 

Vientiane developed a SHOCK 111 target package. The targets lay between 

Ban Bak and the Cambodian border where enemy concentrations 

appeared heaviest. Preparations paralleled those for SHOCK I and 11: The 

Seventh Air ForceIThirteenth Air Force deputy commander and representatives of USAF and RLAF units and other agencies were given a 

special briefing on the type and number of targets. Then the ambassador 

and deputy commander “signed off” on the target package, and finally 

the air requests were sent to the MACV and Seventh Air Force 

commanders in Saigon.I6 

Targets were divided into 2 zones. The RLAF was tasked to hit 

those closest to the Cambodian border, the Seventh Air Force those more 

distant from it. The operation was scheduled from June 30 to July 4 or 

until 200 strike sorties were flown. Seventh would fly 150 sorties or an 

average of 30 a day using F-4 Phantoms, A-1E Skyraiders, and A-26K 

233 

AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

NIMRODS. The RLAF would fly 50 sorties (10 a day) using T-28s. In 

addition, B-52~ for the first time would parti~ipate.’~ 

SHOCK 111 started as scheduled on June 30 against the Sihanouk 

Trail, but the monsoon clouds and rain held the Seventh Air Force to 

just half of its planned strike sorties. Seventy-four were flown in daytime 

and eleven at night. The RLAF reportedly flew sixty-three sorties, 

thirteen more than expected. In addition, nine B-52s (three laden with 

CBU ammunition and six with general purpose bombs) flew saturation 

missions on truck parks, storage and supply areas, and automaticweapons positions. Poststrike photo and other intelligence data disclosed 

that SHOCK 111 had probably destroyed or damaged enemy structures, 

boats, and a bridge, and set off numerous secondary fires and explosions. Tactical and B-52 aircrews also severed Route 110 and other 

routes.18 

North of the SHOCK 111 area, ARC LIGHT B-52s and tactical aircraft 

were busy with SLAM V. From June 17 to August 16, SAC’S superbombers chalked up fifty-three sorties against NVA troop and supply 

redoubts within the PRAIRIE FIRE boundary. Monsoon weather and the 

jungle terrain conspired to prevent much assessment of the destruction 

and damage inflicted by the bombs, explosions, and secondary fires.” 

Air commanders, meanwhile, were getting ready to mount SLAM VI, 

but another dispute between Westmoreland and Sullivan delayed its 

execution. The MACV commander wanted to begin a tactical air-ground 

and B-52 attack on August 4 against a new large enemy complex just 

west of the South Vietnamese border. He said that recent PRAIRIE FIRE 

team probes of the area, agent reports, secondary explosions from a few 

tactical strikes, and small-arms and automatic weapons fire signaled the 

existence of troop concentrations, storage and bivouac sites, waystations, 

loading zones, and trails. Aerial photography revealed no friendly 

villages, shrines, and national monuments. Westmoreland asked for 

“automatic authority” to deploy additional PRAIRIE FIRE teams into the 

zone, to seek out targets, and call in planes (especially B-52s) as needed. 

Sullivan rejected the request.20 

The crux of the problem-as always-was who had final command 

and control authority for American military operations in Laos. Sharp 

backed Westmoreland, citing the “temporary blanket approval” he had 

secured to conduct SLAM V that was still under way. Sullivan demanded 

more photographic and other hard intelligence to confirm the absence of 

civilians in a zone far larger than the SLAM V area. Westmoreland 

countered that he had already sent Vientiane all essential data on the 

zone and was impatient to get the attack going. He stressed the zone’s 

importance-it harbored many NVA troops who could force a quick 

retreat of MACV ground reconnaissance units and was used as a major 

235 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

base for enemy operations in the central and southern portions of the 

RVNAF’s I Corps Tactical Zone. Besides, the communists undoubtedly 

used the zone to prepare for a recent rocket attack on Da Nang. Thus it 

was imperative to remove immediately all strike restrictions.21 

Sullivan refused to budge. He reminded Westmoreland that as 

ambassador he was responsible to the United States and Laotian 

governments for minimizing civilian casualties, and that State and 

Defense had staffed their offices in Vientiane to discharge this function. 

The dispute was settled in mid-August when photo interpreters, after 

scrutinizing new MACV photos of the proposed SLAM VI area, agreed 

there were no friendly civilians in the area.22 

SLAM VI got under way at once with B-52 strikes into the targeted 

area, which for bombing was divided into one-by two-mile sectors. The 

SAC bombers contributed seven missions totaling fifty-seven sortiesz3 

SLAM VI was the last of the large-scale SLAM strikes. SPIKE teams 

and HORNET units found it ever harder to sustain forays into the 

enemy’s redoubts along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to pinpoint aerial 

targets. Larger numbers of well-trained troops defended supply and other 

sites. They waited for PRAIRIE FIRE units, attacking incoming and 

outgoing Army and Air Force helicopters and their escort of low-flying 

FAC and strike aircraft. Most of the American-led teams had too little 

staying power against a well-armed foe.24 

The danger of these operations spurred Westmoreland to renew his 

effort with higher authorities for his PRAIRIE FIRE I11 and SOUTHPAWHIGH PORT concepts-all requiring larger air-supported ground units 

against the trail. As noted earlier, Sullivan and eventually Washington 

agreed that these concepts would prove too escalatory and divert too 

many resources from other essential South Vietnamese military programs. 

In the following weeks, the PRAIRIE FIRE ground probes and the 

tactical and B-52 strikes did not cease but were conducted more 

cautiously. SLAM strikes were of shorter duration. With the arrival of 

October and drier weather on the trail, the operational pace once again 

picked up. Over one seven-day period, six SPIKE teams and five HORNET 

units entered the trail. Their targeting brought in seventy tactical and 

three B-52 sorties.25 

After two years of operations, what had the air-supported PRAIRIE 

FIRE program accomplished? Certainly, it had cost the enemy lives and 

resources that would otherwise have been used in South Vietnam. The 

first team entered Laos on October 13, 1965, and by October 27, 1967, 

the program had amassed the following record: 

236 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

Operational teams or units 

Total ground missions 

Supporting tactical sorties 

Supporting B-52 sorties 

Enemy killed 

Supply caches destroyed 

Structures destroyed/damaged 

Bridges destroyed/damaged 

Vehicles destroyedldamaged 

Secondary explosions 

Prisoners taken 

Antipersonnel mines emplaced 

Antivehicle mines emplaced 

SPIKE 

Reconnaissance 

Teams 

20 

262 

1,783 

634 

368 

177 

1,222 

6 

33 

419 

19 

615 

23 

HORNET 

Platoons and 

Companies 

12' 

61 

1,630 

295 

368 

34 

158 

5 

8 

695 

7 

471 

24 

'Consisting of nine HORNET platoons and three companies. Though many more 

PRAIRIE FIRE teams, platoons, and companies were authorized, recruitment and training 

were slow. 

The human cost to the Americans and the South Vietnamese was 

considerably less than to the enemy? 

SPIKE 

Reconnaissance 

Teams 

U.S. killed 30 

U.S. wounded 33 

U.S. missing 8 

South Vietnamese killed 55 

South Vietnamese wounded 54 

South Vietnamese missing 34 

HORNET 

Platoons and 

Companies 

3 

51 

7 

32 

100 

37 

To what extent these operations delayed the movement of manpower 

and materiel into South Vietnam was difficult to say. The presumption 

was that they did delay the enemy and they added to the enemy's costs in 

continuing the war. On these premises the PRAIRIE FIRE program was 

justified. 

Together with stepped-up PRAIRIE FIRE operations in mid-1967, 

American military planners experimented with another anti-infiltration 

program along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The project consisted of 

mudmaking and carried the code name COMMANDO LAVA. 

237 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

COMMANDO LAVA was born in the laboratories of the Dow 

Chemical Company. There Dow scientists had created chemicals which, 

when mixed with water in the form of rain, destabilized or chelated soil 

into mud. With sufficient chemicals and rain, the scientists believed that 

enough mud could be created to slow and possibly stop vehicular traffic. 

The chemicals were a 50-50 mixture of trisodium nitrilo-triacetic acid and 

sodium tripolyphosphate sold under the trademark Calgon. Early tests in 

Laos indicated that a mixture of about one pound per square yard could 

treat six inches of top soil. About twenty tons would cover an 

average-size chokepoint.*’ 

A C-130 aircraft began the experiments in Laos on May 17, 

free-dropping the chemicals (packed in palletized bags) on chokepoints 

along Routes 92 and 110. Ten days later, both chokepoints appeared 

impassable to traffic. A sloping segment on Route 110 oozed downhill 

like lava, inspiring the project’s code name.” 

Encouraged by the tests, Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Sullivan 

endorsed their continuation. McNamara, the joint chiefs, and other 

Washington high officials likewise approved. Sharp forecast an “excellent potential” for the project against enemy chokepoints, fords, and 

bridge sites during Laos’s rainy season (June-September). Combined 

with air-dropped ordnance, mudmaking also promised to tax the 

communists’ road-maintenance resources. Sullivan waxed even more 

optimistic. He informed the State Department that enemy movements 

through Laos might become prohibitive if mudmaking was combined 

with rainmaking and with the air-supported sensor anti-infiltration 

system to be activated in late 1967. To slow enemy personnel traveling on 

foot, the ambassador supported tests using FAR troops to spread the 

chemicals by hand on soil containing vegetable roots and matting. He 

saw mudmaking possibilities as equally good in South Vietnam. “Chelation may prove better than escalation,” he advised State and endowed 

COMMANDO LAVA with a war cry-“make mud, not war.”29 

In the meantime, Vientiane officials on May 27 briefed Generals 

Momyer and Westmoreland on COMMANDO LAVA. Then in mid-June, at 

the request of Sharp and Westmoreland, Momyer’s Seventh Air Force 

staff wrote Operation Plan 500-67, COMMANDO LAVA 11. The plan 

tasked the 315th Air Commando Wing to furnish several C-130s for 

dropping the chemicals, the 504th Tactical Air Support Group for any 

additional aircraft and crews, and the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing for 

logistic support. Assisted by ABCCC aircraft, the C-130s would fly 200 

feet above the ground at 160 knots and drop palletized paper bags of 

chemicals along traffic chokepoints. General Momyer at the same time 

directed his staff to start planning for early replacement of the nonjet 

C-130s with the speedier jets. He pointed out that if the COMMANDO 

238 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

LAVA project became a regular program, the C-130s would become 

increasingly vulnerable to expanding enemy antiaircraft defense^.^' 

MACV in June chose one chokepoint in Laos and another in South 

Vietnam’s A Shau Valley for further COMMANDO LAVA tests. The A 

Shau Valley tests took precedence because there were 111 Marine 

Amphibious Force personnel available to make a ground inspection of 

soil chelation and its impact on enemy traffic.31 

Two Seventh Air Force C-130s flew their first chemical drops on 

July 20 and 21, 1967, along segments of Route 548 in the A Shau Valley. 

The airdrops succeeded even though small-arms fire struck both planes. 

The next day, three C-130s spread chemicals on a 200-yard segment of 

the same route. One aircraft was hit, apparently by a 30-caliber weapon 

that triggered a fire in the wing and forced the pilot to land at Chu Lai 

airstrip in South Vietnam.32 

The Seventh Air Force flew several more missions in late July and 

early August with out loss or damage to aircraft. Meanwhile, Seventh’s 

initial report based on aerial observation showed that the chemical 

compounds did little to slow or halt communist traffic. The DRV still 

used the roads and made no unusual efforts to bypass seeded sectors. 

Deep rutting on four road segments was seen, but was corrected by roadrepair crews. They covered the ruts with logs and bamboo matting, a 

normal practice where roads were poor.33 

In its final COMMANDO LAVA I1 report, Seventh said that rain had 

activated chelation in all six segments of Route 548 treated with the 

chemical compounds. However, there was scant evidence of mud or 

mudslides, and enemy traffic was not impeded. The report blamed the 

route’s soil texture. Consisting largely of sand rather than clay, it was 

unsuitable for proper chelation. Consequently, MACV discontinued the 

tests on October 21, dashing earlier hopes that a radically new technique 

might significantly arrest enemy traffic. Whether the communists in the 

vicinity of Route 548 were aware of the COMMANDO HUNT I1 experiment 

remained a matter of spe~ulation.~~ 

As the monsoon weather abated in late September and in October, 

enemy troops and supplies commenced their seasonal logistic shift from 

routes and trails in southern North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 

Laos. On the 21st at Udorn, Generals Momyer and Westmoreland, 

Ambassador Sullivan, and Philip C. Habib, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and other officials agreed on 

a new three-phase air plan to interdict the enemy, hoping to inflict on 

him greater manpower and supply losses than in previous dry seasons. In 

Phase I the Air Force would concentrate on supplies stockpiled near the 

North Vietnamese passes leading into Laos. As the supplies moved down 

the trail, the air effort in Phase I1 would focus on striking and harassing 

239 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

trucks along the roads. The last phase would center air power on passes 

opening into South Vietnam.35 

The tempo of the aerial assault on infiltration accelerated dramatically over the next four months, although the phased application of air 

power was overtaken by the shifting military situation in southern Laos 

and northern South Vietnam. Combat sortie totals reflect the magnitude 

of the air campaign: 

Oct 1967 Nov 1967 Dec 

~___ 1967 Jan 1968 

USAF 2,293 3,416 4,346 7,252 

USN 9 219 1,044 unk 

USMC 23 102 456 unk 

Total 2,325 3,737 5,846 7,252 

- - - - 

The Seventh Air Force continued to fly most of the sorties in Laos 

while the Navy and Marines concentrated most of their air effort on 

North Vietnam and South Vietnam respectively. In the closing months of 

1967, SAC stepped up B-52 strikes within the TIGER HOUND sector. For 

all of 1967 the ARC LIGHT personnel flew 1,910 sorties in Laos. Most 

originated from Guam, but in September 1967 Thai-based B-52s were 

permitted for the first time to hit Laotian targets.36 

Converging on the routes, trails, and supply sites of the ECHO and 

Fox sectors of the STEEL TIGER area, the Air Force relied on the 

relatively few prop aircraft available for use in Laos as their main 

antitruck weapon. Besides surpassing the jet aircraft in loiter time, 

technology and experience enabled the A-26 NIMRODS, T-28 ZORROS, 

and A-1E Skyraiders do a better truck-killing job. The starlight scope, 

first tested in March 1966, was now aboard many of the supporting 

0-1E Bird Dogs, C-123 Candlesticks, and on some of the NIMRODS. 

There was additionally a new, twin-engine, 0-2A Super Skymaster 

FAC aircraft that had arrived in the war theater in June 1967. The 0-2A 

excelled the 0-1 in loiter time and in communications that assured closer 

air-ground coordination for both prop and jet strike planes. Pilots had 

learned to use prop aircraft more effectively. A much-used tactic in 

heavily defended areas (where many trucks were likely to be found) was 

pairing aircraft. An A-26K would pair with another A-26K, with a T-28 

ZORRO, and now and then with a jet B-57. The pairings not only 

improved truck hunting but made more ordnance available against trucks 

and antiaircraft positions. Finally, all strike pilots had access to new 

ordnance, including M-3 1 and M-32 incendiary clusters.37 

Nonetheless, the days of the prop aircraft seemed numbered. There 

were few A-26Ks or T-28s left in the USAF inventory, although a fair 

240 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

number of A-1E Skyraiders could eventually be made available. As of 

June 30, 1967, the Air Force had 89 Skyraiders and 150 more could be 

transferred from the Navy and the VNAF during fiscal years 1968 and 

1969. Most important, however, was the vulnerability of the prop 

aircraft to the heavier automatic weapons and antiaircraft artillery fire, 

and receipt by Seventh Air Force of better-equipped USAF jets for 

hunting trucks and other targets.38 

As the antitruck campaign gathered momentum in late 1967, General 

Momyer sent more jet aircraft into Laos. The majority were F-4C and 

F-4D Phantoms, the latter being the Air Force's newest and best fighter. 

After October the Phantoms began accounting for 50 percent or more of 

all strikes on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, about half of them flown at night. 

During November additional F-105 Thunderchiefs appeared over Laos 

and 2 types of specialized jet aircraft made their debut-the F-100F 

Super Sabre and the A-37. On the 13th, several Super Sabres, recently 

converted to MISTY FACs and fitted for flying armed reconnaissance, 

began trail missions. Equipped with 2 LAU-59 rocket launchers for 

target marking and a 20-mm cannon for armed reconnaissance, the 

F-100Fs began substituting for the slower and more vulnerable prop 

0-1s and 0-2s in the heavily defended areas. Also in November, several 

specially equipped A-37s that had undergone a combat evaluation in 

South Vietnam (COMBAT DRAGON), started flying in southern Laos. 

Featuring a 7.62-mm minigun in its nose, the twin-engine A-37 could 

carry 4,855 pounds of ~rdnance.~' 

An exception to the use of more jets in Laos was a test in November 

1967 of a newly configured turboprop JC-130A called Gunship II.* This 

aircraft was a follow-on to the AC-47 gunship withdrawn from Laotian 

operations in 1966 because of its vulnerability to ground fire (though still 

used in South Vietnam). The JC-130 had four M-61 Vulcan 20-mm 

cannon, four 7.62-mm miniguns (MXU-470), beacon-tracking radar, a 

starlight scope, and a fire-control system. It carried considerable armor 

to protect aircrews, an illuminator, and special safety fuel tanks. As a 

truck-killer, Gunship I1 appeared to pass early combat tests with flying 

colors. Its cannon and miniguns were credited with destroying twentyseven trucks and damaging five, and probably destroying seven trucks 

and one automatic-weapons position. The crew counted eleven secondary 

explosions resulting from the attacks on enemy vehicles.+ A number of 

Gunship 11s would see action in Laos during 1968.@ 

'Subsequent models were designated AC-130As. 

'For a history of Gunship 11, see Ballard, Development and Employment of 

Fixed- Wing Gunships, 1962-1972, Chap 111. 

24 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane viewed with disquiet the growing 

use of jets in southern Laos, particularly against enemy trucks. Convinced that prop aircraft were by far the best truck-killers, he wanted 

more-not fewer-of them. It was an issue over which he and Momyer 

had earlier crossed swords. Several weeks previously, Sullivan and 

Eugene M. Locke, U.S. Deputy Ambassador to Saigon, had jointly 

asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense to analyze the efficacy of 

prop versus jet aircraft against trucks and ~atercraft.~' 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense analysts supported Sullivan's 

position. They calculated that for the first 8 months of 1967 prop 

aircraft had destroyed or damaged 996 vehicles and watercraft, at a rate 

of 12.8 transport targets destroyed per 100 sorties and at a cost of 

$55,000 per target. In contrast, jet F-4s and F-105s had destroyed or 

damaged only 336 vehicles or watercraft at a rate of 1.5 per 100 sorties 

and at a cost of $700,000 per transport target. The analysts said that by 

replacing the 2 F-4 squadrons with 2 A-1E squadrons (there being no 

extra A-26K or T-28 prop aircraft on hand), 1,200 more trucks and 

watercraft could be destroyed or damaged in the next 12 months at a 

savings of $28 million. The sole shortcoming of the prop aircraft was 

that it was 4 times more vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft fire. Over 12 

months the additional vehicle and watercraft attrition would cost the 

United States 18 more aircraft and 8 pilots. McNamara solicited the 

views of the joint chiefs who in turn queried field commanders for their 

reaction to these findings.42 

The Seventh Air Force and PACAF commanders and their staffs, in 

detailed replies, argued strongly on doctrinal and practical grounds for 

jets rather than prop aircraft. They invoked the USAF airpower concept 

requiring attacks on enemy supplies as close to the source as possible. 

This dictated giving first priority to supply targets in North Vietnam 

(chiefly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area) before the materiel entered the 

maze of roads, routes, and trails in southern North Vietnam and Laos. 

Also, enemy antiaircraft defenses in Laos as in North Vietnam were very 

dangerous in certain areas, thus foreclosing the use of the vulnerable 

nonjet aircraft. Above all, jets gave the Seventh Air Force commander 

the requisite flexibility to conduct air operations anywhere in the war 

theater. Finally, Seventh and PACAF leaders faulted the analysis for 

omitting from jet statistics the sorties flown for flak suppression, escort, 

and strikes on fixed targets. The omission distorted the record and made 

jet operations against trucks and watercraft seem less effective than they 

really were. A year-round aircraft-by-aircraft comparison, they said, 

would prove that jets destroyed more trucks than the nonjets did.43 

Countering certain of the Air Force arguments was not easy. It was 

hard to argue against a commander's need for adequate operational 

242 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

flexibility when he faced the likelihood that the DRV would bring many 

more 37-mm, 57-mm, and other aircraft weapons into Laos. To General 

Momyer the operational flexibility argument was crucial. Despite the 

daily air requests developed by the Vientiane embassy, he judged it 

essential to evaluate the requests purely within the context of theaterwide air priorities. Momyer also believed that direct embassy strike 

requests were a usurpation of a basic USAF role and mission.* 

Left unsaid was another Air Force concern. This was the continuing 

financial outlays for basically obsolete nonjet aircraft at the expense of 

using and testing numerous newer and higher-performance jet planes. On 

the other hand, the statement that jets surpassed the nonjets in 

truck-killing could not be squared with an abundance of data. The data 

underscored the advantages of the nonjets against fleeting trucks and 

watercraft in a country with mostly jungle terrain and rainy weather. 

These advantages prevailed, however, only so long as the nonjets flew in 

a reasonably permissive environment. 

In any event the jet-nonjet dispute was destined to become academic, although Sullivan tried for a while longer to obtain more A-1E 

Skyraiders. Westmoreland defended the Seventh Air Force and PACAF 

views. The MACV commander noted that the F-4C Phantoms were 

needed to fly MiG combat air patrol over North Vietnam, and that the 

new F-4D was an all-weather aircraft for which there was no equivalent 

prop plane. He further stressed General Momyer’s desire for “flexibility 

and versatility in optimizing the out-of-country air campaign.” Admiral 

Sharp, too, backed Momyer. He advised the JCS and McNamara 

separately that nonjet aircraft losses were bound to rise, and the seasonal 

nature of the war often demanded “fast reacting” strikes that only jets 

could provide. On the basis of this information, McNamara did not 

pursue the matter further.44 

The jet-nonjet issue was not the sole one between the Vientiane 

embassy and the Air Force. In December, as truck traffic accelerated 

along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the west-to-east Sihanouk Trail, 

embassy targeteers and the Air Force wrangled over air responsiveness to 

targets developed by roadwatch teams. Momyer and his subordinate 

commanders insisted a large number of the targets could not be struck. 

Of the 715 trucks reported by the teams in November, Air Force pilots 

using visual and photo reconnaissance could not confirm the presence of 

195 of them, and 375 truck sightings were not acted upon due to delayed 

reports. Disagreeing, embassy officials decided to fashion a SHOCK IV 

target package to extract more air strikes from the Seventh Air Force.45 

‘See Chapter VII. 

243 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

The SHOCK IV targets were found in aerial reconnaissance and 

roadwatch team reports documenting the stepped-up, southward-moving 

traffic along the Sihanouk Trail and water traffic on the Kong River. 

The FAR commander of Military Region 1V feared that the traffic 

portended (as in late June) another enemy thrust against the FAR units 

near Attopeu and on the edge of the Bolovens Plateau in the area.46 

After concurrences by the embassy, the deputy commander, Seventh 

Air Force/Thirteenth Air Force, and the RLAF, a five-day SHOCK IV 

operation began on December 26. Air Force F-~s, A-37s, and RLAF 

T-28s attacked truck parks, storage areas, automatic-weapons positions, 

troop rest stops, and watercraft. While RLAF pilots concentrated much 

of their firepower on watercraft, USAF pilots hit other targets and cut 

the Sihanouk Trail in several places. The assault set off numerous 

secondary explosions and fires. Because weather canceled many missions, 

Seventh Air Force pilots flew only 87 of their planned 160 sorties and the 

RLAF flew 47 sorties. Jungle terrain and weather once more frustrated 

bomb damage assessment missions, but the strikes were judged to have 

taken a fair toll in enemy lives and supplies. Air Force and RLAF 

aircraft carried out a final SHOCK V in the same area during February 

1968 with similar flying problems and uncertain bombing 

Meanwhile, Seventh Air Force’s truck-attrition claims were setting 

unprecedented records. Pilots in November saw 3,019 trucks, attacked 

2,416, and destroyed 517. President Johnson followed the “truckbusting” campaign closely, and as November ended he directed 

“maximum resources’’ against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The U.S. airmen 

rose to the occasion. In December they sighted 5,511 vehicles, attacked 

4,598, and destroyed 978.” In January 1968 they detected 6,911 trucks, 

destroying and damaging 1,15 1 .48 

Questioning the trend of these statistics, Westmoreland in early 

December discussed them with General Momyer. He said the reported 

truck-kills appeared “awfully high,” far above those of a year earlier. 

Momyer promptly had his staff reexamine the criteria for recording 

truck-kills. 49 

The reexamination resulted in the clarification of criteria for 

verifying truck attrition in the 56th Air Commando Wing. Pilots had to 

see a truck explode and burn. Explosions and fires started by an air 

attack on trucks beyond twenty-five feet of a road should be assessed 

*Headquarters USAF analysts later refined the statistics for November and December 

1967 as follows: Trucks sighted in November, 4,267, destroyed and damaged, 834. Trucks 

seen in December, 6,093, destroyed and damaged, 1,030. [TIA, Dir/Ops, USAF, Feb 68, p 

3-33.] 

244 

INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

purely as secondary explosions and fires. Secondary explosions or fires 

created by attacking trucks hidden by jungle foliage should be reported 

solely as probably destroyed or damaged. The 56th Wing stressed the 

difficulties of verification. In general pilots could not confirm truck-kills 

at night due to darkness and jungle terrain, and enemy antiaircraft 

defenses often made it dangerous to obtain photographic bomb damage 

assessment of truck strikes. Low-flying FAC pilots at times took great 

risks using hand-held cameras to secure strike results, as photos taken at 

several thousand feet altitude lacked adequate detail. And the enemy was 

quick to conceal destroyed or damaged trucks. According to the 56th’~ 

pilots, the best way to verify targets was to equip the forward air 

controller with a starlight scope then follow up with night photographic 

missions. Thus the reliability of the high truck-attrition estimates left a 

lot to be desired.50 

Some officials, such as President Johnson and Ambassador Sullivan, 

were inclined to believe the truck-killing estimates. When Air Force Chief 

of Staff McConnell visited Udorn in late November, the elated ambassador commended him on the Seventh Air Force’s truck-killing operations. 

Sullivan called the antitruck campaign the consummation of “nearly 

three years of learning, adapting, adjusting, and refining success.” 

Although the truck-killing could not be publicized nor match the recent 

spectacular American and allied victory at Dak To in South Vietnam, it 

was nonetheless “one of the most significant military and psychological 

accomplishments of the war.” The Ambassdor foresaw the DRV losing 

the bulk of its trucks along the Ho Chi Minh Trail before the end of 

1967. He accepted the intelligence data suggesting that virtually none of 

the DRV’s dry-season cargo was getting as far south as Route 9.51 

Conversely, Westmoreland and many Washington analysts remained 

dubious about the truck statistics and the claim DRV supplies were not 

reaching Route 9. Ambassador Sullivan nevertheless stood firm. He 

insisted in December the air strikes were taking an unprecedented truck 

toll and the air tactics of the past three years were “paying off.” He 

lauded the “special capabilities’’ of USAF prop aircraft which flew the 

bulk of night missions. They accounted for seventy percent of the 

truck-kills, he noted, but only twenty percent of total day and night 

tactical sorties.* The ambassador wanted more A-1E Skyraiders at 

Nakhon Phanom, if General Wheeler could arrange to send them, and 

ARC LIGHT strikes on Routes 15, 137, 911, and 912.52 

‘Sullivan was obviously drawing on the statistics assembled by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense in its analysis of the effectiveness of prop versus jet aircraft. 

246 
AUWRIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

Apart from the disagreement over truck-killing estimates, a more 

elusive figure was the number of communists killed by air on the trail. 

Defense Secretary McNamara offered the only approximate manpowerattrition statistic to a Senate investigating subcommittee on August 25, 

1967. He said that about two percent of the ten to twenty percent of all 

personnel who failed to reach the battle area while transiting from North 

to South Vietnam were victims of air attacks. Presumably, the rest were 

felled by disease, injuries, and other causes. McNamara’s estimate 

included air operations in southern North Vietnam as well as in Laos.53 

Whatever the enemy losses by air in Laos, American commanders in 

late 1967 were fairly sanguine about the anti-infiltration program and the 

war’s progress. Their reports were fairly upbeat, for they were convinced 

that the Hanoi regime was taking a heavy drubbing. Compared with the 

close of 1966, the regime’s manpower, truck, watercraft, and rollingstock losses throughout the war theater were more severe. Its ability to 

support the war had diminished, and reliance on foreign military imports 

had mounted. Lastly, the American pacification effort in South Vietnam 

seemed enco~raging.’~ 

Air commanders envisioned two further military measures for 

slowing the enemy’s manpower and supply flow to the south. One would 

be a sharp upturn in the B-52 sortie rate. The other (initially opposed 

but now supported) would be the use of acoustic and seismic sensors to 

detect personnel and vehicles passing along segments of the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail, thereby identifying targets for air strikes. Months of planning, 

debate, and preparations preceded each measure. 

The desire of air commanders to step up SAC’S sortie rate in the 

war theater triggered another drawn-out debate between the field and 

Washington. By 1967 the bombing issue was more sensitive than in the 

year before. There was now more domestic and foreign opposition to the 

B-52s, and administration officials were deeply troubled by their 

spiraling costs. 

At the beginning of February, the Guam-based bombers were flying 

about 800 sorties per month theater-wide, with increasing numbers 

allocated to Laos. A need existed to reduce the roughly 12-hour 

round-trip flight time between Guam and a South Vietnamese or Laotian 

target. After exploring forward bomber basing with several countries,* 

U.S. authorities asked the Thai government for permission to station 

*SAC and PACAF favored basing the bombers on Okinawa, while Westmoreland 

leaned toward using a Philippine base. South Vietnam and Thailand were also considered 

as possible forward base sites. All but Thailand were rejected for political or military 

reasons. [Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 146-47; Jacob Van Staaveren, The Air Force in 

Vietnam: The Search for Military Alternatives (Washington, 1969), p 8.1 

247 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

part of the B-52 fleet on Sattahip Air Base (shortly renamed U-Tapao 

Air Base) near Bangkok. The Thai government agreed on March 2, 

Secretary of State Rusk publicly announced the decision on the 22d, and 

on April 30 three bombers from the 22d Bombardment Wing on Guam 

landed at the base following a mission in South Vietnam. The next day 

the same bombers flew their first strike from Sattahip against a South 

Vietnamese target area. Fifty-nine sorties had been launched from the 

new base by the end of April. In accordance with Ambassador Martin’s 

instructions, all SAC mission requests had to be received in Bangkok no 

less than 24 hours before launching to allow clearance with Thai 

a~thorities.~~ 

Additional bombers deployed from Guam to Thailand in May and 

June, the last five of the fifteen authorized by the Thai government 

arriving on July 9. With Laos and Cambodia officially neutral countries, 

the bombers flew a circuitous route around Cambodia to reach their 

targets in South Vietnam, the demilitarized zone, and southern North 

Vietnam. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s “neutrality” did not 

foreclose unpublicized bombing of his country. Not until September 

1967, however, did he permit the U-Tapao-based bombers to strike 

selective targets in southeastern Laos.56 

Militarily, the round-about missions from Thailand were wasteful 

and impelled SAC Commander in Chief Nazzaro, Admiral Sharp, and 

General Westmoreland to urge higher authorities to permit overflights of 

Laos. The country was neutral only in a technical sense, they argued, 

and the political risks of overflights appeared minimal. Most important, 

direct flights from Thailand to target areas would further reduce strike 

reaction time, enable the bombers to fly more sorties, and conserve 

considerable funds. Concurrently, Westmoreland pointed out that the 

SAC operations were indispensable for interdiction, close support, and 

keeping the enemy off-balance; and he pressed for a 50-percent rise in 

the sortie rate to 1,200 sorties per month. In light of a limited general 

purpose bomb inventory and the time lag in increasing bomb production, 

the sortie buildup should be graduaL5’ 

These overlapping issues were debated intensely from spring through 

autumn 1967. In briefings for and communications to higher headquarters, General Nazzaro and other air commanders stressed the operational 

advantages of bombers from Thailand overflying Laos. They said the 

B-52s could reach any South Vietnamese or Laotian target within one 

and a half hours versus four and a half hours by detouring around 

Cambodia. The shorter route would make refueling by KC-135 tankers 

unnecessary, save about $1.5 million monthly, and let aircrews select the 

best direction of attack against targets in and near the demilitarized zone. 

The last would minimize the risk of hitting friendly forces or exposure to 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

SA-2 surface-to-air missiles emplaced in southern North Vietnam. All air 

commanders desired round-the-clock B-52 strikes on infiltration in 

southern Laos rather than the present nighttime strikes.58 

Ambassadors Martin in Bangkok and Sullivan in Vientiane needed 

no convincing as to the advantages of overflying or striking targets in 

Laos. The crux of the problem was political. On the one hand, Sullivan 

observed, Thai authorities would allow B-52s to fly from their bases only 

if they were told of the targets. On the other hand, the U.S. government 

was not keeping Souvanna Phouma fully apprised of the magnitude of 

Guam-based B-52 strikes on Laotian targets near the Vietnamese border. 

Sullivan was reluctant, if directed, to inform the Thais but not the 

Laotians about the use of Thai-based B-52s. He also disliked withholding strike information from both governments when circumstances made 

Thai-based missions a compelling need to assure adequate “operational 

flexibility. ”59 

After conferring with Thai authorities, Ambassador Martin secured 

their assent to allow B-52s to overfly and conduct strikes in Laos. He 

cited the “excellent record” of maintaining security about Thai-based 

USAF operations, and the diminishing public interest in the United 

States and elsewhere in the use of the bombers. At the same time, 

Admiral Sharp accented again the military advantages of striking Laos 

directly from U-Tapao.60 

However, Ambassador Sullivan, after learning of the Thai government’s consent, recommended to Washington that Thai-based B-52s be 

allowed to hit Laotian targets only at night and if cover strikes in South 

Vietnam continued. The ambassador opposed overflights because of their 

“significant international dimension.” The Soviets, he said, had remonstrated to Souvanna Phouma regarding further B-52 violations of Laos’s 

neutrality, and the prime minister had assured them such flights were not 

taking place. Sullivan said another reason for his decision was Souvanna’s vexation about recent U.S. “loose talk” concerning combat 

operations in his country. State flashed its concurrence to Sullivan on 

September 1, meaning that the bombers would continue flying their 

circuitous route around Cambodia.61 

Meanwhile, new enemy pressure on northern South Vietnam induced 

Westmoreland and Sharp to ask for more ARC LIGHT B-52 sorties in the 

demilitarized zone area, preferably by the Thai-based bombers overflying 

Laos. Sullivan turned down the overflight request but was overruled by 

the White House three months later.62 

The resurgent enemy pressure on allied forces in northern South 

Vietnam was also a catalyst in Westmoreland’s strenuous effort (still 

unapproved by the JCS and higher authorities) to boost SAC B-52 

sorties from 800 to 1,200 a month. The administration’s concerns 

249 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

paralleled those raised in the 1966 debate leading to approval of 800 

sorties per month-the need for a substantially higher financial outlay 

for more bombers, KC-135 refueling, munitions, and base construction 

but, above all, B-52 effecti~eness.~~ 

The cost and B-52 effectiveness issues were debated interminably 

throughout the spring of 1967 at SEACOORD, at ARC LIGHT conferences in August and September, and in a mountain of dispatches among 

SAC, Seventh Air Force, MACV, PACOM, Vientiane, Bangkok, and 

Washington. In mid-October the joint chiefs solicited from SAC, 

PACOM, and MACV “more explicit data and information on results, 

factual analysis of the overall contribution . , . in meeting objectives, 

[and] benefits expected . . . from the 400 sortie rate increase.”64 

Supported by Nazzaro and Sharp, Westmoreland reemphasized the 

requirement for a 1,200 monthly sortie rate. The ARC LIGHT saturation 

bombings, he said, had been a “major factor” in arresting recent enemy 

thrusts into the demilitarized zone. With the onset of the dry season in 

Laos, allied forces were faced with a potential buildup of enemy troops 

and supplies in South Vietnam’s Kontum Province and enemy stockpiling 

near the Mu Gia Pass and other Laotian base areas. Westmoreland 

conceded that B-52 bomb damage assessment was hard to obtain. 

Nevertheless, the bombers recently killed in and near the demilitarized 

zone an estimated 3,665 enemy and, in conjunction with tactical Seventh 

Air Force and Marine strikes and ground artillery, inflicted 3,000 

additional enemy casualties. 

The MACV commander added that the B-52 strikes created many 

secondary explosions, and prisoner-of-war interrogations further attested 

to the bombers’ destructiveness and fearsome impact. He said there was 

adequate evidence that the bombers prevented communist troop massing 

for very long. Thus “there was every reason to believe . . . the B-52 has 

become and will continue to be a decisive weapon for destroying staging 

and logistic areas and disrupting plans for enemy concentrations.’’ 

Admiral Sharp endorsed the 1,200 monthly sortie rate for either surge or 

sustained operation^.^^ 

State Department analysts in contrast were far from convinced of 

the soundness of these judgments. They noted that earlier DIA and 

Defense system analysis studies showed the absence of a reliable data 

base for proving B-52 effectiveness. In Vientiane, Ambassador Sullivan 

had frequently expressed the view that B-52 strikes in Laos had been 

inefficient and ineffective, and preferred USAF tactical aircraft-props 

rather than jets-for striking enemy trucks and other targets. To justify 

this position, he obtained a study by Defense system analysts that 

generally supported his view.66 

250 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

Secretary McNamara, who had been following the issue closely, 

decided to support the air commanders. He asked the JCS and the Air 

Staff to examine the cost of 60- to 90-day B-52 “sortie surge” proposals. 

The joint chiefs’ final recommendation called for a surge capability of 

1,200 sorties a month for 60 rather than 90 days. This was accepted by 

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, who then proceeded to spell out how 

the capability would be achieved. On November 13, they jointly 

informed Leonard Unger, who had recently replaced Martin as ambassador to Thailand,’ to seek Thai concurrence to increase the SAC bomber 

force from 15 to 25 aircraft, and to permit the entry of more supporting 

KC-135 tankers and 1,000 USAF personnel. The enlarged fleet would 

supply 800 sorties monthly from U-Tapao. Guam-based bombers would 

satisfy additional sortie needs. Unger reported in late November that 

Thai authorities had acceded to the American request.67 

An implemental SAC-PACOM plan called for the 1,200 sorties a 

month to be attained by February 1, 1968, the expenditure of $10 million 

for air base and facilities expansion, the deployment of 5 more B-52s to 

U-Tapao by February 1 and the last 5 by June 1, 1968. The plan also 

provided for an earlier interim 1,200 sortie capability on 72 hours’ 

notice, employing some bombers based on Guam. There would be 

supplemental KC-135 tanker support from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 

and Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan.68 

The details for the 1,200 monthly sortie surge rate were hammered 

out in late 1967. At the same time, President Johnson and his chief 

advisers decided to rescind the ban on overflights of Laos by Thai-based 

B-52s. The rescission was effective at 2400 on December 5, 1967. 

Prompting this change in ARC LIGHT policy was the tremendous 

expansion in DRV truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, together 

with Westmoreland’s recent requests for urgent, fast-reacting ARC LIGHT 

and tactical strikes at Dak To and in the demilitarized zone. Also 

contributing to the president’s decision was a perceived lessening, as 

Ambassador Martin had noted, of public and diplomatic curiosity about 

Thai-based B-52s that had established a “pattern” of flying around 

Cambodia to South Vietnamese targets, and the rising U.S. budgetary 

problems created by the war. Simultaneously, the commander in chief 

authorized B-52 daylight strikes in Laos and canceled cover strikes in 

South Vietnam. The latter decision mirrored the observation that an 

average of three to five ARC LIGHT missions flown daily in South 

*Appointed to succeed Martin on August 11, Unger did not arrive in Bangkok until the 

beginning of October, presenting his official credentials to the Thai government on the 4th. 

25 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Vietnam would afford enough “cover.” However, the curb on public 

disclosure of B-52 operations in Laos would remain.69 

Ambassador Sullivan took umbrage over the bluntness of Washington’s instructions. After receiving McNamara’s and Rusk’s personal 

assurances there would be no public announcement on changes in ARC 

LIGHT missions, Sullivan met with Souvanna Phouma who assented to 

the American requests with several qualification^.^^ 

Briefly, the prime minister stipulated that all Thai-based B-52s 

should overfly Laos at high altitude using an air corridor between 

Savannakhet and Pakse (roughly 160 miles wide) and avoid passing over 

Saravane and other big towns. Large ARC LIGHT missions should be 

avoided in daytime (he was most concerned about daytime strikes). Since 

it would be difficult to characterize the B-52 missions as “reconnaissance 

activity,” Souvanna asked that they enter and leave Laos from the east 

(as Guam-based bombers were doing at pre~ent).~’ 

In conveying Souvanna’s views to Washington, Sullivan said he 

believed the prime minister’s concern about large daylight ARC LIGHT 

overflights of his country could be allayed by normal three-aircraft 

missions. The ambassador foresaw no major problem in requiring 

Thai-based bombers on daylight strike missions to enter Laos from the 

east. This would add but one hour to a normal two-hour mission directly 

from U-Tapao. In any event, the B-52s were seldom fragged for an 

immediate attack on fleeting targets.72 

With bombing secrecy and Laos’s sovereignty intertwined in an 

expanding air and air-ground war, Sullivan narrowly interpreted Souvanna Phouma’s requests in drafting B-52 operation orders. He passed 

his instructions through Colonel Pettigrew, his air attachk, to PACOM, 

SAC, and MACV commanders. Bombers would be restricted to a 20- 

rather than a 160-mile-wide air corridor and required to maintain no less 

than a 30,000-foot altitude, minimize their contrails, schedule only a few 

planes on each mission, and vary their flightpaths. Finally, each 

overflight mission had to be cleared by the emba~sy.’~ 

Finding Sullivan’s instructions unworkable, the Strategic Air Command postponed the first overflight launch from Thailand set for 

December 5. General Nazzaro, SAC Commander in Chief, declared the 

guidelines “so restrictive as to negate much of the advantage [to be] 

gained by overflight.” The twenty-mile-wide ARC LIGHT corridor, he 

said, was too narrow. 

Representatives of SAC, 3d Air Division, Military Assistance Command, Thailand, Pacific Command, Vientiane’s air attache office, and 

others quickly convened in Bangkok to seek a solution. The conferees 

proposed and Sullivan promptly agreed to a sixty-mile-wide flight 

corridor. In addition, SAC desired “north gate” and “south gate” air 

252 
AUGURIES OF EVENTUAL VICTORY 

corridors. The former would assure more effective bombing of the Mu 

Gia Pass area, and the latter (south of Pakse) would facilitate the return 

of bombers to Thailand. The two corridors were likewise needed, said 

SAC, to handle sudden requests for bombers to hit other than preselected target areas.74 

Sullivan disapproved SAC’S request. Secrecy in using a southern air 

gate between Pakse and the Cambodian border, he warned, could be 

readily breached by Cambodian monitoring with Soviet-supplied radars. 

Nor was the Cambodian government likely to hesitate in informing the 

International Control Commission that the United States was making 

illegal use of Laotian air space. Furthermore, new air gates required 

Souvanna Phouma’s approval. The ambassador reminded air commanders of the prime minister’s request to confine the bomber air corridor to 

the region between Savannakhet and Pakse and believed the United 

States should adhere to this arrangement. He asked the commanders to 

launch the overflight missions under the approved guidelines for a 

month. Then if serious operational problems existed, he would solicit 

Souvanna’s approval for a second air corridor between Thakhet and 

Paksane. 75 

In Bangkok, Ambassador Unger quickly obtained Thai government 

assent to B-52 overflights of Laos using a sixty-mile-wide air corridor. 

He then advised Admiral Sharp and Generals Nazzaro and Westmoreland to avoid air corridor deviations without Thai concurrence, respect 

Cambodian air space, and assure that ARC LIGHT missions would not be 

detected over Laos by anyone, including personnel aboard commercial 

aircraft. Adhering to these injunctions, the first Thai-based B-52s on 

December 30 flew to their Laotian and South Vietnamese targets.76 

The Laotian overflight authorization came none too soon. In the 

ensuing weeks, commanders would call on the ARC LIGHT bombers for 

an all-out interdiction effort in defense of the U.S. Marine base at Khe 

Sanh and to blunt the enemy’s Tet offensive that began on January 30, 

1968. 

253 

Chapter IX 

Inauguration of the Sensor-Oriented 

Anti-Infiltration System 

(IGLOO WHITE) 

In late 1967 and early 1968, air and air-ground anti-infiltration 

operations were augmented by a sensor oriented program known as 

IGLOO WHITE.* The Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the 

program, with the Air Force playing a key role in its development. 

IGLOO WHITE evolved from earlier mobile troop and physical barrier 

concepts for blocking the entry of North Vietnamese manpower and 

supplies into South Vietnam. 

Soon after his appointment in June 1961 as military representative to 

President Kennedy, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor considered establishing 

some type of barrier against North Vietnamese infiltration. In October he 

went to Saigon on a special presidential mission to study President 

Diem’s military and political problems. While there, he asked Brig. Gen. 

Edward G. Lansdale, a mission member, to look into the possibility of 

erecting a physical “fence” in South Vietnam. Lansdale subsequently 

recommended in lieu of a fence the formation of special mobile units for 

deterring and attacking enemy infiltrators. 

Taylor concurred in the need for a mobile concept. His Saigon trip 

report to the president in November 1961 urged among other things that 

a special South Vietnamese “frontier ranger force” be formed to patrol 

the difficult terrain along the Laos-South Vietnamese border. The force 

‘IGLOO WWHITE was the last and best known code name of the program, which on its 

inception in September 1966 was called PRACTICE NINE. On June 14, 1967, the code name 

was changed to ILLINOIS CITY and on July 15, 1967, the program was renamed DYEMARKER. 

On September 8, 1967, after the project was divided into two major components, 

DYEMARKER signified that part of the barrier being built in South Vietnam’s Quang Tri 

Province (a strongpoint obstacle system or SPOS), and a new code name, MUSCLE SHOALS, 

was assigned to an air-supported antivehicular and antipersonnel system planned for 

southern Laos. MUSCLE SHOALS was renamed IGLOO WHITE in June 1968. The DYEMARKER 

part of the project was abandoned in late 1968. [Col Jesse C. Gatlin, Igloo White (Initial 

Phase) (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1968).] 

255 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

would attack Viet Cong lines of communication and communists 

infiltrating the high plateau and adjacent areas. In the ensuing months, 

the United States helped the South Vietnamese establish special bordercontrol units, but they quickly proved quite ineffective.*2 

As South Vietnam’s infiltration problem worsened, studies on 

barrier control continued. In 1964 a RAND study for the Defense 

Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) outlined a 

physical and a sieve barrier concept. The physical barrier would comprise 

fences, walls, mines, moats, closely spaced patrols, and possibly biological and chemical deterrents to enemy infiltration. The sieve barrier 

would consist of small patrols reconnoitering randomly selected areas 

near South Vietnam’s borders but away from fixed outposts, strongpoints, or patrol bases. MACV approved of the ARPA-requested study 

and the way in which it appeared, from the Army’s perspective, to 

underscore an “inescapable fact.” That is, a properly manned and 

equipped physical barrier “is the only positive means of halting 

infiltration in RVN.” MACV recognized, however, a second inescapable 

fact-a physical barrier would be very expensive to build and to man.3 

Neither the restricted ROLLING THUNDER air campaign against 

North Vietnam (begun in March 1965) nor the slowly expanding air and 

air-ground anti-infiltration programs in Laos appeared to reduce DRV 

infiltration significantly. Consequently, the barrier concept continued to 

elicit high-level Defense Department interest. A catalyst was a memorandum prepared in January 1966 by Harvard Professor Roger D. Fisher, 

part-time consultant to McNamara and John T. McNaughton, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Concluding that 

neither present nor future bombing levels in the North were likely to 

break Hanoi’s will, Fisher suggested building a combined physical and 

air-supported barrier system. It would be made up of barbed wire, 

mines, chemicals, and air-delivered ordnance. t4 

Fisher’s timely memorandum reached McNamara when the administration was under constant attack by congressional and public critics 

who believed the existing strategy was prolonging the war. There were 

demands to step up the ROLLING THUNDER program, an act the 

administration feared might trigger a larger conflict. Fisher’s antiinfiltration barrier concept held out an alternative to heavier bombing of 

the North. About February 1, the Defense secretary asked Gen. Harold 

‘See Chapter I. 

+For a more detailed discussion of the Fisher memo, Secretary McNamara’s reaction to 

it, and the subsequent decision to proceed with a barrier program, see Paul Dickson, The 

Electronic Battlefield (Bloomington, Ind., 1976). 

256 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

K. Johnson (then Army Chief of Staff) for a more detailed review of 

Fisher’s ~oncept.~ 

As a result, Army planners quickly assembled a 12-page talking 

paper, and in March Johnson sent it to McNamara, the JCS, and 

CINCPAC. In brief the paper called for 5 Army divisions to clear and 

construct a 216-mile-long and 500-yard-wide barrier along South Vietnam’s border with Laos. The barrier would have a concertina wire fence, 

1,800 searchlights, 72,000 floodlights, and 10,000,000 mines. Clearing the 

ground would take 6 months, constructing the barrier another 12.6 

When asked for their views, the joint chiefs and Southeast Asia 

commanders strongly opposed the barrier concept. The Air Staff believed 

it smacked of “Maginot Line” thinking, noting that the requirement for 

five Army divisions would place more troops in South Vietnam than 

were presently there. General Harris declared the barrier would allow the 

enemy to attack it at any point, leaving many American forces in a 

permanent defensive posture. Further, the concept would drain away 

resources from current military operations in South Vietnam. Admiral 

Sharp and the PACFLT commander likewise opposed the barrier because 

of its enormous logistic needs. Only Gen. John K. Waters, USARPAC 

Commander, and General Westmoreland evinced interest to the extent a 

barrier system would give the Army more ground troops, although they 

too underscored the large logistic demands. The MACV commander said 

he preferred to block infiltration through Laos using conventional 

ground forces, and Waters cited two USARPAC plans (RAIN FALL and 

SEA FREE) for sending several thousands of American and allied troops 

into southern Laos from South Vietnam and Thailand.’ 

General Wheeler on April 18 furnished McNamara a Joint Staff 

report on the Army’s barrier paper, appending his view that the Army’s 

estimates of resources requirements and time needed to construct a 

barrier were overly optimistic. It would take 6 to 7 Army divisions-not 

5-to clear and secure terrain for a barrier, and the project would take 

24 to 48 months rather than 6 to 12 months to complete. The logistic 

needs would be considerable: new port facilities at Da Nang and other 

landing areas in South Vietnam and eastern Thailand, new roads and 

bases, and at least 206,000 tons of construction materials. While the 

barrier was under construction, American forces might stop large-scale 

infiltration but not small enemy penetrations. In fact the enemy was 

likely to resort to more resupply by sea and Cambodian routes. Diversion 

of American forces to the barrier project would conceivably enable the 

communists to overrun most of South Vietnam before the barrier was 

finished. 

In light of these findings, the Joint Staff recommended and the JCS 

agreed that the barrier concept should not be adopted, observing that all 

257 
INTERDlCTlON IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Southeast Asia air and ground commanders concurred in this conclusion. 

Wheeler said present and future American forces in South Vietnam could 

be more usefully employed in accordance with previous JCS recommendations calling for more intensive bombing of North Vietnam.8 

Despite the negative views of Wheeler, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

Southeast Asia commanders, McNamara and additional high civilian 

officials retained a high interest in a possible anti-infiltration barrier. 

McNaughton revised Professor Fisher’s barrier concept, and State 

Department officials, with an abiding concern for ending the war, viewed 

the project favorably if it could isolate enemy areas and certain 

infiltration routes. State’s “deep interest” led General McConnell to ask 

Generals Harris and Nazzaro, the PACAF and SAC commanders, to 

study the value of an “aerial blockade” that would increase enemy 

harassment and casualties and reduce or stop infiltration.’ 

Meanwhile, the Defense secretary turned to four distinguished 

government scientific advisers: Drs. George B. Kistiakowsky and Carl 

Kaysen of Harvard, and Jerome B. Wiesner and Jerrold R. Zacharias of 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He asked these scholars to 

form a study group to find ways to enhance technology in the Vietnam 

War. In a memo to McNaughton on April 26, McNamara requested the 

group to consider the feasibility of erecting a fence across the infiltration 

trails and the use of improved warning systems, reconnaissance methods 

(especially at night), night-vision devices, defoliation techniques, and 

area-denial weapons.” 

The administrative arrangements resulted in a contract with the 

Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA), whose JASON division would 

coordinate the studies. A group of forty-seven scientists was soon 

recruited. They and twenty technologically qualified IDA personnel 

convened in Wellesley, Massachusetts, on June 13, 1966, to begin ten 

days of high-level briefings by Defense, State, Central Intelligence 

Agency, and White House officials. Thereafter, the personnel broke into 

four JASON division subgroups to study the intelligence data base in 

estimating the flow of DRV men and supplies into South Vietnam, the 

VC/NVA’s communications and command and control system, bomb 

damage assessment procedures, and a possible barrier to halt enemy 

infiltration from north to south.” 

Working rapidly, the four subgroups submitted four studies on 

August 30. One on the bombing impact on North Vietnam and Laos 

concluded that the bombing had “no measurable direct effect on Hanoi’s 

ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the 

current level.” This was because North Vietnam possessed an agricultural, subsistence economy with few rewarding targets, received most of 

its military supplies from the Soviet Union and China, used a large, 

258 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

flexible transportation network for moving a relatively low volume of 

supplies, and employed very effective bombing countermeasures. The 

countermeasures consisted of moving mostly at night, taking advantage 

of terrain and weather, and organizing large road- and trail-construction 

and repair teams and defense units. Expanding the bombing program 

would make it more difficult and costly for Hanoi to move supplies to 

the VC/NVA in South Vietnam, but would not seriously impair its 

ability to do so. Nor would heavier bombing seriously curtail Hanoi’s 

expansion of recruitment and training of military forces for the insurgency in the South.12 

The most important subgroup study dealt with a barrier concept that 

would use existing technology and rely heavily on air power to slow or 

halt infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. The concept 

had two main components-antipersonnel and antivehicular. Both would 

depend chiefly on detection devices, denial ordnance, and aircraft. The 

antipersonnel component would include a fence in the mountainous area 

just south of the demilitarized zone. It would start fifteen miles from 

South Vietnam’s coast and push thirty miles west into Laos, denying the 

DRV two key personnel infiltration routes. The flatlands farther east 

would be blocked by U.S. and South Vietnamese ground troops. 

The second or road-denial part of the system would be contiguous to 

the first but stretch 80 miles north and south along the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail, covering roughly the CRICKET geographical sector containing main 

truck routes. There would be 2 basic components. One would be 

composed of several types of “gravel” mines (some already in production) that would explode on contact. Manufactured to last 30 days, about 

13,000,000 gravel mines monthly would be sown along roads and trails to 

deny their use to the enemy. Minesowing would require 45 A-1E 

Skyraider aircraft flying 1,400 sorties per month. The second component 

would embody battery-run sensors, initially to be modified Navy acoustic 

sonobuoys. Some sensors would be activated by personnel stepping on or 

vehicles rolling over small, noise-making gravel mines (popularly called 

button bomblets). The “pistol shot” noise from a bomblet would be 

relayed by sensors to monitoring personnel aboard aircraft. They would 

note the sensor’s signals, and hence the enemy’s presence. 

An estimated 62 Navy P-2 aircraft would be needed to dispense and 

ensure that at any one time there were about 800 active sensors lying 

along roads and trails or hanging in jungle growth. Only a few planes, 

however, would be required to drop about 25,000,000 button bomblets a 

month. Approximately 8 specially equipped aircraft would alternately 

orbit above the sensor field and monitor sensor signals. Upon receiving 

the signals, which could travel up to 30 miles depending on terrain, 

monitoring personnel aboard the aircraft would determine the sensor’s 

259 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

(and the enemy’s) location. They would then direct strike aircraft to the 

target area for attacks with BLU-43 bomblets.* An Air Force F-4C 

squadron would drop nearly 10,000 BLU-43s monthly on an enemy 

believed to be moving close to 7,000 infiltrators a month and 180 tons of 

supplies a day largely through Laos toward South Vietnam. 

Another element of the aerial barrier system demanded more 

high-resolution aerial photography of targeted areas and ten to forty 

well-trained photo interpreters to detect new roads and trails. Current 

aerial photography, the authors observed, needed a very intensive 

photographic and photo-interpretative effort to uncover fresh roads and 

trails in the jungle terrain. 

One year after an official go-ahead, the basic concept could begin 

operating at a cost of $800 million excluding aircraft. The authors 

nonetheless cited uncertainties and problems, some quite troubling. One 

was the fence concept and its manning. The fence should be designed to 

require a minimum of manpower. A second was the need for better 

hardware to accurately pinpoint sensor locations. A third was the DRV’s 

potential for taking countermeasures. Among them were minesweeping, 

sensor spoofing to lure pilots into heavily defended areas, concealing 

roads and trails with more jungle canopies, and digging additional 

foxholes for personnel. These countermeasures would take time, and it 

was possible U.S. personnel could in turn nullify them. A fourth concern 

was that modified gravel mines might accidentally develop a life far in 

excess of thirty days. This could leave more than 1,000 square miles of 

mountainous area unsafe for inhabitants for an indefinite period. 

More fundamental, perhaps, was the need to defend the concept 

before the services who were basically opposed to a defensive barrier 

strategy. To meet this challenge, an expanded planning and experimental 

effort appeared in order. The authors recommended establishing a special 

task force, and they volunteered to join it. The task force would work 

out further details of the barrier concept and consider, for example, the 

need for more technical components, the lead time for developing them, 

and the possible use of additional ground troops. 

Annexes to the barrier study spelled out in greater detail the 

requirements for research and development, sensors, munitions, air 

delivery, and other items. The authors urged a sharp step-up in 

intelligence collection to learn more about the DRV’s infiltration system, 

especially in the areas tentatively earmarked for the air-supported barrier 

*A limited number of bomblets modified for antitruck operations were produced. They 

contained sharp tooth-shaped pellets and were nicknamed DRAGONTOOTH. Hence the 

reference to DRAGONTOOTH bomblets in the ensuing pages. 

260 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

program. They recommended expansion of roadwatch team operations 

along motorable roads, and ground patrolling and air reconnaissance of 

enemy activity south of the intended antipersonnel barrier. And they 

suggested how to organize a task force for managing the barrier 

project. l3 

Secretary McNamara, whose interest in some type of anti-infiltration 

barrier never flagged, wasted no time in getting the project under way. 

On September 3 he sent the barrier concept, although not in its entirety, 

to the JCS for review. Prejudging the concept, he told them the proposal 

had “sufficient merit to warrant a decision that we will accept the plan 

or some modification thereof in principle and install it at the earliest 

practical date.” The joint chiefs, after soliciting the views of Admiral 

Sharp, General Harris, and other commanders in the field, informed the 

Defense secretary that they would accept the barrier concept only if it did 

not compete with current demands for money, manpower, and 

materiel.I4 

General Westmoreland was relatively supportive of the project, 

Admiral Sharp less so. But both agreed the concept warranted considerably more study. The response of two component commanders, General 

Harris of PACAF and General Waters of USARPAC, underscored 

sharply the contrasting service views on the infiltration problem and how 

to deal with it. Very unenthusiastic about the barrier concept, Harris 

believed enemy vehicles should be destroyed as far from South Vietnam 

as possible. He considered air delivery of mines the most feasible way of 

denying areas to the enemy. Current plans to establish and maintain an 

infiltration barrier, he added, were limited by insufficient munitions and 

sensors, and by inadequate delivery systems and operational experience. 

Some munitions (BLU-3s and BLU-43s) and sensors would not be 

available in quantity until late 1967 or early 1968. Lastly, Harris 

suggested the use of chemical, biological, and defoliation agents in 

developing the barrier. l5 

In contrast, General Waters questioned the feasibility of the barrier 

concept without the use of many ground troops. He believed that the 

enemy’s supply losses near the end of his lines of communication would 

hurt him more than losses sustained before supplies got there. Stopping 

truck traffic was no solution because many supplies were transported by 

bicycles, carts, and man and animal packs.” Moreover, sensors and 

‘General Waters grossly overestimated the quantity of supplies that could be brought 

into South Vietnam by bicycles, carts, and man and animal packs. He also underestimated 

the indispensability of truck-hauled supplies. Without the latter, the VC/NVA could never 

have sustained their military operations in South Vietnam and in early 1968 the siege of 

Khe Sanh and the Tet offensive. See Chapter V. 

26 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

area-denial weapons in all likelihood could never be delivered accurately. 

In fact, Waters favored reducing the anti-infiltration measures in Laos, 

“since stopping the flow of men and supplies from the North was not 

essential to victory.”16 

As noted, McNamara’s solicitation of the JCS’s views on the 

barrier’s feasibility, based on replies from Southeast Asia commanders, 

was just a formality. For the Defense secretary in early September had 

decided to proceed with the project and appoint Army Lt. Gen. Alfred 

D. Starbird to head a task force to expedite the barrier’s implementation. 

A majority of the joint chiefs supported Starbird’s appointment, but 

General McConnell recommended Air Force Lt. Gen. Marvin L. McNickle, Deputy Director of Administration, Evaluation, and Management, Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), if the 

task force was established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

If not, he recommended Air Force Lt. Gen. Waymond A. Davis, Vice 

Commander of the Air Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force 

Base. All of the services wanted the project administered by DDR&E.” 

At bottom, the joint chiefs harbored deep reservations about the 

barrier, and worried over its substantial cost and the probable diversion 

of resources from current military programs. But aware that McNamara 

was determined to go ahead with the project, they informed him that the 

“first order of business” was to obtain a clearer definition of the barrier 

concept. 

Moving swiftly, McNamara on September 15, 1966, appointed 

General Starbird Director of Joint Task Force (JTF) 728 and instructed 

him to design, produce, and make operable by September 15, 1967, the 

air-supported anti-infiltration barrier system. Again overriding service 

recommendations, the Defense secretary placed Starbird and his organization outside of the military services with authority to report directly to 

himself or to Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., head of Defense Research and 

Engineering. The JTF 728 director could communicate directly as 

necessary with the joint chiefs and each of the military services and their 

subordinate commands and units. This arrangement in effect made 

Starbird the czar of the project. Proper functioning of the antiinfiltration system, said McNamara, required 

experimentation and further development of such features as foliage penetration, 

moisture resistance, and proper dispersion of gravel; development of a better 

acoustic sensor than currently exists; aircraft modifications; possible modifications 

in BLU-26B fusing; refinement of strike-navigation tactics; and total system tests. 

Production of components will have to be increased, personnel will have to be 

trained, and doctrine for its operation will have to be developed. Communist 

infiltration practices and the location of civilian populations will have to be 

262 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

studied. Political groundwork will have to be laid. Public relations questions will 

have to be addressed. Furthermore, to keep ahead of counter-measures, new 

components of the system and new tactics will have to be under development even 

before the first general system is installed. 

As the system would be of political interest, Starbird was further 

enjoined to keep Mr. McNaughton and the State Department up to date 

on the system’s development and to make use of an advisory group of 

nongovernmental experts. Finally, the JTF 728 director was instructed to 

set up a project office and submit by September 29 a program outline of 

how he intended to carry out his task.” 

McNamara’s directive to Starbird failed to reassure the services. The 

joint chiefs considered the directive’s guidelines for Starbird satisfactory, 

but urged that the project’s “definition,” when firmed up by the new 

JTF 728 commander, pass through the JCS. They expressed hope that 

the system would not become a substitute for present military operations 

in South and North Vietnam nor divert critically short munitions. The 

date of September 15, 1967, for inaugurating the system appeared overly 

optimistic.20 

The Air Force still doubted that the system would work. Gen. Bruce 

K. Holloway, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, found nothing but pitfalls 

when asked by Secretary Brown for comments on the system’s concept as 

developed thus far. He warned Brown on September 26 that the system 

might not be effective even if built as a “MANHATTAN PROJECT.”* 

Furthermore, it jeopardized existing high-priority air and other programs; the jungle canopy would prevent distinguishing between humans 

and animals; the seeding of millions of nonsterilized mines could 

eventually cause political trouble with the Laotian and South Vietnamese 

governments; and the research and development timetable probably could 

not be met. However, if the administration was determined to proceed 

with the system which required considerable USAF support, it should be 

headed by an Air Force generaL2’ 

General Holloway’s views made no discernible impression on McNamara or on JTF 728 planning. Starbird remained chief of the new 

agency. Seeing that the barrier program was an accomplished fact, 

McConnell arranged for Air Force support. He appointed Maj. Gen. 

Woodrow P. Swancutt, Director of Operations, as the USAF focal point 

for all JTF 728 matters. Swancutt in turn assigned day-to-day responsibility to his deputy, Maj. Gen. George B. Simler.22 

‘The code name for America’s top-priority effort to produce the atomic bomb in 

World War 11. 

263 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Meanwhile, General Starbird had swung into action. On September 

19 he created a project office. The office’s unclassified code name was 

PRACTICE NINE, the classified name, Defense Communications Planning 

Group (DCPG). On the 29th, he defined his initial manpower needs and 

the barrier’s subsystems. He asked for and McNamara quickly approved 

170 personnel for his JTF 728, already established on the grounds of the 

U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C. The subsystems would 

require several types of mines and other ordnance, a physical barrier, 

surveillance and navigation hardware, aircraft, and command and 

control systems. A few days later, Starbird determined he would need at 

least 2 squadrons of Air Force F-4Cs for a strike force. He also directed 

the Air Force and Army to conduct drop and safety tests of several types 

of gravel and DRAGONTOOTH mines. The tests were to take place in the 

Panama Canal Zone as soon as possible.23 

Next, Starbird flew to Saigon to discuss the barrier system with 

Westmoreland and his staff. From October 10 to 14, he was joined by 

McNamara, and both received comprehensive MACV briefings on the 

war and discussed the barrier concept further. The MACV commander 

proposed during the briefings that a conventional physical barrier be 

constructed all the way across South Vietnam below the demilitarized 

zone, augmented in Laos by air-delivered sensors and munitions. 

McNamara agreed to study such an anti- infiltration system further. The 

concept assumed that additional American forces, above those currently 

requested by MACV, would be furnished for barrier construction and 

manning.24 

After returning to Washington, Starbird took other preparatory 

actions. He asked for and McNamara approved an initial production of 

10,000,000 gravel mines a month (with a life of 30 to 60 days) for the 

antipersonnel facet of the barrier system, and 3,500,000 DRAGONTOOTH 

mines a month for the antivehicular facet.25 

On November 21, Westmoreland sent Washington an outline of his 

ground barrier concept, indicating he believed it was the only way to 

reduce or halt infiltration. “I have never supported the . . . air barrier 

concept in Laos,” he said, “but rather the selective use of special 

munitions as they became available, to augment existing interdiction 

programs.” He said his concept required considerably more manpower, 

no rigid completion date, and operational flexibility to use available 

military resources in pursuit of the overall mission.26 

However, McNamara preferred a less ambitious ground and air 

barrier concept. He reported to President Johnson on November 14 that 

the physical portion of the barrier would stretch from the South China 

Sea westward only nineteen miles over a relatively flat area. The sector 

would contain fences, wires, mines, and sensors, and be supported by 

264 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

aircraft, artillery, and mobile troops. Immediately westward would be an 

intermittent ground barrier blocking ravines or defiles through which 

DRV men and supplies were normally forced to move by the terrain. 

Farther west and extending into Laos would be an air barrier. Still under 

review, the air barrier might be created by stepping up current air 

anti-infiltration operations, by adopting a new USAF COMBAT BEAVER 

concept that envisaged continuous bombing of several important chokepoints or sectors, or by another air program to prevent the transit of 

enemy trucks, men, and supplies.” 

The COMBAT BEAVER concept to which the Defense secretary 

alluded had been hastily developed in October by the Air Staff at the 

direction of General McConnell. Its aim was to forestall an overinvestment of USAF and other military resources in the unwanted barrier 

project, drawing on lessons learned in the STEEL TIGER program in Laos 

and the GATE GUARD and TALLY Ho programs in Route Package I in 

southern North Vietnam. COMBAT BEAVER would rely on Air Force 

tactical and B-52 aircraft as well as naval air and gunfire (the latter, 

obviously, only on coastal targets) to interdict key infiltration points 

traversing southern North Vietnam and parts of Laos. Concentrated air 

power would create a series of “belts” following natural geographic and 

lines of communication features from the demilitarized zone to a line 

running southwesterly from Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam through 

Barthelemy Pass to a point east of Xiengkhouang in Laos.* SAC’S B-52s 

would play a significant role by saturation bombing of enemy routes at 

Mu Gia, Nape, and Barthelemy Passes along the Laotian border. The 

bombers, for example, would orbit above the passes and drop six bombs 

every thirteen minutes over a twenty-four-hour period. 

McConnell said COMBAT BEAVER could be launched at once and 

eventually complement the ground barrier system scheduled for construction just below the demilitarized zone.28 

The COMBAT BEAVER concept was short lived. After an initial Joint 

Staff study, the concept was reviewed in late November 1966 by Admiral 

Sharp and his staff who rejected it. Sharp asserted that with some 

exceptions it was similar to current air programs, overstressed the 

importance of air strikes in Route Packages 11, 111, and IV in southern 

North Vietnam, threatened to increase aircraft losses, and would disrupt 

the current “well-balanced” air effort. Still hoping to win Sharp’s 

approval, the Air Staff reworked COMBAT BEAVER into an integrated 

*The brief GATE GUARD program of the spring of 1966 was based on a similar concept 

and envisaged creating interdiction “gates” to block enemy traffic at strategic points. See 

Chapter IV. 

265 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

strike and interdiction plan. Although the plan was never officially 

adopted, many of its salient features were ultimately accepted by the JCS 

and CINCPAC and put into effect.29 

At the same time, communications between the Defense Communications Planning Group and the services suggested that the barrier’s 

needs for manpower, air, and other resources would soar far beyond first 

estimates. This was manifested in mid-November when Starbird sent 

McNamara his initial program definition plan (PDP) that projected a 

requirement for 45,641 personnel solely for MACV’s ground barrier in 

South Vietnam, nearly 44,000 more than postulated in Defense’s current 

Program 4 deployment plan.’ Shortly afterwards, the USAF air contribution was estimated at 54 F-~s, 34 A-lEs, 21 EC-l2ls, 25 0-2s, 15 0-ls, 

6 UC-l23s, and 12 CH-3 helicopters. The barrier’s price tag was well 

over a billion dollars compared with the JASON division’s August 

estimate of $800 million.30 

The joint chiefs were deeply distressed. “It is clear,” they said, 

“from examination of the PDP, that the barrier program, because of the 

prescribed installation date [of September 15, 19671 is proceeding toward 

execution without adequate and timely determination of feasibility.” 

They voiced special concern over the schedules for tests, evaluations, 

follow-on production, and costs of such sub-system components as the 

acoubuoy sensor, button bomblets and dispensers, gravel and DRAGONTOOTH mines, the sensor monitoring system, and modification of 

EC-121 aircraft. 

JTF 728, they said, optimistically assumed that all research and 

development would adhere to schedules and failed to provide for 

redesign and retesting of components. In view of the uncertainties of the 

technical and operational facets of the plan, the likely diversion of 

resources from existing anti-infiltration programs, and the specter of 

more inflation in South Vietnam’s economy from the influx of additional 

Americans into the country, the joint chiefs recommended against going 

ahead with Starbird’s program definition plan. Instead, they urged 

modifying and expanding current anti-infiltration program^.^' 

McNamara again ignored the joint chiefs’ opinions. General Starbird 

went on revising his plan and on December 22 sent it to the Defense 

secretary and the JCS with lower manpower and other requirements. On 

January 7, 1967, the JCS asked CINCPAC to use Starbird’s guidelines in 

writing two implementation plans. One would be for a strongpoint 

‘Since late 1965, Defense issued periodically a series of numbered deployment plans in 

order to monitor and assure tight control over the number of U.S. military men needed for 

the war. 

266 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

obstacle system in South Vietnam’s Quang Tri Province, the other for an 

air-supported anti-infiltation system in Laos. CINCPAC redelegated the 

task to Westmoreland and his staff, who forwarded the plans in late 

January and March 1967 re~pectively.~~ 

In Washington, McNamara and Starbird were jointly urging and 

taking various measures to speed up the development of the barrier 

systems. At their request, President Johnson on January 13, 1967, 

assigned the highest national priority (signified by a DX symbol) to the 

projects to assure their development and completion by the services at 

the earliest possible date. A week later, the president assigned a DX 

priority to the development and production of gravel and DRAGONTOOTH 

mines, both slated to become vital components of the dual system.33 

The Air Force was already busily engaged in its barrier responsibilities. In November 1966, the Tactical Division of the Directorate of 

Operations, USAF, began work on a design and operational concept for 

a command and control facility to manage the air-supported barrier 

sector. (This facility was soon renamed infiltration surveillance center.) 

The Tactical Division published a design concept on December 5 and 

directed Tactical Air Command and Air Force Systems Command to 

build a mockup for checking out the facility. The original mockup, 

constructed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and operated by the 

Tactical Air Warfare Center, functioned only manually. A larger facility, 

configured for both manual and automatic operations, was later built 

inside a hangar at Eglin and training began.34 

The development of suitable sensors, using existing technology, was 

carried out under the aegis of General Starbird’s Defense Communications Planning Group. In August 1966 the JASON division analysts of 

the Institute of Defense Analyses had recommended making an acoustic 

sensor from a modified Navy acoubuoy. This was done. A microphone 

replaced a sonar device, and a longer-life battery was added. The sensor 

could be parachuted into and left hanging in jungle canopy or implanted 

in the ground with a telescoping spike. Finally, after a spike canister was 

introduced, the sensor was called a spikebuoy. The earliest acoubuoys 

had three detection modes-a C mode using line spectrum detection to 

determine the presence of enemy vehicles, an I mode that could be 

activated by detonations of small aspirin-size mines called button 

bomblets to locate personnel, and a B mode that combined the 

characteristics of the first 2 modes. The early-model acoubuoys, which 

could operate on continuous real-time mode of 40 activations per hour, 

contained batteries with a maximum life of 30 days. The I-mode 

acoubuoy could detect personnel up to 438 yards, and the C-mode 

acoubuoy could detect vehicles at distances up to 1,094 yards.35 

267 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

The initial seismic sensor that could also be dispensed from an 

aircraft was called an air-delivered seismic intrusion detector (ADSID). It 

could sense the vertical earth motion by an internal geophone. The 

geophone processed motion through its circuits and determined whether 

the object was a man or vehicle. The ADSID could detect personnel 

within 33 yards and vehicles at 109 yards, depending on the desired 

activation rate. A helicopter-delivered seismic intrusion detector 

(HELOSID) was almost identical to an ADSID except that it was 

designed to launch from a special pod attached to a USAF CH-3 Jolly 

Green Giant. The HELOSID had a battery life of up to 60 days.36 

The sensors were given frequency channels ranging upward from 

162.5 megahertz (MHz) or 173.5 MHz on the very high frequency band. 

Thirty-one channels were assigned to each type of sensor with a 375-MHz 

separation between each channel. Every channel contained 27 identification codes or addresses which could be set in the field prior to sensor 

emplacement. Thus a total of 837 individual sensors (27 x 31) could be 

deployed at any one time without duplication in a single operational 

zone. After the sensors began to be used, different channel numbers were 

assigned to each type of sensor. Acoubuoys, for example, would have 11 

channels, ADSIDs, 12, and HELOSIDs, 4.37 

Field testing was the responsibility of Air Force Systems Command. 

By the beginning of 1967, that command was conducting occasional 

sensor airdrop tests in the Panama Canal Zone, where jungle conditions 

were somewhat similar to those in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the 

Navy and Air Force were readying units in accordance with McNamara’s 

instructions. The Navy was forming a detachment of Lockheed P-2s 

(redesignated OP-2Es upon modification) to sow sensors along designated infiltration routes in Laos. The Air Force was preparing a Lockheed 

EC-121 unit to monitor the sensors’ signals.38 

The ensuing weeks witnessed more preparations for the barrier 

system. On January 26, in response to a JCS request, Westmoreland 

submitted another linear barrier plan, calling for a minimum of 7,691 

personnel, 5,731 of them ground troops for construction work. He 

introduced helicopter and ground team requirements for emplacing 

sensors and munitions. The initial operational capability (IOC) date was 

slipped from September 15 to November 1, 1967. Several weeks later, 

additional studies boosted the manpower requirements total to 8,353.39 

All the joint chiefs but General Wheeler basically opposed the linear 

barrier plan, citing the spiraling costs in manpower and money. 

Undeterred by the majority JCS view, McNamara directed the Defense 

Communications Planning Group to start procuring materials for the 

strongpoints, base camps, and observation posts for one sector of the 

barrier. He also authorized the services to begin road improvement and 

268 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

port expansion to handle the anticipated large influx of barrier 

material .40 

On March 11, Westmoreland sent to CINCPAC and Washington a 

separate air-supported anti-infiltration plan that would be located largely 

in Laos. The Air Force would provide most of the manpower and 

aircraft. Personnel requirements totaled 5,444, with the Air Force 

assigned 4,319, the Army 794, and the Navy 331. Supporting aircraft 

would include 21 or more Lockheed EC-121s for receiving signals from 

sensors sown along roads and trails and relaying them to an analysis 

center, a squadron of A-1E Skyraiders for air-dropping gravel mines, a 

squadron of F-4 Phantoms (it eventually replaced the Skyraiders for 

dispensing gravel and other ordnance), and about two dozen Air Force 

CH-3E and several Army UH-1B helicopters for sensor sowing and 

logistic support. The Navy would furnish about 8 Lockheed OP-2Es for 

the initial dropping of acoustic and seismic sensors. 

To enhance aircraft navigation and control, the Air Force would 

enlarge the MSQ-77 radar facility at Nakhon Phanom and equip some of 

this aircraft with the latest C and D types of Loran receivers. The 

infiltration surveillance center, undergoing mockup and tests at Eglin Air 

Force Base, would be set up at Nakhon Phanom. The center would 

receive sensor signals on enemy movements from orbiting EC-121s. It 

would decode, evaluate, and integrate the data with other intelligence, 

then request air strikes. The plan envisaged close coordination with the 

BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, and TIGER HOUND air programs in Laos. 

These programs relied heavily on USAF RF-101s and RF-4s for 

photography, 0-1s and 0-2s for visual reconnaissance, UC-123s for 

defoliation of jungle growth along roads and trails, and Army OV-1s for 

infrared and side-looking airborne radar reconnaissance. 

Anticipating some overlap with anti-infiltration operations in that 

area of South Vietnam’s Quang Tri Province abutting the Laos boundary, the plan provided for the I11 Marine Amphibious Force, in 

coordination with the Air Force, to use helicopters and ground teams to 

sow sensors near the Laotian border. 

As with the linear part of the anti-infiltration system, the MACV 

commander urged that the initial operational capability date for the 

air-supported portion likewise be delayed from September 15 to November 1, 1967.41 

The joint chiefs reviewed the plan and recommended that the IOC 

date be deferred to April 1, 1968, to make sure all aerial components 

functioned. But in a series of memoranda (April 22 through May 8) the 

Defense secretary ruled that the IOC date remain November 1, 1967, as 

recommended by Westmoreland. McNamara also approved the deployment of additional aircraft, helicopters, and personnel, and expedited 

269 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

construction to improve or enlarge air bases in South Vietnam and 

Thailand. He directed Mr. McNaughton, the International Security 

Affairs Chief, to seek through the State Department Thai government 

approval for basing more personnel and aircraft on Thai bases, and Lao 

government approval for conducting the new anti-infiltration operations 

and enlarging the PRAIRIE FIRE boundary. Since 1965 the Seventh Air 

Force and MACV had carried out small, air-supported intelligencegathering and air-targeting ground forays within the boundary.*42 

Since the PRAIRIE FIRE geographical sector contained segments of 

numerous infiltration routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it was eminently 

suitable for sensors, gravel and DRAGONTOOTH mines, and other 

munitions. Seven- to nine-man PRAIRIE FIRE SPIKE ground teams, 

comprising three U.S. Special Forces personnel and four to six South 

Vietnamese, would be integrated into the program. They would emplace 

the sensors and mines and when possible pinpoint enemy targets for 

tactical and B-52 strikes. The Lao government quickly acceded to the 

American requests. In July, McNamara approved the establishment of 

thirty-four SPIKE teams for the linear and air-supported systems. The 

teams would be launched from Lang Vei (near Khe Sanh) and from 

Nakhon Phan~rn.~~ 

Meantime, limited construction began in April on the linear barrier 

(recently renamed the strongpoint obstacle system) in Quang Tri Province 

just below the demilitarized zone. However, the builders were plagued 

with insurmountable difficulties in improving roads, in securing the 

needed materials and sufficient vehicles for transportation, and in 

construction. Worse, the builders were increasingly harassed by enemy 

fire that produced many U.S. and allied casualties. Though some 

strongpoints were built, the SPOS failed to meet its IOC date of 

November 1, 1967. Construction delay continued into 1968. After the 

United States decided to begin troop withdrawals later that year, the 

project was dis~ontinued.~~ 

The air-supported barrier system, to be built separately, had as its 

principal unit an infiltration center and associated facilities at Nakhon 

Phanom. In its early development, the center was given several names for 

administrative and security reasons. Just before construction it was called 

the Communication Data Management System. During construction it 

was nicknamed DUTCH MILL, and on October 18, 1967, it was named 

simultaneously Seventh Air Force Task Force and Operating Location 

Number 1, 6250th Support Squadron, Headquarters Seventh Air Force, 

PACAF. But virtually from the beginning of the center's construction, 

'See Chapter IV. 

270 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

officials of the Seventh Air Force, the American embassy in Bangkok, 

and the Thai government agreed to call it TASK FORCE ALPHA. This was 

the chief name by which the center and its supportive facilities would be 

known and remembered.45 

Ground-breaking for the center commenced on July 6, 1967. Col. 

Lawrence M. Politzer of Air Force Systems Command’s Electronic 

Systems Division was site activation manager. He supervised the work of 

personnel from several contractors such as the Ralph M. Parsons 

Construction Company, International Business Machines (IBM), Inc., the 

Magnavox Company, Radiation Systems Company, plus 450 Thai 

workers. Mr. William C. Derango of IBM was the IBM site manager to 

oversee the installation of IBM-manufactured computers, storage and 

retrieval equipment, and other devices.46 

Constructing the center took a little more than 3 months. Upon 

completion in October, it consisted of a single complex holding 3 

buildings: a 20,000-square-foot operations center, a 5,600-square-foot 

communications building, and a building for housing six 200-kilowatt 

diesel generating sets. There were 3 major types of equipmentcommunications, data processing, and display. The communications 

system included 3 parabolic dish S-band tracking antennas and 9 ultra 

high frequency antennas that permitted direct contact with orbiting 

EC-121s (for receiving and relaying sensor signals), and with ABCCC, 

reconnaissance, FAC, and strike aircraft. Data processing machines 

would furnish near or real-time receipt, processing, and display of sensor 

activities. Display equipment would show the weather and the location of 

sensors and enemy targets. While the center’s construction was under 

way, the Air Force determined that more administrative and automatic 

data processing space was needed. After receiving approval from 

Washington authorities, additional space was built during the first half 

of 196fL4’ 

To staff the center, about 200 Air Force officers and airmen arrived 

at Nakhon Phanom in July and August from Eglin Air Force Base and 

elsewhere. More arrived in subsequent weeks until about 400 were in 

place by late October. Because of crash personnel recruitment, many 

officers and airmen arrived without prior training. Consequently, on-site 

training was begun at Nakhon Phanom in IBM computer programming, 

key punch operations, sensor and munitions management, communications, intelligence analysis, weather reporting, and in other specialized 

tasks. The training program had to compete with a concurrent, mundane 

need to construct housing and messing facilities, and to obtain furniture 

and other housekeeping and office items at an austerely stocked air base. 

Nonetheless, the major training and administrative difficulties had been 

27 1 

INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

largely surmounted by November when TASK FORCE ALPHA conducted 

the first tests of its sensor-receiving and associated eq~ipment.~’ 

Monitoring the TASK FORCE ALPHA’S progress was Air Force Brig. 

Gen. William P. McBride. Appointed by General McConnell on July 14, 

McBride’s first job was to organize a Tactical Evaluation Task Force as 

a management control agency. The agency’s main task was to keep Air 

Force Secretary Brown, Generals McConnell and Starbird, and other 

USAF and Department of Defense personnel apprised of the Air Force’s 

ability to meet the IOC date of November 1, 1967, for the antivehicular 

and antipersonnel sub~ystems.~~ 

While work on the numerous TASK FORCE ALPHA components went 

on, the Seventh Air Force issued Operation Plan 48-167 on August 10. It 

itemized the type and number of aircraft, communications equipment, 

and additional elements that would be used to inhibit enemy infiltration. 

Unlike the optimistic expectations of JASON division analysts and 

McNamara, the Seventh Air Force’s plan said that the air-supported 

infiltration systems would “augment [the] current overall interdiction 

program, not substitute for it.” According to the plan, aircraft would 

first sow sensors and mines from central Laos eastward to South 

Vietnam’s border and, if necessary, towards the conventional barrier to 

be built below the eastern portion of the DMZ. This would permit 

detection of truck traffic 

by air-emplaced acoustic and seismic sensors which are activated by the noise or 

microseism produced by truck movement. Personnel movement along foot trails 

will be detected by air-and hand-emplaced acoustic, seismic, and magnetic sensors. 

Small, pressure-sensitive, explosive devices (button bombs and/or micro-gravel) 

will be air-delivered in conjunction with acoustic sensors (acoubuoys). When 

stepped on, the button bomb or micro-gravel will generate an acoustic signal to 

activate nearby acoubuoys. Small mines (gravel and/or dragontooth) capable of 

injuring personnel and damaging truck tires will be air-emplaced to inhibit 

personnel movement on trails, to deter construction of new trails, and discourage 

searching for sensors. Further, they will be used along truck routes to immobilize 

convoys and impede accompanying personnel. Periodic replacement of sensors and 

mines and button bombs will be necessary because of limited life, destruction 

resulting from activation or strike action, and discovery and removal by enemy 

forces.50 

As has been noted, McNamara earlier in 1967 set November 1 as the 

IOC date for antivehicular and anti-personnel systems in Laos. But 

throughout July and August sensor technical problems, the unreadiness 

of numerous EC-121 aircraft and CH-3 helicopters, and delays in getting 

the infiltration surveillance center equipped and manned by trained 

personnel induced General McBride to recommend a slippage in the date. 

273 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

With the concurrence of Generals McConnell and Starbird, Secretaries 

Brown and McNamara, and other officials, the Laotian antivehicular and 

antipersonnel systems were given new IOC dates of December 1, 1967, 

and January 1, 1968, re~pectively.~' 

With the infiltration surveillance center nearing completion, General 

McConnell secured the approval of Generals Westmoreland and Starbird 

and Secretary McNamara to appoint General McBride commander of 

TASK FORCE ALPHA on October 18, 1967. The operational chain placed 

McBride under General Lindley, the Deputy Commander of Seventh Air 

Force/Thirteen Air Force at Udorn, with administrative and logistic 

support to come from Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines. McBride's 

assignment to Lindley was in compliance with a long-standing Thai 

policy underscored by Ambassador Martin, requiring all American 

military personnel in Thailand to be responsible directly to an American 

military commander in Thailand. TASK FORCE ALPHA coordination with 

Headquarters MACV would be through a brigadier general on the 

MACV staff.52 

The TASK FORCE ALPHA commander would be the operating 

manager of the air-supported infiltration system in Laos and in those 

parts of South and North Vietnamese territory near the western end of 

the demilitarized zone that Westmoreland might assign to him. His 

authority would initially be circumscribed, with General Momyer retaining operational control of the Air Force and Navy sensor sowing, 

ABCCC, and strike aircraft earmarked for the project. This would 

permit General McBride to concentrate on making the ISC a workable 

personnel and truck analysis and targeting center. 

If experience pointed to the need for a change, aircraft operational 

control might then be shifted to McBride. Until then, he would be chiefly 

a coordinator of diverse activities and make recommendations to higher 

commands. He would locate and recommend targets to the Seventh Air 

Force Tactical Air Control Center or to the orbiting ABCCCs. In 

coordination with MACV, he would task ground reconnaissance teams, 

interpret intelligence gained through the ISC, plan for and monitor 

sensor and munition drops, suggest sortie levels, and evaluate constantly 

the sensor-oriented anti-infiltration system. Finally, McBride would keep 

the American ambassadors in Bangkok and Laos up to date on all TASK 

FORCE ALPHA activitie~.~~ 

McNamara endorsed the foregoing terms of reference but specified 

that General Starbird would remain in overall charge of the antiinfiltration effort. This would include conceptual planning, research, 

development, and tests of improved concepts and hardware, and timely 

procurement of the necessary resources.54 

274 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

A major planning task was to decide where the initial antivehicular 

and antipersonnel sensor and munition tests and operations should be 

carried out. Important infiltration areas were selected on September 8, 

after extensive study and discussion by representatives of TASK FORCE 

ALPHA, Seventh Air Force, MACV, and the U.S. embassies in Vientiane 

and Bangkok. Both areas were below Mu Cia Pass, not far from South 

Vietnam. The antivehicular area (called MUD RIVER) was solely in the 

STEEL TIGER sector. The antipersonnel area (DUMP TRUCK) encompassed 

a network of trails lying within an area twelve miles north, northwest, 

and west of the intersection of the demilitarized zone and the Laos 

border. It also embraced the westernmost parts of southern North 

Vietnam, the demilitarized zone, and northern South Vietnam. Studies 

disclosed that most DRV personnel entered South Vietnam along these 

Specially equipped aircraft to take part in the sensor and munition 

tests commenced arriving at Thai bases in October. The first seven of 

twenty-six Lockheed EC-121s of the 553d Reconnaissance Wing reached 

Korat on the 20th, and the rest deployed in the following weeks. The 

EC-121s would perform the crucial task of “uplink relay” (i.e., receiving 

sensor data) and “downlink relay” (i.e., sending sensor data to the ISC 

for analysis). The first of eighteen A-1E Skyraiders of the 1st Air 

Commando Wing that would dispense gravel munitions touched down at 

Nakhon Phanom on November 1. On November 15, nine OP-2Es of 

Navy Observation Squadron 67 arrived at Nakhon Phanom with the 

mission of dispensing sensors in the MUD RIVER sector of Laos. Several 

of twelve CH-3E helicopters of the 21st Helicopter Squadron, selected to 

dispense sensors in both the MUD RIVER and DUMP TRUCK sectors, 

reached Nakhon Phanom in early December.56 

Upon arrival at Nakhon Phanom, the personnel and planes from the 

1st Air Commando Wing and the 21st Helicopter Squadron were 

assigned to the 56th Air Commando Wing already at the base. However, 

those from Navy Observation Squadron 67 remained unassigned to any 

USAF organization. A total of twenty-three FAC 0-2s, presently 

assigned to the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, 

would fly FAC sorties for sensor and munition drop missions. A 

squadron of F-4D Phantoms for dispensing DRAGONTOOTH and other 

munitions was not due in Thailand until early 1968.57 

The impending, unique TASK FORCE ALPHA air operations dictated 

an adjustment in existing rules of engagement in Laos. These were 

worked out by representatives of TASK FORCE ALPHA, Seventh Air 

Force, MACV, and the U.S. embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok. The 

changes were relatively minor, and present rules largely promised to 

suffice. Briefly, for sensor drops the pilots would need prior approval of 

275 
553rd Reconnaissance Wing 

8th Tactical Fighter Wing 

56th 

25th 

Air Commando Wing 

Tactical Fighter Squadron 

1 st Air Commando Squadron 

21 st Helicopter Squadron 

23d Tactical Air Support Squadron 

VO-67 (Navy) 

334 Assault Helicopter Company (Army) 

361 Assault Helicopter Company (Army) 

Supporting Igloo White Aircraft 

21 EC-121s 

18 F-4Ds 

18 A-1 ES 

12 CH-3Es 

23 0-2s 

11 0-2s 

Withdrawn or Not Utilized 

8 OP-2Es 

12 UH-1 CS 

12 UH-1 FS 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

a route or geographical area, and FACs would control the drops. Pilots 

would be prohibited from dropping sensor strings (i.e., groups of 

sensors) within 550 yards of a Laotian village, or reseeding a route or 

areas with sensors without higher approval.58 

Air strikes on sensor-developed targets would be controlled by 

Seventh Air Force through an ABCCC following established rules for 

Laos. These required, among other things, FAC visual confirmation of a 

target, FAC marking of a target with a smoke rocket, and no strikes on 

villages nor on any other unapproved target, no matter how lucrative, 

beyond 220 yards on either side of a motorable road or main trail. 

Normal exceptions to these rules would apply. For example, any 

RLAF-validated target could be struck as could any segment of a road or 

trail in an authorized armed reconnaissance area.59 

The first few weeks of November witnessed final administrative 

actions before official testing of the antivehicular system. On the 9th, 

Generals McBride and Lindley, officers from Military Assistance Command, Thailand, and USARPAC flew to Bangkok to brief Thai Air 

Marshal Dawee Chunlasap and other high Thai officials on the impending TASK FORCE ALPHA operations. General McBride gave the principal 

briefing, and a general discussion followed. The Thais raised no 

important questions about the project. On the 15th, TASK FORCE ALPHA 

filled a key personnel slot when Col. Walter B. Forbes, Commander of 

the STEEL TIGER Task Force (based at Nakhon Phanom), was appointed 

director of operations. Col. William L. Walker was already serving as 

director of intelligence.60 

On November 25, General McBride ran the first shakedown test of 

the new anti-infiltration facility. Several Navy OP-2E aircraft, guided 

and controlled by FAC 0-2s, dropped 18 air-delivered seismic intrusion 

detectors and 6 acoustic “hang-up” acoubuoys in the Mud River sector 

of Laos. Seventeen sensors survived the first drop. Orbiting at about 

20,000 feet overhead, an EC-121 monitored the first sensor emplacements and relayed the signals to the ISC with only minor procedural 

difficulties. To the gratification of all, the various “systems” worked. 

There was no attempt to attack enemy targets.61 

The test, as expected, disclosed a number of problems, with drop 

accuracy the most important. While some sensor strings were on target, 

one fell 4 miles from the intended area, and the location of another 

could not be ascertained. Drop inaccuracy had been anticipated because 

the OP-2E’s “bombsight” was a fixed grease-penciled cross on the bow 

of plexiglass (the aircraft shortly acquired a Norden bombsight). In 

addition the targets were hard to acquire in a virtual sea of green and 

gray of the Laotian karst, which was in sharp contrast with the 

well-defined test ranges at Eglin Air Force Base. Heavy enemy 37-mm 

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INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

fire also affected accuracy, forcing the OP-2Es to make their sensor 

drops at around 5,000 feet. From this height some ADSIDs fell too 

deeply into the earth, burying their antennas.62 

December 1 marked the kickoff of the MUD RIVER antivehicular 

IOC sensor test. Preparatory to the first drop, TASK FORCE ALPHA 

operations personnel used aerial photos of the MUD RIVER sector to 

subdivide it into modules corresponding to road segments. A target 

analysis officer (TAO) monitored sensor signals in each module, relayed 

by an orbiting EC-121. An IBM computer routed the signals automatically to the TAO. Since the sensors sent signals twenty-four hours a day, 

EC-121 orbits and TAO analyses would continue around the clock. The 

first EC-121 orbit for relaying sensor signals from the northern sector 

sector of MUD RIVER was called “red.” When sensor emplacements 

began in southern MUD RIVER, a second EC-121 orbit (“yellow”) was 

established. Experience would show that an EC-121 could orbit for 

about eight hours.63 

At 0945 on the same day, a Navy OP-2E dropped a string of 4 

ADSIDs from 5,000 feet in the first MUD R~VER module, then returned 

to base because of bad weather. Only 2 sensors activated. On the 5th, 

after more ADSIDs were dropped, operations personnel requested their 

first strike through a C-130 ABCCC. Seventh Air Force responded 

quickly and hit 5 sensor-detected trucks that triggered 2 secondary 

explosions. A followup strike later the same day produced undetermined 

results. In the third week of December, after planes sowed more sensors, 

operations personnel flashed 321 strike recommendations to the 

ABCCCs. However, FAC 0-2E pilots were able to confirm only 21 

targets, and these elicited 38 Air Force strikes that destroyed an 

estimated 8 enemy trucks and caused 23 secondary fires and explosion^.^^ 

By the close of December 1967, Navy aircraft had sowed 49 sensor 

strings in 17 MUD RIVER modules. The strings contained a total of 247 

ADSIDs and 38 acoustic acoubuoys, generating 959 “target sequences” 

that suggested superficially the passing of 5,766 enemy trucks. Buoyed by 

the successful working of most system components, TASK FORCE ALPHA 

was recommending strikes on about 30 targets a day by late December. 

But there were rather few strike aircraft responses because other or 

higher priority targets were available. In summary, the IOC tests showed 

both success and the existence of numerous system bugs and other 

operational problems.65 

On the plus side the sensors, orbiting EC-121 relay aircraft, and the 

ISC facilities did quite well. The Seventh Air Force cautiously informed 

Washington that the potential for greater surveillance of the DRV’s 

supply system “had been demonstrated.” In fact the sensors had 

detected several truck convoys. Also, the longevity for the battery279 

THE IGLOO WHITE ANTI-INFILTRATION PROGRAM relied on sensors emplaced 

along major infiltration routes. Clockwise from upper left: An acoubuoy acoustic 

sensor hung in the jungle canopy. The spikebuoy seismic sensor implanted in the 

forest floor. An airman prepares to load a spike seismic sensor aboard a CH-3 

helicopter for delivery in Laos. 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

operated sensors in a jungle environment exceeded expectations, with the 

average ADSID’s life running twenty-seven to thirty days in lieu of 

twenty. The longevity of the acoustic acoubuoys hinged on their 

reporting characteristics. Those set for an “impulse mode” lasted about 

twenty days as opposed to an earlier estimate of fifteen days. These set 

for a “continuous reporting mode” lasted only seven days.66 

Among the shortcomings of the antivehicular systems was the 

excessive sensitivity of the sensors, as demonstrated by the 491,814 

ADSID activations and the 125,649 acoustic acoubuoy activations. These 

activation rates were 3 or 4 times higher than those experienced at Eglin. 

It was obvious that not enemy trucks but ambient factors such as 

animals (especially frogs), thunder, and other sounds were triggering 

most of the activations. This created problems for the ISC’s sensor signal 

analysts, but by the end of December they were beginning to learn how 

to distinguish some of the truck signals from those induced by other 

stimuli. 

Another problem area was sensor drop accuracy. In the second week 

in December the circular error probable (CEP) for ADSIDs was 896 

yards and for acoubuoys 789 yards. During the next week the CEPs were 

reduced to 466 and 544 yards respectively-a considerable improvement 

but still excessive. As noted earlier, the Navy soon installed Norden 

bombsights on its OP-2Es. This, plus more reliance on MSQ-77 

SKYSPOT radar, somewhat improved sensor drop ac~uracy.~’ 

The IOC tests further proved that sensors should be dropped in 

strings of 6 and never less than 5, to ensure that 3 would survive and 

could be activated. The ADSIDs and acoubuoys impacting in the earth 

(spikebuoys) did best when spaced 547 to 1,094 yards apart. Acoubuoys 

parachuted into trees (called hang-ups) had to be similarly spaced even 

though Navy pilots found it hard to do. TASK FORCE ALPHA facilities as 

presently designed possessed a limited sensor warfare capability. Only 3 1 

frequency channels and 27 tone codes had been allocated to the seismic 

ADSIDs and acoustic acoubuoys. This allowed no more than 837 sensors 

to be monitored at one time in a specific geographical location.68 

The effectiveness of gravel mines was yet to be tested. Not until 

December 27 did an A-1E drop a damaging type of gravel mine 

(XM-41). It was hoped that the mines would blow up truck tires and 

thus delay truck traffic.69 

Finally, the IOC tests could not surmount long-standing geographic 

and climatic drawbacks in Laos. In spite of numerous TASK FORCE 

ALPHA strike requests, the rules of engagement required the FAC pilot to 

visually verify the target, but the densely foliated test area many times 

prevented the pilot from doing so. If the target was verified and a strike 

282 
INAUGURATION OF IGLOO WHITE 

requested through the ABCCC, strike pilots were frequently weathered 

out or engaged elsewhere in attacking enemy trucks and other targets.” 

Meanwhile, TASK FORCE ALPHA coordinated with MACV and the 

I11 Marine Amphibious Force on preparations to launch IOC tests of the 

DUMP TRUCK antipersonnel system. The first test was set for January 1, 

1968, but the services asked higher authority for a short test delay. The 

reasons cited were unresolved problems of sensor drop accuracy, 

excessively high sensor activations, and the need to complete photo and 

ground reconnaissance of the DUMP TRUCK area. Defense secretary 

McNamara agreed to a maximum extension of no more than three 

weeks .71 

The DUMP TRUCK test scenario called for sensor drops by Navy 

OP-2Es and Air Force CH-3s. The latter would have two missions: 

emplanting helicopter-delivered seismic intrusion detectors, and flying in 

U.S.-led, seven- to nine-man PRAIRIE FIRE SPIKE teams who would 

emplant the hand-emplaced seismic intrusion detectors. However, the 

helicopter missions were held in abeyance pending the correction of the 

sensor injection ~ystern.’~ 

As a consequence the first DUMP TRUCK IOC test employed just 

Navy OP-2Es. Preparing for the first sensor drop, an EC-121 on 

January 13 established a third (“blue”) orbit over the test area. Then on 

the 17th a Navy aircraft dropped two strings of ADSIDS in what turned 

out to be the sole DUMP TRUCK IOC mission. Abandonment of DUMP 

TRUCK came when suddenly the NVA encircled the Marine Corps base at 

Khe Sanh on the eastern end of the DUMP TRUCK area, and the Tet’ 

offensive followed two weeks later. The diversion of most U.S. air and 

other resources to these two events would change drastically the course 

of the war. 73 

283 

Chapter X 

Prelude to Khe Sanh 

and the Tet Offensive 

The threat to Khe Sanh and the potential for enemy offensive action 

in January 1968 was not totally unanticipated by American air and 

ground commanders. Since September there had been heightened enemy 

activity. During that month the VC/NVA attacked numerous US. and 

allied positions in South Vietnam including a major assault on a U.S. 

Marine Corps combat base at Con Thien. In October and November the 

enemy shifted to South Vietnam’s western border region where he 

attacked allied positions at Phuoc Binh, LOC Ninh, and Dak To. MACV 

surmised he was trying to divert allied attention away from urban areas 

and more eastern I Corps regions. As noted earlier, the DRV also began 

in late October a massive truck resupply push down the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail in support of these energetic operations.’ 

Not unexpectedly, news reports of this step-up in the war tempo 

intensified public, congressional, and media criticism and opposition to 

the war. Yet, U.S. commanders were not overly concerned. This was not 

the first VC/NVA preparation for a “winter-spring” offensive in South 

Vietnam. There had been similar seasonal buildups in the past, and when 

heavier attacks came they had been invariably blunted or defeated by 

American air, ground, and naval power. While the magnitude of current 

DRV activity appeared larger than in previous years, the United States 

and its allies believed they were better equipped to counter it.* 

The confidence of Southeast Asia commanders did not conceal, of 

course, their continuing, deep frustrations over the many administrationimposed military restrictions in Laos and North Vietnam which, they 

believed, precluded an early termination of the war. These frustrations 

and mounting concern in Congress over the unending conflict had been 

aired extensively in August during hearings before a Senate Preparedness 

Investigating Subcommittee headed by Senator John C. Stennis. The 

hearings underscored the sharply divergent views between high Air Force, 

Navy, and Army leaders and the administration over the war’s conduct. 

Secretary McNamara, the administration’s chief spokesman, insisted the 

restrictions were necessary to prevent a wider war. He was also 

285 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

convinced, in contrast with the belief of the military leaders, that the war 

could only be ended by negotiation^.^ 

On the one hand, President Johnson was confronted by Saigon’s 

optimistic reports on the war’s progress, and on the other by mounting 

American domestic opposition to the conflict. He therefore decided in 

November 1967 to launch a public relations effort to convince doubters 

and critics as to the correctness of the administration’s support of the 

military operations under way. In conjunction with this move, he asked 

General Westmoreland, Ellsworth Bunker (U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam), and Robert W. Komer (American pacification chief for South 

Vietnam) to come to Washington to brief congressional and media 

representatives as well as top administration officials. The Saigon 

delegation arrived in mid-November but played no part in making the 

Washington briefing arrangements and received no instructions on what 

to say. Nevertheless, the delegation’s views on the war were those of the 

president, their reports having induced his optimi~m.~ 

In a series of public appearances and private official meetings, 

Westmoreland and his colleagues underscored how the war was gradually 

being won. The most visible progress, the MACV commander said, was 

in South Vietnam. There the Saigon government’s stability had been 

enhanced on September 3 by national elections, and its military accomplishments were heartening. On the battlefield, the ratio of enemy to 

allied troops killed was 3 to 1 and for weapon losses 3.8 to 1. The 

enemy’s losses of 12,900 to 15,000 men in the third quarter of 1967 

outstripped VC recruitment and NVA infiltration. In fact, recruitment 

had fallen dramatically, averaging only 3,500 personnel per month 

compared with 7,000 per month in November 1966. The pacification 

program had brought 67 percent of South Vietnam’s territory under 

government control, leaving only 17 to the VC/NVA, and the rest of the 

area still contested. With additional military assistance, the Saigon 

government could assume most of the responsibility for the war by the 

end of 1969, permitting the United States to begin withdrawing its forces. 

Contributing to the successes in South Vietnam were of course the 

air programs in Laos and North Vietnam. In Laos, DRV manpower 

infiltration was estimated at 5,500 to 6,000 per month, down from about 

7,000 per month a year earlier, although the rate could rise again.5 

A month later, U.S. commanders saw no need to change their basic 

November assessments. The Laotian and North Vietnamese air programs 

appeared to be taking a substantial toll of enemy trucks, supplies, and 

personnel. In Laos, American airmen had flown by the end of 1967 

286 
PRELUDE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 

about 103,148 tactical strike sorties, 73,116 of them by the Air Force,* 

with more than three-fourths of the sorties flown against targets in 

central and southern Laos. About 1,718 SAC B-52 sorties were also 

flown, all in southern Laos.+ The strikes destroyed and damaged an 

estimated 6,478 supply-carrying trucks, 430 boats and other watercraft, 

and 7,584 structures (many well stocked with food and war materiel). To 

slow personnel and vehicular logistic movements, aircrews destroyed or 

damaged about 7,784 small bridges and made 12,895 chokepoint and 

other road cuts. Enemy losses in materiel were impossible to quantify, 

but presumably many thousands of tons were denied use in South 

Vietnam. 

The unremitting air and air-ground assaults also forced the DRV to 

divert more manpower and resources than ever before to maintain and 

protect its Laotian road and trail network. In late 1967 about 25,000 

NVA troops and 40,000 laborers (mostly Laotian) were engaged in 

repairing, widening, and extending the routes. Bulldozers and other 

heavy equipment were being used, and U.S. air strikes had forced the 

DRV to deploy more air defense units and personnel to protect its most 

important roads, road junctions, and passes.’ 

The enemy’s personnel losses in central and southern Laos were 

more difficult to calculate. The tactical and B-52 strikes undoubtedly 

killed and injured many troops and workers along the trail and caused 

other losses indirectly. Since most DRV personnel were known to travel 

through Laos on foot, analysts speculated this was partly due to truck 

vulnerability to air strikes. Walking took the communists much longer to 

go from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam, and rendered 

them more susceptible en route to malaria and other diseases. A U.S. 

intelligence study in August 1967 suggested that upwards of twenty 

percent of the walkers became ineffective because of air strikes, illnesses, 

and desertiom8 

Whatever the personnel and materiel attrition, the DRV appears to 

have maintained a steady, significant flow of resources into South 

Vietnam, although numbers or amounts were highly speculative. The 

Defense Intelligence Agency believed that about 82,500 northerners 

entered the South in 1967, only slightly less than the 89,600 estimated for 

‘Not included in these figures were a small but undetermined number of flaksuppression sorties conducted by Air Force and Navy YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance escort 

aircraft from June 1964 to December 14, 1964, when the BARREL ROLL interdiction 

program began. For security reasons at the time, the escort strikes were listed as 

reconnaissance sorties. See Chapter 11. 

+Also for security reasons, some B-52 sorties in 1966 were probably listed as sorties 

flown in South Vietnam. See Chapter VI. 

287 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

1966,* with the majority entering through Laos. Most supplies also 

moved through Laos. Another intelligence analysis estimated that in 1967 

about 31,250 tons of supplies entered the country by truck, chiefly 

through the Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes, and 2,900 tons by trail for an 

average of about 94 short tons per day (STPD). Of this total, about 47 

STPD were consumed or lost in Laos and 47 STPD reached the South. 

In addition, an average of 25 STPD flowed from Cambodia into Laos 

where about 15 STPD were consumed or lost and the remaining 10 

STPD reached South Vietnam.g 

The DRV exacted a high price for the U.S. day-and-night aerial 

surveillance and strike operations. Its automatic weapons and AA 

artillery units were concentrated in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars, near 

the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Nape Passes, and around Tchepone. More 

often than not, these air defense personnel forced strike pilots to remain 

above optimum bombing levels. Employing an assortment of weapons 

but mainly 14.5-, 37-, and 57-mm guns, they had shot down 132 U.S. 

aircraft and helicopters (107 USAF) by the end of 1967. In January 1968 

the gunners would destroy 4 more aircraft, 2 Air Force and 2 Navy. 

Most losses occurred in central and southern Laos where infiltration and 

hence interdiction was heaviest.” 

As noted, military dispatches from Saigon and Honolulu in December 1967 conveyed a sense of steady progress. Westmoreland on the 

20th informed Sharp and Wheeler that Hanoi knew it was on the losing 

end of the war, and would have to make a significant decision in the 

next six months. Hanoi could attempt a final all-out effort that was 

bound to fail, then either open negotiations or continue the war at a 

reduced level. Admiral Sharp’s year-end report proclaimed that 1967 

produced a definite shift to the allies. “AS a result, the enemy is no 

longer capable of a military victory.”” 

These predictions proved overly optimistic. In December the DRV 

continued to display not only a capacity for unprecedented supply 

movement through southern Laos, but resurgent battlefield strength 

throughout Laos and South Vietnam. On December 6 in Laos, NVA/PL 

units threatened the southern town of Saravane and the nearby Ban Khot 

airstrip known as Lima Site 44, endangering a USAF Tacan facility that 

had been emplaced nearby in April 1966. On the 20th of December, they 

encroached again on the Plain of Jars, and a few days later forced the 

abandonment of two strong Meo guerrilla positions near Long Tieng. 

‘For 1967 the “accepted” or reasonably confirmed number of infiltrators totaled 

52,400, the “possible” 29,800. For 1966 the “accepted” figure was 58,700 and the 

“possible” 30,900. [Southeast Asia Military Fuct Book, Jul 68, p A-74.1 

288 
PRELUDE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 

Then in the panhandle on Christmas Day, NVA/PL troops captured 

Muong Phalane and overran a nearby airstrip (Lima Site 61) on which 

the Seventh Air Force had erected a mobile Tacan facility only eight 

months earlier. Three days later, they seized Pak Song and assumed 

virtual control of the southern Bolovens Plateau. However, FAR forces 

managed quickly to retake Pak Song.” 

In retrospect, it was evident that the enemy’s Laotian ground 

assaults were preparatory to his encirclement of Khe Sanh and launching 

of the Tet offensive in January 1968. Keenly aware of the importance of 

Tacan sites to U.S. air navigation, the foe made them primary targets. 

Beginning at 1:30 in the morning, the December 25 attack on Muong 

Phalane and Lima Site 61 (both defended by FAR troops) was a surprise. 

An estimated 300-man NVA/PL battalion assaulted Site 61, and after a 

3-hour battle the disheartened FAR troops withdrew. No USAF or 

RLAF aircraft were available to assist the defenders.13 

Lima Site 61 was wiped out with three buildings and three 

“hootches” or living quarters destroyed. The buildings had housed the 

communication equipment, a generator, and an operations “shack.” 

What remained was booby-trapped. In Muong Phalane the attacks 

demolished several U. S .-occupied buildings including one used by Agency 

for International Development personnel. The FAR’S losses were severe-twenty-five killed, thirty-one wounded, and eighty-one missing in 

action. Also missing in action were two USAF Tacan operators. The two 

Americans were later found killed and their bodies recovered. The town 

and Site 61 stayed in enemy hands until recaptured on December 31 by 

FAR forces and guerrillas.I4 

General Momyer, concluding that security for the Tacan facility near 

Saravane was inadequate, ordered the U.S. operating personnel to spend 

their nights at Pakse. He further directed the instant replacement of the 

Tacan unit destroyed near Muong Phalane but in a more secure area. A 

survey team discovered a suitable site on 6,500-foot Phu Mano Mountain, about 3 1/2 miles from the Thai border town of Mukdahan. The 

mobile Tacan unit began functioning on Janaury 9, 1968, covering the 

Khe Sanh area in South Vietnam nearly 125 miles away. Three days 

later, NVA/PL troops failed to capture another USAF Tacan facility at 

Lima Site 85 in northern Laos, used by aircrews for their operations in 

the Hanoi area. In March, however, they would succeed.I5 

Concurrent with these ground assaults, the DRV’s truck supply 

movements through southern Laos in December 1967 and January 1968 

were unabated. Two new roads eased logistic movements from Laos 

toward South Vietnam. U.S. aerial photos and other intelligence showed 

that the roads stretched from the Laotian border towards South 

Vietnam’s I Corps and ending within twenty-seven and fourteen miles 

289 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

respectively of the Marine base at Khe Sanh. Enemy troop movements in 

the area and elsewhere suggested that the objective was not only Khe 

Sanh but other allied bases throughout South Vietnam.16 

Bracing for the onslaught, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland began to express more concern. While Sharp believed the antitruck 

campaign had yielded “outstanding results,” he warned that the services 

had not “interdicted or will be able to interdict the traffic to the degree 

required to achieve a major threat reduction in this area.” Nor was there 

any assurance, he added, that the sensor-targeting system just beginning 

in the MUD RIVER and DUMP TRUCK areas would attain the desired 

effectiveness in the next few months. Westmoreland reiterated the 

Army’s view that the only effective method of interdicting the enemy 

through Laos was to deploy ground troops to cut off his access to the 

South. He said he had requested a new study (code name EL PASO) for a 

corps-size thrust into Laos during the next dry season. The corps would 

hit the key chokepoints along and near Route 9 to block enemy vehicular 

and troop movements. The MACV commander added that he was 

considering a new concept (YORK 111) that would require more troops 

than envisaged in EL PA SO.'^ 

On January 9, General Momyer expected the VC/NVA to soon 

mount a general offensive. On the 18th, as the enemy began an 

enveloping movement around Khe Sanh, Westmoreland launched OPERATION NIAGARA I, an air-ground effort supported by Seventh Air Force 

and the 111 Marine Amphibious Force, principally to determine the 

location of troop and supply sites. As the enemy completed its 

encirclement of Khe Sanh, Westmoreland launched NIAGARA I1 in 

defense of the base. This triggered the largest single tactical and B-52 

operation of the war.18 

Massive tactical and B-52 operations in defense of Khe Sanh would 

continue for several weeks. SAC bombers flew directly over Laos and hit 

heavily the enemy foot and truck traffic along the trail, especially on 

Route 9 and in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. In addition, General 

Westmoreland tasked General McBride to shift his TASK FORCE ALPHA 

resources (just beginning IOC testing of the DUMP TRUCK antipersonnel 

system) to Khe Sanh’s defense.” 

McBride and several aides flew at once to Dong Ha, South Vietnam. 

They conferred with Maj. Gen. Rathvon M. Tompkins, Commander of 

the 3d Marine Division, whose 26th Marines under Col. David E. 

Lownds were defending Khe Sanh. After indicating how sensor-oriented 

targeting might furnish more accurate coordinates for Marine harassment 

and interdiction artillery fire, McBride and his aides returned to Nakhon 

Phanom to prepare for an earlier-than-expected operational role. 

290 
PRELUDE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE 

The TASK FORCE ALPHA commander called on his 21st Helicopter 

Squadron for the first sensor drop mission. On January 20, one of the 

2lst’s Jolly Green Giant CH-3s, with eighteen ADSIDs tied to the floor, 

flew to the Khe Sanh area, and upon arrival a crewmember began tossing 

ADSIDs out by hand along a designated enemy route. Lt. Col. Harry F. 

Hauser, the 2lst’s commander, had recently demonstrated that both 

ADSIDs and accouboys could be hand tossed from a helicopter with 

reasonable accuracy. During the next four days, ninety-nine ADSIDs 

were hand dispensed by crewmen who stood at the helicopter door 

doubling as “sensor-droppers” and gunners. On the 29th a crewman 

tossed out the first spike acoubuoy in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The 

Navy’s OP-2Es also flew some sensor-dropping sorties.20 

Accompanying each sensor-dropping helicopter was another CH-3 

serving as armed escort, an arrangement that worked quite well. The use 

of armed Army UH-1 copters as escorts, as orignally planned, was 

postponed for the same reason the USAF “choppers” could not begin 

operations in the MUD RIVER sector-the absence of secure helicopter 

refueling bases in Laos. The Army’s UH-1s flew but one escort mission, 

then briefly assisted in tightening up base defense in Nakhon Phanom, 

and finally returned to a South Vietnamese base. Air Force A-1E 

Skyraiders presently took over the helicopter escort mission on a regular 

basis .21 

By the end of January, the CH-3 helicopters and the Navy’s 

Lockheed OP-2Es had dropped 316 sensors in 44 sensor strings for the 

initial DUMP TRUCK tests and for Khe Sanh’s defense. The sensors 

consisted of 171 ADSIDs, 86 parachuted acoubuoys, and 59 spike 

acoubuoys. However, not until January 25 did an A-1E sow its first load 

of button bomblets or mines. These noninjurious mines were designed to 

activate acoustic sensors. An injurious type (XM-41) began to be used on 

the 27th and a variant mini-gravel one (XM-41-1E) shortly thereafter. 

On February 1, General Momyer ordered TASK FORCE ALPHA to give 

highest priority to sowing gravel mines. The more lethal gravel mines 

were meant to keep enemy infiltrators on main trails, injure them if they 

did not, and slow truck traffic by puncturing tires.22 

Despite difficulties due to over-activation of sensors and the later 

dispensing of gravel mines, 282 strikes were made on enemy trucks and 

personnel in both the MUD RIVER and DUMP TRUCK areas during 

January. The strikes destroyed or damaged an estimated 79 trucks, 

caused scores of fires and secondary explosions, and killed numerous 

enemy troops. At first the Marines found little use for the sensorgenerated targeting data because of their unfamiliarity with it and the 

need to collate it with other intelligence. But by early February, under 

29 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

the fire of necessity, they began to learn how to use the new targeting 

system which assisted materially in the defense of Khe Sanh.23 

As Westmoreland’s sensor-assisted NIAGARA tactical and B-52 

operations in defense of Khe Sanh expanded in January, North Vietnamese antiaircraft units took their toll. They downed an Air Force 

F-4D, a Marine F-8E, and two Navy planes (an A-4E and a sensorsowing OP-2E). Then on January 30 the VC, with NVA support, 

launched its offensive in South Vietnam, choosing a day that heralded 

the annual lunar New Year or “Tet” celebrations. “We did not surmise 

the true nature or the scope of the country-wide attack,” Westmoreland 

later observed, “nor did it occur to us that the enemy would undertake 

suicidal attacks in the face of our power. But he did just that.”24 

The enemy, in fact, did more than merely launch a new offensive; 

he changed the course of the war. 

. 

292 
The scope and intensity of the Tet offensive, which would continue 

through February, would profoundly affect American military and 

diplomatic policy toward Hanoi. The offensive underscored the communists’ tenacity and resilience, and cast severe doubt on official estimates 

of their manpower and supply losses in the war theater. As the narrative 

has indicated, nowhere was it more difficult to calculate these losses than 

in Laos. Some assessment of bomb damage was possible by daily aerial 

and ground reconnaissance. But for the overwhelming number of air 

strikes against fixed and armed reconnaissance targets, intelligence 

analysts were forced to assess strike results, chiefly on evidence gleaned 

from fleeting pilot observations, and on extrapolations from thousands 

of secondary fires and explosions. 

North Vietnam’s infiltration through Laos had of course been aided 

and abetted in several ways. There was the generosity of its communist 

suppliers, particularly the Soviet Union and China. More significant was 

the impact of American political considerations on military policy. One 

major concern was the desire to preserve, if possible, the Geneva 

Agreement of 1962 on the neutrality of Laos. More important was the 

danger of a possible confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese. 

Consequently, the president would not allow the Air Force and Navy to 

impose an effective air and naval blockade of the North. Important 

targets were immune from air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area 

(including the Haiphong port), and in the twenty-five- to thirty-nauticalmile buffer zone next to China. This permitted an uninterrupted flow of 

military supplies to enter the North by ship, rail, and road. 

Once freely unloaded in the country, the supplies were quickly 

dispersed. This made it more difficult for American pilots to find and 

destroy them, not only in the North but along the rudimentary 

transportation system in Laos. 

In Laos the jungle and mountainous terrain, the monsoon weather, 

and the smoke and haze were Hanoi’s natural allies. The North 

Vietnamese also adeptly kept infiltration routes open by such tactics as 

night traveling, camouflaging, road and trail building and repairing, and 

by emplacing their most lethal antiaircraft defenses at or along key 

infiltration points. By 1968 they had transformed the 200-mile-long 

southeastern Laos corridor (known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail) into 

hundreds of miles of fair-weather motorable roads, and an intricate maze 

of smaller roads, trails, paths, bridges, supply sites, truck parks, rest 

293 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

areas, and overnight shelters. The roads, trails, and paths were linked 

with a stream and river transportation system. Together they assured a 

steady flow of supplies into South Vietnam or areas adjacent to its 

borders. 

Finally, Air Force and other service pilots were enjoined to abide by 

many and frequently changing air rules emanating from Washington or 

Vientiane officials. The rules prohibited tactical and B-52 strikes on 

friendly towns and villages, troops, roadwatch teams, and on specified 

routes and waterways in the demilitarized zone and neutral Cambodia, 

all for the purpose of preserving the fragile Geneva agreements of 1962 

on Laos’s neutrality. Thus were the North Vietnamese able to blunt the 

impact of a series of progressively heavier, albeit limited, air and 

air-ground infiltration programs in southern Laos. 

The psychological effect of the Tet offensive on a war-weary 

Washington and the nation was dramatic. It impelled the administration 

to alter its war strategy and undertake a more determined effort to find 

peace. In the ensuing weeks, it ended the bombing of most of North 

Vietnam and began initial “talks” with Hanoi’s leaders on a settlement. 

These were developments that lessened considerably the fear of triggering 

a wider war and rupturing fatally the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. 

Later, however, the air war against infiltration in southern Laos would 

intensify, less encumbered by the manifold limited air programs and 

operational restrictions of previous years. 

294 
Appendices 

Appendix 1 

U.S. Tactical Sorties Flown in Laos 

December 14, 1W* - December 31, 1967 

USAF USN 

Strike 73.1 16 19,605 

Flak Suppression*' 154 227 

Combat Air Patrol & Escort 4,572 2,384 

Air-to-Air Refueling 1,905 636 

Search and Rescue 5,268 2 

Other 64,296 1,988 

Totals 149,311 24,842 

'Beginning of Barrel Roll operations 

"With occasional exceptions. most flak-suppression sorties were listed as strike sorties 

USM

10,4

6

8

9

10,66
Appendix 2 

Transportation and Other Targets Destroyed, and Damaged 

December 14, 1964" - December 31, 1967 

USAF 

Destroyed Damaged 

Vehicles 3,642 2,057 

Structures 4,278 1.686 

Bridges 603 616 

Boats & Other 

Rivercraft 187 186 

Ferries 9 9 

Ferry Slips 11 46 

POL Tanks 207 10 

Antiaircraft Sites 831 399 

Radar Sites 1 7 

Road Cuts 10,088 

'Beginning of Barrel Roll operations 

USN 

Destroyed' Damaged 

240 210 

453 23 1 

171 260 

26 13 

0 0 

1 3 

1 0 

41 36 

0 0 

2,080 

USMC 

Destroyed Dam

2 24 20

612 3 2

46 5

~~~~ 

11 

0 

3 

3 

35 

0 

727 
Appendix 3 

Bomb, Rocket, and Other Ordnance Expenditures in Laos 

December 14, 1964 - December 31, 1967 

Bombs 

USAF 

USN 

USMC 

USAF 

USN 

USMC 

USAF 

USN 

USMC 

125-lb 250-lb 250-lb 

Frag 

37,766 37,766 37.766 

0 0 0 

0 0 0 

500-lb 750-lb I-.O-lb 2000-lb 300 Ib 

88,745 170,687 6,195 1,660 2,380 

34,450 137 3,029 235 0 

21,132 548 5,225 309 48 

Rockets 

2.75 AIM 5”Zuni AGM- AGM- AGMRounds Rounds 128 12C 45 

331.704 29 795 125 439 4 

52.251 0 5,244 91 23 8 

4.594 7 1.493 73 0 0 

Other Ordnance 

CBU- Napalm Mines 

pods 

25,468 14,468 90 

20 00 

24 110 0 
Appendix 4 

USAF Aircraft Losses in Laos 

February 1962 - February 1, 1968 

Combat Operational' Total 

A-1 

A-26 

A-37 

AC-47 

8-52 

8-57 

c-7 

c-47 

C-123 

c-130 

C-141 

CH-3 

EB-IRE66 

EC-IRC-47 

F-4C 

F-4D 

F-5 

F-100 

F-102 

F-104 

F-105 

HH-3 

HH-43 

0- 1 

0-2 

RB-57 

RF-4 

RF-101 

T-28 

u-10 

UC-123 

UH-1 

Other 

Total 

28 

6 

0 

4 

0 

4 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

11 

2 

0 

6 

0 

2 

20 

3 

0 

9 

0 

0 

3 

3 

3 

1 

1 

1 

0 

109 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

5 

2 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

0 

0 

13 

29 

7 

0 

4 

0 

4 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

11 

2 

0 

6 

0 

2 

25 

5 

0 

11 

0 

0 

3 

3 

5 

1 

1 

1 

0 

122 

'Losses due to accidents and other non-combat causes. 
10 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

Appendix 5 

North Vietnamese Infiltration Into South Vietnam 

1959-1967 

Yearly totals in thousands 

2 765 infiltrators have 

1959-60 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 

Chapter I 

Early Efforts to Reduce North Vietnamese 

Infiltration through Laos 

1. Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Senate, Background Information Relating 

to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 6th rev ed 

(Washington, 1970), p 161ff [hereafter cited 

as Background Info on SEA and VM. 

2. Background Info on SEA and VN, p 

173ff; Mark Thee, “Background Notes on 

the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Laos and 

the Vientiane Agreements of 1956-1957,” in 

Laos: War and Revolution, ed by Nina S. 

Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (New York, 

1970), Chap 8; Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization, rev ed (New York, 1971), pp 79-80. 

3. Len E. Ackland, “No Place for 

Neutralists: The Eisenhower Administration 

and Laos,” Chap 9, and Jonathan Mirsky 

and Stephan E. Stonefield, “The Nam Tha 

Crisis, Kennedy and the New Frontier on 

the Brink,” Chap 10, both in Laos: War 

and Revolution. 

4. D. Gareth Porter, “After Geneva, 

Subverting Laotian Neutrality,” in Laos: 

War and Revolution, pp 183-195; Ackland, 

Chap 9; Mirsky and Stonefield, pp 155-162; 

memo, Henry L. T. Koren, Dept of State 

(FE/SEA), to Roger Hilsman, Asst SECSTATE for Far Eastern Affairs, subj: 

Meeting on Laos, Jul 27, 1963; Maj Victor 

B. Anthony, “A Military History of the 

War in Northern Laos, 1945-1968,” manuscript [The Air Force in Southeast Asia] 

(Washington, 1976), Chap 111. 

5. Final Report of the Select Committee Study on Governmental Operations with 

Respect to Intelligence Activities, Together 

with Additional Supplemental and Separate 

Views, Foreign Military Intelligence, Report 

94-755, Apr 26, 1976, Senate, 94th Cong, 

2d sess (Washington, 1976), Bk 1, p 147 

[hereafter cited as Senate Select Cmte on 

Intel Activities]; msg, CINCPAC to SECSTATE, 0505002 Dec 63; Aspects of the 

Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967 

(Washington, 1967), p 3 [hereafter cited as 

Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-19671. 

6. Senate Select Cmte on Intel Activities, Bk 1, p 147; Air and Ground War in 

Laos, 1965-1967, p 3. 

7. Joseph J. Zasloff, The Pathet Lao 

(Toronto, 1973), p 70; Jacob Van Staaveren, WAF Plans and Policies in South 

Vietnam, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1965), pp 

18-19; Anthony, Chap 111. 

8. Background Info on SEA and VN, p 

194ff; Mirsky and Stonefield, pp 162-178. 

9. Dommen, pp 224-25, 245-46; 

Porter, pp 179-198; Anthony, Chap IV. 

10. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963, Chap 

11. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Encyclopaedia Britannica: Micropaedia, 1974 ed, s.~. “Vietnam, South”; 

Encyclopedia Americana, 1961 ed, S.V. 

“Laos.” 

14. G. C. Reinhardt and E. H. 

Sharkey, Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia 

(RM-5283-PR, Santa Monica, 1967), p 10; 

Description of the Ho Chi Minh Trail 

(WSEG Study 125, Washington, 1966), pp 

1-3. 

15. WSEG Study 125, pp 8-10. 

16. The Senator Gravel Edition, The 

Pentagon Papers, 4 vols. (Boston, 1971), 11, 

35, 50, 60, 71-72 [hereafter cited as Gravel 

Pentagon Papers]. 

303 
NOTES TO PAGES 10-22 

17. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 11, 75, 89. 

18. A Threat to the Peace: North 

Viet-Nam’s Effort to Conquer South VietNam (Dept of State Pub 7308, Washington, 

1961), pt I, pp 20-21, and pt 11. 

19. C. V. Sturdevant, The Border Control Problem in South Vietnam 

(RM-3697-ARPA, Santa Monica, 1964), pp 

3-4, 36-48; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives, Department of 

Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th 

Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1963), pt 1, pp 

20. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 11, 152, 

717-18. 

21. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 11, 31, 60; 

Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in 

South Vietnam, 1961-1963, p 70; DIA Bul 

22. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 

3939, Oct 7, 1962; USMACV rprt, Summary of Highlights, 8 Feb 62-7 Feb 63, pp 

30-49; Report of Visit by JCS Team to 

South Vietnam, Jan 1963, Sec IV, par. 8. 

23. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963, 

Chaps 11, 111, and pp 69, 70-72, 104-05. 

24. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, #896, Apr 10, 63, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, #948, 12 Apr 63; AmEmb 

Saigon to SECSTATE, #971, 30 Apr 63, 

#3956, 25 Apr 63; PACAF Reference Book 

for May 1963 SECDEF Conference, 

Agenda Item 1; CINCPAC, Record, Eighth 

SECDEF Conference, 6 May 63, Item 6. 

25. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: 

The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New 

York, 1967), p 528; Msgs, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, #948, 12 Apr 63, AmEmb 

Saigon to SECSTATE, #971, 30 Apr 63, 

#3956, 25 Apr 63; PACAF Reference Book 

for May 1963 SECDEF Conference, 

Agenda Item 1; CINCPAC, Record, Eighth 

SECDEF Conference, 6 May 63, Items 1, 6; 

AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in Southeast 

Asia, 1961-1964, Items VI-E, F, G; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Foreign 

96-97. 

135-65, Jul 14, 1965. 

Assistance Act of 1963, 88th Cong, 1st sess 

(Washington, 1963), pp 744-745. 

26. CINCPAC, Record, Eighth SECDEF Conference, 6 May 63, Item 1; AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in Southeast Asia, 

1961-1964, Items VI-E, F, G. 

27. Dommen, pp 256-268. 

28. Msg, SECSTATE-SECDEF to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 1219, Jun 22, 1963; 

rprt, DCS/Mil Ops, USA, to CSA, Analysis 

of SEA Actions, n.d. [ca. Sep 4, 19631; 

Anthony, Chap V. 

29. Rprt, DCS/Mil Ops, USA, to CSA, 

n.d. [cu. Sep 4, 19631; hist, CINCPAC, 

1963, pp 193-200; Anthony, Chap V. 

30. Msg, AmEmb Saigon (EmbassyCIA-MACV) to SECSTATE, 170, Aug 3, 

1963; ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Joint 

FAR/Neut/GVN Assault on Tchepone, Sep 

11, 1963. 

31. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 170, Aug 3, 1963, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, 181, Aug 9, 1963, AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE, 281, Aug 23, 

1963, 296, Aug 27, 1963, and 324, Sep 5, 

1963; ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, subj: Joint 

FAR/Neut/GVN Assault on Tchepone, Sep 

11, 1963. 

32. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, Sep 11, 

1963; msg, USUN to SECSTATE, 71, Sep 

33. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 324, Sep 5, 1963; Hilsman, p 528; 

34. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

17-32; The Pentagon Papers as Published 

by the New York Times (New York, 1971), 

pp 232-33 [hereafter cited as N. Y. Times 

Pentagon Papers]; Van Staaveren, USAF 

Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 

35. New York Times, Dec 20 and 2t, 

1963; Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 494-96; 

Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: 

Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 

(New York, 1971), pp 63-64 [hereafter cited 

as Johnson, The Vantage Point]. 

36. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 64, 111, 

122-23; Kenneth Sams, Escalation of the 

War in Southeast Asia, July-December 

1964 (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Ha26, 1963; JCS 2343/272-1, Oct 3, 1963. 

JCSM-825-63, Oct 26, 1963. 

1961-1963, pp 69-75. 

304 
NOTES TO PAGES 22-26 

waii, n.d.), pp 92-93; Fact Sheet, Lucky 

Dragon Film Processing, May 8, 1964, in 

CINCPACAF Report for General Smart, 

Secretary of Defense Meeting, May 13, 

1964, Bk 11; Anthony, Chap V; William H. 

Greenhalgh, Jr., “U.S. Air Force Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, 1960-1975,” 

manuscript (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1977), pp 

118-121 [hereafter cited as Greenhalgh, 

“USAF Reconnaissance in SEA, 1960- 

1975”l. 

37. JCSM-168-68, Mar 2, 1964. 

38. NSAM 288, Mar 17, 1964; Gravel 

Pentagon Papers, 111, 499-510. 

39. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 927, Mar 1, 1964, 942, Mar 3, 

1964; airgram, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, A-249, Mar 4, 1964, subj: Utilization of T-28 Aircraft; memo, Dir/Ops, 

USAF, to CSAF, subj: Concept of Employment of the Royal Laotian Air Force, Mar 

3, 1964; JCSM 202-64, Mar 11, 1964. 

40. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964 

(Washington, 1965), pp 72-73; Anthony, 

Chap V; Msgs, PACAF to CINCPAC, 

CINCPAC, PFCVC-044, 13 Jan 64, 

PFDOP-5010-64, 25 Feb 64, CINCPAC to 

OSD/ISA, 6 Dec 63; hist, PACAF, JanJun 1964, I, pt 2, 147-48; hist, SAWC, 

Jan-Jun 1964, I, 44-48, 61-65; AFXOPJ, 

Book on Actions in Southeast Asia, 

1961-1964, Item 111-H. 

41. Talking Paper for the JCS, Laos, 

May 17, 1965; JCS 2344/81, May 25, 1965; 

Anthony, Chap IV; hists, PACAF, Jan-Jun 

1964, I, pt 2, 148, 151, Jan-Jun 1965, I, pt 

2, Yankee Team Chronology, 66-67, 76-77; 

msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

#1669, 17 May 64, #1442, 27 May 64, 2d 

AD to 13th AF, 2CCR-64-249E, 25 May 

USAF, PFDOP-5153-63, 27 NOV 64, 

64; Capt Thomas R. Knox, “Waterpump, 

1964-1965,” Aerospace Commentary, 11, 2 

(Spring 1970), 51-52. 

42. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC (Gen 

Taylor to Adm Felt and Gen Harkins), 

1817422 May 64, JCS to CINCPAC, 

2016532 May 64, #2215, 18 May 64, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, #2274, 20 May 64, 

2d AD to PACAF, 13th AF, 

2CCR-64-244E, 22 May 64, to 13th AF, 

2CCR-64-249E, 25 May 64; hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 269-270; hist, MACV, 1964, 

p 47; hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 1964, I, pt 2, 

p 148, Jan-Jun 1965, I, pt 2, Yankee Team 

Chronology, pp 67-82; Anthony, Chap IV; 

Greenhalgh, “USAF Reconnaissance in 

43. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 2016532 

May 64; hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 

269-270; Greenhalgh, “USAF Reconnaissance in SEA, 1960-1975,” pp 127-28; New 

York Times, May 22, 1964. 

44. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC (Gen 

Taylor to Adm Felt and General Harkins), 

1817422 May 64, JCS to CINCPAC, 

2016532 May 64, CINCPAC et al., #6470, 

25 May 64, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 

2608362 May 64; hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 

269-270; hist, MACV, 1964, p 47; hist, 

PACAF, Jan-Jun 1964, I, pt 2, Yankee 

Team Chronology, 67-82; Anthony, Chap 

IV; AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in Southeast Asia, 1961-1964, Item V-B. 

45, Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964, 

pp 75-77; Anthony, Chap IV; hists, PACAF, Jan-Jun 1964, I, pt 2 pp 148, 

151-152, Jan-Jun 1965, I, pt. 2, Yankee 

Team Chronology, pp 66-67; msgs, AmEmb 

Vietiane to SECSTATE, #1669, 17 May 64, 

USAIRA Vietiane to DIA, CX-332, 27 Jun 

64; Knox, “Waterpump, 1964-1965,” p 57; 

Project CHECO, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1964-1965, p 18. 

SEA, 1960-1975,” pp 127-28. 

305 
NOTES TO PAGES 27-35 

Chapter I1 

Expansion of Counterin filtration Activities 

1. Anthony, Chap VI. 

2. Anthony, Chap V; 1st Lt Robert L. 

MacNaughton, Yankee Team, May 

1964-June 1965 (Project CHECO, Hickam 

AFB, Hawaii, 1966), pp 6, 11-12; Rebecca 

Y. Noell, Tactical Air Command in Southeast Asia, 1961-1968 (Langley AFB, Va., 

1972), p 30; Robert F. Futrell, A Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 1954-1967 (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 

1967), p 34 [hereafter cited as Futrell, 

Chronology]. 

3. MSgt Robert T. Helmka and TSgt 

Beverly Hale, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1964-1965 (Project CHECO, Hickam 

AFB, Hawaii, 1966), pp 10-11. 

4. Intvw, Lt Col Robert G. Zimmerman, Oral Hist Br, Albert F. Simpson Hist 

Rsch Cen, with Col Robert L. F. Tyrrell, 

former AIRA, Vientiane, May 12, 1975, pp 

40-45; Air and Ground War in Laos, 

1965-1967, pp 8-9. 

5. MR, William P. Bundy, Asst SECSTATE for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 

subj: Views of Ambassador Unger on Operations in Eastern Laos, Apr 29, 1964. 

6. Ibid.; MACV OPlan 34B-64, CrossBorder Operations into Laos, Dec 18, 1964 

(redesignated OPlan 98A-64 in 1964); Talking Paper for JCS for SECDEF-NSC Mtg 

on Apr 20, 1964, Recommendation 11, 

National Security Action Memorandum 

288. 

7. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

499-510; N.Y. Times Pentagon Papers, pp 

283-85; msg, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 1913, Apr 6, 1964. 

8. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 0222232 

May 64; hist, MACV, 1964, Annex A, p 

A-1; Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, 

Ret, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y., 

9. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1232, Apr 30, 1964, SECSTATE 

to AmEmb Vientiane, 95, May 5, 1964, to 

1976). pp 106-07. 

AmEmb Saigon, 1832, May 5, 1964; memo, 

Rear Adm Francis J. Blouin, USN, Dir/FE 

Region, ISA, to John T. McNaughton, Asst 

SECDEF (ISA), subj: Status of Current 

Authorizations for Operational and Combined Planning for Cross-Border Operations into Laos, Jul 1, 1964; msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon, 130, Jul 14, 

1964, 256, Jul 25, 1964, AmEmb Saigon to 

SECSTATE, 202, Jul 24, 1964, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2512452 Jul 65, 

AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 457, Aug 

17, 1964, COMUSMACV to JCS, 0308572 

Sep 64; memo, Lt Col Steve A. Marcinko, 

USAF, mil rep to Benjamin H. Read, Ofc 

of SECSTATE, no subj, Sep 23, 1964. 

AmEmb Saigon and JCS, 2721412 Jul 64. 

11. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0110572 Jul 64. 

12. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 457, Aug 17, 1964, 485, Aug 20, 

1964, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

1609432 Aug 64. 

13. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 263, Aug 7, 1964, AmEmb Saigon 

to SECSTATE, 485, Aug 20, 1964. 

14. Gravel Pentagon Papers, III, 

565-66; msgs, COMUSMACV to JCS, 

AFIN 57320, Oct 23, 1965, AmEmb Saigon 

to SECSTATE, 1068, 0910502 Oct 64. 

15. Memo, Asst Dir/Processing, Asst 

SECDEF (ISA), to Asst SECDEF (ISA), 

ATTN: Mr. Solbert, Jul 27, 1964; 

JCSM-595-64, Jul 10, 1964; memo, SECDEF to CJCS, Jul 15, 1964. 

16. Msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 89, Jul 26, 1964, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 170, Jul 27, 1964; 

Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 512-17. 

17. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964, 

pp 24-26; Background Info on SEA and 

VN, p 214. 

10. Msg, SECDEF-SECSTATE, to 
NOTES TO PAGES 35-46 

18. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964, 

pp 27-35; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p 

119. 

19. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0408452 Aug 64, AmEmb Saigon 

to SECSTATE, 486, Aug 20, 1964, AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE, 423, Sep 7, 1964. 

20. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 423, Sep 7, 1964. 

21. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

22. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

23. Msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 275, Sep 25, 1964, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 531, Sep 29, 1964, 

and 0105472 Oct 64; Anthony, Chap V. 

24. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to 2d AD, 

3001542 Sep 64; Anthony, Chap VII. 

25. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 568, 0306302 Oct 64, 581, 

0611002 Oct 64; Anthony, Chap VII; Tyrre11 intvw, May 12, 1975. 

26. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSECDEF to ArnEmb Vientiane, Oct 7, 

1964. 

27. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 1068, 0910502 Oct 64, 

SECSTATE-SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 330, Oct 13, 1965, CINCPAC to 

563-66. 

566-68, 

STATE, 582, 0610442 Oct 64, SECSTATEJCS, 2122212 Oct 64; JCSM-870-64, Oct 

13, 1964; JCSM-889-64, Oct 20, 1964; 

Anthony, Chap IV. 

28. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 616, 1404512 Oct 64, 619, 

1411392 Oct 64, and 2211072 Oct 64, 

SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 358, Oct 

20, 1964; Anthony, Chap VII. 

29. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 67, 2611312 Oct 64; Anthony, 

Chap VII. 

30. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, et al, 2812112 and 3111462 Oct 

64, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 374, 

Oct 24, 1964, JCS to CINCPAC, 3017422 

Oct 64, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 

0613332 Oct 64, AmErnb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 706, Nov 3, 1964, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 411, Nov 5, 1964; Anthony, Chap VII. 

31. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0105012 

Nov 64, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

706, 0306082 Nov 64, AmEmb Saigon to 

SECSTATE, 0611132 Nov 64; Van Staaveren, WAF Plans and Policies in South 

Vietnam and Laos, 1964, pp 36-38; Anthony, Chap VII. 

32. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 769, Nov 18, 1964, 772, Nov 18, 

1964, 783, Nov 21, 1964, 784, Nov 21, 

1964, and 2105212 Nov 64; rpt, 2d CCR to 

MACV 5-3, subj: MONEVAL, 2 Dec 64; 

AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in Southeast 

Asia, Item IV-H. 

33. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2123572 

Nov 64; JCSM-997-64, Military Action in 

Laos, Nov 28, 1964. 

34. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 748, Nov 21, 1964, 971, Nov 22, 

1964; Anthony, Chap VII; rpt, 2d CCR to 

MACV 5-3, subj: MONEVAL, 2 Dec 64; 

AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in Southeast 

Asia, Item IV-H. 

35. Rprt, Current Situation in South 

Vietnam, November 1964 [signed Taylor], 

Nov 27, 1964. 

36. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and 

Plowshares (New York, 1972), pp 326-27; 

Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in 

South Vietnam and Laos, 1964, pp 43-44; 

Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 248-255, 

677-683; AFXOPJ, Book on Actions in 

Southeast Asia, 1961-1964, Items IV-Y, 

IV-z. 

37. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1011532 Dec 64, 868, 10 Dec 64, 

JCS to CINCPAC, 1121442 Dec 64, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 1206122 Dec 64, 

COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, 1206122 

Dec 64; JCSM-1041-61, Dec 11, 1964; MR, 

subj: Meeting of National Security Council 

Principals, Dec 12, 1964; Gravel Pentagon 

Papers, 111, 253-54, 335-336; AFXOPJ, 

Book on Actions in Southeast Asia, 

1961-1964, Item IV-2. 

SMACV, CINCPACFLT, 1206122 Dec 64, 

2d AD to JCS, MACV, CINCPAC, et al, 

1405262 Dec 64, 1413232 Dec 64, 2d AD 

38. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMU307 
NOTES TO PAGES 46-55 

CP to 13th AF CP, 1407352 Dec 64, 23rd 

ABG, 2d CCR, 00648, 24 Dec 64, 80th 

TFS, 2d CCR, 00651, 25 Dec 64, USAF to 

PACAF, AFXOP, 60097, 24 Dec 64; Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 254; Anthony, 

Chap IV; hists, 19th TFW, Jul-Dec 1964, p 

40, Jan-Jun 1965, p 3; Robert T. Helmka 

and Beverly Hale, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1964- 1965, (Project CHECO , 

Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1966), pp 81-82; 

AFXOPLC, Analysis of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, Vol I, sec 2. 

39. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 920, 1811402 Dec 64; Melvin F. 

Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966 

(Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 

40. JCSM-1050-64, Dec 17, 1964; msg, 

JCS to CINCPAC, 2818412 Dec 64; Sams, 

Escalation of the War in Southeast Asia, 

July-December 1964, pp 203-217; msgs, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 893, 

1509422 Dec 64, to SECSTATE et al, 

3009372 Dec 64. 

41. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 254; 

msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 

2077, 0710102 Jan 65, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, 1397, Jan 5, 1965. 

42. JCSM-7-65, Jan 7, 1965; 

JCSM-28-65, Jan 15, 1965; msgs, AmEmb 

Saigon to SECSTATE, 2086, 0809502 Jan 

65, 2074, 0705552 Jan 65. 

1967), pp 6-7. 

43. Anthony, Chap VII. 

44. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1081, 1809532 Jan 65, 1098, 

2111252 Jan 65, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 616, Jan 19, 1965, 619, Jan 20, 

1965, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 

CINCPACFLT, 1901562 Jan 65, CSAF to 

PACAF, 79414, Jan 22, 1965. 

45. Memo, Maj Gen Reginald J. 

Clizbe, Dir/Ops, USAF, to SAF, subj: Use 

of Infrared-Equipped Aircraft for Locating 

Targets in Laos at Night, Jan 6, 1965; 

memo, SAF to SECDEF, subj: Use of 

Infrared-Equipped Aircraft for Locating 

Targets in Laos at Night, Jan 11, 1965; 

msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Jan 11, 1965, 

CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 1300312 Jan 

65, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 1404082 

Jan 65, CINCPAC to JCS, 2119592 Jan 

65, CINCPACAF to 2d AD, 2401082 Jan 

65; Anthony, Chap VII. 

46. Msg, SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 0312562 Feb 65; Anthony, Chap 

VIII. 

47. Anthony, Chaps VII, VIII. 

48. Rprt of Inves, Board of Officers to 

Investigate Incident at MACV Compound 

and Camp Holloway, Pleiku, South Vietnam [Maj Gen Milton B. Adams, President], Feb 16, 1965. 

49. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0710562, 

1109422, and 1322202 Feb 65, 2d AD to 

PACAF, 1107482 Feb 65. 

50. Jacob Van Staaveren, WAF Plans 

and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965 

(Washington, 1966), p 13. 

51. Idsg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1363, 2609002 Feb 65. 

Chapter I11 

The Beginning of the STEEL TIGER Program 

1. Adm U. S. G. Sharp, USN, and Gen 

W. C. Westmoreland USA, Report on the 

War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) 

(Washington, 1969), p 107; hist, MACV, 

1964, p 47. 

2. Msg, ADMINO CINCPAC to 

CINCPAC (Exclusive for Adm Sharp), 

1000302 Mar 65. 

3. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

1403152 Mar 65, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 1622592 Mar 65. 

4. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1416, 0612152 Mar 65, CINCPAC 

to JCS, 0502532 Mar 65. 

5. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1433, Mar 13, 1965. 

308 
6. Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vien7. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SEC8. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

9. Ibid.; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 

2000192 Mar 65. 

10. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1511, 2205462 Mar 65, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 809, Mar 20, 

1965. 

11. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2710522 Mar 65, CTF 77 to 

CINCPACFLT, 27 18482 Mar 65. 

12. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2710522 Mar 65; Van Staaveren, 

USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast 

Asia, 1965, pp 30, 37. 

13. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 3011282 Mar 65, to COMUSMACV, info SECSTATE, 1573, Mar 31, 

1965. 

14. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 3122222 Mar 

65. 

15. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 

16. Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 5 vols (Washington, 1965), I, 

2-16A through 2-20A, 11, 2-13 through 

17. Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 11, Sec 2, 111, Sec 2, IV, Sec 2; 

msg, AmEmb-AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2612252 Apr 65. 

18. Memo, Maj Gen Reginald J. 

Clizbe, Dir/Ops, USAF, to Lt Gen Keith K. 

Compton, DCS/Plans & Ops, USAF, subj: 

Interdiction Program in Southeast Asia, 

Apr 13, 1965; msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 

1718532 Apr 65. 

19. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 2107122 Apr 65, 18th ADVON, 

Korat RTAFB, to 2d AD, 1705202 Apr 65, 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 

1787, May 3, 1965, to COMUSMACV (Exclusive for Westmoreland), 1310572 May 

65. 

20. Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, V, 1-1; Greenhalgh, “USAF 

tiane, 780, Mar 14, 1965. 

STATE, 1470, Mar 16, 1965. 

337-340. 

702-03. 

2-15. 

NOTES TO PAGES 55-68 

Reconnaissance in SEA, 1960-1975,” pp 

21. Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, V, 1-1; Greenhalgh, “USAF 

Reconnaissance in SEA, 1960-1975,” pp 

22. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 181 1102 Apr 65, AmEmb-AIRA 

Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2211382 Apr 

65, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 

2d AD, 2211592 Apr 65, AmEmb Bangkok 

(Martin) to COMUSMACV, 2411092 Apr 

65; Helmka and Hale, USAF Operations 

from Thailand, 1964-1965, pp 76-77. 

23. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 

2460, 1001052 May 65, AmEmb Vientiane 

to SECSTATE, 1919, May 25, 1975, 2d AD 

to AIG 914, 2314042 May 65. 

24. Anthony, Chap VIII. 

25. Msgs, CTF 77 to COMUSMACV, 

1118512 May 65 (retransmitted by COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1302452 May 65), 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 

1911402 May 65. 

26. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 1113, Jun 

25, 1965, COMUSMACV to 2d AD et al, 

1907352. 

27. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1305012 May 65, to COMUSMACV, 

1706002 May 65; memo, Gen William H. 

Blanchard, VCSAF, to SAF, subj: Analysis 

of Alleged Air Strikes against Friendly Targets and Other Unauthorized Targets in 

Laos, Apr 13, 1966. 

28. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to JCS, 

CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, 

et a/, 2109052 May 65, AmEmb Vientiane 

to COMUSMACV, 1706002 May 65. 

29. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 2305002 May 65, to CINCPAC (personal from Sullivan to Sharp), 2209412 

May 65; memo, Blanchard to SAF, Apr 13, 

1966. 

30. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 2504402 May 65. 

31. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 2209412 May 65 and 0504002 Jun 

65, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV et 

181-82. 

72-78, 97-106. 

STATE, 2070, 2310462, SECSTATE309 
NOTES TO PAGES 68-78 

al, 2510382 May 65; hist, CINCPAC, 1965, 

32. Msgs, AmEmb-AIRA Vientiane to 

CINCPAC, CINCPACAF et al, 2611352 

May 65, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 

2611372 May 65. 

33. Msgs, SECSTATE to CINCPAC, 

0703122 Jun 65 (relays msg, AmEmb Saigon (Taylor) to SECSTATE, Jun 5, 1965), 

CINCPACAF to CSAF, AFIN 17988 and 

AFIN 17995, Jun 8, 1965; DIA Bul 112-65, 

Jun 10, 1965; Talking Paper for CJCS, 

CNO Evaluation of Effectiveness of Road 

Interdiction in Southern Laos, Jun 4, 1965. 

34. Helmka and Hale, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1964-1965, p 26. 

35. Msg, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, COMUSMACV, 2603302 Jun 65. 

36. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

Jun 12, 1965, to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Jun 24, 1965, COMUSMACV to 

CINCPAC 3002472 Jun 65, CINCPACAF 

to CSAF, AFIN 17988 and AFIN 17995, 

Jun 8, 1965. 

11, 403-04. 

37. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2054, 2104452 Jun 65. 

PAC, 2002472 Jun 65. 

39. Talking Paper for CJCS, Possibility of Barrier across 17th Parallel, Oct 65. 

SMACV, 3022492 Mar 65, AmEmb Bangkok to CINCPAC, 0604082 Apr 65, 

AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, 3664, 

2107122 Apr 65, AmEmb Vientiane to 

SECSTATE, 2311002 Apr 65. 

41. Msgs, AmEmb Bangkok to CINCPAC, 0604082 Apr 65 and 1501302 May 

65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1201522 

and 1207142 May 65, JCS to CINCPAC, 

2523182 Jun 65; MACV Briefing for Visit 

of the Secretary of Defense, 16-20 July 

1965, Tab 10. 

PAC, 1201522 May 65. 

Jun 65. 

PAC, 0504382 Jul 65, JCS to CINCPAC, 

2021092 Sep 65. 

38. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC40. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMU42. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC43. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 2523182 

44. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCChapter IV 

Expansion of the Aerial Anti-in filtration Campaign 

July-December 1965 

1. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p 4. MACV briefing bk, Jul 65, Tab 3; 

140; msgs, SECSTATE to CINCPAC MR, MACV, Meeting between McNamara 

(Taylor to Sharp and Westmoreland), and Party and COMUSMACV and Staff, 

1116002 Jul 65, SECDEF to AmEmb Sai- Aug 2, 1965. 

gon, 0817312 Jul 65. 5. MACV briefing bk, Jul 65; msg, 

2. Msg, SECSTATE to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1508372 Jul 

65. 1116002 Jul 65; MACV briefing bk, Brief6. Memo, SECDEF to Pres, Jul 20, ing for Visit of SECDEF, JUl 65, Tab 15; 

MR, subj: Record Of Questions 

1965 (partial text in ~~~~~l pentagon papers, Iv, 619-622); Public Papers of the 

and Answers in Meeting between . . ' Mc- Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. 

Namara and His Party . . . and His Johnson, 1965 (Washington, 1966), 11, 795; 

and CoMUSMACV and His Staff, Futrell, Chronology, p 85; hist, 355th TFW, 

3. OSD bklt, SECDEF Saigon Trip, Jul 7. Summary of Air Operations, South14, 1965, Tab 10; MR, MACV, subj: Meet- east Asia, 109 vols (Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 

ing between McNamara and Party and 1965-1973), 11, 111, IV, VI (see Steel Tiger 

COMUSMACV and Staff, Aug 3, 1965. sections); NMCC OpSums 155-65, Jul 65, 

JUI 16, 1965; DIA BUI 136-65, JUI 14, 1965. JU~ l-~ec 31, 1965, p 36. 

3 10 
NOTES TO PAGES 78-88 

through 175-65, Jul 65, and 178-65, Aug 2, 

1965, through 226-65, Sep 28, 1965; msg, 

CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 2001242 Aug 

65. 

8. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 11, 1-3, IV, 2-13, VI, 2-5; msg, 

CAF, et a/, 3011122 Aug 65. 

9. Msgs, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, SECDEF, JCS, 149, 2406172 Jul 

65, ADMINO CINCPAC to CINCPAC 

(Adm Sharp), 2123462 Jul 65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, et 

al, 2001122 Aug 65. 

10. Msg, DIA to AIG 926 

(CINCPAC), 1420192 Jul 65; DIA Intel 

11. Msgs, DIA to AIG 7011, 2703112 

Sep 65, JCS to CINCPAC, 1714122 Aug 

65, DIA to AIG 925, 0220452 Sep 65, 

CINCPAC to AIG 929, 0802392 Sep 65, 

CINCPAC to JCS, Sep 65; DIA Intel Buls 

168-65, Aug 30, 1965, and 207-65, Sep 65. 

12. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 11, 1-1; msgs, CINCPAC to 

COMUSMACV et al, 1322192 Jul 65, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 3009302 Sep 

65. 

13. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2409252 Aug 65, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2908302 Aug 65; 

hist, SAC, 1965, 11, 434. 

SMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, 

1322192 Jul 65. 

SMACV, 0721202 Aug 65, 2d AD to Dep 

Comdr, 2d AD, Udorn RTAFB, 1112112 

Aug 65. 

16. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2409252 Aug 65, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2908302 Aug 65. 

17. Msg, AMEmb-AIRA Vientiane to 

COMUSMACV, 021 1152 Jul 65. 

18. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

1023462 Jul65, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1513062 Jul 65, AIRA Vientiane 

to CINCPAC, 2310072 Jul 65, 2d AD to 

CINCPAC, 2604452 Jul 65, CINCPAC to 

PAC to COMUSMACV, 2119292 Sep 65; 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, CINCPABul 161-65, Aug 19, 1965. 

14. Msg, CINCPAC to COMU15. Msgs, CINCPACAF to COMUCOMUSMACV, 0502252 Aug 65, CINCintvw, Lt Col James C. Enney and Capt 

Robert N. Snakenberg, Proj Corona Harvest, with Col Franklin D. Lown, Jr., Dir/ 

Intel, 2d AD (Apr 65-May 66), Nov 4, 

1969. 

PAC, 1705182 Jul 65, to AmEmb Vientiane, 11 11 122 Aug 65, AIRA Vientiane to 

CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 3011312 Aug 

65, AmEmb-AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0103072 Sep 65, COMUSMACV to 

AIRA Vientiane, 0504212 Sep 65, COMUSMACV to 2d AD, COMSEVENTHFLT, 

0712052 Oct 65; Fact Sheet, MACV, Steel 

Tiger, Aug 13, 1965, in MACV rprt, Laos 

Staff Study, Sep 28, 1965. 

20. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1206592 Sep 65. 

21. Msgs, AmEmb-AIRA Vientiane to 

PACFLT TO CINCPAC, 1122222 Sep 65, 

AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC el a/, 

1211452 Sep 65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1507232 Sep 65, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al, 1620332 Sep 65. 

22. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 0300312 

Jul 65, CINCPAC to JCS, 1804032 Aug 

65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1705182 

Jul 65, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 

PAC, 2001242 Aug 65. 

23. Msg, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

2823462 Aug 65. 

24. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 142, 0911242 Aug 65, SECSTATE 

to AmEmb Vientiane, 106, Aug 12, 1965, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 161, 

1310402 Aug 65. 

PAC, 2709492 Jul 65, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2721022 Jul 65, CINCPAC to JCS, 

3121402 Jul 65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0211052 Aug 65, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 106, Aug 12, 1965, 

CINCPAC to CJCS (Exclusive Sharp to 

Wheeler), 2402332 Aug 65. 

26. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to 

AmEmb Bangkok, 146, 0111002 Aug 65, 

148, 0909362 Sep 65, CINCPAC to COMUSMACTHAI, 3005432 Aug 65; Hearings 

before the Subcommittee on United States 

19. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCCINCPAC, 3011322 Aug 65, CINC2805482 Ju~ 65, CINCPACAF to CINC25. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC311 
NOTES TO PACES 88-96 

Security Agreements and Commitments 

Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom 

of Laos, Statement by Amb William H. 

Sullivan, Dep Asst SECSTATE for Far 

Eastern and Pacific Affairs on Oct 21, 

1969, 91st Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 

1970), p 490; msg, AmEmb Bangkok to 

SECSTATE, SECDEF, JCS, et al, 2406172 

Jul 65. 

27. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 0521432 

Jul 65, 1018412 Jul 65, CINCPAC to 

COMUSMACTHAI, 3005432 Aug 65, to 

DIA, 1003562 Sep 65. 

PAC, 2506362 Sep 65, to AIRA Vientiane, 

2d AD, 2100362 Sep 65, COMUSMACV to 

2d AD, COMSEVENTHFLT, 2814252 Sep 

65, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 0523572 

Oct 65. 

29. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 

DIA, et al, 0108372 Oct 65, 0117112 Oct 

65; memo, Blanchard to CSAF, Apr 13, 

1966. 

30. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 

DIA, et a/, 0117112 Oct 65, 0117102 Oct 

65. 

31. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

1003002 Oct 65,2d AD to COMUSMACV, 

0800052 Oct 65. 

32. Msgs, COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 

CTG 77.3, 0206302 Oct 65, AIRA Vientiane to CSAF, DIA, et a/, 0117112 Oct 65, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0307152 Oct 

65, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, 1202192 Oct 65, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 0508152 Oct 65. 

33. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 2021092 

Sep 65. 

34. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al, 2901272 Sep 65, COMUSMACV to CINCPACAF, 2314122 Dec 65, 

2d AD to 6233d CSG, Ubon, 6232d CSG, 

Udorn, 6252d CSG, Da Nang, et a/, 

1404542 Oct 65. 

35. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 3007032 Sep 65, 2407002 Oct 65. 

36. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1709402 Oct 65, 2409552 Oct 65; 

28. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCCOMUSMACV Briefing, in MACV briefing 

bk, Nov 28, 1965, I. 

37. COMUSMACV Briefing, in MACV 

briefing bk, Nov 28, 1965, I; msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2407552 Oct 65, 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 

0305212 Nov 65, COMUSMACV to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 2702502 Oct 65, COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 3102352 Oct 65, 2d 

AD to 6233d CSG, Ubon, 6235 CSG, 

Takhli, et al, 3103052 Oct 65. 

PAC, 0212332 Nov 65, 0412012 Nov 65, 

0608552 Nov 65, COMUSMACV to 2d 

AD, 0410542 Nov 65, CINCPAC to JCS, 

0904302 Nov 65; COMUSMACV Briefing, 

in MACV briefing bk, Nov 28, 1965, I. 

msgs, NMCC to MACV, 2421452 Oct 65, 

COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane (Personal Westmoreland to Sullivan), 2801232 

Oct 65. 

40. Msgs, CINCPAC to CJCS (Personal Sharp to Wheeler), 0323292 Nov 65, 

AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0304162 

Nov 65, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0510452 Nov 65. 

41. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0501462 Nov 65, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0806002 Nov 65. 

42. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1404022 Nov 65, 2211002 Nov 65, 

AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 1410052 Nov 65, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 1505202 Nov 65. 

43. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, X, 3-4, XI, 3-4 to 3-5. 

44. NMCC OpSum 271-65, Nov 21, 

1965. 

45. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 1509472 Nov 65, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 2009052 Nov 65, to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2101352 Nov 65, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2211012 Nov 65, 

SECSTATE-SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 330, 2501302 Nov 65, COMUSMACV to USARV, 2311402 Nov 65. 

46. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 0500262 Nov 65, to DIA, JCS, 

CINCPAC, 2310082 Nov 65, AmEmb 

Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2400592 Nov 

38. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC39. DIA Bul 207-65, Oct 27, 1965; 

312 
NOTES TO PAGES 96-103 

65, SECSTATE-SECDEF to CINCPAC 

(Exclusive for Sharp), 2213002 Nov 65, 

STATE, 0911492 Dec 65. 

47. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 

p 196; Gen Westmoreland’s Historical 

Briefing, Nov 28, 1965. 

48. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2901582 Nov 65, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, Dec 10, 1965; General 

Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, Nov 

28,1965; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XIII, 3-1; PACAF Activity Input 

to Proj Corona Harvest, OutCountry Strike Operations in Southeast 

Asia, 1 January 1965-31 March 1968, Vol 

I, Sub Task IIc: Strike Operations in Laos, 

5 December 1965-31 October 1967 (Maxwell 

AFB, Ala., 1970), 35-36 [hereafter cited as 

Strike Ops in Laos, 5 Dec 65-31 Oct 671. 

49. General Westmoreland’s Historical 

Briefing, Nov 28, 1965; Porter, Interdiction 

in SEA, 1965-1966, p 43. 

50. Msgs, 2d AD to 355th TFW et al, 

2705252 Nov 65, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2611012 Nov 65, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV (Sullivan to Westmoreland and Moore), 0207152 Dec 65, 

VENTHFLT, 0300302 Dec 65, 2d AD to 

PACAF, 0509572 Dec 65; memo, Blanchard to SAF, Apr 13, 1966; Helmka and 

Hale, USAF Operations from Thailand, 

51. Msgs, 2d AD to CINCPAC, 

2912002 Nov 65, to PACAF, 0309252 Dec 

65; memo, MACV to SECDEF, subj: Special Needs to Support Project Tiger Hound, 

Nov 28, 1965; MACV 5-2 Briefing, Nov 28, 

1965. 

52. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2101352 Nov 65; General Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, Nov 28, 

1965; COMUSMACV Briefing, Steel Tiger, 

Nov 28, 1965; Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

1965-1966, p 43; Strike Ops in Laos, 5 Dec 

53. Msgs, COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 

0403352 Dec 65, AmEmb Vientiane to 

SECSTATE, 610, 0404172 Dec 65; Porter, 

Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 43. 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, JCS, SECCOMUSMACV to 2d AD, COMUSSE1964-1965, p 87. 

65-31 Oct 67, 40. 

54. Melvin F. Porter, Tiger Hound 

(Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 

1966), pp 11-13; intvw, Maj Ralph A. 

Rowley and Mr. Riley Sunderland, Ofc/AF 

Hist, with Lt Col Roy C. Dalton, Dir/Ops, 

USAF, Feb 8, 1973. 

55. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 291 1192 Nov 65, 3001 122 Nov 65, 

0404172 Dec 65, SECDEF to JCS, 1020122 

Dec 65. 

56. Strike Ops in Laos, 5 Dec 65-31 

Oct 67, 40-41; Porter, Tiger Hound, pp 

15-16; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XIII, 3-3, 3-D-47; Working 

Paper 66/5, 2d AD Tac Eva1 Cen, Tiger 

Hound Effectiveness, Mar 14, 1966; msg, 

CINCPAC to JCS, 1500402 Dec 65. 

57. Msg, COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 

2712002 Nov 65; Porter, Tiger Hound, pp 

15-16; Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

1965-1966, pp 45-46; Strike Ops in Laos, 5 

Dee 65-31 Oct 67, 38-40; hist, SAC, JulDec 65, 11, 284-85; memo, Rear Adm 

Francis J. Blouin, USN, Dir/FE Region, 

Asst SECDEF (ISA) to Mr. John T. McNaughton, Asst SECDEF (ISA), subj: Use 

of Arc Light Forces, Dec 9, 1965. 

58. New York Daily News, Dec 14, 

1965; Washington Post, Dec 28, 1965, p 1; 

msgs, SECSTATE-SECDEF to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 393, Dec 14, 1965, AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2005462 Dec 65; 

hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 65, 11, 284-85. 

59. Porter, Tiger Hound, pp 15-19. 

60. Assessment of the Air Effort in 

Vietnam and Laos (As of 31 January 1966) 

(Washington, 1966), Annex B, Tab B [hereafter cited as Air Effort in Vietnam and 

Laos]; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XI, 6-4 to 6-6, XIII, 3-6, 3-7, 

XIV, 3-5, 3-6; memo, Harold Brown, SAF, 

to CSAF, subj: Improved Intelligence 

Handling in Southeast Asia, Nov 30, 1965; 

hists, 363d TRW, Jul-Dec 65, pp 31-41, 

6250th CSG, Jul 1-Dec 31, 1965, pp 1-2; 

USAF Management Summary, Southeast 

Asia, Jan 7, 1966, p 24. 

61. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECDEF, 2305252 Dec 65, SECSTATESECDEF to CINCPAC, 2502422 Dec 65, 

SECDEF to principal defense agencies, 

313 
NOTES TO PAGES 103-112 

2300132 Dec 65, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, JCS (Exclusive from Westmoreland 

to McConnell and Sharp), 2609362 Dec 65; 

PACAF DI Report, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, Jan 6, 1966; msg, 

COMUSMACV to 2d AD, 2508072 Dec 65; 

Porter, Tiger Hound, pp 17-18. 

62. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XIII, 3-A-3. 

63. Hist, MACV, 1965, pp 11-15. 

64. Hist, MACV, 1965, pp 262, 

268-273; M. G. Weiner, J. R. Brom, and 

R. E. Koon, Infiltration of Personnel from 

North Vietnam, 1959-1967 (Santa Monica, 

RM-5760-PR, 1968), p 45; msg, CINCPAC 

to JCS (Lt Gen Paul S. Emrick to Vice 

Adm Lloyd M. Mustin, USN), 1103402 Jan 

66. 

Chapter V 

New Aerial Programs and Tactics against In filtration 

January-June 1966 

1. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XV through XX (Sec 3 of each 

vol); msg, AIRA Vientiane to JCS, DIA, 

1209192 Mar 66; Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Fiscal 

Year 1974 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development 

. . . and Active Duty and Selected Reserve 

Strengths, 93d Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 

1973), pt 1, p 427 [hereafter cited as Senate 

Armed Services Committee Hearings on 

Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military 

Procurement]. 

2. Warren A. Trest and SSgt Dale E. 

Hammons, WAF Operations from Thailand, 1966 (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, 

Hawaii, 1967), p 97; msg, CINCPAC TO 

DIA, 1503322 Mar 66; memo, 1st Lt John 

M. Caffery 111, Cricket Intel Sec, to 

Comdr, 4th ACW, subj: Mission of Cricket 

AC-47s, Mar 30, 1966. 

3. EOTR, Brig Gen John R. Murphy, 

Dep Comdr, 7th AF/13th AF, Jul 8, 1966; 

Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967, p 

10. 

4. Hist, 20th TASS, n.d.; Murphy 

EOTR, Jul 8, 1966; hist, CINCPAC, 11, 

530. 

5. Hists, 20th TASS, n.d., CINCPAC, 

1966, 11, 530. 

6. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1106472 Feb 66; Summary of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XVI, 3-6 

through 3-9, Tab 111-C; hist, CINCPAC, 

1966, 11, 530; Effects of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, pp 16-17. 

7. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

8. Memo, Det 3, 505th TCG, to AOC 

Udorn, 2d AD, 305th TCG, subj: Summary 

of Activities for February 1966, n.d.; Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, p 

23. 

9. Hist, 23d TASS, n.d.; Trest and 

Hammons, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 97-98; hist, MACV, 1966, p 

392. 

10. Msg, Det 1, 2d AD/13th AF, to 

Dep Comdr, 2d AD/13th AF, 0305502 Mar 

66. 

11. Memo, Caffery to Comdr, 4th 

ACW, Mar 30, 1966; Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, p 23; Air and 

Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967, pp 18-25. 

12. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

1965-1966, pp 56-57; Jack S. Ballard, Development and Employment of Fixed- Wing 

Gunships, 1962-1972 [The Air Force in 

Southeast Asia] (Washington, 1982), p 46. 

13. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

14. Msgs, CINCPACAF to 2d AD 

(Gen Harris to Gen Meyers), 0420512 Feb 

66, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 

0507092 Feb 66, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 2508552 Jan 66, PACAF to 

CINCPAC, 0721202 Feb 66. 

1965-1966, pp 52-53. 

1965-1966, p 56. 

314 
NOTES TO PAGES 112-120 

15. Hist, 23d TASS, n.d.; msg, 13th 

AF to Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, 2707252 

May 66. 

16. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

17. Trest and Hammons, WAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 98-99; intvw, 

Lt Col Robert G. Zimmerman, USAF Oral 

Hist Prgm, with Col Roland K. McCoskrie, 

USAF, Ret, Jul 14, 1975, pp 16-18. 

18. Memo, Lt Col Richard K. Brown, 

Dir/Ops, USAF, to Asst for Jt and NSC 

Matters, subj: Deployment of B-26K Aircraft, Apr 22, 1966; memo, Alain C. Enthoven, Asst SECDEF (Sys Analys), to Asst 

SECDEF (ISA), subj: Detachment 1, 603d 

Air Commando Squadron, May 10, 1966; 

Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 

58; memo, Lt Col Richard K. Brown, 

Dir/Ops, WAF, to Lt Gen Hewitt T. 

Wheless, VCSAF, subj: B-26K for Cricket, 

Apr 22, 1966. 

19. Debriefing, Col Charles L. Daniel, 

HQ 505th TCG, May 5, 1966; Lt Col Ralph 

A. Rowley, FAC Operations, 1965-1970, 

(Washington, 1975), pp 32-34. 

20. Intvw, Proj CHECO officer with 

Col James P. Hagerstrom, Dir/TACC, 

Udorn Afld, Mar 17, 1966. 

21. PACAF DI Quarterly Review, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

Mar 31, 1966, p 111. 

22. Ltr, Lt Col Robert L. Johnson, 

Comdr, Det 3, 505th TCG, to Dep Comdr, 

7th/13th AF, subj: Proposed Strategic Revision for Cricket Operations, May 18, 1966; 

memo, Maj Gen Charles R. Bond, Jr., Dep 

Comdr, 7th/13th AF, to 7th AF, subj: 

Proposed Strategy Revision for Cricket 

Operations, May 25, 1966; ltr, Brig Gen 

Rockly Triantafellu, Dir/Intel, 7th AF, to 

7th/13th AF, same subj, Jun 20, 1966. 

23. Hist, 23d TASS, n.d.; Trest and 

Hammons, WAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 103-04; msg, Westmoreland 

to Sharp and Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66. 

24. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0205302 Feb 66; Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, XV, 3-4, 3-5, 

XVI, 3-4, 3-5. 

1965-1966, p 55. 

25. Msgs, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 1119232 Jan 66, CINCPACAF to 

CINCPAC, 1312352 Jan 66; Summary of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XV, 3-4, 

3-5, XVI, 3-4, 3-5; intvw, AU Oral Hist 

Ofc with Col John F. Groom, Tiger Hound 

TF, May 28, 1966 [hereafter cited as Groom 

intvw] . 

26. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0204302 Feb 66, 2d AD to COMUSMACV, 0902292 Jan 66. 

27. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0205302 Feb 66, CINCPAC to JCS 

(Lt Gen Paul S. Emrick to Vice Adm Lloyd 

M. Mustin), 1103402 Jan 66, 2d AD to 

COMUSMACV, 0902292 Jan 66; Summary 

of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XV, 

28. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 3110152 Jan 66, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 0205302 Feb 66, 2d AD to 

CINCPAC, NMCC, et al, 3110152 Jan 66; 

Porter, Tiger Hound, p 20; Summary of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XV, 3-5. 

29. Groom intvw, May 28, 1966; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

XVII. 

30. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXII, 2-11. 

31. Groom intvw, May 28, 1966. 

32. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0904002 Apr 66; Porter, Tiger 

Hound, pp 32-34; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XVI, 2-17. 

33. Msg, COMUSMACV to CSAF 

(Westmoreland to McConnell), 0806482 

May 66. 

34. Msg, CSAF to COMUSMACV 

(McConnell to Westmoreland), May 11, 

1966. 

35. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

36. Ibid.; Melvin F. Porter, Night Interdiction in Southeast Asia (Project 

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1966), pp 

37. Msg, Westmoreland to Sharp and 

Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66; Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, pp 61-62. 

38. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0207102 Nov 66. 

3-4, 3-5, VI, 3-4, 3-5, XVI, 3-2. 

1965-1966, pp 59-60. 

35-36. 

315 
NOTES TO PAGES 120-129 

39. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0917162 Jan 66, JCS to CINCPAC, 

1204262 Jan 66, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, SECDEF, JCS, 2508552 Jan 66. 

PAC, 2009592 Feb 66. 

PAC, 0311492 Mar 66, COMUSMACV to 

CINCPAC, 0309262 Mar 66. 

42. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2010212 Mar 66; Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, XX, 3-20, 

43. Summary of Air Operations, South40. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC41. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC3-21. 

east Asia, XX, 3-20, 3-21. 

PAC, 1208262, 2609152, 2711002 May 66; 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast 

Asia, XX, 3-20, XXI, Sec 2, XXII, Sec 2; 

hist, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 534. 

45. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1401052 Jan 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2221482 Jan 66. 

46. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

2223122 Jan 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2214482 Jan 66. 

47. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

2223122 Jan 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2214482 Jan 66. 

48. Msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 703, Jan 3, 1966, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0610162 Jan 66. 

49. Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 465, 1401052 Jan 66. 

50. Msg, AmEmb Bangkok (Martin) to 

SECSTATE, CINCPAC, 2508552 Jan 66. 

PAC, 1102402 Feb 66, JCS to CINCPAC, 

COMUSMACV, 2820142 Feb 66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2411352 May 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 

1811062 May 66; memo, Lt Col Robert M. 

Cowherd, USA, East Asia Sec, Dept of 

State, to Herbert B. Thompson, East Asia 

Sec, Dept of State, Oct 4, 1966. 

52. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2822052 

May 66; JCSM-378-66, Jun 7, 1966; 

memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: Shining 

Brass, Jun 16, 1966. 

53. Summary of Air Operations, Southeat Asia, XXIII, 2-21. 

44. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC51. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC54. Msg, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 2038, 3011052 Mar 66; PACAF 

DI Quarterly Review, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, Mar 3 1, 1966, p 11 1. 

55. Nlsg, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 

2511022 May 66. 

56. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0405502 Jun 66. 

57. Ibid. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Melvin F. Porter, The Defense of 

Attopeu, (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, 

Hawaii, 1966), pp 1-2, 5-6; msg, AIRA 

Savannakhet to 2d AD/13th AF, 0313152 

Mar 66. 

60. Porter, The Defense of Attopeu, pp 

1-3; msg, MACV to DIA, CINCPAC, Mar 

10, 1966. 

61. Porter, The Defense of Attopeu, pp 

62. Zbid.; msg, AIRA Savannakhet to 

2d AD/13th AF, 0313152 Mar 65. 

63. Porter, The Defense of Attopeu, pp 

1-3; msgs, AIRA Vientiane to 2d AD, 

COMUSMACV, et al, 0916002 Mar 66, 

AIRA Savannakhet to 2d AD/13th AF, 

0313152 Mar 65. 

64. Porter, The Defense of Attopeu, pp 

1-3. 

7-8. 

65. Ibid., pp 10-11. 

66. Zbid., p 11; msg, AIRA Vientiane 

to 2d AD, COMUSMACV, et al, 0916002 

Mar 66. 

67. Porter, The Defense of Attopeu, pp 

11-13; msgs, AAIRA Savannakhet to AIRA 

Vientiane, 0423502, 0803152 Mar 66. 

68. Msgs, 2d AD to CINCPAC, 

NMCC, et al, 0103052 Jan 66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1703002 Jan 66, 

AIRA Vientiane to 2d AD, 2104152 Jan 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2d 

AD, 1410452 Jan 66, 2d AD to AIRA 

Vientiane, COMUSMACV, et al, 2012002 

Jan 66. 

69. Msgs, 2d AD to CINCPAC, 

NMCC, et al, 0103052 Jan 66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1703002 Jan 66, 

AIRA Vientiane to 2d AD, 2104152 Jan 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2d 

AD, 1410452 Jan 66, 2d AD to AIRA 

3 16 
NOTES TO PAGES 129-138 

Vientiane, COMUSMACV, et al, 2012002 

Jan 66. 

70. Msgs, AmEmb-AIRA Vientiane to 

COMUSMACV, 2d AD, 1410452 Jan 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1703002 Jan 

66, AIRA Vientiane to 2d AD, CTF 77, 

2104152 Jan 66. 

71. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2d AD, 1410452 Jan 66. 

72. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 866, 0805002 Feb 66; memo, 

Blanchard to SAF, Apr 13, 1966. 

73. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to Dep 

Comdr, 2d AD/13th AF, 2d AD, 2511002 

Feb 66; ltr, U. Alexis Johnson, Dep Under 

SECSTATE for Political Affairs, to Cyrus 

R. Vance, Dep SECDEF, Mar 8, 1966. 

74. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2402402 Feb 66, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 2514552 Feb 66, 2d AD, 

2604182 Feb 66. 

75. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2402402 Feb 66, Dep Comdr, 2d 

AD/l3th AF, 2511002 Feb 66. 

76. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2605002 Feb 66. 

77. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV (Personal ChargC d’Affaires 

Swank to General Westmoreland) 2704252 

Feb 66, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 

COMUSMACV, 2823232 Feb 66. 

78. Command Center Chronology Log, 

PACAF, Jan 20-Mar 7, 1966; memo, 

Blanchard to SAF, Apr 13, 1966. 

79. Memo, U. Alexis Johnson, Dep 

Under SECSTATE for Political Affairs, to 

Cyrus R. Vance, Dep SECDEF, Mar 8, 

1966. 

80. DJSM-360-66, Mar 21, 1966; draft 

Itr, SECDEF Robert S. McNamara to U. 

Alexis Johnson, Dep Under SECSTATE for 

Political Affairs, Mar 31, 1966. 

81. Memo, Blanchard to SAF, Apr 13, 

1966. 

82. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 0303002 Jan 66, SECSTATE, 

73 1, 0806002 Jan 66. 

83. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0409002 Jan 66, DIA, CINCPAC, 

CINCPACAF, 0610502 Jan 66. 

84. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0409002 Jan 66; hists, SAC, Jul-Dec 

545; EOTR, Brig Gen Rockly Triantafellu, 

Dir/Intel, 7th AF, Mar 6, 1965-Jul 1, 1966. 

PAC, CINCSAC, 0610552 Jan 66, JCS to 

CINCPAC, CINCSAC, 0723292 Jan 66, 2d 

AD to 3d AD, 1307552 Jan 66, JCS to 

CINCSAC, 1216382 Jan 66, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, 1971, Jan 11, 1966; hist, 

SAC, Jan-Jun 66, I, 117, 124. 

PAC, 0116152 Feb 66, CINCPAC, 

0309262 Mar 66; hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 66, I, 

124. 

66, I, 177-79, 188-89, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 

85. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC86. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC87. Hist, SAC, 1966, I, 124. 

88. Wesley R. C. Melyan, Arc Light, 

2965-1966 (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, 

Hawaii, 1967), pp 127-132; General Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, Apr 9, 1966. 

89. Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-1966, pp 

90. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, JCS (Westmoreland to Sharp and 

Wheeler), 1710372 Mar 66, CINCPAC to 

JCS 2710002 Mar 66; hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 

91. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 2705342 Mar 66, SECSTATE, 

AmEmb Saigon, 3104202 Mar 66. 

92. Memo, Arthur Sylvester, Asst SECDEF (Public Affairs), to Col Winant Sidle, 

SEA Br, FE Div, JCS, subj: B-52 Strikes in 

North Vietnam, Apr 8, 1966; msgs, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECDEF, 1006002 

Apr 66, JCS to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, 

0823522 Apr 66; hists, SAC, 1966, I, 

93. Hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 66, I, 126. 

94. New York Times, Apr 13, 1968; 

memo, Sylvester to Sidle, Apr 8, 1966; msg, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECDEF, 1006002 

Apr 66. 

95. Melyan, Arc Light, 2965-1966, pp 

137-141; General Westmoreland’s Historical 

Briefing, Apr 26, 1966. 

96. Hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 66, I, 128-29; 

Melyan, Arc Light, 2965-2966, p 141. 

130-31. 

66, I, 125-26. 

125-26, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 551-52. 

317 
NOTES TO PACES 138-144 

97. Hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 66, I, 129; 

msg, COMUSMACV to AIG 7241, AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2907452 Apr 66. 

98. Msg, COMUSMACV to AIG 7241, 

AmEmb Vientiane, 2907452 Apr 66. 

99. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1121, Apr 26, 1966, CINCPAC to 

JCS, COMUSMACV, 3004052 Apr 66. 

100. Msgs, NMCC to CINCPAC, 

2623302 Apr 66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2809432 Apr 66. 

101. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, 3004052 Apr 66. 

102. Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-2966, pp 

147-152; msg, SAC to CINCPAC, 0716502 

May 66. 

103. Msgs, SAC to CINCPAC, 

0716502 May 66, ADMINO CINCPAC to 

CINCPAC, May 11 and 1309252 May 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0213302 

May 66, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

3003022 May 66, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, 3101162 May 66; 

Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-1966, pp 145-46. 

104. Hists, SAC, Jan-Jun 66, 1, 124, 

MACV, 1966, p 396; Robert M. Kipp, B-52 

Operations in Southeast Asia, 1967: A Summary Narrative (Hist Study 105, Offutt 

AFB, Nebr., 1969), pp 63-68. 

memo, Col Jack C. Berger, Asst Dir for Jt 

Matters, Dir/Ops, to CSAF, subj: Employment of Arc Light Forces, Aug 23, 1966; 

hist, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 551. 

106. Memo, HQ MACV through DEPCOMMACV for Air Ops to COMUSMACV, subj: Counter-Infiltration Committee Meeting, Jan 6, 1968; Herman S. 

Wolk, USAF Logistie Plans and Policies in 

Southeast Asia, 1966 (Washington, 1967), 

Chap 11; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 221 1152 Jun 66. 

107. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 0400372 

Feb 66; hist, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 756-765; 

Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment 

Planning for Southeast Asia (Washington, 

1967), pp 32-35; Wolk, USAF Logistic 

Plans and Policies in Southeast Asia, 1966, 

Chap 11. 

105. JCSM-523-66, Aug 19, 1966; 

108. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0400372 

Feb 66, 7th AF to PACAF, 0809102 Apr 

66; Anthony, Chap IX. 

109. Msgs, 7th AF to PACAF (Personal Moore to Harris), 0809102 Apr 66, 

SECDEF to CINCPAC, 0820132 Apr 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0808262 

Apr 66; Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment 

Planning for Southeast Asia, 1966, pp 

32-35; Annual Report of the Commander 

in Chief, Pacific Fleet, FY 1966, p 95. 

110. Hearings before the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, Senate, Foreign Assistance, Statement by SECDEF Robert s. 

McNamara on April 20, 1966, 89th Cong, 

2d sess (Washington, 1966), pp 200-02, 

678-79; msg, SECDEF to CINCPAC, 

0820132 Apr 66; hist, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 

756-761; Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment 

Planning for Southeast Asia, 1966, pp 

32-35; memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: Air 

Munitions and Sortie Plan for Southeast 

Asia, May 24, 1966. 

111. Air Staff Notebook, Honolulu 

Munitions Conference (with 50 backup 

papers), Jul 66; Van Staaveren, USAF Deployment Planning for Southeast Asia, 

1966, pp 32-35. 

112. Hearings before the Preparedness 

Investigation Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Tactical Air 

Operations and Readiness, Statement by 

Gen John P. McConnell, CSAF, on May 9, 

1966, 89th Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 

1966), pp 62-63; hist, CINCPAC, 11, 

761-63; msg, SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 

0818532 Apr 66. 

113. Hist, CINCPAC, 1966, pp 

114. Msgs, NMCC to CINCPAC, 

1914132 Jan 66, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1403472 Mar 66. 

115. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECAmEmb Vientiane, 2400232 Mar 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2512152 

Mar 66, 0206312 Apr 66, COMUSMACV, 

0609582 Apr 66. 

116. DIA Intelligence Bulletin, Feb 9, 

14, 17, 1966; PACAF DI Quarterly Review, 

Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

761-63. 

STATE, 1403472, SECSTATE-SECDEF to 

318 
NOTES TO PAGES 145-153 

Mar 31, 1966, p 111; msgs, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 1710302 Mar 66, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 2402302 Mar 66, 

COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 

0502522 Apr 66. 

117. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1031, 2910502 Mar 66; DIA Intelligence Bulletin, Apr 4, 1966, p S-1; PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 17-66, 

May 6, 1966, p 5; Defense Intelligence 

Digest, Jun 66, pp 24-25. 

118. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 0807572 

Jun 66. 

119. Weiner, Brom, and Koon, Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam, 

1959-1967, pp 36-37. 

120. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 17-66, May 6, 1966, pp 5-6. 

121. Ibid. 

122. PACAF DI Report, Effects of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, Mar 17, 1977; 

Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, Jul 66, 

123. Southeast Asia Military Fact 

Book, Jul 66, p 137; Reinhardt and 

Sharkey, Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia, 

pp 11, 20. 

124. Southeast Asia Military Fact 

Book, Jul 66, p 137; Reinhardt and 

Sharkey, Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia, 

125. Michael Horrocks and David A. 

McCormack, “North Vietnamese Infiltrapp 31-39. 

pp 11, 20. 

tion and Other Activities in Laos and North 

Vietnam,” manuscript (Washington, 1976), 

pp 11-12; Weiner, Brom, and Koon, Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam, 

1959-1967, p 32, 

126. Horrocks and McCormack, 

“North Vietnamese Infiltration and Other 

Activities in Laos and North Vietnam,” pp 

11-12. 

127. Ibid. 

128. PACAF DI Report, Effects of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, Jan 6, 1966; 

PACAF DI Quarterly Review, Effects of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia, Mar 31, 

1966, pp 62-64; Reinhardt and Sharkey, Air 

Interdiction in Southeast Asia, p 12. 

129. Murphy EOTR, Jun 15, 1966; 

msg, JANAF Vientiane to DIA, 1402322 

May 66; Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, 

May 66, p C-13; Reinhardt and Sharkey, 

Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia, pp 

11-12. 

130. PACAF DI Quarterly Review, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

Mar 31, 1966, pp 111-12; msg, 7th AF to 

COMUSMACV, Jun 7, 1966. 

131. Briefing, Brig Gen Joseph A. 

McChristian, ACS/J-2 Intel, MACV, for 

Gen Harold K. Johnson, USA, CSA, Apr 

22, 1966; msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 0502522 Apr 66. 

132. Briefing, McChristian for Johnson, Apr 22, 1966. 

133. Ibid. 

Chapter VI 

Further Rise in Enemy Strength and Additional Air Programs, 

July-December 1966 

1. Gravel Pentagon Papers, IV, 

102- 1 12. 

2. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp and 

Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66, CINCPAC to 

COMUSMACV, 1722452 Jul 66. 

3. Msg, Westmoreland to Sharp and 

Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66. 

4. MR, MACV, subj: General Westmoreland’s Concept for the Initiation of 

Operation Tally-Ho, Jul 19, 1966; General 

Westmoreland’s Historical Briefing, Jul 24, 

1966; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

1911522 Jul 66; Warren A. Trest, Operation Tally Ho (Project CHECO, Hickam 

AFB, Hawaii, 1966), pp 7-12; Jack Shulimson, “US. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An 

Expanding War,” manuscript (Washington, 

5. Msg, COMUSMACV to I11 MAF, 

1978), pp 84-95. 

7th AF, 1808362 Jul 66. 

319 
NOTES TO PAGES 153-165 

6. Trest, Operation Tally Ho, pp 7-12; 

Briefing, Brig Gen Carlos M. Talbott, Dep 

Dir, TACC, 7th AF, for SECDEF Robert 

S. McNamara, Oct 9, 1966. 

7. Trest, Operation Tally Ho, pp 7-11; 

Briefing, Talbott for McNamara, Oct 9, 

1966; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

1911522 Jul 66; Porter, Interdiction in 

SEA, 1965-1966. 

8. Trest, Operation Tally Ho, p 12. 

9. Ibid., p 13. 

10. Zbid., pp 13-14. 

11. Zbid., pp 14-15. 

12. Msg, COMUSMACV to CTF 77, 

7th AF, 2918042 Sep 66; Trest, Operation 

Tally Ho, pp 15-16, 25. 

13. Trest, Operation Tally Ho, pp 

14. Zbid., pp 18-20. 

15. Zbid., pp 25-27; msg, CINCPA16. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

17. Ibid. 

18. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 

1508002 Nov 66. 

19. Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 

1965-1966, pp 68-69; Gen William W. 

Momyer, Ret, Air Power in Three Wars 

(WW II, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, 

1978). p 199. 

PAC, 1605182 Sep 66; hist, MACV, 1967, 

I, 450; L. E. Paterson, Air War in the 

DMZ, January-August 1967 (Project 

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1968), p 

59. 

21. Msg, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 

0608172 Oct 66; hist, MACV, 1967, I, 450; 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast 

Asia, XXVII, Sec 2. 

22. Hist, MACV, 1967, I, 450; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

XXVII, pp 2-5, 2-6; msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, Flash 241, 1001352 Oct 

66, COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 

1 100102 Oct 66. 

23. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, XXV, XXVI (Sec 2 of 

each vol); Briefing Paper on Seventh Air 

Force/Thirteenth Air Force Operations, for 

17-18. 

CAF to CSAF, 1203412 Aug 66. 

1965-1966, pp 68-69. 

20. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCHearings before the Committee on Armed 

Services, Senate, Nov 2, 1966. 

24. Msg, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

1408582 Jan 67; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, XXV, XXVI 

(Sec 2 of each vol). 

25. Briefing, Talbott for McNamara, 

Oct 9, 1966. 

26. Zbid. 

27. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 0603402 Jan 67, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 1408572 Jan 67. 

28. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX 

(Sec 2 of each vol). 

29. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXVII, 2-5. 

30. Msgs, 7th AF to PACAF, CSAF, 

1411102 Mar 67, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 

CSAF, 2708382 Mar 67. 

31. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 7th AF TACC, 1307102 Sep 66. 

32. General Westmoreland’s Historical 

Briefing, Sep 17, 1966. 

PAC, 2904152 Sep 66. 

SMACV, 0705432 Oct 66. 

PAC, 1200152 Oct 66, AmEmb Vientiane, 

1402202 Oct 66, AmEmb Vientiane to 

CINCPAC, 1410302 Oct 66, AIRA Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 7th AF TACC, 

1307102 Sep 66, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, 2419572 Oct 66. 

36. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1407112 Nov 66, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV (Swank to Westmoreland), 1511302 Nov 66, 7th AF to all 

Tiger Hound addressees, 1609522 Nov 66. 

SMACV, AmEmb Vientiane, 0521 122 Nov 

66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1307072 

Nov 66, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 1511302 Nov 66. 

38. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1307072 Nov 66, COMUSMACV to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 1407112 Nov 66. 

39. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0703052 Nov 66, COMUSMACV to 

33. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC34. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMU35. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC37. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMU320 
NOTES TO PAGES 165-174 

AmEmb Vientiane, 1407112 Nov 66, AIRA 

Vientiane to CINCPAC, 2205372 Nov 66. 

40. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, 2-6. 

41. Ibid.; msg, COMUSMACV to 

CINCPAC, 2312072 Dec 66. 

42. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, 2-7, 2-10, XXVI, 2-6, 

2-10. 

43. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, 2-17, 2-18, XXV, 2-7 

through 2-10. 

44. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXV, 2-7 through 2-10; msg, 

AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1806022 

Aug 66; hist, CINCPAC, 1966, 11, 631. 

45. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX (Sec 2 of 

each vol). 

46. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXV, 2-7 through 2-10. 

47. Ibid.; Summary of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, XXVI, 2-6, 2-7. 

48. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXV, 2-7 through 2-10, XXVI, 

49. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXV, 2-7 through 2-10, XXVI, 

XXVIII, 2-10; msg, AmEmb Saigon to 

SECSTATE, 0902302 Oct 66; memo, Leonard Unger, Dep Asst SECSTATE for Far 

Eastern Affairs to Under SECSTATE, subj: 

Expansion of Shining Brass Operations in 

Laos, Dec 2, 1966. 

50. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0311052, 0310462, 1806452 Dec 66, 

AmEmb Vientiane to ADMINO CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 1404322 Dec 66; 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast 

Asia, XXIV, 2-9, 2-10. 

51. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXV, 2-7 through 2-10, XXIX, 

52. Summary of Air Operations, South53. Ibid. 

54. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIX, 2-11; Briefing, Talbott 

for McNamara, Oct 9, 1966. 

2-6, 2-7, XXVII, 2-5, 2-6. 

2-6, 2-7, XXVII, 2-5, 2-6, XIV, 2-17, 

2-8, 2-9. 

east Asia, XV, 2-6, 2-7. 

55. Memo, Maj Gen Richard W. Whitney, USA, C/S, DIA, to Sp Asst for COIN 

and Sp Actys, Jt Staff, subj: Evaluation of 

Shining Brass, Oct 13, 1966; memo, Unger 

to Under SECSTATE, Dec 2, 1966. 

56. Memo, Unger to Under SECSTATE, Dec 2, 1966. 

PAC, 0510352 Jul 66, USARPAC to 

CINCPAC, 1804022 Jul 66; Mission Briefing, 23d TASS, Oct 66. 

PAC, 0510352 Jul 66, USARPAC to 

CINCPAC, 1804022 Jul 66; Mission Briefing, 23d TASS, Oct 66. 

59. Mission Briefing, 23d TASS, Oct 

66; Seventh Air Force Commander’s Operations Command Book, Sep 22, 1966, Sec J; 

msg, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPACAF, 

1506432 Oct 66. 

60. Hist, 2d TASS, Oct 1-Dec 31, 

1966, p 12. 

61. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX (Sec 2 of 

each vol). 

62. Trest and Hammons, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 104-05; 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast 

Asia, XXIV, 2-13. 

63. Trest and Hammons, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 104-05; 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast 

Asia, XXIV, 2-13. 

64. Trest and Hammons, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1966, pp 105-06; 

msgs, 7th AF to Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, 

et al, 1812302 Jul 66, COMUSMACV, 

2909322 Jul 66. 

65. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, 105-06. 

66. Ibid., 106-07; Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIV, 2-12, 

67. Trest and Hammons, USAF Opera68. Ibid. 

69. Ibid., pp 107-08; msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 1407112 

Nov 66. 

70. Memo, Lt Col Richard K. Brown, 

Dir/Ops, USAF, to Asst for Jt and NSC 

57. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC58. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC2-13. 

tions from Thailand, 1966, p 107. 

321 
NOTES TO PAGES 174-181 

Matters, subj: Deployment of B-26K Aircraft, Apr 22, 1966; memo, Alain C. Enthoven, Asst SECDEF (Sys Analys), to Asst 

SECDEF (ISA), subj: Detachment 1, 603d 

Air Commando Squadron, May 10, 1966; 

Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 

58; memo, Lt Col Richard K. Brown, 

Dir/Ops, USAF, to Lt Gen Hewitt T. 

Wheless, VCSAF, subj: B-26K for Cricket, 

Apr 22, 1966. 

71. Seventh Air Force Commander’s 

Operations Command Book, Sep 22, 1966, 

Sec J; Anthony, Chap X; Porter, Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966, p 58. 

72. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPACAF, 1506432 Oct 66; Anthony, “A Military History of the War In Northern Laos, 

1945- 1968,” Chap X. 

73. Seventh Air Force Commander’s 

Operations Command Book, Sep 22, 1966, 

Sec J; msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPACAF, 1506432 Oct 66, COMUSMACV, 

1807502 Jul 66, 7th AF, 1807502 Jul 66; 

Anthony, Chap X. 

74. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXIX, 2-8; Strike Ops in Laos, 

5 Dec 65-31 Oct 67, 127; Anthony, Chap 

X. 

75. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXVIII, 2-16, 2-17; Anthony, 

Chap X. 

76. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1005252 Aug 66, 1405562 Oct 66. 

77. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1005252 Aug 66, 1405562 Oct 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1602152 Jan 

67. 

78. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1005252 Aug 66, 1405562 Oct 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1602152 Jan 

67. 

79. MR, Col William A. Knowlton, 

USA, Secy, MACV Jt Stf, subj: Udorn 

Conference, Sep 14, 1966; msgs, AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE, 3010292 Sep 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2502382 Oct 

66; Air and Ground War in Laos, 

1965-1967, pp 15-16. 

80. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1602152, 1601402 Jan 67, Dep 

Comdr, 7th/13th AF, to 7th AF, 0410252 

Jun 67; Edward Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 

1968 (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1968), pp 71-72; Air and Ground War 

in Laos, 1965-1967, pp 18-25. 

PAC, 1602152 Jan 67, CINCPACAF, 

7th/13th AF, 2018352 Jan 67, 7th AF to 

CINCPACAF, 2410282 Mar 67. 

82. Maj Richard A. Durkee, Combat 

Skyspot (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, 

Hawaii, 1967), p 6; msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 30005302 Jun 66, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 3001312 

Jun 66, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 

2300082 Aug 66; PACAF Commanders’ 

Conference Summary, Dec 66, pp 71-72. 

83. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 

2300082 Jul 66; Effects of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, Aug 31, 1966, p 110. 

84. PACAF Commanders’ Conference 

Summary, Dec 66, p 27; memo, Lt Gen 

Hewitt T. Wheless, Asst VCSAF, to Deps, 

Dirs, and Chs of Comparable Ofcs, subj: 

All-Weather Bomb Task Force, Mar 24, 

1967; msg, CINCPACAF to 7th AF/13th 

AF, 2503502 Mar 67. 

85. Msgs, Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, to 

CINCPACAF, CSAF, et al, 0115302 Dec 

66, CINCPAC to JCS, 2422152 Dec 66, 

PACAF to 7th/13th AF, 2922052 Dec 66. 

86. Capt Donald W. Nelson, The 

USAF Helicopter in SEA (Project CHECO, 

Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1968), pp 17-24. 

87. Ltr, Maj Gen Charles R. Bond, Jr., 

Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, to CINCPACAF, subj: Rationale for Justifying the 

Retention of Helicopters to Thailand, Oct 

15, 1966; msgs, Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, 

to 7th AF, 2402002 Nov 66, CINCPAC to 

SECDEF (Sullivan to McNamara), 1621312 

Jan 67, CSAF to CINCPACAF, 1923152 

Jan 67, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

0206232 Jan 67; Warren A. Trest, Lucky 

Tiger: Special Air Warfare Operations (Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967), 

pp 56-64 [hereafter cited as Trest, Lucky 

Tiger SA W Ops.] 

88. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2422152 

Dec 66; Trest, Lucky Tiger SAW Ops, pp 

81. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC56-64. 

322 
NOTES TO PAGES 181-192 

89. Msg, NMCC TO CINCPAC, 

1900152 Jan 67; Trest, Lucky Tiger SAW 

Ops, pp 64-67; hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, 

Jan-Jun 67, p 392. 

90. Msg, NMCC TO CINCPAC, 

1900152 Jan 67; Trest, Lucky Tiger SAW 

Ops, pp 64-67; hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, 

Jan-Jun 67, p 392. 

PAC, 1504312 Jul 66, Westmoreland to 

Sharp, Info Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66; hist, 

SAC, 1966, I, 177-182. 

92. Hist, SAC, 1966, I, 144-45; msg, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1307252 Jul 

66. 

93. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1504512 Jul 66, Westmoreland to 

Sharp, Info Wheeler, 1609502 Jul 66; 

94. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1504312 Jul65. 

95. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1911152 Jul 66. ' 

96. Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 1823302 Jul 66. 

97. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 0214352 Aug 66; memo, Berger 

to CSAF, Aug 23, 1966. 

98. Msgs, CINCPACAF to CSAF (Gen 

Moore to Gen McConnell), 1203412 Aug 

66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1203082 

Aug 66. 

99. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 143-152, 

192-193; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1203082 Aug 66. 

100. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to 

CINCPAC, 2205182, 2501452 Aug 66. 

101. Msg, CINPAC to COMUSMACV, 0821282 Sep 66; Melyan, Arc 

Light, 2965-2966, pp 168-71. 

91. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCJCSM-523-66, Aug 19, 1966. 

to CINCPAC (Westmoreland to Sharp, 

Info Wheeler), 1605182 Sep 66. 

105. General Westmoreland's Historical 

Briefing, Sep 17, 1966. 

106. Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1316342 Sep 66. 

107. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1606162 Sep 66. 

108. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 

CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 2700272 

Nov 66. 

109. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1608302 Sep 66; memo, Rear Adm 

William E. Lemos, USN, Dir/FE Region, 

Asst SECDEF (ISA), to Mr. John T. McNaughton, Asst SECDEF (ISA), subj: Use 

of Arc Light Forces, Sep 12, 1966. 

110. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 194; 

Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-2966, pp 178-180. 

111. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 194; 

Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-2966, pp 178-181. 

112. Melyan, Arc Light, 1965-1966, p 

180; msg, Westmoreland to Sharp, 241 1222 

Sep 66; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 194-96. 

113. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to 

CINCPAC, 2703482 Sep 66, CINCPAC, 

2209412 Dec 66, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 92784, Nov 29, 1966, COMUSMACV to AIG 7041, 1610062, 1610082 

Dec 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 1704402 Dec 

66; hist, SAC, July-Dec 66, I, 194-96; 

USAF Management Summary, Southeast 

Asia, Feb 10, 1967, p 42. 

114. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 196; 

Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec 13, 1966, p 1. 

115. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 

116. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and 

Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965, pp 39, 

177- 182. 

-* 

lo2' Msg' CoMUSMACV to 'INCPAC, 1304202 Sep 66. 

103. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1506002 Sep 66; COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC (Westmoreland to Sharp, 

Info Wheeler), 1605182 Sep 66; General 118. Ibid. 

Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, Sep 17, 119. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 180. 

1966. 120. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

104. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SEC- 2910472 Aug 66; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 66, I, 

STATE, 1506002 Sep 66, COMUSMACV 178-181. 

'" 117. Memo, Col Francis R. Cappelletti, 

Ch Tgts Div, 7th AF, subj: Effectiveness of 

B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia, Jul 25, 

19". 

323 
NOTES TO PAGES 192-203 

121. EOTR, Brig Gen George B. 123, Memo, Col Fred W. Vetter, Jr., 

Simler, DCS/Plans and Ops, 7th AF, Nov SAF Mil Asst to SAF, subj: Air Staff 

10, 1966. Actions Resulting from Secretary of De122. Memo, Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, fense’s Trip to Southeast Asia, 9-14 OCJr., Dir/Plans, USAF, to Maj Gen Regin- tober 1966, Oct 18, 1966; Van Staaveren, 

ald J. Clizbe, Dir/Ops, USAF, subj: AF- USAF Deployment Planning for Southeast 

XOP Report on B-52 Arc Light Effec- Asia, 1966, p 64. 

tiveness, Sep 19, 1966. 

Chapter VII 

Renewed Hope in the Anti-infiltration Effort 

January-May 1967 

1. PACAF Commanders’ Conference 

2. Zbid. 

3. Msgs, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 

0709232 Dec 66, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACFLT, 2401592 

Dec 66, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 

CSAF, 7th AF, 3102432 Dec 66. 

4. Memo, Gen John P. McConnell, 

CSAF, to SAF, subj: Efforts to Reduce 

Infiltration, Jan 14, 1967. 

5. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1602152 Jan 67, CINCPACAF, 

7th/13th AF, 2018352 Jan 67; Air and 

Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967, pp 18-25. 

6. Msg, AmEmb Saigon to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2108302 Jan 67, CINCPAC to 

JCS, 2521262 Jan 67. 

7. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 2717552 

Jan 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

2708552 Jan 67, AmEmb Vientiane to 

COMUSMACV, 2403332 Jan 67. 

8. Msgs, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 

2908272 Jan 67; hist, MACV, 1967, pp 

450-5 1; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXX, 2-8, 2-9. 

9. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXI, 2-5, 2-6; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0609192 Feb 67. 

10. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0609192 Feb 67, CINCPAC to JCS, 

0703332 Feb 67, COMUSMACV, 0923402 

Feb 67. 

11. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1810302, 1907252, and 1910152 Feb 

Summary, Dec 66. 

67, 1800592 Apr 67; Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXI, 2-5 

through 2-9; Briefing, Lt Gen William W. 

Momyer, Comdr, 7th AF, Presentation to 

the Secretary of Defense, Jul 8, 1967. 

12. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0703332 

Feb 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

0609192, 1907252 Feb 67. 

13. Briefing, Momyer for McNarnara, 

14. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 0303252 

Feb 67. 

15. Hist, CINCPAC, 1967, 11, 592-93; 

JCSM-59-67, Feb 2, 1967. 

16. Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC, 1118242 

Feb 67; New York Times, Feb 6-14, 1967. 

17. Msgs, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

1109052 Feb 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1411512 Feb 67; Baltimore Sun, Feb 

10, 13, 1967; New York Times, Feb 10-14, 

1967. 

18. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

1109052 Feb 61. 

19. Zbid.; msgs, CINCPACAF to 

CINCPAC, 1200182, 1400412 Feb 67. 

PAC, 1411512 Feb 67, CINCPAC to DIA, 

2422562 Feb 67, CINCPACAF to 7th AF, 

1200182 Feb 67. 

21. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, Info 

Wheeler, 1413252 Feb 67, Sharp to 

Wheeler, 1619062 Feb 67; Washington 

Post, Feb 17, 1967. 

22. Msgs, Wheeler to Sharp and Westmoreland, 2222462 Feb 67, Mar 6, 1967. 

Jul 8, 1967, pp 2-3. 

20. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC324 
NOTES TO PAGES 203-215 

23. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 0602082 

Feb 67. 

24. Msg, 7th AF to CSAF, SAC, 

PACAF, 1510002 Feb 67. 

25. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1507432, 2003412 Feb 67; hist, 

SAC, Jan-Jun 67, 11, 159-160. 

26. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 1610452 Feb 67. 

27. Msgs, COMUSMACV to AIG 

7041, 2414552 Feb 67, AmEmb Vientiane 

to CINCPAC, 0110502 Mar 67, SECSTATE, 0110502 Mar 67, 7th AF to 355th 

TFW, 388th TFW, 8th TFW, et al, 0212302 

Mar 67. 

28. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 1209202 Mar 67. 

29. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, 1204302 Mar 67. 

SMACV, 0400302 Apr 67, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 11 11262 Apr 67. 

SMACV, 0400302 Apr 67, COMUSMACV 

to CINCPAC, 1111262 Apr 67. 

PAC, 1111262 Apr 67; Air and Ground 

War in Laos, 1965-1967, pp 15-25, 34-37; 

intvw, Lt Col Robert G. Zimmerman, Oral 

Hist Br, Albert F. Simpson Hist Rsch Cen, 

with Lt Col Howard K. Hartley, USAF, 

Ret, Jul 14, 1972, p 32. 

33. Air and Ground War in Laos, 

34. Msgs, AAIRA Savannakhet to 

7th/13th AF, 1608542 Mar 67, AmEm 

Vientiane to 7th AF, 2109002 Apr 67; 

Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, 1 January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 20, 

60. 

35. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to 7th 

AF, 2109002 Apr 67, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, 2205002 Apr 

67; Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 61. 

36. Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 

61-62; Paterson, Air War in the DMZ, 

30. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMU31. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMU32. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC1965-1967, pp 15-17. 

37. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0208012 May 67; Paterson, Air 

War in the DMZ, Jan-Aug 1967, p 65. 

38. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0208012 May 67; Paterson, Air 

War in the DMZ, Jan-Aug 1967, p 65. 

39. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2208342, 3005002 May 67; Paterson, Air War in the DMZ, Jan-Aug 1967, 

pp 65-66; Summary of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, XXXIV, 2-7, 2-8. 

40. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2006002 May 67; Valentiny, USAF 

Operations from Thailand, I January 

41. Msgs, CSAF to TAC, AFSC, 

OAR, et al, 1421372 Feb 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0203172 Mar 67; 

Maj A. W. Thompson, Strike Control and 

Reconnaissance (SCAR) in SEA (Project 

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1969), p 

80. 

42. Warren A. Trest, Lucky Tiger 

Combat Operations (Project CHECO, 

Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1967), pp 19-32. 

43. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0203172 Feb 67. 

44. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 

1409452 Mar 67; Maj Victor B. Anthony, 

Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961-1970 [The Air Force in Southeast Asia] (Washington, 1973), pp 73-74. 

45. Trest, Lucky Tiger Combat Operations, pp 42-43. 

46. Msgs, CSAF to CINCPACAF (for 

Gen Vogt from Gen Swancutt), 1021012 

Mar 67, COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 1305242 Mar 67. 

47. Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 

67; msg, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 2104052 

Mar 67. 

48. Briefing, Momyer for the Secretary 

of Defense, Jul 8, 1967; msg, 7th AF to all 

Bravo addressees, 0911402 Mar 67; Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, I 

January 1967-1 July 1968, p 7; Jacob Van 

Staaveren, History of Task Force Alpha, I 

October 1967-30 ADr 1968 (Nakhon Pha1967-1 July 1968, p 63. 

Jan-Aug 1967, p 65. nom RTAFB, Thailand, 1969), p 25. 

325 
NOTES TO PAGES 215-223 

49. Msg, SLTF to 7th AF, 1208502 

50. Air and Ground War in Laos, 

51. Msgs, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

2410282 Mar 67, 7th/13th AF, 2710502 

Mar 67; intvw, Lt Col Richard R. Sexton, 

Ofc/AF Hist, with Capt Karl L. Polifka, 

Jr., Dir/Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, USAF, Feb 6, 1978. 

52. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

2410282 Mar 67. 

53. Msg, Westmoreland to Sharp, 

2813272 May 67. 

54. Msg, 7th/13th AF to 7th AF, 

0410252 Jun 67; Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 

55. Msgs, CINCPAC TO COMUSMACV, 0120122 Oct 66, COMUSMACV 

to 7th AF, 0211102 Oct 66, 7th/13th AF to 

7th AF, Oct 3, 1966, COMUSMACV to 

CINCPAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 0507152 

Oct 66, 7th AF CTF, 2312322 Oct 66, 7th 

AF to 7thI13th AF, 2403452 Oct 66, COMUSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 2413082 

Nov 66. 

56. Msgs, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 

NMCC, PACAF, 1110512 Nov 66, AIRA 

Vientiane to 7th AF, 1409402 Dec 66, 

CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, 0201062 Dec 66, AIRA Vientiane 

to 7th AF, 3010332 Nov 66. 

57. Msg, 7th AF to PACAF, 1810592 

Jan 67; Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 

49. 

58. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to 7th AF, 

7th/13th AF, 1317452 Feb 67, 7th AF to 

PACAF, 2807332 Feb 67, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2110552 Feb 67; 

Valentiny, USAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 

48-51; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXVII, 7-A-5, 7-A-6; hist, 

CINCPAC, 1967, 11, 667. 

59. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 21 10552 Feb 67. 

60. Msg, 7th AF to PACAF, 2807332 

Feb 67; Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Oct 67. 

1965-1967, pp 18-25. 

1968, pp 71-72. 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 

49. 

61. Msg, 7th AF to PACAF, 2807332 

Feb 67; Valentiny, WAF Operations from 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 

50. 

62. Msg, 7th AF to PACAF, 2807332 

Feb 67; Valentiny, WAF Operations from 

Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 

63. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0504252 Mar 67. 

64. Msgs, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

1305052 Mar 67, CINCPAC to AmEmb 

Vientiane, 2921262 Mar 67; Valentiny, 

USAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, p 54. 

65. Msgs, ArnEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 2110552 Feb 67, SECSTATE, 

2706002 Feb 67, SECSTATE, A-232, Mar 

15, 1967. 

66. Msgs, AIRA Vientiane to 7th AF, 

0210402 Mar 67, AmEmb Vientiane to 

SECSTATE, 0707012 Mar 67, COMUSMACV, 21 10552 Feb 67; hist, CINCPAC, 

1967, 11, 663. 

67. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 

NMCC, PACAF, 0106162 Apr 67; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, 

68. Memo, JCS to Asst SECDEF 

(ISA), Attn: Mr. Richard C. Steadman, 

Dep Asst SECDEF for FE Affairs, no subj, 

Mar 8, 1967. 

69. Msgs, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

AIRA Vientiane, 1305052 Mar 67, to all 

addressees, 1008402 Mar 67. 

70. Msgs, 7th AF to all Bravo, Tiger 

Hound, Steel Tiger Task Force, Nakhon 

Phanon RTAFB, et al, 1801122 Mar 67, 

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, AIRA 

Vientiane, 2305152 Mar 67. 

71. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXVII, 7-A-5, 7-A-6; msg, 

AmEmb Vientiane to 7th AF, 271 lo02 Mar 

67. 

72. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to 7th AF, 

2711002 Mar 67. 

73. Msgs, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, ArnEmb Vientiane, CINC48-49. 

XXXVII, 7-A-6. 

326 
NOTES TO PAGES 223-231 

PACFLT, 0521482 Apr 67, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0612132 Apr 67. 

74. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 0611132 Apr 67, CINCPAC to 

AmEmb Vientiane, COMUSMACV, 

1101552 Apr 67, AIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 7th AF, 1315502 

Apr 67, 7th AF to all Alpha, Bravo, Tiger 

Hound, Tally Ho, Steel Tiger Task Force, 

1510502 Apr 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2411402 Apr 67. 

75. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to 7th AF, 

2509002 Apr 67. 

76. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 2222222 Apr 67. 

77. Msg, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

2409102 Apr 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2411402 Apr 67. 

78. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 2605342, Apr 67. 

79. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 1603402 May 67, 

AIRA Vientiane to 7th AF, 1802402 May 

67, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 2304122 

May 67, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 

2412452 May 67, 

80. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 1022402 

Aug 66. 

PAC, 2212572 Aug 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2421402 Aug 66, JCS to CNO, CINCPAC, 

COMUSMACV, 0117532 Sep 66, JCS to 

81. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCCNO, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, et al, 

1716332 Sep 66. 

82. Msgs, JCS to CNO, CINCPAC, 

COMUSMACV, 0117532 Sep 66, AmEmb 

Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0407352 Sep 66. 

83. Msgs, JCS to CNO, CINCPAC, 

COMUSMACV, 0117532 Sep 66, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 40012, Sep 

2, 1966, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 1110202 

Nov 66. 

84. Msgs, CINCPAC to OSD, JCS, 

CNO, CINCPACAF, 0900052 Sep 66, 

CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 1800302 

Sep 66, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 111 

MAF, 2012232 Sep 66; 7th AF OPlan 

463-67, Popeye, Sep 23, 1966. 

85. Msgs, 7th AF TF/Tiger Hound to 

SECSTATE, AmEmb Vientiane, CINCPAC, JCS, ISA, OSD, 0905002 Oct 66. 

86. Msg, 7th AF Popeye TF/Tiger 

Hound to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 

3008502 Oct 66. 

87. Msgs, CSAF to PACAF, 0823342 

Nov 66, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 11 10202 

Nov 66, 1st MAW to SECDEF, 2310412 

Oct 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 0921392 Nov 

66; JCSM-746-66, Dec 5, 1966. 

88. Memo, SECDEF Robert S. McNamara to SECNAV, subj: Popeye, Mar 18, 

1967. 

89. Zbid.; ltr, Rear Adm William E. 

Lemos, USN, Dir/FE Region, ISA, to 

Leonard Unger, Spec Asst Secy, Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Dept, 

no subj, Mar 22, 1967. 

Chapter VIII 

Auguries of Eventual Victory Against Infiltration 

July 1967-January 1968 

1. Msg, 7th AF to CINCPAC, 2612352 

Jul 67. 

2. Seventh Air Force Interdiction and 

Assessment Plan, Aug 5, 1967. 

3. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2321312 

Aug 67. 

4. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, Apr 

16, 1967, CINCPAC to JCS, 0420272 Jun 

67, 2103452 Jul 67; memo, MACV, subj: 

Prairie Fire, 24-26 Jul 67, n.d. 

5. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, 

1611382 Apr 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 1800592 Apr 67, 

CINCPAC to JCS, 2103452 Jul 67. 

6. Memo, Cyrus R. Vance, Dep SECDEF, to Gen Earle G. Wheeler, USA, 

327 
NOTES TO PAGES 23 1-239 

CJCS, subj: Prairie Fire, Phase 111, Jun 30, 

1967; msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0409402 Jul 67, AmEmb Saigon to 

SECSTATE, 1909252 Jun 67, JCS to 

CINCPAC, 1515492 JuI 67; JCSM461-67, AUg 19, 1967. 

7. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0409402 Jul 67, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, Bangkok, Vientiane, and 

CINCPAC, Jul 17, 1967, CINCPAC to 

JCS, 2803302 Jul 67. 

8. JCSM-461-67, Aug 19, 1967. 

9. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, Apr 

16, 1967, CINCPAC to JCS, 0420272 Jun 

67, 2103452 Jul 67; memo, MACV, subj: 

Prairie Fire, 24-26 Jul 67, n.d. 

10. Msgs, Westmoreland to Sullivan, 

0913182 Aug 67, Sharp, 1913192 Aug 67, 

COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AmEmb 

Vientiane, 1610172 Sep 67, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 

1806152 Sep 67, CINCPAC to JCS, 

2003592 Sep 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 2912202 Sep 67. 

11. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXV through XXXVIII (Sec 2 

of each vol); msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

0907522 Jul 67. 

12. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXV through XXXVIII (Sec 2 

of each vol); msg, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

0907522 Jul 67; hist, 56th AD, Jul l-Sep 

30, 1967. 

13. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXV through XXXVIII (Sec 2 

of each vol); hist, 56th ACW, Jul 1-Sep 30, 

1967. 

14. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXV through XXXVIII (Sec 2 

of each vol); msg, Westmoreland to Sharp, 

2212352 Oct 67; Briefing, Momyer for the 

Secretary of Defense, Jul 8, 1967. 

15. Msgs, Dep Comdr, 7thA3th AF, to 

7th AF, 201 1052 Jun 67, ArnEmb Vientiane 

to SECSTATE, 2912002 Jun 67, Westrnoreland to Sharp, 2212352 Oct 67. 

16. Msgs, Dep Comdr, 7th/13th AF, to 

7th AF, 201 1052 Jun 67, AmEmb Vientiane 

to SECSTATE, 2912002 Jun 67; Air and 

Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967, pp 15-17. 

17. Msgs, Dep Comdr, 7thA3th AF, to 

7th AF, 201 l05Z Jun 67, AmEmb Vientiane 

to SECSTATE, 2912002 Jun 67. 

PAC, CINCSAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 

2603252 Jun 67, AmEmb Vientiane to 

SECSTATE, 0611032 Jul 67; Valentiny, 

WAF Operations from Thailand, I January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 60-64; hist, 

19. Paterson, Air War in the DMZ, 

Jan-Aug 1967, pp 62-63; rnsgs, Westmoreland to Sullivan, 1011082 Jun 67, COMUSMACV to 7th AF, 1500102 Jun 67; hist, 

SAC, Jul-Dec 67, I, 160. 

PAC, AmEmb Vientiane, 3100252 Jul 67, 

CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, 0222532 

Aug 67. 

21. Msgs, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, 0222532 Aug 67, AmEmb Vientiane 

SMACV to AmEmb Vientiane 1001102 

Aug 67. 

22. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to COMSMACV to AmEmb Vientiane, 1212402 

Aug 67, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 1305322 Aug 67. 

23. Paterson, Air War in the DMZ, 

Jan-Aug 1967, p 63; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 

67, p 160. 

PAC, 2511002 Aug 67; memo, MACV, 

subj: Prairie Fire, 24-26 July 67, n.d. 

PAC, 2812072 Oct 67. 

18. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCMACV, 1967, I, 454-55. 

20. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCto CINCPAC, 0311302 Aug 67, COMUUSMACV, 1011352 Aug 67, COMU24. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC25. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINC26. Ibid. 

27. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0900502 Jun 67, AmEmb Vientiane 

to COMUSMACV, 1905302 Jun 67. 

28. Strike Ops in Laos, 5 Dec 65-31 

Oct 67, 52; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0900502 Jun 67. 

29. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0900102 

May 67, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 

0207002 Jun 67, CINCPAC, 1905302 Jun 

67. 

30. 7th AF OPlan 500-67, Commando 

Lava 11, Jun 14, 1967; msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 0900502 Jun 67. 

328 
NOTES TO PAGES 239-249 

31. Msg, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

2502202 Jul 67; hist, 315th AD, Jul 1-Dec 

31, 1967. 

32. Msg, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

2502202 Jul 67; hist, 315th AD, Jul 1-Dec 

31, 1967. 

33. Msgs, 7th AF to COMUSMACV, 

3106532 Jul 67, 0403452 Aug 67; hist, 

315th AD, Jul 1-Dec 31, 1967. 

34. Msgs, 7th AF to CINCPACAF, 

0304402 Sep 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 2111342 Oct 67; Final Report, 7th 

AF, Operation Evaluation of Commando 

Lava 11, Sep 26, 1967. 

35. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2205592; 7th AF OpOrd 433-68, 

Sep 15, 1967. 

36. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1404062 Aug 67; Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXIX 

through XLIII (Sec 2 of each vol); Senate 

Armed Services Committee Hearings on 

Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military 

Procurement, pt 1, p 429. 

37. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XXXIX through XLIII (Sec 2 of 

each vol); rprt, Dir/Ops, USAF, Analysis 

of Enemy Vehicles: Detection and Destruction in Laos, Dec 7, 1967; hist, 56th ACW, 

Oct 1-Dec 31, 1967. 

38. Ltr, Victor K. Heyman, Dir/SEA 

Prgms Div, Asst SECDEF (Sys Analys), to 

Eugene M. Locke, Deputy Ambassador to 

South Vietnam, Oct 2, 1967, with atch, 

rprt, Analysis of the Use of Propeller vs Jet 

Aircraft in Laos, n.d. 

39. Rowley, FAC Operations, 

1965-1970, pp 173-180; Lee Bonetti, et al, 

The War in Vietnam, July-December 1967 

(Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 

1968), p 19; Summary of Air Operations, 

Southeast Asia, XXXIX through XLIII (Sec 

2 of each vol). 

40. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XL, Sec 2. 

41. Ltr, Heyman to Locke, Oct 2, 

1967. 

42. Ibid.; Valentiny, USAF Operations 

from Thailand, 1 January 1967-1 July 

1968, pp 78-82. 

43. Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1 January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 

44. Ltr, Heyman to Locke, Oct 2, 

1967; Valentiny, USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1 January 1967-1 July 1968, pp 

45. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XL, 2-8. 

46. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2210132 Dec 67. 

47. Msg, JANAF Attache’s Vientiane 

to DIA, SECSTATE, 3011402 Dec 67. 

48. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XL, XLI (Sec 2 of each vol); 

msg, Sullivan to Wheeler, 0118292 Dec 67; 

hist, CINCPAC, 1968, 111, 191; TIA, 

Dir/Ops, USAF, Feb 68, pp 3-33. 

49. MR, Gen William W. Momyer, 

Comdr, 7th AF, subj: SIC Meeting, Dec 3, 

1967. 

50. 7th AF Weekly Intelligence Summary, Dec 16, 1967, pp 24-25. 

51. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2710512 Nov 67. 

52. Msgs, Sullivan to Wheeler, 0108202 

Dec 67, Sharp to Wheeler, 0222252 Dec 67; 

see note 49. 

53. Hearings before the Preparedness 

Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Air War 

Against North Vietnam, 90th Cong, 1st sess 

(Washington, 1967), pt 4, p 280. 

54. Jacob Van Staaveren, The Search 

for Military Alternatives, [The Air Force in 

Vietnam] (Washington, 1969), pp 60-61. 

55. Msgs, AmEmb Bangkok to COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, 1306172 Apr 67, 

CINCPAC to JCS, 0623162 May 67; hists, 

SAC, Jan-Jun 67, p 131, CINCPAC, 1967, 

11, 688-89; Washington Star, Mar 23, 1967. 

56. Van Staaveren, The Search for 

Military Alternatives, 1967, p 8; hist, SAC, 

Jan-Jun 68, I, 160. 

57. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0623162 

May 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

2804402 Aug 67; hists, CINCPAC, 1967, 

11, 688-694, SAC, Jan-Jun 67, I, 166-69, 

58. Msgs, CINCPAC to JCS, 0623162 

May 67, SECSTATE to AmEmb Bangkok, 

AmEmb Vientiane, May 6, 1967, JCS to 

78-82. 

78-82. 

329 
NOTES TO PAGES 249-256 

CINCPAC, 0519562 Jul 67, SAC to JCS, 

1116102 Jul 67; Maj James B. Pralle, Arc 

Light, June 1967-December 1968 (Project 

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 1969), pp 

59. Msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Bangkok, AmEmb Vientiane, Jun 9, 1967, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1006512 

Jun 67, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 

1105522 Jun 67. 

60. Msgs, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, AmEmb Bangkok, 1220012 Aug 67, 

AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1404062 

Aug 67, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 

1506182 Aug 67; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 67, I, 

164. 

61. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SEC1-3. 

STATE, 1404062 Aug 67, JCS to CINCPAC, 0622042 Sep 67. 

PAC, 2804402 Aug 67, CINCPAC to 

AmEmb Vientiane, 0500352 Oct 67. 

63. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 67, I, 138-144. 

64. Msgs, CSAF to SAC, 1019302 Oct 

67, JCS to CINCPAC, 1718112 Oct 67; 

hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 67, pp 159-167. 

65. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 1718112 

Oct 67, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

0111252 Nov 67, SECSTATE to AmEmb 

Bangkok, 1318552 Nov 67, CINCPAC to 

JCS, 1301552 Nov 67; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 

66. Memo, Fred Green, Bureau of Intel 

and Rsch, State Department, to Philip C. 

Habib, Ofc of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, State Department, subj: Evaluation 

62. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINC67, I, 138-148. 

of B-52 Effectiveness, Aug 4, 1967; Martin 

F. Herz, Ofc of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, State Department, to Philip C. 

Habib, subj: Arc Light Overflights of Laos, 

Nov 20, 1967. 

67. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 1718112 

Oct 67, SECSTATE-SECDEF to AmEmb 

Bangkok, 1318552 Nov 67, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 2711352 Nov 67; hists, 

MACV, 1968, I, 407-08, CINCPAC, 1967, 

11, 699. 

68. Hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 67, I, 144-48. 

69. Msgs, Sullivan to Wheeler, 0108202 

Dec 67, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 

2923472 Nov 67. 

70. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 3013252 Nov 67, 0206302 Dec 67, 

SECSTATE-SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 0123032 Dec 67. 

71. Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 0206302 Dec 67. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Msg, AIRA Vientiane to MACV, 

0209502 Dec 67. 

74. Msgs, CINCSAC to CINCPAC, 

0301452 Dec 67, 0721402 Dec 67, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, 0805112 Dec 

67, CINCSAC, 0805112 Dec 67, 0902182 

Dec 67. 

75. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, 1106522 Dec 67, 1211302 Dec 67, 

SECSTATE, 6374, Dec 67, SAC to CINCPAC, 1200152 Dec 67, CINCPAC to 

AmEmb Bangkok, 1410382 Dec 67; hist, 

SAC, Jul-Dec 67, I, 166-167. 

76. Msg, AmEmb Bangkok to CINCPAC, 2809092 Dec 67; hist, SAC, Jul-Dec 

67, I, 167. 

Chapter IX 

Inauguration of the Sensor-Oriented Anti-Infiltration 

System (IGLOO WHITE) 

1. David Halberstam, The Best and the 3. Ltr, Maj Gen Richard G. Stilwell, 

Brightest (New York, 1969), p 164; intvw, USA, Asst C/S, MACV, to Lt Gen Harold 

Jacob Van Staaveren, Historian, Ofc/AF K. Johnson, USA, DCS/Mil Ops, USA, 

Hist, with Vincent H. Demma, Historian, May 12, 1964; Sturdevant, The Border ConUSACMH, Dec 20, 1977. trol Problem in South Vietnam, pp 15-21. 

2. Gravel Pentagon Papers, 11, 86. 4. Memo, Col Charles W. Abbott, Asst 

330 
NOTES TO PAGES 256-266 

Dep Dir of Plans for War Plans, Dir/Plans, 

USAF, to Asst Dir of Plans for Jt and NSC 

Matters, Dir/Plans, USAF, Counter-Infiltration Barrier, Mar 25, 1966; Gravel Pentagon Papers, 111, 112-13. 

5. Memo, Abbott to Asst Dep Dir of 

Plans for Jt and NSC Matters, Dir/Plans, 

USAF, Mar 25, 1966. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Memo, Abbott to Asst Dep Dir of 

Plans for Jt and NSC Matters, Dir/Plans, 

USAF, Mar 25, 1966; msgs, CINCPACAF 

to CINCPAC, 0503562 Apr 66, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 0500592 Apr 66, 

CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 0423462 

Apr 66, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 

0412032 Apr 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

0712352 Apr 66, 

8. CM-1353-66, Counter-Infiltration 

Barrier, Apr 18, 1966. 

9. Gravel Pentagon Papers, IV, 

113-14; msg, CSAF to PACAF, SAC, 

AFOUT 87716, May 6, 1966. 

10. Gravel Pentagon Papers, IV, 115. 

11. Ibid.; memo, Asst SECDEF (IDA) 

to SA, SAF, SN, et al, subj: Summer Study 

Group, Jul 15, 1966. 

12. The Effects of U.S. Bombing on 

North Vietnam’s Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and 

Laos: Retrospect and Prospect (Washington, 1966). 

13. Memo, Seymour J. Deitchman, Albert G. Hill, Carl Kaysen, and George B. 

Kistiakowsky, et a[, to SECDEF, subj: 

JASON Summer Study, Aug 30, 1966. 

14. Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, Sep 2, 

1966; msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 0721552 

Sep 66, CINCPAC, 0823072 Sep 66. 

15. Msgs, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 1004322 Sep 66, CINCPAC to JCS, 

1307052 Sep 66, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 1100292 Sep 66, CINCUSARPAC to 

CINCPAC, 1022202 Sep 66; Maj Roger C. 

Laudati, USA, A Summary of the Infiltration-Interdiction System for Southeast Asia 

(Fort Shafter, Hawaii, 1968), p 9 [hereafter 

cited as USARPAC Summary of the Infiltration-Interdiction System]. 

16. USARPAC Summary of the Infiltration- Interdiction System, p 9; msg, 

CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 1022202 

Sep 66. 

17. CM-1732-66, Sep 9, 1966. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Memo, SECDEF Robert S. McNamara to Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, USA, 

Dir, JTF 728, subj: Infiltration Interdiction 

System for Vietnam, Sep 15, 1966. 

20. JCSM-593-66, Sep 17, 1966. 

21. Memo, SAF Harold Brown to VCSAF Gen Bruce K. Holloway, Sep 9, 1966; 

memo, VCSAF to SAF, subj: Infiltration 

Barrier System for Vietnam, Sep 26, 1966. 

22. Memo, Lt Gen Hewitt T. Wheless, 

Asst VCSAF, to Deps, Dirs, and Chs of 

Comparable Ofcs, subj: Combat Beaver, 

Sep 21, 1966; Herman S. Wolk, USAF 

Plans and Policies: Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 1967 

(Washington, 1968), pp 50-51 [hereafter 

cited as Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 19671. 

23. Rprt, Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, 

USA, Dir, JTF 728, to SECDEF Robert S. 

McNamara, Report to SECDEF on Schedules and Requirements for the Project JTF 

728, Sep 29, 1966; memo, SECDEF Robert 

S. McNamara to Alain C. Enthoven, Asst 

SECDEF (Sys Analys), subj: Personnel 

Authorization for JTF 728, Sep 30, 1966; 

memo, Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, USA, 

Dir, JTF 728, to SA and SAF, subj: Action 

for JTF 728 Personnel, n.d. 

24. Hist, MACV, 1966, 111, 1073. 

25. CM-1845-66, Oct 21, 1966; msg, 

DCPG to CINCPAC, 1920452 Oct 66. 

26. Hist, MACV, 1966, 111, 1073-75. 

27. Memo, SECDEF Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 

subj: Anti-Infiltration Barrier between 

North and South Vietnam, Nov 14, 1966. 

28. Msg, Wheless to Deps, Dirs, and 

Chs of Comparable Ofcs, Sep 21, 1966; 

CSAFM-D-25-66, Nov 23, 1966; hist, 

SAC, Jan-Jun 67, I, 164-65. 

29. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 1920052 

Nov 66; Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, pp 51-52. 

30. Memo, Col James G. Gallagher, 

Dep Dir of Plans for War Plans, Dir/Plans, 

USAF, to Asst Dir of Plans for Jt and NSC 

33 1 
NOTES TO PAGES 266-275 

Matters, Dir/Plans, USAF, subj: Program 

Definition Plan, JTF 728, Nov 21, 1966; 

JCSM-740-66, Dec 1, 1966; memo, SAF to 

SECDEF, Dec 13, 1966. 

31. JCSM-740-66, Dec 1, 1966. 

32. Memo, Lt Gen Alfred D. Starbird, 

USA, Dir, JTF 728, to SECDEF Robert S. 

McNamara, subj: Plans for Increased AntiInfiltration Capability in Southeast Asia, 

Dec 7, 1966; hist, MACV, 1967, 111, 1076; 

Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in 

Southeast Asia, 1967, pp 52-53; msg, 

DCPG to CINCPAC, 1517252 Jan 67; 

DCPG Program Plan, Oct 25, 1967. 

33. DCPG Program Plan, Oct 25, 

1967. 

34. Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 1967, pp 52-53. 

35. Michael Horrocks, “The Sensor 

War, 1966-1971 ,” manuscript (Washington, 

1977), p 7. 

36. Ibid., p 18. 

37. Zbid., p 18. 

38. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 6; Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 1967, pp 52-53. 

39. Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 1967, p 54; hist, 

40. Wolk, Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 1967, p 54; hist, 

41. Msg, Westmoreland to CINCPAC, 

subj: MACV Practice Nine- Air-Supported 

Anti-Infiltration Plan, Mar 11, 1967; 

JCSM-204-67, Apr 17, 1967. 

42. JCSM-204-67, Apr 17, 1967; 

memos, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: Practice 

Nine Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan, 

Apr 22, 1967, subj: Practice Nine Forces, 

May 8, 1967; msgs, DCPG to SECDEF, 

SAF, JCS, 0520152 May 67, SECSTATE to 

AmEmb Saigon, 2501242 May 67; Van 

Staaveren, History of Task Force Alpha, I 

October 1967-30 April 1968, p 9. 

43. JCSM-204-67, Apr 17, 1967; 

USARPAC Summary of the Infiltration-Znterdiction System, p 17; Van Staaveren, 

History of Task Force Alpha, I October 

1967-30 April 1968, p 9. 

MACV, 1967, 111, 1078-79. 

MACV, 1967, 111, 1078-79. 

44. Hists, MACV, 1967, 111, 1087, 

MACV, 1968, 11, 911-19, CINCPAC, 1968, 

111, 6-16. 

45. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, pp 11-12, 14, 21. 

46. Zbid., pp 11-12, 19. 

47. Ibid., pp 4-6, 17. 

48. Intvw, Capt Ralph I. Stearns, PACAF, with Col William A. Breeze, former 

Chief of Intelligence and Chief of Technical 

Intelligence, Task Force Alpha, Jan 15, 

1970; Van Staaveren, History of Task Force 

Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 1968, pp 

14, 31. 

49. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, pp 7, 14. 

50. 7th AF OPlan 481-67, Aug 10, 

1967. 

51. Memo, Col Bryan M. Shotts, Ch/ 

Strat Div, Dir/Ops, USAF, to CSAF, subj: 

Muscle Shoals IOC Dates, Sep 17, 1967; 

memo, Gen John P. McConnell, CSAF, to 

CJCS, subj: Muscle Shoals IOC Dates, Sep 

22, 1967; memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: 

Deployment of Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Operations, Sep 22, 1967. 

52. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, pp 14, 21; msg, AmEmb Bangkok to 

SECSTATE, 1407102 Aug 67; memo, Col 

Edward H. Marxen, Jr., Dir/Plans, USAF, 

to CSAF, subj: Dye Marker Issue, Aug 22, 

1967; CM-2601-67, Dye Marker, Aug 21, 

1967. 

53. CM-2601-67, Dye Marker, Aug 21, 

1967; MR, Gen William W. Momyer, subj: 

Meeting with Generals Starbird and Lavelle, 

Dec 12, 1967; Van Staaveren, History of 

Task Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

54. CM-2601-67, Dye Marker, Aug 21, 

1967. 

55. Briefing for SEACOORD Working 

Group (Muscle Shoals), Nov 21, 1967; Van 

Staaveren, History of Task Force Alpha, I 

October 1967-30 April 1968, p 31. 

56. Msg, CINCPACAF to AIG 592, 

1707162 Oct 67; Van Staaveren, History of 

1968, pp 22-23. 

332 
Task Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

57. Msg, CINCPACAF to AIG 592, 

1707162 Oct 67; Van Staaveren, History of 

Task Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

58. Msg, COMUSMACV to AmEmb 

Bangkok, 1312312 Oct 67; Van Staaveren, 

History of Task Force Alpha, I October 

1967-30 April 1968, pp 33-34. 

59. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 34. 

60. Msg, AmEmb Bangkok to SECSTATE, 1007292 Nov 67; Breeze intvw, 

Jan 15, 1970. 

61. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, pp 34-35. 

1968, pp 34-35. 

1968, pp 35-36. 

62. Ibid., pp 36-37, 41. 

NOTES TO PAGES 275-288 

63. Ibid., pp 37, 40. 

64. Ibid., pp 37-38, 41. 

65. Ibid., pp 39-42. 

66. Msg, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: 

Initiation of the Dump Truck Operations in 

Muscle Shoals, Dec 21, 1967; Van Staaveren, History of Task Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 1968, pp 39-40. 

67. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 41. 

68. Ibid., pp 40, 42. 

69. Zbid., p 53. 

70. Zbid., pp 40-41. 

71. Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: 

Date of Initiation of Dump Truck, Dec 21, 

1967; Van Staaveren, History of Task Force 

Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 1968, p 47. 

72. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 48. 

73. Zbid., pp 48-49. 

Chapter X 

Prelude to Khe Sanh 

1. Msgs, Sharp to Westmoreland, 

2523412 Sep 67, Westmoreland to Gen 

Harold K. Johnson, USA, Actg CJCS, 

2704382 Sep 67; Sharp and Westmoreland, 

Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 

June 1968), pp 138-39, 156-58. 

2. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 

pp 315-16; Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New 

York, 1971), Chap 111. 

3. Hearings before the Preparedness 

Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, The War 

Against North Vietnam, 90th Cong, 1st sess 

(Washington, 1967), pts 1-5. 

4. Msgs, AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, Nov 7, 1967, Wheeler to Sharp, 

0815582 Nov 67; Johnson, The Vantage 

Point, pp 371-78; Westmoreland, A Soldier 

Reports, p 315; Oberdorfer, Tet!, Chap 111. 

5. Transcript of Westmoreland’s address before the Washington Press Club and 

questions and answers, Nov 21, 1967; transcript of Meet the Press (radio-TV broadand the Tet Offensive 

cast), Nov 19, 1967; Johnson, The Vantage 

Point, p 376; Van Staaveren, The Search 

for Military Alternatives, 1967, pp 55-59. 

6. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLI, 2-A-3; Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on Fiscal Year 

1974 Authorization for Military Procurement, pt 1, p 429. 

7. Hist, MACV, 1967, I, 37. 

8. Zbid., p 38. 

9. Ibid., Jul 68, p A-74; MR, Bernard 

Kornhauser, Ofc/Ch of Ops Analys, USAF, 

Mar 19, 1968. 

10. Strike Ops in Laos, 5 Dec-31 Oct 

67, 133; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLI, 5-1 to 5-3. 

11. MR, Col William F. Kaufman, 

USAF, Actg Dir, COC, MACV, subj: 

MACV Commanders Conference, Dec 3, 

1967; msgs, Westmoreland to Sharp, 

2006092 Dec 67, CINCPAC to JCS, 

0101562 Jan 68; Van Staaveren, The Search 

for Military Alternatives, 1967, pp 60-61; 

333 
NOTES TO PAGES 288-294 

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp 

12. Lester A. Sobel, ed, South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in 

Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, 7 vols (New 

York, 1961-1973), Vol 6, p 95; Summary of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLI, 2-3; 

EOTR, Col Robert S. Ferrari, Dep Ch, 

JUSMAG, Thailand, May 27, 1968. 

13. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2514482 Dec 67, JANAF Attach& 

Vientiane to JCS, DIA, SECSTATE, 

3011402 Dec 67; Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLI, 2-3. 

14. Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2514482 Dee 67, JANAF Attachts 

Vientiane to JCS, DIA, SECSTATE, 

301 1402 Dec 67; USAF Communications 

and Air Traffic Control Operations in Southeast Asia, 1960-1973 (Richards-Gebaur 

AFB, Mo., 1976), p 45 [hereafter cited as 

USAF Comm and ATC Ops, SEA, 

15. USAF Comm and ATC Ops, SEA, 

1960-1973, pp 40, 46; msg, JANAF Attachts Vientiane to JCS, DIA, SECSTATE, 

3011402 Dec 67. 

16. Bernard C. Nalty, Air Power and 

3 15- 16. 

1960-19731. 

the Fight for Khe Sanh (Washington, 1973), 

pp 13-31; msg, Sharp to Wheeler, 0623312 

Jan 68. 

17. Msgs, Sharp to Wheeler, 0623312 

Jan 68, Westmoreland to Sharp, 0812592 

Jan 68. 

18. Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for 

Khe Sanh, pp 13-31; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 

30 June 1968), pp 157-164. 

19. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 49; Nalty, Air Power and the Fight 

for Khe Sanh, p 9; hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 68, 

I, 149, 157. 

20. Van Staaveren, History of Task 

Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 

1968, p 50. 

21. Zbid. 

22. Zbid., pp 52-53. 

23. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLII, 2-7; Van Staaveren, History of Task Force Alpha, I October 

1967-30 April 1968, p 52; Nalty, Air Power 

and the Fight for Khe Sanh, p 93. 

24. Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, XLII, 2-7; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam 

(As of 30 June 1968), p 158. 

Epilogue 

1. Hists, MACV, 1967, I, 34-41, 

CINCPAC, 1967, 11, 660. 

3 34 
AA 

AAIRA 

ABLE MABLE 

ACS 

ACS/ 

ACW 

AD 

ADMINO 

ADSID 

ADVON 

AFSC 

AFXOPJ 

AGM 

AIG 

AIRA 

AOC 

ARC LIGHT 

ARPA 

ARVN 

ASOC 

ATC 

AU 

BANGO/WHIPLASH 

BARREL ROLL 

BDA 

BIG EAGLE 

Black Spot 

antiaircraft 

assistant air attache 

Limited reconnaissance by Air Force RF-101s over 

selected areas of Laos and South Vietnam. Began in 

November 1961. 

air commando squadron 

assistant chief of staff for 

air commando wing 

air division 

administrative office 

An air-delivered seismic intrusion detector. See SPIKEadvanced echelon 

Air Force Systems Command (USAF) 

Assistant Director for Joint Matters, Directorate of 

Operations, United States Air Force 

air-to-ground missile 

address indicating group 

air attache 

air operations center 

Strategic Air Command B-52 strikes in South and 

North Vietnam and Laos. Began December 12, 1965, 

in Laos. 

Advanced Research Projects Agency. A separately organized research and development agency of the Department of Defense under the direction and supervision of the director of defense research and 

engineering. 

SID. 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

air support operations center 

air traffic control 

Air University (USAF) 

F-4s at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base (BANGO) and 

F-105s at Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (WHIPLASH) placed on alert for rapid response to requests 

from the air attach6 at Vientiane, for interdiction and 

support of Royal Laotian troops. The alert began in 

May 1965. 

A limited Air Force-Navy interdiction in northern and 

southern Laos that began on December 14, 1964. See 

STEEL TIGER. 

bomb damage assessment 

A-26K night reconnaissance begun in 1966. 

NC-123s equipped with forward-looking radar, lowlight-level television, forward-looking infrared, laser 

335 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

ranger, advanced navigation system, weapon-release 

computer, and dispensers for BLUs. 

C-130 flareships used in Laos, from Ubon Royal Thai 

Air Force Base. 

bomb, live unit 

Photo reconnaissance of targets in North Vietnam, 

begun in 1965. 

Blindbat 

BLU 

BLUE TREE 

CANDLESTICK 

CBU 

CEP 

CHECO 

CIA 

CICV 

CIDG 

CINCPAC 

CINCPACAF 

CINCPACFLT 

CINCSAC 

CINCUSARPAC 

CJCS 

CM 

CNO 

COC 

COIN 

COMBAT BEAVER 

COMBAT SKYSPOT 

COMSEVENTHFLT 

COMUSMACTHAI 

COMUSMACV 

CP 

crachin 

The call sign for the C-123 forward air control/flare 

aircraft in Laos. 

cluster bomber unit 

circular error probable-an indicator of the delivery 

accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in 

determining probable damage to a target. 

Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations (1962); Contemporary Historical 

Evaluation of Combat Operations (1965); Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations 

(1 970) 

Central Intelligence Agency (US) 

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (RVN) 

commander in chief, Pacific Command 

commander in chief, Pacific Air Forces 

commander in chief, Pacific Fleet 

commander in chief, Strategic Air Command 

commander in chief, United States Army, Pacific 

chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

memorandum (chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) 

chief of naval operations (US) 

combat operations center 

counterinsurgency 

Selective interdiction of key logistic hubs as a means of 

providing opportunities for follow-on aircraft to 

strike enemy materiel and equipment. Similar to the 

ROLLING THUNDER concept but with emphasis placed 

on route interdiction and surveillance of Route Packages 11, 111, and IV. 

MSQ-77 and SST-181 radar-controlled bombing. 

MSQ-77 controlled bombing missions in STEEL TrGER, Route Package I, and South Vietnam. 

commander, Seventh Fleet (US) 

commander, United States Military Assistance Comcommander, United States Military Assistance Comcommand post 

A weather phenomenon consisting of low ceiling and 

drizzling rain, encountered over North Vietnam during the northeast monsoon season. 

mand, Thailand 

mand, Vietnam 

336 
GLOSSARY 

CRICKET 

c/s 

CSA 

CSAF 

CTF 

DASC 

DCPG 

DCS/ 

DCSAF 

DDR&E 

DEPCOMMACV 

DEPSECDEF 

DI 

DIA 

Dir/ 

DJSM 

DMZ 

DOD 

downlink relay 

Dragontooth 

DRV 

DUMP TRUCK 

ESSA 

FAC 

FAR 

FE 

FLAMING DART 

Foreign Clearance 

Guide 

frag 

fragmentary 

operations order 

FY 

A special air and air-ground program in central Laos 

with many targets selected by tribal and roadwatch 

teams. Began on January 12, 1966. 

chief of staff 

chief of staff, United States Army 

chief of staff, United States Air Force 

composite task force 

direct air support center 

Defense Communications Planning Group 

deputy chief of staff for 

deputy chief of staff, United States Air Force 

director of defense research and engineering, Office of 

deputy commander, Military Assistance Command, 

deputy secretary of Defense 

director of intelligence; directorate of intelligence 

Defense Intelligence Agency (US) 

director of 

director Joint Staff memorandum 

demilitarized zone 

Department of Defense (US) 

Sending sensor data to the infiltration surveillance 

See BLU-43. 

Democractic Republic of Vietnam 

An antipersonnel detection program. 

the Secretary of Defense 

Vietnam 

center for analysis. 

Environmental Sciences and Services Administration 

forward air control; forward air controller 

Forces ArmCes du Royaume 

Far East; far eastern 

The code name assigned to retaliatory strikes against 

North Vietnam in February 1965. Superseded in 

March 1965 by ROLLING THUNDER. 

A publication of the Defense Mapping Agency covering 

requirements for aircraft and personnel entering foreign countries. It contains information, for example, 

on aircraft clearances, uniforms, immunizations, passports and visas, quarantine, and customs. 

To issue a fragmentary operations order covering details of a single mission. 

The daily supplement to standard operations orders 

governing the conduct of the air war in Southeast 

Asia. It contained mission number and function, type 

of ordnance, time on target, and other instructions. 

fiscal year 

337 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

GAME WARDEN 

GATE GUARD 

GOLDEN EAGLE 

GREEN PYTHON 

GVN 

HARDNOSE 

HAVOC FORCE 

HAYMARKET FORCE 

HILLSBORO 

HORNET FORCE 

HOUND DOG 

HUB AND HEEL 

IBM 

IDA 

IGLOO WHlTE 

INVERT 

IOC 

ISA 

ISC 

JANAF 

JASON 

JCS 

River and waterway patrols consisting largely of intercepting watercraft suspected of carrying personnel or 

supplies to the Viet Cong/Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam forces in South Vietnam. Began on December 18, 1965. 

A special Air Force-Navy program in southernmost 

Laos and North Vietnam. It began on May 1, 1966, 

and ended in July 1966. 

A code name assigned to a proposal to employ American troops to reduce North Vietnamese infiltration 

through southern Laos. 

RF-101 aircraft of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Squadron, Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (1965). 

Government of Vietnam 

Surveillance of North Vietnamese infiltration by Laotian tribesmen. 

Code name assigned by MACV on November 7, 1966, 

to company-size probes into Laos. 

Code name assigned on November 7, 1966, to 

battalion-size probes into Laos. 

The C-130 airborne battlefield command and control 

center during the day. 

Code name assigned to platoon-size probes into Laos. 

Replaced the term Exploitation Force previously 

used. 

Call sign of Air Force 0-1E forward air controllers. 

A night concept devised by Seventh Air Force in March 

1967. It entailed several night B-52 strikes on probable chokepoints (hubs). Afterwards, Air Force 0-1 

or other forward air controllers flew visual reconnaissance over the spokes of the wheel (the routes 

into and out of the chokepoints or hub area). 

International Business Machines, Inc. 

Institute of Defense Analyses 

An air-supported antivehicular and antipersonnel system using acoustic and seismic sensors. Started December 1, 1967. 

Call sign of the ground-controlled intercept station at 

Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. 

initial operational capability 

International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary 

Infiltration surveillance center. See TASK FORCE ALPHA. 

of Defense (US) 

Joint Army-Navy-Air Force 

A division of the Institute of Defense Analyses. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

338 
GLOSSARY 

JGS 

Joint Operation 

Graphic 

Joint Task Force 728 

J-Staff 

JTF 

JUSMAG 

karst 

kip 

LEAPING LENA 

LONESOME TIGER 

Loran 

LUCKY DRAGON 

MAAG 

MAAGV 

MACSOG 

MACV 

MAF 

MANHATTAN PROJECT 

MATS 

MAW 

MHz 

MR 

MUD RIVER 

MSQ 

Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Published in Washington. The chart depicted route 

designations and alignments in Laos. Distribution 

began in November 1965. 

A group formed to expedite the implementation of the 

air-supported anti-infiltration barrier system in Laos. 

Joint Staff, used in numerical combinations as J-1 

(Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), 5-3 (Operations), 5-4 

(Logistics), J-5 (Plans), and 5-6 (Communications 

and Electronics). 

joint task force 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

An irregular limestone region with sinks, underground 

The basic monetary unit of Laos from 1955. 

streams, and caverns. 

Airdrops in mid-1964 by the Vietnamese Air Force of 

several small South Vietnamese information-gathering 

teams along selected areas of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

Flight test of forward-looking infrared in the B-26K 

aircraft (1966). 

Long-range electronic navigation system that uses a 

time divergence of pulse-type transmissions from two 

or more fixed stations. Also called long-range navigation. 

Reconnaissance of the Laotian and South and North 

Vietnam borders and selected target areas by U-2 

aircraft of the Strategic Air Command. Began in 

February 1964. 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 

Military Assistance Command, Studies and ObservaMilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Marine amphibious force 

The code name for America’s top-priority effort to 

Military Air Transport Service (WAF) 

Marine aircraft wing 

megahertz 

memorandum for record 

mobile search special 

Air-supported antivehicle subsystem activity by the 

Defense Communications Planning Group under 

IGLOO WHITE at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air 

Force Base, Thailand. 

tions Group 

produce the atomic bomb in World War 11. 

339 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

NIMROD 

NMCC 

NSAM 

NSC 

NVA 

NVAF 

OAR 

OPERATION HASTINGS 

OpOrd 

OPlan 

OPSum 

OSD 

PACAF 

PACFLT 

PACOM 

PANAMA 

paramilitary forces 

PATHFINDER 

PAVN 

PIPESTEM 

PL 

Plan 34A 

PL/NVA 

POL 

PONY EXPRESS 

POPEYE 

Popular Forces 

Call sign for A-26s of the 56th Air Commando Wing, 

Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, operating in Laos. (The 56th Air Commando Wing was 

redesignated the 56th Special Operations Wing on 

August 1, 1968.) 

National Military Command Center (Department of 

Defense) 

national security action memorandum 

National Security Council (US) 

North Vietnamese Army 

North Vietnamese Air Force 

Office of Aerospace Research (USAF) 

A military operation in July and early August 1966, 

against the North Vietnamese 324th B Division that 

crossed the demilitarized zone to infiltrate the two 

northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. 

operation order 

operation plan 

operation summary 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Pacific Air Forces (USAF) 

Pacific Fleet (USN) 

Pacific Command (US) 

Call sign of the ground controlled intercept station at 

Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam. 

Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular 

armed forces of any country, but resembling them in 

organization, equipment, training, or mission. 

Two or more aircraft using lead aircraft’s loran or 

other navigation system. 

People’s Army, Vietnam 

The code name for limited reconnaissance in October 

1961 by four Air Force RF-101s over selected areas 

of Laos and South Vietnam. Replaced in early 

November by similar aircraft known as ABLE MABLE. 

Pathet Lao 

A concept for conducting clandestine operations against 

North Vietnam for sabotage, intelligence, and psychological purposes. 

Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army 

petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

Support provided by Air Force helicopter units to tribal 

intelligence-gathering and targeting operations in 

southern Laos and North Vietnam. 

The initial code name for a rainmaking program using 

Air Force aircraft to seed clouds over selected infiltration areas. Initial tests were conducted in 1966. 

The former Vietnamese Self Defense Corps. Locally 

recruited South Vietnamese volunteers, organized into 

340 
GLOSSARY 

squads and platoons, and used chiefly as security 

forces in villages and hamlets. 

Code name of the Defense Communications Planning 

Group. 

Formerly SHINING BRASS. Consisted of air-supported 

ground reconnaissance teams sent into enemy territory to select targets for air strikes and to make 

poststrike assessments of damage. 

PRACTICE NINE 

PRAIRIE FIRE 

RANCH HAND 

RAND 

real time 

RED HAZE 

Regional Forces 

RLAF 

RLG 

RM 

ROCK KICK I-IV 

ROLLING THUNDER 

Route Package 

RTAF 

RTAFB 

RVN 

RVNAF 

SA 

SAC 

SAF 

SEA 

SEACOORD 

SEA DRAGON 

SECDEF 

SECNAV 

U 1-C23 defoliation and herbicide operations. 

Research and Development (The RAND Corporation, 

Santa Monica, California) 

The absence of delay, except for the time required for 

the transmission by communications between the 

occurrence of an event and reception of the data at 

some other location. 

infrared surveillance photography 

The former Vietnamese Civil Guard. These were local 

South Vietnamese defense forces, recruited and used 

within one of the administrative regions into which 

the country was divided. 

Royal Laotian Air Force 

Royal Laotian Government 

RAND memorandum 

A code name for B-52 interdiction strikes in 1966 on 

targets at Mu Cia Pass on the border of North 

Vietnam and Laos. 

A code name assigned to the air program against select 

targets and lines of communication in North Vietnam 

(March 1965-October 1968) 

Numbered geographic areas (I-V, VIA, VIB) in North 

Vietnam, designated by the commander in chief, 

Pacific Command, to permit the assignment of ROLLING THUNDER responsibilities to the commander in 

chief, Pacific Air Forces, the commander, Seventh 

Fleet, and the commander, United States Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

Royal Thai Air Force 

Royal Thai Air Force Base 

Republic of Vietnam 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

secretary of the Army 

Strategic Air Command (USAF) 

secretary of the Air Force 

Southeast Asia 

Coordinating Committee for United States Missions 

Southeast Asia 

Naval gunfire against North Vietnam. 

secretary of Defense 

secretary of the Navy 

34 1 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

SECSTATE 

SHED LIGHT 

SHINING BRASS 

SHOCK 

Sihanouk Trail 

SILVER BAYONET 

SLAM 

SLAR 

SLTF 

SN 

Special Forces 

SPIKESID 

SPIKE teams 

SPOS 

STEEL TIGER 

STOL 

STPD 

TAC 

tac 

Tacan 

TACC 

secretary of State 

The overall United States Air Force research and 

development program to improve night attacklinterdiction capability. 

United States-led South Vietnamese team and platoon 

probes into the Ho Chi Minh Trail with Army and 

Air Force helicopter and aircraft support. Began 

September 15, 1965. Renamed PRAIRIE FIRE on 

March 1, 1967. 

A Vientiane embassy program to assure more United 

States Air Force support against targets selected by 

tribal roadwatch teams. 

The nickname for Route 110, a North Vietnamese 

Army logistic route which came north out of Cambodia and ran eastward towards the triborder area, 

terminating near Dak To and Ban Het in South 

Vietnam. 

A 1965 military operation in Pleiku Province. Considered one of the major allied successes of the war. 

Select, locate, annihilate, monitor-a special expanded 

SHINING BRASS program using United States-led 

South Vietnamese ground teams and platoons and 

Air Force tactical and B-52 aircraft. Began October 

7, 1966. 

side-looking airborne radar 

STEEL TIGER Task Force 

secretary of the Navy 

Military personnel with cross-training in basic and 

specialized military skills. They are organized into 

small multi-purpose detachments with the mission to 

train, organize, supply, direct, and control other 

forces in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency 

operations, and to conduct unconventional warfare 

operations. 

An air-delivered seismic intrusion detector with a spike 

to allow it to stick into the ground. See ADSID. 

A new code name assigned to SHINING BRASS teams on 

October 3, 1966. 

strongpoint obstacle system 

Regular Air Force-Navy interdiction in southern Laos 

of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, beginning April 3, 1965. 

(BARREL ROLL was thereafter confined to northern 

Laos.) 

short-takeoff-and-landing 

short tons per day 

Tactical Air Command (USAF) 

tactical 

tactical air navigation 

tactical air control center 

342 
GLOSSARY 

TALLY Ho 

TAO 

TASK FORCE ALPHA 

TASS 

TCG 

Tet 

Tet offensive 

TF 

TFS 

TFW 

TIC 

TIGER HOUND 

TROPIC MOON 

TRW 

USA 

USACMH 

USAF 

USARPAC 

USARV 

USMAAG 

USMACV 

USMC 

USN 

USUN 

VCSAF 

VNAF 

VNSP 

An Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army air program 

using TIGER HOUND Task Force personnel and aircraft. Began on July 20, 1966. 

target analysis officer 

A code name assigned to the organization in 1967 that 

built and operated an infiltration surveillance center 

for receiving and analyzing acoustic and seismic 

sensor information on enemy activities in order to 

pinpoint their location for an air or ground attack. 

Located at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force 

Base, Thailand. 

tactical air support squadron 

tactical control group 

The lunar New Year holiday observed in Vietnam and 

other Asian countries. It occurs early in the Julian 

year. 

A sudden attack by the North Vietnamese and Viet 

Cong that began in the early hours of January 30, 

1968, on Saigon, many other cities and towns, as well 

as numerous South Vietnamese and American military bases and airfields. It took United States and 

South Vietnamese forces several weeks to contain the 

offensive. 

task force 

tactical fighter squadron 

tactical fighter wing 

target information center 

The code name of a special Air Force, Navy, Marine, 

and Army task force that began interdicting southeasternmost Laos on December 5, 1965. 

A research program employing A-IEs with low-lightlevel television (1966). 

tactical reconnaissance wing 

United States Army 

United States Army Center of Military History 

United States Air Force 

United States Army, Pacific 

United States Army, Vietnam 

United States Military Advisory Assistance Group 

United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

United States Marine Corps 

United States Navy 

United States Mission to the United Nations; United 

States Representative to the United Nations and 

Representative in the Security Council 

Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

Vietnamese Air Force 

Vietnamese Special Forces 

343 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

WATER PUMP 

WSEG 

YANKEE TEAM 

Z 

The code name for Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando 

Wing (USAF), that deployed to Udorn Royal Thai 

Air Force Base in April 1964 for the purpose of 

training and providing logistic support for Thai but 

also Lao air force personnel. 

Weapon Systems Evaluation Group 

An Air Force and Navy tactical reconnaissance program 

that began in northern and southern Laos on May 

19, 1964. 

Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time) 

344 
Bibliographic Note 

Sources for this volume have been drawn from a variety of 

depositories. The Washington National Records Center at Suitland, 

Maryland, holds materials on Southeast Asia that can be found in the 

following collections: the USAF Directorate of Plans containing Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and Air Staff papers; the files of the Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force; and those of the International Security 

Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

The United States Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell 

Air Force Base, Ala., possesses numbered air force and unit histories, 

many primary source documents (memoranda and messages), the volumes of the Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia, and Project 

CHECO (Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations), 

Project Corona Harvest, and numerous end of tour and oral history 

reports. Generally, unit histories contain a paucity of data on Laos, and 

the primary source materials are highly fragmentary. Of greatest value 

are several CHECO reports and in particular the Summary of Air 

Operations, Southeast Asia volumes prepared under the aegis of the 

Pacific Air Forces. Virtually all of the foregoing data is on microfilm. 

Copies of CHECO and Corona Harvest reports and volumes of 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia are also held in the Office 

of Air Force History. 

The richest single lode of primary source documents on Laos is 

likewise on microfilm. These record the activities of the commander in 

chief, Pacific Command, during the war and are available through the 

Naval Historical Center. The collection contains a huge volume of 

messages generated by the services, major commands, and the state and 

defense departments on Laos, South and North Vietnam, and Cambodia. 

The messages are filled with both planning and operational data. 

The Army’s Center of Military History holds the records of the 

former United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon. This vast 

accumulation includes many primary and secondary sources on Laos and 

other areas of the war theater. Of particular worth are the personal files 

of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, USA, who served as commander of 

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1964 through 

June 1968. 

The Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center, Department 

of State, has an indispensable lode of messages and memoranda on Laos 

and other areas of Southeast Asia. Although underscoring the United 

345 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

States’ political concerns, the collection contains some data on military 

operations. Many-but by no means all-of the materials here may also 

be found in the Pacific Command’s microfilm holdings. 

Three separate editions of The Pentagon Papers (Defense Department, Gravel, and the New York Times) provide a modest amount of 

high-level source material on the war in Laos. The papers, which end in 

early 1968, deal chiefly with the wars in South and North Vietnam. 

Statistical data on Laos is drawn mostly from the USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Air Force’s Summary of 

Air Operations, Southeast Asia. Each has a different format and largely 

different types of data. 

House and Senate hearings on the war in Southeast Asia give 

important data on the events in Laos. Two documents have been 

especially useful. One is the testimony of William H. Sullivan, former 

Ambassador to Laos, in Hearings before the Subcommittee on United 

States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee 

on Foreign Relations, Senate, United States Security Agreements and 

Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos, 91st Cong, 1st sess, 1970. The 

other is a chronological guide to events in Southeast Asia, entitled 

Background In formation Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 

published by the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate. 

Finally, there are numerous special studies and reports prepared 

under the auspices of the Office of Air Force History, by other defense 

department offices and agencies, and by activities under contract with the 

Department of Defense. 

Governmental Sources 

Books 

Ballard, Jack S. Development and Employment of Fixed- Wing Gunships, 1962-1972. [The 

Air Force in Southeast Asia]. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1982. 

Buckingham, William A., Jr. Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in 

Southeast Asia, 1961-1971. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1982. 

- . A Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 1954-1967. 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1967. 

Momyer, Gen William W., USAF, Ret. Air Power in Three Wars (WW 11, Korea, 

Vietnam). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978. 

Nalty, Bernard C. Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh. Washington: Office of Air Force 

History, 1973. 

346 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 

The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam Books, 

The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of 

Sharp, Adm U. S. G., USN, and Westmoreland, Gen W. C., USA. Report on the War in 

1971. 

United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 

Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969. 

Studies and Reports 

Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam’s Campaign to Conquer South 

Vietnam. Washington: Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 

of State, 1965. 

Air Operations Against North Vietnam. Washington: Rolling Thunder Study Group, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1966. 

Analysis of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. 5 vols. Washington: USAF Study Group, 

United States Air Force, 1965. 

Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, FY 1966. 

Anthony, Maj Victor B., USAF. “A Military History of the War in Northern Laos, 

1945-1968.” Manuscript. [The Air Force in Southeast Asia]. Washington: Office of 

Air Force History, 1976. 

__ . Tactics and Techniques of Night Operations, 1961-1970. [The Air Force in 

Southeast Asia]. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1973. 

Assessment of the Air Effort in Vietnam and Laos (As of 31 January 1966). Washington: 

Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), United States Army, 1966. 

Bonetti, Lee, et al. The War in Vietnam, July-December 1967. Hickam Air Force Base, 

Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1968. 

Description of the No Chi Minh Trail. WSEG Study 125. Washington: Weapons Systems 

Evaluation Group, Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 1966. 

Durkee, Maj Richard A., USAF. Combat Skyspot. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: 

Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

The Effects of U.S. Bombing on North Vietnam’s Ability to Support Military Operations 

in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect. Washington: Institute of 

Defense Analyses, 1966. 

Greenhalgh, William H., Jr. “U.S. Air Force Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, 

1960-1975.” Manuscript. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Albert F. Simpson Historical 

Research Center, 1977. 

Helmka, MSgt. Robert T., USAF, and Hale, TSgt. Beverly, USAF. USAF Operations from 

Thailand, 1964-1965. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air 

Forces, 1966. 

Horrocks, Michael. “The Sensor War, 1966-1971.” Manuscript. Washington: Office of Air 

Force History, 1977. 

Horrocks, Michael, and McCormack, David A. “Distinguishing the Pathet Lao from the 

North Vietnamese in Laos.“ Manuscript. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 

1976. 

- . “North Vietnamese Infiltration and Other Activities in Laos and North Vietnam.” 

Manuscript. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1976. 

Kipp, Robert M. B-52 Operations in Southeast Asia, 1967: A Summary Narrative. 

Historical Study 105. Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr.: Strategic Air Command, 1969. 

347 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

MacNaughton, 1st Lt Robert L., USAF. Yankee Team, May 1964-June 1965. Hickam Air 

Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1966. 

Melyan, Wesley R. C. Arc Light, 1965-1966. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project 

CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

Nelson, Capt Donald W., USAF. The USAF Helicopter in SEA. Hickam Air Force Base, 

Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1968. 

Noell, Rebecca Y. Tactical Air Command in Southeast Asia, 1961-1968. Langley Air Force 

Base, Va.: Tactical Air Command, 1972. 

Pacific Air Forces Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest. Out-Country Strike 

Operations in Southeast Asia, I January 1965-31 March 1968. Volume I, Sub Task 

1Ic: Strike Operations in Laos, 5 December 1965-31 October 1967. Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 1970. 

Patersnn, L. E. Air War in the DMZ, January-August 1967. Hickam Air Force Base, 

Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1968. 

Porter, Melvin F. The Defense of Attopeu. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project 

CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1966. 

- . Interdiction in SEA, 1965-1966. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project 

CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

- . Night Interdiction in Southeast Asia. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project 

CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1966. 

- . Tiger Hound. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air 

Forces, 1966. 

Pralle, Maj James B., USAF. Arc Light, June 1967-December 1968. Hickam Air Force 

Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1969. 

Reinhardt, G. C., and Sharkey, E. H. Air Interdiction in Southeast Asia. RM-5283-PR. 

Santa Monica: The RAND Corp, 1967. 

Rowley, Lt Col Ralph A., USAF. FAC Operations, 1965-1970. [The Air Force in 

Southeast Asia]. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1975. 

Sams, Kenneth. Escalation of the War in Southeast Asia, July-December 1964. Hickam Air 

Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, n.d. 

Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966. Washington: 

History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982. 

Sturdevant, C. V. The Border Control Problem in South Vietnam. RM-3697-ARPA. Santa 

Monica: The RAND Corp, 1964. 

Summary of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. 109 vols. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: 

Directorate of Operational Analysis, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Pacific Air 

Forces, 1965-1973. 

A Summary of Headquarters USARPAC Participation in Development of the InfiltrationInterdiction System for Southeast Asia. Fort Shafter, Hawaii: 1st Military History 

Detachment, United States Army, Pacific, 1968. 

Thompson, Maj A. W., USAF. Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) in SEA. 

Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1969. 

A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam’s Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam. Department 

of State Publication 7308. Washington: Department of State, 1961. 

Trest, Warren A. Lucky Tiger Combat Operations. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: 

Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

- . Lucky Tiger: Special Air Warfare Operations. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: 

Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

__ . Operation Tally Ho. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific 

Air Forces, 1966. 

348 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 

Trest, Warren A., and Hammons, SSgt Dale E., USAF. USAF Operations from Thailand, 

1966. Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1967. 

USAF Communications and Air Traffic Control Operations in Southeast Asia, 1960-1973. 

Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Mo.: Air Force Communications Service, 1976. 

Vallentiny, Edward. USAF Operations from Thailand, 1 January 1967-1 July 1968. 

Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, 1968. 

Van Staaveren, Jacob. History of Task Force Alpha, I October 1967-30 April 1968. 

Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand: Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, 

Thirteenth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, 1969. 

__ . The Search for Military Alternatives. [The Air Force in Vietnam]. Washington: 

Office of Air History, 1969. 

__ . USAF Deployment Planning for Southeast Asia, 1966. Washington: United States 

Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967. 

__ . USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965. Washington: United States 

Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1966. 

__ . USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. Washington: United 

States Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965. 

- . USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos, 1964. Washington: United 

States Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1965. 

Weiner, M. G.; Brom, J. R.; and Koon, R. K. Infiltration of Personnel from North 

Vietnam, 1959-1967. RM-5760-PR. Santa Monica: The RAND Corp, 1968. 

Wolk, Herman S. USAF Logistic Plans and Policies in Southeast Asia, 1966. Washington: 

United States Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967. 

- . USAF Plans and Policies: Logistics and Base Construction in Southeast Asia, 

1967. Washington: United States Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1968. 

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency. RM-4140-PR. 

Santa Monica: The RAND Corp, 1964. 

Intelligence and Operational Data 

Defense Intelligence Digest. Defense Intelligence Agency. June 1966. 

DIA Intelligence Bulletin. Defense Intelligence Agency. February 9, 14, 17, 1966. 

PACAF DI Quarterly Review, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. Directorate of 

Intelligence, Pacific Air Forces. March 31, 1966. 

PACAF DI Report, Effects of Air Operations, Southeast Asia. Directorate of Intelligence, 

Pacific Air Forces. January 6 and March 31, 1966, March 17, 1977. 

PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 38-65. Pacific Command. September 17, 1965. 

PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 46-66. Pacific Command. May 6, 1966. 

Seventh AF Weekly Air Intelligence Summary. Directorate of Intelligence, Seventh Air 

Southeast Asia Military Fact Book. Defense Intelligence Agency/Joint Chiefs of Staff. May 

Force. December 16, 1967. 

1966, July 1966, July 1968. 

Congressional and Presidential Documents 

House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Department 

of Defense Appropriations for 1964. 88th Cong, 1st sess. Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1963. 

349 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Assistance. 89th 

Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. 

Senate. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Armed Services. Tactical Air Operations and Readiness. 89th Cong, 2d sess. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. 

Senate. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Armed Services. The Air War Against North Vietnam. 90th Cong, 1st sess. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967. 

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast 

Asia and Vietnam. 6th rev ed. 91st Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing 

Office, 1970. 

Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and 

Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security 

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos. 91st Cong, 1st sess. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970. 

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization 

for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Construction Authorization for 

the Safeguard ABM, and Active Duty and Selected Reserve Strengths. 93d Cong, 1st 

sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973. 

Senate. Final Report of the Select Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to 

Intelligence Activities, Together with Additional Supplemental and Separate Views. 

Foreign Military Intelligence. Report 94-755. 94th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: 

Government Printing Office, 1976. 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. 

Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 

1966. 

Non-Governmental Sources 

Books 

Adams, Nina S., and McCoy, Alfred W., eds. Laos: War and Revolution. New York: 

Dommen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. Rev ed. New York: 

Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2d ed. New York: 

Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. 

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration 

Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New 

Sobel, Lester A., ed. South Vietnam: US.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 

Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., USA, Ret. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W. W. Norton & 

Harper & Bros, 1970. 

Frederick A. Praeger, 1971. 

Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 

of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, 1967. 

York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. 

1961-1973. 7 vols. New York: Facts on File, Inc, 1961-1973. 

Co, 1972. 

350 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 

Westmoreland, Gen William C., USA, Ret. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, N.Y.: 

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Pathet Lao. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1973. 

Doubleday & Co, 1976. 

Articles 

Encyclopaedia Britannica: Micropaedia. 1974 ed. S.V. “Vietnam, South.” 

Encyclopedia Americana. 1967 ed. S.V. “Laos.” 

Newspapers 

Baltimore Sun, February 10, 13, 1967. 

New York Daily News, December 14, 1965. 

New York Times, May 22, 1964, February 6-14, 1967, April 13, 1968. 

Philadelphia Inquirer, December 13, 1966. 

Washington Post, December 28, 1965, February 17, 1967. 

Washington Star, March 23, 1967. 

35 1 

Index 

A Shau Valley: 239 

Abersold. Edward G.: 156, 157 

Aderholt, Harry C. 209 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA): 256-257 

Agency for International Development: 

220 

Air America: 28. 49, 57 

Air Forces 

Seventh: 7. 125. 151, 159, 160. 162. 

168, 177, 208-209, 214-215, 219, 

227-246 pa~sim, 270, 274 

Thirteenth: 177 

Air rules, U.S.: 42-43, 66, 151, 167, 

Aircraft: 300 

Aircraft types: 

170. 219-26, 294 

propeller: 240-43 

A-1 Skvraider: 

E: 24 100, 117, 118. 120, 168-169, 

222, 227, 233, 240, 241, 242, 

269. 275, 276, 282, 291 

WAF: 157 

H: 48, 88, 116 

WAF: 51 

A-4E: 292 

A-26: 170, 222 

K 173, 176 

BIG EAGLE: 215 

NIMROD: 160, 174-176, 209. 214, 

232, 233, 235. 240 

A-37: 241. 244 

AC-47 gwhips: 100. 112, 117, 124, 

128, 144, 148, 174, 241 

Spooky gunships: 110. 111, 126. 

127, 128 

K 112, 117 

B-26: 14 

B-52 132-141. 157, 159, 166. 167, 

197-198, 203-206, 236, 270 

ARC LIGHT missions: 133-140 

PUSS& 169, 181-89, 196, 199. 

203-204, 235. 251-252 

95-96, 125. 151, 188-190, 

Strategic Air Command (SAC): vii, 

240, 247-253, 290, 292 

B-57: 35, 61. 62, 93. 101, 102, 240 

B-66: 102, 137 

C-47: 14. 222 

RLAF: 86 

C-123: 117, 222 

Candlestick 209, 215, 232, 240 

flareship: 48 

VICTOR CONTROL: 65 

C-130 35, 61, 98, 100, 101, 102, 

116-117, 160, 222, 238, 239 

ABCCC: 118, 153. 164, 165, 177. 

197, 207, 224, 229. 238, 239. 

279 

Blindbat: 116, 118. 153. 207. 215 

CV-2: 50 

EC-121: 115, 268, 269, 275, 276, 277. 

279, 283 

EC-130 ABCCC: 214, 216, 217 

F-4 89, 233, 242, 244, 269 

B: 227 

C: 92, 102. 116, 204, 214 

BANGO: 63, 64, 65, 78, 91, 

86-87. 100. 103. 134, 160, 

222, 232, 241 

D 232, 241, 243, 270, 275 

Navy: 46 

E (Marine): 292 

F 118. 241 

F-8 

F-100 Super Sabre: 27, 35. 44. 241 

F-102 35 

F-105 Thunderchief: 35.44-45.48,62, 

173. 176, 212-219. 223, 241, 242 

88-89. 92. 97. 100, 102, 130, 137, 

WHIPLASK 63, 65, 78, 103 

JC-130A (G~hip II): 241 

KB-50 35 

KC-135: 44, 78, 250, 251 

SAC: 101 

0-1 Bird Dog: 111, 117, 127, 165, 

227. 232 

forward air controller (FAC): 

107-108, 111, 112-113, 118, 

119, 148, 159. 160, 161-162, 

170, 173, 198-199, 207, 209. 

222, 224, 241, 269 

Hound Dog: 153, 155-56, 157 

E 80. 85, 95, 96. 97, 100. 240 

F 50,209,232 

0-2 241, 269, 275, 276, 277 

353 
INTERDICTION INSOUTHERN LAOS 

A Super Skymaster: 229, 240 

OP-2E. Navy: 269, 275, 271. 279, 

283, 291. 292 

ov- 1 

A 63 

B: 100, 116, 204, 230 

C Mohawk 63 

P-2 268 

RB-2 5, 6 

RB-66: 118 

RC-47 177, 216, 217 

RF-8A (Navy): 25 

RF-4 269 

RF-101: 35, 44, 63, 79, 110, 118, 269 

ABLE MABLE: 5, 14, 25 

PIPESTEM: 5. 63, 210 

SC-47: 6 

T-6 16 

T-28: 6. 14, 16. 34, 37. 39, 65, 124, 

125, 126, 222 

RM 244 

ZORRO: 232, 240 

D: 209, 214 

U-2 LUCKY DRAGON: 34. 42, 79 

uc-123 RANCH HAND: 101 

Volpar: 216 

WC-13OB: 227 

Anthis, Rollen H.: 6 

Anti-infiltration: viii, 197, 256, 293 

background v-viii 

barriers: 255-83. 259-60, 269, 270. 

Anderson. Calvin C.: 155-56 

See also Bomblets, 

DRAGONTOOTH 

mines; Select, Locate, Annihiiate, 

Monitor (SUM) strike; TASK 

FORCE ALPHA. 

programs. See under individual 

names: BARREL ROLL; 

GATE GUARD; IGLOO WHITE; 

Rainmaking; SHINING BRASS; 

SHOCK; Select, Locate, 

Annihilate. Monitor (SLAM) 

strike; S"EFL TIGER; TALLY 

Ho; TIGER HOUND. 

COMMANDO LAVA; CRICKET; 

LEAF'ING LENA; POPEYE; 

prop~sals: 69-70, 72-74 

ARC LIGHT missions. See Aircrdt, 

B-52, ARC LIGHT missions. 

Attopeu. Laos: 8. 17. 125-28 

BACK ROAD: 134 

Ban Bak. Laos: 233 

Ban Chom Thong. Laos: 223 

Ban Fangdeng, Laos: 128 

Ban Kagnak, Laos: 128 

Ban Kengxai, Laos: 128 

Ban Na Ka Pat, Laos: 130 

Ban Na Muong. Laos: 217 

Ban Sok. Laos: 128 

BANGO/WHIPLASH: 176 

Ban Tang Vai, Laos: 48-49 

BARREL ROLL: 44-69 PUSS^. 79. 89. 

95. 103-105, 141, 175-176, 232, 

269 

BLACK WATCH 5.6 

Blanchard, William H.: 132 

BLUE TREE. 63 

Boles, John K.: 96-97 

Bomblets 

BLU-3 bomblets: 167 

DRAGONTOOTH mines: 260. 264. 

266, 267. 275 

Bond, Charles R.. Jr.: 108. 128 

Boun Oum na Champassak: 2 

Bounpone Makthepharak: 3940 

Brown, Harold 132 

Bunker, Ellsworth: 286 

Calgon: 238 

Cappalletti. Francis R.: 190-191 

Carter, James R.: 126 

Chavanne, Laos: 15 

Chemicals: 238-39. See also Napalm. 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group 

Clay, Lucius D., Jr.: 192 

Clyde, John R.: 155 

Cochran, Drexel R.: 24 

COMBAT BEAVER: 265-266 

COMBAT DRAGON: 241 

COMBAT SKYSPOT: 179-180 

Combined Intelligence Center (CICV): 

COMMANDO HUNT II: 239 

Con Thien, South Vietnam: 285 

Congressioal hearings: 285-287 

Coordinating Committee for U.S. 

Missions Southeast Asia 

(SEACOORD). See SEACOORD. 

Cambodi~ 96, 107, 148-49, 233 

(CIDG): 12-13 

133 

COMMANDO LAVA: 237-239 

Cool, Gary D. 127-128 

354 
INDEX 

CRICKET: 75-78. 107-114, 141, 144, 

151, 160. 174-176. 178 

WEST: 165, 170, 172-174, 224 

FRINGE: 170, 173-174. 224 

Cross border operations: 38-40 

Crum. William J.: 135. 137 

Davis, Waymond A.: 262 

Dawel Chunlasap: 277 

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos: 5 

Defense Communications Planning 

Group: 266. 267. 268 

Defense Intelligence Agency: 12, 47, 

144, 169. 287 

Defoliation: 84, 96. 101, 107. See also 

Napalm. 

DELTA team: 168 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV): 

5. 17. 147, 288, 289-90 

Department of Defense, US.: 169, 226. 

See also Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); 

McNamara, Robert S. 

Derango, William C.: 271 

Divisions, 2d Air: 6, 7, 24, 28, 57, 62, 

80, 85. 86, 91, 110, 111, 112. 129, 

143 

Donalson, I. B. "Jack: 153, 157 

Dow Chemical Company: 238 

DUMp TRUCK: 283, 291 

Duong Van (Big) Mi& 20 

Emrick. Paul S. 138 

FARM GATE: 6, 13-14, 19 

Felt, Harry D.: 7, 17, 19 

Fisher, Roger D.: 256. 258 

FLAMING DART: 50 

Flareships. Sm LIGHT: 229-230 

FLAT TIRE. See POPEYE. 

Forbes, Walter, B.: 215, 277 

Forces Ardes du Royawne (FAR): 17, 

Forrestal. Michael V.: 11, 20 

Forward air controller (FAC): 164, 224. 

See also Aircraft A-lE, A-26, 

37-38. 80, 108. 176, 238 

C-47, C-123, C-130, 0-1, T-28. 

MISTY: 241 

Foster, John S.. Jr.: 272 

France: 8 

GATE GUARD: 107, 118-120, 265 

Geneva Agreement 

1962: 5. 14, 294 

1954: 1-2, 4 

GOLDEN EAGLE: 72. 87. 88 

Government of National Union (Laos): 

Greene. Wallace M.. Jr.: 36 

GREEN PYTHON: 63 

Groom. John F. 98, 101 

Group Mobile (FAR): 66. 130, 172, 173 

24 

Groups 

35th Tactical, Detachment 2: 28 

504th Tactical Air Support: 238 

505th Tactical Control 

Detachment 1: 108 

Detachment 3: 112. 127 

Gulf of Tonkin incident: 35 

Guam: 240, 247-248. 251 

Habib, Philip C.: 239 

Hagerstrom, James P.: 113, 126, 128 

HARDNOSE: 4 

Harkins, Paul D.: 6, 14. 15, 19 

Harriman, W. Averill: 20 

Harris, Hunter: 35,42,54.81,112, 122. 

257, 261 

Helicopter types: 

Hark 1 and 2 110-111, 176-177. 216 

CH-3 Jolly Green Giant 198. 181, 

268. 281-282, 291 

C: 117 

PONY EXPRESS: 181 

CH9E 269. 275, 276 

CH-34 203 

VNfi 198 

HH-43 Huskie: 57 

UH-1: 203, 291, 

B: 50. 121, 123, 159, 167, 

F 177 

168-169, 269 

Helicopters. Thai-based: 177, 180-181 

HIGH PORT. See SOUTHPAW (HIGH 

Hilsman. Roger: 11, 15, 20 

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 29, 61, 88, 

PORT). 

123-124, 137, 144, 229-230, 

239-240. See also Anti-infiltration. 

description: 7-8. 70, 113. 293-294 

maintenance and defense: 147-148 

transport and personnel: 144-146 

355 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

Hoang Xuan Lam, Laos: 152 

Holloway, Bruce K.: 263 

Hon Giu (Tiger Island): 62 

HORNET FORCE: 166, 167. 198-199, 

201. 203. 230, 231. 236. 237 

Houa Phan. Laos: 1 

Howarth. Albert R.: 174 

HUB AND WHEEL: 214-215 

IGLOO WHITE: 181. 270, 276 

establiihment 261. 270, 277, 279 

nomenclature: 255 

opposition to: 257-258, 263, 266. 268 

Origins: 255-261 

Infiitration: 7-9, 21-22, 114, 151-152. 

See also Anti-infiltration; Ho Chi 

Minh Trail. 

barriers to: 255-283 

Vietnamese, number oE 9-12, 97, 

Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA): 

Intelligence: 4, 15, 17. 21. 53. 287, 288 

International Business Machines (IBM): 

International Coneol Commission (ICC): 

287-288. 301 

258. 267 

27 1 

1. 2, 5. 25. 185. 189 

hVERT Station: 89 

Jensen, George W.: 126-127 

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 29-30, 35, 38-39, 

Administration: 23, 27. 43-44, 49-51, 

Johnson, Hmld K.: 55-56, 256-257 

56, 81. 244, 246. 286 

53. 201-203, 228, 249, 251-252 

Johnson, Robert L.: 114 

Johnson. U. Alexis: 62, 131-132 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 24-26, 27, 

44, 46. 55. 56, 169, 181 

and anti-infiltration physical barrier: 

and short-round incidents: 132. 222 

257-268 passim 

Joint Task Force 728: 262-266 

Kaysen, Carl: 258 

Kennedy. John F.: 4, 5, 9-10. 20. 21 

Khe Sanh. South Vietnam: viii. 289-292 

Kistiakowsky. George B.: 258 

Klusman, Charles F. 27 

Komer, Robert W.: 286 

Kong River: 15. 233 

Kong Le: 2, 6 

Korat. Thailand 275. 276 

Lang Vei. South Vietnam: 222.223.270 

Lansdale. Edward G.: 255 

Laos: 1-29 passim, 88, 89, 94-95. 110, 

112, 162. 165. See also 

Weather. 

LAU-rocket launchers: 241 

Law, William: 37 

LeMay, Curtis: 23, 27, 36 

Lindley. Gene: 274, 277 

kke. Eugene M.: 242 

Loran C and D receivers: 269 

Lownds, David E.: 290 

Lynn, Doyle W.: 27 

LEAPING LENA: 30-32. 72 

Madison, John E.: 215 

Magnavox Company: 271 

Marine Corps, US.: 100, 101, 115. 

116, 157, 232, 240. 290, 291- 292 

III Marine Amphibious Force: 152, 

Martin, Graham A.: 62, 111-112, 181. 

McBride, William P.: 273, 274, 277. 

McChristian. Joseph A.: 148 

McCone, John: 81 

153, 157. 167, 239. 269 

186, 248-249 

290 

McCo~ell, John P.: 117-118, 142, 196, 

228, 246. 263, 265 

McCreery. Jack H.: 28, 29 

McNamara, Robert S.: 11, 20, 21-24, 

76-77. 81, 123. 141, 142, 175, 181, 

185, 193, 195. 228. 247 

anti-infiitration barrier program: 

B-52 saturation bombing: 251-252 

congressional testimony: 285-286 

TASK FORCE ALPHA: 273, 274 

McNaughton, John T.: 53-54, 256, 258, 

McNickle, Marvin L. 262 

Mekong River: 7 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

Military Assistance Command Studies 

256-270 passim 

270 

(MAAG): 4, 5. 6, 12-13 

and Observations Group 

(MACSOG): 91 

356 
INDEX 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

See also Westmoreland, William C. 

(MACV): 6. 7, 10-11. 12, 151, 270. 

Military Region IV: 128. 233, 244 

Milton, Theodore R. 53-54 

Mines: 167, 264, 266, 269, 275, 282. 

291. See also Bomblets, 

DRAGON’KIOTH mines; Ordnance. 

MK-36 Destructor: 230 

XM-41: 291 

1E 291 

Missiles 

Momyer. William W.: 152-153, 157, 

162, 175, 177, 186. 191-228 

passim, 238-239, 242-244, 289 

Moore, Joseph H.: 24. 25, 28, 50. 58, 

81, 96, 98, 112, 143 

Moorer, Admiral (PACFLT 

Commander): 53 

Moorman. Thomas S.: 53 

Mudmaking: 237-239 

MUD RIVER: 275. 279, 291 

Mu Cia Pass: 8, 61. 77, 135, 137-139, 

154, 170, 211. 213, 225 

Muong Hiem. Laos: 129-130 

Muong Phalane, Laos: 218-219, 223. 

Mustin. Lloyd M. 138 

AGM-12 Bullpup: 44 

289 

Napalm: 42. 44. 56. 143-144, 163. 198, 

Nape Pass: 8, 61. 77 

National Photographic Interpretation 

National Security Action Memorandum 

202 

Center: 79 

256 16-17 

273: 21 

288: 23 

314 33, 36 

328: 59 

Naval Ordnance Training Station, China 

Navy, US.: 6-7. 232. 240, 268. See 

Lake, 226, 227 

also Pacific Fleet (PACFLT); 

Pacific Command, U.S. Navy 

(PACOM) . aircraft 25. 46, 103, 115. 116, 

Observation Squadron 67: 275 

reconnaissance missions: 27, 34 

Seventh Fleet: 46, 129 

161-162, 172, 279 

short-round incidents: 68, 97. 132 

Nauaro, Joseph J.: 133. 136. 248. 250, 

Ngo River: 170 

Ngo Dinh Diem: vi, 9-10. 20-21 

Nguyen Cao Ky: 34 

Nolting. Frederick E.. Jr. 10. 14 

North Vietnam. See Democratic 

Republic of Viemam (DRV). 

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 2, 4, 

252 

Ngo Dinh MU: 20-21 

75, 79, 167-168, 197, 288-289, 

292. See also Viet Cong. and North 

Vietnamese Army. 

18th Regiment, NVA 75-76 

324B Division (NVA): 181, 182, 184, 

559th Transportation Division (DRV): 

188- 189 

145 

Operation NIAGARA: 296 

Operation Plan 

Operation OCEAN WAVE: 134 

32-64: 19 

48-167: 273 

99-63: 19 

500-67, COMMANDO LAVA 238 

Operation SHED LIGHT: 117 

Ordnance: 140-143,240,241,299. See 

also Mines. 

MSQ-77 bomb 170, 172. 178. 220, 

269 

COMBAT SKYSPOT: 118. 160. 

196, 229, 232 

Pacific Air Forces (USAF): 59. 61, 

Pacification program: 286 

Pacific Command, U.S. Navy (PACOM): 

Pacific Fleet, U.S. NAvy (PACFLT): 6, 

69-70. 86-87, 108, 178. 242 

7, 227 

48. 59. 60, 65, 86, 100 

PANAMA station: 89 

Parsons Construction Company, Ralph 

M.: 271 

Pathet Lao: 1, 2, 15, 16-17, 24, 68 

PATHFINDER: 86 

Pawl& Hany I.. Jr. 108 

Pettigrew, Paul A.: 78. 89. 94, 129, 130, 

NVA 5. 15-16, 19-20, 24-25, 78-79 

357 
INTERDICTION I SOUTHERN LAOS 

175. 217-218, 219 

Phasouk Somly: 57. 70, 125, 128 

Phoui Sananikone: 2 

Phoumi Nosavan: 2, 4. 5 

Plain of Jars, Laos: 4 

Pleiku airfield, South Vietnam: 50 

Politzer. Lawrence M. 271 

POPEYE: 196,203,226-228 

PRAIRE Fnre: 200. 235. 236-237. 270 

F%om LONESOME TIGER: 117 

mom TROPIC MOON: 117 

Ilk 230-231, 232 

Quang Khe. North Vietnam: 51 

Qui Nhon barracks, South Vietnam: 50 

Radiation Systems Company: 271 

Reconnaissance: 102, 244 

Rainmaking: 226-228 

aerial: 244 

photo: 5, 29, 34, 54, 57, 62-63, 

78-87 passim, 100 110, 159, 

183-184, 197. 202, 204, 205, 233, 

0-1 and 0-2. 

269. See also Aircraft types. 

RED - 73 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

(RWAF): 6. 12-13, 14, 21 

1st Division, Republic of Vietnam: 

I Corps (South Vietnam): 151, 152, 

107-112passim, 124, 159, 164, 

170-177 passim, 202, 207, 209, 

215, 216, 224, 233, 244. 

See also Tribesmen. 

153 

157. 181, 183. 236 

Roadwatch teams: 57, 61, 78, 88. 

ROCK KICK Ik 136. 137 

ROLLING THUNDER: 50-51, 53, 65. 

76. 89. 102. 107. 153, 203 

Route 110 (Sihmouk Trail): 107, 

124-124, 159. 185. 197, 198, 207, 

233, 238, 244 

Route Package I (North Vietnam): 152, 

Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF): vi, 2, 

Royal Laotian Army. See Forces Ardes 

du Royaume (FAR). 

Royal Thai Air Force: vi, 4 

Rusk, Dean: 81, 183. 185, 228 

153-155, 158. 229, 232 

23-26. 35-40. 42-44, 51, 57 

Ryan, Jack B. 125 

Sam Luang. Laos: 15 

Saravane. Laos: 15, 129 

Sattahip Air Base, Thailand 248. 249 

Savannakhet, Laos: 173 

Schoeck, William A.: 7 

SEACOORD 33-34, 38, 42, 47. 56-57. 

62. 80, 122-123 

SEA DRAGON, US. Navy: 229 

Select, Locate. Annihilate, Monitor 

(SLAM) strike: 125, 151, 

158-160. 166. 186, 197 

m: 169, 197, 198-199, 200 

v: 235 

VI: 235-236 

Seno-Savannakhet area, Laos: 17 

Sensors: 267-283 passim, 290. 291-292 

Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant: 35, 50. 54. 

79-80, 88, 118, 175, 178. 199. 201, 

225, 228, 238, 265-266. 288 

anti-infileration activities: 70, 73. 197, 

B-52 strikes in Laos: 135. 138, 139. 

short-round incidents: 223 

230, 231, 257, 261 

140-141, 142, 248-253 

SHINING BRASS: 72-74, 87, 88. 89. 

90-93, 134, 151, 159-160. 164-170 

passim, 199, 202-203. See also 

PRAIRIE m. 

teams: 120-123, 166 

TIGER HOUND operation: 96, 100, 

Ik 208 

m: 233.235 

IV: 243-244 

V: 244 

102, 120-123 

SHOCK: 206-208 

Short-round incidents: 48-49, 66-67, 

Sides, John H.: 7 

Sihimouk Trail. See Route 110 

Simler, George B.: 97, 192, 263 

Smyth, Robert T.: 156 

Sorties, number of: vi, vii, 5, 40. 47, 

88-89, 97. 128-132, 162, 217-226 

(Sihanouk Trail). 

61, 68-69, 88. 102, 107, 108, 

114-115, 116. 139-140, 141, 161, 

169. 170, 172. 184, 189. 199. 

214. 218. 232. 235, 236, 240. 

297 

244-245. 247, 251, 286-287. 291. 

358 
INDEX 

Souphanouvong, Prince: 1. 5 

Souxith Don Sasorith: 165 

Southwt Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO): 2, 5 

See also Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam (MACV); Ngo 

Dinh Diem; Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces (RVNAF); 

Westmoreland, William C. 

58, 94. 98 

SOUTHPAW (HIGH PORT): 230-232 

South Vietnam: 17. 18-20, 21. 

Souvanna Phouma: 1. 2, 5. 24, 37, 51. 

short-round incidents: 223 use of B-52 182. 183. 187. 188. 248, 

use of napalm: 143, 144 

249, 252 

SPIKE teams: 166, 167. 198. 203, 230, 

231. 236. 237 

squadrons 

1st Air Commando: 276 

4th Air commando: 100 

13th Tactical Reconnaissance: 85 

15th Tactical Reconnaissance: 25, 63, 

20th Air Commando: 198 

21st Helicopter: 275, 276 

23d Tactical Air Support: 165, 170, 

214. 215. 224, 232, 275, 276 

54th Weather Squadron: 227 

510th Tactical Fighter Squadron: 27 

603d Air Commando: 174 

606th Air Commando (Composite): 

609th Air Commando: 232 

Detachment 6: 95 

79 

232 

Starbird, Alfred D.: 262, 263, 264 

Starlight scope: 240, 246 

State Department, US>: 4, 10, 11. 13, 

STOL Site 48. FAR: 131 

STEEL TIGER: 54-68 passim, 79, 86. 

14-15. 55, 131-132, 250-251 

89. 92. 93, 95. 99, 129, 130, 131, 

141. 143. 160. 164. 196, 215, 224, 

269 

operations' results: 68-69, 76, 

sectors: 161, 217, 220-221, 229. 232 

Strategic Air Command. See Aircraft 

types, B-52, Strategic Air Command 

(SAC). 

Sullivan, William H.: 44, 46, 103, 143, 

164, 175, 205, 227, 233, 235, 238 

103-105 

anti-infiltration proposals: 70, 73-74, 

231 

B-52 bombing in Laos: 132-141 

passim, 249, 250, 252-253 

CRICKET and CRXmT WEsT 

operations: 170, 172-174. 181 

policy disagreements with U.S. Air 

policy disagreements with 

Force: 242-244. 246-253 

Westmoreland 87, 88, 121-123, 

125-126, 162. 163, 182-183, 185, 

186-187, 235-236, 246 

SHINING BRASS: 92, 169-170 

short-round incidents: 66-67. 89, 97. 

98. 99, 130-131, 217, 218, 

220, 223-224 

STEEL TIGER: 54-57 

Swancutt. Woodrow P. 263 

Swank, Emory C.: 55, 129, 164 

Tactical Air Control Center, Seventh Air 

Tactical Air Control System (TACS): 

Tactical Air Warfare Center: 267 

Tactical Evaluation Task Force: 273 

Tdbott, Carlos M.: 153, 161 

TWY Ho: 151, 152-158. 160. 

181-184. 229 

Tan Son "hut airfield, South Vietnam: 

25 

Targets: 63, 65. 85-86, 100-101, 115, 

118, 188. see also Truck 

traffic. 

TASK FORCE ALPHA: 215, 229-230, 

270-275, 277-283, 290, 291 

Taylor, Maxwell D. 10, 22, 24-25, 

Tchepone: 8. 18, 19 

Team MONTANA: 167 

Tet Offensive: 292-294 

Thailand vi, 4. 23. 28-29, 35, 58, 62, 

63. 65, 176, 177, 180-181, 240, 

Force: 177, 274 

278 

43-44, 75. 76, 81, 255-256 

248-253 

"hakhek, Laos: 8 

Thao Ma: 17, 35-36, 37. 39, 44, 67. 68, 

80.85, 86, 89, 125-131 JXZSS~~, 164, 

165 

Tiao Somsanith: 2 

TIGER HOUND: 80, 85, 96-105. 110. 

passim, 167. 169, 196, 203, 220. 

114-117, 120-123, 141, 151-161 

359 
INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS 

229, 240. 269 

Tompkins, Rathvon M.: 290 

Topography: 68, 216, 235, 244 

Tran Thien Khiem: 32 

Tran Van Huong: 48 

Triantafellu, Rockly: 114, 196 

Tribesmen: 4, 16. 29. 58, 72, 122. 230, 

231. See also Roadwatch teams. 

Truck traffk: 107. 110, 114. 117, 124. 

239-251 passim, 273, 289-290, 298 

Tynell. Robert L. F.: 35-36, 37-38. 44, 

62. 68, 78. 80 

135. 145-146, 158, 170. 225, 

Unger. Leonard 17, 20. 23. 24, 26. 

34-35, 37. 38, 44, 169-170, 251, 

253 

USSR: 2 

United States. See also Johnson, 

Lyndon B.; Kennedy. John F.; 

Pacific Air Forces (USAF). 

air policy in Southeast Asia: vi, 1-5, 

counter-infiltration proposals: 53 

Diem regime: 7, 12-14, 16 

24-26, 28-29, 34-40, 42-51, 56 

troops: 77, 104. 151-152 

United State Air Force 

Air Force escorts for RLAF: 35-40.42 

command structure in Laos: 28 

Directorate of Operations, Tactical 

Division: 267 

strategy: 195-197 

U-Tapao Air Base: 248, 249 

Vance, Cyrus R.: 44. 132 

Vang Pao: 4. 6, 65 

VIC~ORIOUS ARROW: 39-40 

Viet Cong: 15-15. 50. 

Vietnamese Army. 

See also North 

and North Viemmese Army: 76, 

93-94. 104, 151 

Viet Minh: 8 

Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSP): 30, 

32 

Walker, William L.: 277 

Walt, Lewis W.: 152, 189 

Waters, John K.: 257. 261-262 

Weather: vii, 8-9, 34, 68. 69. 77. 78, 

80. 107, 114, 118, 138, 158, 170, 

176. 184,205 208.226-239 passim, 

244 

Westmoreland. William C.: 28. 59, 131, 

143, 243, 246. 286 

air control policy: 158, 162-164. 226, 

230-232, 257. 261, 264, 268. 

269, 296 

anti-infiitration views: 29-20. 32-33. 

70. 72. 73-74, 77. 80, 96- 97, 98, 

117, 152. 155 

and enemy strength: 75-76, 288 

and "exploitation- force" use: 121-124 

policy disagreements with Sullivan: 

use of B-52s: 133, 135. 138, 139. 

87. 125-126, 186-187, 235-236 

181-190. 248-253 

WEsT STREAM: 134 

Wheeler, Earle G.: 75. 76, 257, 258 

Wheless. Hewitt T.: 112 

Wiesner, Jerome B.: 258 

WHIPLASH: 86-87. 176 

wings 

1st Air Commando: 275 

3d Tactical Fighter: 27 

8th Tactical Fighter: 276 

12th Tactical Fighter: 238 

35th Tactical Fighter: 227 

56th Air Commando: 244. 246. 270 

315th Air Commando Wing: 238 

355th Tactical Fighter: 218 

366th Tactical Fighter: 222 

432d Tactical Reconnaissance: 215 

553d Reconnaisannce: 275, 276 

Detachment 6 (WATER PUMP): 24 

Witterman, Benn H. 127-128 

Xom Bang, North Vietnam: 51 

YANKEE TEAM: 25, 43, 53, 54, 63, 

79. 98 

RF-8A, Navy: 27 

RF-101: 27 

Zacharias, Jerrold R.: 258 

360