We will refer to Appellants collec tively as “F -Star.” 1 C O U R T O F A P P E A LS

EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS
F- STAR SOC ORRO, L .P., F-STAR PROP ERTY MANAGE MENT, I NC., JNY, L .P., J NY I I , L .P., and F- STAR MANAGEMEN T, L .L .C., Ap pe lla nts , v. THE CI TY OF EL

PASO, Appellee
. § § § § § § § No . 0 8- 06 -0 00 09 -C V

Appea l from the 171st J udicial District Court of El Pa so County , T e xas (TC# 2001TX040)

O P I N I O N The City of El Paso (“the City ”) br oug ht suit t o rec over unpa id property taxes from Appellants F -Star Socorr o, L .P., F-Star Prope rty Manag ement, Inc., JNY, L .P., J NY I I , L .P., and F- Star Manag ement, L .L .C. The City introduced into evide nce a cer tified tax st atement showing 1 the amount owed by

F- Star for the y ear

2002. The trial c ourt dec ided the ca se in favor of the City , using the amount of delinquent taxes and the amount of abstrac tor’s fe es listed in the
c e rti f ie d tax s tate me n t. F
- St ar

a p p e a le d th e tr ia l c o urt’ s r

u li n g , r a is in g s ix i s s u e s o nr e v ie w . We
a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. The City alleg ed that over

$700,000 in tax es we re de linquent on 145 acr es of land owned by F- Star for the y ear s 1994-1997 and 2001- 2002. F- Star filed a g ener al denial. A be nch trial was he ld on Aug ust 19, 2005. The City introduced into evide nce a cer tified tax st atement showingthe amount due f or-2-

2002 taxes assessed ag ainst a portion of F -Star’s pr operty . Acc ordingto the statement, F -Star owed the City

$516,543.90 on the prope rty as of Oc tober 2002. The statement wa s prepa red on August 19, 2005, the date of tr ial. The stateme nt was sig ned by J uan Sandoval, the tax assessorcollector of the City

of El Paso, and both pag es of the statement bea r his office ’s sea l. F-Star objected to the statement’s admission, arguing that the statement wa s not properly authenticated and that it was pre pare d for litigation. The trial cour t admitted the statement over F- Star’s objection. Th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d in fa vo r o f t he City , o rd e ri ngF -S tar t o p ay the City $5 52 ,6 17 .2 4 in de lin qu e nt t a xes. Ac c or din g to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t, $ 50 6, 79 6. 86 of

tho se ta xes c ame from the year

2002, while the re st came f rom the y ear s 1994-1997. The tria l court also orde red F -S tar t o p ay

the City $1 ,6 67 in a

bs tr a c tor ’s fe e s. F -S tar r a ise s si x issu e s o n a pp e a l. I n I ssu e On e , F -S tar a

rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in g rantingjudgme nt for the City beca use there was no c ompetent evidenc e indicatingthat F- Star owed $506,796.86 in prope rty taxes for the y ear

2002. In I ssue Two, F -Star ar g ues that the trial court e rre d in admitting the ce rtified tax statement into evidence beca use the stateme nt was ina dmi ssi ble he ars ay . In I ssu e s T hr e e and F our, F -S tar a

rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to consider e vidence that F- Star paid its tax es in full in November 2003, as we ll as evidenc e of tax abate ments that should have re duced the amount of prope rty tax owed. I n I ssues Five and Six , F- Star argues that the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingjudgme nt for the City for a dditional collection
e xpe ns e s, be c a

us e the re wa s n o e vid e nc e that th e City wa s e nti tle d to the se e xpe ns e s. Ce r ti fie d Tax St at e m e nt In it s f ir st two iss ue s, F -S tar a

rgue s th a t th e c e rt if

ie d tax state me nt w a s in a dmi ssi ble-3-

hear say , and that ther e wa s no evidenc e supportingthe trial cour t’s judgme nt for prope rty taxes from 2002. I f an a ppellant cha lleng es the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence to support a findingon which it did not have the bur den of pr oof at trial, the a ppellant must demonstrate that no e vidence exis ts to support the trial court’s finding
. Croucher v. Crouche r , 660 S.W .2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). In conductinga no-e vidence revie w, the appe llate cour t should view the evidenc e in a lig ht that tends to support the finding of the disputed fa ct and disre g ard a ll evidence and infe renc es to the contra ry . Brad for d v . V e nto , 48 S.W .3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001). An appe llate cour t will sust ain a leg al-suff iciency on “no-e vidence ” cha lleng e if the r ecor d shows: (1) the c omplete abse nce of a vit a l f a c t; ( 2) the c ourt

is b arr e d b y

ru le s o f l aw o n e vid e nc e fr om g ivi ngwe ig ht t o th e on ly evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t; (3) the evide nce of fer ed to prove a vital fa ct is no more than a sc intill a; or (4) the evidenc e esta blishes conclusively

the opposite of the vital fa ct. City of Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). We reviewa trial c ourt’s evide ntiary ruling s under a

n abuse- of-discr etion standard. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 9 72 S.W. 2d 35 , 4 3 ( Te x. 19 98 ). Th e te st f or a bu se of discre tion is whether the tria l court ac ted without refe renc e to any g uiding pr inciples, i.e. whether it acted in an a

rbitrar y and unre asonable manner . Do wne r v . A qu am ar ineOp e ra tor s, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). An appe llate cour t must uphol d the trial cour t’s evidentiar y ruling if there is any

leg itimate basis for the r

uling. Owens-Corning , 972 S.W .2d at 43. Moreove r, an a

ppellate c ourt should not rever se a tria l court’s e videntiary ruling unless the
err or proba

bly cause d the re ndition of an improper judg ment. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 44.1(a) (1). Rul e 80 3( 8) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e pe rm its pu bli c re c or ds to b e a dmi tte d into-4-

evidenc e, eve n though the y are hear say . T EX .R.E V ID . 803(8). Rule 803(8) (C) per mits admiss ion of pu bli c re c or ds that se t f

or th “ fa c tua l f

ind ing s r e su lti ngfr om a

n inve sti g a tio n ma de purs ua nt t o authority g rante d by

law.” T EX .R.E V ID . 803(8)( C). Normally , even a dmissibl e evide nce must be independe ntly

authenticated or identified. T EX .R.E V ID . 901. Howeve r, there are exceptions for documents that ar e conside red se lf-authe nticating , including public r ecor ds bear ing a signature and the se al of a

ny depar tment or subdivision of the United States. T EX .R.E V ID . 902(1), 902( 4). F- Star argues that the c ertified tax statement is not a public re cord unde r Rule 803(8) of the Texas Rules of Evidence . F- Star does not explain why the statement is not one of the three ty pes of a dmissibl e public docume nts list ed in Rule 803(8). I nstead, F -Star ar g ues that the statement “w as pre pare d for the sole purpose of litigation . . . .” B ut delinquent-tax recor ds may be admitted eve n if they

are prepa red solely for the pur

pose of litigation, as long a s they are proper ly authenticated. Flowe rs v . La v ac a Co un ty Ap prais al D ist
. , 766 S.W .2d 825, 829 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). T he finding s in the cer tified tax st atement a

ppear to result from the tax assessor-c ollector’s inve stigation of F-Star , as outlined in Rule 803(8)(C). Th e re fo re , w e fi nd

that th e c e rt if

ie d tax state me nt i s a

pu bli c re c or d und e r t

he te rm s o f R

ule 803(8). F- Star also ar g ues that the c ertified tax statement does not mee t the self-a uthentication
r e qu i r e m e n t s o f

R u l e 9 0 2
. Ini t s b r i e f

, F
- S t ar s t a t e s th a t“ [ t ] h e r e i s n o s e a l o n ” th e s t a t e m e n t . In fac t, the seal of the Offic e of the assessor- collector of the City

of El Paso appe ars on both pag es of the stateme nt. Grante d, the sea l is somewhat faint, so it does not appea r on photocopies of

the statement. B ut on the orig inal statement supplied by the City , the sea l is quit e visible and tac tile. Moreove r, the fir st pag e of the statement bea rs the sig nature of Juan Sandoval, the tax assessor--5-

collector of the City

of El Paso. The state ment also ce rtifies that Mr. Sandova l is the custodian of the City ’s tax records. We find that the c ertified tax statement mee ts the self-a uthentication
re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 90 2, and

that th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

a dmi tti ngit. The prope r admission of the ce rtified tax statement ref utes F- Star’s ar g ument that there
was no e vidence supporting the trial court’ s finding of delinquent prope rty

taxes from 2002. A delinquent-tax roll or a ce rtified copy of a de linquent-tax roll consti tutes prima fa cie e vidence that the amount of tax alleg ed to be de linquent is the corre ct amount. T EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 3 3. 47 (V e rn on

20 08 ). Th e c e rt if

ie d tax state me nt i n th is c a se is a re c or d o f d e lin qu e nt t a xes, constituting prima f

acie evidenc e that F -Star owe d proper ty taxes for 2002. Ther efor e, we find th a tth e r e w a s s o m e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o rtth e tr i a l c o urt ’ s j u d g m e n to nth o s e t a x e s . A c c o r d i n g l y, I ssues One a

nd Two ar e over

ruled. Collect ion E xpenses In I ssu e s F ive and

Six, F -S tar a

rgue s th a t th e re is n o a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e that th e City is entitled to additional collection pena lties under Section 33.07(a ) of the T ax C ode. Section 33.07(a) permits a taxing author ity to collect an a dditional penalty for de linquent taxes when the authority

contra cts with an attorne y in order to c ollect the taxes. T EX .T AX C ODE ANN . § 33.07(a) . The amount is l imited to the amount of compensation spec ified in the contra ct betwee n the attorne y

and the taxing a

uthority
. Id
. Un de r S e c tio n 3 3. 47 (a ), a c op y of a de lin qu e nt- ta x re c or d c on sti tut e s p ri ma fa c ie evidenc e that: (1) the taxi ng authority “has c omplied with all requireme nts of law;” ( 2) the listed amount of delinquent taxes is corre ct; and (3) the listed amount of pena lties and interest due on the tax is corr ect. Id . at § 33.47(a ). In other wor ds, when a taxi ng authority

introduces a

copy of-6-

its de lin qu e nt- ta x re c or d, it e sta bli sh e s it s p ri ma

fa c ie c a se a s to e ve ry

mate ri a l f

a c t ne c e ssa

ry to establish its cause of

action. Da v is v . Ci ty

of A us tin , 632 S.W .2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982). We assume that, in I ssues Five and Six , F- Star is refe rringto the $1,667 in abstrac tor’s fee s that the trial cour

t assessed in addition to the $506,796.86 in proper ty taxes from 2002. $1,667 is the amount listed in the “Abstrac t Fee s” row of the ce rtified tax statement, discussed above. F -Star see ms to procee d from the a ssumption t hat the stateme nt was inadmissible, as they do not mention the statement in this section of their brief
. As discussed above , we f ind that the trial court pr operly admitted the ce rtified tax state me nt i nto e vid e nc e . We a lso fi nd that th e c e rt if

ie d tax state me nt c on sti tut e d p ri ma fa c ie evidenc e that the City

complied with the statutory require ments of Section 33.07(a ). L ikewise, the statement c onstitut ed prima f acie evidenc e that $1,667 wa s the corr ect amount of abstrac tor’s fee s to be assesse d ag ainst F-Star . There fore , there was some e vidence that the City was e ntitled to $1,667 in abstractor ’s fe es. Ac cording ly , I ssues Five and Six are overr uled. P aym ent and Of

fset Defenses In I ssu e Thre e , F -S tar a

rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in its ru lin g be c a

us e F -S tar p a id i ts 2002 proper

ty taxes in full i n November 2003. In I ssue Four , F- Star argues that the trial c ourt
e rr e d in its ru lin g be c a

us e the City , in

its c a lc ula

tio ns , f a ile d to c on sid e r a

bate me nt a g re e me nts be tw e e n F -S tar a

nd va ri ou s taxinga

uth or iti e s. Pay ment is an aff

irmative def

ense unde r the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure. T EX .R.C IV .P. 94. The rig ht to an offse t of pay ment is also an af

firmative de fense
. Brown v. American Transfer &Storage Co. , 6 01 S.W. 2d 93 1, 93 6 ( Te x. 19 80 ); Columbia Medical Center of L as Con lin as v . B us h e xre l. B us h , 1 22 S.W. 3d

83 5, 86 2 ( Te x.Ap p. -- F or t Wor th 2 00 3, pe t.-7-

denied) . An af

firmative de fense must be pled in a re sponsive pleading , or the de fense will be waived. First Nat ’l Bank in Dallas v. Zimmerman , 442 S.W .2d 674, 675-76 (Te x . 1969). Moreove r, if a de fenda

nt wishes to alleg e pay

ment as an a ffirmative defe nse, Rule 95 re quires him to “file with his plea an a ccount statingdistinctly the nature of such pa

y ment, and the se vera l items thereof

; failing to do so, he shall not be allowed to pr ove the same . . . .” T EX .R.C IV .P. 95. In this case, F -Star filed only a g ener al denial; it did not alleg e pay ment or off

set in any responsive ple ading . There fore , we f ind that F-Star w aived its pay ment and off

set defe nses. Acc ording ly , I ssues Thre e and F our ar e over ruled. Havingoverr

uled ea ch of A

ppellants’ issues for

revie w, we a ffirm the tria l court’s jud g me nt.
J uly 3, 2008 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ.