Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 5747

(4) The number and amount of 

community development loans reported 

as originated or purchased.

* * * * *

Dated: January 22, 2004.

By the Office of Thrift Supervision. 

James E. Gilleran, 

Director.

[FR Doc. 04–2354 Filed 2–5–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–33–P; 6210–01–P; 6714–01–P; 

6720–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM273; Notice No. 25–04–01–

SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 777 

Series Airplanes; Overhead Crew Rest 

Compartment Occupiable During Taxi, 

Take-off, and Landing

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for Boeing Model 777 series 

airplanes. These airplanes will have 

novel or unusual design features 

because of the installation of an 

overhead crew rest (OHCR) 

compartment which is proposed to be 

occupiable during taxi, take-off, and 

landing (TT&L). The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards.

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before March 8, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposal 

may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal 

Aviation Administration, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules 

Docket (ANM–113), Docket No. NM273, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington, 98055–4056; or delivered 

in duplicate to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the above address. 

Comments must be marked: Docket No. 

NM273. Comments may be inspected in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mike Thompson, FAA, Airframe/Cabin 

Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport 

Standards Staff, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington, 98055–4056; 

telephone (425) 227–1157; facsimile 

(425) 227–1100.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning these special conditions. 

The docket is available for public 

inspection before and after the comment 

closing date. If you wish to review the 

docket in person, go to the address in 

the ADDRESSES section of this preamble 

between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On June 25, 2002, the Boeing 

Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG), 

P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington, 

98124, applied for a change to Type 

Certificate No. T00001SE for a design 

change to install an OHCR, which is 

proposed to be occupiable during TT&L, 

in Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. 

The Boeing Model 777 series airplanes 

are large twin-engine airplanes with 

various passenger capacities and ranges 

depending upon airplane configuration. 

The OHCR compartment is located in 

the overhead space above the main 

passenger cabin immediately aft of the 

first pair of main deck emergency exits 

(Door 1) and will include a maximum of 

two private berths and two seats. 

Occupancy of the OHCR compartment 

will be limited to a maximum of four 

crewmembers during flight and two 

flightcrew members, one in each seat, 

during TT&L. 

The OHCR compartment will be 

accessed from the main deck by stairs 

through a vestibule. In addition, an 

emergency hatch, which opens directly 

into the main passenger seating area, 

will be provided for the OHCR 

compartment as an alternate route for 

evacuating occupants of the OHCR 

compartment in an emergency. A smoke 

detection system and an oxygen system 

will be provided in the compartment. 

Other optional features, such as a 

kitchenette and lavatory, may be 

provided as well. 

While the installation of an OHCR 

compartment is not a new concept for 

large transport category airplanes, each 

OHCR compartment has unique features 

based on design, location, and use on 

the airplane. Previously, OHCR 

compartments have been installed and 

certified in Boeing 777 series airplanes 

in the main passenger seating area, in 

the overhead compartment above the 

main passenger seating area, and below 

the passenger seating area within the 

cargo compartment. On April 9, 2003, 

the FAA issued Special Conditions No. 

25–230-SC for an OHCR compartment 

immediately aft of the Door 1 exits and 

an overhead flight attendant rest 

compartment adjacent to Door 3 in 

Boeing 777 series airplanes. These new 

special conditions address an OHCR 

compartment at the same location aft of 

Door 1 as in the April 2003 special 

conditions, except that they address 

occupancy of trained flightcrew during 

TT&L.

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, 

Amendment 21–69, effective September 

16, 1991, Boeing Commercial Airplane 

Group must show that Model 777 series 

airplanes, as changed, continue to meet 

the applicable provisions of the 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

Type Certificate Data Sheet No. 

T00001SE or the applicable regulations 

in effect on the date of application for 

the change. Subsequent changes have 

been made to § 21.101 as part of 

Amendment 21–77, but those changes 

did not become effective until June 10, 

2003, which is after the application date 

for this type design change. The 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

the type certificate are commonly 

referred to as the ‘‘original type 

certification basis.’’ The U.S. type 

certification basis for Boeing Model 777 

series airplanes is established in 

accordance with 14 CFR 21.17 and 

21.29 and the type certificate 

application date. The type certification 

basis is listed in Type Certificate Data 

Sheet No. T00001SE. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for Boeing Model 777 series airplanes 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

5748 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, Boeing Model 777 series 

airplanes must comply with the fuel 

vent and exhaust emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

Special conditions, as defined in 

§ 11.19, are issued in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§ 21.101(b)(2) Amendment 21–69, 

effective September 16, 1991. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design features, or should any other 

model already included on the same 

type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design features, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1) 

Amendment 21–69, effective September 

16, 1991. 

Compliance with these proposed 

special conditions does not relieve the 

applicant from the existing airplane 

certification basis requirements. One 

particular area of concern is that 

installation of the OHCR compartment 

creates a small compartment volume 

within the large overhead volume of the 

airplane. The applicant must comply 

with the requirements of §§ 25.365(e), 

(f), and (g) (regarding the effects of 

sudden decompression) for the OHCR 

compartment, as well as any other 

airplane compartment whose 

decompression characteristics are 

affected by the installation of an OHCR 

compartment. Compliance with § 25.831 

(regarding ventilation) must be 

demonstrated for all phases of flight 

where occupants will be present. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

This OHCR compartment is unique to 

part 25 due to its design, location and 

use on the airplane. This OHCR 

compartment is particularly unique in 

that it is in the overhead area of the 

passenger compartment and is proposed 

to be occupied by trained flight crew 

during TT&L. 

Due to the novel or unusual features 

associated with the installation of this 

OHCR compartment, special conditions 

are considered necessary to provide a 

level of safety equal to that established 

by the airworthiness regulations 

incorporated by reference in the type 

certificate. These special conditions do 

not negate the need to address other 

applicable part 25 regulations. 

Operational Evaluations and Approval 

These special conditions outline 

requirements for OHCR compartment 

design approvals (type design changes) 

administered by the FAA’s Aircraft 

Certification Service. Prior to 

operational use of an OHCR 

compartment, the FAA’s Flight 

Standards Service must evaluate and 

approve the ‘‘basic suitability’’ of the 

OHCR compartment for crew 

occupation. Additionally, if an operator 

wishes to utilize an OHCR compartment 

as ‘‘sleeping quarters,’’ the OHCR 

compartment must undergo an 

additional evaluation and approval 

(Reference §§ 121.485(a), 121.523(b) and 

135.269(b)(5)). Compliance with these 

special conditions does not ensure that 

the applicant has demonstrated 

compliance with the requirements of 

parts 121 or 135. 

In order to obtain an operational 

evaluation, the type certificate holder 

must contact the appropriate aircraft 

evaluation group (AEG) in the Flight 

Standards Service and request a ‘‘basic 

suitability’’ evaluation or a ‘‘sleeping 

quarters’’ evaluation of their crew rest. 

The results of these evaluations should 

be documented in a 777 flight 

standardization board (FSB) report 

appendix. Individual operators may 

reference these standardized evaluations 

in discussions with their FAA principal 

operating inspector (POI) as the basis for 

an operational approval, in lieu of an 

on-site operational evaluation. 

Any changes to the approved OHCR 

compartment configuration that affect 

crewmember emergency egress or any 

other procedures affecting the safety of 

the occupying crewmembers and/or 

related emergency evacuation training 

will require a re-evaluation and 

approval. The applicant for a crew rest 

design change that affects egress, safety 

procedures, or training is responsible for 

notifying the FAA’s AEG that a new 

crew rest evaluation is required. The 

results of a re-evaluation should also be 

documented in a 777 FSB report 

appendix.

Procedures must be developed to 

ensure that a crewmember entering the 

OHCR compartment through the 

vestibule to fight a fire will examine the 

vestibule and the lavatory areas (if 

installed) for the source of the fire prior 

to entering the remaining areas of the 

OHCR compartment. These procedures 

are intended to ensure that the source of 

the fire is not between the crewmember 

and the entrance to the OHCR 

compartment. In the event a fire source 

is not immediately evident to the 

firefighter, the firefighter should check 

for potential fire sources at areas closest 

to the OHCR compartment entrance 

first, then proceed to check areas in 

such a manner that the fire source, 

when found, would not be between the 

firefighter and the OHCR compartment 

entrance. Procedures describing 

methods to search the OHCR 

compartment for fire source(s) must be 

transmitted to operators for 

incorporation into their training 

programs and appropriate operational 

manuals. 

Discussion of the Proposed Special 

Conditions 

These proposed special conditions 

establish seating, communication 

equipment, lighting, personal safety, 

and evacuation requirements for the 

OHCR compartment. In addition, 

passenger information signs and 

supplemental oxygen would be 

required. Where applicable, the 

proposed requirements parallel the 

existing requirements for a lower deck 

service compartment in § 25.819 and for 

an OHCR compartment not occupiable 

during TT&L in Special Conditions No. 

25–230–SC, issued on April 9, 2003. 

These proposed special conditions 

provide a level of safety equivalent to 

that provided for main deck occupants. 

Consideration of a Requirement for an 

External Exit 

The FAA has considered whether or 

not a special condition should require 

that the OHCR compartment have an 

external exit leading directly outside the 

airplane. In accordance with § 21.16, 

special conditions must provide 

flightcrew members who occupy the 

OHCR compartment during TT&L with 

a level of safety equivalent to that 

established by part 25 for main deck 

occupants. The FAA considers that the 

following, in addition to the other 

proposed special conditions, provides 

this level of safety: 

1. The distances along the evacuation 

routes from seats in the OHCR 

compartment to the Door 1 exits on the 

main deck are significantly shorter than 

the maximum distance a seated 

passenger on the main deck would need 

to travel to reach an exit. 

2. Occupancy during TT&L would be 

limited to two flightcrew members who 

are trained in the evacuation procedures 

of the OHCR compartment. An airplane 

flight manual limitation would be 

established to restrict occupancy to only 

persons the pilot in command has 

determined are able to use both 

evacuation routes rapidly. The ability of 

such persons to fit through the escape 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 5749

hatch must be considered in this 

determination. 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA), and International 

Federation of Air Line Pilots (IFALPA) 

reviewed the Boeing OHCR 

compartment design and informed the 

FAA that in their opinion an external 

exit is not needed, because two 

independent, internal evacuation routes 

will be provided. ALPA and IFALPA 

provided this position to the FAA and 

Boeing in a meeting on January 7, 2003, 

and again to the FAA in letters dated 

February 20, 2003, and February 21, 

2003. Since flightcrew members will be 

the only occupants of the OHCR 

compartment during TT&L, this input 

provided further support in determining 

the acceptability of these proposed 

special conditions, which do not 

include a requirement for an external 

exit. 

As discussed in the background 

section, these proposed special 

conditions address the same OHCR 

compartment as that addressed by 

Special Conditions No. 25–230–SC, 

except that these proposed special 

conditions address occupancy of trained 

flightcrew during TT&L. Special 

Conditions No. 25–230–SC were 

developed based on occupancy during 

flight only for crewmembers in general 

(flightcrew members and flight 

attendants). The proposed special 

conditions also allow occupancy of 

flightcrew members and flight 

attendants during flight. However, the 

applicant has requested that new special 

conditions be developed that would 

allow flightcrew members to occupy the 

OHCR compartment during TT&L. The 

FAA has not considered the 

acceptability of any other occupants in 

the OHCR compartment during TT&L. 

The proposed special conditions limit 

occupancy to crewmembers during 

flight and to flightcrew members during 

TT&L. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 1 

Due to the location and configuration 

of the OHCR compartment, it is 

proposed that occupancy be limited to 

a maximum of four crewmembers 

during flight and two flightcrew 

members during TT&L. One factor 

which limits occupancy is the number 

of approved seats and berths provided 

in the OHCR compartment. During 

TT&L, occupancy would be restricted to 

flightcrew members who the pilot in 

command has determined are able to 

use the evacuation routes rapidly and 

who are trained in the evacuation 

procedures for the OHCR compartment. 

The FAA considers this requirement 

necessary to support a finding that the 

OHCR compartment will provide an 

equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by main deck seating. 

Requirements are also proposed for the 

installation of ashtrays and to prohibit 

smoking and the stowage of cargo or 

passenger baggage in the OHCR 

compartment. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 2 

This special condition has the 

requirements for door access and 

locking. It provides requirements 

similar to those in Special Conditions 

No. 25–230–SC for the OHCR 

compartment that is not occupiable 

during TT&L, but also provides 

requirements to prevent doors from 

obstructing an evacuation after an 

emergency landing. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 3 

Section 25.562 was established in 

recognition that some standard beyond 

the static conditions of § 25.561 was 

necessary to provide more crashresistant seats, with the new standard 

being one that traditional main deck 

floor-type structure could withstand. 

Numerous tests were conducted to 

establish this standard. The results were 

the 16G forward and 14G combined 

down and forward dynamic tests, as 

documented in § 25.562. Since § 25.562 

was developed based on the inherent 

capability of traditional main deck floor 

structure, certification testing of main 

deck floor-type structure was not 

required by § 25.562. 

The OHCR compartment structure 

bears little similarity in physical 

characteristics to main deck floor 

structure. In keeping with the intent of 

§ 25.562, this different structure must be 

analyzed or tested to demonstrate that it 

will function with capability similar to 

traditional main deck floor structure in 

a crash event, retaining the seats and 

maintaining their attachments to the 

airplane. Therefore, it is proposed that 

the OHCR compartment structure must 

be demonstrated to be compatible with 

dynamic loads introduced by the seats, 

providing the same level of protection 

during a crash event as that provided to 

those seated on traditional main deck 

floor structure. The applicant must 

propose, for FAA approval, means to 

analyze or test the OHCR compartment 

structure to demonstrate this capability. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 4 

This special condition refers to 

emergency evacuation routes and crew 

rest outlets. A crew rest outlet is an 

opening (for example, a door or hatch) 

between the OHCR compartment and 

the main passenger deck. An emergency 

evacuation route, as used in the context 

of this special condition, is an egress 

path which leads OHCR compartment 

occupants to crew rest outlets and out 

of the compartment. 

It is proposed that, to preclude 

occupants from being trapped in the 

OHCR compartment in the event of an 

emergency, there must be at least two 

emergency evacuation routes that could 

be used by each occupant of the OHCR 

compartment to rapidly evacuate to the 

main cabin. These two routes must be 

sufficiently separated to minimize the 

possibility of an event rendering both 

routes inoperative. The main entry route 

meeting the appropriate requirements 

may be utilized as one of the emergency 

evacuation routes or, alternatively, two 

other emergency routes must be 

provided. 

The following clarifies the intent of 

Special Condition No. 4(b) concerning 

the utility of the egress routes. First, 

occupied passenger seats are not 

considered an impediment to the use of 

an egress route (if, for example, the 

egress route drops into one row of main 

deck seats by means of a hatch), 

provided that the seated occupants do 

not inhibit the opening of the egress 

route (the hatch in this example). 

Second, an egress route may utilize 

areas where normal movement or 

evacuation of passengers occurs if it is 

demonstrated that the passengers would 

not impede egress to the main deck. If 

the egress means opens into a main 

aisle, cross aisle, or galley complex, 

ninety-fifth percentile male passengers 

on the main deck must be considered. 

Third, the escape hatch should be 

provided with a means to prevent it 

from being inadvertently closed by a 

passenger on the main deck. This will 

ensure main deck passengers cannot 

prevent occupants of the OHCR 

compartment from using the escape 

route. 

Training requirements for the 

occupants of the OHCR compartment 

are included in this proposal. 

Requirements to prevent passengers on 

the main deck from entering the OHCR 

compartment and requirements 

regarding door and hatch usability are 

also provided.

Special Conditions No. 25–230–SC 

has qualitative and quantitative criteria 

for determining that the evacuation 

routes have sufficient separation within 

the OHCR compartment. Those criteria 

have been incorporated into these 

special conditions to clarify how 

compliance can be shown to Special 

Condition No. 4(a). 

Proposed Special Condition No. 5 

This proposal would require a means 

of removing an incapacitated person 

5750 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

from the OHCR compartment to the 

main deck. The design and procedures 

for such an evacuation must be 

demonstrated to be adequate for all 

evacuation routes. Limits would be 

imposed on the assistance that may be 

provided in evacuating an incapacitated 

person in these demonstrations. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 6 

It is proposed that exit signs, placards 

for evacuation routes, and illumination 

for signs, placards, and door handles be 

required for the OHCR compartment. 

This proposed special condition allows 

for exit signs with a reduced 

background area to be used. If a reduced 

background is used, the material 

surrounding the sign must be light in 

color to more closely match and 

enhance the illuminated background of 

the sign that has been reduced in area 

(letter size stays the same). These 

reduced background area signs have 

been allowed under previous equivalent 

level of safety findings for small 

transport executive jets. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 7 

An emergency lighting system is 

proposed to prevent the occupants from 

being isolated in a dark area due to loss 

of lighting in the OHCR compartment. 

The emergency lighting must be 

activated under the same conditions as 

is the main deck emergency lighting 

system. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 8 

It is proposed that two-way voice 

communications and public address 

speaker(s) be required, and that 

provisions be made to prevent 

occupants of the OHCR compartment 

from being disturbed with normal, nonemergency announcements made to the 

passenger cabin. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 9 

It is proposed that occupants of the 

OHCR compartment be advised of an 

emergency situation via emergency 

alarm means, use of the public address 

system, or crew interphone system. A 

requirement for maintaining power to 

the emergency alarm system for a 

specific duration after certain failures is 

also proposed. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 10 

This proposal requires a means of 

indicating when seat belts should be 

fastened that is readily detectable by 

occupants of the OHCR compartment 

whether they are seated or standing. The 

requirement for visibility of the sign by 

standing occupants may be met by a 

general area sign that is visible to 

occupants standing in the main floor 

area or corridor of the OHCR 

compartment. It would not be essential 

that the sign be visible from every 

possible location in the OHCR 

compartment. However, the sign should 

not be remotely located or located 

where it may be easily obscured. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 11 

This proposal requires that the OHCR 

compartment, which is remotely located 

from the passenger cabin, be equipped 

with the following: 

• A hand-held fire extinguisher. 

• Protective breathing equipment 

(PBE). 

• A flashlight. 

The following clarifies how this 

proposed special condition should be 

understood relative to the requirements 

of § 25.1439(a). Amendment 25–38 

modified the requirements of 

§ 25.1439(a) by adding, ‘‘In addition, 

protective breathing equipment must be 

installed in each isolated separate 

compartment in the airplane, including 

upper and lower lobe galleys, in which 

crewmember occupancy is permitted 

during flight for the maximum number 

of crewmembers expected to be in the 

area during any operation.’’ But the PBE 

requirements of § 25.1439(a) are not 

appropriate in this case, because the 

OHCR compartment is novel and 

unusual in terms of the number of 

occupants. In 1976, when Amendment 

25–38 was adopted, underfloor galleys 

were the only isolated compartments 

that had been certificated, with a 

maximum of two crewmembers 

expected to occupy those galleys. No. 11 

of these special conditions addresses 

PBE requirements for OHCR 

compartments, which can accommodate 

up to 4 crewmembers. This number of 

occupants in an isolated compartment 

was not envisioned at the time 

Amendment 25–38 was adopted. In the 

event of a fire, the occupant’s first 

action should be to leave the confined 

space, unless the occupant(s) is fighting 

the fire. It is not appropriate for all 

occupants of the OHCR compartment to 

don PBE. Taking the time to don the 

PBE would prolong the time for the 

occupant’s emergency evacuation and 

possibly interfere with efforts to 

extinguish the fire. Therefore, No. 11 

proposes to require two PBE units, or 

one PBE for each handheld fire 

extinguisher, whichever is greater, for 

this OHCR compartment. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 12 

Because the OHCR compartment is 

remotely located from the main 

passenger cabin and will not always be 

occupied, a requirement for a smoke 

detection system and appropriate 

warnings is proposed. The smoke 

detection system must be capable of 

detecting a fire within the OHCR 

compartment, including each area of the 

compartment created by the installation 

of a curtain or door. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 13 

This proposed special condition 

originated from a concern that a fire in 

an unoccupied OHCR compartment 

could spread into the passenger 

compartment or affect other vital 

systems before it could be extinguished. 

This proposal would require either 

installation of a manually activated fire 

suppression system accessible from 

outside the OHCR compartment or a 

demonstration that the crew could 

satisfactorily perform the function of 

extinguishing a fire under the 

prescribed conditions. A manually 

activated built-in fire extinguishing 

system would be required only if a 

crewmember could not successfully 

locate and extinguish the fire during a 

demonstration in which the 

crewmember is responding to the alarm. 

(Ref. S.C. 13 and 13(a) in general) 

This proposal also provides 

requirements for the use of a 

combination of the two methods of 

fighting a fire if the applicant so chose. 

(Ref. S.C. 13(a)(2)) 

It is proposed that the OHCR 

compartment be designed so that fires 

within the compartment can be 

controlled without having to enter the 

compartment; or, the design of the 

access provisions must allow crew 

equipped for firefighting to have 

unrestricted access to the compartment. 

(Ref. S.C. 13(b)(2)) It is also proposed 

that the time for a crewmember on the 

main deck to react to the fire alarm, don 

firefighting equipment, and gain access 

must not exceed the time it would take 

for the OHCR compartment to become 

smoke filled, when it would be difficult 

to locate the fire source. (Ref. S.C. 

13(b)(3)) (See additional information 

continued in the proposed Special 

Condition No. 14.)

The requirements for enabling 

crewmember(s) to quickly enter the 

OHCR compartment, locate a fire source 

(Ref. S.C. (13(b)), evacuate the 

compartment (Ref. S.C. (4)), or evacuate 

an incapacitated person from the 

compartment (Ref. S.C. (5)), inherently 

places limits on the size of the OHCR 

compartment and the amount of baggage 

that may be stowed there. The OHCR 

compartment is limited to stowage of 

crew personal luggage and it is not 

intended to be used for the stowage of 

cargo or passenger baggage. The design 

of such a system to include cargo or 

passenger baggage would require 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 5751

additional requirements to ensure safe 

operation. 

The OHCR compartment smoke or fire 

detection and fire suppression systems 

(including airflow management features 

which prevent hazardous quantities of 

smoke or fire extinguishing agent from 

entering any other compartment 

occupied by crewmembers or 

passengers) is considered complex in 

terms of paragraph 6d of Advisory 

Circular (AC) 25.1309–1A, ‘‘System 

Design and Analysis.’’ In addition, the 

FAA considers failure of the OHCR 

compartment fire protection system (i.e., 

smoke or fire detection and fire 

suppression systems) in conjunction 

with an OHCR compartment fire to be 

a catastrophic event. Based on the 

‘‘Depth of Analysis Flowchart’’ shown 

in Figure 2 of AC 25.1309–1A, the depth 

of analysis should include both 

qualitative and quantitative assessments 

(reference paragraphs 8d, 9, and 10 of 

AC 25.1309–1A). 

Proposed Special Condition No. 14 

This proposal would require that 

means be provided to exclude 

hazardous quantities of smoke or 

extinguishing agent originating in the 

OHCR compartment from entering any 

other compartment. The FAA accepts 

the fact that during the one-minute 

smoke detection time and during access 

to fight a fire, penetration of a small 

quantity of smoke from this OHCR 

compartment into an occupied area on 

this airplane configuration would be 

acceptable, based upon the limitations 

placed in this and other associated 

special conditions. (Ref. S.C. 12(a) and 

14(b), (c), (d) and (e)). 

Proposed Special Condition No. 15 

It is proposed that the oxygen 

equipment and a supplemental oxygen 

deployment warning for the OHCR 

compartment must be equivalent to that 

provided for main deck passengers. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 16 

Requirements are proposed for a 

divided OHCR compartment to address 

supplemental oxygen equipment and 

deployment means, signs, placards, 

curtains, doors, emergency illumination, 

alarms, seat belt fasten signals, and 

evacuation routes. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 17 

It is proposed that if a waste disposal 

receptacle is fitted, it must be equipped 

with an automatic fire extinguisher. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 18 

This proposal requires that materials 

in the OHCR compartment meet the 

flammability requirements of § 25.853 at 

Amendment 25–83. It is also proposed 

that seat cushions and mattresses must 

meet the fire blocking requirements of 

§ 25.853(c). 

Section 25.853(e) indicates that crew 

rest quarters need not meet the 

standards of § 25.853(d) provided the 

interiors of these compartments are 

isolated from the main passenger cabin 

by doors or equivalent means that 

would normally be closed during an 

emergency landing. Since the OHCR 

compartment is occupiable during 

TT&L, the OHCR main entrance door 

must be latched open during TT&L, and 

hence, its interior must comply with 

§ 25.853(d) in the manner consistent 

with the main passenger cabin. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 19 

This proposed requirement is a 

reiteration of existing main deck 

lavatory requirements to provide clear 

applicability. OHCR compartment 

lavatories, if installed, would be 

required to comply with the existing 

rules on lavatories in the absence of 

other specific requirements. In addition, 

any lavatory located in the OHCR 

compartment must also meet the 

requirements of Special Condition No. 

12 for smoke detection due to placement 

within this remote area. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 20 

This proposal requires fire protection 

for stowage areas within an OHCR 

compartment as a function of size 

(compartment interior volume). The 

proposed fire protection requirements 

for stowage compartments in the OHCR 

compartment are more stringent than 

those for stowage in the main passenger 

cabin, because the OHCR compartment 

is a remote area that can remain 

unoccupied for long periods of time, in 

contrast to the main cabin that is under 

continuous monitoring by the cabin 

crew and passengers. For stowage 

compartments less than 25 ft3, the safety 

objective of these proposed 

requirements is to contain the fire. FAA 

research indicates that properly 

constructed compartments meeting the 

proposed material requirements will 

prevent burn-through. For stowage 

compartments greater than 25 ft3 but 

less than 200 ft3, the safety objective of 

these proposed requirements is to detect 

and contain the fire for sufficient time 

to allow it to be extinguished by the 

crew. The requirements for these sizes 

of compartments are comparable to the 

requirements for Class B cargo 

compartments. The fire protection 

requirements proposed are intended to 

provide a level of safety for the OHCR 

compartment equivalent to the level of 

safety established by existing 

regulations for the main cabin. 

Section 25.787(a) requires each 

stowage compartment in the passenger 

cabin, except for underseat and 

overhead compartments for passenger 

convenience, to be completely enclosed. 

This requirement is not applicable to 

the flight deck so that flightcrew 

members may quickly access items and 

better perform their duties. Occupants 

of the OHCR compartment will not be 

performing flight deck duties, and the 

FAA considers that stowage 

compartments in the OHCR 

compartment, except for under-seat 

compartments for occupant 

convenience, should be completely 

enclosed. This will provide occupants 

of the OHCR compartment a level of 

safety similar to that provided to main 

deck passengers. Note that typical 

literature pockets and magazine racks 

are not considered stowage 

compartments and, therefore, are not 

required to be completely enclosed by 

this special condition. 

The addition of galley equipment or a 

kitchenette incorporating a heat source 

(cook tops, microwaves, coffee pots, 

etc.), other than a conventional lavatory 

or kitchenette hot water heater, within 

the OHCR compartment may require 

further special conditions to be 

considered. A hot water heater is 

acceptable without further special 

condition consideration. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to Boeing Model 777 series 

airplanes. Should the Boeing 

Commercial Airplane Group apply at a 

later date for a change to the type 

certificate to include another model 

incorporating the same novel or unusual 

design features, the special conditions 

would apply to that model as well 

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1) 

Amendment 21–69, effective September 

16, 1991.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704.

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) proposes the 

following special conditions as part of 

the type certification basis for Boeing 

Model 777 series airplanes with an 

overhead crew rest (OHCR) 

compartment installed adjacent to or 

5752 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

immediately aft of the first pair of exits 

(Door 1). 

1. During flight, occupancy of the 

OHCR compartment is limited to the 

total number of bunks and seats 

installed in the compartment that are 

approved to the maximum flight loading 

conditions. During taxi, takeoff, and 

landing (TT&L), occupancy of the OHCR 

compartment is limited to the total 

number of installed seats approved to 

the flight and ground load conditions 

and emergency landing conditions. The 

OHCR compartment is limited to a 

maximum of four crewmembers during 

flight and two flightcrew members 

during TT&L. 

(a) There must be appropriate 

placards, inside and outside each 

entrance to the OHCR compartment to 

indicate: 

(1) The maximum number of 

crewmembers allowed during flight and 

flightcrew members allowed during 

TT&L. 

(2) That occupancy is restricted to 

crewmembers who the pilot in 

command has determined are trained in 

the evacuation procedures for the OHCR 

compartment and able to rapidly use the 

evacuation routes. 

(3) That smoking is prohibited in the 

OHCR compartment. 

(4) That stowage in the crew rest area 

is limited to crew personal luggage. The 

stowage of cargo or passenger baggage is 

not allowed. 

(b) There must be at least one ashtray 

on the inside and outside of any 

entrance to the OHCR compartment. 

(c) A limitation in the Airplane Flight 

Manual must be established to restrict 

occupancy to crewmembers who the 

pilot in command has determined are 

able to rapidly use the evacuation 

routes. 

2. The following requirements are 

applicable to crew rest door(s): 

(a) There must be a means for any 

door installed between the OHCR 

compartment and passenger cabin to be 

quickly opened from inside the OHCR 

compartment, even when crowding 

from an emergency evacuation occurs at 

each side of the door. 

(b) Doors installed across emergency 

egress routes must have a means to latch 

them in the open position. The latching 

means must be able to withstand the 

loads imposed upon it when the door is 

subjected to the ultimate inertia forces, 

relative to the surrounding structure, 

listed in § 25.561(b). 

(c) A placard must be displayed in a 

conspicuous place on the outside of the 

entrance door of the OHCR 

compartment and any other door(s) 

installed across emergency egress routes 

of the OHCR compartment, that requires 

these doors to be latched open during 

TT&L when the OHCR compartment is 

occupied. This requirement does not 

apply to emergency escape hatches 

installed in the floor. A placard must be 

displayed in a conspicuous place on the 

entrance door to the OHCR 

compartment that requires it to be 

closed and locked when it is not 

occupied. Procedures for meeting these 

requirements must be transmitted to the 

operator for incorporation into their 

training programs and appropriate 

operational manuals. 

(d) For all doors installed in the 

OHCR compartment, there must be a 

means to preclude anyone from being 

trapped inside the OHCR compartment. 

If a locking mechanism is installed, it 

must be capable of being unlocked from 

the outside without the aid of a key or 

other special tools. The lock must not 

prevent opening from the inside of the 

OHCR compartment at any time. 

3. In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.562 for seats, which are occupiable 

during takeoff and landing, and restraint 

systems, the OHCR compartment 

structure must be compatible with the 

loads imposed by the seats as a result of 

the conditions specified in § 25.562(b). 

4. There must be at least two 

emergency evacuation routes that could 

be used by each occupant of the OHCR 

compartment to rapidly evacuate to the 

main cabin. In addition—

(a) The routes must be located with 

sufficient separation within the OHCR 

compartment to minimize the 

possibility of an event either inside or 

outside of the crew rest compartment 

rendering both routes inoperative. 

Compliance to the requirements of 

Special Condition No. 4(a) may be 

shown by inspection or by analysis. 

Regardless of which method is used, the 

maximum acceptable distance between 

crew rest outlets is 60 feet. 

Compliance by Inspection 

Inspection may be used to show 

compliance with Special Condition No. 

4. An inspection finding that an OHCR 

compartment has evacuation routes 

located so that each occupant of the 

seats and berths has an unobstructed 

route to at least one of the crew rest 

outlets regardless of the location of a fire 

would be reason for a finding of 

compliance. A fire within a berth that 

only blocks the occupant of that berth 

from exiting the berth need not be 

considered. Therefore, crew rest outlets 

that are located at absolute opposite 

ends (i.e., adjacent to opposite end 

walls) of the OHCR compartment would 

require no further review or analysis 

with regard to their separation.

Compliance by Analysis 

Analysis must show that the OHCR 

compartment configuration and interior 

features allow all occupants of the 

OHCR compartment to escape the 

compartment in the event of a hazard 

inside or outside of the compartment. 

Elements to consider in this evaluation 

are as follows: 

(1) Fire inside or outside the OHCR 

compartment, considered separately, 

and the design elements used to reduce 

the available fuel for the fire. 

(2) Design elements to reduce the fire 

ignition sources in the OHCR 

compartment. 

(3) Distribution and quantity of 

emergency equipment within the OHCR 

compartment. 

(4) Structural failure or deformation of 

components that could block access to 

the available evacuation routes (for 

example seats, folding berths, contents 

of stowage compartments, etc). 

(5) An incapacitated person blocking 

the evacuation routes. 

(6) Any other foreseeable hazard not 

identified above that could cause the 

evacuation routes to be compromised. 

Analysis must consider design 

features affecting access to the 

evacuation routes. Possibilities for 

design components affecting evacuation 

that should be considered include, but 

are not limited to, seat deformations in 

accordance with §§ 25.561(d) and 

25.562(c)(8), seat back break-over, rigid 

structure that reduces access from one 

part of the compartment to another, and 

items known to be the cause of potential 

hazards. Factors that also should be 

considered are availability of emergency 

equipment to address fire hazards, 

availability of communications 

equipment, supplemental restraint 

devices to retain items of mass that, if 

broken loose, could hinder evacuation, 

and load path isolation between 

components containing evacuation 

routes. 

Analysis of fire threats should be used 

in determining placement of required 

fire extinguishers and protective 

breathing equipment (PBE). This 

analysis should consider the possibility 

of fire in any location in the OHCR 

compartment. The location and quantity 

of PBE and fire extinguishers should 

allow occupants located in any 

approved seats or berths access to the 

equipment necessary to fight a fire in 

the OHCR compartment. 

The intent of this special condition is 

to provide sufficient egress route 

separation. Therefore the separation 

analysis described above should not be 

used to approve crew rest outlets which 

have less physical separation (measured 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 5753

between the centroid of each outlet 

opening) than the minimums prescribed 

below, unless compensating features are 

identified and submitted to the FAA for 

evaluation and approval. 

For an OHCR compartment with one 

outlet located near the forward or aft 

end of the compartment (as measured by 

having the centroid of the outlet 

opening within 20 percent of the total 

length of the compartment from the 

forward or aft end of the compartment) 

the outlet separation from one outlet to 

the other should not be less than 50 

percent of the total OHCR compartment 

length. 

For OHCR compartments with neither 

required crew rest outlet located near 

the forward or aft end of the OHCR 

compartment (as measured by not 

having the centroid of either outlet 

opening within 20 percent of the 

forward or aft end of the total OHCR 

compartment length), the outlet 

separation from one outlet to the other 

should not be less than 30 percent of the 

total OHCR compartment length. 

(b) The routes must be designed to 

minimize the possibility of blockage, 

which might result from fire, 

mechanical or structural failure, or 

persons standing below or against crew 

rest outlets. One of the two crew rest 

outlets should not be located where 

normal movement or evacuation by 

passengers occurs (main aisle, cross 

aisle, or galley complex, for example) 

that would impede egress from the 

OHCR compartment. If an evacuation 

route is in an area where normal 

movement or evacuation of passengers 

occurs, it must be demonstrated that 

passengers would not impede egress to 

the main deck. If there is low headroom 

at or near the evacuation route, 

provisions must be made to prevent or 

to protect occupants (of the OHCR 

compartment) from head injury. The use 

of evacuation routes must not be 

dependent on any powered device. If a 

crew rest outlet is over an area where 

there are passenger seats, a maximum of 

five passengers may be displaced from 

their seats temporarily during the 

evacuation process of an incapacitated 

person(s). If the evacuation procedure 

involves the evacuee stepping on seats, 

the seats must not be damaged to the 

extent that they would not be acceptable 

for occupancy during an emergency 

landing. 

(c) Emergency evacuation procedures, 

including the emergency evacuation of 

an incapacitated occupant from the 

OHCR compartment, must be 

established. The applicant for a change 

in type design must transmit all of these 

procedures to the operator for 

incorporation into their training 

programs and appropriate operational 

manuals. 

(d) There must be a limitation in the 

Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable 

means requiring that crewmembers be 

trained in the use of the OHCR 

compartment evacuation routes. This 

training must instruct them to ensure 

that the OHCR compartment (including 

seats, doors, etc.) is in its proper TT&L 

configuration.

(e) There must be a means to prevent 

passengers on the main deck from 

entering the OHCR compartment when 

no flight attendant is present or in the 

event of an emergency, including an 

emergency evacuation. 

(f) Doors or hatches that separate the 

OHCR compartment from the main deck 

must not adversely affect evacuation of 

occupants on the main deck (slowing 

evacuation by encroaching into aisles, 

for example) or cause injury to those 

occupants during opening or while 

opened. 

(g) The means of opening doors and 

hatches to the OHCR compartment must 

be simple and obvious. In addition, the 

crew rest doors and hatches must be 

able to be closed from the main 

passenger cabin. 

5. There must be a means for the 

evacuation of an incapacitated person 

(representative of a ninety-fifth 

percentile male) from the OHCR 

compartment to the passenger cabin 

floor. 

Evacuation must be demonstrated for 

all evacuation routes. A crewmember 

may provide assistance in the 

evacuation (a total of one assistant 

within the OHCR compartment). 

Additional assistance may be provided 

by up to three persons in the main 

passenger compartment. These 

additional assistants must be standing 

on the floor while providing assistance. 

For evacuation routes having stairways, 

the additional assistants may ascend up 

to one half the elevation change from 

the main deck to the OHCR 

compartment, or to the first landing, 

whichever is lower. 

6. The following signs and placards 

must be provided in the OHCR 

compartment: 

(a) At least one exit sign, located near 

each crew rest outlet, meeting the 

requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i). An 

allowable exception would be a sign 

with reduced background area of no less 

than 5.3 square inches (excluding the 

letters), provided that it is installed so 

that the material surrounding the exit 

sign is light in color (white, cream, light 

beige, for example). If the material 

surrounding the exit sign is not light in 

color, a sign with a minimum of a oneinch wide background border around 

the letters would be acceptable. 

(b) An appropriate placard must be 

located conspicuously on or near each 

OHCR compartment door or hatch that 

defines the location and the operating 

instructions for access to and operation 

of the outlet door or hatch. 

(c) Placards must be readable from a 

distance of 30 inches under emergency 

lighting conditions. 

(d) The door or hatch handles and 

operating instruction placards required 

by Special Condition No. 6(b) of these 

special conditions must be illuminated 

to at least 160 microlamberts under 

emergency lighting conditions. 

7. There must be a means in the event 

of failure of the aircraft’s main power 

system, or of the normal OHCR 

compartment lighting system, for 

emergency illumination to be 

automatically provided for the OHCR 

compartment. 

(a) This emergency illumination must 

be independent of the main lighting 

system. 

(b) The sources of general cabin 

illumination may be common to both 

the emergency and the main lighting 

systems if the power supply to the 

emergency lighting system is 

independent of the power supply to the 

main lighting system. 

(c) The illumination level must be 

sufficient for the occupants of the OHCR 

compartment to locate and transfer to 

the main passenger cabin floor by means 

of each evacuation route. 

(d) The illumination level must be 

sufficient, with the privacy curtains in 

the closed position, for each occupant of 

the crew rest to locate a deployed 

oxygen mask. 

8. There must be means for two-way 

voice communications between 

crewmembers on the flight deck and 

occupants of the OHCR compartment. 

There must also be two-way 

communications between the occupants 

of the OHCR compartment and each 

flight attendant station required to have 

a public address system microphone per 

§ 25.1423(g) in the passenger cabin. In 

addition, the public address system 

must include provisions to provide only 

the relevant information to the 

crewmembers in the OHCR 

compartment (for example fire in flight, 

aircraft depressurization, preparation of 

the compartment for landing, etc.). That 

is, provisions must be made so that 

occupants of the OHCR compartment 

will not be disturbed with normal, nonemergency announcements made to the 

passenger cabin. 

9. There must be a means for manual 

activation of an aural emergency alarm 

system, audible during normal and 

5754 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

emergency conditions, to enable 

crewmembers on the flight deck and at 

each pair of required floor level 

emergency exits to alert occupants of 

the OHCR compartment of an 

emergency situation. Use of a public 

address or crew interphone system will 

be acceptable, provided an adequate 

means of differentiating between normal 

and emergency communications is 

incorporated. The system must be 

powered in flight, after the shutdown or 

failure of all engines and auxiliary 

power units (APU), for a period of at 

least ten minutes. 

10. There must be a means, readily 

detectable by seated or standing 

occupants of the OHCR compartment, to 

indicate when seat belts should be 

fastened. Seat belt type restraints must 

be provided for berths and must be 

compatible with the sleeping position 

during cruise conditions. There must be 

a placard on each berth requiring that 

these restraints be fastened when 

occupied. If compliance with any of the 

other requirements of these special 

conditions is predicated on specific 

head location, there must be a placard 

identifying the head position. 

11. Protective breathing equipment 

(PBE) must be provided in accordance 

with § 25.1439, except that in lieu of a 

device for each crewmember, the 

following must be provided: Two PBE 

devices approved to Technical Standard 

Order (TSO)–C116 or equivalent, 

suitable for firefighting, or one PBE for 

each hand-held fire extinguisher, 

whichever is greater. The following 

equipment must also be provided in the 

OHCR compartment: 

(a) At least one approved hand-held 

fire extinguisher appropriate for the 

kinds of fires likely to occur. 

(b) One flashlight.

Note: Additional PBE and fire 

extinguishers in specific locations, beyond 

the minimum numbers prescribed in Special 

Condition No. 11, may be required as a result 

of the egress analysis accomplished to satisfy 

Special Condition No. 4(a).

12. A smoke or fire detection system 

(or systems) must be provided that 

monitors each occupiable area within 

the OHCR compartment, including 

those areas partitioned by curtains. 

Flight tests must be conducted to show 

compliance with this requirement. Each 

system (or systems) must provide: 

(a) A visual indication to the flight 

deck within one minute after the start of 

a fire. 

(b) An aural warning in the OHCR 

compartment. 

(c) A warning in the main passenger 

cabin. This warning must be readily 

detectable by a flight attendant, taking 

into consideration the positioning of 

flight attendants throughout the main 

passenger compartment during various 

phases of flight. 

13. Means to fight a fire must be 

provided. The means can either be a 

built-in extinguishing system or manual 

hand-held bottle extinguishing system. 

(a) For a built-in extinguishing 

system: 

(1) The system must have adequate 

capacity to suppress a fire considering 

the fire threat, volume of the 

compartment, and the ventilation rate. 

The system must have sufficient 

extinguishing agent to provide an initial 

knockdown and suppression 

environment per the minimum 

performance standards (MPS) that have 

been established for the agent being 

used. 

(2) If the capacity of the extinguishing 

system does not provide effective fire 

suppression that will last for the 

duration of flight from the farthest point 

in route to the nearest suitable landing 

site expected in service, an additional 

manual firefighting procedure must be 

established. For the built-in 

extinguishing system, the time duration 

for effective fire suppression must be 

established and documented in the 

firefighting procedures in the airplane 

flight manual. If the duration of time for 

demonstrated effective fire suppression 

provided by the built-in extinguishing 

agent will be exceeded, the firefighting 

procedures must instruct the crew to: 

1. Enter the crew rest at the time that 

demonstrated fire suppression 

effectiveness will be exceeded. 

2. Check for and extinguish any 

residual fire. 

3. Confirm that the fire is out. 

(b) For either a built-in extinguishing 

system of limited suppression duration 

or a manual hand held bottleextinguishing system: 

(1) There must be a limitation in the 

Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable 

means requiring that crewmembers be 

trained in the firefighting procedures. 

(2) The compartment design must 

allow crewmembers equipped for 

firefighting to have unrestricted access 

to all parts of the compartment. The 

firefighting procedures must describe 

the methods for searching the crew rests 

for fire sources(s). 

(3) The time for a crewmember on the 

main deck to react to the fire alarm, don 

the firefighting equipment, and gain 

access to the crew rest compartment 

must not exceed the time for the 

compartment to become smoke-filled, 

making it difficult to locate the fire 

source.

14. There must be a means provided 

to exclude hazardous quantities of 

smoke or extinguishing agent 

originating in the OHCR compartment 

from entering any other occupiable 

compartment. 

(a) Small quantities of smoke may 

penetrate from the crew rest 

compartment into other occupied areas 

during the one-minute smoke detection 

time. 

(b) There must be a provision in the 

firefighting procedures to ensure that all 

door(s) and hatch(es) at the crew rest 

compartment outlets are closed after 

evacuation of the crew rest and during 

firefighting to minimize smoke and 

extinguishing agent from entering other 

occupiable compartments. 

(c) Smoke entering any occupiable 

compartment when access to the OHCR 

compartment is open for evacuation of 

the crew rest must dissipate within five 

minutes after the access to the OHCR 

compartment is closed. 

(d) Hazardous quantities of smoke 

may not enter any occupied 

compartment during subsequent access 

to manually fight a fire in the crew rest 

compartment. The amount of smoke 

entrained by a firefighter exiting the 

crew rest compartment is not 

considered hazardous. 

(e) Flight tests must be conducted to 

show compliance with this requirement. 

15. There must be a supplemental 

oxygen system equivalent to that 

provided for main deck passengers for 

each seat and berth in the OHCR 

compartment. The system must provide 

an aural and visual warning to alert the 

occupants of the OHCR compartment to 

don oxygen masks in the event of 

decompression. The warning must 

activate before the cabin pressure 

altitude exceeds 15,000 feet. The aural 

warning must sound continuously for a 

minimum of five minutes or until a reset 

push button in the OHCR compartment 

is depressed. Procedures for crew rest 

occupants in the event of 

decompression must be established. 

These procedures must be transmitted 

to the operators for incorporation into 

their training programs and appropriate 

operational manuals. 

16. The following requirements apply 

to OHCR compartments that are divided 

into several sections by the installation 

of curtains or partitions: 

(a) To compensate for sleeping 

occupants, an aural alert that can be 

heard in each section of the OHCR 

compartment must accompany 

automatic presentation of supplemental 

oxygen masks. A visual indicator that 

occupants must don an oxygen mask is 

required in each section where seats or 

berths are not installed. A minimum of 

two supplemental oxygen masks are 

required for each seat or berth. There 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 5755

must also be a means by which the 

oxygen masks can be manually 

deployed from the flight deck. 

(b) A placard is required adjacent to 

each curtain that visually divides or 

separates, for privacy purposes, the 

OHCR compartment into small sections. 

The placard must require that the 

curtain(s) remains open when the 

private section it creates is unoccupied. 

The vestibule section adjacent to the 

stairway is not considered a private area 

and, therefore, does not require a 

placard. 

(c) For each section of the OHCR 

compartment created by the installation 

of a curtain, requirements for the 

following must be met with the curtain 

open or closed: 

(1) No smoking placard (Special 

Condition No. 1). 

(2) Emergency illumination (Special 

Condition No. 7). 

(3) Emergency alarm system (Special 

Condition No. 9). 

(4) Seat belt fasten signal or return to 

seat signal as applicable (Special 

Condition No. 10). 

(5) The smoke or fire detection system 

(Special Condition No. 12). 

(d) OHCR compartments visually 

divided to the extent that evacuation 

could be affected must have exit signs 

that direct occupants to the primary 

stairway outlet. The exit signs must be 

provided in each separate section of the 

OHCR compartment, except for 

curtained bunks, and must meet the 

requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i). An exit 

sign with reduced background area as 

described in Special Condition No. 6(a) 

may be used to meet this requirement. 

(e) For sections within an OHCR 

compartment that are created by the 

installation of a partition with a door 

separating the sections, the following 

requirements of these special conditions 

must be met with the door open or 

closed: 

(1) There must be a secondary 

evacuation route from each section to 

the main deck, or alternatively, it must 

be shown that any door between the 

sections has been designed to preclude 

anyone from being trapped inside a 

section of the compartment. Removal of 

an incapacitated occupant from within 

this area must be considered. A 

secondary evacuation route from a small 

room designed for only one occupant for 

short time duration, such as a changing 

area or lavatory, is not required. 

However, removal of an incapacitated 

occupant from within a small room, 

such as a changing area or lavatory, 

must be considered. 

(2) Any door between the sections 

must be shown to be openable when 

crowded against, even when crowding 

occurs at each side of the door. 

(3) There may be no more than one 

door between any seat or berth and the 

primary stairway door. 

(4) There must be exit signs in each 

section meeting the requirements of 

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i) that direct occupants to 

the primary stairway outlet. An exit sign 

with reduced background area as 

described in Special Condition No. 6(a) 

may be used to meet this requirement. 

(5) Special Conditions No. 1 (no 

smoking placards), No. 7 (emergency 

illumination), No. 9 (emergency alarm 

system), No. 10 (fasten seat belt signal 

or return to seat signal as applicable) 

and No. 12 (smoke or fire detection 

system) must be met with the door open 

or closed.

(6) Special Conditions No. 8 (two-way 

voice communication) and No. 11 

(emergency firefighting and protective 

equipment) must be met independently 

for each separate section except for 

lavatories or other small areas that are 

not intended to be occupied for 

extended periods of time. 

17. Where a waste disposal receptacle 

is fitted, it must be equipped with an 

automatic fire extinguisher that meets 

the performance requirements of 

§ 25.854(b). 

18. Materials (including finishes or 

decorative surfaces applied to the 

materials) must comply with the 

requirements of § 25.853 as amended by 

Amendment 25–83. Seat cushions and 

mattresses must comply with the 

flammability requirements of 

§ 25.853(c), as amended by Amendment 

25–83, and the test requirements of part 

25, appendix F, part II, or other 

equivalent methods. 

19. The addition of a lavatory within 

the OHCR compartment would require 

the lavatory to meet the same 

requirements as those for a lavatory 

installed on the main deck except with 

regard to Special Condition No. 12 for 

smoke detection. 

20. Each stowage compartment in the 

crew rest, except for underseat 

compartments for occupant 

convenience, must be completely 

enclosed. All enclosed stowage 

compartments within the OHCR 

compartment that are not limited to 

stowage of emergency equipment or 

airplane supplied equipment must meet 

the design criteria given in the table 

below. Enclosed stowage compartments 

greater than 200 ft3 in interior volume 

are not addressed by this special 

condition. The in-flight accessibility of 

very large enclosed stowage 

compartments and the subsequent 

impact on the crewmembers’ ability to 

effectively reach any part of the 

compartment with the contents of a 

hand fire extinguisher will require 

additional fire protection considerations 

similar to those required for inaccessible 

compartments such as Class C cargo 

compartments.

REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR STOWAGE COMPARTMENTS DEPENDING ON INTERIOR VOLUME

SIZE

Fire protection features 

Applicability of fire protection requirements by interior volume 

Less than 25 cubic feet 25 cubic feet to less than 

57 cubic feet 

57 cubic feet to 200 cubic 

feet 

Materials of Construction 1 .............................................. Yes .................................... Yes .................................... Yes. 

Smoke or Fire Detectors 2 ............................................... No ...................................... Yes .................................... Yes. 

Liner 3 ............................................................................... No ...................................... Conditional ......................... Yes. 

Location Detector 4 .......................................................... No ...................................... Yes .................................... Yes. 

1Material

The material used to construct each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant and must meet the flammability standards 

established for interior components (i.e., 14 CFR part 25 Appendix F, Parts I, IV, and V) per the requirements of § 25.853. For compartments 

less than 25 ft3 in interior volume, the design must ensure the ability to contain a fire likely to occur within the compartment under normal use. 2Smoke or Fire Detectors

Enclosed stowage compartments equal to or exceeding 25 ft3 in interior volume must be provided with a smoke or fire detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within a one-minute detection time. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement. 

Each system (or systems) must provide: 

(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within one minute after the start of a fire. 

(b) An aural warning in the OHCR compartment. 

5756 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 25 / Friday, February 6, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

(c) A warning in the main passenger cabin. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into consideration the positioning of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various phases of flight. 3 Liner

If it can be shown that the material used to construct the stowage compartment meets the flammability requirements of a liner for a Class B 

cargo compartment (i.e., § 25.855 at Amendment 25–93, and Appendix F, part I, paragraph (a)(2)(ii)), then no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 25 ft3 in interior volume but less than 57 ft3 in interior volume. For all enclosed stowage 

compartments equal to or greater than 57 ft3 in interior volume but less than or equal to 200 ft3, a liner must be provided that meets the requirements of § 25.855 for a Class B cargo compartment. 4 Location Detector

OHCR compartments that contain enclosed stowage compartments exceeding 25 ft3 in interior volume and are located away from one central 

location such as the entry to the OHCR compartment or a common area within the OHCR compartment would require additional fire protection 

features and/or devices to assist the firefighter in determining the location of a fire. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 

26, 2004. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–2436 Filed 2–5–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. 2003–CE–54–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Cessna 

Aircraft Company Model 525 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to 

supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 

2003–21–07, which applies to certain 

The Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 

Model 525 airplanes. AD 2003–21–07 

currently requires you to disengage the 

pitch trim circuit breaker and AP servo 

circuit breaker and then tie strap each 

of them to prevent them from being 

engaged. Not utilizing this equipment 

prevents a single-point failure. This 

proposed AD is the result of Cessna 

having now developed and made 

changes in the design of the affected 

trim printed circuit board (PCB) 

assembly to allow the use of the 

assembly and the prevention of the 

single-point failure, and identification 

of additional airplanes that have the 

same unsafe condition. Consequently, 

this proposed AD would require you to 

remove and replace an old trim PCB 

assembly with a new design assembly or 

modify an old trim PCB assembly to the 

new design. We are issuing this 

proposed AD to correct this single-point 

failure in the electric pitch trim system, 

which will result in a runaway pitch 

trim condition where the pilot could not 

disconnect using the control wheel 

autopilot/trim disconnect switch. 

Failure of the electric trim system 

would result in a large pitch mistrim 

and would cause excessive control 

forces that the pilot could not overcome.

DATES: We must receive any comments 

on this proposed AD by April 15, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following to 

submit comments on this proposed AD: 

• By mail: FAA, Central Region, 

Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2003–CE–

54–AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas 

City, Missouri 64106. 

• By fax: (816) 329–3771. 

• By e-mail: 9-ACE-7-Docket@faa.gov.

Comments sent electronically must 

contain ‘‘Docket No. 2003–CE–54–AD’’

in the subject line. If you send 

comments electronically as attached 

electronic files, the files must be 

formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for 

Windows or ASCII. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this proposed AD from The 

Cessna Aircraft Company, Product 

Support, P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, 

Kansas 67277; telephone: (316) 517–

6000; facsimile: (316) 517–8500. 

You may view the AD docket at FAA, 

Central Region, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 

2003–CE–54–AD, 901 Locust, Room 

506, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Office 

hours are 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Withers, Aerospace Engineer, Wichita 

Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1801 

Airport Road, Wichita, Kansas 67209; 

telephone: (316) 946–4196; facsimile: 

(316) 946–4107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

How do I comment on this proposed 

AD? We invite you to submit any 

written relevant data, views, or 

arguments regarding this proposal. Send 

your comments to an address listed 

under ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘AD Docket 

No. 2003–CE–54–AD’’ in the subject 

line of your comments. If you want us 

to acknowledge receipt of your mailed 

comments, send us a self-addressed, 

stamped postcard with the docket 

number written on it. We will datestamp your postcard and mail it back to 

you. 

Are there any specific portions of this 

proposed AD I should pay attention to?

We specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this proposed AD. If you contact us 

through a nonwritten communication 

and that contact relates to a substantive 

part of this proposed AD, we will 

summarize the contact and place the 

summary in the docket. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD in light of those comments 

and contacts. 

Discussion 

Has FAA taken any action to this 

point? A report of an accident involving 

a Cessna Model 525 airplane where the 

pilot reported a problem with the pitch 

trim system, and later Cessna and FAA 

analysis that revealed the potential for 

a single-wire shorting caused us to issue 

AD 2003–21–07, Amendment 39–13342 

(68 FR 60028, October 21, 2003). AD 

2003–21–07 currently requires you to do 

the following on Cessna Model 525 

airplanes:

—Disengage the pitch trim circuit 

breaker and AP servo circuit breaker; 

and 

—Tie strap each of them to prevent 

them from being engaged.

What has happened since AD 2003–

21–07 to initiate this proposed action?

AD 2003–21–07 is considered an 

interim action since compliance 

corrected the condition where the 

control wheel autopilot/trim disconnect 

switch did not stop the runaway 

condition. However, AD 2003–21–07 

did not correct the issue of the singlepoint failure while still utilizing the 

desired equipment. Cessna has now 

developed and made changes in the 

design of the affected trim printed 

circuit board (PCB) assembly to 

eliminate the single-point failure while 

allowing the use of the equipment, and 

identified additional airplanes that have 

the same unsafe condition.

What is the potential impact if FAA 

took no action? Failure of the electric 

trim system would result in a large pitch 

mistrim and would cause excessive