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WITH Tt1E'E;NEMY " ". .. . . . ." 

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w. to' :Ill Major- Micnael L Viani "al)dM!ijor""Feter q :.Knigl'lt.. ';Oirectorate of Evaluatioh , 

t::1CJaroes·i Spencer " A' .RlbGfi T6o t oNG: 

Major Harvey Q, Rams'ey •~~'g~rig s cli o,o"'
 

COL,'Edward K. Wintz
 

'Englfieer T rernin'g Brigade
 

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EDITOR·
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..' 
Information for Contributors
 

THE MAGAZINE. The Engineer is an offi cial Department of 

the Army magazine which provides timely and authoritative 

information on Army engineering concepts, plans. policies. 

doctrine. procedures. operations. and developments to active 

Army units, reserve components, and national guard units. As 

a medium for disseminating information, it seeks to increase 

understanding of the role and importance of Army engineering 

and to promote the professional development and knowledge 

of officers. enlisted personnel. and civilians engaged in Army 

engineering activities. 

WRITERS. The primary requisite for being published is your 

message, not your writing ability. If you have something of 

value to offer, whether it be in the form of a feature article, 

announcement. photograph or illustration. we want to hear 

from you. 

SUBJECTS. The Engineer uses art icles on all acnvmes of 

Army engineering, from item development to item disposal. 

from fieldutilization to support operation. The scope of the 

coverage includes all functions at all levels. from Department 

of the Army staff to the smallest field units . 

STYLE. Clean, concise manuscripts written in the third person, active voice are preferred. Strive for simplicity in your 

word selection, and sentence and paragraph construction. The 

editor reserves the right to edit all manuscripts to conform to 

The Engineer style. Substantial technical changes will be made 

only with the author's consent. 

MANUSCRIPTS. There are no prescribed limits for manuscript length. A news item may vary from one sentence to 

several paragraphs. A pictorial feature may be several hundred 

words. Feature articles are generally from 1,000to 3.000 words. 

but may be longer or shorter in length. A single copy of a 

manuscript is sufficient. typed and double spaced. Pictorial or 

art support is not necessary, but certainly helpful. Manuscripts 

should NOT be under editorial consideration elsewhere at the 

time of submission to THE ENGINEER. Manuscripts should 

contain no classified material. If necessary, we will submit 

material to the Office, Chief of Public Affairs. for security 

clearance prior to publication. 

PHOTOGRAPHS. We solicit photographs for consideration. 

They are important in clarifying and explaining your manuscript. They also increase reader interest. Offset printing demands clear. sharp photography. Polaroid photographs are 

generally not acceptable. Photographs preferred are 8"xlO" 

glossy. black and white prints, with captions. Identifi cation. 

including first and last names and middle initial of all persons 

in each photo. should be typed on a separate sheet of paper 

and taped to the back of each print. 

CORRESPONDENCE. Send all manu scripts. photos. art. 

and correspondence to : Editor. THE ENGINEER, Public 

Affairs Office, US Arm y Engineer Center. Fort Belvoir. VA 

22060. 

THE ENGINEER isan authorized quarterly publication of the U.S. Army Engineer SUBSCRIPTIONS: Send all SUbsc ription requests/renewals to Editor, THE 

Center and School, Fort Belvoir, VA. It ispublished to provide factual and in-depth ENGiNEER, Publi c Affairs Off ice, Fort Belvoir , VA 22060. Annua l rate s are 

inf ormation of interest to all Army engineers and engineer units. Articles, photo­ $4 for domestic and APC addr esses and $5 for overseas addresses. Make 

gra phs and ar t work of genera l interest ma y be submitted for considerat ion to : checks payable to The United States Treasury . 

Editor, THE ENGINEER, USA Engineer Cenrer and School, Fort Belvoir, VA THE ENGINEER TELEPHONE : Commercial 703·664 ·5001/3556 ; Aut ovon 

22060. Views a nd opi nions expressed here in are no r necessar ily those of the Depa rt­ 354-500113556. 

mcnt of the Army. Funds for printingof TH E ENGINEER wereapproved by Head­ POSTMASTER: Controlle d circula lion postag e paid at For t Belvoir , VA 

qu arters, Department of the Army, Ja nuary I, 1974. 22060. 

1 
News & Notes 

Ribbon Bridge 

Ribbon bridges have long been an 

important asset of combat engineers 

due to th e spee d and ease of assembly, The 902nd Engineer Company 

(FB) II th Engineer Battalion (CBT), 

For t Belvoir, demon strated ribbon 

bridge ad vantages durin g a recent 

" Float-by" at the U. S. Army Engineer Center and School. Unloa ding 

(top photo) takes ju st two men and 

very littl e time. Th e bridge section 

unfold s (center) by itself. Separat e 

spa ns, onc e off-load ed and unfolded , are pushed together (bo ttom) by a brid ge erection boat. A 

complete bridge can be assembled 

and operational within minutes. 

(Ph otos by Gid Pool, Jr. ) 

Training Brigade 

The Engineer Training Brigade has been organized old configuration and mission of command and 

at Fort Belvoir, VA, effective 1 October. Its contro l of students attending the Ad vanced Ofprimary missions arc the training of soldiers in the ficer Course, Basic Officer Course and Advanced 

repair courses taught at Fort Belvoir and the care NCO Course . The 3rd Battalion also includes the 

of all students at the school. The Engineer Training Advanced Individual Training Company for stuBrigade (ETB) is commanded by Colonel Ker­ dent s attending the Defense Mapping School and 

wood W. Barrand and the Brigade Command the Foreign Student Support Detachment. The 4th 

Sergeant Major is CSM Donald W. W. Elms. The Battalion includes students and instructor s of the 

ETB consists of three battalions org ani zed from 35E Special Electrical Devices Repairman Course 

the Engineer Center's existing personnel re­ and the 52C Utilities Equipment Repairman 

sour ces. The Ist Battalion includes instructors and Course . In addition, students attending th e 12E 

students of the 52D Power Generator Equipment Atomic Demolition Course and the Soils Analyst 

Repairman Course. The 3rd Battalion retained its Co urse ar e billeted in the 4th Battalion. 

2 FALL 1978 
Drill Sergeant of the Year 

A Combat Engineer, Sergeant First Class Dennis 

D. Watters, has been selected as the active Army 

Drill Sergeant of the Year. SFC Watters, whose 

MaS is 12B4X, was assigned to Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, Training Group, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO, at the time of his selection. 

He has since been reassigned to Headquarters, 

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 

VA, where he wiII serve a one-year tour as advisor 

to the TRADOC commander on the drill sergeant 

program. 

CETEX '78 

A German engineer guards a mined road at Military Training Area Baumholder during CETEX 

'78, which is the annual Central Army Group 

(CENT AG) Engineer Training Exercise designed 

to provide combat engineers with a fundamental 

knowledge and understanding of the equipment, 

barrier munitions and doctrine of their allies. 

CETEX '78 was hosted by III German Corps from 

22 May to I June. Participating forces included 

the II and [II German Corps, V and VII U.S. 

Corps, the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade 

Group, the II French Army, the I Belgium Corps, 

and the German Territorial Southern Command. 

Commemorative Plaque 

The U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, 

VA, has been presented a bronze plaque commemorating the 200th Anniver sary of George 

Washington's "call" for engineering education . 

The plaque is a duplicate of the one which was unveiled at Valley Forge earlier last summer. Major 

General James L. Kelly, post commander and 

commandant of the Engineer School, accepted the 

plaque from General (Ret.) Bruce E. Clarke during 

ceremonies on Long Parade Field at Fort Belvoir. 

The plaque was donated by the Freedoms Foundation and the National Society of Professional 

Engineers. It is currently on display in the Engineer Museum at Fort Belvoir. 

Universal Engineer Tractor 

Congress has appropriated $10.6 million for initial 

production of the Universal Engineer Tractor 

(UET) during Fiscal Year 1979. Initial Operational Capability-Force Development Testing and 

Evaluation is scheduled for the third quarter of 

FY 80. Army engineer field units should receive 

the first UETs by early 1982 if additional funds 

are appropriated during the next two years. 

THE ENGINEER 3 
News & Notes 

Bridge Builders 

Members of Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, 

Fort Riley, KS, assemble an M4T6 float bridge on 

the banks of the Big Piney River at Fort Leonard 

Wood, MO . Ninety-eight soldiers assigned to Company C convoyed to Fort Leonard Wood late last 

summer to undergo 13 days of bridge-building 

training in preparation for an ARTEP exercise at 

Fort Riley this November. 

Letters
 

Dear Sir, 

Some of my fellow EOAC students 

believe too much time is allotted to 

tactics instruction at The Engineer 

School. For three reasons I disagree 

with this : 

(1) Observations obtained in Vietnam have led me to believe that 

Engineer officers tend to be weak in 

tactics though proficient in general 

engineering. Observed instances of 

slow perimeter defense establishment, long ambush reaction times, 

lax job site security, inability to 

use supporting fires, and misunderstanding between engineer and maneuver units have led to this belief. 

(2) In many armies the Engineers 

are closely integrated with the 

maneuver units with a resulting increased effectiveness of those armies. This does not seem to be true 

of U.S. Army Engineers. We tend 

towards an "Ivory Tower" attitude 

towards everything except con struction engineering . Successful modern 

warfare in general and European 

warfare in particular requires close 

coordination between Engineers and 

other branches. To realize their full 

potential Engineers must be able to 

participate in the early stages of tactical planning. This requires an 

understanding of tactics which 

Engineers do not always possess. 

(3) Tactics may not be the most interesting of subjects to an Engineer, 

but required combat use will make it 

the most important. An officer who 

has not been in combat, which ineludes most of the EOAC students, 

tends not to appreciate this. 

With these observations I submit 

to my fellow students the belief that 

the current time allotted to tactics is 

insufficient rather than excessive. I 

believe the concentration of effort 

should be towards continual improvement of the subject matter and 

its presentation rather than reduction of allotted time . An Engineer 

officer must have a thorough knowledge of tactics to function as an 

integrated member of the combined 

arms team and to fulfill his battlefield responsibilities to his personnel. This knowledge comes only with 

time and effort. 

lLT LARRY W. JINKINS 

Class 3/78 EOAC 

4 FALL 1978 
The combat role of Army engineers is often overshadowed by their construction, nation-building, and water 

resource management missions, particularly during 

peacetime. Yet, when the Corps of Engineers was redesignated a member of the Army's Combined Arms Team in 

September 1975, it shouldered an equal burden with the 

Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Artillery in 

our national defense. Lieutenant General John W. Morris, 

Chief of Engineers, was asked about that responsibility 

and other matters related to the combat role of Army engineers during a recent interview with THE ENGINEER. 

An 

Interview 

with 

The Chief***
 

THE ENGINEER: In September, 1975, the Corps of 

Engineers was redesignated as a combat arms. How 

have the other combat arms accepted the change and 

what do you think engineers can do to increa se that 

acceptance? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: The Corps of Engineers will always 

be recognized as being more than just a combat arms . 

We do other things in a support role and in service to the 

Army. As I see it, we support the Army in four categories-on the battlefield, in garrison, during mobilization and by doin g a lot of special tasks. Our combat 

arms mission falls only in the first category, support on 

the battlefield. I think there is full acceptance of engineers as part of the combined arms team by the troop 

units, the infantry divisions , those forces which will be 

deployed in the combat zone . But we ought to get it 

THE ENGINEER 

straight. Engineers did not return to the combat arms 

simply becau se the Corps wanted to. That wou ldn' t 

have been good enough. The reason we came back is 

because the other members of the team wanted us back. 

Our field commanders are very, very aware of the importance of engineers to their operations . I am concerned, however, on two scores. First, I believe the 

engineer should be more involved in planning the battle 

or operation as well as in executing it. At present, the 

emphasis on execution is about right, but I think the 

emphasis on helping to plan the battle is too limited . 

Why? Well, the kinds of warfare ahead of us will rely 

heavily on mobility, countermobility, survivability, and 

general engineering. But even more importantly, if field 

commanders want to change the terrain to maximize its 

use, engineers are going to have to do it. So we might as 

5 
well help the commander plan his operation. The other 

deep concern I have-and I may be wrong-is the 

assumption by field commanders that engineer capability available equals the engineer effort they expect. 

I'm concerned that field commanders are assuming 

engineer capability to be greater than it really is, in fact. 

The relative mobility of engineer units on the battlefield 

is considerably less than the combat units they fight 

with. The 0-7 tractor doesn't have the mobility of the 

personnel carrier or the tank or self-propelled artillery. 

And I'm not sure the commander of the combined arms 

team is fully aware of the shortfall of engineer mobility 

in relation to his other units . The combined arms comLT. GEN. MORRIS: There's generally good support 

for the UET. General Blanchard (USAREUR Commander) has sent a message stating how badly he wants 

it. And I think the program managers who support this 

item before the Congress are convincing. But I don't 

know whether it's a matter of priorities before the Congress, competition from the construction equipment 

manufacturers, or what, but so far we've not been able 

to get the UET into production. Once we get it into the 

hands of our troops, I think our field commanders will 

realize what a disadvantage they're at with present 

equipment. I'm optimistic we will get it funded, but I 

was also optimistic last year. 

"I think there is full acceptance of engineers as part of the combined arms team by the troop units, the infantry divisions, those 

forces which will be employed in the combat zone." 

"If field commanders want to change the terrain to maximize its 

use, engineers are going to have to do it. So we might as well 

help the commander plan his operation." 

"Once we get the UET into the hands of our troops, I think our 

field commanders will realize what a disadvantage they're at 

with present equipment." 

"While our troop units may be more equipment intensive today, 

we expect a lot more of the individuals who have this new equip· 

ment than we expected of the individuals who had only rifles to 

fight with." 

mander's assumptions are not necessarily tested during 

peacetime field operations. But in wartime, it would 

become eminently clear quickly that the mobility he 

expects from his combined arms team is less than he 

expects. 

THE ENGINEER: Won't the Universal Engineer Tractor (UET) and other new engineer equipment now being 

developed increase the mobility of combat engineers? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: When we get the UET in the hands 

of our divisional units and support battalions, I will be 

much more relieved that engineer capability will be, in 

fact, what the commanders are presuming it to be. But 

that equipment is not there yet. The lead time on new 

equipment is long. Fortunately, we are at the threshold 

of production, and we could be seeing the UET in the 

hands of our troops in the next couple of years. 

THE ENGINEER: What, if anything, can your office 

do to help solve the funding problems facing the UET? 

THE ENGINEER: There seems to be a trend in the 

development of our engineer TOE to become more 

equipment intensive and less manpower intensive. What 

is your reaction to this trend? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: That's not only true, but it's inevitable. And I believe it's proper. Why? Well, our 

army is mechanized relative to the Army of World War I 

and World War II and maybe even Vietnam. A man's 

capacity to influence the situation on the battlefield is a 

function of the equipment we put into his hands, much 

more than it was before. That's been an evolutionary 

thing. And what we have now is a continuation of that 

evolution that carries with it some other considerations. 

While our troop units may be more equipment intensive 

today, we expect a lot more of the individuals who have 

this new equipment than we expected of the individuals 

who had only rifles to fight with. So we have to get 

much more out of the individual soldier than we used to. 

THE ENGINEER: Many soldiers contend that the 

nation-building role of the Corps, both at home and 

6 FALL 1978 
abroad, diverts the attention and resources of the Corps 

from its most important mission-combat engineering. 

What is your response to this concern? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: Well, I don't disagree that the 

combat engineer role is our most important responsibility, but I do disagree that it is the only thing we can do 

and do well. In fact, I'm more convinced as the Chief of 

Engineers than I ever was before that the engineer support to the Army, at all levels, has historically been a 

direct product of the responsibilities we give our young 

officers and middle grade officers in other-than-combat 

engineer assignments. I have the highest regard for the 

combat engineer troop commander, but I'm also convinced that the very best engineer service that is given 

the Army and the United States in the field has historically been a product of engineer lessons learned in 

assignments other than, and in addition to, the troop 

assignment. I just do not believe that the United States 

Army 'could successfully mobilize for war without a 

peacetime role for its engineers and I don't believe we 

could have accommodated the kinds of construction 

associated with World War II and Vietnam-ports, 

railroads, massive airfield construction, major depot 

projects-with officers who had served only as troop 

commanders. I just don't think it would have been 

possible. Of course, the other side of the coin is the very 

significant contribution the Army is making to the 

nation by having its military engineers in leadership 

positions on those jobs which not only help build our 

nation, but help our allies build their nations. The Army 

takes pride in helping others through this opportunity 

for its engineers. Sooner or later, it all comes back not 

only to the credit but also to the benefit of the Army . 

THE ENGINEER: I understand that a rather common 

criticism among Engineer School Advance Course students is that too much emphasis is placed on tactics and 

the role of the Brigade Engineer, relative to construction 

engineering subjects. What is your response to that criticism? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: Certainly, the criticism is valid 

among the students you're hearing from. Why? Well, as 

I understand it, we're sort of in a transition in the 

advance course. Whereas it used to be a course that 

rounded out an officer's engineering education, regardless of his next assignment, it is now designed as a precompany command course . In other words, graduates 

of the advance course are now expected to become company commanders in their next assignment. I think that's 

part of the problem. As Chief of Engineers I would like 

to see that course include some of the skills an engineer 

officer must have in construction and service support to 

the Army. On the other hand, until an officer has been a 

company commander, that should be his next objective. 

THE ENGINEER: There are many officers who would 

like to see the Engineer Officer Specialty (21) split into 

two or more specialties. What are your views of the pros 

and cons of such a proposal relative to the status quo? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: Well, certainly there are factors 

on both sides. I've given that a lot of thought. And I 

prefer it the way it is. It enhances the engineer officer's 

utility to the Army and also his opportunities for promotion, particularly as he goes into the field grades. 

Just the nature of what the Army expects of its engineer 

officers requires us to have perhaps the busiest career 

field of all. We not only have to be good at leading our 

"I don't disagree that the combat engineer role is our most 

important responsibility, but I do disagree that it is the only 

thing we can do and do well." 

"I would like to see the Engineer Officer Advance Course tnclude some of the skills an engineer officer must have in construction and service support to the Army." 

"The Corps of Engineers and the individual officer is better 

served by having a single engineer specialty than by having 

more than one." 

"I kind of feel the place we need to increase engineer strength 

is in direct support elements." 

THE ENGINEER 7 
troops, but we have to be branch qualified, as I would 

call it, in a technical sense. We must be proficient as a 

facilities engineer, in the military construction field, or 

in the public works field. The engineer officer has to 

kind of hustle. He shouldn't spend any more time in one 

of these experiences than is necessary for him to become 

proficient in it, and then he should move on to another 

assignment opportunity if he can arrange it. I am concerned that we get officers into troop units or into particular positions in a stabilized tour and they stay there 

three years. Well, I just don't believe there's enough 

learning experience requiring three years attention in 

anyone assignment. I think in a three year period he 

should get more than one opportunity. It's done that 

way in some cases but not enough. Everytime I go 

through this problem, I always come out the same waythe Corps of Engineers and the individual officer is better served by having a single engineer specialty than by 

having more than one. But I think we should be very 

careful not to allow our young officers to spend too 

much time doing the same thing. 

THE ENGINEER: Some engineer officers believe that 

engineer companies should be commanded by majors 

rather than captains. What is your opinion on that? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: Well length of service is a more 

important criteria to me than grade in terms of ability to 

run a company. The rationale for majors commanding 

companies has to be founded on the difficulty of the job 

as they perceive it. I just don't think it would be justified 

except under very unusual circumstances. 

THE ENGINEER: Some officers say that an engineer 

battalion cannot adequately support a division on the 

battlefield. What are your thoughts along that line? 

LT. GEN. MORRIS: To me, that's at least a two battalion job. I guess the question is whether there should 

be an engineer group, rather than battalion, in each infantry division. Well, I can visualize circumstances 

where that would work, but I'm inclined to think we 

ought to build the battalion to do the job that is needed 

and then support it directly with additional engineer 

units which are non-divisional. I kind of feel the place 

we need to increase engineer strength is in direct support 

elements. There are not enough engineers in the divisional area, we all agree on that. The question that 

follows is should they be organic to the division or 

should they be immediately available to support. I'm 

inclined to go with the latter, providing the battalion is 

organic to the division to do the jobs normally expected 

by the division. 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN MORRIS 

Lieutenant General John W. Morris became the 44th Chief of Enqlneers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in July 1976. He is the 

engineer advisor to the Army Chief of Staff and the engineering construction agent for the Departments of the Army and Air Force. He is 

currently in charge of a major nation-building program in Saudi Arabia 

which is tutt» funded by that government. 

He is also responsible for the Corps of Engineers' nationwide program for the development and management of our national water 

resources. 

During his career which spans more than three decades he has 

commanded troops at every level from platoon to a separate brigade. 

His broad experience in water resources management dates back to 

1952 when he was Deputy District Engineer in the Corps' Savannah 

District. Later, as District Engineer at Tulsa, Oklahoma, he completed 

several key elements of the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Neviqetion Project and subsequently served as the Corps' Missouri River 

Division Engineer. 

As Director of Civil Works for three years in the early 70's he took 

major initiatives in support of the new emerging national priorities on 

environmental quality and energy. 

General Morris holds a Master's Degree in civil engineering from 

the University of Iowa and is a registered Professional Engineer in 

Oklahoma. 

8 FALL 1978 
The Revised
 

Engineer Active Force
 

Captain James E. Meredith 

The Revised Engineer Active Force (REAF) is a ma­ Th e dri ving force behind REAF stems from recent acjor effort pr esently underway at the United States Army ceptance of new do ctrine which places emphasis on 

Engineer Schoo l, Fort Belvoir, Virginia to update all en­ countermobility, survivability and mobility (COSMO) 

gineer tables of organization and equipment (TO&E). plu s close integration into the combined arms team. 

Th e pur pose of RE AF is to revise all engine er organi za­ This advanced doctrine, which impacts greatly on the 

tions at one time to acco mmo date developmental equip­ engineer concept of operations and material development and to incorporate new concepts to facilitate ment, is introduced in the engineer " How to fight " 

"winning the first battle. " manual, FM 5-100. The doctrine has engineers fighti ng 

THE ENGINEER . 9 
farther forward on the battlefield. Engineers must be 

combat responsive and move forward with maneuver 

units. Consequently, engineers systems must also move 

forward. This forward movement on the battlefield required organizational changes in all engineer units in 

order to optimize the effectiveness of engineer systems. 

CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES 

Under the present system, corps engineer units are 

organized primarily for rear area operations using centralized control. They lack communications or coordination capability for decentralized operations farther 

forward on the battlefield. Their wheeled-vehicles lack 

mobility to keep pace with tracked vehicles and are vulnerable to both artillery and direct fire from the opposing force. 

Engineer systems are not forward where they are 

needed to provide COSMO support. Corps engineer 

units are well prepared to fight the last war with their 

complement of heavy construction equipment and specialized vertical construction skills. However, today's 

forward fighting engineers need lighter and more flexible combat construction equipment and a de-emphasis 

on vertical construction capability. 

Division engineer units are better organized for forward fighting because of their flexibility and mobility. 

However, divisional engineer systems, like corps engineer units, are not forward to provide COSMO work 

for the combined arms team. Although the assistant 

division engineer staff provides liaison with the 

division.there is an increased need for coordination of 

engineer activities at the tactical brigade level. And 

finally, with speed and flexibility needed on the battlefield, present day divisional bridging assets need upgrading. 

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 

The urgent need to revise engineer organizations originates from awareness of the opposing force (OPFOR) 

tactics on the modern battlefield. OPFOR doctrine calls 

for a very short but devastating battle. Numerous echelons of OPFOR maneuver units precededby intensive 

artillery will concentrate their efforts for a major breakthrough and push far into our battle area at a planned 

rate of 30-50 kilometers per day. 

Current US doctrine, as expressed in FM 100-5, requires shifting and concentrating combined arms teams 

in depth with preparation to defend, using COSMO 

techniques. It is mandatory for the engineer systems to 

place COSMO effort farther forward. 

Some of the engineer systems that are currently being 

developed for this role include the surface launched 

unit, fuel air explosive (SLUF AE); the ground emplaced 

mine scattering system (GEMSS); the universal engineer 

tractor (UET); the family of military engineer construction equipment (FAMECE); a rapid excavator; and 

finally some upgrading of commercial construction 

equipment. 

The Division Restructuring Study (DRS) is a program 

presently being tested at Fort Hood, Texas that combines FM 100-5 doctrine with many of these new engineer systems. This study has been instrumental in laying 

the foundation that helped stimulate development of the 

new Revised Engineer Active Force . 

REVISED ENGINEER ACTIVE FORCE 

The Revised Engineer Active Force (REAF) reacts to 

FM 100-5 doctrine by revising all engineer organizations 

to accommodate each new and improved engineer 

system. The major goal of REAF is to maintain zero 

increase in total engineer strength in the active force 

structure by simply cross-leveling the assets of present 

engineer organizations. 

Since treatment of all organization revision is similar, 

three typical units will be discussed that represent nearly 

75 percent of the Active Army strength. These are TOE 

5-145, The Divisional Engineer Battalion, Armored or 

Mechanized; TOE 5-35, The Corps Combat Battalion 

and TOE 5-115, The Combat Heavy Battalion. 

Some of the general guidelines that were established 

by REAF include the following: 

• Most line companies contain a support platoon with 

a COSMOS section, an equipment section, and a maintenance section . 

• Engineer squads are reduced in size from 10 to eight 

men in divisions and separate brigades and are provided 

with more equipment to make them less labor intensive 

and more equipment oriented. 

• Unlike the Division Restructuring Study, REAF 

divisions retain bridging and water production capability. . 

• The Assistant Division Engineer Section is retained 

in divisional battalions and an assistant brigade engineer 

team is created to better coordinate engineer activities 

with the maneuver brigade. 

• For adequate command and control in the corps 

battalion, REAF restores squad radios and adds a second battalion command net for greater operating distances in Europe. 

• With the increased need for materiel haul, REAF 

has maintained or slightly increased long and short haul 

capacity. 

• Personnel administration is consolidated at battalion level with organizational maintenance retained at 

company level. 

10 FALL 1978 
• REAF makes no major changes in roles and missions of engineer units. In 1985, engineer units are 

assumed to have only the ribbon and medium girder 

bridges. 

The first revised organization is TOE 5-145, The Divisional Engineer Battalion, Armored or Mechanized. 

One improvement is deletion of graders, cranes and 

compaction equipment in a deliberate de-emphasis of 

main supply route (MSR) maintenance capability in 

favor of reliance on corps battalions as the divisional 

battalion moves farther forward in the combined arms 

team . 

Each platoon has one combat engineer vehicle and 

two universal engineer tractors, thus partially offsetting 

the reduction in squad size from 10 to eight men. Each 

line company of divisional battalions has a lieutenant as 

assistant brigade engineer, augmented by an operations 

sergeant, and a driver with quarter-ton vehicle and radio 

for proper coordination between the company and the 

associated maneuver brigade. Finally, we have the newly 

created support platoon, one for each line company. 

This innovation is the organizational home of the majority of COSMO systems. It is the means of getting 

engineer systems forward into the companies which form 

the brigade team. 

The next revised organization is TOE 5-35, the Corps 

Combat Battalion. The construction section has been 

reduced by half, deleting many specialized MOSs and 

thus de-emphasizing vertical construction capability. A 

significant modification to many corps combat battalions is replacement of five-ton dump trucks with armored personnel carriers as the squad vehicle. This is a 

new tracked version of the battalion specifically designed 

to operate forward with the armored or mechanized 

division. Each line company of the corps combat battalion also has the support platoon with the standard 

COSMO and maintenance section. 

The third revised organization is TOE 5-115, The 

Combat Heavy Battalion. The general philosophy was 

applied to reduce the size of equipment in the line companies for greater mobility and flexibility in the newly 

acquired combat engineering role. Five-ton dump trucks 

replace 20-ton dumps, 2Y2-cubic yard scoop loaders replace 5-cy loaders, and D-7 dozers replace D-8 dozers 

with consolidation of all heavier equipment in the equipment and maintenance company . The entire quarrying 

and rock crushing capability has been deleted. 

This move, indorsed by USAREUR, places reliance 

on local national sources and supporting engineer units 

for crushed rock and recognizes the increased combat 

engineering role. Most specialized MOSs have been 

deleted in the support section in recognition of reduced 

requirements for specialized vertical construction capability. There is no FAMECE or UET in the unit, but 

only a general upgrading of commercial construction 

equipment. 

CONCLUSION 

The REAF concept was not established to bring about 

a one-time revision of all engineer TO&Es. Instead, 

REAF presents a concept under which engineer organizations are revised on a schedule to optimize engineer 

systems effectiveness in line with improvements in tactical doctrine. In conclusion, REAF is a significant milestone in organizational development. It places the horse 

before the cart. For the first time, doctrine and organization leads materiel, personnel and training developments instead of the reverse. 

REAF is a blueprint to guide organizational, materiel 

and training developers in making combat engineers the 

multiplier of combat effectiveness that FM 100-5intends 

them to be. 

CPT Meredith is a recent graduate of the Engineer 

Officers Advanced Course. He is currently assigned to 

Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort 

McPherson, GA. 

THE ENGINEER 11 
'j Combat Engineers
 

and
 

the Heavy Division
 

Major Joseph Kish 

(EDITOR'S NOTE: This article describes a training 

exercise which placed a combat heavy engineer battalion in direct support of a maneuver division. According to current engineer doctrine, direct support 

to a maneuver division is provided by a corps combat 

engineer battalion, rather than a combat heavy battalion. Other doctrinal matters questioned by the 

author are being considered in the Revised Engineer 

Active Force (REAF) Study.) 

INTRODUCTION 

" Today, more than ever before, the engineer plays a 

critical role as a member of the combined arms team. As 

movement and lethality on the battlefield increase, the 

requirement to reinforce the terrain increases. The engineer brings to the combined arms team a terrain oriented 

system that enhances the capability of our weapons systems while decreasing the effectiveness of the enemy 

weapons." 

Is the doctrine spelled out in the paragraph above, 

taken directly from the Coordinating Draft of FM 

5-100, merely a modern substitute for "two up and one 

back," or can it really provide us with a roadmap for 

future operations? 

I believe the roadrnap is there . However, we must 

have the necessary mapreading skills to take advantage 

of it. Fortunately, our field units are learning those skills 

through training and testin g. GALLANT CREW 77 

provided an excellent opportunity for such training during the Spring of 1977. 

GALLANT CREW 77, conducted at Fort Hood , 

Texa s, was the large -scale Readiness Command Exercise 

for 1977. The free-play, two-sided Field Training Exercise (FTX) was conducted from March 26 through 

March 31 and included as participants both active and 

reserve Army and Air Force units. The major maneuver 

units were the lst Cavalry Division , the 2nd Armored 

Division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat). 

The lst Cavalry Division and supporting units employed opposing force s tactics, while the 2nd Armored 

Division and supporting unit s employed U.S . tactics. 

The 2nd Armored Division deployed as part of a contin­ J 

gency corps with austere logistical support in anticipation of a short duration conflict. The setting was a high 

air threat-nuclear-electronic warfare environmment. 

The lst Cavalry deployed with only two companies of 

its divisional engineer battalion. The 2nd Armored deployed with the entire divisional engineer battalion as 

well as non-divi sional engineer support. 

H should be noted that several limitations were placed 

on the participants. Fort Hood is limited in maneuver 

area. Brigades were deployed on an 8-12 kilometer 

front. Similar restrictions existed in depth, resulting in a 

higher than desired density of combat and combat support units for such a high threat environment. Since not 

all radio frequencies could be cleared for Electronic 

Counter Measures (ECM) , opposing forces could not 

completely utilize the ECM equipment available . Furthermore, a satisfactory method to simulate the casualty 

producing effects of artill ery fires was not employed . 

THE EXECUTION 

The 2nd Armored was employed at the request of a 

friendl y nation to counter an armed invasion from the 

North . Initial combat power favored the invaders by a 

three to one ratio . The employment of additional units 

by the 2nd Armored would enable the 2nd to stabilize 

the line of contact in the vicinity of the brigade rear 

12 FALL 1978 
boundaries. Thereafter, the 2nd Armored would be expected to attack, conduct a deliberate river crossing, 

and restore the friendly country's border. 

The division commander chose to defend in two 

phases . Phase I was a covering force mission (Task 

Force ARMSTRONG) and Phase II was an active defense to be initiated upon the withdrawal of the covering 

force south of Cowhouse Creek. 

It was the first time the 2nd Armored Division had 

employed engineer task forces as well as a combat heavy 

lanes to support the withdrawal of the covering force 

were prepared for closure. Simultaneously, prearranged 

lanes were prepared for closure in the other obstacle systems throughout the main battle area. The forward 

passage points were guarded by engineers until closure 

was ordered by the withdrawing unit. 

In accordance with the austere logistics scenario, obstacles were not heavily dependent on logistics support. 

The terrain was extensively enhanced with tank ditches 

and earthern berms . Mines, concertina, barbed wire, 

[rOJ] 2nd L2J (I s t CAV r A d Armore

ivSituation 

2 

xx 

engineer battalion in direct support. Task force commanders came from the 17th Engineer Battalion. Task 

Force BAKER utilized the Assistant S3 while Task Force 

KISH utilized the Executive Officer. 

Engineers moved to the field 18 hours prior to the 

start of the exercise. AJl mines and Class IV materials to 

be used in the exercise were combat loaded on organic 

vehicles. Based on previous reconnaissance and planning conferences with maneuver commanders, work on 

the obstacle plan commenced immediately. Prearranged 

logs, and preformed dragons teeth were also used . All 

obstacles were integrated with overwatch fires to delay 

the 1st Cavalry advance. All obstacles were designed to 

support counterattacks and sited to facilitate breaching 

from the friendly side . 

The effectiveness of the obstacles during Phase I is 

best summarized by the 2nd Armored Division Commander, "That barrier was so good, and so effective, 

that I was able to execute a very rare tactic-retirement 

from action-never executed before in my life." 

THE ENGINEER 13 
After withdrawal of the covering force, the 1st Cavalry was able to make only one penetration south of 

Cowhouse Creek. A battalion task force discovered an 

area not covered by fire in the far west, and by nightfall 

they occupied a four-kilometer salient south of the 

creek . The 1st Brigade staged a pre-dawn attack against 

this salient. Led by a platoon of Company C, 17th Engineer Battalion, selected breaches were made in an 

ob stacle system and the attacking infantry battalion task 

force cleared the salient. The succe ss was exploited, and 

the entire 1st Brigade attacked north along the entire 

front. During the next four days, no sizeable force of 

the lst Cavalry penetrated south of Cowhouse Creek 

again . 

In anticipation of the 4th Brigade conducting a river 

crossing, the engineers reorganized on the third day . 

Ta sk force KISH released the two companies of the 

62nd Engineer Battalion to their parent unit. At the 

same time, the 586th Engineer Company (FB) was 

placed in direct support of the 2nd Division. 

For three days a war of movement took place, characterized by decentralized execution and extremely frequent changes to ta sk organization. These tactics 

INITIAL ENGINEER ORGANIZATION
 

SUPPORTING THE
 

2ND ARMORED DIVISION
 

PHASE I PHASE II 

TF ARMSTRONG tst Brigade 

TF BAKER TF KISH 

0/17th Engr C/17th Engr 

F/17th Engr F/17th Engr 

B/62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy)(OS) 

tst Brigade 0/62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy)(OS) 

TF KISH (OS) 

B/17th Engr (-) 4th Brigade 

C/17th Engr B/17th Engr (OS) 

B/62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy)(OS) 0/17th Engr (OS) 

0/62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy)(OS) 

Oiv Troops 

4th Brigade 17th Engr 

1/B/17th Engr (OS) 62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy}(DS) 

E/8th Engr 

Div Troops 

17th Engr (-) Corps Control 

62nd Engr (Cbt Hvy)(DS) 36th Engr Grp 

E/8th Engr 586th Engr Co (FB) 

86th Engr Oet (DIV) 

Corps Control 

36th Engr Grp 

586th Engr Co (FB) 

86th Engr Det (DIV) 

NOTE : The 17th Eng ineer Battalion con si sted of HHC , Com ­

pan ies B, C, 0 and F as line com pan ies, and Com pany E 

(Bridge). Company A was in USAEUR as part of Brigad e '75. 

exploited successes as well as countered enemy advances. 

It was a frag-order war, with engineer organization 

and missions constantly changing. Tank trails were 

opened and closed time and again. Armored Vehicle 

Launched Bridges were rapidly emplaced and removed. 

Coordination was essential and kept at the lowest practical level. 

On the fifth day of the FTX the 4th Brigade 

conducted a pre -dawn deliberate river-crossing. The 

Crossing Area Commander was the Assistant Division 

Commander (Support). Company D, 17th Engineer 

Battalion provided crews for assault boats and far shore 

clearing teams that accompanied the dismounted assault 

elements. Vehicles with amphibious capability quickly 

followed across Belton Reservoir. 

Upon establishing a bridgehead on the far shore, 

Mobile Assault Bridge rafts from both the 8th and 17th 

Engineer Battalions entered the water to ferry main 

battle tanks. The 62nd Engineer Battalion was actively 

engaged in improving acce ss roads to the raft sites as 

well as th e bridge site. Upon order of the Crossing Area 

Commander, pre-assembled M4T6 bridge floats were 

airlifted to the bridge site . Personnel from the 62nd 

Engineer Battalion assembled the bridge, aided by tactical smoke at the crossing sites . The 86th Engineer 

Detachment (DIV) assisted with underwater recovery 

operations. The division engineer coordinated all engi ­

neer assets in the division area. 

Upon relinquishment of the river line by the 2nd Division, the 36th Engineer Group assumed responsibility 

for the crossing area . They regained control of the 62nd 

Battalion, 586th Engineer Company, Company E of the 

8th Engineer Battalion, and the 86th Engineer Detachment. The 17th Engineer Battalion bridge company 

remained under division control and followed the attacking elements. 

LESSONS LEARNED 

The outcome of GALLANT CREW 77 was greatly 

influenced by the responsive combat engineer support. 

The challenge is to provide analogous support on any 

future battlefield. 

We know that several factors influence the degree of 

combat power attained . They include a commander's 

imaginative planning, organization, and leadership, plu s 

training and discipline of the forces, as well as the 

organizational factors of firepower, mobility, communications, and logistical support available . These elements form a topical outline for us to examine particular 

engineer lesson s learned during GALLANT CREW 77 . 

PLANNING 

Planning for the exercise was criti cal and highly 

dependent on terrain intelli gence . Early in the planning 

14 FALL 1978 
process, an extensive series of engineer ground and 

aerial recons was made . If the engineers had waited for 

the formulation of the ground tactical plan prior to conducting recons, engineer supportability could have been 

dramatically degraded. 

The withdrawal of a covering force is a delicate operation . Lanes through the obstacles must be kept open 

until the last friendly vehicle passes, yet closed immediately thereafter. A system for ordering closure at the 

lowest level possible must be devised . In this exercise, 

the engineer squad performing closure coordinated onsite with the scouts who led the maneuver unit through 

the obstacle system. 

Planning for the river-crossing was a major undertaking . The 17th Engineer Battalion underwent an internal 

evaluation 8-11 March which emphasized river-crossing 

operations. Other divisional units were evaluated at the 

same time. Prior to these evaluations, an extensive series 

of coordination meetings with the division staff and 

participating units was required. 

ORGANIZATION 

The engineer organization was designed to support 

the initial deployment as well as to anticipate future 

operations. The division engineer was the focal point of 

the engineer support. This is an absolute requirement. 

The creation of an engineer task force was found to 

be a valid means of centralizing direction when more 

than one company is supporting a brigade. However, it 

was found that such a task force must be provided some 

type of staff. The brigade commander needs an engineer 

representative at his headquarters at all times. Engineer 

units employed on a wide front also need on-site coordination of efforts . Since elements of two battalions were 

used in Task Force KISH, an officer from each battalion 

should have been furnished to constitute the task force 

staff. 

The designation of an Assistant Division Commander 

as the Crossing Area Commander provided excellent 

control for the river-crossing. A senior commander is 

required considering the criticality and control problems 

associated with major river crossings. 

Finally, the 62nd Engineer Battalion should have been 

OPCON to the 2nd Armored Division for this exercise, 

as recommended by Field Manual 5-100. Although workable, direct support did not provide the firm degree of 

control needed to rapidly react to the constantly changing battlefield situation. 

LEADERSHIP 

Engineer leadership, from the squad leader to the 

division engineer, was taxed during this exercise. The 

hours were long, the pace was furious, and the tasks 

were never-ending. Professionalism was essential. 

THE ENGINEER 

TRAINING & DISCIPLINE 

Engineer squad and platoon leaders were often required to give critical advice to maneuver commanders . 

The siting and construction of obstacles often depended 

exclusively on their skills. 

The heavy ECM environment required a minimization 

of radio traffic . Changing frequencies, often and at random times, as well as five-second transmissions, helped 

overcome the ECM. 

Finally, a major training advantage of this exercise was 

the seven-day duration . Most units had become accustomed to three-day field problems. Fatigue encountered 

during this exercise was more realistic, and required 

units to enforce sleep discipline . 

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 

The organizational factors of firepower, mobility, 

and communications favored the divisional engineers in 

a direct support role . The squad organization, using the 

armored personnel carrier, was superior to the combat 

heavy battalion's functional organization using wheeled 

vehicles. Although D-8 dozers and big scrapers were a 

welcome addition to the division area of operations, 

most of the commercial equipment severely lacked crosscountry mobility. 

15 
--- --- {rD::cqT8~c;f;7fo}-E;:LR:Y;
 -


-­ c:::::::::: -­

-

--

-

Maintenance support during the exercise revealed the 

criticality of operator proficiency. A good operator 

could prevent equipment break-downs as well as make 

minor on-site repairs. Mechanics were in much demand 

and spent much of their time in-transit. 

For engineer work to be timely, a basic load of Class 

IV mat erials mu st remain combat loaded . However, the 

effectiveness of the materials carried depends on familiarity with the terrain and thorough prior planning. 

Direct support is needed to allow engineer assets to be 

easily readjusted on a need basis. Yet it is a two-edged 

sword, since it requires internal resupply. There were 

times when engineer platoons were extremely difficult to 

locat e. Mobile warfare often requires the maneuver 

commander to provide Class I, III, and V materials to 

engineer units less than company size. If the requirement is anticipated, prior coordination will preclude the 

problem. 

CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 

Two principal conclu sions can be drawn from the 

GALLANT CREW 77 experience . First, it is possible to 

fight outnumbered and win. However , to accomplish 

this feat on the modern battlefield, it is absolutel y essential to maximize the potential of the combined arms 

team . Combat engineers must const antly tra in with 

other team members to maximi ze the team effort. 

Second , the employment of a combat heavy engineer 

battalion in direct support of a division has certain disadvantages. The ba ttalion organization lacks foxhole 

strength, communications, and vehicular mobility . Furthermore, the requirement to maintain construction 

skills severely limits the training opportunities for the 

direct support mission. The combat heavy battalion is 

better organized and equipped to perform area and task 

missions. The non-divisional combat engineer battalion, 

TOE 5-35, is better suited for the direct support mission 

by organization as well as by personnel. 

The modern battlefield will greatly strain the command and control capability of the divisional engineer 

battalion. Organic assets, as well as non-divisional engineer units, will be working in a large division area of 

operat ions, requiring increa sed coordination and liaison 

by the Assistant Division Engin eer section. If an engineer task force is created, offi cers from the divisional 

battalion will be required for the task force headquarters. 

With corps and division commanders concentrating 

the forces and brigade and battalion commanders controlling and directing the battle, what is the role of the 

engineer group headquarters? Many group assets will be 

under the control of division engineers . If the divisional 

battalion is not authorized additional personnel , will the 

group headquarters be able to furni sh officers to temporarily assist several division engineers? If so, it will be a 

type of assistance not traditionally furni shed by an engineer group commander. 

Deliberate river-crossings require technical expertise 

by all combat engineer units, not just bridge units. Do 

we train enough today so that we are prepared to implement tomorrow? 

If the GALLANT CREW 77 experience can be reliably extrapolated to the future battlefield, engineer mission performance will depend more on the mobility and 

the survivability of the engineer squad, not the earth 

hauling capability of a dump truck. 

Maj or Joseph P. Kish wrote this article to satisf y a 

requirement of/he Armed Forces Staf f College Research 

Program. He is currently assigned /0 Headquarters, 

USA REUR & 7th Army . 

16 FALL 1978
One 

Station 

Engineer Style 

Unit 

Training 

Brian Porr 

From Bunker Hill to the jungles of Vietnam, engineer 

soldiers have been on the front lines-laying mines, 

building fortifications , bridging gaps, and sometimes 

defending themselves in close combat. 

In the proud tradition of yesteryear's "sappers" and 

"pontooners.' combat engineer trainees at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, are perfecting the One Station Unit 

Training (OSUT) concept. 

FIRING THE M-60 

THE ENGINEER 

OSUT testin g began at Fort Leonard Wood in late 

1975 when two Combat Engineer Advanced Individual 

Training (AIT) companies participated in a revolutionary 14-week entry level training program. The results of 

the test pointed overwhelmingly in favor of instituting 

OSUT on a much wider scale. Shortly thereafter, the 

2nd Training Brigade was converted to the OSUT configuration . 

Trainee insecurity and the high cost of moving trainees 

from one station to another during their initial training 

were key factors favoring conversion to OSUT. 

The original OSUT program merely combined Basic 

Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training into one cycle of 14 weeks duration with an obvious point 

of transition from the former to the latter after the sixth 

week of training. Due to the special nature of Combat 

Engineer training and the motivational requirements for 

new engineer s, the two distinct programs of instruction 

gradually merged into the completely integrated OSUT 

program of today. 

By eliminating repetitive training and adding a comprehensive review of course content, the total training 

time was reduced to 12 weeks, thus saving the Army two 

weeks per trainee. All combat engineer training previously conducted as AIT is included. However, various 

subjects are now taught throughout the 12-week cycle. 

Every effort is made to provide new soldiers with continuous motivation and identification in their role as 

combat engineers. 

The new program has resulted in better trained combat engineers for several reasons. The retention of all 

subject matter is generally better, since subjects are 

taught, reinforced, reviewed, and tested continuously 

throughout the cycle. And since drill cadre have a longer 

17 
period during which to observe trainees, more accurate 

identification and separation of unacceptable personnel 

is accomplished. Marginal soldiers are brought up to 

standards or separated much more effectively in the 

longer cycle than in the short BCT/ AlT cycles. The 

retention rate for OSUT trainees is five to 10 percent 

greater than the retention rate for either Basic Trainees 

or ArT students. 

OSUT trainees are better motivated than BCT and 

AlT trainees because they are exposed to combat engineer skills and tasks from day one of the OSUT cycle. 

Drill sergeants in the program are combat engineers, 

themselves, and they're present for nearly all training 

During subsequent weeks, trainees are exposed to demolitions, map reading, tools, and rigging. At the same 

time, they're learning basic military skills familiar to 

every soldier: basic rifle marksmanship, road marches, 

drill and ceremony, military justice , and physical training. Subjects are spaced to maintain a high level of 

interest among trainees. 

On the last day of the seven th week of training, each 

OSUT unit conducts an "all trainee" ceremony, including a short parade. All leadership positions during the 

ceremony are manned by trainees. The unit is awarded 

an Essayons streamer for its guidon, symbolizing the 

completion of the first half of training. Each individual 

EMPLACING A CLAYMORE MINE 

throughout the 12-week cycle. Thus, trainees develop 

confidence in them and rely on them to provide the 

answers to many of their questions. 

Early in the first week of OSUT, trainees receive a 

class on the role of combat engineers. During that class, 

many young trainees receive a rude awakening, for 

they're reminded that combat engineers work with hand 

tools, not heavy equipment. They begin to reali ze that 

the tasks they'll be expected to perform in the field is 

often dirty, back-breaking work . They soon find out 

that training is geared to basics. If a trainee learns the 

basic skills at Leonard Wood, he can build upon those 

skills once he reaches his first permanent duty station. 

who has met all training requirements to that point is 

allowed to wear the Engineer Castle on the pocket of his 

uniform for the remainder of the cycle to identify his 

achievement. 

After completing landmine warfare training in the 

eighth week, the mobility phase of instruction begins. 

Trainees learn bridging, tactics, and other subjects to 

aid in the movement of friendly force s during the next 

three weeks. 

The highlight of the entire training cycle is Engineer 

Week, a week-long tacti cal field training exercise conducted during the eleventh week of training. In order to 

mak e the training as real istic as possible, each unit is 

18 FALL 1978 
fully equipped acco rding to TO&E specifications. Activities during Engineer Week include bridging, minefield 

construction and destruction , demolitions, and participation in the Jive fire assault course, the comb at engineer defen sive exercise, and the strongpoint assault 

course. 

Engineer Week reinforcestraining previously received, 

further instills an appreciation for the mission and role 

of the combat engineer, and provides a logical transition 

from training into a TO&E unit. The ta ctical exercise 

incorporates all aspects of training int o a comprehensive 

review and awareness pack age, and for the first time 

trainees are abl e to apply the knowl edge and skills they 

have learned. 

Graduation from OSUT takes place during the twelfth 

week of the cycle with a formal ceremony, complete 

with a sound and slide presentation of the history of 

combat engineers. Every tra inee graduate ha s the Corps 

of Engineers Castle pinned on his collar by the drill 

sergeant with whom he has worked most closely during 

the previous 12 weeks. 

More than 21,500 train ees have gra duat ed from Engineer OSUT since early 1976. They bearlittle resembl an ce 

to the raw recruits who arrive daily at Fort Leonard 

Wood, scared, out of shape and con fused. Engineer 

OSUT is a demanding course which smooths, polishes, 

and matures young men and women. Although graduates of Engineer OSUT are not complete " sappers" or 

" pontooners," most have mastered the basics and will 

readil y assimilate additio nal information and skills in 

their first permanent units. 

They have earned the privile ge of wearing the Castle 

and can state with pride , "Essayons ,"- Let Us Try. 

Mr. Porr heid [he rank of Captain and served as [he 

Opera/ions Officer of the 2nd Training Brigade at Fort 

Leonard Wood, 11,;10., when he wrote this article. He is 

now a civilian residing in Sherman, TX. 

NEGOTIATING THE CONFIDENCE COURSE 

EMPLACING A PANEL BRIDGE 

THE ENGINEER 19 

Today, almost 20 years after nuclear testing ended on 

Enewetak (previously spelled Eniwetok), American 

military and civilian workers have returned to restore 

this tropical paradise lost for approximately 450 driEnewetak (pronounced dree) who were relocated when 

testing began. 

A part of the U.S . Trust Territory of the Pacific 

Islands, Enewetak is in the Marshall Islands, located 

roughly halfway between Hawaii and the Philippines. 

The three-year reclamation project began in June 

1977 when a Joint Task Group of U.S. soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and civilian scientists and engineers descended 

upon the deserted island chain. Under the direction of 

the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), the 900-man task 

force was spearheaded by the 84th Engineer Battalion, 

U.S . Army Support Command, Hawaii. 

The project was designed to progress in three phasesmobilization, cleanup operations, and construction. 

Military participation was limited to the first two phases, 

after which the Department of the Interior will take 

over. Cleanup operations are expected to continue until 

October 1979. 

MOBILIZAnON 

The most immediate problems facing planners of the 

operation were the site's remote location, the lack of 

adequate housing facilities on the atoll, the need for 

specialized equipment, and special coordination requirements of a joint activity. 

A design team in the 84th operations section prepared 

the bill of materials for the Lojwa base camp and the 

encryptment operation on Runit Island . Unit personnel 

who were designated to execute the construction were 

included in the planning phase to insure the complete 

coordination of the operation. 

Special equipment which had to be procured included 

seven ready-mix concrete transit trucks and a concrete 

pump to be used in the tremmie operation for disposal 

of the contaminated soil on many of the islands. 

Major housing construction was concentrated on 

Lojwa since the tiny island was occupied only by rats, 

scrub, and a collapsing tin shed. The Army Functional 

Components system was used as the basic planning 

document for the S()()-man camp, but due to strict time 

limitations, it became necessary for staff officers to 

draw up the bill of materials for local purchase and 

delivery by contract. Some of the building designs were 

also modified to fit the special requirements of the work 

group. 

The 84th Engineers actually lived in tents while they 

built their own camp from a mountain of timbers and 

corrugated sheet metal delivered to the beaches of 

Lojwa . Rising to the occasion, they seemed to thrive on 

hardship while developing into a determined, highspirited team . 

"It's difficult to realize how much work an engineer 

battalion can do and the teamwork it can develop until 

you move it away from the petty problems and irritants 

of garrison life and give it a real mission," noted one 

young company commander. 

Jus t being on Enewetak requires acclimation, for it's 

a shoulder-to-shoulder existence. About half of the 

work force is housed on Enewetak Island and the other 

half on smaller Lojwa. The northern base camp at 

Lojwa is a city of open-air, open-bay metal huts and 

outdoor showers. On Enewetak, however, most of the 

troops and civilian workers live in a multi-storied, air 

conditioned concrete dorm, where they share four-man 

rooms. 

One problem peculiar to Enewetak is the proximity of 

the islands to one another. They are scattered around a 

lagoon which measures 23 miles at its widest point. Thus. 

transportation of men and equipment from living and 

storage areas to work sites has been a major chore in 

itself. For example, a 21-foot open boat carrying the 

mail clerk from Enewetak to Lojwa got turned around 

one day in a rain squall . Ten hours later he was found 

heading for New Guinea. 

CLEAN·UP OPERATIONS 

ON MEDREN 

21 
I 

MOVINGOUTTO LOJWA FROM ENEWETAK 

But in the true tradition of Army engineers, innovation and ingenuity have solved most problems. For 

example, engineers set up a makeshift shop on Enewetak 

using home made jigs and commercial saws to mas s produce roof trusses in lieu of building them piecemeal at 

each work site. 

Innovation also surfaced in the application of corrugated siding to wall panels. Unit commanders discovered that much time could be saved if siding was applied 

prior to, rather than after, erection of panels. 

Another time-saving innovation involved the salvage 

of an abandoned ready-mix concrete truck from the 

scrap heap left from the nuclear testing period . Since the 

truck had no motor, it was pulled by a five-ton truck 

from slab to slab and charged with a jerry-rigged conveyor from a rock crusher. As awkward as it sounds, the 

unit significantly decreased pouring time that would 

have been necessary using only the standard 16S mixers . 

Electrical power to operate all facilities and equipment on the atoll was provided by the Army's Facilities 

Engineering Support Agency. which deployed, installed 

and put into operation a 2,OOO-kilowatt power plant. 

The logistical problems encountered in operating a 

power plant of such size in a remote location have 

proven to be valuable training for future military contingency missions. 

CLEAN-UP OPERAnONS 

Hundreds of tons of debris are scattered over the 

northern islands and traces of radioactive fallout from 

the past can still be detected in much of the soil. Countless hulks of decaying landing craft used by the Atomic 

Energy Commission to move men and equipment during the testing period are aground on lagoon beaches. 

And rusting, metal ghost towns, once teeming with 

AEC scientists and technicians, stand on the atoll's 

southern rim. 

But, little by little, these mute monuments to the early 

days of nuclear testing are falling to the dozer blades of 

the 84th Engineers. And the radioactive soil and debris 

22 

is gradually being removed and deposited at the bottom 

of Cactus Crater, a huge crater on Runit Island left by 

Test Shot Cactus. 

Army engineers have had to learn new techniques in 

the removal of soil and vegetation from contaminated 

sites. Heavy equipment operators were retrained to 

remove soil in lifts as small as six inches. They have to 

work slow and take small bites in order to minimize the 

amount of contaminated dust in the air. Vegetation 

removal has been accomplished with minor soil disturbance by connecting a 200-foot anchor chain to two 08 

dozers and dragging it through the scrub . Machetes are 

used in areas where dozers can't operate. 

Collection of the contaminated soil is one problem 

and disposal is another. Navy causeways or landing 

craft transport Army dump trucks carrying the soil to 

Runit Island, the site of 18 nuclear explosions. There the 

soil is stockpiled and eventually mixed with cement and 

a type of bentonite to increase adhesion. 

The mix is then loaded in the ready-mix transit trucks, 

mixed with water, and moved to the tremmie site. From 

that point, a pump forces the mix under pressure to a 

barge anchored at the center of the crater, where it is 

deposited 36 feet under water on the crater floor. 

DECON TEAM ATWORK 

FALL 1978 

! 
When all contaminated soil has been removed from 

the islands and placed in the crater, an IS-inch concrete 

cap will be placed over it as a seal until the radioactive 

materials decay to safe levels. That is expected to take 

approximately 26,000 years. 

Justification for U.S. participation in the clean-up is 

derived from our agreement as Trust Territory administering authority to protect the dri Enewetak against loss 

of their land and resources, and to a commitment to 

return the atoll when it was no longer needed . 

The people of Enewetak are glad to be going home. 

The first group of 50 returned to Japtan Island, on the 

southern rim of the atoll, in March 1977. Chief Johannes 

Peter, their 84-year-old, gravel-voiced chief, said at that 

time "It is very sad to see what has happened to our 

islands, but we are home now and we are happy." 

Since their return, the dri Enewetak have survived 

mainly on fish they catch in the lagoon and basic staples 

delivered by ship. They spend most of their time clearing 

brush and nursing a few frail pandanus and breadfruit 

seedlings, which will not be productive for another five 

or six years. 

Eventually, the Department of Interior will build 

homes on Japtan, Medren, and Enewetak and replant 

other islands with more breadfruit, pandanus, coconut, 

and other crops. But it will be years , if ever, before life 

on Enewetak returns to a semblance of what it used to 

be. 

MILITARY BENEFITS 

The development of leadership skill is the primary 

benefit to military personnel involved in the Enewetak 

project. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers 

have a unique opportunity to use their initiative and 

resourcefulness to solve basic engineering problems in 

an environment simila r to that which might be encountered in a future war zone. 

THE ENGINEER 

CRATERS CAUSED 

BY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 

ON RUNITISLAND 

Platoon leaders, in addition to their normal duties, 

must coordinate activities of Navy boats, Army landing 

craft, helicopters, and radiation survey teams. They 

must alleviate the fear of radiation by subordinates. 

They must make simple, yet critical, decisions. They 

must make the best use of equipment in a unique environment. They must be alert for changing situations. 

They must be firm, yet remain flexible in their position 

of leadership . The job is tough and demanding, the 

standards high . But we are meeting the challenge. 

Colonel Edgar J. Mixan was the Joint Task Group 

Commander during the first year ofthe Enewetak Cleanup Project. He is currently assigned as Commander and 

Director of the Facilities Engineering Support Agency, 

U.S. Army, Fort Belvoir, VA. 

CHIEF JOHANNES PETER 

23 
J
 

Assault Breaching
 

The key to closing
 

with the enemy
 

Major Michael L. Viani and Major Peter D. Knight 

" The best defense is a good offense" not only in football, bu t in warfare too. 

Is the U.S. Army capable of conducting the type of 

offense necessary to win on the modern battlefield? The 

active defen se requ ires an offensive capability to whittle 

the enem y down to size both by fire, and by fire and 

maneuver. However, it is not enough just to stop the 

enemy advancement. We must then be able to mount an 

offensive against him. 

Mobility is essential to a successful offensive, but it is 

not guaranteed by mechanization. Mobility also depends 

on the ability to breach ob stacles, which is, itself, 

dependent on the following three factors: 

1. Doctrine, which must include tactics and drills that 

enable us to plan ahead for the control and execution 

of assault breaches. 

2. Equipment, which must provide the capability to 

quickly breach all types of obstacles and be placed in 

units so that it is readily available when needed. 

3. Training, which must be practiced at all levels, 

utilizing all components of the combined arms team. 

Once the enemy attacks, we are not necessaril y going 

to hold ground. Instead, we will utilize the ground to 

our advantage so that our fire and maneuver capability 

can be used to attrit the enemy, thu s giving us the time 

to concentrate our forces again st his commitments. 

Throughout the battle we intend to counter-attack not 

necessarily his front , but his rapidly developing flanks 

deep into what is becoming his rear. 

Historically, the enemy has been able to very qui ckly 

organize strong, hasty defenses. Obstacles are an integral part of his defenses. We should not discount the 

enemy's ability to use dynami c mining to strengthen his 

defen ses and protect his flank s. He can lay conventional 

mine s by armored vehicles and helicopters, and may be 

developing more sophisticated mine system s. We also 

must expect our counter-attacks to encounter obstacles 

that we originally executed. 

Current U.S. offensive doctrine stresses the hasty attack, which includes armored forces maneuver and 

outflanking enemy positions, by-passing obstacles and , 

in general, maintaining the momentum and initiative of 

the attack. The deliberate attack is conducted only when 

the attacking force encounters an enemy defen se in 

depth. Doctrine implies that obstacles are really only a 

problem in a deliberate attack, but the ability to by-pa ss 

all obstacles in the hasty attack is doubtful. 

THE BREACHING PROBLEM 

As our preoccupation with the techniques of defense 

diminishes, a realization of the _breaching problem 

grows. Although many arguments have been made, the 

overall goal is to maintain the breaching operation as an 

integrated combined arms effort utilizing many options. 

Giving the problem to the engineers would probably 

mean that they would have very limited resources (unacceptable in terms of the mobility of our attacki ng 

force s) or that the engineers' organization would dramatically increase (an unlikely increase in authori zation 

and fund ing). 

24 FALL 1978 
HAND BREACHING BY THE IN FANTRY 

AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT DOCTRINE 

Doctrinally, there is scant consideration given to 

breaching at this time. FM 90-7 (Obstacles) and FM 

5-100 (Engineer Combat Operations) do address the 

problem, but in a general manner. The drills and combined arms immediate action techniques necessary to insure the success of the attack have not been detailed. 

The same applies to PM 20-32 (Mine /Countermine 

Operations at the Company Level) . Significantly, PM 

71-100 (Brigade and Division Operations-Draft of May 

1977) barely mentions the subject and PM 71-2 (Tank 

and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force) has less 

than two pages devoted to the subject. There is no discussion of how to establish and control a breaching 

force, where the necessary equipment comes from, or 

how to execute a successful breach. There is no development of drills designed to save time and lives when obstacles are encountered unexpectedly. 

FM 71-1 (The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team) has more detail but only in regard to hand 

breaching by the infantry. PM 7-20 (Light Infantry Bat ­

talion) plays through a Brigade deliberate attack scenario, with little mention of breaching requirements. 

PM 90-3 (Desert Operations) details a method of attacking a strongpoint which doe s consider the problem of 

breaching, but it is vague, does not get into the " how 

to," and only con siders hand breaching . TM 5-220 (Passage of Obstacles Other Than Minefields) was last published in 1958 and requires much updating. 

THE ENGINEER 

Much can be learned from other armies. The Israeli 

Army, in particular, has highly developed and detailed 

doctrine designed to enable their combined forces to 

efficiently conduct assault breaches. The British and 

Germans have approached the problem in a similar 

manner as have the Soviets. Forethought, detailed planning and preparation are the keys and each member of 

the combined arms team must thoroughly understand 

the role it must play. 

EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING STATUS 

If we needed to conduct an assault breach today, what 

equipment would be available? We have AVLBs, tank 

ISRAELI PROJECTED LINE CHARGE 

DEMOLITION SYSTEM , APC MOUNTED 

2S 
- -_.._.._ - ---- - - - - -- - ------_._ -

dozers and CEVs to assist in the reduction of gaps, 

blockades, and bunkers. We have line charge s, either 

towed behind or pushed ahead of tanks, to breach lanes 

through minefields. However, we have no positive armored means of locating the forward edge of a minefield-a critical deficiency. If the forward edge of the 

minefield cannot be located, line charges may be placed 

and detonated at the wrong point in the approach. Since 

each charge varies from only 70 to 90 meters in length, 

the problem should be obvious. 

Only two methods of locating the forward edge are 

available today: bulling through-which is very hazardous to armored crews; and with the use of detectors 

and probes by dismounted troops-which is very hazardous to troo ps and very slow. In essence, the rate at 

which we opened routes in Vietnam again st purely nuisance mining would be faster than the rate we could 

expect in a conventional war . Is such a rate acceptable 

for the speed of the hasty attack? The obvious answer is 

NO . 

Because of the deficiencie s in doctrine and equipment, tra ining cannot be considered fully effective. 

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN DOCTRINE 

After discussions between the Engineer and Armor 

Schools during early 1978, the following proposals were 

BRITISH GIANT VIPER IN ACTION 

submitted by the Armor School: 

- One tank per tank plat oon would be fitted with a 

mine plow; 

- All tanks would be fitted with hard points to accept the mine roller ; 

- Each division engineer line company would carry 

three mine rollers per supported tank battalion and armored cavalry squadron; 

- Line charges would be carried by the engineers; 

- Development of an improved line charge (probably 

a Giant Viper version) would be continued to provide a 

better capability. (All line charges would be ordered as 

needed, but each engineer company would carry a basic 

load.); 

- Continued development and testing of SLUFAE. 

The Armor School's proposals are a positive step, but 

the ju ry is still out on many details. If and when they are 

implemented, it would mark a real breakthrough in U.S. 

breaching capabilities. 

Just consider the possibilities. A tank heavy for ce 

moving to contact would be able to maneuver its element s so that one lane per tank platoon could be made 

with organic battalion means. Any area suspected of 

minin g would require only minor shifts to employ 

brea ching assets to that point. The engineer elements accompanying the leading man euver task forces would be 

organized for mor e extensive breaching and other mobility tasks . Specifically, mine rollers and a supply of 

appropriate line charges would be carried forward in the 

column. These would be employed when necessary, but 

most definit ely during the deliberate attack . SLUFAE 

and additional engineers would be positioned to breach 

additional lanes as the assault is completed. 

Such an approach would help solve the breaching 

problem for armored columns, but it must be -rernembered that no single type of equipment can be a panacea, 

for each has its limitations. But what about the strongpoint, which is specifically designed to be "unbypassable ," and requires extensive infantry effort to dislod ge 

the defenders? In such cases, the classic procedure is to 

cross a light force to seize the objective, then rein force 

with heavy weapons as soon as possible . 

How will we best get the light forces on the objective? 

The use of air assault is most innovative. Because of the 

enemy's massive air defense umb rella, such a deliberate 

attack would be proc eeded by intensive counter air defense fires, coupled with normal artillery preparati on 

and direct fire suppression. These fires would lift to 

allow the air assault to be made onto the objective. The 

assaulting tro ops would be equipped to kill tank s and 

oth er armored vehicles at close range , neutralize troops 

in bunkers, and engage the enemy in close combat. While 

direct and indirect fires and smoke ar e placed about the 

obj ective to isolat e it from its mutually suppo rting 

thr eat positions, breaching forces would open lanes to 

move heavy weapons and tanks onto the obj ective. 

26 FALL 1978 
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 

Pressure on equipment development should not stop 

until all necessary items are in the field. Even then, 

research and development must continue in order to 

preclude another 30-year stagnation in the field . The 

mine plow and roller are most likely to be fielded first. 

One problem with the roller lies in its storage, transportation and rapid mounting. Because of its weight, 

bulk, and criticality, the mine rollers must be issued 

with a dedicated prime mover. A twenty-five ton low 

bed trailer could probably be fitted to carry two rollers 

nested and capable of quick connect. A lifting device 

may be required and thus included. Additional low beds 

should then be authorized for each company carrying 

roller s. To insist that the company assume the extra 

equipment without additional transportation would dramatically lower its mobility. (Low beds have limited 

mobility off-road, so another alternative should be investigated. ) 

Line charges must either be fitted to tanks or APCs, or 

towed behind them without unnecessarily limiting their 

mobility. The charges must be armed and launched from 

within a closed vehicle . The Israelis have such operational capability and the Warsaw Pact Armies have something similar . Training charges are needed to allow the 

practice of transportation and deployment in breaching 

exercises. SLUFAE also should come with dummy 

rounds, so that loading and firing can be practiced. 

TRAINING PHILOSOPHY 

In the training for these tasks, we should not be misled into thinking that the technical aspects of setting up 

and firing a charge or manipulating the plow or roller 

are enough . Nor is the exercise in which engineers play 

all roles of the attacking force. Training exercises must 

be built around the combined arms team, but need not 

be lengthy. In fact, initial exercise s should be repeated 

over varying terrain and situations , much like a football 

team practicing offensive plays prior to a scrimmage. A 

maneuver brigade could practice these vignettes locally 

in a series of one-day exercises. It is vital that the question of breaching not be begged off by calling for the 

engineers to do all things. 

In summary, we must insure that in the area of breaching we obtain the proper equipment and train in the 

proper way, making necessary allowances of time, equipment, personnel and logistic support. Although the 

sweeping flank maneuver is more glamorous, we mu st 

be fully competent in performing the more essential mission of closing with the enemy. 

Major Mi chael L. Viani is currently assigned as Chief 

of the Tactics and Operations Division, Department of 

Combined A rms, Directorate of Trainin g, USAES. 

Major Peter D. Knight, a member of the Royal Australian Engineers is currently serving as the Chief of the 

Advanced Tactics Branch, Department of Combined 

Arms, Directorate of Training, USAES. 

U.S. TANK PUSHING SOVIET PROTOTYPE ROLLERS 

THE ENGINEER 27 
- - ......... " / 

--­

I , ' 'W 

- _-......~3 __ --­---­

..",,-===---~ -­ -

---~-

A Bridge Too Long 

Major Harvey Q. Ramsey 

History is filled with uniquely designed and constructed Bailey bridges . The versatility of this unique 

equipment is legend. For almost four decades, the 

Bailey has been the backbone of the military engineers' 

bridging inventory. It has been built as single story, 

multistory, partial story, underslung story, suspended, 

floated , cantilevered and cable reinforced . From this 

perspective, the 170-foot triple single Bailey bridge built 

at Cap Haitian, Haiti earlier this year is not particularly 

unique. But considering available skills and equipment 

in backward, subtropical Haiti, the bridge takes on the 

aura of a much larger accomplishment. 

Cap Haitian is Haiti's second largest city and the only 

port of any consequence on the north shore. As such, it 

serves as a commercial center. On 21 August 1977, a 

79-year-old French-built bridge collapsed in the center 

28 

of Cap Haitian, severing the city's major route of economic intercourse. 

An American engineer under contract to the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) saw the 

Bailey bridge as the solution to the problem. Through 

his experience as an engineer officer during World Wa r II 

in Europe and in Korea , he was aware of Bailey bridge 

capability. If, in his zeal, he erred relative to the bridge 

design and con struction requirements dictated by the 

site, he should not be condemned. The situation was 

critical and an immediate solution was considered necessary. 

One set of Bailey, along with selected erection equipment, was ordered by the Republic of Haiti from excess 

U.S. property. Shortly thereafter, the American engineer from Haiti arrived at Fort Belvoir for a "brush-up" 

FALL 1978 
MARKET AREA 

(OPEN) 

CONCRETE 

WALLS 

ASPI1ALT 

ROAD 

BUILDINGS 

12" PVC 

WATERLINE f • 

--t- ,,-, -I-+-­

J~. ~L-:::"""'-"- _ 

COMPACT 

SAND 

• 

• 

CONCReTE 

WALLS 

CONCRETE 

BLOG 

-­--+--.,.-+ 

(EAST) 

PLAN 

HOT TO SCALE 

1......-­SEAWALL 

class on Bailey bridge construction. It was to be a rather 

simple project; ISO-foot gap , MLC 8 bridge placed on 

the existing abutments. He was given about 12 hours of 

instruction, a preliminary bridge design , and the necessary construction manuals. Carrying with him expr essions of envy about ' 'wintering" in the Caribbean, he 

returned to Haiti. 

Messages requesting a two-man Army mobile training 

team began almost immediately, waxing and waning 

through the holiday season of 1977. When Major 

Harvey Ramsey and Sergeant First Class Richard Pattin 

were dispatched fr om Fort Belvoir in late January 1978, 

they envisioned a two-week holiday with pay in the 

warm Caribbean sun . As always, it ju st didn't work out 

that way . What they expected to be a four -day build and 

a ten-day " inspection" wound up as 21 consecutive days 

of construction . 

Upon their arrival in Haiti, Ramsey and Pattin were 

immediately impressed with the high level of politi cal interest in the project. Cap Haitian was in economic agony 

and its pain was being felt acro ss the total political spectrum . The Minister of Public Works was under pressur e 

and he was pre ssing hard on the USAID engineer staff 

which had promised help . The supporting bureaucracy 

had been less responsive than USAID had hoped, causing delay, revised estimates, and a concomitant loss in 

credibility both to the Haitian and U.S . officials. Continu ing bureaucrat ic frustrations had acted to intensify 

THE ENGINEER 

expectations, reduce discussion , and raise tempers. 

What was anticipated to be a relatively anonymous, lowlevel project had escalated to visions of a grandiose ribbon cutting ceremony by the Pr esident of Haiti and the 

U.S. Ambassador. 

The initial feeling of casual confidence felt by the 

two-man team was shaken when they arri ved at the construction site late on the evening of 25 January. The gap 

wasn 't 150 feet , it was almost 163 feet, thus requiring a 

170-foot bridge. To place a 170-foot bridge on the existing abutments required the construction of 180 feet of 

bridge. A qu ick reference to the Bailey Bridge manual 

confirmed no design criteria for 170 feet of bridge, to 

say nothing of 180 feet. 

The approaches to both sho res were fills and bounded 

by a masonry wall which constricted the con struction 

site. Both fills were sloped at an angle of five percent, 

causing problems in site layout, construction, and 

removal of the launching nose. The extended centerline 

of the bridge on the near shore ran directly through a 

new office building constructed for the local police. The 

city's main water supply, a semi-suspended 12" PVC 

pipe, was immediately adjacent to the bridge site. 

The bridge itself was stored rather haphazardly about 

a quarter mile from the site. To mo ve it to the far shore 

and construct from west to east would require almost a 

week. The only equipment available was a 3,500 pound 

forklift and a compressor with pneumatic hammer. A 

29 
front loader and crawler tractor were promised. Hand 

tools and equipment, available in limited quantity, were 

individually owned and in varying states of disrepair. 

To compound the problem, the bridge was delivered 

with an inadequate number of plain rollers and stringers, 

and neither four-inch nor six-inch grillage came with the 

bridge. The only grillage available was a hodgepodge of 

hand-sawn timber of varying width and depth, unique 

only because of its lack of uniformity. The team chief 

was surrounded by a milling throng of unskilled but 

enthusiastic workers who were without leadership and 

who had never seen a Bailey bridge. He threw his preliminary design into the river. 

The next day, 26 January, was one of decision. Considering available equipment and site conditions, perhaps the bridge should not be constructed. The initial 

mistake in measuring the gap acted to redu ce the class of 

the bridge from MLC 8 to MLC 4. Was the capacity 

131 ' 

f 

EXISTING 

additional set of rocking rollers was placed on grillage 

on the sand immediately in front of the abutment on the 

far shore. To provide the grillage , lO-foot towers had to 

be constructed from available timbers. This reduced the 

clear span to 167 feet. Tidal action in the river and 

anticipated high water due to rains upstream mitigated 

against moving this intermediate set of rollers closer to 

the near shore. 

Only part of the site layout problem had been solved. 

Backspace required for 180 foot DD is II7 feet. Equipment constraints limited truss type to Triple Single . 

There was an excess of rocking rollers but a shortfall in required plain rollers. By using rocking rollers in 

place of plain rollers, and by removing construction 

rollers once the nose was complete, 100 feet of 

backspace could be provided. Additional counterweight 

was provided by using two bays of Single Single construction . There was absolutely no margin for error as 

/31'

5.5' ----.j 14 162.lJ' ~S.5' CONCRETE WALL 

CONCRETE WALL 12Jl x 36" 6.1' 6.1' /2"x 36" 

------­

[X/STING CONCRETE 

ABUTMENTS 

BEARING PLATES ~COMPACT SAND 

(EAST) PROFILE (WEST) 

NOT TO SCALE 

worth the effort? Construction from east to west would 

require demolishing the police station. To build from 

west to east would mean a week's delay to move the 

bridge . 

The team had brought a Bailey bridge film to be used 

in training the work force. Local interest in the bridge 

was obvious as a crowd of about 500 jammed into the 

theater to watch the 1945 Army training film . It was 

indicative of things to come when it was discovered after 

several false starts that the only available projector was 

designed to run backwards. 

While the work force and other interested citizens 

reviewed the training film, the team chief conferred with 

local political officials and engineers. Their decision was 

predictable and almost immediate. The bridge must be 

built! Demolish the Police Station! Build from east to 

west! 

Rocking rollers were placed immediately behind the 

end dam of each shore, producing a clear span of 177.12 

feet. Since the span was well outside the design limits of 

the launching nose and bridge, as a safety measure, an 

every available panel would be used. 

The launching nose design emphasized once again 

that the bridge was to be constructed on the outside limit 

of equipment capability. TM 5-277 made no allowance 

for a launching nose in excess of nine bays . Available 

equipment posed the same limitation. Given this limitation, where should the launching nose links be placed? 

Sag expected during launch over a span of 167 feet was 

83 inches. Placing the links at 20 feet and 40 feet would 

raise the end of the nose 8I inches. If the links were 

placed at 30 feet and 40 feet, the end could be raised 

94.5 inches. 

The designer opted for placing the links at 20 feet and 

40 feet and accepted the requirement to lower the far 

shore rollers by two inches. In actual practice, the point 

was moot because compression in the very high (10') 

grillage towers on the far shore necessitated constant 

jacking and adding of grillage. 

The bridge was launched with the first 10 bays undecked. Additionally, the near shore was counterweighted to reduce problems of shear in the launching 

30 FALL 1978 
SITE 

AVAIL ABLE GRIUoAGE 

z:: x lfl/:t x L{ ':t 

nose. Even this had to be precise to eliminate problems 

of panel deformation and negative moment. This coun ­

terweight had to be removed slowly as the bridge moved 

across the gap . In all respects , the design was outside 

normal procedures and relied upon safety factors designed into the bridge. 

The inconsistency of the grillage required that every 

piece be selected in the fashion of a stone mason selecting stones for a perfect fit. Every two-inch layer had to 

be leveled and aligned . The height of the roller towers 

(six feet at the 100-foot point) magnified the problem. 

The entire process was compounded by an ebb and flow 

of dignitaries and onlookers who stumbled into completed roller towers and tripped over the centerline. 

Construction began on Tuesday, 31 January. Although 

the Haitian workers learned quickly, individual ownership of tools, pride in capability, and limited supervision 

prohibited full use of the available labor. The launching 

nose was completed 1 February and Triple Single construction began immediately. 

Triple truss construction was slow. Differential compression in grillage towers required constant jacking and 

releveling. The length of bridge and the problems of 

working outside the specified limits of equipment dictated th at the launch be level. Construction was set back 

several hours when an overzealous worker put the security picket into the rock ing roller while the bridge was 

still moving . 

Progress was slow. The bridge had to be jacked up 

and the far sho re roller height adju sted with every 20­

foot advance . By the end of the day on 2 February, the 

bridge advan ce was completed and the launching nose 

had been remov ed. 

2 BAYS 18 BAYS TRIPLE. SINGLE 

j..I 

SINGLE 

SINGLE 

LAYOUT 

NOT To SCALE 

Plans called for the bridge to be jacked down the next 

morning. But , crane s to set the bridge on the abutments 

never materialized and the team had not considered the 

problems of jacking with the bridge and posts only 18 

inches from the end dam of the abutment. They discovered there wasn't room for the jack handle to fit into 

such a restricted space . 

It was decided to jack-up the bridge, remove the grillage, and jack the bridge back down. But as the brid ge 

was jacked up, the grillage expanded back through the 

10 inches it had compressed, making it impossible to 

change all six jacks from using the top to using the toe. 

The end dam had to be removed and the bridge jacked 

from the end post as originally designed. 

Once the end dams were removed, the rest of the job 

proceeded smoothly. 

As the moment of completion neared, the number of 

spectators increa sed. By late afternoon on 5 February, 

while final checks were being made, the crowd swelled 

to about 7,000, each intent on being the first to cross the 

bridge. The local Bishop was on hand to bless the bridge 

and the politicians anointed it with champagne before 

crossing in their cars. The last few minutes were tense, 

the speeches lengthy, and the crowd exuberant. It somehow seemed a fitting climax to a project that had been 

so close to failure so many times. 

But even though the bridge was opened, its capacity 

was just too low to adequately support the traffic requirements. The Government of Haiti, with the assistance of USAID engineers, began planning immediately 

to upgrade the capacity. A number of solutions, intermediate supports, cable reinforcing and additional stories 

were considered. After much discussion, it was decided 

9 BAYS LAUNCHING 

LINKS PLACED 

AT 20/~iiO'

NOSE tJ\ 10 BAYS 

UNDECKED 

THE ENGINEER 31 
to add a second story to the bridge, thus increasing it 

from a triple single to a triple double . Once again, 

assistance from the U.S. Army was requested. 

Assistance came from Fort Leonard Wood in the form 

of First Lieutenant Joseph K. Schmitt and Sergeant First 

Class Larry A.Simmons. The job they faced was in many 

respects more difficult than the original construction. 

Reinforcement in place began 27 June 1978 at the 

center of the bridge, center truss, and progressed toward 

each end. At first , the panels went in very easily, but, as 

more panels were added , work crews experienced difficulty with cord bolt and pin hole alignment. To remove 

some of the dead weight from the bridge, the riband, 

chess and plain stringers were removed. Only the button 

stringers were left in place with chess laid lengthwi se on 

the stringers for safety purposes. That relieved some of 

the sag and allowed for easier assembly, but as construction continued, misalignment of cord bolt hole s appeared again , causing work"to be suspended. The only alternative was to construct a temporary intermediate pier . 

On 28 June, the MTT returned on site to evaluate the 

possibility of building a grillage tower 45 feet from the 

far shore. Low tide revealed that the soil was firm 

enough to safely facilitate construction of an adequate 

pier in which the bridge could be jacked to assist in 

evenly distributing the load. The bridge was jacked to a 

height of approximately one-quarter inch from the bearings, thus eliminating more than six inches of sag from 

the bridge. Reinforcement in place procedures resumed, 

but again with an increase in sag. 

Due to difficulty in aligning cord bolt holes at the near 

shore, it was decided that an add itional temporary pier 

was needed to provide structural support and to relieve 

some of the compression load on the top members of 

the first story panels. A pier, constructed with panels 

and supported by grillage consisting of standard 6 x 6 

timbers and bridge stringers, was constructed 15 feet 

from the near shore abutment. The bridge was jacked 

until the near shore end posts were approximately oneeighth inch off the bearings, reducing the effective 

bridge length to 110 feet. 

The last panel of the near shore was inserted and 

pinned to the end post on 30 June. The bridge was 

jacked off the near shore towers and jacked down on its 

bearings. Work crews returned to finish construction at 

the far shore. The bridge was again jacked at the far 

shore grillage towers to help relieve additional sag due 

to the increase in bridge weight and tower settlement. 

On J July, more than five months after initial construction began, reinforcement of the bridge was completed . The bridge was jacked from the grillage towers 

on the far shore, and both shore piers were dismantled. 

The stringers, chess, and riband were replaced. 

The job was finished . The bridge was permanently 

reopened. 

Major Har vey Ramsey is the Chief of the Combat 

Operations Division, Directorate of Training, U.S . 

Army Engineer School. Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

32 FALL 1978 
ENCOA 

The spring and summer editions 

of THE ENGINEER carried articles 

dealing with the Engineer NCO Advanced Course (ENCOA). The articles were aimed at NCOs selected 

for attendance at ENCOA, providing information to help selectees 

prepare for the course. Information 

contained in the articles is still valid 

and copies of the articles are available from the Engineer School upon 

written request. 

Anyone scheduled to attend 

ENCOA, or who just wants to know 

more about the course, may write to 

the Commander of the NCOES Detachment. He will give you a description of the course, and advice on 

how to prepare for the course. 

Math and reading skills are still 

the biggest problem areas for 

ENCOA students. A 12th grade 

equivalency is recommended in both 

math and reading skills. The failure 

rate for ENCOA is approximately 

10 percent. Some students arrive at 

Fort Belvoir with the idea that all 

they have to do is attend classes in 

order to graduate. Be advised that 

the course of instruction is not easy 

and no one is passed because oftheir 

good look s or sparkling personality. 

The offer of individual assistance to 

prepare for attendance at ENCOA is 

open, so take advantage of it. 

PRIMARY TECHNICAL 

COURSE 

The 12C (Brigade Crewman) Primary Technical Course (PTC) is conducted at Fort Belvoir . PTC is aimed 

at Skill Level 2 training and is SQT 

oriented. In the near future this 

course will be redesignated as a 

basic technical course (BTC) and 

aimed at Skill Level 3. The course 

trains personnel in Grades E4 and 

E5 for assignment in SL2 duty positions, but other personnel may attend with a waiver . ( It is desired that personnel have a 

working knowledge of military tactical bridging prior to attending the 

PTC. The course is five weeks in 

THE ENGINEER 

NCO Channels 

length, and upon successful completion, graduates will be qualified in 

all aspects of tactical bridging. 

The PTC uses the latest instructional methods. Training includes 

practical exercises and classroom instruction. Instructor-to-student ratio 

is usually about 1:5, and class size 

averages about 20. Intensive, individualized instruction is thus provided. A complete set of tactical 

bridging reference material is available to each student which he may 

keep upon completion of the course. 

Subjects taught include bridge classification as well as design and construction procedures on the following bridges: the M2 Bailey, MAB, 

M4T6 (Class 60 raft and fixed span), 

LTR, Ribbon and medium girder 

bridge . Instructor personnel are 

among the most highly qualified in 

the US Army and are willing to provide individual assistance to each 

student. 

If you are scheduled to attend 12C 

PTC and need additional information about this excellent course, 

write to: CSM, US Army Engineer 

Course, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060. 

12E ATOMIC DEMOLITION 

MUNITIONS COURSE 

The Atomic Demolition Munitions 

Course taught at Fort Belvoir is a 

self-paced course designed to qualify personnel in MOS 12ElO.Though 

primarily designed for entry level 

personnel, individuals reclassified or 

reenlisting for MOS 12E may also 

attend. Recent changes in the 12E 

course which will be of interest to 

ADM units in the field include the 

following : 

• Reinforcement of timer calculation training using informal leeture and practical exercise with small 

groups of students in addition to the 

self-paced materials. 

• All option mission, practical 

training exercises for small. groups 

of students near the completion of 

the course. 

• An all inclusive "end-of-coursetest" used to detect and correct 

individual student weaknes ses. (Emphasis is placed on quality and 

retention of training-not speed of 

completion.) 

The ADM course is constantly being revised and improved, so comments from the field are welcome. 

Requests for addi tional information 

and questions or comments should 

be addressed to : Commandant, 

USAES, ATTN: ADM Branch, Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia 22060. 

A note to personnel reenlisting for 

MOS 12E: remind your reenlistment 

NCO that a school allocation for the 

12E course must be obtained manually. The automated system provides 

12E school information for initial 

entry personnel only . 

DEFENSE MAPPING SCHOOL 

The Defense Mapping School 

(DMS) is located at Fort Belvoir and 

works closely with the Engineer 

School in developing Career Management Field 81. DMS is a component of the Defense Mapping Agency 

and is responsible for instruction in 

military cartography and related 

subjects. The school provides direct 

support to the Army , Navy, Air 

Force, Marine Corps and allied nations, with instruction and advisory 

services in the functional areas of 

mapping, charting, and geodesy . 

DMS conducts resident instruction 

in the following fields: surveying, 

cartography, graphic arts, topographic sciences and related subjects. 

If your topographic unit has a 

training problem that might be 

solved by a Mobile Training Team 

(MTT) , contact the Defense Mapping School. The point of contact 

should be the Director, Defense 

Mapping School, ATTN: PPO 

(MTT Coordinator), Fort Belvoir, 

VA 22060. Be prepared to outline 

your problem and state why you 

think a MTT might offer the solution. 

If your unit is within CONUS, it's 

possible that assistance will not cost 

you anything. Assistance is available 

to reserve units as well as active 

units. 

33 
Officer
 

COLONELS 

Physicals: Is your official personnel file up to date? Is there a copy of 

your latest physical in your official 

file? Paragraph 10-23c(4) of AR 40­

501, including Change 29, states 

that officers 39 years of age and 

older should receive physicals in the 

birthday month of the odd numbered years of their age until they 

reach the age of 50 and thereafter 

annually. Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and junior officers simply provide a copy to their MILPO for 

posting to their Officer Records 

Brief (ORB), but Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels (P) should have a 

copy forwarded for official filing 

and review by promotion boards. 

Critical items of note are profiles 

(three or more) and body weight and 

height. 

Senior Service College: Eligibility 

for resident instruction in the Senior 

Service College extends through 23 

years of active service, computed 

from the first day of September each 

year. Officers who have a basic service date between 2 September 1956 

and 1 September 1957 are currently 

in their last year of eligibility. The 

board in session in August selected 

officers to start school in the Fall of 

1979. Officers who are not selected 

for resident instruction should 

strongly consider applying for Nonresident instruction in accordance 

with AR 351-11. 

MAJORS 

Congratulations to those officers 

recently selected for promotion to 

Lieutenant Colonel AUS and those 

selected for promotion to Major RA. 

The files of those selected for LTC 

have been transferred to Lieutenant 

Colonel Tom Fisher in the Lieutenant Colonels Division for future 

actions. 

Recent discussions with members 

of various selection boards revealed 

the following vital areas for Engineer 

officers: 

Career
 

Info
 

• Officer Record Briefs (ORBs) 

are incorrect. Some items are correctable by MILPERCEN, but 

others must be changed through 

SlDPERS. Check with your MILPOs for corrections. 

• Military Education Level 

(MEL): Completion of the Command and General Staff College by 

resident or non-resident instruction 

of great importance in consideration 

for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel AUS. When considering officers 

for assignments requiring MEL 4 

schooling, there is no discrimination 

between resident and non-resident 

graduates. 

CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENANTS 

There have been some personnel 

changes in the company grades division. Lieutenant Colonel H. A. 

Froehle is the new chief and Captain 

Bob Melchior has replaced Captain 

Matt Dominy as the Lieutenants 

assignment officer. 

The importance of having an accurate up-to-date ORB in your file 

cannot be overstated. It is critical 

for use in career management and 

selections for school and promotions. Pay particular attention to the 

height/weight ratio reflected. Regulations require an annual update of 

this highly visible element. 

Photos are also important. Remember that you must have a photo 

taken upon promotion to first 

lieutenant and every four years 

thereafter. 

Congratulations to the 231 lieutenants recently selected for promotion to captain. Selection rates for 

Specialty Code 21 was 90 percent. 

Your files are now managed by Major Mike Foster, same office, different desk . 

WARRANT OFFICERS 

The Warrant Officer Regular 

Army Promotion Board adjourned 

July 14. The list should be released 

to the field during the September/ 

October time frame. 

The Warrant Officer Regular Army Automatic Consideration Board 

for Fiscal Year 1978 adjourned August 24. The list of those selected 

was released in September. 

The Fiscal Year 1979 Warrant 

Officer procurement program was 

announced in DA Circular 601-81 

and was released August 22. A copy 

of the circular may be obtained by 

calling the Publications Center 

(Autovon 584-2045/3210). The call 

should be made by the unit's Publication Management Officer since 

he/she holds the activity's Publication Account Number. 

ALL OFFICERS 

All active duty officers and warrant officers may call the Personnel 

Records Division Automatic Telephonic Answering Service to ask 

questions pertaining to their Official 

Military Personnel File (OMPF). 

This service operates on a 24-hour 

basis and can be reached by calling 

AUTOVON 221-8792/3 or Commercial (202) 325-8792/3. As calls 

are received, a recorded message 

will ask for basic identification data 

from the caller. The caller will then 

be asked to state the request. Requests are transcribed and logged 

during the next normal operating 

day. Every effort is made to provide 

a telephonic or written response to 

the individual within five working 

days. 

Questions which are appropriate 

for this service include: 

34 FALL 1978 
• Has the OER for the period 

ending (state ending date of the 

OER) been filed? 

• Has the award (indicate specific 

award and date of the award) been 

filed? 

• Has the specific document authorized for file been filed? 

Questions which cannot be answered by this service include : 

• Requests for copies of documents or copies of the OMPF. Only 

written requests will be accepted . 

• Lengthy or complicated problems pertaining to the OPMF. These 

questions should be referred through 

the servicing Military Personnel Office (MILPO) to the Personnel 

Records Division. 

Engineer Personnel Management 

Contacts in OPMD: 

•	 Colonels Division (DAPCOPC-AF) 

Engineer Assignments / 

Lieutenant Colonel Lin 

Lufkin / x7871 

•	 Lieutenant Colonels Division 

(DAPC-OPL-AS) 

Engineer Assignments / 

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 

Fisher / x0423 

•	 Majors Division (DAPCOPM-A) 

Engineer Assignments / 

Major Wayne Roth / x8109 

•	 Combat Support Arms Division 

(DAPC-OPF-E) (Company 

Grade) 

Engineer Branch Chief / 

Lieutenant Colonel H. A. 

Froehle / x0650 

Captain Assignments / 

Major Mike Foster / x0651 

Lieutenant Assignments / 

Captain Bob Melchior /x7434 

( •	 Warrant Officers Division 

(DAPC-OPW-AU) 

Engineer Assignments / 

CW3 Aleck Fletcher / x7837 

NOTE: Commercial telephone line: 

Numbers above preceded by 

202-325-. 

AUTOVON line: Listed 

number preceded by 221-. 

OERs 

Early in the life of the current 

Officer Evaluation Report, there existed a wide disparity in scores 

between and within commands. As a 

result, many raters felt the need to 

send to DA unsolicited, after-thefact explanatory letters which attempted to clarify their original 

rating intent. Even though not specifically authorized by regulation, 

these letters were accepted and filed. 

In the past few years the score disparity has disappeared and with it 

the value of the explanatory letter. 

Effective 6 June 1978, explanatory 

letters concerning previously submitted OERs are no longer accepted 

for inclusion in the OMPF. The 

change in policy does not affect the 

submission of addendums as authorized in AR623-105. 

MICROFICHE FILES 

The program to mail out a personal copy of the microfiche Official 

Military Personnel File (OMPF) to 

every active duty officer and warrant officer in the Army has been 

completed. More than 94,000 files 

were mailed, beginning last November. However, approximately six 

percent of the files were returned to 

MILPERCEN because the address 

reflected on the data base was not 

current. 

Officers and warrant officers who 

have not yet received their personal 

microfiche file copies should forward 

a request directly to : Commander, 

MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-PSRSR (Document Request Section), 

200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 

22332. The request should include 

name, social security number, duty 

telephone number, and the address 

to which the microfiche copy is to be 

mailed. 

The OMPF paper files from which 

the microfiche files were created are 

still available for purchase by individuals, but time is running out. The 

paper files of general officers and 

colonels will be retained only until 

I March 1979. Warrant officer files 

will be retained only until 1 April 

1979. Captains may purchase their 

paper files until I May next year, 

lieutenant colonels have until 1 July, 

and lieutenants have until 1 September. 

Files may be purchased in person 

at MILPERCEN's Records Review 

Office, Room 5S33, Hoffman II, or 

through the mail by writing to the 

same address . 

Purchases by mail should include 

a check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States. The total 

amount of the purchase price is determined by grade and includes the 

cost of mailing. The fees, by grade, 

are listed below. 

GRADE AMOUNT 

General Officers $6.00 

Colonels 5.50 

Lt. Colonels 4.75 

Majors 4.50 

Captains 4.25 

First Lieutenants 4.00 

Second Lieutenants 3.00 

Chief Warrant Officers 

(CW3 and CW4) 5.00 

Chief Warrant Officer (W2) 

and Warrant Officer (W1) 4.50 

SPECIAL OMPF UPDATE 

To expeditiously process OMPF 

updates on a priority basis for officers in the zone of consideration, a 

special processing section has been 

established in the Officer Personnel 

Records Branch at MILPERCEN. 

Documents for OMPF updates 

should be sent through the MILPO 

to: Commander; MILPERCEN; 

ATTN : DAPC-PSR-RP; 200 Stovall 

Street; Alexandria, VA 22332. 

A letter of transmittal indicating 

name, grade, social security number, 

and the identification of the selection board by which the individual is 

being considered should be used. 

THE ENGINEER 35 
NEW ASSIGNMENTS POLICY 

Under a new assignments policy 

spelled out in AR 614-30 (effective 

15 August 1978), Hawaii is included 

as part of the CONUS sustaining 

base for reassignment purposes. 'In 

other words, soldiers stationed in 

Hawaii who are nearing completion 

of their tours will be considered 

along with soldiers stationed in 

CONUS for selection as replacements for other overseas areas, such 

as Germany, Korea, Japan, Alaska, 

etc. 

Priorities for selection of personnel for any overseas assignment are 

outlined in chapter of the regulation. 

These priorities are designed to maintain overseas assignment equity. 

Soldiers stationed in Hawaii have 

been placed low on both the long 

and short tour area priority lists. 

Changes in the assignment policy 

were the result of a revision of 

Department of Defense Directive 

1315.7, "Military Personnel Assignments" and reflect an effort to 

reduce personnel turbulence and rising PCS costs . Other regulations 

and changes stemming from the 

revised directive are expected later 

this year. 

OMPF PROBLEMS 

The Official Military Personnel 

File (OMPF) should accurately 

represent the accomplishments and 

shortcomings of every soldier's military career. The OMPF is made up 

of many documents from a variety 

of sources, and it is important that 

every authorized item be included. 

As far as selection boards are concerned, if it's not in the OMPF, it 

doesn't exist. 

Currently, thousands of these very 

important OMPF documents are 

Enlisted
 

Career Info
 

backlogged because of one common 

problem: missing or incorrect social 

security numbers. 

The Records Maintenance Division at the Enlisted Records and 

Evaluation Center (EREC), a field 

operating activity of MILPERCEN 

located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, 

IN, maintains more than 666,000 

enlisted records. Over two million 

documents flow through this office 

each year. 

Although the problem of missing 

or incorrect SSNs is not new, it has 

been magnified during the past two 

years by the on-going conversion of 

the OMPF from paper to microfiche. 

Adding a document to the microfiche OMPF is a quick and simple 

process when the document contains 

a valid SSN, but when the number is 

missing or incorrect, the process becomes an administrative nightmare. 

So help yourself by helping the 

folks who maintain your OMPF. 

Make sure every document submitted to EREC for inclusion in 

your file contains your social security number. 

CAREER ADVISERS 

The Enlisted Engineer Career 

Branch, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), has 

the mission to get the right soldier 

with the right grade and skill, to the 

right command, at the right time. 

The branch chief is normally a 

Corps of Engineers lieutenant colonel and his professional development non-commissioned officer is 

normally a sergeant major. The sergeant major's job is mainly one of 

coordination, while the real workadvising the soldier in the field-is 

accomplished by Career Advisers. 

A Career Adviser is selected because of his expertise in his field, not 

because of his qualifications as a personnel specialist. He is the most important person in the branch when it 

comes to managing your career. He is 

the one who makes sure each soldier 

is properly assigned and that career 

progression is considered. He is also 

the person who answers questions on 

future assignments, schools, promotions and career goals in general. 

Master Sergeant Kelly Brown is 

the Career Adviser for Career Management Field (CMF) 81, Topographic Engineering, plus MOS 12E, 

Drill Sergeant (at Fort Leonard 

Wood only), and all E8s and E7s (P). 

Sergeant First Class Garry Barth is 

the Career Adviser for CMF 51, 

General Engineering, and Sergeant 

First Class Al Henderson is the 

Career Adviser for CMF 12, Combat Engineering. 

The Enlisted Engineer Career 

Branch maintains a Career Management Individual File (CMIF) for 

grades E6 through E8 in CMF 12, 51 

and 81 (except MOS 81E and MOS 

82C). CMIFs are also maintained 

for grades El through E7 in MOS 

12E and individuals having a Special 

36 FALL 1978 
Qualification Identifier (SQI) "X" 

(drill sergeants at Fort Leonard 

Wood only). These files are a major 

tool used by career advisers in man ­

aging your career. 

The files contain copies of Enlisted . Efficiency Reports (EERs), 

Senior Enlisted Efficiency Reports 

(SEERs), Enlisted Evaluation Data 

Reports (USAEEC Form 10), copies 

of DA Form 2, DA Form 2-1, item 

38 of DA Form 20, Enlisted Preference Statement (DA Form 2635), reclassification actions, and letters 

pertinent to the individual's career 

or letters of inquiry submitted by 

the soldier. 

Should you, at any time, wish to 

call or write your Career Management Branch regarding an assignment or other aspects of your 

career, the address is: U.S. Army 

Military Personnel Center, ATTN: 

DAPC-EPL-E, 2461 Eisenhower 

Avenue , Alexandria, Virginia 

22331. The telephone number is 

(Commercial) Area Code 202, 325­

7710/11112 or Autovon 221-7710/ 

11112. 

SKILL QUALIFICATION 

TESTING 

Skill Qualifications Tests (SQTs) 

for Career Management Field 12will 

be conducted January I through 

June 30, 1979, according to the latest 

word from the U.S. Army Training 

Support Center at Fort Eustis, VA. 

All personnel with MOS 12B, 12C, 

and 12E should have already received their Soldier's Manuals, 

which were distributed to the field 

during the May-June time frame. 

The Soldier's Manual is the soldier's 

personal copy to retain and maintain. It is his/her personal textbook 

to career advancement. 

THE ENGINEER 

LETTERS OF 

COMMUNICATION 

Effective August 1, a new procedure for filing letters of communication to selection boards was initiated. All such letters, including all 

inclosures , are now considered privileged correspondence and filed with 

the record of board proceedings 

maintained by MILPERCEN, instead of being filed with the OMPF. 

Also effective August 1, only letters from personnel in the primary 

zone of consideration are accepted. 

In the past, letters from personnel in 

both the primary and secondary 

zones were accepted. 

Because letters of communication 

have previously been filed in the 

OMPF, some members have been 

using them as a means to insure that 

documents of career importance are 

added to the OMPF. With the 

changes in filing procedures, this 

means of file update is no longer 

available. OMPF material must be 

submitted through the MILPO, not 

directly to the board. 

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL 

Applications are being accepted 

from active duty enlisted personnel 

and warrant officers for Officer 

Candidate School (OCS) at Fort 

Benning, GA. OCS is a 14-week 

course designed to produce professional commissioned officers for 

various Army branches. Basic eligibility requirements are: 

• No more than 10years of active 

service at date of OCS completion. 

• Two or more years of college 

credit (minimum of 60 semester 

hours). 

• At least 19lJ2 and not more 

than 29 years of age on enrollment. 

• Test scores of 110 GT, 115 

OCT, and composite OCT/OQI of 

200 for male and 115 GT for female 

personnel. 

Other requirements include leadership ability, an outstanding military attitude, and high motivation 

to become an officer. Weight and 

height requirements are listed in AR 

600-9. If the applicant is overseas at 

the time of application, 24 months 

of the tour must be completed 

(waiverable). 

The first step for soldiers interested in applying for OCS is to complete a DA Form 61, Application for 

Appointment. Unit commanders are 

then responsible for counselling applicants and administering an Army 

Physical Fitness Test, and rating 

each applicant. 

Check with your local Military 

Personnel Officer or unit commander for additional details of the 

application process. 

The next deadline for receipt of 

OCS applications at MILPERCEN 

is 22 January 1979, so interested 

personnel shouldn't waste time in 

submitting their DA Form 61 to 

their unit commanders. 

EERWA DATA 

As of 30 June, the Enlisted Efficiency Report Weighted Averages 

(EERWA), by pay grade Army wide, 

were as follows: 

PAY GRADE EERWA 

E·9 124.24 

E·8 123.49 

E·7 121.91 

E·6 119.39 

E·5 116.43 

E·4 111.57 

An up-to-date compilation of the 

weighted averages is scheduled for 

release by MILPERCEN in October 

1978. 

37 
Tactical Problem
 

You are the commander of Company A, 54th Engineer Battalion, 

currently in direct support of the 1st 

Brigade of the 54th Infantry Division (Mechanized). As the brigade 

engineer, the brigade commander 

has discussed with you the requirement for a tactical minefield to support one of his battle positions. 

In further discussions with the 

Brigade S-2 and S-3, you note the 

following: the required minefield 

will be located from AB042835 to 

AB048843; the task force commander who will cover this obstacle 

with observed fires requires at least 

three mobility kills on a Threat 

force armor company proceeding 

through the minefield in company 

line formation; a gap of 150 meters 

must be left in the tactical minefield 

to facilitate the withdrawal of the 

corps covering force; and the leading 

Threat force tanks are given a 60 

percent capability of neutralizing 

any encountered mine. 

You have determined that sufficient M15 antitank and M16 antipersonnel mines are available to 

install the required minefield, and 

that your battalion commander will 

issue one of his M57 antitank mine 

dispensing systems to your company. 

In order to reduce installation time, 

you have decided to include only one 

antipersonnel mine for each antitank mine your company emplaces. 

In addition, the brigade #5-3 air officer has just notified you that up to 

three sorties of the M56 helicopterdelivered scatterable mines are available from corps' 178th Assault Helicopter Company if you can utilize 

them. 

In planning this tactical minefield, 

you must determine the density, the 

time required to emplace the field 

using the M57 antitank mine dispensing system, and the number of 

M56 helicopter-delivered scatterable 

mine sorties needed to close the gap 

in the field. 

See page 40 for THE SCHOOL SOLUTION 

THE ENGINEER
 

welcomes your comments on any material published. 

You may have your viewpoints/ideas published as 

"Letters to the Editor" or you may wish to submit a 

feature length article for consideration. If you have 

something to contribute, let us hear from you. 

Editor 

38 FALL 1978 
Reserve Components
 

FROM THE CHIEF, 

ARMY RESERVE 

" Proof is in performance, and 

there is no room for non-performance in the Army Reserve. Our 

mission and responsibility to the 

nation, to our communities, and to 

our familie s are too important 

to allow any unit, large or small, to 

drift along ."-Major General Henry 

Mohr, Chief, Army Reserve. 

MOBEX 78 

A mobilization and deployment 

exercise labeled "Nifty Nugget" is 

scheduled to run from 10 October 

to 3 November at numerous 

FORSCOM and TRADOC installations. The thrust of the paper 

exercise is to evaluate mobilization 

and deployment systems and procedures. Full mobilization play will 

take place at the following Army 

installations: Fort Benning, Fort 

Bragg, Fort Carson, Fort Chaffee, 

Fort Dix, Fort Drum, Fort Hood, 

Fort Knox, Fort Riley, and Camp 

Shelby. Each Reserve Component 

unit scheduled for mobilization at 

these installations during the first 30 

days of mobilization will send a 

player cell representing that unit's 

command element to the installation 

one weekend during the exercise. 

There, the cells will review mobilization procedures with the installation 

staff. 

Player cells representing early deploying Reserve units will report to 

one of 39 installations in CONUS, 

Hawaii, and Puerto Rico to review 

deployment procedures and to determine if the units are actually deployable. 

RECORDS CONVERSION 

• 

Personnel records of active reservists, both unit and Individual Ready 

Reserve (lRR) members, are being 

converted to microfiche. The conA decision on the disposition of 

paper records once the conversion 

to microfiche is completed will be 

made later. If the paper records are 

made available to individuals, a 

processing cost will be charged. Requests for paper records prior to 

notification will be returned without 

action. 

06 PROMOTION BOARD 

The board scheduled to consider 

Reserve Component lieutenant colonels for permanent promotion to 

colonel has been rescheduled. Originally set for 7 August through 

1 September, the board was rescheduled to convene at the U.S . Army 

Reserve Components Personnel and 

Administration Center in S1. Louis 

on 22 October. It is scheduled to adjourn on or about 17 November. 

NEW COURSES AVAILABLE 

Two new NCOES courses will be 

taught by many USAR schools this 

year. They are the Primary NCO 

Course, Combat Arms (PNCOCCA), and the Primary Leadership 

Course (PLC). The Combat Arms 

Course is designed to develop leadership skills for E4s in MOSs IIB/ 

C/H, 12B, 13B/E/F, 16P, and 

CMF 19. It will be taught during 

two weekend training sessions and 

during two weeks Annual Training. 

The Primary Leadership Course inservice support personnel. It can be 

taught on weekends, evenings, or 

during two-week Active Training 

sessions. 

NEW ENLISTMENT OPTION 

Students and seasonal workers 

who enlist for six years in a troop 

program unit now have the opportunity to participate in their initial 

Active duty for training (lADT) in 

separate sessions. Under a new option, new enlistees may return to 

their home station following successful completion of active duty 

basic training, an eight-week period. 

Within one year of the last day of 

basic training, the individual returns 

to IADT for advanced individual 

training (AIT). Enlistment grades 

authorized by Table 2-4, AR 140-111 

are applicable to nonprior service 

applicants enlisting for this program. 

No participant, with the exception 

of honor graduates, however, will 

be promoted to grade E-3 or above 

until completion of AlT. 

EQUIPMENT FALLACY 

Many reservists apparently believe 

that new equipment will be issued to 

Reserve units in the event of mobilization . Such beliefs are unrealistic. 

Equipment currently on hand is considered part of the total assets of the 

Army, and new equipment is procured by matching these total assets 

against total requirements. This 

means each unit must maintain onhand equipment and be prepared to 

use that same equipment in the event 

of mobilization. 

FACTS AND FIGURES 

• Reservists on continuous active 

duty for 30 or more days may now 

apply for Army Emergency Relief 

loan s through their units . 

• Approximately 25 percent of 

version process is expected to take volves management instruction for all Army personnel belong to the 

up to three years. junior combat support and combat Army Reserve . 

THE ENGINEER 39 
The SchoolSolution 

You detennine from Appendix M, FM 20·32 (Mine/Countennine operations at the Company Level) that the required antitank mine density is 0.80 

mines per meter of front. This gives a field density of 0.8 AT - 0.8 APFaAPB. 

Since the frontage of the minefield is 1,000 meters (3-4-5 right triangle), 

the time required to emplace the field using the M57 antitank mine dispensing system for the M15 antitank mines and laying the M16 antipersonnel mines by hand is calculated as follows: 

Frontage to be laid: 1,000 meters minus 150·meter gap = 850 meters 

AT mines required equals frontage times density: 850 mines times 0.8 

mines per meter of front =680 mines (M15) 

Add 10 percent for non·parallel rows: 680 times 1.10 = 748 mines 

o 0 M15 mines required 

Time reqUIred = 385 mines per hour 

APF mines APB mines ------- + ------­ 8 per man hour 16 per man hour 

+	 x 1.20 

30 men per platoon 

748 0
 

748 8+16
 

Time required = - +	 x 1.20 = 1.94 + 3.74 

385	 30 

= 5.68 platoon hours 

The number of helicopter sorties required to close the gap in the mine­

field is calculated as follows:
 

Frontage of gap = 150 meters 

Number of mines required	 = AT density times frontage 

= 0.80 x 150 = 120 M56 AT mines 

M56 mines required - 120 - 0 75 1 s rt° Number of sorties -	 - - - . or 0 Ie 160 mines per sortie 160 

-c, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 

1978-0·720-392/4 

40 FALL 1978 
FROM THE EDITOR
 

THE ENGINEER magazine is designed as a medium for disseminating 

information throughout th e Army engineering community. Its goal is to 

increase the understanding of the role and importance of the engineer on 

the battlefield and to promote the professional development of the entire 

engineer family. Those goals are met best if engineers in the field tell us 

what they are doing and ways they see to improve the profession of arms 

as engineers. One way to do that is to provide input to THE ENGINEER. 

Input may take one ot several different forms-letters to the editor, 

fea ture length articles, ph otographs, artistic material, announcements, 

brief news items, or simply suggestions on how to improve the magazine. 

Remember, THE ENGI NEER is your magazine. With your help, we can 

make it a top-flight professional journal. 

JJH 
See PAGE 20