J-A21032-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CRAIG STELTZ

v.

WILLIAM C. MEYERS, M.D.; VINCERA 

CORE INSTITUTE AND VINCERA 

INSTITUTE 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 179 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): March Term 2016- 01720

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2020

I respectfully dissent. While I recognize that this Court’s standard of 

review over a trial court’s award of a new trial is deferential, this case presents 

that rare circumstance in which the trial court has abused its discretion. In 

particular, I believe that both the trial court and the Majority have 

mischaracterized the context of the question posed by Appellant’s counsel and 

overstated the existence of prejudice. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial 

court’s order granting a new trial, and permit the jury’s verdict to stand.

Appellee Craig Steltz’s claims for relief were directed at an alleged 

breach of the professional standard of care1 by Appellant William C. Meyers, 

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1

 Mr. Steltz’s expert David Treen, Jr., M.D. (“Dr. Treen”), espoused his view 

of the applicable standard of care. See N.T. Trial, 8/6/18, at 5 (“[Dr. Treen’s] 
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M.D. (“Dr. Meyers”). Specifically, Mr. Steltz underwent surgery on May 1, 

2014, for athletic pubalgia—or a “sports hernia”—in his right leg. Mr. Steltz 

was, at that time, a player for the Chicago Bears of the National Football 

League (“NFL”). During practice on June 19, 2014, Mr. Steltz felt a “pop” in 

his right leg. Mr. Steltz returned to Dr. Meyers for a consultation on June 30, 

2014. At bedrock, this case concerns competing interpretations of an MRI 

taken that day that was reviewed by, inter alia, Dr. Meyers, Adam Zoga, M.D. 

(“Dr. Zoga”), and Peter Read, M.D. (“Dr. Read”).

Both Dr. Meyers and Dr. Zoga testified that they collectively reviewed 

and discussed the June 30, 2014 MRI of Mr. Steltz’s right leg that same day, 

and concurred in the assessment that the image indicated “a little bit of scar 

breakup” and fluid at the surgery site. See N.T. Trial, 8/7/18 (Part II), at 14; 

see also N.T. Trial, 8/9/18 (Part II), at 47, 49. Based upon this diagnosis, 

Mr. Steltz returned to his training and practice regimen with the Chicago 

Bears. Ultimately, Mr. Steltz was released from the athletic organization.

As pled, Mr. Steltz’s case focused upon a report that was reviewed and 

approved by Dr. Read,2 and which was provided to Appellants at some point 

____________________________________________

testimony revealed the steadfast opinion, whether or not the jury chooses to 

believe it, that [Dr. Read’s interpretation of] the June 30, 2014 MRI should 

have been disclosed to Mr. Steltz, and the failure to do so deprived Mr. Steltz 

of the opportunity for treatment . . . .”).

2

 Although Dr. Read approved the report interpreting the June 30, 2014 MRI 

as showing a “complete tear” of Mr. Steltz’s common adductor muscles, it was 

actually authored by a trainee named Zombor Zoltani. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 
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after their June 30, 2014 assessment of Mr. Steltz had already been 

completed and communicated to Mr. Steltz.3 See Complaint, 5/25/16, at ¶¶ 

19-46. That report diverged significantly from the initial assessment rendered 

by Dr. Meyers and Dr. Zoga, and instead concluded that Mr. Steltz had 

suffered a “complete tear” of his adductor muscle. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 

(Part I), at 62. Although this report was ultimately found in Appellants’ 

records, it is not clear how or at what point that report was transmitted to 

Appellants.4 See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 (Part II), at 52-53. 

Regardless, Mr. Steltz’s claims for relief revolve around the allegedly 

delayed disclosure of the opinions expressed in Dr. Read’s report and the 

validity of Dr. Read’s underlying analysis, as made clear in both his opening 

and closing statements. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 (Part I), at 23-28; N.T. Trial, 

8/10/18 (Part II), at 16-17 (“The negligence of Dr. Meyers is [his] arrogance 

of certainty about an injury that was interpreted completely different[ly]. His 

failure to communicate to his patient and . . . his patient’s employer . . . that 

there was evidence of a tear.”). Indeed, even Mr. Steltz testified that he 

____________________________________________

(Part II), at 13-14. Dr. Read was the attending radiologist who reviewed it, 

concurred in its analysis, and approved the report. Id.

3

 Dr. Read did not review and approve the report created by Mr. Zoltani until 

July 3, 2014, and he did not dictate it until July 5, 2014. See N.T. Trial, 

7/31/18 (Part II), at 14-16, 53. 

4

 Dr. Meyers testified that he “likely” saw the report for the first time on 

August 27, 2014, when Mr. Steltz requested a copy of his medical records 

after being released by his employer. Id. at 54, 56. Mr. Steltz testified that 

he first became aware of the report on September 11, 2014, when he received 

a copy of his records. See N.T. Trial, 8/2/18 (Part II), at 79. 
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blamed Dr. Meyers specifically because of his alleged misinterpretation of the 

MRI. See N.T. Trial, 8/2/18 (Part II), at 88 (“It wasn’t the Bears’ doctor I 

went and saw, who read the MRI, and so I felt like Dr. Meyers was at fault for 

it and not the Bears.”).

Despite the critical nature of the June 30, 2014 MRI and Dr. Read’s 

assessment of the injury it depicted, it is undisputed that Mr. Steltz did not

present any corroborating expert testimony from a musculoskeletal radiologist 

at trial.5 Dr. Read testified on behalf of Mr. Steltz as a fact witness, and was 

never qualified as an expert.6 See Pa.R.E. 702. An expert on musculoskeletal 

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5

 In relevant part, Appellee presented testimony from David Treen, Jr., M.D. 

(“Dr. Treen”), who was qualified as an expert in “athletic pubalgia” and 

testified that his physical examination of Mr. Steltz indicated that he had a 

torn adductor muscle. See N.T. Trial, 8/1/18 (Part I), at 55-58. However, he 

freely confessed that he could not opine about the competing interpretations 

of the June 30, 2014 MRI. Id. at 92-93 (“The two reports describe two totally 

different findings. I don’t know which one is true and which one is false, 

. . . .” (emphasis added)). Along similar lines, Mr. Steltz also presented 

videotaped testimony from Benton Emblom, M.D., who was qualified as an 

expert in orthopedic surgery. See N.T. Trial, 8/2/18 (Part I), at 40-41. He 

similarly opined that Mr. Steltz had suffered a torn adductor muscle at some 

indeterminate point. See N.T. Trial, 8/2/18 (Part II), at 83-84.

6

 Mr. Steltz went to great lengths to establish Dr. Read’s bona fides with 

respect to musculoskeletal radiology. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 (Part I), at 49-

51; N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 (Part II), at 25-26. However, he freely allowed that 

Dr. Zoga was a far more experienced and accomplished radiologist with 

respect to musculoskeletal imaging. See N.T. Trial, 7/31/18 (Part II), at 6-8. 

The burden for such qualification is quite deferential. “[T]he test to be applied 

when qualifying an expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable 

pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation. If he 

does, he may testify and the weight to be given to such testimony is for the 

trier of fact to determine.” Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 971 A.2d 1202, 
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radiology was listed as potential witness on Mr. Steltz’s pre-trial statement. 

See Plaintiff’s Pretrial Memorandum, 2/15/18, at 4 (identifying Jamie 

Checkoff, M.D. as an “expert”). However, Dr. Checkoff did not testify at trial, 

and no other qualified expert addressed the merits of Dr. Read’s analysis on 

behalf of Mr. Steltz.

After Mr. Steltz had rested his case-in-chief, Appellants offered the 

testimony of Dr. Jana Crain (“Dr. Crain”), a musculoskeletal radiologist who 

was qualified as an expert in “interpreting MRI images of the core muscle 

region.” See N.T. Trial, 8/6/18 (Part II), at 42, 52. Overall, Dr. Crain flatly 

disagreed with the conclusions in the report approved by Dr. Read. Id. at 64-

65, 71. Thereafter, Dr. Zoga testified as both a fact and expert witness. See

N.T. Trial, 6/7/18 (Part I), at 41-43. However, Appellants’ qualification of Dr. 

Zoga was unusually fraught with an extended series of inflammatory questions 

and remarks by Mr. Steltz’s counsel that directly touched upon the respective 

credibility of not only Dr. Zoga, but also Dr. Read.

Mr. Steltz’s counsel opened this qualification cross-examination with a 

series of remarks concerning Dr. Zoga’s “enormous, enormous ego.” Id. at 

29. An immediate objection was sustained. Id. at 30. Moments later, 

however, Mr. Steltz’s counsel again insinuated that Dr. Zoga was inflating his 

professional acumen, asking whether other “doctors come up to you, boy, Dr. 

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1209 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted). Still, Mr. 

Steltz apparently chose to concede the opportunity to allow his key witness to 

explain his interpretation of the MRI.
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Zoga, you’re the go-to guy?” Id. at 31. Another objection was sustained. 

Id. at 32. Counsel launched into a series of inquiries concerning Dr. Read’s

professional qualifications and credibility, first suggesting that Dr. Read must 

be competent and accurate in his work due to the fact that he hadn’t been 

“fired” after this incident. Id. at 35-36 (“Wouldn’t you, if you knew that one 

of your people couldn’t do his job right—you don’t want him analyzing images 

that affect the lives of people, do you?”). For a third time, Appellants objected 

on the ground that this testimony was inappropriately touching upon Dr. 

Read’s credibility. The trial court, again, sustained the objection. Id. at 36.

However, Mr. Steltz’s counsel persisted and continued to cross-examine 

Dr. Zoga about Dr. Read, including adducing testimony that Dr. Read: (1) was 

a board-certified radiologist; (2) completed a fellowship in musculoskeletal 

radiology; (3) was still employed by his then-employer; and (4) continued to 

review and interpret radiology images, including MRI. Id. at 36-37. 

Eventually, defense counsel raised another objection when Mr. Steltz’s counsel 

began to examine Dr. Zoga regarding his substantive review of the report 

approved by Dr. Read. Id. at 44-47. Ultimately, the trial court qualified Dr. 

Zoga as an expert in musculoskeletal radiology without any discrete objections 

to his qualifications. Id at 47. 

Throughout the qualification examination of Dr. Zoga, Mr. Steltz’s 

counsel comported himself in a manner that smacked of unprofessionalism, 

even based upon the cold record. His questions to Dr. Zoga and his responses 

to defense counsel and the trial court were peppered with sarcastic asides and 
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feigned contrition, despite admonitions from the trial court. Id. at 29-31, 33-

36, 40-42, 46.

Immediately after this prolonged and heated exchange, defense counsel 

advanced the line of questioning that precipitated this appeal:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: [H]ow many musculoskeletal radiologists do 

you think there are in the country[,] ballpark?

DR. ZOGA: So if the definition is radiologists who interpret 

musculoskeletal imaging, it has to be five thousand.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Five thousand. Five thousand of those 

radiologists and [Mr. Steltz] couldn’t find one of them to come into 

this courtroom to support Dr. Read, did you know that?

Id. at 48. The question was not answered, but it did provoke a strenuous 

objection from Mr. Steltz’s counsel, who requested a mistrial. Defense counsel 

responded that: (1) the question was simply a fair response to Mr. Steltz’s 

counsel’s repeated “borderline” comments; and (2) the “only prejudice” to Mr. 

Steltz was that the comment was “factual.” Id. at 51. 

The trial court declined to grant a mistrial, noting that both parties had 

made “occasional statements” that were problematic. Id. at 52. Instead, the 

trial court issued a curative instruction regarding defense counsel’s allegedly 

inappropriate question, addressing the jury as follows:

When we were last here, there was an exchange between the 

counsel and I just wanted to state, as I stated at the beginning of 

the trial, that the statements and arguments made by counsel do 

not constitute evidence. They are not the facts. Evidence includes 

any testimony of witnesses, documents, and other exhibits 

submitted during the trial constitute facts and I just ask that you 

understand that particular principle, as you evaluate the evidence, 

okay.
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So the parties or counsel have agreed to proceed in a civil fashion. 

So we’ll continue. Thank you.

N.T. Trial, 8/7/18 (Part II), at 4-5.

During defense counsel’s closing statement, he reiterated his earlier 

point regarding the lack of expert support for Mr. Steltz’s position: “Why 

wouldn’t they come in and hire a radiologist to tell us, yeah, I looked at those 

images and Dr. Read is correct.” N.T. Trial, 8/10/18 (Part II), at 52; see also 

id. at 33 (“You heard from musculoskeletal radiologists that there was no tear, 

and that there was no retraction . . . . It’s unquestionable, undeniable, and 

[Mr. Steltz] brought in no one to dispute it.”). Pertinent to our review, no 

objection was lodged by Mr. Steltz with respect to these statements. Id. 

Following a verdict in favor of Appellants, the trial court ultimately 

granted Mr. Steltz’s post-trial motion for a new trial, grounding its reasoning 

in three separate findings, namely: (1) that defense counsel’s question was 

inappropriate; (2) that the question was also prejudicial as it undermined the 

validity of the entire trial; and (3) that the prejudice was of such a type and 

magnitude that it could not be remedied via a curative instruction. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 12/12/18, at 6-7 (“There was no curative instruction this Court 

could have delivered to the jury to fix the harm caused by [Appellants’] 

counsel’s egregious statement that not one musculoskeletal radiologist among 

the 5,000 who practice in the United States could be found to support [Dr. 

Read’s] reading of the MRI.”).
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The learned Majority has largely concurred in the trial court’s legal and 

factual assessment. I must respectfully dissent with respect to each finding.

The legal standards that govern our review of a trial court’s awarding of 

a new trial are well-established, and admittedly deferential to the trial court’s 

decision. As a general matter, a trial court engages in a two-step process 

when responding to a request for a new trial by determining: (1) whether one 

or more mistakes occurred at trial; and (2) whether that mistake is a sufficient 

basis for granting a new trial. See Ferguson v. Morton, 84 A.3d 715, 720-

21 (Pa.Super. 2013). An appellate court essentially engages in the same 

analysis in reviewing the decision of the trial court:

First, the appellate court must examine the decision of the trial 

court that mistake occurred. . . . If the mistake involved a 

discretionary act, the appellate court will review for an abuse of 

discretion. If the mistake concerned an error of law, the court will 

scrutinize for legal error.

If the appellate court agrees with the determination of the trial 

court that a mistake occurred, it proceeds to the second level of 

analysis. The appellate court must then determine whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the request for a new 

trial. An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has 

rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, 

or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. A finding by an appellate court 

that it would have reached a different result than the trial court 

does not constitute a finding of an abuse of discretion. Where the 

record adequately supports the trial court’s reasons and factual 

basis, the court did not abuse its discretion.

Id. at 720 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Where, as here, the trial court “articulates a single mistake (or a finite 

set of mistakes), the appellate court’s review is limited in scope to the stated
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reason, and the appellate court must review the reason under the appropriate 

standard.”7 Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 

2000). However, this assessment is not merely focused upon the mistake 

itself, but also properly includes the attendant “circumstances under which the 

statements were made and the precaution taken by the trial court and counsel 

to prevent such remarks from having a prejudicial effect.” Siegal v. 

Stefanyszyn, 718 A.2d 1274, 1277 (Pa.Super. 1998).

As the Majority correctly points out, “[i]t is improper for counsel to 

present facts to the jury which are not in evidence and which are prejudicial 

to the opposing party,” such that “counsel may not comment on evidence to 

the effect that it removes an issue of credibility from the jury.” Young v. 

Washington Hosp., 761 A.2d 559, 563 (Pa.Super. 2000) (emphasis added). 

The Majority relies heavily upon the holding in Siegal, supra, to affirm 

the trial court’s conclusion that defense counsel committed a “mistake” by 

questioning Dr. Zoga regarding Mr. Steltz’s self-evident lack of expert 

radiology testimony. See Majority Memorandum at 11-12. In Seigal, 

defense counsel in a medical malpractice case made an improper statement 

during closing arguments, which ultimately resulted in the awarding of a new 

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7

 The trial court stated that it relied solely upon defense counsel’s question in 

granting a new trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/19, at 4 (“We wish to take 

this opportunity to disabuse [Appellants] of the notion that we might have 

relied on misconduct other than defense counsel’s improper question to Dr. 

Zoga in granting a new trial.”).
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trial. At the outset of the trial in Siegal, one of plaintiff’s fact witnesses—Dr. 

John Shore—had been precluded from offering expert testimony that the 

defendant’s actions fell below the “applicable standard of care.” Id. at 1276. 

During closing, defense counsel directly referred to this lack of testimony from 

Dr. Shore, stating that its absence indicated that no malpractice occurred. Id. 

On appeal, this Court concluded that these statements were improper. Id. at 

1277 (“[C]ounsel’s argument was clearly improper, as it conveyed to the jury 

something that counsel knew to be untrue, i.e., that Dr. Shore’s opinion was 

not favorable to appellants’ case.”). The statement “so polluted the jury that 

the effect could not be cured by the curative instruction that was given.” Id.

Instantly, defense counsel’s objectionable question was as follows: “Five 

thousand of those radiologists and [Mr. Steltz] couldn’t find one of them to 

come into this courtroom to support Dr. Read, did you know that? N.T. Trial, 

8/7/18 (Part I), at 48. In particular, the Majority has focused upon the use of 

the words “could not find” as proof positive that defense counsel was somehow 

misrepresenting the fact that Mr. Steltz had listed Dr. Checkoff as a potential 

expert witness: 

Appellants’ counsel, having received a copy of [Mr. Steltz’s] pretrial memorandum, was, therefore, put on notice that [Mr. Steltz] 

did find and planned to call as a potential witness another 

radiologist whose findings concurred[8] with Dr. Read’s findings 

____________________________________________

8

 Like the trial court, the Majority has characterized Dr. Checkoff’s report as 

corroborating Dr. Read’s interpretation of the June 30, 2014 MRI. See 

Majority Memorandum at 11; Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/18, at 11 n.3. 
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that the June 30, 2014 post-surgery MRI revealed a tear in the 

adductor longus muscle, an allegation that formed the basis of 

[Mr. Steltz’s] complaint. As such, when appellant’s counsel stated 

that [Mr. Steltz] “couldn’t find” verses “did not find” another 

radiologist who would agree with Dr. Read’s findings, his comment 

was analogous to the statement made by counsel in Siegal.

Majority Memorandum at 11. 

With all due respect to the learned Majority, Siegal is inapposite. By 

focusing solely upon the verb utilized by defense counsel to the exclusion of 

all other substance, the Majority has mischaracterized the basic import of 

counsel’s question. In relevant part, defense counsel’s statement betrayed 

no misrepresentation, but drew valid attention to the indisputable fact that 

Mr. Steltz had not presented expert testimony regarding the correctness of 

Dr. Read’s interpretation of the June 30, 2014 MRI, a critical issue in this case. 

In contrast to Siegal, there was no ruling from the trial court precluding Mr. 

Steltz from presenting Dr. Checkoff’s expert testimony. Hence, defense 

counsel was not exploiting an adverse ruling, but properly referring to an 

____________________________________________

However, Dr. Checkoff’s report concludes that the June 30, 2014 MRI indicates 

only a “partial tear” of the adductor muscle. See Plaintiff’s Pretrial 

Memorandum, 2/15/18. I also note that “[i]t is well established that a report 

prepared by an expert who is not called to testify as a witness is hearsay.” 

Semieraro v. Commonwealth Utility Equipment Corp., 544 A.2d 46, 47 

(Pa. 1988); see also Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739, 745 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (same). Permitting Mr. Steltz to benefit from the contents of an expert 

report that originated from a non-testifying witness is particularly suspect in 

light of the rationale behind this maxim. See Phillips v. Gerhart, 801 A.2d 

568, 575 (Pa.Super. 2002) (observing that opinions contained in medical 

reports are inadmissible “unless the doctor who prepared the report is 

available for in-court, cross-examination regarding the accuracy, reliability, 

and veracity of his or her opinion”).
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unforced error: that Mr. Steltz offered no testimony from a musculoskeletal 

radiologist corroborating Dr. Read’s interpretation of the June 30, 2014 MRI.

9

As such, I do not perceive defense counsel’s question to be the flagrant 

misrepresentation of a fact outside of the jury’s knowledge as identified by 

the Majority, but a question duly predicated upon: (1) the lack of expert 

radiology testimony presented by Mr. Steltz; and (2) Dr. Zoga’s testimony 

that there were approximately 5,000 musculoskeletal radiologists potentially 

available for such consultations. Both of these facts were of-record. 

Moreover, Dr. Read’s interpretation of the June 30, 2014 MRI was both the 

subject upon which Dr. Zoga was called to testify, and the lynchpin of Mr. 

Steltz’s case. Although inartfully phrased, I do not believe that defense 

counsel’s question here is in the same disfavored category as the statement 

identified in Siegal.

I also believe that the Majority and the trial court have failed to properly 

view the entirety of the circumstances surrounding defense counsel’s question 

in assessing this “mistake.” Immediately before defense counsel asked his 

question, Mr. Steltz’s counsel had just finished attacking Dr. Zoga’s credibility, 

as bolstering Dr. Read’s interpretation of the June 30, 2014 MRI, over 

numerous sustained objections. See N.T. Trial, 8/7/18 (Part I), at 29-47. I 

note that “[e]ven an otherwise improper comment may be appropriate if it is 

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9

 At the close of the defense case, Mr. Steltz was afforded an opportunity to 

present rebuttal testimony, but largely limited his presentation to 

demonstrative testimony not relevant to this appeal. See N.T. Trial, 8/10/18 

(Part I), at 41-53. No rebuttal expert testimony was adduced.
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in fair response to [opposing] counsel’s remarks.” Commonwealth v. 

Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 974 (Pa. 2014). 

Stated directly, Mr. Steltz’s counsel’s pursued an inflammatory and 

inappropriate line of interrogation with Dr. Zoga regarding both his credibility, 

and that of Dr. Read. As Appellants have argued, I believe that the fair 

response doctrine applies quite aptly to these circumstances.10 Counsel’s 

remarks do not constitute reversible error where they are “a reasonable 

response, in both scope and force, to trial counsel’s attack on the witness’ 

credibility.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 470 (Pa. 2011). 

Here, defense counsel’s single question appears quite proportional in 

light of the conduct of Mr. Steltz’s counsel detailed above. Specifically, Mr. 

Steltz’s counsel was responsible for initially broaching the subject of credibility 

on multiple fronts during his cross-examination of Dr. Zoga. Moreover, he did 

so in a way that was clearly calculated to buttress Dr. Read’s credibility and 

diminish Dr. Zoga’s credibility. In the face of such gamesmanship during an 

adversarial contest, defense counsel cannot be expected to stand mute. 

In short, I must part ways from the Majority with respect to its 

affirmance of the trial court’ conclusion that defense counsel’s question was 

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10

 See Appellants’ brief at 22 (arguing that even if defense counsel’s question 

“broached an improper subject,” it was nonetheless a “fair response” to the 

questioning perpetrated by Mr. Steltz’s counsel); see also N.T. Trial, 8/7/18 

(Part I), at 51 (same argument preserved at trial).
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inappropriate.11 With specific reference to our standard of review, I do not 

believe that the record sufficiently supports the legal and factual assessments 

rendered by both the Majority and the trial court. While my own analysis 

would end at this point, I will also briefly address the remainder of the 

Majority’s contentions. 

“A new trial is not warranted merely because some irregularity occurred 

during the trial . . . .” Harman, supra at 1121. The award of a new trial as 

a result of improper conduct by counsel is an extraordinary remedy, and is 

only appropriate if “the unavoidable effect of the conduct or language was to 

prejudice the factfinder to the extent that the factfinder was rendered 

incapable of fairly weighing the evidence and entering an objective verdict.” 

Poust v. Hylton, 940 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

The Majority’s assessment of the second prong of our analysis, i.e., the 

prejudicial effect of defense counsel’s question, also relies quite heavily on its 

presumption that defense counsel somehow took “liberties” with the facts. 

See Majority Memorandum at 14 (citing Young, supra at 561; Siegal, supra

at 1277). As indicated above, I do not concur in the assessments of defense 

counsel’s statements under the rubric provided by Siegal and Young. In the 

absence of the factual distortion relied upon by the Majority, I find the 

following discussion from Ferguson instructive:

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11

 See Demosthenes, The Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, (1st ed., 

1868) at 33 (translated by Sir R.P. Collier) (“But the facts speak for 

themselves, they are too plain.”).
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A trial in an American court is distinctly an adversary proceeding 

and is therefore bound at times to excite counsel into making 

statements overladen with partiality. However, so long as 

decorum is maintained, and there is no leaving the highway of fact 

to agitate in the marshes of palpable exaggeration, unwonted 

characterizations, hortatory appeals to latent prejudices, and 

improper imputations of gross motives, there is no reason why 

lawyers should not be permitted to express themselves in such 

manner as they believe best serves the interests of justice. 

Ferguson, supra at 723 (quoting Rondinelli v. City of Pittsburgh, 180 

A.2d 74, 77-78 (Pa. 1962)). 

To my mind, the conclusion that defense counsel’s single question 

undermined confidence in the trial as a whole is not adequately supported by 

the record or the law. Accord Ferguson, supra at 725 (“[I]t is self-evident 

that prejudice mounts as the tenor of the comments in question grows more 

flagrantly improper and the frequency of similar comments increases.”). To 

the extent that the Majority claims that defense counsel’s question “removed” 

the determination of Dr. Read’s credibility from the jury, I re-emphasize that 

it was Mr. Steltz’s counsel who first raised that issue with Dr. Zoga during an 

extensive cross-examination. See N.T. Trial, 6/7/18 (Part I), at 33-47.

Finally, the Majority also relies upon Siegal in support of its conclusion 

that the trial court’s curative instruction was insufficient. See Majority 

Memorandum at 14. In Siegal, the trial court’s curative instruction was found 

to be insufficient because it “did not accurately convey to the jury what was 

true, i.e., that [defense] counsel knew that Dr. Shore’s opinion would have 

favored [plaintiff’s] position.” Siegal, supra at 1277. 
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As explained above, I do not find Siegal to be an adequate parallel to 

the instant case. Here, the trial court issued a curative instruction directing 

the jury to disregard the contents of defense counsel’s question. See N.T. 

Trial, 8/7/18 (Part II), at 4-5. Accordingly, I also fail to see why this curative 

instruction was insufficient to dispel any potential for prejudice. See 

Ferguson, supra at 725 (“Jurors are presumed to obey the court’s 

instructions, and, if ever an inappropriate comment could be cured by 

sufficient correction and admonition from the bench, the trial court’s efforts in 

this case would suffice.”); see also In re Smith, 579 A.2d 889, 896 

(Pa.Super. 1990) (“[T]he jury is presumed to have acted within the legal 

parameters established by the court and with a proper evaluation and 

weighing of the evidence.”). 

Based on the foregoing discussion, I respectfully dissent.