156th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the

2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

A Report Prepared by the Staff of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

WASHINGTON:1998

REPORT ON ARMENIAS

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

MARCH 16 AND 30, 1998
ii

This report is based on Helsinki Commission staff delegations to Armenia to observe both

rounds of the March 1998 presidential election. As part of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Observer Delegation during the first round, Commission Staff attended meetings with the Central

Election Commission and most of the candidates. Commission staff also spoke with representatives of the media, NGOs, and the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.

During the second round, the Helsinki Commissions Senior Advisor worked closely with

the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the Yerevan office of the National Democratic

Institute, and the U.S. Embassy. On election day, he spoke with regional and local election officials, candidates proxies and voters.

The Helsinki Commission wishes to express its gratitude to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and to Ambassador Peter Tomsen and the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan.
iii

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

234 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6460

(202) 225-1901

csce@mail.house.gov

http://www.house.gov/csce/

ALFONSE D’AMATO, New York, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Co-Chairman

JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

MATT SALMON, Arizona CONRAD BURNS, Montana

JON CHRISTENSEN, Nebraska OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts HARRY REID, Nevada

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland BOB GRAHAM, Florida

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

Executive Branch

HON. JOHN H. F. SHATTUCK, Department of State

VACANT, Department of Defense

VACANT, Department of Commerce

________________________

Professional Staff

MICHAEL R. HATHAWAY, Chief of Staff

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Deputy Chief of Staff

E. WAYNE MERRY, Senior Advisor

ELIZABETH CAMPBELL, Staff Assistanystems Administrator

MARIA COLL, Office Administrator

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Communications Director

ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor (Vienna)

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel for International Trade

SANDY LIST, GPO Liaison

KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion

RONALD MCNAMARA, Staff Advisor

MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law

MAUREEN WALSH, Congressional Fellow for Property Restitution Issues
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the

leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. Since then, its membership has

expanded to 55, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. (The

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, has been suspended since 1992, leaving

the number of countries fully participating at 54.) As of January 1, 1995, the formal name of the

Helsinki process was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic

and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, it undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve

conflict within and among the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of permanent

representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various

locations and periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION (CSCE)

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance with the agreements of the OSCE.

The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives, nine

members from the U.S. Senate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and

Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and Senate and rotate

every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff of approximately 15 persons

assists the Commissioners in their work.

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates information on Helsinkirelated topics both to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports

reflecting the views of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing information about the activities of the Helsinki process and events in OSCE participating States.

At the same time, the Commission contributes its views to the general formulation of U.S.

policy on the OSCE and takes part in its execution, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings as well as on certain OSCE bodies. Members of the

Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of

non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from OSCE participating States.
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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3

ELECTION LAW ........................................................................................................................... 9

THE CANDIDATES AND THEIR PLATFORMS ........................................................................ 9

CAMPAIGN ................................................................................................................................. 11

MEDIA COVERAGE................................................................................................................... 11

OBSERVERS ............................................................................................................................... 11

VOTING ....................................................................................................................................... 12

COUNTING ................................................................................................................................. 13

RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................... 13

ODIHR ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................... 14

 RUNOFF ELECTION ................................................................................................................. 15

SECOND ROUND VOTING ....................................................................................................... 15

SECOND ROUND VOTE COUNT............................................................................................. 16

RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................... 17

ODIHR ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................... 17

ODIHR FINAL REPORT ............................................................................................................. 18

CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS ...................................................................................... 19
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1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 On March 30, 1998, Armenians went to the polls to choose a president in a runoff between

Robert KocharianArmenias Prime Minister, Acting President and former President of

Nagorno-Karabakhand Karen Demirchian, former Communist Party leader of Armenia.

The election followed first round voting on March 16, in which none of the 12 candidates

managed to win the necessary 50 percent of the ballot. According to Armenias Central

Election Commission, in the second round, Kocharian won 59.48 percent to Demirchians

40.52 percent, to become Armenias second president. Reported turnout was 68.14 percent.

 Some candidates in the first round questioned the eligibility of Kochariana native of

Nagorno-Karabakh, not Armeniato run, but the Central Election Commission registered

his candidacy. The subsequent contest between Kocharian and Demirchian presented voters with a choice between a young nationalist outsider who led Nagorno-Karabakhs

campaign for self-determination and an older, Communist-era leader, forced from office in

1988 because of Karabakh, who represented the past and popular nostalgia for the easier

life of a bygone time.

 The extraordinary election followed the resignation on February 3 of Levon Ter-Petrossyan,

President of Armenia since 1991. Ter-Petrossyan had retained his post in a September 1996

election marred by violations which severely damaged his legitimacy and reputation. His

subsequent acceptance of the OSCEs Minsk Group proposals to resolve the NagornoKarabakh conflict, publicly expressed in fall 1997, generated deep divisions within his

government. The Defense Minister and Minister of National Security allied with Prime

Minister Kocharian against Ter-Petrossyan, whose position enjoyed little or no visible backing among the political opposition and society. As his support faded away, Ter-Petrossyan

left office, implying that he had been forced to resign and explicitly asserting that the party

of war had won.

 After two flawed elections in 1995 and 1996, the March 1998 vote offered Armenia, under

different leadershipwith Ter-Petrossyan gone and his party, the Armenian National Movement, in disarray an opportunity to redeem its image as a democratizing state. Most

observers concurred that the campaign was better than in earlier elections: no candidate

was excluded from the race, there were no serious impediments to campaigning, and the

candidates received their allotted air time. But the preliminary statement of the OSCE/

ODIHR observation mission, issued after the first round, emphasized violations and warned

that the recurrence of such problems during the second round might place the elections

legitimacy in doubt. The Council of Europe and the CIS Parliamentary Assembly, however, gave the March 16 voting good grades and openly disputed the assessment of the

OSCE/ODIHR. Armenian-American groups accused the OSCE/ODIHR of anti-Armenian

bias, reflecting a purported tendency to pressure Armenia into accepting the OSCEs allegedly pro-Azerbaijani proposals on Nagorno-Karabakh.

 No less controversial was the OSCE/ODIHR verdict on the second round, which went through

two stages. An April 1 preliminary statement noted that in some areas, the run-off fell

short of Armenias commitment to OSCE standards, and cited sufficient indication of

voter fraud to require further investigation. Still, the statement concluded, these shortcom-
2

ings did not call into question the outcome. Again, other international organizations and

Armenian-American groups attacked the OSCE/ODIHR assessment as too harsh, while

some OSCE/ODIHR staff and observers took strong issue with an assessment they thought

too positive and not reflective of the violations they had reported to the ODIHRs election

coordinators.

 The first two preliminary statements were written by Sam Brown, former head of the U.S.

Delegation to OSCE, and ODIHRs Special Representative, who led the observation mission. By striking contrast, ODIHRs final report, released in Warsaw on April 10, reversed

course, concluding that the election did not meet the OSCE standards to which Armenia

committed itself in the Copenhagen Document of 1990. Among numerous other problems, ODIHR noted widespread ballot-stuffing, discrepancies in the vote count, and the

presence of unauthorized persons at polling stations. But the report did not explicitly judge

whether the violations affected the outcome, leaving it to others to infer whether the results

were credible.

 Helsinki Commission monitoring of both rounds yielded a mixed picture. The most serious

problem observed during first-round voting was disorganization in small polling stations

swamped by large numbers of voters, and the vote count went well in a precinct where

numerous violations took place in 1996. But the vote count observed during the second

round featured blatant fraud: the ballot box was tampered with during the vote; extra ballots

were present in the box in large and obvious packets; the vote count made no effort to

distinguish valid from improper votes; the precinct committee was in direct contact with

Kocharian headquarters throughout the count; and the precinct protocols were falsified to

make the numbers add upin the direct view of the foreign observers. All the falsified

votes were for Kocharian, who was openly supported by most members of the precinct

committee. At least one fifthand maybe as many as halfof the votes counted in this

precinct were false. Subsequently, at the district election level, the box containing the ballots detachable coupons (a mechanism designed to prevent fraud) arrived over an hour

late with the lid ripped open. Based on these observations, and the accounts of many ODIHR

observers at their debriefing, there is reason to harbor grave doubts about the reliability of

the officially-reported results.

 International observation of the two-round election was itself part of the controversy, highlighting differences between OSCE/ODIHR and other monitoring organizations about the

conduct of the election and the general level of democratization in Armenia. The discrepancies between the ODIHRs second preliminary statement and its final report have also

raised questions about the ODIHRs appointment of a Special Representative to head the

observation mission. The fact remains, however, that the final assessment of the OSCE/

ODIHR, which fielded 140 observers during the second round and based its judgement on

their reports, concluded that the March 1998 Armenian presidential election did not meet

OSCE standards. Since the 1991 election of Levon Ter-Petrossyan, Armenia has not held

an election that OSCE/ODIHR observation missions have been able to qualify as free and

fair, or that the losers in the contest have accepted as the definitive will of the voters. As

before, opposition parties openly questioned the legitimacy of Armenias president. Karen

Demirchian, Kocharians defeated opponent, rejected the official tally, but called on his
3

backers to remain calm and refrain from the sort of disturbances that had taken place in

September 1996.

 Nevertheless, Kocharian is in a much stronger position than his predecessor, as the events

of the last several months have thoroughly shaken up Armenias political constellation.

The formerly banned Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) have returned to the

political arena, and strongly support Kocharian. Even more important, he has the backing

of the power ministriesDefense and National Securityas well as Yerkrapah, an organization of hardened veterans of the Karabakh conflict. Leading the opposition are Karen

Demirchian, who has pledged to remain politically engaged, and National Democratic Union

leader Vazgen Manukian, whose loss in the September 1996 election now looks more controversial than ever. They are preparing for parliamentary elections, which may take place

before the scheduled July 1999 date.

 Many heads of state, including President Clinton, sent Robert Kocharian letters of congratulations after the April preliminary statement, before the release of the OSCEs final

report. Kocharian was inaugurated on April 9, pledging to pursue economic reform, fight

corruption, and continue to defend the right of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination.

He has explicitly rejected Ter-Petrossyans stance on the Karabakh issue and the OSCEs

proposals. At their first meeting, Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev pledged

to maintain the cease-fire and settle the conflict by peaceful means. Whether Kocharians

hardline position deadlocks negotiations and makes renewed war more likely, or whether

his credibility as a Karabakh defender facilitates a deal remains to be seen.

BACKGROUND

In the early 1990s, Armenia was a relatively stable, predictable country while neighboring

Georgia and Azerbaijan were wracked by ethnic conflict, ravaged by armed gangs and coups detat

necessitated unscheduled elections. In the second half of the decade, however, Armenia has become a country of surprises. For example, nobody expected the habitually fractious opposition to

unite behind one candidate against incumbent Levon Ter-Petrossyan in the September 1996 presidential election. In March 1997, Ter-Petrossyan stunned his country and the world by appointing as

Prime Minister the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh. One year later, Ter-Petrossyan had to resign, and

in the ensuing extraordinary election, the reemergence of Armenias former Communist Party boss

startled candidates and analysts alike. This pattern reflects both the gravity of the choices Armenia

must now make, and the change in political fortunes of Levon Ter-Petrossyan, who had come to

power calling for the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

By 1998, Ter-Petrossyan had fallen from grace. The man who led Armenia to independence

and initially steered the country in democratic directions had lost most of his popularity. In December 1994, he banned the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or Dashnaks) for

being financed and led from abroad, which Armenian law forbids. From then on, relations between

government and opposition steadily deteriorated into a virtual state of rhetorical war, and Armenias

reputation suffered. International observers called the July 1995 parliamentary election, in which

the ARF was unable to participate, and other parties claimed to have been intimidated, free but not

fair. With Armenias economy in dire straits, and the political atmosphere ever more strained,

hundreds of thousands emigrated. For many who remained, their president became an isolated,
4

detached figure disdainful of press conferences and other means of maintaining contact with the

electorate. Still, the economy picked up in 1996 and the opposition was divided, so Ter-Petrossyan

had reason to expect an easy victory in the September 1996 presidential election. Shortly before the

vote, however, the opposition united behind Vazgen Manukian, turning a cakewalk into a bitterly

fought horse race. On September 25, the Central Election Commission announced that Ter-Petrossyan

had barely won enough votes to avoid a runoff, with 51.75 percent to Manukians 41 percent.

Manukians supporters stormed the parliament, and beat up the Speaker. It took the imposition of a

state of emergency to restore order, but the events left a legacy of election-related violence and

deep concern about the degree of polarization in Armenias body politic. Ultimately, the final report of the OSCE/ODIHRs Election Observation Mission concluded that there was reason to doubt

the officially announced results.1

Ter-Petrossyan never recovered from the election and its aftermath. Though he retained his

post, with the backingsome claimed at the pleasureof the Ministers of Defense and National

Security, his legitimacy in the eyes of Armenians and the international community was deeply

damaged. Ter-Petrossyans post-election appointment of the highly regarded Armen Sarkissian as

Prime Minister helped salve some of the wounds caused by the election. Sarkissian pledged to

pursue economic reform and, equally important, he reached out to the political opposition. But

when he had to resign for health reasons, Ter-Petrossyan selected Robert Kocharian, President of

Nagorno-Karabakh, to replace him in March 1997. Analysts saw various reasons for the totally

unexpected choice: some focused on the fact that Kocharian had no local power base or clan ties in

Yerevan; others stressed that Kocharian, as a national hero for having overseen the defense and

military victory of Nagorno-Karabakh, was a badly needed unifying figure in a divided polity. Still

others maintained that Kocharian was the only man who might be able to sell a negotiated settlement of the conflict to Nagorno-Karabakh. Certainly, many in Baku thought his appointment meant

that a settlement on terms that would preserve Azerbaijans territorial integrity would be even

harder, if not impossible.

By winter 1997, the OSCE-brokered talks on Nagorno-Karabakh were deadlocked. Though

a 1994 cease-fire remained in effect, the OSCE negotiations had yielded little progress since the

Minsk Group was formed in 1992. In December 1996, at an OSCE Summit in Lisbon, the Chairman-in-Office proposed three principles for addressing the dispute: recognition of Azerbaijans

territorial integrity, the highest level of autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh, and security guarantees

for the Armenian population. In effect, the statement made plain the OSCEs backing for Azerbaijans

territorial integrity, which meant no support for Nagorno-Karabakhs independence or unification

with Armenia. All OSCE states except for Armenia signed on to these principles, leaving Yerevan

isolated. Since then, Armenia has argued that the Lisbon statement pre-determined NagornoKarabakhs status, instead of leaving that decision to the Minsk Conference, as envisaged by OSCE,

and has blamed the Lisbon Statement for the virtual breakdown of negotiations.

In 1997, with pressure intensifying to resolve the longstanding conflict, the structure of the

OSCEs Minsk Group underwent changes. Previously, there had been two co-chairs: Russiaa

permanent co-chair, as decided by the December 1994 Budapest OSCE Summitand another,

_____________

1

See Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on Armenias Presidential Election of

September 22, 1996, Washington, D.C., December 1996.
5

rotating co-chair, which had been Finland. When Finlands tenure lapsed, the OSCE proposed

France. Azerbaijan demurred, fearing Paris would be pro-Armenian, because of Armenian-French

voters, and insisted the United States replace France. Ultimately, agreement was reached to add

Washington to Moscow and Paris, creating a Troika.

In May 1997, the Troika presented to the parties to the conflict a set of proposals. The

provisions remain confidential to this day, but according to official statements and leaks from

various sources, they sought to address issues which could be resolved quickly, while putting off

concerns deemed too problematic. Reportedly, the plan envisaged Armenian withdrawal from occupied territories, a return of refugees, deployment of international peacekeeping forces, an end to

Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the beginning of negotiations over

the eventual status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Shusha and Lachin. As these events were structured

around a timetable, with a decision on Nagorno-Karabakhs status a subject of future negotiations,

it became widely known as the phased approach, as opposed to a package deal, in which all the

conflicts outstanding issues would be settled at once.

Nagorno-Karabakh had long rejected any phased resolution, arguing that the withdrawal of

Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories would give Baku a tangible benefit without

ensuring Nagorno-Karabakhs security. Nevertheless, by late September, representatives of the

Minsk Group expressed optimism that a settlement of the conflict was possible before the end of

1997. Indeed, on September 26, at his first press conference in five years, Levon Ter-Petrossyan

said that the Minsk Group had proposed on September 21 postponing a formal decision on Karabakhs

future status until other issues, including the withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied

Azerbaijani territory and repatriation of refugees, had been resolved. He urged compromise, saying

the international community would not accept independence for Karabakh or unification with Armenia.

The immediate reaction in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia to Ter-Petrossyans gesture

was strongly negative. Nagorno-Karabakhs newly elected President Arkady Ghukassian said that

Armenia has not been authorized to settle the dispute on our behalf, adding that Nagorno Karabakh will never agree to become subordinate to Azerbaijan and exist as an enclave. In Yerevan,

Prime Minister Robert Kocharian openly expressed his preference for a package settlement. Political and intellectual opposition figures rallied to denounce Ter-Petrossyan, demanding that he hold

a referendum on the issue or resign.

After a barrage of criticism, Ter-Petrossyan followed up on November 1 with an exhaustive

article in Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, laying out for the first time in public his vision of Armenias

overall situation and prospects for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He argued, first, that

war must be precluded and the conflict resolved exclusively through peaceful negotiations. Second, the international community would not tolerate the status quo much longer because it threatens regional cooperation and security as well as the Wests oil interests. Third, the ongoing

conflict is palpably hindering the economic development of Armenia--and, therefore, of Karabakh. It is causing complications in our relations with the international community and, especially,

with neighboring countries that can have fatal consequences.

To justify his contention that a solution was needed sooner rather than later, Ter-Petrossyan

maintained that Today Armenia and Karabakh are stronger than ever. But if the conflict is not
6

resolved, within a year or two they will be substantially weakened. That which we are rejecting

today, we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history.

Ter-Petrossyan argued for a compromise. By first rejecting the package, then the step-bystep solutions, and today proposing to return to the package approach, the Karabakh side has put

both Karabakh and Armenia in an uncomfortable situation. Nonetheless, I do not think that we are

facing tragedy or a deadlock, since it is possible to combine these two approaches easily. The main

thing today is the resumption of negotiations that have been interrupted for a year.

Ter-Petrossyan offered the assurance that any resolution would require the signature of

Nagorno-Karabakh, and afterwards, the ratification by the respective parliaments of the conflicting

parties. But his article generated even greater controversy than his remarks at the September press

conference. After much persuasion, he managed to win the support of his own party, the Armenian

National Movement (ANM). But Prime Minister Kocharian, backed by Defense Minister Vazgen

Sarkissian and National Security Minister Serzh Sarkissian, rejected the OSCE proposals. For several months, the pressure on Ter-Petrossyan grew, while he and his government attempted to

downplay the degree of dissension. At a January 7-8 meeting of the National Security Council,

however, which was attended by representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, disagreements were impossible to conceal and thenceforth increasingly entered the public arena.

Other than the ANM, the Hnchak Social Democratic Party of Armenia backed Ter-Petrossyan,

as did the Liberal-Democratic Party (Ramgavars). But most political parties attacked Ter-Petrossyan

for defeatism. Critics pointed to his illegitimacy, arguing that he had no right to represent Armenia

or make decisions about Nagorno-Karabakh.

By January, the confrontation within the government had grown intense, while public pressure mounted on Ter-Petrossyan to resign. Events took a bizarre turn with alleged assassination

attempts on several officials. Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian accused Vano Siradeghian,

Yerevan Mayor, ANM leader and close Ter-Petrossyan associate, of orchestrating the attacks so as

to find a pretext to force the governments resignation. Sarkissian said he would not resign even if

Ter-Petrossyan ordered him to do so, and neither would the Prime Minister or National Security

Minister. On January 29, the government of Nagorno-Karabakh had to issue a statement denying

an Armenian press report that two of its ministers had met with Armenian officials to plot TerPetrossyans overthrow.

In these circumstances, Ter-Petrossyans support melted away. On February 1, Vano

Siradeghian and Foreign Minister Alexander Arzoumanian resigned. By February 2, 40 legislators

had left the ANM for Yerkrapah, a 5,000-strong organization of military veterans of the NagornoKarabakh war, which now became the majority faction in parliament. Yerkrapah leader Albert

Bazeyan accused Ter-Petrossyan of working against the collective will of the people, and called

on all Yerkrapah forces to leave the ANM.

Finally, on February 3, Ter-Petrossyan resigned, explaining on television: The bodies of

power known to you have demanded my resignation. Since the use of the constitutional powers

vested in the president would be fraught with a serious threat of destabilization of the country, I

have met this demand. Ter-Petrossyan added specifically that the party of war has won. Parlia-
7

ment accepted his resignation by a vote of 111 to 36. Speaker Babken Araktsian then announced

his own resignation, and proclaimed Robert Kocharian Acting President of Armenia.

The manner of Ter-Petrossyans resignation struck many as a velvet coup, while others

openly called it a military coup. Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian rejected the characterization,

arguing that Ter-Petrossyans departure had proceeded peacefully, fully in accordance with constitutional norms. Without knowing exactly what transpired between the participants, it is difficult to

characterize Ter-Petrossyans resignation. It could also be, as some analysts suggested, that he left

office rather than become a figurehead president.

Armenias constitution stipulates that if a president leaves office prematurely, extraordinary elections must take place within 40 days. Although Kocharian initially indicated he would not

be a candidate, saying he was not even sure he was a citizen of Armenia, on February 10, he

announced his intention to run for the office.

Kocharians eligibility to run immediately became a matter of heated dispute. According to

Article 50 of Armenias Constitution, individuals at least 35 years old who had been a citizen of

Armenia for the last 10 years...permanently living in the Republic for 10 years, and had the right to

vote can be elected President of Armenia. Kocharian, however, had spent his life in NagornoKarabakh, and indeed, in the eyes of the international community, which recognizes Azerbaijans

territorial integrity, might be seen as a citizen of that country.

Nevertheless, Kocharians legal advisors and backers offered the following arguments in

favor of his eligibility. First, the Republic of Armenia, which became independent in 1991, had not

formally existed for 10 years, so one could argue that nobody had the right to run for president.

Second, Kocharians unclear citizenship status had not prevented him from being elected to Armenias

parliament in 1989 and 1990. Moreover, in June 1988, the Supreme Council [legislature] of the

Armenian SSR adopted a resolution on the unification of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh

Autonomous Republic, which had never been annulled. In fact, in December 1989, a joint session

of the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenias Supreme Council adopted a document on reunification.

Nor was the 10-year residency requirement an obstacle, considering that in fall 1991,

Armenias Central Election Commission [CEC] registered Paruir Hayrikian as a presidential candidate, even though from 1988 to 1990 he had been stripped of Soviet citizenship and exiled. As

Kocharian told Aravot on February 24, the Republic of Armenia has not existed for 10 years.

Besides, I was a deputy to the Armenian parliament for seven years. I have served as Armenian

prime minister for one year. If Im not eligible, then who is?

Others remained unconvinced and contended that he clearly had no right to run. The most

vocal proponents of this view were Communist Party leader Sergey Badalian and parliamentary

deputy and announced candidate David Shakhnazarian. Vazgen Manukian himself coyly declined

to take a position; his representatives in the CEC, however, voted against Kocharians registration.

In all, seven CEC members voted to reject his candidacy, others abstained. The law requires twothirds of all 20 CEC members to deny an application, so the CEC ruled in favor of registration.
8

As if the resignation of Ter-Petrossyan, the rise of Kocharian to the post of Acting President, and the holding of pre-term elections were not surprise enough, the February 13 announcement of Karen Demirchians candidacy came as a shock. Demirchian, Armenias last Communist

Party leader, had left office in 1988, forced out by the nationalist wave of the Nagorno-Karabakh

movement. Since then, he had run an electrical factory and played no role in the countrys political

life. Demirchian had no political organization and no carefully articulated program. Instead, he

appealed to the explicit and implicit longing among many Armenians for the security, relative

prosperity and perceived social justice of the Soviet era. His candidacy touched a chord with the

constituency of Armenias Communist Party, which advocated the formation of a renewed USSR,

and with backers of an initiative to gather signatures in favor of Armenias accession to the RussiaBelarus Union.2

 Against this background, Demirchian offered the additional attraction of experience, incarnating, as it were, a simpler era, fondly remembered by many.

No less remarkable than Demirchians political resurrection was how quickly his campaign

gathered steam. Observers reported that his carefully planned rallies attracted crowds of devoted

supporters, many elderly, of course, but by no means all. According to public opinion surveys, he

soon rose to the first rank of candidates, outpolling political veteran Vazgen Manukian and challenging Kocharian. As the election drew close, Kocharian and Demirchian were neck and neck.

The contest between them offered Armenias voters a stark choice: a young nationalist committed

to the cause of Nagorno-Karabakh and economic reform, and an older, Communist-era leader with

an uncertain program, offering vague promises and playing to nostalgia.

Both candidates had pluses and minuses. Kocharians youth, economic reformism and technocratic orientation appealed to voters thinking about the future. On the other hand, some Armenian voters, however committed to Nagorno-Karabakh, feared he would complicate, if not make

impossible, a negotiated settlement of the conflict; others resented the meteoric rise of an outsider. Demirchiannot a nationalist or personally bound up with Nagorno-Karabakhseemed

capable of sitting down with his old colleague Heydar Aliev in Baku and somehow cutting through

the knottier aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, while stirring memories of a time when most

Armenians lived better. Yet his claim to experience cut both ways, as he also reminded voters of

Leonid Brezhnev. Nor did he reflect the heady, traumatic events of the past decade, when Armenia

attained independent statehood and forged a new national identity based on the struggle for NagornoKarabakh.

Apart from the starkness of the choice between the two leading candidates, and the strategic

implications of their respective approaches to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the election process

itself was significant. After two highly criticized elections, the March 1998 vote offered an opportunity to show that Armenia could hold elections deemed satisfactory by the participants, the public

and the international community. The perception of the fairness of the process would point the

way: a country bogged down in post-Soviet authoritarianism or back on track to democratization.

After the widespread disenchantment of the late Ter-Petrossyan period, many expected Armenias

electorate to display revivified interest and passion.

_____________

2

In September, organizers claimed to have over 1 million signatures. The Communist Party also claimed to

have collected 800,000 signatures in support of Armenias joining the Russia-Belarus union.
9

ELECTION LAW

As no changes had been made to the law regulating the September 1996 election, its provisions were still in effect in March 1998. The president serves a 5-year term, and can serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. A candidate needed 50 percent plus one of the valid votes cast to

win on the first round. There was no minimum turnout requirement.

Political parties, blocs and individuals could nominate candidates, who needed to gather

25,000 signatures and 2 million drams (about $5,000.00). Candidates who won at least five percent

of valid votes cast got back their electoral deposit. Registered candidates could appoint two proxies

to represent their interests in election commissions.

The expenses for holding the elections came out of the budget of the Central Election Commission (CEC). Candidates could also use their own financial resources to campaign, as well as

contributions from individuals and legal entities

There were no precincts organized in military units or hospitals; soldiers voted in regular

polling stations. To enhance the transparency of the process, the chairman of the polling station was

supposed to post a copy of the protocol summarizing the results of the voting. A candidates proxy

or a foreign observer could receive a copy of the protocol, verified by the signatures of the chairman of the committee or the secretarys stamp.

The election law had been criticized by international observers after the 1996 election. In

the view of the OSCE/ODIHR Final Report (April 10, 1998), the law, as applied in March 1998,

created a serious administrative burden and does not guarantee transparency in the election process.

THE CANDIDATES AND THEIR PLATFORMS

Each candidate had to present the required signatures and money by March 1. The CEC was

supposed to authenticate the signatures and register the candidates by March 6.

Ultimately, the CEC registered 12 candidates: Acting President and Prime Minister Robert

Kocharian; Karen Demirchian (Socialist Party), Vazgen Manukian (National Democratic Union),

Sergey Badalian (Communist Party), Paruir Hayrikian (Self-Determination Union), Aram Sarkissian

(Democratic Party), David Shakhnazarian (Member of Parliament), Vigen Khachatrian (Liberal

Democratic Party), Tigran Sahakian (Assembly of Armenians), Artashes Geghamian (National

Accord Party), Hrant Khachatrian (Constitutional Rights Union), and Yuri Mkrchian (civic initiative). With so many candidates, the likelihood of a first round victory was small. It was clear from

the beginning that most of the candidates had no chance and would give their support, such as it

was, to one of the participants in the runoff.

The section below on the first round candidates concentrates on the eventual participants in

the runoff election, with attention to some of the more notable contenders. Given the circumstances

of Ter-Petrossyans resignation, most of the candidates took an even firmer line in support of

Nagorno-Karabakh than they might have otherwise.
10

Robert Kocharian: The Acting President and Prime Minister was best known as the former

President of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a committed defender of Nagorno-Karabakhs right to selfdetermination. Exactly what that meant was not clear but most voters probably assumed he understood self-determination in the broadest possible terms, including de jure independence. In contrast

to his rationalist predecessor, Kocharian openly campaigned as a nationalist, promoting nationalist

themes. He was endorsed by Armenias most nationalist party, the ARF, and his campaign was

heavily manned by prominent Dashnaks.

During his tenure as prime minister, Kocharian had pursued economic reform and fought

corruption. He pledged to continue these policies and to attract Western investment. Kocharian

maintained that Armenias economic possibilities were not exhausted or entirely dependent on

ending the countrys isolation from its neighbors, but that greater organization could squeeze out

greater production. He advocated limiting the powers of the presidency and restoring the balance

between the executive and legislative branches, while promoting the independence of the judiciary.

Kocharian sharply differed with Ter-Petrossyan on dual citizenship, which Ter-Petrossyan

always opposed. During the election campaign, Kocharian often spoke of the need to involve the

Armenian diaspora in the countrys politics and strongly advocated dual citizenship.

Karen Demirchian: The Communist Party boss of Armenia (1974 to 1988), and most recently the manager of Armenian Electric Machinery Plant, was nominated by the Socialist Party

Congress on February 13. It would be an exaggeration to say Demirchian had an actual program.

Without providing details, he promised to solve Armenias foreign and domestic problems, alluding to his considerable experience. Demirchian pointed to the alleged success of his plant as proof

of his ability to turn the economy around. He promised to ease the plight of those who had suffered

the consequences of industrial decline and seen the benefits of privatization go to the well-connected allies of those in power. As for Nagorno-Karabakh, he hinted that his old association with

Heydar Aliev would facilitate an accord, while insisting on Nagorno-Karabakhs right to self-determination.

Vazgen Manukian: The man who maintained he had been robbed of victory in September

1996 advocated parliamentary control of the executive branch and eventually, a parliamentary, not

presidential, system. Manukian urged the election of local officials, instead of their appointment by

the president. He called for turning Armenia back into an industrial country, with emphasis on high

technology, and restoring free medical care and education. Like Kocharian, Manukian favored dual

citizenship. He repeatedly said throughout the campaign that holding a free and fair election was

more important than his victory.

Sergei Badalian: Badalian called for returning to a socialist economy, restoring the social

benefits of the Soviet era, a parliamentary form of government, a Union with Russia and Belarus,

and eventually a restored USSR on a confederative basis. Badalian attacked Demirchian, who obviously threatened to steal his voters, and also accused Kocharian of violating the Constitution by

agreeing to run.
11

Paruir Hayrikian: Armenias most famous dissident, Hayrikian had spent 17 years in Soviet Gulag for advocating Armenian independence. In 1996, he had withdrawn in favor of Vazgen

Manukian in order to improve the odds of defeating Levon Ter-Petrossyan.

CAMPAIGN

Constitutional provisions stipulate 40 days for an extraordinary election, a short time, as all

acknowledged. The campaign officially began on March 7 and ended on March 15.

All candidates received 90 minutes of free air time on television, in an order determined by

lottery. Candidates could buy another 180 minutes. They also received 120 minutes of free time on

radio and could purchase another 240 minutes. Helsinki Commission staff attended meetings the

candidates held with members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observer delegation. None of

the candidates complained about unequal access to the media, including television.

Apart from television and radio spots, candidates campaigned all over Armenia. For the

most part, these rallies went well. There was one violent incident on March 8 in Ararat, where

toughs disrupted a Manukian rally. Eight people were injured, two of whom required hospitalization, including one member of the Central Election Commission. The Ministry of Internal Affairs

fired the local police chief, and four people were arrested.

Robert Kocharian was backed by the Unity and Justice bloc, which included numerous

parties, including the Social Democratic Party, the Armenian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen and the Scientific-Industrial and Civic Union.

As the election campaign heated up, candidates traded accusations. The most common charge

against Kocharian was that he unfairly exploited the powers of the presidency. For example, the

Public Center in Support of Vazgen Manukian charged that the government-run electronic and

print media were supporting the candidacy of Kocharian, even before the official start of the campaign. Several days before the election, Demirchian alleged wholesale intimidation and bribery on

behalf of Kocharian. Kocharian, for his part, responded that the others were, in fact, guilty of all the

above, and were making groundless accusations so as to be able to claim fraud when they lost.

MEDIA COVERAGE

The European Institute for the Media, which monitored coverage of the campaign, confirmed that all the candidates got their allotted air time and space in the print media. But EIM also

reported that Kocharian received far more news coverage during the first round on Channel 1 of

State television than other candidates, and the official newspaper Hayastani Hanrapetutiun gave

him four-to-five times more editorial coverage than any other candidate.

OBSERVERS

Domestic: The election law did not mention domestic monitoring, which the CEC understood to mean it was not sanctioned. After the experience of the September 1996 election, Western

organizations and embassies strongly urged that provision be made for domestic observers, such as

Vote Armenia, which had observed the July 1995 election throughout the country, and had issued
12

a strongly critical report. Twenty Members of the U.S. Congress, including some of Armenias

strongest supporters, sent a letter to Robert Kocharian on March 1, urging the accreditation of

domestic monitors. Kocharian publicly favored the idea, but on March 2, Parliament voted it down.

As a result, there was no countrywide observation effort by local, non-partisan observers.

Foreign: The OSCEs Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)

mounted an observation mission, which arrived in Yerevan about a month before the voting. The

mission was based in Yerevan and set up several regional offices. ODIHR appointed Sam Brown,

former head of the U.S. Delegation to OSCE, as Special Representative. He was primarily responsible for writing the observation missions assessment of the election.

For election day, observer delegations also came from the Council of Europe, the European

Parliament, the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the Russian Duma.

VOTING

Voting took place on March 16 from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. Helsinki Commission staff observed

voting in various precincts in Yerevan.

Voters had to present a form of photo identification, usually a passport, to receive ballots,

which they marked near the name of their preferred candidate. The ballots listed in alphabetical

order the names of the candidates, their party membership, place of employment and occupation,

the party or bloc which nominated the candidate, or the words civic initiative. Voters opposed to

all the candidates could mark the box Against All.

Polling station workers registered the voters identification number on the voter list, which

voters had to sign to receive a ballot. As a safeguard against fraud, the ballots had a detachable tearoff coupon, on which polling station workers wrote the voters identification number. Voters deposited the ballots and the coupons in separate ballot boxes, and the number of coupons was supposed to match the number of ballots.

Mobile ballot boxes, which are easily susceptible to ballot stuffing, were not used for civilian voters, but the Ministry of Defense reached agreement with the CEC to allow them in 13 border

regions where troops were stationed. The boxes were to be under civilian control and international

observers were permitted, although they had to accept responsibility for their own security.

In all the precincts visited, there were proxies of various candidates. The most striking

feature of the balloting was overcrowding, as large numbers of voters tried to fit in small polling

stations. For the most part, however, Helsinki Commission staff observed no serious violations,

except for the presence everywhere of people loitering in the precinct. In one polling station, there

was a serious disturbance when someone later identified as a director of one of Yerevans markets

entered, accompanied by over a dozen young men. He immediately began screaming that the polling station was located too far from his home. The ruckus lasted about 45 minutes until he left with

his entourage. Voting continued throughout, but the atmosphere was certainly intimidating, and the

election commission chairman engaged in a shouting match with a candidates proxy.
13

COUNTING

Helsinki Commission staff returned to the same polling station in Yerevan where, in September 1996, serious electoral violations took place. In March 1998, the former chairman had been

replaced, and none of the commission members was familiar.

The count began on an excited note: at closing time, about 100 people were in the polling

station, demanding to vote, and loudly protesting the refusal of the chairman to let them. They

explained that they had fled as refugees from Baku to Armenia almost 10 years ago. On election

day, they had been driven around the city from precinct to precinct, but had not been allowed to cast

ballots. The chairman explained that as refugees, they were not citizens and could not vote. Some

complained bitterly to Helsinki Commission staff that their sons had to serve in Armenias army

but they were deprived of the right to vote. Ultimately, the chairman held his ground and ordered

them to leave. They eventually did and the count began about 10:30 p.m.

Whereas in 1996, the chairman in this polling station had obviously tried to draw out the

vote so foreign observers would leave, in the first round of March 1988, the count went quickly,

without any obvious violations. The chairman, as stipulated in the law, showed every ballot to all

commission members. There were no signs of ballot stuffing, i.e., bunches of ballots stuck together. None of the observers or candidates proxies, who remained in the precinct throughout,

complained of or displayed signs of intimidation, or protested the behavior of the election commission.

It soon became clear that the race in this precinct would be between Kocharian and

Demirchian, with the others far behind. Demirchian won, with 630 votes to Kocharians 535, while

Manukian got 308.

RESULTS

According to the CEC, voter turnout was 63.4 percent. Kocharian received 38.76 percent,

Demirchian 30.67 percent. Manukian came in third, with 12.24 percent, followed by Badalians

11.01 percent. The rest of the field was far behind: Hayrikian got 5.41 percent, and nobody else

managed to win one percent.

Shortly before the polls closed, Karen Demirchian, Vazgen Manukian, Sergey Badalian,

Paruir Hayrikian and David Shakhnazarian issued a joint statement protesting the conduct of the

election. They charged large-scale fraud, including ballot stuffing, intimidation of proxies, etc.

Hayrikian subsequently retracted his objections, describing the vote as substantial progress in

Armenias democratization, and asserting that cases of alleged vote irregularities will hardly

affect the outcome of the pre-term ballot.

Six members of the CEC, claiming electoral violations, refused to sign the final protocol on

the March 16 vote: Norayr Khanzadian (Self-Determination Union), Armen Khojoyan (Intellectual

Armenia), Filaret Berikian and Vova Hakhverdian (National-Democratic Union), Vania Mkhitarian

and Vilen Sukiassian (Communist Party).
14

ODIHR ASSESSMENT

The OSCE/ODIHR long-term observer mission arrived in Yerevan February 14. For election day, the mission fielded over 200 international observers, visiting over 800 of almost 1600

polling stations, and then following the vote count in polling stations, in many Community Election Commissions and all 11 Regional Election Commissions. On March 18, the mission issued a

preliminary statement about the first round, which noted that the campaign had generally gone

smoothly, although the abbreviated election calendar meant that voter lists were not in the best

order and local precincts were not as well prepared as they might have been.

The ODIHR assessment of the voting, based on the observations of the international monitors, was that in most polling stations, election personnel tried diligently to implement the law.

However, in approximately 15 percent of precincts significant violations of law or regulations

were observed. These would have called into question the validity of the election had there been a

close result. We regret that this first round of the elections fell short of the standards to which

Armenia has committed itself in OSCE documents.

The ODIHR mission singled out the following problems requiring attention before the second round: incidents of ballot stuffing in at least three precincts and substantial evidence of attempts at ballot stuffing in several more precincts; instances of military officers directing their

soldiers how to vote; the use of state resources on behalf of Robert Kocharian, when, for example,

kerosene was distributed to voters who promised to vote for him; the presence of unauthorized and

unidentified people in polling stations, especially personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; a

continuing imbalance in state media coverage of the candidates, favoring Kocharian; and the abovementioned violent incident in Ararat on March 8.

Other international observers, including the Council of Europe and the British Helsinki

Human Rights Group, had a better opinion of the election, which they believed had certainly gone

better than previous elections in Armenia. It was their view that whatever violations may have

occurred were minor and inconsequential. A Council of Europe expert said at a press conference

that other observers were surprised at the ODIHR statement and that Sam Browns statement reflected a rather falsified picture of reality....an objective observation was not expected from the

OSCE.

In Armenia, the ODIHR preliminary statement generated protests. The head of the CEC

criticized the report and dismissed the flaws cited. Political forces across Armenias political spectrum described the OSCE as prejudiced against Armenia, because of its opposition to the Minsk

Group proposals. In Washington, Armenian-American organizations also condemned ODIHR. On

March 20, the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) wrote to the U.S. Helsinki Commission:

We can draw no other conclusion except that the OSCE report seriously calls into question the

impartiality of that body concerning Armenia and its democratic institutions. Regrettably it follows

a consistent pattern of bias against Armenia which has manifested itself most flagrantly in the

proceedings of the OSCE Minsk Group where demands for compromises have been one-sided in

favor of Azerbaijan. The AAA attacked as irresponsible Sam Browns characterization of the

election as deeply flawed and ascribed the differences between the OSCE preliminary statement

and the more positive assessment of the Council of Europe to the deliberate omission by ODIHR

of the good points of the election.
15

 RUNOFF ELECTION

As none of the 12 candidates had garnered 50 percent of the vote, the two highest votegetters, Robert Kocharian and Karen Demirchian, emerged as the contenders in the runoff scheduled for March 30. Kocharian won the endorsement of first-round candidates Paruir Hayrikian,

Aram Sarkissian and Hrant Khachatrian, as well as the Russia-Belarus-Armenia National Initiative public organization. The small Christian Democratic Union (KDM), previously allied with

Ter-Petrossyans Armenian National Movement, came out for Demirchian.

Vazgen Manukians NDU refused to back either candidate, charging the results of the first

round were falsified. He called on his supporters to vote in accordance with their conscience. The

Communist Party also refused to endorse either candidate. But the Union of Patriotic Forces of

Armenia (UPFA), which had backed Badalian, supported Kocharian.

Both candidates campaigned on television and at rallies across the country. Once again,

Demirchian accused his opponent of trying to create an atmosphere of fear and pressuring the

public to vote for him. Kocharian responded that Demirchian was merely preparing to claim fraud

when he lost.  He, in turn, accused Demirchians campaign of spreading libelous leaflets about him,

which Demirchians campaign denied. Demirchian also denied charges that he was secretly allied

with Levon Ter-Petrossyans Armenian National Movement. He called for strengthening the legislative branch and said he had no substantive differences with Kocharian on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Demirchian promised to revive Armenian heavy industry but, as before, provided no details as to

how.

Kocharian again advocated amending the constitution to limit presidential power, especially the right to dissolve parliament. He pledged to pursue economic reforms despite his support

by leftist parties and predicted economic growth of eight to ten percent. Addressing a rally in

Yerevan, Kocharian said a close contest might lead to problems: There should be more than a 10

percent difference between the candidates so that no one can humiliate our country and call into

question the legitimacy of the president.

Demirchian charged that Kocharian was dominating television coverage and imposing an

information blockade on him, by giving him only a few minutes of air time a day. But Demirchian

did not appear at a scheduled television debate with Kocharian on March 28, insisting on changes

in the election law as a precondition.

According to the European Institute for the Media, during the second round campaign,

Channel 1 devoted 42.15 per cent of its editorial coverage to Kocharian and 16.65 percent to

Demirchian, leaving the rest of its coverage to the election process itself. Hayastani Hanrapetutiun

gave 53.32 percent of its coverage to Kocharian, versus 37.79 percent to Demirchian. Also, the

ratio of positive/negative/neutral references to candidates in state-controlled media was greatly in

favor of Kocharian.

SECOND ROUND VOTING

On March 30, the Helsinki Commissions Senior Advisor observed the voting in over a

dozen precincts in Yerevan. Voter participation was quite modest all daya fact confirmed by
16

precinct committee chairmen and by the candidates proxies (present at all polling stations visited).

Instances of crowding at peak voting periods were strikingly absent.

In general, election officials followed most of the formalities of the voting process. There

was no campaign agitation or literature present, police remained off the premises of polling stations

as required by law, the registration of voters was generally correct, and voting took place in private

without any observed efforts by officials to influence the choice. In fact, some precincts made a

notably positive impression. One chairman, for example, had gone through the voter list name by

name to note deceased persons and residents known to be out of the country or in the military to

prevent any attempt to vote using those names.

There were problems, however. The voter lists were woefully out of date and incomplete (a

frequent complaint of election commission personnel). Access to stocks of unused ballots resided

almost exclusively with the precinct committee chairmen and were out of sight of candidates

proxies. Safeguards against abuse of voting materials by election officials were almost non-existent. Finally, at many precincts, the arrival of foreign observers often prompted large numbers of

young men to leave rapidly, sometimes in vehicles with two-way radio antennas. The law prohibits

unauthorized persons in the polling stations, and it was noteworthy that ordinary votersindeed,

all persons other than these young mendid not loiter in and near the polls. Questions addressed to

officials and police about the presence and activities of these unauthorized groups elicited no satisfactory answers.

SECOND ROUND VOTE COUNT

For the vote count, the Helsinki Commissions observer selected a precinct typical of those

visited during the day, neither the best nor the worst. Indeed, this polling station had received high

marks on procedures and organization during the actual voting.

When the observer arrived, election officials were unwelcoming but made no attempt for

the next six hours to conceal what can only be described as flagrant fraud. It was immediately

evident that the front of the ballot box had been pulled out from the frame, for purposes that soon

became clear. The obviously frightened Demirchian proxy scarcely uttered a word throughout the

night, did not object to the fraud being committed, and spent much of the night slumped in a chair

in dejection. The Kocharian proxy, by contrast, impeded the process, frequently consulted through

a window behind a curtain with associates outside, and made (clearly audible) telephone calls to

Kocharian headquarters.

The opening of the ballot box revealed a lower layer of neat piles of individually-folded

ballots in groups of twenty and fifty, all for Kocharian, all marked in the same manner, and without

any of the peculiarities of folding or smudging characteristic of the genuine ballots which emerged

from the box. An upper stratum of ballots exhibited more hurried stuffing, with groups of Kocharian

ballots folded together in clumps, often of fifteen or twenty but also in smaller numbers. When

questioned about the ballots folded together, the chairman initially explained them as family voting but later ceased any pretense. Of the more than twenty-seven hundred ballots, there was only

a single instance of even two folded together for Demirchian.3

_____________

3

When the first clump of twenty ballots was noted by the monitors, one member of the committee angrily said

to the Kocharian proxy, You idiot, look what youve done to us.
17

The committee chairman, who showed the ballots to other commission members, did not

try to hide the packets of stuffed ballots. His deputy attempted subterfuge by dropping packets on

the floor and pushing stuffed ballots around on the table in order to confuse the monitors in their

count, but he gave way to another member who simplified matters by ostentatiously fanning ballot

packets while counting them and then declaring all for Kocharian without bothering to glance at

them. Most committee members cheered the announcement of the first Kocharian ballot; at the end

of the count one member telephoned to Kocharian headquarters to announce, We won!

According to the tabulation of the Helsinki Commission monitor and his OSCE co-observer, at the very least, there were 580 obvious stuffed ballots, or 21 percent of ballots counted.

This figure does not include any of the hundreds of packets of fewer than five ballots. A reasonable

but still conservative estimate is that one-third of the ballots counted, and quite possibly one-half,

were false.

The box of detachable coupons from this polling station arrived at the Community Election

Committee over one hour later than the international observers, with the lid of the supposedly

sealed box ripped open. OSCE monitors at a number of Community Election Committees observed

obvious evidence of coupon stuffing by numerous precincts: folded packets of coupons, coupons

with identical signatures and piles of coupons in sequential numbered order. The OSCE monitors at

Achapniak reported that, after some initial effort to count coupons, the officials there simply gave

up and recorded the number of coupons based on the precinct reports of ballots cast. The precinct

officials clearly opened their coupon box to mix up the coupons so as not to present such obvious

stuffing.

RESULTS

The Central Election Commission released the final results on April 6. Robert Kocharian

was the victor, with 59.49 percent to Demirchians 40.51. Voter turnout was 68.14 percent.

ODIHR ASSESSMENT

ODIHR issued a preliminary statement about the second round on April 1. Noting that the

mission had deployed almost 140 observers to over 680 polling stations (over 40 percent of polling

stations throughout the country), and monitored the vote count, the statement concluded that in

some areas, the elections fell short of the commitments Armenia has made to OSCE standards.

These included: large discrepancies in some Yerevan precincts between signatures and ballots cast;

clearly forged voter signatures; ballot box stuffing; extraordinarily high turnout in several polling

stations, which raised questions about the integrity of the process; a high level of unauthorized

personnel in polling stations; and inadequate voter lists. In several instances, there is sufficient

indication of vote fraud to require further investigation and possible criminal charges.

Nevertheless, given the compacted election schedule, both for the first and especially the

second round, the CEC performed professionally. Most important, Overall, these elections are a
18

step forward from the troubled 1996 elections toward a functioning democracy. The shortcomings

[mentioned above] do not cause us to question their outcome.

Again, the Council of Europes assessment was more favorable. Lord Russell-Johnston,

head of the Council of Europes Monitoring Mission, told a press conference in Yerevan: The

second round of the presidential voting was well-organized: the elections were passed peacefully

and in accordance with the law. There is no doubt concerning the legitimacy of these elections.

This is a steady step along the path towards Armenian accession to the Council of Europe. I congratulate Mr. Kocharian on his election and commiserate with Mr. Demirchian on his defeat and

congratulate both of them on having met together in a civilized way to discuss the best future for

Armenia. That is the democratic way forward.

ODIHR FINAL REPORT

On April 3, ODIHR announced that the observation mission was extending its activity in

Armenia to investigate continuing reports of violations. In fact, ODIHR was scrambling to address

a serious problem: Sam Browns second preliminary statement had generated deep dissension among

ODIHR personnel, who considered the election to have been more seriously flawed. On April 10,

the final report, which reflected a more negative view of the conduct of the election, was released.

As for media coverage, the election demonstrated significant improvements over prior Armenian elections, and both print and broadcast media endeavoured to provide improved coverage in the

second round over the March 16 poll. All presidential candidates were provided opportunities to

present themselves to the electorate through the provision of free and paid access to state media.

Nonetheless, media coverage failed to meet the requirements set out in paragraph 7.8 of the Copenhagen

Document to provide unimpeded access to the media for candidates on a non-discriminatory basis.

ODIHRs overall verdict was that Armenias Extraordinary Presidential Election of March

16 and 30 does not meet the OSCE standards to which Armenia has committed itself in the

Copenhagen Document of 1990. Armenia held elections that were characterized by serious flaws in

both 1995 and 1996. This election showed improvement in some respects over the 1996 election,

but the 1996 election is not an appropriate standard for assessing a meaningful election process in

line with OSCE commitments. Specifically, the Election Observation Mission observed widespread ballot stuffing, discrepancies in the vote count, a large presence of unauthorized persons in

polling stations, and instances of intimidation directed toward voters, election commission members, candidate proxies and international observers.

In response, Armenias Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing puzzlement over

the significant differences between the April 10 final report and the preliminary statement, issued

on April 1, two days after the runoff election: In all likelihood we should look for the source of

these contradictions inside the OSCE. We dont want to believe that the only organizationthe

OSCEmediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has any sort of prejudicial relationship toward

Armenia.

Again, pro-government parties and allies of Kocharian blasted the reports alleged bias

against Armenia. By contrast, the newspaper of Vazgen Manukians NDU said Armenia had lost
19

its chance to join civilized Europe. Demirchian reportedly did not comment on ODIHRs final

assessment, which also generated no strong public response.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

Democratization

Unfortunately, after the experience of 1995 and 1996, it would have been difficult to justify

expectations of a good election while Levon Ter-Petrossyan and his team were in power. Their

departure generated hopes that Armenia, now under new management, could get back on track. In

the event, the 1998 campaign was certainly better than in previous elections, considering that no

candidates were excluded, all received the allotted time in the electronic and print media and were

able to meet as they pleased with the electorate. Moreover, it took two rounds to determine the

outcome, a first in presidential elections in the Caucasus, where incumbents have great advantages.

However, the voting and especially the vote count in both rounds continued to exhibit serious problems. Observers reports of ballot stuffing, coupon stuffing and protocol tampering in

many precincts and Community Election Commissions indicate an intention to ensure a particular

outcome. The fact that all of the above took place in the presence of international observers raises

obvious questions about what happened in precincts where no observers could watch the proceedings. Reports by OSCE/ODIHR monitors about how widespread these patterns were indicate direction from above and, perhaps, intimidation.

There have been divergent assessments of Armenias election (see below). But the fact remains

that Armenia has not held an election since 1991 that the OSCEs observers have been able to characterize as free and fair, or that has been accepted as such by the loser. Optimists take heart from the positive

assessment of the Council of Europe, seeing progress compared with previous elections, and presumably extrapolating continued advances in future elections. Pessimists despair at the negative judgement

of the OSCE/ODIHR, seeing a pattern of flawed elections, regardless of who is in power.4

ARF leader Vahan Hovanissian, citing international pressure related to the Minsk Group,

said the OSCE assessment would have been negative, even if the conduct of the election had been

ideal. His statement accords with the views of the Armenian Government, with which the newly reregistered Dashnaks are now closely aligned. But during the September 1996 election, when the

ARF was still banned, the party did not accuse the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission of

bending to political or geostrategic pressure when the final, negative verdict was announced.

After the 1995 and 1996 elections, which foreign observers criticized, Armenian Government spokesmen and its defenders abroad claimed differenthigherstandards were being set for

Armenia than for other countries. Yet with Levon Ter-Petrossyan out of power, it would be difficult to find anyone in Armenia now who would claim those earlier elections did not deserve severe

criticism. Today, those justifying the March 1998 election maintain that ODIHR unfairly dispar-

_____________

4

A Karabakh journalist writing in Pravda (April 4, 1998) concluded that It is always the authorities that

triumph at the elections in Armenia....Throughout the republic not a single official was to be found who ventured

openly to urge people to vote for anyone other than Kocharian. Because bitter experience suggests that he who at that

moment is in power will invariably win the election...
20

ages Armenias conduct of elections to force Armenians into accepting an OSCE-brokered deal on

Nagorno-Karabakh that is favorable to Azerbaijan or to penalize them for resisting such pressure.

The argument has apparently convinced some non-Armenian organizations as well.5

 But ODIHRs

final report on the 1996 re-election of Levon Ter-Petrossyan did not temper its criticism, even

though he was always seen as a moderate on Nagorno-Karabakh. Nor is it clear how or why a

negative ODIHR assessment of the 1998 election should sway Robert Kocharian into softening his

attitude to OSCE Minsk Group proposals he considers dangerous for Nagorno-Karabakh. And if

the purported intention was to punish him by withholding international legitimacy, it would signal

the OSCEs giving up on the Minsk Group: the example of Ter-Petrossyans failed effort to sell the

Minsk Group package to Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia should have demonstrated conclusively

that only a popular, legitimate president has any hopes of doing so.

In fact, various observers and ODIHR personnel have voiced the suspicion that Sam Brown

wrote the relatively positive preliminary assessment of the second round precisely to help save a

Minsk Group process that is floundering. If so, there might indeed be a link between the OSCE

negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh and the ODIHRs April 1 judgement of the electionbut not

the one official Yerevan, the ARF and the Armenian Assembly allege. In a conversation with

Helsinki Commission staff, Brown strongly denied any such motivation, and restated his conviction that the violations observed did not influence the outcome of the election. He acknowledged,

however, that his appointment as ODIHR Special Representative added an element of political

sensitivity to the technical aspects of election monitoring and assessing an elections fairness.

OSCE/ODIHR and Armenia: In the last two presidential elections, the OSCEs election

observation has become part of the story, instead of merely reporting on and evaluating the fairness

of the process. In September 1996, ODIHRs preliminary assessment concluded that the reported

irregularities had not materially affected the outcome of the vote at this stage of the process, a

very careful formulation that proved highly controversial, and the subsequent judgement of the

final report was far harsher. In 1998, the shift between the first and second preliminary statements

and especially the discrepancies between the second preliminary statement and the final report

have raised questions about ODIHRs professionalism and ability to conduct disinterested election

observation, at least in Armenia.

ODIHRs problems in Armenia are relevant to all OSCE states and merit serious discussion. To some extent, the difficulties flow from the proliferation of organizations now observing

elections. OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (which has an agreement to coordinate election observation with ODIHR), the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the British Human Rights Helsinki Group, the CIS Parliamentary Assembly and the Russian Duma all sent

delegations to Armenia in March 1998. Unquestionably, not all of these organizations employ the

same standards, and some, it is clear, have agendas other than election monitoring. Specifically, the

CIS Parliamentary Assembly delegations are well known for approving elections in the former

USSR routinely. In fact, during the second round in Armenia on March 30, the delegations blessing was broadcast on television before the vote count had even begun. These delegations, generally

headed by a Russian, appear to be instruments of Russian foreign policy, intended to smooth rela-

_____________

5

See, for the example, the report by the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, Armenia 1998: Update on the

Presidential Elections, April 24, 1998.
21

tions between Moscow and the capitals of other former Soviet republics. The same obviously applies to Russian Duma delegations.

The Council of Europe, for its part, had an observer delegation of two people for the second

round. Moreover, the Council of Europe, which accused OSCE/ODIHR of politicizing its assessment, is itself vulnerable to the same charges. The Council is currently considering the application

of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, all of which now have Special Guest status, for accession to

the CoE. Among the conditions for entry is the holding of democratic elections. It would be politically very awkward to reject or delay the acceptance of any one of the three countries, which

presumably creates pressure to sanction elections in all, lest the entire process of integrating the

Southern Caucasus states into European institutions be uneven or grind to a halt. Indeed, on April

22, Armenpress reported that newly appointed Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian said

the Council of Europes positive opinion of the Armenian presidential election would greatly facilitate Armenias joining the Council of Europe.6

Of all foreign election observation missions, only ODIHR is able to cover a significant

percentage of polling stations by fielding large numbers of foreign observers during the vote and

vote count. Many of them are experienced election monitors, others are employees of governments

or NGOs working in the country, quite familiar with the terrain and the local politics. The national

origin of the observers is highly varied, and it is unreasonable to assume they share whatever views

their governments may have about the country or region where the election is taking place. In any

case, they generally travel in pairs, which is a safeguard against prejudicial reportage. ODIHR

delegations are also headed by election specialists, backed up by logistical experts.

Still, the most critical issue is what use the person/persons writing ODIHRs assessment

make of all the information thus gathered. Both Sam Brown and ODIHR acknowledge serious,

continuing disagreements between them in evaluating observers reports about the second round,

and as a result, the handling of the 1998 Armenian presidential election has left ODIHR particularly open to charges of politicizing election observation. If a component of OSCE is to engage in

election observation, it must rigorously eschew any agendas other than evaluating the fairness of

the process, with no thought to the political fallout, which is the responsibility of individual governments and the OSCE to address. Should ODIHR continue to appoint special representatives to

oversee the observation mission and write the assessment, clearly, better coordination is needed

between them and the entire observation team than was evident in Armenia.

Among the most basic rationales for international observation of elections is that first, foreigners are less directly involved in the outcome, not personally tied to any of the candidates or

parties, not subject to possible intimidation and so are able to assess objectively the conduct of the

election. Second, the judgement of international observers should therefore be more credible to the

electorate than the claims of governments or partisan monitors. But if these factors are not in place,

perhaps it is preferable for the brunt of the election observation to be borne by non-partisan, local

_____________

6

Hovannes Igitian, Chairman of the Armenian Parliaments Committee on Foreign Relations, told reporters

on April 28 that the Council of Europes Parliamentary Assembly considered Armenia in compliance with two of the

three conditions for full membership: adequate handling of elections and legalization of the Dashnak party. RFE/RL

Armenia Report, April 28, 1998.
22

election monitors, accompanied by international observers whose primary function would be to

protect them from possible pressure by interested local parties, instead of making judgements.

Robert Kocharian: Ordinarily, a negative assessment of an election by the international

communitys observation mission undercuts the legitimacy of the winner. In the case of Robert

Kocharian, the damage is mitigated by several factors: first, the Council of Europes blessing of the

election; second, the flip-flops between the first and second preliminary statement and the final

report undermine ODIHRs credibility.

Third, and more important, most of the candidates in the first round have made their peace

with Kocharian. Paruir Hayrikian, for example, backed him in the runoff, and was rewarded with

the post of Advisor to the President on Human Rights.7 On May 4, Kocharian also appointed firstround candidate Aram Sargissian his advisor on foreign policy. In contrast to Levon Ter-Petrossyan,

therefore, Robert Kocharian and his presidency have not polarized Armenian politics and society.

Nor does he have to deal with the unfortunate legacy of personal antipathy characteristic of the last

few years. This reservoir of good willor at least, absence of bad willand the desire by all

parties to look forward and address Armenias problems will stand Kocharian in good stead. Obviously, he will have to produce results to maintain his currently strong position.

Still, though well ensconced and obviously capable of political infighting, Kocharian, like

his predecessor, must reckon with Vazgen Sarkissian and Serzh Sarkissianthe power ministers. Unlike Ter-Petrossyan, he may not have any serious disagreements with them over policy and

may not fear ministers who control the countrys armed forces. Should discord arise, especially

over Karabakh, Kocharian may also be in a better position to convince them of his position and win

them over. But he cannot fail to see that the Sarkissians helped to oust one president and might do

the same to another if they felt it necessary.

During the campaign, Kocharian often pledged to amend Armenias 1995 constitution to restrict the power of the presidency, a promise he repeated in his inauguration address. This has not happened in any of the Newly Independent States, so if Kocharian follows through on his pledge, it would

be an innovation. But it is one thing to call for cutting back presidential power when one is not yet a

president, and another to limit ones own prerogatives. The most frequently mentioned restraint involves

stripping the president of the right to dissolve parliament, instead giving parliament the right to dissolve itself. Even if implemented, however, Armenias head of state would retain very wide powers,

and the result would still be far from the parliamentary system advocated by the NDUs Vazgen Manukian and the ARF when the latter party was banned and hounded. Rethinking the relations among

the branches of power may become a critical issue in Armenian political discourse in the next year.

Finally, Kocharian enjoys broad support among Armenias far-flung diaspora, a reflection

of his toughness on Nagorno-Karabakh, his good relations with the ARF and his call to involve the

diaspora more closely in Armenias governance. In fact, he has ordered the establishment of a

special department for relations with the diaspora within the Foreign Ministry, headed by a deputy

_____________

7

Hayrikian on April 27 said that the human rights situation in Armenia is catastrophic. He accepted the post

on the understanding that reforms would focus on curbing executive abuses, enlarging the powers of parliament and

establishing the independence of the judiciary. Noyan-Tapan, April 28, 1998.
23

minister. The intensified interaction between Armenians abroad and their homeland should make

the diasporas backing for Armenia, already impressive, even more effective.

Government-Opposition Relations: The events of the last few months have shaken up

Armenias political constellation. When Robert Kocharian became Acting President, he moved to

re-register the ARF and release Dashnaks from prison. Yerkir, the Dashnak newspaper closed in

December 1994, resumed publication. The speed of the ARFs legalization after Ter-Petrossyans

resignation demonstrates how politicized the Ministry of Justice had been. After over three years in

the political wilderness, the ARF is closely allied with Kocharian, who, after winning the presidency, appointed a Dashnak, Yuri Mkrchian, Minister of Education and Science.8

 Kocharian also

appointed ARF leader Vahan Hovanissian Advisor to the President, in charge of relations with

NGOs and political parties.

Leading the opposition now are the Communists, the NDU and Karen Demirchian. Yet

even they do not seem inclined to confrontation with Kocharian. Sergey Badalian, for his part,

endorsed nobody in the second round, but his Communist Party does not question Kocharians

legitimacy and pledged to work with him on national security, economic and social development

issues.9 Even members of Vazgen Manukians NDU have been approached by Kocharian and offered positions in his administration,10 although there have been no overt signs of reconciliation

between Manukian himself and Kocharian. Karen Demirchian, for his part, apparently still smarting from defeat in a contest he considers unfair, has remained aloof. He did not attend the inauguration (nor did Manukian), and while Demirchian has not indicated acceptance of Kocharians

victory, he has not openly challenged him or made a point of denying his legitimacy.

While Kocharian did not create a coalition government, he has called for a forum institutionalizing a consultative role on policy for all political forces in the country. Unlike Ter-Petrossyan,

therefore, Kocharian has thus far promoted inclusiveness in the political system, which should help

smooth relations with all parties and moderate the tone of political discourse.

Kocharians relations with the ANM are harder to predict, as are the overall prospects for

that party. Levon Ter-Petrossyan accepted the invitation to attend Kocharians inauguration, even

though the gesture could not have been easy or pleasant on the personal level. His statesmanship,

comportment and status as president emeritus foster the development in Armenia of a tradition of

civilized transfers of power, despite the controversial nature of his resignation. Kocharian, for his

part, has sought to reassure the former ruling party that there will be no reprisals against it, even

though some ARF spokesmen have called for retribution against those who persecuted the Dashnaks.

The influence of the ANM, still headed by the controversial Vano Siradeghian, has waned. Kocharian

has begun naming his own people to head Armenias 11 regionsthe positions remain appointive,

unless future constitutional amendments make them electiveand he presumably will also replace

many other ANM members in local positions of influence. Finally, it may prove politically attrac-

_____________

8

His appointment signals the first time since 1920 that a Dashnak is a member of Armenias government.

Another Dashnak, Roland Sharoyan, was subsequently appointed Minister of Culture, Youth Affairs and Sports.

9

 Noyan Tapan, April 1, 1998. Badalian stressed that he has no differences with Kocharian over NagornoKarabakh: We both reject defeatist sentiments.

10 In May, Kocharian offered the post of Chief of the Presidential Oversight Service to David Vardanian, a

senior NDU member. RFE RL Armenia Report, May 11, 1998.
24

tive to bring legal proceedings against ANM members who became wealthy over the last eight

years.

Karen Demirchian has applied to run for a recently vacated seat in parliament, and the

outcome will demonstrate whether he has staying power. Overall, Armenian politicians are planning for parliamentary elections. Scheduled for July 1999, they may take place before, as everyone

recognizes that the current legislature reflects the realities and the flawed election of three years

ago. The ARF, which was excluded from the July 1995 vote, strongly favors pre-term elections. So

does Vazgen Manukians NDU, which also charged the 1995 vote was fraudulent and artificially

resulted in such a large majority for Ter-Petrossyans ANM-led Republic bloc. But leaders of

Yerkrapah, now the largest faction in the legislature, are lukewarm, if not opposed, to pre-term

parliamentary elections. Yerkrapahs disagreement with the ARF over the timing of parliamentary

elections is only one aspect of a struggle for power and influence on President Kocharian between

these two organizations, which, in 1996, were on opposing sides of the barricades.

Whenever parliamentary elections take place, Armenian politicians, NGOs and international observerswhichever organization they representwill be interested to see whether the

shortcomings specified in the assessments of the 1998 presidential election have been addressed. If

those elections go well, concerns about the apparent difficulties of holding free and fair elections in

Armenia may be alleviated.

ECONOMY

The day after President Kocharians April 9 inauguration, he nominated Armen Darbinian,

who had been finance and economics minister since June 1997, as prime minister. Darbinian on

April 20 announced his choices for Cabinet ministers. Naturally, both Defense Minister Vazgen

Sarkissian and Minister of National Security and Internal Affairs Serzh Sarkissian kept their jobs.

Acting Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian was elevated from his post as Deputy Foreign Minister

and was granted full Armenian citizenship.11

Darbinians overriding task is to improve the economy. After declining about 50 percent in

1992, Armenias economy rebounded in 1994, but in 1997, grew by only 3.3 percent and the inflation rate was 21 percent, versus forecasts of 6 and 10 percent respectively. For the last two years, all

Armenians have been receiving electricity round-the-clock, after four years of rationing. But most

of the population still endures very difficult circumstances, mitigated by remittances from abroad

of roughly $350 million in 1997, a sum that equals the national budget. With much of the countrys

manufacturing at a standstill, unemploymentestimated as high as 40 percentis a critical problem.12

As Prime Minister, Kocharian tried to improve tax collection, and he has pledged to revive

industry, create favorable conditions for business and attract foreign investment. The level of such

investment is low, and Armenian officials have complained about the slowness of even co-nation-

_____________

11He had until then been an American citizen.

12 Emil Danielyan, The Armenian Economy: Continuing Stagnation Amid Fresh Promises of Recovery,

Prism, Vol. IV, No. 9, Part 4.
25

als abroad to put money into the country, though charitable contributions have been significant. In

an effort to attract foreign investors, Yerevan plans to step up privatization: by the end of 1998,

Armenia plans to have sold 90 percent of state enterprises, mostly through public offers.

Armenias fiscal and monetary policy have won praise from the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), which cited significant progress in reversing 1997s macro-economic setbacks.

Kocharian has said there is no alternative to a market economy, and Darbinians government will

adhere to IMF recommendations. At the same time, Kocharian continues his campaign against

corruption. On April 23, he warned personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National

Security that combating economic crimes, the shadow economy and smuggling was a top priority.

Armenia must be the most organized country in the region in terms of its system of management,

legislative field and the work of the law-enforcement bodies.13

Kocharians commitment to economic reform may well encounter resistance from the

Dashnaks, the Communists and the reported 41 percent of the electorate who voted for Demirchian.

One reason for Kocharians tough line on Nagorno-Karabakh is his conviction that Armenia can

make economic progress without resolving the conflict and establishing normal relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. As Prime Minister, he tried to do so. Now he has based his presidency on this

proposition.

Nagorno-Karabakh: The conflict did not play a prominent role in the 1996 presidential

election. A cease-fire had been in place since 1994 and no new proposals were on the table, leaving

candidates and voters alike to concentrate on bread and butter issues. In 1998, however, NagornoKarabakh proved emotive enough to force the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossyan for daring to

argue in public that the disputed territory could not become independent or join Armenia. NagornoKarabakh, which had been responsible for the downfall of two presidents of Azerbaijan, now includes among its victims a president of Armenia.

There are different perspectives on the conflict, and specifically, on the freedom of maneuver of the parties involved. Widespread in Baku (and to a lesser extent, in Tbilisi), for example, is

the conviction that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are the instrumentswitting or notof a

Russian policy aimed at restoring Moscows control of the oil-rich and strategically vital southern

regions of the former Soviet Union. In this view, little or nothing happens in the Caucasus that does

not reflect the probably malevolent but always conspiratorial will of someone in Russia. Accordingly, the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossyan caused deep concern in Baku, because he had the

reputation of a reasonable statesman, open to compromise, and the manner of his fall seemed part

of a broader Russian plot. Its purported goals were to destabilize pro-Western Azerbaijanby

bringing to power the hardline Robert Kocharianand pro-Western Georgia, where less than a

week later, the latest assassination attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze took place, thereby undercutting growing U.S. influence in the Caucasus.

In this view, Armenian politicians are not independent actors, and there are no serious differences between Yerevan and Stepanakert, which both operate at Moscows behest. Moreover,

Russian neo-imperialism, though today relatively weak, remains strong enough to scuttle chances

of a negotiated settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflicts. Robert Kocharian, whose

_____________

13Armenpress, April 24, 1998.
26

close ties to the Russian military many in Baku take as an article of faith, is seen as the most

dangerous agent of the most reactionary forces in the former USSR. In the worst case scenario, this

alliance could lead to the resumption of military hostilities. Also possible are intensified clashes

that would frighten Western oil companies, which value stability uber alles, away from further

investments and maybe even from pursuing current development plans.

If this approach truly reflects the relations between players in Moscow and the Caucasus,

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be resolved only if it suits the purposes of the former. The most

conspiratorially-inclined analysts see little reason to believe a resolution would be in Moscows

general interest, as it threatens to: eliminate a source of friction between Armenians and Azerbaijanis

that Russians have exploited to make themselves indispensable mediators and arbitrators; permit

the normalization of relations between Armenia and Russias historic rival in the region, Turkey,

thus lessening Armenias dependence on Russia and giving Ankara easy access through Armenia

to the Caucasus and Central Asia; make possible a pipeline for Azerbaijani oil through Armenia (to

consolidate economically an eventual political settlement), which would add to the growing number of alternatives to the northern route through Russia; undercut Moscows opportunities to derive

revenue from oil exports by offering a competing source and/or by keeping the price of oil low

through the enhanced supply; and, sanction the growing political and economic involvement and

the mediating role of the United States and other Western countries in a region Russia has for

centuries regarded as its backyard.14

Other analysts inside and outside the region emphasize the divergence of goals and tactics

among a multiplicity of actors in Moscow. This more optimistic view focuses on the emergence of

a super-wealthy stratum in Moscow, mostly linked to the energy sector and particularly to LUKoil,

who have grown beyond the traditional Russian political or geostrategic understanding of Russias

national interests. Such politicians and businessmen purportedly see greater advantage in making

money by cooperating in deals with Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and other resource-rich states than in

subversion, intimidation and the instigation and perpetuation of ethnic conflicts to destabilize weaker

neighbors.15

Even if various Russian actors exert influence on events in the Caucasus and on Armenia

and Nagorno-Karabakh specifically, politicians in Yerevan and Stepanakert are surely not just passive pawns in this game. To the extent that they enjoy freedom of maneuver, their non-negotiable

goals are the primary determinant of the prospects for peace. For if Nagorno-Karabakh insists on de

jure independence from Azerbaijan, no settlement is possible, as no Azerbaijani leader could ac-

_____________

14 At the April 29 CIS Summit in Moscow, President Boris Yeltsin told Armenia and Azerbaijan to sit down

and end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, however, after dismissing

totally imaginary accusations about Russian imperial behavior and ambitions, described the CIS as an arena of

competition between Russia and the West: Russias influence in the CIS has somewhat declined, but this phenomenon is temporary. Western and other countries are, understandably, eyeing the post-Soviet space. The struggle for

markets and spheres of influence in the world has never ceased. We shall not allow this process to develop to the

detriment of Russias interests. Prism, Vol. IV, No. 9, Part 1.

15In an unexpected move, Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky, who has mediated the Russo-Chechen conflict

and has traveled to the Caucasus capitals, was named Executive Secretary of the CIS at a summit in Moscow on April

29. Robert Kocharian reportedly opposed the appointment, perhaps a sign of concern that an emphasis on economic

interests in Russias foreign policymaking might work to Azerbaijans favor.
27

cept such an outcome; if, however, the real prerequisite for Nagorno-Karabakh is reliable security

guarantees, an agreement may be possible, though the negotiations will be very difficult.

The appointment of Robert Kocharian as Prime Minister in March 1997 brought into

Armenias government a convinced proponent of Nagorno-Karabakhs self-determination. For many

in the Caucasus, his 1998 election as president signals the unification of Armenia and NagornoKarabakh, though not in the manner often envisioned. One thing is certain: Kocharian does not

share the view of Levon Ter-Petrossyan that time is on Azerbaijans side. In a conversation with

Helsinki Commission staff in September 1996, Kocharian said Azerbaijan would never be able to

make use of its one real advantage over Armenia: oil. The profits from the anticipated boom, he

maintained, would wind up in foreign bank accounts, instead of strengthening Azerbaijan. Meeting

with an observer delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in March 1998, he repeated

these arguments, adding that oil might make certain Azerbaijani families or clans wealthy, but

would not make Azerbaijan a stronger state. Some countries, he continued, have oil [Azerbaijan],

some have transit [Georgia], and others have organization. It was his intention, said Kocharian,

to make Armenia the most organized state in the region.16

As long as Kocharian holds these views, he will not feel time pressure to conclude an

agreement with Baku, for fear that a future deal would not be as advantageous, or that oil money

will allow Azerbaijan eventually to develop the military capability required to retake the occupied

territories by force. In any case, Kocharian must demand, at least initially, more than the Minsk

Group proposals he ousted Levon Ter-Petrossyan for accepting. In an April 8 interview in Izvestiya,

Kocharian cast doubt on the Minsk Groups ability to resolve the conflict, given the differences

between Yerevan and Baku, and rejected as unacceptable Bakus offer of broad autonomy. As

Nagorno-Karabakh is already de facto independent, he suggested either a federation or a confederation with Azerbaijan or the creation of equal, horizontal relations. But he stressed that the final

decision must lie with Nagorno-Karabakhs leadership.

Foreign Minister Oskanian has officially rejected the OSCEs phased approach and called

for a package deal instead.17 On May 4, he visited Bonn and presented the German representative to

the Minsk Group Armenias position: a package solution excluding preconditions, i.e., the principles of the 1996 Lisbon Summit. A Foreign Ministry spokesman explained That means that

negotiations on status should start without preconditions; autonomy and self-government formulations should be excluded. Furthermore, Karabakhs direct subordination to Azerbaijan is

unacceptable and the solution should ensure balanced relations between Karabakh and Azerbaijan

which can be achieved through direct talks between them.

As for the latter demand, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have long argued that Azerbaijan should negotiate directly with Nagorno-Karabakh, as Russia does with Chechnya and Tbilisi

with Abkhazia. In fact, Nagorno-Karabakh does participate in all Minsk Group negotiations, though

it does not have the status of state party to the conflict, as does Azerbaijan. It appears that NagornoKarabakh wants that status and also wants to negotiate with Azerbaijan, without Armenia.

_____________

16He repeated this point in his inauguration address.

17Respublika Armeniya, Noyan-Tapan, April 23.
28

Considering that Haydar Aliev faces a presidential race of his own in October 1998, the

likelihood that Baku will consider any such concessions before the election is nil. Indeed, the

Minsk Group talks seem doomed to irrelevance this year. Nevertheless, when Aliev and Kocharian

met for the first time as presidents, at the April 29 CIS Summit in Moscow, they issued the following statement: The Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia confirm their adherence to

the political peace settlement of the Karabakh armed conflict through negotiations within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group and express their readiness to abide by the cease-fire regime

introduced in May 1994.

The general view of Robert Kocharian is that he is a hardliner, who will insist on NagornoKarabakhs self-determination, and has thereby set back or even scotched any chance of a negotiated settlement.18 Surely, it will be harder for Baku to reach agreement with Robert Kocharian than

with Levon Ter-Petrossyan. But Kocharian would be better able than anyone else, including TerPetrossyan and certainly Karen Demirchian, to sell any negotiated settlement to the population of

Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Optimists see him as the Nixon in China of the Caucasus;

pessimists see war clouds.

Levon Ter-Petrossyan argued that Armenians would support the Minsk Group approach if

they knew what it contained. But because the plan was secret, he could not spell out precisely what

Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would have gained from the package and was hard pressed to

defend his position. Should serious negotiations resume, one new wrinkle may involve scrapping

the confidential nature of the proposals.

Relations with Neighbors: Cut off by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia desperately needs

its lifelines through Georgia and Iran. Kocharian has stressed the further development of transport

routes, particularly the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti, as a top-priority issue in ArmenianGeorgian relations. Tbilisi, for its part, enjoys good relations with both its warring neighbors, and

welcomes enhanced economic ties with them. But while Eduard Shevardnadze congratulated Robert Kocharian on his election victory, Kocharians hardline reputation and the return to legal political activity of the nationalist ARFwhich maintains that regions of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are rightfully Armenianhave made Tbilisi very nervous. In particular, Georgian officials fear

the possibility of troubles with the half-million strong Armenian population of Javakhetia. ARF

spokesman Vahan Hovanissian, freshly out of prison, told Helsinki Commission staff that if Georgia guarantees their autonomy in language, culture and other issues, there would be no problems.

But Georgia, he claimed, was trying to force them out of their territory, so they are naturally turning

to Armenia, as happened in Nagorno-Karabakh. The ARF, he said, would prevent the expulsion or

the forcible de-nationalization of Georgias Armenians. Ominously, Hovanissian said there had

been instances of Armenian monuments being destroyed or converted to Georgian monuments.

Georgian officials acknowledge poor socio-economic conditions in Javakhetia, such as

impassable roads and frequent problems with electricity. They hope, however, that Yerevan under-

_____________

18A typical appraisal is that of Hugh Pope, Hardline Nationalist Is Victorious In Armenias Presidential

Elections, in The Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1998: ...hardline nationalist, Robert Kocharian[s] victory is likely

to dim hopes that Armenia will compromise with Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a

source of instability in the increasingly important Caucasus oil region....International peace efforts will probably go on

the back burner.
29

stands the politicization of such issuesadding to Georgias separatist movements in Abkhazia

and South Ossetia, and Tbilisis problematic relations with Ajariawould quickly damage the

good Georgian-Armenian bilateral relations developed to date. In summer 1996, Levon TerPetrossyan traveled to Georgia, where, accompanied by Shevardnadze, he warned the local Armenian population against demanding autonomous status. Tbilisi will be closely following Kocharians

statements and actions, and to see whether he reins in less cautious Armenian politicians.19

Armenia, for its part, increasingly views Azerbaijans prospects for enrichment through oil

exports as a threat and is therefore concerned about Tbilisis determination to ensure the success of

the western route for Azerbaijani oil through Georgia. Listing dangers in the Caucasus region,

Foreign Minister Oskanian warned that the Georgia-Azerbaijan rapprochment...can create problems between Armenia and Georgia since Georgia is evidently making broad political pronouncements in support of Azerbaijans regional ambitions, with the clear economic goal of securing a

pipeline.20

 Armenias openly expressed reservations about a project Tbilisi views as a life and death

issue cannot serve to advance Georgian-Armenian relations.21 Yerevan will have to balance its

fears of Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation with the need to consolidate ties with one of its two

outlets to the world.

As for Turkey, a defining, untraditional and highly controversial aspect of Ter-Petrossyans

foreign policy was his effort to normalize relations without preconditions, leaving himself open to

criticism from more nationalist politicians who demanded that Ankara first acknowledge and make

amends for the Genocide of 1915-1923. Ter-Petrossyans late brother, Telman, was an active participant in this initiative, leading delegations of Armenian businessmen to Turkey and trying to

persuade Ankara to heed the pleas of Turkish businessmen in Kars province to open the border to

trade with Armenia. Turkey, however, has refused to open the border or establish diplomatic relations pending a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the withdrawal of Armenian forces

from Azerbaijani territory.

By contrast, on April 24, President Kocharian confirmed earlier statements that Yerevan

would raise the Genocide with Ankara. He denied that the move would harm Armenian-Turkish

relations. There is little reason to believe, however, that Ankara will agree to include the issue on

the countries bilateral agenda or that Yerevan really expects any such concession. More likely,

Armenia hopes to counter Turkeys linking of normalized diplomatic relations with a resolution of

the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

_____________

19 Dzhavakhk, the organization representing Georgias Armenian population, has issued a statement expressing its support for the Georgian governments planned measures to improve social and economic conditions in those

areas of southern Georgia with a majority Armenian population. RFE/RL Newsline, December 2, 1997.

20Vartan Oskanian, International Developments and their Influence on the Caucasus and Armenia, The

Speaker, No. 17, May 21, 1998.

21Georgians Foreign Minister Menagarishvili has specifically denied that Georgian-Azerbaijani rapprochement could have a negative impact on Armenian-Georgian relations. He stressed that closer relations with any country, especially in the Transcaucasian region, are not aimed against third parties. Noyan Tapan , June 15, 1998.
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Relations with Russia

When Levon Ter-Petrossyan resigned, Russian President Boris Yeltsin went on television

to declare Armenia a part of Russias strategic field of interest. It is an Orthodox country. Under

no circumstances can we afford to lose Armenia, and we wont lose it. That reasoning had led to

the signing in August 1997 of a 25-year comprehensive military and economic agreement between

Armenia and Russia that consolidated already excellent bilateral relations. At Yerevans request,

Russia has long had a military base in Armenia, with a 25-year tenure assured. Between 1994 and

1996, according to reports from the Russian Duma, Russia transferred about $1 billion worth of

arms to Armenia.22

The August 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance obligates the two

countries to come to each others assistance in case of military aggression against either of them.

Moscow has signed no such treaty with any other CIS country. Russia and Armenia also pledged not

to take part in any initiative or join any alliance that could violate the sovereignty or territorial integrity of either country. Furthermore, the treaty specifies continuing close cooperation between them in

foreign policy. Levon Ter-Petrossyan said the treaty would lead to even closer integration between

Russia and Armenia than between Russia and Belarus, which had formally created a union.

Robert Kocharianapart from whatever relations he and Nagorno-Karabakh may have had

before with Russiathus inherits a legacy of extremely close Yerevan-Moscow ties. Like TerPetrossyan, he does not support Armenias accession to the Russia-Belarus Union, to the dismay of

Armenias communists and of the Russian Duma, which in May 1997 unanimously approved a

resolution encouraging Armenia to join. But Yerevans failure to accede to the union is obviously

in no way a barrier to strategic partnership between the two countries.

In fact, Levon Ter-Petrossyans efforts to normalize relations with Turkey were based on

the understanding that otherwise, Armenia would be wholly dependent on Russia. Given the likelihood that Kocharians insistence on raising the Genocide issue with Ankara will slow, if not make

impossible, the establishment of diplomatic relations and improved economic links, Armenia may

fall even deeper into Russian embraces.23

U.S.Armenian Relations: The State Department used the OSCE/ODIHR assessments as

guidance for comments on the election. Department spokesmen echoed the concerns about violations expressed in the first preliminary statement on March 18. On April 1, 1998, the Department

cited the ODIHR Missions judgement that these elections are a step forward from the troubled

1996 elections toward a functioning democracy. While in some areas the elections fell short of the

commitments Armenia has made to OSCE standards, these shortcomings did not cause the OSCE

to question the outcome. We endorse the conclusions of the OSCE preliminary report issued by

Ambassador Sam Brown on April 1.

_____________

22The matter remains a source of contention between Baku and Moscow, which has assigned the matter to a

commission to investigate. Armenian officials, for their part, claim that Azerbaijan has received even more weaponry

from Russia and other sources.

23Kocharians newly appointed foreign policy advisor, Aram Sarkissian, argues that Armenia must be part of

a Russia-Iran-Armenia axis to counter the emerging Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel alliance.
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The State Department urged Yerevan to eliminate irregularities, investigate reported abuses,

and take appropriate legal action against those responsible. In conclusion, the statement congratulated President-elect Kocharian and wished him success in forming a new government, implementing economic and democratic reforms and reaching a political resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict. We look forward to continuing our close cooperation with the government and people of

Armenia as they work to bring about a stable, democratic and prosperous Armenia at peace with its

neighbors.

President Clinton sent Robert Kocharian a letter of congratulationswhich he pointedly

did not do for Levon Ter-Petrossyan after the September 1996 electionon April 9, after the second, positive ODIHR preliminary statement, and before the April 10 release of the negative, final

ODIHR report. The State Department made no comment on the Final Report, but the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE, in an April 23 statement to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, said: We

have carefully studied ODIHRs final report on the Armenian presidential election and endorse its

conclusions and recommendations. We note that the balloting represented an improvement in some

respects over the 1996 election but clearly fell short of OSCE standards. The statement urged

Armenian authorities to address the problems and take appropriate legal action.24

 The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the American branch of the ARF,

of course, followed the lead of Armenias Dashnaks in strongly backing Kocharian in the election.

Thus, for the first time since the early 1990s, when the ANCA was highly critical of Levon TerPetrossyan, whereas the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) was supportive of him, both major American Armenian organizations are now united behind Armenias president.

The Clinton Adminstration has drawn heavy criticism from American Armenian organizations for allegedly trying to impose, through the OSCE Minsk Group, a resolution of the NagornoKarabakh conflict favorable to Azerbaijan. The Administration will also be under pressure to implement provisions of the 1997 foreign aid bill, which call for allocating $12.5 million for NagornoKarabakh directly. On March 31, 1998, the Armenian Assembly of America charged the Clinton

Administration with violation of clear congressional intent, as Nagorno-Karabakh had not received humanitarian aid earmarked by Congress four months earlier. The Armenian Assembly has

also voiced alarm over suggestions that some of the $12.5 million will be spent on Azerbaijan, as

the language of the law calls for aiding victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. American

Armenian organizations have called for a hard earmark of $20 million for Nagorno-Karabagh and

for raising aid to Armenia from the FY98 $87.5 million earmark to $100 million.

Simultaneously, the Armenian Assembly and the ANCA are mobilizing Congressional opposition to the Silk Road Strategy Act, introduced by Senator Brownback, which would effectively

eliminate Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. Section 907 bars any assistance from the

U.S. Government to the Government of Azerbaijan until Azerbaijan ceases all blockades of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, the Armenian Assembly has urged Members of Congress

to support the Caucasus Peace and Stability Act, which insists on ending the blockade as a precondition to U.S. Government assistance to Azerbaijans government.

_____________

24The same day, the Presidency of the European Union made a similar statement, noting [it is] clear that

elections do not meet OSCE standards to which Armenia has committed itself in the 1990 Copenhagen Document.
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The outcome of the struggle between these legislative initiatives will demonstrate how successfully American Armenian organizations can combat the growing efforts by some in Congress

to dilute or eliminate entirely Section 907. In the 1997 foreign aid bill, Congress agreed to permit

U.S. Government assistance to Azerbaijans government for democratization, humanitarian aid

and economic investment (the latter by approving for the first time the involvement of OPIC, the

Import-Export Bank and the Trade and Development Association). Armenian American organizations opposed this weakening of Section 907, and presumably now see the Silk Road Strategy Act

as the threatening culmination of these inroads already made against U.S. sanctions on Azerbaijan.

Armenias and Azerbaijans respective achievements in democratization are an issue, though

hardly decisive, in the battle over Section 907. After the controversial handling of the election

observation in Armenia, American Armenian organizations, which accuse OSCE of treating Azerbaijan with kid gloves, will surely be watching carefully to see how the OSCE/ODIHR judges the

October 1998 presidential election in Azerbaijan.
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