January 27, 1950 

Hon. Stewart W. Hellman 

Criminal District Attorney 

Fort Worth, Texas Opinion No. V-991 

Re: The legality of operating the 

amusement device called the 

Dear Sir: “Hollycrane” in Texas. 

Your request for an opinion reads in part as follows: 

‘“We are advised that the “HOLLYC,RANE” 

consists of a wooden cabinet 48 inches by 32 inches, 

which is enclosed on two sides and the top with 

crystal-clear glass, which provides perfect vision 

without distortion. The cabinet contains a portable 

playing field 30 inches long by 20 inches wide, the 

floor of which is dressed with colored sea shells, 

upon which are laid small metal animals. The playing field is illuminated by flourescent lights, giving 

the player a perfect view of the field and all operating features of the machine, and which, in the operation of the machine, permits the player to use his own 

judgment of depth perception by the operation of two ; 

electric controls, one each for forward and cross motion. The skill with which these electric control 

levers are manipulated regulates and controls the 

operation of the crane. The levers are provided at 

the front of the machine, one lever enables the player to move the crane in a forward motion along the 

length of the playing field from one end to the other 

or to any desired position on said playing field. The 

other lever enables the player to move the crane to 

the right across the playing field entirely from one 

side to the other or to any desired location on the 

playing field. 

““Upon reaching the desired location either forward or sideward or both, the crane, automatically 

lowers to the playing field, upon which are laid the 
Hon. Stewart W. Hellman, page 2 (V-991) 

metal animals, and the crane then depending on 

the skill and accuracy of the player, picks up one 

of the metal animals. The crane then automatically 

rises and returns to the starting position . . ~ *” 

You subsequently advised us that: 

“It is my understanding that there are three types 

of the HOLLYCRANE machine. They are all operated 

in a similar manner, the difference in them being the 

premiums which are given, if the operators of said 

machines are skillful enough to receive anything for 

their efforts. 

‘MACHINE NUMBER ONE. It is my understand& 

ing that this machine will deliver to the operator a 

premium; which, when so operated, would be a gambling 

device and a violation of law. 

“MACHINE NUMBER TWO. It is my understanding that on this machine, the operator can also receive 

free games from the machine, if he is skillful enough 

in the operation of same. This also would be a violation 

of law. 

“MACHINE NUMBER THREE. It is my contention 

that when an operator of this machine, in using his skill, 

comes in contact with one of the premiums, and said 

premium is lifted by the HOLLYCRANE, and nothing delivered and no free games given, that this is not a violation of law, but a game of skill. This is the machine 

on which I would like to have an opinion from the Attorney General’s office, if you think I am correct in my 

views of the matter.” 

Trade literature submitted with your original request describes the Hollycrane and its operation as follows: 

“Wide expanse of play-field adds to the excitement 

of play and emphasizes the skill-factor which is important 

in practically all territory ~ ~ ~ Mirror at end of cabinet 

creates illusion of greater-than-actual size . D . Although 

average operating cycle is only 10 seconds, the excitement, 

suspense and skill-thrill is so intense that players receive 

complete satisbction and are eager to try again ~ . . -* 

You have expressed the opinion that those models of the Hollycrane described by you as “Machine No. One” and “Machine No. Two” 

are gaming devices, but wish to know whether the operation of “Machine 
. 

Hon. Stewart W. Hellman, page 3 (V-991) 

No. Three” violates the gaming laws of Texas. 

Article 619, V.P.C., provides as follows: 

“If any person shall directly, or as agent or 

employe for another, or through any agent or agents, 

keep or exhibit for the purpose of gaming, any policy 

game, any gaming table, bank, wheel or device of any 

name or description whatever, or any table, bank, 

wheel or device for the purpose of gaming which has 

no name, or any slot machine, any pigeon hole table, 

any jenny-lind table, or table of any kind whatsoever, 

regaidless of the name or whether named or not, he 

shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two 

nor more than four years regardless of whether any of 

the above mentioned games, tables, banks, wheels, devices or slot machines are licensed by law or not. Any 

such table, bank, wheel, machine, or device shall be 

considered as used for gaming, if money or anything 

of value is bet thereon.” 

We agree with your conclusion that the fiirst two types 

of the Hollycrane described by you are gaming devices as defined by 

our statutes. In the recent case of Hoffman v. State, 219 S.W.Zd 539 

(Tex. Civ. App. 1949), it was held: 

“Appellant first argues that his Bridgo game 

(the ball-throwing feature) is admittedly and in fact 

one of skill and such as the statutes against gaming 

were never intended to cover; as opposed to pure 

games of chance with associated gambling or betting. 

We will consider the ball-tossing device as a game 

of skill in accordance with stipulations, though the 

question of whether it was predominantly of such 

character, if open, would appear debatable. However, 

the point need not be argued. Our courts have sonstrued Arts. 619, 621 and 625 as drawing no distinction 

between games of chance and games of skill, but as 

condemning all games upon which money or ‘anything 

of value’ is staked or waged on the outcome; taking the 

view, in short, that playing a game, whether of skill or 

chance, for money or ‘other thing of value’ constitutes 

gambling or gaming. Adams v. Antonio, Tex. Civ. App., 

88 S.W.2d 503 (writ refused); Callison v0 State, Tex. 

Civ. App., 172 S.W.2d 772. ‘This betting on games is the 

evil our law seeks to eradicate.’ Stearnes v. State, 21 

Tex. 692, 693. Texas courts further hold that amusement is a ‘thing of value’ and that free games won on 

marble machines at least are within condemnation of 
Hon. Stewart W. Hellman, page 4 (V-991) 

the statutes. State v. Langford, Tex. Civ. App., 144 

S.W.2d 448; Hightower v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 156 

S,W.2d 327 (writ refused) . , . .” 

We do not believe the present statutes on gaming devices 

prohibit that model of the Hollycrane which gives no reward to the 

player, and described by you as “Machine No. Three.” However, 

actual employment of this model as an adjunct to gaming, as by ‘sidebets” or by separate rewards by the displayer, for example, would 

bring this model within the statutes proscribing gaming. Hightower, 

v. State, 156 S.W.Zd 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, error ref.), wherein 

the court said: 

“As to the other machines . . . it is undisputed ~:::r,: ; 

that none had any automatic ‘pay-off’ adjustment; and 

that the only result from playing thereof was the smusement of the player in securing a high score, No testimony whatever discloses an understanding on%hepaTtibf 

any store proprietor to pay ‘over the counter’ for high 

or particular scores; or thatany player was seen or 

permitted to bet on the machines’ operation. . . . 

“It would follow, therefore, that marble machines 

of the ‘non-pay-off’ variety, as to which no evidence is 

adduced of their being used for gaming purposes at the 

time of seizure, are not gambling devices within the inhibition of above statute?; . . . An entirely different situation would exist if, by mechanical adjustment, the machines were made to pay off; or if an understanding be 

had with the proprietor ‘over the counter’ to the same 

effect; or in case of knowledge and acquiescence by the 

machine keeper to a wagering by players upon resulting 

scores. The machines would then become gambling 

devices per se, placing defendants factually within the 

purview of Houghton v. Fox, supra; . . . .” 

From the above it follows that the model of the Hollycrane 

which gives no reward to the player, while not per se illegal may become so if it is used as an adjunct to gaming. 

SUMMARY 

Two described models of the mechanically operated amusement device known as the “Hollycrane,‘ one 

of which rewards the player in premiums and the other 

in free games, are gaming devices under the provisions 

of Art. 619, V.P.C. Hoffman v. State, 219 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 

Civ. App. 1949). A third model, giving no reward to the 
Hon. Stewart W. Hellman, page 5 (V-991) 

player, while not per se illegal may become so if used 

as an adjunct to gaming. Hinhtower v. State, 156 S.W. 

2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, error ref.). 

Yours very truly, 

PRICE DANIEL 

Attorney General 

Willis E. Gresham 

APPROVED: Assistants 

Charles D. Mathews 

Executive Assistant 

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