******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD BUSH

(SC 19492)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js. *

Argued October 12, 2016—officially released April 18, 2017

Adam E. Mattei, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom were C. Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, and, on the brief, John C. Smriga,

state’s attorney, and for the appellant (state).

Pamela S. Nagy, assistant public defender, for the

appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ROBINSON, J. This certified appeal presents two significant issues, namely: (1) whether a court, in

determining if sufficient evidence of an enterprise exists

to sustain a conviction of racketeering in violation of

the Corrupt Organizations and Racketeering Activity

Act (CORA), General Statutes § 53-393 et seq., may consider the entire record, or is limited to the evidence

concerning only those predicate ‘‘incidents of racketeering activity’’ found by the jury in the special verdict

required by General Statutes § 53-396 (b);1 and (2) the

degree to which a trial court has discretion to deny a

motion for a continuance filed by a criminal defendant

that seeks time to prepare for trial after that defendant

had elected, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), to discharge

his attorney and proceed as a self-represented party.

The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for

certification,2from the judgment of the Appellate Court

reversing the judgment of the trial court, rendered after

a jury trial, convicting the defendant, Richard Bush, of

six counts of the sale of narcotics by a person who is

drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a277 (a), six counts of sale of narcotics within 1500

feet of a school by a person who is drug-dependent in

violation of General Statutes §§ 21a-277 and 21a-278a

(b), one count of conspiracy to sell narcotics in violation

of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 21a-278 (b), and one

count of racketeering in violation of General Statutes

§ 53-395 (c).3 State v. Bush, 156 Conn. App. 256, 258–59,

112 A.3d 834 (2015). On appeal, the state claims that

the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the

defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal with

respect to the racketeering conviction because the two

predicate acts of racketeering, identified by the jury

pursuant to § 53-396 (b), did not constitute sufficient

evidence of an enterprise; and (2) a new trial was

required for the remaining offenses because the denial

of a continuance effectively deprived the defendant of

his right of self-representation. With respect to the racketeering conviction, we conclude that the Appellate

Court improperly circumscribed its sufficiency of the

evidence analysis by limiting it to the two predicate

acts, but nevertheless properly determined that there

was insufficient evidence to support the racketeering

conviction. With respect to the other convictions, we

conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the denial of a continuance effectively

deprived the defendant of his right of self-representation. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part

the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record and the opinion of the Appellate Court

set forth the following background facts and procedural

history. ‘‘The charges upon which the defendant was

brought to trial were all based upon his alleged involve-
ment in seven separate sales of cocaine to a police

informant, David Hannon, during an undercover police

investigation of illegal drug activity in the area of Pembroke and Ogden Streets in Bridgeport between late

June through early November, 2010.’’ Id., 259. As will

be discussed more fully in part I B of this opinion,

during that time period, the investigating task force of

officers from the Bridgeport Police Department and the

Connecticut State Police obtained extensive audiotape

and videotape surveillance footage of these sales, in

which the defendant, working from the porch of his

duplex home, which directly abutted the sidewalk on

Pembroke Street, sold cocaine to Hannon, or facilitated

sales to Hannon by six other drug dealers, namely,

David Moreland, Jason Ortiz, Willie Brazil, Raymond

Mathis, Carlos Lopez, and Kenneth Jamison.4

‘‘In an amended long form information dated January

3, 2012, the state charged the defendant, more particularly, with: one count each of sale of narcotics by a

person who is not drug-dependent and sale of narcotics

within 1500 feet of a school by a person who is not

drug-dependent in connection with each such alleged

sale; and one count each of conspiracy to sell narcotics

and racketeering based upon his alleged involvement

in all seven such alleged sales, as specially pleaded both

in the conspiracy count, as overt acts in furtherance of

the alleged conspiracy, and in the racketeering count,

as incidents of racketeering activity claimed to prove

his involvement in a pattern of racketeering activity, as

required by . . . § 53-396 (a). The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses of sale of

narcotics by a person who is drug-dependent and sale

of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school by a person

who is drug-dependent based upon his proven involvement in sales of cocaine to Hannon on six of the seven

dates specified in the information, particularly June 30,

July 14, July 16, August 6, August 24, and November 9,

2010. It found him not guilty, however, of all charges

based upon the alleged sale of drugs to Hannon on June

25, 2010, the first date specified in the information. The

jury also found the defendant guilty of both conspiracy

to sell narcotics and racketeering, specifying as to the

latter charge, in a special verdict returned pursuant to

§ 53-396 (b), that the sole basis for its finding that the

defendant had engaged in a pattern of racketeering

activity as a member of an enterprise was his involvement in the sale of cocaine on two of the seven dates

specified in the information, June 30 and November 9,

2010, which it found to have constituted ‘incidents of

racketeering activity.’ The trial court later sentenced

the defendant on all charges of which he was convicted

to a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 259–60.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court. Although the defendant

raised numerous claims on appeal, the Appellate Court
only reached the two that it deemed dispositive.5 See id.,

259 n.2. Specifically, the Appellate Court first concluded

that the defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the racketeering charge on the ground that ‘‘there

was insufficient evidence to support his racketeering

conviction because the state failed to prove either the

existence of an enterprise formed for the common purpose of selling narcotics or that he was associated with

such an enterprise.’’ Id., 265. The Appellate Court further concluded that a new trial was required with

respect to the other charges because the trial court had

abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request

for a continuance after he elected, during jury selection,

to represent himself. Id., 288–89. This certified appeal

followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion. Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We begin with the state’s claim that the Appellate

Court improperly concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to support the defendant’s racketeering conviction. The record sets forth the following additional

relevant facts and procedural history. Although the jury

convicted the defendant of a total of six cocaine sales

to Hannon that took place between the dates of June

30 and November 9, 2010, the Appellate Court noted

that the special verdict form, rendered pursuant to § 53-

396 (b), indicated that the ‘‘defendant’s racketeering

conviction was expressly predicated’’ on the two

cocaine sales that occurred on June 30 and November

9, 2010.6 State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 263. The

Appellate Court confined its analysis of the defendant’s

racketeering conviction only to the events of those two

days. Id. It observed that, ‘‘[o]n June 30, 2010, Hannon

met with members of a task force of officers from the

Bridgeport Police Department and the Connecticut

State Police Department to arrange for a controlled buy

of cocaine from . . . Ortiz at the defendant’s home on

Pembroke Street in Bridgeport. To that end, Hannon

telephoned Ortiz before arriving at the defendant’s

home, and also telephoned the defendant’s home phone

number. Prior to Hannon’s arrival at the defendant’s

home, Ortiz, who was then under surveillance by other

members of the task force, went to the rear of the home,

then returned to the front porch with a small blue bag

in his hand, which he later put in his mouth.7 When

Hannon arrived at the defendant’s home, the defendant

emerged from his backyard, walked past Hannon’s vehicle while looking inside it, then continued to the street

corner, where he gestured to Ortiz by raising his hand

in the air. Ortiz then approached Hannon’s vehicle and

opened the door, whereupon the defendant came up

behind Ortiz, reached inside the vehicle, and tapped

hands with Hannon. Hannon gave Ortiz money, in

exchange for which Ortiz gave Hannon the blue bag of

cocaine that had been in his mouth. Meanwhile, another

man approached the defendant. After completing the
transaction with Hannon, when the defendant gestured

. . . once again, [and] Ortiz handed something to the

other man in exchange for money. Ortiz and the defendant then walked together toward the defendant’s

backyard.8

‘‘On November 9, 2010, Hannon met once again with

task force members to prepare to buy drugs from the

defendant. This time Hannon called the defendant,

using the same cell phone number he had called on

June 30, 2010, and told the defendant that he was on

his way to meet him. When Hannon arrived at the defendant’s home, the defendant was standing on the street

corner with . . . Brazil. The defendant got into Hannon’s vehicle, and he and Hannon drove off. During their

ride, the defendant made a phone call in an apparent

attempt to procure cocaine, which Hannon had

requested. After the call, Hannon and the defendant

drove back to the defendant’s home. On the way back,

Hannon told the defendant that he also wanted to buy

a gun, which the defendant said was ‘doable.’ When

they returned, Hannon dropped off the defendant to

speak to Brazil, then pulled around the corner onto

Pembroke Street, as the defendant had directed. Once

he did so . . . Moreland, approached Hannon’s vehicle. When Hannon told Moreland that he had given

money to the defendant, Moreland gave Hannon a quantity of cocaine. The defendant later called Hannon to

confirm that Moreland had given him the cocaine and

to discuss further his stated interest in purchasing a

gun.’’ (Footnotes in original.) Id., 264–65.

Applying this court’s explication of CORA in State v.

Rodriguez-Roman, 297 Conn. 66, 82, 3 A.3d 783 (2010),

the Appellate Court held that there was insufficient

evidence of an association in fact enterprise to sustain

the defendant’s racketeering conviction under § 53-395

(c). State v. Bush, supra, 156Conn. App. 265. In conducting its sufficiency analysis, the AppellateCourt confined

its factual and legal analysis to the June 30 and November 9, 2010 sales that the jury found to be the predicate

acts of racketeering in its special verdict rendered pursuant to § 53-396 (b), citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.

196, 202, 68 S. Ct. 514, 92 L. Ed. 644 (1948), for the

proposition that, ‘‘[w]here . . . the verdict includes

answers to interrogatories specifying the particular factual or legal [basis] upon which the verdict [rests], the

court must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to

support that verdict under the theories so specified.’’

State v. Bush, supra, 261–63. The Appellate Court

observed that, ‘‘[i]n the present case, there is no question that the defendant was personally involved in both

sales of cocaine that the jury specially found to have

been incidents of racketeering activity,’’ but stated that,

for purposes of liability under CORA, the ‘‘question . . .

is whether those two sales, as alleged and proved at

trial, were committed by the defendant and his confederate as members of a single enterprise, whose mem-
bers had joined together with one another in a web of

interlocking relationships to pursue a common criminal

purpose, or as separate groups of individuals who had

joined together on the occasions in question to commit

separate, though similar, crimes.’’ Id., 266. The Appellate Court stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough the defendant’s evident purpose on both occasions was to sell cocaine and

thereby make an illegal profit—a purpose he impliedly

shared with Ortiz on June 30, 2010, and with Moreland

on November 9, 2010—there was no evidence either

that the defendant had a long-term relationship with

either of his confederates for the common purpose of

selling drugs or that his two confederates had any relationship at all with each other.’’ Id. Thus, the Appellate

Court determined that the state had not established

the ‘‘continuing unit’’ that is ‘‘required to prove . . .

membership in an association in fact enterprise under

§ 53-395 (c).’’9

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

267. Accordingly, the Appellate Courtreversed the racketeering conviction and remanded the case to the trial

court ‘‘with direction to render a judgment of acquittal’’

on that charge. Id., 289.

In challenging the Appellate Court’s conclusion that

there was insufficient evidence of the existence of an

enterprise, the state claims that the Appellate Court

improperly limited its sufficiency analysis to the evidence specifically supporting the two predicate acts of

racketeering as found by the jury on the special verdict

form mandated by § 53-396 (b), rather than considering

the totality of the evidence in the record encompassing

all of the defendant’s narcotics convictions. The state

relies on several federal court decisions underthe RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO),

18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., including United States v.

Cianci, 378 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004), and contends that

the ‘‘evidence relating to the five other sales that were

not marked on the [special verdict] form as proven to

be acts of racketeering was still available to the jury

in determining whether the state met its burden of proving an enterprise existed and the defendant associated

with the enterprise.’’ The state argues that the Appellate

Court’s analysis to the contrary is inconsistent with the

standard by which we review sufficiency claims, as well

as the purpose of CORA, which the legislature enacted

in part to allow the jury to consider the entire criminal operation.

In response, the defendant argues that the Appellate

Court properly restricted its analysis to the June 30 and

November 9, 2010 sales, which were the two predicate

acts found by the jury pursuant to § 53-396 (b), because

‘‘the jurors rejected the five other alleged acts of racketeering . . . .’’ Citing State v. Wassil, 233 Conn. 174,

658 A.2d 548 (1995), State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App.

854, 864 A.2d 35, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d

1031 (2005), and Sanchez v. State, 89 So. 3d 912 (Fla.

App. 2012), the defendant contends that the special
verdict established key material facts, namely, that the

only incidents of racketeering activity that occurred

were the two sales considered by the Appellate Court.

Put differently, the defendant contends that the jury’s

failure to find in its special verdict that the other five

sales constituted ‘‘racketeering activity’’ operated as an

acquittal, particularly insofar as the jury also found the

defendant drug-dependent and acting by himself in four

of the proven sales. The defendant further argues that,

even if the entire record is considered, the present case

is distinguishable from numerous reported federalracketeering decisions sustaining findings of an association

in fact enterprise because the present case lacks even

informal organizational hallmarks. The defendant contends, specifically, that the present case lacks evidence

of the following: (1) of a single source for the drugs

sold; (2) of sharing of weapons or profits; (3) of specific

job functions; and (4) that the cocaine sold in this case

came from inside the defendant’s home. Finally, the

defendant contends that, even if an enterprise existed

among the other six dealers, there was insufficient evidence that he had associated with that enterprise.

Although we agree with the state that the Appellate

Court improperly circumscribed its inquiry in determining whether there was sufficient evidence of an enterprise, we nevertheless agree with the defendant that

the Appellate Court properly determined that there was

insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s racketeering conviction.

‘‘The standard ofreview we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded

that the cumulative force of the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We note that the jury must find every element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the

basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions

need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude

that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is

permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider

it in combination with other proven facts in determining

whetherthe cumulative effect of all the evidence proves

the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force

of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of

evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .

It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi-
tude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving

substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating

evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept

as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact]

may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or

facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .

‘‘Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a

reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable

doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found

credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in

an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would

support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,

instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of

guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Crespo, 317 Conn. 1, 16–17, 115 A.3d 447 (2015).

The following background principles governing criminal liability under CORA are relevant to the issues in

this certified appeal. The defendant was convicted of

racketeering in violation of § 53-395 (c), which provides

in relevant part as follows: ‘‘It is unlawful for any person

employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to

knowingly conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General

Statutes § 53-394 (e), in turn, defines ‘‘ ‘[p]attern ofracketeering activity’ ’’ as ‘‘engaging in at least two incidents

of racketeering activity that have the same or similar

purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of

commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same

enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided the

latter or last of such incidents occurred after October

1, 1982, and within five years after a prior incident

of racketeering activity.’’10 Section 53-394 (c) further

defines ‘‘ ‘[e]nterprise’ ’’ as ‘‘any individual, sole proprietorship, corporation, business trust, union chartered

under the laws of this state or other legal entity, or any

unchartered union, association or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity, and

includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental, as well as other entities. In determining whether

any unchartered union, association or group ofindividuals exists, factors which may be considered as evidence

of association include, but are not limited to: (1) A

common name or identifying sign, symbols or colors

and (2) rules of behavior for individual members.’’

Although the pattern of racketeering and enterprise

elements of racketeering are distinct under CORA, they

may well share common proof.11 See State v. RodriguezRoman, supra, 297 Conn. 81–83.
A

We begin with the state’s claim that the Appellate

Court improperly concluded that, in determining

whether the state proved the existence of an enterprise

under CORA, it could consider only evidence concerning the predicate acts that the jury found to have constituted a pattern of racketeering pursuant to § 53-396

(b), namely, the June 30 and November 9, 2010 sales.

Whether CORA, and, particularly, the special verdict

provision of § 53-396 (b), requires that the jury’s finding

as to the existence of an enterprise to be based solely

on the evidence concerning the predicate acts specified

in the special verdict presents a question of statutory

interpretation over which we exercise plenary review.

See State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 317 Conn. 292, 299,

118 A.3d 26 (2015). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking

to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is

whetherthe statute, when read in context, is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . When

a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look

for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and

circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its

relationship to existing legislation and common law

principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘In interpreting the [statutory] language . . . however, we do

not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous

judicial interpretations of the language and the purpose

of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We begin with the text of § 53-396, which governs

the state’s pleading and proof in a prosecution forracketeering under CORA. In particular, we focus on § 53-

396 (b), which requires a special verdict, because that

is the subsection that led the Appellate Court to confine

its sufficiency analysis in the present case to the incidents of racketeering activity that the jury found to

have occurred on June 30 and November 9, 2010. See

State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 263. Section 53-

396 (b) provides: ‘‘In any prosecution underthis chapter

the court or the jury, as the case may be, shall indicate

by special verdict the particular incidents of racketeering activity that it finds to have been proved by the

state beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

Nothing in the text of § 53-396 (b) requires a special

verdict as to the enterprise element of CORA, or in any
way suggests that the proof of that element is limited

to particular evidence, in contrast to its express requirement that the jury specify the ‘‘incidents of racketeering

activity’’ that satisfy the ‘‘pattern’’ element. This is particularly evident when subsection (b) is read in context

with subsection (a) of § 53-396, which governs the

pleading of a racketeering claim under CORA. Section

53-396 (a) is silent with respect to enterprise, and only

requires the state to allege specifically ‘‘the existence

of a pattern of racketeering activity based upon at least

two incidents of racketeering activity, which shall be

specified in such information . . . .’’ Tellingly, § 53-396

(a) expressly contemplates that the fact finder may

well be exposed to evidence of other criminal activities

during a prosecution for racketeering, as it specifically

authorizes the state, ‘‘where otherwise permitted by

law, [to] individually charge in separate counts of the

same information or by indictment any offense notwithstanding that such offense may also constitute an incident of racketeering activity specified in the count

charging a violation of this chapter.’’ Read in context,

the fact that neither subsections (a) nor (b) of § 53-396

mandate special pleading and proof of the enterprise

element and specifically contemplate exposure to other

aspects of criminal activity during the trial suggests

that the legislature did not intend to otherwise limit the

proof of the enterprise element solely to that evidence

used to prove the predicate incidents of racketeering

activity. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the

maxim that ‘‘[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory

language that the legislature may have chosen to omit.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public

Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn.

594, 605, 996 A.2d 729 (2010).

‘‘To the extent that any ambiguity remains, the legislative history of [CORA] supports this interpretation.’’

State v. Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 297 Conn. 78. The

legislature contemplated the jury’s broad consideration

of evidence with respect to the existence of an enterprise. As we noted in Rodriguez-Roman, in a memorandum to the Joint Standing Committee on the judiciary,

Austin J. McGuigan, the then chief state’s attorney,

observed that, although ‘‘in the ordinary criminal prosecution the admissibility of evidence of other crimes

is often severely limited, in the [CORA] prosecution

evidence of criminal activity related to an ongoing

enterprise is not only admissible, it is essential. The

act thus provides the jury with an opportunity to see

the whole picture of the criminal operation and not

merely a part of it.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Conn. Joint Standing

Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 1982 Sess., pp.

667–68; see also Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263

Conn. 279, 314, 819 A.2d 260 (2003) (‘‘[T]estimony

before legislative committees may be considered in

determining the particular problem or issue that the
legislature sought to address by the legislation. . . .

This is because legislation is a purposive act . . . and,

therefore, identifying the particular problem that the

legislature sought to resolve helps to identify the purpose or purposes for which the legislature used the

language in question.’’ [Internal quotation marks

omitted.]).

Given the general similarity of the statutes, we previously have found federal case law applying RICO to

be instructive in our interpretation and application of

CORA. See State v. Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 297 Conn.

81–83. Under RICO, as under CORA, the pattern and

enterprise elements are doctrinally separate, although

‘‘the proof used to establish these separate elements

may in particular cases coalesce . . . .’’ United States

v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 69 L.

Ed. 2d 246 (1981). Although the government may use

common evidence to prove the pattern and enterprise

elements of RICO, the federal courts have held that the

government is not limited to that evidence in establishing the existence of an enterprise and the defendant’s

participation therein, and that a sufficiency of the evidence review may consider all relevant evidence in the

record. We find particularly persuasive the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

in United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 25–26 (1st

Cir. 2003), in which the court observed that fourteen

predicate acts over more than two decades had been

submitted to the jury; of those fourteen, the jury found

that nine instances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected the defendant’s reliance

on a decade long gap in the predicate acts in support

of his argument that the ‘‘government had failed to

prove ‘continuity’ in the enterprise, i.e., that the enterprise had functioned as an ongoing organization over

the period of time alleged, from September 1975 to

September 1998.’’ Id. The court stated that ‘‘the government introduced significant evidence of the existence

of the enterprise apart from the specified racketeering

acts,’’ including testimony about incidents of bribery

that did ‘‘not appear in the alleged racketeering acts.’’

(Emphasis added.)Id., 26. Significantly, the First Circuit

emphasized that, ‘‘simply because the jury found a specified racketeering act as ‘unproven beyond a reasonable

doubt’ does not mean that the jury found the evidence

relating to that act unpersuasive, in combination with

other evidence in the case, on the existence of an [association in fact] enterprise. Rather, it may only mean

that the government did not prove a requisite element

of the underlying crime alleged as a racketeering act.’’

(Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, the ‘‘evidence relating to

those acts remained available to the jury in its evaluation of the enterprise element of the RICO charge.’’12

Id., 27.

Indeed, in United States v. Cianci, supra, 378 F.3d

90–94, the First Circuit specifically rejected the defen-
dants’ argument that express acquittals of predicate

offenses on the special verdict form eliminated the associated evidence from the jury’s consideration for other

RICO purposes. The court observed that ‘‘the specific

purpose of the special verdict form is to limit the facts

found at trial for the purpose of assessing on appeal

the sufficiency of the prevailing party’s case,’’ and that

the ‘‘special verdict form allows juries to specifically

identify the predicates for the general verdict.’’13 Id., 91.

In upholding a sufficiency challenge to the enterprise

element of a RICO conspiracy charge, the First Circuit

held that even the ‘‘evidence relating to those [predicate] acts that were found ‘unproven’ by the jury [with

respective to substantive RICO charges] was still available to the jury in its evaluation of the overall RICO

charge.’’ Id., 93; see also id.(‘‘though the evidence might

not have shown completed commission of the racketeering acts, it could have led the jury to find the requisites of a RICO conspiracy among the defendants to

commit the racketeering acts’’ [emphasis omitted]).

Having considered the relevant statutory language,

legislative history, and persuasive federal case law, we

conclude that the jury, and a reviewing court, may consider the entire record in determining whether the state

has proven the existence of an enterprise, and are not

limited to evidence concerning the predicate acts that

the jury has found to constitute the pattern of racketeering.14 Accordingly, the Appellate Court improperly

limited its inquiry to evidence concerning the predicate

acts in considering whether there was sufficient evidence that an enterprise, in which the defendant participated, existed for purposes of liability under CORA.

B

Having reviewed the full record in this case, we agree

with the defendant that there is insufficient evidence

of an enterprise under an association in fact theory,

and the defendant’s participation in that enterprise, to

sustain his conviction for racketeering under § 53-395

(c). In particular, we conclude that the jury could not

reasonably have found that the state had proven beyond

a reasonable doubt the existence of an association in

fact between the defendant and the six other drug dealers who sold narcotics from the porch of his Bridgeport home.15

Before turning to a review of the evidence in the

present case, we note the following background principles concerning proof of an association in fact enterprise, as defined by § 53-394 (c).16 Following the United

States Supreme Court’s interpretation of RICO in Boyle

v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L.

Ed. 2d 1265 (2009), we held in Rodriguez-Roman that

‘‘evidence of an ascertainable structure that exists for

a purpose [b]eyond that inherent in the pattern ofracketeering activity’’ is not required.17 (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 297
Conn. 82. Nonetheless, we noted that, consistent with

the terms of RICO, an association in fact enterprise

must have a structure, which requires proof of: ‘‘(1) a

purpose, (2) relationships among those associated with

the enterprise, and (3) longevity sufficient to permit

the associates to pursue the purpose of the enterprise

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Id.; see Boyle v. United

States, supra, 945–46. ‘‘[T]he requirements for proving

an association in fact enterprise do not include a hierarchical structure, fixed roles for its members, a name,

regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures and induction or initiation ceremonies.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.

Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 82–83. Rather, an association

in fact enterprise is ‘‘a group of persons associated

together for a common purpose of engaging in a course

of conduct that could be proven by evidence of an

ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 82;

see id., 83–84 (jury reasonably could have found that

‘‘the defendant and [the coconspirator] entered into

an association during the years 2002 and 2003 for the

purpose of issuing fraudulent licenses to illegal immigrants in exchange for a substantial fee,’’ evidenced by

well coordinated scheme with distinct roles for each

partnerthatrequired independent actions for enterprise

to succeed); accord United States v. Ramirez-Rivera,

800 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (‘‘[T]he law is clear that

the government . . . must prove that the enterprise

existed in some coherent and cohesive form. . . . It

follows that the enterprise must have been an ongoing

organization operating as a continuous unit.’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, U.S. ,

136 S. Ct. 908, 193 L. Ed. 2d 800 (2016); United States

v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir.) (individuals

acting ‘‘independently and without coordination’’ do not

constitute enterprise under RICO [emphasis omitted]),

cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 623, 184 L. Ed. 2d

396 (2012); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337

(7th Cir.) (‘‘[t]he continuity of an informal enterprise

and the differentiation among roles can provide the

requisite structure to prove the element of enterprise’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 999, 117 S. Ct. 495, 136 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1996).

Applying these principles to the record in the present

case, we conclude that the evidence of an association

in fact enterprise is insufficient to sustain the jury’s

verdict, even when the evidence is viewed in the light

most favorable to the state. We begin our review of the

evidence with the June 25, 2010 transaction.18 Specifically, Hannon went to the corner of Pembroke and

Ogden Streets intending to make a controlled narcotics

purchase from the defendant. Prior to Hannon’s arrival,

Detective Jason Amato had observed the defendant

standing in front of his house with Moreland and Mathis
and then observed the defendant leaving the area. After

Hannon arrived, Moreland informed him that the defendant had gone to the police station to seek victims’

compensation for injuries he had sustained in a shooting. Hannon purchased cocaine from Moreland, who

had returned to the porch of the defendant’s home to

obtain it from Mathis. A review of the videotape evidence demonstrates that the porch of the defendant’s

home, and its short set of access steps, directly abutted

the sidewalk on Pembroke Street.

With respect to the June 30, 2010 sale, which the jury

found to be one of the two predicate acts in the pattern

of racketeering, Hannon called Ortiz, an ‘‘associate’’

of the defendant on Ortiz’ mobile phone, looking to

purchase drugs. While Hannon was on his way to the

corner of Pembroke and Ogden, the defendant called

Hannon to ask why he had not yet arrived. When Hannon arrived at that location, he called the defendant to

indicate his arrival. Once Hannon arrived at the defendant’s home, the defendant gestured to Ortiz and the

two of them made the sale to Hannon as described by

the Appellate Court. See State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn.

App. 263–64.

The state also relied on evidence from sales onAugust

6, 2010, and August 24, 2010. In particular, the August

24, 2010 sale was precipitated by a telephone call from

Hannon to the defendant’s home phone number, which

the defendant had given to Hannon after selling him

cocaine on August 6. To complete the August 24, 2010

sale to Hannon, the defendant obtained cocaine from

Lopez on his front porch.

Finally, we review the November 9, 2010 sale, which

the jury found to be the second predicate act of racketeering. First, Hannon set up the purchase by calling

the defendant on the mobile phone number that he

previously had used to contact Ortiz,19 to let him know

that he was on the way to meet him. The remainder of

the transaction took place as described by the Appellate

Court, including the fact that the defendant, upon learning of Hannon’s desire to purchase cocaine, called

Moreland to obtain the cocaine. The defendant took

Hannon’s money, and Moreland himself delivered the

cocaine to Hannon on Pembroke Street. The defendant

later contacted Hannon to confirm that the delivery

had occurred, and discussed further Hannon’s stated

interest in having the defendant help him purchase a

gun. See id., 264–65.

We conclude that this evidence was insufficient to

prove the association in fact necessary to establish an

enterprise for purposes of CORA. Even accepting that

the individuals involved shared a common purpose of

selling drugs on the eastern side of Bridgeport, there

is no evidence that they functioned as a continuing unit

or even an informal organization. See State v. Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 297 Conn. 82. Although the evi-
dence demonstrated that the individuals the defendant

permitted to deal drugs from his porch were by no

means strangers to him, it does not establish the requisite relationships necessary to sustain a finding of an

enterprise. Indeed, it is well short of the evidence that

two United States Courts of Appeal have characterized

as minimally sufficient to establish the existence of an

association in fact under RICO. For example, in United

States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1297, 128 S. Ct. 1738, 170 L. Ed.

2d 543 (2008), the First Circuit deemed the evidence

‘‘barely’’ enough to prove that a street gang constituted

a RICO enterprise. Although the defendants in Nascimento relied on the testimony of ‘‘cooperating witnesses who described [the gang] as a loose aggregation

of friends that lacked colors, initiation rites, and a formal hierarchy,’’ the court emphasized that other testimony supported the jury’s verdict that the group was

an enterprise, including ‘‘a shared cache of firearms

that were regarded as property of the gang,’’ and used

to shootrivals. Id., 32–33. The court also cited testimony

demonstrating that members of the group ‘‘self-identified’’ as being part of the gang, ‘‘displayed an ability to

distinguish between members and friends,’’ trained

each other ‘‘in the use of night vision goggles, binoculars, and police evasion tactics to enable them more

efficiently to carry out their shared purpose of killing

[rival group] members,’’ ‘‘kept tabs on one another and

informed one another when things would be ‘hot’

because of a recent shooting,’’ and ‘‘acted on behalf of

one another by attempting to assassinate witnesses to

each other’s crimes.’’ Id., 33. The court ultimately concluded that, although the gang ‘‘lacked some of the

accouterments of more structured street gangs, a

rational jury could find that it had a sufficiently welldefined shape to constitute an enterprise in the requisite

sense’’ because it ‘‘exhibited group cohesion over time;

its membership pooled and shared resources; the individuals involved had a sense of belonging and selfidentified as [gang] members; and the group had a wellhoned set of goals.’’ Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204,

214–16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Buchanan v.

United States, 562 U.S. 953, 131 S. Ct. 251, 178 L. Ed.

2d 251 (2010), the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit described the evidence of enterprise

as ‘‘ ‘somewhat contradictory’ ’’ and having ‘‘limitations’’ given the lack of structure in the narcotics group,

but ultimately rejected a sufficiency challenge. The

court cited evidence that the organization had ‘‘multiple

members who joined in the shared purpose of selling

drugs and promoting such sales’’ from one common

location, ‘‘where they were able to traffic drugs out of

the public’s eye, stored guns, and planned the violent

acts they undertook.’’ Id., 215. The court cited testimony

that one member of the group was indeed the ‘‘ ‘master-
mind’ ’’ who acted as ‘‘the head of the [o]rganization,

controlling the flow of cocaine and cocaine base,

organizing acts of violence, recruiting members, and

directing members’ activities.’’ Id. The court also cited

testimony from dealers who discussed the organization’s narcotics supply chain, and the use of

‘‘enforcer[s]’’ who used violence to retaliate against

rival gangs. Id. Finally, the court cited testimony that

the enterprise continued while the de facto leader was

incarcerated, with shifting roles and responsibilities

until his release. Id., 215–16; see also United States v.

Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60–61 (2d Cir.) (sufficient evidence

of enterprise to distribute narcotics in neighborhood,

despite lack of hierarchical structure, when individuals

acted as ‘‘ ‘street family’ ’’ and cooperated with selling

drugs at specific locations, protected those spots by

use of violence, shared funds and narcotics with each

other, and aided each other during periods of incarceration), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 950, 131 S. Ct. 74, 178 L.

Ed. 2d 246 (2010); United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d

977, 991 (8th Cir. 2004) (‘‘[t]he distinct-structure element can be shown by patterns of retaliation and intimidation undertaken to protect and defend the

enterprise’s business and associates . . . and by regular training, oversight, and coordination of associates’’

[citation omitted]); United States v. Connolly, supra,

341 F.3d 27 (The court noted that the defendant and

his associates ‘‘worked together in an [association in

fact] enterprise over a period of almost two decades,

joining forces to protect themselves from prosecution

and to further other criminal activities—some alleged

in the indictment, and others not specifically alleged.

There was cohesion in the group overtime; the membership shared resources and revenues; there was, in fact,

a sense of membership.’’).

The facts of this case pale in comparison to the federal courts’ decisions in Burden and Nascimento, which

we view as illustrative of the baseline level of ‘‘ongoing

organization’’ or ‘‘function as a continuing unit’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. RodriguezRoman, supra, 297 Conn. 82; necessary to establish an

association in fact for purposes of CORA.20 In contrast

to those cases, there is no evidence of cooperation

among the various alleged participants with respect to

protecting the alleged enterprise from competitors21 or

the police; indeed, there was no evidence of weapons

seized from the defendant’s house or any of the participants.22 There also is no evidence of common narcotics

sourcing at the wholesale orretail level or profit sharing

among the various alleged participants beyond the

drugs accepted by the defendant for his personal use

from individual dealers as a gratuity or tribute after

their sales from his porch.23 Although the evidence demonstrated that the defendant served as a point of customer contact though his home telephone or Ortiz’

mobile telephone for those seeking to purchase drugs
from the vicinity of his porch—either sold by himself

or obtained from other nearby dealers24—there is simply

no evidence that demonstrates the minimal level of

cohesive organization necessary to sustain a verdict

finding the existence of an enterprise that exists to

sell narcotics for purposes of criminal liability under

CORA.25 Indeed, the defendant acted alone in making

four of the six sales of narcotics of which he was convicted, and, in three of those sales, obtained the narcotics from three different locations away from his home

that had no apparentrelationship to each other or to the

other members of the alleged enterprise. With respect to

the two other sales that involved other persons, they

involved different persons with no apparent relationship to each other.26 Put differently, all that the evidence

in the present case proves is an aggregation of apparently friendly individuals involved in various narcotics

transactions, with no indication of ties to demonstrate

a sustained pattern of cooperation among them.27

We acknowledge the well established precepts that,

in considering the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘‘[w]e do

not sit as a thirteenth juror who may cast a vote against

the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of

guilt is shown by the cold printed record. . . . Rather,

we must defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility

of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of

their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . This court

cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury

if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 800, 877 A.2d 739 (2005). ‘‘[O]nce

a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged,

a reviewing court conducts its review of all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In short,

[t]he evidence must be given a construction most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict.’’(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 800–801. Nevertheless, upholding

the jury’s verdict in the present case would mean that

virtually any cooperation by a defendant with others

in connection with the sale of narcotics would have the

impermissible result of turning ‘‘garden variety criminal

activity undertakings’’ into racketeering punishable

under statutes such as CORA.28 Gross v. State, 765 So.

2d 39, 46 n.5 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 948, 121

S. Ct. 1416, 149 L. Ed. 2d 357 (2001); see id.(emphasizing

that elements of state racketeering statute render target

of racketeering ‘‘prosecutions . . . appropriately, the

professional or career criminal and not non-racketeers

who have committed relatively minor crimes’’ and that

‘‘[s]tate should equally not be able to routinely invoke

the [racketeering] statute for prosecuting any ordinary

set of crimes’’). Accordingly, we conclude that the

Appellate Court properly determined that there was

insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for racketeering under CORA.29

II
We next turn to the state’s claim that the Appellate

Court improperly concluded that the trial court violated

the defendant’s sixth amendment right to self-representation by allowing him to elect self-representation, but

refusing to grant his request for a continuance to prepare fortrial, effectively forcing him to acceptrepresentation by an attorney he did not want, namely, assigned

counsel, Vicki Hutchinson. State v. Bush, supra, 156

Conn. App. 271.

The Appellate Court’s opinion comprehensively sets

forth the following additional relevant facts and procedural history: ‘‘On the first day of voir dire, March 12,

2012, the defendant told the court that he and Hutchinson ‘don’t connect at all,’ and that he was ‘very uncomfortable’ with her. In response, the court told the

defendant: ‘Sir, this case is over a year old . . . approximately a year old, you were arrested about a year ago,

around July. You were brought to this courthouse in

July of [2011], you plead[ed] not guilty, and . . . Hutchinson has represented you since then. This is . . . and

we’re ready to start picking the jury, and this is the first

request, [a] request to have someone other than . . .

Hutchinson represent yourself. . . . Hutchinson is an

extremely well experienced defense attorney, we’re

going forward with the trial at this time.’

‘‘The next day, March 13, 2012, the defendant again

voiced his dissatisfaction with Hutchinson’s representation. The defendant also complained that he had not

had the opportunity to review with his attorney various

documents and videotapes she had procured through

discovery. In response, the court reiterated that the

defendant’s trial had already begun and that Hutchinson

was a very experienced attorney. The court explained

that the trial would proceed with jury selection that

morning, but that the defendant would be given the

afternoon to meet with Hutchinson. At that point, the

state suggested to the court that the court may have

an obligation, pursuant to State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn.

406, 978 A.2d 64 (2009), to canvass the defendant as to

his request to represent himself. The court responded,

‘We’re not at that point yet.’ Voir dire resumed.

‘‘Shortly thereafter, when the defendant interrupted

the voir dire proceedings, the court asked him if he

wanted to represent himself. When the defendant

responded in the affirmative, the court canvassed him

both to determine if he had the desire and the capacity

to represent himself, and to warn him of the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation. After asking

the defendant several questions on these subjects, the

court proposed to the defendant that he agree to have

Hutchinson pick the jury, and then it would revisit the

issue of whether he should be allowed to represent

himself going forward. The defendant initially agreed

to that proposal. Voir dire thus continued until 1:15

p.m., with Hutchinson still representing the defendant.
Thereafter, as promised, the defendant was afforded

the rest of the day to meet with Hutchinson to review

the state’s disclosure.

‘‘The next day, March 14, 2012, the defendant notified

the court that technical difficulties prevented him from

being able to watch certain of the videotapes that he

had sought to watch on the previous afternoon. Following an exchange with the defendant and a discussion

with counsel, the court decided not to proceed with

voir dire that day so as to give the defendant another

opportunity to view the videotapes that he had not been

able to view the day before.

‘‘After the defendant reviewed the videotapes, the

courtrevisited the defendant’s request to represent himself, and the defendant reiterated his desire to do so.

The court then thoroughly canvassed the defendant and

determined that he validly waived his right to counsel.

The court asked Hutchinson to remain present as

standby counsel for the defendant, and then adjourned

for the day.

‘‘On the next day, March 15, 2012, Hutchinson asked

the court what she should do with all of the disclosure,

approximately 900 pages of documents, that she had

received from the state. She asked, more particularly,

whether she should turn everything over to the defendant, which would be problematic because there was

a protective orderin effect that prevented the defendant

from bringing those documents back to prison with

him because other codefendants were also being held

there.’’ State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 271–73. At

that point, the defendant asked the court for ‘‘time to

look over’’ those documents. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 273. The trial court denied the defendant’s

request for additional time, explaining it would not provide a continuance because he had ‘‘made the decision

to represent [himself] in the middle of a trial.’’ Id., 275.

The trial court emphasized that, because trial had

begun, it would not have granted a continuance even

if the defendant ‘‘had hired another lawyer to come in

at this moment . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 274. The trial court advised the defendant that

he would ‘‘have time during the trial and after the jury

is selected [to review those documents] but at this time

we’re going to complete the jury selection.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 275. Hutchinson then

suggested that the defendant could be given time to

come to court and prepare the next day, when court

was not scheduled to be in session, a suggestion with

which the defendant disagreed because he claimed to

‘‘need to find [his] witnesses.’’(Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. Over the defendant’s protests, the trial

court then proceeded with jury selection.30 See id.,

275–77.

‘‘The jury panel was brought into the courtroom and,

as the court began to address the panel, the defendant
stated that he wanted to be taken downstairs. The court

admonished the defendant that he would waive his right

to represent himself if he refused to participate in the

proceedings. The defendant explained that he did not

study or practice law and that there were a lot of complicated things that he needed to go through. The defendant repeated that he wanted to go downstairs.’’ Id.,

277. At that point, the trial court informed the jury

panel that the proceedings would be moved to another

courtroom to allow the defendant to ‘‘sit in a glassed

in room and hear the proceedings’’ while Hutchinson

represented him for purposes of jury selection, as he

was waiving his constitutional right to represent himself. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 277–78.

After another discussion about the defendant’s desire

for a different attorney to replace Hutchinson and

whether he intended to participate personally, the trial

court moved the proceedings to the courtroom with an

observation booth.31 Id., 278–79.

After a brief recess, the proceedings resumed in the

courtroom that had the glass observation booth for

the defendant. Id., 279. At that point, the trial court

questioned the defendant about a report that he had

stated to the marshals that he did not want to sit in the

observation room, either. Id. The defendant reiterated

that he felt that he was being treated unfairly, and the

trial court emphasized that the defendant’s only choices

were to represent himself or be represented by Hutchinson.32 Id., 280–81. After the trial court emphasized its

desire to assure the defendant a fair trial, Hutchinson

interjected and advised the court that she had reviewed

the 900 page disclosure, much of which pertained to

the charges pending against the other dealers, and ‘‘separated the six distinct sale charges against this particular defendant, and they are at the beginning of the

books. So, it’s maybe fifty pages that pertain to just his

six sale charges. And I would suggest that he take those

pages out of the binder, and take them back with him

to review. And I would also advise the court that

whether [he represents himself] or there’s an attorney,

whoever is defending the case would be looking at

these papers all weekend long. And I know the state is

concerned about all the other defendants who are in

the rest of the book.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 282. At that point, the defendant stated that

he had changed his mind and wanted to be represented

by Hutchinson moving forward, and the trial court

granted that request after confirming the defendant’s

desire to elect representation by counsel.33 Id., 282–83.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court’s

denial of the defendant’s request for a continuance to

allow him to review the state’s ‘‘voluminous disclosure’’

was an abuse of discretion because it effectively denied

him his right of self-representation guaranteed by the

sixth amendment to the United States constitution

under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806. See
State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 283–89. Specifically, the Appellate Court disagreed with the state’s

claim that ‘‘the defendant reasserted his right to counsel, thus waiving his right to represent himself, following the court’s denial of his request for a continuance’’

because it agreed with the defendant’s argument that

the trial ‘‘court rendered meaningless its prior permission for him to represent himself by denying his request

for time to review the state’s 900 page disclosure, effectively denying him the opportunity to effectively represent himself.’’ Id., 286; see id., 287–88 (noting that

defendant could not bring documents back to prison,

and that it was ‘‘doubtful that there would have been

any meaningful period of time after jury selection and

prior to the commencement of the trial when the defendant would have had the opportunity to review the

state’s disclosure at the courthouse’’). The Appellate

Court further concluded that this abuse of discretion

was structural error entitling the defendant to a new

trial because it ‘‘effectively undermined his right to selfrepresentation . . . .’’ Id., 288–89.

On appeal to this court, the state claims that the

Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial

court had abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a continuance, which was an error

that had the effect of denying him his right to selfrepresentation. Relying on, for example, State v. Flanagan, supra, 293 Conn. 406, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.

1, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983), United States

v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

903, 116 S. Ct. 266, 133 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1995), and State

v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 636 A.2d 760 (1994), the

state contends that the defendant’s right to elect selfrepresentation is ‘‘ ‘sharply curtailed’ ’’ once trial begins

with jury selection, and the trial courtretains the discretion to balance it against the orderly administration of

justice in determining whether a continuance is appropriate. The state argues that the Appellate Court’s conclusion that ‘‘Thursday night, Friday, Saturday, and

Sunday was an inadequate amount of time forthe defendant to meaningfully review the state’s disclosure,’’ was

inaccurate, particularly given Hutchinson’s representation to the trial court that ‘‘she had culled the most

important documents’’ from the original disclosure,rendering adequate time on Friday for the defendant’s

review. The state further emphasizes that the defendant’s request for a continuance came after some jurors

had already been selected based on their availability

given the communicated expectation that the court

would start taking evidence on the following Monday.

Thus, the state contends that, because the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance,

the defendant’s ultimate decision to proceed with counsel, even if influenced by the denial of the continuance,

was a voluntary waiver of his right to self-representation.
In response, the defendant relies on several cases

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, namely, United States v. Farias, 618 F.3d 1049

(9th Cir. 2010), United States v. Royal, 43 Fed. Appx.

42 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion), and Armant

v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied

sub nom. Bunnell v. Armant, 475 U.S. 1099, 106 S. Ct.

1502, 89 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1986), in support of his contention that the Appellate Court properly determined

that the trial court’s refusal to grant his request for

a continuance violated his right of self-representation

because it left him unable to prepare, thus, ‘‘effectively

depriv[ing] [him] of his right to self-representation.’’

The defendant argues that a continuance was necessary

because: (1) the record demonstrates that he had never

seen the records disclosed by the state and the protective order precluded him from bringing those records

back to prison to prepare over the weekend; (2) he

needed time to locate witnesses whom Hutchinson did

not want to present; and (3) he had not had the opportunity to review the audiotape and videotape evidence

while incarcerated awaiting trial. Thus, the defendant

contends that the Appellate Court properly determined

that the trial court’s ‘‘insist[ence] that the trial go forward even though [he] was unprepared and would not

have time to effectively prepare’’ constituted a forced

waiver of his right to self-representation, which was a

structural error requiring a new trial. We, however,

agree with the state, and conclude that the Appellate

Court improperly determined that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a

continuance, thus, effectively depriving him of his right

to self-representation.

This ‘‘case involves the intersection of principles

involving the right to self-representation and the discretionary authority of the trial court in managing trial

schedules.’’ Commonwealth v. Brooks, 628 Pa. 524, 526,

104A.3d 466 (2014).As the United States SupremeCourt

has explained, ‘‘[t]rial judges necessarily require a great

deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of

their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time,

and this burden counsels against continuances except

for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion

must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances

. . . .’’ Morris v. Slappy, supra, 461 U.S. 11.

Thus, the ‘‘determination of whether to grant a

request for a continuance is within the discretion of

the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Hamilton, supra, 228 Conn.

239. ‘‘A reviewing court is bound by the principle that

[e]very reasonable presumption in favor of the proper

exercise of the trial court’s discretion will be made.

. . . To prove an abuse of discretion, an appellant must
show that the trial court’s denial of a request for a

continuance was arbitrary. . . . There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer

must be found in the circumstances present in every

case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial

judge at the time the request is denied. . . .

‘‘In appellate review of matters of continuances, federal and state courts have identified multiple factors

that appropriately may enter into the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. Although the applicable factors

cannot be exhaustively catalogued, they generally fall

into two categories. One set of factors focuses on the

facts of record before the trial court at the time when

it rendered its decision. From this perspective, courts

have considered matters such as: the timeliness of the

request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;

the age and complexity of the case; the granting of

other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on

the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;

the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in

support of the request; the defendant’s personalresponsibility for the timing of the request; the likelihood that

the denial would substantially impair the defendant’s

ability to defend himself; the availability of other, adequately equipped and prepared counsel to try the case;

and the adequacy of the representation already being

afforded to the defendant. . . . Another set of factors

has included, as part of the inquiry into a possible abuse

of discretion, a consideration of the prejudice that the

defendant actually suffered by reason of the denial of

the motion for continuance.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 240–41.

A trial court’s discretion with respect to trial scheduling may well be tempered by the right to counsel under

the sixth amendment to the United States constitution,

which also affords ‘‘a defendant in a state criminal trial

. . . [a] right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 807.

‘‘This court consistently has recognized the inviolability

of the right of self-representation . . . and that the

right is also consistent with the ideal of due process

as an expression of fundamental fairness. To force a

lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that

the law contrives against him. . . . The right to counsel

and the right to self-representation present mutually

exclusive alternatives. A criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected interest in each, but since the

two rights cannot be exercised simultaneously, a defendant must choose between them. When the right to have

competent counsel ceases as the result of a sufficient

waiver, the right of self-representation begins. . . . Put

another way, a defendant properly exercises his right

to self-representation by knowingly and intelligently
waiving his right to representation by counsel.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Flanagan, supra, 293 Conn. 418. Upon a ‘‘clear and

unequivocal’’ request, the trial court must canvass the

defendant in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3,

which ‘‘implement[s] the right of a defendant in a criminal case to act as his own attorney’’ and aids the court

in determining ‘‘the defendant’s decision to waive counsel is knowingly and intelligently made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 419–20.

Continuances and the right to self-representation

relate because, as a general proposition, a ‘‘criminal

defendant does not simply have the right to represent

himself, but rather has the right to represent himself

meaningfully. Meaningful representation requires time

to prepare.’’ United States v. Farias, supra, 618 F.3d

1053. Reasonable continuances may well be required

to allow that preparation to occur. See id., 1054–55.

Indeed, consistent with the Appellate Court’s ultimate

conclusion in this case; see State v. Bush, supra, 156

Conn. App. 288–89; an abuse of discretion in denying

such a continuance may ‘‘effectively’’ deprive the defendant of his right of self-representation, thus, requiring

a new trial. See United States v. Farias, supra, 1054;

Barham v. Powell, 895 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

495 U.S. 961, 110 S. Ct. 2572, 109 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1990);

Armant v. Marquez, supra, 772 F.2d 557–58; accord

State v. Hamilton, supra, 228 Conn. 249 (denial of continuance may deprive defendant of due process rights

or sixth amendment right to counsel of choice ‘‘if a

defendant is arbitrarily deprived of a fair opportunity

and reasonable time to employ counsel of the defendant’s own choosing’’).

The right of self-representation is not, however, unfettered. With respect to disruption of the proceedings,

the court may deny a defendant the right of self-representation if the request is ‘‘untimely.’’34 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flanagan, supra, 293

Conn. 431. A ‘‘criminal defendant must make a timely

and unequivocal request to proceed pro se in order to

ensure the orderly administration of justice and prevent

the disruption of both the [pretrial] proceedings and a

criminal trial. . . . Assuming, however, that a defendant’s request to proceed pro se is informed, voluntary

and unequivocal, [t]he right of a defendant in a criminal

case to act as his own lawyer is unqualified if invoked

prior to the start of the trial. . . . Distinct considerations bear upon requests made after a trial has begun.

. . . After the commencement of a trial, the right of

self-representation is sharply curtailed . . . and a

trial court faced with such an application must balance the legitimate interests of the defendant in selfrepresentation against the potential disruption of the

proceedings already in progress.’’35 (Citations omitted;

emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. ‘‘Trial commences, for this purpose, at voir dire.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pires, 310

Conn. 222, 252, 77 A.3d 87 (2013). ‘‘Trial courts’ decisions to deny requests for self-representation that are

made after the commencement of trial are reviewed for

abuse of discretion.’’ Id., 253.

After trial commences, consistent with the defendant’s ‘‘ ‘sharply curtailed’ ’’ freedom to elect self-representation; State v. Flanagan, supra, 293 Conn. 431; the

trial court’s obligation to afford a self-represented

defendant a continuance for purposes of meaningful

preparation is similarly diminished, given the trial

court’s prerogative to manage the trial in light of the

schedules of the court, witnesses, counsel and the jury.

See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, supra, 461 U.S. 11–12; State

v. Hamilton, supra, 228 Conn. 239–41; see also Commonwealth v. Brooks, supra, 628 Pa. 538–39 (emphasizing that ‘‘right to self-representation . . . is not

absolute’’ and that ‘‘this appeal is not simply about the

right to self-representation; it also involves the timing

of such requests, and the trial court’s authority to manage its docket and trial schedule’’ because ‘‘defendants

should not be permitted to unreasonably clog the

machinery of justice, or hamper and delay the effort to

administer justice effectively’’ via assertion of right of

self-representation [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Thus, once trial commences, a trial court is not obligated to delay the proceedings in order to enable or

facilitate a belated request for self-representation. See

People v. Jenkins, 22 Cal. 4th 900, 1039, 997 P.2d 1044, 95

Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (2000) (‘‘in ruling on [the] defendant’s

midtrial motion to represent himself, the court correctly

noted that it had authority to deny the motion if selfrepresentation required a continuance, and, in advising

the defendant of the perils of self-representation, it

asked [the] defendant whether he understood, among

other things, that he would receive ‘no extra time for

preparation’ ’’), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct.

1104, 148 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2001); Commonwealth v.

Brooks, supra, 538, 545 (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying request for continuance made on first

day of jury selection because right to self-representation

‘‘is not absolute’’ and, insofar as ‘‘disruptive behavior

might affect a trial judge’s exercise of discretion’’ the

‘‘lateness of a continuance request itself can be disruptive’’). Put differently, granting a late request for permission to proceed as a self-represented party, while

denying a continuance for preparation, does not necessarily present the defendant with ‘‘a Hobson’s choice

between either proceeding with appointed counsel or

representing himself with no time to prepare such representation,’’ as ‘‘this predicament was a product of [his]

own making.’’36 United States v. Wright, 682 F.3d 1088,

1090 (8th Cir. 2012).

In particular, a denial of a continuance to enable a

midtrial election of self-representation is not an abuse

of discretion if the trial court has thoughtfully consid-
ered the status of the case and otherwise made reasonable efforts to accommodate the needs ofthe defendant,

such as the provision of standby counsel or breaks

during the scheduled trial itself. For example, in United

States v. Hurtado, supra, 47 F.3d 584, the Second Circuit

rejected a claim that ‘‘the district court failed to afford

[the defendant] enough time to prepare his case once

he chose to represent himself’’ by giving him ‘‘more

time to review certain documents that he claimed he

had not received previously.’’ The court emphasized

that the defendant was advised he would be expected

‘‘to adhere to the same standards as any attorney’’ and

materials had been in possession of defense counsel

for an adequate period of time, and that the defendant

had in fact received time during trial to review documents, notwithstanding the denial of the continuances.

Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Brooks, supra, 628 Pa.

538–44 (trial judge did not abuse discretion by denying

continuance request made on day scheduled for jury

selection to enable defendant to represent himself given

disruption of schedule and assurances from defense

counsel that he had conferred with defendant about

strategy, and was personally well prepared).37

Having reviewed the record in this case in light of

these principles, along with the guiding factors of State

v. Hamilton, supra, 228 Conn. 239–41, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the defendant’s request for an apparently indefinite continuance in order to review the state’s disclosure. It is

significant that the defendant, who had elected selfrepresented status after trial started, did not request a

continuance until three jurors had been selected, and

the trial court had already informed those jurors and

other venirepersons of the trial schedule. Moreover, the

trial court reasonably relied on the representation of

Hutchinson, who was prepared for trial and whom the

court had appointed as standby counsel after the defendant elected to proceed as a self-represented party, that

she had culled the most important documents from the

900 page disclosure for the defendant’s review, in order

to assist with the preparation over the several days

between jury selection and the anticipated start of evidence.38 Further, in declining to grant the defendant’s

request for preparation time, the trial court aptly

observed, consistent with the balancing test of State v.

Flanagan, supra, 293 Conn. 431–33, which is applicable

to midtrial requests, that self-representation was not in

the defendant’s best interests given Hutchinson’s competence and experience, along with the complexity of

the case. See State v. Pires, supra, 310 Conn. 253–55

(trial court did not abuse discretion in denying request

for self-representation made at sentencing because it

observed, inter alia, that appointed counsel did ‘‘fantastic legal work,’’ and delay of sentencing to allow selfrepresentation would not ‘‘be beneficial either to you

and, or, to the family of the victims in this case and,
or, to the judicial process’’ [emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted]); State v. Silva, 166 Conn.

App. 255, 275–76, 141 A.3d 916 (2016) (trial court did

not abuse discretion in denying midtrial motion for selfrepresentation, even when defendant did not request

delay, because it ‘‘determined that the defendant’s reasons for wanting to represent himself would ultimately

waste the court’s time and be prejudicial to the defendant’’). Indeed, the potentially disruptive nature of the

defendant’s requestfor a continuance was further established by his own behavior, insofar as he had refused

to participate in the proceedings after electing to proceed as a self-represented party—to the point that the

proceedings were moved to a different courtroom and

required the active participation of Hutchinson as

standby counsel.

In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

request for a continuance, we are mindful that ‘‘the

question is not whether any one of us, had we been

sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised our discretion differently. Our role as an appellate court is not

to substitute our judgment for that of a trial court that

has chosen one of many reasonable alternatives.’’ State

v. Hamilton, supra, 228 Conn. 250. When the delay

inherent in an apparently indefinite continuance is considered in juxtaposition with the sharply curtailed right

of self-representation following the commencement of

trial, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly

determined that the record in the present case indicates

that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying

the defendant’s request for a continuance. The Appellate Court, therefore, improperly held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s

denial of a continuance effectively deprived him of his

right to self-representation.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed with

respect to the defendant’s conviction of racketeering.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with

respect to the defendant’s motion for continuance and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

consider the defendant’s remaining claims on appeal.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER and

McDONALD, Js., concurred.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson. Thereafter, Justice Zarella retired from this

court and did not participate in the consideration of the case. Although

Justice Palmer was not present when the case was argued before the court,

he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the

oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

1 General Statutes § 53-396 (b) provides: ‘‘In any prosecution under this

chapter the court or the jury, as the case may be, shall indicate by special

verdict the particular incidents of racketeering activity that it finds to have

been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

2 We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the

following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the

state failed to adduce sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of a

violation of General Statutes § 53-395 (c)?’’; and (2) ‘‘Did the Appellate
Court properly conclude that the trial court violated the self-represented

defendant’s sixth amendment right to self-representation by denying his

request for a reasonable continuance to review his attorney’s case before

the start of evidence at trial?’’ State v. Bush, 317 Conn. 903, 903–904, 114

A.3d 1219 (2015).

3 General Statutes § 53-395 (c) provides: ‘‘It is unlawful for any person

employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to knowingly conduct or

participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt.’’

4 We note that the state did not specifically allege in the operative information that Brazil, Jamison, and Lopez had participated in any of the narcotics

sales of which the defendant was convicted, including those alleged as

predicate acts for the racketeering charge. Jamison and Lopez were, however, specifically alleged to be coconspirators for purposes of the conspiracy

count. The evidence adduced at trial, discussed in detail in part I of this

opinion, demonstrates that Brazil and Lopez had some involvement in the

narcotics sales of which the defendant was convicted.

5 Beyond the issues discussed in this certified appeal, the defendant also

claimed before the Appellate Court that the trial court: (1) violated the

defendant’s right of self-representation by ignoring his first request, and

subsequently denying his second request without conducting a full canvass;

(2) improperly instructed the jury on the elements of racketeering; (3)

improperly instructed the jury with respect to conspiracy; and (4) imposed

an illegal sentence for conspiracy, given the acquittal of the underlying crime

of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent.

Subsequent to our grant of certification to appeal, the defendant filed a

statement pursuant to Practice Book § 84-11 (a) raising these claims as

alternative grounds for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court. We

subsequently denied the state’s motion to strike this statement of alternative

grounds. Because the defendant has not, however, included any analysis of

these issues in his brief in this certified appeal, we decline to consider them

further, leaving them to the Appellate Court to consider in the first instance

on remand.

6 As the Appellate Court noted, the ‘‘jury was provided with a verdict form

to complete and submit to the court upon rendering its verdict. The form

first asks whether the jury finds the defendant guilty or not guilty of the

racketeering charge. It then goes on to direct the jury, if it finds the defendant

guilty, to indicate which two or more incidents of racketeering activity

that you have found beyond a reasonable doubt were committed by the

defendant . . . . The form lists the dates of the seven alleged cocaine sales

in connection with which the defendant was charged, with a blank line next

to each date on which the jury was to place a check mark if it determined

that that alleged sale, if committed by the defendant, constituted an incident

of racketeering activity. The jury submitted the completed form to the court,

indicating that it found the defendant guilty of racketeering based upon the

following incidents of racketeering activity:

‘‘1. Sale of cocaine on June 25, 2010

‘‘2. Sale of cocaine on June 30, 2010 X

‘‘3. Sale of cocaine on July 14, 2010

‘‘4. Sale of cocaine on July 16, 2010

‘‘5. Sale of cocaine on August 6, 2010

‘‘6. Sale of cocaine on August 24, 2010

‘‘7. Sale of cocaine on November 9, 2010 X ’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn.

App. 263 n.4.

7

‘‘Detective Jason Amato testified that drug dealers routinely keep contraband in their mouths.’’ State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 264 n.5.

8

‘‘There is no claim that the transaction with this other man was part of

the pattern of racketeering activity charged in this case.’’ State v. Bush,

supra, 156 Conn. App. 264 n.6.

9 The Appellate Court further rejected the use of a ‘‘hub and spokes’’

theory to prove the enterprise, observing that ‘‘there is no evidence that the

defendant’s consummation of either sale with one confederate present and

assisting him involved, much less required, the collaboration or cooperation

of any other confederate, or relied on or benefitted from the actions of the

other confederate in any way.’’ State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 270;

see also footnote 15 of this opinion.

10 We note that General Statutes § 53-394 (a) also provides in relevant part

that ‘‘ ‘[r]acketeering activity’ means to commit, to attempt to commit, to

conspire to commit, or to intentionally aid, solicit, coerce or intimidate
another person to commit any crime which, at the time of its commission,

was a felony chargeable by indictment or information under the following

provisions of the general statutes then applicable . . . (16) sections 21a277, 21a-278 and 21a-279, relating to drugs . . . .’’

11 Although the state discussed the other elements of the racketeering

charge during its oral argument before this court, we note the briefs and

the defendant’s oral argument establish that only the sufficiency of the

evidence of the enterprise element is at issue in this certified appeal.

12 We note that other federal court decisions are consistent with United

States v. Connolly, supra, 341 F.3d 26–27, and permit the jury to consider

a broad array of evidence beyond the proven predicate acts in determining

whetherthe government has established the existence of an enterprise under

RICO. See United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995)

(rejecting sufficiency challenge to enterprise element under RICO because

‘‘the jury was neither limited to a consideration of the [particular] predicate

acts’’ nor to ‘‘any or all of the predicate acts in general’’ in determining

whether defendant ‘‘participated in the operation or management’’ of gang,

specifically noting that ‘‘[t]he jury was entitled to consider in its entirety

all circumstantial evidence’’ of defendant’s participation [emphasis added]),

cert. denied sub nom. Sears v. United States, 517 U.S. 1111, 116 S. Ct. 1335,

134 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1996); United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843–44

(2d Cir.) (rejecting claim of ‘‘ ‘spillover’ prejudice’’ because, under RICO,

‘‘evidence of violent activities engaged in by other members and associates’’

was relevant to establish ‘‘the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise’’),

cert. denied sub nom. Testa v. United States, 506 U.S. 830, 113 S. Ct. 94,

121 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1992); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1200–1201

(8th Cir. 1982) (analyzing sufficiency claim by eliminating predicate acts,

to show that evidence independently demonstrated existence of enterprise

in holding that ‘‘the enterprise alleged by the government has not been

impermissibly equated with the predicate acts ofracketeering’’), cert. denied,

459 U.S. 1110, 103 S. Ct. 739, 74 L. Ed. 2d 960 (1983).

13 As the defendant observes, a special verdict is an appropriate device for

discerning orlimiting the factual basis for a jury’s verdict, and a sufficiency of

the evidence analysis may well be cabined by facts found in accordance

with that special verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Cianci, supra, 378 F.3d

91; State v. Anderson, supra, 86 Conn. App. 864; see also State v. Wassil,

supra, 233 Conn. 179–82 (reviewing manslaughter conviction in accordance

with theory of liability stated by jury in special verdict). This, however, begs

the question in this appeal, namely, the scope of the special verdict. In the

present case, the jury’s verdict as to CORA was a general one, with only

the acts constituting the pattern of racketeering being found specifically,

as is required by § 53-396 (b). Neither the jury instruction nor the special

verdict form restricted the jury’s inquiry or required specification of its

findings with respect to the enterprise element of racketeering under CORA.

See footnote 6 of this opinion. Thus, the special verdict itself does not limit

our inquiry in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to satisfy

the enterprise element. See State v. Anderson, supra, 862–63.

14 We note that the defendant relies on the Florida District Court of

Appeal’s decision in Sanchez v. State, supra, 89 So. 3d 912, forthe proposition

that the Appellate Court properly limited its inquiry to the predicate offenses

specified in the special verdict in determining that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the racketeering conviction under CORA. Sanchez is distinguishable because the sufficiency analysis in that case did not concern

the enterprise element. See id., 916. Instead, in reversing a substantive

racketeering conviction, the court concluded that there was insufficient

evidence to support one of the only two predicate acts specified by the jury

in its special verdict. Id., 917; see also id., 915–16 (concluding that there

was insufficient evidence that defendant had knowingly aided in escape

of prisoner).

15 Given our conclusion that the entirety of the record may be considered

in determining whether the state proved the existence of an enterprise, we

need not consider the state’s arguments with respect to whether the Appellate Court,relying heavily on a decision analyzing RICO, New York v. Chavez,

944 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), properly determined that a ‘‘hub

and spokes’’ relationship is not sufficient to create an enterprise under

CORA. See State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 267–70; see also footnote

9 of this opinion. We note that there is some division in the federal courts

on this point with respect to their interpretation of RICO in the wake of

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948–51, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 173 L. Ed. 2d

1265 (2009), although the Appellate Court’s conclusion in the present case
is consistent with the majority view. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Alibaba

Group Holding Ltd., Docket No. 15-CV-3784 (PKC), 2016 WL 6110565, *5–6

(S.D.N.Y. August 4, 2016).

16 Although an individual theoretically may be an enterprise under CORA;

see General Statutes § 53-394 (c); we note that the state does not claim that

the defendant in this case was himself the enterprise. Indeed, consistent

with RICO case law interpreting § 1961 (4) of title 18 of the United States

Code, in particular Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158,

161–63, 121 S. Ct. 2087, 150 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2001), it would appear that the

defendant and the individual constituting the enterprise must be different

entities for liability to attach under CORA. See, e.g., Ray v. Spirit Airlines,

Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1355 (11th Cir. 2016); Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720

F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013).

17 Under RICO, ‘‘[a]s the Supreme Court indicated in [United States v.

Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. 583], the government is required to prove both

the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity. The

enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated

together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The

pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal

acts as defined by the statute. The former is proved by evidence of an

ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various

associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence

of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants

in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements

may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish

the other. The enterprise is not the pattern of racketeering activity; it is an

entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.

The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which

must be proved by the [g]overnment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

United States v. Connolly, supra, 341 F.3d 25.

18 Although the jury acquitted the defendant of the narcotics sale charges

arising from June 25, 2010 as noted in part I A of this opinion, the evidence

relating to the June 25, 2010 transaction is relevant to prove the existence

of an enterprise for purposes of CORA.

19 The defendant testified that he was given the mobile phone by a female

associate of Ortiz after Ortiz had been arrested.

20 Other recent federal decisions under RICO are illustrative of more

sophisticated narcotics dealing enterprises than those considered in Burden

and Nascimento, involving groups with formal colors or insignias, a hierarchical structure of rank within the group, and designated territories enforced

with violence. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, supra, 800 F.3d

19 (gang had name, rules and structure, gang sign via unique hand gesture,

and was combination following truce between two other housing project

gangs for purposes of selling drugs and eliminating competition); United

States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 838–39 (2d Cir.) (gang members had ‘‘tattoos

and signs that signified their membership,’’ and committed numerous crimes,

including three murders, in furtherance of enterprise of selling narcotics in

vicinity of housing project), cert. denied, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 172, 193

L. Ed. 2d 139 (2015); United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 77–78 (2d Cir.

2011) (gang was enterprise for purpose of selling narcotics when evidence

showed that members ‘‘congregated daily in their territory, marked their

territory with graffiti, received tattoos signifying their membership in the

gang,’’ flashed the gang’s ‘‘hand sign in public places to ‘represent’ that they

were members,’’ used violence to protect specific territory for drug sales,

and shared profits for purposes of purchasing supply, along with evidence

that gang’s structure included ‘‘ ‘senior’ ’’ members who provided mentoring

and financial assistance).

21 The state also relies on the fact that the defendant, Ortiz and Moreland

‘‘sold cocaine from a single location’’ to contend that, ‘‘because drug dealers

do not willingly compromise their profits and security by sharing a single

location with other, unaffiliated dealers, the jury reasonably could have

inferred the defendant, Ortiz and Moreland were associates.’’ The state relies

by analogy on United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th

Cir. 1985) (en banc), which stated that common sense supported a jury’s

conclusion that, ‘‘in the course of transporting or distributing millions of

dollars worth of readily marketable marijuana, through channels that wholly

lack the ordinary protections of organized society, a prudent smuggler is

not likely to suffer the presence of unaffiliated bystanders.’’ Even assuming

that expert testimony—not present in this record—is not required on this

point, the state’s argument falls short given Detective Amato’s testimony
about the heavy amounts of narcotics trafficking in the immediate area,

with no evidence that the members of the alleged enterprise made any plans

or took action to secure its turf in the market.

22 The dissenting justice relies on the defendant’s July 14 admonition to

Hannon, who at the time ironically was accompanied by undercover police

detective Dennis Sang, not to bring the police near his house, as evidence

of protective measures. This admonition—common sense for those engaged

in the sale of narcotics—does not rise to the level of protective measures

that the courts in Burden and Nascimento deemed indicative of an ongoing

enterprise, including caches of weapons.

23 We disagree with the state’s reliance on the lingo used to describe the

quantities of cocaine purchased, as well as the packaging of that cocaine

and the fact that the dealers concealed those packages in their mouths, as

evidence of the enterprise. Given the lack of evidence that this lingo and

packaging were unique to the sales conducted from the defendant’s porch,

and Detective Amato’s testimony that they were in fact common to the

narcotics trade in the east side of Bridgeport as a whole, we agree with

the defendant that this evidence was not probative of the existence of

an enterprise.

24 The dissenting justice suggests that the defendant exercised ‘‘direction

and control’’ over the other drug dealers, as evinced by his use of hand

signals to communicate with Ortiz during the June 30 sale. The dissent also

stated that the defendant ‘‘set the ground rules for participating on the porch

by stating that no one informs on anyone else and instructed the members

not to bring the police.’’ We respectfully disagree. Although the hand signals

suggest some cooperative effort between the men, such as making sure the

coast was clear, they do not by themselves suggest that the defendant had

a leadership role in an organized enterprise. Further, the dissent cites no

evidence that the defendant admonished the other dealers, but rather, only

the buyer, Hannon.

25 With respect to the third element, namely, ‘‘longevity sufficient to permit

the associates to pursue the purpose of the enterprise’’; (internal quotation

marks omitted) State v. Rodriguez-Roman, supra, 297 Conn. 82; we note

that the defendant does not claim that the period of time at issue in this

case, which spans multiple months, is insufficient as a matter of law. See

United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 838 (2d Cir.) (‘‘[T]here is no hardand-fast time period for satisfaction of the longevity prong. Continuity is

both a closed-[ended] and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed

period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects

into the future with a threat of repetition.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 172, 193 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2015);

see also Caro-Bonet v. Lotus Management, LLC, United States District

Court, Docket No. CV 15-2106 (FAB) (D.P.R. July 5, 2016) (seven months

sufficient longevity to establish enterprise under RICO). Rather, we understand the defendant to claim that there is insufficient evidence that the

various individuals involved in the present case had relationships with each

other in furtherance of a common purpose over the time period involved.

26 We surmise that this fact led to the Appellate Court’s analysis of the

enterprise issue under a hub and spoke theory. See footnote 15 of this

opinion.

27 We note, however, that Jackson v. State, 858 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. App.

2003) (per curiam), on which the defendant relies, is distinguishable. In

Jackson, Florida’s intermediate appellate court concluded that there was

insufficient evidence to prove the state’s allegation that ‘‘the defendant was

employed by or associated with a criminal street gang.’’ Id., 1212. The court

observed in Jackson that ‘‘[t]here was no evidence that he was a member

of either gang; that he engaged in transactions with or on behalf of gang

members; or that he shared any of his drug proceeds with the gangs. Rather,

the evidence showed only that [the] defendant sold cocaine in the park and

that he was familiar with some other persons who were gang members.’’

Id. We view Jackson as distinguishable because that case did not turn on

whether one of the two street gangs involved was an enterprise, indeed one

was the Latin Kings, but rather, whether the defendant in that case had

engaged in activities sufficiently associated with the gangs to render him

part of their enterprises. In the present case, the other persons with whom

the defendant was associating bore none of the usual hallmarks of a criminal

street gang.

28 The dissenting justice ‘‘conclude[s] that conducting such an operation

with a group of six other drug dealers on the porch of a private home or

adjoining public streets, and dispensing drugs to people stopping in front
of the porch as if it were a drive-through window at a twenty-four hour

pharmacy, is the very type of activity that CORA was intended to punish.’’

We respectfully disagree. CORA need not stretch this far to ensure that

the defendant receives significant punishment for his contributions to the

narcotics trade in Bridgeport, given sentencing options available for his

multiple narcotics and conspiracy convictions under §§ 21a-277 (a), 21a278a (b), and 53a-48.

29 Although we do not consider the defendant’s challenge to the jury

instructions on CORA in this certified appeal; see footnotes 2 and 5 of

this opinion; we note that greater elaboration on the meaning of the term

‘‘enterprise,’’ and in particularthe significance of its structure element, might

well have aided the jury in divining the difference between racketeering

and ordinary criminal activity. Accordingly, we commend this topic to the

Judicial Branch Criminal Jury Instruction Committee for their able consideration.

30 The following colloquy ensued:

‘‘The Defendant: Your Honor, I really feel like you’re putting too much

pressure on me right now, man, you know what I’m sayin’? Because I

explained to you from day one that, you understand, I don’t have full knowledge, full understanding of all this. Now you puttin’ everything at me at

once, Your Honor, you understand what I’m sayin’, and you’re trying to

make me go, you understand what I’m sayin’, on things I don’t have no

nature about . . . that I have to talk to people to get a better understandin’

. . . you understand. I don’t have a problem with you know, addressin’—

‘‘The Court: Sir, I’m not making, you are electing to represent yourself,

so you know—

‘‘The Defendant: And I’m asking—

‘‘The Court: —this is your choice.

‘‘The Defendant: You’re denying me all my rights though, Your Honor. I

mean, I think I have a right, you understand what I’m saying, to defend

myself properly, man. I mean, I can’t just do something here that’s, you

know, unpredictable.

‘‘The Court: Sir, you’ve decided—

‘‘The Defendant: So what you basically telling me, Your Honor, is you

don’t care. And I’m . . . I mean, I’m very uncomfortable with that.

‘‘The Court: Well, I care very much sir, but you—

‘‘The Defendant: That’s what I’m saying, then show me that you care,

Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Sir, you’ve elected to represent yourself.

‘‘The Defendant: Because—

‘‘The Court: This is your choice.

‘‘The Defendant: Because—

‘‘The Court: We’re not arguing the point.

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not arguing, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: We’re—

‘‘The Defendant: I’m talking to you.

‘‘The Court: We’re going forward with the jury selection. This is what you

have elected to do. I suggested before that you let counsel select the jury,

but you did not want to do that.

‘‘The Defendant: Yeah, but you’re rushing me to do something, Your Honor,

you’re rushing me to do—I’m asking you for time to go over things. You’re

denying me time, you understand what I’m saying? I mean how am I gonna

defend myself properly?

‘‘The Court: Well, sir—

‘‘The Defendant: You understand what I’m saying, if I don’t understand

something?

‘‘The Court: Sir, we’re going forward with the jury selection.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 275–77.

31 The following colloquy took place before the trial court changed

courtrooms:

‘‘The Court: Now, courtroom 3A is available at this moment . . . so we

will proceed today in that courtroom. And Mr. Bush, if you elect to sit

outside the courtroom, then you have elected to give up your right to—

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not giving up no right.

‘‘The Court: —represent yourself. Sir, you can’t—

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not giving up my rights.

‘‘The Court: —have it both ways. You can’t make a mockery of the situation, so—

‘‘The Defendant: I’m not trying to make a mockery of it.

‘‘The Court: Mr. Bush, do you want to be in the courtroom, yes or no?
‘‘The Defendant: I want proper—

‘‘The Court: Do you want to be in a courtroom?

‘‘The Defendant: You’re asking me what I want, Your Honor, I’m trying

to explain to you what I want.

‘‘The Court: Okay, 3A and please bring Mr. Bush down to the glassed in

anteroom in 3A—

‘‘The Defendant: If I’m innocent until proven guilty, Your Honor,

please, man—

‘‘The Court: And then we’ll proceed down in that courtroom.

‘‘The Defendant: I’m asking for proper counsel.

‘‘The Marshal: Yes, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Okay, we’ll stand in recess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn. App. 278–79.

32 The record reveals the following colloquy on this point:

‘‘The Defendant: . . . Why would I be sittin’ around watchin’ something

go down that, you know what I’m sayin’, yo? I feel like I’m not being treated

fairly, man.

‘‘The Court: You have the right to represent yourself, if that’s what you

want to do. We’ve gone through that.

‘‘The Defendant: This . . . like I explained to you before—

‘‘The Court: Now, sir—

‘‘The Defendant: —I don’t want to represent myself. I want the proper

representation, man.

‘‘The Court: No, no, you told me you wanted to represent yourself. If you—

‘‘The Defendant: That’s not what I told you.

‘‘The Court: If you don’t want to represent yourself then Attorney

Hutchinson—

‘‘The Defendant: No—

‘‘The Court: —will stand forward—

‘‘The Defendant: —she’s not helping me, Your Honor. Please understand,

she’s not helping me.

‘‘The Court: Sir, you—

‘‘The Defendant: She haven’t been helping me from day one.

‘‘The Court: Sir, you’re not getting a different attorney. So, either your

election is to go forward with Attorney Hutchinson, we’ve gone through

this, or to represent yourself. Which do you want to do? There’s not a third

choice at this time. What do you want to do, sir?

‘‘The Defendant: Do what you gotta do, lock me up, Your Honor, if that’s

what you wanna do. Put me in jail, I mean you know what I’m sayin’, yo?

But, I feel like I deserve the proper—

‘‘The Court: Sir—

‘‘The Defendant: You understand what I’m sayin’, yo? To be treated, you

know, fairly. I’m innocent until proven guilty, Your Honor. You understand?

Nine tenths of the law. There is nothing in here, nothing in here stating

this case, Your Honor. You understand what I’m sayin’? I’m not a gang

member. . . .

‘‘The Court: . . . Now the choice is representing yourself or having Attorney Hutchinson represent you.

‘‘The Defendant: Like I explained to you, and I’m going to explain to you—

‘‘The Court: There’s . . . I’ve explained to you there’s not a third—

‘‘The Defendant: I like Mrs. Hutchinson.

‘‘The Court: There’s not a third—

‘‘The Defendant: I don’t have a problem with her, but listen, me and her

don’t click. . . . That’s oil and water right there, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: There’s not a third choice.

‘‘The Defendant: How am I have to jeopardize my life . . . well then you

know, I might as well be just . . . you might as well just convict me right

now. You might as well as just find me guilty because, I mean, you’re putting

me under all this pressure here of trying to defend myself. And, Your Honor,

I’m pretty sure you’d know for a fact that I didn’t go to law school. So, I’m

gonna have to use all the wisdom that I got to try to do the best that I could

to represent myself because I’m not going with Mrs. Hutchinson if I can’t

see eye to eye with her, and I feel like she’s not going to represent me

properly. You understand? I’ve been through that before where I had . . .

I went to trial and I was young and ignorant to the fact of a crime I didn’t

commit. I don’t want that to happen again.

‘‘The Court: Sir, what are we doing now? Are we going to—you know,

are you going to represent yourself and select a jury, or are you going to

elect to be outside of the courtroom? . . .

‘‘The Defendant: I don’t know what to do, Your Honor. I—all I want to
do is cooperate, man, but I don’t want to be railroaded, man. I don’t want

to be railroaded, man.

‘‘The Court: I want to see that you have a fair trial, and now is the time

for trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn.

App. 279–82.

33 The record reveals the following colloquy on this point:

‘‘The Court: Okay, I’m listening to you, but right now we have the jury

selection issue. But by these papers you meant the fifty . . . how many

pages were in the front?

‘‘[Attorney] Hutchinson: Your Honor, the six sales, the six alleged sales—

‘‘The Court: How many?

‘‘[Attorney] Hutchinson: I’m going to say it’s—

‘‘The Defendant: Matter of fact you know what, Your Honor? We don’t

even need them. Let’s just start with Mrs. Hutchinson then. I’ll go with

Mrs. Hutchinson.

‘‘The Court: You’ll go with Miss Hutchinson?’

‘‘The Defendant: Yes, I will.

‘‘The Court: Well okay, you know, I’ll tell you, I think that’s a—

‘‘The Defendant: I already know, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: —wise decision.

‘‘The Defendant: You know what, what am I gonna do, man? I don’t wanna

do this, but you know what I’m sayin’, man? . . . I mean, I want to go over

the stuff itself, man, and try to figure out, you know what I’m saying, because

like I explained to you on many occasions, and you know what I explained

to you.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Now you want to go forward with Miss Hutchinson?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes, yes, I’m going to go forward with Miss Hutchinson,

man.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bush, supra, 156 Conn.

App. 282–83.

34 With respect to timely requests for self-representation, there are ‘‘four

instances’’ that support denial: ‘‘A defendant’s request may be denied when

a court finds that the defendant is not competent to represent himself . . .

or that he has not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel. . . . A court can also deny such request because it was

made for dilatory or manipulative purposes . . . or because the defendant’s

behavior is disruptive or obstructive.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Braswell,

318 Conn. 815, 829, 123 A.3d 835 (2015).

35 In Flanagan, we adopted the balancing test utilized by the Second

Circuit; see Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 99 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994); and held

that, ‘‘when a defendant clearly and unequivocally has invoked his right to

self-representation after the trial has begun, the trial court must consider:

(1)the defendant’s reasons forthe self-representation request;(2) the quality

of the defendant’s counsel; and (3) the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel. If, after a thorough consideration of these factors, the trial

court determines, in its discretion, that the balance weighs in favor of the

defendant’s interest in self-representation, the court must then proceed to

canvass the defendant in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3 to ensure

that the defendant’s choice to proceed pro se has been made in a knowing

and intelligent fashion. If, on the other hand, the court determines, on the

basis of those criteria, that the potential disruption of the proceedings

already in progress outweighs the defendant’s interest in self-representation,

then the court should deny the defendant’s request and need not engage in

a § 44-3 canvass.’’ State v. Flanagan, supra, 293 Conn. 433.

36 To this end, the Ninth Circuit cases relied upon by the defendant are

distinguishable insofar as they concern requests for self-representation that

were timely because they were made prior to the commencement of trial.

See United States v. Farias, supra, 618 F.3d 1054–55 (given lack of evidence

or finding that defendant was acting to delay trial, with motion made at

pretrial hearing, trial court deprived defendant of right of self-representation

by requiring him to start trial immediately should he elect to represent

himself because ‘‘we are certain that a single day’s preparation was wholly

insufficient’’); United States v. Royal, supra, 43 Fed. Appx. 44–45 (improper

denial of pretrial motion for self-representation not cured by subsequently

allowing defendant to proceed as self-represented party on morning of trial

without giving him opportunity to ‘‘adequately prepare’’ via grant of less

than thirty day motion for continuance, when record showed no evidence

of inconvenience for court or other parties); Armant v. Marquez, supra, 772

F.2d 557–58 (abuse of discretion to deny continuance because rescheduling

would not have been difficult and defendant needed time to call additional

witnesses, make additional motions, and review preliminary hearing tran-
script).

37 Other cases similarly demonstrate the proper exercise of a trial judge’s

discretion to deny a motion for a continuance to facilitate a request for selfrepresentation. See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal. 4th 1038–40 (trial court

did not deprive defendant of due process in denying motion for continuance

once it granted his midtrial request to proceed as self-represented party

because it advised defendant of perils including that no additional preparation time would be granted, and defense counsel had adequate preparation

time and was serving as standby counsel); accord Barham v. Powell, supra,

895 F.2d 22–23 (denial of self-represented defendant’s pretrial request for

fifty-six day continuance was not abuse of discretion that deprived him

of right to self-representation as trial had already been delayed twice at

defendant’s request‘‘because of changes in his representation,’’ and availability of standby counsel to provide legal research materials accommodated

for lack of library access while he was incarcerated awaiting trial); State

v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 437–38, 72 P.3d 831 (2003) (trial court did not abuse

discretion by denying pretrial denial of motion for continuance because [1]

defendant ‘‘has failed to explain why he could not meaningfully exercise

his right to self-representation without a continuance,’’ [2] rescheduling

murder trial, which had already been continued several times, ‘‘would have

caused considerable inconvenience,’’ [3] defendant represented familiarity

with case during canvass and discharged attorneys were available to serve

as standby counsel, and [4] defendant did not elect self-represented status

until more than two years after entering plea of not guilty), cert. denied,

541 U.S. 940, 124 S. Ct. 1655, 158 L. Ed. 2d 362 (2004).

38 We note that the record does not establish, and the parties disagree, as

a factual matter about whether the defendant had ever personally seen the

state’s 900 page disclosure prior to trial and the trial court’s grant of a four

day review period. Specifically, the state argues that the Appellate Court’s

conclusion that ‘‘Thursday night, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday was an inadequate amount of time for the defendant to meaningfully review the state’s

disclosure’’ was predicated ‘‘upon the erroneous assumption that the defendant had never seen those documents during the eight months prior to trial

when he was represented by counsel,’’ particularly given that the trial court

had granted a continuance four months earlierto allow Hutchinson to review

the state’s belated and voluminous disclosure. The defendant, however,

emphasizes that his statements in the record demonstrate that he had not

received any documents from Hutchinson, and that this lapse was a factor

contributing to the breakdown of their relationship. The defendant also

relies on Hutchinson’s representation to the trial court that ‘‘whether [he

represents himself] or there’s an attorney, whoever is defending the case

would be looking at these papers all weekend long,’’ as demonstrating that

the defendant had not seen them before. Even if we accept the defendant’s

reading of the record, which he contends demonstrates that he had personally never seen those documents prior to the commencement of trial, the

trial court nevertheless did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. Given the late assertion of the defendant’s right to self-representation

and the fact that several jurors had already been selected, the trial court

reasonably relied on Hutchinson’s representations, as an officer of the court,

that she had culled the portions that related specifically to the defendant

for his review. This is particularly so, given that Hutchinson remained in

the case as standby counsel and would have been available to advise the

defendant with respect to the content of the remaining records.