Affirmed in Part, R eversed in Part and Rendered, and Memorandum Opinion filed April 11 , 2024

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00630

- CV

GILCHRIST COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION , Appellant
V.
J. MARCUS HILL AND JAMES E. BRADLEY , Appellee s

On Appe al from the Coun ty Court N o . 2 Galv est on County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV76026A

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Gilch rist C o mmunity Association (Gilc h rist) challenges , in seven issues, the trial court ’ s fin a l judgment con firming an a rbitration awa rd o f quantum

- meruit at torney ’ s fees in favor of appellees J. Marcus Hill and James E. Bradley

. C onsidering our jurisdiction , we conclude the tri al court erred in denying Gilchrist ’ s Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a motion because th e trial court ’ s findi ng o n Gilchrist ’ s date of notic e was not supported by th e evidence received at2 the hearing. We , therefore, hold Gilchrist ’ s appeal is timely, and we reach the

m erits

. On Gilchrist ’ s challenge to the trial court ’ s confirmation of the arbitration award, we c oncl ude the arbitrator did not e xceed her power s in awa rding quantum

- meruit attorney ’ s fees to appellees and that the trial court did not err in confirming the arbitration award. We agree with Gilchrist t hat the trial court erred by awarding postjudgment i nter est when th e arbi trator did not. Therefore, we

re verse the por t ion of the final judgment regarding postjudgment interest and

re n der judgment , in par t , striking the award of postjudgment interest . We affirm the remainder of the final judgment as challe n ged on appeal

. I. B ACKGROUND
We hav e addressed portions of the background of thi s case before. See Gilchrist Cmty. Ass ’ n v. Cnty. of Galveston , No. 14

- 19

- 00774

- CV, 2021 WL 5313781, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 16, 2021, pet. denied) (m em. op.) ( Gi lc hrist II ); Gilchrist Cmty. A s s ’ n v. County of Galveston , No. 14

- 17

- 00681

- CV, 2018 WL 6722343 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op .) ( Gilchrist I ). Gilc hrist was involve d in condemnation proceedings concerning a piece of prop erty commonly known as Rollover P ass, which is located on Bolivar Peninsula in Galveston County.

In 2016, the County filed a petition in condemnation nami ng the Gulf Coast Rod, Reel and Gun Club (the Club) as owner of the property. Alth o ugh the applicable prop erty on Rollover Pass was ow n ed by the Club, Gilchrist managed and maintained the property. While there was no written agreement to that effect before the County filed its condemnation law suit , Gilchrist was added as a defe ndant to t he condemnation pro ceed ing to address its interest i n the property

. Gilchrist II , at *1.3 In 2017, t h e C lub settled the condemnation lawsuit after mediation with the County. Gilchrist also attended the mediation and al though its at torney s and representative agreed to a settle ment , Gilchrist ’ s board of direc t ors refused to accept the se ttlement.
A t the time of mediatio n, appellees were the attorney s for Gilchrist. However, aft er Gilchrist refused the settlement, the relationship between Gilchrist and appellee s soured, resulting in appell ee s ’ withdrawal from r e presentation of Gilchrist. In 2019, a ppellees intervened in the condemnation suit seeking compensation for their represe ntation . The trial court severed the attorney ’ s
- fees claim from the condemnation act ion, and the attorn ey ’ s
- fee s claim was referred to

a rbitration pursuant to the ag reement between the parties. In 2021, appellees ’ att orney ’ s
- fees claim was heard by arbitr ator Alice Oliver

- Parrot , who c oncluded that alth ough appel lees could not recover on their breach

- o f

- con trac t cause of action , they were entitled t o quan t um
- meruit attorney ’ s fees for the value of the work they p erformed defending the condemnation action

. The arbitr ation award is premised on the conclusion there is no contract that covers work perfo rmed by appel lees “ to focus solely on con test to th e right of condemnation and not seek value for th e property int erest take n. ” Several days after the arbitr ation award is sued , appellees file d a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the trial court

. Fo ur days late r, and without a hearing, th e trial cou r t rendered a final judgment in favor of appelle es confirming the arbitration award as well as adding postjud g ment inter est

. Gilchrist appealed but its appeal was outside the standard deadl ine for
ap peal , absent a n ex ten sion of postjudgment dead lines pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a . We previously di smissed Gilc hrist ’ s appeal on the basis that the late filing of the appe al deprived this court of subject

- matter jurisdiction

.4 II. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
On reh eari ng , we concluded that we err ed in d ismissing Gilchrist ’ s appeal for want of jurisdiction

. We concluded this court had limited jurisdiction over the appeal to r eview issues stemm ing from Gilchri st ’ s Rule 306a mo tion to extend postjudgment deadlines . We abat ed the case for the trial co urt t o hold a hearing and make a finding on the date Gilchrist received notice of the final judgment , so that we could determine ou r jurisdiction.

A

. The trial court ’ s finding
The trial court found that notice was sent by th e cl erk of the trial court to al l
par t ies on May 26, 2021 and that Gilchrist received notice on May 29, 2021

. Gilchrist filed a supp lemental brief to chall enge that finding as not supported by the record. 1 We b egin with issue one, in which appellant ar gues th e trial court erred by d enyin g its motion to extend post j udgment deadlines.
We review the trial court ’ s finding for legal and fa ctual su fficiency. See LDF Con str., Inc. v. Tex as Friends of Ch abad Lubavitch , I nc. , 45 9 S.W. 3d 720, 724 (Tex. App.

— Hou st on [ 14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)

. When examining a legal

suffici e ncy ch allenge, we review the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the challeng ed finding an d indulge every reasonable inferenc e that would support it

. Cit y of Kel ler v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 80 2, 8 22 ( Tex. 2005). When a part y att a cks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it h as the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on ap peal that the evidence establis hes, a s a matter of law, all v ital f acts in support of the iss ue. Dow Chem . Co. v. Francis , 46 S. W .3d 2 37, 241 (Tex. 2001)

. Wh e n a pa rty attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse

1 On S ep t em ber 18 , 2023 , the cle rk o f this court issued our orde r invi ting the parties to file sup plemental briefing to address the trial court ’ s d ate

- of

- notice finding. Gilchrist filed a supplemental brief . Appel lees have not filed a br i ef

.5 finding on an iss ue on wh ich it has the bu rden of proof , it must demons t rate on appeal that the ad v er se fin ding is against the great weight and pre ponderance of the evide n ce. I d . at 242. As the fac t

- finder on a motion to extend postjudgment deadli nes , the trial court weig hs the e vidence, judges wit nes s credibility, and enjoys “great latitude” to resolv e re levant fact issues. LDF Cons tr

. , 459 S.W. 3d a t 724

. B

. Evi d ence at the he aring At the hearing , Winsto n Cochran, co unse l for Gilchrist at all relevant times to this appeal, testified that he never received notice by mail or email . Cochran
test ified that he learned of the fina l judgment when he che cked the trial co u rt ’ s docket on August 2, 2021 in preparation for responding to appellees ’ motion to confirm the arbitration award

. A representat ive from Gilch rist testified that it never received not ice of the final judgment from the court ; only from the ir c ounsel

. The l e tter from t he trial

- court clerk transmitting the final judgment , discussed at the hearing and part of the clerk ’ s record , reflec ted that notice was
sent to Calvin Jackson, an a ttorney who had previously appeared as a n attorn ey for Gil chri st. The letter wa s not sent t o C ochr an, the only remaining attorney representing Gilchrist. Although it was undi sputed th at Jackson had w ithdrawn more than a year earlier , appellees argued to t he trial court tha t Jackson operated as a t eam with Cochran and may have covered hearings fo r G il christ after his wi th drawal. 2 T he trial court acknowle dged that Jackson had withdra wn, but decided that it was confusing as to whether he was counsel of record

. 3 The tr ial court exp lained its

2 There was no evidenc e introduced at t he hear ing su pporting this argument or theory

. 3 The tri al court signed an order gran ting Jackson ’ s motion to withdraw as “ Co

- counsel of Record ” in January 20 20. The order p r ovide d that Jackson was to be removed a s counse l of6 finding by stating that servic e on Jack s on was proper notic e t o Gilchrist: “ I find that notice [of the final judgment]

. . . was given by the Clerk’s Office on 5/26/20 21 ;

. . . I do understand your argument; but Mr. J ackso n m a de appearances for Gilchrist even after he withdrew from thi s ca se. ”
C

. Trial court erre d
Th e finding of fact made b y the trial court state s that Gilchrist received notice on May 2 9 , 2 021 “ throug h their counsel. ”
Service under the rules is proper if a copy of the docume nt is delivered : (1) to the party to be served ; (2 ) th e party ’ s duly autho rize d agent; or ( 3 ) attorney of record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a (a)

. No evidence was received a t the hearing to support a conclusion t hat Jack s on was attorney

- of

- record for Gilchrist in May 2021. The only evidence adduced at the hear ing was t hat Gilchrist and i ts a ttorne y of record did not receive notice o f the final judgment wit hin 2 0 days of May 25, 2021 when t he fina l judgment was signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a( 4). 4 Accordingly, there was no evidence in the record that Gilchrist rece ived notice of the final jud gment “ through their counse l

. ”

B ased on the undisputed testimony received at th e hearing, the only finding the trial court could have mad e was that Gilchrist did not receive actual notice of the final j udgment until August 2 , 20 21 a n d that its po stjudg men t timelines s h ould have been extended such that the instant appeal is timely. Te x. R. Civ. P.

record for Gilch r ist.

4 I f the party adve rsely affected by the judgme nt doe s not rece ive notice from the court within 20 days after the final judgment is signed and does not acquire actual k nowledge, then

“ with respect to that party all the peri ods mentioned in paragraph ( 1) shall begi n on th e da te th at such party or his at torney r eceived such notice or acquired actual k nowledge of the signing, whichever occurred first, but in no event shall such periods beg in more than ninety days after the orig inal judgment or other appe a lable order w as sign ed.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).7 306a(4), (5). 5 Therefore, we reverse the finding of fact signed by th e trial court on August 30, 2023 and render a n order finding t hat Gilc h rist first receive d act ual notice of the final judgment on August 2, 2021 and that post judgment deadlines are calculated to begin on August 2, 2021

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 30 6 a(1), (4).

D

. Remedy

I f an appellate cou rt agre e s that the Rule 306a motion was pro p erly denied, the entire ap peal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction for late filing o f the appeal. See, e,g. , Manfredi ex rel. Estate of Manfredi v

. Lub bock Hometel Dev

. Venture , No. 07

- 99

- 0371

- CV, 1999 WL 12775 56 , *2 (Tex . App.

— Amarillo Nov. 12, 199 9,

n o pet.) (per curiam, not de sign ated for publication). If the appellate court finds that th e evidence of notice was undisputed, then the appellate court co ncludes that the appeal was timely filed and proceed s to th e merit s. S ee, e.g. , Continental Ca s

. C

o. v. Dav i lla , 139 S.W.3d 37 4 , 380 ( Fort Worth 2004 , pet. denied )

. Having concluded that Gilchrist ’ s app e al was timely filed, we sustain issue one, and proceed to consider the merits of its appeal.

III. I SSUES ON APPEAL
A. D enial of Gilchrist ’ s motion for new tri al
In iss u e two, Gilchrist a rgues “ [ t] he doctrine in Hamm v. Millenium Income Fund, L.L.C. should not have a cted as a bar to reconsideration by the trial court. ” See generally Hamm v. Millennium Income Fund, L.L.C. , 178 S. W.3d 256 (Tex.

5 To est ablish the applicability of Rule 306a(4)’s tolling provision, “the party adversely affected is required to prove in the trial court , on sworn motion an d notice, the date on which the party or his a t torney first either rece ived a notice of the judgmen t or a cquired ac tual knowledge of the signing an d that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed. ” Tex. R. C iv. P . 306a(5). A properl y filed and granted motion under Rule 306a(5) “ restarts the postjud gmen t tim etable.” Moore Landrey, L.L.P . v. Hirsc h & Westheimer, P.C. , 126 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (emphasis omitted ).8

App.

— Houston [1st D ist.] 200 5 , p et. denied)

. He re, Gilc hr ist argues that on e po ssible explan ation for th e trial court ’ s d enial of its motion for new trial is reliance on the holding in Hamm

. D enial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for a buse of discretion. Waffle Hou se, Inc. v. W

i lliams , 313 S.W.3d 796, 81 3 (Tex. 2010)

. Howev er, Gilchrist does no t argue the trial court reversibl y erred by abus ing its discretion. Gilchrist also d o es not attempt to defeat any other valid basis on which the trial co urt co uld h ave d enied its motion fo r the new trial. Instead, G il christ asks this court to d isapprove of Hamm with out any indication in t he reco rd tha t the trial court relied

o n Hamm in d e nying Gilchrist ’s mo tion. Gilchrist admits in its appell ate brief that th e trial court d eni ed it s mot ion fo r new trial w ith out ex pl aining its r ational e

. Because Gilchris t does no t r aise any re versible e rror on the part of the trial court, we o verrule i ssue two.
B. Co nfirmation of arbitration award
1. Q uantum

- meruit aw ard
In issue three , Gilchrist argue s th e “ tr ial court erred in rati fying an award calculated under quantum meruit analysis when the legal serv ices contract only autho rized a contingent fee .” Th e purported error in issue three is that the arbitra tor

excee ded her powers in award ing quantum

- me ruit at to rney ’ s fees to appellee s bec aus e her power to arbitrate was authorized by a contingen t- fee contract

. B ecause the award o f attorney ’ s fee s was not b ased on the contract, Gilchrist maintains that the arbitrator did not have the power to award quant um-me ruit attorney ’ s fees.

a. Sta ndard of review
We review a trial c ourt’s order confi rming an arbitration award under a de9 novo standard. Sou thwind s Expres s Constr ., LLC v. D.H. Griffin of Tex.
, Inc. , 51 3 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [ 14th Dist

. ] 2016, no pet. )

. Ho wever, t he scope of ou r rev ie w is “ extraordinarily narr ow

. ” Id

. W e indulge every re asonable presumption in favor of upholding th e arbitr ation award. CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado , 95 S. W .3 d 234, 2 38 (Tex. 2002 ) (quoting Ci ty of San Antonio v

. M cKe nzie Con s tr. Co

. , 150 S.W.2d 98 9 , 996 ( T ex

. 1 941)). Texas law strongl y favors arbitration of dis putes. Prudential Secs., Inc. v. Marshall , 909 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1995)

. The arbitrato r ’ s powers are derived from the parties ’ agreement to submit to arbitra tion

. Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Qui nn , 339 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2011). Th erefore, we look to the agr eement to determine whether the arbitrator had aut hority to decide the issue. See id

. ; D. R. Hor ton

- Tex., Ltd. v. Bernhar d , 42 3 S.W .3d 532, 534 ( Tex. Ap p

. — Houst o n [1 4th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied ) . An arbitrator exceeds her authority when she disregard s the contract and dispense s her own idea of justice. Bernha rd , 423 S.W.3d at 534. The authority of an arbitrator is limited to a decision of the matters sub mi tted in the arbit ration agreement either expressly or by necessary implication. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry , 327 S.W.2d 406, 408 ( Tex. 1959). An arbitrator does not exc eed her authority when the matter she address es i s one that t he parties agreed to arbitra te

. Ce ntex /Ves tal v. Friendship S. Baptist Church , 314 S.W.3d 677, 686 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010 , pet. denied).
If an arbitrator exc eeded her powers , the reviewing cou r t shall vacate the award

. 6 Te x. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 1 71.088(a)(3)(A) ; Bernhard , 4 23

6 The contract does not referenc e eithe r the Federa l A r bitration Ac t (F AA) or t he Texas
a rbi tration a ct (TAA ) . Accordingly, both th e F AA and TAA apply

. Natgasoline LLC v. Refractory Constr. Servs. , Co

. LLC , 566 S.W.3d 8 7 1 , 87 8 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [14th Dist. ] 2018, p et. de nie d) (“If an arbi trat ion agreement does not specif y whether t h e FAA or the TAA app lies , but states that it is gove rned b y t he laws of Texas, both the FAA and the TAA apply unless the agreement specific a l l y ex cludes federal law. ” ) (inter nal citation omitted) ; see10 S.W.3d at 5 34

. b. Applicable law

To re cover under a quantum

- meruit theory, a cla imant must prove that (1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished , (2) for the person sought to be charged , (3) tho se services a n d materials were accepted by t he perso n

so ught to be charged, and were used and en joyed by him , an d (4) t he person sought to be charged was reasonably notified that the p laintiff performing such services or furnishing su ch materials was expec ting to be pa i d by the person sought to be

c harged. Vort t Expl. Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990)

. A party generally cannot recover under a quantum

- mer uit theory when there is a valid contract covering the services or mate rials furnishe d

. Hill v. Shamo un & Norman , LL P , 544 S .W.3 d 724, 737 (Tex. 2018)

. Howe ver, the existence of an
express co ntract does no t preclude recovery in quantum meruit for the reaso nable value of work p erformed and accepted which i s not covered by an express contrac t

. Id

.

c. S cope of the contra ct
We cons ider the power granted by the co ntract to th e arbitrator

. The contract provid es that Gilchris t employed “ Hil l & Hill, P.C. Law Fi rm, J

. MARCUS

‘ MARC ’ HILL ” to represent and prosecute an y cl aims Gilchrist may have “ in a certain condemnation (emine nt domain) or damage case ” concerning Rol l ove r

generally FAA, 9 U.S.C

. §§ 1

– 16 ; T AA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. C ode Ann. § § 1 7 1.0 01

– . 098

. Here, th e contract inclu d ed no choice of law provision. We apply Texas law, as the partie s and the trial court did bel o w, because “an issue in co ntract [is] determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the mo st s ign i ficant relati onship to t he tr a nsaction and the parties.” Sona t Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. , 271 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. 2008) (citing Resta tement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188( 1 ) ( Am. L. I nst. 1971) )

.11 Pass. 7 The contract provide s f or compensation to appellees in the form of a contingency

- fee schedule payable from funds received by Gilchr ist from the County

. Regarding dispute s , the contract states : “ S hou ld the re be a disa g reement regardin g thi s enga gement the parties agree to binding ARBITRATION before former Justi ce of the Court of Ap peals Alice Oliver Parrott

. ”
The contract gives the arbitrator power to resolve any “ disagree m ent regarding the engagement

. ” The languag e of the cont ract does not limit the arbitrator ’ s power to only breach

- of

- contract disputes. Here, appelle es repr esented Gilchrist in the condemnation a cti on against the C ounty . After Gilchrist refused to accept t h e settlement and the corresp ond ing monies ass o ciat ed with the settlement, appellees withdrew from their representation of Gilchris t. After realizing th at Gilchrist did not intend to seek compensation in the condemnation action , appellees argued for quantu m
- meruit attorney ’ s fees for the wo rk they perf ormed. The dispute between t he parties clearly arose from the engagement of appel lee s by Gilchrist in the condemnation dispute with the C ounty

. A n arb itrator does not exceed her authority s i mpl y because s he ma y have mi sinterpr ete d the co n trac t or misap plie d th e law. Bernhard , 42 3 S.W .3d at 534

. “T h us, the ap propriate inquir y is n ot whether the arbitrator decide d an issue correctly, but ins te ad wh ethe r she had t he au thority to de c ide the issue at al l. ” Id

. ( c it ation omitted). Having co n clud ed that the ar bitr ator had the power to award to attorney ’ s fees to appelle es, we conclude th at the arbitrator did not exceed her
power s

. Therefore, w e express no opinion on how the arbitrator appl ied the law or decided the is sue

. We overrule issue thr ee.

7 The contract , signed by Gilch rist , g i ves Hill the right to em ploy a nd associate Bradley and share the conti ngent fee

.12 2. Ca lcu lation of rea sonable attorney ’ s fees
In i ssue four, Gilchr ist argues th e trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award because the attorney ’ s fees award did not comply with lodestar principles

. 8 However, al though o ur re view i s de novo, as mentio ned above ou r

sc ope of review is narrow. If the matter of attorney ’ s fees was proper ly sub mitted to the arbitrator , then we express no opinion on whether the a rb itrator correctly applied or followed the lode st ar pr inciples. See Bernhard , 423 S.W.3d at 535 ( “ But the is sue of attorney ’ s fees was clear ly submitted to the arbitrator, and the arbitrat or consulted the contractual provisions and statutes regardin g attorney ’ s fees when reaching his conclusion. Under th ese c ircumstances, we canno t conclude that the arbitrato r e xcee ded his authority b y awardin g attorney ’ s fees

. ” )

. As stated in the arbit ration award, the ar bitrator considered the “ undisput ed expert test imony of counsel ” regarding the reasonable v alue of appellees ’ work. T he matter of att o rne y ’s fees ow ed to appell ee s was properly before the arb i trator and the arbitrator consider ed the issue . T herefore , we hold the t rial court did not er r in upholding the awar d of attorney ’ s fees.
We overrule issue four

. 3. Sou r ce of funds for award
In i ssu e f ive, Gilchrist argues t he tr ia l court erred in confirming an arbitration award which relied on an assumption that funds could be taken from the

escrow a ccount of a different lawyer. Gilchrist ’ s argument on th is is sue lacks foundation. Although the a rbitra t ion award refe rences that se tt leme nt funds were set aside in trust for Gilchrist, the award explains that Gi lchrist did not agree to the

8 Attorneys s eeking recovery for legal services under a quantum

- meruit theory must show that t he attorney ’ s fe e award is “reasona ble” under the Arthur Andersen factor s

. H ill , 544 S.W.3d at 743 ; see Arthur A ndersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp

. , 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)

.13 settlement a nd refused to settle

. No whe re does the arbitration award state that the atto rney ’ s fees would be paid from the condemnati o n
- settlemen t pr oceeds or another lawy er ’ s t rus t accou nt. T he award makes clear that if appelle es proceed with the quantum

- meruit award , then they forego rec overy of any claim to contractual attorney ’ s fees

. The arbitration award provides th a t Gilchrist is responsible f or payment of the attorney ’ s f ees without reference to any settlement proceeds or any other lawy er ’ s escrow account

. We overrule issue five.
4. Pr e judg ment interest Citing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.091, Gi l ch rist
argues in issue six t ha t the trial court erred in f ailing to modify the a rbitrator ’ s award because there was “an evident miscalculation of numbers.” Tex. Civ . P ra c

. & Rem. C ode Ann

. § 171.091(a)(1)(A). Specifically, Gilchrist challenges the

aw a rd of pre judgm ent intere st b eca use the award does not explain w h en the interest began accruing or what event triggered the accrual of interest

. 9 Prejudgment interest is compe nsation for the lost use of money owed as “damages during the lapse of time betwe e n the accrual of the claim a nd the date of judgment.” Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kennec o Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998). There are two primary goa ls in awarding prejudgment interest : (1) compensating plaintiffs for the lost use of m o ney and (2) en couraging both se ttle ments and speedy trial. Texa s Black Iron, Inc. v. Arawak Ene rgy , 566

9 To the extent that Gilchrist argues that the prej udgment interest ne eds to be ad jus ted because the quantum

- m e ruit attorney ’ s f ees should b e redu ced as not reasonable under Arth ur And er

s e n ( as argued in issue four), we have already overruled issue four whi ch mo ots this argument.14 S.W.3 d 801, 825 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018 (pet. denied ). “T here are two legal sources for an award of prejudgment interest : (1) general prin c iples of equit y and (2) an e nab ling statute.” Kenneco Energy , 9 62 S.W.2d at 528.
Gilchrist doe s not argue that the arbitrator exceeded her power s in awarding th e prejudg ment interest. Rather, Gilchrist notes that the arbitrator did not expressly state whe n the claim for quant um
- merui t d amag es accrued

. Attempting
to re create the arbitrator ’ s calcula tion , Gilchrist asserts t he c al culation implies a duration of appr oxima tely five years of interest ( coinciding with the time of mediation) , which Gilchrist maintains i s error

. Even if t he ca lcu lati on of prejudgment in teres t w ere in error, this is not an error the trial court , or this cour t, can correct. See Bernhard , 423 S.W.3d at 534

. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the a rbitrator on a n issue proper l y before the a rbitrator , and we exp ress no opinion on t his m att er

. We overrule issue six.

5. P ost judgment interest

In issue seven , Gilchrist claims that the trial court err e d by improperly award ing post judgment interest because the arbitrator did not aw ard p o stjudgment int erest

. A trial co urt has limited powers t o mod ify an arbitrator ’ s award. ETC Intrastate Procurement Co., LLC v. JSW Steel (USA), I nc. , 620 S.W.3d 168, 179 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.)

. The Federal Arbitration Act does
not e x pressly autho r ize an award o f p ostj udgment interest whe n the ar bitrator has not made such an award; neither does the Texas act

. Id

. This cou rt has p rev iously considered the issue and held that a trial court lacks authority to modify an arbitration award b y adding postju dgment interes t , i n h ar mony with several of our15 s ister courts

. Id

. at 179

– 80 ; see also , e.g. , Thomas Petroleum, Inc. v. Morri s , 355 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)

. B ecause there was no ba sis for the trial court to awar d postju dgment interes t ,
w e s usta in is sue seven.
IV. C ONCL USION
W e conclude Gilchrist ’ s appeal was timel y and consider the meri t s of its appeal

. On the merits, we reverse the judgment of the tri a l court in part and render judgment striking the tr ial court ’ s a w ard of postjudg ment in tere s t. W e affirm the remainder of the trial court ’ s judgment as challenged on appeal

.

/s/ C har les A. Spai n Justice

Panel cons is ts of Justi ce s B ourliot, Zimme rer , and Spai n

.