United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and

Facilities, Committee on National Security, House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m., EST

Wednesday,

March 18, 1998

DEFENSE

INFRASTRUCTURE

Challenges Facing DOD in

Implementing Reform

Initiatives

Statement of Barry W. Holman, Associate Director,

Defense Management Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to provide our observations on selected

Defense Reform Initiatives pertaining to facilities infrastructure. You have

recently expressed concern about the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

management and upkeep of its infrastructure and its long-term plans for

facilities modernization and recapitalization. Our statement today

discusses (1) the need for infrastructure reform; (2) the significant

challenges DOD faces in implementing its infrastructure initiatives and

achieving significant savings in the short term; and (3) the need to

integrate these initiatives into an overall facilities infrastructure plan.

In the November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) Report, the

Secretary of Defense emphasized the need to reduce excess Cold War

infrastructure to free up resources that otherwise could be spent on

modernization. Specific initiatives cited in the report included privatizing

military housing and utility systems, emphasizing demolition of excess

buildings, consolidating and regionalizing many defense support agencies,

and requesting legislative authority to conduct two additional base closure

rounds. The Secretary noted that DOD continued to be weighed down by

facilities that are too extensive for its needs, more expensive than it can

afford, and detrimental to the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s

armed forces. Likewise, he noted that DOD must do a better job of

managing facility assets on its remaining bases.

Before discussing our specific observations, we would like to briefly

summarize our key points.

Results in Brief First, infrastructure reform within DOD is an extremely difficult task but

one that is very much needed. Therefore, we strongly support the need to

further reduce excess support infrastructure, as well as the need for

improved planning to address remaining infrastructure needs. Our work

continues to show that significant opportunities remain to further

streamline operations, consolidate functions, eliminate duplication of

effort, and improve efficiency. These opportunities must be fully embraced

if DOD is to achieve the level of savings it is expecting for use on other

priorities. Our work to date shows that DOD has had little success in

shifting resources from inefficient activities to other priorities.

Second, we are concerned about DOD’s ability to achieve the expected level

of savings and question whether many of the initiatives can overcome

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significant challenges and be implemented in a timely, efficient, and

effective manner. Our work relating to various defense reform initiatives

shows that estimated savings often are not as great as first estimated and

that the initiatives often take much longer than expected to be achieved.

The following are some key points we believe the Congress and DOD

should take into consideration as they assess expected results of DRI

initiatives involving facilities infrastructure:

• The military housing privatization initiative offers a powerful new tool to

help address the military’s housing problem. However, implementation is

off to a slow start and it is unclear whether the initiative will result in

overall budget savings. Other concerns include risks associated with

long-term privatization agreements for on-base housing and the need for

better integration of this initiative with other available tools for addressing

the services’ housing needs.

• Demolition can be a viable option for reducing excess structures and

operating costs on military bases. However, up-front investment costs are

required and can vary by type of structure. While this program recently has

received increased emphasis within DOD, the availability of funding, against

other competing priorities in a constrained budget environment, could

affect implementation over time.

• Despite their potential, most of the initiatives to consolidate, restructure,

and regionalize many of its support agencies have been going on for

several years and still face implementation challenges. Interservicing

support offers the services opportunities to achieve savings, but individual

service prerogatives and institutional resistance can constrain their use on

a large-scale basis.

• While we believe there are significant savings from prior base realignment

and closure (BRAC) rounds, questions continue to exist about the

magnitude of savings. Higher than initially estimated up-front costs caused

savings not to be realized as quickly as hoped. Also, because DOD had not

adequately tracked changes in initial savings estimates, questions have

existed about the reliability of the savings projections. The magnitude of

savings expected from the two additional rounds of military base closures,

which have been requested by DOD, can only be roughly approximated at

this time, and as was the case with prior rounds, successful

implementation will require substantial up-front costs.

Third, the Secretary of Defense’s identification of the need to shed excess

infrastructure as a key component of the Defense Reform Initiatives has

brought high-level attention to this area. However, the services currently

lack comprehensive long-range plans to guide them in reducing excess

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infrastructure and better managing remaining assets. Plans that have

existed have not provided comprehensive strategies for facilities

revitalization, replacement, and maintenance, and they have not been

adequately tied to measurable goals to be accomplished over specified

time frames with linkages to expected funding. The need for such planning

is underscored by the requirements of the Government Performance and

Results Act.

Background The Secretary’s November 10, 1997, DRI was DOD’s latest effort to reform

operations and processes. The report was an outgrowth of

recommendations made in the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

1

The Quadrennial Defense Review report noted that, while DOD had reduced

active duty personnel by 32 percent between 1989 and 1997, it had reduced

the number of people performing infrastructure functions by only

28 percent. That report called for significant additional reductions in

military and civilian personnel. Reductions called for by the Quadrennial

Defense Review and others already planned by DOD would reduce military

and DOD civilian personnel end-strength levels by an additional 59,000 and

130,000 positions, respectively, below their fiscal year 1998 levels.

The DRI report also lays out plans to reduce support costs by emphasizing

demolition of excess buildings, consolidating and regionalizing many

defense support agencies, and requesting legislative authority to conduct

two additional base closure rounds. Privatization initiatives involving

housing and utilities were described by the DRI report as a means of

leveraging private sector capital to revitalize those facility areas that

continue to be needed by the military.

Most infrastructure savings identified by the DRI report were expected

from additional BRAC rounds.2 The Secretary of Defense recently submitted

a legislative proposal to the Congress requesting authority for two

additional BRAC rounds, one in 2001 and another in 2005. The DRI report

acknowledges up-front investment costs will be required to implement

those rounds, but projects that each of them would provide annual

recurring savings of $1.4 billion after the closures have been implemented.

1

The Quadrennial Defense Review was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1997; it was intended to provide an examination of America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015,

including a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.

2

Apart from BRAC, the largest category of other savings identified in the DRI report are those that are

expected to be realized from outsourcing competitions involving commercial activities. DOD is

expecting to realize $6 billion in savings from these studies over the next 5 years, and $2.5 billion each

year thereafter.

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An important element of the Defense Reform Initiative is that the

Secretary has established a Defense Management Council to serve, in

effect, as DOD’s internal board of directors. The primary mission of this

Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and includes

many of DOD’s senior managers, is to monitor progress of the management

reforms, seek new solutions and reengineering opportunities, and assist

the Secretary in overseeing the activities of the military departments and

defense agencies. This Council, if it operates as described, should bring a

heightened awareness and sense of importance to DOD’s management

reforms.

Infrastructure Reform

Is Needed to Avoid

Wasting Scarce

Resources

DOD is faced with transforming its Cold War operating and support

structure in much the same way it has been working to transform its

military force structure. Making this transition is a complex, difficult

challenge that will affect hundreds of thousands of civilian and military

personnel at activities in many states across the nation. However, if DOD

does not address this challenge now, pressing needs will go unmet, while

scarce defense resources will be wasted or used inefficiently. For

example, according to DOD, most of its family housing is old, has not been

adequately maintained and modernized, and needs to be renovated or

replaced. Additionally, many installation commanders previously have told

us that constrained repair and maintenance funding was causing them to

forego regular preventive maintenance and respond more to emergency

breakdowns as they occur. Yet, funds are being spent to operate and

maintain aging and underutilized buildings, roads, and other infrastructure

that will likely be declared excess by DOD in the near future.

Reducing the cost of excess infrastructure activities is critical to

maintaining high levels of military capabilities and adequately maintaining

needed facilities infrastructure. Expenditures on wasteful or inefficient

activities divert limited defense funds from more pressing needs. DOD has

identified net infrastructure savings as a funding source for modernization;

however, thus far, anticipated savings have not occurred. As a result, DOD

has been unable to shift funds to modernization as planned. At the same

time, members of Congress continue to express concern about unmet

needs in the facilities infrastructure area.

Since its Bottom-Up Review in 1993, DOD repeatedly has stated that it must

reduce its infrastructure to offset the cost of future modern weapon

systems. DOD’s 1998 Future Years Defense Program projects that

infrastructure activities will represent a smaller percentage of the defense

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budget than projected in the previous plan. However, in October 1997, we

reported that there is substantial risk that the budget will not be

implemented as planned.3

 For example, DOD’s plan projects billions of

dollars in savings due to management initiatives but does not have details

on how all the savings will be achieved. Another reason we believe the

program is at risk is that DOD’s estimates for procurement spending, in

relation to its total budget and operations and maintenance (O&M)

projections, run counter to actual experience over the last 30 years. Since

1965, O&M spending has increased consistently with increases in

procurement spending. However, the 1998 program shows that DOD plans

to change that historical relationship by increasing procurement while

decreasing O&M spending.

The Congress has focused on the issue of infrastructure reductions and

recently directed DOD to implement numerous initiatives and report on a

variety of issues. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1998 required DOD to implement initiatives and develop reports on

opportunities for infrastructure reduction. For example, the act requires

DOD to reduce the number of management headquarters and headquarters

support activities personnel by 25 percent between October 1, 1997, and

October 1, 2002. The act also requires the Secretary of Defense to report

on the costs and savings of previous BRAC actions and the need, if any, for

additional BRAC rounds.

Infrastructure

Initiatives Face

Significant Challenges

The DRI report identifies a range of facility infrastructure initiatives

designed to revitalize some facilities; eliminate excess structures; and

consolidate, restructure, and regionalize many support agencies and

activities. However, the report states that additional BRAC rounds are

needed to fully deal with the DOD’s problem of excess infrastructure. Now,

let me make some observations about individual reform initiatives on the

basis of results of our work in those areas.

Military Housing

Privatization Initiative

Shows Promise but

Progress Is Slow

DOD’s housing privatization initiative is designed to leverage private sector

resources to address pressing needs for military housing much quicker

than would be possible relying on traditional military construction

funding. However, our ongoing work indicates that efforts to implement

recent privatization legislation is off to a slow start within each of the

services, potentially endangering DOD’s current goal of eliminating all

3

Future Years Defense Program: DOD’s 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risk in Execution

(GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
inadequate housing by fiscal year 2010. Questions exist about the costs

and savings associated with the new initiative, as well as concerns about

the extent to which this new program will be able to address the full range

of military housing needs.

Privatization Is Intended to

Improve Housing Quickly and

Efficiently

As the nation’s largest landlord, DOD owns and operates about 300,000

family housing units and about 400,000 unaccompanied barrack spaces.

Yet, DOD officials testified in March 1997 that about two-thirds of its family

units and about 60 percent of its barrack spaces were below acceptable

standards and needed to be renovated or replaced. Given expected

budgets and using the traditional approaches, officials said that it would

take 30 to 40 years and more than $30 billion to bring these units up to

acceptable standards.

To improve housing faster and more economically, the Congress

authorized the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996 to

encourage private sector financing, ownership, operation, and

maintenance of both military family and unaccompanied housing.4

 Under

this initiative, DOD will test out over a 5-year period a variety of tools to

obtain private sector financing, expertise, and management to revitalize

both family and unaccompanied housing. These tools permit DOD to

provide direct loans and loan guarantees to private entities, convey or

lease existing property and facilities to private entities, and allow

developers to build military housing using local standards and practices

instead of using military construction specifications. As tenants in the

privatized housing, whether on base or off, military occupants would

receive a housing allowance and pay rent. The goal of this program is to

speed the revitalization and replacement of military housing by

encouraging the private sector to invest at least $3 for each $1 that the

government invests. In this way, DOD plans to build or renovate three times

as many units compared with the amount renovated under traditional

approaches and, hopefully, eliminate all inadequate housing by fiscal year

2010.

Privatization Is Off to a Slow

Start

The housing privatization initiative clearly offers a powerful new tool to

help address DOD’s housing problem. However, our ongoing review of the

initiative has shown that the initiative is off to a slow start and may not

achieve the desired results within the expected time frame. Two years

have passed since the new authorities were signed into law, but no new

agreements have been finalized to build or renovate military housing.

4

The Congress also authorized a precursor privatization initiative for the Navy in 1995. Under this

earlier initiative, the Navy entered into limited partnership agreements with private developers to build

new off-base housing in Corpus Christi, Texas, and Everett, Washington.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Although more than a dozen projects are currently being considered and

many others have been proposed, only two projects are close to contract

signing. According to DOD, progress has been slower than expected

because the initiative represents a new way of doing business for both the

military and the private sector and many legal, financial, and contractual

issues had to be addressed and resolved. While officials believe that

progress will accelerate after the learning curve of the first few deals is

passed, the slow progress to date raises questions about whether sufficient

experience will be gained within the 5-year test period to enable DOD to

decide whether to request permanent authorities.

Questions About Savings Substantial amounts of military construction funds would be needed in the

near-term to solve DOD’s housing problems more quickly. The new

privatization initiative should allow DOD to accelerate revitalization of its

housing inventory by securing private sector financing. However, it is

unclear precisely what impact the privatization program will have on

infrastructure outlays in either the short- or long-term. Some upfront

investments still will be required. For example, traditional military

construction funding still will be needed as the seed money for

privatization projects and for projects not suitable for privatization. Also,

until many more units are renovated or built on bases under the program,

DOD will need substantial outlays to operate and maintain existing units.

Finally, as additional units become privatized, the O&M savings that DOD

realizes largely will be offset by increased budgeting for the military

personnel account to cover the payment of housing allowances to more

families. Service officials believe that the program may, in fact, be budget

neutral.

The amount of long-term infrastructure savings are also uncertain. While

more data will be needed before any conclusions can be drawn, DOD’s

life-cycle cost analyses for its first two projects at Fort Carson and

Lackland Air Force Base showed that, compared with traditional military

construction financing costs, the government will achieve significant

savings—24 percent at Fort Carson and 29 percent at Lackland. However,

our review of these analyses found that DOD’s savings estimates were

somewhat high. For example, DOD did not consider all costs and, in some

instances, estimates were not based on actual budgeted amounts for O&M

costs under the military construction alternative. After adjusting for these

factors over the expected 50-year life of these projects, we estimate costs

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
from privitization will be about 7 to 10 percent less than costs using

traditional military construction financing.5

In addition to questions concerning costs, privatization includes other

questions and concerns. For example, many privatization projects under

consideration propose long-term, 50-year agreements between DOD and the

developer. Such agreements present several risks, including increased

potential that the housing may not be needed in the future, the contractor

might not operate and maintain the housing as expected, and civilians

might occupy on-base housing if it is not fully used by military members.

Even if the approach is cost-effective, barriers may exist to using the

privatization initiative to improve barracks housing. This is because of a

determination that the services’ mandatory assignment of single junior

enlisted personnel to barracks constitutes an occupancy guarantee. Under

the budgetary scoring rules established by the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) for the privatization initiative, if members are not free to

decline assignment to privatized housing, DOD must set aside funds to

cover the entire value of this guarantee up front. Because the value of this

guarantee could approximate the amount required under traditional

military construction financing, funding for a privatized barracks project

would not meet DOD’s leveraging goals. This matter is not an issue in family

housing because married members are not mandatorily assigned to family

housing units. An additional barrier to privatizing barracks is that funds to

cover housing allowances for such personnel are not certain since these

funds would need to come from the base operations account—an account

that has traditionally been underfunded. Due to these barriers, officials

doubt that privatization funds will be used extensively to improve the

condition of the services’ unaccompanied housing inventory.6

A further concern is that DOD may not have optimally integrated this

initiative with the other tools available for addressing housing problems.

For example, in September 1996, we reported that DOD could make greater

use of available housing in local communities, as called for in its housing

5

Our analysis differed from DOD’s in that we (1) estimated housing O&M costs using the fiscal year

1999 budget request, (2) estimated allowances using the proposed occupancy paygrades and the 1998

housing allowance rates, (3) added an estimate for utility costs at Fort Carson, (4) added an estimate

for management costs at Lackland Air Force Base, and (5) used the 1998 Office of Management and

Budget discount rate.

6

No projects have been approved and a $5 million appropriation made to the Unaccompanied Housing

Improvement Fund for this purpose remains largely unused.

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
policy.7

 Our report noted that maximizing referrals to such housing is

important since the government’s annual costs are about $5,000 per unit

lower on average when acceptable and affordable housing can be found in

the community than when on-base housing is provided. Although

sufficient quantities of affordable civilian housing are not available at

many installations, greater adherence to this policy in other instances and

an improved housing requirements determination process are needed if

DOD is to avoid building or revitalizing more housing than is needed under

both military construction and privatization programs.

We have also found that DOD often views and manages military

construction, privatization, and housing allowances as separate tools,

rather than considering them in ways that achieve an optimum, synergistic

impact. For example, our work has shown that the two separate DOD

organizations that manage allowances and government housing, while

ostensibly coordinating with one another, frequently manage their

respective programs with limited knowledge of their impact on other

aspects of DOD’s housing program. To illustrate, when the new housing

allowance program indexed to local housing costs was implemented this

year, service housing officials could not tell us how the program will affect

the privatization initiative. Coordination on this new initiative would

appear to be important, since housing allowances could rise in some areas,

thereby making more local housing affordable to servicemembers and

lessening the need for renovation and construction. Capitalizing on the

strengths of each housing tool through a more integrated approach is

critical for DOD to ensure that the military’s housing needs are met as

efficiently as possible.

Demolition of Excess

Facilities Is an Option for

Reducing Excess

Infrastructure

In May 1997, we reported that opportunities existed for DOD components

to use demolition as an option for eliminating old, excess buildings that

are relatively costly to maintain and can be a drain on declining O&M

funding.8 The need for such an effort was illustrated by our findings that

over a 10-year period, from fiscal year 1987 to 1996, total O&M annual

budget authority declined by 25 percent in real terms, reflecting the overall

decline in defense spending. However, annual O&M obligations for facilities

maintenance and repair, excluding family housing, declined by 38 percent

7

Military Family Housing: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Costs and Mitigate Inequities

(GAO/NSIAD-96-203, Sept. 13, 1996).

8

Defense Infrastructure: Demolition of Unneeded Buildings Can Help Avoid Operating Costs

(GAO/NSIAD-97-125, May 13, 1997).

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
on average in real terms during the period.9

 The Army had the steepest

decline of all, about 49 percent. The problem was further illustrated by

available data that indicated that, although servicewide maintenance and

repair obligations had fallen about 38 percent over a 10-year period,

reductions in square footage of space owned and managed by the services

in the United States and overseas were much less—about 10 percent.

The DRI report identified 8,000 buildings totaling 50 million square feet of

space as no longer needed and candidates for disposal. The DRI report

indicates that DOD would be increasing funding for demolition to eliminate

all of these buildings by 2003. Available data suggested the cost of

demolition projects could be recouped in about 3 years depending on the

type of structure, with annual savings in maintenance and repair, and

utility costs to accrue thereafter. However, we noted the potential for

demolition costs to vary, depending on the type of construction and

environmental considerations, and thus cautioned that it would be

important for the services to continue to examine the cost-effectiveness of

demolition on an ongoing basis as part of their future planning.

We reported that demolition offers a viable option for further

infrastructure reductions and millions of dollars in savings, but it requires

an up-front cost. We have also noted that the services differ in the extent

to which they have developed formal demolition programs. The Army is

planning the most aggressive program and accounts for the majority of

planned demolitions.

DOD indicated it prefers to use O&M funding for demolition not associated

with new construction. The extent to which demolition is aggressively

pursued in the future could be affected by future trends in this funding

source and other competing priorities. Various service officials have

expressed the view that earmarking and centrally controlling funds for

demolition might help ensure funds are used for demolition. However,

officials told us they were opposed to fencing funds for demolition

because it constrained their flexibility to use the funds for higher

priorities.

9

Maintenance and repair obligations include spending for facilities measured in square feet and other

types of infrastructure, such as runways, that are measured using different metrics. The services were

unable to break out obligations by type of measurement, but told us that the majority of maintenance

and repair obligations were for facilities measured in square feet.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Military Services and

Defense Agencies

Need to Capitalize on

Consolidation and

Regionalization

Opportunities

The DRI report includes several military service and support agency

consolidation, restructuring, and regionalization initiatives that are

intended to make DOD activities more efficient and support DOD’s planned

personnel reductions. Overall, we support these initiatives but, on the

basis of our past and ongoing work, believe their potential has not yet

been fully realized. As with the reengineering initiatives, most of these

initiatives have been going on for several years but still face

implementation challenges.

Navy Regional

Maintenance Program May

Not Meet Its Goals

In 1996, the Navy reported that it applied more than $8.5 billion of Navy

resources to maintenance programs in support of fleet ships and aircraft.

In response to force structure reductions and subsequent defense planning

guidance to reduce excess maintenance infrastructure, the Chief of Naval

Operations early in 1993 tasked the commanders of the Atlantic and

Pacific Fleets to develop a strategy for streamlining and consolidating

their maintenance functions. This led to the Navy’s establishing the

Regional Maintenance program in March 1994. In addition to reducing

infrastructure and saving money, the program is designed to improve

maintenance processes, integrate supply support and maintenance

functions, and provide compatible data systems for the different

maintenance functions. The program was to be implemented in three

overlapping phases during fiscal years 1995-99 and was expected to save

substantial amounts of money. In its 1995 program review, for example,

the Navy decreased its planned O&M budgets for fiscal years 1995-99 by

about $1.3 billion in anticipation of such savings.

To date the Navy has focused its efforts on establishing a management

structure and process for realigning and reducing its maintenance

infrastructure at eight Navy regions. It has also been developing regional

maintenance business plans, including initiatives and estimates of savings

to be achieved. Subsequent to the start of the program, however, the Navy

reduced the program savings’ estimate to about $944 million for 102

projects to be implemented between fiscal year 1994 and 2001.

In a recent report on the Regional Maintenance program,10 we reported

that the Navy had made substantial progress in establishing a structured

program but that savings had not materialized as anticipated. Further, the

accuracy of savings that had been claimed by the Navy was questionable

because they are not tracked and verified. Consequently, the Navy’s actual

savings may be far less than $944 million and may not be achieved as soon

10Navy Regional Maintenance: Substantial Opportunities Exist to Build on Infrastructure Streamlining

Progress (GAO/NSIAD-98-4, Nov. 13, 1997).

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
as expected. Because reductions had already been made to spending plans

in anticipation of these savings, we reported that maintenance programs,

the overall material readiness of ships and aircraft, or future fleet

readiness could be negatively affected. For example, Navy officials told us

they have thus far been able to absorb the reductions with no impact on

readiness by fixing specific problems rather than performing scheduled

depot-level overhauls. They were concerned, however, that this approach

might adversely affect the condition of ships over the long term.

Nevertheless, we felt the Navy could still achieve significant savings by

moving more quickly to implement the savings initiatives that had been

identified and, where appropriate, implementing other initiatives that

could yield savings without affecting readiness. To do this, however, the

Navy had to overcome parochial and institutional resistance to the

program’s objectives. These include resistance to efforts that might

eliminate organizations, reduce jobs, and or reduce a command’s or an

organization’s control over resources. Other barriers that also had to be

addressed were (1) the lack of management visibility over all

maintenance-related costs; (2) multiple, unconnected management

information systems that do not provide adequate data for regional

maintenance planning and decision-making; and (3) significant differences

in the number of shore duty intermediate-level maintenance positions

needed to support the Navy’s sea-to-shore rotation program and the

number of personnel needed to perform the work. Although the Navy has

established regional maintenance working groups and committees to

address these issues, continued high-level commitment, cooperation, and

coordination from the Chief of Naval Operations, the fleet, and type and

systems commanders will be required to ensure that regional initiatives

reach fruition and achieve the savings projected.

Increased Use of

Interservicing Support

Arrangements Could

Provide Savings

Opportunities

Our April 1996 report on interservicing11 found that, even after several

years of defense downsizing,12 DOD operates hundreds of major military

bases and many smaller facilities in the United States. These bases range

in size from less than 10 acres to several hundred thousand acres. Further,

some bases are adjacent to each other such as Fort Bragg and Pope Air

Force Base in North Carolina; others, while not adjacent, are within a

11Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are Being Missed

(GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23, 1996).

12Interservicing refers to reliance of one service on another, typically in the base operations support

area. Base supporting services vary and can include property maintenance, logistics, transportation

and equipment maintenance, personnel and professional support, and service to individuals, such as

food, housing, recreation, or education.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
relatively short distance from each other. We reported that DOD has long

recognized the potential for savings in base support services through

interservicing and many interservicing agreements exist on a limited basis.

However, our work suggested that the military services have not taken

sufficient advantage of potential opportunities to achieve significant

savings in base operating support costs through greater reliance on

larger-scale interservicing arrangements.

In completing our study of interservicing, our discussions with DOD and

service officials at all levels pointed to a variety of problems and

impediments that they believed historically had limited base support

consolidation and interservicing—problems that continued to exist. Some

reluctance to embrace increased interservicing was attributed to service

parochialism, commanders’ concerns about losing direct control over their

support assets, and loss of ability to influence servicing priorities that

commanders deemed important. Likewise, differences in traditions,

cultures, practices, and standards among the services were often cited as

inhibiting greater emphasis on interservicing arrangements. Base housing

was often cited as an area having the greatest potential for interservicing.

However, within the services, we found widely held views about

differences in quality of on-base housing provided to service personnel

among the services, with the Air Force being known for providing a higher

standard of housing than the other services. More generally, the

perception often existed that the Air Force had a higher quality-of-life

standard and was willing or able to devote more resources to maintaining

that standard than the other services.

Differences between the services were seen as having significant

implications for interservicing arrangements and were factors in a failed

Hawaii housing consolidation effort in 1994. For that reason, we found it

interesting that the DRI report noted that “in areas of heavy concentration

of installations, we can save funds by sharing infrastructure and services

across commands, bases, and the Services. . . . The Joint Staff is now

analyzing regionalization across all Services in Hawaii.” We applaud the

efforts of the Joint Staff, but, on the basis of our previous work, suggest

that such changes may be difficult to achieve quickly and may require

special steps to ensure long-term success. A number of service officials

with whom we discussed such issues previously pointed to the relatively

short tours of duty of base commanders that can limit institutional

knowledge of long-term needs and can often result in commanders

focusing on short-term projects and not on major changes in base

operations involving long-term planning and implementation.

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
We also were told that differences in philosophy from one commander to

another can sometimes lead to a reversal of previously initiated

interservicing efforts. Some service officials suggested that these

impediments could be overcome either through greater reliance on civilian

management of base operations or by basing a portion of an installation

commander’s proficiency assessment on the commander’s efforts to foster

greater efficiencies in base operations. Our general management work has

shown that continuity of management is a key factor to ensuring the

ultimate success of major initiatives in other federal agencies.

The Finance and

Accounting

Infrastructure—Potential

for Further Reductions

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was established in

1991 to consolidate and streamline DOD’s finance and accounting

operations. In May 1994, after several false starts, DOD announced that DFAS

would begin consolidating the finance and accounting infrastructure in

fiscal year 1995. At that time, the plan was to reduce the number of sites

where finance and accounting activities were conducted from over 330 to

26. The 26 sites included the 5 existing large finance centers (Columbus,

Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis, and Kansas City) and 21 new sites called

operating locations. As part of this consolidation, DFAS expected to reduce

its staffing levels from about 27,000 to 23,000 people. DFAS told us that, as

of September 30, 1997, it had reduced staffing to about 21,900 people and

opened 18 of the 21 operating locations.13

We have issued several reports that questioned the need for 21 operating

locations.14 Our primary concern was that DOD used a flawed process to

identify the size and location of its consolidated operations. Among other

things, we reported that the planned infrastructure was larger than

necessary, primarily because DOD had not considered the impact that

future business improvements would have on the finance and accounting

workload. We concluded that, as these business improvements were

adopted, DFAS would have to consolidate its activities once again. We also

pointed out that an earlier DFAS analysis had concluded that the existing

five finance centers and six operating locations was the optimum structure

for conducting finance and accounting operations.

13One of the 18 operating locations (Memphis) is under the control of the US Army Corps of Engineers

and supports the Corps’ accounting and finance operations.

14DOD Infrastructure: DOD’s Planned Finance and Accounting Structure Is Not Well Justified

(GAO/NSIAD-95-127, Sept. 18, 1995); DOD Infrastructure: DOD Is Opening Unneeded Finance and

Accounting Offices (GAO/NSIAD-96-113, Apr.16, 1996); and Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates

for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
A recent DFAS analysis has concluded that the finance and accounting

infrastructure does, in fact, need to be further consolidated. This analysis,

which assessed each finance and accounting function carried out at

operating locations (such as vendor pay, civilian pay, travel pay, and

accounting), showed that DFAS would be able to reduce the number of

employees from about 21,400 in fiscal year 1998 to about 15,350 by the end

of fiscal year 2003. These reductions would be realized, in part, by

technology initiatives underway at DFAS and, if they occur, would leave

DFAS with about 38 percent excess facility capacity.

The analysis did not translate this excess capacity into a specific number

of locations that should be eliminated. Nevertheless, the DRI report stated

that DFAS would continue its consolidation initiatives by eliminating 8 of its

26 finance and accounting facilities. DFAS is currently developing criteria to

help it determine which locations should be eliminated. Once these

criteria are approved, which is expected by May 1998, DFAS plans to take

from 3 to 6 months to further study its infrastructure needs and select the

sites that will be closed. At this point, DFAS does not expect to close more

than eight facilities.

Defense Information

Systems Agency—Status of

Consolidating Its

Megacenters

The DRI report calls for the Defense Information Systems Agency to reduce

its infrastructure from 16 to 6 large processing facilities. This initiative is a

continuation of DOD efforts that began in 1990. Since that time, the Defense

Information Systems Agency was created and eventually consolidated

many of DOD’s computer operations by moving workload and equipment

from 194 computer centers to 16 megacenters. These actions were taken

to better meet DOD’s information processing needs at lower costs. The

megacenters operate as part of the defense working capital fund and bill

their customers for the processing support they provide. We should note

that the military services and defense agencies also operate many

processing centers and, like the Defense Information Systems Agency, also

have consolidated some of their information processing facilities.

Our previous work on information processing center consolidations

pointed out that, although DOD had recognized the need to continue to

reduce the cost of its computer center operations, it had not established

an effective framework for making these decisions.15 Such a framework

would help DOD determine the number of processing centers needed, the

way to consolidate the various computer operations, and the numbers and

skill mix of staff needed to operate the consolidated centers. We believed

15Defense IRM: Investments at Risk for DOD Computer Centers (GAO/AIMD-97-39, Apr. 4, 1997).

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
this framework or plan was needed because our work documented that,

although additional efficiencies could be realized, it was not clear whether

these would be best achieved by further consolidations or outsourcing.

DOD partially agreed with our point, stating that it would comply with the

Clinger-Cohen Act and develop a framework to determine whether

processing centers should remain in-house or be considered for

outsourcing studies.16

The Defense Megacenter Business Strategy, dated October 1997, states

that the Defense Information Systems Agency’s plan to reduce the 

16 megacenters to 6 megacenters could result in annual savings of

$202 million starting in fiscal year 2003. Moreover, the strategy estimates

that total savings over a 10-year period (fiscal years 1998 through

2007) will be approximately $1.5 billion. We have not done any work to

examine this strategy or substantiate these savings. These savings should

help reduce infrastructure costs and, thereby, result in lower prices to its

customers. We are reviewing how the Defense Information Systems

Agency establishes the prices it charges its customers. In the future, we

intend to review the cost of the consolidation effort and the impact it is

having on customer service.

Future Plans to Address

Excess Capacity in

Research, Development,

Test, and Evaluation

Laboratories Are Unclear

Each of the military services operate (1) research and development

laboratories to develop new or enhance existing military technology and

(2) test and evaluation centers to demonstrate and validate the capabilities

of these technologies. DOD’s research, development, test, and evaluation

facilities employ about 100,000 people in 67 federally owned facilities

located primarily in the continental United States. For fiscal year 1997, the

DOD budget for these laboratories totaled just over $37 billion.

Our most recent work, completed in January 1998,17 pointed out that DOD’s

research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure continues to

have excess capacity—an estimated 35 percent in its laboratories and an

estimated 52 percent in its test and evaluation centers in the air vehicles,

electronic combat, and armaments/weapons areas. This condition exists

even though DOD will have reduced funding, personnel, and force structure

and closed 62 research, development, test, and evaluation sites and

activities at host sites as part of the previous BRAC process.

16The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106) requires that federal agencies establish performance

measures that measure how well their information technology supports their missions and programs

and that evaluations be made of the results achieved from their information technology investments.

17Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully Reducing Unneeded RDT&E Infrastructure

(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8, 1998).

Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
The focus of our recent work was primarily on how best practices might

be used to reduce excess capacity in DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE),

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. These agencies

represent about 72 percent of all federal investment in research and

development and own most of the infrastructure. During this work, we

identified five critical elements that led to the successful downsizing of

unneeded laboratory infrastructure at the Boeing Company’s Information,

Space, & Defense Systems Group and the Defence Research Agency within

the British Ministry of Defence. These elements were (1) a “crisis” that

served as a catalyst to spark action; (2) an independent authority to

overcome parochialism and political pressures that, if left unchallenged,

would have impeded decision making; (3) core research, development,

test, and evaluation missions focused to support the organization’s overall

goals and strategies; (4) the infrastructure needed to support the overall

goals and strategies clearly defined; and (5) accurate, reliable, and

comparable data that captured total infrastructure cost and utilization

rates for each research, development, test, and evaluation activity.

According to officials managing these restructurings, their success

depended on using all five of the elements together.

Our report also discusses the actions that DOD has taken to address its

excess research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure. For

example, after full implementation of previous BRAC recommendations,

DOD and the Congress realized that the infrastructure was still too large.

Consequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996

(sec. 277) directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a 5-year plan to

consolidate and restructure DOD’s research, development, test, and

evaluation facilities for the 21st century. The Secretary was to identify the

administrative and legislative actions needed to consolidate facilities into

as few as practical and possible by October 1, 2005. The Secretary

responded with a plan and developed a legislative package entitled

Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Vision 21,

Reduction, Restructuring, and Revitalization Act of 1997 (commonly

referred to as Vision 21). However, while the legislative package was being

reviewed for interagency coordination, officials from the Office of

Management and Budget told DOD to include a provision for an

independent commission, since DOD historically has been unable to reduce

significantly its research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure.

This commission—similar to previous BRAC commissions—would make

the final realignment and closure recommendations to the Congress.

Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
After the Quadrennial Defense Review was completed in May 1997, DOD

decided not to submit the Vision 21 legislative package to the Congress,

opting instead to include research, development, test, and evaluation

infrastructure consolidations and reductions in any future BRAC rounds.

DOD also emphasized that significant reductions could only be achieved

under a BRAC-like authority.

With Vision 21 on hold and future BRAC legislation uncertain, it is unclear

at this time to what extent DOD will attempt to consolidate and restructure

its research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure and how it

might proceed. The DRI report briefly discusses the issue but provides no

further information on how DOD will deal with infrastructure reduction. It

states that each military department will review its research, development,

test, and evaluation facilities to identify restructuring opportunities. As we

stated in our report, we believe the extent to which DOD’s Vision 21 effort

proceeds may be largely dependent on continuing congressional support

for reductions. Moreover, we endorsed DOD’s view that an independent

BRAC-like authority, such as that provided by the Vision 21 legislative

package, is needed to reduce DOD’s research, development, test, and

evaluation infrastructure.

Questions About Savings

and Other Issues Surround

Discussion of Authorizing

Future Base Closure

Rounds

While the Secretary of Defense wants congressional authority to close

additional military bases, questions remain about the extent of savings

from prior closures, and concerns exist about how some decisions were

implemented as part of BRAC 1995. Legislation governing BRAC rounds held

in 1991, 1993, and 1995 is viewed by many as a good starting point for

considering future legislation.

The DRI, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 1997 report of the

congressionally mandated National Defense Panel each cited the problem

of continuing excess infrastructure within DOD and recommended that

additional BRAC rounds be held. The Secretary of Defense recently

submitted a legislative proposal to the Congress requesting authority to

conduct additional BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005. The legislation proposed

was similar to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 

(P.L. 101-510) which authorized BRAC closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and

1995 and helped overcome legal impediments to base closures enacted

during the 1970s. The 1990 legislation expired at the end of 1995. The most

recent legislative request followed an unsuccessful effort last year by the

Secretary of Defense to win congressional approval for additional BRAC

rounds.

Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
After considering the Secretary’s request last year for additional BRAC

round authority, the Congress enacted section 2824 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. This section requires that

the Secretary of Defense provide the Congress with an extensive report on

BRAC costs and savings and other issues. The report is to be submitted to

the congressional defense committees not later than the date on which the

President submits to the Congress the budget for fiscal year 2000. We

understand that the Secretary expects to submit that report to the

Congress in April 1998. We are monitoring DOD’s development of that

report, as required by section 2824 and will be working to more fully

assess and provide the Congress with our assessment of the Secretary’s

report once it is provided to the Congress.

Closing unneeded defense facilities has historically been difficult because

of public concern about the economic effects of closures on communities

and the perceived lack of impartiality of the decision-making process.

Legislation enacted authorizing BRAC rounds and its implementation in

BRAC rounds held between 1988 and1995 helped to mitigate those

concerns. However, certain implementation actions related to the 1995

BRAC round have resulted in questions about the impartiality of those

actions. In addition, concerns about the actual costs and savings from

BRAC, and the economic impact on affected communities, have caused

some to question whether future BRAC rounds should be authorized.

Ultimately, the Congress will decide whether to approve future BRAC

rounds.

Although questions continue to exist about savings from prior BRAC

rounds, our work has shown that net savings from prior BRAC rounds are

expected to be substantial but will not occur as quickly as originally

expected. Also, because DOD has not adequately tracked changes in initial

savings estimates, questions have existed about the reliability of the

savings projections. On a number of occasions, we have cited the need for

DOD to improve its process for tracking and updating BRAC savings

estimates.18 Questions also exist about the magnitude of savings likely to

occur from any future BRAC rounds. However, credible savings projections

concerning any future rounds are likely to be difficult to obtain until such

time as actual closure recommendations are known along with the details

of how individual closure actions would be executed.

18Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds (GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25,

1997); Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily Quantified

(GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
We reported last year that the 1990 legislation, which expired in 1995, was

seen by many officials as a starting point for considering new legislation

should the Congress decide that it wants to authorize any future BRAC

rounds.19 Key elements of the BRAC legislation that DOD and BRAC

commission officials said contributed to the success of prior rounds

included (1) the establishment of an independent commission and

nomination of commissioners by the President, in consultation with the

congressional leadership; (2) the development of clearly articulated,

published criteria for decision making; (3) use of data certified as to its

accuracy; (4) the requirement that the President and the Congress accept

or reject in their entirety the lists of closures adopted by the BRAC

commission; and (5) the creation of tight time frames to force the process

to reach decisions in a timely manner. The legislation also required that we

analyze DOD’s BRAC decision-making process and recommendations.

Additional audit coverage by the DOD Inspector General and service audit

agencies associated with the process evolved over time and helped ensure

the accuracy of data and analyses associated with the decision-making

process.

We recognize that no public policy process, especially one as open as

BRAC, can be completely removed from the U.S. political system. However,

the processes used between 1988 and 1995 had several checks and

balances to keep political influences to a minimum. At the same time, the

success of these provisions requires that all participants of the process

adhere to the rules and procedures.

Long-Range Facility

Plans Are Needed

Our February 1997 high-risk report on infrastructure20 noted that, to its

credit, DOD has programs to identify potential infrastructure reductions in

many areas. However, breaking down cultural resistance to change,

overcoming service parochialism, and setting forth a clear framework for a

reduced defense infrastructure are key to avoiding waste and inefficiency.

To do this, we noted that the Secretary of Defense and the service

secretaries needed to give greater structure to their efforts by developing a

more definitive facility infrastructure plan. We said the plan needed to

establish time frames and identify organizations and personnel responsible

for accomplishing fiscal and operational goals.

19Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds (GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25,

1997).

20High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
We suggested that this plan be presented to the Congress in much the

same way that DOD presented its plan for force structure reductions in the

Bottom-Up Review. This would provide a basis for the Congress to

oversee DOD’s plan for infrastructure reductions and allow the affected

parties to see what is going to happen and when. We noted that, in

developing the plan, DOD should use a variety of means to achieve

reductions, including such things as consolidations, privatization,

outsourcing, reengineering, and interservicing agreements. We also said it

should also consider the need for and timing for future BRAC rounds.

Likewise, such a plan should also encompass recapitalization and upkeep

of remaining infrastructure.

Existing Plans Have

Important Limitations

Our May 1997 report on demolition noted that planning by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and the services for facilities maintenance and

repair, including revitalization of facilities infrastructure, was limited.21

Those plans that did exist were not focused on long-term comprehensive

strategies for facilities revitalization, replacement, and maintenance, and

they were not tied to measurable goals to be accomplished over specified

time frames or linked to funding.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and

Installations) testifying before this Subcommittee on February 26, 1998,

recognized the absence of and need for improved planning for facilities

infrastructure. The Deputy Under Secretary stated that to “ensure the best

allocation of our resources, the Department has initiated a process to

establish long-range facilities plans for each Service. This cross-functional

effort, an outgrowth of the Quadrennial Defense Review, is intended to

guide the development of future programs and budgets and evaluate their

effectiveness”.

The need for improved planning for facilities infrastructure is also

underscored by the requirements of the Government Performance and

Results Act. The act requires federal agencies, including DOD, to develop

agency wide strategic plans by September 30, 1997, and annual program

performance reports beginning March 21, 2000. The strategic plans must

cover at least a 5-year period and include an agency’s mission statement

and goals. They must also describe how an agency plans to achieve its

21In July 1997, OMB provided guidance to federal agencies on the planning, budgeting, and acquisition

of capital assets in its Capital Programming Guide, which was a supplement to OMB Circular A-11,

Part 3. This guidance integrated the various administration and statutory asset management initiatives

into a single, integrated capital programming process to ensure that capital assets contributed to the

achievement of agency strategic goals and objectives.

Page 21 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
goals through its activities and its human, capital, information, and other

resources, such as facilities.

Performance plans must include measurable performance goals, where

feasible, and the indicators for measuring performance. Performance

reports must compare actual performance with performance goals and

explain what needs to be done when goals are not met. Such performance

reporting for DOD’s infrastructure should include, as part of DOD’s

assessment of the program’s efficiency in meeting performance goals, the

measurement of actual against expected facility infrastructure

maintenance costs. Such periodic reporting should also identify and

facilitate monitoring estimates of the costs associated with deferred

facility maintenance.

Improved infrastructure planning can help agency components and

programs to develop outcome-oriented goals and performance measures

that are linked to and support agencywide goals. Our report on DOD’s

implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act notes

that the Senate and House reports on the legislation anticipate that

strategic planning will be institutionalized and practiced at all

organizational levels throughout the federal government.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. We would be pleased

to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee might

have.

Page 22 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Page 23 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Page 24 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Page 25 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Related GAO Products

Defense Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense

Reform Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122, Mar. 13, 1998).

DOD’s Government Performance and Results Act Implementation

(GAO/NSIAD/GGD-97-65R, Jan. 31, 1997).

Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully Reducing Unneeded

RDT&E Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8, 1998).

Navy Regional Maintenance: Substantial Opportunities Exist to Build on

Infrastructure Streamlining Progress (GAO/NSIAD-98-4, Nov. 13, 1997).

Future Years Defense Program: DOD’s 1998 Plan Has Substantial Risk in

Execution (GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds

(GAO/NSIAD-97-151, July 25, 1997).

1997 Defense Reform Bill: Observations on H.R. 1778 (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-187,

June 17, 1997).

Defense Infrastructure: Demolition of Unneeded Buildings Can Help Avoid

Operating Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-125, May 13, 1997).

DOD High-Risk Areas: Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid Billions of

Dollars in Waste (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997).

Defense Budget: Observations on Infrastructure Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-97-127BR, Apr. 4, 1997).

Defense IRM: Investments at Risk for DOD Computer Centers

(GAO/AIMD-97-39, Apr. 4, 1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save

Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar. 12, 1997).

Military Bases: Cost to Maintain Inactive Ammunition Plants and Closed

Bases Could Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-56, Feb. 20, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Page 26 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Related GAO Products

Air Force Depot Maintenance: Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly

While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec. 31, 1996).

Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization Without Further Downsizing

Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept. 18, 1996).

1997 DOD Budget: Potential Reductions to Operation and Maintenance

Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-220, Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Acquisition Infrastructure: Changes in RDT&E Laboratories and

Centers (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept. 13, 1996).

Military Family Housing: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Costs and Mitigate

Inequities (GAO/NSIAD-96-203, Sept. 13, 1996).

Navy Financial Management: Improved Management of Operating

Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings (GAO/AIMD-96-94,

Aug. 16, 1996).

Defense Infrastructure: Costs Projected to Increase Between 1997 and

2001 (GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996).

Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are

Being Missed (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996).

DOD Infrastructure: DOD Is Opening Unneeded Finance and Accounting

Offices (GAO/NSIAD-96-113, Apr. 16, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little

Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Defense Transportation: Streamlining of the U.S. Transportation

Command Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-60, Feb. 22, 1996).

Best Management Practices: Reengineering the Air Force’s Logistics

System Can Yield Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-5, Feb. 21, 1996).

Page 27 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
Related GAO Products

DOD Infrastructure: DOD’s Planned Finance and Accounting Structure Is Not

Well Justified (GAO/NSIAD-95-127, Sept. 18, 1995).

Financial Management: Challenges Confronting DOD’s Reform Initiatives

(GAO/T-AIMD-95-146, May 23, 1995).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

(709334) Page 28 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115 Defense Infrastructure
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