Rel: May 24, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0506

_________________________

Ex parte R.B. and A.L. 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: R.B., Jr.) 

(Conecuh Juvenile Court: JU-22-10.02)

_________________________

CL-2023-0507

_________________________

Ex parte R.B. and A.L. 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: A.B.) 

(Conecuh Juvenile Court: JU-22-11.02)
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

2

________________________

CL-2023-0508

_________________________

Ex parte R.B. and A.L. 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: B.B.) 

(Conecuh Juvenile Court: JU-22-12.02)

PER CURIAM.

R.B. ("the father") and A.L. ("the mother") petition this court for 

writs of mandamus directing the Conecuh Juvenile Court ("the juvenile 

court") to stay cases pending in the juvenile court involving their three 

children, R.B., Jr.; A.B.; and B.B. ("the children"), or, in the alternative, 

to dismiss the underlying actions based upon lack of personal 

jurisdiction.

Background

On May 11, 2022, the Conecuh County Department of Human 

Resources ("DHR") filed dependency petitions as to the children in the 

juvenile court, alleging that the father and the mother had exposed the 

children to domestic violence in an incident with a neighbor. The ensuing 

three actions were assigned case numbers of JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01, 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

3

and JU-22-12.01, respectively. According to the dependency petitions, the 

children had been residing in Alabama for approximately six weeks. The 

children were placed in foster care. 

On February 22, 2023, the mother filed motions for return of 

custody, arguing that DHR had been operating under a protectivesupervision order/shelter-care order and had not requested an 

adjudicatory or permanency hearing. The mother averred that she had 

moved to Georgia and was no longer in a relationship with the father. 

On May 4, 2023, the juvenile court, following a hearing, entered in 

each action an order finding that the children were no longer dependent 

as to the mother and purporting to return custody to the mother. On May 

22, 2023, the children's former foster mother (who had had physical

custody of the oldest child from May 2022 to May 2023; physical custody 

of the middle child from September 2022 to May 2023; and physical

custody of the youngest child from January 2023 to May 2023) filed 

motions to intervene in JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01 and JU-22-12.01. The 

juvenile court denied the motions as moot because, it said, no case was 

then pending in juvenile court. DHR appealed from the orders returning 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

4

custody, but, in August 2023, it filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the 

appeals, which this court granted. 

On May 22, 2023, the former foster mother commenced actions for 

custody in the juvenile court; those actions were assigned the case 

numbers of JU-22-10.02, JU-22-11.02, and JU-22-12.02, respectively. 

The former foster mother alleged that "new and current facts" supported 

adjudications of dependency as to the mother and the father. It appears, 

based on the allegations in the underlying petitions, that the father is

now living in Georgia.

On June 29, 2023, the mother filed answers to the former foster 

mother's petitions and argued that the juvenile court lacked personal 

jurisdiction. The mother also asked the juvenile court to stay the 

proceedings in JU-22.10.02; JU-22-11.02; and JU-22-12.02 because, at 

that time, DHR's appeals in JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01, and JU-22-12:01 

were still pending and involved the same children and parents. On June 

30, 2023, the father filed answers and moved to dismiss the former foster 

mother's petitions for lack of jurisdiction because, he said, the juvenile 

court had found that the children were no longer dependent and because 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

5

they were living in Georgia with the mother. On July 7, 2023, the 

juvenile court denied the motions to dismiss. 

On July 20, 2023, the mother and the father filed joint petitions for 

a writ of mandamus seeking (1) orders staying the custody actions -- JU22-10.02, JU-22-11.02, and JU-22-12.02 -- until the appeals in JU-22-

10.01, JU-22-11.01, and JU-22-12.01 were resolved; and (2) orders 

dismissing the former foster mother's petitions in JU-22-10.02, JU-22-

11.02, and JU-22-12.02 for lack of personal jurisdiction because, they 

contend, the mother and the children reside in Georgia.

The aspect of the parents' mandamus petitions seeking review of 

the juvenile court's orders denying their motions to stay the custody 

actions -- JU-22-10.02, JU-22-11.02, and JU-22-12.02 -- until the appeals 

in JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01, and JU-22-12.01 were resolved is now moot 

because DHR has voluntarily dismissed its appeals in JU-22-10.01, JU22-11.01, and JU-22-12.01. Mandamus will not issue in a case where 

the underlying issue has become moot. Ex parte T.R.S., 794 So. 2d 1157, 

1159 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). Additionally, DHR was the party seeking 

dependency adjudications in JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01, and JU-22-12.01, 

making inapplicable the parents' argument in their mandamus petitions 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

6

that § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, prohibits simultaneous actions on the 

same cause of action against the same party. Also, the former foster 

mother alleged "new and current facts" in her dependency petitions, 

which arguably would have avoided any preclusive effect under that 

statute.

This court asked the parties to address whether the juvenile court 

has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-202, Ala. Code 1975, 

including arguments regarding who might meet the definition of a 

"person acting as a parent" under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. 

Code 1975.1

Standard of Review

Our standard of review is well-established:

"'"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary 

remedy; it will not be issued unless the petitioner 

shows '"'(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to 

the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the 

respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal 

to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; 

1Subject-matter jurisdiction is a matter of such magnitude that we 

take notice of it at any time and can do so ex mero motu. M.L.W. v. J.W., 

[Ms. CL-2022-0640, May 12, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___. ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 

2023). 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

7

and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the 

court.'"' Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 

153, 156 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Gates, 675 

So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala.1996)); Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 

746 So. 2d 960, 962 (Ala. 1999)."'

"Ex parte Vest, 68 So. 3d 881, 884 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) 

(quoting Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 931 So. 2d 1, 

5-6 (Ala. 2005))." 

Ex parte M.A.G., 160 So. 3d 22, 24 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by way of a 

petition for a writ of mandamus. Ex parte C.G., [Ms. CL-2023-0757, Jan. 

12, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). A timely petition for 

the writ of mandamus is also a proper method for presenting a challenge 

to the denial of a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Ex parte Sperry, 377 So. 3d 560, 562 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). 

Discussion

One of the purposes of the UCCJEA is to facilitate cooperation 

between courts in different states in issuing custody and visitation 

orders. Ex parte Siderius, 144 So. 3d 319 (Ala. 2013). 

"'The UCCJEA is a jurisdictional act that establishes 

subject-matter jurisdiction over child-custody proceedings.' 

H.T. v. Cleburne Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 

1062 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). The UCCJEA differentiates 

between a court's jurisdiction to make an 'initial child custody 

determination' and a court's 'continuing, exclusive 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

8

jurisdiction' over a child-custody determination. See §§ 30-

3B-201 and -202, Ala. Code 1975. A 'child custody proceeding' 

is '[a] proceeding in a court in which legal custody, physical 

custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue' and 

includes proceedings alleging dependency and seeking 

termination of parental rights. § 30-3B-102(4), Ala. Code 

1975. A 'child custody determination' is defined as '[a] 

judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the 

legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a 

child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and 

modification order.' § 30-3B-102(3). An 'initial determination' 

is defined as '[t]he first child custody determination 

concerning a particular child.' § 30-3B-102(8)."

A.M. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 262 So. 3d 1210, 1216 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2017). 

The UCCJEA recognizes four categories of subject-matter 

jurisdiction: (1) initial child-custody jurisdiction, see § 30-3B-201, Ala. 

Code 1975; (2) continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-custody 

determination, see § 30-3B-202, Ala. Code 1975; (3) jurisdiction to modify

another state's child-custody determination, see § 30-3B-203, Ala. Code 

1975; and (4) temporary emergency jurisdiction to protect a child present 

in this state, see § 30-3B-204, Ala. Code 1975. 

In the present case, the juvenile court made initial child-custody 

determinations, pursuant to its temporary emergency jurisdiction under 

§ 30-3B-204(a), Ala. Code 1975, when it awarded DHR legal custody of 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

9

the children on May 12, 2022, to resolve an emergency regarding the 

children's safety and welfare. The juvenile court purported to enter 

another set of "permanent" custody orders on May 4, 2023, when it found 

the children not to be dependent and awarded their custody to the 

mother; however, the part of the order disposing of their custody was 

void. See K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So. 3d 499, 502 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ("[I]f, 

and only if, a juvenile court finds that the child is dependent, the court 

may then conduct proceedings to determine the custodial disposition of 

the child.", see also J.A. v. C.M., 93 So. 3d 953, 955 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) 

(stating that juvenile court, after finding that allegedly dependent

children are not dependent, must dismiss a dependency action and allow 

custody to be returned to former custodians). As a result, the juvenile 

court never entered child-custody determinations pursuant to any 

authority other than temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 30-3B204(a).

Section 30-3B-202(a) provides that a court of this state maintains 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-custody determination if 

the determination was made "consistent with [Ala. Code 1975, §] 30-3B201 or [§] 30-3B-203." In this case, the juvenile court did not make child-
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

10

custody determinations consistent with either § 30-3B-201 or § 30-3B203; instead, it relied only on § 30-3B-204(a). Thus, the juvenile court 

did not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to §30-3B-201(a).

Section 30-3B-202(b) provides that "[a] court of this state which has 

made a child custody determination and does not have continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination 

only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under [§] 30-

3B-201." Thus, the juvenile court in this case would have had jurisdiction 

to enter a subsequent child-custody determination only if it had

jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201, which sets forth four separate bases for 

jurisdiction: home-state jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(1); 

significant-connection jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(2); moreappropriate-forum jurisdiction (in which jurisdiction has been declined 

by all courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(2)),

pursuant § 30-3B-201(a)(3); and last-resort-jurisdiction (in which no 

court of any other state would have jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(1), 

(a)(2), or (a)(3)), pursuant to § 30-3B-201(a)(4). 

Section 30-3B-201(a)(1), which governs home-state jurisdiction, 

provides:
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

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"(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date 

of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state 

of the child within six months before the commencement of 

the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a 

parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this 

state; ...."

Under § 30-3B-201(a)(1), the juvenile court may exercise 

jurisdiction over the former foster mother's three new dependency actions 

as to the children if Alabama was the home state of the children on the 

date of the commencement of the proceedings, i.e., May 22, 2023, the date 

on which the former foster mother filed her verified petitions for custody. 

The "home state" is "[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a 

person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately 

before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." § 30-3B-102(7), 

Ala. Code 1975. Alabama was not the children's home state because the 

children moved to Georgia on May 5, 2023. However, § 30-3B-201(a)(1)

further provides that an Alabama court may nonetheless exercise homestate jurisdiction if Alabama was "the home state of the child[ren] within 

six months before the commencement of the proceeding and [they are] 

absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues 

to live in this state."
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

12

The parents argue that the juvenile court, in entering its 

dependency judgments in JU-22-10.01, JU-22-11.01, and JU-22-12.01,

lacked home-state jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201(a)(1) because the

parents and the children had only been in Alabama for six weeks when

DHR filed its petitions for protective custody on May 11, 2022. The 

parents state that they moved to Tennessee during the proceedings and 

the mother later moved to Georgia. The former foster mother asserts 

that she qualifies under the UCCJEA as a "person acting as a parent" 

because, she says, she had "physical custody [of the child] for a period of 

six consecutive months" before seeking custody and "claims a right to 

legal custody under the law of this state." § 30-3B-102(13). 

Section 30-3B-102(13), a portion of the UCCJEA, defines a "person 

acting as a parent" as:

A person, other than a parent, who:

"a. Has physical custody of the child or has 

had physical custody for a period of six consecutive 

months, including any temporary absence, within 

one year immediately before the commencement of 

a child custody proceeding; and

"b. Has been awarded legal custody by a 

court or claims a right to legal custody under the 

law of this state."
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

13

The Official Comment to § 30-3B-102 provides that:

"The term 'person acting as a parent' has been slightly 

redefined. It has been broadened from the definition in the 

[former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the 

predecessor to the UCCJEA,] to include a person who has 

acted as a parent for a significant period of time prior to the 

filing of the custody proceeding as well as a person who 

currently has physical custody of the child. In addition, a 

person acting as a parent must either have legal custody or 

claim a right to legal custody under the law of this state. The 

reference to the law of this State means that a court 

determines the issue of whether someone is a 'person acting 

as a parent' under its own law. This reaffirms the traditional 

view that a court in a child custody case applies its own 

substantive law. The court does not have to undertake a 

choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the individual 

who is claiming to be a person acting as a parent has standing 

to seek custody of the child."

In Patrick v. Williams, 952 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), this 

court held that a grandparent may satisfy the requirements set forth in 

§ 30-3B-102(13). The parents in Patrick were divorced by a judgment of 

the Tallapoosa Circuit Court in 2000. That court, in awarding the mother 

custody of the children, exercised jurisdiction to make an initial custody 

determination. See § 30-3B-201. Subsequently, the mother moved to 

Texas; however, the mother voluntarily placed the children with their 

grandmother, who still lived in Alabama. Shortly thereafter, the 

grandmother filed an emergency petition for custody in the Tallapoosa 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

14

Circuit Court. The father, who also lived in Alabama, filed a response to 

the grandmother's emergency petition. The father and the grandmother 

entered into an agreement giving the grandmother pendente lite custody 

and the father visitation. Ultimately, the Tallapoosa Circuit Court 

awarded the grandmother custody of the children. This court affirmed 

the circuit court's judgment awarding permanent custody of the children 

to the grandmother. We held that the circuit court continued to have 

jurisdiction to modify custody pursuant to § 30-3B-202 because the 

grandmother had had physical custody when she initiated the custody 

proceedings and because the grandmother had claimed a legal right to 

their custody. Also, the children, the grandmother, and the father had 

all been living in Alabama at the time the custody proceedings were

commenced. 

In B.B. v. L.W., 163 So. 3d 1042 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (plurality 

opinion), this court addressed whether the grandmother in that case met 

the definition of "person acting as a parent" under § 30-3B-102(13), when

the grandmother did not have the mother's permission to assume 

physical custody of the child. In B.B., a Michigan court, in 2002, granted 

the grandmother legal guardianship of the child with the mother's 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

15

permission. Subsequently, the grandmother moved with the child to 

Tuscaloosa, where they lived until 2007, when the child went to live with 

the mother in Michigan. The mother thereafter allowed the child to visit 

with the grandmother in Alabama. In June 2011, the mother allowed the 

child and the child's younger brother to visit in Alabama. The children 

were scheduled to return to Michigan in August 2011 before the school 

year began. However, although the grandmother allowed the child's 

younger brother to return to Michigan, the grandmother detained the 

child in Alabama. 

On July 5, 2012, the mother in B.B. v. L.W. filed an emergency 

petition in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court ("the Alabama court") seeking 

an order compelling delivery of the child to her. The record contained a 

letter from the Michigan court to the grandmother dated July 2006, 

informing the grandmother that the guardianship that had been granted 

to her by that court was valid only as long as she resided in Michigan. 

The Alabama court determined that it had jurisdiction as the "home 

state" of the child under the UCCJEA. This court, in addressing the 

grandmother's argument that she met the definition of a "person acting 

as a parent" under § 30-3B-102(13), stated:
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

16

"The grandmother, in reliance on § 30-3B-102(13), 

asserts that, because the child had been in her physical 

custody for more than six months at the time the mother filed 

the petition for a writ of assistance in the trial court, Alabama 

is the proper jurisdiction in which to determine custody of the 

child. However, our analysis of the UCCJEA does not simply 

rest upon the child's residency over the six months preceding 

the initiation of these proceedings. To be sure, we do not take 

lightly the allegations that the child had been abused. 

However, we cannot condone the unilateral decision of a 

grandparent, or of any party, to deprive a parent of the 

fundamental right to custody of his or her child with no legal 

justification. The grandmother did not invoke the temporary 

emergency jurisdiction of the trial court pursuant to § 30-3B204(a), Ala. Code 1975, nor did she file a petition asserting 

that the child was dependent when she first discovered the 

alleged abuse.

"We are further unpersuaded by the grandmother's 

argument that § 30-3B-102(13) does not require that the 

'"claim to legal custody" to be good or bad,' or, in other words, 

that a person acting as a parent need not have a colorable 

claim to custody. Citing Smith v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 94, 99 (Ala. 

2005), the grandmother asserts that she was standing 'in loco 

parentis.' Our supreme court decided in Smith that the trial 

court had erroneously accorded individuals that, although 

family members, were essentially acting as babysitters in loco 

parentis status. Id. at 100. The underlying issues in Smith

were various tort claims relating to the accidental death of a 

child; our supreme court did not address whether someone 

acting in loco parentis satisfied the requirements of the 

UCCJEA. Id. at 96-100. We agree with the North Dakota 

Supreme Court that, '[a]bsent a requirement of mandating a 

colorable claim [to custody], the underlying policies of the 

UCCJEA and the [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act] 

would be frustrated as nonparents execute 'interstate 

abductions and other unilateral removals of children [ ] to 

obtain custody and visitation awards." Rogers [v. Platt], [199 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

17

Cal. App. 3d 1204,] 1212-13, 245 Cal. Rptr. 532 [ (1988) ].' 

Schirado v. Foote, 785 N.W.2d 235, 244 (N.D. 2010). Based 

upon the foregoing, we conclude that the grandmother did not 

have a legal claim to custody under the laws of this state; 

therefore, she was precluded from 'acting as a parent' as 

defined by § 30-3B-102(13). Therefore, we must conclude that 

Alabama is not the child's home state and that the trial court 

could not have assumed jurisdiction over this matter 

pursuant to § 30-B-201(a)(1)."

B.B. v. L.W., 163 So. 3d at 1048-49 (plurality opinion).

In the present cases, Alabama did not become the home state of the 

children under § 30-3B-201(a)(1) within six months of the commencement 

of the three new dependency proceedings. The children did not live in 

Alabama with their parents for six consecutive months. Two of the 

children, R.B., Jr., and A.B., lived with the foster mother for six 

consecutive months, but she was not "a person acting as a parent" at that 

time. Section 30-3B-102(13) defines "a person acting as a parent" as one 

who has not only physical custody of a child, but also has legal custody or 

claims a right to legal custody of the child. During the relevant period, 

the former foster mother did not have legal custody of the children;

moreover, she had agreed not to pursue their legal custody in a fosterparent agreement with DHR. "The nature of the foster care relationship 

is distinctly different from that of the natural family; namely, it is a 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

18

temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements." 

Renfro v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 884 F.2d 943, 944 (6th 

Cir. 1989). Thus, the former foster mother did not qualify as a person 

acting as a parent while keeping the children in foster care.2 The third 

child, B.B., lived with the foster mother for five months only, so Alabama 

did not even arguably become his home state at any point.

The fact that the former foster mother is now claiming a right to 

legal custody of the children does not alter the outcome. Even if we were 

to presume that the former foster mother could somehow qualify as "a 

person acting as a parent" by virtue of filing of the three new dependency 

petitions, it remains true that she was not "a person acting as a parent" 

when she was acting as the foster parent for the children in the preceding 

2At least two other states have addressed whether a foster parent 

is a person acting as a parent under the UCCJEA. See In re Z.H., 245 

W.Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021) (rejecting the West Virginia 

Department of Health and Human Resources' argument that the foster 

parents were "persons acting as a parent" for the purposes of establishing 

home-state jurisdiction because the argument ignored that the child was 

placed with the foster parents after and as a result of DHHR's 

proceedings). But see In re Custody of A.C., 165 Wash. 2d 568, 200 P.3d 

689 (2009) (holding that the foster parents were "acting as a parent"

under the Washington UCCJEA when they had had physical custody of

the child for six months and were claiming a clear legal right to custody). 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

19

six months, as required for Alabama to become the children's home state. 

At the point the former foster mother filed the three new 

dependency petitions, it appears that no state had home-state 

jurisdiction over the children. They had moved to Georgia only two weeks 

earlier, so that state did not have home-state jurisdiction, and, as 

explained above, Alabama also did not have home-state jurisdiction. In 

these circumstances, § 30-3B-201(a)(2), providing for significantconnection jurisdiction, would allow the juvenile court to exercise 

jurisdiction over the three new dependency petitions if:

"a. The child and the child's parents, or the child and at 

least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a 

significant connection with this state other than mere 

physical presence; and

"b. Substantial evidence is available in this state 

concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal 

relationships."

In this case, the parents, who no longer live in Alabama, do not have 

a significant connection with Alabama. Likewise, it appears that the 

children do not have any significant connection to Alabama. They were 

brought to this state in their tender years by their parents and resided 

here for only six weeks before being placed into foster care. Once the 

juvenile court determined that the children were not dependent, they 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

20

immediately moved to Georgia to live with the mother. It appears that 

the children have no family members in this state other than a distant 

relative that they have never met. Their only connection appears to be 

their relationship with the former foster mother, who apparently 

intended to adopt them, but that connection was severed when the 

juvenile court ordered the children to be removed from her custody and 

returned to the mother. Moreover, the former foster mother was not a 

"person acting as a parent," which is required for significant-connection 

jurisdiction under § 30-3B-201(a)(2)a.

We note that more-appropriate-forum jurisdiction and last-resort 

jurisdiction, as set out in §§ 30-3B-201(a)(3) and (a)(4) respectively, do 

not apply to this case. This is so because neither Georgia nor any other 

state court have declined to exercise jurisdiction in favor of Alabama nor 

is Alabama a court of last resort for the former foster mother's petitions.

Conclusion

The juvenile court made its initial custody determinations pursuant 

to its temporary emergency jurisdiction. Alabama lacked continuing 

jurisdiction over the former foster mother's custody petitions filed 

subsequent to the emergency petitions under the UCCJEA. Therefore, 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

21

we grant the parents' petitions for writs of mandamus and direct the 

juvenile court to dismiss the former foster mother's custody petitions

based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 

CL-2023-0506 -- PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND 

GRANTED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

CL-2023-0507 -- PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND 

GRANTED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

CL-2023-0508 -- PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND 

GRANTED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson and Lewis, JJ., concur.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 

Fridy, J., recuses himself. 

3We pretermit discussion of the parents' arguments regarding the 

juvenile court's lack of personal jurisdiction. 
CL-2023-0506, CL-2023-0507, and CL-2023-0508

22

EDWARDS, Judge, concurring in the result.

R.B. ("the father") and A.L. ("the mother") have filed in this court 

petitions for the writ of mandamus seeking review of the Conecuh 

Juvenile Court's denial of their motions to stay and their motions to 

dismiss the dependency and custody actions relating to their children, 

R.B., Jr., A.B., and B.B. ("the children"), which had been filed by the 

children's former foster mother, B.B.C. ("the former foster mother"), on 

May 22, 2023.4 The children had been the subject of previous dependency 

actions instituted in the Conecuh Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") in 

May 2022 by the Conecuh County Department of Human Resources 

("DHR").5 The juvenile court, in orders entered on May 4, 2023, 

determined that the children were not dependent, relieved DHR of its 

temporary legal custody of the children, and ordered that the children be 

4The foster mother's petition relating to R.B., Jr., was assigned case 

number JU-22-10.02; her petition relating to A.B. was assigned case 

number JU-22-11.02; and her petition relating to B.B. was assigned case 

number JU-22-12.02.

5DHR's petition relating to R.B., Jr., was assigned case number JU22-10.01; its petition relating to A.B. was assigned case number JU-22-

11.01; and its petition relating to B.B. was assigned case number JU-22-

12.01.
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returned to the custody of the mother.6 DHR appealed from the May 4, 

2023, orders.

In August 2023, after the mother and the father had filed their 

petitions for the writ of mandamus in July 2023, DHR dismissed its 

appeals. Therefore, like the main opinion, I conclude that, insofar as the 

mother and the father request that the dependency and custody actions 

commenced by the former foster mother be stayed pending the outcome 

of those appeals, the petitions have been mooted. See Ex parte Autauga 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 353 So. 3d 542, 547 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021)

(determining that issue presented in petition for the writ of mandamus 

had been mooted by the dismissal of an underlying action). I would not 

further discuss the arguments of the mother and the father respecting 

the request that the former foster mother's actions be stayed.7 

6DHR's appeal regarding the order entered in case number JU-22-

10.01 was assigned appeal number CL-2023-0300; DHR's appeal from the 

order entered in case number JU-22-11.01 was assigned appeal number 

CL-2023-0301; and DHR's appeal from the order entered in case number 

JU-22-12.01 was assigned appeal number CL-2023-0302.

7I note, however, that Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-440, commonly known 

as the abatement statute, prohibits a particular plaintiff from 

prosecuting more than one action for the same cause of action against the 

same defendant. See Johnson v. Brown-Service Ins., 293 Ala. 549, 551,

307 So. 2d 518, 520 (1974) (discussing the predecessor statute to § 6-5-
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24

However, I am not convinced that the former foster mother's 

dependency and custody petitions, which make allegations that the 

children are dependent based on the "failure [of the mother and the 

father] to comply with [individualized service plans], sexual abuse, 

domestic violence, mental-health issues, and drug use" and allegations 

that the mother's fiancé, S.M., "has a criminal history and abuses drugs 

and alcohol," are sufficient to state new allegations that could support 

the former foster mother's petitions. The juvenile court heard evidence 

regarding the conduct of the mother and of the father and of the conduct 

and character of S.M. at the April 24, 2023, hearing on DHR's dependency 

petitions.8 The May 4, 2023, judgments in DHR's dependency actions 

440, Title 7, §146, Ala. Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958), and stating that the 

abatement statute "stands for the proposition that a person cannot 

prosecute two suits at the same time, for the same cause against the same 

party. The purpose of the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits and 

vexatious litigation."). Both parties -- i.e., the plaintiff and the defendant 

-- must be identical for the statute to bar an action. In this instance, the 

plaintiffs in the two sets of dependency actions are not identical. 

 

8In considering the merits of the petitions, I have considered not 

only the materials provided in support of the petitions and the answers 

to the petitions, but also items that are contained in the record in DHR's 

appeals. See City of Mobile v. Matthews, 220 So. 3d 1061, 1063-64 & n.3 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (explaining the circumstances under which an 

appellate court can take judicial notice of its own records in a different 

appeal).
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determined as a matter of fact that the fiancé was stable in his finances, 

his home, and his employment. A reading of the May 4, 2023, judgments 

compels the conclusion that the juvenile court determined that the 

children were not dependent and should be returned to the custody of the 

mother in part because she was living with S.M., who provided stability 

for the mother. 

The "new and current facts" alleged in the former foster mother's 

petitions are neither new nor current, and, in fact, are the same 

allegations that the juvenile court had resolved in favor of the mother in 

the May 4, 2023, judgments. Thus, I conclude that the former foster 

mother's petitions should have been dismissed because they were barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata.

"In Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188 (Ala. 1988), this Court 

explained the rationale behind the doctrine of res judicata:

" '"Res judicata is a broad, judicially developed 

doctrine, which rests upon the ground that public 

policy, and the interest of the litigants alike, 

mandate that there be an end to litigation; that 

those who have contested an issue shall be bound 

by the ruling of the court; and that issues once 

tried shall be considered forever settled between 

those same parties and their privies."

"'533 So. 2d at 190. The elements of res judicata are
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" '"(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered 

by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with 

substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the 

same cause of action presented in both actions."

"'Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 

1998). "If those four elements are present, then any claim that 

was, or that could have been, adjudicated in the prior action 

is barred from further litigation." 723 So. 2d at 636. Res 

judicata, therefore, bars a party from asserting in a 

subsequent action a claim that it has already had an 

opportunity to litigate in a previous action.'"

Ex parte H.A.S., 308 So. 3d 533, 540-41 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (quoting 

Lee L. Saad Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 851 So. 2d 507, 516-17 

(Ala. 2002)).

DHR's concluded dependency actions and the former foster 

mother's new actions present the same claim -- that the children are 

dependent based on the conduct of the mother and the father. The May 

4, 2023, judgments, which were entered by a court of competent 

jurisdiction, terminated DHR's dependency actions on the merits by 

concluding that DHR had failed to establish that the children were 

dependent. Because the former foster mother's relationship to the 

children resulted from her being a foster parent licensed by DHR and 

from DHR's placement of the children in her care, she is a party in privity 
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with DHR, satisfying the requirement that there be substantial identity 

of the parties. 

In my opinion, the former foster mother alleges no new facts in her 

petitions, and her petitions were due to be dismissed on the basis of the 

doctrine of res judicata. I would grant the petitions for a writ of 

mandamus and direct the juvenile court to dismiss the former foster 

mother's petitions not because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction but because of the application of the doctrine of res judicata.9 

Accordingly, I concur in the result of the main opinion. 

9I express no opinion on whether the main opinion correctly 

analyzes subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq.