Filed 12/20/18; Certified for Publication 1/16/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHELLE A. PONT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JEFFERY D. PONT,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B284064

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD512209)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Office of Foroozandeh and Majid Foroozandeh for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Stephen Temko for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Michelle Pont1 appeals from a $90,000 award in attorney 

fees and costs in favor of her ex-spouse Jeffery Pont. The parties 

were initially engaged in a marital proceeding, which they 

resolved by entering into a stipulated judgment. That judgment 

included a release, continued family law court enforcement 

jurisdiction, and attorney fees to the prevailing party who was

“forced to seek” court intervention to enforce the stipulated 

judgment. 

Specifically, by the stipulated judgment, Michelle released 

her claims against Jeffery, and the parties agreed that the Los 

Angeles family law court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the 

stipulated judgment’s terms. Within the paragraph containing 

the release, Jeffery made representations about their community 

property including that none was given to his new wife, Shantal, 

or the business entity Hand Air, LLC and that neither he nor the 

community had any interest in Hand Air, LLC. The stipulated 

judgment also authorized an award of attorney fees and costs to 

the prevailing party “incurred in connection therewith” a party’s 

effort “to seek Court intervention to enforce any provision of this 

Stipulated Further Judgment.” 

Subsequently, Michelle filed a civil lawsuit in 

Orange County alleging that Jeffery siphoned some of the 

community assets that were subject to the stipulated judgment. 

Jeffery successfully demurred and obtained a judgment of 

dismissal against Michelle’s civil lawsuit in Orange County. In 

 

1 We will refer to the parties and other individuals by 

first name for clarity, not out of familiarity or disrespect. (See 

In re Marriage of Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801, 803, fn. 2.)
3

the family law court, Jeffery then moved under the stipulated 

judgment’s attorney fees provision for recovery of $89,560.50 in 

attorney fees and $670.61 in costs he incurred in connection with 

the civil action in Orange County. Ultimately, the family law 

court awarded Jeffery $90,000 in attorney fees and costs, having 

rounded down from the amount Jeffery requested.

We conclude that the attorney fees provision in the 

stipulated judgment encompasses these fees and costs because of 

its broad language, particularly, the phrase “in connection 

therewith.” We also conclude that the family law court did not 

abuse its discretion in deeming Jeffery the prevailing party 

because he obtained a judgment of dismissal against Michelle’s 

civil lawsuit thereby achieving his litigation objectives, which is 

the applicable standard. Finally, the family law court did not 

abuse its discretion in awarding $90,000 in attorney fees and 

costs, and finding that counsel’s hourly rates and number of 

charged hours were reasonable, particularly where Michelle has 

not provided any competent evidence or analysis challenging 

those fees and hours.

Finally, we do not resolve the parties’ dispute over 

discovery sanctions to the extent their opening and responding 

appellate briefs address them because Michelle clarifies in her 

reply that she “has not appealed [them].” 

Accordingly, we affirm.
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties Resolved Their Marital Dissolution 

Action By Entering Into A Stipulated Judgment With 

An Attorney Fees Provision

In September 2009, the parties each filed a marriage 

dissolution action against the other in the Los Angeles Superior 

Court family law court, which actions they stipulated to 

consolidate. On December 14, 2011, Jeffery filed a 

stipulation and order regarding their final property division, 

spousal support, and attorney fees and costs, which both 

parties, their counsel, and the family law court, through 

Judge Keith M. Clemens, signed. 

On March 26, 2012, the family law court, through 

Judge Clemens, entered a judgment (nunc pro tunc on 

December 31, 2011) pursuant to a stipulated further judgment of 

dissolution of marriage. We refer to this document as the 

stipulated judgment.

The stipulated judgment contains the following attorney

fees provision: “18.3. If any Party is forced to seek Court 

intervention to enforce any provision of this Stipulated Further 

Judgment, the prevailing Party shall be entitled to all of her or 

his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection 

therewith.” 

It also contains a reservation of jurisdiction clause: “20.12. 

Reservation of Jurisdiction. Except where this Stipulated 

Further Judgment expressly provides otherwise, this Court 

reserves jurisdiction to make such further orders, judgments and 

decrees as may be necessary or convenient to enforce, but not to 

alter or modify, the terms and provisions of this Stipulated 

Further Judgment.” (Underscoring omitted.) 
5

The stipulated judgment accounted for the parties’ 

assets including their business entities A.P. Express, LLC and 

A.P. Express Worldwide, LLC. It also accounted for spousal and 

child support, debts, and a settlement or “equalization” payment 

owed by Jeffery to Michelle. 

Under the stipulated judgment, in paragraph 10.1(15), 

Michelle released Jeffery and his new wife, Shantal, from all 

claims regarding another business entity, Hand Air, LLC. As 

part of the release, Jeffery represented that neither he nor the 

A.P. entities provided funds to Shantal or Hand Air, LLC for 

Hand Air Express, LLC’s startup or operating costs through the 

date of execution of the stipulated judgment, and that neither he 

nor the community had any interest in Hand Air, LLC. 

B. Michelle Filed An Unsuccessful Civil Lawsuit 

Alleging That Jeffery Wrongfully Dissipated Some Of 

The Community Assets That Were Subject To The 

Stipulated Judgment

About four years later, on February 9, 2016, Michelle filed 

a civil lawsuit against Jeffery, Shantal, and Hand Air Express,

LLC in the Orange County Superior Court. Michelle asserted 

causes of action for actual intent to defraud and constructive 

fraudulent transfer against all three defendants, and breach of 

A.P. Express, LLC’s operating agreement against Jeffery. 

Michelle alleged, “In an effort to reduce the assets of the AP 

companies in anticipation of reaching a final divorce based on a 

Marital Settlement Agreement, defendant Jeff Pont with the 

assistance of defendant Shantal Pont began transferring AP 

assets, money and customer accounts to Shantal Pont as the 

CEO for Hand Air Express, LLC.” 
6

On June 1, 2016, Jeffery’s family law counsel, 

Meyer, Olson, Lowy & Meyers, LLP (Meyer Olson), through 

attorney Lisa Meyer,2 wrote directly to Michelle stating, “In the 

event you are unwilling to comply with this request [to dismiss 

the civil lawsuit with prejudice], this letter shall serve as further 

Notice that Mr. Pont will proceed in filing an Application with 

the Family Law Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court 

seeking to enforce the Judgment. Please be advised that 

Mr. Pont will also include a request for attorneys’ fees and costs 

pursuant to Paragraph 18.3 of the Judgment . . . .” 

Apparently, there was confusion over whether Michelle was 

then represented by counsel. Thus, in a subsequent letter, 

attorney Meyer wrote to Michelle’s counsel reiterating the 

demand: “Unless you forthwith confirm that Ms. Pont has 

dismissed her pending Civil Complaint and provide proof of 

same, we will proceed in seeking enforcement of Paragraph 

10.2(15) of the parties’ Family Law Judgment, and attendant 

prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs as authorized by 

Paragraph 18.3 of the Judgment.” 

On June 10, 2016, on behalf of Jeffery, attorney Meyer filed 

an ex parte application in the family court and request for an 

order for prevailing party attorney fees and costs under 

paragraph 18.3 of the stipulated judgment. Additionally, Jeffery 

requested an order temporarily staying his payment obligations 

to Michelle pending the civil lawsuit, a finding that Michelle 

violated the release contained in the stipulated judgment, an 

 

2 To the extent Michelle objects to attorney Meyer’s 

declaration, she “failed . . . to get a ruling from the trial court on 

the objection, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal.” 

(Bussard v. Minimed, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 798, 801, fn. 1.) 
7

order enforcing the release, an order requiring Michelle to comply 

with the release and dismiss the civil lawsuit, a finding that the 

family law court retains jurisdiction over Michelle’s claims 

related to Hand Air Express, LLC, a finding that Jeffery was the 

prevailing party in “this enforcement proceeding,” and an order 

permitting Jeffery to withhold portions of two future equalization 

payments to satisfy the attorney fees and costs award. 

The family law court, through Judge Kathleen O. Diesman, 

ruled as follows: “Insufficient showing of exigent circumstances. 

No authority to dismiss or order dismissal of a civil action. 

Set on regular calendar for hearing through clerk’s office.” 

The hearing was then set on the family law court’s regular 

calendar for July 25, 2016. It was subsequently continued 

to November 2, 2016, February 8, 2017, and finally to 

April 19, 2017. We recount those portions of the hearings 

relevant to this appeal in Subsection C, below.

In the meantime, also in response to Michelle’s civil 

lawsuit, Jeffery, Shantal, and Hand Air Express, LLC engaged 

Rutan & Tucker, LLP (Rutan), which filed a demurrer on 

June 9, 2016 on their behalf in the Orange County civil law court. 

Jeffery, Shantal, and Hand Air Express, LLC argued that the 

civil law court lacked jurisdiction because the family law court’s 

jurisdiction had already been invoked and, further, Michelle 

waived the claims she asserted in her civil complaint by agreeing 

to paragraph 10.1(15) of the stipulated judgment. 

On September 14, 2016, the civil law court sustained the 

demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the family law matters asserted in the civil 

lawsuit with no possibility of successful amendment, citing 

Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22 (Neal), 
8

Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1146 

(Rubenstein), and Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824, 834

(Kuehn). The Orange County court’s ruling did not provide an 

explanation of those cases, but we note that they state that 

“family law cases should not be allowed to spill over into civil 

law” (Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 25), and that where a 

family law judgment is procured by fraud, a tort remedy is 

unavailable (Rubenstein, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146; 

Kuehn, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 834). 

On October 13, 2016, the Orange County civil court entered 

judgment against Michelle dismissing her complaint and 

awarding $1,412.70 in costs to Jeffery, Shantal, and Hand Air 

Express, LLC pursuant to their memorandum of costs for 

their civil law counsel’s work.3 On January 19, 2017, the 

Orange County civil law court denied Michelle’s motion for leave 

to file a first amended complaint for the following reasons: “[T]he 

gravamen of the proposed First Amended Complaint is still the 

fraudulent conveyance of community property. As ruled in 

connection with the prior demurrer to the complaint, such 

matters are for the Family Law Court to decide, and this court 

has no jurisdiction to hear the matter.”4 The appellate record 

does not indicate that Michelle appealed that judgment.

 

3 The memorandum of costs is not in the appellate record. 

Additionally, the record does not disclose whether Jeffery, 

Shantal, and/or Hand Air Express, LLC sought, or were awarded 

attorney fees for the work of either Rutan or Meyer Olson in the 

Orange County civil court. 

4 We observe that it is unclear why the Orange County 

civil law court considered Michelle’s motion for leave to amend 

after judgment was entered in light of its earlier ruling 
9

Also in the meantime, in the family law court, the parties 

engaged in a dispute over Michelle’s failure to appear for a 

deposition multiple times and a related sanctions request. 

Judge Richard J. Burdge, imposed a $15,000 sanction against 

Michelle for discovery abuse. Further, Michelle unsuccessfully 

moved to disqualify Meyer Olson and was sanctioned $8,500 for 

doing so under Family Code section 271. 

Additionally, Michelle filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 

which case was eventually dismissed for failing to file the 

required schedules. Michelle also filed an adversary suit in the 

bankruptcy court against Meyer Olson, which it moved to 

dismiss. The record does not disclose the outcome of that motion 

to dismiss, but, in any event, neither party specifically addresses 

it with respect to the attorney fees issues raised in this appeal. 

C. The Family Law Court Awarded Jeffery $90,000 In 

Attorney Fees And Costs Under The Stipulated 

Judgment, Citing Civil Code Section 1717

On February 8, 2017, the parties returned to the family law 

court to proceed on Jeffery’s request for an award of fees incurred 

to Meyer Olson only. At that hearing, the family law court, 

through Judge Burdge, requested additional briefing on Jeffery’s 

entitlement to attorney fees under paragraph 18.3 of the 

stipulated judgment, a breakdown of fees incurred and covered by 

the stipulated judgment, and whether Jeffery could be deemed a 

prevailing party in light of what the family law court described as 

the civil lawsuit’s becoming moot. 

 

sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and judgment of 

dismissal.
10

On March 27, 2017 and April 5, 2017, Jeffery and Michelle, 

respectively, filed the requested additional briefing. In his 

additional briefing, Jeffery argued that he was entitled to an 

award of attorney fees and costs under the stipulated judgment’s 

attorney fees provision, which he characterized as “extremely 

broad.” He argued that he was the prevailing party in the civil 

action, and because the civil action violated the stipulated 

judgment, he was also the prevailing party in this family law 

proceeding. He further argued that his family law counsel were 

forced to file the request for order to seek court intervention to 

confirm the family law court’s continuing jurisdiction and enforce 

Michelle’s release that was memorialized in paragraph 10.1(15) 

of the stipulated judgment. Jeffery did not expressly cite Civil 

Code section 1717, which governs an attorney fees award “[i]n 

any action on a contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

Jeffery next argued, “[i]n addition to the foregoing,” 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 authorized the family law 

court to award attorney fees as costs (id., subd. (b)) and 

determine the prevailing party where a party recovers something 

other than monetary relief (id., subd. (a)(4)). He also cited 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10) as 

allowing attorney fees as costs under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1032 when authorized by contract, statute, or law. 

Finally, Jeffery asserted alternatively that he should be 

awarded attorney fees and costs as a sanction under Family Code 

section 271. 

Although Jeffery sought fees only for Meyer Olson’s work, 

Jeffery’s additional briefing included his, attorney Meyer’s, and 

his Rutan attorney’s declarations, with their respective 

timekeeping and billing records appended as exhibits. As for 
11

Meyer Olson, it represented that Jeffery incurred $90,231.11 in 

attorney fees and costs, and that those charges were reasonably 

necessary to represent him. An exhibit attached to attorney 

Meyer’s declaration summarized the attorney fees charged by the 

firm, which totaled $89,560.50. Attorney Meyer charged $800 per 

hour for 54.9 hours’ work; attorney LaMolinara, $400 per hour for 

106.3 hours’ work; attorney Herrington, $215 per hour for 0.4 

hours’ work; attorney Dickerson, $195 per hour for 9.1 hours’ 

work; and a law clerk, $120 per hour for 10.5 hours’ work. Tasks 

included document review, legal research, interoffice memoranda, 

communication and conferences, the ex parte application, and 

court appearances. The exhibit also summarized costs including 

filing fees, transcript, court parking, legal research, and 

photocopying, totaling $670.61.5 

In opposition, Michelle filed a declaration and 

memorandum of points and authorities. She asserted that 

Jeffery’s request should be denied because Meyer Olson did not 

represent Jeffery in the Orange County civil lawsuit. She also 

asserted in a single-paragraph sentence, “there is nothing to be 

enforced; as such there CANNOT be a prevailing party.” She 

further asserted that the family law court did not have exclusive 

jurisdiction because the dissolution action was disposed of by 

final judgment. Michelle cited Civil Code section 1717 for the 

proposition that the trial court may find no prevailing party for 

fees purposes. She characterized Jeffery’s request as a “head 

 

5 Michelle did not challenge any costs below or in this 

appeal. Accordingly, we do not address the costs portion of the 

award.
12

scratcher” and speculated that it “is grounded upon greed for 

money unnecessarily spent.”6 

She further contended that Jeffery “was being doubled [sic] 

billed by two separate Law Firms for the same legal services,” 

Meyer Olson was not counsel of record in the civil lawsuit, and 

the dissolution judgment’s attorney fees provision did not apply 

to fees Jeffery paid to Rutan. Regarding Meyer Olson’s hourly 

rates, Michelle stated, “$800.00 may be a new gold standard 

hourly rate for family law practitioners in Los Angeles, but 

whatever is a fair hourly rate, is a side issue here.” She, 

however, proffered no evidence to support that assertion. Finally, 

she asserted that Jeffery was not forced to seek court 

intervention to enforce the stipulated judgment because Rutan 

represented him well in the Orange County court. 

Michelle filed an additional supplemental brief. 

Addressing attorney Meyer’s declaration, Michelle commented 

that the family and civil law courts made no finding that Jeffery 

prevailed on his request for order for attorney fees for the reason 

that attorney Meyer claimed, which Michelle summarized as, 

“the Civil Court’s ruling was tantamount to the Family Law 

Court finding that it in fact retained continuing jurisdiction.” 

Michelle asserted that Meyer Olson’s work lacked “any 

reasonable necessity for the prompt, proper and effective 

representation of Jeffery in the civil action.” Michelle also 

commented on the Rutan attorney’s declaration, concluding, 

without explanation, that, between his family and civil law 

 

6 Because Jeffery did not seek fees or costs under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, we do not address 

Michelle’s contentions that section 128.7 would not support 

the award of fees and costs against her.
13

counsel, Jeffery was billed $150,000 for the demurrer. Michelle 

stated that “[i]n reality,” Rutan billed Jeffery only $8,337.50, and 

that amount would be a reasonable attorney fees award. 

Michelle asserted that Meyer Olson’s bills were excessive 

because multiple attorneys worked on the case. Michelle did not, 

however, identify any duplicative tasks. She then asserted that 

Family Code sections 271 (authorizing a sanction for conduct 

that frustrates settlement of a family law dispute) and 2030 

(authorizing fee shifting to ensure that each party has access 

to legal representation in dissolution proceedings) were 

inapplicable. Finally, she asserted that neither party prevailed, 

but she provided no supporting legal analysis. 

At the April 19, 2017 hearing, the family law court, through 

Judge Burdge, announced its tentative ruling to award Jeffery 

$90,000 in attorney fees under paragraph 18.3 of the stipulated 

judgment and Civil Code section 1717. The family law court 

concluded that the civil action was arguably contrary to the 

stipulated judgment, and therefore it was reasonable for Jeffery 

to seek to enforce the stipulated judgment and file the ex parte 

application at the outset of the civil lawsuit “to try to stop the 

bleeding before it started.” It further found Jeffery was 

successful in thwarting what it characterized as Michelle’s 

“attack on the finality of the [stipulated] judgment.” 

The family law court commented that Meyer Olson’s hourly 

rates were high but “within the range of rates charged by firms of 

this capacity in this area.” It stated that it had reviewed all the 

bills and $90,000 did not cover them all. The family law court 

also noted that although multiple Meyer Olson attorneys were 

engaged, Jeffery’s fees request ameliorated potential excessive 
14

billing by, for example, omitting charges for attorneys attending 

the same conferences. 

The family law court further noted that Michelle’s 

opposition papers included “a lot of ad hominem attacks as to 

whether [the amount of Jeffery’s request] was appropriate . . . but 

there was no specific challenge to either any particular activity or 

any particular billing charged . . . . It was just complained about, 

the cost of the whole charge.” 

Michelle’s counsel asked whether the award was being 

made under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; the family law 

court stated that it was making the order under Civil Code 

section 1717. Michelle’s counsel also asked if the award included 

fees Rutan charged; the court stated that it did not. Michelle’s 

counsel asked if the award included Meyer Olson’s charges for 

reviewing the demurrer and attending hearings in the civil 

lawsuit; the court responded in the affirmative, stating that the 

charges were reasonable. Finally, Michelle’s counsel referenced 

Family Code sections 271 and 2030, and Askew v. Askew (1994) 

22 Cal.App.4th 942 (Askew) (after the family law court acquires 

jurisdiction to divide community property in a dissolution action, 

no other trial court department may make an order adversely 

affecting that division); the court responded that the award was 

not being made under Family Code section 271 or 2030. 

On June 20, 2017, the family law court entered the 

following order: “Pursuant to Civil Code, §1717, and in 

accordance with the prevailing party fee provision set forth in the 

Parties’ Judgment, the Court hereby grants a Judgment for 

attorney’s fees and costs against Petitioner [Michelle] in favor of 

Respondent [Jeffery] in the sum of NINETY THOUSAND 

DOLLARS ($90,000).” (Underscoring and fn. omitted.) 
15

The order also stated the following findings: Jeffery’s 

June 10, 2016 ex parte application was a reasonable attempt to 

enforce the stipulated judgment, the charges for Jeffery’s family 

law counsel to attend hearings in the civil lawsuit were 

reasonable, Jeffery was successful and the prevailing party, and 

Meyer Olson’s hourly rates were reasonable. Michelle timely 

appealed this order. (P R Burke Corp. v. Victor Valley 

Wastewater Reclamation Authority (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1047, 

1053 (P R Burke Corp.) [post judgment order awarding attorney 

fees is separately appealable].)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘[A] determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee 

award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.’ ” (Mountain 

Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 

744, 751 (Mountain Air).) “[T]he reviewing court will examine 

the applicable . . . provisions of the contract” “to determine 

whether an award of attorney fees is warranted under a 

contractual attorney fees provision.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., 

Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) 

“We review the trial court’s prevailing party determination 

for an abuse of discretion.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2016) 

248 Cal.App.4th 504, 516.) A “trial court decision on 

the . . . amount of . . . attorney fees to be awarded” is also 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th 

at p. 751.) “ ‘ “An abuse of discretion occurs if, in light of the 

applicable law and considering all of the relevant circumstances, 

the court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a 

miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] This standard of review 

affords considerable deference to the trial court provided that the 

court acted in accordance with the governing rules of law. We 
16

presume that the court properly applied the law and acted 

within its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows 

otherwise.” ’ ” (Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 329, 378 [in context of statutory attorney fees 

award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5].)

DISCUSSION

A. The Parties’ Stipulated Judgment Supports The 

Attorney Fees Award Because It Contains A Broadly 

Phrased Attorney Fees Provision, And The Litigation 

Surrounding Michelle’s Civil Lawsuit Falls Within 

Its Scope

“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by 

statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and 

counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of 

the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) In the case of a 

contractual attorney fees provision, as here, “any inquiry begins 

with the language of the attorney fees provision itself.” 

(Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 760.)

“ ‘[I]n construing a contract the court’s function is not 

merely to import all of the possible definitions or even the 

broadest definition, but to glean the meaning of the words from 

the context and usage of the words in the contract itself.’ ” 

(Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 755, italics omitted.) “Thus, 

if the facts . . . warrant it, courts ‘should consider the pleaded 

theories of recovery, the theories asserted and the evidence 

produced at trial, if any, and also any additional evidence 

submitted on the motion in order to identify the legal basis of the 

prevailing party’s recovery.’ ” (Id. at pp. 760-761.) The approach 

should not be “overly formalistic.” (Id. at p. 760.) 
17

With these principles in mind, we also observe that “[t]he 

words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and 

popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal 

meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or 

unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case 

the latter must be followed” (Civ. Code, § 1644), and “[t]he whole 

of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every 

part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret 

the other” (id., § 1641).

Here, the parties’ attorney fees clause states: “If any Party 

is forced to seek Court intervention to enforce any provision of 

this Stipulated Further Judgment, the prevailing Party shall be 

entitled to all of her or his reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred in connection therewith.” 

The parties dispute whether “Court intervention” is limited 

to the family law court. Although “Court” is capitalized, it is not 

expressly defined in the stipulated judgment. In context, “forced 

to seek Court intervention” is modified by “to enforce any 

provision of this Stipulated Further Judgment.” The party 

opposing the relief sought in a court other than the Los Angeles 

family law court would need to bring a defense in that other 

court. Thus, we conclude that the parties did not intend to limit 

“Court intervention” to the Los Angeles family law court, 

especially given the stipulated judgment’s continuing jurisdiction 

provision which Jeffery sought to enforce.7

 

7 Michelle also asserts the term “ ‘court intervention’ refers 

solely to a Family Law court” because Jeffery has “steadfastly 

argued [that the family law court] was the only court with 

jurisdiction to hear any matter arising out of the Stipulated 

Further Judgment.” Michelle fails to support her interpretation 
18

We acknowledge that the stipulated judgment refers to “the 

Court” in stating factual findings. For example, paragraph 

15.2(3) states, “The Court finds that no sums of child support are 

presently due.” In that context, “the Court” obviously means the 

family law court because no other court was making factual 

findings throughout the parties’ dissolution action. The attorney 

fees provision, however, appears in a different context as 

described above. Additionally, it is phrased as “Court,” not “the 

Court.” The definite article “the” particularizes “Court” to mean 

the family law court. By omitting the word “the” before “Court” 

in the attorney fees provision, the parties expressed their intent 

that the term “Court” refer more broadly to any court.

Even if the term “Court intervention” were limited to the 

family law court, “in connection therewith” expands that term’s 

scope. “In connection therewith” modifies the fees and costs 

authorized by the fees provision. The fees and costs are 

recoverable where incurred to enforce the stipulated judgment. 

Thus, so long as the fees and costs were incurred to enforce the 

stipulated judgment, or in connection therewith, they are 

recoverable regardless of in which court they were incurred.

Concerning “forced to seek,” by bringing a lawsuit, Michelle 

required Jeffery to participate in the Orange County civil court 

proceedings. Jeffery’s only alternative was to decline to 

participate and default. If the only choice is to default, then 

 

with citation to authority or the record and therefore fails to meet 

her burden on appeal. (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 

647, 655-656 (Keyes).) As noted above, we disagree with her 

argument based on the language in the attorney fees provision, 

its context within the stipulated agreement, and principles of 

contract interpretation. 
19

mounting a defense instead constitutes being “forced to seek 

court intervention.”

Turning to the language “enforce any provision of this 

Stipulated Further Judgment,” the stipulated judgment provided 

that the family law court retained jurisdiction to enforce its 

terms. Michelle cannot evade that continuing jurisdiction by 

casting her claims as torts. (See Neal, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 25 [granting writ directing trial court to sustain demurrer 

and stating that “family law cases should not be allowed to spill 

over into civil law, regardless of whether the family law matter 

may be characterized as an action for fraud (Askew[, supra, 

22 Cal.App.4th 942]), malicious prosecution (Bidna[ v. Rosen

(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27]), or securities law violation (D’Elia[ v. 

D’Elia (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 415]). Almost all events in family 

law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant 

wants to be creative with various causes of action.”].)

Michelle brought a civil action in Orange County Superior 

Court asserting fraud, fraudulent transfer, and breach of A.P. 

Express, LLC’s operating agreement based on an allegation that 

Jeffery was attempting to reduce Michelle’s “share of the former 

community estate” with “[t]he end result . . . that 

Michelle . . . received substantially less from the marital 

settlement agreement.” Michelle asserted the two fraud claims 

against Jeffery, Shantal, and Hand Air Express, LLC. She 

asserted the breach of contract claim against Jeffery.

To the extent Michelle’s claims in the Orange County civil 

case concerned the circumstances surrounding the stipulated 

judgment’s formation or efforts by Jeffery and other parties to 

defeat the stipulated judgment’s allocation of properties 

addressed in that judgment, Michelle was required to bring those 
20

claims in the family law court in Los Angeles. When she chose 

the Orange County civil forum instead, she violated the 

continuing jurisdiction provision in the stipulated judgment. 

Jeffery’s defense of the Orange County civil litigation was thus 

necessary to enforce that jurisdiction provision.

Michelle asserts that the term “enforce” excludes tort 

claims, and that Jeffery’s demurrer to her civil complaint did not 

“directly” seek to enforce the stipulated judgment. Michelle’s 

contention lacks merit because even if arguendo the demurrer 

were an “indirect” enforcement effort, the “in connection 

therewith” language brings the demurrer proceedings within 

the fee provision’s scope. (See Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th

at p. 757 [describing the similar term “ ‘in connection with’ ” as 

broad and observing that it “has been interpreted to extend to 

both contract and tort claims in a contractual attorney fees 

provision”].) 

In support of her assertion that the attorney fees provision 

excludes tort claims, Michelle cites Exxess Electronixx v. Heger 

Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698. There, the appellate 

court concluded that tort claims for constructive fraud and breach 

of fiduciary duty were excluded under the following attorney fees 

provision, reasoning that those claims were not brought to 

“enforce” the commercial lease in which the fees provision 

appeared: “If any Party or Broker brings an action or proceeding 

to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder, the 

Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) or Broker in any such 

proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to 

reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Id. at pp. 702-703, 709.) This 

provision is distinguishable from the one here because it lacks 

the broadening terms “forced to seek Court intervention” and “in 
21

connection therewith,” which encompass attorney fees and costs 

incurred in the service of enforcing the stipulated judgment.

In sum, the family law court did not err in interpreting the 

attorney fees provision to encompass Jeffery’s requested fees and 

costs. We thus turn to whether the family law court abused its 

discretion in deeming Jeffery the prevailing party.

B. The Family Law Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 

In Deeming Jeffery The Prevailing Party Because He

Achieved His Litigation Objectives By Obtaining A 

Judgment Of Dismissal Against Michelle’s Civil 

Lawsuit, Thereby Enforcing The Stipulated 

Judgment’s Jurisdiction Clause

Jeffery argues that the second sentence of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) provides the applicable 

standard for determining the prevailing party. The family law 

court applied Civil Code section 1717. We do not have to decide 

which of these provisions governs the dispute here because both 

statutes define prevailing party in terms of overall litigation 

success and recognize that equitable principles inform this 

determination. We conclude that the family law court did not err 

in finding that Jeffery had achieved overall litigation success. 

(Sears v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1156 (Sears) 

[although the two statutes “are not identical in their language 

and therefore differ in application,” “where there is evidence of 

other success [other than the greatest net monetary 

recovery], . . . the court is entitled to take such recovery into 

account when calculating which side prevailed. This should be 

true under Civil Code section 1717 as well as under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1032.”].)
22

Civil Code section 1717 states that “the party prevailing on 

the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in 

the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).)

“ ‘[I]n deciding whether there is a “party prevailing on the 

contract,” the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the 

contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on those same 

claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the 

pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources. 

The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final 

resolution of the contract claims and only by “a comparison of the 

extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed 

in its contentions.” ’ ” (Roberts v. Packard, Packard & Johnson

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 822, 834, italics omitted.) “ ‘[I]n 

determining litigation success, courts should respect substance 

rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by 

“equitable considerations.” For example, a party who is denied 

direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a 

prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise 

achieved its main litigation objective.’ ” (Maynard v. BTI Group, 

Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 992, italics omitted (Maynard).)

Code of Civil Procedure “[s]ection 1032, subdivision (b) 

provides that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by 

statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to 

recover costs in any action or proceeding’ and [Code of Civil 

Procedure] section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A) provides 

that allowable costs include attorney fees ‘when authorized 

by . . . [¶] . . . Contract.’ ” (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 994.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, 

subdivision (a)(4) defines prevailing party as “the party with a 

net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is 
23

entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant 

obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs 

who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” The 

second sentence of this subdivision, which Jeffery relies upon, 

states, “If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in

situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be 

as determined by the court . . . .” (Ibid.) The inquiry under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 is fact intensive and 

authorizes the trial court “to consider all factors which may 

reasonably be considered to indicate success in the litigation.” 

(Sears, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.)

Here, Jeffery obtained a judgment of dismissal against 

Michelle’s civil lawsuit and defeated her subsequent attempt to 

seek leave to amend her defective complaint. Especially given 

Jeffery’s letters to Michelle demanding that she dismiss her civil 

lawsuit, clearly Jeffery obtained his litigation objective of 

defeating Michelle’s attack on the stipulated judgment. 

Therefore, Jeffery achieved his litigation objectives and was 

the prevailing party under either Civil Code section 1717 or 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.

In her appellate briefing, Michelle makes several 

assertions. We address each in turn.

Michelle asserts that the family law court never 

determined the prevailing party at the February 8, 2017 or 

April 19, 2017 hearings. Michelle appeals from a written order, 

and it is the prevailing party finding made in that order which is 

controlling regardless of what was stated or unstated at the

hearings. (See P R Burke Corp., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1053.) The order states that Jeffery was the prevailing 
24

party. Additionally, at the April 19, 2017 hearing, the family law 

court stated that Jeffery “was successful in the litigation.” 

Michelle asserts that the family law court did not 

determine which party recovered greater relief. This contention 

relies upon an incomplete view of the relevant standard. As set 

forth above, the determination of which party obtained greater 

relief is made “in the sense of most accomplishing its litigation 

objectives.” (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.)

Michelle asserts that Jeffery was not the prevailing party 

because he did not obtain all the particularized items of relief he 

requested from the family court in his request for orders 

(1) staying his support obligation, (2) offsetting his equalization 

payment obligation, and (3) requiring Michelle to comply with the 

release and dismiss her civil lawsuit, as well as his request for a 

finding that the family law court retains jurisdiction. Michelle 

further asserts that she was the prevailing party because she 

defeated Jeffery’s June 10, 2016 ex parte request for order (which 

contained the request for attorney fees, was continued, and 

ultimately heard by Judge Burdge), and the family law court 

denied his ex parte application on the ground that it lacked 

authority to dismiss or order Michelle to dismiss her civil lawsuit. 

Michelle also asserts that with her civil lawsuit dismissed, there 

was no need for Jeffery to seek to enforce the stipulated 

judgment, rendering moot the relief Jeffery initially sought in his 

ex parte application and depriving Jeffery of prevailing party 

status. 

Michelle’s arguments are formalistic. It was only because 

she improperly brought her claims in the Orange County civil 

court instead of the Los Angeles family law court that both courts 

struggled with their power to tell the other how to proceed. 
25

Viewed for what it was, Michelle’s civil lawsuit was an end run 

against the continuing family court jurisdiction provided in the 

stipulated judgment. Jeffery thus sought a ruling from the 

family law court to recognize that court’s continuing jurisdiction, 

and simultaneously was forced to defend against Michelle’s 

claims in the Orange County civil court by demurring to those 

claims on that same jurisdictional basis. (Cf. Neal, supra, 

90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 26-27 [“[B]ecause of the inextricable 

connection between [respondent]’s supposedly civil causes of 

action and the family law case (this case is merely family law 

waged by other means), we direct the family law court to make 

an appropriate attorney fee award [pursuant to Family Code 

section 271] in [petitioner]’s favor for having been dragged 

through this unnecessary excursion in the civil court.”].)

Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2007) 

148 Cal.App.4th 249 (Zuehlsdorf) is instructive where the relief a 

party initially sought became moot, but that party could 

nevertheless be the prevailing party if it achieved overall 

litigation success. In Zuehlsdorf, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a 

school district from preventing his daughter from joining a school 

soccer team. (Id. at p. 252.) The plaintiff obtained a preliminary 

injunction. (Id. at pp. 253-254.) The school district complied 

with the preliminary injunction, and by the time of trial on the 

plaintiff ’s request for a permanent injunction, the soccer season 

had ended. (Id. at p. 254.) Thus, the trial court denied the 

plaintiff ’s request for a permanent injunction as moot. (Ibid.) 

Nevertheless, “this did not deprive [the plaintiff] of prevailing 

party status entitling him to [attorney] fees [because h]e was 

successful in his attempt to have [his daughter] reinstated in the 
26

program while [the school district] failed in [its] efforts to prevent 

her participation.” (Id. at p. 257.) 

Similarly here, the dismissal of Michelle’s civil lawsuit 

obviated Jeffery’s pending request for an order from the family 

law court requiring Michelle to comply with the release and 

dismiss her civil lawsuit, and for a finding that the family law 

court retained jurisdiction. The family law court thus did not 

abuse its discretion in deeming Jeffery the prevailing party 

because he achieved his overall litigation objective by obtaining a 

judgment of dismissal against Michelle’s civil lawsuit in 

recognition of the family law court’s continuing jurisdiction under 

the stipulated judgment.

In sum, the family law court did not abuse its discretion in 

deeming Jeffery the prevailing party.

C. The Family Law Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 

In Awarding Jeffery $90,000

Attorney fees are determined under the lodestar method, 

“ ‘ “calculated by first multiplying the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate 

of compensation.” ’ ” (Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP v. Lujan (2015) 

234 Cal.App.4th 608, 619.) “ ‘ “ ‘The “experienced trial judge is 

the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in 

[the] court, and while [the trial judge’s] judgment is of course 

subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate 

court is convinced that it is clearly wrong”—meaning that it 

abused its discretion.’ ” [Citations.]’ Indeed, . . . the ‘only proper 

basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the 

amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience 

and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the 

determination.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 620.) “The party opposing 
27

the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it 

considers objectionable.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development 

Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)

Here, Jeffery’s fees and costs request was supported by his 

attorneys’ detailed declarations, which included timesheets and 

billing records. For each attorney, the records displayed an 

hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours spent, consistent 

with a lodestar analysis. As set forth above, Meyer Olson’s 

hourly rates ranged from $120 to $800 for a total of 181.2 hours’ 

work. Costs totaled $670.61. The family law court found that 

Jeffrey’s attorneys’ hourly rates “are within the range of rates 

charged by firms of this capacity in this area.” The family law 

court noted that the rates “are higher than many, but they aren’t 

higher than everyone. There are a number of firms that charge 

similar rates, and I think the work was justified.” Michelle 

proffered no contrary evidence.

Jeffery’s family law counsel, moreover, excluded fees 

incurred in connection with his request for discovery sanctions 

and Michelle’s motion to disqualify Jeffery’s family law counsel. 

The family law court expressly awarded no fees based on Jeffery’s 

civil law counsel’s work. It also “noted that there were a number 

of times when counsel didn’t charge for certain activities, for like, 

if there were conferences with two people, he charged for one, and 

no charge for the other.” Michelle did not challenge any specific 

charge.

Thus, the family law court found that Jeffery’s family law 

attorneys’ hourly rates were reasonable and within the range 

charged by similarly situated firms, and their work was justified. 

To paraphrase Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc.

(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, the family law court judge “was in the 
28

best position to determine that, a determination within his 

discretion. [Citations.] We can reverse only if [Michelle] 

establishes an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] [She] has 

not.” (Id. at p. 1177.)

In her appellate papers, Michelle makes several assertions 

that she did not raise below. Accordingly, she forfeited those 

contentions. (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 

4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997 [“ ‘As a general rule, theories not raised in 

the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; 

appealing parties must adhere to the theory (or theories) on 

which their cases were tried.’ ”].) Even if we considered 

Michelle’s assertions, they lack merit.

Michelle first asserts that the family law court abused its 

discretion by failing to apportion “between . . . ‘enforcement of 

judgment’ and the ‘legal services’ extended to the Orange County 

civil action.” Michelle does not define her quoted terms, and we 

fail to see the distinction she posits, especially given the 

stipulated judgment’s authorizing fees for work performed “in 

connection [ ] with” enforcing the judgment as we have explained 

above. Jeffery’s family law counsel’s participation in the civil 

lawsuit is within the scope of that provision.

Second, Michelle asserts that fees could not have been 

incurred after September 15, 2016 when the civil action was 

dismissed. The record showing that the parties continued to 

litigate after that date contradicts Michelle’s assertion. For 

example, the civil law court denied Michelle’s motion for leave to 

amend on January 19, 2017. Also, the parties appeared at family 

law court hearings on Jeffery’s request for order for fees and costs 

on February 8, 2017 and April 19, 2017, and filed supplemental 

briefing on March 27, 2017 and April 5, 2017. Michelle 
29

articulates no reason why awarding fees for these proceedings 

was an abuse of discretion.

Third, Michelle asserts that the majority of fees billed 

from October 3, 2016 through February 25, 2017 was related 

to motions to disqualify Jeffery’s family law counsel and 

stay Dr. William Aiello’s deposition. In support, Michelle 

merely states that “[a] quick review of the . . . billing 

statement . . . shows” these facts and cites her family law court 

opposition brief. She does not, however, cite any particular 

timekeeping entries, rendering her showing insufficient. (See 

Keyes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 656 [“It is the appellant’s 

responsibility to support claims of error with citation and 

authority; this court is not obligated to perform that function on 

the appellant’s behalf.”].) We nevertheless reviewed the billing 

statements Michelle mentioned in her appellate opening brief, 

particularly Jeffery’s family law counsel’s billing statements from 

October 3, 2016 through February 24, 2017.8 We identified 

entries related to the motion to disqualify but none related to a 

motion to stay a deposition or anything concerning a Dr. Aiello. 

Michelle also does not explain the significance of Dr. Aiello’s 

deposition or its lack of relationship to enforcing the stipulated 

judgment. Additionally, Jeffery’s fees request expressly excluded 

fees incurred because of the motion to disqualify. 

 

8 Michelle’s record citation erroneously includes portions of 

her supplemental opposition brief filed below and omits the 

statement of account for charges incurred from February 3, 2017 

through February 24, 2017. We nevertheless reviewed the billing 

statements for the dates Michelle stated in her opening appellate 

brief.
30

Next, Michelle asserts “that the [family law] court 

mistakenly awarded the majority of the $90,000 to [Jeffery] for 

the June 10, 2016 exparte [sic] application that was flat out 

denied, and according to [Jeffery’s family law counsel]’s billing 

records, only the sum of $13,600.00 had been incurred at that 

time.” (Underline and bold omitted.) Michelle articulates no 

basis for her belief that that the family law court “awarded the 

majority of ” the fees for the ex parte application. She also does 

not cite the record to support her contention that Jeffery’s ex 

parte application was “flat out denied.”

Finally, Michelle states, “A $175,000 attorney bill for an 

11 [sic] page demurrer cannot be reasonable in the mind [of ] any 

reasonable practicing lawyer or competent court of law in the 

50 states throughout this nation.” Michelle cites no evidence in 

support of this conclusory statement, and does not address the 

lodestar calculation, which included tasks in addition to the 

demurrer. 

Overall, Michelle does not satisfy her burden of 

establishing that the family law court abused its discretion in 

awarding Jeffery $90,000.
31

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Jeffery is awarded his costs on 

appeal.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P.J.

CHANEY, J.
Filed 1/16/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHELLE A. PONT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JEFFERY D. PONT,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B284064

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD512209)

 CERTIFICATION AND

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed 

December 20, 2018, was not certified for publication in the 

Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment.

BENDIX, J. ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J.