July 1990 

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

Expanding Our Horizons 


FB 5-90-2 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Personal Viewpoint 

Sapper and Smoke Make a Perfect Mix 

Place chemical companies in engineer battalions? This possibly 

radical concept has merit--the chemical company must be 

placed in peacetime where it can best be trained and maintained with a clear battlefield-enhancer focus. 

By Lieutenant Colonel Herbert F. Harback 

To win on the battlefield requires that a maneuver 

commander synchronize his 

forces in a timely manner while 

remaining attuned to the basic 

tenets of war. Current command 

and control doctrine for today's 

front-line smoke and decontamination (decon) company, however, lacks a knowledge of how to 

train and maintain this combatmultiplying force for peacetime 

proficiency and wartime success. 

"Where does the smoke soldier 

and his combat chemical unit fit 

in?" and "How can the smoke company be best trained to provide a 

true tactical multiplier to the 

ground commander?" are timely 

questions the Army must answer. 

I believe the answer to both questions is the same. 

Schoolhouse View 

The chemical schoolhouse at 

Fort McClellan proposes that the 

division chemical officer, a nonprimary staff officer located 

within the bowels of the G-3 section, is to be the higher headquarters of the chemical company. 

This proposal will not allow a 

chemical and decontamination 

company to attain its highest 

potential as a multiplying force. 

"But the assistant division engineer (ADE) calls the shots on 

engineer assets," some might 

point out. Not true. The ADE is the 

assistant to the engineer battalion 

commander who, as a special staff 

officer and battalion commander, 

has a staff and is experienced in 

providing command and control to 

his companies. 

Although the chemical staff officer is the subject matter expert 

on technical issues, he is not in a 

position to provide the daily mentorship and direct coaching 

needed in the care and welfare of 

chemical soldiers and their 

families. Nor can he provide the 

equipment and training needed by 

the chemical company. Simply 

stated, when a chemical company 

is placed under a staff officer, the 

unit will never reach its required 

level of readiness. 

Support Approach 

A second approach to finding a 

home for the chemical company is 

to insert the unit in a supply and 

service structure. The division 

support command (DISCOM) has 

been the most common depository 

under this concept. At first glance 

this approach is appealing because DISCOM has well defined 

command and control assets. But 

a closer look shows that these assets have a logistical slant and a 

rear area support outlook. It is a 

strained affair at best because the 

two organizations lack a common 

mission essential task list (METL) 

training focus. 

The chemical company is a task 

force commander's combat multiplier and must be in a 

commander's hip pocket with the 

engineers and the fire support officer. If one believes that as we 

train (do our daily tasks within a 

certain structure), so will we fight, 

then the DISCOM solution ~ffers 

little long-term gain. 

Placing a smoke and decon company in a headquarters command 

(TDA type) is worse than placing it 

at DISCOM. This solution is a 

quick fix that leaves the combat 

chemical soldiers on the short end 

in battlefield tactics and wartime 

focus. Whether within a maintenance or supply battalion, or as 

a separate unit directly under a 

support brigade headquarters, the 

unit will find itself surrounded in 

a fog of mixed priorities, focus, and 

concern. 

Battlefield Focus 


Solution 


The solution to this dilemma is 

to properly define the role of the 

chemical company as an upfront 

battlefield enhancer. Then, match 

the company to a similar force that 

has an onboard staff capable of 

providing a command environment and training resources. This 

proposal is tactically sound, and it 

has been tried and found to be successful in caring for, training, 

maintaining, and leading combat 

chemical soldiers. 

(Continued on page 29) 
July 1990 Volume20 PB 5-90-2 

UNITED STATES ARMY FEATURES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 4 After the Storm: Military Engineers and Hurricane Hugo 

by Major Jeffrey R. Sommen/ille 

12 Beyond the Battlefield-The Other Dlmenslon of Military 

Servlce COMMANDERICOMMANDANT by Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch Major General Daniel R. Schroeder 


20 French Englneer Alternatives for National Service 


by Colonel Jean-Claude Verite 

MANAGING EDITOR 26 The Essayons Program: From Brainchild to Drawing Board 

Catherine Eubanks by Chester A. Kojro 

FEATURES EDlTOR 30 Solving the Task Force Engineer Time Crunch Phillip R. Howell, Jr. by Captain Daniel P. McKenrick 

GRAPHlC DESlGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 38 A British View on American ADSM 


by Major Alec A. Peebles 


46 Misplaced Compassion 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: by Colonel Ron Dabbieri 

CARL E. VUONO 

General, United States Amy 

Chief of Staff 

Official: DEPARTMENTS 

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN II Inside Front Cover: Personal Viewpoint 

Brigadier General, United States Army 2 Clear the Way 36 Engineer Solution 

3 Bridge the Gap 51 Lessons Learned 

24 Engineer Safety 53 Englneer Update 

Front cover photo by Sergeant Richard 29 Engineer Problem 57 Past in Review 

Creed, PAO, Panama 

ENGINEER (ISSN 004&19890) Is prepared quarterly by the U.S. Army En- of expertise. Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 

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Army engineers Informed of anent and emerging developments wlthin thelr areas Superintendent of Documents. 

Engineer 1 
By Major General Daniel R. Schroeder, 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

The past 12 months have seen exciting times at 

the Engineer Center! The Engineer School move was 

completed and we have graduated our first engineer 

officer basic and advance courses at Fort Leonard 

Wood. We now have all our engineer basic and advance leadership training colocated with our basic 

training. Now we have the opportunity to do shared 

training. 

In the future, battalion precommand course students will be able to put together a staff made up of 

advance and basic course officers and advance noncommissioned officer (NCO) course students. When 

the officer basic course students go to the field to 

conduct a field training exercise, basic NCO course 

students and basic trainees can be added to the field 

unit to build platoons. We will keep you informed on 

these exciting opportunities. 

Contingency operations are going to play an increasingly major role in the way we train and fight in 

the next decade. In these operations, we will have 

numerous opportunities to work with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and American, 

British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) partners. Almost everyone knows about our NATO agreements 

and who the partners are in this European-based organization. Not so with the ABCA agreements and 

our partnership in this organization. During the coming decade we may well find ourselves operating in 

this environment. 

In the ABCA arena, the armies look at standardization of equipment and doctrine in low- and midintensity conflicts. Considering the current world situation, one can surmise that we need to look at this 

area more closely. Current operations in the ABCA 

arena show how we are preparing to ensure compatibility. 

In March, your Engineer School participated in a 

project to write a Strike Operations Handbook for 

U.S. Army commanders operating in contingency 

operations. The draft of this manual should arrive in 

the field about the same time as this bulletin. It contains excellent guidance on how engineers will fit into 

these operations. 

2 Engineer 

AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) will be based around 

bfigade-sized combined arms task forces, which will 

be attached to divisional headquarters according to 

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available 

(METT-T). In future operations, we may well find ourselves adapting ALB-F to an ABCA multi-nation organization. In some cases, you may find engineer 

units from other ABCA member nations better organized and equipped to handle the sustainment part 

of the operation than we are. Therefore, you must be 

knowledgeable about these units and do a good 

METT-T, mission analysis, and estimate before task 

organizing engineers into the ABCA force. 

To help you become more knowledgeable about 

our companies fighting in the corps area, we are writing a field manual titled Combat Engineer Company 

Operations. A coordinating draft of this manual is 

scheduled for printing in the last quarter of this year. 

When we look at the continuum of engineer involvement in the levels of conflict, you see our missions increasing instead of decreasing. Engineers may be on 

the ground doing nation assistance missions when 

the situation suddenly intensifies into a low-intensity 

conflict. These engineers would then clear the way 

for the maneuver and support troops and units introduced into the battle area. Therefore, we must be 

well trained on our individual soldier and unit METL 

tasks to ensure we are ready when the time comes. 

We are currently writing a short-of-war field manual 

to provide guidance in this area; a draft manual is 

scheduled to be printed in the fourth quarter of 1990. 

In the past few years, we have seen contingency forces deployed on exercises such as Golden Pheasant, 

in Honduras, and most recently, operation Just Cause, 

in Panama. These joint deployments tested and 

validated our current doctrine and training. The soldiers 

performed in a superb manner and engineers were 

there. Feedback from the soldiers consistently said 

drills paid off and training at the combat training 

centers was great preparation. The challenge for each 

of us is to develop ourselves and our soldiers to be 

combat engineers trained to standards, who stay ready 

to deploy on the next contingency operation. 
BRIDGE THE GA 


By Command Sergeant Major W. E. Woodall 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

"Our leader development programs are some of 

the most important ways we maintain the quality 

force and are also our greatest legacy because they 

provide the leaders that will shape the Army of 

tomorrow." 

General Carl E. Vuono 

Chief of Staff, United States Army 

2 March 1990 

The noncommissioned officers' (NCO) role in training and caring for our soldiers has not changed, nor 

is it likely to. Just as they have always been, sergeants are our Army's first-line mentors, coaches, 

teachers, and role models. 

What has changed is the complexity of how these 

missions are accomplished. This is primarily due to 

the tremendous advances in technology and how 

those advances have changed the way our Army 

does business. Technology has provided our Army 

with more deadly weapons, more efficient equipment, 

better communications gear, and systems of personnel and supply accountability that were unimaginable 

when many of us were privates. All of these improvements have impacted on how units operate, and they 

require today's NCOs to have skills and knowledge 

that simply weren't needed in the past. 

The words "caring for soldiers" have also taken on 

a new meaning. Not too many years ago, a good portion of many units' soldiers lived in barracks and 

spent a lot of their free time in mess halls, snack 

bars, and day rooms. Today, more than half of the 

Army's enlisted force are married. The lives of our 

single soldiers have changed. They earn a fair living 

these days and can afford cars, Ns, and stereos. 

Soldiers, married and single, are free to come and go 

as they please in their free time. 

As leaders, we must be better attuned to these 

human dimensions and understand what these soldiers want and need. We need to understand things 

like child care, off-duty educational programs, employment opportunities for family members, and other 

quality of life issues. 

Although a lot of things have changed, NCOs are 

still charged with the same missions and responsibilities they had in the past. We must still set and 

enforce standards and provide our young soldiers 

with the role models many of them are seeking. We 

need to constantly work for self-improvement and increase our level of education so we can understand, 

explain, and execute the missions passed on from 

our commanders. 

All of these changes demand that sergeants be 

proficient in all leadership competencies. We must 

know and implement FM 22-100, which provides the 

framework for leader development. The programs this 

manual outlines provide a broad category of skills, 

knowledge, and traits necessary for good leadership 

at all levels. The manual gives us a good yardstick to 

measure ourselves and our subordinates against. As 

sergeants major and senior sergeants, we are the 

key to the professional growth of the NCO Corps, 

and we must not fail or do the job halfway. Future 

conflicts and wars will place sergeants in roles more 

challenging than ever. Sergeants may easily find 

themselves the sole leader present in many engagements. With little or no guidance, they must be able 

to take charge, make decisions, take risks, and carry 

out their commander's intent. 

Just as NCOs must continually prepare their soldiers for the demands of war, they must also 

prepare themselves. Today's sergeants must have a 

solid understanding of how the Army fights as a 

total force. Aside from having a handle on modern 

technology and understanding the enemy, NCOs 

must understand AirLand Battle doctrine and how 

their piece of the Army fits into the overall tactical 

picture. 

Today's NCO education system goes a long way 

toward ensuring that our sergeants are prepared to 

meet present missions. But, we must change with the 

times and adapt our schools and training to match 

the realities of our rapidly changing world. As our missions change during peacetime, so must we. 

In many ways we are the masters of our own destinies, and I challenge each of you to keep our NCOs 

strong and continue to improve the Corps. 

Engineer 3 
y Guard units called to 

to limit potential!d8btruc- themselves as best they could with "" 

tnguard of a military force 

3uld give South Carolina, hard- tion centerswere'activated. vehicles were.inspected and dis- ; 

eat hit by the hurricane, a head The National Guard anticipated ,i.!i,,:,patched, and squipmept,, wa,s , , , 
prepared and loaded for movement. Radio and television 

provided the soldiers with the 

latest information on the path of 

the storm, and by the afternoon of 

the 21st, it was predicted that the 

storm would arrive on the coast 

about midnight. Forecasters said 

the center of the storm would hit 

somewhere between Myrtle Beach 

and the historic city of Charleston. 

Advance Parties 

As meteorologists firmed up 

their estimates of Hugo's speed 

and course, plans were made for 

the movement of the engineer 

units. The 122nd Battalion had assembled at its armories in the 

western part of the state, more 

than 140 miles from the coast. The 

battalion was considered far 

enough inland to be safe, but too 

distant to allow quick reaction 

once the storm had passed. Tohelp 

speed the 122nd's movement into 

Charleston, the battalion moved 

advance parties closer to the coast. 

Their mission was to clear routes 

of storm debris so that the unit's 

main body could move quickly 

into Charleston early Friday 

morning. 

The situation was different for 

the 125th Engineer Company. 

Their armory in Bishopville put 

them 100 miles from Charleston, 

and 90 miles from the coast at 

Myrtle Beach. This position was 

considered far enough inland to be 

safe and near enough to the coast 

to afford quick reaction, so they 

remained at their home station 

during the storm. The unit was 

directed to move to Georgetown, 

midway between Charleston and 

Myrtle Beach, at first light Friday 

morning. 

The meteorologist's predictions 

for the time and place of the 

storm's landfall were accurate. 

What they did not foresee was a 

humcane that would gain in intensity as it approached the coast. 

This additional strength gave the 

storm a boost that would carry it 

much farther inland than was expected. The result was severe 

damage in many inland areas up 

to and beyond the North Carolina 

boundary. 

The engineers who moved into 

the area on the morning of September 22 were among the first 

witnesses to the destruction of the 

storm. As the soldiers neared the 

coast, their rate of march fell drastically as they encountered more 

and more fallen trees and other 

debris on the roadways. What 

would have been a 2-hour trip 

under normal circumstances became a 6-hour ordeal of clearing 

trees and removing rubble. Their 

paths into Charleston and Georgetown provided the first access 

into the cities for all other emergency and relief vehicles. 

Coastal Chaos 

On reaching the coast, the soldiers saw destruction caused by a 

force many times that of the 

atomic bombs of World War 11. 

Coastal houses were either 

smashed on their foundations or 

lifted up and floated away. Power 

lines were down everywhere, and 

utility poles listed dangerously out 

of plumb. Thousands of tons of 

sand had been moved inland and 

deposited by the storm tides, completely burying large sections of 

coastal road. In suburban communities away from the beach, 

trees were down everywhere, 

turning neighborhood blocks into 

massive abatis networks. The 

Francis Marion National Forest, 

formerly several hundred square 

miles of pine forest, was devastated by the storm. From the air, it 

appeared that some giant scythe 

had sliced through the forest, leaving the trees neatly on the ground 

like so many rows of corn. 

The first engineers arriving in 

coastal cities entered areas of 

mass destruction and confusion. 

They had arrived before local command and control was established. 

There was no communications 

network, the extent of damage 

was unknown, and work priorities 

had not been outlined. Cities were 

without power, water or sewage 

disposal. And the engineers did 

not know when their own support 

would be available, including fuel, 

rations, maintenance and medical 

assistance. 

But in the midst of this chaos, 

they quickly made some simple 

and sound decisions. Two engineer 

Myrlle Beach 

Engineer 6 
Commanders from the Reserve and Active Components conducted a joint 

planningsession on the evening of September 26. The meeting resulted in 

a decislon to divide the state into two areas of responsibility for military 

engineers (U.S. Army photo). 

companies made a quick survey of 

downtown Charleston and saw 

that just clearing roads was a 

necessary task that would 

demand several hundred squadhours of work. Using a road as a 

boundary to establish engineer 

work lines, their platoons went to 

work clearing lanes through the 

rubble. Later that day, municipal 

officials would activate emergency 

operations centers, and the 

military would set up their command posts. These operations 

centers would make a6ustments 

to the division of work and 

prioritize road clearance. But the 

decision of the two companies to 

start work on their own, before 

receiving specific orders, gave 

relief operations a big head start. 

Military Priorities 

South Carolina state officials established three categories of work 

for the Army, assigned priorities 

within each category, and-to 

their creditwavered very little 

from those priorities. The first and 

highest priority was to clear trees 

from power Lines and open access 

to powerline rights-of-way. Next 

came the opening of roads, with an 

initial single-lane clearing, and 

then the entire roadway. The third 

priority was debris removal. 

The governor's policy was that 

military units would work only on 

powerlines and roads, and that 

debris removal would be done by 

contract labor. Ironically, there 

were many times when it was 

necessary for the military to haul 

storm debris in order to accomplish their main missions. 

There were places, particularly in 

downtown Charleston, where the 

downed trees were so thick that 

crews had to haul away debris just 

to have room to work. 

The 122nd Battalion coped with 

the problem by organizing day and 

night work shifts. The day crews 

would cut and stack and the night 

crews would load, haul and dump. 

This allowed them to use their 

equipment around the clock, while 

restricting the most dangerous 

work (chainsaw operations) to 

daylight hours. 

The state assigned work to the 

military through its county emergency operations centers (EOCs). 

To draw a parallel with the Army's 

command/support termihology, 

the engineer units were attached 

to the state and put in direct support of a county. The state retained 

command of the units through the 

office of the Adjutant General. The 

state was responsible for their 

logistics support and allocated engineer companies to counties. 

Counties received support based 

on the availability of units, a declaration of the county as a disaster 

area, and a request for help from 

the county. Once allocated to a 

county, an engineer unit received 

its tasks and priorities from the 

county EOC. 

The system ran smoothly as 

long as counties assigned work 

from the state-mandated categories I and 11. Understandably, 

there was a temptation to assign 

engineers debris removal (category 111) work, and the counties 

made many such requests. In most 

cases, these had to be disapproved 

by the engineers. The lack of a 

clear understanding by local officials of the state-intended role of 

6 Engineer 
the Army engineers occasionally County boundaries continued to effort in a particular county had 

caused friction between the mili- be used to subdivide the state into been completed. This was espetary and local civilian authorities. company-sized areas of operation. cially important in NO North, 

where platoons often sat idle beReinforcements Arrive 

Hugo had sustained high winds 

all the way across the state, causing destruction over a wide area. 

Consequently, it took a long time 

for assessment teams to determine the extent of stom damage. 

On Monday, September 25, the 

governor decided to ask for help 

from the active Army. His request 

was made that evening, and within a matter of hours warning orders were being received by active 

duty engineer units in Georgia. 

The 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion and the 92nd Engineer 

Combat Battalion (Heavy) from 

Fort Stewart, and the 43rd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) 

from Fort Benning, underwent 

emergency deployment procedures the following morning. In 

addition to the line units, Fort 

Stewart sent its Victory Brigade, 

made up of combat support and 

combat service support units, into 

the state to support the engineers. 

The response of the active units 

was so rapid that they were able to 

start their movement east toward 

Charleston before the state planners knew where they wanted to 

put them. As a result, some units 

began moving before their destinations were known. 

Tuesday evening a joint planning session between Active and 

Reserve Component commanders 

was convened in Charleston. And 

once again, an engineer work line 

was used to give units their initial 

area objectives. In this case, the 

Sank River was used to divide 

the eastern half of the state into 

two sections, Area of Operations 

(AfO)North, and A10 South. NO 

South would remain the work area 

for the 122nd Engineer Battalion, 

while A10 North became the 

responsibility of the active units 

and the 125th Engineer Company. 

Inland Recon 

There was a major difference between the engineer work effort on 

the coast and that further inland. 

In contrast to the widespread 

destruction along the coast, 

damage to the inland counties was 

sporadic. As a result, units assigned to the interior of the state 

had to devote a great deal of their 

energy to reconnaissance. Again, 

to relate the situation in military 

terms, the inland work was not a 

great expanse of abatis, with 

single worksites that could swallow up a platoon-week. Instead, it 

was an indiscriminate series of 

point obstacles, spread over 

hundreds of square miles. A squad 

could work for an hour or two in 

one place and finish the job, and 

then need a frag order to tell the 

location of the next work site. 

Because of the reconnaissance 

requirement, engineers working 

the inland counties had a problem 

keeping their platoons busy. Other 

factors complicated their ability to 

work on storm damage. Powerlines could not be cleared until the 

area was declared safe for work 

crews. Unfortunately, the power 

companies did not have the manpower to escort engineer platoons 

to the various work sites in each 

county. The goal of power officials 

was to have every available 

lineman busy rehanging electric 

lines, and they were hard pressed 

to pull employees out to have them 

check lines. This constraint was 

another major difference between 

the coastal and inland work areas. 

The crews on the coast did not 

have to worry about hot lines because power had been shut off in 

their areas before the storm 

reached the coast. 

As work progressed, it became 

necessary to develop a procedure 

for determining when the military 

cause of delays in the reconnaissance process. Company commanders wanted to either get 

their platoons working or move 

them on to another county, but 

they had no authority to leave, 

The Guard had activated two 

brigade-level headquarters, one in 

NO North and the other in NO 

S'outh. These headquarters were 

responsible for allocating and 

monitoring engineer units among 

the counties in their area. They did 

not want to move a unit out of a 

county without assurance that all 

road clearing and powerline work 

had been completed. But, they had 

no way of knowing if the work had 

been completed without being 

notified by the county director. 

Predictably, the directors acted 

very much like an infantry task 

force S-3would react if asked if he 

would mind giving up a direct support engineer platoon. Directors 

were usually reluctant to give up 

an asset, even if powerline work 

appeared to have been completed. 

It was especially difficult for them 

to approve the release of military 

engineer support while significant 

amounts of storm debris remained 

piled along roads. And it was a 

rare county director who approved 

a release without attempting to 

get at least some debris removal 

work done. But state officials 

stuck to the established priorities, 

and every time a county requested 

exemption from the state priorities, the request was denied. 

Special Problems 

There were several sites along 

the coast where the category I1 

work of clearing and opening 

routes entailed tasks of a different 

nature than simply cutting and 

clearing windfall trees. The combination of wind, waves and tide 

had caused tremendous erosion in 

Engineer 7 
Soldlers from E Company, 3rd Engineer Combat Battallon, an Active Component unR from Fort Stewart, use a rlbbon bridge ferry to take South 

Cardlna National Guard troops to Sullivan's Island. Hugo had put the Ben 

Sawyer Bridge, in the background, out of commission (Photo by Jonas 

Jordan). 

some coastal areas. In one instance, a steel highway bridge had 

been removed from its abutments. 

The south end of Pawleys Island 

is not much more than a large, 

narrow sandbar high enough to 

stay dry during most high tides. 

But it was also home to several 

families. Besides destroying many 

of the homes on the island, the 

storm had played a particularly 

troublesome trick on the islanders. It had cut the island in 

half. As waters from the initial 

storm surge receded back across 

the island, a section of the island's 

asphalt road was washed out. The 

water then tore away a chunk of 

the island itself, undermining and 

overturning a house. After the 

surge retreated, there was a 

breach in the island about 10 feet 

deep and 30 feet wide. Depending 

on the tide. water flowed through 

this breach at a rate of seveFal 

hundred to several thousand cubic 

feet per second. 

Initially, it was thought that a 

bridge, culvert or cofferdam would 

be needed to close the breach, but 

the decision was made to try and 

plug the gap with sand. The 122nd 

Battalion was given the task. Two 

early attempts ended in failure as 

8 Engineer 

the heavy tide flow quickly erased 

any evidence that men and 

machines had been at work. The 

engineers marshalled their resolve and resources. Brick and 

stone rubble were piled next to the 

breach. This would be used later to 

form an erosion-resistant base at 

the bottom of the gap. A full day 

was also spent stockpiling sand on 

the shoulders of the breach. When 

low tide arrived, they were ready 

for their third assault on the island breach. 

Dozers working both sides of the 

breach first pushed in the rubble. 

Then the stockpiled sand was 

dozed into the breach as fast as the 

engineers could move it. The engineers worked their bulldozers 

continuously for 6 hours. Their 

dump trucks were kept running 

the length of the island, feeding 

more and more sand to the dozers. 

When the next high tide arrived, 

the engineers' hard-fought repair 

work held back the water and the 

island was joined together again. 

The Island Ferry 

The Isle of Palms and Sullivan's 

Island, two other coastal residential areas, were also isolated by 

the work of Hugo. Both islands 

had been connected to the Charleston suburb of Mt. Pleasant by 

the Ben Sawyer Bridge. The 

bridge was designed to allow ships 

through the navigation channel by 

rotating on a pedestal in the middle of the channel. Hugo had dislodged the abutments, rotated the 

bridge, then tipped the superstructure so that it slipped from its 

bearing on the center pedestal. 

One end of the bridge ended up in 

the channel, and the other end 

pointed skyward. The two islands 

serviced by the bridge faced longterm isolation and a bleak future. 

The islanders' plight was 

answered by E Company, a bridge 

unit from the 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion at Fort Stewart. The 

company had arrived in Charleston the day after the governor's 

call for Active Component assistance, and was task organized 

under the 122nd Battalion. 

After surveying the area, Echo 

Company leaders found that a 

launch ramp near the base of the 

Ben Sawyer Bridge provided an 

excellent access point. However 

the lack of a suitable abutment on 

the island side of the channel 

precluded construction of a bridge. 

An egress point was located further north on the island, and Echo 

Company soon had a ribbon bridge 

ferry in operation. The determination of who could use the ferry was 

handled by municipal authorities. 

This left the soldiers free to 

operate the rafk and contend with 

the problems of crossing non-tactical vehicles on ribbon bridge 

equipment. 

The Corps 

While soldiers of the Active and 

Reserve Components were working in the media spotlight, the 

third leg of the engineer triad was 

busy at work behind the scenes. 

The Charleston District of the 

Army Corps of Engineers played 
several key roles in the disaster 

relief operation, although very few 

of South Carolina's citizens were 

aware of their relief efforts. Much 

of their work was done from inside 

buildings and over the telephone, 

but they also performed duties on 

the highways and waterways. 

One of the Corps' first tasks was 

to activate and dispatch damage 

survey teams to inspect areas hit 

by the storm. These teams formed 

part of the federal government's 

reconnaissance effort that would 

lead to the declaration of federal 

disaster areas within the state. 

These teams included electrical 

engineers, who assessed the power 

supply damage, and structural engineers, who looked for damage to 

bridges. They also surveyed the 

problem of debris removal, providing a state-wide picture of the significant trash disposal problem. 

Contract negotiation was a critical and time-sensitive part of the 

Corps' relief contribution. While 

work was still being done to clear 

roads and restore power, a warning went out that an exceptionally 

high tide was due to arrive. The 

tide was expected to cause extensive damage in many coastal 

areas, unless artificial barriers 

could be constructed. With no time 

to waste, the Charleston District 

contracted with civilian companies for the construction of artificial dunes in the most vulnerable areas. Within a matter of 

days, the contract equipment was 

on site and piling sand. When the 

high tide arrived, the dunes were 

already in place, and the coast was 

protected. 

Perhaps the most visible work 

by the Charleston District was the 

restoration of the Ben Sawyer 

Bridge. District crews used barges, tugs and a crane to lift the 

bridge back onto its pedestal and 

realign it with its abutments. Two 

barges were positioned to serve as 

floating abutments, and steel 

bents were constructed on the barges. A third barge was used to support a crane. The crane lifted the 

low end of the bridge, allowing the 

superstructure to be placed onto 

the two floating abutments. The 

tugs were then used to maneuver 

the floating abutments until the 

bridge was realigned with the approaches. Although unable to 

rotate on its center pedestal, the 

bridge was back in operation 

within two weeks of the storm. 

Stand Down 

Deactivation of Guard units and 

release of the Active Component 

soldiers began during the second 

week of recovery. The first unit 

released was the 125th Engineer 

Company, the Guard unit from 

Bishopville. The unit was faced 

with a situation unique among all 

of the Army units assisting the 

relief efforts, and it was felt they 

deserved an early release. 

The 125th had been activated on 

September 21, just before the 

storm, and spent the night at their 

armory. At the time those orders 

were issued, it was believed that 

their home station of Bishopville 

and surrounding Lee County 

would not be significantly affected 

by the storm. But when they 

departed Bishopville the next 

morning, they left behind heavily 

damaged homes and property, and 

families that were stranded 

without power. 

Several days later, Lee County 

was added to the list of counties 

that were federal disaster areas, 

and on September 27, a company 

from the 43rd Engineer Battalion 

was assigned to Lee County to perform category I and I1 missions. 

The men of the 125th had left 

their homes without knowing 

whether their families were safe 

and their property secure. They 

went to work in neighboring communities to help fellow citizens, 

who in some respects were better 

off than their own families. But 

these soldiers followed their orders and made a personal sacrifice 

not often seen in a peacetime 

Army. 

By the end of the first week of 

October, all road and powerline 

work in the state had been completed, and units were either on 

their way home or planning to 

leave soon. All components of the 

Army had responded quickly to 

the emergency, and had worked 

together well to restore order to 

the stricken communities. 

Looking back at those few weeks 

of work in the wake of Hugo, a 

young training NCO from the 

South Carolina National Guard 

said, "This was the most real thing 

we have ever done ...we cut our 

way into this city and found out 

there was...no power, no water, no 

toilets, nothing. And nobody knew 

what was going on. The chaos and 

confusion that existed in this place 

during those first couple of days 

has got to be the closest we'll ever 

get to battlefield conditions ....But 

we got organized, we got busy, we 

got to work ...and we got things 

done." 

The men and women engineers 

who answered the call for help in 

the wake of Hurricane Hugo had 

worked selflessly to aid their own 

countrymen. And not only did they 

make a difference in the lives of 

thousands of fellow Americans, 

they gained experience that made 

them better soldiers. MI 

Major Sommerville is the Engineer Team Chief, Readiness 

Group, Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina. He previously served 

as a project manager for the 

Louiseville District of the 

Corps of Engineers. His other 

assignments include company 

commander, assistant S-3, and 

assistant division engineer in 

the 9th Infantry Division. 

Major Sommerville is a West 

Point graduate, and holds a 

masters degree in civil engineering from Washington 

State University. 

Engineer 9 
The Hugo Notebook: 


Lessons from a Hurricane 


Problem: Availability of Maps 

Discussion: The engineer relief effort was 

slowed because-of a shortage of maps. Additionally, the maps that were available did not provide 

the detail needed to support engineer relief 

operations. 

Recommendation: Each county should establish a supply of large-scale maps which can be 

given to relief organizations. An engineer company needs about 30 maps. The ideal county map 

would show all roads, location of all powerlines, 

--andhave an overprint of the UTM grid system. 

The ideal urban map, for towns with populations 

over 10,000, would show all streets and roads by . 

name. Each map would also show the location of 

all government buildings, including schools, armories, fire stations, court houses, etc. A map 

showing the entire power distribution network - (minus the drops to individual buildings) would be 

helpful for all engineer headquarters, from com- 

- pany level on up. 

Problem: Combat engineer companies did not 

have enough chain saws to support the requirement for clearing roads and power lines. 

Discussion: Engineer companies have nine 


chain saws, one per engineer squad; one 


- pneumatic-saw; and one hydraulic saw with each 

Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE). There were 

not enough organic saws to keep the squads busy, 

and when saws had to be pulled off-line for maintenance, the problem became more acute. Fortunately, many privately owned saws were loaned 

to the engineers by local individuals and 

. .

organizations. 

Recommendation: For such intense relief 


work, provide one chain saw for every four 


workers, with an additional 30 percent main- 


tenance float. 


10 Engineer 

Problem: Utilities companies were not able to 

identify work requirements fast enough to keep engineer units fully employed. 

Discussion: Engineer units were initially allocated at one company per county in the inland 

counties. Storm damage in these areas was 

sporadic, with many small areas of downed trees 

throughout affected counties. Often these areas required only a few squad hours to clear, leaving the 

squad free for a new mission in another area. However, utilities personnel were unable to identify 

work areas quickly enough to keep the engineers 

moving from site to site without delay. Delays in 

determining whether downed powerlines were 

"hot" also caused undue delays in relief work. 

Recommendation: The work output of engineer units can be considerable, but they can be 

fully utilized only when jobs are available. While 

utilities companies are understandably strapped 

for personnel during such weather emergencies, 

an ideal arrangement would be to place a utilities 

representative with each engineer platoon. The 

representative should be equipped with a fourwheel-drive vehicle, a portable telephone, a largescale map of the area, and the ability to determine 

if powerlines are hot. . -

Problem Private and commercial vehicles required special consideration for access and egress 

from ribbon bridge ramps. 

Discussion: Private and commercial vehicles 

often do not have sufficient power, traction or 

road clearance to load and off-load from a ribbon 

bridge. The steeper the slope of the ramp, the 

fewer non-military vehicles that can use it. 

Recommendation: When a ribbon bridge is to 

be used by civilian vehicles, access and egress 

ramps should slope as gently as the ramp bay will 

allow. 
- - 

- -- 

Problem: State-mandated work priorities for 

Army engineers were not fully understood by local 

- - civil authorities. 

Discussion: Early in the relief effort, the governor established priorities for engineer work. The - priorities were well understood within the military 

community, and they did not change throughout -- - . most of the relief effort. However, there was a -

need to constantly reemphasize and restate those 

priorities to county officials who directed the engineer work. When work was requested that fell 

outside of the governor's guidelines, it was denied - * .-- by the engineers. Unfortunately, this caused some 

unnecessary friction between civil and military - --- - personnel. 

Recommendation: To avoid misunderstand- 

- --	 ings, the state should ensure that local officials 

are fully informed of the governor's instructions 

for the use of Army engineer assets. -

Problem: Congested roads in urban areas sig- - -	 nifmntly slowed engineer relief efforts. 

Discussion: During the first several days after 

.the hurricane, the city of Charleston remained 

open and relatively free of traffic. The lack of sig- 

-	 nificant private or commercial traffic allowed engineer units to move freely among work sites. However, the situation changed drastically after the 

first few days. The roads became choked with 

returning property owners, commercial vehicles, -	 - and sightseers. With the roads only partially 

cleared of debris and tr&c lights still out of 

-- -- operation, traffic in parts of the city reached gridlock. 

Recommendation: Civil authorities should - restrict access to-urbiin arms-a% much as possible 

until roads are cleared and traffic lights operation- -. 	 al. Also, traffic control-unit%-milihry-orcivilian, 


are needed to ensure that the relief work of en- 


gineer units is not hindered-by traffic snarls. If 


possible, some routes should be dedicated to 


military and relief vehicles. 
 - -	 - ... --

Problem: Units did not perform route reconnais- - - same before sending company convoys into the - - - -

storm damaged areas. I

-- Discussion: Engineer companies were sent into 

i damaged areas in the early morning of September 

-. ---- - 22, only hours after the storm had passed. Com- 


pany convoys were put on the road without the 


benefit of either ground or aerial reconnaissance 
 -.- -. of the route. The convoys were frequently stopped 

by trees that blocked the roads. Movements that 

-. ---could have been completed in less than 2 hours on 

open roads took upwards of 6 hours because of -

downed trees. 

Recommendation: A squad of engineers in a 

HMMWV, with a supporting SEE, bucket loader 

or backhoe, should be sent out as a point team to 

clear roads ahead of the convoy. 

Issue: ZdentifiGation of storm damage categories 

and engineer work requirements. 

Discussion: During the relief effort, military engineers were used to perform the following tasks: 

a. Clearance of trees. Clearing roads and powerlines of downed trees was the most common storm 

damage encountered by Army engineers. -

b. Rubble on streets. Rubble, primariIy roofing 

material, blocked many roads. Initial clearing efforts consisted of pushing most debris to the sides -

of the roads. In some areas, there was so much 

debris that it was necessary to haul it away. Salvageable property, such as private vehicles or 

even entire houses, sometimes blocked roads. . ~-

c. ~and&eposits on roads. Roads in beach areas -

were buried under sand up to several feet deep. 

d. Erosion breaches around bridges and culverts. Roadways were destroyed and hundreds of 

cubic feet of roadbed material were washed awayby waves and subsequent tidal action. 

e. Landfill operations. As landfills became full; -

it was necessary to use Army bulldozers to keep 

the landfills. open. 

Recommendation: Military engineers with hurricane-related area damage-control missions can -

use this list of damage categories for their initial 

operations planning. - - -

Issue: Use of the Small Emplacement Excavator 

- (SEE) during relief-operations, -

Discussion: Engineer units of the South 

- -- Carolina National Guard-used-their recently issued SEES during the Hurricane H<~Orelief effort. The SEES were found to be very reliable and 

well TuitTd to the mission. The-vehicle's high 

mobility allowed it to keep up with engineer work 

teams moving in HMMWVs and dump trucks. It 

had sufficient power to push andlor lift tree 

trunks that blocked roadways. The hydraulic . 

chain saw was used extensively. It was found to 

-be lightweight, easy to use, reliable, and power- ful. In some cases, the bucket of the SEE was 

used to provide an elevated work platform for en- 

- gineers who were clearing tree limbs from power 

lines. 


Recommendation: None. _ 


Engineer 11 
The Other Di 

1989 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture given by 

Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, 

Chief of Engineers 

ecently, General Carl 

Ruono, Chief of Staff of the 

United States Army, wrote an article for the Armed Forces Journal. In that article General 

Vuono said, "The U.S. Army, like 

the nation's intercontinental 

nuclear force, is a strategic force. 

The Army is an essential element in the execution of national 

military strategy which aims to 

deter conflict at all levels, and if 

necessary, to fight and terminate 

wars under favorable conditions." 

The thesis of my presentation is 

that if the Army is to be fully effective in carrying out this vital 

strategic role, it must be capable of 

projecting power to the point of 

influence in its peacetime operations as well. In addition, to be 

successful in this regard, the 

leaders and planners of the Army 

must engage in strategic thinking, 

and must institutionalize a 

process for sound long-range 

planning. 

From my perspective, the concept of a strategic force involves 

two dimensions. The first of these 

is familiar and is usually the focus 

of discussion among defense 

strategists and national security 

analysts. The Army must be 

prepared to win on the battlefield. 

Forces must be organized, trained, 

equipped, and positioned to deter 

and-if necessary-successfully 

wage war. In other words, the 

Army must be prepared for war 

fighting. 

The "other" dimension of 

military and strategic service is 

less familiar. The Army must be 

prepared to address a broad range 

of national security concerns 

during peacetime. It, more than 

any other service, must step up to 

the role as the nation's general 

military servant. This role requires the Army to carry out a 

range of tasks beyond the battlefield-to prevent war-to 

manage peace-to undertake the 

itarv J Service


nation's most difficult and tedious 

tasks. Soldiers fighting forest fires 

in the American west and engineer 

units building roads in Central 

America are just two contemporary examples of these tasks. 

The concept of a strategic force 

implies more than reacting to rcquirements as they develop. A 

strategic force must actively anticipate needs, and position organizations and resources to meet 

these needs. It must think and 

plan strategically. The Army must 

not only be willing to perform dirty 

and difficult jobs in the nation's 

service, it must do them well. This 

"other" dimension of a strategic 

force is not a secondary role. It was 

central to the development of the 

United States. It is important 

today; it is an imperative for 

tomorrow. 

Thus, it is my intention to expand on the concept of the Army as 

a strategic force by focusing on 

this "other" dimension. Along the 

12 Engineer 
way, I will briefly review the U.S. 

Army's service to our nation in an 

historical context, and then discuss some of the changes taking 

place on the international scene-- 

the external influences. Finally, I 

will address strategic thinking 

and planning, and sketch out some 

possibilities for the Army's future-beyond the battlefield. 

Historical Context 

Te histories of the United 

States and its Army are inextricably linked. For much of 

the 213-year history of our nation, the Army has indeed been 

the loyal military servant, and it 

has undertaken a variety of 

tasks--international and domestic. Before we turn our attention 

to the Army's historical roles as a 

general military servant, however, I reiterate that our basic 

business as soldiers is to serve 

the nation well on the battlefield. 

The history of the American 

Army in combat-as this audience 

well knows--pre-dates the founding of the United States. The fledgling Continental Army had to immediately engage a well trained, 

seasoned, highly professional 

force in a war for American independence. I can't help but note 

with some pride, as the Chief of 

Engineers, that from the outset 

comhat engineers played a pivotal 

role in that conflict. For example, 

General George Washington 

selected Colonel Richard Gridley 

to serve as the first Chief Engineer 

of the Continental Army, and immediately put him to work preparing defensive fortifications on the 

high ground overlooking Boston. 

These fortifications were 

needed to prepare for an imminent 

attack from British regulars. That 

attack came on June 17,1775, and 

the colonials held firm behind the 

hastily constructed earthworks. 

This action, known as the Battle of 

Bunker Hill, demonstrated the 

importance of combat engineering 

to the Continental Army, and 

foreshadowed the significant contributions that were to come. 

General Washington recognized 

that his poorly trained, illequipped 

troops needed every tactical advantage they could gain against 

their superbly trained adversary. 

Sappers of the Continental Army 

played an equally important part 

in the last campaign of the War for 

Independence, the siege of 

Yorktown. Here, their abilities to 

support offensive operations were 

tested as they sought to breach 

British defenses. The engineers 

were successful, and ultimately the 

combined efforts of American and 

French ground forces and the 

French fleet brought about the termination of the conflict on 

favorable termsat least from an 

American perspective. 

From these beginnings emerged 

a tradition of an Army that always 

served the nation well in war time. 

This tradition continued through 

the 19th and 20th centuries to the 

most cataclysmic conflict in the 

history of warfare, the Second 

The hastily constructed fortlflcations on Charleston Heights overlooking Boston, during the Revolutionary War, proved the value of 

engineers to the Continental Army. 

This illustration is viewed from 

behind the patriot lines. 

Engineer 13 
World War. The many engagements of World War I1 provide examples of some of the most 

remarkable feats of arms for both 

the British and American armies 

as they fought shoulder to 

shoulder. 

At the risk of sounding too 

parochial, I will cite one example 

which highlights combat engineers fighting as infantry but 

which also illustrates those 

qualities which are essential to 

success on the battlefield-sound 

leadership, initiative, tenacity, 

and courage. 

In December of 1944, the Germans launched a final, desperate 

offensive through the Ardennes. 

This armored thrust caught the 

American 99th and 28th Divisions 

completely by surprise, and their 

lines were quickly breached. As 

the German armor rolled forward, 

at least two engineer units, the 

291st and 51st Battalions, were 

forced to shift quickly from cutting 

timber and graveling roads to 

fighting tanks. In the confusion, 

officers gave orders to sergeants 

with whom they had little prior 

contact, and those sergeants led 

motley collections of soldiers from 

various units. Acting in small 

groups to erect road blocks, hold 

key road junctions, and do whatever had to be done, these men 

stood fast. 

In the end, the initiative and 

independent actions of junior officers and noncommissioned officers blunted one of the key spearheads of the German attack, and 

allowed other units to get into 

position. I might add that this action, known to Americans as the 

Battle of the Bulge, is also an excellent example of cooperation between our two armies as control of 

American forces north of the German penetration was passed 

smoothly to Field Marshall 

Montgomery. 

In sum, the history of our Army 

includes numerous chapters 

which were written on the battlefield. The colors of the United 

States Army are decorated with 

168 battle streamers, and I have 

no doubt that more will be earned. 

However, there is another 

dimension to this history. For two 

centuries the Army has carried out 

a broad range of tasks in service to 

the nation. For example, the Army 

contributed to the opening of the 

continent, development of the engineering profession in America, 

and construction of transportation 

networks. These contributions 

beyond the battlefield are in many 

ways as important as the Army's 

primary peacetime role of preparing for war. 

In the early 19th century, the 

nation sent explorers such as Captain Meriwether Lewis and 

Lieutenant William Clark to open 

unchartered territories in the 

west. From 1804 to 1806, these 

two officers led an expedition to 

the headwaters of the Missouri 

River, across the Continental 

Divide to the Pacific Ocean, and 

back. Their expedition covered 

some 7600 miles by boat, on horseback, and by foot. They brought 

back the first primitive charts of 

the area, and collected botanical 

and zoological specimens. This expedition, together with the efforts 

of other Army explorers, transformed the west from a great unknown into a territory which captured the imagination of the 

American people. 

A second area in which the 

Army made a major contribution 

was in the development of the engineering profession in the United 

States. In March of 1802, the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Military 

Academy at West Point were established by the same act of Congress. This act began a lasting association not only between these 

two institutions, but between the 

Army's military engineers and the 

civil engineering profession. 

I might digress to note that we 

owe a debt of gratitude to the 

British army for the concept of the 

military academy. Your army was 

the first to recognize the importance of higher technical education for military officers. As a 

result, the military academy at 

Woolwich for engineering and artillery studies was established in 

1721. West Point was established 

as the first engineering school in 

the United States in response 

to the demands of a growing 

nation for trained scientists and 

engineers. 

Military engineers at the 

academy adapted European engineering theory to the practical 

applications required by a growing 

America. This combination 

produced an engineering curriculum and trained engineers 

that served as the foundation for 

all engineering education in the 

country. Graduates of West Point 

surveyed, designed, and built 

roads, canals, and railroads 

throughout the United States. 

The legacy of this early relationship between military engineers 

and the engineering profession 

remains alive as my command, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is 

responsible for a host of civil functions, including flood control 

and management of navigable 

waterways. 

Thus, in the broad sweep of history, the contributions of the Army 

to the United States have gone far 

beyond the battlefield. However, 

in recent decades we have been 

more focused on war and preparing for it. 

The Cold War 

or the past 40 years the 

U.S. focus on national 

security has been the rivalry between the United States and the 

Soviet Union. This rivalry, with 

its military, economic, and 

ideological dimensions, has 

dominated the national security 

agenda for government officials, 

14 Engineer 
soldiers, and the American 

public. The United States was 

perceived to be. in a life-or-death 

struggle with an extremely 

powerful and dangerous adversary. The Soviet Union was seen 

to be steadily extending its 

reach, and the communist states 

were seen as a monolithic block. 

The defense of our allies, particularly those in Europe, was the 

highest priority, but this strategic 

competition was carried on in the 

less developed nations as well. The 

centerpieces of national security 

strategy were the nuclear deterrent, large standing forces, and 

forward deployment of substantial 

portions of these forces. The imminence of the Soviet threat was 

widely accepted by the American 

public and our allies. 

Changing International 

Environment 

owever, during the last 

two decades, trends have 

emerged which have begun to 

change the nature of the international system and the nature of 

the threat. Although I believe 

that the United States remains 

ahead as an economic and 

military superpower, its lead 

along both of these dimensions 

has diminished. The nations of 

Western Europe-including the 

United Kingdom-and Japan 

have fully recovered from the 

Second World War and are major 

economic powers. The industrial 

democracies look to each other as 

both trading partners and 

economic competitors. 

Economics and military power 

have become further diffused in 

what used to be called the Third 

World. Many of these developing 

nations have become significant 

industrial powers and have acquired quantities of modern armaments. Many nations and even 

sub-national groups can now pose 

military threats-at least on a 

regional basis. 

Meanwhile, the perception of 

the Second World has changed 

sharply. Differences and disputes 

The forward deployment of forces 

was a centerpiece of our national 

security. The stationing of Army 

units in Europe, like these engineer and armor soldiers, was 

widely accepted by the American 

publlc as a deterent against the 

Soviet threat (Photo by Specialist 

Bob Bastedo). 

Engineer 15 
The degradation of our environment has evolved into a major factor of global significance. The 

Army's Toxic and Hazardous 

Materials Agency recently completed on-site treatment of 1,138 

drums of dioxin and herbicidecork 

tamlnated sol1 and other materials 

by Incineration (U.S. Army photo). 

among the so-called socialist 

states have shattered the images 

of a communist bloc. The communist model of economic developmentautarky and tight central 

control-has been widely discredited. The economic progress 

achieved by the Soviet Union in 

the years immediately after the 

Second World War was selective 

and could not keep pace with the 

rest of the world. Virtually all of 

the communist countries are looking toward some type of market 

mechanism to overcome gross inefficiencies in their economies, 

and are simultaneously struggling 

with the implications of the attendant loss of political control. 

Other changes have taken place 

in the international environment. 

It has become increasingly difficult, especially for the major 

powers, to convert military resources into usable political power. 

Rapid and widespread communication has made it more difficult for governments to control 

internal debate on the causes and 

conduct of war. The superpowers 

are constrained in their use of 

force by the risk of direct confrontation with each other. Several 

conflicts have demonstrated the 

potency of nationalism as a 

motivating force. Lesser developed countries and sub-national 

groups have used terrorism and 

irregular warfare to achieve their 

objectives. 

These factors have served to 

raise the costs and reduce the 

benefits of the direct application of 

military force. These changes are 

beginning to have a profound 

effect on the very meaning of 

16 Engineer 
national security. It warrants continued re-definition. 

Direct conflict with the Soviet 

Union has been made less likely, 

and more costly should it occur. 

This point underscores the concept that henceforth the principal 

function of military forces will be 

to deter-not wage-war. Of 

course, preparing to prevail in any 

conflict remains a central element 

of deterrence, but the focus is 

somewhat different. The principal 

functions of military forces become preventing and limiting conflict, and projecting power to the 

point of influence in a world at 

peace to manage threats to that 

peace. 

The limits on direct use of 

military power and the problems 

which the Soviet Union must confront serve to lessen the perception of a Soviet threat ..., and in 

democracies the public is quick 

(perhaps too quick) to accept good 

news. I note as an aside that Mr. 

Gorbachev knows this too well. 

His initiatives have time and 

again generated pressures for 

reduced defense spending-reductions which are premature at best 

for a force that must be responsive 

to an enemy's capabilities, not 

words. 

Future threats to national 

security will increasingly emanate 

from economic and demographic 

issues in addition to political or 

ideological differences. 

And, finally, there is at least one 

more trend that has evolved into a 

major factor of global significance. 

That is the degradation of the environment itself--everything from 

climate change to nuclear waste to 

ocean dumping to the destruction 

ofjungles and wetlands, to name a 

few. I can assure you that the 

destruction of our global environment and its rapid impact on all 

species of life, including man, is 

certainly a national security issue. 

The questions for the Army are the 

degree of threat and what the 

Army's response should be. 

Requirements Across 

the Strategic Continuum 

oday our Army is oriented 

on a war-fighting spectrum 

from low intensity conflict to 

general war, with-the primary 

focus on deterring the latter 

while recognizing the higher 

probability of the former. If the 

low intensity conflict is more 

likely, should we not move 

beyond the end of our conflict 

spectrum and conduct peacetime 

military operations that will 

deter at that end as well? 

No longer can security be considered narrowly in the context of 

the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, with its 

focus on military power. The national security objectives of the 

United States now include references to meeting the challenges of 

a global economy, and efforts to 

address the root causes of regional 

instabilities. The result is a much 

broader view of national security. 

The view of national security 

that has been dominant until now 

has led the Army to concentrate on 

tasks associated with war fighting. Army leadership has 

focused--quite properly-on fielding a well trained, well equipped 

force that was prepared to win the 

AirLand Battle in Europe. 

The Army has been structured 

around a strategic concept that 

calls for sizable forward-deployed 

forces that could rapidly be reinforced. Virtually the entire Army, 

both Active and Reserve Components, is geared to this task. I 

hasten to note that one exception 

is the recent addition of light infantry divisions to the force. These 

divisions have added flexibility 

and diversity to the Army's ability 

to respond. 

Now the Army is at a tuning 

point. The tough thing about a 

turning point is that you cannot 

see around the comer. The future 

cannot be illuminated directly 

(without some mirrors). Only a 

keen imagination can improve our 

vision and illuminate alternatives. 

In view of the changes evident 

in the international system, the 

future may well bring a reduction 

in forward-deployed forces and a 

commensurate reduction in the 

size of the Army overall. 

This is particularly true if the 

Army continues to define its mission and corporate identity in 

terms that are seen to be less 

relevant to the national security 

environment of the future. Thus, if 

the Army is to continue to serve 

the nation well, it needs to (again) 

diversify beyond war fighting. 

The Army must step up to the 

task of projecting power to the 

point of influence in order to 

counter peacetime threats to our 

national security interests. This 

may or may not be on the battlefield. In fact, I question whether 

the paradigm of the battlefield has 

continued validity as the Army's 

sole strategic organizing concept. 

As a tactical concept, yes; as a concept to train young soldiers and 

their leaders, yes; but the future 

role of the Amy-its vision of service into the next century-must 

go beyond the notion of the 

battlefield. 

Implications for the 


Future 


he relationship between our 

two nations, the United 

Kingdom and the United States, 

is one that carries a rich history. 

It is a relationship based on 

shared values and a common 

political heritage. Today and in 

the future, the interests of our 

nations will continue to 

transcend the mere physical 

defense of our homelands. 

These interests will be based on 

the maintenance of a degree of 

global stability which preserves 

our values. Broadly stated, U.S. 

national interests include the 

Engineer 17 
survival of the United States as a 

free and independent nation with 

its fundamental values intact, its 

economy healthy, its environment 

sound, its institutions and people 

secure. A second component of 

these security interests is a stable 

international system that promotes human freedom and dignity, a sound global environment, 

and a fair and open economic 

system. 

To be a strategic force in service 

to these national security interests, the Army must project power 

across the entire range of the 

operations continuum. We must 

be prepared to wage and win a 

general war, and we must also be 

prepared to contain peacetime 

threats such as terrorism and low 

intensity conflict. 

What are some of the new 

paradigms of projecting power in 

this context? It goes beyond the 

threat or presence of combat forces. It will mean influencing 

people, institutions, and events 

through infrastructure development, medical assistance, communications, and training. It will 

mean developing judiciary and 

financial institutions. In other 

words, projecting power will mean 

reflecting to the world our way of 

life, our economic system, our 

form of government, and their intrinsic value. This is the elegant 

use of power to influence and stabilize. It will be those stabilized 

countries that will lessen the risk 

of conflict and, thus, enhance 

peaceful coexistence. 

Projecting power to the point of 

influence through our peacetime 

operations is indeed managing the 

peace. Asking the Army of today to 

increase its emphasis on this 

dimension of military servicemanaging the peace-requires 

strategic thinking and long-range 

planning by its senior leaders. The 

reference points for this kind of 

thinking are not usually found in 

today's in-box. Simply extrapolatingfrom the threats and responses 

18 Engineer 

". . . the Army 

has the strength 

to prevail on the 

AirLand 

Battlefield, and 

it (can) influence 

the management 

ofpeace on a 

restless planet." 

from the past and present to 20 or 

30 years out will not work. It's like 

trying to illuminate a playing field 

with a laser beam. 

What is needed is a floodlight 

perhaps several floodlights shining from different positions and at 

different angles. Sometimes 

thinking strategically about the 

world three decades from now requires us to leap out and consider 

the broad picture. We cannot 

predict the specifics, but we can 

consider the trends, evaluate alternative scenarios, and consider 

the enduring basics. 

Let me give you one example. 

Our Chief of Staff says that one of 

his principal priorities is maintaining a quality force. I think we 

could agree that whatever our armies will do in the year 2020, they 

will want a team of quality players 

to do it. I haven't said anything 

about forward deployed forces, or 

how they are armed, or whether 

they will be using laser weapons, 

and so on. Regardless of those concerns, we will want a force capable 

of responding to its mission. That 

means we must attract, motivate, 

and retain an effective and 

productive force. 

And what does that mean? From 

my perspective, one of the things it 

means is that we must look carefully at the quality of life for our 

soldiers on our installations. We 

need to consider issues like housing, child care, and facility maintenance. I suggest that this realm 

of a quality force is one that should 

be illuminated with strategic 

floodlights. Abroad range of alternative scenarios should be considered, and then this analysis 

should be brought back to 

today. ..to position ourselves for 

the future. Mere extrapolation 

will not work. 

Now, let's turn on those floodlights to illuminate another of 

the possibilities for the future. 

The political and economic instability of the developing world 

poses a clear threat to western 

interests. Part of the response to 

this threat is to attack the roots 

of this instability-grinding 

poverty, ignorance, and inadequate and uneven economic 

development. 

What is required is a process of 

nation building. In many instances, Third World countries lack 

the most basic facilities for health 

care, and have poor transportation 

and communication networks. In 

fact, the United Kingdom, the 

United States, and virtually all of 

the developed nations have 

directed substantial sums of 

developmental assistance to alleviate these problems. 

I suggest that the U.S. Army, 

principally though the use of support units, can lend assistance in 

this area. This assistance can 

range from the construction and 

management of major projects, 

perhaps entire cities, to the 

provision of advice on the construction of wells, to visits from 

medical teams. However, these activities must be undertaken 

within the broadest context of our 

own foreign policy objectives, and 

with sensitivity to the culture of 

the host nation. 
An example of this 

type of assistance is 

presently underway in 

Central America. 1 

There, Army engineers 

from our Active and 

Reserve Components 

and civilians from my 

own command are 

engaged in projects 

ranging from construction of roads and airfields to drilling water 

wells. Over the past 

four years, we have had 

70,000 engineer soldiers40,OOO of them 1 

from the Rese~e Components-gain exper1 

, 

ience in Central AmerA 7-i.,- -=4 

ica. Similarly, doctors _ .- ---_ 
 and other health care - .. 


professionals from 


Army medical units are . - -


carrying out human- In Central America, the Army is helping to support regional stability through projects 

itarian and civil assis- ranging from construction of roads and airfields to drilling water wells. Over the past 

tance activities. The four years, 70,000 Army engineer&0,000 of them from the Reserve Components-- 

bonds that can be es- have participated In such projects (Photo by Sergeant Richard Creed). 

tablished by these efforts foster trust and mutual 

respecbssential ingredients if 

a program of this type is to 

succeed. 

To leap out and think strategically about the possibilities of 

this nation-building concept 

means considering ways it might 

be expanded. Why not, for example, use more extensive involvement of military engineers in 

development assistance? Why not 

the expansion of this concept to 

other geographic areas? Why not 

to Southeast Asia? Or Africa? 

Conclusion 

n our early history, the Army 

provided the principal federal 

capability to establish, expand, 

and protect our nation on the 

American continent. Although, a 

myriad of federal, state and local 

governmental agencies have assumed a greater public sector 

role in our country through the 

years, there remains an essential 

place for our Army in the 

American scene-both at home 

and abroad. 

Our role ranges from providing 

a maturing experience for our 

young men and women, who will 

later take their places as productive citizens in private life, to 

responding to national disasters, 

to securing the peace by deterring 

armed conflict across the entire 

conflict spectrum. 

Armies are relevant and must 

project that relevancy to the 

publics they serve. For if we fail in 

that, and are weakened during a 

perceived lull in external threats, 

we may ultimately fail our nations 

in their hour of need. 

Our Army must maintain its 

credibility and relevance in the 

public mind, even while the perception of threats to our national 

security are constantly changing. 

We must be viewed as a multi-purpose asset in the support of national objectives both within and 

beyond our national boundaries. 

We must have diverse utility while 

maintaining our essential war 

fighting capabilities. 

The United States Army is a 

strategic force. It is the American 

citizen's general military sewant. 

As a strategic force, the Army has 

the strength to prevail on the AirLand Battlefield, and it has the 

capability to positively influence 

the management of peace on a 

restless planet. God willing, the 

Army's leadership of today and 

tomorrow will have the strategic 

vision to lead us beyond the battlefield...to a nation and a world at 

peace. krl 

Lieutenant General Henry J. 

Hatch has served as the Chief 

of Engineers and Commander 

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers since June 1988. 

Engineer 19 

1 
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, (page 

12) "The Army. ..must step up to 

the role as the nation's general 

t. This role retlefield-to prevent war-to 

manage peace-to undertake the 

nation's most difficult and 

tedious tasks. Soldiers fighting 

forest fires in the American West 

and engineer units building 

roads in Central America are 

just two contemporary examples 

of these tasks." 

The French Army too, because 

of historical circumstances, has 

had to face this expanded dimension of military service. For many 

years, French engineers, in addition to maintaining their readiness for combat missions, have 

successfully met "beyond the 

Here, I will cover four major 

areas of French engineer contributions to national service, including 

nation-building in Africa, the 

Paris Fire Brigade, Civil Safety, 

The Nation-Building Effort 

As the French colonial era was 

drawing to an end, we signed accords with former colonies that 

were design2d to continue French 

assistance in the development of 

newly independent nations. Many 

government agencies are involved 

in this on-going effort, and the 

French Army has also taken an 

important role. 

In addition to any straightforward military training that may 

be requested by these nations, 
French engineers give extensive 

training in construction techniques to these new countries. Officers and NCOs have provided the 

citizens of these former French 

colonies with instruction in both 

vertical and horizontal engineering. They also participate in the 

design and construction of badly 

needed nation infrastructure. In 

addition, some highly qualified engineers, as part of their one-year 

mandatory military duty, are 

selected to serve as technical advisors in these developing areas. 

The Paris Fire Brigade 

Following a disastrous Paris fire 

in 1867, the French government 

decided that the Army would take 

over the responsibility for 

firefighting in the capital city. 

Since that time, the Brigade des 

Sapeurs Pompiers de Paris, a 

military engineer unit, has accomplished the mission with 

professionalism and efficiency. 

The unit carries out an average of 

300,000 missions every year. The 

brigade's motto, "Save or Perish," 

has been proven many times, as 

French sappers have died trying to 

save the property and lives of their 

fellow citizens. About 400 engineers are injured every year in 

firefighting duties in the Paris 

metropolitan area. 

The 7,200-man brigade includes three Fire Groups of eight 

companies each. The force has 250 

officers, and about 1,000 of the enlisted men are draftees. 

The fire brigade enjoys immense popularity among Parisians, and they are always 

greeted with applause when 

taking part in the annual Bastille 

Day military parade. Their 

popularity is well earned, though, 

because they face the threat of 

death and injury daily in their 

duties. 

In addition to their Paris-based 

duties, members of the brigade are 

also called upon to serve as reinforcements for fire and rescue 

teams sent to help foreign 

countries during major disasters. 

Civil Safety 

Another area of French engineer contributions to national 

service is Civil Safety, which is 

served by the three Training and 

Rescue Units for Civil Safety 

(UIISC). These units, created in 

1968, are part of the Engineer 

Corps, but are equipped and 

manned by the Department of the 

Interior. Such close cooperation 

between civilian government 

agencies and the Department of 

Defense has been a keystone to the 

Army's national service program. 

Career soldiers devoted to Civil 

Safety include 92 officers and 235 

n'oncommissioned officers. Of 

these, 75 percent are engineers. 

Also assigned to these units are 

1,250 draftees. 

The general mission of these soldiers is twofold: to rescue people 

from accidents, disasters and 

other inciderlts, and to protect the 

environment. Their area of 

responsibility includes not only 

the entire country, but overseas 

areas as well. 

The units are equipped to fight 

forest fires, clean up environmental pollution, and rescue victims of 

earthquakes and other casualties. 

These units have a dual responsibility and could be called upon to 

perform the same duties in combat 

areas as well. 

The accompanying list of major 

missions conducted by the UIISC, 

on page 22, indicates the diversity 

of missions performed by these 

units. 

A member of the French Engineer 

Paris Fire Brigade listens for 

possible survivors of the 1985 

earthquake in Mexico City. Such 

specialty teams have been highly 

successful in saving lives, and 

they are often sent to overseas 

disaster sites (French Army photo). 

Engineer 21 
Mqjor UIISC Missions 


Since 19763 


1976- Earthquake rescue, 


F'rioul, Italy 


1978 - Environmental clean-up, 


Amoco Cadiz tanker, Brittany, 


kance 


1980- Environmental clean-up, 


Tanio tanker, Brittany, France 


- Earthquake rescue, El Asnam, 

Algeria 

- Earthquake rescue, Mezzo Giorno, Italy 

- Flood relief, Savoy, France 

1981 - Flood relief, Nice, France 

- Avalanche relief, kance 

- Flood relief, near Paris 


1982 - Flood relief, Andorra 


- Hurricane relief, Auverg 


France 


- Avalanche relief, France 


1983 - Hurricane Veena relief, 


Tahiti 


- Rescue, terrorist attack, Beirut, 


Lebanon 


1984 - Hurricane Kamisy relief, 


Comores Islands 


1985 - Earthquake relief, 


Meeco City 


1986- Emergency snow ( 


for southern France 


- Earthquake relief, Kala~ 


Greece 


1987 - Storm relief, Britt 


France 


1988 - Environmental clc 


Brittany/Normandy, Fran,. 


- Technical firefighting assi 


tance, Peru 


- Flood relief, Nimes, FrancG 

- Earthquake relief, Armenia 


1989- Building collapse relief, 


Toulon, France 


- Humcane Hugo relief, 


Guadeloupe, West Indies 


- Medical assistance, Rumania 

Adapted Military 

Service 

Efforts to correct the root causes 

of regional instabilities are part of 

the new strategy for military forces 

- i

-. d.6 . .-

Civil Safety (UIISC) soldiers prepare to clear storm damage from Hurricane 

Hugo on the Island of Guadeloupe in 1989. The UllSC performs duties both 

overseas and at home in France (French Army photo). 

of the future. The French Army's 

Regiments du Service Militaire 

Adapte (SMA) (Adapted Military 

Service Battalions) support that 

strategy in overseas areas. These 

unique units provide assistance to 

French overseas territories in 

education, civil works, and other 

supporting programs. This assistance is provided in cooperation 

with the French government's 

Department of Overseas Districts 

and Tenitones. 

Created in 1960, the SMA units 

serve Martinique, Guadeloupe, 

Guyana, Reunion, Mayotte, and 

New Caledonia. 

The SMA program helps overseas territory draftees, during their 

initial military training and sub 

sequent national service, to develop 

a moral and civic sense of duty. 

The SMH also prepares these 

young citizens for their professional 

life by giving them a technical 

education. The soldiers are then 

given the opportunity to participate 

in local community work programs. 

The different job specialties 

taught by the battalions include 

agriculture, commercial fishing, 

horizontal and vertical construction, forestry and saw mill operations, mechanics, and food service 

operations. 

This combination of vocational 

education and real work experience 

benefits the community and allows 

the soldiers to reenter civilian life 

with job skills. In 1989, more than 

2,000 draftees received training in 

these skills. 

The SMA units also provide assistance with disaster emergency 

plans and operations. Recent rescue and clearing efforts include 

Hurricane Firinga on Reunion Island, and Hurricane Hugo in 

Guadeloupe. 

By giving young people basic job 

training and making them more 

conscious of their responsibilities 

as citizens, the SMA units make a 

significant contribution to the welfare and stability of French overseas territories. 

"Always To Serve" 

In this rapidly evolving world, 

when long-standing ideas of the 

military threat are changing 

before our eyes, national defense 

22 Engineer 
Above: A UllSC rescue team 

searches earthquake rubble for vlctlms with a specially tralned dog. 

This rescue and relief mission to 

El Asnam, Algeria, in 1980, is one 

of many such operations conducted by French Army engineers 

(French Army photo). 

Right: Membersof the Paris Fire 

Brigade make a final check of a 

Pads train wreck in 1987 during the 

final stages of a rescue operation. 

The unit carries out an average of 

300,000flrefighting and rescue misdons every year (French Army 

photo). 

policies must be reevaluated. Nations around the world are examining the role of their military 

forces, and many have scaled back 

both the budget and the manpower of their armies. To maintain 

a key role in national service, armies must seek and adapt to new 

missions. These new missions, accomplished in addition to their 

traditional military roles, must 

demonstrate to the nation the 

value of army expertise and 

professionalism. 

French Army engineers have 

been innovators in these new 

dimensions of national service. 

Faithful to their motto of "Sometimes To Destroy, Often To Build, 

Always To Serve," French engineers have demonstrated their 

ability and willingness to serve 

aeyond the battlefield." 

Colonel Verite is the French 

Liaison Officer to the Engineer 

School. He previously served 

as district commander, Engineer Military Construction 

District of Marseille, France. 

He has served as Chief Engineer Officer, United Nations 

Interim Force in Lebanon, in 

1984-85; Project Officer for the 

Military Construction District 

of Tahiti, and deputy commander of the 5th Foreign 

Regiment (French Foreign 

Legion) in Mururoa, Polynesia. He is a graduate of St. 

Cyr Military Academy and the 

French Army War College. 

Engineer 23 
By Ken Foster 

6677ailure to follow proce- dures" is a term fre- - - quently used in connection with accidents, and it is a 

common safety denominator 

within the engineering community. Situations that fall in this 

category include supervisors who 

allow unqualified personnel to 

operate equipment, backing 

vehicles without ground guides or 

adequate vision, and failure to follow misfire procedures when 

training with demolitions. The 

results of our failure to follow procedures are very costly in terms of 

dollars, equipment, and human 

resources. 

During fiscal year 1989,610 engineer soldiers were accidentally 

a 

"P 

4%-

injured, 24 of them fatally. This 

number of injured soldiers 

equates to three company-sized 

units. Their injuries cost 

$3,574,335, and damage to 

government property amounted to 

$599,000, making a total cost of 

more than $4 million. 

During the 5-year period October 1984 - April 1989, 16 fatalities occurred in engineer units 

during demolition training, fast 

water training, and Army motor 

vehicle operations. "Failure to follow procedures" was a primary 

factor in all of these accidents. 

The purpose of safety in 

military training is to enhance soldier proficiency not to inhibit or 

remove realism from the training. 

-~ 

H 


,-@; r 4e @ 

*

T*d -4. m I 

We must remember that the 

soldiers' welfare is our first consideration, and that a well trained 

force is a safe force. 

Preventing accidents requires a 

pro-active approach to all we do 

through education, engineering 

and enforcement. However, once 

an accident happens, we must establish procedures to properly 

analyze it. The first step is a 

thorough investigation to establish the who, why, when, what, 

where and how of the incident. 

This step is essential to properly 

identify all the causes. The second 

step is to develop and implement 

countermeasures that will prevent similar occurrences in the 

future. 

Soldiers at Fort Leonard Wood, 

such as Private Greene, are taught 

the correct throwing procedures 

while using inert grenades. 

By learning proper procedures, they reduce the risk of 

serious accidents (TASC photo). 

24 Engineer 

-&, I /-: i 
The best solution, of course, is to 

remove the source of the hazard 

but this is not always possible. For 

example, if a bush creates a blind 

spot at an intersection, the hazard 

can be removed. When it cannot be 

removed, as in demolition training, the next best thing is to 

reduce the accident risk by using a 

physical guard or controls and 

educating personnel exposed to 

the hazard. 

Accident prevention includes 

the enforcement of proper procedures, which is important leader 

business. Leaders who fail to enforce established procedures 

should expect an increased accident rate within their area of 

responsibility. Safety is not just 

commander business, it is NCO 

and individual business. We 

all share a part of safety 

responsibility. 

Supervisors need to lead by example, set high standards, and 

conduct operations to meet those 

standards. Supervisors and commanders must ensure that soldiers know and become proficient 

with the equipment they operate. 

They must motivate their soldiers 

to work safely and to identify and 

control risks. If we teach soldiers 

the benefits of safe performance, 

they will be motivated to perform 

to standard. 

Safety must be integrated into 

all operations. Safety awareness 

should become a way of life for our 

soldiers--on and off the job. 

We will never eliminate all engineer-related accidents from 

our work environment because 

the calculated risk dictates 

otherwise. However, we can and 

must reduce the accident risk by 

ensuring that our personnel follow and understand prescribed 

procedures. 

Because we learn from sharing 

experiences, we need to hear from 

you. Help us share your 

knowledge and experiences with 

the rest of the engineer community. Send letters to: Headquarters, U.S. Army Engineer 

Center, ATTN: ATZT-S, Fort 

Leonard Wood, MO 65473-5000. 

Or, call (314) 563-5000, *4V 676-

5000. 

Ken Foster is a safety speciabist assigned to the Engineer 

Branch Safety Office at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

Motor vehlcle accidents are expensive in terms of human resources 

and equipment. The operator of 

this forklift was descending a hill 

at excessive speed for conditions 

when he lost control and overturned. Such accidents cost the 

government ihousands of dollars 

each year (TASC photo). 

Engineer 25 
TbweEssayom q magr(orm:
 C 

From~~~~~~~~~~, 


By Chester A. Kojro 

ometimes, like the old 

Ssaying goes, "you can7t see 

the forest for the trees." And like 

any other large organization, 

that occasionally applies to the 

military. Despite the best efforts 

of a long line of experts involved 

in developing Army equipment, 

doctrine, force stmcture or training, mistakes and shortcomings 

can happen. 

The Engineer Center knows 

that the best solutions to 

problems often come from the 

soldiers who have to confront 

those problems on a daily basis. 

To provide engineers with easy 

access to "the system," the Engineer Center developed the Essayon s Program. The program is 

designed to solicit recommendations for changes in engineer 

systems or concepts. 

Since the program began in September 1988, several recommendations from field units have been 

evaluated, including a Demolition 

26 Engineer 1 
Three Essayons Program recornrnendatlons: opposite page, the Engineer 

Squad Vehicle (ESV); top, the Armored Vehicle Launched MICLIC, and the 

Demolition EffectsSimulator (DES), in its bangalore torpedo configuration 

(U.S. Army photos). 

Effects Simulator (DES), the Armored Vehicle Launched MICLIC 

(AVLM), and the Engineer Squad 

Vehicle (ESV). An overview of 

these three evaluations follows. 

Demolition Effects 

Simulator (DES) 

n 1988, soldiers from the 65th 

IEngineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division (Light), developed and produced the 

prototype of a demolition effects 

simulator. Through the Essayons 

Program, they submitted the 

project to the Engineer School 

for evaluation. 

The battalion's DES comes in 

two configurations. First, satchel 

charges or other above-ground 

demolitions are simulated using a 

chalk charge. This consists of a 

detonator with a large knot tied 

into detonating cord (det cord), 

and placed into a sandbag filled 

with powdered chalk. 

The second configuration simulates a bangalore torpedo, and consists of det cord placed inside a 

6-foot long cardboard tube. The 

tube is filled with approximately 7 

pounds of powdered chalk and 

sealed with tape. Prepared tubes 

can then be connected and 

detonated together. The detonation system for both consists of an 

M60 fuse ignitor, a time fuse, and 

a nonelectric blasting cap. 

Testing of the DES was done at 

Fort Knox by the Engineer Test 

Division of the Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM), and the Armor-Engineer 

Board (ARENBD), September 11-

15, 1989. 

The chalk charge was used to 

simulate steel-cutting and treecutting (abatis) charges. The bangalore configuration was used to 

simulate wire and mine obstaclebreaching missions. 

Both configurations were found 

to be effective training simulators. 

Soldiers were able to work with 

real fuse ignitors, time fuses, det 

cord and blasting caps without actually destroying trees, bridges or 

other targets. The cardboard 

tubes did a good job of simulating 

bangalores, although further 

modifications now under study 

would enhance realism. 

Armored Vehicle 

Launched MICLIC 

(Am) 

he AVLM concept was 

developed by the 16th Engineer Battalion to improve the 

survivability of soldiers deploying a mine clearing line charge 

(MICLIC). They proposed providing these soldiers with a selfpropelled armored vehicle. For 

evaluation purposes, an armored 

vehicle launched bridge 

(AVLB)-minus the bridge-was 

Engineer 27 
temporarily modified to permit 

the mounting of two MICLICs. 

The test configuration was constructed by attaching a frame, 

fabricated from two I-beams and 

various pieces of scrap metal, to 

the rear deck of the AVLB. The 

MICLIC launchers were then connected to the frame with clamps. 

Testing was conducted at Fort 

Knox by the Engineer Test 

Division, again by TEXCOM and 

ARENBD, September 1-29, 1989. 

The AVLM is much more mobile 

than the trailer-mounted 

MICLIC. Compared to the AVLB 

with its bridge mounted, an increase in vehicle speed was noted. 

Visibility and vehicle access were 

also improved. 

Installation of the proposed 

MICLIC assembly required less 

than one hour on all test missions, 

using equipment common to an 

engineer battalion. 

A drawback to the proposal is 

that the AVLB's bridge-launching 

"footn partially blocks the 

MICLICs, requiring the foot to be 

lowered prior to firing. This 

resulted in delayed launch time. 

Too, this configuration left the 

MICLIC assemblies exposed and 

vulnerable, and prevented the use 

of the AVLB for its primary role of 

launching bridges. 

While this proposal has merit, 

its limitations are still being 

studied by the Engineer School's 

Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD). 

Engineer SquadVehicle 

(ESV) 

mis recommendation called 

J for converting a turretless 

tank into an engineer squad 

vehicle that would have a tank's 

mobility and survivability. The 

concept is similar to the Israeli 

Puma, which combines a Centurion tank chassis with a new 

armored superstructure, or 

casemate. The Engineer School 

28 Engineer 

"Changes begin 

T, tne fissayons 

tng I: 

ie fie 

envisions the ESV as an interim 

step toward the planned Sapper 

Vehicle. 

The ESV would consist of an 

Abrams chassis with an armored 

crew compartment and superstructure. A small rubble-clearing 

blade would also be mounted. An 

Abrams hull was not available for 

the test, so an M60A2 chassis was 

used. The steel superstructure 

was fabricated by ARENBD. 

Crew access was through the 

track commander's (TC) hatch on 

top, and two gull-wing shaped 

doors in the rear of the superstructure. Seven seats were mounted 

within the superstructure, in addition to the normal driver's station. Large steel tool boxes 

replaced the tank's side fender 

sponson boxes, and a storage rack 

for munitions and personal equipment was added above the engine 

compartment. 

During the test, a mineplow 

from an Abrams was attached to 

the vehicle using fabricated adaptors. The plow was used for excursion testing in mine breaching, 

and was not intended to be an ESV 

capability. 

Testing was conducted by the 

Engineer Test Division of TEXCOM and ARENBD at Fort Knox 

from September 22 through 

November 30, 1989. During the 

evaluation, the ESV was compared against an M113 for its effectiveness as a squad carrier. 

The ESV was found to be operationally effective, and has improved armor protection and increased external equipment 

storage space. Unlike the M113, 

the ESV can employ tankmounted mine plows and rollers, 

providing the potential for alternate mission capability. 

It does have drawbacks, however. Entry and exit times are 

much longer than the M113, and 

there is less internal storage 

space. 

Since the test superstructure 

was made of brassboard and total 

vehicle weight was not realistic, 

ESV mobility could not be tested. 

The operational tradeoffs of a 

tank chassis-based engineer carrier are still being evaluated by 

the Engineer School's DCD. 

Send It In! 

hanges begin with the soldier, and the Essayons Program continues to be a useful 

tool for evaluating ideas from the 

field. 

While not every proposal makes 

it to the test stage, all are 

thoroughly staffed before a final 

decision is made. 

Engineers are encouraged to 

send your Essayons recommendations to :Commandant, U.S. Army 

Engineer School, ATTN: ATSECDT, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

65473-6620. MI 

Mr. Kojro is a combat developments materiel analyst for the 

Engineer School's Directorate 

of Combat Developments. He is 

a former Armor officer, and 

previously served as a branch 

chief for the Directorate of 

Combat Developments at the 

Armor School. He is a 

graduate of the University of 

Illinois. 
--- 

-- 

(Personal Viewpoint, continued) 

When not under an active duty 

chemical battalion, a chemical 

company needs to be within the 

daily command and control of a 

corps or divisional combat engineer battalion. This places the 

company in a well defined and 

functional battalion environment 

with solid combat-: ?r experience a~ndlike ,attle 

focus. 

,ike a combat engineer comly, the cl lemical company must -Ll- A- . awe w provide combat multiP~Y ing expertise to the task force 

con~mander. Both engineer and 

smc>ke assets shape the battlefield .-through obstacles and obscuration. Also, mobility and countermobility are mission-essential 

tasks for both of them. Thus. a 

similar type of leadership dey velopment is needed for both the castle 

and the crossed retorts we, 51TQTS- ---. 

That depth is found in th .e engineer battalion, where con 3PanY 

commanders maintain a cle ar fix 

3r suppoi rt. 

ctors fa1 vor this solu- --:--I - 9 I. A rle crlerrllcal cur~~ptu~y 

and density of equipmen t are 

familiar to the engineer Imotor 

pool, and the engineer battal lion is 

s type 

. . structured and experienced in 

handling the maintenance challenges. In addition, flexibility in 

independent operations and 

proficiency in METT-T configurations are common in both engineer 

and chemical maneuver support. 

The bottom line is-clear. We 

must organize and train in garrison and field as we will be in 

battle. The mentoring, training, 

maintaining, caring, and leading 

of a chemical company are essential to its overall readiness . Tt a" if*" 

not logical to place this asset 

under a staff officer or wit hin a 

rear battle organization. We must 

avoid bran .ch par0 chialisn1 and 

subscribe tc> a true battle-folcused 

"--trine. 

Can a chemical 

its niche, happiness, and combat 

proficiency within a combat engineer battalion? Absolutely! 

Since February 1989, the 761st 

Smoke and Decon Company, a forces command corps-level unit located at Fort Ord, California, has 

been an integral part of the 14t 

Combat Engineer Battali01 

Before that time, the 761st WL, 

located within a.mixture! of uniqc Le 

TDA and TO& :E units 1 under a 

medical I:,.- n- battaklvll. "peration; 91 

readinc!ss levels .,mainte:nance systems, adminirstrative action,S, .:---I 3 .--A -- professiuncl~ uevelopme~~~, ari .d

(most importantly) battle foct IS 

were a mixed lot. Given this situr stion, the company could not be e: - pected to reach any solid level Iofsustained readi rt 

of a combat bat xt 

chemical soldial~s a~~e MI-"par,LYI__ 

oriented and rock-solid ready. 

This relationship is the answe !r. 

And it is not new. In World War IT 

the 14t'h, as par *tof the :36th Con 

bat En gineer Rlegiment, accumi 

lated 10 battle streamers. Within 

that regiment were a smoke company and a decon company. As an 

integral part of the 14th, the 761st 

Smoke and Decon company is now 

on a winning azimuth. Together 

they have shown where the chemicompany needs to be. 

,,dutenant Colonel Herb Harbacck is commander of the 14th 

Combat Engineer Battalion 

(Ccvps),. Fort Ord, CA. He has 

seroved in various command 

an4d staff positions, including 

exc?cutive officer, bayonet combait support command, 7th Infarztry Division; deputy commctnder, 7th Engineer Brigade, 

v1.1 U.S. Corps; brigade S-3, 

7tlt Engineer Brigade; aide-decalwp to the commanding ..".zeral, Western Command; 

CO?npany commander, 15th Engirseer Battalion, 9th Infantry ni,vision; and assistant diviIn engineer, 3rd Infantry 

vision. 

You are a combat heavy platoon leader in Panama. Your 

mission is to design a roadside ditch for a main supply 

route. The ditch must accommodate runoff from an area 

measuring 12 acres. 

I Additional Information: 

Soil type - ML without turf 

Slope of ditch - 4 percent 

Reference manual- FM 5-335 

Engineer Solution on pages 36 and 37. 

Engineer 29 
SoAviinq B'y the Task Force En


"It is very easy to accept dogma ...when one 

reaches the comfortable state of believing that 

because certain ideas have worked in the 

past, it is not necessary to ask whether they 

can be improved upon." 

S.L.A. Marshall 

Almost every task force engineer (TFE) wishes 

he had more planning time. Often we find the 

TFE producing a written countermobility matrix, a 

survivability matrix, a time-line of events, an engineer annex instruction page, and an obstacle overlay. Without a doubt, this paperwork nightmare is a 

bad dream for both the engineer and the TF he serves. The TFE must be able to immediately develop 

a realistic plan and quickly record it in a readable 

format. This article proposes a fast defense planning method that makes effective use of that valuable time. 

Through the years, task force planning has 

evolved into a drawn-out process loaded down with 

repetitive paperwork. This process is described in 

FC 5-71-2, Engineers in the Tank and Mechanized 

Infantry Task Force. It also takes too much time to 

complete. The time-line contains redundant information that is on the matrices. It is normally used only 

to present a clear picture to the maneuver commander. Calculating a bill of material for each 

obstacle, as is often done, is a long process that 

should be performed by the squad leaders. Have 

you ever seen the look on the face of a maneuver 

commander after he receives the orders brief? He 

tends to look a little puzzled at all the pages of engineer planning and wonders what part of it involves 

him. Chances are, he's not going to read it at all. 

And if he doesn't, you've been wasting your time. 

The answer to the 'There must be a better way ..." 

question is the planning method which follows. It is 

easy to understand and offers speed, simplicity, and 

clear command and control. An overview of this 

method is shown at Figure 1. 

Essentially, the process revolves around two documents: the obstacle overlay and the engineer execution matrix. You can record all engineer tasks, coordinating instructions and details on one form. You 

may add more forms if the defense is particularly 

long in duration. The obstacle overlay is drawn in 

standard fashion. One overlay and one matrixthat's all. It's fast and easy to understand. 

Engineer Execution Matrix 

Avertically oriented time-line serves as the 

framework for this method (Figure 2, page 

32). Across the top are blank spaces for unit designations (normally engineer platoons) and heavy equipment teams. The first column on the left is an hour 

time scale, which ranges from the beginning of the 

defense preparation to a time after the expected attack. Increments of an hour or two work best. 

By Captain Daniel P. McKenrick 

30 Engineer 
I 

Below the time-line area are several blocks used 


for specific unit missions, such as class IV recovery, 


lane closings, scatterable mines, etc. Under that is Gathering lndormati~n 


a remarks block for operation-specific needs and 


the priorities of support or work (if not stated earlier, nce you receive the mission, immediately 


in paragraph three of the operations order move to the task force tactical operations 


[OPORD]). At the bottom of the form is a sample center (TOC). Get with the TF commander or S-3 for 


mission block with its elements explained and any a briefing on the concept and intent of the operation. 


abbreviations spelled out. Simple, but it prevents If you train often with the task force, you are familiar 


misunderstandings. with how the boss thinks and can quickly put things 


Before trying out this method on a task force into perspective. By developing a satisfactory plan 


defense, there is one reference that can simplify life the first time around, you'll save a lot of time. 


for any task force engineer. It is an obstacle logistics The old saying, "know your boss," still holds true. 


and manpower reference sheet (Figure 3, page 33). Read the brigade order, focusing on the com- 


You will have to create this from several field mander's intent and the engineer annex. From the 


manuals and temper it with experience. It is impor- order, determine the brigade obstacle belts, obstacle- 


tant that the hours for obstacle construction accurate- restricted areas, quantities of class IV and mines, 


ly reflect your unit's capabilities. Later you will see the expected time of attack, and the presence of 


how this makes planning much easier. other engineer units that may augment you. 


I the Plan 

analysis 	 Siuation Task Force Engineer 

analysis with Task Force Staff

Nlj~n~ 

General COA I 

I 

List platoons on matrix 	 I List I Dlade assets on matrix 

Find total obstacle length 	

I 	 I

+~neblade assets available 

Prepare overlay: resourced and unresourced 	 Allot blade teams to battle positions 

I __L1 

Fill in mission block on matrix 1 

Fill in mission block on matrix 	 I Coordination

2 


Approv 

'occ varlon ana r~elds of fire; cover and conlent; obstacles; key terrain; avenue !s of approa 

Engineer 31 
- -- -- - - - - 

Secret for Training 

Engineer Execution Matrix 

Annex D to 5-33 Armor OPFORD dated Page 1of I 

Time 11522 PCT (9s) ' PLT (m) PLT (M) PLT DO262 1 DOZER 2 DOZER 3 WZEL 4 


(hr) otv PLT CO,QPS CORPS A& A/= A/S ~/,vw Lo99Ee 1 LoAWl loADER3 WAOER Y


I?00 - -- -- -- -- 1 -- Dsc 0.s~ '4 CPlc Tnc 


1900 --a"(A)-- - r -'TMA -' - -


MFL 0.5K 


1900 -- ARR~VE IN se3~0~2%0810)-- --7wem AWUE :N SECT~G 


TSL ~ O MMFH I li MFL h6~(600M~ 


ANT\ WL) %uYmD~crrmc%cw+~~%~~~ 

loo0 -- -3313 CB) 


280bCC) 2905~~) TMB COC TMo 


a100 -- - -- -- - -- 77UKPG-- +WP@r 


TRAVEL - 5TN&r -- --TRAJEL -- - MFH 2-Y 

2300 --2801 Cf\) ,- &i=L 0.6K-. -- MA1NT 

WVEL 206 ID) WICPPT~~D 

2L100-- -- -- ~\AT --

0100 -- --

DSC I tL 

-- MA\MT 

TWEL 

0200-,-
_ / 

Remarks: PQ\o~LN SWPOE~-A, C, D, B 

?El ORlTy VdokK - Mf 204, 8P 3,/vlF 20f 

EQP AND CLASS IQ Loc~E7AT GC I33 420 (567JON= -&CO~C) 

Example: Double HH- Hedgehogs Initial Locations on Overlay 

Obstacle Number Update wlfireplan 

TSC = Triple Concertina 

MF(H) = i4-0 Minefield Secret for Training MF(L) = ,544 Minefield 

Engineer 
tacle L cs and 


MST PKT CONC CONC PHR 

(m) - DSC TSC 

-. 

DSC M.67 , 

100 20 20 14 70 0.75 0.75 

300 60 60 42 200 2.5 2.5 

500 100 100 70 I a 335 I auu I 0.3 I 4 4 

700 98 5.5 

1000 140 7.5 

1300 182 '^ 10 

1 500 21 0 12 

1700 238 13 

2000 400 280 15 10 

2300

-

460 322 18 12 

2500 500 350 19 13 

- Figure 3 

Review enemy intelligence with the S-2, focusing 

on opposing engineers and their assets. It is likely 

that you will be able to provide important information 

to the S-2 by analyzing enemy strengths and 

capabilities. Using OCOKA, analyze the terrain with 

an eye on potential digging problems in company 

and team battle positions. Armed with all of this information, you are ready to begin. 

Obstacles 

ngineer tasks are accomplished by two forces: soldiers and heavy equipment. The nature of obstacles requires manpower, with the exception of anti-tank ditches. Vehicle fighting positions 

and most mobility positions require heavy equipment. For these reasons, the top of the form readily 

lends itself to placing platoons (countermobility) on 

one side, and heavy equipment like ACVbulldozer 

and scooploader teams (survivability and mobility) 

on the other. For the sake of convention, place units 

on the left, and equipment teams on the right. 

Therefore, the first step is to list, across the top of 

the form, the engineer platoons expected to be 

available. 

Next, determine how many meters (m) of linear 

obstacle can be constructed. To do this, look at 

Class IV materials within the task force and those expected to be available through brigade. Using your 

obstacles logistics and manpower reference sheet, 

enter the quantity of material available and record 

the corresponding obstacle distance, in meters, from 

the table. Since many obstacles require more than 

one type of material, choose the limiting amount for 

that obstacle. 

The next step is to prepare aE obstacle overlay, 

based on the commander's intent, the desired effects on the enemy, and the terrain. Take care not to 

exceed the sum of meters logistically possible. This 

ensures that your obstacles can be completed, and 

will eliminate the need for drawing up a separate bill 

of materials (BOM) for each obstacle. Let the squad 

and platoon leaders calculate the BOM to draw the 

materials. You only need to know that there is 

enough material to construct the obstacle. 

This logistics constraint leads to an overlay which 

realistically portrays the number of obstacles that 

can be effectively emplaced. Now assign obstacle 

numbers. These will be used to cross-reference the 

matrix. 

If, after allocating all available materials based on 

the commander's priorities, you find that your 

proposed obstacles are unable to produce the 

desired effect on the enemy, you can now plan the 

unresourced obstacles. If you have planned properly, your unresourced obstacles will be those with 

less priority. 

Be sure to check with the task force S-4 before 

you say the materials are unavailable. Often, additional materials may be allotted to you because of 

changing priorities. It is very important for the 

Engineer 33 
''P.racticsthis method w!?hyoor fash 

force s@ff.. . They wi!!be able to see 

the b!"gpfcfure,' and the execution of the 

TF sncrine~r e + plan wi!! he a lot spsier."

commander to know which planned obstacles are 

not resourced. I suspect he will be very interested in 

these. You are telling him that they are essential to 

the defensebut you cannot build them because of 

material shortages. The subject of important but unresourced obstacles tends to get quick "radio 

publicity," and may help you get the necessary 

materials. 

Now, assign the specific obstacles as tasks to the 

platoons. Often the corps company and the divisional platoon have missions that take them from 

one end of the battlefield to the other. Because engineers often travel long distances, elements are difficult to control and responsibilities may become 

foggy. By establishing a convention, this problem 

can be solved. 

Begin by assigning the foremost obstacle on 

either the left or right of the battlefield to a platoon. 

Working from front to rear, assign that platoon tasks 

until it has no available time. Then, working from 

front to rear again, assign tasks to the next platoon. 

Assigning tasks across the battlefield in this manner 

is much like hanging wallpaper. You start at the top, 

work your way down, and then repeat the process. 

Using this technique to assign missions ensures 

that the most important tasks are started first across 

the whole sector. It also creates convenient areas of 

responsibility. There is no need to establish formal 

boundaries because the task force will want to maintain flexibility. 

Also, each engineer squad will know which company team it is supporting and who commands that 

unit. This is an advantage when the squad leader 

coordinates the placement of obstacles. Later, if the 

companylteam commander discovers a problem with 

an obstacle to his front, he need not wander the battlefield to get it straightened out. The engineer unit 

that constructed it will still be to his front. This lends 

itself to a working relationship between the overwatching maneuver unit and the engineers who support it. And the closer coordination between the two 

will solve many problems encountered under the 

34 Engineer 

present system. 

The next step is to schedule the tasks on the 

form. This requires a few rules. Between each task, 

the engineer platoon needs some time, generally 30 

minutes to an hour, to obtain materials, make site 

coordination, and reorganize. Be sure to block that 

time out, and call it "travel time." The platoon should 

enforce a sleep plan (the obstacle logistics and manpower reference sheet reflects this) so the entire 

platoon doesn't have to shut down during obstacle 

construction. 

To fill in the block, draw a line across the platoon 

column at the hour the mission is to start. From the 

overlay, determine the length of the obstacle. Refer 

to the logistics and manpower reference sheet to 

determine the platoon hours required. This amount 

of time determines how far down to draw the end of 

the task line. Between these two lines, place the four 

key elements of information. (Hint: When you are filling it out, the elements are listed at the bottom of 

the form for you-and everyone else-to see.) Enter 

the obstacle number, which can be referenced to the 

overlay to provide the type and location of the 

obstacle, the distance to the obstacle, in meters, and 

the unit overwatching the obstacle. Complete the 

"travel time" block next, and you are ready for 

another mission. 

If needed, list obstacle locations in the mission 

blocks. However, this tends to cause limited coordination with overwatching units and is inaccurate 

when the obstacle is emplaced. Aside from direct observation, actual obstacle locations can be obtained 

from the companylteam commander, who will report 

his fire plan obstacles to the TOC. In addition, the 

engineer unit constructing the obstacle will report actual locations through engineer channels. 

The overlay shows the location and intent of 

obstacles. No one knows where an obstacle will actually end up until the maneuver unit sites it in. The 

task force engineer must approve any obstacle that 

varies significantly from its original location because 

moving the obstacle may alter its intent. 
Heavy Equlpment 

Planning for heavy equipment use is much 

easier. Initially, you need to determine the 

number and types of fighting positions needed. Also 

determine mobility and anti-tank ditch requirements. 

These are usually secondary to survivability. 

Now find out what equipment is available for the 

jobs at hand. A few equations make planning easy. 

Multiply the number of available ACUbulldozers by 

the number of hours available for the defense. 

Blades X available hours = blade hours 

Subtract one-eighth to allow for maintenance and 

refueling. This means that every 8 hours the equipment will not operate for about an hour. This 1-hour 

block goes on the form later. 

Blade hours X 7/8 = blade hours of work 

Now divide the operating hours by the average 

time needed to construct a fighting position. 

Blade hours of work =. number of positions Hours per position 

This provides the number of fighting positions 

that it is possible to build under the current circumstances. If there are other equipment needs, subtract those hours out before working the equation. 

Now that you have a clear understanding of what 

is needed and what is available, allocate positions to 

the maneuver teams. Keep in mind the 

commander's intent, and the impact of the differing 

terrain on each company and team area. 

Staying consistent with the commander's priorities, schedule the equipment on the form. To do 

this, draw a line across the column of the specific 

equipment team at the time it is to begin work. Determine how long it will take the equipment team to 

complete the task by multiplying the number of the 

team's assigned fighting positions by the average 

time needed to construct a position. Then draw an 

end-of-task line across the column at that time. Now, 

just as before, enter the four essential elements of information: 

who uses the equipment, 

how many positions are expected, 

pick-up information, and 

hand-off information. 

After the end-of-task line, allow an hour to get the 

equipment to the next company battle position. 

it is also helpful to put in the 1-hour maintenance 

blocks before recording any missions. Remember to 

stagger the maintenance blocks so that not all equipment teams are stopped at the same time. The contact team with the maintenance truck can only be in 

one place at a time. 

If one equipment team takes too long to complete 

a priority mission, allocate another equipment team 

to assist. The stated mission priorities are your guide 

to solving allocation conflicts. Repeat this process 

until there are no teams available. if there is an 

equipment shortage, quickly request more assets 

from higher headquarters, using your form to support 

the analysis. 

The Advantage 

I

n a very short time, the analysis, planning, and 

recording of engineer support for the defense is 

complete. Copy the overlay and the one page matrix 

and you are ready for the orders brief. 

The matrix time line and block format make it 

"maneuver" readable. The final plan is realistic and 

closely reflects those obstacles that will be on the 

ground at the expected attack time. Compared to 

the standard way of doing TF engineer business, 

the planning process is simpler and the writing requirements are significantly reduced. Informal command and control areas for engineers greatly assist leaders in the execution of the plan. Overall, 

this method allows the engineer to quickly arrive at 

a realistic plan and to record it in a readable 

format. 

This method has proved valuable in all task forces 

of the 194th Armored Brigade on several deployments and exercises. Based on the recommendations of former maneuver battalion commanders, this 

method is taught to officers at the Armor School for 

their use in planning. 

Practice this method with your task force staff. 

Train them on your new system. They will be able to 

see the "big picture," and the execution of the TF engineer plan will be a lot easier. Y 

Captain McKenrick is an Army Resewe officer in 

New Jersey. While on active duty, he sewed with the 

79th Engineer Battalion, and the 522nd Engineer 

Company, 194th Armored Brigade. He was also an 

instructor in the Engineer School's Department of 

Combined Arms. He is a graduate of West Point. 
?ngineer Solution 


Use the Field Estimate Method to determine runoff: 

where: Q = Quantity of water, in cubic feet per second (cfs) 

2 = Constant 

A = Area, in acres 

R = Rainfall intensity (Panama = 2.5 inches per hour) 

C = Coefficient of runoff (ML soil without turf = 0.40) 

Follow the ditch design procedure beginning on page 4-7 of FM 5-335. 

1. Calculate Q: 

Answer: Q = 24 cfs 

2. Determine cross section area (Aw), using the Continuity Equation: 

Q= VxAw 

where: V (velocity)= 4 feet per second (fps) 

Answer: Aw = 6 square feet 

3. Select ditch side slope ratios: 

Answer: Roadside ditch is 3:1 to 1:1 ratio 

4. Select ditch shape: 

Answer: Because Q is less than 60 cfs, use a Vee-shaped ditch. 

5. Compute depth of water: 

Note: X and Y are the horizontal components of the side slope ratios; 

X=3andY=I. 

36 Engineer 
tngineer Solutio 


depth =

J,2 (Aw) 

depth = / 2 (6) 

depth = 1.73 feet ,$ Answer: 1.7 feet 

6. Calculate cutting depth (CD): 

CD =depth + 0.5(freeboard) 

Answer: CD = 2.2 feet 

7. Calculate top width of ditch (TW): 

TW=(X+ Y) CD 

where: X = 3 

Y= 1 

Answer: TW =8.8 feet 

8. Provide a sketch of the ditch 

Road 

Erosion Control 

The slope of the ditch is greater than 2 percent. Therefore, erosion control 

must be considered. Use check dams or line the ditch with rip rap. 

This problem was submitted by CPT Michael F. Malsom, a drainage instructor 

at the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood. 

8.8 -1
Author's Note: This article, as differences in word 

spellings will attest, was originally written for a British 

audience. While my views on the use of ADSM are not 

official in nature, I thought they might be of interest to 

readers on both sides of the Atlantic. 

-Major Alec Peebles 

catterable mines are a fact of life on today's 

battlefields. The United States, Soviet and 

West German armies already have scatterable mine 

systems in service. The United Kingdom will have 

the capacity when MRLS II and Vehicle Launched 

Scatterable Mine Systems (VLSMS) are in service in 

the 1990s. It is timely and relevant, therefore, to consider some of the practical lessons learned by our allies whilst we develop our own tactical doctrine. 

The U.S. has had a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) in service for some years. The artillery 

delivered element is an integral part of brigade and 

battle group level force-on-force training at the National Training Centre (NTC), where the effects of artillery delivered scatterable mines (ADSM) are simulated by fire markers and controllers. 

In consequence, a number of effective tactics for 

the use of ADSM have been developed along with 

the practical techniques needed to ensure that 

ADSM is completely integrated into the all arms battle. Recently the U.S. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 

from 4th Infantry Division (Mechanised), deployed to 

the NTC for a 3-week rotation. In my role as brigade 

engineer and British exchange officer, I was in a unique position not just to observe, but to be a principal 

player in all aspects of the use of ADSM. 

Aim 

The aim of this paper is to show, using the American experience, how ADSM should be used to fight 

the brigade deep battle, and to illustrate the degree 

of integration necessary between both staff and all 

arms units. 

The Battlefield 

The National Training Centre (NTC) is the United 

States Army's premier training facility. Several aspects 

of the facility are unique and, because of them, the 

facility offers the most realistic and demanding training 

environment possible for manoeuvering troops. Some 

of the unique features are: 

A permanent motor rifle regiment (MR Regt)- 

sized opposition force (OPFOR) is established at 

the NTC. This force is trained in Soviet tactics, is 

equipped and organised as a Soviet unit, and 

fights according to Soviet doctrine. They are not 

a controlled enemy but are free players who 

have the advantage of an intimate knowledge of 

the terrain. 

38 Engineer By Major Alee A. Peebles, Royal Engineers 
A Dermanent, fully . equip~ed team of observer . .. 

controllers (OC) are established as direct sup- 


port (DS) down to platoon level. They also pro- 


vide a higher formation control and flank informa- 


tion input. 


All vehicles (including helicopters and aircraft) 


are equipped with Multiple Integrated Laser Ef- 


fects System (MILES) so that the effect of bat- 


tlefield fire is realistically portrayed. Similarly, 


each soldier has individual MILES equipment so 


that casualties and the need for reconstitution is 


a major battlefield problem. 


An electronic system of tracking combat vehicles 


to within 10 meters (m) anywhere on the bat- 


tlefield is centrally controlled. The information is 


displayed in real time on an electronic screen 


and kept as a permanent record for immediate 


and very thorough after action debriefs. 


The NTC is a 50 mile x 40 mile manoeuvre area 


whose only restrictions are its terrain features. 


A very real determination exists in both players 


and controllers to produce the real effect of ac-


tions taken (whether good or bad). 


Although the NTC is not designed specifically to 

test equipment, it is the prime training vehicle for 

mechanised combined arms training. It has become, 

in consequence, the proving ground for equipment in 

a battlefield environment. More significantly, it has 

become the testbed for developing the tactical 

doctrine and necessary techniques for integrating 

equipment into the all arms AirLand Battle. A perfect 

example of this is the use of ADSM. 

PROJECTILE BASE 

I 

-

, 

I M483 

mOJECT1LE CARRIER i

i 

/

-

The Weapon 

The rules of engagement for ADSM remain constant for each battle at NTC: 

Four low-density, two medium-density, or one 

high-density minefield are available. 

Only short delay fuses are used at brigade level, 

i.e., 5 hours to self-destruct. Longer length fuses 

are reserved for higher formations. 

All ADSM fire missions must be authorized by 

division before firing.. In practical terms this means 

that 10-12 minutes must be allowed to get divisional 

approval and a minimum of 7-1 0 minutes from firing 

until mines land and are armed on the ground (for a 

registered target). 

The Players 

On rotation 89-10, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team 

(BCT), part of 4th Infantry Division (Mech), 

deployed to NTC for 3 weeks, including 14 days 

continuous force-on-force manoeuvres in the field. 

The brigade consisted of two balanced task forces, 

each with two armor companies, two infantry companies, one engineer company, and one DS artillery 

battalion, plus brigade-level assets of a support battalion, chemical company (smoke and decontamination), military intelligence (MI), and air defence artillery (ADA) assets. Fixed-wing air, Army aviation, 

and division-level artillery were allocated for all battles depending on real availability and weather. The 

brigade commander, Col J. Dickey, is a very experienced brigade commander and veteran of 

EXPULSION CHARGE 

~577 

FUZE 

BATTERY ACTIVATION ROD 

~~~~~~~~~E. 155MM, HE, M592 1 M731 (ADAM) 

'hot0 courtesy of Honeywell, Incorporated 

Engineer 39 

24 
several NTC deployments, including one as brigade 

commander. This deployment was typical and included four attacks, three movements to contact 

and two defence battles. 

Planning-Effects 

The physical effect of a scatterable minefield once 

it has been emplaced is the same as for a conventionally emplaced minefield, i.e., it will cause some 

casuatties, will probably impose some delay (if only 

from forcing the enemy to carry out a battle drill or to 

avoid the area), and it may cause the enemy to turn 

or divert. 

The criteria for an effective and successful 

minefield must be related to what it is designed to 

achieve. However, two elements are critical for success. Namely, that it must be covered by effective 

fire (either direct or observed indirect) and that it 

must be observed so that the fire can be effectively 

controlled. 

ADSM minefields are unique in that they allow the 

tactical commander to do two things he was previously unable to do. First, he is able to produce an 

effective obstacle anywhere on the battlefield within 

artillery range without committing ground troops or 

exposing their dispositions or strengths. This allows 

the tactical commander to extend the range over 

which he can directly influence enemy movement. 

The ADSM will also increase the effectiveness of 

those weapons which can be brought to bear on the 

enemy at those ranges, e.g. close air support (CAS), 

attack helicopters, and artillery. Second, the weapon 

gives the tactical commander the ability to shape the 

battlefield in response to a changing or developing 

tactical situation. 

The combined effect of these two extra factors is 

that the tactical commander now has a number of 

new options available to him on how to fight the 

brigade deep battle. These, when coordinated with 

other assets, give him an opportunity to seize and 

retain the initiative from the enemy. 

Planning-Options in Defence 

In the brigade deep battle, that is, forward of the 

direct fire zone, engagement areas (EA) will have 

been identified and coordinated. The ADSM can be 

used as a combat multiplier either to delay an 

enemy force within the EAs andlor to deflect a 

moving enemy into them. The targets are thus concentrated and slowed, thereby enhancing the effect 

of those weapons targeted on the engagement area. 

Conventional obstacles may also achieve this if they 

are properly constructed and concealed. The advantage of the ADSM is that there is likely to be a 

number of EAs in the brigade area, and it allows the 

tactical commander to tailor his countermobility plan 

to the tactical situation while not prematurely 

obstructing his own mobility corridors. 

ADSM can be used to orchestrate the battle to 

limit the number of enemy units with which the 

defenders are confronted. The aim is to achieve 

separation of the enemy's first and second echelon 

forces before they enter the direct fire zone. ADSM 

is thus used to disrupt the enemy's ability to mass. 

Typically, a Soviet motorized rifle regiment will attack either three motor rifle battalions (MR Bns) in 

column, or two MR Bn up and one (the trail) 15-20 

minutes behind. (The "trail" is ready to reinforce the 

more successful lead MR Bn.) In either case, the 

40 Engineer 
ADSM is targeted to separate the trail (or third MR 

Bn), allowing the defending ground forces to concentrate on the lead MR Bn. Other brigade-level assets, e.g., CAS, attack helicopters, or MRLS destroy 

the trail MR Bn. Thus, by denying the enemy the 

ability to reinforce quickly or to commit fresh troops 

to a weakened point, the defending force is given 

time to mount a counter penetration operation or to 

readjust their dispositionsin effect, to develop their 

own mass to meet the threat. 

This has been one of the most effective uses of 

ADSM at the NTC, where even a seemingly insignificant delay of 5-10 minutes has been the decisive 

difference between success and failure of a defensive battle. 

In the direct fire zone, the ADSM may equally be 

employed to delay and disrupt an enemy force in the 

direct fire weapon killing areas. It could also be used 

to enhance the obstacle plan which shapes that 

area. (This may have to be done as an expedient 

measure if there has been insufficient time or resources to complete the obstacle plan, or if it has been illconceived and gaps have been left.) It is more effective to use ADSM to reestablish obstacles which 

have been breached or to use it in conjunction with 

a preplanned counter-penetration task. The complications of how these are best controlled and by whom 

on a confined and confused battlefield will be addressed later. 

When moving a force of any size, an ADSM plan to 

Engineer 41 
target likely enemy avenues of approach into an exposed flank is both sensible and obvious. However, 

the options for using ADSM in offensive operations are 

even more diverse than in defensive operations. 

In a meeting engagement scenario, ADSM can be 

used initially to fix in position the enemy lead elements. 

Subsequently, ADSM can be targeted to enhance 

natural terrain features, e.g., an impassable ridge, 

thereby allowing mechanised infantry to establish a 

hasty defence to restrict the enemy's abilrty to conduct 

a flanking movement. The ability to do this quickly requires very slick battle procedure. A decisive commander with a clear battle picture combined with the 

artillery's ability to deliver the mines accurately and 

quickly is essential. Limiting your own freedom of 

movement is a danger in a rapidly changing situation. 

In an attack, the ADSM should be used to restrict 

the enemy's ability to mass by preventing him from 

repositioning, i.e., by firing the ADSM on top of his 

known static locations or by selecting a suitable 

choke point through or round which he must pass. 

Clearly, the prime target in attack is the enemy 

counter-attack force, which will probably also be the 

priority target in attack for other brigade assets, such 

as army aviation or fixed-wing assets. 

Often the enemy tactic is to use hide positions 

and only occupy prepared positions at the last moment (to avoid the artillery preparatory fire). When 

this is the case, two additional options are open. The 

first is to target the hide positions if they can be identified. The second is to target the prepared positions 

to prevent reoccupation. Either course will be influenced by the need for friendly forces to use the 

same ground and by the quality of intelligence information available. It is possible to time the ADSM to 

self-destruct before friendly forces arrive on the 

target. 

The list of options given is not exhaustive, but it illustrates that a clear understanding of the weapon's 

capabilities is needed if the unique qualities are to 

be utilized. 

Essentials For Success 

Concept. The ADSM plan must have a clearly 

defined aim and be designed to support the overall 

concept of operations. At brigade level there are likely to be several contingencies dependent on the 

enemy threat. The ADSM plan must be capable of a 

quick and flexible response. 

Targets. The ability to respond flexibly means that 

many more targets must be planned than can be 

fired. Routinely at the NTC this meant about 20-24 

targets per mission, although a maximum of four 

ADSM targets are authorised. It is also possible to 

shape the target to suit the ground, e.g., 800m x 

42 Engineer 

200m centred on grid 123456 oriented north-south; 

although at the NTC a standard 400 x 400 square 

minefield was used for control simplicity. 

Time. The planning time to obtain release 

authority from division is approximately 10-12 

minutes, while the lead time from firing until the 

mines have landed and armed is approximately 7-10 

minutes for registered targets. There is, therefore, a 

clear requirement for an intelligence trigger if the 

ADSM is to be in position in time to affect the immediate battle. The circumstances needed to trigger individual targets must be defined. 

Triggers. The circumstances (triggers) which 

cause an ADSM mission to be fired are worked out 

according to three factors: 

A straight timeldistance calculation, based on the 

location of the target and the best speed of the 

enemy moving towards it. 

The projected enemy decision points, which are 

either terrain related, e.g., when he has to commit himself to a particular avenue of approach, 

or event related, e.g., when the enemy has to 

commit his trail MR Bn to reinforce one of the 

lead MR Bns. 

Enemy action may force our own troops to a particular course of action for which planned ADSM 

targets may be detrimental. A comparatively 

simple decision support matrix format is used for 

control and to keep all players informed (see 

chart at riaht). 

Intelligence. The receipt of the necessary battle information or intelligence assessments is, therefore, crucial if the ADSM is to be fired in time. The solution to 

the problem depends on gearing the intelligence collection plan to provide the necessary information for 

ADSM triggers. In practical terms, this is a major coordination effort that includes specific taskings for reconnaissance assets on the ground, and utilizing longer 

range assets, e.g., fixed wing, army aviation, direct fire 

assets, etc. 

Equally vital sources of information are division 

and flank formations. (Often enemy decision points 

and friendly trigger lines lay outside the brigade 

boundaries.) Similarly, it is often possible for division 

assets to confirm battlefield reports or vice versa. 

The whole process also has the effect of focusing 

the division intelligence system on the information 

that is critical to the brigade plan. It also helps the 

rapid release of firing authority. 

Assets. When the decision to fire ADSM has 

been made, execution still depends on three factors: 

9 That the artillery and ammunition are still available, i.e., they have not been destroyed or were 

on the move. 
=catterable Mine (FASCAM) Decision Matrix Exam 


vlslon 

Locatia 1 

Aim 	 --.ww-

-. 

DBC Separate effect 

,

.ow den . ,, . .-. . A .

IU June minenelc 

ised rifle southslrn ap 14 passing coordinc 

battalion proacl7 076 with Avic 

from lead 2. Enermy trail Liaison C ..- - MI7 Bn corn fm uttac 

mittedto helicoptc 

southelrn ap from attc 

proacl7 position c 

3. Enemy lead 

MR Bn 

reach63s target loc :ation 

Delay 1. Enemy Eating 34N lvor yet glven Low aen 

enemy in committed to of Northing 12 rninefielc 

southern southern pass mxm: 

pas defile at decision 

point 4 track 

junction 

note 1 See note 2 339140 See note 3 See I ,,,, , 

Not6)S: 

1. 	 s.tandard 4th Infantry, Division t~ zrget nurr 

8 ." ., . . .?,,. 2. 	This aennes me lnrenr or miner1 eld. There may be several different sets or clrcurnsTances wnlcn WII 

trigger the FASCAM. Equally, tk >e minefie lld may meet several aims which would be defined separateiy. 

3. 	 he trigger point ideally should be relate d to a terrain feature to assist the observer asset tasked to 

Dversee It. 

ne authori ity release time, the time the ( tire was 	 3 the FAX:AM was I 

olace. 

That authority for release has been obtained 

from division. 

That the priority of fire has been given to the 

ADSM mission. In practical terms, to fire two lowor one medium-density minefield means being 

without a 3 x 8 artillery battalion for approximately 4-5 minutes, not counting the subsequent 

movement. 

Effwthreness. In order for the ADSM minefield to 

have the maximum effect it, like any other obstacle, 

must be covered by fire. In the case of the brigade 

deep battle, this means coordination of other assets, 

e.g., artillery, attack helicopters or CAS, together 

with the surveillance assets to direct them on the target. Equally important is to report their effect on 

enemy movement and the number of casualties. 

Orchestrating the types of fire to complement the 

ADSM and increase its effect is also possible. For 

example, conventional artillery fired on an enemy 

moving in columns in front of a minefield causes the 

enemy to disperse into battle formation. This causes 

them to incur more casualties from the mines. 

Similarly, the OPFOR tend to reform into columns 

after passing through a minefield when conventional 

fire is again more effective. 

Clearly, the quantity and detail of coordination 

necessary from all elements of the staff as well as 

those engaged on the battlefield is considerable. 

The planning sequence and responsibilities are outlined below. 

Level of Control 

Control is best retained at brigade level. ADSM 

has most influence when it is used as part of the 

brigade deep battle and in conjunction with brigadecontrolled fire assets throughout the whole brigade 

area. It is most effective when used on brigade level 

tasks, such as separating the enemy echelons, 

preventing his repositioning or by delaying his 

counterattack force. 

Speed of reaction to the enemy situation or in obtaining release authoriiy is critical if the ADSM is to 

Engineer 43 
be fired in time. The brigade headquarters is the 

focus for the intelligence collection plan, and with the 

best communications to division can keep delays to 

a minimum. 

Conversely, delegating the control of ADSM to the 

battle group level only produces a problem for the 

brigade commander. He has neither the intelligence assets, time, nor communications necessary to anticipate 

when ADSM is to be fired to be effective. The temptation is to fire ADSM before battle is really pined to 

avoid "losing* indirect fire assets at a critical time. 

Similarly, delegation of control requires a commitment to one or other of the battle groups. Hence, the 

flexibility of response to the enemy action is lost or 

at least complicated. The NTC experience is that 

even when ADSM targets are fired in the direct fire 

zone, they are best fired by the brigade in direct support of the battle group action rather than controlled 

by the battle groups themselves. 

Planning Sequence 

Initial staff work on receipt of mission. In addition to the normal brigade engineer officer (BEO) 

input into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) by the brigade S-2 (intelligence officer) 

such as terrain analysis, battlefield obstacle update, 

and likely enemy engineer courses of action, the 

BE0 identifies terrain suitable for ADSM targets. It 

may be necessary at this stage to tailor target shape 

and orientation of ADSM to ensure the minefields on 

the ground are effective, e.g., extended across the 

whole width of a defile. 

At the same time, the BE0 and fire support officer 

(Arty Ops) must confirm what ADSM has been allocated and what restrictions apply, e.g., release authority, available fuses, or which artillery is to execute 

the missions (this may impose a range restriction). 

Tactical commander's outline concept. Based 

on the IPB, which includes the templated enemy 

positions and his possible courses of action according to doctrine, the tactical commander decides on 

the brigade concept of operations for each eventuality. As part of that process, the overall aim and 

possible uses for ADSM are identified. The crucial 

elements are to clearly identify what effect on the 

enemy the ADSM is designed to achieve and to establish which circumstances are to trigger the 

decision to fire ADSM. 

This process allows the BE0 to produce a combined target list and decision support matrix. This is 

the basis for the control of the ADSM during the battle. It contains not just locations, type and shape of 

the ADSM targets, but also the decision criteria and 

triggers for each one. The ADSM decision support 

matrix is included in the brigade order in parallel with 

the brigade obstacle plan with which it has been 

coordinated. 

Subsequent staff actions and coordination. 

The decision support matrix is used by the brigade 

S-2 to identify priority intelligence requirement (PIR) 

and to incorporate them into the intelligence collection plan tasking brigade and battle group assets accordingly. Similarly the PIR are passed to the 

division and flank formations via the intelligence net. 

The FSO (Arty Ops) uses the matrix to register targets in the digital tacfire systems. It is often possible 

to checkfire and adjust the targets and thereby to 

rehearse and prove both the artillery execution and 

the reconnaissancelsurveillance assets tasked to 

oversee them. In defence, the registration can be 

done by the artillery target surveyor system (PADS) 

to keep the target location secure. Other artillery targets are planned in conjunction with the ADSM to 

complement it. Artillery problems can also be identified at this stage, e.g., for a movement to contact, 

artillery assets somet~mes have to be moved forward 

early to provide the necessary range. 

The BE0 passes the ADSM plan to both the 

division engineer and the division G-3 (operations), 

requesting release authority from the latter for the 

top priority targets. This is sometimes given early although usually with some qualification, e.g., release 

given from 30 minutes prior to line of departure time 

(H hour). 

The battle group commanders, after a similar initial planning sequence at the lower level, may identify further ADSM targets to support the close contact battle, or seek adjustments to the brigade target 

list. These are agreed and are incorporated into the 

brigade decision support matrix rather than be a 

separate list. For each new target or adjustment to 

the list, all the staff actions have to take place. This 

takes considerable time and effort. 

Further coordination with the air liaison officer 

(ALO) and the aviation LO is needed to preplan how 

those assets will be orchestrated and controlled on 

the battlefield to make maximum use of the opportunity ADSM provides. This is part of the overall coordination of fire plan when detailed control arrangements and priorities of fire and of targets are 

coordinated. 

The final function to be performed, which is crucial 

to achieving success, is a full staff rehearsal of the 

plan. This staff rehearsal on a large-scale sand 

model is a brigade staff prebattle SOP for the whole 

battle. It is the means whereby all those who will be 

or could become involved in fighting the battle are 

fully informed and made to understand the concepts 

and priorities of the battle, and how it is to be executed and controlled. It includes not only all principle staff but the ALO, attack helicopter LO, air battle 

44 Engineer 
captain, and those who will be running the battle 

from the TOC (main HQ), jump TOC (alternate HQ), 

and tac HQ. The rehearsal does not necessarily include subordinate commanders, although they are 

desirable. The rehearsal often exposes shortfalls 

and the need for further coordination. It is also used 

as the vehicle to design some redundancy into the 

plan particularly in communication aspects. 

Battle Fighting 

The long, involved and time-consuming planning 

and coordination process is proved justified when 

the battle is fought. It clarifies the responsibility of 

the principle staff, who are therefore better able to 

anticipate requirements and react quickly. The 

responsibilities are: 

The brigade commander, or XO, fights the battle 

and makes all executive decisions either to fire or to 

change the priority of ADSM targets. 

The brigade S-2 (intelligence officer) coordinates 

the information from all agencies plotted on the 

operations map and from which he produces his assessment of enemy intentions. 

The FSO (Arty Ops) executes the ADSM and 

keeps the brigade staff updated on likely reaction 

time if the executive order is given. 

The BE0 is the overall coordinator of the ADSM 

battle. This involves correlating all the intelligence information with the ADSM decision support matrix 

and recommending to the commander which targets 

should have priority and what the trigger events are. 

He is also able to assess how much time is available to make the decision. When changes are 

needed, which is often, the BE0 obtains release 

authority from division, warns the other staff, e.g., 

FSO, ALO and aviation, and passes the scatterable 

mine warning report up to division. 

Once the executive order is given to fire the 

ADSM, the BE0 ensures that it is properly recorded 

and reported. An accurate report on its effect is 

often difficult to obtain in a confused battle, however. 

The reporting is critical to maintain an accurate battle map, and to record when short time delay selfdestruct fuses have been fired. 

The distribution of responsibility serves two other 

important functions besides ensuring that the ADSM 

is used effectively. First, it allows the battle commander to concentrate on making decisions while 

being sure he is being fed the right information to be 

able to react in time. Second, it ensures that the engineer has a real and crucial part to play in fighting 

the battle, often carrying out functions which are 

usually S-3 (Operations) actions. This serves to 

relieve the pressure on the operations staff at critical 

times in the battle. 

Summary 

The main points are: 

9 Artillery delivered scatterable mines (ADSM) can 

be a decisive battle-winning factor in both offence and defence. 

ADSM are most effective when used in the 

brigade deep battle, where they can allow the 

tactical commander to seize and retain the 

initiative. 

ADSM must be used to support the overall concept of operations and are most effective when 

used to disrupt the enemy's ability to mass. 

Their use must be planned and controlled at 

brigade level, where a specific member of the 

brigade staff should be responsible for overall 

coordination of planning and control during battle. 

Firing scatterable mines in response to enemy 

action requires significant lead time. Clear trigger lines and decision criteria must be identified 

in the plan and integrated into the intelligence 

collection plan using all available assets if these 

lead lines are to be met. The decision support 

matrix is a simple, well proven technique to assist in this process. 

It is insufficient to regard ADSM as a weapon 

which can be pulled out and used if the right circumstances arise. It will simply not operate in 

time. 

Conclusion 

It is not possible to make detailed comparisons between the U.S. Army artillery delivered scatterable 

mine (ADSM) system and our MRLS 11. The 

weapons, organisations and philosophy of how to 

fight are very different. However, the fundamental 

employment options and the requirements for planning and control to use the weapons effectively are 

the same for both systems. A study of the proven 

American tactics and techniques is, therefore, 

relevant and should be studied and applied to the 

British organisation when developing our own tactical doctrine. YI 

Major Peebles is a British engineer exchange officer 

assigned to the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. His 

previous assignment was as an instructor at the 

United Kingdom Combined Arms Tactics Course. He 

is a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, 

Sandhurst, and holds a civil engineering degree from 

the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham. 

Engineer 45 
By Colonel Ron Dabbieri, 


Chief, Combat Support Career Division, 


Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, 


U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) 


A Speech Presented at the Signal 


Corps Association Regimental 


Dinner, Fort Gordon, Georgia, 


April 25, 1990 


ver the next few years the Army will be 

faced with some significant leadership chal- -

lenges. My intention here is to explain a 

philosophy as to how we, as leaders, should approach these challenges. A few years ago when I 

was commanding the 2d Engineer Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, in Korea, I had an executive officer named Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Tom 

Tindall, who introduced me to the term "misplaced 

compassion." Since then I have run across the 

same concept termed "tough caring," among other 

things, and I have tried to apply it in my dealings 

with both situations and people. The best way to 

explain it is to use a couple of examples. 

A good tactical example would be when a unit 

goes through MOPP training in chemical protective gear during the summer. -4lthough it may become uncomfortable, unless troops are endangered 

by the training, being merely uncomfortable is not 

a reason to compromise the training. Because I 

troops only do in combat what they have practiced 

in training, a leader who feels sorry for his troops 

and allows them to cheat and remove their protective masks in training is setting them up to do the 

same if they were to ever get into an actual chemical environment. 

I 

, 

I 

46 Engineer 
Another good example is physical training. Not 

making troops get into shape during peacetime 

means they will not have the stamina to survive 

in combat. Is it not much more compassionate, 

more humane, to make them do the right thing in 

training so they will not die in combat? 

Although it is very clear how misplaced compassion applies to training, it has a definite application in the personnel business, and I want to explain how all leaders should use this concept to 

guide their actions in dealing with subordinates. 

Both the command sergeant major and sergeant 

first class promotion lists were recently released. 

As is always the case when a list is released, I 

was deluged with phone calls from soldiers asking 

"why wasn't I selected?" and from leaders (some 

with four stars) asking "why wasn't my main man 

selected?" Because I've been asked this question 

so many times during the two years I've been in 

PERSCOM, I have done some extensive research 

into what enlisted centralized selection boards 

look for in a selectee. I have thoroughly analyzed 

two years worth of after action reports prepared 

by each panel for branch proponents, interviewed 

members of nine promotion panels, and screened 

thousands of records of selectees and non-selectees. I feel that I have developed a fairly good understanding of what promotion boards for the 

branches I manage (Signal, Engineer, Aviation, 

Transportation, Military Police and Military Intelligence) are looking for. The most important attribute is outstanding performance in the tough 

TOE leadership positions. 

The Attention Getter 

henever I talk to leaders, especially officers, I get their attention by questioning 

how much interest they really have in their enlisted soldiers. I do this by asking what the selection rates to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel 

were this year. Almost every officer, even second 

lieutenants who don't have a prayer of being 

retained past their initial term of obligated service, can tell me within 2 percent the right 

answers. (Just for comparison it ranges from 

about 70 percent for major to 40 percent for 

colonel). 

Then I ask what the selection rate was for sergeant first class for the list released in March 90, 

and I get blank stares. After I give the hint that a 

staff sergeant had a 42 percent greater selection 

chance this year than last I start getting guesses 

from 60 percent to 80 percent. The real answer is 

this year the SFC selection rate soared up to 15.6 

percent, which is 42 percent greater that it was 

last year when it was 11.2 percent. This year the 

selection rate to master sergeant was 17.1 percent, the highest it has been in years. Last year it 

was 12.7 percent. Today a staff sergeant has a 

less than 3 percent chance of ever making master 

sergeant! 

With these low selection rates, boards are not 

only looking for outstanding NCO Evaluation 

Reports (NCOERs), they are looking at what the 

NCO was doing when he got the outstanding 

NCOER. They refer to jobs like platoon sergeant, 

first sergeant, and other TOE leadership jobs as 

being the '%igh risk-high payoff' positions. An 

NCO who wants to get promoted can't afford to sit 

back, he has to go out and aggressively seek those 

tough leadership jobs. Commanders and leaders 

also have an obligation to help worthy NCOs by 

putting them into those "high payoff' jobs. All too 

often, NCOs avoid these positions either because 

they are afraid of them due to their lack of previous leadership experience, or they are complacent and happy to let someone else do the 

tough jobs. 

Why Me? 

e all know NCOs who are delighted to 

spend many years behind the podium as a 

service school instriitor, going home at 1600 

hours every night. They can perform any mission, 

just so long as it is under environmentally controlled conditions-air conditioned in the summer, 

close to a heater in the winter, and within arm's 

reach of a coffee pot. Letting them stay there 

forever-is that true compassion? Yes, soldiers 

who do this are selecting themselves for non-selection. Yet, even though they know the end result is 

bei~g"passed over" for promotion, these are the 

first guys to call me when the board results are 

released asking "why wasn't I selected?" 

True compassion is to make these NCOs move 

to a location where the job they need for professional development is available, tell them what 

that job is, and encourage them to seek those 

tough leadership challenges. Many of these NCOs 

were simply afraid to try the TOE positions, but 

after being forced to, they do well. They just 

needed to mature into them. With the number of 

NCOs that have repetitive platoon sergeant tours 

back to back and done well in them, it is obvious 

that in most Career Management Fields (CMFs) 

there are more than enough to go around. Some 

NCOs feel comfortable doing them over and over 

again after they have gotten the first successful 

tour under their belt. Commanders and leaders 

need to show real compassion by encouraging all 

Engineer 47 
1 

good NCOs to seek these "high risk-high payofl" 

positions and helping them develop into 

"promotable" leaders. 

Chauffeurs vs. Leaders 

Sometimes commanders and leaders are 

either selfish in using: soldiers or don't understand the effect they have in the NCO's career by 

the jobs they keep them in. The best example of 

this occurred at 0730 hours on the morning the 

last SFC list was released. PERSCOM got two 

calls from two senior generals asking "why didn't 

my driver get selected?" With the short suspense I 

had, it was fortunate I had done an analysis of 

selection rates of VIP chauffeurs a few months earlier to provide professional development counselling for one of these same two NCOs. Both were 

primary zone SFC non-selects with excellent 

records, high GT scores, high school degrees, 

ANCOC graduates, and outstanding NCOERs-all 

with three-star or above raters. My analysis a few 

months earlier was that it would have been a 

miracle if either one of these two NCOs were to 

have ever been selected! 

SFC promotion boards are asking the question 

"Do I want this NCO to be a platoon sergeant for 

me?" and if the answer is no, then the NCO is a nonselect. In this case, these generals had been keeping 

these drivers with them as they went from assignment to assignment, or arranging for them to drive 

for other generals. Unfortunately, the members of 

the Transportation Promotion Panel do not recognize the "leadership* associated with driving a general officer, so they rarely select them for promotion. 

Jobs and Careers 

This does not mean that one tour as a VIP 

A driver ends a career. I'm talking about the 

NCO who stays a driver and avoids the tough 

TOE leadership position. With a 15.6 percent selection rate, there are more than enough soldiers 

who have been truck platoon sergeants and 

maneuver support platoon sergeants to fill the 

quotas without selecting soldiers who have never 

served in a tactical leadership position. Misplaced 

compassion is helping that NCO avoid the tough 

job that might have allowed him to be selected. 

Now, understand that the Transportation Corps 

is not alone in having jobs that must be done but 

that are less than career enhancing. MPs have accident investigators and dog handlers, and engineers have repair and utilities NCOs. And it 

doesn't help for anyone to work out of their MOS. 

48 Engineer 

Sometimes commanders just must have a job 

done, but they need to realize the effect it has on 

the NCO's career. And they need to make sure 

that don't keep that soldier in that position for too 

long. If you don't have a supply sergeant and you 

absolutely have to put your 31Y commo chief in 

there to hold it together, recognize the fact thateven if you give him great NCOERs-he is still 

going to be hurt by it. Promotion boards promote 

people because of how well they perform in their 

own MOS, not in another one. 

Another good example of misplaced compassion 

is when a commander or leader helps a subordinate get off an overseas assignment. First, it 

should be noted that selection boards view overseas service favorably. Soldiers who have performed their fair share of the tough overseas duty 

tend to have better career patterns, more varied 

assignments, more leadership experience, and 

higher selection rates. Selection panel members 

tell me they know what the turn around times are 

in their CMFs and it is obvious when someone has 

not done his fair share. When a soldier is selected 

for an overseas assignment, he is the most eligible 

to perform that duty. Overseas assignments must 

be filled, so when a soldier is deleted from the assignment, another less eligible soldier has to take 

his place, and he gets a lot less lead time. When 

leaders, believing they are being compassionate, 

help a soldier manipulate the system to avoid an 

overseas tour, they need to show a little compassion for the other poor soldier, who is less eligible, 

but who now has to replace the shirker. 

The system is fair. If everyone takes his fair 

turn in the rotation for both long and short overseas tours to USAREUR, Korea, and Panama, 

then there will be a maximum turn around time 

for everyone. Commanders, do what is right and 

show compassion for all soldiers. 

The Rush to Reclassify 

Another phenomena occurs right after a romotion list is released: the number of soldiers who clamor to reclassify, and the number of 

commanders who blindly sign the recommendation 

for approval on the DA Form 4187, without even 

talking to the soldier. First, understand that in 

many cases reclassifying out of a grossly overstrength dead-end MOS is a good career move, but 

the soldier needs to be smart about it. 

My research shows that very few NCOs, staff 

sergeant and above, who reclassify out of their 

CMF, and especially out of their branch, ever get 

promoted. I have questioned panel members why 

this occurs. I've been told that there is no bias 
against them, but when an NCO reclassifies, he 

gets Skill Level 1training and maybe BNCOC if 

he is lucky. Then he is expected to supervise soldiers who have been in the MOS for years. This 

can be a "mission impossible," and normally their 

first few NCOERs are not good. With the low selection rates, you don't need too many mediocre 

NCOERs to be non-competitive. Also, selection 

boards have more than enough 'Chome grown," inthe-branch NCOs with outstanding records to fill 

all the promotion quotas without looking for opportunists who came into the branch late in life. 

As a battalion commander, if your XO came in 

to see you about a branch transfer to be a 

dietitian because they had a 100 percent selection 

rate to LTC this year and your branch didn't do as 

well, wouldn't you set him down and counsel him? 

Wouldn't you say to him "Look, you've been a 

platoon leader, company commander, and now a 

battalion XO in this branch, what do you know 

about being a dietitian? Yes, they had a good selection rate but they're not going to select you!" 

Instead of giving your NCO the instant gratification of approving his request, don't you owe it to 

him to counsel him so that he makes the right 

decision? My advice is to stay in the same branch 

where there is a great deal of transferability of 

skill, and the members of the promotion boards 

have been members of your branch all along. 

"Not in my Army!" 

Another area where I see many instances of isplaced compassion is mandatory reclassification actions where an NCO has lost qualification for an MOS through his own misconduct. A 

security clearance is required to hold many MOSS, 

especially in the Signal Corps, Military Intelligence, and Military Police branches. I have seen 

numerous instances where an NCO has committed 

repeated acts of misconduct, in many cases 

without any disciplinary action being taken, and 

the commander simply wants me to move the individual out of his branch. The attitude seems to 

be "this NCO is good enough to be in the Armyjust not my Army!" 

If it's possible, I leave the individual in the 

MOS and return the action back to the commander to reevaluate the NCO's retention potential. PERSCOM mandatory reclassification rules 

leave the soldier in the same CMF or branch if 

possible, then he stays in the same category (Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support). In these circumstances, if I could, I would 

enter this substandard individual (along with the 

, commander who wants to keep him in the Army) 

into the Married Army Couples Program so they 

could be together for the rest of their careers. The 

problem is, if we do retain one of these soldiers on 

active duty, some other branch has to take him 

and he blocks a promotion for some other good soldier who has paid his dues in the MOS-and that 

is not fair. 

Commanders, when you have a soldier who 

must be reclassified because of his own misconduct, take care of your own dirty linen and don't 

just shuffle your problem off to another branch. 

This is truly the definition of misplaced compassion, when you show compassion for a substandard NCO. You don't want him in your branch or 

unit, yet you allow him to continue to take up 

space and stripes in our Army that rightfully 

belong to a good and deserving soldier. Here, what 

we need is a little compassion for the other soldiers that this guy is holding back-or the soldiers 

being subjected to this NCO's substandard 

leadership. 

If you have been reading the Army Times, you 

know about as much as anybody about Army force 

structure and strength reductions in the years to 

come. We have already begun to draw down forces 

and inactivate units at Fort Lewis and Fort Knox, 

and are planning for reductions at Fort Hood. 

Tomorrow's Army 

The future size of the Army will be in- 

.& fluenced by national strategy, the changing 

threat, and the budget. The strength of the Army 

will be adjusted to keep authorizations and inventory in sync. The number most commonly quoted 

is about a 580,000 soldier Army by N 96/97. This 

would mean about a 35,000 loss every year between now and then. The Chief of Staff guidance 

has been not to sacrifice readiness and, as a matter of fact, he expects readiness to improve. Some 

things to consider-today's Army is built on volunteers, they are quality soldiers not eager to leave 

the service. This is not a demobilization exercise 

like after our wars where people were eager to get 

back to civilian life. 

Given this, the personnel principles we will be 

guided by are: 

b Protect quality 

b Care and compassion 

b Shape the force for the future 

b Common sense 

b Sustain readiness 

So what have we already done in FY 90? 

Engineer 49 
b Reduced by 18,000 the number of new accessions into the Army. 

b Reduced MACOM first term reenlistment missions from 34,400 to 27,000. 

b As of April 1,1990, greatly reduced reenlistment options. Career soldiers with 10years 

or more time in service can reenlist Regular 

Army or leave service. Several other options 

have also been greatly reduced. 

b,Curtailed Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 

(SRBs) to cover only the most critical MOSS. 

b This year an estimated 1100 substandard 

NCOs will be eliminated as a result of 

Qualitative Management Program (QMP) actions. The zone of QMP consideration for the 

July 1990 master sergeant board will include 

all sergeants first class with one year time in 

grade. Previously, only those NCOs in the 

zone of consideration for promotion were 

scrutinized. 

b Granted commanders authority to separate 

early those soldiers barred from reenlistment, 

if they volunteer for such action and the commander feels the soldier is not capable of overcoming the bar. Here, it is incumbent upon 

the commander to counsel the soldier on the 

merits of cutting his losses and starting over 

as a civilian rather than hanging around 

until ETS. 

b Provided authority to separate soldiers up to 

90 days prior to normal ETS. We are seeking 

authority to separate soldiers up to one year 

early in units affected by reductions, who do 

not intend to reenlist,'provided there are no 

loss of benefits. 

b Internal to PERSCOM, liberalized standards 

for approving "exception to policyn retirements. The two year lock-in for promotion is 

routinely waived for soldiers who want to 

retire immediately rather than accept an overseas assignment. A warning here is that you 

must submit immediately and retire as soon 

as you reach 20 years service. Don't expect to 

be -allowed to decline an unaccompanied assignment and then, six months after you come 

down on instructions, be allowed to submit 

your retirement. 

And what do I see coming up in FY 91 and 

beyond? 

Continued reductions in accessions. 

b Continued early separations for substandard 

soldiers (bars and QMP). 

50 Engineer 

b Possible reductions in reenlistment control 

points (RCP). 

I can't provide any guarantees, but it is the 

Army's position to do everything possible to avoid 

an enlisted reduction in force (RIF). 

As commanders and leaders-what can you do 

to help? 

Be selective in reenlisting soldiers. Go for the 

quality. Remember, if you allow a less-thanquality soldier to reenlist today, he may displace a 

good soldier who we won't have room for tomorrow. 

When a soldier commits an act of misconduct 

that requires you to revoke his security clearance-take a hard look at him. Don't just hand 

him off to another branch by reclassifying him. Do 

the right thing even if it means separating him. 

mb Straight Talk e frank and honest with your soldiers when 

lrL7you counsel them. As a commander you can 

tell when a soldier does not have the to 

complete a successful career. Tell that soldier to 

cut his losses early and get out. It is much more 

compassionate and humane for that individual to 

get a new start as a civilian after a first term of 

service than to invest 12 or 15 years in service 

only to be QMP'd or separated. It is also much 

more compassionate for other soldiers so that they 

are not subjected to substandard leadership from 

an inferior NCO. It also clears the way for more 

capable junior leaders to be promoted. 

In closing, I would like to relate this all back to 

compassion. A really compassionate leader cares 

for his subordinates, he makes them do the tough 

things that prepares them for promotion, and he 

is frank with them in providing the very best advice he can. It may not be what they want to hear 

but is always what they need to hear. 

When a commander or leader does the right 

thing morally and ethically, invariably it is the 

right thing for the Army and the right thing for 

the soldier. The soldier just may not know it at 

the time. u 


Colonel Dabbieri is an engineer officer and former 

enlisted soldier. Commissioned from Engineer OCS, 

he served in Vietnam and has commanded four 

companies. He served as the executive officer of the 

19th Engineer Battalion, 194th Armor Brigade, 

and commanded the 2d Engineer Battalion, 2d Znfantry Division, in Korea. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the National 

War College. 
LESSONS LEARNED 


By Captain Neal T. Lovell, DOES 

This column concentrates on Honduras, where 

several Army engineer units have been involved in 

humanitarian construction projects over the past 

several years. It is a sample of the information available upon request from the Engineer School. For 

more information write to: Commandant, U.S. Army 

Engineer School, A 77N:A TSEESAL, Fort Leonard 

Wood, MO 65473-6630 

ISSUE: Effects of lime slurry on 6000-gallon water 

distributors. 

DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment, commercially 

available lime slurry distributors were planned for 

use in lime slurry operations. Several vendors were 

located and lease prices were obtained, but the 

costs submitted to the brigade S-4 were determined 

excessive. Also, some vendors did not want to bid 

on the lease of single distributors, they wanted to 

lease a package of equipment. The only other distributors available on short notice were organic 6000- 

gallon water distributors that belonged to another engineer battalion. The decision was made to use 

them. 

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure funds for future 

projects that require lime stabilization are sufficient 

to include the lease of suitable commercially available distributors and that adequate lead time is 

provided for procurement. 

ENGINEER SCHOOL COMMENTS: There is no 

on-going action to procure distributors made specifically for lime slurry operations. Several sizes of 

water distributors suitable for lime slurry operations 

are available in the supply system. However, users 

must clean the equipment thoroughly after use. 

ISSUE: Mix of vehicles used for a task force support battalion's (TFSB) transportation fleet. 

DISCUSSION: The TFSB deployed with ten M923 

5-ton cargo trucks and six M931 tactical tractors that 

would be used as a line haul transportation fleet. 

The vehicles were required to travel on mountainous 

terrain with many hairpin curves. Portions of the 

route between San Lorenzo and Sato Cano, Honduras, are in disrepair and would be considered offroad conditions in the U.S. The M931 tactical tractors were selected because they can be driven 

off-road. It was difficult for the M923 5-ton cargo 

trucks to travel down steep grades at safe speeds. 

Because both vehicles have diesel engines and semiautomatic transmissions, drivers could not effectively 

use downshifting to slow their speed. The only way 

to keep vehicles within prescribed limits was to ride 

the brakes. This action caused the brakes to overheat and "glaze," requiring extensive maintenance 

after each convoy. 

RECOMMENDATION: Deploy six M915 tractors 

in addition to the six M931 tractors. The M915s have 

a "retarder" that can slow the vehicle without riding 

the brakes. Use the M915s for line haul assets and 

the M931 s for local off-road runs. 

ISSUE: Construction of tent floors. 

DISCUSSION: Original base camp construction 

plans called for using 4' X 8' prefabricated tent pads 

to construct tent floors. Only one-half of the required 

tent pads could be contracted out due to dollar ceilings. Construction of the rest was time consuming 

because it required cutting and nailing lumber. 

RECOMMENDATION: Prefabricated tent pads are 

expensive and unnecessary. The following alternate 

method eliminates the need for cutting wood or nailing boards together, and it eliminates waste when 

teardown occurs. The method uses 2' X 4' lumber 

placed (wide side down) along the tent sides and 

down the center. Then 1' X 6' or 1' X 8' lumber is 

laid on top of the 2' X 4's to form a satisfactory floor. 

ISSUE: Threat 

DISCUSSION: The greatest threat to the task 

force was, as predicted, theft and population control. 

Local Hondurans, including children, vendors, 

thieves, and prostitutes, continually surrounded the 

Engineer 51 
base camps, work sites, and equipment parks. 

Some of them looked for opportunities to steal or 

sell their wares to soldiers. The situation was complicated by friendly soldiers, who encouraged the sale 

of sodas, goods, fruit and sex. Because of this activity, safety became a major concern for both Hondurans and U.S. soldiers. 

RECOMMENDATION: The key to population control is command involvement, soldier discipline, and 

physical barriers. Commanders and first-line supervisors must make soldiers aware of the threat and 

discipline them early in the deployment. Soldiers 

must not give handouts to local citizens because this 

practice encourages the problem. Use the chaplain's 

office or the public affairs office to operate any 

programs that donate items to the local populous. 

ISSUE: Use of Honduran guards 

DISCUSSION: It was necessary to use Hondurans as guards, and one task force employed between 10 and 43 guards at any time. Breakdown of 

security for the different phases of operations included port operations, base camp developmentlteardown, and construction. Guard requirements 

changed for each phase. Because the exercise encompassed a large area of operation, the requirement for Honduran guards was large. During ship 

onJoff load, 10 Honduran guards were employed 

with an equal number of U.S. guards at the vehicle 

marshalling area. Ideally, the ratio of Honduran to 

U.S. guards should be 1:1 to ensure overlap and 

joint HOJUS participation. Guard requirements for 

base camp development/teardown rose and fell, 

depending on the size of the U.S. force. 

Most of the Honduran guards came from the 11 th 

Infantry Battalion (HO), although a few came from 

the 1 Olst Infantry Brigade. These soldiers were very 

young, 14 - 19 years old, inexperienced, and had little education. All Honduran guards had one NCO 

with them at all times. At night, they were alert and 

extremely sensitive to movements near the perimeter. They did not hesitate to fire warning shots or 

bodily apprehend intruders. Also, they did not adhere to JTF-B rules of engagement, but took instructions from their Honduran commander. 

RECOMMENDATION: Use Honduran guards as 

much as possible, but be realistic in your requirements. Local Honduran units may not be able to 

meet the total guard requirement, so establish 

priorities and coordinate with the Honduran commander and S-3 prior to deployment. Honduran soldiers appreciate the opportunity to be with U.S. 

forces. 

ISSUE: Delivery of construction materials. 

DISCUSSION: Contractors delivering construction 

materials were directed to one of two base camps, 

depending on the project materials they had. Strict control of materials became difficult because there was confusion about which materials went where, and some 

deliveries contained material for projects at both base 

camps. The haste to off-load complicated the problem. 

In an attempt to correct the problem, the task force S-4 

directed that all material be delivered to one location. 

RECOMMENDATION:If the task force (TF) is 

composed of more than one battalion (i.e., controlled 

by a group or brigade), establish a central Class IV 

receipt and issue yard. Require subordinate units to 

augment the TF or brigade S-4 staff section with 

stock control personnel. 

ISSUE: Poor quality of contractors and construction material. 

DISCUSSION: Failure of contractors to meet required delivery dates and poor quality of construction 

materials created delays in project starts and completions. Delivery of construction materials such as 

base-camp lumber, gravel, culverts and sand was difficult. Most of the materials were ordered through 

the JTF-B contracting office well in advance. However, many of the Honduran contractors failed to 

meet their scheduled delivery date or provide the required quantity of materials. 

RECOMMENDATION: Establish a list of reliable 

contractors for construction materials. The unit must 

request construction materials for projects early in 

the planning cycle to allow for receipt by the JTF-B 

Class IV yard (DCSENG) at least two months prior 

to STARTEX. In addition, each bill of materials must 

be identified by project number. 

ISSUE: Number and type of vehicles deployed as 

line haul assets. 

DISCUSSION: The TFSB deployed with ten M923 

5-ton cargo trucks and six M931 tactical tractors, 

which would be used as the line haul transportation 

fleet. The TFSB was forced to augment them with 

unit organic vehicles at the rate of three 5-ton tractors per day for a 2-week period. The requirement to 

transport rations, lumber, concertina, and major assemblies far exceeded the TFSB's capability during 

this time. In the redeployment phase, the organic 

vehicles were not available to augment the transportation fleet because they had already passed customs inspection. The unit could not afford the loss of 

these vehicles during redeployment. 

RECOMMENDATION:The transportation fleet for 

a battalion-plus sized TF should consist of six M931 

tractors, six M915 tractors, ten M871 trailers, four 

M874 trailers, and ten M923 cargo trucks. 

52 Engineer 
iENGINEER UPDATE 


Directorate of Training and ARTEP 5-145-11-DRILL, "Engineer Battle and Crew Drills," 

Doctrine scheduled. ARTEP 5-145-11-DRILL is scheduled for printing in the (DOTD) 	 4th quarter of FY 1990. This manual describes the most common 

engineer battle and crew drills for all types of engineer organizations. Battle drills, designed for platoons and smaller elements, are 

collective actions executed without a deliberate decision-making 

process. Crew drills are a form of battle drill designed for crews or 

specific items of equipment (AVLB or CEV). Each engineer organization will choose the battle and/or crew drills that support their 

METL. POC is CPT James Glass, (314) 563-7784. 

Department of Military Scatterable Mine Information Declassified. The self-destruct 

Engineering (DME) 	 (SD) times and the safe separation and arming (S&A) times for U.S. 

scatterable mines have been declassified. For U.S. scatterable 

mines the self-destruct times are: 

DAMIRAAMS (M692JM718) 

GEMSS (M74lM75) 

MOPMS (M76JM77) 

Mines will start to self-destruct at 80 percent of their SD time. 

When the full SD period is reached, no mines will remain. Mines 

with a 4-hour SD time will start to self-destruct at 3 hours and 12 

minutes. When the 4-hour self-destruct period is reached, no unexploded mines should exist. The probability of a live mine existing 

past its SD time is 1 in 1000. 

Although most U.S. scatterable mines have an S&A time of 2 

minutes, the S&A time is 45 minutes for GEMMS mines and 90 

seconds for MOPMS. An on-going product improvement program will 

reduce the S&A time of ADAMJRAAMS mines from 2 minutes to 45 

seconds. During the S&A time period, the mines conduct a self-test. 

If a mine fails the self-test, it will self-destruct at the arming time. 

VOLCANO mines self-destruct at the S&A time (2 minutes) at a rate 

of 13 per 1000. POC is CAPT Joe Jenkins, (314) 563-5595. 

Medium Girder Bridge (MGB) Upgraded. The MGB has been 

approved for MLC 70 in the following configurations: 

Engineer 53 
Directorate of Combat 


Developments (DCD) 


54 Engineer 

Note 1 - For MLC 70 tracked (T) and MLC 100 wheeled (W) configurations, the bridge width should be shown on a sign, as shown in 

STANAG 2010. 

Note 2 - MLC 100(W) span has not yet been confirmed by tests. 

POC is Joe Cowgill, (314) 563-5835. 

Information For Short-of-war Manual Requested. Your ideas and 

experiences are needed for a manual tentatively titled, "Engineers in 

Operations Short of War." Topics will include engineer support in 

deployments, military construction, peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism, mobile training teams, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and nation assistance. A coordinating draft is planned for fielding 

in 4th quarter, FY 1990. POC is CPT Doug Houck, (314) 563-5671. 

Team Leaders Sought for Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

(EOAC). Are you looking for a continuing challenge after a successful tour as company commander? Come to Fort Leonard Wood and 

be a team leader for the EOAC. As a team leader, you are responsible for the training, coaching, and total fitness programs for 12-15 

EOAC students. They include Army (Active, National Guard, and 

Reserves), Marine Corps, and International officers. Your primary 

roles include small group instructor, facilitator, counselor, team 

leader, subject matter expert, and role model for the officer students. 

We want to make the Engineer School the best leader training 

facility in TRADOC. If interested, contact your captains' assignment 

officer at Headquarters, DA, and let your desires be known. POC is 

LTC Lloyd Evans, AV 676-5754 or (314) 563-5754. 

Reforger 90 Concept Evaluation Program (CEP). The TRADOC 

Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) conducted a CEP 

during the REFORGER 90, Centurion Shield exercise to assess the 

division engineer (DIVENG, formerly E-FORCE) force structure. 

Results of the CEP demonstrated significant improvement in command and control, maneuver force combat effectiveness, and corps 

flexibility. A report describing results will be fielded in June 1990. 
TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) Completes Engineer 

Structure Study. A study to compare three engineer force structure 

alternatives against current engineer force design was completed in 

June 1990. The study used several analytic tools, including spreadsheet performance 'analysis, command and control computer modeling, and force effectiveness computer modeling. Results show significant improvement in corps warfighting capability when using the 

DIVENG force structure. A report describing results is scheduled for 

distribution in July 1990. POC is Vern Lowrey, (314) 563-7885. 

Automatic Integrated Survey Instrument (AISI) Update. The 

AlSl is an electronic total station that integrates functions currently 

performed by theodolites and distance measuring equipment into a 

single, state-of-the-science device. Suitable for both office support 

and field work, it is rugged and man-portable, with speeds matching 

AirLand Battle requirements. The instrument will be used by construction (826) and topographic surveyors (82D). Fielding is planned 

for 1992 and 1993. POC is Merrill Stevens, (314) 563-7209. 

Department of Combined Field Manual Update. The following field manuals (FM) are in the 

Arms (DCA) 	 final stages of production. FM 90-13, River Crossing, and a coordinating draft of FM 5-X, Combat Engineer Company Operations, are 

scheduled for printing in the 4th quarter of FY 1990. FM 90-13-1, 

Combined Arms Breaching Operations, is scheduled for printing in 

the 1st quarter of FY 1991. These manuals will provide a common 

thread through all levels of training, from the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course through the Pre-Command Course. POC is 

Herman Kufura, (31 4) 563-5449. 

DepartmentofTopographic DigitaiTerrainAnalysisProgramsDemonstrated.The Earth 

Engineering (DTE) 	 and Space Division recently demonstrated current and future digital 

terrain analysis capabilities at the Armor, Engineer, and Infantry 

Commanders' Conferences. Two Army-developed software packages were included: Terrabase provides warfighting commanders 

with quick response terrain-related decision aids, such as 3-dimensional views and line-of-sight products. The Condensed Army 

Mobility Model System (CAMMS) provides warfighting commanders 

with decision aids regarding tactical ground mobility, such as vehicle 

speed predictions and route planning products. Both packages 

operate in a PC DOS environment and are available to Army users. 

An upgraded composite of Terrabase and CAMMS will be incorporated in the future Digital Topographic Support System, to be 

fielded in FY 1993-94. POC is MAJ Pat Poulson, AV 676-5715. 

Directorate of Engineer Unreported Accidents. Commanders are requested to report 

Branch Safety near-miss or minor accidents involving engineer equipment. Such (DEBS) incidents frequently go unreported because there is little or no 

equipment damage or injury to personnel. However, the Safety 

Engineer 55 
Ist Brigade 

132d Brigade 

Office needs to be informed about them so that potential major accident producers can be identified. Such reports will also allow us to 

correct deficiencies in future materiel acquisitions. Examples include 

instances where equipment is unstable on hills or at corners and 

problems resulting from poorly designed control panels. POC is Paul 

Rusinko, (314) 563-5002, or Mark lotzke, 563-7346. 

Senior Warrant Officer Course Vacancies. Openings are available in the Senior Warrant Officer Training (MOS 213A) course at 

Fort Leonard Wood. The 11-week course is scheduled to begin 28 

September 1990 and 18 January 1991. The course includes 2 

weeks of common core subjects and 9 weeks of technical, MOSspecific subjects. Students must have completed the Warrant Officer 

Tactical and Technical Certification Course, be in grade CW3 or 

CW2(P), and have been accepted for voluntary indefinite status. For 

more information, call CW4 Harrel Rinehart, (314) 596-8223. 

Fast rack Training Program Benefits Quality Soldiers. 

Selected soldiers in the engineer Advanced Individual Training (AIT) 

at Fort Leonard Wood can participate in a special studies program 

called Fast Track. The program is open to all Active, Reserve and 

National Guard soldiers in MOS 12F, 51B, 51G, 51K, 51R, 62B, 

62E, 62F, 62G, 62H, 62J, 818, and 82B. Students receive additional 

MOS-specific training, cross training in other selected MOS, and additional common soldier training above the standard Basic Training 

and AIT programs. To participate, soldiers must have exceeded the 

Army standards in performance, attitude, military bearing, and physical fitness, in addition to maintaining a 90 percent AIT and Fast 

Track program academic average. 

Upon completion, a letter highlighting the soldier's accomplishments is sent to the battalion commander of their first unit of assignment, and a copy is added to his or her Training Records jacket. It 

identifies the graduate as a high quality soldier. 

The battalion commander also receives a questionnaire to assess 

the Fast Track graduate's performance at the new unit. Completed 

questionnaires are a prime assessment tool for the program, and we 

request they be returned to us. Your information will help increase 

the benefits of the program to units and the soldiers. POC is SFC 

Gary Shriner, (314) 563-2453. 

Army-wide Sapper Stakes Competition Planned. The Engineer 

Center will host the first annual Sapper Stakes competition at Fort 

Leonard Wood on 10-14 September 1990. The purpose of the competition is to promote standard engineer battle drills and recognize 

the best engineer squad in the Army. Ten events are planned for 

both Active and Reserve Component personnel in divisional, corps 

combat, light, and combat heavy engineer battalions. A total of 14 

seven-man squads representing USAEUR, FORSCOM, WESTCOM, 

SOUTHCOM, and USFWEUSA will participate. POC is CPT Mark 

Miller, (314) 596-3141. 

56 Engineer 
Past in Review 


By Dr. Larry Roberts 

n the early days of World War 

- faced with the problem 

11, British engineers were 

of 

bridging that was inadequate for 

their new armored and mechanized equipment. Modifications 

of existing materiel met some 

bridging requirements, but new 

equipment was clearly needed. 

Mr. Donald Coleman Bailey, 

chief engineer of the British Experimental Bridging Establishment, offered a solution to this 

problem by proposing a bridge 

design based on panel trusses. 

Bailey's design met the criteria in 

terms of manpower requirements, 

transportaticn needs, flexibility of 

design, and flexibility in loadbearing capacity (see photo on 

back cover). 

Recognizing the advantages offered by Bailey's bridge, British 

engineers rushed the initial 

fabrication, test and, ultimately, 

production of the panel bridge. 

The normal design-to-production 

time of one year for military 

hardware was cut almost in half. 

In seven and one-half months, 

British engineers had produced 

the new "Bailey bridge." By the 

time the United States entered the 

war, British engineer units had 

employed the Bailey bridge in 

combat and had noted its remarkable versatility. 

American military engineers 

faced similar problems-the increased vehicle weights exceeded 

the capacities of existing bridging 

material. Like the British, they initially tried to modify existing 

bridges to handle the loads. However, the success of the Bailey 

bridge soon prompted the Army to 

examine its adoption as a partial 

answer to the needs of the newly 

organized armored and mechanized forces. The fact that both 

armies could use the same bridge 

offered the possibility of interchangeability of components in 

tactical situations. If this was possible, it would simplify the production process. 

Americans began to work with 

the Bailey bridge early in 1941, 

and for the next two years 

American engineers, civilian and 

military, tested and modified its 

design. The major problem with 

the bridge was the close production tolerances required for the 

panel sets to be truly interchangeable. 

The British approach to production was for contractors to produce 

the components, with assembly at 

a central facility. The Americans 

chose to contract complete bridge 

sets to American steel and metal 

fabrication companies. In an attempt to ensure uniformity of 

production, American engineers 

acquired master gauges, duplicated those gauges, and provided 

them to contractors. 

Field tests of the Bailey under 

various conditions confirmed the 

value of its design and its potential for use in many tactical situations. The Bailey could be used as 

a semi-permanent fixed bridge, 

spanning dry gaps or small 

streams, and it could be used with 

pneumatic floats or pontoons 

across wide water bodies. 

Early use of the bridge by combat engineers in battle reconfirmed 

the results of field trials. 

Throughout the war, Baileys were 

used in many configurations, from 

floating bridges to suspension 

bridges. It could be altered in place, 

raising its load-bearing limits to accommodate heavier loads and 

greater volumes of traffic. 

The one aspect of the Bailey 

which defied solution was the 

problem of manufacturing tolerances. Examination of factory 

production and reports from field 

units revealed that Americanmade sets were not interchangeable with British sets, and sometimes were not compatible with 

other American sets. 

The problem was variation in 

the gauges used by the fabricators. 

It was not until the very end of the 

war that American gauges 

matched those of British instruments. Interoperability simply did 

not exist. This forced front-line 

units to segregate American- and 

British-produced sets, complicating the logistical support for engineer operations. 

The operational value of the 

Bailey far outweighed the difficulties of production and interchangeability. In Sicily and Italy, 

the Bailey was often the bridge of 

choice. In northern Europe, the 

Bailey complemented the tactical 

float bridges and assault bridges, 

especially for armored forces. The 

Bailey was also used in the Pacific 

and in China. By the end of the 

war, tens of thousands of vehicles 

had crossed versions of the panel 

bridge that was born of military 

necessity, constructed by countless 

British and American engineers, 

and designed by Donald Bailey. 

Dr. Larry Roberts is the historian for the U.S.Army Engineer School and Center, Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

Engineer 57