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SJC-12475

COMMONWEALTH vs. ADRIAN T. LOYA.

Barnstable. November 8, 2019. - February 6, 2020.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.

Homicide. Criminal Responsibility. Insanity. Practice, 

Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Request for 

jury instructions, Acquittal by reason of insanity.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on July 1, 2015.

The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J.

Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 

for the defendant.

Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.

LENK, J. On February 5, 2015, the defendant broke into 

Lisa Trubnikova's home. He confronted her in the bedroom, where 

she lay beside her wife, Anna Trubnikova.1 The defendant shot 

 

1 Because Lisa Trubnikova and Anna Trubnikova share a last 

name, we refer to them by their first names.
2

both women, killing Lisa and wounding Anna. Before finally 

surrendering to police, the defendant also shot and wounded a 

responding police officer, Jared P. MacDonald.

For more than one year, the defendant had been obsessed 

with killing Lisa, and in turn being killed by police. The 

defendant eventually reduced this intended murder-suicide in a

detailed, written plan labeled "Operation Purple Rebel" in his 

electronic files. At trial, the defendant argued that this

obsessive and self-destructive plot showed that the killing was 

not born out of malice; rather, he was mentally disturbed.

Counsel unsuccessfully claimed that a mental disorder caused the 

defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and 

commit the crime. On appeal, the defendant contends that our

current law on criminal responsibility made this defense not 

viable, and therefore, because he was deprived of his only 

defense, a new trial is required. Alternatively, the defendant 

asks us to reduce the verdict, pursuant to our authority under 

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

We discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the 

conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.

1. Background. a. Facts. We recite the facts as the 

jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion.
3

The defendant first met Lisa in 2011, when they served

together in the United States Coast Guard at a base in Kodiak, 

Alaska. They worked together in an information technology 

office, and they developed a fast friendship.

Their relationship took a dramatic turn in September of 

2012 following an incident at Lisa's home. According to the 

defendant, Lisa invited him over to have drinks and watch some 

video recordings. While he was there, however, Lisa became 

intoxicated and attempted to seduce him. Although Lisa had no 

sexual contact with the defendant, this incident affected him so 

deeply that he would later refer to it as a "rape of the mind."

The defendant eventually reported the encounter to his 

superiors. In June of 2013, he was transferred from Kodiak to 

Chesapeake, Virginia. On the day he arrived at his new base, 

the Coast Guard issued the defendant a "Page 7" reprimand for 

his role in the incident and ordered him to cut off all contact 

with Lisa and her wife Anna. The defendant was shocked and 

refused to sign the letter acknowledging the outcome of the 

Coast Guard's investigation. He felt wronged, and this feeling 

turned to anger.

These events coincided with a deterioration of the 

defendant's mental health. He became depressed, started taking 

Benadryl to help him sleep, and lost interest in the few 

activities that previously had interested him, such as playing 
4

video games. The defendant also began to harbor a hatred for 

the woman he blamed for his misfortune: Lisa. As his life 

seemed to unravel around him, the defendant ultimately decided 

that he no longer wanted to live. He did not want to die, 

however, without seeking vengeance. Therefore, he resolved to 

take Lisa's life.

Over the following months, the defendant meticulously 

planned his killing. Through the Internet, he learned that Lisa 

and Anna had relocated to the town of Bourne on Cape Cod. In 

October of 2014, he traveled to Massachusetts and set up hunting 

cameras outside their new home to confirm that Lisa was living 

there. When he returned home, he also began playing shooting

games with plastic replica weapons, using plastic bullets,2 to 

gain more experience with wielding weapons in a combat 

situation. In the midst of these preparations, the defendant 

documented his troubled history with Lisa, the downward spiral 

of his professional and personal life, and his plot to kill Lisa

in a 250-page manifesto entitled "The Wrath of Loya."3 After 

 

2 The defendant obtained these weapons, sold for use in 

casual and competitive games, from a commercial manufacturer.

3 The electronic file containing the manifesto was titled 

"The Loya Wars." The titles were references to the science 

fiction television and movie series Star Wars and Star Trek,

respectively. Both series featured prominently in other aspects

of the crime, including insignia the defendant wore during the 
5

months of planning, he ultimately decided to carry out the 

killing on February 5, 2015, his thirty-first birthday.

On February 1, 2015, the defendant left his home in 

Chesapeake, Virginia, and began making his way to Massachusetts. 

He arrived on February 3, 2015, checked into a local hotel, and 

prepared for the fatal encounter. His original plan was to 

attack Lisa at her house, force her to confront what he had 

become, and stab her in the heart.4 He did not intend to harm 

Anna. The defendant originally planned to cover Anna's ears 

with "ear protection" so that she would not have to hear any 

sounds that Lisa might make as she was dying. Once Lisa was 

dead, the defendant then would provoke a firefight with police 

so that they would shoot and kill him.

The defendant arrived at Lisa's house shortly before 2 A.M. 

on February 5, 2015.5 He parked his vehicle across the road 

approaching her house, and set it on fire to obstruct police 

 

shooting. Dr. John Daignault identified these references as

further evidence of the defendant's delusional disorder.

4 Many details of the defendant's planning and the 

commission of the crime come from his statements to police. As 

Dr. Martin Kelly, an expert called by the Commonwealth, noted, 

the defendant's recollection of these events was unusually

precise. Kelly identified this "Eidetic memory" as further 

evidence of the defendant's mental disorder.

5 Most of the following encounter was captured on video

recording by a body camera that the defendant strapped to his 

chest. An edited version of this recording was played at trial, 

and the entire recording was entered as an exhibit.
6

access. He also set up smoke grenades, noise makers, and fake 

explosive devices to further delay first responders. Having 

staged the scene, the defendant breached the door to Lisa's 

house by shooting the lock off with a shotgun. Once inside, he

made his way up the stairs to her bedroom.

The defendant found Lisa and Anna in their bed. He ordered 

them to separate, threw handcuffs at them, and demanded that 

they put on the cuffs. The women screamed and asked who he was 

and why he was in their house. The defendant pulled off his 

mask, revealing his identity. Lisa and Anna recognized him, and

Lisa shouted his name. The defendant responded, "See what you 

did to me" and "This is what I've become because of you."

Lisa apologized to the defendant and said that she never 

meant to hurt him. Both women pleaded with the defendant and

promised that they would not tell anyone if he left them in 

peace. Face-to-face with Lisa, the defendant froze, unsure of 

how to proceed.

With the defendant momentarily distracted, Lisa and Anna 

attempted to shield themselves with their mattress. The

defendant exclaimed, "What do you think you're doing?" Now 

refocused on completing his "mission," he drew his pistol and 

fired fifteen shots through the mattress in Lisa's direction. 

Eleven bullets struck Lisa, killing her in a matter of seconds.
7

Four bullets struck Anna. The defendant heard gurgling sounds 

from Lisa's direction, and he concluded that she was dying.

With his primary objective completed, the defendant

intended to die at the hands of the police. He went back 

outside, retrieved a rifle that he previously stashed in a snow 

bank, and prepared to engage with responding officers. Soon 

thereafter, he saw the silhouette of an approaching police 

officer, Jared MacDonald. The defendant fired four shots at 

MacDonald; one struck him in the spine.

The defendant then retreated behind the victims' house to 

wait for more officers to come and end his life. As the minutes 

slipped by, however, the defendant's resolve to kill himself 

weakened, and he decided to give himself up. He discarded his 

weapons, approached the officers with hands raised, and was 

taken into custody.

b. Procedural history. On July 1, 2015, the defendant was 

indicted on thirty counts, including murder in the first degree 

for the shooting death of Lisa.6 Trial commenced on August 28, 

 

6 The other indictments against the defendant were three 

counts of assault with intent to murder; three counts of 

aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon;

two counts of armed home invasion; two counts of armed assault 

in a dwelling; three counts of using a firearm in the commission 

of a felony; two counts of armed kidnapping with bodily injury; 

one count of burglary and assault on an occupant; one count of 

burning a motor vehicle; one count of possessing a hoax device; 
8

2017. From the beginning of the trial, defense counsel 

acknowledged that this case was not a "whodunit."7 Rather, the 

key issue at trial was whether the defendant was criminally 

responsible for his actions.

Four medical professionals testified concerning the 

defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting. Each 

expert opined as to whether the defendant met the standard to 

establish a lack of criminal responsibility set out in

Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546–547 (1967): "A 

person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 

such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 

substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 

[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of law" (citation omitted).

Two witnesses testified that the defendant had been

criminally responsible, and two testified that he had not. Dr. 

David W. Holtzen, a forensic psychologist at Bridgewater State 

Hospital, was asked by the Commonwealth to perform competency 

 

one count of assault and battery on a police officer; and ten 

counts of possessing a large capacity feeding device.

7 Indeed, defense counsel stated the same in an extensive 

interview he gave to the Cape Cod Times on the day before trial 

began. The judge took pains to comment on this interview during 

empanelment, and to make sure that the article was preserved in 

the record. Exposure to media coverage was, appropriately, a 

subject of individual voir dire.
9

and criminal responsibility examinations of the defendant. He 

testified that the defendant had not been suffering from any 

mental disorder or illness at the time of the killing. Dr. 

Judith Edershein, a forensic psychiatrist based at a large 

teaching hospital,8 was engaged by the Commonwealth to reach a 

determination whether the defendant had been criminally 

responsible by reviewing the records and other experts' 

opinions, but she was precluded from speaking with the 

defendant.9 She testified that although the defendant had at 

least one personality disorder, it did not render him incapable 

of conforming his conduct to the law or appreciating the 

wrongfulness of his actions.

Another of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Dr. Martin Kelly,

a practicing psychiatrist also at a large teaching hospital, 

interviewed and examined the defendant three times, and reviewed 

records and the police reports. Kelly testified that the 

defendant had high functioning Asperger's Syndrome, a disorder 

on the "autism spectrum," and that the condition was "hardwired" 

 

8 Dr. Judith Edershein also testified that she had graduated 

from Harvard Law School and become an attorney prior to entering 

psychiatry and ultimately becoming an assistant professor of 

psychiatry.

9 Edershein was retained in December of 2016, after the 

Commonwealth's first expert, Kelly, completed his report. 

Edershein did not formally request to interview the defendant 

until May of 2017, at which point her request was denied by 

defense counsel.
10

in the brain, not something that is acquired, readily amenable 

to treatment, or "episodic." Kelly considered and rejected 

diagnoses of schizoid personality disorder, major depressive 

disorder, and delusional disorder. Based on his evaluation of 

the defendant and having examined the records, including the 

police reports, Kelly concluded that the defendant "suffered 

from a mental disease; and that as a result of that mental 

disease, he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of the law."

The defendant called a single expert, Dr. John Daignault, a 

forensic psychologist, who previously had been the clinical 

director of Bridgewater State Hospital. Daignault determined

that the defendant had not been criminally responsible for his 

actions on the night of the shooting, but concluded as well that

the defendant suffered from a delusional disorder and did not

suffer from Asperger's Syndrome.

After deliberating over the course of three days, the jury

convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 

theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or

cruelty. The jury also found the defendant guilty of twentyeight of the twenty-nine other indictments. He was found not 

guilty of armed assault with intent to murder. The defendant

filed a notice of appeal in September 2017.
11

2. Discussion. Before us, the defendant argues that a new 

trial is required because our current law regarding criminal 

responsibility deprived him of a meaningful defense. The 

defendant contends that the trial judge committed reversible 

error by denying two motions the defendant filed to remedy these 

flaws. One motion proposed a verdict slip that presented the 

jury's decision in a series of yes-or-no questions, in addition 

to a general verdict of "guilty," "not guilty," or "not guilty,

lack of criminal responsibility." The other motion asked the 

judge to instruct the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but 

not criminally responsible" rather than "not guilty, lack of 

criminal responsibility." As appellate counsel acknowledged at 

oral argument, both motions advocated for a departure from our 

current law regarding the defense of a lack of criminal 

responsibility. We decline to adopt the defendant's recommended 

changes, and discern no error in the trial judge's decision to 

deny these motions.

a. Verdict slips. At the beginning of trial, counsel 

filed a motion requesting that the verdict slips include several 

yes-or-no questions on whether the Commonwealth had met its 

burden.10 Ultimately, however, the defendant expressed 

 

10 By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the 

following language:
12

satisfaction with the verdict slips, drafted by the judge, that 

omitted these questions. Therefore, as the parties agree, any 

error in the judge's decision to deny the motion is unpreserved 

and would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a 

 

"1. Has the government proven that the Defendant committed 

the act of an unlawful killing of a human being without 

justification?

"__________Yes __________No

"If the answer to the above is yes, proceed to Question 2.

"2. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 

doubt that the Defendant, at the time of such killing, was 

not suffering from a mental disease or defect?

"__________Yes __________No

"If the answer to this question is no, proceed to Question 

3. If the answer is yes, proceed to Question 4.

"3. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 

doubt that such mental disease or defect did not affect the 

Defendant so that [he] was unable to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of [his] conduct or conform his conduct to the 

requirements of the law?

"__________Yes __________No

" . . .

"4. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable 

doubt that at the time of the killing that the Defendant 

was not suffering from a mental disease or Defect that 

reduced his capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness 

of his conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the 

requirements of the law?

"__________Yes __________No"
13

miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass. 

24, 40 (2014).

"[W]e review these claims to determine whether there was 

error and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of 

a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 

805, 814–815 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). "In 

analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard, we 

review the evidence and case as a whole and consider whether any 

error made in the course of the trial was likely to have 

influenced the jury's conclusion." Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 

Mass. 602, 618 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014). Where there 

is no error, this court need not reach the question of 

prejudice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 207 

(2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error).

The defendant's motion most fairly is read as a motion for 

special questions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (c), 378 

Mass. 897 (1979).11 Special questions are "rarely resorted to in 

criminal trials." Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., 

 

11 Alternatively, the defendant's motion could be 

interpreted as a motion for a "special verdict," i.e., one that 

"involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but 

only a statement of facts the jury have found from which the 

judge determines the appropriate judgment." Commonwealth v.

Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 675 (1982). Only general verdicts are 

permitted in criminal trials. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a), 378 

Mass. 897 (1979); Licciardi, supra (recognizing that 

Massachusetts rules of criminal procedure eliminated special 

verdicts in criminal trials).
14

Inc. (No. 1), 389 Mass. 902, 916 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 94 (1955). Although they sometimes may

"aid in the disposition of a case," Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 

387 Mass. 670, 676 (1982), the decision to issue them typically 

is "discretionary with the judge." Dane Entertainment Servs., 

Inc. (No. 1), supra, quoting Lussier, supra. We have required

special questions only where they are necessary to ensure that, 

should a jury convict a defendant of an offense, they are 

unanimous as to the theory of that offense. Compare 

Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 287–288 (2003) (where

Commonwealth pursues multiple theories of murder in first 

degree, verdict slip must indicate unanimous theory of 

culpability), with Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 Mass. 163, 175 

(2011) (no special question necessary where Commonwealth pursued

only one theory of murder in first degree), and Commonwealth v. 

Arias, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 433 (2010) (no special question 

required on different methods of committing assault by means of

dangerous weapon).

We discern no compelling reason to require special 

questions when the jury consider criminal responsibility.12

Although the criminal responsibility defense presents special 

 

12 We do not decide whether, in other circumstances, special 

questions may be required for some purpose other than to ensure 

the unanimity of a verdict.
15

problems for a jury, see part 2.b, infra, it is unclear how yesor-no questions on the Commonwealth's burden would help the jury 

to deliberate fairly on this issue. Indeed, such questions are

at least as likely to steer the jury towards a verdict of 

guilty. See Licciardi, 387 Mass. at 676, quoting Commonwealth

v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 260-261 (1977), cert. denied, 434 

U.S. 1039 (1978) (special questions "must avoid any 'tendency to 

lead the jurors step by step to a verdict of guilty'"). See 

United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) 

("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict 

of guilty than to approach it step by step"). To the extent 

that a jury may require additional guidance on how to consider 

whether a defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the proper 

source of that guidance is the jury charge. See Commonwealth v. 

Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) ("the 

long-standing principle that the jury are presumed to follow the 

judge's instructions . . . lies at the very heart of our justice 

system" [citation omitted]).

Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 

defendant's motion for special questions to which he was not 

entitled.

b. Jury instructions. In addition to his motion for 

special questions, the defendant filed a "Motion to Permit the 

Jury to Consider Whether the Defendant is Guilty But Insane." 
16

Through this motion, he requested that the jury consider a 

verdict of "guilty but not criminally responsible," rather than

the verdict set forth in the then-existing model instruction, 

"not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility." See 

Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 11 (2013).

At the charge conference, however, defense counsel did not 

renew this request, and ultimately declared himself satisfied

with the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility. We 

therefore review the judge's decision to deny this motion for a 

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Brown, 

477 Mass. at 814–815.

The defendant argues that the option of finding him "guilty 

but not criminally responsible" was necessary in order for the 

jury fairly to consider the role that mental illness played in 

his crimes. The defendant maintains that, to the average juror, 

a finding of "not guilty" is tantamount to a finding of factual 

innocence. In addition to potentially confusing the jurors, the 

defendant argues, this formulation requires them to 

compartmentalize their knowledge of the defendant's actions and 

separately to consider if he nonetheless was not guilty. The 

defendant contends that, given the particularly egregious acts 
17

in this case, asking the jury to equate the defendant with the 

term "not guilty" was simply unrealistic.13

Without discounting these concerns, we conclude that the

instruction the defendant requested was not warranted. 

Instructing the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but not 

criminally responsible" would be inconsistent with our longstanding jurisprudence on criminal responsibility. As the 

defendant acknowledged at trial, he can point to no 

Massachusetts authority that supports his requested language.

Furthermore, the defendant's requested instruction would 

invite unnecessary confusion. A verdict of "guilty but not 

criminally responsible" is an oxymoron: if the Commonwealth is 

unable to prove a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a 

 

13 "[E]xperience in this Commonwealth has shown that it is 

most difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of 

insanity." Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 854 (1999), 

overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 

806 (2016). Jurors' objections to the criminal responsibility 

defense, particularly in the homicide context, are welldocumented outside the Commonwealth as well. See Brooks, Guilty

by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense Demands a

Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 Geo. Mason L.

Rev. 1183, 1202-1203 (2013); Grachek, The Insanity Defense in 

the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United States Supreme 

Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 Ind. L.J. 1479, 1487-

1488 (2006). This resistance may stem from suspicions that

defendants malinger, and that the expert testimony on which a

criminal responsibility defense depends is susceptible to bias. 

See Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 

1575-1577 (2007). In any event, it is clear that jurors do not

easily reach the "chilling determination that the defendant is

an insane killer not legally responsible for his acts." 

Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822 (1975).
18

reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty. See Commonwealth

v. Bruneau, 472 Mass. 510, 517 (2015); Golden, petitioner, 341 

Mass. 672, 674 (1961) (affirming "the undoubted premise that one 

acquitted by reason of insanity has been found guilty of no 

crime"). To make sense of this instruction, the jury would have 

to parse the difference between factual "guilt" in the context 

of criminal responsibility and legal "guilt" as it applies to 

the charges as a whole. Particularly in light of the other 

complications that the jury face when considering criminal 

responsibility, it would be unwise to add this complexity to the 

equation.

The nomenclature the judge used, "not guilty by lack of 

criminal responsibility," was proper. This language has deep 

roots in our common law. See Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass.

515, 515 (1822) (defendant "found not guilty, by reason of 

insanity").14 We recently affirmed this formulation in our Model 

Jury Instructions on Homicide. See Model Jury Instructions on 

Homicide 10-11 (2018). The Legislature similarly has employed, 

and thereby sanctioned, this language. See G. L. c. 123, § 16 

(establishing commitment procedures for those found "not guilty by 

 

14 We since have moved away from the formulation "by reason 

of insanity," see Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 738 

(1996) (Appendix), in favor of "by reason of a lack of criminal 

responsibility." See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 10-11 

(2018).
19

reason of mental illness or mental defect"). It was not error for 

the judge to rely upon this well-established formulation.

Viewing the entire jury charge in light of the evidence at 

trial, it is clear that the issue of criminal responsibility was 

properly and fully before the jury. The judge accurately 

explained the law on criminal responsibility before commencing 

to instruct on the numerous specific offenses with which the 

defendant had been charged. When discussing each offense, the 

judge again reminded the jury that even should they find that 

the elements were met, they still had to consider whether the 

defendant was criminally responsible.15 These instructions 

informed the jury that they could recognize that the defendant 

had committed unlawful acts, but still find him not guilty by 

reason of lack of criminal responsibility.16

 

15 The judge also informed the jury that they could consider 

the role that mental illness might have played in the 

defendant's ability to form the requisite intent for certain 

offenses.

16 To the extent that a defendant may seek further 

clarification in future cases, a better practice would be for 

the judge to provide an additional instruction on the 

relationship between criminal responsibility and factual guilt. 

An appropriate instruction would mirror the language we 

sanctioned in Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 52 (2019): 

"If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the

defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the

Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally

responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." This language would

clarify that a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of

criminal responsibility necessarily includes a conclusion that
20

With these instructions in hand, the jury were well 

equipped to consider the evidence from both sides that bore on 

the defendant's responsibility: the opinions of four expert 

witnesses;17 the video recording of the defendant's planning and

commission of the offense; the defendant's recorded statements 

to police; and the defendant's manifesto. The jury deliberated 

over a period of three days before reaching their verdicts. In 

sum, the defendant was not deprived of a meaningful defense; the 

jury rejected it.

c. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Having reviewed the 

entirety of the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, 

§ 33E, we are left with no doubt that mental illness played a 

central role in this crime. Nonetheless, although the defendant 

presented "substantial evidence supporting his insanity 

defense," Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 773 (2007), we 

discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 

§ 33E. Mental illness does not equate with the absence of 

criminal responsibility. The jury could properly credit the 

opinions of Edershein and Holtzen that, assuming the defendant 

 

the defendant committed the act that constitutes the charged

offense. See id. at 52-53; Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 472 Mass.

510, 517 (2015) (not guilty by reason of criminal responsibility

verdict "is unlike an acquittal because it includes a finding 

that the defendant committed the criminal act").

17 In addition to the witnesses' testimony, by agreement of 

the parties, each expert's report was introduced as an exhibit.
21

suffered from a qualifying mental disorder, he nonetheless was 

able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the 

wrongfulness of his brutal actions. Their testimony provided 

sufficient support for the jury's verdict. On similar facts, we 

have concluded that, "[s]ince the issue of the defendant's 

criminal responsibility was fully and fairly before the jury[,] 

. . . justice does not require that their verdict be 

disturbed.'" Brown, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 

Mass. 42, 50 (1983). We likewise conclude that this verdict was 

consonant with justice.

Judgments affirmed.