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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

030401

COMMANDANT

MG R.L. Van Antwerp

563-6158

vanantwerpr@wood.army.mil

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

BG Randal R. Castro

563-6192

castror@wood.army.mil

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM William D. McDaniel, Jr.

563-8060

mcdanielw@wood.army.mil

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL John (Pat) Leake

563-8080

leakej@wood.army.mil

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT – ARNG

LTC Robert McCabe

563-8046

mccaber@wood.army.mil

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC Thomas E. O’Donovan

563-7116

odonovant@wood.army.mil

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for ENGINEER COMBAT SYSTEMS

COL John Holler

563-4081

hollerj@wood.army.mil

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE - TERRAIN DATA

COL David Kingston

563-4086

kingstond@wood.army.mil

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL James Rowan

596-0224

rowanj@wood.army.mil

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

COL Jeffrey P. LaMoe

563-4093

lamoej@wood.army.mil

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

COL Robert S. Kirsch

563-4119

kirschr@wood.army.mil

DEPARTMENT OF INSTRUCTION

LTC Jeffrey A. Bedey

563-4129

bedeyj@wood.army.mil

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE

LTC Anthony Funkhouser

563-7537

funkhousera@wood.army.mil

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER/COUNTERMINE

TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER

Mr. Paul Arcangeli

596-3869

arcangelip@wood.army.mil

U.S. Army Engineer School

573-563-8080 / DSN 676-8080
In light of current world events, MG Van Antwerp, in consultation with the Chief of Engineers, decided to

cancel ENFORCE 03. The Engineer School is focusing, instead, on providing the very best support possible

to the Army in the field, the Regiment, and the soldiers training here during this period of increased worldwide

tension. It was definitely not an easy decision because of the critical nature of ENFORCE to the Regiment’s

leadership and future. However, this will allow increased focus on near-term missions and requirements that

will set the stage for ENFORCE 04.

Although ENFORCE 03 was cancelled, the focus on transformation is too important not to be covered in

Engineer, our professional bulletin. The articles in this issue focus on the areas that were planned for breakout

sessions at ENFORCE 03—the Objective Force, the Officer Education System, Regimental Transformation –

How to Fight, Operationalizing Assured Mobility, the Countermine Center, FM 3-34, Geospatial Engineering,

Terrain Visualization, and Environmental Ethics.

The Commandant will look for an opportunity later this year to host a two-day Regimental Warfighter

Conference that will focus on the Objective Engineer Force, Officer Education System transformation, and

lessons learned from current operations.

By Captain Mark A. Winkler

April-June 2003 Engineer 1

The ENFORCE Conference, hosted by the U.S. Army Engineer School, is an opportunity for senior

engineer leaders to come back to the home of the Regiment once a year to attend professional

development seminars, receive Army institutional updates, and participate in informational exchanges—

and then take this information back to the sappers on the ground.

ENFORCE, as we know it, began as the Engineer Commanders’ Conference (ECC) before the school’s

move from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in 1989. Soon after the move here to Fort Leonard Wood, the name of

the conference changed to the Senior Engineer Leader’s Training Conference (SELTC), to signify the

change in focus from only engineer commanders to all senior engineer leaders. In 1995, the name

changed again to the Engineer Force Conference (ENFORCE), to signify the Regiment’s move into the

future and its focus on what that future would hold for engineers.

Typical ENFORCE attendees are commanders and command sergeants major at the battalion,

brigade, and group levels of Active and Reserve Component engineer units; senior engineer advisors to

the Reserve Component units and the Readiness Groups; engineers from Corps/Major Commands;

senior engineers from the Engineer School, 310th Theater Army Area Command, 98th Division (Training),

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Directorates of Public Works; members of the Army Engineer

Association; and selected senior staff engineers.

CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED

ENFORCE Background

Captain Winkler is an operations officer in Headquarters, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri.
R

 Engineer 1

Front Cover:

Artwork by Mark

Dean.

Back Cover: WWI

and WWII U.S. Army

engineer posters

COMMANDANT

Major General

R.L. Van Antwerp

April-June 2003

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major William D. McDaniel, Jr.

22 Letter to the Editor

26 Regimental Awards

42 CTC Notes - “Conventional Threat Antipersonnel

(AP) Mines (OZM-3)”

By Master Sergeant Mark A. Sankey (NTC)

42 CTC Notes - “Engineer Support Area (ESA) Live Fire”

By Major Gerald O’Connor and Captain Thomas D. Patton

(NTC)

43 CTC Notes - “Wet Gap Crossing”

By Major Michael W. Rose and Captain James

Koeppen (NTC)

FEATURES

04 ENFORCE 03

 By Captain Mark A. Winkler

05 Objective Force 101

 By Captain Mark A. Winkler

06 Engineer Objective Force Concept: “How to Fight”

 By Mr. Mike Fowler

09 Stryker Brigade Combat Team: A Window to the Future

 By Lieutenant Colonel Robin Selk and Major Ted Read

12 Providing Assured Mobility in the Unit of Action

By Major Ted Read and Major Nelson “Glenn” Kerley, Jr.

15 Operationalizing Assured Mobility

By Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey and Major Ted Read

18 Engineer Officer Education Transformation

By Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey and Major Storm E. Reynolds

20 FM 3-34, Engineer Operations: A Blueprint to Forge Our Future

By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony C. Funkhouser

23 The Countermine Center Forges Ahead

By Mr. Eric Johnson and Colonel Jeffrey P. LaMoe

27 Operation Enduring Freedom: A Waypoint Toward Geospatial Engineering

Transformation

By Chief Warrant Officer 3 David Kasten

30 Transforming Geospatial Engineering . . . Critical to Success of the Objective Force

By Colonel David A. Kingston, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Tupper, and Major Carl G. Herrmann

33 Terrain Visualization Systems: Rapid Path to Terrain Understanding

By Mr. Ken Bergman

37 Brigade Returns to USAREUR After 11 Years

By Mr. Arthur McQueen

38 Forging the Environmental Ethic: Transforming the Army Through Environmental

Stewardship

By Mr. Daniel Taphorn

Volume 33 PB 5-03-2

UNITED STATES ARMY

April-June 2003 Headquarters, Department of the Army

ENGI

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

NEE

ENGINEER SCHOOL

44 CTC Notes - “Engineer Participation in the

Targeting Process”

By Captain Mark C. Quander (JRTC)

46 CTC Notes - “Synchronizing the Brigade Combat

Team Breach—‘SOSRA in Effect’”

By Major John Horstmann and Sergeant First Class

Danny Petersen (CMTC)

49 Engineer Safety - “Rear-Detachment Risk

Management Options”

By Mr. Fred E. Fanning and Mr. Carter T. Boggess, Jr.

51 Engineer Update

Inside Back Cover: Subscription Order Form

MANAGING EDITOR/

EDITOR

Rena L. Humphrey

Mona E. Mitchell

Olivia A. Prewett

CONTRIBUTING

EDITORS

Shirley Bridges

Jennifer Morgan

GRAPHIC DESIGNER
April-June 2003 Engineer 3

Clear The Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

I

n October, we here at the Engineer

School began active support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. It wasn’t called that

then, but our involvement was an important factor in the decision to cancel ENFORCE 03. It wasn’t an easy decision, and

we held off on until the last possible moment. We think it was the right thing to do

in many ways, but the work that was to be

accomplished was to have important impacts on the future of our Regiment. That

work must continue, so this issue of the

bulletin remains devoted to opening the discussion on critical transformational ideas.

In it we lay out some of the key conceptual,

informational, and material ideas that form

the basis of our overall theme: Regimental Transformation –

Forging Our Future.

In the last two issues, I began to describe to you some of

the underlying ideas behind the transformation of our Regiment. Those were some of the ideas behind assured mobility

and some of the impacts of information superiority. In the

following pages, more ideas—such as operationalizing assured mobility, a description of many aspects of how we will

fight in the Objective Engineer Force, and ideas in the areas of

the Officer Education System transformation—are explored.

Each of these in turn was to form the basis for breakout sessions where you, the regimental leadership, would come together to discuss, debate, hopefully engage, and explore. That

is part of what I am talking about when I say that people are

our strength. People and leadership—woven together—are

what will carry the Regiment into the future.

We were looking forward to the discussions at ENFORCE

03, the feedback you would provide, and the ideas you would

carry away, which are vital in that effort to reach the future.

These things are important, because I believe we are at the

crux on transformation. We have been talking it, briefing it,

writing about it, and—perhaps most painful—resourcing and

funding it for more than three years.

There has been progress in a variety of areas within the

overall goals of transformation, but much of that progress is

not apparent, not even to those who work it every day. I assess that we, the Army, are very close to what the Chief of

Staff calls sustainable momentum. I take that to mean that we

are close to having a coherent concept—tied to achievable

resourcing and solid science and technology—that will allow

us to achieve the goal of fielding the Objective Force.

That’s a remarkable thing to say, and it has some specific

impacts that you, the leadership, need to understand. For

example, in some ways this affects the

Legacy Force. Although I think everyone

will agree that every engineer leader remains

deeply committed to taking care of the

legacy portion of our Regiment, everyone

must understand that the new force is coming, and the process of reaching that force

has deep impacts on the Legacy Force.

Further, it has come to the point where we

must commit to the Objective Engineer

Force. It is our path to ensuring that we

can support the Objective Force in the future operational environment. Without the

Objective Engineer Force, we will simply

watch our portion of the Legacy Force fade

and will see the risk inherent in future

operations rise to truly unacceptable levels.

Now you notice that I have used the term leadership in

several contexts within this article. In that usage comes my

challenge to you. If this discussion seems difficult to understand—new ideas, new terminology, complex approaches, difficult decisions—then you are right, but your effort to understand them is an example of one of the aspects of transformed

leadership that we must incorporate: lifelong dedication to

learning. It simply isn’t enough to say “I have mastered that

skill.” That’s no more appropriate than an ophthalmologist

saying “I am competent on the concept of contact lenses”

and then never going on to grasp the idea of laser surgery.

Such an inability to keep on learning simply dooms that type

of leader to obsolescence in the march of new ideas. We aren’t,

can’t be, and won’t be that kind of leader. That’s my first

challenge to you—lifelong learning.

My second challenge to you is the other half of the leadership team—the led. I think that while many great ideas about

leader development come and go, there is one enduring aspect for transformation. We must develop agile and adaptive

leaders. Agile (fast on their feet, fast in their thoughts, fast in

their analytical and assessment skills and make it happen, get

it done, do it right) and adaptive (come out on top, work together to overcome, ensure teamwork, learn and grow) leaders can and will overcome the challenges that we and the

future environment are building for them. I know that many of

you have given quite a bit of attention to these types of

thoughts, and I look forward to your feedback.

I know, just from the type of leaders you are, that we will get it.

And even more importantly, you can count on us to use that

feedback as we continue to work toward the Objective Engineer

Force and toward ENFORCE 04.

Essayons!
Lead The Way

By Command Sergeant Major William D. McDaniel, Jr.

U.S. Army Engineer School

4 Engineer April-June 2003

I

 would like to use this article to reach out to

all of you and highlight my travels around

the Regiment. Since my message to you in

the last issue of the bulletin, I attended the Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) Nominative

Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Conference in

January at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. We had a week with the

senior Army leaders, to include the Secretary of

the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, Army G1,

Army G3, Director of the Army National Guard,

Chief of the Army Reserve, TRADOC Commander, and past SMAs. Many others provided

briefings and insight into our future. This was a

very informative week for all attendees.

I also briefed TRADOC Commander General

Brynes, the SMA, and all the Nominative CSMs on our Engineer Branch

Key Initiatives. CSM Balch and myself visited and had dinner with our

future sergeants major (SGMs) and their spouses who were attending

the SGM Course at the Sergeants Major Academy.

Here at Fort Leonard Wood, I visited the 1st Engineer Brigade,

5th Engineer Battalion, 35th Engineer Battalion, 169th Engineer

Battalion, 544th Engineer Battalion, and 577th Engineer Battalion.

The 1st Engineer Brigade is a diverse organization that does remarkable work with limited manpower. The brigade produces professional, confident, and competent leaders and soldiers through the

Advanced Individual Training, One-Station Unit Training, B-6 Additional Skill Identifier, and Sapper Leader Courses. In addition, the

brigade provides support to the Engineer School and Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Academy in conducting the Officer Education

System, Noncommissioned Officer Education System, and Warrant

Officer Candidate School.

I had the privilege of carrying the 18th Engineer Brigade unit colors

from the U.S. Army Engineer Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to Heidelberg, Germany, and then participated in the activation

ceremony of the 18th Engineer Brigade (see article on page 37.) I was the

NCO of the Year for this brigade in 1983. To participate in the activation

twenty years later, as the Regimental CSM, made it a very special

event. This brigade is not the same as in the old days, because it is

redesignated as a Theater Army Brigade. The commander, designated as

a brigadier general, is COL (P) William H. McCoy.

I spent ten days in Europe, visiting the leaders and soldiers of the

130th Engineer Brigade, 94th Engineer Battalion, 54th Engineer Battalion, 1st Armored Division Engineer Brigade, 16th Engineer Battalion, 40th Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division Engineer Brigade, and 9th Engineer Battalion. Then, in Kosovo, I spent a couple

of days with the 82d Engineer Battalion “Blue Babes” and watched

the Super Bowl with them. The leaders and soldiers from all these

organizations were heavily engaged in future operations, and the

morale was high. They were confident in their abilities and were

prepared for any mission.

I visited the Caterpillar® plant in Peoria,

Illinois, where we had soldiers training on

CAT® equipment. The leadership there was

doing a superb job of supporting the Regiment’s

needs in a professional and expedient matter. It

is a great team effort, and the support cast at

CAT was doing it right in every facet of the

requirements. My special thanks go out to Mr.

Frank Weinburger, Mr. David Haney, Mr. Rick

Sharp, and Mr. Thomas Brady.

I continually spread the word about our engineers at the U.S. Army Engineer School. They

are a great team of dedicated professionals who

strive to provide key information and solutions

to the many issues that our leaders identify and

inquire about. These important issues come in

daily, and our engineers here always provide quick response to the

field.

We continue to support the Regiment through a host of different

means. One example of excellence is our mobile training teams (MTTs)

that are providing countermine training throughout CONUS and

OCONUS (Germany, Kuwait, and Afghanistan). They are doing a

great job, and I have received positive feedback from leaders

throughout the Regiment. As BG Castro says, we are a “Team of

Teams”—always supporting and reaching out to each other.

I realize that as a Regiment we are extremely busy and engaged in

a multitude of ongoing missions. I will continue to encourage you to

keep safety on the forefront when performing our missions. Continue to take care of the soldiers and their families, because this is

one of our most important missions, and if done right, everything

else will be accomplished easily. Remember that we can only be

effective if we take care of ourselves; if we don’t, then we can’t

focus on taking care of our soldiers and the mission at hand.

I want to congratulate CSM Rodney Craddock as the new 18th

Engineer Brigade CSM and CSM Gerald Jones as the new 1st Engineer

Brigade CSM. I also want to thank CSM Dave (and Rosie) Delgado for

their professionalism and dedication to the Regiment as they transition

into retirement. They have been a superb command team and family. We

bid them farewell and wish them the very best in the future.

In closing, let me say thanks for your dedicated support to our

great Regiment. It is held in high esteem, and that is due largely to all

our efforts. We are a Regiment that takes great pride in producing

superior results. We are always on the cutting edge of full-spectrum

engineering with the energy of taking care of each other, our soldiers,

and their families—while giving our total support to mission accomplishment. Be proud of whom you are, and always let those around

you know that you are a proud member of the best Regiment in our

Army. God bless you all.

Essayons!!
April-June 2003 Engineer 5

Most of us have heard the term Objective Force. For many,

this conjures up images of an Army that has done away

with the very combat forces that have made us the premier

military in the world. For some, it causes a sense of excitement, knowing

they will be leaders in cutting-edge technology. For a few, it causes a

glazed-over look of confusion and boredom. This Objective Force

tutorial is written in an effort to clarify some misconceptions, introduce

some new terminology, and lay a foundation of understanding concerning

the intent of the Objective Force and the Army Vision. It is imperative

that officers and noncommissioned officers have a basic understanding

of the concepts, doctrine, and terminology so they can support the

Army Vision and Transformation process.

Army Transformation

The Army regularly undergoes transformation to meet current

and future national military requirements. In the emerging

asymmetrical combat environment, the Army—and the Corps of

Engineers—are once again rethinking our strategies, equipment, and

training doctrine to meet current and future national security

contingencies. The environment has changed; therefore, we must

change. Our current structure is a Cold War relic not designed to

support the full spectrum of operations. Engineer units are not

sufficiently responsive, deployable, and agile to meet the realities of

the Objective Force.

The Army Transformation Plan is based on Army Chief of Staff

General Eric K. Shinseki’s Vision for the Army: “Soldiers on Point

for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.” The vision

includes three primary components starting with an overriding

requirement, key principle, and primary objective statement.

Readiness continues to be the Army’s top priority requirement. The

principle recognizes that the Army’s people are the centerpiece of

Army capabilities and represent the most important element of change.

The objective statement sets the tone for Army Transformation. It

calls on the Army to create “strategic dominance across the entire

spectrum of operations” with seven broad goals. They are to make

the Army more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,

survivable, and sustainable. These goals underscore everything.

Army leaders contend that Army Transformation is one of the

most sweeping institutional changes ever designed. It involves more

than new equipment, vehicles, uniforms, basing, doctrine, tactics,

training, or any other single or coupled aspects. Army Transformation

is a complete paradigm shift in training, doctrine, equipment, and

institutional thinking. Army Transformation has three key elements:

the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force. These

will be separate initiatives for the first decade of the 21st century but

will merge during the second decade to create the final product, which

is envisioned as a whole new Army.

The term Legacy Force centers on current major weapons

systems, principally combat maneuver vehicles and armored fire

support and combat support vehicles. Known as the heavy force, it

comprises the Army’s mechanized infantry and armored divisions.

The Army will continue upgrading the heavy force while developing

other paths. The Legacy Force will still be the Army’s primary

warfighting maneuver force for the foreseeable future.

The plan for the Interim Force is to use available technology to

reequip brigade-sized units to adapt them to meet many of the Army’s

missions. This will enable them to deploy more quickly than the

heavy forces but have greater lethality, speed of mobility, and soldier

protection than the Army’s light forces. Although Interim Force units

will handle conventional missions, they will also be used to develop

much of the doctrine and training aspects of the Objective Force.

The Objective Force, currently in the development phase,

represents the vision of the future Army: what can be done to equip,

organize, and train units to integrate the best aspects of the heavy,

light, and interim forces. For example, the Army is conducting core

research to create a new family of lighter armored fighting vehicles,

called the Future Combat System, that offers equal or better protection

for soldiers who will use them.

Objective Force: The Big Picture

The Objective Force Model consists of two primary echelonments:

units of employment (UEs) and units of action (UAs). UEs function

primarily at the operational and strategic level of war and are concerned

with the prosecution of campaigns and major operations. UEs have

the headquarters structure to perform as a joint task force and are

highly tailorable to mission requirements. UAs function primarily at

the tactical level of war and are concerned with planning and fighting

engagements and battles. They are semifixed organizations, capable

of training and operating across the full spectrum of operations, and

are inherently combined arms.

Misconceptions

There are three major misconceptions about Army Transformation:

 Misconception No. 1: The plan is for the Army to divest its tanks

and mechanized infantry fighting vehicles quickly in favor of

lightly armored, wheeled vehicles. That is wrong. Abrams tanks

and Bradley fighting vehicles will remain in the Army’s inventory

for decades.

 Misconception No. 2: Interim Brigade Combat Teams will replace

light forces. That is not right either. Airborne, air assault, light

infantry, and special operations forces will continue to be the

Army’s forced-entry team. The Initial Brigade Combat Teams are

not being organized to be the tip of the spear.

 Misconception No. 3: The Interim Brigade Combat Teams are just

peacekeeping forces. Wrong again. They will have major wartime

missions in addition to being able to handle operations other than

war. They are combat formations first and foremost and will have

a substantial amount of firepower. There are a number of roles for

them on the battlefield.

Machines That Perform; Soldiers Who Think

Objective Force equipment will have vastly increased capabilities,

but soldiers will have a larger responsibility to interpret information

that the systems provide. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams at Fort

Lewis, Washington, are focusing on training individual soldiers to

maximize the use of the information they receive. Meanwhile,

leadership training that emphasizes flexibility and adaptability starts

at the lowest level and continues up the chain of command. The goal

is to prepare soldiers to assume a leadership role at one or two echelons

above their own and to be better prepared for those jobs when they are

promoted to them. Soldiers will utilize live-virtual-constructive training

venues in both classroom and field environments. Simulations and

enhanced situational training exercises will develop their leadership

potential and technical capabilities.

Captain Winkler is an operations officer in Headquarters, U.S.

Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

By Captain Mark A. Winkler

Objective Force 101
6 Engineer April-June 2003

As everyone knows, the environment of our world has

changed, and the Army is transforming to adapt to

this new environment. The Army’s goal, referred to as

the Objective Force, has led us to look at the Engineer Regiment

to examine how engineers will fight in the future.

Objective Force

Before discussing the overarching Objective Force

engineer concept, it is imperative that we review how

the Objective Force maneuver unit of action (UA) is

designed to fight. The Objective Force is a full-spectrum force,

capable against an adaptive, learning enemy in all terrain

conditions (see Figure 1). It operates with greater effectiveness

and versatility and achieves greater empowerment in smallunit tactical operations through improvements in the—

 Development of the situation out of contact.

 Information dominance that allows unprecedented

situational awareness and situational understanding.

 Ability to know and use terrain and weather to a degree

that removes the enemy’s “home court” advantage.

 Standoff destruction of enemy systems.

 Assured mobility that creates a significant mobility

differential relative to the adversary.

 Embedded, robust, all-weather, 24/7 intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance.

 Ability to achieve assured lethality with a very high

probability of hit—and assured kill with an equally high

probability of kill given a hit—all beyond the range of the

enemy’s weapons.

 Ability to achieve three-dimensional mutual support

between units on parallel axes while on the move.

 Ability to plan collaboratively and rehearse virtually while

on the move, arriving at the objective on parallel axes.

 Precision fire control and distribution when conducting

tactical engagements at the small-unit level.

Engineer Objective Force Concept:

“How to Fight”

By Mr. Mike Fowler

Figure 1

A Regiment That Can Support the Entire Battlespace

FCS = Future Combat System

HSOC = home station operations center

UE = unit of employment
April-June 2003 Engineer 7

 Standoff detection and neutralization of mines; booby

traps; improvised explosive devices; and chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats.

 Inherent air-ground integration.

 Manned-unmanned teaming with organic unmanned

systems.

 Reliability of combat power.

 Seamless transition while in contact.

Ultimately, decisive operations require tactical success in

close combat—the capability to seize and control key terrain

and to close with and destroy enemy forces. In this sense,

close combat actions are the fundamental building blocks for

operational success and strategic victory. The Objective Force

executes decisive combat operations by denying the enemy

freedom of action and destroying him through a series of rapid,

violent actions. Future engagements will be characterized by

new tactical principles based on the development of the

situation out of contact and the balanced combination of

standoff capabilities, skillful maneuver, and tactical assault to

achieve simultaneous decisions at multiple locations.

Continuous integration of powerful, small tactical units—

moving along multiple, noncontiguous lines of operation to

objective areas that are force-oriented—is the foundation

underlying the success (see Figure 2).

Objective Force Engineers

One of the challenges that the Engineer Regiment must

address is that under our current structure, engineer

units are not responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,

or sustainable in the context of the Objective Force. Some

overarching concepts have been developed to help eliminate

these shortfalls:

 Foundation forces and force pools

 Command and control cells

 Early-deployable detachments (EDDs)

 Construction modules

Foundation Forces and Force Pools

One of the underlying concepts in the Objective Force

engineers is the design of foundation forces and force pools.

Foundation forces are the building blocks for projecting

engineer capabilities into tactical units. They are made up of

engineer effects modules (EEMs) and engineer mission teams

(EMTs) with a broad baseline capability. The foundation force

relies on the force pool to provide mission-specific capabilities.

The force pool is the primary force provider, comprised of a

modular base structure with a fixed organization of discrete

sets of capabilities. This enables rapid force tailoring and a

scalable robustness to allow for maximum operational flexibility.

Figure 2

The Changing Battlefield

FLOT = forward line of own troops

LOCs = lines of communication

AO = area of operation

ISB = initial staging base

OBJ = objective
8 Engineer April-June 2003

Both organizations have an inherent design for small-unit

excellence. In both the foundation force and the force pool,

organizations are based on engineer mission forces (EMFs),

which are compatible with the engineer battalion of today.

Command and Control Cells

Developing a command and control structure that is

projectable and scalable to support the foundation force and

force pool concept will be a challenge. This concept breaks

out command and control headquarters (HQ) into four cells

that vary among the standing (regiment/brigade), foundation

force, or force pool HQ. The command and integration cells

are the bulk of the standing and foundation force HQ.

 Command cell—contains the command group and is

responsible for issuing orders, executing current

operations, providing the vision for future operations, and

providing a command presence.

 Integration cell—provides control for current operations

and battle tracking, participates in combined arms planning,

and produces orders.

 Technical cell—provides a specific engineer expertise

that analyzes the engineer’s common operational picture

(COP) and provides technical advice and design to help

produce solution sets. This cell, which is also responsible

for the reachback for technical assistance, is more robust

in the force pool HQ.

 Sustainment cell—tracks readiness, plans and coordinates sustainment operations, and anticipates logistical requirements. Engineer regiment and brigade HQ

have a larger sustainment cell.

As EMFs are task-organized, the modularity of these cells

form together to provide the right HQ structure to support the

mission requirements.

Early-Deployable Detachments

A new capability embedded in engineer organizations is an

EDD. This capability is a small, rapidly deployed team that

enables engineer solutions out of contact and allows precise

employment of engineers. The EDD would be organic to

organizations with an EMF role and, in some cases, may have

duty in a Corps of Engineers role to enhance its professional

engineer skills. Once deployed, an EDD begins to build/update

the engineer COP for the specific mission, identifies problems,

and initiates reach to get the expert centers to develop solutions

and shape the engineer battle through identifying contracts

and resources available.

Construction Modules

There are several aspects of the construction battalion

concept. The first is designing modules that can be easily

deployed that will allow the battalion to phase in its capabilities

with the maneuver force. The construction EDD is made up of

technically trained soldiers who can begin to identify and

prioritize the required engineer missions that must be

accomplished and begin to reconnoiter possible contract

support. The next step is a skid steer-type platoon. This platoon

is equipped with commercial skid steers and a variety of

attachments that allow it to begin some limited work. The skid

steer operators are trained on heavy construction equipment,

so if more robust requirements exist, they can use commercial

construction equipment. The primary role of this platoon is to

support the first-deployed maneuver forces with unmanned

aerial vehicle landing areas, rotary wing sights, forward area

rearming and refueling points, and limited airfield repair. As

deployment continues, these limited teams are followed by a

light air-transportable construction company, which gives

additional capability in a deployable package. The company

will provide increased airfield repair and main supply route

maintenance. The rest of the battalion is comprised of heavier

construction equipment that is capable of supporting a

sustained military operation.

There are some additional changes that must be addressed

to fully embrace the Objective Force. As we look at the current

level of construction equipment and the Army dollars that are

available to update this fleet, we find that there is a considerable

shortfall. This initiative looks at reducing the number of construction equipment items while maintaining the operators,

allowing for 24-hour operations. Reduced equipment strengths

would then be augmented with rental equipment for surge

capability. This would also find efficiencies in deployment

and maintenance. This concept will require some major

changes. Standing lease/rental agreements must be developed

which would require changes to the current acquisition laws.

Additional analysis needs to be conducted to determine the

optimized amount of equipment for current operations and

training. As we rely on industry to support us abroad with

equipment, our operators must be readily adaptable to the

differences of equipment by manufacturer. One way to help

this and to stay proficient with operator skills is to field

configurable construction equipment simulators.

Conclusion

The Army is changing. The enemy is changing. The way

we fight will change. Engineers in the future will have

greater demands forced upon them. Developing

solutions out of contact over noncontiguous operations, with

a greater reliance on support to future maneuver, are just some

of these demands. Engineers may not be organic at all echelons

in the future, but engineer requirements will still exist. The

Engineer Regiment must be a relevant option for the maneuver

commander. It will take the efforts of the entire Regiment to get

this change right. The Engineer School must receive your

support and feedback to accomplish this challenging task.

Mr. Fowler, a military engineer development analyst, has worked

in the Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Engineer

School, and more recently, the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center,

at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for fourteen years. During the past

ten years, he has been involved in developing engineer concepts, to

include those for Force XXI, the Stryker Brigade, and the Objective

Force.
April-June 2003 Engineer 9

We are often admonished to “improve your foxhole

every day, because you never know how bad you

might need it tomorrow.” The foxhole and the

defense allow us time to prepare for an offensive operation.1

Army Transformation calls for a similar effort, to get better

every day while preparing for future operations. To that end,

the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is an existing

formation, an organization that is optimized for mobility, and a

lens through which we can glimpse the future.2

With one organic engineer company supporting the SBCT,

the mobility capability of the formation has been questioned.

When we look at the strategic, operational, and tactical mobility

of any organization, there are always trade-offs. A light

organization has excellent strategic mobility but does not have

the organic transportation assets that give it operational and

tactical mobility. Likewise, the heavy forces have unmatched

tactical mobility and speed in many environments at the

expense of strategic mobility. The operational mobility of the

heavy force is very dependent on local infrastructure and a

large logistics and engineering tail. In the SBCT, the three

forms of mobility are optimized for high-end, small-scale

contingencies. According to the SBCT operational and

organizational (O&O) concept, augmentation of the engineer

company will be necessary when the brigade undertakes

special operations support element or movement control office

missions.3

 Looking through our lens to the future, it is clear

that the situational understanding of the SBCT and future

forces will be a fundamental mobility enabler. Proactive use of

situational understanding through emerging doctrine will help to

prioritize the use of SBCT engineer assets to provide mobility to

the decisive force. In the Objective Force, we will see other units

designed to exploit the information gained through situational

understanding. Prudence dictates that we invest thought and

resources into the SBCT’s development and doctrine.

The concept and organization of the SBCT’s engineer

companies has changed little since the report published in the

May 2001 issue of Engineer.

 4 One can see the mobility focus

in the organization of these companies as shown in Figure 1,

page 10. A rough estimate of the unit’s mobility capability is as

follows: the three combat mobility platoons have a combined

mobility capability of 400 to 900 kilometers of level 1 route

clearance and 540 meters of mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC)

lane reduction, plus rollers and plows. The mobility support

platoon will have the capability to cross four gaps simultaneously with the rapidly emplaced bridge system. The bottom

line is that by design, the organic engineer company is

optimized for the mobility requirements of the SBCT.

To address the augmentation of the SBCT, the commander

of the 555th Engineer Group presented a series of initiatives,

known as the Engineer Augmentation Package (EAP), to the

Engineer Council of Colonels in October 2002. The EAP

concept provides the SBCT with a set of tailored modules to

address operational and tactical missions outside of the

SBCT’s current capabilities (see Figure 2, page 10).

The EAP is designed to augment all of the operational

requirements of the SBCT. It will provide the SBCT with greater

mobility, countermobility, and survivability options in theater,

to enhance the maneuver force’s ability to conduct combat

operations. This is done through the organization of five EAP

modules:

 Sapper module—provides assets for route reconnaissance, local security, conventional mine emplacement,

scatterable mine emplacement, obstacle reduction,

Stryker Brigade Combat Team:

A Window to the Future

By Lieutenant Colonel Robin Selk and Major Ted Read
Combat Mobility Platoon 1 (1-0-29-30)

Combat Mobility Platoon 2 (1-0-29-30)

Combat Mobility Platoon 3 (1-0-29-30)

(1-0-3-4)

M1025

CBT

CBT

CBT

CBT

Mobility Support Platoon (1-0-21-22)

HMEE DEUCE

HMEE DEUCE

HMEE DEUCE

DEUCE

DEUCE

DEUCE

HMEE

HMEE

HMEE

M1114 M1114 VOLCANO MICLIC MICLIC

VOLCANO MICLIC MICLIC

VOLCANO MICLIC MICLIC

M1114 M1114

M1114 M1114

M1025 M998 RWS With SICPS

Mobility Section 1 (0-0-6-6)

Mobility Section 2 (0-0-6-6)

Mobility Section 3 (0-0-6-6)

Company HQ (2-0-11-13)

PLS Trailer

PLS Trailer

PLS Trailer

PLS Trailer

10 Engineer April-June 2003

Figure 1. SBCT Engineer Company Objective TOE

Figure 2. SBCT Support Missions (Combat Engineer Task Force [Corps Wheel Company/Battalion])

APOD = aerial port of debarkation

SPOD = seaport of debarkation

ISB = initial staging base

LRS = long-range surveillance
April-June 2003 Engineer 11

route and area clearance, stability and support operations, and mine-clearing operations support.

 Horizontal module—provides assets for main supply

route (MSR) construction from unimproved trails or combat

trails to gravel roadways, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

airstrip construction, rapid runway repair, MSR repair, road

crater repair, survivability positions, and Hesco Bastion

fortifications.

 Vertical module—provides for temporary base camp

construction, to include the tactical operations center

(TOC), guard towers, living areas, a dining facility administration center, and shower and lavatory facilities.

 Bridge module—provides additional bridging assets to

the SBCT to include the medium girder bridge, the assault

float bridge, the Mabey-Johnson bridge, and crossing-area

engineer support.

 Heavy module—further augments the horizontal module,

allowing it to provide complete survivability support, hightraffic roadway construction, new roadway construction,

and increased productivity in all other horizontal

operations. The heavy EAP module is not C-130 mobile.

The EAP modules will be organized with a command and

control design that can be tailored to meet the needs of the

mission (see Figure 3).

The engineer company mission in the SBCT O&O specifies

that augmentation may be required “... on order, with

augmentation, provides additional mobility (lines of

communication [LOCs]), countermobility, survivability, and

sustainment engineering support to the Interim Brigade Combat

Team ...”5

 Today’s challenge is to ensure that there is robust,

deliberate, and perhaps contentious dialogue to refine the

augmentation and organizational packages that will ensure the

survivability and sustainment of the SBCT in future operations.

The U.S. Army Engineer School has worked closely with

SBCT leadership to improve the mobility of the force with

organic enablers in the nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield

of a small-scale contingency. In July 2002, during the Senior

Leaders Course, assured mobility was introduced to the 1st

Brigade, 25th Division (SBCT #2), to give unit leaders the

tools to optimize their mobility by using situational

understanding as a fundamental enabler. The instruction at

the Senior Leaders Course, and the following Tactical Leaders

Course in September 2002, was well received by the 1st Brigade

commander and his subordinate commanders. The confidence

they had in the concept was such that the brigade requested

that the agenda of a second Tactical Leader Course, scheduled

in November 2002, be modified to include discussion of assured

mobility.

The central theme of the training was to help the SBCT

leadership realize and use their unique enablers to answer the

following commander’s focus question: What must I do to

sustain my ability to maneuver, to prevent enemy interference,

and to protect the force in order to accomplish my mission?

The assured mobility framework seems most successful in

providing an answer in the proactive, enabling perspective of

warfare. The SBCT leadership addressed the six assured

mobility fundamentals—predict, detect, prevent, avoid,

neutralize, and protect—through an analysis of the four

imperatives: develop the mobility common operational picture

(COP), establish and maintain operating areas, attack the

enemy’s ability to influence, and maintain mobility and

momentum. Analysis should be conducted from both friendly

and enemy points of view, using three perspectives: en route

to, on, and beyond the objective. The use of these perspectives

is critical to success. The end result of the training was leaders

looking at the battlefield from a new, proactive perspective

Figure 3. EAP and SBCT Support/Command and Control Relationship

BSB = base support battalion

MRBC = multirole bridge company

ALOC = air line of communication

CBT HVY = combat heavy
12 Engineer April-June 2003

“Convinced that the general advance in the

weaponry of the world’s armies was introducing

a tactical revolution in land combat which

rendered the organization of the ROAD [Reorganization

Objective Army Divisions] ...obsolete, the TRADOC commander, General DePuy, set in train in 1976 a restructuring

study of the heavy division.”1 General DePuy was concerned

that the Army would miss the opportunity to build organizations around the newest technology of the time. From

this beginning, the Army of Excellence and its doctrine, AirLand

Battle, were born.

Concept

The concept is not much different today. The Army is

working hard to define success in the future battlefield

with the technology and doctrine of the future. The

Army is reaching for flatter organizations and processes with

enduring doctrine, as U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Military Operations

Force XXI Operations,

2

 described almost ten years ago. The

Engineer Regiment has contributed heavily to the description

of the future battlefield and its systems and doctrine by

providing assured mobility within the maneuver support

battlefield function.

Providing assured mobility is a critical imperative of the

maneuver support battlefield functional area for Objective

Force operations. Maneuver support is thoroughly discussed

in The United States Army Objective Force Maneuver Support

Operational Concept, Coordinating Draft, 3 and incorporated

in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90, The United States Army

Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan Unit

of Action.

4

 It concentrates on two interrelated components:

freedom of maneuver and force protection. The figure on page

13 displays the seven maneuver support imperatives, although

the dependencies are more complicated than the simple model

depicts.

Evolving an assured mobility framework to meet the needs

of the Objective Force begins with the definition: “Actions

that guarantee the force commander the ability to deploy, move,

and maneuver where and when he desires, without interruption

or delay, to achieve his intent. This includes maneuver in all

types of terrain and weather, including urban terrain.”5

Assured mobility will create a mobility differential relative

to the adversary, significantly contributing to the unit of

actions’s (UA’s) greater empowerment in small-unit tactical

operations.6

 When applied near the objective, the UA forces

will avoid enemy kill zones, increasing their ability to close

with and destroy the enemy.7

The most notable automation/technology change is our

ability to move from focusing on the mobility perspective of

the common operational picture (COP) as an imperative to a

more holistic approach in developing the situation. The key is

still a proactive-centric method that establishes predict-toprevent linkages that will allow commanders to leverage

analysis and collection capabilities, predict enemy actions to

hinder his mobility, and then take proactive measures to prevent

the enemy from impeding our maneuver. A commander may

make or alter his maneuver plan to avoid known impediments.

If required, he will neutralize, reduce, or overcome the

impediments to his mobility that cannot be prevented or

avoided. Through a structure of systems and improved

processes, we will provide assured mobility to the future

commander.

The imperatives—as defined in the article on page 15,

“Operationalizing Assured Mobility”—change in scope and

become four nested and overlapping tasks that require

providing assured mobility: develop the situation; select,

establish, and maintain operating areas; attack the enemy’s

ability to influence operating areas; and maintain mobility and

momentum from standoff to greatly reduce the likelihood of

traditional breaching or neutralization.

Develop the Situation

“This is the collection and integration of imagery and

geospatial, cultural, and enemy information—aided by

automated mobility planning tools—to establish the mobility

COP for the operating area.”8

 Automated terrain products and

dissemination will allow commanders at all levels to understand

the total implications of the terrain and how to leverage it to a

tactical advantage. Potential capabilities include a tool that

quickly produces a modified combined-obstacle overlay and

publishes mobility courses of action. The overlay would be

dynamically updated as refinement and alterations of the terrain

are reported.

Select, Establish, and Maintain Operating Areas

“With the aid of automated tools, critical mobility choke

points, operating areas, and airspace are identified, and a

Providing Assured Mobility

in the Unit of Action

By Major Ted Read and Major Nelson “Glenn” Kerley, Jr.
April-June 2003 Engineer 13

shaping plan is developed en route to the area of operation

(AO). Operating areas are designated portions within the

AOs that the maneuver commander has identified as relevant

to the scheme of the maneuver. This plan includes prediction

of enemy actions and required sensor coverage to fill any

information voids within the operating area. Through this

proactive process, sensors ‘stare’ at critical areas to fill the

voids or improve our situational awareness. In coordination

with sensor-effects packages, the ability to predict, detect,

prevent, avoid, and neutralize the enemy’s ability to emplace

or use mines and booby traps from stand-off positions sets

the conditions for mobility situational understanding. For

critical choke points such as bridges, sensor packages linked

with brilliant munitions form an active protective system to

eliminate the enemy’s attempt to influence or degrade these

critical points. The ability to control and monitor critical

mobility areas are essential to coordinating a mobility plan

in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver.”9

Attack the Enemy’s Ability to Influence Operating Areas

“This task includes the specific actions to be taken to

preclude, deny, or prevent enemy maneuver and facilitate

the UA’s movement. The commander proactively attacks those

enemy systems capable of directly or indirectly impeding

friendly maneuver, thus destroying route interdiction

capability before it occurs. This includes precision fires and

munitions, obstacles, and attack by aircraft. Precision

munitions (all types) and dynamic obstacles (Intelligent

Munitions Systems [IMS]) are effective and important

methods of hindering the enemy’s freedom of movement. Sensor

suites tied to point munitions and networked fires are also

employed to protect freedom of maneuver once it is established

in key operating areas or along key routes.”10

The operational employment and utility of the IMS is

discussed in the IMS Operational Employment Concept11 and

the UA O&O Plan.

12 The IMS operational requirements are

outlined in the Future Combat System (FCS) Operational

Requirements Document,13 and the IMS is being developed

within the FCS. More information on the IMS is provided at

the TRADOC System Manager–Engineer Combat Systems

Web site at http://www.wood.army.mil/TSM/.

Maintain Mobility and Momentum

“Most mobility impediments will be mitigated through

prediction, detection, and prevention. Obviously, if

operationally feasible, impediments to maneuver will simply

be avoided. There will be situations in which operational

requirements dictate negotiation of impeded routes. Based

on FCS survivability to antipersonnel mines and some

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

hazards, the commander may choose to simply detect and

move through the area.”14

Summary

As a doctrinal framework, assured mobility truly

achieves General Sullivan’s vision of “a doctrine

today and tomorrow”15 that he had while the Army’s

leadership was laying the post-Cold War foundations for

doctrine we are using today. The proof of the product is that

doctrine as written in FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, (see

article on page 20) has been accepted throughout the Army as

a standard for constructing operational thought. And as an

imperative to the future maneuver support battlefield functional

area, it has been accepted as hard requirements for tomorrow’s

Objective Force.

Engineer-Focus Imperatives

 Understand the battlespace environment

 Enable theater access

 Provide assured mobility

 Deny enemy freedom

of action

Provide

assured

mobility

Deny enemy

freedom of

action

Enable

theater

access

Understand

the battlespace

environment

Neutralize

hazards and

restore the

environment

Enable force

protection and

security

Engage

and control

populations
focused on attacking the enemy—not reacting to the

enemy’s impediments.

The SBCT provides a window for us to see the future of

organizations and mobility. Its design is a balance between

responsiveness and capability.6 The focus of balance and

mobility on the design is evident in the embedded engineer

company. While smaller than the current mechanized formation,

the embedded engineer company has significant mobility

enablers. In some missions, the SBCT—like any organization—

will need engineer augmentation. The challenge is to design

scalable augmentation forces that can precisely meet the unit’s

need for those specific missions. A doctrinal approach that

recognizes situational understanding as a fundamental enabler

will help define those packages. This approach will leverage

the design and doctrine of the SBCT and augmenting forces

to successfully shape future organizations.

The SBCT is an organization that is preparing for

tomorrow’s operations, which provides us with insight to the

tools that will be used in future organizations. The Engineer

School will use the lessons and emerging doctrine of the

Stryker Brigades to help shape the dialogue of the future,

while capitalizing on their presence to improve our Regiment

today and in the days and years to come.

Endnotes

1

 FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001, Chapter 7.

2 Organizational and Operational [O&O] Concept for

the Interim Brigade Combat Team [IBCT], 30 June 2000,

Chapter 1.6.

3

 Ibid., Chapter 9.1.

4

 Major Anthony O. Wright, Concept and Organization of

the IBCT Engineer Company, Engineer, May 2001, pp. 6-9.

5 O&O Concept for the IBCT, Chapter 9.1, 1.

6

 Ibid., Chapter 1.8.

Lieutenant Colonel Selk is chief of the Combat Support Division,

Brigade Coordination Cell, Fort Lewis, Washington. Previous

assignments include executive officer, 299th Engineer Battalion, 4th

Infantry Division; company command with 536th Engineer Battalion,

Panama; and platoon leader, 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry

Division. LTC Selk is a graduate of the Command and General Staff

College and holds a bachelor’s in mechanical engineering from the

Georgia Institute of Technology.

Major Read is an instructor/writer in the Department of

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. He was previously an engineer observer/controller at the

Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, and

commanded C Company, 9th Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division,

in Schweinfurt, Germany. He has deployed to operations in Somalia,

Haiti, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.

(“Stryker Brigade,” continued from page 11)

14 Engineer April-June 2003

Endnotes

1

 Romjue, John L. (1997) The Army of Excellence: The

Development of the 1980s Army, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military

History, p. 8.

2

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Military Operations Force XXI

Operations, August 1994.

3 The United States Army Objective Force Maneuver Support

Operational Concept, Coordinating Draft, Volume 3, 6 November

2002, Chapter 6, p. 32.

4

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90, O&O Change 1, The United

States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Plan

Unit of Action, 25 November 2002, p. 4-68.

5 Maneuver Support Operational Concept, p. 32.

6 TRADOC Pamplet 525-3-90, p. 4-2.

7

 TRADOC Pamplet 525-3-90, p. 4-5.

8 Maneuver Support Operational Concept, p. 33.

9

 Ibid., pp. 33-34.

10 Ibid., p. 34.

11 Intelligent Munitions System Operational Employment Concept

Paper and Briefing, Final Draft, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473, 23 October 2002.

12 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90, pp. 4-15, 4-38, 4-68, 4-73, 4-

74, F-8, F-32, F-37, F-43, F-62.

13 Operational Requirements Document for the Future Combat

Systems, Change 2 (Army Requirements Oversight Council

Approved), Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, Fort Knox,

Kentucky 40121, 22 January 2003, p. 39.

14 Maneuver Support Operational Concept, p. 34.

15 John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold

War, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997, p. 35.

Major Read is an instructor/writer in the Department of

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. He was previously an engineer observer/controller

at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels,

Germany, and commanded C Company, 9th Engineer

Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, in Schweinfurt, Germany.

He has deployed to operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans,

and Afghanistan.

Major Kerley is chief of the Munitions Systems Branch,

TRADOC System Manager–Engineer Combat Systems, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is the lead combat developer

and project officer for the Intelligent Munitions Systems

Requirements Integrated Product Team, which drafted the

IMS Appendix to the Future Combat System Operational

Requirements Document. Previous assignments include

commander, C/299th Engineer Battalion, and Engineer

Brigade Assistant S3, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.
April-June 2003 Engineer 15

By Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey and Major Ted Read

Operationalizing

Assured Mobility

Figure 1. Assured Mobility Framework

Firepower Leadership Protection

Maintain Mobility

and Momentum

Neutralize Avoid

Attack Enemy’s

Ability to Influence

Operating Areas

Maneuver

Information

Select, Establish,

and Maintain

Operating Areas

Develop a

Mobility COP

Situational

Understanding

FM 3-0, Operations

Commanders combine the

elements of combat power

to meet constantly changing

requirements and defeat an

enemy. Commanders

synchronize the elements of

combat power to create

overwhelming effects at the

decisive time and place.

Focused combat power

ensures success and denies

an enemy any opportunity to

maintain a coherent defense.

FM 3-34, Engineer Operations

Assured mobility is “actions that give

the force commander the ability to

maneuver where and when he desires,

without interruption or delay, to

achieve the mission.”

Protect

See First

Finish

Act First

The assured mobility framework enables increased

situational understanding to yield increased freedom

of maneuver as it ties together the elements of combat

power for existing and future formations. The framework is a

proactive thought process that is not tied to equipment

capability, but rather is a way to systematically refine the

combined arms assets available to assure maneuverability of

the decisive force. Essentially, the framework enables Legacy,

Interim, and Objective Force units to harness situational

understanding as a fundamental enabler to attack the threat

before he impedes our ability to maneuver.

To recap, the assured mobility framework was originally

developed to leverage information and the other elements of

combat power to determine mobility requirements for the

Objective Force (see Figure 1). As an analysis tool, it is very

successful in ensuring that mobility requirements are

adequately defined in the Objective Force Organizational and

Operational Plan for the unit of action. Essentially, it is an

exemplar that enables units to proactively identify “predictto-detect,” “detect-to-prevent,” and “predict-to-prevent”

linkages to generate superior situational understanding and

focus on the maneuverability of the decisive force. The key is

to build these linkages to prevent the threat from affecting our

ability to maneuver and protect ourselves from the threat’s

effects.

The current Legacy/Interim Force assured mobility

framework definition is “actions that give the force commander

the ability to deploy, move, or maneuver where and when he

desires, without interruption or delay, to achieve his intent.”

The framework of assured mobility entails four imperatives

(see Figure 2, page 16):

 Develop the mobility common operational picture (COP).

Gain improved situational understanding geographically

by using geospatial tools to combine improved intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with

terrain data and an integrated reconnaissance and

surveillance to help the commander visualize the

battlefield.

 Establish and maintain operating areas. Identify enemy

engagement areas (EAs), named areas of interest (NAIs),

targeted areas of interest (TAIs), choke points, operating

areas, and lines of communication (LOCs) connecting

those areas in order to determine enemy capability and

intentions.

 Attack the enemy’s ability to

influence operating areas.

Allocate combat power and

sensors to negate the threat’s

efforts to impede maneuverability. In addition, secure

our ability to maneuver where

needed (operating areas, LOCS,

TAIs, and EAs),

 Maintain mobility and momentum. Synchronize all

Battlefield Operating System

(BOS) capabilities to protect and sustain our established ability to maneuver

when and where we wish,

enabling us to maintain pressure and lethality despite

the threat.

 se

Understand First

 Decisively

Predict, Prevent, Detect
16 Engineer April-June 2003

The assured mobility fundamentals tie the imperatives

together and must be proactively viewed from two perspectives

(see Figure 3). The six fundamentals are:

 Predict actions and circumstances that could affect

maneuverability.

 Detect early indicators of impediments to battlefield

mobility.

 Prevent potential impediments to maneuverability from

affecting battlefield mobility of the force. A key is to develop

predict-to-prevent linkages to detect impediments and

identify alternative mobility corridors needed to . . .

 Avoid battlefield impediments.

 Neutralize, reduce, or overcome impediments (from

traditional mines to industrial chemicals) that cannot be

prevented or avoided.

 Protect against the effects of enemy impediments.

Successful application of assured mobility analysis is

gained through a sequential and continuous application

of the fundamentals throughout the imperatives en route

to, on, and beyond the objective.

The linkage of assured mobility to FM 3-0 begins with

information—the newest element of combat power. FM 3-0

refers to information as an element that “...enhances leadership

and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and

protection.”1

 Later, the manual describes information

superiority as the “...force being able to see first, understand

first, and act first.”2 These additions to FM 3-0 were a concrete

start to enabling the information edge within the operational

art as foreseen by Generals Frederick Franks, William Hartzog,

and Gordon Sullivan in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations.

3

Assured mobility is a model that enables commanders to

see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively from

a mobility perspective. Furthermore, when used as a layered

system of proactive refinement in complex environments, it

can provide a way to enumerate the amount

of combined arms assets required to assure

freedom of maneuver of the decisive force.

The definition of “provide assured

mobility” in the Objective Force shifts to

“...actions that guarantee ...” from

“...actions that give...,” and it becomes an

imperative to our future BOS as “provide

assured mobility.”4

 (See article on page 12.)

In the Objective Force, we will guarantee

freedom to maneuver through a system-ofsystems approach that capitalizes on

embedded standoff capabilities. Until the

assured mobility system of systems is built,

proofed, fielded, and embedded, the Army

must maximize existing combined arms

capabilities to give mobility to the maneuver

commander. To that end, assured mobility

Develop the mobility COP.

Where can I maneuver?

Establish and maintain operating areas.

What/where are potential impediments to my maneuver?

Where must I move to achieve a position of advantage?

Attack the enemy’s ability to influence operating areas.

What capability does he have to impede my maneuver?

Where is it? How can I prevent it?

Maintain mobility and momentum.

Find, target, and destroy the enemy’s ability to impede maneuver.

Establish ISR to monitor changes in mobility

Figure 2. Assured Mobility Imperatives

Figure 3. Assured Mobility Perspectives

Ensure that the force

can maintain offensive

momentum regardless

of the enemy, the

terrain, or any other

impediments

Ensure that the force

is proactive, not

reactive – derived

from the commander’s

intent and scheme

of maneuver

Depends on superior situational understanding,

shared knowledge, and decisive execution through

the fundamentals:

Actions that

sustain

friendly

maneuver

Actions that

preclude

enemy

maneuver

Predict

Detect

Prevent

Avoid

Neutralize

Protect
April-June 2003 Engineer 17

provides a framework that helps transform increased situational

understanding into decisive maneuver. Essentially, the assured

mobility framework is the transmission that transfers power

from the elements of combat power to the wheels of time,

space, and purpose within the operational framework.

An example of doctrinal application today is how the U.S.

Army Engineer School is helping the Stryker Brigade Combat

Team (SBCT) leadership maximize its capabilities to provide

mobility to the decisive force. Assured mobility was the

centerpiece of an interactive practical exercise that proactively

used enhanced situational understanding and situational

awareness to build linkages among the assured mobility

fundamentals to enable maneuverability. Assured mobility

provides the SBCT leaders a framework to mobility solutions

by addressing a few considerations (listed below) to help focus

their analysis of the fundamentals against each imperative.

The analysis was shaped to ensure that both an enemy and

friendly perspective were accounted for en route to, on, and

beyond the objective.

 Develop the mobility COP.

√ Leverage terrain and reconnaissance technology to

determine mobility corridors, defensible terrain, and

choke points.

√ Determine who is using what mobility corridor and why.

√ Predict when, where, and why the enemy will maneuver.

√ Develop a sensor web and reconnaissance plan to

confirm enemy maneuver.

 Establish and maintain operating areas.

√ Determine friendly operating-area needs.

√ Identify key terrain, and implement an ISR plan to support

mobility.

 Attack the enemy’s ability to influence operating areas.

√ Allocate combat power to attack the enemy’s ability to

influence the maneuverability of the decisive force.

 Maintain mobility and momentum.

√ Predict, detect, and then prevent the enemy from using

situational obstacles, and when prevention fails, avoid

or breach/bridge obstacles as necessary.

√ Maintain multiple routes to enable maneuver flexibility.

√ Anticipate and allocate assets to reduce civil/cultural

impacts.

√ Anticipate and prevent the use of toxic industrial

chemicals and weapons of mass destruction.

√ Counter enemy reinforcement attempts.

The SBCT leadership used the considerations to focus the

discussion within a continuous and sequential analysis of the

assured mobility fundamentals to successfully tie FM 3-0’s

see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively to

physical assets owned by the maneuver commander. The result

was an innovative and proactive application of information

enablers and combat units to ensure the mobility of the decisive

force in complex and urban terrain specific to that mission.

 Assured mobility is a framework leaders can use to envision

the elements of combat power in allocation of assets to multiple

engagements in time, space, and purpose. The SBCT leadership

has proven that the assured mobility framework contributes

to the freedom to maneuver for existing Legacy and Interim

Force formations—not just the Objective Force. The key to

implementing assured mobility is altering thought processes

from reactive-centric to proactive-centric methods that build

decisive maneuver linkages with the assets available.

The hard part may have been said best by Sir Basil Liddell

Hart in Thoughts on War, 1944 “...that the real challenge is

not to put a new idea into the military mind but to put the old

one out....”5

 Assured mobility provides a new idea to help the

commander maximize information, in conjunction with the other

elements of combat power, to achieve decisive results within

an operational framework. Assured mobility is how a maneuver

commander can, as envisioned in FM 3-0, enhance the elements

of combat power and build successful engagements within

time, space, and purpose.

Endnotes

1 Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, Washington,

D.C., 14 June 2001, p. 4-10.

2

 Ibid., p.11-2

3

 Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force

XXI Operations, A Concept for the Evolution of FullDimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early

Twenty-First Century, Washington, D.C., 1 August 1994,

p. 1-3.

4

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-25, The United States Army

Objective Force Maneuver Support Operational Concept,

Coordinating Draft, v1.3, 6 November 2002, Chapter 6, p. 32.

5

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5.

Lieutenant Colonel Bedey is chief of the Directorate of

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. Previous assignments include commander of the

299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,

Fort Hood, Texas, and S3 and company commander, 15th

Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). LTC

Bedey is a graduate of the Command and General Staff

College and holds a bachelor’s in construction engineering

from Montana State University and a master’s in construction

management from Colorado State University.

Major Read is an instructor/writer in the Department of

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. He was previously an engineer observer/controller

at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels,

Germany, and commanded C Company, 9th Engineer

Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, in Schweinfurt, Germany.

He has deployed to operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans,

and Afghanistan.
18 Engineer April-June 2003

Engineer Officer Education

Transformation

By Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Bedey and Major Storm E. Reynolds

On 4 February 2003, the Army announced significant

changes to the Officer Education System (OES). These

changes seek to provide the right education, in the

right medium, to the right leader at the right time and place.

Just as the Army transforms to the Objective Force to meet the

challenges of the 21st century security environment, so too

must the Army transform its education system to train and

educate the leaders who will command and control that force.

 The U. S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri, has been a leader in every facet of OES transformation. One of the keys to our success has been the many

ideas, comments, and concerns from the field. Much of the

feedback is incorporated into the Engineer School’s transformation strategy. The latest initiatives and changes to the

way we will train our engineer officers are captured in the

following paragraphs.

After the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), junior officers

will no longer move through broad-based educational gates

based solely on a time frame. But, when officers move into a

new staff job or into command, they will receive specific

institutional training that is tailored to the skill sets necessary

to succeed in that position (see Figure 1).

The current Officer Basic Course will transform into BOLC.

This course will ensure a tough, standardized, small-unit

leadership experience that flows progressively from

precommissioning (BOLC I) to initial-entry field leadership

experience, a 6-week training experience held at a centralized

location (BOLC II). The final component of the course will be

branch technical/tactical training, an 11-week program held in

residence at the proponent school (BOLC III). Current plans

are for BOLC to be fully implemented in the 3d quarter fiscal

year (FY) 06.

Training beyond BOLC will consist of the Combined Arms

Staff Course (CASC) and the Combined Arms Battle Command

Course (CABCC). These two courses will replace the existing

Captain’s Career Course and the Combined Arms and Services

Staff School. The changes in the OES will provide institutional

training that is tailored to a specific job in a way that is expertly

packaged and provides more frequent training for shorter

periods. This will allow the mind to better absorb and

understand concepts and thus increase overall retention and

depth of knowledge. Exposure to multiple and diverse jobs

will provide breadth to an officer’s knowledge.

The CASC is designed to train staff officer skills. The

diversity of the Engineer Regiment requires multiple

assignment-oriented training opportunities for its officers. With

that concept in mind, the Engineer School developed a modular

concept for the CASC built around six engineer staff/technical

courses:

 Assistant Brigade Engineer

 Assistant Division/Corps

Engineer

 Task Force Engineer

 Geospatial Manager

 Construction Engineer

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(USACE) Engineer

All six courses will include advanced

distributed learning (ADL) and intense

resident experiential training. The officer’s initial CASC course will include

a 2-week common-core ADL, followed

by a 1-week functional ADL module, and

then a 2-week resident phase. The

resident experience is the vehicle by

which the officer will demonstrate a

Engineer Officer Training – Future

Figure 1
April-June 2003 Engineer 19

mastery of knowledge gained through

completion of ADL.

The experiential training will immerse the

officers in simulations, history-based

vignettes, and progressive problemsolving situations related to developing

the skill sets required

of the position.

These courses will

provide assignmentoriented training just

in time for a staff duty

position. The construct of this design

allows engineer officers to receive

training before assuming a staff/

technical position

anywhere along their

career path. The six

courses have some

foundational knowledge in common, which is organized into

modules. This commonality allows for reduced training time

as officers receive the foundational knowledge in the first

course attended. Subsequent courses will not repeat this

baseline but will build on it to train the unique skills and

knowledge for that course. For instance, an officer can take

the fourteen required ADL modules for the Construction

Engineer Course but only have to take five additional courseunique ADL modules to complete the Assistant Brigade

Engineer Course. The residential phase is still required, and

the officer has an option to repeat modules if desired. Current

plans call for the implementation of CASC for 3d quarter FY05

(see Figure 2).

As with the CASC, the Engineer School has developed a

modular construct to train battle command skills in the CABCC.

The curriculum in the proposed command course is divided

into seven modules: take command, train, administer, maintain,

deploy, fight, and lead. Each module will include both ADL

and experiential training activities that focus on company

command. Leaders and officers in the field will also benefit

from the modular design. The time an officer spends completing

his ADL will be more focused, and leaders will be able to

provide more focused mentorship, which should result in a

more meaningful and rewarding learning experience for junior

officers. The course will culminate with a 2-week combat

training center experience, which will expand upon training

management skills. Current plans will implement CABCC in 2d

quarter FY06.

The current Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

will change to Intermediate Level Education (ILE). All majors

will attend 12 weeks of common-core operational instruction.

An additional phase of up to 28 weeks will be provided to

meet the requirements and needs of officers in their respective

career field and/or functional area. Current plans are for ILE to

be fully implemented by 4th quarter FY05.

Lieutenant Colonel Bedey is chief of the Directorate of

Instruction, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. Previous assignments include commander of the

299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,

Fort Hood, Texas, and S3 and company commander, 15th

Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). LTC

Bedey is a graduate of the Command and General Staff

College and holds a bachelor’s in construction engineering

from Montana State University and a master’s in construction

management from Colorado State University.

Major Reynolds is chief of Officer Education System

Transformation, Directorate of Instruction, U.S. Army

Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He was

previously a small-group leader and commanded the 84th

Engineer Company, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and

Alpha Company, 46th Engineer Battalion (C) (H), Fort Polk,

Louisiana. A graduate of the Captain’s Career Course, MAJ

Reynolds holds a bachelor’s of architecture from Texas Tech

University and a master’s in business administration from

Webster University.

Figure 2

Engineer Staff/Technical Course Modules

Advanced Distributed Learning Examples

Construction Engineer Staff Course

Assistant Brigade Engineer Staff Course

Unique Modules Shared Modules
20 Engineer April-June 2003

I

n the last few years, the world has been transformed, with

new threats to our nation requiring a broader range of

military missions, new technologies for our armed forces,

and a new National Security Strategy. The Army took these

matters into account as it established new doctrine, beginning

with Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, and FM 3-0, Operations.

This iteration of doctrine was developed more systematically

and, for the first time, linked Army doctrine to joint doctrine.

The new numbering system also reflects this change. FMs 1

and 3-0 are the capstone manuals and, as such, are at the

pinnacle of the doctrine hierarchy from which all other Army

manuals descend. Additionally, FM 3-0 is written at the

operational level of war, relating doctrinal principles that will

enable senior commanders to fight full-spectrum operations

and campaigns. It lays out the doctrinal frameworks, tenets,

and principles for senior leaders to consider when fighting

over extended time and space. As the Regiment’s capstone

manual, the doctrinal principles within FM 3-34, Engineer

Operations, were derived from FM 3-0. Like a blueprint,

FM 3-34 will provide the foundational principles that will forge

the Regiment’s future at the operational level of war.

To understand where we will go with FM 3-34, we should

understand its history and relationship to FM 3-0 (formerly

FM 100-5). The origins of engineer operations doctrine can be

traced back to the first edition of FM 5-100, Engineer

Operations, published in 1979. This version of FM 5-100

melded two other engineer manuals, FM 5-135, Engineer

Battalion Armored Mechanized and Infantry Divisions, and

FM 5-136, Airborne Division Engineer Battalion, both

published in 1961. These two manuals focused solely on the

principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures for battalion

commanders operating in a division (tactical level). Coming

just after the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, this 1979

version of FM 5-100 addressed common themes of divisional

engineer operations against a Cold War threat. The manual

(again written at the tactical level) explained how the engineer

functions of mobility, countermobility, survivability, and

topographic and general engineering support the maneuver

commander. Since then, FM 5-100 has been revised four more

times, three of which were in direct response to revisions of

FM 100-5 (see table above).

The revisions of each of these manuals are indicative of

changes to organizations, equipment, and how the Army was

to fight. However, the enduring principles of war did not

change. It was not until the Army began to think of how to

train and participate in military operations other than war that

new doctrinal principles began to emerge. The current version

of FM 3-0, published in June 2001, addresses participation in

the full spectrum of operations (offense, defense, stability,

and support) in noncontiguous areas of operations and the

impact of a new operational environment. Throughout the

process of developing this new doctrine, principles of war

endured. The authors of FM 3-0 also established an operational

framework, integrating elements of combat power, principles

of war, and Army tenets to achieve decisive operations. It is

this framework that provides the basis of all discussions in

FM 3-0 and, therefore, other manuals in the doctrinal hierarchy.

The U.S. Army Engineer School’s Doctrine Development

Division has taken this framework into consideration, along

with feedback from senior engineer leaders in the field, and

has started drafting a new FM 3-34. To maintain integrity with

higher-order manuals and to create the parameters from which

the manual could be written, this manual integrates the engineer

functions, responsibilities, and principles addressed in joint

publications and our Army capstone manuals. These parameters give us the latitude to address our advances in how we

will fight the Regiment and serve as the foundation for all

other engineer manuals.

FM 3-34 provides many firsts for the Corps of Engineers.

First, the manual weaves a theme of engineer operations at the

operational level of war throughout the entire manual. Second,

it describes new threats in the operational environment and

the implications to engineers around the Regiment. Third, it

expands upon the role of the Regiment. It specifically discusses

how the entire Regiment contributes to operational-level

FM 3-34, Engineer Operations:

A Blueprint to Forge Our Future

By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony C. Funkhouser

Publication dates of capstone manuals

FM 100-5, Operations FM 5-100, Engineer Operations

1968

1976

1982

------

1986

1993

2001 (FM 3-0)

1961 (FM 5-135/136)

1979

1982

1984

1988

1996

2003 (FM 3-34)
April-June 2003 Engineer 21

commanders and how the Regiment interacts with all of its

various engineer organizations to support the Army’s seniorlevel commanders. Toward this end, we propose a regimental

mission essential task list (METL) to support the Army’s

METL. Establishing a common engineer METL is another

means to tie the Regiment together. Last, but certainly not

least, is the center of gravity for this manual. The figure above,

which is excerpted from the manual, takes the operational

framework described in FM 3-0 and explains how the engineer

functions support this framework, through the assured mobility

subframework we recently published.

The manual uses this amalgamation to establish the

relationships of the assured mobility imperatives and fundamentals to the elements of combat power within the operational framework. It should facilitate maneuver commanders’ understanding of what assured mobility does for

them, as it is explained within the context of their operational

structures. It also shows how field force engineering enables

engineer functions throughout the Regiment and expands our

capabilities down to the point of the spear.

In FM 3-34, we try not to regurgitate doctrine from other

manuals but rather refer the reader to the source document.

Also, we steer away from tactical-level discussions that will

be addressed in other manuals. FM 3-34 does not directly

address the Objective Force, but by integrating a number of

principles and introducing frameworks such as assured mobility

and capabilities such as field force engineering, it provides

the foundation for future doctrine focused on the Objective

Force.

As you can see, FM 3-34 is different than previous editions,

and those with a vision for the future of the Regiment will

appreciate the contrast. It is critical to the Regiment that we

are tightly linked to Army doctrine so we are not overlooked

and made irrelevant. Therefore, it is very important that we get

feedback from the field and make this an interactive process

as we come to closure and publication.

In draft form, FM 3-34 was posted to the Army Knowledge

Online (AKO) collaborative Web site (Army KCC Home/

Army Communities/TRADOC/Engineer/Engineer School/

 Assured Mobility Within the Operational Framework

BOS

General Engineering

Geospatial Engineering

Mobility

Countermoblity

Survivability

C2

INTEL

MAN

M/CM/S

AD

FS

CSS

Combat Engineering

Engineer

Battlespace

Functions

Decisive

Operations

Offense

Defense Stability

Support

Principles

of War

Field Force

Engineering

(Enabler)

Assured Mobiltiy

Fundamentals

 Predict

 Detect

 Prevent

 Avoid

 Neutralize

 Protect

Operational

Framework

Tenets:

 Initiative

 Agility

 Depth

 Synchronization

 Versatility

Assured Moblity

Objective

Offensive

Economy of Force

Maneuver

Mass

Unity of Command

Simplity

Surprise

Security

Elements of

Combat Power

Maneuver

Firepower

Leadership

Protection

Information
Directorate of Training/Doctrine) for feedback until 21 March

2003. The comments were integrated for a coordinating draft

and posted to the AKO Web site on 4 April 2003. This version

will be used to discuss the manual and identify areas for

modification.

The Engineer School plans to publish and distribute

FM 3-34 by the end of FY03. The manual will be the foundation

and blueprint for future engineer manuals. In the next year, the

Doctrine Division will take the principles in FM 3-34 to revise

our next tier (engineer functions) of manuals as follows:

 FM 3-34.1 (FM 90-7 and FM 5-102), Combined Arms

Obstacle Integration

 FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1 and FM 5-101), Combined Arms

Breaching

 FM 3-34.112 (FM 5-103), Survivability

 FM 3-34.250 (FM 5-104 ), General Engineering

 FM 3-34.230 (FM 5-105 ), Geospatial Engineering

 FM 3-97.13 (FM 90-13), River Crossing Operations

 FM 3-34.32 (FM 20-32), Mine/Countermine Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Funkhouser is chief of the Doctrine

Development Division, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri. He was previously the Engineer

Brigade executive officer, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood,

Texas. A graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies

and the Command and General Staff College, LTC

Funkhouser is a professional engineer in Virginia.

Letter To The Editor

I originally wrote “Planning Engineer Support for an Urban

Attack” (published in Engineer, July 1998, and reprinted in

Engineer, January-March 2003) to provide options with the

technology and doctrine fielded to table of organization and

equipment engineer units. Since I left the Joint Readiness

Training Center, the Army has developed new doctrine and

equipment to address some of the challenges I discussed. We

have learned well from our experiences in the Balkans and

Afghanistan. Notably, the sensor arrays now in development

through the Infantry Center and in testing with the Special

Operations Forces community mitigate the need for explosive

entry during precision-strike military operations on urbanized

terrain (MOUT). Remotely controlled breaching equipment

has improved mobility and reduced the need for explosive

breaching in many cases. Unmanned aerial vehicles and

improved intelligence dissemination systems have greatly

improved our situational awareness, reducing the need for

“brute force” approaches. Indeed, the entire Army is making

great strides in addressing the MOUT challenge.

Given that the world continues to urbanize, we must

continue to develop new techniques to meet a wide range of

MOUT tactical problems. Lieutenant Colonel Funkhouser and

Major Kirkton (“Doctrinal Changes in Urban Operations,”

Engineer, January-March 2003) rightly state that we have an

obligation to reduce collateral damage as a way to protect

civilians and maintain legitimacy for our operations in the host

nation. I would add that the complex three-dimensional

battlespace of a large city, such as Seoul or Baghdad,

presents a broad range of tactical problems for the maneuver

commander—high population density, complex terrain, and

dispersed-but-lethal military opponents. The supporting

engineer soldiers have a responsibility to prepare a broad range

of solutions to these tactical problems, some of which may be

quite destructive. For example, explosive mine clearing may be

appropriate in engagement areas like urban parks, and

explosive-entry techniques may be required to gain access to

enemy-held buildings. The Israeli-Palestinean conflict provides

rich examples of improvised obstacles supporting small groups

of determined opponents and demonstrates that excessive

force can have significant unintended consequences. We must

balance the risk of collateral damage with mission accomplishment, force protection, and proportionality. Excessive force

risks escalation and violates the principles of legitimacy and

restraint that are the foundation of successful smaller-scale

contingency operations.

In any case, good mobility/survivability support contributes

to maintaining initiative and momentum. Detailed mobility/

survivability planning and preparation is essential in every

environment. It must address the needs of the entire tactical

force—from tooth to tail. Resupply and ground casualty

evacuation routes, movement corridors for armored support

forces, and a variety of assembly areas must be thoroughly

planned and resourced. Engineer support to dismounted

infantry platoons and companies in urban environments must

remain prepared to clear a variety of reinforcing obstacles,

including breaching buildings.

 This is a superb discussion topic that should rightly take

place in the pages of our professional publication.

Major John DeJarnette

Planning Engineer Support for an Urban Attack

22 Engineer April-June 2003
April-June 2003 Engineer 23

“The enemy will fight asymmetrically. He cannot face us

frontally and will come at us from the side and in the gaps he

can find. My challenge is always loss of momentum. If I can

keep momentum, he will stay off balance and have to fight my

fight. The area where loss of momentum is always greatest is

in crossing gaps and breaching complex obstacles. Any piece

of ground that stops us takes away the initiative. A great

challenge. Having an adequate countermine program is a

level-of-confidence issue and one of our key responsibilities.”

—General Eric K. Shinseki

Chief of Staff of the Army

S

ince Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military missions have

spanned the spectrum of conflict. Those who

oppose U.S. interests and objectives acknowledge that

their forces would not survive a direct confrontation with our

forces in conventional war. With U.S. involvement in a conflict,

direct combat actions become less frequent as opponents

disperse their forces and adopt tactics, techniques, and

procedures (TTP) designed to offset our advantages. The

effectiveness of this approach has been demonstrated

repeatedly. In Chechnya, forces confronted with numerically

or technologically superior opponents also realized that they

must operate in complex terrain and urban environments to

offset the advantages of their adversaries. Analyses reveal

that our potential adversaries believe that denial of regional

access can dictate the tempo of conflict to the U.S. disadvantage. Adversaries understand that if they attack our

alliances and coalitions, they can delay the start of decisive

operations and dictate the strategic tempo by frustrating U.S.

and allied access.

 The current force is trained, equipped, and organized to

breach complex linear obstacles intended to shape the

battlefield. The Army’s countermine capabilities were

developed to breach linear obstacles. With few exceptions, all

current countermine equipment in our inventory employs one

of three strategies: metal detection or mechanical or explosive

“brute-force” neutralization. While this is a critical capability

that must be maintained, recent experience in multiple

operations demonstrates that there is a distinct need to clear

mines from an area, not just breach.

The Army is not organized—and has very few organic

assets—to detect and neutralize mines for area and route

clearance operations. We cannot clear routes at operational

speeds; technology will not support it. We must bridge the

current countermine capabilities gap with commercial off-theshelf (COTS) equipment to conduct operations in the

contemporary operational environment (COE) for the Legacy

and Interim Forces until countermine equipment that meets

our required countermine capabilities is fielded to the Objective

Force.

However, the COE—with adaptations by potential

adversaries to offset U.S. advantages—is leading conflict

toward nonlinear, simultaneous operations conducted

throughout the depth of the area of operations, using

conventional and unconventional means oriented on the

destruction of U.S. national will and weakening international

support. As in the attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia

in 1996, adversaries have added new depth to the battlespace.

They have demonstrated that they clearly understand the

political value of attacking soft targets when they are unable

to achieve success in conventional operations.

In January 2002, the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center

(MANSCEN) began to establish a Countermine/Counter

Booby Trap Center (CMCBTC) at Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri, as the “go-to” Center of Excellence for all things

having to do with countermine.

The requirement for a CMCBTC is the result of the

challenges presented by the extreme proliferation of mines,

booby traps, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the COE.

The challenges have been intensified by the employment of

improvised explosive devices (IEDs), side-attack mines, and

command-detonated devices. Potential adversaries have

learned that they no longer have to achieve military victory;

instead, a way to achieve success is to avoid defeat while

inflicting casualties on U.S. and allied personnel. This is an

effective way to attack political will and popular support for

military operations. Demonstrated repeatedly over the last

decade, taking hostages, using civilians as “shields,” using

mines as instruments of terror, and using IEDs for ambushes

have proven very effective. From southern Lebanon to

Oklahoma City, from the Balkans to Latin America, mines and

explosive devices in the hands of renegades have been

successful in making our superpower military feel helpless

and ill-prepared.

The CMCBTC was created to help remedy the current

shortfall in mine/countermine training that currently exists in

the Army. The center’s goals are to—

The Countermine Center

Forges Ahead

By Mr. Eric Johnson and Colonel Jeffrey P. LaMoe
24 Engineer April-June 2003

 Integrate, not duplicate, countermine and counter-booby

trap doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) issues and solutions.

 Develop expertise in countermine and counter-booby trap

techniques to detect and defeat booby trap and mine threats

and enhance mobility and force protection in the COE.

 Maintain superiority in all facets of countermine warfare,

including resident and reach-back technical capabilities.

 Focus the science and technology community on

developing new technologies to counter the mine and

booby trap threats that support countermine technologies

for Objective Force assured mobility.

Today the CMCBTC is well on its way to establishing itself

as a fully resourced Center of Excellence, which will become

the recognized leader in countermine and counter-booby trap

training and technology. The center will focus and synchronize

aggressive countermine exploitation of present and emerging

mine and explosive threats, enhance countermine interoperability and hazard awareness with the combined arms,

and develop DOTMLPF solutions and TTP for integrating

newly developed or COTS equipment into countermine

operations.

Many organizations are trying to help solve the explosive

hazard problem; this synergy of effort did not exist previously.

The focus of the CMCBTC’s efforts this past year centered on

interfacing and integrating countermine issues and solutions

with other U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schools,

allied forces, and joint services. This past year has also shown

an increased awareness of the challenges in the countermine

environment and initial integration of effort across branches,

services, and Department of Defense agencies. The figure

below shows the number and scope of organizations with

involvement and interest in countermine.

 The CMCBTC, working in concert with the MANSCEN

Directorate of Combat Developments, developed a

specification for a standard minefield database linked to

Geographic Information System (GIS) tools to track and

graphically display minefields and hazard areas. This effort,

dubbed the Tactical Minefield Database (TMFDB), is being

developed through the Topographic Engineering Center (TEC),

Alexandria, Virginia—the government lead for the Maneuver

Control System (MCS)-Engineer (MCS-E)—and Northrop

Grumman, TEC’s software development lead for MCS-E. The

TMFDB will be forward-compatible with the beta release of

MCS-E, which is scheduled for FY03.

The TMFDB resulted from urgent requirements emanating

from Operation Enduring Freedom to develop a database of

minefield and explosive hazard information. This initiative

provides Coalition Joint Task Force 180 the ability to capture

explosive hazard data and print georeferenced minefield maps

and tactical decision aids to support the mobility and force

protection of the force.

The TMFDB is relational, versatile, and customizable. The

database will operate on a host unit’s local area network,

permitting near-real-time sharing of hazard data among U.S.

elements. Friendly and enemy obstacles are assigned obstacle

numbers based on the obstacle-naming convention in Field

Manual (FM) 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, and

hazard locations will be displayed on tactical map backgrounds

using color schemes and symbology shown in FM 101-5-1,

Operational Terms and Graphics, and Military Standard

(MILSTD) 2525B, Common Warfighting Symbology.

The TMFDB and GIS software can track and display point,

linear, and area obstacles, minefields, and explosive hazards.

Built as a subset of MCS-E, the application is being designed

to interface with the command and control personal computer

(C2PC) and MCS-Light and to input and output the minefield

database to multiple formats (for example, the UN-approved

Standard Information Management System for Mine Action

[IMSMA]). The CMCBTC is presently demonstrating TMFDB

capabilities to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Kuwait.

Countermine/Counter Booby Trap Center
April-June 2003 Engineer 25

The past year has been demanding for the CMCBTC

Countermine Training Integration Division. The CMCBTC

developed mine awareness, engineer-specific countermine and

counter-booby trap training to prepare forces for Operation

Enduring Freedom. The CMCBTC also trained more than 4,000

soldiers and qualified more than 100 instructors at Fort Leonard

Wood and various other locations (eleven mobile training

teams in the continental United States [CONUS] and three

outside CONUS [OCONUS]). Recently, nine CMCBTC

personnel were deployed to Germany, Kuwait, and Afghanistan for countermine predeployment and on-site training.

In addition, the CMCBTC—along with the National Ground

Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Navy

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head,

Maryland— developed two handbooks that describe common

explosive hazards, their doctrinal usage, recognition features,

immediate action drills, reporting, countermeasure equipment,

and TTP to deal with these threats. One handbook, which is

titled Land Mine and Explosive Hazards Reference Guide,

concerns Afghanistan. The second one is the Soldier’s

Handbook, Land Mines and Explosive Hazards–Iraq. The

CMCBTC also developed a detailed Training Circular (TC)

20-32-5, Commander’s Reference Guide, Land Mine and

Explosive Hazards (Iraq).

Our current practice, in response to urgent circumstances,

does not fit the “train-alert-deploy” model; instead, it is “alertdeploy-train.” We need to emphasize common soldier skills

training in mine awareness, detection, avoidance, and

extraction, and develop combined arms strategies across

Battlefield Operating Systems. The CMCBTC proposes the

five functional courses shown in the table below to enhance

and integrate individual and combined arms skills and to ensure

that we have requisite skill sets trained before deployment.

Funding is needed to support the functional training courses

until the FY05 budget submission establishes funds for a

throughput of 400 students per course.

The U.S. Army requires a mine-detection-dog program to

support Operation Enduring Freedom and the Objective Force

and to reduce the risk to soldiers. Mine-detection dogs are the

only tool we have to identify mines and explosive hazards

based on the chemical odor of the explosives used in these

devices.

In August 2002, the U.S. Army Engineer School Assistant

Commandant briefed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and

the Army Requirements Oversight Council on the school’s

solutions for dealing with the countermine threat. They

approved funding for the Operation Enduring Freedom area

and route clearance sets, but not a CONUS-based training set.

Approved items include mine-clearing armor-protected

(MCAP) dozers, berm sifters, medium flails, mine-detectiondog teams, flares, weight-dispersion boots, interim vehiclemounted mine detectors, and mine-protected vehicles.

Included in the briefing was the establishment of a minedetection-dog unit, which was approved and funded. After

careful research, it was decided that the British Army can best

train the baseline requirements the U.S. Army needs for its

mine-detection-dog capability. The first squad and the

detachment sergeant were transferred to Fort Leonard Wood,

Countermine Functional Courses

Countermine Course Will provide joint service and combined arms leaders with an understanding of countermine

operations and equipment and will advise commanders on force protection, area clearance, route

clearance, and maneuver and attack missions. It will also train personnel on COTS and Legacy

Force equipment. 

Course Description

Counter-Booby Trap Course Will teach knowledge- and technical-based tasks that support detection, identification, marking,

recording, reporting, extraction, and neutralization of booby traps on the battlefield. 

Urban Breacher Course Will provide individual training for Department of Defense and Department of Justice personnel. The

course will teach advanced urban breaching operations, explosive theory, planning combined

operations, safety issues, urban reconnaissance, employment of urban breaching assets, and

breaching techniques for urban operations. It will also train personnel on COTS and Legacy Force

equipment. We are working with the Marine Corps to exploit their current course (joint training).

Master Countermine Course Will provide training to noncommissioned officers (E-7 and above) with battle staff qualification and

officers (lieutenants, captains, and majors) to increase the planning capability of joint service and

combined arms staff personnel in mobility tasks influenced by mines, booby traps, and UXO. The

course will enable staff personnel to establish a mine information and coordination cell within an

operational headquarters and advise commanders on all countermine TTP, including force

protection, area clearance, and route clearance. It will also train liaison skills for operations with

coalition forces, United Nations, nongovernment organizations, private volunteer organizations, and

demining organizations.

Will teach non-explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) soldiers to conduct initial procedures to mitigate

the hazards of UXO, booby traps, and IEDs. 

Unexploded Ordnance

Reconnaissance Agent Course
small training base and the CMCBTC will be taxing it to the

fullest in support of our efforts.

The Engineer School is addressing the area clearance

shortfall with updated doctrine, training support plans, and

TTP and certified instructors to help train our Army for ongoing

and future area clearance operations.

Mr. Johnson is the lessons learned researcher in the Countermine/

Counter-Booby Trap Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds

a master’s in computer resources and information management from

Webster University in Saint Louis, Missouri, and is a graduate of the

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Colonel LaMoe is the Director of Training, U.S. Army Engineer

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Previous assignments include

senior combat engineer trainer, Sidewinder 07, National Training

Center, Fort Irwin, California, and deputy commander, 555th Combat

Engineer Group, Fort Lewis, Washington. He holds a master’s from

Michigan State University and a master’s in strategic planning from

the U.S. Army War College.

26 Engineer April-June 2003

future home of the mine-detection dogs, and are awaiting orders

to the United Kingdom for training. Training is expected to begin

in May 2003. Training for mine dogs is 24 weeks long.

Mine-detection dogs give Army engineers an additional

tool for countermine operations—a tool last used in the Army

during the Vietnam conflict. Today’s planned detachment will

have an offensive capability similar to that of the Vietnam-era

units. However, the threat today is very different and complex.

Dogs have performed civilian humanitarian demining missions

for more than a decade, but the U.S. Army requires more than

just that capability. This new unit will be breaking ground

with TTP and doctrine for the military countermine dog. In

fact, this unit will be trying to advance procedures used by

other armies. The U.S. Army mine-detection-dog unit will be

the world’s most advanced dog unit.

It will take almost three years to field this unit of 30 dogs.

The time delay is because the U.S. military has no training

capability for mine-detection dogs and will have to stand up a

trainer base while the unit stands up. The British Army has a

Regimental Awards Regimental Awards Regimental Awards

Each year we recognize the best noncommissioned officer, lieutenant, and engineer company, in each of the components, for

outstanding contributions and service to our Regiment and Army. Every engineer unit in the Regiment can submit the name and

achievements of its best of the best to compete in these distinguished award competitions. Only the finest engineer soldiers are selected

as recipients of these awards. They will carry throughout their careers the distinction and recognition of being the Engineer Branch’s best

and brightest soldiers and leaders. Following are the results of the 2002 Active Component Itschner and Grizzly Awards and Sturgis Medal

selection boards:

The Itschner Award committee selected the U.S. Army Europe nominee—Company C, 9th Engineer Battalion (C), 1st Infantry

Division Engineer Brigade, Schweinfurt, Germany, APO AE 09033—as the 2002 winner.

The Grizzly Award Committee selected First Lieutenant Michael White, Company A, 54th Engineer Battalion (C) (M), Bamberg,

Germany, APO AE 09139, as the 2002 winner.

The Sturgis Medal committee selected Sergeant First Class Bradley J. Schneier, Company B, 54th Engineer Battalion (C) (M), Warner

Barracks, Germany, APO AE 09139, as the 2002 winner.

All of the nominees represented their major commands with the highest professionalism and dedication to the Engineer Corps’s

vision and deserve our highest praise. The award recipients will be recognized at the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Ball, tentatively

scheduled for 23 October 2003.

For many years, senior leaders of the Regiment have debated about an appropriate award to recognize the very best engineer soldier,

private through specialist. In keeping with the tradition of naming such an award after a distinguished member of the Regiment, the

Regimental Command Sergeant Major, along with other senior sergeants major, recommended and gained approval for an award named

after the most distinguished command sergeant major in the history of our Regiment—the fourth Sergeant Major of the Army, Leon Van

Autreve.

The award is extremely significant for two reasons: first, it was created to recognize the most outstanding junior enlisted soldier of

the three components of our Regiment as a tribute to one of our Army’s greatest champions of welfare and care of soldiers and their

families; second, it showcases and highlights the important and significant service our junior enlisted soldiers provide to our nation. They

are truly our most valued resource, and we wouldn’t be the Army or Regiment that we are without their selfless and dedicated service. The

Van Autreve nominations will be submitted for FY03 and presented at ENFORCE 04.

Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

Lieutenant General Robert B. Flowers

Chief of Engineers
April-June 2003 Engineer 27

I

n early December 2001, I was just settling down in

Kosovo—doing my part toward fulfilling the 10th

Mountain Division’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) rotation—

when I received a call to go to Afghanistan to support Central

Command’s (CENTCOM’s) Operation Enduring Freedom. So I

packed up and moved out, leaving a three-man element

deployed in support of KFOR. The other personnel from our

detachment remained at Fort Drum, New York, supporting the

rear commander and performing force protection missions.

Terrain Team Mission

My unit, the 66th Engineer Detachment (Terrain),

works for the 10th Mountain Division assistant

chief of staff, G2 (intelligence), in support of the

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Being

collocated with the G2 section is helpful in getting access to

required geospatial information and imagery. However, due to

our capabilities to rapidly visualize the terrain, we also stayed

in the back pocket of the division chief of staff. Our main piece

of equipment was the Digital Topographic Support System

(DTSS)-Deployable (DTSS-D). We also had some augmentation

equipment from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(NIMA), headquartered at Bethesda, Maryland. Despite our

small size and the austere environment in Afghanistan, we

were still able to provide support to the division with ondemand, non-standard, unique terrain products in a timely

manner.

The 10th Mountain Division had many successes during

Operation Enduring Freedom. The terrain team supported the

division during the deployment and was extremely successful

during the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda.

Adequate planning would not have been possible without

the DTSS-D. The overall DTSS was christened during the

combat operation. (To learn more about the DTSS, see the

Topographic Engineering Center [TEC] Web site at

www.tec.army.mil.) It enabled us to provide many tactical

decision aids and other nonstandard products. Most engineers

are familiar with the products we were asked to generate—

elevation tints, shaded/painted relief maps, high-resolution

image maps, multispectral image maps, combined-obstacle

overlays, lines of communication overlays, hydrology

overlays, limited map reproduction, perspective views using

high-resolution imagery, threat domes, intervisibility products,

and virtual fly-throughs. This may sound like “the short list,”

but every product was tailored to its intended user, and a lot

of imagination from both the analyst and the user was required

to make it useful.

One particular item we generated was the initial air insertion

visualization product of the Shaikot Valley in southeastern

Afghanistan. The aviation commanders needed to know what

air routes were available from Baghram into the objective area

of operation with specific cloud ceilings. These corridors had

to be displayed using the Earth Resources Data Analysis

System (ERDAS®) Virtual Geographic Information System

(VGIS®), an invaluable commercial applications program

included in the DTSS-D. Using the VGIS, the commander was

given a better understanding of how rugged the terrain was

and what options were available. After looking for air avenues

with varying ceilings, the aviators and terrain technicians

determined that the ceiling could not be less than 7,500 feet in

order to use the corridors that were selected. The value of this

information allowed premission decisions to be made by the

division chief of staff in support of CENTCOM’s overall

mission.

Operation Enduring Freedom:

A Waypoint Toward Geospatial Engineering Transformation

By Chief Warrant Officer 3 David Kasten
28 Engineer April-June 2003

Lessons Learned

The DTSS proved to be the right system to support

warfighters of Operation Anaconda, aviation units,

and division decision makers—it fulfilled its requirements. The many lessons we learned during this operation

concerned things such as equipment challenges, the importance of maintenance, enhancements that the system should

incorporate, understanding data and data limitations, new

training we need, the importance of working closely with the

G2 imagery section, the need to push software to users, and

on-demand printing. Based on my recent experiences with the

10th Mountain Division, I will discuss these lessons in this

article.

Equipment and Maintenance

Although it is labeled as a deployable system, the DTSS-D

is geared more toward a garrison-type environment. Dust and

heat will quickly render the system useless, and maintenance

can’t be stressed enough. The initial problem we had was that

we were in a very dusty environment in Afghanistan, which

took its toll on all our equipment. Saving factors were a good

industrial vacuum cleaner and regular maintenance. Even then,

we still lost the capability to output to soft mediums such as

floppy, jazz, and digital video disks (DVDs) and compact discsrecordable (CD-Rs). Luckily, we brought extra (off-the-shelf)

computers that had the same output capability that we

connected through the DTSS.

The constant moving of systems also created havoc on

external wires. We lost many small computer system interface

(SCSI) cables and terminators and one power cable. These

were mission stoppers. The bottom line is: gather spare parts

prior to departure. The Department of Defense Manufacturing

Technology (ManTech) Program, which provides DTSS

contract support, will help obtain spare wiring.

It is important to understand the limitations of the system—

both the hardware and software aspects of it. We thought we

had a good handle on this until we really pushed the system.

Bring your own networking tools, such as RJ45 (Internet) cable,

testers, crimpers, and spare 6- to 8-port hubs. We need to take

it upon ourselves to understand our systems so we can do

our own basic troubleshooting.

Enhancements

We used VGIS exclusively in special operations mission

rehearsals and quick-response force planning. This included

helping users visualize their insertion route, extraction route,

helicopter landing zones, and tactical operations. We used

VGIS to visualize where the battle was taking place, determine

mortar threat domes, build line of sight from known enemy

and friendly locations, and assess possible exfiltration and

infiltration routes from known enemy locations (commonly

referred to as “rat trails”). However, VGIS would work even

better if we incorporated a high-end graphics card to allow

better resolution and larger-sized fly-throughs. Also, a better

three-dimensional (3-D) fly-through program that could be

rendered and flown in real time would be helpful in the future

(such as Skyline’s TerraExplorer Pro®).

Lack of Information

We sometimes take for granted that everyone understands

the possible lack of geospatial information and the limitations

of the data we use and require for geospatial analyses. As

geospatial engineers, it is our responsibility to make our

customers understand data accuracy and data resolution—

for example, by creating line-of-sight or visible-area plots (360-

degree line of sight) using Digital Terrain Elevation Data

(DTED) Levels 1 and 2 or Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission

(SRTM) Level 2. Very little vector data was available in

December 2001. The terrain team extracted as much data as

possible from 1:50,000 Russian maps, and then we used imagery

for critical areas.

Training

Geospatial instruction taught in the U.S. Army

Engineer School is only the basic building block.

It’s our responsibility to teach soldiers the reality of

the field. We must give them realistic training, to

include holding them to the time constraints we can

expect in a high-tempo operation. Encourage

creativity when producing a product, pass on the

shortcuts we use when we produce products, and

get soldiers to understand the mission of the

customer. We have to prepare for the fact that we

may have to deploy as a small element. We need to

ensure that we cross train everyone from the bottom

up, keeping in mind that the terrain technicians are

still the experts. There will always be a learning curve

to overcome, but there are basic items that must be

addressed before any deployment. Following is a

list of tasks with which all of us should be familiar.

Digital Topographic Support System-Deployable Most deal with computers, and many may think this
April-June 2003 Engineer 29

is an assistant chief of staff, G6 (information management),

function. This is correct, but if your G6 is as undermanned and

overtasked as ours, you’ll find that this knowledge will help

cut out minutes, hours, or days of downtime. These skills

include—

 Basic networking, such as setting up Internet protocol

addresses for plotters, printers, and computers.

 Setting up gateways, workgroups, domains, and RJ45

cables, both standard and crossover; up-linking hubs.

 Basic computer operation and troubleshooting (including

maintenance), such as file transfer protocol (FTP) and file

allocation table (FAT) 16 versus FAT 32 versus New

Technology (NT) file system.

 Understanding the common errors/problems/limitations

with Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRITM)

ArcInfo®, such as missing information within vector

coverages and inverted fly-throughs (VGIS).

 Understanding the problems/shortcomings of all data that

is being used and being able to convey this to the customer.

 Understanding the IPB process better.

G2 Imagery Section

Understand the functions and limitations of your imagery

section. The terrain team relied heavily on imagery during this

operation. With the lack of standard maps, we filled the data

gap by producing multiple image maps. Imagery was vital in

producing products because NIMA maps that were available

were at 1:100,000 scale and almost 20 years old. These did not

provide the ground operator with enough information.

Australia shared scanned Russian 1:50,000 digital maps that

provided great detail but were still 15 to18 years old.

We created many updates using imagery provided from

two main sources. The first was unclassified, high-resolution

imagery that the TEC Imagery Library provided as soon as it

was available. The second source was the NIMA support team

(NST), formally called the Customer Support Response Team

(CSRT), that provided high-resolution, georeferenced,

classified imagery. The team could download current imagery

(less than 30 days old) via the Secret Internet Protocol Router

Network (SIPRNET) and could also create image maps. Later

in the deployment, the NST brought its own dedicated satellite

dish for connectivity, which improved the team’s ability to

download imagery that the division needed. Both sources were

vital to the success of the mission.

One misconception many users have is that all imagery is

accurate and precise; however, we found errors that were as

great as 400 meters off of actual locations. Geospatial engineers

must inform their users of the possible data inaccuracies.

National and Coalition Partners

There are many organizations that can assist us in just

about every aspect of our job. During our deployment, we

asked for assistance from ERDAS, ESRI, NIMA, TEC,

ManTech, ILEX Systems (a software support contactor), and

terrain units from the United States, Britain, and Australia.

They all bent over backward to assist us; just like the old

cliché, “no question is a dumb question.”

Software and Data

Push terrain/map programs to the people we support. Give

the tools and basic instructions to our customers. The

programs that we pushed were Terrabase 2, FalconViewTM,

ArcExplorer®, ERDAS Viewfinder®, SID® Viewer, and screengrabbing software. We also pushed as much raw data as

possible, such as DTED, raster product format (RPF) images,

and raster data. This helped eliminate the small taskings that

we were constantly receiving. The training that the customers

need to use these map programs will take some time, but the

payoff in time saved in the future will be worth it.

 Printing

One of the functions of the DTSS-D is low-volume map

printing. Although this is a thorn in the side of many terrain

detachments, it is also a great asset. Due to the lack of

information on standard NIMA 1:100,000 maps, we turned to

printing some of the Russian 1:50,000 maps. These maps had

an abundance of information that was helpful to the ground

operators, such as water velocity, bridge information, and road

width. The most helpful information was that contours on

these maps were 20 meters versus the 50 meters on the

1:100,000 maps. Because of this, the terrain team overlaid World

Geodetic Survey 84 grids on the Russian 1:50,000 maps and

reproduced more than 500 copies to support the ground

operators.

Conclusion

The DTSS is a great system. It works in combat, it works

in the field, and it works in garrison. There are aspects

that can be improved, and I challenge the Engineer

School to make that happen. The terrain warrant officer and

81T soldiers are in high demand. There are many customers in

your organization beyond the traditional support to the IPB.

In my case, the division chief of staff and the aviation and

special operations forces were new and prized customers. No

information set is going to be perfect—and may not even be

good enough to use—but I used imagery to improve upon

existing NIMA- and Soviet-produced maps. Finally, the best

job is done in collaboration with NIMA, TEC, and our allies.

We really have the interoperability built in to allow us to work

together smoothly.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Kasten is a terrain technician in

the 66th Engineer Detachment, 10th Mountain Division, Fort

Drum, New York (with deployments to Kosovo and

Afghanistan). He has also served in the 33d Engineer

Detachment, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea; 526th Engineer

Detachment, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany

(with two deployments to Bosnia); and the 66th Military

Intelligence Group in Augsburg, Germany.
30 Engineer April-June 2003

With the fielding of the Digital Topographic Support

System (DTSS) and the increase in the size of terrain

detachments in the heavy divisions and the Stryker

Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), many changes in geospatial

engineering have occurred over the past five years. These

changes enabled significant improvements in geospatial

engineering support to commanders and proved critical to

success in recent combat operations. (The article on page 27

tells how the DTSS supported Operation Enduring Freedom.)

As successful as we are, our current capabilities still do

not meet the total requirements for our Legacy and Interim

Forces. Furthermore, the requirements for geospatial

engineering support for the Objective Force will be even

greater. This article explains how the geospatial community

will transform to meet the needs of the Objective Force. It

also covers deficiencies in the current force that must be

fixed, what we see as the emerging geospatial requirements

for the Objective Force, and the organizational and

materiel system changes that are necessary to meet these

requirements.

Current Force Support Deficiencies

One deficiency in the current force is a lack of accurate,

robust, and timely geospatial data for worldwide

missions. The possibility exists that a terrain team

will not have the required terrain data to support a unit’s mission

and will have to acquire that data from an outside source or

create it internally. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(NIMA), headquartered at Bethesda, Maryland, is the primary

outside source for our digital geospatial data and imagery.

The problem commonly associated with this source is that the

resolution is often insufficient (for example, Digital Terrain

Elevation Data [DTED] Level 1 or 2, with 100- and 30-meter

spacing), and it often takes too long for NIMA to provide the

data. When terrain teams support operations, particularly

special or airborne operations or military operations on

urbanized terrain, high-resolution geospatial data (such as

DTED and Imagery of 1 meter) is often required. Thus, to

overcome the shortfall, terrain teams need to have the capability

to generate their own geospatial data internally. The current

DTSS suite of software tools has limited capabilities to rapidly

generate geospatial data.

Another deficiency of the current topographic force is that

the organizational structure is not designed for generation,

management, fusion, and dissemination of digital data. The

current organizations do not support the growing geospatial

needs of the Army. A case in point is the topographic unit

chain of command: units designed to task have no authority

to task. For example, the production and control (P&C) team

has the mission to manage P&C for an entire theater, but it has

no authority over the underlying geospatial units. Additionally,

there is an awkward relationship between the topographic

battalion and the accompanying P&C team. While both are

led by a lieutenant colonel, their lines of responsibility seem

to be interwoven.

Finally, there is no distinct line of communication between

the terrain team assigned to a brigade and units assigned at

echelon-above-corps units. There is no established organizational structure that a terrain team can use to acquire new or

updated terrain data from a higher-echelon support unit.

A further deficiency of the current structure is that there

are still seven divisions in the active Army that have only a

single nine-person terrain team assigned to them. Digitized

divisions have 36 soldiers who support them and each

maneuver brigade. This capability should not be limited to the

digitized divisions; the nondigitized divisions can also make

use of these larger terrain teams.

Objective Force Support Deficiencies

The Objective Force has a number of constructs that

will cause it to fight in a manner completely and totally

different than the way we fight current forces. These

constructs include—

 Use of knowledge as a substitute for armor and mass. The

Objective Force must see first and understand first to be

successful. In the case of geospatial engineering, this will

require an unprecedented amount of timely, accurate, and

robust geospatial data to proactively understand the effects

of terrain. This is particularly true if we are to accomplish

the concept of assured mobility. In this case, knowledge of

the terrain is part of the first of the four imperatives of the

assured mobility concept. Our current organizational

structure and materiel solution don’t even come close to

meeting this requirement. We can’t rapidly generate data,

and we can’t manage data sufficiently.

Transforming Geospatial Engineering

. . . Critical to Success of the Objective Force

By Colonel David A. Kingston, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Tupper, and Major Carl G. Herrmann

Transforming Geospatial Engineering

. . . Critical to Success of the Objective Force
April-June 2003 Engineer 31

HSOC

DCGS-A

DTSS-B

Data Generation

Data Management

Data Analysis

Coproduction

Library

U E

DCGS-A

DTSS-L

U E

Support from

U E DTSS

Planning Cell

Data Generation

Data Management

Data Collection

Data Analysis

Survey

Print

Info Management

Info Use

User Exploitation

Geospatial Plan

National/Joint/Army Agencies

NIMA - Gateway

NIMA - Commercial Satellite Imagery Library

TEC - “DTSS-Main”

Army Space Command - Spectral Analysis

NGIC - Ground Analysis

Joint Warfare Analysis Center - Joint Warfare Imagery Library

Real-Time and Near-Real-Time

National and Commercial Imagery

Real-Time and Near-Real-Time

Multisensor Feeds

Predator

Fused Battlespace

Geospatially Enabled

COP

Environmental Data

 Use of reach-back to minimize the footprint of deployed

forces. This requires robust home station operating centers

(HSOCs) and high-capacity communications systems, plus

the ability to fuse/conflate data from multiple sources.

It also requires a capability to create a predictive geospatial

tool that can be disseminated to soldiers for use in a standalone mode. None of these currently exist.

 Emphasis on battle command. Objective Force systems

must have as their main focus the ability to support the

commander wherever he may be to execute the art and

science of command. Individual stovepipe systems will not

work for the Objective Force. The current Army Battle

Command System, which includes DTSS, does not meet

this requirement. There must be organizational and system

changes.

Objective Force Organization and Materiel

Solutions

From the above, it is obvious that organizational and

materiel changes are needed if the geospatial engineering community is to meet the requirements of both

the current and Objective Forces. It is clear that the organization needed to support the Objective Force must have

some capability at the unit-of-action (UA) level, a fairly robust

topographic capability at the unit-of-employment (UE) level,

and a very robust capability at the HSOC level. The organization

must enable the critical missions of data generation,

management, analysis, survey, and printing. The figure below

shows the operational architecture that we believe is needed

to make this work.

 Table 1, page 32, shows the major teams that we envision

will be put together as modules that will be able to execute at

the UE and be plugged into the UA, should it need augmentation. Also shown is a geospatial planning cell at theater

level that will have all of the capability needed for the entire

theater (such as database management, conflation, and

generation).

As far as the HSOC is concerned, we envision the Army’s

Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) at Alexandria, Virginia,

as being the premier geospatial engineering center of

excellence. However, TEC’s current organization would need

to be greatly expanded in size and capability to meet the

Objective Force HSOC requirements.

The Objective Force will also require major upgrades to our

primary system—the DTSS. This system, which we currently

call DTSS-Objective Force (DTSS-OF), must be able to rapidly

generate data from numerous sensors and sources, to include

sensors in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellites and

data sources from NIMA; the National Ground Intelligence

Center (NGIC), Charlottesville, Virginia; TEC; etc. The Objective

Force system must rapidly generate whatever data it needs to

support specific missions. All this must be semiautomated in

gathering data from whatever source is available, generating

the data, and providing the smart geospatial database (logic
32 Engineer April-June 2003

“network”) that will eventually be sent to each system platform.

It must seamlessly provide data to other Objective Force

systems, such as the Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy (DCGS-A), the Objective Force Battle Command System,

and the Future Combat System. This Objective Force

geospatial system will provide unparalleled capabilities to

understand the terrain and provide the foundation for the

Objective Force common operational picture (COP). Table 2

shows the major requirements of the Objective Force

geospatial system.

Conclusion

I

n conclusion, the transformation of geospatial engineering

began in the late 1990s with the fielding of the DTSS and

the increase in size of the geospatial teams. This transformation has already brought great success in current

operations. However, the current DTSS and organization

structure still does not meet all of the requirements that will be

needed to support the Objective Force. The organizational

and materiel solutions presented in this article will serve as

the road ahead in overcoming these deficiencies and allow the

Objective Force to see first and understand first. Additionally,

we will develop the changes in doctrine, training, leader

development, and facilities needed to bring about those

solutions. Our efforts will be closely coordinated with those

of other members of the community (such as NIMA, the Battle

Command Battle Laboratory, the Military Intelligence School,

and TEC). The future of the geospatial community and the

Engineer Regiment has never been brighter.

Colonel Kingston is the director of the TRADOC Program

Integration Office for Terrain Data, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. He previously served with the 39th Engineer

Battalion, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. A graduate of the

United States Military Academy, the Army War College, and

the Command and General Staff College, COL Kingston

holds a master’s in civil engineering from Pennsylvania State

University. He is registered as a professional engineer in

Virginia.

Lieutenant Colonel Tupper is chief of the U.S. Army

Engineer School Terrain Visualization Center, Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri. He previously served as the Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army Engineer School. LTC Tupper is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy and holds a master’s in

electrical engineering from the Georgia Institute of

Technology. He is a licensed professional engineer.

Major Herrmann is the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) project leader for the materiel team,

Directorate of Combat Developments (Engineer Division),

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. He holds a master’s in business administration from

Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

 Precision push of terrain information/intelligence to user

 Exploitation down to user/command and control system

(command/joint mapping tool kit [C/JMTK]) by applets (terrain

reasoning)

 Advanced inputs and outputs

 Intuitive visualizations

 Position navigation (POS/NAV) enabler

 Autonomous operations with little human intervention

 Predictive terrain analysis (course of action analysis, planning)

 Reach enabled; auto data mining (brilliant pull)

 Virtual/simulations data driver (battle simulation, mission

rehearsal)

 Auto filtering and scaling of information

 Wireless

 Mounted and/or dismounted

 Artificial intelligence

 Generation of responsive terrain information (Multispectral

Scanner and Data System [MSDS])

 Conflation of MSDS and national readiness terrain information

 Connectivity to the intelligence community (NIMA, NGIC,

National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center

[NAIC], National Reconnaissance Office [NRO])

 Integration of output with DCGS-A (IGI)

 Leverage of Army Space Command – commercial imagery

 Exploitation of all sources and sensors

 Addition of new data types (ground photo, video, audio)

 Sensor tasking and control

 Data collection, including sensors and platforms (engineerdedicated UAV feeds)

 Update of terrain information

 Certification and control of terrain information sets to guarantee

a COP

 Map service responsibilities

 Geospatial database and products database

 Ability to perform at joint level when command-designated as

joint task force

 Builder of exploitation applets

 Adaptive/complex analysis

 Overlay early warning/threat/environment (weather) impacts

DTSS-OF Major Requirements/Capabilities

Table 2

Geospatial planning cell

HSOC (joint-land component

commander level)

Theater

Geodetic survey

Data generation

Data management

Table 1

Geospatial Structure Based on Small-Unit Modules

(UE level)

Corps

Geospatial data collection/

cartography/printing

(UE level)

Corps

(UE level)

Division

(UA and UE levels)

Brigade

(UA and UE levels)

Brigade Geospatial analysis
April-June 2003 Engineer 33

Terrain Visualization Systems:

Rapid Path to Terrain Understanding

By Mr. Ken Bergman

I

n the mid-1990s, an Army warrant officer in Korea flew his

helicopter north of the demilitarized zone and was shot

down. He flew north of the border because he was

unfamiliar with the terrain, and he became lost. Joint Task Force

–Korea responded by purchasing a mission-rehearsal system

called Tactical Operational Scene (TOPSCENETM), a software

package that used elevation data with imagery draped over it

to provide a three-dimensional (3-D) terrain fly-through, with

annotations and labels on key terrain features. The software

facilitated night flying because it showed scenes as they would

appear using night-vision goggles. The system provided Army

helicopter pilots the technology to rehearse missions in Korea

many times before ever getting into the cockpit. The Army

paid about half-a-million dollars for this high-end TOPSCENE

capability, which was supported by a refrigerator-sized

workstation. Databases had to be built and maintained by

contractors. Although terrain warrant officers could update

the databases, this required nonstandard training, and rotation

of trained personnel made in-house database generation a

challenge. However, the capabilities gained by having this

system at Joint Task Force–Korea were extremely useful.

The cost of computers has decreased significantly, and

many high-end Unix®-based workstations have been replaced

by Windows®-based personal computers (PCs). Today’s highend laptop can easily compare with yesterday’s refrigeratorsized workstation in terms of processing capability and speed.

Software has rapidly evolved to leverage the new, powerful

PCs. There are now literally hundreds of terrain visualization

systems that use imagery draped over elevation data to provide

3-D terrain fly-through capabilities.

Terrain Visualization Systems Capabilities

Terrain understanding is a key aspect of warfare.

Thousands of years ago, Sun Tzu said that knowing

the terrain is a significant advantage on the battlefield.

This axiom has not changed. Tactical decision aids built by

the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS) are very

useful tools to achieve terrain understanding; for example, the

modified combined-obstacle overlay is a tool that is familiar to

all topographic engineers. Tactical decision aids are typically

used in a two-dimensional (2-D) presentation, either digitally

or as hard-copy products. Terrain visualization systems, on

the other hand, provide a bird’s-eye view of the terrain, to give

the user another way to achieve terrain understanding.

 Terrain visualization systems use elevation data to provide

a basic understanding of the lay of the land (such as hills,

valleys, plains, and escarpments). More detailed elevation data

provides a better terrain understanding, but it also requires

higher data storage and processing capabilities. Imagery or

digitized raster maps are draped over the elevation data to

display terrain features. As with elevation data, more detailed

imagery provides better terrain understanding, but this comes

with a data storage and processing cost.

Many terrain visualization systems have additional

capabilities:

 Display radar domes and surface-to-air missile threat

domes.

 Drape vector (feature) terrain data over elevation data and

imagery.

 Add landmarks and signposts for improved orientation.

 Page in more detailed images or maps as you fly closer to

the ground.

 Extrude (stand up) buildings to show detailed urban terrain

data.

 Render the scene to look like a night-vision or infrared

scene.

 Export stand-alone files to any PC for 3-D fly-through

capability.

 Interface with battle command systems.

The last two points listed here merit some elaboration, since

they are key aspects in the utility of terrain visualization

systems.

Export Stand-Alone Files to Any PC

This aspect refers to the recent phenomenon of high-end

terrain visualization systems being able to export a file that

can run without any software license support. Figure 1, page

34, shows five leading terrain visualization systems that are

being used in the field. DTSS Imagizer, TerraExplorer®, and

TerraVista® are systems that are capable of exporting standalone files to “any PC” (for example, a mainstream Pentium®

computer purchased in the last couple of years). The process

of building and using terrain visualization data in Figure 1

starts with source data (elevation, feature, and urban data

and imagery), data preparation (processing the data to

provide a smooth fly-through), viewer (type of file or software

used to display the data), and data interchange (data
34 Engineer April-June 2003

Figure 2. ABCS Terrain Visualization Data Flow

interoperability from the

system to other systems).

The capability to export

stand-alone terrain visualization files makes it possible

to provide unlimited copies

of compact disks (CDs) or

digital video disks (DVDs)

to soldiers, who can load the

files on their laptops at no

cost. This is a huge technology breakthrough that

the Army needs to leverage

more effectively.

Interface With Battle

Command Systems

Interoperability with

battle command systems is

another key capability for

terrain visualization systems. The acquisition community has developed the

Army Battle Command System (ABCS) to achieve command

and control in the field. Windows-based systems in the ABCS

can use stand-alone 3-D fly-through files (see Figure 2). This

figure also shows that products from DTSS can be exported to

ABCS workstations using the DTSS overlay provider.

The ABCS is being fielded to numerous units, but fiscal

limitations have precluded fielding to all units. Some field units

have obtained systems on their own to achieve battle command

functionality. Command and control personal computer (C2PC)

is a popular government offthe-shelf (GOTS) battle command software package being

used by the Army. It uses the

media gateway controller (MGC)

or “magic” file to display overlays

(such as fire support control

measures). The Advanced Deep

Operations Command and

Control System (ADOCS),

another popular GOTS battle

command system (see Figure 3),

can be used to ingest shape files

from the DTSS and export MGC

files to C2PC. A new software

patch in the DTSS enables direct

export of MGC files from DTSS

to C2PC.

Terrain Visualization

Categories

Terrain visualization data

can be categorized into

two types:

Cross-Country Mobility Data

This terrain visualization data is derived by draping imagery

or digitized maps over elevation data. There is some level of

elevation data and imagery available over the entire planet,

and it is possible to provide some rudimentary level of terrain

understanding anywhere in the world.

Urban Data

 Urban data is built by extruding buildings, based on an

estimation of building heights from image shadows, blueprint

Figure 1. Export Stand-Alone File to Any PC
April-June 2003 Engineer 35

Figure 3. C2PC Terrain Visualization Data Flow

data, or stereo photogrammetry. These are all slow, laborintensive processes. The only other way to get accurate urban

data is to fly a light-detection and ranging sensor over the city

to obtain detailed elevation data (1 meter post spacing).

Although it is presently not possible to collect urban data

using active sensors over denied areas, programs are underway

to achieve this capability using unmanned aerial vehicles.

Low-End Software Packages

There are many low-end terrain visualization systems

that are free. These systems provide a basic capability

to build a 3-D terrain fly-through, but without the

impressive visualization capabilities of more powerful highend systems. TerraBase software, which is trained at the U.S.

Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri,

provides a basic 3-D terrain visualization capability. This GOTS

software can be downloaded from the Engineer School Web

page (http://www.wood.army.mil/tvc/DefaultPageContents/

MicroDEM_TBII.htm) for free. TerraBase also provides a

variety of other basic geospatial functions. FalconViewTM is

another free GOTS package that is popular with many users in

the field; it is often used in conjunction with C2PC.

High-End Software Packages

More powerful software packages incorporate

advanced aspects of terrain visualization. The

following systems are currently being used by Army

units in the field:

DTSS Imagizer

DTSS software now has the capability to generate the Earth

Resources Data Analysis System (ERDAS®) Imagizer file,

which can be exported to

laptops and PCs as a standalone capability. Once the

Imagizer 3-D fly-through has

been generated on DTSS, it

can be disseminated to as

many users as needed—for

free. Additional tools will be

available on the Imagizer file,

to include terrain analysis

tools, simultaneous 2-D and

3-D displays of detailed data,

and the ability to add (ingest)

more products. Imagizer will

use the Virtual World file

generated for the DTSS Virtual

Geographic Information

System (VGIS®), so terrain

analysts are already trained to

build data sets. Most PCs can

run the Imagizer stand-alone

file, but at least a 36-megabyte

graphics card is recommended. The DTSS is designed to be compatible with systems

in the ABCS architecture. Marine Corps teams are also likely

to have this software in the near future, since the DTSS and

the Marine Corps topographic production capability have the

same basic software architecture.

Joint Battlespace Viewer (JBV)

This free GOTS software, developed by the Navy, requires

a PC with a 128-megabyte graphics card. It is capable of using

multiple resolutions of imagery and digital raster maps. As the

user flies closer to the earth, higher-resolution imagery or map

products are displayed automatically. The JBV was designed

to have good interoperability with C2PC. Army users who

need to achieve data interchange with C2PC have shown a

high level of interest in the JBV, which can only use Digital

Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Level 1.

TerraVista®

This system is typically associated with modeling and

simulation; however, it is relevant to terrain visualization in

that it can be used to build detailed urban terrain data for

export as a stand-alone file and also for export as source data

for other terrain visualization systems. This is the type of data

interchange capability that is needed in a world where different

systems are being purchased by field units.

TerraExplorer

This system is used to build large terrain databases that

can be displayed on most modern PCs. It can display hundreds

of miles of data at varying levels of imagery and elevation

resolution, with a “seamless” fly-through. It is very simple to

install and use. A key benefit of TerraExplorer is that it can be

exported to as many users as necessary, limited only by the

file size or the number of CD or DVD copiers available. Another
36 Engineer April-June 2003

aspect that is unique to this system is its capability to support

Web-streaming video. This means that the 3-D terrain flythrough can be achieved remotely using a Web browser. The

National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Engineer

Research and Development Center-Topographic Engineering

Center (ERDC-TEC), and the U.S. Army Joint Precision Strike

Demonstration Program Office are using this system to provide

terrain visualization capabilities to a wide variety of users.

TOPSCENE

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, TOPSCENE

has been used for many years by Army units to achieve highend terrain visualization capabilities. Costs can be relatively

low ($1,000 - $5,000 for each viewer software license) or very

high (hundreds of thousands of dollars for the top-level data

generation hardware and software). Lockheed Martin

Corporation builds the database in a company-proprietary

format. Soldiers in the field can update and modify the data by

purchasing a midlevel capability to edit the data sets. System

capabilities include the infrared and night-vision rendering of

a scene and data interchange in a number of formats. The

Lockheed Martin data sets built under contract to other

Department of Defense users can be obtained for use on

TOPSCENE-licensed workstations.

Data Interchange

There is a need for data interchange among the various

terrain visualization systems that various units have

purchased. The costs associated with building and processing

a terrain visualization database can be very high. This is

particularly true for generation of detailed 3-D features (such

as urban buildings). Contractors and government agencies

that build terrain visualization data would serve the needs of

the Army best if their data could be used by more of the

systems in the field. Limited resources for the production of

this data could be conserved by data reuse. If a unit built a

terrain database over its immediate area, then adjacent units

and higher headquarters could use the same data even if they

had different terrain visualization systems.

One of the goals for the Objective Force is to have battle

command, modeling and simulation, and mission planning and

rehearsal systems—all using the same data. The best way to

achieve this is to begin using interchangeable data formats

that are commonly accepted. OpenFlight® is one example of a

terrain data format for 3-D terrain data interchange in the

modeling and simulation community. OpenFlight files can be

exported from TerraVista and TOPSCENE. Another interchange

format that the modeling and simulation community uses is

Synthetic Environment Data Representation and Interchange

Specification (SEDRISTM), which contains more detailed terrain

information than OpenFlight. TerraVista and TOPSCENE can

import and export SEDRIS files. Other commercial standard

formats are used to represent imagery, elevation, and feature

data. DTSS, TerraVista, and TOPSCENE can import and export

data in commercial formats. TerraExplorer and JBV can ingest

commercial-format terrain data. The use of common terrain

data formats must be increased to achieve data interchange

for terrain visualization systems.

Nonstandard System Considerations

When field units purchase nonstandard systems,

they enhance their capabilities immediately.

However, at least one soldier must start performing

tasks that were not established by U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools through the requirements process. Training and maintenance of the system

is a task set that is added as a collateral duty, or the new tasks

take the place of tasks that the soldier was performing before.

A couple of systems added to the unit can improve operations,

but the addition of many nonstandard systems can become a

problem for individual units and for the Army in terms of

training and interoperability and achieving common tactics,

techniques, and procedures.

The Army’s doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) must be adjusted to keep

units compatible and interoperable. The TRADOC Program

Integration Office for Terrain Data (TPIO-TD) at Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri, is conducting an assessment of terrain

visualization systems in conjunction with the ERDC-TEC, the

Engineer School, and the TRADOC Battle Command Training

Program to address DOTMLPF issues.

Conclusion

Terrain understanding is a fundamental ingredient for

success on the battlefield. Soldiers are increasingly

using 3-D terrain visualization systems to show the

“lay of the land,” primarily using elevation data and imagery.

The rapid advancement of computer technology and emerging

terrain visualization technologies have made it possible for

any soldier with a PC to achieve rapid terrain understanding.

The Army uses standard systems provided through the

acquisition cycle to meet the terrain visualization needs of

field users. Field units are also acquiring nonstandard

capabilities to augment standard systems and meet their

immediate needs. The Army must address DOTMLPF and

interoperability issues associated with these emerging

capabilities in order to effectively manage the use of standard

and nonstandard terrain visualization systems on the same

battlefield.

Mr. Bergman, a physical scientist, is a technical

representative from ERDC-TEC to TPIO-TD, Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Mr.

Bergman holds a master’s in systems engineering from George

Mason University. He is also a lieutenant colonel in the

Marine Corps Reserve.

Correction: The January-March 2003 issue—which was labeled as Volume 32, PB 5-03-1—should have been Volume 33, PB 5-03-1.
April-June 2003 Engineer 37

Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg,

Germany—The 18th Engineer

Brigade (Theater Army) was

reactivated 21 January here in a ceremony attended by more than 150 people.

USAREUR Chief of Staff Major

General Anthony R. Jones unfurled the

colors of the brigade, cased in 1992 at

another ceremony just 50 kilometers

away in Karlsruhe, Germany.

Jones presented the colors to the new

commander, Colonel William H. McCoy,

Jr., who also serves as USAREUR’s

Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer. McCoy

then passed them to Engineer Regimental

Command Sergeant Major William D.

McDaniel, Jr., for inclusion in the color

guard.

McCoy told the attendees the brigade

will be at full strength by the end of the

year and praised the efforts of the

USAREUR staff and others who made

the reactivation possible. McCoy

challenged his soldiers to be “ready to

deploy, tactically and technically

proficient.” He told USAREUR Commanding General B. B. Bell, “Sir, we are

ready.”

Specialist Abraham Santana was

picked by his first sergeant to be the first

soldier to receive and carry the colors.

“It’s really an honor to carry this flag

because of the Army tradition behind it.”

The 18th Engineer Brigade, whose

motto “Essayons” means “Let us try,”

has a history dating back to 1921 when

it was constituted as the 347th Engineers

(General Service) as a reserve unit. It

entered active service on 6 May 1942 and

entered combat on 29 June 1944, in

France.

The brigade was inactivated and

reactivated several times prior to July

1965, when it was reactivated and moved

to Vietnam. The brigade constructed

everything from depots to seaports and

By Mr. Arthur McQueen

Brigade R Brigade Returns to US eturns to US eturns to USAREUR

After 11 Y After 11 Years

airfields to orphanages throughout

central and northern Vietnam. It won four

meritorious unit commendations and one

Republic of Vietnam civil action honor

medal, first class, prior to inactivation in

1971.

USAREUR benefited from 15 years of

service by the 18th Engineer Brigade,

from 1977 to 1992. The brigade provided

rail and sea deployment support to the

VII Corps and deployed a combat heavy

battalion and topographic company to

support operations in southwest Asia.

The brigade also coordinated all

engineer efforts of a joint and combined engineer force, providing construction and relief support to Kurdish

refugees during Operation Provide

Comfort. It was last inactivated as part

of the reduction of forces in Europe on

15 October 1992.

Mr. McQueen is a public affairs

specialist with Headquarters, USAREUR and 7th Army in Germany.

Colonel William H. McCoy, Jr.

(left) passes the just-unfurled

colors of the 18th Engineer

Brigade (Theater Army) to

Engineer Regimental Command

Sergeant Major William D.

McDaniel, Jr. (right).

Note: This article is a reprint from a

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) News Release from 21 January 2003.

Photo by Arthur McQueen
38 Engineer April-June 2003

Most soldiers will agree that the environment is

important, but few understand the wide range of

issues that make environmental stewardship critical

to the military and society at large, particularly in light of Army

Transformation initiatives. The ever-increasing need for a

collective military environmental consciousness is driven by

factors today that directly affect military readiness. It is a

combination of these factors and others that helps forge an

environmental ethic in soldiers at all levels. For example,

knowing the consequences of environmental law violations,

understanding the health implications of environmental

pollution, and realizing the impact of the environment on military

training are just a few of the forces that shape the environmental

ethic. Readiness and environmental stewardship are inextricably tied together, and as such, a strong environmental

ethic in soldiers will be critical to ensuring that the Army is

ready to fight the nation’s future wars and win decisively.

Soldiers today are fully engaged, many in the global war on

terrorism, and spread out internationally across some 120

countries. Transformation is also increasing the demand on

soldiers, requiring them to be smarter, faster-thinking

individuals who can operate in extraordinarily complex,

asymmetric, and dangerous environments and apply

knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations. In

light of these challenges, it is not surprising that soldiers today

focus on little more than compliance, to speak nothing of

environmental stewardship. One might argue that stewardship

of any type must stem from an ethic or set of guiding moral

principles or values in order to be truly meaningful. Stewardship thus transcends mere compliance, and it is when environmental protection becomes part of one’s system of beliefs that

real, meaningful stewardship begins. This paradigm shift in

the way soldiers approach the environment will likely be a

precondition for Objective Force realization and a key

Transforming the Army through Environmental Stewardship

Forging the Environmental Ethic:

By Mr. Daniel Taphorn

“An important part of the Army’s Transformation is our continued emphasis on

caring for the training lands that sustain and enable Army readiness.”

—General Eric K. Shinseki

Chief of Staff of the Army

Figure 1
Maneuver

Areas

Impact

Areas Lead bullets

Clean Water Act

Munitions emissions

reporting

Massachusetts

Military Reservation

NPDES* Permits?

Native American

issues

Clean Air

Act

Future concerns?

Munitions Response

Program

Public lands

withdrawals

Safe Drinking

Water Act

Perchlorate?

Noise

endangered species

Threatened and

Munitions rule

Unexplosed

ordnance

April-June 2003 Engineer 39

component of Army Transformation if the

Army is to maintain a strong readiness

posture and climate as a values-based

institution.

As an evolutionary phenomenon, the

development of environmental stewardship is a relatively new occurrence. When

put in perspective, the passing of U.S.

federal environmental legislation

supports this assertion. It has only been

in the last few decades that a national

environmental consciousness has

matured to a point that obliged the

passing of what is the majority of

environmental federal legislation in

existence today. This has resulted in a

400 percent increase in federal environmental legislation passed in the last 33

years over the amount passed in the first

183 years of U.S. history (see Figure 1).

To say that the military has been

operating under the guise of such

legislation since World War I would be a

gross fabrication. Even the amount of environmental legislation

that existed during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts represents

less than a third of the legislation that exists today. Furthermore,

it was not until the passing of the Federal Facilities Compliance

Act (FFCA) in 1992 that state and local governments could

impose fines on Department of Defense (DOD) facilities for

noncompliance with environmental laws and regulations. The

FFCA also established criminal liability against federal

employees who violate federal and state hazardous waste

legislation. While the Army has done well to comply with these

laws (reducing the number of environmental fines imposed by

the federal and state governments over the past several years,

going from 58 fines in 1993 to 16 in 2002 and from 307

enforcement actions to 106 over the same period), the impact

of growing and existing legislation is hampering military

readiness more and more each day. This legislation boom—

coupled with other encroachment considerations (the

cumulative and aggregate effects from environmental regulation

and urbanization that restricts or encroaches on the ability to

train on installations)—and Objective Force operational

requirements are having a detrimental impact on the conduct

of realistic training by creating unacceptable levels of

artificiality.

Urban sprawl has contributed to several of the encroachment problems DOD is facing today. During World Wars I and

II, military installations were constructed in relative isolation

to support the training of a much larger military. Over the last

half century, urban sprawl has pushed communities up against

installation borders, resulting in an increase in civilian

complaints due to live-fire exercises and aircraft noise, smoke,

and dust caused by maneuvers. In some cases, installations

have self-imposed restricted training hours to pacify disgruntled citizens. Additionally, urban development has

continued to eliminate the natural habitats of threatened and

endangered species surrounding installations. As a result, these

species are forced onto installations, turning these training

areas into “islands of biodiversity,” which generate further

training restrictions for units. Consequently, there are more

than 150 endangered species residing among 94 U.S. Army

installations today. Figure 2 portrays this and several other

environmental variables that contribute to the degradation of

a unit’s ability to train.

Urban sprawl is affecting installations in other ways. Natural

resources are being consumed at a rate that stresses installation capacities. For example, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has

experienced water shortages from the increasing consumption

of the growing, upstream Raleigh-Durham community.

Additionally, the industry and population growth in North

Carolina has resulted in more stringent air quality requirements.

Regional shortfalls in complying with Clean Air Act (CAA)

standards may further restrict training, construction activities,

and transportation.

Objective Force operational requirements are also exacerbating the situation. Doctrinal distances for operating

maneuver units are expanding from about 96 square kilometers

(km2

) during World War II to an operating area of about 2,500

km2 for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).

Consequently, the Army today is faced with the dilemma of

exploring ways to sustain the Objective Force, with its known

and still developing doctrinal requirements, in an increasingly

restrictive training environment. The situation at Fort Hood,

Texas, illustrates the encroachment problem. Of the some

185,000 acres of training land, only 16 percent (or roughly

30,000 acres) is restriction-free throughout the year. The white

areas on the Fort Hood map in Figure 3, page 40, represent

training areas without encroachment-related restrictions. The

Figure 2

Encroaching Pressure Points

*National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
40 Engineer April-June 2003

figure also depicts the doctrinal change in operating areas

from the U.S. Army of World War II (96 km2

) to the new

requirements of the SBCT (2,500 km2).

The concept that addresses environmental issues and

others is sustainability. Not to be confused with the

operational term sustainment as defined in Field Manual (FM)

3-0, Operations, or Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, sustainability (or sustainment) in the context of

transformation is a comprehensive approach that brings all

Army resources to bear on achieving readiness. As such,

initiatives like the Sustainable Range Program and Installation

Sustainability Program are at the forefront of Army efforts.

Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) realigns

installations into seven regional directorates as part of the

Installation Management Agency under the Office of the

Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. TIM

creates a more efficient, businesslike structure and supports

these sustainability initiatives. In short, sustainability is

about—

 Creating efficiencies that reduce waste.

 Reducing dependence on nonrenewable resources.

 Enhancing productivity.

 Lowering system life cycle costs.

 Decreasing the environmental impacts on training and the

potential for fines.

 Creating mutually beneficial relationships with local

communities.

 Enhancing the well-being of soldiers and civilians.

 Optimizing the ability to conduct realistic training in support

of readiness.

Achieving these objectives will be an arduous

task—one that lends greater credence to the

importance of an Armywide environmental ethic.

To promote the environmental ethic in support

of Army Transformation, in 2000, the Vice Chief of

Staff of the Army designated the U.S. Army

Engineer School as the proponent for integrating

environmental consideration across doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership,

personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and into

military operations. On behalf of the Engineer

School, the Directorate of Environmental

Integration (DEI) has since developed several

training products (such as resident courses and

distance learning products like Army Correspondence Course Programs and Graphic

Training Aids) and doctrinal publications such as

FM 3-100.4, Environmental Considerations in

Military Operations. Additionally, DEI incorporates pollution prevention initiatives into the

materiel requirements determination and development process

to maximize efficiency and minimize pollution throughout a

system’s life cycle. This represents some of the DEI initiatives

that promote Army environmental stewardship in direct support

of Army sustainability initiatives.

An event that will soon be a benchmark of the Army’s

environmental stewardship posture is the implementation of

an environmental management system (EMS). Required by

Executive Order 13148, each federal agency will be required to

implement an EMS at all appropriate facilities by 31 December

2005. EMS (as defined by International Organization for

Standardization [ISO] 14001) is “the part of an overall

management system that includes organizational structure,

planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures,

processes, and resources for developing, implementing,

achieving, reviewing, and maintaining environmental policy.”

ISO 14001 does not define absolute requirements for environmental performance. Instead, it requires a commitment by the

organization to continuous improvement. Since the goal is for

improved environmental performance, the ISO 14001

methodology involves integrating effective management

mechanisms into the management structure of the organization.

There are five essential and auditable elements of an ISO 14001-

compliant EMS. They include environmental policy, planning,

implementation and operation, checking and corrective action,

and management review.

The benefits of the Army’s EMS directly support many

activities on sustainable installations, and the areas that EMS

has the potential to positively affect are abundant. The EMS

will improve the forecasting ability of installation leadership

in identifying environmental issues, allowing leadership to

take proactive steps toward addressing these issues rather

than reacting to them. It will facilitate Army Transformation by

protecting training and maneuver areas. The EMS will also

enhance the well-being of Army soldiers, civilians, and families

Figure 3

8 km

12 km

50 km

50 km

Stryker

Brigade

doctrinal

standards

Fort Hood, Texas
April-June 2003 Engineer 41

through more robust management of environmental health

issues. It will facilitate compliance with the law and will help

foster a climate of environmental stewardship. For example, in

a post-September 11 world, the EMS will facilitate faster, more

prepared responses to environmental modification threats on

sensitive U.S. targets (such as attacks on power plants,

wastewater treatment plants, and industrial sites) through

sound consequence management and planning as part of the

global war on terrorism. As part of sustainable installations,

the EMS will also contribute to cost savings by reducing waste

and mitigating the risks that result in environmental fines.

Undoubtedly, the EMS will play a vital role in the management

of environmental issues during future base realignments and

closures. By providing these benefits and others, the EMS

will support unit training and readiness for decades to come.

However, since an effective EMS feeds into the installation

management structure, it will be soldiers and civilians at all

levels who will feel the effects of the EMS and ultimately

determine its success or failure.

While critical to readiness, environmental considerations

do not cease to be important when units deploy on missions

away from installation boundaries. Although installation

environmental issues may seem administrative in nature,

integrating federal, state, and local environmental restrictions

into the military decision-making process while training directly

supports real-world contingency planning across the spectrum

of military operations. FM 3-100.4 is the U.S. Army and Marine

Corps guide in applying appropriate environmental protection

procedures during all types of operations. In it, an excerpt

from Joint Vision 2010 states—

“The American people will continue to expect us to win in

any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more

efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing the mission successfully. Commanders at all levels

will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects of

military operations, from environmental disruption in

training to collateral damage in combat.”

Increasingly, environmental considerations are playing a

larger role in preserving mission legitimacy. A lessons learned

publication for judge advocates, titled Law and Military

Operations in the Balkans, 1995-1998, states that “Task Force

Eagle noted that environmental considerations in peace

operations are enormous because preserving the mission’s

legitimacy is as critical as combat readiness to overall success.”

This bold premise, while sometimes disconcerting to

warfighters, is often a defining characteristic of military

operations other than war. Consequently, integrating environmental considerations across the spectrum of military

operations, both vertically and horizontally, is critical to

managing risk on today’s asymmetric battlefield.

DOD and the Army have embraced environmental

protection as both a necessary and an ethical responsibility

to achieve sustainability and readiness. Environmental

stewardship directly supports the Army Vision by protecting

the natural resources that contribute to the health and welfare

of our soldiers, families, and surrounding communities

(people); providing forces with the land and resources

necessary to conduct realistic training with minimal constraints

(readiness); and transforming business processes through the

implementation of an Army EMS. The EMS is a key component

of sustainable installations and forging an environmental ethic

in soldiers and civilians at all levels through the integration of

environmental considerations across DOTMLPF (transformation). FM 3-100.4 affirms that “from every philosophical

or moral perspective, environmental stewardship is the right

thing to do.” Department of the Army soldiers and civilians

must support this cause, not solely based on the legal requirement to do so but because it is “the right thing to do.”

Understanding this moral imperative will foster the development of an environmental ethic and promote meaningful

environmental stewardship.

Of the many uncertainties lingering in the future, one thing is

clear: Environmental stewardship is and will continue to be part

of the way the Army does business. Stewardship does not exist

separate from the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless

service, honor, integrity, and personal courage; rather, it is

unequivocally bonded to each of them. Stewardship founded on

a solid environmental ethic is an evolutionary process with the

potential to reap huge benefits for installations and their

surrounding communities. As institutional knowledge of the

environment continues its accelerated growth, environmental

considerations will play an increasingly important role throughout

peace and conflict. It is the environmental ethic that facilitates

the EMS. It is the EMS that supports sustainable installations. It

is the sustainable installation that enables Army Transformation,

and it is transformation—among other things—that will enhance

readiness. While viewing these items linearly is helpful, it only

partially represents what is an otherwise intertwined and difficult

process. Environmental stewardship provides many benefits that

extend beyond installation boundaries. Community goodwill and

the enhanced prestige as the nation’s defender are also benefits

of military environmental stewardship. However, achieving sound

environmental stewardship requires strong environmental

leadership. As FM 22-100, Army Leadership, puts it, “Doing the

right thing is good. Doing the right thing for the right reason and

with the right intention is better.” This will be the yardstick against

which the Army and its soldiers will be measured, as the Army

enhances combat readiness through early consideration and

resolution of environmental impacts and transforms into the

Objective Force.

Mr. Taphorn, a training analyst with Horne Engineering

Services, Inc., works in the Training Division, Directorate of

Environmental Integration, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort

Leonard Wood, Missouri. A former Army engineer captain,

his assignments included S3, 554th Engineer Battalion, and

platoon trainer, B/554th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri; and executive officer, HHT/2-17 Cavalry

Regiment, and platoon leader, C/326th Engineer Battalion,

Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
42 Engineer April-June 2003

By Master Sergeant Mark A. Sankey

As NTC continues to implement the contemporary operational environment (COE), the Opposing Force (OPFOR) will

also adjust its inventory of battlefield effects to match worldwide threats and challenge the rotational units. The OZM-3

marks the arrival of the AP mine to NTC. Units should realize

that AP mines are a realistic threat and will be replicated during their rotations. Units do not train on or emplace AP mines

but must react to their presence on the battlefield.

Capabilities

The OZM-3 can be detonated with a variety of fuses,

including trip wires and electrical command. The mine weighs

3.0 kilograms and has a cylindrical cast-iron body that is sent

into the air by a small charge at the base of the mine. Triggered

by a delayed charge, the body of the mine explodes

approximately 1.5 meters off the ground. The fragmentation

results in a casualty radius of 25 meters. Because of its metal

content, the OZM-3 can be readily detected by demining/

detection equipment.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

There are no ROE changes to explosive- and mechanicalreduction techniques. For manual reduction, proper grappling

techniques (according to FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations) will result in the AP mines being detonated without

casualties. Failure to adhere to this procedure will result in

casualty assessment of the grappler. If a grappling hook hits a

mine, the mine will be assessed as destroyed along with the

grappling hook and a small portion of the grappling hook line.

The assessment of the line will be based on the materiel type

and how the line is laid near the mine.

POC is MSG Mark A. Sankey (SW09), (760) 380-7040 or

DSN 470-7040, or e-mail sidewinder09@irwin.army.mil.

Engineer Support Area (ESA) Live Fire

By Major Gerald O’Connor and Captain Thomas D. Patton

For several years, the brigade support area (BSA) has conducted a defensive training event during the live-fire rotation.

Other separate support elements have also had live-fire training events. Though these events have always been important,

the asymmetrical threat posed by the COE has demonstrated

the necessity of all elements. Throughout the depth of the

brigade’s area of operations, it is necessary to maintain a high

level of protection. Starting this year, Force XXI unit ESAs

and units with separate unit maintenance collection points

can also take part in a live-fire defensive training scenario.

When reacting to a mounted and dismounted threat within

the brigade rear boundary, units must defend their perimeter

from a combination of light armored vehicles, dismounted soldiers, and aerial attacks. Units are required to analyze intelligence reports from higher headquarters, raise their readiness

posture, and defend their perimeter from prepared fighting positions using individual and crew-served weapons, sector

sketches, and fire control measures. As units defend their perimeter, they must evacuate casualties and conduct ammunition redistribution and resupply. This scenario gives soldiers

greater confidence in their weapons proficiency and an ability

to defend themselves from an attack.

Units wishing to take part in this training must meet the

following requirements:

 They must request the ESA live fire in their 180-day letter

to the NTC.

 Firing soldiers must have qualified on assigned weapons

within 180 days of the live-fire event.

 They must complete the Dragon Team live-fire safety brief.

 Soldiers must be in flak vests and proper field uniforms.

 M2s must be screened according to the ROE, Chapter 3.

 They must complete a minimum of hasty fighting positions to standard for the firing soldiers.

 Fighting positions must have aiming stakes with methods

to limit elevated fires over 45 degrees.

Actual (L) and training aid (R) OZM-3s

National Training Center

(NTC)

Yes

OZM-3 Characteristics

120 millimeters

75 millimeters

3 kilograms

75 grams TNT

Casing material and color Olive-green cast-iron body

Mechanized utility vehicle (MUV)

series,VPF, RO-1, RO-8, and

electrical and seismic firing systems

NM, MVE-72, and VP-4/12/13)

As for each fuse

Fuse type

Sensitivity

Diameter

Mine weight

Explosive weight

Height

Detectability

Conventional Threat Antipersonnel (AP) Mines

(OZM-3)
This event also requires resources from the brigade rotational ammunition allocation that is equivalent to the amount

of Class V supplies currently used by engineers involved in

the BSA live fire.

Units should coordinate for the ESA live fire with the

Sidewinder Team at Fort Irwin during the leadership training

program or in the brigade 180-day letter.

The ESA live fire gives rotational units a tremendous opportunity to focus on total unit protection and provide their

soldiers realistic live-fire training.

POCs are MAJ Gerald O’Connor, (760) 380-7270 or DSN

470-7270, or e-mail sidewinder02@irwin.army.mil; and CPT

Thomas D. Patton, (760) 380-5163 or DSN 470-5163, or e-mail

sidewinder10@irwin.army.mil.

Wet-Gap Crossing

By Major Michael W. Rose and Captain James Koeppen

NTC has developed a river-crossing scenario for rotational

units. Blue Force (BLUFOR) units may be required to conduct

a river-crossing operation in order to deploy into its area of

operations. In the scenario, the “Calusan Canal” is the main

water source for “Irwin Military City,” making it an environmentally and politically sensitive site. The canal is narrow

enough to cross with an armored vehicle-launched bridge

(AVLB), but in certain areas the water velocity exceeds

vehicle-fording capabilities. Vehicles that enter the canal will

be assessed as a mobility kill and will require recovery assets.

After the brigade crosses the canal, it may request division

assets to come forward and establish permanent crossing sites.

So that the scenario does not fall under the category of a

true deliberate river crossing, units have at least three options

when planning for the mission:

 Use the crossing fundamentals as outlined in FM 90-13,

River-Crossing Operations.

 Use the breaching tenets covered in FM 3.34.2, CombinedArms Breaching Operations.

 Use a combination of doctrine covered for both rivercrossing and breaching operations.

April-June 2003 Engineer 43

Regardless of the technique used, there are four critical

aspects that must be fully developed during the planning

process:

Command and Control (C2)

Units must fully develop effective C2 to ensure a deliberate

and coordinated effort in establishing river-crossing sites as

well as managing traffic control and flow. One technique used

recently was to have AVLB commanders report directly to platoon leaders, who acted as crossing site commanders at the

call-forward area to control throughput from the call-forward

area to the crossing sites.

Traffic Control

Detailed planning for traffic control must include routes

used by separate task forces from the release line to holding

areas, call-forward areas, and crossing sites. Integration of

military police platoons is vital to marking routes and establishing and manning traffic control points. Ultimately, the goal

is to enable the brigade combat team to rapidly reroute units if

one or more crossing site becomes unavailable.

Communication

A solid communication plan will bring together the C2, traffic control, and throughput of the brigade across the canal.

Although this list is not all-inclusive, you should ask yourself

the following questions during the planning process:

 Who is controlling traffic from the release line to the staging areas and on what net?

 What net are the traffic control points operating on and

to whom are they reporting?

 What nets are the crossing sites and call-forward areas

operating on and to whom do they report?

 Who is tracking traffic flow at the task force and brigade

combat team levels?

Risk Management

Most brigade combat teams have not crossed an entire

team across AVLBs. This makes it essential to conduct proper

risk management at all levels. Using AVLBs during rehearsals

in the rotational unit bivouac area (RUBA) is one mitigation

technique. Inspecting and configuring equipment at the callforward area, as well as briefing vehicle crews on AVLB crossing procedures, is also a way to mitigate risk during the

operation.

Summary

The canal-crossing scenario at NTC provides units an opportunity to plan and execute a realistic gap-crossing operation and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures addressing critical issues that are likely to be encountered in realworld contingencies.

POCs are MAJ Michael W. Rose (SW03), e-mail

sidewinder03@irwin.army.mil; and CPT James Koeppen

(SW11), DSN 380-7055, e-mail sidewinder11@irwin.army.mil.

Suggested Ammunition Allocation

Department of

Defense Identification Code

(DODIC)

Nomenclature Weapon Number of

Rounds

.50-caliber 4:1 (M2) M2,

.50-caliber

300 rounds

per M2

A059 or A064 5.56-millimeter ball

5.56-millimeter 4:1 M16 40 rounds per

firing soldier

A062 5.56 4:1 squad automatic weapon (SAW) SAW 200 rounds

per SAW

A131 7.62-millimeter 4:1 240B 200 rounds

per 240B

A557
Today, we face a more asymmetric threat than in the past.

The enemy does not look like a conventional force and has

become more unpredictable and more lethal. As we adapt, commanders at all levels will have greater challenges in focusing

combat power effectively against these forces. Failure to do

so can be perilous. However, a process already exists to assist

the commanders and staff in focusing combat power to win

decisively—the targeting meeting. A successful targeting meeting requires active participation from all members of the Battlefield Operating System. The following paragraphs describe

how engineers take an active role in targeting:

Why Targeting?

FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the

Targeting Process, states—

“The targeting process supports the commander’s decisions. It helps the targeting team decide which targets must

be acquired and attacked. It helps in the decision of which

attack option to use to engage the targets. Options can be

lethal or nonlethal and/or organic or supporting. For example, they can be maneuver, electronic attack, psychological operations (PSYOP), attack helicopters, surface-tosurface fires, or a combination of these. In addition, the process helps in the decision of who will engage the target at the

prescribed time. It also helps targeting teams determine requirements for combat assessment to assess targeting and

attack effectiveness.”

Targeting Methodology

The targeting process is formed from the model of decide,

detect, deliver, and assess (D3A). The targeting methodology

can be used to describe how engineers can provide input into

the process. In deciding which targets to attack, engineers

must provide input to develop the high-payoff target list

(HPTL). A high-payoff target (HPT) is something that friendly

forces perceive to be necessary for enemy forces to accomplish their mission. Some HPTs that engineers could recommend are enemy scatterable munition systems, tactical

minefields, and enemy breaching assets. However, you must

be specific. Usually, not all HPTs will be targeted because the

unit may not have assets available to target them all. If you

want to target enemy breaching assets, list the type of breaching asset you want targeted (such as the KMT-4). If you want

minefields listed as HPTs, then nominate the ones that will

affect future operations (such as minefield B01). The templated

minefields will be used to continue describing the process.

See Figure 1 for examples of assets that can be used during

various stages of the targeting process.

To detect, nominate the templated minefields that impact

future operations as named areas of interest (NAIs). NAIs are

used to help confirm or deny a particular enemy course of

action. During the targeting meeting, the D3A model is captured on the target synchronization matrix (TSM) (see Figure

2). The templated minefield located at WQ01654015 on the

TSM will be used to describe the process. The staff recommended this minefield as NAI 43 on the TSM. If practical,

have multiple assets (primary and alternate) target the NAI at

various times. Ensure that the collectors have time windows

in which to collect on the NAI, because you don’t want all the

collectors at the NAI at the same time. Also, the assets you are

targeting must report back in a timely fashion. Give them a

time for the latest time of intelligence value (LTOIV). Be cognizant of the other minefields, but the targeting process should

focus on what has a bearing on future operations. In this

instance, the unit has chosen to use OH-58D scout reconnaissance helicopters as the primary detector and B/1-187 Infantry as the secondary collector on the NAI. Again, the detection windows must be at different times. If the NAI is denied,

then the assets to deliver or assess are free for other missions.

Joint Readiness Training Center

(JRTC)

44 Engineer April-June 2003

By Captain Mark C. Quander

Engineer Participation in the Targeting Process

Figure 1. Targeting the Rakkasan Way (Based on a figure in CALL Newsletter No. 02-3 Feb 02)

Scouts

LLVI

Shell reports

Antitank assets

Civil affairs

Air defense artillery

Radars

Public affairs

Quick fix

Combat

Power

Synchronization

Team

Decide

Access

Deliver

Detect Delivery Assets

Artillery

Infantry

Antitank aviation

Armor

Civil affairs

Military police

Quick fix (QFIX)

Engineer

Antitank assets

Mortars

Close air support

AN/TLQ-17

Naval gunfire

PSYOP

Logistic medical support

Air defense artillery

Scouts

Chemical/smoke

Who

What

Where to attack

Commander’s guidance

Intent

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield

Mission

Assess Assets

Scouts

Infantry

Armor

Antitank assets

COLT/ETAC

Military police

Civil affairs

Q-36/Q-37

Antitank aviation

Engineers

Close air support (CAS)

AN/TRQ-32

Air defense artillery radar

Chemical/smoke

Public affairs

Detect Assets

Q-36/Q-37

Antitank aviation

AN/TRQ-32

COLT/ETAC

Military police

Ground surveillance radar/

general supply support

Special operations forces

PSYOP

Engineers

Delivery Effects

Tactical effects

Suppress

Neutralize

Destroy

Information operations (I/O) effects

Inform

Warn

Influence

Disorganize

Isolate

Organize

Co-opt

Deceive
If the NAI is confirmed, the deliver assets committed will

bring effects against the target.

Deliver against the target by destroying, neutralizing, or

suppressing it. In this case, we would neutralize the minefield

by breaching a lane or by clearing. In choosing the deliver

asset, don’t just think about what assets engineers bring to

the fight, but rather what assets the unit brings to the fight—

plows, rollers, mine-clearing line charges (MICLICs), Antipersonnel Obstacle-Breaching Systems (APOBs) (for AP

minefields and wire), etc. For NAI 43, the staff used Team

Heavy, the armor company team, as the primary unit to deliver

effects against the minefield with primary means of the MICLIC,

then the plow. It is a planned operation, so the unit should

have time to prepare and rehearse before execution.

The final part—assess—can be done again by engineers or

any number of assets to report battle damage. In this case, the

minefield was proofed by Team Heavy. The unit used a roller

to assess the minefield and ensure that no mines were present

in the area they breached or cleared. However, battle damage

is usually very difficult to assess. When a unit thinks about

preassault fires on an objective to attrit enemy forces before

an attack, how do we confirm that the forces have been attrited

sufficiently? Assess is generally the hardest part of the process. At the completion of the targeting meeting, the information from the TSM will be used to build a fragmentary order

(FRAGO). Brigade-level targeting should focus future operations 48 to 72 hours out and battalion-level operations 24 to 48

hours out.

Preparing for the Targeting Meeting

The same level of detail that goes into preparing for the

military decision-making process (MDMP) should be applied

to the targeting meeting. Targeting should be built into the

MDMP timeline as well as a unit’s battle rhythm. Generally,

products used in the targeting meeting are refinements to

already-existing products. As part of course-of-action analysis

and comparison, the staff generally starts the targeting process

with a targeting conference. Using the results of staff wargaming and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as

a guide, the planning staff focuses assets to assist with the

collection process. Engineers should do the following before

the targeting meeting begins:

 Update the assets-available list.

 Refine the obstacle template (from initial entry).

 Prepare the obstacle-tracker overlay.

 Collaborate with the S2 to ensure that enemy engineers are

portrayed on the situation and event templates.

During the Targeting Meeting

During the targeting meeting, the engineer should consult

with other staff officers. Engineers must talk in maneuver terms

in order to get mobility/survivability/countermobility targets

that support the commander’s plan serviced. During the targeting meeting, the following coordination should take place:

April-June 2003 Engineer 45

Figure 2

Target Synchronization Matrix (Phase/Event: III – Expand the Lodgement)

H-Hour is 052200MAR03

As of:

031200ZMAR03 to

041159ZMAR03

Decide Detect Deliver Assess

HPT Location

N

A

I

Agency Assets Agency Assets Agency Assets

DShK WQ02404210 1 B/311 MI Bn

B/311 MI Bn

LRS

QFIX

QFIX

Division Division

3-320 FA

3-320 FA

NGF/CAS

105 mm

105 mm

Division

B/311 MI Bn

LRS

QFIX

SA-18 WQ00654372 6

43

23

Minefield

WQ01654015

WQ01563567

Division LRS Division NGF/CAS/

J-SEAD

B/311 MI Bn QFIX 3-320 FA 105/155 mm

B/311

MI Bn QFIX

2-17

Cav Rgt OH-58D Team Heavy

Team Heavy Mine

roller

MICLIC

Mine plow

Explosive

C/326

Engr Bn

Mine

detectors

B/1-187

Inf Rgt

Team Heavy MICLIC

Mine plow

Explosive

Team Clear

Team Clear

C/326

Engr Bn

2-17

Cav Rgt

C/1-187

Inf Rgt

Mine

detectors

OH-58D

Team Heavy Mine

roller

Legend:

DShK = [12.7mm Krupnocalibernyj Pulemet Degtyareva-

 Shpagina, DShK] A heavy machine gun used as an antiaircraft

 weapon and also as a heavy infantry support gun.

JSEAD = joint suppression of enemy air defense

LRS = long-range surveillance

NGF = Naval gun fire

SA-18 = A Russian manportable surface-to-air missile
46 Engineer April-June 2003

With the S2:

 Confirm the template.

 Perform predictive analysis—nominate NAIs.

 Assist in developing the situation and event templates

with probable enemy employment of engineer assets and

obstacle emplacements.

 Describe the effects of terrain and weather on maneuvers.

 Participate in the selection of decision points, NAIs, and

targeted areas of interest (TAIs) for obstacles.

 Identify enemy engineers supporting the reconnaissance

effort.

 Confirm HPT (bridging assets, breaching assets, and

scatterable mine delivery systems).

With the S3:

 Assist in developing the high-value target list (HVTL)

and nominating high-value targets (HVTs) to the HPTL.

 Advise on the employment of scatterable munitions to

attach targets and the selection of TAIs to support the

employment.

 Review the minefield report.

 Prioritize the clearance of routes.

 Draft tasks to subordinate units.

 Recommend task organization changes.

With the S4:

 Synchronize the logistics package resupply with the brigade combat team route clearance package.

With the medical officer:

 Synchronize the route clearance package with casualty

evacuation routes.

Conclusion

The targeting process enables the staff to direct all the

elements of combat power against enemy forces to win decisively. Conducted daily, the targeting meeting should provide subordinate units sufficient time to prepare for future

operations. The end product of targeting should be an updated TSM, reconnaissance and surveillance plan, HPTL, and

FRAGO with appropriate task organization changes. Engineer participation in targeting is critical and, in doing so, they

ensure that engineers are out front, providing the commander

mobility on the ground.

CPT Quander is a light engineer platoon senior observer/

controller. Previous assignments include commander, C/326th Engineer Battalion (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky—deploying to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom;

platoon leader, A/307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg,

North Carolina; and assistant brigade engineer, 1st Brigade, 82d

Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

 “Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination

of tactics and techniques to project combat power to the far

side of an obstacle. Breaching is a synchronized combinedarms operation under the control of a maneuver commander.”

—FM 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team

All too often, maneuver forces come to a stalemate at the

breach, leading to mission failure immediately thereafter. CMTC

discovered that one of the causes of this is the failure to synchronize the breach during brigade combat team (BCT) planning and rehearsals. Typically, units happen into breaching

operations before doctrinal conditions are set. Although FM

3-34.2, Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, serves as the

capstone breaching manual, many maneuver commanders focus primarily on FM 3-90.3. It discusses combined arms breaching operations in Chapter 12, where Table 12-4 (see Table 1

below) provides a basic framework. However, it does not

specify who has direct responsibilities for each decision or

event. As a result, these decisions are routinely delegated to

very low levels within the BCT.

Combat Maneuver Training Center

(CMTC)

Synchronizing the Brigade Combat Team Breach

—“SOSRA in Effect”

By Major John Horstmann and Sergeant First Class Danny

Petersen

Table 1. Establishing criteria (Based on Table 12-4 from

FM 3-90.3)

- Suppression and obscuration is

 adjusted and effective.

- CFZ is in place over reduction site.

- Engineer preparations are

 completed.

- Fire control measures are in

 effect.

Decisions Criteria

Decide the point of

penetration and

reduction site.

- Reconnaissance force identifies

Commence suppression

and obscuration fires.

- Observers are in position.

- Support force crosses designated

Occupy support-by-fire

(SBF) position (support

force).

- Critical friendly zone (CFZ) is in

 place over the positions.

- Obscuration is in place to screen

 support force movement.

- Designated essential fire support

- Support force maintains more than

 70 percent of its combat power.

Commit the breach force.

Commit the assault force. - Lane is created, proofed, and

 marked.

- Far-side security is in position.

obstacles and enemy positions

related to priority intelligence

requirements (PIR).

phase line (PL).

 tasks (EFSTs) are completed.
April-June 2003 Engineer 47

Fundamental to achieving synchronization are detailed

reverse-breach planning, clear subunit instructions, wellrehearsed forces, and effective command and control. Without proper breach synchronization, the conditions for executing the breach will not be established when necessary, generally resulting in the rapid destruction of breaching assets.

The assistant brigade engineer (ABE), as the staff officer

primarily responsible for setting the plans groundwork, has

many tools available to assist him during the planning process. FM 3-34.2, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-44, provides a detailed explanation of how to synchronize breaching planning

and operations. Table 2, (which is Table 1-2 in FM 3-34.2) is a

breaching complexity chart, which shows successful synchronization of breaching operations and provides an example of

the complexity of the operation. It is also a good tool to use as

a template during planning or rehearsing or when explaining

the complexity of breaching operations to maneuver brethren.

This same chart is also a template to effectively build an execution matrix of the breaching operation. This chart, like Table

12-4 from FM 3-90.3, does not designate responsibility for

decision making.

A good relationship between the ABE and other BCT planners, especially the fire support and chemical officers, enables

the ABE to create a framework for the breach that best fits the

brigade commander’s intent. Using the reverse-breach planning process, the ABE must ensure that the commander’s

intent—as it relates to mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations—is understood. The ABE also recommends

changes to support that intent, based on the capabilities and

limitations of engineer assets under brigade control. But more

importantly, the ABE must convey to the brigade staff the

conditions that must be set before attempting the breach in

order to synchronize these conditions throughout planning

and war gaming. If the reverse-breach planning process is

followed, and the staff members have synchronized their efforts, the stage is set for a fluid breach at the combined-arms

rehearsal (CAR) and in combat.

Far too often the breach force commander commits assets

only to have them killed by direct and indirect fires as they

reach the obstacle. As engineers, we must communicate to the

brigade commander that the conditions must be set before

moving breaching assets forward to the obstacle. Disaster

awaits if units attempt to breach before setting these basic

conditions. This level of synchronization begins with the planning process, is reinforced at the CAR, and continues through

the beginning of operations. At the CAR, all too often the term

“SOSRA [suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault] in effect” is heard from senior leaders when addressing breaching

operations, and the rehearsal continues with the assault force

conveniently placed on the other side of the breach. Such a

simple wave of the hand does not work on the battlefield.

Leaders need to demand specifics during the rehearsal, with

each step addressed individually. Following is an example of

such a rehearsal:

 Suppress. Who is suppressing? With what systems and

ammunition? Who is being suppressed and where?

 Obscure. Who is obscuring and for how long? With what

system and ammunition? Who is the obscuration being

directed against and where? What is the required duration

of the obscuration? Who determines whether the

Table 2. Breaching complexity (Table 1-2 from FM 3-34.2)

Actions Element Time

(Minutes) Controlled By

Develop the situation (verify the boundary of the enemy

obstacle system). Force in contact M to 2 S3

Maneuver the support force into the overwatch position. Support M + 2 to 15 Support commander

Maneuver the assault force into the covered assault

position. Assault M + 2 to 15 Assault commander

Direct support

(DS) artillery Call for artillery. M + 2 to 15 Fire support officer (FSO)

Build smoke. Mortars M + 5 to 10 FSO

Suppress the enemy with direct fires. Support M + 15 to 29 Support commander

Suppress the enemy with artillery fires. DS artillery M + 10 to 29 FSO

Maintain smoke. DS artillery mortars M + 10 to 30 FSO

Maneuver the breach force to the breach location. Breach

Breach

Breach

M + 20 to23 Reduction commander

Reduce the obstacle and prepare two lanes.

Place smoke pots.

Shift direct fires off the objective.

Shift indirect fires beyond the objective.

Assault to destroy the enemy on the far-side of the obstacle.

Reorganize to continue the mission.

NOTE: M = Contact with the obstacle

Support

DS artillery

Assault

Task force

M + 23 to 30

M + 23 to EOM

M + 29 to 30

M + 29 to 30

M + 30 to 45

M + 45 to EOM

Engineer leader

Reduction commander

Assault commander

Assault commander

Assault commander

S3
Decision Maker

Support force commander

Support force commander

Breach force commander

Decision Criteria

Suppress

Obscure

Secure

Reduce

Assault

Initiate suppression - Position of support force

- Reconnaissance of enemy position

Shift suppressive fires - Position of breach and assault forces

Initiate obscuration - Position of breach, support, and assault forces

- Observers in position Task force commander

Adjust obscuration

- Wind direction

- Terrain

- Ammunition remaining

Initiate near-side security - Position of security force

- Templated position of overwatching force Task force commander

Task force commander Initiate CFZ/ADA

coverage

- Position of breach force

Determine breach area

- Engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and intelligence

 preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

- Forces available

- Reconnaissance results

Brigade commander

Initiate breach

- Successful obscuration

- Successful suppression

- Nearside security established

- Position of breach force

Breach force commander

Breach force commander

Breach force commander

Assault force commander

Breach lane complete

Initiate assault force

Shift fires

- Position of breach force

- Initial marking complete

- Position of breach force

- Far-side security established

- Lane marking complete

- Position of breach, suppression, and assault forces

48 Engineer April-June 2003

obscuration is successful or not? Who is the primary/

secondary observer?

 Secure. Who is securing and where? And with what systems? What fire control measures are in effect? What air

defense artillery (ADA) coverage is there, and who provides it? Where is the CFZ, and who controls its initiation

and termination?

 Reduce. Where are the breaching assets, and who controls them? What are the primary and alternate means?

How many lanes are there, and where are they located?

What is the separation between the lanes? Where is the

breach force located before commitment? Who commits

the breach force? What is the lane-marking technique?

 Assault. What fire control measures are in effect, and who

controls the transition of firing from the breach to the assault force? Are there protective obstacles between the

breach and the objective? Who is responsible for breaching these and with what systems? Who assumes traffic

control through the breach?

These questions need to be answered with clarity and rehearsed at the CAR for SOSRA to be synchronized, while setting up successful breaching operations during the battle.

However, even in answering these questions, the process

is not complete. A fundamental of successful synchronization

is effective command and control. As previously mentioned,

current doctrine does not discuss a crucial aspect of command and control—determining who is responsible for key

decisions. As part of the planning process, the brigade staff

must identify those responsible for critical decisions and make

sure they are addressed in the decision matrix and at the CAR.

Table 3 is a guide to assigning responsibility for key decisions

of breaching operations.

The bottom line is that engineers are the doctrinal experts

regarding breach planning, rehearsals, and operations. If we

plan and rehearse according to our published doctrine, and

help the maneuver commanders understand this doctrine, we

will be more successful at the breach. The “proof in the pudding” is our ability to discuss SOSRA in detail at the CAR in

order for SOSRA to indeed be “in effect.”

MAJ Horstmann is the engineer headquarters and headquarters

company and staff officer observer/controller at CMTC. He previously commanded B Company, 299th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and was the CMTC S3 plans officer.

SFC Petersen is the engineer battle staff NCO observer/controller

at CMTC. Previous assignments include assault section sergeant/

combat engineer vehicle commander, 82d Engineer Battalion, and

assault and obstacle platoon sergeant/operations sergeant in the

58th Engineer Company, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Opposing

Force), Fort Irwin, California.

Table 3. Assigning responsibility for key decisions

Breach

Fundamental
April-June 2003 Engineer 49

Table 1

With the fast pace of today’s Army, it would be easy

to overlook the details of deployment preparation.

However, we must diligently complete these

preparations in order to ensure a successful deployment for

all. Part of this preparation should include consideration for

hazards faced by rear detachments and the families of deployed

service members. The overall risk management of the

deployment should be done as an integral part of deployment

planning. It should be a part of the military decision-making

process and must include rear-detachment operations and

families.

There are seven primary areas that should be addressed, in

addition to the normal hazards: geographic location of the

unit, geographic location of services, leadership experience,

leadership training, planning, training/exercise schedule, and

family support (see Table 1). Geographic considerations are

more important for the Army National Guard, Army Reserve,

and organizations outside of the continental United States.

Leadership experience and training are key for all rear

detachments. The farther down you go from the rank designed

to command a unit, the more risks you assume.

The geographic location of the unit (if separated from its

parent unit), as measured in driving time, can cause or

contribute to the hazards of operating a motor vehicle—one

of the most dangerous things rear-detachment personnel and

family members do. The hazard is determined by comparing

the type of unit with the driving time. This can range from

thirty minutes to well over an hour. The longer the driving

time, the more risk involved.

Geographic location of services involves distances from

services measured in driving time. Again, this measures the

risk involved with operating a motor vehicle to obtain services.

These measurements are by service type, which would include

the hospital, dental clinic, family assistance center, commissary,

post exchange, and recreation services. The more important

the service, the more times personnel are likely to visit it. The

second measurement can be the miles that must be driven to

get to the service. The more important the service, and the

more driving time, the more risk involved. However, additional

risk is often present if essential services are not provided.

Many of us can live for a short time without a library, but if a

medical facility is a great distance from our home and we have

no transportation, the risk becomes high that we will not have

appropriate medical treatment when it’s needed.

Leadership experience can cause or contribute to accidents

in many ways. The most obvious is that lower-ranking military

personnel normally have less knowledge, skills, and abilities

than higher-ranking personnel. This is due to the training,

education, and job experience of a normal career. Leadership

positions for rear detachments often range from brigadecommand level down to platoon level. If you compare this

with the individual assigned as the rear-detachment commander, you can obtain a risk level. The rear-detachment

commander at the brigade level might be a captain, while the

company rear-detachment commander might be a sergeant first

class. Units can also offset this risk by providing training to

personnel to prepare them for the duties and issues of reardetachment command. With training provided, you can

Rear-Detachment Risk Management Options Rear-Detachment Risk Management Options Rear-Detachment Risk Management Options

By Mr. Fred E. Fanning and Mr. Carter T. Boggess, Jr.

Rear-Detachment Risk Management

Geographic location of the unit

Geographic location of services

Leadership experience

 Planning

Training/exercise schedule

Organized family support group

 Distance from parent unit in driving time compared with unit type

Distance from services in driving time compared with service type

Leadership position held prior to rear detachment compared to rear

detachment command level

Leadership training Type of training provided and the level of rear detachment command

Preparation guidance compared to time for preparation

Operating tempo guidance compared to type of training

Includes access and availability of privately owned vehicles, commercial

transportation, telephones, a family support group alert roster, and a

medical and dental facility 
compare the rank of the individual assigned with the training

received. The training can be in the classroom, on the job, or

both. Without any training, the risk may be high; with

classroom and on-the-job training, the risk could easily be

reduced to a low level.

Planning preparation and guidance will still be necessary

for the rear detachments and family member activities. Planning

is often measured as in-depth, adequate, minimal, vague,

implied, and specified. The more time that can be provided to

the rear-detachment commander, the lower the risk during

mission execution. The general rule of thumb is to take onethird of the time allotted to conduct your planning and then

give the subordinate unit two-thirds of the time for them to

plan. This allows additional time for rear-detachment

commanders who have little planning experience.

Training and exercises will still be conducted at the reardetachment level. The operating tempo, compared to the

guidance provided, determines the risk level. A field training

exercise or a command post exercise with good guidance

present less risk than an exercise with medium or low guidance.

Whether or not a unit has an organized family support group

determines the risk level of family members while the service

members are deployed. The better organized and the lower the

unit level, the less the risk. These support groups can provide

invaluable assistance to family members that can reduce their

risk. It also relieves a great deal of stress on family members

when they know they are not alone at this difficult time. Young

family members with privately owned vehicles might be at a

higher risk than older, more experienced drivers. Furthermore,

some vehicles may not be in good working order. Sharing

rides or using public transportation through the family support

group can produce less risk.

Whether or not family members have access to a telephone

can determine the type and availability of medical treatment.

Again, the family support group can help family members work

through this issue by using neighbors or other means to

provide telephone service. Sharing rides and telephone support

are made much easier and more effective with a family support

group alert roster. This document can be a family member’s

best friend, by listing other family members who want to help.

You should include the hazards posed by these seven

categories just as you would hazards from missions and

operations. It works just like the procedures outlined in Field

Manual 100-14, Risk Management. The leader identifies the

hazards present. The highest risk of these initial estimates

becomes the initial risk. The leader then identifies risk reduction

measures to reduce the risk and then identifies the risk based

on the control measures.

After reducing the initial risk as much as feasible without

adversely affecting the rear detachment’s ability to conduct

its mission, we then identify the residual risk. This level of risk

is accepted or refused by the rear-detachment commander.

The amount of approval authority should be determined in

the early stages of the deployment planning process (see

Table 2).

This risk acceptance approval authority should be agreed

to by the individuals at the various levels of command within

the organization. In addition, the risk acceptance levels should

be documented in the operations order or operations plan to

ensure that commanders and staff at all levels understand

who the approval authority is. These levels are based on the

knowledge, skills, and abilities of personnel at different ranks.

These levels describe the amount of risk each level agrees to

accept.

A good safety program must include the particular hazards

faced by rear detachments and the families left behind. By

including these two areas in the initial risk management process

conducted during deployment planning, you can identify and

reduce the hazards to rear-detachment personnel and families.

The risk management process can and should be updated

periodically as the mission and situation changes.

For additional information, please refer to the U.S. Army

Maneuver Support Center Safety Web page at www.wood.

army.mil/safety/.

Mr. Fanning is the safety director, Maneuver Support Center and

Fort Leonard Wood. He can be contacted at fanningf@wood.army.mil.

Mr. Boggess is a safety specialist, 89th Regional Support

Command. He can be contacted at carter.boggess@usarcemh2.army.mil.

Table 2

 Division commander

Battalion commander

Brigade commander

Rear-Detachment Risk Acceptance Matrix

Approval Level

Risk Level

Squad Platoon Company Battalion

Low Squad leader Platoon leader Company commander

Medium Platoon leader Company commander Battalion commander

High Company commander Battalion commander Brigade commander

50 Engineer April-June 2003
Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted.

April-June 2003 Engineer 51

ENGINEER UPDATE

Directorate of Training (DOT)

WANTED! Applicants for Terrain Analysis Technician

Warrant Officer. Military occupational specialty (MOS) 81T

NCOs with five to twelve years of service may apply. The duty

description is in DA Pamphlet 611-21, Military Occupational

Classification and Structure. Soldiers may get information on

how to become a warrant officer on the home page of the

Warrant Officer Career Center at http://www.leaven-worth.

army.mil/wocc/ or U.S. Army Recruiting Command at http://

www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/.

POC is CW4 Frederick Kerber, (573) 563-4088, DSN –4088;

e-mail kerberf@wood.army.mil.

Deployment and Mobilization Training. The Department of

Instruction has established a contingency operations

(CONOPS) training program for students who are likely to deploy after completing their training at Fort Leonard Wood.

Students in the Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses, Engineer Officer Basic Course, and Engineer

Captain’s Career Course have been screened to determine

those students with follow-on assignments to deploying and/

or deployed units. These students are then given training in

four areas: intelligence update, mine awareness, lessons learned

from previous operations, and terrain visualization. All four

classes focus on the Iraqi threat but also highlight items of

interest from operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other

locations.

National Guard and Reserve units that mobilize through

Fort Leonard Wood also receive focused training from the

Engineer School. Many of the units have been bridging units

and therefore received additional instruction in river-crossing

operations. These units also received training on mine awareness and division- and corps-level operations and instruction

on the planning process.

Mobile training teams (MTTs) are a critical element to getting focused training to units in the field. In September, an

MTT was sent to Afghanistan to train a cadre of instructors

on mine awareness. This team also helped develop a mechanical area clearance SOP. Mine awareness training is the most

frequently requested training for both CONUS and abroad.

POC is CPT Ken Boggs, (573)-596-0131, ext 35593; DSN

–5593; e-mail boggsk@wood.army.mil; or MAJ David Ray,

(573)-596-0131, ext 35695; DSN –5695; e-mail rayda

@wood.army.mil.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Train-Up. As part of IRR

call-ups, engineer officers are given refresher training before

deployment. They attend a modified Reserve Component

Engineer Captain’s Career Course for thirteen days with an

average nine-hour workday. They receive training in the military decision-making process and brigade and task force tactics. The course is rounded out to meet the needs of the

individual by including theater-specific threat analysis, mine

awareness, and threat engineer capabilities training. The final

phase of the course focuses on the technical engineering

issues of force protection, base camp development, road and

airfield design, and airfield damage repair.

POC is MAJ Craig Jolly, (573)-596-0131, ext 34128; DSN

– 4128; or e-mail jollyc@wood.army.mil.

Officer Education System. On 4 February 2003, the Army

announced significant changes to the Officer Education System. During 3d quarter fiscal year (FY) 06, the Officer Basic

Course will transition to the Basic Officer Leader Course

(BOLC). The Combined Arms Staff Course (CASC) will replace the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) and

portions of the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). CASC will use

both distance and residential learning to prepare officers to

take staff jobs. The CASC implementation date is currently 3d

quarter FY05. The Combined Arms Battle Command Course

(CABCC) will replace the CCC and will focus on training officers to take command. It is scheduled for implementation during 2d quarter FY06. The Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) will transition to Intermediate Level Education (ILE).

This change will focus educational requirements for majors in

their respective career fields. ILE is scheduled for implementation by 4th quarter FY05.

POC is MAJ Storm Reynolds, (573) 596-0131, ext 35747;

DSN - 5747; or e-mail reynoldss@wood.army.mil; or LTC Jeff

Bedey, (573) 596 0131, ext 35647; DSN – 5647; or e-mail

bedeyj@wood.army.mil.

Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The Engineer

School continues to work closely with the SBCTs on how to

use organic enablers to improve the mobility of the force while

operating in the nonlinear and noncontiguous battlefield of a

small-scale contingency. In July 2002, during the Senior Leaders Course, assured mobility was introduced to 1/25th SBCT

to help it optimize its mobility by using situational understanding as a fundamental enabler.

POC is MAJ Ted Read, (573) 596 0131, ext 37060; DSN

– 7060; or e-mail readt@wood.army.mil.

Countermine Mobile Training Team (MTT) – Germany.

An MTT from the Countermine/Counter Booby Trap Center

conducted training from 19-31 January 2003 in Germany. The
MOS-qualified (MOSQ) classes, instructor and small-group

courses are also taught.

The 1/98th Battalion currently has the following openings:

If you do not have the specific MOS skill required, the unit

can train you to get you qualified and certified. We’ll ensure

that you complete the Total Army Instructor Training Course

(TAITC) and/or Small-Group Instruction (SGI) course before

you begin teaching. By completing the TAITC course, you

will be granted an “H” designator authorizing you to teach

MOSQ classes. This designator is a key differentiator that can

enable you to get promoted faster and get the positions that

you want!

If you are interested in this opportunity, please contact

Catherine M. Burke, the 1/98th Battalion staff administrator

at (845)-567-3975, or e-mail catherine.burke@usarcemh2.army.mil.

52 Engineer April-June 2003

MTT instructed members of the 130th Engineer Brigade, 1st

Armored Division, and 1st Infantry Division on Mine Awareness Instructor Training (MAIT), Engineer-Specific

Countermine Instructor Training (ESCIT), Counter Booby Trap

Familiarization (CBTF), Mesa Associates’ Tactical Integrated

Light-Force Deployment Assembly (MATILDA) Robot System Training, and Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System

(HSTAMIDS) New Equipment Training. The team provided a

three-hour seminar for senior engineer leaders at Grafenwohr,

including a Tactical Minefield Database (TMFDB) overview

and the latest National Ground Intelligence Center threat assessment for Iraq. The team also taught a one-day mine awareness course to Corps Support Command soldiers.

POC is LTC Mark Thompson, (573) 596-0131, ext 37347;

DSN – 7347; or e-mail thompsma@wood.army.mil.

Countermine Mobile Training Team–Kuwait and

Afghanistan. From 3-18 February 2003, MTTs from the

Countermine/Counter Booby Trap Center conducted training

in Kuwait and Afghanistan. Afterwards, the two teams met in

Afghanistan to provide instruction on the MATILDA,

HSTAMIDS, and TMFDB. The team also provided feedback

to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) IV in Kuwait on the Mine

Intelligence Collection Center (MICC) design for posthostility

reconstruction and assisted with the MICC design, organization chart, and mission statement development.

POC is LTC Mark Thompson, (573) 596-0131, ext 37347;

DSN – 7347; or e-mail thompsma@wood.army.mil.

News and Notes

Unit Seeks Engineer Instructors. Do you enjoy instructing

and mentoring soldiers? If so, we may have an opportunity

just for you! The U.S. Army Reserve’s 1/98th Battalion

(Engineer), 98th Division (Institutional Training) (W76H01,

W76H02) is seeking highly motivated NCOs and officers from

active duty, the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the

Individual Ready Reserve, who are in military occupational

specialty (MOS) series 12, 51, or 62 and want to join the Army

Reserves as engineer instructors.

Headquartered in New Windsor, New York (near West

Point), the 1/98th plans to relocate to Fort Dix, New Jersey, in

training year (TY) 04. The unit conducts only two consolidated

weekend drill assemblies at its battalion headquarters each

year, and the remaining weekend duty is conducted at training

sites throughout the northeast. Therefore, unit instructors

can teach closer to their homes. Instructor training sites are

located throughout New Jersey, New York, and New England.

This table of distribution and allowances (TDA) unit is

responsible for engineer MOS training in an eight-state region—New Jersey, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont. The

unit—which trains Active and Reserve Component engineers

in MOSs 12B10, 51B10, and 62E10—is scheduled to expand

its list of classes to include nearly all 12-, 51- and 62-series

training for 10-, 30-, and 40-level soldiers. Besides the

Openings Rank Title Branch/MOS

1

1

18

2

MSG

SFC

SFC/SSG

SSG

Course manager

Supply sergeant

Instructor

Personnel Staff NCO

Any 12/51/62 series

92Y

74B/71L

Civil Affairs Battalion Needs MOS 11B and 12B Soldiers. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), the Army’s only

Active Component civil affairs unit, is adding two more tactical companies. One company will be activated in FY 04, the second

in FY 05. The battalion needs to fill a total of 84 positions in MOSs 11B and 12B. These positions are part of six tactical teams

in the two tactical companies; each team will have a team sergeant, a team engineer, and a team medic.

Interested 11B soldiers in the rank of SFC and 12B soldiers in the rank of SSG should contact MSG Deel at (910) 432-8423/

5555 or DSN 239-8423/5555 or SFC Campbell at (910) 432-6406/8102 or DSN 239-6406/8102.

Any 12/51/62 series
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Company name Room , floor, suite o GPO Deposit Account [II] I I I 1- 0 

o VISA 0 Mastercard 0 Discover 

Street address 

jexplr-alion dale) I I City State Zipcode +4 ITITI 

Dayllme phone Including area code Authonzmgsignature 

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Mail to: Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 

Important: Please include this completed order form with your remittance .