GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and the Ranking 

Minority Member, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate

August 2001 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Internally Displaced 

Persons Lack 

Effective Protection

GAO-01-803

Page i GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Many Internally Displaced Persons Lack Protection 10

Immediate Assistance Needs Reported Being Met, But Longer-Term 

Needs Remain a Challenge 24

U.S. Government Lacks an Overall Policy and a Lead Office for 

Internally Displaced Persons 29

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 38

Appendix II: Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan 41

Burundi 41

Colombia 43

Sudan 46

Appendix III: Comments From the U.S. Department of State 48

Appendix IV: Comments From the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 54

Appendix V: Comments From the United Nations 56

Appendix VI: Comments From the International Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement 58

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 61

GAO Contacts 61

Acknowledgments 61

Tables Table 1: Organizations’ Budget Requests, Actual Funds Received, 

Percentage of Shortfall, and U.S. Contribution, 2000 15

Table 2: Countries With Internally Displaced Persons Protection 

Activities, 2001 17

Table 3: Number of Protection Staff Present in Burundi, Colombia, 

and Southern Sudan, 2000-2001 20

Figures Figure 1: Map of Countries With Internally Displaced Persons, 

2001 6
Contents

Page ii GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 2: Community of Internally Displaced Persons in Central 

Burundi, 2000 9

Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001 11

Figure 4: Extent of Protection Interventions for Internally 

Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001 13

Figure 5: Rwandan Civilians Fleeing Ethnic Fighting, 1994 19

Figure 6: A World Food Program Food Delivery Airdrop in 

Southern Sudan 23

Figure 7: GAO Survey of Assistance Interventions Taking Place for 

Internally Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001 25

Figure 8: Reasons Why Internally Displaced Persons Were Not 

Receiving Assistance 26

Figure 9: Perceived Sources of Threat to Internally Displaced 

Persons 27

Figure 10: Members of a Teenage-headed Household That Receives 

Food Security and Shelter Assistance from USAID, 2000 

43

Figure 11: An Internally Displaced Persons Community Outside of 

Bogota, Colombia, 2001 45
Page 1 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

August 17, 2001 Letr

The Honorable Joseph Biden

Chairman

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes because of 

armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country— 

are among the most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world. They 

typically differ from refugees only by the fact that they have not crossed an 

international border as refugees have. Governments are responsible for 

protecting and aiding their own citizens; however, some cannot do so or 

actively persecute groups of their citizens, thus creating a displacement 

crisis. When this happens, international organizations, such as the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the 

Red Cross, acting in response to international humanitarian and human 

rights law help protect and assist the estimated 20 million internally 

displaced persons in over 50 countries. The charters of these 

organizations, and their governing bodies,1

 acknowledge the sovereignty of 

each state to deal with internally displaced persons as an internal matter 

but also recognize the obligation of international organizations to help 

address humanitarian and human rights crises.2

1

The governing bodies of these organizations, comprised of representatives of member 

states of the organizations, set overall policy and direction. The governing body of the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees is its Executive Committee. The Commissioner also 

reports to the General Assembly annually through the Economic and Social Commission, a 

U.N. body of member states that promotes humanitarian and social issues and recommends 

actions. The governing body of the International Committee for the Red Cross is the 

Assembly of the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose president is also the 

president of the organization.

2

For example, the Charter of the United Nations states that one of its purposes is to achieve 

international cooperation in solving problems of a humanitarian character and to promote 

and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The U.N. Charter, 

article 2(7), also states that nothing contained in the charter shall authorize the United 

Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 

state. The International Committee of the Red Cross is formally recognized in the 1949 

Geneva Conventions, which give it the right to take actions on behalf of civilian populations.
Page 2 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

The U.S. government, which spends about $2.5 billion annually in 

humanitarian aid, provides assistance to the internally displaced, 

principally through the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development. State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration provides grants to international organizations that work with the 

internally displaced, while the Agency for International Development’s 

Bureau for Humanitarian Response provides similar grants and also direct 

assistance. These bureaus, as well as the U.S. Missions to the United 

Nations in New York, Geneva, and Rome, are responsible for working with 

the international organizations to ensure U.S. interests are met.

Because of your concerns about human rights violations and other issues 

related to displaced persons, you asked us to assess (1) whether 

international organizations’ efforts have adequately protected internally 

displaced persons and what impediments these agencies face, (2) whether 

international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of 

displaced populations, and (3) whether the U.S. government has a 

coordinated and effectively managed program to help protect and assist 

internally displaced persons.

To assess the level of protection and assistance international organizations 

provided to the internally displaced, we surveyed field-level officials from 

the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Movement, and nongovernmental organizations that conduct activities in 

48 of the more than 50 countries with internally displaced populations. Our 

survey provided field level views on what international organizations and 

the U.S. government are doing to provide physical security for the 

internally displaced and supply them with basic necessities--food, water, 

and shelter. The criteria we applied in our assessment of these activities 

was based on standards set forth in the 1998 publication, Guiding 

Principles on Internal Displacement.

3

 We supplemented the survey 

information with (1) meetings with U.S. government, United Nations, Red 

Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organization officials at the 

headquarters, regional, and country levels and (2) case study fieldwork in 

3

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, based on international human rights 

and humanitarian law, have gained international standing and acceptance. They have been 

referred to by courts in several countries and have been recognized and accepted by various 

intergovernmental bodies, including the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Commission on 

Human Rights, and the U.N. Economic and Social Council. We also consulted the Handbook 

for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Washington, D.C.: The 

Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 1999).
Page 3 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan. Collectively, these countries have 

1.5 million to 2.5 million internally displaced persons. (See app. I for a 

complete description of our scope and methodology.) 

Results in Brief International organizations have been unable to secure effective protection 

for internally displaced persons as set forth in the Guiding Principles on 

Internal Displacement, although they have made some effort to do so. 

Field-level officials of such organizations in 48 countries who responded to 

our survey indicated that internally displaced persons are subject to direct 

physical attack or threat in 90 percent of the countries, forced migration in 

58 percent of the countries, and the sexual assault of women in 46 percent 

of the countries. A primary reason for this situation was that ongoing 

armed conflicts, or governments themselves, citing sovereign rights of 

states, prevented the organizations from taking more effective action. 

However, even within these circumstances, the organizations had 

undertaken only limited protection measures. For example, although a 

simple visible presence of international monitors is one of the most 

effective means to prevent harm to internally displaced persons, 

international organizations did not provide monitors or assign staff to help 

provide protection for the internally displaced or the number of staff 

assigned for this purpose was small. Insufficient resources provided by the 

international donor community was cited as a factor for these shortfalls. 

Also, international organizations have been reluctant to challenge 

governments about their human rights responsibilities, as called for by the 

Guiding Principles, for fear of offending these governments and being 

asked to depart. International organizations also have not established 

country-level working groups to coordinate protection activities for the 

internally displaced among the organizations, nor have they developed 

practical training about protection issues for officials providing relief 

assistance.

When international organizations could obtain access to internally 

displaced populations, they generally met their food and shelter needs 

during the emergency or flight stage of the displacement. For example, in 

Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan, we observed that international 

organizations usually delivered sufficient food, health care, shelter, and 

water to displaced persons to sustain life during the initial stages of 

displacement. However, as the emergency phase transitioned into longerterm displacement situations, international organizations were less 

effective in meeting the continuing needs of displaced populations. For 

example, in Colombia, farmers internally displaced by fighting in the drug-
Page 4 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

producing areas were initially provided adequate food and shelter during 

the first 90 days of their displacement, but when they moved to secondary 

cities or urban areas, such as Bogota, they received little or no assistance. 

Furthermore, nonlife-sustaining help such as supplying clothing, education, 

psychosocial activities for traumatized persons, and employment 

opportunities generally were not provided or were provided only to a 

limited extent.

The Department of State does not have an overall policy for addressing the 

issue of internal displacement, as it has for refugees, nor has a lead office 

been designated to direct and coordinate overall U.S. action in this area. 

Some State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials said 

that this has hampered effective management of programs for the internally 

displaced because of overlapping mandates and duplication in areas such 

as analysis, planning, and program delivery. Despite this, we found that 

officials of each agency were generally aware of each other’s activities. We 

also noted that the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices contains limited discussion of internal displacement 

issues and the human rights abuses that displaced persons suffer. 

Moreover, the report does not focus on the problem nor does it have a 

standard definition or format for reporting on the internally displaced that 

would allow for systematic data gathering and analysis regarding the 

issues. 

This report recommends that the Secretary of State direct the Permanent 

Representative of the United States to the United Nations to (1) work to 

advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist 

internally displaced persons and (2) seek the implementation of in-country 

protection training programs and the formation of country-level protection 

working groups. We also recommend that the Secretary of State include a 

focus on internal displacement issues in State’s annual Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices.

The Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

the United Nations, and the Red Cross Movement commented on a draft of 

this report. Each organization generally agreed with our analysis and our 

recommendations—and State noted they are actively working to address 

them. State and the United Nations both cited a lack of resources as a 

reason for some concerns raised in our report, and State also pointed to 

limited access to displaced populations and physical danger to relief 

workers as obstacles to greater activism on the part of international 

organizations. We agree that limited resources and access are significant 
Page 5 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

impediments to effective protection and assistance programs for internally 

displaced persons. These are core issues that international organizations 

cannot resolve without member states’ support. Nevertheless, we believe 

that the steps we suggest in this report to improve the situation for the 

internally displaced can be taken by international organizations with 

existing resources. The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement also 

noted that although the report focuses on those who are displaced due to 

armed conflict and persecution, others displaced by natural disasters and 

economic hardship have similar needs.

Background The U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced 

Persons estimates that there are 20 million internally displaced persons in 

the world, scattered across more than 50 countries. (Fig. 1 depicts the 

countries with internally displaced persons from which we received 

surveys.) However, lack of access to some of these populations due to 

insecure environments and governments’ assertions of sovereignty 

prevents international organizations from obtaining accurate accounts of 

the numbers, locations, or physical conditions of a large percentage of 

displaced persons. Further complicating the issue of internal displacement 

is the lack of a universally accepted definition for “internally displaced 

persons,” including criteria for determining when a person no longer 

should be considered displaced.4

4

The most widely used definition for internally displaced persons is contained in the 1998 

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which defines them as “persons or groups of 

persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 

habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 

conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.” 
Page 6 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 1: Map of Countries With Internally Displaced Persons, 2001

Note: Map shows 48 countries with internally displaced persons from which we received surveys.
Page 7 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Source: Compiled by GAO from survey responses.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of internally displaced persons 

has grown steadily (and now surpasses the number of refugees), as has the 

international community’s awareness of their plight. By all accounts, 
Page 8 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

internally displaced persons suffer extreme deprivation; are subject to 

threats to their physical security during flight and while displaced; and are 

unlikely to have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to earn a 

livelihood. Mortality rates among internally displaced populations are 

much higher than among stable populations, especially among the more 

vulnerable segments of the populations—children, the elderly, and 

pregnant women. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual 

assault, rape, and discrimination in receiving assistance. Psychological and 

social distress due to violence and the breakdown of family and community 

structures is endemic in internally displaced populations. (Fig. 2 depicts a 

community of internally displaced persons in Burundi who are receiving 

assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development.)
Page 9 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 2: Community of Internally Displaced Persons in Central Burundi, 2000

Source: GAO.

The plight of the internally displaced generally did not begin to draw the 

attention of the international community until 1992, when the U.N. 

Commission for Human Rights requested that the Secretary-General 

appoint a special representative to study the problems of the internally 

displaced and devise solutions to improve their situation. Despite a 

subsequent series of reports, books, briefings, and U.N. resolutions 

identifying shortcomings in and recommending solutions for the 

international community’s response, little progress was made in addressing 

the needs of internally displaced persons throughout most of the 1990s. 

Prompted into action after strong criticism from the U.S. Representative to 
Page 10 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

the United Nations in early 2000, international organizations began a period 

of reassessing their policies, programs, and coordinating mechanisms.

Many Internally 

Displaced Persons 

Lack Protection

Field-level officials of international organizations in 48 countries who 

responded to our survey reported that some modest success had been 

achieved in extending protection interventions to internally displaced 

persons. Nonetheless, international organizations’ officials also reported 

that they have not been able to secure adequate protection for internally 

displaced persons in most countries we surveyed. Several obstacles 

prevent international organizations from protecting displaced populations, 

including the limitations of working in active war zones, attacks on and 

death threats to aid workers, and government assertions of sovereignty 

that block the organizations’ access to displaced persons. While these 

limitations hamper their work, international organizations often have not 

taken proactive measures they could have taken to protect internally 

displaced persons, such as being more assertive on protection matters, 

implementing training programs on protection issues for relief workers, 

and establishing country-level coordination mechanisms.

International Organizations 

Are Unable to Secure 

Effective Protection for 

Internally Displaced 

Persons

International organizations have generally not been able to secure for 

internally displaced persons the fundamental rights set forth in the 

Guiding Principles. The vulnerability of internally displaced persons is 

reflected by our survey responses, which indicates they are at risk of direct 

physical attack in 90 percent of the countries and at risk of forced 

migration, sexual assault, and conscription or forced labor in many 

countries. Figure 3 provides data on various types of protection threats 

faced by internally displaced persons.
Page 11 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001

Source: GAO survey.

According to human rights officials, based on existing international 

humanitarian and human rights law, international organizations act to help 

ensure the internally displaced have protection and are afforded the 

fundamental right to be free from the threats noted in Figure 3. In some 

instance (such as in Kosovo), organizations are explicitly mandated by the 

United Nations and their governing boards to provide protection and 

assistance to internally displaced persons. To accomplish this, the 

organizations undertake protection activities in almost all countries we 

surveyed. For example, as shown in figure 4, in 63 percent of the countries, 

the organizations reported that to a great or very great extent they are 

engaging and meeting with both government and opposition forces to try to 

get them to respect the rights of internally displaced persons. In 79 percent 

of the countries, international organizations indicated they are to some 

extent providing the displaced with information about a voluntary return to 

their homes. In 90 percent of the countries, international organizations 

said they are, to a small extent or greater, establishing systems to document 

human rights violations of the displaced. 
Page 12 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Overall, however, the extent of protection activities is limited, and in many 

countries some protection activities are not being carried out at all. A 

senior official of the International Committee of the Red Cross told us that 

there is not a single country in the world that can serve as a successful 

model for the protection of internally displaced persons. From providing 

core protection actions, such as providing a visible in-country presence of 

international staff to help protect the displaced, to replacing lost personal 

documentation and preserving the right to asylum, to alerting the displaced 

about threats, international organizations have taken limited action. Figure 

4 shows the extent to which protection interventions identified in the 

Guiding Principles had taken place in the 48 countries from which we 

received survey responses.5

 Only 1 of the 14 protection interventions—

engaging both government and opposition forces—was being undertaken 

to a great or very great extent in at least half the countries. Conversely, 7 of 

the 14 interventions were not being undertaken in half the countries.6

 

5

The Guiding Principles provide a framework for the protection of internally displaced 

persons and affirm the right of individuals to be protected from arbitrary displacement and 

the responsibility of governments and other authorities to prevent such displacement. 

While the Guiding Principles are intended for governments and armed opposition groups, 

the principles also serve as a standard by which to deliver protection and assistance and to 

monitor and assess the extent to which international human rights and humanitarian law are 

being observed.

6

In figures 3 and 8, “not applicable” answers were treated as “not at all” responses. In all but 

three instances, fewer than 10 percent of survey responses were answered “not applicable.” 

However, with few exceptions, such as for the interventions pertaining to managing camps 

and landmine awareness, respondents should not have answered “not applicable.” An 

example of an inappropriate “not applicable” answer was the category asking if the Guiding 

Principles were distributed in the local language.
Page 13 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 4: Extent of Protection Interventions for Internally Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001

Source: GAO survey. 
Page 14 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

External Factors Obstruct 

Protection Efforts

Several factors inhibit the international community’s response on 

protection matters. The danger of operating in conflict zones and the 

personal security risks to aid workers are major limitations to involvement 

in protection matters. (In 75 percent of countries in our survey, 

humanitarian organizations indicated that personal security fears impact 

their ability to provide protection or assistance to internally displaced 

persons.) 7 State sovereignty is also a significant factor, as many countries, 

such as Algeria, Burma, and Turkey, bar international involvement with 

their internally displaced populations. In August 2000, the Group of 77, a 

group of more than 130 developing countries, blocked the U.N.’s Economic 

and Social Council from endorsing a U.N. approach to dealing with 

internally displaced persons for fear that humanitarian intervention and 

protection of human rights would infringe upon their countries’ 

sovereignty. 

Finally, scarce or declining budgetary resources provided by the 

international donor community inhibit agencies from expanding their 

protection (and assistance) activities. According to officials of these 

organizations, it is difficult to get the funding they request for refugees and 

other specifically mandated programs; and there is increasing donor 

fatigue because of humanitarian crises that have been ongoing for years 

without resolution. Given this environment, officials said it is even more 

difficult to get funding for internally displaced persons, who outnumber 

refugees by nearly 2 to 1 and where no international organization has an 

absolute right to intervene to protect and assist them. Table 1 shows the 

amount of funds international organizations’ requested from international 

donors in 2000 and the shortfall from their budget requests.

7

For example, since 1996, in Burundi, five expatriate relief workers were murdered, and 

numerous officials have been attacked or forced to evacuate due to death threats. Since 

1990, 23 World Food Program staff members have been killed in the line of duty in Burundi, 

Rwanda, and Uganda.
Page 15 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Table 1: Organizations’ Budget Requests, Actual Funds Received, Percentage of 

Shortfall, and U.S. Contribution, 2000

a

Includes core or regular budget only.

b

Includes emergency budget only. U.S. contribution includes emergency and regular budget.

Source: Specified agencies.

Dollars in millions

Agency

Budget

request

Actual

budget

Shortfall

percentage

U.S.

contribution

International 

Committee of the Red 

Cross

$671 $540 19% $122

U.N. High 

Commissioner for 

Refugees

930 693 25 239

U.N. High 

Commissioner for 

Human Rights

53 44 17 7

U.N. Development 

Programa

1,100 645 41 80

World Food Program 2,117 1,685 20 796

U.N. Children’s Fundb 254 149 41 110
Page 16 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

International Organizations 

Are Cautious in Challenging 

Governments

According to numerous relief and human rights officials we spoke with, 

their organizations and their representatives at the country level are often 

reluctant to speak out and challenge governments on protection matters 

for fear of jeopardizing relationships and continued access for ongoing 

relief or development programs. In Sudan, for example, U.N. officials told 

us some of its offices were often reticent about pressing the Khartoum 

government on its restrictive flight clearance process in the south 

(impeding emergency relief efforts) due to concern of putting at risk U.N. 

development activities in the north. Also, in Burundi, the U.N.’s 

Humanitarian Coordinator (the lead U.N. official in country) was criticized 

by U.N. agency, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. government 

officials for weak leadership: the Coordinator was said to be more 

interested in maintaining good relations with the government than in 

serving as the main advocate for humanitarian and internally displaced 

persons’ concerns. Furthermore, U.N. Resident Coordinators8

 from several 

countries were unwilling to respond to our survey on internally displaced 

persons despite assurances of confidentiality because of their concern 

about antagonizing the host government if their participation in the survey 

became known.

According to Department of State officials, in some internal displacement 

circumstances, international organizations have little leverage to affect the 

conduct of governments toward their citizens. In those cases, international 

forums, such as the U.N.’s Security Council or Economic and Social 

Council, offer the best opportunity to address issues of internal 

displacement within the context of underlying political and security 

factors. For example, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations advocated increased assistance and protection for the internally 

displaced in the U.N. Security Council and in other forums. As a result, 

U.N. officials said this raised the awareness of the plight of the internally 

displaced, prompted other governments to respond, and prompted an 

assessment of international organizations’ policies, programs, and 

coordinating mechanisms on the internally displaced.

8

Within the U.N. system, the Resident Coordinator is the highest-ranking official in country 

and is responsible for representing the United Nations before the host government and for 

coordinating the various U.N. agencies’ relief and development programs.
Page 17 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Gaps in Field Presence and 

Protection Coverage

Organizations with the mandate and staff expertise to provide protection—

the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross—are 

often not present to take a proactive role in the protection of internally 

displaced populations, according to representatives from these 

international organizations and protection experts. Despite a March 2000 

policy pronouncement by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to 

become more engaged with the internally displaced, we found the number 

of internally displaced persons assisted and country programs in place 

declined in the last year (from 5 to 4 million and from 13 to 11, 

respectively), although the total number of worldwide displacements are 

reported to have remained relatively stable. According to State 

Department officials and other knowledgeable observers, the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Human Rights has few officials working directly in the 

field and currently lacks the capability to intervene in human rights 

situations. As for the International Committee of the Red Cross, it has a 

specific protection mandate during armed conflict, but it generally does not 

conduct protection activities for displaced populations caught up in 

nonconflict circumstances. Table 2 shows the number of countries where 

these organizations said they have a staff presence and engage in 

protection activities.9

Table 2: Countries With Internally Displaced Persons Protection Activities, 2001

Sources: Specified agencies. 

9

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Red Cross Movement in their comments 

on a draft of this report provided new statistical data on the number of countries where they 

had protection activities and the number of protection personnel posted in a country, which 

in some cases exceeded the data we report. We adjusted the numbers in some instances, but 

our analysis indicates that the data reported reflect a more accurate account of protection 

activities now being carried out by the organizations. This is because we include only 

protection-related persons and activities and excluded assistance activities and personnel.

Organization

Number of countries with internally

displaced persons protection activities

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 11

U.N. High Commissioner for Human 

Rights

7

International Committee of the Red 

Cross

48
Page 18 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

During our fieldwork, we observed in two of the three countries we visited, 

that despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 

persons, agencies did not have protection officers to monitor conditions or 

had assigned only two or three officers for this purpose. Protection 

experts acknowledge that a simple visible field presence is sometimes the 

most effective means to prevent harm to internally displaced persons. (Fig. 

5 shows International Committee of the Red Cross staff accompanying 

Rwandan civilians fleeing ethnic fighting in 1994.) In our three case study 

countries, only the International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia 

provided a robust staffing presence of significant size (54) to help monitor 

conditions and provide protection activities. In Burundi and southern 

Sudan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees did not have a protection 

presence even though there were refugees repatriating into internally 

displaced communities. In Burundi, none of the agencies were engaged in 

protection activities directed toward internally displaced persons, although 

geographically nearly half the country is experiencing internal 

displacement. According to officials from these organizations, the number 

of protection officers working in these countries is not sufficient given the 

level of threat against internally displaced persons. Table 3 shows the 

number of protection officials assigned in Burundi, Colombia, and southern 

Sudan in 2000 to 2001.
Page 19 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 5: Rwandan Civilians Fleeing Ethnic Fighting, 1994

Source: International Committee of the Red Cross.
Page 20 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Table 3: Number of Protection Staff Present in Burundi, Colombia, and Southern 

Sudan, 2000-2001

Source: Specified agencies.

No Coordination Activities International organizations do not have mechanisms at the country level to 

promote and coordinate actions that could help protect the internally 

displaced. Unlike international organizations’ efforts to provide assistance 

(e.g., food aid and health care) to internally displaced persons where there 

are established working groups to share information and plan and 

coordinate action, there are no counterpart coordination mechanisms for 

protection concerns. For example, in our three case-study countries, we 

were told that there was little to no discussion among international 

organizations concerning protection issues. There were no focal points to 

raise the profile of protection or ensure its place on the agenda of those 

organizations working in the field. Officials engaged in protection 

activities in these countries told us that because there are no established 

mechanisms to share information, there is a lack of (1) basic information 

on where protection officers are posted, (2) common thinking and 

approaches to protection, and (3) knowledge about what protection 

interventions work or do not work.

We noted that in countries where international organizations have not 

assigned staff to monitor for protection concerns, the organizations do 

provide relief assistance and are often in direct contact with displaced 

persons and are knowledgeable about their conditions. However, 

according to U.N. and other international organization officials, they have 

not established working groups or other mechanisms in these countries 

that could alert the international staff about potential dangers to the 

internally displaced or provide advice about how to record and report on 

abuses they witness in their routine of providing assistance.

Protection Considerations Not 

Incorporated Into Assistance 

Programs

Officials in the field who provide assistance to internally displaced persons 

lack knowledge about how to incorporate protection considerations and 

techniques into their assistance activities. As was shown earlier in figure 3, 

Organization Burundi Colombia Southern Sudan

International Committee of the Red 

Cross

2 staff 54 staff 2 staff

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 2 11 0

U.N. High Commissioner for Human 

Rights

36 0
Page 21 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

79 percent of the countries in our survey indicated that no action is taken to 

set up and manage camps for internally displaced persons to prevent 

attacks, such as ensuring vulnerable female-headed households are not 

isolated to remote areas in the camp. Relief officials told us there is little 

consideration given to protection concerns when designing programs--their 

focus is on providing assistance as quickly as possible. Forty percent of the 

countries in our survey also indicated that no training had been received on 

how to undertake protection actions for internally displaced persons, 

although officials we spoke with stated they would strongly welcome such 

training. 

During our fieldwork, we found numerous examples of how relief agencies 

both incorporated and failed to incorporate protection measures into the 

design and implementation of their programs. These examples include:

• In southern Sudan, protection considerations were taken into account 

when water bore holes were drilled in locations that drew internally 

displaced populations away from conflict zones into more secure areas.

• In Burundi, when relief workers did not take into consideration the 

timing of bulk food deliveries during periods of intense fighting (as 

opposed to dispersed deliveries in locations outside the battle zone), the 

result was armed attacks and theft of supplies by combatants. 

• In both Colombia and southern Sudan, the provision of assistance to 

internally displaced persons, while equally vulnerable local populations 

were ignored (as opposed to provision of some aid to both 

communities), led to conflict between the two groups.

Recognizing that the state of training for internally displaced persons 

issues has been deficient, in March 1998 the U.N.’s Inter-Agency Standing 

Committee ordered the development of a comprehensive training program 

focused on protection issues for the international organizations working 

with the displaced. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was tasked 

with developing the training module for protection but did not do so until 

the end of 2000. To date, no training has occurred. 

Protection Interventions 

Can Have Positive Impact

Despite the overall poor state of protection for internally displaced 

persons, we learned that practical actions, as advised by the Handbook for 

Applying the Guiding Principles were successful in the countries we 

visited. Even in highly insecure environments, reasonable advocacy on the 

part of senior officials and the presence of human rights observers and 

monitors can have positive effects. For example,
Page 22 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

• In Colombia, International Committee for the Red Cross protection 

officers negotiated with rebel and paramilitary groups to relocate 

internally displaced individuals and families away from areas where 

death threats were being issued; they also successfully negotiated with 

these groups to resolve kidnappings and prevent executions by death 

squads.

• In Burundi, the U.S. Ambassador sent demarches (diplomatic messages) 

to the highest level of the Burundi government in mid-2000 challenging 

government troops who were intimidating patients in rural health clinics 

near the capital Bujumbura. This helped end the troops’ harassment and 

occupation of the rural health clinics, which were used heavily by 

displaced populations.

• In southern Sudan, the government and factional commanders 

increased the risk to internally displaced persons by requiring that food 

drops and the provision of aid be provided in strategic locations at 

specific times to coincide with their strategies. The relief organizations 

tailored methods to circumvent these requirements and safely 

accomplish their relief goals. (Fig. 6 shows a food airdrop in southern 

Sudan.)
Page 23 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 6: A World Food Program Food Delivery Airdrop in Southern Sudan

Source: World Food Program.
Page 24 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Immediate Assistance 

Needs Reported Being 

Met, But Longer-Term 

Needs Remain a 

Challenge

Overall, international organizations believe they have been generally 

successful in meeting the emergency food needs for those internally 

displaced persons to whom they have access. However, in numerous 

countries with active emergencies and hostile, insecure environments, 

such as in Burundi, and southern Sudan, large numbers of internally 

displaced persons were outside the reach of international organizations’ 

relief efforts, according to relief experts to whom we spoke and observed 

during our case study fieldwork.10 Other emergency assistance provisions 

such as health care, water and sanitation, and shelter were also generally 

being provided to displaced populations, although to a lesser extent, 

according to relief officials with whom we spoke. According to our survey, 

54 percent of countries reported that basic needs, such as food, water, and 

health care, are being met to a great or very great extent. Figure 7 provides 

the results of our survey on the extent to which assistance interventions 

identified in the Guiding Principles have taken place. In Colombia, for 

example, largely through the combined efforts of the International 

Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program, the emergency 

needs (food, shelter, and health care) of the internally displaced were 

reported being met during the first 90 days of displacement. 

10Access to humanitarian assistance is one of the most pressing problems affecting 

internally displaced persons. According to the Guiding Principles, the primary duty and 

responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies 

with national authorities. However, international organizations have the right to offer their 

services in support of the internally displaced. Key organizations with the mandate to 

provide humanitarian assistance include the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red 

Cross Movement (National Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the 

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), the U.N. Development 

Program, the World Food Program, and the U.N. Children’s Fund.
Page 25 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 7: GAO Survey of Assistance Interventions Taking Place for Internally Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001

Source: GAO survey.

Gaps in Assistance 

Programming

Although international organizations were generally able to meet the initial 

emergency needs of the internally displaced, we found a number of 

programming gaps in the overall response scheme. First, international 

organizations were less effective in meeting the assistance needs of 

internally displaced persons after the initial displacement phase. In 

southern Sudan, for example, we were told that internally displaced 

persons who relocated to nonconflict areas were generally not receiving 

assistance from international organizations. Gaps in assistance areas we 
Page 26 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

identified include providing clothing, education, and income-generation 

training and opportunities; psychological and social assistance for 

traumatized persons; and nonfood items, such as kitchen utensils, tools, 

and personal hygiene items. Figure 8 provides information from our survey 

of country-level officials on why internally displaced persons were not 

receiving assistance. Foremost among the obstacles were problems in 

assistance logistics and distribution.

Figure 8: Reasons Why Internally Displaced Persons Were Not Receiving 

Assistance

Source: GAO survey.

Also, internally displaced persons who were congregated in camps or 

identifiable communities were more likely to have their assistance needs 

met. In contrast, those displaced persons who were dispersed throughout 

the countryside, such as in Burundi, or merged into urban communities, 

such as in Colombia, were generally not receiving assistance, according to 

U.N. officials with whom we spoke. International organizations have 

difficulty identifying and obtaining access to these populations, as some 

internally displaced persons purposely keep a low profile for fear of 
Page 27 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

discrimination or retribution at the hands of the government or rebel 

groups. Figure 9 provides officials views on whether the source of 

protection threat to internally displaced persons comes from the 

government, nonstate actors (such as rebel groups), or both.

Figure 9: Perceived Sources of Threat to Internally Displaced Persons

Note 1: Nonstate actors include opposition and rebel groups.

Note 2: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: GAO survey.

Internally displaced persons were thought to be generally less likely to 

receive assistance the more time had lapsed since their initial 

displacement. According to relief and development experts we spoke with, 

there is a tendency among donors and aid agencies to provide short-term 

relief assistance rather than longer-term development or life-sustaining 

assistance. This funding and program trend particularly affects internally 

displaced persons, since most internal displacement situations are longstanding in nature. Similarly, assistance to internally displaced persons is 

negatively affected by international organizations’ difficulty in transitioning 
Page 28 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

or redirecting their programs from the immediate relief phase to the longerterm rehabilitation/development phase. 

Finally, the volatile nature of complex emergencies often results in sudden 

surges of mass displacement. In two of our case study countries—Burundi 

and Sudan-- fighting accompanied by drought had resulted in the sudden 

movement of thousands to tens of thousands of people within the last few 

years. According to relief officials, international organizations do not have 

adequate food reserves to respond immediately to these quick surges in 

displacement populations. For example, according to World Food Program 

officials, the organization only had a 1 month reserve of food for Sudan, 

and only 40 percent of its food appeal for Burundi had been met. During 

our fieldwork in central Burundi, we were told of rising levels of 

malnutrition caused by displacement and drought, and relief officials were 

fearful that a failure in the upcoming harvest could lead to significant food 

shortages. According to U.N. officials, it takes a lead time of 5 to 6 months 

before requested food aid is delivered in-country. 
Page 29 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

U.S. Government Lacks 

an Overall Policy and a 

Lead Office for 

Internally Displaced 

Persons

The U.S. government addresses the needs of the internally displaced by 

providing funds to international organizations and by directly 

implementing programs. However, the U.S. government does not have an 

overall policy or agency-specific guidelines for dealing with internally 

displaced persons, nor has the Department of State designated a lead office 

to help coordinate and direct the U.S. government’s response for internally 

displaced persons. According to State officials, the lack of a lead office has 

been identified as a problem and discussed within the department, but no 

policy decisions have been taken to address this issue. Some State and 

Agency for International Development (USAID) officials said that as a 

result of a lack of policy and a lead office, the U.S. government has 

difficulty coordinating and managing its programs to aid the internally 

displaced. A study by the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning and 

an assessment by the former director of the USAID’s Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance concluded that the absence of a U.S. policy for 

internally displaced persons has resulted in limited awareness, overlapping 

bureaucratic mandates, and fragmented and duplicative efforts. The 

reports noted the multifaceted nature of displacement crises and that U.S. 

efforts were undermined by the absence of a single, responsible office 

managing the interrelated assistance, protection, advocacy, peace 

processes, and international cooperation components. Both studies 

concluded that U.S. humanitarian interests would be better served with 

clear policy direction and senior leadership within the federal bureaucracy 

on internal displacement issues.11

11See Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian and Transition 

Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Jan. 2000), and The U.S. Government 

and Internally Displaced Persons: Present, But Not Accounted For (Washington, D.C.: The 

Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement and the U.S. Committee for 

Refugees, Nov. 1999).
Page 30 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Difficulty Managing U.S. 

Government Policy 

Response

We identified six offices within State and USAID that directly assist 

internally displaced persons, plus several other agencies and offices that 

are involved in such related functions as intelligence gathering and 

representing U.S. interests in international organizations. The Department 

of State’s Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees and USAID’s 

Bureau for Humanitarian Response are the two main sources of U.S. 

assistance to internally displaced persons. Based upon our discussions 

with officials from these agencies and a review of program documents, we 

found that there is duplication of effort and little coordination among the 

various agencies. For example, in Colombia, we learned that the World 

Food Program received funds from four different U.S. funding sources— 

State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration; USAID’s Office of 

Transition Initiatives; the Department of Agriculture; and Plan Colombia—

to support the same type of food assistance programs. However, the 

evidence shows that this funding was provided without coordination and 

knowledge about whether this would be complementary or duplicative. 

Furthermore, these offices were not able to determine how much of the 

$2.5 billion the U.S. government spends annually on humanitarian 

assistance goes to internally displaced persons, because agencies do not 

track how much money they spend on internal displacement.12

According to State and USAID program officials with whom we spoke, 

there are numerous drawbacks to not having a lead office or interagency 

working group to direct policy and activities related to internally displaced 

persons activities. Some of these drawbacks are listed as follows:

• Responding to crises is inefficient. It takes longer and is labor intensive 

to launch a response to an internal displacement crisis, as planning 

meetings are ad hoc and usually staff generated. 

• There is no lead office or person to settle policy disputes among various 

agencies. For example, in Sudan, State and USAID had unresolved 

disagreements over aid policies and the content of assistance inputs to 

refugees and internally displaced persons, resulting in confusion among 

the nongovernmental organization implementing partners about which 

groups should be provided assistance.

• It is unclear whom to consult within the U.S. government. It is difficult 

for regional bureaus and other programming offices to take a proactive 

12USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is the only U.S. agency to track funding to 

internally displaced persons. It estimates expenditures of $123 million in 20 countries in 

fiscal year 2000.
Page 31 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

role for their countries or areas of responsibility. In the critical area of 

providing protection for internally displaced persons, we were told that 

good intelligence information exists about protection threats against 

internally displaced persons, but without a lead office to receive the 

information and direct it, the information does not pass smoothly to the 

organization needing it, as was the case in Kosovo and Rwanda. 

• There is no senior-level representation or single voice to consider and 

address internally displaced persons’ issues during political-military 

crises deliberations within the highest level of the U.S. government.

• There is no clear locus of accountability for internal displacement issues 

within the U.S. government, especially on policy issues. 

According to the acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population, 

Refugees, and Migration, there are pros and cons to designating a lead 

office, some of which were pointed out in the interagency review. 

Primarily, the issue of internally displaced persons involves human rights, 

diplomacy, political-military affairs, humanitarian concerns, and 

designating a lead office either within State or USAID could skew the U.S. 

approach toward one of these concerns. Without a thorough review of all 

concerns and the related organizational structure of several departments, it 

would be difficult to determine if a designated lead would improve the 

situation. He said that the current administration is addressing the issue 

through improved coordination and cooperation among the offices 

involved. Furthermore, there is a coordinating committee led by the 

National Security Council that could be used to address specific situations. 

However, he said that if problems arose in coordinating a U.S. government 

response to internally displaced persons, the administration might consider 

designating a lead office.
Page 32 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Funding for Internally 

Displaced Persons 

There is no overall policy on the funding priority for internally displaced 

persons within the U.S. government. The Department of State’s Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian 

Affairs each has general legislative authority to address the assistance and 

protection needs of persons in need, such as provisions authorizing 

contributions to international organizations, assistance to victims of 

disasters and complex emergencies, help for victims of human rights 

abuses, and aid to those needing food assistance.13 But the legislation does 

not specifically refer to internally displaced persons. Thus, according to 

Department of State officials, the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and 

Migration does not see itself as the initial source of the U.S. government 

response to the internally displaced and has not requested appropriations 

for these populations. Similarly, USAID officials told us that internally 

displaced persons are not a direct focus of development assistance monies 

provided under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Officials from both 

agencies told us that they interpret their current statutory authorities as 

putting a priority on funding for refugees, development, or emergency 

programs. Therefore, they manage their funds to meet these legislative 

priorities with no overall direction to coordinate their efforts on internally 

displaced persons. 

Reporting on Internally 

Displaced Persons Is 

Insufficient 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the State 

Department to report annually to the Congress on the status of 

internationally recognized human rights. Although internally displaced 

persons are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations, the 

Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

do not contain much information on the subject. These reports generally 

serve as an authoritative source and a basis for advocacy by U.S. diplomats 

both bilaterally and in international forums. 

13The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (22 U.S.C. 2601 et seq) and the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq) provide the primary statutory 

framework for assisting internally displaced persons.
Page 33 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Our examination of several country reports14 in State’s Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices for 2000 and a Brookings Institution analysis of 

1996 and 1997 reporting,15 indicated that State generally provides only a 

cursory account of internally displaced persons. In eight country reports 

we examined for 2000, three country reports provided some information on 

specific incidents of displacement, three reports noted that internal 

displacement exists and made estimates of the populations affected; but 

two reports made no mention of internal displacement issues, although 

such issues existed. The country reports neglected or provided insufficient 

information on the protection and assistance problems that internally 

displaced persons face or the conduct of the government and opposition 

groups toward these populations. For example, the country report for 

Afghanistan noted only that drought and conflict were causing an increase 

in internal displacement. Furthermore, there is no standard format for 

reporting on internal displacement that would allow for systematic data 

gathering and analysis. Unlike a standard format for reporting on refugee 

issues, discussion of internal displacement issues are dispersed throughout 

various sections, for example, freedom of movement, respect for political 

rights, and torture, making identification of internally displaced persons 

reporting difficult in the lengthy country reports. In addition, the reports 

use various terms to refer to internally displaced persons—“IDPs,” 

“forcibly displaced,” and “village re-evacuation”—increasing the difficulty 

in identifying internal displacement issues and sometimes blurring the 

distinction between internally displaced persons and refugees.

Conclusions Although some protection has been provided to internally displaced 

persons, international organizations have been unable to meet the 

protection needs of internally displaced persons in most locations, partly 

because of the danger of operating in conflict zones, the presence of 

personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary 

resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a 

proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers 

have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations 

and interventions into their assistance activities, and in the three countries 

14The countries reviewed included Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Turkey.

15IDP Coverage in State Department Human Rights Reports Brookings Institution 

Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Aug. 24, 1998).
Page 34 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

we visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection 

actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such 

coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic 

information about the location of their protection officers and effective 

approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one 

forum where these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying 

political and security factors.

The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its 

efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government 

activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and 

offices. Some State and USAID officials believe that providing assistance 

to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a 

locus of accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although the 

Department of State is required to provide the Congress with an annual 

report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited 

information about the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, 

the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing 

information about the internally displaced and their human rights condition 

that would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. 

Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on 

internally displaced persons would identify what we found to be a 

significant problem and would provide U.S. government and international 

and nongovernmental organizations’ officials with country-level data to 

craft a cohesive program and policy response. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To strengthen the international response to the plight of the internally 

displaced, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent 

Representative of the United States to the United Nations (1) work to 

advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist 

internally displaced persons and (2) seek with other member states to 

strengthen international organizations’ protection efforts by encouraging 

them to implement a training program for international organizations and 

to form country-level protection working groups. We also recommend that 

the Secretary of State include a focus on internal displacement issues in 

State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Page 35 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State, USAID, the United Nations, and the Red Cross Movement provided 

written comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III to VI) Both State 

and the United Nations emphasized that lack of resources seriously 

undermines international efforts to address the protection and assistance 

needs of the internally displaced. This report recognizes that shortfalls in 

funding for internally displaced persons programs have had a negative 

impact on the international response; nevertheless, we believe our 

recommendations can be implemented by international organizations 

within existing resources. 

State said this report is useful in drawing attention to the phenomenon of 

internal displacement and identifying areas of concern that the State 

Department and USAID are working to address. State agreed with our 

recommendations to work toward more proactive programs to protect 

internally displaced persons and in-country training programs and working 

groups for protection. Concerning our recommendation for improved 

reporting on internal displacement in its annual Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices, State said that it recognizes the importance of 

reporting on issues related to internally displaced persons and stated that 

such information is found throughout the report. State said it strives to use 

systematic language when referring to internally displaced persons, and it 

will continue its efforts to report on internally displaced persons. 

USAID stated that the report identifies issues of concern that it is actively 

working to address. USAID agreed with our recommendation to work with 

other countries and international organizations to advance programs that 

protect and assist internally displaced persons. Regarding the report’s 

discussion about the lack of an overall policy and a lead office for 

addressing the issue of internal displacement, USAID noted that its efforts 

are directed by the Foreign Assistance Manual, which states that 

“AID/OFDA has responsibility for assisting people displaced within their 

own country as a result of natural or man-made disasters.” State said that 

there are pros and cons to designating a lead humanitarian office.

The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement noted that steps are 

being taken to improve coordination among international agencies at the 

headquarter level and that initiatives such as the U.N.’s Senior Inter-Agency 

Network on Internally Displaced Persons are examining the institutional 

arrangements within and between the United Nations, the Red Cross 

Movement, and nongovernmental organizations. We recognize that some 

coordinating activities have been recently initiated; however, as discussed 
Page 36 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

in this report, we believe particular focus should be placed on improving 

country-level coordination mechanisms, especially in the area of 

protection.

The World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the High 

Commissioner for Refugees, the Brookings Institution, and the Norwegian 

Refugee Council provided technical comments on this report, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the 

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on 

International Relations, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the U.N. Secretary General, and the 

President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Movement. We will also then send copies to others who are 

interested and make copies available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix VII.

Harold J. Johnson, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 37 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Page 38 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

At the request of the Chairman and the Ranking minority member of the 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we assessed (1) whether 

international organizations have adequately protected internally displaced 

persons, and if not, what impediments these agencies face; (2) whether 

international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of 

displaced populations; and (3) whether the U.S. government has a 

coordinated and effectively managed program to help ensure the 

protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons.

To assess whether international agencies have adequately provided 

protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, we interviewed 

officials and analyzed policy, program, and budgetary documents from the 

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 

Rights, the World Food Program, the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. 

Children’s Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the 

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. We 

met with officials and reviewed reports pertaining to humanitarian and 

internal displacement issues from numerous think tanks and 

nongovernmental organizations, including the Brookings Institution’s 

Project on Internal Displacement, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, 

InterAction, and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government coordinates and 

manages its efforts to ensure protection and assistance to internally 

displaced persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy and 

program documents from the Department of State’s Office of Policy 

Planning; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the 

Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues; and the U.S. Missions to the 

United Nations in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. We also 

analyzed a judgmental sample of country reports from the Department of 

State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 to determine 

the extent to which the issue of internal displacement is addressed. We 

met with officials and analyzed program documents for the U.S. 

International Agency for Development’s (USAID) Bureau of Humanitarian 

Response, including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Office of 

Transition Initiatives, and the Office of Food for Peace. 

We also developed a field-level survey that was completed by U.N. Resident 

and Humanitarian Coordinators and officials from the Red Cross 

Movement and nongovernmental organizations. The survey solicited 

information on demographics, the effectiveness of international programs, 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

and program management of aid and protection efforts for internally 

displaced persons. The survey asked for information based upon criteria 

set forth in the normative framework of protection and assistance 

principles outlined in the 1998 U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal 

Displacement and included modifications based upon recommendations 

from relief and protection experts from the United Nations, the Red Cross 

Movement, and think tanks. 

We sent an electronic copy of the survey directly, and through points of 

contact at the headquarters of the United Nations, the Red Cross 

Movement, and nongovernmental organizations, to field-level officials in 

more than 50 countries. A total of 120 usable surveys from 48 countries 

were returned from the various organizations; an additional 10 surveys 

were received but could not be used because key questions were not 

answered. The number of surveys returned from each country varied from 

one to eight. To provide equal weight to the opinions coming from each 

country, we computed a countrywide average response for each item. 

Thus, the unit of analysis was the 48 countries, rather than the 120 surveys. 

For questions that asked for a “yes” or “no” answer, the countrywide 

answer was coded “yes” if 50 percent or more of the respondents from the 

country responded “yes.” Countrywide mean ratings were also computed 

for questions that asked for the extent to which aid/protection concerns 

were being addressed (rating scale: 1 = Not applicable/Not at all, 2 = Small 

extent, 3 = Moderate extent, 4 = Great extent, 5 = Very great extent). The 

countrywide means were rounded (and collapsed to three categories) so 

that the percentage of countries at each point on the extent scale could be 

ascertained. If the countrywide mean was 1.00 to 1.49, the aid/protection 

intervention was judged to be not occurring at all. If the mean was 1.50 to 

3.49 or 3.50 to 5.00, the intervention was characterized as occurring to a 

small/moderate extent or a great/very great extent, respectively. Because 

we were unable to determine the total number of countries or officials that 

received the survey in each country, we were unable to project the findings 

with a specified degree of precision to the population of all countries with 

internally displaced persons.

We also performed fieldwork in our case study countries of Burundi, 

Colombia, and southern Sudan to determine the effectiveness of 

international organizations’ responses to the protection and assistance 

needs of internally displaced persons. These three countries are 

experiencing long-standing internal displacement crises, with large 

population movements and programs operated by the U.N. system, the Red 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Cross Movement, nongovernmental organizations, and the U.S. 

government. During our fieldwork, we met with officials from these 

organizations responsible for providing protection and assistance to the 

internally displaced. We also met with other donor governments and their 

aid agencies, with host government and opposition groups involved in the 

displacement crisis, and with internally displaced persons who were 

recipients of international assistance. We observed first-hand assistance 

programs designed to assist displaced populations and attended 

coordination meetings by country teams. Due to security concerns, we 

were unable to travel within southern Sudan; however, we met with agency 

and nongovernmental organization officials in Nairobi and Lokichoggio, 

Kenya, who conduct relief activities in southern Sudan both within and 

outside the U.N.-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan program. 

We performed our review from September 2000 through June 2001 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 41 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan ApendxiI

Burundi Burundi is a poor, densely populated country in East Africa. More than 90 

percent of the country’s 6.6 million population is dependent on subsistence 

agriculture for survival. Over 3 million people—half the population—

needed food assistance in 2000 because of drought or war. Burundi’s 

majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi populations have struggled 

against each other for economic and political power for 30 years, with a 

small number of Tutsi elite having dominated the country’s politics and 

military since independence in 1962. 

Periodic military crackdowns slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people 

during the 1970s and 1980s. The victims were overwhelmingly Hutu. The 

first democratic election in 1993 elected a Hutu president. However, 

elements within the Tutsi-dominated military assassinated the President in 

1993, triggering a wave of violence. A 1996 coup eliminated the rest of the 

democratically elected government, and the Tutsi elites shifted back into 

power. An insurgency by Hutu rebels and a counterinsurgency campaign 

by the government have claimed tens of thousands of lives and caused 

mass internal displacement in an ongoing civil war that continues today. 

The military has pursued a regroupment policy starting in 1996, requiring 

an estimated 350,000 persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment 

camps, to prevent those living in the countryside from supporting the 

rebels. The camps had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to 

water, food, shelter, and medicine, according to the U.S. Committee for 

Refugees. International organizations could not reach many of the 

government’s forced regroupment camps due to inadequate infrastructure 

or because they were prevented from doing so by security forces.

The government’s and the rebels’ human rights record are poor, according 

to the Department of State’s human rights report. Combatants on both 

sides deliberately uprooted civilian populations and targeted displacement 

camps for attack. Government forces and rebels committed large-scale 

atrocities against civilians. According to Amnesty International, the armed 

forces and rebel groups have continued to show complete disregard for 

human life, acting with little or no accountability. Scores of civilians were 

killed in ambushes. Humanitarian workers were also killed and attacked. 

On numerous occasions, rebel groups killed unarmed civilians in reprisal 

for alleged collaboration with the government or for failing to support 

them.
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 42 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

The U.S. government has made humanitarian relief its priority response in 

Burundi. Inadequate harvests during the last three seasons due to conflict 

and drought have caused severe malnutrition in several provinces. USAIDfunded programs implemented by nongovernmental organizations and U.N. 

agencies primarily focused on life-sustaining activities such as food 

security assistance (provision of livestock, seeds, and tools), health care, 

and supplementary nutrition programs. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. 

government provided an estimated $5.8 million in food aid and another $3 

million to combat HIV/AIDS and promote human rights and democracy. In 

addition, the U.S. government is a significant contributor to the programs 

of the World Food Program and the U.N.’s Children Fund in Burundi. 

Figure 10 shows a USAID-assisted family.
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 43 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Figure 10: Members of a Teenage-headed Household That Receives Food Security 

and Shelter Assistance from USAID, 2000 

Note: The smallest child is age 4 and suffers from stunting due to chronic malnutrition.

Source: GAO.

Colombia The roots of the conflict in Colombia go back to a power struggle between 

liberals and conservatives in the late 1940s. Between 1947 and 1957, the 

fighting claimed more than 300,000 lives and forced more than 1 million 

Colombians to abandon their homes, according to the International 

Committee of the Red Cross. In subsequent years, rural defense groups 

sprung up in various parts of the country. Some of them turned into 

guerilla groups with strong Marxist leanings. In later years, paramilitary 
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 44 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

groups appeared. The addition of a flourishing drug trade combined to 

create a complex and violent civil conflict that has resulted in the 

cumulative displacement of millions of people.

Attempts to end the violence over the years have produced neither 

substantive agreements nor a decrease in the levels of violence. In 1999, 

the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion, 

multiyear strategy designed to support the peace process, an antinarcotics 

strategy, democratization, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. 

However, the Colombian government faces serious challenges, as armed 

paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotic traffickers exert influence 

over more than one-third of the country’s municipalities. Furthermore, the 

government’s human rights record is poor. According to the Department of 

State’s human rights reporting, government forces commit serious abuses, 

including extrajudicial killings. Members of security forces collaborate 

with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in some instances 

allowing them to pass through roadblocks, sharing information, or 

providing ammunition and supplies.

Paramilitary groups and guerillas were responsible for the vast majority of 

political and other killings, according to the Department of State’s human 

rights report. Throughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, 

and threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an 

orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby 

depriving guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to 

challenge the guerrilla groups for control of narcotic cultivations and 

strategically important territories. The two main guerrilla groups—the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National 

Liberation Army (ELN)—are reported by the Department of State to 

regularly attack civilian populations and commit massacres and summary 

executions. They are also reported to have killed religious and medical 

personnel.

Plan Colombia is being supported by the U.S. government with a $1.3 

billion assistance package that was approved in June 2000. In addition to 

drug eradication and interdiction efforts, U.S funding is supporting (1) 

democracy programs and the peace process, (2) reduction of opium and 

cocoa cultivation through alternative development, and (3) assistance to 

internally displaced persons. USAID programs were focused on providing 

assistance to internally displaced persons in the reestablishment, or postflight, stage of displacement. This phase of displacement represents a 
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 45 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

major gap in the international community’s response in Colombia. USAIDfunded activities focused on secondary cities bearing the brunt of internally 

displaced populations and included food-for-work community projects, 

income generation and long-term economic opportunities, primary 

education, and shelter. State-funded activities of the World Food Program 

and the Pan American Health Organization focused on areas of capacitybuilding to improve health care delivery to displaced persons and 

supplementary feeding programs for women and children. Figure 11 shows 

Colombian women engaged in an income generation project.

Figure 11: An Internally Displaced Persons Community Outside of Bogota, 

Colombia, 2001 

Note: Women manufacturing low-cost clothing items sold in retail stores and local markets in 

Colombia.

Source: GAO.
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 46 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Sudan Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been at war nearly 

its entire independent existence. The conflict started just before 

independence in 1955, when the ruling north refused to share power with 

the south. This phase of the conflict, which lasted 17 years and claimed 

several hundreds of thousands of lives, ended in 1972 with the signing of a 

peace agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, fighting resumed in 

1983 when southern black troops in the national army created the 

Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and demanded a change of government 

in the capital, Khartoum, and a fair share of the resources for all regions in 

the country. In addition to the conflict between the regular army and the 

Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, fighting has raged between various 

militias allied with these two parties. 

The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 2 million 

persons, and the internal displacement of several million more has 

continued into its 18th year. There has been no significant progress toward 

peace in years and Department of State officials believe the current 

situation is likely to go on indefinitely. Neither side appears to have the 

ability to win the war militarily, although oil revenues have allowed the 

government to invest increasingly in military hardware. Presently, the 

government controls virtually all of the northern two-thirds of the country 

but is limited to garrison towns in the south.

The drive for oil and territorial control over newly operational oil fields is 

now central to the conflict that has long been rooted in racial, cultural, 

religious, and political differences. Government forces have pursued a 

scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around a newly 

built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities. These forces have 

killed and injured civilians, destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in 

order to create an unoccupied security zone, according to Department of 

State reporting. The government has also blocked or harassed 

humanitarian relief operations. 

The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army has been guilty of property theft 

from nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies operating in the 

south, according to the Department of State. Militia factions have 

manipulated humanitarian aid programs to gain food for their troops and 

have conscripted new soldiers from camps housing refugees and internally 

displaced persons. The militias are also guilty of committing serious 

human rights abuses. According to Amnesty International, militia forces 

frequently change sides depending on their perceived interests or the 
Appendix II

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and 

Sudan

Page 47 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

supply of arms. The government pursues a policy of providing support and 

weapons to the various militia commanders and encouraging interfactional 

fighting. It is estimated that more people have died as a result of 

interfactional fighting between militias than in armed encounters with 

government forces.

Since 1991, the United States has provided $1.2 billion in humanitarian 

assistance to Sudan. Because the government of Sudan is involved in gross 

human rights violations and support of international terrorism, the United 

States provides only humanitarian assistance in government-controlled 

areas but both development and humanitarian assistance in oppositioncontrolled areas. USAID programs provide emergency food and nonfood 

aid (blankets, kitchen items, and plastic sheeting) in areas of displacement 

and resettlement. With increased emergency needs related to the many 

active conflict zones and large simultaneous displacements, USAID is 

providing life-sustaining assistance to extremely vulnerable populations. 

Most assistance is provided through Operation Lifeline Sudan, which is a 

consortium of U.N. agencies and more than 40 international 

nongovernmental organizations. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. government 

provided an estimated $4 million in direct program assistance, in addition 

to U.S. contributions to the programs of international organizations, such 

as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Children’s 

Fund.
Page 48 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of 

State

Page 49 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of 

State

Page 50 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of 

State

Page 51 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of 

State

Page 52 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Department of 

State

Page 53 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Page 54 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix IV

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development ApendxiIV
Page 55 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Page 56 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix V

Comments From the United Nations ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments From the United Nations

Page 57 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Page 58 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix VI

Comments From the International Red Cross 

and Red Crescent Movement ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments From the International Red Cross 

and Red Crescent Movement

Page 59 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Appendix VI

Comments From the International Red Cross 

and Red Crescent Movement

Page 60 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs
Page 61 GAO-01-803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix VII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Harold Johnson (202) 512-3540

Tetsuo Miyabara (202) 512-8974

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Patrick Dickriede, Norman Thorpe, Jack 

Edwards, Ernie Jackson, Zina Merritt, and Rona Mendelsohn made key 

contributions to this report.

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