United States

Department

of Agriculture

www.ers.usda.gov

Electronic Outlook Report from the Economic Research Service

WRS-04-01

January 2004

Regulatory Barriers in

International Horticultural

Markets

Abstract

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures adopted by countries to protect plant or human

health can affect patterns of trade in horticultural products by increasing the costs of

imports or prohibiting them entirely. To prevent the protectionist use of such measures to

shield domestic producers from competition—rather than to avert genuine

hazards—countries participating in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations agreed to multilateral rules to govern their use. These rules have lowered many unnecessary barriers

to horticultural trade, primarily through requirements that regulations be transparent and

based on science. To quantify the benefits of continued regulatory reform, further

research is needed to assess the trade and welfare effects of sanitary and phytosanitary

measures in horticulture markets.

Keywords: Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, horticulture, trade. 

Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the reviewers of this report: David Kelch, Daniel Pick,

Janet Perry, Joy Harwood, Larry Deaton, and John Love. Thanks also to Linda Hatcher,

our technical editor, and to Juanita Tibbs, our graphics designer.

Donna Roberts and Barry Krissoff
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures adopted by

countries to protect plant or human health can affect

patterns of trade in horticultural products by increasing

the costs of imports or prohibiting them entirely. Plant

health (phytosanitary) measures are generally more

trade restrictive than food safety (sanitary) measures

for this group of commodities. To reduce the risk of

introducing exotic plant diseases or pests, countries

frequently ban imports altogether or adopt import protocols that require substantial public and private

investments in the exporting country. For example, an

import protocol to decrease the likelihood of a destructive fruit fly entering the importing country could

require the government to conduct frequent field surveys and producers to build special packinghouses. In

contrast, food safety measures are more often in the

form of product or process standards that may increase

foreign producers' costs relative to domestic producers'

costs, but do not further restrict imports. Examples

include a maximum residue level for a pesticide (product standard) or the required use of filters for irrigation

water (process standard).

When SPS measures restrict imports, they insulate an

importing country's domestic market from the world

market. In these instances, domestic consumer and

producer prices rise relative to world market prices,

affording the domestic industry a measure of import

protection. During the last round of multilateral trade

negotiations, exporters voiced concerns that SPS measures were sometimes used to shield domestic industry

from foreign competition rather than from genuine

hazards, and that such protectionist pressures would

increase as other trade barriers, such as tariffs, were

reduced. Countries therefore adopted the Agreement

on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Measures (SPS Agreement) under the auspices of the

World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The SPS

Agreement provides a set of multilateral rules that

would recognize the legitimate need for countries to

adopt SPS regulations while establishing a framework

to reduce the regulations' trade-distorting aspects.

The SPS Agreement reiterates earlier commitments

under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT) and the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical

Barriers to Trade to apply technical restrictions only to

the extent necessary and to avoid unjustifiable discrimination among members where identical or similar

conditions prevail. Beyond these general requirements,

the SPS Agreement sets out more specific obligations.

These rules require countries to (1) provide notification through the WTO of proposed regulations that

affect trade (transparency); (2) use scientific risk

assessment to inform regulatory decisions (sciencebased risk management) while allowing national determination of the level of SPS protection (national sovereignty); (3) recognize that different measures can

achieve equivalent safety outcomes (equivalence); and

(4) allow imports from regions that are free or nearly

free of pests or diseases (regionalization). Adoption of

international standards (multilateral harmonization) is

encouraged, but not required. Dispute settlement is

available when WTO countries are unable to resolve

differences through bilateral negotiations. If countries

are unable to resolve differences in formal consultations, the first step of the WTO dispute-settlement

process, the exporting country may request a panel to

hear its complaint. Either party to the dispute may

appeal the panel's ruling to the WTO's Appellate Body.

2 Economic Research Service, USDA

Introduction
The evidence indicates that the SPS Agreement

spawned a broad-based "regulatory review" when it

came into effect in 1995, as major agricultural

importers and exporters began to assess whether they

and their trading partners were complying with the

new rules (Roberts, 1998). As a result of this review,

several measures restricting trade in fruits and vegetables were unilaterally revised following technical consultations. For example, Japan agreed to rescind its 46-

year-old ban on several varieties of tomatoes grown in

the United States based on scientific research indicating that the tomatoes were not afflicted with tobacco

blue mold disease (USDA). New Zealand authorities

officially recognized the equivalence of hot forced air

treatments to treatment with a prohibited fumigant,

thereby allowing several South Pacific countries to

resume exporting mangos, papaya, and eggplant to

their market (WTOb). Chile's decision to allow

imports of fresh melons and watermelons from all production areas in the United States except Hawaii provides an example of the trade effect of the regionalization approach to mitigating pest risks (WTOa).

In many cases, a change in an SPS import regime was

attributable to more than one provision of the SPS

Agreement. For example, the United States agreed to

lift a longstanding ban on Mexican avocados following

a risk assessment indicating that produce imported

from specified regions and subject to a series of other

quarantine measures would pose negligible phytosanitary risks to U.S. production areas (Roberts, 1997).

More systematic information about member countries'

regulations is now available because the SPS

Agreement requires notification of regulatory changes

affecting trade to the WTO. Fewer than one-fourth of

WTO member countries (34 of 141) notified the WTO

of changes in horticultural SPS measures between

1995 and 2000, but these countries included some of

the largest importers and exporters of fruits and vegetables, including the United States, the European

Union, Mexico, and Chile. Over these 6 years, 291 (of

nearly 1,800) SPS notifications were related to trade in

horticultural products. More than 90 percent of the

notifications indicated changes in measures affecting

fresh rather than processed products (table 1).

Slightly more than half of the horticultural notifications cited "food safety" as the objective of the

changes, with the United States and Canada accounting for most of the food safety-related measures.

Generally, these notifications proposed changes in the

maximum residue level (MRL or tolerance) for a particular pesticide, herbicide, or fungicide on individual

fruits and vegetables. In most cases, the U.S. notifications stated that regulators proposed to approve new

uses of existing inputs or the use of new inputs.

However, in some instances, the U.S. notifications

indicated that the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) was reviewing tolerances to comply with the

1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which

required the agency to re-examine the health effects of

residues. Of the remaining food safety notifications, 17

were related to measures to reduce microbial contamination in processed and dried products, 3 were related

to the use of additives in juices, and 2 proposed

approval for imports of food processed from potatoes

that had been altered using gene technology.

The trade effect of these regulatory changes is difficult

to ascertain. In most instances, the measure expanded,

rather than restricted, production technologies available to producers. However, one cannot therefore conclude that such measures increased imports because,

even if they permitted entry of products previously

excluded from the domestic market, they might also

improve the competitiveness of domestic producers

relative to foreign producers. Moreover, it is difficult

to know what the net effect of different regulations is

without further study. For example, even though the

United States may allow a greater number of pre- and

post-harvest treatments on produce, as of January

2002, it requires fruit and vegetable juices to be

processed using a Hazard Analysis and Critical

Control Points (HACCP) system to reduce microbial

contamination. Exporters in countries that do not

require HACCP for domestic production must either

invest in risk reduction technology to maintain access

to the U.S. market or divert their products to countries

without HACCP requirements. Only the latter option

may be viable for exporters in some developing countries currently lacking adequate laboratory, inspection,

and certification infrastructure. Without more detailed

information about the relative cost structure of domestic and foreign industries, it is difficult to determine

the net effect of food safety measures on horticultural

trade patterns or even to ascertain the qualitative

impact on the total volume of imports.

Economic Research Service, USDA 3

Implementation of the SPS Agreement
The notifications on plant health measures provide a

clearer picture of the SPS Agreement's impact on produce trade. To mitigate pest risks, regulators generally

use a bilateral "positive list" approach, excluding all

commodities from all sources except for individual

products from specific sources approved for import.

Notified changes in phytosanitary policies generally

indicate increased market access for a product from a

specific country or region under certain conditions.

There are exceptions. An importing country may temporarily suspend market access following a disease or

pest outbreak in an exporting country. Nonetheless,

most of the 128 notifications for phytosanitary measures for horticultural products between 1995 and 2000

expanded trade opportunities for exporters.

The number of phytosanitary notifications is likely a

conservative indicator of the Agreement's effects on

produce trade. Accomplishment reports from USDA's

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

cite regulatory changes in 49 instances that increased

market access for U.S. produce during 1996-99. The

WTO was not notified about many of these changes.

For example, when Japan lifted its aforementioned ban

on several varieties of tomatoes from California and

Florida in 1999, it did not notify to the WTO. Since

then, U.S. tomato exports to Japan have steadily

increased, expanding in value from under $10, 000 in

1993 to over $4 million in 2000, mostly to the foodservice sector.

There appear to be two reasons for the underreporting

of trade-expanding changes in phytosanitary policies.

First, some countries have interpreted the mandate to

notify the WTO of all SPS measures affecting trade as

an obligation to notify only those that restrict trade.

Second, many countries consider it unnecessary to

notify the WTO of a regulation that affects the exports

of only one trading partner who already knows of the

measure through official bilateral channels. Members

are more likely to notify the WTO when measures

resolve prominent disagreements or signal a broad

shift in phytosanitary policy.

4 Economic Research Service, USDA

Table 1—Regulatory objective of measures notified to WTO, by product 

Fresh Processed Fresh and processed Total

Fruit Vegetables Both Fruit Vegetables Both Fruit Vegetable Both

Number of SPS Notifications

Food safety 37 40 60 10 5 4 2 1 4 163

Plant health 61 38 26 -- -- -- 2 -- 1 128

Total 98 78 86 10 5 4 4 1 5 291

-- = Not applicable.

Sources: WTO(a) and authors' calculations.
The SPS Agreement urges the widest possible harmonization of countries' SPS measures based on internationally recognized standards. The agreement identifies three organizations to promote this objective: the

Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for food

safety measures, the International Plant Protection

Convention (IPPC) for plant health measures, and the

International Office of Epizootics (OIE) for animal

health measures. The Agreement's endorsement of harmonization stems from repeated complaints by

exporters that complying with divergent SPS measures

substantially increases the transaction costs of trade,

particularly for fresh produce and animal products. 

The net benefits of harmonization to exporters will be

positive if the revenues from additional market access

exceed the costs of complying with the international

standard. These net benefits are usually considered

large compared with those of regionalization or equivalence, as the former usually permit greater economies

of scale in both production and certification.

Consumers may also benefit from harmonization if

eliminating regulatory heterogeneity among countries

lowers prices and expands product choice by allowing

more products into the domestic market.

Despite the potential advantages of harmonization, its

impact on horticultural trade appears to be constrained

by both the insufficient number and infrequent adoption of international standards, particularly Codex

standards. Between 1995 and 2000, more than 70 percent of the food safety notifications reported that no

international standards existed for the referenced

measures (table 2). The character of international standards as a public good has traditionally led to underinvestment in their creation. This underinvestment leads

not only to too few international standards, but to too

many outmoded standards, which may account, in

part, for the low adoption rate for those international

standards that do exist. Fewer than half (18 of 41) of

the fruit and vegetable notifications indicating that

Codex standards existed reported full or partial adoption of these standards.

The nature of international standards is also important

in assessing their impact on trade. Although more plant

health notifications than food safety notifications reported the existence and adoption of international standards,

one cannot conclude that IPPC's standards have necessarily expedited horticultural trade more than Codex

standards since the Agreement came into effect. Most of

the IPPC's resources have historically been allocated to

the development of metastandards—which identify

common approaches to risk identification, assessment,

and management—rather than to international standards

per se. In fact, the IPPC has not yet produced one commodity-specific standard, although some are under

development. Anticipated gains to exporters from international metastandards may be smaller than from international standards because, even if an importing country

has used the IPPC's endorsed methodology to determine

the pest status of an exporting country, for example, its

measures may vary from those of other importers.

International plant health standards have, therefore, contributed to the trading system by setting out scientific

approaches to regulation, not by establishing measures

that are the same across countries.

Economic Research Service, USDA 5

Impact of International Standards on International

Horticultural Markets

Table 2—Harmonization of measures regulating fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, 1995-2000

Adopted

international Did not Partially

Regulatory standard or adopt adopted International

goal less restrictive international international standard does Total

measure standard standard not exist Unknown1 notifications

Food safety 7 23 11 116 6 163

Plant health 40 1 2 77 8 128

Total 47 24 13 193 14 291

1The member did not respond to the question regarding adoption of an international standard, guideline, or recommendation.

Sources: WTO(a) and authors' calculations.
When technical exchanges between regulatory officials

in the importing and exporting countries reach an

impasse, a country may choose to raise the matter for

discussion in the WTO SPS Committee as an interim

step before pursuing its rights in the WTO's formal dispute settlement process. Countries registered 33 complaints related to SPS restrictions on horticultural products in the Committee during 1995-2002 (table 3). The

origin and number of the complaints in the first years

of the Agreement's implementation are starkly different

from those of more recent years. The United States and

the EC initiated the only 3 complaints made in 1995-

96, while developing countries in Asia, Latin America,

and Africa account for 11 of the 16 complaints that

were registered in 2001-2002. Most of the complaints

(20 of 33) target the measures of developed countries,

primarily the EC (8), Australia (4), and Japan (4). The

United States has brought more complaints (7) to the

SPS Committee than any other country.

The distribution of complaints across product categories is similar to the distribution of notifications

across product categories. The number of complaints

against measures regulating imports of fresh produce

(30) far outnumber those that reference processed products (2).1 Within the fresh produce category, complaints

against measures that regulate fruit imports (18) outnumber measures governing the entry of vegetables (6)

or both fruits and vegetables (6). However, the similarity between the distribution of notification and complaint data does not extend to the distribution of measures across regulatory objectives. Food safety measures

accounted for more than half of the notifications but

only 5 of the 33 complaints (or 15 percent), providing

evidence in support of the view that plant health measures are more significant impediments to trade in horticultural products than food safety measures. 

Since 1995, countries have reported the resolution or

partial resolution of six trade complaints raised in the

SPS Committee before these complaints advanced to

formal dispute settlement (table 3). Negotiated settlements increased access for exports of (1) New

Zealand fresh fruit to Indonesia; (2) Hungarian apples,

pears, and quinces to the Slovak Republic; (3) EC and

Polish potatoes to the Slovak Republic; (4) U.S. fruit

to Chile; (5) Argentine citrus to the EC; and (6) EC

potatoes to the Czech Republic.

Five cases related to horticultural products have

advanced to formal dispute settlement since 1995. The

United States was the complainant in the first three

cases. The U.S. complaint against Korea's import

clearance measures, which included fruit fumigation,

testing, and sorting requirements, was resolved at the

first stage of dispute proceedings, in bilateral consultations. The U.S. complaints against Japanese testing

regulations and Japanese quarantine regulations for

apples both advanced to WTO panels and the WTO

Appellate Body.

In the U.S.-Japan Testing dispute, the United States

challenged the scientific basis of compulsory testing of

treatment effectiveness on several horticultural products, primarily stone fruit and walnuts. Japan required

exporters to test whether methyl bromide treatments

effectively exterminated codling moths on each new

variety of fruit or nuts before allowing import. The

significant costs of the tests discouraged U.S.

exporters from marketing new hybrids in Japan. The

WTO concurred with U.S. arguments that the requirement of new data for each new plant variety was not

supported by science because there is no evidence that

the effect of fumigation varies with plant variety.

Hence, the WTO ruled that there was no scientific

basis for Japan's requirement and that Japan had not

fulfilled its obligation to base its SPS measures on a

risk assessment. It also ruled that the measures were

not transparent as Japan failed to meet the conditions

for publication set out in Annex B of the Agreement.

Japan's argument that the measure was temporary was

not accepted, as it had been in effect for 48 years.

Even if the measure had been accepted as temporary,

the WTO ruled that requiring exporters to supply data

did not fulfill an importer's obligation under the

Agreement to seek additional information to complete

a risk assessment. The Appellate Body issued its ruling

in the case in February 1999, and the parties to the dispute finally settled the case in August 2001. 

The U.S. brought its complaint against Japanese

requirements (chlorine dip, cold treatment, and

orchard inspections by Japanese phytosanitary authorities) for imported apples to a WTO panel for resolution in 2002. A WTO panel concurred with the United

6 Economic Research Service, USDA

Disputes Over SPS Measures

1Brazil's complaint against the EU's proposed MRLs for the pesticide dimenthoate references both fresh fruit and fruit juices.
States that these measures violated the SPS

Agreement, primarily because there was no scientific

basis for the requirements. The WTO Appellate Body

upheld the panel's findings in November 2003. Most

other countries accept the U.S. systems approach

(which includes good commercial production practices, grading and sorting, and visual inspection for

pests) as adequate for mitigating the risk of diseases

and pests affecting apples, such as fire blight and

codling moth. One risk assessment estimated that there

was a likelihood of one fire blight outbreak every

11,364 years under the U.S. protocol. If Japan were to

accept U.S. quarantine measures, Japanese apple

imports would increase by an estimated 22,000 to

88,000 metric tons, or as much as 14 percent of U.S.

apple exports, under different assumptions about

demand and supply elasticities (Calvin and Krissoff,

1998).

Economic Research Service, USDA 7
8 Economic Research Service, USDA

Table 3—Complaints in the WTO SPS Committee against measures regulating imports of fresh and processed

fruits and vegetables, 1995-2000

Issue first Status 

Respondent Complaint Raised by Supported by raised (if reported)

US Detention of cantaloupe due Mexico Nov. 2002

to salmonella contamination

EC MRLs for the pesticide Brazil Argentina, Uruguay, Nov. 2002

dimethoate on fruits and in Bolivia, Dominican

fruit juices Republic, Jamaica,

Mexico, and Cuba

Japan Required fumigation for New Zealand U.S., EC, Australia June 2002

non-quarantine pests on citrus 

and other fresh fruits and 

vegetables

Brazil Import requirements for seed EC Canada June 2002

potatoes

Venezuela Import requirements for Argentina Chile, United States, Mar. 2002

fresh potatoes, mushrooms, Canada

and tomatoes

China Import requirements for apples, Argentina Mar. 2002

pears and citrus

US Import conditions for clementines EC Mar. 2002

Cuba Restrictions on apples and pears Argentina Oct. 2001

EC Restrictions on apples and pears Argentina Oct. 2001

(Canary Islands)

EC MRLs for pesticides on fruits and, Cote d'Ivoire July 2001

vegetables, especially pineapples

EC MRL for the thiabendazole in Israel July 2001

fruit juices

EC Measures that severely restrict Egypt July 2001

imports of potatoes

Turkey Restrictions on banana imports Ecuador Mar. 2001 Resolved following

consultations under

formal dispute 

settlement procedures 

Australia Access of California table grapes United States ASEAN Mar. 2001

EC Sampling methods for aflatoxins Argentina Bolivia, India Mar. 2001

in dried fruits (as well as other

products)

Venezuela Venezuela's phytosanitary Argentina Mar. 2001

requirements for garlic and

potato imports

Indonesia Restrictions on importation of New Zealand Nov. 2000 Resolved

fresh fruit

Australia New temperature requirements EC Nov. 2000

for methyl bromide treatments for

fresh produce (as well as

other products)

Australia Import restrictions on durian Thailand EC, India, Philippines Nov. 2000

See notes at end of table.
Economic Research Service, USDA 9

Table 3—Complaints in the WTO SPS Committee against measures regulating imports of fresh and processed

fruits and vegetables, 1995-2000—Continued

Issue first Status (if 

Respondent Complaint Raised by Supported by raised reported)

Australia Restrictions on imports of Philippines, Brazil, EC, India, Mar. 2000 Panel established in 

tropical fresh fruit, ASEAN Korea, Malaysia, Aug. 2003

(including mangoes, Thailand, U.S.

bananas, and pineapples)

United States Imports of citrus fruit Argentina Nov. 1999

Japan Import measures to control United States Australia, Canada, Nov. 1998 Unresolved

non-quarantine pests ASEAN, Uruguay,

Chile, EC,

New Zealand

Slovak Republic Restrictions on imports of Hungary EC, Bulgaria Mar. 1998 Partially resolved

apples, pears, and quinces

Slovak Republic Import restrictions on potatoes EC, Poland Argentina, Chile, Mar. 1998 Resolved

Hungary

Brazil Import prohibition of Philippines Malaysia, Sri Lanka June 1998

dessicated coconut

Japan Plant quarantine regulations, United States New Zealand, Chile Mar. 1997 The WTO panel and

including fire blight measures Appellate Body ruled

for imported apples against Japan's

measures

Chile Restrictions on imports of fruit United States Mar. 1997 Partially resolved1

from areas designated as free

of fruit flies (anastrephaa 

fraterculus and ceratitus capitata)

EC New restrictive measures for imports Argentina Brazil, Chile, July 1997 Partially resolved

of citrus from third countries South Africa,

where citrus canker is present Uruguay

(because restrictions on intra-EC

movement of produce were 

liberalized)

EC Elimination of protected zones Uruguay Chile, Mar. 1997

within EC leading to more Mexico,

restrictive phytosanitary South Africa

requirements for citrus

Imports

Indonesia Fresh fruit and vegetables Australia, Mar. 1997

United States

Czech Republic Imports of potatoes EC Argentina Oct.1996 Resolved

Japan Requirements for testing each United States Oct. 1996 Negotiated 

variety of apples, cherries, solution in

and nectarines for efficacy Aug. 2001 following

of methyl bromide in eliminating panel and Appellate 

codling moth Body rulings against

Japan’s measures

Korea Import clearance procedures, United States Several delegations June 1995 Resolved following

including fruit fumigation, testing, consultations under

and sorting requirements formal dispute

settlement proceedings

1Chile now allows imports of U.S. raspberries; grapes, kiwis, avocados, and lemons from California; and apples and pears from Washington.

New measures that would allow imports of other U.S. fruits, including citrus from California and Arizona and apples and pears from Oregon, are

under consideration.

Sources: WTO(b) and WTO(c).
An assessment of the SPS Agreement's impact on horticultural trade should first recognize what has not

occurred since the Agreement went into effect in

1995—-a flood of protectionist SPS measures supplanting traditional trade barriers as they are phased

out over time. The Agreement's intended deterrence of

regulatory protectionism, therefore, can be credited

with protecting the potential gains from trade liberalization that were negotiated during the Uruguay

Round. 

The SPS Agreement's requirements for science-based

SPS regulation, recognition of equivalence, and

regionalization have demonstrably increased export

opportunities for producers in some instances. The

SPS disciplines have not only increased market access

for countries that have internationally recognized

biosecurity regimes, but have also helped poorer countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, that rely on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange.

Quantitative estimates of the gains from trade for cases

of SPS regulatory reform are rare. But if the estimates

of the effects of changes in Japan's fire blight measures are indicative of potential gains, continuing modification of SPS policies will lead to sizable global benefits for both exporters and consumers, although

domestic producers will suffer losses. The early examples of regulatory reform will also likely have important multiplier effects over time, spurring additional

research on time/temperature regimes, seasonal variation in insect populations, and water treatments, which

will lead to further expansion in horticultural trade.

The impact of international standards on horticultural

trade since the Agreement came into effect appears to

be limited. One clear impediment to harmonization has

been the lack of relevant standards. The Codex

Commission has proposed to remedy this shortcoming

by increasing the frequency of its meetings, increasing

the number of working groups to address new issues,

and adopting a "fast track" approval procedure for

some standards. If adoption rates for the new standards

are high, the impact of harmonization on horticultural

trade will be greater than it has been in the past. Yet

such assessments must be moderated by the recognition that the most significant barriers to produce

trade—plant health regulations which stipulate multiple process standards to mitigate risks that vary by

destination as well as by source—are generally less

amenable to harmonization than food safety measures

such as MRLs for pesticides and additives.

The procedural obligations of notification and dispute

settlement have clearly reduced the degrees of freedom

for the disingenuous use of SPS measures to restrict

imports in response to pressure by interest groups. The

contribution of these obligations to the integrity of

world horticultural markets should not be underestimated. The requirements for transparency of regulatory

regimes have made it easier to identify and track contentious regulations, the discussion among trading partners in the SPS Committee pressures countries to

weigh the benefits and costs of regulation more carefully than they otherwise would, and the demonstration

effect of dispute rulings engenders reform of other regulations.

Scientific developments, new technologies, and evolving consumer preferences will continue to push SPS

measures to the center of the trade policy debate. To

inform this debate, more research is needed to quantify

the trade and welfare effects of alternative SPS measures in horticultural markets. Progress on this research

agenda lags far behind similar efforts to assess the

impacts of traditional trade barriers. But if the SPS

Agreement is to fulfill its potential in serving the goal

of welfare enhancement through trade, this research

challenge must be met.

10 Economic Research Service, USDA

Conclusions
Calvin, L., and B. Krissoff (1998). "Technical Barriers

to Trade: A Case Study of Phytosantary Barriers

and U.S.-Japanese Apple Trade," Journal of

Agricultural Resource Economics, 23(2): 351-366.

Roberts, D. (1997). "USDA to Lift Import Ban on

Mexican Avocados," Agricultural Outlook, July: 17-

21.

Roberts, D. (1998). "Preliminary Assessment of the

Effects of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Trade Regulations," Journal of

International Economic Law, 1 (3): 377-405.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service. "SPS Accomplishment

Reports," various issues, 1997-2000.

WTO(a). "Notifications," Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Committee, G/SPS/N series at http://www.wto.org 

WTO(b). "Summary of the Meeting," Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Committee, G/SPS/R series on WTO

website at http://www.wto.org 

WTO(c). "Specific Trade Concerns," Note by the

Secretariat, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee,

G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.2, Feb. 15, 2002 on WTO

website at http://www.wto.org

Economic Research Service, USDA 11

References