What Does 

Disarmament Look Like?

THE WHITE HOUSE

JANUARY 2003 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 1 

WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE?

INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 2002, President Bush called on the United Nations to live up to its 

founding purpose and enforce the determination of the international community – 

expressed in 16 UN Security Council resolutions – that the outlaw Iraqi regime be 

disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. 

On November 8, the Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1441, which gave 

the Iraqi regime “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” (OP 

2). Recognizing that genuine disarmament can only be accomplished through the 

willing cooperation of the Iraqi regime, the resolution called for the reintroduction of 

weapons inspectors into Iraq, to test whether or not the regime had made a strategic 

decision to give up its mass destruction weapons. 

The world knows what successful cooperative disarmament looks like. When a country 

decides to disarm, and to provide to the world verifiable evidence that it has disarmed, 

there are three common elements to its behavior: 

• The decision to disarm is made at the highest political level; 

• The regime puts in place national initiatives to dismantle weapons and 

infrastructure; and 

• The regime fully cooperates with international efforts to implement and verify 

disarmament; its behavior is transparent, not secretive. 

EXAMPLES OF COOPERATIVE DISARMAMENT

In recent years, there have been several notable examples of countries that have chosen 

to give up mass destruction weapons, and willingly cooperated with the international 

community to verify its disarmament. These countries include: 

• South Africa 

• Ukraine 

• Kazakhstan 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 2 

HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL COMMITMENT

President de Klerk decided in 1989 to end South Africa’s nuclear weapons production 

and in 1990 to dismantle all weapons. South Africa joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) in 1991 and later that year accepted full scope International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

Under the leadership of President Kravchuk and President Nazarbayev, Ukraine and 

Kazakhstan, respectively, ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation and START Treaties. 

This created high-level political commitments to give up the nuclear weapons and 

strategic delivery vehicles they inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

NATIONAL INITIATIVES TO DISMANTLE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan each charged high-level organizations with 

implementing disarmament. In South Africa it was the Atomic Energy Commission 

and ARMSCOR. In Kazakhstan it was primarily the Ministries of Defense and Atomic 

Energy. In Ukraine it was mainly the Ministry of Defense. Each of these organizations 

worked cooperatively with outside organizations - for example, the IAEA in South 

Africa and the United States and Russia in Ukraine and Kazakhstan - to implement 

disarmament. 

FULL COOPERATION AND TRANSPARENCY

The true measure of cooperation is to answer questions without being asked. In each of 

these examples, weapons programs were disclosed fully and voluntarily. 

South Africa began its disclosure with a declaration to the IAEA on its nuclear program, 

which was expanded over time. South Africa allowed the IAEA complete access to 

operating and defunct facilities, provided thousands of current and historical 

documents, and allowed detailed, unfettered discussions with personnel involved in 

the South African program. 

An IAEA article from 1994 sums up the cooperative South African approach to nuclear 

disarmament and IAEA verification: 

“In the case of South Africa, the results of extensive inspection and assessment, and 

the transparency and openness shown, have led to the conclusion that there were no 

indications to suggest that the initial inventory is incomplete or that the nuclear 

weapon programme was not completely terminated and dismantled. However, in 

the future, and without prejudice to the IAEA’s rights under the safeguards 

agreement, the IAEA plans to take up the standing invitation of the South African 

Government -- under its reiterated policy of transparency -- to provide the IAEA 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 3 

with full access to any location or facility associated with the former nuclear 

weapons program and to grant access, on a case-by-case basis, to other locations or 

facilities that the IAEA may specifically wish to visit.” 

Given the full cooperation of both governments, implementation of the disarmament 

decision was smooth. All nuclear warheads were returned to Russia by 1996, and all 

missile silos and heavy bombers were destroyed before the December 2001 START 

deadline. The United States had full access, beyond Treaty requirements, to confirm 

silo and bomber destruction, which were done with U.S. assistance. 

Both countries have also gone farther in disarmament than the NPT and START Treaty 

require. For example, Kazakhstan no longer has strategic missiles and Ukraine is well 

on the way to giving up its strategic missiles. Ukraine asked for U.S. assistance to 

destroy its Backfire bombers and also air-launched cruise missiles. 

In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan revealed to us a stockpile of more than 500 kg. of HEU, 

and asked that we remove it to safety in the United States. It has also shut down its 

plutonium-producing reactor and is using U.S. assistance to ensure the long-term safe 

storage of the spent fuel. Finally, Kazakhstan used U.S. assistance to destroy all nuclear 

test tunnels and bore holes -- a total of almost 200 -- at the former Soviet test site there. 

IRAQI NON-COOPERATION

The behavior of the Iraqi regime contrasts sharply with successful disarmament 

examples. 

Instead of high-level commitment to disarm, highly organized concealment efforts, 

staffed by thousands of Iraqis, are led from the very top of the Iraqi regime. 

• Iraq’s concealment activities are run by the Special Security Organization (SSO), 

under the control of Qusay Saddam Hussein, Saddam Hussein’s son. 

Instead of charging organizations to work with outside groups to disarm, the regime 

tasks key institutions with thwarting the inspectors. 

• The National Monitoring Directorate -- whose stated function is to facilitate 

inspections -- actually serves as an “anti-inspections” organization that: 

o Provides tip-offs to inspection sites; and 

o Uses “minders” to intimidate witnesses. 

 The minders are often former engineers and scientists with direct 

WMD experience, and first-hand knowledge of what needs to be 

protected from the inspectors when they arrive at a facility. 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 4 

• Thousands of personnel from Iraqi security agencies provide manpower for 

hiding documents and materiel from inspectors, policing inspection sites, and 

monitoring the inspectors’ activities. 

o Such organizations include the Military Industrialization Organization, 

the SSO, the Special Division for Baghdad Security, the Iraqi Intelligence 

Service (IIS), the Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, and 

the Directorate of General Security. 

o These “anti-inspectors” vastly outnumber the 200 UNMOVIC and the 

IAEA personnel on the ground in Iraq. 

Instead of cooperation and transparency Iraq has chosen to conceal and to lie. 

• Iraq’s declaration is not “currently accurate, full, and complete.” It is inaccurate 

and incomplete. 

o Anthrax and Other Undeclared Biological Agents

 The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably 

account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. This is 

enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax -- 3 times the amount 

Iraq declared; 1200 liters of botulinum toxin; and, 2200 liters of 

aflatoxin, a carcinogen. 

o Ballistic Missiles

 Iraq has declared its attempt to manufacture missile fuels suited 

only to a type of missile which Iraq’s declaration does not admit to 

developing. 

 Iraq claims that its designs for a larger diameter missile fall within 

the UN-mandated 150km limit. But Dr. Blix has cited 13 recent 

Iraqi missile tests which exceed the 150km limit. 

o Nuclear Weapons 

 The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad. 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 5 

o VX 

 In 1999, UN Special Commission and international experts 

concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible 

information about VX production. UNSCOM concluded that Iraq 

had not accounted for 1.5 tons of VX, a powerful nerve agent. 

Former UNSCOM head Richard Butler wrote that “a missile 

warhead of the type Iraq has made and used can hold some 140 

liters of VX . . . A single such warhead would contain enough of the 

chemical to kill up to 1 million people.” 

 The declaration provides no information to address these concerns. 

o Chemical and Biological Weapons Munitions 

 In January 1999, the UN Special Commission reported that Iraq 

failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled 

artillery shells and 400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had 

been lost or destroyed. 

 The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, 

possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors. 

o Empty Chemical Munitions 

 There is no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty munitions 

that could be filled with chemical agents. 

• If one of those shells were filled with the nerve agent Sarin, 

which Iraq is known to have produced, it would contain 

over 40,000 lethal doses. 

o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs 

 Iraq denies any connection between UAV programs and chemical 

or biological agent dispersal. Yet, Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was intended to carry a 

biological weapon spray system. 

 Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into bombs 

and how to disperse biological agent using aircraft or unmanned 

aerial vehicles. 

o Mobile Biological Weapons Agent Facilities 

 The Iraqi declaration provides no information about its mobile 

biological weapon agent facilities. 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 6 

• Iraq continues its tactics of “cheat and retreat” that defeated prior inspections 

efforts, and Iraq continues its efforts to hide prohibited WMD programs. 

o This fall, satellite photos revealed activity at several suspected WMD 

facilities, apparently in anticipation of the resumption of inspections. 

o We have multiple reports of the intensified efforts to hide documents in 

spaces considered unlikely to be found, such as private homes of low level 

officials and universities. On January 16, 2003, a joint UNMOVIC/IAEA 

team found a significant cache of documents related to Iraq’s uranium 

enrichment program in the home of Iraqi scientist Faleh Hassan. 

o We have many reports of WMD material being buried, concealed in lakes, 

relocated to agricultural areas and private homes, or hidden beneath 

Mosques or hospitals. In one report such material was buried in the banks 

of the Tigris river during a low water period. Furthermore, according to 

these reports, the material is moved constantly, making it difficult to trace 

or to find without absolutely fresh intelligence. 

• The regime routinely conducts well-organized surveillance of inspectors. 

o The SSO tracks the number, expertise, equipment, vehicles, location, and 

heading of inspectors. 

o Iraq has in the past used, and is likely again to use, cyber attack methods 

in its efforts to collect intelligence. 

 Computer systems used to store, process, or communicate 

UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection schedules, methods, criteria, or 

findings will be particularly high-value targets. 

 At a minimum, Iraq can apply tools and methods readily available 

from publicly accessible Internet sources, many of which are quite 

effective and require only moderate skill to implement. 

 According to Iraqi defector Dr. Khidhir Hamza, Iraq’s Babylon 

Software Company was developing cyber warfare capabilities on 

behalf of the Iraqi Intelligence Service as early as the 1990s. People 

assigned to Babylon initially worked on information security 

technologies and techniques, but some of the programmers were 

segregated into a “highly compartmented unit” and tasked with 

breaking into foreign computers in order to download sensitive 

data or infect the computers with viruses. Some of the 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 7 

programmers reported that they had accumulated enough 

expertise to break into moderately protected computer systems. 

o Yet the Iraqis accuse the inspectors of being spies – the gravest accusation 

that a totalitarian government can make. 

 In mid-January Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan said 

“We know they [the inspectors] are playing an intelligence role. 

The way they are conducting their inspections and the sites they 

are visiting have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction. 

But we are cooperating with inspection teams in a positive way in 

order to expose the lies of those who have bad intentions.” 

• Iraq has not provided “immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access 

to witnesses.” 

o Instead inspectors have been expected to interview Iraqis with minders 

under unsecure conditions. 

o The regime has resisted allowing interviews outside the country. 

• Iraq’s list of WMD scientists together with their associated work places and dates 

ends in 1991 although UNSCOM proved that the programs did not.

• Iraq refuses to provide key documents, some of which have been demanded by 

inspectors for years.

• Iraq has impeded the inspectors’ demand to begin aerial surveillance. 
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WHAT DOES DISARMAMENT LOOK LIKE? 8 

CONCLUSION

Iraq’s behavior contrasts sharply with successful disarmament stories. 

Instead of a high-level commitment to disarm, Iraq’s concealment efforts are led by 

Saddam’s son Qusay. The inspectors are labeled spies and treated as the enemy, not as 

a partner in disarmament. 

Instead of national initiatives to disarm, Iraq’s SSO and National Monitoring 

Directorate are national programs involving thousands of people to target inspectors 

and thwart their duties. 

Instead of cooperation and transparency, Iraq has chosen concealment and deceit best 

exemplified by a 12,000 page declaration which is far from “currently accurate, full, and 

complete,” as required by the United Nations Security Council.