United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Committee on the Budget,

House of Representatives

January 1998 BUDGET ISSUES

Budget Enforcement

Compliance Report

GAO/AIMD-98-57

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-278615 

January 23, 1998

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman

Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we assess compliance by the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget

Office (CBO) with the requirements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency

Deficit Control Act of 1985, more commonly known as

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH), as amended. The Budget Enforcement Act

of 1997 (BEA-97)1

 extended GRH budget enforcement provisions through

fiscal year 2002 and made other technical changes. Our assessment covers

OMB and CBO reports issued on legislation enacted during the 1st session of

the 105th Congress, which ended on November 13, 1997.

To assess compliance with GRH, we reviewed OMB and CBO reports issued

under the act to determine if they complied with all of the act’s

requirements. To accomplish this, we reviewed the OMB and CBO preview,

update, and final Sequestration reports to determine if they reflected all of

the technical requirements specified in GRH, such as (1) estimates of the

discretionary spending limits, (2) explanations of any adjustments to the

limits, (3) estimates of the amount of net deficit increase or decrease, and

(4) the sequestration percentages necessary to achieve the required

reduction in the event of a sequester. We interviewed OMB and CBO officials

to obtain explanations for differences between reports. We also reviewed

OMB and CBO estimates for the 78 provisions in appropriations laws that the

President had cancelled using his line item veto authority before OMB

issued its final sequester report.

Our work was conducted in Washington, D.C., from July 1997 through

December 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards. Background information on the budget enforcement

process, including the scorekeeping process when the line item veto act is

used and the various reports required by the act, and details concerning

our scope and methodology are discussed in appendix I.

1

Title X of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Public Law 105-33.

Page 1 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
B-278615 

Overall, we found that CBO and OMB substantially complied with the act. We

did find one compliance issue—discussed in detail in appendix II—related

to the late issuance of some of the required OMB reports. Although CBO met

its deadlines, OMB issued both its sequestration update report and a

number of its required scorekeeping reports later than the law requires.

GRH sets a specific timetable for issuance of OMB reports.2 By law, OMB must

issue sequestration reports at three specific times during the calendar

year: (1) when the President submits his budget, (2) on August 20, and

(3) 15 days after the end of a congressional session. Instead of issuing its

fiscal year 1998 sequestration update report on August 20 as required by

law, OMB issued it on September 5, 1997, as part of the mid-session review

on the fiscal year 1998 budget. This was 16 days later than the law

requires.

Also, as was the case for fiscal year 1997 compliance, OMB issued many of

its scorekeeping reports late. All its scorekeeping reports on individual

appropriation acts and many of its pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) scorekeeping

reports were issued later than the time specified in law. The law requires

that OMB issue scorekeeping reports on appropriation and PAYGO legislation

at specified times after enactment. During the period under review, BEA-97

lengthened the time frame for issuing reports, effective August 5, 1997,

from 5 calendar days to 7 working days.

Of the 34 scorekeeping reports OMB issued by the time it issued its final

sequester report on November 24, about 40 percent of the reports

(14) were late. The late reports included all 9 appropriation reports and 5

of the 25 PAYGO reports. Twenty-one PAYGO and 6 appropriations

scorekeeping reports were issued after OMB’s final sequester report.

Eighteen (67 percent) of them (including all 6 appropriations reports)

were issued late.

In our report on fiscal year 1997 BEA compliance,3

 we raised the issue of

late scorekeeping reports. In that review, we looked at 101 scorekeeping

reports that had been issued under the 5-day criterion. The average length

of time between enactment and scorekeeping report issuance was 7.5

calendar days, making the reports, on average, 2.5 days late. This year,

under the 7-day criterion, the 27 most recent scorekeeping reports issued

after OMB issued its final sequestration report have averaged 12.5 work

days between enactment and report issuance, making the reports, on

average, 5.5 work days late. Although OMB has been given additional time

2

CBO has similar reporting requirements.

3

Budget Issues: Budget Enforcement Compliance Report (GAO/AIMD-97-28, January 16, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
B-278615 

to prepare scorekeeping reports, the reports have been later than before

the law was changed.

In addition to this compliance issue, we also found some implementation

issues related to OMB and CBO differences in (1) scorekeeping for the open

season for switching to the Federal Employees’ Retirement System,

(2) cap adjustments, (3) appropriations scoring, and (4) PAYGO estimates

for the airport and airway tax reinstatement. These issues are discussed in

appendix III.

We provided a draft of this report to OMB and CBO officials for their review.

OMB officials declined to provide comments. CBO officials agreed with our

presentation of their views and the facts as presented. We have

incorporated their comments where appropriate.

Copies of this report are being provided to the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office,

the Ranking Minority Member of your Committee, and the Chairmen and

Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Budget Committee and the

Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Copies will be made

available to other interested parties on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-9142 if you or your staff have any questions.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Susan J. Irving

Associate Director, Budget Issues

Page 3 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Background and

Scope and

Methodology

6

Appendix II 

Compliance Issue

13

Appendix III 

Implementation

Issues

16

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

26

Tables Table I.1: Sequestration Reports and Due Dates 7

Table III.1: OMB Estimates of Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations

Compared to Discretionary Caps

21

Abbreviations

BEA Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

BEA-97 Budget Enforcement Act of 1997

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CSRS Civil Service Retirement System

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERS Federal Employees’ Retirement System

GRH Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development

IMF International Monetary Fund

NTEU National Treasury Employees Union

OBRA 93 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PAYGO pay-as-you-go

Page 4 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Page 5 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

Background The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (GRH), as

amended by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) and the Omnibus

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93), established statutory limits

on federal government spending for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 by

creating

• annual adjustable dollar limits (spending caps) on discretionary spending

funded through the regular appropriations process,

• a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)1 requirement for direct spending2 and receipts

legislation, and

• a sequestration3 procedure to be triggered if (1) aggregate discretionary

appropriations enacted for a fiscal year exceed the fiscal year’s

discretionary spending caps or (2) aggregate PAYGO legislation is estimated

to increase the combined current and budget year deficits.

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (BEA-97)4

 extended these budget

enforcement provisions through fiscal year 2002 and made several other

technical and conforming changes to GRH. Changes relevant to this

compliance report are reflected in this appendix.

To track progress against the budget enforcement requirements and to

implement any needed sequestration, GRH requires CBO and OMB to score

(estimate) the budgetary effects of each appropriation action and each

piece of PAYGO legislation. As soon as practicable after the Congress

completes action on any appropriation involving discretionary spending,

CBO is required to report to OMB the estimated amount of new budget

authority and outlays provided by the legislation. Within 7 working days

after an appropriation is enacted,5 OMB must report its estimates for these

amounts, using the same economic and technical assumptions underlying

the most recent budget submission. It must also include the CBO estimates

and explain any differences between the two sets of estimates. If there are

significant differences between the OMB and CBO estimates, OMB is required

1

BEA requires that any new legislation that increases direct spending or decreases receipts be deficit

neutral (that is, not increase the deficit). Such legislation is often referred to as PAYGO legislation.

2

Direct spending (commonly referred to as mandatory spending) means entitlement authority, the food

stamp program, and any budget authority provided by law other than in appropriation acts.

3

Sequestration is the cancellation of budgetary resources.

4

BEA-97 is title X of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33), signed into law on August 5,

1997.

5

Prior to the enactment of BEA-97 in August 1997, OMB was required to issue a scorekeeping report

within 5 calendar days of enactment of an appropriation.

Page 6 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

to consult with the budget committees prior to issuing its scoring report.6

OMB and CBO have similar requirements for reporting their estimates for

any direct spending or receipts legislation.

GRH also requires CBO and OMB to submit a series of three sequestration

reports at specified times during each year as shown in table I.1. Each CBO

and OMB report must include a discretionary sequestration report that

tracks progress against the discretionary spending caps and a PAYGO

sequestration report that displays the net deficit decrease or increase for

enacted PAYGO legislation. Because OMB’s reports are controlling for

purposes of sequestration, CBO adjusts its reports to the OMB estimates in

its most recent sequestration report as a starting point for each of its

reports.

Table I.1:sequestration Reports and

Due Dates Due date

Report CBO OMB

Preview report 5 days before President’s

budget submission

President’s budget

submission

Update report August 15 August 20

Final report 10 days after end of

congressional session

15 days after end of

congressional session

Discretionary Spending

Limits

Annual discretionary spending limits for budget authority and outlays are

set forth in GRH. BEA-97 established three separate categories of

discretionary spending for 1998 and 1999: defense, non-defense excluding

violent crime reduction spending, and violent crime reduction spending.

For the year 2000, the law sets two categories—violent crime reduction

spending and all other discretionary spending—and for 2001 and 2002, a

single category.

The law provides that certain adjustments be made to the discretionary

limits when appropriate. The limits may be adjusted for changes in

concepts and definitions, emergency appropriations, funding for

continuing disability reviews, allowances for International Monetary Fund

(IMF) increases, allowances for international arrearages funding, the

earned income tax credit compliance initiative, and a special outlay

allowance to cover technical scoring differences between OMB and CBO.

7

 In

6

This requirement was added by BEA-97.

7

Prior to BEA-97, an adjustment for inflation was permitted. Both OMB and CBO preview reports issued

prior to the enactment of BEA-97 contained adjustments for inflation. Also, BEA-97 added the adjustments

for IMF increases, international arrearages, and EITC compliance.

Page 7 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

addition to adjustments to the limits set forth in BEA-97, the Line Item Veto

Act of 1996, as discussed later in this appendix, requires adjustments to

the discretionary limits for budget authority cancelled by the President

that is not enacted into law as a disapproval bill.8

 The spending limits are

enforced by sequestration should appropriations exceed the limits.

According to both CBO and OMB, no sequestration of discretionary funding

was required for fiscal year 1998.

In addition, for a fiscal year in progress, if an appropriation that is enacted

between end-of-session adjournment and July 1 of that fiscal year causes

any of the spending limits for the year in progress to be exceeded, CBO and

OMB must issue within-session sequestration reports 10 and 15 days,

respectively, after enactment. On the same day as the OMB report, the

President must issue an order implementing any sequestrations set forth in

the OMB report. This year no within-session sequestration reports were

required.

Pay-As-You-Go

Enforcement

PAYGO enforcement covers all direct spending and receipts legislation. CBO

and OMB maintain a “scorecard” showing the cumulative deficit effect of

PAYGO legislation to track progress against the PAYGO requirements. If, at

the end of a congressional session, cumulative legislated changes enacted

in direct spending and receipts increase the deficit for the budget year, a

sequester of non-exempt direct spending programs is required to offset the

increase. Prior to enactment of BEA-97, net savings in either the current or

budget year could be used to offset increases in the next year. The

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (Public Law

104-208) required that the PAYGO scorecard balance for fiscal year 1997 be

changed to zero on the day following OMB’s final sequestration report for

fiscal year 1997. This had the effect of requiring any increases in the deficit

that result from legislation enacted in the 1st session of the 105th Congress

to be offset within that session by either legislation reducing the deficit or

sequestration. BEA-97 sets the current year scorecard balance to zero at the

end of each session of the Congress each year through fiscal year 2002,

which prevents any net savings achieved by legislation enacted during one

session from being used to offset deficit-increasing legislation enacted in

the future.

BEA-97 extended PAYGO discipline to legislation enacted through fiscal year

2002. The PAYGO scorecard must take into account the effects in the

8

A disapproval bill is a bill or joint resolution that only disapproves one or more cancellations of dollar

amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending, or limited tax benefits in a

special message transmitted by the President.

Page 8 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

current year, budget year, and the following 4 years. Therefore, the effects

of PAYGO legislation enacted through fiscal year 2002 could result in the

cancellation of budgetary resources through fiscal year 2006.

In their final sequestration reports, both OMB and CBO calculate the net

change in the deficit due to PAYGO legislation. However, the OMB report is

the sole basis for determining whether any end-of-session sequestration is

required. If OMB determines that sequestration is required, the President

must issue an order implementing it. For fiscal year 1998, neither CBO’s

report, issued November 21, 1997, nor OMB’s report, issued November 24,

1997, called for a sequester.

Line Item Veto Act and

BEA

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-130) directly affects the

discretionary spending caps and scorekeeping reports issued by OMB. The

act authorizes the President to cancel discretionary budget authority, new

items of direct spending, and limited tax benefits with specified

characteristics that are in a bill signed into law.

The President must notify the Congress of any such cancellations within 5

calendar days (excluding Sundays) after enactment of a law to which the

cancellation applies. Items vetoed must be transmitted to the Congress in

a special message setting forth specified information which includes,

among other things, budgetary effects and adjustments to the

discretionary spending limits. The cancellations are effective on the date

the special message is received in the House and Senate.

Under the expedited disapproval procedures provided in the Line Item

Veto Act, the Congress has 30 calendar days of session in which to pass a

disapproval bill. If a disapproval bill overturning the President’s

cancellations is passed in both houses, it is sent to the President for his

signature. The President may veto the disapproval bill under his

constitutional authority to veto laws; a two-thirds vote in both the House

and the Senate would be required to override the veto. Under the Line

Item Veto Act procedures, if the disapproval bill is enacted into law, it

voids the cancellations disapproved and the original provisions of law are

effective as of the original date provided in the law to which the

cancellation applied. If the Congress adjourns at the end of a Congress

prior to the expiration of the 30-day period of consideration and a

disapproval bill is then pending, a disapproval bill for the same special

message may be introduced within the first 5 calendar days of session of

the next Congress.

Page 9 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

For discretionary budget authority and each item of new direct spending

cancelled from an appropriation law, the law requires that the reduction in

budget authority and outlays be reflected in the estimates in OMB’s

scorekeeping reports and that the discretionary spending limits for budget

authority and outlays be reduced by amounts reported in the scorekeeping

reports. “As soon as practicable” after the President makes a cancellation,

CBO is required to provide the budget committees of the House and Senate

with an estimate of the reduction in budget authority and outlays. Ten

calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the expiration of the 30-day

period set for consideration of a disapproval bill, the spending limits are

adjusted; these adjusted limits are included in the next sequester report.

For new direct spending or limited tax benefit cancellations, the law

directs OMB to include an estimate of the deficit decrease as a separate

entry in its PAYGO scorekeeping reports. However, the law specifies that

OMB shall not include any change in the deficit resulting from a

cancellation in its sequestration reports.

At the time that OMB issued its final sequester report, the President had

sent 78 special messages cancelling budget authority provided in 8 of the

11 appropriations acts he had signed.9

 The Congress had passed one

disapproval bill (H.R. 2631) to overturn cancellations related to the

Military Construction Appropriation Act; the President vetoed that

disapproval bill on November 13, 1997, the same day that the Congress

adjourned. There was no attempt to override the President’s veto.

BEA-97 Incorporated GAO

Recommendations and

Issues

BEA-97 made many technical and conforming changes, corrected certain

drafting errors in BEA, and brought the law up to date for various changes

enacted since 1990. Included in the changes are some that address issues

raised by GAO in previous BEA compliance reports. In several reports on

OMB and CBO compliance with BEA,

10 we reported on incomplete inflation

adjustments to the discretionary caps and the use of different bases for

computing inflation. BEA-97 resolved these problems by eliminating

inflation as an adjustment to the discretionary caps. In several other

9

On December 2, 1997, the President issued an additional special message cancelling budget authority

in the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998,

one of the two appropriations acts not signed at the time OMB issued its final sequester report on

November 24.

10Budget Issues: Compliance With the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (GAO/AFMD-93-38, November

23, 1992), Budget Issues: Compliance Report Required by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

(GAO/AIMD-94-66, January 10, 1994), Budget Issues: Compliance Report Required by the Budget

Enforcement Act of 1990 (GAO/AIMD-96-41, February 16, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

reports,11 we pointed out large differences in OMB and CBO estimates for

discretionary and PAYGO legislation. BEA-97 added a provision that now

requires OMB to consult with the budget committees when there are

significant differences between CBO and OMB estimates on legislation.

In our report on BEA compliance for fiscal year 1997,12 we reported on OMB

delays in issuing reports and its erroneous interpretation of baseline

construction in its scoring of the 1996 farm legislation. CBO also had raised

the baseline issue in its August 1996 sequestration update report on OMB’s

departure from longstanding scoring practices when it scored the farm

bill. In response to these problems, BEA-97 extended the time allotted to

OMB for issuance of scoring reports from 5 calendar days to 7 working

days. It also clarified baseline construction for expiring or recently expired

programs by requiring the use of the law most recently in effect in

determining the baseline.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine whether the OMB and CBO reports complied with the

requirements of GRH as amended by BEA and other legislation, we reviewed

the OMB and CBO preview, update, and final sequestration reports to

determine if they reflected all of the technical requirements specified in

GRH, such as (1) estimates of the discretionary spending limits,

(2) explanations of any adjustments to the limits, (3) estimates of the

amount of net deficit increase or decrease, and (4) the sequestration

percentages necessary to achieve the required reduction in the event of a

sequester.

We reviewed legislation dealing with budget enforcement, including GRH as

amended by BEA, OBRA 93, the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994, the Contract With America Advancement Act of

1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation

Act of 1996, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, and the

Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. We reviewed appropriations acts

enacted during the 1st session of the 105th Congress—1 for supplemental

emergency appropriations for fiscal year 1997, the 6 continuing

11Budget Issues: Compliance Report Required by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

(GAO/AFMD-92-43, February 14, 1992), Budget Issues: Compliance With the Budget Enforcement Act

of 1990 (GAO/AFMD-93-38, November 23, 1992), Budget Issues: Compliance Report Required by the

Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (GAO/AIMD-94-66, January 10, 1994), Budget Issues: Compliance

Report Required by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (GAO/AIMD-95-66, January 13, 1995), Budget

Issues: Compliance Report Required by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (GAO/AIMD-96-41,

February 16, 1996), Budget Issues: Budget Enforcement Compliance Report (GAO/AIMD-97-28,

January 16, 1997).

12Budget Issues: Budget Enforcement Compliance Report (GAO/AIMD-97-28, January 16, 1997).

Page 11 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix I 

Background and Scope and Methodology

appropriations measures, and the 13 regular appropriations enacted for

fiscal year 199813 and any applicable OMB and CBO scoring reports issued by

December 31, 1997. We also examined the OMB and CBO PAYGO scoring

reports for mandatory spending and receipts legislation. We compared

each OMB and CBO report and obtained explanations for differences of

$500 million or more in estimates for the PAYGO reports. For discretionary

spending, we compared OMB and CBO scoring reports and obtained

explanations for differences of $500 million or more in budget authority or

outlay estimates. We also examined OMB and CBO adjustments to the

discretionary spending limits for the preview, update, and final

sequestration reports. We also examined appropriation scoring reports for

patterns in reasons for differences between OMB and CBO, irrespective of

the dollar amounts. Finally, we reviewed OMB and CBO estimates of items

cancelled by the President under authority in the Line Item Veto Act of

1996. During the course of our work, we also interviewed OMB and CBO

officials.

13At the time OMB issued its final sequester report for fiscal year 1998 on November 24, 1997, covering

legislation enacted through November 21, two appropriations acts were not yet signed by the

President. He signed both bills (Commerce and Foreign Operations) on November 26, 1997, two days

after OMB issued its final sequestration report.

Page 12 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix II 

Compliance Issue

Some OMB Reports

Issued Late

Although CBO met its deadlines, OMB issued its sequestration update report

and a number of its required scorekeeping reports later than the law

requires. Because BEA-97 changed the timing requirements for scorekeeping

reports, two different timing requirements were effective for fiscal year

1998 legislation. Prior to August 5, 1997 (the effective date of BEA-97),

scorekeeping reports were due within 5 calendar days of enactment of

appropriations and PAYGO legislation. Last year, we reported that OMB

issued 72 scorekeeping reports late.1 Since August 5, 1997, the

scorekeeping reports have been due within 7 working days of enactment.

OMB Issued Late

Sequestration Update

Report

GRH sets a specific timetable for issuance of OMB reports.2 By law OMB must

issue sequestration reports at three specific times during the calendar

year: when the President submits his budget, on August 20, and 15 days

after the end of a congressional session. OMB did not issue its fiscal year

1998 sequestration update report on August 20 as required by law. Instead,

OMB issued its report on September 5, 1997, as part of the mid-session

review on the fiscal year 1998 budget.3

 This was 16 days later than required

by law.

In its letter transmitting the mid-session report, OMB said it delayed the

sequestration update report so that it might incorporate policy changes

called for by the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act, both of

which were signed into law by the President on August 5, 1997.

OMB Issued Late

Scorekeeping Reports

As was the case for fiscal year 1997 compliance, OMB issued many of its

reports for fiscal year 1998 later than the time specified in law. All of its

scorekeeping reports on individual appropriation acts and several of its

PAYGO scorekeeping reports were issued late. The law requires that OMB

issue scorekeeping reports on appropriation and PAYGO legislation at

specified times after enactment.4

 As noted above, during the period under

review, the time frame for issuing reports was lengthened by BEA-97. For

scorekeeping reports required to be issued by OMB prior to August 5, 1997,

section 251(a)(7) required the following:

1

Budget Issues: Budget Enforcement Compliance Report (GAO/AIMD-97-28, January 16, 1997).

2

CBO has similar reporting requirements.

3

Section 1106(a) of Title 31, United States Code, requires the President to issue before July 16 of each

year a supplemental summary of the budget (commonly known as the Mid-Session Review).

4

CBO is required to issue scorekeeping reports “as soon as practicable” after the Congress completes

action on any discretionary appropriation and any direct spending or receipts legislation.

Page 13 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix II 

Compliance Issue

“Within 5 calendar days after the enactment of any discretionary appropriation, OMB shall

transmit a report to the House of Representatives and to the Senate containing the CBO

estimate of that legislation, an OMB estimate of the amount of discretionary new budget

authority and outlays for the current year (if any) and the budget year provided by that

legislation, and an explanation of any difference between the two estimates.”

For direct spending or receipts legislation, section 252(d) contained a

requirement for reporting estimates of changes in outlays or receipts

resulting from that legislation within 5 days after the enactment of that

legislation.

Nine scorekeeping reports for both appropriations and PAYGO actions were

issued when the time frame was 5 days. Report issuance ranged from 5 to

11 days after enactment, with an average of 7.7 days. Seven of these 9

reports (78 percent) of the scoring reports were issued more than 5 days

after enactment. Both appropriations reports were issued 11 days after

enactment—i.e., 6 days late. The 5 PAYGO reports were an average of 2.4

days late.

BEA-97 changed the time allowed for OMB’s submission of scorekeeping

reports for appropriations and PAYGO legislation from 5 calendar days to 7

work days (calendar days excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal

holidays). Since enactment of the longer time frame to issue reports, the

results have been mixed. Our analysis of the 25 scorekeeping reports

issued under the new time frame criteria at the time OMB issued its final

sequester report showed that all 7 reports on appropriations were from 1

to 8 work days late and averaged 11 work days from enactment. In

contrast, all 18 PAYGO reports were issued on time and averaged 6.1 work

days from enactment.

At the time OMB issued its final sequester report on November 24 (which

covered legislation enacted through November 21), the President had not

yet signed two appropriations bills. In addition to those two

appropriations, OMB had not yet issued appropriation scorekeeping reports

for 4 other appropriations which had been enacted. OMB did, however,

include estimates for all appropriations actions for fiscal year 1998 in its

final sequester report.

Twenty-one PAYGO scorekeeping reports were issued after OMB’s final

sequester report. In contrast to those issued between August 5 and

November 21 (the cut-off date for OMB’s final sequester report), 12 PAYGO

scorekeeping reports (57 percent) issued after OMB’s final sequester report

Page 14 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix II 

Compliance Issue

were late. The late reports were from 1 to 3 work days late and averaged

9.1 work days from enactment to issuance of the scorekeeping report. In

its final sequester report, OMB did include preliminary estimates for bills

enacted or pending presidential signature for which OMB had not yet issued

a PAYGO report, but the estimates were not included in deficit calculations.

Those cost estimates will be included in deficit calculations reported in

OMB’s preview sequestration report issued in the President’s fiscal year

1999 budget submission.

Six appropriations scorekeeping reports were not issued until January 5,

1998. These reports were late an average of 21.8 work days. Issuance

ranged from 17 to 27 work days late.

In our report on fiscal year 1997 BEA compliance, we raised the issue of

late scorekeeping reports. In that review, we looked at 101 scorekeeping

reports that had been issued under the 5-day criteria. The average length

of time between enactment and scorekeeping report issuance was 7.5

calendar days, or 2.5 days late. This year, the 27 most recent scorekeeping

reports issued after OMB’s final sequestration report have averaged 12.6

work days between enactment and report issuance, making them an

average of 5.6 work days late. Although OMB has been given additional time

to prepare scorekeeping reports, the reports have been later than before

the law was changed.

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix III 

Implementation Issues

We identified several implementation issues in which OMB and CBO differed

in making (1) estimates of the open season for federal employees’

retirement, (2) adjustments to the discretionary spending limits,

(3) estimates of discretionary appropriations, and (4) an estimate of PAYGO

legislation.

Open Season for

Federal Employees’

Retirement System

The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for fiscal year

1998 (Public Law 105-61) included a provision to provide an open season

for federal employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System

(CSRS) to switch to the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS).

Differences between OMB and CBO in estimating the impact of this

provision affect both discretionary and PAYGO estimates. The primary

difference in discretionary estimates stems from very different OMB and

CBO assumptions on the number of employees who would switch from CSRS

to FERS. The difference in PAYGO is attributable to a disagreement over

whether revenue provisions in appropriations acts must be scored against

the PAYGO scorecard (CBO’s view) or may be scored as discretionary (OMB’s

view).

The Federal Employees’ Retirement System Open Enrollment Act of 1997

(section 642 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,

1998) provided that employees currently enrolled in CSRS could elect to

transfer from CSRS to FERS between July 1, 1998, and December 31, 1998.

The President signed the appropriation act on October 10, 1997, but on

October 16 elected to use his power under the Line Item Veto Act to cancel

the provision authorizing the transfer program.1

The President’s cancellation notice and accompanying press release

contained an estimate that a new open season would reduce revenues for

the CSRS trust fund by $8 million in fiscal year 1998 and $854 million over

the 1998-2002 period and result in additional costs to agencies of $1.3

billion in discretionary resources in future years to pay higher retirement

benefits.2

 The cancellation notice identified these estimated costs as

savings resulting from the line item veto. CBO estimated that a new open

season would reduce CSRS revenues by $4 million in fiscal year 1998 and

1

The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) filed a lawsuit challenging the President’s authority

to veto this provision. NTEU argued that employee contributions to the CSRS fund are not “dollar

amounts of discretionary budget authority” subject to cancellation under the Line Item Veto Act.

Pursuant to an agreement reached between NTEU and the Department of Justice, the court issued an

order which invalidated the veto and reinstated the provision for an open season to switch to FERS.

2

These increased agency costs estimated by OMB and CBO are subject to future appropriations which

are not scored until actually appropriated.

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix III 

Implementation Issues

$139 million from 1998 through 2002. CBO estimated the increase in agency

costs (excluding the Postal Service) to be $262 million. The President’s

recent decision to withdraw the cancellation means that the OMB estimates

represent estimated costs, not savings.

These different estimates result primarily from different assumptions

about how many workers would take advantage of the opportunity to

switch retirement plans. OMB made an assumption that the federal workers

who would switch would have at least 37 years of federal service—about

60,000 people or 5 percent of the eligible workforce. CBO, on the other

hand, estimated that about 11,500, or only 1 percent of eligible employees,

would switch to FERS if given the opportunity. CBO based its estimates on

the rates at which employees switched from CSRS to FERS in 1987 and its

assumption that today’s CSRS employees would switch at a lower rate than

in 1987. CBO officials testified that if CBO had used OMB’s assumption that

60,000 workers would switch plans, its estimate would have been similar

to OMB’s.

In addition to the differences noted above, CBO reported PAYGO costs due to

loss of on-budget revenues of $4 million in 1998, $151 million for the

period 1998-2002, and $312 million over the 1998-2007 period. OMB did not

consider the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act to be

subject to PAYGO so it did not score any PAYGO costs. These revenue losses

scored by CBO represent the loss of income tax revenue resulting from an

estimated increase in employees’ contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan

and the loss of on-budget revenue resulting from the switch of

6.2 percentage points of employees’ contributions from the Civil Service

trust fund to the off-budget social security trust fund.

Under GRH, both CBO and OMB count changes in direct spending caused by

provisions in appropriation acts as increases or decreases in discretionary

spending for purposes of determining compliance with the discretionary

caps. According to CBO, changes in revenues in appropriation acts are not

counted in determining compliance with discretionary caps but should be

recorded on the PAYGO scorecard. OMB did not consider the bill to be

subject to PAYGO and thus did not score any PAYGO costs. OMB did not

provide any further explanation for its scoring.

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
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Implementation Issues

OMB and CBO

Differed on

Adjustments to

Discretionary

Spending Limits

Adjustments to the spending limits for fiscal year 1998 are covered by two

sets of criteria: those in effect prior to enactment of BEA-97 and those set

forth in BEA-97. OMB and CBO preview sequestration reports were issued

under the pre-BEA-97 criteria and the update and final sequestration

reports were issued under BEA-97 criteria.

Section 251(b) of GRH, which is applicable to the preview sequestration

reports, required that spending limits be adjusted to account for

(1) changes in concepts and definitions, (2) changes in inflation,

(3) emergency appropriations, and (4) spending for continuing disability

reviews by the Social Security Administration in excess of certain

amounts. While both CBO and OMB are required to calculate how much the

spending limits should be adjusted, OMB’s adjustments control for the

purposes of budget enforcement, such as determining whether enacted

appropriations fall within the spending limits or whether a sequestration is

required to avoid a breach of them. CBO’s cap adjustment estimates are

advisory.

In the preview reports, both OMB and CBO made fiscal year 1998 cap

adjustments for changes in inflation and concepts and definitions. OMB and

CBO adjustments to the preview report caps differed by $6.4 billion in

budget authority and $1.5 billion in outlays. OMB lowered the general

purpose caps for 1998 by $577 million in budget authority, while CBO

lowered them by $7 billion. For outlays, OMB lowered the caps by

$2.6 billion and CBO by $4.1 billion.

CBO and OMB Differed in

Adjusting 1998

Discretionary Spending

Limits for Changes in

Inflation

Prior to enactment of BEA-97, discretionary spending limits were adjusted

to reflect changes in earlier inflation estimates. After enactment of BEA-97,

inflation is no longer an adjustment item. Both CBO and OMB preview

sequestration reports for fiscal year 1998 issued prior to the enactment of

BEA-97 contained downward inflation estimates for 1998. Thus both CBO and

OMB called for reducing the discretionary spending caps to reflect the

lower inflation forecasts. CBO estimated the 1998 inflation rate at

2.4 percent3

 while OMB estimated it at 2.6 percent.

Inflation adjustments were calculated using the cumulative inflation factor

of the current year divided by the cumulative inflation factor estimates

from OMB’s preview report for the prior year. Since CBO and OMB had

3

CBO’s preview report cited 2.6 percent inflation for 1998 but CBO officials advised us that this was a

typographical error. CBO’s calculations in its preview report correctly were based on the 2.4 percent

estimate which was the amount published in its January 1997 publication, The Economic and Budget

Outlook: Fiscal Years 1998-2007.

Page 18 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix III 

Implementation Issues

different estimates of inflation, the CBO and OMB preview reports had

different estimates of how much the 1998 caps needed to be adjusted. OMB

reduced the 1998 caps by $4.2 billion in budget authority and $2.5 billion in

outlays to reflect its updated, lower 1998 inflation estimate. Using OMB’s

methodology but CBO’s inflation estimate, CBO reduced the caps by

$6.7 billion in budget authority and $4.0 billion in outlays.

OMB and CBO Made

Different Adjustments for

Changes in Concepts and

Definitions

Discretionary spending limits are adjusted for changes in accounting and

scorekeeping conventions and budget concepts definitions, including

reclassification of spending and programs between the direct and

discretionary spending categories. In their preview sequestration reports

for fiscal year 1998, both OMB and CBO adjusted the 1998 spending caps for

changes in concepts and definitions. OMB increased the budget authority

spending caps for such changes by $3.6 billion for 1998, while CBO

decreased the budget authority spending caps by $220 million. This

difference was due primarily to a single adjustment.

OMB included an upward cap adjustment of $3.7 billion in budget authority

for the redefinition of certain obligation limitations as discretionary

budget authority. The funding for administrative expenses for some trust

fund accounts had been counted as a discretionary obligation limitation

rather than discretionary budget authority and was not covered under the

discretionary budget authority spending caps although its outlays were

covered. Beginning with the 1998 budget, obligation limitations enacted in

appropriations acts were defined as discretionary budget authority to treat

administrative expenses for all trust funds consistently. Although CBO

officials did not include an adjustment for this item because the change

occurred in the 1998 budget which was submitted after CBO’s report had

been issued, they told us that they did not disagree with the adjustment

that OMB made.

OMB and CBO Made

Different Adjustments for

Emergency Spending

OMB and CBO update sequestration reports differed in their fiscal year 1998

cap adjustments for emergency spending due to different estimates of

budget authority and outlays for emergency funding enacted since

issuance of the preview reports. A difference of $16 million in 1998 budget

authority reflects CBO scoring of a reappropriation of funds for the U.S.

Customs Service. Those funds were originally appropriated as emergency

spending in fiscal year 1997 in the 1997 Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act for Recovery From Natural Disasters, and for Overseas

Peacekeeping Efforts, Including Those in Bosnia (Public Law 105-18). In

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Implementation Issues

our opinion, OMB correctly scored the reappropriation as a regular

appropriation and did not adjust the caps, whereas CBO treated it as

emergency spending and adjusted the caps upward. Although the original

appropriation had used an emergency designation, the reappropriation

language did not.

The largest difference in cap adjustment outlays is due to different

assumptions about the spend-out rates for outlays associated with

additional resources provided in Public Law 105-18 for the Federal

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund. CBO did not

score any outlays in 1998, while OMB scored $1.3 billion. Another large

difference is due to different assumptions about the spend-out rate of

Department of Defense (DOD) resources in Public Law 105-18. CBO scored

$419 million and $1.1 billion for 1997 and 1998, respectively, while OMB

scored $1.5 billion and $301 million for 1997 and 1998, respectively. OMB’s

faster spendout rate for FEMA and DOD was also discussed in last year’s

compliance report4

OMB and CBO also had different estimates of fiscal year 1998 cap

adjustments in their final sequester reports for budget authority and

outlays. The $307 million difference in budget authority was attributable

primarily to a $300 million contingent emergency appropriation for the

Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program in the Labor, Health and

Human Services, Education and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. CBO

scores contingent emergency appropriations at the time the appropriation

is made because congressional action is completed. In contrast, OMB

scores budget authority only when the President officially releases those

contingent appropriations.

OMB and CBO also differed in outlay adjustments to the caps for violent

crime reduction spending. OMB adjusted the caps upward by $1.2 billion

using the special outlay allowance permitted under law,5

 while CBO made

no adjustment. The difference was due to OMB’s estimate of a faster

spendout rate for violent crime reduction spending than CBO.

4

Budget Issues: Budget Enforcement Compliance Report (GAO/AIMD-97-28, January 16, 1997).

5

The special outlay allowance is included in the BEA to cover technical scoring differences that result

when OMB scoring exceeds CBO scoring. If, in any fiscal year, outlays for a discretionary spending

category exceed its spending limit but new budget authority does not, the special outlay allowance

may be used.

Page 20 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
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Implementation Issues

OMB and CBO Scored

Appropriations

Differently

Appropriations enacted during the 1st session of the 105th Congress did

not exceed the 1997 or 1998 discretionary spending caps. However, as

shown in table II.1, OMB’s estimates of both budget authority and outlays

from appropriations for violent crime reduction spending were at the

spending cap level. CBO’s estimates of 1998 discretionary spending were all

less than the discretionary caps except for violent crime reduction

spending, which equaled the budget authority cap. OMB estimated a higher

spendout of violent crime reduction funding than did CBO and used the

special outlay allowance to adjust the cap upward by $1.2 billion to cover

the estimated spending.

Table III.1: OMB Estimates of Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations Compared to Discretionary Caps

Defense Non-Defense Violent Crime Reduction

(Dollars in millions)

Budget

Authoritya Outlaysa

Budget

Authoritya Outlaysa

Budget

Authoritya Outlaysa

Discretionary spending limits $269,000 $267,124 $253,500 $285,680 $5,500 $4,833b

Total appropriations enacted $268,491 $262,391 $252,123 $284,797 $5,500 $4,833

Amount under spending limits $-509 $-4,733 $-1,377 $-883 $0 $0

aOMB estimates contained in final sequester report. Estimates of appropriations include

cancellations transmitted by the President as of November 21, 1997. Not all scorekeeping reports

had been issued when OMB issued its final sequester report on November 24, 1997.

bContains special outlay allowance adjustment of $1,241 million to avoid a sequester.

Differences in Scoring

Appropriations

Section 251(a)(7) of GRH requires CBO and OMB to score the budget

authority and outlays of each discretionary appropriation bill enacted. Not

later than 7 work days after the date of enactment of an appropriation bill,

OMB is required to transmit its and CBO’s scoring estimates to the House

and the Senate, with an explanation of any differences between the two

estimates. We examined all CBO and OMB scoring reports for appropriations

enacted during the 1st session of the 105th Congress for which scoring

reports were released by November 24, 1997, the date of OMB’s final

sequestration report. As of December 31, 1997, OMB had not released

scoring reports for the last 6 appropriations6

 enacted even though it had

included estimates for all appropriations in its final sequester report.

Therefore, our analysis of differences in OMB and CBO scoring of

appropriations legislation was limited to those for which OMB had issued a

scorekeeping report.

6

Scorekeeping reports for appropriations for Agriculture, Commerce, District of Columbia, Foreign

Operations, Interior, and Labor were not issued at the time OMB issued its final sequester report.

Page 21 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
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Implementation Issues

OMB and CBO differed less on budget authority than on outlays. Differences

in budget authority generally result from different program assumptions

where specific program levels are not specified. Appropriation acts specify

the exact dollar amount of budget authority for most discretionary

programs and scoring budget authority is relatively simple and

straightforward. In contrast, outlays for a particular fiscal year depend on

the pace at which budget authority is obligated and payments are made,

and can be more difficult to score with precision. Outlays during a fiscal

year consist of payments for obligations incurred in prior years as well as

in the current year.

Small differences in total scoring of an appropriation may be comprised of

several offsetting components. For example, a difference of $316 million in

scoring 1998 emergency spending outlays in the 1997 Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act resulted from six

instances in which CBO’s estimates exceeded OMB’s by a total of

$996 million and one instance in which OMB’s estimate exceeded CBO’s by

$1.3 billion.

Sizable differences between OMB and CBO scoring7

 occurred for four

appropriations acts—the emergency supplemental appropriations act and

regular appropriations acts for Energy and Water Development, Defense,

and Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (HUD).8

Emergency Appropriations OMB and CBO differed in their scoring of the 1997 Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 105-18) for outlays for

1997 and for both budget authority and outlays for 1998. OMB estimated

that emergency spending outlays in this act would be $1.7 billion higher in

1997 and $316 million higher in 1998 than did CBO. These differences were

due to different OMB and CBO assumptions as to the spendout rate for

emergency funding. OMB assumes a faster spendout rate than does CBO.

For nonemergency spending in Public Law 105-18, the differences were

$471 million and $91 million in budget authority for 1997 and 1998,

respectively, and $864 million and $272 million in outlays for 1997 and

1998, respectively. The largest item affecting 1997 budget authority was a

$700 million difference in the estimate for Payments to States for job

opportunities and basic skills training program in the Department of

7

We adjusted OMB estimates where applicable to eliminate any differences due to any amounts subject

to a line-item veto.

8

Scorekeeping reports for only 7 of the 13 regular appropriations acts had been issued as of

December 31, 1997.

Page 22 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
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Implementation Issues

Health and Human Services. OMB and CBO had different assumptions about

the effect of the language in the bill. CBO assumed that the language would

result in a rescission of $700 million in budget authority for fiscal year

1997 and scored a savings. OMB does not score a rescission to an

appropriated entitlement that does not change the authorization for the

entitlement. Therefore, OMB did not score any savings from this provision.

With regard to OMB and CBO differences in scoring outlays, several

Department of Defense accounts represented $635 million of the

$864 million difference in 1997. This was attributed to different

assumptions about the spendout rates for Defense accounts in the act. For

1998, these same Defense accounts represented $197 million of the

$272 million difference in outlays. Another difference between OMB and

CBO budget authority and outlay scoring was in the Commodity Credit

Corporation export loans program account. CBO assumed a lower demand

for guarantees than was assumed in the 1998 budget and estimated no

savings. The budget assumed $5.5 billion in guarantee commitments.

According to OMB, the bill decreased the loan level to $3.5 billion, resulting

in savings of $160 million in subsidy budget authority and outlays.

Energy and Water Development

Appropriation

OMB’s outlay estimates for the Energy and Water Development

Appropriation accounts in the non-defense category were $601 million

higher than CBO’s. The largest item making up that difference was related

to Department of Energy General Science and Research Activities where

OMB estimated $382 million more in outlays than CBO. Although CBO

assumed $205 million more in outlays from prior balances than OMB did,

CBO’s first-year spendout rate for new appropriations was 49 percent,

compared to OMB’s 76 percent. For the defense discretionary category, CBO

estimated $758 million more in outlays than OMB did. This was due

primarily to different spendout rates and estimates of outlays from prior

budget authority for the Weapons activities and the defense environmental

restoration and waste management accounts in the Department of Energy,

which differed by $159 million and $587 million, respectively.

Defense Appropriation OMB and CBO differed by about $2.6 billion in their outlay estimates of the

Defense Appropriations bill in the defense discretionary category. OMB

estimated that Defense Working Capital Funds would generate

$798 million in revenues in excess of expenditures, while CBO estimated

this amount to be only $250 million. For several other Defense accounts,

OMB and CBO differed on spendout rates and estimates of outlays from prior

year balances, resulting in a total outlay difference of about $2.8 billion. In

Page 23 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix III 

Implementation Issues

almost all of these instances CBO estimated higher spendout rates than OMB

did.

Veterans Affairs and HUD

Appropriation

OMB and CBO differed in scoring of the Veterans Affairs and HUD

Appropriation for the non-defense discretionary category by about $1

billion. OMB estimated that outlays from the Department of Veterans

Affairs account for construction of major projects would be $164 million

less than CBO estimated. The differences were due to different estimates of

initial spendout rates for new appropriations and for outlays from prior

balances. OMB also estimated that Federal Emergency Management Agency

disaster relief outlays would be $191 million lower than CBO estimated. OMB

had estimated that $128 million of new budget authority would be

outlayed, while CBO estimated that none would be outlayed. However, this

difference was more than offset by a difference of $319 million in outlays

from prior year balances. OMB also made an adjustment of $1.4 billion to

score outlays for previously enacted emergency spending to this act. OMB

stated that the adjustment was made so that final OMB scoring would be

comparable to the discretionary caps that were included in its

sequestration update report, which included adjustments for emergency

spending.

OMB and CBO

Differed on PAYGO

Estimate

In its final sequester report, OMB included the deficit effect of PAYGO

legislation enacted (as of November 21, 1997) during the 1st session of the

105th Congress. According to OMB, this legislation reduced the deficit for

1998 by $11 million, so no PAYGO sequester was required. The $11 million

savings for 1998 will be removed from the PAYGO scorecard as required by

BEA-97. CBO’s final sequester report reported that the same PAYGO legislation

decreased the deficit by $7 million for 1998. CBO also concluded that no

sequester for 1998 would be required.

OMB’s final report also included preliminary estimates for 22 additional

pieces of PAYGO legislation pending OMB PAYGO reports or enactment. OMB

estimated that these items would decrease the 1998 deficit by $155 million.

These estimates are not included in the final totals for 1998 and will be

included in OMB’s preview report issued with the fiscal year 1999 budget.

None of the PAYGO estimates for fiscal year 1998 met our criteria for further

analysis, that is, no OMB and CBO PAYGO estimates for 1998 differed by more

than $100 million. We did, however, do additional analysis on the fiscal

year 1997 PAYGO calculations for the Airport and Airway Trust Fund Tax

Page 24 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix III 

Implementation Issues

Reinstatement Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-2), where there was a

$324 million difference in the estimates.

The Airport and Airway Trust Fund Tax Reinstatement Act reinstated

aviation excise taxes that expired on December 31, 1996. The reinstated

taxes were a 10 percent excise tax on domestic passenger tickets, a $6 per

person international departure tax, and various taxes on freight and

aviation fuel. CBO’s estimate, which was provided by the Joint Committee

on Taxation, anticipated increased receipts of $2,730 million. OMB’s lower

estimate, which was provided by the Department of Treasury, was

$2,406 million. OMB and CBO analysts told us that the difference between

the estimates was mainly a result of different estimates of the number of

people expected to be taking international flights and of the pricing and

volume of domestic flights. The other causes for the difference in the

estimates were different assumptions about the amount of freight to be

shipped and the number of gallons of aviation fuel to be used.

CBO prepared a PAYGO estimate for the Treasury and General Government

Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 106-61), for a provision that

permitted federal employees to transfer from CSRS to FERS. OMB did not

consider this a PAYGO matter. Although the difference for 1998 is only

$4 million, the 5-year cost is $151 million, according to CBO. This case was

discussed earlier in this appendix.

Page 25 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

Accounting and

Information

Management Division

Christine E. Bonham, Assistant Director

Robert M. Sexton, Evaluator-in-Charge

Joseph G. Heisler, Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel

Charles Roney, Assistant General Counsel

Carlos Diz, Attorney-Advisor

Edda Emmanuelli-Perez, Attorney-Advisor

(935247) Page 26 GAO/AIMD-98-57 Budget Enforcement Compliance Report
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