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i

37–889 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–55]

CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY

FORCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

APRIL 25, 2007

(II)

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JEFF MILLER, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

GREG MARCHAND, Professional Staff Member

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member

SASHA ROGERS, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, April 25, 2007, Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces .............. 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 ..................................................................................... 65

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007

CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 3

Meehan, Hon. Marty, a Representative from Massachusetts, Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 1

WITNESSES

Avant, Dr. Deborah D., Professor, Political Science and International Affairs,

Director, Institute for Global and International Studies, George Washington

University ............................................................................................................. 45

Brooks, Doug, President, International Peace Operations Association ............... 48

Burke, Gerald F., Major, Massachusetts State Police (Ret.), Former Senior

Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service ............................. 51

Motsek, Gary J., Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Office of

Program Support, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,

Technology & Logistics), U.S. Department of Defense ..................................... 8

Patterson, Ambassador Anne W., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department

of State .................................................................................................................. 4

Raines, Col. Anita M., Chief, Logistics Services Division, J4 Directorate, Joint

Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ..................................................................... 10

Swartz, Bruce C., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

U.S. Department of Justice ................................................................................. 6

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 71

Avant, Dr. Deborah .......................................................................................... 98

Brooks, Doug ..................................................................................................... 113

Burke, Gerald F. ............................................................................................... 123

Meehan, Hon. Marty ........................................................................................ 69

Motsek, Gary J., joint with Col. Anita Raines ............................................... 94

Patterson, Ambassador Anne W. ..................................................................... 74

Swartz, Bruce C. ............................................................................................... 80

Page

IV

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Akin ............................................................................................................ 139

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 140

Ms. Davis ........................................................................................................... 140

Dr. Gingrey ....................................................................................................... 146

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... 135

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 139

(1)

CONTRACTING FOR THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 25, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Marty Meehan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MEEHAN. Good morning, and welcome to our witnesses and

guests. This is the sixth session and second open hearing of the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the topic of the

development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

In his address to the Nation on January 10th, the President announced his intention to accelerate the transition of security operations to the Iraqis. Reports from the theater regarding the readiness and performance of the Iraqi army have, however, been mixed,

and news regarding the Iraqi police services has often been very

discouraging. It is my intent to lead this subcommittee past the anecdotal evidence and to get to the bottom of what kind of progress

we are really making.

To that end, we have been pursuing this effort through a series

of briefings, hearings, and requests for information over the past

several months to examine specific aspects of the Iraqi security

forces. We have looked at training, equipment, logistics and costs.

We have talked to the leaders engaged in the effort and have tried

to talk to the more junior personnel who work directly with the

Iraqi Security Forces on a daily basis.

Last week, you may know, our efforts to do that were blocked at

the last minute by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Since we have Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses

with us today, I would like our record to reflect the fact that we

are unhappy about what happened last week and, furthermore,

that no one from the senior levels of the department or the Joint

Staff has called us to discuss the situation.

I would also like to have it on our record that today this is not

a settled issue, and I would not expect the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to stand in the way of

this committee’s constitutional responsibility to perform oversight,

in pursuant to our congressional prerogatives and policies. And it

is not the intention of this subcommittee to have the department

dictate what our policies or what our procedures ought to be.

2

With that said, today we turn our attention to the role of private

contractors and the role that they have played in the mission to

train, equip and sustain Iraqi Security Forces.

There were almost 127,000 contractors for the Department of Defense alone in Iraq, as of the DOD’s most recent count, in addition

to the 145,000 troops. And I want to repeat that: There were almost 127,000 contractors for the Department of Defense—only the

Department of Defense—in Iraq, as of the DOD’s most recent

count, in addition to 145,000 troops.

We must leave aside for another day the broader issue of whether this is an appropriate way for the United States to fight its modern wars. Today, we will focus on the role that these contractors

have played, with respect to the Iraqi Security Forces’ mission.

We will first receive testimony from a panel of the Department

of Defense, Department of State, Department of Justice witnesses.

The reason for the breadth of this panel is that the Iraqi security

forces’ mission does not involve only Iraqi military training. The

Departments of State and Justice have played a major role in

training Iraqi police, advising the Ministry of Interior, and other

rule-of-law-oriented missions.

We will look forward to hearing about how the roles and responsibilities for each agency in Iraq have evolved, as well as the procedures for accountability, management and oversight of contractors

that have been put in place. In addition, we expect our Department

of Defense witnesses will provide us with greater insight into the

nuts and bolts of how contracting for a mission as broad and complex as this is being done and implemented.

Our first panel of witnesses includes Assistant Secretary of State

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Ambassador Anne Patterson; Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce

Swartz; Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Gary

Motsek; the Colonel Anita Raines, who is the chief of the logistics

services division of the Joint Staff.

We also welcome a second panel of witnesses today, who we expect will provide both outside perspectives on the use of contractors

for this kind of mission, and a real-life account of the contractorled police development effort on the ground in Iraq.

Our second panel includes: Dr. Deborah Avant, who is Director

for Global and International Studies at the George Washington

University Elliott School of International Affairs; Mr. Doug Brooks,

the President of the International Peace Operations Association;

and Gerald Burke, who is a retired Major in the Massachusetts

State Police and former Senior Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Services.

To encourage discussion at today’s hearing, I would like to follow

the same less-formal procedures as we have in our previous briefings and hearings. I have talked with our distinguished ranking

member, Mr. Akin, and he has agreed to dispense with the fiveminute rule for today’s hearing. And pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) of

the rules of our committee, the Subcommittee will dispense with

the five-minute rule and allow questioning to proceed, as subcommittees express interest rather than strictly by seniority.

I would like to also remind everyone that, while this is an open

hearing, we have received closed briefings in which classified inforVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
3

mation was presented, so please be mindful of anything you might

say based on what you heard in the closed briefing.

Again, we welcome our witnesses. Thank you for being here. And

we are looking forward to your remarks. And we will take your

whole text for the record, but I would ask you to keep your prepared remarks fairly brief so that we can get to our questions.

And now I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Akin, our

ranking member, for any opening remarks that he might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meehan can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for taking time to join us.

And I think today’s hearing is starting to come toward the end

of our hearing overall study of how things are going in training the

Iraqi Security Forces, and particularly the focus today is on contractors and how the contractors help to fill this critical mission,

particularly building the Iraqi Security Forces.

Specifically, I am interested in how we use contractors for training the Iraq police services. And it seems to be that the police area

is one that we need to pay some particular attention to and understand what is going on there, for no other reason, the police, as sort

of a new idea, I suppose, to the Iraqis.

The U.S. government’s reliance on contracts raises a second, related issue that has come up indirectly a number of times over the

course of our investigation. I am referring to the challenge of effective interagency participation in Iraq. Today’s hearing should shed

light on how agencies other than Department of Defense have and

continue to contribute to the development of the ISF, in particular,

and improving the overall situation in Iraq in general.

Winning this war requires the application of all elements of national power; we must be able to tap into a wide-ranging expertise

resident across the U.S. Government.

It seems to me that both the State and Justice Departments rely

on contractors to carry out missions that reside within their area

of expertise, at least with respect to training local police. I would

like our witnesses to comment on the rationale for this practice and

the benefits and drawbacks of using contractors in Iraq.

Finally, I want to comment on one specific contract matter. Use

of contractors in theater is a complicated situation. When contractors are embedding in the U.S. police transition teams, as in the

case of the international police liaison officers, an already complicated matter turns into a matter of concern. I am curious about

the guidance we give these contractors with respect to command

and control, personal security, and logistical support.

I look forward to the witnesses elaborating on some of these

points. And, once again, thank you all for joining us.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

4

And I will start with our panel.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL

NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Akin, and other distinguished members of the committee.

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL, is a proud participant in our nation’s effort to help make Iraq a more stable country, by developing

civilian security forces that serve the people of Iraq. In response to

the President’s directive that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

lead the development of Iraqi Security Forces, INL strives to help

the U.S. military’s commanding generals in the field and our fighting men and women on the ground by providing personnel and contract support for this mission.

Creating such a force in Iraq is a challenging task, and the tragic

deaths of 17 American police advisers and many other security personnel are testament to the difficulties and risks we face. To date,

CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, or CPATT,

has exceeded all its basic training goals, with the assistance of the

Departments of State, Justice and other agencies, and international partners, but enormous challenges remain, as the coalition

and the government of Iraq continue to develop the skills, integrity

and credibility of these forces.

As demonstrated in other post-conflict police development missions in the Balkans and elsewhere, this will be a very lengthy

process. INL has conducted post-conflict civilian police and criminal

justice missions since the early 1990’s, but Iraq marks the first

time since 1994 in Haiti that we have participated in such an effort

led by the Department of Defense.

As expected, there have been challenges, but these have largely

been resolved, as the relevant civilian organizations understand

that DOD, through CPATT in the lead, and the military have come

to appreciate the expertise our law enforcement professionals offer.

Since taking charge of the police mission in 2004, the Department of Defense has transferred $1.5 billion to INL to provide a

range of support, including operation and maintenance of the Jordan International Police Training Center, with interagency and

contract help: 690 international police liaison officers, for which we

have contracted with DynCorp International; 192 international police trainers, provided by the Department of Justice and their contractor, through an interagency agreement with INL; 143 border

enforcement advisers, 20 of which are provide by the Department

of Justice and their contractor through an interagency agreement,

and 123 of which are provided through a task order with DynCorp.

In addition, INL provides body armor, housing, construction of

forward operating bases and camps, meals, transportation, security, communication, and medical support to our civilian police personnel through a contract with DynCorp. For specialized training

and advisory services to Iraqi civil security forces, we utilize several interagency agreements with U.S. law enforcement agencies,

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug EnforceVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
5

ment Agency (DEA), Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms Bureau (ATF),

and the U.S. Marshals.

I might also note that even the most effective police will not be

successful if the rest of the criminal justice system is broken. We

are therefore providing substantial support to the criminal justice

sector in concert with our interagency partners and contractors.

Today, it also my pleasure to review the steps INL has taken to

improve contract management and oversight. CPATT and the military continue to set the overall requirements for the mission and

exercise operational control over the police advisers and trainers

that INL supplies. However, we are responsible for managing and

overseeing our contracts with service providers and for monitoring

our agreements with interagency partners.

We have cooperated closely with the various inspectors general

and have undertaken our own assessments, asset verifications, and

audits to identify problems in management contract oversight. Numerous remedial measures to have already been taken, and we are

constantly exploring ways to be more effective.

In the past, the mission in Iraq has often outstripped our staffing

and oversight capabilities, both domestically and in the field. Recognizing this, we added 64 permanent positions, recently obtained

approval from Embassy Baghdad to increase INL’s permanent

staffing from 4 to 20 people—4 are from a contract officer representatives—and created an entire contract support division for

programs in Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan, which consist of 15 employees. We are also expanding our Washington-based Iraq program staff.

We continue to strengthen internal controls, as well, in areas

such as inventory oversight and performance reporting on property

management. Statements of work are now more detailed provide

contractors with specific requirements and performance standards.

INL is improving our invoice files and significantly is actively

reconciling all past payments made since the inception of our contracts in Iraq and Jordan, as well as Afghanistan. This is an intensive process, which includes the review of an estimated 2 million

pages of supporting documentation, covering roughly $2.5 billion in

contracts, that will require approximately 10 full-time staff members an estimated three years to complete, but I assure you we will

recover any payments inconsistent with contract terms and conditions.

The Department of State and INL are committed to promoting

competition and have recently competed or are in the process of

competing several of our Iraq contracts and task orders. We recently began the process of competing the task order for most of

the personnel and related support INL provides in Iraq.

Contractors are critical to implementing programs in Iraq and

other crisis zones, but we recognize it is our duty to ensure that

contracts are carefully monitored, as American lives and tax dollars

are at stake. We have made significant progress in recent months,

but this effort will require constant vigilance.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson can be found

in the Appendix on page 74.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much.

6

Mr. Swartz.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE C. SWARTZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

Mr. SWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Akin, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of the Department of Justice in this development and training of the Iraqi

Security Forces.

Submitting my full statement for the record, I would like to briefly focus this morning in my opening statement on three topics:

first, the mission of the Department of Justice’s police training office, the Office of International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program; second, how we have fulfilled that mission in

what is called ICITAP in Iraq; and, third, what other roles the Department of Justice has played in Iraq in an attempt to build a rule

of law system within that country.

During first to ICITAP, the Department of Justice’s police training office, ICITAP was created in 1986. And it has as its mission

the goal of advancing U.S. government’s criminal justice, national

security, and foreign policy objectives, by attempting to create foreign law enforcement counterparts and institutions that respect

democratic values, respect human rights, and have the capacity to

fight terrorism and transnational crime.

We have programs now in 48 different countries around the

world, countries ranging from emerging democracies, such as in the

Balkans, to frontline states in the fight against terrorism, such as

Pakistan and Indonesia, and in countries such as Iraq, that are

post-conflict states.

In all of these countries, ICITAP seeks to develop the police in

the context of all of the pillars of the justice system, that is police,

corrections, and justice prosecutorial elements of the justice system. So whenever possible, ICITAP works collaboratively with its

sister organization in the Department of Justice, known as

OPDAT, another unwieldy acronym, but it deals with prosecutorial

training and with other Federal law enforcement agencies in the

Department of Justice, including the FBI, the Marshals service, the

ATF, and other agencies.

I should note, as well, that virtually all of ICITAP’s funding

comes from programs specific funding provided by other entities of

the United States government, primarily the Department of State

and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau,

headed by Ambassador Patterson, U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID), and recently the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

In addition, while ICITAP does and whenever possible does send

overseas senior law enforcement advisers to be resident in our missions or embassies overseas—we have 18 such personnel now—we

also make use, particularly in larger missions such as Iraq, of the

services of the contractor, MPRI, to provide both logistics support

and, in the case of larger missions, police trainers or others that

are necessary to provide the services that we have been asked to

undertake by other elements of the United States government.

7

Turning now to the mission in Iraq, the United States Department of Justice has been involved, in terms of police training, police development, from the very start in Iraq.

Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, in May 2003, the Department

of Justice criminal division deployed, with funding from INL, a select team of 25 senior Federal law enforcement officials to assess

the state of the justice system in Iraq. And the result of that assessment team was a comprehensive set of three reports regarding

the police services, the corrections services, and the justice element

of the country of Iraq.

The ICITAP portion, the police training portion of that mission,

stayed on and was critical in helping to stand up, from the start,

the Iraq police services, the border agency, and the corrections

services. And from that day until the current time, ICITAP has

been in the country of Iraq for the Department of Justice, working

in three critical areas: police strategy, in terms of development and

training; corrections, where, too, we have helped establish the

strategy for the corrections services and implement it; and, finally,

anti-corruption, where the Department of Justice, through ICITAP,

has been extremely active in the Commission for Public Integrity.

Our current staffing is four authorized slots for senior, full-time

employees, Federal senior law enforcement agencies, and a number

of contractor positions for each of these missions. And in each of

these areas, corrections, police, anti-corruption, we have helped create and develop strategies; we have helped formulate training curriculum, and provide that training curriculum; helped established

and lead academies; and have participated under the direction of

CPATT, in particular, in the training of tens of thousands of Iraqi

police and correctional officers.

I would be remiss, however, if I did not, in my third topic, point

out that ICITAP’s efforts, dramatic as they have been and, we believe, as dedicated as they have been, are only part of the efforts

undertaken by the Department of Justice, with regard to Iraq and

the rule of law in Iraq.

There are a number of Federal law enforcement agencies from

the Department of Justice that have been involved, again, from the

start in police training and police-related activities in Iraq. Among

those are OPDAT, as mentioned, our overseas prosecutorial development office, which has deployed a number of assistant United

States attorneys or other Federal prosecutors to serve both in the

embassy in Baghdad, as rule of law advisers, and on the provincial

reconstruction teams.

Those advisers have helped mentor and train investigative

judges and trial judges, have provided advice on both the structure

and the implementation of the prosecutorial service, and have been

instrumental throughout in building up the counterpart to the police and correctional aspects of our work there.

In addition, the United States Marshals service, again, oftentimes with funding from State and INL, has provided invaluable

training, with regard to judicial security, witness security, and related court personnel security matters, and is now engaged in helping to establish a similar marshals service in Iraq itself.

The ATF, our alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives agency,

has been involved in training, with regard to explosives and

8

counter-explosives, from the start. They have also deployed a number of agents in an operational mode, in that regard.

The FBI has been deeply involved in training, both in connection

with the work of CPATT, and has also deployed agents throughout

the country on a rotating basis through its Legat’s office, the legal

attache’s office, and as well with regard to the Baghdad operations

center. So, both with regard to training and operations, they, too,

have been present.

DEA has trained under the CPATT direction with regard to intelligence activities. We, as well, have had a number of prosecutors

and agents working with the regime crimes liaison office, to deal

with the crimes of the Saddam Hussein era.

And, finally, with regard to the Major Crimes Task Force, which

was established by the Department of Justice, again, with assistance in terms of funding, the FBI, DEA, ATF and Marshals service

have created a task force to work with the Iraqis to deal with the

most serious crimes facing Iraq at this time—kidnapping, murder,

and related activities—in order to build a core competency to deal

with this time of crime.

In sum, then, the Department of Justice has been deeply involved from the beginning to the present day with regard to rule

of law in Iraq. And, in closing, I would simply like to pay tribute

to the courage, the dedication, and the professionalism of the Department of Justice men and women who have served in Iraq

throughout this period.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swartz can be found in the Appendix on page 80.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Swartz.

Mr. Motsek, if you could go. And before you do, we were just

talking. Of the 127,000 contractors, DOD contractors, if you know

how many of them are American citizens——

Mr. MOTSEK. Seventeen percent, sir.

Mr. MEEHAN. Seventeen percent?

Mr. MOTSEK. Seventeen percent. We will have newer numbers in

May.

STATEMENT OF GARY J. MOTSEK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF PROGRAM SUPPORT,

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE

Mr. MOTSEK. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Akin, members of the

committee, I am Gary Motsek, and I am the recently appointed Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Program Support,

within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics. Prior to this position, I was within the

Army Materiel Command as their deputy G–3 for support operations and earlier their deputy chief of staff for ammunition.

I would like to note that I appreciate the fact that Congress has

chosen Congressman Snyder to personally supervise me in both my

present and prior assignments. You have been there every time,

sir. Good to see you again.

9

I have a vested interest in this hearing, as my son, Chris, who

is an explosive ordnance disposal officer, has been deployed both to

Afghanistan and Iraq in support of our ongoing operations. I want

to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today and

to participate in today’s discussion.

I intend to concentrate on DOD’s support to the multi-agency effort in the acquisition, management, oversight of the security

forces, their training, and how that fits into the larger, theaterwide management and accountability of contractor personnel. I

would like to thank the committee for your support and all you do

to help us in our mission. It is a team effort, including our military,

civilian, coalition, agency, industry partners. None of us could get

the job done without the others, and I continue to be impressed by

the cooperation among the partners.

Our acquisition DOD team continues to provide our warfighter

with the support they need, consistent with responsible management and stewardship, effective acquisition planning, timely contract execution, and responsible oversight that provided our

warfighters and the team the contract support needed to accomplish their mission.

We recognize that our contracting processes have been and are

still being performed under very trying circumstances, particularly

within Iraq. This is a dynamic environment, and we are constantly

changing and applying lessons learned.

We normally don’t think of our contracting officers as being vulnerable, but they accept the same risk of the forces that they support, and some have paid the ultimate price. They also serve in

harm’s way, whether it be traveling on dangerous roads to inspect

construction sites, negotiating with contractors and paying them

for their work accomplished, or, frankly, consoling Iraqi family

members who have lost one of their members while supporting us.

The support we will discuss today is part of the overall effort,

which also includes base operations, maintenance, transportation

and security. It is a huge effort and has interests for both houses,

including your parent committee. I look forward to your suggestions on how we can improve our contracting oversight and ensure

that we are good stewards of the nation’s resources, and that the

security forces are well-equipped and trained so that the nation,

the Iraqi nation can assume full responsibility for their own security needs.

I appreciate the fact that the committee’s staff has been very understanding in recognizing that operations in theater, including the

recent impending changes of command of, keep mission critical theater personnel from appearing before the committee at this time.

What Colonel Raines and I cannot answer today will be taken for

the record, and we promise to respond promptly back to the committee.

In closing, I thank you for your interest in our efforts, and we

are ready to answer any questions you might have.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Motsek and Colonel Raines

can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]

Mr. AKIN. Colonel Raines, if you want to proceed, or are you allowed to? Or is there a problem, or where are we in that?

10

STATEMENT OF COL. ANITA M. RAINES, CHIEF, LOGISTICS

SERVICES DIVISION, J4 DIRECTORATE, JOINT STAFF, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Colonel RAINES. Good morning, sir.

Chairman Meehan, Congressman Akin, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today

to discuss contracting issues related to the Iraqi and Afghan security forces. To put my testimony into context, I am speaking to you

today as the chief of the logistics services division within the J4 logistics directorate of the Joint Staff.

As a career multifunctional logistician, I have served as the division chief for six months and have supervisory responsibility for

the division’s primary functions, which include mortuary affairs,

base camp services, and contracting. We serve as the combatant

command’s advocate and integrator for these joint functions within

the Joint Staff.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for

your continued support, and I am happy to address your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Colonel Raines and Mr. Motsek

can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]

Mr. AKIN [presiding]. The chairman stepped out for just a

minute, so I get to enjoy for a moment a chance to ask a question

or two.

And I guess I had quite a few, but, Mr. Swartz, maybe I would

start where you are. And I would like to just make something that

is an intuitive kind of thing that I have been seeing, as we have

been having hearings, and also my trip to Iraq several times. And

tell me if you think that at least I am on to something, and how

does that relate to your area of expertise.

It is my sense is that our warfighters have been reasonably wellorganized, done a pretty good job, but when it comes to the nonmilitary pieces that we have to do to build a civilization, particularly things like wire transfers of money and banking, creating an

entire judicial system, it is not just a matter of police, which they

don’t really understand the technology of police anyway, but aside

from that, a judicial system, some kind of system of law and a

place to put the bad guys and lock them up, that entire system, my

sense is that we can tell a general to go somewhere and go fight

a way, but we don’t tell the Department of Justice to take a battalion over and set up a judicial system. We don’t say to Commerce,

you know, ‘‘Go set up a banking system,’’ or whatever it is.

So I guess my question is, is that true, that we are not as wellequipped to do the non-military functions? And you said that—you

made what sounded like a great statement, all the stuff that Justice has done and everything, but there is one thing you said. You

said we had four full-time employees—that seemed like maybe you

needed a little more than that to set up a justice system in Iraq,

if that is what I heard you saying.

So if you would comment on that. And I can cheat with this

question a little bit and say that relates, also, to the development

of the police services, but that is my overall concern. Are we really

equipped and organizationally set up to do things other than just

military? And I hate to use the word nation-building, but anybody

has a free shot at that. I have a couple of minutes.

11

But you, Mr. Swartz, could proceed, if you would, sir.

Mr. SWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Akin. And I am sure that my colleagues will want to add on this.

The question you asked is certainly a complex one. The United

States has had extensive experience over the years in working on

justice systems, particularly in post-conflict countries, in Haiti, in

the Balkans, now in Iraq. And as you suggest, it is a difficult longterm process. It cannot be accomplished overnight. It does have,

again, as you suggest, a number of different facets, not simply

building up the police, but building up the police in conjunction

with a prosecutorial service, with an effective system of judges,

with an effective correctional system.

We have developed, I believe, over the years, the capacity to lead

such efforts, in terms of the number of personnel that we have and

the kind of expertise that we can bring to bear with our colleagues

from the State Department and the Department of Defense. In

terms of the bulk numbers, though, if you were sneaking, as you

suggest, a number of trainers, for instance, the reserve capacity, it

is the case that I do not have quite the command and control authority that my colleagues at the Department of Defense may have,

in order to order battalions, if I had a battalion, to do that kind

of work.

So we, as a government, the United States has relied for these

large-scale operations on contractors for the day-to-day police training work. But, again, in conjunction with supervision by the experts, oftentimes at the Department of Justice, whenever possible,

we have sought to provide that expertise.

So when I spoke of four senior Federal officers authorized for

Iraq, that is true. That is just the top level, with regard to police

training. And they are working with their colleagues in CPATT, of

course, who are also providing supervision, as well as our reach

back here to the Department of Justice experts in ICITAP and related agencies.

And, as well, that does not encompass, as I suggested, the full

range of Department of Justice personnel on the ground in Iraq.

Those are the four dealing with police, corrections, but they are

working in conjunction with all of the personnel we have there for

prosecutorial work and for the investigative work that is being

done.

Mr. AKIN. Just for my information, how many people would Department of Justice have in Iraq? How many do you have at a

given time?

Mr. SWARTZ. I can get you for the record——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 139.]

Mr. AKIN. Are we talking dozens, hundreds, thousands?

Mr. SWARTZ. Well, we have, in terms of between our police

and——

Mr. AKIN. I am not talking about contractors——

Mr. SWARTZ. Right, I am talking about—yes, I would guess that,

between police and prosecutorial, there are approximately 10 to 12

at a given time. If you begin to add in the FBI, which are also involved in this, and the other Federal agencies, and our various offices involved, I think we are getting up more in the range probably

12

of 40 to 50. I will do the math while my colleagues address this,

but we do have——

Mr. AKIN. It is still a relatively small number, though. So you are

counting a lot on contractors to help do what has to be done over

there?

Mr. SWARTZ. In terms of the implementing the day-to-day training, that is correct. That is an essential element of what we do.

Mr. AKIN. Anybody else want to take a quick shot at that before

my nickel runs out here?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Akin, let me just say that this issue

has provoked a lot of soul-searching on the part of the Administration, and there is a special office that has been set up in the State

Department led by Ambassador John Herbst. And he has the full

support of Secretary Rice. And you might want to ask him for a

briefing directly, but he has about 30 people working for him.

And he designing, basically, a civilian reserve corps. And he has

reached out to a number of other agencies and his colleagues within the State Department to plan. And the idea of this would be that

it could deploy quickly in emergency situations, that security on

the ground get basic economic services restored. And, again, I think

it might be interesting to hear from him directly. But this, as you

say, is a real issue.

Mr. AKIN. So you are agreeing with me that it is an issue, but

you are also saying that we are trying to address that——

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. And, I guess, my question is, I assume we have run

into this in other nations where we have been, but we don’t always

learn by our mistakes, either. So my question is, do we have something ready to go so that we end up getting into some conflict and

we have to do some rebuilding, do we have teams that can go in?

So you are saying he is the guy to talk to?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, I have been in the foreign service

for almost 34 years, and I have never seen anything on this scale.

For instance, in Haiti, in 1994, it was a much easier situation. We

confronted many of the same problems you are seeing in Iraq

today, but the scale was simply a lot less, so it was easier to take

them out of the civilian agencies and deploy them more rapidly.

And, frankly, the sums involved were a lot less, as well.

Mr. SWARTZ. And, Mr. Akin, if I may return to that topic, as I

think we demonstrated in Iraq with the support of our other agencies, particularly State Department, the criminal division of the

Department of Justice and the other law enforcement entities in

the Department of Justice can deploy almost immediately a rapid

force to assess the situation and to put in place the structure that

needs to be put in place for whatever—work is done.

And if I may supplement my answer, just doing the math——

Mr. AKIN. But for all of your assurances, there really isn’t a court

system in Iraq now, is there?

Mr. SWARTZ. Well, I cannot say that we have successfully completed that process, but I think we have certainly—we have made

strides, in terms of the judges we have worked with. And I think

that the number of investigative judges who have shown a great

deal of courage throughout this process and worked very closely

with our Federal prosecutors over there.

13

And if I may just supplement my answer, it looks—just my quick

calculation—we have approximately 75 to 100 personnel, with regard to training and operations, and that is not counting the approximately 120 we have the regime crimes liaison office.

Mr. AKIN. Not a word from Fort Belvoir here or anything? I am

a survivor of Fort Belvoir.

Mr. MOTSEK. I survived Fort Belvoir. In fact, they moved my old

headquarters.

So you bring up—the question you asked from the Department

of Defense is in the larger context, which is, we made a conscious

decision in the early 1990’s to size the force at a particular size,

and then we decided to focus our forces on the pointy end of the

spear, if you will. And so we took the risk in the back end.

So we knew consciously that we were going to have to rely on

a package that was not organic to us, that was going to be contracted. That was a conscious decision. What Ambassador Patterson said, though, was absolutely correct. The order of magnitude of

this effort dwarfs anything we have done in the past.

Just for a quick buzz, we constantly talk about the LOGCAP contract, the multibillion-dollar contract that we use for general support inside the area of responsibility (AOR). That is multibillion

dollars today. If you added up all the previous LOGCAP contracts,

summed them for all the previous contingencies that we had, you

would be somewhere in a little bit of excess of $600 million. So that

gives you a sizing issue that we have been faced with.

And so the discussion might be appropriate as to, did we do the

right thing? Do we need to re-look consciously where the chop lines

need to be on the variety of functions? And I am sure that the

other agencies in government have a similar function. It is exacerbated at DOD simply because of our size.

Mr. AKIN. The scale of what you are dealing with.

Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Chairman, I have strayed a little bit, I confess,

from the strictly police and all, but it does connect to the contracting. Thanks so much.

Mr. MEEHAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.

My question is primarily for Ambassador Patterson, but I would

like the other panelists to comment. What is the current status of

the contracts overseen by the INL, the Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and ICITAP, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, with

respect to the international police trainers and international police

liaison offices that are providing training to the Iraqi police? What

is the status of those contracts?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, the status of INL’s portion with

DynCorp, the contract—we went out to our three main contractors

with a statement of objectives last week. We are in the process of

re-bidding this contract, and we hope we will be finished by the

19th of July.

Mr. MEEHAN. We have heard varying reports regarding the quality of police trainers being provided for police liaison officers. How

do you respond to our reference that they tend to lack the management and training experience that would truly make them useful

for the mission that they were tasked with?

14

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, let me describe for a

minute our recruitment process. Our contractor, DynCorp, goes out

to police organizations and recruits people with at least five years

experience. They can’t have been retired from a police office for

over nine years, so they have recent experience. They are given

psychological tests. They are given criminal background tests. They

are given a reference review. And then they are put into two weeks

of INL training and a week of DOD training.

We have a 23 percent washout rate, which suggests to me that

we are fairly rigorous in our review of this. And then they are deployed to Iraq. And I have met many of these people. Seventeen

have died in the line of duty. Today we had an incident where we

got a report just as we were coming up, where one of the International Police Liaisons (IPLOs) has lost two legs in an Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) attack. So these fellows are engaged in very

dangerous activities.

And they are constantly evaluated through the process. They are

evaluated by the contractor. They are evaluated by INL personnel

on the ground. And, of course, in any organization, you have bad

performers, and mediocre performers, and good performers, but we

are confident we are getting quality personnel.

Mr. MEEHAN. And all organizations have people that either don’t

act properly or turn out not to be qualified. What procedures are

in place to see to it that such a person is removed and replaced

with qualified personnel?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, we have issued a directive to the

contractor. First, if you are removed from cause—again, we have

the 23 percent washout rate just in the process of the hiring. But

if you are removed from service—and I see these reports every

week, and I know that some are removed from service every

week—you cannot be hired again, or at least that is our directive

to the contractor, by the same contractor. You cannot be hired

again on another INL program, and we try and keep track of that.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am not in the queue. I came late.

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay.

Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess I am in the queue. That is appropriate today. We have

a barrister, and you are listed as a career minister, Ms. Patterson.

I feel like saying, ‘‘Here, here. Here, here.’’

Also, Secretary Patterson, I want to acknowledge your birth state

of Arkansas. We have Arkansas day here, and we appreciate you.

I find this kind of snapshot of things just overwhelming, just

overwhelming. I mean, all four of you are obviously very capable

career people that care deeply about your country, working hard at

doing this stuff. My guess is, if anybody was looking at this stuff,

they would say, ‘‘We have the right people in these positions doing

it.’’

But none of us can be satisfied with where we are at today, compared to where we thought we were going to be four years ago. You

know, regardless of how we all voted on—and we have a split of

opinion, and it is the parties here. I mean, we have different views

15

of the decision the President made, but he made the decision. We

need to do what we can to make it work.

But we can’t be satisfied with where we are at, and I know you

are not satisfied, either. So then the—not the frustration—challenge for Mr. Akin, and Mr. Meehan, this committee, and the Congress, American people, is how we can we be of help? I mean, how

can we help sort this stuff out, not in a combative relationship?

That is what was so discouraging about this memo a few days

ago, is this committee is not trying to be in a combat with the Secretary of Defense’s office. But we are trying to figure out ways that

we can help, because no one is satisfied with how it is going.

So part of, it seems to me, what we try to do is to look at, well,

do we have the right people? Do we have the right congressional

oversight? Do you have the tools—or the financing? Do you have

the right tools that you need to help you deal with wayward contractors, when someone goes awry, I mean, all those kind of things?

Because, obviously, we don’t know how to do your work. We don’t

know how to do it. And it is a frustrating thing.

I wanted to ask a series of questions in that vein. Secretary Patterson, what languages, foreign languages, do you speak?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I speak decent Spanish and have had a

year of Arabic, which I don’t remember very well.

Dr. SNYDER. And Arkansan?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes. [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. What has been your experience with regard to trying to fill these positions with contractors or State Department personnel with regard to language skills?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I can speak to my INL office there. I believe we have one person there who speaks some Arabic. We have

a 10-person office of 10 professionals that is going increasingly up

to 20. It has been an enormous challenge, and I can’t speak for the

department as a whole. I know the Secretary has addressed this

in her hearings, but language capability has been a huge challenge

in all the deployments.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, as somebody who has been in the business

since—I think 1973 is when your career started, and you have a

very illustrious career, we are proud of you—when September 11th

occurred, the whole country was stymied by this whole issue of,

how do we get language-skilled peoples that meet the security classification and everything?

But we are now five years later from that. Why are we still stymied with regard to language skills in State Department personnel? Why has there not been a successful effort so that there would

have been the kind of focus on—I assume that we think language

skills are important to do these jobs—why are we still behind, this

many years later from when the war started and when the war in

Afghanistan started?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, I will take that question back to

our management and get an answer for you, because I have heard

the Secretary answer this in other oversight hearings. And, frankly, I don’t want to wing it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 139.]

Dr. SNYDER. We like winging it.

16

Ambassador PATTERSON. I must say that a lot of the Arabic

speakers have done service in Iraq. And then it is not as if they

are sitting in Paris. They have been to places like Yemen or Saudi

Arabia, too, where we served, my husband and I served.

So I think the system is just stressed, but I will take that question back and get an answer for you from the director general.

Dr. SNYDER. And then one final question, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Swartz, if Ms. Patterson has a U.S. contractor—and I have

had some in my district that have served both DOD and State Department—and it turns out that an individual turns out to be a

drug dealer, who, in the course of the drug dealing, has shot and

killed a couple of Iraqi civilians, what is your ability—how is that

person dealt with in the legal system? Who has the authority to

prosecute that person? And how many people have we had those

kinds of issues? Do we have people out there with those kinds of

challenges that are not being dealt with by anyone’s legal system?

Mr. SWARTZ. Sir, I think that that is a question that I will also

take back, but I can tell you that, thanks to the work of Congress,

with regard to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,

MEJA, we have certainly had expansive and expanded powers to

deal with that type of issue, that is, to deal with criminal actions

taken in certain circumstances for those accompanying military

forces abroad.

In terms of people out there, as Ambassador Patterson has suggested, we have, I think, all three entities here have moved quickly

to deal with any questions of misconduct, in terms of leaving people

in place. And I could give you further information, I believe, with

regard to, in general terms, any ongoing criminal investigations,

with the main focus on contractors.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 139.]

Dr. SNYDER. Well, I want to be sure what part you are taking

for the record and what part you are not. Who is going to prosecute

the person I described?

Mr. SWARTZ. Sir, it would depend. I would have to look at the

facts of the particular case to see whether we can fit into one of

our particular jurisdictional statutes within the Federal criminal

justice system. The Department of Defense can address the capacity of the Iraqi government to deal with contractors or not, in terms

of what is permitted.

But in terms of our actions, of course, the criminal division,

whenever possible, seeks to prosecute any criminal activity that is

engaged in by contractors. And it would depend, again, on whether

the jurisdictional prerequisites for our statutes were met in a particular instance.

I would believe, again, in the hypothetical you have provided,

that we would be able to find a basis of prosecution of such an individual, probably on several different jurisdictional bases.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17

And I think this probably would be for Colonel Raines or Mr.

Motsek, in regard to the DOD’s role. I wanted to ask you—well,

first of all, what steps is DOD taking to go back and ensure it has

received appropriate value from the contractors in Iraq, for projects

such as the highly problematic Baghdad college? If you could take

that, I would appreciate it.

Either one of you would be fine.

Mr. MOTSEK. Let’s put it in context first. Less than one percent

of the contract vehicles that we have out there have we had a

major problem with, where we have had a challenge where we have

had to go into some very unpleasant ways of dealing with the issue.

The particular construction project that you are referring to is still

under litigation, as a matter of fact.

It is under litigation to—excuse me, it is going to resolution of

the contract, because there were changes in the scope of the contract midstream. I don’t think anyone is proud of the production of

that particular building, but I can’t give you the final outcome of

that, because we are still in the process of making the determinations of our recovery of dollars.

It is important to note that we have had lots of numbers jump

around about dollars that have been lost or dollars that have not

been properly accounted for in contracts. But if you look at most

of the investigations, that is pre-close-out of the contracts, and that

is very important to understand.

And we are improving with time. Make no mistake about it:

When we started operations in theater, there was an attempt to try

to manage this from the outside of the theater, to minimize the

footprint of these people that had to be on the ground. And so we

were doing things in a bit of a remote means.

Over time, we have learned very, very quickly that we have to

have boots on the ground to provide the proper oversight of these

things. That is why we have the joint contracting command physically in place in Iraq today that manage much of what we are

talking about. That is why we have strengthened the requirement

to have contractor-officer representatives and technical representatives down there.

The Department of Defense will not let you be a COR, contractor

officer representative, right now unless you take the course, which

is available through the Defense Acquisition University, to give you

the skill sets so you can raise the flag when you think a contractor

is either non-performing or has had some shortfalls.

Those occur because of the needs that were shown in the theater.

And so the particular construction process is a perfect example of

why we had to do that.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, who had that contract?

Mr. MOTSEK. I believe, sir, that was the Corps of Engineers proper. Army Corps of Engineers was the lead agent for that particular

contract.

And, if I might, sir, because we are still undergoing this, I will

take it for the record and give you the blow-by-blow description of

where we are and when we think we will close that out.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to continue this same

line, if you will indulge me, but, you know, we have situations a

lot of times where, in our congressional districts, we may have a

18

company that has a contract with the military to do something, to

produce something.

I will give you an example. In my district, we have a manufacturer. The company is called TUG Technologies, and they manufacture these tractors and equipment that push the planes back so

they can take off, and I saw the thing, and they pull the planes.

I mean, they do this—you see them all the time when we are flying

back and forth to our districts on the commercial airlines.

But this is a military contract. And the contractor probably

wasn’t very smart in negotiating the contract and is really having

a very difficult time now producing at the price that was contracted

for a set price, which had very little, you know, change with inflation and that sort of thing.

The military contractors are tough. I mean, they are making this

vendor in my district toe the line, almost to the point of bankruptcy. I mean, maybe that is appropriate.

But I tell you that, because I think what we are all concerned with here is that all of the—we have an $8 billion-a-month burn

rate in the AOR. And a lot of it is contractor money, and we have

a lot of departments involved, Justice, State, Defense, and all these

contracts flying around. And nonperformance or poor performance

is not just dollars. It is lives.

And so we do have some real concern. It would be very nice if

you could reassure this oversight committee that somebody is connecting the dots on all of these people that are out there making—

you know, pretty damn—darn good profit on these contracts that,

you know, it is our money. It is our constituents’ money.

So anybody can take that question—put that in a form of a question—and respond to it.

Mr. MOTSEK. I am the lead on that, primarily because it is us.

As we sit here right now, based on the latest census, there are

1,986 major contracts operating within the——

Dr. GINGREY. Nineteen hundred——

Mr. MOTSEK [continuing]. One thousand nine hundred and

eighty-six supporting the Iraqi AOR. So that gives you a scope of

the number of contracts we are talking about today. And when you

talk about contract actions, which are—you know, you do a variety

of things on that—there are tens and thousands of those. So this

is clearly big, big business, in that respect.

What I can assure you and assure the committee, that we have

taken our responsibilities of being effective stewards and supporting the force extraordinarily seriously. Again, I alluded to the fact

that we have put boots on the ground, and our folks are in theater

now doing this work. We have trained them to be contingency contractors versus accepting the normal contracting functions.

There are ways that you can accelerate the process. There are

ways that you can account for things differently, the contingency

operation. There are waivers, but you have to be smart enough to

exercise them, because it is not business as usual.

All things being equal—and it goes back to your particular contractor—generally speaking, the best contract we write is a fixed

price, best performance contract, all right? So the contractor is

forced for a particular price, and then we have based it on best performance. So that may not be the cheapest tug that is available on

19

the market, but it may be the most reliable tug. And if you base

the cost differential, that becomes very, very important.

So we take that very, very seriously. The challenge is, because

we do that, it is a decentralized process, because you have hit the

nail right on the head, sir. The guy on the ground is the one who

knows what is going on. The contracting officer on the ground who

is interfacing directly with the local commander is the one that can

make the decisions and make the support more effective and efficient.

It does not serve us well for me to sit in the Pentagon and try

to make broad pronouncements about something as mundane as

dining facilities, because they have impacts on the ground that are

very, very real and very meaningful. So this is our challenge.

And I gave the chairman the number of contractors out there.

That is not an easy metric to come up with, because it is a decentralized process, and we have to pull those numbers together.

Frankly, we don’t care, from a contractual standpoint, the actual

number of contractors we have on the ground. We care from a security, force protection issue, and our responsibilities to them to protect them and manage them.

But from a contractor on a fixed-price concept, it itself does not

matter. So you are absolutely right, sir. This has been an extraordinary challenge, but we have matured as we go along. You would

see a different process, a different set of oversight today than you

would have seen two or three years ago. We have taken it very seriously.

I am unaware of a contractor, either a contractor let inside of

Iraq or one that is let outside Iraq that supports Iraq, for example,

the Stryker Brigade support contract, where contractors support

the maintenance of those vehicles, where we have had mission failure because of a contractor failed to do that.

We have had contracts that have failed to perform, again, less

than one percent. We have had contractors who have failed to deliver product when they assured us they would deliver a product,

again, one percent, less than one percent. But to my knowledge,

that is a pretty impressive number, frankly, and we have not had

mission failure, because—which I think is your biggest concern.

But it is not just sitting there, waiting for this to happen. These

people are aggressively managing these contracts. We did not have

contractor technical representatives early on in most places, but

now for something, again, as mundane as a dining facility, we have

someone in there that makes the daily assessment of the cleanliness, the quality, the servicing, you know, the whole mundane nine

yards of things that you would come to expect to be standards for

our troops and our people that are being served there.

And that has pushed up the tape. Early on, that was not a consideration. Get the dining facility in; get it serving; get on with it.

And so we have taken that on as we go along.

We are not at 100 percent. Don’t let me, you know, paint a completely rosy picture. We have lessons learned going on every day.

One of the things we have to do to get our hands on this is consolidate where we can, consolidate contracts, because we tend to just

let contracts as a need arises and, as over time, it serves and it

20

is in our interest to start consolidating these down to a more manageable level.

And so we are in the process of doing that, as we speak, as well.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony this

morning and each of you for your service to the country, as well.

We greatly appreciate it.

And particularly you, Mr. Motsek, please give your son our best

wishes and our thanks for his service.

Mr. Motsek used the phrase ‘‘effective stewardship’’ a few minutes ago. And, Ms. Patterson, I want to ask you about some concerns we have about effective stewardship at the Joint Police

Training Academy in Jordan (JIPTC).

Two months ago, the chairman led members of this subcommittee and others to a visit to Iraq, and Jordan, and Kuwait, Brussels.

And one of the stops was at the police training academy in Jordan,

which I will call the JIPTC for purposes of our discussion.

In your testimony, you note that more than 54,000 Iraqi police

recruits have been trained in the basic training at the JIPTC.

When we visited the JIPTC, we were told—now, let me preface this

by saying, I was very impressed by the quality of the work by the

people running by the JIPTC. They were sincere, and they are very

competent. They are very committed to their mission. And I have

no doubt that they do a very good job training police recruits.

My concern is the quality of the recruits coming in and what

happens when they leave. We were essentially told that referrals

to the JIPTC were done by the Iraqi government without a significant background check. Whomever they sent got trained. There is

a biometric identification process when recruits arrive, but that

process is not then matched against any database, we were told, so

that we can determine who, in fact, is coming in the front door of

the academy.

Is that so? Do we know who was coming in the front door of the

JIPTC?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Let me first say, Congressman, that basically the role of the trainers and the officers at JIPTC is not to

handle recruitment, nor is it to handle deployment after they return.

But on the recruitment side, it is CPATT that handles recruitment, and I know they are working vigorously to improve the recruitment process and the vetting process. But the biometric thing

that you saw there—and I have seen it myself—is a feedback mechanism to develop databases——

Mr. ANDREWS. If I may, who is responsible for the recruitment

of people coming into the JIPTC?

Ambassador PATTERSON. CPATT, the civilian police mission handles recruitment. Certainly in the early stages—I am not trying to

duck your question.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Certainly in the early stages there was

a problem with recruiting and with vetting. They have been running these names against existing Iraqi criminal databases, and

21

one figure that sticks in my mind—and this is a better question for

DOD than for ourselves—they have gotten rid of over 3,000 people,

because they have found criminal records on these individuals.

So this is an ongoing challenge. You bet, it is an ongoing challenge. But there has been some improvement——

Mr. ANDREWS. Here is the specific question I am asking. When

a recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a year ago,

did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we have to rely

upon who they said they were?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Could you get the answer for us?

Ambassador PATTERSON. We will ask CPATT to give you the answer.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay.

Second is, when this biometric database was up and running,

against what was it checked? So if we collect someone’s biometric

information, did we check it against a database that would have

identified a Shiite militia fighter or an al Qaeda member? Did we

or did we not?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, we will have to take most of that for the

record, but when you talk about those specific sub-elements, part

of the databases that are referenced—and, again, you are only as

good as your databases, as you are alluding to—are the field interviews and the field records that are prepared by the military side

of the house. So that is included in the——

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask you this specific question. If, in March

of 2004, a suspected al Qaeda fighter is arrested and detained in

Iraq, and he or she is then biometrically identified when they are

held in Baghdad, and then they are released for whatever reason,

and then they use a different name and enroll in the JIPTC, would

we know that the person who enrolled in JIPTC was that suspected

al Qaeda fighter?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think so.

Mr. ANDREWS. You think so. How would we know that?

Ambassador PATTERSON. We can’t—because we have fingerprint

checks. And we will get you more definition here, but there is a fingerprint check, and it does get checked against Iraqi databases. So

I think that would be the case. We need to get——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.]

Mr. ANDREWS. That is not what we were told by the people running the JIPTC.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Okay, well, we need to get you more

precision——

Mr. ANDREWS. What they told us 60 days ago was that a large

majority of the people who came through the front door were not

checked against any existing database. Could you clarify that difference for me?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right, the second question I have is about cost.

Our research indicates that, by the time the chairman led the

CODEL to the JIPTC, that the American taxpayers had spent

22

about $600 million, $150 million to construct the facility, $450 million in operating costs through the time that we were there. Is that

accurate?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Not quite, Congressman. My figure is

$500 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you think it is $500 million?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, and I can give you the figures with

some precision.

Mr. ANDREWS. So that is roughly $10,000 per recruit, right?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I can break it down for you. Yes,

it has been very expensive.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, in your testimony you say it was about

50,000 recruits; $500 million would be $10,000 a recruit for an

eight-week course. So this would be the equivalent, on a year-long

course, of about $50,000 to $60,000 a year for a recruit?

Ambassador PATTERSON. I suppose so.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you know how—what did we spend to recruit

and train police personnel in the rest of the world? Is it anywhere

near $50,000 a year on an annualized basis?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Oh, what do we train in other countries? No, but it is not cheap, either. I will get you those figures.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know about what it is?

Ambassador PATTERSON. In a place like Haiti, what do we

train—I guess between $25,000 and $30,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. But why does it cost twice as much to train people

in Jordan for the JIPTC for Iraq? Why would it cost twice as much?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, let me sort of walk through some

of the costs—there. First, there was the construction costs, which

was about $150 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. Which accounts for less than 30 percent of the

$500 million.

Ambassador PATTERSON. And then we have our agreement with

the government of Jordan, which reimburses them for fuel and utilities.

Mr. ANDREWS. It costs more for utilities in Jordan than it does

in Haiti?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I can’t answer that, Congressman.

But, yes, it is an expensive operation.

But let me go back to why this camp was set up, this training

center was set up. First of all, it was set up under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). And it was, frankly, a very urgent requirement to get a training center set up quickly that would train large

numbers of Iraqi police. It started training in November of 2003.

It switched over to basically a State Department contract in

2004. And we renegotiated the arrangement with the government

of Jordan and I think have done a pretty good job of reducing those

costs. But, yes, it is an expensive facility, but it is also been, I

think, as you know, a very effective one in training——

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, let’s talk about its effectiveness. What database exists as to what the 54,000 graduates are doing today?

Ambassador PATTERSON. None that I know of.

Mr. ANDREWS. So we don’t know where these 54,000 people are?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Not with any degree of precision.

23

Mr. ANDREWS. So we don’t know how many are police officers,

right? We don’t know how many have gone and done something

else. Do we know how many are fighting for the Shia or Sunni militia or for al Qaeda?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, no, we don’t. We don’t

know how many are still on the job, because we are not in a position to monitor that.

Mr. ANDREWS. I must say, coming back to this point of effective

stewardship, what we found exasperating on this trip was that the

academy appears to be doing a very good job of training people how

to detect an IED and how to prevent it from exploding and killing

people, how to conduct a house-to-house search, how to identify

ways that we might break the back of the resistance.

Common sense tells me that some percentage of the 54,000 people who went through this, who we don’t know anything about, are,

in fact, members of that resistance or members of those militia or

members of al Qaeda who are learning the very techniques we are

using to defend our people. I think this is outrageous.

And I am interested in hearing from you, why don’t we have a

tracking device to find out where these 54,000 people are?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, we will have to take that

question and bring it back to CPATT. But let me emphasize that

I know, on CPATT’s behalf, that they are working very vigorously

with the Ministry of Interior to develop such a tracking system,

largely through the financial system.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Motsek, is the Department of Defense tracking through CPATT these trainees?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, I have to take that for the record. I don’t know

the—I know about the biometrics, but I understand what your concern is.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Whose responsibility within the DOD is CPATT?

Mr. MOTSEK. CPATT falls under MNSTC–I, which falls under

Multinational Force Iraq, which is today General Petraeus.

Mr. ANDREWS. But who in Washington is responsible for that?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, I don’t know.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would like to know that.

Again, I am not an expert, Mr. Chairman, on this issue, but here

is what I know: We have been told that we have spent $500 million. We have been told that 54,000 people have gone through this

program. We have been, on site by the people running the facility,

that most of them did not have a background check, so we don’t

know who they were when they came in.

And given the circumstances, it is probable that some of them

were Sunni militia, Shiite militia, or al Qaeda fighters, who we

then trained on how we are defending our people. They then left.

And we hear this morning that we do not know whether there is—

as a matter of fact, Ms. Patterson tells us the State Department

doesn’t have a database, Mr. Motsek tells us he doesn’t know

whether the DOD has a database as to where these people are.

24

I would be astonished if it were not true that some percentage

of these graduates are out there attacking our forces today, after

we have spent $500 million on this.

The final question I have for you is——

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Andrews, just on that point, what was interesting about it was, it seemed, in the screening process, the only

Iraqis who they screened out were Iraqis who had already been

trained prior to—in other words, they had the fingerprints of somebody who had already gone through the training, who would come

back to the facility to be trained again under a different name,

however—for a refresher course—under a different name. However,

because of the system with the fingerprinting, we were able, it

seems, to weed those people out, but I don’t think there——

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, if the chairman will recall, the other thing

that we found very disconcerting is that we asked, who was expelled and on what basis? Because we were told by the leaders of

the academy they do expel people. And the basis for expulsion for

really misbehavior during the training course. So this means that,

if an al Qaeda member was polite for eight weeks, they stayed, and

they learned all of it.

I mean, here is the final question I have for you. How many people are being trained at the JIPTC this morning?

Ambassador PATTERSON. This morning?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think we started our corrections program at 830.

Mr. ANDREWS. Eight hundred and thirty people.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Or in the process of arriving. This is a

new course, Congressman, for corrections officials.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many Iraqi police are being trained at the

facility this morning?

Ambassador PATTERSON. None.

Mr. ANDREWS. None? So all the Iraqi police are now being

trained somewhere else in Iraq?

Ambassador PATTERSON. In Iraq.

Mr. ANDREWS. This is after we spent $150 million on the facility,

we are not training Iraqi police anymore? Why is that?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Because they are being trained in Iraq.

And the idea is that we don’t want to continue paying the overhead

on what you aptly described is a very expensive facility, if we have

no reason to use it.

Mr. ANDREWS. But how does it make sense, from a cost management perspective, to incur an entirely different set of overhead for

new places in Iraq that I assume we are paying for, as well?

Ambassador PATTERSON. We are not paying for them. That function has been largely turned over to the Iraqis.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Iraqi government is paying for these training

facilities?

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Iraqi—yes, again, this is a question

more appropriately addressed to CPATT, but the training function

has been largely turned over the Iraqis.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Motsek, are we paying any of the overhead

in those new facilities or are the Iraqis paying for all of it?

25

Mr. MOTSEK. I will never say 100 percent for anything, but we

will take it for the record. And we will get you the split, but the

ambassador is correct that the intent was to turn over to the provincial and regional authorities the responsibilities for this training. And that is part of the continuum to go through it.

I take your point, that your concerned also about the investment

that is already been let in the earlier facility, and what the hell are

we going to do about that? I mean——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 140.]

Mr. ANDREWS. We have $150 million facility that is training 800

corrections officers? I mean, I will tell you, there are corrections

systems around the United States that would probably do it a lot

less expensively than that.

I must say, again—and I appreciate you all inherited this problem—but I am dismayed by the fact that we have spent taxpayers’

money to train people on how to attack our forces. I know that

wasn’t your intent, but because of the sloppiness of the way people

were screened and the failure to create a database as to where people went after they left, that is exactly what we did.

And I eagerly await the explanation as to why it has taken all

this time to create a tracking mechanism to see where these people

have gone after we trained them, because it is scandalous, in my

opinion, we have let this happen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Chairman? I think the CPATT is under MNSTC–

I, which I think is General Dempsey. I think that is——

Mr. ANDREWS. With whom we met, as you recall, in Iraq.

Mr. AKIN. Yes, that is the one that should know all those answers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I certainly hope that DOD would provide us

with those answers promptly. Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Motsek, we seem to do a better job of keeping

track of Security Forces—in other words, when we are training

Iraqi security forces—because you see the statistics that a certain

percentage of those who are trained go home. A certain percentage

don’t show up. A certain percentage, once the paychecks are given,

go home to their families, and sometimes we don’t hear from them

again.

Why is it that we are able to set up this system where we can

keep track of those security forces that we train, but in this instance of this—as Mr. Andrews has aptly described—very expensive police training facility, did we not think to set up a system to

figure out how many of the 54,000 showed up for work, how many

become sergeants, how many are leading their departments’?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, the—and I am going to have to give you a general comment, because this is relatively—it is new to me—but

there is a fundamental difference between what you and I would

call the Ministry of Defense side of the house, the military side of

the house, and the police side of the house. And the fundamental

difference is—and it is just like in this country—the bulk of the

armed forces report directly, one way or another, to the Ministry

of Defense.

26

There is a line authority to the Ministry of Defense. If you go to

the grand state of Arkansas today, what percentage of the law enforcement activity within the state of Arkansas reports directly to

the Federal agency, the Department of Justice? And I would submit to you it is probably way less than one percent.

With the law enforcement side of the house—and I hope the ambassador can elaborate, if necessary—you have a decentralized regionalization issue, where the police force fundamentally is going

to end up working for the provincial governor, not for the Ministry

of the Interior. So you have, in my mind, there is a complicating

factor.

The piece that I am familiar with, as Congressman Andrews

talked about, is the biometrics piece. Once I get the person in the

system, and the system is now more sophisticated than a simple

fingerprint, we can find him after the fact, if something happens.

But his concern, how are we positively tracking him, as opposed to,

you know, tracking him as an event occurs. And I understand the

difference that he is asking.

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, we can identify—but we can’t necessarily find

him. I mean, we can identify him, right?

Mr. MOTSEK. If an event occurs and he is picked up again, or

something of that nature, we can, with certainty, say who this person is now. We have a good biometrics system in place.

What Congressman Andrews was concerned about is, how do you

track him, from the time he graduates, to where he is at any given

day? And we do a relatively decent job, as you noticed, on the military side. We can tell you, on a daily basis, X percent of these people reported for duty, X number deployed——

Mr. MEEHAN. Right. But my question is, why can’t we do it on

the police side? I understand the jurisdictional issues, but it seems

to me that—it really was stunning, not to mention—the question

I want to get at is, now they are training in Iraq, in the Baghdad

area, where violence is clearly, if you consider where they were

when this facility opened, I can’t imagine or the facilities are even

close to what they are in Jordan.

And whose decision was it to transfer the training of Iraqis back

to Baghdad? And is anybody keeping track of the quality of the

training of the police that is taking place at these fragmented facilities around the Baghdad?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Could I answer your other question

first, about why this is so hard to monitor? And it goes back to

what Congressman Andrews was saying.

Mr. MEEHAN. Yes, but my question isn’t, why is it so difficult?

I get it. I have a grasp on why it would be difficult.

Ambassador PATTERSON. A thousand different police—1,000 police stations. That is the short answer, and provincial and district

control.

Mr. MEEHAN. I just want to know why we have been able to do

it on the security side and not on the police side.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Because these people are dispersed all

over the country.

Mr. MEEHAN. Aren’t they on the security side, though? We

train——

27

Ambassador PATTERSON. They are under provincial and district

control, as Mr. Motsek was saying, just like there would be under—

they are a highly decentralized system, just like they would be in

the United States. So it is very hard to get at—and it is very hard

to get out and monitory these stations. That has been a challenge

throughout this entire program. That is why the IPLOs, the police

liaison officers, are paired with military units to get out there and

monitor these.

But it is a highly decentralized system. And I know the way we

did this in Afghanistan was to work through the payroll system,

and I believe this is what is CPATT is doing now.

Mr. MOTSEK. They are trying to do now.

Mr. MEEHAN. So we are trying to do that now? But what about

the other question?

Ambassador PATTERSON. The other question, about the training?

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Andrews said we have spent $150 million to

set up this—what I would say is—a state-of-the-art facility in Jordan. And then somebody makes a decision. It seems to me the Iraqi

government made the decision that they preferred training the

Iraqi police force in and around Baghdad at these facilities that,

frankly, my guess is, given the tours that I took, probably is nowhere near the quality of the facility that we spent $150 million

to construct in Baghdad.

My question is—monitoring the type of training that they are

getting in these new locations in and around Baghdad? And do we

monitor the effect, downward, I would say, in terms of the quality

of the training that the Iraqi police are not getting outside of this

facility in Jordan?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Again, that is a question more appropriately directed to CPATT, but my understanding is, yes, they intend to have people in these academies in Iraq. It was always envisioned that we would phase out the Jordanian police academy and

revert it back to the Jordanians. That was always—because, as

Congressman Andrews has pointed out, it was very expensive, and

that the Iraqis would take this over.

But I think the answer to your question—again, we need to take

that back to CPATT and get you more precision, but they are planning to monitor the training in the various police academies in

Iraq. It is not just in Baghdad.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, can I just ask one more thing?

Mr. MEEHAN. Let me just say on that point. Here is what I believe: I believe that, at some point, the Iraqis, who are involved

with the police, decided that they no longer wanted to have training take place in Jordan, so they are setting up their own training

in and around Baghdad. And my belief is that the quality of training, whether they be al Qaeda, whether they be—regardless of who

they are, the quality of their training cannot be anywhere near

what the quality of their training was in Jordan.

And to spend that much money and then not have a sense of

what is happening to, you know, the facilities these people are

being trained in—it was clear to all of us, I think, on the trip that

we have this state-of-the-art facility in Jordan, and somehow the

decision has been made that they were going to be trained in Baghdad and at a number of locations. Nobody can even tell you—no

28

one knows about a location where they would train police in Baghdad, let alone the quality of the training.

So that is my point. After spending all this money, it is clear to

me that the training isn’t even—even if we could track people, is

now much lower quality.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Ms. Patterson, one thing I would say, you said it

was the plan all along to phase out the JIPTC.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Right.

Mr. ANDREWS. Was there ever any discussion of recovering some of the costs from the Jordanians, since we spent $150 million to

build it? Did we have a plan that said we are going to train people

for a few years and then leave and walk away from $150 million

investment?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, that was essentially the plan.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have the Jordanians pick up the cost?

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Jordanians are in control of half

the camp, and we are using—if I could come back to the other point

on the corrections officers—we are using the other half, CPATT

and INL and the Department of Justice, to train these correction

officers who will participate in guarding prisoners who are picked

up in the surge.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are the Jordanians paying us rent for using half

the camp?

Ambassador PATTERSON. No, it belongs to them. We had two

agreements with them. It reverts back to the Jordanian government.

Mr. ANDREWS. So we gave it to them?

Ambassador PATTERSON. It always belonged to them.

Mr. ANDREWS. But we paid for it.

Ambassador PATTERSON. We paid for the construction.

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Hindsight is wonderful.

The question that Dr. Snyder mentioned, are there any American

contractors held in Iraqi prisons under Iraqi judicial authority for

criminals? That is kind of what you were trying to get to, wasn’t

it? Are there any Americans held by the Iraqis? A lot of head turning.

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, I will take it first. I am personally unaware of

anyone being held in an Iraqi prison, U.S.—you are talking about

U.S. citizens?

Mr. CONAWAY. Right.

Mr. MOTSEK. Being held in an Iraqi prison.

Mr. SWARTZ. If I may add to that, there are, I believe, individuals

who may be dual nationals or others that are held, but not necessarily in connection with contracting——

Mr. CONAWAY. So there are contractors that we had put in place

that the Iraqi judicial system is now responsible for?

Mr. MOTSEK. No, sir. None that I am aware of. We will go back

and try to verify, but I am aware of no U.S. personnel or U.S. contractor that is being held by the Iraqis.

Mr. CONAWAY. I also agree with Dr. Snyder. This is obviously a

huge subject to spend an hour and a half on to try to even begin

29

to start at it. Your role is obviously to come in here and put the

absolute best foot forward, your organizations, and I understand

that.

But, together, our role is to try to get it right. And parts of my

frustration is, this system, this deal doesn’t allow you to share

often with us what is not working. We heard about all the stuff

that you have done, and it is positive, and all those kinds of things,

but I don’t think anybody remotely thinks that the Iraqi justice

system, the Iraqi police system, any of those Iraqi functions are

working the way that we would want to.

And to the extent that we still have a role in that, I understand

the chairman’s frustration, in that sovereign government’s going to

make decisions that we disagree with, but it is their government.

If they decide to move all the training to Baghdad, and it is on

their nickel, you know, that is one of the joys of working with a

partner that gets to control their deal. They make decisions that

we don’t necessarily agree with.

On a second comment, I was in a hearing yesterday in which the

Department of Agriculture was complaining about not being able to

contract for stenographers, hearing reporters, and how difficult

that was for them. And they were using that as an excuse as to

why it took so long to make certain changes in the milk program.

Last time I checked, I don’t think we have had an IED or a gunfight at any of those hearings, so figuring out how you find contractors, and how you manage those contractors, and how you get rid

of the bad ones and keep the good ones, can you talk to us—I am

a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by background, and so I have

a sheet in here that is labeled ‘‘Exhibit E’’ from some place, that

says somebody did some sort of an audit—they use that phrase—

$3.2 billion has been looked at.

How do you coordinate—obviously, you have three different organizations at the table. You all have your own funding streams. You

all have your own ideas about how—how do you coordinate between each other just the review of contractors? Or do your contractors just work for you and you are solely responsible for that

work?

In other words, how do you manage that contractor group? Do

you ever actually fire somebody? And not these individual folks

who are actually providing the work, but I am talking about the

DynCorps and the umbrella folks, who actually you looked at first.

How do you set up a system to evaluate those guys or do you, I

guess is a better question?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, we are principally responsible for contract execution.

Mr. CONAWAY. Even on the State Department side?

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, it is not an easy question to answer, because,

as I said, this is a rather unique lash-up. And what will happen

is, we have two sets of overriding direction on what we are doing.

We have the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the acquisition

regulations, but then we also have the FMR, the financial management regulations. So those are the two big, broad contexts, big

muscle moves, CPA-oriented-type documents we have to operate

under.

30

If you are sitting in Iraq and working and supporting Ministry

of Interior (MOI), the dollars that probably started with an appropriation from Congress that went to DOD as part of the supplemental, that were then shopped to state, as per the direction, and

then those dollars would then be executed on behalf of state by the

Department of Defense for a variety of contracts.

Another portion of those dollars—for example, which may be materiel related—may go directly to the Department of Defense. And

we will execute the materiel order, that part of it—for example, if

we have a truck issue, and the tank and automotive command in

Warren, Michigan, has to deal with it, they deal with it directly.

So it is a fairly complex set of moving parts, but the intent was

to keep an audit trail of the dollars, fundamentally. And then we,

in the contracting side, under the FAR and our Defense Federal

Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), would follow behind, but it was the

audit trail of dollars that takes priority number one.

With regards to quality, I will keep on coming back to the fact

that, yes, we are extraordinarily concerned. And both things have

happened. We have released contractor personnel, the individual.

We have fired contractors for non-performance, as well. But at this

point in time, our records indicate that is less than one percent of

what is going on, because our contracting officers are now actively

engaged, I mean actively engaged in what is going on, on the

ground.

That is not to say that, as a contractor closes out, and we go to

the final table to start laying out the bills, what is a reasonable

charge, what is an unreasonable charge, that is not to say that that

is an easy process.

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me just make one comment. The cynics among

us could say, well, the one percent is because we are not doing a

very good job of looking at the whole picture, you know, your

threshold of failure is really low. That is not the case, is it?

Mr. MOTSEK. I can only refer to—the document you were referring to was a DOD Inspector General (IG) that specifically was

looking at the $5 billion-plus associated with this part of the process. And it was a very favorable assessment.

I mean, we have had inspections by SGIR, the DOD IG, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the like, where warts are

found. You are always going to find warts. But what I would caution us all is check to see if it is an auditable wart or it is before

the close-out process.

I mean, we are in negotiations today—it is public record—where

the Army, under their LOGCAP contract, said, ‘‘You will not hire

security personnel under LOGCAP. We, the military, will provide

your security.’’ As we dug through the process and because you

have contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, which is the

challenge to manage, it turned up there was a $19.8 million bill inside of LOGCAP that was attached to security. And we have thus

far refused to pay that bill, and we will not pay that bill, in all likelihood, because they were not supposed to enter into that sort of

contract.

It is extraordinarily challenging—you have hit the nail right on

the head—because we focus primarily on the major contractor, the

major contractor that we hire, because then there is a separate set

31

of contractual relationships between him and his subcontractors,

and that is how the system is designed. So when I go back and

start digging out and giving you contract numbers, it is a challenge

to start building that pyramid of what is going on.

We are developing—and some of your staff have gotten a little

bit of background on it—an automated system. It is already out

there now in an early version, where I can take a contractor’s CAT

card, or his I.D. card, and I can swipe it. And I can tell you who

he works for, what he works for, where he is supposed to be, what

his privileges are, what his privileges aren’t. I have a copy of his

passport in the database. I have a pretty good system from what

is going on.

If he goes to a dining facility to eat, and he is not supposed to

eat there, it picks him up. I am not interested if he is not entitled

to eat there; what I am interested is charging that contractor for

that meal. I mean, that is the important part.

So we have to get out of the stubby pencil way of doing business,

which is, frankly, what we are doing. But as I told the chairman

those numbers, that took us 45 days to develop those numbers for

him and for the rest of Congress. And it took us another 45 days

to get the latest set of numbers, which will be available in May.

And our effort is, is to get our automated system up and running.

We have roughly 60,000 of the contractors in the system right now.

Our folks have been out there deploying this thing very rapidly.

Part of its success is tied to the passing of the supplemental, because some of the dollars for their material is in the supplemental.

But in the long term, it is going to be to the point, I can assure

you, where next time the chairman takes a delegation over there

you are going to be carrying one of my cards in your pocket, because I am going to be able to prove you ate in dining facility X,

and you were manifested on an aircraft on this particular place, because I have to know where you are. It is not just good enough to

know who your contractor was, but, you know, there are always potential liabilities for exposure of things in the future. I want an

audit trail of where you have been while you have been in theater.

So that is being very aggressively developed. The Undersecretary

is solidly behind it. And I have to be blunt about it. Something that

should take five, seven, nine years to deploy, we are deploying in

roughly a year. I mean, if I was here before you a year ago, I would

have said zero people were in an automated database. Now I have

60,000 contractors in the database, and that is making extraordinary progress.

So we aren’t there yet. That is what I am trying to tell you. We

are not there yet, but we are driving in that direction. So I am not

trying to make it all through rose-colored glasses, but we understand the sensitivity of knowing these issues. And we have tried

to develop the processes and put them in place so that we can do

it.

We have learned from not having a joint contracting command

on the ground early on. We learned. We thought we could do it one

way. It doesn’t work. We are in the process of developing the concept so we institutionalize that idea. So next time, if there was a

next one, and you took a delegation over there, you would have a

belly button to push and say, ‘‘I want to know about contracting

32

in this theater,’’ instead of having, you know, to get your questions

and come out of theater. You have someone in theater now that

should address that.

And, more importantly, the commander on the ground now has

a central belly button to push when he has questions about contracting, which, quite frankly, he did not have early on. So we have

stumbled, to be sure, but we are making improvements.

The last thing I would reiterate, again, it is a decentralized process. Heads of contracting agencies in the states, head of contracting

agency in Iraq, they all issue contracts, and they are all individually responsible for the quality of those contracts.

Part of my new mandate in my new office is develop a systematic

way of making assessments and audits of those contracts. Right

now, we tend to take a arithmetic approach to it, a statistical approach to check, or, if we hear something about a contract, we will

go in there and audit it, if something is brought up before us. We

have to get more proactive about it and come up with an analytical

process where we get in front of this thing and we just routinely

and constantly are taking over and working the analytics and the

auditing so that we are not surprised by the alleged $19.8 million

loss. We have known about it before it hits the papers.

Mr. CONAWAY. What do you all need going forward to get to the

success level that you want? What is it that you are not getting or

that you do need from us, State, Justice, DOD?

Mr. MEEHAN. Either statutorily—I was going to ask the question—statutorily, can we change a law? What do we need to do?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I think, as Mr. Motsek has put so

eloquently, I think one of the main issues was the sort of overwhelming of the administrative system, certainly in both State and

DOD. And I don’t think we need anything more from you statutorily or legislatively, but I think, at least from my operation, as

I mentioned, we need to hire a lot more people to do these invoice

reviews and these contract close-outs, because that is the only way

we are going to recover for the taxpayer what to do.

And that is going to be highly labor-intensive and not cheap, but

we are committed to doing that on all our contracts.

Mr. SWARTZ. And I should add, as well, the Department of Justice, both with regard to the MPRI contract generally that deals

with support to ICITAP, and in particular with regard to Iraq, has

taken steps itself to ensure that that is properly audited, controlled

both by our Justice management division, our criminal division administrative office, and with regard to the individuals in Iraq, both

working with CPATT and directly through our personnel, our—personnel in Iraq, to ensure that they are performing the tasks that

have been sent to them.

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, two things. One, in 2007, Congress passed the

National Defense Authorization Act, and as Section 854 in that act,

which, among other things, prescribed the Office of the Secretary

of Defense (OSD) victim for contracting, which is me now, but we

need help is giving us a chance to implement.

There are some time hacks in there, where we have to come back

to the Hill and tell you how we are doing, but we are aggressively

taking that. But I would like to be able to come and my people

33

would like to be able to come tell you where we stand at any given

date so you can see the progress made.

But I honestly got to tell you, you have to give us a chance to

implement it, because a lot of people are demanding a lot of information, and a lot of sub-element pieces that we are trying to pull

together to give you a coherent package. So, from a personal standpoint, if we can have the chance to actually implement that, which

we are aggressively doing, and I fully support it, it is a logical

thing for us to have to do. And it was a very good piece of legislation, which we are following as best that we can.

The second piece is just——

Mr. MEEHAN. Excuse me. On the first piece, does that mean you

think that, in the defense authorization bill, there should be an adjustment in the language?

Mr. MOTSEK. No, sir, just give me a chance to implement what

you got, because we are pushing the envelope. But I am more than

willing to come up and let you know where we stand on any given

day as to how we are doing and implementing, and then the warts

will become obvious where I have a problem.

And the second piece of that will be that—and this is just for

your information now—it would be premature for me to ask for

your direct help, but just to be aware of it, is that the contractor

personnel issue is bigger than the Department of Defense. You

Members of Congress keep on talking about the AOR in general.

And we are backing into the control of that.

The field, the commander in the field has published fraggos that

talk about the responsibility of non-DOD contractors to report into

our automated system so we can get a feel for them. It is very important, as I said early on, the man in the field, I am principally

interested for the numbers, for the sake of a security and force protection. And so, at some point in time, we may need assistance in

making that a forcing function, if we can’t get it through fraggos

in the field and compliance at DFAR. So we may come back to you

for some help there.

Mr. SWARTZ. And, Mr. Conaway and Mr. Chairman, if I may add,

as a general matter, I think that hearings that let us explore the

importance of technical assistance and developmental work with

regard to security forces and police forces around the world are

very useful to highlight, I think, the important work that is being

done by the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and

DOD. And it is seldom recognized, but it is critical, we believe, to

our national security interests.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here.

It is clear this is very complicated. I think, Ms. Patterson, you

probably put it best when you said that the requirement here has

outstripped our efforts, and a lot of catching up to do. About how

long has it been, then, since you feel that you actually are moving

in a direction that is going to accomplish results? How long has it

been, if at all? Where do you think that has been, the last year——

Ambassador PATTERSON. For my own operation, I have been here

about a year and a half, but I would put it well before that, about

34

two years. We started to do a number of intensive, internal reviews

of DPCK, of our own operation, of our contracting. We called in our

own inspector general on some questionable issues with our contractor.

Just this year, as Mr. Motsek says, the critical issue has been

getting the contracting officers out to the field. We, too, I think

made perhaps the same mistake DOD made, which was largely to

protect our personnel and try to do this sort of back-office operations in Dubai and Jordan, and we realized that that wouldn’t

work, because they didn’t have the granulary that they needed.

So I would say—and it gets better every day. I must tell you, it

gets better every day. I think that this broad invoice review will

return a lot of value to the contractor.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess we could, in some ways, thank

the Oversight Committee, because has that played a role at all?

You said getting your numbers together—and I want to thank the

chairman, because I question whether or not we would have this

information if we weren’t sitting today or, you know, in the course

of time—I don’t know whether you would have had those

numbers——

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, certainly, and I would like to say

the inspector general for—the special inspector general for Iraq has

played a very constructive role in this entire process. He has a lot

of people in Iraq. We have worked with him very cordially and constructively, and they have had lots of useful suggestions.

Our own IG, the GAO, this has been subject to—certainly in the

last two years, not only to congressional oversight, GAO, but a lot

of very useful oversight. And I think we have gotten our act together a lot better.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

I am going to move on, because I do have a few questions. I appreciate—and you may want to add your responses later.

Part of the difficulty, of course, is that we have this opportunity

today, but the general public has really been hearing stories about

contractors. The Washington Post had an article not too long ago

about the Triple Canopy employees. And at the end of that article,

it referenced who really was in charge there. And I guess the

CENTCOM spokesperson said that it wasn’t a CENTCOM issue; it

is whoever is running the contract.

I think we come back to how the use of contractors have created

problems, in terms of chain of command, and who really is responsible for the contractors’ actions. So which government agency actually does own the ISF training mission?

Mr. SWARTZ. With regard to police, I believe that responsibility

has been delegated to CPATT in the Department of Defense, the

civilian police’s training team.

Mr. MOTSEK. That is correct.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And in terms then of prosecution of

contractors, do we know how many contractors have actually been

prosecuted for illegal acts in the country?

Mr. SWARTZ. Congresswoman, we can get you those figures. The

Department of Justice has been working closely with Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), with regard to any

allegations of criminal conduct.

35

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You don’t know today how many prosecutors have been——

Mr. SWARTZ. How many contractors have been prosecuted? I

would have to check to get you the exact number in that regard.

And, obviously, there would be sensitivities about ongoing investigations, but I will discuss with my colleagues and with SIGIR to

get you the appropriate figures.

Mr. MOTSEK. And, ma’am, you are talking beyond CPATT? You

are talking about all contractors? I think that is the question you

are asking.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. No, particularly contracted by DOD.

Mr. SWARTZ. I am sorry, I misunderstood your question. I

thought you meant in the broadest sense.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Well, I am thinking about, even the

DynCorp—the Triple Canopy employees, for example.

Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, DOD contracts——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. DOD contracts. Do we know how

many have been prosecuted?

Mr. MOTSEK. No.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do we think there are any?

Mr. SWARTZ. Well, there have been a range of investigations and

some criminal prosecutions and some convictions coming out of activities related to Iraq. If the question is misconduct within the

context of the contract itself or abuse of the contracts, we would

have to—I would have to get you those figures and break it down.

But, yes, there have been a number of ongoing investigations and

cases that have related to Iraq in one way or another that have involved contractors, not necessarily——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. Individuals who have

been under contract, have been prosecuted? Are there individuals,

per se?

Mr. SWARTZ. We will get you that number.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Andrews asked a number of questions about the identification of any possible al Qaeda or other foreign fighters who have been trained by us, perhaps, in Jordan or

otherwise in Iraq. Of those people who have been picked up, have

any of them been identified through your biometrics that you mentioned?

Mr. MOTSEK. I have no numbers. That is outside my range right

now. But even with the basic fingerprinting process, early on, people were identified, as I told the chairman, after the fact, when

there is—you were able to pick him up because you at least had

his fingerprints on file.

Under the new biometrics, you may have already seen it. You

know, it is ten fingers and a eyeball that you have to place it on.

And if you are working for the U.S. Government, it all ends up

with an access on the card, just like this, that we scan this. It tells

me who you say you are. Then, we can compare immediately in the

field that biometric.

Whether this gets deployed out, that is the next issue, but they

are in the repository record now, which sits in West Virginia. Actually, the repository is physically in West Virginia.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. But how long have we had that process in place? I am just talking about any fighters who have been

36

identified and picked up, whether or not we actually have had information that they were trained.

Mr. MOTSEK. I mean, I believe basic fingerprinting was from day

one. The expansion of biometrics, which is out there now, and they

are doing it, but the broad expansion of them for a variety of purposes in theater, I believe, is tied to the supplemental right now.

There are dollars in the supplemental to force that much more aggressively into theater.

These are technologies that, in the old days, if I was an old acquisition guy, I would tell you it is a five- to seven-year process.

And now, because of where we are and what we are doing, we are

talking in months or a year or two.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are individuals who are picked up in

the field, are they—do we run their fingerprints through a record

to demonstrate whether or not they, in fact, were trained? Are we

doing that?

Ambassador PATTERSON. You mean, picked up in the field, arrested?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes.

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. MOTSEK. I could only tell you they could.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Pardon me?

Mr. MOTSEK. I could tell you they could——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. They could be fingerprinted——

Mr. MOTSEK [continuing]. Because the database is available.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Right. But we are not sure that we

are doing that?

Mr. MEEHAN. Probably what we need to do is bring CPATT before the subcommittee and speak directly with them.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Just a few other question, in terms of

contracts. For example, DynCorp, you mentioned that people need

five years of experience in police work in order to train Iraqi personnel. Do we think that that is enough? And are they bringing the

skill sets that are really necessary to do that job?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congresswoman, is it enough? I think,

as I mentioned before, we have been satisfied with the quality of

the personnel. And many people, I might add, have vastly more experience than that. Certainly some of the more senior people out

there have 20, 30 years of police experience, and they are basically

doing this as a patriotic effort to help out the war effort.

So I wouldn’t say that—that is the minimum, but I wouldn’t say

it is the average. My own personal observation is that many of

these people are retired police officers, quite senior police officers,

with a lot more experience than five years. But if we can get a precise figure, we will average them.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Chairman, just one other question. I know that in our next panel one of the comments was made

that, in fact, the perception is that, when we use contractors, it is

perhaps less of a U.S. commitment than DOD forces. What do you

think? Do you think that that is a perception? Is that real? And

have you ran into that?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congresswoman, no, I mean, these people are enormously patriotic. And as I mentioned 17 of them have

died in the line of duty, and one is seriously injured today. Most

37

of these people—and I have talked a lot with them when I have

out there—they do this because they are patriotic. They do this because they want to impart the skills that they have learned. They

do this because they believe in the mission, and we try and offer

an attractive financial package to attract them.

Mr. SWARTZ. And if I could add, Congresswoman, with regard to

the individuals that ICITAP brings on, since we do integrate them

into an existing Federal law enforcement structure through our Department of Justice office, I think we try and build the team concept, with them reporting up through our career personnel, and

those career personnel working to build them and, as a concept,

working together.

Mr. MOTSEK. And the question cannot be and/or. We must use

contractors. They are an integral part of our force. I mean, they are

literally the fifth force provider that we have today, under the way

we are organized today and how we are structured. So we have to

use them, as we sit here right now. So we do not have the luxury

of saying, ‘‘We are going to do it this way instead of that other

way.’’

My son, again, is an EOD officer. In a perfect world, military

EOD types would teach military EOD training to the Iraqi and

Afghani counterparts. There aren’t enough of them. And so you

have had to take contractors to do that. The bulk of them are retired military, and they go on over. And has been alluded to, they

are every bit as patriotic and committed to the mission as any of

our folks are.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I am not questioning their patriotism.

I am just wondering about the perceptions in the field. And, of

course, there are tensions, and we know that. And I would say that

chain of command is obviously an important one, as well.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And to the panelists, I join my colleagues on both sides to say

thank you for—it sounds like an impossible job, that you are trying

to find possible—I sit here in amazement. We have a different responsibility.

Obviously, the responsibility we have is multi-faced, but we also

have to think that, at some point in the future, there has got to

be some stabilization in Iraq. And yet I look at Mr. Swartz—I appreciate your comments, and I have heard you when you have said,

in your comments, difficulty, long term, to create a satisfactory, I

guess, police force or justice system. Can you give me, in a short

answer, what is your definition of long term?

Mr. SWARTZ. Well, sir, I think that each set of circumstances requires its own answer, in that regard. We have been in some of the

Balkan countries, for example, for almost a decade or more, in

terms of building a justice system there.

We are talking about reconstructing in Iraq, or constructing, if

you will, almost from the ground up, a justice system that meets

the standards we would consider, not just as U.S. standards, but

international standards, of a system that recognizes and respects

human rights, affords due process.

38

I think we have found willing counterparts in a variety of different parts of the justice system of Iraq. And, in particular, I

would point out that the judges have shown remarkable courage

and tenacity over the time period in working with our prosecutors

there.

But I don’t know that I could give you a time estimate, in terms

of number of years. But I can say that the people we have sent out

are fully dedicated to this mission and continue to believe that it

is a mission worth trying to perform. We have a number of Federal

prosecutors, as I mentioned, who work on a daily basis with the

judges. The Department of Justice has indicated its commitment to

Ambassador Crocker to increase its rule of law, work in Iraq, and

to help formulate how we go forward, so that this is a task, regardless of how monumental and long term, that we are fully engaged

in and wish to continued to be engaged in, because we think it is

an important task.

Mr. JONES. Well, I think for those of us in Congress—and, obviously, we, on the House side, have two-year contracts. And at the

end of two years, we either are renewed or not renewed.

The problem that frustrates me is that I can’t say to the people

that I represent—and I have listened to the military. I have listened to the professionals, like yourselves. And you get to a point

that this great nation is borrowing money from other countries to

pay the bills.

And I realize this is not what you are testifying on today, but the

point is that, when I, as one Member of Congress—and that is all

I am—when I listen to what you are saying—and, Ms. Patterson,

thank you for your service, your comments. And you said this is not

a Haiti. Well, you know, I understand what you were saying and

what you meant.

But the problem is, we have to show the American people—that

is why the Democrats are in the majority, and I am a Republican.

But I knew a year ago that the American people were frustrated

and dissatisfied because we were not able to really—I think this is

one of the best things that the Democrats have done, is to step up

this subcommittee, because many of us in the Republican Party

were asking the same thing, that we never had the forum that we

have here today.

And yet I know that Mr. Motsek—I hope I said that

somewhat——

Mr. MOTSEK. Close enough, sir.

Mr. JONES. Thank you. When you have a Jones for a last name,

you get spoiled. But, anyway, thank your son, as well, for his service.

And I realize what you have said to the answers to my colleagues, that you do think that, in time, you will have a system

that will be efficient, that will give us, the Congress and the American people, what they need. But the problem—that is why we had

this supplemental. That is why we had benchmarks in this supplemental, because for too long we have been having people like yourselves, who I have great respect for, coming to this Congress—and

it is beginning the fifth year.

And every time someone comes up here—I remember Abizaid

and Casey. We have Petraeus today coming before the Members of

39

Congress. And everybody seems to say, well, you know, we are getting this in place, and then you hear that it is not in place.

And I guess what my rambling is leading to this: Jack Sheehan,

a Marine general, was asked to be a war czar. And I am going to

use his comment to ask my question. The very fundamental issue

is they don’t know where the hell they are going.

And this is a four-star Marine general that knows a whole lot

more about life than Walter Jones knows. But what can you say

to the Congress today to give us some hope that we can share with

the people back home? Because if they were watching this on C–

SPAN, I believe instead of those who have been critical of me back

home, that I was supporting the Democratic position, to ask for

benchmarks would probably call me up and say, ‘‘We agree with

you. Now we understand.’’

And this is not your fault. But if we have a system that it is

going to take 10 to 15 years to get the police force up so that the

police force can do their job, or the security forces—I am not asking

you personally when I make this statement—be honest with us.

Because I would hate—I won’t be here ten years from now. I

might not here be here two years from now. But I would hate to

be here ten years from now and people like yourselves making the

same presentation. And I realize you cannot predict the future;

that I understand. But you are the professionals. You have been in

environments similar to this, maybe not as difficult as this, but you

have seen things like this before.

Give us some idea of a benchmark of where things should be a

little bit better, where we would be able to say to the Iraqi police

force, ‘‘You now can walk the streets without the Americans with

you.’’ Can anybody give me any hope?

Mr. SWARTZ. Mr. Jones, I will start and then turn it over to the

ambassador.

I think that our experience suggests that, even in countries in

which the security situation is much more secure than what we

face in Iraq, that building a police force from the ground up takes

a long period of time. And by that, I mean five to ten years would

not be an unusual amount of time to do something like that.

Here, we have the added complication of, of course, insecure environment. But I think that it is important in thinking about this,

and for us, for all of us, for the United States, to recognize that,

however we go forward with Iraq, it is important we have and we

build to the extent we can effective law enforcement partners, because we will need to cooperate with Iraq, as we do with other

countries over this time period.

So the strategy of the Department of Justice has been, not just

in Iraq, but in other countries as well, to think in the very long

term, in terms of working with the countries. That is why we have

resident legal advisers in countries for sometimes more than a decade, to work with them, to help build incrementally the systems

that we hope will allow them to cooperate with us, because it is not

simply a matter of altruism.

It is very much in the interests of the United States and its citizens to ensure that those countries have the capacity, both to address criminal problems and terrorist problems in their own countries, and to cooperate with us down the road. So I think all of us

40

in the Department of Justice are looking to see what institutions

we can focus on, in particular, things such as the Major Crimes

Task Force, investigating magistrates, and others who will build,

if you will, a legacy that we can look to and that American citizens

can look to for cooperation in the future.

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman Jones, the State Department has a lot of experience in this, and it takes decades. And it

is very expensive, although the costs, I think, in a benign environment, a more peaceful environment, begin to drop sharply.

I was ambassador to El Salvador about ten years after the war,

and there we were still working on the police force, concentrating

in two areas, which was middle management, which is always a

huge challenge in rebuilding these police forces, and in internal affairs, because they have to have some capacity to clean out the bad

apples, internal affairs and inspector general capacity to clean out

the bad apples. So it takes a long time. We are back in Haiti basically redoing what we did in 1994, for a variety of reasons.

But I would certainly agree with Bruce about this, with Mr.

Swartz about this, that there is simply no other way than to go forward with this. We have to have a police force that has the support

of the population. This has been very dramatic in Latin America,

because otherwise interest groups turn to vigilante justice, which

I think is what has happened, certainly, in parts of Iraq, unless

you have law enforcement in which the population has confidence.

I certainly agree with Mr. Swartz. It is important for us, and it

is important for them, for our democracy agenda.

Mr. MEEHAN. I would like to go to Mr. Sestak now, but we were

supposed to have this panel over by 11. We are a little over, so I

want to go to Mr. Sestak.

Joe.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your time. I was taken by your comment on databases. You know, one part of the government has it, the other

doesn’t, and may not have access, may not know, but that is the

interagency process, this time, unfortunately, out in the field, not

here in Washington.

But now we have complicated it with contractors, almost become

a fourth branch of government. I am really taken by Representative Davis’ question. You remember, I think they were called the

Blackwater incident in Anbar province. I remember talking to the

Marine colonel who actually went to pick up the body parts afterwards, the three individuals, and he said, ‘‘They would be alive

today if only they had just called me. I knew that road wasn’t a

safe road.’’

These aren’t the same contracts you are dealing with, but

Strykers, or F–18s, ENFs, as we deploy them now, must go forward, as the V22 will, with contractors. And so much has been

talked about, about what has happened. And I appreciate, without

question, the patriotism of the individuals, what is more important,

actually, is, what is next?

What is the process by which we are, the next time, supposed to

have this be something that wasn’t? It wasn’t prompt. It wasn’t effective. And, by and large, it hasn’t been accountable. I mean, by

and large, you expect what you inspect.

41

So my question is, when you talk about these terms like accountability, what is the public image that a contractor gives us out

there? It may or may not be the soldier with the candy bar, but

everybody tells us this is not a war to be won by the military. It

is about the hearts and the minds.

And when we sit back and look at the chain of command, there

really is no command. I mean, that contractor is responsible to a

contractor. His incentive is, as much as anything, from a financial—you said you offered money. And, remember, the soldier next

to him sometimes earns one-fourth of what this same person is

doing out there.

You also tend to have and report to MNSTC–I or also to CPATT.

So my question really comes down—every war plan has a phase

four. When we get to the next phase four, what is the process? Not

just here that we now have a single belly button, just because a

congressperson comes out. What is the overall process that can

make us prompt, effective, and accountable from day one?

You know, what is it that we put on the shelf on our lessons

learned from this? Or has there been that?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Sestak, I mentioned to Congressman Akin that the Administration is struggling with this and that

there is an office in the State Department run by Ambassador John

Herbst that is developing a concept for basically a civilian ready reserve, that is trying to fill just this hole that you described.

He has got about 30 people working for them. He has got a very

large interagency operation. He is developing statements of work

and position descriptions for such a ready reserve. Again, that is

not a short-term answer, but I think the Administration—with this

issue and trying to address it.

Mr. SESTAK. Did we do the same thing after Bosnia in the State

Department and put lessons learned on the shelf? I mean, I know

the scale is immense, but it is just a scalable thing.

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know, but the scale is so much

smaller. I think we went into Bosnia under United Nations (U.N.)

auspices, which also provides basically a very fundamental

logistical support that we didn’t have in this situation.

Mr. SESTAK. But did an office also go about and do what you say

this 30-person office is doing? I mean, do we—my take is, is that

lessons learned is something we don’t do well.

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know what happened after Bosnia, but let me assure you, we are trying to look at lessons learned

from Iraq experience. And I suggested to Mr. Akin that he might

want to get Ambassador Herbst up here for a briefing so he could

describe in more detail what is being done.

I mean, rest assured, as I say, there is a lot of soul searching and

review underway in the U.S. Government about just the issue you

raise.

Mr. SESTAK. Sir?

Mr. SWARTZ. Admiral Sestak, as Ambassador Patterson suggested, Ambassador Herbst is not simply looking at lessons

learned, although that is an important part of it, but thinking

through a way forward, in terms of creation of a possible civilian

reserve corps. And the Department of Justice and the Department

of Defense are working very closely with him in that task.

42

Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Motsek.

Mr. MOTSEK. Sir, I can focus your questions on the contractor

personnel issues in particular, because you were absolutely right.

And as I alluded to before, you gave us a kick in the pants with

the Section 854 language. It forces us to build a more coherent

package of what we are going to do in the future.

A couple of challenges you talked about—you are absolutely

right. You have contractors in the battle space, and you have a

commander here, and you have the contractor officer representative

here. One of the things we have to do is we have to institutionalize

training in our senior service colleges and service colleges so that

that brigade and battalion commander knows, from day one, he has

a force protection and accountability responsibility for the contractors in his area of operations.

That is not to say he assigns duties to them, because we know

we have a contractor officer representative, which makes it a bit

more complex, but he has the fundamental responsibility for the

health and protection of his people in his battle space. We have not

done that very well.

You talk to a 3rd DISCOM commander, who went up with the

3rd Division at the very outset of this, the biggest surprise that you

had is he had a tail of contractors that were coming in along with

him, and he didn’t know they were going to be there. Well, we have

to change that institutional process, so we are building it into the

schools.

The lessons learned are active lesson learned, but we are trying

not to put them on the shelf. We have contingency contracting for

our civilian side of the house that goes on in the military contracting folks that is daily, literally daily, and it is with base. So the

constant lessons learned are being applied there.

But going back to your fundamental question, what we have not

done very well is in the planning process, up front, before. You

know, you put the plan on the shelf, but the planning process had

a bunch of ‘‘To Be Determined,’’ a bunch of holes with regard to

this huge contractor plug that we knew was eventually going to go

in there. You know, it was almost like magic was going to happen.

You understand what all the tidbits are about, the time-phased

deployment. We had all the military people arrayed out perfectly.

We knew when they were flying in there. But when 50 percent of

your log structure is going to come into the contracting process, if

you don’t have the equivalent, you have a problem.

Part of our initiative is to build into—and we are formalizing it

now—we are going to have joint planners whose sole function is to

be pushed down to the combatant commands to build those parts

of the op plans, to build those parts of the op plans, keep them current. I am going to technically own them. We are going to pull

them back into Washington on a routine basis, force them to deconflict their plans with the service plans and the other agency

plans, so that we don’t stumble along in the early stages, as we

have in the past.

We are going to formalize the process, and that is a due out to

you, with regards to 854. We have to tell you in October how we

are doing and April how we are implementing. So that is a due out

to you.

43

Mr. SESTAK. I have been taken by the work that you have all

done in the standing joint headquarters. It seems, even though people have said during the Clinton Administration they didn’t want

to, certain individuals, we have ended up continuing to do nationbuilding, often after a crisis.

And the time, the promptness means that, you know, the Army

is ready to go. They have their standing joint force, their headquarters now. If time is of such an essence, I understand what you

have all said, but the missing piece to me is—are you actually

going to have contract personnel identified?

I mean, if everybody had been on the ground on day one after

war, so many of these problems wouldn’t be here. I mean, where

is the force that is going to do this? Or are we going to have to gear

up like a sinusoidal wave each time? Because at the end, you can

have nice plans, but someone has to go out and now be the software and your hardware plans.

Where is that force to do the training for the police and I imagine

a myriad of other types of intergovernmental projects that need to

be done? And where is that interagency plan for that resource?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, Congressman, that is what Ambassador Herbst is working on, an interagency plan that would deploy these people quickly, identify them, train them, equip them,

and deploy them to the field.

Mr. SESTAK. Just not contracts, but——

Ambassador PATTERSON. The U.S. Government employs and, in

turn, the contractor would identify people. But let’s be candid here:

This all takes money. And the sooner we get the money, the State

Department—and, unlike DOD, is it is—$2 billion operation. I

mean, we cannot do this out of O&M. It takes contingency funds

that are basically in our budget to enable us to do that.

And on any issue like Iraq, it takes a long time to get the money.

We just sort of can’t squeeze them out of hide.

Mr. SESTAK. You know, I think your point, Ms. Ambassador, is

well-taken. We have talked about this—even during the Clinton

Administration, there was an NPD, or whatever they called it back

then, to do this.

The military deploys, and there is an emergency supplemental that is now going to raise us from $8 billion a month to $14 billion

a month, just because they have asked for it. So, to my mind, it

is about the resources that are ready to do this. And so is that

going to be part of this?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, and it has been part of it in the

past, and it has been turned down, because the Congress doesn’t

like to fund a pig in a poke, a contingency fund, as it were.

But, yes, first of all, I think the attitude up here has changed

rather dramatically, and I think there is a lot more support, but,

sure, our budget requests will be part of this.

Mr. SWARTZ. And if I may add, Mr. Congressman, it is, if you

will, a second-level funding problem at the Department of Justice.

We can deploy. We can’t order, but we have never had any lack of

volunteers to deploy, even in the most dangerous circumstances,

both from our criminal division, from the FBI, from our standing

ICITAP and OPDAT resources, but we can only do that if we receive funding from the Department of State or the Department of

44

Defense. We do not have funding to do this kind of activity on our

own.

Mr. SESTAK. And the national security has really changed. National security is not just the military any longer.

One last comment. And, as I know, we have gone over, and I

want to save the questions. I was also taken—and I was only out

there for a couple days with Senator Hagel about a week ago—to

Congressman Andrews point. You know, I raised the question similarly out there, is what has happened to both the military that we

have trained? Because we have gotten numbers here. They are not

there, they say, including an intelligence agency. Those numbers

aren’t accurate, and as for the police, also.

And so the question I asked for both was, how many have gone

to the other side? Or how many don’t show? And the answer we

got there was, we are doing a study on both. You know, and, again,

I come back to the—I was more concerned about the threat side of

it than just we have trained and wasted money.

Again, it comes—I think you said it well, sir—you know, it is all

in the planning. And this is a new world, but it is got to have the

ready resources. And if contractors are to be—you know, I mean,

I have watched 30-some years, as contractors weren’t there, and

you just deploy without them anymore. And it is a missing piece

with the resources for the contingency.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

I want to thank our distinguished panel for—excuse me, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. May I make a final comment?

Mr. MEEHAN. Sure. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to make two quick comments, if I could,

Mr. Chairman. The first one is with regard to one of the questions

I had, and then some other members, several of you wanted to do

statements for the record, answers for the record. And I hope you

will do that in a timely way.

It is not good enough that you send it to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or whatever and sit there in the bowels

of OMB until, you know, the eons of time. And so I hope you will

work to see that those answers come and that whatever gets

scrubbed out by OMB actually says what you intended it to say.

The second thing I wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, if I might,

since we are doing this debate and vote on the supplemental, the

discussions about the contractors. I think there has been a lot of

misstatements about what has been in the House version of the

bill, including the version we are going to vote on today, but there

is no limit in the House bill that Ms. Pelosi has supported, no limit

on the number of U.S. citizens that can be there, either contractors

or non-military personnel, and even more importantly there is no

limit on the number of U.S. military combat troops that can be

there to protect any U.S. citizen.

And I heard again in a report on a radio station this morning

that it starts the date for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops.

No, in fact, the President may decide, if he were to sign this bill,

which he says he is not going to, he may decide, ‘‘You know, I actually need 200,000 troops to protect the judges and all the State DeVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
45

partment people and the veterinarians from Arkansas that are

there.’’

And no one wants to put any of these civilian contractors at risk,

and there is no limit on a number of combat troops the President

can have there to protect those folks and your people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Dr. Snyder.

Ranking Member Akin asked me to ask Mr. Swartz how many

active or actually houses of courts there are right now in Iraq?

Mr. SWARTZ. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, how many active courts

there are?

Mr. MEEHAN. Courts or courthouses.

Mr. SWARTZ. I will have to get—I will get you that answer for

the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 135.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Thank you.

Thanks very much to all of you, and thank you for your service

to our country. And thank you for participating with us this morning. Thank you.

We are going to take a two- or three-minute break while the new

panel, second panel comes up. Thank you.

We would like to begin our second panel, if we can, because we

are behind. And my concern is that there is going to be a vote

somewhere around 12 o’clock, a little after. And one of the panelists has to leave, so I am sure that we would come back after votes.

I want to thank the panelists for appearing.

And I would ask, Dr. Avant, if you could begin with your testimony. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. DEBORAH D. AVANT, PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Dr. AVANT. Yes, Chairman Meehan and members of the committee, I thank you for having me here. And I want to speak much

more generally about the use of contractors to train security forces.

We all know that effective security forces are key to stable government, but we are not always clear about exactly what effective

force means. A minimum condition for state building is security

forces that not only have certain capacities—ability to shoot

straight or, you know, arrest a criminal—but also some sort of coordinated, if not centralized, political control, and some modicum of

respect for professional military and/or law enforcement values.

As you can imagine, creating these forces is quite difficult. Even

when the training is carried out by U.S. forces, there are several

common difficulties. Often, the training isn’t right for the threat;

it is hard to coordinate civilian, military and police forces for

counterinsurgency missions; political direction from fledgling civilian governments, host governments, is often opportunistic, aimed

at partisan rather than public goals; professional values are hard

to put in practice, particularly against irregular opposing forces.

And the U.S. itself often has many sub-goals in a conflict, where

the pursuit of one goal might undermine the pursuit of others. For

46

instance, U.S. forces working with warlords in Afghanistan to gain

access to al Qaeda hideouts, one U.S. goal, has worked against

President Karzai’s efforts to consolidate control over the country by

training a national Afghan army, which is, of course, another U.S.

goal.

Now, the ability to contract with private security companies for

training undoubtedly augments U.S. forces. The use of private security companies offers a variety of other benefits, as well, but also

some risks that generally exacerbate the difficulties with training

that I just mentioned.

So this morning, I just wanted to outline the benefits and risks

of using contractors and how they impact the general difficulties of

training foreign forces. And I will end with a brief comment about

ways in which this might be ameliorated.

First of all, the benefits. Private security companies can draw

from a deeper pool of personnel and personnel with specific experience. We heard this morning talk about language experience and

things like that. Contractors are able to pool from those kinds of

experiences more easily.

Second, contractors can provide greater stability in training programs. Often, troops rotate in and out, and contractors can stay for

a longer period of time.

And finally, and somewhat ironically, contractors can actually

move personnel through the field more quickly. It is sometimes

easier to mobilize contractors for a surge capability than it is to actually redeploy U.S. forces.

There are also some risks. The first is that contractors are—and

I use a quote from many, many people in the Pentagon—‘‘rigid

tools for fluid environments.’’ The contract specifies what has to be

done and payment to be received for a specific period of time and

a specific set of tasks. Even if U.S. priorities change, the contract

enshrines the original agreement and the exchange costly.

Second, contractor services often pose difficulties with coordination and integration, and I will talk about that more in a minute.

Contracted training services are more subject to political opportunism. Contracted training is difficult to monitor and control. And

contracted training can be more costly, particularly in risky or uncertain environments, such as Iraq.

So how do these benefits and risks affect the sort of general

training problems? First of all, in terms of getting the right training, the private sector’s ability to mobilize personnel from a deeper

pool with access to a wider variety of skills can give them better

access to the right trainers.

Contracting makes it harder, though, to asset the fit between

contracted training and force needs. Often, the contractor is the

main source of information about progress, and the contractor may

withhold information, or the contractor may not understand U.S.

goals well, or they may just be inadequate communication channels

from the contractor to U.S. policymakers.

Second, in terms of coordinating civilian, military and police

forces, the additional risks posed by contracting loom very large

here. The very fact of contracting often divides what should be an

integrated set of policies into a number of discrete tasks, but each

one task is interdependent with the other. And how to write conVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
47

tracts to ensure that communication and coordination with a variety of different entities is often very difficult and is particularly the

case when events on the ground change in a way that the contract

has not anticipated, which is common in experiences like Iraq.

Unlike U.S. forces, which are placed under a commander in the

field, contractors are ultimately subject to the contract rather than

the commander. In one important way, however, contracted for

training can provide some advantages in coordination, by generating greater stability of personnel during the training by contracting

them for a longer period of time.

Third, in terms of opportunistic political direction from civilians.

While the efforts of U.S. troops are not impervious to this dynamic,

private security companies are much more likely to feed into opportunism. This was apparent in the creation of the facilities protection services in Iraq, as well as various police units.

And I think there are really two kinds of opportunism at work

in Iraq. One is very dangerous potential for a diffusion of control

over force that could result in the development of parallel forces.

And here I am talking about the police forces, national police

forces, subject to rule by the Ministry of Interior, and stressed between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense.

And the second is lower-level corruption, where officials pay kickbacks to their superiors and ghost soldiers line the pockets of politicians. And this second problem is exacerbated by the degree to

which governance is by local and tribal religious leaders can take

precedence over or is simply not well coordinated with the Iraqi

constitution and Iraqi law. Both of these kinds of opportunism

work to undermine training efforts, and often they work together.

In terms of professional values, this obviously has been an issue

for U.S. forces in Iraq, but much more so for contractors. Though

many private security companies draw from retired military personnel who are well socialized in international values, because contractors are not subject to the chain of command, the reliability of

their behavior is not reinforced, as well. Many report a rather cavalier attitude among private security personnel in Iraq for international law.

Also, though, the U.S. contracting pattern in Iraq has relied on

some companies that have recruited much more internationally.

This has yielded a more heterogeneous set of employees and companies that may respect different values or less attention to the

professional values that American troops represent in training.

And specifically, I would, again, reference the U.S. contract with

the Jordanians to train the facilities protection force.

Even if professional values are modeled in training, they also

have to be reinforced with promotions and other rewards in service.

If personnel are reported for professional behavior, the organization

will yield more professionalism, but also the reverse. But political

opportunism by Iraqis has often led this not to be the case.

There is one example I mention in my remarks where a contractor was aware of and reported infiltration of police by militias, but

political sensitivity led the government—in this case, the British

government—not to act, and this is really a communication and coordination problem. And then when the police chief was fired for

telling the press about the militia infiltration, on the advice of the

48

private security company, the contractor felt that its efforts had

been dramatically undermined.

Finally, contractors often use a complexity of U.S. goals to advantage the pursuit of contracts in ways that further undermine the

integrity of U.S. policy.

So what to do? There is a lot of focus that has been at a very

micro-level of trying to get accountability on individual contracts,

and that is very important. And I think a lot of the legislation that

Congress has issued already has made strides in working on those

issues, but I think it misses the bigger point: that contracting often

disaggregates a mission to the point where it is not coordinated

and integrated. So contractors can follow the letter of the contract

and still not yield well-trained troops.

I suggest in my remarks that sometimes it is possible to counteract this, what I think is a much more serious problem, there is a

larger umbrella that can coordinate norms and standards for forces

with enforcement tools for all actors involved. And I reference Europe, and particularly NATO, in the Partnership for Peace program

as one example of an umbrella like that, that has generated that

kind of framework.

And I look at the private training in Croatia as an example of

a fairly effective use of private trainers, in a situation where you

might not imagine it would be all that effective. This is mostly for

the Army. Partnership of Peace does not deal with the law enforcement side.

But I think that, in addition to sort of thinking about getting a

handle on the sort of micro-issues, of making sure contractors are

accountable, you also have to think about these macro-issues of coordination and what kinds of tools might be available.

Obviously, there are huge differences between conditions in Croatia in the mid–1990’s and conditions in Iraq today, and I would

say that these differences offer little optimism to me that the same

kind of framework can be devised. But some sort of larger umbrella

within which to coordinate training for Iraqi security forces and incentives for Iraqi civilian government would undoubtedly be helpful

for steering the overall training effort.

And this kind of umbrella should, at the very least: specific

model behavior for both civilians and military personnel; ensure

that the model and the training centralizes rather than diffuses

control; tie continued support of the government and each contract

to institutional milestones; take advantage of regional agreements

and international institutions to nest the reinforcements for this

model, and this echoes some of the arguments made in the Iraq

Study Group report; and focus on the long term.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Avant can be found in the Appendix on page 98.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Brooks.

STATEMENT OF DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL

PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an industry perspective on the critical issues

49

highlighted in this hearing. The role of the private sector is too little understood and too often treated with suspicion.

About ourselves, the International Peace Operations Association

(IPOA) is a non-profit, non-partisan, nongovernmental association

of service companies providing critical services to peace and stability operations worldwide. We have more than 30 member companies providing services, including training, logistics, security, aviation, mine action, and medical support. We represent a demanddriven industry, providing cost-effective services in some of the

most dangerous environments imaginable.

This testimony will provide some background information and

explain why our government utilizes these companies to enhance

policies and ways the government could be a smart client.

First, I want to be clear. The leadership, initiative and oversight

of the training effort must come from the governments of the

United States and Iraq. While some of the actual training can be

done by U.S. military and government employees, a significant portion of the expertise, resources, and hundreds of the experienced

long-term personnel doing the hands-on training and mentoring are

necessarily going to come from the private sector.

This is a concept where an effective public-private partnership is

simply indispensable. Indeed, it is inconceivable that success could

be achieved any other way. Attempting reconstruction and redevelopment in the face of an ongoing conflict is necessarily difficult,

and nothing quite like the operation in Iraq has been attempted in

the past.

The closest parallel might be the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the CORDS program, in Vietnam,

which did show a surprising degree of success in the face of constant attacks by the Vietcong, but only with an astonishing level

of national commitment, which we do not have today.

While there are a number of actions that can be taken to improve the training process, the ultimate success of Iraq depends on

dramatic political improvements in that country, as well. Simply

put, a professional security sector is not a replacement for a functioning government, and it is inconceivable that a functioning government could survive long without a reliable security sector.

The private sector has been active in the training process. And

if called upon, they will increase its role even more. In the years

since 2003, much has been done to increase and improve the security sector training capacity. At the same time, much has been

done to address the contractual and oversight problems that are inevitable in any operation on this scale.

We need to get it right. The private sector is playing a critical

role and will be an essential player during and beyond any withdrawal.

Why do we use the private sector? Well, first of all, I think contractors are cost-effective. Contractors are veterans and ex-cops

that live side-by-side with the military personnel in the same dangerous, rough conditions. They provide an astonishing degree of experience and expertise. They usually stay in the country longer

than the troops, and Dr. Avant addressed that point.

50

Surprisingly, they cost the government far less in the long run.

U.S. troops have some astonishing capabilities, but they cost somewhere around $15,000 per month per soldier in Iraq.

Contractors have staying power. Military personnel have to be

rotated in and out while contractors can serve multiple years, and

the companies can establish greater continuity of programs and

doctrine. At the same time, they are remarkable resilient. As we

say, contractors are risk managers, not morons. They can take a

certain amount of risk. And we were seeing early predictions by

pundits that the private sector could not operate in dangerous environments have been pretty much thoroughly dispelled. Contractors

do operate in dangerous environments.

Companies are accountable. Contractors can be and sometimes

modified contracts can be and are sometimes modified, penalized or

canceled based on performance and changing conditions. Companies must answer to government contract officers, providing guidance and oversight and obtain government licenses to do military

and police training.

Contractors themselves can be held accountable. The Military

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, MEJA, allows the U.S. Government to try individuals in Federal courts for felonies. This law has

been on the books for several years, but the Department of Justice

is only now beginning to exercise it appropriately in Iraq. Another

alternative that has been raised is a use of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, but I think there are some problematic issues

with that. I think MEJA is the way to go, and we supported expansion of MEJA in the past.

Contractors can expand their operations. Companies are able to

tap into huge pools of expertise, and most companies have databases of thousands of individuals with a full array of skills, expertise, experience, languages, all of which can be brought to bear in

support of our policies.

I think there are some areas for improvement. To maximize the

value, both the Department of State and Department of Defense

must improve oversight capacities and capabilities in general. This

is a common refrain and one the industry strongly supports. Good

oversight benefits both the companies, as well as the clients. And

problems with oversight has been a number-one client of IPOA

member companies since 2003.

Contract coordination between the government departments

needs to be improved. Companies are concerned that the Department of Defense contract officers and Department of State contract

officers do not communicate enough, nor do they operate with the

same rules, creating cost and complications which have negatively

impacted on performance.

Quality matters. Too much emphasis is placed on contract price,

when better quality companies are more effective at achieving policy objectives. Contracts awarded with too much emphasis on price

can reward marginal companies and undermine more experienced

and professional firms. IPOA members agreed to abide by an industry code of conduct and want some credit for that, as well.

The means of law enforcement can be improved. Impartial investigations into allegations of corruption and abuse benefit the larger

51

industry in the long run, and we fully support that kind of oversight and accountability.

I think, in the larger picture, we have the best support and supplied military operation in history in Iraq. And this fact is largely

due to imaginative and effective use of the private sector. There are

a lot of things that can be fixed and improved, but we should not

ignore that basic fact. Private companies are being contracted to

support and enhance government policies around the world. There

is no reason we cannot demand that these companies live up to

high professional and ethical standards.

From an industry perspective, we fully support effective oversight and accountability. It is good for good companies. Getting this

aspect right is something you folks can help with.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks can be found in the Appendix on page 113.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Burke.

STATEMENT OF GERALD F. BURKE, MAJOR, MASSACHUSETTS

STATE POLICE (RET.), FORMER SENIOR ADVISOR, IRAQI

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND IRAQI POLICE SERVICE

Mr. BURKE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

opportunity to speak today. In May 2003, I was a member of a sixperson team of police executives sent to Baghdad, Iraq, by the

United States Departments of Justice, ICITAP in particular, and

Department of State, INL’s office.

The police team was part of a larger criminal justice team, including corrections and legal executives. My assignment in Iraq

would last until June 2004. Initially, our team conducted a needs

assessment of the Iraqi Police Service for the Department of Justice and Department of State, and my assignment transitioned into

being the adviser to the Baghdad police chief for the rest of my

tour of duty.

In March 2005, I returned to Baghdad with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office as a national security adviser to the Iraq

Ministry of Interior, particularly the deputy minister for police affairs. That assignment lasted, until February 2006.

It is my professional opinion that the police training program in

Iraq has been a complete failure. This is despite the best efforts of

thousands of American police officers over the last four years, and

the ultimate sacrifice of 17 American police officers.

The magnitude of the mission and the political environment of

the mission created challenges that exceeded the organizational capabilities and capacities of the Department of Justice and the Department of State. Many of the lessons learned on previous police

training missions were either ignored or could not be adapted to

the mission in Iraq.

The original assessment team of six members, of which I was

one, had no ability to move around the country to meet or work

with Iraq police and government officials. In fact, we were overwhelmed with the task of simply moving around the city of Baghdad, the city of an estimated 6 million people, with a police department that should have been 18,000 police officers. In fact, the genVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
52

erals—we have several hundred police generals in the Iraq police

service that we were dealing with.

The first additional civilian police advisers, American police advisers and trainers, did not arrived until November 2003, six

months after the original team arrived. In November, we received

our first reinforcements. In November 2003, we received 24 members. We added 24 members to the original team. By the time my

first mission ended in June 2004, we still had less than 100 American police trainers and advisers on the ground in Iraq.

A similar situation existed with our equipment. We did not receive armored vehicles until the spring of 2004, and then we received only two. It is easy in the situations like this to look within

the agencies responsible for individuals to blame. It is my experience, however, as a senior manager in two large police agencies,

and the former director of the New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management, that the causes for failure usually lie elsewhere. My experience is that such failures usually lay in the system, policies, and procedures used to administer the agencies involved.

By July 2003, the Department of Defense, CPA, and the policetraining mission had fallen irretrievable behind in the key management areas of planning, organizing, staffing, budgeting, in coordinating their efforts, and reporting back their progress. Ever effort

since then, the creation of CPATT under military command, the

creation of MNSTC–I, the military training teams that have gone

out to the police department, the provincial reconstruction teams,

the Iraqi national police force, the 3rd Forces, it is called, of commandos and the Wolf Brigade, and other units that have been

drawn from the sectarian militias, the disastrous year of the police

in 2006, every one of these efforts has been a desperate effort to

correct for past failures.

It is my opinion that Federal law, rules and regulations, and

policies and procedures for the hiring and contracting of personnel

and the acquisition of supplies and equipment were serious obstacles to accomplishing the mission and unnecessarily put peoples’

lives at risk, including my own.

It is my opinion that the United States missed a brief window

of opportunity in the late spring, early summer 2003 to work with

the Iraqi Police Service to provide a more secure environment for

the reconstruction effort.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Burke.

It is interesting. The first time I visited Iraq was in the summer

of 2003. I came back, and I said, ‘‘We have a window of opportunity

to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and that window

is closing.’’ It is amazing. Your testimony just reinforces everything

that I know and everything that has been written.

The question, I guess, is, where do we go from here? Professor

Avant, in your prepared testimony, you noted that, ‘‘With different

entities training the various armed services in Iraq, the potential

for coordination difficulty obviously goes up.’’

53

Mr. Brooks, you note that, ‘‘The contract coordination between

the government departments has to be improved.’’

All of you, I think, had a chance to listen to the first panel. And,

Mr. Burke, you have just articulated what was going on, on the

ground and in the theater.

How was the way in which this mission has been split up between different agencies and contractors in Iraq affected the training of Iraqis? And what specific recommendations would you make

to improve coordination, management and oversight?

And in light of Mr. Burke’s testimony, I guess the question is,

how do you undo—I mean, we missed a window, and we didn’t

make adjustments. So I guess, in addition to insight that you could

give, or specific recommendations to improve coordination and

management and oversight, I guess I would be interested, Mr.

Burke, in what any other insight—the question of what we do now.

Mr. BURKE. Well, I think part of the problem is that we put command of the police training program—and I want to differentiate.

We sometimes use the phrase ‘‘Iraqi Security Forces,’’ and that is

kind of catch-all phrase. It really blends a military force with a civilian rule of law force.

If we want to establish civilian rule of law in the country of Iraq,

then we can’t keep calling it security forces, because the military

and the police have two entirely different missions.

Mr. MEEHAN. But you know why we call them security forces?

We call them security forces because, when we lump them all together, it sounds like there is a lot more of them.

Mr. BURKE. Yes. And part of the problem, I think, is we put command of the training of the civilian rule of law police under the

military, in particular combat arms people from the infantry, artillery and armor forces, who are trained to close with and destroy

the enemy. That is not what we do in civilian law enforcement.

I have been in meetings with generals, two- and three-star generals, where they talk about maneuver elements. Well, my frame

of reference is a police officer, and maneuver element is a two-man

patrol car, not a brigade of troops. So I think we need to re-look

at that.

The military still has to be involved. We need them for protection

and transportation. But the command of the police training program should be put back under civilian professionals.

Mr. BROOKS. One of the ideas that has come up is the State Department’s S/CRS office of reconstruction and stability, and to have

all the sort of state-building reconstruction efforts put under one

single office. The State office was chosen. I don’t believe it has been

funded by Congress yet, but State has been sort of stealing money

from other departments to keep it going.

It is not being used in Iraq, to my knowledge, but it is sort of

designed for the future. And I think it is something that we would

support. I think, for the contractors, I mean, having a single, central source for contracts and coordination, I think, would be helpful.

Dr. AVANT. Yes, I think I want to echo something that Mr. Burke

said. In even preparing and in reviewing the efforts that the U.S.

did with police training in Kosovo, one of the things they noted was

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the importance of having civilian police principles and having civilian police training that is separate from the military.

And that was one of the lessons that they took from Bosnia, so

that goes to sort of—not necessarily folding the lessons we have

learned from past wars into the future. But I think the idea of coming up with principles for police training and having those principles not only train officers, but you are also training the whole

set of civilians, you know, politicians, rule-makers, bureaucrats,

and, you know, sort of targeting that civilian sector is something

that we, as a government, the U.S. Government, does not have a

coordinate effort doing.

And I know Bob Perito, who actually was, you know, the person

who thought of using DynCorp in the first place in Haiti, because

there was no other way to get international civilian police force to

Haiti, has criticized the fact that the U.S. Government has not sort

of developed a planning agency for doing that kind of thing in the

future.

And so the fact that we outsource to DynCorp, we sort of

outsourced the ideas to DynCorp, too, and DynCorp, you know, as

a company has now developed the kind of institutional memory

that you would expect the U.S. Government to. And so I think that

a lot more could be done, in terms of that kind of ongoing planning.

Mr. MEEHAN. But with the escalation of violence since 2003,

doesn’t it become extraordinarily difficult to set up any kind of—

how do we get better at this, with violence going up at such a rapid

pace of a period of time? How do we deal with that?

For example, I don’t know—Mr. Burke, I assume you were here.

We were talking about the Jordan police training. I am interested

in your insight. But it is remarkable to me that, as violence goes

up, that we are now doing the training at facilities in Baghdad.

And I tried to get the tour on the last trip that we took, those facilities in Baghdad, but we were unable to do that.

I wonder how you accomplish legitimate police training and legitimate policing in an environment where, obviously, the violence

is that of a civil war?

Mr. BURKE. It is very difficult. The Baghdad police academy, I

think it was in August of 2004, took over 300 mortar rounds in

that one month alone. So it is very difficult to teach in that kind

of an environment, with——

Mr. MEEHAN. So why would they want to bring the police academy—why would they want to train police in Baghdad rather than

Jordan, in their facility?

Mr. BURKE. It came out of a sense of national pride. The Iraqis

felt offended that they had to go outside their country to provide

training. They have pride in their own educational level. They

think they are among the most educated in the Middle East, and

they felt it was demeaning to go outside the country for training.

Mr. BROOKS. It is incredibly difficult to do anything in Baghdad.

If you are working in the red zone, you are lucky to have two meetings per day, whereas in Bosnia or—I visited Kabul, and you could

do a lot more. I mean, simply, the security situation is so difficult

in Iraq that getting anything done, police training, rebuilding hospitals, whatever, is just insanely difficult.

55

Dr. AVANT. Yes, at this point, I think any police training has to

be part of a general counterinsurgency effort. Successful

counterinsurgency efforts, particularly those that involved an intervening country, typically would involve committees that would

have civilian representatives from both the U.S. Government and

Iraqi government, also representatives from the military of both

entities, and representatives from police of both entities.

I think, you know, sort of, if you look at the—emergency, the attempt in CORDS, that is the sort of structure with which you begin

to operate. And so, even though you would train police separately

by different principles, presumably that are in a same place than

an unsafe place, the way that you actually begin to get control over

the country is actually integrating the effort of civilian police and

military units.

What you do with the national police force is another question.

You know, I think that that is probably—you know, I understand

why it was created, but if you sort of look at countries emerging

from transitions around the world, having a national sort of paramilitary force is not always a good idea for stable nation-building.

Mr. MEEHAN. Dr. Snyder. I don’t know if you were in the queue,

but——

Dr. SNYDER. The queue, that is right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Burke, I was struck by your statement, the desperate effort

to correct past failures, which I think has been very discouraging

for the American people, for the Congress. I remember back when

during one of the hearings we had several years ago with Ambassador Bremer, and I think it was in response to my question when

I said, ‘‘You know, what is it that you need?’’ And he said, ‘‘Patience.’’

Well, okay, I think the American people have been very patient,

and so that is why we are kind of desperately asking for State Department or military, whoever. What does the Congress need to do

that we haven’t done to try to make this thing work?

I think one of the issues is—I mean, the obvious issue is, this is

not like ‘‘The Sword and the Stone,’’ in King Arthur, where somebody tries and it doesn’t move, and the next person tries and it

doesn’t move. It is that you don’t get a second chance at what was

there last month, because this month is different.

And we now look back to almost with, you know, halcyon eyes

of what it was like when U.S. troops first went into Baghdad and

how much we all wished that we had provided the immediate kind

of security, and not let the looting occur, and deal with the

Baathists in a different way, and how much different it might have

been, but we can’t go backwards. And so we are having to deal with

the situation we are now.

I wanted to ask a specific question. I am not trying to draw you

in to the supplemental debate about timelines and all, but I have

some contractors in my district, as well as military veterans, some

contractors of both Afghanistan and Iraqi experience. And one of

them came to me not long ago and, after, I think two tours in Iraq

as a contractor, and he said—he began by prefacing this thing by

saying, ‘‘You know, I am more supportive of the war in Iraq that

Dubya,’’ you know, and that was preface up to say that he was not

being critical of the issue to go in.

56

But he said, ‘‘I, for a long time, was not supportive of any kind

of timeline and deadlines,’’ but he said, at his level—I think I am

addressing this to you, Mr. Brooks and Mr. Burke—but he said, at

his level, he said, ‘‘Not at the high level of the President calling up

Maliki or anything like that,’’ but at his level of just dealing with

people out in the community, he said the people he dealt with felt

like the Americans were a gravy train, that, you know, they were

getting paid to come and attend these conferences, and meetings,

and training sessions that he was providing.

And, you know, he said, they just look at him and—you know,

he would say, ‘‘We have a deadline. We need to get this to work.’’

And he said they just look at him, pat him, and say, ‘‘You Americans will never go anywhere. We know you are not going anywhere.

You are going to be here for a long, long time.’’ And he described

it as a gravy train.

And so my question is, do you all have any experience—perhaps

not in Iraq, but elsewhere—is it helpful when you are sending in

contractors that they have, that they present to the folks they are

working with, ‘‘We have a certain time period to do this, and if you

don’t get it right, we are moving onto another group of people’’? Do

you have any comments on that?

Mr. BURKE. I think, as far as the mission and doing it over sort

of approach to it, I think we have been doing the military mission

over and over. What we haven’t done is taken a good look at the

other two legs of this three-legged stool, if you will.

One is the government side. We have not done a lot of training

with the government officials. I know at one point, about six

months ago, we had one permanent State Department employee

and two contractors working in the prime minister’s office. So we

haven’t really done a lot of training of the government officials.

They haven’t come to the United States for programs. Even before

the government was established, we should have been training

them.

Also, the economic package. We still have about 60 percent unemployment in Iraq, probably 20 percent underemployment on top

of that, where doctors, and dentists, and lawyers are working as interpreters rather than their primary profession. So I think we need

to look, not just at the military solution, which is what we always

focused on—maybe because it is easier to understand—but we have

to look at the governance and the economic package, as well.

If I could just sort of slip back to the time frame issue, for police

training, what we are looking at is a generation of police officers.

As we call back the old police officer who worked under Saddam,

you can’t just put them out on the street without a paycheck. You

need them, because they could be problems like the Iraqi army

was. So we bring them back in.

We have trained them, and we want to retrain them, and continue to retrain them, the veteran officers, as well as bringing in

new recruits. Then we retire the older officers and we keep bringing in, over the course of a generation, new, young officers who are

trained the proper way, from the beginning.

So I would say a generation is what we need in the police market.

57

Dr. AVANT. If I could just add to that, I think, in terms of not

just a timeline, but having some mechanism to punish failure to

develop is important. And in Croatia, it was very important to be

able to freeze the training funds. And so the threat of a freeze even

would often create movement, even in Tudjman’s government, in

ways that would be very useful.

And so I think, even if you are not talking about a timeline, talking about some sort of institutional milestones and some amount

of money that is tied to that, or resources that are tied to that, is

very important.

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Gates has been candid, both with Members of Congress, but also publicly about, while he doesn’t agree

with the House Democratic bill, that the debate has helped nudged

the ball down the field a little bit, and we have a good cop-bad cop

thing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here. I am sorry I missed some of the early

testimony, but I will try and follow up and take your comments

from your written testimony.

I would like to go to the question—and I know you were here

when we discussing with the first panel—you just mentioned a generation to train the Iraqi police. Do you believe that, in what you

thought of our trainers, five years experience that was requested,

and what kind of training do you think they got to be trainers? And

are we developing, basically, the capacity to do that kind of training?

Mr. BURKE. First, we need to divide the training concept up into

two. We have classroom trainers who are, you know, platform instructors. And they come under the MPRI contract, I believe, right

now. It had been SAIC. And they work under ICITAP, Department

of Justice. And that is the cost-plus contract, where they are able

to set standards for the people they want to employ, and then the

contractor gets the cost of the employee, plus a profit margin,

whatever that is.

The other contract, which I think is still held by DynCorp, is a

competitive, low-bid contract, where it is in DynCorp’s interest to

perhaps lower the price paid to the employees that they are hiring.

And these are the advisers who are going out on the streets, who

are running the streets of Baghdad and Iraq. It is where the 17 of

them have been killed, so I want to be careful how I say this, but

I think we could do better, perhaps, raising the standards of the

people who are going into that advisory role, going out in the police

stations.

If you are at 5 years as a police officer and you are walking into

a police station and trying to advise a 25-, 30-year veteran, police

colonel, he is going to look at you as a 5-year—you know, he knows

you are obviously young, if you have only 5 years on the job. And

you are not going to have quite the same impact if you come in

with the years of experience that the classroom instructors have.

So I think we could perhaps——

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Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What about cultural training, as well?

I mean, were we really providing them with what they needed? I

am assuming that very few of them spoke out, I expect. Were we

providing them on the other end what is needed to be able to understand the culture that they are working?

Mr. BURKE. We are providing some training, but very minimal

training. I know, at the beginning, we didn’t get any training. A

week at Fort Bliss, mostly some medical checkups and x-rays and

stuff like that, and then we deployed. So it was sort of, for the

original team, learning on the fly.

But, yes, we could do better. And I think if we look at this plan

that the State Department is considering, we could build into that

cultural training, cultural awareness for, you know, whatever size

this reserve corps is going to be, and have some of them train for

different parts of the world, much like the SF, the Special Forces

community in the military does, where they have teams designed

for specific theaters.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is the State Department going to you

for consulting on that at all?

Mr. BROOKS. To me?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, please, go ahead.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I was just going to say, on the cultural training, I think that is becoming a larger component. I think it is important.

And it is interesting. For example, Blackwater actually trains as

a training course, where they do intensive Iraqi Arabic and Iraqi

customs and things for contractors, because they see it as a valuable, I guess, mechanism for their own people. So it is actually got

some value, and I think that is an aspect that I think contractors

are going to get into much more.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes, well, we certainly know. I mean,

we have been to Fort Riley, in terms of the embedding with the

military, and what that role will be, but I wasn’t certain whether

we were developing that kind of capacity, if you will, at our training level, when it comes to the——

Mr. BROOKS. It can be put into contracts that a certain amount

of training goes into anybody who deploys. I think that would be

appropriate. I mean, to a certain extent, you don’t know where the

next deployment is going to be. We already have contractors, I

think, in Somalia now, supporting the African Union. We have contractors in Darfur. We have contractors in Congo. So you can’t

train everybody for everything, but you can either find people that

have background or you can have, you know, require within the

contract a certain amount of training in certain areas.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Did you want to say something, Dr.

Avant?

Dr. AVANT. I was just going to point out the difference between—

I mean, the training that DynCorp employees get, that are the police advisers, is not the kind of training that Doug was talking

about, in terms of cultural awareness.

I know that there were complaints about the training capacities

of many people, even in the Balkans. And I think, in Iraq, it is a

very different kind of environment, where you have the degree of

tribal and religious law that is operating alongside the system of

59

law that we are trying to create, in terms of sort of the law enforcement.

And so the training, I would imagine, for the kinds of police advisers that you would need would be quite a bit greater in the Iraqi

context. So, you know, that would be another thing that would go

into some sort of long-term, strategic thinking about having a police force that was able to train, would be not just, you know, an

eight-day course or something in how to deal with people that

aren’t from the United States, but also have certain kinds of issues

that people would have to face in different parts of the world.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If we are going to accept the idea that

we are always going to need both contractors, as well as a military

force and a police force, perhaps, assisting in some way, then we

need to do this differently.

Dr. AVANT. Right. And we don’t have—I mean, with many of the

contractors in the military, you can decide. Do you want to send

people from the Army or do you want to send contractors? But the

United States doesn’t have a deployable international civilian police force, and so that—you are really are deciding—contractors.

What would be good, if you were going to do that, is at least have

some sort of agency in the government that is in charge of thinking

about strategically, rather than using the contractor for the strategic thinking, as well as the deployment.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is that part of the civilian corps? You

heard them mention the State Department is looking to kind of development of civilian corps. Is that kind of——

Dr. AVANT. Well, this was in Bush’s State of the Union address.

And I don’t think anyone knows exactly what is going on in that

office, or no one that I have talked to, so I don’t know, you know.

I hope you all have him up and at least the testimony.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Any other response to the testimony

that you heard, that you would like us to know about, that was a

concern to you, or you would like to emphasize?

Mr. BROOKS. I think I would emphasize, actually, the aspect of—

when you use contractors, they will use as many local employees

as they are allowed to use, which is actually quite good, in terms

of redevelopment. Now, with the police, it is a little bit different,

with the police training.

But, you know, when you are doing reconstruction work, when

you are doing security, you want to use as many locals as you can,

which is good for the economy, which is training, which is all sorts

of long-term benefits.

When I was doing my academic research before IPOA, I was in

Sierra Leone, and PAE was one of the contractors there. They had

eight Americans, and I think it was 400 Sierra Leoneans doing all

the logistics and support. And everything in that U.N. operation

that was fixed, or moved, or done was being done by these PAE employees, these Sierra Leoneans.

And it made a lot of sense. And it is a real benefit, I think, you

get from contracting.

Mr. BURKE. It is a situation that only just hadn’t happened in

Iraq. Most of the contractors—country nationals were coming in

from other countries to work in Iraq. Now we are starting to hire

some locals.

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I think, for a while, it was a security issue, but now we are looking at the benefit of hiring locals and putting money into the local

economy as outweighed by the risk, if you manage the risk well.

Dr. AVANT. Yes, I would just add to that, that, you know, as you

might worry about people who are being trained without background checks that are sort of going off to fight in the militias,

when the United States leaves Iraq, it will leave whatever capacities its imparted to local people, under the control of whatever civilian leadership there is.

And so I think that it is—you know, I completely agree that it

is wise to use locals, but it is also wise to pay attention to the kind

of structure, the political structure that they are operating under.

And that just goes back to the whole issue of training, you know,

not only people working in the national government in Iraq, but

also local government officials.

If you are going to have a police force that can do certain kinds

of things, and yet it is responsive to a local government that isn’t

acting the way local governments act or we would expect them to

act, then you are going to have a lot of problems.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for

this meeting, this hearing. I know we have had two panels. I have

not been able to be here for much of it, and I missed a lot of your

testimony, but thank you for being with us and shedding some

light, a lot of light on this issue.

I know Ms. Davis and I went to Fort Riley, as she was pointing

out. And we have heard testimony from the MiTT teams, military

transition teams. I think that what she was alluding to, and I

would certainly agree with this, we need something similar to that

in regard to the police force. I guess we could call it a POT team

and get away with that, but something similar to the MiTT teams.

And Representative Davis and I were at Fort Riley, Kansas, and

very impressed with what the military is doing there.

I know that, Mr. Burke, you had said in your testimony that you

have considered the police training mission a complete failure, and

that bothers me, of course. I just would like to know a couple of

things that you might suggest—maybe you have already done this

and I missed it—but in regard to what we can do.

And, you know, you talked about the five-year experience level

and the lack of credibility if they don’t have a little gray around

the temples with the Iraqis, who have, in many instances, a lot

more experience. And I understand that, but I would think it might

be a little difficult to recruit an older, more seasoned, near retirement, if you will, police person with lots of experience for this very

dangerous mission. You point out 17 of them have been killed, and

I can understand that.

But, you know, just how do we go about this? And I do want to

ask this question. I really should know the answer to it. What was

the police situation in the country before 2003, March? And, of

course, Baghdad is, I think, a metropolitan area of 4 million people,

is it not?

Mr. BURKE. A little larger.

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Dr. GINGREY. And, you know, you have one of the largest of the

cities, not that large, of course, but what did they do before? And

where are all these people now?

Mr. BURKE. Well, the Iraqi Police Service actually dates back to

the 1920’s, and it was created by the Brits along the British model.

And up until the 1950’s, the chief constable of the Iraqi police force

was a British officer seconded to Iraq. So they have a long tradition

of, if you will, our way of thinking toward policing.

Under Saddam, however, he created—he didn’t trust the police,

so he created other security organizations that superseded the Iraqi

police service and had more authority and more power, to the point

where, by the end of the regime, the Iraqi police service had sort

of a fire department mentality. They stayed in the police station,

waiting for the alarm to ring. They did no proactive policing, because they were afraid of crossing paths with one of the other intelligence operations.

There are probably 17, or 18, maybe 19 different security organizations, if you include, for example, the Olympic committee had a

security organization that had broad powers that would be unimaginable in a democracy. So the police were perhaps the 16th or

17th on this hierarchy, but they yet prided themselves on their

education and their completing the police academy.

When we went in May of 2003, when we walked through the

academy, we actually found translated documents that were FBI

law enforcement bulletins that were issued in the 1970’s and 1980’s

that somehow managed to make their way to Iraq and be translated into Arabic. So they did pride themselves on their British

heritage in wanting to be a democratic-style police force.

In June and early July, we ran a management training program

for just the generals. And basically what I took is a course that I

had taught at Boston College and reduced it to 15 hours. It would

have been a semester-long course—and I found that, as I was skipping, and, you know, I am making this brief presentation, one of

the generals or one of them would raise their hand and they would

say, ‘‘You know, but you forgot something.’’

They recognized the course I was teaching, that there were

things I was leaving out in trying to condense a long semester

course in a brief presentation. They knew what I was talking

about, but there was a gap between what they knew and what they

were allowed to practice under Saddam.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, again, I ask you the question about, where

are they now? Where are some of these people? Have they resurfaced? I mean, it sounds like there is some real talent there

that——

Mr. BURKE. There was some real talent there. The ones who

came back were probably the ones, if you will, with the cleanest

conscience, and some of them were very educated, well-educated

people, who had gone to school in Eastern Europe before the fall

of the communist countries. Some of them had gone to school in the

United Kingdom. One of the deputy ministers had gone to school

in Japan, and they prided themselves a lot on their educational

level.

The ones who came back, some of them had been killed. We have

had a few of them assassinated, some of my friends that I worked

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with over there. Some of them have been forcibly retired, because

the new government doesn’t want their people with their background, if you will. Maybe it is religious issues; I don’t know. Some

of them——

Dr. GINGREY. Well, let me interrupt you. In that part of our reBaathification benchmark that, you know, we want them to give

these people an opportunity to come back, do we not?

Mr. BURKE. We do, but I don’t think they will. I know one major

general who used to head up what we would consider the rapid response police, the patrol police. He has left the country. He is living

in Egypt.

The former police chief of Baghdad, he is now living down in

Dubai, working down in Dubai. Another major general, who is still

there in a very important position, e-mails me constantly, asking

me to help him get out of the country and come to the United

States as a refugee. So there are many of them that, you know,

don’t want to stay there and who want to get out.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, let me just real quickly—Dr. Avant,

am I pronouncing it correctly?

Dr. AVANT. Avant.

Dr. GINGREY. Avant. I am not familiar with a lot of your publications, but I was reading your bio, and I know that it says that you

have been doing some work on how the United States government’s

use of private security affects democratic processes in the United

States. Can you comment on that just a little bit? I mean, you

know, a few minutes.

Dr. AVANT. Yes, I am basically gathering a lot of information

about the way in which the press covers private security forces in

Iraq versus military forces, looking to the issue of transparency.

How much do people know about these kinds of forces?

Because, you know, as we heard earlier, you know, private contractors have essentially doubled the size of the U.S. force in Iraq.

And, you know, the degree to which people get information about

that would be important for transparency.

I have also looked at something that we call in political science

veto points, which is essentially the role of Congress in deciding on

contracts and sort of looking at the deployment of forces versus

contracting and the degree to which it gives power to the executive

versus Congress. And there, as I think I mentioned at the end of

my prepared remarks, it tends to advantage the executive branch

relative to Congress, at this point.

The third thing that I have done is some experiments that look

at how people react to the deaths of private security versus military personnel in Iraq. So it is trying to look at issues of public consent, transparency, and checks and balances, in order to sort of understand how our government’s use of these contractors has affected the processes of democracy in the U.S.

Dr. GINGREY. Yes, but, I mean, in regard to the use of the private

security contractors, you don’t consider that somewhat a violation

of our democratic process, do you?

Dr. AVANT. Well, I think that if you sort of look at the foundation

of democracy in the Western world, it came alongside the idea of

citizen armies. And so there is a very long tradition of connecting

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democracy with some duty and responsibility of citizens to both

serve, but also be a check.

And the whole issue of whether contracting separates that is actually—I am just writing a paper right now—looking at exactly

that kind of issue historically.

Dr. GINGREY. That is very, very interesting, and I thank you for

that.

Mr. Chairman, I didn’t have anything else. That is great.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

And I want to thank the members of our second panel for your

testimony. Appreciate it very much. We would love the opportunity

to follow up with any of you, should other members have questions.

But thank you very much for appearing.

And the hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 25, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate among ISF personnel?

Colonel RAINES. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy examination during the

recruiting process and individuals must meet the minimum literacy standards. For

those individuals that need to improve their literacy skills, literacy training is offered at certain police training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nationwide program within the Ministry of Interior.

Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint Forces. The Iraqi Joint

Headquarters is considering potential programs to improve literacy. For example, in

Al Anbar province, Coalition forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with

local universities to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently, informal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and university staffs to extend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army, but no formal agreements have

been reached.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy rate among ISF personnel?

Mr. MOTSEK. All Iraqi police forces complete a literacy examination during the recruiting process and individuals must meet the minimum literacy standards. For

those individuals that need to improve their literacy skills, literacy training is offered at certain police training centers; however, there is no comprehensive nationwide program within the Ministry of Interior.

Literacy is also a basic requirement to join the Iraqi Joint Forces. The Iraqi Joint

Headquarters is considering potential programs to improve literacy. For example, in

Al Anbar province, Coalition forces and Iraqi leaders have recently worked with

local universities to provide focused tutoring for perspective recruits. Currently, informal discussions are ongoing between military leaders and university staffs to extend a literacy program to soldiers in the Army, but no formal agreements have

been reached.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the poor literacy among ISF personnel?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team,

which provided the following response:

All Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) candidates for positions within the civil security forces must be literate at time of entry. The MOI recruiting policy states that,

‘‘the candidates must have graduated from Intermediate School as a minimum requirement.’’ The MOI recognizes that illiterate individuals were hired during a period of expedient hiring in the provinces and has ordered the provinces to develop

literacy programs to address this problem where it may exist. CPATT has supported

and implemented a pilot program for literacy at the Baghdad Police College. This

program was quite successful and it was turned over to the Iraqi Police Service for

wider implementation. Provinces such as Ninawa (Mosul) have developed and implemented programs to address the problem of illiteracy within the ranks.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition teams and partner units four

years into the war?

Colonel RAINES. Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF–I) is not aware of any substantiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a formidable lack of linguists.

The latest information from the 27 May 2007 Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that

Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTCI) currently has the

following linguists per the stated requirements:

Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93 percent)

Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96 percent)

Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)

Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100 percent)

The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists through

Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.

136

The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the ground to

provide the greatest linguist support possible to each element present. The majority

of the linguist requirements in Iraq are for Arabic speakers and a small percentage

is for Kurdish speakers. When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is

normally for dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.

The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF theater linguist

requirements:

a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills currently support OIF operations in accordance with their occupational specialties and unit rotations.

b. In February 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide Pilot Program

to bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural expertise into the Individual

Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort later expanded to include Kurdish and other

languages. In February 2006, the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military Occupational Specialty 09L, Interpreter/Translator. Currently, some OIF theater linguist

requirements, to include the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq, are supported by available 09L Soldiers.

c. The bulk of the Arabic and Kurdish linguist support to the MiTTs, U.S. trainers and Coalition partner units in Iraq comes from Local National contract linguists.

MiTTs, U.S. trainers subordinate to the MNSTCI and partner units have a current

combined linguist requirement of 1935. The Theater Linguist Manager is focused on

filling these requirements and has maintained fill in these elements beyond the

level of many other OIF units. In February 2007, the total OIF linguist requirement

was raised to support an increase of forces. The contractor is increasing local recruiting efforts; newspaper advertisements, flyers, and monetary incentives are

being considered to meet the higher requirements. The Army continues to provide

screening support to the local hiring effort and is addressing local recruitment with

the contractor to improve the overall linguist fill. The Army continues to press the

current contractor to recruit and retain linguists to achieve 100 percent of the contract linguist requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

d. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has expanded its efforts to increase

linguist throughput and quality, and to increase the Arabic and Kurdish language

familiarization available to the Army. The Emerging Languages Task Force provides instruction in low density languages, including Kurdish. New DLI language

training detachments and distribution of Arabic Survival kits also increased the

available Arabic language training opportunities.

While mission requirements are not static and mission changes make it unlikely

that we will achieve 100 percent support for the forces in OIF, the Army is doing

all possible to provide maximum linguist support.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition teams and partner units four

years into the war?

Mr. MOTSEK. Multi-National Forces—Iraq (MNFI) is not aware of any substantiated analysis, data, or recent inquiries that indicate a formidable lack of linguists.

The latest information from the 27 May 07 Linguist Weekly Roll-up indicates that

Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTCI) currently has the

following linguists per the stated requirements:

Arabic Cat 1 Local Nationals: 507 assigned/547 required (93%)

Kurdish Cat 1 Local Nationals: 25 assigned/26 required (96%)

Persian Farsi Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)

Turkish Local Nationals: 1 assigned/1 required (100%)

The Army addresses the requirement for Arabic and Kurdish linguists through

Soldiers, where available, and through contracting activities.

The OIF Theater Linguist Manager manages the linguist assets on the ground to

provide the greatest linguist support possible to each element present. The majority

of the linguist requirements in Iraq are for Arabic speakers and a small percentage

is for Kurdish speakers. When Kurdish linguists are requested, the requirement is

normally for dual-language Arabic-Kurdish speakers.

The following initiatives below represent Army efforts to fill OIF theater linguist

requirements:

a. All available Soldiers with Arabic and Kurdish language skills currently support OIF operations in accordance with their occupational specialties and unit rotations.

b. In Feb. 2003, the Army initiated the 09L Translator Aide Pilot Program to

bring additional Arabic language skills and cultural expertise into the Individual

Ready Reserve. The recruiting effort later expanded to include Kurdish and other

languages. In Feb. 2006, the Pilot Program transitioned into the Military OccupaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
137

tional Specialty 09L, Interpreter/Translator. Currently, some OIF theater linguist

requirements, to include the Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq, are supported by available 09L Soldiers.

c. The bulk of the Arabic and Kurdish linguist support to the MiTTs, U.S. trainers and coalition partner units in Iraq comes from Local National contract linguists.

MiTTs, U.S. trainers subordinate to the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq and partner units have a current combined linguist requirement of

1935. The Theater Linguist Manager is focused on filling these requirements and

has maintained fill in these elements beyond the level of many other OIF units. In

Feb. 2007, the total OIF linguist requirement was raised to support an increase of

forces. The contractor is increasing local recruiting efforts; newspaper advertisements, flyers and monetary incentives are being considered to meet the higher requirements. The Army continues to provide screening support to the local hiring effort and is addressing local recruitment with the contractor to improve the overall

linguist fill. The Army continues to press the current contractor to recruit and retain linguists to achieve 100% of the contract linguist requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

d. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has expanded its efforts to increase

linguist throughput and quality, and to increase the Arabic and Kurdish language

familiarization available to the Army. The Emerging Languages Task Force provides instruction in low density languages, including Kurdish. New DLI language

training detachments and distribution of Arabic Survival kits also increased the

available Arabic language training opportunities.

While mission requirements are not static and mission changes make it unlikely

that we will achieve 100% support for the forces in OIF, the Army is doing all possible to provide maximum linguist support.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the plan to address the continuing lack of Arabic and Kurdish linguists to serve with U.S. trainers, transition teams and partner units four

years into the war?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team,

which provided the following response:

The Coalition Forces have addressed this issue by expanding contracts with private companies for providing skilled linguists in support of the mission. Linguists

and translators from the United States and the Coalition as well as local national

personnel are employed to fulfill this requirement. There are significant challenges

with the utilization of local national personnel. These individuals face major security risks when going to and from work assignments. The Coalition will continue

to support these vital members of the mission.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the status of the analysis of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice versus Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act proposal for contractors?

When will this be completed?

Colonel RAINES. The matter was referred to the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (JSC) in January 2007. The JSC has completed its analysis. The results

of the JSC review and its recommendations regarding an appropriate course of action will soon be presented to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense

for consideration.

Mr. MEEHAN. What is the status of the analysis of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice versus Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act proposal for contractors?

When will this be completed?

Mr. MOTSEK. The matter was referred to the Joint Service Committee on Military

Justice (JSC) in January 2007. The JSC has completed its analysis. The results of

the JSC review and its recommendations regarding an appropriate course of action

will soon be presented to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for consideration.

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department of Defense and the Department of State or Department of Justice with respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission, including provisions for funding, contract management, and oversight.

Colonel RAINES. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department of Defense and the Department of State or Department of Justice with respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission, including provisions for funding, contract management, and oversight.

138

Mr. MOTSEK. The Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) has been unable to discover any interagency agreements, or similar

documentation, existing between this office, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

(Material Readiness & Logistics), or the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,

Technology & Logistics) and the Departments of State and Justice with respect to

support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission.

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide a copy of all interagency agreements (or similar documentation), current or historical, between the Department of State and the Department of Justice or Department of Defense with respect to support for the Iraqi Security Forces training mission, including provisions for funding, contract management

and oversight.

Ambassador PATTERSON. [The information referred to is retained in the committee

files and can be viewed upon request.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide a copy of any after action report, lessons learned, or

audit documentation prepared with respect to the contract for the training of the

New Iraqi Army issued to Vinnell Corporation on June 25, 2003 (DABK01–03–C–

0001).

Colonel RAINES. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Please provide a copy of the agreement(s) with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for ownership and operation of the Jordanian International Police

Training Center.

Ambassador PATTERSON. [The information referred to is retained in the committee

files and can be viewed upon request.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Describe the current status of all Department of State contracts

that provide support for the Iraqi Security Forces, and provide appropriate documentation, or, at a minimum, a detailed description of the scope of work and objectives, who the contract is with, the type of contract, contract period, cost ceiling,

costs to date, approximate number of contract personnel in Iraq, and any plans for

recompetition or expiration of the contract.

Ambassador PATTERSON. There are two base contracts that provide support for

the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). CPI personnel are presently operating in Amman,

Jordan at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). DynCorp International is the only INL prime contractor currently performing in Iraq. The approximate number of DynCorp contractor personnel in Iraq is 1,000 (an additional 123

Border Enforcement Advisors provided under a separate task order with DynCorp

are in the process of deploying to Iraq).

Contract Contractor Contract Type Status Contract

Period

Original

Cost

Ceiling

Present

Cost

Ceiling

SLMAQM040030 DynCorp

International, LLC

Combination Firm Fixed

Price Indefinite Quantity

Indefinite Quality, CostPlus-Fixed-Fee

Active 2/18/04 thru

2/17/09

$2B $25 B

CPI contract

SLMAQM040032

Civilian Police

International, LLC

Combination Firm Fixed

Price Indefinite Quantity

Indefinite Quality, CostPlus-Fixed-Fee

Active 2/18/04 thru

2/17/09

$2B $20.4B

A detailed description of the contract scope of work and objectives, etc. is attached

in Appendix C. Sections C–H of the base contracts are identical for both the

DynCorp and CPI contracts. The contracts shown above are for services/supplies

provided on a global scale. ISF-specific support services, supplies and funding are

provided on a task order basis as shown below:

DynCorp—SAQMPD04F0338—IRAQ

DynCorp—SAQMPD05F1436—IRAQ (Criminal, Justice, Food)

DynCorp—SAQMPD05F2059—Iraq Ratification

DynCorp—SAQMPD04F0765—JIPTC Buildout

DynCorp—SAQMPD04FA528—JIPTC O&M

DynCorp—SAQMPD07FA515—Border Enforcement Advisors

CPI—SAQMPD04FA574/SAQMPD06FA574—JIPTC O&M

INL is currently in the early acquisition planning stages for recompetition of the

base contracts with an anticipated award in the latter part of FY 2008. Further,

INL is currently involved in competing the $1 billion Iraq task order currently

awarded to DynCorp and expects to make an award of a new task order this summer. The task order will include personnel (e.g., police advisors requested by

CPATT) as well as personnel support such as housing, meals, security, communicaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:38 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037889 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-55\115160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
139

tions, and medical services. INL is intent on providing every opportunity for fair

consideration between the three prime contractors for the Iraq task order.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN

Mr. AKIN. How many people would Department of Justice have in Iraq? How

many do you have at a given time? Are we talking dozens, hundreds, thousands?

Are you counting a lot on contractors to help do what has to be done over there?

Mr. SWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Why are we still stymied with regard to language skills in State Department personnel? Why has there not been a successful effort so that there would

have been the kind of focus on—I assume that we think language skills are important to do these jobs—why are we still behind, this many years later from when

the war started and when the war in Afghanistan started?

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Department’s effort has in fact been very successful,

but historical funding and staffing shortfalls, coupled with the complexity of learning a language like Arabic, present no rapid solutions. The State Department focuses recruiting efforts on Arabic and other critical needs language speakers, gives

bonus points in the Foreign Service hiring process to candidates with demonstrated

Arabic proficiency, and has dramatically expanded our capacity to train students in

Arabic.

For example, the Department’s recruiters specifically target schools and organizations with Arabic language programs and other critical needs languages to increase

our recruitment. Since 2004, the Department has given bonus points in the hiring

process to Foreign Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages

such as Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have passed the written

examination and oral assessment. In addition, our Diplomats in Residence and recruiters hold individual counseling sessions with speakers of Arabic and other critical needs languages.

The Department has also increased its capacity to train in Arabic language. State

enrollments in Arabic language training at our Foreign Service Institute (FSI) have

nearly quadrupled since 2001, with roughly 450 students enrolled in various types

of Arabic courses in FY 2006. We are working to keep the trend moving in an upward direction, predominantly by utilizing distance learning and similar delivery

methods as alternatives to traditional classroom-based training. The Foreign Service

Institute is also expanding on-line and Early Morning Arabic programs, as well as

conducting greater numbers of domestic and overseas immersion training events.

Arabic Training

Enrollments * FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06

Employees 109 156 223 323 406 454

Eligible Family Members 12 17 21 18 20 14

* Includes enrollments in all types of Arabic training (full-time FSI courses, Tunis field training, online distance learning courses, early morning language courses, etc.)

In addition, we have increased the number of Arabic language-designated positions and the required level of proficiency for already language-designated positions,

and student enrollment levels will reflect these additional positions. The Foreign

Service Institute is also expanding on-line and Early Morning Arabic programs, as

well as greater numbers of domestic and overseas immersion training events in Arabic-speaking areas.

On average it takes two years of full-time training in Arabic language to attain

a level of General Professional Proficiency in speaking and reading, and that creates

staffing challenges for the Department. Employees assigned to long-term language

training are not available for other assignments. Staffing deficits created by hiring

freezes in the 1990s and increased language and other training requirements in the

post-9/11 environment have left the Department with approximately 88 available

staff for every 100 positions.

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Absent a ‘‘training float,’’ the Department simply does not have enough personnel

to fill all of its critical overseas and domestic positions and simultaneously allow for

large numbers of long-term language students. We have prioritized staffing, redefined assignments rules, and drawn on Civil Service employees to help fill critical

overseas positions, but more resources are needed both to sustain the Department’s

efforts to develop and maintain a highly-proficient cadre of Arabic speakers and to

tend to the general business of diplomacy worldwide.

The FY 2008 State Department budget request includes an increase of

$20,821,000 to enhance the Department’s ability to provide foreign language and

other developmental training, including 48 new Foreign Service positions to improve

the language proficiency of current and incoming Foreign Service employees. The requested increase of $20.821M would also be used to fund special programs such as

Arab media workshops and internships in the field and additional overseas immersion training opportunities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. DAVIS. Just a few other questions, in terms of contracts. For example,

DynCorp, you mentioned that people need five years of experience in police work

in order to train Iraqi personnel. Do we think that that is enough? And are they

bringing the skill sets that are really necessary to do that job?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Most have significantly more experience. The roughly

690 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) currently serving in Iraq have an

average of 21.6 years of law enforcement experience. The current low is nine years

and the high is 38 years.

We have made significant enhancements to our pre-deployment orientation and

screening processes to ensure the personnel we deploy are prepared to meet mission

objectives. The screening program includes: psychological tests, physical agility

tests, and joint interviews with DynCorp and Department of State employees. IPLO

candidates that pass this screening must undergo two weeks of INL-sponsored

training before being deployed. Training includes: weapons qualification, mission

briefs, familiarization with the history and culture of the region, first aid, convoy

operations, team building, GPS and map reading, and hostage and survival training.

This effectively screens for unqualified or unmotivated individuals, and roughly 23

percent of candidate IPLOs fail orientation training.

We are confident that the IPLOs supplied by the Department of State’s contract

with DynCorp International have sufficient and relevant law enforcement experience in order to train and mentor Iraqi civilian security forces. We are in constant

communication with CPATT to ensure that the personnel provided by our contractor

meet the mission needs and are performing effectively as part of the MNF–I mission

in the field.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. When a recruit walked through the front door of the JIPTC a year

ago, did we know, in fact, who that person was, or did we have to rely upon who

they said they were?

Mr. MOTSEK. All of the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)

and U.S. Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) files have been routinely sent to the

Department of Defense’s Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) to be checked against previously entered BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi criminal

records, 1991 Gulf War prisoner fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints harvested from various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also an arrangement with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare these records with FBI records and

other associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.

If this crosscheck identifies derogatory or negative information on any student

who is attending, or has graduated from, the Jordan International Police Training

Center (JIPTC) or other Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)-certified

police academy inside Iraq, those files are turned over to the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and Iraq’s Ministry of Interior Internal Affairs section. The

comparison of all biometric records (not exclusively police cadets or graduates) up

to June 2007 had resulted in more than 8,500 matches to criminal records generated

from approximately 666,500 biometric enrollments (includes persons other than police). As of June 2007, there were 29,691 JIPTC graduates enrolled in the system.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the Department of Defense tracking through CPATT these trainees?

141

Mr. MOTSEK. The assignment and tracking of police personnel after academy

graduation is conducted by Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI). The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) monitors this effort through its embedded ministry

transition team and provides feedback to Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC–I) on the status of these trainees.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who in Washington is responsible for CPATT?

Mr. MOTSEK. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is a subordinate entity to the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC–I)

which is a subordinate of Multi-national Force Iraq (MNF–I). USCENTCOM has

oversight of MNF–I. Within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff’s J–

3 and J–5 are responsible for monitoring activities within MNF–I, and therefore,

CPATT.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are we paying any of the overhead in those new facilities or are

the Iraqis paying for all of it?

Mr. MOTSEK. The Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC– I) asked for, and received, $332M in FY07 for Iraqi Ministry of Interior infrastructure. That funding is paying for the construction of 102 police station garages, 18

medium maintenance facilities, 5 regional base facilities, 4 medium repair facilities,

18 police stations in Baghdad, border fort refurbishment, roads to border forts, and

other smaller projects. In 2008, the Government of Iraq (GoI) will assume total responsibility for infrastructure.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type of tracking for recruits was in place at the opening of

the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?

Colonel RAINES. JIPTC opened on 29 November 2003 with a class of 485 Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits. Basic biographical information for all recruits was collected.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type of tracking for recruits was in place at the opening of

the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?

Mr. MOTSEK. JIPTC opened on November 29, 2003 with a class of 485 Iraqi Police

Service (IPS) recruits. Basic biographical information for all recruits was collected.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for recruits was in place at the opening of

the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Responsibility for the recruitment, selection and vetting

of Iraqi personnel receiving training at JIPTC was the responsibility of the Coalition

Provisional Authority and is now overseen by the U.S. Central Command’s Civilian

Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT).

The Coalition Provisional Authority collected biographical information on every

recruit beginning with the first JIPTC class in November 2003. This included home

of record, family members, father’s name, place and date of birth, previous employment, education, and medical history. Staff at JIPTC would then re-interview recruits and take identification pictures. A system to collect biometric data was established at JIPTC in December 2005.

Information provided by recruits was extremely difficult to verify. No reliable

database existed in Iraq to check names against for possible criminal, militia, or terrorist ties. Because existing records had been maintained by a despotic regime, it

was not always appropriate to use them as a basis for excluding a candidate from

police training. Moreover, the physical task of verifying information by visiting a

candidate’s hometown or interviewing neighbors and acquaintances, which had

worked successfully in other post-conflict missions, was impractical given the large

number of recruits and the security situation. This method of verification could also

result in threats or violence against police recruits and their families.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at the opening

of the JIPTC?

Colonel RAINES. Basic biographical information for all graduates was passed to

the Ministry of Interior.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at the opening

of the JIPTC?

Mr. MOTSEK. Basic biographical information for all graduates was passed to the

Ministry of Interior.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for graduates was in place at the opening

of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Graduates from JIPTC were transported back to Iraq, at

which point they were to report to a local police station for service as an officer in

the Iraqi Police Service. A number of factors impeded the Coalition Provisional

Authority’s (CPA) efforts to track graduates of police training at JIPTC and other

academies within Iraq, including: the decentralized nature of the police forces and

limited Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) role and capacity; the lack of an international presence in many of the police stations to which graduates were assigned,

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which limited CPA’s ability to verify graduates’ whereabouts; and the absence of

electronic database systems (and often even the power to operate electronic systems)

at both the federal and provincial/district levels. Other factors also complicated the

effort. Police station commanders, in many cases, were not given notice from MOI

that new officers would be assigned to their stations and commanders often did not

have the resources to pay new officers. There was also resistance on the part of

some Iraqi police commanders to accept JIPTC graduates, as they either did not accept the training or preferred to appoint their own officers. Finally, some Iraqi officers decided not to serve as police officers and others left due to insurgent intimidation, threats, and attacks against new police officers.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for recruits and

graduates at the JIPTC?

Colonel RAINES. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered into biometric databases. Each recruit provides detailed personal information, ten fingerprints, a front

and side view photograph, a retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are

sent to the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at

Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi AFIS system (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West

Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked with two U.S. force protection systems

used by the Coalition in Iraq: the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA)

and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a

‘‘hit’’ on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two agencies),

is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for investigation.

The Iraqi AFIS does not track where IPS officers are stationed or what training

they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/ledger process. However, a

human resources system, the Iraqi Police Data Management System (IPDMS), is

currently being developed by the Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will

populate IPDMS, but IPDMS will not contain biometric data.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of biometric tracking is now in place for recruits and

graduates at the JIPTC?

Mr. MOTSEK. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) recruits are entered into biometric databases. Each recruit provides detailed personal information, ten fingerprints, a front

and side view photograph, a retinal scan, and a voice print. The electronic files are

sent to the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) compound at

Adnon Palace where all the files are checked not only through the Iraqi AFIS system (internal to Iraq), but also through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West

Virginia. There, these files are cross-checked with two U.S. force protection systems

used by the Coalition in Iraq: the Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA)

and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT). Any recruit record identified with a

‘‘hit’’ on the AFIS system (e.g., criminal record or double dipping in two agencies),

is sent to Ministry of Interior Internal Review for investigation.

The Iraqi AFIS does not track where IPS officers are stationed or what training

they have received. Currently, this is a manual paper/ledger process. However, a

human resources system, the Iraqi Police Data Management System (IPDMS), is

currently being developed by the Ministry of Interior. Iraqi AFIS information will

populate IPDMS, but IPDMS will not contain biometric data.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of tracking for graduates is now in place for recruits

and graduates at the JIPTC?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

(CPATT), which provided the following response:

All students at JIPTC and other CPATT-certified police training academies inside

Iraq are enrolled into the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).

All AFIS files are sent back to the Department of Defense’s Biometric Fusion Center

(BFC) to be checked against previously entered Iraqi civil and detainee records, prewar Iraqi criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints harvested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.

The AFIS data collection program is maintained to help provide a positive identification for all Iraqi Security Force personnel, though it is not a human resources

system that tracks personnel throughout their career in the Iraqi police, army or

the prison system.

The assignment and tracking of police personnel after academy graduation is conducted by Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI). However, the current paper-based

records system used by the MOI, coupled with the decentralized nature of the Iraqi

Police Service and the ongoing insurgency, makes tracking personnel exceedingly

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difficult. In the near future, an automated system currently being installed in the

MOI and its subordinate units, with U.S. Government assistance, will make the

MOI’s personnel and pay systems more transparent.

Graduates of U.S.-sponsored academy training are assigned to the Provincial Police Directorate. The Provincial headquarters will then make the district and station

assignments. CPATT tracks the number of graduates and the assignments to the

provinces but does not have a presence in all stations to directly verify that the

graduates report for duty. At this time, we can not guarantee that an individual

reports to duty at a specific police station; however, it is the contention of the MOI

that the vast majority of academy graduates report to their assigned duty station.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?

Colonel RAINES. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service recruits began in

March 2005.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?

Mr. MOTSEK. Biometric screening for Iraqi Police Service recruits began in March

2005.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long has this tracking system been in place?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

(CPATT), which provided the following response:

There is no U.S. Government system in place to track graduates of the Jordan

International Police Training Center or graduates of other CPATT supported police

training academies in Iraq. However, CPATT is assisting Iraq’s Ministry of Interior

in creating an automated record system that will make the MOI’s personnel and pay

systems more transparent. The Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System,

which collects biometric data on individuals receiving training, has been in theater

since November 2005.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in Iraq that are

suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill Americans identified using biometrics?

Colonel RAINES. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then most likely the

detainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset and the detainee’s status

was checked through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.

If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been entered into the

Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and checked with Iraqi

AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS

upon sentencing by an Iraqi judge.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockades in Iraq that are

suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill Americans identified using biometrics?

Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, if the detainee is a Coalition detainee, then most likely the detainee was entered into Biometric Automated Toolset and the detainee’s status was

checked through the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.

If the individual was detained by Iraqi forces, some have been entered into the

Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and checked with Iraqi

AFIS and the BFC. Iraqi law states that Iraqis are only entered into Iraqi AFIS

upon sentencing by an Iraqi judge.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are people in U.S. military prisons and stockade in Iraq that are

suspected of or have been charged with killing or attempting to kill American identified using biometrics?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team,

which provided the following response:

All U.S. Military prisons in Iraq use the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), an

identity management system used to record data and classified attachments linked

to biometrics of detainees and non-U.S. persons of interest. The BAT system was

originally designed as a dossier system for U.S. Military Intelligence personnel. It

is composed of biometric records used to positively identify individuals (unclassified

information), and an application for entering relevant intelligence information concerning the individual (classified information). These two portions can be separated

and routed to the appropriate organizations for processing. BAT is interconnected

with other CENTCOM databases and databases in the continental United States.

BAT data travels back to the Biometric Fusion Center (West Virginia) to be checked

against previously entered BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi

criminal records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints harvested form various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship with the

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Federal Bureau of Investigation and other associated biometric records collected by

the U.S. Government.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these prisoners and

graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were the results?

Colonel RAINES. Yes, this information is cross-checked. JIPTC graduates are entered in the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.

Those detainees held by Coalition forces are checked using the BFC. Some Iraqi

detainees have been entered into AFIS and checked with the BFC.

Unfortunately, results of these cross-checks are not available at this time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these prisoners and

graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were the results?

Mr. MOTSEK. Yes, this information is cross-checked. JIPTC graduates are entered

in the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and the Biometric

Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia.

Those detainees held by Coalition forces are checked using the BFC. Some Iraqi

detainees have been entered into AFIS and checked with the BFC.

Unfortunately, results of these cross-checks are not available at this time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has anyone ever run a cross check between these prisoners and

graduates of the JIPTC? If so, who did so and what were the results?

Ambassador PATTERSON. National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36)

assigned the responsibility for developing Iraq’s security forces to CENTCOM. We

referred this question to CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

(CPATT), which provided the following response:

All of the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) files containing information on Iraqi police receiving U.S.-sponsored training and U.S. Biometric

Automated Toolset (BAT) files containing information on detainees are sent back to

the Department of Defense’s Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) to be checked against

previously entered BAT records (civil and detainee records), pre-war Iraqi criminal

records, 1991 Gulf War fingerprint records, and latent fingerprints harvested form

various forensic efforts in Iraq. There is also a relationship with the Federal Bureau

of Investigation and other associated biometric records collected by the U.S. Government.

If this crosscheck identifies derogatory information on any students at, or graduate of, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) or other CPATTcertified police academy inside Iraq, those files are turned over to the National

Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and Iraq’s Ministry of Interior Internal Affairs

section. The comparison of all biometric records (not exclusively police cadets or

graduates) to date has resulted in over 8,500 matches to criminal records generated

from approximately 666,500 biometric enrollments (includes persons other than police). There are 29,691 JIPTC graduates enrolled in the system.

Mr. ANDREWS. Here is the specific question I am asking. When a recruit walked

through the front door of the JIPTC a year ago, did we know, in fact who that person was, or did we have to rely upon who they said they were?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Though we did not solely rely on the candidates own representations, we did not know with 100 percent certainty if an Iraqi recruit receiving training at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) or at any

other facility at which Iraqi police are being trained within Iraq was who they

claimed to be. JIPTC and the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) in

Baghdad collect biometric information on individuals receiving training and crossreference it with both Iraqi criminal databases and Coalition databases to check for

derogatory information. However, the Iraqi criminal databases were largely compiled during Saddam Hussein’s regime and so it was not always appropriate to use

them as a basis for excluding a candidate from police training. Moreover, Coalition

databases had to be populated with biometric information on Iraqis who attended

U.S.-sponsored training, were detained on the battlefield, or were imprisoned by the

Government of Iraq before they became effective tools for vetting candidates. The

system to collect biometric information on Iraqi police officers receiving U.S.-sponsored training both at JIPTC and in Iraq was established in December of 2005. This

information is collected, in almost every case, before candidates arrive at JIPTC. Before December 2005, biographic information was collected and stored on all individuals receiving training at JIPTC.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask you a specific question. If, in March of 2004, a suspected al Qaeda fighter is arrested and detained in Iraq, and he or she is then biometrically identified when they are held in Baghdad, and then are released for

whatever reason, and then they use a different name and enroll in the JIPTC,

would we know that the person who enrolled in JIPTC was that suspected al Qaeda

fighter?

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Ambassador PATTERSON. Since December of 2005, CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has collected biometric information for every individual receiving training at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)

and other CPATT-certified police training facilities in Iraq, and checked it against

both Iraqi criminal databases and Coalition databases. If the suspected al Qaeda

fighter’s biometric data was entered into Coalition databases, as is standard practice

with individuals detained by Coalition forces, we would be able to identify that individual if he or she attempted to receive training at JIPTC or a CPATT-certified

training facility in Iraq.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you think it is $500 million?

Ambassador PATTERSON. We have, with Department of State funds and funds pro- vided by the Department of Defense, spent $434,330,060 on the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) between FY 2004 and FY 2007.

Mr. ANDREWS. So that is roughly $10,000 per recruit, right?

Ambassador PATTERSON. From FY 2004 to FY 2007, the per-recruit cost of train- ing at JIPTC was $7,991. This figure was derived by dividing the total cost of constructing and operating JIPTC ($434,330,060) by the number of individuals trained

(54,351).

The total cost of JIPTC includes construction; operations and maintenance; security; international police trainers; and life support such as meals, laundry service,

etc. However, it does not include the salaries of Iraqi police personnel receiving

training, which are paid by Iraq’s Ministry of Interior, or transportation for Iraqi

personnel between Iraq and Jordan, which is provided by the Department of Defense.

JIPTC is currently in the process of training an additional 2,500 Iraqi Corrections Service officers at a cost of approximately $21.07 million, making the projected perrecruit cost of training $8,010.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you know how—what did we spend to recruit and train police personnel in the rest of the world? Is it anywhere near $50,000 a year on an

annualized basis?

Ambassador PATTERSON. Training at the Jordan International Police Training

Center (JIPTC) has been more costly than during other post-conflict police development missions due to a variety of factors. The cost of building an entirely new facility on an expedited basis to meet an urgent requirement is chief among them. In

Afghanistan, the per-recruit cost of training is approximately $3,215 ($402.6 million

total between FY 2003 and FY 2006 divided by the roughly 125,254 individuals);

however, this is not a perfect comparison. Training in Afghanistan is conducted at

Regional Training Centers which are constructed and operated by the U.S. Government and Coalition partners, but the Centers vary in size and security needs, mitigating the cost. The courses also vary in length with some being as short as two

weeks, allowing for more candidates to have been trained.

Mr. ANDREWS. It costs more for utilities in Jordan than it does in Haiti?

Ambassador PATTERSON. At the Jordan International Police Training Center, it

costs roughly $3.12 million per year for utilities and another $780,000 for fuel. I unfortunately do not have any comparable data for Haiti, as my Bureau does not incur

similar expenses there.

Mr. ANDREWS. I must say, coming back to this point of effective stewardship, what

we found exasperating on this trip was that the academy appears to be doing a very

good job of training people how to detect an IED and how to prevent it from exploding and killing people, how to conduct a house-to-house search, how to identify ways

that we might break the back of the resistance. Common sense tells me that some

percentage of the 54,000 people who went through this, who we don’t know anything

about, are, in fact, members of that resistance or members of those militia or members of al Qaeda who are learning the very techniques we are using to defend our

people. I think this is outrageous. And I am interested in hearing from you, why

don’t we have tracking device to find out where these 54,000 people are?

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Administration shares your concern and is working

diligently to obtain biometric information on both academy graduates and suspect

individuals detained in Iraq to ensure that members of militia or terrorist groups

do not receive U.S.-sponsored training. In addition, CENTCOM’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) and INL are working to build the internal affairs

capacities of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Police Service. This will help to

identify and remove corrupt or compromised individuals from the ranks. CPATT is

also assisting the MOI in creating an automated record system that will make the

MOI’s personnel and pay systems more transparent. However, tracking graduates

is exceedingly difficult and is complicated by the current paper-based records system

used by the MOI, the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service, and the ongoing insurgency.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY

Dr. GINGREY. What steps is DOD taking to go back and ensure it has received

appropriate value from the contractors in Iraq, for projects such as the highly problematic Baghdad college? Who had that contract?

Mr. MOTSEK. The Coalition Provisional Authority awarded a contract to Parsons

Delaware to construct and renovate the Baghdad Police College in March 2004.

Upon the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Joint Contracting

Command Iraq/Afghanistan became the contracting agent. The U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and the Project and Contracting Office have been

responsible for the efficient and effective execution and administration of designbuild contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. The Special Inspector General for Iraq

Reconstruction (SIGIR) visited the Baghdad Police College on six separate occasions:

August 22, 2006, September 4, 2006, September 21, 2006, November 10, 2006, December 1, 2006, and December 8, 2006. The Baghdad Police College construction

and renovation project results were found not to be consistent with the original contract and task order objectives. The majority of the work observed did not meet the

standards of the contract and task orders. On May 31, 2006, the contract was terminated. Details concerning this construction project can be found in SIGR PA–06–

078.2 and SIGR PA–06–079.2 reports dated January 29, 2007. Although work was

terminated in May 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is still engaged with

the contractor (Parsons) for the final close-out of this contract.

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