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[Senate Prints 107-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 1st Session                                                    107-43
_________________________________________________________________________

 
                    STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

                               __________

                             A COMPILATION

                                 BY THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman

                                     

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-249                     WASHINGTON : 2001

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                    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
    Virginia
                     Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
            Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director

                                  (ii)

  

                            C O N T E N T S

                               __________
                                                                   Page

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Letter of Transmittal to the 
  United States Senate...........................................     v

``Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,'' 
  Executive Summary from the report of the National Commission on 
  Terrorism, June 5, 2000........................................     1

``Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,'' the 
  Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/
  21st Century, Excerpt on ``Securing the National Homeland,'' 
  February 15, 2001..............................................    17

``A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation 
  Programs With Russia,'' Executive Summary, by Howard Baker and 
  Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force, the Secretary of 
  Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001........................    41

``The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious 
    Diseases,'' U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
    hearing of September 5, 2001                                     55

      Nunn, Sam, former United States Senator, Co-Chairman of the 
        Nuclear Threat Initiative, prepared statement............    57

      Henderson, Dr. Donald A., MD, MPH, director, Center for 
        Civilian Biodefense Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 
        Baltimore, MD, prepared statement........................    69

``Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy 
  Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam,'' January 1999. 
  Executive Overview.............................................    77

``First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the 
  Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
  Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing 
  the Threat,'' December 15, 1999. Executive Summary.............    89

``Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the 
  Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
  Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: II. Toward a 
  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,'' December 15, 2000. 
  Executive Summary..............................................    99

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                Washington, DC, September 26, 2001.

    Dear Colleague:

    The tragic and unconscionable attacks of September 11 have 
awakened all Americans to the very real threat posed by 
international terrorism. As Congress works to ensure that the 
awful events of September 11th will never be repeated, it is 
instructive for us to review several recent studies of the 
issue. In recent years, a number of major commissions and 
distinguished witnesses before Congress have highlighted the 
emergence of both nation-states and sub-national groups with 
the desire and the capability to employ asymmetric means, 
including weapons of mass destruction, to strike at the United 
States homeland. Their reports and statements have underscored 
the real vulnerability of the United States in responding to 
such attacks and mitigating their consequences.

    The Committee on Foreign Relations has reprinted the 
executive summaries and key excerpts from some of the leading 
reports on emerging threats to U.S. national security. For your 
benefit, I include a brief summary of each of the six reports 
included in this Committee reprint:

          I. The National Commission on Terrorism (June 2000)

    The final report of the National Commission on Terrorism, 
chaired by L. Paul Bremer III, declares in no uncertain terms, 
``Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they 
are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil. 
They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, 
forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or 
ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United 
States.''

    The National Commission urged the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement communities to use the full scope of their 
authorities to collect information regarding terrorist plans 
and attack. Some of the specific measures suggested, including 
loosened restrictions on CIA recruitment methods and expanded 
electronic surveillance capabilities, are now being considered 
in the current environment. It encouraged the United States to 
firmly target all states that support terrorists through 
diplomatic, financial, economic, and military means, including 
the imposition of sanctions on states not fully cooperative 
with counter-terrorism efforts.

 II. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century: Excerpt on 
                    Homeland Defense (February 2001)

    This commission, known as ``Hart-Rudman'' after its co-
chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, concluded 
that ``attacks against American citizens, possibly causing 
heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century.'' 
Citing a growing diffusion of technology and an abundance of 
actors with grievances against the United States, the Hart-
Rudman commission urged making the security of the American 
homeland the primary national security mission of the U.S. 
government.

    To begin carrying out this mission, the commission 
recommends creation of a National Homeland Security Agency to 
coordinate all U.S. government activities on homeland defense. 
The commission urges the United States to rely on three main 
instruments in deterring and defending against threats to the 
homeland: (1) diplomacy, (2) the overseas U.S. diplomatic, 
intelligence, and military presence, and (3) vigilant border 
security and surveillance.

  III. A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation 
   Programs with Russia (``Baker-Cutler Task Force'') (January 2001)

    This bipartisan task force called on the President to 
quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize 
in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable 
material located in Russia. To carry out this goal, the task 
force suggested that the U.S. government set aside 
approximately $30 billion over the next eight to ten years.

    Co-chaired by former U.S. Senator Howard Baker and former 
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the task force declared that 
the most urgent threat facing the United States is the danger 
that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material, 
i.e., plutonium and highly enriched uranium, could be stolen 
and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states. The task force 
concluded that current U.S. government efforts, including the 
Nunn-Lugar programs and the Department of Energy nuclear non-
proliferation programs, were on the right track but were 
insufficient to meet the enormity of this threat.

IV. Statements by former Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. D.A. Henderson before 
     the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on ``The Threat of 
Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious Diseases'' (September 
                                 2001)

    According to Senator Nunn, ``Biological terrorism is one of 
our greatest national security threats, and one that cannot be 
addressed by Department of Defense standard operating 
procedures.'' Both he and Dr. D.A. Henderson, an architect of 
the global campaign to eradicate smallpox more than twenty 
years ago, testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
earlier this month on their participation in ``Dark Winter,'' a 
recent exercise simulating the U.S. government's response to a 
smallpox attack on three American cities.

    Senator Nunn and Dr. Henderson drew a number of lessons 
from the Dark Winter exercise. First, the measures we can take 
to deter or prevent bioterrorism are cost effective measures in 
countering natural epidemics. Second, the United States must 
recognize the central role of public health and medicine and 
seek to recapitalize our medical infrastructure. These efforts 
should include an adequate surge capability to handle 
emergencies and a strong surveillance and monitoring network, 
both domestic and international, to detect, track, and contain 
epidemics and provide evidence of biological weapons attacks. 
Third, we should build our national pharmaceutical stockpile to 
capacity, including extra production capability for drugs and 
vaccines, and increase funding for biomedical research to 
develop new medicines and diagnostic tests.

           V. Crowe Report on Embassy Security (January 1999)

    The Crowe Report called for the appropriation of $1.4 
billion per year over ten years to fund capital building 
programs, security operations, and personnel to ensure maximum 
security at U.S. embassies around the world. The final report 
of the Department of State Accountability Review Boards, better 
known as the Crowe Report after the former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff William J. Crowe, examined the August 
1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It 
criticized the State Department for an ``institutional 
failure'' in not fully recognizing the threat posed by 
transnational terrorism and the particular use of large car 
bombs.

VI. The Gilmore Commission: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
   Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                   (December 1999 and December 2000)

    The so-called ``Gilmore Commission,'' named for its chair, 
Virginia Governor James Gilmore III, recognized terrorism 
employing weapons of mass destruction as a serious threat to 
homeland defense and focused on the need to improve domestic 
capabilities in responding to such attacks. The Gilmore 
Commission called upon the U.S. government to develop a viable 
strategy on national domestic preparedness plans to combat 
terrorism. To carry out this national strategy, the Commission 
recommends that the President should establish a National 
Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the 
President. The director of this office, a Senate-confirmed 
appointee, would exercise program and budget authority over all 
federal efforts to fight terrorism.

    Certainly, we should not rush to adopt all of these 
recommendations; some of these proposals, under closer 
scrutiny, may not advance our objectives in the war on 
terrorism. But it is my hope that these reports will help frame 
our debate on comprehensive legislation to counter terrorism 
and other emerging threats to U.S. national security in coming 
weeks and months. I welcome the chance to speak in further 
detail with each of you on these critical issues.

            Sincerely,
                            Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.

                                     
=======================================================================

                   COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
                        INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

             Report of the National Commission on Terrorism

                              June 5, 2000

=======================================================================

      
                      Commission Members and Staff

                              ----------                              

                             Commissioners

L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman, is the Managing Director of 
        Kissinger Associates. During a 23-year career in the 
        American diplomatic service, Ambassador Bremer served 
        in Asia, Africa, Europe and Washington, D.C. He was 
        Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1983 to 1986. From 
        1986-1989, he served as Ambassador-at-large for 
        Counter-Terrorism, where he was responsible for 
        developing and implementing America's global polices to 
        combat terrorism.

Maurice Sonnenberg, Vice Chairman, is the senior international 
        advisor to the investment banking firm of Bear, Stearns 
        & Co. Inc. and the senior international advisor to the 
        law firm of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. He is a 
        member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
        Board. He recently served as a member of the U.S. 
        Commission on Reducing and Protecting Government 
        Secrecy and as the senior advisor to the U.S. 
        Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. 
        Intelligence Community.

Richard K. Betts is Leo A. Shifrin Professor of War and Peace 
        Studies in the political science department, Director 
        of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Director 
        of the International Security Policy program in the 
        School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia 
        University. He is also Director of National Security 
        Studies and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign 
        Relations, and author of Surprise Attack: Lesson for 
        Defense Planning.

Wayne A. Downing, General, U.S. Army, retired in 1996 after a 
        34-year career, where he served in a variety of command 
        assignments in infantry, armored, special operations 
        and joint units culminating in his appointment as the 
        Commander-in-Chtef of the U.S. Special Operations 
        Command. Since retirement, he was appointed to assess 
        the 1996 terrorist attack on the U.S. base at Khobar 
        Towers, Saudi Arabia, and to make recommendations to 
        protect people and facilities world wide from terrorist 
        attack. General Downing serves on several boards and 
        panels in both the private and government sectors.

Jane Harmon just completed a year as Regents Professor at 
        U.C.L.A. where she taught at the Department of 
        Political Science and Center for International 
        Relations. Harmon represented California's 36th 
        Congressional District from 1992-1998 where she served 
        on the National Security, Science and Intelligence 
        Committees. Prior government experience includes

        Senate Counsel, White House Deputy Cabinet Secretary 
        and DoD Special Counsel. Harmon is currently seeking 
        election to her former seat.

Fred C. Ikle is a Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic 
        and International Studies. Dr. Ikle is Chairman of the 
        Board of Telos Corporation and a Director of the 
        Zurich-American Insurance Companies and of CMC Energy 
        Services. Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Ikle served 
        as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Director 
        for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Juliette N. Kayyem is an Associate of the Executive Session on 
        Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of 
        Government, Harvard University. She writes and teaches 
        courses on counter-terrorism policy and the law. Ms. 
        Kayyem has most recently served as a legal advisor to 
        the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice 
        and as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for 
        Civil Rights.

John F. Lewis, Jr. is Director of Global Security for Goldman, 
        Sachs & Co., New York. Previously, he was Assistant 
        Director-in-Charge of the National Security Division of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Lewis managed 
        the FBI's national counterintelligence and 
        counterterrorism programs. Mr. Lewis has held a variety 
        of positions, including an appointment as Director of 
        Intelligence and CI Programs, National Security Staff 
        and previous Chairman of the International Association 
        of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism.

Gardner Peckham is Managing Director of the government 
        relations firm of Block, Kelly, Scruggs & Healey with a 
        practice focused on international trade, defense and 
        foreign policy issues. Prior to joining the firm, Mr. 
        Peckham served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Speaker 
        of the United States House of Representatives. He also 
        held several other senior positions in Congress and 
        during the Bush Administration served as Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the U.S. 
        Department of State and Director for Legislative 
        Affairs at the National Security Council Staff.

R. James Woolsey is a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner 
        with a practice in the fields of civil litigation, 
        alternative dispute resolution, and corporate 
        transactions; he also serves on several corporate 
        boards. Previous to returning to the firm, Mr. Woolsey 
        served as Director of Central Intelligence. His U.S. 
        Government service includes Ambassador to the 
        Negotiations on CFE, Under Secretary of the Navy, and 
        General Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed 
        Services. He has served on many Presidential and 
        Congressional delegations, boards, and commissions.
       Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism

                              ----------                              

                           Executive Summary

    International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and 
difficult threat to America. This was underscored by the 
December 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the U.S./Canadian border 
of foreign nationals who were allgedly planning to attack 
crowded millennium celebrations. Today's terrorists seek to 
inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both 
overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state 
sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational 
affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a 
common hatred of the United States. This makes terrorist 
attacks more difficult to detect and prevent.

    Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat 
requires significantly stepping up U.S. efforts. The government 
must immediately take steps to reinvigorate the collection of 
intelligence about terrorists' plans, use all available legal 
avenues to disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities and 
private sources of support, convince other nations to cease all 
support for terrorists, and ensure that federal, state, and 
local officials are prepared for attacks that may result in 
mass casualties. The Commission has made a number of 
recommendations to accomplish these objectives:

    Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S. 
intelligence and law enforcement communities must use the full 
scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding 
terrorist plans and methods.

   CIA guidelines adopted in 1995 restricting 
        recruitment of unsavory sources should not apply when 
        recruiting counterterrorism sources.
   The Attorney General should ensure that FBI is 
        exercising fully its authority for investigating 
        suspected terrorist groups or individuals, including 
        authority for electronic surveillance.
   Funding for counterterrorism efforts by CIA, NSA, 
        and FBI must be given higher priority to ensure 
        continuation of important operational activity and to 
        close the technology gap that threatens their ability 
        to collect and exploit terrorist communications.
   FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to 
        distill and disseminate terrorism-related information 
        once it is collected.

    U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support 
terrorists.

   Iran and Syria should be kept on the list of state 
        sponsors until they stop supporting terrorists.
   Afghanistan should be designated a sponsor of 
        terrorism and subjected to all the sanctions applicable 
        to state sponsors.    The President should 
        impose sanctions on countries that, while not direct 
        sponsors of terrorism, are nevertheless not cooperating 
        fully on counterterrorism. Candidates for consideration 
        include Pakistan ond Greece.

    Private sources of financial and logistical support for 
terrorists must be subjected to the full force and sweep of 
U.S. and international laws.

   All relevant agencies should use every available 
        means, including the full array of criminal, civil, and 
        administrative sanctions to block or disrupt 
        nongovernmental sources of support for international 
        terrorism.
   Congress should promptly ratify and implement the 
        International Convention for the Suppression of the 
        Financing of Terrorism to enhance international 
        cooperative efforts.
   Where criminal prosecution is not possible, the 
        Attorney General should vigorously pursue the expulsion 
        of terrorists from the United States through 
        proceedings which protect both the national security 
        interest in safeguarding classified evidence and the 
        right of the accused to challenge that evidence.

    A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly 
chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it 
succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire 
nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an 
event.

   The President should direct the preparation of a 
        manual to guide the implementation of existing legal 
        authority in the event of a catastrophic terrorist 
        threat or attack. The President and Congress should 
        determine whether additional legal authority is needed 
        to deal with catastrophic terrorism.
   The Department of Defense must have detailed plans 
        for its role in the event of a catastrophic terrorist 
        attack, including criteria for decisions on transfer of 
        command authority to DoD in extraordinary 
        circumstances.
   Senior officials of all government agencies involved 
        in responding to a catastrophic terrorism threat or 
        crisis should be required to participate in national 
        exercises every year to test capabilities and 
        coordination.
   Congress should make it illegal for anyone not 
        properly certified to possess certain critical 
        pathogens and should enact laws to control the transfer 
        of equipment critical to the development or use of 
        biological agents.
   The President should establish a comprehensive and 
        coordinated long-term research and development program 
        for catastrophic terrorism.
   The Secretary of State should press for an 
        international convention to improve multilateral 
        cooperation on preventing or responding to cyber 
        attacks by terrorists.

    The President and Congress should reform the system for 
reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to 
ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are 
part of a comprehensive plan.

   The executive branch official responsible for 
        coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the 
        government should be given a stronger hand in the 
        budget process.
   Congress should develop mechanisms for a 
        comprehensive review of the President's 
        counterterrorism policy and budget.

             The International Terrorism Threat is Changing

   Who are the international terrorists?

   What are their motives and how do they get their 
        support?

   How can we stop them?

    The answers to these questions have changed significantly 
over the last 25 years. There are dramatically fewer 
international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties. 
Many of the groups that targeted America's interests, friends, 
and allies have disappeared. The Soviet bloc, which once 
provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists. 
Countries that once excused terrorism now condemn it. This 
changed international attitude has led to 12 United Nations 
conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more importantly, 
growing, practical international cooperation.
    However, if most of the world's countries are firmer in 
opposing terrorism, some still support terrorists or use 
terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest 
case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security carry out terrorist activities and 
give direction and support to other terrorists. The regimes of 
Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training 
bases, and weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide 
support to some Palestinian terrorist groups and to harass 
expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide 
weapons to terrorists. Cuba provides safehaven to a number of 
terrorists. Other states allow terrorist groups to operate on 
their soil or provide support which, while falling short of 
state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important 
assistance.
    The terrorist threat is also changing in ways that make it 
more dangerous and difficult to counter.
    International terrorism once threatened Americans only when 
they were outside the country. Today international terrorists 
attack us on our own soil. Just before the millennium, an alert 
U.S. Customs Service official stopped Ahmad Ressam as he 
attempted to enter the United States from Canada--apparently to 
conduct a terrorist attack. This fortuitous arrest should not 
inspire complacency, however. On an average day, over one 
million people enter the United States legally and thousands 
more enter illegally. As the World Trade Center bombing 
demonstrated, we cannot rely solely on existing border controls 
and procedures to keep foreign terrorists out of the United 
States.
    Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. Most terrorist 
organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s had clear political 
objectives. They tried to calibrate their attacks to produce 
just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not 
so much as to alienate public support. Groups like the Irish 
Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization often 
sought specific political concessions.
    Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed 
to kill as many people as possible. In the 1990s a terrorist 
incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death 
or injury than an incident two decades ago. The World Trade 
Center bombing in New York killed six and wounded about 1,000, 
but the terrorists' goal was to topple the twin towers, killing 
tens of thousands of people. The thwarted attacks against New 
York City's infrastructure in 1993--which included plans to 
bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels--also were intended to 
cause mass casualties. In 1995, Philippine authorities 
uncovered a terrorist plot to bring down 11 U.S. airliners in 
Asia. The circumstances surrounding the millennium border 
arrests of foreign nationals suggest that the suspects planned 
to target a large group assembled for a New Year's celebration. 
Overseas attacks against the United States in recent years have 
followed the same trend. The bombs that destroyed the military 
barracks in Saudi Arabia and two U.S. Embassies in Africa 
inflicted 6,059 casualties. Those arrested in Jordan in late 
December had also planned attacks designed to kill large 
numbers.
    The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the 
changing motivation of today's terrorists. Religiously 
motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin Ladin's group, 
al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies 
in Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred of the 
United States. Other terrorist groups are driven by visions of 
a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such groups may 
lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their 
enemies by killing as many of them as possible, seemingly 
without concern about alienating sympathizers. Increasingly, 
attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of 
responsibility or lists of political demands.
    The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change 
in the way some international terrorist groups are structured, 
Because groups based on ideological or religious motives may 
lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have 
less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely 
on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of 
countries to support their common cause against the United 
States.
    Al-Qaida is the best-known transnational terrorist 
organization. In addition to pursuing its own terrorist 
campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some 
of its ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign 
against the United States, But neither al-Qaida's extremist 
politico-religious beliefs nor its leader, Usama bin Ladin, is 
unique. If al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear 
tomorrow, the United States would still face potential 
terrorist threats from a growing number of groups opposed to 
perceived American hegemony. Moreover, new terrorist threats 
can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or obscure cults 
with no previous history of violence.
    These more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist 
networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate. They 
rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical 
support, including self-financing criminal activities such as 
kidnapping, narcotics, and petty crimes. Their networks of 
support include both front organizations and legitimate 
business and nongovernment organizations. They use the Internet 
as an effective communications channel.
    Guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the 
weapons of choice for most terrorists. Such weapons can cause 
many casualties and are relatively easy to acquire and use. But 
some terrorist groups now show interest in acquiring the 
capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or 
nuclear (CBRN) materials. It is difficult to predict the 
likelihood of a CBRN attack, but most experts agree that 
today's terrorists are seeking the ability to use such agents 
in order to cause mass casualties.
    Still, these kinds of weapons and materials confront a non-
state sponsored terrorist group with significant technical 
challenges. While lethal chemicals are easy to come by, getting 
large quantities and weaponizing them for mass casualties is 
difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so. 
Biological agents can be acquired in nature or from medical 
supply houses, but important aspects of handling and dispersion 
are daunting. To date, only nation states have demonstrated the 
capability to build radiological and nuclear weapons.
    The 1995 release of a chemical agent in the Tokyo subway by 
the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo group demonstrated the 
difficulties that terrorists face in attempting to use CBRN 
weapons to produce mass casualties. The group used scores of 
highly skilled technicians and spent tens of millions of 
dollars developing a chemical attack that killed fewer people 
than conventional explosives could have. The same group failed 
totally in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in 
Tokyo.
    However, if the terrorists' goal is to challenge 
significantly Americans' sense of safety and confidence, even a 
small CBRN attack could be successful.
    Moreover, terrorists could acquire more deadly CBRN 
capabilities from a state. Five of the seven nations the United 
States identifies as state sponsors of terrorism have programs 
to develop weapons of mass destruction. A state that knowingly 
provides agents of mass destruction or technology to a 
terrorist group should worry about losing control of the 
terrorists' activities and, if the weaoons could be traced back 
to that state, the near certainty of massive retaliation. 
However, it is always difficult and sometimes dangerous to 
attempt to predict the actions of a state. Moreover, a state in 
chaos, or elements within such a state, might run these risks, 
especially if the United States were engaged in military 
conflict with that state or if the United States were 
distracted by a major conflict in another area of the world.
    The Commission was particularly concerned about the 
persistent lack of adequate security and safeguards for the 
nuclear material in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A Center for 
Strategic International Studies panel chaired by former Senator 
Sam Nunn concluded that, despite a decade of effort, the risk 
of ``loose nukes'' is greater than ever. Another ominous 
warning was given in 1995 when Chechen rebels, many of whom 
fight side-by-side with Islamic terrorists from bin Ladin's 
camps sympathetic to the Chechen cause, placed radioactive 
material in a Moscow park.
    Cyber attacks are often considered in the same context with 
CBRN. Respectable experts have published sobering scenarios 
about the potential impact of a successful cyber attack on the 
United States. Already, hackers and criminals have exploited 
some of our vulnerabilities.
    Certainly, terrorists are making extensive use of the new 
information technologies, and a conventional terrorist attack 
along with a coordinated cyber attack could exponentially 
compound the damage. While the Commission considers cyber 
security a matter of grave importance, it also notes that the 
measures needed to protect the United States from cyber attack 
by terrorists are largely identical to those necessary to 
protect us from such an attack by a hostile foreign country, 
criminals, or vandals.
    Not all terrorists are the same, but the groups most 
dangerous to the United States share some characteristics not 
seen 10 or 20 years ago:

   They operate in the United States as well as abroad.
   Their funding and logistical networks cross borders, 
        are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to 
        disrupt with economic sanctions.
   They make use of widely available technologies to 
        communicate quickly and securely.
   Their objectives are more deadly.

    This changing nature of the terrorist threat raises the 
stakes in getting American counterterrorist policies and 
practices right.

  Good Intelligence is the Best Weapon Against International Terrorism

    Obtaining information about the identity, goals, plans, and 
vulnerabilities of terrorists is extremely difficult. Yet, no 
other single policy effort is more important for preventing, 
preemepting, and responding to attacks.
    The Commission has identified significant obstacles to the 
collection and distribution of reliable information on 
terroriswm to analysts and policymakers. These obstacles must 
be removed.
    In addition, this information, often collected at great 
risk to agents and officers in the field, must be safeguarded. 
Leaks of intelligence and law enforcement information reduce 
its value, endanger sources, alienate friendly nations and 
inhibit their cooperation, and jeopardize the U.S. Government's 
ability to obtain further information.

     Eliminate Barriers to Aggressive Collection of Information on 
                               Terrorists

    Complex bureaucratic procedures now in place send an 
unmistakable message to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
officers in the field that recruiting clandestine sources of 
terrorist information is encouraged in theory but discouraged 
in practice.

          Pursue a More Aggressive Strategy Against Terrorism

    Since the 1980s, the United States has based its 
counterterrorism policy on four pillars:

   Make no consessions to terrorists and strike no 
        deals:
   Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes:
   Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor 
        terrorism to force them to cange their behavior; and
   Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of 
        countries that work with the United States and require 
        assistance.

    The government uses multiple tools to pursue this strategy. 
Diplomacy is an important instrument, both in gaining the 
assistance of other nations in particular cases and convincing 
the international community to condemn and outlaw egregious 
terrorist practices. Law enforcement is often invaluable in the 
investigation and apprehension of terrorists. Military force 
and covert action can often preempt or disrupt terrorist 
attacks. But meeting the changing terrorist threat requires 
more aggressive use of these tools and the development of new 
policies and practices.

    Prepare to Prevent or Respond to Catastrophic Terrorist Attacks

    A terrorist attack in the United States using a biological 
agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, 
even if only partially successful, would profoundly affect the 
entire nation, as would a series of conventional attacks or a 
single bombing that caused thousands of deaths. Given the trend 
toward more deadly terrorist attacks and indications that mass 
casualties are an objective of many of today's terrorists, it 
is essential that America be fully prepared to prevent and 
respond to this kind of catastrophic terrorism.
    Over the past few years, the U.S. Government has taken a 
number of positive steps. Several Presidential Directives have 
effected major changes in organizational responsibilities and 
improved cooperation. The Department of Health and Human 
Services' Strategic Plan, the Attorney General's Five-Year 
Plan, the establishment of a military Joint Task Force for 
Civil Support, and improvement in first responders' 
capabilities are valuable efforts, but there is still more to 
do.

    There is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a 
catastrophic terrorist attack, officials may hesitate or act 
improperly because they do not fully understand their legal 
authority or because there are gaps in that authority.

    There is some statutory authority that does not now exist 
that should be considered for catastrophic conditions. For 
example:

   Federal quarantine authority cannot be used in a 
        situation that is confined to a single state.
   Not all cities or states have their own quarantine 
        authority.
   There is no clear federal authority with regard to 
        compelling vaccinations, or rationing scarce 
        vaccinations, or requiring autopsies when necessary for 
        a terrorism investigation.

    The Constitution permits extraordinary measures in the face 
of extraordinary threats, To prevent or respond to catastrophic 
terrorism, law enforcement and public health officials have the 
authority to conduct investigations and implement measures that 
temporarily exceed measures applicable under non-emergency 
conditions. These may include cordoning off of areas, vehicle 
searches, certain medical measures, and sweep searches through 
areas believed to contain weapons or terrorists.
    Determining whether a particular measure is reasonable 
requires balancing privacy and other rights against the public 
interest in coping with a terrorist threat which may lead to 
massive casualties. Advance preparation is the best way to deal 
successfully with a terrorist incident without jeopardizing 
individuals' Constitutional rights.
Recommendations:
   The President should direct the preparation of a 
        manual on the implementation of existing legal 
        authority necessary to address effectively a 
        catastrophic terrorist threat or attack. The manual 
        should be distributed to the appropriate federal, 
        state, and local officials and be used in training, 
        exercises, and educational programs.
   The President should determine whether any 
        additional legal authority is needed to deal with 
        catastrophic terrorism and make recommendations to 
        Congress if necessary.

    The U.S. Government's plans for a catastrophic terrorist 
attack on the United States do not employ the full range of the 
Department of Defense's (DoD's) capabilities for managing large 
operations. Additionally the interagency coordination and 
cooperation required to integrate the DoD properly into 
counterterrorism planning has not been accomplished.

    The Department of Defense's ability to command and control 
vast resources for dangerous, unstructured situations is 
unmatched by any other department or agency. According to 
current plans, DoD involvement is limited to supporting the 
agencies that are currently designated as having the lead in a 
terrorism crisis, the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). But, in extraordinary circumstances, when a 
catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and 
other federal agencies, or is directly related to an armed 
conflict overseas, the President may want to designate DoD as a 
lead federal agency. This may become a critical operational 
consideration in planning for future conflicts. Current plans 
and exercises do not consider this possibility.
    An expanded role for the DoD in a catastrophic terrorist 
attack will have policy and legal implications. Other federal 
agencies, the states, and local communities will have major 
concerns. In preparing for such a contingency, there will also 
be internal DoD issues on resources and possible conflicts with 
traditional military contingency plans. These issues should be 
addressed beforehand.
    Effective preparation also requires effective organization. 
The DoD is not optimally organized to respond to the wide range 
of missions that would likely arise from the threat of a 
catastrophic terrorist attack. For example, within DoD several 
offices, departments, Unified Commands, the Army, and the 
National Guard have overlapping responsibilities to plan and 
execute operations in case of a catastrophic terrorist attack. 
These operations will require an unprecedented degree of 
interagency coordination and communication in order to be 
successful.
    There are neither plans for the DoD to assume a lead agency 
role nor exercises rehearsing this capability. Hence, these 
demanding tasks would have to be accomplished on an ad hoc 
basis by the military.
Recommendations:
   The President should direct the Assistant to the 
        President for National Security Affairs, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Attorney General, to develope and adopt detailed 
        contingency plans that would transfer lead federal 
        agency authority to the Department of Defense if 
        necessary during a catastrophic terrorist attack or 
        prior to an imminent attack.
   The Secretary of Defense should establish a unified 
        command structure that would integrate all catastrophic 
        terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning 
        and exercises with relevant federal, state, and local 
        authorities.

    The interagency program and plan for exercising the 
government's preparedness to respond to a catastrophic 
terrorist attack is inadequate.

    In addition to DoD exercises, a realistic interagency 
exercise program, with full participation by all relevant 
federal agencies and their leaders, is essential for national 
preparedness to counter a catastrophic terrorist attack. In 
June 1995, the President established an interagency 
counterterrorist Exercise Subgroup and program which included 
preparation for a catastrophic terrorist attack. However, not 
all federal agencies have participated in or budgeted for these 
exercises.
    Additionally, in September 1998, Congress funded and 
mandated the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency to conduct a counterterrorism and consequence 
management exercise, called TOPOFF, involving relevant federal 
agencies and their senior leadership, with select state and 
local governments participating, to evaluate the U.S. 
Government's preparedness for a catastrophic terrorist 
incident. However, sufficient funding was not provided and 
there is no requirement to exercise on a regular schedule.
Recommendation:
   The President should direct (1) the Exercise 
        Subgroup, under the direction of the national 
        coordinator for counterterrorism, to exercise annually 
        the government's responses to a catastrophic terrorism 
        crisis, including consequence management; and (2) all 
        relevant federal agencies to plan, budget and 
        participate in counterterrorism and consequence 
        management exercises coordinated by the Exercise 
        Subgroup and ensure senior officer level participation, 
        particularly in the annual exercises.

    Given the urgency of near-term needs, long-term research 
and development (R&D) projects on technologies useful to 
fighting terrorism will be short-changed unless Congress and 
the President can agree on special procedures and institutional 
arrangements to work on research that is risky and has more 
distant payoffs.

    Research and Development spending for new technologies to 
cope with catastrophic terrorism has significantly increased 
over the past three years. Most of the funds, however, are 
targeted on near-term improvements to meet immediate needs for 
better detectors, more vaccines, and requirements of first 
responders.
    To prevent or cope with terrorist attacks in the future, in 
particular attacks using CBRN agents, the U.S. Government must 
make greater use of America's dominance in science and 
technology. No other country, much less any subnational 
organization, can match U.S. scientific and technological 
prowess in biotechnology and pharmaceutical production and 
quality control, electronics, computer science and other 
domains that could help overcome and defeat the technologies 
used by future terrorists. But this kind of R&D requires time--
five to ten years or more--to develop new ideas, test 
hypotheses, craft preliminary applications, and test them. 
Developing mass production for successful applications further 
delays getting products into the hands of users.
    The following list illustrates, but by no means exhausts, 
the type of projects that could constitute a long-term R&D 
program.

   New sensors to detect nuclear weapons in transit 
        (e.g., gamma-ray imaging systems, including stimulation 
        to elicit detectable emissions).
   High power ultraviolet beams to destroy BW agents 
        and to clean up contaminated areas.
   New types of ``tripwires'' suitable for many 
        different entry-points (e.g., expolsive-sniffers, body-
        scanners, and their proto-typing for mass-production.
   Advanced development of anti-virals for smallpox.

    The Commission considered several institutional 
arrangements to manage long-term R&D. One option is 
establishing a large program at one of the Department of Energy 
(DoE) or other national laboratories to conduct in-house 
research, contract for external research, initiate prototyping 
for production, and involve qualified outside experts. This 
last task is particularly important in the fields of 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical production techniques. The 
goal would be to attract talented biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry scientists and engineers to work with 
the government for one or two years on high priority projects.
Recommendation:
   The President should establish a comprehensive and 
        coordinated long-term Research and Development program 
        to counter catastrophic terrorism.

    Current controls on transfers of pathogens that could be 
used in biological terrorism are inadequate and controls on 
related equipment are nonexistent. In addition, current 
programs of the Department of Health and Human Services are not 
adequate to ensure physical security of pathogens or to monitor 
disease outbreaks overseas.

    Terrorists, without serious risk of detection, could obtain 
pathogens from domestic natural sources, steal them, or import 
them into the United States. Most pathogens in the United 
States are tightly controlled, but regulation of laboratories 
as well as of dangerous agents during transport are designed to 
prevent accidents, not theft. Moreover, these controls are not 
as rigorous as controls over nuclear material.
    Creating pathogens small and sturdy enough to disperse 
broadly over a target population for an effective period of 
time remains, fortunately, a complex process. Thus, regulating 
the sophisticated equipment required to turn pathogens into 
weapons could hamper terrorist efforts to acquire this 
capability.
    However, no regulatory scheme is foolproof. Moreover, 
contagious diseases do not require sophisticated dispersion 
devices. Thus, it is important to have the ability to detect 
outbreaks of infectious diseases and to distinguish 
bioterrorist attacks from natural outbreaks. Some detection and 
analytical systems are in place domestically, but the 
international community's ability to distinguish natural 
disease from terrorism lags far behind even these modest U.S. 
efforts.
Recommendations:
   The Secretary of Health and Human Services should 
        strengthen physical security standards applicable to 
        the storage, creation, and transport of pathogens in 
        research laboratories and other certified facilities in 
        order to protect against theft or diversion. These 
        standards should be as rigorous as the physical 
        protection and security measures applicable to critical 
        nuclear materials.
   The Congress should:
    --Make possession of designated critical pathagens illegal 
        for anyone who is not properly certified.
    --Control domestic sale and transfer of equipment critical 
        to the development or use of biological agents by 
        certifying legitimate users of critical equipment and 
        prohibiting sales of such equipment to non-certified 
        entities.
    --Require tagging of critical equipment to enable law 
        enforcement to identify its location.
   The Secretary of Health and Human Services, working 
        with the Department of State, should develop an 
        international monitoring program to provide early 
        warning of infectious disease outbreaks and possible 
        terrorist experimentation with biological substances.
=======================================================================

         ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE

 The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st 
                                Century

             Excerpt on ``Securing the National Homeland''

                           February 15, 2001

=======================================================================

      
         U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Disclaimer: This Commission has striven successfully to achieve 
consensus on all major issues, and each Commissioner stands by all the 
major recommendations made in this report. However, as is to be 
expected when discussing complex issues, not every Commissioner agrees 
completely with every statement in the text that follows.

Gary Hart                           Warren B. Rudman
Co-Chair                            Co-Chair

Anne Armstrong                      Norman R. Augustine
Commissioner                        Commissioner

John Dancy                          John R. Galvin
Commissioner                        Commissioner

Leslie H. Gelb                      Newt Gingrich
Commissioner                        Commissioner

Lee H. Hamilton                     Lionel H. Olmer
Commissioner                        Commissioner

Donald B. Rice                      James Schlesinger
Commissioner                        Commissioner

Harry D. Train                      Andrew Young
Commissioner                        Commissioner

                  Charles G. Boyd, Executive Director
         Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change

                              ----------                              

                   I. Securing the National Homeland

    One of this Commission's most important conclusions in its 
Phase I report was that attacks against American citizens on 
American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely 
over the next quarter century.\7\ This is because both the 
technical means for such attacks, and the array of actors who 
might use such means, are proliferating despite the best 
efforts of American diplomacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the National 
Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 
Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and 
weapons of mass disruption. As porous as U.S. physical borders 
are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its ``cyber 
borders'' are even more porous--and the critical infrastructure 
upon which so much of the U.S. economy depends can now be 
targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present 
global predominance does not render it immune from these 
dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the American 
homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness 
and freedoms make it more vulnerable.
    Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of 
the threat to the homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction 
and disruption, the U.S. government has not adopted homeland 
security as a primary national security mission. Its structures 
and strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The President 
must therefore both develop a comprehensive strategy and 
propose new organizational structures to prevent and protect 
against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks 
if prevention and protection should fail.
    Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the 
scenarios we envision and the enormity of their consequences. 
We need orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning, 
coordination, and exercise. The govemment must also be prepared 
to use effectively--albeit with all proper safeguards--the 
extensive resources of the Department of Defense. This will 
necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and 
particularly, in our view, for the National Guard.
    The United States is today very poorly organized to design 
and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the 
homeland. The assets and organizations that now exist for 
homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen 
departments and agencies, and all fifty states. The Executive 
Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to 
realign, refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent 
whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle 
for implementation.
    This Commission believes that the security of the American 
homeland from the threats of the new century should be the 
primary national security mission of the U.S. government. While 
the Executive Branch must take the lead in dealing with the 
many policy and structural issues involved, Congress is a 
partner of critical importance in this effort. It must find 
ways to address homeland security issues that bridge current 
gaps in organization, oversight, and authority, and that 
resolve conflicting claims to jurisdiction within both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives and also between them.
    Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that 
homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that 
protects the civil liberties and privacy of American citizens. 
We are confident that the U.S. government can enhance national 
security without compromising established Constitutional 
principles. But in order to guarantee this, we must plan ahead. 
In a major attack involving contagious biological agents, for 
example, citizen cooperation with government authorities will 
depend on public confidence that those authorities can manage 
the emergency. If that confidence is lacking, panic and 
disorder could lead to insistent demands for the temporary 
suspension of some civil liberties. That is why preparing for 
the worst is essential to protecting individual freedoms during 
a national crisis.
    Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies 
and state and local authorities must take particular cognizance 
of the role of the Defense Department. Its subordination to 
civil authority needs to be clearly defined in advance.
    In short, advances in technology have created new 
dimensions to our nation's economic and physical security. 
While some new threats can be met with traditional responses, 
others cannot. More needs to be done in three areas to prevent 
the territory and infrastructure of the United States from 
becoming easy and tempting targets: in strategy, in 
organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative 
cooperation. We take these areas in turn.

                       A. THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

    A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of 
intimidation and loss of life is an essential support for an 
international leadership role for the United States. Homeland 
security is not peripheral to U.S. national security strategy 
but central to it. At this point, national leaders have not 
agreed on a clear strategy for homeland security, a condition 
this Commission finds dangerous and intolerable. We therefore 
recommend the following:

 1: The President should develop a comprehensive 
strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect 
against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to 
such attacks if prevention and protection fail.

    In our view, the President should:

   Give new priority in his overall national security 
        strategy to homeland security, and make it a central 
        concern for incoming officials in all Executive Branch 
        departments, particularly the intelligence and law 
        enforcement communities;
   Calmly prepare the American people for prospective 
        threats, and increase their awareness of what federal 
        and state governments are doing to prevent attacks and 
        to protect them if prevention fails;
   Put in place new government organizations and 
        processes, eliminating where possible staff duplication 
        and mission overlap; and
   Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to 
        facilitate closer cooperation between the Executive and 
        Legislative Branches of government on this vital issue.

    We believe that homeland security can best be assured 
through a strategy of layered defense that focuses first on 
prevention, second on protection, and third on response.
    Prevention.--Preventing a potential attack comes first. 
Since the occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic 
loss of life would represent an unacceptable failure of policy, 
U.S. strategy should therefore act as far forward as possible 
to prevent attacks on the homeland. This strategy has at its 
disposal three essential instruments.
    Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy. U.S. 
foreign policy should strive to shape an international system 
in which just grievances can be addressed without violence. 
Diplomatic efforts to develop friendly and trusting relations 
with foreign governments and their people can significantly 
multiply America's chances of gaining early warning of 
potential attack and of doing something about impending 
threats. Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is 
crucial to help identify individuals and groups who might be 
considering attacks on the United States or its allies. 
Cooperative foreign law enforcement agencies can detain, 
arrest, and prosecute terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic 
success in resolving overseas conflicts that spawn terrorist 
activities will help in the long run.
    Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation 
efforts must remain a top priority. These policies can help 
persuade states and terrorists to abjure weapons of mass 
destruction and to prevent the export of fissile materials and 
dangerous dual-use technologies. But such measures cannot by 
themselves prevent proliferation. So other measures are needed, 
including the possibility of punitive measures and defenses. 
The United States should take a lead role in strengthening 
multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.
    In addition, increased vigilance against international 
crime syndicates is also important because many terrorist 
organizations gain resources and other assets through criminal 
activity that they then use to mount terrorist operations. 
Dealing with international organized crime requires not only 
better cooperation with other countries, but also among 
agencies of the federal government. While progress has been 
made on this front in recent years, more remains to be done.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: The 
White House, December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second instrument of homeland security consists of the 
U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas. 
Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or 
cyber attack is the key to stopping a strike before it can be 
delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies 
overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad, 
are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. But 
increased public-private efforts to enhance security processes 
within the international transportation and logistics networks 
that bring people and goods to America are also of critical and 
growing importance.
    Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are a 
third instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who 
are not detected and stopped overseas from actually entering 
the United States. Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service 
and U.S. Coast Guard have a critical prevention role to play. 
Terrorists and criminals are finding that the difficulty of 
policing the rising daily volume and velocities of people and 
goods that cross U.S. borders makes it easier for them to 
smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move their operatives 
into and out of the United States. Improving the capacity of 
border control agencies to identify and intercept potential 
threats without creating barriers to efficient trade and travel 
requires a sub-strategy also with three elements.
    First is the development of new transportation security 
procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk that 
importers, exporters, freight forwarders, and transportation 
carriers will serve as unwitting conduits for criminal or 
terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the intelligence 
gathering, data management, and information sharing 
capabilities of border control agencies to improve their 
ability to target high-risk goods and people for inspection. 
Third is strengthening the capabilities of border control 
agencies to arrest terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments 
before they arrive on U.S. soil.
    These three measures, which place a premium on public-
private partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order. 
They will allow for the more efficient allocation of limited 
enforcement resources along U.S. borders. There will be fewer 
disruptive inspections at ports of entry for legitimate 
businesses and travelers. They will lead to reduced theft and 
insurance costs, as well. Most important, the underlying 
philosophy of this approach is one that balances prudence, on 
the one hand, with American values of openness and free trade 
on the other.\9\ To shield America from the world out of fear 
of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for 
them. To continue business as usual, however, is irresponsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Note in this regard Stephen B. Flynn, ``Beyond Border 
Control,'' Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The same may be said for our growing cyber problems. 
Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure depends on 
greater public awareness and improvements in our tools to 
detect and diagnose intrusions. This will require better 
information sharing among all federal, state, and local 
governments as well as with private sector owners and 
operators. The federal government has these specific tasks:

   To serve as a model for the private sector by 
        improving its own security practices;
   To address known government security problems on a 
        system-wide basis;
   To identify and map network interdependencies so 
        that harmful cascading effects among systems can be 
        prevented;
   To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the 
        federal government and the private sector; and
   To design and carry out simulations and exercises 
        that test information system security across the 
        nation's entire infrastructure.

    Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires 
that the United States maintain long-range strike capabilities. 
The United States must bolster deterrence by making clear its 
determination to use military force in a preemptive fashion if 
necessary. Even the most hostile state sponsors of terrorism, 
or terrorists themselves, will think twice about harming 
Americans and American allies and interests if they fear direct 
and severe U.S. attack after--or before--the fact. Such 
capabilities will strengthen deterrence even if they never have 
to be used.
    Protection.--The Defense Department undertakes many 
different activities that serve to protect the American 
homeland, and these should be integrated into an overall 
surveillance system, buttressed with additional resources. A 
ballistic missile defense system would be a useful addition and 
should be developed to the extent technically feasible, 
fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses should 
also be pursued against cruise missiles and other sophisticated 
atmospheric weapon technologies as they become more widely 
deployed. While both active duty and reserve forces are 
involved in these activities, the Commission believes that more 
can and should be done by the National Guard, as is discussed 
in more detail below.
    Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and 
providing cyber-security must also include:

   Advanced indication, warning, and attack 
        assessments;
   A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate 
        private-sector reporting of potential attacks to enable 
        other private-sector targets (and the U.S. government) 
        better to take protective action; and
   Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing 
        backups, and restoring service.

    Response.--Managing the consequences of a catastrophic 
attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult 
process. The first priority should be to build up and augment 
state and local response capabilities. Adequate equipment must 
be available to first responders in local communities. 
Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and disseminated 
and then practiced through simulations and exercises. 
Interoperable, robust, and redundant communications 
capabilities are a must in recovering from any disaster. 
Continuity of government and critical services must be ensured 
as well. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and 
manmade disasters will also help to build mutual confidence and 
relationships among those with roles in dealing with a major 
terrorist attack.
    All of this puts a premium on making sure that the 
disparate organizations involved with homeland security--on 
various levels of government and in the private sector--can 
work together effectively. We are frankly skeptical that the 
U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond effectively to 
the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the 
next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our second task: 
that of organizational realignment.

                     B. ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT

    Responsibility for homeland security resides at all levels 
of the U.S. government--local, state, and federal. Within the 
federal government, almost every agency and department is 
involved in some aspect of homeland security. None have been 
organized to focus on the scale of the contemporary threat to 
the homeland, however. This Commission urges an organizational 
realignment that:

   Designates a single person, accountable to the 
        President, to be responsible for coordinating and 
        overseeing various U.S. government activities related 
        to homeland security;
   Consolidates certain homeland security activities to 
        improve their effectiveness and coherence;
   Establishes planning mechanisms to define clearly 
        specific responses to specific types of threats; and
   Ensure that the appropriate resources and 
        capabilities are available.

    Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the 
following:

 2: The President should propose, and Congress should 
agree to create, a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) 
with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating 
various U.S. government activities involved in homeland 
security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should 
be a key building block in this effort.

    Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities involved 
in these homeland security tasks, someone needs to be 
responsible and accountable to the President not only to 
coordinate the making of policy, but also to oversee its 
implementation. This argues against assigning the role to a 
senior person on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and 
for the creation of a separate agency. This agency would give 
priority to overall planning while relying primarily on others 
to carry out those plans. To give this agency sufficient 
stature within the government, its director would be a member 
of the Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security 
Council. The position would require Senate confirmation.
    Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National 
Security Council would still play a strategic role in planning 
and coordinating all homeland security activities. This would 
include those of NHSA as well as those that remain separate, 
whether they involve other NSC members or other agencies, such 
as the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of 
Health and Human Services.
    We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency 
upon the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), an existing federal agency that has performed 
well in recent years, especially in responding to natural 
disasters. NHSA would be legislatively chartered to provide a 
focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency 
planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA's ten 
existing regional offices as a core element of its 
organizational structure.
    While FEMA is the necessary core of the National Homeland 
Security Agency, it is not sufficient to do what NHSA needs to 
do. In particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and policing the 
flows of peoples and goods through the hundreds of ports of 
entry, must receive higher priority. These activities need to 
be better integrated, but efforts toward that end are hindered 
by the fact that the three organizations on the front line of 
border security are spread across three different U.S. Cabinet 
departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary of 
Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the 
Department of the Treasury, and the, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service oversees the Border Patrol in the 
Department of Justice. In each case, the border defense agency 
is far from the mainstream of its parent department's agenda 
and consequently receives limited attention from the 
department's senior officials. We therefore recommend the 
following:

 3: The President should propose to Congress the 
transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast 
Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while 
preserving them as distinct entities.

    Bringing these organizations together under one agency will 
create important synergies. Their individual capabilities will 
be molded into a stronger and more effective system, and this 
realignment will help ensure that sufficient resources are 
devoted to tasks crucial to both public safety and U.S. trade 
and economic interests. Consolidating overhead, training 
programs, and maintenance of the aircraft, boats, and 
helicopters that these three agencies employ will save money, 
and further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other 
resources such as information technology, communications 
equipment, and dedicated sensors. Bringing these separate, but 
complementary, activities together will also facilitate more 
effective Executive and Legislative oversight, and help 
rationalize the process of budget preparation, analysis, and 
presentation.
    Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three 
individual organizations themselves. The Customs Service, the 
Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of 
being overwhelmed by the mismatch between their growing duties 
and their mostly static resources.
    The Customs Service, for example, is charged with 
preventing contraband from entering the United States. It is 
also responsible for preventing terrorists from using the 
commercial or private transportation venues of international 
trade for smuggling explosives or weapons of mass destruction 
into or out of the United States. The Customs Service, however, 
retains only a modest air, land, and marine interdiction force, 
and its investigative component, supported by its own 
intelligence branch, is similarly modest. The high volume of 
conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the United 
States each year already overwhelms the Customs Service's 
capabilities. Over $8.8 billion worth of goods, over 1.3 
million people, over 340,000 vehicles, and over 58,000 
shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of this volume, 
Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound 
shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in 
terms of dollars and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it 
may well double again between now and 2005.
    Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved 
computer information capability and tracking system--as well as 
upgraded equipment that can detect both conventional and 
nuclear explosives, and chemical and biological agents--would 
be a wise short-term investment with important long-term 
benefits. It would also raise the risk for criminals seeking to 
target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for illicit 
gains.\10\
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    \10\ See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and 
Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and 
prevention of illegal entry into the United States. It works 
primarily between ports of entry and patrols the borders by 
various means. There has been a debate for many years about 
whether the dual functions of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service--border control and enforcement on the 
one side, and immigration facilitation on the other--should be 
joined under the same roof. The U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform concluded that they should not be joined.\11\ We agree: 
the Border Patrol should become part of the NHSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 
(Washington, DC: 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with 
multiple missions and a natural role to play in homeland 
security. It performs maritime search and rescue missions, 
manages vessel traffic, enforces U.S. environmental and fishery 
laws, and interdicts and searches vessels suspected of carrying 
illegal aliens, drugs, and other contraband. En a time of war, 
it also works with the Navy to protect U.S. ports from attack.
    Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model 
homeland security agency given its unique blend of law 
enforcement, regulatory, and military authorities that allow it 
to operate within, across, and beyond U.S. borders. It 
accomplishes its many missions by routinely working with 
numerous local, regional, national, and international agencies, 
and by forging and maintaining constructive relationships with 
a diverse group of private, non-governmental, and public 
marine-related organizations. As the fifth armed service, in 
peace and war, it has national defense missions that include 
port security, overseeing the defense of coastal waters, and 
supporting and integrating its forces with those of the Navy 
and the other services.
    The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's 
multi-mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role 
in protecting national interests close to home has not been 
adequately appreciated, and this has resulted in serious and 
growing readiness concerns. U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft 
are aging and technologically obsolete; indeed; the Coast Guard 
cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval 
fleets. As a result, the Coast Guard fleet generates excessive 
operating and maintenance costs, and lacks essential 
capabilities in speed, sensors, and interoperability. To 
fulfill all of its missions, the Coast Guard requires updated 
platforms with the staying power, in hazardous weather, to 
remain offshore and fully operational throughout U.S. maritime 
economic zones,\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard 
Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century 
(Washington, DC: December 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Commission recommends strongly that Congress 
recapitalize the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the 
Coast Guard so that they can confidently perform key homeland 
security roles.
    NHSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities 
would be undertaken through three staff Directorates. The 
Directorate of Prevention would oversee and coordinate the 
various border security activities, as discussed above. A 
Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would 
handle the growing cyber threat. FEMA's emergency preparedness 
and response activities would be strengthened in a third 
directorate to cover both natural and manmade disasters. A 
Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA Director on 
research and development efforts and priorities for all three 
directorates.
    Relatively small permanent staffs would man the 
directorates. NHSA will employ FEMA's principle of working 
effectively with state and local governments, as well as with 
other federal organizations, stressing interagency 
coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take place 
directly supporting state officials in its regional offices 
around the country. Its organizational infrastructure will not 
be heavily centered in the Washington, DC area.
    NHSA would also house a National Crisis Action Center 
(NCAC), which would become the nation's focal point for 
monitoring emergencies and for coordinating federal support in 
a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the 
private sector. We envision the center to be an interagency 
operation, directed by a two-star National Guard general, with 
full-time representation from the other federal agencies 
involved in homeland security.
    NHSA will require a particularly close working relationship 
with the Department of Defense. It will need also to create and 
maintain strong mechanisms for the sharing of information and 
intelligence with U.S. domestic and international intelligence 
entities. We suggest that NHSA have liaison officers in the 
counter-terrorism centers of both the FBI and the CIA. 
Additionally, the sharing of information with business and 
industry on threats to critical infrastructures requires 
further expansion.
    NHSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the 
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure. 
Considerable progress has been made in implementing the 
recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision 
Directive 63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the 
United States has real and growing problems in this area.
    U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more 
concentrated critical infrastructures has increased 
dramatically over the past decade. Electrical utilities, water 
and sewage systems, transportation networks, and communications 
and energy systems now depend on computers to provide safe, 
efficient, and reliable service. The banking and finance 
sector, too, keeps track of millions of transactions through 
increasingly robust computer capabilities.
    The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are 
privately owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with 
little or no provision for manual back-ups in an emergency.
    Moreover, the computerized information networks that link 
systems together are themselves vulnerable to unwanted 
intrusion and disruption. An attack on any one of several 
highly interdependent networks can cause collateral damage to 
other networks and the systems they connect. Some forms of 
disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but 
other forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the 
dependence of hospitals, air-traffic control systems, and the 
food processing industry on computer controls to appreciate the 
point.
    The bulk of unclassified military communications, too, 
relies on systems almost entirely owned and operated by the 
private sector. Yet little has been done to assure the security 
and reliability of those communications in crisis. Current 
efforts to prevent attacks, protect against theft most damaging 
effects, and prepare for prompt response are uneven at best, 
and this is dangerous because a determined adversary is most 
likely to employ a weapon of mass disruption during a homeland 
security or foreign policy crisis.
    As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland 
Security Agency. This directorate would have two vital 
responsibilities. First would be to oversee the physical assets 
and information networks that make up the U.S. critical 
infrastructure. It should ensure the maintenance of a nucleus 
of cyber security expertise within the government, as well. 
There is now an alarming shortage of government cyber security 
experts due in large part to the financial attraction of 
private-sector employment that the government cannot match 
under present personnel procedures.\13\ The director's second 
responsibility would be as the Critical Information Technology, 
Assurance, and Security Office (CITASO). This office would 
coordinate efforts to address the nation's vulnerability to 
electronic or physical attacks on critical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ We return to this problem below in Section IV.13
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    Several critical activities that are currently spread among 
various government agencies and the private sector should be 
brought together for this purpose. These include:

   Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), 
        which are government-sponsored committees of private-
        sector participants who work to share information, 
        plans, and procedures for information security in their 
        fields;
   The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), 
        currently housed in the Commerce Department, which 
        develops outreach and awareness programs with the 
        private sector;
   The National Infrastructure Protection Center 
        (NIPC), currently housed in the FBI, which gathers 
        information and provides warnings of cyber attacks; and

   The Institute for Information Infrastructure 
        Protection (I3P), also in the Commerce Department, 
        which is designed to coordinate and support research 
        and development projects on cyber security.

    In partnership with the private sector where most cyber 
assets are developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate would be responsible for enhancing 
information sharing on cyber and physical security, tracking 
vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk management 
policies, and delineating the roles of various government 
agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks. 
To do this, the government needs to institutionalize better its 
private-sector liaison across the board--with the owners and 
operators of critical infrastructures, hardware and software 
developers, server/service providers, manufacturers/producers, 
and applied technology developers.
    The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work 
with the private sector must include a strong advocacy of 
greater government and corporate investment in information 
assurance and security. The CITASO would be the focal point for 
coordinating with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
in helping to establish cyber policy, standards, and 
enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer 
Council (CIO Council), the CITASO needs to speak for those 
interests in government councils.\14\ The CITASO must also 
provide incentives for private-sector participation in 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information 
on threats, vulnerabilities, and individual incidents, to 
identify interdependencies, and to map the potential cascading 
effects of outages in various sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ The Chief Information Officer Council is a government 
organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers 
in the government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director 
for Management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber 
security issues internationally. At present, the FCC handles 
international cyber issues for the U.S. government through the 
International Telecommunications Union, As this is one of many 
related international issues, it would be unwise to remove this 
responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless, the CIP Directorate 
should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in 
international bodies.
    The mission of the NHSA must include specific planning and 
operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response. These include:

   Setting training and equipment standards, providing 
        resource grants, and encouraging intelligence and 
        information sharing among state emergency management 
        officials, local fast responders, the Defense 
        Department, and the FBI;
   Integrating the various activities of the Defense 
        Department, the National Guard, and other federal 
        agencies into the Federal Response Plan; and
   Pulling together private sector activities, 
        including those of the medical community, on recovery, 
        consequence management, and planning for continuity of 
        services.

    Working with state officials, the emergency management 
community, and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's 
third directorate will be to rationalize and refine the 
nation's incident response system. The current distinction 
between crisis management and consequence management is neither 
sustainable nor wise. The duplicative command arrangements that 
have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion and 
delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single response system 
for national incidents, in close coordination with the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the FBI. This would require 
that the current policy, which specifies initial DoJ control in 
terrorist incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress 
creates NHSA. We believe that this arrangement would in no way 
contradict or diminish the FBI's traditional role with respect 
to law enforcement.
    The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate should 
also assume a major resource and budget role. WIth the help of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the directorate's first 
task will be to figure out what is being spent on homeland 
security in the various departments and agencies. Only with 
such an overview can the nation identify the shortfalls between 
capabilities and requirements. Such a mission budget should be 
included in the President's overall budget submission to 
Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate 
will also maintain federal asset databases and encourage and 
support up-to-date state and local databases.
    FEMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past 
few years and has gained a well-deserved reputation for 
responsiveness to both natural and manmade disasters. While 
taking on homeland security responsibilities, the proposed NHSA 
would strengthen FEMA's ability to respond to such disasters. 
It would streamline the federal apparatus and provide greater 
support to the state and local officials who, as the nation's 
first responders, possess enormous expertise. To the greatest 
extent possible, federal programs should build upon the 
expertise and existing programs of state emergency preparedness 
systems and help promote regional compacts to share resources 
and capabilities.
    To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend 
transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), 
currently housed at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security 
Agency. The Commission believes that this transfer to FEMA 
should be done at first opportunity, even before NHSA is up and 
running.
    The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training of 
local responders and providing local and state authorities with 
equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in a 
V/MD emergency. NUSA would develop the policies, requirements, 
and priorities as part of its planning tasks as well as oversee 
the various federal, state, and local training and exercise 
programs. In this way, a single staff would provide federal 
assistance for any emergency, whether it is caused by flood, 
earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.
    A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm 
local fire and rescue squads, medical facilities, and 
government services. Attacks may contaminate water, food, and 
air; large-scale evacuations may be necessary and casualties could be extensive. 
Since getting prompt help to those who need it would be a 
complex and massive operation requiring federal support, such 
operations must be extensively planned in advance. 
Responsibilities need to be assigned and procedures put in 
place for these responsibilities to evolve if the situation 
worsens.
    As we envision it, state officials will take the initial 
lead in responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its 
Regional Directors to coordinate federal assistance, while the 
National Crisis Action Center will monitor ongoing operations 
and requirements. Should a crisis overwhelm local assets, state 
officials will turn to NHSA for additional federal assistance. 
In major crises, upon the recommendation of the civilian 
Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior 
figure--a Federal Coordinating Officer--to assume direction of 
all federal activities on the scene. If the situation warrants, 
a state governor can ask that active military forces reinforce 
National Guard units already on the scene. Once the President 
federalizes National Guard forces, or if he decides to use 
Reserve forces, the Joint Forces Command will assume 
responsibility for all military operations, acting through 
designated task force commanders. At the same time, the 
Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating 
Officer to provide civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil 
support. This person would work for the Federal Coordinating 
Officer.
    To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under 
extreme circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust 
exercise programs and regular training to gain experience and 
to establish effective command and control procedures. It will 
be essential to update regularly the Federal Response Plan. It 
will be especially critical for NHSA officials to undertake 
detailed planning and exercises for the full range of potential 
contingencies, including ones that require the substantial 
involvement ofmililary assets in support.
    NHSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland 
security, but other government agencies will retain specific 
homeland security tasks. We take the necessary obligations of 
the major ones in turn.
    Intelligence Community. Good intelligence is the key to 
preventing attacks on the homeland and homeland security should 
become one of the intelligence community's most important 
missions.\15\ Better human intelligence must supplement 
technical intelligence, especially on terrorist groups covertly 
supported by states. As noted above, fuller cooperation and 
more extensive information-sharing with friendly governments 
will also improve the chances that would-be perpetrators will 
be detained, arrested, and prosecuted before they ever reach 
U.S. borders.
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    \15\ We return to this issue in our discussion of the Intelligence 
Community in Section IlI.F., particularly in recommendation 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The intelligence community also needs to embrace cyber 
threats as a legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence 
gathering on potential strategic threats from abroad into its 
activities.
    To advance these ends, we offer the following 
recommendation:

 4: The President should ensure that the National 
Intelligence Council: include homeland security and asymmetric 
threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a 
National Intelligence Officer; and produce National 
Intelligence Estimates on these threats.

    Department of State. U.S. embassies overseas are the 
American people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must 
make homeland security a top priority for all embassy staff, 
and Ambassadors need the requisite authority to ensure that 
information is shared in a way that maximizes advance warning 
overseas of direct threats to the United States.
    Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of 
information, and particularly from open sources, takes full 
advantage of all U.S. government resources abroad, including 
diplomats, consular officers, military officers, and 
reptesentatives of the various other departments and agencies. 
The State Department should also strengthen its efforts to 
acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad 
in private capacities.
    The State Department has made good progress in its overseas 
efforts to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this 
effort into the Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP 
Directorate, the State Department should expand cooperation on 
critical infrastructure protection with other states and 
international organizations. Private sector initiatives, 
particularly in the banking community, provide examples of 
international cooperation on legal issues, standards, and 
practices. Working with the CIP Directorate and the FCC, the 
State Department should also encourage other governments to 
criminalize hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track 
hackers, computer virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.
    Department of Defense. The Defense Department, which has 
placed its highest priority on preparing for major theater war, 
should pay far more attention to the homeland security mission. 
Organizationally, DoD responses are widely dispersed. An 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support has 
responsibility for WMD incidents, while the Department of the 
Army's Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD 
contingencies. Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines 
of authority and responsibility or ensure political 
accountability. The Commission therefore recommends the 
following:

 5: The President should propose to Congress the 
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
reporting directly to the Secretary.

    A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security 
would provide policy oversight for the various DoD activities 
within the homeland security mission and ensure that mechanisms 
are in place for coordinating military support in major 
emergencies. He or she would work to integrate homeland 
security into Defense Department planning, and ensure that 
adequate resources are forthcoming. This Assistant Secretary 
would also represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency 
process on homeland security issues.
    Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also 
recommend that the Defense Department broaden and strengthen 
the existing Joint Forces Command/Joint Task Force-Civil 
Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military planning, doctrine and 
command and control for military support for all hazards and 
disasters.
    This task force should be directed by a senior National 
Guard general with additional headquarters personnel. JTF-CS 
should contain several rapid reaction task forces, composed 
largely of rapidly mobilizable National Guard units. The task 
force should have command and control capabilities for multiple 
incidents. Joint Forces Command should work with the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to ensure the 
provision of adequate resources and appropriate force 
allocations, training, and equipment for civil support.
    On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and 
conventional forces is as high a priority for homeland security 
as it is for other missions. Shaping a peaceful international 
environment and deterring hostile military actors remain sound 
military goals. But deterrent forces may have little effect on 
non-state groups secretly supported by states, or on 
individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of clear 
and imminent danger, the military must be able to take 
preemptive action overseas in circumstances where local 
authorities are unable or unwilling to act. For this purpose, 
as noted above, the United States needs to be prepared to use 
its rapid, long-range precision strike capabilities. A decision 
to act would obviously rest in civilian hands, and would depend 
on intelligence information and assessments of diplomatic 
consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively is 
never taken or needed, the capability should be available 
nonetheless, for knowledge of it can contribute to deterrence.
    We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its 
mission of protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the 
United States, consistent with emerging threats such as the 
potential proliferation of cruise missiles. The department 
should examine alternative means of monitoring approaches to 
the territorial United States. Modern information technology 
and sophisticated sensors can help monitor the high volumes of 
traffic to and from the United States. Given the volume of 
legitimate activities near and on the border, even modern 
infonnation technology and remote sensors cannot filter the 
good from the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise 
nor possible to create a surveillance umbrella over the United 
States. But Defense Department assets can be used to support 
detection, monitoring, and even interception operations when 
intelligence indicates a specific threat.
    Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of 
responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity 
and interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. 
This includes addressing the nature of a national 
transportation network or cyber emergency and the Defense 
Department's role in prevention, detection, or protection of 
the national critical infrastructure. The department's sealift 
and airlift plans are premised on largely unquestioned 
assumptions that domestic transportation systems will be fully 
available to support mobilization requirements. The department 
also is paying insufficient attention to the vulnerability of 
its information networks. Currently, the department's computer 
network defense task force (JTF-Computer Network Defense) is 
underfunded and understaffed for the task of managing an actual 
strategic information warfare attack. It should be given the 
resources to carry out its current mission and is a logical 
source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical Information 
Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.
    National Guard. The National Guard, whose origins are to be 
found in the state militias authorized by the U.S. 
Constitution, should play a central role in the response 
component of a layered defense strategy for homeland security. 
We therefore recommend the following:

 6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's 
direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of 
the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly 
trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.

    At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized 
and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this the 
Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active 
military during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the 
Guard carries out many state-level missions for disaster and 
humanitarian relief, as well as consequence management. For 
these, it relies upon the discipline, equipment, and leadership 
of its combat forces. The National Guard should redistribute 
resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for 
conventional wars overseas to provide greater support to civil 
authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters, 
especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.
    Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed 
assessment of force requirements for both theater war and 
homeland tecurity contingencies. The Department of Defense 
should conduct such an assessment, with the participation of 
the state governors and the NHSA Director. In setting 
requirements, the department should minimize forces with dual 
missions or reliance on active forces detailed for major 
theater war. This is because the United States will need to 
maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive posture against 
homeland attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most 
likely timing of a major terrorist incident will be while the 
United States is involved in a conflict overseas.\16\
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    \16\ See the Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial 
Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
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    The National Guard is designated as the primary Department 
of Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the 
National Guard will respond as a state asset under the control 
of state governors. While it is appropriate for the National 
Guard to play the lead military role in managing the 
consequences of a WMD attack, its capabilities to do so are 
uneven and in some cases its forces are not adequately 
structured or equipped. Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams, 
made up of trained and equipped full-time National Guard 
personnel, will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first 
responders, provide technical advice, and pave the way for 
additional military help. These teams fill a vital need, but 
more effort is required.
    This Commission recommends that the National Guard be 
directed to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of 
homeland security. It should provide a mobilization base with 
strong local ties and support. It is already ``forward 
deployed'' to achieve this mission and should:

   Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, 
        local, and regional planning for responding to a WMD 
        incident;
   Train and help organize local first responders;
   Maintain up-to-date inventories of military 
        resources and equipment available in the area on short 
        notice;
   Plan for rapid inter-state support and 
        reinforcement; and
   Develop an overseas capability for international 
        humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

    In this way, the National Guard will become a critical 
asset for homeland security.
    Medical Community. The medical community has critical roles 
to play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or 
violence could cause casualties far beyond any imagined 
heretofore. Most of the American medical system is privately 
owned and now operates at close to capacity. An incident 
involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the capacities of local 
hospitals and emergency management professionals.
    In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the 
Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a 
reassessment of their programs. Research to develop better 
diagnostic equipment and immune-enhancing drugs is underway, 
and resources to reinvigorate U.S. epidemiological surveillance 
capacity have been allocated. Programs to amass and regionally 
distribute inventories of antibiotics and vaccines have 
started, and arrangements for mass production of selected 
pharmaceuticals have been made. The Centers for Disease Control 
has rapid-response investigative units prepared to deploy and 
respond to incidents.
    These programs will enhance the capacities of the medical 
community, but the momentum and resources for this effort must 
be extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response assess local and federal 
medical resources to deal with a WMD emergency. It should then 
specify those medical programs needed to deal with a major 
national emergency beyond the means of the private sector, and 
Congress should fund those needs.

                  C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION

    Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an 
Executive Branch problem. Congress should be an active 
participant in the development of homeland security programs, 
as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and 
solutions. Individual members should develop expertise in 
homeland security policy and its implementation so that they 
can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice 
in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the 
purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have 
sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated, 
efficient, and effective.
    Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan 
Congressional initiative produced the U.S. effort to deal with 
the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could ``leak'' 
out of a disintegrating Soviet Union.\17\ It was also a 
Congressional initiative that established the Domestic 
Preparedness Program and launched a 120-city program to enhance 
the capability of federal, state, and local first responders to 
react effectively in a WMD emergency.\18\ Members of Congress 
from both parties have pushed the Executive Branch to identify 
and manage the problem more effectively. Congress has also 
proposed and funded studies and commissions on various aspects 
of the homeland security problem.\19\ But it must do more.
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    \17\ Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Luger.
    \18\ Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. This legislation, 
known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in July 1996.
    \19\ We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington, 
DC: July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge 
William Webster's Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law 
Enforcement (Washington, DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission 
[Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the 
Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, DC: June 
2000)]; and an advisory panel led by Virginia Governor James Gilmore 
[First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
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    A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul of 
much of the legislative framework for preparedness, response, 
and national defense programs. Congress designed many of the 
authorities that support national security and emergency 
preparedness programs principally for a Cold War environment. 
The new threat environment--from biological and terrorist 
attacks to cyber attacks on critical systems--poses vastly 
different challenges. We therefore recommend that Congress 
refurbish the legal foundation for homeland security in 
response to the new threat environment.
    In particular, Congress should amend, as necessary, key 
legislative authorities such as the Defense Production Act of 
1950 and the Communications Act of 1934, which facilitate 
homeland security functions and activities.\20\ Congress should 
also encourage the sharing of threat, vulnerability, and 
incident data between the public and private sectors--including 
federal agencies, state governments, first responders, and 
industry.\21\ In addition, Congress should monitor and support 
current efforts to update the international legal framework for 
communications security issues.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ The Defense Production Act was developed during the Korean War 
when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and gas 
were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production 
Act of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. Sec.  2061 et seq. Tide I includes 
delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services based on 
national defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National Defense 
Industrial Resources Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements Title I of 
the Defense Production Act. Congressional review should focus on the 
applicability of the Defense Production Act to homeland security needs, 
ranging from prevention to restoration activities. Section 706 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 also needs revision so that it includes the 
electronic media that have developed in the past two decades. [See 48 
Stat. 1104, 47 USC Sec.  606, as amended.] Executive Order 12472, 
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness 
Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the breakup of 
AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the Executive 
Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in directing national 
communications media during a national security emergency. It came 
before the Internet, however, and does not clearly apply to it.
    \21\ For more than four years, multiple institutions have called on 
national leadership to support laws and policies promoting security 
cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical 
Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC: 
October 1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
    \22\ This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums, such as 
the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnationsl organized 
crime. See Communique on principles to fight transnational organized 
crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight, 
December 9-10, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its 
own to do. As things stand today, so many federal agencies are 
involved with homeland security that it is exceedingly 
difficult to present federal programs and their resource 
requirements to the Congress in a coherent way. It is largely 
because the budget is broken up into so many pieces, for 
example, that counter-terrorism and information security issues 
involve nearly two dozen Congressional committees and 
subcommittees. The creation of the National Security Homeland 
Agency will redress this problem to some extent, but because of 
its growing urgency and complexity, homeland security will 
still require a stronger working relationship between the 
Executive and Legislative Branches. Congress should therefore 
find ways to address homeland security issues that bridge 
current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more 
innovative oversight mechanisms.
    There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate's Arms 
Control Observer Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement 
Group were two successful examples of more informal Executive-
Legislative cooperation on key multi-dimensional issues. 
Specifically, in the near term, this Commission recommends the 
following:

 7: Congress should establish a special body to deal 
with homeland security issues, as has been done effectively 
with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for their 
expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law 
enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include 
members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-
officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.

    This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of 
the problem of homeland security, exchange information and 
viewpoints with the Executive Branch on effective policies and 
plans, and work with standing committees to develop integrated 
legislative responses and guidance. Meetings would often be 
held in closed session so that Members could have access to 
interagency deliberations and diverging viewpoints, as well as 
to classified assessments. Such a body would have neither a 
legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not eclipse 
the authority of any standing committee.
    At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review 
and restructure its committee system, as will be proposod in 
recommendation 48. A single, select committee in each house of 
Congress should be given authorization, appropriations, and 
oversight responsibility for all homeland security activities. 
When established, these committees would replace the function 
of the oversight body described in recommendation 7.
    In sum, the federal government must address the challenge 
of homeland security with greater urgency. The United States is 
not immune to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or 
disruption, but neither is it entirely defenseless against 
them. Much has been done to prevent and defend against such 
attacks, but these efforts must be incorporated into the 
nation's overall security strategy, and clear direction must be 
provided to all departments and agencies. Non-traditional 
national security agencies that how have greater relevance than 
they did in the past must be reinvigorated. Accountability, 
authority, and responsibility must be more closely aligned 
within government agencies. An Executive-Legislative consensus 
is required, as well, to convert strategy and resources into 
programs and capabilities, and to do so in a way that preserves 
fundamental freedoms and individual rights.
    Most of all, however, the government must reorganize itself 
for the challenges of this new era, and make the necessary 
investments to allow an improved organizational structure to 
work. Through the Commission's proposal for a National Homeland 
Security Agency, the U.S. government will be able to improve 
the planning and coordination of federal support to state and 
local agencies, to rationalize the allocation of resources, to 
enhance readiness in order to prevent attacks, and to 
facilitate recovery if prevention fails. Most important, this 
proposal integrates the problem of homeland security within the 
broader framework of U.S. national security strategy. In this 
respect, it differs significantly from issue-specific 
approaches to the problem, which tend to isolate homeland 
security away from the larger strategic perspective of which it 
must be a part.
    We are mindful that erecting the operational side of this 
strategy will take time to achieve. Meanwhile, the threat grows 
ever more serious. That is all the more reason to start right 
away on implementing the recommendations put forth here.
=======================================================================

                   A REPORT CARD ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
                   ENERGY'S NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

                              WITH RUSSIA

      Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force

                 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board

                            January 10, 2001

=======================================================================

      
                           Task Force Members

Howard Baker (Co-Chair), Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, 
        Former United States Senator

Lloyd Cutler (Co-Chair), Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, Former 
        White House Counsel

Graham T. Allison, Director, The Belfer Center, Kennedy School 
        of Government, Harvard University

Andrew Athy, Chairman, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, 
        Partner, O'Neill, Athy & Casey PC

J. Brian Atwood, Executive Vice President, Citizens Energy, 
        Former Administrator, USAID

David Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former United 
        States Senator from Oklahoma

Lynn Davis, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation

Butler Derrick, Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 
        LLP, Former Member of Congress from South Carolina

Susan Eisenhower, President, The Eisenhower Institute, Founder, 
        Center for Political and Strategic Studies

Lee Hamilton,  Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Former Member 
        of Congress from Indiana

Robert I. Hanfling, Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett

Gary Hart, \1\ Of Counsel, Coudert Brothers, Former United 
        States Senator from Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Senator Hart has been prevented from full participation in the 
Task Force's deliberations by other government service.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Mayers, Of Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering

Jim McClure, McClure, Gerard & Neuenschwander, Inc., Former 
        United States Senator from Idaho

Sam Nunn, Senior Partner, King & Spalding, Former United States 
        Senator from Georgia

Alan Simpson, Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard 
        University, Former United States Senator from Wyoming

David Skaggs, Executive Director, Democracy and Citizenship 
        Program, The Aspen Institute, Former Member of Congress 
        from Colorado

John Tuck, Senior Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, 
        Former Under Secretary of Energy
 A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs 
                              with Russia

                              ----------                              

                           Executive Summary

                              Introduction

    Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed 
the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear 
weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast 
quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and 
thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across 
11 time zones and lacks the Cold War infrastructure that 
provided the control and financing necessary to assure that 
chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and 
materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and 
weapons-proliferating states. This problem is compounded by the 
existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always 
having the resources necessary to adequately care for their 
families, may be tempted to sell their expertise to countries 
of proliferation concern.
    In order to assess the Department of Energy's part of 
current U.S. efforts to deal with this critical situation, in 
February 2000 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former 
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House 
Counsel Lloyd Cutler to co-chair a bipartisan task force to 
review and assess DOE's nonproliferation programs in Russia and 
to make recommendations for their improvement. After nine 
months of careful examination of current DOE programs and 
consideration of related nonproliferation policies and programs 
of the U.S. Government, the Task Force reached the following 
conclusions and recommendations.

    1. The most urgent unmet national security threat to the 
United States today is the danger that weapons of mass 
destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be 
stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used 
against American troops abroad or citizens at home.

    This threat is a clear and present danger to the 
international community as well as to American lives and 
liberties.

    2. Current nonproliferation programs in the Department of 
Energy the Department of Defense, and related agencies have 
achieved impressive results thus far, but their limited mandate 
and funding fall short of what is required to address 
adequately the threat.

    The Task Force applauds and commends Secretary Richardson, 
his predecessors and colleagues for their dedication, 
commitment and hard work in seeking to address this issue. The 
cooperation of the Russian Federation has also been a critical 
and significant factor in the work carried out to date.
    But the Task Force concludes that the current budget levels 
are inadequate and the current management of the U.S. 
Government's response is too diffuse. The Task Force believes 
that the existing scope and management of the U.S. programs 
addressing this threat leave an unacceptable risk of failure 
and the potential for catastrophic consequences.

    3. The new President and leaders of the 107th Congress face 
the urgent national security challenge of devising an enhanced 
response proportionate to the threat.

          The enhanced response should include: a net 
        assessment of the threat; a clear achievable mission 
        statement; the development of a strategy with specific 
        goals and measurable objectives; a more centralized 
        command of the financial and human resources required 
        to do the job; and an identification of criteria for 
        measuring the benefits for Russia, the United States, 
        and the entire world.

    The Task Force offers one major recommendation to the 
President and the Congress. The President, in consultation with 
Congress and in cooperation with the Russian Federation, should 
quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize 
in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable 
material located in Russia and to prevent the outflow from 
Russia of scientific expertise that could be used for nuclear 
or other weapons of mass destruction. Accomplishing this task 
will be regarded by future generations as one of the greatest 
contributions the United States and Russia can make to their 
long-term security and that of the entire world.
    While emphasizing that enhanced efforts are needed from the 
U.S., the Task Force underscores that enhanced efforts are also 
required from Russia. Ultimately, Russia will be responsible 
for securing its remaining nuclear arsenal. If this program is 
conceived in full cooperation with the Russian Federation, is 
adequately financed, and is implemented as part of a growing, 
open and transparent partnership, then the Task Force believes 
that Russia should be positioned to take over any work 
remaining at the end of the eight to ten year period. If Russia 
is not prepared for such a partnership, then full success will 
not be achieved.
    Bearing this in mind, the Task Force report outlines an 
enhanced national security program as described above. This 
program could be carried out for less than one percent of the 
U.S. defense budget, or up to a total of $30 billion over the 
next eight to ten years.\1\ The Russian Government would, of 
course, be expected to make a significant contribution 
commensurate with its own financial ability. The national 
security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing and/or 
neutralizing the equivalent of more than 80,000 nuclear weapons 
and potential nuclear weapons \2\ would constitute the highest 
return on investment in any current U.S. national security and 
defense program. The new President should press other major 
powers such as the European Union, Japan and Canada to assume a 
fair share of the costs of these efforts designed also to 
enhance the security of these countries. Contributions from 
other countries could significantly reduce U.S. costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ This plan is based on the assumption that both countries will 
maintain a core nuclear weapons program sufficient to meet defense 
needs and to provide for naval fuel requirements. A detailed budget for 
this program would be developed on the basis of the strategic plan 
called for above. The Task Force believes a budget of approximately $3 
billion annually would be appropriate, recognizing that it would not be 
possible to ramp up to that level immediately. A suggestive outline is 
attached as Appendix A.
    \2\ Assuming approximately 4 kg of plutonium or 20 kg of highly 
enriched uranium per weapon. David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William 
Walker. ``Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World 
Inventories, Capabilities and Policies.'' SIPRI (Oxford Press: 1997), 
page 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Background

    As two former adversaries adapting to the end of the Cold 
War, the United States and Russia both have a responsibility to 
examine and address the dangers posed by the massive nuclear 
arsenal built up over the past five decades. In Russia, this 
review must examine the many dangers and challenges posed by 
the more than 40,000 nuclear weapons produced by the former 
Soviet Union and the large quantities of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and plutonium that could be used to make more 
than 40,000 additional nuclear weapons.
    Important steps have already been taken with many ambitious 
milestones being met over the past decade. Former President 
Bush negotiated and President Clinton implemented what some 
have called the ``contract of the century'' with President 
Yeltsin. Under this agreement, the U.S. is purchasing 500 
metric tons of HEU removed from former Soviet nuclear weapons, 
and this material is being converted to low enriched uranium 
fuel that is then used in civilian power reactors. To date, 
more than 110 metric tons of HEU, enough to build some 5,000 
nuclear weapons, have been blended down and rendered impotent 
for nuclear weapons use. In its blended-down form, this 
material has been delivered to the international market to fuel 
civilian power reactors. Through close cooperation among the 
U.S., Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union, 
we have also succeeded in eliminating strategic nuclear 
arsenals left in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus--preventing 
the potential emergence of three major new nuclear weapon 
states. The elimination of these arsenals has greatly increased 
U.S. and international security, particularly since these 
nuclear weapons were mounted on strategic intercontinental 
ballistic missiles aimed at the United States.
    Since the Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991,\3\ the 
U.S. Government has established an array of threat reduction 
programs in both the Departments of Defense and Energy to 
assist in dismantling Russian nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction and to improve significantly the security of such 
weapons and materials. Together, these programs have helped to 
protect, secure, and begin disposition of strategic weapons 
delivery systems as well as hundreds of metric tons of nuclear 
weapons-usable material--preventing the emergence of a virtual 
``Home Depot'' for would-be proliferators. Additional work, 
under the aegis of the Department of State, has addressed what 
is known as the ``brain drain problem'' both in Russia and 
other countries of the former Soviet Union through programs 
such as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) 
Program. This program, together with DOE's Initiatives for 
Proliferation Prevention and its Nuclear Cities Initiative, has 
helped to redirect weapons scientists and engineers from 
defense work to civilian employment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The Soviet Nuclear Threar Reduction Act of 1991 was created 
under Public Law Number 102-228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These U.S. programs have reduced the threat of diversion of 
nuclear weapons materials. To the best of our knowledge, no 
nuclear weapons or quantity of nuclear weapons-usable material 
have been successfully stolen and exported, while many efforts 
to steal weapons-usable material have been intercepted by 
Russian and international police operations.
    Much more remains to be done, however. The Task Force 
observes that while we know a good deal about the size and 
state of the Russian weapons complex, there is still much that 
we do not know. More than 1,000 metric tons of HEU and at least 
150 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium exist in the Russian 
weapons complex. Most of the cases involving the successful 
seizure and recovery of stolen nuclear weapons-usable material 
have occurred on the western border of Russia. The southern 
border is less secure. Materials may be diverted through 
centuries old trade routes along Russia's mountainous border. 
In addition, many of the Russian nuclear sites remain 
vulnerable to insiders determined to steal enough existing 
material to make several nuclear weapons and to transport these 
materials to Iran, Iraq, or Afghanistan. At some sites, one 
well-placed insider would be enough. The Task Force was advised 
that buyers from Iraq, Iran and other countries have actively 
sought nuclear weapons-usable material from Russian sites.
    In a worst-case scenario, a nuclear engineer graduate with 
a grapefruit-sized lump of HEU or an orange-sized lump of 
plutonium, together with material otherwise readily, available 
in commercial markets, could fashion a nuclear device that 
would fit in a van like the one the terrorist Yosif parked in 
the World Trade Center in 1993. The explosive effects of such a 
device would destroy every building in the Wall Street 
financial area and would level lower Manhattan.
    In confronting this danger, the Russian Government has 
recognized that theft of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-
usable material threatens Moscow or St. Petersburg as surely as 
it threatens Washington, DC or New York. Chechen terrorists 
have already threatened to spread radioactive material around 
Moscow; if they were armed with a nuclear device, the situation 
would be much worse. Success in countering this threat to both 
nations rests on a bedrock of shared vital interests.

                            The Threat Today

    Russia today wrestles with a weakened ability to protect 
and secure its Cold War legacy. A number of factors have come 
together to present an immediate risk of theft of potential 
weapons of mass destruction: delays in payments to guards at 
nuclear facilities; breakdowns in command structures, including 
units that control weapons or guard weapons-usable material; 
and inadequate budgets for protection of stockpiles and 
laboratories housing thousands of potential nuclear weapons. 
Such threats are not hypothetical. Consider the following:

   In late 1998, conspirators at a Ministry of Atomic 
        Energy (MinAtom) facility in Chelyabinsk were caught 
        attempting to steal fissile material of a quantity just 
        short of that needed for one nuclear device. The head 
        of MinAtom's nuclear material accounting confirmed the 
        attempted theft and warned that, had the attempt been 
        successful, it would have caused ``significant damage 
        to the Russian State.''
   Early in 1998, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk-45, a closed 
        Russian ``nuclear city'' that stores enough HEU for 
        hundreds of nuclear weapons, wrote to Krasnoyarsk 
        Governor Alexander Lebed warning that a social 
        explosion in his city was unavoidable unless urgent 
        action was taken. Nuclear scientists and other workers 
        in the city remained unpaid for several months, and 
        basic medical supplies could not be purchased. General 
        Lebed, a former National Security Advisor to President 
        Yeltsin, had earlier proposed to Moscow that his region 
        take responsibility for the nuclear forces and 
        facilities on its territory, pay salaries for these 
        military officers and atomic workers, and take command 
        of the structures. The Russian Government has never 
        agreed to the proposal.
   In December 1998, an employee at Russia's premier 
        nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-
        16) was arrested for espionage and charged with 
        attempting to sell documents on nuclear weapons designs 
        to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan for $3 million. The 
        regional head of the Federal Security Bureau, when 
        reporting the case, confirmed that this was not the 
        first case of nuclear theft at Sarov and explained that 
        such thefts were the result of the ``very difficult 
        financial position'' of workers at such defense 
        enterprises.
   In January 2000, Federal Security Bureau agents 
        arrested four sailors at the nuclear submarine base in 
        Vilyuchinsk-3 on the Kamchatka Peninsula with a stash 
        of precious metals and radioactive material they had 
        stolen from an armored safe in their nuclear submarine. 
        After the sailors' arrest, investigators discovered at 
        their homes additional stashes of stolen radioactive 
        material and submarine components containing gold, 
        platinum, silver, and palladium.

    These are a sample of dozens of actual incidents. Imagine 
if such material were successfully stolen and sold to a 
terrorist like Osama bin Laden, who reportedly masterminded the 
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and is the 
chief suspect in the recent attack on the U.S. destroyer Cole.
    Democracies like ours are inherently messy, frequently 
distracted, and often bogged down in partisanship. Our 
government historically finds it difficult to mobilize without 
the catalyst of an actual incident. The new President and 
leaders of the 107th Congress face no larger challenge than to 
mobilize the nation to precautionary action before a major 
disaster strikes.

            Assessing Current DOE Nonproliferation Programs

    The Task Force had the benefit of briefings by both 
government and non-government experts and reviews of written 
materials. Members of the Task Force also visited seven sites 
in Russia in July 2000, reviewing DOE programs and meeting with 
13 organizations over the course of a week. The Task Force was 
able to visit only a few sites of the vast nuclear complex, and 
it recognizes that those sites were probably in better economic 
and physical condition than others in the complex. The dire 
state of those sites gave the Task Force members cause for 
grave concern about the overall condition of the Russian 
nuclear complex.
    The Task Force applauds the accomplishments of current DOE 
programs and related programs of other U.S. Government 
agencies. The Task Force commends in particular the dedication 
to duty exhibited by the hundreds of DOE and national 
laboratory employees involved in these programs. The Task Force 
was also impressed by the high quality of cooperation extended 
by most of DOE's Russian counterparts during the course of its 
vist to Russia. Both MinAtom and the Russian Navy provided 
access to all of the facilities requested, as well as some 
additional sites that were thought to be inaccessible. Despite 
difficulties in the overall implementation of the DOE programs, 
the Task Force found Russia's cooperation to be a significant 
and positive factor. The United States and the Soviet Union 
competed in creating nuclear weapons of mass destruction; now 
the U.S. and Russia are cooperating to dismantle them. The Task 
Force believes that the record of progress demonstrates it is 
far better for the United States to be on the inside working 
with Russia than on the outside with no capability to affect 
Russia's actions.
    However, the Task Force finds very disturbing the ongoing 
Russian trade with Iran in dual-use nuclear technology and 
missile technology and Russia's apparent intention to supply 
new conventional weapons systems to Iran. Despite the fact that 
these issues have been raised with Russia at the highest levels 
of both governments, the problem has not yet been resolved. The 
Task Force views the failure to resolve these issues as very 
serious and believes the lack of satisfactory resolution will 
increase the difficulties inherent in continued cooperation 
with Russia and in carrying out the Task Force's 
recommendations. While the Task Force affirms that the DOE 
nonproliferation programs are unequivocally in the U.S. 
national security interest, the Task Force is particularly 
concerned that if Russian cooperation with Iran continues in a 
way that compromises nuclear nonproliferation norms, it will 
inevitably have a major adverse effect on continued cooperation 
in a wide range of other ongoing nonproliferation programs. 
Among other consequences, there will be little support in 
Congress and the Executive Branch for the major new initiatives 
the Task Force is recommending.
    Unquestionably, much has been accomplished by the array of 
programs now being operated by DOE and other U.S. Government 
agencies. Nonetheless, the Task Force believes it is time for 
the U.S. Government to perform a risk assessment based on input 
from all relevant agencies to estimate the total magnitude of 
the threat posed to U.S. national secutity. The Task Force also 
believes there is a strong need to create greater synergies 
among the existing nonproliferation programs, hence its call 
for government-wide coordination of the current programs and 
direct White House involvement.

                   The Task Force Specifically Finds

    1. By and large, current DOE programs are having a 
significant and positive effect. The strategic plan recommended 
by the Task Force should review the needs of each of these 
programs and, where appropriate, provide for a substantial 
increase in funding. Expansions of program scope and increases 
in funding, however, must take careful account of the pace at 
which funds can usefully be expended in each individual 
program.
    2. The strategic plan and the associated budgets should 
identify specific goals and measurable objectives for each 
program, as well as provide criteria for success and an exit 
strategy. These should be factored into the five-year budget 
plan currently being developed for the National Nuclear 
Security Administration.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ On March 1, 2000, in accordance with Public Law 106-65, the 
National Nuclear Security Administration was formally established as a 
semi-autonomous entity within the Department of Energy. The NNSA is 
comprised of four preexisting component organizations: defense 
programs, nuclear nonproliferation, fissile materials disposition, and 
naval reactors. With the establishment of the NNSA, the Office of 
Nonproliferation and National Security became Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and incorporated the Office of Fissile Materials 
Disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3. A major obstacle to further expansion and success of 
current programs is the continuation of differences between the 
U.S. and Russia over transparency and access. As a condition 
for a substantially expanded program, the U.S. and Russia 
should agree at a high level on the degree of transparency 
needed to assure that U.S.-funded activity has measurable 
impacts on program objectives and that U.S. taxpayer dollars 
are being spent as intended.
    4. Given the gravity of the existing situation and the 
nature of the challenge before us, it is imperative that the 
President establish a high-level leadership position in the 
White House with responsibility for policy and budget 
coordination for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 
across the U.S. Government. The President should appoint a 
person of stature who commands the respect and attention of 
relevant Cabinet officers and Congressional leaders to lead 
this program.
    5. The U.S. administration of these programs should seek to 
eliminate any unnecessary and overly restrictive controls that 
hamper swift and efficient action. To overcome potential 
impediments that often arise from ``business as usual'' 
practices within the Russian and U.S. bureaucracies, DOE and 
related agencies should take practical steps, including further 
enlargement of the DOE team working with the U.S. Ambassador in 
Moscow, to ensure the most efficient on-the-ground 
implementation of the programs in Russia.
    6. It is imperative to mobilize the sustained interest and 
concern of the Congress. The Task Force urges the Congress to 
consider the creation of a joint committee on weapons of mass 
destruction, nuclear safety and nonproliferation, modeled after 
the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Creation of such a 
committee would ensure that the issues receive adequate high-
level attention and that Member and staff expertise is 
developed and preserved.

                         Accomplishing the Task

    The major recommendation of the Task Force is that one of 
the first national security initiatives of the new President be 
the formulation of a comprehensive, integrated strategic plan, 
done in cooperation with the Russian Federation, to secure and/
or neutralize in the next eight to ten years all nuclear 
weapons-usable material located in Russia and to prevent the 
outflow from Russia of scientific expertise that could be used 
for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The Task 
Force's vision is a world in which all such weapons-usable 
materials are safe, secure, and accounted for, with 
transparency sufficient to assure the world that this is the 
case. The path toward this vision begins by securing all 
existing nuclear weapons-usable material and eliminating excess 
stockpiles of uranium and plutonium in Russia.
    The Task Force has reviewed many promising proposals but 
does not claim to have a complete grasp of the universe of good 
solutions to this set of problems. While it recognizes that the 
new President will wish to consider other options, the Task 
Force proposes a strategic plan with specific goals and 
measurable objectives to eliminate the danger of inadequate 
controls over weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable 
materials. The Task Force recognizes that the quantities of 
excess material in Russia are so large that they cannot be 
completely eliminated even within an eight to ten year period. 
This is especially true of the plutonium stockpile, elimination 
of which is directly linked to the progress of U.S. efforts to 
eliminate its own excess plutonium. This plan is designed to 
bring the material under effective control, to reduce 
drastically the threat posed by such materials, and to reach a 
position where Russia can take over any remaining work at the 
end of the eight to ten year period. Consultation and 
collaboration with Russia will be critical to success. The 
proposed strategic plan follows.
1. Secure Russian nuclear weapons and material by:
   drastically shrinking the number of sites where the 
        material is held;
   accelerating security upgrades for the remaining 
        buildings in use;
   assisting the Russians as they identify, tag, and 
        seal all their warheads and materials as part of a 
        reliable accounting system;
   securing the return of HEU from Soviet-built 
        research reactors, primarily in Eastern Europe, to 
        Russia for downblending and disposition; and
   developing a plan, after a joint U.S.-Russian 
        examination of the extent of the threat, to be 
        implemented by DOE and DOD, to minimize potential 
        proliferation threats posed by decommissioned Russian 
        general-purpose submarines and their fuel.
2. Eliminate excess Russian HEU by:
   demilitarizing all remaining excess Russian HEU 
        through the development of art expanded capacity for 
        downblending in Russia; and
   accelerating the purchase of the approximately 400 
        metric tons of HEU remaining to be downblended under 
        the current HEU agreement, while ensuring that the 
        material not flood and depress the world market. This 
        could require the Russian or U.S. Government to hold 
        the material for an indefinite period of time.
3. Manage excess Russian plutonium, accelerating existing disposition 
        commitments and emphasizing safe and secure storage, by:
   storing up to 100 metric tons of plutonium at Mayak 
        if additional storage wings are built there, or at 
        other highly secure sites;
   eliminating up to 100 metric tons of excess Russian 
        plutonium by blending fuel as mixed oxide fuel and 
        burning it in civilian reactors, building on what the 
        U.S. and Russia have agreed to do for an initial 34 
        metric tons;
   reinvigorating verifiable efforts to halt additional 
        Russian production of plutonium; and
   preparing an inventory of the total Russian 
        stockpile.
4. Downsize the nuclear complex, building on existing Russian plans and 
        accomplishments, by:
   facilitating Russian efforts to accelerate the 
        shutdown of its weapons facilities, ensuring the 
        identification of the highest-value targets for 
        cooperation;
   funding ``contract research'' by Russian nuclear 
        scientists to develop efficient, low-cost environmental 
        technologies of benefit to the U.S., while 
        simultaneously preventing the outflow of scientific 
        expertise from Russia that could be used for nuclear or 
        other weapons of mass destruction;
   working with Russia to ensure that nuclear weapons 
        scientists and workers are provided financial 
        incentives for early retirement from the weapons 
        complex;
   overhauling foreign and domestic lending practices 
        to new businesses in the nuclear cities; and
   enhancing communication between the municipalities 
        and the weapons institutes or facilities that are co-
        located with them to increase efficiency in the 
        expenditure of resources.
5. Plan for Russian financing of sustainable security by
   seeking specific commitments from Russia to fund 
        adequate levels of security and accounting for its 
        nuclear material and a slimmed-down nuclear complex;
   exploring, in consultation with Russian officials, 
        an array of concepts fur developing new revenue streams 
        for financing projects in an accountable and 
        transparent manner; and
   working with Russian officials to begin detailed 
        planning for the transition away from U.S. financial 
        support.

    The Task Force believes it is quite feasible that the 
Russian Federation and the United States could together carry 
out an intensive, well-conceived and well-funded strategic plan 
as outlined above over the next eight to ten years.
=======================================================================

               U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                               Hearing on

    THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM AND THE NATURAL SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS 
                                DISEASES

                           September 5, 2001

    Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the former Chair of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, continues to play an active 
role in national security and non-proliferation affairs as the 
co-chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Senator Nunn 
recently carried out the duties of the President of the United 
States in an exercise titled ``Dark Winter,'' which simulated a 
smallpox attack carried out against three U.S. cities.

                                ------                                

    Dr. D.A. Henderson, one of the leading experts in the world 
on bioterrorism, served for 20 years with the Centers for 
Disease Control, including assignments as Chief of Surveillance 
and Chief of the Epidemic Intelligence Service; 11 years with 
the World Health Organization as Director of the successful 
Smallpox Eradication Program; and 16 years as Chairman of the 
Pan-American Health Organization's Technical Advisory Group 
which advised on the design and development of the polio 
eradication program. Dr. Henderson is now the director of the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies. Dr. 
Henderson's data formed the technical basis for the ``Dark 
Winter'' scenario exercise in which Senator Nunn participated.

=======================================================================

      
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Nunn, Former U.S. Senator, Co-Chairman 
                    of the Nuclear Threat Initiative

    Chairman Biden and members of the Committee, it is a 
privilege and honor for me to come back to the United States 
Senate where I spent so much of my life. I thank you for 
dedicating the first of these hearings to the threats of 
bioterrorism and the spread of infectious diseases. Biological 
terrorism is one of our greatest national security threats, and 
one that cannot be addressed by Department of Defense standard 
operating procedures. The specter of a biological weapons 
attack--and the parallel peacetime threat of a naturally 
occurring infectious disease outbreak--are unique, and they 
deserve the time and focus you are devoting to them today.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as you may know, 
this past June at Andrews Air Force Base, I was a participant 
in the exercise Dark Winter--which simulated a biological 
weapons attack on the United States. It's a lucky thing for the 
United States that this was just a test and not a real 
emergency. But, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, our 
lack of preparation is a real emergency.
    During my 24 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
I saw scenarios and satellite photos and Pentagon plans for 
most any category of threat you can imagine. But a biological 
weapons attack on the United States fits no existing category 
of security threats. Psychologist Abraham Maslow once wrote: 
``When all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like 
a nail.'' This is not a nail; it's different from other 
security threats; and to fight it, we need a different set of 
tools than the ones we've been using.
    Our exercise involved an intentional release of smallpox. 
Experts today believe that a single case of smallpox anywhere 
in the world would constitute a global medical emergency. As 
Members of this committee know, a wave of smallpox was touched 
off in Yugoslavia in 1972 by a single infected individual. The 
epidemic was stopped in its fourth wave by quarantines, 
aggressive police and military measures, and 18 million 
emergency vaccinations to protect a population of 21 million 
that was already highly vaccinated.
    Mr. Chairman, we have effectively only 12 million doses of 
vaccine in America to protect a highly vulnerable population of 
275 million that is essentially not vaccinated. The Yugoslavia 
crisis mushroomed from one case; our Dark Winter exercise began 
with 20 confirmed cases in Oklahoma City, 30 suspected cases 
spread out in Oklahoma, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, and 
countless more cases of individuals who were infected but 
didn't know it. We did not know the time, place or size of the 
release, so we had no way of judging the magnitude of the 
crisis. All we knew was that we had a big problem and a small 
range of responses. One certainty was that it would get worse 
before it would get better. Our medical experts told us that we 
had only two strategies for effective smallpox containment: (1) 
isolating those who are sick, and (2) vaccinating those who 
have been exposed. Isolation is difficult when you're not sure 
who has it; vaccination cannot stop the spread if you don't 
have enough of it.

                          Dark Winter Overview

    Dark Winter simulated a series of National Security Council 
(NSC) meetings dealing with a terrorist attack involving the 
covert release of smallpox in three American cities. The 
exercise was conducted by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian 
Biodefense Studies, and the ANSER Institute for Homeland 
Defense, under the leadership of John Hamre, Tara O'Toole and 
Randy Larsen, respectively. Many of the participants in Dark 
Winter had served previous Presidents in cabinet or sub-cabinet 
positions. Most knew how the NSC worked, and they were all 
individuals with considerable expertise and perspective in the 
security, law enforcement and health fields.
    I will not take the Committee's time with a complete replay 
of the events, but will share with you the highlights.
    In the opening minutes of Dark Winter, we learned from the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services that cases of smallpox 
had just been diagnosed by the Centers for Disease Control. 
Given the infectious nature of the disease, we were facing the 
start of a smallpox epidemic--an event with devastating, if not 
catastrophic, potential.
    Like all of you, I received a smallpox vaccination when I 
was a child, but I had forgotten the honor of the disease. In 
the 20th century, more than 300 million people died from 
smallpox--more than those killed in all wars of the century 
combined. Thanks to a massive and highly collaborative 
international campaign, smallpox as a naturally occurring 
disease was eradicated. But once eradicated, the consequences 
of a smallpox outbreak has become more dangerous with each 
passing year as new generations of unvaccinated citizens are 
born and the potency of the previous vaccinations diminishes 
with time. Unfortunately, we know that smallpox was made into a 
weapon by the Soviet Union; we do not know if any other nations 
or groups have successfully pursued a similar goal, and this 
should be a matter of keen intelligence forces.
    Over a 24-hour period at Andrews Air Force Base, our NSC 
``war gamers'' dealt with three weeks of simulated shock, 
stress and horror. I was given the role of President of the 
United States, and Jim Woolsey was the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
    We learned that on December 9, 2002, some dozen patients 
reported to the Oklahoma City Hospital with a strange illness 
confirmed quickly by the CDC to be smallpox. While we only knew 
about the Oklahoma cases the first day, we later learned the 
scope of the initial infections and the sites of three 
simultaneous attacks in shopping centers in Oklahoma, Georgia 
and Pennsylvania. The initial infection quickly spread to five 
states and 3,000 victims although most infected individuals had 
not displayed symptoms or gone to the hospital in the first few 
days so we did not know who they were or where they were.
    We quickly learned that we had only two tools available to 
deal with a smallpox attack--vaccination and isolation, and we 
had only enough vaccine for one out of every 23 Americans.
    I denied the Secretary of Defense's demand that all 2.3 
million of U.S. military personnel be immediately vaccinated 
wherever they were in the world. Instead, we administered 
vaccine to U.S. military, including the National Guard, and 
security and medical service personnel who were on the front 
lines locally and also those who were in areas of the world 
where a smallpox attack was more likely to occur. Our initial 
decision was to use our limited vaccine supply to protect 
health care workers, local police and fire officials, National 
Guard on the scene and local, state and federal officials in 
the line of fire. We also devised a strategy to try and put a 
firewall around the infections that were being reported, but 
that strategy was largely ineffective because of the rapid 
spread of the disease and our limited supply of vaccine.
    So, on the first night of decision-making, we designed a 
vaccination strategy, and we ordered accelerated production of 
new stock. We asked the Secretary of State to try to find 
surplus stock from other countries. I will skip the agonizing 
details and get to the conclusions.
    On Day Six of the crisis, we had very little vaccine left. 
We quickly faced the only alternative--forced isolation with 
large numbers of exposed citizens whose locations and 
identities remained guesswork. We were down to the really tough 
questions. Do we force whole communities and cities to stay in 
their homes? How? With force? Do we physically prevent citizens 
in high-risk areas from fleeing their communities when they 
themselves may already be infected? Who provides food and care 
for those in forced isolation, particularly when we can no 
longer provide vaccine to essential providers?
    On Day Twelve, when our war game ended and my brief tenure 
as President concluded, we were beginning the next stage of the 
epidemic--those who caught smallpox from the original 3,000 
people who were infected in the initial terrorist attack. Our 
health experts told us that every two to three weeks the number 
of cases would increase ten-fold. To give you a glimpse of how 
the exercise ended, here are a few highlights from a simulated 
CNN broadcast:

          On Day Twelve of the worst public health crisis in 
        America's history, demonstrations for more vaccine in 
        hard-hit communities disintegrated into riots and 
        looting around the nation. Interstate commerce has 
        stopped in several regions of the nation. A suspension 
        of trading on America's stock exchanges takes effect 
        tomorrow. International commerce with the U.S. has 
        virtually ceased.
        The Centers for Disease Control reports that efforts to 
        stem the smallpox epidemic have depleted America's 
        inventory of smallpox vaccine. While the CDC may be out 
        of vaccine, at least 45 Internet websites are offering 
        what they claim are safe, effective vaccines from 
        previously forgotten stocks. These claims have not--
        repeat not--been independently verified, and 
        authorities urge caution.
          At least 25 more states and 10 foreign countries are 
        reporting smallpox infections. At the United Nations, 
        China has sponsored a resolution to censure the U.S., 
        blaming America for reintroducing smallpox to the 
        world. It is demanding that the U.S. supply the world 
        with vaccine.

    In summary, Mr. Chairman, I determined from our war game 
that public health has become a national security issue, but 
that we are unprepared. We were out of vaccine. We were 
discussing martial law. Interstate commerce was eroding 
rapidly. The members of our simulated NSC, as well as state and 
local officials, were desperate. We came to realize too late 
that our country:

   Had not produced sufficient vaccine.
   Had not prepared top officials to cope with this new 
        type of security crisis.
   Had not invested adequately in the planning and 
        exercises absolutely necessary for coordinated 
        response.
   Had not ensured that the public health 
        infrastructure was adequate, with built in surge 
        capacity.
   Had not educated the American people, or developed 
        strategies to constructively engage the media in 
        educating the public, about what was happening and what 
        to do.
   Had not practiced what few plans there were in 
        place.
   Had not ranked biological terrorism or infectious 
        diseases as high national priorities.

                         Dilemmas and Insights

    Most participants in our exercise would have been much more 
in their element if we had been dealing with a terrorist 
bombing. The effects of a bomb are bounded in time and place. 
After the explosion, the nation's leadership knows the 
geography and the extent of the damage. You know where to 
start, and how much it will take to respond and rebuild. 
Smallpox, on the other hand, is a silent, ongoing, invisible 
attack. It is highly contagious, and spreads in a flash--each 
smallpox victim can infect ten to twenty others. It incubates 
for two weeks before physically appearing--it comes in waves.
    The most insidious effect of a biological weapons attack is 
that it can turn Americans against Americans. Once smallpox is 
released, it is not the terrorists anymore who are the threat; 
our neighbors and family members can become the threat. If 
they've been exposed, they can kill you by talking to you. The 
scene could match the horror of the Biblical description in 
Zechariah (8:10): ``Neither was there any peace to him that 
went out or came in
. . . for I set all men every one against his neighbour.''
    A biological weapons attack cuts across categories and 
mocks old strategies. For more than two thousand years the most 
important rule of war has been to know your enemy.
    In military language, this means that when you face a 
battlefield scenario, you draw up an order of battle--you 
estimate the number of enemy tanks and planes and troops, their 
intelligence and logistics capabilities, and other resources. A 
biological weapon, however, is an invisible killer. An attack 
may go unrecognized for days, only becoming evident after large 
numbers of people become sick. In the case of a contagious 
disease, our own people would become the enemy's weapons as 
they transmit the disease to others, creating ever-widening 
circles of exposure.
    Even after you know there has been an attack, there still 
are few reliable numbers--because you don't know who initially 
released it, how much more they have, or where they are. And 
the usual responses to an attack are impossible: ``Engage the 
enemy; open fire; stop their advance; bring out the wounded.'' 
You can hardly know who is wounded.
    For the participants, this exercise was filled with many 
such horrible dilemmas and unpleasant insights.
    Number one: We have a fragmented and under-funded public 
health system--at the local, state, and federal levels--that 
does not allow us to effectively detect and track disease 
outbreaks in real time.
    Two: Lab facilities needed to diagnose the disease are 
inadequately supported and laboring with outdated technology.
    Three: There is insufficient partnership and communication 
across federal agencies and among local, state, and federal 
governments.
    Four: The only way to deal with smallpox is with isolation 
and vaccination, but we don't have enough vaccines, and we 
don't have enough dedicated facilities, resources, or 
information for effective isolation.
    Five: A biological weapons attack will be a local event 
with national implications, and that guarantees tension between 
local, state and national interests. In our exercise, Governor 
Keating of Oklahoma asked for vaccine for every one of his 
citizens--as he had to in the interests of his state. The 
President said no, as he had to in the interests of the nation. 
Naturally, this demands a high degree of advanced planning and 
coordination, because of the diverging interests, and because 
key players and partners are answerable to different leaders.
    Six: Most hospitals run at or near full capacity all the 
time: a surge in patients from smallpox, combined with the 
inevitable infections of hospital personnel, and the flight of 
some fearful health care professionals, would create a 
catastrophic overload.
    Seven: There will be a dearth of information on this kind 
of event. My staff and cabinet could not tell me ten percent of 
what I wanted to know: ``How many cases are there right now? 
How many more cases can we expect? Will there be more attacks? 
When and where did the first infections take place? Who 
released it? What's the worst-case scenario? Is our vaccine 
supply secure and safe for use? Will other countries loan us 
emergency vaccine to keep the disease from spreading all over 
the world?
    And there are many tradeoffs. One of the biggest: We have 
12 million vaccines; that's enough for one out of every 23 
Americans. How do we decide whom to vaccinate?
    Do we take power from the Governors and federalize the 
National Guard? Do we seize hotels and convert them into 
hospitals? Do we close borders and block all travel? What level 
of force do we use to keep someone sick with smallpox in 
isolation? Do we keep people known or thought to be exposed 
quarantined in their homes? Do we guarantee 2.3 million doses 
of vaccine to the military; or do we first cover all health 
care providers? Do we take strong measures that protect health, 
but could undermine public support or destroy the economy?
    Finally: How do you talk to the public in a way that is 
candid, yet prevents panic--knowing that panic itself can be a 
weapon of mass destruction? My staff had two responses: ``We 
don't know'' and ``You're late for your press conference.''
    I told people in the exercise: ``I would never go before 
the press with this little information,'' and Governor 
Keating--who knows about dealing with disaster, said: ``You 
have no choice.'' And I went, even though I did not have 
answers for the public's most urgent questions: ``How do you 
plan to protect our families?'' ``How rapidly and how far will 
it spread?'' And ``Why isn't there enough vaccine?''
    Naturally, there are some skeptics anytime you describe a 
dire threat to the United States. I want to tell the Committee: 
I am convinced the threat of a biological weapons attack on the 
United States is as urgent as it is real. As Secretary Rumsfeld 
said in his confirmation hearings: ``I would rank bioterrorism 
quite high in terms of threats . . . It does not take a genius 
to create agents that are enormously powerful, and they can be 
done in mobile facilities, in small facilities.'' An experiment 
some years ago showed that a scientist whose specialty was in 
another field was able to weaponize anthrax on his first 
attempt for less than $250,000.
    Hundreds of labs and repositories around the world sell 
biological agents for legitimate research--and the same 
substances used in legitimate research can be turned into 
weapons research. In addition, the massive biological weapons 
program of the former Soviet Union remains a threat, at least 
to the extent that materials and know-how could flow to hostile 
forces. At its peak, the program employed 70,000 scientists and 
technicians and made twenty tons of smallpox. One Russian 
official was quoted some years ago in The New Yorker saying: 
``There were plenty of opportunities for staff members to walk 
away with an ampule.'' There still are.
    According to a very prominent press report, former Soviet 
biological weapons scientists have been aggressively--and in 
some eases successfully--recruited by Iran. And Ambassador Rolf 
Ekeus, who headed the United Nations special commission that 
investigated Iraq's arsenal after the Gulf War, and who we are 
lucky to have on the Board of Directors of NTI, had testified 
before Congress that in 1991 Iraq had 300 biological bombs.
    So the ability of people to acquire or create biological 
weapons should be clear beyond any doubt. And no one should 
doubt how lethal biological weapons could be. In 1979, a small 
amount of anthrax escaped from a Soviet biological weapons lab 
in Sverdlovsk. Seventy-seven cases of human anthrax occurred in 
the city surrounding the lab. Sixty-six died, and new cases 
were appearing as late as 47 days after the leak. All this 
resulted from only a tiny amount of anthrax being released--on 
the order of ounces. It doesn't take much imagination to 
envision the catastrophe that would result if someone 
deliberately released a much larger quantity.
    It is important not to overstate this threat. But it is not 
an overstatement to say it is real, it is dangerous, and if it 
occurred today, it would catch us unprepared.
    Michael Osterholm and John Schwartz, in their book Living 
Terrors, told about the experience of one doctor who knew his 
state was one of the best-trained areas of the country for a 
biological weapons attack. One day he conducted some 
unscientific research. He discovered that the total city 
stockpile for dealing with an anthrax attack would not cover 
even 600 patients. He found that a doctor trained in biological 
weapons failed to diagnose anthrax when the classic symptoms 
were described; a doctor in the radiology department failed to 
recognize inhalation anthrax when shown an X-ray; and a voice 
mail message describing a bioterrorism concern went unreturned 
by the state health department for three days.

                               Next Steps

    In fairness, we are making progress. The Clinton 
Administration deserves credit for recognizing that a 
biological weapons attack is different from warfare or other 
terrorist threats and for targeting funds to address it. That 
initiative includes strengthening the public health 
infrastructure, creating a pharmaceutical stockpile for 
civilian use, a contract to develop and produce a new smallpox 
vaccine, research to develop new and improved diagnostics, 
drugs and vaccines, programs to train first responders (police 
and fire departments as well as public health and medical 
professionals) across the United States, and investments in new 
technologies to help detect biological agents.
    Under the Bush Administration, these efforts are continuing 
and in some eases, funding is increasing. It is also heartening 
that Secretary Thompson has named a senior advisor on 
bioterrorism who previously directed the program on 
bioterrorism at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
These are positive steps. Still, we have to do more--and 
quickly.
    Before detailing the issues that I believe deserve the 
greatest attention, we should keep in mind that the results of 
biological attacks would vary according to the specific agent 
used. Technology and training for early recognition of the type 
of pathogen are essential. This exercise gave us valuable 
lessons about a possible smallpox attack. The circumstances 
would be very different in the case of an anthrax attack, for 
example. In the event of an attack using anthrax, vaccination 
and isolation would be irrelevant, but antibiotics would need 
to be administered on the scene immediately.
    For the participants, the Dark Winter exercise instilled in 
all of us that there is much work to be done:
    Number one: Clearly, measures that will deter or prevent 
bioterrorism are the most cost effective means to counter 
threats to public health and social order. We need to prevent 
the proliferation of biological weapons, in part by 
strengthening intelligence gathering against such threats, but 
also by providing peaceful research options to scientists in 
the former Soviet Union. Efforts to fight proliferation require 
a global approach, including finding a way to strengthen and 
enforce the Biological Weapons Convention.
    Two: We need to focus more attention, concern and resources 
on the specific threat of bioterrorism--understanding that it 
is different from other threats we face. Biological weapons 
must be countered with new protocols for securing dangerous 
pathogens, with increased vigilance and surveillance, as well 
as with increased supplies of medicines and vaccines and 
significantly increased training.
    Three: We need to recognize the central role of public 
health and medicine in this effort and engage these 
professionals fully as partners on the national security team. 
We must act on the understanding that public health is an 
important pillar in our national security framework. In the 
event of a biological weapons attack--millions of lives will 
depend on how quickly doctors diagnose the illness, communicate 
their findings, and bring forth a fast and effective response 
at the local and federal level. This means, clearly, that 
public health and medical professionals must be part of the 
national security team. Planning for an event like this is not 
the exclusive purview of the Department of Defense, the 
National Security Council, the CIA and the Department of 
Energy. The Department of Health and Human Services (CDC, FDA, 
NIH, etc.) must also be included.
    This may seem obvious enough. But several years ago, when 
Administration officials were meeting to discuss supplemental 
funding legislation for defense against biological weapons--the 
presiding official from the Office of Management and Budget 
greeted the officials from the NSC, and FBI and CIA and DOD, 
then saw the Assistant Secretary from Health and Human Services 
at the table, did a double-take and said: ``What are you doing 
here?'' Health officials should not need to be given directions 
to the White House Situation Room in an emergency.
    Four: We need to identify and put into practice the 
mechanisms by which all levels of government will interact and 
work together. It is critical that we understand our differing 
roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and authorities, and 
plan on how we will work together before an act of terrorism 
occurs.
    Five: We need to reexamine and modernize the legal 
framework for epidemic control measures and the appropriate 
balance with civil liberties--the laws that would apply if we 
were to find ourselves managing the crisis that would come with 
a biological weapons attack. These laws vary from state to 
state and many are antiquated. We need to make sure that they 
are up-to-date, consistent with our current social values and 
priorities, and we need to reacquaint high-level officials in 
all areas of response with the specific authorities these laws 
provide, and how they can implement them.
    Six: There should be a clear plan for providing the news 
media with timely and accurate information to help save lives 
and prevent panic.
    Seven: We need to increase the core capacities of our 
public health system to detect, track and contain epidemics, by 
providing resources for effective surveillance systems, 
diagnostic laboratory facilities, and communication links to 
other elements of the response effort.
    Eight: The national pharmaceutical stockpile should be 
built to capacity, including extra production capability for 
drugs and vaccines, with heightened security at the various 
dispersal sites. We must not fall victim to a twin attack that 
releases a bio-agent and simultaneously destroys our drugs and 
vaccines.
    Nine: We need to develop plans for a surge of patients in 
the nation's hospitals to make the best use of existing 
resources in the event of an emergency. This will require 
careful advance planning, including how to utilize ancillary 
facilities such as gymnasiums or armories, since most hospitals 
are operating at or near capacity right now.
    Ten: We need to increase funding for biomedical research to 
develop new vaccines, new therapeutic drugs, and new rapid 
diagnostic tests for bioweapon agents.
    Eleven: We need to encourage the scientific community to 
confront the sinister potential of modern biological research, 
and help them devise systems and practices that ensure the 
safe, secure storage of, and access to, dangerous pathogens.
    Twelve: Officials at the highest levels of the federal, 
state, and local government need to participate in exercises 
like Dark Winter to understand the importance of advance 
preparation. Plans must be exercised, evaluated, and understood 
by decision-makers if they are to prove useful in a time of 
crisis.
    I know how difficult it is to find funding for new 
initiatives, and public health is often left behind. We need to 
think about supporting public health activities in the same way 
we think about our national defense. Congress and the public 
should understand that expanding disease surveillance, creating 
additional lab capacity and enhancing vaccine production 
capabilities will benefit the United States not only in 
responding to a biological weapons attack, but also by 
improving our responses to natural disease outbreaks. We have a 
chance to defend the nation against its adversaries and improve 
the public health system with the same steps.

            The Nuclear Threat Initiative--A New Foundation

    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, encouraging and 
helping our government to deter, prevent, and defend against 
biological terrorism is a central part of our mission at the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)--the organization founded by 
Ted Turner and guided by an experienced board that Ted and I 
co-chair. We are dedicated to reducing the global threat from 
biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons by increasing public 
awareness, encouraging dialogue, catalyzing action, and 
promoting new thinking about these dangers in this country and 
abroad.
    We fully recognize that only our government can provide the 
leadership and resources to achieve our security and health 
priorities. But within that context, NTI is:

   Seeking ways to reduce the threat from biological 
        weapons and their consequences.
   Exploring ways to increase education, awareness and 
        communication among public health experts, medical 
        professionals, and scientists, as well as among policy 
        makers and elected officials--to make sure more and 
        more people understand the nature and scope of the 
        biological weapons threat.
   Considering ways to improve infectious disease 
        surveillance around the globe--including rapid and 
        effective detection, investigation, and response. This 
        is a fundamental defense against any infectious disease 
        threat, whether it occurs naturally or is released 
        deliberately.
   Stimulating and supporting the scientific community 
        in its efforts to limit inappropriate access to 
        dangerous pathogens and to establish standards that 
        will help prevent the development and spread of 
        biological agents as weapons.
   And finally, NTI is searching for ways to help our 
        government and the Russian government to facilitate the 
        conversion of Russian bioweapons facilities and know-
        how to peaceful purposes, to secure biomaterials for 
        legitimate use or destruction, and to improve security 
        of dangerous pathogens worldwide.

                           Concluding Remarks

    Mr. Chairman, enemies don't normally attack us where we are 
strong; they target us where we are weak. Enemies of the United 
States are not eager to engage us militarily; they saw what 
happened in Desert Storm. They will attack us where they 
believe we are vulnerable. Today, we are vulnerable to 
biological terrorism and those who perpetuate such an act are 
not likely to be quickly identified or leave a return address. 
It is critical that we prepare with all possible speed, because 
if an attack occurs, and succeeds, there will be others. 
Preparing is deterring.
    Our first priority must be prevention. Whether the enemy 
achieves its objectives in an attack depends, to a large 
extent, on how the American people respond. Panic is as great a 
danger as disease. Some will respond like saints--doing 
whatever they can, exhibiting brave and selfless patriotism--to 
meet the needs of family and community. Others will respond 
with panic, perhaps even using violence to obtain vaccines or 
drugs, or try to protect themselves or their loved ones from 
exposure. The distance between these two is broad. How most of 
our citizens will respond will depend largely on what they hear 
from the President and their elected leaders, and how they see 
our government respond. This means we must be prepared.
    When America faced possible financial panic in March of 
1933, President Roosevelt did three things immediately upon 
taking office: he ordered the banks to close temporarily, he 
proposed emergency banking legislation, and he explained his 
plan to the public in the first of his regular national radio 
broadcasts.
    If he had not talked reassuringly to the American people, 
his plan might not have worked. But if he had talked, and had 
no plan, his talk would not have been reassuring. In the event 
of a biological weapons attack, no President, no matter how 
great his natural gifts, will be able to reassure the public 
and prevent panic unless we are better prepared than we are 
right now.
    If we are well prepared--with the ability to detect the 
disease quickly, report it swiftly, and implement the 
appropriate infection control measures, including the provision 
of necessary drugs or vaccines for all those who came in 
contact with it--then the President of the United States will 
address the American people with knowledge, with courage, and 
with confidence, and the people will respond in kind. Whether 
this or a future President will exert this essential leadership 
will depend in large part on how we all address this issue now.
    I commend the Committee for tackling such a difficult but 
important matter. Our country's protection and safety depend on 
your leadership. Thank you.
         Prepared Statement of Dr. Donald A. Henderson, MD, MPH

    Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
the realities of the threat posed by biological weapons, our 
capabilities to secure an early warning of an attack, our 
potential for response and, finally, measures that might be 
taken nationally and internationally to lessen the probability 
of an attack.
    It is generally agreed that the 21st century brings with it 
a new era in the biological sciences with advances in molecular 
biology and biotechnology that promise longer, healthier lives 
and the effective control, perhaps elimination of a host of 
acute and chronic diseases. The prospects are bright but there 
is a dark side--the possibility that infectious agents might be 
developed and produced as offensive weapons; that new or 
emergent infections, like HIV/AIDS, might overwhelm available 
preventive and therapeutic measures or that laboratory 
scientists, perhaps inadvertently, might create and release a 
new and lethal agent. These concerns are as relevant to Europe, 
to Africa, to Asia as they are to America, In today's world of 
rapid travel and large migrant populations, epidemic disease, 
wherever it occurs and of whatever origin, threatens the 
security of all nations. We are, today, ill-prepared to deal 
with these challenges.
    Throughout the 45 years of my professional career, my 
principal concern has been the control of infectious diseases 
both in the United States and abroad. My experience has 
included 20 years with the Centers for Disease Control, 
including assignments as Chief of Surveillance and Chief of the 
Epidemic Intelligence Serve; 11 years with WHO as Director of 
the Smallpox Eradication Program; and 16 years as Chairman of 
the Pan-American Health Organization's Technical Advisory Group 
which counseled PAHO experts on the design and development of 
the polio eradication program. Enormous strides in epidemic 
disease control have been made over the past quarter century 
and more is promised. Four years ago, however, it became 
apparent to me that these accomplishments and more were 
jeopardized by the growing threat of biological weapons as well 
as by new and emergent infections. This led to our founding 
three years ago of the Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense 
Studies. Our energies are directed ultimately toward preventing 
biological disasters that potentially could become global in 
scope, such as epidemic smallpox could readily be and which 
AIDS is rapidly becoming.

                   The Threat from Biological Weapons

    Nothing in the realm of natural catastrophes or man-made 
disasters rivals the complex problems of response that would 
follow a bioweapons attack against a civilian population. The 
consequence of such an attack would be an epidemic and, in this 
country, we have had little experience in coping with 
epidemics. In fact, no city has had to deal with a truly 
serious epidemic accompanied by large numbers of cases and 
deaths since the 1918 influenza epidemic, more than two 
generations ago.
    Senators Hart and Rudman, chairs of the United States 
Commission on National Security in the Twenty-first Century, 
singled out bioweapons as perhaps the greatest threat that the 
U.S. might face in the next century. Admiral Stansfield Turner 
pointed out that, besides nuclear weapons, the only other 
weapons with the capacity to take the nation past the ``point 
of non-recovery'' are the biological ones.
    The Dark Winter scenario dramatizes the catastrophic 
potential of smallpox as a weapon. It is, of course, not the 
only possible organism that might be used. In 1993, the Office 
of Technology Assessment estimated that 100 grams of anthrax 
released upwind of a large American city--the model being 
Washington, DC--could cause between 130,000 and 3 million 
deaths, depending on the weather and other variables. This 
degree of carnage is in the same range as that forecast for a 
hydrogen bomb. Although there is legitimate concern as well 
about the possible use of chemical weapons, they are far less 
effective pound for pound and extremely difficult to deploy 
over large areas. Ten grams of anthrax can produce as many 
casualties as a ton of a chemical nerve agent.
    The insidious manner by which a biological attack would 
unfold is itself alarming. The fact of an attack using an 
explosive or chemical weapon would be recognized immediately 
and resources summoned quickly to deal with the consequences 
and to begin to remediate the situation. A biological agent 
would, in all probability, be released clandestinely as an 
aerosol spray, odorless and invisible, which would drift slowly 
throughout a building or across a city. Not until days to weeks 
later would people begin to fall ill; new cases would continue 
to occur over a period of one to several weeks. Some of those 
exposed, in all likelihood, would be hundreds of miles away 
when they develop symptoms--in other cities, in other 
countries. Thus, the consequence of the attack would extend 
well beyond the immediate area of release.
    Biological weapons have not been used since WWII but this 
is not because of concern that they might not work. The U.S. 
program was abandoned in 1969 not for technical but for 
political reasons. As Gradon Carter has pointed out, the 
utility of bioweapons had been demonstrated by all possible 
means short of war. By the 1960s, the U.S. knew how to grow and 
process many microorganisms in a form usable for mass casualty 
biological weapons. Trials that modeled dispersion of simulant 
agents as aerosols were conducted in many cities and scores of 
tests with live biological agents using animals as targets were 
performed at the Johnson Atoll from 1963 to 1969. There is now 
no doubt and there was then no doubt, of the capacity of these 
weapons to cause widespread casualties. A World Health 
Organization (WHO) analysis, now 30 years old, supported the 
belief that biological weapons are strategic, population-
destroying weapons. Since then, the technology needed to create 
and disperse these weapons has advanced significantly.
    The year 1972 was a significant one in the history of 
bioweapons. That year, the Biological Weapons Convention was 
agreed upon, calling for all signatory countries to cease 
research on biological weapons and to destroy existing stocks. 
The Soviet Union and Iraq were both parties to the Convention. 
The Soviet Union, however, began immediately to greatly expand 
and modernize its existing biological weapons program and to 
develop genetically engineered pathogens and other organisms 
that could serve as strategic weapons. A new organization was 
created called Biopreparat. Ostensibly a civilian operation, it 
recruited some of the most capable of Russian biologists. At 
its peak, it employed over 30,000 persons. There was also a 
military program of at least 15,000 people and an agricultural 
program making crop pathogens that employed 10,000 people. The 
overall complement of staff was equivalent in size to that of 
its nuclear program. Biopreparat's agenda included the 
manipulation of viruses and micro-organisms to render them 
capable of surviving delivery on missile warheads; the 
development of particularly virulent strains of organisms that 
are resistant to vaccines and antibiotics; the creation of 
peptides that could alter moods and heart biorhythms; and the 
manufacture of tons of anthrax, as well as smallpox virus and 
antibiotic-resistant strains of plague.
    Although the Soviet program was of prodigious size and 
sophistication, the infrastructure that is actually necessary 
to make a biological weapon is, in fact, comparatively simple 
and inexpensive, especially compared to that required to make a 
nuclear weapon. To make one kilogram of plutonium requires 100 
tons of uranium ore; a substantial quantity of specialized 
equipment; and an enormous facility readily visible from the 
air. A biological weapon can be produced with the same 
equipment one uses to produce an ordinary vaccine; it can be 
readily housed in a building the size of a two-ear garage; 
nothing on the exterior would identify its use. Moreover, the 
room and the equipment could be sufficiently cleansed within 24 
hours so that no one, on inspection, would be able to determine 
whether it had been used to make vaccines or biological 
weapons.
    The intelligence agencies have estimated that at least a 
dozen states possess or are actively seeking an offensive 
biological weapons capacity. Most of these states are those 
named by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism. 
Expertise for operating these facilities is readily available 
from now poorly funded laboratories of the Russian biological 
weapons complex. For these countries, biological weapons have a 
special appeal. They are inexpensive, they occupy little 
volume, they are readily transportable from place to place and 
they are capable of being disseminated covertly so that 
attribution may be impossible.
    It is also important to appreciate that the technologies 
needed to build biological weapons are available in the open 
literature and on the Internet. This is not knowledge that is 
limited to a few hundred scientists isolated in a laboratory in 
the western desert. There are many scientists who have this 
knowledge and are capable of putting together a biological 
weapon. Some have argued that preparing a biological weapon is 
complicated and have been mistakenly reassured by the failure 
of Aum Shinrikyo's efforts to aerosolize anthrax throughout 
Tokyo. In fact, although the sect did include some with 
experience in microbiology, those who actually worked on the 
project were not well-trained microbiologists. Nonetheless, 
they came very close to succeeding.

               Implications of Advances in Biotechnology

    A key reason for being concerned about biological weapons 
is the remarkable progress now being made in biotechnology and 
genomics research. Bioscience is moving at a much faster pace 
than did physics in the 1950s, partly because of computers and 
the more ready accessibility of knowledge, and partly because 
of the money that is being invested by large corporations in 
the biological sciences. In 1998, the U.S. biotechnology 
industry employed 150,000 people and had a market 
capitalization of $97 billion with product sales of $13.4 
billion. Last April, the Harvard Business Review predicted that 
the ability to manipulate the genetic codes of living things 
will dwarf the business transformation propelled by the 
Internet. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the life 
sciences will be the most important technology of this century.
    But, as the understanding of molecular biology increases 
and as we develop the ability to manipulate cellular processes, 
we are also creating the tools and knowledge for building more 
powerful and more diverse weapons. When we discover why a 
particular virus or bacteria is especially virulent or why it 
has become resistant to antibiotics, we create an opening for 
building a new drug or a new vaccine. At the same time, we 
facilitate the creation of tools needed to build more virulent 
weapons.

               The Effects of a Biological Weapons Attack

    The consequences of a biological weapon attack would be an 
epidemic, most likely following an unannounced attack. In all 
probability, we would know that something had happened only 
when people started appearing in the emergency rooms and 
doctors' offices with strange maladies. Depending on the 
biological agent and its incubation period, it could be days or 
weeks after release of the organism before people first became 
ill. Identification of the cause could be problematical. 
American physicians today are not trained to diagnose illnesses 
due to the pathogens thought to be the ones most likely to be 
used as bioweapons. Few physicians have ever seen cases of 
anthrax or smallpox or pneumonic plague.
    It is difficult to imagine how the public might respond in 
today's world to a fast-moving lethal epidemic. In recent 
decades, there have been few such epidemics in industrialized 
cities. One of the more recent occurred in India in 1994. 
Plague broke out in the diamond-polishing district of Surat. It 
was reported by the media as a deadly, mysterious fever, 
possibly plague. Within hours, panic reigned. People began 
streaming from the city. Many in the medical community were 
among the first to leave. Eventually half a million fled, 
leaving the city a ghost town. It is estimated that India lost 
some two billion dollars in lost trade, embargoes, and 
production as a consequence of this outbreak. How many actually 
died of plague is still not clear but the total was not more 
than 50.
    Epidemics have the potential to spread internationally as 
we have observed with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The disease is 
contagious but it is not easily transmitted from one person to 
another. Nevertheless, it spread across the globe and is 
changing the population demographics in some African countries 
to a degree comparable to that caused by the Black Death of the 
1300s, which killed a third of the European population.

                Addressing the Biological Weapons Threat

    The status of national preparations to deal with 
bioterrorism is difficult to summarize. The diverse initiatives 
taken by different agencies of government are not well 
coordinated, even within the agencies themselves and many have 
been designed with little comprehension of what is implied for 
the civilian population when a biological weapon is used. 
Beginning in 1995, when the first Presidential Decision 
Directive was issued, preparations to respond to terrorism 
focussed almost exclusively on training and equipping ``first 
response'' teams to counter the effects of a nuclear or 
conventional explosive device or a chemical attack. Training 
programs in 120 cities were targeted to include police, fire 
and emergency rescue personnel in a ``lights and sirens'' type 
of response and special full-time units of the National Guard 
were constituted whose function is not clear but certainly have 
little to do with bioterrorism.
    Not for several years was there a beginning comprehension 
that the consequences of use of a biological weapon would be an 
epidemic and that those first detecting its presence and those 
primarily responsible for controlling the disease would be 
public health personnel and physicians. Accordingly, in most 
cities, public health, medical and hospital personnel were not 
included either in planning or training. Finally, in FY 99, 
significant funds began to be made available to the Department 
of Health and Human Services, primarily the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), whose traditional responsibility, with state and 
local health departments, has been the surveillance and control 
of infectious diseases. Some two years ago an Office dealing 
with Bioterrorism was established at CDC; modest funds began to 
be made available to the states for development of programs 
both for response and surveillance; stockpiles of antibiotics 
were procured; smallpox vaccine was ordered; and a national 
network of laboratories was established that is capable of 
diagnosing the organisms of principal concern. Unfortunately, 
little has yet been done to provide for the training of public 
health and medical professionals and hospitals remain woefully 
unprepared.

                        Current Vulnerabilities

    We are today ill-prepared to deal with an epidemic of any 
sort. There is, as yet, no comprehensive national plan nor an 
agreed strategy for dealing with the problem of biological 
weapons. There is little inter-agency coordination at the 
federal level and nationally funded programs appear to be as 
often competitive as cooperative. Particularly serious are the 
vulnerabilities in our medical health care system and our 
public health infrastructure.
Hospitals
    When Americans are seriously ill, they expect to be cared 
for in hospitals. If the hospitals became overwhelmed and were 
paralyzed by chaos, it would have serious implications for 
public morale and for the potential for containing an epidemic, 
let alone treating those who were already sick. The likelihood 
of public anxiety rising to civil disorder would rise 
substantially.
    Hospitals are under serious pressure today. Of the 5000 
hospitals in the U.S., 30% are losing money; over the last 
decade, 1000 have closed because of financial reasons. They 
face a host of regulatory issues including those dealing with 
health insurance portability, safer needles, medical and 
medication error reduction, limits on medical device reuse, 
ergonomic standards for employees, requirements for patient 
restraints and seclusion, and many more. At the same time, the 
numbers of the uninsured are increasing and the population is 
aging and in need of more medical services. The hospitals have 
struggled to become ever more efficient but, in their quest to 
eliminate inefficiencies, they have basically wiped out their 
surge capacity. Even minor increases in patient demand, such as 
that of the 1999 brief and mild flu season strained most 
hospitals.
    This lack of elasticity is also seen in the pharmaceutical 
field as companies have focussed on just-in-time production and 
delivery. The result is that reserve supplies are few and 
temporary problems in production are regularly manifested in 
country-wide spot shortages of such as antibiotics and other 
critical drugs.
    There is an increasing shortage of emergency rooms what 
with the loss of a thousand hospitals in the past decade and a 
desire on the part of hospitals to close ERs, if possible, 
because of their drain on resources. The amount of time that 
Baltimore's hospitals have been on ``diversion'' of ambulances 
because of over crowding has doubled every year for the past 
three years. Ventilators to aid respiration are in short 
supply. Baltimore, home to two major medical centers and 
medical schools, could not handle an acute situation that 
produced as many as 50 casualties requiring ventilators. A 
handful of highly contagious patients would cause havoc, there 
being in the Baltimore-Washington area, no more than 100 beds 
in negative pressure rooms that could handle highly contagious 
patients.
    However, the most intractable problem for hospitals is 
likely to be staffing. As we have been told, only half of all 
nurses work in hospitals and the average age of a nurse in 
America is 53. More are now retiring than are being recruited 
to the field. Hospital administrators report that, even if they 
had more open beds, they doubt that they would have staff to 
care for the patients.
The Public Health System
    The public health system is in even worse shape. Public 
health is a long-neglected stepchild to modern medicine. It is 
a sector that has been understaffed and under funded for 
several decades.
    It is believed that, in most states, there is ample 
authority for public health officials to respond aggressively 
and effectively to protect the public health. However, many of 
the relevant laws were written between the time of the Civil 
War and the 1930s. A more critical problem is knowing what to 
do and how to do it. With sharp reductions in the number of 
cases of the major infectious diseases, processes and knowledge 
about when and how to use quarantine and isolation procedures, 
how to organize large scale vaccination programs and how to 
communicate effectively with a concerned public have been lost.
    A major problem is that there really is no public health 
``system'' for dealing with infectious diseases in this 
country, but, rather, a fragmented pattern of activities. The 
federal system, which for the most part is in the federal 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is itself comprised 
of a number of Centers and activities that are themselves 
independent fiefdoms. State and local health departments 
reflect a similar pattern and there is a major disconnect 
between the public health and medicine. Doctors rarely 
communicate with local public health officials and often, when 
they try to do so, they find no one with needed competence. In 
New York City, a city with one of the best public health 
departments in the country, the report of two eases of 
encephalitis to the health department led to the unraveling of 
the West Nile epidemic. This was a laudable and important 
response. However, it was later discovered that at the time the 
first two cases were reported, there were 20 other patients 
already hospitalized with encephalitis, a clearly recognizable 
and legally reportable disease.
    In most areas, public health is not treated as an emergency 
service as are police, fire and utilities. The concept of a 24 
hour per day, 7 day per week ``hot line'' is little known. Yet, 
public health officials will be the ones who will be obliged to 
organize a response to an epidemic, to communicate with the 
public and to orchestrate a city and state's response resources

                        Increasing Preparedness

    What can be done to diminish our vulnerability to 
bioweapons.
    First, we have got to better prepare our public health and 
medical care services to respond to outbreaks and epidemics and 
to mass casualty situations whatever their origin. They are at 
the core of any response and yet, only recently have they even 
begun to be involved in the necessary planning and training 
activities. Significant resources will be required for this 
purpose, perhaps one billion dollars per year or more. Although 
a large sum, this would represent less than 10% of government 
expenditures for counter-terrorist activities. This investment, 
however, would serve a far broader utility than bioterroism 
alone.
    Second, we need to mount a robust research and development 
program for bio-defense. It would seem logical for this to be a 
joint DOD-DHHS effort. We need to engage the genius of the 
universities, the pharmaceutical firms and the biotechnology 
companies, few of whom are now involved. The bioscience 
community does not have a history of engagement with defense 
projects and, by and large, they have not been eager to work 
with government in this field. For this to happen will require 
inventive structures and incentives. Three areas of research 
and development would be especially important: (1) More 
definitive, rapid, automated means of diagnosing major 
pathogens, basically building microchips that could identify 
specific pathogens by deciphering the molecular genomes. (2) 
Mechanisms for being able to rapidly develop and produce new 
antibiotics and antiviral drugs for new and emergent diseases. 
(3) Mechanisms for enhancing the immune response generally, so 
as to get beyond the one organism-one drug approach.
    Third, public health has to identify those critical 
capacities that are needed to fight epidemics of contagious 
disease. These include surveillance and reporting systems, 
particularly the ability to track an epidemic once it occurs. 
But what we must do, even in normal times, is to track 
outbreaks once they arc identified. Communications systems that 
connect health care providers and the public health system are 
critical.
    Fourth, in cooperation with WHO and other countries, we 
need to strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering 
capability. A focus on international surveillance and on 
scientist-to-scientist communication will be necessary if we 
are to have an early warning about the possible development and 
production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups 
and, likewise, to have the earliest possible warning and 
longest possible lead time to develop drugs and vaccines to 
deal with new or emergent organisms.
    Fifth, a concerted effort by the medical, public health 
and, broadly, the biological sciences community to condemn 
participation in research or development of biological weapons 
is clearly indicated. Such a response would provide no certain 
guarantees that misbehavior would not occur but then, there is 
as yet no other satisfactory deterrent to deal with these 
troublesome weapons.

                                Summary

    Biological weapons are a significant threat, and because of 
the rapidly growing power of biotechnology and biological 
knowledge, the urgency and the diversity of this threat will 
only increase. The nature of biological weapons and the 
epidemics that they could create is such that preventing them 
will be far more challenging than preventing the catastrophic 
use of chemical or nuclear weapons. It is going to be hard to 
detect biological weapons production facilities, it is going to 
be hard to track the weapons before they are used, and it is 
going to be very hard to interdict them before they are 
released.
    If we do nothing more than strengthen the public health and 
medical care systems, we can significantly decrease the 
suffering and death that would follow a bioweapons attack. By 
being able to mitigate the consequences of such an attack, we 
can make ourselves less attractive targets to would-be 
perpetrators. As important, we could improve the everyday 
functioning of the health care and the public health system for 
the general good.
=======================================================================

                  REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW
                   BOARDS ON THE EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN

                       NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM

                  Chairman: Admiral William Crowe, Jr.

                              January 1999

=======================================================================

      
               Report of the Accountability Review Boards

                              ----------                              

                             Board Members

                   Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman

                                ------                                

                             Nairobi Board

                        Amb. Michael H. Armacost

                       Amb. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.

                           Dr. Janne E. Nolan

                         Mr. Arthur W. Donahue

               Amb. Richard C. Brown--Executive Secretary

                                ------                                

                          Dar Es Salaam Board

                         Amb. Terence A. Todman

                            Mr. David Busby

                           Dr. Lynn E. Davis

                        Mr. Montgomery L. Rogers

               Mr. Kenneth R. McKune--Executive Secretary
 Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in 
                Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam--January 1999

                              ----------                              

                           Executive Overview

    The near simultaneous vehicular bombings of the US 
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya. and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, on 
August 7, 1998. were terrorist incidents costing the lives of 
over 220 persons and wounding more than 4,000 others. Twelve 
American USG employees and family members, and 32 Kenyan and 8 
Tanzanian USO employees, were among those killed. Both 
chanceries withstood collapse from the bombings, but were 
rendered unusable, and several adjacent buildings were severely 
damaged or destroyed. In examining the circumstances of these 
two bombings, the Accountability Review Boards for Nairobi and 
Dar Es Salaam determined that:
    1. The terrorists intended to destroy the chanceries; to 
kill or injure US Government employees and others in the 
chanceries; and to damage US prestige, morale, and diplomacy. 
Thus, according to P.L. 99-399, the incidents were security 
related.
    2. The security systems and procedures for physical 
security at the embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam as a 
general matter met and, in some cases, exceeded the systems and 
procedures prescribed by the Department of State for posts 
designated at the medium or low threat levels. However, these 
standard requirements had not sufficiently anticipated the 
threat of large vehicular bomb attacks and were inadequate to 
protect against such attacks.
    The Department of State, in fact, does not apply its 
security standards fully. For far too many* (Note: Passages 
here and elsewhere in this document marked with an asterisk (*) 
indicate more details can be found in the classified version of 
the report.) of its overseas facilities it implements them only 
``to the maximum extent feasible,'' applying ``risk 
management.'' For example, neither the chancery in Nairobi nor 
in Dar Es Salaam met the Department's standard for a 100 ft. 
(3Om) setback/standoff zone. Both were ``existing office 
buildings'' occupied before this standard was adopted; so a 
general exception was made. The widespread use of such 
exceptions worldwide with respect to setback and other non-
feasible security standards reflects the reality of not having 
adequate funds to replace all sub-standard buildings within a 
short period of time. Thus in the interim before Inman 
buildings could be constructed, exceptions were granted. In 
light of the August 7 bombings, these general exceptions to the 
setback requirement in particular mask a dangerous level of 
exposure to similar attacks elsewhere.
    3. The security systems and procedures relating to actions 
taken at Embassies Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam were, for the most 
part, properly implemented. In Nairobi, the suicide bomber 
failed in his attempt to penetrate the embassy's outer 
perimeter, thanks to the refusal of local guards to open the 
gates. In Dar Es Salaam, the suicide bomber likewise failed to 
penetrate the perimeter, apparently stopped by guards and 
blocked by an embassy water truck.
    However, neither post's Emergency Action Plan anticipated a 
car bomb scenario. Nor were there explicit Department 
requirements for dealing with such contingencies in EAP 
worldwide guidelines, despite clear Inman Report 
recommendations. While car bombs are often immediately preceded 
by some types of as was the case in Nairobi, personnel Side 
embassies are not trained to react properly, nor do perimeter 
guards have appropriate equipment
    4. There was no credible intelligence that provided 
immediate or tactical warning of the August 7 bombings.

   A number of earlier intelligence reports cited 
        alleged threats against several U.S. diplomatic and 
        other targets, including the embassies in Nairobi and 
        Dar Es Salaam. All of these reports were disseminated 
        to the intelligence community and to appropriate posts 
        abroad, but were largely discounted because of doubts 
        about the sources. Other reporting--while taken 
        seriously--was imprecise, changing and non-specific as 
        to dates, diminishing its usefulness. Additionally, 
        actions taken by intelligence and law enforcement 
        authorities to confront suspect terrorist groups 
        including the Al-Haramayn non-governmental organization 
        and the Usama Bin Laden (UBL) organization in Nairobi, 
        were believed to have dissipated the alleged threats. 
        Indeed, for eight months prior to the August 7 
        bombings, no further intelligence was produced to warn 
        the embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.*
   The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
        investigation of the bombings is still underway but, 
        thus far, has uncovered no information indicating that 
        the earlier intelligence reporting could have predicted 
        the time or place of the attacks. Information from FBI 
        and intelligence sources could yet be developed, 
        however, to implicate some of the individuals or groups 
        cited in the earlier intelligence reporting, or more 
        likely, to further amplify understanding of the UBL 
        organization's role in the bombings.

    5. The Boards found that both the intelligence and policy 
communities relied excessively on tactical intelligence to 
determine the level of potential terrorist threats to posts 
worldwide. The Inman Report noted and previous experience 
indicates that terrorist attacks are often not preceded by 
warning intelligence. The establishment of the Counter 
Terrorism Center with an inter-agency team of officers has 
produced tactical intelligence that has enabled the US to 
thwart a number of terrorist threats.* But we cannot count on 
having such intelligence to warn us of such attacks.
    6. The Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that 
any employee of the United States Government or member of the 
uniformed services was culpable of dereliction of his or her 
duties in connection with the August 7 bombings. The Boards did 
find, however, an institutional failure of the Department of 
State and embassies under its direction to recognize threats 
posed by transnational terrorism and vehicle bombs worldwide. 
Policy-makers and operational officers were remiss in not 
preparing more comprehensive procedures to guard against 
massive truck bombs. This combined with lack of resources for 
building more secure facilities created the ingredients for a 
deadly disaster. Responsibility for obtaining adequate 
resources for security programs is widely dispersed throughout 
the US government as is decision making for determining 
security policies and procedures. No one person or office is 
accountable for decisions on security policies, procedures and 
resources. Ambassadors who are specifically charged with 
responsibility for the security of US diplomatic personnel 
assigned to their posts lack adequate authority and resources 
to carry out this responsibility.
    7. The Boards were especially disturbed by the collective 
failure of the US government over the past decade to provide 
adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of US diplomatic 
missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the 
world. Responsibility for this failure can be attributed to 
several Administrations and their agencies, including the 
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the 
Office of Management and Budget, as well as the US Congress.
    8. The US response to the August bombings was resourceful 
and often heroic. However, in the absence of significant 
training and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties 
and major destruction from terrorist bombs, the response was 
occasionally chaotic and marred by a host of planning and 
logistical failures, especially in the area of military 
transportation. The Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FESTs) 
arrived in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam about 40 hours after the 
bombings, having experienced delays of 13 hours. There was 
disjointed liaison between the State Department, as the lead 
agency, and the Defense Department, FBI and other agencies. The 
personnel selection of the FESTs was ad hoc and not ideal. 
Medical and other emergency equipment was not always ready and 
available for shipment.
    9. In the wake of these two terrorist acts, the Department 
of State and other US government organizations focused quickly 
on the lessons learned. They immediately reviewed the 
vulnerabilities of our embassies and missions abroad and took 
steps to strengthen perimeter security at all posts, to re-
prioritize the construction and upgrades necessary to bring our 
overseas US facilities up to what are referred to as ``Inman 
standards,'' and Congress appropriated over $1 billion in 
supplemental funds.
    10. This is only the first step in what is required to 
provide for the security of Americans in embassies overseas. We 
must undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy for 
protecting American officials overseas, including sustained 
funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for 
increased security personnel, and for a capital building 
program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new 
range of global terrorist threats. This must include 
substantial budgetary appropriations of approximately $1.4 
billion per year maintained over an approximate ten-year 
period, in addition to savings from the closure of overseas 
installations where increased capital and security costs 
outweigh the magnitude of overall US interests. Additional 
funds for security must be obtained without diverting funds 
from our major foreign affairs programs.
Key Recommendations
    The 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic and Anti-Terrorism Act 
established the legal basis for the Accountability Review Board 
and specifically requires that acts of terrorism against US 
diplomatic installations abroad, wherein the loss of life or 
significant property damage occurs, be investigated with a 
view, among other factors, toward determining whether security 
systems and procedures were adequate and were implemented. 
After addressing these issues in this report, the Boards will 
propose and elaborate on a number. of recommendations aimed at 
improving security systems and procedures. We provide a listing 
of the recommendations below.* The bulk of them are 
necessitated by the use of large vehicular bombs, a threat that 
has not been fully appreciated in recent years. The first 15 
recommendations deal with adjustments in systems and procedures 
to enhance security of the work place. The final six 
recommendations address how to improve crisis management 
systems and procedures. All are directed toward achieving the 
objective of saving lives. They are urgent and need to be acted 
upon immediately. No single measure will accomplish the 
objective but, taken together, they should substantially 
improve the security for US personnel serving abroad.
    Three additional recommendations deal with intelligence and 
information availability, matters the Boards are also enjoined 
to address under the law.* (Details and rationale for all of 
the recommendations are contained in the classified version of 
the report.)

              I. Improving Security Systems and Procedures

            A. Work Place Security Enhancements
    1. Emergency Action Plans for all posts should be revised 
to provide a ``special alarm signal'' for Large exterior bombs 
and duck-and-cover practice drills in order to reduce 
casualties from vehicular bombs. Special equipment should be 
provided to perimeter guards.*
    2. Given the worldwide threat of transnational terrorism 
which uses a wide range of lethal weapons, including vehicle 
bombs, every post should be treated as a potential target and 
the Department of State's Physical Security Standards and 
policies should be revised to reflect this new reality.
    3. For those US diplomatic buildings abroad not meeting 
Inman standards, essential physical security upgrades should be 
made immediately and should include a number of specific 
measures involving perimeters and counter-surveillance.*
    4. The Secretary of State should personally review the 
security situation of embassy chanceries and other official 
premises, closing those which are highly vulnerable and 
threatened but for which adequate security enhancements cannot 
be provided, and seek new secure premises for permanent use, or 
temporary occupancy, pending construction of new buildings.
    5. Demarches to all governments with whom we have relations 
should be made regularly to remind them of their obligation to 
provide security support for our embassies. For those 
governments whose police forces need additional training to 
enable them to provide more adequate protection, the Department 
should provide training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) program. The Department should also explore ways to 
provide any necessary equipment to host governments to upgrade 
their ability to provide adequate protection. Failure by a host 
government to honor its obligations should trigger an immediate 
review of whether a post should be closed.
    6. The Department of State should radically reformulate and 
revise the ``Composite Threat List'' and, as a part of this 
effort, should create a category exclusively for terrorism with 
criteria that places more weight on transnational terrorism. 
Rating the vulnerability of facilities must include factors 
relating to the physical security environment, as well as 
certain host governmental and cultural realities.* These 
criteria need to be reviewed frequently and all elements of the 
intelligence community should play an active role in 
formulating the list. The list's name should be changed to 
reflect its dual purpose of prioritizing resource allocation 
and establishing security readiness postures.
    7. The Department of State should increase the number of 
posts with full time Regional Security Officers, seeking 
coverage of as many chanceries as possible. The Department 
should also work with the Marine Corps to augment the number of 
Marine Security Guard Detachments to provide coverage to a 
larger number of US diplomatic missions.
    8. The Department of State should provide all Regional 
Security Officers comprehensive training on terrorism, 
terrorist methods of operation, explosive devices, explosive 
effects, and other terrorist weapons to include weapons of mass 
destruction such as truck bombs, nuclear devices and chemical/
biological weapons.*
    9. The Department of State should define the role and 
functions of each of the US embassies abroad for the coming 
decade with a view toward exploiting technology more fully, 
improving their efficiency, ensuring their security, and 
reducing their overall cost. The Department should look 
specifically at reducing the number of diplomatic missions by 
establishing regional embassies located in less threatened and 
vulnerable countries with Ambassadors accredited to several 
governments.
    10. The physical security standards specified in the State 
Department's Security Standards and Policy Handbook should be 
reviewed on a priority basis and revised as necessary in light 
of the August 7 and other large bombings against US 
installations.
    11. When building new chanceries abroad, all US government 
agencies, with rare exceptions, should be located in the same 
compound.
    12. The Department of State should work within the 
Administration and with Congress to obtain sufficient funding 
for capital building programs and for security operations and 
personnel over the coming decade (estimated at $1.4 billion per 
year for the next 10 years), while ensuring that this funding 
should not come at the expense of other critical foreign 
affairs programs and operations. A failure to do so will 
jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit 
America's ability to protect and promote its interests around 
the world.
    13. First and foremost, the Secretary of State should take 
a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility 
of ensuring the security of US diplomatic personnel abroad. It 
is essential to convey to the entire Department that security 
is one of the highest priorities. In the process, the Secretary 
should reexamine the present organizational structure with the 
objective of clarifying responsibilities, encouraging better 
coordination, and assuring that a single high-ranking officer 
is accountable for all protective security matters and has the 
authority necessary to coordinate on the Secretary's behalf 
such activities within the Department of State and with all 
foreign affairs USG agencies.
    14. The Department of State should expand its effort to 
build public support for increased resources for foreign 
affairs, and to add emphasis on the need to protect US 
representatives abroad from terrorism, without sacrificing 
other important foreign policy programs.
    15. The Department of State, in coordination with the 
intelligence community, should advise all posts concerning 
potential threats of terrorist attacks from the use of 
chemical, biological or nuclear materials, should establish 
means of defending against and minimizing the effect of such 
attacks through security measures and the revision of EAP 
procedures and exercises, and should provide appropriate 
equipment, medical supplies, and first responder training.
            B. Better Crisis Management Systems and Procedures
    1. Crisis management training for mass casualty and mass 
destruction incidents should be provided to Department of State 
personnel in Washington to improve Task Force operations to 
assure a cadre of crisis managers.
    2. A revitalized program for on-site crisis management 
training at posts abroad should be funded, developed, expanded, 
and maintained.
    3. The FEST should create and exercise a team and equipment 
package configured to assist in post blast crises involving 
major casualties and physical damage (while maintaining the 
package now deployed for differing counter terrorism missions). 
Such a new configuration should include personnel to assist in 
medical relief, public affairs, engineering and building 
safety.
    4. A modern, reliable, air-refuelable FEST aircraft with 
enhanced seating and cargo capacity to respond to a variety of 
counter terrorism and emergency missions should be acquired 
urgently for the Department of State. Clearly defined 
arrangements for a backup aircraft are also needed.
    5. The Department of State should work closely with the 
Department of Defense to improve procedures in mobilizing 
aircraft and adequate crews to provide more rapid, effective 
assistance in times of emergency, especially in medical 
evacuations resulting from mass casualty situations. The 
Department of State should explore as well, chartering 
commercial aircraft to transport personnel and equipment to 
emergency sites, if necessary to supplement Department of 
Defense aircraft.
    6. The Department of State should ensure that all posts 
have emergency communications equipment, basic excavation 
tools, medical supplies, emergency documents, next of kin 
records, and other safety equipment stored at secure off-site 
locations in anticipation of mass destruction of embassy 
facilities and heavy US casualties.

                    II. Intelligence and Information

    1. In order to enhance the flow of intelligence that 
relates to terrorism and security, all such intelligence should 
normally be disseminated to concerned levels of the policy and 
analytic community; compartmentalization of such information 
should be limited to extraordinary situations where there is a 
clear national security need for limited dissemination;
    2. The Department of State should assign a qualified 
official to the DCI's Counter Terrorism Center; and
    3. The FBI and the Department of State should consult on 
ways to improve information sharing on international terrorism 
to ensure that all relevant information that might have some 
bearing on threats against or security for US missions or 
personnel abroad is made available.*
=======================================================================

   First and Second Annual Reports to the President and the Congress

                                 of the

                   ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC

                  RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM

                 INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                        I. ASSESSING THE THREAT

                             December 1999

         II. TOWARD A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

                             December 2000

=======================================================================

      
                        Panel Chair and Members

                              ----------                              

                     Project Director: Mike Wermuth

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Name and Affiliation                      Expertise
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III,     State perspective
 Governor of the Commonwealth of
 Virginia, Chair
James Clapper, Jr. (Lieutenant General,  Intelligence
 U.S. Air Force, Retired), Private
 Consultant, and Former Director,
 Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice
 Chair
L. Paul Bremer, Private Consultant, and  Terrorism, counterterrorism
 Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-
 Terrorism, U.S. Department of State
Raymond Downey, Commander, Special       Emergency response--local
 Operations, City of New York Fire
 Department
George Foresman, Deputy State            Emergency response--state
 Coordinator, Department of Emergency
 Management, Commonwealth of Virginia
William Garrison (Major General, U.S.    Special operations
 Army, Retired), Private Consultant,
 and Former Commander, U.S. Army
 Special Operations Command's Delta
 Force
Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator,          Emergency response--state
 Emergency Management Division,
 Department of Public Defense, State of
 Iowa, and President, National
 Emergency Management Association
James Greenleaf, Independent             Law enforcement--federal
 Consultant, and Former Associate
 Deputy for Administration, Federal
 Bureau of Investigation
Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate           Emergency response--local
 Executive, and Chief of Fire and
 Rescue Services, King of Prussia,
 Pennsylvania
William Dallas Jones, Director, Office   Emergency response--state
 of Emergency Services, State of
 California
Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President,      Emergency response--local
 National Association of Emergency
 Medical Technicians, and Deputy Chief/
 Paramedic, City of New York Fire
 Department, EMSC
John O. Marsh, Jr., Attorney at Law,     Interagency coordination and
 and former Secretary of the Army         legal aspects
Kathleen O'Brien, City Coordinator,      Local perspective
 City of Minneapolis, Minnesota
M. Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., Medical      Health--state
 Director/State Epidemiologist,
 Department of Public Health, State of
 Iowa
Patrick Ralston, Executive Director,     Emergency response--state
 Indiana State Emergency Management
 Agency; Executive Director, Department
 of Fire and Building Services; and
 Executive Director, Public Safety
 Training Institute, State of Indiana
William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S.   NGOs
 Army, Retired), Former Senior Vice
 President of Operations, American Red
 Cross
Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of Police,    Law enforcement--local,
 Richmond, California                     terrorism
Kenneth Shine, M.D., President,          Health--federal
 Institute of Medicine, National
 Academy of Sciences
Hubert Williams, President, The Police   Law enforcement and civil
 Foundation                               liberties
Ellen Embry, U.S. Department of Defense
 Representative
------------------------------------------------------------------------

 First Annual Report to The President and The Congress--Assessing the 
                                 Threat

                              ----------                              

                           Executive Summary

    The possibility that terrorists will use ``weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)'' \6\ in this country to kill and injure 
Americans, including those responsible for protecting and 
saving lives, presents a genuine threat to the United States. 
As we stand on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the 
stark reality is that the face and character of terrorism are 
changing and that previous beliefs about the restraint on 
terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (CBRN) devices may be disappearing. Beyond the 
potential loss of life and the infliction of wanton casualties, 
and the structural or environmental damage that might result 
from such an attack, our civil liberties, our economy, and 
indeed our democratic ideals could also be threatened. The 
challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing 
that, to be able to detect and interdict terrorists before they 
strike. Should an attack occur, we must be confident that 
local, state, and Federal authorities are well prepared to 
respond and to address the consequences of the entire spectrum 
of violent acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ For reasons of clarity and precision, the report uses the term 
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism, in 
preference to the more commonly used, yet potentially misleading term, 
``weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent years, efforts have clearly been focused on more 
preparations for such attacks. The bombings of the World Trade 
Center in New York and Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, coupled with the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in 
Tokyo and the U.S. embassy bombings this past summer, have 
heightened American concern and have already prompted an array 
of responses across all levels of government. At the same time, 
the country's seeming inability to develop and implement a 
clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic 
preparedness strategy means that we may still remain 
fundamentally incapable of responding effectively to a serious 
terrorist attack.
    The vast array of CBRN weapons conceivably available to 
terrorists today can be used against humans, animals, crops, 
the environment, and physical structures in many different 
ways. The complexity of these CBRN terrorist threats, and the 
variety of contingencies and critical responses that they 
suggest, requires us to ensure that preparedness efforts are 
carefully planned, implemented, and sustained among all 
potential responders, with all levels of government operating 
as partners. These threats, moreover, will require new ways of 
thinking throughout the entire spectrum of local, state, and 
Federal agencies. Effecting true change in the culture of a 
single government agency, much less achieving fundamental 
changes throughout and among all three, presents formidable 
hurdles. Nonetheless, the nature of these threats and their 
potential consequences demands the full commitment of officials 
at all levels to achieve these goals. Indeed, the need to 
ensure that a strategic national vision regarding domestic 
preparedness is in place, so that the country is better able to 
counter these threats and to respond effectively to the 
challenges that they present, is among the reasons that this 
congressionally mandated Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction was established.
    The enabling legislation\7\ directs the Panel to assess 
Federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness, the progress 
of Federal training programs for local emergency responses, and 
deficiencies in Federal programs for response to terrorist 
incidents involving WMD; to recommend strategies for ensuring 
effective coordination of Federal agency response efforts and 
for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for 
WMD terrorism incidents; and to assess appropriate state and 
local funding for response to WMD terrorism.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (HR. 3616. 105th Congress, 2nd 
Session) (October 17, 1998).
    \8\ For purposes of the Panel's activities and recommendations, it 
has included the state level within the scope of its mandate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To meet those objectives, the Panel determined that it must 
first understand the full range of potential CBRN threats from 
terrorists, based on the belief that without a fundamental 
understanding of the threats, preparedness efforts by Federal, 
state, and local entities could be misguided, uncoordinated, 
and wasteful.
    The Panel's analysis of such threats points out that CBRN 
terrorism has emerged as a U.S. national security concern for 
several reasons:

   There has been a trend toward increased lethality in 
        terrorism in the past decade.
   There is an increasing focus on the apparent dangers 
        posed by potential CBRN terrorism.
   Terrorists may now feel less constrained to use a 
        CBRN device in an attempt to cause mass casualties, 
        especially following the precedent-setting attack in 
        1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo.

    The reasons terrorists may perpetrate a WMD attack include 
a desire to kill as many people as possible as a means ``to 
annihilate their enemies,'' to instill fear and panic to 
undermine a governmental regime, to create a means of 
negotiating from a position of unsurpassed strength, or to 
cause great social and economic impact.
    Given any of those potential motives, the report identifies 
the ``most likely terrorists groups'' to use CBRN as 
fundamentalist or apocalyptic religious organizations, cults, 
and extreme single-issue groups but suggests that such a group 
may resort to a smaller-scale attack to achieve its goal. The 
analysis, however, indicates two additional possibilities:

   A terrorist attack against an agricultural base.
   A terrorist use of a CBRN device with the assistance 
        of state sponsorship.

    In the latter case, nevertheless, the Panel concludes that 
several reasons work against state sponsorship, including the 
prospect of significant reprisals by the United States against 
the state sponsor, the potential inability of the state sponsor 
to control its surrogate, and the prospect that the surrogate 
cannot be trusted, even to the point of using the weapon 
against its sponsor.
    The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for 
the entire spectrum of potential terrorist threats--both the 
unprecedented higher-consequence attack, as well as the 
historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist 
attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near 
term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of 
the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon of 
choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale CBRN or 
conventional, any such lower-consequence event--at least in 
terms of casualties or destruction--could, nevertheless, 
accomplish one or more terrorist objectives: exhausting 
response capabilities, instilling fear, undermining government 
credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the government. 
With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced 
approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be 
considered, but that increasing attention must now also be paid 
to the historically more frequent, more probable, lesser-
consequence attack, especially in terms of policy implications 
for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources, to 
optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on 
preparing for an event potentially affecting thousands or tens 
of thousands may result in a smaller, but nevertheless lethal 
attack involving dozens failing to receive an appropriate 
response in the first critical minutes and hours.
    While noting that the technology currently exists that 
would allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN 
weapons, the report also describes the current difficulties in 
acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling, testing, 
transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the 
capability to cause ``mass casualties.'' Those difficulties 
include the requirement, in almost all cases, for highly 
knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources, 
obtainable but fairly sophisticated production facilities and 
equipment, quality control and testing, and special handling. 
In many cases, the personnel of a terrorist organization run 
high personal safety risks, in producing, handling, testing, 
and delivering such a device. Moreover, the report notes, the 
more sophisticated a device, or the more personnel, equipment, 
facilities, and the like involved, the greater the risk that 
the enterprise will expose itself to detection and interdiction 
by intelligence and law enforcement agencies--particularly in 
light of the increasing attention focused on terrorism today.
    The report explains, with some specificity, the challenges 
involved in each of the four device or agent topic areas--
biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological--which suggests 
that some public pronouncements and media depictions about the 
ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction 
or inflict widespread casualties do not always reflect the 
significant hurdles currently confronting any nonstate entity 
seeking to employ such weapons. The report acknowledges, 
nevertheless, that the situation now facing a terrorist could 
change dramatically because of new discoveries, further 
advances in technology, or other material factors. No matter 
how difficult or improbable such higher-consequence incidents 
may be, prudence requires that appropriate steps be taken 
across the broad spectrum of terrorist threats to deter, 
prevent, or interdict a terrorist attack before it occurs or 
failing that, to respond in a way that will--first and 
foremost--minimize human casualties and also mitigate damage to 
property and to the environment.
    Part of the report focuses on the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo nerve 
gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which marked the first time 
that a nonstate group had used a chemical weapon against 
civilians. The conventional wisdom--that terrorists were not 
interested in killing, but rather in publicity, or were 
concerned about a loss of popular support or international 
recognition--has increasingly been called into question, not 
only by the Aum event but also by others, such as the World 
Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings.
    Nevertheless, Chapter Three, which chronicles Aum's 
attempts to develop a variety of lethal agents or devices, 
indicates that, despite Aum's considerable resources and the 
superior technical expertise and state-of-the-art equipment and 
facilities at its disposal, the group could not effect a truly 
successful chemical or biological attack. The lesson of Aum is 
that any nonstate entity faces organizational and significant 
technological difficulties and other hurdles in attempting to 
weaponize and deliver chemical and biological weapons, arguably 
providing a refutation of the suggestion voiced with increasing 
frequency about the ease with which such weapons can be made 
and used.
    The report contains several conclusions and 
recommendations, as a result of the threat analysis and other 
information provided to the Panel and the collective expertise 
and experience of its members:

   The conclusion that the United States needs to have 
        a viable national strategy to guide the development of 
        clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national 
        domestic preparedness plans to combat terrorism, one 
        that recognizes that the Federal role will be defined 
        by the nature and severity of the incident but will 
        generally be supportive of state and local authorities, 
        who traditionally have the fundamental responsibility 
        for response, and the recommendation for promulgation 
        of a national-level strategy, with a ``bottom-up'' 
        perspective--a strategy that clearly delineates and 
        distinguishes Federal, state, and local roles and 
        responsibilities and articulates clear direction for 
        Federal priorities and programs to support local 
        responders; \9\ and a comprehensive, parallel public 
        education effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The Panel has chosen to use ``local responders''--as opposed to 
``first responders''--to characterize those persons and entities that 
are most likely to be involved in the early stages following a 
terrorist attack. That characterization includes not only law 
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical technicians, emergency 
management personnel, and others who may be required to respond to the 
``scene'' of an incident, but also other medical and public health 
personnel who may be required to provide their services in the 
immediate aftermath of an attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The conclusion that initial and continuing, 
        comprehensive and articulate assessments of potential, 
        credible, terrorist threats within the United States, 
        and the ensuing risk and vulnerability assessments are 
        critical for policymakers and the recommendation that 
        more attention be paid to assessments of the higher-
        probability/lower-consequence threats--not at the 
        expense of, but in addition to, assessments of the 
        lower-probability/higher-consequence threats.
   The conclusion that the complex nature of current 
        Federal organizations and programs makes it very 
        difficult for state and local authorities to obtain 
        Federal information, assistance, funding, and support; 
        that a Federal focal point and ``clearinghouse'' for 
        related preparedness information and for directing 
        state and local entities to appropriate Federal 
        agencies, is needed; and that the concept behind the 
        National Domestic Preparedness Office is fundamentally 
        sound.
   The conclusion that congressional decisions for 
        authority and funding to address the issue appear to be 
        uncoordinated, and the recommendation that Congress 
        consider forming an ad hoc Joint Special or Select 
        Committee, to provide more efficiency and effectiveness 
        in Federal efforts.
   The conclusion that much more needs to be and can be 
        done to obtain and share information on potential 
        terrorist threats at all levels of government, to 
        provide more effective deterrence, prevention, 
        interdiction, or response, using modern information 
        technology.
   The conclusion that many definitions and terms in 
        this arena are ambiguous or confusing (e.g., ``weapons 
        of mass destruction'' and ``mass casualties''), and the 
        recommendation that there be a revision and 
        codification of universal and easily understood terms.
   The conclusion that national standards for 
        responders at all levels, particularly for planning, 
        training, and equipment, are critical, and the 
        recommendation that more emphasis be placed on 
        research, development, testing, and evaluation in the 
        adoption of such standards.
   The conclusion that, despite recent improvements, 
        too much ambiguity remains about the issue of ``who's 
        in charge'' if an incident occurs, and the 
        recommendation that efforts be accelerated to develop 
        and to test agreed-on templates for command and control 
        under a wide variety of terrorist threat scenarios.

    The report concludes with an overview of the activities of 
the Panel being undertaken in the current fiscal year:

   A comprehensive review of related Federal programs, 
        placing emphasis on training; communications; 
        equipment; planning requirements; the needs of maritime 
        regions; coordination among the various levels of 
        government; the effectiveness of the structure of 
        military organizations for responses across a broad 
        spectrum of potential threats; and research, 
        development, testing, and evaluation.
   A survey of local and state emergency management and 
        response officials to elicit their views on the 
        efficacy of current Federal programs, particularly in 
        the areas of training, equipment, planning, 
        communications, and Federal agency coordination among 
        the various levels of government.
   Interviews with a number of related Federal, state, 
        and local officials to obtain more detailed information 
        on their views of current Federal programs and 
        activities and their specific proposals or 
        recommendations to improve or enhance Federal efforts.
   Case studies of jurisdictions where such events have 
        occurred or have been threatened, to review and analyze 
        lessons learned from the full range of elements and 
        issues involved in each specific plan or actual 
        response.
   An analysis of the status of existing or the 
        development of appropriate standards in the areas of 
        training for responders at all levels, equipment, 
        notification procedures, communications, and planning.
   Consideration of cyber terrorism issue in the future 
        work of the Panel.
   Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress--Toward a 
               National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

                              ----------                              

                           Executive Summary

    We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents 
in this country--however tragic--have occurred so rarely that 
the foundations of our society or our form of government have 
not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist 
attacks inside the borders of the United States is a serious 
emerging threat. There is no guarantee that our comparatively 
secure domestic sanctuary will always remain so. Because the 
stakes are so high, our nation's leaders must take seriously 
the possibility of an escalation of terrorist violence against 
the homeland.
    The continuing challenge for the United States is first to 
deter and, failing that, to detect and interdict terrorists 
before they strike. Should an attack occur, local, State, and 
Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate 
the consequences of the attack.
    To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks 
effectively, the United States needs changes in the 
relationships among all levels of government. Our ability to 
respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of 
government. Rather we need a national approach, one that 
recognizes the unique individual skills that communities, 
States, and the Federal government possess and that, 
collectively, will give us the ``total package'' needed to 
address all aspects of terrorism.
    The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in 
its first report, of the terrorist threat. The Panel stands by 
its conclusions from one year ago.
    In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis 
from threat assessment to broad program assessment. The 
Advisory Panel addressed specific programs for combating 
terrorism and larger questions of national strategy and Federal 
organization. While the Advisory Panel found much to commend, 
it also found problems at all levels of government and in 
virtually every functional discipline relevant to combating 
terrorism. The Panel believes these problems are particularly 
acute at high levels of the Federal Executive Branch. Hence, 
the present report highlights the related issues of national 
strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions for 
these and other problems.

    Finding 1: The United States has no coherent, functional 
national strategy for combating terrorism.

    The United States needs a functional, coherent national 
strategy for domestic preparedness against terrorism. The 
nation has a loosely coupled set of plans and specific programs 
that aim, individually, to achieve certain specific 
preparedness objectives. The Executive Branch portrays as its 
strategy a compilation of broad policy statements, and various 
plans and programs already under way. Many programs have 
resulted from specific Congressional earmarks in various 
appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch 
budget requests; they are the initiatives of activist 
legislators. Although Federal agencies are administering 
programs assigned to them, the Executive Branch has not 
articulated a broad functional national strategy that would 
synchronize the existing programs and identify future program 
priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic 
preparedness for terrorism. Given the structure of our national 
government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a 
national strategy.

    Recommendation 1: The next President should develop and 
present to the Congress a national strategy for combating 
terrorism within one year of assuming office.

    A national strategy is a high-level statement of national 
objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means that 
will be used to achieve these objectives. In a coherent 
strategy, program details are analytically derived from the 
statement of goals. The next Administration should begin a 
process of developing a national strategy by a thoughtful 
articulation of national goals, encompassing deterrence, 
prevention, preparedness, and response.
    Ends. The first step in developing a coherent national 
strategy is for the Executive Branch to define a meaningful, 
measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in 
combating terrorism. To date, the Federal government's goals 
have been expressed primarily in terms of program execution. 
Rather, the national strategy must express goals in terms of 
the ``end state'' toward which the program strives. Since there 
exists no ready-made measure of a country's preparedness for 
terrorism (especially domestically), the Executive Branch must 
develop objective measurements for its program to combat 
terrorism, to track its progress, to determine priorities and 
appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired ``end 
state'' has been achieved.
    Means. With meaningful objectives, logical priorities and 
appropriate policy prescriptions can be developed. That is the 
essence of any coherent strategy. Setting priorities is 
essential and can only be done after specific objectives have 
been clearly defined. For instance, should the nation seek a 
higher level of preparedness for its large urban centers than 
for its rural areas and, if so, how much higher? In the broad 
area of terrorism preparedness, what should be the relative 
importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, 
radiological incidents, chemical weapons, or biological 
weapons? With respect to biological weapons, which pathogens 
deserve priority? What priority and commensurate resources need 
to be devoted to defending against cyber attacks? A proper 
national strategy will provide a clear answer to these and many 
other questions. With these answers in hand it will be possible 
to design and manage an appropriate set of programs. The 
country is at a disadvantage, of course, in that a large number 
of programs have already been established and may have to be 
reconfigured--an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins.

 Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive Functional Strategy for 
                          Combating Terrorism

   National in scope, not just Federal.

   Appropriately resourced and based on measurable 
        performance objectives.

   Focused on the full range of deterrence, prevention, 
        preparedness, and response across the spectrum of 
        threats--domestic and international.

   For domestic programs, built on requirements from 
        and fully coordinated with relevant local, State, and 
        Federal authorities.

    Finding 2: The organization of the Federal government's 
programs for combating terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, 
and politically unaccountable.

    The lack of a national strategy results in part from the 
fragmentation of Executive Branch programs for combating 
terrorism. These programs cross an extraordinary number of 
jurisdictions and substantive domains: national security, law 
enforcement, intelligence, emergency management, fire 
protection, public health, medical care, as well as parts of 
the private sector.
    No one, at any level, is ``in charge'' of all relevant 
capabilities, most of which are not dedicated exclusively to 
combating terrorism. The lack of a national strategy is 
inextricably linked to the fact that no entity has the 
authority to direct all of the entities that may be engaged. At 
the Federal level, no entity has the authority even to direct 
the coordination of relevant Federal efforts.

    Recommendation 2: The next President should establish a 
National Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office 
of the President, and should seek a statutory basis for this 
office.

    The office should have a broad and comprehensive scope, 
with responsibility for the full range of deterring, 
preventing, preparing for, and responding to international as 
well as domestic terrorism. The director of this office should 
be the principal spokesman of the Executive Branch on all 
matters related to Federal programs for combating terrorism and 
should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. The office should have a substantial and professional 
staff, drawn from existing National Security Council offices 
and other relevant agencies. It should have at least five major 
sections, each headed by an Assistant Director:

    1. Domestic Preparedness Programs
    2. Intelligence
    3. Health and Medical Programs
    4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and 
National Standards
    5. Management and Budget

    The National Office for Combating Terrorism should exercise 
program and budget authority over Federal efforts to combat ter

rorism. It should have the authority to conduct a review of 
Federal agency programs and budgets to ensure compliance with 
the priorities established in the national strategy, as well as 
the elimination of conflicts and unnecessary duplication among 
agencies. The National Office should administer a budget 
certification/decertification process with the authority to 
determine whether an agency's budget complies with the national 
strategy and to appeal ultimately to the President to resolve 
disputes.
    In addition to developing and overseeing the national 
strategy, the National Office for Combating Terrorism should 
oversee terrorism-related intelligence activities. The office 
should coordinate Federal programs designed to assist response 
entities at the local and State levels, especially for 
planning, training, exercises, and equipment. The office should 
provide direction and priorities for research and development, 
and related test and evaluation (RDT&E) for combating 
terrorism, as well as for developing nationally recognized 
standards for equipment and laboratory protocols and 
techniques. It should coordinate programs designed to enhance 
the capabilities of and coordination among the various health 
and medical entities at all levels.
    The National Office for Combating Terrorism should not be 
an operational entity in the sense of exerting direct control 
over Federal assets in operations to combat terrorism.
    Finally, the director of the National Office should 
establish an Advisory Board for Domestic Programs to assist in 
providing broad strategic guidance and to serve as part of the 
approval process for the domestic portion of strategy, plans, 
and programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism. 
This board should be composed of one or more sitting State 
governors, mayors of several U.S. cities, the heads of several 
major professional organizations, and nationally recognized 
subject matter experts in combating terrorism, in addition to 
senior representatives of the major Federal entities that have 
responsibility for combating terrorism. The President and the 
Congress should each appoint members to this board.

    Finding 3: The Congress shares responsibility for the 
inadequate coordination of programs to combat terrorism.

    The Congress's strong interest in, and commitment to, U.S. 
efforts to combat terrorism is readily apparent. The Congress 
took the initiative in 1995 to improve the nation's domestic 
preparedness against terrorism. But the Congress has also 
contributed to the Executive Branch's problems. Over the past 
five years, there have been a half-dozen Congressional attempts 
to reorganize the Executive Branch's efforts to combat 
terrorism, all of which failed. None enjoyed the support of the 
Executive Branch. At least 11 full committees in the Senate and 
14 full committees in the House--as well as their numerous 
subcommittees--claim oversight or some responsibility for 
various U.S. programs for combating terrorism. Earmarks in 
appropriations bills created many of the Federal government's 
specific domestic preparedness programs without authorizing 
legislation or oversight. The rapidly growing U.S. budget for 
combating terrorism is now laced with such earmarks, which have

proliferated in the absence of an Executive Branch strategy. 
The Executive Branch cannot successfully coordinate its 
programs for combating terrorism alone. Congress must better 
organize itself and exercise much greater discipline.

    Recommendation 3:  The Congress should consolidate its 
authority over programs for combating terrorism into a Special 
Committee for Combating Terrorism--either a joint committee 
between the Houses or separate committees in each House--and 
Congressional leadership should instruct all other committees 
to respect the authority of this new committee and to conform 
strictly to authorizing legislation.

    The creation of a new joint committee or separate 
committees in each House is necessary to improve the nation's 
efforts to fight terrorism. The committee should have a 
substantial standing staff. The new National Office for 
Combating Terrorism must establish a close working relationship 
with the committee, and propose comprehensive and coherent 
programs and budget requests in support of the new national 
strategy. The new joint or separate committee should have the 
authority to dispose of the Executive Branch request and to 
oversee the execution of programs that it authorizes. For this 
to work, other Congressional authorizing committees with an 
interest in programs for combating terrorism must recognize the 
concurrent, consolidated authority of the joint or separate 
committee; and relevant appropriations committees must exercise 
restraint and respect the authorizing legislation of the new 
structure. We recognize that this task is no less daunting than 
the Executive Branch reorganization that we propose above, but 
it is no less needed.

    Finding 4: The Executive Branch and the Congress have not 
paid sufficient attention to State and local capabilities for 
combating terrorism and have not devoted sufficient resources 
to augment these capabilities to enhance the preparedness of 
the nation as a whole.

    The foundation of the nation's domestic preparedness for 
terrorism is the network of emergency response capabilities and 
disaster management systems provided by State and local 
governments. ``Local'' response personnel--community and State 
law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical 
technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health 
officials, and emergency managers--will be the ``first 
responders'' to virtually any terrorist attack anywhere in the 
nation. Federal resources may not arrive for many hours--if not 
days--after the attack. A disproportionately small amount of 
the total funds appropriated for combating terrorism is being 
allocated to provide direct or indirect assistance to State and 
local response efforts. This level of Federal funding for non-
Federal capabilities is not commensurate with the importance 
that State and local capabilities will have in any operational 
response to a major terrorist attack inside our borders.
    Any coherent national strategy for combating terrorism 
domestically must recognize the critical need to build on the 
nation's exist

ing emergency response and management systems for the pragmatic 
reasons of viability and cost-effectiveness.

    Recommendation 4: The Executive Branch should establish a 
strong institutional mechanism for ensuring the participation 
of high-level State and local officials in the development and 
implementation of a national strategy for terrorism 
preparedness.

    To be consistent with the Federal structure of our 
government, the President should work in closer partnership 
with State and local governments as they collectively strive to 
achieve higher levels of domestic preparedness for terrorism. 
The domestic portion of a national strategy for combating 
terrorism should emphasize programs and initiatives that build 
appropriately on existing State and local capabilities for 
other emergencies and disasters. The Executive Branch, 
therefore, should develop the national strategy in close 
partnership with high-level State and local officials drawn 
from key professional communities: elected officials, law 
enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical technicians, 
public health officials, hospital medical care providers, and 
emergency managers. State and local officials should, in 
particular, have substantial responsibility for the detailed 
design and oversight of the Federal training, equipment, and 
exercise programs. The Advisory Board for Domestic Programs, 
proposed earlier, should provide advice for these functions, 
augmented as necessary by State and local representatives 
assigned to the National Office for Combating Terrorism.

    Finding 5: Federal programs for domestic preparedness to 
combat terrorism lack clear priorities and are deficient in 
numerous specific areas.

    We have a number of recommendations about selected aspects 
of current U.S. programs for domestic preparedness to combat 
terrorism. The lack of clear priorities is an obvious byproduct 
of the lack of a strategy. Thus, many of our specific 
recommendations reflect criticisms that are subordinate to our 
macro-critique that the United States lacks a coherent national 
strategy. We recognize the problem of offering detailed 
programmatic recommendations in advance of a national strategy. 
Through its deliberations, the Advisory Panel has, 
nevertheless, reached consensus on a number of specific 
findings and recommendations, summarized below and detailed in 
the full report.

    Specific Functional Recommendations: Our focus continues to 
be on the needs of local and State response entities. ``Local'' 
response entities--law enforcement, fire service, emergency 
medical technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public 
health officials, and emergency managers--will always be the 
``first response,'' and conceivably the only response. When 
entities at various levels of government are engaged, the 
responsibilities of all entities and lines of authority must be 
clear.

    1. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing 
Information. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should 
foster

the development of a consolidated all-source analysis and 
assessment capability that would provide various response 
entities as well as policymakers with continuing analysis of 
potential threats and broad threat assessment input into the 
development of the annual national strategy. That capability 
should be augmented by improved human intelligence collection 
abroad, more effective domestic activities with a thorough 
review of various Federal guidelines, and reasonable 
restrictions on acquisition of CBRN precursors or equipment. 
The National Office should also foster enhancements in 
measurement and signature intelligence, forensics, and 
indications and warning capabilities. To promote the broadest 
possible dissemination of useful, timely (and if necessary, 
classified) information, the National Office should also 
oversee the development and implementation of a protected, 
Internet-based single-source web page system, linking 
appropriate sources of information and databases on combating 
terrorism across all relevant functional disciplines.

    2. Operational Coordination. The National Office for 
Combating Terrorism should encourage Governors to designate 
State emergency management entities as domestic preparedness 
focal points for coordination with the Federal government. The 
National Office should identify and promote the establishment 
of single-source, ``all hazards'' planning documents, 
standardized Incident Command and Unified Command Systems, and 
other model programs for use in the full range of emergency 
contingencies, including terrorism. Adherence to these systems 
should become a requirement of Federal preparedness assistance.

    3. Training, Equipping, and Exercising. The National Office 
for Combating Terrorism should develop and manage a 
comprehensive national plan for Federal assistance to State and 
local agencies for training and equipment and the conduct of 
exercises, including the promulgation of standards in each 
area. The National Office should consult closely with State and 
local stakeholders in the development of this national plan. 
Federal resources to support the plan should be allocated 
according to the goals and objectives specified in the national 
strategy, with State and local entities also providing 
resources to support its implementation.

    4. Health and Medical Considerations. The National Office 
for Combating Terrorism should reevaluate the current U.S. 
approach to providing public health and medical care in 
response to acts of terrorism, especially possible mass 
casualty incidents and most particularly bioterrorism. The key 
issues are insufficient education and training in terrorism-
related subjects, minimum capabilities in surge capacity and in 
treatment facilities, and clear standards and protocols for 
laboratories and other activities, and vaccine programs. A 
robust public health infrastructure is necessary to ensure an 
effective response to terrorist attacks, especially those 
involving biologic agents. After consultation with public 
health and medical care entities, the National Office should 
oversee the establishment of financial incentives coupled with 
standards and certification requirements that will, over time, 
encourage the health and medical sector to build and maintain 
required capabilities. In addition, Federal, State, and local 
governments should clarify legal and regulatory authorities for 
quarantine, vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures.

    5. Research and Development, and National Standards. The 
National Office for Combating Terrorism should establish a 
clear set of priorities for research and development for 
combating terrorism, including long-range programs. Priorities 
for targeted research should be responder personnel protective 
equipment; medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; 
improved sensor and rapid readout capability; vaccines and 
antidotes; and communications interoperability. The National 
Office must also coordinate the development of nationally 
recognized standards for equipment, training, and laboratory 
protocols and techniques, with the ultimate objective being 
official certification.

    6. Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism. Cyber 
attacks inside the United States could have ``mass 
disruptive,'' even if not ``mass destructive'' or ``mass 
casualty'' consequences. During the coming year, the Advisory 
Panel will focus on specific aspects of critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP), as they relate to the potential for terrorist 
attacks. In our discussions thus far, we have identified 
several areas for further deliberation, including CIP policy 
oversight; standards; alert, warning, and response; liability 
and other legal issues, and CIP research. We will make specific 
policy recommendations in our next report.

                                   
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