United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and

Merchant Marine, Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, U.S. Senate

For Release

on Delivery

Expected at

2 p.m., EST

Thursday

March 13, 1997

INTERCITY PASSENGER

RAIL

The Financial Viability of

Amtrak Continues to Be

Threatened

Statement of Phyllis F. Scheinberg,

Associate Director, Transportation Issues,

Resources, Community, and Economic

Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-97-94

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on Amtrak and the future of

intercity passenger rail in the United States. As you know, over the last

several years, we have issued a number of reports on Amtrak’s financial

condition, its Strategic Business Plan, and the status of the Northeast

Corridor.1

 We are continuing to monitor Amtrak’s progress as it attempts

to address its financial problems and free itself from federal operating

subsidies by 2002.

Our statement today presents preliminary information from our ongoing

work looking at Amtrak’s progress in achieving this operating

self-sufficiency. In particular, we are updating information from our July

1996 and February 1995 reports on Amtrak’s financial condition and

progress toward self-sufficiency; commenting on Amtrak’s need for, and

use of, capital funds; and discussing some of the factors that will play a

role in Amtrak’s future viability. In summary, our ongoing work shows the

following:

• Amtrak’s financial condition is still very precarious and heavily dependent

on federal operating and capital funds. We previously reported that

Amtrak’s financial condition had deteriorated steadily since 1990 and that

Amtrak was unlikely to overcome its financial problems without

significant increases in passenger revenues and/or subsidies from federal,

state, and local governments. In response to its deteriorating financial

condition, in 1995 and 1996 Amtrak developed strategic business plans

designed to increase revenues and reduce cost growth. However, we have

found that in the past 2 years, passenger revenues, adjusted for inflation,

have generally declined, and in fiscal year 1996, the gap between operating

deficits and federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels

exceeding that of fiscal year 1994, when the continuation of Amtrak’s

nationwide passenger rail service was severely threatened. At the end of

fiscal year 1996, the gap between the operating deficit and federal

operating subsidies was $82 million.

1

Amtrak’s Strategic Business Plan: Progress to Date (GAO/RCED-96-187, July 24, 1996); Northeast Rail

Corridor: Information on Users, Funding Sources, and Expenditures (GAO/RCED-96-144, June 27,

1996); Amtrak: Early Progress Made in Implementing Strategic and Business Plan, but Obstacles

Remain (GAO/T-RCED-95-227, June 16, 1995); Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial and Operating

Conditions Threaten Amtrak’s Long-Term Viability (GAO/RCED-95-71, Feb. 6, 1995). The Northeast

Corridor is the area between Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts.

Page 1 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
• Capital investment continues to play a critical role in supporting Amtrak’s

business plans and ultimately in maintaining Amtrak’s viability. Such

investment will not only help Amtrak retain revenues by improving the

quality of its service but will be important in facilitating the revenue

growth predicted in the business plans. In both 1995 and 1996, we reported

that Amtrak faced significant capital investment needs to, among other

things, bring its equipment and facilities systemwide and its tracks in the

Northeast Corridor into a state of good repair and to introduce high-speed

rail service (at speeds of up to 150 miles per hour) between Washington

and Boston. Amtrak will need billions of dollars in capital investment for

these and other projects.

• It will be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2002

given the environment within which it operates. First, Amtrak is relying

heavily on capital investment to support its business plans, which envision

a significant increase in capital funding support—possibly from a

dedicated funding source, such as the Highway Trust Fund. While such a

source may offer the potential for steady, reliable funding, the current

budget environment may limit the amount of funds actually made available

to Amtrak. Second, Amtrak is also relying greatly on revenue growth and

cost containment to achieve its goal of eliminating federal operating

support. The economic and competitive environment within which Amtrak

operates may limit revenue growth, and Amtrak will continue to find it

difficult to take those actions necessary (such as route and service

adjustments) to reduce costs.

Background Amtrak was created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to operate

and revitalize intercity passenger rail service. Prior to its creation, intercity

passenger rail service was provided by private railroads, which had

continually lost money, especially after World War II. The Congress gave

Amtrak specific goals, including providing modern, efficient intercity

passenger service; helping to alleviate the overcrowding of airports,

airways, and highways; and giving Americans an alternative to

automobiles and airplanes to meet their transportation needs. Through

fiscal year 1997, the federal government has invested over $19 billion in

Amtrak. Appendix I shows federal appropriations for Amtrak since fiscal

year 1988.

In response to continually growing losses and a widening gap between

operating deficits and federal operating subsidies, Amtrak developed its

Page 2 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Strategic Business Plan. This plan (which has been revised several times)

was designed to increase revenues and control cost growth and, at the

same time, eliminate Amtrak’s need for federal operating subsidies by

2002. Amtrak also restructured its organization into strategic business

units: the Northeast Corridor Unit, which is responsible for operations on

the East Coast between Virginia and Vermont; Amtrak West, for operations

on the West Coast; and the Intercity Unit, for all other service, including

most long-distance, cross-country trains.

Amtrak Is Still in

Financial Crisis

Amtrak is still in a financial crisis despite the fact that its financial

performance (as measured by net losses2

) has improved over the last 2

years. At the end of fiscal year 1994, Amtrak’s net loss was about $1.1

billion (in 1996 dollars). This loss was $873 million if the one-time charge

of $255 million, taken in fiscal year 1994 for accounting changes,

restructuring costs, and other items, is excluded.3

 By the end of fiscal year

1996, this loss had declined to about $764 million. However, the relative

gap between total revenues and expenses has not significantly closed, and

passenger revenues (adjusted for inflation)—which Amtrak has been

relying on to help close the gap—have generally declined over the past

several years (see apps. II and III).

More importantly, the gap between operating deficits4

 and federal

operating subsidies has again begun to grow. Amtrak continues to be

heavily dependent on federal operating subsidies to make ends meet.

Although operating deficits have declined, they have not gone down at the

same rate as federal operating subsidies (see app. IV). At the end of fiscal

year 1994, the gap between Amtrak’s operating deficit and federal

operating subsidies was $75 million. At the end of fiscal year 1996, the gap

had increased to $82 million. Over this same time, federal operating

subsidies went from $502.2 million to $405 million.5

2

As used here, net loss is calculated as total revenues minus total expenses. Unless otherwise noted,

information on financed performance and condition was provided by Amtrak and was not

independently verified.

3

Amounts stated in 1996 dollars.

4

As used here, operating deficit is the same as net loss, except noncash items (such as depreciation)

and the one-time charge taken in fiscal year 1994 are excluded from total expenses.

5

Amounts include excess railroad retirement payments. Amtrak is required to participate in the

railroad retirement and unemployment systems. Each participating railroad pays a portion of the costs

for all retirement and unemployment benefits in the industry. Amtrak’s payments exceed its specific

retirement and unemployment costs.

Page 3 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Amtrak’s continuing financial crisis can be seen in other measures as well.

In February 1995, we reported that Amtrak’s working capital—the

difference between current assets and current liabilities—declined

between fiscal years 1987 and 1994. Although Amtrak’s working capital

position improved in fiscal year 1995, it declined again in fiscal year 1996

to a $195 million deficit (see app. V). This reflects an increase in accounts

payable and short-term debt and capital lease obligations, among other

items. As we noted in our 1995 report, a continued decline in working

capital jeopardizes Amtrak’s ability to pay immediate expenses. Amtrak’s

debt levels have also increased significantly (see app. VI). Between fiscal

years 1993 and 1996, Amtrak’s debt and capital lease obligations increased

about $460 million—from about $527 million to about $987 million (in 1996

dollars). According to Amtrak, this increase was to finance the delivery of

new locomotives and Superliner and Viewliner cars—a total of 28

locomotives and 245 cars delivered between fiscal years 1994 and 1996.

These debt levels do not include an additional $1 billion expected to be

incurred to finance 18 high-speed trainsets due to begin arriving in fiscal

year 1999 and related maintenance facilities for the Northeast Corridor (at

about $800 million) and the acquisition of 98 new locomotives (at about

$250 million).

It is important to note that Amtrak’s increased debt levels could limit the

use of federal operating support to cover future operating deficits. As

Amtrak’s debt levels have increased, there has also been a significant

increase in the interest expenses that Amtrak has incurred on this debt

(see app. VII). In fact, over the last 4 years, interest expenses have about

tripled—from about $20.6 million in fiscal year 1993 to about $60.2 million

in fiscal year 1996. This increase has absorbed more of the federal

operating subsidies each year because Amtrak pays interest from federal

operating assistance and principal from federal capital grants. Between

fiscal years 1993 and 1996, the percentage of federal operating subsidies

accounted for by interest expense has increased from about 6 to about

21 percent. As Amtrak assumes more debt to acquire equipment, the

interest payments are likely to continue to consume an increasing portion

of federal operating subsidies.

Page 4 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Implementation of

Strategic Business

Plans Has Improved

Financial

Performance, but Net

Loss Targets Have

Been Missed

The implementation of the strategic business plans appears to have helped

Amtrak’s financial performance—as evidenced by the reduction in net

losses between fiscal years 1994 and 1996 (from about $873 million to

about $764 million).6

 As we reported in July 1996, about $170 million in

cost reductions came in fiscal year 1995 by reducing some routes and

services, cutting management positions, and raising fares. Amtrak

projected that these actions would reduce future net losses by about

$315 million annually once they were in place. The net loss was reduced in

fiscal year 1996 as total revenues increased more than total expenses did.

In contrast, Amtrak estimates that its net loss in fiscal year 1996 would

have been about $1.1 billion if no actions had been taken to address its

financial crisis in 1994.

Although the strategic business plans have helped reduce the net losses,

targets for these losses have often been missed. To illustrate, Amtrak’s

plans for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 included actions to reduce the net

losses by $195 million—from about $834 million in 1994 (in current year

dollars) to $639 million in fiscal year 1996. This reduction was to be

accomplished, in part, by increasing revenues $191 million while holding

expenses at about the 1994 level. However, actual net losses for this period

totaled about $1.572 billion, or about $127 million more than the $1.445

billion Amtrak had planned. This difference was primarily due to the

severe winter weather in fiscal year 1996—a contingency that Amtrak had

not planned for and one that added about $29 million to expenses—and

the unsuccessful implementation of various elements of the fiscal year

1996 business plan. For example, many of the productivity improvements

(such as reducing the size of train crews) that Amtrak had planned in

fiscal year 1996 were not achieved. As a result, cost savings fell short of

Amtrak’s $108 million target by about $60 million. As we reported in

July 1996, Amtrak has made little progress in negotiating new productivity

improvements with its labor unions.

For fiscal year 1997, as a result of higher than anticipated losses and an

expected accounting adjustment, Amtrak planned for a net loss of

$726 million. However, after the first quarter of operations, revenues were

below target, and although expenses were lower than expected, the

operating deficit was almost $4 million more than planned for that quarter.

Furthermore, fiscal year 1997 financial results will be affected by the

postponement of route and service adjustments planned for

November 1996. Amtrak estimates that postponing these adjustments will

6

As mentioned, the net loss for fiscal year 1994 excludes the one-time charge of $255 million (in 1996

dollars). Amounts stated in 1996 dollars.

Page 5 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
bring a net revenue reduction of $6.9 million and a net cost increase of

$29.2 million. Part of this increased cost will be offset by an additional

federal operating grant of $22.5 million made to keep these routes

operating. In part, as a result of these increased costs, Amtrak revised its

planned fiscal year 1997 net loss upward to $762 million from the

originally projected $726 million. Even that might not be achieved. As a

result of additional unanticipated expenses and revenue shortfalls, Amtrak

projects its actual fiscal year 1997 year-end net loss could be about

$786 million.

Amtrak’s projected fiscal year 1997 financial results may also affect its

cash flow and the need to borrow money to make ends meet. For example,

in January 1997, Amtrak projected a cash flow deficit of about $96 million

at the end of fiscal year 1997—about $30 million more than planned. This

deficit may require Amtrak to begin borrowing as early as March 1997 to

pay their bills. Moreover, the cash flow deficit may be even larger than

projected if Amtrak does not receive anticipated revenues from the sale of

property ($16 million) and cost savings from lower electric power prices in

the Northeast Corridor ($20.5 million). Amtrak’s fiscal year 1998 projected

year-end cash balance is also bleak. On the basis of current projections,

Amtrak estimates that it may have to borrow up to $148 million next year.

Amtrak currently has short-term lines of credit of $150 million.

Amtrak Continues to

Have Significant

Capital Investment

Needs

Amtrak’s need for capital funds remains high. We reported in June 1996

that Amtrak will need billions of dollars to address its capital needs, such

as bringing the Northeast Corridor up to a state of good repair.7

 This

situation largely continues today. In May 1996, the Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA) and Amtrak estimated that about $2 billion would be

needed over the next 3 to 5 years to recapitalize the south end of the

corridor and preserve its ability to operate in the near term at existing

service levels. This renovation would include making improvements in the

North and East river tunnels serving New York City and restoring the

system that provides electric power to the corridor. This system, with

equipment designed to last 40 to 50 years, is now between 60 and 80 years

old, and, according to FRA and Amtrak, has gotten to the point at which it

no longer allows Amtrak and others to provide reliable high-speed and

commuter service. FRA and Amtrak believe that this capital investment of

about $2 billion would help reverse the trend of adding time to published

schedules because of poor on-time performance. Over the next 20 years,

7

See Northeast Rail Corridor: Information on Users, Funding Sources, and Expenditures, previously

cited.

Page 6 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
FRA and Amtrak estimate, up to $6.7 billion may be needed to recapitalize

the corridor and make improvements targeted to respond to high-priority

growth opportunities.

A significant capital investment will also be required for other projects as

well. For example, additional capital assistance will be required to

introduce high-speed rail service between New York and Boston. In 1992,

the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act directed that a plan be

developed for regularly scheduled passenger rail service between New

York and Boston in 3 hours or less. Currently, such trips take, on average,

about 4-1/2 hours. Significant rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure

as well as electrification of the line north of New Haven, Connecticut, will

be required to accomplish this goal. According to Amtrak, since fiscal year

1991 the federal government has invested about $900 million in the

high-speed rail program, and an additional $1.4 billion will be required to

complete this project. A significant capital investment will also be required

to acquire new equipment and overhaul existing equipment. Amtrak plans

to spend about $1.7 billion over the next 6 years for these purposes.

Progress Has Been

Slow in Addressing

Previously Reported

Capital Needs

We reported in July 1996 and February 1995 on Amtrak’s need for capital

investments and some of the problems being experienced as a result. We

noted the additional costs of maintaining an aging fleet, the backlogs and

funding shortages that were plaguing Amtrak’s equipment overhaul

program, and the need for substantial capital improvements and

modernization at maintenance and overhaul facilities. We also commented

on the shrinking availability of federal funds to meet new capital

investment needs. Our ongoing work, the results of which we expect to

report later this year, is looking at these issues.

The preliminary results of our work indicate that Amtrak has made some

progress in addressing capital needs, but the going has been slow, and in

some cases Amtrak may be facing significant future costs. For example,

we reported in February 1995 that about 31 percent of Amtrak’s passenger

car fleet was beyond its useful life—estimated at between 25 and 30

years—and that 23 percent of the fleet was made up of Heritage cars (cars

that Amtrak obtained in 1971 from other railroads) that averaged over 40

years old. Since our report, the average age of the passenger car fleet has

declined from 22.4 years old (in fiscal year 1994) to 20.7 years old (at the

end of fiscal year 1996), and the number of Heritage cars has declined

from 437 to 246. This drop is significant because Heritage cars, as a result

of their age, were subject to frequent failures, and their downtime for

Page 7 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
repair was about 3 times longer than other types of cars. However, these

trends may be masking substantial future costs to maintain the fleet. In

October 1996, about 53 percent of the cars in Amtrak’s active fleet of 1,600

passenger cars averaged 20 years old or more and were at or approaching

the end of their useful life (see app. VIII). It is safe to assume that as this

equipment continues to age, it will be subject to more frequent failures and

require more expensive repairs.

Our ongoing work also shows that the portion of Amtrak’s federal capital

grant available to replace assets has continued to shrink.8

 In

February 1995, we reported that an increasing portion of the capital grant

was being devoted to debt service, overhauls of existing equipment, and

legally mandated uses, such as equipment modifications and

environmental cleanup. In fiscal year 1994, only about $54 million of

Amtrak’s federal capital grant of $195 million was available to purchase

new equipment and meet other capital investment needs. Since our report,

although the portion of the capital grant available to meet general capital

investment needs increased in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, it shrunk in

fiscal year 1997 (see app. IX). In fiscal year 1997, only $12 million of the

capital grant of $223 million is expected to be available for general capital

needs. The rest will be devoted to debt service ($75 million), overhauls of

existing equipment ($110 million), or legally mandated work ($26 million).

It is likely that as Amtrak assumes increased debt (including capital lease

obligations) to acquire equipment and as the number of cars in Amtrak’s

fleet that exceed their useful life increases, even less of Amtrak’s future

capital grants will be available to meet capital investment needs.

Achieving Operating

Self-Sufficiency by

2002 Will Be Difficult

Amtrak’s ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2002 will be difficult

given the environment within which it operates. Amtrak is relying heavily

on capital investment to support its goal of eliminating federal operating

subsidies. For example, Amtrak’s draft fiscal year 1997-2002 Strategic

Capital Plan indicates that about 830 million dollars’ worth of actions

needed to close gaps in the operating budget through 2002 is directly

linked to capital investments. To support these actions, Amtrak anticipates

significantly increased federal capital assistance—about $750 million to

$800 million per year. In comparison, in fiscal year 1997, Amtrak received

federal capital funding of $478 million.9

 Amtrak would like this increased

8

The federal capital grants referred to in this discussion exclude ones for the Northeast Corridor

Improvement Program (NECIP) and the high-speed rail program. In fiscal years 1994 and 1997, Amtrak

received $225 million and $255 million, respectively, for these programs.

9

This amount includes the $255 million for NECIP and the high-speed rail program.

Page 8 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
assistance to be provided from a dedicated funding source. Given today’s

budget environment, it may be difficult to obtain this degree of increased

federal funding. In addition, providing funds from a dedicated

source—such as the federal Highway Trust Fund—may not give Amtrak as

much money as it expects. Historically, spending for programs financed by

this Trust Fund, such as the federal-aid highway program, has generally

been constrained by limiting the total amount of funds that can be

obligated in a given year.

Amtrak is also subject to the competitive and economic environment

within which it operates. We reported in February 1995 that competitive

pressures had limited Amtrak’s ability to increase revenues by raising

fares. Fares were constrained, in part, by lower fares on airlines and

intercity buses. From fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 1996, Amtrak’s yield

(revenue per passenger mile) increased about 24 percent, from 15.4 cents

per passenger mile to about 19.1 cents. In comparison, between 1994 and

1995, airline yields declined slightly, intercity bus yields increased 18

percent, and the real price of unleaded regular gasoline increased a little

less than 1 percent.10 However, it appears that Amtrak’s ability to increase

revenues through fare increases has come at the expense of ridership, the

number of passenger miles, and the passenger miles per seat-mile (load

factor). Between fiscal years 1994 and 1996, all three declined.11 Such

trade-offs in the future could limit further increases in Amtrak’s yield and

ultimately revenue growth.

Finally, Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions

necessary to further reduce costs. These include making the route and

service adjustments necessary to save money and to collectively bargain

cost-saving productivity improvements with its employees. During fiscal

year 1995, Amtrak was successful in reducing and eliminating some routes

and services. For example, on seven routes Amtrak reduced the frequency

of service from daily to 3 or 4 times per week and on nine other routes

various segments were eliminated. Amtrak estimates that such actions

saved about $54 million. Amtrak was less successful in making route and

service adjustments planned for fiscal year 1997 and estimates that its

failure to take these actions will increase its projected fiscal year 1997 loss

by $13.5 million. Amtrak has also been unsuccessful in negotiating

productivity improvements with labor unions. Such improvements were

10Data for 1996 were not available for this analysis.

11Between fiscal years 1994 and 1996, Amtrak’s annual ridership declined from 21.2 million to

19.7 million passengers, passenger miles declined from 5.9 billion to 5.1 billion, and the load factor

declined from 49 to 46 percent. Ridership excludes commuter passengers.

Page 9 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
expected to save about $26 million in fiscal year 1995 and $19.0 million in

fiscal year 1996. According to an Amtrak official, over the last 2 years

Amtrak has not pursued negotiations for productivity improvements.

Conclusions Amtrak’s financial future has been staked on the ability to eliminate

federal operating support by 2002 by increasing revenues, controlling

costs, and providing customers with high-quality service. Although the

business plans have helped reduce net losses, Amtrak continues to face

significant challenges in accomplishing this goal, and it is likely Amtrak

will continue to require federal financial support—both operating and

capital—well into the future.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may

have.

Page 10 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Page 11 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix I 

Federal Appropriations for Amtrak, Fiscal

Years 1988-97

Dollars in Millions

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Fiscal Year

Mandatory Payment

NECIP Subsidy

Capital Subsidy

Operating Subsidy

Notes: Mandatory payments to the Railroad Retirement Fund for fiscal years 1988 through 1990

are estimated.

The appropriations for fiscal year 1993 include $20 million in supplemental operating funds and

$25 million for capital requirements. The appropriations for fiscal year 1997 include $22.5 million

in supplemental operating funds and $60 million for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program.

For fiscal year 1997, an additional $80 million was appropriated to Amtrak for high-speed rail.

Source: Amtrak.

Page 12 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix II 

Revenues and Expenses, Fiscal Years

1988-96

Dollars in Millions

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

2100

2300

2500

2700

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

Expenses

Revenues

Note: Amounts are in 1996 dollars.

Source: Amtrak.

Page 13 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix III 

Amtrak’s Passenger Revenues, Fiscal Years

1989-96

Dollars in Millions

200

400

600

800

1000

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

Note: Amounts are in 1996 dollars.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Amtrak’s data.

Page 14 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix IV 

Amtrak’s Federal Operating Subsidy and

Mandatory Payment Compared to the

Operating Deficit, Fiscal Years 1988-96

Dollars in Millions

250

275

300

325

350

375

400

425

450

475

500

525

550

575

600

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

Operating Deficit

Federal Operating Subsidy & Mandatory Payment

Notes: Amtrak’s operating deficit was calculated as total revenues minus total expenses,

excluding noncash expenses such as depreciation.

Amounts are in current year dollars.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Amtrak’s data.

Page 15 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix V 

Amtrak’s Working Capital Surplus/Deficit,

Fiscal Years 1987-96

Dollars in Millions

-250

-225

-200

-175

-150

-125

-100

-75

-50

-25

0

25

50

75

100

125

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

113 112

84

27

-36

-67

-100

-227

-149

-195

Notes: Working capital is the difference between current assets and current liabilities.

Amounts are in current year dollars. In 1996 dollars, working capital declined from $149 million in

fiscal year 1987 to a deficit of $195 million in fiscal year 1996.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Amtrak’s data.

Page 16 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix VI 

Amtrak’s Outstanding Debt/Capital Lease

Obligations, Fiscal Years 1987-96

Dollars in Millions

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

Note: Amounts are in current year dollars.

Source: Amtrak.

Page 17 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix VII 

Amtrak’s Interest Expense, Fiscal Years

1987-96

Dollars in Millions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Fiscal Year

Note: Amounts are in current year dollars.

Source: Amtrak.

Page 18 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix VIII 

Average Age of Amtrak’s Car Fleet, October

1996

28% • Amfleet I (20.9 years)

14% • Heritage Passenger (43.0 years)

12% • Baggage/Autocarrier (39.7 years)

16%•

Superliner I (16.7 years)

•

8%

Amfleet II (14.7 years)

•

6%

Horizon (7.1 years)

•11%

Superliner II (1.5 years)

•

3%

Turboliner (21.0 years)

1%

Capitoliner (29.8 years)

•

2%

Viewliners (0.9 years)

Notes: The data exclude mail-handling cars and road railers.

The age of the baggage and autocarrier cars is a weighted average.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Amtrak’s data.

Page 19 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
Appendix IX 

Commitments of Amtrak’s Federal Capital

Funds, Fiscal Years 1989-97

Dollars in Millions

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Fiscal Year

Available For Other Uses

Previous Commitments

Legal Mandates

Capital Overhauls

Notes: The amount “available for other uses” is that portion of the capital grant not already

committed for specific requirements at the beginning of the fiscal year. This figure does not

include capital grants for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program.

Amounts for fiscal year 1997 are estimated.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Amtrak’s data.

(343885) Page 20 GAO/T-RCED-97-94
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