United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1998 FAA COMPUTER

SYSTEMS

Limited Progress on

Year 2000 Issue

Increases Risk

Dramatically

GAO/AIMD-98-45

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-276525 

January 30, 1998

The Honorable Constance A. Morella

Chairwoman

The Honorable Bart Gordon

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Technology

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen Horn

Chairman

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Government

 Management, Information and Technology

Committee on Government

 Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Time is running out. In 2 years, hundreds of computer systems that are

critical to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operations—such as

those used to monitor and control air traffic and those used to target

airline inspections—could fail to perform as needed unless proper

date-related calculations can be assured. In many systems, the year 2000

could be indistinguishable from 1900 because many systems use only two

digits to designate the year. In this case, both would read “00,” causing

systems to malfunction or fail unless corrections are made.

In response to your September 4, 1997, letter, we reviewed the

effectiveness of FAA’s Year 2000 program, including the reliability of its

Year 2000 cost estimate.

Results in Brief FAA’s progress in making its systems ready for the year 2000 has been too

slow. At its current pace, it will not make it in time.

The agency has been severely behind schedule in completing basic

awareness activities, a critical first phase in an effective Year 2000

program. For example, FAA appointed its initial program manager with

responsibility for the Year 2000 only 6 months ago, and its overall Year

2000 strategy is not yet final.

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FAA also does not know the extent of its Year 2000 problem because it has

not completed most key assessment phase activities, the second critical

phase in an effective Year 2000 program. It has yet to analyze the impact of

systems’ not being Year 2000 date compliant, inventory and assess all of its

systems for date dependencies, develop plans for addressing identified

date dependencies, or develop plans for continuing operations in case

systems are not corrected in time. FAA currently estimates it will complete

its assessment activities by the end of January 1998. Until these activities

are completed, FAA cannot know the extent to which it can trust its

systems to operate safely after 1999. The potential serious consequences

include degraded safety, grounded or delayed flights, increased airline

costs, and customer inconvenience.

Delays in completing awareness and assessment activities also leave FAA

little time for critical renovation, validation, and implementation

activities—the final three phases in an effective Year 2000 program. With 2

years left, FAA is quickly running out of time, making contingency planning

for continuity of operations even more critical.

FAA’s inventory and assessment actions will define the scope and

magnitude of its Year 2000 problem; since they are incomplete, FAA lacks

the information it needs to develop reliable Year 2000 cost estimates. FAA’s

Year 2000 project manager currently estimates that the entire program will

cost $246 million based on early estimates from managers throughout the

agency.

Background FAA is responsible for ensuring a safe, secure, and efficient airspace system

that contributes to national security and the promotion of U.S. airspace.

To fulfill these key missions, FAA administers a wide range of

aviation-related programs, such as those to certify the airworthiness of

new commercial aircraft designs, to inspect airline operations, to maintain

airport security, and to control commercial and general aviation flights.1

Integral to executing each of FAA’s programs are extensive information

processing and communications technologies. For example, each of FAA’s

20 en route air traffic control facilities, which controls aircraft at the

higher altitudes between airports, depends on about 50 interrelated

computer systems to safely guide and direct aircraft. Similarly, each of

FAA’s almost 100 flight standards offices, responsible for inspecting and

1

General aviation flights are any civil aircraft operations not involving commercial activities, such as

the transport of revenue-paying passengers.

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certifying various sectors of the aviation industry (e.g., commercial

aircraft, repair stations, mechanics, pilot training schools, maintenance

schools, pilots, and general aviation aircraft), are supported by over 30

mission-related safety database and analysis systems. Because of the

complexity of the systems supporting FAA’s mission, most of these systems

are unique to FAA and not off-the-shelf systems that can be easily

maintained by system vendors.

FAA also has numerous, complex information processing interactions with

various external organizations, including airlines, aircraft manufacturers,

general aviation pilots, and other government agencies, such as the

National Weather Service (NWS) and the Department of Defense. Over the

years, these organizations and FAA have built vast networks of interrelated

systems. For example, airlines’ flight planning systems are linked to FAA’s

Enhanced Traffic Management System, which monitors flight plans

nationwide, controls high traffic situations, and alerts airlines and airports

to bring in more staff when there is extra traffic. As another example, FAA

facilities rely on weather information from NWS ground sensors, radars,

and satellites to control and route aircraft.

FAA is headed by an administrator, who is supported by the chief counsel,

assistant administrators responsible for each of its five staff offices, and

associate administrators responsible for each of its seven lines of

business. The chief counsel and five staff offices handle crosscutting

management functions (e.g., system safety), while the seven lines of

business are dedicated to specific services (e.g., airport funding). For the

purpose of Year 2000 program planning, FAA refers to all of these 13

organizations as “lines of business”. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of

FAA’s management structure, highlighting the 13 lines of business.

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Figure 1: Organizational Chart Highlighting FAA’s 13 Lines of Business

Administrator

Deputy Administrator Office of

System Safety

Office of the

Chief Counsel

Assistant 

Administrator for 

Policy, Planning and

International Aviation

Office of

 Civil Rights

Office of

Government and

Industry Affairs

Office of

Public Affairs

Europe, Africa and

Middle East Office

Office of Aviation

Policy and Plans

Asia-Pacific

Office

Office of Environment

and Energy

Latin AmericaCaribbean Office

Alaskan

Region

Central

Region Eastern

Region

Great Lakes

Region

New England

Region

Northwest

Mountain

Region

Southern

Region

Southwest

Region

Western-Pacific

Region

Mike Monroney

Aeronautical

Center

Office of

International Aviation

Associate

Administrator

for Administration

Associate

Administrator

for Regulation and

Certification

Office of Business

Information &

Consultation

Office of Financial

Services

Office of Human

Resource

Management

Office of Accident

Investigation

Aircraft 

Certification

Service

Office of

Aviation Medicine

Flight Standards

Service

Office of

Rulemaking

Associate

Administrator 

for Airports

Office of Airport

Planning and

Programming

Office of Airport 

Safety and

Standards

Associate

Administrator

for Civil Aviation

Security

Office of Civil 

Aviation Security

Intelligence

Office of Civil

Aviation Security

Operations

Office of Civil

Aviation Security

Policy and

Planning

Airway Facilities

Service

Air Traffic Service

Office of System

Capacity

Associate 

Administrator for 

Air Traffic Services

Office of Aviation

Research

Office of

Acquisitions

Office of Air Traffic

Systems

Development

Office of

Comm., Navigation,

and Surveillance 

Systems

Office of Information

Technology

Office of System

Architecture and

Investment

Analysis

William J. Hughes

Technical Center

Associate

Administrator

for Research and

Acquisitions

Air Traffic System

Requirements

Service

Associate

Administrator for

Commercial Space

Transportation

Office of Independent

Operational

Test and Evaluation

Page 4 GAO/AIMD-98-45 FAA Computer Systems
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Objective, Scope, and

Methodology

In assessing actions taken by FAA to address the Year 2000 problem, our

objective was to determine the effectiveness of FAA’s Year 2000 program,

including the reliability of FAA’s Year 2000 cost estimate.

To satisfy this objective, we reviewed and analyzed key FAA documents,

including (1) Year 2000 guidance and draft performance plan documents,

(2) Year 2000 memorandums and cost estimation worksheets, (3) minutes

of FAA’s Year 2000 steering committee, and (4) the lines of businesses’ Year

2000 project plans, monthly status reports, and systems assessment

documentation. We also reviewed the agency’s Internet Web sites for Year

2000 information and newsletter articles, plus FAA’s documentation of

various Year 2000 briefings. We used our Year 2000 assessment guide2

 to

assess FAA’s readiness to achieve Year 2000 compliance.

To supplement the analyses noted above, we interviewed FAA’s Year 2000

product team members, the Year 2000 program manager, FAA’s deputy

chief information officer, and representatives from each of FAA’s 13 lines of

business.

We performed our work at the Federal Aviation Administration in

Washington, D.C., the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma, and the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic

City, New Jersey. Our work was performed from February through

November 1997, in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards. We requested comments on a draft of this product

from the Secretary of Transportation or his designee. On January 6, 1998,

we obtained oral comments from Transportation and FAA officials,

including representatives from the Office of the Secretary of

Transportation and FAA’s Chief Information Officer. Their comments are

discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section of this

report.

2

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept. 1997).

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High Risk of Year

2000 Complications

Can Be Reduced

Through Structured

Approach and

Rigorous Program

Management

On January 1, 2000, computer systems worldwide could malfunction or

produce inaccurate information simply because the date has changed.

Unless corrected, such failures could have a costly, widespread impact.

The problem is rooted in how dates are recorded and computed. For the

past several decades, systems have typically used two digits to represent

the year—such as “97” for 1997—to save electronic storage space and

reduce operating costs. In such a format, however, 2000 is

indistinguishable from 1900. Software and systems experts nationwide are

concerned that this ambiguity could cause systems to malfunction in

unforeseen ways, or to fail completely.

Correcting this problem will not be easy or inexpensive, and must be done

while such systems continue to operate. Many of the government’s

computer systems were developed 20 to 25 years ago, use a wide array of

computer languages, and lack full documentation. Systems may contain up

to several million lines of software code that must be examined for

potential date-format problems.

The enormous challenge involved in correcting these systems is not

primarily technical, however, it is managerial. Agencies’ success or failure

will largely be determined by the quality of their program management and

executive leadership. Top agency officials must understand the

importance and urgency of this undertaking, and communicate this to all

employees. The outcome of these efforts will also depend on the extent to

which agencies have institutionalized key systems-development and

program-management practices, and on their experience with such

large-scale software development or conversion projects. Accordingly,

agencies must first assess their information resources management

capabilities and, where necessary, upgrade them. In so doing, they should

consider soliciting the assistance of other organizations experienced in

these endeavors.

To assist agencies with these tasks, we have prepared a guide that

discusses the scope of the challenge and offers a structured, step-by-step

approach for reviewing and assessing an agency’s readiness to handle the

Year 2000 problem.3

 The guide describes in detail the following five

phases, each of which represents a major Year 2000 program activity or

segment:

• Awareness. This phase entails defining the Year 2000 problem, gaining

executive level support and sponsorship, and ensuring that everyone in the

3

GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept. 1997.

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organization is fully aware of the issue. Also, during this phase, a Year 2000

program team is established and an overall strategy is developed.

• Assessment. This phase entails assessing the Year 2000 impact on the

enterprise, identifying core business areas, inventorying and analyzing the

systems supporting the core business areas, and prioritizing their

conversion or replacement. Also, during this phase, contingency planning

is initiated and the necessary resources are identified and secured.

• Renovation. This phase deals with converting, replacing, or eliminating

selected systems and applications. In so doing, it is important to consider

the complex interdependencies among the systems and applications.

• Validation. This phase deals with testing, verifying, and validating all

converted or replaced systems and applications and ensuring that they

perform as expected. This entails testing the performance, functionality,

and integration of converted or replaced systems, applications, databases,

and interfaces in an operational environment.

• Implementation. This phase entails deploying and implementing Year 2000

compliant systems and components. Also, during this phase, data

exchange contingency plans are implemented, if necessary.

FAA Year 2000

Awareness Activities

Not Yet Completed

Institutional Year 2000 awareness is the first step in effectively addressing

the Year 2000 problem. FAA has initiated awareness activities, including

conducting a Year 2000 problem awareness campaign, drafting a Year 2000

agencywide plan, issuing a Year 2000 guidance document for project-level

plan development, and establishing a program management organization.

However, FAA fell behind in other key awareness activities, such as

finalizing the agency’s Year 2000 strategy, in part due to its late designation

of a program manager.

FAA Has Initiated Year

2000 Activities

FAA recognizes that the upcoming change of century poses significant

challenges to the agency. It began Year 2000 problem awareness activities

in May 1996, and during the ensuing 3 months established a Year 2000

product team and designated it as the focal point for Year 2000 issues

within FAA. Also, FAA established a Year 2000 steering committee. Since

then, the Year 2000 product team and steering committee have

(1) sponsored an awareness day and held assessment and testing practices

workshops, (2) set up Web pages and published a newsletter article to

provide information on the Year 2000 problem, and (3) briefed FAA’s

management on the agency’s Year 2000 problem. In addition, in

September 1996, the product team issued the FAA Guidance Document for

Year 2000 Date Conversion. This guide was intended to assist the lines of

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businesses within FAA in planning for the conversion of their computer

systems to handle processing of dates in the year 2000 and beyond.

FAA Late in Designating

Year 2000 Program

Manager, Leading to

Delays in Year 2000 Plan

It is essential that agencies appoint a Year 2000 program manager and

establish an agency-level program office to manage and coordinate Year

2000 program activities. The problem and solutions involve a wide range

of dependencies among information systems: the need to (1) centrally

develop or acquire conversion and validation standards, inspection,

conversion, and testing tools, (2) coordinate the conversion of

crosscutting information systems and their components, (3) establish

priorities, and (4) reallocate resources as needed.

However, FAA did not establish a program manager who had responsibility

for Year 2000 program management until July 1997.4

 This contributed to

key awareness activities being delayed. Specifically, FAA experienced

delays in establishing the agencywide Year 2000 plan needed for timely

initiation and effective execution of the key awareness and assessment

phase activities.

Because FAA was slow to designate a program manager, it is only now

finalizing its agencywide plan for achieving Year 2000 compliance. The

September 1997 draft of this document outlines the FAA strategy and

management approach to address the Year 2000 century date change.

Specifically, it

• defines the Year 2000 program management structure and responsibilities;

• adopts the five-phase management process, including the awareness,

assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation phases that are

being used throughout the government to manage and measure agencies’

Year 2000 programs;

• calls for awareness and assessment activities to be completed

expeditiously;

• provides for completion of the three remaining program

phases—renovation, validation, and implementation; and

• establishes performance indicators and reporting requirements.

FAA’s Year 2000 project manager provided a draft of this plan to the

Administrator on December 1, 1997, but does not have any estimate as to

when this document will be signed by the Administrator and made final.

4

Organizationally, FAA’s Year 2000 program manager position reports to the Chief Information Officer

(CIO), who heads the Office of Information Technology.

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Without an official agencywide Year 2000 strategy, FAA’s executive

management is without a road map for achieving Year 2000 compliance.

Further, the lack of an approved strategy means that FAA’s program

manager lacks the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies. As a result, each

line of business will have to decide if, when, and how to address its Year

2000 conversion, irrespective of agency priorities and standards. This

reinforces our existing concerns with FAA’s CIO not being in the proper

place in the organization to develop, maintain, and enforce information

technology initiatives. We have repeatedly recommended that FAA adopt a

management structure similar to that of the department-level CIOs as

prescribed in the Clinger-Cohen Act.5

 The Department of Transportation

(DOT) and FAA have disagreed with this recommendation because they

believe that the current location of the CIO, within the research and

acquisition line of business, is effective. We disagree. FAA’s CIO does not

report directly to the Administrator and thus does not have organizational

or budgetary authority over those who develop air traffic control systems

or the units that maintain them. Further, the agency’s long history of

problems in managing information technology projects reflects the need

for change.

FAA Does Not Know

the Full Extent of Its

Year 2000 Problem

Because It Has Not

Completed

Assessment Activities

FAA has not completed key assessment activities, placing it at enormous

risk of not achieving Year 2000 compliance by January 1 of that year.

Specifically, FAA has not (1) assessed the severity of its Year 2000 problem

and (2) completed the inventory and assessment of its information

systems and their components. Also, while FAA has initiated other key

assessment phase activities on individual projects, it has not completed

determining priorities for system conversion and replacement, developing

plans for addressing identified date dependencies, developing validation

and test plans for all converted or replaced systems, addressing interface

and data exchange issues among internal and external systems, and

initiating the development of business continuity plans in case systems are

not corrected in time. FAA states that it expects to complete assessment

phase activities by the end of January 1998.

5

Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA Systems Modernization

(GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997) and Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes

Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997).

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FAA Does Not Know the

Likely Full Impact of Its

Year 2000 Problem

Developing and publishing a high-level assessment of the severity of the

Year 2000 issue provides executive management and staff with a broad

overview of the potential impact the century change could have on the

agency. Such an assessment provides management with valuable

information on which to rank the agency’s Year 2000 activities, as well as a

means of obtaining and publicizing management commitment and support

for necessary Year 2000 initiatives.

Unfortunately, FAA has only begun to assess the severity of the impact of

Year 2000-induced failures. The Year 2000 Financial Oversight Team,

established in October 1997, has been tasked with identifying the impact of

Year 2000 failures on FAA’s operations, programs, and priorities. This

assessment will be focused primarily on key mission critical systems and

is to be provided to FAA management in February 1998.

On the basis of our discussions with FAA personnel, it is clear that FAA’s

ability to ensure the safety of the National Airspace System and to avoid

the grounding of planes could be compromised if systems are not changed.

For example, the Host Computer System, the centerpiece information

processing system in FAA’s en route centers, relies on the date to determine

which day of the week it is when the system is initialized. This information

triggers the use of different prescheduled flight plans. That is, carriers use

different flight plans and times on a Monday than they do on a Saturday.

Because January 1, 2000, is a Saturday, and January 1, 1900, was a

Monday, uncorrected date dependencies could lead to the Host using

incorrect flight plans. This could result in delayed flights. While FAA

officials stated that they believe this problem has been solved, they

acknowledged that other unforeseen problems may exist because they

have not yet completed assessments of the impact of the Year 2000

problem.

External organizations are also concerned about the impact of FAA’s Year

2000 status on their operations. FAA recently met with representatives from

airlines, aircraft manufacturers, airports, fuel suppliers,

telecommunications providers, and industry associations to discuss the

Year 2000 issue. At this meeting, participants raised the concern that their

own Year 2000 compliance was irrelevant if FAA was not compliant

because of the many system interdependencies. Airline representatives

further explained that flights could not even get off the ground on

January 1, 2000, unless FAA is substantially Year 2000 compliant—and that

would be an economic disaster. Because of these types of concerns, FAA

has now agreed to meet regularly with industry representatives to

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coordinate the safety and technical implications of shared data and

interfaces.

Inventory and Assessment

of Information Systems

Are Incomplete

An agencywide inventory and assessment of information systems and their

components provides the necessary foundation for detailed Year 2000

program planning. A thorough inventory ensures that all systems are

identified and linked to a specific business area or process, and that all

agencywide, crosscutting systems are considered while detailed

assessments determine (1) the criticality of the various systems and

(2) how they should be handled (through conversion, replacement,

retirement, or no remedial action).

According to FAA’s April 1997 Year 2000 guidance document, it expected to

have completed inventories of its computer systems and components by

May 31, 1997. However, FAA still had not finished them when we completed

audit work in November 1997. This inventory did not contain all systems,

support software, firmware, telecommunications equipment, and desktop

computers. According to FAA’s November 15, 1997, quarterly Year 2000

report to DOT, its inventory included 619 systems. These systems comprise

approximately 18,000 subsystems and 65 million lines of software code. In

commenting on a draft of this report, a Year 2000 program official told us

that the inventory of systems was completed on December 29, 1997, with

other inventory items expected to be completed later.

In addition, FAA has not completed assessing (1) the criticality of the

computer systems in its inventory or (2) how the systems should be

handled. Of the 619 systems in its inventory when it reported to DOT on

November 15, FAA identified 329 as mission-critical, 278 as

nonmission-critical, and 12 as undetermined, meaning that they have not

yet been categorized as mission-critical or nonmission-critical. These

numbers will likely continue to grow as the inventory nears completion.6

In mid-November, FAA provided data to DOT on the number of mission

critical systems it had assessed and whether it had determined that they

should be replaced, retired, left alone, or converted to Year 2000

compliancy. DOT requested validation of these assessments and refined

these numbers for its November quarterly report to the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB). In that report, DOT stated that FAA had

completed assessments of only 84, or about 25 percent, of its 329

6

In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA officials stated that as of December 29, 1997, FAA’s

inventory of 741 systems included 420 mission-critical systems, 284 nonmission-critical systems, and

37 systems whose criticality was as yet undetermined.

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mission-critical systems. That is, FAA had not determined how to handle its

remaining 245 mission critical systems.

Of the 84 completed assessments, DOT reported that 34 are Year 2000

compliant, 8 are to be replaced with new compliant applications, 2 are

being retired, and 32 are being repaired. The remaining 8 systems are in

the process of being certified compliant. Figure 2 summarizes the

completed assessments’ results.

Figure 2: Results of Completed

Assessments

compliant

to be replaced

to be repaired

compliance pending

to be retired

34

8

32

8

2

FAA reported that assessment of the remaining mission-critical systems will

continue through the end of January 1998.

Other Key Assessment

Phase Activities Are

Likewise Incomplete

Other key assessment phase activities include determining priorities for

system conversion and replacement, developing plans for addressing

identified date dependencies, developing validation and test plans for all

converted or replaced systems, addressing interface and data exchange

issues among systems, and developing contingency plans for continuing

operations in case systems are not corrected in time. FAA has just begun

these activities.

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In October 1997, FAA established a Year 2000 Financial Oversight Team

with responsibilities for determining priorities for system conversion and

replacement, and recommending sources for funding Year 2000 activities

to FAA management. At the conclusion of our audit work, Year 2000

program officials told us that they provided preliminary recommendations

to FAA management in December 1997, with final recommendations to

follow in February 1998.

Also, FAA’s draft Year 2000 plan calls for each of the 13 lines of business to

(1) develop plans for addressing identified date dependencies, (2) develop

plans for validating and testing all converted or replaced systems,

(3) address interface and data exchange issues among systems, and

(4) develop a realistic contingency plan, including establishing manual or

contract procedures, to ensure the continuity of core processes. To date,

most of the lines of business have developed plans for addressing

identified date dependencies. Some of these plans include requirements

for testing converted or replaced systems, addressing interface and date

exchange issues, and developing contingency plans; other plans, however,

do not address these items. Regardless, not all of these plans have been

finalized. The program manager told us that she was working with the

responsible organizations and planned to finalize their plans by the end of

December 1997. At the conclusion of our review, these plans had still not

been finalized.

Delays in Completing

Awareness and

Assessment Leave

Little Time for Critical

Renovation,

Validation, and

Implementation

Activities

Renovation, validation, and implementation activities are the three critical

final phases in correcting Year 2000 vulnerabilities. FAA has started the

renovation process for some of the systems with completed assessments.

However, because of the agency’s delays in completing its awareness and

assessment activities, time is running out for FAA to renovate its systems,

validate these conversions or replacements, and implement its converted

or replaced systems.

FAA’s delays are further magnified by the agency’s poor history in

delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget.7 FAA’s

weaknesses in managing software acquisition will also hamper its

renovation, validation, and implementation efforts.8

7

Advanced Automation System: Implications of Problems and Recent Changes (GAO/T-RCED-94-188,

Apr. 13, 1994); High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb. 1995); and High-Risk Series:

Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb. 1997).

8

GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21, 1997.

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Given the many hurdles FAA faces and the limited amount of time left,

planning for business continuity becomes ever more urgent for FAA so that

its mission-critical business processes and supporting systems continue to

function through the millennium. Such business continuity planning

defines the assumptions and risk scenarios, business service objectives,

time frames, priorities, tasks, activities, procedures, resources,

responsibilities, and the specific steps and detailed actions for

re-establishing functional capability for mission critical business processes

in the event of prolonged disruption, failure, or disaster.

Until Assessments Are

Complete, Cost

Estimates Will Remain

Incomplete

Reliable program cost estimates require a thorough and complete

definition of a program’s scope and components. However, FAA has yet to

completely define the scope of its Year 2000 program. As noted above, FAA

has not yet completed its inventory of systems or its assessment of which

systems are critical and how to handle them. As a result, the current Year

2000 program cost estimate of $246 million will likely change once FAA has

a better handle on its inventory and determines how to handle the various

systems. FAA acknowledges the uncertainty of its current cost estimate due

to incomplete inventory and assessment information.

Even after assessments are completed and estimates finalized, FAA’s cost

estimates could still be of questionable reliability. We have previously

reported on FAA’s weaknesses in reliably estimating the cost of its

software-intensive Air Traffic Control projects and recommended that FAA

correct its weak cost estimating practices by institutionalizing defined

estimating processes.9 FAA agreed with our recommendation and has

initiated efforts to improve its processes.

Regardless of the eventual cost estimate, uncertainty surrounds funding of

FAA’s Year 2000 activities. For example, only $18 million of the $246 million

is currently in the fiscal year 1998 budget. At the same time, however, OMB

has stated that, because of DOT’s disappointing progress on the Year 2000

issue, it has established a rebuttable presumption that it will not fund any

DOT requests for information technology investments in the fiscal year 1999

budget unless they are directly related to fixing the Year 2000 problem.

Further, according to a December 4, 1997, briefing to the Administrator,

FAA has been directed by OMB to reprogram existing funds from lower

priority projects to its Year 2000 program.

9

Air Traffic Control: Improved Cost Information Needed to Make Billion Dollar Modernization

Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20, Jan. 22, 1997).

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Conclusions Should the pace at which FAA addresses its Year 2000 issues not quicken,

and critical FAA systems not be Year 2000 compliant and therefore not be

ready for reliable operation on January 1 of that year, the agency’s

capability in several essential areas—including the monitoring and

controlling of air traffic—could be severely compromised. This could

result in the temporary grounding of flights until safe aircraft control can

be assured.

Avoiding such emergency measures will require strong, active oversight.

Yet an approved strategy containing detailed plans, milestones, and valid

cost estimates—all vital considerations—is still lacking. This is due, at

least in part, to incomplete assessment of agency vulnerabilities. Such

incomplete assessment is cause for concern. It means that FAA has no way

of knowing at this time how serious its Year 2000 date software-coding

problem is—or what it will cost to address it.

FAA’s delays to date are very troubling. Given the rapidly approaching

millennium, such delays are no longer acceptable. Until all inventorying

and assessments have been completed—set for the end of

January 1998—FAA will not be able to effectively or efficiently marshal the

available resources, both human and financial, that will be needed to do

the job. Once the degree of vulnerability has been determined, a structured

approach—such as that provided in our assessment guide10—can offer a

road map as to the effective use of such resources. Unless critical

renovation, validation, and implementation activities are completed in

time, and sound contingency plans are available, FAA risks not successfully

navigating the change to the new millennium.

Recommendations Urgent action is imperative to improve the management effectiveness of

FAA’s Year 2000 program and thus the likelihood of its success.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct

that the Administrator of FAA, take the actions necessary to expedite the

completion of overdue awareness and assessment activities. At a

minimum, the Administrator should

• finalize an agencywide plan which provides the Year 2000 program

manager the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies and outlines FAA’s

strategy for addressing the Year 2000 date change;

• assess how its major business lines and the aviation industry would be

affected if the Year 2000 problem were not corrected in time, and use the

10GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept. 1997.

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-98-45 FAA Computer Systems
B-276525 

results of this assessment to help rank the agency’s Year 2000 activities, as

well as a means of obtaining and publicizing management commitment

and support for necessary Year 2000 initiatives;

• by January 30, 1998, complete inventories of all information systems and

their components, including data interfaces;

• by January 30, 1998, finish assessments of all systems in FAA’s inventory to

determine each one’s criticality and to decide whether each system should

be converted, replaced, or retired;

• determine priorities for system conversion and replacement based on

systems’ mission-criticality;

• establish plans for addressing identified date dependencies;

• develop validation and test plans for all converted or replaced systems;

• craft Year 2000 contingency plans for all business lines to ensure

continuity of critical operations; and

• make a reliable cost estimate based on a comprehensive inventory and

completed assessments of the various systems’ criticality and handling

needs.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOT and FAA officials provided oral comments on a draft of this report.

These officials generally concurred with the report’s findings, conclusions,

and recommendations. FAA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) stated that FAA

recognizes the importance of addressing the Year 2000 issue and plans to

implement our recommendations.

The CIO stated that FAA’s administrator had not yet signed the agencywide

Year 2000 plan and that its Year 2000 program manager retired at the end

of December 1997. FAA plans to hire a new acting program manager from

outside the agency. Given the limited amount of time left to address Year

2000 issues, delays in finalizing the agencywide plan and the turnover of

senior management further risk FAA’s chance of success.

Representatives from the Air Traffic Services (ATS) line of business, the

organization responsible for operational air traffic control systems,

commented that their organization has made significant progress in

addressing the Year 2000 problem and that they do not have the problems

that FAA has overall. ATS officials stated that they have in place a Year 2000

project plan, repair process and standards, and a quality assurance plan

for system renovations. While we acknowledge these steps by ATS, the

pace of progress must increase if ATS and FAA are to address the Year 2000

problem in time.

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-98-45 FAA Computer Systems
B-276525 

FAA officials also offered some specific comments directed to particular

language in the draft report. These comments have been incorporated into

the report where appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from its date. At

that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations, and their Subcommittees on Transportation; the

Subcommittee on Aviation, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation; and the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure. We are also sending copies to the

Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration, and other interested congressional committees and

subcommittees. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-6253 or by e-mail at

willemssenj.aimd@gao.gov if you have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to the report are listed in appendix I.

Joel C. Willemssen

Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-98-45 FAA Computer Systems
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Rona B. Stillman, Chief Scientist for Computers and Telecommunications

Keith A. Rhodes, Technical Director

Randolph C. Hite, Senior Assistant Director

Colleen M. Phillips, Assistant Director

Tamara Lilly, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Michael P. Fruitman, Communications Analyst

Madhav Panwar, Technical Assistant Director

Naba Barkakati, Technical Assistant Director

Ronald E. Famous, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Atlanta Field Office Glenda C. Wright, Senior Information Systems Analyst

(511533) Page 18 GAO/AIMD-98-45 FAA Computer Systems
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