In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1471

REBECCA GYSAN, individually and as executor of the estate of 

Shane Cataline,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STEVEN FRANCISKO and MARC MILLER, Director of the Illinois 

Department of Natural Resources,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 16-cv-8254 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 9, 2020 — DECIDED JULY 13, 2020

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. On the first day of deerhunting season in 2013, Officer Steven Francisko was checking hunters’ licenses to prevent poaching. He saw a van 

parked on the side of a road; immediately across the road, 

armed hunters had just emerged from the woods. Francisko

approached the driver, who turned out to be Shane Cataline. 
2 No. 19-1471

Francisko thought that Cataline was acting strangely and 

was reluctant to answer questions, though he handed Francisko his driver’s license. While Francisko was in his car doing a license check, Cataline called 911 and said: “I am in a 

lot of trouble right now. ... I think I am going to be disappearing or something.” He hung up without requesting assistance. Francisko found that Cataline’s license was valid 

and that he was not wanted on a warrant, so he told Cataline 

that he was free to go—though he thought that Cataline 

looked tired.

By the time Cataline drove away, Francisko had been 

joined by State Trooper Luke Kuehl in a second car. The 911 

operator, worried about the strangeness of Cataline’s statements, called back, but he did not answer. The operator 

called the dispatcher, who reached Kuehl’s supervisor, who 

told him to stop Cataline to check whether he was fit to 

drive. (Everyone calls this a “welfare check,” meaning that it 

concerned the welfare of both Cataline and other drivers he 

might endanger.) Meanwhile Francisko had told Kuehl that 

he suspected that Cataline might be carrying drugs. The two 

officers followed Cataline’s van onto the eastbound lanes of 

I-88 and eventually pulled it over, though they took a while 

to see whether he violated any traffic laws that might support a stop.

Cataline stopped his van on the side of the highway after 

Kuehl turned on his flashing lights. Kuehl parked his car behind the van, and Francisko parked in front. The officers 

asked Cataline to put the van in park, turn off the engine, 

and hand over the keys. He did none of these things and 

stared straight ahead. Told that the officers wanted to ask 

about the 911 call, Cataline ignored them and continued to 
No. 19-1471 3

look ahead. Again, and then a third time, they told Cataline 

to turn off the engine. He did not comply. Instead he put the 

van into reverse, obtained enough room to turn 180°, and 

pointed the van west in the eastbound lanes of the Interstate. 

Francisko, who had to jump out of the way to avoid being 

hit, started trying to warn approaching traffic. Cataline then 

made a further 90° turn and plowed the van into the side of 

Kuehl’s car, bending its open door forward (the wrong way)

on the hinge. Kuehl and Francisko say that Kuehl was 

pinned behind the door.

A dashboard camera on Kuehl’s car was pointed straight 

ahead and recorded the van making the first 180° turn, but 

that maneuver took it out of the field of view. The audio portion of the recording continued, however, and the sound of 

the collision is followed by the sound of the van’s engine 

running and tires spinning after the crash, plus the voice of 

someone screaming. Francisko jumped onto the hood of Kuehl’s car and shot Cataline, who died at the scene. The video 

continued, and Kuehl can be seen limping.

Rebecca Gysan, Cataline’s mother and the executor of his 

estate, filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. She contended

that the police thrice violated the Fourth Amendment (applied to the states by the Fourteenth): first by asking questions while Cataline’s van was stopped, next by directing 

Cataline to stop driving while his van was moving, and finally by shooting him. The district court granted summary 

judgment to both defendants—Francisko and Marc Miller, 

director of the state agency that employed Francisko. 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23805 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2019).

The judge rejected the first two theories on the merits and 

the third after concluding that Francisko is entitled to quali-
4 No. 19-1471

fied immunity because existing precedent would not have 

made clear to all reasonable officers that the use of deadly 

force was forbidden. On appeal Gysan has abandoned any

claim based on the initial encounter between Francisko and 

Cataline, and her brief does not so much as mention Miller. 

Our discussion is limited to the remaining theories.

We start with the shooting. Gysan proceeds as if showing 

that the van should not have been stopped would be enough 

to demonstrate that Francisko could not lawfully have shot 

Cataline. Doubtless the stop was one step in the causal chain 

leading to Cataline’s death, but an improper stop would not 

demonstrate that Francisko used excessive force under the 

circumstances that he faced after the stop occurred. Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017), holds that officers who 

make errors that lead to a dangerous situation retain the 

ability to defend themselves. We therefore put aside (for 

now) the question whether the officers should have stopped 

Cataline and ask whether it was clearly established that the 

Constitution forbade the use of deadly force under the circumstances that ensued.

Whether it is “clearly established” that the official conduct is forbidden is the principal issue when a defendant asserts qualified immunity. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139 

S. Ct. 500 (2019). And few propositions are as well established in favor of police officers as that they are entitled to 

use deadly force to protect themselves or the public from an 

imminent threat of serious harm. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Mendez and Emmons discuss many of 

these decisions. Recent opinions in this circuit illustrate the 

point. King v. Hendricks County Commissioners, 954 F.3d 981 

(7th Cir. 2020), holds that police who shot a person who 
No. 19-1471 5

charged them with a knife were entitled to qualified immunity, and Ybarra v. Chicago, 946 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020), holds 

that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by shooting the driver of a fleeing car from which shots had recently 

been fired.

Gysan does not doubt that police may use deadly force to 

protect themselves. Instead she contends that Cataline was 

not a danger to them. Yet he had violated an order to turn off 

the engine; then he turned the van around, began to drive

the wrong way on an expressway, and turned again to hit a 

police cruiser. All of that is undisputed.

Gysan suggests that, after smashing into Kuehl’s car, 

Cataline may have put up his hands in surrender. That’s 

conceivable, though we do not see how it could be proved; 

as in King, the only person in a good position to offer evidence contradicting the police account is dead. Francisko 

and Kuehl both testified that Kuehl was wedged behind the 

door and at continuing risk; again Gysan lacks contrary evidence. What objective evidence we have supports the officers: the van’s engine continued to run at high speed until 

Francisko shot Cataline, which is inconsistent with his desisting from the aoack and surrendering. Kuehl appears in 

the video to walk with a limp after the events, and Gysan 

does not deny that the voice heard screaming was Kuehl’s; 

this supports the officers’ contention that Kuehl’s life was at 

stake. Francisko is entitled to qualified immunity.

This brings us back to the question whether the traffic 

stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Gysan’s brief left us 

uncertain whether she seeks damages for the stop, independent of the shooting, but at oral argument her lawyer 

said that she is. The briefs do not address questions such as 
6 No. 19-1471

whether invasion of privacy, loss of time, or the other injuries from an unnecessary traffic stop survive the driver’s 

death and what damages, if any, an estate may pursue. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), holds that state survival statutes determine the answers for suits under §1983, 

yet the parties’ briefs do not mention how Illinois handles 

these maoers. Instead of exploring these issues on our own, 

we stop with the question whether Cataline would have had 

a good claim, had he lived. Cf. United States v. SinenengSmith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).

Let us suppose that Francisko was looking for a pretext 

that would enable him to stop the van so that he could check

for drugs. That does not maoer because analysis under the 

Fourth Amendment is objective. Whren v. United States, 517 

U.S. 806 (1996), holds that as long as a stop is supported by 

an objectively sufficient cause, a court must ignore the officers’ motivations. So we ask whether it was reasonable to stop 

Cataline’s van.

The answer is yes. Cataline’s behavior when initially 

questioned and the odd 911 call both would have led an 

officer to be concerned that he was tired or under the influence of drugs, which would have posed a danger to himself 

and other drivers. After learning about the 911 call the dispatcher and Kuehl’s supervisor both concluded that he 

should stop the van and inquire about those potential problems. And when Francisko set out to find a pretext for the 

stop, what he saw was consistent with concern about safety 

on the road. Francisko and Kuehl testified that they saw the 

van cross the white line on the right of the highway several 

times. (The parties call this the fog line.) Inability to keep a 

vehicle centered in the lane suggests that the driver is im-
No. 19-1471 7

paired. Gysan denies that the van crossed the fog line, but 

again that contention is unsupported by evidence. The officers’ testimony is the only evidence that we will ever have 

about that subject. The stop was a reasonable one and compatible with the Fourth Amendment.

AFFIRMED