FILED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T HC IR C U IT J AN 16, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 16678 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C . D ocketN o. 05 -029 37 -C V -C C -1 M I L D R E D M C C R A Y , P la in tif f - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s J O H N E . P O T T E R , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lle e .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e N o r th e r n D is tr ic t o f G e o r g ia

_________________________ ( Jan u ar y 16, 2008) B efo re A N D E R S O N , C A R N E S an d B A R K E T T , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M: M i l dred M cC ra y, an em pl oyee of the U ni t ed S t at es P ost al S er vi ceThe Postal Serviceresponde d to McCray ’s complaint with a motion to dism iss or, 1 alternatively , a motion for summary judgment. McCray

did not respond to the Postal Service’ s motion but in ste a d f

ile d h e r o wn

motion fo r s umm ary

judgme nt. Con sid e ri ngour disp os iti on of thi s a pp e a l, w efind

that th edis tric t c ourt

did no t a bu se 2 its dis c re tio n in

de c lin ingto e xerc isesu

pp le me ntal juri sdic tio n o ve r M c Cr ay ’s statelaw c laims beca use all other c laims over which thecourt ha d orig inal jurisdiction weredismiss ed. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004). “ We have encourag ed district courts to dismiss any remaining stateclaims when . . . thefederal c laims have be en dismiss ed prior to trial.” Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) . We need not address issues on appe al beyond those that dec ide the ca se. See I n re Club 3 Assocs., 956 F .2d 1065, 1068 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994). 2 pr oc e e di ng pr o s e , a ppe a l s the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s de c i s i on t o di s m i s s he rc om pl a i nt a lle g in g e m p lo y m e n t d is c r im in a tio n u n d e rT itle V I I f o rf a ilu r e to s ta te a c la im unde rF e d. R . C i v. P . 12( b) ( 6) or , a l t e r na t i ve l y , t o de ny he rc r os s - m ot i on f or su m m ary j u d g m en t . M cC ray al so ap p eal s th e d i stri ctco u rt ’ s refu sal t o ex erci se 1 supp l em ent al j uri sdi ct i on ov erher s t at e l aw cl ai m s. O n app ea l , M cC ra y a rgues thather c l ai m s s ho ul d n othave been di sm i ss ed. A l t ernat i vel y, she a rgues thather c a s e s houl d ha ve be e n a l l ow e d t o pr oc e e d be c a us e the P os t a l S e r vi c e pr ovi de d no e vi de nc e t o di s pr ove he rc l a i m s . L i be r a l l y c ons true d, s he a l s o a r gue s tha ts he shou l d b e a l l ow ed t o p roce ed on her s t at e l aw t ortcl ai m s. B ec ause w e f i nd that 2 e v e n u n d e rth e m o s t lib e r a l c o n s tru c tio n o f M c C r a y ’s c o m p la in t s h e h a s f a ile d to m ake outa c l ai m for r el i ef un der T i t l e V II , w e a ff i rm the di sm i ss al of her c o m p la in t. 3 W e r e v ie w a d is tr ic t c o u r t o r d e rg r a n tin g a m o tio n to d is m is s p u r s u a n t toWe of coursearealso mindful of McCray ’s pro se status and ac cording ly hold her 4 ple a din g s to a

le ss s tring e nt s tand ard . T ann e nb a um v . Unit e d St ate s, 14 8 F .3 d 1 26 2, 12 63 (1 1th Cir. 1998). We note that the mag istrate cour t below showed significant e ffor t at its hearingon the motion to dis miss to develop McCray ’s complaint and understand the ba sis of her discrimination claim. We areconfide nt that, even though McCray did not have the a ssistance of counsel, the c ourt aff

orded her every

opportunity

to present her arguments. 3 F ed. R . C i v. P . 12 (b)( 6) for f ai l ure t o st at e a cl ai m up on w hi ch re l i ef ca n b e gra nt ed de novo. C he ps t ow L t d. v. H unt , 381 F . 3d 1077, 1080 ( 11th C i r . 2004) ( c i t a t i on om i t t e d) . I n di s c us s i ng a R ul e 12( b) ( 6) m ot i on t o di s m i s s , w e ha ve he l d m a ny t i m e s tha t“ the pl e a di ngs a r e c ons true d br oa dl y , ” e . g. , L e vi ne v. W or l d F i n. N e tw or k N a t ’ l B a nk, 437 F . 3d 1118, 1120 ( 11th C i r . 2006) , a nd tha tthe al l egat i on s i n t he com pl ai ntar e vi ew ed i n t he l i gh tm ostfa vo rabl e t o t he pl ai nt i ff , 4 e . g. , C he ps t ow L t d. , 381 F . 3d a t1080. H ow e ve r , “ a f or m ul a i c r e c i t a t i on of

the e l e m e nt s of

a c a us e of

a c t i on w i l l notdo. ” B e l l A t l a nt i c C orp. v. T w om bl y , ___ U . S . ___, 127 S . C t . 1955, 1965 ( 2007) . T he “ [ f ] a c tua l a l l e ga t i ons m us tbe e nough to ra ise a rig h t t o re li ef

ab o v e th e s p ec u lati v e lev el.” Id . T h e S u p re m e C o u rt’s m os tr e c e ntf

or m ul a t i on of

the s t a nda r d i s tha tthe c om pl a i ntm us tha ve “ e nough fa ctual m att er(t aken as true) t o sug gest ” the re qu i re d el em ent s. Id. T he C ou rt i ns truc t e d tha tthe rul e “ doe s noti m pos e a pr oba bi l i ty r e qui r e m e nta tthe pl e a di ng s t a ge , ” buti ns t e a d “ s i m pl y c a l l s f ore nough f

a c tt o r a i s e a r e a s ona bl e e xpe c t a t i on th a t d is c o v e r y w ill r e v e a l e v id e n c e o f ” th e n e c e s s a r y e le m e n ts . I d . T i t l e V I I m a ke s i tunl a w f ul f ora n e m pl oy e r“ t o di s c ha r ge a ny i ndi vi dua l , or4

othe r w i s e t o di s c r i m i na t e a ga i ns ta ny i ndi vi dua l w i th r e s pe c tt o hi s c om pe ns a t i on, t er m s, cond i t i on s, or pri vi l eges of em pl oym ent , beca use of s uch i nd i vi du al ’ s r ac e, c o lo r , r e lig io n , s e x , o rn a tio n a l o r ig in .” 4 2 U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 e - 2 ( a ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . T h e p l ai n t i ff i n an em p l o ym en td i scri m i n at i o n l aw su i tm u stsh o w th atan ad v erse e m pl oy m e nta c t i on w a s r e l a t e d t o a n e m pl oy e r ’ s di s c r i m i na t or y a ni m us t ow a r ds the em pl oyee base d o n a prot ec t ed chara ct er i st i c. S t i m pson v. C i ty of T usca l oo sa , 18 6 F . 3d 13 28 , 13 31 (11t h C i r. 19 99 ). T i t l e V II do es no tencom pass ever y tri bu l at i on a w orker m ay experi ence i n t he w orkp l ac e, bu ti nst ea d o nl y prosc ri bes e m p lo y m e n t d is c r im in a tio n b a s e d o n r a c e , c o lo r , r e lig io n , s e x , o rn a tio n a l o r ig in . S ee , e. g. , G i l chri stv. B ol ger, 73 3 F . 2d 15 51 , 15 53 -54 (11 th C i r. 19 84 ). M cC ra y f

ai l ed t o st at e a val i d T i t l e V II cl ai m beca use s he di d n otal l ege that a ny di s c r i m i na t or y a c tw a s t a ke n be c a us e of he rr a c e , c ol or , r e l i gi on, s e x, or na t i ona l or i gi n. M c C r a y ’ s c om pl a i nta l l e ge d tha the re m pl oy e r“ f a i l [ e d] t o pr ovi de [her ] w i th t he equal ri gh t s, op po rtun i t i es , and t he di stre ss re l i ef that[s he] re qu es t ed[, ] re peat edl y c ausi ng [her ] i l l ness and l osse s. ” S he al l eged di s c r i m i na t or y c onduc ti n the f or m of “ a bus i ve s e r vi c e a s a n e m pl oy e e of the U ni t ed S t at es P ost al S er vi ce . ” H erform com pl ai ntse l ec t ed “ ot her” as her c at egory o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ( f

r o m a m o n g r a c e , r e l i g i o n , s e x , n a t i o n a l o r i g i n , a n d o th e r ) . At i t s he a r i ng, the m a gi s tr a t e c our ta s ke d M c C r a y w he the rs he f e l tthe a bus e s heOn appe al, McCra y also argues that she should be allowed to amend her complaint. 5 However, an a

mendment would be f

utile beca use McCra

y ’s testimony

at oral argument reve aled that sh edid

no t be lie vehe r a

bu seto b ere late d to or

be c a us eof any Ti tleVIIprote c te d s tatus , and she ha s not demonstrated a ny other ba sis for re lief on appe al. See B rew er- Giorg io v. Prod uc e rs Vi de o, Inc ., 21 6 F .3 d 1 28 1, 12 84 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) (m oti on

to a me nd may bede nie d if amendment is futile). A dditionally , undisputed evidenc e showe d that McCray' s claim was barred by Title VI I ’s 90 day

statute of limitations following final ag ency action: the EEOC issued its noti ce of

final ac tion to McCray

on October

30, 2003, more than two year s before she fi le d th epre se nt c omp la int in t heNo rt he rn Di stric t of

Ge org ia on No ve mber 3 , 2 00 5. 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-16( c) (requiringplaintiff to file suit within 90 day s of re ceipt of noticeof final a ction); Z illyette v. Capital OneFin. Corp., 179 F .3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). The Appe llant’s reque st for oral argument is DENIED. 6 5 s uf f e r e d w a s be c a us e of

he rs e x, r a c e , r e l i gi on, orna t i ona l or i gi n; M c C r a y di d not in d ic a te s h e f

e lt d is c r im in a te d a g a in s t b e c a u s e o f a n y p r o te c te d s ta tu s u n d e rT itle V I I . P uts i m pl y , T i t l e V I I doe s notpr ot e c tM c C r a y f r om the ki nds of di s c r i m i na t i on s he a l l e ge d. T he di s tr i c tc our tthe r e f or e di d note r ri n gr a nt i ng the Po s t a l Se r v i c e ’ s Ru l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) mo t i o n f o rf a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m. 5 AF F I R ME D. 6