- - 

lNAL BULLITIN FOR ARMY ENQINEER 
By Major General Robert 5.Flowers 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

The World's Premier EnaineerTeam: I MCS-ENG is an engineer-specificsoftware systemthat 

The slogan "One Regiment, One Team, One The Grizzly is a complex obstacle-breaching vehicle 

FightJ'embodiesthe Engineer Regiment's vision. that is based on a refurbished MI chassis. It integrates 

The Senior Engineer Officer Board of Directors advanced countermine and counterobstacle capabilities 

carefully crafted the vision in Washington, D.C., in in a single, survivable system. 

September. Its purpose is to ensure that our regiment The Wolverine is a heavy assault bridge that is 

remains relevant to all our military forces, major Army based on an MI chassis. It is designed to transport, 

command (MACOM) staffs, Directors of Public Works, launch, and retrieve a military load class 70 bridge 

Department of Defense civilians, private industries that across gaps up to 24 meters. 

serve or support military units, and Corps of Engineer The DTSS integrates commercial off--the-shelf hardorganizations around the world. The vision statement ware and laboratory-developed software to form a 

describes how an organization will look, what it will do, package that provides direct access to data acquired by 

and how it will operate. It states what we continually national systems and delivered by tactical exploitation of 

strive to achieve. Our new vision statement is: national capabilities assets. Soldiers utilizing the DTSS 

have the capability to produce soft and hard topographic 

" 

I is subordinate to the Maneuver Control system (MCS). Full-Spectrum,Total Force-Vital to the Army and 11 

the Nation , The MCS is a command and control system that provides 

I the maneuver commander and his staff (Cor~slevel and 

1 The U.S. Army Engineer Regiment I products, such as digital terrain elevation data map 

substitutes and three-dimensionalterrain products. 

Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges Today - Deployed engineer survivability and give engineer units an 

or at Home, in Peace or in War armored capability for providing mobility and counterI mobility support to the maneuver forces. The leading One Regiment, OneTeam, One Fight contender for a modernized ESV is the Bradley fighting 

Values Based -Respected! Res~onsiveyReliable 

Visualizing and EnhancingTerrain to Ensure 1 

Mission Success 

I vehicle. The long-term solution is to co-develop an ESV 

Our next step is to staff this vision statement with variant of the future infantry vehicle (see article, page 7). 

regimental leaders at all levels to gain an understanding As Part of OPMS XXI, we recently updated the 

of what each bullet means to the various organizations Engineer chapter in DA Pam 600-3. The most significant 

within the regiment. As stated during the 1998 change expands o~~ortunitiesfor majors to become 

ENFORCE Conference, the vision is effectiveonly ifthe branch qualified. Branch-qualifying positions for majors 

officers, noncommissioned officers, and Department of now include assistant division engineers, directors of 

the Army civilians understand it. To that end, I ask all of public works, and deputy district engineers, as well as the 

you to continually communicate this vision to soldiers traditional S3 and XO positions. This change recognizes 

and civilians throughout our diverse regiment. the importance that these positions have in supporting 

The Engineer School continues to field new the total force and the considerable responsibility they 

equipment to maintain a vital force structure. Our top demand. I believe that this change will result in officers 

five priorities remain the Grizzly, the Wolverine, the spending more time in branch-qualifying positions for the 

Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), the betterment of the organization and themselves. 

Maneuver Control System-Engineer (MCS-ENG), and As I travel around the world and visit military units, I 

a modernizedengineer squad vehicle (ESV). I ask your have an o~~ortunit~ to meet SOr-ne of the outstanding 

support to communicate the importance of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who trained here 

systems to key Army, Department of Defense, and at Fort LeonardWood. I never fail to be amazed at their 

political leaders. Brief descriptions follow. high quality.Thank you for a job well done. 

, , 

below) with automatedassistanceto execute precise, near 

real-timecommand and control of combat forces. 

A modernized ESV is critically needed to enhance 
November 1998 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 28 PB 5-98-4 - 

I 

UNITED STATES ARMY I F;EA,TUPES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 2 The Army XXI Division: Engineer Relevancy in the Age 

of Information Technology 

I By Major General Robert B. Flowers, Mr. Vern Lowrey, and 

COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT 1 Colonel Bruce Porter 

Major General Robert B. Flowers 

' 7 The Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle ' By Major Aniello L. Tortora and Major Thomas Quigley I 

12 Operation Desert Thunder: Coalition Task Force-Kuwait 

MANAGING EDITOR I Engineer Operations 

Catherine Eubanks 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Shirley Bridges 

I By Lieutenant Colonel William Bowers, Major Michael Lynch, 

and Major Donald Johantges 

Tactical DPW in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

By Captain David G. Winget 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER ( 20 Underground Combat: Stereophonic Blasting,Tunnel Rats, 

Jennifer Morgan and the Soviet-Afghan War I By Lester W Grau and AE Ahmad Jalali 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 

DENNIS J. REIMER 

General, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

24 Guantanamo Bay: Combat Engineering Don't "Gitmo" 

Better Than This 

By Captain Anthony J. Monaco, USMC 

30 TerraBase Il, Version 3.0: Supporting the Terrain 

Visualization Expert 

By Mark Adams and Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hooper 

38 Training Base Expansion: An Active-Reserve Partnership 

By Lieutenant Colonel Allen C. Estes and Second Lieutenant 

Kenneth Caubble 

41 Cracking the Code on Class IVIClass V Supply Point 

Operations 

Front Cover: Through Army XXI reorganization, experimentation, deployments, and / DEPARTMENTS 

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

05173 

By Captain Mark T: Martinez 

44 The Origins of Military Mines: Part II 

By Major William C. Schneck 

51 Through the Breach: ATanker's Perspective 

By Captain Jeffrey Erdley 

training, engineers prepare for the next 

millenium. 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by the U.S. Army Engineer 

School, 320 Eng~neer Loop, Suite 370, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929. Second 

Class postage is paid at Fort Leonard Wood. MO, and additional mailing offices. 

Inside front cover: Clear the Way 

11 Book Review 60 Engineer Update 

Back Cover: A historical example of the Army 

value "Respect," 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to ENGINEER Magazine. 320 

Engineer Loop, Suite 370, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929. 

33 CTC Notes 61 Lead the Way 

56 Past in Review 

CORRESPONDENCE, letters to the editor, manuscripts, photographs, official 

unit requests to receive copies, and unit address changes should be sent to 

ENGINEER at the preceding address. Telephone: (573) 563-4104. DSN 676-4104. 

ENGINEER'S e-mail address is: eubankscQwood.army.mil. Our Internet home page 

is located at: http://w.wood.army,m~llENGRMAG/emag-hp.htm. 

DISCLAIMER: ENGINEER presents professional information designed to keep 

U.S. military and civilian engineers informed of current and emerging developments 

within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional 

development. Views expressed are those of the author and not those of the 

Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not necessarily reflect 

official U.S. Army positions and do not change or supersede information in other U.S. 

Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy 

nor product endorsement. ENGINEER reserves the r~ght to ed~t material. 

CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is given to 

ENGINEER and the author. 

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION is targeted to all engineer and engineer-related units. 

PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are available by contacting the Superintendent of 

Documents. PO. Box 371954, Pittsburgh. PA 15250-7950. Address changes for 

personal subscriptions should also be sent to the Superintendent of Documents. 

November 1998 Engineer I 
By Major General Robert B. Flowers, MI: Vern Lowrey, and Colonel Bruce Porter 

E ngineers continue to prove their professional excellence and relevance in ongoing missions and training 

throughout the world. Today, Army en,' olneers are 

deployed in more than 70 countries to support operations 

ranging from building roads to clearing landmines to 

producing terrain visualization products. In the coming 

months and years, Army engineers have yet another challenge 

to meet-the Army XXI division (see Figure 1). 

Since 1993, the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) has been in the process of restructuring for 

tomorrow's Army. Through numerous seminars, analyses, and 

Advanced Warfighting Experiments, we designed a new heavy 

division. In June 1998, Army Chief of Staff General Reimer 

approved the Army XXI division design, which will be fielded 

initially by the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. The 

division will reorganize starting in October 1998 and will be 

evaluated during a series of experiments and exercises that 

culminate in a Division Capstone Exercise (DCX) to validate 

the design sometime during the summer of 2001. 

The U.S. Army Engineer School will thoroughly evaluate 

the 4th Infantry Division engineer structure from now through 

the DCX. The school will properly collect and analyze data 

that may lead to appropriate recommendations to the Army 

Chief of Staff concerning the Army XXI engineer structure. 

The school does not support efforts to convert other heavy 

divisions to the Army XXI structure until the design has 

been thoroughly evaluated by the Army and appropriate 

enablers are available. 

TRADOC Commander General Hartzog wrote in the JulyAugust 1998 issue ofArmy RD&A that this design is "...unique 

because of its smaller size (about 15,000 soldiers), its smaller 

and more compact combat elements (45 combat platforms in 

Army XXI Division Design 

15,719 

HHC 27RC 

0 ROC 2RC @:C HHC 2RC DRC HHC 

a61 

HHB 

a111 

HHC 

an 

DMMC 

12 RC 

2 Engineer 

Figure 1 

November 1998 
"Let rirc c~rn~~1rcr~ir.c fo cJrrer:lqorrcJ thctf rlrc /OI\ of the riii,ri\ii~rt e~tgirrcrl. hr-i~tr(lc~ I.~enclq~icrr.tc~~~~ irt 

tl~~ .~I*IFIJT ,!:!'I clivi,inrr dc~jiyir is rtot cr "(Eottc iletr~!" Tltcp Engirrerr. Sclrool TI-ill corrtirruc to gcitlrtv. 

I?ct~~;l, (!iiri.sioit,v iir flr~ j~t!rfi.e. If'[> fr.~!i rf~(~f jvfi 1i~1l'ii j,otir r~~ci)t~rtt~t~rtc/~~ti~?r~~s t!t~.oii~yl~ jSolii. r~t(~jor 

." r~nj, coinnrc~rtd !!c~trrl(/r!rr~.fi~t~.~ (ic., I'O R.YC'O.\'', I.'S,.,1 X,Ef-JC,'R, or. rht~ ;V(~riorlrrf d;irrrr.t/ Klir.cvirr) to 

f f? L' . -f 14f~{)' iC/! i(.;f' of' strrf?; IJ.2 (rl.\.r) u.\k f i'tcrl j'otc /ice/> kq. E~lgilr ccr ,S'c.lr oo! pc,r..\orz rtel irlj';?rnr ctl I? f 

JYI~!I* (w~io/~,+. !+'c ~uff.sf !i<01.!~: ro,y!~flr~~~~ ro fr(~lr;u~!c 0~1. cowr~~o~t ,yoli/. " 

itfrrjor C;i!nrj~.~/l Rnhcrf R. F1olow~ri.s 

maneuver battalions), and its reliance upon digital technology sion engineer brigade headquarters as part of the Army 

and computers. Its size makes it more rapidly deployable. Its XXI division validation process. We will accomplish this 

ability to share information horizontally and vertically across through the DCX.) 

the battlefield makes it capable of sustaining a rapid tempo of . An engineer battalion is assigned to brigade 

planning, preparing, and executing operations as well as team (BCT) in the division-rather than being assigned to 

sustaining and recovering from operations. Its modular the division engineer brigade headquarters as it is today. 

organization contributes to its versatility for specific missions. 

The division is agile and lethal and increases warfighter All combat service support (CSS) (less medical) for the engineer battalion is provided by the base support company survivability, and it has the organizational capability for what 

is called "mental agility." (BSC) of the BCT forward support battalion-versus the 

current engineer battalion with its own CSS. 

Army XXI Division Engineer Structure 

T' he Army XXI division has three major changes in 

engineer structure compared to the current Army of 

Excellence division: 

. An engineer staff element is part of the division headquarters and headquarters company (HHC)-versus the 

current separate division engineer brigade headquarters. 

(The Engineer School's goal remains to reinstate a diviDoctrinal and Organizational Impacts 

rmy XXI division engineers will be required to change 

the way they operate doctrinally based on organizational 

.changes in the Army XXI division design (Figure 2). 

The major organizational changes affecting doctrine include the 

division engineer staff element, the division engineer battalion, 

echelon above division (EAD) engineer support, and CSS 

operations. Implications of these changes follow. 

Engineer Structure for.the Army XXI Division 

Army Of - Concept Army XXI 

Excellence 

- Lost brigade headquarters HHC, HVY DIV 

Engineer colonel and 27-person staff 

X HHC, heavy division TOE 87W4F200 

- Colonel is staff officer Engheer Seclbn 

12-0-1 6-28 Three battalions are organic to 

maneuver brigades 

Equipment loss per division: 

- 18 SEES 12LMlVtrucks 

92-4-1 293-1389 

1 14-1-42-17 1 1,- 111 - 27 ACES 6 HEMT trucks 26-1 -417-444 

- 3 APCs 24Trailers 

425 personnel decrease: 

Must depend on the base support 

company, FSB (TOE 63108F000) for 

maintenance, food service, and fuel 

- 3 officers14 warrant officersl418 enlisted 

I 

Figure 2 

November 1998 Engineer 3 
The Army XXI division engineer staff element is under the 

control of the division engineer officer, who remains a 

colonel. The engineer staff is embedded in division command 

posts, currently the tactical and main command posts. The 

engineer staR provides digital engineer input to division 

orders and writes the engineer annex. The staff determines 

additional engineer capabilities needed from EAD based on 

division requirements. The engineer staff maintains situational understanding of the organic division and augmenting 

EAD engineer operations through division digital reporting 

procedures. All engineer staff recommendations flow through 

the division G3 for action or decision by the division 

commander. The engineer staff normally works to integrate an 

engineer command and control headquarters-such as an 

engineer group (combat), which is task organized from EAD 

to support the division. 

Heavy Di\iqion Engineer Hattalion 

Army XXI division engineer battalions are now under the 

BCT commander (Figure 3). They support the commander's 

intent by providing responsive mounted obstacle breaching 

and emplacement, such as Volcano-scatterable minefields. 

The Army XXI division engineer battalion is fully mounted 

and uses Grizzly breathers, Wolverine heavy assault bridging, 

and M9 armored combat earthmovers (ACEs) in support of 

brigade offensive operations. The Army XXI engineer battalion no longer has small emplacement excavators (SEES). It 

has one less squad per engineer platoon, no tactical command 

post capability, and fewer ACEs. The engineer battalion can 

receive additional engineers from EAD for increased obstacle 

reduction and creation capability, deliberate defensive operations, operations in restricted terrain, lines-of-communication 

(LOC) construction, and maintenance and repair in the 

brigade battlespace. 

The Engineer School and 4th Infantry Division Engineer 

Brigade are evaluating the TRADOC-approved concept of 

using an M2 Bradley fighting vehicle as an engineer squad 

vehicle to possibly replace the M 113A3 armored personnel 

carrier (APC) in Army XXI division engineer battalions. (See 

article on page 7.) 

The engineer battalion commander is dual-hatted as the 

brigade engineer and the engineer battalion commander. The 

engineer battalion provides an assistant brigade engineer staff 

element that operates in the brigade command post. The ABE 

provides digital engineer input to brigade orders and writes 

the engineer annex. He determines additional engineer 

capabilities needed based on brigade requirements and passes 

them to the division engineer. The assistant brigade engineer 

maintains situational understanding of organic and augmenting EAD engineer operations through brigade digital 

reporting procedures. The engineer battalion staff writes 

Engineer Battalion, Heavy Division 

HHC ENG BN HVY DIV 

TOE 05335F000 

7 

El 26-0-286312 

El 11-048-53 5-0-78-83 

2 Carrler CPs 

Q 

12 ACEs 

28 Carrler rlss 12 1-1RT tmllers 

6 M548 tracked whlcles 4 Water tmllers 

4 Carrler W llght 12 Wolverines 

6 Volcanos 9 Jawllns 

6 HEMMTs,cargo 4 LMTV trallers 

27 HMMWVs 2 3f4T trallers 

3 MN truckcargo 12 Grlnly 

5 LMTVtruckcarp 

12 MlCLlC 

12 2-1RT trallers 

Figure 3 

digital engineer orders to companies in support of task-force 

operations. 

EAD kInfiineer Support 

Army XXI division engineers are structured to provide only 

minimal obstacle-creation and obstacle-reduction capabilities. 

Any additional engineer support needed by the Army XXI 

division, such as bridging and heavy construction equipment, 

must come from EAD engineer forces. The Engineer School is 

working with TRADOC as part of the Corps XXI redesign 

process to determine EAD engineer doctrine and organizations 

required to support the Army XXI division and other maneuver 

forces. The EAD engineer support will come mainly from the 

Reserve Components of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard. 

EAD engineer support normally will require an engineer 

headquarters element (such as an engineer group) to command 

and control EAD engineers operating in the Army XXI 

division's battlespace. Some EAD engineer units may not be 

digitized and thus will be unable to "plug" into the Army XXI 

division information networks. Extensive liaison capability may 

be required to effectively integrate EAD engineers with the 

Army XXI division. 

EAD engineer support to the Army XXI division is 

primarily in the areas of terrain visualization, supplemental 

obstacle-reduction capability, mobility support through 

4 Engineer November 1998 
restrictive terrain, emplacement of deliberate defenses, and 

force protection. Additionally, EAD engineers will construct, 

repair, and maintain combat trails, LOC facilities, routes, 

bases, and forward aviation support sites. 

Terrain Visualization. It is the Engineer School's intent to 

provide digital terrain analysis and data-management 

capability to each BCT, the aviation brigade, and each 

division command post. This capability will be in the form of 

terrain analysis teams that use the Digital Topogaphic 

Support System. The Engineer School is working this 

initiative as the "Concept for the Redesign of Topographic 

Analysis Teams (Heavy)" through the Corps XXI redesign 

process with TRADOC and the Department of the Army. An 

article describing this concept will be published in a future 

issue of Engineer: 

Obstacle Reduction. The Army XXI division engineer 

structure provides minimal mounted capability to reduce 

obstacles in support of task force attack operations. Reduction 

of other obstacle systems in the division area falls to 

supporting EAD engineer units. These units create additional 

lanes through obstacle systems to clear logistics base sites for 

occupation and open LOCs. Fixed- and fl oat-bridging support 

continues to be provided by multirole bridge companies from 

EAD. 

Restrictive Terrain Operations. The Army XXI division 

requires extensive EAD augmentation for operations in 

restrictive terrain, such as urban areas. For engineers. this 

includes the requirement for dismounted sappers to assist with 

reconnaissance and obstacle clearance in buildings. EAD 

engineer equipment will reduce and clear rubble along urban 

routes. 

Deliberate Defense Operations. The Army XXI division 

engineer structure maintains minimal digging and dismounted 

sapper capabilities. These engineers have only Volcano mine 

systems to support limited hasty defense operations. This 

means that EAD engineers must provide the heavy engineer 

equipment (bulldozers and other earthmoving equipment such 

as SEES and scrapers) needed to support a division deliberate 

defense. Major EAD engineer tasks in support of deliberate 

defense operations include the emplacement of vehicle 

fighting positions, dismounted infantry fighting positions, and 

conventional obstacles. 

XXI division will conduct nonlinear and distributed operations 

over large areas with bypassed and other enemy forces 

operating at will throughout the division's battlespace. 

Supposting EAD engineers must secure themselves against 

these threats up to level I1 because Army XXI division security 

forces (military police and maneuver) will not be readily 

available to support the EAD engineer effort. 

Construction, Repair, and Maintenance. The Army XXI 

division will operate over areas up to 200 kilometers wide and 

deep. This will require exclusive EAD engineer support to 

construct, repair, and maintain extended division LOC 

facilities. bases, routes, ports, and airfields. These missions 

will have a significant security risk to our soldiers and 

equipment because of bypassed enemy forces, irregular 

operations, and the lack of division maneuver and military 

police forces throughout most of the battlespace. EAD 

engineers must be able to secure themselves against higherlevel threats than currently is possible and maintain continuous 

co~nmunications with division command posts. 

Co~nl~at Scrvice Support 

The Army XXI division has consolidated CSS for armor, 

infantry, and engineer battalions. This support is based on 

situational understanding of the CSS status of each unit. For 

example, as an engineer company runs low on fuel, that 

information will be transmitted digitally to the supporting 

CSS unit for its response. CSS units use distributed 

operations and velocity management tools to provide 

responsive support for supply, maintenance, transportation, 

food service, fuel, and medical support. Army XXI division 

engineer line companies will receive CSS (less medical) 

primarily from the engineer support platoon of the BSC of the 

brigade forward support battalion. The engineer battalion 

HHC will be supported by elements of the BSC. EAD 

engineers operating in the Army XXI division area will 

continue to receive support from an appropriate EAD CSS 

unit, such as a corps support battalion. 

General Supply, Food Service, Fuel, Water, Repair 

Parts, and Ammunition. When engineer operations are 

centrally located in the BCT area, the engineer support platoon 

will coordinate with the supply and transportation platoon of 

the BSC and send normal logistics packages out of the brigade 

forward support area. Most supplies will be pushed to the 

brigade support area or forward support area by EAD units. 

Force Protection, EAD engineers will provide the Then the SLI~P~Y and transportation platoon will move them to 

majority of engineer force-protection support to Army XXI the engineer company. 

division operations, including the construction of logistics- Maintenance. All required engineer maintenance support based security systems; tactical clearing of landmines and resides in the BSC. It has a maintenance section in the en,' meer 

unexploded ordnance; construction of chemical deconsupport platoon that includes an engineer maintenance tamination sites; environmental hazard remediation; and technician, senior mechanic, and three engineer combat repair camouflage, concealment, and deception support. The Army teams. Each team has improved mobility with a tracked vehicle 

November 1998 Engineer 5 
and two wheeled vehicles and is designed to provide on-site 

support to a single engineer line company. Scheduled 

maintenance such as periodic services and maintenance 

problems that are beyond the capability of the combat repair 

teams to resolve will be provided by other elements of the 

BSC. The engineer support platoon may be augmented by 

other maintenance elements of the BSC to form a unit 

maintenance collection point that services all engineer 

vehicles from the line companies. Alternatively, engineer 

combat repair teams may combine with task force forward 

support companies to provide maintenance support. The 

engineer battalion HHC will be supported directly from the 

BSC maintenance platoon. 

Medical Support. A combat medical section with 10 

medics is organic to each Army XXI division engineer 

battalion. This organization allows for a combat medical 

section of three medics to be task organized with each 

engineer line company; doctrinal employment is one combat 

medic per engineer platoon. Four of the 10 medics in the 

engineer battalion remain on active duty, and the other six will 

be in the Reserve Components. Medical evacuation support 

will be coordinated through the task force medical platoon or 

forward support battalion medical company. 

Training and Leader Development Impacts 

rmy XXI division engineers must continue to train 

with the combined-arms team and focus training on 

.mobility tasks. The Army's increasing reliance on 

systems such as air Volcano, artillery-delivered scatterable 

minefields, and Raptor intelligent combat outposts require 

that engineers be well-versed in aviation, artillery, and 

intelligence functions. Increased training will be required for 

terrain visualization and digital engineer planning and 

execution using digital command and control systems. 

Training with Army XXI division combat service support 

agencies will be required to properly sustain and maintain 

the engineer force. The noncommand operational relationship between the division engineer staff and engineer 

battalions under the control of the BCTs must be fostered 

and developed during training. EAD engineers must be 

included with Army XXI division engineer training at every 

opportunity, such as division warfighters, combat training 

center rotations, and during the DCX. Many challenges will 

arise as we integrate Reserve Component medics and EAD 

engineers with Army XXI division engineer training. The 

Engineer School is developing new strategies to assist Army 

XXI engineers, including Classroom XXI distance-learning 

capabilities, new training simulators, and digital doctrine 

and training products. 

Materiel Impacts 

my XXI engineers will have the same enabling digital 

command and control technologies as those available to 

the rest of the division. These include appropriate Army 

Battle Command System components such as the Maneuver 

Control System, All-Source Analysis System, and Force XXI 

Battle Command Brigade and Below Systems. The Digital 

Topographic Support System will enable the Army XXI 

division to properly portray terrain in these digital command 

and control systems. EAD engineers supporting Army XXI 

will require similar digital command and control components 

to obtain and maintain situational understanding with the 

Army XXI division. 

Soldier Impacts 

my XXI division engineer soldiers must continue to 

master basic warfighting skills, which are pre-

. requisites for gaining digital proficiency. They will 

require increased skills in the operation and maintenance of 

digital command and control equipment. Engineer soldiers will 

be required to maintain assigned equipment without ready 

access to mechanics and spare parts. They will be required to 

operate in isolated locations and without responsive security 

support. Engineer School personnel will address these 

challenging realities as they participate in the ongoing Corps 

XXI redesign process. 

Conclusion 

he Army Engineer School continues to stay in the 

forefront of all actions associated with the standup, 

training, and validation of the Army XXI division 

design. Insights gleaned from our efforts will be used to ensure 

that engineers remain relevant with future light-force and strikeforce redesign efforts. If you have questions, call Vern Lowrey 

at DSN 676-4082 or commercial (573) 563-4082 or Pete 

Malley at DSN 676-7282 or commercial (573) 563-7282. w 

Major General Flocvers has sewed as Commandant of the 

U.S. Arinv Engineer School and Commander of the U.S. Army 

Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood since Julj~ 1997. 

ME Lowrey is the technical director of the Maneuver 

Support Battle Lab at Fort Leonard Wood. He is commander 

r$ the 1138th Engineer Battalion (First Missouri), Missouri 

National Guard. 

Colonel Porter is the 410 Engineer Brigade comnzander; 

Fort Hood, Texas. 

6 Engineer November 1998 
BJ~ Major Aniello L. Tortora and Major Tlzoms Quigley 

This article presents preliminary observations regarding 

the possible replacement for the MI13 Armored Personnel 

Carrier: The Engineer School is continuing to explore 

materiel and doctrinul concepts related to the Engineer 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Additional information will be 

published as it becomes available. 

o be a relevant force multiplier in the 21st century 

Army, combat engineers need a mobile and survivable 

platform from which to fight. We believe that the 

vehicle tentatively called the Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

(EBFV) is the answer. Since the mid-1980s, combat engineers 

have struggled to keep pace with the modernized forces they 

support, which are equipped with M1 Tanks, M2 Infantry 

Fighting Vehicles, and M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. Too 

often, combat training center rotations demonstrate that 

engineer equipment is outdated and will not satisfy the demands 

of combat in the 1990s nor will it meet the needs of our 21st 

century Army. The M113 Armored Personnel Carrier is a 

perfect example: It is slow, has a high deadline rate, provides 

little protection, and serves only as a troop and cargo carrier. 

The Army is transitioning from a mechanized to an 

armored warfare force. In mechanized warfare, soldiers move 

to an objective in a vehicle and dismount to conduct their 

mission. In armored warfare, soldiers move on the battlefield 

in a survivable, firepower-laden platform that allows them to 

conduct their mission while mounted and under armor. The 

implication for combat engineers is that we need to progress 

from a sapper-based force to an equipment-based force. 

Moreover, our equipment must provide the functions needed to 

accomplish our mission. 

The characteristics of the Force XXI battlefield will 

demand even more from combat engineers. Like the maneuver 

forces we support, combat engineers need platforms with 

speed, versatility, and survivability. Force XXI technologies 

will allow greater dispersion, enable distributed operations, 

and increase the tempo of battle as never before. All these 

Force XXI enablers put demands on providing mobility to the 

force unlike any previous doctrinal change. Equipping combat 

engineers with the Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle is a step 

in the right direction. It is essential to the future of combat 

engineer forces and to the success of maneuver forces. 

Concept Experimentation Plan 

T his article discusses the initial results of an ongoing 

Bradley Concept Experimentation Plan conducted by 

the Engineer Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division and 

the U.S. Army Engineer School. The end state for the 

evaluation is twofold: to determine if the Bradley is suitable for 

combat engineers and to determine the advantages and disadvantages of the Bradley as a combat engineer platoon 

vehicle. Throughout the Bradley experimentation, the focus of 

the Engineer Brigade was to provide the engineer community 

with feedback in three areas: 

November 1998 Engineer 7 
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for conducting combat engineer missions using Bradleys. 

The load plan, so engineers can carry what they need to 

execute their combat engineer missions. 

The level of gunnery proficiency engineers must 

achieve and how engineer training is balanced with 

gunnery training. 

In February 1998, A Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, 

made history when it fielded nine M2AO Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles. The Engineer Brigade received the Bradleys on loan 

from the 49th Armored Division, Texas National Guard, at 

Fort Hood. 

The structure of the combat engineer company was 

minimally changed with the fielding of the Bradley. The 

number of personnel assigned to the combat engineer platoon 

was decreased to match force-structure authorizations in the 

conservative heavy division's modified table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE). For example, engineer platoons 

changed from three to two squads. Bradleys were substituted 

for the company's M 1 13s. The company commander received 

a Bradley, and four were assigned to each line platoon--one 

for the platoon leader, one for the platoon sergeant, and one to 

each of the two sapper squads. 

Two points are worth noting regarding the structure of the 

Bradley engineer company. First, the engineer Bradley is not 

called a squad vehicle. It is tentatively called an En,' olneer 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle. This name is in keeping with 

today's offensively oriented doctrine where the engineer 

platoon, not the squad, is employed as the basic breaching and 

reduction unit. This is also true of countermobility operations, 

which focus on emplacing scatterable mines. The engineer 

platoon sites and marks these obstacles. Second, reducing the 

engineer platoon from three to two squads was not precipitated 

by the transition to Bradleys: It is the result of a previously implemented MTOE change. 

Net\ Equipment train in^ 

The evaluation began in March 1998 with new equipment 

training (NET) and culminated in August 1998 with AJ588th's 

participation in National Training Center Rotation 98-10. The 

Bradley NET team from Fort Benning, Georgia, conducted the 

training in two phases. 

The first phase included 18 days of training on driving 

and licensing, maintenance, and turret operation; gunnery 

skills with a Unit Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (UCOFT); and 

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) 

gunnery. 

The second phase was eight days of Bradley gunnery 

qualification training: one day of Bradley Gunnery Skills 

Testing and a UCOFT refresher; one day on Table V; and 

two days each on Tables VI, VII, and VIII. 

No training was conducted on the h~be-launched, optically 

tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system since it was 

determined this is not a weapon system engineers are expected 

to use to accomplish their mission. Use of the TOW launcher 

and the type of munitions engineers might employ in the future 

need further evaluation. 

A Bradley vehicle transporting bundles of wire on its trim vane. 

8 Engineer Novetnber 1998 
The NET was fairly easy for combat engineer soldiers and 

leaders, who quickly adapted to the new equipment and skills. 

In addition to the dedicated NET team, the company 

borrowed other resources to accomplish the training. A 

qualified Bradley master gunner was needed at both company 

and battalion levels to train gunnery skills and to plan, 

prepare, and help execute gunnery qualification. The 

company also required a dedicated UCOFT to prepare for 

gunnery training and maintain gunnery skills. For the test 

period, the unit acquired a master gunner from the Engineer 

School and a UCOFT from 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. 

Between phase I and phase I1 of the NET, N588th 

conducted companylteam lanes training with Task Force 1-67 

Armor to prepare for the National Training Center. Representatives from the Maneuver Support Battle Lab and the 

Engineer School were on hand to examine the Bradley's 

performance. N588th focused on validating load plans and 

on the 'M'Ps for conducting missions in offensive and 

defensive operations. The company took this training a step 

further by conducting a one-week platoon lanes field training 

exercise (FTX) to further refine the TTPs needed to execute 

their mission at the National Training Center. 

Preliminary UEP Results 

Combat engineer soldiers embrace the Bradley because it 

provides them speed, mobility, protection, and firepower not 

possible in an M113. Engineer leaders champion this vehicle 

because of its versatility and potential. Maneuver forces are 

advocates of combat engineers in Bradleys because EBFVs 

can maintain the pace and tempo of maneuver forces and 

provide enhanced mobility and countermobility support. 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

he 588th Engineer Battalion is developing detailed 

TTPs for the Bradley Engineer Platoon and Engineer 

Company. Converting from M113s to Bradleys has 

not generated dramatic changes in TTPs. Most of the TTPs 

used for operations in M113s translate satisfactorily for 

operations in Bradleys. In some areas, however, new TTPs are 

being developed to support enhancements provided by the 

more survivable and versatile Bradley. Lane-marking and row 

minefield-emplacement TTPs require minor modifications. 

Interestingly, we found row minefield emplacement easier 

and more productive in the Bradley than in the M 1 13. 

Mobility 

Increased speed, armor, and firepower allow combat 

engineers to work, maneuver, and protect themselves simultaneously. The turret and main gun of the Bradley are 

extremely valuable to combat engineers and increase their 

capability and versatility. Engineers in M113s command and 

control mobility and countermobility assets, but they rely on 

maneuver forces to protect them. This reliance often drains the 

already-stretched firepower of infantry and armor forces. 

Engineers in Bradleys can better protect themselves during 

movement and when breaching and reducing obstacles. Thus, 

the Bradley Engineer Company and Battalion are better suited 

to perform as a breach force during battalion and brigade 

deliberate breaches. 

The 588th Engineer Battalion also experimented with Vtype surface mine plows manufactured by Pearson Engineering. One plow was borrowed from Fort Leonard Wood 

and three are on loan from the Land Forces Canada. These 

plows have potential for maintaining mobility of the force en 

route to an objective. The blades can clear rubble and skim 

scatterable mines from level, hard-packed surfaces. They plow 

well in soft soil where adequate spoil can be maintained before 

the blade. The blade would be even more useful if it floated 

along its horizontal axis so it could be employed along 

semilevel surfaces, such as combat trails. The blade currently 

does not perform well on uneven surfaces or in rocky areas. 

More experimentation with other blades is required to fully 

develop this mobility asset. 

Counterrnobility 

The Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle increases our 

capability to conduct countermobility operations as well. While 

the EBFV platoon is capable of conducting conventional mine 

operations, the focus of the countermobility effort centers on the 

rapid emplacement of dynamic obstacles. Engineer platoon-, 

company-, and battalion-sized countermobility organizations 

can be formed with the capability to operate independently on 

the battlefield. If these organizations are equipped with EBFVs 

and scatterable mine systems, they could protect themselves 

during movement and while emplacing and marking obstacles. 

The potential exists for adding other engineer systems to 

the EBFV. One possibility is to replace the TOW launcher 

with a weapon system that employs a high-explosive munition 

similar to the 165-millimeter high-explosive "bunker buster" 

round on the Combat Engineer Vehicle. An EBFV demolition 

gun could be used to reduce roadblocks and other obstacles. 

Another opportunity worth considering is to design and mount 

a small panel for Volcanos on the EBFV. Each Bradley 

engineer platoon would then have a rapid scatterable mine 

capability. 

Sustainability 

While not directly related to 'M'Ps, but often having a 

tremendous impact on how we conduct a mission, sustainability 

is an area where EBFVs are winners. During a two-week 

companylteam lanes FTX, one Bradley was deadlined. An 

M113 company had six M113s deadlined at various times 

during the same period. As we adopt the Force XXI centralized 

logistics support concept and move from supply-based to 

distribution-based maintenance, an economy of scale is created 

November 1998 Engineer 9 
through the use of a common chassis. This makes the Bradley 

more sustainable in the heavy division than M113-type 

vehicles. Although Bradleys are more expensive to maintain 

than M113s, the increase in survivability, capability, and 

sustainability more than justifies the additional cost. 

Load Plans 

S oldiers from N588th Engineer Battalion developed 

standard load plans for the EBFV that facilitate the 

successful execution of combat engineer missions. 

Every piece of platoon equipment was examined to determine 

what an engineer platoon needed in combat. TOW storage 

racks were removed from the M2AO Bradley to increase 

interior space, and the exterior was adapted to carry wire, 

pickets, and tools. Although Bradleys do not have as much 

interior space as MI 13s, the EBFVs can carry the en,' "lneer 

equipment necessary for combat. The EBFV load plans were 

explored again during National Training Center Rotation 

98- 10. 

AI588th personnel also developed plans to modify the 

interior and exterior of the Bradley to increase space and 

utility. Through an agreement with the Bradley project 

manager and Red River Army Depot, these plans were 

used to modify an M3AO Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. Soldiers 

from N588th worked with a team at Red River to complete 

the modifications. Bench seats with storage boxes replaced 

individual seats, and shelves and cabinet-type storage boxes 

replaced excess TOW racks and ammunition boxes. Posts 

were welded on the exterior of the vehicle to carry pickets and 

lane-marking materials, and the trim vane was used to carry 

concertina wire. A larger bustle rack also was installed. 

These were simple and inexpensive modifications that 

could be completed within the battalion. M2 Bradleys can be 

similarly modified to increase space and function. M2 ODs 

Bradleys (those modified for use in Operation Desert Storm) 

already have more interior space than earlier M2 models as a 

result of similar modifications. 

Gunnery 

nother tremendous success story for the EBFV and 

combat engineers was gunnery. Confident and 

motivated engineers conducted Bradley gunnery 

only six weeks after the vehicle was introduced, and they 

produced astounding qualification scores. All crews qualified 

on their first attempt (Q1 rating), with one crew qualifying as 

"distinguished" and two crews qualifying as "superior." This 

record is rarely achieved in the division. 

Engineers conducted their gunnery according to FM 23- 1, 

Bradley Gunnery. AI588th soldiers practiced firing using 

Tables V, VI, and VII and then qualified on Table VIII. These 

tables should not be modified for engineers, because 

engineers encounter the same types of engagements while 

conducting their missions. 

The 588th is also developing a platoon live-fire table for 

combat engineers. Bradley platoon gunnery for infantry soldiers 

consists of Table XI, Platoon Practice, and Table XII, Platoon 

Qualification. Qualification is based on the platoon's ability to 

execute collective tasks in a live-fire environment. Similarly, 

the engineer platoon Table XI1 focuses on offensive and 

breaching operations under live-fire conditions. A Bradley 

engineer Table XI1 serves as an excellent graduation exercise 

from platoon Jane training and also prepares the engineer 

company to participate in the maneuver task force Combined 

Arms Live-Fire Exercise. 

Enhancing the Combined Arms Team 

he EBFV has made engineers a more valuable part of 

the combined arms team. It is the platform from which 

to launch combat engineers into the Army After Next. 

Inexpensive and simple modifications to the Bradley have 

alleviated load-plan fears. Plows and other attachments offer 

advantages for the combined arms team and will enable the 

engineer force to move from the mechanized to the armored 

way of warfare. The Bradley provides a more survivable 

platform for our soldiers. In our experience, gunnery was not a 

distracter to training. We believe it has potential to improve 

engineer training by merging gunnery with engineer lane 

training. 

For current Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle information 

and photos, visit the Engineer Brigade, 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized). web site at http:/hood-ivygree'n.army.miV 

engineer. Send comments and input to the brigade S3 e-mail 

address provided on the web site or directly to tortoran@hoodemh3.army.mil. lil 

Major Tortora is the Engineer Brigade S3, 4th Infantry 

Division. Previous assignments include S3, 588th Engineer 

Battalion; project engineer; Omaha District, USACE; company commander; 16th Engineer Battalion; and platoon 

leader and company executive ofJlcer; 43rd Engineer 

Battalion. MAJ Tortora is a graduate of the United States 

Military Academy and holds a master's degree in engineering 

from the University of Texas. 

Major Quigley is the executive oficer; 588th Engineer 

Battalion. Previous assignments include S3, 588th Engineer 

Battalion; division comptroller; 410; budget analyst, Army 

Budget Ofice, Pentagon; Engineer Assignment Oficer; 

PERSCOM; company commander; 4th Engineer Battalion; 

platoon leader and company executive ofJicer; 293rd Engineer 

Battalion. MAJ Quigley holds master's degrees in business 

administration from Troy State University and in national 

security and strategic studies from the Naval War College. 

10 Engineer November 1998 
F 1 

Book Review Thorough training also provides a denial defense 

mechanism for dealing with the extreme trauma of killing. ~ 

Soldiers have practiced killing so much that when they 1 

On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill actually do, it's no big deal, it's almost like being on the ~ 

in War and Societ~: by Lieutenant Colonel David range. There are several documented examples of 

Grossman, Little, Brown Company Limited (Canada), soldiers talking about killing as being like shooting E-type 

1995, 366 pages. The ISBN is 0-31 6-33000-0 for a hard silhouettes on the rifle range. This denial allows soldiers 

cover and 0-31 6-3301 1-6 for a paperback. to psychologically deal with the act of killing. 

--- Grossman diagrams what he calls the "Anatomy of 

Killing." The significant elements in this theory include 

In his book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of the demand of authority, group absolution, total 

Learning to Kill in War and Societl: Lieutenant Colonel distance from the victim (both physical distance and 

David Grossman offers a fascinating and perceptive in- emotional distance), target attractiveness of the victim, 

sight into the mental anguish and emotional impact of and the predisposition of the killer. According to the 

violence. Grossman's study is somewhat unique in that he author, only 2 percent of our population can kill without 

does not try to explain what makes soldiers kill, but rather any real feeling of remorse. Of this group, only a few are 

how they are able to overcome an inherent resistance to able to effectively function in a regulated, military 

killing fellow men. This book is a compelling work for environment. The rest of the population (98 percent) 

anyone in the military or law enforcement, especially face extreme difficulty in overcoming the natural 

those responsible for training soldiers to kill the enemy. abhorrence to violence and dealing with the traumatic 

S.L.A Marshall's famous work, Men Against Fire, aftermath of killing. The elements in Grossman's model 

documented astonishingly low firing rates for American dynamically interact with one another as a soldier 

riflemen during World War II. According to Marshall, only 15 decides whether or not to squeeze the trigger. 

to 20 percent of U.S. combatants in World War II fired their Grossman includes lengthy discussions of postweapons at the enemy. Grossman points out that this traumatic stress syndrome in Vietnam veterans. His 

reluctance to kill is not unique to World War II, and he analysis provides reasons for the seemingly disprovides psychological and sociological reasons for soldiers' proportionate number of Vietnam veterans suffering 

actions and reactions in combat. He cites situations from mental illness and substance abuse. As a society, 

throughout history when "warriors" have apparently refused we must understand the consequences of sending 

to kill, even when faced with mortal danger. soldiers to war, what they endure on the battlefield, and 

According to Grossman, "Since World War II, a new how to accept them back into society. 

era has quietly dawned in modern warfare: an era of The author concludes with a look at American 

psychological warfare-psychological warfare con- society and how popular culture is "desensitizing" 

ducted not upon the enemy, but upon one's own troops." America's youth. Grossman claims that some of the 

When S.L.A Marshall went to the Korean War to conduct same conditioning techniques that allow soldiers to kill 

the same type of investigation as he had in World War 11, on the battlefield are partly responsible for kids killing 

he found that 55 percent of the infantrymen were firing each other in the streets. The author ends with dire 

their weapons. In some units, almost 100 percent were warnings about the future and somewhat radical 

firing! The question was, What made the difference in solutions to the dangers of violence in movies, music, 

the soldiers' attitudes? and television. 

Desensitization to killing is the first element to the LTC Grossman is able to take a scientific work and I improved firing rate. Thinking of enemies as "inhuman" make it readable, interesting, and easily understandor calling them by disparaging names, Such as gooks, able. He uses historical anecdotes and personal acKrauts, Japs, or Commies, seemingly is innocuous be- counts from hundreds of interviews to give the book a 

havior, but that behavior helps a 19 Year old overcome personal and authentic feel. On Killing does not in any 

his natural aversion to killing. way come across as a sterile, clinical analysis of 

Conditioning soldiers is another element. Both Pav- soldiers' psyches. It is a compelling analysis of what is I lovian classical conditioning and Skinnerian operant required to turn a normal 19-year-old American into a 

I conditioning have roles in training soldiers to kill without soldier, capable of killing or maiming his fellow man, 

thinking about it. Grossman does not claim that the and return him to a productive life in society. This book 1 armed forces intentionally condition their soldiers to kill, is a must-read for anyone responsible for training, 

but he provides examples of its existence. One example leading, and commanding combat soldiers. I is modern firing ranges, where every aspect of killing 

is rehearsed and visualized. These actions provide ILT Christian Childs serves with the 3-278 Armored Cavahy 

soldiers with realistic and interesting when the Regiment, TennesseeArmy National Guard. He previously .served 

soldiers do well, they are regularly rewarded and with the I-502nd Infantry, 10Ist Airborne Division. ILT Chi1d.r 

1 praised by superiors and peers. is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. 

November 1998 Engineer 11 
OPERATION DESEIW' THUNI 

COALITION TAfK FORCE-KUWAIT ENGINEER OPERATIONS 

By Lieutenant Colonel William Bowers, Mujor Michael L~lncll, 

and Major Donald Johantges 

series of Iraqi provocations against Kuwait in 

November 1997 resulted in a crisis that lasted until 

March 1998. Defending Kuwait was the responsibility of Coalition Task Force-Kuwait (CTF-K), commanded 

by the U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) Commander. CTFK consisted of units from all service components as well as 

representatives from 10 other countries. The United States 

responded also to help deter Iraqi aggression and reassure 

the coalition partners4r defend Kuwait should that 

become necessary. More than 11,000 U.S. personnel and 

35,000 coalition personnel participated in this operation, 

which came to be known as Desert Thunder. 

he USARCENT Assistant Chief of Staff, Engineers 

was the C7 of CTF-K. He and his staff simultaneously deployed forces; provided facility support 

for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; 

supervised engineer operations and planning; and supported 

intelligence planning with topographic supplies. 

12 Engineer 

The CTF-K C7 engineer mission was to establish and 

manage the commander's engineer policies and guidance. 

This included staff supervision of combat, combat support, 

and combat service support activities. Construction contracting assets and other activities in the areas of combat, civil, 

electrical, and topographic engineering; force protection; and 

real estate planning also required intense management. 

The deployment process began with an analysis to 

determine engineer requirements to ensure mission 

success. Since this was a short-notice deployment, a 

crisis action planning cycle was used. With only a few days to 

plan, the foundation was initially based on doctrinal allocations. The analysis began by examining the forces allocated 

for the operation. The CTF-K engineer did not use the timeconsuming Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System 

(JEPES) because of the short planning period. During deliberate planning the JEPES model is used to help ensure that all 

engineer requirements are identified. 

November 1998 
The staff, which was still in Atlanta, developed the units' 

construction needs based on requirements for previous 

deployments. Then staff' personnel contacted Corps of Engineers assets in Kuwait to determine which of those construction projects the Corps would perform. This modification to 

the deployment plan met the commanding general's guidance of "just enough, just in time." Several unknown factors-such as the availability of host-nation facilities and 

equipment, presidential selective reserve call-up, and support from other coalition countries-were critical and estimates were factored in for them. 

After the CTF-K engineer section identified its requirements to support the operation, it was the services' responsibility to provide resources. A daily dialogue developed 

between CTF-K and the services' engineer action officers so 

we could monitor the engineer force flow. 

Sequencing the arrival of engineer units in country and 

balancing those arrivals against available host-nation support was a challenge. Combat engineer units had to move 

with their respective maneuver elements. Fire-fighting units 

arrived in conjunction with aviation elements. Topographic 

engineers were integrated in the flow to support the headquarters elements and components. Division headquarters 

controlled divisional assets of the combat and topographic 

engineers, while echelon-above-division assets-such as 

fire-fighting teams, corps topographic engineers, personnel 

from the prime-power detachment, and the 416th Engineer 

Command-required detailed coordination daily between 

the CTF-K engineer and force providers. 

After arriving in country, the engineer assessment team 

realized that engineer support to bed down the force would 

be the most critical "do not fail" task. Recognizing the extent 

of this challenge, the CTF-K engineer adjusted the staff 

deployn~ent flow. He brought in facilities and construction 

staff support early to provide engineer contracting expertise 

and other technical skills. 

Facilities Snnuort 

A modern headquarters requires an immense amount of 

electrical power. All CTF-K staff sections use both 

secure and unsecure computers, telephones, and facsimile machines extensively, as well as a coffeepot, refrigerator, 

and microwave oven. The high demand for electrical power in 

fixed facilities makes an electrical engineer an invaluable member of the staff. To meet that demand, the CTF-K coordinated to 

deploy power-distribution experts from the 249th Engineer 

Battalion (Prime Power). Together. they successfully managed 

electrical problems within Camp Doha, which was established 

after Desert Storm as a long-term USARCENT camp, and identified potential problems at other facilities. Military engineer 

expertise is especially important when deploying to areas with 

different cultures. Because of many religious holidays, hostnation contract personnel may not be available to take care of 

daily problems. 

ver the next two weeks, the engineer section grew to 

11 personnel, with USARCENT providing the core 

of engineer staffing. Personnel from CENTCOM's 

Joint Crisis Action Center and the 416th Engineer Command 

(Forward) completed the staff. 

Sufficient facilities and construction staff personnel did 

not deploy early enough in the flow as the CTF-K headquarters was established. This placed a heavy burden on the limited staff in the CTF-K engineers' facilities and construction 

division. As large numbers of personnel surged into and 

through Camp Doha, the number of infrastructure breakdowns increased significantly-particularly in electrical 

power and sewage disposal. 

Combat units transitioned quickly through Camp Doha 

and then moved directly into occupied base camps or kabals 

in the Kuwaiti desert. A kabal is enclosed by earthen berms 

A joint bed-down facility in 

northern Kuwait. 

November 1998 Engineer 13 
The kabal's shower point is 

upgraded by using shower 

trailers that provide climate 

control and heated water. 

that establish the perimeter for force protection. In Operation Inbe!ligt.nce Plannning 

Desert Thunder, most kabals were large enough to accommodate a battalion-sized task force. The task force kabal is a I ntelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was 

self-contained support area with living tents, mess facilities, another key task in Kuwait. Topographic products to 

motor pools, and recreation facilities. The commercially support CTF-K operations were in high demand 

leased tents were equipped with wood floors, field showers, throughout the deployment, especially early in the IPB Proand burnout latrines. A commercial generator connected to a ce". The CTF-K staff included a topographic manager from '. 

power grid provided electrical power for the area. 

The Kuwaiti government and people were eager to assist 

the coalition force with facilities and construction support. 

Numerous construction contractors were available, which 

took some of the construction burden from deployed engineers. In addition, the Kuwaiti government gave U.S. forces 

access to several military facilities, thereby eliminating the 

immediate need for leasing real estate and using expensive 

transportation assets for supplies and equipment. 

Occupying host-nation installations greatly reduced the 

scope of engineer construction. Use of these facilities throughout Kuwait City was coordinated through the U.S. Embassy, 

Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait. The CTF-K engineer 

staff assessed many unused facilities in the city to determine 

the repairs necessary to make them functional as billets, office 

space, dining facilities, recreation areas, etc. Required repairs 

typically involved water, sewer, or power upgrades. If a facility was deemed inadequate, the engineer section wrote a scope 

of work to bring it up to standards outlined in the Civil Engineering Support Plan for Operation Desert Thunder. Upgrading wooden field showers in the kabals to trailers with electric 

water heaters and air conditioning is an example. In most 

cases, work was contracted through host-nation construction 

firms or performed by host-nation contract engineer assets. 

Each facility was also evaluated using the U.S. Central 

Command (USCENTCOM) force protection construction 

standards, which outline the type of construction and standoff distances. This evaluation helps ensure that U.S. personnel are not exposed to unnecessary risks due to catastrophic 

structural failure caused by weapon systems or truck bombs. 

the 132nd Engineer Battalion, who worked with the terrain 

teams. In addition, the 100th Engineer Company (Topographic) organized and deployed a 10-person team to support 

the CTF-K. The terrain team established joint operations with 

the National Imagery Mapping Agency team and elements 

from the supporting military intelligence brigade to allow use 

of intelligence communications systems with bandwidth 

capability to obtain real-time imagery. Together these teams 

provided automated and conventional terrain-analysis support with equipment that included multispectral image processors, large-format plotters, tangent scanners, and a database of the joint operational area. 

Environmental Managenlent 

nvironmental management, an important area early in 

any deployment, was overseen by a civilian contractor 

from USARCENT. The Overseas Environmental 

Baseline Guidance Document specifies standards we must 

maintain during contingency operations. The CTF-K environmental officer established procedures for hazardous- and 

solid-waste collection and disposal, spill prevention, and 

cleanup. As units arrived, the environmental officer briefed 

commanders on the procedures. 

USARCENT environmental specialists inspected the 

training areas periodically. Typical deficiencies noted during 

these inspections were unchecked petroleum, oil, and lubricant releases; improper solid-waste disposal; improper 

secondary containment; and a lack of hazardous-materials 

training and waste-management training. Units must conduct 

proper environmental operations when training overseas, just 

as they do when training in the United States. 

14 Engineer November 1998 
L 

Soldiers of the 317th and 1 lth Engineers construct berms to improve force protection. 

Forming thc Coalition combat, facilities, construction, and environmental engineers. Facilities and construction engineers must deploy 

A fter force bed down and the IPB process were well early and possess electrical engineering expertise to hanunderway, forming the coalition became the CTF-K dle the bed down of the initial surge of forces. 

staff's top priority. Participating coalition countries Use available adequate host-nation structures. To speed represented the entire world, and each had unique tactics, contracting for facilities that do not meet our standards, techniques, and procedures. Only a few foreign repre- prepare generic construction statements for repetitive sentatives had any knowledge of U.S. engineer doctrine. requirements. 

Without standard procedures for obstacles-especially Use contract construction as much as possible to reduce mines-there is always a potential for fratricide. To help the number of deployed engineer troops and promote the 

mitigate that risk, the CTF-K engineer staff produced a philosophy of "just enough, just in time." 

minefield data booklet in both English and Arabic. The 

booklet contained standard diagrams to mark coalition Conclusion 

minefields and lanes through those minefields, as well as 

information on engineer obstacle-effects graphics. 

CTF-K engineers sponsored and participated in a series 

of meetings with coalition partners to improve their 

understanding of U.S. Army engineer doctrine, capabilities, 

and limitations. Most importantly, the CTF-K C7 sent an 

engineer liaison officer to the Kuwaiti Engineer Brigade. 

This officer helped close the doctrinal gap and reduce 

friction associated with intercultural communications. 

Lessons 1,carncd 

S everal important lessons resulted from our experience 

in Kuwait: 

Dedicate one officer to develop and manage the TimePhased Force Deployment Data when preparing for 

deployment. That officer must maintain daily contact 

with planners for the Joint Operations Planning Execution System and the force provider. (In our case, the 

force provider was FORSCOM.) 

Ensure that the engineer staff is multifunctional. To support contingency operations, the section must include 

he CTF-K is an organization unique in our nation's 

military history. Never before have we formed 

a forward-deployed, joint, multinational, groundcombat-oriented, and rapidly expandable deterrent force. CTFK proved its worth during Operation Desert Thunder by 

contributing to a show of force that ultimately succeeded in 

deterring Iraqi aggression and compelling compliance with 

U.N. mandates. As long as it continues to stand, CTF-K will 

fulfill this role. This unique organization allows the United 

States to achieve unprecedented levels of interoperability with 

foreign militaries in a region that is of vital importance to our 

national security. LI 

Lieutenant Colonel Bowers was chief of the Engineer 

Plans and Operations Division for CTF-K-from February to 

April 1998. 

Mujor Lynch was the engineer plans ofJicer for CTF-K 

from February-May 1998. He is a graduate of the Command 

and General Staff College. 

Major Johantges serves as an engineer plans officer for 

the 3rd U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia. 

November 1998 Engineer 15 
Tactical DPW in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

C'nptnrr.~ David G. Winget 

i * 

<,a:&. . h* w - 

- . ," 

;L.- f 

MI 

n permanent military bases, a Directorate of Public 

Works (DPW) controls construction projects. The 

DPW structure-consisting of a military director 

with mostly civilian engineers-was designed to provide 

construction support to one base in a secure environment. In 

a potentially hostile environment such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

the DPW organization is not practical. There, several base 

camps-ranging from a platoon-sized element on a hilltop to 

a division headquarters housing more than 2,000 peopleare spread over 100 miles. A new structure was required to 

support the diverse multinational force. 

The American sector of Bosnia, Multinational DivisionNorth, includes elements from the 1 st Armored Division, the 

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 401 st Expeditionary Air 

Base Group, a Nordic/Polish Brigade, a Russian Brigade, 

and a Turkish Brigade. American units form Task Force 

Eagle, which is spread over 13 main base camps and five hilltops in support of the NATO peacekeeping mission. Because 

this situation made the usual DPW structure impractical, the 

Base Camp Coordinating Agency (BCCA) was created in January 1996. Staffed mostly by armed military engineers with 

up-armored HMMWVs, the BCCA became a tactical DPW 

responsible for all base camp facilities and occupied hilltops in 

the American sector. 

The BCCA's scope and responsibilities are similar to those 

of a DPW, but they are modified for use in a deployed environment. The agency supports Operation Joint Guard by providing facility engineer planning and operations, project 

management, and Joint Acquisition Review Board administration. The BCCA also assists with development and 

maintenance of base camp standards, base camp assessments. 

environmental engineering, ammunition surveillance, real 

estate acquisition, fire inspection and prevention, and financial 

oversight of the operation's sustainment contract. Located in 

Tuzla Main, the BCCA staff normally ranges from 11 to 14 

personnel. The agency reached a peak of 24 personnel in September 1996 to facilitate base camp decommissioning and closure when the Implementation Force of 20.000 downsized to 

the Stabilization Force of 8,500. The BCCA currently is 

staffed by seven active duty military personnel on temporary 

change-of-station orders and four civilians. 

Organization 

T he BCCA chief. a lieutenant colonel, serves as a special staff officer on the Task Force Eagle staff. He is 

Task Force Eagle's single point of contact for all base 

camp facilities, which are managed by six organic and three 

nonorganic sections within the BCCA. 

Plans Section 

This section develops plans and orders for future operations, forecasts necessary construction support for these operations, and coordinates with Task Force Eagle staff. 

Identifying issues, collecting information, and developing 

courses of action are integral parts of the planning process. 

When the Operation Joint Guard mission was extended, a 

process action team was formed to set new standards for construction. The team expects to increase the level of force protection and the standard of living. By proposing and 

analyzing several courses of action, the team can develop economical solutions to meet future needs in a less temporary 

16 Engineer November 1998 
environment. The plans section recently 

acquired AutoCAD software, which allows 

it to develop standard designs for projects 

such as medical aid station bunkers, 

barracks-style living containers, and chapels. In addition, the section helps each base 

camp develop a master plan for site layout .---. A =.+ e7 

. , L. that will meet future needs with an organized and economical solution. 

Operations Section 

This section conducts day-to-day operations for the BCCA and collects detailed 

information on base camp population, 

capacities, life-support capabilities, and 

other key factors affecting the success of 

Task Force Eagle. The section also develops and maintains the Base Camp Standards, a document that governs base camp Multinational Division-North soldiers construct a 100-man bunker. facilities and services and defines the minimum construction standards authorized within the limits of responsible environmental stewardship. A Corps of Engineers 

good fiscal stewardship. This document is continually up- civilian environmental specialist provides guidance on hazdated to conform to current conditions, military needs, and ardous materials and hazardous waste management, pollution 

available resources, based on the changing mission of Opera- prevention, and waste minimization. He also oversees envition Joint Guard. ronmental baseline and closure studies and periodic sampling 

Project Management Section of Task Force Eagle sites. For new construction, the environmental specialist identifies environmental concerns and Construction projects are processed through this section, 

which validates the need for new work through interaction develops courses of action to address those concerns. 

with the customer. Section personnel determine the scope of Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST) 

work needed and ensure that the work complies with Buse These civilian members of the Corps of Engineers secure 

Carnp Standards. The section also provides technical con- leases for land to support operational requirements and work 

struction expertise and identifies economical ways to meet with landowners to address their concerns. Team members 

requirements. After determining requ.irements, section per- write leases, investigate property titles, and assess damages to 

sonnel pass specifications and drawings to contracting offic- help settle claims. 

ers or military engineers for execution. They also track Nonorganic Sections projects On a theater-wide database and in- Nonorganic sections that work closely with the BCCA 

progress reviews with the contractor to update statuses and include a prime power platoon, a military fire-fighting pla- identify potential problems. toon, and a quality-assurance specialist, ammunition surBase Camp Assessment Team (BCAT) veillance (QASAS) representative. The prime power unit 

The BCAT inspects each base camp and occupied hilltop operates the tactical power ylant for Tuzla Main and provides 

n~onthly to ensure that occupants comply with standards. liaisons to the BCCA to assist with electrical projects. FireTraveling in a convoy of four up-armored HMMWVs, the fighters participate in BCAT inspections, develop the fireteam focuses its inspections on force protection, environ- fighting plan for Task Force Eagle, and provide expertise in 

mental compliance, safety, fire prevention, and ammunition fire-protection standards for contingency projects. The 

storage. After completing an inspection, the BCAT conducts QASAS representative serves on BCATs and helps plan 

an outbriefing with the base camp mayor and tactical com- ammunition holding areas. 

manders. The team provides guidance and assistance to unit 

representatives in each area inspected. Construction Projects 

Environmental Section he BCCA divides consti-uction work assignments into 

This section provides technical oversight of Task Force three categories: troop labor; Brown & Root Services 

Eagle operations to ensure that U.S. personnel conduct oper- Corporation, which holds the sustainment contract for 

ations in a manner that protects human health, complies with Operation Joint Guard; and local contractors. Militray conappropriate environmental regulations, and is consistent with striiction assets located in Multinational Division-North 

Noveinher 1998 Engineer 17 
include elements from a mechanized combat engineer battalion and an attached Navy Seabee company. The engineer battalion reviews all approved construction requests before the 

BCCA gives them to a contractor to determine if it has the 

assets required for the job. If the engineer battalion does not, 

projects are given to Brown & Root. The BCCA occasionally 

deals directly with local contractors. 

Construction projects originate with work requests from 

units, base camp mayors, or division staff members. The 

project management section validates the requests, assigns a 

priority to them, and forwards them to military engineers or 

the Defense Contracting Management Command for execution by Brown & Root. Projects costing less than $2,500 are 

executed immediately under the authority of the BCCA chief. 

For those costing more than $2,500, a Rough Order of Magnitude is prepared and sent to the Joint Acquisition Review 

Board for consideration. The board recommends approval or 

disapproval to the division chief of staff, who holds approval 

authority for projects costing up to $50,000. Projects exceeding $50,000 are approved by the United States Army-Europe. 

Foreign nation support is another type of construction 

request. Foreign units in the American sector sometimes must 

rely on Brown & Root for construction support. As long as 

Americans do not benefit from the project, this type of 

request requires no approval and is paid for by the foreign 

nation. After a Rough Order of Magnitude is prepared, a representative from the nation signs an agreement to reimburse 

the United States for expenses. 

The BCCA handles a variety of projects, such as forceprotection upgrades, quality-of-life improvements, and mission support. Base camp design is focused on force protection to withstand terrorist attacks as well as provide a safe 

working environment for soldiers. Several projects involve 

hardening structures with a force-protection wall of bastions 

and constn~cting bunkers, crash-resistant gates, and fighting 

positions. The average tour of duty in Bosnia ranges from 6 

to 12 months, so quality-of-life improvements are critical to 

maintaining morale. Current quality-of-life projects include 

upgrading 48 living tents to wooden seahuts (512-squarefoot, plywood, one-room structures with electrical outlets and 

a heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning unit); constructing 

a morale, welfare, and recreation tent for soldiers; and 

upgrading gyms and TVIgame rooms. Mission support 

includes a wide range of construction pro.jects--from a railhead loading site to a life-support area for a gunnery range. 

Construction Challenges 

olitical, military, and environmental conditions in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina cause several engineering challenges. Therefore, the BCCA must constantly re-evaluate 

and improve construction designs to ensure they are compatible with the ever-changing environment. As with all engineering projects, the overriding factor is cost, and the goal is 

to achieve the best solution for the lowest price. 

Temporary Construction 

A~my engineers must restore land to its original state after 

closing a base camp, so a major engineering challenge for the 

BCCA is that all construction must be temporary. As a result, 

concrete is used only occasionally in prefabricated slabs or barriers. Gravel over geotex is often substituted for concrete 

because it is easily removed. Most structures also are temporary 

and are easily removed-such as tents, wooden seahuts, or containerized units-but a few are pre-existing permanent facilities. When a base camp closes, construction materials are 

reharvested for future projects. An environmental survey is then 

conducted and compared to the baseline survey conducted 

before occupation, while the CREST team gathers photographs 

to assist in settling damage claims with landowners. 

Winterization 

Due to the extremely cold winters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

winterization techniques are incorporated in construction 

projects. For guard towers, a sliding plexiglass window that can 

be closed to contain heat or opened during emergencies is 

installed on each wall. Three coats of paint are applied to 

wooden structures to protect them from rain, snow, and ice. 

Tents are upgraded to tier three standards, which include plywood floors and walls, roof trusses to support snow loads, electrical outlets, and lights. They are heated with two kerosene 

heaters. Tents that are not occupied for a few days-and therefore not heated-fien require repairs due to heavy snow loads 

that accumulate on roof trusses. 

Ground Conditions 

A high water table and poor soil conditions in Bosnia also 

present challenges. Sand for sandbags and soil for fill material 

must be purchased and transported to constnlction sites. Perhaps 

the largest cost associated with most construction projects is the 

enormous amounts of gravel used to stabilize soil. Bunkers and 

fighting positions must be constructed aboveground, and all structures must have large footings on a thick foundation of gravel. 

Utility Costs 

Since Operation Joint Guard has been extended, the BCCA 

is seeking ways to reduce utility costs. One method under consideration is to convert from generator to commercial power 

where feasible and use generators for backup power in critical 

areas. Another option is to convert to well water rather than use 

bottled potable water and nonpotable water delivered by Brown 

& Root. The BCCA is investigating the feasibility of digging 

test wells at some base camps. For force-protection reasons, 

however, a water source outside the base camp is not practical. 

To save heating costs while upgrading soldiers' quality of life, 

the BCCA may discontinue using tier three tents and use 

seahuts or containerized living units, which are electrically 

heated. Finally, mobile generator-powered sets on base camp 

perimeters are being replaced with fixed poles with lights that 

operate from commercial power or a central generator. 

Coordination 

When a project is assigned to both Brown & Root and military engineers, the BCCA must ensure that they coordinate 

18 Engineer November 1998 
between construction phases through 

preconstruction conferences and inprogress reviews. Details are worked out 

with a representative from the engineer 

battalion and a Brown & Root liaison, 

and any conflicts are resolved. For example, approximately one million landmines and various unexploded ordnances remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

from the war. New construction sites that 

have not been cleared of mines require 

surface clearance. Before Brown & Root 

can start a new project in an uncleared 

area, they must coordinate through the 

BCCA to have military engineers clear 

the ground. 

Conclusion 

he BCCA is a nondoctrinal organization that has served and continues to serve its purpose in 

support of Operation Joint Guard. The 

agency continues to assess the evolving 

mission and to plan for future requirements, while providing construction 

support and base camp assessments to 

Task Force Eagle. Faced with many 

challenges in construction design and 

changes in standards, the agency maintains flexibility and continually seeks to 

provide the best possible product at the 

lowest cost. It accomplishes this goal by 

maintaining a close working relationship 

with Brown & Root, the Defense Contracting Management Command, rnilitary engineers, base camp mayors, and 

the tactical commanders. The BCCA 

organization provides a template that can 

be used for base camp management during future multinational stability and 

support operations. 

Captain Winget is attending tllr 

Engineer Oficer Advarzced Course. He 

was assigned to the 20th Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, and was 

on temporary orders to support the 1st 

Armored Division as Project Manager 

for the BCCA during Operation Joint 

Guard. Frotn February to June 1997, he 

supported Operation Intrin.sic Action in 

Kuwait. CPT Winget is a graduate of 

the United States Military Academy. 

The follov 

ploying to $ 

is learned 

er stability I 

Sustail 

its, the con . .. 

oice of eve 

? informatic 

int Guard 

31ut10ns. 

!ry project 

1 the BCCl 

to reduce ( 

In flow an( 1 shared a 

~struction a 

without det 

~nd develo~ 

ailed plans 

) a plan fo~ 

i often mu: 

r overall ba 

d be reloci 

~se-camp I; 

sted at ad( 

- 

11 into two 

e-and rep1 

authority fc 

the grounc . -. . 

:ary engine ..L -- . .- 2. 

t facilitates 

prevents di 

--3ons Learned 

ving lessor during OF may assist units 

de ;upport 0th operations: 

0 Ensure that troop engineer un 4 coordinate daily 

to resolve problems and develop Dener sc 

fl Allow troop engineers first ch :osts and sustain 

unit training. 

0 Colocate the troop engineer consrrucrlon managemenr secrlon and the BCCA in 

the same building to facilitate ssets and equipment. 

0 Staff the BCCA with officers nolalng a aearee Irl englneerlng and who understand tactical operations. 

0 Develop a thorough and regular base camp inspection program to maintain high 

levels of safety, force protection, environmental standards, ammunition safety, 

and fire prevention. 

0 Establish a mayor (who is not occupied with command responsibility) to be the 

single point of contact for each base camp. That individual will assist in communication with customer units and resolve issues between units at each camp. 

fl Obtain support from the Corps of Engineers for equipment, personnel (real 

estate and environmental specialists), and other expertise. 

0 Ensure that the BCCA works directly for the senior commander on the ground, 

not for a higher headquarters, to ensure that construction supports the commander's intent. 

Improve 

O Provide additional personnel so the BCCA can expand its responsibilities and 

provide a better product at a lower price. For example, provide engineers to perform independent government estimates on projects and clerical and administrative personnel to assist in day-to-day operations so engineers can focus on 

construction. 

0 Create a BCCA structure as early as possible in the deployment to manage initial base-camp cor youts. 

Base camps built 1 jitional 

expense. 

0 Develop a flexible masrer plan Tor oase-camp layout that allows for expansion. 

O Determine the initial standards of living and level of 1 ; much 

detail as possible--and establish a board to review terly to 

consider changes in fundina and mission reauireme 

0 Organize personne nnel in eac xn the 

same unit if possibl~ 3 time to m, tinuity. 

fl Plan for a minimurll uvellap UI LWU weeno U~;LW~;OII outqoinq all" cement 

personnel. 

O Delegate approval e highest commander on tuation 

than higher headquarters. I nls melnoa allows ror ~UICK approval or n~gn-priority 

projects. 

0 Ensure that all milil i (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marines) work togerner unaer one englneer commander for facilities construction. This alignmen ~aximizes efficient 

use of assets, and tary personnel. 

teams-wit 

lace only or 

)r projects I 

j, because .. . 

ers in a joir . . - . - - - 

a coordina 

ffering stan 

h all perso 

ie team at i 

I,^ L^C..^^. 

costing les: 

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November 1998 Engineer 19 
Underground Combo 

Stereophonic Blasting, Tunnel Rats, 


and the Soviet-%ban War 


By kster W Grau und Ali Ahmad Jalali 

he U.S. Army fought subterranean battles in the left active duty now, but the need to train for this type of 

tunnels of Vietnam. Following a few tear-gas underground combat remains. The U.S. Army's experience 

grenades or a charge of C4 plastic explosive, "tunnel with tunnels was not unique. From 1979 to 1989,the Soviet 

rats" would go underground to find Viet Cong or North 40th Army waged war against the mujahideen in AfVietnamese combatants or materiel. Small, slender soldiers ghanistan. Part of this war was fought in the tunnels of 

armed with flashlights and.45-caliber pistols would crawl Afghanistan, which were larger and far more extensive than 

into the Vietnamese tunnels for reconnaissance and possible those in South Vietnam. 

close combat. Almost all of the Vietnam-era tunnel rats have 

Welcome to the Underground 

I

n the Middle East, water is life itself. Over the centuries, 

the inhabitants of Iran, Afghanistan, and Western 

\ 

\ Pakistan have taken some extraordinary measures to 

\ preserve and conserve this precious resource. Since many of 

the rivers are seasonal, rural inhabitants have found ways to 

4 el$ prolong their agricultural water supply during the dry 

ral warer =able ' River months. Open-ditch irrigation is used in the northern part of 

Afghanistan, where the water table is relatively shallow, but 

in eastern, southern, and southwestern parts of the countly 

the extensive underground karez system (a man-made water 

system) is necessary.' When flying over these regions, the 

neat lines of mounds that lead from the foothills across the 

desert to the "green zones" of vegetation surrounding towns 

and villages are a common sight. The mounds are entrances 

to shafts that intersect the water table and that are connected 

Figure 1. Idealized cross section of a karez system. to each other by tunnels (Figure I). The deepest shaft highest 

20 Engineer November 1998 
Figure 2 

on a hillside intersects the water table. Water moves through 

the tunnels and into irrigation ditches and fields near the 

towns and villages.* Some of the karez tunnels stretch for 

several kilometers underground. Some historians claim that 

the karez system was already working when Alexander the 

Great went through Afghanistan in 328 B.c.~ 

The karez tunnels are dug by farmers. Occasionally they 

use large ceramic tile drainpipes to shore up weak sections 

of the strata. Digging the tunnels is dangerous work because 

the shafts usually range from 9 to 15 meters deep, with some 

more than 30 meters deep. The tunnels are labor- and 

maintenance-intensive. Silt that collects in them must be 

cleaned out annually and hauled to the surface by a windlass 

equipped with goatskin bags.4 

The karez tunnels also have another use. Since ancient 

times, villagers have used these underground waterways for 

shelter against invading armies. Chroniclers of Afghan 

history in medieval times refer to the use of the karez by 

civilians and combatants during the invasion of Genghis 

Khan's Mongol armies in 1221 A.D. The Mongols set out to 

destroy all major cities in Afghanistan and neighboring areas 

and made every effort to massacre the inhabitants to the last 

ma5 The Mongols did not go into tunnels after the 

refugees. Rather, a day or two after destroying a town, the 

Mongols sent a small detachment back to the area to cut 

down any resurfaced survivors. They did this to ensure that 

no potential resistance against Mongol rule remained. The 

Mongols had learned during earlier campaigns that the 

official surrender of a city did not guarantee permanent 

submission of the area, because the inhabitants often rose 

against the invader after his main force moved on. 

During the Soviet occupation, both villagers and local 

mujahideen guerrillas used the karez system as a hiding 

place. Since the towns and villages are close to the karez, 

they provide ready-made shelters from bombing and artillery 

attacks. Guerillas dug caves in the sides of the shafts, where 

they hid weapons and themselves, and used the karez tunnel 

network to move undetected to and from ambush sites and 

attack positions. According to mujahideen eyewitness 

accounts, Soviet forces passing through an area usually did 

not try to flush out the refugees and guerrillas hiding in 

tunnels. However, in major cordon-and-search actions, the 

Soviets and Afghan communist forces made special attempts 

to destroy the underground m~jahideen.~ 

Underground Warfare 101 

n the mid-1980s, the Soviets conducted a tunnelneutralization course in Paghman Province. about 14 

kilometers northwest of the capital city of Kabul. The 

course was designed for Afghan special-forces soldiers and 

was similar to courses provided for Soviet sappers in 

Afghanistan. The training was necessary because men do not 

readily go underground to fight. Tunnels are ideal locations 

for booby traps, knives thrust from a side tunnel, and caveins7 Additionally, tunnels teem with snakes, scorpions, and 

other creatures.' After a short course in theory, participants in 

the tunnel-neutralization course moved to the field for 

practical applications. 

The soldiers conducted a reconnaissance to find shaft 

entries, which usually were marked by mounds. The Soviets 

taught the soldiers to form into two covering groups and hold 

two adjacent shafts simultaneously. Since civilians often hid 

in the karez, the first step was to yell into the shaft and 

demand that anyone sheltering inside come out.9 The soldiers 

were taught to yell without exposing themselves to answering 

gunshots from inside the karez. If no one answered or came 

out, the next step was to throw two RGD-5 concussion 

grenades in the karez.1° After the grenades exploded, it was 

customary to again demand that the occupants surrender 

because the karez was about to be blown up.' I 

The depth of a shaft was determined from the sound of a 

falling rock tossed inside. After determining the depth, 

soldiers used a mirror to reflect sunlight down into the shaft 

and examine it. If there were areas they could not examine, 

the soldiers tied a cord to a grenade, lowered the grenade to 

the suspect area, and detonated it. Only then would soldiers 

lower a blasting charge on detonating cord. They usually used 

captured TC-2.5 or TC-6.1 Italian antitank blast mines 

because many of them were available.12 The soldiers then 

lowered the first charge to the bottom of the shaft. Next they 

prepared a second charge using three or four meters of 

detonating cord and 800 grams (two and three-quarters 

pounds) of high explosive. Then they tied or taped the 

detonation cord to a standard hand-grenade fuze (Figure 2). 

They would weight the firing assembly with a rock or wedge 

it near the mouth of the shaft. Two trained soldiers could 

prepare a 20-meter shaft for detonation in about three 

minutes. All that remained was to pull the ring on the firing 

assembly. After four seconds, the charges would explode. 

During the explosion, it was necessary to stand at least five or 

six meters from the mouth of the shaft, because the explosion 

caused rocks to fly from the shaft like a volcano.13 

November 1998 Engineer 21 
Figure 3 

The Soviets' placement of the charges was particularly 

effective because the top charge exploded a fraction of a 

second earlier than the bottom charge. The top explosion 

tightly plugged the shaft with gases. When the bottom 

charge exploded, shock waves from it would rebound off the 

higher gas mass and rush back down and against the sides of 

the shaft and tunnels. This movement created a deadly 

overpressure between the two charges. The Soviets called 

this the "stereophonic effect" (Figure 3).14 

The stereophonic effect can be multiplied by preparing 

two adjoining shafts for simultaneous detonation. The 

Soviets prepared each site as described above. Then they 

joined the detonation cord at the midpoint between the two 

shafts and taped the detonation cord to a standard handgrenade fuze. When the charges were set off, a wider area of 

overpressure and destruction occurred. The Soviets called 

this the "quadraphonic effect" (Figure 4).15 

A Fistful of Roman Candles 

fter the dust settled, the Soviets tossed a smoke pot 

down each shaft. The smoke is nontoxic and 

ventilation in a karez system is excellent. If the smoke disappeared, it meant that 

some tunnels were intact and that the search 

team could go in without wearing respirators. 

Search teams consisted of three or four men. 

Two of them would search to the front while the 

rest guarded their backs from a sneak attack 

from the rear. The lead man had a line tied to his 

leg. If the lead man found enemy materiel, he 

tied the line to it and rejoined the team so they 

could all drag it out. If the lead man was killed 

or wounded, his team members used the line to 

drag him back. l6 

The search group was armed with knifes, 

entrenching tools, hand grenades, pistols, and 

22 Engineer 

assault rifles." A flashlight was taped to the forestock of the 

automatic rifles. The magazines of the assault rifles were 

loaded with tracer ammunition. 

The Soviets developed a psychological weapon for 

underground combat using their SM signal mines. The SM is 

basically a Roman candle that shoots a series of red, green, or 

white signal stars from five to 20 meters. The signal mine 

simultaneously emits a siren-like sound. Although designed 

for trip-wire release by an unwary enemy, the SM can be 

safely ignited while holding it in one's hand. The Soviets 

taped from three to six signal mines together and, holding 

them in one hand, they ignited and fired them into a tunnel. A 

brilliant shaft of light, screams of sirens, and a fountain of 

signal stars filled the tunnel for nine seconds. The signal stars 

ricocheted off the tunnel walls like tracers. When the mines 

stopped, the Soviets found the unsuspecting foe covering his 

head with his arms, even though there was no real danger 

unless a signal star hit someone in the eye.18 

Flame, Fuel-Air Explosives, and Fuel 

lamethrowers were also used against those hiding in the 

karez. The Soviets had replaced their short-range 

LPO-50 backpack flamethrowers with the RPO-A 

flamethrower. The RPO-A is a disposable system with a 

maximum range of 1,000 meters, a maximum effective range 

of 600 meters, and a minimum range of 20 meters. The round 

is 93 mm in diameter. It has three types of projectile: 

thermobaric (fuel-air), incendiary, and smoke.19 The fuel-air 

round was most effective against the karez. The problem was 

that flamethrower gunners drew more enemy small-arms fire 

than radiomen. An incendiary round from an RPO-A could 

clear out any opposition on the surface around a shaft 

entrance, but no flamethrower gunner wanted to lean over the 

mouth of a karez to fire down the shaft-the gunner might be 

shot before he could fire a round. The Soviets developed the 

following method for these tunnels: Soldiers first secured the 

shaft entrance and then locked and cocked an RPO-A 

Figure 4 

November 1998 
flamethrower with a thmnobaric mund. After tying two during the Soviet-Afghan War: Mc Jalali has cotnpleted the 

lowering lines on the RPO-A and a \tring on the trigger, they Infantry Opcer's Advanced Course at Fort Benning. Georgia; 

slowly lowered the RPO-A down the haft until it faced a the British Army Stafl College at Camher[ey; the Soviet 

tunnel. Then they pulled the trigger string to fire the Frzinze Academy in Moscow; and the Naval Post-Graduate 

thermobaric round down the tunnel. The resulting over- School in Monferey, California. 

pressure of the fuel-air round was devastating for anyone in Photos and artwork courtesy of the Russian Soldier of 

the vicinity.*' Fortime magazine, No. 11, 1994. 

In the early days of the war, the Soviets reportedly used 

POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) products against those 

hiding in the karez. In the spring of 1982, Soviet soldiers 

entered the village of Padkhab-e Shana in Logar Province. A 

karez passes through the village and many villagers took 

refuge in it. According to eyewitness reports, "...villagers 

who fled spoke of soldiers wearing gas masks, pouring 

mysterious things into an underground irrigation canal 

where villagers, including children, were hiding. Our 

investigation showed that the soldiers had actually used 

gasoline, diesel fuel, and an incendiary white powder, an 

evil-smelling [substance] designed to ensure that the 

gasoline would properly burn in a tunnel with little oxygen. 

After the 105 people, including the little children, were 

burned to death, the population in a panic decided to run 

away to ~akistan."~~ 

There were also many reports that Soviet forces used 

chemical agents during the early part of the war to flush out 

or kill mujahideen hiding in the kare~.~* 

Tunnel Rats and Future Conflicts 

igging the enemy out of tunnels appears to be a 

constant factor in guerrilla warfare, and the combat 

engineer always seems to be the first soldier called 

for the task. Differentiating innocent civilians from combatants underground will prove to be a challenge for combat 

engineers. Since underground combat will not disappear 

from the future battlefield, we must prepare for the task. In 

the quest for high-technology answers to the complex 

problems of tomorrow's battlefields, there are few hightechnology solutions for underground combat. After all the 

charges are blown, determined soldiers still must go 

underground to meet equally determined opponents. 

Specially trained soldiers will be better prepared to cope 

with future subterranean combat, which will remain the 

realm of raw courage, cunning, and nerve. u 

MI: Grau is a military analyst at the Foreign Military 

Strldies Ojjice at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a Vietnam 

combat veteran, retired infantry lieutenant colonel, and 

Soviet Foreign Area Ojficex Mc Grau holds a master's 

degree from Kent Stare University. 

Mc Ali Jalali, a journcrlist, has covered Afghanistan and 

Central Asia for the past 15 years. He served as a colonel in 

the Afghan army and was a member of the Afghan resistarzce 

in hanc 

edge or 

18~, 

. - 

--K1 

editing 

21~ m. 

Endnotes: 

'~arez is the Pashto term for the man-made underground water 

system. Qanar is the Arabic term used in Iran and Afghanistan. Louis 

Dupree, Afghanistan, New Delhi: Rama Publishers, 1980, page 40. 

Figure 1 is from page 41. 

2~bid. 

3~. Bek, "Smertel'naya volna: Podzemnaya voyna v 

Afganistane" [Deadly wave: Underground combat in Afghanistan], 

Soldat udachi, [Soldier of Fortune], November 1994, page 4. This 

article is based on Colonel Bek's article and diagrams 2, 3 and 4 are 

Colonel Bek's. 

4~upree, page 40. 

5~li Jalali, The Military History ofAfghanistan, Volume 1, Kabul, 

1964, pages 437-442. 

6~ccounts of mujahideen commanders from Ghazni Province 

made to Ali Jalali in 1984. 

7~ek, page 5. Lieutenant Colonel Bek ran this school. 

8~fghanistan has two species of cobra, the deadly krait, and many 

types of vipers. Dupree, 53. 

'~ost Afghans would state that they seldom, if ever, gave 

warning. 

'%ragmentation grenades, such as the cast-iron body Soviet F-I, 

are fairly ineffective underground. ' '~ek, page 5. 

'he Italian TC 6.1 mine has about six kilograms (13.2 pounds) 

of explosive. Soviet engineers often used a box of TNT in lieu of a 

mine. 

13Bek, page 5. 

l41bid. 

151b 

161b 

17~he entrench~ng tool was a weapon of choice for Soviet soldiers 

1-to-hand ( normally kept a razor-sharp 

L their entrc 

:k, page 6. 

lYTc Weapons 

1995-1' 5, pages 

203-201 

2nn usslan creneral acarr marenal rnar mr. crrau is translating and 

for publica 

Lommlttee for Inrernat~ona~ Argnanlsran neanr.,, 1984, as 

cited by M. Hassan Kakar. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and tlte 

Afghan Response, 1979-1982, Berkeley, 1995, pages 234-235. 

22~tate Department Special Report # 106, Afghanistan: Tltree 

Years of Occupation, Washir Governmc 

December 1982, page 5. 

id. 

id, pages 5 

:ombat. El 

:nching toc 

nder and I 

v: Jane's 11 

ite forces 

,Is. 

[an V. Hof 

nal Afghar . .,., . 

igton: U.S. 

:g, Jane's 

Group Lil 

Infantry 1 

mited, 199 

listan Hea. . -. . ring, editel 

IS Odn. ' 

November 1998 Engineer 23 
The Bahamas b 

Atlantic Ocean 

Caribbean Sea 

Cayman Islands (u.K.) + 

t3 

By Captain Anthony J. Monaco, USMC 

ommonly dubbed "Gitmo," the U. S. Navy's unique 

base on Cuba's southeastern coast has long been a 

showcase of naval expeditionary engineering capabilities. Originally seized by Marines as an advanced base 

for the Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War in 

1898, Guantanamo Bay has been well used throughout the 

last century. The sheltered harbor, its position near the 

windward passage (an important maritime route between the 

United States and Central and South America), and its 

proximity to the Panama Canal make the base strategically 

important. Its airfields and extensive supply, repair, and 

training facilities make Gitmo an excellent forward-based 

naval facility. In 1961, though, the base was forced to turn its 

focus inland after escalating tensions between the United 

States and the Cuban revolutionary government resulted in a 

serious threat to base security. In response to that threat, 

Gitmo severed all local ties, closed its gates, and assumed a 

defensive posture. Since then, Gitmo has been surrounded on 

three sides by a less-than-cordial neighbor-the Cuban 

Army's Guantanamo Division. 

In this real-world setting, U. S. sailors and Marines, 

though vastly outnumbered by their potential adversaries, 

continue to prepare to impede a Cuban attack on the base. 

The tenuous defense has relied heavily on combat engineers 

to shape a maneuver-constrained battlefield and to protect the 

force from the direct- and indirect-fire advantage afforded 

A Russian-made HI P8 

helicopter patrols 

Gitmo's perimeter. A 

U.S. observation post 

is on the left and a U.S. 

minefield is in the foreground.Two Cuban 

observation posts are 

at the top of the hill. 

24 Engiaeer Novernber 1998 
the Cubans by their superior numbers and occupation of 

high ground around the base's perimeter. Along with 

providing a more credible defense, U.S. Navy and Marine 

countermobility and survivability efforts at Gitmo have 

firmly established combat engineering's value as a combat 

multiplier. This article describes these combat engineering 

efforts and shows their arduous, occasionally ingenious, and 

at times costly development and integration into the defense. 

Some valuable lessons learned along the way are 

highlighted. 

Weather, Terrain, and Obstacles 

G itmo is unique in the Caribbean in that it is not lush 

and tropical like nearby Jamaica and the Bahamas. 

Because of its seaside location, tropical heat and 

humidity are prevalent. Mountain ranges across Cuba's 

eastern end and mountains in Hispaniola block storms and 

rain, rendering the Guantanamo region semiarid. In most 

places, Gitmo resembles Arizona's desert more than it does a 

Caribbean island. Dense, gnarled chaparral, mangroves, and 

various scrub trees flourish in this climate. Because of the 

nearby ocean and intense tropical sun, the salt spray on 

vehicles, equipment, field fortifications, and obstacles is 

highly corrosive. There is no cool, dormant season to 

provide a break from the weather. High temperatures in the 

summer average in the mid- to high 90s, while winter highs 

average in the high 80s to low 90s. The temperature rarely 

drops below 70 degrees. Adding to its desert-like character 

is the lack of any naturally occurring freshwater source 

within four miles of the base. 

Defenders usually pick terrain that affords them a distinct 

advantage over would-be attackers, but little about Gitmo's 

terrain favors the defense. From the island's eastern 

mountains and five key high points just outside the base, 

Cubans can view almost everything that occurs within 

Gitmo's fences. Terrain on the base is rugged and unwieldy 

due to the confluence of volcanic and coral geographies. 

Steep hills with loose, rocky slopes cover much of the base, 

although salt marshes and mangrove swamps also are 

common. Despite the relatively small amount of rainfallan average of 23 inches per year-erosion control and soil 

stabilization are perpetual necessities on the many combat 

roads and trails in the defensive area. Even from the best 

positions on base, defenders must cover at least a dozen 

mechanized, small-unit avenues of approach that funnel into 

the base from concealed positions inside Cuba. 

Several man-made obstacles and physical limitations 

further constrain American defenders. The first is the base's 

boundaries, which were set by treaty in 1934. The United 

States anticipated having to defend against an attack from 

the sea, so it took only the land needed for a coastal defense 

of the base and harbor. The boundaries were drawn along 

straight north-south or east-west lines, often cutting directly 

over the top of key terrain features and stopping short of 

several prominent, and later tactically critical, hills and ridges. 

When the threat shifted inland, the boundaries drawn three 

decades earlier became an instant liability to the land-based 

defense. In 1983, Castro eliminated the possibility of 

Americans branching into Cuba to gain valuable maneuver 

space by seeding the Cuban side of the perimeter with 

thousands of landmines. 

Another lasting effect of the treaty is that the base 

boundaries do not encompass the entire bay, merely the lower 

bay. The bay divides the naval base into two distinct sides, 

called leeward and windward. No bridges connect the two 

sides and travel between them is limited to boat and 

helicopter. The channel to the upper bay contains an important 

Cuban agricultural port and must, by treaty and international 

maritime law, remain open-at least during peacetime. The 

effects of this diplomatically imposed obstacle on maneuver 

and the defense are especially constraining. 

In total, Gitmo's intense, difficult climate, coupled with its 

rugged, unforgiving terrain and vegetation are natural 

enemies. In the preparation and maintenance of a sound 

defense, these factors exact a heavy toll on both men and 

machines. At best, the terrain and weather are equally harsh to 

attacker and defender. At worst, adding the diplomatic foibles 

of yesteryear, they favor the attacker. He holds key terrain 

outside the base and can direct a multipronged attack through 

many avenues of approach to literally push the undermanned 

Marines and sailors into the bay from whence they came in 

1898. 

Developing a Defense, 1958-1964 

he buildup of Gitmo's initial land-based defense 

corresponds with the rise in national-level tensions 

with Cuba and the general panic over the spread of 

communism in our backyard between 1958 and 1964. Before 

the late 1950s, the base had no well-delineated perimeter road, 

and its boundary was marked only by an unsubstantial picket 

fence. Marines occasionally patrolled the perimeter on 

horseback. Marine engineers conducted training at Gitmo but 

were not used or needed in its defense before this period. In 

June 1958, Castro's rebels elevated local tensions when they 

kidnapped a group of 28 Marines and sailors who were 

returning to the base from liberty in Guantanamo City. (They 

were returned in July 1958.) Castro officially claimed control 

of Cuba on 1 January 1959, and Cuban-American diplomatic 

relations plummeted until 4 January 196 1, when President 

Eisenhower terminated them completely. In concert with this 

termination, the base closed its gates, began regular patrolling 

of the perimeter, and started work on its defense. The Bay of 

Pigs fiasco in April 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 

November 1998 Engineer 25 
General L.F. Chapman, 

Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, is briefed on Gitmo's 

defensive preparations in 1971. 

1962. and various provocations by Castro's forces around 

Gitmo's perimeter during this period yielded an urgency to 

defense planning and preparations on the base. 

The United States initially reacted to the tension 

threatening Gitmo in the early 1960s by throwing large 

numbers of combat and combat support troops into the fray. 

Although the naval base commander was responsible for 

defending the base's 17.4-mile perimeter, he exercised it 

through the commander of Ground Defense Force, a Marine 

colonel who was commanding officer of Gitmo's Marine 

Barracks. The force, equipped and manned to hold out for 

up to a week without reinforcements, was comprised of a 

regimental-sized infantry component augmented by several 

provisional Navy companies. It boasted an impressive array 

of combined arms-from Marine artillery, tank, antitank, 

and engineer units to Navy attack airplanes and gunfire 

platforms. A Seabee battalion dug in the force and created 

the initial field fortifications and revetments. 

The initial defense reflected the prevalent tactical thought 

of the period. Navy and Marine planners deployed a large, 

static force in hold-at-all-cost positions along the entire 

perimeter and strengthened it with impressive firepower. 

Engineer efforts, always the most time-intensive on the 

battlefield, were limited because the defenders, aptly 

figuring on the inevitable Cuban attack, were only willing to 

gamble on a minimal amount of preparation before the 

defense needed to be set. 

Field fortification construction and minefield emplacement topped the engineers' tasks. Marine infantrytrained and supervised by Marine engineers-installed 

protective, standard-pattern minefields during lulls in the 

tension. Everything about these initial minefield efforts 

reflected the urgency of the defensive situation. The 

minefields did not maximize use of the terrain or incorporate 

sufficient man-made, nonexplosive obstacles. Minefield 

records were hastily drawn and often incomplete. Probably 

because of working long hours in the Cuban heat at a 

dangerous, unforgiving task, two junior Marines were killed in 

separate minefield accidents within a three-month period. As 

further evidence of the haste of these efforts, Marine Barracks 

staff members studying the continued requirement for 

landmines at Gitmo in late 1966 could find no record of the 

initial emplacement authority and few records on the initial 

efforts. 

Changing the Focus, 1965-1966 

s tensions around the perimeter relaxed about 1965, 

the American troops protecting Gitmo were slowly 

parceled out elsewhere. As American involvement in 

Southeast Asia grew, only a skeleton of the former force was 

left to defend against the still-credible Cuban threat. At this 

point, combat engineering earnestly entered the forefront of 

defensive preparations at the naval base. The new situation 

demanded that defenders make the best possible use of all 

combat multipliers. General Douglas MacArthur's prophecy 

began to be fully realized at Gitmo in 1965: "...It is certain 

that infuture wars, even more than in the past, endeavors will 

be made by every possible means to prevent or delay the 

march of the enemy's troops by throwing obstacles in the way 

and by cutting such lines of communication as they might 

use." 

The new defensive situation, featuring the tropical version 

of a Soviet-styled mechanized force, provided the impetus for 

a large-scale, combat-engineer-intensive defense retooling. 

The Marine Barracks exchanged its obsolete continuous 

perimeter defense for a mutually supporting strongpoint 

defense that relied heavily on an obstacle belt to disrupt, 

channel, or turn potential attackers. To effect this end, Marine 

engineer companies from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 

rotated to Gitmo in 1965 to plan and construct a more 

tactically sound obstacle belt around the perimeter. This 

retooling took more than a year of steady work to complete. 

26 Engineer November 1998 
Engineer tasks were plentiful and the pace of implemen- remain an effective part of the defense. The destructive 

tation rapid. Seabees continued to assist the Marines with effects of the omnipresent Cuban termites and carpenter ants 

survivability efforts by fortifying strongpoints and artillery, compounded the situation. These pests destroy wood 

mortar, and tank positions. They also expanded the network structures at an alarming rate. To combat their effects, 

of combat roads and trails on rugged ground in and around Marines treated fortification timbers with thick applications 

the strongpoints, making reinforcement and maneuver of creosote. 

between them more feasible. 

Navy and Marine planners determined that landmine Obstacle Belt 

warfare was still a vital component of the Gitmo defense. Marines and sailors continued to work together to 

They also recognized that the minefields emplaced from maintain and improve the obstacle belt. The minefields 

196 1 to 1962 were sorely in need of rehabilitation and better remained the focus; Marine engineers and Navy corpsmen, 

ordnancemen, and explosive ordnance disposal technicians incorporation into a long-term defense plan. Marines 

worked together daily in minefield rehabilitation operations. removed or modified the minefields and emplaced several 

One of the more ingenious additions to the countermobility new ones. Guided this time by sound obstacle-employment 

principles and not nearly as hurried as their predecessors, the plan was the "Valley of Balls" reinforcing obstacle, the 

product of a Gitmo-unique recycling effort. From the early Marines tied 21 minefields, covering more than 600 acres of 

ground, into natural terrain obstacles such as salt marshes 1900s until the end of World War 11, the entire Atlantic Fleet 

and steep hillsides. More than 41,000 MI5 Heavy Antitank sailed to Guantanamo Bay for training and anchored 

Mines, MI4 "Toe Popper" Antipersonnel Mines, and M16 throughout the bay. To accommodate this massive force, the 

Navy placed several hundred floating anchorages-large, Bounding Fragmentation Antipersonnel Mines were used in 

steel spheres and cylinders-in the bay for ships to tie to. these minefields. The Marines also built and incorporated 

substantial wire entanglements, tank ditches, and other Once the fleet stopped deploying to Gitmo in large numbers 

nonexplosive obstacles into the obstacle belt. These efforts after World War 11, the Navy tried to rid the bay of the 

anchorages, which had outlived their usefulness and were allowed the smaller, yet better-protected force to deploy hazardous to boat traffic. The solution was to use the behind a solid, well-planned, complex obstacle belt; fight a 

anchorages as antivehicle obstacles. Placed in offsetting rows combined arms defense, albeit at closer range than desired; along vulnerable terrain-in this case two small valleys-the and reasonably expect to deter Cuban forces until help 

arrived from the United States. anchorages further strengthened the effort to deny attackers 

the use of key avenues of approach. 

Refining the Plan, 1967-Present 

he Marine Barracks, later called the Marine Barracks 

Ground DefenseISecurity Force (GDISF), continued 

to refine its defense plan. The more reasonable "live 

to fight another day" precept led the GD/SF to develop a 

delaying defense and abandon the outmoded "die-in-place" 

one. Along with the old strongpoints, this defense ultimately 

incorporated the more fluid concepts of battle positions, 

planned engagement areas, counterattacks, and phased 

fallback positions. The combined effects of this defense 

bought the time needed to evacuate noncombatants and 

allow reinforcements to build up in the rear area. 

Refinements to the defense plan generated more engineer 

tasks. Though not in the numbers of the early and mid1960s, Marine and Seabee engineer units continued to 

answer the call with regular deployments to the base, making 

the "smarter-not-harder" defense possible. 

Field Fortifications 

A prime focus for the deployed engineers was to maintain 

and upgrade the many field fortifications. Because of harsh 

environmental conditions, the fortifications-most of which 

relied on structural-grade timbers-had to be continually 

checked, repaired, and often rebuilt in order for them to 

Observation Posts 

Another sizable engineer task during this period 

showcases the well-known "can-do" motto of the Seabees. 

During their regular deployments, Seabees built 10 

substantial timber-tower observation posts along the 

perimeter. Designed and built to withstand the effects of 

hurricane-force winds, these towers were significant undertakings. They were fitted with steel plating at the top to 

protect sentries from small-arms potshots from the other side. 

Placed on the highest ground available along the perimeter 

and usually standing about four stories high, the posts 

partially mitigated the American disadvantage in observation. 

The posts were crucial to the 24-hour surveillance of the 

perimeter. From these towers, guards could gain early 

warning of potential Cuban hostilities and constantly monitor 

daily activities of Cubans for later analysis by intelligence 

personnel. The towers also allowed Marines to effectively 

control the heavy influx of Cuban asylum seekers who came 

through the fence line in the early to mid-1990s. 

Gitmo's Own Engineers 

Early in 1968, the Marine Barracks received its own 

permanent combat engineer unit for rehabilitating the base's 

700 acres of minefields. Called the Minefield Maintenance 

November 1998 Engineer 27 
Cold War, they included road craters and bridges that were 

I -- 

Engineers upgrade the obstacle belt in 1997. I ohstaclc. In keeping with the foolproof use of these obstacles, 

instructions for blowing the bridee were stenciled on one of its 

; 

. 

'" 

... , .- i 

.'' 

.I, 

(MFIVI) Section, the rmit included highly trained landrnine 

warfare experts, all of whom held the rank of sergeant (E5) 

and above. The MFM Section relieved deploying Marine 

engineers of dangerous minefield work. Previous landmine 

operations had caused heavier-than-expected casualties to 

these units, claiming five lives and wounding several others 

between November 1965 and November 1966. 

The MFM Section continued to upgrade and expand the 

minefields to better meet the needs of the defense plan, raising 

the total number of mines to more than 55,000, the total 

minefield acreage to more than 700, and the total number of 

minefields to 26. The MFM Section's daily efforts centered 

011 locating and removing old mines and replacing them with 

newer, more eftective ones, ensuring that Gitmo's nunefields 

remained the highly effective backbone of the obstaclc belt. 

One maintenance rotation, which involved removing and 

replacing all the mines and inspecting and repairing the 

infrastructure of each of 26 minefields, took seven years to 

complete. Between 1967 and 1990, minefield operations 

continued to provide a sober reminder of the price of 

maintaining Gitmo's defense. During this period, six more 

Marines and five Cuban fence jumpers were killed and 

several other personnel were injured. 

Adding the MFM Section also provided the GDISF with 

a combat engineer capability to supplement its battle plans. 

Their integration increased the plan's flexibility and resulted 

in the development of several unique, ready-made obstacles. 

The obstacles, positioned for rapid tactical employment 

throughout the base, did not prohibit normal traflic patterns 

or other routine occurrences. 

The preplanned obstacles illustrated more of the combat 

engineers' innovative contributions to Gitmo's defense. 

Similar in concept and design to the obstacles employed by 

U.S. A~my engineers in Korea and West Germany during the 

prechambered for demolitions placement and falling blocks. 

Their construction emphasized quick, foolproof employment. 

The most prevalent of these obstacles were the prechambered 

road craters known as blo>v holes. Blow holes consisted of 

polyvinylchloride (PVC) pipe placed in the ground across the 

width of a road to maintain the holes into which cratering 

charges could be placed and ignited. The holes were tied 

together with a concrete cap, and metal lids wcre placed over 

the ends of the pipe. Everything was flush wib the road 

su~face. The prechan~bered bridges crossed antitank ditches. 

which were vital to the defense but obtrusive to the cveryday 

business of perimeter surveillance. To blow the bridges and 

cornplete the obstacle, an MFM team would place predetermined quantities of demolitions in cradles welded to the 

underside of the bridge, tie the charges together, and fire the 

abutments. The last or these obstacles were the Palling blocks. 

called monoliths. Consisting of large concrete columns, they 

could be felled by a small "kicker" charge placed in a space at 

the bottom of each column. The columns would then fall 

inward and block the road. 

The basic battle concept was for the MFM Section to be 

employed in mobile, four-man teams that served in general 

support of the GDISF fight. The teams would be dispatched to 

initiate these obstacles at decisive junctures in the foreseen 

defensive battle, thus cutting off certain avenues of approach. 

This concept was especially important in Gitmo's shallow 

defensive area, because it allowed maximum use of the limited 

maneuver space for as long as possible and then quickly 

denied the enemy use of the same terrain as he pressed into the 

base. In case of a quicker-than-expected break in the lines. 

engineers could be employed as infantry-a bonus for the 

already lean defense force. 

The Current Situation 

D efensive operations at Gitmo have fallen to the same 

downsizing ax as the rest of America's military. Cuban 

forces around the base also have undergone changes, 

having lost their Soviet benefactor. However, the nccd for a 

credible defense has not dissolved and preparations continue, 

though on a more modest scale than in previous eras. Chief 

among these efforb-and one only recently completed-was 

the Seabee's repair and upgrade of the perimeter road. This 

road, the lifeline of the perimeter, had always been subject to 

damage from erosion and heavy tactical vehicle traffic. It was 

dangerous to drive on at night, the peak time for pall-olling, 

and was badly in need of repair. The Seabees implemented a 

comprehensive plan to fix the problem that integrated soil 

stabiliration, culverts, concrete ditches, gabions, and a doublebituminous, surface-treated road along the entire 17.4-mile 

28 Engineer November 1998 
perimeter. The Seabees have also completed another timber 

observation post and started building several storm shelters 

along the fence line for Marine sentries and patrols. 

Countermobility operations have taken the biggest hit 

recently. The president's decision in May 1996 to ban the use 

and stockpiling of all antipersonnel mines was manifested in 

a directive to completely remove Gitmo's minefields. The 

MFM Section is carrying out this operation, but the work is 

necessarily deliberate, slow, and thorough and is not 

scheduled for completion until after the year 2000. The GD/ 

SF continues to search for a viable replacement for the 

minefields and is considering scatterable mine systems like 

the Volcano and the Modular Pack Mine System or perhaps a 

nonexplosive alternative. Survivability maintenance has 

been affected too, but recent developments from the Army's 

experiences in Bosnia show promising applications at 

Gitmo. Survivability and countermobility projects continue 

to accumulate because too few engineer units are available 

to accomplish all of the proposed projects. 

sailors have taken valuable lessons learned at Gitmo to 

Vietnam, Beirut, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and elsewhere. 

a Ensure that engineer leaders receive jire-support training. Simulating the placement of demolitions in front of 

enemy and friendly lines when both sides are manning 

their positions-essentially working in "no man's 

landn--is a good way to remind everyone to brush up on 

call-for-fire and close air and radio communications 

skills. 

0 Appreciate the dificulty, danger; and long-term consequerzces of minefield operations. Conventional minefields require an incredible amount of resources and time 

to emplace and maintain. Minefields also present problems long after they have ceased to be tactically beneficial, regardless of the type of mine systems used. 

Friendly minefields produce casualties among even the 

most seasoned troops. These realistic considerations 

must be factored into our tactical planning. 

Lessons Learned o Encourage innovation. Some of Gitmo's most effective 

a he evolution of Guantanamo Bay's defense has obstacles resulted from unlikely materials or bold ideas. 

yielded the following combat engineering lessons: a Stress simplici~. Seemingly simple engineer tasks, such 

as priming a road crater or locating and removing mines 

O Integrate combat engineers into the drfen.~e. This from thick undergrowth, are not so simple when perincludes individual engineers on the ground who coordi- formed in view of an enemy guard tower. Working at 

nate with infantry as well as engineer leaders who inte- Gitmo, with the nearby threat, shows how difficult it 

grate engineers into operations plans. The Marines' would be to do the same tasks in a combat situation. 

experience at Gitmo clearly shows the value of a combat 

n Develop a unit standing operating procedure (SOP). multiplier that is often not fully employed in peacetime Although the MFM Section essentially followed estab- exercises, because many combat engineering tasks are lished landmine warfare doctrine, the doctrine was by no too time intensive to complete. means comprehensive enough by itself. The MFM SecKeep combat engineers in general support of the force. 

At Gitmo, the MFM Section showed that they were 

more flexible if they stayed in general support of the 

GDISF during defensive exercises rather than be task 

organized to subordinate units. 

Integrate engineer and jire-support planning. This lesson is especially obvious at Gitmo, where Marines can 

stand on an obstacle, look down the avenue of approach 

it seeks to deny, and clearly see the desired combinedarms effect. 

0 Stress the importance of realistic "hands-on" training 

,for junior sailors and Marines, trairzirig which open is 

not possible in the United States. Because the defense 

tion found it necessary to develop thorough, stringent 

procedures for daily minefield operations. The use of the 

SOP by all Marines, regardless of rank, was undeniably a 

major factor in minimizing minefield casualties. 

0 Minimize the potentially debilitating eflects of terrain 

and weather on a defensive posture. If not for a dedicated maintenance effort, there would no longer be any 

worthwhile positions or obstacles at Gitmo. 

n Emphasize the true relevance of the tenet "Every Marine 

a Rijleman." The defense plan at Gitmo relies on the use 

of evely Marine, regardless of specialty. 

The Future 

mission takes top priority in Gitmo, there are few con- T he defensive situation around the perimeter of the 

straints+nvironmental or otherwise-to hamper dig- Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is one of only a few 

ging, building, demolishing, etc. The operational nature Cold War conflicts vet to be resolved. The future of 

of the mission infuses defenders and those who have the base and its defensive bpeMlions are currently unclear, 

deployed to Gitmo with a singular focus and sense of and significant changes are likely as relations with cuba 

purpose. The result is that generations of Marines and (Continued on page 32) 

November 1998 Engineer 29 
Supporkinq= he Terrain Visualiza~ionExpe.rl 

By Mark Adams and Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hooper 

he U.S. Army Engineer School continues its efforts 

to develop TerraBase I1 as an easy-to-use, low-cost, 

PC-based terrain evaluation tool for the engineer 

force. This software assists in training engineers to be terrain 

visualization experts and provides a personal software tool 

to evaluate and view digital terrain data products. TerraBase 

I1 is tailored specifically for military applications and 

requires minimal training. This article reviews the capabilities provided by version 2.2 and describes improvements 

available in the new 3.0 release. 

Version 2.2 Capabilities 

erraBase 11has been the instructional standard for the 

Engineer School since the summer of 1997. The 

Engineer School distributed the original 2.04 version 

of TerraBase I1 on a Terrain Visualization Training CDROM (see Engineer, August 1997, pages 38-39). The 2.2 

version of the software was distributed via the web in April 

1998. TerraBase I1 quickly reached the field with our graduating students and through the Terrain Visualization Center 

web site. 

With TerraBase 11, version 2.2, engineers can produce a 

variety of tactical decision aids (TDAs) to assist with terrain 

visualization. These include line-of-site displays, weapons 

fans and range circles, visible area plots, oblique and perspective views, elevation and slope tints, contour and reflectance plots, point elevations, and fly-throughs. TerraBase I1 

also performs coordinate datum transformations and calculates sunrise-sunset day length, moonrise-moonset, and 

over-the-ground distance. 

TerraBase 11, version 2.2, a users' guide, and a set of battle drills are available from the Terrain Visualization Center 

web site at htttp://www.wood.ar~ny.mil/TVC.Each battle drill 

contains an abstract and step-by-step procedures to help new 

users develop basic TDAs. 

The primary data requirements are imagery and elevation 

data products from the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency (NIMA - formerly the Defense Mapping Agency), 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and a variety of commercial 

products. The 2.2 version usesw NIMA digital terrain elevation data (DTED). 

USGS digital elevation models (DEM). 

w NIMA controlled-image base (CIB). 

w USGS digital orthophoto quads (DOQ). 

LANDSAT (land satellite) multispectral imagery (MSI). 

w SPOT (Systeme Probatoire d' Observation de la Terre) 

satellite imagery. 

w Indian reconnaissance satellite (IRS) imagery. 

Version 3.0 Updates 

ince the release of versions 2.04 and 2.2, a steady 

stream of questions, requests for assistance, recommended improvements, and bug reports flowed into 

the Terrain Visualization Center. The most useful information consistently came from users in the field, who add tactical significance to the TDAs produced with TerraBase 11. 

The result of this input is TerraBase 11, version 3.0. From 

the users' perspective, most of the improvements are evolutionary. Although many processes are simplified, the look 

and feel of TerraBase I1 remains unchanged. The following 

paragraphs summarize the most significant updates in version 3.0. 

New Formats 

Field users frequently requested map-based product formats. The 3.0 version adds digital map formats from NIMA 

and USGS that can be used to create TDAs, including perspective and fly-through products. New formats available in 

release 3.0 are30 Engineer November 1998 
NIMA standard data types: Arc Digitized Raster 

Graphics (ADRG) maps, Compressed Arc Digitized 

Raster Graphics (CADRG) maps, and Compressed Digitized Raster Graphics (CDRG) maps. 

USGS standard data type: Digitized Raster Graphics 

(DRG) maps. 

New commercial and allied imagery in GeoTiff georeferenced formats. 

An NTC fly-through (left view) with a corresponding two-dimensional track (right view). 

IZe\ ised 1.wr Interk~ce 

Version 3.0 includes an expanded and simplified user 

"options" interface, improved pull-down menus, and a Graphics User Interface (GUI) for the most popular TDAs. This version also includes an updated coordinate conversion module 

and a "hot key" to execute the Topographic Engineering Center GEOTRANS software. The GEOTRANS software adds a 

Universal Polar Stereographic capability for the coordinates 

in polar regions, a few minor secondary grids, and the ability 

to batch-process coordinate conversions. 

Improvcd TDA Presentation 

Version 3.0 allows users to drape any of the tactical overI lays (weapons fans, point elevations, annotations, custom 

grids, etc.) on elevation data, imagery, or maps to create 

two-dimensional, perspective, and oblique views. A curved1 path fly-through is now possible with automatic smoothing 

of directional changes. The new fly-through interface simultaneously displays, frame by frame, both the fly-through 

three-dimensional view and the two-dimensional map track 

(see figure). Resolution restrictions on three-dimensional 

perspectives and fly-throughs are relaxed to take advantage 

of high-end PC capabilities. 

CPS Connecti1,ity 

Military and commercial Global Positioning Systems 

(GPS) now can be connected to laptop computers and-in 

real time4isplay track, bearing, and speed, with updates 

every two seconds. The track can display over elevation data, 

imagery, and maps. Way points recorded using a military precise lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) now can be downloaded 

and displayed in TerraBase I1 over elevation data, imagery, or 

maps. In a reverse role, routes planned with TerraBase I1 can 

be uploaded as way points to a PLGR for navigation. 

Other Irnprol ements 

The help files in version 3.0 are greatly expanded and contain an automatic help feature for new users. Major changes in 

data retrieval and manipulation are embedded in the software 

that allow NIMA, USGS, and GeoTiff products to display in 

their native formats. Although TerraBase I1 still uses an internal.idx format for some products, most products load directly 

without the need for conversion. This capability greatly enhances the speed of creating TDAs and reduces file-storage 

requirements. Most importantly, it takes advantage of the geocontrol embedded in products from primary data providers. 

Availability 

T erraBase 11, version 3.0 beta, may be downloaded from 

the new Terrain Visualization Center web site at htfp:// 

www. wood.army.rnil/rvC/index. htm. A revised users' 

guide and an updated set of battle drills are planned for release 

by the end of 1998. A new two-CD-ROM set is projected for 

completion early in 1999. The first CD-ROM will contain a 

self-paced interactive training program, while the second one 

will contain the TerraBase I1 software and an expanded set of 

training data. The Engineer School continues to support earlier TerraBase I1 releases, battle drills, and users' guides until 

version 3.0 is available on CD-ROM and the Terrain Visualization Center web site. 

Sample digital elevation and satellite imagery data coverage for several CONUS training posts is available from the 

Terrain Visualization Center web site. The key source of data 

for training and operations continues to be the NIMA. Units 

November 1998 Engineer 31 
ious ass 

Yection 4 

can use their Department of Defense Activity Address Code 

(DODAAC) to order digital and hard-copy products from 

NIMA on a 30-day turnaround cycle. As of 1 April 1998, 

NIMA products are ordered and delivered through the 

Defense Logistics Agency and requested by national stock 

number using the standar. ~~~~il supply system. 

Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

message (DALO-SMP, DTG 1408582 ~~~il 97) provides 

instructions. Map stock and issue procedures follow AR 

710-2, Inventory Management Supply Policy Below the 

Wholesale Level. Mapping, charting, and geodesy products 

are stocked at Class 11, IV, and VII supply points at Corps 

and the Theater Army Area Command. The Defense 

Supply Center web site at http://www.dsc~dlu.mil/PC9/ 

dscr-maps.htm provides information on the new ordering 

and distribution process. All NIMA products are provided at 

no cost to support military requirements. 

Joint Venture 

T he TerraBase I1 developmental effort continues as a 

joint venture between the Engineer School's Department of Training and Doctrine Development (responsible for all training, instructional materials, and training support), the Terrain Visualization Center (responsible 

for software development management, priorities, and field 

technical support), and the U.S. Naval Academy (responsible for programming and software development). 

Engineer School personnel are grateful to Dr. Peter Guth 

of the U.S. Naval Academy for his extraordinary skill and 

dedication to this project and to the U.S. Naval Academy for 

its flexibility and support of Dr. Guth's efforts This relationship allows TerraBase I1 to develop and respond quickly to 

user feedback. TerraBase 11, version 3.0, is indicative of this 

cooperative relationship. 

MI: Adams is a physical scientist in the Terrain 

Visualization Center; U.S. Army Engineer School. Previously 

he war a cartographer and geodesist with the Defense 

Mapping Agency Aerospace Center; St. Louis, Missouri. Mr. 

Adams holds a master's degree in geology from the 

University of Arkansas. 

Lieutenant Colonel Hoo12er is Chief of the Terrain 

Visualization Center; U.S. Army Etzgineer School. Previou~ 

assignments include operations oficer; 30th Engineer 

Battulion (T)(A) and Corps engineer plan r oficel; XVIII 

Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and 

commandel; 814th Engineer Company (AFB), Hanau, 

Germany. LTC Hooper zs a graduate of the Airborne School, 

Ranger School, and Command and General Staff College. 

He holds an zndustrial engineerirzg degree from the 

Univer~sit~ of Central Florida and a tnastefr degree in 

systems management from the Florida Institute of 

Technology. 

and S3A. 

Marine D 

indel; 9tl: 

~Continued~om page 291 

contin prove. That the defense has never been 

cOmpr lespite occasionally fierce posturing throughOut ne jeeades, is testament to the resolve and skill of 

its defenders. Gitmo's tangible, unique defensive preparations, 

which showcase the competence and ingenuity of Marine 

engineers and Seabees, have shown that combat engineering is 

to succe Lil 

Captain Mor ) the 2d Combat Engineer 

Battalion, 2d lv~urine u~ vl>run. Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina. Pret include OIC, Minejield 

Maintenance ; .racks Engineel; Marine 

Barracks, Guantanamo Bay, cuba; platoon commander; 

engineer oficel; lt Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion, 1st 1 ?9 Palms, California; and 

platoon commc .r Support Battalion, 3rd 

Force Service Support GI; awa, Japan. 

References: 

"Bienvenido." Public Affairs Office pamphlet, U.S Naval 

Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 1993. 

"Brief Histoly of the Marine Engineer" An unpublished paper 

by Ralph W. Donnelly). September 1983. 

Contesting Castro. Thomas G. Patterson. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1994. 

FM 5-102, Countermol artment of the Army, March 

1985. 

EM 5-103, Survivabili~. UGVUL~LL~~~ of the Army, June 1985. 

FM 20-32, Mindcount lerations. Department of the 

Army, September 1992. 

FM 100-5, Engineer Combat uperations). Department of the 

Army, November 1988. 

"Gumtanam': Keyston Pacific Caribbean." Jules B. 

Billard. National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 119, No. 3, March 

1961. 

Interviews with Mr. Jacl March 1996 to March 1998. 

"Landmine Trauma in uuancanamo Bay, Cuba, 1962-1983." 

An unpublished paper by David B. Adams, M.D., 27 September 

1983. 

Marine Barracks Historical Files. Maintained by the Barracks 

Historical Officer at the Marine Barracks, Guantanamo Bay, 

Cuba, 

Minefield Maintenance Files. Maintained by the MFM Section 

Office, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

Minefield Maintenance Standard Operating Procedures 

(Marine Barracks Order p8092.1M). May 1996. 

"Revisiting the Cactus Curtain." Byron D. Varner, USN (Ret). 

KeepingApaceMagazine. Summer, 1996. 

Seawolf: The Biography of Admiral Bulkeley, W. Brever, 1988. 

"Study of Landmine Warfare Operations and Requirements at 

the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." 25 November 1966. 

SS. 

ignments 

and Bar 

- - 

, 3rd Ligh 

livision, 2 

i Enginet 

oup, Okin 

7ility. Dep 

. n~--..*... 

ermine Oi 

ie in the I . -. 

32 Engineer November 1998 
While the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) understands how 

to use reverse breach planning, the brigade staff does not use 

the reverse planning process to develop the brigade's scheme 

of maneuver. The breach plan does not address brigade 

responsibilities for a task-force breach nor does it specify 

how the brigade intends to synchronize the SOSR (suppress, 

obscure, secure, reduce) fundamentals. 

To improve breach planning at the brigade level, the 

engineer battalion and maneuver brigade staff should focus 

their efforts on the following five areas: Notes Engineer Integration in the intelligence preparation of 

the battlefield (IPB) 

Breach organization and mass 

Reverse planning process 

Actions at the breach 

Brigade responsibilities at the breach 

National Training Center (NTC) 

By Captain Fred Erst 

During offensive operations, maneuver brigades often 

struggle with isolating the point of penetration and massing 

sufficient combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield. As a result, many brigades are unable to set the 

conditions for the fight before committing to the breach and 

are rapidly destroyed by the defending enemy. Many of these 

problems can be traced back to ineffective breach planning by 

both the maneuver brigade and the engineer battalion. 

The maneuver brigade staff does not consistently 

recognize or include the breach as a significant phase of the 

operation during course-of-action (COA) development and 

war gaming because enemy obstacles are not adequately 

depicted in the brigade's situation template (SITEMP). The 

brigade's main effort is not weighted with sufficient combat 

power to conduct a penetration and lacks the additional 

mobility assets required to provide redundancy at the breach. 

Specific actions for each area follow. 

Engineer Integration in the IPB. Effective breach 

planning must begin during the brigade's IPB process. The 

ABE and engineer battalion S2 must develop and use the 

engineer battlefield assessment to provide the brigade commander and staff with a common vision of how they believe 

enemy engineers and the terrain will shape the battlefield. 

The ABE and engineer S2 must work closely with the brigade 

S2 to template all possible enemy obstacles throughout the 

depth and width of the battlefield based on each enemy 

course of action. To provide the necessary focus during the 

brigade planning process, they must ensure that enemy 

tactical and situational obstacles are included in the brigade 

SITEMP. This includes minefields emplaced by the mobile 

obstacle detachment, the universal mine layer, and rocketdelivered scatterable mines, as well as expected enemy 

positions and weapons systems. A detailed brigade SITEMP 

is an essential part of developing an effective breach plan. 

The brigade SITEMP provides the common vision of the 

enemy needed to drive the brigade's reverse planning process, 

task organization, and reconnaissance planning early in the 

military decision-making process. 

Breach Organization and Mass. The size of the enemy 

force overwatching the obstacle drives the type of breach the 

brigade conducts (brigade versus task force). The brigade 

staff must consider the enemy's ability to mass combat power 

and reposition his forces or commit his reserve. The brigade 

must then develop a scheme of maneuver to mass sufficient 

combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield. FM 

71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantr)] Brigade, states 

"Massed combat power is directed against an enemy 

weakness. The location selected for breaching depends 

largely on a weakness in the enemy defense where its 

covering fires are minimized. If the attacker cannot find a 

November 1998 Engineer 33 
Reverse Planning Process 

Size of Amount of Size of Number and Size of Actions 

support < suppression as3au1t < location 

force and obscuration force of lanes force 

*Secure *Reduce * Penetrate * Exploit 

Support Force 

Eliminate 

the enemy% 

ability to 

Assault Force interfere with 

Destroy or reduction 

dislodge the 

enemy on the 

far side of 

the obstacle 

Breach Force 

With 50 percent 

redundancy and local 

security, create lanes 

to pass the assault force 

natural weakness, he creates one by fixing the majority of 

the defending force and isolating a small portion of it for 

attack. The need to generate enough mass strongly 

influences which echelon can conduct a breaching 

operation ... A task force has sufficient combat power to 

attack an obstacle defended by a company." 

The success of a task force breach depends on the 

brigade's ability to isolate that portion of the enemy defense 

that the lead task force has the ability to penetrate. 

Otherwise, the brigade must organize for a brigade-level 

breaching operation. A brigade with one armor and one 

infantry task force can designate one unit as the support 

force and the other as the assault force. The brigade can then 

use the engineer battalion (with a security and reduction 

element) to serve as the breach force. By organizing for a 

brigade-level breach, the brigade can mass the combat 

power and mobility assets needed to successfully isolate and 

penetrate a motorized rifle battalion defense. 

Reverse Planning Process. The reverse planning 

process is an essential tool in building an effective plan (see 

figure above). The end state is not the breach; rather it is 

getting the assault force onto the objective to destroy the 

enemy. By starting at actions on the objective and working 

back to the line of departure, the staff can allocate combat 

power, mobility assets, and indirect fires (suppression/ 

smoke). The following list is based on the technique shown 

in FM 90- 13- 1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, and 

is supplemented with lessons learned during breaching 

operations: 

1. Actions on the objective drive the size and composition 

of the assault force, the assault force objective, and the point 

of penetration (POP). 

2. The size of the assault force and location of the POP 

determine the quantity and location of lanes. 

3. Lane requirements, type of obstacles, and type of terrain1 

soil drive the amount and type of mobility assets (i.e., size and 

composition of the reduction element) task organized to the 

breach force. 

4. The size and composition of the security element in the 

breach force are based on the enemy's ability to interfere with 

obstacle reduction. 

5. The amount of suppression and the size, composition, 

and location of the support force are driven by the enemy's 

ability to mass fires and interfere with the breach at the reduction site. 

Actions at the Breach. The brigade's operations order 

(OPORD) must specify brigade actions at the breach required 

to achieve SOSR for either a brigade- or task-force level 

breach. An effective technique is to sketch these actions at 

each expected breach site based on the templated obstacle, the 

specific terrain, and the enemy positions. The actions are 

found in FM 7 1-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company 

Team, and can be applied to brigade or task force breaching 

operations. 

The reconnaissance force identifies the reduction site. 

The support force occupies positions and begins suppressive and obscuration fires. 

The breach force establishes near-side security at the 

reduction site. 

The breach force reduces the obstacle. 

The breach force proofs and marks lanes and establishes 

far-side security. 

The asssault force assaults and secures the objective. 

34 Engineer November 1998 
SOSR Criteria 

The staff should develop a time line for these actions at 

the breach to ensure that the brigade maintains momentum 

during the attack. The brigade OPORD should specify the 

task and purpose of each element of the breach organization 

needed to achieve SOSR. The staff should also develop and 

track criteria for achieving SOSR to assist the commander in 

determining if breach conditions have been achieved. A 

method for establishing the criteria is shown above. (Note: 

These criteria are not all-inclusive). 

Decisions 

Determine the point of penetration and 

reduction site 

Commence suppression and obscuration 

fires 

Support force occupies support-by-fire 

(SBF) position 

Commit the breach force 

Commit the reduction element 

Commit the assault force 

Obscuration Plan. The brigade staff should develop a 

time line for critical actions at the breach for both the 

support force and the breach force as constrained by 

available smoke. Specify the task and purpose of both 

projected and generated smoke. Allocate or task organize 

smoke assets to the support force and the breach force based 

on those requirements. Develop solid triggers to employ 

obscuration and specify who controls obscuration. Ensure 

that the support force commander controls/shifts artilleryprojected smoke needed to obscure his movement into the 

SBF position and set conditions for the breach. 

Fire Control Plan. Identify fire-control measures in the 

brigade graphics such as SBF positions, coordinated fire 

lines or restricted fire lines, and no fire areas. All elements 

of the breach organization must specify and discuss direct 

fire-control measures such as target reference points (TRP); 

phase lines; and signals to initiate, lift, shift, or cease fires. 

Brigade Responsibilities at the Breach. Engineers must 

ensure that brigade responsibilities during a brigade- or taskforce breach are defined in the brigade's breach plan. 

Criteria 

- Reconnaissance force identifies obstacles and enemy 

positions. 

- Observers are in position. - Support force crosses phase line. 

- Critical friendly zone (CFZ) is in place over the SBF 

position. 

- Obscuration is in place to screen support force movement. - Support force maintains more than 70 percent of its combat 

power. 

- Suppression and obscuration are adjusted and effective. - CFZ is in place over the reduction site. - Engineer preparations are complete. 

- Fire-control measures are in effect. 

- Breach force near-side security is in position. - Security element controls the reduction site by fires or 

occupation. 

- Lane is reduced, proofed, and marked. - Far-side security is in position. 

Obstacle Intelligence. Current and accurate obstacle 

intelligence (OBSTINTEL) is necessary to confirm or deny 

the SITEMP. FM 5-170, Engineer Reconnai.~sance, states 

that OBSTINTEL allows the commander to refine the plan 

and set conditions for a successful combined arms fight; 

maneuver rapidly to the objective; and exploit the opportunities offered by obstacles, terrain, and the enemy. The 

engineer battalion S2 and ABE must assist in developing the 

brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. Task 

force scouts and the brigade reconnaissance troop must be 

trained to collect detailed OBSTINTEL. Any effort to 

conduct engineer-specific reconnaissance must be integrated 

with the brigade R&S plan. Both maneuver scouts and 

engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) are given parts of the 

same task to accomplish; both must maneuver through and 

occupy the same area during reconnaissance missions; and 

both must be able to report using retransmission, relay, or 

tactical satellite communications. FM 5-170 also states that 

integrating maneuver scouts and ERTs provides close 

cooperation and mutual support, decreases reconnaissance 

overlap, and reduces the risk of fratricide. 

Isolating the Point of Penetration. The brigade plan 

must synchronize combat multipliers to isolate the point of 

penetration. The brigade staff must use close air support, 

artillery, aviation, electronic warfare, scatterable mines, air 

defense, obscuration, and deception to set conditions for the 

fight. Additionally, the brigade must continue to fight deep to 

stop the enemy from repositioning or counterattacking. 

Traffic Control at the Breach. The brigade must task 

military police to provide maneuver mobility support to 

November 1998 Engineer 35 
control traffic at the lanes, especially if the scheme of 

maneuver involves a passage of lines. The brigade breach 

plan should also specify a lane-numbering system, identify 

traffic-control points, and state which lanes will support 

reverse-flow traffic to evacuate casualties. 

Conclusion. To achieve mission success, the maneuver 

brigade must isolate the point of penetration and mass 

sufficient combat power and mobility assests at the decisive 

point on the battlefield. Effective breach planning enables 

the brigade to maneuver rapidly and pass the assault force 

onto the objective to destroy the defending enemy. By 

improving breach planning at the brigade level, the 

maneuver brigade and engineer battalion can set the 

conditions for mission success. 

Captain Erst is the assistant brigade engineer trainer at 

the National Training Center; Fort Irwin, California. He 

previou.rly served as a company commander in the 3rd 

Engineer Battalion/lOth Engineer Battalion and as a 

platoon leader/company XO in the 4th Engineer Buttulion. 

He is u graduate of the University of Ceatral Florida. 

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) 

Irnpro~~inji E!'f?cienc~ of Enyinccr C'omniarad ant1 

Control Nodcc 

By Lieutenant Colotzel Ron Light 

Recent BCTP Warfighter exercises indicate that engineers 

struggle with the functions and roles of engineer command 

and control (C2) nodes within the division area. Many units' 

standing operating procedures (SOPS) are incomplete and fail 

to clarify functions and roles. Details about which engineer 

C2 node pegorms which tasks, where, often are unclear. Units 

that have achieved success in the C2 arena blend their own 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with current 

engineer doctrine (FM 5- 100, Engineer Operations, and FM 

5-7 1 - 100, Division Engineer Combat Operations). 

The division commands and controls operations through 

a command group and three command posts (CPs): the 

division rear CP, the division main CP, and the division 

tactical (TAC) CP. Engineers integrate the mobility and 

survivability battlefield operating system (BOS) at each of 

these CPs. Engineer functions at each C2 node interrelate, 

and the overall success of efforts to synchronize engineers 

rests in part with each node. Because staffing levels and 

experience at each C2 node differ, their productivities also 

differ. Some of the TTPs units use to increase the 

synchronization of engineers within the C2 nodes follow. 

The Division Engineer Main CP 

The division engineer (DIVEN) MAIN CP serves as the 

nucleus of the division engineer C2 organization. To mitigate 

staff inexperience and personnel shortfalls, successful units 

establish the DIVEN MAIN CP as the hub of information 

collection, analysis, and dissemination. The executive officer 

(XO) manages the DIVEN MAIN CP and coordinates the 

efforts of the staff (both officers and noncommissioned 

officers) during the military decision-making process 

(MDMP). Soldiers from the S2 and S3 staff sections operate 

the DIVEN MAIN CP. When conducting the MDMP, the XO 

includes the S1, the S4, liaison officers, and others in the 

effort. 

At the DIVEN MAIN CP, the S2 and S3 receive reports, 

develop the situation, and attempt to answer the commander's 

critical information requirements (CCIR). The staff assembles, packages, and forwards answers to CCIR and other 

information to engineer C2 nodes. The CCIR form, in part, a 

filter to screen which information is sent to other C2 nodes, 

and successful units establish the mechanics of this effort in 

their SOP. For example, a unit may describe the best way to 

package CCIR information for the tactical CP engineer. In this 

way, the DIVEN MAIN CPMaximizes the available staff effort and expertise to 

collect, analyze, and disseminate information. 

Ties information collection and dissemination to the 

CCIR. 

Streamlines routine, cyclic reporting requirements for 

subordinate engineer units. 

Functions as the nucleus of engineer C2 functions in the 

division. 

The Division Engineer Rear CP 

Within the division rear CP, the engineer S4 is the officer in 

charge of the DIVEN REAR CP. The S4 integrates engineer 

operations among other division logisticians. The S4 understands that main supply routes must remain clear of obstacles, 

that defensive operations require early planning and transport 

of Class IVN obstacle materiel, and so on. 

The DIVEN REAR CP requires the same situational 

awareness as the DIVEN MAIN CP for several reasons. The 

S4 requires current information so that the DIVEN REAR CP 

can effectively integrate engineer operations into division 

plans. Also, the DIVEN REAR CP must be prepared to 

assume the duties of the DIVEN MAIN CP. And, since the 

engineer XO assesses the logistics supportability of engineer 

36 Engineer November 1998 
plans based on the S4's staff estimate, it is essential that the engineer C2 nodes, experience and attention to the CCIR help 

S4's estimate is based on current information. define what the ADE needs to know. What information is 

Accordingly, the DIVEN REAR CP duplicates the battle important will vary based on the tactical situation and the 

tracking conducted in the DIVEN MAIN CP. Because commander's needs. 

staffing at the DIVEN REAR CP often is limited, the 

integration function of the S4 eventually overtakes the battletracking function. When this occurs, the S4 loses situational 

awareness and the DIVEN REAR CP's plans no longer 

synchronize with the true picture of the mobility/ 

survivability BOS. The S4's time is best spent integrating 

engineer operations across the division logistic framework 

rather than collecting and posting information. 

A 7TP some units use to maximize the integration 

function of the DIVEN REAR CP is to proactively "push" 

information to the DIVEN REAR CP from the DIVEN 

MAIN CP. Details about which information the DIVEN 

REAR CP requires and how to package that information are 

established in the SOP. In some units, the division engineer, 

the XO, and/or the command sergeant major provide a 

structured update to their staffs whenever they visit an 

engineer C2 node. This practice can have a marked positive 

effect on the situational awareness and battle-tracking 

accuracy of engineer CPs. To assist in achieving this 

common picture, the battle-tracking charts at the DIVEN 

MAIN and REAR CPs are identical. 

The Assistant Division Engineer 

The assistant division engineer (ADE) is the division 

engineer's primary point of contact regarding division plans 

and current operations cells in the division main CP. The 

ADE plans future engineer operations and often integrates 

mobility and survivability issues in the division deep 

operations coordination cell. An effective TTP to maximize 

the ADE's integration and planning functions is to push 

critical information to the ADE on the same basis as 

information flows to the DIVEN REAR CP. 

Most units recognize that the ADE cannot perform 

planning and battle-tracking functions simultaneously. 

Accordingly, they limit the ADE's duties to planning. In 

some units the engineer XO, rather than the ADE, is 

responsible for briefing the division commander during his 

morning update brief. This frees the ADE to continue 

planning and provides him with "ground truth" as the 

DIVEN MAIN CP, through the XO, understands it. The XO 

pushes information to the ADE throughout the MDMP. This 

practice allows parallel planning and helps to ensure that the 

ADE and DIVEN MAIN CP have a common understanding 

of the enemy, the terrain, and friendly engineers. 

It is imperative, however, that the DIVEN MAIN CP pass 

along only critical information. The ADE, like the S4, is not 

staffed to wade through unit status and logistics reports or 

dozens of electronic mail messages. Here, as with other 

The Division Engineer Tactical CP 

Most divisions establish a TAC CP as a matter of course. 

Engineers staff the DIVEN TAC CP within the TAC CP. In 

some units the engineer S3 works from this CP all of the 

time. In other units he remains in the DIVEN MAIN CP and 

assists at the TAC CP during major operations. In either case, 

the function of the TAC CP is tojght the close battle. 

According to FM 5-71-100, forward engineer units report 

directly to the DIVEN TAC CP during the close fight. Action 

in the TAC CP is fast-paced, and the S3 quickly develops a 

sense for what information he needs to synchronize these 

engineers. Information requirements for the DIVEN TAC CP 

typically are smaller than those for the other engineer C2 

nodes. For example, during offensive operations the S3 may 

only require the location of friendly engineer units; the status 

of sapper squads, mine-clearing line charge systems, and 

bridging assets; and the location and type of friendly and 

enemy obstacles. In some units this information is known as a 

"slant report."The point is that the S3 must carefully craft the 

information the TAC CP requires and let the DIVEN MAIN 

CP process the rest. 

Forward units continue to send routine information to the 

DIVEN MAIN CP. Again, the DIVEN MAIN CP pushes 

information to the DIVEN TAC CP to assist the S3 in fighting 

the close battle. The S3 and the XO develop the list of 

information requirements for the DIVEN TAC CP based on 

the CCIR, and package it in a form that is immediately usable 

by TAC CP personnel. 

As the Army shifts to the new heavy division design and as 

more information automation equipment finds its way into 

command posts, the functions of the divisional engineer C2 

nodes will evolve. The DIVEN MAIN CP currently is the most 

robust of these C2 nodes in terms of both manning level and 

experience. Units that rely on the DIVEN MAIN CP to collect, 

analyze, and disseminate information enable the other C2 

nodes to focus on their primary mission, whether that is to plan 

future engineer operations, integrate engineer plans into the 

combat service support structure, or track the close fight. Units 

that rely on the DIVEN MAIN CP to be the nucleus of the 

engineer C2 function realize increased synchronization and 

more effective utilization of engineers across the division. 

Lieutenant Colonel Light is an obsewer/controller for the 

Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. He previously sewed ~7s the S3 and XO of the 168th 

Engineer Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort 

Le~ji.~, Washington. 

November 1998 Engineer 37 
An Active- eserve Partnership 


By Lieutenrrnt Colonel Allen C. Estes and Second Lieutenant Kenneth Caubble 

Training units at Fort Leonard Wood experience a surge 

of trainees each summer that stretches and sometimes 

exceeds the resources available in the authorized training base. The solution has been a training base expansion 

(TBE) mission where U.S. Army Reserve soldiers from the 

98th Division (Institutional Training) stationed throughout 

New York state provide the additional capacity. The relationship between Fort Leonard Wood and the 98th Division is 

one of the best active-reserve partnerships in the Army. Both 

sides win. The Active Component is augmented during the 

summer surge, and the Reserve Component receives a topnotch, two-week annual training experience. Their combined 

efforts result in the Army's newest soldiers. 

Organization 

ather than augment existing companies with more drill 

sergeants, the training battalion activates an additional 

company for the TBE period. The 98th Division provides enough cadre for a complete training company, which 

includes a commander, an executive officer, a first sergeant, 12 

drill sergeants, a supply sergeant, an operations sergeant, and 

an armorer. The entire cadre rotates every two weeks. To provide continuity and stability, the activated TBE company has a 

[nix of active and reserve cadre members. 

Figure 1 shows the typical TBE company organization, 

where the 98th Division provides the commander. the first 

sergeant, and half of the drill sergeants. The Active Component provides the executive officer and the other half of the 

drill sergeants, including the senior drill sergeant, who coordinates most of the training. The company staff (operations, 

supply, and armorer) are a mix of Active and Reserve Component personnel. Meanwhile, the rest of the reserve cadre 

backfills existing companies. For example, if the active executive officer for the TBE company is from Charlie Company, 

then the reserve executive officer backfills the vacant spot. 

Each company in the battalion has Reserve Component personnel assigned during the TBE mission. 

Fort Leonard Wood's 169th Engineer Battalion (OneStation Unit Training [OSUT]), for example, recently formed 

an Echo Company, which was led by company commanders 

from the 11390 and 21390th Battalions from the 2nd Brigade, 

98th Division. Echo Company was activated on 27 April 

1998, executed a complete 13-week cycle of OSUT for 12B 

I 

Executive Officer 

Commander 

RC 

I 1 

I I I I I 

Training NCO Supply NCO Armorer Drill Sergeants Drill Sergeants 

AC and RC AC and RC AC and RC - * L-, AC (6) - RC (6) 

Figure 1. Organization of theTBE company 

38 Engineer November 1998 
provides continuity and allows 

trainees to see some of the same 

faces throughout the entire cycle. 

The TBE company conducts the 

same training to the same rigorous 

standards as any other OSUT company. The reserve drill sergeants 

are partners and participate fiillythey teach classes, counsel soldiers, 

run ranges, and perform such mundane details as KP (kitchen police) 

and CQ (charge of quarters). 

There is a one-day overlap 

between rotations. During that 

transition period, incoming and 

outgoing cadre share information, 

sign over equipment, and conduct a 

formal but quick change of comOSUT trainees negotiate obstacles on the Confidence Course mand. The outgoing rotation conducts an after-action review with 

Combat Engineers and 12C Bridge Crewmembers, and was the battalion commander and turns over the continuity book. 

inactivated on 3 1 July. The mission included eight separate The incoming rotation receives a legal orientation, safety 

cadre increments, or rotations, over 16 weeks. Figure 2 classes, and commander briefings. Meanwhile, soldier training 

shows the role of each increment. does not cease or even slow down. To ease the transition, 

reserve soldiers arrive with their driver's licenses, defensive 

Coordination driving course cards, range safety cards, and updated training 

records. 

T he TBE executive officer and senior drill sergeant are 

critical members of the team since planning must Preparation 

extend past the two-week rotations. Coordination and 

arrangements for field training exercises (FTXs) and gradua- T he TBE mission requires significant preparation from 

tion are completed six to eight weeks in advance. Using both the Active and Reserve Components. The 98th 

some Active Component personnel in the TBE company Division prepares extensively throughout the year with 

Increment Week Activity 

1 Activation ceremony, mission preparation 

2 Company fill 

3 Unit-taught subjects, drill and ceremony, Army Physical Fitness Test 

4 First aid, map reading, NBC 

5 Rifle marksmanship, weaponeer, zeroing, field fire 1 Rifle qualification, U.S. weapons, hand grenades 

7 Basic FTX, individual tactics, night ranges 

8 Confidence Course, bayonet training, hand-to-hand combat 

9 End-of-Course Test, drill and ceremonies competition, basic graduation 

lo 1 Demolitions, accident avoidance, combat construction 

Landmine warfare, medium-girder 

Bailey bridge and armored vehicle 

bridge, bal 

!-launched 

ttle driHs 

bridge trair 

Ribbon bridge and armored combat earthmover training 

Combat engineer FTX, End-of-Course Comprehensive Test I 

15 Final inspection, out processing, graduation 

16 Inactivation ceremony, closeout procedures 

ure 2. Schedule of TBE increments for a 12811 2C OSUT cycle 

November 1998 Engineer 39 
weapons qualification; nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) training; drill and ceremonies; common task training; 

field training exercises; physical training; and instruction 

preparation. The 169th Engineer Battalion and the 98th Divi- I 

sion coordinate year-round. As the mission approaches, the 

169th sends a mobile training team to New York to answer 

questions and address specific training needs. This allows 

face-to-face contact with team members, most of whom have 

never met. Given the Active Component turnover, it is difficult to use the same experienced personnel from year to year. 

However, many of the reserve drill sergeants have been coming to Fort Leonard Wood for more than a decade. 

The reserve company commander for the first TBE increment goes to Fort Leonard Wood for the cycle laydown. At 

that time, training events are scheduled, resources are allocated, and training areas are assigned. Once the TBE laydown is complete-along with laydowns for companies that 

will be backfilled-reserve drill sergeants know which training will take place during their two-week rotation, and they 

each increment of TBE cadre receives logistical support. 

The division liaison officer is one of the most important 

individuals in the entire mission. 

7 Reserve drill sergeants must do everything expected of 

active drill sergeants so the two will be viewed as equal 

in the eyes of trainees. Reserve drill sergeants should 

pull their fair share of duties but no more. A successf~~l 

technique is to put TBE drill-sergeant slots on DA Form 

6 (Duty Roster) and rotate each increment into those 

spaces. During physical training, the 1 st Engineer Brigade wears specially purchased red road-guard vests 

with white name tags. The brigade purchased vests for 

TBE cadre and had name tags made and sewn on before 

the cadre arrived. Any action that makes the reserve 

cadre indistinguishable from the active cadre pays big 

dividends. 

Conclusion 

can prepare in detail. 

Meanwhile, Echo Company cadre at Fort Leonard Wood T he TBE mission can only succeed through teamwork 

prepare the orderly room, purchase supplies, establish and frequent communication. Reserve Component solaccounts, and prepare barracks for the new company. The diers must coordinate with their civilian supervisors to 

98th ~i~i~i~~ sends a series of S3 liaison officers and non- attend annual training. Active Component personnel must 

commissioned officers before activation to help prepare for a provide accurate and timely information on the training cycle. 

successful mission. The 169th and the 98th Division conduct There are many moving pieces and lots of o~~ortunities for 

weekly conference calls to coordinate details and provide error. The TBE works because of a spirit of cooperation and 

information for upcoming increments. constant coordination. The training base expansion is an ideal 

~h~ TBE mission culminates (he graduation of (he example of how the Active and Reserve Components can 

OSUT cycle of trainees, where a motivated and disciplined work as equal partners to perform a difficult mission. 

group of 12B and 12C soldiers are ready to make an immediate contribution to their Army units. The final increment 

closes the orderly room and billets, replenishes supplies, 

conducts the inactivation ceremony, and makes initial preparations for next year's mission. After-action comments are 

compiled and the 98th Division hosts a conference in New 

York, where all participants discuss lessons learned and suggest procedures to improve the next mission. 

Lessons Learned 

K ey lessons learned from the recent TBE mission 

follow: 

o Coordination among first sergeants on barracks rules, 

policies, and areas of responsibility is key to success. 

The TBE company rarely has its own barrack since it 

would be vacant nine months of the year. If an Active 

Component company has a small fill of soldiers, that 

company shares its barrack with the TBE company. If 

all companies have large classes in session, the TBE 

company splits and one platoon occupies each of the 

barracks. 

0 The 98th Division liaison officer must arrive well 

before the mission begins. He opens accounts, arranges 

billeting, coordinates transportation, and ensures that 

u 

Lieutenant Colonel Estes commarzds the 169th Engineer 

Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood. Previous assignments 

include S3,36th Engineer Group; and S3,43rd Engineer Battalion. LTC Estes is a graduate of tlze United States Military 

Academy and holds a doctorate in civil engineering from the 

University of Colorado. 

Lieutenant Caubble is executive ofJicer of C Compcrny, 

169th Engineer Battalion, and serves as e-vecutive oficer of 

the TBE company. He is a graduate ofthe Engineer OfJicer 

Basic Course and holds a degree in civil engineering from 

Arkansas State University. 

40 Engineer November 1998 
By Cuptuin Murk 7: Murtirzez 

racking the code on how to plan and conduct Class 

IVIClass V supply point operations on the battlefield 

can be painful and, if not done correctly, can cause a 

lot of finger pointing during after-action reviews (AARs). A 

challenge for any brigade is to develop a standing operating 

procedure (SOP) for running a Class IVIClass V supply 

point, identify those responsible for planning and running it 

(called "pinning-the-rose"). and train those individuals with 

the rest of the brigade according to the SOP. This article 

describes how the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 1st 

Armored Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, cracked this code 

during their train-up for, and deployment to, the National 

Training Center for Rotation 98-08. 

Doctrine Guidance 

hat was once known as the engineer forward supply 

point (run by an overworked, sleep-deprived 

engineer assault and obstacle platoon leader) is now 

the task force Class IV/Class V supply point. It is run by the 

maneuver S4. According to guidance in FM 90-7, Combined 

Arms Obstacle Integration, page C-9, this central receiving 

point for all obstacle material in the task force sector is 

established and operated by the task force, not the engineers. 

"Pinning the rose" on the task force S4 is sometimes 

difficult. He is not trained for this task, and his chain of 

command may view Class IV/Class V operations as an 

engineer's job. When the task force pawns this task off on its 

organic engineers, it degrades engineer capabilities on the 

ground. We must educate our maneuver brethren to correctly 

use their engineer assets by taking ownership of the Class IV/ 

Class V supply point. 

Make It Simple 

he first thing engineers must do to educate the 

brigade's maneuver personnel is to condense complex 

information in field manuals and all of the algebraic 

planning factors into easily understood and executable concepts. The 3BCT uses acronyms (Figure 1) to simplify these 

planning factors and Powerpoint slides to present them. 

Simple to Plan 

n the 3BCT, each task force S4 and XO is given what the 

engineers call a "WELCOMES" card that outlines plan- 

'ning considerations a task force S4 must observe to 

conduct a successful Class IVIClass V supply point. The 

acronym "WELCOMES" means the following: 

W = Work Detail. The 3BCT SOP calls for one 

noncomnlissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and 20 soldiers 

to form a work detail. The NCO is not an engineer and 

usually is from the task force S4 shop. The 20 soldiers make 

up three crews. The unloading crew downloads wire and 

mines from Corps throughput assets, and the uncrating crew 

uncrates mines, inspects them, and configures them into push 

packages. The loading crew then loads the push packages 

onto task force transportation assets for transport to forward 

mine dumps. 

November 1998 

Figure 1 

Engineer 41 
"Planning and running a Class ZV/Class V supply point is like having a tooth 

pulled-no matter how many times you do it, it's still not much fun. " 

A task force S4 

-\4K ('ur~~~r~cr~l Use the task force's heavy expanded 

mobility tactical vehicle (HEMMT) to transport push 

packages. 

E = Equipment. Equipment required to run the supply 

point includes wire gauntlcts for each soldier, handing 

machines, tin snips, crowbars, and engineer tape. Material 

required to lay out the site includes bicycle flags or a handemplaced minefield-marking set, engineer tape, green and 

red chemlights, and a picket pounder (Figure 2) A warm-up 

or sleep tent also may be needed. 

\\It C'rtri~i~~atit. Each TF S4 shop should maintain a 

footlocker with this necessary equipment that can be easily 

transported to the Class IVIClass V supply point site. 

L = Lift Assets. According to the 3BCT SOP, the task 

force S4 requests materiel-handling equipment (MHE) and 

additional transportation assets from the forward support 

battalion's support operations officer. The Class IVlClass V 

supply point belonging to the task force responsible for the 

main elf011 has priority for receiving lift assets. 

1 (omn~rnt. During the planning PI-ocess, units 

should war-game and "rock drill" moving the MHE to the 

Class IVIClass V supply point. Ensure that the forklift 

operator is equipped with night-vision goggles for night 

operations. 

C = Communications. The task force S4 maintains 

communications with the task force tactical operations 

center (TOC). The engineer representative at the Class IVI 

Class V supply point maintains communications with 

engineer platoons and the engineer company TOC. The 

engineer company TOC maintains communications with the 

engineer S4 on the engineer battalion administrativellogistic 

(AIL) net. This communication web is driven by the unit's 

signal plan and varies with each unit. 

\&R ('irn~n~v~it. A good retransmission plan for the 

battalion AL net is essential for this to work. 

0 =Organized Layout. The 3BCT uses the palletired load 

system to deliver Class IVIClass V supplies. A standard layout 

was developed to give the task force S4 a baseline for using 

this system effectively (Figure 2). During the National 

Training Center rotation, each task force S4 revised the 

standard layout according to the mission, enemy, terrain, 

troops, and time available (METT-T). 

\\I< < ~irlnllicllt. Mark this layout clearly before night 

operations, because vehicles that wander into the work area 

after dark pose a serious safety threat to personnel. 

M = Medical Support. The task force S4 must coordinate 

for medical support and develop an evacuation plan. The task 

force Class IVIClass V supply point NCOIC maintains a list of 

trained combat lifesavers in each work group and the battle 

roster of all personnel at the supply point. 

i.\R Cr~n~n~cnl. The medical support plan must be 

synchronized with the task force scheme of support for that 

phase of the operation. 

E = Engineer Expertise. Each engineer company 

supporting the task force in sector provides an cngineer NCO 

representative to the task force S4. This NCO is not the supply 

PLATOON UPLOAD LANE 

Figure 2 

42 Engineer November 1998 
point NCOIC and does not supervise the work detail. He to the supply point NCOIC and asked him to build a number of 

provides technical expertise for the push-package con- them. In this case, one picture is worth a thousand directives. 

figuration; oversees the handling of mines, fuses, and antihandling devices; and monitors and records the quantities of Sustain the Fight 

6 x Bulldog "I Package" 

6 each MlCLlC Reloads) 

Class IVIClass V supplies at the site. 

,\AR Comment. Use the same NCOIC each time, so he 

will build a good working relationship with the task force S4. 

S = Security. The task force S4 and staff, in cooperation 

with the engineers, selects a Class IVIClass V supply point 

location that can be easily defended against both mounted 

and dismounted troops. The S4 develops and enforces the 

site security plan. The task force provides a security force for 

the supply point. 

,\.\It Comment. This task often is given only "lip service." 

The task force must initiate a security plan. Losing the Class lV/ 

Class V supply point to "dismounts" has grave consequences. 

Simple to Run 

Bulldog "G Package" 

300 meters of Triple 

he Class IVIClass V supply point plays a key role in 

sustaining the fight. This fact sometimes is overlooked 

until the call comes to end the mission, and then it 

becomes a reaction drill to recover lost barrier material. An 

easy way to plan recovery operations is to use the four "Rs": 

retrieve, reconsolidate, reconfigure, and reintroduce When 

transitioning from the defense, the implied task for the task 

force can be: "Conduct battlefield recovery operations using a 

collective effort to retrieve, reconsolidate, reconfigure, and 

reintroduce Class IVIClass V supplies into the battle." To 

recover obstacle effects, reconfigure the packages, and reintroduce them into the fight is essential in conducting 

sustained defensive operations. The Class IV/Class V supply 

point should be the cornerstone for this operation, and the task 

Bulldog lLD Package" 

1 each Fix MF 

plan is only good until the line of departure, so keep force S4 must be trained in recovery operations. A it as simple as possible. FM 90-7, page (Continued on page 50) 

8-9. states that most brigades and regiments in the U.S. Army use push packages to 

simplify and expedite planning and resourcing of 

Class IVIClass V supply points. Push packages 

are the most efficient way to get the right amount 

of wire and mines to the right spot on the 

battlefield, especially when you are 72 hours into 

your failed sleep plan. 

The 3BCT takes the push-package concept one 

step further and provides the task force S4s with a 

"cookbook" that describes the push packages 

(Figure 3) Each page shows a picture of the 

n~aterial required for a particular type of obstacle. 

To facilitate building and transporting, the page 

also shows how the material is arranged on the 

palletized load system flatrack. At the National 

Training Center, this cookbook was extremely 

helpful in recovering and reconfiguring push 

packages so they could be used again in the next 

fight. For example, the task force S4 used the 

cookbook to provide a picture of the 'cG Push packages loaded with obstacle material. 

November 1998 Engineer 43 
The Origins of Military Mine 

By Major Willium C. Schneck 

Part II of this series traces the origins of antivehicle 

mines ant1 counter-mine equipment. Though it may seem odd, 

the explosive antivehicle mine predutes the appetlrunce of 

the tank by more than 50 years! The continuous evolution of 

these weapons is driven by the defender's need to economize 

his forces cvhile protecting them from attack. This, in turn, 

drives the development of the countermine equipment thut 

attackecs must have to successfully retain their mobilit)! 

Antivehicle Mines 

ne of the earliest antivehicle "mines" was described 

by military engineer Philo of Byzantium around 120 

B.C., when he recommended that "in front of the 

advanced walls (of a city) empty earthenware jars should be 

buried. These are placed in an upright position with their 

mouths upward, stopped up with seaweed or imperishable 

grass, and covered with earth. Troops may then pass over the 

jars with impunity, (but) the engines and timber towers 

brought up by the enemy will sink into them."' Another 

early example occurred during the Roman siege of 

Jerusalem in 70 A.D., when Jewish Zealots dug a tunnel 

mine under one of the besieger's [our massive siege engines 

(powerful battering rams on wheels), resulting in its 

destruction and a three-day delay in the battle.= During the 

American Civil War, Confederate soldiers developed and 

employed pressure-fuzed railroad mines that destroyed at 

least two heavily loaded trains in ~ennessee.~ To counteract 

the railroad mines, the Union Army improvised the first 

mine-clearing roller, a flatcar pushed slowly in front of a 

locomotive to detonate any mines ahead of it.4 

Antitrack (Pressure-Fuzed) Mines 

erman pioniere (combat engineers) improvised the 

first antitank (AT) mines during World War I 

in response to another innovation in combat 

engineering-a British-made tank developed in September 

1916 by Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Swinton, Royal Engineers 

(RE). Initially, the Germans buried standard artillery and 

mortar shells with a sensitive fuze pointed up. They also 

employed command-detonated mines, which are forerunners 

of full-width-attack AT mines. Later in World War I, the 

Germans improvised many types of mines, including a 

wooden box mine that measured approximately 14 by 16 by 2 

inches and weighed about 12 pounds. Twenty 200-gram 

blocks of explosive were placed in each box, which was 

normally buried about 10 inches deep. Detonation was 

initiated by a hand grenade placed inside and against one wall 

of the box so that the primer passed through the wall. The 

mines functioned by pressure as tanks passed over them or by 

command detonation. Electric blasting caps, which first 

appeared in 1900, greatly facilitated command det~nation.~ 

During World War I, Germans scattered their AT mines at 

random or in locally created patterns to reinforce wire 

obstacles and AT ditches in front of trench lines6 

The Germans began to manufacture standard AT mines in 

1916 and produced nearly three million before the Armistice 

of 19 18. Regrettably, no information on the characteristics of 

A German World War I vintage antitank mine lifted by U.S. combat 

engineers prior to its destruction. (Photo courtesy of Military 

Engineer magazine) 

these factory-produced mines has come to 

light. German AT mines accounted for a significant portion of allied tank losses, including 

about 15 percent of U.S. tank casualties, during 

the battles of St. Mihiel, Catalet-Bony, Selle, 

and ~eusel~rgonne.' The British also improvised AT rnines during World War I. Two 

varieties have been identified: one based on a 

pipe bomb and the other on a bombard shelL8 

In 1929, the Germans introduced the Tellermine 29, the first in a series of modern 

pressure-fuzed AT mines. This series formed 

the basis for many of the AT mines used to 

date, including the U.S. MIS. 

44 Engineer November 1997 
Table 1. Origin of Mobility Equipment 

Antihull (Full-Width-Attack) Mines 

T he Russian AKS, a tilt-rod-actuated blast AT mine 

that appeared on the Russian front during World War 

11, was probably the first true full-width AT mine. 

However, the Germans developed the first modern fullwidth-attack mine toward the end of World War 11. Called 

the Hohl-Sprung Mine 4672, it employed a tilt-rod fuze and 

shaped-charge kill mechanism.' Although 59,000 of this 

mine were produced, there are no reports that it was ever 

used in combat.1° Nevertheless, it represented a significant 

improvement in mine technology. The French probably were 

first to field a modern full-width-attack mine when the 

Model 1948 entered service in 1948. 

Another important advance in the evolution of the fullwidth AT mine was the Russian development of influence 

fuzing, both seismic (VZ-1) and magnetic, during World 

War 11.'' This combination of a shaped charge with a fullwidth-attack fuze has proven extremely effective. Its greater 

coverage enables emplacing units to get the same obstacle 

effect with significantly fewer mines per kilometer of front. 

Additionally, this type of mine often produces a K-kill 

(catastrophic kill), with fatalities to crew members of all 

vehicles, including tanks and other tracked vehicles. This 

lethality definitely decreases the willingness of combat 

vehicle crews to "bull through" a mined area. 

First Combat Use 

U.K., Western Front, WWI 

U.S.S.R., 

U.K, Sword Beach, WWll 

Germany, Polish Campaign, 1939 

U.S. 

U.K., 2d El Alamein, 1942 

(24 prototypes were used in this battle.) 

Germany, Sevastopol. 1942 

US., Anzio, May 1944 

U.K., Calais, September 1944 

U.K., North Africa, 1941 

U.S., Gulf War, 1991 

Equipment 

Bangalore torpedo 

Tank mine roller 

Tank mine plow 

Electronic mine detector 

Vehicle-mounted electronic 

mine detector 

Flail 

Remote-control breaching 

Demolition snake 

Projected line charge 

Mine-resistant wheeled 

vehicle 

Scatterable mine-clearing 

system 

Full-width mine rake 

Side-Attack Mines. The advent of shoulder-fired AT 

weapons, beginning with the U.S. bazooka in 1942, led to 

the development of side-attack AT mines. First employed by 

the Germans and Soviets during World War 11, these mines 

were based on the panzerfaust.12 The early Soviet-made 

LMG reportedly is still being used by North ~0rea.l~ This 

type of mine is difficult to employ due to its large size and 

because it must be emplaced aboveground. 

Wide-Area Mines. The predecessor of the wide-area 

landmine--one that sends a munition toward its target without 

human guidance-is the Russian "dog mine" of World War 

11.l~ Advanced wide-area mines are now emerging in Western 

Europe and the United states.15 

First Prototype 

U.K., 1912 

U.K., 1918 

France 

France 

France, Pre-WWII 

U.K., 1942 

France 

Canada 

U.K., 1944 

U.K., 1941 

France, 1980s 

U.S., 1990 

Mine-Emplacement Systems 

First Production 

U.S.S.R. 

U.K. 

U.S. 

U.K., 1943 

Germany, 1940 

U.K., 1944 

Sweden, 1940s 

Israel 

U.S., 1990 

T he Italian AR-4 Thermos Bomb (also called Antipersonnel (AP) Bomb Manzolini) was one of the first 

scatterable mine-laying systems used in combat. 

Scattered by aircraft, it was used fairly extensively in North 

Africa from 1940 to 1942).16 Another early scatterable mine was 

the German SD-2B Schmetterling (buttelfly). It was used 

effectively against the Poles in September 1939. Both types 

employed antidisturbance and time-delay fuzing. The Germans 

also developed a cluster-bomb version of the SD-2 that had 

airburst or impact fuzing. An aircraft-dropped bomb container 

could cany 24 Thermos bombs as a submunition. The 

Schmetterling could be carried as submunitions in the following 

cluster-bomb containers: AB 23 (23 SD-2s), the AB 250-3 (108 

SD-2s), the Mk 500 (6 SD-2s), and the AB 241 (24 SD-~S),'~ In 

addition to Poland, the Schmetterling was used in France, North 

Africa, Italy, England, and ~ussia.'~ It could be dropped by one 

of 15 Luftwaffe groups equipped with specially modified aircraft 

(Ju-88s, Do-17s, Me-logs, or JU-~~S).'~ The U.S. Air Force 

copied this mine, called it the M-83, and used it against Germany 

and later in ~orea~' and ~ietnarn.~' In Germany, Knlpp 

developed (but did not field) the first mechanical mine planter, 

which was towed behind a Tiger tank.22 The U.S. Marine Corps 

developed the first air-scatterable AT mine-the Douglas Model 

3 1 from 1952 to 1958. The first one to enter production (in 1975) 

appears to be the U.S.-made UH-I helicopter-mounted M-56 

system, which used the M-34 AT mine.23 

November 1997 Engineer 45 
Table 2. Origin of Countermobility Equipment 

MineIFuzeTyp 

Tunnel mining 

Caltrops 

Explosive tunnel mines 

Self-contained AP mine 

Electric command- detonated mine 

Blast AT Mine 

Bounding AP mine 

Chemical mine 

Flame mine 

Mechanical boobytraps 

Side-attack AT mine 

Full-width-attack AT mine 

Fixed-wing a~rcraft- scattered AP mine 

Fixed-wing aircraft- scattered AT mine 

Helicopter-scattered AP mine 

Helicopter-scattered AT mine 

Tube artillery-scattered mines 

Rocket artillery-scattered mines 

Vehicle-scattered mines 

Manpack-scattered mines 

Radio-controlled mines 

Tilt-rod fuze 

Daisy-chained mines 

Coupled mines 

Boosted mines 

Breakwire fuze 

Tripwire fuze 

Railroad mint 

Electronic boobytrap 

Low-metal mine 

Influence fuze 

Antihandling devices 

Mechanical mine planter 

E ed mines 

1 r mine 

Integral electronic antihandling device 

'confederate States of America, 1861 -65. 

46 Engineer 

First 


Prototype 


China. 1277 


France, 1858 


Germany, 1917 


U.S., 1859 


U.K. 


Confederacy, 1864' 


China, 1277 


Germany, 1943 


Germany, 1945 


Germany, 1930s 


U.S. 

U.S., Vietnam 

U.S., 1970s 

U.S., 1970s 

U.S.S.R., 1970s 

Finland, 1939 


Germany, 1942 


Germany, 1942 


Germany, 1573 


Confederacy, 1862' 


Germany, WWll 

Viet Cc)ng, Vietnam 

First 


Product 


China, 1277 


Germany, 1918 


Germany, 1930s 


Germany, WWll 


U.S.S.R., 1943 


Confederacy, 1864' 


U.S.S.R., 1943 


France, 1948 


Germany, 1930s 


US., 1960s 


U.S.S.R., 1970s 


U.S., 1975 


U.S.. 1970s . 


U.S., 1970s 


US., 1990s 


U.S.S.R., 1941 


U.S.S.R., 1941 


Germany, WWll 

US., 1960s 


Germany, 1939 


Germany, WWll 


Yugoslavia. 1980s 


Finland, 1939 


U.S.S.R., WWll 


Germany, 1930s 


U.S.S.R., post-WWII 


Italy, 1980 


First 


Combat Use 


Assyria, -1000 BC 


Greece, 330 BC 


Florence, 1403 


China, 1277 


France, Sevastopol, 1858 


Germany, Western Front, 191 7 


Germany, West Wall, 1939 


U.S.S.R., Kursk, 1943 


China, 1277 


Germany, Eastern Front, 1943 


Germany, Polish Campaign, 1939 


U.S., Southeast Asia, 1960s 


U.S.S.R., Afghanistan, 1980s 


USSR, Afghanistan, 1980s 


U.S., Gulf War, 1991 


U.S.S.R., Afghanistan, 1980s 


U.S.S.R., 1942 


U.S.S.R., 1941 


Finland, 1939 


Germany, North Africa, 1942 


Germany, North Africa, 1942 


U.S.S.R., Afghanistan 


Germany, 1500s (?) 


Confederacy, Civil War, 1862' 


Yugoslavia, 1990s 


Finland , 1939 


U.S.S.R., WWll 


Germany, WWll 


Mujahideen, Afghanistan, 1980s 

Viet Cong, Vietnam War 

November 1997 
Countermines 

he original countermines were tunnels dug by 

besieged defenders to disrupt enemy mining efforts. 

A countermine was successful when an enemy 

tunnel was intercepted. Inevitably, a confused, closequarters fight in the dark followed, as the two sides fought to 

control the One example of this occurred during 

the siege of Barca about 510 B.C. "The Persians excavated 

underground tunnels that reached the walls. Among the 

Barcaeans there was a skilled worker in brass who took a 

brazen shield and, carrying it round within the wall, applied 

it here and there at places where he thought the workings 

might be. Where there were no mines the shield was silent, 

but at places near mining operations the shield made a 

vibrating sound. By countermining at these points, the 

Barcaeans broke into the enemy's works and slew the men 

they found there."25 

Explosive Countermines. The first identified use of an 

explosive countermine was during the siege of Belgrade in 

1433, when John Vrano used black powder in a countermine 

against the ~urks.*~ In this application, the intent was to dig 

close to the enemy's mine gallery and emplace and detonate 

a charge that would collapse the tunnel and kill the miners. 

This type of explosive countermine was used up to World 

War During the Thirty Years War in central Europe 

(16 18- 1648), some defenders released poisonous antimony 

gas into tunnels to kill miners.28 

Manual Breaching. The first deliberate breach of a 

minefield was by Colonel Serrel's 1st New York Volunteer 

Engineers at Fort Wagner, South Carolina, in August and 

September 1863 during the Civil War. Union sappers 

literally dug their way through the minefield using 

traditional siege warfare techniques.29 

Mine Plows, Rakes, and Detectors. In 1918, the French 

developed the first plow-equipped tank, which was based on a 

Renault FT-17 tank.30 However, plow tanks were not used in 

combat until D-Day in 1944, when the British 79th Armored 

Division employed a "Bullshom" plow on a Churchill tank at 

Sword ~each.~' Modern versions used by most countries, 

including the United States, are based on an Israeli design. 

The highly successful full-width mine rake was first 

developed and used by the United States during Operation 

Desert Storm. 

The Germans, French, Russians, and Italians entered 

World War I1 with metallic mine detectors, but information on 

the details of their origin is lacking.32 During the interwar 

years, the French developed the first vehicle-mounted 

electronic mine detector on an R-35 tank.33 

Bangalore Torpedo. Captain McClintock-an engineer 

officer in the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras Sappers and 

November 1997 

Miners-invented the bangalore torpedo in 191 2. Its purpose 

was to counter problems caused by the rise of barbed-wire 

obstacles during the Boer War (1899-1902) and the RussoJapanese War (1904- 1905). The torpedo, which took its name 

from Bangalore, India, where it was developed, was originally 

a 5.5-meter length of pipe filled with 27.2 kilograms of 

dynamite.34 Early in World War 11, the torpedo was found to 

effectively clear a path through minefields, and it remains a 

standard item in most armies. In 1944, the United States began 

experimentation for a supplemental system that would use a 

bullet-trap rifle grenade or small rocket to deploy a length of 

detonating cord,35 but these devices have not been generally 

accepted. A more likely successor is the U.S. Antipersonnel 

Obstacle-Breaching System (APOBS), which is based on the 

Israeli-developed POMINS.~~ 

Mine Rollers and Assault Bridges. At the end of World War 

I, the British developed a tank-mounted mine roller as a 

countenneawre against German AT mines. Major Martel (RE) 

explored the possibility of producing mine rollers and assault 

bridges that could be used by armored vehicles. Martel was 

assisted by Major Inglis from the Engineer-in-Chief's branch at 

general headquarters. Inglis, an engineering professor at 

Cambridge, had designed a prefabricated tubular mobile bridge to 

carry tanks across a clear span of 100 feet. Three special tank 

battalions, one commanded by Martel, were formed at Christchurch in Hampshire, England, in 19 18. Each battalion had Mk V 

tanks designed to accept either mine rollers or to pusNpul1 mobile 

bridges. Although the armistice came before the units were 

operational, Martel continued trials with the one remaining unit, 

called the Experimental Bridging Company, which was transitioned to the civilian-controlled Experimental Bridging 

Establishment in 1925.~~ The mine roller was first used in

combat in 1940, when the Russians used it to help breach 

Finland's Mannerheim ~ine.~~ The highly successful Russian 

Mugalev roller, which first saw action in 1942, was developed 

based on this e~perience.~~ Mostrollers currently used by former 

Warsaw Pact countries, Israel, and the United States are patterned 

after the Mugalev roller.40 

Snake. The demolition "Snake" was first developed by 

Major MacLean, a Canadian combat engineer from the 1 1th 

Field Company, in October 1941. Originally nicknamed the 

"Worthington Wiggler" after F. F. Worthington, commander of 

the 1st Canadian Tank Brigade, it was basically an oversized 

bangalore torpedo. The Snake consisted of sections of 3-inch 

diameter pipe loaded with explosives, which could be coupled 

together in lengths up to 400 feet and pushed as a unit across a 

minefield ahead of a tank. The subsequent detonation would 

clear a path through the field. The Snake was demonstrated 

successfully in February and March 1942.~' Although the 

U.S. Army was equipped with a small number of them during 

the campaign in North Africa, the Snake was first used in 

Engineer 47 
combat by the U.S. 1st Armored Division on 23 May 1944 

during the breakout from the Anzio ~eachhead.~~ 

Mine-Clearing Line Charge. A British-made, rocketdeployed, flexible line charge called the "Conger" was 

developed to overcome the shortcomings of the Snake. The 

Conger was the first modern mine-clearing line charge. 

Consisting of 330 yards of specially woven 2-inch diameter 

flexible hose, it was launched across a minefield by a 5-inch 

rocket. After the hose was deployed, it was filled with 2,500 

pounds of a nitroglycerine-based liquid explosive known as 

822C. Because it was so dangerous, the Conger was used in 

combat only once by the British 79th Armored Division 

during the battle for Calais on 25 September 194.4.~~ Modern 

mine-clearing line charges like the U.S. M58 MICLIC and 

the British Giant Viper evolved from this device.44 

Mine-Clearing Flail. Lieutenant Colonel Colman, a South 

African engineer, got the idea for a mine-clearing flail when 

he saw a tracked vehicle drive by with a length of wire 

wrapped around its sprockets. The wire hit the ground hard 

with each revolution of the sprockets. Colman's idea was 

developed by Field Marshal Montgomery's 8th Army in the 

general headquarters workshops in August 1942. Twenty-four 

of these flails, called "Scorpions," were first used in combat 

during several British breaching efforts in the Second Battle of 

El lame in.^' Eventually, the British consolidated the flail 

and many other specialized armored vehicles in the famous 

79th Armored Division. Commanded by General Hobart, RE, 

this division-known as Hobart's Funnies-was probably the 

most advanced combat engineering organization ever de- 

~elo~ed.~~ Modern descendants of the Scorpion are in service 

in England and are the forerunner of the jointly developed 

German and Israeli Keiler system.47 

Remote-Controlled Breaching Vehicles. The f rst 

prototype, remote-controlled breaching vehicles for cutting 

wire obstacles were developed in Germany and France 

during World War The Germans were the first to 

produce and deploy remote-controlled minefield breaching 

vehicles by using both an expendable charge-carrying 

vehicle (the "Goliath) and a nonexpendable vehicle (the BIV) that was intended to drop its charge and withdraw before 

the charge detonated. Although these vehicles were used 

with some success at Sevastopol in 1942 and Kursk in 1943, 

they were generally considered failures.49 

Sea Mines 

he Chinese first employed sea mines in the 14th 

century. The oldest known European design for a sea 

mine was presented by Ralph Rabbards to Queen 

Elizabeth I in 1574.~' In the West, the first known employment of sea mines occurred in 1777 when Captain David 

Bushnell, an American Continental Army engineer, attacked 

British ships on the Delaware River with floating mines. He 

also made the first submarine attack in the history of warfare 

and commanded the Company of Sappers and Miners that 

stormed Redoubt 10 at ~orktown.~' Robert Fulton and Samuel 

Colt both experimented with sea mines in the early 1800s but 

lost interest when their efforts were not well received by any 

government. The term "torpedo" was first applied to Fulton's 

submarine engine. Floating mines were used by the Russians 

during the Crimean War in 1855 and at Canton, China, in 

1 857-58.52 Their first significant employment, however, 

occurred during the American Civil War, where they were 

responsible for most of the Union ships sunk.s3 

Antiaircraft Mines 

T his type of mine is still emerging from the technological 

shadows. The first improvised antihelicopter mines 

appeared during the Vietnam War and were used by the 

Viet Cong on potential landing zones.54 During the Cold War, the 

Russians developed an antiaircraft mine based on their surfaceto-air (SA)-7/14 missile for use by their special-purpose forces 

(SPETZNAZ) against NATO air base^.^^ In the 1990s, Britain 

and the United States had developmental programs for producing 

"smart" antihelicopter mines that could be deployed to engage 

low-flying helicopters, but these have been cance~led.~~ However, a Russian company is looking for partners to help hind the 

development and fielding of the "Temp 20," an antihelicopter 

mine with a lethal range of 200 meterss7 Some of the technologies being developed for the Ballistic Missile Defense Office 

could even be considered orbiting space mines. 

Conclusion 

his series of articles has explored the origins of 

military mines and the ingenuity of the engineers 

who drove their development. (See Engineer, July 

1998, for Part I.) The evolution of these necessary 

but unglamorous weapons will continue. Antiaircraft1 

antihelicopter mines and possibly antisatellite "mines" will 

almost certainly appear in the future. So far, history has 

shown that whenever a new means of movement appears in 

the attacker's repertoire, the military engineer responds with a 

defensive countermeasure. 1Y 

Major Schneck, a professional engineer: is the Assistaizt 

Division Etzgineec 29th Light Infuntry Division (Virginia 

Army National Guard), and a senior project engineer in the 

Counternline Division, Night Vision and Electrotzic Sensors 

Directorate, Fort Belvoir; Virginia. A veteran of both the Gulf' 

War and Somalia, he has prihlished numerous papers on mine 

warfare. M~ijor Sclztzeck is a graduatr of the Command and 

General Staff College and holds cr master's degree in 

mechanical engineering from Catholic University. His e-mail 

address is: wschneckOnvl.army.mil/. 

48 Engineer November 1997 
'9~erman Air Force Operations in Support of the Amy, by 

General der Flieger and. D. Paul Deichrnann, USAF Historical 

Studies: No. 163, USAF Historical Division Research Studies 

Institute Air University, Arno Press, New York, June 1972, pages 

43-44. 

Endnotes 

A History of Fortification, From 3000 BC to AD 1700, by 

Sidney Toy, Heineman, London, 1966, page 31. 

20 The 1st Cavalry Division and Tlzeir 8th Engineers in Korea, 

edited by Frank Armstrong, Bull Run of Vermont, South 

Burlington, Vermont, 1993, page 180. 

Ibid. pages 151-156. 

The Sinking of the USS Cairo, by John C. Wideman, 

University Press of Mississippi, 1993, page 5 1. 

21 Viet Cong Boobytraps, Mines, and Mine Wafare Techniques, 

TC 5-31, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1969, 

page 2-1 1. 

Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, by Herman Haupt, 

Arno Press, 198 1 edition, page 49. 

The Fighting Tanks Since 1916, by Ralph Jones, George Rarey, 

and Robert Icks, The National Publishing Company, Washington, 

D.C., 1933, page 262. See also FM 20-32 (1976), page 133. 

22 German Mine Wafare Equipment, TM 5-223C, Department 

of the Army, Washington, D.C., March 1952, page 10. The device 

proved "impractical." See also a video titled "Great Fighting 

Machines of WWn." The first fielded mechanical mine planter was 

probably Russian. 

"Destruction of Enemy Traps and Mines:' by J. Frank Barber. 

Military Engineet September-October, 1924, pages 374-377. 

23 OP CIT, Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1991-1992, 

pages 217-218. 

Ibid. pages 47, & 106-114, also see Treat 'em Rough! The 

Birth of American Armo1;1917-20, by Dale E. Wilson, Presidio, 

1989, pages 117, 170, 182,196, and 204. 24 Medieval Warfnre, by Terrence Wise, Hastings House 

Mine/Countermine Operations at the Company LRvel, FM 20- Publishers, New York, 1976, pages 168-169. 

32, Department of Doctrine and Training Development, US Army 

Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 30 September 1976, p: 

133. 

25 OP CIT, A History of Fortification, page 23. 

26 Ibid. p: 

German Mine Warfnre Equipment, TM 5-223C, March 19. 27 War C 

pages 118-122. See also pages 89-94. 

hderground, The Emnellers of the Great War, by 

Alexander Bame, Tom Donovan, London, England, pages 196- 

206. 

''~eutsche Landminen, 1935-1945, by Wolfgang Fleischer, 

Waffen-Arsenal, Band 164, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1997, pages 12 

and 43. 

28 European Weapons and Warfare, 1618-1648. by Eduard 

Wagner,Octopus Publishing, page 222. 

''~oviet Mine Warfare Equipment, TM 5-223A, Department of 

the Army, August 1951, pages 45-52 and 83-89. 

29 Infernal Machines, The Story of Confederate Submarine and 

Mine Warfare, by Milton F. Perry, Louisiana State University Press, 

1965, pages 58-60. l2 bid. pages 113-1 16. 

30~ncyclopcdia of 3 .ow and R .obert Icks, 

Chartwell Books, page 

Duncan CI 

4. l3 North Korean People's Army Handbook, FC 100-2-99, Battle 

Command Training Program, April 1992, page 10-36. 

try of the 7! 

Ige 45. 

31 The St6 

ne 1945, p; 

Yth Armoured Divisio, published, 

l4 Soviet Mine Warfare Equipment, TM 5-223A, Departmenl 

the Army, Washington, D.C., August 1951, pages 62-63. 

32 "Mine , ,,,,,Lermine in Recent History, 1914-1970,'' by 

lssel Stolfi, BRL Re1 aboratories, 

,erdeen Proving Grou : 21. 

l5 Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1991-1992, edited 

Christopher Foss and Terry Gander, Jane's Defence Data, GI 

Britain, 1991, pages 199-200 and "Smart Mines Join the Fr: 

Armed Forces Journal, August 1992, page 14. 

~ort 1582, 

nds, Maryl 

Ballistic R 

land, April 

33 OP CIT, Encycloped~a of lanks, page 3 

34 Royal A 

175, page 7 

35 IXI"",".. 

Engineers, 

2. 

by Derek I Boyd, Leo 

17 lnnrin 

North Africa, 1940-1943, Landmine and Countem Cooper Lt 

Warfare, Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Washing1 

D.C., June 1972, pages 15,20,30,50, and 51. 

d., London, 

,, Lwr,c, World War .., -,,,,,zinc and Cbunteimine 

rentones, Washington, 

VVCJCCI 

zrfare, En$ 

C., July IS 

'2C. -- -_. 

17~talian and French E.xplosive Ordnance, TM 9-198: 

Departments of the Army and the Air Force, March 1953, page 

25, 59-60. And German Explosive Ordnance (Bombs, Fu. 

Rockets, Land Mines, Grenades, and Igniters), TM 9-1981 

Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Washington, D 

March 1953, page 34. 

;ineer Age1 

173, page 2 

ICY for Re! 

05. 

"" ~~~ 1'l.l; Jane's Mllitary Vehicles and Logistics, 1991-1992, 

d 249. 

r, Royal Ei ages 75-76 

l8 OP CIT, North Africa, 1940-1943, Landmine 

Countermine Warfnre, page 15. Luftwaffe Handbook, 1939-15 

by Alfred Price, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, New Yc 

1997, page 42. Unexploded Bomb, A History of Bomb Disposal 

Arthur Hartley, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1958, pages 

132-134, 159-165, and 213. 

Yinter War 

: and Laur 

7. 

-. 

; The Rus~ 

i Paananer 

;o-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40, by 

I, Charles Sons, New 

111c 1 

oise Engle 

~rk, page 7 

10 _ . "' Soviet 7anks and Combat Vehicles of worra M'ar Two, by 

Steven Zaloga and James Grandsen, Arms and hour Press, 

November 1997 Engineer 49 
:ngineers 

Iowever, it 

fine Wa$a, 

47 OP c 

age 232. 

48 nn n. 

- - 

aval warfa 

''The 

Vashington 

52 Torp .. .. 

Vashington 

53 OP 

ubmarine 1 

)estructior 

t, and 49. 

Associatio 

is possibl 

re Equipm 

L of Army 

n of Car 

e that the 

?nt, pages : 

:no to the Alps, 

by Ernest Fisher, 

lington, D.C., 1977, 1 

[T, The Sto 

IT, Jane's .a- ,.A* n 

p the Lnn 

;outh Afri 

lay have 

IT, Jane's 

m" , 

re. 

enius of C? 

- - 

?ers of I~L 

reers in thc --. . . 

, D.C., pap 

edoes: Th . ., . . 

CIT, Infer 

2nd Mine \ 

ry of the 71 

Military U 

i 248. 

-. . dmine, by 

ca, 1986, 

been first, 

Two, page 

,tory, The 

s Stationer 

Military U 

2. ,-rr 

lependenct 

5 Americar 

-. . . 

nal Mach 

Va$are, pa 

Group Cer itre, by Stt :ven Zalog 

)yal Canac 

and W. A. 

lada, Otta 

Germans 

215-216. 

lian Engin, 

McDill. 1 

Lwa, 1966 

were first, 

eers, Vol~n "L- x.r:,:.- 

I, page 9 

see Germ 

London, pages bL, 81, , ., ,, IYU, & 191. bee also, Bagratron 

1944, The I a, 

pages 33,3r 

40 OP CI I, Jane s Murrary venrcles nna Logrsncs, I YYI -I YY~, 

pages 234,235,238, a 

41 History of the C ~e 

11. 1936-1946. bv A. J. r\cllv LLLG lvllllld~ 

E 9. 

H m 

I% 

of 

C JS 

A 

43 OP C1 

44 OP c 2, 

pages 238,24~, L~I, d 

Publishing, 

A natively, the 

R 2nd Combat 

Vehicles of World War 

46 Vanguard of Vic id 

Fletcher, Her Majesty' 

~hicles and Logistics, 2, 

P 

- ur LI I, cncyclopeara oj ~anks, pages 133 and I 

49 German Remote-Control 7 1940-1 943 US 

Jaugitz, Schiffer Military, Atglen ania. Thesc re 

arguably related to the much olu~l LUIILGW~ of a "fire ,~IIIU llum 

n 

:r, 

New York, 1986, page 

'~n~in, ., A Documentary History of the 

Army Engir z Revolution, 1775-1 783, by Paul 

K. Walker, Hlstorlcal Ulvls~on, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

v 

st 

App~rcazron ro me Arr oj war ro me rresent lrme, oy w. K. mng, 

V 

'te 

S 

54 OPCII, IL 3-51, pages 4-14 ana 4-13. 

55 On Air Defense, by James D. Crabtree, Praeger, Westport, 

Connecticut, 1994, pages 183-1 84 

'2, 

P ti 

IIIL~~~~LIOII~I. unuilleu 

IS Antl-Hellcopter Mine Project," Jane's 

6 Review, 111998, page 16. 

The Medi 

Center of 

20-128. 

9th Armore 

khicles anc 

Peter Sti 

pages 23 

see SovL 

79th Armo, 

y Office, L 

'nnk Units 

, Pennsylv 

a - - - - - - 

~bert Temp 

tion and .. - 

ines, Tlie 

ge 4. 

terranean 

Military 

Theater 

History, I. 

~d Division 

f Logistics, 

ff, Galago 

-28. Alten 

ot Tanks c 

red Divisic 

,ondon, 191 

le. Simon z 

Use, Fror . -. . 

, page 136 

1991-199 

)n, by Dav 

54. 

3 devices a . ..L:-?, r-- 

tnd Schustt 

n the Fir r.7 r. w. 

56 OP c 

age 198 

-.. - 

IT, Jane's 

and "At 7 .... >..> 

Military V 

iti-Helicop 

thicles an1 

lter Mine 

1 Logistics: 

" Brochu 

, 1991-199 

re, Ferrar 

sia Unvei 

11 Defense 

(Continued from page 43) 

Sell the Idea 

o matter how great his ideas, an engineer is worthless 

to those he supports if he cannot sell himself and those 

ideas. Unfortunately for engineers, infantly and armor 

officers make the final call on the brigade SOP. New ideas are 

a hard sell, especially to those comfortable with the "old 

ways." Engineers in the 3BCT developed a Powerpoint slide 

presentation that shows the Class IVIClass V supply flow on 

the battlefield. This presentation points out to the task force 

S4s that the supply point is their responsibility and 

demonstrates with the "WELCOMES" card how easy their job 

can be. After the 3BCT commander blessed the concept, it 

was included in the brigade's noncommissioned officer and 

officer development plans. Then, with a measurable amount of 

insistence on the part of the engineers, the Class IVIClass V 

supply flow was exercised during the home station train-up for 

the National Training Center. After receiving guidance, the 

task force S4s took ownership of their supply points and ran 

them quite well. This achieved the brigade commander's 

intent to free up the engineers and use the brigade's limited 

assets to push enough material to keep those engineers gainfully employed on the ground. 

Maximize Assets 

M 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, states that 

"Mine warfare logistics at the task force level can be 

complex. It requires prudent use of scarce haul and 

materiel handling equipment and demands positive command 

and control." With dwindling resources in personnel and 

equipment across the Engineer Corps, it is paramount to use 

all the brigade's assets for Class IVIClass V supply point 

operations. Training maneuver elements in the brigade before 

they deployed to the National Training Center paid high 

dividends for the 3BCT-and it would be time well spent 

during any brigade's train-up. Key tasks for engineers are to 

simplify doctrine, assign responsibilities, sell the idea, and 

train maneuver elements to take ownership of the supply 

point. When a unit can free engineers from processing mines 

and mass their efforts on mine emplacement, they have 

cracked the code on Class IVIClass V supply point operations. 

u 

Captain Martinez is commander; A Company, 70th Engineer 

Battalion (Mechanized), 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st 

Armored Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. He served in Operations 

Desert Storm and Intrinsic Action and has completed three 

rotations to the National Training Center and one to the 

Combined Marzeuver Training Center CPT Martinez is a 

graduate of the Army Airborne School, the Engineer OfjTcer 

Advanced Course, and the Combined Arms Service School. 

50 Engineer November 1997 
Through the Breach: 

A Tanker's Perspective 

By Captain Jeffrey Erdley 

November 1998 Engineer 51 

Q uotes such as this may stir emo- I Leonard Wood. Through my experi- with little more than direct-fire support. 

tions of disbelief in U.S. forces, ence, one fact has proven itself over The disjointed guidance may be corbecause all of the breaches dur- and over: the maneuver arms and engi- i rected in future versions of FM 71-2, 

ing Desert Storm were successful. It is neers lack a common understanding of because engineers don't use the term 

"hasty," and the new FM 90-13-1 will 

eliminate each distinct operation (deliberate, in-stride, etc.) and designate 

them all simply as a "breach." 

In my engineer and 

maneuver soldiers when faced with a 

breach often view each other as adversaries who get in the way of the mission. An important point is that creating 

a lane through an obstacle is not conducting a breach; it is one small part of 

important to note, however, that the breaching and only work together when 

majority of our forces (except the Ma- forced to conduct a breach. 

rine divisions and a 2d Armored Division brigade) maneuvered far to the west I'.reachi~~g T\\ues 

of the main defenses. In every case, the M 90-13-1, Conlbined Arms 

Iraqi resistance was vastly weaker than Breaching Operations, lays the 

predicted-a fact that thankfully negated the 80 percent casualty predictions 

for U.S. breaching forces. 

I served as an acting engineer platoon leader with BI23rd Engineers (1st 

framework for a common vision, 

but the principles of this manual are not 

always followed or understood by units 

in the field. 

FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized 

Arm'red Division) for a Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, 

rotation and conducted well over 100 

breaches as a tank platoon leader, executive officer, and acting commander of 

armOr-heav~ teams. I have held both 

tanker and engineer viewpoints through 

field training in local training areas and 

combat training centers and formal 

schooling at Fort Knox and Fort 

Infantry Battalion Task Force, states, the operation. A breach is a combined 

"combat engineers are located with the 

breaching force of the battalion to perarm5 operation involving not just engineers and tankers but every battlefield 

form hasty breaches. H~~~~~~, time ! operating system (BOS) element. 

distance factors may require a Somewhere in the middle of the engihasty breach by maneuver units with- ~ neer and armor "high grounds" is an 

out direct engineer , 

effective way for these branches to 

~ik~~i~~, engineers are often thrust work together to breach an obstacle and 

forward of both light and mechanized 

.,its and are told to reduce obstacles 

continue with an attack. This is where 

task force and brigade combat team 
their own. To spur ideas and raise 

awareness, I offer some personal observations on identifying obstacles, ways 

to maneuver to them, notes on equipment, and breaching techniques that 

have proved successful in the field. 

Obstacle Intcllige~ice 

rehearsals and training become essen- method of locating obstacles, by- breaching operations in mind, the task 

tial-before units deploy to the field. It passes, and potential reduction sites force or brigade combat team breach 

is imperative for the unit to develop a was to put an engineer in a scout vehi- ' force must maneuver toward the front 

cohesive plan for a breaching operation cle that overwatched named areas of of the formation. If a breach is immiA s with any successful combat . . 

operation, a successful breach . I 

begins with accurate reconnaissance. Through trial and error, 3-67 An Al3-67 Armor Ml A1 moving to a company assembly area. Note the deliberArmor learned that the most effective ate orientation of the gun tube away from the roller assembly. 

52 Engineer November 1998 

nent, their best location is second in the 

order of march. 

Both FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, and 

FM 71-2 state that the roller tank 

should lead in a breach, because it 

is designed to detect minefields. This 

technique may be effective if units canas early as possible and to bring all participating elements together to orchestrate the complex operation. Through 

refinement, the breaching plan is 

developed and captured in the unit's 

standing operating procedure (SOP) as 

an effective reference for both maneuinterest and have him gather obstacle 

intelligence. Armor battalion scouts 

know the task force or brigade combat 

i team commander's intent and have the 

"maneuver view" of how to conduct the 

operation. But no one has more knowledge of obstacle composition, dimenver and support units. sions, and purpose than engineers. not visually identify mines or locate 

Current doctrine does not provide When they are in the same vehicle, them with the tank's thermal sites. The i insight concerning an effective middle I armor and engineer soldiers form an ~ roller tank may also find enemy scatground for breaching operations. Most 

armor manuals reserve a few pages to 

roller and plow operations and simply 

state that armor units will get support 

efficient team to locate obstacles and ' terable mines. With the density of con1 locate and mark potential bypasses or ' ventional and scatterable mines, howcreate lanes not covered by fire. Other ever, the roller tank may be well past 

reconnaissance assets, such as the bri- the leading edge of the minefield befrom the engineers for large obstacles. , gade reconnaissance troop, unmanned fore the roller hits a mine and thus 

Engineer manuals are also lacking. For aerial vehicles, scout helicopters, and determines the minefield's location. 

example, the obstacle-reduction capa- ' combat observation lazing teams, may 

~ 

I have not observed this order of 

bility of tanks is viewed as an after- be available depending on the priority march to be effective, because the 

thought, mainly for proofing. Even FM of the mission in the overall scheme of roller tank is a massive, lumbering 

90- 13-1, the doctrinal bible on breach- operations. beast that is ill-suited to lead a combat 

ing operations, barely mentions tank 

obstacle reduction. It states that plows , 

and rollers are mechanical reduction 

assets but does not explain how to 

employ them. FM 20-32, Mine/Coun1 formation. Lead tanks should not have 

Breach Operation planning mounted equipment, because they must 

E ven as reconnaissance personnel be killers on point that clear the immeare being deployed, the corn- diate area for the formation and fix 

mander and staff must start plan- ~ I enemy vehicles with direct fire. Tanks 

terming Operrrtions, devotes one page , ,ing for a breach in evely offensive with plows and rollers should then 

each to the plow and roller. (Lest we course of action. ~t is safe to assume move behind terrain or at a safe disforget how important tanks me, it was : that our forces will be under both direct tance to the rear of the lead tanks. ! the introduction of British tanks that 

opened the wire and trenches in France 

to help end the stalemate of World War forces just as we do, With the speed of ment distributes one plow to each 

I.) Since there is no effective manual on 

the tactical employment of either the 

plow or the roller, tankers must discover 

the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs) for unit SOPS and operations on 

and indirect fire, because the enemy 

' Within a tank company, the modi- 

,ses obstacles to channel and separate fied table of organization and equip- 
platoon and a roller on another tank in 

the company. Since tank platoons 

rarely maneuver on their own and 

never maneuver alone in a breach, this 

division of resources is a serious violation of unity of command that is usually corrected through task organization in the field. The most effective 

breach forces I have seen have had all 

of the reduction assets massed in one 

platoon. In a few missions, we attempted to attach this platoon under an 

engineer company commander. However, these attempts had disastrous 

results because the units did not use 

guns in the battle. Tanks were treated 

as engineer vehicles, and the company's killing capability was reduced 

by one-third. 

To be successful, both maneuver 

and engineer chains of command must 

remain intact. Although the maneuver 

commander commands the breach 

force, the engineer commander may 

control the reduction element within 

that force. This organization allows the 

maneuver commander to concentrate 

on the security element and the critical 

task of controlling direct fire at the 

reduction site. 

Mobility Assets 

he equipment available for a 

breach is not limited to tank 

and engineer armored vehiclelaunched bridges (AVLBs), mine-clearing 

line charges (MICLICs), armored vehicle-launched MICLICs (AVLMs), bangalore torpedoes, and grappling hooks. 

A successful breach is a combined 

effort involving engineers; indirect. 

counterbattery, and smoke missions of 

field artillery; mortars; aviation fires; 

infantry support; and sometimes chemical corps smoke. All these systems are 

excellent in their own way, but this article concentrates on integrating the M1 

tank with mine-clearing plows and rollers with engineers. 

Armor Equipment 

Armor manuals are fairly weak on 

describing breaching nlissions. Three 

breaching methods are discussed in 

FM 71-2: employing an M1 tank with a 

, plow/roller combination, using an M88 

, recovery vehicle with its blade down, 

and simply driving through. FM 17-15 

describes the disastrous method of staggering plow tanks to create wider lanes. 

This method often leads to a live mine 

I in the spoil that explodes on the second 

tank. FM 17-15 also instructs tank platoon leaders to use the cleared-lanes 

I marking system (CLAMS). I believe I that most of these systems were turned 

in after they proved to be ineffective. 

In my opinion, the most effective 

~ method of tank obstacle reduction is 

with the plow tank. It digs below mines 

and then uses spoil to push them to the 

sides. Any vehicle that stays within the 

track of the tank is safe from mines. 

Contrary to the belief of some soldiers, a plow does not necessarily slow 

a tank during movement. The main 

planning consideration for plow tanks 

is to keep them away from wadis, 

streambeds, bridges without the appropriate military load classification, and 

I other restricted terrain that would 

impede movement. A tank is much 

I the far side to be retrieved later. In this 

I mission, and this mission only, a roller 

is effective. Prolonged use of a roller is 

suicide to a tank. During one field exercise, a wingman left the roller on a tank 

for an entire month because the unit 

lacked support to transport it. It took 

about nine months to replace or repair 

all the shocks and seals of the tank's 

suspension that were destroyed by the 

extra weight. 

There is a major Class IX supply 

problem with both the plow and the 

roller. These systems are not reportable 

and can lose deadline visibility. Neither 

system is reportable, so we could order 

all the parts 02 priority, nondeadline. 

Even with this priority, the average 

shipping time for plow parts is about 

nine months and about a year for roller 

parts. Crews that cannot repair deadlined systems do not train on them. 

After a short time, no one in the unit is 

familiar with the equipment and it is 1 ignored. Even item managers could not 

help us get parts faster because of 

the lack of emphasis on this vital 

equipment. 

November 1998 Engineer 53 

longer with a plow attached and cannot Engineer Equipment drive through steep If a plow During most of the heavy task force 

in, crews must scrape the mud and dirt operations I have been involved with, off If don't, the engineers believed that the best breachtank. 

added weight may cause seals to burst 1 equipment was the MICLI~ and the 

on the suspension in the front of the AVLM. The belief 

armor personnel when they saw the 

Roller tanks have some uses but MICLIC or being prepared for 

generally are considered to he more the point of breach was: "Get the 

trouble than they are worth in the armor plows ready, the MICLIC won.t work.. 

tank sug- Engineer aftereaction reports from 

gest leading an attack with a roller tank Desert Storm contain the following to find the leading edge of the mine- conclusions: 

field. However, anyone who has maneuvered with them understands that an "Units placed an overreli~lrzce orz 

attack with a roller point man the MICLIC as the answer to all their 

have all the momentun, of a lethargic breaching problems. This was due to 

snail. ~~ll~~~ were designed to be car- 1 the ignorance of threat mine cupahiliried to the battlefield on a lowboy 1 d'~, poor MlCLIC traif1;il~ Clt home 

trailer, and the receiving tank would station, and the general lack (f an 

already have a mounting kit secured to efective training device or training 

the front slope. The crew only installs ~fr~teg~'." 

rollers on a tank in the attack position "The MlCLIC system suffered from 

before crossing the line of departure, several serious shortcomings. During 

then it maneuvers through the breach as 

the proof tank and drops the rollers on 

test jring.~ the s.Ystem sufered a 50- 

~erce17t.failure rate." 
Even when the MICLIC fires successfi~lly, it can only clear a 100-meterlong path in an obstacle. This is excellent for small obstacles, but not for the 

deep obstacles found in many breaching operations. FM 90-1 3-1 acknowledges that the MICLIC has a "skip 

zone," where mines are left untouched. 

Also, deeply buried mines, nonpressurefuse mines, and overpressure-resistant 

mines are very resilient against the 

MICLIC. A major advantage of tankmounted systems is that they can keep 

going through an obstacle without a 

these fires. Artillery and armor battalion 

mortars must be used to the fullest for 

fires and smoke missions. If they fail, 

tanks can fire volleys of high-explosive 

antitank rounds in front of enemy positions to create obscuration from soil. 

When the effects of all these systems 

peak, then and only then has the force 

set the conditions for commitment of the 

breach force. Regardless of the breaching method used, the end state must be 

the same: The maneuver force must get 

through a breach quickly to continue the 

assault and kill the enemy. I lengthy firing process. Since engineers MICLIC/Plow Tank Method 

cannot accomplish a breach alone, it is After setting the conditions for comessential that they work closely with mitment of the breach force, most engi- tankers to perform the operation. neers I've observed have moved the 

and MICLIC at the point of breach, he 

has a large target (two vehicles end to 

end) to aim at for several minutes. This 

is when everyone learns if the suppressive fire was effective or not. During 

this time, enemy forces can destroy the 

attacker's best tools for getting through 

the breach and deny the commander the 

best place to enter the lane. Even if the 

plow tank crew survives the enemy fire, 

a 25-year-old friendly vehicle with a 

misfire rate of about 50 percent is about 

to fire almost a ton of high explosives 

over their heads. 

i plow tank in position in front of the 

F<C~!!.IC+;O!I ~~v:!~t~icg~~w obstacle with the MICLIC directly ~ 

T he possible combinations behind it. In this technique, the 1 

breaching assets and methods MICLIC is the reduction asset and the i 

use them are almost unlimited. plow is the proofing system. This techThe methods I have used most are the nique provides some cover for the 

MICLICIplow tank combination and MICLIC crew while they are exposed , the plow tank/roller combination, But ~ to the enemy for the minutes it takes to 

regardless of the method, all breaches ' raise, lock, fire, and detonate a charge. ~ 

Immediately after the MICLIC fires, 

the plow tank begins to move through 

what is left of the wire and mines. The 

tank must go on a straight path, because it 

cannot turn without risking damage to the 

plow tines. The turret should be traversed 

to the left, so that any mine blast to the 

front does not damage the gun tube. If the 

turret is traversed to the right, the tank 

commander is farther back and has problems seeing the front to determine the far 

edge of the obstacle. Some crews install a 

makeshift wire-cutting device in the center of the blades. This allows them to cut 

and push away the wire, so it won't be 

dragged along. The wire won't stop the 

tank, but it could damage the plow by cutting the nylon lifting straps or getting 

caught in the track. 

Armor and engineer doctrine on plow 

tank employment present the extremes 

of plow performance, while the best 

answer lies somewhere in between. 

Many annor and joint doctrinal publications state that the crew can drop the 

plow blade as little as 10 meters in front 

of the obstacle and then plow up to 10 

miles per hour (see FM 7 1-2). (The M 1 's 

speedometer is in kilometers per hour.) 

The tank platoon Army Training and 

Evaluation Program lists no standards. 

Engineer manuals bring the blade drop 

point back to 100 meters with a speed 

below 10 kilometers per hour (see FM 

20-32). Both specifications are partly 

right and partly wrong. 

The only way to be sure the depth 

setting and plow speed are effective is 

to conduct a rehearsal. By plowing two 

or three practice lanes in the area of 

must be the task force's or combat 

team's main effort. Because an attack 

54 Engineer November 1998 

A well-trained tank crew also may help 

set up the engineers for success on the 1 

hinges on the breach mission, every MICLIC launch by halting at the corasset-including most of the ammuni- rect stand-off distance for launching 

tion, close air support, fire priority, and then positioning the tank perpenfirefinder radar, and smoke platoons- dicular to the obstacle. After the explomust be concentrated at this decisive sion, the tank is in position to plow 

point. Using these assets, the corn- through the obstacle while the enemy is 

, 

mander must build the breach fun&- still disorganized from the detonation. 

mentals of suppress, obscure, secure, While the MICLIC crew is getting 

and reduce. To accomplish this, he ready to fire, the tank crew can drop the 

organizes the breaching unit into sup- plow and verify that it is locked down. 

port, breach, and assault forces. When Once the rocket is fired, the obstacle is 

forming these forces, he must retain 

unit integrity and the existing chain of 

quickly reduced. 

From a tanker's perspective this 

command. 

Success hinges on keeping those platechnique works, but it includes actions 

that could lead to failure for the breach 

toons or companies intact under the ' force. It is critical that the attacker 

maneuver commander, with the engi- place a large volume of fire on the 1 

neer commander as a right-hand man. defender during the entire mission. 

When teams are in place and firing on 1 However, with the plow tank directly in 

the enemy, the support force com- ' front of the breach, where our obscura- I. mander calls for indirect fires and . tlonsmoke and burningenemy vehicles , 

smoke missions. His mission dictates a may obscure the enemy's view, his 

good view of the battlefield, which gives main gun is effectively taken out of the 

him the best overall view to control fight. When the enemy sees the tank 
operations with conditions similar to 

those at the obstacle, the commander 

can determine the best depth and speed 

to dig out mines and produce sufficient 

spoil to push them to the sides. The 

blade drop point and speed also can be 

refined during a rehearsal. It is best to 

drop the blade before beginning to 

move to avoid possible damage to the 

plow tines. After the plow creates a 

lane, the roller follows the same path 

through the obstacle to detonate any 

remaining mines. The roller should 

travel at the same speed as the plow, 

with the gun tube to the left, and then 

exit the lane to the right in a hasty 

defensive position. In theory, each 

roller can withstand two mine hits and 

continue to effectively proof the lane. 

Regardless of the method used, several 

syslems must work together to breach, 

proof, and mark lanes. 

A plow can dig down to 8, 10, or 12 

inches. Thc depth must be set before 

the mission begins and is based on 

ground conditions (the softer the soil, 

the deeper the setting). The depth is 

critical, as is installation of the plow's 

moldboards, which force spoil farther 

to the sidcs of the tank and create a 

wider lane while preventing mines 

from falling back into the lane. After 

the tank commander is sure that the 

plows have plowed beyond the far 

edge of the obstacle, the tank must 

briefly stop, back up, and raise the 

plow. This orily takes a few seconds. 

Then the plow tank should move to the 

left of the breach lane and remain in a 

suppressive fire position. Because the 

plow control cables run through the 

driver's right vision block, he should 

drive to the left so he can see where he 

is going. Meanwhile, the gunner traverses and looks for targets. 

Although the lane is now well 

established, it is not complete until it is 

marked. The MICIIC and the path dug 

by the plow are very distinctive, so the 

immediate concern is to mark the exact 

entrance and exit. VS-17 panels are 

excellent markers at each end. We used 

the red side on the right and orange on 

the left. The exit point is the most critical under fire, because many combat 

vehicles turn off too early in training 

and run into the minefield. At night, 

plastic water bottles filled with chemical light Ruid enhance the VS-17s. We 

used markers called "tippy toms" to 

mark the left handrail of the lane 

because engineers can throw them out 

as they move through, but they usually 

are not very useful after the path is dug. 

Any initial method that clearly marks 

the entrance, exit, and path of the lane 

is satisfactory but should be continually 

improved for follow-on units (see FM 

90-13-1, Appendix E). 

PlowIRoller Tank Method 

When tank units train to reduce 

obstacles without a MICLIC or AVI.M, 

they use only a plow and roller. They 

follow the basic tenants of breaching as 

with the MICLIClplow combination. 

but this method uses the plow to reduce 

and the roller to proof. Without a roller, 

tank units are forced to drive a "Hollywood tank through the obstacle first 

to proof the lane. It is a grim job, but if 

the tank doesn't hit a mine, then the 

lane is proofed. Regal-dless of which 

reductionlproofing combination the 

commander uses, the plowing portion 

is almost identical to the process described for the MICLICIplow combination. The only difference is in how the 

plow tank begins its mission. When 

terrain allows, a plow tank is most 

effective if it remains behind an intervisibility line while conditions are set 

for the breach. The commander can 

talk directly to the tank commander 

and position him directly in front of the 

desired breach point, so that when he 

orders the plow forward it quickly 

drives straight to it. This is another 

instance where doctrine falls apart. 

Determining the blade drop point and 

tank speed may seem simple, but they 

drastically affect the quality of the 

lane. 

Synopsis 

I n heavy-force breaching operations, the maneuver commander 

must synchronize every available 

BOS to set the conditions for a successful breach and continued attack. No one 

system or branch can accomplish this 

mission without direct involvement and 

assistance from others. A major prohlem facing the combined arms team 

today is a lack of understanding of the 

common doctrine in FM 90-13-1 on 

how to execute this mission. The primary soldiers in a breach are tankers 

and engineers, but our schools teach 

different execution methods. Then, 

when we comc together in the field to 

plan and execute a mission, the officers 

disagree on exactly what to do. 

To eliminate this confusion, we 

tnust develop more effective combined 

arms doctrine and TTPs for obstacle 

reduction. If we begin by locking a 

group of tanker sergeants and captains 

in a room with their sapper counterparts, they may be ablc to find some 

common ground before the next balloon goes up. Common techniques will 

allow tankers and engineers to complement each other in a combined arms 

breach and be reinforced by every 

available BOS. Through combined 

TTP development, refinement, implementation, and training. we can set the 

conditions for a successful combined 

effort of all BOS elements on the battlefield. As individuals, or individual 

units, we can do many great things. 

Acting together as a cohesive team 

with common doctrine, we can accomplish anything--even an operation as 

demanding as a breach. Y 

Captain Erdley is working on a ma.7- 

ter's degree in engineering management at rhe Univer.siW of MissouriRolla. He has served as a rank platoon 

leadn; ~xeclrtive officer; battalion 

maintenance office5 and S1 for 3-67 

Armor in 2dArmored Divirion and 4th 

Infantry Division (Mechanized). He is a 

graduate of lhe Airborne, Air Assault, 

Armor Oficers Basic, and Engineer 

Officers Advanced Co~frses. CPT Erdley is a 1994 Distingnislled Military 

Graduate of LRhigh Universiry, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 

November 1998 Engineer 55 
Past in Review 


By Jmet A. McDonnell 

uring the Gulf War, the U.S. 

Army supported what was by 

all accounts the largest oil-firefighting campaign in history. Overall 

responsibility for fire-fi ghting operations rested with the Kuwaiti government and its Ministry of Oil. Kuwaiti 

leaders decided early on that the 

Kuwait Oil Company would manage 

and direct all fire-fighting operations. 

Before the Iraqi invasion (in August 

1990), Kuwait had roughly 1,300 producing wells in its primary oil fields. 

Approximately 75 of them were highpressure wells in the important Burgan 

field that produced from 20,000 to 

50,000 barrels of oil a day. Kuwait had a 

56 Engineer 

i 	 production quota of 1.5 million barrels smoke shrouded the fields. To further 

' per day, set by the Organization of complicate matters, unexploded ordPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), nance and Iraqi land mines littered the 

though it could produce much more. oil fields. The country's three refinerAs Iraqi soldiers withdrew from ies-Shuaiba, Mina Abdulla, and Mina 

Kuwait, they blew up more than 600 oil a1 Ahmadi-were also damaged. I i wells, resulting in the loss of an esti- The Kuwait Oil Company directed 

mated 5 to 6 million barrels per day. 1 the early planning for the fire fighting 

, Roughly 520 of the wells, or 85 percent, in Washington. The Kuwaitis requested 1 burned at temperatures as high as 2,000 U.S. Army civil affairs support in the 

degrees Fahrenheit. The rest gushed planning effort. Members of the Kuwait 

thousands of barrels of crude oil into Task Force (a small group of reserve ' large, dark, lifeless "lakes" that were up I officers from the 352nd Civil Affairs 

to six feet deep. Onlookers hundreds of I Command) helped the Kuwaitis gather 

, 	 feet away could feel the intense heat and 1
 information about the well fires. plan 

hear the roar of the burning wells, simi- logistics support, and develop an emer- 

! 	 lar to the sound of a jet engine. Thick gency plan of action. The Kuwait Oil 

November 1998 
Company hired O'Brien, Goins and 

Simpson as the executive agent to 

coordinate fire-fighting activities. It 

signed contracts with Red Adair Company, Boots and Coots, and Wild Well 

Control, Inc., all skilled Texas-based, 

world-renowned firms; and with Safety 

Boss of Calgary, a well-qualified Canadian firm. The Kuwait Oil Company 

eventually hired Bechtel to reconstruct 

the oil infrastructure and to provide 

food, housing, and other support to the 

firefighters, but Bechtel had no direct 

role in putting out the fires. 

It took the Kuwaitis four months to 

award the first fire-fighting contract, and 

they hired firefighters before hiring a 

contractor to support them. A severe 

shortage of heavy equipment. such as 

bulldozers, backhoes, and trucks, hampered the fire-fighting effort. Because of 

theft and Iraqi destruction, virtually 

everything needed to support the operation had to be imported. The challenges 

of feeding, housing, and equipping a 

workforce that eventually grew into the 

thousands were staggering. 

Firefighters arrived to survey the 

damage, assess their personnel requirements, and determine where they could 

stage their equipment. The first experts An estimated 5 to 6 million barrels of oil a day were lost. 

from Red Adair, Boots and Coots, and 

other companies arrived in Kuwait City food, water, lodging, and helicopter and Because of the shortage of equipon 4 March and toured the burning oil truck transportation. This gave the ment and firefighters, the work got off to 

fields by helicopter. They estimated that Kuwaiti government enough time to a painfully slow start. The Kuwait Oil 

extinguishing the fires and repairing the bring Bechtel personnel on-site to take Company initially used nine teams that 

wells could take two years. over the support operations. The Kuwait represented the four fire-fighting comInitially, the contractors could not Task Force also provided explosive ord- panies. Fire-fighting equipment began 

bring in workers because they had no nance disposal support and training and arriving in Kuwait on military aircraft 

way to feed or house them. The compa- coordinated engineer support until Ku- throughout March, and on 7 April a 

nies also had trouble getting the neces- waiti equipment arrived. Army explosive Boots and Coots team used liquid nitrosary equipment. The Kuwaitis initially ordnance disposal specialists steered the gen and water to extinguish the first oilwere reluctant to invest the tens of mil- firefighters safely through unexploded well fire. Fighting the wellhead infernos 

lions of dollars needed for equipment, ordnance to the wellheads and checked was dangerous and difficult. The fireeven though the fires consumed roughly the wellheads for explosives. fighters worked in intense heat, amid 

$100 million worth of oil each day. Kuwait Task Force members, Major blowing sand and smoke, and their 

Members of the Kuwait Task Force Tom Wilson, a procurement specialist brightly colored jumpsuits quickly beprovided immediate logistics and com- with Hunt Oil Company in civilian life, came coated with an oily mist. 

munications support to the fire-fighting and Lieutenant Colonel Phil Huber, In April, Kuwait's oil minister, Dr. 

teams. They also provided ground and focused on fire issues. Task force mem- Rashid Al-Amiri, announced that the 

air transportation to assess damage in the bers coordinated between the firefight- national oil company would bring in 

burning fields. Civil affairs troops coor- I ers and Ambassador Edward Gnehm. fire-fighting teams from several different 

dinated the use of C-5A aircraft to bring They also coordinated between contrac- companies, breaking up the American 

in heavy fire-fighting equipment from , tors looking for work and Bechtel or the and Canadian monopoly. With only 25 

Texas and to provide firefighters with 1 Kuwait Oil Company. well fires extinguished, he wanted to 

November 1998 Engineer 57 
Firefighters cap an oil well in Kuwait in August 1991. 

quicken the pace. The Kuwaiti government later brought in teams from three 

additional U.S. companies as well as 

British, German, French, Russian, Chinese. and Iranian firms. Ultimately, 

however, teams from the original 

American and Canadian firms put out 

most of the fires. Meanwhile, firms and 

individuals from around the world continued to inundate U.S. and Kuwaiti 

officials with proposals for extinguishing the fires. 

The slow pace of the fire fighting 

worried U.S. officials. In April, the Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and Plans 

hosted a meeting for representatives of 

the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Department of Energy to address this issue. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Energy for Export Assistance, George 

Helland, warned that the Bush administration would come under attack if it did 

not act quickly to put out the oil fires. 

The participants decided to forward all 

proposals for extinguishing the fires to 

the Undersecretary of Energy. He would 

screen the proposals before forwarding 

them to David Tarbell, the Director of 

International Economic and Energy 

Affairs, in the Office of the Principal 

I Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

I Strategy and Plans. The participants, 

however, made no attempt to define the 

problem. They failed to develop any 

1 specific format or guidance for drafting 

proposals and failed to develop any initiatives to get support from high levels in 

the Pentagon or the Bush administration. These were important oversights. 

After Task Force Freedom ceased 

operations, the Army continued to support the fire-fighting effort through the 

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office. Neither the Kuwaiti government 

nor any of the commercial firms could ' quickly bring in needed supplies and 

heavy equipment. As a result, with little 

legal or funding authority, the Military 

Airlift Command found itself flying the 

cargo on U.S. Air Force C-5A transports. The Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office later helped broker more 

than $13 million in transportation expenses between the Military Airlift 

Command and the Kuwaiti government. 

Other Defense Department agencies 

provided support through satellite imagery photographs, airfield repair, and 

environmental surveys. 

Major General Patrick Kelly, Commander of the Defense Reconstruction 

Assistance Office in Kuwait, and his 

staff monitored the work, gathered information, and kept the U.S. Ambassador to 

Kuwait, Edward W. Gnehm, informed. 

Gnehm had no environmental specialists 

on his staff, so he relied on Kelly's environmental officer, Lieutenant Colonel 

Christopher Werle, to advise him and 

coordinate environmental issues. Where 

appropriate, Kelly's staff helped coordinate the delivery of heavy equipment on 

C-5A transports, the tracking of oil fires 

and spillage with Landsat imagery, and 

the stabilization of work sites with airfield matting. Werle, who performed 

much of the day-to-day coordination 

with the fire-fighting organizations, 

developed a particularly good rapport 

with the firefighters and their support 

crews. Kelly and his staff considered all 

activities related to the environment and 

the oil-well fires to be "embassy business" and took no action without the 

ambassador's approval. 

The Army also provided combat engineer vehicles (CEVs). These vehicles are 

tanks with turret-mounted demolition 

guns and hydraulically operated debris 

blades. They give engineers in forward 

combat areas a versatile means of clearing rubble and filling tank ditches. More 

58 Engineer November 1998 
November 1998 Engineer 59 

than 80 Kuwaiti oil fires were encircled Some experts questioned the validity it began producing 30,000 barrels a day 

by huge, hardened mounds of coke (sol- of the agency's study because it onshore. On 25 July, Kuwait announced 

ids produced when unburned oil mixed I included only samples the team could that for the first time since the Iraqi invawith sand), which had to be removed 1 collect within 20 minutes, rather than ' sion it would resume exporting crude oil, 

before the firefighters could work. Fire- I samples collected over 18 to 24 hours. though only on a small scale. Half of the 

oil fires had been extinguished. Firefighters were snuffing out more than six 

, fires a day. By November 1991, all of 

Kuwait's oil wells had been capped. On 

6 November, the emir attended a ceremonial capping in the Burgan field of the 

final oil well. The Kuwaitis, delighted to 

see the end of this tragic and costly episode, celebrated the event as a national 

holiday. 

Kuwait lost more than 1 billion barrels of oil (or 1 percent of its sole natuI ral resource) as a result of the Gulf War, 

fighters used dynamite and backhoes to The team found an abnormally high 

remove the searing mounds, but the pro- level of particulates. "Soldiers may 

cess was hazardous and slow. Werle become concerned because they find 

developed a plan to use existing CEVs to soot in their nostrils," they conceded, 

fire rounds of high explosive plastic at but the smoke was "only an irritant and 

mounds to break them up so the fire- a nuisance." For the long term, though, 

fighters could remove the debris. This scientists needed to know more about 

plan, he argued, would speed the cap- the composition of the smoke to deterping effort and save the Kuwaiti govern- mine the potential health hazards. 

ment $300,000 per well. Moreover, it Meanwhile, at the request of the Depwould provide unique training for the 

CEV crews and positive Army public 

relations. The Kuwait Oil Company covuty Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Environment, a special health-risk assessment team from the Army Environered the costs of using the CEV crews 

and equipment. 

On 31 July. the Kuwaiti government 

and Bechtel conducted a very successful 

experiment: firing the large-caliber gun 

on a CEV to remove coke mounds from 

wellheads. Rounds from the vehicle 

shattered four out of five of the cokemound targets. Soldiers cleared two 

wells using this method. Soon after the 

initial experiment, however, the focus of 

mental Hygiene Agency conducted a but its huge reserves escaped lasting 

; 60-day study. The agency coordinated damage. The country still retained 10 

its effort with the Environmental Pro- percent of the world's crude oil retection Agency's interagency assess- serves. With assistance from the U.S. 

ment team to exchange information and Army and the dedicated, skilled private 

prevent duplication of effort. 

At the request of President George 

Bush, the administrator of the Environcontractors, the Kuwaiti government 

had extinguished the oil fires and 

recapped the wells in record time. 

, U.S. A~), and the ~~~~~~~~~~~i~~ of 

~~~~i~by janet A, ~~~~~h~ 

book, a joint publication by the U.S. 

corps of ~~~i~~~~~ and the U.S. 

1 center of ~ili~~~ ~i~is 

scheduled for distribution in the spring 

of 1999. T~ obtain a copy, write to: U.S. 

Corps of ~~~i~~~~~ Publications 

Depot, 2803 52nd Avenue, Hyattesville, 

~~~~l~20781-1 102. 

the fire-fighting effort shifted to Burgan, Iraqi invasion. "The horrors endured by 

Kuwait's densest oil field. Officials con- the people of Kuwait and the unprececluded that using the CEVs there would dented level of intentional environmenbe too dangerous because the wells tal destruction," Reilly reported, "rewere so close together. I mind us all that there is still evil in the 

As the oil fires continued to burn, 

the U.S. Army and other agencies 

became increasingly concerned about 

mental Protection Agency, William K. A 

Reilly, traveled to Kuwait in June to 1 Note: ~h~ above article is from a 

world." He praised the "environmental 

sensitivity" of the soldiers he met. "One 

of the untold stories," he added, "is the 

headed by the Environmental Protection Agency collected samples at sevassess environmental damage from the 

tary, he informed Secretary of Defense Records of references used in the 

Richard Cheney, had greatly assisted sci- are in the research 

new book, D~~~~~ storm: ~h~ 

the short- and long-term health risks of dazzling performance of the Army 

the smoke and other emissions. In Corps, which essentially jump-started 

March 1991, an interagency team 

era1 sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and entists working in Saudi Arabia and lections of the Office of Historyt U.S. 

elsewhere in the Middle East. They Kuwait and those responsible for sewage Army Co'~s of Engineers, 7701 Teleattempted to ascertain the presence of treatment and pollution control. Upon graph Road* A'exandria3 Virginia 

potentially harmful air pollutants, spe- his return, Reilly reported that the envi- 223 15-3865. 

the infrastructure of a county." The miliAll photographs by Jonas N. Jordan, 

, U.S. ofEngineers, Savannah 

District. 

Janet A. McDnnnell, chief historian 

at the Defense Logistics Agency, previously served as senior historian with the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. She 

holds a Ph.D from Marquette University. 

cifically carbon monoxide, sulfur diox- : ronnlental damage was not as great as 

ide. and hydrogen sulfide gases and predicted. He cited the interagency 

particulates-tiny particles that lodge team's finding that the levels of sulfur 

in the lungs. The team found each of and heavy metals in the air were not 

these gases but not in concentrations abnormally high. Environmental groups, 

that exceeded current standards. The 

Environmental Protection Agency subsequently concluded that no imminent 

however, questioned those findings. 

On 2 June, Kuwait resumed oil production in an offshore field, averaging 

health risk existed. I 130,000 barrels a day. Later that month, 
Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxwx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

Rflaneuv~r Support Center (fiflAP!SCEF\n) 

MANSCEN Update. New facility construction is 

more than 80 percent complete, and some new 

buildings and ranges have been turned over to the 

Fort Leonard Wood installation. The Chemical Defense 

Training Facility will undergo surety training and inspections during the 2nd quarter of FY99. 

Schoolhouse organizations are reorganizing to the 

MANSCEN structure, with adjustments to office space 

scheduled for completion by May 1999. Most Engineer 

School personnel will keep their current telephone 

numbers after they move. Job vacancy lists have been 

published by Fort Leonard Wood's Civilian Personnel 

Advisory Center (CPAC), and the selection of personnel to vacancies is ongoing. The Garrison Command 

Reception Plan is initiating sponsorship and reception 

activities. POC is Mark Premont, -6134. 

Engineer Personnel Proponency Office (EPPO) 

DA Pam 600-3. The Chief of Staff, Army, approved 

the new DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer 

Development and Career Management, on 4 August 

1998. It is scheduled for publication on the U.S. 

Army Publication and Printing Agency (USAPPA) 

homepage (http:Nwww-usappc.hoffman.army.mil) in 

November. Distribution of paper copies is scheduled for 

December. 

The Engineer Chapter in DA Pam 600-3 experienced one significant change during the staffing 

and approval process. Based on a decision by the 

Combined Arms Center (CAC) commander, the 

Engineer Training Support Battalion's Executive Officer 

(XO) and Operations Officer (S3) positions are no 

longer considered branch-qualifying for engineer 

majors. POC is MAJ Dave Hartley, -4087. 

Department of Training and Doctrine 

Dovelor~ment (DOTD) 

Field Manual Update. FM 5-1 16, Engineer 

Operations: Echelons Above Corps, and FM 5-415, 

Fire-Fighting Operations, are at the Army Training 

Support Center awaiting printing. FM 5-1 16 is a revision 

of the 1989 edition, and FM 5-415 is a new publication. 

These manuals are posted to the Engineer School's 

Publications Page at: http://www.wood.army.mil/PUBS/ 

pubs.htm. 

The following manuals are scheduled for publication 

and release to the field within the next 180 days: 

FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data 

FM 5-436, Paving and Surfacing Operations 

FM 5-434, Earthmoving Operations 

FM 5-472, Materials Testing 

FM 90-1 3-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations 

FM 20-3, Camouflage 

POC is Sandra Gibson, -41 00. 

Directorate of Combat Developments (DSD) 

Tool Kit Upgrades. Prototypes for the revised 

Masonry-Concrete Tool Kit (LIN W44923), Electrician 

Set #1 Tool Kit (LIN W36977), Pipefitter's 118" to 2" Pipe 

Tool Kit (LIN W49033), and Pipefitter's 2-112" to 4 Pipe 

Tool Kit (LIN W48622) were reviewed by subject matter 

experts at Fort Leonard Wood in October. The tool kits 

were showcased at the Soldier Review at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, and are available for viewing at intraservice 

school sites at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, and 

Gulfport, Mississippi. These upgrades follow the upgrade of the carpenter tool set. The new kits will 

provide soldiers in the General Engineering Career 

Management Field with industry-standard tools and 

high-technology devices comparable to those used in 

the commercial construction industry. Although the 

focus remains on construction in a theater of operations, these sets will enable soldiers to complete 

new construction projects and perform maintenance on 

existing structures across the spectrum of conflict. POC 

is Alan Schlie, -61 91. 

60 Engineer November 1998 
r 

I 

I 

I 

1 I 

I @$ Lead the Way 

- ;, I 

- - 

By Commarid Sergeant Major Robert M. Dils 

U.S. Amzy Engineer School 

Tell 'It Like It IS 3. Some NCOs forget the importance ot rnllitary school~ng. We 

M know that the NCOES schools are a must for promotion. uch has been wrirten about the Depslvnent Of the Remember that the Battle Staff course, the Fist Sergeants' course, Army's enlisted centralized promotion selection board and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute are process and how soldiers can successfukly compete. important for NCOs who serve as an operations or intelligence While the process is familiar to all of us, after-action reports sergeant, a first sergeant, or in an equal opportunity position The written by the ArmorIEngineer Panel reveal some disturbing Airborne, Master Parachutist, Air Assault, Master Fitness, and trends. A review of these trends follows. Sapper Leader Courses are important for those serving in a unit 1. Many noncomm~\~~oned officcrs (NCOs) do not 5pend and position requiring that knowledge. enotrph time In key leadenhip pu\itlons - specifically as squad 

leaders for promotion to sergeant first class, as platoon sergeants 4. Cibiltan education also is irnpor-tant. It improves NCOs' 

for promotion to master sergeant, or as first sergeants for written and oral communications skills and develops their 

promotion to sergeant major and appointment to command intellect. Ln today's Army it is not acceptable for an NCO to stop 

sergeant major. No other positions can substitute for these key and at a general education development or high-school diploma. 

challenging leadership experiences. It is critical that NCOs serve NCOs must progress further to successfully compete with their 

in these positions for a minimum of 18 months, but more time is peers. All NCOs have time during their careers to acquire eivilian training. Be a self-starter! Your post education center will better, and it is best to serve in several different squads, platoons, 

or companies. Nothing takes the place of sufficient leadership help you select aprogram that meets your needs. 

experience. ~l~~, NCO~ should not spend too much time in tables 5. Sc'nie NCOy have photo\ In thar Dh f lc\ that are rnorc 

of distribution and allowances (TDA) positions and should aMid than 5 years old. Army Regulation 640-30 states that a new 

back-to-back TDA assignments. A proper balance of TDA and photo is required every years Or when the photo longer 

tables of organization and equipment experience is best, represents your appearance. The regulation allows certain memEvery N~~ should also perfom well in one of he following bers of the chain of command to order a soldier to get a new DA 

positions: drill sergeant, recruiting, Active c~~~~~~~~~~~~~ photo, so it is a chain-of-command issue. It is a good idea to get 

Component (ACIRC) duty, equal opportunity duty, Inspector a new photo every time you are promoted. hat practice sends a 

General duty, Reserve mcer Training coIps du~, or as an signal to board members that you care about your records and 

observer/controller at a combat training center. career. Take a buddy along when you are photographed to ensure 

2. Many engineer Nonconlmlrsloned Officer Efficiency that your fits properly and looks good and that 

Reports (NCOERc) do not properly qtate the rateeq' performance awards and decorations are placed correctly. 

and potential. "Excellent" blocks must be fully substantiated with 6. KO5 fail to tI>orouEfii?' revletv thclr records and 

well-written bullet comments, Raters and senior raters must do a DA microfiche before the promotion board meet\. NCOs must 

better job of quantifying and qualifying perfomance and review the microfiche to ensure that all d~cuments on it are theirs 

potential of the NCO~ they evaluate and avoid personal and that it includes all documents favorable to them. All of your 

For example, instead of "Best squad leader I have ever sen" NCOERs, college transcripts, orders for awards, letters and 

write qest squad leader in my platoon.y7 Instead ofG~d from the certificates of appreciation, and favorable documents allowed by 

frontM write -~~~~~~~~d the squad's average p~ score by 25 the regulation should be on the microfiche. Thoroughly check 

percent.s' ~~~~~~d of =fiysically fit" state uscored 275 on the your DA Forms 2A and 2-1 for accuracy and neatness. Ensure 

Army Physical Fitness Test." State facts about the rate's ability that these forms are complete and thaf they You 

to train his soldiers, maintain his equipment, care for his correctly. The degree of interest you show in your record will 

soldiers. Senior raters must be specific about the NCO's potential. Pay big dividends at promotion time. 

For example, write "Must select for promotion to master ser- Leaders at all levels should ensure that all their subordinates 

geant" or "Promote ahead of peers." who compete for promotion have reviewed their records and that 

Raters must evaluate subordinates thoroughly and fairly. their records and photos are up to date. It is the right thing to do. 

Everyone is good, but a few are "best." If the senior rater does Additional information on promotions is found in the Engineer 

not identify the best squad leader in his platoon or the best first Center Command Sergeants Major home page (http://www.- 

sergeant in his battalion, someone else will make that decision wood.army.milIECCSM/index.htm) or the Engineer Personnel 

based on what they think was intended in the NCOER. Be Proponent Office home page (http://www.wood,my.~l/EPPO/ 

specific-write "Best squad leader in my platoon" or "Best first eppo-hp.htm). The proponent guidance document that is sent to 

sergeant in my battalion." Tell it like it is. Senior raters must the promotion board's Armofingineer Panel is posted on the 

inform Army leaders about the truly great NCOs. There is room home page along with the review and analysis memorandum, 

to promote only the best so don't allow the promotion board to which is the board's AAR. Use this information to help you and 

second-guess you. They may not make the right decision. your subordinates at promotion time. I wish you good luck. 

November 1998 Engineer 61 
RESPECT a 

, . . - 

' . # ,. . . .: ~&~rfiljffgof~r.wk&&tbmadkd~h 

ConhKiw ANALECTS - 6th Cenq B.C. . I, . -- . . 

I - 

0, .. 

- 

18th Engineer Brigade Cw.trucdon, OptmUSon Pmvide Comfort 

. . I. . .. F~flowlng 0pedon Desert Storm, soldiers from the 18th Engineer , . b. -. 

Brigade were callled.upon to provide h~~ assistace to the ~urdisli' 

people of northern Iraq In Operapton Provide Comfort. An ~~t con-', - - 

sidemou for constructing faWe was that they be appropriate to the. : 

I Kurdish Ltfeayle. Cultural and religious considemions were more important ,# , ' 

than any "engineering &dency." This was me for all construction & for ' . ' 

sanitary fadties. The engineers of the 18th knew as 0th- before them tha2:. i- ' , respect for the culture of the people was often the key ingredient to succd, . .. 

1 I , '-' lo nnflon bddlng, cMc action, or h~~ did. Atmost 30 yepn; - - , 

before Operation Provide Comfort, an mgheer in Southeast Ash noted .?, ' 

I -'. 

. : - the key to success fa foreign &stance was to establish bads of trost and; : - , . respect Ween the engineers and those they sought to help. . ,- .-L 1. . -.. . _'> 

. . I ' . . . - . * 2. -1 . -