Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Kristopher G. Richter

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Marcellus M. Lebbin

Trevor Q. Gasper

Hilary R. Johnson

May Oberfell Lorber

Mishawaka, Indiana

I N THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kristopher G. Richter,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Laurenz Place, LLC,

Appellee-Defendant.

September 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A04-1610-SC-2526

Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Paul E. Singleton, 

Magistrate.

Trial Court Cause No.

71D02-1606-SC-5542

Shepard, Senior Judge

[1] Appellant Kristopher G. Richter appeals the trial court’s judgment against him 

in his small claims action against his landlord, Laurenz Place, LLC. 

Concluding that Richter was a tenant under the landlord-tenant statutes, we 

reverse and remand with instructions to consider the costs he bore as a result of 
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his landlord’s failure to afford him the statutory protections to which he was 

entitled under Indiana law.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 28, 2012, Kaylie Sexton entered into a lease agreement for an 

apartment with Park Jefferson Realty, LLC, the predecessor of Laurenz Place, 

LLC. On April 30, 2013, a second lease was executed with Park Jefferson. 

This lease was signed and initialed by both Kaylie Sexton and Kristopher 

Richter.

[3] On January 1, 2016, the leasehold having expired, Sexton and Richter moved 

out. Thereafter, Laurenz Place conducted a routine inspection of the apartment 

to assess damages. Following the inspection, it sent an itemized bill for 

damages to Sexton, but not to Richter. Richter attempted to obtain an 

itemization of the damages, but Laurenz Place would not release the 

information to him. Unable to obtain a copy of the itemized charges, Richter 

hired counsel to do so. 

[4] After receiving the notice of damages from Laurenz Place, Sexton sued Richter. 

She won a judgment against him for a portion of the amount. Sexton’s lawsuit

prompted Richter to bring the current action against Laurenz Place, in which he 

(1) claimed that he was a tenant and therefore should have received notice of 

the alleged damages, (2) disputed some of the damages, and (3) asserted he was 

wrongly denied access to the apartment in December 2015. He requested 
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money damages, filing fee, attorney fees, and transcript fees. After a bench 

trial, the court entered judgment against Richter.

Issue

[5] Richter enumerates six issues for our review. We consolidate and restate the 

dispositive issue as: whether the trial court erred by determining Richter was 

not a “tenant” within the meaning of the landlord-tenant provision of the 

Indiana Code.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Implicit in the small claims court’s judgment, and the crux of this case, is the 

determination that Richter was not a tenant of Laurenz Place. Small claims 

court judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules 

and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we 

review the facts determined in a bench trial under the clearly erroneous 

standard of review, with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to 

assess witness credibility. Hamilton v. Schaefer Lake Lot Owners Ass’n, Inc., 59 

N.E.3d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This deferential standard of review is 

particularly important in small claims actions where trials are informal and 

where the sole objective is to dispense speedy justice between the parties 

according to the rules of substantive law. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196 

(Ind. 2008); Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A).
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[7] For the purposes of landlord-tenant relations, Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10 

(2002) defines the term “tenant” as “an individual who occupies a rental unit: 

(1) for residential purposes; (2) with the landlord’s consent; and (3) for 

consideration that is agreed upon by both parties.” 

[8] The evidence at trial showed that a one-year lease, executed on April 28, 2012, 

was signed and initialed only by Sexton. The first page of the lease designates

Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized occupant. Ex. 1, p. 1. On 

the last page of the lease, Sexton signed as “Resident.” Id. at 3. On the 

Clubhouse Addendum to the lease, Sexton signed as “Leaseholder” and was 

noted as having been issued one club membership card. Id. at 4. 

[9] A subsequent lease was executed on April 30, 2013, with the word “Renewal” 

handwritten at the top of the first page. Id. at 9. Although the first page of this 

lease also identifies Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized 

occupant, each page of the lease was initialed by both Sexton and Richter, and 

both of them signed the last page of the lease under the “Resident” column. Id.

at 9-11. In addition, both Sexton and Richter signed the Clubhouse Addendum 

to the 2013 lease as “Leaseholder” and both received club membership cards. 

Id. at 12.

[10] In as much as Laurenz Place provided the contract for Richter to sign and 

initial, the lease terms and their meaning for purposes of resolving later disputes 

are strictly construed against the party who drafted and furnished the 

agreement. Vertucci v. NHP Mgmt. Co., 701 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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[11] Other evidence at trial reflected on whether Richter was a “tenant” under 

section 32-31-3-10.

[12] Richter testified that the previous management company with whom he signed 

the lease explained to him that he was indeed a leaseholder. He further testified 

that he paid rent, and he presented evidence of other payments to the landlord. 

For instance, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 is a receipt from Laurenz Place with his name 

typewritten in both the “Bill To” and “Customer Name” lines. The receipt 

notes that on July 31, 2015, and August 26, 2015, Richter paid door 

replacement charges for the apartment.

[13] To be a “tenant” under the pertinent section of the Code, Richter must have 

occupied the premises “for residential purposes.” On that, there is no dispute. 

Second, he must have occupied with the landlord’s consent. It is plain that he 

did. Third, there must have been consideration for this occupancy agreed upon 

by both parties. Construing the leases between the parties strictly against 

Laurenz Place and doing so in the context of the other evidence at trial, it is 

apparent that there was an agreement on monthly rent and the like. 

Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous to determine that Richter was not a 

“tenant” as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10. He was.

[14] The tenant rights Richter held as a tenant are set forth in Indiana Code sections

32-31-3-12 and -14 (2002) and 32-31-5-6 (2007). Section 32-31-3-12 requires 

that, upon termination of a lease, the landlord must return to the tenant(s) the 

security deposit less any amount applied to the payment of accrued rent, 
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damages, and unpaid utility charges. It further requires that any damages be 

specifically itemized in a written notice as mandated by section 14. If the 

landlord fails to comply with these requirements, the tenant(s) may recover all 

of the security deposit and a reasonable attorney fee. Section 32-31-3-14 

requires that, within forty-five days after termination of occupancy, a landlord 

must mail to the tenant(s) an itemized list of damages claimed.

[15] In addition, Indiana Code section 32-31-5-6 prohibits a landlord from 

interfering with a tenant’s access to or possession of the tenant’s apartment.

[16] Relying on its contention that Richter was merely an occupant and not a 

tenant, Laurenz Place does not dispute that it did not send him an itemized list 

of damages and that it denied him access to the apartment. See Appellee’s Br. 

p. 7, Tr. pp. 32-33, Ex. 3, 9; Appellee’s Br. pp. 6, 15, Tr. pp. 25-26. However, 

we conclude today that Richter was a tenant who should have been afforded all 

of the corresponding rights.1

 

1

In his brief to this Court, Richter also asserts a claim of negligence against Laurenz Place and alleges error 

with the trial court’s pre-trial denial of his motion to consolidate. The negligence claim was not included in 

Richter’s Notice of Claim, and neither of these claims were presented at trial; they are thus waived. See 

Commitment of T.S. v. Logansport State Hosp., 959 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating long-held rule that 

party may not present argument or issue to appellate court that was not raised in trial court), trans. denied.
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Conclusion

[17] For the reasons stated, we conclude that under this lease Richter was a tenant, 

as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10, yet he was not 

afforded the corresponding statutory rights.

[18] Reversed and remanded with instructions to consider the costs experienced by 

Richter as a result of Laurenz Place’s failure to afford him the rights to which 

he was entitled as a tenant, enter judgment against Laurenz Place for that 

amount, and determine the amount of attorney fees this failure cost Richter.

Vaidik, C.J., and May, J., concur.