Personal Viewpoint 

JRTC: LIGHT ENGINEER CHALLENGE 


By CPT Richard Kuhu 

Tlic Armv has long undcrstoc~d 

the i~ccd lor combined arms training centers which thoroughly stres 

the capahilitics 01 those units participaling. The Niltional Training 

C:cntcr (NTC) at Ft. Irwin. CaliSiorniit w;tr dcvcloped I provide a 

realistic training cnvironmcnt where 

hcavy rncch;ini/od forccs hatllc 

rcalistic Sovicl-type units. 

Rcccntly, thc Armcd Forces 

npcncd thc .loin1 Rcsdincss Training C'cntcr (.lRTC) at Ft. Chaffee, 

Ark;rns;rs. Ils oli,jcclivc is nnt just to 

p r o rc;tlistic training cxpcricncc for Army unils, but also in 

provide 21 rclitic I and cilmI,incd ;rrms ;inJ wrviccs enviri~mcnt 

Sor light io~ccs in ;icc<,rdancc with 

AirLand l?atllc doctrine. 

nRMY 

Liglit Sorccs arc specially designctl lo fig111 in all lypcs of environmcnts, climates, and conditions. such as mountains, jungles, 

and citics. Also, they are organized 

to operate t~t~d fight in lhc cntirc 

spectrum of conflict -lroni low lo 

mid lo high intensity cnviromcnts. 

The comlxit cnginccr force which 

supports light operations must also 

be capable (11' fishting side hy sidc 

with his maneuver counterpart in 

thcsc lcthal arcn;is. 

Light task orccs thsl dcploy i'or a 

two-wcck rotatinn at thc JRTC have 

a typical trainins package (Scc 

.IRTC Training Systcm char[). 

Usually, one light combat cliginccr 

conip;iny is task organized into the 

task force. Pi~rlicipating in the first 

JRTC TRAINING SYSTEM 

TYPICAL TRAINING PACKAGE 

rntation at the .lRTC: it1 ~hcl't~ll 01' 

1087 was an airborne inrantry t;~~k 

force (Sec Task Force Organi/;ttion 

cliart on page 13), Iirom tllc 

82nd Airborne Division, Ft. I3r;r~. 

North Carolina. 

The traditic~nal combat enginccr 

funclional areas or missic~nscornrnon to all comhat cnginccrsmobility, counlcrmohility, surviv-

:thilily, sustainmcnl engineering, and 

topography -have not changed. The 

operational Sundamentals I these 

functional areas also ha\'c 1101 

changed. Then. what actually is the 

big dil'rcrcncc hctwccn how incchtinired engineer i)rces end light cngineer forces support the ma~icuvcr 

AIR FORCE 

e.. eee 
 1 I t FLfGHT 0

RESCUE DET 

DEFENSE 

0 
 RECCE F4
w 


July 1988 Volume 18 PB 5-88-1 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER SCHOOL FEATURES 

6 E-Force- An Update 

by MG Richard S. Kem, LTC J. Richard Capka, and 

COMMANDANT MAJ Houng Y.Soo 

MG Daniel R. Schroeder 14 Myths From the NTC 

I by LTC Robert J. GreenwalC Jr. 

16 How To Pack a Track 

MANAGING EDITOR by CPT Frank S. Weston, Jr. and CPT John L. Saufley 

Katherine Moylan 20 MICLIC-Training for Combat Engineers 

DESIGNERS by MAJ Kevin W Pippard RAE 

Beatrice McDonald 22 Future Communications in the AirLand Battle 

Jennifer C. Bolyard by MAJ Mark C. McAvoy 

25 Winning Engineers at the Training Center 

by LTC Robert J. Greenwalt, Jr. 

28 The Joint Readiness Training Center 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: by CPT David E. Jurgens 

34 Combat Engineer Sapper Squad Qualification Course 

CARL E. VUONO by CPT John Lock 

General, United States Army 36 The Basics For Good Combat Engineer Multiplication 

Chief of Staff by MAJ Roger J. Sommerville 

42 Communication in a Combat Engineer Battalion Official: bv LT Bernard J. Jansen 

R. L. DILWORTH 

Brigadier General, United States Army 

The Adjutant General 

DEPARTMENTS About the cover 

At a Joint Readiness Training Inside Front Cover: Personal Viewpoint 

Center exercise, aircrews offload a 2 Clear the Way 39 Engineer Solution 

dismantled helicopter from the mas- 3 Bridge the Gap 44 Lessons Learned 

sive C-5. The Air Force inclusion in 4 Engineer Update 48 Past in Review 

light forces training has greatly en- 32 Engineer Problem 

hanced the realism of tactical exercises for Army troops. 

ENGINEEK (ISSN 00.16-1HXlllli is prepared qozirlerly by the U. S. shuuld he sent to ENGINEER, st the preccdinp address. Telephone: 

Ammy Kngineer Schnnl. ATTN:A'I'LA~TDP. Stlip 2!11D. Fort Relvuir. 17W1i i<fA2nl? AV ?iA'2ilY? ,,.,-, ... .,.,, .,,, "-, 


VA Y'illlili. This puhiiraiirrn presents proirssionai ini~rmation, ildt,rs PEHSONAI. SURSCRIPTIONS are available by contnctin~ tire 


nnt necrssarilyrefleet ~IIC oifirii~lArmy position. ilnd itdoes not change Superintendent of 1)ocuments. ATTN: Chief, >Tail List Ijrmch. Stop 


or supers~d~ any informi~lionpl.esented in otlx.~.~fficial Army p~I~li?~%- SSOM. Wnahln~ton. D.C. 20405. Address chanera rur ~rrsonal sub^


li,lns. L!nlessoth~rwiscstoted, when~vrrtllc n,sacuiinegendcr is used. scriptions shouid also he sent to the Suprnntrndent uk L)ocuments. 

Second Class yostage is poid at Fort Relvoir. VA, ilnd additional mail1 O\ I t S'I .- 11 18 I .y\(t,:hli+ 11 ~',.r I >>.I\ b. r+pnr...I 1. .- ing offlcrs. 

:. .. 1 t I I . , I 1.. :,,,,,. 1 

OCI 11'1 .,II.I,.l,,c,r.~n,~rr,::~. POSTMASTER: Send address change to f,'.hi(;INGER, ATZA-TI)F. \I.I)IS~I~IIII'TIO\~.~.~~~~~.~~. ,. -~~. St<ii>BID. For1 Belvnir. VA 220(j(I-$%YI 

CORRESI'ONDENCE. letters to the editor, mnnuarripts. phuto~ 

gra~~t~a.o~iici~1 

~~~~ ~~ ~ 

unit requests to recei\.eeopies, and unit addresschanges 
by MG William Henry Reno 

Outgoing Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

As i leave Ft. Belvoir and the Engineer School. I am 

reminded of the contribution the Corps of Engineers 

has made to our Army and our great nation. 

History records the great contributions of the Corps 

of Engineers in building our country. Engineers built its 

early roads and its ports, tamed its mighty rivers, built 

the world's best hydropower system, established inland water transporation systems, and helped open 

the West through survey and contruction. 

It was the Corps which built the mobilization infrastructure during our major wars. The Corps has also 

supported fighting soldiers beginning with construction of fortifications at Bunker Hill, through leading the 

assault at Normandy, to support in Vietnam. It is the 

engineer who is committed and leading our efforts in 

Latin America today in nation building. in short, ours is 

a branch that both builds the enduring infrastructure of 

our nation and others, and fights alongside the combat soldier of our sister maneuver arms. 

Ours is an historic branch, and the many outstanding officers and soldiers, who have passed through the 

doors of our home at Ft. Belvoir, have further distinguished its heritage. 

In June 1778, George Washington directed that 

there be a School of Engineering. However, the Army 

Engineering School as we know it today was established 88 years later, in October 1866, at Willets Point, 

New York (now Ft. Tonen), by BG Andrew A. 

Humphreys, Chief of Engineers. He did so without 

seeking War Department recognition and it was not 

until 1885 that the Department recognized the School. 

September 1901 saw the Engineer School of Application move from Willets Point to Washington Barracks (now Ft. McNair). it was not until March 1915 

that engineers began training at Camp Belvoir (now Ft. 

Belvoir) on the 1500 acres purchased in 1901. 

With the advent of World War I, the first Engineer Officers Training Camp was established at Camp Belvoir, 

in June 1917. in December 1918, the Engineer School 

opened at Camp A. A. Humphreys, the name Belvoir 

having given way to honor the Chief of Engineers who 

pioneered our school. 

It is now fining that engineer training be centralized 

at Ft. Leonard Wood. Innumerable economic and training advantages will be gained there and the school will 

reside in the heartland of America, in a state that 

served as the Gateway to the West. It is there that our 

doctrine will mature; where our structure, particularly EForce, will be refined. It is there that our Army's finest 

soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers will 

be trained. The training will be characterized by field 

experiences with tough, realistic training to standards. 

Ft. Leonard Wood offers the Corps of Engineers' combat, construction, and topographic capabilities-a 

renaissance of creativity limited only by the imagination of our talented military and civilian leaders. Ft. 

Leonard Wood will become our home and one from 

which we will derive great pride. 

A very special soldier has been selected to lead us 

there. During the 122 years of our School's history, 

there have been 46 commandants. Six sewed at Willet's Point; six served at Ft. McNair; and 34 have 

sewed at what is now Ft. Belvoir. Now there is a 47th: 

A distinguished field soldier and outstanding engineer, 

MG Dan Schroeder. it is he who will move the school 

to its new home in Missouri's beautiful Ozarks. 

I wish him, the Engineer School, and engineers 

throughout the Army thevery best 
by MG Daniel R. Schroeder 

Incoming Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

It is with a deep sense of honor and privilege that I 

assume my duties as the 47th Commandant of the 

U.S. Army Engineer School. One cannot help being 

mindful of the more than 200-year heritage of this fine 

institution. I accept this responsibility with an awareness of my obligations and look forward eagerly to 

working with the entire engineer community as 

together we write the next chapter of the Engineer 

School's history. 

This is an exciting time. The Engineer School is now 

at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. This brings together 

two great traditions of excellence in both the Engineer 

School and the Army Training Center at Fort Leonard 

Wood. The civilian and contract employees and soldiers of Fort Leonard Wood have a well-earned reputation for providing excellent service, and I know they 

look forward to presewing those high standards as we 

complete this transition. Likewise, the staff, faculty and 

support personnel of the Engineer Schooi have built 

an exceptional program that is a model of excellence 

for the other service schools to emulate. The merger 

of these two fine institutions provides a training synergy that will benefit our soldiers and units. 

The environment that has been established at Fort 

Leonard Wood over the past 40 years is especially well 

suited to the integrated training of our combat engineer officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. This unique opportunity will assure that we 

provide technically skilled, tactically competent engineers to our Army. Our objective is to train all engineer soldiers to high standards and to ensure that 

they are hardened to the rigors of the battlefield. 

As the directorates complete the move to Fort 

Leonard Wood, they face a challenge to maintain their 

workload and look after their people. The initiatives of 

developing sound engineer doctrine in harmony with 

doctrine of other branches of the Army will persist; 

combat developments will continue to shape the engineer force with the structure and equipment needed 

to defend our nation. In short, our task will continue to 

be to develop the doctrinally sound weil-equipped engineer force that our nation will need as we enter the 

21st century. 

My focus is consistent with that of my predecessor, 

MG Bill Reno: Warfighting and leader development. it 

is indeed an exciting time to be a soldier in the Corps 

of Engineers. in that our heritage is founded on ingenuity and creativity, I am most confident that we will 

overcome the challenges we face in the coming years. 

ESSAYONS! 
late 

-SCHOOL NEWS- 


IN HONOR OF 


GEN. BRUCE C. CLARKE, USA (RET.) 


1901-1988 


General Bruce Cooper Clarke gave a lifetime of 

service to the U.S. Army and Corps of Engineers. 

His many years as an engineer officer led to a long 

association with the Engineer School, where he 

spent countless hours in the library telling stories 

and offering advice to eager young officers. He will 

be deeply missed, but his ideas on leadership will 

live on through his writings, published in various 

Army publications, many after his retirement. 

Two of his booklets, "Reflections: General Bruce 

C. Clarke's Thoughts on Creating Outstanding Soldiers and Outstanding Units" and "Soldier Management and Morale." are available from the Commandant. U.S. Army Engineer School, Leadership 

Branch, ATTN: ATZA-TC-C, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060- 

5341. The P.O.C. is CPT Donald D. Jacobovitz at 

(703) 664-4991 or AV 354-4991. 

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY 


ENGINEERING (DME) 


Coordinating Draft FM 5-330 Limited quantities of 

the FM 5-330 coordinating draft are due to be sent 

to the field for comments in fourth quarter of FY 88. 

All receiving units are requested to review it 

thoroughly and provide comments as soon as possible. Point of contact for this manual is MAJ Rivenburgh, (703) 664-2889 or AV 354-2889. 

DEFENSE MAPPING SCHOOL (DMS) 

Course Offered The Defense Mapping School, Fort 

Beivoir, VA, offers a one-week course entitled, "lntroduction to Multispectral Imagery." The course introduces students to the theory and application of 

remote sensing technology. It covers current operational systems (primarily civilian satellites), Imagery 

availability, computer-assisted image analysis, manual image analysis and current military applications. 

Students use both hard copy imagery and computer 

software to perform analysis and to generate 

topographic products. While the course is aimed at 

the topographic community, engineers benefit as 

well. Classes are limited to 12 students; quotas are 

available through normal training channels. For 

more information, contact CPT Tom Milo or CPT 

Jon Clark. (703) 664-297813972 or AV 354.297813972. 

RESERVE COMPONENT ADVISORY 


STAFF (RCAS) 


New Staff Member Mrs. Mary Sinclair has been 

transferred to the Rese~e Component Advisors Office from the Nonresident Training Branch, DOTD. 

Questions regarding United States Army Reserve 

Forces School Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

completions should be directed to her. She can be 

contacted by telephone at the following numbers: 

Commercial-(703) 664-238211679 

Autovon-354.238211679 

Toll free-(800) 336-3095, extension 238211679. 

Correspondence should be addressed to: 

Commandant 

U.S. Army Engineer School 


ATTN: ATZA-RCS. Stop 245 


Building 270. Engineer School Library 


Fort Belvoir. VA 22060-5245 


Pre-command Courses Engineer Reserve Component officers are reminded that Pre-command 

Courses (PCC) are offered to selectees for command of battalions or brigades on a periodic basis. 

This class is 2 weeks (not 2 weeks, and 2 days as 

listed on the ATRRS). Obtain additional information 

through the chain of command or from CPT Donald 

D. Jacobovitz at (703) 664-4991 or AV 354-4991. 

DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS 

(DCA) 

Manuals Revised The FM 5-100 coordinating draft 

goes to field units July 1988. Tactics. Training, and 

Doctrine Division (TTDD) is awaiting comments on 

FC 90-13-1. Com6ined Arms Counterobstacle Operations: The In-Stride Breach; and F,C 5-71-2. Engineers in the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Task 

Force, as both of these manuals are being rewritten. 

FC 90-13. Counterobstacle and River Crossing 

Operations, is being rewritten to become FM 90-13. 

and will include only river crossing operations, much 
late 


like the old FM 90-13. Comments are welcome on 

river crossing operations as well. 

TDD is also writing a new manual on Engineer 

support to close-combat light forces followed by a 

new engineer support to close-combat heavy forces. We need comments from units with actual training experience on MlCLlC employment for ongoing 

doctrine development. 

Course Revisions We have implemented two new 

Pols for the EOAC and EOBC. Both Pols have 

more hands-on and practical exercise-type instruction aimed at making our officers better able to support the combined arms team. Our lessons have 

been modified to teach the new doctrinal concepts 

described in the new FM 5-100, Engineer Combat 

Operations. A one-week refresher course is now 

being given to engineers at the beginning of 

CGSOC to update everyone on new doctrine. PCC 

and the Warrant Officer Advanced Course have 

moved to Fort Leonard Wood. 

ENGINEER SCHOOL TRANSITION 


OFFICE (ESTO) 


New Building Ahead of Schedule The Engineer 

School move to Fort Leonard Wood is on schedule. 

Construction of the new Headquarters Building and 

Academic Facility are ahead of schedule and should 

be ready by early fall 1989. Construction of the 

library and four visiting officers quarters (VOQs) 

started with a ground breaking ceremony April 9, 

1988 and should be completed by spring 1990. 

All NCO courses have completely moved, and are 

now a part of the NCO Academy at Fort Leonard 

Wood. DCD. EPPO, and the foreign liaison officers. 

as well as select positions from DOTD and ESS, are 

moving this summer. The move will be completed 

when EOAC and EOBC begin at Fort Leonard Wood 

in January and February 1990, respectively. 

For questions, contact the Engineer School Transition Office, (703) 664-6292 or AV 354.629216293 

-CAREER NOTESEnlisted Engineer Branch 

Promotions have a dramatic impact on soldier 

retention in the Army. In FY 87, the Army was successful in increasing NCO strength by 3,400 to approximately 283,000. The original goal of the FY 88 

promotion program was to increase the NCO inventory to 286,000 which would have met approximately 99 percent of demand. However, the amended FY 

88 budget required a reduction in NCO strength to 

277,000 by the end of September 1988. This reduction translates into a fill of approximately 96 percent 

of NCO authorizations across the Army. In the future, force structure cuts will reduce NCO authorizations to around 283-284,000 and growth in promotions in FY 89 will bring NCO strength back to 

around 279.000. The current FY 90-94 program 

(POM 90-94) includes resources to increase NCO 

strength to about 284.000 by the end of FY 92. 

The challenge to commanders and supervisors in 

FY 88 is to assist and counsel soldiers on the 

promotion issue, and that promotions are projected 

to increase in FY 89 for MOS where there are requirements. Obviously, soldiers wishing to be 

promoted to a grade cell that is excess will continue 

to wait until the excess is dissipated before being 

promoted 

A recent change in AR 601-280. Total Army Retention Program, eliminates waivers for soldiers to exceed a reenlistment eligibility point. Soldiers in promotion list status will be considered for reenlistment 

under the ineligiblity point for the grade to which 

they will be promoted. This change eliminates overseas assignment eligibility of soldiers who cannot extend or reenlist to meet the time-in-service remaining requirement for the assignment. 

In general, the enlisted engineer inventory is in 

relatively good shape given ttie tremendous turbulence that has occured over the past two years. 

The turbulence has been caused by planned changes in force structure (conversion to L-series 

MTO&Es), unforeseen changes such as the earlyout program in FY 87/88, and the Army end-strength 

reduction in FY 88. The planned change in MOS inventories and structure will be completed by early 

FY 89, and return to a more normal rate of progression for most MOSS should occur. 
by M(i Richard 5. Kern, 

LTC: .I. Richard C:apka 

and MAJ Houng Y. Soo 

(The following article is reprinted, with introditctory update, 

from the Spring 1086 cdition of EN-

(ilNEER.) 

E-FORCE ~ortlirtrie.~to receive 

z1,nrlg rltarteul'er arrd errgirzeer srly170ri. Ui~~eltt plarr,~ur? for lire EFORCE cottce/>r lo be ~~alidaredbv 

tire Ar7)!\. 11.sittg tile 7111 Irrfarttr~~ 

Di~~isiort aldu~ior r~rodcl. EFORCE will he validated 011 tire 

qolrrrd irr CONUS a1 rite rusk force 

utzd brigatlc le~,elarrd bz USAREUR 

a1 [Ire di~,isiorrarrd covs levelr. 

Ctorerlr plarrs call for Ute corti2ersiorr of orte E-FORCE batroliorr irl 

CONUS arrd orre divisiort erzgirzeer 

(rhrce E-FORCE batraliorrs pltu a 

HHC) irr USAREUR irz 1989. ntese 

r~rtilsWINlruirt for a period of 6 to 12 

rltorrlhs arzd therr be rested to deter17rirre rhe irzcreuse br war figlzlirzg 

capahilin' offered b~' E-FORCE. 

Ur~orrcotlzr~leriortor a strccessfiil lest. 

lire Ar7iry WIN~la11E-FORCE cort~'er-

.riort, heh.i,ritirz~br 1991 at lire earliest, 

with USAREUR rlrzirs. 

AirLand Battle doctrine 

stresses combined arms 

opcrations over largc areas. Its four tcnets-agility, flexibility, depth and synchronizationan update 

accentuate the role of the combat 

enginecr on the modern battlcfield. 

If demands increased tempo and 

greater distances from all functional 

engineer missions -nrobili@, cozrrrter-

~ttohili, sr~nd~~abiii~, stfstairrrttertt 

erginccrirtg and ropo~al>lty.In other 

words, engineers must accomplish 

the same tasks over a larger area in 

significantly less time. 

This comcs at a time when combat engineers are at a watershed. 

The Army has embraced a new warfigI1t doctrine that stresses maneuverability and is equipping with 

more mobile and lethal fighting systems. Yet, the combat engineerthe man who converts mobility to 

maneuverability-finds himself supporting a rapidly modernizing battlefield with a cumbersome World 

War I1 organizational architecture 

and antiquated equipment. In short, 

todav's combat eneineers are the v 

weakest link in the battlefield combined arms team. The Engineer 

School is currently developing EFORCE-a plan to restructure enginccr assets throughout the depth 

of the battlcfield. E-FORCE brings 

togcther the requirements of AirLand Battle, the lessons learned 

from exercises like Reforger and 

the National Training Center 

(NTC), the results of analyses ol 

worldwide engineer requirement, 

and studies of new cquipmcnt 

productivity. 

The goal is to lix systemic dcfccls 

in engincer organizations- defects 

that until now prevented the comhat 

engineer from providing tirncly, 

responsive support to the maneuver 

commander executing AirLand Battle doctrine. 

E-FORCE addresses the entire 

spectrum of engineer organizations 

from the combat zone to the 

RCUCOMMZ. E-FORCE consists 

of three components: 

Support to close combat ltcal.)~ 

forces in the forward combat 

Zone. 

Support to close combat light forces in the forward combat zone. 

Support for the rear comhat 

zonelcommunications zone. 

Two of these-support to the 

clnsc combat light and lor fhc rear 

combat zone- have already bcen approved for implementation. Engineer support to close comhat light 

forces was reorganized fo meet special rcquirements ol air transportability to and within the theater of 

operations. As a result, the engineer 

support package to XVIll ABN 
Corps contains light corps engineer ENGINEER PLATOON LEADER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 

battalions and light equipment companics that are readily transportable bI- ..2,m -4 

to augment the light division enginccrs in the contingcnq theater. R~~,,R~~~~,,, sPt 

In thc RCZICOMMZ: 

The topographic engineer battalion has been reorganized and 

& YXI 

tailored to mcct theater-specific 5.shm 

needs. 

Thc cnginccr combat battalion 

(heavy) has been redesigned to I----,@ 

incrcasc hori~ontalcapability rcl- 7rrl, s~~~~~~~~~ 

ativc to vertical capability, reflecting battlefield requirements. 

Specializcd tcams and detachments were formed at echelons 

above corps to centralize control 

and dcccntr;tlizc cxccution of spe- Flhqrra 2 

cializcd functions such as well 

drilling, diving and asphalt operations. and control (C?), communications, fcrences between divisional and 

Now our energies are focused on maintenance, and logistics become corps battalions. 

improving suppnrt to the close com- complicated to the point of not For example, divisional cnginecrs 

bat heavy Torccs -on giving the working as the battle progresses. have AVLBs and CEVs; corps units 

mancuvcr commandcr the respon- The current structure also Tostcrs a do not. So, we patch togcthcr ad 

sivcncss hc nccds to win on the false sense of flexibility at the corps hoe task organizations in a vain cfmodern hattlelield. level. fort to ensure sufficient engineers 

Studies and our long-term ex- and equipment are available to supThe problem periencc in Europe show that each port maneuver forces. Figure 1 

Engineer support to the close maneuver brigade in the forward shows how this task organization is 

combat heavy combined arms team combat zone requires at least one deployed on the battlefield. 

is broken. Insufficient engineers are engineer battalion. Typically, the This complex arrangement strains 

organic to maneuver forces. At- need is met by augmenting the di- toward a solution. The divisional entempts to overcome the deficiency visional engineer battalion with gineer leader at each maneuver 

by assigning ad hoc task forces for- corps combat battalions. Even with echelon is dual-hatted-serving as 

ward out of corps asscsts overload the mechanization of corps combat both commander of his unit and thc 

engineers at all echelons. Command battalions, therc are significant dif- maneuver commander's engineer advisor. 

ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD LAYOUT For example, the engineer batDEFENSE SCENARIO talion commander not only exerCURRENT cises command and control over his 

L -I I I I ) battalion which is spread through-

) out the division area; he is also 

Cot H"" ! @ "' ) responsible to the division com- ",p' a mander Tor orchestrating the ac- x X 

x '"'" @ tivltlcs of all corps' engineer asscsts 

cell, C11 @" that support his maneuver echclon. 

O'" 

) His attentions arc divided and his 1 

'"'" @ ) staff is ovcrtaxcd. 

coins ) The divisional platoon 1c;rdcr who ---- Illilrn supports a battalion task force is the 

most overloaded engincer unit comF~~II~C 1 mandcr. He serves simultancously 
as an engineer planner, executor, 

coordinatorlintegrator, and principal advisor to the lieutenant colonel 

mancuvcr commander. Yet he is 

onc of thc youngest oflicers in the 

division -typically 20 to 24 years 

old and probably fresh out of 

EOBC. 

Consider the task force enginecr's area of responsibility comtrol with engineer task forces, supported units and parent units. The 

differences in assigned frequencies, 

CEOIs and COMSEC keying equipment exacerbate the problems. Engineer responsiveness is hindered. 

Similiar problems arise in the 

maintenance and supply arenas. Divisional units are supported by DISCOM; however, corps units operatCURRENT C' 

I 

I I I I I I I 

la 

Fi,qvr,r, .? 

parcd with that of his infantry ing in the division arca are still tied 

countcrpart (Fisure 2, on page 7). 

Experience at NTC has borne out 

how easily the task force engineer 

(platoon leadcr) is overcome by 

events. Maneuver commanders at 

NTC quickly recognize that their enginecr platoon lcaders-no matter 

how motivated-cannot succeed as 

bur11 planners and executors. This 

limits the engineer . support available .. 

to a task form! 

There is also another C' probIcm. At each maneuver echelon, the 

level of engineer command and control is inappropriate in relation to 

the rest of the combined arms team. 

For cxamplc, at brigade level, the 

brigade commander works with 

armor, infantry, artillery, and support battalion commanders and battalion staffs (Figure 3). The disconnect is with the engineer. His engineer commandcr is a company 

commander who must overcome thc 

difference in lcvcl of experience between himsclf and battalion commanders to get into the inner circle. 

Ad hoc engineer task force organizations also play havoc with 

communications. Units compcllcd 

to operate at cxtcndcd ranges rcquire AM as well as FM communications. Multiple nets must be 

used to establish command and conto thcir COSCOM umbilical cord. 

This issue is furthur complicated because maintenance and supply 

relationships change as command 

support relationships shift. The 

result? Corps units operating forward put unresourced burdens on 

an already overloaded DISCOM 

and must work with an external 

logistical tail. 

Habitual association-a close, 

continuous relationship between all 

elements-is vital to successful integration of the combined arms 

team. It enables the mancuvcr commander to mold the team he will go 

to war with-to put them through 

grueling drills that instill confidence 

and cohesion. Yet, stationing and 

our current architccturc deny corps 

units opportunties lo train in 

habitual association with their go to 

war divisions. They become pick-up 

units rather than well-drilled combined arms partners capable of antipicating the commander's intent 

and acting with mission-type orders. 

Perhaps the most serious pitfall 

inherent in our current structure is 

a falsc impression of flcxibility at 

the corps level. Thc original intent 

of current structure was to provide 

the corps commander with the assets and the flexibility to provide cngineer support over a broad arca 

and still weigh the main effort. 

When subjected to the rapid tempo 

of AirLand Battle, this apparent 

flexibility dwindles to illusion. 

For example, considcr the sccnario in Figure 4. The corps commander is reauired to control the 

ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD LAYOUT 


OPERATIONAL LEVEL 


"

CURRENT 
 ....xxx - 5 

ca, """ .--.:::g X X 

fl:--, + 

Cb, ""* 

XXX XX 

FijIlrr 4 
FLOT, contain the penetration 

from the center, and conduct a 

counterattack in the south. Engineers arc shown committed to the 

forces holding thc FLOT and assisting in containing the penetration. 

Allhougl~ thc corps commander 

would like to rcinforcc his attacking 

division with additional engineers 

(dotted lines), his mechanized cngineers arc committed forward. 

This means thc best he can do is 

provide whcclcd engineers to support the attacking division. Due to 

thc timc rcquired to disengage and 

link up, the attacking division would 

go on the offensive with only its 

divisional engineers forward-with 

assistance from corps cngineers 

limited to facilitating movement behind the FLOT and following to 

keep the LOC open for CCS elemcnts. 

The sulution 

E-FORCE solves the problems inherent in our current structure by 

providing sufficient engineer assests 

organic to the division and simplifying command and control, communications, maintenance and supply. It gives engineer units the advantages of habitual association with 

theirgo ro war units. 

The close comhat hcavy EFORCE divisional organization 

(Figure 5) consists of three 493-man 

divisional combat engineer battalions and one ribbon bridge company. These battalions have three armored combat engineer companies 

comprised of two sapper platoons 

and one assault and barrier platoon. 

With an end strength of 1,684, it is 

formcd hy combining the 893-man 

divisional cngincer battalion with a 

790-man corps combat cngincer battalion. 

Figurc 6 (on page 10) shows how 

this organization can be deployed 

on the baltlclicld. Thc division engineer orchcstratcs the cnginccr cffort throughout the division arcacontrolling both organic and corps 

assets. An engineer battalion is forward with each of the forward 

deployed brigades. The third divisional engineer battalion provides 

general support of the entire division rear and moves with the 

reserve brigade upon commitment. 

At task force Icvel, today's overloaded platoon leader is replaced as 

task forcc cngineer by a company 

commander. The company comlions in support of both offensive 

and defensive situations. 

Each E-FORCE engineer battalion has three of thesc companies. 

The battalion organizational diagram is included in Figure 5. The 

battalion organizational structurc 

parallels that of the comhat arms 

battalions. Maintenance is colocatcd at battalion lcvcl with company teams to support the crib' unccr 

mandcr brings the 

force commander 

I 


maneuver task 

the additional 

E-FORCE 


DIVISION ENGINEER 


*I 


RIBBON 

companies. A support platoon 

within the HHC will support the engineer companies with POL and 

Class V (ammunition) resupply- reducing the size of the company 

trains and paralleling armor and 

mechanized infantry organizations. 

The fact that thc hattalion will 

opcrate within a brigade rather than 

a division area makes these orpani7ational changcs possible. By 

centralizing soppor( ;isscts. wc focus 

the effort ol deployed squads, 

platoons and companies forward. 

This allows units morc timc on-site 

to support the maneuver commander. It is a flexible organization 

knowledge, expertise, personnel, 

and equipment necessary to responsively and adequately support the 

task Force. And the engineer 

platoon leader is given the opportunity to learn his trade under the 

tutclage of an experienced cngincer 

commander. 

The E-FORCE company organizational diagram is shown in 

Fi~ure7 (on page 10). The company is organi/cd into two sapper 

platoc~ns III 30 Inen each (similiar to 

today's sctpper platoons) and one 

equipment intensive assault and barrier platoon. This organization 

provides flexibility for task organiza- 
ENOINEER BATTLEFIELD LAYOUT 

DEFENSE SCENARIO 

IE-FORCE) 

EWL 

X X 

CM *r, 

. 

x 

XX -

that intcgratcs sufficient assault 

breaching equipment forward with 

the mancuvcr forces-allowing units 

to deploy rapidly, cross obstacles in 

stride and maintain the momentum 

of the attack. 

Each maneuver echelon has an 

engineer element of the commensuratc level lo support thc mancuvcr commandcr: 

An engineer company commander supports the task force. 

An cngincer battalion commander supports a maneuver 

hrigadc. 

A division enginecr directs the 

total engincer effort within the 

division area and performs advance planning for luturc operations. 

The maneuver commander can expect and rcccive the same level of 

rcsponsivencss throughout his organi7at' on. 

Communicalions requirements 

are simplified. As org;tnic mcmhers 

of the division, cnginccr units arc assured access to C:EOls and COMSEC keying mittcrials. Thc area of 

responsibility lor each engineer hattalion is reduced to a manageable 

Icvcl. DISC:OM can he rcsourced to 

support the additional cnpinccr asIL' 6 

ly train with their fellow membcrs of 

the combined arms team. 

E-FORCE provides the maneuver commander at corps and 

division level with dynamic, llexiblc, 

rcsponsivc cnginccr support to influence the battle. Figure 8 depicts 

the Figure 4 sccnario under EFORCE. 

Again, the corps commander 

must control the FLOT, contain the 

penetration in the center, and conduct a counterattack in the south. 

Engineers are again committed to 

assist in controlling the FLOT and 

containing the penetration. But this 

time the attacking division has sufficient engincer assets to support its 

offensive. 

Corps units can still assist in 

preparing the route of advance to 

the FLOT, but each attacking 

brigade has at least onc battalion of 

mechanized combat cngincers-soldicrs they habitually trained withwho are ready to accompany them 

into battle. 

Concurrent with the reorganization of thc divisional cnginccr support structure, enginecr capability 

in the corps' area will be restrnctured. Corps capability and flexibility is retained because over 52% 

of the engineer structure remains at 

corps. 

Figure 9 is an organizational diagram of the corps sappcr ballalion. 

E -FORCE 

DlV ENGR COMPANY 

I I I I 

SAPPER Arraull 6 

wa,.,er 

1 -2.>r Tll 

I - APC 

1 - water Trlr 

I - HMMWY 

I - &PC I - APC 

3 - ACE 1 - 1 ,',lT.1, 

. .. I - HMMWV 2 - COVICEV 2 - VOLCAI*O 

I - '.T T,,, 2 - MICLIC 2 - Dum~Tr. 

2 - AVLW I - SEE 

I - HMMWV 2 - Dump Tr, 

I - HMMWV I - 6T CBrgo Carrler a -I<,,T ~,l, 

. . - sets in the division area. Most important, cngincer units can habitual-
ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD LAYOUT 

OPERATIONAL LEVEL 

XXX 

CbI ""7 

X 

CI nr* 

XXX 	 I XX 

E-FORCE CORPS SAPPER BATTALION 

I I 

. . I-CUCV I-HMMW 

1-$07WRECKER (-57 DUMP >-ST DUMP 

I-CONTACTTAUCK 2-DOZER 1-1 li2TTRL 

?-IT TRUCK 1G250 CFM AC 

• 8 Z-FUEL TANKER ibPlO ELEC TOOL IRL 

>SEE ?-DOZER 


2-TEX ?.LET 


4-5T DUMP 2.5CY LOllDER 


2-VOLCANO 	 3-GRADERS 

I-CUCV 	 (-CRANE 


,.WATER OlST 


I-CUCV 


Fi&n~r<'9 
ENGINEER COMPANY 

COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 

I

r-T 

62117161 

I 	 , I 

TI 1% 
 El -1 	 ,., G, C"C" 	 >CoNTACI TRUCK ' CoNTnCT 79x ,2 12, TRX 

IBATMOilLI I ELEC REP SHOP TC.C 

I ,"T WRECKFII lGEN PYF REP moi. ,p,L ,,, ,~TV" , H"ST&" 

,bWELD,NG TRL >IT TIIAC 

4.5, ,R% ,LST ,WRECKER 

a.1 ,*T TRL I* 12, TRK 

gineer missions, it places additional 

emphasis on the dimension of time. 

To contribute as a combat multiplier and true mcmbcrs of thc combined arms tcam, combat enginccrs 

must be able ro provide timely, 

reponsive support to the mancuvcr 

commander. If, on the other hand, 

the maneuver commander must wait 

for his enSlnecrs, fleeting windows 

of opportctnity on the battletieid are 

lost. 

The current engineer structure is 

unresponsive to the demands of 

AirLand Battle. The deficiencies 

defy genuine efforts to overcome 

the problems through ad hoc command and control arrangements and 

task forces. E-FORCE attacks and 

corrects deficiencies. Under EFORCE. the combat engineer is 

truly itn intcgral mcmbcr of the comhincd arms tc;~ni. 

MC; Ric/lu,zI S. Kerrr is n Jor711er cnrrtThis three-company battalion will 

replace today's corps combat engineer battalion. Blade-type earthmoving equipment is bcing addcd to 

carry out thc rubble clearance and 

rwtc maintenance tasks expected 

[rom high intensity combat in built 

up areas such as central Europe. 

The combat support equipment 

(CSE) company will also be reorganized to focus on LOC maintenance-type missions and to augment corps sappcr battalions with 

hcavy enginccr equipment. Figure 

10 shows the proposed CSE company organization. 

The emphasis on LOC maintenance and rubble clearance acknowledges the importance of keeping thc corps' lifeline to resupply 

open end prcscrving ability to 

maneuvcr bchind the FLOT. The 

heaw cquipmcnt is irlso rcadily 

available 111 move fixward and supplcmcnt thc divisi~inal cnginccrs in 

crealing survivability positions and 

conslrucling i,hslaclcs. 

Conclusion 

While AirLand Battle doctrine 

doesn't change thr basic combat enUISAREUR. 7/11 A~III!,, Hci~/~~/l~iir~~, 

C;e17111/1!\,. 

LTC J. Riclrard Capka senvd as 111~. 

S3 Jor tlte Ertgi~teer Sclrool Brigu(li. 

ur For? Bclr~oir; arld is p,r.s~,~lrl\' coirritate; 1st Ertgi~tccr Batlaliort, FI. 

Riley Ka~tsas. He pdlluted J~IIIIlilt. 

U.S. Milira~y Acade~ity uiid rhe COIIIritcr~ldarid Ger~erol Stuff Colleg(:. Hc 

ltas a rtta.sler!s degree 01 ertflrleerirlg 

froril tlte U~riversiQ of Cali/or71iu ul 

Berke1e.v artd is a rqirlercvl profissiortal ertgirtccr irt Vir~iitiu. 

MAJ Holing Y. Soo is XO, 11/11 Eftgirteer Balloliort (Co~ttbat) (Healy), 

Fl. Belrzoir. He llas a baclte1ur.k dcpee fro171 tlte Po(~~tec11r1ic Irtslitrrte of 

Brooklr~rl, a rllaster's degwe ill r~~rclear e/th<rteoirtg Jlonr rile Lzr~hvr.sily 

o/ M'ashirtgor~, urtrl is u ,q~ad~rare of 

lltr Cori~nrand arld C~errerol SraJJ Coll<'ge. He is a rc@s/erc(l proJes.sior~al 

c,rzRi,lce!- in FVaslti~tgfon. 

ir~ui~(irntr lhc U.S. 11171g' EII,~~II~CI 

Sclrool ur F(IU Belini,: He itas .se~~e~/ 

ill UIII~!~, o , COIII~U~ heal?:

urtd uirboi71(' c11~iri~~o. hur/ulior~s ur~d 

a/ hot11 clil~isior~ urtrl corps sluff 

level. He is pre.rolf!~~ Clzief of Sluff, 

"Success in battle stems in great 

degree from superiority in the 

means of mobility and Rs employment for effective maneuver." 

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA 
--------------------- 

------- --- 

soldier'? The answer lies in the 

means, rcrlilircments, and cdpabilities of light combat engineers. 

This is where the JRTC provides 

the grcatcst challenge to light en-

@liccrs. 

To truly scc the challenge light 

cnginccrs fitcc, one must look at thc 

enemy situation and where light enginccrs arc best used. In order to 

survive in the type of cnvironmcnt 

in which light forces are expected to 

be cmploycd, the light enginecr 

niust be a master of improvisation. 

Hc must he capablc of melding 

scraps of iron, u,ood, and demolitions into a nonnegotiable obstacle. 

He must bc adept at piecing 

togethcr what is available into what 

is needed. At the .JRTC, thc light 

engineer docs exactly this. Duc to 

the incvil;thle lack of airframes available bringing the elements of war 

into an area ol operations, enginccr 

related supplies and materials usually take low priority. The light cngineer must, therefore, improvise, 

I 1 

M 

using what he can find on the 

ground or what he can receive from 

the host nation to completc his mission. 

Not only must he be able to improvise materials, but also he must 

bc an expert in expedient demolitions. Whether it be using common 

fertilizer or creating makeshift explosive devices, the light combat engineer has to bc resourceful. 

On the offense, the light combat 

enginccr must he just as capable. 

Again, due to a limited amount of 

organic breaching equipment, the 

light cn~necr on thc offense has to 

use what is on hand to keep the 

force mobile. Here again, the JRTC 

is challenging the light engineer. 

Most of the scenarios inherently 

limit the availability of requested 

supplics and materials. The light cnginccr planner and cxccutcr must 

think light on his feet. 

The light training center puts a 

hcavy strain on the light engineer's 

command and control capability. In 

most cases, relying only on what hc 

can carry or on the limited number 

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION 

(MODEL ABN TASK FORCE) 

I I 

of C' vehicles organic to his unit, 

the light engineer leader frequently 

finds it difficult to monitor the activities of his subordinates. The 

JRTC experience forces the cngineer C 2 operators to their limits. 

The Joint Readiness Training 

Ccntcr presents a challenge to all of 

its player units, from the ;rrtillcry to 

the infantry to the logistician to the 

c-nginecr. All must be physically and 

mentally tough and ready. It forces 

the light engineer to be rcsouccful 

and use expedient measures. He 

must rely on his wits and imapination in order to first survive and ultimately support the mission of thc 

task force. It's a tough challengc, 

but one that all cnginccrs must bc 

ready to undertake. 

CPT Ricllard Kublr is crfr~cr~r!r' assigrted to 1l1e Tactics, Truir~irt~, a~rd 

Docmrir~e Divisio~t of I/te Del~arrrrrerrf 

o/ Corlrbir~edArms of tire USAES. 

He is u gradrrure of USMA ar~d 110s 

saved wffh fire 27th Ertgir~eo. En!- 

rrriiorl (CBTJ (ABN) ul R.Brag, 

No~iit Carolirro. 

I 

r*? 

I (-) (PROV) I 

I-----.- - ------------ -I 

0.0 r--ozo--- 0.0 

L -- - - - -------- --I 

r- - - 1 NOTE: ELEMENTS ATTATCHED TO BDE UPON 

I I ARRIVAL IN AREA OF OPERATIONS 

L---J 
MYTHS FROM THE NTC 


review of new doctrine 

I>y LTC' Robcrt .I. Greenwalt, Jr. 

The "lessons learned" 

puhlicatiolis developed hy 

training units and their ohscrvcrs ;\re valuable hy-products of 

tlic intcnsc and realistic training excr.ciscs cnnductcd hv the National 

Training C:cntcr. 

CJnforlun;~lclv. some of the new 

cloctrinc provcs deadly under closer 

cxarnin;~tion. What may work at the 

Training C'cntcr it1 ;I perfectly controlled cxcrcisc may not occur on 

the real hattle licld. Ohscrvcrs and 

commanders alike should be wary 

of the quick, the easy, or the obvious reason in analyzing combat 

situaticms. 

A Car bcttcr tactic lor lcadcrs to 

use in analyzing these combat exerciscs is to consider all METT-T factors-mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time. By thinking through 

any tactical encounter using thrsc 

five considcr;~tions, we can avoid 

such common enginccr - related 

"myths" as those shown hclow. 

MYTH: Fifi111i11,q ~Jo.s~Iiolls ure 01-

1r;nr.c I vuI11~hlr 11rar1 ar~litar~k 

111e.s. Irr tlrc ! I I (*rlh<~~cers 

sIror11~1 u s corrccr~lmlc or1 slrr1~~1'11/1~/il~~ /IC:[(J~(, ~l~lllllc~~flobi/i~l~.

OBSERVATION: A dugin tank 

is vcry difficult I hit. Antitank 

ditchcs arc not good obstacles. 

Tying antitank ditches into "NO 

(;O" terrain requires dedication of 

elfort for a long time, yet produces 

obstacles which can he quickly 

hreached by hand. 

ANALYSIS: The factors in this 

situation which you need to analyze 

in greatcr detail are enemy 

(OPFOR) weaponry. NTC terrain, 

and typical employment of friendly 

troops. 

In a situation peculiar to the 

weapons simulation at Fort Irwin, 

shallow positions and small berms 

prove very cflcctive against the typical enemy armament, MILES lasers. 

In a real comhat situation, these 

positions would be deathtraps 

against an enemy armed with kinetic energy penetrators. 

The Fort Irwin desert terrain also 

contributes to the erroneous observation that survivability is the 

preferred tactic. In the crumbly 

desert soil, antitank ditches are easily breached with hand tools. The 

typical obstacle employment usually 

consists of a single antitank ditch 

dug perpendicular to the avenue of 

approach which joins the mountains 

together. 

Hand breaching proves very effective hecause it's not only impossiblc 

to cover Icngthy ditchcs with lircs 

from the dcfcnding hattle positions. 

it's difficult to adjust artillery lire in 

Fort Irwin's map-reading environment. Tactically, it would takc less 

time to install shorter antitank 

ditches. Because these could be adcquately protected against hand 

breaching, they would remain clfcctive during any attack. 

MYTH: 771e IJIffSt efictii~c? lrse o/' 

ob.rlucles i.7 lo ~ituke ir~rrg 1i11eur "bur- 

!ie,sN lo l;~"NO GO" l(s~~ui~r togerlter: 

OBSERVATION: At the NTC, 

U.S. units on the attack arc routinely destroyed by the simple linci~r 

obstacles which the OPFOR cniploys. The troops "pile up" in front 

of any barrier which ties together 

"NO GO" terrain where thcv arc 

easily destroyed hy OPFOR defenders. 

ANALYSIS: The key clcm~nts in 

this scenario arc the cncniy ohstaclc 

techniques and the ability of friendly troops to handle the ohst, <IC'I cs. 

Contrary to employing ectu;~l 

Soviet tactics, the OPFOR at thc 

NTC installs comparatively simple 

ohstacle systems. They do this hecause (1) thcy don't have thc normal complement of Sovict obstaclc 

installation equipment, and (2) thcy 

don't need better barricrs bccausc 

the Bluc Forces can't hrcach anything the OPFOR builds. 

The real prohlem is that the U.S. 

combined arms forces consistently 

fail to reconnoiter the area or pcrform other preparatory tasks csscntial to a breaching attempt. Because 

they are poorly prepared and 

rehearsed, thr Blue Forces arc consistently stalled andtor "destroyed" 

at these simple obstacles. lnstcad of 

identifying their own shortcomings, 

the Blue Force leaders get the impression that simple long, linear harriers arc effective against OPFOR. 

In fact, Soviet forces arc highly organizcd, well-rehearsed and equipped for effective breaching. In actual comhat, Soviet. rcirccs would 

takc such linear ohst;tclcs in stride. 

MYTH: 771c "~1nl.s~ l)uckn is tllc

IllOSl Cf/?<l;l'(! l+'Ul, 10 l2~11/~/0)~ ,Slll'J"U~elnid ~iir~es. /r~,s~c~/lir~fi rf~ilres close 

logellro. erlsllres 011 crre1fy Iurtk will 

srrike one, prod~rcirtg the sunre eflecl 

as tl~evel~icle 11illi11g u brick woo. 
OBSERVATION: A typical NTC 

exercise has shallow minefields, seldom more than 20 or 30 inches 

deep with devices placed two or 

three meters apart. They work well. 

ANALYSIS: The minefield mission is the factor in this situation. 

Tank "kills" at the NTC depend 

on an ohservcriconlroller (OIC) 

viewing and assessing tank movement from a distance. Therefore, 

most units makc minefields shallow 

with high linear densities so an OIC 

can easily scc when a vehicle trips 

one of the inert mine devices. This 

exercise situation abrogates the real 

mission -to emplace an effective 

minelicld. In reality, this type of 

minefield is easily breached and the 

closcly spaced war-reserve mines 

may "self-breach" through sympathetic detonation. 

MYTH: Mir~efields r~itrsr alwa.ys irlclude wire ertlar~gleri~er~ts to be art effectira obsracle. 

OBSERVATION: Minefields by 

themselves are not only easily 

breached by dismounted infantry, individual tanks can "pick their way 

through them. Installing wire obstacles with minefields ensures the 

effectiveness of the obstacle and 

makes breaching more difficult. 

ANALYSIS: Again, your primary 

considerations in this situation are 

the minefield mission, enemy 

breaching procedures, and friendly 

troops. At NTC, no safe, effective 

antipersonnel mine or antihandling 

device exists for the exercises. All 

minefields are surface-laid and the 

mines are painted bright blue to 

enable controllers to see them. 

Even when employing such obvious 

tactics, the limited number of observerlconlrollers to assess casualties make minefields ineffective 

against dismounted troops. Fnrthermore, obstacles are generally not 

protected by antipersonnel fires because of the poor employment tactics employed. Since the OPFOR 

do not have actual enemy breaching 

equipment, they can, under the 

training center's rules of engagement, simply pick up mines and 

move them to the side to make a 

lane. As a result, at the NTC, the 

only way to ensure that minefields 

will slow tanks is to hinder dismounted troop movement using 

wire. This tactic is based on the soldiers' reluctance to hang up their 

vehicles on wire. 

In reality, surface minefields are 

composcd of O.D. painted mines 

which are difficult to detect, breach, 

and arc deadly. Buried minefields 

incorporating antipersonnel mines 

and antihandling devices arc even 

more so. Bolh types of minefields 

What may work at the 

Training Center in a 

perfectly controlled 

exercise may not occur 

on the real battle field. 

would be covered by effective antitank and antipersonnel fire. Therefore, wire obstacles would be ineffective in actual combat. 

MYTH: Dozers are so bnportarlt 

rliat coritr?larrders r~ttrsl designate a 

"CINC dozer': a nzmtenr'er soldier to 

be in charge of the vehicle. This soldier er~stlres that 11te dozers dorz'l nirl 

otif of firel, perfon11 ar mauirt~trrit efficiet~cy, eerc. 

OBSERVATION: Because of the 

understandable desire to excel in 

the NTC exercises, few units use 

only their normal TOE equipment 

at Fort IM~. They normally "beefup" the engineer element with many 

additional bulldozers. This engineer 

equipment tends to sit idle before 

and after a miqsion. During actual 

employment, the engineer unit 

leader generally ignores the vehicle 

maintenance requirements which 

results in the dozer breaking down 

or running out of gas. By having the 

supported unit provide a "dozer 

CINC" (the CSM, an assistant S3, 

or an XO), the equipment gets 

proper attention from the organization with the most to gain from correct employment. 

ANALYSIS: The key factor in 

this situation is the number and organization of available troops. 

A key principle of task organization is to match assets against missions, and then add in the necessary 

command and control elements to 

make the assets effective. A platoon 

leaderitask force engineer has limited capability to control much 

more than his organic personnel 

and equipment. If the lcader 

receives several additional bulldozers, the unit should also be augmented. As a minimum, a supervisory element with an experienced 

equipment NCO and the necessary 

materiel to manage an equipment 

section should accompany the 

bulldozers. A unit on a detached 

operation, like an NTC rotation, 

should also be augmented with a 

fucl tanker and a maintcnance 

team. By organizing in this manner, 

the maneuver commander will not 

only have the necessary technical supervisory expertise, the engineer 

unit will also gain maximum productivity from the bulldozers. 

The "myths" outlined in this 

report are not designed to diminish 

the training conducted at the NTC. 

Observing and analyzing a tactical 

engagement in order to develop 

universal principles and doctrine is 

a very difficult task. The point is, 

just as the staff officer must use 

METT-T to devise a tactical plan, 

trainers andlor observers must 

analyze these factors to develop effective lessons for future operations. 

Only then will accurate lessons 

learned replace the current myths. 

LTC Robert J. Greertwalt Jr., u corllbar ertgijieer, is ctinertf!)~ assigicd as 

CltieJ Tactics, Trairib~g artd Docriirle 

Divisiorl, Departritcrlt of Coritbbled 

Antts, U.S. Amzy Erifiirzeer Scltool. 

Preiaiolrs assigrirrter~ts itlclride cornparty cor~intartder irt llte .747fil, 2Otl1, 

ar~d 34111 Ertgineer Bulluliorzs, S3 attd 

Assi.~lm~f Divisiort Erlgifleer b~ /lie 

71h Ertgirteer Ballalion, atid Coriir~rander, 16/11 Ettgir~cer Baftaliorr. 
MOW TO RACK A TRACK 


the right way to pack an APC 

By CPT Frank S. Weston, Jr. and 


CPT John L. Sauflcy 


If begar1 wifir a pitorte cull tween like vehicles is probably the 

&~llrislritas evertir~g. 77ri~-six norm rather than the exception. 

lrorrrs lafer; I watclred as riry Combat engineers need to develop SAP 

secortd sqrrad prepared a road crater a standard load plan for all of their .(2OMMO TA-1 

011 a rrarrow Genilarl road. "Wlrar's APCs. This way, any 12B soldier iroll wtre 

tukirrg so lorlg?" I yelled, as I walked can walk into a squad anywhere in back pack for PRC 77 

I,vrir ritv truck. "Sir; we lefl tlre deriro the world and know how his vehicle * [ demo bags 

box irr 111~back of llre trailer and we is loaded and where his mission-es- r i ,,,,,,, , ,D-handle sl 

have lo dig or11 lire deriro bag," was 

(Ire rep!)'. 

(;r.eat, I tilo~rgi~t. We were already 

3 1ror1,s beilirrd sclredrrle due to tile 

lerrgth of tirile if Irud lukerr 11s lo prrf 

irr orrr row rnirrefield. Witit rrof 

errufrgir space for orrr rilines, we /lad 

rreeded roo ritarg~ trips to [Ire ritirte 

dip. I had irlspected the sqzrad 

bo,re.~err!\) a week ago, and rlrey were 

in dress-rigill-dress order accordirlg lo 

IIte rfrlif SOP. I'w got lo gel rtry 

purku orrr of t11e boffortr of lily TA-SO 

bug I 11101rgI1fus I sfrode back lo ri~y 

(ruck. 

Was this the case of an ineffective 

platoon leader? Or was he only inexperienced? Maybe neither. Unfortunately the disorganized, cluttered 

interior of a sapper personnel carrier with no common layout beSapper box 

5-gal 

MOGAS canfor chain saw 

sential equipment is kept. 

A standard load plan is also essential if engineers are to execute 

their rapid battlefield techniques. 

The plan needs to be as uncluttered 

as possible to accommodate the ammunition and engineer Class IV and 

V materials the APC will carry in 

war. Consider the amount of space 

the squad's .SO-caliber ammunition 

alone takes up in the track. It nearly 

fills the entire floor. To this, add approximately 100 M15 AT mines for 

a minefield or boxes of bangalores, 

TNT, and satchel charges for offensive operations. There is no room 

left inside for nonessential items. By 

moving all of the less critical items 

to the trailer, the sapper APC becomes the working platform that it 

must be. The following sample load 

long handb ? shovels 

set post ho le dtggers 

axes 

.-L-. -2 


plck heads 

machetes 

cnaln saw 

bow saw 

patr wtre g, 

lack 

snatch bloc 

plan of an APC and trailer are snggested for use by the combat engineer community. 

We load two types of equipment 

on an engineer MI13 and trailer: 

squad equipment and individual 

equipment. The squad equipment, 

normally stored in boxes on the 

floor of the APC, is taken out and 

secured on top of the APC in a box 

built to accommodate selected essential tools from the pioneer, 

commo, and demolition kits (Figure 

1). The sapper box, as this is called, 

contains all of thc tools and equipment normally required for the 

squad to carry out its tactical techniques. It is easily accessible from the 

cargo hatch. Table 1 is an example 

listing of tools and equipment 

stored in the sapper box. By keeping most of their essential tools outside of the APC, the squad has 
more room left inside for demolitions, ammunition basic loads, and 

work space. The squad carries 

remaining backup tools and equipment in its trailer (Figure 2 on page 

18). 

Standard organization of personal 

gear, such as the duffle bags in the 

trailer, is also important. The squad 

loads individual equipment in four 

locations depending on how critically each item is needed: worn hy the 

soldier, in an ALICE pack on top of 

the APC, in a tanker roll in the 

APC, or in duffle bags in thc trailer. 

Each soldier wears his load bearing 

equipment (LBE), helmet, flack 

jacket, protective mask, and ballistic 

goggles. The setup for the LBE is 

standard for the entire squad 

(Table 2). The ALICE packs are 

tied down on top of the APC so 

that the cargo hatch is not blocked 

and the equipment is readily available to each soldier (Figure 3 on 

page 19). The rucksacks also have a 

standard packing plan (Table 3 on 

page 18). 

The squad keeps its tanker rolls, 

which contain minimum essential 

sleeping gear (Table 4 on page 18), 

inside the APC to keep them dry 

(Figure 4 on page 19). All remaining individual clothing, equipment, 

and backup NBC gear is placed in 

duffle bags and kept in squad 

trailers (Figure 2). Table 5 on page 

19 shows the contents of the duflle 

bag. To make space for the duffle 

bags while still retaining maximum 

room for demolitions and mines, 

the squad builds the shelf shown in 

Figure 2. 

Standardizing the load plan for 

an engineer APC has several important advantages. The soldier carries, 

on his person, all that hc needs to 

fight as a combat engineer. In his 

track, with him at all times, is his 

basic life support equipment, including environmental and NBC protective clothing and sleeping gear. The 

squad carrics its mission critical 

tools, equipment, ammunition, dcmolitions, and mines on the track to 

allow it to fight as a combat 

~hle2 

COMBP EER FlGH

nrvrar nelrrtet: 

3 cover with 

3 band with 

wn on 

ne in block Iletters 

me ram se 

the last nar 

kIau lacuet (worn ov all except the ventcle crewman Drotected bv armor. It 

must be rea 

Ear plugs u 

Dog tags 

ldily avaiiab 

(4th case ca! 

le.) 

. 'ried in any I

. 

Ballistic protective goggles 

Load bearing equipment (LBEI- for rifleman. This equip1 

worn by all personnel with the exception of vehicle crew 

the vehicle through a hatch. Crewmen leaving the vehicl.. ..."-. 

their LBE (including the flak jacket) 

-Individual equipment belt (pistol be 

-Individual equipment belt suspend< 

-Small arms 

each. Worn on 

also carry a ba 

rounds; automatlr; rnlarr~er~carry ~aur, 

srrier. Worn 

,teen and ct 

towara lne rear 

wet, worn 

the, ie right side 

r penlight. b 

Flasnl~gntequ~ppedwith a blue filter. 

-Bayonet. W side betwee 

entrenching toc 

-Survival knife. Worn on right side o' .~.~-.. . 

-Biped. Carr matic rifleman. Worn on the right 

knife. 

-Snap link. L.-- ... ---ure gloves. Worn on the pistol belt to the righ 

am! 3e. 

nent will ah 

men who rr 

' rn,,", h. 

Nays be 

lust exit 

%.roarinn 

i ammunitic 

front of be 

ndoleer wit1

..>-.<'# 

~n cases (b 

It, one on e 

1 Seven extr 

.... --,.. 

NO each) 8 

ach side of 

a 20-round 

..>. 

iith three 3u-8vu~u 

connector. (Automatic 

magazines.) Riflemen c, 

~gazines 

riflemen 

arry 210 

JUrlaS. 

on left side 

rp. Worn on 

of belt. 

the right si 

Entrenching 

Canteen 00' , .. 

tool with ci 

ver with car de of the pi st01 belt

First aid pa 

n worn on 11 

Flashlight o . .. . 

on the lefi 

, suspender. 

Vorn on tht .. ~.~ 

: side suspenaer (unlel 

1 

3 same suspender with 

I left-hand, 

the first aid 

sd firer; 

packet. 

n left small 

f Canteen 

orn on left ! 

11. 

sse and 

Survival 

t of the 

.I g equipmer med w~thpistols. All itt,,,, ,. 

I..---...- ,.for the rifle,,,,,, ,,,,. ,, .,,, ,,;ted below: 

-Small arms 

front of belt, or 

tol, 35 rounds a 

r soldiers a1

'A.**^"n li. 

Vorn on 

the pisammunitior 

ie on each 

Ire carried. 

. ,A,-.- --

Icases (twc 

Side of con 

I each) with 

~nector,lncll 

two magaz, 

Jding the rr 

ines each. V 

lagazine in 

-Pistol holster. rvutt~ura rlgrn "1 me "ell aneaa or me canreen. r 

veh llder holster 

umorea 

ine tool 

icle crewme 

No bayonet. - . ., ., 

n wear shot 

. ... -bUrVIval Knlle. Worn on the left side or tne Delt Detween tne entrench, 

and small arms case 

.I 

hz58 Oecontamtnatlon u~tcarrled in Drotecttve mask carrler 

• I pment (squr 

-I Vorn on left 

nee t s~deammunltlon case grenade lo( 

-Whtstle wtth 

(ask. Worn c . . . 

In lett hip oi . ~ 

r under left ; 

.eader equil 

)ompass. V 

tor or on lef 

ld leaders, 

side of be 

eantslleader 

3mall arms 

IP. 

elt con. 
.-- - -. 


Cornmi~n~cationswire 

14 each) 

Entra individual 

NBC equipment 

Tohle i 

-LICI<SACK LOAF 

Duffle bags 

(2each) 

2nd the tanker roll 3x;li a;wnvs Se xwth 

$3" lie because :he$, C?~C,I:UTP 

i-5 rnl?itl?llm s::ivivai eou*~mrini.17. 

r :!? !;a? contaivs backuo cioihinc 

::n 

Sandbags 

1100 each) 

,IS 

ritn straos .L.. 

Back oarr socr 

Tie downs 13 each) Chock blocks (4 each) 

!?it oocke: 

'!,let weathe 

Black glove 

Inserts 

W9aoons cleanino kir 

;oggles 

':/inter 

The 1311~w~n( 2 Items are! added to Camouflage 

Right side poles the r,irlr<,,rr. 

Cold weath 

u,,.u-" ,,>, . . rnjrl ,..nrt* ,.-",,,, 

D~handleshovel 11 each) 

, Brush hook 12 eachl Chock blocks (4each) ie Trigger ling.;, 

w~hinserts 

t,t,,lslls 

7 

TBNP 

.sq, slter haif 

Carpente Sleeorna paaia~r mattress 

tools ',WC )oi bianket 

-.?i it poles 

Tei 11 5,"s

Tent rope (to t. 

:he tanker's rol 

\ 1 set BDUs 

Left side Tie downs 13 each) Sleeping bag v 

1 set long undl 

Sleepng shirt i 

FI,c~I~, 2 Poncho (used ., .,,,,,, wal 
Lontsnts may vary ne<:ause the du 

worn or in use 

Duffie DE Trigge 


2 oair fie Giove 


2 OG shl Cold r 


Parka with hooo Bath tr,we! 


Mess kit, Parka I ine, 


Barracks Field 1slcket liner 


Coid weather mask Field nants . . liner 


Combat hoots extra Year extra 


Fieid jaci let inderweai e 


BDUs e, :tia sets uai loci, 


bag iscarried at squad ievei and might not be with the soldier. 

Ptck handle 


\ Short tankers 


Track iacks bar Rucksacks Concertina wrre 

Sapper Top view 

box 

F;~<r+iic .? 

= -.1-L-J ~0thminyetectors 

Fire extinguisher 

5-gal 

50-caliber barrel Water can 

cneincer squad. The trailer is used 

to carry backup individuai equipment, backup squad tools, and additional demolitions and mines not required for the imrncdiatc mission. 

This allows the squad to drop the 

trailer if the tactical situation 1.equires and to rcmain fully missii~n 

cffcctivc. The company hcadquarters kccps track (11' thc trailers 

and brinp thcm forward when 

nceded. A good. solid load plan is 

ncccssary if a conihat cngincer 

squad is going to accomplish its missions quickly and cffecti\,cly. A 

srandard load plan will hclp the 126 

engineer soldier know his jot? and 

execute his mission. A load plan will 

not exist. however, without cornmand emphasis. Nothing cvcr docs. 

Start today; or3anij.c your APCk as 

working platforms and load your 

tracks as rhouph your trailer may 

never be seen again. Kccp inspccting thcm until you know the jr~h was 

done right. Having our onits 

prepared lor war is the greatest scrvice we can do for our nicn. 

CPT Fr-arzk S.We.s/orz, J,: is air bzslnlctor ill rile Deyuifr~rorl of CUIIIhirred Anils, U.S. Arilg' Errgirrcur. 

School. He IIUS also .selvwi 0.7 

ylatoort leado., corlrparty c~eclrlii'e ofJicer; and baltaliorr S2 witli rlze 4rlz 

Eri@reer Battaliorr, 4/11 I~zJurr/n 

Divisioiz (Mecl~). CPT M~CSIOII p~izlated f,nrlr USMA irt 1982, arrd is u 

pd~late of EODAC and CAS~. 

CPT Jolrrt L. Surflev is a traiirer- for. 

EOBC. He pzdliared fror~~ USMA iir 

IYC1.7, arrd is an EOAC gr-ad~~me. He 

also senrd as a platoorr leader nriri 

I I ~ crenflivc I office. lvillz llze

Ifit11 Err,qir~eei Barraliori, 1st Ai71zor-ed 

Divisioit. 

/

Squads tanker rolls 

Figrlr-'2 1 
MICLIC -training for combat engineers 

overcoming equipment and training challenges 

by MAJ Kevin W. Pippard RAE 

Thc Mine Clearing Line 

Chargc or MICLIC is 

hcing fielded to U.S. Army units throughout the world, offering the combined arms team an 

cxplosive mincficld brcach capability. Designed to be rapidly emplaccd and executed, this counterniinc option enables forces to pass 

quickly through a mincficld to an 

ohjcctivc. For engineers it is a 

hreakthrough. 

Use of MlCLlC in combined 

arms training offcrs some significant 

advantages. No longer are maneuver commanders forced to simulate a minefield breach and drive 

on, combat power intact, to the end 

should develop confidence in the 

breach capability of MICLIC and 

the effectiveness of the battle drill 

so that the commander will, after 

analysis of the mine threat, be confident in organizing his force to 

breach in-stride. 

Remember, the in-stride breach 

is a preplanned and rehearsed battle drill. Train to reach proficiency 

and to establish battles drill with existing equipment. Allow for incorporation of advances in technology 

and equipment improvements as 

they become available. Equipment 

and training limitations are challenges to be overcome by innovation 

and enthusiasm. 

brought forward, towed into a 

sclcctcd firing position by a combat 

vehicle, and fired in sequence with 

the battle drill. If you arc on a field 

firing rangc, add realism by detonating a small charge to simulate the 

line charge. Although MICLIC will 

be the training focus For the engineers in the breach force, emphasize that it is simply a tool which 

allows the combined arms team to 

rapidly cross the minefield and attain its objective. The engincer mission is not complete upon firing of 

the MICLIC. 

Consider the rangc of skills required to complctc a minefield 

breach mission: 

of yet another successful exercise. Engineer intelligence prcpara- Use of thc MlCLlC in brcaching Training techniques tion of the battlefield. 

drills clearly shows thc tactical reMoving a trailer-mounted MIC- Minefield rcconnaissancc. 

quircmcnts of this complex and Tactical analysis and planning. potentially dangerous operation. In LIC is difficult. Accept the limita- .Passing of orders. reality, an unsuccessful breach is tion and minimize the distance it Conduct of the battle drill. likely to rcsult in loss of a sig- must be towed by a combat vehicle. Lane marking. nificant portil)n of combat power. This will require effective and Passage by assault force. We can avoid this by thorough and responsive organization and good Securing of the objective. vigorous training. Employment of analysis of battlefield intelligence to Reorgani~ation. MlCLlC in breaching drills, will en- predict where a minefield breach Handover of obstacle. hance the tactical ~roficiencvof the will be needed. The transport orBNnF and Co cam in dfiensive 

operations. 

Training for the in-stride breach 

Guidance for conducting the insrridc brcach can be found in FC 90-

13-1. Using that guidance, incorporatc MICLIC as the means by 

which tbc breach clcment will 

reduce the obstacle. 

Thc challenge 10 combat engineers is to cmploy MICLIC cffcclively and convincingly in combined 

arms training. Wc must allow the 

maneuver commander the in-stride 

breach option and the opportunity 

to train to a proficient level. We 

ganization to get MICLIC and its 

support equipment to the right 

place at the right time must be 

mastered. Anticipate the requirement and be organized to meet it. 

Don't he depressed at the 

shortage of rockets and line charges 

for live fire training. Bc enthusiastic 

and positive in your training and 

live fire will be the highlight of thc 

training year, not only for the engineers, but for all combined arms 

elements. 

In other [raining you may have to 

employ an cmptv trailer fitted with 

an expcnded rocket casing and ballast a\ you work to develop the battle drills. Make sure it is prepared, 

MlCLIC must be used skillfully 

to ensure confidence. Basically a 

simple device, soldiers will receive 

training in its maintenance and 

operation. Although the operator 

checks and drills are not complex, 

thcy are numerous and mu\( bc 

completed in scquencc. Soldicrs do 

not need to go to the field to practice these skills and opportunities 

should be incorporated in other 

skills training activities. Allow combat engineers the oppor[unity to 

demonstrate their proficiency, particularly to their infantry and armor 

hrothcrs-in-arms. This type of training is easily incorporated into a unit 

training proficiency competition. 
Throughout all training, consider 

the practical application of MICLIC 

to a tadica! situation. Incorporate 

MICLIC in TEWTs and MAPEX, 

even milipdry history studies may include account5 of the use of explosive line charge equipment to 

brcach mincliclds. 

Aiming and alignment 

Accurdtc positioning of the line 

charge ;]cross the minefield depcnds on aiming and alignment of 

the MICLIC' launcher rail prior to 

firing. With prcscnt equipment, 

aiming and alignment depend almost cntirclv on the attitude of the 

trailer and its towing vehicle. On uncvcn ground or when the vehicle 

has rcverscd into thc liring position 

thcrc is always a chance the rocket 

could hc misdirected. An incorrectly aligned linc charge may Pail to 

cross the inincficld. 

Firing or only one MlCLlC may 

not always require exact alignment 

as the capability may excccd the 

depth of thc minefield. However, 

thc simplc act of emplacing and 

firing almost 1,XOO pounds of high 

cxplosive on the battlefield demands responsible execution. The 

rcsponsihility not to needlessly endanger the livcs of our own troops 

remains as important in operations 

as in training. It should also be a 

mattcr or pride and professionalism 

to accurately-place the line charge. 

Sequential firing 

MlCLlC is capable of clearing a 

path 100 meters in lcngth. When 

this is not enough to achievc full 

pcnctration of the obstacle, scquential firing should be considered. 

Twc~ MICLIC: sequentially fired first 

from the forward edge, then a 

sclcctcd point on the cleared path, 

should clear a path at lcast 1x0 

mctcrs in lcngth. Considcrablc skill 

is required to cnsure that the start 

ol the path clcared by the second 

MlCLIC coincides with the end of 

thc path clcarcd by the first. You 

may consider tiring some live rockets in training as if they were the 

second MICLIC, in order to 

develop this skill. 

Reloads 

Plan for reloads and replenishment to ensure that MICLIC is not 

a "one-shot" weapon and hence 

restricted unnecessarily in its application. Understandably, there 

will be some difficulties not only in 

handling the additional rockets and 

line charges hut in providing the lift 

capability to allow reloading. You 

must consider return of the empty 

trailer from the forward edge of the 

minefield and its replacement by 

another loaded trailer or its replenishment and turnaround from a 

reload point. Soldiers must be 

trained and vehicles allocated for 

this misbion. Again, empty trailers 

and previously expended rocket 

casings should be used as training 

aids to develop reload drills.. 

Doctrine development 

Doctrine has been written to 

provide guidance in MICLIC employment. This is the framework or 

starting point on which units base 

procedures and battle drills to best 

employ the equipment. Development of doctrine should not be completed in isolation. Even officers 

with user experience will bring their 

own prejudices and preferences to 

the school. Aware of this problem, 

school officials seek additional input as fielding of MICLIC progresses. 

The EOAC includes instruction 

on tactical application of MICLIC 

during both formal classes and in 

TEWTs. The course also now includes an optional advanced tactics 

sepcnt and will shortly include a 

package of engineer study options. 

These optiuns allow students with 

some ficld expcriencc and interest 

in tactics to solvc a range of tactical 

problems. The vast range of situations and problems faced by combat 

engineers in attempting to reduce 

obstacles are often discussed. It is 

expected that firsthand licld experience with MlCLlC will be used 

to develop and refine future instruction at EOAC and devclop doctrine. 

Direct input from user units is 

particularly useful as it reflects ficld 

conditions and equipment experience. Units arc encouraged to pass 

along such information, through the 

chain of command, in the form of 

technical reports, post exercise 

reports, training notes and lessons 

learned. These should be sent to the 

U.S. Army Engineer School, Dcpartment of Combined Arms (DCA), 

ATTN: ATZA-TC-T, Ft. Bclvoir, 

Virginia 22060-5341. Of course, if 

you use the MICLIC in training at 

the NTC, DCA will receive rcports 

of lessons learned through CAC. 

An Engineer School representative 

will probably also provide obscrvations. It is still important to submit 

a unit report to document subtle, 

less apparent observations. 

Stay maneuverable 

If you accept the theory that battles are won or lost long before lorces actually meet in combat, the importance of effective use and continued development of MICLIC is 

sclf-evident. Combat engineers must 

accept the challenge to develop and 

train in combined arms battle drills, 

to refine skills and build confidence 

in MlCLIC employment, and to assist in development and testing of 

doctrine. Apply yourselves to meet 

that challenge and to keep our 

maneuver forces maneuverable. 

MAJ Pippard is ll~e A~rsraliar~ ercl~ar~geir~,stnrcfor a1 tile U.S. Ani~v 

Errgirleer Scllool arrd .servi>.y uas a lactics irtstntctor irt tltc D[!pmtr7ior1 of 

Cor?~bir~edAnlts. Hc scncd irr field 

er~fiirleerii~g, corrsrr7rclior1 arrd truir~iilg 

~rrliu as well us erlgincor w0,k.s arld 

ol~erulions slul u/)poir1lt71nll,s. hDfJ 

Pippard is u grud~ralc of 111e Amtruliur~ Cortlri~arrd arrd Staff College. 
FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE 


by MA.[ Mark C. McAvoy 

Every Engineer company 

comniandcr and platoon 

lcadcr have faced the frustrations of the currcnt communications systcm. Perhaps he needed to 

use two radios to communicate with 

three units-his own, the one he is 

supporting, and his higher headquarters. Through trial and crror, 

he successfully met this challenge by 

switching frequencies, relaying 

through other stations, and arranging report times. 

Howcvcr, this logical solution was 

often frustrated by distances too 

great for radio contact, as well as by 

radio interference from friendly stations or cncmy jammers. He also 

faced ollicr critical communications 

nccds. Pcrhaps he wanted to coordinate with logistical or other aclivitics using the tactical telephone 

systcm or needed a written message 

or tacrical graphics faster than a 

mcsscngcr could dclivcr it. In the 

past. hc had no hope for communications llcxible enough to meet 

all thcsc nccds. Now two new communications systclns arc being fielded which will changc the way he 

new hope for engineers 


communicates on thc modern battlefield. 

Thcsc two ncw systems are: the 

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 

and the Mobile Subscriber Equipment System (MSE). SlNCGARS 

will upgradc the quality of the current family of FM voice radios 

(ANIVRC-12 series including the 

ANIVRC-46) while adding important counter jamminglinterference 

capabilities. MSE will replacc the 

existing tactical telephone network 

and extend its capabilites forward 

into the battlefield. The chart on 

page 24 shows the list of SINCGARS radios and the equipment 

they replace. This article describes 

the basic capabilities of these systems and illustrates how they will 

improvc Engineer communications. 

FM radios will continue to be the 

primary mcans of distant communications for Engincer echelons battalion and lower hut SINCGARS 

will oficr scvcral obvious improvements. Tyo of these new radios can 

be located in the same vehicle space 

as one of the old VRC-46s. Also, 

frcqucncics are entcrcd on an 

electrical number pad rather than 

dialed on a manual rotary switch 

(sometimes confused with a Nautilus machine). All models of the 

SINCGARS will have six positions 

to preset frequencics. The Srcatcsl 

improvements, however, will be in 

its operating characteristics. 

The SINCGARS will now havc 

2,320 channels instead of YGO available on the old radios. Ten niegaherr were added to the available frequencies (now 30.00 MHz to 87.975 

MHz) and the size of each channel 

narrowed (reduced from 50 to 2.5 

KHz). More channels will mean 

fewer users sharing each frequency. 

This will, in turn, mean lcss mutual 

friendly interference. 

A special feature of the 

SINCGARS is its Elcctronic Countcr Counter Mci~~ures Module 

(ECCM) designed fo avoid dctcction, location, and j;imming by 

cnemy clcclronic warfare (EW) 

equipment. Unils located near the 

forward edge or the battle area 

(FEBA) will have this module 

added as an internal component of 
the basic radio. With ECCM, the 

radio can bc prcprogrammed to 

hop lrcqucncies irt the rate of 100 

times per second. The unit cannot 

be monitorcd, locatcd, or jammed 

hccause thc EW equipment cannot 

track this scqucncc and lock on frequency long cnough to hc effective. 

It also providcs additional protection against mutual intcrferencc. Unless anotlicr radio within range 

lands [in the ssmc frequency on the 

same 11100th of a second, the radios 

will not conflict. This would not be 

audiblc unlcss thc area was satur;~tcd with transmitters and the 

numbcr ol conflicts was cxtremcly 

high. 

Thc SINCGARS will have a data 

port to connect ;I digital dcvice 

(such ;IS n f;lcsimilc). Mndcls produced allcr 10x9 will have encryption capability built into the radio 

without having to add a KY-57 

C'OMSEC: dcvicc. 

Dcspitc improvements in security 

and reliability, SINCGARS will not 

cxtcnd the rangc of communications 

nr incrcasc coordination capability. 

MSE. howcvcr, is designed to do 

just this. MSE. combines mobile 

radio telephone capability with digital transmission, computer-driven 

call routing capability and an unchanging telephone number system 

to extend this powerful, flexible 

telephone system into forward areas 

of thc battlcfield. 

MSE will bc a great improvement 

ovcr the current tactical telephone 

system which is impractical for use 

in forward areas for scveral reasons. 

The equipment is manpower intensive, diflicult to move and install, 

and can only be located where ccrtain hookups and connections are 

availahlc. Together, these opcrational problems mean that nctwork telephone support cannot be provided 

to units that move ircqucntly or to 

units operating forward of mancuvcr brigade headquarters. 

MSE will solve thesc problems 

and more. Its power comes from a 

computer-driven telephone search 

syslem called Flood Search Routing. With this feature, a request for 

a called number goes out over every 

link within the corps network until 

the number is found. Since subscriber numbers never change, they 

can be located as long as they are 

Ioggcd on the network. Flood 

search will bypass any signal node 

that has been destroyed. 

Connection to the network varies 

for fied and mobile users. At a 

futed command post, static subscriber telephones (called Digital 

Nonsecure Voice Terminal or 

DNVT) will lay wire to a local 

switchboard. The local switchboard 

will be connected to an area signal 

site called a Node Center Switch 

(NCS) through a microwave radio 

link. Once thc subscriber is linked 

to thc NCS, thc subscriber will log 

on using a personal number known 

only to himsell. He can then access 

any other user on the nctwork for 

voice or data communications. 

The greatest advantage of MSE 

for Engineer companies and battalions is Mobilc Subscriber Radio 

Telephone (MSRT) capability. The 

user will have a telephone connected to a MSE-unique radio unit 

mounted on his vehicle. As long as 

the radio unit has line-of-site (LOS) 

contact with the Radio Access 

Units (RAU) provided by the signal 

corps, it will have connection into 

the telephone network. Operational 

planning range is lSkm from any 

RAU. The subscriber will log on 

the system through the first RAU 

he contacts and takes no further action unless he logs off. As the subscriber moves through the battlefield, he will enter the area of 

one RAU as he leaves another. 

When this happens, his MSRT will 

automatically log off of one RAU 

and log onto another. 

Thc MSRT allows digital devices 

to bc conncctcd through the phone 

instrunicnt and can be operated 

with a digital fiicsimilc. The radio 

will provide encryption security and 

will hop frequencies to avoid detection. The system is also dcsigned to 

automatically reduce transmission 

power to the level required to reach 

the RAU. The current issue plan 

calls for each Engineer company 

commandcr to get one MSRT and 

for an Engineer battalion headquarters to get three. 

With the increased flexibility of 

MSE, the ability to recicve written 

copies of diagrams, charts, and messages will be extended down to company commander level through thc 

use of digital facsimile (FAX). This 

device will transmit an exact copy of 

an 8-112- by 11-inch piece of paper 

in 15 seconds (may also hc used 

with the SINCGARS radio). Onc 

FAX is scheduled to be fielded to 

each Enginecr headquarters down 

to company level. It will replace the 

Radio Teletype (RATT) system 

which currently providcs hard copy 

capability at battalion level only. 

In order to illustrate the difference in communications that 

MSE and SINCGARS make, assume you are the commandcr of a 

divisional Engineer company. You 

have been placed on OPCON to a 

corps Engineer battalion (hat is in 

direct support to one of the 

divisional maneuver brigades. Your 

company has been placed in direct 

support to a maneuver task force. 

You are required to communicate 

with your subordinate platoons, [he 

task force, the corps Engineer battalion (higher headquarters) and 

the divisional Engineer battalion 

(for logistical support). You currcntly solve the problem by staying on 

the task force and company command nets, switching to the other 

nets as required. The divisional battalion is well out of radio range. 

Radio contact with thc corps hattalion is difficult at times. Thc task 

force and platoons will ordinarily be 

in range but in an intensc electronic 

warfare (EW) cnvironrncnt; contact 

may be impossible and will certainly 

be risky. If any of these radio links 

fail, the only alternative command 

and control is mcssengcr or radio 

relay. 

With complete Fielding of both 

these new systems, communications 
-

Mc 

-

AN -

AN 

-

ANivn~-aa 

AN 

-

ANNRC 90 

AN 

-

AN 

- 7--

Vehicular 

Short-Rang 

Vehicular 

Short-Range 

Dlsmountable 

Vehicular 

Long-Rang, 

Short-Rang 

Vehicular 

Long-Range 

Veh~cular 

Long-Rang 

Dtsmountal 

Short-Rang 

Vehicular Chat 

Long-Range 

(Retransmi1) 

ANIPRC-Z! 

Same as ANNF 

wlth addlt~on 01 

Manpack acces 

^ 	 ne as ANNF ANItitiG-11 

iadditiono. plus ANNf 

npack acces 

Same as ANNF ?C-89 

with addition o'f 2nd 

PWR. Amp and Retrans 

Fielding of the SINCGARS radio 

was scheduled for March 1988. The 

first 16,000 units, produced without 

thc embedded COMSEC cap;~hility 

(which eliminalcs the need for KY57 encryption dcviccs),wcre sclicdulcd to go lo 8th Army in Korca 

and TRADOC. All units produccd 

after 1989 will havc thc C:OMSEC 

with ihc first of thcsc 111 g(1 to 

USAREUR starting in 1000. It will, 

however, take scvcral years to 

replace the large quantity or radios 

in the Army. 

The MSE fielding is ;I i'irsl-of-ilskind with much of the opcrt~liont~l 

tests occurring in conjuction with ils 

fielding. The MSE contract, including all options, to1;lls $4.3 l>illi<in 

with the first units bcing licldcd in 

the 1st CAV Division at Ft. Hood. 

Assuming that field tcsts arc successful, the rest of Ill Corps will 

receive MSE through 8 Aflcr 

this, one Corps will be fielded pcr 

year through 1993. The nature or 

MSE requires that thc (iuard and 

Reserve units receive thc cquipmcnl 

at thc same [ime as thcir alliliatcd 

corps. 

Although fielding to the Total 

Army will take some time, MSE and 

SINC(;ARS will add an important 

new dimension to Engineer communications. The increased flexibility of these communications systems will significantly aid the limrly 

execution of Engineer missions in 

the AirLand battle. 

MAJ Mark C. McAvoy recei~sed hir 

coritrtrissiorr irt 1972frortt Taa.s A & 

M Urii~,ersify. He Iteld as.rig~ntertt.s us 

Brigade Coritmrrnicatior~s Plaloorr 

Leade,; Divi.siorr Radio OJficer, Cortrrtr~rrticatiorts Pluroort Lcodcr, BN(-

tali or^ Siptul Officer, Rrcr~titirtg An,o 

~11111/!1ulld .?~K,IU! (>fl;C~, 011 

rhe gerrerol sruf of .3rd SI/I/IO Corlrrtturt(t. He gra(11tatcd J,.o,r~ 111~Sigrrol 

CjJ]ic.c~r A(1h;arr~crl (>,r(i'se irr 1079 

mtd Corir111ar1~1urrd (;rn~cruI SIuJ 

ColIc~(, iri I%Sh. Hc, i.s c.~~,rcr~t!r' ul irrslnrctor art(/ Clricj; Corirbul Sr~/~/~orl 

Brur~ch, DCA, U.S.Ar7itg' Ertgir~eer 

Sclrool. 

-

- ANIARC-541131 

ANIARC- 11 4 

ANIARC-186 (VHF-FM) 

GARS both use the same frequency 

spectrum. This may result in mutual 

interference if operated in close 

proximity to each other. The frequency hopping capability will nd 

provide protection from this interference where radios are colocated. 

To solve these problems separate 

the antennas by at least 50 

meters or transmit at different 

times. If antennas arc on different 

vehicles, one vehicle can be moved 

and wire layed between thc CP 

telephone and the remoted vehicle. 

Antennas can also he separated 

from the location of the radio unit 

but this requires special equipment 

hat may not be available. Where 

concurrent transmissions must occur without separation, a third 

mcthod, known as spectrum sharing, is possible. However, this 

method involves soilie degradation 

in operational capability and is 

beyond the technical levcl of this articlc. 

--9le 

ANIARC-201 	 Arborne 


Transcetvet 


-

with all required elements, exccpt 

thc platoon, could be accomplished 

with either secure telephone or 

secure radio. It would include voice, 

written messages, and the use of 

computers. Communications with 

rlic platoon would be over secure 

radio but with a vast increase in 

reliability and survivability. 

As with any new system, there are 

certain drawbacks. All equipment in 

the MSE system is user owned, 

operated, and installed. Signal corps 

wircnicn will be removed from 

other non-signal units. The user will 

havc to dctcrminc thc ncarcst signal 

connection point and lay the wire to 

Ihirt localion. Constant training programs will also he needed. After iniLial training with new cquipmcnt 

training tcams. training will hc a 

unit rcsponsibilitv using availahlc 

materials or trainins packages froin 

the Signal Center at Ft. Gordon. 

Another disadvantage is that the 

MSRT radio units and thc SINC-
_>-. 

hy LTC Rohcrt .I. (irccnwalt, .lr. 

Although NTC and 

JRTC: are cxccllent training facilities, most units 

do m,t perlc)rm wcll and tend to 

rcpcat their predecessor's mistakes. 

in thc tlelcnsc, the OPFOR attackcr typically "blows through" obstacles, barely slowing, and crosses 

engagement areas with massed 

vehicles in minutes. 

In the attack, the BLUFOR unit, 

running into an obstacle, stops 

deild. Sitting lor long pcriods, while 

a small portion of the force 

attcmpts questionable, hesitant 

breaching clrorts, the unit is gradually dcstroycd hy overwatching fires. 

In almost cvcry case, the commander is rapidly overloaded by the 

numbcr ol decisions he's called 

upon to makc, in a vcry short time, 

and loses control. 

Why, artcr years of attendance at 

the National Training Center, aren't 

units more successful? One reason 

is that we fail to learn from the mistakes of others. Most commanders 

take their unit to a training center 

only once. Much like the 6 month 

engineer commanders in Vietnam, 

who did not understand the extent 

of the monsoon drainage problem 

or take measures to counter it until 

they personally had lived through a 

monsoon season, unit commanders 

do not understand the scope of the 

Doing well at the NTC is 

not really that hard -it 

simply requires hard 

preparation. 

problem until they personally lace 

the OFFOR in real life. 

We cannot bolvc the problems of 

the Army at the NTC. We can, 

OPFOR at the NTC 

however, ensure that engineers contribute to the commander's success 

and don't cause him additional difficulty. The causes and engineer 

solutions are quite simple, but as 

Clausewitz said, "In war, everything 

is simple but the simple is very difficult". 

Causes in the defense 

The OPFOR attacker moves very 

fast, far quicker than the maneuver 

commander expects. Thc dclcndcr 

has only a vcry short timc to cngasc 

OPFOR as he passes through the 

engagement areas. He finds it diflicult to counterattack, succcssfully, 

bccause the OPFOR speed carries 

him past the couutcrt~ttackcr. nut ol 

reach, and, normally controllers end 

the engagement. The OPFOR's 

speed early always allows him 

to operate inside the defcnder's 
decision window, limit his losses to 

fires, and dominate the battlefield. 

BLUFOR obstacles are inadequetcly pl:mncd and protected. The 

typical ohstaclc is shallow, linear, 

;~ndperpendicular to OPFOR's att:tck. These arc the simplest type of 

ohst;~clc 1 overcome, given the 

OPFOR hrcaching capabilities. Typically. the OPFOR knows more 

:~hout friendly obstacles than the 

friendly unit, hccausc hc has an outstanding reconnaissance ability to 

fioil.thcn~.oftcti ovcrwatching the insta1l;ttion. He also will prehreach 

obstacles before his attack, during 

limited visibility. 

BLUFOR cnginccrs r!e~*erreceive 

adcqu~~tcimc lo prepare defenses. 

Thc dcsirc to develop the best plan 

results in lengthy discussion and 

w;~rgatningin the TOC, with comtiiitndcrs PI-oviding minimal time 

after issuing their ordcrs for 

clelcnders to occupy and prepare 

pare their dcfcnses. Engineers plan 

ohstacles aficr the final siting of battle positions, leaving little time for 

thcir installation. The last minute 

decisions on h;~ttle positions result 

in cvcn later decisions on individual 

vehicle siting, requiring engineers to 

mass thcir effort on survivability 

positions. 

Causes in the offense 

Engineers don't understand how 

to fight as a part of a maneuver formation. They often pull their 

trailers in thc attack (see "How to 

Pack a Track", page 16, for related 

article on combat loading APCs), 

don't use the ground well in their 

movcmcnt techniques, and often are 

not well placed and integrated into 

the maneuver formation. 

A smooth, combined arms, instride or deliberate brcach almost 

never occurs. Thc attacking BLUFOR is most oficn surprised by an 

obstacle and hecomcs stallcd in 

front or it while organizing to 

breach. Units have not developed 

into an integrated team that exccutcs well-practiced "plays." Engineers employ ad hoc, inappropriate reduction operations, typically using grappling hooks or bangalore torpedoes in futile ways. 

Engineer solutions 

Doing well at the NTC is not really that hard-it simply requires 

hard preparation. The engineer 

must prepare a small number of tactical techniques, procedures and battle drills, and he must train to follow certain well-defined principles. 

The secret is to-

.Employ cficfive obstacles.

.Don't waste time.

.Learn to brcach three obstacles. 

Practice, practice, practice. 

Employ effective obstacles 

Obstacles must work! All obstacles must accomplish a critical 

component of the commander's 

plan. Individual obstacles should be 

designed to disrupt, turn, fs or 

block the enemy force. They must 

atrack the enemy's command and 

control within his formations and 

frustrate the execution of his plan. 

And they must slow his movement 

across engagement areas. This is acWhy, after years of 

attendance at the 

National Training 

Center, aren't units more 

successful? - ~ 

complished by employing obstacles 

tactically, not just to "reinforce lerrain", and by using short but deep 

segments-300 meters wide by 100 

meters deep. This ensures that 

breaching requires a significant effort, breaks up formations, and 

causes lateral motion in the engagement area. (For thc current student 

handout on obstacle employment 

tactics, write to Department of Combincd Arms, USAES, Ft. Belvoir, 

VA 22060-5341). 

The maneuver commander will 

take adequate precautions lo protect the obstacles only if they arc a 

critical part of his plan. His cnginecr must have developed credibility at home station and must he 

an integrated part of the h:~ttlcstaff 

planning process for this to happen. 

The OPFOR reconnaissance effort is superb. He will change his attack within hours prior to initiation 

based on results of his reconnaissance, if allowed free movcmcnl of 

his rccon forces before the battlc. 

An effective counter-rcconnaissancc 

operation (outposts and aggressive 

combat patrolling), along with supplemental battle positions adjacent 

to obstacles for periods of limited 

visibility, will make the engagcmenl 

area effective. 

Deceive, deceive, dcccivc! The 

OPFOR portrays an enemy with a 

highly-developed ability tu cxccutc 

breaches on the movc, with thc 

equipment to make this possible. 

He must, however, mass his forces 

and his breaching capahility at the 

proper location. Engineer effort can 

and should he used to dcccive. Shallow tank ditches look real from a 

distance. Equipment-generated dust 

clouds are a sign of positions being 

dug in. Dummy surface mines falsely suggest engagement areas. If 

OPFOR eyes (scouts) can be dcceived, he can be led to deliver his 

blow into thin air. 

Don't waste time 

There never is enough time to do 

all the engineer work necessary, and 

final decisions and siting of combat 

vehicles always occur at the last 

minute. Learn to bcgin cmplacing 

initial obstacles and constructing 

survivability positions immediately. 

If thc cnginecr is $ill wititing on 

maneuver dccisions, work can hcgin 

on long-range disruption ohst;tcles, 

which will slow OPFOR ilrriv;~land 

allow intclligcncc timc to analyze 

his attack. When engagement arcas 

are selected, turning obstacles to 

deflect his formations into them, 
and fing obstacles to slow his 

movement across them, can he 

startcd hcfore battle positions are 

actually sited on thc ground. Once 

fricndly battle positions are identified, survivability positions can be 

dug, hut the occupying unit must 

first precisely position their combat 

vehicles. If nothing clse, enginecr 

work in a dcccption area can be 

hegun hcforc thc actual defcnsc 

plans arc finished. 

Hreacli three obstacles 

Thc engineer has a simple breaching chi~llcnge at the NTC. Due to 

the terrain and the ROE, he only 

has to learn to handle three obstaclcs-a surface minefield, a tank 

ditch, and wire. There is no excuse 

for arriving without well-drilled techniques that engineers can employ 

virtuzilly i~utom;~tically, without wasted motion. 

Surri~cc mincficlds can he 

hrcachcd with MlCLlC or with dismounrcd soldiers with hand-placed 

charges. Ncithcr technique should 

take more than 10 minutes. nle 

brracll rit11s1 he rllurked so tltaf followirlg forcc,,~ call firid if fro111 a distarrcc. The hrcaching technique 

cmploycd depends on whether antitank or antipersonnel fire is the 

grcalcr thrci~t. In either case, the 

proccdure should hc exceptionally 

well-drillcd. Antitank ditches arc 

most easily breached with a CEV or 

with dismounted soldiers with 

shovels (a popular OPFOR technique in thc crumbly soil found at 

NTC). Using an AVLB, while possible, is gcncrally not the best solution because of AT fires. Wire is seldom installed in such dcpth or complcxity to justify usc of a bangalore 

torpedo. Using wire cuttcrs or simply driving ;I vehicle through, so that 

one track pushcs down a picket, will 

make a hasty comhi~t breach. A 

single vchicle disabled by wire while 

brcuching is still a bctter outcomu 

than scveral vehicles killed while 

waiting for a slower procedure. Fast 

proccdurcs to handle these three 

obstacles solve the NTC breaching 

problem. 

Practice, practice, practice 

Engineer units with great breaching procedures have failed at NTC. 

When asked if they practiced with 

the entire combined arms team at 

home station they almost always 

answcr, "yes-once." That's not 

practice, that's a demonstration. 

Combined arms breaching training 

Most units don't know 

how to rehearse -and 

rehearsing would solve 

most of their problems. 

requires repetitive practice -much 

like a football team repeatedly practices plays-to ensure that all 

players understand precisely what 

they're to do and the proper time sequencing of cvcnts. Thc commander's decision requirements must be 

minimized or he'll be overloaded 

and the breach will fail. Practicing 

with only one element of a task 

force is inadequate. Home station 

practice is the single most critical 

element of success at the NTC. 

(Proccdurcs iound in FC 90-13-1, 

nte 111-Sfride Breacll should be 

employed). Engineers need to understand as much about combat formations as their maneuver brothers-and this only occurs through 

constant practice. 

Rehearsals at NTC are the 

second practice element. While 

preparing for the attack, one of the 

assembly area requirements is to 

rehearse critical events - and 

brcaching known obstacles certainly 

qualifies. Building small models or 

known obstacles, and rehcarsing all 

elements, including fire support, 

minimizes confusion whcn the attempts are made under fire. Most 

units don't know how to rehearscand rehcarsing would solve most of 

their problems. 

In the past, most engineers concentrated on the technical aspects 

of their craft and shortchanged thc 

study of the tactical application. 

The epitome of engineer tadics was 

to properly task organize the engineers with the "right" command 

or support relationship, establish 

whether mobility, countcrmohiiity 

or survivability had thc priorityand then let battle commencc. Thc 

enginccr on thc bottom had to 

figure out what to do (and often 

how to do it) in order to support 

the maneuver commander. As engineer tactical understanding increases, and we learn better tcchniques and procedures, wc need to improve our application-so wc help 

thc commander win at thc NTC. By 

learning to employ cffcctivc obstacles, taking full advantage of 

available time, learning simple 

breaching techniques for the most 

common enemy obstaclcs, and hy 

practicing, practicing and practicing-we can learn to win both at the 

NTC and in actual combat. 

On the Art of War 

*The shock effect of tanks in the 

attack varies as the square of the 

number in the anack. 

*Learn to use terrain as a 

weapon against the enemy. 

*In the rules of Tactics and 

Bridging, there are no such words 

as "always" and "never". 

*My concept of the tank and 

tank warfare is based upon armored fighting vehicles, employed 

in such a way as to use its three 

weapons systems in this order of 

importance: 

-the tracks 

-the machine guns 

-the main gun 

*As fighting vehicles and equipment get heavier and heavier, the 

importance of the Combat Engineers. to help ensure mobility 

gets more and more important ... 

-Gen. Bruce C. Clarke 
THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER 


the observer/controller's perspective 

By C:PT David E. Jurgens 

%As 111(, trr~il waited for llte ;I?- 

corttirtg C-130 to lartd, 111e 

.sa/q>er plaloort 1i:ader lislcrted lo 1ti.s cor1y7artv cor?lrnurtder 

i.s.srre lhc operariorts order lo /he 

troq1.s. 

"AN ri~ltl, rttar," /Ire corttrttartdcr 

artrtorr~tcod "wPSF de/r/ovirt~10 a 

corrrrtn, culled Coribta or1 tlte Islar~d 

of Atlartticn irt tlte Caribhearr. We'll 

be a.s.sirrirtg /he local forces irt qtreflirt~ art instrrgertl trpri.sirtg. We'll lar~d 

at a friotdli) airbase irt abotrt fotrr 

horrrs, artd that 171arch lo our area of 

ol?eruliort.s. Silrruliort. mtntty for; 

CES... " 

Rather than a mythical island 

called Atlantica, this unit is, in fact, 

headcd for the hilly, rugged terrain 

of Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, as part 

of a spccial training cxcrcisc conducted by the .Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). 

In today's world scenario, light 

forces have a special mission. They 

are the Army forces that will be 

called upon first to move into hot 

spots anywhere in the world where 

a military presence is needed to 

protect U.S. lives and interests. The 

JRTC is the latest in a long line of 

changes designed to keep pace with 

the changing face of modern war. 

These ncw soldicrs-including 

the sapper-are members of units 

designcd to move rapidly by air and 

opcratc under austere conditions. 

To fight using only what you can 

carry is a big responsibility. It requires soldicrs who are well-disciplined, well-motivated, and abovc 

all, well-trained. 

In the last dccadz, the Army has 

placcd increased emphasis on improved training. The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, 

revolutionized training for heavy 

units. However, the desert terrain 

and exercises which were ideal for 

heavy combat units are inappropriate for light forces. 

As a result, the Army developed 

a light force oriznted adrranced collective training center, headquartered at Little Rock Air Force 

Base, in the Ozark Mountains of 

west-central Arkansas. 

The Joint Readiness Training 

Center (JRTC) focuses on the kcy 

training objectir,es of light forces 

which are not available at home stations. These missions are carried 

out against a redirected opposing 

The JRTC is the latest in 

a long line of changes 

designed to keep pace 

with the changing face of 

modern war. 

force (OPFOR) which wears a distinctive uniform and fights according to the tactics used by thc Soviet 

surrogates. It offers a flexible training outline, modified to match a 

deploying unit's mission essential 

task list (METL). As a result, no 

two deployments are totally the 

same. Therc are, however, several 

standard phascs in most rotations. 

So, let's return to our sapper 

platoon lcadcr and his unit in Atlantica to observe how they might perform during the various phases of 

thcir training mission. 

Phase I, Deployment 

nre 12-kilort~elcr forced rttarclt 

&III llte airltead to /Ire urra of operalior~s ga~'e llte Sapper Lietrlerrarrl 

ar1tl)le lirtte lo r~ttrll over how his 

platoort sltotrld clear tlrc jirrwar(1 

lartdirtg strip. 77te sigh1 of his soldiers 

sweepirlg wit11 rttir~e deleclorr r7turle 

hint wortder if ihe Conir~iuri rsbels 

had rttir~ed /Ire slril~. "771is ltas go1 lo 

be dorte rigltl, " he said lo ltis ylaroor~ 

sergeart/. "We dorl'l get art), cqtrip111t.rtt rrrttil lltis sfrip 1,s cleared." He 

added to himself; "I cart jrrsr sce 

a C-130 rollirtg over art mtfilurtk ri~i~re 

wltile lar~ding " 

The hallmark of effective light forces is the speed and efficiency with 

which they can "move out." This is 

true even before they reach a combat area. Moving a combat unit and 

all of its support personnel is far 

from easy. Relatively few people get 

to see the complex logistics that are 

involved in moving about 1,200 soldiers and their gear to a remote 

location. 

The process of deciding what 

equipment is needed to conduct 

combat operations, and how it will 

be loaded, transported, and 

protected at the other end of the 

journcy, is a major step in re a I'ism 

that is seldom exercised. Just taking 

care of those intricate dctails is a 

major training accomplishment in itself. 

To ensure a unit performs this 

vital phase properly, JRTC observericontrollcrs (OiCs) arc assigned to work with a unit months 

before that unit actually deploys to 

the JRTC. This team coordinates 
with the unit to ensure that the 

Operations Order is written specifically for thc unit's mission and to 

mcct that unit's brigade commandcr's training objectives. The 

OiC team deploys to the unit's 

homc station 3-5 days prior to the 

start of the 10-12 day rotation in 

order to explain the rules of engagement, discuss how MILES will be iucorporstcd into the exercise, and 

provide an initial operations order. 

These OiCk remain with the unit 

throughout thc exercise, providing 

constant feedback. They even dcploy with thc unit to Atlantica, hy 

whalcver entry method the unit 

uscs: aircraft, airborne or air assault. 

Phase 11, Low Intensity Conflict 

"A1 ierrvl we go1 lire c~cilirtg job," 

tire Salqler Plaloort Leader llroltgirl 

lo 1tirrr.relf. "We corrld he dirn'rig 

prorecri~v posifiorts artd entplacbtg 

obsracles in sttppori of tlre BSA 

(Brigade Srrl~porf Area) artd Tearti 

A viariort." 

Afler seeirtg tlte h~.srrr~ertl hase 

carilp, ltowe~ar, 11c wa.s no, so sure. 

Suipportirzg [lie irifarrtry co~i~pany's atlack on an irtsilrgenf base had 

soltrtded easy lotti1 he weill on llte 

leader's recori. ntg had reaclred a 

poirrt about 300 rlteters frorrr the 

ertenty positiort, rigl~t lo file otrler bell 

of wire artd ritines. 771e Sal~per had 

rter'er seer1 so ntirclt wire aroltrtd a 

/Jlaloo/t-.~i;ed posifion. arid he collld 

see rtlrriterolu lrip wire., frorrz arttipersorirtel riiirzes. "If's a good fltirig we 

reltearsed rhe close assarrN breacltirig 

wirlt tltc irtfarrtry, " Ire 1110i~gItf. "rite 

way 011r firsf reltearsal wertf, rtorle of 

its wottld ltave rliade it tltrorrglt tltese 

obsracles." 

During the low-intensity conflict 

(LIC) phase, insurgents operate in 

squad and team-sized elements intent on undermining confidence in 

the existing government. They accomplish this through sniper attacks, booby traps, and other guerrilla-type operations against the native 

military and any supporting U.S.forces. 

Upon reaching their area of 

operations, the U.S. troops must establish and defend its air line of 

communication (ALOC). Engineer 

support in LIC presents some interesting challenges. The insurgents 

are not likely to attack a deployed, 

combat ready infantry company, so 

the engineer priority is to reinforcing "soft" targents such as class I11 

and V supply points and aircraft 

rearm and refuel points. Some engineer units will also bc cmploycd 

clearing and reclearing the road networks in the arca, or cmplacing 

obstacles to support the defense of 

the ALOC. 

Meanwhile, the infantry forces 

are defending lhc ALOC: and 

searching for insurgcnl hascs. As 

soon as a base camp is disci~vercd, 

an infantry unit, with engineer support, moves in lor the attack. 

Phase 111, Mid-Intensity Conflict 

(Defense) 

Sirlirtg irt rlte corrtpary TOC lhc~ 

Supl~er plaroort icud~*r Ji~tislted ltis 

porliort of /lie obstacle 11lart. Alpha 

corrt~~art~~ was desiguured rite forward 

cor?rparty iri tlte ill-deptlt urrtiuni~or 

dcfertsc, artd /he ob,stacle l~lari was 

nitical. His plaroort was alrea&, 

The JRTC scenario takes a unit through a broad range of possible 

missions, including deployment, low intensity conflict, defense and phase IV 

offense. 
CPT Kula (right), Engineer ObserverIController, revlows the de.;ens~ve 

obstacle wlth LT Hollis from 29th ID (L). 

RTO. "Orrc ci~ii:do^. Ld:\ 

bt~ril< /I(IcI< IO ('It(ir1i1' Coi7:/?ari)> aizd 

. : I I I fir I ) 1 

a'q: cve'll cl:wk IIOK: 1111' D-5,s u,rr 

~v,r~ri,l,qr>12 ihc orrlilo~rk (1it1:li. " 

In Phnsc 111 oi thc trainine- sccnaricl, cncmv iurces invadc the 

mythical country oC Corlina in 

rcsponsc to the U.S. troop prcscncc. Thr I . t;isk forcc must 

deicnd airinst an atvacking forcc 

consisting primarily oi dismounted 

inlantry supported hy some mechaniycd inCalitry and tanks. This is 

the light Iorce's toughcst challcngestopping a mechanire(l force in 

restriclivc terrain. During this phasc 

the units cstahlish a defensive position aimcd at prevontiny a pcnctration into Cortina. Thc companies 

arc ilrreycd in-depth with the antiarmor wcitpons sited on cngagcment 

iirci~s along likcly avcnocs of mech- 

;:nixd a[,pro;~cli. The infilntrv'n 

poel is to dcCcat thc cncmy dismounts. In Arkansas. thcsc mid-intcnsity m;~ncuvcrs take on added 

rcalism l>ccaiz\c ihc rogscd, wooded 

cn\:ironmcn~ clo.;cly rcsctnblcs many 

undcrdcvclopcd nrcits or thc world 

with its limited visibility, and 

rcstrictcd niol,ility. 

. - - ~, 

"MuI, as y11r kiiow: l/t(! hulfctlioi~ 

itas heoi @I'WI llie iiiis.si~~~ ir~co~trl~rcl 01: iitfiilmlio!: olluck," 111~ supper- lictrlm~ai~r or~r~orr~rccd to 11i.r

trool?.~. "BI~NI'O Co!iiyaizy 11u.s ihc, riiisContrary to yesteryear's 

training exercises, 

bullets don't 

automatically appear at 

9 a.m. every morning ... 

siorl, aid it looks like we'x goirlg 

will: llleii~. See rl~at ridge to rllc sotill: 

of IIS?" 77:c l~r~rtcriarit i)oir~ted lo [lie 

ridgeli~le6 liilo~l~cters away aild ow>r

100 r?tele!:r l~iglier tlzn11 rlre potrrtd 

wlterp lie MJUS stuiidii:g. "lt'r ca~lecl 

tlte DeidiS Buckburlc OIIY ubjetli~,e 

is oil 111e ofltersitic." 

During the dcfensc. inrclligcnce 

sourccs identify an enemy division 

cooin~and p11st and scveral logistical 

sitcc. In the offense phasc. the C1.S. 

task lorcc ~niihsion is to infiltrate 

encmy lines and strike to ihe enemy 

rear, crippling the OPFOR hcadquartcrs and/or support operations. 

The engineers providc critical 

breaching support during the final 

asca:llrs on the encmy positi~ns. 

Tlie Joint Concept 

ntc .sa/?j~ef liet~rnta~rtg/riitc(,i! II!, 

or 111e pLldiirg sorrir(i nho\,e !rbii. Tltc 

,4-I0 "7?1r11ider/~oi/.~" 11:1:icI! /:u~l ji.\f 

flo~v~:(i~~cr-l~c~u~l .sec,ii~e(/ to .SI(III~s~ill.

Fro~iz lit^, lop of 111~I(II~CI Itiii, dii?, 

cilr.sl uir(1 .oiloke w I r/r(' 

&70l(11(1. '~1~111.strr<, g1u/t 11c.k 011 ol!r 

side." llrc 1itt1111 Ilto~tlt. LC's 

tlt(i/t UI: Itotrr Iulcr It<, uguirr ~r~~~ir~l !It<. 

scr~~ari:ir~ sori~~ii q/'a dii'irl~ jet. aird 

threr* 1rin:seY ro lire pnlr~rdus lic 

r-c~u1i:ed 11:ut r:ohtJ, /:is IIII~IIOU,\ tl~!~urg<,1. 

Thc .IRTC: rcprcscnts a majr,r 

breakthrough in thc military's in~croperahilit? truclurc. In thc p;:st. 

whcncvcr thc Army nccdcd 111 

deploy somcwherc Cor cithcr an ;ictu;~l mission 11r Cor oCf-[>i~sl !raining. 

thc Air Force would gct the call to 

move troops and equipment 111 their 

clestination. What this n~c;rnt i;,r 

130th surviccs was t1i;ti thc success 

or Cailurc ol each mission w;ls Iiil-ormiss tlcpending on coordination elforts. aircraft availability, etc. 

Tht: collocating of the .IRTC with 

thc 314th Tactical Airlift Wing at 

Little Rock Air Forcc Base h;ts significantly inlprovcd the training oi 

both Army and Air Force pcrsonncl. The 314th flies (he turho-prop, 

C-130 cargo plancs. The C:-130,thc 

"workhorse or the military," is inlportant to light forces operations hccause the plane can get supplies to 

ground forces in [orward areas, 

landing on dirt strips or dropping 

parachute loads in places whcre the 

larger, faster jet cargo aircraft cannot opcrate. 

Other Air Forcc unit fron~ hibcs 

throughout the country are als11 involved in thcsc joint o[)cra:icrns. 

Their plancs include the hupc ('-5 

which supports cxcrciscs hy llying in 

clismantled hclic~,ptcrs. ;and tl~e 

C'-141 cargo jets which fcrry in solllicrs and supplies. 

Many smaller Air Forcc aircraft -

n<~rably lighter plancs and (actical 
bombers- practice close air support 

nissions durin! each .IRTC: rotal>*!>P. 

TL.c inciu~io~i (>I- [lie Air Force

plilncc in .lQ.T(.: ~!xercircs has done 

T;tr,ri: lhnn i!,iprotc ~hc 11-ainins of 

i , ii: : I i~nil tactical , . .:oct;.ltr(, li'i ?rii~iiplccl Armv Icadcr.~:t, IX~:?;!~L :nore tlli,ro~$IiIy iijr 

c0:17!?:!t. C'i:!iti-a!!: to !;cstcrye;tr's . . Ir;ll!i:,>gs:rv t:i\i\. I,iillcts d~~n't aur<,-

I : ! ! : at a.m. cverv 

i;!i,i-nini:-ihcir dclivcry hiir tu l~c 

planned. processed, and exccuted 

lhroueli propcr channels, and the 

delivcry is made undcr combat conditions. The same goes for food and 

medicine. Casualh, treatment and 

cvacuirtion is all donc in real world 

time with available assets. Attention 

to detail inlust be cxcrciscd when 

cr,n:,idering c-,,cry itan necdcll un 

he b;ittlcfield. Verv little. if anythin.3, is administriitivelv simulated. 

This realistic participation of the 

Air Forcl: in .IRTC excrciscs takcs 

on additional importancc when you 

rcalize its planes will he the key link 

in thc supply systcrn [or any overseas conflict. For this reason, rhc 

n t aspect of excrciscs ;kt thc 

!RTC will probably he cxpondcd to 

include thc Nay and Marins Corps. 

Since it was cstahlisiicd in 1087. 

thc Joint Readiness Traininn C:cn[cr 

Ihns filled a hie Zap in thc Armb's 

training of the liaht !'orccs, Thc 

Ccnter has heen ahlc t11 cli~iiinatc 

;nost of {he negativc as?cct\ <ti carlier trainin,! methods ancl actui~ilv 

train r, coldier eccorcline to thc 

doctrinal standards hc will tic expected to accomplish in cornhat. Actions and lessons lcarncd arc all 

hroughl together al niter-i~ction 

reviews (AARs) conrluctcd pcriodicallv throughout the cxcrcisc. 

Thcsc less(,ns arc taken liomc with 

the unit to be incorporated into 

their future training plans. 

It's hcing able to mcct tlic>sc 

standards that meiins thc mo~t-l~ccause that's what will savc lives in 

combat. Too oltcn in thc pas(. our 

soldirrs had to get realislic tr:iining 

on thc actual battlefields of France, 

Germany. Korca. and Vietnam. 

Many of them didn't learn thc right 

lessons before they died. For this 

reason. the JRTC and its training innovalions are invaluablc. Today's 

.Joint Readincss Training Ccnter exercises may aid in prcvcntine U.S. 

light forces from payinp thz ultimate 

price on future battlefields. 

CPT David E. ht&errs is crtn-e~~r!~' an 

!rlslnrcror and docmrirzc wrifcr ill riic 

Tachcr, Truirzirzg arid Docfrirlc Di- 

~?siorr of tile Dc/>urin~e~ir of Curilhirzcd An11.s a1 r11e Er(<<r~err Sri~ool, 

Fort Bchoir. A godlrure or EOAC 

ar~d EOBC, lie !IWS 11ir EII,~~II(<CI 

Scllool ,-e(lwserz1olii'e iri rile cie~~r/o~~- 

11in1r of rile JRTC, urld i~arfici/~uled 

ill rile fbsl hue unblir~p iwlaric~rls. 

At a Joint Readiness Training Center, aircrews offload a 

helicoper from the massive C-5. 
w'ngineer Problem 

YOU are the comn lander of i3 neavy atvlslon engineer corn lpany atta' ched 

to a bala .nced arm' or task for ce (TF). The task force missio n is to cor tduct .. .A A

a deliberaw atlatin LV uesiruy a BTR company established III a UCIIU, 8. :- -
A..,:L 

The make-up of the company teams is IS follows: 

TM Dismount TM Mech 

3 Bradley platoons 2 Bradley platoons 

1 Tank platoon 1Tank platoon 

TM Tank Tank Co (-1 

2 Tank platoons 2 Tank platoons 

1 Bradley platoon 

The TF's scheme (>f maneuver is to ha ve TM Tar ~k and Tank Co (-) estabiish over watch po: sitions ant 1 attack ot ~jectivesC)OG and CAT by fir6 ?. On , .c. .. . ~ ~~ ~ , ~ . ~ oroer, snln rlres rrorn oolective DO' G. TM Dismount attacks (in itiaily 

mounted) along axis JILL, then dismounts its \ the vicint ty of 

CP 1 and continues attack to seize and secut le DOG. IJpon 

seizure of objective DOG, TM Mech attacks along axls JACK, conc jucts 

an in-st1,ide breac :ical obsti ~cies, anc i assaults to seize and 

secure (,bjective 1 TM Tank and Tank Co (-) fc~llow TM Ivlech .%... . atuna axis JACK. 

lount has the mission to attack, seize, a! ~d secure objective DOG .A- -L:--.:. .- , allu lllert lo support by fire the TF's attack on uujecuve CAT. The company team commander accomplishes his mlssion by attacking the 

enemy platoon from the flank with two dismounted infantry platoons supported by their Bradley vehicles and a Tank platoon (vicinity CP 2) 

3 close-in 

,.^A ^ .,.:. 

provide I) that he Ican use in tnted or ntounted ro 

needed. 
- Engineer Problem 


BREACHlASSAU 

MOUNTED ATTA 

LI 


lELlBERATE ATTACK OVERWA - TCH.. 

xxxxp ~ -

MOUNTED 


ACHIASSI 


ENEMY 

to Answer 

Identify tlie critical engineer 1:asks by company tieam requi 


~rtthe task(force deliberate attack. 


2.Determine the amount of engineer personnel and equipment needed 

to accomplish the mission. 

3. Develop the engineer task organization. 

oage 39. 
COMBAT ENGINEER SAPPER SQUAD 


QUALIFICATION COURSE 


By CPT John Lock 

Re;llis!ic, motivating, and challcng~ng training is extremely diflicult to conduct successfully in a 

garrison cnvironment. The 16th 

C'omhat Engineer Battalion, 1st 

AD. Nurllhurg, Germany, overcame 

somc or these garrison training 

prohlcms with the development of a 

Sapper Squad Qualification Course 

(SSOC). 

This course was developed and 

implcmentcd to instill a sense of 

competition among the line squads 

and LC) evaluate their level of 

proficiency on sapper squad tasks. 

The SSOC consisted of the following tasks: Catamount Course, Squ;td 

Dcfcnsc, Buddy AidICrew Extraction, NBC Reaction, Squad Maintcn;tnce, Point Minefield Battle 

Drill. Hasty Breach of a Minefield 

Batrlc Drill, Deliberate Road Cratcr Battle Drill, Breach an Antitank 

Ditch for APC Traffic, and an Engineer Assault Course. These 10 

t;tsks were chosen for their GDP-relatcd skills and tc~ted during an intense two-week evaluation phase. 

Each event was designed to 

solidily small unit cohesion and 

strengthen troop-leading proccilures. Thc Catamount Course was a 

specially designed obstacle course. 

The course, run one soldier at a 

time, assessed time penalties lor 

railurc to negotiate obstacles corrcclly. An average time per man 

was thcn calculated for each squad 

to dctcrrnine a final score. 

Squad DeSense dealt with marksmanship and fire control. With the 

aid nl a pop-up target range, each 

squad was placed on line with 100 

rounds of 5.5Omm. Then within two 

minutes. 100 targets in a preplanncd 

scqumcc were raised and engaged 

by the scluad. (;ood marksmanship 

and fire control were necessary il a 

squad desired to do well. 

The Buddy AidICrew Extraction 

drill was designed to increase a 

squad's ability to provide immediate 

medical assistance to fellow soldiers 

on the battlefield. With two simulated casualties (medics) trapped in 

an APC, this site nas cvaluatrd by 

the battalion's physician's assistant 

and provided some very realistic 

medical training. This type of training is similar to that taught by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to its 

soldiers; training that has, for them, 

resulted in a number of lives saved 

that would otherwise have been lost. 

The NBC Reaction drill consisted 

of individual and collective NBC 

tasks: Put On and Wear Protective 

Clothing, Drink Water While in 

MOPP IV, Restore Breathing Using 

the Back-Pressure Arm Lift Method of Resuscitation, and a MOPP 

Gear Exchange. This site was conducted and evaluated by the battalion NBC NCO. 

The Squad Maintenance portion 

of the SSQC was run and evaluated 

by BMO warrant officers and senior 

NCOs. Squads went through this 

event with all their assigned equipment: M113A2 w~th trailer, caliber 

.SO machine gun, communications, 

and mine detectors. If its equipment 

was deadlined for other than organizational deficiencies, a squad 

was authorized to use a corresponding piece of equipment from the 

platoon leader's assets. IT equipment was deadlined for organizational deficiencics, this constraint 

procided an excellent incentive to 

get that piece of equipment off the 

deadline report. Each squad 

brought its vehicle into the evaluation site and condueled belore, 

during, and after PMCS, during 

which time the BMO evaluators 

asked specific questions in reference to the equipment. Upon the 

completion of this event. the squad 

had no doubts, whatsoever, how to 

properly conduct maintenance on 

its equipment and the BMO had 

firsthand knowledge about that 

squad's level of training and the 

status of its equipment. 

The Point Mineficlcl, Hasty 

Brcach of a Mincficld, and Dcliberate Road Crater tasks wcrc all 

standard engineer hattlc drills developed by the unit. The Brcach en 

Antitank Ditch For APC Traflic was 

more ol a team-building task than it 

realistic mission. Faced with hrcaching a very real tank ditch, the squad 

had to gel its APC across will1 only 

the use of picks, shovcls, and physical stamina to assist them. With 

time as their enemy, these squ;tds 

worked until they dropped. 

The final and most challcnging 

event was the Engineer Assault or 

"Rambo" course. MILES supported, this course combined the combat engineer's primary rolc of combat multiplier with his secondary 

role of inrantryman. To successli~lly 

complele this course, the engineer 

squad had to negotiate a playing 

field-nearly 200 meters long, hy 50 

meters wide-to destroy an cnemy 

machine gun bunker located ;I[ the 

far end. Monng onto the field of 

play in their track, the squad was 

forced to dismount and employ a 

bangalore torpedo to open a passage through a triple st;~ndard concertina wire ohstaclc. While crcwserved wcdpons pmvidcd supportive fires, thc squaJ hrc;~chc(l this 

obstacle and a suhscqucnt linear 

"minefield". Moving forward, 111c 

scluad was once itgain k~rccd to dismount irorn its carricr when it cncountered an antitank ditch lillcd 

with concertina. From this point the 

squad had to fire and maneuver 

through the tank ditch, a second 
I 

wire obstacle and a trench network 

to destroy the bunker with a satchel 

charge. The M60 machine gun firing 

from the hunker and two armed 

enemy soldiers, randomly located 

on the battlefield, taught our soldicrs many valuahle lessons. Armed 

with smoke, practice hand grenades, 

and simulated demolitions, the sapper squad faced an exceptional challenge. 

There is a great deal of planning 

and coordination that must take 

place to ensurc the success of this 

squad qualification course. Local 

training areas (LTAs), ranges, ammunition, training aids, schedules, 

and digging assets must be coordinated. Site OICINCOIC selection 

is extremely important. Tasks such 

as NBC, Maintenance, and Buddy 

Aid have their own specialists on 

the battalion staff. Line company officers and senior NCOs should be 

selcctcd as evaluators lor the remaining events. The experience and 

knowledge of each evaluator is extremely important, for he will have 

a tremendous impact for his particular event upon the training 

standards of every line squad in the 

battalion. For the good of the battalion and the individual soldier this 

impact needs to be positive and constructive. 

For each event, a task, condition, 

and standard must be developed 

and pr6yided to the chain of eommand, down to squad level. To ensure that no doubts exist as to what 

is expected for each task, performance standards explain in a stepby-step manner exactly what is to be 

evaluated. These performance standards should be produced in draft 

form, first, and circulated among 

the commanders and site evaluators 

to correct any doctrinal problems or 

errors. Once finalized, these standards must be provided down to 

squad leader level in a timely manner. All squads must be given 

enough time to train to standards. 

Rewards and recognition serve as 

very powerful motivators for any soldier. The results of all squad evaluations were posted in the mess hall 

for all to view. The four squads with 

the highest point scores and all 

"GOs" were selected as Dislinguished Sapper Squads with the 

squad attaining the highest score 

designated as the Top Sapper 

Squad. Each member of the Top 

Sapper Squad received an AAM, a 

trophy, a four-day pass from the battalion commander, and a specially 

designed pennant for their APC. 

This course also proved 


to be valuable to the 


commanders for they got 


a realistic "snap shot" of 


the status of training 


and maintenance within 


their units. 


The other Distinguished Sapper 

Squad members received a threeday pass from the Battalion Commander and a specially designed 

pennant for their APCs. Of the 

remaining squads, those that 

received all "GOs" were designated 

as Expert Sapper Squads, while 

those receiving one "NO GO" out 

of the 10 events were designated as 

Qualified Sapper Squads. All 

qualified squads have a specially 

designed logo stenciled on their 

APCs designating their level of 

qualification. Those squads with 

two "NO GOs" or more were 

deemed unqualified. Of 36 squads, 

only 18 squads met the standards 

for expert or distingushed, while 

four squads were judged unqualified. 

Evaluators should be flexible but 

should not compromise on standards. Equity in scoring and evaluating can be difficult, at best, when an 

event spans two weeks and involves 

36 line squads. But with stabilized 

evaluators and standardized score 

sheets, these difficulties can be kept 

to a minimum. 

As the developer of this course, I 

hoped to provide the best and most 

realistic training possible under 

peacetime constraints to the soldiers of my battalion. In Men 

Against Fire, S.L.A. Marshall states, 

"The fundamental purpose of all 

training today should be to develop 

the natural faculties and to stimulate the brain of the soldier." 

believe this course served that purpose and after-action reviews by 

evaluators were critical to achieving 

that end. Feedback on performance 

is needed immediately after the 

completion of any training, while 

the images are still fresh in the soldier's mind. Nothing is more important than the correction of training 

deficiencies or the reinforcemcnt of 

positive performance. 

This course offered a bit of something for everyone. It provided the 

soldier with the best and most challenging training he had had in many 

years, and he enjoyed doing it. This 

course also proved to be valuable to 

the commanders for they got a 

realistic "snap shot" of the status of 

training and maintenance within 

their units. This "snap shot" proved 

to be a real eye opener to the 

deficiencies and strengths uncovered. 

Finally, one of the best features 

of the course is that it is branch independent. With a few changes 

here and there, any branch can 

operate this course successfully, in a 

number of variations. Run twice a 

year, this type of course will 

rejuvenate any garrison training 

program. 

CPT John D. Lock is currently tlte 

contnrander of C Conrparty, 307th 

Eit@iteer Battalioil, 82d Airbontc Division, Fort Brag, NC. He was 01-

listed for four yean prior to receieirtg 

11;s contritissiort at USMA. CPT 

Lock's drrty positions wit11 Ute 16tlt 

E~rgineer Battaliort, IAD, FRG included platoon leadel; co1npa1t.y XO, 

and assistant S3. CPT Lock is also a 

,qadlratc of IOAC. 
THE BASICS FOR GOOD COMBAT 


ENGINEER MULTIPLICATION 


lessons for successful engineer operation 

Seldom in our ~nilitary carcers do we, the professional soldiers, get to practice war end do so with almost all 

the realities of the battlefield. Seldom do leaders get to try their 

(~pcri~tion;tlplans in a situation in 

which human error, equipment and 

personnel limitations, imagination, 

initiative, and just plain good luck 

all play a part. Seldom do we get to 

see the real impact that combat multiplicrs-artillery. air defense, aviation, engineers, combat intelligence, 

NBC, and communications- have 

on the armor and infantry maneuver 

forces fighting the battle. These opportunities are now available at the 

U.S. Army's National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 

Many lessons from the NTC battlefield are learned, relearned and 

studied by the professionals in our 

Army today. A large percentage of 

our divisional combat soldiers get to 

experience a rotation at the NTC. 

Unfortun;~tely there are many soldiers who can only read, study, and 

hcar of thc cxpcricnces other soldiers havc while participating in a 

force-on-fcircc c~pcration. Thcsc soldiers miss an opportunity we all 

should havc: to prcparc ourselves to 

accomplish our ultimate mission. 

Therefore. this article is aimed at 

engineer soldiers who do not have 

an opportunity to fight at the NTC 

or participate in task force operations. 

Combat engineers have become 

cxiremcly important to both the 

Engineers cannot be left 

out of the planning and 

be expected to perform 

the mission. 

BLUFOR and OPFOR units at the 

NTC. This article will discuss ways 

to ensure that these engineers are a 

true combat multiplier, not just an 

additive, to the task forces. Combat 

engineers have always played a 

major role in our Army's past successes. The combat engineer units 

with BLUFOR and Corps cngincer 

units that augmcnt the OPFOR play 

a major role on the NTC battlefield 

in both offensive and defensive missions. Often they are he soldiers located at the turning point in the battle. Thc following four lessons will 

almost always ensure the cngineer 

and commandcr havc a successful 

engineer operation. These lessons 

arc basic and in most cases, ones 

you have becn taught in school. 

Know commander's intent 

Lesson number cine is to always 

know the commander's intcnt. No 

matter how often you have read it, 

heard it in class or from your superiors, you still can scc e~iginccrs 

trying to do their job without really 

knowing the commander's intcnt. 

Whether on the offense or dcfcnsc, 

the engineer must know [lie ammander's intent and thcir role in the 

operation. They must he able to explain this concept hack to the commander and most importantly, to 

thcir soldiers. The engineers cannot 

be discounted by the maneuvcr cc~mmanders because they are newly assigned or unfamiliar with thc unit. 

Engineers cannot be left out of 

the planning and be expected to perform the mission. Numerous defensive operations at the NTC have 

shown that the commander and the 

engineer havc different conccpts on 

how thcir defense is going to kill thc 

OPFOR. All too ol'tcn, thc c~immander will have a clear intent 21s to 

how he will try to mancuvcr the 

cncmy forccs into thc kill ionen. 

Studying the cngincer plan, you lind 

the obst;tclcs will not support thc 

plan. We have sccn obstaclcs that 

deflect or force the OPFOR out of 

the main kill zones to a placc 
that allows an easy bypass. Most 

reccntly, an OPFOR regimental attack \Gas guided lo tha BLUFOR 

lclt llilnk by obstacles and the regiment was able to roll the unit op 

lrom it's flank. Obstacles placed 

must sunnort . the commander's in- . tcnt, not just the terrain. Engineers 

working in a vacuum, even though 

working hard, must understand 

what their work is going to accomplish or it is wastcd effort. 

Cover obstacles 

The second lesson is that 

obst;~clcs must be covered by observation and lires. In a way, this ties 

into thc firs1 lesson. This is taught in 

;rII the combat arms schools. It is 

the subject I' many articles and 

talked ;~l>out hy our leaders. Yet it 

is pnorly practiced on the NTC battlcficld. This simple rule has lost 

many a battle for the rotational 

onits ant1 won many a battle for the 

OPFOR in lhcir motorized rifle 

company (MRC) defenses. In ohserving and participating in many 

OPFOR dclcnscs over the past six 

months I havc seen many varying 

and fires. If the obstacles are not 

covered, then the engineer must inlorm the commander. This can only 

be done by being on the ground 

with the units when the ohstaclcs 

and fighting positions are being 

sited. The commander on thc 

ground must also ensure the ohstacles suppod the survivability positions and battle plan. This cannot 

be assumed to automatically happen, as is often seen, when the commander hands the engineer a map 

and says, "Put this defense in." This 

situation is headed for failure. Both 

men must position thc obstacles and 

fighting positions together on the 

ground. Having the cnginecr position the obstacles and fighting positions would be like having thc cnginecr tell the mancuvcr cornm;rnder how to place his vchiclcs and 

units. When the commander and cngineer mark the positions, it must 

be done correctly the first time, so 

as not to waste valuable cnginccr 

equipment and unit lime. In the 

U.S. Army, engineer assets arc 

scarce. It is counter-productive to 

have engineers redig survivability 

positions or move obstacles as a result of poor initial planning. 

Control Engineer assets 

Since engineer units, equipment, 

and materials are a scarce, valuablc 

asset, the engineer commandcr 

must have a good command and 

control system set up to contrrrl 

them. This is the third lesson. In all 

The combat eneineer 

unitS with BLUFORand 

Corps engineer 

units..-~la~ major role 

on the NTC 

battlefield ~~~~~ ~ ...Often thev 

are the soldiers locatid 

at the turning point in 

the battle. 

obstacle plans defeat the BLUFOR 

unit just because the OPFOR 

covers its obs~acles. The OPFOR 

does not have the patent on the perfect obstaclc plan; their unit commanders and engineers are also 

learning with each defense and yet 

they will most always be successful 

because they follow the one basic 

rule-cover ail your ohrlacles will1 

ohsen~afion arrdfims. 

The maneuver commander owns 

the ground and is therefore the 

boss. The engineer must ensure that 

the obstacles placed support the 

maneuver commander's tactical 

plan and are covered by observation 

F' 
 ?, 

operations, the engineer comman-

.. - :.r, der must inform the maneuver com- a .. ,. ., i. 

.,. 

L 

C-

,.. . . 

.e 

..Q 

--.% / 

> 

) 

.:- 

'*Lp\ 

h ..

.

.-

.

.."~ 

<

., :.. . v.. -1 i. , , 

mander and if there is one, use thc 

commandcr's engineer staff scction. 

Information is a must in a maneuver 

unit and it is the samc in irn cngineer unit even if the cnsinecr 

MTOE docs not support ihc re1: .--. quired comrnunicati,>n cquipmsnt. 

The engineer commandcr must set 

k:.' 

Y 

.. 

: < 

... 

up a simple system that works and 

the cnginccrs at all lavcls within thc 

command must keep cach other informed on the current status. 

Pounding pickets for a concertina fence. 
I 

!. i 

.* ~*.. ..? . . . , 

.

. (.Z *1 

. . . ., 

." ' A, 

To plan propcrlv, ~lic commander 

nr stall' enginccr must know thc current status ol' equipment, personnel, 

and material. So ol'tcn engineer 

units supporting the OPFOR do not 

undcrstsnd thc importance of this 

siniplc rulc. The samc is probably 

truc in lhc BLUFOR units. Thc engineer unit should have a good 

operations scction, one that knows 

the current stati~s of its units and cnginccr work and forwards this information to higher headqoarters. 

Withoul up-to-date status. the maneuver commalidcrs could make incorrect decisions I change their 

plan, without concern for the extended enginccr effort. Always 

know what your unit is doing and inform your bosses on your successes 

and failures so they can plan accordingly. 

Lieutenants milst lead 

Enginccr licutcnants 111ust Icarn 

from thc beginning that thcy are 

leaders, not managers. They must 

bc tcclinically and lactically proficient in thcir combat jobs. This is 

lesson numher four. Occasionally, 

you ohscrvc cnginccr licutcnants 

leading fron) thc Cront seat of a 

CUCV while the soldiers accomplish thc mission under the con- 

,. 

trol of the platoon scrgeant or 

squad leader. Engineer leaders 

must bc likc armor and infantry 

leadcrs-up front leading the way, 

setting the example, ensuring the 

work is being done correctly. 

Platoon leaders must be the expert 

on the ground. Although they usually do not have all the expertise ol 

the platoon sergeant, they must 

learn to bc an en~ineer expert. In 

school thcy must be taught tactics 

so they will understand what the 

maneuver commander is trying to 

accomplish. At their unit they must 

learn the capabilities of their equipment, their fighting systems, thcir 

cngineer materials and ammunition, 

and their soldiers. They must be 

able to use the equipment like the 

picket poundcr to know what is required of their soldiers; they must 

learn to operate their enb'rlnecr 

equipment; and they must know the 

capabilities of the currently available spccial engineer oCfensivc 

weapons and mines of both friendly 

and enemy forces. Without this information, thc lieutenant cannot be 

a good platoon leader or even if rcquircd, a good task force engineer. 

He must ensure that the work he is 

doing supports the commander's intent and is capable of defeating the 

enemy's engineer systems. The comTank leader giving orders to 

cover obstacle with fire in a hull 

defilade position. 

pany commandcr must havc been a 

skillcd licntcnant who leads thc 

unit, tcachcs the young licutcnants, 

ensures that the unit is correctly accomplishing its missions and c(~ntrols all the unit's assets. Management starts at battalion lcvcl. The 

platoon leaders and company commanders arc the individuals that 

lead and get the job donc. 

These basic lessons always surface whenever enginccr units participate in the National Training 

Ccnter experience. They apply to all 

engineer units that supporl both 

sides and arc lessons that must not 

be forgotten. The engineers arc a 

valuable asset to units that use them 

correctly at the NTC. All engineers 

must work together with the other 

combat arms soldiers to accomplish 

our battlefield missions. 

Major (P) Roger J. Soritcn~ille, a 

cori~hal i>rtXi,teer; is crrrrer~l/~' ocsipterl 

us tlte OPFOR regirt~ertru/ erlgirreer of 

rlte Naliortal Trob~irlg Curlo; Fori 

Irwin, Califon~ia. Preldor~s assiptri~erfts btcl~rde li~te coritl~urg~ co~it171arlda~tdBN XO bt !he 161h Dl- 

,qitlrer Boftcrliort m~d ucvi~stmrt tlirliiiort eilgzrtcer ill lllr 1st Ar~itored 

Diior He gnrrlrialed {rorit Morttarra Slate Urtiversi!y irr 1970 will1 a 

BS degree i~tcivil ertgrteerirlg. 
~n~ineer Solution 

ritical eng8 

For TM T 

ineer task! 

ank and T, 

liberateat 

-

tack are a.s follows: 

a ank Co (-) 

No identified needs for engineers to asstst overwatch element to get 

into positionto attack objectives DOG and CAT t 

Unexpectedrequirementswould be passed from ~mmander to the TF commander, who would task the englneer company 

ling 

)yfire. 

the comp 

comman 

under his 

, - -..-

der to hi 

;control. 

nndle the requirements with the assf 

D ror IIVI UIsrnuurItProvidefor mobilit! IS JILL to CP 1. 

Provide dlsmountea englneer squad (appropriately armed with demoii3rs and probes, wirl dislatoons in the lead 

along ax1 , . 

tions, mi 

mounted 

,.. 

ne detect1 

infantry p & , 

f the two 

....-I.- blear roures (one engineer sauad wirn equtpnlerltl LV ye1 ralms and 

to overwatch (local rrce) position in vicir 2. 

a ~tesfor Bradley pla watch vehicies to r ard 

alona axis JILL to overwatchalsmounred infantry and enclir 

to allow the dismo~ )tryto assault 

~bjectiveDOG. This lestruction of 

mlnes arlo wlre oosiacres, as well as assault on ~orut~cauonslentrenchition guns can provi ellent mea :roy 

3onstructed fottifica ! of M203 the 

Bradieys 

Clear rot 

support fc 

ltoon over 

vity of CP : 

nove fom 

leers. - Reduce 1 

enemy p ~~~ ~~~ - ~ - ~ 

obstacles 

sition on ( 

.A. -2.. . 

-

~ntedinfar 

requires ( 

f.-:Z!.-.2. 

ments. C 

bunkers 

... 

:EV demol 

and well-I 

. .., 

dean exc 

tions. Use - - - - --,. 

ins to desl 

j to mark .,.r-5, -P aeslrea rarger wlrn colored smoke can grearly assist the bcv ~i in 

lg critical f the CEl acled by thf PL as rec 

identifyin 

complist' 

targets. I 

? engineel 

,, 

Zontrol 01 

r platoon ,L , 

Ps fires v 

luested b. ~ -....,. 

tould be 

y the infa1 -!.I z ream commander use or assaulr ladders can qrearlv alo rorces in 

wire obst; 

a ehicle lanc UPDon rorce (tank plaroon ano L araulev p~a~our~s verllclesr LU alsu ascrossing 

8 Create VI 

A 

ncles and I 

?Sthrough , -...- .-

sntrenchn 

protectivf 

,A m....,,. 

lents. 

? obstacle 

.. 

-

s to allow the local s .,.--,--

sault the 

For TM N 

-. 

objective. 

lech-

.. . .. neauce me ractlcal oDsracles imlnerleios) uslng MlCLlC ro creare me 

lane as ;2 MiCLl um per lane, 

(Ideally t to be gt\ ~nalMlCLlCs 

from the englneer Danallon ) 

platoon needed to reduce tl asobjective CAT. (If poss~bleTN )me 

or me lanes created by TM D~smount) 

quickly a! 

he enginc 

;possible 

?er compz 

.. ,. > 

. Require! 

my needs 

Cs minim 

,en addith 

8 Engineer 

saulting 

... , 

1 obstacle 

3y be able 

ie close-ir 

I Mech m; 

s prior to 

to use sc 
I1to Quest 

Revieu ........ 
 r or rne aDove crlucsi tasks srlows tila1 you riave lrtsunlclt 

sets org anic to yc )ur company to accomplish 1lour missit on. You rc 

and recc ?ive two a( jditional MlCLlCs from your b; ittalion. 

Solutior1to Quest 

Anaiysis of the 1F's concc ?pt of ope ration, the enemy situation, and the ...... ............. . .&...>,. 
 Lerralrl resulted in tne rollowlng oelalleu englrieer task organization: d ... ..:-. .. 

TM Dlsrnount rn 

1st PitlEngr Co (OPCON) 3rd PltIEngr Co ( 


1st SqdiPnd PltIEngr Co 1 AVLB 


2 CEVs 2 MlCLlCs 


1 AVLB 1 MlCLlC 


m&l& Tank Co ITF Control 
 I

1 Englneer Co (-)


The en gineer company (-) under TF control consfsts 6. ..., ,,

headquetrters, and 2 squads i from 2nd i platoon. Specific e quipment ur~uer 

the conipany commander's control includes: 2 AVLBs, 2 additional 

nf tl-0 onnino ,. .,,. ,.,

penser, 7 dump tr ucks, and 1 HEMTT uploaded with MICI LlC reload Is and 

other de ,molitions and mine s (require1 3 to prept ire object1 ive to rep1 ?I1 the 

onom,, " ~ck). 

The en gineer pla itoon lead er suppor ting TM Dismount plositions h~ir~se~r 

with the maneuve'r team cc ~mmande~ r. The fou r enginee r squads of his 

roinfnrmr .S,.,,C~ .A nlO+nnr .. 704 ,,"r 4-1

,,,,,..,In>"," Tl.,?, Aicmn,,n scsu,.,s,c, are ut~lii,, ,.., ,,,,,ted squae-A , -*- -3, 

with the two forw; ~rddismounted Bradley platoons (one each). Orle dismountecJ engineer squad is with h~m and is used to widen and mark lanes 

-"A ir 9 I r^infnrlr ,.-,-.A ..,-.A" q80u uQ dailabie tc ,c,,,q,,,d the efforts of the other two i,,vv,,u^,- ,unun. 

The forth engineer squad remains Imounted, and alon g with th e two 

CEVs, AVLB and MICLIC, a ssists the TM's vehicles in po sitioning v,icinity 1 

CP -,E h\,f;.^ ,^hi.,. 2 to anack objective DLU 3rbc010 They assist th, ,v,vvn, 

vehicles from CP 2 in assaulting objective DCIG. The el ngineer pl atoon 

PSG is with this squad and equipment. The enc lineer plat, Don PL cc lntrols 

,l+:..- ^,:^I^ the fires of the CEV demolition guns used in dca~,,,,,,,, of fortific 

and bun1 kers on ot 

MlCLlCs frnm ..,,.. ,..,...,.

"nr ,tho? m m ,.,.,,, ,.dn, GEMMS dis- nnn,, 

The en ,"I Mech is placed DL ,,.,,,, .he efforts of 1that platoc ,n remain focused Ion creatio n of the I: ine throu! , ., 

ninn.31 ni3 , ,,,, rlC(LVVI I Yur,,_IVI .,, I

tactical Isbstacles. When Th d Mech a! ;saults ob +,.^ ,..."i.. 

jective CP tT, the en! 

"" ..^^ h*, ^-.-,.-.."..<, 

the closl ?-in protec :tive obst; icies. This ; engineer platoon hias been 

nl-tnnn .A n-p"-, %.,:,I.
- Engineer Solution 


D re quickly return to its parent s control to 

n ""A nn.ntl*o+inn nf tho nh -0 onnino asolor ,,, ru,,aurlull,,ul, rlrralauull vl lllr vu,rrrlrr llr rllslllrer

company must be prepared to rap~dly emplac e GEMS: ; mines to 

w~thstand the enemy counterattack The platoon supporti~ng TM Dismount will require significant time prior to assisting I,, -,hie "."A" \*"*+inn rsrratatvv63 

CHIASSAULT ELEMENT 

TED ATTACK 

I & 

/


'RATE ATTIC 

ENEl 

CLOSE-IN OVERWATCH 

PI ~yMAJ NI'cholas J. Buechler ie ., -2.8. 2,- " ?-. Deparrmenr or Lornolneo Hrrns or rrre ua ~rrrrvtrrq~neerecnoo~ 
COMMUNICATION IN A COMBAT 


ENGINEER BATTALION 


by LT Bernard J. Jansen 

ovc shoot, and communi- "Mcatd,9IS the axiom underlying most onit missions. While move 

and shoot are basic tenets, communication is not inherent to the engineer. Communication is the allocation and use of the unit's organic 

and assigncd communication equipmcnt. 

Elfective communication is especially difficult in the new, light engineer units, many of which do not 

have a battalion signal officer 

(BSO), formcrly called the communication-clcctronic staff officer 

(CESO), and lack their full authori~ationof MTOE cquipmcnt. An engineer officer usually assumes the 

BSO duties with little or no training 

and tries to provide communication 

to the unit. Some do well; some do 

not. Good communication can be 

obtained by utilizing nonorganic support, prioritizing organic assets, and 

training key personnel. The recent 

ARTEP of the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Airborne) demonstrated proper application of 

thcsc thrcc principles. 

Nonorganic support 

To fully utilize available nonorganic signal support, analyze the 

unit's mission, locate available signal support, and allocate this support where needed. On this particular ARTEP, the unit's mission 

rcquired a vast geographical separation of the line companies and the 

battalion headquarters. Already fully committed, thc battalion's organic 

co~nmunication assets were unable 

to link all of the subordinate units 

into a secure communication network. This required nonorganic signal support, and since this was not a 

major deployment, an area signal 

center was not available. 

At this point, the BSO faced 

many difficult tasks. The first of 

these was to determine just what 

type of signal equipment was 

needed. He then sent an official request through appropriate channels 

outlining these requirements. Second, the BSO contacted the S3 

plansitraining section of the supporting signal unit. Since signal units 

usually do not support battalions 

(and rarely at the company level), 

the situation needed to offer a training opportunity for both units. (For 

example, if the signal unit has an exercise planned at the same time as 

your exercise, volunteer the battalion as subscribers. If the unit 

docs not get everything requested, 

the BSO must allocate the signal 

support based on mission requirements.) 

Following this course of action 

prior to the ARTEP, the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) (A) had multichannel support down to the company-level, an unusual situation for 

a battalion-level exercise. This system linked tbe line companies with 

the battalion headquarters in a 

secure communication network. 

This network facilitated the rapid 

dissemination of information resulting in a more productive ARTEP 

and provided training for the signal 

unit. 

Unit personnel must bear in 

mind, however, that this unusual 

level of support would not be available during a full deployment of all 

units normally supported by the signal battalion. Engineer companics 

should not become accustomed to 

procedures or controls the success 

of which depends on multichannel 

communications support. This levcl 

of support should be rcstrictcd to 

administrative functions associated 

with the controls of an ARTEP. 

Prioritize equipment 

The BSO must also prioritize organic communication cquipmcnt. 

This is the second principle of good 

communication and a dilficult task 

if the unit is short of such equipment. During their ARTEP, thc 

27th Engineer Battalion was short 

35 VRC and PRC radios and 35 

KY-57s. 


Faced with such a shortage, thc 

proper allocation of equipment was 

essential. To accomplish this task, 

the BSO prioritized nets and subscribers within each net. The battalion maintained a brigade command net (BDE CMD net) (secured), a battalion command net 

(BN CMD net) (secured), a battalion administration log net (BN 

ASrL net) (nonsecured), and separate company command nets (CO 

CMD net) (secured). Nets were 

prioritized based on their impact on 

operational missions. From highest 

to lowest, their ordcr of priority 

were: BDE CMD, BN CMD, CO 

CMD, BN A&L. After prioritizing 

the nets, the BSO prioritized the 

subscribers within each net. 

Prioritizing subscribers is again 

based on thcir direct impact on the 

operational mission, hcginning with 

the highest priority net. Sincc the 

battalion was short 35 radios, all of 

which were assigncd to sectionslindividuals who nccdcd comniunication capability, thc BSO rilloca~c<l 

the available radios to the key 

players in each net. Within thc BDE 

CMD net, the key battalion players 
arc the battalion commander, main 

TOC, and the jump TOC (S3). The 

BN CMD nct has these same subscrihers plus the company TOCs, 

company commanders and the S3. 

As each nct is cstablishcd, a pattern 

develops. The key players in a givcn 

net arc also in the communications 

nctwork pyramid illustratcd. 

The hase of this pyramid is the 

BN A'QL net (nonsecured). The 

s~~bscribersof this net must encodcidccodc messagcs. From this 

net, radios are taken to replace 

radios in the uppcr nets that go 

down due to niaintenancc or to 

provide equipment to the occ;~sional increasc in key players. 

The priority of the net remains 

constant hut the priority of subscril>crs within each net is constantly changing. For example, during 

the i~irborne operation of the 

ARTEP, each company assembly 

area necdcd to bc within the BN 

CMD net for accountablity purposes. Alter thc airborne operation, 

tlicse radios were distributed to subscril>crs in the CO CMD net and 

the BN ASLL net. The BSO must 

coordinate this distribution. 

The same process is used for 

secure equipment with one exception. If a subscriber loses secure 

capability, he must go to the BN 

A&L net until the secure equipment can be replaced. The BSO 

must maintain the purity of the 

securc nets. All subscribers in tlie 

BN A&L net have access by relay 

A 

Main Jump 

TOC TOC 

BN CDR Maln TOC 

Engineer onleers 

Main TOC conrmnlon pbtoon 

via the main TOC to the BDE 

CMD and the BN CMD nets. As 

such, the main TOC is the most 

valuable communication asset of the 

battalion and must be given top 

priority in equipment and maintenance. Regardless of how carefully the BSO prioritizes the equipment, communication will not be 

fuUy effective unless the unit's key 

players arc properly trained. 

Training personnel 

The training of key personnel is 

the final and most important principle of good communication. The 

BSO must set realistic priorities 

based on the unit's capabilities and 

mission. In this case, secure equipment had rarely been used below 

company commander level. Shortly 

before the ARTEP, the battalion 

received the capability to secure 

down to the squad leader-level. The 

battalion embarked on an intensive 

program to familiarize and train the 

unit on the use of secure equipment, including that on airborne 

operations and tactical missions. 

Just prior to the ARTEP, experienced communication soldiers 

gave classes to key personnel identified by the BSO. Although lacking 

hands-on experience, this intensive 

short-term training allowed the battalion use of the secure equipment, 

which provided more reliable, 

speedy, and secure communications 

during the ARTEP. 

T 

rn 

n

9 

a 


T 

AkL 

ntic CDR 

Communication training must tenter on key aspects of the unit's communication system. In addition to 

secure equipment, training also 

focused on FM retransmission, FM 

relay, and radio-wire integration, 

which are available to the battalion 

using organic equipment. It is thc 

duty of the BSO to sct communication training guidance and intcgratc 

this training into the unit's training 

schedule. By adhering to this course 

of action, the battalion's comnionication system providcd a rcliablc and 

secure flow of inforn~ation during 

tlie ARTEP. 

Follow these principles 

Good communication docs not 

just happen. It is the result of following the basic principles just outlined. The BSO's utilization 01' nunorganic assets benefits thc battalion 

with a reliable, sccure communication network. The combincd unit 

training is also of great benclit. Thc 

signal support supplcmcnts the 

unit's organic communication equipment. By prioritizing organic equipment, the BSO provides the unit 

with the best possible communication system given available resources. 

Of course, regardless of how well 

a communication system is organized, the subscribers must be 

trained on the procedures and 

capabilities of the system and what 

systems are available. The BSO 

must be intimately involved in the 

utilization and prioritization of 

equipment and the training of kcy 

personnel. By doing his part, the 

BSO cnsures the battalion cnn do 

all of the big three: move, shoot and 

communicate. 

LT Benturd J. JUIIS~IIi.s u 1985 

pdttule oJ rlte Urtirecl Srures Mi1iror.v 

Acurletitjr LT Jur~sert /us I u 

pluroort leullelcr, hu~~uliort CESO, urtd 

is ~?rc.se~trlvse~virtg in rlzc 5Orlt Sigtul 

Borr~lio~~ (C) (A) ar Fr Brag, NC. 

Communications Network 
LESSONS LEARNED 


The following Lessons Learned were taken from unit 

deployments to Latin America unless indicated otherwise. Some of the subjects discussed involve shortages of equipment, maintenance, safety, and personnel problems. 

LOGISTICS 

Construction water 

ISSUE: Construction water shortage 

REMARKS: There was not enough water to support 

the construction requirements for compaction, cement-soil stabilization and stabilized cement-soil 

curing at either Palmerola or San Lorenzo. 

The situation at Palmerola was especially acute due 

to the distance of the water source from the construction site and the increased demand caused by multipie users. To relieve the situation, 1st COSCOM 

hauled potable water for construction use and used 

unse~iceablePOL 10,000-gallon bags to store water. 

SOLUTION: Units should use 40-50,000 gallons of 

water per day for this type of construction and must 

have sufficient storage containers. Unserviceable POL 

containers can be effectively used to store the water. 

(20th Eng Bde) 

Pallets and 55-gallon drums 

ISSUE: Lack of availability of pallets and 55-gallon 

drums. 

REMARKS: Each task needed several hundred 

wooden pallets to store construction materials and 

other items. These pallets were not readily available. 

They had to be collected from the PX and the TEA, 

three or four at a time. Also, 55-gallon drums were 

needed for bunker construction, waste oil containers, 

fire protection, waste burnouts, etc. Again these barrels were not readily available, and had to be purchased locally at the high cost of $40 each. 

SOLUTION: Commanders should include these 

items on the bill of materials to stockpile in advance 

or to be ordered as part of the normal materiel acquisition process. (20th Eng Bde) 

Repair parts 

ISSUE: Shortage of CUCV tire rims. 

REMARKS: Prior to deployment, the unit brought its 

PLLIASL close to 100% fill, including parts not considered critical. CUCV tire rims, however, were not 

stocked. in rough road conditions, such as those in 

many third-world nations, spare rims are needed for 

small vehicles. 

SOLUTION: Wheel rims for highdensity vehicles 

should be bought and stocked for deployments to 

countries having poor and rugged road conditions. 

(20th Eng Bde) 

Rex Rororiiler tines 

ISSUE: Shortage of Rototilier tines 

REMARKS: During the second week of construction, the unit discovered that they did not have a sufficient number of Rototilier tines on hand to complete 

the construction project. The Air Force REDHORSE 

operators estimated that an additional eight complete 

sets were needed to complete the project. The 

Rototiller operators deployed with three complete 

sets. Each set of tines contaln 42 left hand and 42 

right hand tines. The shortfall of tines was due to lack 

of experience with the equipment. Operators did not 

realize how quickly tines had to be replaced. local 

sources fabricated and rebuilt the tines (which lasted 

several weeks compared to several days for the 

original tines, but were more expensive due to higher 

quality steel) until the replacement tines arrived. 

SOLUTION: When planning for construction 

projects requiring the use of Rototillers, commanders 
should plan for extra replacement tines. Also, contract 

with local repair and fabrication sources to offset any 

shortfalls. (20th Bde) 

Tractor tires for 290M 

ISSUE: Tires for 290M tractor wearing out at an unusually high, unanticipated rate. 

REMARKS: Prior to deployment to Latin America, a 

banalion replaced virtually every 290M with a new tire. 

In addition, 13 new tires were carried as ASL. The extremely rocky countryside and the sharp, highly fragmented sedimentary rock wore down the tire treads in 

a maner of weeks instead of months. The battalion 

practically ran the tires to cord in order to remain 

operational. And all spare tires were used. Tires were 

run so long they were useless for recapping. 

SOLUTION: Engineer units should deploy with a 

minimum of two sets of tires per tractor. The maintenance support activity should exercise the Class IX 

system early on to ensure 290M tire support. (46th 

Eng Bde (CH) ) 

MAINTENANCE 

Hinges for M929 5-ton dump trucks 

ISSUE: Tailgate hinges for M929 5-ton dump trucks 

crack or break. 

REMARKS: During the first 30 days of the exercise, 

the unit had five sets of 5-ton dump truck tailgate hinges crack or break. This was the first time the unit experienced the problem. Hinges were repaired and reinforced by a local machine shop. 

SOLUTION: Ensure that the bolts holding the hinges are torqued to 150 foot-pounds once a week and 

coordinate with the DS shop to stock additional hinges as part of their shop stock. (20th Eng Bde) 

6738 water distributor 

ISSUE: Priming loss in the 6138 water distributor 

pump. 

REMARKS: Operators of the 6138 water distributors 

could not tell how much water was left in the tank 

while dispensing water. If the tank ran too low the 

pump lost its prime. Refilling of the prime tank is a 

time consuming process. 

SOLUTION: The unit developed a simple float rod 

which projects out the top of the tank. This rod allowed the operator to monitor how much water 

remained in the tank. The rod was then incorporated 

as a permanent fixture to the tank. (20th Eng Bde) 

M920 72.5-ton tractors 

ISSUE: High incidence of transmission and transfer 

failures on M920, 12.5-ton tractors. 

REMARKS: The extremely dangerous MSR between 

San Lorenzo-Comayagua and San Lorenzo-Aguacate 

took an unexpectedly high toll of M920 transfers and 

transmissions. Steep grades, sharp curves, and 

severely rutted, potholed roads caused drivers to ride 

clutches, brakes, and transmissions. When hauling 

D8Ks or scrapers, M920 drivers were apprehensive 

about the weight of their loads. High temperatures 

and dust contributed to these parts wearing out early. 

SOLUTION: Engineer units should train heavy equipment operators and M920 drivers in steep, rugged terrain, with heavy outsized loads. Such training . 

will identify transfer/transmission problems prior to deployment and will familiarize drivers with hauling 80,000 

pounds up a mountain and bringing It back down. 

From safety and maintenance viewpoints, such training is critical prior to deployment. (46th Eng Bn(CH)) 

PERSONNEL 

Personnel shortages 

ISSUE: Advance party lacked sufficient supply and 

maintenance personnel to perform mission. 

REMARKS: One task force did not send any supply 

personnel and sent only one mechanic In the advance 

party. As a result, they could not open any supply accounts or do any logistical planning. The shortage of 
mechanics delayed the off-load of the ship because 

there were not enough mechanics to repair deadlined 

vehicles on board. Other units had to assist so that 

the advance party's mission could be completed. 

SOLUTION: Commanders should ensure that a sufficient number of mechanics and supply personnel are 

included in the advance party in order to resolve logistical problems as they arise. (20th Eng Bde) 

Soldier care 

ISSUE: Lack of repair or direct exchange for 

uniforms and CTA 50-900 items. 

REMARKS: The 20th Eng Bde had no means during 

the exercise to direct exchange worn uniforms or TA50 items. Soldiers involved in maintenance and construction activities had few or no untorn uniforms after 

the second month. The work schedule offered little 

time for soldiers to repair these items and such 

repairs would be as unprofessional in appearance as 

the tears and stains themselves. 

SOLUTION: Units shouid ensure that personnel 

deploy with extra clothing. Also units should establish 

a direct exchange station during ail future exercises. 

These stations shouid be stocked with enough items 

to handle ail anticipated DX requirements. (20th Eng 

Bde) 

SAFETY 

Armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) 60 crossing 

restrictions 

ISSUE: AVLB structural and curb damage. 

REMARKS: The class 60 AVLB has been sustaining 

structural and curb damage due to the speeds which 

the M601M48iM88and MI family of vehicles cross. 

SOLUTION: A "Safety-of-Use" message issued by 

TACOM dated 0311002 June 1987, subject: Operational Crossing Restrictions For Class 60 Bridge, Armored Vehicle Launched (NSN 5420-00-522-9599) imposes crossing restrictions for combat vehicles exceeding a 50-tonvehicle weight. The following restrictions are immediately imposed: 

Vehicle must be centered on bridge. 

Maximum crossing speed is 8 miles per hour (13 

kilometers per hour). 

No stopping, accelerating or gear shifting while 

on the bridge. 

This information should be disseminated to ail subordinate units and operators of vehicles which exceed 

50 tons (TACOM). Units in charge of AVLB sites 

should fabricate conspicious signs to be posted listingthe restrictions. 

Commanders are responsible for ensuring that 

vehicle operators are properly briefed on crossing 

restrictions and for ensuring that the restrictions are 

strictly adhered to. 

MOBILITY 

(VIETNAM LESSON LEARNED) 

Barricades 

ISSUE: Clearing barricades on roads. 

REMARKS: Many types of barricades were used by 

the enemy to delay traffic and expose convoy traffic 

to possible ambush. Earth mounds, trees, branches, 

logs, and other indigenous materials were frequently 

used. Mechanized and armored vehicles detonated 

booby trapped mortar and RPG rounds while attempting to penetrate the barricades. 

SOLUTION: Engineer units probed the barricades 

with mine detectors. Whenever metal objects were discovered, small charges were emplaced and 

detonated. A 290M scraper was then used to clear the 

remaining barricade. In addition, branches and other 

flammable material were burned to prevent future use 

at that location. The scraper was found to be more effective than a dozer because of its greater speed, 
ability to maneuver more effectivelyon narrow roads, 

and its self-propelledcapability. (35th Eng Grp) 

NoTe: Since the 290M scraper is being phased out of 

our system, the M9 ACE wiii provide a similar 

capability in the future. 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Trial defense service 

ISSUE: Trial defense service was unavailable except 

by phone. 

REMARKS: While deployed to Latin America, trial 

defense service was only available through 

AUTOVON hookup with Fort Bragg or Panama. This 

created two problems for the unit: 

Soldiers did not get face-to-facecounselling. 

Soldiers spent a minimum of three days away 

from the job site. 

SOLUTION: Commanders should request that legal 

support be provided and attached for deployment. 

(20th Eng Bde) 

Civil affairs projects 

ISSUE: Additional military and civil affairs missions. 

REMARKS: Engineer battalions in Honduras were 

the sole troop constructions assets of the Joint Task 

Force and were subject to receivingadditional military 

and civil affairs missions beyond the original scope of 

work. 

SOLUTION: Ensure a good engineer reconnaissance is made of the projects, involving direct coordination with the customer. Do not accept or commit 

to projects sight unseen or without the construction 

materials and equipment on hand. It is better in the 

eyes of the Hondurans to decline a mission than to 

promise and not deliver. Plan for public affairs office 

coverage on these projects to publicize the positive 

image generated. (36th Eng Grp) 

Chief of Staff of the Army (Observations made at NTC) 

The following anecdote illustrates the aggressive 

and innovative attitude which Engineers must have: 

Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) visited 

the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, 

California. He saw a Reserve Component (RC) Engineer company commander from South Carolina 

whose unit was supporting the OPFOR. He observed 

the task force commander give instructions to the 

company commander about the placement of 

obstacles. The RC commander responded: "Sir, just 

tell me your intent. I will ensure you get the right 

obstacles." The CSA said, "That is the kind of 

response we need from all our Army Captains, and I 

am glad to see it was an Engineer." (Provided by LTG 

Heiberg) 

READERS SURVEY 

The purpose of Lessons Learned is to distribute information concerning doctrine, equipment, and 

materiel from exercises to members of the Engineer 

community, both active and reserve, ltems for Lessons Learned are always welcome and could answer 

the following questions: 

Do you have any successful tactics, techniques, 

or procedures from your unit's experience which 

you would like to share? 

What would you like to see added to Lessons 

Learned that would be of general interest to the 

Engineer communitp 

Is the informationor guidance provided clear and 

viable to the Engineer communitp 

ltems for Lessons Learned should be sent to: U.S. 

Army Engineer School, Directorate of Evaluation and 

Standardization, ATTN: ATZA-ES, Stop'271. Fort Belvoir. Virginia 22060-5000. 
Past in Review 


By CPT Chnrlec M. L~tl-elman 

Vietnam is half a world away 

from Central Amercia, hut engineer 

construction missions in Honduras 

often give veterans a sense of d&j& 

vu. The cliniates, the geographical 

reaturcs-and the engineering challenges-are similar. Lessons the 

Army Icarned in the Southeast 

Asian theater are well worth reviewing, bcc;tuse the problems the Army 

is encountering in Honduras and 

other Latin American nations often 

arc prohlcms we havc mct in the 

past. Although not having the opportunity to serve in Vietnam .or Honduras, pcrs~~nal intcrvicws and afteraction reports portray a clear and 

accurate picture of both theaters. 

Like Vietnam, Honduras has 

both mountainous terrain and coastal lowlands and hot, humid weather 

predominates. Each half a year of 

rain is followed by six months of dry 

weather. Heat injuries to perso~inel, 

reduced equipment effectiveness, 

and problems with construction and 

drainage are constant hazards. 

Though far smaller in scale, the 

kinds of construction needed in 

Honduras resembles the initial inSrastructure buildup in Vietnam. Engineers in both areas have been 

called upon to build tropical woodframe buildings, to upgrade and surface roads. to build expedient airfields-then improve them by adding hardened asphalt runways. 

Maintenance and parts- system 

needs improved 

Thc prohlcnis and challenges are 

similar. Nuw. as 20 years ago. afteraction reports name maintenance as 

a numhcr one "hroken .system". The 

problems range from environmental -

stress on equipment to poorly 

trained or insufficient maintenance 

personnel and a spare parts resupply system that is cripplingly slow. 

One commander in Vietnam 

pointed out that equipment operators were too often called on to 

maintain their own machines-even 

though they weren't well-trained for 

the job. Equipment was subject to 

overuse-laboring 12 or more hours 

a day, 7 days a week-in order to 

finish critical projects in short time 

frames. For the mmt part, the situation in Honduras remains the same, 

although the projects are not as 

critical. 

Low-density equipment was pushed beyond the limit in wartime Victnam. Operators simply "hoped it 

would last the day", and resorted to 

substituting '%lose enough parts 

like fuel filters that almost fit, or onthe-spot oil changes just to keep the 

motor running. In the long run, this 

sometimes led to the complete loss 

of a hard-to-replace system. 

One commandcr in Vietnam suggested that the only way to keep a 

grasp on the maintenance situation 

was to supervise intensively-all the 

time. Another suggested that engineer equipment should be pro--

'. 

gramrned for an 11-niooth work scssion: Ihe 12th month being devoted 

to a complete rebuilding and inspection cycle. In reality, maintenance 

was accomplished by many units 

alter each work day, when the unit 

returned to a secure location from 

the job site. Broken vehicles would 

be taken to a third shop location, 

where maintenance crcxvs worked 

around the clock. 

In Honduras, engineers are running into the same kinds of 

problems. According to recent observers from the Engineer School, 

rue1 filters, air cleaners and thc lack 

of lube order manuals, have had a 

serious impact on mission support. 

Scarce equipment is kept running 

continuously -until it breaks down. 

Steep grades, sharp curves, and 

blinding dust have led drivers to 

ride clutches, brakes, and transmissions. The rcsulting high toll in 

M920 transfers and transmissions 

has sidelined many vehicles. These 

and other hard-to-get spare parts 

are essential if missions are to be 

completed. As a quick fix for low 

density equipment, the Army sent 

some of its maintenance technicians 

m.~;.' 

, 

.. . . . . >. ., .. 

Heavy equipment operations construct mountain slopes. 
- -.b * - Culvert construction on Fuertes Caminos Road, Honduras. 

to Tcgucig;~lpa to contact local Anicrican companies, such as John 

Dccrc end C:;~tcrpillar. 

Aficr-action recommendations 

from Honduras 11;lvc suggcstcd that 

rcusuablc oil and air filters might extend maintainability. An accurate 

listilig ~11PLLIASL lor engineer 

equipment helped in~nieasurably hy 

prliducing morc repair parts. 

In Vicln;~m, lhc conslruction of 

~lficnsivc itlid dcrensive positions to 

incrc;lsc security, survivability and 

warlighting c;lpahility was urgent. 

During the early months of the conflict. the 18th Engineer Bripdde 

struggled I build as many as 44 

pr(~iccts in nine separate locations. 

Working ilround the clock, their 

projects included c;lntonment area 

barracks, road surfacing, erecting 

class 611 hridges, and the construction 11f C;~ni Ranh Bay. 

in Honduras, the lifc-or-death 

stresses or wi~rlare arc fortunately 

not the issue. Thc pressure to finish 

pr<i,jccts within the time limi~s of 

short (reining deployments and to 

build infr;lstructurc from scratch. 

Ii<iwcvcr, isre demanding. The obstacles and hindcranccs we cncounter in Latin America show 

todi~v's Army just how wcll cir illprcli;~rcdwc arc to establish opcraticins in an underdeveloped theater. 

Engineers in Honduras have 

devoted their construcrion cffort to 

building lines of conimonicationmainly a road network- base 

camps, airfield, civic action and a 

host of othcr projects. Thc work 

schedule is also morc bearable but 

still a pressing cycle of 12-hour 

days, 6 days a week. 

To meet the demands for continuous work and reduce the heat 

stress ol a tropictll climate, cnginccrs have scheduled some licavier work-like concrctc placementfor the ctioler hours of darkness. IC 

icc is a\,ailable, it is addod to the 

concrctc mix to prcvcnt flash sc~ting 

in the extreme heat. In Vietnam. 

work was only done at night iT the 

job sire was located in a sccure area. 

Construction workers in Central 

America are reaping thc benefit of 

one hard-earned lesson froni Victnam: The 16s mixers that were inadequate to meet large concrete 

pouring operation needs in Vietnam 

are being replaced by thc new M919 

concrctc mobile. These vehicles are 

proving invaluable in Hondurastheir durability and versatility docs 

much to relieve. the excessive hurden on manpower imposed hv the 

old system. However, the old rcliable ihS mixers are still uscd for culvert hcadwalls and other hard to 

reach areas. In othcr cases-notably 

rock crushing operations-thcre's 

still an urgent need to replace wornout and inefficient equipment. 

Basic ct~nstruction materials likc 

lumber can be hard to come by in 

third-world economics. Mahogany 

imported from the Phillippines met 

the demand in Vietnam-lor a liigh 

price. We must csport ply~~ood 

from the Unitcd Slates 111 Hon '11ri~s 

to mect many constructioll ,qcccls. 

Local timber (conilcrous) can Ire 

uscd for framing work. I7111 only 

with caution. Dressed lumber docs 

not havc ihc same dimensions as 

that in tlic U.S. Much of [lie lumber 

is also still grccn. which nicans high 

shrinkage and some dirficult workability. 

New soluti~ns sonictimcs lhi~vc 10 

be round Tor old problems. Latcritc. 

a coninionly occurring matcrial 

used for road buildi~ig in Vict11a111, 

pulverizes under tr;ilfic ;~nd sends 

up blinding cloud [rl dust. In Asi;~. 

we solvcd this problcni hy rprcrlding 

crushed coral on the r(111d surl;~cc. 

Thc matcrial used in Hondur;~~ Tor 

soil slabilizetion consictcd of a 

crushed aggegate surlitce. 

People-munaging ;Icritic111 

resource 

No matter where the Army gncs. 

it must have the right pcoplc witli 

the right training in order 10 accomplish its missions. In Hvnduri~s. 

as in Vietnam, the Arm!, finds itscll 

facing shortages ol lechnically prolicient oflicers and NCOs. Many construction missions can be c,implctcd 

only under thc direction (if a prolicient NCO. Major picccs ol engineer equipment arc oncn ucclcss 

without trained crews tri opcratc 

and maintain them. 

We can't assign troops with sccondary MOS clui~lifications ti1 fill critical positions. After-action reports 

lrom Victnam stressed this prolilem, and insisted [hill pcrsr~nncl rcpl;~cemcnts hc madc i>n an MOS-rcquircd h;~sis. 

CPT Cltarlc,~hl. Lira.l,?rntr ic crimrlr-

!v ossigtrcd lo rlrc Dclx~trt~~orr qf

hlililatp Et~fii,~(,eritrji ac n Tc,util 

Lctld<,l'/.%ltl~l/ J / 7 H<' 

is a gzrtliiolc (11EOAC, CAS! 110lds 

BA utlrl MA dcg?cs, otrcl rottir~latldcd H<*odqrirrtler.s C;~III/I(III~, 

44111 Etrgirreer. Bnllaliotr. Ko,r*o. 
SECOND-CLASS MAIL 

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARM 

lSSN CU4fi-1.989