NRC NEWS

 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

 Office of Public Affairs Telephone 301/415-820

 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov

 Web Site: www.nrc.gov

No. S-03-012

Remarks by Commissioner Edward McGaffigan, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regulatory Information Conference

Washington, D.C.

April 17, 2003

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today for the seventh time. I do

not intend to take up very much of the next hour in delivering a speech. Like Chairman

Diaz yesterday, I intend to give the floor over to answering your questions for the bulk of

the time.

The past year has been marked by significant progress in enhancing the already

unmatched security at our nation’s civilian nuclear facilities. A year ago I concluded my

remarks to you by stating: “The Commission has much to do in the months ahead on

security matters. It is the single issue which has most dominated our time since

September 11. We have a firm foundation on which to build and we will continue to

ensure that these facilities are the best defended and most physically hardened facilities in

our critical infrastructure. We will do so responsibly, in full consultation with the Office

of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, the intelligence community

and others. We hope that the Congress will pass the legislation which we have been

requesting for many years that we believe would bolster the current security regime. The

NRC is not an independent actor on homeland security matters. We need to be part of the

integrated national effort which the President is seeking to put in place with the help of

the Congress. A year from now I believe that we can have much of our enhanced security

regime in place. I look forward to discussing these issues with you then.”

Today, we do have much of our enhanced security regime in place. Month after

month the NRC staff, particularly the staff of the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

Response, and the Commission have worked long hours to develop, analyze and then

implement appropriate security enhancements for all of our homeland-security significant

licensees. We have done so in partnership with other federal agencies. We have done so
in partnership with the States to the maximum extent possible. We have done so in

partnership with cleared industry stakeholders. And we have done so while listening to

the input of stakeholders who do not hold clearances, such as the Project on Government

Oversight (POGO), which became a public channel for the frustration of some members

of our licensees’ security forces.

I do not have time to cite all of our achievements. But I would refer you to our

home page, where under Commission Documents, Commission Correspondence, you will

find a September 5, 2002 and a March 31, 2003 letter from former Chairman Meserve to

Secretary Ridge that outlines those achievements. I honestly believe that aside from the

Office of Homeland Security, now the Homeland Security Council, no agency of

government has worked harder, or achieved more, on homeland security in the past

nineteen months than the NRC. You heard Marianne Burtnett of the Homeland Security

Council staff tell you yesterday that NRC was the “rock star” last August in putting in

place on time the five-tier Homeland Security Advisory System directed by Homeland

Security Presidential Directive #3. She said that we “led the way” and were a model for

other agencies in how to implement that Presidential Directive. Many hours went into

that achievement last summer. The staff first held closed meetings with various

categories of licensees and State officials. They sought to determine what other agencies

were doing. And then with the help of the Commission, they drafted Regulatory Issue

Summary 2002-12 for each category of licensee, a far larger set of licensees than had

been covered by NRC’s previous three-tier threat advisory system. The simple act of

mailing that regulatory issue summary with its safeguards information or confidential

attachment to every licensee, with copies to every State Homeland Security Advisor and

every State NRC Liaison Officer, by the President’s August 24, 2002 deadline was a

monumental effort carried out by our support staff, and to my knowledge with no wrong

enclosures.

This is a gathering largely of those interested in reactor issues, and I will soon turn

to reactor security. But I want to tell another story about extraordinary staff achievement,

this time with regard to the control of high-risk radioactive sources that might be used in

a Radiological Dispersal Device. Former Chairman Meserve and Secretary of Energy

Abraham met last summer and agreed to launch a joint working group to study additional

controls on high-risk radioactive sources. By early this year that working group had

identified the radionuclides of greatest concern and recommended action levels (in

Curies) for each radionuclide. They had outlined a program to achieve cradle to grave

controls on those sources, including export and import controls. Simultaneously we were

working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to revise their draft Code

of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and supporting documents

to insure compatibility with the DOE/NRC Working Group recommendations. As we

prepared for potential war with Iraq, the Homeland Security Council assigned NRC the

task of tightening control on these high-risk radioactive sources as part of what became

known on March 17 as Operation Liberty Shield. With tremendous help from our

Agreement State colleagues, who for security reasons could not be fully informed of our

intentions, our staff put together the mailing addresses and fax numbers of every licensee

in the country who might possess such high-risk sources, some 1500 or so licensees. On
the evening of March 17 within minutes of the commencement of Liberty Shield, the

NRC staff issued an advisory to them, outlining additional security measures they should

take. Again, I believe that our staff was considered a model by HSC in carrying out this

Presidential assignment.

Let me now turn to power reactor security. When we met last year, we had just

issued our February 25, 2002 Order with its interim compensatory measures. That Order

had made implicit (and in some cases, for example the size of the truck bomb, explicit)

changes in the design basis threat for radiological sabotage. Those changes were captured

in the enhanced adversary characteristics used in the table top security exercises that

resumed last summer. For the first time those security exercises specifically sought the

involvement of a broad array of State, local and Federal law enforcement and emergency

planning officials, because as I said last year, we have sought from the outset of our

security review to put in place an integrated approach to the security of these sites. 

Wherever we draw the line on the design basis threat, there is a possibility of a beyond

design basis threat actually confronting the plant. The responsibility for dealing with

such beyond design basis threats is clearly shared with government, and government has

to tell you how it will carry out its responsibilities. As Chairman Diaz indicated

yesterday, we intend to work with the Department of Homeland Security on this. But first

we need to revise the DBT. And we will soon do this by Order.

In revising the DBT for radiological sabotage, we have sought the views of as

broad a range of stakeholders as possible given that all of the details are properly

safeguards information. The staff has met with other Federal agencies, State homeland

security officials and cleared industry representatives. They have received many written

responses to our request for comments. The Commission has twice met with industry

representatives to hear directly their concerns. I am proud of the process we have

followed. We have followed similar processes in developing the access authorization

Order issued in January and the training Order approved by the Commission and soon to

be issued. Indeed, on the training Order, at POGO’s suggestion, the staff sought direct

input from security officers around the nation. On the fatigue Order we followed a totally

public process, putting out two drafts for comment and holding two rounds of public

meetings on those drafts.

I hear a great deal of comment about using a rulemaking process rather than

Orders to effect these changes. Frankly, aside from fatigue, I do not believe that any

conforming rulemaking activity that subsequently follows these Orders will go into any

detail on any of these matters. The details belong in safeguards information documents. 

To be binding, they need to be in the form of Orders. In my view, the 10 CFR 73.1

description of the design basis threat for radiological sabotage in the future should consist

of about one line that says the details are issued by Order. No one’s legal rights are

curtailed by the issuance of such Orders. Any licensee has the right to contest the Order

before a licensing board panel, which is quite capable of holding closed hearings on

safeguards information matters. We have gone the extra mile in having as broad

comment as possible before issuing all but the initial February 25, 2002 Order. 
This is not the forum in which to discuss the details of the DBT. But I will tell

you that the Commission has thought long and hard about the fundamental issue we

posed in our January 2, 2003 letter asking for comments from cleared stakeholders,

namely the appropriate limits on the threat against which a regulated private sector

security force should have high assurance of defending. The industry has publicly argued

that essentially anything beyond the threat enhancements of last summer’s enhanced

adversary characteristics involves an ”enemy of the State” threat against which they

should not be required to defend. I respect the argument, but I will end up disagreeing on

some of these matters. The “enemy of the State” regulation, 10 CFR 50.13, was not

meant to be construed as widely as the industry attempts to do today. 

When the Commission completes its deliberations on the DBT, we will have put

in place all the results of our comprehensive security review as they pertain to power

reactors. As Chairman Diaz has said, we then expect a period of regulatory stability

during which our power reactor licensees can consolidate the various enhancements that

we have ordered. But our work will be far from over. We intend to continue to work

with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies, as well as State

and local law enforcement and emergency planning officials, to insure an overall

integrated approach to the security of these critical facilities. You saw the early fruits of

that effort on March 17 as part of Operation Liberty Shield, in which DHS took the lead

in talking to Governors about possible augmentation of security at power reactor

facilities. And we will continue to try to identify possible cost-effective mitigating

strategies against beyond-DBT threats. 

Chairman Diaz spoke yesterday about the difficulty of public communication on

security matters, and indeed in general. NRC has a responsibility to say what we can

about these matters in public without aiding potential terrorists. We should not abandon

the playing field to either anti-nuclear activists or pro-industry groups. As you will see

from the transcripts of public Commission meetings, I am clearly frustrated that we have

not said more thus far, particularly when it comes to the vulnerability of spent fuel pools

to terrorist attacks. There is a lot of bad information being spread about the alleged

vulnerability of spent fuel pools, and this has been going on for more than a year. 

Unfortunately, in some cases, previous NRC staff or contractor studies, which themselves

either have errors, or made non-physical simplifying assumptions, are misused to make

extraordinary claims about spent fuel pool vulnerabilities. The worst of these NRC staff

studies was NUREG-1738, a study which the staff released in January 2001, but which

the Commission never endorsed because of our deep misgivings about it. Indeed we

asked for public comments on NUREG-1738, held a public meeting on it in February

2001 at which various groups asked that it be peer-reviewed because of its obvious flaws,

but never decided that question because the paper which would have been the vehicle for

that decision was withdrawn by the staff after the events of September 11. 2001. I can

tell you I would have voted for a peer review and that our current more realistic research

on spent fuel vulnerability does not support that study. As Chairman Diaz said yesterday

in response to a question, terrorists can’t violate the laws of physics, but researchers can. 

Even they can’t do it for long. We will soon be releasing more information on spent fuel

vulnerability. In fact, a fact sheet may already be in ADAMS. Let me read from that fact
sheet:

“Nuclear power reactor spent fuel pools are not soft structures. They are neither

easily reached nor easily breached. Instead, they are robust structures constructed of very

thick concrete walls with stainless steel liners. In addition, other design characteristics of

these pools can make them highly resistant to damage and can ease the ability to cope

with any damage. Such characteristics can include having the fuel in the pool partially or

completely below grade and having the pool shielded by other plant structures.

“Spent fuel pools at operating power reactors are protected by robust licensee

security plans, which have been further augmented as a result of NRC’s February 25,

2002 Order, the details of which are sensitive. Even prior to September 11, 2001,

licensees had multiple barriers and sensors, well-armed and trained guards, ready to

defend from prepared positions. The February 25, 2002 Order augmented those

capabilities through requirements for increased patrols, augmented security forces,

additional security posts, greater vehicle stand-off distances, and enhanced coordination

with law enforcement authorities. The Order also directed licensees to develop guidance

and strategies to maintain or restore spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or

available resources.

“The National Research Council in its 2002 report, Making the Nation Safer: The

Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, found: “The threat of terrorist

attacks on spent fuel storage facilities, like reactors, is highly dependent on design

characteristics. Moreover, spent fuel generates orders of magnitude less heat than an

operating reactor, so that emergency cooling of the fuel in the case of an attack could

probably be accomplished using ‘low tech’ measures that could be implemented without

significant exposure of workers to radiation.” The Commission agrees with this

statement, and through its February 25, 2002 Order has already made provision that

licensees prepare such “low tech” measures in advance.

“In the unlikely event that a spent fuel pool were successfully attacked, and the

water either partially or completely drained (an almost impossible event for below grade

pools), there would still be several hours or longer for recovery of fuel cooling.

“Finally, preliminary results from current NRC analyses indicate that, even if all

water were lost in a spent fuel pool and spent fuel recovery actions were not successful in

cooling the fuel, most fuel in the pool would not be involved in any fire initiated in the

fuel cladding. Thus, the consequences of such an extreme event would be much less

severe than previously estimated in the NRC staff’s February 2001 study, NUREG-1738.

“Given all of this, NRC does not believe that the fundamental recommendation of

the Alvarez study, namely that all spent fuel more than five years old be placed in dry

casks through a crash 10-year program costing many billions of dollars, is at all justified. 

The Commission will release an initial critique of the Alvarez study shortly.”

How will we convince the public at large that what we are doing to protect nuclear
facilities from terrorist attacks is reasonable, given the details of our security

arrangements will be classified? In all honesty, I am not sure that we ever will. The

debate may be much like the defense debate throughout the Cold War. That debate

featured “missile gaps” and “Team Bs” and never ended until the Cold War was over. 

The classified information on Soviet capabilities was subject to multiple interpretations. 

Cold War hawks tended to worst-case the information, attribute extraordinary

performance to Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and demand sharp increases in defense

spending. Cold War doves tended to see Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities as

Potemkin villages, and argue for cuts in defense spending. The truth was somewhere in

between, but as a nation we insured through our elected representatives, both Presidents

and Congresses, that the threat was adequately, if not perfectly met. We erred, if at all,

with today’s 20-20 hindsight of real Soviet capabilities, on the high side. The

Commission’s job, under the full cognizance of the President and the Congress, is to

ensure that the current terrorist threat is adequately met. I believe that we will be able to

convince the Congress of this and to say enough in public to convince most of the public

of this. But I fully expect that there will be ongoing criticism both from those who feel

we are not doing enough, and will hold us to an absolute assurance of perfect protection

standard, and from those who feel we are doing too much, and attributing to terrorists

capabilities far beyond what they actually possess. As in the Cold War, we will err, if at

all, on the high side. The integrated security strategy we seek to put in place, marrying

the licensee’s high assurance against a design basis threat and significant deterrence

against beyond design basis threats, with State, local and Federal response capabilities

against beyond-DBT threats will likely far exceed the security strategy for all other

elements of our national infrastructure for a very long time to come. Obviously, it does

so today. Some of you may feel that that is unfair. The nuclear industry has always been

held to a higher standard than other industries. That is why the NRC exists. But it is not

an absolute or perfection standard. I believe that we are striking the right balance here as

we do in our safety regulation, but reasonable people may differ. That, as Chairman Diaz

said yesterday, is the genius of a democratic society.

I have devoted all of my formal presentation to security matters today. I hope I

will get questions on other matters, for despite our focus on security issues since

September 11, I, as well as most of our staff, spend most of our time on the critical safety

issues that are the core of our mission. Let me now open the floor to your questions.