In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-23-00036-CR

IN RE GREGORY DEWAYNE NEWSON

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gregory Dewayne Newson has petitioned this Court for mandamus relief. Newson asks 

us to grant a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable LeAnn Rafferty, judge of the 123rd

Judicial District Court of Panola County, to rescind her order denying Newson’s motion to 

disqualify attorney pro tem April Sikes and to enter an order granting his motion. Because we 

conclude that Judge Rafferty did not clearly abuse her discretion when she denied Newson’s

motion to disqualify, we deny his petition for a writ of mandamus.

I. Background

Law enforcement arrested Newson in Louisiana on December 31, 2019, for the offense of 

capital murder of a peace officer, which was alleged to have occurred earlier that day in Panola 

County, Texas. On January 8, 2020, the trial court granted Panola County District Attorney 

Danny Buck Davidson’s motion to appoint April Sikes as a special prosecutor in Newson’s case. 

At that time, Sikes was employed as the first assistant district attorney for Gregg County. On 

February 27, Newson was extradited back to Texas, and at the request of the Panola County 

Sheriff’s Office, he was held in custody in the Gregg County Jail. 

On March 2, Davidson filed a motion for recusal and appointment of attorney pro tem, 

explaining to the trial court that there was a “potential conflict of interest” that had “arisen 

during the investigation of [the] case that would possibly require [Davidson] and [his] staff 

members . . . to be called as fact witnesses in the trial of [Newson’s] case.”

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 (Emphasis added). 

1The investigation was related to the forfeiture of $5,500.00, which the State maintained was held by Newson as 

illegal contraband. On February 13, the State filed a motion to nonsuit its original notice of seizure and intended 
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Davidson asked the court to “grant [the] motion and recuse Movant and Movant’s Office . . . .” 

On March 6, the trial found that good cause existed to grant Davidson’s motion to “voluntarily 

recuse[],” and the court appointed Gregg County District Attorney Tom B. Watson to act as

criminal district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case. The trial court did not refer to Sikes in the

order granting Davidson’s motion to recuse. 

Around that same time, Newson’s attorney notified the trial court, via email, that Newson

objected to Sikes’s continued involvement in his case. Counsel continued, “[T]he law requires 

that if Mr. Davidson is disqualified . . . [Davidson’s] employees and staff, including Ms. Sikes, 

would also be disqualified from participating in the prosecution(s) pending against 

Mr. Newson.”2

On July 27, the trial court, on its own motion, issued an order removing Watson as the 

district attorney pro tem and disqualifying Sikes from serving as counsel in the case, because 

they had been remiss in their obligations to present Newson’s case to the grand jury and because

they had not “provide[d] any excuse or reason as to why the grand jury presentation would not 

forfeiture, asking the trial court to dismiss, without prejudice, the forfeiture proceeding against Newson. The trial 

court granted the State’s motion the same day.

2

In his email message to the court, Newson’s counsel explained, 

It is our understanding of the law that once the elected District Attorney is disqualified from 

participating in a case, that disqualification is imputed down the ranks of the employees and staff 

of the District Attorney’s office, to include any assistant district attorney and or special prosecutor 

employed or otherwise assisting the District Attorney. 

It has also been suggested that if the DA of Panola County is disqualified, then the primary 

employer of Ms. Sikes, the DA of Gregg County, Tom Watson, could be appointed as the 

Attorney Pro Tem for this case. While the disqualification of Ms. Sikes would not be imputed up 

to her employer, the elected District Attorney of Gregg County, Ms. Sikes’ continued participation 

in the prosecution of this case would, in our view, be prohibited. We take no position on the 

propriety of the appointment of Mr. Watson as the Attorney Pro Tem in this case, although we see 

it as potentially problematic. 
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occur.” The court also noted that Sikes had been appointed as special counsel to the Panola 

County District Attorney’s office when Davidson voluntarily recused himself from the case but 

that “[t]he record [was] unclear as to whether Sikes sought to withdraw her appointment as 

special counsel” at the time Davidson recused. Despite that, the trial court “removed” Watson as 

district attorney pro tem and ordered that Sikes be “disqualified to serve as counsel in this 

matter.” The trial court then appointed the Texas Attorney General’s Office (AG’s Office) as the 

district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case.

Around seven days later, on August 3, Watson filed a motion for recusal and appointment 

of attorney pro tem. Newson states that Watson’s motion for recusal was filed pursuant to an 

agreement between the parties and the trial court. The trial court found that good cause existed

to grant Watson’s recusal motion and disqualified Watson from serving as the prosecutor in 

Newson’s case.3 On that same day, the trial court entered a second order referring the case to the 

AG’s Office to serve as district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case. The trial court assigned 

Newson’s case to Assistant Attorney General Natalie Tise, and the State indicted Newson for 

capital murder and aggravated assault on September 28. 

Around May 2022, Sikes, who had since left her employment with the Gregg County 

DA’s office, was hired by the AG’s Office and reassigned as the criminal district attorney 

pro tem in Newson’s case. On August 12, Newson filed a motion to disqualify Sikes as the 

prosecutor in his case. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Newson’s motion to disqualify

Sikes. Newson’s petition for a writ of mandamus followed.

3On August 4, the trial court entered a separate order to vacate its July 27 “[r]emoval [o]rder.”
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II. Standard of Review

“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.” In re Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 572 S.W.3d 

315, 319 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding). The decision to deny a motion to 

disqualify counsel is reviewable on a petition for a writ of mandamus. In re Cox, 481 S.W.3d 

289, 295 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding). In a criminal case, “[m]andamus 

relief may be granted if a relator shows that: (1) the act sought to be compelled is purely 

ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law.” In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). To meet his burden to establish entitlement to

mandamus relief, Newson is required to show that the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant 

his motion to disqualify Sikes. See In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013) (orig. proceeding)). An act is considered ministerial if relator can show a clear right 

to the relief sought. Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig.

proceeding). A clear right to the requested relief is shown when the facts and circumstances 

require but “one rational decision ‘under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, 

constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles.’” In re. State ex rel. 

Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810). “Mandamus is not available to 

compel a discretionary act as distinguished from a ministerial act.” State ex rel. Holmes v. 

Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (orig. proceeding). 

III. Discussion

In his mandamus petition, Newson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion to disqualify Sikes because she had “twice before been disqualified.” Newson 
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points out that Sikes was initially disqualified as a special prosecutor for the Panola County 

District Attorney’s Office due to her status as a potential witness in the civil forfeiture case and

that she was disqualified a second time from serving as district attorney pro tem in Gregg County 

due to her failure to fulfill her duties. Newson asks this Court to (1) grant his petition for a writ 

of mandamus, (2) direct the trial court to rescind its order denying Newson’s motion to 

disqualify Sikes as district attorney pro tem, and (3) direct the trial court to enter an order 

granting Newson’s motion to disqualify Sikes. 

In regard to prosecutors, recusal and disqualification are not interchangeable words. In re 

Guerra, 235 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007, orig. proceeding). 

“Legal disqualification refers to the ineligibility to act as the prosecutor in a particular case.” 

In re Ligon, 408 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). 

“There are . . . a few instances in which the district attorney is legally disqualified from acting,”4

Coleman v. State, 246 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), and Newson fails to allege that 

any of them applied to Sikes. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (“Each district attorney 

4Article 2.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled “Disqualified,” states,

(a) District and county attorneys shall not be of counsel adversely to the State in any 

case, in any court, nor shall they, after they cease to be such officers, be of counsel adversely to 

the State in any case in which they have been of counsel for the State.

(b) A judge of a court in which a district or county attorney represents the State 

shall declare the district or county attorney disqualified for purposes of Article 2.07 on a showing 

that the attorney is the subject of a criminal investigation by a law enforcement agency if that 

investigation is based on credible evidence of criminal misconduct for an offense that is within the 

attorney’s authority to prosecute. A disqualification under this subsection applies only to the 

attorney’s access to the criminal investigation pending against the attorney and to any prosecution 

of a criminal charge resulting from that investigation. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.08(a), (b) (Supp.).
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shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals 

therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely.”).

If there is a basis for legal disqualification for a district attorney, for example, if “an 

elected prosecuting attorney has previously represented a defendant in a particular proceeding,” 

the disqualification “is imputed to those assistants ‘who serve[] at his will and pleasure.’” 

Scarborough v. State, 54 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref’d) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. May, 270 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1954, no writ)). 

In other words, “if an elected prosecuting attorney ha[d] previously represented a defendant in a 

particular proceeding, then article 2.01 disqualifies him from representing the State in the matter 

and that disqualification is imputed to those assistants ‘who serve[] at his will and pleasure.’” Id.

(alteration in original). On the other hand, “if an assistant district or county attorney has 

previously represented a defendant in a particular proceeding, then that particular attorney is 

disqualified from assisting in the prosecution of the case, but the elected prosecutor and his other 

assistants are not.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Edison v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1990) (orig. proceeding).

In relation to a voluntary recusal, like the two recusals in this case, “[a] district attorney 

who is not legally disqualified may request that the district court permit him to recuse himself in 

a particular case for good cause.” Coleman, 246 S.W.3d at 81. This procedure, which is 

specified in Article 2.07(b-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, “allows the district 

attorney to avoid conflicts of interest and even the appearance of impropriety by deciding not to 

participate in certain cases.” Id. “Once the trial court approves his voluntary recusal, the district 
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attorney is deemed ‘disqualified.’” Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(b-1)

(Supp.)).

The distinction between a legal disqualification and a voluntary recusal is critical. Had 

Davidson or Watson represented Newson previously, the knowledge that either of them gained 

through that representation would be imputed to Sikes, and the disqualification would follow her 

after she left the DA’s office. But that is not the case here, and Newson has cited no legal 

authority showing that a deemed disqualification, following a voluntary recusal, would follow 

Sikes to her future employment. In fact, “the notion of ‘once deemed disqualified, always 

disqualified,’” has been expressly rejected. O’Neal v. State, No. 07-15-00273-CR, 2016 WL 

3136039, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 31, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (citing Coleman, 246 S.W.3d at 85). 

Recently, we addressed a similar issue in In re Rider, No. 06-22-00129-CR, 2022 WL

7208629 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 13, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). In that case, Rider filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to 

order “the 124th Judicial District Court of Gregg County, Texas, to enter an order disqualifying 

the prosecutor pro tem.” Id. at *1. We denied Rider’s petition for mandamus relief.

Rider was indicted for capital murder, and the trial court appointed John Moore to 

represent him. At that time, Sikes was the first assistant to Greg County DA Tom Watson, and 

she made multiple appearances on behalf of the State in Rider’s case. “On January 21, 2022, . . . 

Watson . . . informed the trial court that he [would not be] seeking re-election” and that he did 

not have sufficient time in office to prosecute Rider’s case. He further informed the court that 
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John Moore would be running for Greg County DA “unopposed and would be sworn in as the 

next criminal district attorney on January 1, 2023.” Id. Watson asked the trial court to grant his 

motion to voluntarily recuse his office “‘[a]s a result of the upcoming changes in the’ DA’s 

Office” and because “a conflict ar[ose] in that John Moore w[ould] not be able to prosecute the 

case against the Defendant due to their previous attorney-client relationship.” Id. “The recusal 

request expressly contemplated a future conflict of interest and not one existing at that time.” Id. 

The trial court granted Watson’s motion on February 2, allowing him to recuse pursuant 

to Article 2.07(b-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court also appointed the 

Texas AG’s office to prosecute Rider’s case as DA pro tem. Five months later, Sikes left the 

Gregg County DA’s office and was employed as an assistant attorney general. At her new

position, Sikes was assigned to represent the State against Rider. “Rider moved to disqualify 

Sikes based solely on the argument that, because the DA’s Office [previously] recused, Sikes 

was disqualified” from prosecuting Rider as an AAG. Id. The trial court rejected Rider’s 

reasoning, found that there was no “evidence of a due process violation or issue,” and denied 

Rider’s motion. Id.

Rider filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, maintaining that the trial 

court’s denial of his motion to disqualify Sikes was an abuse of discretion. Id. In denying 

Rider’s petition, we first noted the difference between a legal disqualification and a voluntary 

recusal and then explained, “Had Watson previously represented Rider, the knowledge he gained

through such a representation would be imputed to Sikes and the disqualification could follow 

her after she left the DA’s Office. But those are not the facts . . . .” Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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Newson maintains that the facts in the present case are critically different from those in 

Rider. Newson argues that, in Rider, “neither Ms. Sikes nor her supervisor Mr. Watson (nor 

anyone else in the Gregg County District Attorney’s Office for that matter) ever labored under 

any kind of conflict in the case. Mr. Watson sought voluntary recusal prospectively based on the 

eventual legal disqualification of his successor.” With respect to this case, Newson contends,

“Davidson sought a recusal based on his own existing conflict, then Mr. Watson was removed

and later voluntarily recused based on his failure to fulfill his duties as attorney pro tem. In both 

circumstances, Ms. Sikes was not simply an unwitting bystander.” (Emphasis added). He 

continues, “[Instead,] she was an active participant. And she was disqualified based, not only on 

the imputed taint from her supervisors, but also on her own status and conduct.” We disagree.

Similar to what Watson did in the Rider case, Davidson filed a motion to voluntarily 

recuse from Newson’s case based on the possibility that he, or one of his staff members, might

be a potential witness in a civil forfeiture proceeding against Newson. The trial court had the 

discretion to grant or deny Davidson’s motion. Not unexpectedly, the court chose to grant 

Davidson’s motion and appointed Watson as the attorney pro tem. Regardless, Newson’s 

forfeiture case, which was the sole basis for Watson’s motion to voluntarily recuse, was 

dismissed pursuant to the State’s own motion. But even if the forfeiture case were to be refiled 

by the State, the trial court would have the discretion to determine whether Sikes had a conflict 

of interest regarding the forfeiture proceeding. The fact that the trial court has the discretion to 

determine whether Sikes has a conflict of interest refutes Newson’s assertion that the trial court 

had a ministerial duty to grant his motion to disqualify Sikes.
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Newson also argues that Sikes was disqualified from prosecuting his case based on 

Watson’s and Sikes’s prior legal disqualifications. It is true that the trial court entered an order 

disqualifying Watson and Sikes based on their failure to participate in grand jury proceedings. 

However, the trial court used its discretion when it chose to vacate its order disqualifying Watson 

and Sikes and, then again, when it entered its order granting Watson’s motion to voluntarily 

recuse. Neither of those rulings were ministerial in nature, and Newson has not met his burden 

of showing that the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant his motion to disqualify Sikes based 

on any of the prior recusal orders. 

IV. Conclusion

Because Sikes’s appointment as attorney pro tem was consistent with the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to allow Sikes to continue to 

prosecute Newson lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

For this reason, we deny Newson’s petition for a writ of mandamus.

Charles van Cleef

Justice

Date Submitted: April 20, 2023

Date Decided: April 21, 2023

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