H ow Te r rorism Ends

B r i e f l y ...

• T he na t u re of the grie v a nce ma t t e r s. Ethnically based terrorist campaig ns can be

h a rder to end decisively than politically based one s, because they often enjoy

b ro a der support amo ng a population they seek to re p re s e nt .

• Po l i t ical vio l e nce by itself can ra rely achieve its aims, but it can some t i mes do so

in conjunc t ion with less vio l e nt political actio n .

• By the same token, de t e r r i ng terrorism and pro s e c u t i ng terrorists may be ins u f f ic ie nt to end terrorism, especially when a large population supports the terro r i s t s ’

c a u s e. In such situa t io ns, ne go t iated settleme nts may pro v ide the only solutio ns.

• In Sri Lanka, the go v e r n me nt appears to have conc l uded from its victory over the

Maoist JVP that law enfo rc e me nt and compulsion can end a terror campaign. Ho we v e r, the LTTE has a much bro a der base of support than the JVP ever did, and the

LTTE is unlikely to go away simply through go v e r n me nt - a p p l ied fo rc e.

• O ne of the most effective stra t e g ies at go v e r n me nts’ disposal may be to split of f

p ra g matists from ra d ical re j e c t io n i s t s. Such efforts can diminish public support fo r

t he terrorists and de ny them a stro ng base from which to opera t e.

• In the cases of the IRA and the PLO, the initia t ion of political ne go t ia t io ns has no t

c o nclusively ended terrorism, but it has swung public support behind a peaceful

s o l u t ion and helped diminish popular support for the terro r i s t s.

• Ma k i ng conc e s s io ns to causes espoused by terrorists can arouse hostility from tho s e

w ho believe that terrorism is “being re w a rde d.” Weak go v e r n me nts find it diffic u l t

to ma ke such conc e s s io ns.

• Peace overtures must be well-time d. Ide a l l y, they should come at a time when the

go v e r n me nt is stro ng and the terrorist org a n i z a t ion is unde rgo i ng a period of int ros p e c t ion. Good int e l l ige nce can ma ke a differe nce in these cases.

UN I T E D STAT E S IN S T I T U T E O F PE AC E w w w. u s i p . o rg

SPECIAL REPORT

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The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not advo c a t e

specific policies.

CO N T E N T S

2 Martha Cre nshaw on How Te r rorism End s

5 Paul Wilkinson on the IRA

7 Jon Alterman on the PLO

8 Te resita Schaffer on the LT T E

11 C o nc l u s io ns

May 25, 1999

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

Po l i t ical vio l e nce re ma i ns a serious threat to life

in much of the world, and it can have a corro s i v e

effect on the political processes that cont r i b u t e

to do me s t ic and int e r na t io nal peace. On

April 12, 1999, the United States Institute of

Pe a c e, toge t her with the British-based Aire y

Neave Trust, convened a working group me e t i ng

on the subject “How Te r rorism End s.” The works hop, which attracted the partic i p a t ion of

a c a de m ic ex p e r t s, curre nt and fo r mer go v e r n me nt

of f ic ia l s, and security cons u l t a nt s, was conduc t e d

as an activity of the Int e r na t io nal Research Gro u p

on Po l i t ical Vio l e nc e, which the Ins t i t u t e

c o - s p o nsors with the Airey Neave Trust and

w h ich is chaired by the Rt. Hon. Sir Adam Butler.

Pa nelists at the workshop inc l uded Prof e s s o r

Martha Cre nshaw of Wesleyan Un i v e r s i t y, Prof e s s o r

Paul Wilkinson of St. Andrews Un i v e r s i t y,

Jon B. Alterman of the Ins t i t u t e, and

A m b a s s a dor Te resita Schaffer of the Center fo r

S t ra t e g ic and Int e r na t io nal Stud ie s.

I nstitute Pre s ide nt Ric h a rd H. Solomon mo de ra t e d

t he me e t i ng, which was attended by some fo r t y

a u t ho r i t ies in the field of political vio l e nc e.

This report, written by Dr. Alterman with the he l p

of fo r mer re s e a rch assistant Sara Simo n ,

s u m marizes the points ma de by the pane l i s t s.
In an attempt to better unde r s t a nd what go v e r n me ntal actio ns can hasten the end

of political vio l e nc e, the workshop began with an overview of the problem by Ma r t h a

C re ns h a w. Her pre s e nt a t ion was followed by three case stud ie s. In the first, Paul Wilkinson of St. Andrews University discussed the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and in the seco nd, Jon B. Alterman of the United States Institute of Peace discussed the Pa l e s t i ne

L i b e ra t ion Org a n i z a t ion (PLO). Both were cons ide red “successful” case stud ie s, because

t he org a n i z a t io ns in question have embraced political dialogue instead of vio l e nce to

pursue their aims. In the third case study, Te resita Schaffer of the Center for Stra t e g ic

a nd Int e r na t io nal Stud ies discussed the Libera t ion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who

have been fig ht i ng for autono my for Tamil-populated areas in Sri Lanka for almost two

de c a de s. The LTTE was cons ide red a “failed” case because go v e r n me nt actio ns have been

u nable to end the vio l e nc e.

Martha Crenshaw on How Te r rorism Ends

As we try to create go v e r n me ntal polic ies aimed at end i ng terrorism, it is useful to

e nu me rate some of the variables that distinguish differe nt situa t io ns.

T he first set of variables involves the terrorist groups the ms e l v e s.

• Internal fa c t o rs. How does the org a n i z a t ion ma ke de c i s io ns? How does the org an i z a t ion perceive its enviro n me nt? What are the int e r nal psycho l o g ical dy na m ic s ?

Is the org a n i z a t ion divided int e r nally? All of these things are important to kno w

but often difficult to ascertain.

• External fa c t o rs. How does the relative stre ngth of the terrorist org a n i z a t ion comp a re with that of the go v e r n me nt it opposes? Are the terrorists ide o l o g ically or ethn ically motivated? What kinds of ties do they have to outside groups who ma y

support them? Is the conflict best characterized as a secessionist mo v e me nt’s civil

w a r, or does the conflict involve a battle over civil society and re p re s e nt a t io n ?

T he second set of variables involves the tools that a go v e r n me nt uses to re s p o nd to terrorism. Ma ny of these optio ns can be pursued simu l t a ne o u s l y.

• D e t e r re n c e. G o v e r n me nts can use their coercive capacity to ma ke terrorism too

costly for those who seek to use it. They can do this by military strikes agains t

t e r rorist bases, assassina t io ns of key leade r s, collective punishme nt, or other me t ho d s. The re are several drawbacks to this approach, ho w e v e r. On the one hand, it

can lead to unacceptable hu man rig hts vio l a t io ns. In add i t ion, groups may no t

c o me to go v e r n me nt attent ion until mo v e me nts are so well developed that effo r t s

to contain them through de t e r re nt me t hods are ins u f f ic ie nt .

• Criminal justice. G o v e r n me nts can treat terrorism primarily as a crime and the refo re pursue the ex t ra d i t ion, pro s e c u t ion, and inc a rc e ra t ion of suspects. One dra wback to this approach is that the pro s e c u t ion of terrorists in a court of law can

c o m p romise go v e r n me nt efforts to gather int e l l ige nce on terrorist org a n i z a t io ns. In

a dd i t ion, criminal justice efforts (like de t e r re nt efforts) are deployed mostly after

t e r rorists have struck, me a n i ng that sig n i f ic a nt da ma ge and loss of life may have

a l re a dy occurre d.

• Enhanced defense. G o v e r n me nts can ma ke targets harder to attack, and they can

use int e l l ige nce capabilities to gain advance kno w l e dge of when attacks may take

p l a c e. As targets are harde ne d, ho w e v e r, some terrorist groups may shift the i r

s ig hts to softer targe t s. An example is the targe t i ng of U.S. embassies in Ke nya and

Ta n z a n ia in August 1998 by truck bombs. Although the attacks are stro ng l y

b e l ieved to have been coord i nated by ind i v iduals with Middle Eastern tie s, targe t s

2

UN I T E D STAT E S IN S T I T U T EO F PE AC E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the peaceful

re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io nal conflic t s.

E s t a b l i s hed in 1984, the Institute meets its

c o ng re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of

p ro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R DO F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ke r ( C h a i r man), Research Prof e s s o r

of Diploma c y, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • Max M. Ka m p e l m a n, Esq.

( V ice Chairman), Frie d, Frank, Ha r r i s, Shriver and

Jacobson, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark,

S e n ior Fellow, Hoover Ins t i t u t ion on Wa r,

R e v o l u t ion and Pe a c e, Stanfo rd University •

T h e o d o re M. Hesbu rg h, Pre s ide nt Eme r i t u s,

University of No t re Dame • Seymour Martin

L i p s e t, Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George Ma s o n

University • W. Scott Thompson, Prof e s s o r

of Int e r na t io nal Po l i t ic s, Fletcher School of Law

a nd Diploma c y, Tufts University • Allen We i n s t e i n,

P re s ide nt, Center for Demo c ra c y, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. •

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO: Ralph Earle II, Deputy

D i re c t o r, U.S. Arms Cont rol and Disarma me nt

Age ncy • Phyllis Oakley, As s i s t a nt Secretary of

State for Int e l l ige nce and Research • Daniel H.

S i m p s o n, Vice Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defens e

University • Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secre t a r y

of Defense for Po l icy • Richard H. Solomon,

P re s ide nt, U.S. Institute of Peace (no n v o t i ng) 
in Africa were chosen because of their relatively lax security compared with targe t s

in the Middle East.

• N e g o t i a t i o n s. G o v e r n me nts can elect to enter into ne go t ia t io ns with terro r i s t

g roups and ma ke conc e s s io ns in exc h a nge for the groups’ re nu nc ia t ion of vio l e nc e.

While go v e r n me nts are often re l uc t a nt to do so at the beginning of terror camp a ig ns, ne go t ia t io ns may be the only way to resolve some long - s t a nd i ng disputes.

Given the above sets of varia b l e s, the end of terrorism may result from one or mo re of

t he fo l l o w i ng situa t io ns :

• S u c c e s s. T he terrorists may have accomplished their objectives, such as the overt h row of a go v e r n me nt or the end of an occupation. Te r rorism per se canno t

a c h ieve long-term goals such as re v o l u t ion or inde p e nde nc e, but it can some t i me s

do so in conjunc t ion with less vio l e nt political actio n .

• P reliminary success. A corollary to achie v i ng objectives is having at least achie v e d

p u b l ic re c o g n i t ion for an org a n i z a t ion and the cause it espouses. In this case, cont i nued terrorist actio ns may alie nate supporters, spons o r s, or key third - c o u nt r y

actors for whom cont i nued vio l e nce is una c c e p t a b l e.

• O rganizational bre a kd ow n . Te r rorist org a n i z a t io ns, like any org a n i z a t io ns, mu s t

c o ns t a ntly work to ma i ntain the ms e l v e s. If re c r u i t i ng dr ies up, or if fund i ng

b e c o mes una v a i l a b l e, the org a n i z a t ion may be unable to sustain itself. On the

o t her hand, self-pre s e r v a t ion may in fact fo rce org a n i z a t io ns to cont i nue terro r i s t

a c t i v i t ies even if the leadership otherwise wishes to give them up. It may be that

t he only way for the org a n i z a t ion to cont i nue to attract new recruits and fina nc ial support is to cont i nue to gain publicity for its terrorist actio ns.

• Dwindling support. O rg a n i z a t io ns may lose the support of their various cons t i t u e nc ie s — t he populatio ns they seek to re p re s e nt or the go v e r n me nts or othe r

o rg a n i z a t io ns that support them. They can do so for re a s o ns of ide o l o g ical or

s t ra t e g ic differe nc e s, personality clashe s, or simple fa t ig u e. Te r rorist actio ns can

also pro v o ke mo ral outra ge and unde r m i ne support.

• N ew alternative s. At time s, other optio ns for political change eme rge. They can

i nc l ude mo re tra d i t io nal fo r ms of warfa re or re v o l u t ion, mass pro t e s t s, or politic a l

ne go t ia t io ns.

As suggested above, ma ny of the factors and cons e q u e nces outlined above may occur

s i mu l t a ne o u s l y. Both go v e r n me nts and terrorist org a n i z a t io ns can pursue ma ny tracks at

o nc e, and org a n i z a t io ns may confro nt a wide series of challenges simu l t a ne o u s l y.

G o v e r n me ntal de c i s io ns about how to confro nt terrorism are ma de mo re difficult by

t he fre q u e ntly high de g ree of unc e r t a i nty go v e r n me nts have about the na t u re of terro rist org a n i z a t io ns, their mo t i v a t io ns, and the effects of go v e r n me nt actio ns on tho s e

o rg a n i z a t io ns. The need for unde r s t a nd i ng terrorist org a n i z a t io ns is hig h l ig hted by the

fact that such groups’ calculatio ns are based on the groups’ perc e p t io ns of costs and

re w a rd s, not those of the autho r i t ies confro nt i ng them or of objective observers.

So called “get-tough” me a s u res against terrorist groups can have unint e nded cons e q u e nc e s. Tr y i ng to “decapitate” a mo v e me nt may ra d icalize the whole mo v e me nt or

s o me splinter fa c t ion. As s a s s i na t io ns and military fo rce can pro v o ke a de s i re for re v e nge,

a nd ra ids and arrests can re i n fo rce ma r t ial ima ge s, create my t ho l o g ies of ma r t y rdom, or

feed para no ia and secre t i v e ness (which ma kes the mo v e me nts even harder to pene t ra t e

for re a s o ns of either unde r s t a nd i ng mo t i v a t io ns or fo i l i ng actio ns ) .

In the event that org a n i z a t io ns are primarily motivated by a de s i re for re c o g n i t io n ,

how should polic y ma kers re s p o nd? Should the go v e r n me nt recognize the org a n i z a t io ns

a nd eliminate their mo t i v a t ion for terrorism? Since terrorist actio ns most often are conBoth governments and terro r i s t

o rganizations can pursue many

t racks at once

3
s ide red ne w s w o r t hy events by me d ia org a n i z a t io ns, it is beyond go v e r n me nts’ cont ro l

w he t her the actio ns garner attent ion or not. Governme nts can play an effective ro l e,

ho w e v e r, in influenc i ng how terrorist events are portrayed to the public, and thus influe nce (but not cont rol) how the public int e r p rets those event s.

P u b l ic opinion is important because it stro ngly affects the amo u nt of fina nc ial and

o p e ra t io nal support the terrorists enjoy. In some cases, support comes from abroad and

is difficult for go v e r n me nts to cont rol. In other cases, ho w e v e r, go v e r n me nts have cont rol over populatio ns sympathe t ic to the terro r i s t s. In this event, they must walk a diff icult line. On the one hand, re p ressive me a s u res can enc o u ra ge ant igo v e r n me nt ho s t i l i t y

a nd support for the terro r i s t s. On the othe r, fear of punishme nt for the terrorists’ exc e s ses can unde r m i ne a population’s willing ness to support terrorist activitie s. In this bala nc e, the terrorists have two weapons on their side. The first is their own ability to me t e

out punishme nt against those who do not support their actio ns, and the second is the i r

ability to build on group solidarity to overc o me re s e r v a t io ns about their me t ho d s.

O ne effective tactic against ma ny terrorist org a n i z a t io ns may be to pro mote the i r

d i s i nt e g ra t ion from the ins ide. Governme nts can de mo ns t rate to groups that their support amo ng the populatio ns those groups supposedly re p re s e nt is waning. Even if suc h

a l l e g a t io ns are true, ho w e v e r, groups may be resolute in belie v i ng they enjoy support

even after that support has dissipated. Governme nts can also split off members from a

g roup, either by of f e r i ng large re w a rds for info r ma t ion that unde r m i nes group solida r i t y

or by ma k i ng promises of lenie ncy for imprisoned group me m b e r s. Fina l l y, go v e r n me nt s

can unilaterally enact re fo r ms that re duce public support for the terrorists witho u t

re w a rd i ng the terrorists dire c t l y, or even ne go t ia t i ng with the m .

A no t her tactic may be to put pre s s u re on states sympathe t ic to a terrorist gro u p ’ s

go a l s, even if the states are not outrig ht sponsors of the group. Expulsion from a haven

often causes fina nc ial pre s s u res or logistical diffic u l t ies and can some t i mes end a gro u p ’ s

v ia b i l i t y. In ma ny cases, ho w e v e r, affected count r ies lack the necessary ties to effect

s uch pre s s u re, or laws go v e r n i ng free ex p re s s ion ma ke it very difficult to crack down on

an org a n i z a t ion’s activitie s.

If efforts to eliminate a terrorist group through compulsion fail, ho w e v e r, go v e r nme nts are left trying to reach a peaceful settleme nt with that group. In civil conflic t s,

s uch a settleme nt will entail ne go t ia t io ns for amnesty on both the ind i v idual and gro u p

l e v e l s.

G o v e r n me nts must confro nt opposition on two fro nts: amo ng ra n k - a nd-file me m b e r s,

w ho may be mo re disposed toward vio l e nce than the leadership, and amo ng their own

p o p u l a t io ns, who may oppose the go v e r n me nt’s sitting down with killers and “re w a rdi ng vio l e nc e.” Groups opposed to a peaceful re c o nc i l ia t ion at that time will act to unde rm i ne the peace, often by unde r t a k i ng terrorist actio ns of their own. In this event ,

go v e r n me nts that have only a pre c a r ious grip on power will find it difficult to move de c isively toward peace.

In add i t ion, go v e r n me nts must time their peace overtures care f u l l y, first by ma k i ng

s uch ge s t u res when their ability to re w a rd good behavior and punish bad is stro ng, and

s e c o nd, by ma k i ng them when the terrorist org a n i z a t ion is go i ng through some perio d

of int e r nal questio n i ng. In such situa t io ns, effective int e l l ige nce can be cruc ial, since it

can both ide ntify auspic ious times for a peaceful ge s t u re and help inform the na t u re of

that ge s t u re.

Public opinion is importa n t

because it strongly affects the

amount of financial and

o p e rational support the

t e r rorists enjoy. 

4

One effective tactic against

m a ny terrorist org a n i z a t i o n s

may be to promote their

d i s i n t e g ration from the inside. 
Paul Wilkinson on the IRA

Of Martha Cre nshaw’s mo dels pre s e nted above, we can discount three with re g a rd to the

I R A .

• We cannot let the terrorists win on their own terms. The prospect of conc e d i ng the

f u t u re of No r t hern Ire l a nd to those who have shown little re g a rd for de mo c ra t ic

p rocesses is simply ho r r i f y i ng .

• We cannot wait for the terrorists to discount the ms e l v e s. The idea of the IRA just

“ w i t he r i ng away” in the medium term or even the long term is highly unlike l y

because through a long process of socia l i z a t ion, pre d i l e c t io ns toward ex t re me viol e nce are deeply embedded in some eleme nts of society in No r t hern Ire l a nd.

• State use of “dra c o n ian military fo rce” is unacceptable because it suspends de moc ra t ic rig hts and allows terrorist groups a victory at the ex p e nse of de mo c ra t ic

i ns t i t u t io ns.

T hese optio ns elimina t e d, three main areas for ma neuver re main. The first is what

m ig ht be called “politic s, diploma c y, and pro p hy l a x i s.” That is, to use de mo c ra t ic

p rocesses to address the unde r l y i ng grie v a nces of various groups in the re g ion. Such a

re s p o nse is an important tool for any de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt. In fact, a de mo c ra t ic go ve r n me nt should be re s p o nd i ng to the kinds of grie v a nces that lead to vio l e nt conflic t

b e fo re that conflict turns vio l e nt at all. That being said, once vio l e nce has bro ken out,

it is possible for a de mo c ra t ic system to address the causes of vio l e nce and re duce the

v io l e nce that results from people’s grie v a nc e s.

A l o ng these line s, the example of the Basque population in Spain is ins t r uc t i v e. The

new de mo c ra t ic go v e r n me nt in Spain in the late 1970s ma de a bold and fa r s ig hted de c is ion to gra nt autono my to the Basque re g io ns. Cons e q u e nt l y, popular support for the

Basque terror group ETA (Euskadi Ta As ka t a s u na, or Basque Fathe r l a nd and Liberty) has

been re duced eno r mo u s l y. ETA has become so fragile in re c e nt years that it has de c ide d

to investigate fo l l o w i ng the No r t hern Ire l a nd exa m p l e. The Spanish go v e r n me nt is unde rs t a ndably cautious about ne go t ia t i ng, but ne go t ia t i ng may re p re s e nt a way fo r w a rd in

that conflic t .

It is important to re me m b e r, ho w e v e r, that political ra p p ro c he me nt cannot end

v io l e nce ent i re l y. It is unre a l i s t ic to expect that, after de c a des of vio l e nc e, a single do cu me nt can put an end to every vio l e nt act. A political agre e me nt can, ho w e v e r, attra c t

t he support of a large segme nt of a population, and that support can be a very import a nt compone nt in end i ng a cycle of vio l e nc e.

T he second mo del to be cons ide red involves criminal justice and law enfo rc e me nt .

T he United States and other de mo c ra t ic count r ies reach for this mo del almost ins t i nct i v e l y, and rig htly so, for terrorist actio ns are crime s. The criminal justice system is an

i m p o r t a nt weapon in both re duc i ng and de t e r r i ng vio l e nc e, and it re ma i ns an important

tool to combat terrorism in No r t hern Ire l a nd.

As part of its exe c u t ion, the criminal justice mo del may have to inc l ude military aid

to the civilian power if the civilian police are unable to ma i ntain order on their own. In

s uch a case, it is important that the military assistance re main under the firm autho r ity of the civilian polic e, because, if unc he c ke d, the military power thre a t e ns to de s t ro y

de mo c ra t ic rig hts and pro c e s s e s.

T he third mo del is enhanced int e r na t io nal coopera t ion against terrorism. Even

t hough ma ny terrorist groups carry out their actio ns in a na r rowly de f i ned ge o g ra p h ic a l

a rea, groups waging vio l e nce have developed inc re a s i ngly sophisticated int e r na t io na l

support struc t u re s. Such support may be in terms of political and diploma t ic support

a b road but could also inc l ude sig n i f ic a nt fund - ra i s i ng and arms pro c u re me nt activitie s.

A democratic gove r n m e n t

should be responding to the

kinds of grievances that lead to

violent conflict befo re that

conflict turns violent at all. 

5
Even localized terrorism can have a cruc ial int e r na t io nal eleme nt, and it takes int e r nat io nal coopera t ion to diminish the terrorist thre a t .

In the case of No r t hern Ire l a nd, all three of these mo dels are being used. Since the

D o w n i ng Street de c l a ra t ion and the start of the No r t hern Ire l a nd peace pro c e s s, the re

has been a very heavy stress on pro p hylaxis and politic s. The Good Friday Ag re e me nt

w o r ked out by George Mitchell ex p resses well the fears of both sides in the No r t hern Irel a nd conflict, and it enjoys overwhe l m i ng support in the commu n i t ies affected by it.

No ne t heless the re re main threats to the Good Friday Ag re e me nt. The most important

is neglect of the key re l a t io nship between peace and security. A broadly inclusive political settleme nt must inc l ude groups with a long and brutal terrorist past that lack a ge nu i ne commitme nt to de mo c ra t ic princ i p l e s. In the case of the IRA, its political wing ,

Sinn Fein, is highly ex p e r ie nced and committed to ma k i ng political pro g re s s. But its military wing, especially at the grass ro o t s, is much mo re ske p t ical about pro g ress thro u g h

a political process and has wanted to keep its tra d i t io nal weapon—fo rc e — re a dy and

w a i t i ng if politics does not gain it the results it want s.

C o ns e q u e nt l y, the re has been deadlock over the issue of de c o m m i s s io n i ng weapons.

T he IRA ma i nt a i ns a large stockpile of highly de s t r uctive weapons, inc l ud i ng the ex p l osive Semtex, mo r t a r s, and ma c h i ne guns. While perhaps not nu me r ically larger than the

stockpiles of the Loyalists, the IRA stockpiles contain mo re de s t r uctive weapons. The

Good Friday Ag re e me nt pro v ides a two-year time fra me for de c o m m i s s io n i ng fo rc e s, but

mo re than one year into the agre e me nt, not a single weapon has been handed in on

e i t her side. The IRA argues that giving up any weapon is an act of surre nde r. Still,

de c o m m i s s io n i ng of weapons is the litmus test of the Ag re e me nt, not only for its pra ct ical effects but also for its psycho l o g ical effects on the partie s.

Given the pre s e nt state of affa i r s, the respective go v e r n me nts may wish to link

v a r ious events in the No r t hern Ire l a nd peace process to inc rease the inc e ntive fo r

t e r rorists’ coopera t ion. For exa m p l e, the orig i nal agre e me nt does not link the release of

l a rge numbers of prisoners to the de c o m m i s s io n i ng of weapons. This strategy may bear

re v i s i t i ng .

A no t her way out may be to try to split Sinn Fein off from the IRA. Sinn Fein ma y

de c ide that pro g ress at the political level is important enough that it will distance itself

f rom the armed wing of the IRA and sever links with that wing if it refuses to cooperate with the political pro c e s s. Such an outcome occurred with the Basques.

Whatever the IRA, Sinn Fein, or the Loyalist terrorists de c ide, de mo c ra t ic parties mu s t

c o nt i nue the political pro c e s s. The political fra mework must func t ion even if some fa ct io ns re main attached to terrorist gro u p s. Along these line s, it is hard to ima g i ne one

t e r rorist group completely ma k i ng the tra ns i t ion to a political party; perhaps a split is

t he best we can hope fo r.

S o me groups are not on board in this peace pro c e s s, so we have not eliminated the

p roblem of terrorist gro u p s. The re fo re, our best option now may be to use public opinion to ma rg i nalize the terrorists while using the criminal justice system to punish tho s e

w ho cont i nue to pursue terro r i s m .

John Dillon carries one of his son's cof f i ns in

Rasharkin Tu e s da y, July 14, 1998, as the thre e

c of f i ns of Ric h a rd, Mark, and Jason Quinn, are

moved to the Catho l ic chu rch at Rasharkin,

No r t hern Ire l a nd. The three bro t hers were killed in

a sectarian arson attack on their ho me on

July 12. Their de a t hs sho c ked the pro v i nce and

led to serious soul-searc h i ng about the future of

No r t hern Ire l a nd’s shaky peace. Their fune ra l

h ig h l ig hted the emo t io nal distress that mo re

than 20 years of vio l e nce have wro u g ht on

i nd i v idual fa m i l ie s.

6

AP Photo/Alastair Gra nt
Jon Alterman on the PLO

A l t hough orig i nally established in 1964 by the Arab League, the PLO absorbed a nu mber of other mo v e me nts in the aftermath of the 1967 war and has been an umbre l l a

o rg a n i z a t ion do m i nated by Fateh in ge ne ral and Yasser Ara fat in partic u l a r. Ara fat’s cons t a nt effort to build coalitio ns between Fateh and other org a n i z a t io ns has ma de the PLO

s o me t h i ng of a less ra t io nal actor on the one hand, but mo re re s p o nsive to changes in

Pa l e s t i n ian public opinion on the other hand.

A second chara c t e r i s t ic of the PLO is that since an early period it has resembled a

go v e r n me nt, with a large re s o u rce base (perhaps exc e e d i ng $1 billion per year in the

late 1980s), its own bure a uc racy and ent i t l e me nt pro g ra ms, and the re c o g n i t ion of at

least some world go v e r n me nt s.

A third chara c t e r i s t ic is that it has been able to rely on sympathe t ic re g io nal go ve r n me nts for logistical support. Mo v i ng from Jo rdan to Lebanon to Tu n i s ia (and with

f ig hters in an even wider array of count r ies), the PLO has been able to re b o u nd fro m

s e t b a c k s.

T he de c i s ion to abandon armed struggle has not been una n i mo u s, but the idea has

g a r ne red inc re a s i ng support within the org a n i z a t ion since it first surfaced in the early

1 9 7 0 s. Several de v e l o p me nts accelerated that mo v e :

• S oviet policy. T he Soviet Un ion was a stro ng ally of the PLO for ma ny years, but

Mikhail Gorbachev ma de it clear to Ara fat in the late 1980s that Soviet support fo r

Pa l e s t i n ian armed struggle was diminishing (as indeed were the larger fo r t u nes of

t he Soviet Un io n ) .

• I n t i fada. T he Pa l e s t i n ian uprising against the Is raeli occupation occurred witho u t

PLO coord i na t ion and fo rced the PLO leadership to move quickly to reassert the i r

c e nt rality to Pa l e s t i n ian life. In so do i ng, they were fo rced to choose between

t hose fa v o r i ng a vio l e nt solution to the Ara b - Is raeli conflict (ma ny of whom were

in exile) and those fa v o r i ng a ne go t iated one. They chose the latter (in the pro c e s s

i nc o r p o ra t i ng such local leadership as Ha nan As h rawi and Faisal Husseini) but have

been careful not to crack down too hard on the fo r me r, especially Ha ma s.

• Gulf wa r. By all account s, the PLO’s embrace of Saddam Hussein fo l l o w i ng the latter’s invasion of Kuwait was a horrible miscalculation that led to the ex p u l s ion of

hu ge numbers of Pa l e s t i n ian workers from the wealthy Gulf mo na rc h ies and a drama t ic cut in those count r ies’ subsid ies to the PLO.

• Madrid. In exc h a nge for Arab support in Desert Storm, the Bush Adm i n i s t ra t io n

o rc he s t rated a confere nce in Ma dr id to find a perma ne nt solution to the Ara b -

Is raeli conflict. While the Ma dr id Confere nce itself did not pro duce pro g re s s, it

c reated an enviro n me nt in which the Oslo Ac c o rds could be struc k .

While ma ny of the factors in the PLO’s turn to diplomacy are specific to that case,

t he re appear to be several ge ne ralizable lessons.

• T he PLO had an unusually rich re s o u rce base to draw on. It was not me rely a terrorist org a n i z a t ion but also a go v e r n me nt in ex i l e, a business cong l o me ra t e, and a

s o u rce of sig n i f ic a nt patro na ge—it had du ra b i l i t y.

• T he PLO was a re s p o n s i ve org a n i z a t i o n. As a loose confede ra t ion of na t io na l i s t

o rg a n i z a t io ns, it often had to (and did) shift policy to reflect the opinio ns of its

c o ns t i t u e ncy or re b o u nd from changes in the int e r na t io nal enviro n me nt .

• U.S. diplomacy played an important ro l e. As early as the 1970s, PLO leaders began

to unde r s t a nd that they could not achieve their goals without at least tacit

The decision to abandon armed

struggle has not been

u n a n i m o u s, but the idea has

g a r n e red increasing support

within [the PLO] since it first

s u r faced in the early 1970s.

7

PLO leaders began to

u n d e r s tand that they could not

a c h i eve their goals without at

least tacit support from the

United Sta t e s.
support from the United States. Ame r ican cond i t io ns for a dialogue shaped to some

de g ree PLO behavior in the 1980s and even 1990s.

Is raeli law enfo rc e me nt me a s u res appear to have played little role in the PLO’s de c is ion to turn toward a ne go t iated solution to the Ara b - Is raeli conflict. Bro a der stra t e g ie s

s uch as the village council plan of 1980-81 were ine f f e c t ual, and Is rael’s widely re p o r ted support for Ha mas in its earliest phases appears to have backfire d.

Two Is raeli de c i s io ns have played a cruc ial role in the PLO’s tra ns fo r ma t ion, ho w e ve r. The first was the Is raeli invasion of Lebanon, which at one stro ke de n ied the PLO terr i t o r iality and re moved it from Is rael’s borde r s. Although Lebanon has turned into a

q ua g m i re for Is rael, it ma r ked a decisive end to any PLO illusio ns about victory thro u g h

fo rc e. Second, the go v e r n me nt of Is rael was willing to ne go t iate when the opportunity

p re s e nted itself at Oslo. Despite having ignited a political backlash at ho me, it he l p e d

pave the way for an as yet to be achieved ne go t iated end to the Ara b - Is raeli conflic t .

Te resita Schaffer on the LT T E

Sri Lanka has the distinc t ion of having had two civil wars go i ng on at the same time ;

a nd in a number of ways, Sri Lanka’s two differe nt ex p e r ie nces with terrorist org a n i z at io ns have complicated the task of de a l i ng with its terrorist pro b l e ms. One of Sri Lanka ’ s

t e r rorist ex p e r ie nces has happened two time s. The go v e r n me nt has twice put down a

majority Sinhalese group called the JVP (Ja natha Vimukthi Pe ra mu na, or Na t io nal Libe ra t ion Fro nt) using police action verg i ng on military fo rc e. The go v e r n me nt has also

battled for a de c a de and a half with the LTTE, although that effort has been ma r ke d l y

less suc c e s s f u l .

Of the Sri Lankan population of 18 million, 75 perc e nt are Sinhalese and 19 to 20

p e rc e nt are Tamil. The two groups are ethnically and ling u i s t ically distinct, and Sinhalese

a re pre do m i na ntly Buddhist while the Tamils are pre do m i na ntly Hindu. Mo re than half

of the Tamils live in the North and East, with smaller conc e nt ra t io ns in major cities suc h

as Colombo. Other Tamils are plant a t ion workers whose ancestors were bro u g ht over fro m

I nd ia about 100 years ago by the British to work on the tea plant a t io ns; they are kno w n

as “Hill Tamils” or “Estate Ta m i l s.” The re ma i nder of the population consists primarily of

Ta m i l - s p e a k i ng Mu s l i ms who tend to oppose the Tamil militant s.

T he ex p e r ie nce of twice putting down a group with ex t re me political views has left

an unfo r t u nate legacy of allowing people in the Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt to think that

t hey know how to deal with terrorism. First fo u nded in the 1960s, the Maoist JVP had

t ies to the Chinese Communist Party but was philosophically closer to Peru’s “Shining

Path.” The org a n i z a t ion was avowedly re v o l u t io na r y, and its support in the early years

c a me mainly from university stude nts and frustrated high school gra dua t e s. In the late

1960s these youth mobilized politically and also armed the ms e l v e s. In the 1970 Sri

L a n kan election, they threw their support to the Sri Lankan Fre e dom Pa r t y, which was

v ic t o r io u s. By April 1971, ho w e v e r, they had grown disaffected with ma i ns t ream politic ia ns, and one nig ht they coord i nated simu l t a neous attacks on five police statio ns, fo llowed by a series of political killing s. The JVP was put down by military action supported

by Ind ia, Pakistan, China, and the United States. Members were either jailed or killed,

a nd the group virtually ceased to ex i s t .

In 1977, politic ia ns seeking to show that the JVP could not survive in the politic a l

a re na allowed the party to reestablish itself legally. The ex p e r i me nt appeared to work;

in a 1981 election the group re g i s t e red less than 5 perc e nt of the vote na t io na l l y, and

in its stro ngest district received just 13 perc e nt of the vote. In university electio ns, ho we v e r, the group enjoyed sig n i f ic a nt support.

Sri Lanka’s two differe n t

experiences with terro r i s t

o rganizations have complicated

the task of dealing with its

t e r rorist pro b l e m s. 

8

The experience of twice putting

d own a group with ex t re m e

political views has left an

u n fortunate legacy of allow i n g

people in the Sri Lankan gove r nment to think that they know

h ow to deal with terrorism. 
In 1987 the Ind ian go v e r n me nt sent 100,000 troops to Sri Lanka to enfo rce a peace

a g re e me nt fo l l o w i ng four years of Sinhalese-Tamil armed strife. The pre s e nce of Ind ia n

t roops on Sri Lankan soil agitated members of the fero c iously na t io nalist JVP, and the

o rg a n i z a t ion’s militant opposition to those troops helped it gain support amo ng ma ny

Sri Lankan na t io na l i s t s.

By the late 1980s, the JVP’s membership was almost completely differe nt than it had

been twenty years befo re. Although Rohana Wijeweera still led the JVP, most of its old

members had go ne on to mo re ma i ns t ream political affilia t io ns, and a new crop of

y o u ng, unemployed gra duates once again comprised the rank and file. The group’s first

a c t io ns were a series of ge ne ral strike s, but in late 1988 the JVP began to target the

fa m i l ies of police of f ic e r s. In re s p o ns e, the go v e r n me nt closed ranks behind the polic e

a nd attacked the JVP me rc i l e s s l y. At the he ig ht of the conflict, the weekly death toll

topped 300 people. By early 1990, the ent i re JVP leadership had been killed and the

o rg a n i z a t ion was de s t ro y e d.

A l most a de c a de later, the legacy of the JVP re ma i ns. Ma ny Sri Lanka ns lost frie nd s

or relatives in the vio l e nc e, and me mo r ies of those days re main fresh in ma ny people’s

m i nd s. In add i t ion, ma ny Sri Lanka ns harbor re s e nt me nt over what they perceived to be

l e c t u res by Western of f ic ials de ma nd i ng that they respect hu man rig hts in their de a d l y

battle against the JVP. Fina l l y, ma ny Sri Lanka ns have conc l uded that the go v e r n me nt

d id what it had to do against the JVP and that they now unde r s t a nd how to counter terrorist campaig ns.

In fact, the go v e r n me nt’s campaign against the JVP suc c e e ded in part because the

JVP lacked a broad cons t i t u e nc y. Put quite simply, the JVP’s grie v a nces did not capture

t he ima g i na t ion of any major conc e nt ra t io ns of people. Even at the he ig ht of its popul a r i t y, the re was no district in which the JVP would have won an election. As a cons eq u e nc e, the JVP’s campaign of terror got it mo re attent ion and influence than it would

have gotten through political me a ns. At the same time, the JVP failed because the re was

never a hu ge reservoir of people who said, “We don’t like their me t hods but at least

t hey’ve gotten us on the map.” It ma kes a differe nce how much re s o na nce the unde r l yi ng grie v a nce has.

T he LTTE has been a differe nt phe no me non. Ethnic rivalry has a long history in Sri

L a n ka, but the roots of the pre s e nt - day ethnic conflict lie in the period after its indep e nde nce from Britain in 1948. For cent u r ie s, int e rc o m mu nal ties between Tamils and

Sinhalese have been close at the elite level, but Sri Lanka’s first post-inde p e nde nce go ve r n me nt ma de a catastro p h ic de c i s ion. In a blatant attempt to tig hten the Sinhalese

grip on power, the go v e r n me nt wrote a na t io nality law that effectively disenfra nc h i s e d

t he Hill Ta m i l s, who constitute almost half of the Tamil population. The error was comp o u nded in 1956 when a prime ministerial cand ida t e, S.W.R.D. Banda ra na i ke, de c ided to

c a m p a ign on a call for the primacy of Sinhalese lang ua ge, culture, and re l ig ion in Sri

L a n ka. The two moves served to he ig hten int e rc o m mu nal tens ion and led first to Ta m i l

m i l i t a ncy and later to separatist sent i me nt s.

T he first Tamil militant groups were fo u nded in the 1960s, and they took as their go a l

g reater rig hts for the Tamil population. By 1976, the Tamil United Libera t ion Fro nt

(TULF) had eme rged as the first political group calling for a separate Tamil state. In

1983, ho w e v e r, the Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt adopted a cons t i t u t io nal ame ndme nt crimina l i z i ng advocacy of a separate state within Sri Lankan territory and re q u i r i ng that all

members of parlia me nt swear an oath not to support separatism in any way. That de c is ion fo rced the TULF out of the parlia me nt and de e p e ned the alie na t ion between the

Tamil population and the go v e r n me nt. As a result, support for the LTTE inc re a s e d.

The government’s campaign

against the JVP succeeded in

part because the JVP lacked a

b road constituency. 

9
In the early years, much of the support for Tamil inde p e nde nce came from ind i v iduals in their thirties who were primarily motivated by the lang ua ge issue. Starting in the

1 9 7 0 s, the cause of Tamil inde p e nde nce began to attract a younger cro w d, in part

because of quotas on university adm i s s io ns aimed at limiting the number of Tamils with

access to hig her educ a t ion. In the 1990s, the tre nd toward youth has accelera t e d. Some

members are as young as thirteen or fourteen years old. Ma ny of these younger me m b e r s

a re fa na t ical; they are issued a cyanide capsule on completion of their basic tra i n i ng with

t he LTTE, and they have been eng a ged in suic ide bombing .

T he LTTE’s first acts of terrorism were directed against Tamils who opposed the LT T E ’ s

p o l ic ies; LTTE leader Velupillai Pra b a k h a ran got his start assassina t i ng the mayor of the

p re do m i na ntly Tamil city of Ja f f na in the mid - 1 9 7 0 s. Since 1985, the four targets of freq u e nt terrorism have been

• V I P s, such as Ind ian Ind ian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lanka n

P re s ide nt Rana s i ng he Pre ma dasa in 1993;

• Tamil rivals;

• isolated Sinhalese and Muslim populatio ns on the borders of Ta m i l - majority are a s ;

• c i v i l ian population cent e r s, such as mosques and the Temple of the Tooth Shrine.

In combating the LTTE, the Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt has employed three stra t e g ie s.

• Law enfo rcement effo r t s have placed cons t ra i nts on the LTTE and have imprisone d

a number of their followers and sympathizers, but at the same time have alie na t e d

ma ny Ta m i l s.

• Military efforts have been inc o nc l u s i v e, in part because the Sri Lankan military has

not proven particularly competent, and in part because it does not appear to possess a clear stra t e g y. The military has never been able to hold the main Tamil popu l a t ion centers in the North and East of the country simu l t a ne o u s l y.

• E f forts to negotiate a political settlement have ge ne rally been cases of too litt l e, too late. A 1995 peace proposal started out with great promise but is no w

mo r i b u nd.

T he Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt has not tried three stra t e g ies that may hold out the

p romise of end i ng the long - r u n n i ng conflic t .

• Engage in public diplomacy. T he Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt could launch a ma j o r

“ hearts and minds” campaign to win the support of large segme nts of the Ta m i l

p o p u l a t ion away from LTTE sympathy. The pre s e nt go v e r n me nt mo u nted a limited

e f fort along these lines in the so-called “White Lotus” campaign, but a major camp a ign has yet to be trie d.

• D e m o n s t rate that autonomy can work. T he Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt could mo u nt a

major effort to show that autono my can work. Cons t i t u t io nal ame ndme nts int roduced in 1987 pro v ided for a de g ree of de c e nt ra l i z a t ion of power. This could have

been an opportunity to show that the Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt was capable of allowi ng local autho r i t ie s, inc l ud i ng Ta m i l - do m i nated one s, to run their own affa i r s

e f f e c t i v e l y. The ne a r - no r ma l i z a t ion of life in the East in 1994 and the go v e r n me nt ’ s

t a k i ng cont rol of Ja f f na in 1995 could have led to similar “de mo ns t ra t ion pro j e c t s ”

in de v o l u t ion. In each case, the opportunity slipped away, re i n fo rc i ng the conc e r ns

of ske p t ics in the Tamil community about whe t her de v o l u t ion could work.

• Conclude a peace settlement. T he Sri Lankan go v e r n me nt could reach a peace

a g re e me nt with the LTTE. The re have, of course, been a whole series of ne go t ia t i ng

e f fo r t s, which thus far have come to na u g ht .

In the early ye a r s, much of the

support for Tamil independence

came from individuals in

their thirties who we re

primarily motivated by the

language issue.

1 0

In the 1990s, the [LTTE’s] tre n d

towa rd youth has accelera t e d ...

m a ny of these younger members

a re fa n a t i c a l .
T he chief lesson to be learned he re is that if we focus only on the criminal side of

t e r rorism, then we will fail to solve even that side of terrorism. In the Sri Lankan case,

re s o l v i ng the terrorism arising out of the ethnic conflict will re q u i re at least two

a p p ro a c hes: a political ne go t ia t ion and an int e g rated military stra t e g y. This go v e r n me nt

u nderstood the importance of the political part of the packa ge but was unable to de l i ver on it. It then turned to the military arm as a separate re s p o nse but, despite its

s uccess in capturing the LTTE’s stro ng hold in Ja f f na, was not able to put the military

a nd political parts of its strategy toge t he r. The LTTE, of course, had by then lost int e rest in the ne go t ia t ion, leaving the conflict in a new and bloodier stalema t e.

S uccess in the initial political ne go t ia t io ns mig ht not have eliminated terro r i s m .

W hen one is de a l i ng with hard-bitten adversarie s, some of whom see little persona l

a d v a nt a ge in a peaceful settleme nt, the risk is high that ex t remist eleme nts will cont i nue to use terrorism even if the ma i ns t ream has settled. Ho w e v e r, under the s e

c i rc u ms t a nc e s, terrorism would be re duced to its criminal eleme nt. With the unde r l y i ng

g r ie v a nces at least he a ded for re s o l u t ion, the terrorism problem would assume ma na geable pro p o r t io ns.

C o n c l u s i o n s

O ne of the hardest pro b l e ms fa c i ng go v e r n me nt of f ic ials de a l i ng with terrorism is

de c id i ng when to employ what stra t e g y. Ne go t ia t io ns with those perpetra t i ng vio l e nc e

a re not the solution to every problem; by the same token, ma ny terrorist campaig ns

c a n not be stopped by law enfo rc e me nt actio ns alone. Ma ny partic i p a nts suggested a

decisive factor de t e r m i n i ng the suffic ie ncy of law enfo rc e me nt activities is the support

that the terrorist groups have amo ng the populatio ns in which they are based. Na r ro wly based terrorist groups can be rooted out, but groups that rely on a broad base of

support (some of which can come from beyond a na t ion’s borders) have a du rability that

may defy such effo r t s. For that reason, ethnically based groups may be harder to eliminate through fo rce than class-based gro u p s, since ethnicity has proven a stro nger tie

than class in most cases.

If ne go t ia t io ns are pursued, two cond i t io ns should be pre s e nt. The first is that the

go v e r n me nt should enjoy a stro ng popular ma nda t e. Po l i t ical oppone nts often portra y

ne go t ia t i ng with terrorists as “giving in to terrorism.” Such an attack can topple weak

go v e r n me nts or, short of that, stymie whatever agre e me nt has been re a c hed thro u g h

ne go t ia t io ns.

T he second cond i t ion is that the terrorist org a n i z a t ion is go i ng through a period of

s e l f - e v a l ua t ion. In such circ u ms t a nc e s, the go v e r n me nt may be able to successfully split

off pra g matists from hard - l i ne terro r i s t s, bring the population along with the pra g mat i s t s, and dry up popular support for those cont i nu i ng to pursue vio l e nc e.

T h ro u g hout, partic i p a nts stressed the importance of int e l l ige nc e. In confro nt i ng terrorism, the na t u re of the grie v a nce does ma t t e r, and the na t u re of the org a n i z a t io n

p u t t i ng forth the grie v a nce matters as well. Int e l l ige nce is important not only to prev e nt terrorist attacks but also to unde r s t a nd how the org a n i z a t ion works and how its

de c i s ion ma k i ng processes can be affected.

A cons i s t e nt the me in all of the pre s e nt a t io ns was the ex t e nt to which terrorism is

an int e r na t io nal problem. Mo ney and weapons flow across borde r s, and supporters

of terrorism (if not the terrorists the mselves) often have established bases in othe r

c o u nt r ie s. Inc re a s i ng l y, law enfo rc e me nt efforts aimed at stemming terrorism have

an int e r na t io nal compone nt, and such a strategy will re q u i re mo re int e r na t io nal coope ra t ion in the future.

About the Pa n e l i s t s

Jon B. Alterman is a pro g ram of f icer in the

United States Institute of Peace’s Research and

S t ud ies Pro g ram, whe re he covers the Midd l e

East. His most re c e nt book is New Media, New

Politics? From Satellite Television to the Internet

in the Arab Wo r l d.

Martha Crenshaw is John E. Andrus Professor of

G o v e r n me nt at Wesleyan University in

M iddletown, CT. She is the author of a number of

works on political vio l e nce and terrorism and was

co-editor of The Encyclopedia of World Te r r o r i s m.

Te resita Schaffer is director of the South As ia

P ro g ram at the Center for Stra t e g ic and Int e r nat io nal Stud ie s. She is a thirty-year veteran of the

F o re ign Service and served as U.S. Ambassador to

Sri Lanka from 1992 to 1995.

Paul Wilkinson is a professor of int e r na t io na l

re l a t io ns and chairman of the Cent re for the

S t udy of Te r rorism and Po l i t ical Vio l e nce at the

University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He is the

a u t hor of several authoritative works on terro r i s m

a nd political vio l e nc e. His book most re c e nt

book, Terrorism and Liberal Democracy, will be

p u b l i s hed sho r t l y.

1 1

If negotiations are pursued, two

conditions should be present: 

– the government should

e n j oy a strong popular

m a n d a t e.

– the terrorist org a n i z a t i o n

[should be] going thro u g h

a period of self-evaluation.