UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

Case No. 1:20-cv-23287 Gayles / Otazo-Reyes 

____________________________________ 

 : 

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, et al., : 

 : 

Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

v. : 

 : 

IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

 : 

DEFENDANT CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A.’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 

AND FOR OTHER RELIEF, AND 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF 

CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 1 of 39
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................iii 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................1 

ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................2 

I. Venue Is Improper ...................................................................................................2 

II. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction, and, If the FSIA Applies,

Also Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ................................................................7 

A. The FSIA, Invoked by Plaintiffs, Does Not Apply; If Applicable, It 

Divests This Court of Subject-Matter and Personal Jurisdiction .................7 

B. Whether or Not the FSIA Applies and, If Applicable, an Exception to 

Immunity Is Met, Due Process Personal Jurisdiction Is Required but 

Lacking; If the FSIA Does Not Apply, Personal Jurisdiction Is Also 

Lacking for Failure to Satisfy the Florida Long-Arm or Rule 4(k)(2) ..........13 

1. The Requirements for Jurisdiction as to the Claim for the 

Cigar Factory Are Not Met .........................................................................14 

i. Due Process Requirements Are Not Met As to the 

Cigar Factory ...................................................................................14 

(a) The Due Process Requirement that the Claim for 

Trafficking in the Factory “Arise Out of or Alleged 

Relate to” the Contacts Is Not Met ...........................................14 

(b) The Due Process “Purposeful Availment” Requirement 

Is Not Met with Respect to the Cigar Factory .........................17 

(c) Plaintiffs’ Florida Residence Does Not Provide Due 

Process Personal Jurisdiction ...................................................19 

ii. Statutory Requirements Are Not Met with Respect to the 

Cigar Factory ...................................................................................20 

Florida Long-Arm ......................................................................20 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ................................................................21 

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ii 

2. The Requirements for Jurisdiction as to the Mixed-Use 

Building Are Not Met ..................................................................................21 

i. Due Process Requirements Are Not Met As to the 

Mixed-Use Building .........................................................................21 

ii. Statutory Requirements Are Not Met with Respect to the 

Mixed Use Building ..........................................................................23 

III. Due Process Prohibits Title III’s Application to Habanos, S.A. ..........................23

IV. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed for Insufficient Service of Process. .............24

V. If Dismissal Is Denied, a More Definite Statement Is Required ..........................25

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................25 

REQUEST FOR HEARING .....................................................................................................25 

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iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases ............................................................................................................................................Page

Africa Growth Corp. v. Rep. of Angola, 

No. 17-cv-2469, 2019 WL 3253367 (D.D.C. July 19, 2019) ................................................13 

Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 

106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000) ....................................................................................19 

Araya-Solorzano v. Gov't of the Rep. of Nicaragua, 

562 F. App’x 901 (11th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................13 

Arencibia v. AGA Serv., 

No. 20-cv-24694, 2021 WL 1318225 (S.D. Fla. April 8, 2021) ............................................15 

Argos Glob. Partner Servs., LLC v. Ciuchini, 

446 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (S.D. Fla. 2020) ..................................................................................17, 19 

BackGrid USA, Inc. v. Mod. Notoriety Inc., 

No. 21-cv-03318, 2021 WL 4772474 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2021) .........................................3, 17

Blue Water Int'l v. Hattrick's Irish Sports Pub, 

No. 17-cv-1584, 2017 WL 4182405 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) ...........................................17 

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 

139 S.Ct. 893 (2019) ..............................................................................................................25 

Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Sup. Crt, 

137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017) ............................................................................................................14 

Brophy v. Almanzar, 

359 F. Supp. 3d 917 (C.D. Cal. 2018) ...................................................................................17 

Cap. Trans. Int’l. v. Int’l. Petroleum Industrial Co., 

No. 10-cv-529, 2013 WL 557236 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) ................................................7-9 

Concesionaria DHM, S.A. v. Int'l Fin. Corp., 

307 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)....................................................................................2 

Day v. Taylor, 

400 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................................15

Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, 

No. 19-cv-22619, 2020 WL 2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) ...........................................20 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 4 of 39
iv 

Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 

889 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................12, 13 

DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, 

897 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...................................................................................18 

DHTK LLC v. UNKNWN LLC,

No. 19-cv-61627, 2020 WL 4932237 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2020) ...........................................12 

Diamond Crystal Brands v. Food Movers Int'l, 

593 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................................16, 18 

Dish Network, LLC v. Jadoo TV, Inc., 

No. 18-cv-9768, 2020 WL 6536659 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020)............................................18, 19

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 

538 U.S. 468 (2003) ...............................................................................................................8 

Eitzen Chem. PTE, Ltd. v. Carib Petroleum, 

749 F. App’x 765 (11th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................12 

Euclid Fish Co. v. Cape Fla. Seafood, 

No. 21-mc-22310, 2021 WL 4976530 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2021) ........................................13 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX, S.A., 

534 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2021) ...........................................................................................10 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX, S.A., 

No. 19-cv-1277, 2021 WL 4709566 (D.D.C. Oct. 08, 2021) ................................................10 

First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 

703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................13 

Fischell v. Cordis Corp., 

No. 15-cv-184, 2016 WL 8467615 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2016) ..........................................5 

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.,

141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021) ............................................................................................................20 

France.com, Inc. v. French Republic, 

992 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................................10 

Fraser v. Smith, 

594 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2010) ...............................................................................................22 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 5 of 39
v 

Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 

2 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2021) .......................................................................................................13 

Gerling Glob. Reins. Corp. v. Gallagher, 

267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................23 

Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 

496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................16 

GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 

680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................13 

Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. MidSouth Cap., Inc., 

669 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ..................................................................................4 

Herbal Brands Inc. v. Photoplaza Inc., 

No. 21-cv-577, 2021 WL 5299677 (D. Ariz. Nov. 15, 2021) ...............................................18 

Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., 

896 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1990) .............................................................................................16 

Honus Wagner v. Luminary Grp. LLC, 

No. 17-cv-61317, 2017 WL 6547899 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2017) ...........................................17 

Hurtado v. Balerno Int'l Ltd., 

No. 17-cv-62200, 2018 WL 4053122 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2018) ..........................................24 

Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, 

No. 20-cv-20157, 2021 WL 3083063 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020 

 & June 17, 2021) ....................................................................................................................12 

In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 

674 F. Supp. 2d 580 (M.D. Pa. 2009) ....................................................................................22-23 

In re Takata Airbag, 

396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ..................................................................................18 

In re Zantac, 

6 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (S.D. Fla. 2021) ......................................................................................23 

Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 

39 So. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla. 2010) ............................................................................................20 

Jenkins Brick v. Bremer, 

321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................2-3

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 6 of 39
vi 

Kennedy v. Heidi Motel Inc., 

No. 19-cv-60946, 2019 WL 11553695 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2019) .........................................3 

King v. Burwell, 

576 U.S. 473 (2015) ...............................................................................................................24 

Lawrence v. U.S., 

597 F. App’x 599 (11th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................16 

Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 

443 U.S. 173 (1979) ...............................................................................................................5, 6

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 

736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................18 

Lubian v. Rep. of Cuba, 

2011 WL 13186846 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2011) .......................................................................12 

Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 

85 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................24 

Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., 

433 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................................15 

McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 

268 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2017) ..................................................................................12 

Molinos Valle del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 

633 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................12 

Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 

-- F. Supp. 3d --, 2021 WL 5524484 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021) ...........................................16 

Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 

632 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ..................................................................................21, 23 

 

Neelu Aviation, LLC v. Boca Aircraft Maint., LLC, 

No. 18-cv-81445, 2019 WL 3532024 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2019) ............................................3

OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs, 

577 U.S. 27 (2015) .................................................................................................................10 

Ocean Line Holdings Ltd. v. China Nat’l Chartering Corp., 

578 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)....................................................................................9 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 7 of 39
vii 

Owens v. Kristen Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi A/S, 

No. 08-cv-264, 2008 WL 4067431 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2008) .............................................21 

Pat. Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., 

No. 17-cv-23060, 2017 WL 5032989 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017) ............................................4 

Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 

251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................9, 10 

Performance Indus. Mfg., Inc. v. Vortex Performance Pty, 

No. 18-cv-00510, 2019 WL 78840 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2019) ................................................17 

PG Creative Inc. v. Affirm Agency, 

No. 18-cv-24299, 2019 WL 5684219 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2019) ...........................................20 

Pierson v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 

619 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2009) .................................................................................25 

Poschmann v. Ponte Vedra Corp., 

No. 18-cv-14321, 2018 WL 7890201 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018) ...........................................3

Prince v. Poulos, 

876 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................24 

Princz v. Fed. Rep. of Germany,

26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ...............................................................................................12

Qatar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC, 

432 F. Supp. 3d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)....................................................................................9

Rep. of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 

504 U.S. 607 (1992) ...............................................................................................................12 

Rep. of Germany v. Philipp, 

141 S.Ct. 703 (2021) ..............................................................................................................10-11

Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health Org., 

No. 18-cv-24995, 2020 WL 1666757 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) .............................................2, 5-6

Rosen v. Terapeak, Inc., 

No. 15-cv-112, 2015 WL 12724071 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015) ............................................19

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574 (1999) ...............................................................................................................6 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 8 of 39
viii 

Schuster v. Carnival Corp., 

No. 10-cv-21879, 2011 WL 13220428 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2011) ...........................................17, 20 

Segal v. PEMEX, 

No. 05-cv-2390, 2009 WL 10670372 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2009) ............................................2, 6 

Sequeira v. Rep. of Nicaragua, 

815 F. App’x 345 (11th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................10 

Sequeira v. Rep. of Nicaragua, 

No. 16-cv-25052, 2019 WL 2267507 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2019) ...........................................13

S-Fer Int’l, Inc. v. Stonesheets LLC, 

No. 14-cv-24662, 2016 WL 8808749 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 2016) ...........................................12 

SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Praveen Narra & Indyzen, Inc., 

No. 21-cv-60799, 2021 WL 5749520 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2021) ...........................................19 

Snow v. DirecTV, 

450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................16 

Sovereign Offshore Servs. v. Shames, 

No. 17-cv-80172, 2017 WL 7798664 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017) ............................................17 

Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 

No. 09-cv-2501, 2010 WL 2791850 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2010) ............................................12 

Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 

543 U.S. 481 (2005) ...............................................................................................................25 

Storms v. Haugland Energy Grp., LLC, 

No. 18-cv-80334, 2018 WL 4347603 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2018) .........................................18 

Tarantino v. Riddell, 

No. 17-cv-60567, 2018 WL 2011551 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2018) ...........................................15 

Telchi v. Israel Mil. Indus., 

No. 14-cv-20244, 2015 WL 6550664 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2015) ...........................................13 

Tifa Ltd. v. Rep. of Ghana, 

692 F. Supp. 393 (D.N.J. 1988) .............................................................................................6 

TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Sunstrike Int'l, Ltd., 

273 F.R.D. 697 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ...........................................................................................24 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 9 of 39
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Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Wilson, 

No. 10-cv-20180, 2010 WL 11566068 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010) ........................................3 

TriOptima AB v. Quantile Techs. Ltd., 

No. 19-cv-390, 2020 WL 11613655 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2020) ...........................................19

U.S. v. Baston, 

818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016) ...............................................................................................23 

U.S. v. Ibarquen-Mosquera, 

634 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................24 

U.S. v. Street, 

472 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................24 

Volt, LLC v. Volt Lighting Grp., 

369 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2019) .................................................................................17, 20 

Watts v. Haun, 

393 So.2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ................................................................................20 

Werner v. Dowlatsingh, 

818 F. App’x 671 (9th Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................3 

Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 

854 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1988) ...............................................................................................20 

Zanakis v. Scanreco, Inc., 

No. 18-cv-21813, 2019 WL 2211872 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) .............................................23 

Statutes 

Title III, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 

 22 U.S.C. § 6081-6085 ..........................................................................................................passim

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 

 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq..............................................................................................passim

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) ................................................................................................................5-6 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) ................................................................................................................2, 4-6 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) .....................................................................................................................5 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) ......................................................................................................................2 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 10 of 39
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28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1) .................................................................................................................2-5 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) .................................................................................................................6 

28 U.S.C. § 1392(b)(2) ................................................................................................................3 

28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) .....................................................................................................................2 

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) ................................................................................................................7, 8 

28 U.S.C. § 1604 ..........................................................................................................................10 

28 U.S.C. § 1605 ..........................................................................................................................10 

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) .................................................................................................................10, 13 

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) .................................................................................................................10 

28 U.S.C. § 1608 ..........................................................................................................................24, 25 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) ..........................................................................................................20

Rules 

Fed. R. App. P. 25(a) ...................................................................................................................24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C) .............................................................................................................24, 25 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) ..................................................................................................................24 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)..................................................................................................................passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, Advisory Committee Notes (1963) .................................................................24 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b) ......................................................................................................................24 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)................................................................................................................1 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 11 of 39
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) ....................................................................................................................1, 25 

Cal. C. Civ. P. § 410.10 ...............................................................................................................21 

Other Materials 

Black’s Law Dictionary, “Mail” (11th ed. 2019) ........................................................................24

Dep’t of State, Legal Considerations Regarding Title III, 

 141 Cong. Rec. S15106, S15108 (Oct. 12, 1995) ..................................................................23 

H.R. Rept. No. 94-1489, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. on Judiciary (Sept. 9, 1976) ..................25 

 

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “Mail” available at www.merriamAwebster.com/dictionary/mail ...............................................................................................24 

Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 471, cmt. b (1987) ............24

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 12 of 39
Corporación Habanos, S.A. (“Habanos, S.A.”) respectfully submits this Memorandum of 

Law in support of its individual motion to dismiss this action with prejudice: 

(a) for improper venue, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); or 

(b) in the alternative, for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, 

and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and, additionally in the event that 

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (“FSIA”), is applicable, 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (5) and (6). 

Habanos S.A. further submits this Memorandum in support of its motion pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(e) for a more definite statement in the event that dismissal is denied. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Habanos, S.A. is a Cuban joint venture corporation owned in equal parts by a Cuban party 

(allegedly Tabacuba) and a foreign party: allegedly, from 2008 to at least 2020, Imperial Brands 

PLC (“Imperial”), either directly or through one or more subsidiaries. Second Amended 

Complaint, ECF 208 (“SAC”), ¶¶ 6–7, 11, 44, 61. 

 Plaintiffs sue Habanos, S.A., as well as Imperial, for “trafficking” in a cigar factory in 

Havana, Cuba (“Cigar Factory”) and the commercial floors of a commercial/residential building 

in Havana (“Mixed-Use Building,” together the “Properties”). Plaintiffs allege the Properties were 

owned by a Cuban limited partnership, to whose owner they are allegedly successors. SAC ¶¶ 1–

3. Plaintiffs’ claim is brought under Title III, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 

(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–6085 (“Title III”). SAC ¶ 101. 

Plaintiffs also sue two New York “advertising agency subsidiaries” of a U.K. company, 

Young & Rubicam LLC (“Y&R”) and BCW LLC (“BCW”), under Title III for marketing and 

publicizing “the products produced at the confiscated Cigar Factory,” as well as the parent 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 13 of 39
2 

company, WPP PLC (“WPP”). SAC ¶¶ 12–16, 20–23. 

On January 26, 2021, Habanos, S.A. received a DHL delivery in Havana of a Summons 

and Complaint. ECF 66. The SAC was filed on March 9, 2022, ECF 208. 

ARGUMENT 

I. Venue Is Improper

1. Plaintiffs’ allegation that Habanos, S.A. is an “agency or instrumentality of the 

Cuban government” under the FSIA, SAC ¶ 42, is fatal to proper venue in this District. “Section 

1391(f) controls venue in every case where a foreign state is named as a defendant.” Rodriguez v. 

Pan Am. Health Org., No. 18-cv-24995, 2020 WL 1666757, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020) (Gayles, 

J.).1 It is clear on the face of the SAC that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy § 1391(f)’s requirements.

Section 1391(f)(1) lays venue in a District where a “substantial part of events or omission 

giving rise to the claim occurred,” just as the general venue statute does. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).2  

Dispositive of venue under § 1391(f)(1), the SAC alleges no event or omission in the 

District giving rise to the claim; to the contrary, its allegations foreclose venue here. Plaintiffs have 

long been on notice that Habanos, S.A. challenges venue, and have since completed jurisdictional 

discovery, yet still, in their third pleading, allege no acts in the District. 

Settled Eleventh Circuit precedent establishes that the requirement of § 1391(b)(2) and 

§ 1391(f)(1) “focus[es] on relevant activities of the defendant, not the plaintiff.” Jenkins Brick v. 

Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 2003).3 “[R]elevant activities” are “only the events 

1

 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) defines “foreign state” to include agencies or instrumentalities. 

Consequently, § 1391(f)(1) applies in suits against agencies. Concesionaria DHM, S.A. v. Int'l Fin. 

Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 

2

 The other provisions of § 1391(f) lay venue where the vessel at issue is found; where an agency 

is licensed to do business or does business; and the District Court for the District of Columbia. 

3

 Cases applying § 1391(b)(2) are fully applicable to § 1391(f)(1) because their standards are 

identical. See Segal v. PEMEX, No. 05-cv-2390, 2009 WL 10670372, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 14 of 39
3 

that directly give rise to a claim” and have a “close nexus to the wrong.” Tracfone Wireless, Inc. 

v. Wilson, No. 10-cv-20180, 2010 WL 11566068, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010) (emphasis in 

original) (citing Jenkins Brick). Further, “only those locations hosting a substantial part of the 

events [giving rise to the claim] are to be considered.” Jenkins Brick, 321 F.3d at 1372. 

Yet nothing in the SAC alleges Habanos, S.A. has done any act in the District, or that others 

engaged in any acts relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim in the District, much less what is required. 

First, the SAC alleges that Habanos, S.A. is marketing Cuban cigars through social media 

accounts on Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. SAC ¶¶ 22, 41. However, the SAC does not allege 

these companies are located in Florida; to the contrary, they are located in California.4

Second, courts have uniformly found marketing on globally accessible websites, such as 

Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, insufficient for venue in a particular district. See, e.g., Kennedy 

v. Heidi Motel Inc., No. 19-cv-60946, 2019 WL 11553695, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2019) 

(rejecting venue under § 1392(b)(2) where the “only act related [to] Plaintiff's claim that occurred 

in the Southern District of Florida is Plaintiff's unilateral act of accessing Defendant’s website in 

the district”); Neelu Aviation, LLC v. Boca Aircraft Maint., LLC, No. 18-cv-81445, 2019 WL 

3532024, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2019) (“venue is improper” despite alleged “advertis[ing] 

nationwide, including Florida”). To hold otherwise would eviscerate the congressional venue 

scheme and, with “far-reaching implications,” permit a plaintiff “to establish venue in his home 

district over any [defendant] that maintains a website.” Poschmann v. Ponte Vedra Corp., No. 18-

cv-14321, 2018 WL 7890201, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2018). 

Third, it is unclear if the SAC alleges marketing other than through the social media 

2009) (applying Jenkins Brick to action against foreign state, where § 1391(f)(1) applied).

4 BackGrid USA, Inc. v. Mod. Notoriety Inc., No. 21-cv-03318, 2021 WL 4772474, at *6 (C.D. 

Cal. Sept. 15, 2021), quoting Werner v. Dowlatsingh, 818 F. App’x 671, 673 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020). 

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accounts, but to the extent it does (without alleging what that marketing may be), see SAC ¶¶ 14, 

20, 21, 56, Plaintiffs do not allege it occurred in Florida.5 

Fourth, the SAC alleges “Imperial ... either directly or through Habanos” “retain[ed]” 

“WPP, the WPP Group and its U.S.-based agents” for social media marketing of Cuban cigars 

connected to the Properties, SAC ¶ 61, but Plaintiffs allege that Y&R and BCW have their 

principal places of business in New York, and that WPP is co-headquartered in New York and 

London, not in the District. SAC ¶¶ 36–38. This forecloses venue unless there are allegations that 

they nonetheless undertook activities in Florida giving rise to this claim—and there are none. 

The SAC alleges that Y&R and BCW (and, through these or other subsidiaries, WPP) are 

registered to do business in Florida, derive revenue from Florida, and have offices in Florida, but 

these allegations do not support venue: the SAC does not allege that these defendants, or their 

subsidiaries, engaged in any acts in Florida related to this claim, SAC ¶¶ 67–69, as required for 

venue under §1391(f)(1) or §1391(b)(2). Further, that a defendant is registered to do business, 

conducts business, or has an office in a district does not provide venue on a claim as to that 

defendant, Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. MidSouth Cap., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. 

Fla. 2009), let alone as to another party which allegedly hired that defendant. 

Fifth, the SAC alleges that all so-called, worldwide “WPP Group” entities use general, 

back-end networking and other technological services, collectively labeled by the SAC as “U.S. 

Services.”6 These “U.S. Services” are not alleged (even after discovery) to have anything to do 

5

 Further, while they need not be considered because of this facial insufficiency, the previously 

submitted declarations by Y&R and BCW establish they undertook no activity related to the 

alleged marketing in the District, see ECF 93-1; ECF 93-2. (The Court may consider a factual 

challenge to venue. Pat. Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-cv-23060, 2017 WL 

5032989, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017)). 

6

 These services are: “networking and other services provided through Microsoft, and other 

services,” “YR.com, BM.com, Ogilvy.com,” “file share sites on internet domains nominally 

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with the District. Their only alleged links to the U.S. are that some are “sold by U.S. companies,” 

SAC ¶ 54, and some are allegedly “nominally controlled” by Y&R or BCW. SAC ¶ 23. There is 

no allegation of a link to Florida, let alone one that is related to Plaintiffs’ claim. 

Sixth and finally, the SAC alleges five Plaintiffs reside in Florida. SAC ¶ 66. In addition to 

not alleging residence in this District, “it is absolutely clear” that venue is not established by “the 

residence of the plaintiff[.]” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 185 (1979).7 

2. Given Plaintiffs’ FSIA allegation, the general venue provision invoked by the SAC 

¶ 71, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), need not be considered, but, in any event, its requirements are 

identical to § 1391(f)(1), and thus are not satisfied, as already shown.

3. Plaintiffs do not allege venue under § 1391(b)(1), SAC ¶ 71, and so cannot rely 

upon it, particularly now, in a second amendment of their pleading. Fischell v. Cordis Corp., No. 

15-cv-184, 2016 WL 8467615, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2016) (“Plaintiff does not plead 

that venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1);” “arguments” “waived” as to § 1391(b)(1)). Additionally, 

Plaintiffs cannot rely on § 1391(b)(1) because of their allegation that Habanos, S.A. is an “agency 

or instrumentality,” upon which they exclusively rely for service of process, SAC ¶ 43, and invoke 

for subject-matter jurisdiction. SAC ¶ 42. 

If considered, § 1391(b)(1)’s requirement that “all defendants are residents of the State in 

which the district is located” (italics added) is not met. A corporate defendant resides in a State for 

purposes of this venue provision if it is “subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to 

the civil action in question.” § 1391(c). Since Y&R and BCW would be subject to general 

controlled by Y&R (YR.com) or by BCW (BM.com[)],” and “email addresses running through 

U.S.-based servers, including ... servers nominally controlled by Y&R (YR.com) and Ogilvy (the 

Ogilvy.com server[)].” SAC ¶¶ 23, 54, 62. 

7 See also Rodriguez, 2020 WL 1666757 at *10 (Gayles, J.) (no § 1391(f)(1) venue “[a]lthough 

some plaintiffs reside in the [District]”). 

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jurisdiction in New York under Plaintiffs’ own allegations that they are headquartered there, 

Plaintiffs cannot rely on Rule 4(k)(2) to establish personal jurisdiction over them in Florida. (The 

same would be true as to WPP on the SAC’s allegation that it has co-headquarters in N.Y.) 

Rather, acts in Florida related to the claim sufficient to satisfy both Due Process and the 

Florida long-arm are required as to each of these defendants for personal jurisdiction. Yet there 

have been no relevant acts in Florida at all; hence, they are not resident in Florida because there is 

no personal jurisdiction over them, and there can be no venue under § 1391(b)(1). 

4. Plaintiffs may seek to lay venue elsewhere in a refiled action: in the District of 

Columbia, where venue always lies in suits against agencies or instrumentalities, § 1391(f)(4),

Segal, 2009 WL 10670372, at *3; Tifa Ltd. v. Rep. of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393, 407 (D.N.J. 1988); 

California, where they allege acts related to the claim (creating social media accounts with 

California companies) occurred, under § 1391(b)(2); or New York, either under § 1391(b)(2), 

because of Y&R’s and BCW’s alleged acts there, or § 1391(b)(1), because Y&R, BCW and WPP 

are allegedly subject to general jurisdiction and Plaintiffs could invoke Rule 4(k)(2) as to Habanos, 

S.A. and Imperial. However, it is clear that venue does not lie here.

5. The Court need go no further than venue to dismiss this action, and should not reach 

the other issues presented by the instant motion. As it is a threshold issue, the Court may properly 

dismiss for lack of venue without first determining subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, or 

service of process, as courts often do. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2020 WL 1666757 at *10 (Gayles, J.) 

(dismissing for lack of venue without reaching subject-matter and personal jurisdiction). Those 

issues should be left to a court where venue is proper. There are “sound prudential justification[s] 

for doing so,” Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180; see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 

584–85 (1999) (“leeway to choose among threshold issues”): judicial economy, the risk of 

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needlessly creating a conflict with rulings of the court with proper venue; and the ease and 

simplicity of deciding venue. 

II. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction, and, If the FSIA Applies, Also Lacks 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 

Habanos, S.A. is not, as alleged, an “agency or instrumentality.” SAC ¶ 42. If the Court 

finds to the contrary, then the FSIA is the exclusive source of subject-matter jurisdiction. As none 

of the exceptions to FSIA immunity are met, the Court would be divested of jurisdiction. 

Whether or not the FSIA applies, or, if applicable, any of the exceptions to FSIA immunity 

are satisfied, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must satisfy the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs 

cannot meet its requirements, independently requiring dismissal. 

If the FSIA does not apply, Plaintiffs must additionally satisfy the Florida long-arm or Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), but cannot meet the requirements of either. 

A. The FSIA, Invoked by Plaintiffs, Does Not Apply; If Applicable, It Divests This 

Court of Subject-Matter and Personal Jurisdiction 

1. That Habanos, S.A. is not an FSIA “agency or instrumentality” is established on the face 

of the SAC. Plaintiffs have thus failed at the threshold to meet its prima facie burden in invoking 

the FSIA, Cap. Trans Int'l, LLC v. Int'l Petroleum Inv. Co., No. 10-cv-529, 2013 WL 557236, at 

*7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013). 

A “separate legal person” is an “agency or instrumentality” within the FSIA when “a 

majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state” or it is “an organ 

of a foreign state[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). The SAC alleges that Habanos, S.A., is a separate 

legal person, SAC ¶ 9, and is 50% owned by a U.K. company, SAC ¶¶ 5, 7, 35, 60 n.33, 77, 86, 

97, leaving 50% for Cuban ownership—not “a majority.” The SAC’s gambit to meet the 

“majority” ownership prong by alleging the Cuban Government has “ultimate control” of Habanos, 

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S.A., SAC ¶ 9, is foreclosed by Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003) (rejecting 

that “control may be substituted for an ownership interest”).8 

The SAC’s reliance on § 1603(b)(2)’s “organ” prong, SAC ¶ 9, also fails. It is contrary to 

authority, and extends the FSIA to a vast new category of entities: commercial trading joint 

ventures with foreign parties, including those which trade in consumer products. 

The SAC alleges that Habanos, S.A. markets Cuban cigars internationally (except for the 

U.S.), SAC ¶¶ 5, 11, 77, 82, 86; it makes contradictory allegations as to whether it also 

manufactures the cigars it sells. SAC ¶¶ 12, 60, n.33, 77. Plaintiffs allege it is “jointly control[led]” 

by a U.K. company, Imperial, and a Cuban non-party, Tabacuba. SAC ¶ 82; see also id. ¶ 7 

(“operational control of [] Habanos . . . 50% owned by Imperial”). Habanos, S.A. distributes profits 

equally “between Imperial and Cuba in their 50-50 joint venture,” SAC ¶ 97 n.47. Habanos, S.A. 

is a “corporation,” SAC ¶ 35, a “sociedad anomina” (hence, the “S.A.” in its name), i.e., a 

mercantile stock company established under the Cuban Code of Commerce by two or more persons 

contributing assets to the company “to obtain profits” and registered on Cuba’s Mercantile 

Registry. See Declaration of Professor Marta Moreno Cruz (April 18, 2022, submitted herewith) 

(“Moreno Decl.”) on Cuban law. 

Habanos, S.A. is thus a “purely commercial venture” and, hence, cannot be considered an 

“organ.” Cap. Trans Int'l., 2013 WL 557236 at *8–*9 (company that “[i]nvest[s] in, establish[es], 

and run[s] business and industrial projects” for profit not an “organ”). 

Cap. Trans Int’l so held on the basis of a thorough analysis of the FSIA and the authority. 

A company created to “bring [their] shareholders a profit” through the conduct of a “business” is 

8

 Separately, even if Plaintiffs had alleged majority state ownership, such ownership must be direct, 

not through an intermediary. Dole, 538 U.S. at 473–77; but, the SAC alleges ownership “by Cuba, 

through one or more Cuban-owned companies.” SAC ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 

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not an “organ;” this is the “key inquiry.” Id. at *9. They stand in contrast to legal entities that 

“perform governmental functions,” Ocean Line Holdings Ltd. v. China Nat’l Chartering Corp., 

578 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), such as a central bank, the “paradigmatic example.” 

Qatar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC, 432 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).9 

That profits may ultimately inure to the benefit of the State, through indirect ownership or 

less than majority direct ownership, does not convert such a company into an “organ.” See, e.g., 

Cap. Trans Int’l., 2013 WL 557236, at *9 and Ocean Line, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (entities not 

organ despite profits inuring to State through intermediary).10 

Plaintiffs’ sole assertion of a “public activity”—that Habanos, S.A. “market[s] all Cuban 

tobacco products worldwide,” SAC ¶ 9—fundamentally misconceives what constitutes a “public 

activity” for purposes of determining “organ” status, namely, a company that is not created to 

“bring its shareholders a profit” through the conduct of a “business,” the “key inquiry.” Cap. Trans 

Int’l at *9. By the SAC’s own allegations, that is what Habanos, S.A. does. 

While this is dispositive, subsidiary indicia sometimes considered, identified in Cap. 

Trans. Int’l. 2013 WL 557236, at *9–*10; see also First Abu Dhabi Bank, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 409, 

weighs against agency status. The SAC does not allege that Habanos, S.A. was created by 

Government decree, that Habanos, S.A.’s are public employees, or that it is an agency or 

instrumentality of the State under Cuban law.11 “Ownership structure” weighs against “organ” 

9 See also, e.g., Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 808 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 538 U.S. 

468 (2003) (company created “in pursuit of profits” is not “organ”); First Abu Dhabi Bank, 432 F. 

Supp. 3d at 409 (comparing commercial companies run for profit with “organs,” such as legal 

entities dedicated to protecting depositors). 

10 Were it otherwise, Dole would be subverted: because profits flow upward through ownership of 

shares, third-tier commercial companies owned by government-owned corporations would always 

be an agency or instrumentality, contrary to the Supreme Court’s insistence that this ownership 

structure does not establish agency or instrumentality status. 

11 See also Moreno Decl., confirming that Habanos, S.A. is not an organ, agency or instrumentality 

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status, as Habanos, S.A. is 50% foreign owned. The control accompanying majority shareholder 

position does not weigh in favor of “organ” status, Dole Food, 251 F.3d at 808; here, there is not 

even that and concededly “joint[] control” and 50% “operational control.” SAC ¶¶ 7, 82. 

2. If the FSIA were applicable, it would provide Habanos, S.A. with immunity from suit 

because, when applicable, it is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state,” OBB 

Pesonenverkehr v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27, 34 (2015), and none of the exceptions to the immunity it 

confers on agencies and instrumentalities are met. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1605. 

Sequeira v. Rep. of Nicaragua, 815 F. App’x 345 (11th Cir. 2020) establishes that the 

commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), invoked by Plaintiffs, SAC ¶ 42, does not 

apply. There, the plaintiff sued Nicaragua for taking his farmland “and sell[ing] the livestock as 

meat products in the United States.” The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff could proceed only 

under the expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), not the commercial activity exception. 

Id., at 347, 350–51.12 Plaintiffs’ claim here is on all fours with Sequiera, which is controlling.13 

 Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the controlling expropriation exception. In Rep. of Germany v. 

or part of the Cuban Government under Cuban law. 

12 That the plaintiff claimed damages for commercial use of the property did not make the 

commercial activity exception applicable because the action’s gravamen was the taking of the 

property, a sovereign act. Id. at 347. 

13 See also France.com, Inc. v. French Republic, where the plaintiff sued France’s tourism agency, 

as well as France, for its use of a domain allegedly expropriated, via judicial process, to promote 

tours, lodging and restaurants. 992 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Circuit held that only 

the expropriation exception applied, even though it considered the agency’s use of the domain to 

be commercial. 

A court in the District of Columbia held that the commercial activity exception applied to a Title 

III action. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX, S.A., 534 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 

2021); No. 19-cv-1277, 2021 WL 4709566 (Oct. 8, 2021) (denying reconsideration); appeal 

pending, No. 21-7127. Unlike here, the court was not bound by Sequeira and relied exclusively on 

its own Circuit’s authority. It certified interlocutory review because there was “a substantial 

ground for difference of opinion” even under D.C. authority. ECF 77 at 5–6. It did not consider 

France.com. 

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Philipp, 141 S.Ct. 703 (2021), the Supreme Court held that the exception’s requirement that the 

property at issue was “taken in violation of international law” is not met if the confiscated property 

was owned at the time by nationals of the expropriating country. Id. at 711. Here, the SAC does 

not allege that the limited partnership which owned the Properties was organized under U.S. law, 

or that the partnership’s owner was a U.S. national at the time of the confiscation. See SAC ¶ 1. 

 Even if it could be invoked, the SAC fails to satisfy the commercial activity exception’s 

requirements. As to the Cigar Factory, the social media accounts cannot be the “direct effect” of 

use of the Cigar Factory, as required,14 because the accounts were established in 2015 and 2016, 

years after use of the Cigar Factory ended. Infra at 16–17. Habanos, S.A.’s alleged hiring of U.S. 

marketing entities, SAC ¶ 82, and their or the “WPP Group”’s alleged use of the “U.S. Services,” 

also post-date use of the Cigar Factory, see infra at 16–17, and so they too cannot be a “direct 

effect.” 

As to the Mixed-Use Building, Habanos, S.A.’s marketing of cigars, through globally 

accessible social media accounts and allegedly with the assistance of WPP agencies, is not a “direct 

effect” of Tabacuba’s alleged use of office space in that building to sell raw tobacco to 

manufacturers of cigars, which then sell the cigars to Habanos, S.A., which then markets and sells 

the cigars outside the U.S. SAC ¶¶ 11, 80, 85.15 (The SAC does not allege that Tabacuba and 

14 That the action is “based upon an act outside the” U.S. “in connection with a commercial activity 

of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” 

15 The declaration of Lisset Fernández García (“Fernández García Decl.,” April 12, 2022, filed 

herewith), establishes that Habanos, S.A. does not manufacture cigars and never occupied the 

Cigar Factory. 

The SAC does not allege that Habanos, S.A., occupies or uses the Mixed-Use Building, but, rather, 

alleges that Tabacuba does. SAC ¶¶8, 11, 18, 80. The declarations of Jorge Fernández Nuñéz, ¶¶ 

4–6, ECF and Fernández García additionally establish that Habanos, S.A. has never occupied, used 

or held an interest in the Mixed-Use Building. 

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Habanos, S.A. are alter egos, let alone the specific facts required to plead alter ego).16

In sharp contrast, for the “effect” to be “direct,” it must “follow[] as an immediate 

consequence of the defendant's ... activity, ” Rep. of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 

(1992); have “no intervening element, but, rather, flow[] in a straight line without deviation or 

interruption,” Lubian v. Rep. of Cuba, 2011 WL 13186846, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2011) (quoting

Princz v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); and “must be more than 

‘purely trivial’ or ‘remote and attenuated[.]’” Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 

889 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). The relation between Tabacuba’s alleged use of the MixedUse Building as office space to sell raw tobacco and Habanos, S.A.’s marketing cigars through 

globally accessible social media accounts and allegedly through WPP agencies, does not satisfy 

any of these requirements.17 

Case law where the relation between the property abroad at issue and the U.S. is not as 

attenuated as here stands against the SAC’s assertion of “direct effect.” Advertising on U.S. 

websites the sale or rental of the unlawfully converted real property in Angola was held not to be 

16 Conclusory allegations of alter ego would fail even if they had been made, which they were not. 

They “must be supported by facts.” Stansell v. BGP, Inc., No. 09-cv-2501, 2010 WL 2791850, at 

*1 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2010), cited with approval, DHTK LLC v. UNKNWN LLC, No. 19-cv61627, 2020 WL 4932237, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2020) (Gayles, J.); see also, e.g., S-Fer Int’l, 

Inc. v. Stonesheets LLC, No. 14-cv-24662, 2016 WL 8808749, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 2016). The 

entities must be “so united” that one “practically ceases to exist”. McCullough v. Royal Caribbean 

Cruises, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1349 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (Gayles, J.); Eitzen Chem. PTE, Ltd. v. 

Carib Petroleum, 749 F. App’x 765, 771 (11th Cir. 2018); Molinos Valle del Cibao, C. por A. v. 

Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011). 100% common ownership is not sufficient, Eitzen, 

at 771, and here, Tabacuba allegedly owns only 50% of Habanos, S.A. A plaintiff “must allege” 

“the shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation’s 

independent existence was in fact non-existent,” and the corporate form was “used fraudulently or 

for an improper purpose . . . caus[ing] injury to the claimant.” Iglesias v. Pernod Ricard, No. 20-

cv-20157, (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020), ECF 55, Order at 10–11, 15–16; 2021 WL 3083063, at *2 

(S.D. Fla. June 17, 2021), appeal pending, No. 21-12398. 

17 Further, the evidence establishes that the only WPP-affiliated entities that worked for Habanos, 

S.A. are Spanish companies working from abroad. ECF 93-1, 93-2, 173. 

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a “direct effect” of the challenged conversion and use of the property. Africa Growth Corp. v. Rep. 

of Angola, No. 17-cv-2469, 2019 WL 3253367 (D.D.C. July 19, 2019). In Sequeira v. Rep. of 

Nicaragua, No. 16-cv-25052, 2019 WL 2267507, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2019), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 16-cv-25052, 2019 WL 2268978 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2019), aff'd 

on other grounds, 815 F. App'x 345 (11th Cir. 2020), the export to the U.S. of goods grown on 

expropriated property in Nicaragua was held not to be “direct effect” of the challenged taking and 

use of the property. That Plaintiffs reside in the U.S. does not establish “direct effect.” ArayaSolorzano v. Gov't of the Rep. of Nicaragua, 562 F. App’x 901, 903 (11th Cir. 2014). 

The SAC also does not satisfy either of the two other prongs of the commercial activity 

exception. This action is not “based upon” use of the social media accounts, U.S. marketing agents 

or U.S. Services, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (that action is “based upon” “a commercial 

activity carried on in the United States” or “an act performed in the United States”). Further, in 

determining, as required, the “‘particular conduct’” a claim is “based upon,” the Court must 

identify the “‘gravamen’” of the claim. Devengoechea, 889 F.3d at 1224: the gravamen here is not 

any commercial activity in the U.S. or act in the U.S. but acts and activities in Cuba. 

B. Whether or Not the FSIA Applies and, If Applicable, an Exception to Immunity 

Is Met, Due Process Personal Jurisdiction Is Required but Lacking; If the FSIA 

Does Not Apply, Personal Jurisdiction Is Also Lacking for Failure to Satisfy 

the Florida Long-Arm or Rule 4(k)(2) 

If, contrary to Point II(A), the Court finds the FSIA applicable and an immunity exception’s 

requirements met, Plaintiffs still must satisfy the Due Process requirements for jurisdiction.18

18 See Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th 42, 65 (2d Cir. 2021); First Inv. Corp. of 

Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 748, 755 (5th Cir. 2012), as 

revised (Jan. 17, 2013); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 

Euclid Fish Co. v. Cape Fla. Seafood, No. 21-mc-22310, 2021 WL 4976530, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 

20, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-mc-22310, 2021 WL 4145207 (S.D. Fla. 

Sept. 13, 2021); Telchi v. Israel Mil. Indus., No. 14-cv-20244, 2015 WL 6550664, at *4–*5 (S.D. 

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Likewise, if the FSIA is inapplicable, Plaintiffs must satisfy the Due Process requirements. As the 

Due Process requirements are not met, dismissal is required in either event. 

In addition, if the FSIA is inapplicable, the statutory requirements of the Florida long-arm 

statute or Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), each invoked by Plaintiffs, SAC ¶¶ 66, 70, must be satisfied, but 

Plaintiffs fail to meet the requirements for either.19

For jurisdictional contacts, the SAC alleges: (a) social media marketing of Habanos, S.A.’s 

cigars, SAC ¶¶ 22, 41, 54–59; (b) retention of advertising agencies in the “WPP Group” to market 

the cigars, SAC ¶ 61; and (c) the “U.S. Services” used in the ordinary course of “WPP Group” 

affiliates’ business worldwide that are “sold by” U.S. companies or “nominally controlled” by 

WPP’s U.S. subsidiaries. SAC ¶¶ 23, 54, 62. 

1. The Requirements for Jurisdiction as to the Claim for the Cigar Factory Are Not Met 

(i) Due Process Requirements Are Not Met As to the Cigar Factory 

(a) The Due Process Requirement that the Claim for Trafficking in the 

Factory “Arise Out of or Relate to” the Alleged Contacts Is Not Met 

As to the Cigar Factory, the Title III claim cannot, as required, “arise out of or relate to,” 

Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Sup. Crt, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (alterations omitted), social media 

marketing of cigars because the marketing began only after use of the Cigar Factory ended. This 

is established on the face of the SAC and, in any event, is shown by Habanos, S.A.’s factual 

submissions. 

Facial Insufficiency 

The three cited social media accounts, SAC ¶ 22 & n.11, show on the face of the accounts 

Fla. Oct. 29, 2015). 

19 In its Statement of Interest to this Court, the United States recognized that Defendants’ personal 

jurisdiction challenges “raise substantial questions.” ECF 125 at 2. 

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that they were created in January 2015 (YouTube, Twitter) and February 2016 (Instagram), see 

Declaration of Susan Bailey, ¶¶ 2-4, ECF 89-1, but the alleged use of the Cigar Factory ended long 

before that.20 To show the dates of the Cigar Factory’s use, Plaintiffs rely upon photograph 

exhibits. All of these photographs were taken between some time on or before January 12, 2005 

and, at the latest, December 2013.21 Further, the January 2013 blog post the SAC specifies, as Ex. 

7’s source states, “[i]t’s been over a year” since the Factory was used for cigars—i.e., no later than 

2011—with cigar operations having been moved out due to “terrible floods from water coming 

through the roof,” requiring “renovations.” Bailey Decl. ¶ 10. 

Even aside from the foregoing, the SAC is insufficient. It only alleges that use of the 

Properties “from January 2008 until at least October 29, 2020” “included the production and 

shipping of . . . cigars,” SAC ¶ 17–18 (italics added) without alleging when between 2008 and 

2020 the Properties’ use “included” production and shipping of cigars. “Vague and conclusory 

20 Plaintiffs do not allege a different start date for the social media accounts. See SAC ¶ 22 

(accounts “set[] up” “no later than 2017”). Because the temporal sequence is critical to the SAC’s 

jurisdictional theory, and there can be no dispute as to the accounts’ authenticity given that 

Plaintiffs refer to and rely on them in the SAC, the start dates shown on the face of the accounts 

can be considered in a facial challenge. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 

(11th Cir. 2005) (“a document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if 

it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity"); Day v. Taylor, 400 

F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (considering document referenced in complaint, but not 

attached); see also Tarantino v. Riddell, No. 17-cv-60567, 2018 WL 2011551, at *2 & n.2 (S.D. 

Fla. Apr. 30, 2018); Arencibia v. AGA Serv., No. 20-cv-24694, 2021 WL 1318225, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 

April 8, 2021). 

21 This is shown by the dates appearing on the publications where they were published, or the dates 

shown on data embedded in the original photographs. Bailey Decl., ¶¶ 6-10; Declaration of Karel 

Perez Alejo, ¶¶ 3-4, ECF 89-2: Ex. 2, ECF 208-2, referenced at SAC ¶¶ 2, 78, 80—on May 15, 

2013; Ex. 3, ECF 208-3, top image, referenced at id. ¶¶ 2, 80—on January 11, 2005, and bottom 

image, referenced at id., ¶ 2—earlier than December 15, 2013; Ex. 6, ECF 208-6, referenced at id., 

¶ 79—in or earlier than 2009; Ex. 7, ECF 208-7, referenced at id., ¶¶ 79–80—earlier than January 

24, 2013. SAC ¶ 80 identifies a “publicity piece” on the cited webpage as being from February 

2010. The bottom images on Exhibit 2, ECF 208-2, referenced at SAC ¶¶ 2, 78, are of the MixedUse Building, not the Cigar Factory. 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 27 of 39
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allegations...are insufficient,” Snow v. DirecTV, 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006); conclusory 

assertions of ‘continuing’ or ‘ongoing’ conduct do not cut it.” Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 

-- F. Supp. 3d --, 2021 WL 5524484, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021) (Title III case). Here, there 

is not even that. 

Further, it is “well-settled” that “when the exhibits contradict [] general and conclusory 

allegations . . . , the exhibits govern.” Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007); 

Lawrence v. U.S., 597 F. App’x 599, 602 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting allegations “that are contrary 

to factual details presented in [] exhibits”). In a facial challenge, the court may consider what the 

sources of a pleading’s exhibits reveal, supra at 15 n.19, and here they reveal that the Cigar Factory 

was out of use by the time the social media accounts were established. 

Factual Challenge 

The foregoing, based on Plaintiffs’ own pleading, is dispositive. In addition, Habanos S.A. 

submits proofs establishing that the Factory was no longer used for cigars when the social media 

accounts were established.22 Habanos, S.A.’s proofs show: (i) the social media accounts were 

established in Jan. 2015 (YouTube, Twitter) and Feb. 2016 (Instagram), Bailey Decl. ¶¶ 2–4, ECF 

89.1; (ii) all cigar operations moved out of the Factory in 2011 due to deterioration; and (iii) there 

were no cigar-related operations in the Cigar Factory from 2011–present.23 There is no way around 

22 Where, as here, the defendant “makes a showing” that the requirements for personal jurisdiction 

are not met, the plaintiff may “not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint;” it must 

“substantiate the jurisdictional allegations” by “competent proof.” Diamond Crystal Brands v. 

Food Movers Int'l, 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). A pleading’s 

allegations are not taken as true when “[]controverted by ... affidavits,” Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas 

Indus., 896 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

23 Declarations of Martha Riquelme Armenteros (employee of cigar manufacturer that occupied 

the Factory), ECF 89-5; Juan Luis Arias (security technician), ECF 117-1. Habanos, S.A.’s proofs 

also show that, when operations were moved out in 2011, the Factory was unusable absent major 

repairs, and that no repairs have since been made. Declarations of Mirel García Días (engineer 

who inspected Factory) and attached photographs, ECF 89-3; Rafael Agramonte Hevia (engineer 

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this dispositive, temporal disjuncture. 

(b) The Due Process “Purposeful Availment” Requirement Is Not Met with 

Respect to the Cigar Factory 

Social media marketing. In addition to failing because the social media accounts were 

established after the Factory was no longer in use, the SAC’s reliance on the social media accounts 

fails because it is well-settled that purposeful availment is not shown by use of globally accessible 

websites that cannot be used for transactions. Blue Water Int'l v. Hattrick's Irish Sports Pub, No. 

17-cv-1584, 2017 WL 4182405, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) (no jurisdiction “merely because 

a Floridian might view [defendant’s] Facebook[ or] Twitter . . . pages”).24 

Social Media Company Headquarters. It makes no difference for purposeful availment 

that Twitter, Instagram and YouTube are based in the U.S. SAC ¶¶ 54, 61. Courts uniformly 

conclude that the location of such companies are not to be deemed meaningful contact for 

jurisdictional purposes.25 To hold otherwise would render “essentially meaningless” the 

who inspected Factory) and attached report, ECF 89-4. 

24 See also Argos Glob. Partner Servs., LLC v. Ciuchini, 446 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1092 (S.D. Fla. 

2020) (“Defendants' website, visible to internet users in Florida” does not create requisite 

“substantial connection” with forum); Honus Wagner v. Luminary Grp. LLC, No. 17-cv-61317, 

2017 WL 6547899, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2017) (no minimum contacts from website “available 

to anyone with internet access in the world, including Florida residents”); Sovereign Offshore 

Servs. v. Shames, No. 17-cv-80172, 2017 WL 7798664, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017) 

(“Defendant’s awareness that his blog posts would be accessible in Florida, by virtue of the nature 

of the world-wide web . . . [is] insufficient”); Performance Indus. Mfg., Inc. v. Vortex Performance 

Pty, No. 18-cv-00510, 2019 WL 78840, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2019). Otherwise, there would be 

“jurisdiction in every spot on the planet where that [] website is accessible.” Blue Water Int'l, 2017 

WL 4182405 at *1 (quotation omitted). 

Plaintiffs make no allegation that the social media accounts can be used to purchase cigars (as is 

readily apparent from the accounts, they cannot, see Bailey Decl., ¶ 5). Courts uniformly reject 

reliance on websites that only display general promotional information. See Volt, LLC v. Volt 

Lighting Grp., 369 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1248 (M.D. Fla. 2019); Schuster v. Carnival Corp., No. 10-

cv-21879, 2011 WL 13220428, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2011). 

25 See BackGrid USA, 2021 WL 4772474 at *6 (rejecting reliance on headquarters of Twitter and 

Instagram); Brophy v. Almanzar, 359 F. Supp. 3d 917, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (same as to 

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purposeful availment requirement because such accounts are “ubiquitous” for marketing;” 

“millions . . . around the globe” would be subject to jurisdiction where such companies are based. 

DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp. 2d 871, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

Alleged Retention of Y&R, BCW and Non-U.S. “WPP Group” Agencies. Nor does it 

make any difference that Habanos, S.A. allegedly retained “WPP Group and its U.S.-based [] 

agents” for the social media marketing. SAC ¶ 61. It is the substance of the agent’s work, not the 

location of the alleged agent, that is jurisdictionally relevant;26 and, as shown, the substance—use 

of globally accessible social media accounts—is insufficient. 

As noted, it does not appear that the SAC alleges marketing by the U.S. agencies other than 

through social media.27 To the extent it does (without alleging what that marketing is), see SAC 

¶¶ 14, 20, 21, 56, this general allegation of “marketing” lacks the required specificity and must be 

disregarded.28 

Instagram); Dish Network, LLC v. Jadoo TV, Inc., No. 18-cv-9768, 2020 WL 6536659, at *8 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 16, 2020) (same as to YouTube). 

26 It is “well-established . . . that [] merely contracting with a forum resident” cannot “establish 

sufficient minimum contacts.” Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1268; see also Louis Vuitton 

Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, the inquiry “focuses 

on the substance of the transaction.” Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1268–69. 

27 Further, Y&R and BCW’s declarations establish that the U.S. agencies do no work for 

Habanos, S.A. See supra at 4 n.5. 

28 In re Takata Airbag, 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1148–49 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (no jurisdiction where 

plaintiffs “generally allege” U.S. agents “engage[] in...advertising[ and] marketing” on 

defendants’ behalf because “generalized allegations [] devoid of specificity ... fail to establish that 

the Foreign Defendants purposefully availed”); Storms v. Haugland Energy Grp., LLC, No. 18-

cv-80334, 2018 WL 4347603, at *3, 8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2018), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2018 WL 4347604 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018) (advertising allegation “fails to specify how 

Defendant ‘advertised’ in Florida,” and thus is “not to be considered in deciding the sufficiency of 

the pleading”); Herbal Brands Inc. v. Photoplaza Inc., No. 21-cv-577, 2021 WL 5299677, at *3 

(D. Ariz. Nov. 15, 2021) (advertising allegation “conclusory and does not provide any details about 

how Defendants specifically advertised the product in [forum]”). 

The SAC’s allegations concerning Ogilvy are devoid of any specificity, let alone what is required. 

Plaintiffs do not allege Ogilvy was involved in the social media accounts. SAC ¶ 22. The only 

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To the extent, if any, the SAC’s allegation of marketing by entities within the so-called 

“WPP Group” is meant to reference non-U.S. agencies, and not just the U.S. agencies (Y&R and 

BCW), the allegation fails for lack of specificity: the non-U.S. entities are not identified, their 

locations not specified and what marketing services they provide (and how) is unstated. See SAC 

¶¶ 42, 61, 92. In addition, the allegation fails because the only alleged link to the U.S. is the “U.S. 

Services,” which, as shown below, is insufficient. 

“U.S. Services.” Finally, the SAC alleges all members of the “WPP Group” worldwide 

use U.S. technology services. SAC ¶¶ 23, 54, 62. Overwhelming authority forecloses Plaintiffs’ 

attempt to show jurisdiction over Habanos, S.A. on this basis.29 Further, the same authority holding 

that the location of social media companies in the U.S. does not provide jurisdiction, supra at 17–

18, applies a fortiori to Plaintiffs’ reliance on general back-end services such as the domain name 

of a file-sharing site, where email is routed, and where servers happen to be located. 

(c) Plaintiffs’ Florida Residence Does Not Provide Due Process Personal 

Jurisdiction 

allegation as to Ogilvy is one of unspecified “marketing,” which is insufficient. 

29 See supra at 17–18; see also Argos Glob., 446 F. Supp. at 1079–80 (existence of shared server 

“in Florida” insufficient); Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859 (E.D. Va. 2000) 

(“registration of the domain name with [company located in the forum] . . . is simply not a 

sufficient contact [] to establish personal jurisdiction”); Dish Network, 2020 WL 6536659 at *7–

*8 (“management and operation of domain names and servers that can be accessed ‘anywhere in 

the world’ . . . [is] insufficient”); Rosen v. Terapeak, Inc., No. 15-cv-112, 2015 WL 12724071, at 

*9–*10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015) (rejecting that the “‘fortuitous’ presence of a server [is] relevant 

to a finding of personal jurisdiction”); TriOptima AB v. Quantile Techs. Ltd., No. 19-cv-390, 2020 

WL 11613655, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2020) (use of “datacenters in Texas . . . [is] insufficient 

to support personal jurisdiction”); SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Praveen Narra & Indyzen, Inc., No. 21-

cv-60799, 2021 WL 5749520, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2021) (“development and maintenance 

contracts” for technology services insufficient to support jurisdiction). 

If it were otherwise, any foreign defendant’s hiring a non-U.S. agency could be subject to U.S. 

jurisdiction, simply because the non-U.S. agency happens to contract with a U.S. technology 

service for back-end support. This contravenes the overwhelming authority that use of a general 

technology service does not provide jurisdiction where the service provider happens to be based. 

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That five Plaintiffs allegedly reside in Florida, SAC ¶ 66, irrelevant because “the place of 

plaintiff’s injury and residence cannot create a defendant’s contact with the forum.” Ford Motor 

Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist., 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021); PG Creative Inc. v. Affirm 

Agency, No. 18-cv-24299, 2019 WL 5684219, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Supreme Court 

has made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not ... sufficient”). 

(ii) Statutory Requirements Are Not Met with Respect to the Cigar Factory 

Florida Long-Arm. The requirements of the Florida Long-Arm provision invoked by SAC 

¶ 66, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), are not met: the SAC alleges no claim-related activity in Florida, 

while Plaintiffs must “demonstrate that the foreign defendant ‘committed a substantial aspect of 

the alleged tort in Florida.’” Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Watts v. Haun, 393 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (alterations omitted)). 

This requires proving that acts in Florida ‘were essential to the success of the tort,’” id., and that 

without those acts the tort “is not completed.” Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 

1214 (Fla. 2010). 

First, the SAC does not allege that YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter are located in Florida, 

and to the contrary, they are in California. Supra at 3 n.4. 

Second, as with Due Process and venue, use of globally accessible websites is insufficient 

to satisfy the long-arm requirements. Del Valle v. Trivago GmbH, No. 19-cv-22619, 2020 WL 

2733729 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2020); Volt, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1245–47 (long-arm not satisfied by 

website that allows no sales); Schuster, 2011 WL 13220428, at *8–*9 (same).

Third, as shown, the SAC does not allege any marketing activity in the District. See supra 

at 3–5. The agents allegedly retained for marketing are based in New York and/or London, id., not 

Florida, which forecloses jurisdiction unless there are allegations of relevant activities in Florida, 

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yet there are none. 

Fourth, the SAC’s allegations related to the U.S. Services, back-end technological services, 

are not alleged to have anything to do with Florida, despite discovery. Supra at 19–20. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) invoked by SAC ¶ 70, also does not apply: 

as a court of this District held, Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 (S.D. 

Fla. 2007), 4(k)(2) is inapplicable when it appears from the record that contacts with a different, 

particular state “may allow” it to exercise jurisdiction, even if the defendant—as Habanos, S.A. 

does here—disputes that jurisdiction lies, and does not consent to jurisdiction, anywhere in the 

U.S., and even if no finding is made that the other forum indeed has jurisdiction. 

There is particularly strong reason to apply Mother Doe here. Twitter, Instagram and 

YouTube are headquartered in California, which (unlike Florida) exercises jurisdiction “on any 

basis not inconsistent with the Constitution[.]” Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 410.10. Insofar as the Court 

finds the social media accounts satisfy Due Process, that contact necessarily “may allow,” Mother 

Doe, 632 F. Supp. at 1143, California to exercise jurisdiction. And insofar as Habanos, S.A.’s 

alleged relationship with BCW and Y&R is found to satisfy Due Process, that “may allow” 

jurisdiction in New York. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot, as required by Rule 4(k)(2), “establish that the 

defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state.” Owens v. Kristen Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi 

A/S, No. 08-cv-264, 2008 WL 4067431, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2008). 

2. The Requirements for Jurisdiction as to the Mixed-Use Building Are Not Met 

(i) Due Process Requirements Are Not Met As to the Mixed-Use Building 

The Due Process and statutory requirements for jurisdiction as to the Mixed-Use Building 

also are not met. 

First, that the Due Process purposeful availment requirement is not satisfied by social 

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media marketing on globally accessible websites that do not allow transactions, the location of the 

social media companies, the alleged retention of the advertising agencies and the U.S. Services see 

supra, Point IIB1(b), is dispositive as to the Mixed-Use Building just as it is to the Cigar Factory. 

Second, the SAC alleges that Tabacuba, not Habanos, S.A., has offices in the Mixed-Use 

Building, and uses them to buy “raw tobacco from Cuban farmers and subsequent resell[] ... to 

other entities in Cuba for further manufacture or use.” SAC ¶¶ 2, 8, 11. It does not allege that 

Tabacuba is Habanos, S.A.’s alter ego even in conclusory terms, let alone allege the specific facts 

required to plead alter ego. See supra at 11–12. Plaintiffs thus cannot assert jurisdiction over 

Habanos, S.A. for non-party Tabacuba’s alleged use of the Mixed-Use Building. 

Third, the alleged connection between use of the Mixed-Use Building by Tabacuba and 

Habanos, S.A.’s alleged U.S. marketing contacts is insufficient. The Mixed-Use Building is used 

to buy and sell raw tobacco, but Habanos, S.A.’s alleged U.S. contacts are not for the marketing 

of raw tobacco. SAC ¶ 14 (marketing is of “Cuban cigar products and the Habanos brand name”). 

Moreover, although the Mixed-Use Building is used to sell raw tobacco to manufacturers of cigars, 

SAC ¶¶ 2, 11, Habanos, S.A. does not manufacture cigars. See supra at 11 n.14. Habanos, S.A. 

also does not use or have an interest in the Mixed-Use Building. Fernández García Decl., ¶ 3. 

Thus, the connection, if any, between the Mixed-Use Building and Habanos, S.A.’ U.S. 

contacts is far too “attenuated,” Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 845, 851 (11th Cir. 2010), to satisfy 

Due Process’s “arises out or relates to” requirement. Indeed, attempts to establish jurisdiction by 

linking one party’s sale of inputs (here, Tabacuba’s sale of raw tobacco to cigar manufacturers 

which sell to Habanos, S.A.) to the forum contacts of another (here, Habanos, S.A.’s), have been 

rejected.30 Further, “marketing activities” must “relate to the core conduct ... that constitutes the 

30 See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 674 F. Supp. 2d 580, 602, 604 n.34 

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rationale for holding [defendant] liable,” In re Zantac, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 2021); 

Tabacuba’s alleged use of the Mixed-Use Building is not the “core conduct” here. 

(ii) Statutory Requirements Are Not Met with Respect to the Mixed-Use Building 

The SAC’s reliance on the Florida long-arm and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) as to the MixedUse Building fails for identical reasons as with respect to the Factory. As to long-arm, globally 

accessible websites are insufficient; the social media companies are not based in Florida; and 

neither marketing activities nor the U.S. Services allegedly take place in Florida. As to 4(k)(2), 

Mother Doe is equally applicable. See Point II(B)(1)(ii). 

III. Due Process Prohibits Title III’s Application to Habanos, S.A. 

Application of Title III to Habanos, S.A. exceeds Due Process limits on prescriptive 

jurisdiction. There must be “not only [] contacts between the regulated party and the state, but also 

[] contacts between the regulated subject matter and the state.” Gerling Glob. Reins. Corp. v. 

Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001) (italics in original); see also U.S. v. Baston, 818 

F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, the “regulated party” is not a U.S. national and has no U.S. 

offices, and the regulated property and its possession and use that constitute the “subject matter” 

of the action are abroad (and, also, Habanos, S.A.’s cigars are not sold in the U.S.). Further, Title 

III’s application here would give it an extraterritorial reach that the State Department 

acknowledged to be “difficult to defend under international law,”31 a weighty consideration in 

(M.D. Pa. 2009) (“Periodic purchases of raw materials” from “remote wholesaler” “do not 

establish personal jurisdiction” where remote wholesaler lacked connection to forum and separate 

company marketed product to U.S.); Zanakis v. Scanreco, Inc., No. 18-cv-21813, 2019 WL 

2211872, at *1, *12 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) (no jurisdiction over faulty joystick manufacturer 

where joystick entered Florida through “attenuated chain of custody” and manufacturer lacked 

independent connections to Florida). 

31 Dep’t of State, Legal Considerations Regarding Title III, 141 Cong. Rec. S15106, S15108 (Oct. 

12, 1995). 

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setting the Due Process limits on prescriptive jurisdiction. U.S. v. Ibarquen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 

1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011). 

IV. The Complaint Must Be Dismissed for Insufficient Service of Process 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) authorizes service by “any form of mail,” but DHL, used by 

Plaintiffs, ECF 66, is not “mail.” The plain meaning of “mail” is items “sent or carried in a postal 

system.”32 The Rule must be applied according to its plain meaning. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 

(2015); U.S. v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1317 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, the Advisory Committee 

specified that the Rule referred to a “postal service.” Notes, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (1963). 

 The two appellate courts to address the issue held that “mail” does not include courier 

services. See Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (service by “mail” 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)): Prince v. Poulos, 876 F.2d 30, 32 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (service by “mail” 

under Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)).33 

Even if DHL is considered “mail,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C) conditions its use on its not 

being “prohibited by the foreign country’s law.” Cuban law prohibits service of process issued in 

a foreign action by mail (or courier); like numerous other countries, Restatement (Third), Foreign 

Relations Law of the United States, § 471, cmt. b (1987), Cuba requires service through letters 

rogatory. Declaration of Prof. Ivonne Pérez Gutiérrez, ECF 89-7. 

That DHL is not “mail” is also dispositive of Plaintiffs’ reliance on the FSIA’s service 

provision. SAC ¶ 43; 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(B). In language identical to Rule 4, the FSIA requires 

32 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “Mail” available at www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/mail (last accessed April 19, 2022); see also Black’s Law Dictionary, 

“Mail” (11th ed. 2019) (“An official system for delivering such items; the postal system”). 

33 When courts in this District have permitted courier service, it was upon prior court order under 

Rule 4(f)(3) (“by other means . . . as the court orders”), see, e.g., TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. 

Sunstrike Int'l, Ltd., 273 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2011); or uncontested. See, e.g., Hurtado v. 

Balerno Int'l Ltd., No. 17-cv-62200, 2018 WL 4053122 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2018). 

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service by “any form of mail,” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(B). Because Rule 4 used this language 

when Congress enacted the FSIA, it must be given the same meaning as Rule 4.34 Further, the 

FSIA provision was drafted “to conform ... with the Federal Rules.” H.R. Rept. No. 94-1489, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. on Judiciary, at 25 (Sept. 9, 1976). 

V. If Dismissal Is Denied, a More Definite Statement is Required 

If dismissal is denied, Plaintiffs should be required to specify: (a) the acts of trafficking 

allegedly committed by Habanos, S.A. itself; (b) the acts of trafficking allegedly committed by 

others but attributed to Habanos, S.A.; and (c) by whom the attributed acts were committed and 

the basis for attribution. Because the SAC is “so vague or ambiguous” in these respects, Habanos, 

S.A. “cannot reasonably prepare a response,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Many of its allegations 

intermingle Habanos, S.A., Tabacuba, other Cuban companies and “Cuba” without specifying 

which is doing what, and use “Cuba” to refer to Habanos, S.A., Tabacuba, and/or the Cuban 

Government. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 10; 48, 62. Classically, this requires a more definite statement.35 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Habanos, S.A.’s individual motion to dismiss with prejudice 

should be granted. 

REQUEST FOR HEARING

 Oral argument is requested, and would be helpful to the Court, because of the multiplicity 

of issues presented by the instant motion. Habanos, S.A. estimates that forty-five minutes will 

34 See Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 487 (2005) (“Congress took the term ... as the 

... law found it”); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S.Ct. 893, 898–99 (2019) (“materially 

indistinguishable” term has same meaning when used in laws with “similar[] . . . purpose”). 

35 See, e.g., Pierson v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1271 (M.D. Fla. 

2009), aff'd, 451 F. App'x 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (“improperly group[ed] [defendants] together and 

d[id] not describe what action each of them allegedly took against Plaintiff”). 

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be required for oral argument. 

Dated: April 20, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Charles Murray Harris, Jr. 

CHARLES MURRAY HARRIS, JR. MICHAEL R. KRINSKY

Florida Bar No. 967459 (admitted pro hac vice) 

E-Mail: charris@trenam.com E-Mail: mkrinsky@rbskl.com 

STEPHANIE CRANE LIEB LINDSEY FRANK

Florida Bar No. 31806 (admitted pro hac vice) 

E-Mail: slieb@trenam.com E-Mail: lfrank@rbskl.com 

TRENAM KEMKER SCHARF BARKIN RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD, 

FRYE O’NEILL & MULLIS KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, P.C.

101 E Kennedy Boulevard 320 West 85th Street 

Tampa, FL 33601-1102 New York, NY 10024-3802 

Telephone: (727) 820-3950 Telephone: (212) 254-1111 

Fax: (727) 820-0835 Fax: (212) 674-4614 

Attorneys for Defendant Corporación Habanos, S.A. 

On the Brief: 

Nathan Yaffe 

(Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, 

Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C.) 

 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 38 of 39
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 20, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

was filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send a notification of the 

filing to all counsel and parties of record. 

/s/ Charles M. Harris, Jr. 

Attorney 

Case 1:20-cv-23287-DPG Document 225 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2022 Page 39 of 39