J-S76037-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LARRY HILL,

Appellant No. 3851 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 14, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0001816-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2018

Appellant, Larry Hill, appeals from the order denying his first petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546, after a hearing. We affirm.

On May 17, 2012, after the start of jury selection in his criminal trial, 

Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted murder, one count of 

criminal conspiracy, and one count of possessing an instrument of a crime.

1

 

The charges related to Appellant’s shooting at three Philadelphia police 

officers. In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros

the remaining charges, and recommend an aggregate sentence of not less 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 903(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.
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than ten nor more than twenty years of incarceration. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant to the agreed upon term of imprisonment. On May 24, 

2012, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court 

denied on June 14, 2012. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

On February 20, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition on January 21, 2016, 

alleging that Appellant’s guilty plea was not valid because plea counsel 

incorrectly advised him that he would be eligible for parole after having served 

only seven years.2

The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 14, 

2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that counsel had 

rendered ineffective assistance when she failed to inform Appellant of the 

denial of his motion to withdraw. However, the court found that Appellant’s 

claim that counsel told him he only had to serve seven years to be incredible. 

Thus, the court denied Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective and had 

induced him to unknowingly plead guilty. Appellant timely appealed the PCRA 

court’s denial of his claim that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

regarding the guilty plea.3 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed a counseled second amended petition on October 5, 2016.

3 Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal on January 4, 2017. The PCRA court entered its 

opinion on June 28, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant raises one question on appeal: “Did the PCRA court err in 

denying [his] request to withdraw his guilty plea?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 3)

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred when it denied his petition 

with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. (See id. at 

7-8). Specifically, he contends that counsel induced him to plead guilty by 

telling him that he would only have to serve seven years of his ten-year 

minimum sentence. (See id. at 8). Appellant’s issue does not merit relief.

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 

This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it 

is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This 

Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it. We grant great deference to the factual 

findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings 

unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no 

such deference to its legal conclusions. Further, where the 

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief because of the 

ineffectiveness of plea counsel.

To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA 

petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable 

merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or 

failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable 

probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

[See] Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111, 
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1127 (2011) (employing ineffective assistance of counsel test 

from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 

975–76 (1987)). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective 

assistance. . . .

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (one citation and 

footnote omitted). 

It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to 

effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well 

as during trial. However, [a]llegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty 

plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant 

enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 

counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

[T]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased 

with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that 

is required is that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently made. Moreover, with regard to the 

prejudice prong, where an appellant has entered a guilty plea, the 

appellant must demonstrate it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

gone to trial.

Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, the PCRA court explained that:

At the [evidentiary] hearing, [Appellant] testified that he 

had not wanted to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer but did 

so after his attorney promised him (and his family) that he would 

only have to serve [seven] years of the [ten to twenty] year

sentence. He admitted that his attorney did not explain why he 

would be permitted to serve below the minimum sentence, but 

was “guessing it was good time earned time.” [(N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 11/14/16, at 26)]. Only when one of his cellmates told 
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him that he would have to serve more than [seven] years did 

[Appellant] decide to withdraw his guilty plea. . . .

Plea counsel . . . testified that when presenting the 

Commonwealth’s offer, she never told [Appellant] or any family 

member that he could be released from custody in as few as 

[seven] years. Instead, her practice was to inform clients facing 

violent charges that “[g]enerally speaking, you can expect not to 

get paroled or you can be seriously considered for parole after you 

have done about [seventy-five] percent of your max time.” Id.

at 47[.] Moreover, although she considered the Commonwealth’s 

offer a good one based upon [Appellant’s] sentencing exposure, 

she did not attempt to persuade him to accept it because she also 

thought he had a chance at establishing reasonable doubt at trial.

* * *

The [PCRA] court found [Appellant’s] testimony that his 

attorney had promised him he would be released after [seven] 

years incredible and denied his claim of ineffectiveness as to the 

entry of his guilty plea. . . .

(PCRA Court Opinion, 6/28/17, at 3-4) (some record citations omitted; 

emphasis in original). 

The PCRA court found Appellant’s claim that plea counsel promised him

that he would be released after seven years incredible. (See id.). We are 

bound by the credibility determinations of the PCRA court. See 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 2004) (“[W]e are 

bound by the PCRA court’s credibility determinations where there is record 

support for those determinations.”) (citation omitted). The PCRA court’s 

finding is supported by the record and free of legal error. See Rykard, supra

at 1183. Thus, we conclude that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that plea 

counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter an unwilling or unknowing plea. 

See Timchak, supra at 769-70. Appellant’s claim does not merit relief. 
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/23/18