COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00470-CR 

SARAH ASHLEY BOSWELL APPELLANT

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 14-00431 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant Sarah Ashley Boswell pled guilty to 

credit card abuse of an elderly individual,2 a third-degree felony,3 and the trial 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 

2See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.31(b), (d) (West 2011). 

3See id. § 12.34 (providing range of punishment is 2 to 10 years’ 

confinement and a fine of up to $10,000). 
2 

court placed her on deferred adjudication community supervision (DACS) for five 

years and imposed a $500 fine. Less than three months later, the State filed a 

motion to adjudicate, alleging that Appellant had violated several terms of 

community supervision. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s 

DACS, adjudicated her guilt, and sentenced her to ten years’ confinement. 

In one point, Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion 

and violated her rights to due process by revoking her community supervision 

and sentencing her to ten years, the maximum term of confinement,4 “against all 

logic and the evidence presented.” Because the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by revoking Appellant’s DACS and she forfeited her sentencing 

complaint by failing to raise it in the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

Statement of Facts 

Appellant’s community supervision officer and grandmother testified at the 

adjudication hearing. The community supervision officer testified specifically 

about several violations. At the end of her direct examination, she answered 

“No” when asked if Appellant had done “anything on probation.” 

One of the violations the community supervision officer testified about was 

illegal drug use. She testified that Appellant had tested positive for 

methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana on one occasion and 

 4See id. 
3 

methamphetamine on another occasion. After the second positive drug test, the 

community supervision officer instructed Appellant to attend outpatient treatment 

and to attend AA or NA; Appellant did neither. On cross-examination, the 

community supervision officer agreed that outpatient or inpatient treatment would 

have been beneficial for Appellant and that Appellant had a “drug abuse 

problem” but also stated that Appellant “doesn’t want help with it. . . . [I]f she 

wanted help, she would have done the outpatient.” Appellant’s grandmother 

testified that drug treatment would be good for Appellant and that to be 

successful on community supervision, she would need weekly drug tests. 

The community supervision officer also testified that Appellant had 

previously been convicted of seven state jail felonies for six counts of fraud and 

one count of possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s grandmother 

clarified that Appellant’s seven prior state jail felony convictions stemmed from 

one indictment. 

After the hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had violated her terms 

of community supervision by 

 failing to report as directed for July and September 2015; 

 failing to provide her community supervision officer with proof of 

employment and earnings; 

 failing to complete community service for the months of July and August 

2015 and any months thereafter; 

 testing positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and THC on July 31, 2015 

and by testing positive to methamphetamine on August 25, 2015; 
4 

 leaving Cooke County without permission; and 

 failing to attend any AA/NA meetings when instructed to attend four such 

meetings a week on August 25, 2015. 

The trial court’s judgment provides that when the trial judge asked 

Appellant whether she “had anything to say why said sentence should not be 

pronounced,” she “answered nothing in bar thereof.” The record does not reflect 

that precise use of statutory terminology,5 but it does show that Appellant had 

two opportunities to raise her sentencing complaint after the trial court revoked 

her DACS and adjudicated her guilt, 

[THE COURT:] Do you understand, [Appellant], that it now 

becomes my duty to sentence you? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Do you have anything further to say before 

you’re sentenced? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court having revoked the Defendant’s 

deferred adjudication, having found the Defendant now guilty of the 

third-degree felony of credit card abuse committed against an elderly 

individual, sentences the Defendant . . . to confinement in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 

ten years. 

State prepare the paperwork. 

A deferred adjudication was an unwarranted gift to someone 

that has seven prior felony convictions. And you did not take 

probation seriously[.] I sentence you to the full ten years. 

Get me the paperwork. 

 5See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07 (West 2006). 
5 

(Recess taken.) 

(Open court, Defendant present/no jury.) 

THE COURT: In Cause No. 14-00431, State of Texas versus 

[Appellant]. 

[Appellant], do you have anything further to say before I 

formally sentence you? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: The Court having found the allegation that the 

Defendant violated Term 3, Term 7, Term 10, Term 13, Term 20 and 

Term 30 to be true, the Court revokes the Defendant’s deferred 

adjudication and adjudicates and finds the Defendant guilty of the 

third-degree felony offense of credit card abuse against an elderly 

individual. 

It is the order of this Court that the Defendant is sentenced to 

ten years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice. Defendant will receive credit as 

reflected in the judgment. 

Anything further from the State? 

[Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: From the Defendant? 

[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] 

Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. 

No Abuse of Discretion 

We review an order revoking community supervision for an abuse of 

discretion.6 In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and 

 6Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. 

State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
6 

conditions of community supervision.7 The trial court is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.8 If the 

State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion by 

revoking the community supervision.9 Proof by a preponderance of the evidence 

of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is 

sufficient to support a revocation order.10

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

violations but does complain of the revocation. The community supervision 

officer’s testimony about Appellant’s positive drugs tests provided proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence of the violation.11 Further, Appellant was 

afforded due process; she had the “opportunity to show . . . that there was a 

justifiable excuse for any violation [and] that revocation [was] not the appropriate 

disposition.”12 The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by revoking 

 7Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

8Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). 

9Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94. 

10Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); 

Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). 

11See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. 

12Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2258 (1985). 
7 

her DACS and adjudicating her guilty. 

Appellant forfeited her sentencing complaint by not raising it when she had 

the opportunity in the trial court or in a motion for new trial.13 As she concedes, 

however, her ten-year sentence is within the range of punishment for her 

offense.14 We overrule Appellant’s sole issue. 

Conclusion 

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Appellant’s 

rights to due process by revoking her DACS and because Appellant forfeited her 

sentencing complaint, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot 

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT 

JUSTICE 

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ. 

DO NOT PUBLISH 

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 

DELIVERED: August 25, 2016 

 13See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07; Hicks v. State, 415 S.W.3d 

587, 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). 

14See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.34, 32.31(b), (d).