The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers 
I U.S. Army Engineer School By 01 Secretary 573-xxx-xxxx IDSN 676-xxxx ERIC n.sn11uaEKI 

COMMANDANT Gene !ral, Unitec 1States Ar 

MG Anders B. Aadland 'of Staff 

563-61 58 

AadIanda@wood.army.mil 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

BG Ronald L. Johnson 

563-61 92 

Johnsoro@wood.army.mil 

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR 

CSM Robert R. Robinson 

563-8060 

Robinsonr@wood.army.mil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

COL Douglas L. Horn 

563-8080 

Hornd@wood.army.mil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT- USAR 

Official: pQ& 


JOEL.B. HUDSON 

Administrative .Assistant to the 

Secretary ot . 

mt 

. 

Engi..--. ,.--..0046-19890) is prepared quarterly by 

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DlSl2LAIMER: Engineer p,aaal,,5 r,ofessional information designc ?d to keep U.S. military and civil- ~

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DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT-ARNG 

LTC Robert Hudnall 

563-8046 

Hudnallr@wood.army.mil 


TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for 


ENGINEER COMBATSYSTEMS 


COL John Holler 


563-4081 

Hollerj@wood.army.mil 

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE 

COL Louis R. Best 

596-0224 

Bestl@wood.army.mil 


DIRECTOR OFTRAINING 


LTC(P) James Rowan 


563-4093 

Rowanj @wood.army.mil 


DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTION 


Dr. Rebecca Johnson 


563-4129 

Johnsonr@wood.am~y.mil 


CHIEF OF DOCTRINE 


LTC Harry Rossander 


563-7537
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I 
A

February 2001 Headquarters, Department of the Army 	 Volume 31 PB 5-01-1

1

I 	FEATURES ~1 1 UNITED STATES ARMY 

i ENGINEER SCHOOL 4 Mine Threats in Mission Areas 

By Colonel Andrzej Zarczynski 

8 Mine Effects Awareness at JRTC 

By Major Douglas Langrehr I COMMANDANT 10 Ambush at Serzhen Yurt: Command-Detonated Mines in the I 

Major General Second Chechen War 

Anders B.Aadland By Captain Adam Geibel 

20 Demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina I 

By First Lieutenant Eric Midden I 

, MANAGING EDITOR 24 A Light Combat-Engineer Platoon in Kosovo 

Lynne Sparks 	 By Captain Andrew J. Short 

1 1 EDITOR 28 Dynamic Theater Bridge Management: The Korea Challenge ' Shirley Bridges By Lieutenant Colonel Scoff F "Rock" Donahue I 

:# GRAPHIC DESIGNER 36 Engineer Success on the JRTC Battlefield: An OPFOR Engineer 

Jennifer Morgan Perspective 

By Captain James S. Matthews 

39 West Point Cadets Train With the 416th ENCOM 

By Colonel Robert Phillips 

I Front Cover: 

,I 40 Unit History: A Two-Edged Sword , Mine threats in mission By Dr. Larry Roberts 1 areas are real. Photographs 

I 	 show various mines and 44 NTC: Lessons Learned From My First Rotation 


damage that can occur to I By Second Lieutenant Steven L. Kreh 
 1 vehicles from mine explosions. (Engineer Corps flag 49 Engineer Assistant Commandant Promoted 

, photograph by Mark Dean.) By Specialist Peter Fitzgerald I 

Back Cover: DEPARTMENTS 

"We Clear The Way!" 1 

Engineers - The Proud 2 Clear The Way 32 PERSCOM Notes 


Tradition. This historical 


painting was rendered 3 Lead The Way 34 CTC Notes 


during WWll by famed war 15 Personal Viewpoint 45 Engineer Safety 
 poster arfist Jes W. 


Schlaikjer. 	 21 Personal Viewpoint 47 Engineer Update 

27 Letters To The Editor 
-- ~~ ~~ 

- -- -- - 

-

CPear The wav.' A . . 

By Major General Alzrlens B. Aadlnnd 


Co~~in~anrlnrzt, U.S. Arnq E~~girzeer Scl7ool d i t


am lio~inrcd tu be "back home" at the our "Speak-With-One-Voice" imperative. 


Home of tlic Enfiinccl-s-Fort Leonard Supporting the field is our hiehest priority a? 


LVood. .4nd I tiit~st si~y. the place has never 3 tmioinp base; supponing the wartighter is 


li':ked better: the Manc~~\,cl- Sopport Center is 
 our highest priority as a branch. So lct us hear


~n full >\x!ng \\ill, ~~eill tei~mwut.kamnn,o the fmni ?ou-fill 
 our rucksack with your ideas 


Milir.~Policr.. Chcmi~~l. ;tndEiisitirer Schools. and i,sues. Here ;!re some ways our network 


, I appreciitte the tnrie of r!yicrgy th:it LTG Bob ill stay energized: (I) Semiannual 

Flancr5 inspired during his corii~nand here: we Conimandant's VTC (?(I and 4th quanersjall congratulate him on his protiintion and make sure you're on the net. and contact us if 

selzcrion a\ tile 50th Cliicf of Engineers. M:e you \isere not notified for the .iOJaoi~aly VTC: 

alho congratulate Ron Johnsoti on liis pronii>tioii i?) Ati~itlal Enginrer Senior Leaders 

to BG and tli;ink him for his greill work i-otlninp Conference-ENFORCE 2001 "Eneineers 

the Engineel School and ensuring ii ceaziiles\ Leaditis Tr;ttisforttiatiol1" will be conducted 

tli!nsition between commandaots. The Ensineel- liere from X to I I May; we're lookinp forward 

School n.ill continue th;it vitally ~.lo\e Iiaiwn toseeing you; (3)Seiiiinnnoal Engineer Council 

with the Chief. USACE. and Engineers it1 the of Colonels i 1st and 3d qonnersl-oiiiets the 

field round thr aol-Id in the spirit of"0ne Corps. VTC; the next one is scheduled for R Ma! 

One Reei~nent. One Fight." I see this poct ;tr :I bc;~cs-n01 ir Ih;1t 15 to dn~inpENFORCE: (I)USAES Web site-check uq our and tall in: 

colne in TRADOC and the Army. Fun Leonard \Vood iq an enduring see info on how to do just that in this bulletin (pilgc 471;(3).Anti) 

in.;t:tllation ihat is demonstlatin$ holy branches can ni;tintai~i their Engineer Association (AEAj-LI~ thisgreat orgnni7arinn to smy in 

~iro~x~~~~tcy power and technic;ll veracir! a hile bre;tking da\vn the the loop on goings-on rhroughout the Corps: and (61 EII.?~,IC.E!- 

sto~cpipcaallcand working together tos~tl>port thc mailruver fnrces help us make this bulletin cpeak for and to you: we aelconie your 

of our tmn\formin? Amy. Clearly the po\ver of the teani is Srcntcr itip~l011how to make it better. With all thecr nteiliii. we hope you 

rhnn tlic \om of its p;ats. have ample opportunity to be heard: if not. your a;illr. c;irdr. lcuers. 

a,l e\ciri,ly tobean E,lgineei a ;apl)el-! and e-ni"ls ale nl\=?s appreciated andencourafied. 

cutting edfie of clianfe in our Army andnor Regiment. We Engineers We \\ill keep the network enersized to keep you infor~tieil so 

mo\t be ;lo ititegfi~l p;lrt ofthe T~.an,furmation effort: leatlers do~'~i to 
 lh;ll you ktlo\v our "One-Voice"posi1ions and can promul,oate them. 

battalion lc\.cl niuq have thcii- 1,c;id in this pamr We owe you tlic Retite~nber.chnllengrtI~em
 back tous, and advocate them a.itli !loor 


le:idei-\hip. 3ziinttth. and dyn;irnics of this rifon: we will ensure that hossec. Be stead!. positive \~aniol-s; remain liokedal-ln-in-am, with 


you kii~\i o~tr pri~l.itics atid issues for the Legacy. Intrsim. and us in the professional developrncnt of or11 NCO and officerleaderc. 


Ohlectivr Fal-ver. I encrrurasr all Enp~nrrrlendrrs to share their- ideas Commanders in the field, always take the time and effon tocounsel 


nith the Eii:inecr School on how to best transfoim oor Regiment in and mentor ).nurjunlor leaders so that they understand the vibrancy 


pace with the Army. As we ilonsfnrnl in sycrems.onits. and operational of their branch. appreciate their tremendous career opponunities, 


concepts. we most be i+~illitig tn palt with the old. Remember. theold and maintain coiilidcncc in their leaders. 


stoff never was periecl: we ;tlways u.anted better. nod we survived lw,t,tto,ielcollle~~~~b ~~bi~~~~~t~t

positionof~,,oineel-


by makine compromises ;ttiiI iipplying uiiir-lrvcl innovations alone ~ ~ ~ i conlInan(l sergenIlt ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~~j~~~~dth~~

CSM ~ l ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ 

the u3y. Nnn is thr titile to cntcli 11p-that'? \vhy ue Engineers for ills dislineuis~led ser\,ice, \ve also want to tlIani, CSM ~~b ~il~ 

should regard Transforniarion ;IS an opportunity and an exciting fol.his ereat cer\.ice here as the MANSCEN CSM c,,noraru[ats 


challcn~e.Remember. the po\vcr;~tid~e~ii~~\ lh;i, hin, on his srlecrion ti, the USACE CSM, ~i,,~ll?. thailhs oo
 ufuurb~;llich always 


been its people. not itc cquipmcnr. to LTG Bob Flo\vers on leit\.ing behitid cuch a cupel-b orpanization 


one most etlmpel[in,opriol-ities is loestablish maintain in MANSCEN. buildin: a greiil teitrii ill the En~ineer Schuul. and 


an you-lhe our ~ ~1 see brilliantly leading ~ t .
our Regiment fnr the past 3 years. I know the 


suppon ti, anddialog \vith the ticld asthe fou11r;~ill of <,itrwisdo,~l:the entire Corps joins me lo \visli hi111 \YcII in his telillrc as Chief of 


kc! to our \uccess in doctrine. tritioiog, leader development, Engineers. 


orpnlzation. materiel. atid soldiers (DTLOb'ISI: slid the vehicle for Essajons! 


~~:,~l~~, ~ i ~ 

"...the power and genius of our branch has always been its people ....99 
B! Command Sergeant Major Robert R. Robinson 

U.S. Army Engineer Sclzool i ~- - - -

A s the new Command Ser?e;int Major To accolnplish the abo\,e. I need to visit 

of the Engineer School and the units and soldiers. all over the world. in the 

Rezitnent. 1 send niy sincerest appre- Active and Reser\,e Components. I nerd your cia11i.rto the senior leaders of the Regiment for insightc atid. specifically. trends you see, both 

your\ote of confidencethat led to my selection. good and bad, that nced to bc addressed. I 

It means it lot to me to know that yoit all havz know you all are very pmud of your unit5 

faith in my abilities to perform these iti~poltant and will put a lot of effort in telling me about 

duties. I pledge that I will always do my best to them. I would prefer that you SHOW ME 

champion those issues and concerns you feel yourunits. l ask that you give ina your candid 

are vital to the future success of the Regiment. opinions and time with your soldiers. I need 

I con$ratulate CSM Art Lauphliti on his to see tlieln do u-hat they do day-to-day. I 

stellar career as he heads into life after the Army. don't necessarilg want cannzd hriefr. tours 

I knoa. you join me in saying to liini fronl the through barracks, or soldiers standing by. I do 

Re@itnenr."Thanks for ajob well done." !\'ant to see them in the mou,rpools: in the 

As I assume m),duties as the Engineer School field: up to rhcir knees in mod: and at the 

CSM. I hare become painfully awareofthe many ranges. training areas. and CTCs. 

projects, issues. and initiatives that our Engineer \%ie haw tnade great srridei in team hoildlng 

School is working and has been working for some tin~e.The list is among thc benior leaders of the Regiment. We need to continue 

long. and the persotinel available to work these issues are few!. In the that. and the tray we do that is by communicating with each other 

shon time I have been at Folt Leonard Wood. I can tell you that I have and attending EXFORCE and our other scheduletl conferences. 

gained a new respect for what our school does and the amount of These are importat11to our Rspirnent and arc kcy lo addressing 

\\.ark associated with improving ourhmnch's relevance to the rest of and fixing the issues we',-e faced with as a branch. I know we're 

the Army. It is a daunting task to say the leal. BG lohnson has put busy and resources are tight, hut we need to innkc the time and 

together a quality team. and although few in numbers. the right people convince our commanders to tilake theresotlrces available to attend 

are here and doing their level best to help shape the Re~iment,with these events. 

respect to Transforniation. The last key clcnient in our branch's success is to "Speak With 

I havs thought long about what I consider the imporlat~tissues I One Voice.' We have becn hearing that phrase since LTG Ballard 

need to focus uti during my tcnuse as the Regimental CSM. I have coined it in 1992: but it's very important to our relevance as a port 

formed this list based on my most recent challenges as the CSM of of the Objecti\.e FOI-ce.Spe~tkingwith one voice is the hridgi. 

the 555th Combat Engineer Group: Transfnrmation: pidance from between doing what we do at tlie EngineerSchonl and ivliat we do 

my boss. BG Johnson: and from what I consider tlie lnost important in units around the world. Speaking with one voice enables BG 

elelnenr in our hl-atich and Arm-SOLDIERS. I intend to focus oti Johnson in winning the heans and ~nindsof our senior Army 

the following areas: leadership and. more important. petting the resources we need to 

keep the Regiment relevant. It's what's going to perpetuate our Leader De~,eloprnent existence as a force tnultiplier in the decade to come. And. if you Enpincer NCOES and Drill Sergeant School don't know what you should be saying, call usur get on our home 

Sappcr Leader Course page to find out lhou, you can help us help the Regiment. 

Soldier Development I will close by telling you all that I am honored to be your Engineer OSUT and AIT Regimental Command Sergeant Major. I have done tii;lny things in 

IET process my ZX-year career that have given me great pride z~nda sense of 

Mental toughness in new soldiers fitlfillment. but none more so than serving in this position. I \r,iil 

Soldier retention work diligently with BG Johnson and the orher very impottant 

Training Development people at the Engineer Scliool. I look fo~wanlto the challenges and 

MOS qualification working with you all. 

MOS consolidation Essayons! 

POI revisions 

"...show me your units." 

I 
M'lnes are a very effective means of battle in 

international armed conflicls. The Cun\,ention on 

Prohibitions or Restrictions on tlie Use of Certain 

Conventional Weapons-Protocol 11. signed in 1980111 Geneva. 

Switzerland, bans the use of urtdelectnblc mines, booby [raps, 

and other such devices, as well as the use of mines against the 

ci\'ilian populatioli. 

There a[-e about 700 kinds of [nines in the world. with about 

300of them being antipersonnel mines, hlines are often called 

"weapons of the poor" because tilost of them are simply 

constl-ucted, inexpensive, simple to use. and very dangerous. 

hlines are used on a niassive and uncontrolled scaleninef fields are laid witl~out plans, for~lii, or sketches in local 

armed contlicts. This weapon is always a threat to people, ever1 

after a war has ended 

The Problem 

According to rcpons by the UN and nongovernmental 

organizations, about 35 countries produce mines. At 

present, about I I0 million mines are laid in 64 to 69 

countries, and each month, about 800 people a~.ound the globe 

are killed and 1,200 maimed by thesemines. Sorne 300.000people 

are living with shattered limbs and lives-and their number is 

still gl-owing. Statistically. a new tragedy lakes place evcry 20 

nlinutes. 

In Afghanistan, the most land-mined area of the world, there 

at-c probably 10 million mines. There are about 9 i~iillion mines 

in Angola; 7 million in Cambodia (left over from 25 wars); 6 

million in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Herzegovina, and 

Croatia):?millioninMozambique;and I millioneachinSonialia. 

Kuwait, Nicaragua, and West Sahara. There are also extensive 

minefields in Egypl and Lihya thal we1.e laid during World 

War 11. 

Who laid these minet.ields? Probably eve]-yone in aconflict 

area, For example, EN specialists estimate that in the former 

Yugoslavia, - tlie laying of mines has gone throueh three 

distinctive "bases: 

The first phase involved demolition and laying niinefields 

by the Yugoslav National Ar111y (JNA) and the local civilian 

militia. Even if the regular army made partial records (such as 

maps, sketches, andforms) of the minefields, most of the mines 

laid by the militia were random and poorly recorded. 

In tlie second phase (stabilization operations). inlervention 

by the JNA brought somecontrol over the mine warfare in the 

arcas it controlled. Both sides brought some discipline to the 

mining practices and said that they established control or~ly 

over tlie mines of the former Yugoslavia. Both sides agreed on 

clearing the mines to their real- areas so that only niinefields in 

the front line would be left for protectioli of the units. In the 

same phase, civilians who were fleeing for their lives laid 

antipersonnel and antitank mines and boohy traps in their 

homes. falms. fields, and forests. 

In the third phase (ethnic and regional conflict), conilicting 

sides and civilians lhave continued to lay rninefields randomly, 

with apparently no recoi-ds tilade of their locations. Laid along 

roads and in forests, urban areas. and single houses. the 

minefields close convenient lines of activity. 
In addition to the land-mine threat, unexploded ordnance 

(UXO) is also a problem. Forexample. during the civil unrest in 

Albania in March 1997,38storage buildings<ontaining about 

5.700 tons of weapons. anmiunition,mines. and TNT--exploded. 

(The explosions may have been caused accidentally by people 

who \\'ere ssearching for explosives or using unsafe electric 

liehts.) Although some of the ammunition exploded completely, 

most of it was UXO and was delivered to 15 sitcs or "hot spots" 

that co\:er about 200.000 square meters. The sites are located 

in cornfields. on main roads that link villages, in forests, and 

war civilian houses. Local people. especially children. still 

perish as a result of botli the explosions in those areas and the 

subsequent civilian handlinp of the UXO. So far. there have 

been 42 casualties and 59 wounded in Albania. 

Mines 

There are both antipersonnel and antitank mines in the 

conflict areas. Thesc mines may be laid singly, in groups. and/ 

or as minefields. Sometimes they are laid using an unconventional method (for greater effecti\,eness) and specially 

constructed booby traps. Following are examples of laying 

antipersonnel mines unconventionally: 

Usi11: twofmgmentation mines connectedby one trip wire. 

Using a fragmentation ]nine with six wil-esextending from it. 

Whcn one of the wires is touched. the mine explodes. 

Using a device which, when broken, completes a firing 

circuit. What appears to be agrey plastic box is attached to 

a fragmentation mine and, when the trip wire is cut, it 

cottipletes the circuit and the mins detonates. 

Following are examples of laying antitankmines 

unconventiotially: 

Painting over the training markings on training mines. These 

would then be deployed in agroup. with only one real mine 

in the group. 

A minefield laid in Serb Krania, Croatia 

Turning a mine upside down with an antihandling device 

(AHD) in it. The mine could detonate when it is lifted. 

Piling mines to enhance an explosion. (An antitank mine 

could he combined with 15 to16 kilograms of explosives.) 

Laying an antiklnk mine as an antipersonnel mine. The mine 

is buried in a sand shoulder, and atrip wire linked to the top 

of the fuse is attached to a tree opposite the mine. 

Bwby Traps 

Booby traps are a common means of protecting property. 

They are laid by both troopsandcivilians. (Both sides in armed 

conflicts deny using these devices but always accuse their 

opponent of using them.)Theconstruction of the mines depends 

on the inventiveness of the people who construct them. In 

Unexploded ordnance in Albania 

Fehl-rrav 2001 EIIRIIIPC~ 5 
booby traps. common-user items and military equipment (such (a wal-that lasted only 2 months and wns waged between two 

as weapons and bayonets) are osually uscd. Following are conventional armies), nrine-clearing operations were begun at 

examples of booby traps used in conflict areas: once. However. the o~erationswere so difficult that they we]-e 

A fragmentation mine placed with two tight trip wires on 

both sides of the mine, going in the same direction. One 

end of the wire is attached to a tree trunk and the other end 

to a bent branch. If the wire leading to the trunk is cut, the 

mine explodes. 

A bounding mine attached to stakes at the height of about 

I metel: A wire under the ground attaches to 5 kilogra~ns 

of TNT mith a pull fuse. 

A grenade in a glass, which is attached to a door or window 

handle. When the door or window is opened. the device 

falls out of the glass and detonates. 

A video. record, or stereo booby-trapped. since these are 

attmctive loot items. 

A slais setting on a s~nallhole d~illedin a tabletop. One end 

of a fishing line is glued to the botto~nof ihe glass. and the 

other end is threaded through the hole and connected to an 

initiator (with an explosive or a grenade) below. Moving the 

glass sets off the trap. 

A propane bottle loaded with exploi\.es and filled with 

gar. One such bottle was exploded on a road. causing a 

crater that u,as 2.5 meters deep and 7 meters wide. 

A dropped pen containing explosives. Children often pick 

them up and lose a hand as a result. 

Mine Clearing 

Mines are the main threat to missions (UN and 

NATO). troops, and clearing teams. Mine 

clearance is not only costly and slow but also 

extremely dangerous. Afterthe ujar in the Falklands-Malvincs 

finally abandoned. Think what the situation must be in countries 

where fighting has continued for years and ~nirieshave been 

used indiscriminately and on a massive scale? 

For example; during mine-clearing operations in BosniaHerzegovina, the nrine-field records werechecked. Some were 

of good quality, with the irecorded intervals between mines. the 

distance between rows and marking points. and the direction 

and distance of marking points relatively reliable. However. in 

other records, the amounts and types of mines did not match 

those actually laid in the land. the marking points were not 

given. and they were indistinpuishable from the terrain. 

Since the beginning of the implementation FOI-cc(IFOR)/ 

Stabilization Force (SFOR)mission in Bosnia. there have been 

at least 10 casualties and 70 woundcd as a result ol mine 

explosions. and each month there are a feu, more. If clearing 

operations in this area proceed at the culrent irate. it will be230 

years before the last weapon is removed. 

In Afshanistan. a country infested with mines, the UN 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic 

Aid to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) has launched a inineclearing program. With the 27 mine-clearins teams now 

operating. it will take at least 15 years to clear the priority 

zones! At a rate of 30 square kilolneters per year. it \\.ill take 

more than 4 years to clear mines manually from only 20 

percent of the Afghan territory. Sixlcen UNOCHA staff 

members have already been killed and 20 injured while 

removing inines from only 68 square kilometers of territory. 

111Kuwait, as many as 84 foreign and local experrs were 

killed by nines in less than 10 months. 

And in the former Yugoslavia, many mine incidents ha\;e 

occurred desuite . . - . suecial traininz and urevention

effom. Between April 1992and Decenlber 1995. 

there were 22 casualties and 2 17 wounded in the 

United Nations Protection Force (UKPROFOR) 

as a result of mine explosions. Ofthose incidents,

I I I4 were due to antipcrsonnel mines. 82 due to 

antitank mines, and 19 due to boohv traps. There 

Clearing mines in Serb Krania, Croatia 

. . \\;ere 112 vehicles lost or damaged and 72 

incidents of people stcpping on mines and losing 

a foot. In addition, there were 41 French. 38 

British, 29 Canadian, I8 Ukrainian, 13Danish, 13 

Russian, and 10 Polish casualties. 

Exccuting tasks under the threat of mines 

in ~nissionareas is very difficult. You must 

never abandon your observation post or 

chcckpoint or change your route because you 

will be in great danger. Tlie table on pape 7 

shou,s the various causes of mine incidents. 
iuse of lr 

Walking 

Perforrr 

-

I in unsafe 

ling mine-( 

areas 

:learing op 

. ... 

erations 

tncounterlng mlnes lala in prevlousfy cleared areas 

Traveling in vehicles in unapproved areas 

Travelin 

Encoun 

ig in vehicl 

tering book 

es on road 

)y traps 

I shoulders 

of lncid 

I 

Becoming lost 6.51 

-

Conclusions The mine threat is real, and we must respect this threat. 

The dramatic mine situation in conflict areas indicates Mines kill!! 

that the following problems remain to be solved: 

Id 

Colonel Zarc?yiz.rki, an @cer irt the Polish arrned,forcrs. 

is the head of the Tactics De/~<rrtm<mt of the Engineerir7,y 

After international armed conllicts, all minefields should be ~ ~ i ~ i ~ ~ centel; ~~d~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ilit~,.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ marked (to include fencing) us a part of demobilization, and ~~~~~l~,,~, polnnd. H~ has .yei.vedin the UNEF~~~.~~

in sinni, 

steps should be taken to provide for the safety ofthe local UNPROFOR mission in croatin, and [he ASIDT in 

population. Albnnia. He is c~rrrerltlytraining the Polish engineering units 

As mines often are not equipped with neutralizing or firr UNar~dNATOmis.sions. 

self-destruction mechanisms. conflicting sides need to 

disseminate all ninef field information as soon as possible 

aftera war. 

Mines are being produced that are virtually impossible to 

detect; therefore, the locations and characteristics of all 

minefields slioi~ldbe recorded. 

Clearing minefields is a long, costly, and dangerous task, 

but it needs to be done as soon as possible by those \vho 

have the means. 

In international armed conflicts, rulcs outlined in Protocol 

I1 of the 1980 Unitcd Nations Convention must be obeyed. 

While thecost of laying one nine is only a few dollars, and 

laying a minefield is perhaps several hundred. clearing 

unexploded mines is very expensive. And the cost of treating 

survi\,ing mine victims and preparing them to live in society (if 

this is at a11 possible) is still more. 

Although the following cautions seem obvious, they cannot 

be stated too often: 

Do not drive past mine signs: they are there to alert you to 

danger. 

Do not ignore local advice. 

Listen to the advice of engineers. 

Avoid tracks that have not been used for some time. 

Stay within the known safe areas 

Do not attempt to breach a roadblock. 

References 

(English titles) 

1. "A Perverse Use of Technology Mines," International 

Committee of The Red Cross, 1992. 

2. Post Operafion Report of NATO PfP Support to Albania, 

5 October - 4 December 1998. 

3. Albanian General Staff - Ammunition Branch, Briefing d 

the Albanian Experts, Tirana 6.10.1998. 

4. UNPF Mine incident Report, December 1995. 

5. Landmine, Mine Action News, The United Nations, 

Volume 3.2, Fourth Quarter, 1998. 

6. Barry,John. "It'sNot a Pretty Picture," Newsweek, March 

8, 1999. 

7. Dickey, Christopher. "Seeds of Carnage," Newsweek, 

August 2, 1999. 

(Polish titles) 

1. Zuchowski Ryszard. "0 minach przeciwpiechotnych." 

PWL 4f1998. 

2. Romanowska Krystyna. "Pola nienawisci," Zycie 

4.8.1 999. 
Tlze spectrito,~ sr+~e/hrred ii? rile hot mirb~iomiii,y sur7 oii i11e 

June 2000rluy 11r~i~~st have bre~i (n!or-100O~lugr-eesaiiil rrs huinid 

orr snretrr. We stood hehiid rr fe??re iiinrle n,hite eilgineer 

trtpe, smririg ar rite ili.strrr~t inrgets that shim~nered irz the heat. 

Tile kevlar he1rnc.u ice II.~I-ea(l0eif ro the discoilzfiri. oi~d rhe 

soldim Ji(/,qi?t(~rl, brc~iling ir~ anfii.i/wtion ~v11ilr tile d?moIiiioi~ 

e.xper/s nrrachcd the r-rmore firi in,^ dcricr to conzl?lete the 

prel?ar(rfioi~.As the crrl~ruin gave rhe order ro fir<,, ~11eryoize 

n:orcIied in ulve as a So~,iet TM-62 mine vvu.s dcto~zated iri~cl~v 

the trac.k of n 54-ron co~~zbat-ernginerr ~vhicle(CEV). 

Tile ,flasIi nnii inznzerlre cloud of snloki, cmd (11rsr broughr 

pnsps (~f's~rr[>rise frfrun~ the crowd rrs tlie tmk ~cc~s plr)~,sh.alh;

picked up and moved like u chilrlk toy. Nexr i.n!ne rlie 

iii~rni~tukable"whonrp" of det~ii~nti~~g high e.vplosi~;es. 

,follow~dIIJ n.hining .sou~~ds a .s/~nrds if,shorteredo~innrn.a~r

.fl?in,q rllrn~rgh the iiir Silerice. "Divrr God, " in~rrrereda 

ser-gmnr. "I thirik we lznve been ui~d~~y~Iayin,q 1110 <@err of 

mines here at rile Joii~t Rendiness Tr<rinin,q Coirer (JRTC). " 

And so the aim of the Sirst engineer mine-demolition 

PI-actice at the JRTC was achieved. The intent of the 

senior engineer observerlcontroller (OK) was to 

demonstrate the devilstilting effects of a selected range of 

Soviet and U.S. mines on a variety of vehicles. In addition to 

increasing tlie awareness of the OKs and capturing the display 

on video, wc hopc that the demonstration will encourage 

commanders to develop route-cleat-ance and security plans and 

take tlie [nine threat seriously in all future operations. 

The Targets 

Tlic cngincer team came up with an impressive display 

of working and hulk vehicles for targets for the 

(lemonstration: a working CEV, two Sheridan tanks. 

two MI '13 armored personnel carriers (APCs),a working jeep. 

and a 2.5-ton truck. And the Army and Air Force Exchange 

Scrvice donated a mannequin to help demonstrate the effects 

of an antipersonnel mine. 

The Mines 

We sought assistance from the U.S. Army 

Communications-Electronics Command's Countermine Division. Fort Belvoir. Virginia, to provide the 

lanil mines to be used in the demon-stration. Thc agency sent 

a team with mines, explosives, and the expertise needed to 

make the demonstration a success. The mine included an Italian 

VS-50 antipersonnel !nine: SoviellM-62 antitank mines; U.S. 

MI5 and M 19 blast mines and M21 shaped-charge mines: as 

well as I-. 10-. :~nd IS-pound satchel charges. The tearn also 

brought a comprehensi\,e display u l the types of mines U.S. 

fol-ces could encounter worldwide. 

The Setup 

The engineer te;lm selected sites for each target to 

cnsurc that the audience would gain the best view of 

the practice. Thevchicles were positioned and the mines 

WCIClaid out in prepir:rtion for placement. Tlic teain wanted to 

ensurc that the type of fi17e. the locatioii of tl~e mine. how it 
Sheridan tanks destroyed by a TM-62 (left) and an M21 (right) 

was buried, and even the type of spoil that went on top of the 

mine were commensurate with the type of mine being uscd. 

The team also placed the mines so the JRTC video team could 

pet thc best angles for filming. 

The video team consisted of four professional crews with 

eight video cameras. Four cameras were housed only 100 meters 

away tiom the targets in specially made protective boxes. The 

I-emaining camel-as were placed around the targets, just outside 

the sarety distance. At the end of the day. all (nines were in place. 

the camera plan was perfected, and thc renge was ready to go. 

The Practice 

The busses arrived and the safcty brief uras given. Thc 

spectators inspected the targets and then moved back 

to the viewing area. For the next 2 hours, the mines and 

ch:trges were detonated with a break in between to allow the 

spectators to view the results. Between each scrial, a narrative 

was provided on the history of (nine warfare. 

The blast mines shattered tracts. destroyed suspension 

comp(ments, and hucklcd hulls. The shaped-charge mines 

penetrated the hulls and destroyed engine blocks. One or the 

APCs was picked up and thrown onto its side, and the other 

flipped onto its top. The whecled vehicles were toti~lly 

destroyed. 

The Conclusions 

The aim of the mine-awareness dernonstr;ttion was 

met-with some additional benefits. The video will be 

made available to all n~lations that come through the 

JRlC and to thc branch schools. Altl~ough the videos cannot 

show the psychological and physical effccts of mines on 

humans, they should help soldiers understand the devastating 

effects of mines on equipment. The engineer team at the 

JRTC hopes that this demonstration and video will prove 

the need for mine-awareness training at the ~111it level. 

Y 

M(rjor Lnnpl-ehr is the del~ut,;s[,~rk?~-rrzginee~.oh.server/ 

rontrf)llerof the Joirlf Rmi1itte.s.s fi-aining Ccnte~: Fort 

Polk. Louisiaizcr. Hrioinerl the Ao.stralian Ann? h 1986 

ond gradr~ared to the Rm:ol A~r.struiliatl E17,qinernr it1 July 

1987. MAJ Lnngrelir ho.s had corn~nand as (I lier~rrr~ant 

and cal~tnin ond conimand(~d thclsr FieM Sqrta(lron as o 

mq;ol: He i.r a gm~lu~~tu of the Ausfrolian Srr~ff Colle~e. 

Units can request the video through MAJ Lang1.eI11- at 

Dorrglas.Longrehr@poIk-f<i?~h.(i~-rny.mil. 


A jeep destroyed by a TM-62 

F~~bruary 2001 Engineer 9
Ambush at Serzhen Yurt: 


Command-Detonated Mines in the 


Second Chechen War 


Onr task is to find the bandits and destroy them. A special operation is now going on in the Vedeno 

and Shatoi gorges to destroy bandits. 

Colortel-General Genrzudy Troshev 

Commander of federal troops in the North Caucasus 

22 April 2000 

Tlzilp Spconii Chechpn Wnr be,yirn in Seprernber 1999, >~,ilen AFebruary formal announcelnent that federal troops 

Rlr.~.siiir~firces rros,sed inlo Clzeclrn~n iliierir on cr~rslring had crushed the backbone of Chechen resistance 

severoi irr,ne(/ groirps that Ifad urienipred to criwre crri isianiic and were giving up large-scale operations \<,as cast 

~r~~rising into serious doubt by three well-planned and costly Chechen irr Dngesrrrri. Tire R~lssinns quick/? prrslled Clrechen 

zrriiri from rhi> p1oin.s a~ld luid .sir,qe ro the ciipirnl. GI-ozny. attacks that month. OMON (special-purpose police 

Affer rile cicfell in Febr-uarj 2000, rhe reir~niniiz,y Chrchen detachments).' Spetsnaz, and airborne units were all hit hard, 

iuiirs e$lr,-cited iiiro rhe colorirj's .so~~r/~er.n with command, control. and coordination problems later irzoi~rirui~i~. 

Frorn their liideoufs, the Ciiecheirs resorred ro ninbush cited as the reason for heavy federal casualties. Yet 

rncrics the? Iznrlperfecredriuring rhe Firsr Cliecherz lVar (1994 complacency remained in the federal command. Despite latero 1996). Using the he.sr inielligi~nce a~~iriiahle, cr ierrain- March Russian estimates that 4,000 Chechen fighters were 

fai:ur(ibIe arrbush site wus picked oiid cuirrmn~i(i-derorinfed still operating in the southern Chechen mountains and that 

rrriries were laid. Wlzen rhe Russian ~rrrir e~riered the kill zone, 1,000 more had escaped to the plains to blcnd in with the 

rhe rrsrrlr ii,o,s ~~rr~dicriible-the Clrechens desrr-o?eri vrhic1e.s local population. Federal Interior Ministry unit commanders 

arzn' killed Rrr.ssirin rrool~s, rlzeri .slipped iii!:ay iilnzost continued to be careless and failed to coordinate operations 

irn.scnrhed. witli the army. 
On2 Mxh. a9S-man. Moscow-area OMON unit. traveling in ambush. According to the Russian dclcnse minister. at 1730 

nine Lral soft-topped trucks. was ambuslicd in (;rozny. Tlrc Moscow time on 23 April. a co~ivoy carrying am~nunition end 

Chcchens h;~l chosen o sitc at the entsance to the rubble-strewti other supplies to the airborne unit was :tnihushed 3 kilometers 

Staroproniyslovsky district where the road rises. Thcre wcrc 110 south of Ser7hcn Yun. This arm is irbout 25 kilometersllh miles 

BRDM scout vehicles or BTR annored prsonnelca~~iensco~li~ig southeast oTGrozny, in the Vedeno Gorge, and close enough 

the OMON. and thc unly armor protection the officers had were 

flak vests lia~iging on the sides of tlie \:eliicles. Repons g;~vc 

varying cesu;~lty fig~~res of 20 to37 killedand 12to 17 wounded. 

hllist of tlic trucks wcrc destroyed or dam;~ged. 

On tlie evening of5 April. ;I Nizhnevanovskiy OMON unit 

bringing replacements Tram the Khankal;~ air bitse was hit on 

the road to Kurchaloy. A co~iiniond-deto~iatedminewas blouv 

under tlie lend \,ehiclc, a RTR,' and only n large-caliber 

antiaircr;ill maclii~~c stin moonted on one of the UAZ jeeps 

kept the con\.oy fro111 being overrun. The Russians admitted to 

one killed and eight n,nonded. 

The Ambush 

to tlie mouth of this terrain feature to be co~isidered ;I "covering 

po5ition." 

The Chechen Version 

The "Jihad in Chechnya" Weh sitc reponcd thnc licld 

co~i~ni;inderAbul Waleed Al-Kindi's unit was on ;I 

reco~inaissance mission when it detected the rnovi~~g 

23, chicle Russian ;~r~nurcdolumn on the road from SerzIie~i 

Yurt to Vcdcno. Ahol Waleed's unit was joilied by field 

commander Abu Ja'fal- AlLYenieni's unit '(which had hcc~~ 

stationed nc;~r the Serzhcn Yt~rt-Vedeni~ road for more thiui 1 

days). and both hastened to set up an ambush, ilccording 111 

one sourcc. there wcre 75 ~nujahidec~i of the lsla~nic 

The military launched "a planned mop-up' ~~T~i~ouritain Pcsekeeping Arniy and Spets~raz units of the Central Front 

nrcas" in inrid-April, but sources in tlie Russian (5 Arabs. l l Pagestanis. 4 Ingushs. 5 K:trachay;ins, and 50 

headqua~tsrs claimed that the fcderal command h:~d 

solliewhat bigger plans and cslirnntcd tIi;~tabout 3.000 troops 

wcrc invol\,cd in the area. All airdrop was made south of Sliaroi 

on 18 April. and Russian paratrooper< went on \carell-anddestroy niisrinns to eliminate s~iiall Chcchen groups (and their 

b,'ISCS) . . that had not been forewarned. 

Probahly clue niorc to necessity than tl~e opcmtio~taluxury 

of ;I carclully chosen target. the Chechens tnreered a rear 

(services) column oftlie 51st Palachute Regimelit. 106th (Tula) 

Chcchens). 

The Chechens triggered the ambush and, in less than an 

hour. claimed that they had "111rncd all 21 vcliiclcs into musses 

of burning hulls n~~d twisled ~iittal." Thc 1:rerich \\ire service 

AF'P quoted a Chechen spukesmair who said tli:~t a 4-hnllr 

battle eruplcd aftel- ;I Russi;~~~ colu~n~i of 23 "tanks" was 

ambushed or I500 hour\ in Serrhen Yurt. AFP originally 

reported th:it I8 tanks \\:el-e k~~ockedout and XORus\ians killed. 

whilc 5 t;tnks cscaped. Rel~te~..~ qtl~tedthe sp~kcstiti~~i as saying 

Airhorne Di\:ision. Ik>rtheir cl;~ssic co~nn~iind-dct~iiated-~iii~ie that "the arrnoredcolurnn was totally destroyed." \\ irh I3 tanks 

Typical OMON transport (note fuel drum) 

F~hrirnrr2001 1Y11,yirircr11 
MT-LBs replace BTRs as convoy escorts in the mountains. Unpaved roads were easy to mine. 

and t~oop camel.; knocked out. However. there were co~itlicting 

figures on the Chechen side. The next day, Chechen fighters in 

lngushetia told The A\.YOC~[IIPI/ Pres.~that 9 of 23 vehiclcs in 

the column were damaged after 40 minutes of fighting. 

Initiall). Qoqu; repolled that 10 armored fiylmting vehicles 

were destl-oyed in the attack but that rhere was uo speciiic 

count of enemy casualties (althouyh they felt !hat there were 

very heavy losces amongst the Russian ranks). A later report 

from the yame news Web site listed I0 trucks. 4 BMP infantry 

fighting \chicles. a Shilka (a self-propelled antiaircraft gun) 

vehicle. and several othel-Russian rnilitny vehiclcs destroyed, 

along with 56 Russian soldiers killed. The Chechen spokesman 

claimed that no prisoners wels taken and that there were !no 

losses on the Checlien side. 

The RussianVersion 

AF fal- as the Russian army was concerned. all 

necessary and possible protective measures had 

been instituted. The convoy left Khanki~la at 1400 

hours. and the 106th Airborne deputy divisio~t commander told 

the press that "ahead of the airborne troops' rear convoy, two 

combat convoys had taken the samc road. Evidently the 

gunmen deliberately let them pass. waiting for the vel~icles 

carrying stocks of fuel and ;~mmunition. They thought they 

would be easy prey." 

Russian VTV quoted the commn~~der of the joint group of 

forces as saying that the 22 vehicles had a two-vehicle combat 

reconnnissance patrol-21 RMD air-droppable combat vehicle 

and a BTR with a sapper unit on boiird-at the head of the 

convoy. The con\.oy's niiiin body was led by another BMD. as 

part of its fi\.e-vehicle protection force. The Russia11 Militaiy 

Neu~s Agency iAVN) listed four BMDs and a Slmilka (not a 

ZSE-23-4.but a2.3-~nillimeter ZU-23-2 on a Kanmov t~ucki at the 

rear of the convoy. 

Tliere were "more than a pair" of combat helicopters 

escorting the convoy. which was also \\:itbin mnge of and 

directly cuppolred by artillery. As a rule. helicopters operate as 

pan of an aviation tactical group (2 to 4 Mi-24 gonslmips and I 

to 2 Mi-8 transports. each with 20 Spersnaz troopers aboard). 

usually attached to a regiment. The route had been 

reconnoitered in advance. and the con\,oy was able to maintain 

radio communications. 

The ~nujahideen had hidden on the back slopes of two 

do~iminant heights so that they ren~ained unnoticed "until the 

beginniny of their assault" despite the helicopter escorts 

hovering above (probably because of the Ion$ shadou.~. as it 

was late in the day). Ilirerji~~-noted that the Chechens attacked 

thecolumn with 1.5 radio-contmlled mines'and sniperfire. along 

with a volley from grenade launchers and firearnms. The 

n~ujahideensaid that they got as closc as 15 to 20 meters to the 

Russian tanks and BMPs. A fueler and five ammunition-laden 

trucks were destroyed. 

Both sides stated that the attackers were driven back when 

federal helicopters rocketed the area. Only the second pair of 

hclicopters manayed to detect the Chechen firing points and 

operied fire at 1740 hours. Since the Chechens apparently were 

within 60 meters of the column, supporting artillery initially 

couldn't react for fear of hitting the paratrooper% The Russian 
"While there are many ways to create cornmand-detonated 


mines, how they are employed determines their repercussions." 


poblication Is~~~siin repo~tccltIi;~tthe lielicoptcr\' ;~ir strike on 

the outskirts of Scr7hen Yurt was inllicte(l after I KO0 hoursafter tllc hattle was already over. 

Additional Russian troop\ (including airborne 

~.cconn;~issanceccrmpaniesl surrounded thc ;t~i~busli arcii at 

IS05 and fizhting l;~>ted until I Y?G\vhen the ;~ttacl;er\ scattered 

(according to tlie Russians. toward^ the \.illage of Mar/(liMokhk). IJdugov added that a Russi;~~~ counter;~tlack lia(l lcrt 

tlie villnpe bumed-out~ien though Cheche~i fighters liad 

left tlie area-~vliile Qoip: ~iirtedthat the two iiiui;iIiideen units 

retun~cd to their bases 1nilc11 with i~ sif~iifici~~it clua~ilit),OF 

caplured ;inils. 

The Aftermath 

Russia's top sp(~kesrrran or1 Chechnya. Sergci 

Ynstrzhrmbskiy. liiid :I slightly iliffere~it \:ersion of tlie 

hattle-d;~inage assessmcllt than his Chccl~cn 

cgii~nlcrl,art. He s:~id (hat between 50 and 60 Checl~cnsattackecl 

the cijnvoy near the vill;l:c and initii~lly lrporteil eight rehclc 

killecl ;~rtd two taken priso~~cr. He later said that 20 \rere killed 

and 14 captured. (The Russian Airbnn~e Troops headquarters 

said tli;tt 20 Checlicns ujerc killed and 2 taken prisoner.) 

Gc~~cr:~l Troshc\, estinr;~tcd that 80to 100"bn~tdits"attacked 

from hot11 sides, along the entire length of tlie convoy. I\ 

spokectnnn at the unified federal heatlquarters in the Uortli 

wountlcd and n truck and a fueler wel-e darnaged. The Russian 

defe~tse n~inister laiscd this to 15 go\:erllment soldiers hilled 

and 6 \chicles di~maged. including the foeler. 

01124 April. Yestrzhernhskiy ;~dmitted to 15 Chechens 

killetl and 6 wo~~tided. AVN's final tally was 1.3 killed. hut 

this cli~nhcd to 17 by 26 April. However, the news Web site 

,gniefo.rii reported that up to 25 h;~d heen killed. General 

Troshev told the press tIi;~t the bndies of 4 fighters we1.e 

found and I I prisoners takc~in the area (but he could not 

say whether all of the~n were bandits, although his most 

current informatiri~i indic;ited that). 

The mnst significant Russian reaction came frorn tlre 

coi~~i~~ancler of the group ofScde~.al troops, who co~icluded that

in order to prevent such i~icidents, thc rnovelnent of rear 

con\joys ttirougll (:ltechoya's territory should hc substantially 

reduced. lie iilso stated that in most cases, transport 

helicopters should he used to deliver niateri;~l resources and 

ammunition to suhunits sti~tioned in niounc;~in and foothill 

regions of the rep~~hlic. 

Cauc;rsus xd~nincd rh;~t five federal troops were killed and r~i~~e the \;\me nlutes at prcdict;~hle time\. They pilid for this nii\take 

Thoughts for the Future 

The Checheri units used classic guerrilla lactics lo their 

best effect. ReIyir~f on por~dintelligctii.~ (including 

radio intercepts). they cupported tl~i'ir cotii~tinnddetonated riiines with direct-fire antitank and aut~imatic 

\vc:~lx~ris. Whcre posiihle. there was al~o innrtar support. 

'The iilajo~ity of criii~~iiand-ilcrotiatcci111ines lin\.e herti 

labclcd "r;rtli[~-controllcii" in thc Russian prcss; but tlicrc have 

beeti iru, technical dct;~ils. During the Fir\t Chschc~i War. 

critxiinals ill St. Pete~.sbur:r were ancsted foriir;~n~~facu~li~~g \uch 

clcvices from remote cc~ritrols of automobile al;~rms and 

cxl~losii,es scavenged li~oln World War I1 (ierman ordni~nce 

fnuttd uutsidt. the city The Ros>i;~n\ have ~ntzntioned tl~athe 

rt;~~~dard mine used for antitank attacks \\,a\ the TM57. \\;hilt 

nnliprrsonncl 111i11es were usually 1 52-millit~lcter. hi~b-explosive 

sltell\ \\it11 "\e\zrsl" cl;~h\ nfplajtic explcisi\.es packed i~rountl 

tli~lll. 

While thcrc are nt;tny ways tv el-eate conimand-dclo11;1te<i 

~nincx.ko~t.111cy are cn~ployed dclcrmincs thcir repcrcu\sion~. 

A n~cksach lid1 of explos~ves and ;I sirnple detonator. cotiibined 

with skillful cxploitationof;~nene~l~y.s wc;rkncsse\.c;ln hccomc 

a t;~ctical \vcal,on th;~t ;ichieves stc~tegic results. Thc Old 

Tc<t;~ntcntstor). of youn~, Davi~l's pcbblc shot taking out thc 

gii~ntGoliath :tpplies lierc. This wah pal-ticulorly true during the 

First Checl~cn War, wl~en sevcr:~l senior-r;~nkiiig Russiati 

nfficers illsisted on keeping set patterns and tl-avelinf ;lion: 

witli their li~es. 

Vie Checlleils cho,c their ;i~nhush sites c;rrefully. ~n;rkin: 

rnahirnum use oftlomin:rnt terrain. which placed tliem so close 

to the targctcd unit that Russiati Ihelicopter eur~sliipc were 

frostratcd. Tlic Chcclien, also foui~d the "sc;r~rr" in the Russian 

plinlanx -the cnordin;~ti<>n, oo~itrol. and cnnl~n;lnd nightmare 

that exists bctwccn the Russian ;~r~ny and tl~c Interior Millistry. 

The Kelevarice for Combat Engineers 

A merici~n o~iits' rnnsl tcccnt experience with 

colnm;~nd-dct<,n;lted mi~~cx \\)as in Sunralia. Pure luck 

has hccn the only thing prc!,entins fi~rther incidmts 

in Bibnia or Kosovo :III~. cha~~ce:. are, Anterican firrccs will 

face this type ofweapnn ant1 att;rck in thc iutole. 

Whilc actinp indel~c~t~lcntly. A~ncricattrnrces have standard 

operoting procedures to de;~l witli such ;~mbl~sl?cs. The danger 

lies in coalition-typc peacekeeping f~~rcc\. ~vl~cre ;my

opposition will seek to lind i111d ;~ttack the wcakest link ill tlie 
force. These weak spots could range from language barriers 

and differences in levels or types of training to the degree of 

equipment modernization. It could be especially dangerous 

wlren nriliiary units have to work with police forces. 

If American forces-specifically combat-engineer 

squads-are cross-attached to new allies, they need to 

review individual skills such as call lor fire, map reading, 

and encoditig grid coordinates (imagine if the allied force 

doesn't have the Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio 

System JSINCGARS]). However. the best way to counter 

command-detonated-mine ambushes is through superior 

coti~mand-and-control coordinalion. This means that 

combat-engineer leaders need to know their hosts' plan and 

proactively ensure that everyone associated with the 

attached engineer group knows their plan. In short, make 

sure that the left hands know what the right hands are doing. 

Y 


CoptirUi Geihel ir tlir. S2 fur 5/11 7Cr11,olri. Sqiaidion. 42dIr!funtg. 

Diri,$io,z,/\'eii J~.~~~.?A~~,~iy~V~itiorin/ Grin>-(1. A,firi,,ci 19E cretvnin,l, 

scoirt, iiitrl rii,ik~ploroon lciiile,; CPT Gcibci hiis ivrirren 01)topicr 

UOOL,~rlze Fi':~t Che~hepi Wur for Airnor aiid 1,ifniitr-y Mogorir,es. ou 

11.c1los Arne(/ Forces .lo~riiio/ li~reriinrionnl, Army Ai:intioii. iind 

Militni? Rei,icic. Hu ii ii n>,-,*s,ioridiiirf0,-rlic .lorrr,inl ofhliiita,? 

0,diinncu a,idIin.r i\,ritrpn on co,,~,,~oiid~dcio,~~iir~/min~.s in the First 

Chrclien Il'iil- fix rhe RTR J~,io-iiii/"Eirik"oiid riie Afiiiiirt Aniicd 

Fonvs Journoi. He i. c~l~.~.e,it/y\:orki~z~ OIZ(Ibook uboiti the rot.tica1 

L(.T(. ~f~o~~ii~i~ind-il~~r~~~~~~rc~i ,f~iii~,r in rlie Firsr ntzii Secoi~rl Chrch~ti 

l,Ni,.i. 

Allphotos from Venik's "War in Chechnya" Web site. 

Endnotes: 

The OMON, or "Omonovtsy," have been described as a 

secretive paramilitary force with a reputation for brutality. Part 

cop. part commando. a bit like a BATF raid team with sotne 

training like U.S. Army Rangers, there simply is no real 

equivalent to the OMON in the U.S. militaiy or law-enfot-cement 

comnutiities. 

?A BTR is frequently called a'.bicycleS by the troops. since 

they consider it to be equivalently armored and could only be 

called "serious protection" by a person who has never seen 

one. 

'When mobilized for combat zones, the OMON are tasked 

with some of the war's dirtiest u'ork-mopping up (known as 

"z'achistki") Chechen villages and urban areas of stay-behind 

mu,;ahideen, which tneans flllshirig thetri out of hiding places 

andlor separating them from the civiliall population. 

-'TheRussian military spellings are Abu-Valid (oneof Shamil 

Basayev's lieutenants) and Abu-Dzhaia (adding that both were 

Arabs, with the fighters being "Arab and Pakistani 

n~erceniu.ies"). 

' "Fougasses" was the specific terln used by ~Ve:ni.isirna?o 

G~zetii:,Ilya Maksakov. 

References 

1."Georgiyev: Growing Value of Amy Aviation, Paticularly 

the Use of Strike Helicopters in Chechnya," Nezavisirnoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 4,4-10 February 2000. 

2. "Feds Airdrop 3,000 Men South of Chechnya's Shatoi," 

AVN, 18 April 2200. 

3. "Federal Troops Continue to Fulfill Duties inchechnya," 

ITAR-TASS, 23 April 2000. 

4. "XORussians Killedin Chechnya Ambush: Rebels," AFP, 

23 April 2000. 

5. "Chechen Rebels Kill Russian Troops," Yuri Bagrov, AE 

24 Apd 2000. 

6. "Rebels Attack Motorcade in Southern Chechnya, Five 

Feds KIA,"AW, 24 April 2000. 

7. "Moscow Concedes Fresh Chechen Ambush in Southern 

Mountains. AFP, 24 March 2000. 

X. "Russians Sustain Heavy Losses in New Ambush," 

Qoqaz,24 April 2000. 

9. "15 Troops Dead in 23 Apr Chechen Convoy Attack." 

Inter&, 24 April 2000. 

10. "15 Paratroopers, 20 Rebels Killed in Chechnya," RIA, 

24 Apd 2000. 

11."Yastrzhenibskiy: 20 Chechen Rebels Killed in Convoy 

Attack," Interfax, 24 April 2000. 

12. "Thirteen Russians Killed in Chechen Rebel Attack 

Sunday,"Troshev, Interfax, 24 April 2000. 

13. "Rebels Attack Motorcade in Southern Chechnya," 

AVN, 24 Ap11122000. 

14. "Maskhadov's Ceasefire Was Short, Andrey Matyash," 

gazeta.ru, 24 April 2000. 

15."Russian Reinforcements Receive Their FirstBattering," 

Qoqaz, 24 April 2000. 

16. "Shamil Basayev on the Operation in SerzhenYurt," 

Kavkaz Center, 25 April 2000. 

17."Ternin Irregularity,"Zzvestiva,25 April 2000. 

18. 'T'aratroopers Have Died Again; Maskhadov Retracts 

His Statements," ilya Maksakov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 

Russian, 25 April 2000. 

19. "Shooting of Column-4 Helps Nothing in Chechnya," 

Olga Ruban, Moskovskiy Komsontolets, 25 April 2000, p. 1. 

20. "Details of Rebel Attack on Federal Convoy Made 

Public," Andrey Mqchev, Pave1 Koryashkin, ITAR-TASS, 25 

Apti12000. 

21. "Russian Troops' Latest Victory Secured Almost 

Without Losses," kina Paramonova in Tula and Aleksandr 

Igorev, Kommrrsant, 26 April 2000. 
Pei:~orzalViewpoint 

BEWARE 

MINES DON'T CARE 

Mine-Clearing/beminin~Qpsrations: 


levelo~inlEngineer Exglorts 


I 

By C(i/~iiibr Drrrwr~ LijMnsrrr 

believe that we need to develop engineer experts in tlie 

U.S. Army who posscss both tlic knowledge and the 

capability to perfol.m !nine-clearing operations. During the 

p;ist four years. our engineer soldiers hare operc~ted in areas 

contaminated with minefields and unexploded ordnance 

(UX0)-in Bosnia-He~zegovinaand Inore recently in Kosovo. 

Theirgreatest challengeis that they typically lack bothclearing/ 

demining training and denlining equipment. Ibelieve that %'e 

failed to utilize opportur~ilics in Bosnia to train: e\,illuatc: and 

establish tactics. techniques; and procedul-es (TTP) fhr new 

demini~~gequipment. Additionally, U.S. engineers arc ignorant 

of basic for-eign riiiiies and UXO render-safe procednres. 

With these limitations, it is essential that a staff engineer becomes knowledgeable about basic humanitarian demining 

fundarnentnls. 

This :~rticle outlines the fundamental procedures of 

humanitarian demining opcmtions as described in lessons fro111 

the French Army Engineer School. where 1 attended tlie 

Humanitarian Uemining Course in Angers. Frt~nce. The article 

also includes inionnation from missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

and outlines sonic of the basic responsibililics of a properly 

structured demining oper;~tion. 

Clearing vs. Demining 

FM 20-32. Mirie/C(~rrr~t~rrr~irr(! 0l1rrzitioir.s. Cliaptcr 9. 

differentiates between the ternis "cle:~rin$" and 

"demining" by describing clearing as operations for a 

military purpose and demining as operatio~is typically for a 

civilian population (Iiumanit:lri;~n purpose) after hostilities 

cease. In FM 20-32.the terms are defined as [ollou,s: 

Clearing irtvo/i,e.s the torai (,/irniirritiorr or n(,~riin/i.-utioii 


f!finirrr.r fim arr nrro. 11b riot rrsir(r//~ (.i~nducrrd irrdrr 


~~~r?ltry/~~~~, /~rrtilc:<1!1 6(, c~orr~ir,cl(,(/ /I\i~i7,yi17(~~r.v
 (/ifrin,y 


i~.r~r
 or (!ftcr hosri1irie.s rr.r /~cirt r!f rrarioii ~i.s,si.strrirc~. 

Dernirring is the r.or~~lJ(,tc, rr~rrol:nl ofnil ririii~~ ti~iilL'XO 


to scr.fe,~~ror-rIfire iili IIII~/I~~JII a.ii/iiri (I 


gro!x~/iric(rl boai~i/iir~ nfi~r/io.sliliti~~ LC~ITC.11i.5
 (111 


~~lr-rr!tr/s irurn!?m.(~r.- cr110 ti,rrc-i~rt(,r?.si~~r ~~/wrirtioir
 LIIO 

is nor-tn(r/h. (.oirrr(r(.~eil. Althnirgh riot u .fi)urw/ Ar-rin. 

ini.s,si,~~~ (11-fiir~crioii, rirg;rrc,c,r.~ ii1111 S/~(*c.i(rl O/~~~rirri(~rf.s 

Fr~rcr.s r~ru? /I~OI:~~P .s/?<,~~;rr/ (~.tr/~<~rfi,\(, irl trfrinirr,q 


doviiihi,y oi~,qarri:ori(iii.s, o(.tiifg (is n~/~'io~r.s,
 nird rokirf,y 


rhe /(,ad iiiprovidirz!: c/i.ri~-in,?i,i~~ri!)rrimt or- t(,(.hniclue.s 


t/irrt L<II he IIS~$I/ iri ile~ilini~r~ o/~i'nifiorrs.


Whclhcr cle;~ring/de~nininp operations 

iii\.olve the milital-y or nongovenrmentd 

organizations. the o\rc~xll objective is the 

samc- to relnoveconta~liinationand provide 

;Isafe area. And whether monitoring minclilting actiuiliz. conducting mine-clearing or 

hurnanilarian dcmininf operations. or 

identif)ring a picce of a cluster-bornb unit. tlie 

critical factor is to detcl-~ni~ie if:m area is safe.

When wldiers are questioned ;lhoul tlic 

safeness of an arcs. their ;lns\iers will vary 

significantly based on their knowledge oftl~c 

basic 131-indples and organization of demining 

opel.ations-trailling, informatioll collection 

and survcys, plnnning, the mission. and ~n,incawareness training programs. 

This photo ofa destroyed building 

depicts a typical sight from operations in 
. . 

as. To develop such 

should include inSafe operational procedures (a 

fundamental knowledge of clearirie 

lining equipment usage 

and techniques (TTP). 

m Facilitation of a unit UXOImineawal-eness training program. 

Families and characterisrics of 

mines, submunitions. and 

Iris important to understand how mines 

standing of humanitarian dernining 

operations, such as those conducted in 

. ,, .. . Regardless of the mission TTP produced 

fundamental knowledge of deminirrg A minefield-contamination map from the U.N. Mine Action 

Center shows the extent of the contamination. operations. such as the French humanitarian demining training. 

is needed now at the unit level in order to niodilv TTP to siteMine Experts specific mission factors and requirements, Tlir ,9001 is riot to 

rrcriit rler~ri~rer.~ brr ropi-ovide n bn.sic k~~vivlrtlgrso thnr ~,11ei1 

are the U.S. Arm? mine experts? Ihe knowledge is r~~ii~e-clenrhr,q oper(~tiorr.sor<,c.orrdrrcfcdor ob,srn.ecldue to n 

spread throughout various Army special~ies: rtrilirorr r~ecc.s.sir\;rllr riri.s,sior~.sore condr~crprlsofel~. 

Explosi~e-ordnance-disposal(EOD)personnel. the technical 

experts in identification, render-safe procedures. and 

destruction or neutr-ali7.ationof ammunition. land mines, 

suhmonitions. and pyrotechnics. 

Special Operations Forces, who are currently i~istructing 

humanitarian demi~iingefforts in nurnerous countries and 

possess a lalrguage proficiency. mpport. and cadre training 

ability to do so. 

Engineers, who have the basic knowledge of mine detection, 

demolitions, minefield reduction or breaching, and technical 

arid tactical em~lovmentof U.S. mines. 

Demining Training 

Numerous humanitarian demining training plogranrs 

exist today. ranging from various nongovernmsntalorganization programs to the United Nations Humanitdrian Demining Training P~ogram.The prosrams are very 

similar with respect to the type of training: ho\ve\-er. each 

program is adapted to fir the local area. thc personnel trained, 

and the type of contamination. 

The underlying gml in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to develop 

a national-level demining training program to protide demincrs ' 2 ~~ -

for the local areas. The core functions of a demining pro,"ram 

Most foreign armies, to include the French army. have a 

are individual and leader training, preoperations procedures. combined en:ineer/EOD specialty. The U.S. Army lacks this marking, and tlaining, A professionaltraining type of experrise. Because the EOD and Special Operations staff is necessary. in addition to a suitable place to conduct Forces communities are relatively small and have a distinctly training that sirnulares the operational area. Additionally. self- different mission, engineers have been forced into assuming discipline is an essential factor to consider during training the lead role in UXOIclearing operations. because of the seriousness of failiny to coriduct ciearin tasks -

In tny opinion. nongovenimental organizations are often properly. 

best suited to demining operations because of their experience, 

training. and struculre. However. I believe that we also need Individumadernaining 

engineers who are expens inclcaring operations and identifying The training conducted depends on the initial knowledge level 

UXOImiaes. We need engineer staff NCOs or officers who of the personnel being trained. The French zlpproach to irldividual 

can ad\;ise corn~~ia~iders during missions in and around demining training is divided into the following bait tasks: 
Mine and booby-trap procedures 

Plodder, tl-ip-wire,and mine-dctector procedures 

Marking PI-ocedures 

Actions on encountering a mine. 

Demolitions training 

Job rcsponsihilities. 

Prcoperations training cstahlishes a basic knowledge of how 

to conduct a specific clearing mission: 

Setting up a clearance worksite 

Site operational procedul-es 

Reporting procedures. 

Equipment checks (detector and personal-protection 

equipment). 

m Actions in case of injury and medical-evacuatiuli 

ploced~lms 

Personnel who demonstrate proficiency and leadcrship 

skills during the training process become leaders for the 

dclninirig teams. In addition to individual training, selected 

leaders learn leadership skills, site- reconnaissance procedol-es. 

and route- :~ndarea-clearatice methods. Typically. leaders 

manaee the ope!-ationsof three 2-man teams. The employlnent 

nf these teams depcllds an the tel-rain.types of mines. detection 

methods, contamination information, and knowledge of each 

of the deminers. Deniining leaders manage the daily demining 

operations and must know the psychological limits and mental 

condition of the deminers. 

Training in Bosnia 

In 1997. as a part of the Stabili7ation Force initiative in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 16th Engineer Battalion's Task Force 

Catamount set up a program to train local Bosnian military 

derniners on humanitarian demining techniques. Based on the 

United NaLions Humanitarian Denlining Training Program and 

sorne aspects of othcr programs, the initiative focused on the 

local niincs and incolporated the knowledge level of delniners 

participating in the training. The program, which established 

Iiomanitarian detnining standards for tlie Entity Armed Forces 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulted in the following lessons 

learned: 

Knowledge;lble instmctul-s and quality interpreters were 

essential. Intelpreters had to tmnslate military letminology 

and technically specific words for proper colnrnunication 

to occur-in eithel-direction. Complicating translation even 

further was the fact that there were multinational instructors. 

which sometimes ~nadetwo translations necessary. 

The location of the training played a significant role. An 

outdoor training area that simulated the local contaminated 

arcas and minelield characteristics and a proper classroom 

environmclit were required for a successful training 

program. 

Although the trainees wcre technical experts at mine 

employment, destnlction, and render-safc procedures, even 

the most knowledgcnble deniiner leanled procedoral aspccts 

of humanitarian demining. The most notable improvement was 

the establishment of safety procedures in accomplishing 

demining tasks ranging froni basic demolitions and proper use 

of equipment to the safe conduct of operations in the minefield 

itseli. 

One afthe biggest challenges was that instructors from the 

U.S. engineer units had little to no hands-on experience on 

some of the teclinical aspects of deniining. I-Iowever,the group 

discussions and lessons shared among the experienced 

derniners from various geog~.aphicalareas within BosniaHerzegovina helped lilake up for any instructor shortcon~ings. 

Some of the challenges demiliers faced in BosniaHerzegovina included the fact that the deminer had fought 

near or on the ground he was dcmining and had possibly lost 

Family or friends; rarnily issues, with the foremost concern being 

how his fi~rnilywould be supported if he was injured or killed; 

and recerit mine strikes that hxd killed or injured otherdetniners. 

Minefield Surveys 

I

lntelligencc and reconnilisst~nceare the first steps of the 

minc-clearing proces,. The United Nations Mine Action 

Centcr formalizes tl~isin a series of three standardized 

reports: the MineIUXO Incident Report, Level One Survey 

(General Suney); Level Two Survey (Technical Survcy); and 

Level Three Survey (Clcnled-AreaConipledan Survey). 

Level One Surveys provide information on the general 

location of contamination to help establish low- and high-risk 

areas, set priorities. and esrablish 21 database. 

Level Two Surveys outline the conduct oC a detailed 

technical sur\.ey to determine thc contaminated-area perimeter 

-establishment oTs;~feand danger arcas. The suluey identifies 

the types of mines, patterns, and vegetation and reference 

points and concludes with marking the area. 

Level Three Surveys are the final reports that determine 

that thc area is demined after operations. This survey involves 

turning over the land to thc local government and recorcling 

the rcport at the national level. 

No final reports of clearing were conducted during 

operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was a need to maintain 

an up-to-date record of areas clcared by the military since there 

was no document;uion on the areas cleared during the presence 

of the initial United Nations Protection Force. Documentation 

of the extent of military clearing operations-such as 

checkpoints, camps, and expansions and who conducted the 

clearance-is unknown. Most of tlie available clearance 

information is based on soldiers' knowledge that was passed 

on from unit transitionsor even from foreign soldiers' visits to 

niultinational camps. 
Demining Missions 

De~iiinilig ~iiissions are highly detailed. Danger Zone dangeroils. and time-consuming 

Marking operations that involve identifying 

and clcaring all contamination CI-om an area. : J L_.-I.--

- ExPloliVs 

Sfaiags 

Demining-Site Organization 

Information Sources 

Minefield infor~iiation is gathered froin a number of sources; 

to include hospitals. police stations. local povernme~ital 

organizations, local civilians. international organizations (suclr 

as the United NationsiN.4TO). former warriiig-faction records. 

and local military f~~rces. The objectivcs are to drtemiine the 

force responsible for the contamination, reasons for mining; 

date and age of the a~nmunition, capabilities and characteristics 

of ordnance. and skills of the minelayers in ordcr to dctcnnine 

proper cleal.in~ operations. 

The prohle~iis encountered with information collection 

are significant. The language harrier is the primary obstacle. 

Other pr-ohlem areas include tlie difficulty in obtaining 

reports due 10 destruction and loss. conflict in deter~iiining 

accuracy in sp;lce and time, imprecise reports. \vitliholdi~ig 

of informatior1 fol-personal gain, local government coi~flicts, 

and the fact that the soldier who laid the tiline is not the 

person \\ ho is taking it out. 

In Bosnia-Hcrrcgovina. general problems included lost 

records. false reports. and the fict that battle lines fluctuated 

many titlies over the same ground. Opposing forces typically 

changed the original configui-ation of the minefield. The 

essential aspect is the collection of minefield i~iforrnatio~i before 

an operation: Iiow many lnincs are present'? What are the 

pattern(s) and type(s) of mines'? Who laid the mines? This was 

a significant challenge for the Stabilization Force and the Entity 

Armed Forces-the engineers on the ground. To obtain 

firsthand knowledge, the Entity Armed Forces 11-ied to find the 

engineers who had originally emplaceil the rninerield. but they 

often had little success. 

The missions include site setup and 

operations in the safe area: operations in the 

danger area (demining with or without a 

detector); and demolitions (storage. handling, 

transportation. and destruction methods). 

Site Setup 

Site setup is critical to safe demining 

operations. 'l'lie safe area contains a conirirand 

pust (radio), check points wliere ihe locals/ 

journalists and de~uiners enter tlie ma. a medic ,, /' post. a desigt~nted helipad, a scrap-metal 

point. explosive and equipment-storage 

r~reas.a shelter or rest area. and lifted (in the 

French anny. it is neutralized) mine-storage 

area (see figure above). Each aspect contains a spccific function 

in the overall operationofthe mine area and prevents accidents 

caused by improper storage or transport or lack of control onsite. 

Demining Operations 

Most humanitarian demining operations invol\'e a mine 

detector, a probe. or both. Section leaders are responsible fi~r 

organizing and modifying the detection techniques based on 

the weathei tel-rain. types of inines or UXO in the area. and 

other site factors. 'The clearance method and approach are 

typically determineil in tlie site recontiaissance or Level Two 

Survey. Highly detailed TTP outliiie procedures for clearing 

operations. to include safe working distances. methods for 

marking lanes, establishment of safe lanes. and neutralization 

(a French army terrn) or destruction of mines once they are 

found. 

It is outside the scope of this a~ticle to describe the demining 

tech~iiq~lestaught during tlie French Humanitarian De~nir~ing 

Course. but the planning factors used by the French verify 

that humanitari;in demining is a time-intensive process. For 

example. on open terrain. a platoon (20 trained deminers) can 

clear only 600 square meters in 4 hours, 111 heavy \-egetation, 

the same platoon can clear only 60 square meters in 4 11ours. 

Final Surke? 

After completion of demining operations. boundaries are 

marked. the final Level Three Survey is completed. and the area 

is handed over to the local government. This handover is critical 

in establishing a legal transfer of the area and assurances that 

the area is 99.6 percent clear of mines to a depth of li 

cerititneters. 

Quality assurance and quality control are critical factors 

during minefield surveys and de~nining operations. Observers 

from tlie United Nations Mine Action Ceiiter or agents of the 
organization funding the demining 

operation typically handle external 

checks. Routine inspections durin -the 

demining operation ensure safe 

operations and proper clearance. 

Military organizations arc 

particularly well-organized to conduct 

both demining and clearing operations 

such as this. In fact. civilian nongovernmcntal organizations and the 

structure of the United Nations Mine 

Action Center de~nining teams ale very 

similar to the structure of a military 

platoon. The complexity of the overall 

mission regarding interaction with local 

governments and agencies, civilians. 

and other nongovernmental organ- izationsillld OveTillllackoftechnical A nongovernmental-organization personnel conducts humanitarian demining. 

training (knowledge of foreign lnillcs 

and UXO) lead to high-risk operations that are not normally with engineers-participated in a mine-awareness prograrn. 

the responsibility of U.S. Arniy engineers. Technical training However, the key lo a successful mine-awareness program is 

is the key, and the nongovel.nn1ental organizations have the the establishment of local and regional coordinators, with 

expertise to pel-form demining operations. Critical lessons assistance fro111 international aid organizations. Miles of 

learned and approaches from humanitarian demining can be minefields were marked during the li~ilc of the Implementation 

applied to military clearing operations that are conducted due Force and Stahili7ation Force, and until the local rrainilig 

to a military neccssity. Because of time limitations, military program educates the local people to the need to leave 

clearing operations may not consider all operational :tspects at minefield-marking material for its intended purpose, thc mission 

the same levcl of detail that humanitarian demining does. will continue. This is just one of many mine-awareness problems 

that arise. Civilian urganizations are bcst suited for this typeof 

Mine-Awareness Training Programs operation. 

Mine-awareness training programs educate people to CO~C~US~O~ 

the danger of mines and UXO. The programs I

believe that it is necessary to establish additional engineer emphasize the importance of the contamination training and expertise so an engineer staff NCO or officer 

thrczit, risk involved with living in contaminated areas, and can advise commanders of lhrcats and considerations 

notii'icntion of the thrc:~t area. The programs disseminate illvolvingoperationsin Ensitleer cxpcrtise information through posters, pamphlets. comic strips. stickers. is to support opelxtionsIllat are where 

T-shirts, newspaper articles, and radio announcetnents. The cuntalninationis pre\,alent.Whctllel.the operationis a military best distribution ccnters are churches, schools. and hospitals are;l clearanceor a organ,ration since typical mass-media technology such as tele~ision is not demining, the desired result is the same-a safe area. lmpo~rant available to most of the people affected by mines. lessons can he drawn fro111 liulnanitarian demining procedures 

The key to successful training programs is lo establish them when conducting clearing operations due to military necessity. 

at the national levcl for standardized iniliativcs, information Engineer st;~ffofticers can implement unit training programs 

processing, and coordination of local demining programs. Local and provide input to the overall operational considerations. 

host-nation organizers are necessary lo confirm that tlie Y 

message is adapted to the audience--along with being short, Capfai~iLrMasrer i.7 mssijii7crl fo the 864th EII~~IIPP

simple. ;md direct. the message must be politically correct. This Boffolion Cornbur Hea~:): or Fort Le~t,i.s. Wrisiiingto~i. Hc 

assessment is best accomplished at the lowest level. Minefield affe17deil fhr FI-rnchAnn!. H~~mmiifar-ion Drmirri17,y Corlrse information is also collected and reported through the local in I997 and served in Bo.s~~irr-Herzegr~~'i~~n as file MND rcpresentatives to higher-level delnining cells. The objccti\,e is (North) Mine Actio~t Ccnfer. OIC and B/16r11 Enginepi- for regions to continue awareness programs that are Battalion XO.CPT I,eMosfr,r is a recent gr~irl~~afe if fire established by orgal~izlitions such as ihc United Nations or Engineer Cai~fains Cur<~erCowr.se. the International Red Cross. 

In Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. soldiers from psychological Comments can be scnl to the author at 

operations. EOD, and local civil-affairs teatns-in conjunction d-lrnzrr.srer@hof~nnil.co~n. 

Frbri~or!.2001 Engineer 19 
Demining in Bosnia-larze~bavina 

By Firsr Lieuir!lonr Eric Mid(/r!i 

The signing of tlie Dayton Peacc Accords on 14 

December 1995 brought an end to war in tlie l'ormcrYu~oslavia.Shortly after bridging the Sava River in 

lati. Decembel- 1995, the lurple~nentationForce (IFOR) began 

its mission of enfo~ringthe Dayton Peace Accords. One ofthc 

primary concel-nsof the international co~n~nunitywas the large 

ni~niberoflandminesandminefieldsin the Bosnia-Herzegovina 

region. Tlie Dayton Peace Accord? addressctl the topic of 

demining and established specific yuitlelines regarding ho\v 

the minefields would he removed and u~liatwould happen to 

the stockpiles orland mines held hy tlie former warning factions. 

Tlie region known as Bosnia-Her~cgovinacontains about 

two to three million land niincs. Witli this Inany mincs in an area 

about tlie sire of \Vest Virginia. it is easy u) see why denlining 

was so important to the IFORISt;~hilii.;~rionForce (SFOR) and 

the iodigenoos personnel. 

Command and Control 

ne of the key steps in demining such a large areJ 

was establishing command and control for the 

demining ;~ctivitiesthat were riiaridated hy thc Dayton 

Pci~cc.Accords. When tlie Mine Actio~iCcntcr (MAC) was 

formed in Sar:ijevo. it created the command and control iieeded. 

The MAC has the following missiilns: 

Trackin2 all dcniining operations that take place in BosniaHer~egovina. 

Providingo\~erwatchfor all demining operations. ensuring 

that dcmining is conducted safely and efficiently. 

Evfaintaining a datlrhase on all the known minefields in the 

region. 

Altliougli the MAC monitors delnining. the standards by 

which demining is condncted conte from other sources. Tlie 

Dayton Pet~ceAccords pmvide tlie general framework Tor 

demining in the Sormcr Yugoslavia. With rhc addition of several 

SFOR SOPs and tlie Entity Armed Forccs (EAF) SOPs. the 

standards fol-humanitarian dcmining in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

can effectively be determined. The SOPs explain how many 

demining teams each EAF ~iiustField and specifics on the 

delnining operations that are to be conducted. Howeyer, this 

alticle focuses on tlie SFOR inonitorins ofthe demining efhrt. 

Fmm 1995 to 1999. the IFORISFOR [monitored all EAF 

delilining operations. This meant that in order for tlic EAF to 

earn creclit for demining. IFORISFOR soldiers Iind to obscr\.c 

all the EAF demining efforts. 4s a i-esulr,nionitoring dcmining 

operations became one of the primary missions of engineers 

deployed as part of the IFORISFOR. 

During tlie 1999 demining season. ideas circulated about 

moving from 100 pel-cent monitorins of (he EAF to making 

periodic sp~tchecks. Tlie move has ;I two-fold purpose: First. 

spot checks significantly I-educe the notnhcr 11f engineers 

required, allon-ing fearer engineers to monitor more minefields. 

Second. periodic checks transltr more of the responsibility of 

dcmining to the Eb\F. who are olti~natelyrespnnsihle for 

demining their country. 

My experience with detiiilii~lgin Bosnia was at minefield 

4185 near thc tow11ofOlrivo in tlic Multinational Division Noltli. 

Situated on the southern-fg~cirigslope of a ridge that runs for 

approximately I0 kilonierers, tiiinefield 4185 is comprised of. 

several small minefields empl;~ccdto protect the trench lines 

that rim along tlic ridge. Tlie minefield colitairis hoth antitank 

and antipel.sonncl mines. 

Challenges 

Removing any minefield is dangerous. hut tlic 

lninefields in Bosnia-Herzegovina present scver:~l 

uriiq~lechallenges. While the MAC maintains rccords 

ul 11in\tof tlie ninef fields in the region. most of the records are 

extreliiely outdated. Several nuncfields have no records at alleithcr the records were not recovered from thc EAF that 

eniplaced them or the records never existed. 

Tlie prevalence of antihandling deuicss and booby traps 

makes the ~iiineiieldsthat much more dangerous. Furthcrmore. 

mines tliat have been ar~nedand exposcd to the environment 

for several years are niore dangerous illan mines that are new 

and siniply need to be disarmed. This is because the fuse could 

bc rusted to the body ofa wcatherctl mine. prcventing it fioni 

being dibarrned. The filsc :dso could he 11io1-esensitive than it 

was designed to be. 111 the best case, the fuse could have gone 

bad, rendering tlie mine harmless. The terrain on which the 

minefields were placed ;~lsomakes dcmining difficult. Minefield 

4185 is on bteep, heavily vegetated terrain. and large amounts 

olferrous ore in tlie soil make mine detectors useless. 

Manual Demining 

Because of these factors. de~niningat niinefield 4185 

ancl several othel-minefields in the region is done hy 

lio~id.EAFdeniiners use a hpecialized drill tliat bc~ins 

(<.0171inuc,dOII po,qJ 26) 
Pel*sonnl Viewpoint 


Moving a Volcano 


Tlie dcvcl<~pmcnt (IF ic;illcl-;lhlc ~iiiiic\ replrcelits llie Facts About the Volcano 

ii~-sl11.1ie p;tr:i<liy!ii $liil't ill c~~~~~il~r~ii~~l~lily hitice llic Tlic MI30 Vcilc:t~io sysrcm ci,il\irt\ {IC iout- I:ILIIIC~ICI. 

A~iicsic;~~~ C'ivil War. The \ystc~ii tasked to c~nplacc tlie

hiilk of tlicsc iiiilict is tlic M 139 \'olcai~o. U!. il\clfllic Volc;l~~o 

is poi%~hlc. robiiht. and r,;~sy 111 we: it'\ rhc ~cliiclc \vc llsc 10 

Ir,inhport tlie ~y\t?lii tIi~11'~ the 1prohIc111. 

111 this i~rticlc. I\\illdrfi~irtl~ibproblem. IISIsome i;~cts 1Ii;it 

;il~l~ly totlic pl-ohleni. ;~nd disc~iss sonic iithcr i\\uc\ th;~~ I

<111?it1cd il-,>111 the :irticlc. 1 \rill c~plai~~ wh;it 1 belie\c ;~rr tlic 

~xxsihle solulionh lor !hi.: pr<~hlcm;lti<l will re\t thoce \OIIItion\. I\\illcoiirlu~lenitli 11iy l-eco~ii~iic~idatiri~i ior the 131-adlc! 

Fi:Ii~iii~ Vt.11icIc (t%FV) ;I\ the hcst choice I'r~rc:ti.r~ing~hc MI39 

Vi>lc;rno inlo h:~ttle. Tlic Ipurpiiic ill'tliis article is to con\-itice 

you tIi:11 lllc \TI .30 Vulc:i~io Is OII~hcsl co~1111er111obility systcr~> 

illld tli:lt il c;~~lilol be ~iscd lilit, lull c;ili:~hiIily a\ it is currently 

citrriccl ill111hiitlli~. 

Iclentifying the Problem 

Accordiny to FM 5 - 100. I,i,yi,ic,ci 0~x~~~iioi1.v. "Ofi'c~i 

ii\c actioii is IIICmo\r eifective nliil drcici\c \\a! 10 

attain ;I cle;lrly defined comliion i~l>jcctive. ;\I] <~iicliri\.c \pil-il inus1 he inlicrc~it wlic11 co~ld~~ctiti~ iill elifi~icer(11.-

Icn\i\c npcrati~~~i~.'' M'l~cn\ri. I'ix. III~II.disil~pt. or hloch ;III 

cnr~~ny's iitnlteu\.cr. we ;lri. att;~chin$ Ill\dcci\io~i-m:~h~~ig pn)-

re\\. \Vlic~i \\c :IIC ~icl'c~iditi~. cok~titer~iiohili!! opcr;~~io~i\ ;I)-

lo\\: 11s to seize. rclaiii. i111c1 exploit tlie initi:~ti\c. It c;lri 111~rei11rc 

tw ;~rgi~c<l tli;~t co~~ntcr~iiohility i\ ;+I) ~~FCcii\i\c opc~~ti(>~i ;IIICI 

Ilri.11 inrllicr orgiicrl rlial the V(>lcano is cxlr c~f (lie mix1 ],o\verlul i~i'Tc~i\ivc wci~pon s?.;teins oc:l~iic to a lhrigailc. 

l'lie ]prohIc~ii ~vitlithchl1.39 \'~IIC;IIIOih !lie \ cliiclc tli:it tr;lti>- 

porls it. Thc rounJ ~r;~nsl?ort;~tio~i currcnllv ;i\aiIable to tlir 

~lcki.;Iclispenscr conl~-ol unit (DCU).a halicl coulrul 

utiit (HCUI. illid \.;1ri011\ cablo ;riicl hi-accz Illat crlliricer co~np~~nents ;III~ hold ihc sy.;tcm illplace. Each r:~ch holds 

40 canisters for ;Iruli~lc,r 160 cal~istcrs. E;lcli caiii\tcr Ii<~ld\ (, 

1n111eik,r ;Itol:tl ul: 9h(l ininch. Each y\lelli can clnpl:lcc ;III 

1.100-~ncrcr by 120-~iictcr iiii~iciicldill:I111;lttcr ofmitil~tcs. 

-1-lie M87 c;lriistcr co~it;~iii\ fi\e ;~ntit;l~ik (.AT1 11iinc\ ;itid 

I i~iticl-i~i A ~iii 'The M87..\l c,~ntninssix AT

nli11i.s. The .AT ri~i~lcb ilrcbidircitioiii~l. ~~iil~~ictic;iIl! l~~\cil ;~titl. 

thcrcf'orc, ;iiitidiiti~rhanc~~. Oncc the ,XI'111incIi;15 arnicd ilhcll 

allti ad.iu\tcd to 1111. rnr~li'~ rn:i;nctic licltl, 811) dl\tu~h;~~ice oi 

111;11 ricld (slicli as a ta~ihormo\-i~~$ lllc lninc) n ill c~l~~c the l.i

~x~~~icls olRDS (cyclo~iilc)111 caplo~ic. llills liriti: thc S~F \\.:irI~cii<l.TIic~?\P 11111ics clcpl~~y X trill wire3 up 10 40 ice1 ajid require only 0.9 poond.: ilf pl-e\slirc ilcton;itc the 0.9 ~)oun~ls 

oIC<~mpn\itioii H tllal 11i;lhe up it5 1n;iili c1i:tr~c. Fat;~l ci~zu;~ltics 

rc\lllt at II~ to I5 ri1erei.r. AI tire 211d 01 tlic set ~UKIIIOII ti~iic 01'

tlic nlilie 1-1h1111rs. JX Iii~u~.\. ~11IS dii?\-a\ \?I h! 111c oj)cl-;~ 

l~irt.it \\illchpl~~lc. Tlic h~ttotii liic ih Ilia1 aV~>Ic;lno r~~itlcl'icld 

will h~ll;i~~ytIiiti:tlit~teiicc~it~it?rs it. i? ~ir-t11;1Ily itiipo~sihlc 10

b~c;~cli hy ni,i~iit,~liiic.in*. and got\ ;I\v;I! at a ~ircdi'lcr~iii~ic~l 

tiilie (hcll~dcslrocl occur\ crpo~ic~iti;iliy will1 99.i)'10 Ipercciil 

coi~~plil?~lccI. 

1)iscussion 

TIlcle ;I-c I\v<I i111por1;iiiI ]?oiiiIs 10 ~IIXLI~S coiiccrti~~i; 

III! w"'cc~iit~gLIIILI c\ :~Iu,itio~i crilcri;~. Tllc iir.1 lp<li!il i\ 

tIi;11 Ill?hcrcctiirig critcri:~ 1 cl>o\c cli~iii~talc every \eIiiclc \ye currciillg LISC I<> irnnspoi-l tlic V(I~~;III~. Tlli, \\a\ 1101 

1.11.79 \~~IC:IIIO i\llic k1548A.3 ~r;ickeci c:11~2c c:~rri?r. tlic hei~~y 

cxpa~ided-tiiohilily Iirlic:~l truck (HEMTT). tlic 5-Ion trrich. ;~niJ 

(1111cc the ~1111vcr\i01i kit is ilppr(ivcdi the li_~liI ti~di~tiil I:ICI~C;II 

\cliiclc (LMTV). A~lyolle uhi~ i\ i,iniili;rrwith il~~yoCtl~c\c vchiclcs ktio\~\ th~t (lie front "ill-tilor" ~>r,~tec~ir)~i coli\iits or :t 

\vit~d\h~cl(l. A\ 3 hide III~I~. ilic Li~lca~iocan hc c111plo)icd \';;I ;iil, 

hy tlic HI:~chIiawh liclicopter. I)ut tIi;it is beyol~il the scope 01' 

Illis nrliclc. 

It is 11il1 currct~lly pc)xciblc lo use llic V(~lc;i~io tci levcl-agr 

our firc1>,1\\cr ill :,I1 c1l~~t~c1llcllt l~ec~lllse tI1e V~~Ic;l,l<> C~,II~I get

to llle fif111 if it i\,,ti a tlii~~-\kin~ii,d vcliiclc. Tlic coticcpt olllic. 

Vi~l~.;~i~o-crn~)lacc~i~c~lt tc;i~ii (VET)-\\liere ;ui ;~nlroled cornpiiri!~ . . tci11111110\es iorwn~cl iiill1 a Vi>lcalioti? ]pro\ idc scci~rity-is ;I 

pcrod telnllornry lia to tlli pl-ohlcin. hut why 41<111ld\\c :illoc;itc 

-..,.-*

tli;tt 111~1cli ci~iih;iI ]po\vct to 8 \\sleiii Ilizit C:III lhc ~li~;ihIc~l An bl548A3 transporting the Volcano by 

s1nlill-a1.111\lid? 
too long to develop new systems, debug them, and then figure 

out how to mt~intainthem. While there will be a requirement to 

test the viability of aVolcano on any new chassis. this process 

is much less com~lexrhan building a new system irom scratch. 

An MLRS chassis with the Volcano 

done intentionally and is not to say that our current choicc for 

Volcano transporters u'as a mistake. The point is that we have 

recognized new uses for the system. and our current vehicles 

will not support those uses that carry the Volcano into directfire range. 

The second point concerns a possible modified table of 

organization and equipment (MTOE) change. I am making the 

assumption that a choice to replace the M548A3 with the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) chassis would be a onefor-one swap, ;ind the Volcano system itself would not change. 

Conversely. a choice for the Bradley could mean either a onefor-one swap with the MS48A3 or the elimination of the M548A3 

and the outfitting of every "Engineer Bradley" with a Volcano. 

I did not look at MTOE as a criteria because I don't have the 

data to evaluate these two vehicles based on the multiple issues an MTOE change would bring. such as cost reduction by 

deleting the M548A3, cost increase by redesigning the Volcano to fit the Bradley, and doctrinal changes to the employment of combat engineers. These are in~portantissues, hut 

unless someone is willing to take this article from drawing 

room to boardmom. these issues will not materially affect this 

discussion. 

Possible Solutions 

I

used the follou,ing screening criteria to determine what 

vehicles were acceptable to put the Volcano on: 

Already in the inventory. 

Survivability. 

Commonality of parts. 

Trafficability. 

The two vehicles I came up with are the MLRS chassis and 

the M2 BFV. Both vehicles meet all the criteria and are Pamiliar 

to most officers in acornbat-arms branch. For this reason, I will 

skip the detailed explanation of each vehicle's capabilities and 

focus on the criteria I chose. 

Already in the Inventory. It is important to consider a vehicle that is already in the Anny's inventory hecause it takes 

- Perhaps the best reason to choose ;I vehicle that is already in 

the system is the same reason that General Shinseki wants to 

field the medium brigades with "or-the-shelf' systemsmomentum. The Army of Tomo~~ow, Force XXI, and the Strike 

Force were all valid concepts, but they lost funding because 

they lost momentum. We can put a Volcano on an MLRS or 

Bradley chassis within 18 months if we are decisive in our 

action. 

Survivability. The primary reason that the Volcano should 

beon an al-moredvehicle is survivabilitv. I don't know ifthere 

is a windshield made that will stop shr;ipnel. but I do know that 

such a windshield is not on any of the vehicles that currently 

carry the Volcano. The Volcano is relatively easy to operate, 

but it does require training. What are the implicationsof sending an arniored company team forward to emplzlce a Volcano 

obstacle only to have the operator become a casualty before 

the mission is accomplished? Would a maneuver co~nmander 

even be willing to send a thin-skinned vehicle into direct-fire 

range of the enemy? I believe the answers to these questio~ls 

are apparent, and they relegate the best countermobility asset 

we have to a "second-string" role. 

Commonality of Parts. If maintaining the operator of the 

Volcano is thc number one priority, then maintaining the vehicle the Volcano rides on is a definite second. This is why a 

co~nrnonalityof parts is important. With the Corps of Enginccrs due to turn in its MI 13s for BFVs, the next logical step is 

to find a Volcano transporter that will be able to share parts 

with the line-platoon vehicles. Choosing the Bradley has obvious implications for commonality or parts and tbe1-efore an 

advantage over the MLRS chassis. However, since the MLRS 

chassis has the same drivetrain as the BFV, it stands to reason 

that it will also keepdown the nulriber of lines of the prescribed 

load list needed to maintain the vehicle. 

Traf'ficability. The Chief of Staff of the Army has declared 

that the Army is going to get lighter. However, I cannot help 

but think that we may he missing an important lesson-that 

thc failed German invasion of Russia may have been as much 

from not choosing the proper equipment as from overextending lines of supply. During Operation Barbarossa, the German 

army had to use its tanks (when it could get them unfrozen) to 

tow its trucks because the trucks just could not move in the 

n~udand snow. So, since the Germans could not get their 

wheeled trucks to the front, I draw the correlation that a 

"wheeled" Volcano will not always get to the fight. 

Testing the Solutions 

I

chose the following criteria as being feasible toevaluate, 

acceptable after a reality check, suitable for the pt.oblem, 

and distinguishable between the two options: 

Recognizability. 

Availability. 
Trainabiiily. This refers to the fsiction a battalion commander 

must overco~neto keeo a Volc;~nocrew trained. Since tlre death 

The M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

l'rainability. 

Reporting. 

I established these cl-iterii~based on my 32 nlonths as a 

conrbat-e~igilieerplatoon leader. 10 of which wel-e spent ns a 

Volcano platoon leader (my battalion formed a platoon fro111the 

line companies' Volcanoes). These are issues I faced when 

making recornnienclations tor the best way to employ Volcanoes in missions such as Bright Star and the defense of Kuwait 

by the Division Ready Brigade. 

Recognizability. This tics directly to the screening criteria 

of survivability. The intent here is to facilitate the standard 

essential eleriicntsof friendly infomintion requirement to "hide" 

Volcanoes because they are higli-value talgets. The culrent 

problmm is that the Volc;~nois e:ey to identify because it is 

carried by the M548.43. which has only one purpose-carry 

the Volcano. While moving the system to the MI.RS chassis 

would co~ifusethe enemy about what it tilight be shooting at. 

it pn~bablywould not care because the MLRS is also a highvalue target. However. a Volcano on a BFV could easily he 

confuscd lor a B~xdleyStinger Vehicle. a Linebacker, a Bradley 

SmokeVeliicle. or any one of tlie 200+ BFVs in a mechanized infantry brigade. A Volcnno on a Bradley would be difficult to recognize. 

Availability. This criterion follows the logic of fielding the 

medii~lnbrigades with off-the-shelf technology-that the 

changes that are necessary will not take place if the concept 

does riot achieve and maintain the lnnolnentum necessary to 

complete thc task. In coniparing the two vehicles. MLRS chassis (in thc words of one United Defenseemployee) "are :IS rare 

as hen's teeth." And allhough no more BFV hulls are being 

made, the fielding of the Opel-arionDesert Stol-ni Bradley, the 

turn-in ofBradleys by mechanized scout platoons. and the fact 

that the Bradley is the most widely used combat-vehicle plntform in the U.S. Army make the Bradley much more available 

for use than tlie MLRS chassis. 

of thc 12F military occup;~tionalspecialty (engineer trackedvehicle crewman), 12Bs (combat engineers) have taken ovelthe responsibility of operating assault and obstacle (A&O) 

platoon equipment. This means that a Volcano operator today 

may be a grapiiel ]wan tomorrow and vice versa. By the same 

token, the skills necessary to operate the MLRS in an A&O 

platoon (where I am assuming the Volcalnocs would stay) will 

not transfer directly lo the skills necessary to operate the BFVs 

in a line platoon. It is apparent that the skills necessary to 

operate a Bradley with ;I Volcano would translate directly to tlie 

skills necessary to operate a Bradley without a Volcano and. 

therefore, tlie Bradley has the advantage for trainability. 

Reporting. Although the Bradley has the adnntage in 

the first three critel-ia,the MLRS chassis has a definite advantage in reporting. This is because the celestial navigation system available with the MLRS chassis will facilitate 

quick. accurate reporting of minefield locations without 

worrying about "plugger" batteries. Planning minefields is 

important, emplacing minefields is critical, but reporring on 

the location of minefields is the long pole in the tent for an 

Army that expects victory via agile. decisive maneuver. The 

Bradley has no discernable advarltnge over the M548A3 

for reporting. but the MLRS chassis pl-ovides a capability 

thnt no other system evaluated can match. 

Conclusion 

The Duke of Wellington said that "Junior officers nust 

either master terrain or the language of the conquernr." 

His words are as tnle today as they were in his day. No 

syswm in our arsenal has evcr let us dominate terrain the way 

the Volcano has. However. leveraging combat power by means 

of thz Volc:mois orrly possible if its transporter is avehicle that 

can go into the fray and survive. 1believe tlie best vehicle to 

accomplish this mission is the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Although it does not have tlie I-eportiogadvantage of the MLRS 

chassls. .. . lt. is less recognizable. more readily available, and sitnplifies training and maintainingqualified crews. 

The whole point oltliis article is to substantiate my claim 

that we are ~~nderutilizingour most lethal coontermohility asset and thereby li~ilitingthecommanders' ability toapply combat power to thedecisive point ofs battle. In shon, tlieVolcano 

cannot he used properly if it cannot cross lines of departure. 

Y 

CPT Hoilond is rlre S1. 577fh Ert~iiic~r Borriilini~,Forr 

1,eonrrnl Wooil, Mivsoiiri. He wirsprn.iou.sh. tlre A.~.si.~rc~r~t S.3. 

Sf/? Err,qiwccr Barrrrlion. Fort Lem~ardbVooo[i. Af th~317ri1 

Ert~inerrBorrolion. Fort Bri~niii,q.G<>o~-fiiii, hi, wos rr line 

plittoon /racier; rrn A&O-l~loroon 1rarlr.1; on11 o Volcano111otoon leor/ei: CPT Hollmid hris ibto NTC roriitini~scis n 

pinroorr irnrli,r. and ii~in~o.o~rs piiitooir ~IIIVLI~IZ fiisk:fi)rce 

coi~ibii?ed-nrnrrfii~i~i /~roi?I~,rs. 
XT Tlicn tlic I - I87 Irifanu-v Batralion. Fort Carriobell, 

Kentucky. deployed to Koso\,o in February 2000 

to participate in Operation Joirit Guardian, it lcft 

wirli acornplete task force to enhance the hattalion'soperations 

and effectivensss. Subszquently. Fort Campbell's 326th 

Engineer Battalion (Air Assault) attached a >apper platoon to 

the task iorcs. The habitually associated platoon from Charlie 

Company deployed \r:ith the infantry battalion. While cnyineers 

comprised onl) a small number of the 900-man task force. the 

diversit? ;ind flexibilrty of the light combat-ensilleel- platoon 

made it a \ aluable asset. 

W 

Task Organization 

Tlie sapper pl;ttoon (liCi326th)- three 8-lnan squads, 

a platon leader, a platoon sergeant. aiid a driverdeployed \\-ill1 its entire modified table of organization 

and equipment. In keeping with tlie divisiolial readiness force 

packags. two sn~all ctnplacernent excavators (SEES) and their 

operators and a niedic also deployed with the platoon. Because 

an infantry task force has no h2B mechanics. a skillcd junior 

rnechilnic was includcd to work on any pmblems associated 

wi~h rhe SEES. The battalion i~lso rcqursted that a vertical 

engineer squad from the XVIll Airborne Corps be armclied, so 

a squad irom the 27th Engineer Battalion. Fort Bmgg, Korth 

Carolina. \\.as added to tlie task iorcc. 

Instead ofha\:ing cacli squad of the platoon tasked to each 

infi~ntry compxny. 111~task-force conimander decided to keep 

tlie sapper platoon together and ltttach it to one of the infantry 

companies. The decision rllacle it necessary to include an 

additional licutcriant to serve as the task-force ensineer so the 

platoon leader could stay with tlie platoo~i. The \:ertical squad 

fell unrla. Headqu;llters itnd Headqiiartrrs Companyll-187 and 

~vorketl Tor thc task-force ensineer. 

Sa~wrPlatonn .. 

Unlike in where an 

colllpany a battalion, the air. 

assllult infantry battalioll is supported b!, one sapper platoo11. 

~~lroLlghoLrtdeployment,tile sspper-sshowed diversity 

of I 2B soldie, slid tlleir abilitv to in different 

capacities. in Kosovo, platoon served as allother 

lislltinfantry elenlent, Initi>llly servingwith DlI.1~7in towll 

ofKlokot,tl,eplatOo cotlducted distnountedand 

pauols, guarded serbian cl,urclles, mannedtrafic.contro~

ooints (TCP). In addition. both the platoon leader and squad 

leaders worked with the local iiiaynrs and people it? the cities of 

Klokot. Zititije. andother sur~ounding villages on a daily basis. 

They conductcd nomerous house se;irches of suspected 

criminals or curfew ~iolators. looking for weapons or other 

contraband. The platoon's ability to serve as infantry was a 

great asset to the task force. More than 80 percenr of the 

platoon's YCOs haw attetided Sappcr School, and the skills 

they learned there. along with tlie trainins perfontlcd as part of 

tlie IOlst Airborne Di\.isioii. provided thein with the skills 

needed for mission success. 

In May. the platoon moved northeast into the Russian scctor 

to run :I checkpoint along tlie Kosovo-Serbian border with the 

Russian oldiers. Here. U.S. and Russian soldier< ran a TCP 

and searchetl e\.ery ~eliicie and person entering Kosovo. 

Workin? out oi Camp Monteith in Gnilanje. the pl;ttoui rotated 

the squ:~ils every 8 hours for tl~e I0 days they were there. As 

part of a joint Koso\,o Force effort. it was an experience that 

the pl:ltoon will never fo~yet. 

On hitr occasions. ~irembcrs of the platoon participatetl in 

battalion-level cordon-and-search operations. The sapper 

squads were equipped with ANIPSS-I2 mine detectors hut 

served in many diflerenl solcs. In soiiie cases. an elenient u'ould 
pcrforni ;Iilclibel;~tc route clc;~r;~nceof;1 rood or 11;1tt1so c~lher 

vehicular or disrilou~ited11-afficcould p;~\s.7'11~\quads nlco 

swept 1ia)~s~acks. barns. and the surro~indinggrou~idsof 

Ihousc\ with the ~ni~ie detccti>rsin \care11 of huricd caches of 

\\:capons or mines. In additi~~n. the sc]~~;ldssnnlctiines set :i?ide 

the detectors and searcheil liouscs. On one ilii\sion. the 

cnginccr squad served as the h;~tt;~lionmain cfl'i)rt ant1 

conducted a deliberate route cle;~r;oice;ind searcl~edsuspeclcd 

cache cites. Anothcr mission called kir ;Ixtlpper squad to be 011 

tlre first lil't of oo ;~irnss;iult into a villase in order to clear a 

roirte tlirougl~a suspected rni~~eore;^. 

Tllc s;lppers ;~lci~coi~ductcdthree trcc-cuttinp ~rrissio~isfor 

tlir task force. In one care. trees were cut dowr with cl~i~i~i 

caw\ lo ilnprovs fieldc of fire and cle;lr dcad sp;icc nest to ilic 

hnttnli~~t~ ilcadqu;~rIcrsco~iipli.~.In the othci- iivo i~~iisions. 

s;~pliersl~clpedtlic h:ittali~i~i S5 supply local Serhs with trees 

fiir fircw~i~dfor the upconling winter. The tree\ \\el-c t:~kc~i 

cin\r,n \?it11 detotxition cord 2nd CJ. The squadh conducted ;I 

recon ofthc site, pc~.fiirrnedli;~stycalculations. and then mo\,cd 

to the arc;i the foll{~wingtl;iy 10 co~lducthe tnisiio~i. 

In al-Idition to the tree-cutti~i$mis\iotis. a squad conducted 

a live brc;~cliwith bangalore\ 1111a range. The sapper platoon 

also put up wire for protectio~~round the batr'II.IL) n 

lheadquarierc. co~iductedi~cri;~l reconn;iissance of the sector 

to view p<issiblcohsl;icle sites. empl:scd \tire a1 afCP site in 

;inticip;ition of a possible riot. :~ndc~~ntlt~ctetl bridge and liinl 

~CCOIII~:I~S~:IIIC~ it1 sector to iri~l~rovell~eiiiohility or tri~chcd 

vehicles. Certainly. the enpi~~eerplatoonoffered the task force 

:Ivery flexibleelement that could perl'i~rniamulti~udeoftask.;. 

The task-f(1rce engineer worked in the hatlaliiin Iic:~~lqonncr.; 

and .;crvcd ;IS the PI-iiiciple advisor to the co~n~lia~ldo.. 111 

addiliiin to working with the 1-187 staff inemhers. the taskforce engineer dealt exrensi\.ely \pith the Base (:amp 

Coi~rdinatingAgency. tlic constl-uction manayement sectio~~. 

and the contractor iBrow~i& Root Service?Corporz~tion).Thc 

task-force cnsineer \\as 111splini;~ryspokesm:m lor the hattalii~n 

wliilc planni~igand dcvcloping its hcadqunrtcrs in Vitina. He 

alhi~conrdinatcdwitli tlic 16thand 87il Engineer Bau;~lionsTotother ~prijectsand mis\ir~~is. pulled hnttlc-ci~ptainshifi\. lielped 

the local ci\il-afl'iiirs teani with a cleanup 111-ojcct. 

tinil ;itlvised the battalion com~n:~nderon liirce-priitcctiori 

~SSIICS. 

1,essons Learned 

The clcpl~iynienti11'l/C/S2hth Eng~neerBattalion to 

Ko\ovh \\,as :Itroc tesl of the c;ip,ihilities rif ;a11 airassnlllt sapper platl~o~i. Scvcl'al lessons were lcarncd 

fr(i111the dcplirymcnt: 

.A pl;aoon sh<iulddeploy witli :IIIof its eill~ipment.Reforc 

1c:lvine. many ireins i111the pla~oi)~i lc;~~lcr'sh;~ndreceipt 

wer? questioned as to whctlicr they sliould be takcn to 

Ko?o\:o. but tlie ilecisioti ti, take ;!I1 cquipnicnt paid 

ilividellils. Even thiioglilhc mc~it;~lity\v;~siifopcr:~ti~igas :t 

light infantry platoon, the 1-187 iisc(l tlie pl:~tixinas 

cn~insers(in iilany occasions. Having prol~erlgmai~~tnined 

chain saws. tools. ;urd equipment aliowed tlic pl;~toonto 

complete every 111issi1,n. 

Vertical Engineer Squad The vertic;~l enginccr squad from the 27th Engineer 

Mort of the 111-ojectsperlnrnied hy the \.crtic:il engineel. Unttalio~rnJas ;lb;~lu;lble asset to the task I'rircc in 

squad in\,iilved iniproving the qu;~lity of lik Siir soldiers at Kosovo. Houever, fi~turedcpliiymcntr hy light inrantry 

remure sites. The six-111x11silu;id 

constructed six pel-mnncnt. 

gcner;~l-p~~rpose. n~cdiumtc~it 

"huts" ;~ndniosc thiin 70 hunk 

beds. Olher pl-ejects included 

decigning and building the 

i~rterioridthe hathilio~imailrilo~n. . . . ilesks and t:ibles for the h;ittalion 

:~dniinistr;iti\,c area, 2nd goarc1 

tii\vers n~iildetention shacks :rt 

the conip;iny co~iini;lndprihts. 

1)oring cordiit~-a~id-sc;~rch 

open~tions,the h~j11:ldrepaired 

any cla~n;i:c to loc;~lhou?es that 

occurrc(l doring tlic scarclirs. In 

addili(111.tlizy r;in ~I'I'CI'duri~iga 

crisis ~rpc~xticin. The verlic:~I 

cnginccr sc]u;~d c~ii~bletl 'l't~zli 

IZorce1- 187 11iF;intry~oco~iiplete 

projects willio~~t requesting 

\upport Il-iirnthe p;lrcnt L'11-111ccr ,' 

hsttalio~ii~twchcdto 'l'ask J'orce Soldiers from Cl326th Engineer Battalion conduct a tree-cutting operation in Kosovo. 

Falcon. 
-

task forces to this theater will probably not need this !co"finuedfr()lnIT? 20) 

attachment. ~l~~ illfrastructure has been established when the deminer establishes the start point of the I-meter 

in K ~and the projects ~ for vertical ~ , engineers are ~ ~ lane that he will work. After checking the area inlmediately in 

decreasing. front of him with a tl-ip-wire feeler. thederniner removes all the 

rn 	 An additional officer to serve as the task-force engineer is 

needed only if the sapper platoon is kept together. Should 

a task-force commander decide to split up the platoon and 

attach engineer squads to infantry companies, the platoon 

leader can easily perform both platoon-leader and taskforce-engineer duties. 

rn 	 Training on soldiertasks other than I2B-specific ones will 

help improve the readiness of engineers on tuture Kosovo 

deployments. Devoting time to patrolling, military 

operations in urban terrain, checkpoints, searches (vehicle 

and individual), and other squad- and platoon-level tasks 

during training will help prepare engineers for missions 

they will perform on aBalkandeployment. 

Redeployment 

The leaders and soldiers of C1326th Engineer Battalion 

returned to Fort Campbell with the confidence and 

knowledge of the great job they did in Kosovo. The 

importance of training as both a combat engineer and an 

infantryman took on new meaning to them. The light combatengineer platoon's diversity and flexibility made it a valuable 

asset to the battalion. y 

Cal>rcrin Shor.r MJns rhe rnskrforcs ei~gineer for 1-187 

Infi~nn:~Botrnlion. He prn'iorrsls served ns u jjiaruun lrarler 

anrl e.recurive oflrcer in th[, 326rh Engineer Bairnlion, Fort 

C~ntl>bell, Kentrr* A gradcrcrfr ofthe U~ziredStotes Militan 

Acrrdemy CPTShorr Iru.~cornpiered file Etz,qineer Oflicer Bnsic 

Corrrsp and the Airbonle, Air- Arsault, Rnrigei; and Sul~per 

Schools. 

- Editor's Note 

The bulletin staff thanks Mr. Brian NI. Green, ;a 

project management engineer for the U.S. ArmY 

vegetation from the area that he has cleared of trip wires. 

Then he probes the area for mines, inserting the probe 6 

cenlimeters into the earth at about a 30-degree angle every 2 

centimeters across the cntire I-meter width of the lane. Ii 

nothing is found, then thedeminerrnovcs fo~ward 6centimeters 

and probes again. Once he reaches the end of the area he has 

cleared of vegetation. he starts the entire drill again. This 

slow and tedious process typically one ~ ~ ~ 

50 to 60 square meters-being cleal-ed each day, 

At minefield 4185. about 100 to 120 square meters were 

cleared in a day. While this may sound like comparatively 

good progress, it is important to look at in relation to the area 

that the minefield covers, which is about 4 grid squares or 

about 4.000.000 square meters. At the current rate of demining, 

it will take 33.000 to 40,000 days to clear this minefield. 

Lessons Learned 

While deployed as part of SFOR 6 from August to 

December 1999. our plaloon learned several 

valuable lessons about demining in BosniaHerzegovina: 

rn 	 Esrablish a good working relationship with the EAF 

deminers. We found [hat by doing this. our EAF team 

would do the things that we asked them to do. But even 

though a good working relationship helped make thc job 

easier, it did not replace rhc need for supervision. 

rn 	 Establish stlict standards by which deruiners are to work. 

If our standards were not met, the team knew that it would 

not receive credit for its efforts. This encouraged deminers 

to safely arid effectively work the required 4 hours a day. 

Conclusion 

hile the war in Bosnia-Hcrzegovina lnay be over, Wthe country is far from being where it was before 

the outbreak of the fighting. The efforts of the 

Demolitions, Countermine Division, Foil Belvoir, 

Virginia, for reviewing the mine articles in this issue. 

Mr. Green isa Marinecombat-engineer Officer who 

fought in the Gulf LMar and hlas been to Somalia1, 

Bosnia, a1nd Korea (three times). He adv ,ised on th, 

removal of minefield!;in Guants inamo Bay :Cuba, an1 . ,.. . .. .. .. . - . . wrole ana ealtea tne numanlrarlan uemlnlng 

Equipment Planning Guide forthe theater commanders 

in chief,Hehasbeen officer-in-chargeoftheMarine 

detachment at the National Ground Intelligence Center, 

a mine-warfare analyst, chief of the M~~~ warfare 

Branch and instructor at the U.S. Army Engineer 

School, and subject-matter expert on mine1 

countermine warfarc ?for the school for two years. Mr. 

Green has authored several arl iclesfor Engineer. 

,minn Project Manager for Mines, Co~nte,~~~~~~, ,,,cl IFORISFOR have made a difference. Although it is several 

years from bcing completed. the demining of the region is 

well underway, More important decreasing SFOR h.oop 

strengths. The people of the country are beginning to govern 

themselves again and take responsibility for their actions. .' 

The move from constant monitoring of demining to periodic 

spot checks is a prime example olthis progress. 

Where there has been conflict, there will be mines. so fi~tul-e 

contingency operations will require expenise in mine clearance 

and humanitarian demining. That means that engineers will 

beneeded to o\,ersee theclearing operations of every mission. 

kt 

Firsr Lierrter~nnr Midden i. rke rnnb~rcnnnre oficerfor the /,,I 

Olfiinerr. Bnlmlio,t. Fort Rile?, K<insos. Wl8ilc in Buoiia, he ix~sn 

plnroon leader b, B Conipitrri; 1st E~~gbieer Barf~~1ior~. lLTMirl<imi s

o grad~iirale,?frhe Univ~nip of Mi,s.souri-Kollrr. 
I-Letters To The Editor 'I

Engineers Train With New, Advanced Equipment 

' With The New, October 2000 issue Advanced Equipment." This equipment, of Engineercontained an article by which was PFC a part Matthew of the Joint Contingency Force J. Jenkins titled "EngineersTrain Amy 

Warfighting Experiment held at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in September 2000, included adescription of the Volcano 


(Light). 


Paragraph one states that "The Volcano (Light) is designed to lay a minefield about 900feet long and more 


than 110 feet wide." Minefield size in any Volcano-installed minefield is directly related to the density (number 


of mines per square meter) and the total number of minesdispensed for the minefield. I caution readers to keep 


this in mind. A large minefield may contain many or few mines. The same is true for a small minefield. Minefield 


density and minefield size are independent of each other and aredetermined by the commander and the laying 


crew, not the device. Do not jump to conclusions that the Volcano (Light) has this amazingly advanced capa- 


bility in such a small HMMWV-mounted package that it is able to replace the normal Volcano in the normal 


Volcano mission. 


Paragraph two states that "...canisters, each containing five antitank mines and one antipersonnel mine. 


...When the mines hit the ground, trip wires spring out of each mine to prevent the enemy from passing 


safely."Only the M87 mine canisters contain an antipersonnel mine along with the five antitank mines. The 


main canister in our war stock is the M87A1, which contains only antitank mines. Most importantly, only the 


antipersonnel mines containleject wires. Antitank mines contain none. 


A warning note: Volcano-launched antitank mines do not have antihandling devices, but they DO have 


antidisturbance integrated into them. Movement of an armed Volcano mine is extremely technologically 


complicated and is NEVER safe. NEVER attempt to move ANY Volcano mines that have been dispensed! 


Mr. Glenn Boxley 

Combat Developer 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

DSN 676-7337 

U.S. Army Prime Power: A Tradition of lnnovation and Excellence 

An article by CW02 Andrew K.Potter in the July 2000 issue of Engineer ("U.S. Army Prime Power: A 


Tradition of lnnovation and Excellence") refers to Camp Century, Greenland, a site that "generated power from 


more than 30 feet below the polar ice cap" as part of the Army Nuclear Power Program. 


I'm glad to see there is some solid, accurate recognition of Camp Century and what we tried to do there. As 


a young SP4 radio-teletype operator with the Polar Research and Development Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 


I made four trips to Greenland in the early 1960s. A lot of our communication from the camp was by Morse 


code-there was no such thing as a Global Positioning System! It was an adventure and perhaps the most 


memorable time of my life. Thanks for remembering what we did. 


Robert P Radzyminski 

National Geographic Society Library 

1145 17th Street N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

20Z857-7098 

* 

Februnr) 2001 Engineer 27 
Dynnmic Theater Bridge Management.- 


The /<ores Challenge 


"Brid,yo.r tirr trl\i'o~s cri~rr(iI,feritrr,-c.s in il:tri: Bottlt>s nr~d rrtriil~trigns crrr ~fitv~ 

d<,cit/etlIJ~it:ho i~o1ti.c rlr~ hriilye, or seizes tlzc. hritlxe. oi- t1r.stroy.s the hi-itlyr. " 

The Korccln peninsula is 84.512 squasc tniles (21'4,020 

square hilotneten). Ahoot 80 to 85 percent of it i\ 

mi,untn~nou\. ;~nd it is cut hy ne;irly 2.300 iiiiles (3.862 

kiioineters) of w;lter\\nys. The rugyed ter~iiti and tcniperotc 

c!irn;ire produce n i;uid with literally tIious:ind\ of wet ;~nd dry 

giilic. It IS c1e;irtliat iftlie c:~mpaipn plat1 to dstcr ho\tilc act5 of 

esternal aygsscsion against tlic Rcpublic [ifKorea (ROK) and 

defeat an cxtzr~i;il ar~iied ;iuack ng;iitist [he Rcpuhlic should 

f'11I .c1eilrr\e .':, opcratio~is wr~old snliiil ~niiiltiple river cros\i~igs. 

Thc relative shortapt of standard military hridging nhsels to 

Srrj)heri E. An~hrose 

Pugcisrrs Briclge 

provides guidance on the appropriate ibs\l'ard rnoveriient riF 

:~\sault float bridges in tlie for\va~dcomhat zoils ntid the titiicly 

replacement of inilitary hridgi~rg in the cotl~s rcar areas ;ind 

coinmunic:itii~~i\zone. Bridgin; stwk such ai the rihhon 

bridge. tlie mediu~ii sisiles bridge (MGB). and the .\I2 Raile!. 

hsidgz tiiust be appre\hi\ely 11r;inagcd tliro~~fliout tlic 

cotiditio~~-bahc~lotnpnign !o sustain tlie tactic;il mahilit!: o f

u\raulti~ig fi~rcc\. to f;icilitnle tlie opcra1ioti;il m~~~ncnturn 

provided h!. \upport 2nd follow-on forerr. ;and to \uirnlii tlie 

litles o~comnii~nic;itioti (LOCs)holiircal-;~re;i<to allin\ suificie~it 

\111)port thc~c p~t~~iliiil ol)eriilio~~~ posed :I \ip~iilica~iltlirooglipot capacity on rii;~i~i \uppl) nintes. 

clinlleupe to both ROK ;ind U.S. enpinccss, 

In Jatiu;isy of 199'). the Com~iinndc~.iti Cliicf (CII'C) ofthe 

Lri~itctlNation5 Cu~irnra~id and Combined Forces Cotnm;tnd arid 

the Co~nmander. U~iitetl Slate5 Forccs Korr;~. directed the 

cie\elopnient of a de!xilcd theater bridpc-tiianagemctit plan 

(TBbIP) to \uppol? cornpollent schemes of ninneuver. Thc 

\iynifica~~ceof hi\ gui~laiice is adequritely so~ninccl up by noted 

~nilitnr) histori;in Stephen Amhrose. who concluded that 

bridpes can be the rlccisive element in militas! c;irnp;iig~is.' 

Thi, axloni hold\ equ;illy true lor the battlefield employment 

and manayenlent of militiiry flinti~tid tixcd bndfeh in rlic Korca~i 

theater topera at ions (KTO). 

The Challenge We Face 

II meet the CINC's intent. tlis Comhincd Filrceh 

Comiii;~nd en,oi~iccr atnii-nith direct support from 

rlie United St;itcs Forces Korea. Eizlith U~iitetl States 

.Arri~y. and KOK field army en2ineer rtnffs--de\,elopeii o 

dytiatiiic TBMP to optimally allocate limited tht;itel- bridgi~ip 

:l\setc to tlieet c;itiipaifn requit-emeiits. Addirioiiell!, the TBXIP 

Sc~eral ;iltcrn;~ti\its \vci-c exalllined lo mirigarc hritlginp 

~li~irll'alls. TIic\u optjo~is iticluilcd c~iborinp tlic earl!. XIT~\ ;ilof 

ol'f-peninula U.S. -\riiiy rihhon-hridpe compiinirc to rneet the 

CINC'\ required dclivc~-!: ddntcs: tailot-i~ip l!.S a~idROK hridpcmoderri~zntion progr'ims to iiieet ihc thearer's i~~liclur. iiccds 

(Ibrcxaniplr. cc~o\e~ti~ip tri the rnulti~.olc h~idge COI~PIIII~. fieldiii: 

the WiiI\.eri~ie Ilea\) :~ssault bridge, and tlcveloping a suitable 

LOC bridging iyrtcm): and ctiiploying niilit;ir! c;iusc\!;iy 

systeins a\ well :IS proven. commercially manul';icti~sed panel 

bl-idping. 

Bridge-Employment Concepts 

The PLIS~OSC(if3 delihernte wet-g;ip TI\ cr crossio~ ik to 

npidl? project co~iibnt po\ver acro55 a \Y;II~S ohsrnclc 

at n fastcs sate than [lie elieni! can pcticsatc hi.; 

coi~ntenitt;icl, li~sci.\. itliile ~iiinimizi~ig the itnp;~ct ul'tiic ri\i.r 

on the ground coiii~iinnder'.: ;~hility to rna~ieu\~esIii~ forces.: 111 

the KTO. three types or h~idginy operation, are c~i~iductcd 

throughout tlic campaign u~ides vnriou\ battlefield cr~nditions: 
tain Tactical Mobility 

Facilitate Operational Momenium 

Figure 1. Employment of theater assault, support, and lines-of-communication bridging throughout 

the battlefield framework 

A\\ault bridging (when in contact \villi the cneniy ;ind 

cxposed to direct and obserued indirect fire,). 

Supp~~rt bridging (ivhcn cneni\; cutitact is unlihely hut rile 

po>ibiliry exist<of exposure to ohservcd indirect liresj. 

LOC bridgine (~.lietieneniy contact is very unlikely and 

there is no ilii~nilientthreat of direct or indirect fires). 

Both ROKand US.mra~dtbtidging nssets (such as the nr~nae[l 

vehicle-launclietl hridpe [AVLBIand tlie ribbonb~idpe).suppot? 

bridging assets (suchas [lie MGB, XIiT6. and Class [CL]60).and 

LOC bridging assets (such as tlic h.12 Bailey brid@eand 

commercially a\~:~ileblepanel bridfingl are an integral part of tlie 

maneu\.er conimaiider's coinbined assanlt. frdlo\6~-on.and 

sustninment forces. respectively. They are doctritinlly employed 

tliro~~hoitt thc depth of thc hattlrficld frameuork. as depictedin 

Figill-e I.to ensure continuousopelarional tempo. Tlic preferred 

hi-idzingassets to support these three forces arc prioritizeti based 

on tlic likelihood of enemy contact, the tlireat oi indirect firs?. 

and the speed at iiliich the assets can be emplir!ed. 

Both ROK ;liitl US. rihhoti-bridge colnpanieshave the snme 

organirntion and equipment. Consequently. these unlts are 

intercliane_cahle.Combined training hetwecn ROK and U.S. 

Ar~n?ribbon-bridge comp;~niesis conducted routincl) on the 

K~I-anpenincula. This is critical to support the iicnihle task 

organi~ationrcquired to support dccisiw opelation\. ,IROK 

or U.S.ribbon-hridpc company can span 215 meters 2nd cross 

200 \eliicleh per hour ~~ndcr normal crossine coniliti<~ns.Thc 

two mo\t limiting factors forribhon-hridge employment aretlie 

required ri\erdeptii of 24 inches (0.61 tnetcrs) to <upport llie 

minitnum dl~itof tlie bridge ;~ndthe river velocitie\. Higher 

river velocities necessitate crossing undel- c311tin11or risk 

conditions. Ths tahle belo\\ depicts the m:~ritiiumcspahilities 

and plannin,a factors for employing ROK atid U.S. ribbon 

bridge.' 

R0WU.S. Ribbon-Bridge Company 

I Components I Quantity 1 Capability I Planning Factors b 

Bridge platoons Six 6-float rafts (2 ramp bays1 

4 interlor bays): MLC 70' or Support platoon 215 meters of bridge (2 ramps1 

Interior bays 30 interior bays): MLC 96' 

wheeledl70' tracked Ramp bays ('normal crossing wlmax current 

velocw of 1.75 mus 16 f~sl) 

Rafl construction: 15 minl6-float raft 

Bridge construction: 200 m/hr (day): 

133 mlhr (night) 

Bridge retrieval: 1-2 hours1215 m 

Crossing rate (200 m): 200 veh1hr at 

16 kmlhr per vehicle and 30 m spacing 
Figure 2. Dynamic assault float bridging on successive river crossings 

over a notional timeline 

Both ROK and U.S. MGR assets. as well as ROK M4Th and 

CL 60 support bridging, lnust be rapidly elnplaced to return 

assault brides to the close battle. Additionally. fixed bridges 

such as the ROK and U.S. M2 Bailey bridge. the theater's 

primary LOC bridging asset. are required to replace bridges 

lost due to friendly interdiction and friendlyienem); denial 

operations throughout the campaign. These assets will open 

and si~stain rnovenrent along mobility colridors. Fixed bridges 

are "labor-intensive and expose personllel ti] enemy fire during 

construction but provide stable gap-crossing support for 

continuous operations."' 

Dynamic Assault Float Bridging 

TIre ribbon bridge is the theater's primary assault float 

hridge. Hoth ROK and U.S. ribbon bridges must be 

continuously and dynamically clnplaced, retrieved. 

replimced. and thcn moved forward ("leap-frogged") with 

assaultitlg forces to adequately support successi\.e deliberate 

river-crossin: operations to sustain tactical mobility. These 

assets are moved fonvard via airlift or groundair transport. 

Assault float bridees are then replaced by support/LOC 

bridging within 4 to I0 days, or as soon as battlefield conditions 

and equipment a\,ailability permit. The nssatllt tlont bridge5 are 

then returned to attacking forces. U.S. doctrine recommends 

rccovery of these bridges after 72 houra: however. extended 

lines of comnlunication, constrained Ionistics and transportation assets. and extensive fixed-bridge recjuirements make 

this nearly infeasible in the KTO.' 

Dynamic assault float brideing was deemed the most suitable. 

feasible. and acceptable course of action to provide component 

command+rs the capability to conduct river-crossings within 

a\~ailabletime. space, and resourccs. Additionally. this method of 

assault-float-bridee employment provides a tactically and 

operationally ad\-ant;~geous cheme of bridging operi~tions. witlun 

acceptable risk. thatjuctifiesthedynm~ic allocation of this critical 

resource. Figure 2 depicts the concept of dynanlic assaolt float 

bridging on successi~e river crossings over a notional timeline. 

The snapshot at C+70 indicates that :~ssault, support. and LOC 

hridgine will likely be conducled concurrently across the 

battlefield throughout thc campsign. 

Component Estimates and Analysis 

Estimates for component float- and fixed-bridge 

requirements wcrc developed and analyzed over the 

course of approximately 18 months. Combined Forces 

Cimrnand engineers published several point papers for senior 

military decision n~okers to hne the theater b~ideng challenges 

and present tlie concept of dynamic bridge management. 

Additionally. numerous combined deliberate plannine sessions 

%!ere conducted between December 1998 and h4arch 2000 to 

refine bridging estimates and develop thc TBMP Amphibious 

operations analysis conducted by the U.S. Army's TRADOC 

Analysis Center at Fort Leavenwonh, Kansas. from 1998 to 

1999 was also used to assess the it~~pact of additional theater 

brideing operations. 

Thefollou-ins i~ssumptionr wel-e nmade to analyze component 

estinmates within the context of dynamic assault-tloat-bridge 

management 
Arriving US. Ar~nybridge cotnpatiies will be fully sourced. 

Reception, staging, onwanl niovenlent. and integration of 

orrivin: U.S. Army bridge units will take an average of 12 

days. 

Successi\'e river crossings will take place at the times 

estimated by the C3 Operations Analysis Branch and the 

Center for Army Analysis inodeli~igefforts. 

One hunclred percent of the assault tloat bridpes will be 

leap-frogged from one river crossing to the tiext. excluding 

th? additional assets allocated ihr maintenance atid loss or 

damage. 

Assault floi~tbridges must he replaced by soppon 01-LOC 

hridging. 

Exiittt~gfixed bridges that span less than 18 meters will 

remain intact. 

4 'Twenty-five percent of tlic existing fixed bridges between 

IS and '0 tneters in length will have one span destroyed, 

but tlie piers and abutments will !.enlain intact. 

Fifty percent of theexisting fixed bridges that are inore than 

50 meters in lcttgth u:ill have two spiins destroyed. hut tlie 

picl-s and abutments will reiliait1intact. 

Based on hihtorical data from tlie niost recent U.S. 

contit1,oencyhridping opeiationh on the Sava River in Bosnia 

iii 1995. \re estimated three different factors for maintenance 

and loss or datiinge to assault float bridges: 10 percent for 

supporting-effort rivet. crossings. 20 percent for main-effort 

river crossings conducted early in the campaigti. and 30 percent 

for main-effort rivcr crossings conducted in support of decisive 

oper:ttions later in the campaign. Tlie I0 pet-cclit increase for 

main-sffon river crossings accounts for the extertdcd use and 

expected loss. damage. and accumulated wear on component 

bridging assets. Fu~idamentally,these planiiitig fi~ctorsimply 

that 70 to 00 percent of all assault float bridges are retrieved. 

replaced by support or LOC bridging. then moved lbruard to 

the tiext crossing site. Additionally, \vc estimated a 25 perccnt 

redundancy for bridge-erection boats at each crossing site and 

that assault bridging units that were redi~cedto he lo^^, 75 percent 

combat effectiveness u~ouldbe rcol-ganized to sustain tactical 

tiiohility.' 

Prclirnitlary analysis was conducted usitig a heuri\tic 

algoritlirnthat fully resourced assault float bridges for one rivercrossing operation before resourcing the next. liiitial results 

indicated that unconstrained bridging csti~natesexceeded 

available resources. Several alternatives uerc examined to 

mitipate the shortfall. Options included contititrally refining 

river-crossing estimates to adequately support componen~ 

schemes of maneuver, decrementing suppoi'ling-effort river 

crossings within an acceptable degrsc of risk. adjusting tlie 

a1i;uuv;lldate of off-peninsulaU.S. Army ribbon-bridgecompanies 

to tiieet the CINC's requircd delivery dates. enhancing fixedbridge de~iialplans to preserve assault tloat bridging early in 

the campaign. and e~nployingmilitary causeway systems as 

well as proven, conimercially nianuktctored panel bridging to 

lessen the burden on standard military support arid LOC 

bridging. 

The Theater Bridge-Management Model 

Combined Forces Comm;~ndengineers concluded that 

although the heuristic algorithm approach was an 

acceptable technique to analyze assault-float-bridge 

requirements. it didn't guarantee a mathematically optimal 

solution. Additionally. this approach couldn't handle the mixing 

of differelit bridging factors or varying constraints. Most 

importantly, it couldn't provide the detailed sensitivity analysis 

necessary to develop a balanced theater-wide float- and fixedbridge emplacetnent strategy. As a result. Combined Forces 

Comnimd engineers initiatedacoopcrative modeling effon with 

the C3 Operations Analysis Branch in October of 1998 to 

develop an interactive. \,ersatile, rcsponsivc. andtranspo~rahle 

PC-boscd analytical tool using cost-effective, co~nmercially 

available. off-the-shelf softwarc that allows timely analysis on 

multipl? river-crossing schemes to ensure near-optimal 

allocation of scarce bridging resources. 

Visual Thinking International's object-oriented si~nulatio~i 

package, SIMULS, was used to develop the Theater BridseManagement Model ('TBM2j.l A working prototype was 

co~nplctedby September 1999.and thc model was fully Lerified 

and validated by May 2000. Tlie TBM2's flexible nctu:ork 

metliodology provides unique interacti~eassuniption testing 

and rapid course-of-action building and feasibility an;~lyzing 

that complement the capabilities of existing combat iiiodels 

(such as TAC\VAR and ELIST). Its versatile architecture 

provides the capability to rapidly modify the niodel and input 

pa'ametels to reflect the specifications and fr:lnieu.ork of a u ide 

variety of logistics atid transportation prohlcms (such as 

demilitnri7.ed-zone obstacle breaching and lntle expansion). 

Model results are the11easily exported to Microsoft@ Excel to 

generate parametric statistics and evaluate me:lsures of 

effectiveness. 

Key Bridging Issues 

Tlirce key bridging issues continue to he exanii~~edin 

suppon of tlie TBMP: 

4 Increasing the nttmber of U.S. Army assault-float-bridge 

companies allocated to the KT0 in the event of a major 

theater war. 

4 Assessing the availability and employment ol'nonstandardbridging stock (such as military c;toseway systems atid 

commercial panel bridging) tomitigate theater fixed-bridge 

shortfalls. 

Refining the plan fol-etnploying fires to li~nitdamage to key 

bridges to minimize e~ieineerrepairefforts. 

Although riot all-inclusive. these issues represent the 

general focus of tlie Combined. Joint, and Amiy engineer staffs 

to finalize the TBMP. 

(r(~~!ri~iireil on pqe 33) 
' 
 PERSCOM Notes 


Bi.Liruferurnt Coioirel John R. LIICP 

Hcrc is a quick update on n couple of imporhnt items and 

some ;tdditional information you may find useful. 

Current MOS Strengths 

verall. we are doing very well in the Regiment. 


Several of out- MOSS have madc great increases in 


strength during the l;~st two years. The table below 


shows our cot-rent strengths. 

As you can see. the strenglh of Inany of our MOSS is at or Component (ACIRC) over the number-of authorized positions 

above 100 percent. This is great news. However, there are for those organizations. When we fill those positions. other 

several we need to improve: diver (008). prime-power- areas ill Ihc At-my must go short. 

production specialist (52E). and topographic analyst (81T). 

Additionally. we have a very critical need for airborne- Promotions 

equipment operators (62E and 621. esl~ecially privates to Promotion is a topic near and dear to everyone. and specialists). These are critical to our success as engineers. If there are no new secrets here. However, there are 

you have adesire to work in these ficlds, contact us or your rc- MOSS where we a1.e shott NCOs at the sergeant and tention noncommissioned officer urdiscuss it with your chain sr:iff.segeant le\,els, ~1~~~~ are called STARMOS~, 

of command. We can help you make the t~ansition to these t,,ilt soldiers in the MOS~ by grade on page 33) will be 

fields! Any 62ElOor62J10\vho wantstoattend AirbotneSchml to they complete primary 

and enter the exciting life of a paratroopel- should call us; we ~ ~ ~ d ~ ~~~~l~~~~~~ ~ h course ~ i have ~ points can help get you a school slot to get you on your way! validated. Soldier5 may be promoted conditionally to staff 

Also note that 100 percent srrcngth does not mean that sergeatit when their poino are validated, but they ~il~tst 

every position will be filled. We currently are required to fill cotnplcte the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course m~ithin 

recruiters, drill sergeants, and Active ComponentIReserve one year. 
Scrgeant STARMOSs: OOB, 51K, 5 I M, and 62H 

Staff sergeant STARMOSs: OOB, 5IM, and 52E 

Leaders should look at this list closely. If you have soldiers 

in theseMOSs who areeligible for promotion, any unnecessaiy 

delay in getting them to the board 01-school will delay their 

pl-ornotion.If they are not qualified for promotion, be specific 

in your counseling and give the soldiers concrete guidance on 

areas to improve for pro~notion.Advising them of this culrent 

situation could provide them the extra motivation to correct 

their deficiencies so they can get boarded, schooled, and 

pt.o~notedas sooil as possible. 

AssignmentPrioritiesand Guidance 

Man the l'orce. Get divisions and armored cavalry 

regiments (ACRs) to 100 Percent strength. This is 

the guidance we are following today as directed by , 

thc (:hiet of Staff of the Amly. Wecun.emly have two categories 

for assignments: Fill Priority I and 2. Fill Priority I assigtiments 

are the divisions and ACRs, recruiters, drill sergeants. Army 

combat-training centers (National Training Center, Joillt 

Readiness Training Center, and Combat Maneuver Training 

Center), AClRCpositions. andotherjoitlt-duty and higlh-priority 

assignments. Therest ofthe Army is Fill Prio~ity2. This means 

that we fill 100 percent of the positions in Fill Priority I units 

and fair share the remaining soldiers in Fill Priority 2 units. 

Soldiers Needed!!! 

We need soldiers for the following MOSS: 

OOB diver 

52E prime-power-production specialist 

XIT topographic analyst 

62EiJ airb<)rne-equiplnrntoperators 

If you ale interested, call us at commercial (703)325-4824or 

DSN 221-4824. 

Call Us 

Feel free to contact us, or your assignnxent personnel, 

with any questions. Remember that we can't help if we 

don't know there is a problem. And we surely can't 

sc~idyou to the assignment of your choice if yon don't tell us 

what it is bcfi~rewe make your PICA-t anssi,pnrnent. 

Lielrtenant Colonel LL~CPis the Brrrnrh Chi<f/orEngineer 

Enlisted Assi,qnmmrs. 

Febrcrary 2001 Engineer 33 

/ 

(continued from page 31) 

The Road Ahead 

validating the TBMP is an ongoing and evolutionary 

process. The main effort for both ROK and U.S. 

engineers over the next several months will be to 

implement the TBM2 to conduct detailed analyses on a wide 

range of dynamic float- and fixed-bridge employment schemes. 

We must integrate recent analyses of Korean roads. bridges, 

tunnels, and underground facilities to validate planning 

assumptions and enhance fixed-bridge repair and replacement 

strategies. Additionally, we must monitor bridge-modernization 

programs to explore and refine options to mitigate bridging 

shortfalls thecampaign, 

Specifically,we must carefully evaluate the impact ofthe U.S. 

conversion to the multirole bridge company and the turn-inof 

ROK bridging stocks (M4T6and CL 60)in future years. We must 

assess older ROK and U.S. bridging (like the ~2 

~ ~ i l ~ ~ ~ridp)withiEspecttoreadiness.maintenance,andtraining 

to maximize LOC bridging capability, employment, and 

sustainment, ~i~~ll~, we must determine the availability of 

potential bridging that is not currently allocated to this 

theater, hi^ includes bridging stock in sagami D~~~~japan; 

~~~,~nny~b~on.~ridgecomponentsthloug~ontt~e~~ve

ueseWec ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ and conunercially available stocks such 

as the noatinp MGB and modular bridges, 

~~~~~~i~~ these options will ensure battlefield 

employmentan~managementofmilitaryfloatandfixedbridging 

in the^^^, Y 

LTC Domhue commands the 41st Engineer Battcilion. 10th 

Mountain Division. Fort Drum, New York. Previously, /re 

served as Chief; Studies & Analysis Bronch, Plans Division, 

Asristant ChiefofStafl Engineer; Combined Forces Command, 

Scoul, Korea, a.s well as the Engineer Brigade S3 and 11th 

Engineer Battalion S3, 3d Infantry Division (Mech)at Fon 

Stewart. Georgia.A graduate of the VirginiaMilitary Instit~rte, 

LTC Donahlie holds a master's in operations researchjrom 

the Naval PostgradzrafeSchoolnnd is a licensedprofessional 

engineer in Virginia. 

Endnotes: 

' Ambrose,Stephen,PesosusBridge,New York: Simon& Schuster 

Inc., 1988. p.10. ' FM 90-l3lMCWP 3-17.1. River-Crossing Operations, 

Headquarters, Department of the Army1U.S. Marine Corps. 26 

January 1998,pp, I-I and 

, pp. C-9, and C-13, 

nBid,, p, 

Bid., p. 9-5. 

* E-mail correspondencebetween Colonel John F. Troxell, Chief 

of Plans Division, CFC AColS, Engineer. and Colonel Steven R. 

wawkios,Chiefof Staff3d Infanny Division (Mech), on 30-31 July 

1998. and Operation Joint Endeavor Bridging Research Analysis 

conductedby BRTCTechnology Research Corporation, 15 July 1998. 

'SIMULX, Visual Thinkng International,http://www.visualt.com. 
Obstacle Numbering.. .Critical to Planning, 


Tracking, and Reporting 


,A ct~i~imon problem for e~ipineer units training ;it the Combat 

Maneuver Trai~ri~ig Centel- (CMTC) is \'isnoli/ing the

counta-mobility eSSort. Specifici~lly. moji units llave poortnctics. 

tcchniqucs, ant1 ]~rocedures (TTP) f?~rplanning, tracking. and 

rcpr~rtinge~bstacles. Unit prohle~iis al-e compounded by a lack 

oSti11nili:lrity with tliedoctriiial obstacle-numbering con~ention 

described in FM20-32. ~Miir~~/(,~~~nitrr~niiie O[~rniriortc. They 

routii~elyu\c nonsta~~dardnumbering, resulting in conhsion 

duringplanniog. difficulty with tracking. and p(~orreporting of 

the cc~nntcrmohility elTort. Uccd properly. the dc~ctrin;~l I?- 

c,. ala~tcr .. , obstacle-~iumbcl-ing~mhcrig systcni f;tcilitatcs pl;ln~ii~ig.

tracking. ;ind reporting ofohst;~clc information. 

FM 20-32 clates. "The n~inefiel~llmu~litiot~ field ohrtaclenumbering systcm consists of I I characters and I obstacle 

status sy~iibol. It \hou:s tlic type of obstacle. (he belt and the 

zone in whicli it ir loc;~ted. and the headquarters tliirt 

cstahlishcd the /orre." All tlie intbr~iiati~~n needed to pli~n. track.

1001 A 1 B 

Zone Belt Group 

A 1 6 

and rcport obstacles is present. Figure I is an cx;~~iiple of the 

obstacle-nu~iiheri~igsystcm. 

Tlie doctrinal numbering system con-ects a unit tendency to 

byat ohstacles like a~lillc~y pal-gets. Tl~c "target" technique assigns 

;Iseries of obrtacle numbers to eachemplacing unit. The problem 

with this technique is terrain visualization. Higher headqua~rers 

cannot readily associnte the obstacle number a'itli a location on 

the ground. Tlie doctrinal numbering system p~.ovidcs ternin 

\-isuali7.nlion by a~iswering w,hcre (zone. belt. group). ~i.iiur 

(obstacle type), and the slnrrr.r (planned!, being PI-epared -. 

prepxed+ jtix rcser\:e ohst;rclcs]. ;lnd co~nplcte X). 

Units adapt the target tcchnique hecause the doctrinal 

system appears to be co~nplicatcd; however. the doctrinal 

system is dcceptivsly siinple. For example, ;it brigade level and 

belou,. the obstacle prcl'ix (di\.ision-level headqi~;lrtn.s) is the 

s:lmc for ;illobstacles. Similnrly. task-force-level engineeretii~rt 

is nol.mnlly coutninccl within onc obst;icle zo11c and so~lietimes 

within one obstacle helr. Tlicrefo~e, the task-force tacticaloperations center records the zone and belt for suhnlittinp 

reports to higher headqu;~rters. Finally, the engineel- platoon 

leatler only tracks the hell and group. What initially nppears to 

hc acurnbersonic numbering syste~n gets pmgressivcly simpler 

at lower levels. 

Anotherproblem with trackin: the counterni(~bility effort is 

:Itendency 111 tl.ack several distinct obstacles as a sinplc 

obstacle. This o\,ersimpliiicntinn of the c~hstacle plan 

clisrcgnrds tlie purpose c~fbottorn-LIP refinement. For example. 

many unit\ track a wire-mine-wire obstaclc;~~ a single ohstacle 

ratlicr than an ohstacle group consistil~g elf ~i.ire. trip/(?- 

.sroit~/(inl (WT)-~i!ii~~~fi~~l</, fi.? (MF)-and II'T. To clarify t~sking 

iuid rcporli~ip. the platoon lender plans multiple obstacles in 

each group ;~tid arsigns obstaclc numi~e~-s. In doing so. he 

completes tlie p1;uining process hy prouidin: bottom-op 

rcfinelnent. The result is a co~npletcd obstacle plan ;I( the 

origin;~tio~i headquarters (Figure 2). 

Psoper u\e of tlie ohstocle-~lunihcri~ig systcln ir show11 in 

Fipul-e, 2 and 3. 4 sketch of a block ohst;~cle group (A IBj is 

shown in Figure 2. The group wits pl;~nned at the task-li~rcc 

level. Thc platooli leadcr krrows the ohst;~cle intcl~t and tlie 

gc11em1 pcographic lncmion hased 011top-douzn planning. From 

dctitilcd recon~inissilnce. hc plans to complete this nbstaclc 

grot111 with live individual obstacles: ii.i,-c,. rrij~lr-sr~lri~l~ii.i

(WTOI ): 111iii<<f7~,/~1, iz~ii.s<i~!~~(, (MQO?); ,t,ilv, iri/~/~~~.si<iii[/[i~

(WTO3); ~i!iii[~/i~~/(l, itiiis(iit~~(~ (MQ04): illid ro<i(i (,ITI~PI: /!ash

(RHOS). Thecomp:kny tracks the ohst;sle group on i111cxecl~lion 

mat~ix(Fignrc 3). 

WT 01 X 

Wire, Obstacle 


triple ti 01 


standard 


Figure 1. Obstacle Numbering 
IOOlAlBWTOIX 

Figure 2. Obstacle Planning 

'Reference lo reserve-obstacle execution matrix 

Figure 3. Directed-Obstacle Execution Matrix (from FM 90-7, Figure5-1) 

The platoon leader uses the sarne matrix as an executionand-report inatrix. For example, assunre thc first obstacle is 

complete (A IBWTOIX). The platoon leader reports 

"AIBMQOZ-" when bepinning the second obstacle. Upon 

completion, the report hecotnes A IBMQO1-X. The company 

[hen repons lo higher headquarter\ on tile status of the group. 

Since Group AIB consistsoffive obstacles and two ofthe five 

obstacles are complete, tlie starus report is "Group A1 B 40 

percent complete." The zonc-helt tlesign;ltion is nearly 

transparent at tile platoon level but easily used at higher lc\.els 

for visualir;iliu~i of the counter~nohility ct'k)rl. 

Using the proper ~numhering convention fisilitates topdown pla~iningand hotto~n-upretineme~it. It helps hubordinare 

units refine the plan nnd send inrormation to higher 

headquarters. The numhcring \?stem Lecds directly into a 

tracking systerri and pmmpts leaders on the gi-ound to send 

I-epolls. A cle;u.undentandingof tlie doctrinal numberingsystem 

will help alleviate problems with obstacle planning. tracking. 

and ieporting. 

Gr/>ioiit Erzrlnnr. o hrijirrtlr cfrlgii7rer oh.ser-vei~/rv~iii~(~//~

[ti ihr CMTC, wits prc,~.i(xt~h (I /~l<tr(~oit IPN~~I- mmd .YO, 16111

E~igiirerrB~ttt(r1ion (Cor/>.s Me(,h).in Botnbrr,~, Gr~~nroqr7iI 

Bosaio. Ifr also (.rm71nonrlcd C/326 Eri,qincer Borrnlion, F(JI-I 

Coi~~/?h(,ll,K(,niiic.ky. 

Lirt~rar~otrr Coloi7~I Si17ifl1, //I(' sriii~~ er~giii~rr ~l?.s~ri,~r/

r.or~lrol/rr(11 r11eCMTC. bws /?rr~~iiiti.s/y rh? errcirti1,e r~fi(.er 

fill- rhc~ 54rh Errginr,o- R~riictlion, Hnrr?box, G?rnfun\: 
Liberate Cortina! 

Engineer Success 

on the JRTC Battlefield: 

An OPFOREngineer Perspective 

Serving as the Opposing Force (OPFOR) task-force 

engineer for IX rot:~tions at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Loui>iana. provided 

kc) insight on how successful engineer operations allow a 

brigade-plus organization to acconrplish a aartime mission. 

Each year. I O light infantry bl-igades came to JRTC to participate 

in one of the most realistic combat-training exercises in the 

U.S. milltar). Brigade colnmanders are expected to accomplish 

the given mission \virile leadi~rg6.000 soldiers. draling with the 

clrallcnge of n role-playing civilian populace and news media 

and. of course. conducting combat operations against the 

insurgent and invading forces of Coni~i;~. a fictitious country 

developed by ihc staR at JRTC. An important lcsson learned 

by cach brigade is the impormnce ofmobility. cuuntermobilty, 

and sun-i~ahility operations to mission accomplishment. 

Engineers prcparing to enter Co~tina need to understa~rd a 

few important concepts to enjoy success on this light 

battlefield. First. they must understand the strengths nnd 

weaknes\e\ ofthe OPFOR. Second, a Blue Force (BLUFOR) 

urrit ~rlust secure and guard an OPFOR obstacle once it is 

encountered. Third. and most important. securing the breach 

site is the key to ;I successful breach on the JRTC battlefield. 

Understand OPFOR Strengths and Weaknesses 

Thc OPFOR at JRTC has many strengths and 

weaknesses that differ from U.S. units. The forces of 

Cortina do not have the resources on which U.S. 

solil~ers rely. The enemy soldiers are forced to substitute 

i~igenuityand tenacity to compensate for this lack of resources. 

Success can be gained by understanding the strengths and 

weakncssrs of this enemy. 

OPFOR Class IV and V supplies are very limited for 

counter~liobility operations. An S2 can analyze the luiown 

encni) ohstncle on the ground against the templated Class IV 

and V resources to determine future countermobility capability. 

Tlie typical complex obstacle found in Corti~ra during a People's 

Democratic Republic ofAtlantica (PDRA) defense contains 40 

rolls of u'ire iurd I5 mines (see figure on page 37). 

The T\4-62 is uscd in probable breach points due to the 

effectiveness allowed by its fuse. Although there are many 

variants. the \.errion of the TM-62 yonrayed at JRTC has a 

seismic. magnetic. and pressure fuse. It is the antitank (AT) 

mine preftrred by OPFOR soldiers on the ground. The box 

mines (YAM-5 and TMR-D) are not as effecti\e. and they are 

difficult to bury properly because of their large size and 

rectangular shape. The AT [nines will be reinforced and 

protected by anripcrsonnel (AP) mines, typically OZM--3s. 

either placed on the flanks or ticd in to the \\:ire obstacle (ver), 

effective method). Air-delivered scatterable mines can be used 

by the PDRA. The systern requires lrlultiple passes froni the 

MIL17 HIP (helicopter) for emplacement. This platform is 

extrenirly viilnerable to l1.S.Army air-deiense-artiller)' assets 

and is not as capable as an air Volcano for seeding ;I lag? area 

(onlv200bv I00 tnetersi. , , 

Tlie OPFOR in Conina has a very limited amouilt of combat 

pov,er to maneuver against the enemy. Tl~e Coltina Liheratioti 

Rant typically fields about 150 soldiers during the lo!vintensity 

conflict. The PDRA xi11have less than 250 soldiers and a sniall 

mechanized counterattack force during dcfensi\.e operations. 

The importance of these numbers to the task-force cngii1ee1-is 

the limited number of troops pn~viding security at the obstacles. 

A olntoon or less will ~rovidc cover and observation for a 

major tactical obstacle. The OPFOR infantry has \,en few 

transportation assets and therefore a limited ability to move 

forces quickly in the area of operations. The tanks arid Soviet 

mechanized infantry \,chicles (BMPs) mn move quickly to 

provide supporting fires, but once they have started their 

engincs. it is only a matter oftime before OH-58 helicopters or 

AC- 130aircr.zfr will find them by their thermal ima~e. Therefore. 

the OPFOR commander will only bring mechanized forces out 

of hide sites when he sees that the situation is urgent and is 

willing to risk those assets. One important riiethod the OPFOR 

uses to make up for a IackoTtroops is employinp the L.ees\ille 

Urban Group (LUG). These terrorists in civilian clothes and 

lorlg hair blend with the population to providc intellige~lce on 

BLUFOR activities. They routinely infiltrate a U.S. perimeter 

under some false pretense of waking site sketches to post in 

the Cortina Liberation Fro~lt'c tactical-operations center. They 

will also be called on to execute offensive terrorist operations 

such as ruck bombs. truck bonrbs, sniper attacks. and ambushes. 
m The f~rstwile obstacle is more than 100 meters from the second to avoid being breached by a slngle MlCLlC 

AP mines are tied to the wire and placed on flanks to stop dismounted forces 

A serles of AT mines IS placed in a row to defeat a roller or plow by causing multiple hits n the same spot. 

All wire is tied with barbed wire on the top with 6-inch ties. 

The separations between the sets of wire allow vehicles to be trapped. 

m Mines are placed in the wire to stop a charging MI tank. A damaged or destroyed heavy tank in the wire 

IS an extremely effective obstacie. 

A iog is placed between rows 4 and 5 lo block the breach with a bangalore torpedo 

Typical complex obstacle used by the PDRA during thedefense 

OPFOR ii~diri.ctblirc :~ssstioacd ;~faitt,t hrcochinf forces 

;ire alw at risk. Mort;tr~cii~iisII~IYCto tlispli~ccquickly ti] ilvoid 

crn~ntcrlire(typically 4 ~iiinutcsor lcss). Artillcry acquired h) 

ths ANTTPQ~.36Fire-Fi~tderR;i&~rSy\teni \+illu\t~:illyrccei\c 

counterfire hclore it can ~li\pl;~rr The OPFOR will have roldiel\ 

or terrorist\ lir~nitltc LllGs tli:tt repn~tthe directi<moi~hcAN/ 

TPQ-36. Ttlc task-fcircc eilgi~iccrsiiol~ldcii\~~retlii~thi\ \(ildicrs 

nre receiving i-aditr covci'sgc duriiiy brcachi~~gopelntiot~r. 

Whelt covclrJ hy the ANITPQ-36. tllc OPFOR's a.illiilfnc\s I<) 

lile1111 ;I hrcitcii j~ointwill bc arficted. Thc ohstacle will he tial 

in to tile tcrr,lin (i~suallva.atero1.3 h\vit~lii)l2nd co\,ercd hv S2- , , . . 

i~iiliinicterntmrtar. ilnor hy :ulillev ~~rr~ckct Ire. 

BLUPOR ci~gi~iee~-s prcj~~t~itlf for the dcfc~iseileed lo 

ondsrsinnd the m<~hility111. tllc OPPOR wlrile lightin: 8s ilie 

PDRA Tlic day hclorc thz attack. divisii~iticcon unit, tl.;lvci 

lltc pla~tncd~iiecll;irii/cd alt;ick rl~ute\to report ohstaclc 

conatroction ;ind ~lisp<isitionof B1,IIFOK Iror~ps.They ;trc 

Ibllowrd by the brigade rcco~~ to eive itn updated st;~tu\.Both 

recon forces :I\ oid contic1 t~nlch\a high-payoff target prcscnrs 

itbclf (p:trkecl Volcnnocs arc :I ia\,orite). Ligl~tI?)rccs hegin 

m;~rchiii@tlic tiipl~tbefore tlic littack, clearing the roulc with 

attachccl s;lplie~-sand killing tl~cHLllFOR \ccuring thc route. 

Iniix~uni11"rgct~for tile disi~~ountedfoi-ces are \iolconuc\. 

Modular Pack Miiic Sy\tcms (MOPMS).;III~Hornets 11131have 

yet to hc c~i~ployed. The BLUFOK i).plc;~lly do not cmploy 

thesz systetri more 1hi1114 I~our\hclOre llic attach clue to the 

tliirrt-ilui'atii~~idestrt~cti~~tt tiltlcs. Dis~noul~lcdf(~rccsthat find 

a~~d dertroy Ilic\e ;ir\ct\ hefi~rctlicy are ;tctiv;tled n\.nid ;I 

t;rtici~lhreach. u:hicli makcs it ~lifficultfor thc RI .IIFOI< to till 

lllc pap before the 111;1inclli~rt:~iri\.c\.OPFOR c~,rnp;~i~ici on 

the ~~~IIIOLIII~C~ r~rtlesIeil\'c i~srlldicr at caclr pr~i~tt 01' hrcach 

10 cn\ilrc tIi;it the ~~ischnt~irc~l :trtack finds the lane atld ~;ISSC\ 

tl~r~,tigli the ohstaclc. Tltc mecllirni/cd attach lauilches ;I! first 

light 011 thc ~liorningofthc atti~ck.The OPIFOK I\ prelxlrcd to 

uhiit ii\ ~niai~l clforl rtriniites hefirre rollout. 

The l~tohilityc~itlicT~h2sis ari ir~iponitntklctor to co~~sitlcr 

\ulicn prcp;~ring;ill<~l)~tuclc p1;11i.The OPFOK tnccli;t~iii.eil troop 

is accurroined to tr;~vcllin~thnrl~ghtlic w;llnpi;, l)iinot cxpcct 

tlicr~iti1 k~llon.tile wad or\\:ell-r*rabli\hed trails. They rcp~~iarly 

\t~rlxiscU.S. t.orcc\ hy cn~crgingfi-oil1tlic wc~odline ;tt ;Il~ifh 

rntc of pccd. at time\ \\ithi11 the armin. range of :I tuhcI:~unchcd.optically iri~ckcd,wireguided (TOW) ittissilc. They 

also arc 11ot;tfr:iid <)l'tI~cipocir lr:~ctio~l in tllc lo\vl~111<4s. l)[~ritl~ 

some r~~lnliotic. the OPFOR loci mr,x tracks by pcttinp stuck 

ill the mod tii;~nfrom eilcmy fin. By tno\ing tlir~~ugli ihess 

u~rexlxctddnvenues of appro;~ch. ihcy :tru able to ;IplJex at 

tlic brigade supporl r1re;r r,r tactic;li-~~pcrdio~~~ cc~iicr\~,itiiii-u 

casualties. Some T-h2<areequipped with a inine-clcaririf plow. 

Tlis is on i~~tlx)rt;~nl f;lct to ternemher \vlii'n tciiiplaling n 

sc:ltterahlentincficl~l.Tl~cIOLI density (if4T11ii1ic~in sc;~ttcnhle 

1111ileficldsmale5 thcm at1 eas!. bl-e:~clifor rilecl~;~tti~ed force\ 

1~1incdin proper pliiu. tecl~niql~cs. The meclt;~ni/cdiitt;tck has 

xcveri~lplo~tiitiks tlii~tiirc pt.nlicieitt in tllc hrei~chilig<Ir111. 
Secure OPFOR Obstacles 

The BLUFOR ~nust secure thc area around an OPFOR 

obstacle once it is encountered on the JRTC 

battlefield. The OPFOR uses an ohstacle as a choke 

point to commit its limited forccs. The PDRA con~ma~~der often 

launches his limited mechanizetl assets or even moves infantry 

to capitalize on BLUFOR preoccupied with beaching 

operations. Many times BLUFOR troops encountel-an ohstaclc 

and either fail to report its location or thcir report is ignored. 

These mistakes cause other BLUFOR vehicles to be involved 

in mine strikes or an ambush. 

The engineer colnpaliy needs to identify. mark. and breach 

each obstacle. In addition, the ohstacle needs continued 

observation and clearing to protect against reseeding of the 

minefield. OPFOR soldiers will place an additional mine at the 

end of a hreach la~re to produce casualtics and weaken the 

BLUFOR's confidence in the routes. Any minefield that is 

cleared and then left unsecure will havc thc same \\'ire strung 

back across the road. Mines taken from a local cache are also 

emplaced. If a mi~lcfield is not to be completely clearcd, the 

cleared lane needs to be nrarked with a system that will withstand 

heavy military traffic and forces civilian traffic to drive only 

through the clearcd 1;lne. 

Concertina wire that funnels the traffic is a provcn technique. 

Any marking system that allows a driver to stray from the lane. 

go around the marking system, or knock down the markers will 

lead to BLUFOR casualties. In addition. Cortinian natives who 

were not briefed on >I lane-marking system will also use the 

breach lane during their ilaily travels. A destroyed civilian 

vehicle in a BLUFOR-controlled obstacle does not look good 

on the national newscast. 

Secure the Breach Site 

Securing the operation site is the key to a successful 

breach on the JRTC battlefield. The other breaching 

fu~idanientals-suppress. obscure, reduce and securemust also be completed to standard. hut the enemy's eyes on 

thc ohstacle are his streugth. Properly securing the obstaclc 

will prevent the OPFOR from obser\,ing the attacking BLUFOR 

and calling observed indirect fire. 

Suppress. Suppression of the rarget is most effectively 

executed hv usinz -indirect fire. The OPFOR orovidinc securitv " 

of the obstacle will not show itself when presented with an 

organized breach force. This lnakes direct-fire suppression vely 

difficult. The OPFOR remains in the vegetation and interdicts 

the enemy using its own indirect assets (primarily 87.n1iIlimeter 

mortars). In addition, small-arms direcl-fire engagements 

typicillly come out in the OPI'OR's favor. 

Obscure. Obscuration of the obstacle reduces thc number 

of direct-fire casui~lties but will not eliminate casualties due to 

indirect tire. Keeping in mind the small sizeof the typical obstacle 

emplaced by Cortinian forces, obscuring the cxact location of 

soldiers is not sufficient to save them from mortnr rounds. The 

OPFORcommander will direct his troops to have a 10-digit grid 

coordinate for the ohstaclc and probahle breach points. The 

blastradios of an 82-millimeter moltar or a 152-millimeter artillery 

round will affect the engineers in and around the wire. 

Coordinate with the chemical units or fire-support officer to 

assure that the smoke will arrive on time and on target. 

Reduce. Reduction of the ohstacle needs to be executed 

qoickly. All mines are suhsurface unless placed on a hardhall 

road. Do not attempt to remove the mines from the route. The 

seismic fuse on the TM-62 will kill anyone who attempts to 

removc it. Be aware of OZM-3 trip wilrs while :~pproachingand 

cutting the concertina. The OPFOR in the dcfense slrifts forces 

to affect BLUFOR troops during a breech. The fol-ce 

augn?entation could range from a few scouts to a tank-BMP 

teani. Moving BLUFOR Ibl-ces through the breach allows them 

to fight in an open area past theohstaclc and out ofthe pl:~nned 

engagerrrent arcil. 

Secure. Securing the operation site is the key to a successful 

b~.eaclron t11c JRTC battlefield. The small number of OPFOR 

soldiers providing observation cin the ohstacle demonstrates 

that indirect fire is the key to obstacles in Cortina. The fil-st 

rounds cause casualties and begin the casni~lty-evacuation 

process. Each successive wave of BLUFOR trying to brcach 

and rescue f2llen comrades only adds to the pain of the process. 

Infantry forces must secul-e the point of breach and clear the 

sorrounding area through occupation before the ohstacle can 

be reduced. Sewching theimmediate area llushes out OPFOR 

and identifies hide sites. Once the immediate area is secured. 

the surrounding terrain needs to be swept to ensure that 

OPFOR scouts :Ire not w;liting to call a fire rnibsion. Removing 

OPFOR cyes t?onr tlre obstilcle tnakes the reduction an easy 

battle drill. 

Conclusion 

Engineers who heed these suggestions will he more 

successful both on the JRTC hattleficld and in light 

conflicts. Rerne~nher lo know and understand the 

OPFOR. Locate the ohstaclc. secure the site. :lnd remain in 

control of the area after the hre:lcli. This knowledge will allow 

the most intelligent use of engineer forces in the breach and 

the defense. greatly improve ihc BLUFOR's pc~fnrmance, and 

produce a better-trained and -prepared forcc. Y 

Cnpriiin Marrh~,~i:.s is :he S4 of :he 27th Engiiiec.r 

Rn:fnlioii (ABN), Fort Bmgg, Norfii Cnr-olina. HP n.os 

/v~~vinu.si~ ii~i> OPFOR task:furr~a en~irzeer; //SOY Irifrrntr? 

(ARX), or flr~,JRTC: irvsistir~ir oprrorioiis off'icri: HHC/ 

20th Engiiirer RI-i,qudr (ABN), Fort Brn,q,y; cri~d vrrtical 

plnioon 1cad1,r. For-i Polk. CPTMatthe\l.,s hol(i,s a hricheior 

of .scierlc~~de~rec in ri1,ii ~n,yinerrirl,y fronr thp Geor,qio 

1n.riifufrof techno lo^!. urtrl is u yt-udu(ir~of ihr Airboriir. 

Juny~ntasrer, orrd Rorr~rr- Sclzou1.s. HI, i.s ii pr-ofe.s.sio~icil 

e~r,qOreerin Mis.soui,i. 
West Point Cadets 


Train With the 416th ENCOM 


Rs Coloitrl Kohot Phillips 

Traditionally West Point cadets 


are assigned to active Army 


unils for their cadet troop-leader 

training (CTLT). Howcve~; this year two 

cadets completed their troop-leader 

training with Army Reserve engineer 

units that were on annual training in an 

installation-related construction mission 

at Fo~t Dix, Yew Jersey. Accordingto the 

;~cademy's Engineer Branch reprcsentative for the Department of Militar), 

Instruction, this year's Reserve 

Componenr CTLT with the 416th 

Engineer Conimand (ENCOM), headquartered in Darien, Illinois, was a first 

for the United StatesMilitary Academy. A cadet operates a vibratory roller at the Manchester Road project site. 

After arriving at Fort Dix on 10 July meetings and briefed lii\ platoon's b~n;ider tr:lining expcricnce in engineer 

2000, the cadets were assigned to progress. By training wilh Army Reserve operations. A spokes~nan for the 416th 

companies of the 458th Engineer units, he learned that troop leading is the ENCOM observed thar the two cadets 

Battalion (Combat) (Wheeled). The sane whether working with active w rcceived training time equal to the West 

cadets gave classes on troop-leading reserve personnel. After completing his Point cadets l1c sponsored while on 

procedures and the proper placement of CTLTrotation, he decided that his brauch active duty. He explained that Reservc 

obstacles to deter an enemy. They led of choice would hc engineer. units are out in the field the majority of 

squads 011 ambushes, helped run several The second cadet was assigned to the the time whileon annual training in older 

weapon.; ranges. participated in / equipment platoon of the battalion's to maximize their training opportunities, 

demolition training, andlearned todeploy j ~ ~ and ~ ~ ~ while d ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ the cadets he sponsored on active 

bangalore torpedoes. The cadets also company during half of the duty spent rnuch of theirtime in garrison the 

took part in the unit's 72-hour Sapper training and supervised his and not in the field on engineermissions. 

Stakes tactical operation against an platoon's construction of a helicopter within the past few yean, the term 

opposing force. The executixre officer of gunnery staging area. H~ "seamless Army" has been replaced by the 458th Engineer Battalion stated that battalion st;lff lneetings to brief the "the Arnmy," connoting that the active 

the cadets worked ha]-d and had fun bur ; progress of his pl-oject and Army, the United States Army Reserve, 

did not hesitate to ask questions. ! served as an assistant range officer for and the Army National Guard arc all 

especially concerning platoon-sergeant the rifleand .50-caliberranges. Believing partners in the total-force concept. The 

and platoon-leader t-esponsibilities. i illat the training was one of the more 416th ENCOM's participation in the 

~~~i~~ the second half of their CTLT interesting experiences he had had in the United States Military Academy's CTLT 

rotation, the cadets were assigned to the militaly, thecadet recommended that the program is but another example or the 

165th Engineer Battalion (Combat) Acadenry sendmorecadets toparticipate relevancy of the Reserve Co~nponents in 

(Heavy). One cadet led the horizontal in annual training with Reselve units. the Anny. Y 

platoon for A Compilliy and was The two cadets were pleased with n coml~tr-ollerin designated the officer in charge of the their Reservc Component CTLT Colon~lPliiIlip,~, th~416rlz 

Manchester Road resurfacingproject. In rotations. They especially appreciated ENCOM. has over 29 years of corn,nissioned 

addition to his supervisory duties, he was being given an opportunity to train in 

scn:ice. A jirndlrnte /,f rile hedge Ad~~ncute 

Ge,!erul:\ Sclrool rrnd the Jild~e Adi,ocofe given the opponunity to operate some two different types of engineer General :,Of/i(~~rAdvcir~ied Course, he holds 

mad-construction equipment. As platoon battalions. Serving in both combat-heavy i1cgrer.s ,p'orn 1,rdiana Uni~~rsiry and the 

leader, he attended battalion staff 1 and combat-wheeled units galrethem a D~PairlUtzivcrsin. CollegeqfLo~:Cllicugo. 
Hx Dl: krr~;v R~be~.f.s 

i ~ 1 . 1 6 i 0fh~Apri1 l System(MARKS). However. that file- hrochurei, and pictures ol' changes of 

1994 i.s.s~reof En,' "~nccr. I dndunit history in gcnclnl-can actually comln;~~rdand organizational-day 

I 

serve theunit commander in two wavs: It actit ities. Wlrilc these latcr items have 

n more t1l:ln one instance, young 

1

~ can enhance unit nlorale and esprit de mcrit. they do not cotrrpletzly document 

I : 

officers h:ive walked into the History col-ps and provide information for the unit's accomplishments in a,ar or 

command decision making. This is peace. Invrrriahly. those same officers Office at the Engineer School with ; returned to my office in search of more the n~ission of writing a liistory of tlleir possible only if there is command 

nnit. Usu:~lly, the task wasgiven to them i emphasis. 	 infolination. They ultimately le:~rned that 

gathering material on their units is a slow by a h;~ttalioti commander who wanted Few ol' those young officers who 	

PI-ocess that involves work in^ with ;I snmething for ncw soldiers to read. The entered my office knew of a unit history 

obvious purpose of such a docl~rnent is file. Once informed of its possible numher of federal organizations. Howcvcr. with patience and determination, to instill a sc~rse of nridc in the onit. existence. they went to it andofterr found . . 


fostelinr unit ;lnd csorit de corns, liltlc of value to their task. Unit history 1i tlhey can get what they need. 
 b 

This is the tradition:rl ricw of unit liistury. I'ilcs run the gamut from littlcornothing 1 Before contacting federal organIt is tlre reason units are allowed to (except for last year's :innual history 	 izlltiorls for inl'orln;ltion. the unit 

maintain an orgnnirational history file 1 report) to a collection of ].andom news- 	 historian should examine the unit's 

within the Modern Artny Recordkecping 1 paper clippintis. change-of-corntnand 1 	 lineage and honors (see page 41). often 

found in the comn?ander's office. This 

will save n lot ol time. The lineagc and 

li(~n(~rs details the unit's fedel~ll scrvice 

and idcntil'ies the variouscatnpaigns for 

uhich the organization h;ls service 

credit. By knowing the pel-iotls offedeml 

service. the action officcr can disregal-d 

thoseconflicts di~rinp which the unit was 

inactive. Thc lineage and honors also 

iderrtifiespatrntorganizntionsTheir files 

and histories ;IW logically n part of the 

hcl-itage of tlic unit and should be 

ena~irined ils well. The carnpr~ign creclits 

tell the researcher ~1le1.e the unit served. 

Camptrign credits for the Pacific in World 

War 11 means that the officer cnn i, c7nore 

the European theater when doing work 

in published historical works. After 

reviewing the lineage and honors, the 

action officer can begin contacting 

other organi7,ations for additional 

information. 

Unit crest of the479th Engineer Battalion 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Constituted 22 February 15'1't in :he Aray of the United States as rhe 

12c.5ch Enjlnee: Combat Sattallon 

Activated 3 April 1544 at Cm.p Howze, Texas 

Inactivated 25 January 1546 at Canp Z,,wie, Texss 

Hedesignated 15 April 1447 as 128jth EngiceerConstruction Sattalion; 

concurrently allotted to Orgaxized Reserves zi-~d assi,;r.ed to First Arry 

Activated 1 Xay 1547 at Buffalo, Nev York 

(Orgmired Rcserves redesignazed 25 March 154G as Orsanized Xeservt? Corps; 

redesi<nat.cd in 1452 as Army Reserve) 

Redesigr.ated 16 jx~e 14b8 as 474th Ensineer Constrliction Battalion 

Inactivated 6 July 1450 at 3uffal0, Piew Yurk 

Redesignated 22 A:;ril i4j4 as 475th Battalion (An~l-~~.b!.o~us) 

Activated 1 i/l.iy 1555 vitii Herdquarters at irlatertown, Yew YorZ 

Rmrgarlzi-6 li: J-.~.ll;ary 1563 as b75th Engineer 3attalion (Combat.) (Am:.;) 

EOMF W,E,EA: First ilnlted States A~my(I1 UniteC States Aray Corps) 

CANPAIGX PARTICIPITI3i! CREDIT 

World Wa:x 

Central hurope 

Ey Order of the Secretary of the Amy? 

I. C. LRI.IEE37 

l1,aJor General, VSA 

The Adjclsnt Grrer,?j <9bit 

qE0 ' 
There are a number of sources of unit Southeast Asia. Often, the Military determine what is available. Again, with 

history. The National Archives in History Institute at Carlisle Barracks. patience and determination, enough 

Washington, D.C., contains unit files for Pennsylvaoia, is the best single source material can be collected to write a unit 

hundredsolorganizations.especially for for much of this type of publication. history that is usefill in telling new 

the years of World Wars I and II and the Milirory Bigineer and Engineel; the soldiers a story of challenges and 

Korean and Vietnam Wars. The major ptufessiorial bulletin of Army engineers, accomplishments. 

disadvantage of using the Amhives is have traditionally published articles on That story normally deals with 

the cost charged to reproduce the files. unit activities. The Defense Technical operations io war because most of the 

A unit that chooses to purchase complete Information Centcr (DTIC) has some of ilifor~nation found in the Archives, 

files normally finds copies of material the quarterly reports (lessons leanred) C . ' a] Isle Barracks, and other places deals 

(such as unit orders and correspondence) , w~itteliby engineer units in Vietnam. Many with units in war. While that is important, that have little merit Cora written history. Army libraries have access to DTIC mtd combat constitutes only a small part of 

However, scanning the files to sott out ( can ordcr these reports. any unit's overall history. A greater the unwanted material I-equires a trip to ; ~~e~istory~~fice,~fficeo~tlle~hie~ a~nountof time is spent inpeacetimcand the At-chives, something few units can 	i of~ngineers, at~l~~~~d~i~, "irginia. has involves the countless challenges and 

afford. One of the best approaches is to I ,, ,,tensive unit-history collection, A requirements of an Army not at war. 

contacl Criends or associates in the tnasterindexforeac~unitidenti~ieswhat Ironically. the unit's eflorts i n Washington area and ask lhen1 to spend type of material is present. including oral peacetime in such areas as training call 

a couple of hours in the Archives. interviews with seniol-engineer officers. provide the second important bcnefit of 

Other information can be round in In addition, a call or note to the Or- unit history and the organizational written histories. such as the official histo53 ganizational History Branch of the Center history file-support for decision making. of WOI-Id War Il puhlislied by the Center i of Military History can produce Unit commanders face numerous 

of Military History. Washington, D.C.. or infol-mation on the unit's history andthe challenges over the course of their 

books written by participants. Some ' synlbology of the olganization's crest command. Requirements for mainmaterial can he found in publications such i or distinctive unit insignia. tenance, training, and post and family as the Srors und Stripe.$ and Yank i While the Engineer School at Fort support compete for attention and 

magazines. Command newsletters, such as I 

I Leonard Wood has been slowly resources. This is not new. Peacetime is 

the Cc~stic Col~rier (the newsletter of the 

engineer commnnd in Vietnam). are 	' collectingunit is much we traditionally the most demanding period 

I do not have. A call or note would for an army because resources al-e scarce excellent sources for units that served in I 

This historical photo of the 8th New York State Militia is an example of recording unit history. 

42 E~lgincer 	 Fehruar): 2001 
This photograph, 


taken by CPT 


Dunham of the 43rd 


Engineer Battalion, 


Fort Benning, 


Georgia, shows 


humor in recording 


his unit's history. 


and reqoirements are not. Tlie know , 

ledge of how one's predecessors handled 

these conflicting demands would benefit 

any commander. 1 

For exatnple, if aftel--action reports / 

from unit field training excrcises (to 

include thosc at the National Training 

Center) were maintained ovel. time, the , 

current command could identify areas of 

consistent strength or weakness. When 

coupled with colnpietio~l reports of 

construction projects, post-support 

detail summaries,etc., ~lewcomrnanders ! 

would know quickly what challenges to 

expect. Copies of annu111 organizational 

inspections, especially in the areas of , maintenance, would reveal the impact of 

these demands on the readiness of 

cqoipment, unit morale, and soldier 

support. I 

Many of these reports are found in I 

other files in the headquarters, such as 

the S3 andS4files. However, these items 

normally have acomparatively short file 

life. Regulatory rcquirellients to retire ' 

certain files after a cutoff date, and the 

simple need fur file space, rlor~nally 

account fol- the dcmise of historically 

significant documents. By contrast, the 

Organizational History File, MARKS 

number 870-Sa, is a per~nanet~t file. 

Regardless of who maintains the file. it , 

exists as long as [he unit does. Therefore, : 

the matcri;~l ~laccd in lharfile will always , 

be available to comlnanders or their 

staffs. ! 

Somemay consider it strange to put a 

command-inspection report or a field 

exercise after-action report in a "histoly" 

file. That is because too many believe 

that history is what happened 20 or 30 1 

years ago. In Pact. yesterday is history: 

it has happened and cannot hc changed. : 

The material placed in the historical file j 

today becomes the historical material 

for ;!I1 who serve in the unit in the 

future. Invariably, thevalue of that file is 

driven by the quality uf lnateriai placed I 

init. ! 

One of important itenlsthat I 

I 

could be placed in the file is the 

review and assesslnentof 

activities. Virtually every unit is required 

to produce some formof annual historical 

report. Often, these documents are of 

marginal value, being only copies of last 

year's input with the names, statistics, 

and dates changed. However, this veport , 

could be invaluable if seen in thecontext 

of what was done, why, how, and the I

: 

lessons learned frorn the effort. An 

annual-or even mol-e frequcntsummary of what the unit did, what 

initiatives were taken, and what worked 

ordidnot work would heextremely useful 

to future unit leaders. 

111lhc past, end-of-tour reports were 

commoii for nlany unit commanders and 

key personnel. Today, we tend to limit 

that type of report to general officers. 

However, there is no reason why key 

officers and NCOs in a command should 

not write such areport. Not only would it 

he valuable in the unit history effort, but 

it would also he useful in providing 

perspectives and insights railled during 

service with the unit. 

History is valuable to the profession 

of arms. Many famous leaders have 

attested to the value of applying the 

lessons of the past to the challenges of 

the present. The knowledge and appreciatioo of a unit's accomplishments 

are iilnportant in building and sustaining 

espl-it de corps. Soldiers are challenged 

to maintain the traditions and standards 

of those who came before them. However, 

the raw materials of a unit history-the 

repons and papers that docu~nent what 

happened and why--can also be used 

to help current leaders guide their 

soldiers through the demands of today. 

Maintaining a viehle unit-histoty file u~ill 

serve all those who follow. Y 

~~:~~b~~t~i,~tu.s.A~~~

~ ~ h ~ hiJrorinlr ,corr L~~,~

~ l l.vood,

~ j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i , 

Februar~r2001 Engineer 43 
R?. Secoird Lier,r~noirr Sre~lenL. Kreil 

Throughout the Engineer Officer Basic Course and other 

training. I was told to prepare for anything once I 

arrived at my permanent duty station. Fortunately. 1 

landed in an excellent position to learn how to be a platoon 

leader. After 3 weekswith my new company. 1 had the opportunity togo to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, 

California. where I was a liaison officer to a light engineer attachment. This position gaveme time to observe platoon leaders and learn from their mistakes and successes. I learned several lessons from the operations in this training envirnnment that will help me become a better platoon leader: how to 

develop and execute a well-rehearsed plan, remain flexible at 

the platoon level. and issue a proper operations order (OPORD) 

foreach mission. 

Developing and Executing a Plan 

Awell-rehearsed plan is a key ingredient in conducting 

a successful operation. The main problem within the 

light engineer attachment was indecisiveness rsgardIng tile location of obstacles and fighting positions. This created several problerns rnr the engineer platoon personnel because they needed to know the general locatiorl of an obstacle 

before any work could begin. If the platoon leader could not 

site in the obstacle, then the platoon could 

not begin to work on the obstacle. This 

pushed back the timeline and mads it next to 

ilnpossible fnr the engineers to execute all 

the planned obstacles. 

What seemed to work best during the wargaming process was a thorough plan that 

provided the task-fol-ce engineer knowledge 

of where his soldiers could wurk as soom as 

they hi1 thc ground. Planning allowed ti111e 

for the squad leaders to conduct precombat 

checks (PCCs) and rehearsals forthe upconling missions. When the company tcam conducted a proper rehearsal. the unit fought 

well, and the soldiers all knew their rolzs. If 

engineel-s are given aplan that the task force 

fillly develops and adheres to. they can conduct proper rehearsals arid PCCJ to ensure 

that they increase productioity to their highest level. 

Soldiers train in the National Training Center de~sert. (c~~ir/inr~~ii on pnge 46)
A*" %'@+%,, 

A 

d yQ5 Engineer Safety 

f 

-r P 

3 k . i;. '* 

gC~,l - s*f~* 

4 

Space Heater Safety 

BJ Fred F(itii?ins~ 

Each winter., soldiers are injured by impn~peruce oS ~~~i~~~types of space heaters are used, .rhc hest types are 

space heaters. The key to preventing these injurics is type-classitied heaters, laborntoryevaluations 

a unit program that identifies the hazards associated malluals to assistullirsin theiruse,spacehearers \\ 1111the specific space heaters the unit uses and the that use fossil fuels should alwaysbc outside the space i~iq~lementationof procedures that will reduce or eliminate the beillg llsed or being used by personnel, hi^ lilnits 

hazards. However, this program is only effective if the tlleirexposure tocarbon monoxide gas, which is colorless and 

procedures are actually implemented. tasteless and normally cannot hc detected by personnel. It is 

Improper operation of space heaters is nornlally at the root of key to lilllit or ~~rcvellt exposure to this gas. 

tlie problem. Proper opention begin? by identifying a soldier to ~i~k management sllould also bea pan ofthe pmgram. opeyatetheheater. followed by heater-spcciticrrainingthat results pl-ocess is best implelnel,ted by leaders to ensul-etha, 

in licensing thesoldier AR600-55. nzpAmiyUrivernn(l0peruror control are used andthat hazard alld colltro~.lneasure 

Sto~idor<li:ariun Pro,qr(rm, provides guidance on selecting. ill~orm;rtion is passed on to will be exposed to tllc 

training, snd licensi~lgheater operators. Unit personnel use the hazards of operating space lleaten, 

appropriate technical liianual for the heater to develop lesson Through the proper application of a space-lieater setety plans for the training. A hands-on peiiotn~anceevaluation is the 

best way to determine the skill level before licensing. program. leaders can control and eli~ninatzthe hazards faced 

by their soldiers. This program will enhance a unit's ability to 

Table 1 lists the most common contributi~lgfdctors to space- conduct by pn,,enting burns or deaths to soldiers 

heater accidents. In reading through the list, it becomes and fire dalnage that often destroys cquiplnent,A winter. 

apparent lhat if the soldier is properly selected, trained, and weatller alert for leadcr use call be found wjnteF 

licensed, many of these factors can be avoided. Adding proper hazard section of the U,S, M~~~~~~~s~~~~~~ center 

supervision to the progranl not only will ensure that the opelator safetyofficeholne page at M.M.,c.wo"do,?,lyIII i,,SnfC,,.,, 

is trained and licensed hut also will identify and cvrrect hazal-ds 

with the heaters, their fuel. and their use. Table 2, page 46, Mr F[rnt?ii!g is the, Mnneirvrr Su/,/,orf Centri. sufct). 

provides a list of measures that unit leaders can use to control directof: 

or eliminate the hazards. 

Table 1. Contributing Factorsto Space-Heater Accidents 

e of fuel. 

.+-"tnrirl 

Failing to train personnel to operate space heaters. 

Using the wrong typ 

Placing clothing, ter,, ,,,nLrllalo, "ther items too close to heaters 

and stovepipes. 

Storing flammables 

Refueling heaters bt 

B Leaving heaters una 

?forethey I 

ittended wi 

~nition/explosivesinside tents. 

lave cooled. 

hile operating. 

Maintaining heater units improperly. 

Failing to establish emergency procedures and make available and 

maintain fire-fighting equipment. 
Table 2. Control Measures to Reduce 

Space-Heater Accidents 

Train personnel to operate space heaters safely 

and according to AR 600-55. 

,Ensurethat the proper of fuel is used, Label the 

fuel container according to its contents, Refer to the 

operator or technical manualfor recommendedfuel, 

Keep clothes (wet or dry) at least 24 inches 

away from heating sources. 

'lace tent stoves On a noncombustible base and 

surroundthem by no 36 by 36 

by inches when sand and wooden construction 

materialsre available'instal' tent stoves at least 

feet from tent walls. Keep tent flaps and ties near the 

stove opening away from the stovepipe. 

,placefuelcontainers at least feet fromthe outside 

wall of the tent, Dike the containers to prevent fuel 

from spreading to space heaters. 

= Avoid storing ammunition, combustible and corrosive 

materials, explosives, pyrotechnics, and simulators 

intents with stoves or other heating sources. 

Turn off space heaters and allow them to cool for at 

least 30 minutes before refueling. 

'

Use Only heaters with a ventilationsystem that is 

with tent-vent-stack Openings. 

Extendat leasttwo pipe sections above a tent peak. 

Keep a 2-inch Wace betweenthe exhaust 

pipe and the tent. 

Designate afire guard for each tent or a group of tents 

and brief him on his responsibilities and procedures. 

m Check heating units (including fuel lines and 

connections) daily for leaks and malfunctions. Allow 

onlyqualified maintenance personnel to make repairs. 

T~~~inequipmenthrough supply channels when 

maintenance personnel are unable to repair. 

m Developandimplementafieldfire-alarmsystem.Make 

availableafire extinguisher,shovel, andax at selected 

fire points. Provide at least one 10-pounddry chemical 

and water extinguisher per general-purpose (GP), 

medium tent and one pressurized water extinguisher 

for a GP, small tent. Ensurethat all fire extinguishers 

are in operating condition. Ensure that all water 

fire extinguishers are winterized before using in 

winter months. 

(cvrtrinired$rorn pn,qc 44) 

RemainingFlexible 

Flexibility gives a leatlcr the opportunity to adjust to the 

chancing environment of a battle. When the task force 

carefully planned where to p~~t every obstacle in a defense at the NTC. that location would ch:~ngeotice the ensinwrplatoon leader conducted his reconnaissance and noticed 

a better location for the obstacle. For this reason, flzxibility 

hecaneextremely importantinevely successful mission. 

Another example of flexibility being key was the location 

and utilization of obstacle-constmctic~nmaterials. referred to 

as Class IV The task force never properly planned or executed 

a Class IV point. a hich meant that the engineers couldnot rely 

on the materials bein: where they wcre needed. The platoon 

leader had to remainflexihle and adjust his plan so his soldiers 

could transport tlie materialsto where he neededthem. A mission will never go exactly as planned. no matter ho\v niuch 

preparation is put into it, but this does not mean that a unit 

should disregard planning altogether. When the task force 

develops a thon~u~hplan, the unit can react quickly when 

things do not go according to the plan. As long as platoon 

leaders remain flexible. they can adjust to ensure that they 

meet their comrnat~der'sintent. 

Issuing OPORDs 

Thc cotnmander's intent defines what a s~~ccessful mission entails. and it collies fron~an OPORD.Although it takes some time to prepare, an OPORDpro\.idssall the 

inh,rniation neededto conduct a mission. Without this kno\vledgc. a platoon leader cannot expect his subordinate leaders 

to understand a nlission thoroughly. Too o[ten, soldiers-to 

include the squad lendel.s-are not informed regarding olis. 

sion specificsbecausethey ha\-enotreceiveda proper OPORD. 

If a platoon leader doec not properly give an OPORD to his 

platoon. they must work u,ithout any knowledge of why they 

are pe~forniingthat mission. 

Conclusion 

Awell-rehearsedplan, flexibility. and a proper OPORD 

are essential to the success of a platoon. Without 

these key elements, a platoon cannot execute all of its 

~~iis~~~nxfficie~~tly. These elcrnents at-e critical to a platoon's 

functionins despite operating in the confusing and cot~stantly 

changingenvironment of war. The NTC allows soldiers to train 

under conditions that resemble war without actually being in a 

war. The NTCis a ,seat environmentinwhichtotrain as asoldier. 

hut a platoonwill only get out of the experiencewhat it puts into 

it. The best advice is to understand that the NTC is a training 

environment and tliat everyone will make mistakes.The important thing is that the soldiers learn f~omthose mistakes and use 

their experiences when deploying to :Ihostile nation. 

SecondLie~rrenrrfrrKwh i.r nssignud ~IJ C Corn,i~ori!: 4th Erigincei-Rorrrrlion. Fr~rfCor..sori, Color-ado. Ife ~u.(isp,ui.iou.~/yo 

platoor~leofler-irl A G~rnpony,44; Engir~errBo~r[~lio~!. -
ENGINEER UPDATE 

I I 

Commerciai numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless othewise noted. 

Engineer School 

USAES Web Site. To access the U.S. Army Engineer School Web site, go to http~//www.wood.army.mii/eschooil. 

POC is LTC Billy Tollison, (573) 596-0131, ext. 3-7166; DSN -7166; or e-mail tollisob@wood.army.mil. 

Lineage and Honors Updates. This office recently acquired the "current" Lineage and Honors statements of 

active, Reserve, and National Guard engineer units. In many instances, these statements are more than 20 years old. 

The Center of Military History (CMH), which maintains the Lineage and Honors of units, updates the statements only 

when it receives aformal request from a unit for an update. We recommend that you look at your Lineage and Honors 

and, if necessary, request an update from the CMH. The address is: 

U.S.Army Center of Military History 

ATTN: DAMH-FPO 

103Third Avenue 

Fort McNair, D.C. 20319-5058 

POC is Dr. Larry Roberts, Historian, -6109; DSN -6109; or e-mail robertsl@wood.army.mil 

Directorate of Training (DOT) 

Engineer Bradley Fighting Vehicle (EBFV)Military Occupational Classification Structure (MOCS) Proposal. 

DA PERSCOM has approved this proposal, which authorizes engineers to use additional skill identifiers (ASls)for the 

Engineer Bradley Operator Course, the Master Gunner Course, and the Bradley Leaders Course (BLC). The EBFV 

approval calls for the use of three existing skill identifierslASls and the creation of one new AS1 as follows: 

3Xfor engineer officers who attend the BLC at Fort Benning, Georgia 

D3 for engineer NCOs who attend the BLC at Fort Benning. 

8 J3 for battalion and brigade NCOs who attend the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) Master Gunner Course at 

Fort Benning. 

D5 for Skill Level 10 engineer soldiers is a new ASI. It will be awarded to one-station unit training (OSUT) 

graduates who also complete the Combat Engineer BFV Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. (The first 

course is tentatively scheduled for FY05.) 

POC is Ms. Victoria Anthony, -6137, DSN -6137, or e-mail anthonyv@wood.army.mil. 

Engineer Lessons Learned. To help build our lessons-learneddatabase, we request that field units send us their 

significant engineer-related lessons learned. A recent addition to the database is task-force and higher after-action 

reports from Bosnia. In addition to lessons learned, we want to develop a digital archive of tactical unit SOPs to help 

units develop and maintain their SOPs. Please send copies of your SOPs to help get this started. 

POC is Mr. Reggie Snodgrass, (573) 596-0131, ext. 3-7762; DSN -7762; or e-mail snodgrarOwood.army,mil. 

EngineerOfficer Advanced Course (EOAC) Training. In this course, we are emphasizing military operations in 

urban terrain (MOUT) as it applies to the Engineer Branch; stability and support operational scenarios; and engineer 

support to light forces. Current training materials are available at http://www.wood.army.mil/OTD/ 

EOAC%2OHornepage.htm. 

POC is MAJ Steve Cross. Royal Australian Engineers, -4128; DSN -4128; ore-mail crosss@wood.army.m~l. 

Terrain Visualization IICD-ROM. We are in the final stages of completing the Terrain Visualization II CD- ROM 

and forwarding it to TRADOC for approval. We expect this TerraBase II product to be available by the end of second 

quarter FYO1 

POC is CPT Chris Kramer or Mr. Ed Zielonka, (573) 596-0131, ext. 3-706017061, or DSN -706017061 
Countermine Training Support CenterIHumanitarian Demining Training Center Web Site. Visit our revised 

Web site at http://www wood.army.mil/ctsc. 

POC is Dr. Steve Grzyb. -6199; DSN -6199; ore-mail grzybst@wood.army.mil. 

MobileTraining Teams (MTTs). We have two mine-awarenessMTT programsof instruction--one is for all arms 

and the other is engineer-specific.Contact us early in your preparationfor deployment if you needan MTT so that we 

can put you on the calendar.We normallytry to schedulethe actual training within 3 months of deployment. Unitsare 

required to pay associated costs. 

POC is Dr. Steve Grzyb, -6199; DSN -6199; or e-mailgrzybst@wood.armymii. 

Unit Environmental Compliance Officer (UECO) Course. Development of our Web-based UECO course is 

progressingwell, and we are now in the final reviewingstages. This course, which is designedto supplementcurrent 

UECOcourses as requiredby AR 200-1, EnvironmentalProtectionandEnhancement,will be providedto installations. 

POC is MAJJohn Whitfield, (573)596-0131 ext. 3-5647; DSN-5647;or e-mail whiffiej@wood.armymii. 

Environmental Websites. The homepage for the Office of the Director of Environmental Programs at 

www.hqda.armymil/acsimweb/env is an excellent site for "communication and information between major Army 

commands."The site also serves as an unclassifiedinformationsource for all parties interestedin the Army's compliance 

program. Another excellent site for critical information pertaining to environmental compliance is the U.S. Army 

Environmental Center (USAEC) homepage at http://www.aec.army.mil. The USAEC provides technical services to 

HQDA, major commands, and commanders and also integrates, coordinates, and oversees implementationof the 

Army's environmentalprogramsforthe Army Staff.HQDA. 

POC is MAJ John Whitfield, (573)596-0131ext. 3-5647; DSN-5647;ore-mail whitfiej@wood.army.mii. 

Directorate of Training Development (DOTD) 

Field Manual Update. The following field manuals have recently beensent to ATSC to be printedand distributed. 

They are availablefor viewingand downloading from the MANSCEN Publications Page at http://www wood.army.mil/ 

PUBS/newpubs/htm. 

FM 3-34.331, Topographic Surveying. This manual, which combines FM 5-232 and TMs 5-232 and 5-237, is 

a guide for military occupational specialty 82D (topographic surveyor). It provides techniques not found in any 

commercial text concerning the precise determination of position, azimuth, or elevation of a point. Additionally, 

this publication describes and standardizes procedures for performing recons, preparing station descriptions, 

and reporting and briefingsurvey projects. 

FM 5-472, Change 1, Materials Testing.This change corrects some formulas given in the basic publication. 

FM 5-125, Change 1, Rigging. This change addresses safety considerations related to determining when wire 

rope is beyondthe recommended serviceability. 

The following publicationswill be sent for printing and distributionwithin the next 60 days: 

FM20-32, Change 1, Mine/Countermine Operations. 

FM 5-250, Change2, ExplosivesandDemolitions 

POC is Sandra Gibson, -4100 

2001 Engineer Unit Directory. The directory,which is updatedperiodically, is availableat http://www.wood.armyrnil/ 

PUBS/dsd/dsd.htm. Units may submit changes/corrections at any time via e-mail to Jennifer Morgan at 

inorgan/@wood.army.mil. 

POC is Jennifer Morgan, (573)596-0131,ext, 3-7644,or DSN-7644. 
Ny Specirriisi IJr>fr,rFirzgemlri 

hc morning star seen on Friday. 5 January. belonged 

to Fort Leonard Wood's newest general officer. BG 

Rclnald Johnson. 

Johnson, assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer 

School. wits promoted to the rank of brigadier gcocral in a 

Friday morning ceremony at Davidson Fitness Centcr. 

"It is with great humility and healthy perspective that I accept 

this promotion today." said Johnson. 

members, community leaders, falnily 

membeus. and ti.iends 811 gathered to pay tribute lo [lie Chicapo 

native. The ceremony included a static parade l'ortned by 

rcp~.esentatives from all thc units on post. The 399th Aruuy 

Band was also there to add an air of stiuteli~~ess to the occasion. 

MG Anders Aadland. post commanding general, opened 

the ccrcmony, dcscrihitig Johnson as a strong leader, 

outstanding role model for our troops. comhat ready Sapper 

u,arrior, thoughtful mentor, father. and husband." 

"He's had a huge role in the ilaining of our Engineer soldiers 

and leaders." Aadland ;~dded. 

cerernt~ny's guest speaker. Bnll;~rd, a l'ormcr Fort Leonard Wand 

corninanding general, said the promotion was "a cause for 

celcbriution." 

"He is just the kind of genert~l officer our Army needs." 

Ballard said. "He's an excellent Iei~der. He takes care of his 

people. and he's conscientious and dedicated." 

Ballard, along with Clyde Redmon, Johnson'% IBthcr-in-law. 

helped pin on the general's new stars. Faunily mcmbcrs and 

colleogu~ cheered ;IS Johnson stri~pped 011 tlic distinctive 

f"e'-al oificcr's be't for the first lime. 

"It's a gl-eat l'eclinp." said Rita Larnhe~f. Johl~son's sistcr-iuilaw. "We're very proud of Ron and his accomplish~r~enls. I('\ a

lovely ceremony, and \we're glad to be a part of it." 

Taking the stand, Johnron thnnkeil his family for their 

support. He illso rktnked his colleagues. mentors. and Sellow 

soldiws by saying, "This rei~lly isn't nhour me. This is about 

tllose of you who Iuave contributed to my success." 

In closing. Johnson said. "This is u ereat day to he 2 soldier. 

It is a greater day to be a :ener;11 officer ..." 

Acadenry at West Point, New Ynrk. in 1976. Johnson assumed 

duties as aasistiuot commandant of the Engineci. Scl~ool in 

Secretary oS the Antry. 

Johnson has also colnuniunded the IiOtIi Engineer Rrigndc 

in Han;uo. Gerlruany, atid thc 14th Engineer Batlalion at Fort 

Ord. California. snrl Fort Lcu~is. Washinpt(~n. 

Johnson has n masfeu-'s in upci-ations resei~rch and systems 

~unalysis from the Georgia I~ustitute of Technology in Atlanta. 

He has also been n ~rrather~raticsprofessor at West Poitit iind ;I 

1995 t!. S. Army War Collcge Fellow at the Joint Center for 

Political and Economic Studies. 

Johnson is married to the for-uner lris Redmon of Pensacola_ 

Florida. The Jolinsons have an I l-yez~r-old son. Ian.