The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers 
U.S. Army Engineer School 

573-563-8080 1DSN 676-8080 

COMMANDANT 

MG R.L. Van Antwerp 

563-61 58 

vanantwerpr@wood.armymil 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

BG Randal R. Castro 

563-6192 

castror@wood.army.mil 

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR 

CSM Robert R. Robinson 

563-8060 

robinsonr@ wood.army mil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

COL John (Pat) Leake 

563-8080 

leakej@wood.armymil 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT -ARNG 

LTC Robert McCabe 

563-8046 

mccaber@wood.army mil 

CHIEF OF STAFF 

LTC Thomas E. O'Donovan 

563-71 16 

odonovant@wood.armymll 

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for ENGINEER COMBAT SYSTEMS 

COL John Holler 

563-4081 

holle~@wood.armymil 

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE -TERRAIN DATA 

COL David Kingston 

563-4086 

kingsfond@ wood.armymi1 

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE 

COL James Rowan 

596-0224 

rowanj@wood.army mil 

DIRECTOROFTRAINING 

COL Jeffrey P LaMoe 

563-4093 

lamoej@wood.armymil 

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTALINTEGRATION 

COL Robert S. Kirsch 

563-41 19 

kirschr@wood.army mil 

DEPARTMENTOF INSTRUCTION 

LTC Jeffrey A. Bedey 

563-4129 

bedeyj@ woodarmy mil 

CHIEFOF DOCTRINE 

By OrcJer of the Secretary of the Army: 

ERIC 1K. SHlNSEKl 

Genet-a/, United States Army 

Chief of Staff 

Official: 

Y 
MQU

JOEL B. HUDSON 

Admirlistrative Assistant to the 

PA^-^tary of the Army 

~z5as 

Engii,~evrpa8.1 0046-19890) is prepared qua .--8.. L... tar~yuy the U.S. Arl my Maneuver Support Center, 32 

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-,or.,a,."r". , V~~~LHI!YICK:IFngineer PIresents prc 

formation designe d to keep U.S. milita ry and civilian engineers info1 med of cu rrent and E!merging de- .. . velopments within tnelr areas or expenlse for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. 

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- -- 

October-December 2002 Headquarters, Department of the Army 	 Volume 32 PB 5-02-4 

I 

FEATURES UNITED STATES ARMY 

I ENGINEERSCHOOL 4 Base Camp Infrastructure Development and C2 in Afghanistan 

I i By Major Dennis J. McNulty 

1' I 9 Ooeration Bulldoa - Barrier 

I 	 5; First Lieutenant John Mooney I 	 COMMANDANT 

13 	 Leveraging the Power of the Regiment Major General 

R.L. Van Antwerp 	 By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J Toomey 

17 Vigilant - Warriors 2002 Army Transformation War Game I 

I 	 I By Mr. James L. Allen, Mr. Edd Pyaff, and Lieutenant Coionei Mark H. Potter 

I MANAGING EDITOR 19 Supporting Army Recruiting and Retention 

!! Lynne Sparks By Ms. Zandra Smith, Captain Kristen Youngman, and Lieutenant Coionel 

Ronald N. Liaht 

I EDITOR 22 V Corps Terrain Analysis Supports a Wartighter Exercise Sh~rley Bridges I By Lieutenant Colonel David R. Goddard 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 28 Crossing the River "Regen": Regenerating Combat Power at NTC 


Jennifer Morgan By Lieutenant Colonel James A. Knowlton and Lieutenant Colonel 


Michael J. Teague 


34 The Sapper Leader Course 


Front Cover: Engi- By First Lieutenant Joseph Roman 
 neers meeting 

homelanp security 37 Command-Challenging and Rewarding 


challenges By Captain Dale Snider 


41 	 Training Model of Polish EOD Engineers Back Cover: US. 

Army engineers 	 By Colonel Andrzej Zarczynski 

throughout history 48 	Professional Registration: Advice for Aspiring Army Engineers 


By Captain Richard J. Gash 


51 Developing an Engineer Exit Strategy for Road Repair and Maintenance 

By Colonel Michael J. Ulekowski 

54 	Let'sGet Our Volcano Systems Into the Fight 

By Colonel Thomas K. Lililefieid, Jr. (Retired) 

I 

DEPARTMENTS 44 Past In Review - "Bridging the Tennessee River" 

2 Clear the Way By Captain Darman Place 

I By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp 56 	CTC Notes - "Mobility, Counterrnobility, 

Survivability Battlefield Operating System Needs : 3 	Lead the Way Emphasis" 


By Command Sergeant Major Robert R. Robinson By Captain James C. Moses (JRTC) 


26 	Engineer Safety - "Engineer Branch Accident Analysis" 58 Engineer Update 

By Mr. Fred Fanning and Ms. Vicki Hall 	 60 News and Notes 

32 	Enlisted PERSCOM Notes 60 The Engineerwriter's Guide 

By Lieutenant Colonel Jack F: Smith 	 Inside Back Cover - Subscription Order Form 

October-December2002 	 Engineer I 
~kyy=+,q "Ihkpv 


I 

-


By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

t isreally grcatto he back in BDUs.Amy 


life is fill1 of changes and challenges. 


and each assignment has its own 


rewards. But I am so pleased to be back at 

Fort Leonard Wood and, more importantly, 

back with the Regiment. Thank you all for 

the warm welcolnc and youl- tremendous 

support during thc transition. 

1have bccn walking the grounds of Fort 

Leonard Wood since July, and I am impressed 

with what I've seen-sappers training in the 

basics of soldiering and combat engineering, 

seasoned drill set-geants, bright-eyed lieutenants, tough captains as small-group -.., ~.~-.--.. .~~~ ~ -

awavr w 


1 

II -!

.~ . 

lock, stock, and barrel; and accomplished the 

mission. It didn't~natter if it was HIC (Dcsert 

ShieldiDesert Storm), SASO (I4onduras, 

Fuertes Caniinos), Grafenwohr, or NTC. The 

~ulewas "if it is green and on your property 

book, then you nced it. every time, every 

place," and you took it with you. In some 

ways, weno longer employ and deploy in this 

manner. Engineer employment is planned and 

prepared at a varicty of levels to build taskorganized units that are tailored to minimize 

lift, ~ninilnizc logistical footprint, and maximize 

effects. We deploy what wc need and whom 

we need. We train them to a high state of 

rcadiness in the special skills they will need. instructors, and the list goes on. The dcdicatioll andhard work ofthe civil,ans and soldiers ol.rlle E ~ 

School inspirc mc,as 1see the EnginecrRegimenttransfonning 

before my eyes. 1 would like to thank MG Andy Aadland for 

handing over the reigns to such a superb organization and 

fantastic team. And, Andy. keep those TIM dollars coming! 

Thehard workofthe part ofthe Regimentliere also includes 

work toward transformation. That work is important, and the 

reason is simple-the world in which we lille is ,-hanging, ~h~ 

United States is now in a world of regional instability, rogue 

nations, international crime, land ,nines, and F~~ 

those reasons, we "lust transform. ~ut our commander-inChief, President Bush, has also told tlie militaly fol-ces to be 

ready. Two missions at once is tough business, but engineers 

are used to it. We've always succeeded at multiple missions; 

we support the maneuver force and accomplish the engineer 

mission. 

Change is soniething that we do not do easily. we have not 

:\nd tiis).acco~nplish their missions magnificently. ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ 

A significant goal for the Interim and Objective Force 

Army is that same deployability, responsjveness, and 

sustainahility-maxin~u~n effects, ~ninin~um lift, and mininiu~ii 

logistical footprint. Overall rapid, decisive, and successful 

operations require this tailorability. There are a variety of 

things that are allowing this to becolne Part of how we do 

business: superior information flow, itnproved intelligence, 

better and control, and smarter and tougher 

soldiers and leaders. It is an important shift and one of several 

that I think needs exploring. I need leaders at every level to 

keep brainstorming new ways we can fight the engineer fight 

of the future. If yo11 are not engaged in the future, then You 

are Part of the Past. 

While transformation is the direction of the future of the 

Anny, the key to the continued success of the Army is people. 

YOU are the future of the Engineer ~egiment. you are the ~.eason 

we have the most dynamic engineer force in the world. You are had ama;or ill engineer force structuresince EM,~h~t 

was almost 12 ago during the cold warera, we have the reason I am so confident in the futurc successes of the 

made some changes in the but filndamentally we are Corps of Enginccrs. And this is tlie rcason that all leadersand and usually function in from myself down to each squad leader-must take care oftheir 

exactly tlie same way that we did when thewall fell. However, people. I want each leader to ensure that he takes care of his 

there is one area where things have changed significantly- peopleby achievingahealthybalance-abalanceofs~,irituality, 

engineer actions across thc spectruln of operations. F~~~~~ family, and work. The context of that balance certainly changes, 

Bosnia to Afghanistan to a multitude of smaller operations, we 

have seen what I think is a fundamental shift. I see smaller 

engineer forces carefully selected and trained to accomplish 

specific effects in support of maneuver. 

Let's look at an example. In the past. we just put combat 

heavy battalions or companies on the TPFDD; deployed them 

2 Engineer 

but the fUndamental approach applies ever~whcre-gamison, 

field,and battlefield. 

Think about the fi~ture, take care of your people through 

balance, and we'll talk again in upcoming issues. 

Essayons! 

Ocloher-L 
Lead The wav
 1 


By Conznzand Sergeant Major Robert R. Robinson 


s you read this article, there will 

be a new Regimental Command 

Sergeant Major at the helm of our 

Regiment. CSM Bill McDaniel has been 

selected to replace me and will undoubtreplacement being named, our Corps of 

Engineers will have a new CSM in CSM 

Mike Balch. I realize this is old news, but 

I'm very excited about the future of our 

Regiment and \&,hat these two super NCOs 

will bring to it. Their selections represent a 

new generation of leaders, with fresh ideas 

and experiences that will shape the 

Regiment's future. 

As I wind doun the time 1 have left in this job and in the 

hy, Ihave reflected often on how much has changed in the 

last two years and over the course of my 30-plus years of 

senice. In the last tu'o years, we have seen the transition of 

several of our Regiment's best leaders. As I ha\,e said in earlier 

articles, transition of leaders in our business is commonplace, 

But what we have to realize is that with the passing of evely 

great leader, our Regiment gets better 

We have.seen our Ar~iiy transform. Organizations, equipment, and doctriiie are vely different today in a lot of places in 

our Army than they were two years ago. Here at the Engineer 

School, we have won, then lost-and in some cases won 

back-key battles with regard to organirations, personnel, 

and doctrine. Although some of the faces have changed, and 

will continue to change, the mission here at Fort Leonard Wood 

will always be to ensure that our Regiment is relevant and 

integral to the Anny's transformation. 

I have visited most of our engineer soldiers throughout 

the world. and I'm always impressed with their enthusiasm 

and professionalism when they perfom their duties. Our 

soldiers are the busiest in our Amy and are the busiest they 

have ever been over the last 30 years. I can remember ail Aniiy 

that. in the mid to late 70s. did nothing in comparison to what 

our operational tempo has us doing today. In the 70s and 

earl? 80s. we occupied our time and our soldiers' time by 

maintaining equipment that never got used and training on 

tasks until we were numb. And alerts-when we did use our 

vehicles to get to the local deployment or marshalling areaswere one-day events. 

1 also remember an Ann? where the leadership was weak 

and uncaring and, therefore, soldiers were unmotivated, 

undisciplined, and unprepared for combat. 1 can reine~iiber 

reporting to my first unit overseas and being approached by a 

person in civilian clothes offering to sell me drugs, only to find 

October-December 2002 

out the next day that this person was an NCO 

in my unit. And I remember being housed in 

a room with a couple of specialists who 

smoked so much hashish that I refused to 

sleep in the room and moved my bunk and 

locker into the hallway. I also remember, as a 

platoon sergeant. relieving all four of my 

squad leaders whom I caught drinking wine 

at 0530 hours, when their squads and the 

rest of the platoon were preparing to move 

I am not naYve enough to believe that 

we have completely removed this kind of 

misconduct in our Amy, but I feel secure 

Our Army is much better today because of 

the people who join it and our superb NCO Corps. The leaders 

of our Regiment today are quality people who care for and 

prepare our soldiers superbly. They are all outstanding and 

are training their soldiers to carry on with the highest of 

standards and traditions. The greatness of our Amy lies in all 

its components-Active, Guard, and Reserve-and the component we most often forget--our civilian workforce. That is 

why I can leave the Amiy content in knowing that the future 

of the Regiment is in good hands. 

I began my life as an Any engineer at Fort Leonard Wood, 

and it's appropriate that I retire here. This has been my home 

for more than 12 years of my career, and this place has been 

good to tile and my family. I reminisce often about my days on 

the trail, working out on the ranges, and the other positions 

I've held here. 1 think a lot about all the soldiers I trained and 

how many of them are Sergeants Major and First Sergeants 

today. And. as ironic as it may seem, 1 can remember avoiding 

guys like MG Jack Waggoner and CSMs Baxter. Butler. Haller. 

and Allen. but now I look fonvard to seeing them cveiy day 

in closing, I want to thank all of the leaders of our Regiment 

for your suppofi-~ommanders, command sergeants ~~ j 

oficeer and NCO~.youhave made my tinle here as 

~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ t ~ CSM rewarding and have allowed to l

a dream I have had since I became an NCO. I have been blessed 

throughout my career. serving with and for great commanders. 

I would name you all, but I know you know who you are. 1 

want to say, simply, .'~h~,,kyou." 

I would ask that you-and I know you will-g~ve Bill 

McDaniel and Mike Balch the same level of support and faith in 

their abilities to do this urork as you have me. Your t~ust and 

loyal support to them will make this arduous task fun. Essayons! 

Engineers Lead the Way! 

Sapper 7, OUT. 

Engineer 3 
2 in Afghanistan 


By Major Dennis J. I 

.-


hc rapid aiid unexpected population pi-out11 that 

occurred at the base camp at Baghram, Afghanistan, 

and the expansion of base camps in general, presents 

challenges for engineer and logistical planners concellled with 

developing base camp infrastructure in an efficient manner. 

Before Operation Anaconda, the base at Baghram, located 

approxi~uately 30 miles no~ih of Kabul, was not expected to 

exceed more than 300 personnel. Accordingly. engineer and 

logistical plal~ners did not expect, nor plan, extraordinaty life 

support or base camp construction tasks. As the situation 

developed, however, the camp population began to expand 

rapidly, and by mid-January, the population was hovering at 

about 1,000. Thirty days later, it had nearly doubled, and two 

weeks after that, the population was up to almost 3,500. By 

mid-March. the population had peaked at about 4,000. This 

rapid growth presented several cli:~llunges for engineer planncrs who were concerned about developing basic base camp 

infrastructure. Challenges such as providing bed-down, latrinc, 

and shower facilities; potable water; and adequate power 

distribution had to be overcome at Baghram, as well as at the 

base camp at Kandahar. Establishing a base camp master plan 

and a command and control (C2) organization in th'e midst of 

the rapid expansion also proved challenging. 

Bed-Down Facilities 

I

nitial bed-down facilities for the first units arriving at 

Baghram consisted of a mix of old Russian barracks; 

standard general-purpose, medium tents; and Force 

Provider tents. As the camp expanded, Inore Force Provider 

facilities were added, and several buildings were renovated for 

*'dl 

A UXO-littered field in Afghanistan 

4 Engineer Octoher-December 2002 
use as offices and limited sleeping quarters. Planners faced a 

major challenge in establishing bed-down facilities at Ba_phram 

because the area was heavily mined. The method used to clear 

areas throughout Afghanistan was dependent on several 

factors. including the known or perceived threat, the purpose 

for clearing. the assets availt~ble, and tlie terrain on which the 

clearing was required. In Raghram-as in Kandaliar-largc, 

flat areas were available and desig~~atcd for tent cities. In most 

cases, these areas werc clearcd with a mine-clearing armorplated D7 dozer. or an Aardvark or a Hydrema flail. and then 

visually proofed. Mine-detection dogs were also used for 

additional proofing. (Sce article, "Repairing Runways and 

Clearing Mines in Afghanistan," E~igi~reei., July 2002.) 

Another issue faced by planners at Baghram was that 

initially. many conventional forces and some special operations 

units deployed to Baghrarn without tents. Consequently, 

several hundred tents had to be procured on short notice to 

provide adequate life support for these units. 

Water Supply 

Providing an adequate supply of potable water at 

Baghram was also challenging during its rapid expansion. Initially, bottled water was flown in, and this 

u;is sustainable when the camp consisted of fewer than 300 

personnel. However. it soon became apparent that as the 

population expanded. bottled water would not be adequate to 

meet dining. laundry. and hygiene requirements. 

During their occupation, the Soviets had built hvo wells at 

Baghram. but neither ofthe pumps was operational when U.S. 

forces secured the base. ABritis11 well-drilling team and U.S. 

engineers repaired or replaced the pumps. The British team 

tested the water from one well and confirmed that it was safe 

for drinking. However, reverse oslnosis water purification u~iits 

were brought in for both wells as added insurance of safe 

dlinking water. 

Repairing the well at Baghraln required that cngineers 

overcome a heavy lift problcm. Acrane was not available to lift 

the pipe from inside the well, so a helicopter secured the existing 

pipe and pulled it out. At Kandahar, wells also pro~ided potable 

water. There, one of the pumps operated with three-pl~ase 

electrical power. Very few people on the ground at the time had 

much experience with three-phasc power. Fortunately. the 

engineer battalion S3, who had an electrical ensineering degree, 

and a logistical assistance representative from the TankAutomotive and Armaments Command were able to get the 

pump into operation. Had these people not been available, the 

pump would have had to be replaced with a pump that operated 

on more co~iventional single-phase powcr. 

Latrine Facilities 

The latrine facilities at Baghram went through several 

stages as the base camp expanded. The first latrine 

was a singleprivacy box constructed of four military 

merdl pallets placed ovcr an available sewage manhole cover 

The first latrine constructed at Baghram 

(see photo above). Tile camp quickly outprc\\ illih facility. and 

latrine facilities progressed to slit trenchcs and urine tubes. As 

these facilities were improved to provide for privacy. more 

construction materials and enginccr assets were flown in or 

purchased locally. In a theater where the primary-and often 

the only-means of logistical support is by air. getting heavy 

engineer equipment and large stocks of tnaterials into Baghram 

was challenging. Early on, delays were common and often 

fnlstrated engineer pla111lcrs on tlic ground. 

Units \\:ere not accustomed to providing their oaw latrines. 

A general consellsus of senior participants in the operation 

was that unit-level field sanitation tasks need Illore emphasis 

during home station training exercises. 

Because the area around the Baghraln airfield was l~eavily 

mined and littered with unexploded ordnance (UXO), contiliually relocating slit trenches was not practical. As the base 

camp continued to expand. slit-trench latrine facilities 

progressed to bum-out latrines. Once these facilities were 

constructed. personnel hired from the local area maintained 

them. In the Baghram area. planners were fortunate that there 

was plentyofunskilled labor availablc and willing to maintain 

bum-out latrines. 

At tlie end of February. porta-potties became available and 

started to replace the burn-out latrines. At Baghram. local 

contractors maintained the porta-potties, but finding competent 

contractors turned out to be somewhat challenging for engineer 

planners. The long-term goal of the camp at Baghram is to tap 

into existing sewage lines. However, the problems involved 

with locating and cleariilgexistinglu~esmaymake it more feasible 

to construct a completely new sewage system. 

At Kandahar, tlie latrines progressed in a similar manner. . -

Potta-potties there were serviced by a Canadian team w-ith the 

appropriate equipment. Waste was hauled to a local leach bed 

within the camp perimeter. It is noteworthy that buni-out 

latrines. as opposed to porta-potties, are generally considered 

the best interim solution since using contractors or coalition 

partners for waste disposal will not always beareadily available 
An Aardvark flail used to clear the base camp art ?a 

The mission of the prime power units is to 

design the power grid and provide low-voltage 

(1201208 - 60 hertz) power to the user. Their 

normal tasks do not include running long exterior 

low-voltage lines to end users. Military 

occupational specialty 5 I R electricians assigned 

to the combat heavy engineer units were vely 

competent at interior wiring tasks, but most of 

them had little experience with running long 

exterior low-voltage lines. Fortunately, soldiers 

from the prime power detachments were able to 

assis( the combat heavy units' electricians, who 

installed low-voltage power lines for other units 

as required. 

It was noted that the generation of technology used by the prime power detachments is 

based on aging technology. Prime powetpersonnel are required to manually balance the 

option. As ofthis writing, a utilities detachment was installing 

a sewage main at Kandahar that will allow gray water to be 

drained directly to the leach bed and will allow some existing 

facilities to be brought into service. Fortunately, the engineer 

battalion commander purchased a commercial ditching machine 

for each of his companies before deploying. This equipment 

has proved very useful for installing cable, sewage lines, and 

underground power lines. 

Shower Facilities 

S

hower facilities were quickly sought at Baghram as well 

as at Kandahar. A few permanent facilities were located 

and put into operation by the combat heavy engineers, 

but they were always overcrowded and were not nearly 

adequate for the number of soldiers at the camp. Many units 

did not deploy with kits or materials to make field-expedient 

showers, so they were dependent on the logistical system to 

provide them. Some of our coalition partners, however, came 

with field shower equipment and were able to provide service 

to their units. As ofthe writing of this article, showers were still 

in high demand at both base camps. 

Power Distribution 

Power generation went through similar development at 

both Kandahar and Baghram. Initially, units depended 

on their organic tactical generators for their power 

needs. At Kandahar, personnel from prime powerunits arrived 

and quickly designed power grids. The existing power distribution systems at both camps were deemed too unsafe or 

unreliable, so the utility detachment and other en&' meer 

personnel began installing underground power lines. The 

biggest constraint in getting the power grid into operation at 

both camps was the transpoi? and availability of the prime 

power unit's large 750-kilowatt (kW) generators. Once these 

generators were on the ground, the prime power units-with 

the assistance of the utility detachments-installed a power 

grid in relatively short order. 

6 Engineer 

loads placed on the power grid. In modem power grids, this 

task is auto~natically accomplished by semiconducting 

resistance circuit boards. In addition, the step-down transformers that they use can only be obtained through the Army 

supply system and are unlike the ones readily available off the 

shelf. This is potentially problematic, since the required hansformers can only be procured from limited sources. 

The initial assessment was that the power reqvirement at 

Kandahar was 2.2 megawatts. This required the base camp to 

use three 750-kW generators and one backup 750-kW 

generator. However, during the summer months, many units 

subsequently added environmental control units to provide 

air conditioning. These requirements were not initially 

accounted for, and they easily doubled the requirement for 

750-kW generators from fourto eight. 

This situation points to a larger issue. The Army has not 

clearly defined the standards for base camps. Established 

standards or goals are needed so that future base camp infrastructure plans can be completed early on and ample lead time 

is available for necessary logistical support coordination. 

Without established planning standards, planners have nothing 

on which to base plans. To solve this problem, the Coalition 

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) C7 and Central 

Command (CENTCOM) staffs drafied-and received approval 

for-a set of standards that are available for future operations. 

These standards are called the Sand Book. 

Base Camp C2 and Master Planning 

During early stages ofbase camp development, planners 

sometimes found it difficult to expand the camp in an 

organized, synchronized manner This was especially 

truc at Baghram, and one ofthe ways this problem manifested 

itself was when planners discovered that a recently renovated 

building could not beused as a dining facility because of force 

protection concerns. This situation was partially attributed to 

the rapid and unpredictable growth of the base camp but can 

also be attributed to the rapidly changing C2 structures and 

0ctobe1,-December2002 
missions of the forces at Baghram. A brief history ofBaghram 

will illustrate how the base camp C2 structure evolved. 

On 19 November2001, CFLCC issued operations order 

(OPORD) 02-005, which directed CFLCC forces, in coordimation 

with coalition forces, to operate and maintain Baghram airfield 

to support humanitarian assistance and set the conditions for 

follow-on operations. Task Force Baghram was officially 

activated on 29 November 2001. The initial staffconsisted of 

18 personnel. The task force's mission was to protect the force, 

conduct airfield and detainee operations, provide base support 

to seven coalition tenet units, and provide C2 to the approximately 600 coalition and joint forces operating in the 

BaghramValley area. Key tasks also included enabling infrastructure development within Afghanistan. 

On 9 December 2001, CFLCC published fragmentary order 

(FRAGO) 02 to CFLCC OPORD 02-005, which directed the 

movement of a colonel from CFLCC C3 (Rear) to assume 

command ofTask Force Baghram. - Over the next three months, 

the task force headquarters grew to nearly five times its initial 

staff strength, and tenantunits grew to more than 4,000. As the 

number of tenant units and their corresponding life support 

requirements quickly increased, problems such as the one 

described in a preceding paragraph began to surface, and it 

became apparent that closer attention had to be given to base 

camp development. 

A base camp planning board was established on 27 January 

2002, based on the recommendation of amember of the CFLCC 

C7 staff who was sent to Baghram to assist in the orderly 

expansion of the camp. This colonel, the chief of construction 

and facilities section of the CFLCC C7, became the de facto 

mayor of Baghram and held this unofficial position for about 

seven weeis. The concept of the planning board and base 

camp mayor was taken from the C2 structures recommended 

by the Redbook, a planning guide for 

base camp development used in 

Europe. The planning board, which 

consisted ofrepresentatives from most 

of the major tenant units and staff 

elements, met weekly. The meetings 

provided a forum for representatives 

to voice requirements and issues. In 

addition? an officer who specialized in 

master planning deployed to Baghram 

on a temporary basis to help develop 

the overall infrastructure plan. The 

board developed a robust plan and 

successfully housed an additional 

1,000 personnel during the last five 

days in February. 

About this time, a seven-person 

facilities engineer team (FET), consisting of engineers with a variety of 

engineering disciplines, was deployed 

to Baghram. The team's mission was 

board (which later became the Base Operations Center) in 

developing technical scopes of work and designs for future 

base camp infrastructure upgrades. The FET found that the 

Theater Co~~struction Management System (TCMS) was useful 

for obtaining basic designs and drawings, even though some 

of the drawings were outdated. In addition, it found that the 

software was not user-friendly unless the user was thoroughly 

familiar with the program. 

The Redbook was used in space allocation planning for 

services such as postal, base camp C2, laundry, and bathing. 

The FET found that having team members with basic surveying 

skills was useful for making field surveys of various sites. In 

addition, the team found that it would have been beneficial to 

have a power distribution engineer on the team. The team also 

coordinated with CFLCC C7 staffand the U.S.Army Corps of 

Engineers liaison officer to coordinate scope of work for 

projected military construction and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program projects. - .. 

The FET was given a general planning horizon and number 

of personnel to plan for when it began work in Baghram. Until 

that time, a clearly defined end state for the base camp was 

difficult to ascertain, which made it rather hard for engineer 

planners to commit the right resources to base camp planning 

and development. Understandably, security concerns over 

future operations to be staged out of Baghram were likely the 

reason ,hy few on the ground blew how rapidly the camp 

would expand and how the expansion would be. 

Task Force Baghram commenced drawdown and transition 

activities on2 1 Febmay2002, and on 6 March 2002 it officially 

transferred staff functions and responsibilities for garrison C2 

responsibilities to the commander of the resident supply and 

service battalion. 

to assist the base camp planning A ditching machine used to install cable and sewage and power lines 

October-December 2002 Engineer 7 
Lessons Learned Power Distribution

ngineers and logistical planners learned the following 

lessons regarding base camp infrashucture development and C2 in Afghanistan: 

Bed-Down Facilities 

Clearing areas of mines and UXO for tent space may limit 

the pace at which a base camp can expand in areas where 

the mineiUX0 threat is high. 

Units should come prepared witb enough tents to 

accom~nodatetheir personnel or should let their higher 

headquarters know their requirements early on. 

Water Supply 

In austere theaters that arc dependent on logistical support 

by air, using bottled water as the only source of potable 

water may not be sustainable. 

Combat heavy engineer units should know how to sewice 

wells and pumps, to include pulling and replacing pipes. 

They also should know the basics of thrce-phase power. 

Drilling new wells may be necessary ifexisting wells are not 

satisfactory or are not available. 

Units must be ingenious and use all available assets to 

accomplish their missions in austere environments. 

Latrine Facilities 

Battalion-sized and smaller units should he prepared to 

pro\.ide for their own field latrines until more pennanent 

facilities are constructed. 

Units may not be getting the necessary training on basic 

field sanitation tasks because ofthe dependence on portable 

latrines in most training areas and the relatively short 

duration and low density of troops during training events. 

Units that are not prepared to conshuct basic latrines place 

additional and unnecessary requirements on scarce engineer 

resources. 

Units must mark slit trenches and urine pits when they are 

filled in so that hture base camp expansion call be planned 

without jeopardizing the health of the inhabitants. 

m Potta-potties cannot always be expected to replace slit 

trenches sincc they are dependent on the availability or 

maintenance equipment in theater. 

Availability and transport of 750-kWgenerators can be a 

limiting factor in the rapid establishment of a power 

distribution system. Off-loading the generators from the 

aircraft is difficult since each generator weighs more than 

39,000 pounds and requires a special loadcr to off-load it. 

This special loader itself requires heavy lift assets to offload from the aircraft.Although clearly stated in FM 5-422, 

Engineer Prime Po~rer-Operations, the logistical coordination required to transport these large generators 

into austere areas of operation should not be overlooked. 

Units should train on how to run low-voltage power lines 

to main access points provided by prime power units. 

Ditching machines greatly enhance the rate at which power 

lines can be installed. 

The technology used by prime power units should be 

upgraded to keep up with coninion indusw standards. 

Base Camp CZ and Master Planning 

It is difficult to plan for base camp facilities when the 

population rapidly and unexpectedly expands and the 

internal C2 organization rapidly changes. 

A Base Camp Planning Board should be established as soon 

as possible to assist with the organized development of the 

infrastructure of the base camp. 

m The FET enhances the infrastructure planning for base 

camps. 

Allowing the FET to tailor itself to the specific m~ssion 

enables the right capabilities to be deployed. 

Clearly defining the end state for a base camp is the single 

most important thing that can be done to ensure that proper 

planning for life support can bc accomplished. 

The TCMS is generally useful but needs to be updated and 

made more user-friendly. 

rn The Redbook is senerally usell11but should be updated to 

include base camp living standards or goals for varying 

lengths of expected occupation in austere environments 

such as those encountered in Afghanistan. Some of these 

standards are addressed in the SrrndBouk. However, e\;ery 

commander should have his own standard. Y 

Major !McrV~rI[vis the rrecrrtive oflcer of the 577th Engineer 

Bartalion. 1st Enpi~icerBrigode, Fort Leo~rar.<lMbod.

.A allowsutility and engineers Mi.ssouri. Previous assignme~ilsinclrrde operations qfficer: 

to rapidly install cable, sewage lines. and underground 5th Engineer Barmliort. Fort Leo~iardWood. and cornma~ider: 

power lines. B Conrpany, 299th Dlgineer. BoItnlion and 43d Engineer 

Cornpail)., 3 ACR, Fort Carsorr. Colorado. A prrrdfrare ofthe 

Shower Facilities United Stales 1Wi1irar.yAcodem?. MAJ McNulti: holds o 

master's irr ~ni~reral econoinics from the Colorado School o f .,

.Units should deploy with materials to construct field ,Mines. He naveled to Afghanistan as a rt~etnberoJ'n Conrhinedshowers and be prepared to use them until more permanent Army Asse.ssnieiit Teaiil led by the Ce~irerfor AFIII!,Lesso~is 

facilities are in place. Lenr~~ed, Fort Leovem~,orrh.Kansos. 

October-December 2002 
Operation Bulldog Barrier 

By First Lieutenant John Mooney 

The wake ofthe I 1 September 2001 attacks left much of Mission 

the Army-including the forces stationed in Hawaiiscrambling to implement antiterrorism and force n 20 September, the 84th received the mission to 

protection measures. Though measures such as identification construct at least 25 concrete barriers per day-for 

card checks and vehicle searches were implemented im- an indefinite period of time-with the following 

mediately, there was still the threat of a brute-force attack, either specifications: 

via charging through the gates in a vehicle or by car bombing. M~~~stop a vehicle traveling at 55 miles per hour 

United States Army Hawaii (USARHAW) has plastic waterfillable barriers to cover this threat. But, unfortunately, these m Must be movable by a forklift and crane 

barriers are limited in number, are intended to be temporary, Must measure approximately 3'x 2' x 6' 

and offer less protection than a solid concrete barrier. Can be painted yellow or beige, depending on use 

At most posts, such a problem could be solved easily. 

Concrete highway or "New Jersey" barriers are common and ProjectPlanning 

would simply need to be purchased and moved into place at 

installation gates and mission-essential vulnerable areas 

(MEVAs). On the island of Oahu, finding concrete barriers is a 

little more difficult, and to ship such barriers from the mainland 

United States would be extremely expensive and slow. Bids 

from local civilian contractors were equally impractical, since 

they could produce only three to five barriers per day at an 

exorbitant cost. Recognizing the criticality of this need, the 

USARHAW commander turned to the 84th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat) (Heavy) at Schofield Barracks. 

he civil engineer section (S3C) began to develop a design 

for the barriers, and Bravo Company started planning 

the project, using FM 5-412, Project Management, as 

a guide. Because there was such a critical need for the barriers, 

we could not afford to delay the start of production. In this 

case, a 50 percent solution right away was better than a 90 

percent solution too late. The indefinite nature of the project 

was the most significant factor in the planning process. 

Estimates for the total l~u~nber ofbarriers needed ranged from 

100 to 3,000. This meant that maximizing 

An aerial view of the jobsite 

efficiency was pararnount and that the plan 

could not ignore normal day-to-day activities 

such as physical training, maintenance, and 

personnel actions. 

We determined that the most efficient 

method would be to develop an assembly line. 

By breaking down individual tasks to the most 

fundamental levels, soldiers could focus on a 

single task continuously, which would cut 

down on mistakes and increase production. 

The use of jigs or templates for these tasks 

wouldvirtually eliminate mistakes. In addition, 

any soldier could learn any single operation 

on the assembly line very quickly, allowing 

supervisors to allocate any soldier to any task 

based on changing needs and opening the 

possibility ofusing othermilita~yoccupational 

specialties to augment the Career Management Field 5 I (general engineering) soldiers. 

The battalion motor pool was selected as 

the site forthe constmction, due to its abundant 

October-December 2002 Engineer 9 
rebar cages with zip ties and the cages 

placed in the forms. 

Place concrete. The plan was to 

place the forms in long rows, leaving 

a lane between rows wide enough for 

a ready-mix concrete truck. Each row 

, ... 	 would correspond to one day ofwork. i:.


. 	 On any given day, we used one row 

for form assembly and the next for 

placing concrete. The third row would 

contain previously poured concrete 

that was curing. and the fourth row 

would contain forms that were ready 

for disassembly. The last row would 

be for painting the barriers. Finally, we 

anticipated that we should have at 

least two extra storage rows to allow 

the unit that picked up and delivered 

the barriers some flexibility in 

scheduling. To actually place the Soldiers remove a new barrier from its form 

space, vehicle access, existing electrical and plulnhing utilities, 

and proximity to the rest ofthe battalion. Moreover. the platoons 

could work out of their tnotor pool storage sheds. and the tools 

and equipment would remain in a secure area throughout the 

project. This proved to be one of the wisest decisions made 

dwing this project. 

Ruilding the Rarriers 

In working out the details of the project, the process of 

building the barriers was separated into six major operations. 

Each of those tasks was further broken down using flow 

diagrams as outlined in FM 5-412, Chapter4. 

Fabricate cages. The design for the reinforcing steel (rebar) 

caecs - called for A4 (112-inch diameter) rebar to be cut. bent. 

and tied together into cages. There were four different types of 

pieces for the cage: two 5'4" x 1'8" braces, three 5'3" x 2'4" 

long stirmps, five 2'3" x 1'7" short stirrups, and two 4' lifting 

hooks. The processes to build each piece were broken down 

into the most basic steps: cut to length, bend, assemble, and 

tie. We determined that it would be more efficient to cut and 

bend the braces in two pieces, then weld them together. We 

also determined that for the sake of strength, the lifting hooks 

should be welded to the cage. Once the cages were completed, 

they were moved to a location where they could be 

conveniently placed in the concrete forms. 

Construct forms. The woodworking processes were split 

into a dimensional lumber-cutting operation, a plywood-cuning 

operation, and a forms-assembly operation. The plyvood was 

cut to be sheathing for the sides and bottom of the forms. 

Yokes were cut from 2"x6" lumber, and 2"x 10" lumber was cut 

to leave holes for forklift tines. The precut lumber would he 

partially assembled at the woodworking station and moved 

out to the concrete placing area for final assembly. Once the 

forms were complete, high chairs u,ould be attached to the 

10 Engineer 

concrete, we planned to roll the trucks 

down the line of forms, filliiig each form. The screed, float, and 

finish crews would follow right behind the truck. 

Remove forms. Following placement of the concrete, we 

planned forthe barriers to cure at least 36 hours before removing 

the forms. During initial planning, we did not have a definite 

place to remove the forms. We anticipated that th'e best way to 

find the most efficient method was to allow the crew leaders to 

use the trial-and-error method. We anticipated that the plywood 

forms would be durable enough to use for four to five concrete 

placements, and we realized that to reuse the forms, we would 

have to carehlly remove them. The forms would then be moved 

to another line to he reassembled and readied for another concrete placement. 

Aanlv .. <. naint. As with form removal. we were unsure during - initial planning about how to most efficiently paint the bamers. 

We didnote, however, thatpaint sprayers wouldbe much more 

efficient than rollers or brushes and that environmental compliance would be a concern. 

Deliver barriers. Deliveiy of the bamers was also left 

unplanned, because we had received the mission to construct 

the barriers but had received no requirement or guidance to 

deliver them. 

Assecessing the Risk 

The company safety officer and NCO conducted a risk 

assessment for each operation and created a safety plan. Most 

of the safety measures were fairly standard, such as using 

ground guides to move vehicles around the jobsite and assigning a dedicated safety NCO. One of the most important 

outcomes of the risk assessment was the identification of 

necessaty safety equipmentthat was not on hand. For example, 

although safety goggles are included with most of our organic 

sets, kits, and outfits, we did not have enough for evety soldier 

in the company. Also, we anticipated a lot of wear and tear on 

October-December 2002 
the safety equipment on hand and planned to order additional 

stock of those items. 

Jobsite Setup 

Four days after receiving the mission, Bravo Company 

began setting up the jobsite. During this short phase of 

the project, the barrier construction plan continued to 

ei olve. Though the company had done a good deal ofplanning, 

many issues had gone unresolved due to the urgent need to 

begin the project. 

The rebar station came together as planned. The station crew 

built metal-cutting tables with stops to ensure that rebar cuts 

were made exactly. They also built tablcs with makeshift rebar 

benders and stations for crews to tie cages together. The company 

maintenance section set up a welding station with our welding 

trailer and contact truck surrounded by welding screens. The 

makeshift bending tables were an excellent improvisation but 

produced large-radius bends, making it difficult to assemble the 

rebar cages within tolerance. Fortunately. before setup was 

complete, the command provided funds to buy specialized, 

nonorganic tools, including dedicated rebar benders. 

The woodworking stations and concrete lines came together 

quickly. The initial rows held 25 forms-the anticipated daily 

output. Based on estimates by the first sergeant and the 

commander, the row of forms would expand to 35, then to 50 

before the first batch of barriers was completed. Also during 

the setup phase, we solved the painting problem. We bought 

paint sprayers using our tool fund and built a mobile paint 

booth from two M920 tractors with M870 trailers, plywood, 

and nylon matting. 

On the last day before the start of production, the first 

sergeant an3 the platoon sergeants conducted a leaders' 

validation course for the NCOs to ensure that crew leaders 

knew how to supervise almost any station and to gain a rough 

production estimate. By I October, the first batch of barriers 

was ready for delively. 

Execution 

0

peration Bulldog Barrier, as it came to be known, 

went as planned for the most part. Over the 10- 

week period of construction, soldiers and NCOs 

011-sitc devised many improvements in eficiency. Without 

these innovations, Bravo Company might have been 

building harriers through January 2002. However, many 

problems surfaced during construction that significantly 

impacted production. Though many were out ofour control, 

some occurred because of planning shortfalls. 

The rebar operation turned out to be very manpowerintensive, requiring a minimum of 16 soldiers to run. Early 

in the project, before the process was streamlined, it took 

up to 30 personnel to maintain normal daily production. 

This was even more difficult when resources became a 

used four to five times before disposal, the next batch could be 

built over the course of several days, and we stockpiled extra 

form sections to replace those that broke or wore out early. The 

operation started slowly, although the purchase of a large table 

saw and a panel saw sped the process. Also, scrap plywood 

was used to build form inserts in the shape of-among other 

things-the 25th Infantry Division (Light) insignia. 

The concrete placement crews consistently improved in 

efficiency. In the beginning, it took them seven to eight hours 

to place 50 barriers. By the end of the project, they could place 

55 barriers in only four and one-half hours. Changes to the 

initial plan included running two ready-mix concrete trucks 

simultaneously and adding a fourth yoke to the forms, since 

about three forms would experience blowout failure each day. 

In addition, the customers began to request barriers that could 

hold soil forpottedplants tomake thebaniers more aesthetically 

pleasing. These flowerpot barriers were much more difficult to 

construct. 

It soon became apparent that form removal and reconstruction were critical to the project. In the first three to four 

weeks, the company worked 12 to I4 hours a day, and rebuilding 

forms was always the last to be completed. Initially, soldiers 

unscrewed the form completely and pried the sides off. Then, a 

forklift raised the barrier, and the bottom sheathing was 

removed. Lastly, soldiers used sledgehammers to remove the 

blocks that formed the forklift holes. This process was 

manpower-intensive and time-consuming, caused at least a 

dozen sledgehammers to break, removed the forklift from service 

elsewhere, and exhausted the soldiers. 

One NCO came up with the idea to use the hydraulic 

excavator and a rollcr to liA the barrier and remove the fonns. 

Also, the forms removal crew became proficient enough to 

remove only one side of the sheathing and then lift the barrier 

out of the form. With this system, the soldiers could remove 

and reconstruct 55 forms in seven to eight hours. Something 

problem later on. 

The woodworking operation was fairly simple once an 

I 

A soldier guides thevibratory roller forward. The slots 

initial hatch of 150 forms was made. Since the forms were underneath the barrier enable a forklift to carry it. 

Oclober-December 2002 Engineer 11 
Two soldiers paint 

mobile paint booth 

else that speeded 11p the process was that \ye discovered-by 

trial and error-that the fortns could be removed as soon as 30 

hours after placing the concrete. 

By far, the most crucial aspect of the project was resources: 

when resources were delayed, we were delayed. T\K'ace, ' we ran 

out of rebar because the contractor did not deliver the next 

batch on schedule. The same thing happened with tie wire, 

high chairs, plywood, and dimensional lumber. In addition, our 

cordless drills-which wcrc critical to forms removal-burned 

out at a rate of about one or two each day, causing delays if 

they could not be replaced immediately. 

The barriers were loaded and transported to their destinations around Oahu by the 325th Forward Support Battalion 

and the 25th Transportation Company (Medium Truck). The 

65th Engineer Battalion and the 25th Infantry Division (Light) 

divisional engineer battalion directed the placement of each 

bmier. 

By 14December, Bravo Cotlipany had built 2,033 ba~iicrsat 

an approximate cost of $1.5 million. (Concrete costs about $170 

per cubic yard on Oahu, and each harrier requires 1.4 cubic 

yards. Plywood is $34 per sheet.) The soldiers gained a lot of 

pride and an unprecedented level of esprit de corps. In addition, 

the efforts of the 84th Engineer Battalion saved USARHAW 

an estimated $5 million. 

Lessons Learned 

Resources drive the train. If anyaspect of the project 

needs to be perfect, it is resources. .4 project should 

not be started unless you arc confident that resirurces, especially materials, will be available \\.hen they are 

nceded. In any project, rcsource needs should be projected 

well into the future. 

Planning is an inuestment,and it doesnot stop when a project 

starts. In this prqject, we needed to begin as soon as possible. 

We conducted thc minimum amount of planning necessary to 

start. then became focused on day-to-day operations. Foresight 

could have prevented the follou:ing problems: 

We neglected to plan a project tracking method, making it 

difficult now to estimatc the project cost, equipment hours, 

and man-hours. Life should have required platoon leaders 

to turn in daily or weekly reports on equipment. manpower, 

and material usage. 

Our safety staff deployed to Bosnia midway through thc 

project. Because of the meticulous attention of first-line 

supervisors. we sustained only one reportable accident; 

however, the safety system on a project of this magnitude 

should be centralized. 

Tool control became difficult because there were so many 

tools on-site, and there was no plan to account for them on 

a daily basis. We should have established platoon-level 

toolroom procedures. 

We did not plan for waste disposal. We did not contract for 

trash bins until after scraps from the forms began to pile up 

on the jobsite. The waste generated by cleaning out the 

concrete mcks became a problem as well, and we had to 

improvise a solution to prevent a buildup of slag. 

Fortunately, none of these prohlelns were fatal, but planning 

ahead would have saved 111ucl1time and effort, even after the 

project started. 

The right tool is necessary for the right job. This project 

proved to Bravo Company that cordless tools are very valuable. Specialized tools that are not organic to a'construction 

company arc probably worth the cost. The savings of time 

and itnprovement in quality Inore than paid for our rehar 

benders and panel saw. 

External resources maximize engineer effort. The 325th 

Forward Support Battalion loaded the barriers and tnoved them 

to gates and MEVAs, which relieved Bravo Company of that 

task. As a result, engineer soldiers could focus on the engineer 

mission. while transpottation soldiers took care of the transportation duties. 

Construction management doctrine should betrusted. FM 

5-412 was extremely useful for this project. Many smaller 

projects allow the officer or NCO in charge to get away with 

minimal planning, but it is still a good idea to esercise criticalpath-method planning and site layoutiflow process analyses. 

Thc practice will reap huge benefits when trying to plan more 

substantial projects. 

Conclusion 

verall, Operation Bulldog Barrier was a success. 

Barriers are now placed in dozens of areas around 

the island of Oahu, providing vital force protection 

to USARHAW. In addition, Bravo Company soldiers gained 

an immense atnount of training benefit and unit pride, while at 

the same time saving USARHAW about $5 million. Y 

Firsr Lin,roiiirir ,clooiiej: nu\t,c~.~c,ctrri\r qflic~rforBrn,aCo,npai,?: 

84th E,rgi,ww Bnrtnlio,i /Co,,ibal) (lieo\y), i~~asprn~io~~.~/~~l~

I~~ail~~rfbr. 1st Platoo,~.Briivo Coiiz[)a~!He holds n hnchelnri in 

r~~echonicnle,igi~.irleerrri,q,r,l,,,i the CiiiilrdSiatw :L/iliio,?.A< od<~n~?. 
Leveraging - - 

the Power 


of the Regiment 


By Lieuienni?/ Colonel Christopher J. Toomey 

Any valid description of the current and future 

operational environments demonstl-ates thecontinued 

relevance of engineers. We fully expect our forces to 

operate for extended periods in austere environments 

characterized by poor infrastructure and often saturated with 

mines. Consider recent operations in such diverse places as 

Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Our forces operate 

amongst poor roads and immature and inadequate airfields, 

with little to no supporting utilities. 

~dd to this the for an elusive and asymmetric 

enemy that will necessitate extensive force protection 

measures-as well as the removal of varied, often undoculnellted lninefields-and it is clear that engineers will be 

extremely busy. The record ofrecent operations bears this out. 

Regardless of the theater, whether removing mines along the 

Tuzla-to-Brcko rail line or preparing joint logistics-over-theshore sites in Haiti, our engineers are key members of any 

combined-arms teams and are called on to execute varied 

missions that stretch our capabilities and challenge our leaders. 

Yet, though we know the characteristics of any future 

environment literally cry out for engineers, force structure 

demands in the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and 

the proposed Initial Division (IDIV) diminish the density of 

organic engineers. Figure 1 shows the SBCT Engineer 

Company. Optimized forthe immediate tactical mobility of 

the SBCT, it is challenged to provide significant countcrmobility, survivability, or general engineering within its 

doctrinal 50- by 50-kilometer area of operations. Certainly, 

the embedded digital battle command will provide increased 

situational understanding that will help get the right 

engineer force to the right place at the right time, but an 

analysis of engineer capabilities versus potential requirements indicates that we are accepting considerable risk. 

Providing oversight over the engineer company and orchestrating maneuver support within the SBCT is the brigade 

engineer section, shown in Figure 2, page 14. The organic 

digital terrain team can provide terrain visualization down 

to brigade level.' Yet, the brigade engineer section is limited 

I I I 

Headquarters Sect~on 

d@Gae 

Moblllty Support Platoon 

Figure 1. Organization of the SBCT Engineer Company 

October-December ZOO2 Eiz,yineer 13 
Brigade Engineer 

DigitalTopographic Support System - Deployable 

Digital TopographicSupport System - Light 

Figure 2. The SECT Brigade Engineer Section 

in its connectivity and will have to fight for high-demand 

and scarce bandwidth. Additionally, it faces challenges when 

integrating analog-based legacy engineers into the fight. 

In any operation, the SBCT engineers will require augmentation. As a Regiment, are we rcady to provide that augmentation? Additionally, engineers "in the box" will want to 

leverage the full intellectual power of our Regiment to expand 

the combat power of our committed engineer forces. Are we 

ready to do this'? I will explore both of these concepts in this 

article and provide some thoughts to add to an already active 

discussion on engineers within Transfonnation. 

Building Effective Augmentation 

Augmentation of organic engineen is expected. It is 

needed for anything but the most rudimentary missions, and the Regiment's ability to provide rapid and 

effective augmentation to the SBCT or IDIV will be asolid gauge 

of our effectiveness to the combined-anns tcam. As seen during 

Force XXI and with the SBCTs, augmentation of digital forces 

presents some unique challenges for analog legacy units. Since 

it is expected that the lnajority of nondivisional engineer units 

will be in the Legacy Force forsome time, we needto examine the 

nuanccs of our Legacy Forces working with SBCTs and, 

eventually, IDNs. Some of the obstacles are digital integration1 

awareness, establishing digital-analog integration procedures, 

and the challenges with austere logistics. 

Digital Awareness 

Engineer forces joining the SBCTareexpcctcd to be digitally 

aware and understand the full power of the Army Battle 

Command System (ABCS)'. A key component of the Interin? 

Force is that it can deploy quickly. Rapidly augmenting 

engineers cannot expect a long train-up period to get soldiers 

and leaders ready to operate in the digital environment and 

must be prepared to operate either without the benefit of digital 

enablers or with digital equipment-and with luck some 

attached operators-loaned from the gaining unit. It is expected 

that they will know how to employ the equipment with minimal 

refresher training. This is especially true of leader understanding ofdigital battle command capabilities. At Fort Lewis, 

Washington, solne units are finding that operators can normally 

be trained to use ABCS and digital co~nrnand and control 

systems rather quickly--often, a few weeks is enough to Ieam 

how to push the buttons. Leader digital battle co~n~nand 

employment training takes longer. 

Familiarizing leaders, both NCOs andofficers, is a training 

problem that can be addressed both at the institutional and 

unit levels. At the institutional level, we need to weigh adding 

digital training to already heavily committed training schedules. 

TRADOC recognizes the need foran Armywide digital training 

program, but it is currently not funded. The Regiment needs to 

carefully examine the overarching benefitsof "leaping forward" 

to include digital training and awareness in its officer and NCO 

training? 

Fomnately. unit leaders do not need to wait to get started 

on familiarizing their subordinates with digital battle command 

and can consider incorporating ABCS familiarization into unit 

professional-development programs. Just because the system 

is not in the unit does not mean it cannot be trained. Those 

units fortunate enough to have access to actual syste~ns via 

collocation with digital units must work to share some systems 

and develop digitally cognizant, if not enabled, leaders. 

Additionally, leaders should take advantage of the nilmeroils 

digital distance learning tools that the Amiy is developing to 

support training digital staffs.' 

Procedures 

Leaden in both digital and supporting analog units must 

look to establishing the procedures and protocols for integrating 

an analog unit into a digital unit. Working within the digital 

environment will require so~nc accommodations by analog units. 

Thcy will need to understand what the digital units "see" and 

the workings of the digital units' information management 

methods-both inherent in the digital SOPS-to ensure that 

they have current information to achieve at least a measure of 

situational awareness. 

A critical element is that nondigitizcd units will not "show 

up" on the digitized units' battlefield unless their locations 

are rigorously tracked and manually put into the system. 

Digital unit locations are routinely updated via the tactical 

internet. This will NOT happen with units that are not 

digitally enhanced with a blue feed tracking device. In a 

nonlinear battlefield, this can quickly result in fratricide and 

accountability problenls as units operate and try to clear 

fires and effects in an environment with no front line. Thus, 

both supporting analog units and receiving digital units 

~nust have clear procedures to ensure that unit locations 

are known and disse1ninated.j 

October-December 2002 
Austere Logistics 

~h~ of .3ust.in.tinle logistics2' the lnteriln 

Force means bare-bones logistical infrastructure. With an 

anticipatory-based logistics conceptthat seeks to minimize onhand inventory, Interim Forces will have a hard time absorbing 

resource-intensive aupentees, such as engineer units."he 

anticipato~ logistics concept is targeted at minimizing inventory. limiting the amount of on-hand supplies. This makes 

even niore acute the continual problems associated with 

supporting echelons-above-division engineers within divisional 

and brigade areas, particularly during the early part of an 

operation. 

One particularly challenging area is with maintenance. A 

look at the SBCT Engineer Company organization shows no 

dedicated engineer maintenance. In fact, the maintenance 

concept is focused around combat repair teams dedicated to 

the maneuver battalions and field artillery There are only six 

militaty occupational specialty 628 construction equipment 

repairers in the entire SBCT, wit11 four assigned to actual repair 

duties, one supc~visor, and one technical inspector. There are 

serious challenges with even supporting the SBCT Engineer 

Company, never mind any augmenting forces. 

Engineers must aliticipate providing-r negotiating from 

supporting logistics units-a combat service support ''slice'' 

to provide for their ilnlnediate needs and establish the 

procedures-via either digital oranalo~means-for~roviding 

logistical reports. 

Reaching Back 

one way that Interim Forces are expected to enhance 

cdmbat power is to use reach (also hiown as "reach 

back" or "reach operationsw) to leverage assets not 

under tlieir immediate control. Though possessing a physical 

quality in terms of calling for additional assets and logistics. 

reach also has an arguably more powerful infonnation-oriented 

Figure 3). 

Engineer Reach 

Engineers are already experienced with "reaching" to 

enhance the informational combat power of deployed 

for'ces. Indeed, such initiatives as field force 

en~inccringthat are currently employed to support forces with 

U. S.Anny Corps of Engineers-provided information are already 

making great strides in ensuring that engineer forces can tap 

into the intellectual power of the Regiment. Notwithstanding 

recent accomplish-ments, the Regiment needs to consider how 

to juaxilnize its reach potential and continue to look for 

opportunities to both exercise and practice reach operations. 

At an extreme fidelity,reach involvescreating the conditions 

for "brilliant push," where the right information is pushed to 

the user at the right time and in the right format, vice "smart 

pull." which is someone answering a carefully worded question. 

One isproactive, while the other isreactive, One remol,es the 

burden of "asking the right question," while the other relies 

heavily oncolnlnittedforces doing the asking, 

The Regiment is already moving toward a smart pull. Using 

a wide range of lnediums to include cell ,,hones, deployed 

engineers are in contact with ~ ~ ~ i asking questions 

,,d answers, B~~ is this tllere missed 

opportunities because we are not formulating a brilliant push? 

In establishing a push-oriented reach capability. the Regiment will have to commit to establishing some protocols on 

how to conduct husiness and manage information. Additionally, engineer forces in the field--at all echelons-need 

to establish the conditions to provide oppomtnities to train 

reach operations. Only rigorous training will expose problems 

with procedures, architectures, and connectivity. 

Reach: The process of expanding the commander's 

information battlespace through networks to exploit 

agencies and assets both inside and outside of the 

Brilliant Push vs. Smart Pull! 

Virtual Collaboration: 

Moving Information - Not People 

Figure 3. Moving toward a definition of reach 

October-Deceffiber2002 Eifgbfeer IS 
Forward-Deployed 

or Both 

Eng~neerl 

Sanctuary 

Portal 

Large Bandwidth 

/ Multlple Formats 

/ 

Limited Bandwidth 

Constrained Formats 

USAc;t 

Centers and Labs USAES 

.DivisionsDiatrict! 

Field Operating A, 

COMB 

Figure 4. A notional example of engineer reach 

Developing a knowledge agent, an organization that 

represents the informational interests ofthe committed engineer 

force, is a step in the right direction. A knowledge agent can 

serve several knctions. First, it serves as a single, 2417 information portal for the cornlnitted force. No more surfing around 

Web sites or hunting around agencies. Next, the knowledge 

agent is virtually linked to the committed forces and, with a 

clear understanding of the commander's intent and conditions 

in the field, is able to anticipate requirements and push the 

right infonnation to the committed force at the right time. Third, 

the knowledge agent, because it is connected to the larger 

global information network, is able to continuously mine the 

community for infonnation that may escape members of the 

comniitted force who are operating under "less-than-officeenvironmen2' conditions. It is expected that the knowledge 

agent connectivity is normally less constrained than that found 

in the connnitted force, particularly during the early stages 

when bandwidth constraints over satellite communications will 

be acute. Finally, the knowledge agent can ensure that information is phased in at the right time and in the right format to 

ensure it is usable. The knowledge agent is an information 

manager for the committed force (see Figure4). 

Conclusion 

Lieutenant Colonel Toomey, currentlyaftendingthe Naval 

War College, was recently chief: Battle Command and C41SR. 

at the Fort Lewis Brigade Coordirtarion Cell, Avmjl Transformation Task Force. The former commander of the 14th 

Combat Engineer Battalion. LTC Toonley is a gradrtare of the 

United States Milirarj, Academy and the Massach,nse/t.~ 

Instit~rte of Tecl?nology 

Endnotes 

I Major Anthony Wright, "Concept and Organization 

of the IBCT Engineer Company," Engineer, May 2001. 

An overview of the ABCS system-of-systems is 

at the TRADOC Program Integration Office-ABCS 

Web site: hffp:llww.leavenworth.armymiIItpioabcs/ 

overviewlABCSoverviewexe 

Discussions at ENFORCE 2 ltethat the 

U.S.Army Engineer School is araauy Imoving to c.4..-+:.- incorporate digital training into the Officer ruubauul I 

siystem an d Noncon d Officer Education 

System. 

Warrio~.-T has nu) rnerous pr oducts to; sssist with . . A: -:*., ... x f.7 r....

... ..-- .L . n..:... -3. tralrllny ulyikal srarls.Iry irafrr~rrqlrte arwaue 

Battlestaff at http:, 

detai/.asp?docid=239 

Anny Transformation and the emergcnce of the Ilitcrim 

Force present unique challenges for our Regiment. 

Without question, we want to ensure that we are enWarrinr-T .. .. . . . . has assembled tactics, techniques, 

and proced ures (TTP) to assist in integrating digital 

and analog units. See Mixed TTP Manual at hffp:ll 

gaged at every level to solidify the relevance and role ofAr~ny fi'oasat.hood.arrny.millproducts.sp?view=type ,'....-.? engineers in making our Army successful. All units should ' &type-L. 

look for opportunities to further develop their ability to serve This problem of supporting echelons-abovealongside digital forces while the Regiment needs to address brigadelechelons-above-divisionengineer units is not 

developing ways to optimize engineer-related infonnation new. Several methods are discussed in "Suooortina 

needed by committed engineer forces. Ove1.coming the chal- hlondivkior~alEngineer Forces" Iby Major C 

lenges ahead will be exciting! kl -

Toorney, Ar my Logisti'cian, Marc %April 19 

16 Engineer Ociober-Decen~ber2002 
---- -- 

- . . 

,,,, 

, 

- ~-,!; 


-;.. 
 k~ ~ ~ 

f' , 

r 

71%-. ~ ~- ~

UigilarntWarriors 2002 


BrmyTransformationWar Game 


Bv Mr Janies L. Allen, MI: EddP2valt, and Lieuteriant Colonel Mark H. Potter 

he ongoing Anny Transformation is aguably the single 

largest effort to change itself that the Amy has ever 

undertaken. As such, it represents a tremendous 

investment of every type of resource. The goals of transformation are generally well understood across the Anny. Less 

well understood, however, is the ongoing development work 

to support transformation planning. The Army Transformation 

War Game (ATWG) is a part of that development. This year's 

ATWG, called Vizilant Warriors 2002, was held at Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. The exercise involved a significant 

portion of the Arniy's senior leaders, including the TRADOC 

commander and the Anny Chiefof Staff Vigilantwarriors 2002 

is a good example of how the Amy is trying to think about the 

fUhlre defense of our nation. 

Back to the Future 

Thegear i.7 2020 and we are at war The United States b 

preparing to go into baitle with an enemy unlike an? it has 

faced before. 61ferior lo U.S.fol-ce.s in manv u3avs, the enemy 

plans to use technological sophistica~ior~ it possesses in 

certain areas to create vulnerabilities in perceived U.S. 

October-December 2002 

strengrhs. Tlie ener?l,v .k approach is lo use the Ohjective Force i 

heavy reliance on sensols us a way to disn~pr U.S. operatio~is. 

From rr~imanned aerial vehicles (such as the "Global Haivk ") 

arid space-based serisors to unmanned and manned ground 

sensors, the ener~ij~ Iias determined that tlzese sen.7or.s can be 

used agaiast irs jf'the.~ are ,fed disinformatio~l or are 

overwhelmed with information, 

Simulrn~ieous!~, the e11e1nj) u,ill fly to 1,:in small hut higllly 

pz~blicized victories as our.forces a1.e deployi~ig. Designed fo 

tarn the U.S. populatior~ against co~lfinrled fighting. these 

e~ieniy actions ore 1101 so n~ttch to gain victor?; over the 

ovo~*,helmingl? sllperior power, of rhe Uuired Stnres as tiler 

are toprei~ent &@at of it.7 own forces until the United States 

losesplrblic s~pporr and u;it/idraws. Ifk a sor~ndstrategy, one 

thar has worked before-for General Geoee Cti7shin.qton in 

the Re~~olr~tiona~y War: 

Within the contemporary operating environment just 

described, the ATWG was fought against a backdrop of 

tremendous and chaotic conflict. U.S. peacekeeping forces 

deployed to the fictitious Southeast Asia countly of Sumesia, 

only to find the operational environment changing to a 

Engineer 17 
counterinsurgency operation against well-organized separatist 

extremists. In the Caspian Sea area, a major regional fight 

developed between the U.S. ally Azerbaijan and the fictitious 

aggressor nation ofAnfal; assisted by Iran, over access to the 

region's large oil and natural gas reserves. Other potential 

trouble spots included Colombia, a newly unified Korea, and 

the Balkans. Overlaid upon this world scenario were terrorist 

bombings and cyber attacks aimed at disrupting U.S. 

transportation and financial institutions. 

Vigilant Warriors 2002 

Such was the world of Vigilant Warriors 2002. With 

approxitnately 500 military leaders from across the 

services participating-as well as civilians, former ambass:ldors, and retired military personnel-the purpose was to 

assess the capabilities ofthe Objective Force in a 2020 operating 

environment. Fought using a seminar format. a live Red Force, 

and a multitude of scenarios, the exercise included a significant 

focus on homeland security operations, with maneuver support 

forces (engineer, chemical, and military police) playing a critical 

role 

The area of homeland security-with its significant possibilities of successful attack against domestic targets of high 

political or national importance, military power projection 

airports and seaports of embarkation, or other lucrative 

targets-drew the focus of the maneuver support community. 

The threat of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosives; cruise and ballistic missiles; and nuclear 

and/or chemical "dirty" bombs on U.S. soil-combined with 

the conduct of disinformation and misinformation/cyber attacks 

against U.S. financial, industrial, government, and business 

interests to disrupt capital flow and impact world energy 

markets-produced co~iditionsrequiring engineer, chemical, 

andmilitary police support. These homeland security incidents 

were acritical aspect ofthe war game, stressingArmy resources 

to their limits and identifying insights for Anny leadership into 

transformation issues created bv simultaneouslv fiehtine- terrorism overseas and at home. The key headquarters for 

fighting the homeland security battle was the newly created (in 

2002) Northern Command (NORTHCOM), with missions 

including the following: 

Provide chemical responsc units to civil authorities 

(chemical). 

Provide explosive ordnance disposal assets 

m Provide medical support assets. 

Provide force protection (engineer, chemical, and military police). 

m Provide air defcnse assets. 

Provide general-purpose forces for physical security of 

designated ports (military police). 

Provide crisis management, consequence management, and 

deliberate planning to support civil authorities upon request 

(engineer,chemical, and milita~ypolice). 

Conduct command and control with civil authorities and 

subordinate forces (engineer, chemical, and military police). 

Provide liaison officers to civil authorities (engineer, 

chemical, and military police). 

Since this range of missions is very similar to that of the real 

NORTHCOM, it provided an excellent opportunity to exercise those missions against a backdrop of global conflict. 

That global conflict came to a head as the deployed force in 

Su~nesia(an Objective Force division, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and minimal maneuver support and maneuver sustainment forces) became embroiled in a revolution while performing a U.N.-mandated peace enforcement mission between 

government forces and those of the National Independence 

Movement (NIM). With the NIM forces in control ofthe majority of the population, terrain, and forces on the island of 

Sumatra, they were able to put U.S. forces in the quandary of 

having sufficient combat power to defeat the NIM forces but 

lacking key inability enablers needed to rapidly and efficiently 

maneuver small combat formations throughout the width and 

breadth of the island. For example, without the joint transport 

rotorcrafl or significant mobility assets, U.S. forces found themselves constrained by the limited road networks and hostile 

terrain comprised of mountains, jungle, and flood plains. Having infonnation and intelligence dominance and the ability to 

capitalize on the information by aggressively pursuing and 

destroying massed NIM forces using non-line-of-site and other 

standoff technologies was compromised by a Rcd Force that 

truly understood the key concept of the Objective Force-to 

survive by rapidly maneuvering in a nonlinear, noncontiguous 

environment. This dilemma produced the opportunity for the 

war game participants to explore, in detail, aspects ofthe Objective Force as part of determining the best possible avenues 

for force and combat developments. 

Similarly, major theaterwar en~ptedin the Caspian. TheU.S. 

and allied forces quickly squelched an Iranian incursion, and 

the Iranian anny was driven behind its borders. The Anfarians 

proved to be no match for the superior intelligence, combat 

power, and resolve of the friendly forces, and in a matter of 

days, it was all over. Engineer, military police, and other postconflict forces were left to reconstruct a nation and handle the 

thousands of prisoners and displaced civilians. 

The give and takc of the war game in these missions 

produced the following key insights: 

There is a need to develop actionable intelligence for the 

homeland security mission area. 

Sensor technology can contribute significantly to homeland 

security. 

Liaison officers are needed among NORTHCOM, the 

29 Federal Response Plan-led Federal agencies, Canada, 

Mexico, and U.S. territories to maximize operational 

interconnect~vity. 

Critical infrastructure protection requires an Anny/civil 

authority partnership. (contiti~redon page 21) 

18 Engineer October-December 2002 
8,Ms. Zandra Smith, Captain Krirte~t Yaurignian, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald N Light 

"Because recruiting is SO critieal to readiness, it is #I on my mission-essential task list. " 

General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief ofStrrffof the Army 

(Manning Message, 8 November 1999) 

hc Cnncd Statcs.4rmy nl3kr.s no 


secret that rccn~i~~np - ad re- I


tention of quality soldiers and 

officers are vitally important to its continued preeminence. The Honolulu 

District supports both of these crucial 

missions through its real estate services 

and intern programs. It is one of 18 U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers districts (out 

of a total of 41) that supports the 

recruiting efforts of the Army and the 

other armed services. Throughout the 

Department of Defense, the Corps of 

Engineers supports nearly 6,800 recruiting and support facilities: Army 

(2,022), Navy (1,725), Air Force (1,587), 

and Marines (1,465). 

The Honolulu District is engaged 

throughout the Pacific Region in support 

of the Honolulu Company of the U.S. 

Army's Portland, Oregon, Recruiting 

Battalion. Geographically, the District's 

area ofresponsibility is the largest in the 

Corps. Its support begins in the Hawaiian Islands, then moves 2,400 miles 

south to the territory ofAmerican Samoa, 

west 3,800 miles to the territory of Guam 

and the commonwealth of the Northern 

Marianna Islands, and on to Japan and 

Korea, nearly 5,000 miles fiomHawaii. 

In the Honolulu District's area of The Honolulu District assists recruiters for the Army and other seroperations, there are 13 Army and 21 vices across the Pacific region through leases, building upgrades, 

Navy,Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army telecommunications, furniture purchases, and emergency repair 

National Guard recruiting stations. For support. 


all theseoffices, the District executes all support he gels from the District. He In FYOI, the Anny recruited nearly 
 office space leases, building upgrades, noted that in today's competitive job 1,600 Pacific Islanders into the U.S. Amy
 telecommunications support, furniture market, a professional-looking recn~iting or Anny Reselve. Recruits came not only 
 purchases, and emergency repairs. facility sets the right tone for prospective from Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mari- 


The Honolulu Recruiting Company recruits. The office there is large, clean, anna Islands, and American Samoa but 

was recently honored as the top pro- and well-lit and meets the ~nission also from the Federated States of 

ducer of recruits in the western United requirements. If there is a problem with Micronesia, the Republic ofthe Marshall 

States. The NCO in charge of the lighting, building fixtures, or janitorial Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 

Kapiolani, Honolulu, station attributes service, he calls the Corps, and it provides Residents of Micronesia, Palau, and the 

part of the company's success to the excellent, timely service. Marshall Islands are able to volunteer for 

October-Decenther 2002 Engineer 19 
1: 


A recent Honolulu 

District intern 

checks work on 

the Palau Compact 

Road ~roiect with 

the ~iitrict's Palau 

Resident Office . . . - project engineer. 

The District is overseeing construc- \--. 

tion of the U.S. 

Department of the 

Interior's %-mile 

road project. . . 

sewice in the armed fol-ccs ofthe Unitcd , iinplcnisntcd olliccr intempm:~.ims. (See OI'I'IH IUIII~IL'> 11' i"\c 111 1 iic C~ul?s. 

States through an agreement called the a~ticle..'-l-l~cJunior Officer District Intern I'articipants gait1 n greater understanding 

Compact of Free Association, signed in i Program," Engi,teer, October2000.) 1 of the fimctions and rolcs of the Corps, 

January 1986. the support provided to major co~mnands TJ,~~ ~ ~ i ~~ intern~ ~ ~ i l ~ ~ ~ . ~ l ~ 

While the Honolulu District executes program began in August 2000 through and the 

a relatively small portion of the Anny's tnelnoranda of agreement with tactical consmctiOnlnanagementinthetield,alld 

$172 millionrecn~itingfacilitypro~mforengineer units located in Hawaii. The ~ theOppOttunitiestOservewithintheCO"Ps. 

FY02, its support to Army recruiting intent of the program is to expose Anny One of the first participants in the 

efforts is important. First, it provides officers and cadets to the Corps of En- Honolulu District's intern program said 

accessto the lnilitaryselvicesforPacific gineers fiom the perspective of a field that previously she saw the Corps of 

Islanders. This helps to ensure diversity , district, alerting the111 to the many op- Engineers as a federal government orof the force from this vital part of the pom~nitiesto selve in the "nontactical" ganization that invested in the local 

w-orld. Second. theDish-ict'ssewicesup- side of the Corps. The progsam invests community through its civil works 

portstheUnitedStates'strategicengage- in junior officers, relying on the construction projects. But the intern 

ment of the region, providing a link to mentoring, coaching, and teaching of program helped her realize that the 

the Department of Defense's growing Department of the Army civilians in the Corps's mission is much greater, esreliance on the Pacific area. District. pecially in the area of impacting soldiers' 

Rccruitingquality soldiers andofficers , The typical internship lasts three lives on a daily basis. The new barracks 

is important andretainingthem is a must, 1 weeks and enables colnpdny grade of- and family housing construction in 

In recent years, the Anny faced a par. ficers and cadets to learn about work the Hawaii, workplace renovations, and other 

titular problcnl regardhlg the loss of District perfortns at any one of four facility construction demonstrated to 

company grade officers. Accordingly. resident offices throughout the Pacific. llerhow the Corps sewes the~rm~ and 

thoughout the Army, elnphasis was on This includes the Palau Compact Road soldiers as part of the "One Team" 


studying the problem and finding ways Resident Office, Republic of Palau: concept. 


to solve it. Analysis determined that Kwajalein Resident Office. Kwajalein An important facet of the District's 


young officers would be Inore likely to Atoll. Republic of the Marshall Islands; program is the opportunity for officers 


continueserving ifthey weremoreaware and the Schofield Barracks and Fort and cadets to interact and learn from 


of the variety of career options the Army Shafter Resident Offices, located on the Department of the Army civilians. 


offered. In response. corps districts- ! island of Oahu. Hawaii. 1 According to the chief of the con-


includingHonolulu,Alaska,Charleston. This professional development struction branch-a former Army 


Far East. Fort Worth, Mobile, Portland, opportunity encourages officers and engineer officer-participants learn the 


Savannah. Seattle, and Walla Walla- cadets to appreciate the diversity and I life cycle process of a construction 


20 Engineer. October-Decen~ber2002 
project from its inception, through 

design, and into construction. The 

officers and cadets work closely with 

seasoned professionals, who share their 

knowledge, life experience, and lessons 

learned over the years. The insights and 

techniques that the officers and cadets 

take away fromthe program apply to both 

tactical and nontactical situations. In 

addition, participating in the program 

establishes relationships and lines of 

commullicatioll to solicit counsel and 

advice in the future. 

I~lvestigatingdesign difficulties, inspecting quality control, and scoping 

project requirements are a few ofthe tasks 

visiting officers tackle during their 

internships, which are structured to their 

inter-ests. The officers are exposed to all 

the detailsof delivering a project, including 

project managerneni, contracting, and 

safety. The intent is to get the oflicers out 

into the field, working with contractors, 

construction representatives, and field 

engineers. It's a hands-on program. 

Exposure to the civilian side of the Amy 

and the Corps can be invaluable. lntems 

are surrounded by the projects these 

people construct and manage, and they 

bring a lot of management and construction expertise to the Army. 

Since the program began, the 84th 

Engineer Battalion at Schofield Banzcks 

has sent five officers to the Hol~olulu 

District for the three-week intemship, 

one per month on average. Upon completion of the intemship, every officer 

shares lessons learned and personal observations, and it has had a positive 

impact on junior officer retention in the 

84th. To date, not one officer within the 

entire unit has resigned from active duty, 

arid many are asking how they call get 

into a Corps district following successful 

completion of company command. 

Every officer intem leaves \\,it11a much 

greater understanding of the Corps and 

the dedication of Department of the Anny 

civilians who support the Anny and the 

nation. Moreover, they leave excited and 

eager to be part ofthe Amiy in the future. 

Y 

Ms. Smith i.7 a Department qftheAi.my 

civiliaiz real estate .speciali.stfor the 

Honolulzr District. 

Cuplaiiz Youngmaiz completed an 

internship with the District while she 

commanded the 70th Engineer Comuarzy, 29th Engineer Battalion (Topo). 

She is curreiztiv training for an 

assignment in the 96th Civil Afoir,~ 

Battalioi?, Fort Bragg, North Caroliiza. 

Lieutenant Colonel Light was commander and district engineer of the 

Honolulu Districr at tile time illis article 

was written. 

October-December 2002 Engineer 21 

("Vigilant Warriors 2002 " co~itinuedfrornpage 18j 

Mobilization adversely impacts 

civilian first responder capability, 

because a disproportionately large 

number of first responders are also 

inembers of the National Guard and 

Anny Reserve. 

, is a need for missioll 

requiremeiits to facilitate preparation 

by the U.S. military for homeland 

security roles and responsibilities. 

While the true ramifications of emplaying the Sumesian forces in a 

traditional combat role-as opposed 

to the nonlinear, noncontiguous role 

it was designed for-were never 

evaluated, it was apparent that this 

force must have all the enablers (such 

as comrnand,control,communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance [C4ISR] and joint 

tactical radios [JTRs]) the design calls 

for, or there is serious risk associated 

with a conventional employment. 1 Military PoliceDivision. He retiredfrom 

Conclusion I active militailv service as an aviation 

lieutenant colonel and has heen 

T I he ATWG was just one small ! rnvolved in military police trans- I part of the overall effort to : JormationsincetlzemoveoftheMilitaiy determine the best possible Police School lo Fort Leonard Wood. 

i~nplelncntationofArmyTransformation. 

But even so, it represented a lot of hard 

work by a lot of leaders trying to see into 

the future. Their efforts to see as clearly 

as possible will have a long-term impact 

Lieutenant ColoiielPotter is the total 

force integrator (AR)for the Engineer 

Division, MANSCEN DCD. During the 

three years bz this position, he has been 

deeply involved in Army Transfoi.mation. 

on how the engineer, chemical, and , Before his a.ssignment to DCD, LTC 

military police forces within our Amy : Potter served as the pions chief and 

develop. rn operations oficer at both the 412th and 

416th ENCOMs and 3d US. Army/US. 

1Mr Allen is the lead analyst and A,,,,~), central ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ science advisor ,far the Coi~ceprs 

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h , ~~~i~~~~~;~i.~i~~, M~~~~~~~~ 

i up port Center (MANSCEN) Directorate of Coinbat Developinents 

(DCD), port Leonard wood, ~issoun'. p* He retiredfrom the U.S. Army Reserve P . 1 

.- '< .', 

as a lieuteizant colonel and has 34 years :.,,"r.%,.' ,.P 'i 

qf active, reserve, and civilian miiita17j 

duty Mr: Allen served in the 4th Infantry 

Division in Vietnam and the 1st Infantr)~ 

~ i ~ i ~ i ~ ~ in G~~~~~~~ ,C.*, '\.h,, 

Mr. Pyatt is a militarj>research &.?- T%-~ : w . el..r 

analvst wiih the MANSCEN DCD, 
Effcctive terrain analysis pays big dividends to the 

warfighter. And during V Corps's warfighter exercise, 

Urgent Victory 2002, effective integration of terrain 

ai~t~lysisin the military decision-making process contributed 

significantly to the success of the entire exercise. With the 

support ofthe 1stArmored Division and 35th Infantly Division, 

VCorps conductedurgent Victory2002 from 27 March through 

2April at GrafenwoehrTraining Area, Germany. Unitcd States 

Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7thArmy provided an exercise 

response cell to simulate the higher command headquarters. In 

each of these commands, thc topographic units provided 

significant support to their respective higher headquarters. 

The 320th Engineer Company (Topographic) provides V 

Corps's organic terrain analysis support. The 320th maintains 

a 22-person terrain analysis section, collocated with V Corps 

headquarters, on Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg, Germany. 

Thc remainder of the company is stationed at Grossauheim, 

Germany. 

Important Early Decision 

To cnsilre that the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) gaming 

process was transparent and that the Corps gained the 

maximum training value from the exercise, the V Corps 

co~il~nandcr directed that the battle staffbase its planning focus 

only on the real-world terrain. Commands can choose to fight 

only the simulated CBS terrain. (See article titled "BCTP 

Terrain Analysis: Unlocking the Mystery." Engineer, August 

2001.)The comnlander's commitment to training thc "right way" 

drove the military decision-making process and reinforced the 

vital role of the Corps's organic terrain analysisltopographic 

personnel. 

Getting the Terrain Data 

I

npreparation for the exercise, the terrain analysis tcchnician 

bcgan developing a terrain database for the exercise in 

November 2001. The National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency (NIMA) provided foundation data (FD), interim terrain 

data (ITD), vector interim terrain data (VITD), vector maps 

(VMAPs), and digital feature analysis data (DFAD) for the 

exercise area. NIMA generally produces FD to support planning 

products produced at a scale of 1:250,000. The Corps headquarters required planning products at a scale of 1:50,000, so 

the terrain platoon added more detail to NIMA's FD and other 

vector data. 

With the assistance and cooperation of the Corps's G2 

collection management section, the terrain platoon obtained 

imagery of the area from national sources. This imagery was 

analyzed and used to develop additional information about the 

area of operations. Features such as road networks, bridges, 

and airfields were added to the FD to create aTactical Geospatial 

Data Set (TGDS) for the exercise. By the time the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) seminar arrived, the terrain 

platoon was able to come up with about a 70 percent co~nplete 

TGDS. 

The TGDS was sufticient to facilitate the military decisionmaking process during the BCTP seminar. The seminar was 

held in Heidelberg, so as specific areas of intcrest and operations were refined, the tcrrain platoon could focus its 

production efforts on these areas. The platoon developed 

specific data for the road network leading to the river-crossing 

site, the crossing site itself, and the road network leading to 

follow-on objectives. Other products includedAn elevation study used by the signal unit to locate lineof-sight cotn~nunicationassets. 

Vertical obstruction maps used by aviation units during 

flight planning. 

Determinations as to whether or not existing airfields could 

support military requirements. 

Following the seminar and leading up to the train-op 

exercise, called Victory Focus 2002, the terrain analysis platoon 

22 Engineer October-December 2002 
continued to refine the TGDS and fill the information gaps that 

existed. Again, the Corps's collection management section 

worked closely with the terrain platoon to secure full-frame 

national imagery, which was used to develop Controlled Imagery 

Base-l Meter(CIBO1). 

During the train-up exercise, mobility of the force was a key 

issue in enabling the Corps to move quickly to the river-crossing 

area and then continue the movement to follow-on objectives. 

The terrain platoon's efforts contributed significantly to the 

Corps's ability to maintain freedom of movement and enjoy 

great success. Within the exercise, the contribution of the 

divisional terrain teamswas particularly evident during the rivercrossing operation. 

The 1st Armored Division terrain team developed the detailed 

terrain analysis products required to support the Corps's 

crossine of the river. The divisional team added another laver u 

of detail and accuracy to the TGDS provided by the Corps's 

terrain team. This layer ofdetail facilitated the planning of rivercrossing operations at the battalion level within the division. 

As the data was created, the divisional terrain team passed this 

data back to the Corps's terrain platoon as well, which allowed 

the olatoon to uodate the Corns's master database and share 

the data with subordinate elements. 

The Corps and division staffs continued to develop 

contingency plans, branches, and sequels throughout the 

exercise, which drove abbreviated military decision-making 

processes within the train-up exercise itself. Often, this involved 

developing terrain data for specific areas that had not been 

analyzed by the terrain platoon or teams. The terrain data 

developed in conjunction with this effort was also added to the 

master database and then disseminated to other subordinate 

elements. 

A vital aspect of the support the terrain platoon provided 

to the Corps was identifying locations where the long-range 

surveillance teams could make the maximum contribution to 

the Corps's operations. The terrain platoon performed line-ofsight analysis to determine the best observation locations 

and helped identify suitable insertion and extraction locations. 

Again, this information was added to the Corps's master 

database. 

By the end of the exercise, the Corps had significantly 

improved the quality of its inaster terrain database. The terrain 

platoon leader estimated that the database was about 90 percent 

complete and was nearing a I00 percent solution. 

Sienificant - Results 

S

everal after-action issues were identified during the trainup exercise, including Strike tactical operations center 

(TOC) staffing, use of SkyMedia systems, function/role 

of tlie geospatial information and services (GIS) officer during 

the exercise, and dissemination of products. 

New TOC Configuration 

At the start ofthe train-up exercise, a full-blown Corps TOC 

was established. In this configuration, three of four squads of 

the terrain platoon, 320th Engineer Company, collocated with 

the Corps Main to provide the required topographic support. 

During the course of the exercise, the Corps tested a TOC 

configuration (called the Strike TOC), with a much smaller 

footprint. Jn this configuration, the terrain analysis platoon 

The V Corps terrain team analyzes terrain data. 

October-December 2002 Engineer 23 
A soldier updates the terrain database during V Corps's 

warfighter exercise. 

collocntcd with the 320th Engineercompany, leaving only three 

terrain analysts behind to support the Corps. However, these 

thrcc personnel wcrc insufficient to provide the rcquired level 

of support and rcsponsivencss to the Corps headquarters. 

During Urgent Victory 2002. thc Strike TOC was staffed with 

about eight personnel on each shift. This allowed the terrain 

platoon to provide superior service to thc Corps staff, while 

minimizing its footprinl. This I-esultconfi~medthat the minimum 

size of a ten-ain team should be about eight (squad size). 

SatelliteConnectivity 

The Corps has two SkyMedia systems; however, both 

systems arc nondeployable, and they pro\,ide little additional 

value to the Corps's forward-deployed topographic effort. In 

garrison, there are easier and more dependable alternatives for 

downloading co~nlncrcialimagery and other geospatial 

intelligence, whereas in the field, the alternatives are limited. 

Since the terrain platoon doesn't have a deployable SkyMedia 

system. it is forced to rely primarily on the intelligence backbone 

to download data from outside the command. Due to the sheer 

size of ~mmercialilnager~and geospatial data files, an 

independent, deployable lneans of data transfer within the 

Corps's topographic colnpany is required in the organization 

capabilities. 

nedirli~at~rl

- - --.... -CIS -.- Offirer -...... 

The Corps's GIS officer wasdual-hatted as atargetingoficer 

during the train-up. Since the targetingofficer duties consumed 

a significant portionof his time during the train-up, he couldn't 

dedicate much time to his CIS duties. As a result, there was no 

one actively seeking out GIs requirements from other staff 

sections and subordinate units. During Urgent Victory 2002, 

the GIS officer was able to dedicate only slightly more time to 

his zeosoatial resnonsibilities. with the maioritv of his time u . , A 

bcing consu~nedby targeting. The role of the GIS officer is 

important. It should not be diluted with additional duties or 

dual-hatting. Corps and division engineers must insist on 

properly supporting this mission. 

24 Engineer 

Cmspatial Information Sharing 

The bandwidth to plavidc digital availability of 

all the different topographic and terrain analysis 

maps does not exist within the Corps today. To 

ensure that the widest number of the Corps's 

subordinate elemcnts benefit from the work of thc 

terrain analysts, the 320th Engineer Company uses 

high-volume plotters to make hard copies of the 

various products and disseminates them to supported units. These copies are produced in the 

company's garrison facilities.During Urgent Victory 

2002, the 320th was able to not only sustain this 

capability but also improve its responsiveness by 

deploying the high-volume printers to the field. This 

greatly improved the company's ability to provide 

support, espccially to major units subordinate to 

the Corps. Mine maps and other products were 

produccd and distributed to soldiers in the field. 

This capability was vital to supporting muddy-boot soldiers 

during tbecxercise. 

Commandcr'sGuide 

Between the train-up and Ursent Victory 2002, the 320th 

Engineer Company published the Com~nai?derb Guide to 

Topog~.nphicOperations. The guidc highlighted thc products 

that the topographic company could produce and how these 

products could be used by various units to support the decisionmaking process. The guides, which were disseminated before 

and during the exercise, helped educatc commanders on tlie 

capabilities of the topographic company and increased the 

demand for various products the company produced. 

Command and Control Systems 

An important observation made in both the train-up 

exercise andurgent Victory 2002 was tlie limitedability 

to share digital terrain data with the digital command 

and c(,ntrol (~2)systems. ~h~~~are several problems related 

to this issue includingthe use of different C2 systems 

USAREUR v corps, the use of commercial ofGthe.shelf 

software, and the multitude of fileformats. 

CZ From Corps to Higher 

The Global Command and Control System-Amy (GCCSA) only allows raster graphic backgrounds. These formats 

don't lend themselves to provide even the most basic of analysis 

capability or flexibility in displaying data. M~~~commallders 

demand more sophisticated products this system is able 

to Drovide. so the staff is drivel, to use so+-mare 

prdducts to track the battle and provide a comrnon operating 

picture (COP). GCCS.A functionality ,nust be expanded to 

account for this more sophisticated need, 

ExperimentalFreehies 

T~~USAREUR staffreliesheavily on~alcon~iew~~as its

utility for displaying the COP, v corps, on the other 

hand, uses a Command and Control Personal Computer (CZPC) 

0ctohe1.-December 2002 
to display the COP and repon the disposition of the force to 

USAREUR. Both the USAREUR and V Corps headquarters 

staffs prepare ope]-ations graphics with their respective C2 

systems. However, the graphics can't be shared between the 

systems without ~nanually converting them since the file formats 

for FalconView and C2PC are incompatible--as are the file 

formats being used by our terrain analysts. Corps and division 

headquarters should use the same C2 system or at least use 

compatible file fonnats. 

Digital Topographic Support System 

Our terrain analysts use Arn~y standard coinmercial off-theshelf software programs like Environmental Syste~ns Research 

Institute (ESRITM), ArcGISTM, and Earth Resources Data 

Analysis System (ERDASB) IMAGINE to analyze. develop, 

and improve the level of detail found on national-level products. 

These programs have Inore capabilities than C2PC or FalcouV~ew 

and allow the production oftnore sophisticated terrain products. 

Unfortunately, neither ESRI, ArcGIS, nor ERDAS will store 

informati011 in a file fonnat that can be read by C2PC or 

FalconV~ew. 

Labor-Intensive Work Around 

During the final preparation for Urgent Victory 2002, the 

60th Engineer Delach~nent commander ~nanually convertedv 

Corps maneuver graphics to ERDAS IMAGINE formats so he 

could georeference them. Then he manually converted this 

georeferenced information to FalconView fonnats. Through a 

rather inefficient process, he was able to ensure that both 

USAREUR and V Corps shared at least one aspect of the COP. 

During the exercise, the 54th Engineer Battalion employed a 

rather interesting work around for this problem. Fint, graphics 

from one program were projected onto a white board. Using a 

white-board marker, the graphics were traced onto the board 

itself. The map graphics from the other system were then 

projected over the graphics on the white board. Finally, the 

graphics were redrawn using the mouse to trace over the white 

board. But the difficulty in sharing databases is not limited to 

player units; it extends to the simulation cell as well. 

Back to the Early Decision 

The ten-ain database in CBS does not take advantage of 

the detailed terrain analysis perfonned by our units. 

The database it uses is rather rudimentary by comparison. It can be altered to more realistically reflect real-world 

conditions, but it would be better if our CBS database used the 

very detailed database PI-epared by the terrain teams. This would 

be especially true if the system were used for war gaming 

variations of a tactical plan. Sharing a common geospatial 

database between the various systems would improve the 

accuracy and validity of the contlict modeling process (war 

gaming) and the COP-used to manage conflict. The V Corps 

commander's commitment to train right pays off because the 

staff is well-trained, issues such as bandwidth and C2 

co~npatibility are uncovered, and the following significant 

conclusions are generated. 

Unify Terrain Data 

An effort should be made to synchronize the develop~nent 

of tactical terrain analysis systems, tactical C2 systerns, and 

simulation systems. This effort would eventually lead to a 

convergence of the geospatial databases supporting each of 

these systems. 

Fix the USAREUR C2 Tangle 

In the meantime. both USAREUR and V Corns should 

possess comparable and interoperable C2 capabilities. 

Compatible systems will improve the ability to transport, 

portray, and manipulate infor~nation that provides real-time 

visualization. collaborative planning, and decision tools in 

current and future network-centric operations. The file formats 

supported by commercial off-the-shelf terrain analysis 

programs used by the terrain teanls must also support the C2 

systerns used within the command. 

During Urgent Victory 2002, the V Corps terrain platoon 

was again reminded of the need for precision when making 

requests for information. The analysis and control elemenl 

gencrally provides what you request. If you don't request 

the right product, it causes delays and additional work. An 

approach recommended by personnel at the U.S. Army 

Engineer School is to staff the analysis and control element 

with an engineer officer on a full-time basis. This would be 

of great value to the terrain analysis effort and the broader 

engineer effort as well. 

Terrain Teams Worth Their Weight 

The Corps's terrain tealn performed well during Urgent 

Victory 2002. The TGDS produced by the Corps and 

divisional terrain teams contributed decisively to the 

decision-making process during every phasc of the 

operation-from the BCTP seminar through the exercise. In 

addition, the printed products produced by the 320th Engineer Company dernonstreted its ability to provide timely, 

relevant, and useful products to support actual combat operations on the ground. The topographic soldiers, noncolnmissioiled officers, and officers truly fulfilled their 

commander's charge by training the right way. Y 

Lieutenant Colonel Goddurd was chief of the GI&S 

Division, Deputy Chiej'ofStafffor Engineers, USAREUR, a1 

the time this article ~:a.c writien. He is cu~,i-ently serving us 

deputy resoul-ce maijagei; V Corps. Previous assignments 

inclnde deputy district commander, Honolul~r Engineer 

District; S3, 65th Engineer Battalion, Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii; area con~mai~de,: Honduras and El Salvador Mobile 

Engineer District; engineer team chief; Readifzess Grozlp Salt 

Lake; commander, 50th Engirleer Company, Korea; 

conzmande< B Company, 4th Engineer Battalion, Foi? Carson, 

Colorado; cornpan)) executive officer andplatoon leader; 54th 

Eizgineer Battalion, Gel-many 

October-December 2002 Engineer 25 
Enqineer Safety 

Englneer Branch Accident Analysh 

Bv MI: Fred Fanning- aiid jM.9. VickiHall 

Each year, Army personnel are involved in accidents, 

many of which could have been prevented. The key 

to preventing these accidents is for everyone to 

understand where they occur and learn how to prevent them or 

lessen their effect on us. The U.S. Army Safety Center at Fort 

Rucker, Alabama, maintains a databaseofArmy accidents. Each 

time an accident occurs, a report is submitted through the 

installation's safety office to the U.S.Armv Safety Center and 

then into its database, which any soldier or civilian employee 

can access by going to htlp://~~w~v.rmis.armymil. In this article, 

we provide aquick analysis of accident statistics forthe Engineer 

Branch over a three-year period-fiscal year (FY) 99, FYOO, 

and FYOl-in five accident categories. 

Background 

The nature of engineering tasks makes them among the 

most hazardous in the Army. Specialized heavy 

equipment use, quarry and blasting operations, 

conslruction, high-voltage-line maintenance, demolitions, 

diving, fire fighting, and earthmoving each has its hazards. 

There are many types of accidents (see Army Regulation 

385-40, Accide~tt Reportirlg and Records), but the five most 

common types for engineer units areArmy motor vehicle, Army 

combat vehicle, other Army motor vehicle (O-AMV), privately 

owned vehicle (POV), and personal injury-other. Army accidents 

are also classified by their severitydesignated as classes A 

through E. An accident falls into a pa~ticular class if it has any 

or all of the criteria. Our discussion focuses on classes A 

through C (see Table 1). 

,-Propert) I damage is $1,000,1 

iinjury or occupatior~al illness 

lit\, nr nclrrr,onant ,,*I r(ic=hili+\, 

Class 5-Property damage is ir more 

but less than $ 1,000,00C Iry or . ... .. . .. . occupatlonal Illness results in Dermanenr panla1 

disability;five or mo ?I are hospi talized 

as inpati ents as a I single acci, dent. 

Class C-Property damage is $10.000 o. .,, 

but less than $200.000: a nonfatal injury causes 

lost time from work, other than on the shift on ...t.;",.
 "",,,b,, +he L accident occurred; a no-'-'-' ,,,,a,a, 


occupational illnes: i causes lo st time fror n work 

or disabi lity at any I:?me. 

I 

Table 1. Army accident classes 

26 Engineer 

Accident Analysis 

Amy Engineer Branch accidents have cost more than 

$14 million since FY99. About $12 million of 

that was for personnel injury and fatality costs. During 

that period, 40 engineer soldiers lost their lives and more than 

400 were injured. Some of those injured received permanent 

disabling injuries that will involve treatment costs for many 

years. 

Army motor-vehicle accidents involve tactical Army 

wheeled vehicles. The number of this type of accident has 

remained fairly constant from FY99 through FYOI (see Table 2). 

The causes are inattention, inexperience, excessive speed, and 

failure to take appropriate actions for environmental conditions. 

The average age of drivers involved in these accidents was 18 

to 25. This indicates that perhaps the required level of operator 

experience should be raised to a higher standard. 

Army combat-vehicle accidents involve vehicles such as 

armored personnel carriers. These accidents have also remained 

constant over the last three years (see Table 2). Causes point 

to improper or inadequate training for operators and improper 

maintenance, mainly during the preventive maintenance checks 

and services (PMCS) process. One area of concern is that 

improper maintenance on the track on the M1 I3 has led to the 

tracks breaking and causing rollovers. Many of these rollovers 

have resulted in the death of the track commander. 

O-AMV accidents involve operatins an Army vehicle other 

than Army motor vehicles or combat vehicles, such as 

bulldozers, forklifts, road graders, rollers, and most other 

construction equipment. A major cause of accidents is that 

drivers lose sight of other vehicles or personnel because of 

y 

-

motor vehicles 

. ... 

notorvehicl 

Pr~vately-owned vehicles 33 34 27 YO 

Personal injury-ther 94 69 82 245 

- Explosives 2 1 3 6 

- Fire 2 1 1 4 -

73tal accide nts 166 135 141 442 

Table 2. Three-year accident-type comparison for 


A-C accident classes 


October.-December 2002 
sudden or unexpected changes in the terrain. Maneuvering in 

the safe zone-that area in which the driver can see objects or 

other vehicles-is not specifically addressed during initial 

training but is only learned while operating the vehicle. It is 

important for engineer equipment operators to recognize that 

equipment and vehicles come with their own peculiar 

restrictions, and they must consider those restrictions before 

conducting a mission. Nothing should be assumed when it 

comes to operator capability. Supervisiors should perfo~ln 

periodic tests to ensure that proficiency is being maintained 

and standards are adhered to. We must never allow deviations 

from the standard to become the standard. 

Are soldiers being properly prepared for driving and 

performing other aspects of engineering'? No amount of 

classroo~n instruction, reference materials, or lecturing call 

replace the hands-on training needed to adequately understand 

a vehicle's abilities and limitations. For example, we have 

determined that blind spots on the M9 ACE are in excess of 75 

feet. Yet, until recently, this fact was barely addressed in Raining 

materials. Now, lesson plans have been changed, and the issue 

is being taught to all new drivers. 

POV accidents involve an individual operating a personal 

vehicle in an unoff~cial capacity. These accidents claim more 

lives of engineer soldiers thanany other type of accident. Even 

though POV accidents in FYOl were down 21 percent from 

FYOO (see Table 2), 27 accidents is still a high amount. 

Investigations show that driver fatigue, inattention, distracted 

driving, failure to maintain control of the vehicle, and excessive 

speed are the top reasons for these accidents-the same 

reasons as for Army motor-vehicle accidents. Another parallel 

between these two types of accidents is the age of the 

operators, 18 to 25 years, indicating that the level of experience 

and maturity are contributing factors. 

Personal injury-other accidents are those that involve injury 

to Army personnel not covered by any other accident type. 

These accidents include slips, trips, and falls; sports injuries; 

being struck by an object other than a vehicle; or injury by a 

tool. These accidents are common and can result in a wide 

range of injuries, from lost time to death. The causes of these 

accidents are nonnally failure to follow procedures, using the 

wrong tool, using a tool improperly, housekeeping hazards such 

as tripping, and improper use of pyrotechi~ics and explosives. 

It is critical that supervisors know the proper procedures and 

that all personnel are following them. In addition, field-expedient 

methods should he reviewed and confilmed as appropriate. 

Many field-expedient methods once commonly used are not 

allowed now, but unless the review is conducted, soldiers may 

not know. 

Leaders' Resaonsibilities 

A nalyzing motor-vehicle accidents raises the issue of 

whether or not training or the lack of it may have 

been contributing factors. There are lesson ~lans and 

training circulars that units or organizations should use to train 

their operators properly. In addition, hands-on training can 

October-December 2002 

supplement the training program and assist instructors in 

teaching all the hazards that exist in driving. Leaders of units 

using the MI 13 should ensure that their preventive 

maintenance program for the tracks is working properly. In 

addition, the seat bar for the track commander's scat should 

have any paint removed so the seat can fall when the release is 

pulled. The operation of this seat should be checked 

periodically. Leaders shouldalso ensure that track co~n~nanders 

do not stand or sit out of the vehicle hatch more than the 

height of the name tag on their uniform from the ridge on the 

hatch. Conducting PMCS is another important practice for 

Icaders. Properly training drivers and enforcing standards can 

reduce the numberof~necllanical problems that lead to accidents. 

Once shortcuts become routinc, accidents will occur more 

frequently and with more severity. 

Personnel must be reminded to take measures to ensure 

their own safety, such as being defensive drivers. Being in the 

"right" is no longer enough. They must also lean1 to anticipate 

other driver's actions and he prepared to take evasive actions. 

In vchiclc convoys, field operations, or other exercises, kecping 

a watchful eye on other vehicles will go far in preventing 

accidents. If an operator is unsure of correct procedures or is 

not perfomling to standard, leaders must take the time to correct 

the problen~. We still see POV accidents involving personnel 

who have consumed alcohol and'or were not wearing seat belts. 

Leaders must continue to emphasize the importance of not 

drinking and driving and of using seat belts. 

Summary 

As this analysis shows, POV accideuts cause more 

deaths to enginecr personnel than any other type of 

accident. This Inore than justifies the time commanders 

take to present holiday briefings and counsel soldiers who 

have received traffic tickets for moving violations. The analysis 

also shows that accident numbers are constant in most areas 

with a definite reduction in POV accidents and an increase in 

personnel injury-other. There is much morc that can be leamed 

about accidents; thisarticle has only touched the surface. Each 

unit and organization should analyze its accident data and then 

take positive steps to reduce or eliminate hazards. The entire 

Engineer Branch will benefit from an across-the-board reduction 

in accidents. 

For additional assistance in accident prevention measures. 

please visit the Maneuver Support Center Safety Web page at 

ht~p://u~~~~v.~ood,ai.my. mi//srfety/. kl

Mi: Fanning 1.7 the safe+ director: Safeg: Ofice, US.AI-my 

MANSCEN, Fort Leonard M'ood Missorrri. 

M.T. Hall is a sufih~ .speciali,sl, Safety Ofice, US. A~.my 

MAA'SCEN, Fort Leonard Wood. 
Crossing - the River "Regen":


Regenerating Combat Rower at MTC 


BY Llezifenanf Colo~iel Janies A. Ki7owlton n~id Liraf~nanrColonel Michnal J Tengue 

Arotation at thc National Training Center (NTC) is one 

of the toughest training events a battalion will 

undertake. Fighting the World-Class Opposing Forces 

(OPF0R)-on their own turf-makes for an intense training 

event that challenges each and evcly member of a combat 

engineer battalion. But this is more than a big field training 

exercise; it truly is a campaign. Just deploying to a "hostilc 

count~y" is a challenge. Drawing pre-positioned vehicles and 

equipmcnt along with all classcs ofsupplies-in a compressed 

time schedule-requires planning and organization to get into 

the maneuver box, ready to fight. 

Unfortunately, oncc a battalion finishes battling the OPFOR, 

it is ready to sit back and bask in the glory that comes from 

working hard and successfully throttling the enemy, but this is 

when the"real fight" starts. The next phase of the campaign is 

turning all drawn equipment hack to ITT, the contractor that 

owns and ~naintains the pre-positioned fleet at NTC. T1ii.s is the 

ti~i~l~le~it River "Regell " rhofjso~rrli~iit musf CI.OSS in ohila~. lo 

gel e~'m:vone I?ome! Regeneration-or rcgen-is extremely 

difficult and can bring a unit to its knees if it has not properly 

prepared for this fight. Rcccntly, the 4th Engincer Battalion, 

Fon Carson, Colorado, co~npleted two rotations to NTC within 

seven months. During thc second rotation, we were able to 

apply valuable lessons learned during our previous rotation. 

We returned to home station knowing that not only had we 

Force Maintenance Area 

I
Movement Cor I Center "-..-

succcssfully battled the OPFOR. but we also had successfully 

"won" the regeneration fight! 

The following system worked well for the 4th Engineer 

Battalion. In addition to being a con~pilation of our lessons 

learned, it also contains lessons from the experiences of other 

units. We are sure the system can be improved, but it is a great 

baseline to start with as a unit prepares for a rotation to NTC. 

Regeneration Is a Mission 

hike any other mission, regeneration requires thorough 

planning; an order; rehearsals; and solid command, 

conh.01. and communications. It is a training event that 

sl~ould have its own after-action review (AAR). (That's where 

we captured the lessons leanled from the first rotation.) As 

engineers, regeneration seems very similar to a river crossing. 

Therc is literally a hardball road between the "shores" of the 

turn-in yards, and the key to success is to get equipmcnt to the 

far shore (ITT's side) and keep it there. 

Since we knew there would be a "crossing" during this 

campaign, we started our planning before we left home station. 

We did a sand table of lnvin Military City and conducted 

rehearsals for reception, staging, onward movement. and 

integration (RSOI) and regeneration so that all of our leaders 

understood the terrain. The staff gathered tools that would be 

h 1 ''The :zBowl" 1 

~ ~~ 

(MCC) ~ngagement~;stern (MILES) I -.-
critical during regeneration, and the units identified key leaders 

and operators for the process. We developed tracking charts 

for the draw grid that included every piece of equipment we 

would draw and had the tracking charts enlarged and laminated. 

We designed tlie charts as spreadsheets and used thein as part 

of our nightly status report throughout both RSOI and 

regeneration. 

We found it important to identify all vehicles by both their 

home station bumper numbers and the NTC admin numbers. 

ITT and the NTC Theater Support Command talk solely using 

NTC numbers, and by the end of regeneration, lilost soldiers 

and leaders are more comfo~table with the NTC numbers than 

those of the home station. 

As part of our unit's preparation, we brought office supplies 

specifically for regeneration, including accordion files for each 

company and job order folders for each vehicle and trailer. 

These folders became the key management tools to ensure 

that files were complete and allowed us to maintain positive 

control over all of the paperwork for each piece of equipment. 

This helped avoid the frustration of getting a vehicle ready for 

the final quality check and discovering that the air filter slip 

was missing. 

Planning Is Critical 

e wrote a separate operations order (OPORD) for 

the regeneration operation that covered the end of 

live fire through the turn-in of equipment and 

redeployment to home station. The OPORD covered moving 

out of and clearing the maneuver box and occupying tlie 

RUFMA. An OPORD shell was completed before deploying to 

NTC, and the staff planning was completed during the live-fire 

transition. We did not conduct a full rehearsal in the field, but 

each commander and primary staff officer back-briefed the 

battalion commander on his plan before departing the box. 

A battalion can prepare in many ways for success during 

regeneration, but the most important step is foi- operators and 

supervisors to be ruthless about completing DA Fonns 5988E, 

Equipmeizt Mainteizance Worksheet, and processing them 

through the maintenance system each day the unit is in the 

maneuver box. This is easier said than done when the OPFOR 

is pressing fro111 all sides, you can't find the mine-clearing line 

charge (MICLIC) tags, and the observer/controller wants an 

AAR. But if you don't get low-density engineer parts on order 

early, your unit will spend additional days in the RUBA-also 

known as the "Dust Bowlx-waiting for parts instead of 

heading home. 

In addition to working the Anny maintenance system as 

designed, there are several other systems that you can 

implement within your unit to improve the probability of 

success. It was absolutely critical for us to designate oneNCO 

to be in charge of locally purchased repair parts. The Theater 

Support Conlinand maintenance tech is a wealth of information 

about local sources, hut one NCO-who had a commercial 

vehicle and a government credit card and could run for partswas a linchpin throughout the entire rotation. (Your installation 

resource manager will want you to keep track of the purchases 

for NTC versus lioine station veliicles.) You also need to understand the tun-in standard. Although the nrrnor mill told us that 

ITT would change the standards between drawing equipment 

and tunling it in, we found that the ITT team was extremely fair. 

The team used an NTC Overprint 2404, Equipmeizt Inspection 

rrrzd~MainlenarzceWorksheet,for each vehicle rather than a 10120 

standard out of a technical manual. The same standard fonii is 

used at draw and tum-in time. In addition to daily DA Fotins 

5988E, our operators completed an NTC Overprint 2404 during 

live-fire transition to identify problems early and get parts on 

order before departing the maneuver box. 

Finally, you must complete the Army Oil Analysis Prograi~i 

(AOAP) satnples while the unit is in the maneuver box. This is 

easy to do, but it requires an NCO in the unit maintenance 

collection point (UMCP) to track each vehicle and ensure that 

each sample is collected and turned in and the results returned. 

ITT will not accept a vehicle without the proper AOAP 

papetwork. 

1. Purchase locally. 

2. Use NTC Overprint 2404s. 

3. Complete AOAP samples. I 

Start on the Right Foot 

nce the final battle is over, the tendency is for unils to 

sit back and relax for a day or two. Alter all, they have 

fought an intense campaign against the Krasnovian 

hordes over the previous 14 days and now deserve a break. 

This is the worst thing a unit can do because it puts it two days 

behind on recovery and turn-in. This is when leaders must be 

ready to execute an already-developed plan and execute it 

violently! Soldiers must understand that each day wasted up 

front is an extra day in the Dust Bowl. Once the unit finishes 

initial battlefield recovery in tlie tnanelrver box and begins 

redeployment to the Dust Bowl, everyone's focus must turn to 

regeneration. 

The first part of the regeneration mission is redeploying 

from the maneuver box. Successfully accomplished, this 

postures the unit for tlie regeneration fight. We set up a dri\,ethrough station that was run by the engineer battalion 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), which 

gathered all Class I, IV, and V supplies and trash from each of 

our units before it left the live-fire area. Our brigade combat 

team (BCT) conducted a four-comers (referring to the intersection of the two main range roads) drill that accomplished 

the same requirements outside the cantonment area, but most 

of the battalion's vehicles were able to drive straight through 

and into the RUFMA because they were already downloaded. 

When planning, don't forget the engineer piece of clearing 

training areas. You will have to fill in all the major holes, and 

there is no reason to race blade assets back to the RUFMA just 

to send them out again. 
The quartering party for the battalion was the UMCP The 

battalion maintenance technician (BMT) and battalion motor 

sergeant (BMS) set up shop in the trailer provided and were 

ready for the companies to arrive. They had marked vehicle 

lines by fleet: rather than by company, and the mechanics were 

ready for the vehicles. We consolidated all mechanics and 

reorganized by fleet: tracked, wheeled, and engineer. Tlus aligns 

the unit's assets with ITT's crew organization. 

Since most vehicles did not have to stop at four corners, the 

drawn vehicles immediately got into line for the washrack. This 

is the first step, and the line gets long. This is where great 

NCOs take over as they use the "down" time in line to remove 

the Multiple Integrated Laser Equipment System (MILES), 

download personal gear, and move home station equipment 

and sets. kits, and outfits to the MILVANs. This is also where 

home station vehicles separate from drawn vehicles. Home 

station equipment does not go through the washrack hut goes 

right to the MILES warehouse. Drawn vehicles that were not 

mission-capable bypassed the washrack and went straight to 

the maintenance area. These vehicles were very specifically 

tracked, knowing that the ITT inspectors could not conduct 

the joint technical inspection (TI) until the operator washed 

the vehicle. 

Vehicle Turn-In Process 

0

nce we pushed drawn vehicles through the washrack, 

downloaded the MILES, and turned in items such as 

communications equipment and weapons, we parked 

them on line in the Dust Bowl. Once there. the vehicles did not 

move until ITT inspectors conducted the initial joint TI. This is 

the inspection that identifies the deficiencies operators will 

ultimately work off before they can turn in the vehicle. Units 

must be careful about pulling vehicles out oftheRUFMA for a 

detail. During our first rotation, we had to pull an M916 truck 

and a loader out of the RUFMA-after ITT had already 

conducted the joint TI-to clear part of the training area. The 

operator had already worked off a great deal of the vehicle 

deficiencies, but he had to start over once he cleared the mining 

area, a morale buster at best!^ 

Steps for Vehicle Turn-l 

1. Download. 

2. Go through washrack. 

3. Replace air filter and complete AOAP 

samples. 

4. Perform joint TI with IT1 

5. Work off all deficiencies. 

6. Obtain pass from line boss. 

7. Go to final QA line. 

8. Turn in or return to Step 5. 

(Most vehicles will return to Step 5 several 

times before final turn-in.) 

Each operator must replace the air filter on his vehicle as part 

ofthe regeneration process. This can be done before the joint TI, 

and the shop gives him a slip verifying that the filter has been 

replaced. Leaden must ensure that the slip gets into thevehicle's 

packet in thejoborder folder because no one cantum in a vehicle 

without one. This is where the folders become so important. 

There is a line boss fromITTfor each unit. and working with 

him as a teammate will make life mucheasier Inspectors do not 

work for your line boss so you will have to coordinate for them 

to inspect your vehicles. Get this done as soon ac possible! 

You can't order the right parts or work the right deficiencies 

until you have an NTC Overprint 2404 from the joint TI. Our 

BMT was the primary person who worked with the line boss, 

and the BMS worked with the inspectors. Everything was 

centralized through battalion maintenance with the BMT, BMS, 

and maintenance battle captain. This last part of the team \%,as 

one ofthe tactical operations center (TOC) battle captains who 

ran all communications and reported from the trailer in the 

RUFMA to the rest of the leaders on the ground. Operators, 

squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders were 

not allowed to coordinate with the line boss. During both 

rotations, we saw operators lose their tempers because of 

frustration with a system they did not understand. Working 

with ITT-not against them-is the key to going home. 

A11 of the maintenance clerks were inside the trailer under 

the control ofthe BMT and BMS. Their role is very important 

since no one wants to wait for parts that are the wrong ones! 

They must also remove all home station vehicles from the UnitLevel Logistics System (ULLS) box and turn in all of the 

recoverable parts. You will not leave NTC unless all recoverables 

are turned in or your unit pays double for the pan or assembly. 

The AOAP monitor is also in the trailer making sure that the 

AOAP documents are correct and in each folder. 

The battle captain controlled the folders for each vehicle 

and trailer and the draw grid spreadsheet. Unless a mechanic 

was working on the vehicle or it was in the final quality 

assurance (QA) line, the folder stayed in the trailer. The battle 

captain or BMT coordinated with the line boss to get the pass 

required to get into the final QA line. 

Vehicle Packets 

1. Air filter pass. 

2. AOAP printout. 

3. Joint TI 2404 with all deficiencies 

worked off. 

4. Pass from line boss. 

5. Clean DA Form 598E 

Command, Control, and Communication 

0

nce operators work off deficiencies, the next phase of 

the fight begins. At this point, it is important to get 

leaders at key locations to control vehicle flow and 

October-December- 2002 
track the location ofall unit vehic1es.A lot oftime is wasted ifa 

vehicle fails a final inspection for a minor problem and the 

operator gets out of line when he could have gone to the quickfix line and bcen finished in a matter ofminutes. As with a river 

crossing, leadership on the groi~nd was our solution to this 

problem. 

We did not allow a vehicle to go to the final QAlinc without 

an NCO. After a while, we identified certain NCOs who were 

successful at turning in vehicles. That NCO is not always a 

mechanic; in our unit, our best guy was a motivated cook! We 

placed key leaders at critical points on the battlefield. The battle 

captain ran the maintenance trailer and tracked where every 

vehicle was in the turn-in process. The Alpha Company 

commander went to the final QA line, and the HHC commander 

went to a staging area located a few hundred yards before the 

final QA line. When the QA line got too long, ITT tightly 

controlled the vehicles that got in, regardless of whether they 

had a pass or not. We staged vehicles close to the QA line 

under the control of a commander and treated that location 

much like the engineer regulating point (ERP) before a crossing 

site. The Charlie Company commander was at the MILES 

warehouse, the S I was in the MCC, and the S4 was turning in 

secondary loads and basic issue items. The battalion commander, executive officer, and command sergeant major moved 

among all of the sites. Since all leaders had communications 

equipment, it was easy to get one of the top three to a critical 

point on the regeneration battlefield when needed. Units without 

a senior leader in the RUFMA spent considerably more time 

before crossing the River Regen. 

The RUFMA and the Dust Bowl did not seem vq spacious, 

but by the second day, we had walked miles. Each leader must 

have communications equipment to provide status reports to 

the trailer as vehicles move in many directions throughout the 

RUFMA. ANIPRC-127 radios are the method of choice, but 

Motorola@ and other handheld radios also work well. You 

cannot count on your vehicle radios since you will be turning 

them in or packing them for home station. 

Each day after ITT shutdown, we conducted daily operations meetings to review the current status and establish 

priorities for that night and the next day. For us, it was a 24-

hour-a-day operation, just like the training in the maneuver 

box, and we even executed a sleep plan to ensure that mechanics and operatols were getting at least four hours of sleep 

each day. 

The ITT line boss can be a tremendous asset. For vehicles 

requiring maintenance work above the capabilities of the BCT 

(depot level), the ITT line boss recom~nends arbitration. Then 

he coordinates and puts his recommendation on the arbitration 

process, and the unit turns the vehicle in with the required 

paperwork to go to the next maintenance level. We had several 

vehicles that went through arbitration. Establishing a good 

relationship with the line boss made this a less contentious 

process. He can also help with parts because hc hows where 

most of the parts are throughout Fort Invin and can point you 

in the right direction. 

Almost Done, but Don't Stop Yet 

nce you get down to the last 10 vehicles, ensure that 

you keep a sufficient number of key leaders and 

soldiers to complete the turn-in. The tendency is to 

try to get as many people home as you can (taking care of 

soldiers), and you end up short. Our forecasting rule for 

transportation was for a soldier to head home a full day aPer 

his vehicle was turned in. Since we worked 24 hours a day in 

the RUFMA, this gave everyone a chance to sleep, do laundry, 

and then start the manifest process. The standard was 

published in the regeneration OPORD. so everyone knew the 

rules up front. 

We also kept several home station vehicles until thc very 

end. All contact trucks, the wrecker, the Batmobile, and the tool 

truck stayed until the last day. If you don't have access to a 

commercial truck, you should also keep a cargo HMMWV to 

pick up parts and turn in recoverables. We contracted for three 

air compressors with impact wrenches to help in changing 

tracks and were able to return them when the last of the tracked 

vehicles were turned in. As the engineer battalion, you will 

probably be responsible for the environnlental team ofthe White 

Cell, which means that you will be responsible for cleaning any 

spills in the RUFMA. We found it best to arrange for contracted 

equipment so drawn equipment can be turned in and home 

station equipment can be rail-loaded while still accomplishing 

the White Cell mission. You cannot use the same equipment 

you are turning in. 

Conclusion 

Every unit that goes to NTC learns a great deal from the 

experience. They get better with every fight and 

nonnally leave the maneuver box extremely proud of 

their combat readiness. One of the challenges that can bring a 

good unit to its knees is the regeneration process. The battle 

that awaits a unit when it comes out of the box is as tough as 

any fight it will experience at NTC. With proper preparationboth at home station and during the rotation-this final battle 

can be another streamer on the battalion colo~-s. It's a great 

feeling to he the first battalion in the BCT to cross the River 

Regen and send soldiers home. This truly is the best way to 

end a successful canlpaign against the Krasnovian World-Class 

OPFOR! hd 

Lie~rtenunt Colonel K~wivlton is the Europea,? Conrrnn~id 

exercise plar~ner in 537. US. Space Command. At the rime 

this article was ,vriften, he cornrnanded tile 4th Engineer 

Battalion. 4th Infantry Divisio~?.Fort Carson, Colorado. 

Prei~ious assignnlents include the S3 and Assistant Division 

Engineer of the 307th Engineer Buttalion, S2d Airborne 

Division, and company commander of irnit.7 in Ascharenburg 

arzd Berlin, Germanv 

Lieufcnunt Colonel Teague is chief of training for the U.S. 

Anny Space Command arrd was the battalion XU of the 4th 

Engineer Buttalion, 4th Infunt~:,, Division, when tilis article 

was a8ritten. He previousiv served with the 10th and 19th 

Engineer Battolior~s ar~d co~~rn~anded the 131h Engineer 

Company (Con.sfruction Stipporl). 

October-December 2002 
(?@=

Enlisted PERSCOM Notes dC::, : 

'U.. ."&& 

B)' Lieutetiant Colo~iei Jack E Smith 

n behalf of the great staff here inAlexnodria, Virginia, The Assignment Process 
 0 greetings from the Engineer Enlisted Branch. Having 


The assignment process for enlisted soldicrs is just arrived as the new branch chief, I arn glad to 

have tliis oppoltunity to update you on the cument health of complicated, yet relatively simple. Thc co~nplicatedpari 

the enlisted engineer force. is getting 15,000 soldiers properly aligned with so many 

priorities througliout the world for high-quality, trained, and 

Health of the Regiment ready soldiers. Thc simple part is that each soldier can have a 

T 

direct impact on his or her assignment process. 

he overall Engineer Regiment is very healthy. Todny There are many variables that go into the assignment our Regiment is manned with I5 of 21 military oc- process: exceptional family member program, married soldiers cupational specialties (MOSs) at or above 100 percent program, drill sergeant!recn~iting nomination process, ACiRC, will1 three more at 99 percent (see table). schooling, needs of the Army, deployment stabilization, and 

Our biggest challenge is in the 12B MOS, particularly at theall-important readinessofourfield units. However, there is 

skill level one. We underassessed this MOS during fiscal year thing that is not a variable, the soldier's preference. what 

(FY) 01 to correct a significant overstrength. The result ofthis llas amazed in short tilue on the job is the nulnber of 

and other corrective action is that the majority of units in the both junior enlisted and NCIJS who have not bothered to let 

field are currently beillg manned below 95 Percent at skill- Branch know their prefercnces. There are three methods to 

level-one positions. Starting in October, we will bring in lllakethishappen: youcansubmita~~~orm4187,personnel 

additional soldicrs to incrcase our strength in this critical 

combat specialty. 

Several actions taken over the past fiscal year have 

dramatically improved our low-density MOSS-OOB, 52E, and 

airborne 62ElJ. These should be healthy by the end of FY03. 

Thesc MOSS offer very attractive reclassification bonuses 

under the Bonus Extension and Retraining Program. Call this 

office if you are interested in reclassifying into these 

specialties. 

The shortage in noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 

coiitinues to be proble~natic worldwide. While there are many 

rcasons for the sho~ti~ge, there really is only one solution. 

Soldiers in the field need to get scheduled for promotion 

boards. If you are eligible, ask your chain of command when 

you can go before the next promotion board. 

Recruiting and retention have been well above historical 

averages across the Anny and in the Engineer Regiment. All 

of our training seats were filled for FY02, and all the required 

seats for the first quarter FY03 have already been contracted. 

On the reenlistment side, all but one of our 21 specialties are 

well above the five-year historical trend. We expect this to 

continuc, partly due to reenlistment bonuses, but most likely 

due to our ongoing campaign against terrorism. 

The long-tcnn pro.jections for the Regiment are very good. 

We can expect our shortage MOSs (12B 10, OOB, 52E) to improve 

dramatically in thenext I2 months. Meanwhile, other specialties 

(SIB, 51M, SIR, SIT) will experience decreases in overall Engineer Enlisted Operational Strengths 

strength to bring them in line with authorized manning levels. (as of 4 September 2002) 

A 

32 Engineer October-December 2002 
Action, listing your assignment preferences: you can go online through Anny Knowledge Online and use theAssign~nent 

Satisfaction Key (ASK): or you can call your assignment 

manager and tell him yourpreference. Ifyou do tlie latter, you 

will be asked to follow up with a DA Form 41 87 to document 

your preferences. ASK is the preferred method because that 

process eliminates the middleman. Your preferences arc 

automatically ~osted to your record as soon as you hit the 

enter While we cannot guarantee that we call meet Your 

preference in evely assignment, I can guarantee that when we 

do liave a validrequisitionforasoldier, the first thing we look 

for is those who liave listed that location on their preference. 

When should yo11 talkto your assignment manager? Ofien! 

We do work assig~iments for E-4s through E-6s six to eight 

months out from their report date. So if you've been at one 

location forover36 mouths, your manager is already deciding 

where you will PCS to next. For those on short tours, about 

the time you arrive in country, you need to update your 

preferences. 

For sellior NCOs (E-7s and we are attempting to 

work your assignments so we can pro,,ide , 

notificationof a We have been but we will 

llevcr get to a percent solution on due to soldiers 

coming off levy, school scheduling, and the like. Here at 

Engilieer Branch, we intend to startposti~ig on our Web page 

critical assignments that wc need to fill for selected senior 

NCO key billets with ACIRC and otherjobs that are seldom 

easy to fill. Assignments can range frorn North Dakota to 

Hawaii, Egypt to Australia, and I think it will be a good 

opportunity to match up soldiers who want a deal ofa lifetinie 

to go to select locations. 

I know there are soldiers reading this who are thinking, 

"What is this guy talking about? I got my orders exactly 32 

days before the truck showed up at the house." There are a lot 

of rcasons for this happening. Sometimes, but not often, the 

needs ofthe Anny demand that we doa short-notice PCS, and 

we do eve~ything in our power to avoid this. Another reason 

can be that some headquarters, for whatever reason, lias not 

done its job of downloading assignment instructions and then 

publishing orders. If it has been more than 30 days since DA 

has informed you that you have bcen placed on assignment 

instructio~is, You need to go to Yoor installation pcrsonllel 

office and find out what is holdilig up your orders. Here's a 

little secret: We post assignment instructions worldwide every 

Tuesday lliorning. Once posted, they are available for your 

installation personnel office to act on immediately. Tlic key 

words here are "assignment instructions." Just because an 

assignment managcr lias told you that you have been nomi~lated for an assignment does not mean assignment instructions have been published. The nomination process can 

take several months as the packet is vetted though all of the 

offices that ensure that only fully qualified soldiers are sent to 

critical duties such as recruiting and drill sergeant. 

October-December 2002 

In some cases, and in some MOSS, the number of available 

worldwide billets and the number of soldiers to fill those billets 

can dramatically impact the amount oftilne asoldiercan expect 

between PCSs. It is not uncommon to move soldiers with only 

24 months on station to ensure the operational readiness of 

fo~ward-deployedunits. Many NCOsare alsomoved early when 

they are selccted to recruiting or drill scrgeant duty. 

Tlie bottom line to all of this is my chalter to man the force 

with the soldiers we ha\,e available. My goal is to treat each of 

you with respect and to as much input as possible to 

career, periodically you to contact your assignment 

lllanager or professional dc,,elopment NCO to review your 

assignment eligibility, preferences, and family circumstances. 

Keep in mind that therc are restrictions about where we can 

send you. First, your MOS has to be authorized at the desired 

location. (Sorry, hut there are no combat engineer slots in the 

Bahamas.) Also, if you liave managed to avoid overseas duty 

for many years; we need to send you thcre, so step up and 

enjoy the scenery. We also attempt to avoid repetitive TDA 

assignments. If you arc an NCO, you will need to do drill 

sergeant, recruiting, andlorACiRC assignmentsat some point. 

These arcnominativc assignnients that our best NCOsareasked 

to fill. They are challenging assignments and recognized by 

boards as being carcer-ellhancing. 

To thc staff sergeant 12B ranks, we have a peat career opportunityco~liingavailablethisnext summer. Our authorizations 

for 12R30 soldiers assigned to the Special Forces Civil Affairs 

Company will increase fro~n 6 slots to 24. Gct your packets 

together now if you want in on this great chance to serve your 

country on thc edge. 

Promotions and Training 

This is one topic that has the intcrest of almost all soldiers. 

The singlc biggest item that slifles the process is the 

inordinatc atiiount ofboard-eligible E-4s who are never 

gi~cn the opport~l~iityo go before the protnotion board. My 

philosoplly is quite Ifyou have an E.4 in an ~-5or E.6 

billet, then llo\\ can you possibly claim tllat the soldier is not 

ready for the promotion board. lf he is all-eady doing the job, he 

should already be getting the money. ~h~ prolnotion orders 

state only that the soldier has demonstrated “the for 

the next liighcr grade. Sometimes it appears that some units 

want the soldiers "fully qualified" for the next higher grade. It 

takes about 10 years to get 10years of experience that our great 

NCOs possess. Let some of the experience occur with the 

requisite illcrease in pay and rank. 

Conditional p~ornotions havc been on tlie street for some 

time. Remember, they require anelida~ice in thc requisite NCOES 

course (PLDC. BNOC and ANOC) within one year of the 

conditional promotion. Failure to meet this requi~sment can 

result in a demotion. There are exceptions to policy for 

operational and hardship reasons; howeves it is imperative that 

(contitirted on page 40) 

Enzitleer 33 
The Sapper Leader Course 


The tsrnl ,'i-il>pci-"datcb h,tch io 

16th centu~y furopewlicn Hlltish 

enginccrs were given the name 

from the French word sappe, which 

described an entrenching tool used to 

construct ditches. The way of the sapper 

is hard and dangerous and lies always 

across the ground between friendly 

forces and the enemy. The job of the sapper calls for the best and the bravest in 

any Army. 

"What is a sapper?" asked the British 

Royal Engineer, CaptainT.W.J. Connolly, 

80 years ago. "He is a man of all work of 

the Army and the public, astronomer, 

geologist, surveyor, draghtsmen, artist, 

architect, traveler, explorer, antiquary, 

mechanic, diver, soldier, and sailor, ready 

to do anything or go anywhere; in short, 

he is a SAPPER." 

Today, almost all engineers consider 

themselves sappers. However, to the approximately 450 soldiers a year who challenge themselves and their soldiering 

skills at the Sapper Leader Course (SLC) 

at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, the term 

means so much more. 

Graduates from the SLC are physically 

tough, mentally proficient, and tactically 

soi111<1. They ~ol~~i~iccre~i [(I ~111dcrgo

solne of the most rigorous training thc 

Corps of Engineers has to offer. They 

successfully trained for 28 days at an 

avemgeof 17.5 hours aday. They learned 

advanced skills neccssaly to be a strong 

combat multiplier for their task force. 

They earned theright to be called sapper. 

Sappers must arrive at the course in 

peak physical condition. They begin their 

training with a standard Army Physical 

Fitness Test and basic in-processing 

requirements. The challenge often lies in 

the increased elevation provided by the 

Ozark Moi~ntains and the demanding 

weather of the Midwest. All soldiers are 

eligible to attend the SLC, regardless of 

their military occupational specialty or 

gender. Although the majority of the 

students are combat engineers, any 

soldier with a strong train-up can be 

successful at the SLC. All are in the rank 

of E-4 or above, but they must have a 

waiver ifthey are not E-4 (P). Following 

their day of acclimatization, the sapper 

candidates begin one of the most rigorous training schedules they will ever face. 

The connotation of combat engineer 

implies proficiency with demolitions. To 

ensure that this image is upheld, the SLC 

i~~cli~des iiio~c lli,in trio days of instruction on safe and efficient employment of a variety of charges. A full 

day is dedicated to classroom instruction 

on safety, system emplacement, and 

charge calculation. Awritten examination 

confirms their proficiency and allows 

younger soldiers the opportunity to 

understand the mechanics of demolition 

placement. This instruction is validated 

with an overnight stay at a demolition 

range. The SLC is currently moving its 

operations to the new engineer qualification range, where a variety ofcharges 

will be discussed and emplaced. To complement the contemporary operating environment, an increased focus is being 

placed on charges used in military operations in urban terrain that focus on 

safety and a low standoffradius. Furthermore, sappers learn to construct fieldexpedient charges basedon realistic supplies and contemporary missions. 

In addition to the mobility support 

provided by the demolitions expertise, 

sappers also learn to move their task force 

through the water. Training is conducted 

at tlie Lake of the Ozarks, where students 

get hands-on training with Zodiac boats 

34 Engineei- October-December 2002 
in addition to field-expedient methods for 

crossing wet gaps. This training is 

complementedby instnlctionincrossing 

site reconnaissance, assault crossing, 

and setup. While the primaly training lies 

in the efficient construction and use of 

the boats, students also are able to 

overcome fear of the water and moving 

heavy loads across gaps they might not 

normally swim. Basedontheweatherand 

aircraft availability, someclasses have the 

opportunity to helocast and learn the 

technicalities of nonstandard theater 

enhy. The water, however, is not the only 

obstacle sappers learn to conquer. 

Three days of the SLC are dedicated 

to mountaineering operations. Sappers 

are first introduced to ropes and the 

proper care and use of these essential 

items ofequipment. They learn to tie knots 

that are incorporated in many of the 

individual and collective tasks used 

throughout the course. Additionally, 

they construct one-rope bridges and an 

A-frame to enhance both horizontal and 

vertical mobility Sappers then practice 

ascent and descent techniques on a 

tower and at ourowncliffsite. In addition 

toindividual andc'imhs,students 

learn the essentials for casualty evac- 

'ation a vertical drop and practice 

these techniques.Thetrainingculminates 

with a 90-f00t night with 

equipment. 

Sappers not only must provide 

mobility but also must identify and 

combat the enemy. To this end, a day 

is dedicated to enemy capabilities. 

Sappers are introduced to some of 

the most common~nines in the world 

today. An instructor fresh from Afghanistan who received hands-on 

training on our enemy's "weapon of 

choice" teaches this training. By 

learning to successfully identify 

these weapons, engineers can make 

a greater impact in the planning and 

reconnaissance of their task force. 

Additionally, students are taught 

the components and capabilities of 

the mostcommon rifles in the world. 

Students are then able to assemble 

and disassemble an AK-series 

weapon and, in the coming months, 

will be able to fire these weapons, 

see their capabilities firsthand, and learn anyone who trained at home station. 

their signature sound. Furthermore, Following the road march, a medical 

sappers learn the intricacies of boohy techniques class is given to check the 

trap employment and detection. Class- students' knowledge, which includes 

room inshuctionis provided to familiarize applying an IV to fellow students to 

students not only with the conventional replenish fluids lost during the march. 

boohy traps available via nomial supply Additionally, students are paired up and 

channels but also innovations commonly ' complete a land navigation course that 

seen throughout the world. Students can best be described as humbling. The 

construct their own booby traps, limited majorityoftheamition at theSLCcomes 

only by their imagination, and then clear from this event, with injuries as the 

lanes produced by other students to secondlargestreasonfornotcompleting 

enhance detection and disarming the course. Again, home station training 

abilities. and toughening are the keys to success. 

Finally, students are given an in- Following two weeks of intense 

troduction toairoperations.Asapperhas individual training, students then 

knowledge of airborne, air assault, and transition into the patrolling phase of the 

pathfinderoperationsandlandin.g/pickup SLC. Here, they are required to put all 

zone setup and operations. Additionally, their newly acquired knowledge to work 

students soon begin training on fast rope in a field environment. They begin with a 

techniques on our tower. They are re- few days in a classroom. simply to arm 

quired to put this lcnowledge to the test themselveswitha working knowledgeof 

by guiding in an actual aircraft and basic patrolling methods and small-unit 

controlling its operations based on the leadership skills. Although students 

classes they received. should show up with some experience, 

thebeginning the standardization allows the class to ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ d ~ h ~ 

mo weeks ofclass are various exams to better perform as a sapper platoon for 

test [he proficiency and physical tlieirupcoming IO-day field problem. 

toughness of the students. A 12-mile While the focus of the field problem 

roadmarch, whichisregularly described IS. the successful employment of the five 

as the toughest course the students have 1 basic principles of patrolling, the SLC is 

ever walked, is given at the end of the shifting the patrolling missions toward 

firstweek Wkilethethree-hourtimelimit moreofanengineerfocus. Studentswill 

is difficult, it is clearly attainable for rotate through leadership positions and 

Staff Sergeant Plimpton conducts jump master personnel inspection. 
I I forcesfi-omminefields. Lessons I successfullv co~nnlete the land navi- I I learned in recent vears nreach I -

zation course. ~ students cannot leam ~ to 

extraction methodology, and 

the SLC helps hone theseskills. 

Of course, with extraction 

comes the implied task of 

identifying and marking minefields. 

Culminating the SLC field 

problem, students will be required to perform a live breach 

using mechanized transportation. While the mechanized 

lifestyle cannot be replicated, 

this mission will provide an 

introduction for light fighters 

and a chance for ~nechanized 

soldiers to shine in their own 

Sapper students prepare to rappel from the 

.-~~~~~~ environment, ~ ~ la dis-l rower. 

will each face some unique and challenging tactical probletns requiring 

planning, focused leadership, 

andviolent execution. 

To betterrepresentthe conternporaly 

operating environment, students will 

now see an increased mobility requirement in their patrols. Challenging 

breaches will he necessary to fully close 

with and destroy the enemy, along with a 

more challenging enemy objective. To 

better replicate an actual mission, ohjectives are being rebuilt which will 

require detailed analysis on-site to 

effectively destroy enemy equipment. 

Also, thevertical and horizontal mobility 

skills learned during the previous weeks 

will benecessatytocompleteallmissions 

issued. Mobility,liowever, isnot theonly 

skill that is trained at the SLC. 

As the Army shifts to a smarter mine 

system, so too will the SLC. To be suecessful, students should show up at the 

SLC with a working knowledge ofall the 

mine systen~s available to them, as some 

missions will require hasty defenses or 

mineincorporation inanambush.These, 

mixcd with traditional wire obstacle 

construction, will be agood refresher for 

students and better illustrate the difficulty 

ofe~nplacingobstacles i~nderdemallding 

physical and mental conditions. Mine 

emplacement must complement mine 

awareness, as students will be forced to 

cxtract both themselves and friendly 

mou~ited route clearance, students will linkup with transportation and 

finishtheirfieldproblem. 

The field environment is demanding, 

with students getting little sleep or food 

if a team environment is not present. 

Students who show up in top physical 

shape can best handle the strcsses induced by these harsh conditions. However, the stress and their body's reaction 

are some of the best training that studentsclaim they receive. Similartoa field 

problem at Ranger School, shldents learn 

how their body will react, how to push 

theirmental andphysical limits,andliow 

to lead another student who only wants 

to close his eyes. 

successat the SLC depends on a 

quality train.llp program, unitsare 

to send students with their 

leadership to better foster a team environment. Historically, when this 

happens, graduation rates increase significantly and individual training is 

co~nplemented with a strong team unity 

upon returning to their home station. Thc 

unit should prepare for the SLC by 

conducting tough physical training 

daily, focusing on road marching. Additionally, students should arrive with a 

basic understanding of math skills and 

basic delnolitions calculations. Land 

navigation is acritical, yetperishable, skill 

that dooms the majority of sapper 

candidates. About one of every three 

sappers who do not graduate did not 

move cross-countly in an hour block of 

instruction. They must practice before 

arriving at Fort Leonard Wood. An introduction to basic knots will enhance 

the students' performance during the 

mountaineering portion of the SLC. 

Finally, sappers must show up 

knowing their jobs as cornbat engineers. 

Many basic skills are required during the 

field problem; howcver, thcy are not 

taught at the SLC. For example, sh~dents 

are expected to know their own weapon 

systems, how to breach, and how to 

emplace a minefield. Students who 

struggle with their basic individual tasks 

will not be able to focus on the development ~ ~ i ~ ~ of thcir leadership skills. Units do 

best when their NCO~and leadership 

accompany their young soldien through 

the SLC. 

Students who meet all graduation 

requirements know the meaning of the 

word sapper. They understand how to 

best utilize all of their engineering and 

soldiering skills to strcngthen their task 

force. Those who complete the course 

but do not graduate return to their units 

much stronger soldiersand more effective 

leaders. Noone leaves the SLC without a 

better knowledge of himself, his equipmcnt,orhissoldiers.TheSLCemphasizes 

the ability to organize on the move and 

transition quickly along the spectrum of 

conflict. and it trains leaders to be 

adaptive.The SLC is relevant with the 

new core competencies and imperatives 

in FM 1, TheArnfy. 

Questions about the SLC can be 

directed to,vmu~~j@i~ooilar~~~y~m

You 

can visit our Web site at wu~n,,wood. 

a,-m~m!?mil/suppe~: Y 

Firsf Lieutenant Roman con?pleted 

EOBC in 2000. Following Ranger 

School, he was assigned us a platoon 

leader in tl?e 307th Engineer Batfalion. 

For1 Bragg, North Carolitin. Afier 

serving as a compar7y executive officer, 

hebecamechie/'~ftrai~?ingattl~eSupper 

Leader Course. 

October-Deceniher 2002 
By Cuptoin Dale Snider 

Company command can be the most challenging and Training 

reaarding period of personal sacrifice and profes- Training, training, training-virtually el-erything an sional grou.th an engineer captain may ever experience. individuel soldier and a unit does is training of some As commander of an engineer constn~ctioncompany (combat kind at some organizational level. Training is dynamic. heavy). I experienced the greatest ups and downs of my 10 fluid, and the one organizational area that should be anacked years with thehy. I would like to sharemy experiences with with every asset in the colnpany with as much vigor and 

you in an attempt to help you avoid my carly mistakes and aggressiveness as possible-then require 20 percent nlore from allow you to build on my company's successes. The areas I your subordinates. focused on during my command, in their order of prioriiy. were 

basic soldier discipline, training, leader development, and I a~~roachedtraillillg objectives by putting all training 

maintenance. events ofsquad size or larger on the company training calendar 

as far out as possible. Usually, scheduling 8 to12 weeks out 

Basic Soldier Discinline would still give company leaders clear obiectives for the training 

To me. basic soldier discipline is the underpinning of 

everything a unit does and does not do. Up011entering 

command, I believedif my company was disciplined, it 

could function as a unit in the most difficult of environments, 

and individuals would act professionally and ethically even 

when no one was watching. I believed that a disciplined unit 

could be given a mission it had never trained on and still be 

successful because the soldiers andNCOs would be thoughtful. 

creative, and safe in executing an unfamiliar mission. I also 

believe history teaches that, in a developing theater of war, it is 

critical that units be able to execute missions that are unfamiliar 

at a tactical level for strategic missions to be successful. 

I tried to create a disciplined company by supporting and 

reinforcing the authority of the company's NCOs. When an 

NCO gave an order, it was to be obeyed. There was no compromise in this area. If an NCO told a soldier to do something 

and the order was lawful, ethical, and moral (and I never had an 

NCO give an order that was otherwise), I supported that order 

with the full weight ofcorrective training and theunifonn Code 

ofMilitary Justice. 

I also stressed the use of the chain of command. I required 

that when soldiers came to see me, they had already talked to 

their squad leader and platoon sergeant or platoon leader. I 

ensured that all soldiers' administrative requests bad been 

reviewed by their chain of command. I believed that this 

~ ~ 

event. ~heseevents on the calendar bccatne .'stakes in the 

ground" on which the colnpany focused. The stakes acted as 

anchors for organizational effolt such as bip-pocket training. 

short-term trainins, maintenance preparation. and supply 

actions. I was regularly surprised at how these stakes affected 

the company. For example, I heard team leaders planning 

[raining materials-such as Class I1 and Class 1X-with the 

maintenance platoon sergeant and supply sergeant, so their 

team would be successful. 

At the weekly trainingmeetings, we synchronized the training 

calendar with all leaders. We started with tomorrow and worked 

our way through the calendar day by day until we rcachcd T+ 

three months. Normally. we reviewed only squad-sized and larger 

events. I required that the officer or NCO in charge ofwhichever 

event \ve were currently reviewing answer when, >v/le~e, and II.~O. 

For example, for events such as the Anny Physical Fitness Test, 

who was required to take the test, when and i.r/~erewas it going 

to be given, and M:~Owould be grading (by name). 

I planned backward, wit11the company's leaders. the major 

events that would prepare our unit for the upcorning training: 

Warning order and operations order briefs 

Lieutenant and key-leader lunches (where we reviewed 

training objectives and mission training plan leader tasks 

and clarifiedmy intent) 

reinforcement would solidifv. in both the soldiers and their .Company in-propressreviews(lPRs) ,. .. . - chain ofcommand, that their chain ofcommand was responsible .Rehearsals at both platoon and company levels 

for their welfare in every area. As a result of these efforts, our 

company hadfewermilitarypolicereportsandsoldicrand~~~ .Back briefs and milestone reviews (to track critical 

discipline problems than our sister companies over an 18-month "equi'ements that would ensure a successful company 

period. preparation) (See Figre I, page 38) 
I 

Monday 

Tuesday 

... . . : weanesaay 

Thursday 

Friday 

Week 2 

Monday 

Tuesday 

Wednesday 

Thursday 

Friday 

I Mondav's PMCS I 

Platoon sergeant (PSG) picks up DA Form 5988 at 0900. Operators perform 

I 

..... .. ... Perform PMCS on in? fullownq I PMCS on equipment and identify high-priority faults. Mecr~ari~cs are asslgrneo ru 

each platoon and initiate repairs. Dozers (338,339,340,341.342) 

Operators look up low- and routine-priortty parts and NSNs and check DA Form (314,315,316.317) 

5988 against parts receivedl~nstalled. PSG and platoon leaden (PI , -",.) ," r-$,i-*, an.1 1302.3031 - I c~.+cI( *-,~ fnr rlicrran.nrins 	 -,uv,-y- 5-ton trucks (102-230)

-. 	 Trailers (102A-230A) 

rLs brief DA Form 5988 with XO and maintenance section. 

Maintenance platoon performs PMCS on its equipment. 

Mechanics continue repairs and services. 

Perform PMCS on the following: 

Perform PMCS with last week's DA Form 5988. Mechanics continue to verify, HMMWV (300.301) 

repair, and perform services. Light sets (300T. 301T) . 5-tonl2.5-ton trucks (304,305) Operators look up low- and routine-priority parts and NSNs and check DA Form 105 trailers (304T, 305T) 5988 against parts receivedlinstalled. PSG and PLs review and check for Scoop loaders (312,313) discrepancies. 916s (331,332,333,334,335,336,337) 

SEE and crane PLs brief DA Form 5988 with XO and maintenance section. 	 Rollers (325,326,327.328) 

Maintenance platoon performs PMCS on its tools and shop equipment. 870s (331T332T333T,334TS335T) 

Water trailers (336T.337T) 

Print new DA Forms 5988 for the following week. Tampers. pumps, generators 

Figure 1. Two-Week Maintenance Cycle 

Vehicle staging in serial order (to focus the company on the 

upcoming convoy and the associated convoy briefs, 

internal commo checks, load plans, commo rehearsals, and 

leaders' recons) 

If the mission, enemy, terrain, troops. and time available 

(METT-T) allowed, 1took the XO and other key elements to the 

expected company tactical assembly area (TAA) and reconnoitered lnajor training sites and talked through the 

,,lall and f hi^ really helped during the weeks 

before the company deployed. As questions came up, the xo 

and others could provide intelligent answers. This early recon 

also brought up many good questions that we worked on before 

deployment. 

The XO talked the leaders through tlieTAAsetup. timeline for 

day one, and platoon's sectols. During this second recon, there 

were opportunities to conduct hip-pockct training for the 

lieutenants in areas such as terrain association. 

Leader Development 

T	bow from personal experience that leaders arenot born, 

they are And strong, confident, colnpetent leaders takesthought, patience, and 

efturt. Leader development was a training event 1 planned for 

and tried to find oppo~iunities "in the moment" to train. 

1 approached leader development by putting an event, such 

as a rock drill, on the calendar. Tlien we set up the event by 

preparing the site, sand tables, titnelines to be reviewed, and 

briefers. My goal was forthe key leaders to bea panofthedrill 

and see how an effective rock drill was set up and executed. I 

used this same method oftraining for teaching lieutenants how 

toexecutetrainingmeetings. IPRs, back briefs, leaders' huddles, 

and after-action reviews. In environments such as convoys or 

platoon movements, soldiers helped by acting as largerelements 

during these training sessions and ~noved from one rock or dirt 

pile ill a quickly created but large sand table by time sequence 

or phase lines. 

Training could be and demanding at the same time 

mnningsquadcompetitionsat individualandsquad-levelevents. 

These events would continue over a period of several weeks. We 

also initiated constructive competitions among the platoons in 

physical trailling (PT) and in scheduled sports by running a 

Company multisport, single-elimination challenge roster on 

Tuesdays during PT. All of these leadcr development events 

were intended to build individual and team self-confidence, while 

training and bonding us as a unit. 

Maintenance 

Army doctrine says that maintenance is training, 

but I believed it was so vital to our unit's mission accomplish~nenthat we created a separate area of emphas~,. Before taking command, I spent 18 months as the 

battalion maintenance officer. ~~~i~~ that time. I saw - tnaintenance platoons with too little time to accomplish all 

that was required ofthetn and a DA F~,.,,, 5988E, ~ ~ 

~ai,,lena,lce~~~k~,,~~~, flow that was paper heavy 

because of a too frequent cycle. This delay often demoralized operators because they repeatedly wrote down 

the same routine or low-priority faults without getting 

action from the maintenance platoon. In addition, lowdensity equipment such as hand tampers, saws, pumps, 

and generators received less attention than they deserved. To respond to these areas, mTe created a two-week 

maintenance cycle (see Figure 2) that allowed time for 

38 Engineer 	 Octoher-December 2002 
s V (and pickup date) 

S 

0 Nov 00 

items 

brief I Nov 00 

Nov 00 

Figure 2. November 2000 FTX Milestones 

Octoher-Decemher 2002 Engineer 39 
the maintenance platoon to respond to all priority faults and 

involve operators in the parts-ordering process. 

We had Command Maintenance Week One where we used 

new DA Forms 5988E torecord preventive maintenance checks 

and services (PMCS) perfonned on all plime movers and hailers 

on the first day of the week. Then, over the next two days, the 

maintenance platoon verified the faults and the operators 

ordered all routine and low-priority parts. Whenwe first started 

this program. all NCOs and officers were trained on how to 

look up and order parts using a parts request form and the 

appropriate technical manual (TM). 

A TM library was created for the operators separate from 

the one used by the maintenance platoon. We also created a 

cross-reference sheet that showed the operators which TMs 

went with each piece of equipment. This process of having 

operators order their own equipment parts did two things for 

our unit: It created ownership and involvement in the 

maintenance process by the owners of the equipment, and it 

freed up a tremendous amount of timc for the maintenance 

platoon to work off deadlines and required services. 

The second week of our two-week cycle was identified on 

our company training calendar as Comrnand Maintenance Week 

Two. During this week, we perfonned PMCS on and cleaned 

and lubricated the low-density equipment such as hand 

tampers, generators. and skill saws. The rest of the week was 

the same as week one. Another change we made to this week 

was to move command maintenance for the maintenance 

platoon to Thursday afternoon. This allowed the maintenance 

platoon to be with the rest of the company on Monday to 

perform simple fixes and work on equipment that was identified 

as not mission capable during PMCS. Our two-week maintenance cyclc was adopted by our sister companies, and it 

became the battalion standard. 

(Enlisted PERSCOM Notes, continued from j 'age 33) 

Y(~u attend tl le NCOES courses a soon as ,ossible. Do not 

hc:sitate to contact this : office if you have 8questions about 

I tilade it apointto be available to all soldiers. I only closed 

my office door when absolutely necessary and spent as much 

time as possible at the project sites, with the platoons during 

PT, and on the weapon ranges. When a group of soldiers 

conducted training, I went out to be with them. My intent was 

to get to know the soldiers by name and leam something about 

their families, where they were from, or what theirhobbies were. 

One of the bcst things about being a commander is getting to 

know America's sons and daughters and becoming a team 

member in the best ofAmerica's organizations. Of all the things 

you do during command, spending time with your soldiers, 

heariug their stories, and helping them solve their problems 

will be the most rewarding. lfyou are not committed to the wellbeing of the soldiers or arenot willing to take on their issues to 

help solve them, then my advice is to turn down command and 

help your unit through good staff work. 

Summary 

n my opinion, if you pick more than four or five areas on 

which toreally focus during yourcommand, you will spread 

yourself too thin and hc less successful in the areas you 

are most interested in. Command time means that you will 

sacrifice family time and personal interests, but you will be 

compensated by professional development and acceptance 

by the NCOs and soldiers as the commander of a great 

organization. 

You may contact Captain Snider at martin.dule.snider@ 

us.arinyr11i1 Y 

Captain Sniilfr. i.spirci.rri,ig a maslo. $ in consnuctioion monogemen1 

at Texas A&M Nepwviorrslj~ commandedA Company, 52dEngineerBattniion, Fort Curson, Colorado, andsen,edas ti~eassisrant S3 and 

battalion mainte,~uncc oflcer CPTSnider i,s a grnduate qfTc~ns Tech 

tiniwr.si{v rind rheFieidArtilloy OfJrerAdvancedCourse 

the information on how to contact us. Remember, the only thing 

in the assignment process that does not have to be a variable mcP ,...A:*:..-", -.........*:...., 
 NLVLL~att~ndanceorcuuun~uua~ p~ul~iu~~u~ls. is your preference. Take the time to let us know your prcference. 

For information on pending r ;election boards, vis; it the Y 

PERSCOM Web site ( wwnJ.persc8 om.arm),.nef) for the latest Lieutenant pineer Enlivfrd ..""~l ".. ... -7. 2.. '1.. news. It'sup to you tor^..... JYYl Official Military Persi.~~..~. orrotutr irr inr ".a. ~orutnrr,ryrcns~vivr. vrnerossignrnen/s

Fi~le. You car I obtain a c( ,py by follc wing the p~ lude comn landel; 44t h Engineer. Bnrmlion (Brokenheart), 

at our Web s ite. mp Hoivz6 ?, Korea; 11:ar plans anal~~st, 
 U.S. Slrategic 

mmand, 0 futt Air Fc ~ce Base. Nebraska: nnd e.r~cutive
 n 1To ~ - . - .. . - . grce?; iutlz bngrneer- 8attalro11, 1st Cavalry Dii'isior~, Fort 

r 7 ne s, ole functic In of Engi neer Branc :I1 IS I0 SUwort 

1Yood, Texas. He has a nzosteri. ir7 nrrcleur engir~eering,fiam 

soldiers and cor nmanders in the field. I encourageyou 7enn State, a master :s in rnilitary sciencefinm the Adi,anced 

to contact your ass~gnment manager PDNCO, Branch . 3chool of Military studies, und a 171asto.,+ in .swategic studies , 

sergeant major, or me with any questions about assignments f.0 m the Arm) War College. 

or professional development. The PERSCOM Web site has all 

40 Engineer October-December 2002 

I 
S

ince the end of World War 11. Polish engineers have 

taken part in numerous peacekeeping missions. During 

these missions, mine-clearing operations have been the 

main task ofexplosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. Mines 

have become a very simple and effective means of battle, 

because most of them are simple to construct, inexpensive to 

manufacture, and easy to use. Mines have now become one of 

the principal threats to NATO and UN operations and soldiers. 

Clearing these mines is not only costly and slow but also 

extre~nelydangerous. Therefore, engineers from EOD teams 

must be specially trained if they are to be involved in mineclearing operations. 

The Polish armed forces train young engineer officers for 

assignments as EOD platoon leaders, warrant officers and 

nonco~nmissionedofficers as EOD team leaders, and co~iscripts 

as EOD teammembers. 

Peace SupportTraining 

Training Polish engineer soldiers for EOD team operations consists of three phases: 

Skills Training 

This six-month phase is conducted in selected military 

engineer units within Poland, where soldiers learn the basics in 

Polish military doctrine on mine operations. They learn the 

lypcs or mines and minetieids (pni-pow, dcicriplion, end 

rnethod of oper;ltion and handling) and the methods of laying 

and removing mines. Soldiers also receive instructions on 

minefield construction, such as where to use a~itiperso~inel or 

antitank mines and the kinds of mincs to use in various areas 

(fields, forests, roads, etc.). 

The soldiers receive extensive training in mine-clcaring 

operations, which includesMethods of marking and fencing minefields and minefield 

lanes. 

Basic rules of safety during mine-clearing operations (for 

example, the minimum safe distances for mine clearance 

and EOD operations appropriate to the threat of blast and 

shrapnel). 

Disposal procedures during electrical and safety fuse 

methods of blast initiation. 

During this time, engineer officers (who have graduated 

from the Military Academy) and warrant officers or NCOs (who 

are graduates of the Engineerin8 Training Centre in Wroclaw) 

rcspcctively serve as platoon leaders and squad leaders in a 

military englneerunit. 

After their initial six months of training, conscripts-if 

appointed to serve in a mission area-and a cadre from a 

selected rnilita~yunit take part in a ten-day course at the 

October-December 2002 Engineer 41 
. . 

A soldier uses a probe during mine detection training. 

Engineering Training Centre. training to bc EOD team members. 

These soldiers prepare for a specific mission area. Currently, 

we train EOD soldiers foroperations in Lebanon, Syia, Kosovo, 

Bosnia. and Afghanistan. 

Correlate Training 

During this five-week phase, training for UN peacekeeping 

missions is conducted at the Sikorski Military Training Centre 

in Kielce. Training for NATO missions is at selected military 

enaneer units in Poland. During this phase, soldiers are specially 

trained in EOD mine-clearing operations. 

AdvancedTraining 

The last phase of training is conducted in the mission area 

(for example. Kosovo) for five days. The newly arrived team 

receives instruction on the operational environment from the 

team that is currently in the mission area. During this phase, 

the two teams develop a training plan and use actual mines, 

which have been rendered safe, that the conflicting sides have 

been known to use in that area. 

Engineering Training Centre 

Training at the Engineering Training Centre conslsts of 

classroom instruction, followed by practical field 

training. The classroom instruction, which comprises 

about 10to15 percent of the training syllabus, is conducted at 

the Engineering Training Centre. The practical field training is 

conducted at selected battle camp locations that are specifically 

designated to train Polish EOD personnel. 

During the classroom instruction, there are lectures about 

current ongoing UN or NATO missions; characteristics of 

antipersonnel and antitank tnines, unexploded ordnance 

(UXO). and booby traps; and other mine-related threats. The 

instructors have a wealth of experience to share with the 

students. because each instructor has completed at least one 

rotation in an actual mission area.Additionally, we use a great 

deal of original documentation, such as mission instructions 

andoperational maps, from mission areas where Polish soldiers 

have been and are currently operating. 

Training Requirements and Content 

OD teams are trained according to NATO or UN 

procedures and Polish doctrine. There are many 

standard operating procedures (SOPS)and instructions 

tli~itwe profit from during training. We continually revise and 

develop training materials (training aids, instruction syllabi, 

and drafts) to better train our soldiers. Recently, we produced 

a detailed mine-clearing video based on actual operational 

mission experience to supplement thc standard training 

package. Our operations experiences have been published in 

military magazines, including an article titled "Mine Tlueats in 

Mission Areas" in the February 2001 issue ofE17gineer. 

Methods of\Vork 

Soldiers receive training in individual and panel activities 

during mine-clearing operations. In addition, they learn the 

dangers of handling ammunition and UXO. Every Polish EOD 

engineer soldier is trained inDetection-using various kinds of equipment, such as 

probes, types of mine detectors, and grapnels. 

Identification and on-site evaluation-identifying types 

of mines, ammunition, and UXO that may be encountered in a particular mission area. 

Rendering safe or recovery-being able to operate independently and having the self-confidence to know how 

to render safe or recover mines, ammunition, or UXO. 

Final disposal of mines, ammunition, andUXO-performing 

demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area, 

or other means appropriate to the mission area. 

During training, we use mines that were used in previous 

military conflicts and have been rendered safe. We now have 

about 100 drill mines from current conflict zones. (There are 

about 700 types of mines in use worldwide, with more than 300 

of them being antipersonnel mines.) 

Booby Traps 

The construction of booby traps depends greatly on the 

inventiveness of the people and soldiers who make them. They 

are normally made of readily available, commonly used items 

42 Enqineer October-December 2002 
and militaly equipment such as a weapon or bayonet. We train 

our soldiers on the methods ofpreparing booby traps, to include 

the various types, the materials that can be used to construct 

them, and where they can beused effective1y.A~always, special . . 

attention is devoted to the history and details of the use of 

booby traps that soldiers may encounter in a spccific area of 

operation. Our training, based on operational experience, 

includes the following examples: 

a An antitank mine is connected to an inductive shortcircuiting switch by an electric circuit. The inductive shortcircuitiug is situated adjacent to an antitank mine. When a 

mine is swept by amine detector during clearing operations, 

the detector generates an electromagnetic impulse, which 

causes the electric circuit to close and the antitank mine to 

detonate. 

a A direction mine is connected to a plate short-circuiting 

switch (an aluminiumplate and a pressure plate with nails) 

by an electric circuit. When the pressure plate is stepped 

on, it perforates the aluminum plate, which causes the I . 1

electric circuit to close and the mine to detonate. ., . ,, . .. 

Militaly equipment (such as a weapon, sideam, or bin- A soldier trains on antitank mine render.safe procedures. 

oculars) is connected to TNT or a mine by wires to an 

electric circuit or antihandling device. When the equipment PsychnlogicalAspects is moved or lifted, the TNT or mine detonates. 

EOD engineers are trained on the psychological impact of 

Maps in a are attached to TNT by an electric constantly dealing with antitank and antipersonnel mines and circuit. When the maps are taken out of the bricfcase, the booby traps. During training, we show new soldiers films and 

electric circuit closes and the TNT detonates. uhotos of mine accidents to increase their sense of safety and 

a Ammunition or an antitank mine is buried under another 

antitank mine. An antihandling device connects the two, 

and the mines could detonate when the first one is lifted. 

a A grenade in a glass is attached to a door or window handle. 

When the door or window is opened, the device falls out of 

the glass and detonates. 

a A bounding (or fragtnen1ation)mine is connected to a shovel 

by a trip wire. When the shovel is lifted, the mine detonates. 

TNT is placed in a telephone, videocassette, or night lamp. 

When the receiver is lifted, the videocassette opens or 

the night lamp switches on, a fuse activates, and the TNT 

detonates. 

Safety Rules 

Soldiers are given instructions on safe distances for 

conducting mine clearance and EOD operations appropriate to 

the threat of blast and shrapnel. This is achieved by ensuring 

strict adherence to SOPS and established NATO or UN 

procedures and training doctrine. Safety procedures also 

require soldiers to wear personal protective equipment (full 

body armor, helmets, and visors) during mine-clearing 

operations. 

Minetields and Minefield Lanes 

We train our soldiers to mark and fence ininefields and 

minefield lanes according to current NATO or UN procedures, 

as required within the mission area. 

reinforce the properprocedures for handling explosive devices. 

First Aid 

Soldiers are trained to provide immediate first aid to mine 

victims, and they learn the proper procedures for requesting 

medical evacuation of casualties. 

Conclusion 

ur training model and education prepare excellent 

engineer soldiers for EOD teams, as demonstrated by 

their continued high-quality performance during 

actual operational missions. During both training and mineclearing operations, we teach soldiers to be safety conscious 

and impress on them that their actions can ensure the safety of 

the local civilian population and the environment. Our training 

program is intensive and focused. And it benefits greatly from 

having cadre with actual operational field experience to teach 

the next generation of engineer EOD specialists. w 

Colonel Za~.czynski,an officer in the Polish armedforces, 

is currently the chief of the Engirieer Bmnch, HQ SFOR, 

Samajevo/Butnlil;Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also has served 

in the UNEF mission in Sinai, the UNPROFOR mission in 

Croatia, and the ASIDT in Albania. Colonel Zorczynski is 

head ofthe Tactics Department of the Engineering Paining 

Centre, Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Acarfem),, Wroclaw 

Poland, where he trains Polish engineering units,for UN arid 

NATO missions. 

October-December 2002 Engineer 43 
Past In Review 


By Captain Darman Place 

0

n27 October lS63,BrigadierGeneralWilliam"Baldy" 

Smith (see photo), Chief of Staff and chief engineer 

for the western army, e~nplaced a pontoon bridge 

across the Tennessee Rivec This bridge was the key link in 

creating a supply line-"the cracker line," as it was the first 

time the garrison at Chattanooga was able to receive a steady 

supply of rations-for the Union army at Chattanooga. This 

action allowed the 'Union army to reestablish its combat 

strength, take the offensive, and rout the Confederates from 

their positions, leaving Chattanooga in the hands ofthe Union 

and the Confederate a~my weakened from a terrible loss. 

On 20 September 1863- General William S. Rosecrans, 

commander of the Union forces in the West, received what 

would be for him a career-ending defeat at the Battle of 

Chickamauga. Confederate forces led by General Braxton Bragg 

routed the Union army when Lieutenant General James 

Longstreet attacked with his Corps through a gap in the Union 

line. Longstreet enveloped the Union line and rolled up its 

defense. General Rosecrans and his army were forced to retreat 

to Chattanooga, hoping to establish a hasty defense to stop 

what he was sure would be a quickly pursuing Confederate 

army.' General Bragg did not pursue the fight illto the city but 

decided to surround Chattanooga and simply starve the 

Union out. Bragg had a viablc plan, considering that the 

Confederate army controlled all the high ground surrounding 

the city to the south and east, and the Tennessee River 

served to block the Union forces in from the north and west 

(see map). 

44 Engineer 

Suffering from a recent defeat and the knowledge that he 

had caused it, General Rosecrans lost confidence in his ability. 

He quickly relegated himself and his 1ne11 to an eventual defeat 

when the Confederates decided to anack. However, weeks went 

by and the Confederates showed no signs of attacking. 

BrigadierGeneral William "Baldy" Smith 

October-December 2002 
Rosecrans cot~ti~~ued to improve the 

defense. but General Bragg's plan to starve 

the Union aniiy out was starting to take effect. 

Surrounded on all sides by either the 

Confederate army or unforgiving natural 

obstacles, the Union army was receiving 

barely enougli resupply to keep from stawing. 

Supply wagons dispatched to support the 

Union army were subject to Confederate 

cavalry raids, and a treacherous route through 

the lnountains sewed to destroy more of the 

supply wagons than did the Confederate 

cavalry. 

The situation was desperate for the Union 

anny at Chattanooga. The wire dispatches 

Rosecrans sent to Washington sounded like 

those ofan already defeated commander; thus, 

President Lincoln wired General Grant and 

informed him either to retain Rosecrans or 

replace him as he saw fit. Grant immediately 

wired Rosecrans that he was to relinquish 

colnmand to General Thomas and that he 

(Grant) would bc arriving soon to take overall 

command of tlie situation in Chattanooga. This {- city was colisidercd the gateway to the South 2 

and of extreme strategic importance to both f armies. o 

$ General Grant a~rivcd at Chattanooga on g 

23 October 1863 to find the Union army in a 

desperate situation.? It was secure in its c. 

fortifications within the city but, with no 

means of effective resupply, the anny would g

soon starve and be virtually incapable of $ 

defending against a Confederate assault. $ 

Grant's first objective was to open an effective 0 

supply line. Brigadier General Smith offered a 

Assault on Brown's Ferry (Map by J.L. Moon, Jr.) 

plan to achieve that objective. His plan called 

for establishing two pontoon bridges across the Tennessee 

River: the first would beuncomplicated: it would be positioned 

dircctly behind the city, terraill the Union controlled. The second 

bridge would be much more difficult. because to connect tlie 

Union to tlie west and its resupply, it would have to seize and 

bridgc the area at Brown's Ferry-an area controlled by the 

Confederates (see map). 

~h~ unionassault of Ferry began early on 

momins of27 October.3inith'splan was simple and couragcous 

and requircd the element of absolute surprise. Brigadier 

Generals John B. Turchin and William B. Hazen werc assigned 

the infantry mission; Major John Mendenhall, commander of 

three batteries of artillery, was to support the infantry assault. 

A portion of Hazen's brigade was the main effort: the success 

or failure of the mission would rest largely upon its shoulders. 

Hazen's after-action report effectively stated the goal and 

method he intended touse to achieve the objectives Smith had 

given him: 

"IVe were to orgnnize irito./;f@ squnds alone olficer ~rtd 

t~~en~-/orrr 11ie17 each. to enibark on ponroorz hoar.^ or 

Chattarlooga arid float doii.17 ihe rive r... a dismrzce. bj rhc 

bends of the ri1.e~; of riirie rniles, and land upon itr lcfi hnrik, 

(lien occtipied la; ihe wien!~: riiaking thereafie~: ir17nlediate 

disposi!ions.for. holdi~tg it, a.hile the rem<iir~i~ig portioris q,f 

nly brigade rind unorher one sho~rld he .speediij. setit over rile 

7ii:er in the same boats ro ,z.it!/i,rce me; tire moveme~~i n.ns to 

he rnadejuct before da~lighr ... '" 

The other brigade Hazen rcfcrred to was Turchin's. His 

brigade was to move along a hidden road through Moccasin 

Point, take up a position directly across from Brown's Ferry, 

remain hidden from enemy pickcts in the u.ood line. and wait 

for [lie assault of Hazen's brigade. Pontoon boats used by 

Hazen to negotiate the river would be launched to pick up 

Turchin's men and fei~y thein across to esploit the penetration 

of the Union line caused by Hazen's brigade. Mendenhall's 

artille~y took up aposition overlooking Brown's Ferr) to support 
river Absolutely no talking was allowed during 

movement.' 

The flotilla moved silently down the river 

using only the current forvolition. The flotilla's 

movement was as nearto perfect as Smith could 

have hoped for. The boats hugged the treefringed banks of the river opposite the enemy. 

Confederate pickets spotted the boats hut 

perceived no danger because they didn't see 

any men; thus, they didn't raise an alarm, 

assuming that the boats weremerely a pontoon 

bridge that had been destroyed, a common site 

throughoutthe war. Only two incidents marred 

the boat movement: a soldier was reportedly 

knocked out of the boat by a tree limb but was 

recovered, and another soldier apparently fell 

out of the boat and drowned. By 0430, 

Turchin's soldiers were in position across from 

Brown's Ferry, awaiting the arrival of Hazen's 

A pontoon bridge such as this was used to bridge the Tennessee men (see map, page 45). They built fires to 

River. at-.Chattanoona . . .

=-. ..... ..-.-... 

the withdrawal of the Union force should it become overwhelmed and find it necessary to retreat to the near shore of 

the Tennessee? 

Brigadier General Smith's plan called for a swift assault, 

focusing on the element of surprise to help the Union achieve 

victory. To achieve the element of surprise at the assault point, 

BrigadierGeneral Brown decided to launch the boats wellabove 

the assault point, some nine miles by river. Smith took a tactical 

risk in this area stating, 

'Tt nos deemed better to take this risk than to launch the 

boais near theferry because they nwould move more rapidly 

than itztelligence could be taken by the infantiypickets and, 

in addition, though the enemy might he alarmed, he would 

not know where the landing was to beattemptedatid therefore 

could itot concentrate with certainty against us. ''O 

Because the success of the mission depended largely on 

the element of surprise, only Grant, Smith, the brigade commanders, and the engineer officers in charge of the pontoon 

flotilla and the actual laying of the bridge knew the plan. The 

soldiers who executed the plan only knew that they were 

attacking the confederates and the mission was dangerous. 

But if the mission was successi%l, it would spell supplies and 

relief for the Union army within Chattanooga. 

On26 October at 2200 hours, Hazen's brigade marshaled at 

the launch site, and the soldiers were given the details of their 

mission. The brigade broke into fifty 25-man squads, loaded 

the pontoon boats, and prepared to launch the miniflotilla. The 

pontoons were launched at 0300 on27 October, their movement 

screened by a mist that hung over the river. The soldiers were 

ordered to lay down in the boats. The only person exposed 

above the gunwales of the pontoon was the boatswaio-an 

engineer soldier with the job of guiding the pontoon down the 

46 Engineer 

guide the flotilla to the proper landing site and 

waited forthe tinle when they would cross the river andreinforce 

Hazen's brigade.' 

As the Union forces came ashore at Brown's Feny, they 

surprisingly met little resistance. The only Confederate troops 

occupying the actual ferry site were a thin picket line that was 

easily routed. Behind the pickets and in a position to reinforce 

them, the Confederates had less than a regiment of soldiers. 

Had Smith's plan heen executed two days earlier, an entire 

Confederate brigade comnanded by Brigadier General Law 

would have met him. As it was, Hazen's brigade closed arms 

with the Fifteenth and Fourth Alabama of Longstreet's Corps, 

not nearly enough combat power to repel the Union's massed 

assault. Upon seizing the foothold for the farside bridgehead, 

the boats were sent to feny Turchin's brigade across while 

Hazen's soldiers began etching out a defensive line. Colonel 

Oates, commander of the Fifteenth Alabama, immediately 

launched a counterattack against the intruding Union brigade, 

with the following orders, "Every man is to walk fonvard at 

one-pace intervals on a lateral line and fire only upon placing 

the muzzle of their weapon against the body of a Yankee 

~oldier."~Though gallant, the Confederate counterattack was 

quickly repelled, and the Union pushed farther inland from the 

feny head. 

By this time, Brigadier General Turchin's brigadewas quickly 

moving across the river. With eachunit that came to the farside, 

the Union defensive line was pushed out farther. Brigadier 

General Smith ordered an abatis placed around the perimeter of 

the Union bridgehead to establish a hasty defensive position 

and provide cover from Confederate muskets. Colonel Oates 

continued to attempt counterattacks throughout the morning 

until he was wounded. Later that day, Brigadier General Law 

arrived with three more regiments and a regiment of the Texas 

Brigade to fmd Oates in a nearby farm house, recovering from 

a wound. 

October-December 2002 
Oates informed Law that he had arrived too late to make a 

difference. The Union had managed to cross a sizeable force 

and had gained a very tenable position. Law went forward to a 

vantage point from which he could oversee the Union position. 

With one look, he turned around, returned to Colonel Oates, 

and remarked that Oates was quite correct in his assessment. 

By that time, 1630 hours, the Union had seized the bridgehead 

and emplaced the pontoon bridge (see map, page 45). thus 

creating theunion's cracker line. This one small action was the 

beginning of the end for the Confederates at Chattano~ga.'~ 

Establishing the cracker line enabled the Union to effectively 

resupply its garrison in Chattanooga-not only with food and 

ammunition but also with troops. Opening this supply line 

coincided with two other events. First, Longstreet's Corps 

departed from the Confederate perimeter to attack Major General 

Burnside's Union force at Knoxville. Second, Major General 

Sherman's army arrived to reinforce Grant at Chattanooga. The 

result was areinforced Union army and a weakenedconfederate 

force. The ability to resupply the Union force at Chattanooga 

hinged completely on Brigadier General Smith opening the 

cracker line. Establishing the bridge across the Tennessee River 

was arguably the decisive point of the battle of Chattanooga 

for the Union artny. 

Brigadier General Smith expertly employed the principles of 

a river crossing to emplace a pontoon bridge across the 

Tennessee River and establish a supply route for the Union 

forces at Chattanooga. 

Advance to the river, phase one, requires a unit to seize the 

terrain on the nearside of the river, including road networks 

and favorable crossing sites. Smith moved Turchin's brigade 

to the nearside of Brown's Feny, a site that obviously had a 

trafficable road network and a preconditioned crossing site. 

This move ensured that Hazen's assault force would have a 

reserve and that the assault force would not arrive at Brown's 

Ferry to find the Confederates already occupying the nearshore 

and, thus, become flanked. 

Assault across the river, phase two, is designed to place 

combat power rapidly on the far shore to eliminate the enemy's 

ability to place direct fire on the crossing site and secure terrain 

for attack positions. Smith executed this phase perhaps better 

than any other portion of the operation. Using the principle of 

surprise, he massed a large force on the far shore rapidly and 

with little resistance by the Confederate army. Brigadier General 

Smith made it impossible for the Confederates to place direct 

fire on the bridge site, which allowed him to cross Turchin's 

brigade. 

Advance from the exit bank, phase three, is intended to 

extend the initial foothold created by the assai~lt force. Once 

Turchin's brigade crossed, Smith pushed the bridgehead line 

out farther-known today as seizure of an intermediate 

objective. The intent is to prevent direct fire from being placed 

on the bridge site and to deny observation of indirect fire. By 

pushing his lines out farther into the enemy-controlled area of 

the bridgehead, Smith negated the enemy's ability to see the 

river-crossing site. This allowed Smith to begin emplacing the 

pontoon bridge and prepare for the crossing of even larger 

units to secure the foothold created by the initial assault. 

Secure the bridgehead, the final phase, is desiged to create 

a position secure from enemy counterattack and large enough 

to accommodate follow-on forces as they cross the bridge. 

When Smith ordered the felling of an abatis and established 

his initial defensive perimeter, he effectively repelled at least 

four counterattacks by Colonel Oates and his Alabama brigades. 

When Brigadier General Law and Confederate reinforcements 

arrived, Smith's position was i~nmovable by the available 

Confederate forces; by I630 hours, the bridge was emplaced. 

Smith'stwo brigades now held avery tenable position, and the 

Union sirpply line to Chattanooga was open. Y 

Caj~tain Place currently commands A Company, 326th 

Engineer Battalion, IOlst Airborne Division (AASLTJ, Fort 

Campl~ell, Kentucky. 

En1dnotes: 

,.~~~~~. ~~ James Lee wlcuonougn. Chananooga-uearn brip on the 

co1 ress, 1997, 

~8 

'IDIO, P. 94. 

,..-~ ---.-, 55 vvar uepanmenr, vvaror me neuer~~on: urnc!ar 

nrbulu;l u, lrUnion and Confederate Armies. Series 1, Volume 

31, Part ll Rep1srls: Looko~ !t Mountain lary Ridge, 

Hal-risburg:His1:orical Timer , Inc.. 1985. 

7bid. 

'Unlted Stat, es War Depz 

'OMcDonou(lh. 

Works Cited: 

Department of the Army, The Bridge Equipage of the United 

States arm^ With Directions for the Construction of Military 

Bridges, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1870. 

Downey, Fairfax. Storn; ling of the C 


1863. NewYork. 1963. 
 - ,., r c Hay, Thomas R. "The aarrle or Lnananooga. beorgra 

Historical Quarterly June 1924. 

Longacre, Edward J. '"APerfect Ishmaelite: Gen leral 'Baldy' 

Smith." Civil War Times Illustrated, December 1971 3. 

MacDonald. John. Great Battles of the Civil War New York: 

Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988. 

Tucker, Glenn. "The Battleof Chickamauga." Civil v.0, J ,UJIE~ 

Illustrated, August 1971 

October-December 2002 Engineer 47 
Professional Registration: 


Advice for Aseirina Armv Lnaineers 


By Captain Richard J. Gash 

Almost two years ago, a group of Engineer Officer 

Advanced Course (EOAC) classmates and I struggled 

through the professional engineer (PE) application 

plocess. Afier hours of toiling over experience forms, 

making innumerable telephone calls to the Missouri Board for 

Professional Engineers, and spending a small fortune on 

express mail, some of us met the application deadline. Many 

did not. 

Your professional joumal should include a record of all the 

engineering-related projects you work on. The EOBC practical 

exercises are a great place to start. This record will make filling 

out the experience portion of the PE application much easier. 

Another important aspect of the joumal is contact information. 

The application requires the officer who was your supervisor 

at the time to verify your engineering work experience. While 

at EOBC, get a good permanent standard or e-mail address 

~h~ pll,.,,,,,e of ,lliS ;Irlii12 ,, froni ym~r l>latoon rralnzr and cemp:ln!. cornn1~nd:r. You \~111 is ,u c:lpl,lrc ,llC I~~~,,~ 

fBrslgna111rc lenrLll.j ,,,hlleapplylnl? ,llld sh:lrC ,hCII1 ,,.LI~l c,nglnc,..r ,,ific2rhha! c 10 111311onr. .)l'thelil a p3n oi!oorappl~;:~t~on 

aspiring to dothe same. In keepingwith most military operations, four years later. Your journal should also include contact 

I have broken the process into fonr phases. The first phase information for PEs you work under. You will need recominvolves becoming an engineer in training, which is designed mendations from three ofthem for the application. If anyone in 

to set up an applicant for success. The second phase is filling your EOBC chain of command-from platoon trainer to brigade 

out the application. The third phase, which is generally 

everyone's favorite, is studying and preparing for the exam. 

Tlie final phase is taking the examination. 

Phase I: Engineer in Training 

This phase begins before commissioning and continues 

through the Engineer Officer Basic Course (EOBC) and 

assignments leading up to the EOAC. The first step is 

to bccome an engineer in training by graduating from an 

engineering program approved by the Accreditation Board for 

Engineering and Technology and passing the Fundamentals 

of Engineering Examination. This requirement is written in 

Missouri law. The second step is EOBC. My advice for the 

course is threefold. First, pay attention. Second, keep the 

construction handouts. Third, stm aprofessional journal. While 

it may be possible to succeed without the first two pieces of 

advice, the joumal is essential. 

?er'sCreec 

.--..l,,l,-.,.J,,.I-,.. noor I rlorlirr .-,..,r,-.,-.l-.,-l.l.,.,,l.. Iedae and skill to the advancement and betterment of human 

vveifare. I pledgeII To g~veth e utmost of 

- 7 .. . . r lo parrlclpare In none our nones1 enrerprlse. 

II To live and work acl :ording to tl ie laws of I e 

highest standards of professionaI conduct. 

. ---, .----c. 
 ..A

profession before personal advantage, and the publicwelfare 

above all other considerations. 

In h~~milityand with need for divine guidance, I make this 

I 

48 Engineer 

commander to course director-is a PE, introduce yourself, 

state your intentions, and get good contact information. 

Phase I continues with the jobs you hold as a lieutenant. 

Keep updating your joumal with contact infonnation for PEs 

and supervisors. Continuc to record engineering projects you 

work on. While some of us are lucky enough to work in 

conshuctionunits or even for the U.S.Army Corpsof Engineers, 

most of us are more familiar with concertina wire and C-4 than 

construction. TI?;$is not aprohlem. Believe it or not, much of 

the work done by mechanized and light engineers is engineering 

related. Route, bridge, and ford reconnaissance; bridge classification and demolition; terrainand trafficability analysis; and 

even combat obstacle and fighting position construction all 

require engineering and prqject-management skills. Record them 

in yourjournal. Always fight to get projects that will add to 

your experience. A co~iibat engineer platoon can easily clear 

and construct a live-fire range or even a playground! 

Phase I culminates with the transition to EOAC and the 

start of the application process for the Principles and Practice 

of Engineering Examination. Fortunately for most engineer 

off~cers,the engineer-in-training experience required to apply 

generally coincides with the move to Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. The end state for this phase is four years of experience 

and good contact infonnation for supervisors and PEs. If your 

experience doesn't quite add up to fonr years, don't panic; 

EOAC and postgraduate education (University of MissouriRolla) will add to your time. 

Phase 11:Application 

The application to take thc Principles and Practice of 

Engineering Examination is probably the biggest 

obstacle separating Army engineers from professional 

reg~stration. Timing, pel-ceived lack ofengineering experience, 

and the inability to obtain signatures combine to discourage 

October-December 2002 
many officers from applying. Selecting the proper esam date 

and completing the application early will give you the best 

chance for success. 

The Missouri Board for Architects. Professional Engineers, 

and Professional Land Surveyors and Landscape At-chitects 

adlninisters the examination sc~niannunlly in April and Octoben 

I recommend taking it right after graduation from EOAC. 

Although it is tough to juggle course requirements, studying. 

and trips to the Lake of tlicOzarks, stayingon forthe University 

of Missouri-Rolla degree will give you a chance to take the 

exam a second time in Missouri ifyou fail. Get an application 

from the Missouri Board as soon as you beein - EO.4C. You can 

milst be a PE, this is not tlie case. Keep in mirid that you catuiot 

use the same person as a supe~visor and as a reference. Remember to include EOBC and EOAC as part of your experience. 

(IVOfe: Tlr~ Etz,ci~leer School poi111 nf conliicr hms cvo~nyiev 

rho/ mi,yhr he l1el~fi11.j 

If you have any qilestions while working on your application. the best thing to do is contact tlic board or the 

Engineer School point of contact. The end state for this phase 

is an accepted application and a letter fiomthc Missouri Board 

authorizing you a seat at the exatnination. Once you have this 

letter in hand. it is timc to focus all your enerpy on sh~dying 

and Phase 111. 

request one through tlie board's Web site at hlrp:N~~.>~~i~: 

ecodei:srnie.~rzu,rr~/p~/~~roupeis/.
 Even though applications are 

generally due three months before eachcxamination, complete 

yours as soon as possible and turn it in early. Iftlie board tinds 

any problc~lls with it, you will have time to correct it. I found 

the board very willing to help. 

The two sections of the application that cause the most 

hc;tdacIies are Section V, Refi.reiice.~.and Section V1, Engirteeri~r): Experience. Section V requires applicants to obtain 

character recommendations kom fiveindividuals, three ofwhom 

must be PEs. I strongly advise sending out additional recommendation requests. Since military life is transient by nature, 

at least one of tlie officers on whom you were banking will be 

deployed to a classified location, in the middleofa PCS. orwill 

simply not receive your request. The recommendation fomi is 

easy to fill out. A couple of completed extras urill ensure that 

you do not get caught short. It is also very likely that you have 

been out of contact with many of your potential references fnr 

some time. Your EOBC brigade commander or former college 

professor may not remember who you are. If you fear this [nay 

be the case. includc acopy of Section VI from your applicatio~i 

and the telephone number of your last battalion commander 

for them to cont3ct. 

An early start should allow you plenty of time to get the 

recommendations you need. However. if you find yourself 

closing in on tlie application deadline and still in need of 

reco~nmendations. there is one last collrse of action available. 

Start knocking on doors at thc U.S. Army Mzineuver Support 

Center at Fort Leonard Wood. Because it is the home of the 

U.S. .Army Engineer School, it has onc of the highest 

concentrations of PEs in the Army. With a proper introduction 

and the right testimonials, you should find the recommendations you need. (Nore: The Engineer. Scliooi poinl of 

co,l/oci rlion~~i iri !he fj,yirre on poye 50 mni11min.s n lisr ofPEr 

011 pos1.i 

Section VI is the Incat of tlie application. In it you must 

account for four years of engineering esperience-all accrucd 

subsequent to baccalaureate graduation. Here is where the 

experience pan ofyolir p~wfessional journal \rill come in handy. 

Tlie application requires a bricfsynopsis of tlie work you have 

done in each job you have held. A supervisor \vho oversaw 

your work must vcrify each synopsis with his or her signature. 

Altllou~li tlie application appears to imply that this supervisor 

Phase 111: Preparation 

The question of how much effon to put into studying 

for the Principles and Practice of Engineering Esamination is forcmost on every applicant's mind. Tlic 

best ans\\~er-although probahly not the one you want to 

hear-is, of course, enough to ensure that you pass! This can 

range anywhere from a few rveeks to a few years. Each applicant 

should conduct an introspective assessment to determine how 

long and how hard he needs to sh~dy. Ireconunelld en-ing 

toward longer and harder. It is important to note that for many, 

this period of preparation may need to stan well before Phase 

I1 is completed. 

The nest questions most applicants have are what and how 

to study. Fomlnately, I can offer much more explicit advice in 

this area. Concerning what to study. 1 strongly recommend 

that civil engineerins applicants porcl~ase Michael R. 

Lindeburs's Civil E~~girieer.Or,q R~/~WIICP MIIIIIIUI. P~.oc~ice 

Pr.ohierrrr/or~ !Ire Civil E,igirzen-i~tg PL Escr~~ri~~urio~~, and Civil 

Brginee~-i!lg.Snntple E.l~ur1li~lali~~11. Used together, these three 

books will serve as excellent study guides. They will also 

filnction as invaluable rcsoilrccs durinf the examination. The 

reference manual contains detailed inlbmiation about the esatnination, step-by-step salnplc prohlems. and a wealth of upto-date reference material. The practice problems book includes 

sample problems covcring engineering fundamentals and all 

disciplines ofci\,il enginccriilg. Tlie sample csamination offcrs 

a great way to gauge the progress of your preparation. ,411 

three books arc \veil \+'ortli the cost. 

How to study is a little more complicated. It is bcst to 

develop a solitl plan of action that will streamline your prcparation process. :\ good place to stan is by researching the 

examination. which recently undenvent significant revision. The 

nc\r7 civil engineering exam format has hvo sessions. Tlie 

morning session includes 10 nlultiplc-choice questions that 

encompass all disciplines of civil engineering. The afternoon 

scssion also has -10 multiple-choicc questions focused on one 

of five disciplines. Applicants must choose from \rater resource. 

transportation. geotechnical, cnvironlnenri~l. and structural 

engineerins. Decide on a discillline early in your preparation. 

and focus your studying on that ficld. 

Afier selecting an area of cnipliasis. the bcst way I found to 

study was to \vork through the practice problems in Michael 
Lindeburg's books. The first section in the reference manual is 

devoted to engineering fundamentals. Although these may 

seem rudimentary at first, I found them invaluable as a review 

of complex unit conversions and how to use my calculator. 

Mastering these two areas alone will greatly enhancc your 

chances for success on the examination. The next sections are 

each devoted to one of the five afternoon disciplines. Don't be 

disheartened by the difficulty of the sample probletns. With 

practice, answers will begin to come easily. 

Whileyou work through sampleproblems, take time to become 

familiarwith yourreference materials. Chances are that you have 

the informationneeded to answer all of the examination questions 

somewhere in your references. The trick is being able to find the 

right informationquickly.Trytoavoidalwayslooking for answers 

in Michael Lindeburg's books. One slight flaw withusing them 

as study guides is that by design, almost all the information 

needed to solve his sampleproblelns can be found somewhere in 

his reference manual. Some of the actual exam questions may 

require you to dig through other refcrences. You need to become 

familiar with your other manuals as well. 

As examination time draws near, 1recommend taking a break 

from studying. Take some time to relax and mentally recharge. 

You definitely do not want to be burned out before starting the 

eight-hour exam. Take the last few days to finish organizing 

your references and supplies and make the transition from Phase 

I11 to Phase IV. The end state for this phase is the confidence 

that you are ready to pass the examination. 

Phase IV: Examination 

Taking the Principles and Practice of Engineering 

Examination is the last step in the process ofbecoming 

a registered PE. This phase involves actions on the 

ob.icctive. I can offer advice on what to bring with you, along 

with some final hints. Taking the examination is up to you! 

Applicants often lose sleep while trying to determine which 

reference books to take to the exam and which to leave behind. 

I can clear up any confusion. If in doubt, take it. Take every 

book you own that remotely relates to engineering. Go to the 

Maneuver Support Center library and check out any additional 

books you think you might need. Take a good dictiona~y,the 

thicker the better. Inevitably, questions will include obscure 

words you have never seen before. Take your Engineer School 

handouts. They present a surprising amount of pertinent 

information in an easy-to-follow format. Don't wony about 

being overloaded. No matter how many books you take, you 

will seepeople at theexam with more. It iseasy to tell the firsttimers from the veterans of several examinations. The novices 

struggle from their cars to the exam room, dropping books out 

of overflowing cardboard boxes. The veterans have bookshelves on wheels they can push along with them. I recommend 

the middle ground-a collapsible luggage dolly. 

In addition to your reference materials, make sure you think 

through the logistics involved in taking the exam. You will need a 

good transportation plan. This is partly to accommodate your 

reference materials, but mostly because of the road network in 

7 

Becoming a ProfessionalEngineer 

The licensureof PEsis important to the public because of the 

significant role engineering plays in society. The profession 

regulates itself by setting high standards to help protect the 

public safetyandwelfare. Becoming registered as a PE increases 

your opportunityfor promotions, pay raises,credibility,respect. 

and security. 

The US.Army Engineer School maintains a Web site at 

wwu!woodarmy millENGRlregisbrhtmthat provides general 

information about registering militarypersonnelas PEs. 

The registration process involves the following steps: 

Graduate from an Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology accredited program. 

Pass the Fundamentalsof EngineeringExamination. 

Gain a minimum of four years (three years with a 

master's) of verified practical engineeringexperience. 

Pass the Principles and Practice of Engineering Examination. 

Examinationsarelypicallyadministeredtwice a year,once in 

April and once in Octobet. Applicationsmust be completed 4510 

120days beforetheexamination date,depending on the individual 

state regulations. 

The Engineerschoolpointofcontactforquestionspertaining 

to the PE registration process is Mr Kenny Light, PE, at 

lighfk@wood.army.mil. 

central Missouri. The board makes every effort to centralize the 

exam location for applicants from across the state. Unfortunately, 

this ensures that a direct laud route will not exist between the 

exam site and Fort Leonard Wood. Take the time to conduct a 

good route recon before the examination. Struggling down unfamiliar 0zal.k roads in the predawn darkness will only add 

unneeded stress to your day. A better plan would be to spend the 

night before the examination in a local hotel so you won't have to 

wony about getting to the examination site on time. 

Having the proper amount of supplies is also essential to 

success. Determine how many pencils, erasers, batteries, and 

even calculators you think you will need-and double that 

amount. Halfway through the afternoon session is not the 

best time to realize that the "7" key on your calculator has 

stopped working. 

My final piece of advice is to stay relaxed. Don't panic or 

get frustrated. Stick to your plan of action. Don't try to switch 

afternoon disciplines at the last minute just because you 

overheard someone during lunch saying that transportation 

was easier than water resources. Trust your preparation. Keep 

a positive attitude. The end state for this phase is walking out 

of the exam site with full confidence that you passed! Y 

Capinin Gas11cornmond.~rheHeadqsarlersandSupporf Compan,~ 

864th Engineer Bafralio~t.For1 Lewis, Washinglon. Previous 

assignmenls includepinnsoficerlor DCSPER, ICarp.%Fort Lewis, 

andn?echan~edntgi~teerpiafoo~~ leaderandcompn~tverecutiveoj,7ice< 

70thEngineer-Boftalion,3dBrigade. IslArmoredDivision,Fort Riley, 

Kansas CPTGarh is agraduale ofthe Uni~edS~otesMili~ary Academy 

and the Engineer O/licerAdwnced Cotrrse and holds a masierk in 

geoioa andfieophy.sics,fromthe University oJMissolmri-Rolia. He is 

aprofessionaleitgineer in Missotrri. 

50 Engineer Octoher-December 2002 
Ileweloping a11E~igiliecrExit Strategy 


A Roadmap for Returning Responsibilities Back to the Host Nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

BL. Colonel Michael J. Ulekowski 

k,s the number of peacekeeping missions increases, 

countries involved with these missions look for a 

eans to decrease their engineer forces within that 

countty and return the responsibility for road repair and 

maintenance back to the government entities that were initially 

responsible for them. This becomes much more important as 

the costs for the military presence increase over time and the 

total numbers of rnilita~y forces within countries involved with 

peacekeeping are decreased with the lessening of Cold War 

tensions. 

Initial EngineerMission 

when initial forces arrive in a host country with the 

intention of being peacekeepers, the immediate 

mission is for control of the country. For engineers, 

this means a return of freedom of movement-primarily road 

and rail-for the incoming troops. Host nation government 

involvement in this phase is either very minimal ornonexistent. 

Engineer troops are brought into the country in sufficient 

numbers to perform temporary repair and minimal maintenance. 

The standard atthis point ofthemission is theminimummilitary 

requirement, which is normally marked by the ability of the 

roadway to handle a military four-wheel-drive vehicle. There is 

no contingent for providing a means for civilian traffic to move 

on the roadway. 

Bridge repair is accomplished through theuse of temporary 

military bridges, such as the Mabey Johnson or Bailey truss 

bridge. These bridges are not designed to he permanent 

structures, nor are they designed for heavy civilian traffic. 

During this time, only major roads-which include those 

designated as main supply routes or theater-controlled roadsare opened. All others are either ignored by the peacekeeping 

forces or left to subordinate unit control. 

The initial return to normalcy is marked by direct contracts 

between the ueacekee~inc force contracting agency and civilian . - - - . contractors for road repair and maintenance. Normally, govemments are not in this loop since they are still in the process of 

recovering. Also, it is easier and faster to work directly with the 

contractors. 

Unfomnately, during this period, there is no incentive for 

the government agencies to develop ethical procedures in 

dealing with contractors and outside agencies providiugmoney 

for roads. As a result, previous procedures that were not up to 

U.S.-acceptable ethical and moral standards continue to 

flourish. With the concentration of internationalmoney coming 

into the country and the desire of government agencies for 

this cash flow, the situation can easily develop into one of 

government conuption and mismanagement. 

Route Sparrow in Bosnia, 

March 2000. Some of the results from improper road construction by the old Yugoslavian government were spectacular in their failures. Using 

the MOU and the oversight by 

SFOR engineers, the reconstruction will follow more on 

Western European guidelines, 

keeping these roads from failing. 

October-December 2002 
For the initial MOU with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of 

Srpska, certain roads remained under SFOR control for maintenance and repair. All 

other roads were considered part of the joint venture initiative in March 2000. 

Engineer Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

ith the breakup of the formerYugoslavia, numerous wwars erupted within the fragments of that country 

during the 1990s. A group of nations led by NATO 

entcred Bosnia-Herzegovina following the failure of the United 

Nations Protective Force to keep the peace. As time progressed, 

a strategy was developed to reduce the enginecr mission 

within that country and hring about a return to nonnalcy for 

the government agencies responsible for road repair and 

niaintenance. 

During the three years that the warring factionsfought each 

other in Bosnia-Herzegovina, much of the national infrastructure was destroyed. When the Implementation Force 

(IFOR) moved into the country in 1995, the primary n~ission of 

the engineers was to rcgain freed0111 of movement. When IFOR 

became the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on 20 December 1996, 

military forces-cspecially engineer-werc decreased by the 

participating nations. This dccrease occurred deliberately and 

rapidly, espccially after commitment of troops to Kosovo. 

Government Structure 

within Bosnia-Herzegovina, two different 

govcrnrnents wcre set up: the Federation of 

Bosnia-Herzcgovinaand theRepublicofSrpska. 

Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

The Federation, which consisted of Bosnian Croats andthe 

Muslims (later known as Bosniacs), was formed frrorn two 

52 Engineer 

cntities within the government structure that had previously 

fought with each other. Politics and a lack of desire for true 

unity further complicated issues. 

The Fcderation's road directorate was responsible for road 

rnaintcnance and repair. Under the fonner colnmunist system, 

there was no free enterprise used in contracting for roadwork. 

Instead, each area had Putevies (the Yugoslavian tern1 for contractors), who were coniplctely responsible for certain roads. 

There was no open bidding or competition for the work. Since 

only one contractor was responsible for an area's road network, 

the quality of construction varied from area to area. 

Many of the rccords for road and bridge constn~ction had 

been destroyed during the war. making it difficult to engineer 

good renovations or replacements. However, with the capital 

of theFederation residing in Sarajevo, the government agencies 

were able to use old government offices and facilities that 

weren't destroyed in the war to makc their return to nonnalcy 

more efficient. The few records that survivcd were in these 

facililies, making it easier on the new government road 

directorate. 

Republic of Srpska 

The Rcpublic of Srpska government consisted of Bosnian 

Serbs. Even though this portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina had 

no problelu with internal politics, the posturing of the 

government during the initial days of the peacekeeping 

mission-and its inability to work with IFOR-resulted in 

minimal fi~nds from international sourccs. With little money 

to perform the needed repairs, the roads suffercd. Since 

Odober-December 2002 
government offices were needed that did not exist before the 

war, money was used to develop these oftices rather than for 

other purposes that would have helped with the civilian freedom 

of movement. An open government hostility to the United 

Nations and peacekeeping missions also resulted in a more 

difficult situation for the road directorate in dealing with the 

external forces within its boundaries. As the government 

matured. this hostility became less of a problem and international money previously withheld became available to the 

Republic of Srpska. Again, the fonner communist system did 

not provide for open competition and hiring ofthe best available 

contractor for roadwork. 

Snow and Ice Clearance Operations 

I

n 1997, military snow removal assets were reduced in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, requiring an alternative method for 

rcmoving snow and ice from the national road system. 

SIOR headquarters also decided to increase the number of 

roads cleared during the winter months. The result was that 

SFOR contracted with 13 different snow and ice clearance 

contractors for plowing the roads. The military regional 

engineer offices (part of SFOR) were insufficient to ensure 

that contractors were performing properly. Both BosniaHerzegovina go\'emments were unwilling to help enforce the 

contracts since thc contractors reported directly to SFOR. 

Clearing of ice and snow that winter became an unenforceable 

nightmare. 

Memorandum of Understanding 

n 1998, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was set 

up through each of the two government road directorates 

so that they would receive payment from SFOR to contract 

directly with the snow and ice clearance contractors. This 

allowed SFOR to use the government entities to enforce proper 

performance of the contractors. It also provided a means for 

money to flou, througli the government agencies. gi\:ing them 

CJ-edibilityas well as a certain amount of cash flow. Ofcourse, 

because of the situation, the MOU included penalties for not 

performing to a given set of standards and also for not paying 

the contractors, a problem that was prevalent during the 

beginning of the season. Because of the success of these 

contracts in both 1998 and 1999, a decision was made within 

SFOR to use this method ofreturning more of the responsibility 

for road tnaintetlance and repair hack to the BosniaHelzego\:ina governments. 

The Road Initiative 

n the summer of 1999, SFOR militaly assets funded the 

maintenance of 2.300 kilometers of roadway, while an 

additional 3,300 kilometers were the responsibility of the 

di. \ Iblons : within SFOR. In January 2000_ MOUs were developed 

for execution with both road directorates for future road 

maintenance and repair projects. Because of the experimental 

nature of this initiative, certain roads were kept under the old 

system ofcomplete SFOR responsibility, specifically hrro major 

east-west roads and nvo major north-south roads. The majority 

of other road maintenance was to be accomplished through 

joint ventures benveen SFOR aud the road directorates. 

A list ofpossiblc joint venture projects was developed twice 

a year, or when warranted by changes in the road conditions. 

by both SFOR and the road directorates. Both must approve 

each project for joint venture. Naturally, if each of these 

organizations thought that a project was itnporlant enough to 

fund completely through its own resources, this \\,as acceptable. However, for the first series ofpmjects, SFOR would 

fund 50 percent of each with the remainder funded by the 

respective government. 

SFOR stipulated in the MOU that only preapproved 

contractors would be allowed to bid on the road\vork. Also, 

contractors would be allowed to bid on any road repair pro.jects, 

even those that previously had been the responsibility of 

another contractor in the old Yugoslavian system. Because 

NATO is the primary funding agency for SFOR. NATO 

contracting procedures apply to the invitation for bid and the 

contract execution process. This brought more of a westem 

approach to the construction contracting process through the 

governments. 

SFOR freedom of movelnent engineer teatns that had replaced 

the previous refional engineers were responsible for random 

quality assurance inspections. The road directorates were 

responsible for selecting the contractors and maintaining the 

contracts with them. The directorates were also responsible 

for providing joint supewision of the construction work, 

ensoring proper completion and a quality of work that was 

comparable to SFOR and N.4TO specifications. Payment from 

SFOR was scheduled at the end of the project, follo\x,ing a 

"joint declaration of acceptance of the works." For long, 

expensive prqiects. partial payments could also be agreed to 

on a case-by-case basis. 

Both governments agreed to the wording of the MOUs in 

May 2000. The initial percentage of SFOR participation in the 

funding process was set at 50 percent. As civilian traffic 

increased and SFOR traffic decreased, the percentage of the 

total amount paid to the governments for the projects would 

decrease. This decrease was planned to correlate to the amount 

of SFOR traffic 011 the roadways, according to a survey jointly 

conducted by SFOR and the governments. As time passed, 

SFOR ~vould become more of an investor in the roadway system 

of Bosnia-Herzegovina than an irnplementer of the constn~ction 

work. There are also provisions in the MOU for modifications 

as the road situation changes. All roads are reviewed annually 

on 15 March. which provides a means ofadding or subtracting 

more roads to the MOU, depending on the current situation. 

Importance of an Engineer Presence 

An important factor in this process was the presence of 

a civilian cnginccr assigned to SFOR who kept the 

process on track through the rotations of chief 

(co~?riniiedon page 57) 
~et'scet our volca~osustems
 v 

IH~Othe ~~ght 


By Colonei Thonlas K Littiefield Jr (Retired) 

As a sihvr-dollar-sized drop of.serni/ivzen rainforrnd 

its way down the back of his neck. Captain Buck 

Rogers noted that tlie >veather was jirst ahotrt as 

miserohle a it corrld porsibly be. It had been a long, cold 

nightfor his Rt!fj"Riders, a compan,v of 135 ofAmerica i.fiilest 

).orrng u.arrio~s. The,v were in a defensi>,epositio~l il Orangeiarid aspa,? of the net< elite Earlv-Enr~ Deploynierit Force 

IEEDF). A brigade-sized unit thati. part of //re newiyformed 

Joint Reaction Force, the EEDF was the most n~odern, highspeed ~mit in the L'S. military The RuTf Riders had been 

training.for the post sir months and had three more months 

schedrried when this cricis erupted. It didn ) nlarter- what the 

training stotrts %ws; Captain Rogers kneu' thar )nu go when 

you 're called. Until three days ago, he arid most ofiiis soldiers 

had never heard of'01-angeland He ;cat icished he had more 

time to work our tlie detai1.s ofen~plqving the ne~vjoint standof 

n.eapon .systems. 

Another challeizge riot seen in tlie train-up n~as the,failrrre 

of tile sittrationai-awareness system. Tlie NCOIC said that 

somethirig was wrong with the saieliite, .so the conlparzy set 

up local repeaters, k:o ofthefive site.s had bee11 overrun tlie 

jirst night. Thirty of Roger-s' 135 warriors had heen detached 

to prolect one of the remaining sites. 

Capruin Roger,.~ was finally able to slip aic.aj'for some 


sleep. ID'irh all lhrrt iva.~ going on, he hadri i .slept in more than 


72 hoirrs. Alniost, it seemed before he closed his eves, he 1vas 


rou~lili~
 shaken au.ake. It was thefir.stser~gearir. u.110 reported 

sonze acrii:itj, on tile southern side oftheir posirioii. Rogers 

gave ordersfor Situation Charlie-RuffRider talk,for 100 

percent secirripa~id to lock and load all systents. Local 

sensors ideritified a number ofdismori~its and 15 vehicles 

approrrching. TI?@>, were represented by red icoris, so they 

had to he the elien1.y. 

Captrzin Rogers directed that the nei~: standoff antilank 

weapojls engage the vehicles arid the neb,, ,srnr~doflanfipersonriel systen1.s eiigage the dismounts. The sj~steni operators 

pirslied their- "erecute" buttor~s andwceii~eda "Code 6" error 

TI10 meiint that a comrnarlder higher in the chair1 ofcornninnd 

/lad ol.erridde~i his s.~.;rerns with a nor~engogement order: He 

called his iie.rt higher commarider-the brigade co~miionderwho said that he had no enoily shoivirig on his dirl,Iriy: tlizrs, 

he had~i 'r released engagement autliority. A,fter a heated 

di,scr~s.sion. tile brigade commander said he ~~'ould contact 

the corps for grridance. The corps comma~tder was adaniant 

tlrat he cotrldn f release errgagemeizt author.itj: His information 

/low and dispia). showed no enemy ariyrvhere nmr- the Ruff 

Riders. 

54 Engineer 

As the brigade commander attempted to get erigagemenr 

atrthoriy from the corps. Captain Rogers rushed to assess the 

developing sifiration on the southern part of his posirion. By 

the sotinds of it-a crescendo ofsmall am with n~achine 

guns, mortars, and NII occasional main gun-Rogersfigrired 

he was getting hit hy a con~pari}>-sized unit slipported by rrp to 

15 ranks. Tanks iiadn 7 S~OM~II up on his orde~oflbattle displaj,.

He gtressed that they didn ? show trp on the brigade or corps 

commander jdisplaj' either Thestandoflfigl~t never occurred; 

close combut was the order ofthe day 

This scenario may sound outlandish, but we have the same 

problem today. Higher commanders are the emplacement 

authority for the scanerable mine systems in our inventory. 

According to FM 20-32, Mine/Corrntermine Operations, 

obstacle emplacement authority is the jurisdiction that a unit 

commander has to emplace tactical obstacles. In a theater of 

operations, theater commanders have the authority to emplace 

obstacles. In most cases, they delegate this authority to corps 

commanders, u:ho further delegate it to division commanders. 

Division commanders then have obstacle emplacement 

authority in their area ofoperations, unless authority is withheld 

or restricted by a higher commander. Commanders subordinate 

to the corps and division do not have the authority to emplace 

obstacles unless the higher commander delegates authority 

for a cui-rent operation. 

During my time as acombat engineer commander and staff 

member, I had difficulty in getting authority for using our 

organic Volcano systems. Often we could get authority for 

4-hour-duration mines. The problem came when we requested 

48-hour- or I 5-day-duration mines. I occasionally received 

48-hour permission, but I never received 15-day permission. At 

the same time. I had pennission to emplace conventional handemplaced mines that didn't havea self-destruct capability. They 

are armed and deadly until removed or destroyed. 

Why will permission to use a temporary mine be denied 

while permission to use a permanent mine be routinely allowed? 

The usual reasons that I received for denial were concerns 

about fratricide and constraints on fi~ture~naneuverability Both 

of these concerns can be mitigated. Before any land Volcano 

system can be used to emplace a minefield, fratricide fences 

must he erected, just like those used for conventional handemplacedminefields. Theconcem about future maneuverability 

can be mitigated with the use of lanes, which can be left in the 

Volcano minefield. They can be closed with Modular Pack Mine 

Systems (MOPMSs). They can also be opened with the selfdestruct feature of the MOPMS. 

October-December 2002 
As we move to the future, we have to get 

used to replacing conventional hand-emplaced 

mines w~thscatterable mines. We need to do 

this for three primary reasons: much reduced 

logistical requirements, much faster emplacement times. and much smaller manpower 

requirements. In the logistical arena, a Volcano 

antitank mine weighs about 4 pounds versus 

about 30 pounds for a conventional M15 

antitankmine. This is more than an 85 percent 

reduction in weight for countermohility 

logistical requirements. Two soldiers with one 

vehicle can emplace a 1,000-meterminefieldin 

about 10 minutes versus the 10 hours it takes 

an engineer platoon to emplace a surface-laid 

conventional minefield of the same lencth. - This is extremely significant when you A Volcano system mounted on an M548A1 tracked cargo carrier 

consider the significant reduction of sappers 

in combat engineer companies. 

As a company commander, my company had nine 10-man I recommend the following to commanders: 

sapper squads. As a brigade commander, my companies had 

six 8-man squads. The last version of future divisional engineer 

companies that I saw had four 8-man squads. We have a 

reduction from 90 sappers to 32 in combat engineer companies. 

This greatly reduces the ability to hand-emplace mines in a 

time-constrained situation. We have to depend on scatterable 

mines emplaced by the Volcano system. 

We need to routinely use the Volcano as we would 

conventional mines. We need to let people know it's all right to 

use them in the 15-day mode if the situation dictates. I found 

that the brigade commanders I supported didn't routinely plan 

15-day Volcano minefields, because they couldn't count on 

getting the required authority. Instead their fallhackldefault 

was to depend on conventional mines. 

We have an Army based on decentralized mission command, 

but we routinely restrict the use of the Volcano. The same 

commanders who impose these restrictions don't think twice 

about delegating conventional mine-emplacement authority to 

the banalion level. What's wrong with this picture? They are 

vely concerned about scatterable mines that will never last 

longer than 15 days but will use conventional mines that last 

for yean without a second thought. 

My message to commanders is this: Don't tie the hands of 

subordinate commanders. Don't routinely withhold authority 

for using the Volcano. Only withhold the authority as you would 

for conventional mines. Don't restrict commanders from 

bringing all their combat lnultiplier systems into the fight. Let 

your commanders know what theirvolcano assets are and allow 

them to use these assets. Use specific and not blanket restrictions.A commander would never assign a defend-in-sector 

mission to a subordinate commander and withhold the use of 

organic weapons. They need to do the same for the Volcano. If 

not, this valuable tool will never be used to its potential to 

make up for the lack of sapper manpower and reduce the 

logistical requirement for tactical obstacles. 

Use specific obstacle restrictions for specific reasons rather 

than simply using blanket restrictions because "that's the 

way we've always done it" or "that's the way we did it at 

NTC." 

Allow people on the ground to determine the best way to 

fight their ground, especially if they are assigned a defendin-sector mission. 

Use the Volcano to make up for reduced sapper manpower, 

provide faster obstacle emplacement, and reduce the 

obstacle logistics. 

Develop unit rapid mine teams and drills using the Volcano. 

Mitigate fratricide concerns with fratricide fences. 

Mitigate future maneuverability concerns with lanes and 

closure with the MOPMS. 

Appropriate use of the Volcano system won't get better 

until maneuver commanders demand it. Plan it, and do it. Don't 

stand for being limited any more than you would with your 

main weapon systems. Y 

Colonel Litrlefield (11ow retired) was assigned to rhe U.S. 

Army War College Department qfMilitan~Srratea; Planning, 

and Operations when he wrote thi.? article. He previouslj~ 

commanded the 2d InJanty Division> Engineer Brigade. A 

graduate of the United Stares Military Academy, COL 

Littlefieid holds a master:^ in operations research/systems 

analysisfrom the .~avalPostgmduateScliool He was ajoint 

special!?;ofier and i.7 a registeredprofes.sio,In[ engineer in 

Krginia. He is nor: a contractorfor Sona(~~sts, Inc.. woi.king 

in joint e.rperinientation. 

Note: A variation of this article was published in the Spring 

2002 issue ofI~!fantr?;. 

October-December 2002 Engineer 55 
Joint Readiness Training Center 

MobiIitylCountermobilitylSu~ivability 

Battlefield Operating System Needs Emphasis 

(4th Quarter 2002) 

By Captain James C. Moses 

Subject: Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs) 

Observation: Detailed TLPs are inconsistent at the 

Discussion: Afler receiving the task force order and 

subsequentfragmentary order (FWGO), the platoon does 

little analysis before issuing its own FRAGO, Similar 

actions are taken at the squad level, resulting in illprepared soldiers to execute the mission. Detailed backward planningwould helpestablish a timelineforthe platoon 

leadership to follow. The absence of any engineer battlefield 

assessment (EBA) leads to hasty plans with noticeable 

gaps. Most FWGOs lacksufficient detail in the situation 

paragraph and also fail to address branches and sequels 

adequately. Too often, platoons conduct no rehearsals. 

Precombat checks (PCCs), precombat inspections (PCls), 

and squad rehearsals are essential for mission success. 

This will require extensive involvement by the platoon 

sergeant and platoon leader. The last step of TLPssupervise-also requires attention. Officers and NCOs 

56 Engineer 

mission success. The absence of detailed TLPs causes 

soldiers to be unsure of their specific requirements during 

movements, reconnaissance missions, and clearance 

operations. 

Reference: ARTEP 5-1 45-1 1 -MT? 05-3-1 01 8, Mission 

Training Plan for the Combat Engineer Platoon, Heavy 

DivisionlCorpsiArmored Cavalry Regiment. 

Techniques and Procedures: Continue to refine the 

TLP process within the platoon so that leaders are 

adequately involved in both planning and execution to 

achieve not only mission success but also the highest 

possible standard. Mission analysis begins immediately 

afler developing facts and assumptions from the received 

mission statement. Efforts should be made to assign 

mission warning orders to platoons, a minimum of 24 to 

48 hours out, to allow for effectiveTLPs. If this time frame 

is not available, it should begin immediately upon receipt 

of the mission. Ensure that squads are doing complete 

orders and that brief backs are conducted at all levels, to 

includesquad leaders to platoon leader and platoon leader 

to commander 

TREND 2 

Combined.ArmsRehearsals 

Observation: Platoons rarely conduct rehearsals to 

validate battle drills, standard operating procedures 

(SOPS), or plans. 

Discussion: We often do not see productive combinedarms rehearsals during mission preparation at any level. 

Rehearsals for breaching and obstacle reduction are critical 

for mission success. There are many situations that require 

rehearsals and sufficient time to conduct them. Rehearsals 

are also a means of refining PCC and PC1 checklists. Oflentimes, mission execution is slow or incomplete for reasons 

that could have been identified and corrected by proper 

rehearsals. Rehearsals should cover planned operations 

as well as contingencies. Battle drills and recurring tasks, 

such as casualty evacuation, should be rehearsed 

Techniques and Procedures: Adequate time needs 

to be programmed into the timeline to allow for combinedarms rehearsals. Analyze the situation to prioritize the 

appropriate rehearsal type and technique. The more 

detailed the rehearsal, the greater the understanding the 

soldiers will have. Leaders at all levels need to ensure that 

once time is allocated, full-dress combined-arms rehearsals 

will take place and cover actions on the objective and 

contact contingencies. For information on the different 

types of-and techniques for-rehearsals and obstacle 

reduction, refer to FM 3-34.2, CornbinedAnns Breaching 

Ocioher-December 2002 
TREND 3 

Subject: Battle Tracking 

Observation: Platoons do not initially track enemy 

and friendly minefield status in their area of operation and area of interest. 

Discussion: Platoons do not initially track enemy or 

friendly minefields or route status in their area of interest. 

This lack of tracking occurs throughout the platoon from 

the platoon leader to squad leaders and results in little to 

no situational awareness within the platoon. Because of 

these tracking problems, task force and supported units 

traveling on the routes do not know the status or condition 

ofthe route or ifthere are minefields along the route. This 

contributes to the continued problem of mine strikes within 

the brigade. The task force and units also need to track 

all mobility/survivabilitylcountermobilityissues within the 

supported unit's tactical operations center (TOC). Some 

of these issues are combat power status (personnel and 

equipment), attached engineer assets, Modular Pack 

Mine System (MOPMS) remote-control units, MOPMS 

batteries, and minefield clearance and route status. 

Platoons do not have the proper tracking tools and need 

a system of tracking charts that are easy to update. 

Platoons need to establish a system and then provide 

the means of ensuring that the entire platoon can keep it 

updated and disseminated. Platoons need to become 

familiar with the TOC SOF! The platoon leader needs to 

be proactive and play an integral part in developing the 

engineer portion of the TOC SOF! 

Techniques and Procedures: The platoon should 

develop a standardized tracking mechanism to monitor 

the status of combat power, current enemy situation, 

obstacle locations, route status, and important supply 

issues. The actual use and understanding of the standardized tracking mechanismslreports and the use of 

standard map boards for all vehicles would greatly 

facilitate information flow within the platoon and between 

the platoon and its higher headquarters. The platoon 

should deveiopan SOP for daily information updates that 

follows a set agenda covering these important command 

and control issues. 

Captain Moses is a platoon engineer observer1 

controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center; Fort 

Polk, Louisiana. He commandedthe HHC120th Engineer 

Brigade and served as a platoon leader in the 618th 

Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and the 307th 

Engineer Battalion (Airborne), all at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. 

engineers and chiefs of engineer operations. Without this 

individual, the process would have takcn IIILIC~ longer to 

implement and rvould have required constant revisions and 

different viewpoints among the participating soldiers. This 

constant presence is essential to the process and should be 

included with all peacekeeping forces. SFOR was fortu~late to 

have a very experienced, hard-working local engineer on staff 

throughoot the process. 

Lessons Learned 

Anuliiber of lessons were learned during thc maturation 

process of the SFOR engineer operations. Whcn a 

peacekeeping force initially moves into a war-torn 

country, the military engineer units are important to maintain 

freedom ofmovenient. This is acco~nplishedthrough the p~i~naly 

use of milita~y engineer units. As the cou~itry moves toward 

self-sufficiency, an exit strategy must be developed to return 

road maintenance and repair back to the government agencies 

that are nonnally responsible for their upkeep. 

Joint-venture projects can be developed with the government agencies to allow them more funds, yet keep the 

peacekeeping fol-ces and NATO involved in the product-in 

this case, road repairs and maintenance. These joint-venture 

projects also allow local governments to develop standards 

that are more fair and equitable with their contractors. In time, 

the peacekeeping force can contribute less and less of the total 

amount of the cost as its presence decreases inthe host country 

Evcntoally, the cost of road maintenance and repair will be 

borne completely by the host nation, with minor contributions 

by tlie peacekeeping forces for the portion ofthe traffic on the 

national roadways. The final document should have provisions 

for change. As time passes, the road situation, as well as the 

peacekeeping force, will change. The MOU should allow tor 

this. 

Finally, it is important lo have a person in the engineer 

operation who will ensure that the direction of engineer 

movement within the country remains consistent. This person 

can provide a biggcr piclure of the peacekeeping engineers 

and reinforce the need to return the country to its normal 

procedure for road repair and maintenance. Y 

Colonel Ulckoiw.vki, United Stoies Arm,; Reserve, was the 

SFOR engineer chi<f'uf'opei.ntiortr in Sarflievo. Bo.s~iii!. fiom 

A c~gn.~t I YYY to Map 2000. He is a graduate of tlie United 

Stares Militar,~Acade~gl: and a registered i,rufessio17al 

engineer: His etyerfise is in co~isrrucfion iurmagen~mit and 

engineering of corlstrucrio~iprqiects. He M,as a vice pre.~idenf 

of a coiist~~uctioti manqenze~~t J~~IIIin Houstort, Texn.~, until 

he was activaied,fb~- Oprrntio~l E~~dnririg Freerlom. He is 

cirri-entl,; the Conlitiuf~ Forces Lafid Coniponent Comniand 

forward engifzeer at Cnnip Dolla. Kun:oit. 

Engineer 5 7 
I I 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless othewise noted. 

Directorate of Training (DOT) 

CounterminelCounter-BoobyTrap Center (CMCBTC). The 11 September attack raised the prospect of deploying 

ground troops to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. This focused attention on the capability of U.S. ground forces to 

operate in mined environments and created an urgent need to assess the countermine landscape. The TRADOC 

commander commissioned a combined-arms Countermine Task Force (CMTF) to evaluate doctrine, training, leader 

development, organization, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) solutions to address near-term countermine requirements 

for current forces and to develop a countermine operational concept to support the Objective Force. The CMTF met 

from October through December 2001 and developed materiel and science and technology recommendations. The 

TRADOC commander approved the recommendations. 

The CMTF oresented its findinas and recommendations ~~~ to the Armv Review Oversioht Council ~ ~ 

., lAROCI ~~,~on ~~~~ \ 

19 ~ecember2001. he AROC app;ved recommendations to acquire available countermine equipment and accelerate 

other systems. The AROC also approved funding to establish a CMCBTC to focus the Army's countermine efforts and 

to evaluate commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items of equipment. The U.S. Army Engineer School 

updated the AROC on 22 August 2002 on the status of systems recommended at the December AROC and made 

further recommendations based on lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom. The AROC approved establishing 

a mine-detection-dog unit, procuring area and route clearance sets, updating countermine doctrine, developing 

countermine functional courses, conducting countermine experiments and studies, and continuing the CMCBTC. 

POC is Mr Dorian D'Aria, (573) 596-0131, ext 35361; DSN-5361; ore-mail dariad@wood.armymil 

Quality Assurance Element (QAE). The Army School System (TASS) has reorganized as the QAE under the 

assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES). The mission initially will remain the same in 

regard to TASS Battalions but will now include evaluation of training and assistance to the USAES. This reorganization 

is the result of the activation of the TRADOC Quality Assurance Program and the MANSCEN Quality Assurance 

Ofice. 

POC is MAJ James Avants. 341 14; DSN 4 114; or e-mail avantsj@wood.armymil. 

Title XI Reorganization. Effective 1October 2002, all engineer TASS Battalion Title XI soldiers will be aligned with 

the U.S. Army Engineer School Quality Assurance Element. 

POC is MAJ James Avants, 341 14; DSN 41 14; or e-mail avantsj@wood,armymil. 

WANTED! Applicants for Terrain Analysis Technician Warrant Officer. MOS 81T NCOs with 5 to 12 years of 

service may apply. The duty description is in Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21, Military Occupational 

Classification and Structure. Soldiers who wish to become warrant officers may obtain information on the home page 

of the Warrant Officer Career Center at htfp:llleav-~armymillwocclorthe U.S. Army Recruiting Command at http: 

II~usarec.armymil/hq/warrantl. 

POC is SGM Michael Cline, 34087; DSN 4087; or e-mail ciinemi@wood.armymil. 

Proponent Guidance "Promotion Book."The Engineer Personnel Proponency Office (EPPO) prepares proponent 

guidance for panel members to use to select soldiers for promotion to senior grades (E-7 through E-9). The guidance 

is posted on the EPPO Web site for NCOs to check where they stand. New guidance is posted on the day the annual 

board meets. Guidance for the upcoming command sergeant majorlsergeant major board is currently being worked. 

POC is SGM Michael Cline, 34087; DSN 4087; or e-mail clinemi@wood.armymil. 

Captain (CPT) Officer Education System (OES). The original proposed CPT OES concept remains unchanged 

pending any guidance that may emerge from the briefings to the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. 

The Combined Arms Staff Course (CASC) consists of five weeks of training (three weeks advanced distributed 

learning [ADL] and two weeks of resident instruction). All officers, regardless of branch, must complete the CASC 

common core module consisting of two weeks of ADL. Officers selected for primary staff positions (such as S1, 52, 

assistant S3lS3 air, S4, S5, or battalion maintenance officer) will, upon completion of the CASC Common Core, 

58 Engineer Ocfober-DecemberZOO2 
complete a third week of ADL before assuming the staff position. Officers being assigned to a special staff position 

(such as fire support officer, assistant brigade engineer, or petroleum officer) will, upon completion of the CASC 

Common Core ADL module, complete a third week of ADL tailored to that staff position, followed by two weeks of 

resident technical training at their respective branch schoollcenter 

The Combined Arms Battle Command Course (CABCC) consists of ten weeks of training (four weeks of ADL and 

six weeks of resident instruction). Officers selected for company command must compete CABCC before assuming 

command. Each phase of CABCC must be completed sequentially before starting the next phase of training. CABCC 

consists of four weeks of ADL instruction with two distinct focuses. The first two weeks of ADL, referred to as CABCC 

Common Core, will be developed by the Combined Arms Command according to TRADOC and will contain all nonbranch-specific topics. The second two weeks of ADL, referred to as the Preresident Company Commander's Course, 

will be developed by individual branch schoolslcenters and will focus on specific branch skills and knowledge. Upon 

completion of all ADL, officers will attend the resident training referred to as the Company Commander's Course, 

which focuses on company command. Uponcompletionof the Company Commander's Course, all officerswill complete 

a Train-the-Trainer Course, consisting of two weeks of resident training at one of the Combat Training Centers. 

POC is MAJ Dale Scherer, Transformation Cell team chief (573) 596-0131, ext. 35747; e-mail schererda 

wood.arrnymii; or LTC Jeff Bedey, Director, Department of Instruction (573) 596-0131, ext. 35647; or e-mail 

bedeymwood.armymi1. 

Center for Engineer Lessons Learned (CELL). The Web site repository of lessons learned is continually being 

updated. We have now added a listing and short synopsis of Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned. You can 

obtain this material by viewing the CELL Web site, selecting the items you want, and sending an e-mail request or 

calling the CELL POC. Most of the current operations material is FOUO and cannot be placed on a public Web site 

but can be sent to a .mile-mail address. 

We thank the units and individualsthat have sent digital copies of lessons learned and after-action review (AAR) 

products. We request that all units forward engineer lessons learned and AARs from exercises and operations to the 

CELL POC. This material is usedto reviseldevelop doctrine and training and is provided to units preparing to conduct 

similar missions. Others can benefit from your experiences. 

POC is MAJ Jan Kirkton, 38112; DSN -8112; or e-mail kirktonj@wood.armymii. The CELL Web site address is 

http:Ilwww wood.army miliCELL1index.htm. 

Directorate of Training Development (DOTD) 

Field Manual Update. The following field manuals have recently been sent to the Army Training Support Center for 

print and distribution. Look for them in the near future on the Reimer Digital Library at h~p:lll55.217.58.58latdis.htm. 

The revisions in all three manuals incorporatethe"expertnoperator proceduresfor conducting mine detectionoperations 

with the ANIPSS-I2 mine detector. 

Change 3 to FM 3-34.2, Combined-Arms Breaching Operations 

Change 3 to FM 20-32, MineiCountermine Operations 

Change 2 to FM 5-34, EngineerFieidData 

POC is Tina Waters, (573) 596-0131, ext. 35288; DSN -5288; or e-mail waterst@wood,armymii 

e History C 

argely from 

C^. ,,A ,.^"+. 

)fficeat the 

I World Wa .-.-+ n. I -.. 

Visual Arc Engineer School is developing a visual archive. It currently has more than 

18,000 photo! r II and Korea. Units that would like to contribute photographs (copies) or 

other visual n,, Lu,,,,LL ,. ,,y D. Roberts, Historian, U.S. Army Engineer School. Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri 65473. Where possible, caption information should accompany the images. If you have questions, please 

call Dr. Roberts at (573) 563-6109. 
News and Notes 


Contract Awarded for Production of DTSS-L. The Engineer Research and Development Center's (ERDC's) 

Topographic Engineering Center, Alexandria, Virginia, recently awarded a production contract totaling more than 

$5 million to SECHAN Electronics Inc., Lititz, Pennsylvania., to build 16 Digital Topographic Support System-Light 

(DTSS-L) units in FY02, with an option for 15 additional units in FY03. 

The DTSS provides dig~tal maps and updates to battlefield commanders and weapons platforms in support of 

mission planning, rehearsal, and execution. The DTSS automates terrain analysis and visualization, database 

development and management, and graphics reproduction. The system uses the latest commercial off-the-shelf 

technology in printers, scanners, and computer workstations, combined with image processing and geographicinformation 

system software. 

The DTSS-L version is shelter-mounted on high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and is capable 

of providing digital, computer-generated terrain analysis data and products to combat commanders located at brigade 

through echelon-above-corps levels. They are transportable by air, sea, rail, and land and are capable of worldwide 

deployment. 

This is the second production contract for DTSS-Ls; SECHAN previously built 52 DTSS-Ls (FY99-01). ERDC's 

Combat Terrain Information Systems Project Management Office has a requirement to procure and field 83 DTSS-Ls. 

The new contract with SECHAN will complete this requirement in FY03. The DTSS-Ls procured in FY02, as a result of 

this latest contract award, will be fielded to various U.S. Army engineer terrain teams. 

POC is Mark Hainsey, Project Manager, (703) 428-6734. 

-,,< ,, acronym the first time you use it; don't assume that eve iryone 

The Engineer Writer's Guide 

Engineel is a profe ssional-de~relopment Ibulletin dez ;igned 

t~,orovide a forum fore xchanging informatiorI and ideas within .. ... . , . .. the ~rmv enolneer commun~w. vve lncluae arrlcles ~y ana about 

o~fficers, enli Lted soldie :rs, warrant officers, Dlepartrnent of the 

Pirmy civilia n employe ies, and ol :hers. Writ1 srs may di SCUSS 

.-:-:..- -.., .,:,.-- .-A squipment, histor y, personal Iviewpoint!j, or other areas of g, sneral 

interest to e ngineers. Iirticles ma! share go( ~d ideas ar td lessons learne d or explor e better wg lys of doin' g things. 

, ... . . ., . . . .. Articles snoula oe concise, stralgnnorwaro, ana in rt ie active voice. If they contain attributable informal tion or quot ations 

not referenced in the text, provide appropriate notes at tt 1e end LI Cnnll of the article, not at the bottom of each page. Y,,8m 

full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past 

assignments, experience, and education; your mailing addl.ess; and a fax number and commercial daytime telephone 

number. 

Include a statement with your article that your local secu- 

,i

..ty office has determined that the information contained in 

tt~e article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to 

tk le public. (The reason being that Engineeris available for 

siale through the Superintendent of Documents.) We do not 

r 6iquire a hard copy of the clearance. 

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted 

eicles. They are accepted for publication only after thorough 

review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we 

ill notifv vou. Therefore. it is imoortant to keep us informed , , knows what it means. Text length should not exceed 2,000 

words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after01i changes in your e-n Tail addres s or telephs one number. All 

alrticles acce :pted for PI~blicationzIre subject to grammatical action-type articles, reviews of books on engineer topic s. and - -....-L... ., -t. ----A -. ,, -- r-. ~ru strutilura! cr!a!lyas as wall as ~UIIIII~IVI Style. letters to the editor are also welc ome. Send submissions by e-mail to pbd@wood.army.mil or 

Include photos (with captions ) andlor lir 1e diagram s that , 

~deil- .,-?aced copy of the manuscript, to: Editor. Engineer Professnd a 3 112-inch diskin MicrosofKBWord, along with a double- Dlaoc.3 illustrate information in the articl~. . ,,,,, 

lustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them 

,,

In nn+ iinrl, .,,. .,.,,. r 

sionalBuletin, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard

as a separate file. Do not embed photos in PowerPoinK3. If 

illustrations are in Powerpoint, avoid excessive use of color Wood, Missouri 65473 ----

and shading. Save diaital " imaaes - at a resolution no lower Please indicate your man,,script is being considered tlhan 200 dp i. Images c:opied from a Web site ! must be a >rpublication elsewhere. Due to the limited space per issue, 

F)anied by (:opyright permission. ,e normally do not print articles that have been accepted for 

Provide a short pai-,.-,.. rsnrsnh th...-.-I ......-. .--- ...---...-... .ublication by other Army professional bulletins. 

of the article. Also include a short biography, includin! 

60 Engineer Octobev-December2002 

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City State L8p code*4 
'hot0 2, fop right: Loading operations in the coral pits onthe Los Negros Islands in the South Pacific. Heavy-duty bulldozers toosen thi 

orat sand and 2-cubic-))atxi shovels toad the loose s3nd Into the heavy-duty 2 112-ton G.I. trucks and 314-ton weapQn Garners. Photo 3 

loftomright: 815th Eng~neerBattaliin (Constructron), ATT, 15-19 May 1961. Spreading aggregate on asphalt road constmotion, f8r 

Iliss, Texas. Photo4 bottom left: Engineers putting instringers after posts and sidewalls have beenplaced. Stringer&wiU be#ver&witl 

~obyersof planking. Italy, 1944. 

Photos courtesvof the U.S. ArmV Enaineer School Historv Office.) 

PIN: 080257-000