Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Marce Gonzalez, Jr. Appellate Public Defender Crown Point, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### I N T H E 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Albert B

. Lucero, III , Appellant

- Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana , Appellee

- Plaintiff

. November 15, 2016 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 45A03

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- 639 Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G01

- 1506

- F4

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Najam , Judge .Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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### Statement of the Case
[1] Albert B. Lucero , III appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for child molesting , as a Level 4 felony , and performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor , as a Level 6 felony. He also appeals his habitual offender enhancement. He raises the following three issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in removing Lucero from the courtroom during his sen tencing.

2. Whether Lucero waived his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender charge by stipulating to his habitual offender status.

3. Whether his sentence was inappropriate in light of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm. 

### Facts and Procedural History
[3] Lucero is the father and only parental guardian of C.L., who was born in December 2001. Until April 2015, Lucero and C.L. lived with C.L.’s grandmother , C.L.’s brother , and C.L.’s brother’s girlfriend, Melinda Rogers , in East Chicago. After that time, Lucero and C.L. moved around and, at one point, slept in the lobby of a jewelry store after hours.

[4] When C.L. was between the ages of twelve and fourteen, Lucero repeatedly fondled her breasts and slapped her buttocks. Luce ro told C.L. t hat he was checking for lumps and to see if she need ed to wear a bra. One night, whileCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 3 of 18 C.L. was sharing a bed with Lucero in her grandmother’s house, C.L. awoke to feel something poking her in the back. C.L. realized that the back of her shirt was wet wi th what she described as a “whitish clear

- ish kind of liquid.” Tr. at 93. C.L. woke Lucero, who m she thought was p retending to be a sleep, and he told her, “ t hat’s what happens when a man is not with a woman for a long time.” Id . at 94.

[5] During th at sam e period of time, Lucero also tried to get C.L. to wear costumes featuring revealing clothing and lingerie. The first costume was a bunny outfit that was silky and slightly transparent . The second costume was a transparent nurse’s outfit that included a red la ce bra and panties . Lucero bought C.L. lace and silk undergarments and told her that “he knew how to dress [C.L.] sexy, but classy.” Id . at 117. Lucero also told C.L. that it was fine for him to see her body, stating , “It’s fine. I made it. I ca n see it.” Id

.
[6] One night when C.L. was thirteen and she and Lucero were staying in the local jewelry store after hours , C.L. was eating dinner in the lounge area of the store and Lucero was in a backr oom
. Lucero called C.L. into the backroom and showed her photographs on his cell phone of a woman i n lingerie on a bed. Lucero showed C.L. another photograph depicting what C.L. later described as a “girl’s private area with a lollipop in her .” Id . at 102

. C.L. noticed that Lucero ha d a bulge i n his pants

. Lucero instructed C.L. to stand in the corner and, w hile C.L.’s back was turned, Lucero began ma sturbating and moaning

. C.L. tried to cover her ears so she did not ha ve to listen to Lucero

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 4 of 18 [7] After a few minutes, Lucero asked C.L. to back up so he could “ touch [ her ] butt ” and make it “feel more realistic to him .” Id . at 106

. Lucero then asked C.L. to sit on his covered lap and “wiggle , ” and she did so. Id

. at 107

- 08

. Lucero then told C.L. to stand up and to turn around to face him

. C.L. w as reluctant to turn around, but Lucero said, “It’s not a snake. It’s not going to bite you .” Id

. at 105

. C.L. turned around and saw o n t he floor in front of Lucero the same substance that C.L. had seen in the bedroom before

. Lucero told C.L. to get a mop s o he could clean it up

. On another occasion while Lucero and C.L. were sleeping in the jewelry store after hours , Lucero told C.L. that he would give her the Wi

- Fi password if she would “jack [him] off .” Id . at 113

.
[8] Later that same year, C.L. and Lu cero went to the Indiana sand dunes

. Because it was raining, they stayed in the car

. Lucero began to look at the same photogra phs he had shown to C.L. previously in side the jewelry store

. Lucero leaned back his seat and told C.L. to “keep an eye out .” Id . at 110

. C.L. looked out of the car window, and she heard Lucero masturba ting and moaning

. Lucero asked C.L. to put her leg up on the car’s dash board so he could touch her, and he began to touch C.L.’s inner

- thigh while he masturbated

. Lucero finish ed a nd asked C.L. to pass him a grease cloth so that he could clean up

.
[9] At first, C.L. did not tell anyone what Lucero was doing to her because sh e was scared of him

. Lucero had told C.L. that if she talked to anyone like the Department of Child Services (“DCS”), they would send her to live with her mother

. Lucero had told C.L. that her mother was a prostitute and would se llCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 5 of 18 C.L. for drug money

. However, later that year, C.L. saw her brot her’s former girlfriend, Rogers, at a drug store

. Rogers immediatel y noticed tha t C.L. wore tight pants and high heels

. After s he spoke with Rogers for a while , C.L . told Rogers what Lucer o was doing with her

. Rogers immedi ately called DCS

.
[10] When DCS attempted to investigate, they initially could not l o cate Lucero or C.L

. Eventually, a DCS investiga tor called Lucero directly

. Lucero lied and stated that he was living in South Dak ota on a reservation. However, DCS tracked C.L. down to a nearby apartment in East Chicago and w ent to the apartment

. Lucer o called C.L. to warn her that DCS was coming and instructed her to change her appearance , disguise herself, escape out of the back door of the apartment , and meet him in an alley. C.L. followed Lucero’s instructions and met him i n a nearby alley where he had parked his car and hidden in the bushes

. Lucero then drove C.L. to Nebraska

.
[11] C.L. spent several weeks in Nebraska until she called her grandmother and asked her grandmother to come and get her. C.L.’s grandmot her drove C.L. back to Indiana and cal le d DCS

. After C.L. was interviewed by DCS, the State filed crim inal charges against Lucero

. Lucero twice violated a no

- contact order with C.L.: prior to his trial, Lucero sent C.L. a letter from prison, and, during his trial, Lucero mouthed the words “I love you” and “you can stop this” to C.L. over and over while she was on the witness stand preparing to testifying. Id. at 393.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 6 of 18 [12] Following a jury trial, Lucero was convicted of child molesting as a Level 4 felony, and performing sexual conduct in the prese nce of a minor, as a Level 6 felony. Lucero admitted that he had two prior unrelated felony convictio ns and “stipulate[d] to the habitual offender enhancement.” Id . at 328. According to Lucero’s pre - sentence investigatio n report , he had three adjudications as a juvenile delinquent , one misdemeanor conviction as an adult , and three felony convictions as an a dult

. Lucero’s felony convictions were for attempted burglary in Florida , and Class C felony burglar y and Class C felony criminal recklessn ess in Indiana

.
[13] On February 19, 2015, the trial court held Lucero’s sentencing hearing

. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court noted that Lucero was communicating with correctional officers and court staff that he may act in such a way as to f or ce someone to kill him

. As soon as Lucero was brought into the courtroom for the hearing , he began interrupting the proceedings despite being rep resented by counsel

. The trial court asked Lucero to be q uiet and told Lucero that he would have “the oppor tunity to say something in a few moments.” Id . at 361

. Lucero continued to interrupt the proceedings, and the trial court continued to order Lucero to stop interrupting. The trial court told Lucero:
THE COURT: It is not proper for you to interrupt me o r interrupt these proceedings. But I’ll

— as I’ve indicated before, I’ll give you the opportunity to speak, if we get to that point.

MR. LUCERO: If.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 7 of 18 THE COURT: But you don’t have an absolute right to be here. I can make the finding t hat you’ve become so disruptive that you should no longer be part of this hearing. It’s something that I rarely do because I try to be extremely patient

— particularly when it comes to a sentencing hearing on

. . . a person who’s been found guilty as a result of a jury trial. You should be here and you should have the opportunity to be heard, but that’s not absolute. If you continue to interrupt me, Mr. Lucero, I want you to be perfectly clear. I will excuse you and we will conduct the sentencing hearing in your absence withou t you being here. So I’m asking you at this point to be quiet. And I’m requesting you to not interrupt the proceedings anymore. Keep that in mind.

Id

. at 364

- 65

.
[14] Lucero continued to interject throughout the hearing, including raising objections despite his counsel telling him that he could n ot speak out

. Lucero also stated, “ [t] his is all a setup,” and, “ [t] his is all a lie .” Id

. at 379

. The trial court once again warned Lucero and stated, “ [y] ou need to stop interrupting

me. If you do it one more tim e, I will excuse you .” Id

. at 380

. Almost immediately, Lucero again i nterrupted his own counsel

. The trial c ourt once again told Lucero to stop speaking and the court would give him an oppor tunity to speak if they go t to tha t point in the hearing

.
[15] While he reviewed the presentence investigation, Lucero stated , “ [t] his is bullshit

. ” Id . at 381

. When the prosecutor began to read the victim impact statement from C.L., Lucero crumbled a piece of paper and interrupted by saying, “ [i] t’s a lie. It’s not her. I already know my daughter .” Id . at 382

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 8 of 18 [16] At that point, Lucero had interrupted the proceedings app roximately twenty times

. The trial court ordered that Lucero be removed from the courtroom because of the constant in terruptions

. In explaining its decision, the trial court stated , in part :
Lucero is now removed from the courtroom. And I think I’ve given him more than enough opportunity to be present and more than enough opportunity to be part of this proceeding

— a significant proceeding, as I see i t.

... I removed him as opposed to holding him in contempt. He’s upset. But being upset does not give rise to being excused for being disruptive.

Id . at 38 2

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. The trial court also noted that it was “highly concerned” about Lucero’s threat of suicide at the hands of the guards and that it did not want “to take the chance that he would blow up in our presence

. ” Id . at 383

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. Lucero’s counsel did not object to h is client bei ng removed from the courtroom

.
[17] Lucero’s counsel remained present throughout the sentencing hearing and took part in those proceedings. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found there were no mi tigating circumstances

. Regarding aggravating factors , the trial court noted that Lucero demonstrated poor character by being dishonest, manipulative, and violating the no c ontact order

. The trial court also noted that Lucero’s criminal history and Lucero’s violation of a posit ion of trust as a father were aggrav ating circumstances

. The tr ial court sentenced Lucero to
ten years on Count I, child molesting as a Level 4 felony, and two years for Count III, performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor as a Level 6 felony. The tr ial court enhanced Count I by fourteen years for Lucero’s statusCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 9 of 18 as a habitual offender and ordered Lucero to serve his sentences for Counts I and III consecutively

. Thus, Lu cero’s aggregate sentence was twenty

- six years in the Indiana De partment o f Correction

. This appeal ensued.



### Discussion and Decision Issue One: Right to Be Present at Sentencing
[18] Lucero contends that the trial court erred when it removed him from the c ourt room and held his sentencing hearing without him. We review a trial cou rt’s decision to remove a defendant from the courtroom and continue his trial in his absence for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State , 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied . “ An abuse of discret ion occurs when the trial court’ s deci sion is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presente d. We do not reweigh evidence. ” Id

. (citations omitted).

[19] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 , Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution grant a defendant i n a criminal proceeding the right to be present at all stages of his trial. Id

. However, that right may be waived if it is done so knowingly and voluntarily. “[S] ignificantly contemptuous conduct by a defendant can function as a knowing and voluntary

wa iv er of [his] right to be present” at any stage of his trial. Id

. As we stated in Campbell v. State , 732 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970)): [A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists onCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 10 of 18 conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.

[20] In the instant case, the trial judge w as extremely patient with Lucer o and provided him with multiple opportunities to cease his interruption s of the proceedings and remain in the courtroom . Moreo ver, the trial court gave Lucer o two clear warning s that he would be removed and the sentencing hearing would be held without him if he did not cease his interruptions . Tr. at 365, 380. Yet, Lucer o chose to continue to interrupt both the court and the lawyers and disrupt the proc eedings by shouting out sometimes profane
statements. Lucer o’s disruptive actions amounted to a waiver of his Sixth Amendment and Article 1 , Section 13 rights. Campbell , 732 N.E.2d at 205. The trial court was well within its discretion when it finally e xcluded Lucer o from the remainder of his sentencing hearing.



### Issue Two: Habitual Offender Status
[21] Lucero claims his admission to being a habitual offender 1 was a guilty plea, not a stipulation, and that it was not given knowingly or voluntarily. After the pronouncement of the jury’s verdicts, the trial court engaged in th e following exchange with Lucer o, outside of the jury’s presence , regarding the habitual offender charge :

1 A “habitual offender” has at least two prior unrelated felony convicti ons such that his sentence can be enhanced. Ind. Code § 35

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- 8 (201 4 ).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 11 of 18 THE COURT: You may be seated. All right. Mr. Vazanellis, you indicated that you discussed with your client the second phase and your client has indicated to you that he would like to stipulate to the habitual offender enhancement ; is that correct?

MR. VAZANELLIS: Yes , your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lucero, I want to address you on this, because you have some rights and they’re your rights and your rights alone. Okay. You have the right to have a jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement. And at that trial all of the same rights would pertain that pertained to the fi rst half of this trial. You have the right to confront the witnesses, to cross

examine them; to testify, if you chose to do so.
MR. LUCERO: I’m not worried about none of that. It doesn’t matter. THE COURT: You’re not worried about any

—
MR. LUCERO: No. THE COURT: Okay. So you’re willing to waive your right to a jury trial? MR. LUCERO: I’ll waive my death. I waive everything. It’s done. THE COURT: All right. All right. I’ll show, then, that the defendant has, in fact, waived his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement. Then let me ask you, Mr. Lucero, are you admitting to the f act that you do have

. . . two prior u nrelated felony convictions ?Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 12 of 18 MR. LUCERO: I got a million of them. THE COURT: Okay. So you are admitting that ?
MR. LUCERO: It’s done. THE COURT: I need a yes or a no from you.

MR. LUCERO: Yes , it’s fine. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I’ll show, then, that you have made that admission. .

. .
Tr. at 328

- 30 (emphasis added).

[22] The trial court then listed and discussed two of Lucero’s prior felony convictions as follows:
THE COURT: The count that they’re talking about here is the amended informatio n habitual count. It indicates that on February 21st of 1991, that you were

– that you committed the offense of burglary as a C felony. And on or about October 4th you were sentenced to a term of two years in the Department of Correction for that convict ion, which was suspended and served on probation, six months to be served on home detention.
Thereafter, after that sentence

– specifically[,] on or about November 1st of 1991, it is alleged that you committed the offense of criminal recklessness as a C fe lony. That was in 45G01

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- 244. It’s alleged that[,] on June 10th of 1993, that [sic] you were convicted by way of plea agreement to criminal recklessness as a Class C felony. And on June 10th ofCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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* * * Would you admit those convictions for me, Mr. Lucero? MR. LUCERO: When I was a juvenile or young, yeah. THE COURT: When you were young, yes.

* * * Okay. I’m gonna accept, then, the stipulation or the admission to the habitual offender and the waiver of a jury trial on that

– on that enhancement.

Id . at 332

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[23] A defendant , personally or through his attorney , may stipulate that he has two prior unrelated felony convictions but that stipulation does not, by its elf, equal an admission that he is a habitual offender for sentencing purposes. See Garrett v. State , 737 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ind. 2000). However, if the defendant, personally or through his attorney , goes beyond merely stipulating to the underlying convict ions and also expressly admits to the habitual offender enhancement, such an admission is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. See Vanzandt v.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 14 of 18 State , 730 N.E.2d 721, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 2 And a defendant may challenge a guilty plea only in a petition for post

- conviction relief, not on direct appeal. Tumulty v. State , 666 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind. 1996).

[24] Here , Lucero’ s admission was a guilty plea, not a stipulation. Lucero admitted that he had at leas t two prior unrelated felony convictions , which the court described to him, and that admission provided the factual basis for his guilty plea to the habitual offender charge. See, e.g. , Daugherty v. State , 547 N.E.2d 1116, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) ( citing Frazier v. State , 490 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ind. 1986) (holding a sufficient factual basis existed for defendant’s guilty plea to habitual offender charge, where defendant admitted facts in information charging him as habitual offender). However, Lucero went further and, through his attorney , expressly “stipulate[d] to the habitual offender enhancement ,” and personally agreed to waive his right to a jury trial , along with other fundamental rights, on the habitual offender charge. 3 Tr. at 329. In light of Lucero’s express admissions and waivers , the trial court ended the habitual offender phase of Lucero’s t rial . T he lawyers ceased all argument on

2 When a defendan t pleads guilty to being a habitual offender, the trial court must advise t he defendant of his right against self

- incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers before accepting a guilty plea. Dewitt v. State , 755 N.E.2d 167 , 171 (Ind. 2001) (citing Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). Lucero makes no claim that the trial court failed to advise him of th o se rights

. 3 Thus, Lucero clearly made a personal waiver of his right against self

- incrimination, right to a trial by jury, and right to confront accusers. Horton v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1159 (Ind. 2016) (holding the defendant must personally waive his right to a jury trial on a habitual

- offender charge.)Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 15 of 18 the issue, the issue was never put to the jury , and the trial court proceeded directly to sentencing.

[25] The same scenario led our supreme court to conclude in Tumulty that the defendant had ple a d ed guilty to a habitual offender enhancement. 4 666 N.E.2d at 3 95

- 96 . Similarly, in Vanzandt , we held that the defendant had entered a guilty plea where he admitted not just to the underlying convictions but also to the enhancement itself, which resulted in the trial court dismissing the jury. 730 N.E.2d at 726; cf

. Garrett , 737 N.E.2d at 392 ( holding that the defendant did not plead guilty to being an habitual offen der where (1) he only admitted to the existence of prior offenses, but did not admit the offenses were unrelated, (2) the lawyers subsequently presented arguments on the hab itual offender charge , and (3) the habitual offender charge was submitted to the ju ry).

[26] Because Lucero’ s admission to the habitual offender enhancement was a guilty plea, he cannot challenge his plea or the enhancement on direct appea l. Tumulty , 666 N.E.2d at 396

. Therefore, we affirm Lucero’ s convictio n
. See Stringer v. State , 899 N.E.2d 748, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).



### Issue Three: Inappropriateness of Sentence
[27] Lucero also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana

4 The State cites Hopkins v. State , 889 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind. 2008) , for authority that Lucero had stipulated to the habitual offender enhancement, but Hopkins is not controlling here because it was decided under the post

conviction relief standard of review

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 16 of 18 Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State , 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appella te Rule 7(B). Id . Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State , 866 N.E.2d 867 , 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non

- recognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State , 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 20 06). However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush , 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

[28] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State , 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven th e outliers.” Id . at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a gi ven case.” Id . at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State , 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 17 of 18 Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good ch aracter).” Stephenson v. State , 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[29] Lucero’s offenses were child molesting , as a Level 4 felony, and performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor , as a Level 6 felony. These are, by their very nature, serious and depra ved crimes

— but even more so in this case where the sexual abuse was directed toward Lucero’s own minor daughter who trusted and relied upon him as her sole parental guardian. Moreover, as the trial court correctly found, Lucero exhibited poor character by abusing his position of trust as the young victim’ s father and by behaving in a dishonest and manipulative manner with her, as shown , among other things, by his repeated violations of the no

- contact order. All of this, in addition to Lucero’s criminal hi story, see, e.g. , Garcia v. State , 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied

, reflect poorly on his character.

[30] Lucero appears to assert that his sentence should be revised because he did not commit more serious crimes. Appellant’s Br. at 25. However, our Rule 7(B) analysis does not focus on comparisons to the sentences for other types of crimes. 5 See, e.g. , Anglin v. State , 787 N.E.2d 1012, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),

5 Moreover, we note that the trial court did not ev en impose the maximum sentence on Lucero; had it done so, his sentence would have been thirty

- four years of incarceration. I.C. § 35

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- 5.5 (sentencing range forCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03

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- 639 | N o v e m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 Page 18 of 18 trans. denied . Rather, we focus less upon comparing the facts of a case to others, whether real or hypothe tical, and more upon the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced and what it reveals about his charac ter. Id .; see also Brown v. State , 760 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“ Although one can imagine facts that might be worse than those before us here, such does no t lessen the severity of [defendant’s] conduct or bolster the quality of his character by comparison .”), trans. denied

.
[31] Lucero’s sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of the offenses and his character.

[32] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur

.

Level 4 felony); I.C. § 35

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- 7 (sentencing range for Level 6 felony); I.C. § 35

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- 8 ( sentencing range for the habitual offender enhancement). Instead, the court sentenced Lucero to an aggregate term of twenty

- six years.