[Cite as State v. Jones , 2021-Ohio-1864.]

COURT OF APPEALS KNOX COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsLEO L. JONES Defendant-Appellant JUDGES: : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. : : : Case No. 20CA000020 : : : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 20CR09-0223

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 1, 2021

APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

CHARLES T. MCCONVILLE TODD W. BARSTOW Knox County Prosecutor 261 W. Johnstown Rd., Ste. 204 117 E. High Street, Ste 234 Columbus, OH 43230 Mount Vernon, OH 43050[Cite as State v. Jones , 2021-Ohio-1864.]

Gwin, P.J. {¶1} Appellant Leo L. Jones appeals the November 13, 2020 judgment e ntry of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the State o f Ohio. Facts & Procedural History {¶2} On September 9, 2020, the Knox County Grand Jury returned an in dictment charging appellant with failure to provide change of address, i n violation of R.C. 2950.05(F)(1), a felony of the third degree. Appellant is requ ired to register as a Tier III sex offender based upon previous sex offense convictions. Appe llant registered an address with the Knox County Sheriff on June 12, 2020, but appe llant was not present and living at that address from August 19, 2020 through Septemb er 3, 2020. {¶3} On October 15, 2020, appellant appeared with counsel and entere d a guilty plea to the charge. {¶4} Appellant signed a “plea of guilty” form. He stated his plea o f guilty was freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Appell ant also acknowledged that he was fully informed by his attorney and the court of all the constitutional rights he was waiving, “including my right to a jury trial * * *, my right to confront witnesses against me, my right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in my favor, and my right to require the State of Ohio to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which I cannot be compelled to testify against myself.” {¶5} Appellant also signed a “Plea Agreement Disclosure and Acknowle dgment.” He stated he understood that his “attorney could have obtained witnesses by subpoena to testify in [his] defense at trial.”«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 3

{¶6} At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed he was satisfied with his attorney, and confirmed his attorney reviewed the written plea agreement with him. The trial court went through the maximum penalty appellant faced, and appellant stated he understood. Appellant also stated he recalled signing the plea form. {¶7} The trial court continued, “your plea cannot be accepted unless you understand the constitutional rights that you’re giving up.” A ppellant responded “yes,” he understood that: he has the right to a jury or the right to ha ve the judge hear his case; he understood the prosecutor had to prove him guilty beyond a reas onable doubt of every element of the crime he was charged with; he understood his att orney could have crossexamined anyone who testified against him; and he understood he would not have to testify. The trial court stated, “And you understand that at t he trial your attorney could have obtained witnesses by subpoena to testify in your defense? ” Appellant responded, “yes.” {¶8} The trial court asked appellant if he had any questions, and ap pellant stated, “No.” Appellant confirmed he voluntarily waived and gave up al l of the constitutional rights discussed. Based upon appellant’s representations, the trial c ourt found appellant had “been informed of his constitutional rights, [and] ha[d] made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary wavier of those rights.” The trial court accepted ap pellant’s guilty plea and found him guilty of the charge. {¶9} The trial court issued a journal entry on October 16, 2020, sta ting it personally addressed appellant as to the matters contained in C riminal Rule 11(C)(2), and finding appellant’s plea was freely, voluntarily, and intel ligently made. The trial court referred the matter for a presentence investigation, and set a sentencing date.«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 4

{¶10} The trial court sentenced appellant to twenty-four (24) months in jail. The trial court issued a sentencing entry on November 13, 2020. {¶11} Appellant appeals the November 13, 2020 judgment entry of the K nox County Court of Common Pleas and assigns the following as error : {¶12} “I. APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA OF GUILTY, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION SIXTEEN, OF THE OH IO

CONSTITUTION.”

I. {¶13} In his assignment of error, appellant contends his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily m ade. Specifically, appellant a rgues the trial court failed to adequately advise him that he was “waiving the right to have co mpulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor,” when the trial c ourt stated, “you understand that at the trial your attorney could have obtained witnesses b y subpoena to testify in your

defense?” {¶14} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea mu st be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of t hose points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle , 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “An appellate court determining whether a guilty plea was entered k nowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, conducts a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court complied«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 5

with the constitutional and procedural safeguards.” State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). {¶15} Criminal Rule 11(C) requires a trial judge to determine whether a criminal defendant is fully informed of his or her rights and understand s the consequences of his or her guilty plea. State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826. Of particular relevance to this case is Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)( c), which provides, “[i]n felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and * * * informing the def endant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant i s waiving the rights * * * to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defen dant’s favor * * *.” The underlying purpose of Rule 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent decision as to w hether to plead guilty. State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). {¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that strict compliance with Rul e 11(C)(2)(c) is required when advising a defendant of the consti tutional rights he or she is waiving by pleading guilty or no contest. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, 897 N.E.2d 621; State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826. The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in State v. Miller , 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, and held, “trial courts mu st strictly comply with 11(C)(2)(c) and failure to do so cannot be deemed harmless.” I ncluded in the list of constitutional rights is “the right to compulsory process to ob tain witnesses.” Id. {¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly held that while the pr eferred method of informing a criminal defendant of his or her constitu tional rights during the plea«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 6

colloquy is to use the language contained in Criminal Rule 11(C ), a trial judge is not required to recite the provision of 11(C)(2)(c) verbatim. State v. Miller , 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio5200, 897 N.E.2d 621; State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826. To “strictly comply with the rule, the trial court must o rally advise the defendant, in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant, that the pl ea waives the rights

enumerated in the rule.” Id. {¶18} Appellant argues the trial court d id not strictly comply with R ule 11(C)(2)(c) because the trial court did not tell him he was waiving the rig ht to have the court compel enforcement of a subpoena. We disagree. The language used by the trial court in this case mirrors language that has been found to strictly comply wi th Rule 11(C)(2)(c). {¶19} The Supreme Court has held that a trial court complies with Cri minal Rule 11(C) and it is a reasonably intelligible explanation to the de fendant of his right to compulsory process when the right is described as the “right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf.” State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826. The terms “subpoena” or “compel” were not required. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also recently held that the statemen t, “your lawyer can issue subpoe nas to help you get them [witnesses] here to testify for you,” strictly complied with Ru le 11(C)(2)(c). State v. Miller, 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617. {¶20} Other courts have similarly held that language stating counsel may subpoena witnesses for the defendant was sufficient for strict compliance with Rule 11(C)(2)(c)’s compulsory process requirement. State v. Coleman , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26008, 2012-Ohio-1712 (statement that “by pleading guilty he wa s giving up the right to«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 7

have his counsel subpoena and cross-examine witnesses” was suff icient); State v. Pigge , 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3136, 2010-Ohio-6541 (statement that gui lty plea waives the right to subpoena witnesses sufficiently advises a defendant in a reasonably intelligible manner of his compulsory process right); State v. Ward, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 21044, 2006-Ohio-832 (statement that the defendant was “giving up his right to have his own witnesses come in here and testify for him” was sufficient for strict compliance); State

v. Parks , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86312, 2006-Ohio-1352 (use of word “su bpoena” adequately informs defendant of his right to compulsory process ). {¶21} In this case, we find the trial court strictly complied with th e compulsory process portion of Rule 11(C)(2)(c) because the trial court use d language understandable and reasonably intelligible to appellant, such that he could ma ke a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty knowing that the c onstitutional right to compulsory process would not be exercisable if he did plead gui lty. {¶22} Further, the “plea of guilty” form and “plea disclosure” docume nts, both signed by appellant, address the issue of compulsory process, a nd are additional evidence that the trial court adequately advised appellant of h is right to compulsory

process. State v. Barker , 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826 (when trial court addresses all the constitutional rights in an oral colloquy, a reviewing court should be permitted to consider additional record evidence such as a change of plea form); State v. Coleman , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26008, 2012-Ohio-1712; State v. Pigge , 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3136, 2010-Ohio-6541. The “plea disclosu re form” states appellant understood his “attorney could have obtained witnesse s by subpoena to testify in [his] defense at trial.” The plea of guilty form states app ellant was fully informed by his«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 8

attorney and the court of the constitutional rights he was waiv ing, including his “right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [his] favor. ” {¶23} Defendant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings and, at the change of plea hearing, he affirmatively responded when the trial court asked if his counsel had gone over the plea agreement to his satisfaction an d if he understood the rights he was waiving. Nothing in the record suggests that app ellant did not understand. At no point during the plea hearing did he indicate any sort of confusion over the meaning of any of the court’s statements or the rights he was waiving b y pleading guilty. Rather, every time the court asked him if he understood, appellant indi cated he did. At the conclusion of the plea hearing, the trial court asked appellant if he had any questions. Appellant responded, “no.” {¶24} We find the trial court used easily understood words conveying to appellant that he would be waiving certain constitutional rights if he pl ed guilty and that exchange resulted in appellant’s plea being voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. The trial court strictly complied with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(c). Appell ant’s assignment of error is

overruled.«County» County, Case No. «CASE_NO»0 9

{¶25} The November 13, 2020 judgment entry of the Knox County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. By Gwin, P.J., Wise, John, J., and Wise, Earle, J., concur[Cite as State v. Jones , 2021-Ohio-1864.]