COUNTERMINE 


Headquarters, Department of the Army 


PB h984 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

~ 

- - - - - . 

By Major General Clair F. Gill 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

Land mines cause about 26,000 casualties worldwide 

every year. Although most of these casualties are the 

result of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of 

mines, they have caused antipersonnel (AP) mines to be 

severely stigmatized by the international community. As a 

leader of the "responsible" international community, the 

United States has chosen to pursue the regulation of AP 

mines. In setting a standard that we hope others will follow, 

the President announced a significant change in U.S. policy 

for AP mines on 16 May 1996. The Army and the engineer 

community were involved with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 

developing the new policy and will continue to be key players in discussions regarding the expanded policy. This new 

policy affects the way combat engineers will "shape" battlefields in the future. Several articles in this magazine 

address the countermine challenge. I will discuss the 

impacts of this policy on the way engineers will train and 

fight at all levels of conflict. 

The "U-S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy" announced 

by the President in May 1996 states: 

.	~h~ U,S, aggressivelypursue an international 

agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production, and 

transfer of AP land mines. 

.	The U.S. views the security situation on the Korean 

Peninsula as a unique case and in the negotiation of 

this agreement will protect our right to use AP mines 

there until alternatives become available or the risk of 

aggression has been removed. 

.	Effective immediately, the U.S. will unilaterally undertake not to use, and to place in inactive stockpile status 

with the intent to demilitarize by the end of 1999, all 

nonself-destructing AP mines not needed to train personnel engaged in demining and countermine operations, and to defend the United States and its allies 

from armed aggression that crosses the Korean Demilitarized Zone. 

This far-reaching policy eliminates the use of MI4 blast 

AP mines and MI6 bounding fragmentation mines outside 

the Republic of Korea. It does not affect our use of selfdestructing mines or command-detonated weapons (MI8 

claymore). The loss of nonself-destructing mines requires 

that we rewrite doctrine on the emplacement of both tactical and protective minefields. Engineer School personnel 

are revising the doctrine in FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine 

Operations, to reflect these changes. The regional commanders in chief (CINC) have been directed to remove 

~ 

nonself-destructing AP land mines from all unit basic loads 

(except in Korea) and to modify existing war plans to 

account for the loss of nonself-destructing AP mines. Currently there is no replacement for these mines, although 

alternative technologies and "nonlethal" weapons are 

being explored (see article, page 11). 

We are reviewing and changing our training strategies 

accordingly. Because there will be no live MI6 AP mine 

training by units outside of Korea, the authorizations for 

live-mine training in DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training(STRAC manual) are being eliminated except 

for units in Korea. The Engineer School will continue to 

train initial entry soldiers on inert mines. 

As of the change in land.mine policy, we have been 

directed to examine ways engineers can help expand demining ~ is~defined as ~ the complete i removal ~ of

a//mines and unexploded ordnance from an area after a 

conflict. It is typically done without the benefit of any existing 

minefield record. Traditionally, special operations forces 

(SOF) have conducted most demining train-the-trainer missions. The policy stating that U.S. soldiers will not enter a 

live minefield will change. 

The U.S. goal in demining is to develop a long-term, selfsustaining, indigenous demining program based on training 

provided by U.S. forces to a foreign government. The U.S. 

training program includes mine awareness campaigns, setting up national demining headquarters, detection techniques, and demolitions used to destroy mines. U.S. Army 

engineers may participate in demining operations but probably not in a pure engineer unit. Army engineers generally will 

parlicipate as part of a combined team of SOF, engineers, 

and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), psychological operations, and civil affairs personnel in a train-the-trainer mode. 

The Engineer School has been asked to investigate the 

feasibility of establishing a humanitarian demining operation 

(HDO) training facility at Fort Leonard Wood. Our Countermine Trainina - Su~~ort Center is conductina this studv due .. 	 - to their ties to the special operations and EOD communities. If approved and funded, we anticipate that this center 

will become the nucleus of the HDO training facility. The 

engineer community must ensure that the military use of AP 

mines is effectively presented in future political and legislative initiatives. 

We will keep you informed about the new mine doctrine, training-policy issues, and demining studies. Engineers must work within this policy and remain a trained 

force ready to fight our nation's battles. 

i 
December 1996 Headquarters, Department of the Army 	 Volume 26 PB 5-96-4 -p------ - - - - --..--- - . 

I 

UNITED STATES ARMY ~ , .~.~. .. 

ENGINEER CENTER AND Countermine: It's More Than In-Stride and Deliberate 

FORT LEONARD WOOD Breaches 

By Colonel Robert Greenwalt and Major Brlgid Ockrassa 

Mine Detection Sensors COMMANDEWCOMMANDANT 

Major General Clair F: Gill 	 By Jim Sm~th 

Alternatives to Antipersonnel Mines -

By Captain Bryan Green 

MANAGING EDITOR Building a Minefield Database System Catherine Eubanks By Major Edward 9. Taylor 

FEATURES EDITOR 	 Photo-Essay From Operation Joint Endeavor - Part II 

Shirley Bridges 	 By Major Andrew Goetz 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER Leading the Way Together: New Doctrine for Joint 

Jennifer Morgan Engineer Operations 

By Lieutenant Colonel John P Paczkowski 

The Need for Joint Engineer Doctrine: Excerpts From a 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: White Paper 

DENNIS J. REIMER Edited by Lieutenant Colonel John t? Paczkowski 

Ice Bridging in Alaska 

General, United States Army By Captain Joseph E. Staton and Staff Sergeant Clinton K. 

Chief of Staff Brown I1 

MANSCEN Construction 

Official: 	 By Major Steven M. Heroid and Major Neil F: Wilson 

The Total Army School System 

By Major Larry Cerny 

JOEL B. HUDSON 	 The Engineer Jungle Warfare Course 

By Captain Andrew V. Jasaitis Acting Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 	 Precast Demolitions Training Range Bunkers 

By Gerald L. Knapp and First Lieutenant Adrian Donahoe 02750 

Front Cover: Countermine technology 


supports the global effort to detect and 


neutalize mines and UXO. Photos, clockwise: Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 


Mozambique deminer. Afghan soldiers with Personal Viewpoint CTC Notes 


recovered mines, and U.S. soldiers with 


miniflail in Bosnia. 	 Letters to the Editor Past in Review 

Engineer Problem Engineer Update Back Cover: Baffle of Palo AMo. Artwork 

courtesy Library of Congress. 	 Engineer Solution Bridge the Gap 

ENGINEER (ISSN 0046-198901 4sprepared quanery by the US. Army Engrneer eqefiiso for the purpose of enhancing their protesoional development. Vlews 

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postage is paid at Fon~eonardWood, MO, and additional mailing omces. eikmena. The contents do not necersarly refled ancia1 US. Army positions and do 

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December 1996 	 Engineer I 
CaunIlermifle: It's MrnThan 


By Colonel Robert Creenwalf and Major Brigid Ockrassa 

ngineers do countermine. It's a key part of the mobility 

,mission, and we how how to do it. Field Manual 90-

13-1, Combined Anns Breaching Opemrions, tells the 

entire Army how to do it. Our equipment may not be very 

good, but it works and we train the mission all the time, particularly at the combat training centers. So what's the big dcal? 

Hold on to your Kevlar! The world has changed. Breaching through defended obstacles to allow maneuver forces to 

close with the enemy is no longer the only game in town. 

Since the Cold War ended and peace broke out, the world 

has discovered that it is littered with mines-about 100 million mines! The United Nations (UN)and our allies are 

actively engaged in dealing with them Somalia reinforced 

the fact that single mines buried in a main supply route can 

stop traffic-and that marly people can bury single mines in a 

road. Bosnia showed that widespread minefields can stop 

operations cold, even when no one is activcly mining. Mines 

are ubiquitous and, under the scrutiny of CNN cameras, may 

impact any military operation. Their impact must be neutralized. The engineer force must move beyond simply breaching minefields. 

2 Engineer 

Lessons From Bosnia 

osnia is a model of counterminc operations in a 

, "peace" environment. Residual mines in that country 

are a threat to all members of the Implementation 

Force (IFOR). U.S. actions there have included extensive 

mine-awareness training as well as extremely controlled 

troop movements and operations to avoid mine encounters. 

Engineers working with the former warring factions have 

mapped and recorded minefield locations and proofed and 

cleared areas for use hy U.S forces. 

The FOR'S role in mine-clearing operations highlights 

the dangers and frustrations of clearing operations. Details of 

the demining activities made headlines similar to those produced for the Sava bridging mission. Faithful CNN watchers 

learned the incredibly low-tech, labor-intensive methods we 

use to clear minefields-and they became outraged. 

Although the media hype on the countermine mission in Bosnia has crested, it left a lasting impression. It motivated the 

American public and Congress to demand better solutions. 

As is typically American, standards are high and patience is 

December 1996 
A United Nations peacekeeper uses a bayonet to probe a minefield along the road to 

the enclave of Gorazade, just outside Sarajevo in 1995. 

low-but the resolve to "fix" the countermine problem has 

energized the world. 

President Clinton, along with Ambassador Albright (the 

U.S. Ambassador to the UN) and Senator Leahy, have deep 

concerns about the worldwide disaster caused by residual 

land mines. In addition to working toward an international 

ban on antipersonnel (AP) mines, they want to remove residual AP mines that threaten innocents daily. In the policy 

announced un 16 May 1996, President Clinton directed the 

Department of Defense to increase its support to humanitarian demining operations. 

Once again, engineers find themselves on the cutting edge 

of a defense issue of national importance: trying to solve the 

countermine problem. As new types of mines, fuzes, explosives, and emplacement techniques are discovered, the task 

becomes increasingly difficult. However, we aren't in th~s 

situation alone. The assets of the nation and the world have 

mobilized and, in a very real sense, U.S. Army engineers are 

at the hub of this activity. 

December I996 

As a result, your job as an Army engineer will assume a 

new countermine dimension. 

What's the Problem? 

6 6 I

f we can put a man on the moon, why can't we find 

m~nes?" This question was asked in congressional 

committee hearings. If only we could make the 

ground transparent! It's easy to find the moon because we 

can see it. The keystone in the countermine arch is detection, 

and it is extremely difficult. Mines come in a wide variety of 

shapes, sizes, and materials. The ground is an almost infinite 

set of soils, moisture, vegetation, and clutter (and much of 

the clutter is the same shape, size, and material as the mines). 

Weather plays a significant role. And the enemy tries to fool 

us. No single technology solves the mine problem-and so 

far, no combination does either. 

In a high-speed maneuver scenario, engineers don't look 

for individual mines. Instead, we treat the ground with 

Engineer 3 
something like a MICLIC, or use plows or rollers to remove 

enough mines to pass through, and move on. Less-thanperfect technologies are good enough for this scenario. Unfortunately, as the Amy moves beyond a high-speed maneuver focus, engineers must move beyond breaching into areas 

where technological weakness has significant impact. 

Countermine consists of two basic tasks: find the mine, 

and neutralize it. If we know exactly where a mine is, neuualization is relatively simple. If we don't know where it is 

or don't know how many mines we may have missed, ncutralization is far more difficult. The best detection technology available today has only a 70-percent probability of 

detecting plastic AP mines. We cannot adequately detect 

mines along routes at speeds that allow convoy operations. 

All mine detectors produce too many false alarms (each of 

which must be treated as if it were a mine). Instead of precise 

detection, engineers sometimes use breaching techniques to 

treat an entire area-but those techniques aren't 100-percent 

effective either. Breaching techniques are extremely destructivc and cannot be used in areas where they may damage 

propeny or structures. 

To put it bluntly, the technology isn't thcre yet! 

Who's Working the Problem? 

efore addressing the categories of "players," we 

acknowledge that there is a long-standing group of 

professionals in each. The following information 

focuses on recent changes, activities, and increases to the 

"team roster." 

The Army 

When U.S. forces deployed into Bosnia, the US. Army 

Engineer School immediately took steps to send additional 

countermine equipmcnt to them. We fielded low-risk items 

that showed definite operational potential, working with the 

countermine technology base at the CommunicationsElectronics Command, Night Vision Laboratory Countermine 

Directorate, at Fort Bclvoir. That effort soon was absorbed by 

the Army Countermine Task Force, which provided additional 

quick "Band-Aid" type enhancements for countermine shortfalls. It broke through much of the traditional acquisition 

bureaucracy to get limited quantities of needed products into 

the hands of our soldiers. A follow-on task for the Army 

Countermine Task Force is lo determine an ideal mix of countermine equipment to support contingency operations. 

Joint Services 

The entire military community has gained a sincere appreciation for the effects of mines. This was made extremely 

clear during Operation Desert Storm, in Somalia, and now in 

Bosnia. As the following examples show, many groups 

within the joint structure are addressing parts of the countermine issue. 

The U.S. military services work together on the battlefield, and we require joint doctrine to support them. Joint 

Publication 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles and Mines, currently is 

under revision, and the new version will update the countermine doctrine. 

One tangible result of the President's policy statement is 

the recently formed joint unexploded ordnance (UXO) and 

countermine working integrated product team (WIPT). This 

team is tasked to coordinate user requirements and development work across all services. The WIPT defines five categories of users: 

Combat countermine 

UXO site remediation 

UXO disposal 

Humanitarian demining 

Explosive ordnance disposal aclive range clearance 

The WIPT showcases thc vastness of the problem. An 

Engineer School representative is the subgroup chairman, 

and hc articulates the joint services' combat countermine 

requirements. A follow-on task for the WIFT is to compare 

the requirements of all five groups, eliminate redundancy. 

and streamline technical solution scts. 

The Defense Science Board focuses a brain lrust ol outstanding scientists, retired senior military, and captains of 

industry on defense matters. They are exploring the challenges of UXO remediation. To ensure that recommended 

products meet user needs, they establishcd a working liaison 

with the Engineer School. Board members consider mixes of 

technologies, such as ground-penetrating radar, remotely 

operated systems, and nuclear quadripole resonance. 

The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency and its 

advisors in industry and academia, the Defense Science 

Resource Counsel, and the JASONs address the minedetection challenge by attempting to artificially replicate the 

chemical detection process that takes place in a dog's nose. 

To promote education and training regarding the mine 

issue, the Naval Post-Graduate School is hosting a weeklong seminar in November 1996 that will showcase working 

solutions. 

Federal AgenciedPrivate Industry 

This is the hardest category to describe because it is so 

diverse. Unlike most military technological challenges, solutions to the countermine problem have vast federal and 

4 Engineer December 1996 
M60 Panther countermine vehicle with track-width mine roll 

commercial applications-vast lucrurive possibilities. Detnining is big business. Although profit is a strong motivator, 

motivations include everything from money to moral rcsponsibility and to simple mission satisfaction. 

Among the federal agencies with operational interests in 

UXO and countermine issues are the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, Interior, and State; the Federal Aviation 

Administration; and the Environmental Protection Agency. 

National laboratories, including those at Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Sandia, and the Savannah River, are pushing the technological envelope to find workahle solutions. 

Potential solutions range far afield-including, for example, 

genetically engineered bacteria that produce a protein that 

glows in the presence of explosives. (Don't laugh, it works!). 

If technology can ensure reliable detection of explosive 

material, the, antiterrorism applications alone would be 

incredible. Additional missions, less glamorous but necessary, include cleaning hundreds of ranges affected by the 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. 

Participating private and commercial institutions include 

numerous defense, environmental, medical, and security 

contractors. Academic participants include the University of 

Missouri at Rolla, Duke University, and Ohio State Univcrsity. Promising developments at these institutions may result 

in school grants. As their developments produce iterative 

improvements, everybody wins. Academia is exploring some 

innovative ideas that may evolve into great successes. 

International Organizations 

Several international organizations dedicate significant 


energy to the UXOI countermineldemining challenge. The 


cornerstone organization is the United Nations. The UN has 


December 1996 

ers and improved dogbone assembly. 

sponsored and financed demining operations worldwide and 

set the standard for performance and international demining 

contracts. 

A coalition formed by America, Britain, Canada, and 

Australia (ABCA) has a Countermine Special Working 

Group that shares ideas, doctrine, and techniques. A countermine subgroup of the U.S.1U.K. Staff Talks meets biannually 

to share data and techniques. The U.S. and Canada share test 

data and ideas. As a result of the open dialogue and extensive 

experience of coalition members, participants' understanding 

of countermine concepts has increased significantly. 

The South African Defense Force, which has more than 

20 ycars of active countermine activities, willingly shares its 

approach to the problem. Their military has adopted an 

aggressive program to make all military vehicles safe from 

mines. This program, coupled with unique mine-detection 

and mine-clearing equipment and a mine-hunting program 

that includes bounties for mines, has rendered land mines oi 

linle value to insurgents in South Africa. 

Clearly a strong sense of cooperation permeates the international community. This cross-fertilization is reaping great 

benefits. 

What's the Army Doing? 

The Army is gaining a clear understanding of the countermine challenge. A deployed force that conducts 

operations in a mine-threatened environment is faced 

with one of two distinct problems: In a combat operation, the 

force must be capable of free maneuver (maneuver-oriented 

countennine, where risk is traded for speed). In an operation 

less than combat, it must ensure there are no mine casualties 

(a force-protection orientation, where speed is traded for 

Engineer 5 
risk). Tliese ~roblems require different solution sets, and neither is satisfied simply by placing an engineer with an AN/ 

PSS-I2 mine detector on the ground. 

A significant outcome of Operation Joint Endeavor is the 

shattered perception that countermine is exclusively an engineer mission. All forces in Bosnia are encountering mines 

and must "deal" with them tactically. The need for the entire 

Army to perform missions in a mined environment has 

expanded the player list to include everyone. This is a mission for the entire force! 

TRADOC has chartered a Countennine Integrated Concept Team to develop a holistic concept across all branches, 

all battlefield operating systems, and all DTLOMS (doctrine, 

training, leadcr development, organization, materiel, and soldiers). On the basis of this concept, the team will determine 

what future operational capabilities must be developed 

across all DTLOMS and will test them under Rattle Lab auspices to determine which should he funded and fielded. 

All Army branches must identify how they will operate in 

a mined environment. They must determine which countermine tasks are so Lime sensitive that the unit should accomplish them directly, and which require a call for help. 

The Army lnust institutionalize mine-awareness training, 

as it has NBC training. This includes training forSoldiers-initial entry, annual, and predeploymenl training. 

Leaders-basic and advanced officer and NCO courses 

W Units-the Army Training and Evaluation Program, 

combat training centers, and field exercises. -

The President's policy set the stagc for Department of 

Defense engineers to start planning support to special operalions forces in humanitarian demining missions. The current 

concept has the Army in the lead. 

What Happens to the Engineer Role? 

While its too early to tell, it appears (hat the engi- 

" * neers' role will significantly expand. We undcrstand the need for an extensive mint dalabase in 

Rusnia and thc need for a formal "Mine Action Center" when 

mines are the major threat to an operation. We require an 

improved reconnaissance capability. The requirement to keep 

routes open through sweeping and clearing operations is 

returning to our mission essential task list (METL). Engineers have other new tasks: answer 911-type calls when units 

get in trouble, extract wounded, clear mission-critical areas, 

and resume operations. Additional tasks engineers are almost 

assured to acquire include assisting with humanitarian demining through reconnaissance, recording, mapping, training. 

and proofir~g lor quality control. 

To assist with these traditional and additional missions, 

we are on the verge of fielding some exciting technologies 

for enzineers: 

The Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System 

(ASTAMIDS) is due for fielding in 2002, but an early 

version mounted on a Blackhawk hclicopter is almost 

ready-and an engineer may ride in the back to watch the 

screen. 

The first prototype ground-penetrating radars that attach to 

an ANIPSS- 12 mine detector were tested this fall. A few 

may be purchased for use in contingency operations. 

A mine database system that links powerful computers, 

stores data, and overprints maps to field GPS survey computers will he ready within months. (See article, page 14). 

New engineer equipment employed in Bosnia includes 

remote-controlled tank rollers and miniflails. Mine protective boots used there may become standard engineer field 

footwear (they work and are extremely comfortable). The 

Arrny is purchasing special mine-hardened vehicles for engineer squads worlung main supply routes and an interim vehiclemounted mine-detection system. The Engineer School, 

working with the Army Countermine Task Force and the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, is assembling a set of 

contingency equipment to augment normal unit equipment 

for the next countermine operation. 

The Countermine Training Support Center, recently established at the Engineer School, is developing new tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for all mine mission areas. This 

organization will provide mobile training teams to take new 

technologies to units that deploy to contingency operations. 

Better countermine technologies are coming, and they are 

coming faster than anyone could have predicted even a year 

ago. In the interim, Army engineers can expect changes in 

doctrine; in tactics, techniques and procedures; and in organizations. Keep using your mission focus, your Essayons spirit, 

and the creativity of your soldiers to attack and defeat this 

problem. Last but not least, send your good ideas to the Engineer School. Together we can wln the countermine battle. 

Y 

Colonel Greenwalt is the direcrol; Directorate of Combat 

Developments, U.S. Army Engineer School. Previous 

us.rignments incllrde chief; Nuclear Division, and weapon's 

effect,ecrs once< US. Army Nl~clear and Chemical Agency; and 

chief; Tactics, Tririning, and Doctrine Division, US. Anny 

Engineer School. COL Greenwnlt holds a master's degree in 

National Security and Strategic Studiesfm~n the Naval War 

College. 

Majol- Ockrassa is an action oficer in the Director of 

Coml~at Developments at the U.S. Army Engineer School. 

She serves on the Army Counterntine Task Force, the 

Countermine Integrated Concepts Team and the UXO 

Requirements Subgroup of the Integrated Products Ram. 

6Engineer December 1996 
By Jim Smiifh 

0

ver the past century, land mines 

became an inexpensive, effective means to stop enemy 

movements and demoralize personnel. 

Deployed and stockpiled, they number 

in the hundreds of millions. They will 

continue to pose a threat to soldiers and 

civilians alike for generations. To 

combat their threat, countennine efforts 

have pursued numerous mine-detection 

avvroaches. .. One result is the fielded

handheld ANIPSS-12 metal mine 

detector. The "silver bullet" solution to 

mine detection has eluded our efforts. 

Why is it so difficult to find an 

object buried just inches underground? 

One reason is that Mother Nature 

provides an endless number of roadblocks in the way of environmental 

factors that change hourly. Also, mine 

manufacturers produce an almost 

infinite variety of mine features such as 

size, shape, and composition. Their 

only commonality is the intent to 

thwart effective mine detection. 

Technological approaches often rail to 

meet all of the combat developer's 

requirements. Often, the solutions are 

too big, too heavy, or too slow to meet 

requirements. Finally, countermine 

program funding is usually too low and 

fluctuates with demands for other 

military equipment. 

The Defense Science Board of 1987 

suggested three technologies with 

potential to meet the mine detection 

challenge: 

Metallic detector sensors. 

Ground-penetrating radar (GPR). 

Infrared (IR) sensors. 

All three technologies are useful in 

mine detection, but they have latent 

limitations that impact the mission. One 

common point is that none of them is 

ASTAMIDS consists of sensors (1R or IR and laser) mounted on either fixed or rotary-wing aircraft and helicopters. 

Data processing (minefield detection) will occur onboard a helicopter or in a ground control station. 

December 1996 Engineer 7 
HSTAMIDS is a multisensor handheld mine detector that will replace the ANIPSS-12. The "standoff" sensor is 

a FLIR. A metal detector and GPR sensors are mounted on a wand similar to the ANIPSS-12. 

specifically a minc detector. They are 

anomaly detectors, because they look for 

metal, ground density, or thermal 

anomalies. By judicious use of equipment 

coupled with visual cucs, an experienced 

mine sweeper can find many (if not most) 

mines under varying soil, weather, 

vegetation, and topographic conditions. 

Of course, there is no pelfection in this 

world, so some mines may be missed. The 

challenge is to know when and how to use 

the various sensors for the best results. 

Other technologies are emerging 

from industry, universities, and the 

government. These will be evaluated 

for technical potential as well as 

operational utility, and we will need 

lessons learned about them. We can 

assume that each will have some 

strengths and some weaknesses. Many 

are so new that it will take years to 

prove their capabilities. 

Our mine-detection capability will 

improve when the Army fields three 

emerging Standoff Minefield Detection 

Systems (STAMTDS). They areAirborne STAMIDS (unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) or helicoptermounted) is scheduled for fielding 

in FY02. 

Handheld STAMIDS (the replacement for the ANIPSS-12) is scheduled for fielding in FY03. 

Ground STAMIDS (vehiclemounted) is scheduled for fielding 

in FY06. 

A brief description of the sensor 

technologies used in these systems and 

how they are fuzed together follows. 

Metallic Detector Sensors 

The theory is simple. Although 

there are different mctaldetection technologies (such as 

balanced bridge and metallic induction), the basic concept remains 

the same: As the detector head moves 

over a metallic mass, the detector 

senses a change in the magnetic field 

under it. This initiates an audible 

signal (and often a visual signal for 

reduced noise operations), which 

alerts the operator. By moving the 

detector head forwardlback and left1 

right, the location can be narrowed to 

within a few inches. Mine and "coin" 

detectors share many characteristics, 

but the capabilities of coin detectors 

pale by comparison. Today's advanced mine detectors find minuscule 

metal traces, are hardened for rough 

field use, and some can be used 

underwater. 

To some extent, metallic detectors 

arc our most dependable workhorses. 

They are not subject to error from soil 

moisture and other weather-induced 

variables. If all mines possessed 

enough metallic content, metal detectors would be adequate as standalone sensors. Unfortunately, mine 

construction is veering from large, 

metallic bodies to small, nonmetallic 

mines. Lightening and reducing mine 

size decreases the cost, weight, and 

manpower needed to transport and 

8 Engineer December 1996 
employ the mines. Gluing metal onto It is "look down" only (it must be 

The ANIPSS-12 evolved out of an 

effort to find low metallic content 1 Ground-PenetratingRadar 

nonmetallic mine$ is one answer, but it 

is expensive and labor intensive. In 

addition, there is no way to control the 

mine producers and users to ensure that 

all mines receive the metal tab. We 

foresee more nonmetallic mines in the 

future, because they defeat metallic 

sensors. 

within inches of mines to detect 

them). 

It cannot find totally nonmetallic 

mines

~~~~~~~-

Finding mines from outside their 

lethality distance is a critical detection 

survivability objective. 

the picture changes. The mine body, 

buried in the same homogeneous soil, 

disrupts the soil density. It retlecb an 

active signal which, in certain radar 

designs, can actually trace the mine 

surface much like a topographic map. 

One radar developed by the LawrenceLivermore Laboratory may penetrate the 

mine housing, search for component 

planar arrays, and possibly identify the 

mine by its characteristic planar 

structure-essentially its fingerprint. This 

is the high end of advanced ladas. To 

date, it is unproven and requires a detailed 

mine-construction database. 

GPRs are limited by distance from 

the ground surface and do not work well 

in conditions of high soil moisture. They 

work best with aspect angles of "near 

nadir" (+I-5 degrees from the vertical); 

performance drops off as the angle off 

mines. In use by many NATO and U.N. 

forces, it proved itself in Operation 

Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, and in 

Bosnia. Along with its improved 

maintainability, cheap operation, and 

interoperability among friendly forces, 

GSTAMIDS is a multisensor vehicle-mounted mine detector. It is in concept exploration with development scheduled 

to begin in FY98. This concept drawing shows GSTAMIDS mounted on a teleoperated HMMWV.The actual system will 

be different, 

December 1996 Engineer 9 

The GPR sensor is typical of all 

radars. It includes two 

antennae: one to broadcast an 

active signal through the ground and 

another to receive the reflected signal 

that bounces off whatever is in the 

the ANIPSS-12 detects minuscule : ground. These bounced-back echoes 

metal amounts. However, it has two are plotted to trace thc surface texture 

major shortfalls that are common with of thc target. Homogeneous soil sends 

all handheld mine detectors: back a tlat image, but add a mine and 
the vertical increases. As such, almost 3-5 range works in most areas and sensor's output, combine the best 

all GPRs can be characterized as 'bok- reduces the number of false alarms features of each. and process them 

down" detectors. This requires the because of its narrower sensitivity. The using a mature algorithm. By prosensor to pass over the mine to detect it. 8-12 range is more sensitive, but it has cessing data from each sensor into an 

Look-down sensors may accidentally ' a bighcr falsc-alarm rate. integrated whole, we keep their 

trip the mines, thereby detecting the : IR has technical limitations. It strengths and filter out their 

mine by losing the sensor. Also they are ; requires solar loading to develop weaknesses. At times, the processor 

slow because every inch of the mined passive heat signature. As the sun must ignore one sensor and use the 

area must be "viewed." A few emerging moves throughout the day, shadows remaining two. This sounds easy, but 

"look ahead" GPRs promise increased , from trees, buildings, and other solid developing complex processors and 

standoff anddetectorlcrewsurvivability. objects move. This changes the amount efficient algorithms is as difficult as 

of solar loading available to a mined developing complex sensor techInfrared Sensor area. Cloudy days lower or eliminate nologies. A few commercial comilitary forward looking in- solar loading. Precipitation reduces the panies entered the market during the 

frared (FLIR) sensors search dielectric at the soilinline interface. early 1990s, and today we have highfor thermal anomalies. A Any object (such as a rock, beer can, or speed processors that can handle the 

FLIR can find an active heat source lost wheel cap) buried in a given soil , huge data influx from the sensors. 

quite easily. A main battle tank type has its own thermal signature. Companies with in-depth countermine 

silhouetted against vegetation or clear Additionally, IR sensors can't "see" experience are working diligently to 

sky is easily detected, but it is more through solid objects (such as foliage); improve their sensor fusion algordifficult to differentiate between passive they require optical access to mines or ithms. Algorithm development reI I 


thermal targets. Passive targets are those at least to the soil over mines. mains the long pole in the tent for 


that receive heat from another source As the sun rises, mines and tbeir mine detection. 


(typically solar loading for mine environment soak up solar heat at 


detection). The ability of an object to different rates. During the morning, cold Conclusion 


radiate its heat is impacted by many mines show well against the wanner soil. ine detection is a complex, 


factors, including size, construction During the evening, warm mines show difficult task we are working 


material, and soil moisture. A metal well against rapidly cooling soil. At full 

to solve. The challenge to ma- 


mine radiates heat at a different rate night and around noon, mines and their teriel developers is tremendous. 


than a plastic mine beside it, as does the background environments are at roughly Combat developers (in this case the 


soil on which it rests and vegetation and i 

1 the same temperatures; hence, no thermal Engineer School) often establish 


water nearby. This enables a FLIR to ; signatures. stringent operational requirements. 


"photograph" a scene from its passive, me FLIR is essentially blind at Our intent is to provide a family of 


radiated electromagnetic energy. ceaain hours, hut has excellent vision robust mine detectors that will 

On the surface, it appears that a at other times. Having the flexibility to safeguard force. and

use the sensors only when they work ' FLIR may make an admirable mine- I materiel developers are working todetection sensor, especially since IR is well makes IR an excellent tool. I gether to achieve this goal. 

a true "look ahead" sensor. A camera Unfortunately, soldiers must conduct I Y 

enables the user to cake photos from a operations throughout the day and j 

distance; this is the same concept-just under all weather conditions. The trick Jim Smith is a countermine combat 

a different slice of the electromagnetic is to use IR when it is most effective j developments materiel analyst at the 

spectrum. Visible light is 0.4-0.7 milli- and plan mine-detection operations I Engineer School He has 32 years of 

microns, short-wave IR is 0.7-1.2 around its best target of utility. military/retired service wirh nine years 

millimicrons, medium-wave IR is- 3-5 of countermine experience. ME Smith 

millimicrons; and long-wave IR is 8-12 Sensor Fusion holds a bachelor's degree in earth 

millimicrons. Most mine-detection There is one important option in "cienc" 

sensors are in the medium- and long- using the three sensors discussed 

wave IR portions of the spectrum. The in this article: We can take each 
By Cupruin B~yanGreen 

0

n 16 May 1996, the President 

announced a new policy that 

establishes guidelines for the 

use of antipersonnel (AP) land mines 

by U.S. forces. (See "Clear the Way," 

inside the front cover.) The following 

information describes actions taken by 

the U.S. Amy Engineer School in a 

vanguard effort to prepare for the 1999 3 

P. moratorium on mine warfare. o 

e 

8 

9

Countermobility Mission !a 

Needs D 

'.\ . - IL 

'

For military forces to meet '.., 

IS 

combat mission requirements 

and stay within the policy limits, -

.. , , 

.. -~ . . __ 5 m-"

they will require nonlethal AP -

munitions that support the coun- Sticky Foam 

termobility mission. These munitions Constraints vehicles and systems, operate in all 

must fulfill the intent of AP obstacles types of weather, and be environpre- against both combatants and non- When implemented as mentally safe. 

belligerents, provide less-than-lethal scribed, nonlethal munitions Before describing new technologies 

effects, and preserve the lives of must incapacitate, distract, that may replace conventional AP 

innocent parties. or contain both nonbelligerents and mines, we must define what these AP 

Munitions that can discriminate military forces. While directly af- mines do. Review of mine-warfare 

between noncombatants and bel- fecting personnel and vehicles, they doctrine and conventional uses leads to 

ligerents, such as claymore mines and must provide the equivalent physical . four basic caoabilities: 

other man-in-the-loop (command- and psychological deterrents as

W Protect other mines (antitank) or 

no 

AP mines under the new nolicv. permanent damage or intentional dis- ; 

However, they are discussed as an AP ability. Nonlethal AP munitions also .Provide an economy of force by 

mine alternative in this article. 

' I must interface with existing military effectively denying terrain; they 

detonated) systems, are not considered existing lethal mines but leave obstacles from dismounted forces. 

December 1996 Engineer I I 
FlashIBang-Type Munitions 

Bursting Smoke Grenade M359 Bursting Obscurant 

M46O Thunderstrip Stun Munition Smoke Grenade 

.i ,;,idi< 

'.. .,I, ,!:..:: 

, .-,,.. ,., .. . . . ~ .. .~ I,......,. : . . 

.....

....

. .. 

, A .. 

M452 SlingballStun Grenade P 

MU: 'sion/DisLraciion Grenades 

,.% 

Rubber Bullet "Slingshol" 

Ammunition 

SPLLAT Munitions 

I Soft-Projectile Munitions I I I 


Various nonlethal antipersonnel munitions that may be used 


equate to an additional soldier or : mores, for example, allow soldiers to lethal man-in-the-loop and tunable 

sentry on the battlefield. discriminate targets and distinguish 1 (selective-energylprogressive-penalty) 

between belligerents and noncom- munitions. 

Act as a protective obstacle to 

defeat the enemy's final assault on 

batants before detonation. However, The countermobility remote-control 

a position. many nonlethal options fail to meet the system (CIRCE) is one man-in-the-loop 

psychological dctcrrent criteria. initiative. It is a teleoperated system of 

Act as a psychological deterrent. fiber-optic monitors that relays 

Any successful AP mine re- Alternatives information back to the controller. It 

placement or group of replacements allows the operator to decide whether to 

must achieve these four functions. All ased on these guidelines, the fire or not. The CIRCE controls 

man-in-the-loop munitions meet these Army and the Engineer Corps conventional mines and effectively 

criteria. Command-detonated clay- are pursuing alternative non- makes them command-detonated. 

12 Engineer December 1996 
- - - - 

Possible alternative nonlethal munitions 

System 	 Capability 

~p~-
 -


Tasar Shoots low-voltage darts that incapacital:e the targe 


Sticky-foam mine 	 Covers the target with encapsulating foam. 

Sting net 	 Shoots nets that are charged with low-voltage electricity and cover a 50-meter 

area. 

Microwave energy 	 Beams from a field generator and slowly heats the skin. It gets hotter as the target 

approaches the source. If the target progresses too far, the heat produces a casualty. 

Soft-projectile kineticenergy munilon Shoots rubber balls, beanbags, or baton rounds instead of steel pellets. 


(Nonlethal claymore mine) 
 1 

Water slug munition Fires supercharged slugs of water in the autonomous mode or turns to an explo- 

(tunable munition) sive charge when command-detonated. 

1 Texas boot 	 I Locks or attaches to the foot, immobilizing or limiting mobility. 1 

Embrittling/galvanlzing agent Corrodes material or fibers or causes mechanical parts to fuse together. 


(a spray chemical or powder) 


Radio-frequency-kill munition 	 Causes a nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse that destroys computers and electronic circuits, effectively stopping vehicles and forcing equipment to be operated 

manually. I 


Tessler coil Creates a harmonic wave that produces a tremor within a 100-meter radius. 


Another man-in-the-loop system is incorporate nonlethal technology. response hut progress to an ultimately 

the intelligent minefield (IMF). This Selectlvc-cnergy nlunitions remain fatal penalty for continued persevef 

prototype system will ultimately aulonomous while in the nonlethal ancc in a particular direction. 

develop into both an artificial 1 mode, preventing casualties or damage i Some nonlethal systems that the 

intelligence and a man-in-the-loop i to noncombatants. They can be placed Engineer School is considering for 

automated combat-security outpost. in a lcthal mode when there is a man in 1 future use are shown in the table above. 

The outpost will employ an array of ! the loop. These are just a few of the alternatives 

lethal, nonlethal, and tunable munitions. I Progressive-penalty munitions pro- currently being pursued. 

The IMFprobably will control a suite of vide another option. They are designed ; We wclcome ncw ideas for AP mine 

sensors that can cuc fires and cornmand . to teniporarily incapacitate both replaccrnents. To offer suggestions, call 

and control elements. i soldicrs and noncombatants. These 1 Captain Bryan Green at the Maneuver 

Tunable munitions are systerns that tunahle munitions start with a nonlethal Support Batllc Lab, DSN 676-7355 or 

commercial (573) 563-013 1, 

extension 3-7355. Y 

Cupfain Green is !he integration 

officer in the Maneuver Support Brrttle 

Lab, U.S. Army Engineer School. Previous assignments include cornmaildr~ 

B Cornpar~y,3/10 1nfantr)r Battalion, 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; platoon 

leaderKO, 14th Engineer Butlalion, 

Fort Otd, Califbrnia. Caprain Green 

holds a rnasreri degree in engineering 

management from the University of 

Misrouri at Rolla. 40-mllllmeter baton/beanbag/sponge round 

December I996 	 Engineer 13 
By Major Edward B. TayIor 

The deployment of U.S. forces to 

Bosnia hghlighted an engineer 

information operations shortconling. The 1st Armored Division (IAD) 

Engineer Brigade identified a void in our 

ability to develop and maintain minethreat information in an immature theater. 

Their challenges include fulfilling 

doctrinal responsibilities as the custodian 

of the "dirty" battlefield, developing minethreat information to ensure force 

protection, and incorporating a solution 

into existing command and control (C2) 

platforms that support the maneuver 

commanders. These commanders require 

detailed information about minefields and 

other obstacles during and after hostilities. 

So how do we track thousands of 

minefields now? How can we improve the 

way we track them in the future? 

The IAD Engineer Brigade determined that computer technologies were 

!he appropriate tools to track mines. 

However, current table of organization and 

equipment (TO&E) units lack the 

computer equipment and expertise to build 

and manage complex databases. Due to 

their tenacity and resourcefulness, 

engineer soldiers in Bosnia are 

successfully managing this information 

with an ad hoc organization and database. 

But their solution is theater specific. 

Considering the experience of these 

engineer soldiers, we must begin now to 

prepare for the "next Bosnia." We must 

capitalize on the experiences and 

recommendations of the IAD Engineer 

Brigade to develop a useful set of 

database tools and a supporting organizational structure. 

The Night Vision and Electronic 

Sensors Directorate (NVESD) of the 

Communications and Electronics Command and the Engineer School have 

developed a program to build a 

comprehensive database system. Between December 1995 and August 1996, 

their strategy slowly emerged. 

Strategy 

The NVESD and the Engineer 

School agreed on a three-phased 

approach to solve the minetracking problem (see table below). In the 

near term, we sent a quick fix to the 

engineers in Bosnia--commercial computers. printers, and software to give 

soldiers there an improved capabilily. 

However, this "Bosnia Band-Aid is not 

the solution for the future. 

The near future (1 to 5 years) requires 

an interim system that bridges the gap 

between Bosnia and Force XXI (Figure 

I). It will combine lessons learned from 

Bosnia with currently known Force XXI 

requirements. This data will define the 

operational requirements to create a 

contingency system for near-term future 

operations. 

Lessons learned from the interim 

system and related events will provide 

the framcwork for the design of the 

objective system for Force XXI. Both 

Task Force XXI and the Joint 

Countermine Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (JCM-ACTD) are 

likely sources of additional or refined 

requirements. 

The remainder of this article describes 

the interim system. 

Phases of buildlng a minefield database system 

14 Engineer December 1996 

Phase 

Near term 

Near future 

Far future 

System 

Bosnia Band-Aid 

Interim system 

Objective system 

Target 

Quick fix 

Post-Bosnia missions 

Force XXI 

Characteristics 

Commercial hardwarelsoftware 

Paper maps 

Current capabilities plus enhancements 

Windows and UNlX systems mixed 

Bosnia minefield database program 

Army common hardwarelsoftware 

Digitized Army 
p~&&l Digital Man Mine Fusion Center 

Reconnaissance Reoorting Svstem -

PC 

Printer 

CD-ROM PC 

GPS Printer 

Camera CD-ROM /c-O\L 

NT Server 

li 

MSIP 

Binoculars I GPS I 

Figure 1.The interim minefield-database system 

Mine Fusion Center provides it to other system?. The program I A user interface to modify database I developer is the Waterways Experiment I entries and attributes. 

he organization charged with 

collecting and disseminating 

mineficld i~iformationin Bosnia is 

the Mine Fusion Center, which resides at 

the engineer brigade level. Other United 

Nations and NATO organizations in 

Station (WES), a Corps of Engineers 

Laboratory. 

TEMIE-OPS is a prototype of tl~e 

Tactical Engineer Command and Control 

System (TECCS) (Figure 2, page 16). 

Eventually, it will merge into the 

Ability to plot minefields with 

appropriate symbols. 

theater use the tenn Mine Action Center. M~~~~~~~control system (MCS) as the 

In the JCM-ACTD, which is scheduled 1 engineer piece or that system. TEMIEto begin in the summer of 1997, a similar 1 op~is a combination terrain. 

organization called the Mine Warfare v~sual~zat~oncapabilities and engineer

Centcr is under consideration. 1 dec~sion-support : applications for planRegardless of the name, the unit that gets ning and tracking battlefield operations

the next Bosnia-type mission should 1 related to mobility and survivability. It 

have a minefield information system currently runs on a common~~d~~~~ 

ready and waiting, with an organization I and Software I1 (CHS 11) workstation,

such as these centers provide to operate wh~chis a Sun workstation that runs a I ' ' it. Figure 1 shows the components of the 1 uNlX operating system. Each workAbility to export data to the All 

Source Analysis System (ASAS) and 

the Multispectral Imagery Processor 

(MSIPI. 

developing system. In addition to the 

devices discussed below, each system 

contains both a color and a hlack-andwhite printer, a CD-ROM recorder, and a 

MulfispectralImagery Processor 

The MSlP will use minefield-database 

information received from the TEMIE-OPS 

to produce special digital or paper maps, 

overlays, or other products that assist 

battlefield visualization. The Topographic 

Engineering Center, another Corps of 

Engineers laboraloly, assembles the MSIP. 

The MSIP provides an interim 

capability to generate and print image 

maps from commercial and national 

imagery and to perform sumc terrain 

analysis of the imagery. MSIP hardware 

consists of ihc Common Hardware and 

Software I (CHS I) workstation. It has 

station contains two TEMIE-OPS to 

100.percentredundancy. 

TEMIE-OPS is being enhanced to 

required by the 

scanner. ! minefield database program. These enEngineer-Obstacle Planner System Engineer Reports and Returns, and 

(TEME-OPS), the central database, three STANAG minefield-related 

maintains minefield informarlon and I messages. 

TEM/E-OPS 

The Terrain Evaluation Module1 

printers). 

The software on the MSIP is Earth 

Resources Data Analysis System's 

~ ~ 

hancements include: i several storage devices and one HewlettA database modified to include porPackard DesignJet 650C large-format 

of NATO 2430, printer (it can operate up to three such 

December 1996 Engineer 15 
Armv Battle Command Svstem 

v 

Tacticalr 

Obstacle planning 

.Breachingmrldglng 

Simple survivability 

Loglstlcs over the shore (LOTS) 

.Infrastructureassessment 

Figure 2. The interim system will merge into the Maneuver Control System as a part of the ABCS 

(ERDAS) Imaeine, which can- j The NT server hosts a scanner and a I between the engineer battalions and the -

Process commercial and national 

digital imagery 

Rectify and add grid lines. 

Add thematic layers. intelligence, 

and environmental conditions overlays. 

Retrieve and use Defense Mapping 

Agency standard digital detabases. 

Windows New Technology (NT) Server 

Windows NT is an advanced version 

of the Windows operating system. The 

Mine Fusion Center's Windows NT 

server is a temporary storage location for 

incoming information. The server stores 

data until it is reviewed, verified, and 

recorded in the TEMIE-OPS. 

CD-ROM recorder, which allow the Mine 

Fusion Center to scan minefield records 

into thc database and produce CD-ROMs 

for bulk distribution to supported uniu;. The 

NT server also hosts an elecuonic bulletin 

board system (possibly Wildcat Navigator) 

to provide a digital wireless e-mail link 

between the engineer battalions and the 

Mine Action Center 

High Frequency (HF) Radio 

The NT server has a Joint Internet 

Controller (IINC) that readily connects 

with tactical ultra-high-frequency (UHF) 

radios (such as SINCGARS [singlechannel, ground-to-air radio system]) or 

HF radios. This connection allows the 

transmission of digital minefield reports 

or updated minefield information 

Mine Action Center. 

Digital Map Reporting System 

perators of the Digital Map 

Reporting System (DMRS) combine information collected by 

Digital Reconnaissance System (DRS). 

equipped reconnaissance units for 

transmission to the Mine Fusion Center 

(Figure I). The DMRS is used at battalion 

level. It enables commanders to view data 

collected by their subordinates before it is 

transmitted to the Mine Fusion Center 

Software being written for the DMRS 

will allow the battalion to receive 

minefield data from the Mine Fusion 

Center and display it on digital maps. 

(Confinuedon page 61) 

16 Engineer December 1996 
Personal Viewpoint 


Death of the Combat Engineer Vehicle 


By Command Sergeant Major limothy B. Chadwick 

Tt is official, the Army has declared 

that the combat engineer vehicle 

(CEV) will cease to exist 

throughout the Army inventory. When I 

heard the news, many emotions ran 

through me in a split second. I felt 

relieved of the burden of trying to 

maintain a piece of equipment based on 

a chassis system that the resl of 

the Army had retired. The second 

feeling was that of disgust-that the 

leadership of our Amy finally agreed 

with us engineers about how painful 

maintenance of this system had 

become. 

Several days passed before the last 

and probably most important emotion 

hit me head-on. Evidently it took that 

long to fully digest the impact of the 

loss of the CEV, without a replacement 

identified. I can only call this emotion 

fear. That's right, fear-that we are 

getting rid of a piece of equipment 

based on our inability to maintain it and 

not on an evaluation of its tactical 

requirement. My fear centers around 

engineer soldiers of the future and their 

need for a standoff demolition capahility that only the CEV or a like 

vehicle can provide. 

I am fully aware of the Amy's 

research into a 120-mm gun round that 

will replace or closely resemble the 

capabilities of the 165-mm CEV round. 

Can that he done? You bet it can, but 

my concern doesn't center around the 

round itself. Why did we look at 

keeping the gun tube of the CEV so 

shoe? I believe that we recognized the 

need of a turret system for use in tight 

spaces, such as cities. That tactical 

possibility exists today and will 

continue to exist in the future. I tried to 

December 1996 

remember how many times I personally 

saw tanks in urban areas with their gun 

tubes restricted or even stuck through 

building walls. I soon realized there 

were far too many times to count. So, 

how do we solve this problem in the 

future? I say that the solution must 

center around a turret system that 

resembles the one on the CEV. 

I fully realize and agree that the 

current CEV is too difficult to maintain 

at the necessary operational readiness 

rate of our leaner Army. My primary 

concern remains that mechanical and 

monetary nightmares overrode our 

tactical need. Will we need the CEV in 

the future?You bet we will! I only hope 

that someone realizes it before a bloody 

nose forces its replacement. 

So ends our love-and-hate relationship with the CEV. To all of the 

soldiers who manned the CEV, past 

and present. a hearty "well done!" is in 

order. You employed and maintained 

the system to the best of your abilities, 

and for that you deserve great credit. 

To the soldiers who employed the 

CEV in combat, 1 ask that you voice 

your opinions about the need for a 

standoff demolition capability. Let's 

not wait for the need to arise in combat 

before we tell the leadership about our 

concerns. Soldiers' lives may rest with 

this lost capability. We must provoke a 

thorough evaluation of this possible 

need. 

Again, farewell to the single piece of 

equipment I hated and loved the most 

of all others during my career. 

CSM Timothy Chadwick currently 

serves as the command sergeant major 

of the 299th Combat Engineer Battalion (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. 

He has served in every leadership position available to combat engineers. 

Previous assignments include three 

tours with the 7th Combat Engineer 

Battalion (Mechanized), Fort Polk, 

Louisiana; two tours in Germany, with 

the 8Znd Combat Engineer Battalion 

and the 547th Combat Engineer Banalion (Corps) (Mech); and nvo tours with 

the 17th Combat Engineer Battalion 

(Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. 

Engineer 17 
Pho~o-Essay From 


By Major Andrew (ioeh 

Engineers and engineer units must be able to accomplish a wide range of missions, regardless of modified tables of organizafion and equipment 

(MJOE). As an engineer observer with Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAV ii,Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in Bosnia, ifound fhis 

lesson reinforced most of aK Our currenf division engineer brigade stiucfure, howevec is not designed to accomplish the wide range of general 

engineering missions asked of if inBosnia. A large section of fhis essay addresses my thoughts on the shortfalls of our current structure in the heavy 

division. ithink it's wofihfhwhie to talk about these shorifaiis even as we move toward Force XXi. We must identify the capabilities we need. Only men 

can we design a unit that ensures success inboth fhe high-intensity coniiicfs for which we must be ready and the Joint Endeavor-type missions mat we 

willsurely continue to have. 

Base Camp Living Conditions 

Much of the base camp construction was complete by the time I arrived in March 1996, and most soldiers were living in relative comfort. 

with hot showers in almost every camp. The following information shows some of the techniques used to house soldiers in Bosnia. 

Brown & Root had the contract for base camp maintenance and upgrades, while engineer soldiers continue to work the force 

protection mission. The two missions are closely linked and require good coordination at all levels. 

Task Force Eagle established a "mayoi" in each base camp to serve as the camp administrator. The mayor provides transient 

housing, coordinates with Brown & Root, and resolves base camp issues as they arise. 

Few of the camps are built from the Army Facilities Component Systems standard designs for initial or temporary construction. Most 

are somewhere in between these two standards and include hardback tents, Force Provider modules, container express (CONEX) 

camps (often called United Nations container camps), and existing facilities adapted for our use. 

Eagle headquallers. is the most traditional type 

of base camp in Bosnia. The dwellings are 

hardback, general purpose, medium tents with 

wwd floors, sides, and frames. Boardwalks in 

most camps keep soldiers out of the mud. Task 

Farce Eagle instituted a self-help program, 

which provides some materials for soldiers to 

build shelves, load-bearing equipment racks. 

and other quality-of-i~fe improvements. 

The daiiy ration cycle is A-MRE-A (hot 

meal; meai. ready-toeat; hat meal). Most 

base camps supplement the lunch MRE with 

soup, bread, and salad or occasionally serve 

a hot meal. Mess halls are frequently run by 

or in conjunction with contradors. At Tuda 

Main, the mess hall is run by contractors and 

is in an old Yugoslavian Army mess hall. 

(Photo, right) 

This photo shows the difficult 

cond~tions under which many of the 

base camps are built. The tracked 

vehicle is from the 40th Engineer 

Banaiion. The buildings in the 

background are Vpicai of those in the 

zone of separation. They are either 

destroyed or strtpped of useful items. 

including window and door frames. 
(Photo, left) 

This bunker is at Lisa Base, 

headquarters of the Zd Brigade 

Combat Team. The bunker is a 

standard design developed by the 

engineer brigade. It must pass brigade safety and construction 

standards inspections before it is 

certified as complete. 

(Photo, right) 

This is Steel Castle, home of the 

division engineers and division 

artillery.The engineer flag flies at the 

94th Engineer Battalion (C)(H). Steel 

Castle is a Farce Provider camp. 

Each Force Provider module can 

support 550 soldiers and is 

comfonable, with electricity, heat, 

and air condiioning. 

Steel Castle is built on a dirt 

Gravel has been laid for all of the 

camp, as for other base camps and 

the entire area of responsibility, is a 

major concern for engineer units. 

",. *. 

camp is made from military-owned 

demountable containers (MILVANs) 

with windows, doors, air conDecember 1996 Engineer 19 
(Photo. right) 

Thisview at a container base camp 


in the 2d Brigade sector shows 


eievated CONEXes and boardwalks. 


Off the boardwalks. the mud is two feet 


deep In places and probably was 


deeper early in the sprlng. A similar 


CONEX camp design links the 


containers into barracks. 


Construction Effort 

The primary engineer mission during my stay in Bosnia was construction. Mine-clearing operations in the zone of separation 

were important, but the construction effort clearly drove the engineer train. In Task Force Eagle, the division engineer brigade 

was responsible for construction. The 130th Engineer Brigade was on the other side of the Sava River, not in Task Force Eagle's 

area of responsibility. Division engineers also managed the Class IV construction materials. 

To complete their construction mission, the division engineer brigade obtained construction management sections from the 

130th, the 94th Engineer Battalion, and the 535th and the 362d Combat Support Equipment (CSE) Companies. Division 

engineers originally asked for a group headquarters to help manage these corps assets, but that request was not approved. 

The construction management section provided planning, management, and quality assurance for the division engineers, and 

the 94th furnished design work. Both units had the Theater Construction Management System, but problems with the hardware 

were not resolved during my stay. 

(Photo, left) 

Constructing parking lots and roads 

keeps every hortzontai asset in country 

busy. Soil conditions throughout the area 

of responsibility are terrible, and laying 

gravel on the muddy subgrade does not 

salve the problem. Mud percolates 

through the gravel and causes the 

structures to fail. The solution is to use 

geotextile fabrics before laying down the 

gravel. Since geotextiles are not available 

through the military system. Task Force 

Eagle purchased large quantities 

commerciaily. We should gel these 

geotextiles a national stock number and 

maintain them in the supply system. 

..-*c.-.,. , 

20 Engineer December 1996 
(Photo, left) 

Bosnia's extremely weak infrastmdure was neglected during the war, and we 

have weakened it further Main suppiy route maintenance is a major mncem 

thrwahout the COUntW. The 94th did some paving operations. as shown above and in 

the next photo. soldiers in Task Force ~aile lilied potholes with gravel, cold patch. 

and hot asphalt. Much of this work was done under contract and was paid lor by either 

NATO or Task Force Eagle, depending on the route and location 

(Phota, below) 

The division enaineer banalions are deeolv involved with construction. in addition , . to building bunkers, two-man fighting positions and erecting hardback tents. combat 

engineers completed projects like the bridge abutment shown here. This abutment is 

for an armored vehicle-launched bridae (AVLBI on the entrance road to a base camp. 

The 3620 Comoal Support El. rmrnt Co-pany prcvrw, tne neavy cqulpmenl ana 

tno Assa. 1 n-n Obsla~e Platorn R Com~anv4Un Fng neers o 0 lne rest Tnls s a 

fairly significant project lor an engineer battalion with the current force structure. 

(Photo, left) 

This is another view of m e AVLB 

abutment. Sandbags will eventually 

cover the structure on the river side 

fa ~rotect itfrom erosion. 

December 1996 Engineer 21 
Current Engineer Battalion Strengths and Shortfalls 

Operation Joint Endeavor highlights both strengths and weaknesses of the current division engineer brigade structure. The 

benefits having an engineer brigade commander and staff at the division level and battalion commanders and staffs supporting 

maneuver brigades cannot be overemphasized. The ability of brigades to receive diverse engineer units and to synchronize 

their efforts in support of the division is a force multiplier that cannot be replaced by an ad hoc or nonorganic headquarters. The 

habitual relationship between engineer battalion headquarters and maneuver brigades in Bosnia enhanced staff integration of 

the brigade combat team. It also allowed engineer company commanders and especially platoon leaders to focus on mission 

execution. The result is accomplishment of the diverse missions described in this article. The basic structure of the divisional 

engineer brigade is an excellent starting point for the engineer organization of Force XXI. 

Despite the soundness of the basic structure, Operation Joint Endeavor highlights several deficiencies in the organization, 

equipment, and training of battalions configured under the engineer restructure initiative (ERI). My intent here is not to try and 

turn back the clock in our structure, change the primary focus from warfighting to peacekeeping, or propose a wish list that our 

resources cannot support. I understand the manpower and fiscal limitations we must work with. I believe, however, that we must 

identify our current shortfalls in order to design the best engineer structure for Force XXI. 

Operation Joint Endeavor is the first true operational test of the ERI concept. It represents our most likely future operationspeace enforcement (with or without forced entry) into a theater with a poor infrastructure and a focus on force protection. From 

an engineer perspective, Joint Endeavor is not very different from Operation Desert Shield: entry into a theater without preexisting U.S. facilities, no immediate combat operations, great demands for force protection, and significant construction 

requirements. 

The primary mission of a division engineer brigade is to provide the force with mobility and countermobility support. I believe 

that, with some minor changes, division engineers can maintain that capability and provide critical survivability and sustainment 

support as well. 

Maintenance 

The maintenance organization in the divisional engineer battalion is not robust enough to support dispersed companies 

during extended operations. The small contact team attached to the companies from the battalion motor pool is usually headed 

by an E5 soldier. This noncommissioned officer lacks the maintenance management experience and training required to run 

company maintenance operations. Maintenance support problems are compounded by the low-density, unique equipment in 

the engineer company. Class IX requisitions and direct-support jobs for dispersed companies cannot be easily supported by one 

engineer unit-level logistics system (ULLS) computer. If the company goes through the task force for supplies (which is not 

doctrinally correct for direct support), then the engineer battalion loses sight of the maintenance status of the company. 

Maintenance for the small emplacement excavator (SEE) and the armored combat earthmover (ACE) was especially 

challenging during Operation Joint Endeavor. The two key maintenance leaders in the motor pool-the maintenance technician 

and the motor sergeant-are both wheeled-vehicle maintenance experts. This doesn't make sense because the pacing items 

are all tracked vehicles. 

I Shortlalls I Fixes I 

rn The E5 soldier in the maintenance contact team lacks 

maintenance management experience. 

rn Add enough E6 slots for each company contact team. I 

rn One ULLS computer cannot supporl the companies in a rn Add three ULLS computers and clerks to operate them. 

dirwct-support role. 

I rn 

The ratlo of one 628 mechanic to 45 pieces of equipment 

is insufficient. 

rn Add 628 mechanics. 

rn The maintenance technician and motor sergeant are both rn Change one maintenance technician to an engineer vehicle 

trained to maintain wheeled rather than tracked vehicles. maintenance technician. 

Construction Management 

During Operation Joint Endeavor, division engineers were tasked to manage all in-theater construction, which they 

accomplished with a construction management section obtained from the 130th Engineer Brigade. Task Force Eagle created 

the "Base Camp Coordinating Agency" to help manage requirements and priorities for base camp construction. 

22 Engineer December I996 
The construction challenges of Operation Joint Endeavor highlighted our need to develop a frame of mind that recognizes 

that both "combat" and "construction" engineers must be able to manage construction. This concept should be stressed in the 

Engineer Officer Basic Course and reinforced in the Advanced Course. In addition, the Combat Training Centers should include 

this concept in their training. 

At the conclusion of Operation Joint Endeavor, the Engineer School should take a hard look at the division engineer brigade 

staff. Based on input from the 1st Engineer Brigade, they should determine if the staff is robust enough to manage the wide 

range of operations expected of it. 

Haul Capability 

Shortfalls 

rn No significant construction management capability exists 

in the division engineer brigades or in the battalions. 

The division engineers obtained a construction management section from the 130th Engineer Brigade. 

The battalions appointed either a captain or a lieutenant 

as their construction ofticer. 

The current engineer battalion structure does not have the haul capacity to self-deploy on a contingency mission to an 

austere theater or to conduct extended operations. The motor pool cannot break its prescribed load list (PLL) into separate 

trucks to send to dispersed companies. This capability is a key requirement for low-density equipment for which the task force 

does not carry PLL. The motor pool has extremely limited Class IV haul capability in a theater where the demand for Class IV 

material drives much of the engineer mission. 

Fixes 

rn Stress construction management in both the Englneer Officer 

Basic and Advanced Courses. 

Determine if the division engineer brigade staff needs to be 

more robust. 

Earth-Moving Assets 

Shortfalls 

Engineers cannot transport ail MTOE and tables of distribution 

and allowances (TDA) materiel. 

Engineers cannot transport Class IV unit basic load (UBL). 

rn The motor pool cannot haul its PLL and tool room or disperse 

PLL to the companies. 

Because soil conditions are poor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, earth-moving assets are in great demand. The only asset 

organic to the division engineers is the ACE. It does many things well, but it cannot move dirt like a D7 Dozer. The division 

engineers have no equipment to haul gravel and sand. Earth-moving and fill materials were both in demand early in the 

deployment. 

Demands on corps construction units were heavy throughout the first several months. The units could not provide all of the 

support required by the maneuver brigades. If engineer battalions had earth-moving and fill capabilities, they could provide 

much more support to the maneuver brigades. As il is, the battalions have little to offer from their organic assets. 

Fixes 

rn Add six dump trucks to the engineer banalion's support 

platoon. 

rn Add two 5-ton cargo trucks to the support platoon for 

use by the battalionmotor pool. 

December 1996 

Shortfalls 

rn Division engineers lack construction earth-movingcapability. 

rn Corps construction units could not fill the immediateearth-moving 

needs of maneuver units upon forced entry. 

Division engineers have no dump trucks to move even limited 

amounts of fill. 

Fixes 

m Replace two ACES with 07 Dozers and lowboys in 

each engineer line company. If this is not possible, add 

at least three D7 Dozers to the battalion support platoon. 

Add four to six dump trucks to the battalion support 

platoon. 
Carpentry Skills 

In Bosnia, 128 engineers built protective bunkers and wood fighting positions, repaired buildings, and erected hardback 

tents, all requiring carpentry tasks that are rarely practiced in currently structured engineer battalions. Maintaining basic 

competence in these skills is not difficult, and engineers in Bosnia relearned the skills quickly. The main hindrance was a lack of 

power tools. While I do not promote bringing back the old pioneer tool trailer, I do promote putting some key power tools in a 

platoon carpenter's box. 

Class IV Management 

Shortfalls 

Some deploying units did not train on carpentry skllls 

needed in Bosnia. 

Carpentry boxes had essentially been banded and stored. 

Lack of power toois diminished the 12B construction 

capability. 

As is frequently the case, engineers in Operation Joint Endeavor were given the mission of managing Class IV construction 

materials. This was a major logistical planning and management challenge as well as a material-handling and transportation 

challenge. As part of the Class IV management mission, engineer companies assumed responsibility for running the Class IV 

storage yards. While engineer battalions have one forklift, which is usually old and difficult to maintain, engineer companies 

have no material-handling equipment. Engineers had to borrow the equipment needed to manage stockpiles of lumber, wire, 

and geotextiles. Since they were the primary users of Class IV materials, transportation of the materials also fell to them. As 

currently structured, battalions are light in haul assets just as they are in material-handling equipment. 

Flxes 

Recognize that carpentry remains a 128 mission, even in currently structured battalions. 

Use self-help and post projects to maintain a minimum level of 

carpentryskills in the unit. 

Field a platoon carpenter's box with two skill saws, two power 

drills, and two electric nail guns. 

1 Shortfalls 1 Fixes I 

Engineers were responsible for Class IV man- Assume that engineers have the Class IV construction material mission. 

agement. Fillthe divislon engineer brigade S4 or assistant 54 slot with a rnultifunctional logistics officer. 

Units lacked sufficient material-handling equip- Field one SEE forldifl attachment to each engineer company. 

ment. Replaceandlor maintain the banalion forklift I 

Units lacked sufficient haul capability to move rn Increase the haul capacity of the current engineer battalions. 

Class IV materials. 1 

Conclusion 

I realize that we don't have the resources to do all the "fixes" in the accompanying charts. However, the capabilities that those 

fixes represent are ones that we must consider as we move toward Force XXI. As our missions diversity, we must break the 

recent trend of limiting the division engineer brigade to offensive operations. As our missions become more diverse, our 

capabilities must keep pace. When the maneuver commander needs engineer work, be it breaching a minefield or building a 

base camp, he expects his engineers to be able todo it. We must ensure that he can. Y 

Major Goetz is attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Previous assignments include construction branch chief, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; company commander, 82d Engineer Baffalion 

during Desert Storm; maintenance detachment commander. 3rd Engineer Brigade, 3rd infantry Division; andmilitary observer to 

the U.N. mission in the western Sahara. 

24 Engineer December 1996 
The Engineer School: 


Providing Lessons Learned to the Force 


I would like to respond to your discussion of mine awareness training for units deploying to Operation Joint Endeavor (Engineer, August 

1996, page 12). 

me mine awarcncss training conducted for units deploying to Operation 

Joint Endeavor before January 1996 was developed independently by both 

the engineer nbscrvericontraller (OIC) teams at the Combat Manruver 

Training Center (CMTC) and by the 130th Engineer Brigade. The 16th 

Engineer Banalion's tralning plan (developed with assistance from the Engineer School) war used to win many of the corps assets and some of the divisional combat service support units at Grilf and at the home station^ 

However, the majoriy of the maneuvcr and combat support unitr in the brigade combat teamc were rrained using the CMTC mine-awareness propam. 

The mine-awareness training that has been and is currently required 

for all individual replaccmcnts and new units deploying to Operation 

Joint Endeavor was developed by thc engineer OICs at CMTC. Well 

over 14.000 soldiers have been trained since we started Individual 

Replacement Training (IRT) at CMTC in December 1995. In September 

1996, we trained an IRT Mobile Training Team (officers and NCOs 

from the 130th Engineer Brigade) that deployed to Fort Hood, Texas, to 

train morc than 500 cngiocers from the 62d Engineer Bnttdion. That 

training man from 1-10 October. 

The two progrms are similar in content and are gener:dly based an 

information in FM 20-32, Mine/Co~intei-mine Oprmrionr, FM 90-13-1. 

Combined Anns Breaching Oprmrio,?~, and the Engineer Conri~~gericy 

Hmdbook. The CMTC version also incorpordtes lessons learned from the 

Canadian and British armies and others. Since the deployment, we conlinue to update the instmction with lessons learned from Task Force 

Eagle, observations from OIC trips down range, and other sources. 

The following NCOs from the Grizzly Task Force OICs were instrumental in developing and executing mine-awareness haining at CMTC: 

SFC James Scher. MSG Herman Wells, and SFC Carlton Young. They 

did a great job with a difficult subject, and according to the feedback of 

the soldiers we trained it was "... the best training we ever had...." and 

"...a real eye opener ..." 

CFI Scott C. Johnson 

Engineer Company OIC, Grizzly 15 

Cornhat Maneuver Raining Center 

For Your Informotion: 

The CMTC Individunl Replacetnenr Training is n three-rluy profit-am 

that includes counrry on'enrorion, medin awarencrs, mler of engagement, negoriariuns, environrnortal rhreots, convoy opernrinns, mine 

awareness, countermine, siruarioml awareness (checkpainr opern~ 

lions), and force-proreclion classes. For each clnsr, we also detomre a 

live MI5 mine under o military veliicle to shmv rhe efecrs ofn mine 

rtrike. Classes usually hove rrbour 120 .srudertts. 

The Air Fo~ehas o one~dny class ar Ramstein, Germmy. rho1 

selected individuals onend. 1know they cover mine awareners, bur 1 

have never seen the program of imlrucrion or talked to anyone who 

ortended the clasr. 

Autlzor's reply: 

1 did not intrnrl ro slight CMTCS gzat efl,,rl.,,ls in i~oisirig rheforre in 

ntine awareness. Their success is dcmomtmred in the low cnsualry rarer 

lhar Task Force Engle has srrsiahied from mines. My poinr wrii only ro 

illusnate rhar when necessagz Ihc Engineer School ir capable ofsrcpporfing rheficld dimcrlg wirh subjecr mniter expcrrr The school never sought 

10 ssul>plo,2t rhe effons of CMTC, oniy ro arrirr wirh rhe training "surge" 

tho1 is o normalgnn of any comirtgency operorion deploymmt. 

MAJ David Brinkley 

Maintaining the MlCLIC 

The article entitled "Maintaining the MICLIC" in the August 1996 

issue of Engirtctr was very informative and gavc us insight into practices and problems associated with the usc of the system in thc field. 

This office is responsible for managing the system, to include the end 

item, and for supply. maintenance, and publications for all Army applications. Input such as yours can be very beneficial to us. 

On page 45, the article specified using a ratchet strap to secure the 

launcher rail with the rocket to lhe launcher We agree with the information in the paragraph except for the use of the ratchet strap. This could 

caily cnuse he rail to be distorted, thereby causing a problem with the 

launch process. 

If the crew thinks it is necessary, tle the Launcher to the front of the 

line charge conminer rail with four interconnected bungee swaps. Pages 

2-74 and 2-75 of the draft TM 9-1375-215-13&P give detailed instructions. (Please note that the revised TM has been changed from a -14&P 

to a 13&P manual). 

In response to another inquiry, this office prepared a point paper 

regarding several othcr problems mentioned in your article. 

Thank you for placing this office on the Engineerrnailing list. In the 

future, closer coordination with our offices may be of mutual benefit. 

Denise Springmeier 

Chief, MBOIFOV, Mines 

Armor Product Center 

Author's reply: 

We are pleascd thnr Ms. Spririgmeier hod an npponmiry ro read lhe 

or-iicle mtd rhor many of the issuer Ornughr up in the article ore inco~orated into rhe new TM rho1 will be publirhed in rhe near furur?. 

Although we do nor disagree wirh using bungee srraps inrreudofcargn 

srraps. I will ray rho1 ir~ the past iwo years the Narioncll Training Cenrer 

(NTCJhos nor had a problem a~sociored wirh using cargo itraps (the 

NTC launches up rm four MICLlCs per rnonrh). This anicle wos wrirren 

osparrqf theNTCk arrempr to reverse identified trend.r wirh this equipment We appmciare rhe,fnct rhar Engineer was oble to get rhL informarim quickly to rhe forre and rho1 ir also was seen by the people 

responsible,for managing the MlCLlC sydem. 

CPT Joe Birchmeier 

December 1996 Engineer 25 
heading the Way Together: 


New Doctrine for Joint Engineer Operations 


By Lieutenant Colonel JohnP Paczkowski 

Much has been written in this magazine and elsewhere 

concerning the need lor hetrer doctrine governing 

joint engineer operations. I am pleased to report that 

we have made considerable progress in this regard during the 

past 12 months. With input obrained from a broad cross section of the joint engineering community, we have reached 

consensus among the flag officers responsible for engineering in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. More 

significantly, the Director for Logistics (14) of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has endorsed the need and will be the 

principal sponsor of thc effort to move proposed changes 

through the doctrine-developrncnt mill. 

We are on the threshold of an intensive effort to craft new 

doctrine for joint engineer operations. Therefore, it is important tbat military and civilian engineers at all levels of each 

service understand the forces driving these changes and the 

direction in which rhe new doctrinc is heading. We can argue 

details within our own community, but we must all "sing 

from the same hymnhook" as we actively promote these 

ideas to the commanders we serve and our counterparts in 

other combat and service support functions. 

The following paragraphs describe the joint service 

team's efforts to define the need and set the wheels in motion 

for development of the new doctrine. That information is followed by key portions of the white paper prepared by the 

team. The white paper defines the terms of reference for the 

service, Unified Command, and Joint Staff engineers 

involved in moving the issuc 1-orward. 

Background 

n n February 1993, the Joint Staff J4 comlnissioned the 

joint Engineer Interoperability Working Group (EIWG), 

which is composed of senior engineers from each of the 

four service headquarters. An outgrowth of experience 

acquired in the roles and missions review, the EIWG is an 

ongoing forum to identify and initiate actions that address 

issues pertaining to interservice coordination and interoperability. An early priority of the working group was the perceived need for better JCS guidance on the conduct of joint 

and combined engineer operations. 

In September 1993, the ElWG prepared a draft standing 

operating procedure (SOP) for contingency engineering 

slaffs as a way to bridge the gap in joint doctrine. Unfortunately, the draft was not well received by reviewers. It was 

seen as being too prescriptive, "in the weeds" regarding staff 

organization and procedures, and did not adequately address 

the lack of overarching engineer doctrine. Given this reaction 

and the pressure of other business. the doctrine initiative was 

put on hold. The EIWG revived it in June I995 when, as a 

working group member, the director of the Navy's Seabee 

Programs Office (OPNAV-N446) requested assistance from 

the Naval Reserve Contingency Engineering Programs 

(NRCEP). 

Making It Happen 

he NRCEP began organizing an EIWG subgroup for 

joint engineer doctrine in Septemher 1995. Although it 

bad no fixed organization and membership varied with 

time, the suhgroup eventually included about 40 military and 

civilian engineers, who represented a cross section of the 

community. Members included both active duty and reserve 

personnel from staffs of the commanders in chief (CINC) of 

the regional commands, major component and service headquarters, doctrine centers, and engineer schools. With limited 

ability to meet due to distance and travel costs, the subgroup 

functioned as a "virtual" team with most interaction occurring via e-mail and fax. The subgroup's work was accomplished in five phases. 

Phase I - Organization and Research - Potential 

"stakeholders" were contacted in September and October 

1995 to invite their participation in the effort. Background information concerning the issue along with the 

names of people who might provide valuable input were 

solicited. Initial service and CINC positions regarding 

the need for doctrine were assessed, and potential "hot 

button" issues were identified. Command directives, 

articles, whitc papers, after-action reports, and lessons 

learned werc collected, reviewed, and circulated to team 

members. 

26 Engineer December 1996 
"We are on the threshold of an intensive 


effort to craft new doctrine for joint 


engineer operations." 


Phase II - Defining the Problem - Based on data gathered in Phase I, the subgroup planned a meeting to define the 

joint doctrine issue and determine a shared strategy for succeeding steps. The two-day session was conducted in 

December 1995 at the headquarters of the Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command in Alexandria, Virginia. A key product was an outline for a white paper that would become the 

primary vehicle for gaining interservice agreement and communicating the issue to a broad audience. 

Plwse III - Building Consensus - The work of the subgroup, including the initial draft of the white paper, was presented at the Joint Engineer conference in Norfolk, Virginia, 

in February 1996. The presentation generated considerable 

discussion on the need for joint doctrine and culminated in 

several well-attended breakout sessions. These sessions dealt 

with doctrine and related issues. such as training for joint 

engineer operations, joint engineer planning systems and 

procedures, and environmental management. 

Phase IV- Winning Executive Commitment - With input 

gained from the conference, the subgroup revised the white 

paper and issued the final copy in mid-May 1996.This paper 

formed the basis of a briefing on joint engineer doctrine and 

training issues to the Engineer Interoperability Review Board 

in late July. Chaired by the Joint Staff 14, the Review Board 

provides executive oversight for the EIWG; it includes flag 

officers from each servicc with engineering responsibilities. 

At the conclusion of the July briefing, the Review Board 

unanimously agreed to advance a proposal for new doctrine 

to the 17 (Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate), with the 14 electing to be the sponsor. The Amy, 

through the Engineer School, accepted the task of shepherding the proposal though the JCS review proccss. The Navy, 

through the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, agreed 

to formulate a proposal for broad-based education in joint 

engineer operations, as recommended in the white paper. 

Phase V - Gaining Joint StaffApproval - In late August, 

the 14 transmitted the proposal for new doctrine to the 57. 

This action also added the proposal to the agenda for the 

biannual Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), held on 22-

23 October. Coordinated by the Joint Warfighting Center at 

Fort Monroe, Virginia, the JDWP includes representatives 

from the semicc headquarters and the CINCs, who review 

proposals for changes to joint doctrine. 

Prior to hosting the JDWP, the Joint Warfighting Center 

December 1996 

conducted a front-end analysis to assess justification for the 

proposed changes and recommend actions to be taken by the 

JDWP. The front-end analysis, completed on 3 October, recommended that new joint engineer doctrine be developed. Following extensive lobbying by members of the subgroup, the 14's 

engineer staff presented the doctrine proposal on 22 October. 

Based on thc presentation by the 14 engineer staff and the 

favorable recommendations presented by the Joint Warfighting Center, as reflected in its front-end analysis, the JDWP 

recommended development of new overarching joint engineer doctrine. In addition, the JDWP endorsed placing this 

publication in the "3" (operations) series. This important 

decision recognizes the broad span of engineer functions in 

support of operations. As such, it begins to resolve problems 

that often result from type-casting engineering as primarily a 

logistics function at the joint force level. 

Next Steps 

With JDWP approval in hand, the 17 will soon issue a 

directive assigning the Army as lead agent and 

TRADOC as the primary review authority (PRA). 

As PRA, TRADOC will coordinate the joint service 

doctrine-development effort, with the Army Engineer School 

in direct support. 

With TRADOC and the Army Engineer School poised to 

take the lead, the work of the EIWG subgroup on joint engineer doctrine is complete. However, the EIWG and the 

Review Board will continue to monitor progress until a new 

publication is fielded, probably within the next 18 to 24 

months. I encourage you, particularly those of you with 

experience in joint and combined operations, to step forward 

and "lead the way" by contributing to this endeavor as it 

gains momentum over the coming months. 

Lieutenant Colonel Paczkowski, a contingency engineeringplanner msigned to the installations and Logistics Branch, 

Heudqwrters U.S. Marine Corps, is the Marine Corps liaison 

to the staff of the Director; Naval Reserve Contingency 

Engineering Programs. He previowly served as a Marine 

urlvisor to the Reserve Naval Consnucrion Force and as the 

force engineer; Fleet Marine Force Europe. Lt Col Paczkowski 

chaired the EIWG subgroup on joint engineer doctrine and is 

primary author of the subgroup's white paper: He holds a 

master's degree in management engineering from New Jersey 

Institute of Technology. 
The Need for Joint Engineer Doctrine: 


Excerpts from a white paper by the joint engineer community 

Edited by Lieutenant Colonel John F1 Paczkowski 

The absence of a well-developed 

program of joint doctrine for 

contingency enxineering threatens 

the effective employment of forces and 

needlessly increases the costs and 

risk inherent in joint and multinational operarions. 

The Issue 

Biminishing resources, reduced 

force stsncture, and an 

increasingly complex geopolitical environment have placed 

demands on the U.S. military to 

improve the effectiveness of joint and 

combined operations. In response, the 

Joint Staff. Unified Commands, 

Component Commands and service 

planners are revising joint and service 

publications, operations plans, standing operating procedures (SOP), and 

training programs to reflect these 

realities. Unfortunately, development 

of comprehensive joint contingency 

engineer doctrine and its integration 

with other joint and service doctrine 

havc not kept pace with these reforms. 

The fundamental role of 

engineering in support of joint and 

combined operations is not receiving a 

level of attention and focus consistent 

with its importance. As a con1 sequence, the full potcntial of 

1 engineering as a critical element of 

operational maneuver is not fully 

exploited and sometimes is taken for 

granted by senior combatant 

, commanders. Consideration of key 

1 engineer functions critical to mission 

1 success is often absent from seniorlevel decisionmaking. This absence 

sometitnes hampers engineer staff 

actions and inhibits effective planning, 

task organization, and the synchI ronized employment of engineer 

resources by joint or combined forces. 

I 

~~~~~i~ ,f contingency I Engineering 

1

n the early 1980s, European 

Command (EUCOM) concluded 

that an all-out confrontation with 

1 the Warsaw Pact would cause keen 

; competition within the joint force for ! engineer resources and that a 

mechanism for interservice coordination and setting priorities would 

he needed. Accordingly, they designated the dominant service in each 

EUCOM region as Regional Wartime 

Construction Manager (RWCM), with 

responsibility for coordinating all U.S. 

military construction in that region. 

! By CINC directive, each RWCM was 

to augment its engineer staff with 

representatives from other services as 

needed to meet its responsibilities. 

As the Cold War came to a close, 

the U.S. military turned its attention to 

limited intensity conflicts and military 

operations other than war (MOOTW). 

The phrase wartime construction 

management was replaced with 

contingency engineering management 

to reflect the broader role of military 

engineering from peacetime contingency to war. The U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) employed 

contingency engineering management 

during the Persian Gulf War. Lessons 

learned from that conflict and lesser 

contingencies since then led to 

contingency engineering initiatives by 

the other regional CINCs. Today, 

contingency engineering is viewed 

within the engineer community as the 

overarching concept for coordinating 

joint engineer operations. However, 

these concepts are not yet fully 

developed or incorporated into 

doctrine. 

The Critical Role of Engineering 

When its full range of 

capabilities are employed, 

military engineering can be 

28 Engineer December I996 
a significant force multiplier for the "TO fully exploit combatant commander. It aids overall 

success by shaping to best advantage military engineering at 

a variety of conditions under which 

military operations must be con- the operational level, the 

ducted. In particular, the contingency 

engineering concept ensures that joint or combined force 

maximum benefit is obtained from the 

eneineer - assets available. commander must 

Military engineering provides support to the intelligence and recognize it as an 

operational planning efforts by essential aspect of his analyzing the effects of terrain, 

hydrology, and infrastructure, and Scheme of maneuver in 

identifying potential targets. It speeds . -. . 

force flow by assessing shortfalls and an overall campaign 


improving needed facilities, in-


cluding air and sea ports of plan involving naval, air, 


debarkation, force-beddown sites, 
 and land forces ... 1, 

and lines of communication. Military 

engineering also provides associated 

facility operation and maintenance 

and fire-fighting capability. It facil- is centered on expeditionary or 

itates operational maneuver and force combat-related activities, primarily of 

protection by providing bridging, a service concern. Between these two 

expeditionary airfietds, facility war- is the operational level (i.e., subunified 

damage repair, explosive-ordnance commands and joint or combined task 

disposal, barriers, and defensive forces), where campaigns are planned 

fortifications. Military engineering and fought. At this level, there must be 

also plays essential roles in disaster balanced emphasis on both deliberate 

recovery and humanitarian relief and combat engineer activities. 

operations, environmental compliance I To fully exploit military enand mitigation, and chemical and gineering at the operational level, Ihe 

biological widc-area decontamination. , joint or cornbincd force commander 

The importance of military must recognize it as an essential aspect 

enginecring spans the continuum from of his scheme of maneuver in an 

the strategic to the operational to the overall campaign plan involving 

tactical levels of war, and the focus of naval, air, and land forces, as 

the engineer effort varies ac- ; appropriate.Theobjectofoperational 

cordingly. Thc CINCs are primarily maneuver is to orchestrate movements 

concerned with the overall de- and engagements to seize, exploit, 

ployment of forces in the context of I
, retam, or deny freedom of action to 

theater war plans. Thus, engineering support the achievement of a common 

at the strategic level tends to locus on set of objectives. Frecdom of action 

major facilities, thcatcr-wide con- allows the efficient concentration of 

struction management policy, and the I tnilitary capability when, where, and 

allocation of scarce engineer re- how it is needed; it applies to 

sources. At the other end of the 1 operations in both peacetime and war. 

spectrum, tactical-level engineering I

I At the operational level, freedom of 

December 1996 

action can be achieved only through 

careful planning and seamless execution of deliberate and combat 

engineer functions in a wellsynchronized and, where necessary, 

integrated effort. 

Sufficient engineer resources to 

satisfy all requirements probably will 

not be available in all contingencies. 

Also, the nature of engineer priorities 

changes as a contingency evolves from 

reception, staging, and onward movement to force protection, operational 

maneuver, and ultimately, termination 

of operations and withdrawal. Resource limitations and the associated 

challenge of matching requirements 

with the right capability at the right 

place and time make it essential that 

the full range and versatility of all 

engineer assets be exploited. 

Maximizing the use of resources to 

meet the needs encountered at each 

stage of an operation will often depend 

on the flexible use and, when 

necessary, task organization of troop 

construction, civilian contractor, and 

host-nation capabilities as integrated 

elements of a total contingency 

eng~neering effort. Given the unique 

requirements of a particular contingency, it will also require a welltrained joint engineer staff that is 

appropriately positioned to most 

effectively influence the full range of 

engineer functions. 

Deficiencies in Current Joint 

Doctrine 

Despite its importance to the 

overall success of joint operations and general acceptance 

of contingency engineering as the 

overarching concept for coordination 

of the joint engineer eCfort by the 

regional CINCs, there is no clearly 

defined program of enginecr doctrine 

in the joint publication hierarchy. 

Engineer 29 
What doctrine exists is incomplete 

and, at times, contradictory. 

Joint Publication 4-04, Joint 

Doctrine for Civil Engineering 

Support, is assumed to be the 

"capstone" manual and, thus, the 

primary source of guiding doctrine on 

joint engineer matters for combatant 

commanders and their staffs. Though 

perhaps sufficient as general guidance 

for engineer management at the CINC 

level. it falls short of being adcquatc 

overarching doctrine across the full 

spectrum of joint opcralions. In 

particular, it fails to present principles 

underpinning the naturc of cngineer 

support for operational maneuver at 

the joint or combined task-force level 

and does not address gaps and 

inconsistencies elsewhere in joint 

doctrinc. Finally, it does not reflect 

lessons learned from recent operations 

lo the extent that they relate to 

engineer force organization, staff 

placement, and operations planning. 

Consequently, each regional CINC 

is pursuing his own approach to 

contingency engineering, and implementation varies widely. Several 

major service commands, both active 

and reserve, have incorporated unique 

versions of thc concept into their SOPS, 

training, and support relationships. 

Most recently, both the Army and the 

Navy have initiated comprehensive 

efforts to revise their service doctrine to 

reflect their views of contingency 

enginccring considerations. USACOM, 

in its expanded role as joint force 

trainer, has independently established a 

training program for contingcncy 

engineering staff. These efforts are 

positive in that they serve to develop 

and promote application of the 

contingency engineering concept, but 

they are not coordinated with one 

another and lack a common base in 

joint doctrine. 

The inadequacy of Joint 

Publication 4-04 as overarching 

doctrine becomes clearer when 

viewed in light of the key elements of 

military engineering it does not fully 

cover but that are considered 

significant enough to be addressed in 

other joint publications, typically in 

the operations or "3" serics. They 

include, but are not limited to, Joint 

Publication 3-10. JTTP for Rear Area 

Operutiuns, and Joint Publication 3-

10.1, JTTP for Base Defense, which 

address aspects of survivability and 

sustainment support engineering. Also 

significant is Joint Publication 3-15, 

Barriers, Obstucles, and Mine 

Warfare, which deals with achieving 

operational advantage through 

mobility and counternobility engineering. 

There are also significant gaps in 

joint guidance concerning arcas such 

as topographic engineering, engineer 

intelligence, common design standards, real-estate acquisition, environmental mitigation, disaster recovery, wide-area decontamination, and 

engineer support for deep operations 

and targeting e employment of 

FASCAM and future intelligent widearea munitions). 

Logistics Paradigm and the 

Engineer Staff 

erhaps the most significant 

impediment to full and effective 

use of engineer resources in any 

contingency arises from the traditional 

view that, aside from the most basic 

combat-related tasks, engineering is 

predominantly a logistics function that 

is primarily concerned with the 

construction of facilities in support of 

the sustainment effort. The only joint 

guidance available, Joint Publication 

4-04, reflects this view and is replete 

with references to "civil engineering" 

and "facilities," but noticeably silent 

with regard to the enginecr functions 

of mobility, counter~nobility, survivability, and topographic enginccring as 

these relate to support of combat 

operations. This logistics paradigm is 

reflected in the staff organizations of 

major combatant and scrvice commands, where engineering typically is 

a J4 function. 

Four of the five regional CINCs 

have placed engineering under the J4 

and have developed internal policies 

for contingcncy engineering based on 

this approach. The 54 model may be 

workable at the strategic or CINC 

levels, particularly in peacetime when 

the focus is on deliberate planning and 

facilities development. However, recent experience indicates this approach does not always work during 

contingencies. This is particularly true 

at the joint task- forcc levcl. Given the 

nature of current guidance, joint force 

commanders have a tendency to view 

the engineer function in its strategic 

(sustainment engineering) or tactical 

(combat engineering) extrcmes. They 

oiten fail to recognize or rully 

capitalize on the advantages of a total 

engineer effort that is integrated as an 

essential part of their operational 

scheme of maneuver. Thus, joint taskforce staffs are often organized 

accordingly. 

At the joint task-force level, when 

subordinate to the J4, the staff 

engineer is not well positioned to 

coordinate or monitor the total 

contingency engineering effort in 

support of operational maneuver. The 

engineer's visibility in operational 

planning and decision making is 

significantly curtailed; interaction with 

and advice to other staff functions is 

unnecessarily limited; and independence and the ability to exercise 
initiative are diminished. The result 

tends to be engineer support for the 

joint force shaped solely through the 

eyes of the logistician; whose primary 

focus is on just one key aspect of the 

joint campaign: force sustainment. 

Placement within the J4 staff 

increases the likelihood that the full 

value of engineering will not he 

realized and that key engineer-related 

issues may not surface to the joint or 

comhined force commander in time 

for resolution. 

Neither Joint Publication 0-2, 

Unified Action Armed Forces, nor 

Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force 

Planning and Procedures, specifies 

staff placement of the engineer in the 

joint force structure. While Joint 

Publication 0-2 assigns supervision 

of engineer functions to the 54, Joint 

Publication 5-00.2 is contradictory on 

joint staff responsibility for engineering. It states that J3 responsibilities include mine warfare; 

rcconnaissaoce; rear-area protection 

and security; disaster relief; and 

mobility, countermohility, and survivMility operations, all of which are 

heavily engineer-related. However, it 

also states that J4 responsibilities 

include engineer reconnaissance and 

intelligence, bridge and river 

crossings, barrier operations, general 

construction, and base development 

and maintenance. Aside from base 

development and maintenance, each 

of the other responsibilities assigned 

to the J4 is more operational than 

logistics in nature and overlaps 

considerably with those of the 53. 

Although neither Joint Publication 

0-2 nor Joint Publication 5-00.2 

specifies placement of engineers, both 

publications reinforce the joint force 

commander's prerogative to organize 

the staffs as necessary to accomplish 

the mission in the few recent 

instances where the joint force staff 

''Fundamental to the 

nature of joint 

operations is the need to 

tailor force packages 

and command 

structures to suit the 

situation at hand." 

engineers were placed outside the 

1 logistics organization (i.e., as special 

I ' staff), the wisdom of affording the 

) englneer greater indcpendence was 

! ultimately validated. 

1 

I 

Joint Training

1 

1 

F undamental to the nature of joint 

' operations is the need to tailor 1 force packages and command 

structures to suit the situation at hand 

Although the joint force engineer staff 

initially may be built around the 

headquarters element of the dominant 

I component command, this staff I typically is augmented with in1 dividuals drawn from other components and agencies. Since the 

makeup and level of competence of ' thc engineer staff is critical to the 

ultimate effectiveness of the total ii engineer effort, it is important that 

these individuals have a common basis 

) for interacting as a team. Gaps and 

I inconsistencies in current joint 

doctrine and the lack of joint engineer 

I staff training programs make this

1 requirement difficult to achieve. 

TO a greater or lesser degree, 

regional CMCs and major component 

i commands have established directives 

and SOPS to provide local guidance on 

contingency engineering operations, 

hut approaches vary widely. It is 

apparent that these differences are not 

only due to the unique characteristics 

of a given area of responsibility 

(AOR) hut how, in the absence of 

adequate guiding doctrine, alternative 

views on the concept of contingency 

engineering have evolved over time. 

The lack of some appropriate level of 

uniformity in the application of these 

principles serves to confuse staff 

augmentees and may result in conflict 

between the way a ~najor component 

command and a regional CINC plan to 

conduct their operations. 

The lack of relevant doctrine and 

the limited number of personnel 

experienced in joint contingency engineering operations, combined with 

i the usual staff turbulence, causes a I 

1 situation where the same lessons are 

I relearned over and over. Oppor- 1 tunities to train service personnel in 

contingency engineering concepts are 

I !Eew. Engineers typically are not

permitted a strong presence in joint 

rierciws, and engineer issues are most 

1 often assumed away by operational I commanders. Although some major 

reserve organizations have the mission 

and capability to train and provide 

engineer staff augmentation (i.e., the 

Army Reserve's engineer commands 

and the Rcserve Naval Construction 

Force Support Command), these 

organizations will not he the first to 

provide personnel to go "down range." 

A larger pool of active duty engineers 

from each service must he trained in 

contingency engineering techniques. 

However, this assumes a common base 

in joint doctrine and interservice 

compromise on engineer staff 

practices. 

I In its role as joint trainer for 1 assigned CONUS-based forces and 

joint task force staffs, USACOM has 

December 1996 Engineer 31 
developed and implemented a 1 	 pose important implications for the ( c) Revise both Joint Publications Oprogram of instruction (POI) for i successful planning and execution of 2 and 5-00.2, Joint Task Force 

Engineer Support to Joint Task future joint and combined operations. Planning and Procedures, to resolve 

Forces. In addition, the Army's Battle Steps must be taken now to the ambiguity and/or potential conflict 

Command Training Program (BCTP) systematically improve joint doctrine, in responsibility concerning engineer 

concept is being adapted to exercise engineer planning systems, and staff matters between the joint task force J3 

joint task force commanders and training programs to flexibly meet the and the J4. 

staffs. This "JBCTP" focuses on joint needs of current and future d) Revise Joint Publication 5-00.2 

staff practices, planning, and doctrine contingencies. to outline the principles and options 

as well as tactics, techniques, and governing engineer staff placement 

procedures. The USACOM POI and Recommendations and functions. 

the engineer component of the JBCTF' 	 1. Publish more effective guidance for 3. Develop joint tactics, techniques, 

are important steps forward in joint engineer operations; fully and procedures (ITTP) to amplify conproviding platforms for joint develop the concept of contingency cepts presented in a revised and/or 

contingency engineer training. How- engineering to reflect its evolving new publication and to fill spec~fic 

ever, these initiatives have been practice in the field. gaps identified in engineer doctrine. 

largely shaped from the perspective of a) Revise Joint Publication 4-04, a) Revise existing SlTPs and those 

the organizations that developed Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering in development to reflect the concept 

them. They do not reflect input from 	 Support, as interim and of contingency engineering and related 

an measure 

other combatant CINCs or the major develop a new publication to serve as principles, as presented in new 

service commands with direct overarching engineer doctrine. overarching doctrine. 

experience in contingency engineer- b) Ensure coverage of the full span b) Evaluate the need and propose 

ing operations. Developed in the of engineer functions-mobility, new JTTPs covering such topics as, 

absence of clear jo~nt guidance as countermohility, survivability, topo- hut not limited to, topography, 

their foundation, these initiatives run graphy, and sustainment-in support environmental mitigation, civilian 

the risk of becoming joint doctrine by of operations. contracting, real estate, wide-area 

default. c) Define the broad role of the decontamination, disaster recovery, 

engineer in deliberate and crisis action and design standards. 

Conclusion planning and execution, to include 4. Pursue a comprehensive strategy to 

support for the intelligence, oper-	

increase knowledge of and compeI

n an era of reduced force size and 	 tence in joint contingency engineering 

limitations on strategic lift, it 

ations, and logistics efforts. operations among combatant comcannot be assumed that a joint or 2. Propose principles and options to manders and engineer staffs. 

guide joint commanders in staff orga- a) Establish a formal training combined force will have enough 

engineer resources when and where 	 nization and placement, and empha- program for joint force engineer staffs, 

size early involvement, freedom of building on work already completed they are required in a contingency. action, and ongoing visibility. by USACOM and the Army's Battle Therefore, it will he essential to get the a) Propose revisions to other Command Training Program. most out of the resources available. publications to ensure that references b) Promote a stronger role for The future development of joint to engineering throughout the doctrine engineers in Jomt Chiefs of Staff- engineer doctrine should do everything hierarchy are consistent with the sponsored exerclses and consider possible to support this need. concepts outlined in new, overarching formulation of an ongoing engineer Existing joint doctrine is doctrine. 	 exercise program to run in parallel. incomplete and fragmented. This, h) Revise Joint Publication 0-2, c) Introduce contingency engi- along with the view that engineering Unlfied Action Armed Forces, to 	 neering concepts and familiarization is primarily a logistics function with 	 elaborate on the importance of with emerging doctrine in the syllabus 
 an emphasis on force sustainment, has exercising flexibility in the position of of service and joint command schools. 
 hampered the efficiency of the total the staff engineer in accordance with 


engineer effort in support of the needs of a given contingency. "Engineers Lead The Way!" 


operational maneuver. These factors 	 hI 
By Captain Joseph E. Staton and StaffSergeant Clinton K. Brc 

/ oldiers participating in arctic operations must deal with S\ extremely cold temperatures, long periods of darkness,

and snow-covered terrain. In these conditions, simple 

tasks take much longer to accomplish, and new or complex 

tasks arc difficult to complete. Units must be prepared to 

live, eat, and rest in the open at temperaturcs far below zero. 

The environment is unforgiving and mistakes can bc costly. 

llis article provides information from several references 

and personal observations on reconnaissance of ice bridge 

sites and construction of ice bridges, which are one means of 

increasing mobility in scvere weather conditions. Under arctic conditions, mobility requires unique considerations. 

Cold temperatures and rapidly freezing water are beneficial in ice bridge construction, but they also create problems. 

Extreme cold takes a toll on soldiers as well as equipment. 

Since personnel involved in this type of construction are vulnerable to frostbite and hypothermia, tents are a necessity so 

that soldiers, hoses, and equipment have a place to thaw out. 

Ice Crossings 

I

ce bridgcs are a viable means of crossing rivers in an arctic environment, because they are inexpensive and field 

expedient. They free up tactical bridging assets for 

maneuver operations, do not need to be taken up, and potentially can carry heavy loads. Disadvantagcs are that they are 

dependent on weather. are manpower intensive (they must be 

monitored constantly), lake 2 to 8 weeks to build, and are 

usable only a few months of a year. 

In Alaska. the 47th and 23rd Engineer Companies conduct annual training on ice crossings. Near Fort Wainwright, 

the 47th constructs and maintains several ice bridges that 

provide land access to large arctic training arcas. 

Arctic Strike '96 

Recently, the 47th participated in Exercise Arctic Strike 

'96 at Fort Greely. The unit's primary mission was 

mobility and evaluation of possible crossing and helicopter landing sites. The exercise was a valuable training 

opportunity to work directly with and provide support to 

maneuver and aviation elements. 

Conditions for building an ice bridge were favorable. 

Temperatures had been well below zero for more than 60 

days, and the frozen rivers provided numerous crossing sites. 

Most of the exercise was conducted at temperatures ranging 

from -30 to -57 degrees Fahrenheit. When it warmed up to -20 

degrees, the windincreased and the wind chill was at or below 

-65 degrees. With this chill factor, preservation of personnelor asset conservation-was more important than the mission. 

Reconnaissance 

he success of a river-crossing operation depends on Tthe reconnaissance crew's assessment of possible 

crossing sites. The ice-reconnaissance crew is a 

squad-sized element consisting of a squad leader, an ice measurer, a recorder, four auger operators, and two soldiers to 

measure for the next hole. 

The crew uses an akio sled to transport the following 

equipment: 

Power augers (2) 

0 Hand augers (2) 

Dippers (2) 

Measuring rod (1) 

0 Measuring tape, 100-foot (1) 

Ice axes (2) 

Cl Fuel can, 5-gallon (I) 

Safety rope, 100-foot (1) 

Before the reconnaissance begins, the crew establishes 

security and erects a warming tent. Then it evaluates existing 

ice conditions to determine the best bridging method to use 

and the amount of time required to establish a crossing site. Ice 

uniformity varies along the length of a river or lake, and its 

thickness depcnds on snow depth, water current, and springs. 

An ideal crossing site meets the following requirements: 

R The river channel is straight at the crossing 

The river occupies one main channel and is widc enough 

to allow a slow current. 

The bank approaches are gradual (less than three percent). 

The site is not immediately downstream from creeks or 

streams or near open bodies of water. 

The site is near an existing road network. 

0 The ice is level. 

The ice is free of warm springs, sand bars, and deep snow 

drifts. 

December I996 Engineer 33 
Figure 1 - Freeboard 

To perform initial reconnaissance, the crew bores holes in 

(he ice, measures its thickness and freeboard (the amount of 

ice exposed in the hole above the waterline (Figure 1). and 

completes an ice bridge profile. 

The first hole is bored 20 feet downstream of the proposed centerline and 5 feet from the bank. Test hole distances 

and layout are shown in Figure 2. During the initial reconnaissance, the crew bores holes completely through the ice to 

ascertain how it is supported. They determine the bottom 

conditions and water depth under the ice, plot the borehole 

depths and the depth to the bottom, and estimate conditions 

between the holes by connecting the dots with a curve. Their 

ice bridge reconnaissance report includes: 

Horizontal and vertical scales 

Channel number of the bridge 

Classification data for that channel and whether the channel is critical or not (refer to the channcl with the lowest 

military load class [MLC]) 

Type of ice on the channel 

O Graph showing ice and water depth and air voids 

After the bridge profile is complete, the crew classifies 

the bridge using the following formulas: 

W = MLC (wheeled) = -(T~)CS

7 5-. Date of the reconnaissance and 

CI Individual and unit doing the profile 

0 Name of the bridge 

A = MLC (tracked) = -

(T')CS

Second HOI~ 

-

Figure 2 -Test Hole Layout 

December 1996 
Note: To provide a safety factor, round down to the next 

whole number. 

Where: T = ice thickness, in inches 


C = color factor (Table 1) 


S =strength factor (Table 2) 


Table 1. Determining Color Factor of Ice 

Factor Ice Color 	

I 1

Clear (transparent or black) 1.O 

Semiclear (both transparent and 0.9 

black and white layers) 

White (snow mixed with ice) 0.8 

Discolored (stained yellow or 0.7 

brown) 

Table 2. Determining Strength Factor of Ice 

I Ambient Temperature Condition 

Solid 	 Remained at or below freez- 1.O 


ing for the previous week 


Solid 	 Above freezing during the 


day, below freezing at night 
 I 0,9 
 1

Solid Water is running on the sur- 


face from runnoff or overflow 
! 0.8 
 1

Not solid 	 Water or air pockets are 

found between layers I I 

Has air 	 Ice is not supported by water 0.6 

under it 	 (freeboard is <90 percent) 1 O7 I 

The reconnaissance crew determines the classification of 

each channel in the river based on the thinnest ice thickness 

found. The critical channel is the one that limits the cntire 

class of the bridge andor has the lowest MLC. If the ice is 

frozen to the bottom of the channel, it is classified as unlimited. The classification is also unlimited if 2 inches or less of 

water is undcr the ice, because the load on the bridge would 

flex the ice to the bottom of the channel. 

A quick reference card (issued by the U.S. Army Cold 

Rcgions Research Engineering Laboratory [USACRREL]) 

provides information to quickly evaluate possible crossing 

sites (Figure 3, page 36 and Table 3, page 37). Note the distances between vehicles when using this card. The color and 

strength factors can he used with the card to further define 

the ice. 

December 1996 

Landing Zones 

evaluating possible helicopter landing zones 

(LZs), consider the following: 

R 	Helicopter spacing on ice is the same as that for vehicles 

(150 feet); however, helicopters must land harder on ice 

than usual (1.2 to 1.3 times the force of gravity) so the 

wheels will set down more firmly on the surface and 

avoid sliding. 

0 	When evaluating lakes as LZs, bore the first four boles as 

if it werc an ice bridge (Figure 2, page 34), then space the 

holcs 100 feet apart. 

R 	The MLC of static loads on the ice must be doubled (for 

example, a fully loaded CH-47 weighs 49,000 pounds, 

giving MLC 42 for ice LZs). 

0 	When parking on ice, bore a hole 20 feet from the vehicle. If water flows out of the hole onto the ice, move to 

another location immediatly. 

Strengthening Natural Ice 

f the strength of existing ice meets traffic requirements, 

the only necessary steps for building an ice bridge are to 

compact the snow layer to 2 inches, improve the 

approaches, and mark the centerline. If conditions do not 

meet the required specifications, two options are available: 

use standard Army bridge construction or strengthen the ice. 

Ice formsnaturally fromthe bottom of an ice sheet when the 

temperature is cold enough. Ice and snow are insulators and 

control the natural formation of ice-the thicker the layer of 

insulation, the slower the ice growth. The ice fomlation process 

can he speeded up by flooding the surface of existing ice where 

it is exposed to the air and not insulated. An ice bridge should 

be at least 150feet wide to allow for ice sh-engthcning along the 

entire section of the ice sheet carrying vehicular loads. 

A flooding crew consists of a supervisor, a warming tent 

guard, an equipment operator, one to three pump operators, 

and a hose handler. 

The type of pump used to flood the ice depends on the 

temperature and the pumps available. Submergible, electric 

pumps are best. They do not freeze up as easily since the 

water and ice are in equilibrium at or near 32 degrees. The 

47th and 23rd Engineer Companies use surface-operated 

pumps (typhoon pumps manufactured by Wayjax, NSN 

4320-00-227-5852). These pumps have gas engines that tend 

to freeze up every 20 to 30 minutes, requiring that they be 

rotated through the warming tent. Other pumps, such as 

chain-belt and Gorman-Rupp pumps (both with free-standing, gas-operated engines) may be used as long as the hoses 

can withstand sub-zero temperatures. The pneumatic tool 

and compressor outfit (250 cubic feet per minute [CFM] 

trailer) comes with sump pumps that continue to run below 

Engineer 35 
R 

e 

9 

P 

r 

e 

d 

100 

I 

c 

e 

10 

T 

h 

i 

F 

k 

n 

e 

S 

s 

if) 

1 ' 10 100 

Vehicle Class (MLC) 

Figure 3 - Quick Reference Graph 

the surface. The compressor hoses on tile surface are exposed 

to sub-zero temperatures (down to -60 degrees). A concern is 

that the 1 112-inch hose, which operates at I00 to 200 CFM, 

may break and injure a soldier. However, arctic hoses that 

stay flexible to -60 degrees may be purchased locally. 

If the snow layer is deep, pumping water on it may cause 

voids in the ice. Much of the snow must be removed by a 

crew consisting of a supervisor and equipment operators as 

necessary (for the SEE tractor, grader, bucket loader, snow 

blower, or shovel). 

The snow removal crew must avoid pushing the snow 

into berms along the sides of the bridge area for two rcasons. First, moving heavy snow from one area and concentrating it on the sides causes the ice to form into a crown in 

the center of the roadway. Then water applied to the center 

of the bridge will drain to the sides, failing to strengthen the 

roadway of the bridge. The crown also may develop an air 

pocket and become unsupported (freeboard less than 90 

percent, which will not permit safe passage of vehicles). 

Second, ice will not form on the bottom of the ice sheet 

near the snow berm. This leads to thin ice along the edges, 

which can cause the bridge to fail (Figure 4 and Figure 5, 

page 38). 

The crew removes the snow on the surface until the layer 

can be compacted to 2 inches or less. Then they flood for the 

first lift (layer). The flooding depth depends on the available 

equipment and the air temperature. Normally, one 2-inch lift 

can be completed in each 24-hour period. Under extremely 

cold temperatures, more than one layer may be applied per 

day. Once the first lift is completely frozen, successive lifts can 

be placed until the bridge reaches the desired classification. To 

avoid water pockets between the layers, each lift must be completely frozen before the next lift is added. The time required 

for the water to freeze depends on the air temperature, wind 

speed, and floodwater depth. As the ice thickens, the bridge 

takes on a dish shape because the heavy section of ice causes 

the water to pool naturally (Figure 6, page 38). 

Bridge Maintenance 

ce bridges require daily maintenance, because river ice 

thickness can change daily. The thickness also varies 

throughout the winter and in different locations on the 

river. Thickness of river ice depends on the current strength 

and temperature variations (air and water). The critical ice 

channel depth must be checked and the bridge capacity 

reclassified daily. Constant travel over the same path may 

cause the ice to become thin in that area. 

If temperatures rise above freezing, all channels of the 

bridge must be checked. During the daily check. look for 

changes in the color of the ice and strength factor requirements. 

Compact new snow to 2 inches or less and flood or remove the 

excess. If temperatures remain below freezing, check all of the 

channels every 3 days. If any of the channels must be strengthened, traffic cannot cross until the lift has frozen completely. 

When the ice bridge is thick enough to suppoa the heaviest 

crossing vehicle, spread and pack 1 to 2 inches of snow over 

the roadway to provide traction and a wearing surface. 

36 Engineer December 1996 
Table 3. Field Guide Quick Reference Card 

I I I I 

Vehicle 

Class 

(wheeled 

or 

tracked) 

Before using table, see remarks below: 

. , ~, 

1. If he air temperature has been above freezing formore than 

6 of the past 24 hours. multiply the vehicle class by 1.3 to obtain 

he requlred icethickness. If the air temperature stays above freezing for2 hours or more, the ice starts to lose strength, and the table 

no longer represents safe conditions. A rapid and unusually large 

temperature drop causes the Ice to become brittle, and travel may 

not be safe for a period of 24 hours. 

2. For the distance required between two vehicles of different 

classes, use the distance required for the higher class. 

3.If vou plan to park for extended periods, multiply Me vehicle 

Required Ice 

Thickness 

(inches=4-

fin) fcm) 

required ice thickness and maintaln at least 

Drill a hole through the Ice near 

Distance Between 

Vehicles(about l00x 

thickness [in em]) 

(ft) (m) 

200 Ibs 

thevehicle and move if ihe Ice begins to Rood. 

4. The ice must have water support. Be very careful close to shore. 

Vely often Me water level will drop after freeze-up. When this hap 

pens. he ice close to the shore may no longer have water support. 

5. Cracks are either dry or wet. If dry, they do not penetrate Ice 

cover and can be Ignored. If wet, multiply the vehicle class by 2to 

obtain the required ice thicknessand try to drke straight across the 

cracks (avoid going parallel to wet cracks). 

2 5

During construction, cracks will appear everywhere in the 

ice bridge and loud snaps may be heard. The noises are 

caused by the thermal expansion and contraction of the 

entire ice mass and do not indicate failure of the bridge itself. 

Many cracks are caused by sudden changes in temperature. 

These are usually dry and do not weaken the bridge. They 

can be flooded and refrozen if desired. If a vehicle crosses 

that is classified at or above the bridge load class, wet cracks 

may foml. They will refreeze, strengthening the bridge. If 

the temperature is bclow freezing, harmless cracks perpendicular to the flow of traffic will be visible. 

If the bridge banks have a slope greater than 3 percent, 

use snow to reduce the slope. Pump water on a snow pile to 

make wet, heavy snow, which is good for construction. The 

snow pack will freeze and the I- to Zinch snow cover acts 

as a wearing surface. 

Air voids normally occur near river shores because the 

water recedes after the initial freeze. Ice that is not supported 

by water is very weak. Breaking the ice sheet and setting it 

backon the water will greatly increase the strength of the ice. 

Use a wrecking ball and crane to break the ice, or load it with 

enough wet snow to cause it to break. Boring holes in the ice 

will also help. If the ice sheet does not break up, try another 

location. Push dirt or snow over the ice to the supported area 

of the bridge, especially near the banks, or use planks to 

move the load lo the supported ice. 

Crossing an Ice Bridge 

17 

ark ice bridges like any other river crossing as 

shown in FM 90-13. Place signs near the bridge to 

'inform drivers of safety precautions. Place a 

marker 150 feet from each shore to determine the proper 

vehicle spacing on the bridge. 

Before vehicles are allowed to cross, drivers must be 

aware of the following safety precautions: 

O Bridge classification is for one-way traffic only. 

5 

0 Avoid crossing if the vehicle classification exceeds the 

limits of the bridge. 

0 Passengers need not dismount or open doors during a 

crossing. 

0 Stop vehicles before driving onto the ice bridge to 

reduce the impact. 

Space vehicles at least 150 feet apart. 

0 Maximum speed on the bridge is 10 mph. Keep vehicles 

in the lowest gear possible. Driving too fast may create a 

wave ahead of the vehicle and cause the bridge to fail. 

Avoid stopping on the bridge. A sudden application of 

brakes increases the weight pressure of a vehicle, especially in the front wheels. 

December 1996 Engineer 37 
Snow Berms 

Water 

Figure 4 -Cross Section of Bridge and Berms 

mpkld Width at h t 150 

CompacledSnm 

wren 

Figure 5 - Cross Section of Snow Compaction 

Figure 6 - Location of Pump Holes tor Flooding the Bridge 

0 	If parking on the ice is unavoidable, double the vehicle than the bridge classification. If the combined load exceeds the 

classification and bore a hole 20 feet from the vehicle. If classification, chose another recovery method. If the ice fails, a 

water surges out of the hole and floods the ice, move the team must be prepared to react quickly. A slow response could 

vehicle immediately. allow ice to form around the vehicle, requiring demolitions to 

Prepare a recovery plan for vehicles that break down on the free it. The first vehicle at or near the maximum bridge classiice bridge. During recovery, vehicles should no1 exceed the fication should have a tow cable connected to the pintle and 

150-foot spacing requirement unless the combined load is less thrown on top of the vehicle to aid in recovery. 

38 Engineer 	 Decenther 1996 
Conclusion 5. Technical Manual 5-349, Arctic Construction, 19 Feb-

/ ngineers must be prepared to deploy anywhere in the E world and to provide expertise in many areas. In cold 

environments, the battlefield may require that they 

build ice bridges to gain access to critical regions. Ice can 

enhance maneuverability for both vehicular and air mobile 

traffic. A thorough knowledge of ice bridging allows engineers to overcome one of the major problems faced in coldweather operations. 

References 

1. 6th Infantry Division (L) Pamphlet 350.11, Squad 

Leader's Guidefor Constructing ice Bridges, October 1986. 

2. USACRREL Report 76-29, Failure of an Ice Bridge, 

August 1976. 

3. USACRREL Report 85-18, Snow in the Construction 

of IceBrrdges, Oclober 1985. 

4. USACRRELReport 93-12, On Winter Warfnre,June 1993. 

ruary 1962. 

6. Field Manual 90-13, River Crossing Operations, 30 

September 1992. 

Captain Staton is the engineer advisor; U.S. Army 

Readiness Group, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Previous assignments 

include commander; 47th Engineer Company (C)(H),Special 

Troops Battalion, Fort Wainwright,Alaska; A/S3 Construction, 

555th Combat Engineer Group and XO, HSC, 864th Engineer 

Battalion (C)(H),Forf Lewis, Washington. Captain Staton has 

had fwo National Training Center rotations. He is a gradiurte 

of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

StaffSergeant Brown is rhe Engineer Operations NCO for 

the Special Troops Battalion, Fort Richardson, Alaska. 

Previous assignments include station commander; Derby, 

Kansas, Recruiting Station; squad leader; 23rd Engineer 

Company, Fort Riley, Kansas; and he served with P 

Company, 293rd Engineer Battalion, 18th Engineer Brigade, 

Baumholder; Germany. Staffsergeant Brown is a Basic NCO 

Course graduate. 

Engineer Problem 

Using the information provided in the above article, test your knowledge by completing the following 

exercise. 

Situation: Your company is deployed to a remote cold-weather region. The task force commander 

directs a reconnaissance of a possible ice bridge crossing site. The platoon you task to perform the 

reconnaissance provides the following report: 

Critical ice thickness = 43 inches 

Water depth below the ice = 60 inches 

Type of ice = Semiclear with dry cracks 

0 Temperatures have been below freezing for at least a week I 

Freeboard = 25 percent I 

Width of river = 600 feet 1 

0 Critical channel width = 335 feet I 

I 

Use the equations on page 37 to determine the following: I 

1. Determine the military load classifications (MLCs) of the bridge for wheeled and tracked vehicles. 

2. Determine how long it takes to increase the strength of the bridge to safely cross an MIA1 tank if 

temperatures remain below zero. 

Engineer Solufion is on page 47. 

December 1996 Engineer 39 
By Major Steven M. Herold and Major Neil E Wilson 

R ealignment of the Chemical and Center headquarters to form the : have fully hard-wired multimedia and 

Military Police Schools from Ian MANSCEN headquarters and schools 

I 

computer-linked training capabilities 

McClellan to Fort Leonard Wood complex. The building plans should be / to support the high-tech Classroom 

grows ever closer to reality. The j 95-percent complete by December 1 XXIconcept. 

realization of the impending moves is 1 1996. The MANSCEN staff and the 1 A computer-based simulations 

brought to life in artistic renderings and I Engineer, Chemical, and Military "Warfighter Training Center" will be 

models depicting $203.4 lnillion (M) in j Police School staffs will take up located within the GIF, where Engincer. 

construction projects for the Maneuver residence in the new complex in the Chemical, and Military Police ofticers 

Support Center (MANSCEN). These second half of FY99. While some of and NCOs will train on both combined 

construction efforts will propcl the the building spacc is dedicated to and branch balllefield functions. 

MANSCEN into the Army's showcase ' unique branch control, much of it will 1 Engineer officers and NCOs will train 

of consolidation, while retaining ! bc uscd by all the schools. I on mobility, countermobility, and 

individual regimental identity and Many training functions will take ' survivability operations; and general I 

proponency. Construction will begin place in the new building. It will , and topographic engineering skills. 

after the ongoing Environmental include general instruction classrooms, Chemical officers and NCOs will use 

Impact Statement (EIS) is completed , numerous applied instructional fa- the intelligence-preparation-of-theand approved. The EIS process is on 1 cilities, and administrative areas that battlcfield and the deliberate decisionschedule, which should allow the two- : support the Chemical and Military making processes to advise battalion 

year construction effort to begin in the I Police Schools and the combined and brigade commanders on nuclear, 

spring of 1997. Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) biological, and chemical (NRC) 

The MANSCEN is one of the future ! Academy. Many classrooms are contamination avoidance, protection, 

TRADOC clusters that will be designed for small-group instruction decontamination, smoke, and flame 

organized around battlefield functions. and some have moveable walls to allow operations. Military Police officers and 

I The TRADOC concept will link like use by larger groups. Classrooms will ! NCOs will train the Military Police 

battlefield functions into mutually 

supporting school clusters to enhance Projected MANSCEN population 

execution of training, doctrine, and 

combat developments. stegory BRA( FY99 Post-BRAC 

The table on this page shows the Impac. Population expected impacts of the two additional 

schools on the population at Fort Military permanent party 1,599 6.231 

Leonard Wood. Traineeslstudents 3,378 11,684 

(average daily load) 

General Instruction Facility Civilian workers 498 4,892 

The General Instruction Facility 

(GIF), a $58M project, will 

connect to the current Engineer 

Familymembers 

Total 

3,621 

9.096 

12,005 

34,812 

40 Engineer December 1996 
Artist's conception of the Military Police Village 

battlefield missions of circulation Critical facilities inside the GIF for also provide classroom and adcontrol, area security, enemy prisoner specialized Military Police training will ministrative space for students and 

of war, and law enforcement provide physical security areas, in- instructors. A wcapons sirnulator will 

operations. The top-notch simulation cluding a mock arms room, interview allow students to improve gunnery 

capabilities will replicate contingency and interrogations rooms, a computer skills. Mock facilities include a 

operations and provide Military Police fraud room, and mock crime scenes. Military Police station, a confinement 

leaders experience in planning and Military Policc officers and NCOs will facility, a communications lab, and a 

executing missions to support use the high-tech classrooms for minimall storefront. In its entirety, the 

maneuver forces. professional development courses. village provides OSUT students a mock 

The General Instruction Facility will community with streets, parking lots, 

house some of the Chemical School's 

most critical training - areas, such as the Military Police Village businesses, and homes, where Military 

Policc soldiers will practice patrolling -

Radiological Laboratory (Rad Lab) and 

the NBC Reconnaissance and Biological Integrated Detection Systems 

(BIDS) training simulators. The Rad 

Lab will be used to instruct all Chemical 

Corps soldiers on the fundamentals of 

radiation protection, monitoring, and 

equipment operations. Instructors will 

also use the lab to train radiation safety 

officers assigned throughout the Army. 

The NBC Reconnaissance and BIDS 

traininn simulators will use state-of-thehile the General Instruction 

Facility will provide the majority of resources to instruct 

oflicers and NCOs, the Military Police 

Village will be the primary location for 

Military Police one-station unit Waining 

(OSUT) and advanced law enforcement 

training (ALET). More than 15,000 

military and civilian personnel will be 

trained in the Military Police Village 

each year. 

' 

and crime-scene techniques. 

The Tactical Clearing Complex 

FCC), part of the Military Police 

Village, will provide mock military 

installation facilities. These facilities 

will include a credit union, medical 

clinic, and single-family and duplex 

living quarters where soldiers and 

civilians will practice ALET techniques. The ALET staff will train about 

5.700 students, including 3,300 federal, state, and municipal law enart technology to provide advanced The buildings in the Military Police forcement personnel, in 'this state-oftraining to selected Chemical Corps Village that support the skill level 1 the-art training complex. Two of the 

soldiers. training tasks of OSUT soldiers will ALETS primary TCC users will be 

December 1996 Engineer 41 
students in the Special Reaction Team 

(SRT) training course and the 

Counterdrug Special Weapons and 

Tactics Course. A large adminisnative 

building in the TCC will provide 

classroom and administrative areas. 

Chemical Defense Training 


Facility 


The "crown jewel" of the Chemical 

School facilities is the Chemical 

Defense Training Facility 

(CDTF). This S28M project will be the 

location oi toxic agent training. The 

commandant of the Chemical School 

views this facility as the place where all 

Chemical Corps soldiers prove that 

chemical defense doctrine, training, 

and materiel (detection kits, 

decontamination kits and solutions, and 

protective equipment) work effectively. Most importantly, soldiers 

will become confident in their 

equipment, procedures, and themselves. This confidence w~ll be 

transported to the soldiers' ncxt units. 

Allied and international soldiers and 

personnel in various federal, state, and 

city agencies also will train at the 

CDTF. 

Decontamination Apparatus 

Training Facility 

The other major Chemical School 

facility in the construction project 

is the Decontamination Apparatus Training Facility (DATF), used 

to instruct light and heavy decontamination equipment techniques. The 

interior will house the "hands on" 

equipment training while the exterior 

will provide a thorough decontamination site. There soldiers will 

apply their training knowledge to 

simulated contalninated equipment and 

personnel. 

Ranges and Waining Areas 

n addition to the facilities construction, the Chemical and Military 

Police Schools will receive new 

ranges and training areas to execute 

core training. 

Chemical soldiers will train to 

standard on several new areas: Range 

27127A. the flame field expedience 

range; static and mobile smoke training 

areas; range instructional facilities; 

NBC Reconnaissance and BIDS field 

training exercise sites; and operational 

decontamination sites. 

Range 19 on Fort Leonard Wood will 

be upgraded to an MK19 (40-millimeter 

grenade machine-gun) range for Military 

Police training. The Military Police will 

also receive Range 13, an SRT complex, 

Site plan for Chemical Defense Training Facility 

December 1996 
~ 

Artist's conception of new Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing Facility 

where they will receive specialized housing complex. The building will architectural designs complementing 

training in weapons, to include mini- I feature 888 beds, an operations center (

,

existing shuctures. The well-planned 

uzis, shotgun, pistol, and sniper rifles. i tO provide soldier support services, a and coordinated consolidation of the 

Range 13 will allow live-fire building- ! community building, and a dining : Engineer, Chemical, and Military 

clearing exercises that add a high degree / facility. The building design, window ( Police Schools at Fort Leonard Wood 

of realism to SRT training. styles, and landscaping provide a / will ensure that the MANSCEN stands 

1 college-campus look to the dormitorv 1 as TRGWC's model cluster 

~ i lOperations i ~ ~in ~~il~- ~ ~ Y 


Up Areas Training Site 1

1 Instruction Facility, which houses thc 1 Major Herold serws as ttre Militam 

military operations in built-up , NCO 

I

1 Police representative,for Base Realignareas (MORA) (fonnerly called 1 ! ment and Closure (BRAC) actions at 

military operations in urban I ArtifactStorage Facility i Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Previous 

1 assignments include S3 and XO of the terrain [MOUT]) training site will 

provide all Fort Leonard Wood soldiers two-story, climate-controlled ar793rd Military Police Battalion, Germany and Bosnia; Management Directhe ability to train in a highly realistic tifact storage facility will be torate, Once of the Chief of Staffofthe 

urban environment. The MOBA added to the currentFort Leonard 1 Army; and recorderfor the Secretariat 

village will consist of 16 buildings-9 1 Wood nluseum. The Engineer, Chern- for /JA officerselection ~ ~ ~ intact and 7 partially rubbled. Several I ical, and Military Police Schools will 

have two stories, and one is a lhree- 1

I share equally in the new faciliry and the ! Major Wilson is the U.S. Army 

story apartment building. The village / existing museum, where each regiment : Chemical School commandanti reprealso will contain an underground sewer ' will display artifacts depicting unique ' sentative on the Fort Leonard Wood 

complex that has safe subterranean branch history. ' BRAC st@ Previous assignments 

egress and ingress routes. include battalion chemical officer; 2-32 

Conclusion Armor; 3 AD; decontaminatior~ platoon 

leadec 22nd Chemical Company; briUnaccompanied Enlisted 

he quality of the planned gade chemical officer and battery comPersonnel Housing T mander; 35th ADA Brigade; instructor/ 

construction will be writer; Combined Arms Branch, U.S. 

CO studcnts will reside in i

!

1 ... commensurate with training fa- A,~ ~~~i~~~~ ~~,,~~l; and chief:

a newly constructed unaccom- 4 cllltles now on Fort Leonard Wood. Chemical Branch Assistunce Team, 5th 

panied enlisted personnel Buildings will be all brick with U.S. Army Readiness Group. 

December 1996 Engineer 43 
- - 

The Total Army School System 


By Major Larry Cemy 

ver time, each of the thrce components of the ArmyActive, Reserve, and National Guard-developed independent school systems, which gradually developed 

separate standards. The new Total Army School System 

(TASS) creates one system with identical tasks and standards 

for all three components. 

The Engineer School's mission is to complete a transition 

to an effective and efficient TASS of fully accredited and 

integrated Active, Reserve, and National Guard schools that 

provide standard engineer institutional training and education for America's Army. 

Organization 

To understand this mission, we must first understand the 

TASS organization. The Continental United States is 

divided into seven regions, labeled A through G (Rgure 1). TASS implementation began in 1994 with the standing up of Region C, which was used as a test bed. The other 

regions were activated in October 1996. 

Imple~nentation of this new system creates the following 

major changes: 

U.S. Amy Reserve Force (USARF) schools were 

replaccd with school battalions. 


Total Army Training System (TATS) courses are replac- 


ing Reserve Component Configured Courseware (RC3). 


Proponents are responsible for instructor certification. 

Proponents are responsible for accreditation of the school 

battalions. 

Each school battalion is functionally aligned with a proponent school. Functional alignment is "a branch school's 

functional relationship with its affiliated Reserve Component 

training institutions and instructors, which provides current 

concepts, techniqoes, and cquipment for that branch's 

courses." For example, the Engineer School, located at Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri, is functionally aligned with the 

seven Engineer School battalions. 

In addition to their functional alignment, the school battalions have a command alignment (Figure 2, page 45). 

E 

*FtMcCoy 

-	 Newburgh -1 

I ,' *FtSheridan 

-

; -- 1 Pittsbdrgh I 

-*Ft Lee 

-. . , 

- I, fl 	 *Ft Jackson 

Engineer School Battalions -F -. 

*Regional Coordinating Elements '. <. .~~, 

Note: 	 Region C includes Puerto RicoNirgin Islands 

Region G includes Alaska, Hawaii, Guam 

Figure 1.TASS regions 

44 Engineer 	 December 1996 
Figure 2. Command alignment of school battalions 

I 

Division The 

(Institutional Adjutant General 

Training) 

I I I I I 

School battalions report to school brigades. Combat arms 

and leadership brigades report to the Adjutant General 

(TAG). Combat service support, health service support, professional development, and combat support brigades report 

to reserve divisions. 

The Engineer School's Department of Training and Doctrine Development created a TASS Division to control all the 

functions that TASS dictates. The division is responsible for 

the following areas: 

Health Sewice 

Brigade 

tasks to a common performance standard, including those for 

Department of the Army and TRADOC-directed courses. 

Reserve Component soldiers normally have 16 hours of 

~nactiveduty for training (IDT) each month. They meet one 

weekcnd a month or once a week for 4 hours. In addition. 

they normally have a 14-day annual training (AT) period. 

In the past, Reserve Component Configured Courseware 

was taught in U.S. Army Reserve Force schools. This 

courseware included only those tasks needed to . 

ureDare . reservists for mobilization, no1 necessarily all the tasks for Codeveloping individual training courses with the Trainwhich active duty soldiers trained. Performance standards for ing Development Division. 

each component differed. Trade-offs were made for reservMaintaining functional alignment with the Engineer ists because of their time constraints. 

Developnent Bde 

School battalions. TASS changes this process. Now one standard course 

Accrediting the Engineer School battalions. replaces the separate Active and Reserve Component 

H Maintaining a central point of contact concerning TASS courses. Instead of the Training Development and TASS 

issues. Divisions working independently, they work together to 

Leadership 

Brigade 

-FS 

-OM 

develop a product that fits the needs of both components. 

Each of the seven TASS regions has a Regional Coordinating Element (RCE) that is staffed with Active Component, full-time Army Reserve, and full-time National Guard 

-91C 

-91B 

Instructor Certification 

-TC -OW -WOE 

-OD 

soldiers. They are a TRADOC element charged with being Under TASS. proponent schools certify the Reserve 

the overall TASS coordinator for their respective region. Component instructors who teach in the school battal-

"Title XI," the congressional action that authorizes and ions. Each proponent school has a battalion in each of 

requires the use of active duty personnel for dedicated SUP- the seven regions. The Engineer School has a battalion in the 

port of reserve units, supports the TASS structure. Title XI following locations: 

-CAS3 

-CGSOC 

personnel are assigned to RCEs, proponent schools, and the Region A-Newburgh, New York 

Reserve Component school battalions. 

Region B-Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

-MP 

-MI 

TATS Courses 

-AVN 

-FA 

-Engineer Bn 

-SG 

Region C--Charleston, South Carolina 

Region D-Knoxville, Tennessee 

-CM -ADA 

-SO 

-IN OCS 

-AR NCOA 

- hese selected courses are designed for militay occupation Region E-Fort Sheridan, ulinois 

specialties (MOSS) within all Army components. 

Although the training may occur at different sites and may Region F-St. Louis, 

use differcnt media or methods, a TKIS course trains all critical Region G-Camp Grafton, North Dakota 

December 1996 Engineer 45 
The school battalions send instructors wherever thcy are 

needed. For example, if a milita~yunit located in southern 

California needs a course taught during IDT, the engineer 

battalion at Camp Grafton selects a Reserve Component 

instructor near that site to instruct the course. 

Under TASS guidelines, the following certification 

standards apply to both Reserve and Active Component 

instructors: 

Meet mandated soldier requirements for height, weight 

Army Physical Fitness Test, and security clearance. 

Have the MOS of the course being taught. 

Graduate from the course, be a subject matter expert (certified for specific blocks or lessons only), or test to proponent school standards. 

Graduate from an Instructor Training Course. 

Demonstrate teaching competence. 

Meet the specified minimum grade level for teaching he 

course. 

Fulfill additional proponent school requirements. 

Certification requirements must be achieved in onc 

Reserve Component training year, which equals two AT 

weeks and 12 IDT weekends. Together, AT and IDT will not 

exceed 39 training days. 

School Battalion Accreditation 

Beginning in FY98, and every three years thereafter, an 

accreditation team from proponent schools will evaluate the school battalions that are functionally aligned 

with them. The team will consist of a team chief, an evaluator, and a subject matter expert. Accreditation requirements 

involve two major areas: administrative procedures and 

records, and conduct of training. In the evaluation process, 

the team will use checklists that cover the following: 

M Quality of instruction. 

Use of qualified instructors 

Adequacy of facilities and equipment 

M Procedures to ensure that students meet established prerequisites. 

Compliance with approved programs of instruction and 

governing regulations. 

To accredit a school battalion, proponent schools must 

evaluate one annual training period and at least one-third of 

the inactive duty training periods. 

Distance Learning 

Distance learning (DL), although separate from the 

other TASS responsibilities, plays a key role. DL 

applies multiple means and technologies to deliver 

standardized training to soldiers and units at the right place 

and time. At the center of DL is Classroom XXI, an Army initiative to place high-tech classrooms throughout Ule military 

community. The current TRADOC plan calls for fully implemented DL by the year 2010. By that lime, TRADOC expects 

that 66 percent of our soldiers will receive DL and that 99 percent of our soldiers in the continental United States will be 

located within a I-hour drive from a DL facility. 

Conclusion 

The TASS affects all Army soldiers. They can either 

attend training at the Active Component Teaching 

Institution (ACTI) or one of the Reserve Component 

school battalions. However, all initial-entry training occurs at 

the ACTI. No matter where they are located, the Anny 

courses teach the same tasks and standards and are taught by 

instructors with identical certification standards. 

To make TASS work for the engineer community, we 

need feedback on what is working and what needs to be 

improved in our individual training courses. Whether you are 

an Active, Reserve, or National Guard soldier, these are your 

courses and TASS is your school system, so send your ideas 

to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN 

ATSE-TD-TASS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473; or 

via einail: cernyl@wood-vines.army.mil. The telephone 

numbers are: DSN 676-4114; commercial 573-563-41 14. 

Y 

Major Cerny is chief of the Schools Branch, TASS Division, 

DOTD, US.Army Engineer School. Previous arsignments 

include training officer 98th Division (Institutional Training); 

assistanf S3, 367th Engineer Battalion (Combat Corps); and 

training oficer/platoon leader; 760th Engineer Company 

(CombatSupport Equipment). 

References: 

I. Total Army School System (TASS) OPLAN-2. TRADOC. 1 January 1995. 

2. TRADOC Regulation 35@70, Training Development 

Management, Processes, and Products. 24 September 1995. 

3. TRADOC memorandum, subject: Total Army Training 

System (TATS). 25 March 1996. 

4. TRADOC memorandum, subject: Policy for Certifying 

Instructors. 20 November 1995. 

5. TRADOC TATSIDL Workshop. 29 April - 2 May 1996. 

46 Engineer December 1996 
-- 

I t - 2 I J --__jEngineer 	Solution 

I 1. Use the equations on page 37 of the Ice Bridging artick to determine the military load classifications: 

C = 0.9 (Semiclear) 


S = 0.6 (Freeboard less than 90 percent) 


T = Thickness of ice (in inches) 


W = Wheeled vehicle MLC 


A = Tracked vehicle MLC 


W = (T')CS = (43)2(0.9)(0.6) = 39.9 (round down) = 39 

25 25 

A = (T')CS = (43)2(0.9)(0.6) = 49.8 (round down) = 49 

20 20 

Answer: The MLC for wheeled traffic is 39, and the MLC for tracked vehicles is 49. Vehicles will 

be spaced 150 feet apart (up to two vehicles may be on the ice at a time). 

2. The MLC for an MlAl tank is 70. To determine the ice depth required from the equation, complete the following: 

Thickness (inches) = 	A(20) or 70(20) 


C x s cs 


Thickness (inches) = 	70(20) = 50.9 inches (round up) = minimum ice thickness of 51 inches, 

0.9 x 0.6 

Answer: There are currently 43 inches of ice over the river and 51 inches are required to safely 

cross the MIA1 tank. Therefore, 8 inches of ice must be added. Since 2 inches of ice may be added 

to the bridge per day, it will take 4 days to reach the desired strength. 

! Alternative Solution 

? 

The problem also can be solved by using the Quick Reference Card and Graph shown in Figure 3, 1 (page 36) and Table 3(page 37). They are used when time does not allow for a deliberate recon on 

the crossing site. The deliberate method gives a different answer because detailed information is I known about the ice and safety factors are included in the calculations. When using the quick 

method, normally only the ice thickness and ambient conditions are known. The ice color and 

1 strength factors are not considered when determining a solution but can be added to further define 

: the crossing site conditions. When time allows, a complete recon and ice-bridge profile should be 

i completed. 

, 

1. It is given that the ice is 43 inches thick and the heaviest vehicle crossing the bridge is an MlAl 

I Abrams tank (MLC 70). Reading down column 1 on the Field Guide Quick Reference Card (Table 

, 3) to MLC 70, the minimum thickness required is 34 inches and the required distance between vehicles is 280 feet. 

I 

2. The reference card indicates the ice will support MLC 70 vehicles, and further strengthening of 

the bridge is not required. Note the 280-foot spacing between vehicles, indicating that only one veI hicle may cross the bridge at a time. The wear surface and approach and exit banks will require 

I occasional maintenance. 

December 1996 	 Engineer 47 
By CaptainAndrew !4 Jusuifis 

The Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC), located 

at Fort Sherman, Panama, trains infantry battalions 

and engineer companies to conduct jungle combat 

opcrations. One of the programs offered by JOTC is the 

Enginecr Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC). 

The EJWC provides a unique opporlunity for engineer 

conipanies and platoons to train in a jungle environment. The 

Jungle Operations Training Battalion normally supports lour 

engineer company and ten engineer platoon rotations 

annually. The EJWC is open lo almost any combat engineer 

company-airborne, air assault, wheeled, combat support 

equipment, combat heavy, etc. Most rotations are from 

corps-level engineer companies because divisional engineer 

platoons deploy and hain with the Infantry Battalion Jungle 

Warfare Course rotations. 

The Jungle Operations Training Center's primary 

objective is to keep the art of jungle warfare alive in the 

Army today. In concert with this mission, the Engineer 

Jungle Warfare Course prepares engineers to fight future 

battles and win in a jungle environment. 

In addition to supporting U.S. Army combat engineers, 

the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course provides joint training 

to selected U.S. Marine Corps engineer platoons and some 

Latin American engineers. 

48 Engineer 

Program of Instruction 

The program of instruction for the EJWC is organized, 

manned, and equippcd to provide training to three 

engineer platoons. Instructors lrom Alpha Company, 

Jungle Operations Training Battalion, conduct the training by 

committees. Team 6 provides instruction in engineer-specific 

tasks. 

The four-week EJWC consists of two weeks of combat 

training (core junglc training and tactical opcrations) and two 

weeks of construction (Army Facilities Components SystemTropical). 

Combat Training. Typical training during the first two 

weeks includes: jungle living, land navigation, mines and 

booby traps, jungle combat techniqucs, rappelling, advanced 

rigging and hauling, squad reconnaissance, squad react-tocontact (blank and live fire), waterborne and smell-boat 

operations, basic and advanced demolitions, and platoon 

reconnaissance and demolition missions. Platoons also 

negotiate the rugged "Grcen Hell" obstacle course. The second 

week culn~inates in a two-day company field training exercise 

designed to meet the unit's mission essential task list (METL) 

haining needs and to employ tactics, techniques, and 

prcxedures learned during core training. Company infiltration 

Decenther 1996 
An engineer squad from B Company, 27th Engineer Battalion (CBT) (ABN) conducts a reconnaissance 

mission on the Chagres River. 

and movement is by seven1 methods-landing craft. medium .FOCUShome-station training on knotstrope management, 

(LCM); F-470 Zodiacs, or Army aviation (air assault). basic land navigation, and battle drills in dismounted 

Construction Training. The third and fourth weeks of movement/patrolling at squad and platoon levels. Identify 

lhe course are spent on construction missions, which include weak swimmers (water safety and drown-proofing classes 

carpentry, concrete and masonry, plumbing, and construction must be conducted within three months of deployment). 

management tasks. Projects include bridge repair or Units that conduct airborne operations must conduct B-7 

replacement; target, rappel tower, obstacle, boat dock, fcnce, training and request permission to jump in country. 

cage, and roof construction; office and classroom renovation; 

and window installation. Units normally provide eight days Benefits 

of construction effort. All projects are designed to support 

the training center so that the Jungle Operations Training I-'he benefits of a deployment to EJWC are many. 

Battalion can continue to provide high quality training Engineers receive METL-related training in 

opportunities. dcployment and numerous collective, leader, and 

individual tasks. The decentralized training allows squads to 

Deployment Tips train soldiers and develop or improve standing operating 

procedures. Units can identify strong and weak performers as 

A planning is important for a successful well as build teamwork and cohesiveness. Soldiers are 

deployment to the Jungle Operations Training Center, allowed to make mistakes and train to standard without the 

The following tips will help units planning to attend: Pressures of higher headquarters. The Jungle Operations

.Send a sire survey team six months before deployment. Training Battalion provides almost all training support, so 

The team should consist of two or three people who can 

that leaders can concentrate on meeting training objectives. 

make decisions on training and who have a working Most of all, engineer units increase proficiency and gain 

knowledze of construction. confidence in conducting operations in a harsh jungle 

environment. 

Allow fivc days onda day through Friday) for the team's Engineer units should contact Forces Command for 

visit-two travel days, one day on the Pacific side, and sched,iling and funding to attend the jungle operations 

two days at Port Sherman for coordination. Training Center Under the current Panama Canal Treaty

.Plan for the main body to arrive on the Friday or Satur- Implementation Plan, Fort Sherman will remain open until 

day before the first training day on Monday. the end of 1999. For more information, call the Jungle 

. Operations Training Battalion engineer at DSN (313) 289- Plan for the advanced echelon to arrive four days before 6411; Team 6, A Company, (313) 289-6057; or the S3, the main hody. Jungle . Operations Training Battalion, DSN (313) 289-6287. . . 

Deploy with all necessary construction equipment (such 

as sets, kits, and outfits; power tools; and generators). 

Y 

Captain Jasaitis served as the senior engineer instructorH Plan to be self-sufficient (special equipment will be coor- observer/controller at the Jungle Operations Training Centeq 

dinatcd in-country if needed). Fort Sherman, Panama,fmm February 1995 to May 1996. 

December I996 Engineer 49 
B)' Gerald L Knupp and Fir.71 Lieutenant A<lriun Donahoe 

Today's Army continually changes 

its training to fight different types 

of conflict?. Adjusting training is 

relatively easy, hut adjusting training sites 

is not. It is difficult to move existing 

ranges, establish new ranges in a costeffective way, identify range fans and 

safety or buffer areas, build new support 

facilities, and redefine impact areas while 

maintaining good environmental 

stewardship. Units must often adjust to 

the loss of training areas and the 

proverbial "doing more with less" 

situations. This article describes how the 

United States Military 

successfully designed and installed a new 

demolitions training range hunker using 

state-of-the-art concrete technology. 

Mission 

The planning process for 1996 

cadet field training revealed the 

need for more light infantry 

training and a larger training area. 

Since acquiring more land was not an 

option, we decided to maximize the use 

of existing training areas 

The demolitions range occupied 

prime areas needed for light infantry 

training. Range control personnel 

selected an alternate site adjacent to the 

existing artillery impact area and moved 

the demolitions range there. The impact 

area provides a safety zone around the 

new demolitions training site, which is 

an added benefit. 

Overall design of the demolitions 

range was driven by the requirement to 

allow cadets to witness detonation of 

the demolitions charges they prepared. 

since this was the site for the 

demolitions range in five years, ease of 

construction and portability were 

primary issues. 

While reviewing sales literature for 

precast concrete bridge spans for use in 

our range and training complex, we 

discussed whether these spans might 

also provide overhead cover protection 

for the range. We contacted the 

manufacturer, who indicated that a 

concrete precast bridge span had never 

bcen used for a bunker. We reviewed 

the construction details of the proposed 

unit and decided it would meet our 

needs. The manufacturer sent shop 

drawings, which were presented to 

members of the U.S. Military Academy 

Range Review Board. This group of 

trainers, range control managers, the 

Director of Housing and Public Works, 

and environmentalists routinely meet to 

plan and track range improvements. 

They approved our plan as presented. 

Specifications 

The bunker is made froni four 

precast concrete pieces. The 

floor is two panels, each 9 

inches thick, 21 feet long, 6 feet 6 

inches wide, and weigh~ng7.8 tons. 

The panels are reinforced with Number 

6 and Number 4 rebar. They are joined 

with a keyway filled with fast-setting 

construction grout. 

SOEngineer December 1996 
A completed bunker built with precast concrete. 

The 10-inch-thick reinforced end 

wall is 37 feet long and weighs 14 tons. 

It has three windows that arc 6 feet 

long, 2 feet 6 inches high, and 2 inches 

thick. They are multilayered 

(laminated glass, polycarbonate, and 

lexan) and bullet-resistant to meet 

Amiy specifications. Thesc are basic 

embassy windows [hat will resist 15 

minutes of forced entry and impacts 

from three 7.62-millimeter rounds in 

an 8-inch circle. This is more than 

sufficient to stop fragments that may 

result from demolitons training. A 

replaceable scar shield of 1M-inch 

Plexiglas protects both sides of the 

windows from vandalism and 

fragments. 

A bridge span that is 38 feet long, 9 

fect high at the apex, and 6 feet 6 

inches deep provides overhead cover. It 

weighs 25 tons and is connected to the 

end wall at six points with 6-inch by 6-

inch angle iron bolted to drop-in 

anchors installed during casting. 

Construction 

o prepare the bunker site, an 

engineer platoon removed 

existing mortar pits, moved a 

set of bleachers, removed the existing 

range tower, and hauled suitable fill for 

December 1996 

the walls of the demolitions pit. 

The foundation has a 12-inch-htgh 

base of 314-inch stone to ensure good 

drainage around the hunker. The base is 

held in place by a curb made of 2 by 10 

lumber and rebar. This is strengthened 

by backfilling around the curb with 

more stone. 

The bunker anived on three flatbed 

trucks at 1000 hours and was in place 

by 1800 hours. Thc following day the 

engineer platoon grouted the joints 

between the span and the base and 

caulked the arch1 end wall joint. 

Personnel rrom the Directorate of 

Housing and Public Works installed the 

windows, which were mounted with 3-

inch angle iron on both sides. They 

used sheet steel to shim the windows 

and fill the voids around them. 

Cost Effectiveness 

he total cost for the project was 

approximately $30K (see table). 

This sounds expensive for a 

bunker, but it is portable. If the 

demolitions site is moved, the bunker 

can go with it. It has an expected life 

span of at least 20 years. 

Moving the "portable bunker" will be 

relatively easy. It requires fracturing the 

grout, unbolting the 6-inch angle iron 

connectors, removing the windows, and 

transporting the hunker lo the new site. 

We left the lifting point exposed to 

facilitate rigging when the unit is moved. 

Cost of Precast Bunker 

Precast bunker parts 519 I Windows I 6 l 
 I Crane and rigging 1 4 l 


Site preparation 

Moving and consolidating ranges to 

meet financial and environmental 

constraints is a fact of life in our current 

downsizing phase. By using state-ofthe-art construction materials creatively 

in our training areas, we help ensure 

that training is effective for soldiers, 

friendly to the environment, and cost 

effective for the tax payers. Y 


MI: Knupp is the operations ojj'ice~ 

Directorate of Housing and Public 

Works, U.S. Military Academy. 

First Lieutewnt Donahoe is the 

engineer platoon leader; U.S. Military 

Academy. 

Engineer 51 
A 


NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER 

National Training Center (NTC) 

Using Obstacle Group Designs 

By Major Tom Buning 

The last submission of CTC Notes from the National 

Training Center (August 1996) focused on the combat engineer platoon's role as executors. It emphasized that improvement it1 engineer platoon productivity in countermobiliity 

tasks requires taking action at all levels to narrow the platoon's focus in the defense to siting and emplacing minefields. Lessons learned at the NTC show that poor planning 

products at the engineer battalion and company levels are a 

primary cause of poor obstacle exccution. This anicle provides a technique to produce an executable plan for the platoon leader as a way to improve productivity and support to 

the mission. 

To provide an effective link between obstacle planning 

and execution, engineers need a tool tbat focuses the effort of 

the former to improve the efficiency of the latter. It is not sufficient to hand a set of obstacle graphics to a platoon leader 

and expect that a plan will be executed to a standard that 

either meets or supports the maneuver commander's intent. 

A recommended technique for providing the details required 

for timely execution is to introduce into the planning process 

an obstacle group design that includes each directed obstacle. 

(Note: Most tactical obstacles at the task-force level are 

directed; some may be reserve or situational.) Planners must 

provide a level of detail in the obstacle group design tbat 

enables platoons to emplace obstacles that meet the commander's intent. 

Task force engineers (engineer company commanders) 

must produce an obstacle group design overlay that provides 

the following information as a minimum: 

Tentative layout of the obstacle group depicted on a 

1:25,000- or 1:12,500scale map showing (to scale) the 

size, shape, location, and orientation of each obstacle. 

Operations graphics showing the applicable engagement 

areas, battle positions, and target rcference points. 

Various terrabase pictures from both friendly (key direct 

fire systems) and enemy (engagement area) perspectives. 

Text, including both the resources and effort required to 

execute the obstacle group and any special instructions. 

This information tells the platoon leader what he is siting, 

the effort he must commit to the project, and the expected 

duration of the effort. 

Production of an obstacle group design will force planners 

to more clearly understand the effort they are committing as 

they lay out the details of a directed obstacle group. It also 

forces planners to clearly and accurately define the Class NI 

V requirements needed to integrate obstacles into the combat 

service support plan. Commitment is the key word. The value 

of preparing an obstaclc group design is that it forces planners to provide the level of details required for the platoon to 

execute the plan. It also provides the capability to more accurately track the precious platoon hours and resources needed 

to accomplish the plan. The countennobilitylsurvivability 

time line uscd to track planned versus executed performance 

enables engineer staff officers to better inform the chain of 

command on the status of building the defense. 

Successful execution of an obstacle group design by task 

force engineers requires a task organization constraint. Engineer platoons cannot be placed in direct support to a maneuver company and remain effective in their ability to execute 

the plan established by the assistant and task force enginecrs. 

Therefore, combat engineer companies cannot he task organized beyond direct support to the supported task force. This 

does not mean that the engineer platoon leader is relieved of 

the responsibility to properly coordinate with the maneuver 

company team that owns the engagement area where they are 

constructing an obstacle group. 

From a current doctrinal perspective, use of an obstacle 

group design fills a void. FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle 

Integration, establishes that task force engineers (engineer 
company commanders) are responsible for planning. FM 20-

32, Mine/Counrermine Operations, recommends an obstacle 

group design method as an initial step toward establishing a 

framework for emplacing obstacles, while FM 90-7 states 

that a platoon leader executes intent. This is where doctrine 

fails to discuss in detail the need to produce a detailed plan or 

the important role of the engineer platoon as its executor. In 

fact, chapter 5, FM 90-7, warns that given a plan with too 

much detail, a platoon leader will emplace minefields as 

articulated in concept and disregard proper obstacle siting. 

Given this line of thought, it may be argued that use of the 

obstacle group design will increase the problem of improper 

obst~cle siting, because this technique places greater emphasis on precise designlexecution standards. However, NTC 

engineer trainers submit as a strong counterpoint that, for 

efficiency in execution, it is a lesser training challenge to 

make lieutenants and platoon sergeants understand that they 

must site obstacles and adjust a given design to the terrain 

than to generate the design itself. 

The goal of these two submissions from thc NTC (August 

1996 Engineer and this article) is to ensure that en&' meer 

leaders and staff officers manage the precious time available 

to engineers in establishing the defense. The most effective 

way to accomplish this is to prepare an executable plan that 

allows for the efficient use of engineer platoon hours. It is 

not sufficient to point out a problcm without suggesting a 

solution. This article provides a technique (the obstacle 

group design) that will narrow the focus of the platoon to its 

organizational capabilities and instill discipline into obstacle 

emplacement. Disciplined execution of an obstacle plan will 

allow our combat engineer force to maintain its credibility as 

a member of the combined arms team. It will enable us to 

deliver what we promise-obstacle effects on the ground to 

shape the fight for the cornmander. With victory as the only 

acceptable alternative, there is no other choice. 

Battle Command Training Program 

(BCTP) 

B)' Lieutenant Colonel David Snodgrass 

Recent BCTP Warfighter exercises show that targeting 

enemy capabilities presents a significant challenge for diviDecember 1996 

sions. Complete targeting of an enemy capability almost 

always requires a combined arms operation. If successful, it 

provides an excellent opportunity to upset the opposing force 

(OPFOR) plan and time line and improve our position on the 

battlefield. For example: Some divisions use air interdiction 

(AI) missions to destroy fixed bridges over rivers deep in the 

enemy rear area, theoretically to slow enemy follow-on echelons and force hi~n to expend various critical resources (time, 

bridging, and engineer effort). Unfortunately, they target 

only the fixed bridges and not the full spectrum of components that comprise the enerny force and its capability to 

move rapidly across a river. The usual result is only a minor 

inconvenience to the OPFOR and has little impact on their 

overall plan. 

Consider for a moment how rare and valuable A1 missions 

are and the risks we take to fly behind enemy lines to hit 

bridges. Are we accomplishing our objective if we fail to 

track the movement of the enemy force, interdict the bridges 

too early, or allow the enemy sufficient time to change routes 

without delaying his time line? Worse yet, what if we hit the 

bridges after he has already crossed? Assuming that the 

enemy's bypass options are difficult, how effective is knocking out a bridge if we fail to detect or target enemy engineer 

bridge units located near the bridge? How effective is the 

action if we fail to dedicate reconnaissance assets to watch 

the damagedldestroyed fixed bridges and detect his attempts 

lo construct float bridges or repair the damaged fixed 

bridges? Have we maximized the delay time of the enemy 

force if we allow enemy engineers to work unimpeded? If we 

do not dedicate additional reconnaissance efforts to identify 

and repon the enemy maneuver elements stacked up on 

routes into the crossing area, or if we do not dedicate assets 

to strike "target rich environments, have we fully realized 

the maximum benefit of our actions? If we lose aircraft and 

pilots on the A1 mission and the encmy has bridges up and 

forces moving again within a few hours, was the cumulative 

effect worth our efforts? 

Our best option is to hit the enemy, specifically his capability to rapidly move forces across a river, with multiple 

problems from multiple directions and present him with 

more than one challenge to solve at any given time. Doctrine 

states and experience shows that an obstacle is effective only 

when it is combined with other types of obstacles and integrated with planned, dedicated direct and indirect fires to 

achieve a specific effect. To accomplish this, we must anack 

the spectrum of assets that comprise the enemy capability as 

well as the enemy forces. We must remove his ability to use 

fixed bridges, take away his crossing alternatives and bridgerepair capability, consider other means to make an obstacle 

complex (i.e., Gator minefields), and then strike his forces as 

they wait for an opportunity to move forward. 

Division decision makers, in this case the combined arms 

Engineer 53 
deep operations coordination cell (DOCC),need a costbenefit analysis to assist their decision making. After we 

clcarly define the desired effect, we should clearly identify the 

targeted capability, component pieces, and resources required; 

determine if the resources are available and in the proper position; and quantify the risk associatcd with the mission. Once 

this analysis is complete, the decision makers will clearly 

understand the challenges involved in the mission. Then they 

can determine if the committed resources and risks involved 

are worthy of the net effect gained over the enemy. Planners 

should brief the division commander on the high-risk operations that commit limited resources, potcntially impact other 

operations, or have a potential payoff that is not clcarly in our 

favor to assist him in the decision to execute an attack. 

A1 missions against bridges are onc example of this concept using the mohility/survivability battle operating system 

(BOS). Enemy capability targeting challenges are found all 

across the battlefield, in each of the BOSS, and require a 

combined arms effort for success. Complete targeting of an 

enemy capability provides a much greater opportunity to significantly impact the OPFOR plan, presents the encmy with 

more than a minor inconvenience, and significantly improves 

our position on the battlefield. 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 

Minefield Battle Tracking and Influencing the 

Low-Zntensio Fight 

By Captain Jeff Farnsworth 

Enemy minefield battle tracking is an improving trend for 

units rotating through the JRTC. Successful units expend 

considerable effort to ensure their minefield-tracking charts 

and feeder reports include the information elements needed 

to show the mine threat across the battlefield. Many units 

disseminate minefield feeder reports widely and post them in 

all vehicles throughout the brigade. The tlow of obstacle 

intelligence (OBSTINTEL) from subordinate units is 

improving, although the accuracy and timeliness of reporting 

still need attention. Detached engineer platoons are getting 

better at flipping thc switch on their SINCGARS and reporting minefield incidents to the engineer companylbrigade 

engineer cell as they occur. Engineer conference calls facilitate information flow to confirmldeny other OBSTINTEL at 

the brigade level. The engineer at the brigade level is better 

integrated with the intelligence and maneuver battlefield 

operating systems (BOSS). Most OBSTINTEL is captured 

and posted. Brigade engineers consistently confirmldeny and 

exchange information with the S2. These actions are positive 

indicators that systcms are in place for commanders to "see" 

the battlefield. They set the stage for the application of battle 

command in the countermine fight. 

To increase the effectiveness of their combat operations, 

units should focus training efforts on the dissemination and 

analysis of battlefield information. Some successful techniques follow: 

Dissemination. Units typically disseminate updated 

minefield tracking reports as an engineer annex to daily brigade fragmentary orders. Most successful units ensure this 

information is quickly passed to company and platoon levels, where it is integrated into current operations. This technique, however, does not allow for rapid dissemination on a 

fluid, nonlinear battlefield. As minefield incidents occur, 

consider sending "flash minefield reports" over command 

nets, in much the same way that units disseminate flash 

NBC reports. This technique provides subordinate units and 

srnall unit leaders immediate access to this critical information and enhances their situational awareness. 

Analysis. The brigade and task force engineers who are 

able to influence the maneuver targeting process experience 

significantly more success against an austere enemy than 

those who are not. Sharing, confirmingtdenying, and disseminating information is not enough. Engineers also must 

aggressively intluence the S2's analyses and ensure that 

updated situational templates accurately reflect the relationship between enemy activity and disposition to OBSTINTEL. The engineer must advise and assist the S2 in adjusting 

templated caches, supply transfer points, and, therefore, 

likely enemy unit locations. Jointly with the S2, update the 

S3 on the current enemy situation. This information helps 

focus the intelligence picture used in targeting meetings at 

brigade and task-force levels. Engineers typically are passive 

observers during the targeting process. Instead, they 

shouldRecommend a focused area around high-densily enemy 

minefield activity for designation as named areas of 

interest and high-priority targets. 

Recommend using scouts and other intelligence assets to 

monitor enemy activity in these areas. 

Recommend that counterreconnaissance efforts and 

ambushes be employed near reseeded minefields. 

By employing a combination of these efforts, engineers 

will assist maneuver commanders in exercising effective battle command to win the counterminc fight. 
Past in Review 


War With Mexico: 


The Northern Campaign, 1846-1847 


By Paul K. Walker 

n the mid-l840s, the United States and 

Mexico went to war over the 

annexation of Texas as a state and an 

unresolved boundary dispute. Mexico 

claimed the Nueces River; the U.S. claimed 

the more southerly Rio Grande. 

As the crisis worsened, the U.S. Amy 

readied for possible hostilities. Authorized 

strength was only 8,500, but in 1845 

considerably fewer men were available for 

service. The situation resulted from a long 

period oi relative peace and traditional bias 

against standing armies and large military 

budgets in favor of the militia. 

The Amy's engineers were organized in 

two corps-a Corps of Engineers and a 

Corps of Topographical Engineers. The 

Corps of Engineers, under Colonel Joseph 

G. Totten, numbered 43 officen; the 

Topographical Engineers, under Colonel 

James W. AberQ numbered 36. The top 

graduates of West Point filled their ranks. 

Indeed, a West Point education was a 

unifying factor among the engineen who Second Lieutenant George G. Meade, a the way to Matamoros, gave Lieutenant 

served in the war with Mexico. topographer, was one of them. Jacob Blake (a topographer), his moment of 

By the 1840s, the Corps of Engineers' After a diplomatic mission failed, glory. Blake volunteered to inspect the 

primary duties involved coastal fortifi- President Polk ordered Taylor to move enemy's positions. An anillery captain 

cations, while the topographers (topogs) through the disputed tenitory to the Rio described the action: Blake "dashed off 

were engaged in river and harbor Grande. On 8 March 1846, Taylor set out from the right of our line to within musketimprovemenl~, road building, Western for Matamoros. Captain Jared K. E shot of the enemy's left. Here he 

exploration, and mapping. Neither corps Mansfield led the reconnaissance and dismounted, and with his field glass coolly 

had a troop unit assigned to it and had to selected camp sites along the 150-mile counted the number of men in one of the 

rely on soldiers detailed from other route. After they reached the north hank of enemy's squadrons, which of course enabled 

branches and hired civilians. the Rio Grande, across from Matamoros, him accurately to estimate the enemy's 

In June 1845, President James K. Polk there was little rest for the engineers. The entire cavalry force. Blake then remounted 

ordered Brevet Brigadier General Zachary topographers reconnoitered the surrounding his horse and galloped from left to right of 

Taylor to move his forces from Louisiana to area, while Mansfield directed constluction the enemy's line, stopping from time to time 

Texas. Taylor first set up camp on the of a 6-bastioned earthen fonress capable of and carefully observing the formation and 

Nueces River at Corpus Christi (on the holding 2,000 men and their horses. number of his infantry, as well as the 

northern edge of the disputed territory). By The stage was set for conflict. On 24 position, "umber, and calibre of his field 

fall his force numbered 4,000, about two- April 1846, Mexican forces ambushed an guns, all of which information was fully 

thirds of the actual strength of the entire American patrol, killing or wounding 16 verified by the subsequent events of the 

regular Army. Initially Taylor had two soldiers. lNo battles followed in eady May. day." Blake's repon helped the outnumbered 

engineers and three topographers with him. One, at a watering hole called Palo Alto on Americans prevail. 

December 1996 Engineer 55 
In official reports, maps, and drawings, the Topographical Engineers of the Mexican War period helped 

detail the wonder and beauty of a vast, previously unknown territory. Lieutenant James Abert's sketch of 

Cheyennes is an example. 

Meade also described his role at Palo 

Alto: "I was in the action during the whole 

time, at the side of General Taylor and 

communicating his orders. I may justly say 

I have had my 'Baprem de feu!' An officer 

of the general's staff had his horse shot 

under him, not two yards from me, and 

some five horses and men were killed at 

various times close to me." The Mexicans 

retreated, but Taylor encountered them 

again the next day a few miles south at 

Resaca de la Palma. In what amounted to a 

pitched infantry battle, experienced 

American regulars and the skilled 

leadership of junior officers helped carry 

the day. 

After the two battles, Taylor 

commended Blake and Meade, as well as 

Lieutenant Wood, another topographer, 

who helped set up and tire the artillery's 18- 

pound cannon at Resaca de la Palma. In 

those two days of battle, American 

casualties totalled 175, with less than 40 

killed, and Mexican casualties numbered 

1,000. 

The Mexican army retreated across the 

Rio Grande to Matamoros, but Taylor did 

not pursue them. He was outnumbered and 

lacked equipment to cross the river. The 

delay frustrated Meade. In his view, Taylor 

had the time but did not know how to use 

his staff, especially his engineers. "Had 

Taylor known," Meade wrote, "he would 

have had us at work experimenting and 

when any plan proved successful, had a 

bridge constructed and put in depot, and 

then on the tenth (of May), in three or four 

hours, the whole army, artillery and all, 

could have crossed and the Mexican army 

been prevented from retreating with some 

twelve pieces of artillery." By the time the 

American soldiers crossed the river eight 

days later, using captured boats, the enemy 

had withdrawn. Matamoros belonged to 

Taylor, but the Mexican army remained 

alive. 

Slow commu~cations kept word of the 

24 April attlck and American deaths from 

President Polk until the evening of 9 May. 

That news was all he needed to obtain a 

declaration of war from Congress, along 

with $10 million, an increase in authorized 

Army strength to 18,000 by expanding 

existing units, and authority to raise 50,000 

volunteers. 

On 15 May 1846, Congress established a 

100-man company of sappers, miners, and 

pontoniers whose duties included assisting 

laborers in erecting fortifications and then 

supervising the finished fortifications. The 

company was to consist of 10 sergeants, 10 

corporals, 78 privates.first and second class, 

and two musicians. This unit was the 

forerunner of today's 1st Engineer 

Battalion, slationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

For years, Chief Engineer Totten had 

argued in vain for such a company. 

Commanding General of the Army Winfield 

Scott, a staunch admirer of the engineers, 

had echoed his support. But it took a 

declaration of war to win Congressional 

approval. 

Even so, preparations had ken 

underway at West Point. From the faculty, 

Captain Alexander Swift was designated for 

command and had already spent two years 

at the French school of military engineering 

at Metz. When Congress acted, Swift 

56 Engineer December 1996 
selected Lieutenant Gustaws W. Smith, a 

fellow faculty memhe~ IS his sccond in ' 

command. Experienced in cumpany 

administration and infantry drill, Smith I 

complemented Swift's technical expertise. ; 

As ll~e third officer for what would be ; 

known as Company A of Engineen, they 

selected George B. McClellan, a soon-to- , 

graduate cadet. 

The three officers immediately bigm 1 

the challenging job of obtaining equipment 

and recruiting and training men. Totten's I 

instructions were specific: "We must have 

smart, able-bodied young men, who can 1 

read and write, and have knowledge of a / 

relevant mechanical trade." He urged Swift 

not to recruit married men and naturalized 

citizens and declared that, except for the , 

musicians (buglers), their minimum height I 

should he 5'6" with preference lor those I 

5'8" 105'10.'' 

Promotions in the Army werc rare. j 

Ling a retirement pro and a 

mandatory retirement agc, senior officcrs 

stayed on and many were too old to serve 

in the field. McClellan was ecstatic to be 

graduating and immediately going to war 

"Hip! Hip! Hurrah!" he wrote home, 1

I 

"Ain't it glorious!" George Derhy. another I 

member of the class of 1846 who joined 

the topographers, wrote to his mother, 

"Nothing is heard but promotion, glory, ' 

and la~jrcls." 1 

Still, recruitment was slow. The ! 

company rlcvcr reached Cull co~nplemenl 

and waited until 12 September for orders to 

join Taylor's army in Texas. Finally on 26 

Scptemher. 1 officcn and 71 enlistees with 

basic training at West Point under their 

belts, sailed from New Yi~rk harbor All but 1 

two were native-horn. Only lbur had ' 

previous militaly experience. After arriving in Texas in December, Company A , 

moved to Tampico and became involved in 

preparations for Vciu Cruz. 

Mcanwhiie Taylor's army in Texas grew I 

by adding new recruits, volunteers, and 

topographers. Captain William G. Williams ! 

was fresh from the Great Lakes survey j 

when he became Taylor's chief topographic 1 

engineei ; 

In early August, Taylor staned for his 

ncxt objective-Montcre~, the capital of / 

the Mexican province of Nueva Leon. ! 

December 1996 

which had a population of 10.000. His /

1 

e~~gincersaccompanied an advance pany 

to reconrtoiter and repair the roads. As 

Taylor drew near, Captain Mansfield's 1 

party obtained information on the city's 

defenses. Based on Mansfield's findings 

Taylor decided to cut off Monterey from ' 

the west. 

I

' 

Thc ansck began on 20 September. , 

Officers af both ingineer corps 1 

participated, fighting side-by-side and ' 

working together un rcconnaissmie and i 

planning assaults. Cliicf topographer 

Williams died in the figllting, and i Mansficld was wounded. On the 24th the I Mexican commander ol'fercd to surrender 

if hc could withdraw his army and obtain ! an 8-wcck truce. Taylor agreed. For their 

pans in the action, sevcral engincers I 

received brcvet promotions. 

This news from Mexico angered i 

President Polk, and he ordered Taylor to 

resume operations Meanwhile Polk 

recognized it would take more than a few 

I 

victories in the north to bring the Mexican i 

government lo the peace tahlc. Adopting a : new strategy, he shifted operations from 

I 

northern Mexico and put General Scott in 

charge of a landing at Vera Cruz and a 

march to Mexico City. This dccisiun 

assured that Taylor's army would soon bc 

severely reduced in size and that the 

remaining units would becomc in essence 

an army of occupation on the defensive in , northcrli Mexico. : 

Before [hilt happened, Taylor fought one I 

last battle st Buena Vista it1 February 1847, i 

Joining him were forces undcr Brigadier ' 

Gencral John E. Wool, who had advanced 

into Mcxico from San Antonio. Wool 

brought with him a strong engineer 

component, including West Point paduatcs 

Captains Roben E. Lee and William D. 

Fraser Captain George W. Hughes, one ol' ' 

the few non-West Pointers involved, was I 

I chief topopraphic engineer. On their way to 

join Taylor, Wool's army made thc 164-mile 

march to the Rio Grande in just II days. I 

using roads and bridges provided by the 

engincers. Unlike Taylor, Wool planncd his 

Rio Grande crossing in advance. Led by 

Lee, the engineers assembled a 'flying 

bridge,' prefabncarcd in San Antonio, ! 

which carried Wool's men across in a single I 

day. From there, they proceeded in stages 

dceperinto Mexico. 

Hughes' report on the march detailed the 

difficult challenges and significant rules of 

engineers and topographers. The going was 

not easy. Hughes rclnrd: "We were almost 

literally co~npelled to grope our way and 

likc a ship at sea to determine our positions 

by astronomical observations. Thus 

topographical panics usually had to be kept 

on the advance seeking camps and supplies 

of water, food, and fuel." 

At Buena Vista, Taylor met a largo 

Mexican army under General Santa Anna. 

In a complicated battle on 23 February 

1847, the American forces formed il wideangle "V" to turn the battle against the 

Mexicans. It was one of the most vicious 

engagenmntr of the war Once again, the 

engineers and topographers earned recognition and brevet promotions for their 

actions. As was their custom, the topogihcn prepad adetaded after-the-battle 

map ol'theaction. 

As [be war in northern Mexico came to a 

dose, peace was still more than a year away. 

The U.S. Anny began to reflect on some 

sobering lessons of the campaign. Engineers 

had proven they could work togcther on the 

march and on the battlefield. Comrnanders 

had an opportunity to see firsthand thz 

results of years of training at West Point. 

The war with Mexico was the United 

States' only major war between 1815 and 

1861. As such, it was a training ground for 

the Civil War. Id 

Dr Paul K. Wnlkcr is chief hisrorinn, 

Hendquarrers, U.S. Army Co171.r of Icnginee". Alexundria. Mrginia. 

quoted lnaterial is from 

the following sources: 

Eiscnhowei, John S.D., So Far From 

Gorl: The US Wur WirI~Mrrico,1846-1848 

(1989), Random House. 

Traas, Adrian G., From rhe Golden Gar? 

lo Mexico City: Re US Arm)' Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War; 

1846-1848. U.S. Government Printing 

Office (1993). 

En~ineer57 
ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted. 

Engineer Unit Directory. Units are reminded to check their entries in the Engineer Unit Directory and send 

changes no later than 15 January 1997 to: Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATSE-TD-D-P, Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473. Changes also may be sent via e-mail: bakernawood-vines.army.mil. The updated 

directory is scheduled for distribution in mid-March 1997. POC is Nancy Baker -4100. 

Doctrine Product Updates. Several engineer-proponent doctrine products are accessible on the Engineer 

School Publications home page on the world wide web. The file location is: www.wood.army.mil/DDDIPUBSI 

pubs.htm. The following doctrine products are scheduled for distribution in printed media in the next few months: 

Title 

FM 5-428, Concrete and Masonry 

FM 5-1 16, Engineer Operations Echelons Above Corps 

EXFOR ST 5-1 05-1, DigitizedTopographic Operations 

FM 5-105-1, Topographic Operations 

FM 5-499, Hydraulic Power Control Systems 

FM 5-250, Demolitions and Explosives 

FM 20-32, Mine Countermine Operations 

FM 5-572, Materials Testing 

FM 5-424, Interior Wiring 

FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data 

EXFOR Special Texts Update (Bn, Co, Plt) 

EXFOR ST 5-71 -100-5, Digitized Division Engineer Combat 

Operations 

I

I

I

I

I

I 

I

I

I 

Initial Draft 

Sep 96 

Nov 96 

Nov 96 

Nov 96 

Jan 97 

Jan 97 

Feb 97 

Final n 

FM 90-1 3-1, Combined Arms Breaching Mar 97 

FM 90-1 3, River-Crossing Operations 

FM 5-41 5, Firefighting Operations 

FM 5-170, Engineer Reconnaissance 

FM 20-400, Environmental Management I 

Apr 97 

May 97 

POC is Sandra Gibson, -4115. 

58Engineer 
NATO STANAGs. The Engineer School is working with NATO countries to revise STANAG 2036, Land Mine 

Laying. Marking, Recording, and Reporting Procedures, for which the school is custodian. FM 20-32, Mine/ 

Countermine Operations, incorporates much of this STANAG. The Engineer School also is developing a proposal 

for a new STANAG that deals with countermine activities. Comments on STANAG 2036 or topics to be included in 

the new countermine STANAG are welcome. POC is CPT Joe Birchmeier, -4115. 

Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations. On 22 October, the Joint Doctrine Working Party approved a proposal to develop an overarching engineer doctrinal publication. The first draft is scheduled for review in summer 

1997. (See article on page 26.) The Engineer School, the Army's representative on the working group, is developing the doctrine. We received a tremendous response to a recent request for information about joint engineer 

operations (such as tactics, techniques, and procedures; standing operating procedures; and operations plans) 

that will assist the development effort. If you haven't already done so, please forward material covering doctrinal 

"work arounds" your organization has developed. POC is MAJ Richard Graves, -41 15. 

Field Manual Inventory Reduction. The TRADOC Chief of Staff directed that all proponent schools reduce 

the number of field manuals in their inventory, and the number of pages in those manuals, by at least 20 percent. 

Each TRADOC school must prepare a plan to reach its established goal. The Engineer School is considering the 

following actions: 

W Retain core manuals containing doctrine for units at brigade level and below. 


W Consolidate like information in selected field manuals. 


H Purchase commercial, "off-the-shelf" technical publications for low-density MOSS 


Update engineer publications to support multiservice use 

W Place selected publications in "Inactive Publications Storage" until assets are available to permit updating. 

A study addressing these options was provided to field commanders at the October 1996 Council of Colonels 

and the commanders' and directors' meetings. Units are encouraged to review the study and submit recommendations. POC is Lucius Warrick, -41 15. 

Partnership Conference on Future Engineer Operations Concepts. Nearly 50 representat~ves from Army 

laboratories and research and development activities met at the Engineer School on 9-10 October for the Partnership Conference on Future Engineer Operations Concepts. Planned by the Futures Division of the Directorate of 

Combat Developments, its purpose was to show how attendees' organizations fit Into the emerging Force XXI 

Army and the overall modernization equation. Additional meetings are planned to refine the process. The end 

result will be an Engineer Corps that is better able to support the total force. POC is Brian Murphy, -7214. 

Officer Development System Review. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed an Officer Personnel Management System task force to review the officer development system. The task force will review leader development. 

assignments, career management, character development, and the new Officer Efficiency Report. The Diredor of 

Training is the Engineer School's representative to the task force. This review provides an opportunity for you to 

express concerns and provide input into your future. For more information, visit the Engineer Personnel Proponency Office's home page at http://155.9.32.3IEPPOleppo~hp.htm. The e-mail address is: zajacmOwoodvines.army.mil. POC is CPT Matt Zajac, -4087. 
.BRIDGE---- THE-GAP - = 

By Command Sergeant Major Julius B. Nutter 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

The Centralized Promotion System 

While traveling through Army installations, Ioften Sergeant major (CMF-19) 

hear false myths and incorrect perceptions . Sergeant major (CMF-51) - about the Army's centralized promotion 

system. To correct the many misconceptions, I will Training is an important first step for panel members 

present the facts about the promotion system, which to ensure that they vote consistently on each soldier's 

affects the career of every member of our Engineer file. During this intensive training, they develop panel 

Regiment. standards, practice voting on sample records, analyze 

A centralized system for the promotion of enlisted practice votes, adjust standards, practice voting on 

soldiers has been in effect since 1969. It became additional sample records, make final adjustments to 

effective for the promotion of sergeants rnajor on 1 the standards, and obtain the board president's 

January 1969, for master sergeants on 1 March 1969, approval of the final standards. 

and for sergeants first class on 1 June 1970. During selection board proceedings, three board 

The system is composed of several centralized members review each soldier's individual record. They 

enlisted promotion boards that have the following review the official military personnel file, microfiche, DA 

missions: photo, DA Form 2A, DA Form 2-1 and other hard-copy 

documents, and compare them with the approved panel Select candidates for promotion to sergeant first standards. Then they place a numerical score ranging class, master sergeant, and sergeant major, and from 6+ to 1- on each soldier's board file. This process appoint command sergeants major. ensures that no single success or failure is an 

Select attendees for the resident Sergeant Major overriding factor in determining the soldier's standing in 

Course and the Advanced Noncommissioned relation to hislherpeers. Panel members are charged to 

Officer Course. consider the 'total soldier" in determining those best 

Provide qualitative management program screen- qualified for promotion. 

ing and an appeals process. The following chart shows the scoring system:

- Provide a qualitative management program final 

board. 

Provide standby advisory boards, as necessary. 

The Secretary of the Army, through the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Personnel, selects the individuals who sit on 

the boards. Each board includes both officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and a general 

officer serves as board president. Nine to eleven panels 

comprise each board, with at least four members on 

each panel. The panels are organized by career 

management field (CMF), and the size varies in 

proportion to the number of records to be considered. 

Each panel has a nonvoting administration NCO, who 

controls the flow of records. A typical panel organization 

follows: The Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report 

Colonel (Engineer) (NCOER) is the single most important document in 

Lieutenant colonel (Armor) determining the promotion potential of senior NCOs. It 

must be a clear and concise document that tells panel Command sergeant major (CMF-19) members how the soldier performed and where he can 

Command sergeant major (CMF-12) best serve the Army in the future. Despite its 

60 Engineer December 1996 
; ~ 

importance, many NCOERs do not provide the of the form must be specific and provide details that 

information panel members need to adequately assess support the "NO" in the value block. They ensure that 

the performance and potential of the rated NCOs. There promotion board members get the intended message. 

is nothing an NCO can do to compensate for a poor or Part V Overall Performance and Potential mediocre NCOER. 

Let me share a few observations about NCOERs These two areas are most important when 

reviewed by the FY96 master sergeant selection board. selecting the soldiers best qualified for promotion. 

Senior rater bullets are critical in determining 

Part IllDuty Description promotion potential. The senior rater's comments 

Part Ill(a) is extremely important. It tells the panel should state clearly and concisely what he recommends 

what job the NCO actually performed. The job Army leaders do with the rated NCO (promote ahead of 

description on some NCOERs did not match the peers, promote with peers, promote immediately, etc.). 

soldier's principal duty title andlor the duty MOS. This Senior raters also must ensure that the performance 

reflected negatively on the soldier because the and potential blocks checked are consistent with the 

information did not provide a clear picture of what the associated bullet comments. For example, a "Promote 

soldier did on a day-to-day basis. It is especially with peers'' bullet and a "1" rating in the potential block 

important that the duty description of a soldier in a are not consistent The comments must focus on 

nontraditional or TDA position clearly state the specific potential and help panel members make tough calls to 

duties and responsibilities of the position. That clearly identify those soldiers who are superior to their 

information enables panel members to make a peers. The statement, "The best platoon sergeant of 

reasonable decision as to the importance of the rated five I currently rate" provides a definable standard that 

soldier's duties and the quality of histher performance. helps the panel make an informed decision. 

The centralized promotion system is a creditable Part IV Values system. To keep it creditable, leaders must be involved 

I

n some NCOERs, the rated soldier received a "NO" in the NCOER process and educate their soldiers about 

block checked with a supporting bullet comment, but the system. With sufficient leader involvement, the 

nothing was annotated on the back of the NCOER by centralized promotion system will continue to meet the 

the rater or the senior rater. The comments on the back Army's needs. 

(Conrinued from page 16) DMRS but also has a digital camera and By 2001, the objective system should 

The software also will display associated 

minefield records and query the database. 

This subsystem includes a PC with 

CD-ROM reader, a JINC connected to the 

tactical SINCGARS UHF or an HF radio, 

a printcr, and a Glohal Positioning System 

(GPS) card. 

laser binoculars. The camera allows the 

user to photograph the target and store the 

digital photograph with the report. Laser 

hinoculars allow the user to capture 

accurate coordinates from a standoff of 

up to 1,500 meters. The PC captures the 

distance from the observer's location to 

the target object and the azimuth, directly 

I 

I 

seamlessly integrate with other Army 

Battle Command System (ABCS) programs operating at that time. Obstacle 

information managed by the system will 

integrate with other engineer command 

and control information and engineer 

intelligence throughout the ABCS. This 

system will ensure that commanders, 

kom the binoculars, via a serial planners, and soldiers have access to 

Digital Reconnaissance System connection. accurate and timely minefield information 

Reconnaissance teams use the DRS 

to collect minefield, obstacle, or 

other battlefield data. This 

information is digitally stored in a PC 

during the collection process. After 

collecting the data, reconnaissance units 

hand carry ("Sneaker Net" or floppy disk 

transfer) or use communications devices to 

Parts of the interim system may go 

to Bosnia, Parts will play in the 

Task Force XXI exercise 

scheduled for March and April 1997. 

Most be in lhe JCM-ACTD in 

August 1997. Feedback from these events 

What's Next? 

1 

Major Taylor serves in fire Direrlorate of Combat Develo/~ments, U.S. Arnly 

Engineer School. Previous assignments 

include rours with the 249th Engineer 

Combar Battalion (HJ, Germany, and 

the 52d Engineer Combat Battalion (H), 

Fort Colorado. He holds a 

regardless of the theater or mission. 

Y 

transmit the results to higher headquarters. will shape the design characteristics of degreefrom N~~ M ~state~ This subsystem is identical to the the objective minefield-database system. University. 

December 19% *U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1996554-122 Engineer 61 
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