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0316915

COMMANDANT

MG R.L. Van Antwerp

563-6158

<vanantwerpr@wood.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

BG William H. McCoy, Jr.

563-6192

<mccoyw@wood.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR (OUTGOING)

CSM William D. McDaniel, Jr.

563-6151

<mcdaniew@wood.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR (INCOMING)

CSM Clinton Pearson

563-8060

<pearsonc@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL John (Pat) Leake

563-8080

<leakej@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Gerald Lago

563-8045

<lagog@wood.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Dennis Smith

563-8046

<smithde@wood.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC John Drolet

563-7116

<droletj@wood.army.mil>

TRADOC SYSTEMS MANAGER for ENGINEER COMBAT SYSTEMS

COL John Holler

563-4081

<hollerj@wood.army.mil>

TRADOC PROGRAM INTEGRATION OFFICE–TERRAIN DATA

COL David Kingston

563-4086

<kingstond@wood.army.mil>

COMMANDER, 1st ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Paul Kelly

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<kellyp@wood.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

LTC(P) Thomas E. O’Donovan

563-4093

<odonovant@wood.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Dr. Rebecca Johnson

563-4119

<johnsonr@wood.army.mil>

CHIEF OF DOCTRINE

LTC Reinhard Koenig

563-7537

<koenigr@wood.army.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Paul Arcangeli

596-3869, DSN 581-3869

<arcangelip@wood.army.mil>

COUNTERMINE/COUNTER BOOBY TRAP CENTER

LTC BIlly Tollison

563-7347

<tollisob@wood.army.mil>

U.S. Army Engineer School

573-563-8080 / DSN 676-8080
 Engineer 1

COMMANDANT

Major General

R.L. Van Antwerp

July-September 2003

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major William D. McDaniel, Jr.

23 Letters to the Editor

41 Operation Iraqi Freedom Warfighter Conference

46 CTC Notes - “Subterranean Complex Operations”

By Sergeant First Class Josue A. Pinos (NTC)

46 CTC Notes - “Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching

System (APOBS)”

By Sergeant First Class Josue A. Pinos (NTC)

47 CTC Notes - “Mine Effects Simulator (MES)”

By Sergeant First Class William Sutton (NTC)

FEATURES

04 Victory Sappers: V Corps Engineers in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Part I: The Attack to Baghdad and Beyond . . .

 By Colonel Gregg F. Martin and Captain David E. Johnson

13 The Inland Petroleum Distribution System in Kuwait and Iraq

 By Captain Anthony De Simone and Major Norm Gauthier

19 Engineer Operations in Turkey Support Operation Iraqi Freedom

 By Lieutenant Colonel Roxanne Nosal, Lieutenant Colonel Randal Fofi, Lieutenant Colonel John

McClellan, and Major Shawn McGinley

24 Improving the Engineer Battalion’s Combat Power: Lessons Learned in Iraq

 By Captain Aaron P. Magan

28 Army Diver Missions in Iraq

544th Engineer Team (Dive)

By First Lieutenant Christopher F. West

29 74th Engineer Team (Dive)

By FIrst Lieutenant P.J. Inskeep

32 Breaching Around Corners: Engineer Operations in Urban Environments

By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony C. Funkhouser

36 36th Engineer Group Conducts Somber Mission

By Captain Brian Chapuran

37 Transforming the Light Equipment Company

By Captain Paul J. Kremer

42 Helping Iraqis Rebuild Iraq

By Colonel James I. Vosler, LIeutenant Colonel Clarence D. Turner, and Captain Kevin J. Schrock

52 Prime-Power Considerations for Engineer Planners

By Captain Geoff Van Epps

55 Live From Baghdad: It’s Prime Power

By Staff Sergeant Robert Stephenson

59 Engineers Battle Sulfur Fires

By Mr. Thomas O’Hara

62 Task Force Neighborhood

By Specialist Joshua Hutcheson

63 Kazer Bridge Restoration

By Sergeant Robert Woodward

July-September 2003 Headquarters, Department of the Army Volume 33 PB 5-03-3

48 CTC Notes - “Engineer Equipment Platoon Leadership:

Operating in Support of a Light Brigade Combat Team”

By Sergeant First Class Steven J. SanPedro and Staff

Sergeant Joey W. Dunn (JRTC)

49 CTC Notes - “NCO Roles and Responsibilities in C2 Nodes”

By Sergeant First Class Danny Petersen (CMTC)

56 Enlisted PERSCOM Notes

By Lieutenant Colonel Jack F. Smith

58 Regimental Awards - Reserve Component

60 Engineer Safety - “Motorcycle Rider Risk Management”

By Mr. Fred E. Fanning

64 Engineer Update

64 News and Notes

Inside Back Cover: Subscription Order Form

UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

ENGI

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

NEER

Photo by Andrew

Wright, courtesy

McGraw-Hill

Construction

U.S. Army engineers

in Operation Iraqi

Freedom

Front Cover:

Back Cover:

MANAGING EDITOR

EDITOR

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

CONTRIBUTING

EDITOR

Rena L. Humphrey

Shirley Bridges

Rick Brunk
2 Engineer July-September 2003

Clear The Way

By Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

I

n the last issue of Engineer, we explored

the (then named) Objective Engineer

Force and its path to transforming our

Regiment. As you know by now, we are no

longer using the term Objective Force; instead our focus is the Future Force as we

continue the Transformation mission.

This issue of the bulletin is focused on

aspects of the major combat operations

phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.You will

be provided some insights into what happened during the preparation for, and execution of, this complex, tremendously challenging and superbly executed engineer

support to Operation Iraqi Freedom. I expect that discussions of the following articles in this bulletin will take place at your professional development (officer and NCO) and command information classes:

“Victory Sappers: V Corps Engineers in Operation Iraqi Freedom” by Colonel Martin; “The Inland Petroleum Distribution

System” by Captain DeSimone; “Engineer Operations in Turkey Support Operation Iraqi Freedom” by Lieutenant Colonel

Nosal; “Army Diver Missions in Iraq” by First Lieutenants

West and Inskeep; “Engineer Operations in Urban Environments” by Lieutenant Colonel Funkhouser; “Helping Iraqis

Rebuild Iraq” by Colonel Vossler; and “Prime-Power Considerations” by Captain Van Epps. There is much more that we will

publish in future issues of this bulletin as we write the next chapters of Army engineer history.

Even though Iraq and Afghanistan remain combat zones,

we must begin the analysis and begin to answer “What

happened?” From 3 to 5 November 2003, the senior leaders of

the Regiment will gather in Savannah, Georgia, to continue

the after-action review (AAR) process at the regimental level

by coming to grips with the question “Why did it happen?”

and begin the discussion on “What do we need to do about

it?” We will seek to identify the truly critical aspects of how

the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom apply to

engineers in the Current and Future Forces, as well as develop

thoughts on how to implement those lessons learned into our

Army Transformation efforts.

Seek out lessons learned articles and

AARs from engineer units and senior

engineer leaders as they are published.

They are powerful and valuable learning

tools. In some way, virtually all of our

Regiment has been affected by the events

of the past two years, and I solicit your

comments and ideas to help us in the

transformation of our Regiment.

It is with immense pride that I serve as the

Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer

School. These past months have seen the

truth in the phrase: “One Corps–One

Regiment–One Team.” It has been especially

gratifying to see the outstanding readiness

displayed on mobilization and arrival at Fort

Leonard Wood of our U.S. Army Reserve and Army National

Guard engineers. Those citizen soldiers have answered the call

and have done what they were asked to do. With nearly 75 percent

of our engineer soldiers in the Reserve Component, there is just

no way all the engineer missions would have been accomplished

by relying only on the active forces.

It is also important at this time to acknowledge the tremendous

support our soldiers have received from their family members.

Separation, and especially separation involving a family member

in combat, is an extra stress component that requires love and

special handling. Family Readiness Groups have remained key

elements to keeping the home fires burning and an information

and support group that lend stability to a traumatic situation.

Thanks to all of you.

As the Army’s builders, we construct our future from the

groundwork of our past experiences. Our true heritage and

the history we hold dear was merged from the cement of our

values and the blood of our heroes into the enduring concrete that is our Regiment. Our Regiment is people, and when

we suffer the losses that we did recently, we must take their

inspired service and ensure that those who follow as Army

engineers know of their exploits and deeds while facing enemy fire in direct combat operations. We dedicate all that we

do to their memory. Essayons!

Sergeant First Class Paul Smith Bravo Company, 11th Engineer Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia

Private First Class Jason Meyer Bravo Company, 11th Engineer Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia

Staff Sergeant Hollinsaid Lincoln Bravo Company, 11th Engineer Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia

Private Gregory Huxley Bravo Company, 317th Engineer Battalion, Fort Benning, Georgia

Staff Sergeant Kenneth Bradley Bravo Company, 588th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

Sergeant Keman Mitchell Charlie Company, 4th Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado

Private First Class Pablo Manzano Bravo Company, 54th Engineer Battalion, Bamberg, Germany

Staff Sergeant Mark A. Lawton Alpha Company, 244th Engineer Battalion, Grand Junction, Colorado
Lead The Way

By Command Sergeant Major William D. McDaniel, Jr.

U.S. Army Engineer School

July-September 2003 Engineer 3

As I begin this article, it is very

difficult for me to express in words

my thoughts about the role of the

U.S. Army Engineer School Regimental

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). This

position is not only very important to the

Commandant and Assistant Commandant

of the School but also to all the soldiers

and leaders in the Engineer Regiment. I must

state my sincere appreciation to Major

General (MG) Van Antwerp and Brigadier

General (BG) (P) Castro for allowing me the

freedom to accomplish my job and the

opportunity to get out and visit engineers

throughout the continental United States

(CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS).

As many of you know, I was selected by MG Van Antwerp,

Commanding General of the Maneuver Support Center

(MANSCEN) and Fort Leonard Wood, to serve as his post

CSM, and on 19 May 2003, I received my charge during the

change-of-responsibility ceremony. In addition to fulfilling

the duties of my new position, I will continue to support and

cover down on the duties of the Regimental CSM until my

replacement, CSM Clinton Pearson, is in place here at Fort

Leonard Wood.

Although I only served as the Regimental CSM for eight

months, the time between the start and finish date is not

important. What is important is what we accomplished

together between those dates and the impact we had during

that time.

MG Van Antwerp often uses a bus to describe key leaders/

people in this great organization. He states that it is important to

have the right person, on the right bus, in the right seat, at the

right time to be an effective organization. I have been extremely

humbled, blessed, and honored to serve in this capacity and

represent all of you. I believe that I have made a positive impact

in our Regiment and that I was on the right bus, in the right seat,

at the right time in our history as a Regiment.

In fact, I have been on a great bus with a great team of

teams. I have been extremely fortunate to have this opportunity to serve with two general officers who are superb leaders—both very talented and experienced and visionaries in

their own right. They demonstrate caring and concerned leadership through their selfless examples daily, and they have

taught us all a sense of balance in our lives and profession,

which is absolutely essential and necessary in this great profession. They have been great role models for all to follow—

with their personal examples of balance—and neither of them

just gives this lip service but rather physically demonstrates

it every day. As a senior NCO, I have learned

so very much from both of them in my personal and professional life, and I am honored to have served with both of them.

I feel that I have managed to bridge the

gap in communicating with our CSMs and

Sergeants Major from all components

(including retirees) within our Regiment. I

tried very hard to provide information and

to stay connected with them so I could help

with their issues. During my time as

Regimental CSM, I visited a number of

locations throughout our engineer communities. I enjoyed the opportunity to talk

to our soldiers and leaders, report their

issues and concerns to the Commandant

and Assistant Commandant, and then see the Engineer School

“Team of Teams” go to work to resolve these issues reported

from you in the field. I feel that I have represented all engineer

soldiers (Active Component, National Guard, and Reserve—

past and present).

These are exciting and trying times for us as engineers.

Buzzwords such as transformation, maneuver support

transformation, Future Force engineering, geospatial engineering, transforming the Regiment T3 (transform the

Regiment, train soldiers and leaders, take care of [support]

the Regiment), force pooling, engineer effects module (EEM),

engineer mission team (EMT), engineer mission force (EMF),

assured mobility, countermine, counter-booby trap, mine dog

team, urban breachers, Officer Education System, NCOES

transformation, MOS conversions, MOS consolidations—and

many others—come to mind. A lot is happening in our

environment as we look to the future.

I am a soldier with lots of energy and one who always

wants to make a positive difference. I don’t know all the answers. What I do know is that I love being a soldier, and because of this passion, I will continue to embrace every challenging position with absolute commitment and selfless service. So as I move to the MANSCEN post CSM position and

complete this last article to you, I must say thank you for your

total support and confidence.

My thoughts and prayers go out to all the soldiers on

point around the globe and to all their families during their

separation. Remember to always think safety as we accomplish our required missions, regardless of where we find ourselves. Take care of your soldiers, yourselves, and your families. God bless you all, my very best goes out to you, and

please stay in touch!

Essayons!!
4 Engineer July-September 2003

Victory Sappers:

V Corps Engineers in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Part 1: The Attack to Baghdad and Beyond . . .

By Colonel Gregg F. Martin and Captain David E. Johnson

An armored D9 dozer clears a road blocked by a destroyed vehicle.

A year after the fateful 11 September 2001 attacks, the

United States began to assemble a “coalition of the

willing” for the second phase of the war on

terrorism—the liberation of Iraq. The United States and coalition

allies built up forces in neighboring Kuwait and prepared for

war. After diplomacy failed, the air and ground forces of the

assembled coalition crossed the Iraqi border on 21 March,

with V (U.S.) Corps leading the attack as the main effort. The

attack, code-named Operation Iraqi Freedom, isolated Saddam

Hussein’s bases of power in Baghdad and Tikrit. The goal

was to eliminate the regime quickly—with a minimum loss of

life and destruction of civil infrastructure—in order to rapidly

transition to Iraqi civil rule capable of ensuring peace,

prosperity, and freedom for the Iraqi people.

U.S. Army engineers played a crucial role during the initial

attack and continue to do so during the follow-on stability and

support operations and rebuilding effort. Every element of the

“The sappers of the Victory Corps were all over the battlespace, providing value wherever they were employed . . . river

crossing operations, building and maintaining infrastructure, conducting stability and support operations, repairing

airfields, conducting combat operations—and much, much more . . . all done to an exceptionally high standard . . . each

member of this high-energy team is a national hero.”

—Lieutenant General William S. Wallace

Former Commanding General, V (U.S.) Corps
July-September 2003 Engineer 5

Engineer Regiment has contributed to the fight: Active and

Reserve Components and civilians; combat engineers of every

type (armored, mechanized, airborne, wheeled, air assault), combat

heavy, construction, bridging, and topographic, as well as divers

(see article on page 28), fire fighters, well drillers, and utilities/

prime-power personnel (see articles on pages 52 and 55), facility

engineer detachments and teams, and the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE). During initial combat operations, engineers

assured the mobility of the ground forces, enabling coalition

forces to move rapidly north and overwhelm Iraqi military forces.

As the high-intensity fighting ebbed, engineers transitioned to

stability and support operations, as well as humanitarian civic

action (HCA), performing virtually every conceivable type of

mission.

 Although theater Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force,

and coalition engineers all played a vital role in the campaign,

this article focuses on the V Corps engineer effort, and in

particular, the role of echelon-above-division (EAD) forces.

The article first looks at the planning that set the conditions

for such a remarkable triumph. It then describes the decisive

role that the V Corps engineers played, reviews some of the

lessons learned from the campaign, and recommends ways for

engineers to improve their performance on future battlefields.

The authors concentrate mostly on the planning and highintensity combat phases of the campaign, as the stability and

support operations are still ongoing and the lessons to be

learned are still emerging.

Engineer Plan and Task Organization

Engineer planners at V Corps and the various divisions

did a magnificent job under very challenging conditions. These challenges came from the compartmentalization of information; the dispersion of key planners

and units across multiple posts, countries, continents, and

time zones; and the competing requirements of numerous

simultaneous real-world missions.

 The engineer plan was based on the emerging doctrine of

“assured mobility.” To support this doctrine, it was crucial for

commanders to understand the impact of terrain and weather

on military operations. In the V Corps headquarters, the Terrain

Analysis Platoon of the 320th Engineer Company (Corps)

(Topographic), 130th Engineer Brigade, provided map and

imagery analysis that yielded the V Corps commander and his

staff products to visualize and understand the terrain.

Moreover, each division had embedded terrain analysis teams

that could provide similar analysis tools. Further, combat

engineers throughout V Corps validated their charge as terrain

experts, providing key analysis and timely decision-making

products to the maneuver commanders.

Throughout V Corps and the divisions, the true testament

of engineers was enabling commanders and staffs to “see”

and visualize the terrain to a degree never before witnessed in

warfare. The V Corps commander, deputy commander, chief of

staff, and key members of the battle staff spent countless

hours studying and analyzing special terrain products with

the V Corps senior terrain technician and his terrain analysts

at their sides—helping key leaders comprehend the impact of

the terrain in order to make the right decisions. The 320th

Engineer Company and, in particular, the Terrain Platoon

embedded in the V Corps battle staff, proved their incredible

worth time and again throughout this campaign. Every effort

should be made to retain this powerful capability at the corps

level to ensure that battlefield commanders continue to have

the right tools to make the very best decisions.

For each phase of the operation, planners from the V Corps

Staff Engineer Section (SES) estimated the engineer effort required

to support the scheme of maneuver. Working with the 130th

Engineer Brigade, the SES resourced subordinate units with EAD

engineers to accomplish required tasks. The planners identified

several missions that were critical to the Corps, such as breaching

border obstacles; maintaining main supply routes (MSRs);

clearing and opening Tallil Air Base for medical evacuation

(MEDEVAC) and C-130 resupply operations; developing logistics

support areas (LSAs) and convoy support centers; using bridging

assets for multiple river crossings; constructing C-130 and

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) airstrips and hundreds of

helipads; clearing and opening Baghdad International Airport;

and providing for the tactical mobility and survivability of the

maneuver forces.

Key engineer units were sent to Kuwait relatively early in

the deployment process because planners and senior leaders

recognized the importance of getting engineers into the theater

early.

The engineer plan maximized the support forward to the

divisions and accepted risk in the corps rear area. The earlyarriving EAD engineer units went to support the 3d Infantry

Division (3ID),V Corps’s main effort. The 130th Engineer Brigade

initially detached its organic 94th Engineer Battalion

(Combat)(Heavy) and 54th Engineer Battalion (Combat), along

with several multirole bridge companies and the 937th Engineer

Group, to reinforce the 3ID division engineer (DIVENG) brigade

and its organic units—the 10th, 11th, and 317th Engineer

Battalions (Combat). The 94th was organized into force packages

and tenaciously reduced obstacles, upgraded MSRs, constructed

LSAs, built helipads and airfields, and prepared banks for rivercrossing operations. The 54th provided critical combat engineer

support to the divisional cavalry squadron, augmented the

divisional engineers to weight the main effort, and provided

command and control (C2) for both the border crossing and an

assault float river crossing. Shortly before the attack, the 130th

controlled just a single combat heavy company until follow-on

EAD engineer units from Forts Lewis, Carson, and Drum arrived

and were able to cross the line of departure. This decision was

made to ensure that 3ID was properly weighted with EAD units

and set for success.

Follow-on divisions also received EAD engineers. Each

division ultimately received an engineer group headquarters

to assist with the C2 of EAD engineers within the division’s

area of operations. This arrangement allowed the divisions’

organic engineers to focus forward on providing mobility
6 Engineer July-September 2003

support to the maneuver elements in the offense. Because the

environment was so austere, the requirements for engineers

outweighed their capabilities. Given the scarce engineer resources, the priority was to resource the main effort first, then

resource the other divisions as additional units arrived. This

kept only a modest engineer capability in the corps rear area

until well into the stability and support operations phase of

the campaign.

Engineer Missions

Throughout the campaign, V Corps engineers performed

virtually every conceivable type of mission. In addition,

they simultaneously deployed forces; conducted

reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI); attacked

into Iraq; and conducted both stability and support operations

and HCA missions—bringing together and fighting an

engineer force from all components and every type of engineer

unit, geographically dispersed over hundreds of miles in

combat and over multiple time zones and continents during

deployment.

During the attack to Baghdad, the 3ID DIVENG brigade was

weighted with the 937th Engineer Group, the 94th Engineer

Battalion (-), the 535th Engineer Company (Combat Support

Equipment [CSE]), the 54th Engineer Battalion, and several

multirole bridge companies. The 130th commanded and controlled

the 864th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) (plus two additional

line companies) and the 642d Engineer Company CSE; the 565th

Engineer Battalion, which included the 502d Engineer Company

(Assault Float Bridge [AFB]), the 38th Engineer Company

(Medium Girder Bridge [MGB]) and the 544th Engineer Team

(Dive); and the 320th Engineer Company (Topographic). In

addition to supporting 3ID, the 130th also provided EAD engineer

support to the 101st Airborne Division and its organic 326th

Engineer Battalion, the 82d Airborne Division and its organic

307th Engineer Battalion (-), 3d Corps Support Command,

numerous V Corps separate brigades, the V Corps command posts,

and Special Forces elements—all this while maintaining MSRs

and alternate supply routes (ASRs) stretching 500 kilometers from

the Kuwait-Iraq border to Baghdad.

V Corps would ultimately grow to a force of four-plus divisions

and an armored cavalry regiment (ACR). However, the attack to

Baghdad, destruction of the Iraqi Army, and forced collapse of

the regime was conducted principally by 3ID, 101st Airborne

Division, 82d Airborne Division (-), and the V Corps separate

brigades, supported by the remarkably modest engineer force

described in the preceding paragraph. After the fall of Baghdad,

the V Corps engineer force grew to more than 19,000 soldiers in 3

brigades, 5 groups, 30-plus battalions, and numerous separate

companies and detachments—an enormous force required and

organized for subsequent combat, HCA, stability, support, and

force bed-down operations that continue throughout Iraq. Some

of the major missions include the following:

Improve Bed-Down Facilities

One of the first tasks facing engineer units upon arrival in

Kuwait was improvement of the austere bed-down facilities.

While most of the base camp construction was handled by

theater engineers, V Corps engineers improved facilities by

building protective berms, command posts, and ammunition

holding areas; constructing helipads and nuclear, biological,

and chemical decontamination sites; maintaining and upgrading roads; and providing numerous quality-of-life improvements such as gravel pads, electrical work, carpentry

jobs, and drainage. In assembly areas in the open desert,

engineers also found innovative ways to build gravity showers

and burn-out latrines from the limited materials at hand.

Currently, engineer units are focused on constructing force

bed-down facilities throughout Iraq.

Breach Border Obstacles

The first critical mission of the war was breaching the border

obstacles. Before the attack, American and Kuwaiti engineers

moved forward and cleared multiple lanes through the

5-kilometer-deep obstacle belt that marked the Kuwait-Iraq

border. The 937th Engineer Group commander was the initial

crossing force engineer—with the 54th Engineer Battalion

commander serving as the crossing area engineer, responsible

for the C2 of division forces as they passed through the breach

lanes. Along each lane, combat engineers and military police

manned traffic control points, with construction equipment

and recovery vehicles nearby to remove blockages. The entire

operation had been planned and rehearsed in detail before the

attack; all key leaders in the division and corps drove through

a full-scale mock-up of the border and the lane-marking system

prior to execution. During the actual breach, once 3ID combat

units had passed through the border, control of the crossing

transitioned from division to corps, with the 130th Engineer

Brigade’s 864th Engineer Battalion commander assuming the

role of crossing force engineer. This handover allowed the

3ID engineers to move rapidly north and focus on the forward

fight.

Clear and Repair Runways

The next major corps engineer mission was at Tallil Air

Base, southwest of An Nasariyah. Capturing the airfield would

allow the coalition to fly attack aviation, MEDEVAC flights,

and C-130s closer to the front. A mechanized task force from

3ID, supported by A Company, 317th Engineer Battalion,

captured the airfield; however, the runway and the surrounding

facilities were unusable because of landmines, unexploded

ordnance (UXO), craters, and protective berms. A team of

engineers from the 54th, equipped with the M1 Panther II—a

modified Abrams tank specially designed to clear minefields—

cleared 200,000 square meters of the runway, allowing the first

Apache attack helicopters to land. Then B Company, 94th

Engineer Battalion, brought dozers, graders, and scrapers to

finish repairing the runway for use by Air Force planes and to

dig protective positions for the Patriot air defense batteries

capable of defending the airfield against attack from Iraqi

missiles. In less than 12 hours, the airfield was C-130 capable.

Within two days, it was structurally capable of receiving all

aircraft types, including C-5s.
July-September 2003 Engineer 7

Maintain and Improve Supply Routes

Maintaining and upgrading the hundreds of kilometers of

MSRs and ASRs, ultimately stretching from the Kuwait border

to Baghdad, was an enormous and critical mission. As V Corps

attacked through As Samawah and on to An Najaf, fierce enemy

resistance caused the Corps to divert traffic off the preferred

paved highways and onto the inferior secondary desert route

to the west, a move that allowed enhanced convoy security.

The huge volume of heavy-duty military traffic quickly

deteriorated the already substandard Iraqi pipeline road, which

had become the V Corps MSR. Much of the road had to be

upgraded and widened to accommodate the thousands of

heavy trucks hauling fuel, ammunition, water, and supplies to

the forward units—only to return to Kuwait to retrieve more

supplies and drive north again. Large stretches of the road

disintegrated into “moon dust,” requiring the two combat

heavy battalions and CSE companies to perform herculean

efforts in maintaining and upgrading these routes under

extremely adverse weather and combat conditions.

Build LSAs

The two combat heavy battalions and CSE companies also

built five enormous corps and division LSAs that leap-frogged

from southern Iraq, north to Baghdad, and beyond to Balad,

which was conquered by 4th Infantry Division (4ID) in midApril. While the divisions were still in direct contact with

nearby enemy forces, engineers built these critical logistical

support bases that included construction and maintenance of

UAV runways, C-130 and larger airfields, hundreds of helipads,

cargo distribution centers, convoy support centers, fuel bag

farms, water distribution points, field hospitals, enemy prisoner

of war holding areas, and hundreds of kilometers of force

protection berms, as well as improvement of nearby MSRs.

After the fall of Baghdad, engineers began to focus on force

bed-down and quality-of-life improvements in the LSAs and

forward operating bases.

Provide Survivability/General Engineering Support

While divisional engineers fought the close fight, EAD

engineers provided critical survivability and general engineering support for divisional, corps, and Special Operations

Forces all over the battlefield, to include the battles for As

Samawah, An Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. With such a

relatively small engineer force operating over several hundred

kilometers of battlespace, the key to success was in splitting

battalions, companies, and platoons into small, mobile teams

based around functional capability. While the battalion

headquarters managed large projects like constructing an LSA,

these smaller modules were given orders to move rapidly to

the needed locations and aggressively execute high-priority

missions. The impact was enormous as these modules

maneuvered independently around the battlefield, rapidly

providing critical engineer support. The standard package

consisted of a dozer team, a bucket loader, a small emplacement

excavator (SEE), a dump truck, and a vertical squad. This

module could move rapidly and make an immediate and

significant impact in handling a wide variety of survivability

and general engineering missions. Based on the mission,

enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), this

package was easily augmented with other equipment to handle

larger missions. The flexibility, power, and speed of these

Engineer soldiers repair the airfield at LSA Anaconda, near Balad, Iraq.
8 Engineer July-September 2003

modules ensured that units received responsive engineer

support throughout the V Corps area of operations.

Construct and Repair Bridges

The ability to cross rivers was key to V Corps’s operational

maneuver. The Iraqi army rigged nearly all of the major bridges

across the Euphrates River for demolition and succeeded in

damaging several. Fortunately for V Corps, most of the key

bridges were captured at least partially intact. Engineers

emplaced numerous MGBs across damaged spans and

conducted one AFB crossing under fire, just south of

Baghdad. This heroic assault across the Euphrates River, the

last natural barrier between the coalition forces and Baghdad,

set the conditions for the final attack on Baghdad. Shortly

after the fall of Baghdad, in Saddam Hussein’s hometown of

Tikrit, the 565th Engineer Battalion assumed control of a

combined arms task force of more than 1,000 soldiers and

emplaced a 536-meter AFB over the Tigris River in support of

the 4ID. This became one of the longest float bridges ever

built in a combat zone. It was completed on 28 April, Saddam’s

birthday, and was therefore nicknamed the “Birthday Bridge.”

The damaged fixed bridge was later reopened with two MabeyJohnson logistic support bridges, also constructed by the

565th. During subsequent stability and support operations,

engineers have emplaced numerous Mabey-Johnson bridges

and MGBs throughout Iraq. In addition, a heavy dry support

bridge was emplaced for the first time in combat, in support of

the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq.

Conduct Urban Operations

Engineers played a key role in the urban battles of As

Samawah, An Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. Combat engineers

provided excellent mobility support, fighting alongside tanks

and infantry. During military operations on urbanized terrain

(MOUT), engineers knocked down walls with M9 armored

combat earthmovers (ACEs) and explosives; cleared roads

blocked by mines, destroyed vehicles, or rubble with armored

D9 or mine-clearing armor-protected (MCAP) D7 dozers; built

hasty road blocks for force protection and traffic control; and

destroyed caches of weapons and ammunition. Although

many missions were not standard engineer tasks, engineers

from many units exhibited technical and tactical proficiency

and an excellent ability to improvise. Of particular note, the

armored D9 dozers were tremendously effective in MOUT, as

they were the lead combat vehicles into several urban battles.

Repair Infrastructure

As the southern cities of As Samawah, An Najaf, and

Karbala were liberated, engineer assessment teams began

working with local civic leaders in assessing and beginning

the repair of Iraqi infrastructure—often only a few blocks from

where the fighting continued. Forward Engineer Support

Teams (FESTs) from USACE were key to this effort, as was a

strategy to hire local Iraqis to provide construction materials,

equipment, and services as rapidly as possible to repair and

build Iraqi civil infrastructure, as well as military infrastructure

and bases. This strategy had two purposes: to put Iraqis back

The “Birthday Bridge,”

over the Tigris River,

is one of the longest

float bridges ever built

in a combat zone.
July-September 2003 Engineer 9

to work as quickly as possible in rebuilding their own country,

which would generate employment, stimulate the economy,

and generate pride in themselves and their communities; and

to mitigate the theaterwide shortage of both engineer troops

and construction materials. Initiated by the 130th Engineer

Brigade early in the campaign at LSA Bushmaster in southern

Iraq, this effort grew steadily, reaching new heights with 3ID

in Baghdad, and it continues to be a main effort of coalition

forces throughout Iraq.

Provide Community Assistance

During the transition from combat operations to stability and

support operations, engineers played a key role in civic action

operations. The most prominent example has been “Task Force

Neighborhood,” an initiative of then V Corps commander,

Lieutenant General William Wallace, whereby coalition forces help

Iraqis clean up and rebuild their country—one neighborhood at

a time. The basic concept is to put engineers in command of a

combined arms task force consisting of construction equipment

and soldiers and medical, dental, military police, civil affairs,

psychological operations, public affairs, combat camera, and

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.

The original Task Force Neighborhood was in Baghdad in

support of 3ID. The V Corps commander gave the mission to

the 130th Engineer Brigade, which put the 94th Engineer

Battalion in charge. The V Corps commander directed the task

force to go into the poorest neighborhoods of Baghdad first

to help the people who were most neglected and disadvantaged

during Saddam’s reign. The effect was dramatic and significant,

as engineers provided much-needed assistance for the

community’s immediate needs, made assessments of their longterm requirements, and reassured them of America’s positive

intentions. Engineers hired and employed hundreds of local

Iraqis to help do cleanup and repairs. Together they hauled

away thousands of tons of accumulated trash, cleaned up and

repaired numerous schools and hospitals, disposed of

thousands of UXO, repaired playgrounds and sports facilities,

and worked to restore basic services. Such efforts have been

instrumental in improving relations with the local communities,

getting Iraqis to rebuild Iraq, and paving the way for the

eventual return of Iraqi civil government. This concept has

become the cornerstone of current stability and support

operations efforts, with each of the divisions developing its

own version of Task Force Neighborhood, to include the

innovative Task Force Graffiti and Task Force Pothole

developed by the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. Perhaps

an Iraqi journalist in Baghdad best summed up the value of

Task Force Neighborhood when he said, “No one has ever

cared about this neighborhood or these people before, until

you, the Americans, came. Thank you.” (For more information,

see articles on pages 42 and 62.)

Perform Nonstandard Missions

Throughout the campaign, engineers performed a wide variety

of nonstandard missions that were critical to the success of V

Corps. These missions included conducting boat-mounted

riverine patrols; hauling, storing and destroying captured enemy

ammunition and equipment; burying dead enemy soldiers;

collecting, hauling, and disposing of enormous quantities of trash

and garbage; and performing numerous civil-military support

operations to help the Iraqi people. In taking on and accomplishing

these important nondoctrinal missions, the engineers of V Corps

enhanced the historic reputation of Army engineers as being the

most flexible, multifunctional, can-do, make-it-happen soldiers

on the battlefield.

What Went Well

Assured Mobility Concept

Operation Iraqi Freedom validated the emerging doctrine

of assured mobility. In a dynamic operational environment,

engineers should focus on ensuring the uninterrupted mobility

of the maneuver forces as an outcome, rather than a specific

task or battle drill. During the operation, engineers succeeded

by using terrain analysis to anticipate potential problems,

providing technical advice to maneuver commanders,

developing flexible organizations able to anticipate and react

quickly under rapidly changing circumstances, and training

to the highest level of individual and collective competence.

Aggressive, Rapid Execution

The key to aggressive, rapid execution was moving small

modules rapidly to the decisive point on the battlefield where

they could make an immediate impact. A solid but partial

solution on the battlefield NOW is far better than a more

complete and thorough solution that is too late. We were all

amazed at the engineer effects that these small modules could

deliver at the decisive time and place in the corps-level fight.

Training Philosophy

Much of our success was due to a home station training

philosophy that concentrated on “doing less better.” Training

on the core battle tasks at individual, crew, squad, and platoon

levels helped develop soldiers, junior leaders, and units that

are flexible, adaptive, and competent—capable of adjusting to

new situations and finding innovative solutions to problems.

“The one BOS that has been consistently critical at every phase of the campaign—from the border obstacle breach,

all the way through the attack, to current stability and support operations—and has performed uperbly and come

through big time for the Corps at every turn . . . has been the engineers . . . .The engineers have been the most flexible,

versatile, multipurpose, and important force—from start to finish—in the campaign . . .”

—Major General Walt Wojdakowski

 Deputy Commanding General, V (U.S.) Corps
Terrain Analysis

The engineer terrain analysis and visualization capability

returned great dividends, allowing maneuver commanders at

all levels to understand the effects of weather and terrain on

military operations and enabling engineers to anticipate and

adequately resource potential requirements. At the corps and

division levels, dedicated topographic units provided support

for planning staffs. At the battalion level, many engineer units

had developed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for

providing responsive terrain analysis support directly to their

supported maneuver commander. Our success in this arena—

both at corps and division levels—demonstrated the value of

the 320th Engineer Company (Topographic) and validates the

requirement for a topographic company and its terrain platoon

at corps level.

Engineer Headquarters

Engineer headquarters played an important role as C2 nodes

in the campaign. EAD groups and battalions were able to

command and control forces at critical nodes, freeing up the

engineer brigade and the divisional battalions to focus forward

on the close fight. Engineer headquarters are particularly well

suited for this task because these critical nodes are often

located at potential mobility bottlenecks. For example,

engineers controlled the Iraq-Kuwait border crossing, the

Karbala Gap crossing, and multiple crossings over the Tigris

and Euphrates Rivers. At the Birthday Bridge in Tikrit, the

565th Engineer Battalion controlled a 1,000-soldier task force

of engineer, infantry, air defense, and signal units and

coordinated additional support from a combat heavy battalion,

a corps wheeled battalion, and numerous bridge companies.

Although current wisdom from the business schools advises

organizations to flatten and reduce the numbers and layers of

headquarters, this runs counter to our experience in this

campaign, where several levels of engineer headquarters

multiplied benefits rather than inhibited success.

Combat Heavy Battalions and CSE Companies

The combat heavy battalions and CSE companies were

critical throughout the entire campaign. They were the tip of

the spear for the border obstacle crossing and in providing

tactical mobility across rough desert terrain—often out in front

of attacking armored forces. These units maintained MSRs

and constructed LSAs and convoy support centers along the

hundreds of kilometers of roads between the Kuwaiti border

and Baghdad. Without this effort, V Corps would not have

been able to push follow-on units or supplies forward along

the substandard Iraqi road network. They constructed or

repaired five airstrips, hundreds of helipads, hundreds of

kilometers of force protection berms, and much more. They

built the access and egress ramps and performed the bank

preparation that enabled river-crossing operations. The superb

effort of our combat heavy battalions and CSE companies

guaranteed the operational mobility, and enhanced the tactical

survivability, of coalition forces. Every effort must be made to

increase the number of these enormously capable units in the

Active Component force structure. The notion that these types

of units can or should be replaced by contractors is sheer

foolishness. And this campaign proved it.

Embedded Key Enablers

Infrastructure repair and construction were enhanced when

key enablers and competencies were embedded inside of

executing units. Critical elements were a construction management section with solid technical engineering expertise,

a civil affairs team, Arab linguists, and dedicated contracting

support.

Reach-Back Capabilities

One of the new capabilities that engineers brought to this

campaign was the ability to reach back to military and civilian

engineers and harness their experience and expertise. This

began with the FEST–Augmentation (FEST–A), which

provided technical assistance and the ability to access USACE

resources around the world. FEST–As have been critical

throughout the campaign on both military and civil engineering.

Another critical asset was the TeleEngineering Tool Kit, which

enabled engineer reconnaissance teams to send pictures and

measurements back to the Engineer Research and Development

Center or the Waterways Experimentation Station for technical

assessments, bridge classifications, and engineering solutions. These kits were widely used all over the battlefield,

from damaged runways, bridges, and electrical power stations

to MSRs, helipads, and demolitions work. In addition, they

provided a powerful communication capability that allowed

engineers to conduct daily videoteleconferences for communication, coordination, and situational understanding.

Finally, cooperation and on-site technical advice (which started

at the Campo Pond bridge training site in Hanau) between

military and civilian engineers paid off with the emplacement

of Mabey-Johnson bridges in combat.

D9 Dozer and M1 Panther II

These two items were big winners in combat and should be

programmed and fielded into the Army inventory. They must

however, come with organic transportation, communications,

crew-served weapons, and dedicated operators.

Engineer/Sapper Spirit

Engineers were everywhere on the battlefield, and their

hallmark was an amazing can-do spirit. The V Corps commander

frequently praised his Victory Sappers for their enthusiasm

and “any mission-anywhere-any time” attitude. Their initiative,

flexibility, adaptability, dedication, and professional expertise

were incredible. Their team spirit in supporting the commander

was second to none. Their raw courage and bravery on the

battlefield were an inspiration to all.

What Needs Improvement

An Aging Fleet of Equipment

Despite their superb performance, engineer units have some

of the oldest equipment in the Army. For combat engineers in

particular, much of the equipment was unable to adequately

support the maneuver units.

10 Engineer July-September 2003
Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB). Based on the

M48/M60 chassis, the AVLB is both slow and difficult to

maintain under the best of circumstances; continuous

operations and an extremely austere logistics environment

made the task even harder. The maintenance problems were

exacerbated by recovery problems. The AVLB should be

replaced by the Wolverine. Much of the construction

equipment in combat heavy units and CSEs is in the same

condition and must be replaced.

M113 Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV). The ESV often lagged

behind the maneuver forces it was supposed to support. In

addition, it did not offer enough protection against enemy

fire. Despite their need for mobility support, some maneuver

commanders became unwilling to commit their scarce engineer

assets forward into the fight for fear of losing them to enemy

fire. The Army must outfit armored engineers in an appropriate

vehicle that can keep up with the maneuver forces it supports

and that offers adequate force protection.

Mine-Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) and the Volcano.

These two key engineer weapon systems—both missionessential in the combat training center environment—did not

meet expectations. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Volcano

was never fired, and only one MICLIC was fired. For scatterable mines, the release authority was held at the Combined

Forces Land Component Commander level; during a rapidly

moving campaign against an ill-defined enemy, it is nearly

impossible to identify a target and get timely approval to use

scatterable mines during a short window of opportunity. For

breaching, a more effective technique was either to physically

remove the mines or to conduct a mechanical breach with a

D9 or an MCAP D7 dozer; an M1 Panther II; a tank with a

plow; or an M9 ACE. Given the real-world limitations of both

the MICLIC and the Volcano, we should invest in other means

to accomplish the intended effects.

Signal, C2 Package, and Logistics Support

For EAD engineers, three special shortfalls emerged: First,

although EAD engineers operate throughout the division and

corps battlespace, they often were not high enough on the

priority to receive dedicated support from corps signal assets

and often operated away from divisional signal support.

Without the ability to communicate, EAD engineers lost some

of their ability to operate independently, provide the mobility

portion of the common operational picture, or to serve as key

C2 nodes for the division. Second, EAD engineers did not

have the same C2 hardware and software that the division was

using. This diminished their ability to see and understand the

battlefield to the same degree as their maneuver brethren. Third,

the logistics systems were not flexible enough to support the

dynamic and fast-moving role that EAD engineers played

within the division and corps areas of operation. In particular,

maintenance (especially Class IX) and construction materials

(Class IV) were a constant challenge. These issues need to be

worked hard before the next conflict.

July-September 2003 Engineer 11

Rapid Helipad Construction and Dust Control

There was an enormous demand on engineers to rapidly

construct hundreds of helipads in the desert. The dust, dirt,

and sand caused dangerous brownout conditions that

damaged the aircraft and caused several crashes. The best

and fastest method to meet the demand for helipads was to

install Mobi-Mat pads. Fast to emplace and extremely effective,

this material should be purchased in sufficient quantities and

issued to both divisional and EAD engineer units—PRIOR to

crossing the line of departure.

 Recommendations

Continue to develop assured mobility into doctrine.

Develop corresponding mission-essential task list

changes, training models, evaluation tools, and TTP

for implementing the doctrinal framework. Organizations need

to include enhancers such as topographic, engineer reconnaissance, and reach-back capabilities. For example, each

division and separate maneuver brigade or ACR needs a

FEST–A. TeleEngineering Tool Kits must be fielded to every

engineer battalion and ACR engineer company. Another critical

component of assured mobility is the ability of engineers to

conduct MOUT effectively. (See article on page 32.)

Combat engineers supporting maneuver forces need

comparable training and modern equipment to be combat

capable and relevant for the maneuver commander. In particular,

engineers need a more survivable and capable squad vehicle,

preferably one that uses the same chassis as the infantry and

armor it supports. Sappers also need equivalent enhancers,

such as thermal sights and night-vision capability. MOUT

training should receive greater emphasis and Engineer

Qualification Tables should include mounted gunnery so that

engineers are better trained to fight alongside tanks and

infantry. Engineers should be included in fielding distribution

plans with the maneuver units they habitually support—and

not as separate fieldings.

During combat operations, EAD engineers will be taskorganized in functional teams to perform specific missions. To

prepare for combat, units should develop, train, and employ

force enhancement modules (FEMs) designed around

capabilities rather than units. (See “Transforming the 130th

Engineer Brigade...One Step at a Time,” Engineer, May 2001,

pages 52-60; and “Operation Enigma Strike: Testing the

Deployability of the 130th Engineer Brigade FEMs,” Engineer,

April 2002, pages 41-43.) Deployments and decentralized

training are the preferred mediums for training the junior leaders

who will form these modules and operate independently across

wide areas of operation. Such leaders must be flexible, adaptive,

and innovative—able to make things happen based on a clearly

articulated and understood commander’s intent.

Engineers must work more closely with the Ordnance Branch

on EOD. The requirement for the destruction of weapons

caches, ammunition dumps, and UXO quickly outstripped the

resources of the EOD units, and combat engineers picked up
the excess. With greater mutual cooperation and training,

combat engineers and EOD specialists could work together to

relieve much of the workload for routine demolitions and free

up dedicated EOD teams for unusual situations or emergencies.

Two months after the capture of Baghdad International

Airport, there were virtually no international construction

contractors operating in Iraq, and military construction units

continue to perform nearly all heavy construction. That

contractors could or would do what the military engineers

have done during combat and the early stages of stability and

support operations is an ill-conceived fantasy, with no basis

in reality. And this operation has clearly demonstrated that

fact. EAD engineers are critical enablers for divisions during

sustained operations. The Army needs to retain as many

combat heavy battalions and CSE companies on active duty

as possible. The general engineering effort they provide is an

engineer core competency that cannot be contracted to civilian

engineers during combat operations. The Engineer Regiment

must champion this cause, as most of the Army never sees

these units in action. General engineering requirements are

usually ignored in peacetime training and computer-based

Warfighter exercises—or they are performed by civilian

companies like Brown & Root—and therefore the force

regularly underestimates their value.

All EAD engineer units must be structured to operate

independently and form multiple functional modules for

particular missions (for example, a C2 headquarters for a river

crossing, an MSR team, and an airfield team), to include

personnel and equipment for C2. Consider developing

multifunctional battalions with an extremely robust C2 infrastructure. As an example, the 565th Engineer Battalion

(Provisional) performed great service during the crossings of

both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. This battalion should

be formally recognized, activated, and manned.

C2 systems such as the Force XXI Battlefield Command -

Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and Maneuver Control System

(MCS) need to be standardized and pushed to lower levels,

particularly for EAD engineers. Engineers also need greater

long-range communications capability; terrain information is

particularly bandwidth-intensive and overwhelms tactical

communications nets. Engineers also need greater transportation capability in order to remain mobile.

Non-modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE)

enablers, such as the M1 Panther II and the D9 dozers, were

great and must be added to the MTOE along with the

supporting prime mover, communications capability, and a

mounted .50-caliber machine gun.

Conclusion

“Operation Iraqi Freedom was and is an engineer’s war.

During the fight, and even more now, the engineers are critical.

We cannot do without the engineers.”

—Major General Walt Wojdakowski

 Deputy Commanding General, V (U.S.) Corps

The Engineer Regiment provided outstanding support

to V Corps during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although

the engineers accomplished all of their missions and

enabled V Corps to accomplish its historic mission to liberate

Iraq, there are many lessons to learn from the high-intensity

phase of the war, and there will be many more as we fight to

win the peace. Learning these lessons and continuing to

develop highly motivated, professional soldiers, units, and

leaders—with the right doctrine, equipment, and TTP—will

ensure that the Engineer Regiment is ready again the next time

the nation calls.

Colonel Martin commands the 130th Engineer Brigade

and is the V Corps Engineer, deployed to Iraq in support of

Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has served in a wide variety of

command and staff assignments, including instructor duty at

West Point and the Army War College. He is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy, Command and General Staff

College, and both the Naval and Army War Colleges and

holds masters’ and a doctorate from M.I.T.

Captain Johnson is with the 54th Engineer Battalion,

deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He

has served in Korea and on the V Corps staff. He is a graduate

of the United States Military Academy and holds a master’s

from Oxford University.

On behalf of all the Victory Sappers, we express

our deepest thanks, respect, and admiration to

Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, the former

V Corps Commanding General. His clear intent and

power-down leadership ensured that his sappers

always knew what to do and took the initiative to

get the job done—ALL OVER the battlefields of Iraq.

VICTORY!

In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge

the visionary leadership and work of previous 130th

Engineer Brigade commanders. Many of their

initiatives came to fruition on the battlefields of Iraq,

where Army engineers have never been better.

SAPPERS IN!

For more information and a video on the V Corps

engineers during Operation Iraqi Freedom, see the

130th Engineer Brigade Web site “130th OIF

Interactive History” at NIPRNET <http://www.130th

engineers.army.mil> or SIPRNET <148.35.87.68>.

12 Engineer July-September 2003
July-September 2003 Engineer 13

On 14 January 2003, the 62d Engineer Battalion

(Combat)(Heavy) from Fort Hood, Texas, deployed

to the Kuwaiti U.S. Army Central Command

(CENTCOM) area of operations in support of Operation

Enduring Freedom. The 62d was the first combat engineer

battalion in country and was assigned as a direct-reporting

unit to the 416th Engineer Command, the theater-level engineer

command from Chicago, Illinois. The unit’s job would be to

construct the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) in

preparation for an attack on Iraq—a mission usually reserved

for one or more engineer pipeline companies, which are all

reserve units. The IPDS would be constructed from Camp

Virginia, Kuwait, to Logistics Support Area (LSA) Adder (near

Tallil Air Base), Iraq, a distance of about 224 miles. The pipeline

was essential, as one of the Combined Forces Land Component

Command’s (CFLCC’s) prestart conditions for the war with

Iraq was the completion of the IPDS to Breach Point West on

the Kuwait-Iraq border.

Upon receiving the mission, we contacted the 808th Engineer

Company (Pipeline) in Houston, Texas, to learn about the

construction of an IPDS. They sent us the training manuals

and CDs, but we were unable to go to Houston for training

due to the short deployment suspense. Eventually, the

battalion received the 226th Engineer Company (Combat)

(Heavy) and the 808th Engineer Company (Pipeline) in

February and March, respectively. The battalion strength

averaged 750 soldiers during the time period when the IPDS

was constructed.

IPDS

The IPDS is a rapid deployment, general support, bulk

fuel storage and pipeline system manufactured by

Radian, Inc. The system has a design throughput of

720,000 gallons per day based on 600 gallons per minute at 20

hours per operational day. The IPDS is transported in military

vans (MILVANs) and packaged in sets containing materials to

construct a pipeline 5 miles long. Each set fills 13 MILVANs.

There are 1,404 sections of pipe, 19 feet long and 6 inches in

diameter, that fill nine of the MILVANS. The other four

MILVANs contain necessary pipeline parts such as couplings,

elbows, hammers, retaining pins, and gate and check valves.

The 19-foot-long sections of pipe are made of aluminum

with variable wall thickness. These sections cannot be cut.

Instead, each 5-mile set contains 44 pieces of 9-foot-6-inchlong pipe with constant wall thickness that can be cut to length

and regrooved. Each piece of pipe is designed with a special

single-groove design in order to join pipe sections. When two

pieces of pipe are joined, snap-joint coupling clamps hold them

together. Each clamp has an integral gasket that makes pipe

connections relatively easy. Before installing the coupling, a

light coat of petroleum lubrication is applied to prevent the

gasket from adhering to the metal pipe in extremely hot

temperatures. The coupling holds the pipe sections together

by wrapping around the grooves on the ends of the two

sections of pipe. The coupling is closed with a special tool

(included with the set) and is held shut by hammering a

retaining pin into place.

There are a few guidelines to follow when constructing the

IPDS. The aluminum pipe used in the IPDS is highly reactive

to changes in temperature. Expansion and contraction of the

The Inland Petroleum Distribution System

in Kuwait and Iraq

By Captain Anthony De Simone and Major Norm Gauthier

A soldier from the 62d Engineer Battalion couples a

section of the pipeline while an oil fire burns in the

background.
14 Engineer July-September 2003

pipeline can move it almost 2 feet per 50 sections of pipe. Each

coupling is designed to handle 4 degrees of deflection, so it is

important to control the amount of expansion and contraction.

Some ways to control the expansion and contraction are to—

 Install the pipeline as straight and level as possible.

 Make any change of direction by using elbows.

 Construct anchors and “U” or “Z” expansion loops at

certain intervals.

Another thing to consider when constructing the IPDS is

maximizing fuel flow. To do this, we needed to install pump stations,

which consist of two 800-gallon-per-minute mainline pumps, a

launcher to launch a pig (a scraper that passes through the line to

clean it), and a receiver to catch the pig. The pump is best moved

by a rough terrain cargo handler or crane. The launcher and strainer

weigh about 2,800 pounds each.

Once the IPDS is constructed, it has to be filled and flushed

before placing it in operation. The pipeline is designed to run

at 600 gallons per minute with each pipe section having a

maximum allowable operating pressure of 740 pounds per

square inch. Water is pumped into the pipeline and a pressure

check is conducted. Once the pipeline passes the pressure

check, a pig or scraper is passed through the pipe via the

launcher and caught by the receiver. The pig scrapes the sides

of the pipe, removing any sand or debris before fuel is added.

Behind the pig, fuel is pumped into the pipeline. Once the pig

is received at the pump station, that section of pipe is charged

with fuel and ready to operate. If there are any problems along

the way, a repair crew closes the gate valves and repairs that

section of pipe. After these tests are conducted, the pipeline

is operational.

To deliver fuel from the pipeline, tactical petroleum terminals

(TPTs)—run by quartermaster units—are set up at desired

intervals. The mission of the TPTs is to receive, store, and

dispense fuel, and millions of gallons of fuel can be stored or

delivered to tankers or other vehicles.

How We Did It

Since the war was still months away, we could not

construct all 224 miles of pipe simultaneously. As a result,

we broke the mission into five segments, IPDS I through

IPDS V.

IPDS I

IPDS I stretched from Camp Virginia to Breach Point West

(about 51.5 miles) near the Iraq border in preparation for a

ground assault. Because we had so many miles of pipeline

to construct, six pump stations and two large TPTs to build,

Soldiers from the 808th Engineer Company construct a pump station in Kuwait.

IPDS I runs from Camp Virginia

through Camp Udairi to Breach

Point West.
July-September 2003 Engineer 15

and the TPT at Camp Virginia to expand, we broke the

pipeline trace into company sections. They then broke their

sections into platoon sections. Each company was given a

section of the trace and daily goals to meet. At the start of

the pipeline, we only had three line companies. We used a

planning factor of 2 miles per day per company or about 6

miles per day for the battalion. We trained our leaders on

the IPDS on 24 January. Our trainer had been in the 515th

Engineer Company (Pipeline) during Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, when the company laid more than

100 miles of pipeline. Due to the short duration of the war,

that pipeline was never used to pump fuel.

Since our ship had not come into port yet, we borrowed

transportation assets (5-ton cargo trucks and high-mobility,

multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs]) and sent two

vertical platoons, one each from Alpha and Bravo Companies.

We reserved the other two vertical platoons for port download

operations. Construction of the IPDS from Camp Virginia to

Camp Udairi began on 28 January 2003.

The ship with our equipment arrived in port on 31 January,

and we began download operations the following day. With

commercial and heavy equipment transport, we moved the

battalion from Camp Arifjan to Camp Udairi on 7 February. We

set up our base camp operations, and the next day all six vertical

platoons were working on their assigned sections of pipeline.

Our plan was to stage two 5-mile sets every 10 miles, but

external transportation assets were in demand and routed

elsewhere. As a result, we used our M916/M920 and M870

trailers to move pipeline and our 25-ton all-terrain cranes

to load the MILVANs.

Pipeline construction continued at a rapid pace as Bravo

Company moved its command post to a location just outside

of Breach Point West and started construction from there back

toward Camp Virginia. The 10-mile segment was primarily on

flat ground but incorporated three large crossing sites for

maneuver forces. Each 5-mile set of pipeline comes with 80

feet of 24-inch nestable culvert. We were tasked to build

ten 100-meter (approximately 328 feet) crossing sites over the

51.5-mile trace, and there were several sites where the pipeline

crossed the main supply route (MSR). Since these crossing

site requirements exceeded the supplies in the pipeline set, we

contracted for the delivery of hundreds of pieces of 19-footlong PVC culvert with a 13-inch diameter. We modified the

pipe layout to ensure that we had gate valves and expansion

loops before each large crossing site. By digging with the

hydraulic excavator (HYEX), the crossing sites were emplaced

easily and didn’t hamper progress.

One section of IPDS I that we called the “moonscape” required special attention. It was a 5-mile-long section that

passed through rough terrain and sand dunes. The equipment

platoon from Headquarters Support Company spent 9 days

with seven dozers leveling this area before pipe could be laid

there. In all, it took 21 days to complete IPDS I, 5 days ahead of

schedule. However, it took the quartermaster personnel an

additional 21 days to fill and test the line. Normally, the pipeline

construction company would have performed this task, but it

had not yet arrived in country. One of the lessons learned for

our construction of IPDS II was to incorporate time into the

work schedule to fill and test the line.

IPDS II

As the possibility of war increased, the CFLCC projected a

larger daily requirement for fuel at Breach Point West. As a

result, we needed to construct an additional pipeline parallel

to IPDS I. There was one consideration in constructing this

section. Pipe and pump stations were only estimated for one

pipeline to reach approximately 205 miles. By constructing

this second pipeline, issues would arise later on that might

prohibit the pipeline from reaching LSA Adder. Equipped with

many lessons learned from IPDS I and the addition of the

808th Engineer Company, the battalion was able to complete

IPDS II with ease. Alpha and Bravo Companies and the 226th

Engineer Company concentrated on pipeline construction, and

the 808th focused on pump station construction and filling

and testing the line. Headquarters Support Company cleared

another trace through the moonscape with Bravo Company.

Alpha Company, 62d Engineer Battalion, transports pipe by loading three MILVANs on a lowboy.
16 Engineer July-September 2003

Internal Transportation and Flatracks. We planned for and

requested external transportation but also planned for completing the mission without it. We also requested flatracks for

our PLS trucks. This asset enabled us to conduct our own

transportation of pipeline MILVANs and pump stations. We

did not have the volume of vehicles we would have liked, but

we managed to keep our trucks with pipeline MILVANS one

day ahead of the soldiers constructing the pipeline.

Lessons Learned

Pipeline Construction. Break the unit into several sections

by platoon and give them goals.

Construction Meetings. With our limited assets, a detailed

construction meeting was a must. Each commander reported

progress and identified equipment needs (from Headquarters

Support Company or other) for the following 24 to 48 hours.

These were addressed to minimize confusion and lost time

and to maximize construction effort the following day.

Security. As you lay and couple pipe, the site moves

forward, so security must also be mobile. We used two soldiers

at each end of the mobile construction site with the M249

squad automatic weapon (SAW) on top of a vehicle to provide

clear lines of sight. We increased this in Iraq by using the M2

.50-caliber machine gun, MK-19 grenade launcher, and AT-4

antitank weapon.

Transportation. You need a dedicated transportation unit

with 14 or more PLS vehicles. These will greatly reduce the

amount of internal haul assets and increase the productivity

of the soldiers constructing the pipeline.

Protecting the Pipeline. The only thing we found effective

at protecting the pipeline in the desert conditions was berms.

We initially constructed 3-foot berms but found that HMMWVs

could still go over the top. As a result, we built dual 6-foot

berms.

Bobcats®. The battalion received four Bobcats with all

attachments before the pipeline construction began. They were

a great asset in pump station construction. We used them for

installing both gate and check valves, which are too heavy to

lift without several soldiers.

Challenges

Transportation. External transportation assets were always

in high demand. We were forced to transport MILVANS to

worksites a few at a time with internal haul assets (M916/

M920 and M870 trailers, as well as the Palletized Load System

[PLS] with flatracks). Using internal assets, we averaged 6 to 8

miles of pipeline constructed per day. With dedicated PLS

support, we constructed 34 miles of pipeline in a 2-day period.

Water. Getting the water required to flush and fill the

pipeline was difficult, and we experienced several delays waiting

for water. In the end, most of our water requirements had to be

contracted out and brought in by commercial assets.

MOPP1. After the completion of IPDS I and II, the ground

war started, and all units went into MOPP1. Progress on IPDS

III into Iraq slowed because now the soldiers were in MOPP1

and wearing flak vests in temperatures near 120 degrees.

Drinking water was essential, as were timed breaks for soldiers.

Pipeline sections now took two to three times as long to

construct as those constructed before the war.

Rough Terrain and Sandstorms. Most terrain in the desert

was flat and ready for pipeline construction. The section in

Kuwait that we called the moonscape was difficult to work

through. Many days were spent and thousands of tons of

sand were moved to prepare the site. At times, sandstorms

reduced visibility to less than 20 yards and prevented the pipe

seals from staying free of debris. The rough terrain and

sandstorms also made it impossible to align the pipeline for

anchoring.

Crossing Site Adjustments. A pipeline set includes 80 feet

of nestable culvert. We had to build crossing sites 100 meters

across for tracked-vehicle maneuverability. Luckily, we were

able to obtain 19-foot lengths of 13-inch diameter culvert from

Camp Doha and link the pieces together to span the required

length.

Extended Lines of Communication. We worked on sections

of the pipeline that spanned more than 60 miles at a time.

Communications became an issue when our FM radios did

not transmit the entire distance. To overcome this problem, we

set up retransmission sites in Kuwait. In sections in Iraq, we

set up base camps every 15 to 20 miles to maintain communication between base camps.

Tricks of the Trade

Quality Assurance/Quality Control Inspections. Building

pipeline can be monotonous, and it was important that the S3

section constantly inspect the construction. Often, we

identified and corrected mistakes before they caused major

problems. We also checked the line with members of the

quartermaster unit that took over the pipeline. If the unit

identified any problems, we corrected them before turning the

pipeline over to the unit. Another valuable asset was the

representative from Radian, Inc., who was in theater throughout

our construction of the pipeline. He was truly the expert on

constructing the pipeline and pump stations.

The battalion’s Bobcats were invaluable in constructing

the pipeline.
July-September 2003 Engineer 17

Another consideration when constructing the pipeline was

how to protect it. At the time, there were many maneuver units

in the area preparing for a ground assault into Iraq. Our initial

plan to protect and mark the pipeline was to use 8-foot-tall

pickets, flying 3 feet of white engineer tape, every 100 meters.

CFLCC then issued a fragmentary order to inform all commands

of the location of the pipeline and instruct them not to cross

over it. With fuel at 700-plus pounds per square inch, it could

be dangerous if the pipe ruptured. While this method may

have marked the pipeline, it did not protect it. We then

constructed a 3-foot-high berm on one side of the pipeline,

which also failed to protect it. Finally, we constructed a 6-foot

berm on both sides of the pipeline, and this method proved to

be effective. For four weeks, all the dozers in the battalion

worked at constructing more than 130 miles of 6-foot berm for

IPDS I and II from Camp Virginia to Breach Point West (to

include force protection berms for the pump stations and

TPTs).

This time, IPDS II (the same 51.5 miles as IPDS I) only took

the battalion 12 days to construct and 5 days to fill and test.

We finished on 18 March and fulfilled the CFLCC requirement

for fuel prior to the ground war. With IPDS I and II complete,

there were 103 miles of pipe on the ground, enough to sustain

V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) ground and

rotary-wing combat forces.

 IPDS III

IPDS III began a few hours after the ground war started.

The team, consisting of a HYEX and two squads from the

808th, was attached to the 6th Engineer Support Battalion,

Marines out of Oregon. They crossed the border and began

digging crossing sites so the battalion could follow with pipe

without delay. On 22 March, the remainder of the battalion

crossed the border and secured their base camps in Iraq. To

maintain FM radio communication, each company established

its base camp within radio communication distance. As a result,

the battalion had uninhibited communication throughout the

area of operation for the new pipeline. This section of the

pipeline stretched from Breach Point West in Kuwait to LSA

Viper in Iraq, a distance of 58 miles.

Since we were now in a combat zone, soldiers had to take

additional safety precautions. For the first three weeks of

pipeline construction in Iraq, soldiers worked in their Joint

Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) suits

(at mission-oriented protective posture [MOPP] level 1), flak

vests, and full combat load of ammunition. With all of this

gear, production dropped to less than a mile of pipe constructed

per day per company, a 50 percent decline in productivity.

This reduction was acceptable, as completion dates had been

adjusted accordingly.

IPDS III, consisting of 58 miles of pipeline and four pump

stations, was finished on 14 April, ahead of schedule. Before

the ground war, the initial goal for IPDS III was to extend to

Tallil Air Base near LSA Adder. However, a few days into the

war the area was still not secure from enemy activity.

Consequently, the plan changed from reaching LSA Adder to

reaching LSA Viper instead.

A crossing site at MSR Iron Horse Trail
Platoons from Alpha Company and the 226th constructed

IPDS V as fast as pipe could get to them and finished it on 13

May. Then the battalion withdrew from Iraq—one company at

a time—into base camps in Kuwait and waited for further

missions.

Conclusion

When the pipeline construction was finished, the 62d

Engineer Battalion had completed the longest

operational IPDS ever constructed by the Army.

More than 720,000 gallons of fuel could be pumped daily from

Kuwait into LSA Cedar II in Iraq, a distance of 224 miles. The

soldiers of the battalion moved more than 66,000 pieces of

pipe, weighing 4,500 tons. The battalion learned many lessons

from conducting this mission. Although a pipeline can be

constructed without a pipeline company, we found that with

the assistance of the 808th Engineer Company, the battalion’s

efficiency greatly increased. The 808th also was able to reduce

the fill-and-test process by several weeks, which enabled the

battalion to meet every deadline early. The 62d Engineer

Battalion’s success can be attributed not only to having a

good plan but also to having superior noncommissioned

officers and motivated soldiers. Ensuring that they knew the

importance of this mission was directly correlated to the success

of the CFLCC mission.

Captain De Simone is the construction officer for the 62d

Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He was previously a

platoon leader and executive officer in the 52d Engineer

Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Major Gauthier is the S3/operations officer for the

62d Engineer Battalion. He previously served as the

S3/operations officer for the 91st Engineer Battalion, 1st

Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood.

18 Engineer July-September 2003

IPDS IV

By the time the pipeline reached LSA Viper, LSA Cedar I

was secured and was ready for fuel delivery. IPDS IV would

extend an additional 29.5 miles from LSA Viper to LSA Cedar I.

Construction on two additional pump stations began on 15

April. Each company was given about 10 miles to complete,

and progress went smoothly. We were now a seasoned pipeline

construction unit, anticipating problems before they occurred.

Alpha and Bravo Companies and the 226th continued to

construct the pipeline while the 808th focused on pump station

construction and filling and testing the pipeline.

An important thing to consider when filling and testing the

pipeline is the availability of water. This requirement was

always an issue throughout this process. We were in the

desert, and water was scarce. To complete the filling and

testing, we had to contract local tanker companies to haul

water to fulfill our requirements. IPDS IV was completed on 20

April without a hitch, merely 5 days after it was started.

IPDS V

Just when we thought we were done with pipeline

construction, we received orders to continue the pipeline to

LSA Cedar II, north of LSA Adder. This section would extend

the pipeline an additional 34 miles and require three pump

stations. However, since we constructed IPDS I and II in

Kuwait, we had used more pipe than we scheduled for, and

there were no pump stations in country to continue IPDS V.

Simultaneous to our pipeline construction, the Kuwaitis

had completed a contract for a fuel pipeline from Camp Virginia

to Camp Udairi, so IPDS II was no longer needed. We decided

to send platoons from Bravo Company to recover this pipe to

construct IPDS V. A platoon from the 226thleveled the berms,

and the 808th removed the pump stations. In order for the

pipe to be recovered, it had to be flushed with water, uncoupled,

and air-dried before handling.

Engineers lay pipe for the IPDS.
July-September 2003 Engineer 19

I

n the fall of 2002, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was

directed to open a northern front into Iraq in support of

potential actions against the Hussein regime. The area of

operations would include an 800-kilometer line of

communications in Turkey with up to 18 different nodes—all

requiring acquisition of property, careful environmental

consideration, and construction or modification to ready them

for up to 60,000 soldiers. A hodge-podge of roughly 3,300

Army and Navy engineers had been identified to perform the

mission; however, no headquarters structure was available to

oversee the planning or execution. As a result, the reactivation

of the 18th Engineer Brigade (theater Army), which was

scheduled for June 2003, was moved to 21 January 2003. (See

article in Engineer, April-June 2003, page 37.)

The reactivation of the 18th Engineer Brigade served two

major purposes: First, the core of the brigade headquarters

serving as theater engineer planners is fully engaged in the

development of operations plans and therefore has the

Engineer Operations in Turkey

Support Operation Iraqi Freedom

By Lieutenant Colonel Roxanne Nosal, Lieutenant Colonel Randal Fofi,

Lieutenant Colonel John McClellan, and Major Shawn McGinley

A Seabee from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 surveys for the logistics support area near Nusaybin, Turkey.
20 Engineer July-September 2003

advantage of anticipating and planning for engineer requirements in a contingency. Secondly, although the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers (USACE) has enormous capabilities that

can be brought to bear as required during contingencies, these

assets do not typically come with an overarching headquarters

capable of integrating small, specialized units (both Active

and Reserve Component) where they can best influence the

operation. The 18th Engineer Brigade is fully capable and

designed to perform this mission. This became evident in

Turkey in February 2003.

Operational Concept

The USAREUR mission in Turkey was to establish and

operate the infrastructure required to pass combat

forces centered around the 4th Infantry Division

through southeastern Turkey into Iraq. This mission was

considered vital to achieve the U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM) commander’s intent of opening a credible

northern front against Iraqi forces and fixing up to 13 Iraqi

divisions in northern Iraq so they could not shift south to

engage coalition forces attacking out of Kuwait.

Army Forces–Turkey (ARFOR–T) was organized around

four major units:

 1st Infantry Division provided overall command and control

and force protection for all U.S. ground forces in Turkey.

 21st Theater Support Command operated the logistics

infrastructure and sustained all U.S. forces in Turkey and

northern Iraq.

 7th Signal Brigade established and maintained the communications architecture for ARFOR–T.

 18th Engineer Brigade acquired the property and built or

improved the facilities to support the forces.

The original plan allowed up to 60 days for preparatory

work before the arrival of combat forces. This included

establishing command and control and force protection,

acquiring property, opening three seaports and two airports,

and establishing operational nodes along 800 kilometers of

highway and into Iraq in the east. Node sizes and complexities

varied from basic truck stops for driver breaks along the

highway to tactical assembly areas up to 50 square kilometers

in size. It was envisioned that, once established, the 4th Infantry

Division would flow in over a 28-day period and prepare to

attack into Iraq.

With the approach of combat operations and no decision

by the Turkish government to allow combat forces to pass

through the country, the USAREUR commander decided to

accelerate the preparation schedule and to focus efforts on

those tasks required to support the combat forces initially.

Instead of a 60-day preparatory phase, the USAREUR staff

developed an abbreviated plan to rapidly acquire and prepare

ports and staging areas for use by the 4th Infantry Division.

This plan would take about nine days but would allow the

rapid introduction of forces into the CENTCOM operation.

Scheme of Maneuver and Task Organization

To support the general operational concept, the

USAREUR staff identified the preparatory tasks that

had to be completed to receive and pass the 4th Infantry Division. The 18th Engineer Brigade, serving as the

USAREUR engineer prior to deploying to Turkey, determined

that the essential tasks included acquisition of properties for

ports, airfields, headquarters, and staging areas and the

establishment of minimum living and sanitation facilities to

support the reception and rapid onward movement of combat

forces.

The engineer scheme of maneuver was built around these

essential preparatory tasks to meet the CENTCOM timeline

and assure the success of the overall operation. The compressed timelines drove engineer planners to adopt a course

of action that would initiate all essential tasks simultaneously

through contract construction—a combination of Kellogg,

Brown & Root Services; the Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program (LOGCAP) contractor; and USACE contractors.

Military construction units would be focused at the area of

greatest need upon their arrival. As essential tasks were

completed, engineer effort would be shifted to secondary

tasks—mainly those tasks required to sustain ARFOR–T units.

If there were sufficient engineer resources in theater, then all

tasks would be initiated simultaneously as long as the execution

of a secondary task did not interfere with essential tasks. The

concept also called for the 18th Engineer Brigade to be

prepared to follow and support into northern Iraq as the theater

matured and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command

(CFLCC) force passed through. Likely missions in northern

Iraq would be maintaining supply routes, constructing and

repairing bridges, and constructing camps for displaced

persons and enemy prisoners of war.

Logistic support areas were constructed primarily

through the LOGCAP contract. Shown are bunk beds at

Oguzeli.
July-September 2003 Engineer 21

The task organization was built around this concept. The

brigade headquarters would be augmented with members of

the divisional engineer brigade of the 1st Infantry Division,

Forward Engineer Support Teams (FESTs) from USACE, and

real estate specialists from the Europe-based Installation

Management Agency. The brigade integrated itself into the

ARFOR–T with the commander wearing two hats—18th

Engineer Brigade commander and ARFOR engineer. The FESTs

provided subject matter experts in various fields of engineering

as well as contracting officer representatives to help manage

contract construction. In addition to construction capability,

the brigade’s task organization also included base camp

maintenance and management capability in the form of facilities

engineer teams and prime-power, fire-fighting, and utilities

detachments.

Priorities and Execution

Having identified the essential tasks, the brigade

planners prioritized them in coordination with 1st

Infantry Division, 21st Theater Support Command,

and USAREUR planners. The basic rule of thumb was that

priority tasks were those tasks absolutely necessary to receive

the 4th Infantry Division at the port, lodge them in austere

conditions in a tactical assembly area in the east, and allow

them to attack with appropriate stocks of fuel and ammunition.

Once in country, the brigade planners devised a master

plan for each node. This process called in site survey chiefs,

site officers in charge, force protection specialists, the LOGCAP

contractor, and members of the security force to define in detail

where everything would go and in what sequence. The tasks

to be accomplished at each node were further prioritized so

there would be no confusion by the contractor. These prioritized

statements of work were provided to the contractor through

the contracting officer. The 18th Engineer Brigade served a

vital role in the development and approval of all statements of

work to ensure that the contractor was focused on only

essential tasks. New requirements were submitted to a

construction review board to review their validity and to a

joint acquisition review board for final approval. At this time,

projects identified as having a highly technical and discrete

nature were passed to the local USACE office at Incirlik Air

Base for action. These projects—the Seyhvelet Bridge bypass

and the lightning protection system and Agalar Pier—were

issued as individual contracts to specialized Turkish

contractors.

Change of Mission: Increase Support

to ARFOR–T

I

n March, it became obvious that the Turkish government

would not make a decision quickly to allow forces into

the country. At that time, the ARFOR–T preparatory forces

the government of Turkey had allowed in (about 1,800 soldiers)

were dispersed throughout Turkey, living under fairly austere

conditions and waiting for the go-ahead to continue the

mission. With these new circumstances, the ARFOR–T

commander shifted the priorities to ensuring an adequate

quality of life and providing protection for ARFOR–T soldiers.

In general, this meant shower and sink units and

tents/sleeping areas with heat and lights and whatever force

protection infrastructure improvements that were deemed

necessary. This was a distinct change from the austere

approach that had been planned. However, the 18th Engineer

Brigade planners were able to quickly modify contract

statements of work, and the LOGCAP contractor, with sufficient

personnel and materials on the ground, was able

to rapidly modify its priorities. The advantage of

using the LOGCAP contractor was that it is able to

react to changes across a broad front versus having

to have individual contracts modified.

Change of Mission: Closure

As the end of March approached and

the government of Turkey had not

called for a revote on the introduction of

combat forces through Turkey, CENTCOM directed

the 4th Infantry Division to proceed to port in

Kuwait. No replacement force for the 4th Infantry

Division was identified. Since the government of

Turkey was also requesting the departure of

Operation Northern Watch units, it appeared

unlikely that any other support to Operation Iraqi

Freedom would be approved. As a result,

USAREUR directed ARFOR–T to develop a

detailed plan and be prepared to downsize the

current ARFOR–T capability and place those

facilities into a “warm” status required to either

pass a small ground force through Turkey (should

A 6,700-foot heavy equipment transport bypass for Seyhvelet

Bridge
22 Engineer July-September 2003

it be approved) or to maintain a ground line of communication

through Turkey to sustain forces in northern Iraq. On 2 April

2003, ARFOR–T directed the reshaping of forces in Turkey

and began closure operations.

The key closure tasks focused on an orderly and deliberate

reduction in forces and equipment while simultaneously

returning properties to the appropriate Turkish owners and

harvesting as much U.S. material as practical, while ensuring

the protection and safety of all personnel. The 18th Engineer

Brigade was charged with forming east and west closure teams

to return leased lands and facilities to the private owners or

government entities of origin. Each of the closure teams was

tailored to its particular geographic and facilities makeup and

contained expertise in operations, construction management,

real estate, environmental engineering, logistics, contracting,

and legal matters.

Much attention was paid to the question of what materials

were to be recovered, disposed of, or offered to local owners

or military forces. Broad guidance from the USAREUR

commander to “recover all U.S. government property and return

it to the military system” was translated into specific harvesting

guidance addressing various commodities. Customs

restrictions were researched to ensure that the unit and node

commanders were aware of what materials could and should

be loaded into unit containers for return to Europe.

Closures in the east were completed by 16 April and in the

west by 26 April, culminating with the return of the port of

Iskenderun, the last facility required to redeploy the force. In

almost every case, the closure teams completed their missions

ahead of original projections for the site. The closure checklists,

savvy real estate officers, and some smart decisions by the

closure teams streamlined the process and ensured that no

additional U.S. funds were spent on property rentals beyond

already existing commitments.

Conclusion

The 18th Engineer Brigade was the single agency at the

theater level with coordinating responsibilities for all

military and civilian engineer capabilities and host

nation engineer support, as well as joint and multinational

engineer efforts engaged in combat support of a theater of

operation. This included the command direction of topographic

operations, construction, real property maintenance activities,

lines-of-communication sustainment, engineer logistics

management, petroleum storage and distribution, and base

development. During the deployment to Turkey, the 18th

Engineer Brigade managed $13.8 million of real estate

acquisitions and utilities, $28.1 million of LOGCAP construction, $992,000 of USACE contract construction, and

$108,000 of materials for military construction. No single

construction delivery method could have met the timeline

originally proposed. Only a combination of military engineers,

LOGCAP construction, and USACE contractors could have

completed the mission on the originally proposed timeline.

Having a theater Army engineer brigade managing all of the

engineer effort for the Army in the theater allowed the most

efficient and cost effective construction delivery method for

each situation and made it possible to modify the plan as

external forces caused the situation to change.

The theater Army engineer brigade is a unique organization,

capable of providing engineer support across the spectrum of

military operations depending on which elements are attached

to it during the operation. The ability of the organization to be

responsive, agile, and versatile is in keeping with the objectives

of Army Transformation and will ensure the best possible

support to the Future Force.

Lieutenant Colonel Nosal is the G5/NATO infrastructure

officer for the 18th Engineer Brigade and the Deputy Chief of

Staff, Engineers, U.S. Army Europe. During the deployment

to Turkey, she acted as chief of the administrative/logistics

operations center. Recent assignments included Deputy

Secretary of the General Staff, V Corps, and executive officer,

130th Engineer Brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel Fofi is the deputy brigade commander,

130th Engineer Brigade, V Corps, in Iraq. He was the G3 of

the 18th Engineer Brigade for the deployment to Turkey.

Previous assignments include commander of the 46th

Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy), Fort Polk, Louisiana;

liaison officer to the French Engineer School in Angers,

France; and brigade S3, 45th Area Support Group, and

battalion executive officer of the 84th Engineer Battalion

(Combat)(Heavy), both in Hawaii.

Lieutenant Colonel McClellan is the G3, 18th Engineer

Brigade (Theater Army). During the operation, he served as

the brigade’s operations officer, working directly out of the

ARFOR–T Main in Mardin. Previous assignments include

contingency operations officer (SFOR/KFOR) for Deputy

Chief of Staff, Engineers, USAREUR; as well as S3, 9th

Engineer Battalion, and director of public works in

Schweinfurt, Germany.

Major McGinley is the chief of operations, Staff Engineer

Section, V Corps, in Iraq. He was the chief of plans, G3, 18th

Engineer Brigade, for the deployment to Turkey. Other

assignments include brigade S3, 1st Infantry Division

Engineer Brigade, executive officer of the 9th Engineer

Battalion, and assistant division engineer, 1st Infantry

Division. He will take command of the 54th Engineer

Battalion in summer 2004.
July-September 2003 Engineer 23

Letters To The Editor

To the MANSCEN Directorate of Training Development,

I really appreciate the box of treats that the people at DOTD

sent to me. It meant a lot, knowing there were people who

cared enough to do that. The time I spent at DOTD and the

MANSCEN was rewarding, and I met a lot of good, dedicated

people. I’m proud and thankful that I have been given the

opportunity to deploy and do my job as a firefighter. It is a

learning experience, and I hope to bring lessons back to use

to implement change to our doctrine. My parents taught me

that the best lessons learned are those that are learned through

hardship. If that is true, this deployment should produce some

good lessons learned.

Life here in Kuwait and Iraq is hot, sandy, and windy. It is

sad to see the way these people have been forced to live. I

know we did the right thing by freeing them. After driving by

and seeing what these people have had to endure, it makes me

angry when one of our own people complains. We have no

reason to ever complain, and I’m proud to be here helping.

Keep up the hard work that you do there at DOTD; it pays off

on the battlefield, as I have now seen firsthand.

My fire-fighting unit, the 562d Engineer Detachment (Fire

Truck) from Fort Leonard Wood, was on the Iraqi border next

to the Paladins and Patriot systems the night the war began. At least three Scuds flew overhead as we ran to our

bunkers. Also, a mortar round hit and destroyed a Kuwaiti

police station about 1 to 2 kilometers from us. We wore

various levels of MOPP gear for 2 months.

We are staying very busy and rarely have access to

photos or mail. There are no modern facilities here. It’s like

living back before running water and electricity. But it’s

great to experience what it’s like not having all the things

we take for granted; it shows us a simpler way of life.

Those who really know me know that I could talk on

forever, but I will cut it off now. Thanks again for the box

of treats; I did share it with my soldiers. They are great

guys, just as everyone is there at DOTD. Sorry for the

sloppy handwriting; I don’t have a table to steady the

writing pad.

Sincerely,

SFC William A. Brassfield

June 2003

As a nonengineer, I read Engineer for general interest.

Articles that are “engineer-techie” go by me in a hurry, although I do have a civil engineer working for me who can

explain—slowly and patiently—what I do not grasp. However, the January-March 2003 issue contained a lot of information at my level.

I was especially impressed by USMC Major Jeffrey J.

Johnson’s article on QA/QC (page 16). This is a tremendously

weak area that needs a lot of work. Major Johnson’s credentials for commenting are impeccable—in Joint Task Force 6

(JTF 6), he saw a long string of engineer construction units

pass through and knows whereof he speaks. I would reinforce his statements. At Fort Lewis Range Control, we have—

over the past few years—tried to avoid doing much range

construction with engineer troop units because QA/QC is so

bad. We’d rather not get something built than to go through

the agony of dealing with shoddy results caused by inadequate (at best) QA/QC.

Some would protest that this is driven by the nature

of the missions we can offer. Units working on installation projects are not deployed; they are coming from

garrison and are subject to all the distractions of garrison life. But in the past, I have seen engineer units accomplish great construction planning, execution, and QA/

QC on our projects under those identical conditions. It is

definitely in the realm of the possible, but it has to happen by intent, skill, and application—not by osmosis. I

also note that Major Johnson’s comments apply entirely

to units that are deployed to JTF 6 and away from garrison, so it’s obvious that it’s a problem more of organization than of location.

Bottom line: There is a crying, critical need for applied

QA/QC in engineer troop project planning and execution.

John Weller

 Fort Lewis Range Officer

A Letter From Iraq

QA/QC Construction Supervision . . . or “Just Wing It”
24 Engineer July-September 2003

The 326th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Air Assault),

based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is a part of the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault). On 6 February 2003,

the battalion received deployment orders to Mosul, Iraq, in

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the unit accomplished all its assigned missions and suffered no combat

losses from a lack of training or resources, its combat power

could be far greater. This article examines the successes and

challenges of the battalion, based on the current modified

table of organization and equipment (MTOE), and offers

recommendations as to the direction future equipment fielding

plans and training scenarios should take.

Predeployment and Training

With the clarity of hindsight, it is apparent that some

of the predeployment preparations and training

events were crucial to our success, and others need

some refinement. The division conducted a deployment

exercise that proved invaluable as it allowed the unit to—

 Verify load plans based on the newly received shipping

containers.

 Identify and requisition blocking, bracing, and shoring

requirements.

 Sort hazardous material paperwork and packaging.

 Identify and weigh secondary vehicle loads.

 Update deployment equipment lists so that ships and trains

could be reserved based on the unit’s equipment footprint.

In short, the deployment exercise accurately reflected the

complexity of moving an entire unit with all its associated

equipment like no combat training center (CTC) rotation or

home station field training exercise ever has. In addition, neither

CTC nor home station training scenarios accurately reflected

the nature of urban combat operations that we experienced in

Iraq or the volume of enemy weapons and ammunition caches.

Urban Operations

In urban operations training conducted before deployment,

an impregnable position was continually pursued, resulting in

a meat-grinder-type of urban operation attack that consumed

soldiers at an alarming rate. In actual practice in Iraq, a sniper

or enemy position in a building meant that the floor of that

building—or more often than not the entire building—was

destroyed by a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

(TOW) missile; an AH-64 or OH-58 helicopter; a tank main

gun round; a shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapondisposable (SMAW-D); or an AT-4 light antitank weapon. It

was reassuring to see that commanders did not continue to

send soldiers into a faulty urban operations attack as is

frequently seen in training.

An exchange training program within the XVIII Airborne

Corps should be established between 3d Infantry Division

and the 101st Airborne Division where mechanized company

teams and light infantry battalions are rotated into each

other’s home station training scenarios. The CTCs do a better

job than home station training at integrating mechanized forces

in an urban operations attack.

By Captain Aaron P. Magan U.S. Army photo by SPC Derek Gaines

Improving the Engineer Battalion’s Combat Power:

Lessons Learned in Iraq
July-September 2003 Engineer 25

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Engineers are masters of the “pop-and-drop” handemplaced explosive charges for destroying unexploded

ordnance (UXO), ammunition, and equipment in limited

quantities. However, when dealing with multiple truckloads of

ammunition and equipment, standard methods and techniques

do not apply. A poorly constructed shot will only create more

problems and scatter the now-sensitized ammunition and

explosives over a larger area.

With the manpower limitations of explosive ordnance

disposal (EOD) teams, it was not possible for them to inspect

and/or destroy every cache, so it fell to the engineers to take

over the task. None of the standard engineer courses train

engineers to deal with proper destruction of such large caches

and, as a result, we have to learn by trial and error. Additionally,

engineers are not currently trained in any of the Engineer

School courses to identify enemy ammunition and explosives,

especially when those items have been involved in fires and

engineers are required to recommend which items are safe for

removal and which must be destroyed in place.

Engineer units need embedded EOD/UXO experts. Based

on our experiences in Iraq, the right number is two per platoon.

Possible methods for achieving this goal are a joint training

program, an additional skill identifier, a change to the program

of instruction in the Engineer School, or a change to the MTOE.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The actual process of deploying went more smoothly

than most expected. The usual inconveniences of

delayed planes, trains with the wrong combination of

car types, and transloaded ships still occurred. We provided

two supercargo personnel to accompany the equipment on

the ship and sent two advanced-party personnel to secure

accommodations at the destination, but little else could have

been done that would benefit the unit during the deployment

process.

We recommend that the battalion continue to provide a

download, maintenance, and reception command and

control node at the seaport of debarkation and possibly

expand it to cover the aerial port of debarkation as well.

That node requires the battalion executive officer and

maintenance officer to be an effective reception, staging,

onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) multiplier. When

properly resourced, they can track incoming equipment, stage

downloaded equipment, organize convoys, manage the driver

pool, provide maintenance support, and direct incoming

personnel.

Every vehicle needs at least one spare tire, already inflated

and mounted on a rim. Upon arrival in theater, the initial

convoys were briefed regarding distances, and units were

cautioned about desert-specific maintenance problems, such

as lubrication and air filters, but road conditions were never

specifically mentioned. The combination of poor roads,

overloaded vehicles, and the debris of war meant that tires

were constantly in short supply. A high-mobility, multipurpose,

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) with a flat tire may get soldiers

out of the immediate area, but it will not allow them to continue

on a convoy for any distance.

HMMWV scissor jacks need to be replaced with tower

jacks (sometimes called bumper jacks or shepherd’s jacks)

because the original equipment is inadequate. A tire patch kit

is also invaluable. The kits are inexpensive and require little

training to use, making them ideal for each platoon to carry.

Tow bars should be authorized at a minimum of one per

platoon. Our unit purchased tow chains before the deployment

for every vehicle because of a shortage of tow bars. While

effective and relatively inexpensive, it is not the safest way to

tow a vehicle. Additionally, each squad HMMWV needs a

self-recovery winch to allow for independent operations.

In the town of Al Kifl, Iraqi forces had prepared bridges for

demolition. Engineers were called on to render the demolitions

safe and remove the explosives from the bridge. While this

mission was safely accomplished, embedded EOD personnel

would have been an invaluable asset for this mission.

The Iraqi town of Karbala presented a different type of

urban operation than we were used to encountering. As

opposed to a village of 40 personnel, as is found at the CTCs

or at home station, we attacked a city of 700,000. There was no

outer perimeter wire or antipersonnel minefields that ringed

the city. Instead, units moved from the landing zone directly

into the city and faced no opposition for the first few blocks.

However, once the units were inside the city, they faced sniper

fire, rocket-propelled grenade ambushes, and sporadic mortar

attacks. Without the typical array of obstacles, engineers

fought as infantry during the attack and provided limited

mobility support. They encountered no enemy-emplaced

explosive obstacles. Coalition dual-purpose, improved

conventional munitions (DPICMs) were the most frequently

M-220 TOW missile
26 Engineer July-September 2003

encountered UXO, but they could easily be avoided by

dismounted personnel. All roadblocks were hand-emplaced

by locals and could be removed by hand to allow mechanized

forces to pass through. The primary method of mobility

support provided by engineers during this operation was the

use of bolt cutters to gain access into buildings and compounds. Explosives were still used initially to create breaches

into walls, but it ultimately proved faster to use a tank main

gun round to create personnel breaches. Often the greater

engineer mission occurred once the unit had gained access to

the compound and discovered enemy caches.

The magnitude of the caches that the Iraqis had hidden

within their population centers meant that entire battalions

had to be diverted to begin removing enemy weapons,

ammunition, and equipment from the city of Baghdad in order

to create a safe environment for the civilians in the newly

liberated city. Again, engineers made recommendations to the

maneuver units concerning which items were safe to transport

out of the city and which must be destroyed in place. We

underestimated the amount of demolitions and, more

specifically, the number of initiating systems that would be

required. Many of the caches had been involved in fires,

rendering them unsafe for removal.

Locals had begun breaking apart shells, throwing down

the fused warhead, dumping out the propellant, and taking

the brass shell casing to sell on the black market. This

produced large piles of highly flammable propellant that

took only one spark to set off, thereby cooking off many of

the warheads lying around. This occurred time and time

again all over Iraq and required more Class V supplies than

we could carry to destroy it all. What could be transported

was hauled to a consolidated cache collection point by the

family of medium tactical vehicle (FMTV) trucks that

augmented the engineer platoons, as well as all available

cargo trucks from the brigade.

Unit basic loads (UBLs) must be adjusted to reflect a dual

command-detonated initiation requirement using modern

demolition initiator (MDI) shock tube/cap assemblies only. In

an urban environment, or in an area where we do not control the

airspace, we cannot afford to have explosives set off with a time

fuse. It is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to block off

every avenue of approach within a city that leads to a prepared

demolition charge. Should the primary command-detonation

initiating system fail, we are forced to wait until the time fuse

detonates the charge. In the meantime, aircraft can fly overhead,

or civilians can wander too close to the prepared demolition. In

the future, both the primary and secondary initiating systems

should be command-detonated. We were unprepared for this,

and while we did not have any mishaps, we also did not have

enough of the command-detonated initiating systems on hand to

prepare each charge as we would have liked.

Line engineer companies were tasked with opening routes

that had been bombed by the U.S. Air Force, as well as Iraqi

engineers. A line engineer company has the organic assets to

fill in a crater and/or create a bypass. Engineers can sweep the

area for UXO before the repair begins, but the end result is a

road that is a combat trail at best. Although adequate for military

vehicle traffic, to include heavy equipment transporters loaded

with M1 tanks, it was difficult for civilian traffic to navigate

these roads or newly created bypasses. The engineer work

line described in doctrinal manuals lagged far behind the

divisional maneuver units. This resulted in 101st Airborne

Division engineers clearing and repairing routes through the

sectors of three different divisions.

The diversity of missions given to engineers in stability

and support operations surprised most people. Road repair,

chemical spill response, unstable structure demolition, river

interdiction, cache destruction and transport, UXO destruction,

route reconnaissance and classification, and a number of other

tasks forced us to consolidate the engineer company under

the engineer company commander within the brigade combat

team. Platoon leaders remained with their task forces and took

at least one squad with them each day to respond to missions

in each task force sector. The rest of the company became

general support to the brigade and worked on taskings

generated by daily Civil-Military Operations Center meetings.

Often, engineers massed efforts on missions that did not

necessarily represent what was typically thought of as the

engineering main effort but rather supported the overall

information operations campaign. This approach seemed to

work well for us in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. We often

tackled easy engineering victories (such as reopening a

roadway for civilians or clearing UXO from a school yard)

even though there were more important roads or UXO fields.

This allowed us to get the local civilians on our side and

showed them that we were interested in helping them reconstruct their country.

Future Organizational Structure

W ith a rapid runway repair box and two Bobcat®

skid steer tractors per line company, the division

could double its runway repair capability and

add enormous utility to the line company and subsequently

its supported brigade. The division seized several airfields,

three of which required repairs. Currently, only the division’s

light equipment company has the airfield repair matting and

other required equipment. With the proper reinforcement, a

rapid runway repair box could accommodate the weight of two

Bobcats and reduce the haul requirement to only one additional

truck and trailer. Engineer line companies already have the

rest of the required equipment (dozer and small emplacement

excavator [SEE] truck). Another plus for the Bobcat is that it

can be augmented with auger bits to provide dismounted

survivability positions, a concrete mixer (which has been

required several times during operations in Iraq), a pavement

breaker, and other hydraulic tools.

Each platoon needs its own dedicated FMTV dump truck.

An unmodified engineer squad HMMWV can safely carry an

entire squad. However, three more load categories remain that

require transport: the MTOE items, the soldiers’ rucksacks
July-September2003 Engineer 27

and “A” and “B” duffel bags, and the Class IV and V UBL.

The trailer (another issue) can safely carry one of those three

load categories. The rest is then left behind or strapped to the

sides or top of the vehicle or trailer. The right answer is for

each squad vehicle to transport the troops and the missionessential MTOE items (troop seats are removed and replaced

with equipment boxes bolted into the vehicle) and use the

trailer to haul the Class IV and Class V UBL. The remainder of

the MTOE items and soldiers’ bags can then be transported

by the platoon sergeant in the platoon FMTV dump truck.

Additionally, the truck could be used to support engineer

missions when they are attached to maneuver units.

During operations in Iraq, each platoon required the

augmentation of a 5-ton-equivalent truck on a daily basis,

because they transported enemy weapons and ammunition

caches out of the various liberated cities. The ultimate goal

should be to resource an engineer platoon for independent

operations with the ability to carry all personnel and equipment

in a single internal lift.

Line companies should have two additional dozers for a

total of four organic dozers to help provide survivability

support in the absence of any augmentation. Typically a line

company is augmented with a platoon from the division’s

habitual corps light equipment engineer company. When this

does not happen, the line company’s two dozers will work

around the clock and still take a minimum of six days to finish

digging in the brigade commander’s priorities for the entire

combat team.

An interim solution would be to purchase the excavator

that is available from a U.S. manufacturer in lieu of the winch

currently found on the back of our dozers. Such an option

would force the commander to choose between providing

survivability berms with the dozer blade versus providing

dismounted survivability positions with the excavator. However,

dismounted positions can still be constructed by hand until

the dozer arrives, and the previously requested additional two

dozers would free up the assets more quickly. In practice, blade

assets are used nonstop at the beginning of operations, but

that usage quickly scales back after a unit has been in place for

a week or more. After the initial flurry of activity, only occasional

sanitation trenches and force protection or road repair missions

require blade assets.

A HMMWV-based contact truck should be added to the

MTOE. Sapper companies currently have their own

maintenance sections based on our own battalion internal

reorganization. However, they need a HMMWV contact truck

as opposed to the older excess commercial utility cargo vehicle

(CUCV) that is currently on hand.

The company is one HMMWV short of what is required.

The first sergeant needs a vehicle and so does the assistant

brigade engineer. Currently, it is one or the other. The company

also needs to be authorized an operations noncommissioned

officer (NCO). Companies in our battalion currently pull the

senior squad leader to fill this role.

A platoon-sized Kipper Tool kit would have greatly

enhanced the level of support that engineers could have

provided for the maneuver commander. Our unit purchased

these tool kits using organizational money; however, they

should be MTOE items fielded by the Army. Kipper Tool’s

base camp construction kit was long overdue, and we used it

nonstop in Iraq.

Engineer equipment fielding should be on the same

schedule as the supported infantry unit. Currently, engineers

are the only habitual slice element that fights dismounted

alongside the infantry, yet they are continually left out of the

new equipment fielding plans.

We need to maintain a general support engineer team

within the headquarters platoon to react to small incidents.

There are always brigade-controlled areas such as the brigade

support area, brigade TOC, forward area rearming and refueling

points, and primary assembly areas where engineers have to

go to react to a single UXO incident or provide transport of a

few rounds of enemy ammunition. When engineers are

consolidated under the engineer company commander, he can

dispatch a squad to deal with the smaller engineer missions.

The assault and obstacle (A&O) platoon leader should

be made a permanent MTOE position. The line engineer

companies have consolidated all engineer blade assets as well

as the Volcano mine system into an A&O platoon. In this

battalion, each platoon is resourced “out of hide” with a

lieutenant as the platoon leader, and the heavy equipment

section NCO in charge generally serves as the platoon

sergeant. This structure has served us well both in training

and in combat. The notion of using the task force or brigade

command sergeant major as the synch-dozer never really

worked as well as it’s briefed. However, with the dig assets

under the control of an A&O platoon leader, we have

developed a more efficient survivability section that is capable

of simultaneous missions.

Summary

The diversity of missions and extended distances at

which engineer units have operated during Operation

Iraqi Freedom highlight the need for updating the type

of training, organizational structure, and equipment fielding

plan. Months—not years—is the appropriate timeline for these

changes. There is still time to affect the fight in Iraq and improve

the capabilities of the deployed units in this ultimate proving

ground for engineers.

Captain Magan commanded B Company, 326th Engineer

Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort

Campbell, Kentucky, at the time this article was written. He

previously served as a platoon leader in the 50th Assault

Float Bridge Company, 2d Infantry Division, Korea, and

company executive officer and battalion S1, 9th Engineer

Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, Germany.
28 Engineer July-September 2003

T.he 544th arrived in Kuwait on 30 March 2003 and

moved north into Baghdad to link up with the 565th

Engineer Battalion at Logistics Support Area (LSA)

Bushmaster on 4 April.

9-13 April

We received our first mission from the 130th Engineer

Brigade to help with the search and recovery of a shot-down

F-18 and its pilot. At the crash site, we were notified that a

Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team and a Marine

expeditionary force reconnaissance team were also on-site.

The Navy EOD team gave us the locations of the plane wreck

and where the Air Force pararescuemen, or parajumpers (PJs),

had found the pilot’s parachute.

Both the 544th and the Marine team performed a hasty

search using a side-scan sonar system. (See note on page 31.)

We developed a plan and calculated a search area to look for

the body of the pilot. We divided the area so the Marines

would work from the south and move north and the 544th

would do the opposite. When we recognized an object as a

potential priority (such as the pilot, ejection seat, parachute,

or cockpit), by means of the side-scan sonar system that

parallels the shore in an attempt to locate foreign objects, the

544th would dive and verify each of these potential sites. We

pulled out smaller wreckage pieces and brought them to shore.

After several days of searching, something that looked like a

body was spotted from a helicopter. Divers from both the

Marines and the 544th verified that it was the pilot, and a

medical evacuation aircraft flew the body back to Tallil Air

Base. Later, Navy EOD personnel destroyed the F-18 using

C-4, and the 544th disposed of the wreckage it had brought to

shore.

14 April

The 814th Engineer Company tasked the 544th to link up

with the 565th Engineer Battalion to conduct a deliberate river

reconnaissance of a potential assault bridge site at Objective

Peach. A seven-man element collected shore and water data

and took digital pictures of the near and far shores. The end

state was a hydrographic survey with DA Form 7398, River

Reconnaissance Report, and digital photos attached to it.

18 April

The 544th received a mission from the 565th Engineer

Battalion to help the 101st Airborne Division recover sensitive

items dropped in a canal north of the Karbala Gap. Eight soldiers

had fallen into the 30-foot-deep water, following a light medium

tactical vehicle (LMTV) crash, and had lost sensitive items.

Surface swimmers looked for these objects, but after

recovering only four weapons and a Kevlar® suit during the

first hour, the team decided to put scuba divers in the water.

By the end of the diving day, we had recovered equipment

totaling more than $100,000.

23 April

A six-man reconnaissance team traveled with the 565th

Engineer Battalion to Tikrit to conduct hydrographic surveys

of the largest-ever military river-crossing site. While in Tikrit,

the 544th pulled debris out of the work area for the bridge

companies and helped the 74th Engineer Team (Dive) render

hydrographic surveys.

27-28 April

A 13-diver team spent two days at Engagement Area

Chamberlain, cutting four steel I beams with the underwater

torch. The team also conducted salvage operations on the

Army Diver Missions in Iraq

Army divers are a relatively unknown element of the Engineer Regiment. However, they perform many important missions

around the world, such as underwater search and recovery, port opening and clearing, river reconnaissance, watercraft

maintenance, hydrographic surveys, salvage operations, and underwater demolitions. The divers are a part of the U.S. Army

Dive Company at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The company has five dive teams, two of which deployed to support Operation Iraqi

Freedom. The following excerpts from journals kept by the authors describe a few of the missions they performed.

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

544th Engineer Team (Dive)

By First Lieutenant Christopher F. West

Soldiers from the 544th Engineer Team (Dive) move

out across the water to conduct a hydrographic

survey for an upcoming river-crossing mission.
July-September 2003 Engineer 29

new pontoons emplaced by the 671st Engineer Company. A

hole in one of the pontoons caused it to sink, and the weight

of the sunken pontoon forced another pontoon to sink also.

The 671st developed a patch that could be used on the

pontoons so they could pump out the water. Once the

pontoons were floating, the divers plugged the hole in the

one pontoon with a bolt. The entire area was cleared to allow

bridging to continue.

4 May

Divers from the 544th met with Iraqi water treatment plant

workers to determine the location of potential sea mines to the

east of the bridge at Objective Peach. The workers, who spoke

fluent English, believed that there were 40- to 500-pound sea

mines on the shore but that there were none in the water. The

divers used the side-scan sonar to search the area but did not

find any mines.

4-9 May

Six divers supported the LSA Anaconda EOD team

responsible for ridding the base of all unexploded ordnance

(UXO) and munitions. The mission included lifting, moving,

and hauling crates of ammunition to bunkers to completely

backfill them.

8-12 May

The 544th began pumping water out of the canal just

outside the fence of LSA Anaconda to help the 864th Engineer

Battalion fill holes in the airfield with concrete and extend the

landing strip. The divers were on call 24 hours a day to support

this effort and used their new 180-gallons-per-minute pumps

to conduct the mission. The trucks needed to be filled an

average of six times a day to satisfy the requirement for

concrete.

The 544th was tasked to find an area for conducting dive

training in the vicinity of LSA Anaconda. A lake in AdDuval

was only 15 kilometers away and seemed fairly large, so a

team of divers went to determine the feasibility of diving and

helocasting operations there. Upon arrival, the divers noticed

a large cache of used, unused, unexploded, and exploded

ordnance and munitions, which indicated that this was not a

good place to dive. However, the team completed a

hydrographic survey and determined the average depth of

the water to be about 8 feet.

First Lieutenant West is the leader of the 544th Engineer

Team (Dive) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. He is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy.

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

After arriving in Kuwait on 14 April 2003, the 74th

Engineer Team (Dive) met up with the 5th Engineer

Battalion on 18 April at the Taji Airfield on the north

side of Baghdad.

22-26 April

The team was notified of a river reconnaissance mission on

the Tigris River in the vicinity of the city of Tikrit. Two members

of the team convoyed to Tikrit with the command element of

the 74th Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge[AFB]),

where they linked up with personnel from the 130th Engineer

Brigade and the 299th Engineer Battalion and a reconnaissance

team from the 814th Engineer Company (AFB). The initial

assessment of the damage that two 500-pound bombs had

created was that the bridge was blown in two different places,

causing obvious structural damage. The current was so strong

that we wondered if we could even get a diver down to the

bottom. We took the initial data back to the 299th’s tactical

operations center (TOC), where the commander of the 130th

began to devise a plan to fix the bridge. The 74th Engineer

Company commander called back to Taji Airfield to prepare

the rest of the team for a convoy to Tikrit.

74th Engineer Team (Dive)

By First Lieutenant P.J. Inskeep

Army Diver Missions in Iraq

Divers transport gear from the shore to the bridge site

where diving is taking place.
30 Engineer July-September 2003

 A topographic detachment at 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry

Division, headquarters provided the imagery we needed to

complete a hydrographic survey. Back at the site, we collected

near-shore and far-shore data using our Trimble TSC1TM data

collector and took photographs to analyze the best method

for clearing a lane for the bridge.

Using the side-scan sonar, we conducted a survey of the

bottom of the river. We could see that there were no major

obstacles in the middle of the river, but there were about 20

large trees and numerous small bushes in the way of the

projected path of the bridge on the far shore. Also, there were

two I beams under the surface of the water on the near shore

where the bridge boats were being launched. The other boat

left to conduct a hydrographic survey of the bridge site using

the Global Positioning System (GPS), a high-precision depth

finder, and Trimble software to collect the river depth data.

After all the data was collected, we rendered the survey for

the bridge companies using TerramodelTM software.

Meanwhile, other divers set up a surface-supplied station,

which consisted of SuperLite (SL) 17K helmets, a communications box, air supply hoses, and a high-/low-pressure

air system. Then, we inspected everything beneath the water

and measured the diameters of the trees at their base to start a

demolitions plan. We found the water to be about 10 feet at

the deepest spot. After assessing the situation, we decided to

let surface swimmers measure the diameters of the trees off of

breath holds.

While this was taking place on the far shore, we conducted

a reconnaissance of the two I beams under the surface by

measuring the beams that were above the water’s surface.

From this, we developed a demolitions plan. We received

permission from higher headquarters to set off the demolitions

the next morning. One group was to remove the trees from the

far shore and another would remove the two I beams. They

rehearsed and planned three separate shots.

 Two divers in scuba gear placed the charges. The divers

had zero visibility in the water and were working against a

strong current. The only sense they could use to emplace the

demolitions was touch. Each diver emplaced the demolitions

on the downstream side of the tree. The demolitions were then

held in place by 550 cord (parachute cord), and we had

detonation cord already attached to the charge and precut to

15 feet.

Once the demolitions were set, the detonation cord was

tied to the tree above the water until the charges were correctly

placed. Then surface swimmers ran a ring main to all the

charges and tied them in, and we connected the modern

detonation initiator (MDI) and ran it to the far shore for

detonation. At the same time, we made sure the military police

had cleared the bridge. After our first blast went off successfully, we emplaced the next round of charges and set up

shearing charges to cut some I beams that had ruined the hull

of a bridge boat the day before. The two sites blew simultaneously. The third blast was a single tree. Once the water

was cleared, we helped pull the trees out.

27 April

The bridge companies wanted us to blow the rest of the

little brush and cut out five light poles. We performed a reconnaissance, came up with a plan, and prepped the demolitions

for it. The demolitions had to be in early that day so the bridge

companies could rehearse their operations, so we emplaced

them and by 0700 were prepared to blow.

One of the divers took on the task of removing the five

poles. Having dived in fast current before, he thought it would

be best to see if demolitions could be placed at the base of the

poles to ensure that they were sheered completely and no

longer posed a navigational hazard to the bridge boat operation.

A diver went in the water off the Zodiac® inflatable boat

moored to a pole. The current was too strong to even get to

the pole safely. The diver tried to slide the demolitions down

Divers from the 74th Engineer Team (Dive) stand on

the shore as they watch a bridge blow after a demolition emplacement mission.

Army Diver Missions in Iraq

Divers emplace detonation cord in preparation for

clearing underwater obstacles.
July-September 2003 Engineer 31

the pole from the boat. However, weeds and brush had been

pinned to the pole by the current, which prevented the

demolitions from sliding to the base. We decided to try to put

another diver in on the pole so he could shimmy down it.

Again the current was too strong, and he could not reach the

bottom.

We finally decided to cut the poles about 3 feet above the

water and see if they were hollow. If they were, we could pack

C-4 inside them and remove them with no problem. We took

out a boat that a mechanic with the 74th had repaired—one

that had belonged to Saddam. (We didn’t think he would mind

if we borrowed it to help his people!) On the boat, we set up an

oxyacetylene cutter, and another boat was set up to pull the

light pole away from the cutting boat so no one would get

hurt. Once the poles were cut, we discovered they were hollow.

We put charges inside each one, packed them with dirt and

water, and blew them that night. The poles were removed, and

the site was ready for the bridge.

 28 April

Bridge construction began. We had a boat upstream and

another downstream from the bridge, searching for enemies

on the water. We also had an emergency surface swimmer

ready in case anyone fell in the water and a scuba diving

station set up as a quick-reaction force. The team searched

the river, reporting every half hour. They spotted a couple of

fishermen, but nothing serious. By 1300, the bridge was

completed and we were pulling security up- and downstream

from it. We did it during the daytime, and the infantry took

over at night.

6- 8 May

We conducted our final day of reconnaissance for the

destruction of the two Tikrit Bridge spans. One diver rappelled

underneath the bridge to estimate what needed to be done.

After receiving the demolitions from the 814th and 502d

Engineer Companies, some of us were assigned to the

Both the 544th and the 74th Engineer Teams (Dive) continue to perform their unique missions in the barren regions of

Iraq. In spite of the frustrations, the soldiers are experiencing satisfaction from a job well done and knowing that they are

contributing to the very important Operation Enduring Freedom.

Note: The side-scan sonar is a method of underwater imaging that uses sound rather than light. The system consists of a

processing unit above water, a cable for towing and electronic transmitting, and a unit beneath the surface (a towfish) that

transmits and receives acoustic energy (sound) for imaging. The system was originally designed for ocean archeology, but

its military application was recognized early on. The towfish, which looks like a 4-foot torpedo, contains a transducer and

receiver that exchange signals within nanoseconds, using the speed of the boat and a GPS to create a picture on the

attached computer. While the towfish is being pulled behind the boat, the transducer on either side of the towfish generates

a half-inch sound signal. What is actually seen on the screen is sound waves bouncing off objects and creating shadows. The

side-scan sonar, which is best used to find large objects, has made river reconnaissance quicker and safer, as well as making

searches in larger bodies of water more accurate and more efficient.

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

near-shore span and the others the far shore. In emplacing the

demolitions, our only problem was how to attach them to the

bridge without causing further damage to the spans. The first

explosion was a success; each span fell as we expected and

no further damage was done to the bridge. We cleared the

bridge and prepared demolitions to destroy the near shore

span. When we set off the demolitions, the span was destroyed

and the 38th Engineer Company (Medium Girder Bridge) began

to emplace the Mabey-Johnson bridge.

9-11 May

A Black Hawk had crashed into the Tigris River near

Samarra, and we searched for sensitive items. The divers also

searched inside the helicopter for personal items of the pilots.

Unfortunately, we discovered that all four men had died. (Their

Kevlar suits were used the next morning for a memorial

ceremony.) Later, we rigged up the helicopter to a crane and

pulled it out of the water. We gathered all the bits and pieces

that floated downstream and collected the data needed for a

hydrographic survey.

14-15 May

We cut down I beams that were in the water so the 38th

could use them for the Mabey-Johnson bridge. The men set

up a surface-supplied station, brought out the hydraulic cutter,

and went to work. The water was only 10 feet deep, but they

could only see inches in front of their eyes. The small amount

of oxygen on hand meant they could only cut down one I

beam each day.

20May

We found another lake within the compound. The divers

located weapons and ammunition, which were taken to Tikrit

North Airfield and disposed of.

First Lieutenant Inskeep is the leader of the 74th Engineer

Team (Dive) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. He is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy.

Army Diver Missions in Iraq
32 Engineer July-September 2003

The Department of Defense and the Army recently

published new strategic-, operational-, and tacticallevel doctrine for urban operations: Joint Publication

3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations; Field Manual

(FM) 3-06 (Doctrine Review and Approval Group [DRAG]),

Urban Operations; and FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms

Operations in Urban Terrain. The Army has long published

doctrine on military operations on urbanized terrain

(MOUT), but the previous doctrine was typically constrained to tactics, techniques, and procedures at the

brigade level and below. The doctrine was flexible and

allowed commanders the option to enter a city or isolate it

and bypass. Due to the complex nature of urban operations,

commanders typically opted to isolate and bypass. However, this may no longer be a solution. We now face adversaries that use asymmetric tactics and/or terrorism

because there are few who can directly oppose America’s

combat capabilities. Future threats may use cities to negate

our technological advantage and use the civilian population

to impede and complicate operations. Commanders may

enter cities to pursue the threat or to seize intermediate

objectives. For this reason, it is imperative that engineers

understand the potential problems under all these

circumstances.

The newly published doctrine provides a new urban

operational framework—assess, shape, dominate, and transition.

This provides a means for the commander to frame how he

visualizes, describes, and directs the urban fight. The two new

Army manuals provide limited considerations for engineer

missions. Many of our maneuver peers, and even engineers, think

of engineer operations as solely limited to combat operations

(mobility/countermobility/survivability). However, at the

operational and tactical levels, engineers provide significant

contributions from the geospatial and general engineering

functions. The following paragraphs describe some additional

battle command considerations for engineer operations in urban

terrain. This article examines the assess portion of the urban

framework as a primer to stimulate thought.

By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony C. Funkhouser

Engineer Operations

 in Urban Environments

Corners:

Around

Breaching
July-September 2003 Engineer 33

Engineers in MOUT

As the commander frames the urban fight, he begins

with an assessment of the terrain, the threat, and

friendly capabilities.

See the Terrain

The complexity of urban terrain demands map products

that provide a common operational picture for the commander

to visualize the urban three-dimensional terrain. The National

Imagery and Mapping Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, produces

urban terrain imagery. There are a number of commercial offthe-shelf software products like FalconViewTM and Tactical

Operational Scene (TopSceneTM) that use satellite imagery and

allow a fly-through capability. However, these products do

not provide detailed infrastructure information such as utilities,

sewer systems, and bridges. This important information that

maneuver commanders need to make informed decisions can

be accessed through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Topographic Engineering Center, Alexandria, Virginia, which

has developed an Urban Tactical Planner software program

intended to support MOUT. It is a compact, field-ready suite

of urban terrain data and geospatial analysis tools. These tools

facilitate rapid visualization of key aspects of the urban

environment, including buildings, roads, railroads, streams,

forests, marshes, water bodies, and vertical obstructions. It

uses streamlined data sets to provide the greatest amount of

data in a small, easy-to-use package. The product is designed

to be produced on short timelines to meet contingency

planning requirements as they arise. Urban Tactical Planner

provides an overview of the urban terrain in the form of maps,

imagery, elevation data, perspective views, handheld photography, video clips, scanned building plans, tables, and text.

The data is structured for use with ArcView® 3.0a Geospatial

Information System (GIS) software—the most common commercial off-the-shelf desktop GIS. ArcView 3.0a, the basic

software used by the Army’s Digital Terrain Support Systems,

allows terrain teams to manipulate data and apply unit-specific

control measures. The Topographic Engineering Center provides databases for many cities on its Secret Internet Protocol

Router Network (SIPRNET) Web site at <tec.smil.mil.>

Soldiers operate in the confined space of a MOUT environment.
34 Engineer July-September 2003

See the Enemy

As we examine the threat in the urban environment, we

know that no matter how a threat fights (whether from house

to house or in concentric circles or concentric circles with

strong points), the maneuver commander will face the

challenges of moving through a dynamic environment filled

with complex obstacles. Urban obstacles may include existing

debris, furniture, vehicles, wire, and rubble. These alone hinder

the maneuver of units but are complicated with the movement

of civilians throughout. Civilians can be considered dynamic

impediments to maneuver and must be influenced away from

the route. To complicate matters even further, the threat may

introduce mines and other improvised explosive devices

(IEDs). No longer in a two-dimensional plane, mines not only

may be placed under roads but also may be positioned for a

side or top attack mode that is command detonated or

activated. Antipersonnel (AP) mines, IEDs, and booby traps

may also be used in many areas, buildings, and other likely

avenues of approach.

Recent urban combat experiences in Northern Ireland,

Grozny, Jenin, and Afghanistan reveal an accelerated adaptation to countermeasures developed by friendly forces. The

threat will also adapt and use IEDs to complicate our detection

and neutralization efforts. Examples of recent IEDs found

around the world include remote detonation devices using

electronics, radio control, or even cellular telephones to initiate

the systems. These methods are all shared via the Internet. So

what British Forces encounter in Northern Ireland may soon

confront our soldiers in another urban area of operations. Some

current IED techniques are as follows:

Coupling. One mine or explosive is linked to another,

usually with a detonating cord. When the first device is

detonated, it detonates the linked explosive. This technique

is often used to defeat countermine equipment such as

mine rollers. When the linked devices are directional

fragmentation mines, they can create a large, lethal engagement area.

Boosting. Buried low-metal mines are stacked atop one

another, and the farthest mine from the surface is fuzed.

This reduces the probability of detection and increases

the force of the blast.

Sensitizing. This technique is used with antitank (AT)

mines. On some nonmetallic AT mines, the pressure plate

can be cracked and the spring removed to reduce the

pressure required to initiate the mine. Similarly, the pressure

plate can be removed from metallic AT mines for the same

effect. Alternatively, a pressure-fuzed AP mine can be placed

atop an AT mine thus creating a very large AP mine.

Daisy-Chaining. Command-detonated AP mines are commonly used in daisy chaining. Enemy forces link the mines

with trip wires or detonating cord. When the initial mine

is detonated, the other mines will detonate. This creates

a large, lethal engagement area.

The threat will also take advantage of survivability within

the urban environment by digging in open areas and using

existing infrastructure to conceal positions. We can expect

the threat to maintain mobility between positions to interdict

friendly lines of communication and to reinforce his own

positions. FM 3-06 (DRAG) highlights that historically, the

threat will resist his own isolation more than any other friendly

effort. Since we can never achieve a 100 percent isolation, the

resulting movements impact on potential future maneuver

operations.

Another key to understanding an urban environment is

assessing the threat’s general engineering capabilities.

Adversaries have general engineering capabilities in their own

forces or host nation to maintain utilities and infrastructure.

They have access to commercial equipment and experts to

repair destroyed targets. As friendly forces target and destroy

utilities or reduce their capabilities, the threat may dispatch its

own forces to rapidly repair or improvise a means to maintain

the capabilities we are attempting to eliminate.

See Yourself

We will seek to maintain freedom of friendly maneuver and

deny threat movement throughout the urban terrain. Engineers

enable maneuver commanders freedom of maneuver within

the urban environment to accomplish their mission. The

fundamentals for success will be our ability to—

 Predict actions and circumstances that could affect

maneuver.

 Detect using early indicators of impediments.

 Act early to prevent potential impediments from affecting

maneuver.

 Avoid impediments by identifying alternate routes.

 Neutralize by reducing or overcoming impediments.

 Protect the force against the effects of threat and

impediments.

Friendly capabilities vary by unit. What friendly assets

allow us to achieve these fundamentals? Prediction capabilities

include all the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

“Engineers enable maneuver commanders freedom of maneuver

within the urban environment to accomplish their mission.”
July-September 2003 Engineer 35

capabilities within the organization but may be dependent on

human intelligence. Current detection capabilities are limited

for operations within the urban terrain. Capabilities include

dozers with mine-clearing armor protection, robotics such as

the Matilda, the Improved Vehicle-Mounted Mine-Detection

System (IVMMDS), sappers with mine detectors such as the

AN/PSS-12 or Handheld Standoff Mine-Detection System

(HSTAMIDS), and coalition and/or contracted mine dogs.

Mines and booby traps are never more difficult to detect

than after they are emplaced; that is why prediction and

interdiction or prevention are so important. These detection

assets are extremely limited within the engineer inventory, and

operations within multiple or major urban areas will exhaust

detection capabilities quickly. Detection training will need to

occur before deployment as well as in theater to train on the

adaptive enemy’s techniques.

Neutralization capabilities include mine-clearing line

charges (MICLICs), Panthers, plows/rollers, mine flail systems,

the Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS),

launched grapnel hooks, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),

specialized equipment and training (sets, kits, and outfits),

ladders/bolt cutters/rescue saws, and contract support for

additional capabilities. None of these systems by themselves

can do it all, but good engineers will determine what

combinations of resources are available to accomplish the

mission. The combat engineer vehicle (CEV) no longer

provides rubble removal under armor. It is questionable

whether the M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE) has the

mass and traction to push rubble. Therefore, we need to explore

other options. In Jenin, the armored D9 dozer has proved its

worth in the urban fight. However, if it is not available, could

we integrate an M88 recovery vehicle forward to lift vehicles

out of our way when a blade vehicle may not have room to

displace the rubble or other material?

Also, how do we work with EOD units forward and leverage

their capabilities to identify, render safe, and dispose of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs to minimize collateral

damage? Engineers must work with EOD personnel early in

the planning phase to organize and delineate responsibilities

for the execution of mobility operations. Potential operations

may have engineers detecting, marking, and bypassing IEDs,

allowing EOD personnel to render them safe and minimize harm

to civilians in the area. Civilians will be a significant issue for

our forces. They may not move to relocation areas and will be

intermingled with our adversaries throughout the areas of

operation. So what assets are available to move civilians from

potential maneuver routes?

Nonlethal weapons may also provide an option to the

commander, depending on the situation. There are a number of

systems available that the military police have proponency for.

(For more information, see Military Police, The Professional

Bulletin of the Military Police Corps, April 2003). Therefore,

engineers will have to work closely with the military police as we

develop courses of action to deal with civilians along our routes.

Other Considerations

Other friendly force considerations include providing force

protection, solving logistical issues, minimizing collateral

damage, and accessing expertise to remote areas.

Force Protection. A major concern for all commanders is

force protection of all these unique capabilities. In a threedimensional environment, a unit’s flank is always exposed to a

potential threat. Therefore, as we maneuver through the urban

environment, engineers need to simultaneously conduct

countermobility operations to protect the flanks within a

compressed area of operations. Protection of engineers will

be vital as they are exposed to a wide range of IEDs. Concurrent

training for engineers and maneuver forces on the most

recently identified threat capabilities in the area of operations

will improve protection of engineers and the combined arms

team. Another lesson learned from Jenin and Grozny is the

removal of all flammable materials from the outside of combat

vehicles. Urban forces should consider increasing their

requirements for fire extinguishers as the potential for fire

increases in the urban area.

Logistics. Historically, certain key classes of supplies are

consumed at a higher rate in urban operations—as much as

five to ten times normal consumption rates. As a result, friendly

forces can anticipate an increased logistical requirement for

hauling supplies for urban operations and moving critical

engineer assets. Since engineers tend to use large items for

barriers in isolation operations, acquiring dedicated assets

may become a problem. Engineers will have to be resourceful

and use existing materials in the urban area to their advantage.

It may require “urban foraging,” which can range from

contracting materials to confiscation. Engineers should

conduct a thorough assessment of the urban area to identify

potential locations for engineer equipment and materials to

reduce haul requirements.

Collateral Damage. Collateral damage alters the urban

landscape and may harm civilians. It may also impede

movement along previously cleared routes and affect civilian

behavior and movement. Therefore, engineers—as the terrain

experts—should anticipate where collateral damage may occur

and predict the impact on future operations. This engineer

battlefield assessment capability may have direct influence

on priority intelligence requirements and the entire force. This

is no easy feat, but it is one that engineers will be expected to

perform.

The Engineer Research and Development Center, Vicksburg,

Mississippi, has a new software program called the Simplified

Survivability Assessment that captures information and

technical data from Technical Manual (TM) 5-855-1, Design

and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional

Weapons Effects. The software allows users to calculate the

potential damage created by various weapons on a variety of

structures, estimates the protection required against various

weapons, calculates overhead cover, and includes a survivability timeline program.
•

• Friendly Capabili ties. When assess ing our friendly 

capabilities, we must examine our general engineering 

capabilities and requirements. General engineering will occur 

throughout the urban fight and may be the main effort during 

stabil ity and support operations. As General Krul ak, United 

States Marine Corps, said, "In one moment in time, our service 

members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugeesproviding humanitarian assistance. In the next moment , they 

will be holding two warring tribes apart-conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal 

midintensity battle. All on the same day, all within thre e city 

blocks . It will be what we call the three-block war." 

We cannot expect civilians to leave cities.They will remain 

in their home s, and their requirement for services such as food, 

shelter, water, and medical treatment may outstrip our capability 

to provide.Therefore, we may be responsible for requirem ents 

such as sewage , electricity, and public order. Many engineer 

units located at echelons abo ve corps, such as eng ineer 

commands, may be available to provide speciali zed capabilitie s and assist in these missions , Ifconstruction engineers 

and civil affa irs personnel are not available immediately after 

combat operations, then units and combat engineers mu st 

initiate general engin eering operations for stability or support 

operations. 

Another general engineering capability available to the 

operational commander is field force engineering- a reach 

capability by deployed forces to the engineer commands, the 

U.S.Army Corps ofEngineers, and even the Engineer School 

for virtual collaboration. This allows access to services and 

technical expertise to these geographically disper sed units in 

the field. 

Summary 

As you can see, many eng ineer requirements have 

second- and third-order repercussions that the 

commander must think through. The same process 

for the engineer battlefield assessment and military decisionmaking process applies to urban operations, but now we need 

to consider how the new threat will fight and what new 

capabilities we have. When the mission finally concludes, 

en gineers mu st be prepared to tr ansfer functi on s and 

responsibilities from military to civil authority or to another 

agency. This article provides a means to begin thinking through 

the urban fight and ho w engi neers will mak e their 

contributions. III 

Li eutenant Colo ne l Funkho user comma nds the 5th 

Engin eer Battalion in Ira q. Previous assignm ents include 

Chief. Doctrin e Development Division, u.s. Army Engineer 

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. In that capacity, he 

spent three mo nths with th e Battle Co mma nd Trai ning 

Program-Op erations Group F, specializing in urb an 

operations. He also pa rticipated in the United States-Israeli 

Urhan Opera tions Work Group in Tel Aviv, Israel. 

Photos by SGT Kevin Doheny. 19th PublicAffairs Detachment 

36 Engin eer 

G 

36th Engineer Group
 

Conducts Somber Mission
 

By Captain Brian Chap uran 

rue soldiers of the design management section of the 

36th Engineer Group from Fort Benning, Georgia, are 

often tasked to survey sites. It is a mission they have 

done hundred s oftimes in preparation for various construction 

missions.The mission they executed on 19May 2003, however, 

was anything but normal. Two surveyors and a civil engineer 

had the somber mission of siting and mark ing a gravesite. It 

was the location where Iraqi captors had buried nine u.s. 

soldiers, members of the 507th Maint enanc e Company who 

were captured when their convoy was ambushed.Almost every 

American has heard the story of Private First Class Jessica 

Lynch and her dramatic rescue from the hospital in An 

Nasariyah.The nine soldiers were with Private First Class Lynch 

when they were captured, but they were not as fortun ate as 

she.The soldiers were killed and their bodies buried in a shallow 

grave just outside the hospital. 

After the bodies were discovered , detailed information 

about the site needed to be recorded . At this point, the 36th 

Engineer Group was asked to provide its technical expertise. 

There were two main reasons to locate and mark the site. The 

first was to begin the process of designing and possibly 

buildin g a memorial to the soldiers. The second reason for the 

mission was to assist in the inve stigation of war crime s. The 

informati on gathered by the 36th Engineer Group will be used 

by the U.S.Army Criminal Investigation Command as part of 

its inve stigation into potential war crimes committed by the 

former Iraqi regime. 

The 36th Engineer Group commander saw the mission as a 

necess ary and unforgettable task in the aftermath of war, yet 

one more remind er of the ultimate price some have paid to 

ensure that the principles of freedom are made available to all 

people . The soldiers from the 36th Engineer Group were proud 

to put their skills and experti se to use for a mission they 

probably never envision ed and will never forget. III 

Captain Chapuran is curr ently the trial counsel fo r the 

36th Engin eer Group and the l l th Infantry Regim ent at Fort 

Benning, Georgia. During Operat ion Iraqi Fr eedom , he 

served as j udge advocate, p ublic aff airs, and civil affairs 

officer for the 36th Engineer Group. 

July-September 20 03 
July-September 2003 Engineer 37

The engineer company, light equipment, is undoubtedly

one of the most versatile units in the Corps of Engineers.

The variety of missions the company can accomplish

epitomizes the resourcefulness of the entire engineer force.

While exceptional in capability, the light equipment company

must look to the future to ensure that it continues to meet the

maneuver commander’s needs. Through evaluation of the

training in preparation for deployment to support Operation

Iraqi Freedom, and the performance of the unit in theater, we in

the 887th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) (Air Assault),

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, have developed recommendations

for the light equipment company of the future. We believe that

a new modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE)

should be developed, since the last complete revision was in

1983, so the light equipment company of the future will be an

even more versatile asset for the Army.

Definition

The MTOE defines a light equipment company as a unit

designed to augment a light engineer force. Additionally, one of the main missions of the 887th

Engineer Company and the 618th Engineer Company (Light

Equipment) (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is airfield

damage repair (ADR). Both units repair airfields for the XVIII

Airborne Corps. One of the companies has been attached to

the 82d Airborne Division and one to the 101st Airborne

Division (Assault) since 1986.

Equipment

When looking at the company motor pool, the light

equipment company could be defined as a

horizontal construction company with equipment

that is downsized from that of a combat heavy company. For

example, the light equipment company has 613B versus 621

scrapers, 5-ton versus 20-ton dump trucks, and 2.5-cubic-yard

versus 5-cubic-yard loaders. The company is a construction

asset that can quickly augment a light division with all the

main supply route (MSR) construction/repair assets it needs—

in addition to being able to quickly “open the door” for a rapid

deployment force by repairing airfields for follow-on forces to

flow into a forward operating base.

Training

Training is without question the key to success in

combat. In preparation for the deployment to Iraq, the

887th focused on two main areas in the 6 months prior

to receiving the deployment order: training on the missionessential task list (METL) and training on the actual task of

deploying.

Mission-Essential Task List

Quality time spent practicing the unit’s METL is invaluable

because it is what keeps soldiers alive as they accomplish

missions. The 887th was able to deploy as trained (T) in seven
38 Engineer July-September 2003

of its eight tasks. The unit trained almost year-round since it

does not have a habitual association with a maneuver brigade

and therefore does not repeatedly enter into a “tasking” cycle.

In addition, enlightened leaders tasked the 887th to work

construction projects for the post instead of performing

nonengineer tasks. Each year, the countless post projects the

unit completed ensured that operators refined their skills. From

the METL, there were some tasks that proved essential for

combat.

Convoy Live Fire. In the 12 months before deployment, the

887th conducted four convoy live-fire exercises. Each platoon

conducted one of these 24-hour events that incorporated a

dry blank live fire, day and night sequence of events. As

additional challenges for the convoy commander, the exercises

also included OH-58D helicopter support—a real-time 9-line

request for medical evacuation using the post’s UH-60s;

nuclear, biological, and chemical scenarios; and vehicle

breakdown scenarios. The leadership was fully tested under

constantly changing conditions with live ammunition during

both daylight and darkness. The leadership training was crucial

to our future success in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Little did we

know that we would be convoying more than 1,100 kilometers

along future MSRs in Iraq. Since every mission required

convoying to the mission site, this training was validated on a

daily basis.

Airfield Damage Repair. The task the unit wanted to be

absolutely 100 percent prepared for was ADR. In the year

before deployment, 3d Platoon spent 6 months in Kandahar,

Afghanistan, making daily repairs to the airstrip. The handson experience made them ADR experts. To ensure that the rest

of the company also achieved the highest training levels, the

company planned three ADR exercises off post. Over the

course of 5 months, the 887th sent platoons to Malmstrom Air

Force Base, Great Falls, Montana, to train with the 819th RED

HORSE; Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train with the 20th

Engineer Brigade; and Germany to train with the Southern

European Task Force. Training with rapid deployment

engineers from both the Army and Air Force allowed the 887th

to display its skills on ADR as well as watch the other units

perform their battle drills. Once the training was completed,

the 887th knew it had the best-trained and most experienced

ADR experts in the armed forces.

Combat Lifesaving. Combat lifesaver training should be

required of every company on a quarterly basis. For the 887th,

the week-long training proved its worth. The company suffered

several injuries over the course of 2 weeks during Operation

Iraqi Freedom, including cutoff fingers; an unexploded

ordnance explosion causing shrapnel wounds and lost toes;

and an enemy grenade attack on a stopped vehicle, which

caused extensive shrapnel wounds to a soldier. But amazingly,

Soldiers from the 887th Engineer Company use a small emplacement excavator (SEE) and a Bobcat® to repair a

crater in an airfield in northern Iraq.
July-September 2003 Engineer 39

not a single soldier was killed during these incidents. Combat

lifesavers were on the scene in each instance, and without

question they saved lives. It was difficult to have soldiers

injured, but it would have been tragic for them to die.

Deployment Exercise

In November 2002, the 887th was directed to conduct a

deployment exercise, which would become one of our best

training events to date. The exercise required that we fully

upload and roll everything out of the motor pool; move to a

scale house for weigh-in; and have the vehicle secondary

loads inspected, which included preparing hazardous material

(HAZMAT) paperwork. At the end of the exercise, we would

be ready to load the train in preparation for war and have an

extremely accurate automated unit equipment list/deployment

equipment list.

The 887th spent a week conducting the deployment

exercise as the company prepared more than 100 vehicles

to move. As the unit left the motor pool, it was simple to

verify the accuracy of the non-mission capable (NMC)

report—an additional bonus before deployment. As the unit

moved through the various stations, it became obvious

which HAZMAT teams were best, who packed their

secondary loads best, and what load plans needed refining.

Having railroad company personnel at the last station to

inspect the vehicles was essential to success. They showed

us what would not pass their inspection team in the future

and helped the unit executive officer replan a few secondary

loads. Once the exercise was complete, the company knew

how to upload for war and how long it would take, which

unit movement officer and HAZMAT teams were best, and

that the company master load plan was accurate.

After conducting quality training for 18 months and

completing a highly successful deployment exercise, everyone

knew we were ready for combat—that we could get to war in a

well-planned, well-rehearsed manner and subsequently execute

any missions assigned to us once in theater.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The 887th received the order to move to the rail yard

in early February 2003 to began preparations for

overseas movement and arrived in theater on 1

March. The company operated over the entire division area

of operations, providing the engineer battalion commander

the ability to quickly weight any main effort. During the

initial assault into Iraq, survivability of forward area

rearming and refueling points (FARPs) was key. The 887th

assembled all its blade assets and some SEEs to protect

them and to dig in command and control nodes. Once in the

vicinity of An Najaf, the 101st Airborne Division required

survivability support as it reconsolidated. FARPs were constructed, division command and control nodes bermed,

borrow pits operated, and Patriot batteries dug in as the

887th received mission after mission.

When the 101st moved to Baghdad, the 887th provided

support by clearing 50 kilometers of Highway 8 and 70

kilometers of Highway 1 of all obstacles emplaced by Iraqis

and more than 60 vehicle hulks destroyed by the 3d Infantry

Division. With the highways cleared, the 4th Infantry Division

was able to move into sector along a high-speed MSR during

its movement north.

The 101st then began taking successive airfields—Al

Iskandariyah, Mosul, Qayyarah West, and finally Tall Afar.

The 887th assembled teams for each one, clearing the airfields,

sweeping the area for helicopter/Air Force operations, and

conducting ADR. As airfield runways were being worked, the

101st also required survivability/force protection support as

units closed on those airfields. The 887th again supported

that effort. Other missions included hauling rock to projects,

clearing airfield hangers, hauling division command post

equipment, and constructing/emplacing force protection

measures around the base camps.

Future Organization

While the unit was highly successful during Operation

Iraqi Freedom, there are always ways to improve.

Two problems were obvious after only 2 months

overseas: transportation and maintenance.

Transportation

During all phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 887th

was required to move very long distances, mostly without

additional transportation support. The unit made three moves

of 200-plus miles, starting in Kuwait and eventually ending in

Mosul, Iraq. Obviously, our construction equipment fleet was

not able to drive itself that far, so external transportation assets

were required.

The first movement of the 101st to An Najaf went very well,

with heavy equipment transport support from the Corps,

although the trucks were a week late in arriving because of

their nonstop schedule. This delayed much of our equipment

from moving north with our convoys of family of medium tactical

vehicles (FMTVs) and high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled

vehicles (HMMWVs). As the war progressed, we moved to Al

Iskandariyah, south of Baghdad, and then on to Mosul, which

required that we move via internal lift assets.

The best way to reduce transportation requirements is

to reduce equipment. The light equipment company is very

large; however, with a few equipment modifications, it could

reduce its fleet in some areas but retain almost all of its

capabilities.

Graders. The company has nine graders but could

accomplish all its missions with eight. More importantly, we

should trade all Caterpillar® 130GSs for Volvo G86 graders.

Because the G86 is lighter than the 130GS, it can be moved via

CH-47 helicopters without sectionalization. The G86 can also

use external hydraulic attachments, similar to the Bobcat. One

such attachment is a vibratory roller that can be towed behind
40 Engineer July-September 2003

the grader. Multiuse vehicles are the key to the future for the

entire engineer force, not just the light equipment companies.

Loaders. The 950BS should be replaced with a smaller loader

from the Family of Loaders Operational Requirements

Document (ORD) currently being developed at the U.S. Army

Engineer School. The light equipment company needs five

new loaders from the Family of Loaders ORD that can be moved

by one CH-47, air-dropped, and outfitted with other hydraulic

attachments (such as concrete mixers, impact hammers,

moldboards/blades, and modified scraper bowls) to make it a

multiuse vehicle.

Scrapers. The 887th rarely uses scrapers in garrison and

even less in combat. The company has nine MTOE scrapers

but only deployed with six because it did not expect projects

that would require the use of a scraper. After a couple of months

in theater, we decided that even six was too many. There is

very little possibility of constructing a new airfield, so few

scrapers are required in the inventory. Preexisting airfields in

every country make it easy for our rapid deployment forces to

seize a functional or damaged airfield for operational use. It

will always be faster to repair a damaged airfield than to build

a new one. Therefore, light equipment companies of the future

should only have three scrapers.

Skid Steers. Without question, the 887th could not have

accomplished its missions without its six Bobcats—the most

important pieces of equipment in the motor pool. As in

Kandahar, Afghanistan, they were once again in constant use

during the deployment. The unit used the sweeper attachments

for everything from clearing airfields of debris to clearing out

buildings for tactical operations centers. The pavement breaker,

vibratory roller, and combination bucket were used during ADR.

The only problem with the Bobcat is the lack of national stock

numbers to requisition parts through the Unit-Level Logistics

System–Ground (ULLS-G).

Vibratory Rollers. The light equipment company has six

CS-433C vibratory rollers, and each of the six Bobcats in the

887th inventory has a vibratory roller attachment. The Bobcat

roller is certainly best for repairing small craters on an airfield.

Line platoons can survive with only the Bobcat. Support

platoons should retain two CS-433C vibratory rollers for the

company as a resource for large crater repairs (as experienced

at Qayyarah West) and for large-scale compaction efforts on

dirt airstrips.

Water Distributors. The current light equipment company

has three water distributors. Two of the soon-to-be-delivered

613C models would be more than sufficient. We could have

used these distributors constantly during Operation Iraqi

Freedom, but we could not have procured enough water and

soil stabilization solution to keep three water distributors in

use. While the need is great for dust control in any operation

(for debris control at airfields and especially for dirt MSRs and

shoulders), the resourcing of the material to fill the tank is

extremely challenging. A technique for the future is to fill the

water distributor’s empty tank before deployment with 5-gallon

buckets of the soil stabilization solution. Therefore, once in

theater the only required resource is water. An even better

solution to further reduce the required transportation support

is to field two to three skid- or trailer-mounted water tanks

with spreader bars and/or sprayer attachments. This would

cut the transportation requirement even further with no loss

The 887th Engineer

Company clears

battlefield debris

(destroyed T-72s)

using the company’s

DEUCEs in the town of

Al Mahmudiyah, Iraq,

south of Baghdad.
in capability. A pressurized spraying capability would be a

significant enhancement to soil stabilization and dust control.

Other Equipment. There should be no change in the M1094

dump trucks, deployable universal combat earthmovers

(DEUCEs), M1088 tractors, M984 heavy, expanded-mobility,

tactical truck (HEMTT) wreckers, and HMMWVs, as they

proved their value in type and quantity. Obviously, the table

of organization and equipment (TOE)/MTOE writers should

emphasize the need to retain the end strength of the company.

Reducing the quantity of equipment and retaining the same

number of soldiers and transport assets is essential. The most

important weapon system on the MTOE is the soldier, and the

unit could not function in theater without each of them.

Planning convoys with a shortage of soldiers was extremely

difficult. Additionally, trying to support operations on four

airfields with a shortage of unit mechanics was a challenging

problem to solve.

Providing security for missions further drained the already

strained platoons. For several missions within Baghdad, the

company had three times as many soldiers in the streets pulling

local security as it did on the heavy equipment clearing the

roads of battlefield debris. In addition, the battle losses from

unexploded ordnance and enemy contact further depleted the

ranks since five soldiers who were evacuated to the combat

support hospital were losses for the remainder of Operation

Iraqi Freedom. For these reasons, the value of every engineer

soldier on the MTOE is far higher than any piece of equipment.

Maintenance

After Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is apparent that two fixes

are needed to better maintain the light equipment company.

The mechanics and noncommissioned officer leadership

performed in an outstanding manner and kept the fleet moving,

but a few changes would greatly improve the unit.

Hydraulic Systems Test and Repair Unit (HYSTRU)

Trailer. The lack of a HYSTRU trailer caused delays in repair

times, which hampered the unit significantly.

Direct Support. The light equipment company must have a

direct support maintenance section on the MTOE, because it

is often impossible to get support.

Summary

The light equipment company is an outstanding resource

for the combat engineer battalion to which it is

attached. The 887th Engineer Company was able to

provide support to any mission required by the 101st Airborne

Division. At one point, the 887th had assets at four different

airfields, demonstrating the flexibility and capability of the

unit. To guarantee its continued usefulness to maneuver

commanders, the light equipment company must be transformed into a more rapidly deployable team, in parallel with

the rest of the Army. In doing so, the Engineer Corps will

ensure that it continues to have the light equipment company

as a fully capable—and even more versatile—tool in the force

structure.

Captain Kremer is a small-group instructor at the U.S.

Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. At the

time this article was written, he was assigned to the 326th

Engineer Battalion (Air Assault) in northern Iraq. He

previously served as the battalion maintenance officer,

assistant S3, and company commander of the 887th Engineer

Company. Captain Kremer holds a bachelor’s in both

business administration and computer information systems

from Thomas More College and is a graduate of the Engineer

Captain’s Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff

School, Battalion Maintenance Officer Course, Sapper

Leader Course, Air Assault and Airborne Schools, and

Mountain Warfare School.

July-September 2003 Engineer 41

The U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES) is hosting an Operation Iraqi Freedom Warfighter Conference

in conjunction with the Society of American Military Engineers (SAME)/Army Engineer Association (AEA)

South Central/South Atlantic Regional Training Conference in Savannah, Georgia, from 3-5 November 2003.

Due to space constraints, only formal invitees may attend.

For registration and additional information, please visit the conference Web site at <www.same.org/

savannah/_2003/savannah2003.htm>. The conference point of contact is Ms. Lindsay Fox at (912) 234-

5300 or <fox.l@thomas-hutton.com>. The USAES point of contact is First Lieutenant Elizabeth Helland at

(573) 563-7293 or <hellande@wood.army.mil>.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Warfighter Conference
42 Engineer July-September 2003

Task Force Neighborhood, an aggressive community

outreach program, was developed by V Corps to help

Iraqis rebuild their country. The initiative consists of

“task forces” of coalition forces that go into neighborhoods

and assist hired Iraqis with projects. V Corps’s 130th Engineer

Brigade took the lead in this effort. After gathering support

from the local communities with these Task Force Neighborhood projects, Iraqis are contracted to develop and execute

their own local community repair projects.

The 555th Engineer Group (Task Force Able), sometimes

known as the “Triple Nickel,” joined 4th Infantry Division

forces—explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and civil affairs

teams, interpreters, contracting specialists, and medical/dental,

military intelligence, and media personnel—to participate in

the infrastructure repair program with reconstruction projects

that included the following:

 Removing debris.

 Removing arms, ammunition, and unexploded ordnance

(UXO).

 Constructing roads and bridges.

 Assessing facilities.

 Restoring power, water, and sewage treatment.

 Restoring hospitals, clinics, and schools.

Purpose

Specifically, Task Force Able’s goal was to reinvigorate

the Iraqi labor force to promote an upward trend in the

economy and create advancement in civil works and

engineering to rebuild the infrastructure of local communities.

This enables forward progress in their social and communal

By Colonel James I. Vosler, Lieutenant Colonel Clarence D. Turner, and Captain Kevin J. Schrock

A masonry specialist with Bravo Company, 142d Engineer Battalion, replaces wooden desktops and

seats at the school in Al Hurriyah, Baghdad.

U.S. Army photo by SPC Adam Nuelken

Helping Iraqis Rebuild Iraq
July-September 2003 Engineer 43

living and move toward stability and helps develop a positive

perception of coalition forces.

Organization

We are structured to use the enablers to facilitate the

rebuilding of Iraq. The use of the local population

more than triples the engineer combat power in

Task Force Able, enabling platoons to accomplish tasks

normally assigned to a company or higher. An example of this

is the repair of an eroded causeway of a bridge over the Tigris

River. The division of labor for this project consists of 90

percent from local labor and equipment and 10 percent from

Task Force Able’s organic resources. These resources are organized through community action teams composed of .Task

Force Able engineers, local labor, and division augmentation.

Task Force Able uses community action teams to conduct

assessments of the condition of local infrastructure.

 Contracting

Putting Iraqis back to work is our main intent. The 555th

uses Office of Coalition Provisional Authority funds

to hire local Iraqi workers and equipment operators.

We also contract for resources such as rock, gravel, and sand

to complete infrastructure projects that require them. Some of

these projects are for joint use by the Iraqis and U.S. military.

For example, the task force hired several former plant workers

to fix the water pumps and generators to a water treatment

plant in the town of Abu Rajash. This feeds water into the

northern Tikrit area and the Al Sahra Airfield, which houses

thousands of 4th Infantry Division soldiers. A member of

Charlie Company, 223d Engineer Battalion (Task Force Knight),

Mississippi National Guard, was able to put his civilian water

treatment plant expertise to use and help negotiate the

purchase of parts that brought the water treatment plant to

full operation.

In addition, personnel from the 14th Engineer Battalion

(Task Force Rugged) contracted for 350 loads of rock, gravel,

and sand and used 20-ton dump trucks to repair an eroded

causeway over the Tigris River. The gravel and sand will also

be used to repair road craters in Iraqi Highway 1, which was

damaged during the war. The 14th also contracted for equipment to rebuild the causeway—five 20-ton dump trucks, two

excavators, two bucket loaders, a fueler, a grader, a water

distributor, a roller, and a dozer. Task Force Rugged will provide

the remaining equipment necessary for this repair. In addition

to the above examples, personnel from the 223d Engineer

Battalion negotiated several asphalt contracts to repair the Al

Sahra airfield and several large road craters on Iraqi

Highway 1 between Tikrit and Mosul.

UXO Clearance

Most of the UXO found in Iraq is submunitions that

present a safety hazard to the local communities

throughout the country. UXO also posed a similar

hazard to the rebuilding of Highway 1. The 47th Ordnance

Company EOD team provided support to remove 150 cluster

bomb munitions from three road craters in Highway 1, thus

enhancing the safety of the local population. Alpha Company,

14th Engineer Battalion led a mine-clearing armor-protected

(MCAP) D7 dozer crew to further clear the route. Additionally,

Bravo Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, and the 47th EOD

team cleared 51 cluster bomb munitions from a local community

(Tall ath Thahab), enabling them to once again use the land

for farming.

Engineers

The Task Force Able engineers repaired a local water

treatment plant, constructed an improved ribbon bridge

across the Tigris River, completed a 500-meter bypass

on the Buffalo Soldier Bridge, repaired several major road

craters on Iraqi Highway 1, constructed a landfill, and replaced

windows in the Tikrit hospital. The 565th Engineer Battalion

(Provisional) (Task Force Renegade) constructed an improved

ribbon bridge that provided assured mobility for U.S. forces

U.S. Army photo by SPC Adam Nuelken

A metalworker with the 535th Engineer Company braces

a steel door while grinding off the rough spots. Soldiers

welded hinges and repaired doors at an elementary

school in Al Hurriyah, Baghdad.
44 Engineer July-September 2003

and the Tikrit community. Alpha and Charlie Companies of the

14th Engineer Battalion constructed a 250-meter causeway for

this bridge. Following its completion on Saddam Hussein’s

birthday, the bridge was named the “Birthday Bridge.”

Similar to this project, the 14th Engineer Battalion established a contract with the community of Az Zawiyyah to

restore the causeway on the Buffalo Soldier Bridge. On 25

May 2003, the battalion completed work on a 500-meter twoway bypass on the southern side of the Buffalo Soldier

Bridge causeway, 20 kilometers north of the city of Bayji,

Iraq.

This project was undertaken to provide assured mobility

across the Tigris River for Task Force Iron Horse and the local

community. Before the bypass was completed, access to the

bridge was via a rapidly eroding causeway that barely permitted

one-way traffic. If this causeway failed, the nearest passable

bridge would be in Tikrit, 60 kilometers to the south. Completion

of this project ensures that the people of Iraq have a safe

means to cross the Tigris River near Bayji.

The Bayji bridges, 9 kilometers to the south, were

destroyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Charlie

Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, undertook this project,

which is only the first phase in repairing the causeway to

full use. Later phases, which will be accomplished using

mostly contracted labor and equipment, include measures

to prevent future erosion and reconstruction of the original

causeway, thus returning to the Iraqi people a vital lifeline

across the Tigris River. Initial construction on the bypass

was started on 5 May 2003, enabling one-way traffic. The

battalion closed off the causeway and began rebuilding it

with the use of Iraqi workers and equipment on 7 June

2003. This causeway is also of vital interest to Task Force

Iron Horse as it is one of the division’s alternate supply

routes.

The 14th Engineer Battalion is repairing Iraqi

Highway 1, just north of Bayji. The project is broken into

four zones. Before the repair of Zone A, this section

narrowed to one lane around one 15-meter-wide hole and

a smaller 5-meter-wide hole, the results of an aerialdelivered bomb. A collapsed concrete box culvert that ran

beneath the southbound lane complicated the repair. The

culvert was demolished using explosives, then it was

removed and replaced with new culverts to restore water

flow beneath the route. In lieu of box culverts, we used

round culverts and sandbag headwalls. Then the crater,

along with collateral damage, was filled and compacted to

accept traffic.

This is the first of four such repairs planned by the

14th Engineer Battalion. The remnants of an aerialdelivered bomb complicated the second set of craters,

Zone C. More than 150 cluster bomblets were destroyed

by the 47th EOD team to set conditions for future repairs.

Completion of this project removes a bottleneck and

ensures that the primary V Corps north-south main supply

route remains open as a high-speed line of communication. It

also facilitates the use of Highway 1 by local travelers. The

use of local materials and equipment on the project is another

example of the division’s efforts to help Iraqis rebuild Iraq.

This repair also prepares this section of Highway 1 to be

repaved, restoring it to preconflict condition. The 14th also

constructed a city landfill for a local community, just northwest

of Tuz, Iraq, which will prevent random dumping of trash in

the nearby community.

Infrastructure Assessments

The 14th Engineer Battalion conducted several infrastructure assessments during Operation IraqiFreedom, which are used to identify future projects.

The primary goal was to assess the condition of power, water,

oil/gas, and infrastructure using the red, amber, and green

rating method. These ratings allow Task Force Able engineers

to prioritize future work. The assessments are used to hire

local Iraqi workers and equipment, utilize troop labor and

equipment, or seek a private cooperation to conduct the repairs.

U.S. Army photo by SPC Joshua Hutcheson

Soldiers from Bravo Company, 37th Engineer Battalion, Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, stand at the bottom of a 20-foot-deep

crater made by an American bomb at an airfield in northern

Iraq.
July-September 2003 Engineer 45

Bravo Company, 5th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Fighter),

conducted the following assessment of the Az Zawiyyah.

General

We entered the town and looked for an English-speaking

man. We were approached by a man who worked at the Bayji

refinery and lives within the town of Az Zawiyyah. He is the

nephew of the town sheik, who lives farther east within the

town (no location given). After a tour of the local water plant,

the town deputy mayor, who spoke very good English,

approached us. He was a colonel in the Iraqi Helicopter Corps

during the war.

Utilities

 Water. The water-pumping facility consists of four pumps

from the Tigris River to two (30’ x 8’ x 15’) holding tanks.

Connected to the holding tanks are two chlorine-filtering

tanks. Water distribution to the town itself consists of two

pumps from each tank to the town. Currently, only one

pump from the river works. However, there is no filtering

of the water, and only one pump to the town actually works.

The water pressure to the town is currently two bar (mostly

gravity fed). Due to the poor quality of water, most of the

town is suffering from dysentery, and a large portion of

the town funds are going toward medicine to treat the

illness. We have hired two local plumbers to fix the pumps.

We have also hired personnel to add 12 kilometers of

piping to provide water to the remainder of the town.

 Electric. The overhead power lines were strung in the

1970s and are in disrepair. Due to the problems with the

power grid, there are daily power outages, which last

from 2 to 6 hours. This severely degrades the town’s quality

of life and shuts down the local school.

Schools

Due to power outages and money, many of the teachers do

not come to work each day. As a result, the students are being

held back this year in an attempt to help them catch up next

year.

 The company conducted a similar assessment in the town

of Sharquat. The hospital needed some plumbing and carpentry

work, and the school needed similar repairs. Task Force Rugged

is working to hire someone to repair the plumbing in the

hospital and school, and either Task Force Able engineers or

contracted labor will perform the carpentry work.

Another key to helping Iraq is restoring the bridges damaged

or destroyed through neglect and war. To enable one repair, an

assessment was conducted with a representative from the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers Forward Engineer Support Team of

the two damaged bridges in Bayji. These bridges will be

repaired through contracted labor.

Limitations

Task Force Able engineers overcame several limitations

as they executed Task Force Neighborhood:

Design

Since there were no box culverts available for the Zone A

road crater project, we designed a culvert system with round

culverts and sandbags as headwalls. The temporary fix should

last long enough to allow the Iraqi government to reestablish

itself and provide a more permanent solution. We also designed

the causeway for the Tikrit Bridge using a geotextile. We

constructed the causeway directly on the Tigris River using

river rock, gravel, and sand. The geotextile allowed much better

compaction of the aggregate.

Language

To overcome the language barrier, we used local community

personnel or Task Force Iron Horse interpreters.

Cultural Differences

We adapted our work efforts to accommodate Iraqi culture

differences. Since they do not work on Friday, we performed

maintenance that day.

Resources

We negotiated the use of local rock quarries, labor, and

equipment to overcome some of our resource shortfalls. The

MCAP D7 dozer only clears UXO to a depth of 12 inches.

Submunitions were found at 24 inches, so we used D9 dozers

to overcome this limitation.

Force Protection

No project was started unless a thorough force protection

plan was established and executed.

Conclusion

Operation Task Force Neighborhood is vital to the

rebuilding of Iraq. Task Force Able engineers continue

to assess infrastructure and hire local Iraqis to rebuild

their country, while providing the coordination necessary to

efficiently prioritize, resource, and manage the projects until

the government is reestablished and this role can be turned

over to the Iraqi people.

Colonel Vosler commanded the 555th Combat Engineer

Group when this article was written. Previously, he served as

the Executive Director of Military Programs at the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers headquarters in Washington, D.C. He

also commanded the 35th Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri.

Lieutenant Colonel Turner commands the 14th Engineer

Battalion. He previously served as a brigade executive officer

and S3 in the 1st Armored Division Engineer Brigade and

battalion executive officer in the 40th Engineer Battalion.

Captain Schrock is an assistant S3 in the 14th Engineer

Battalion. Previous assignments include platoon leader and

executive officer in Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 16th Engineer Battalion, and operations and

training officer for the I Corps Transformation Office.
46 Engineer July-September 2003

Subterranean complex (or cave) operations are part of the

contemporary operational environment at NTC. These operations provide covered and concealed routes of movement

throughout urban or mountainous terrain and replicate terrain

condition challenges where our forces will fight.

A detailed knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is potentially of great importance to both the

attacker and the defender. Maximizing the use of a subterranean complex could prove to be a decisive factor during urban

or mountain operations. Units planning to conduct such operations should consider the following:

Tips for Success

 Use night-vision goggles with infrared (IR) sources.

 Use IR-filtered flashlights/white lights.

 Use field telephones and messengers.

 Use tag lines to guide soldiers along the route.

 Use shotguns or scatter-type munitions.

 Include caves on the modified combined obstacle overlay.

 Calculate demolitions needed for cave destruction.

 Integrate explosive ordnance disposal assets for search/

destruction of caches of weapons of mass effect.

 Review Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations

in Urban Terrain.

National Training Center

(NTC)

Subterranean Complex Operations

Common Mistakes

 Lack of experience in neutralizing booby traps and obstacles

 Poor/inadequate communications

 Poor route marking

 Failure to consider chemical hazards

Highlights of Rules of Engagement

 No booby traps and pyrotechnics are authorized except

the M117 simulator.

 Units are authorized to use meals, ready to eat (MRE) bag

grenades as simulators in place of M84 stun grenades

and M67 and M69 fragmentation grenades.

 No smoke grenades or CS (tear gas) canisters will be

used within 10 meters of the cave entrance.

 No ammunition is authorized inside the cave except

5.56-millimeter blanks.

 Weapons may not be fired within 5 meters of another

soldier.

 Stoves or open flames are prohibited inside the cave

complex.

 Vehicles are not permitted to drive over or park on top of

the cave complex.

 Units assaulting or occupying the cave complex must receive a safety briefing from their observer-controller (OC).

 No live demolitions (to include demolition-effects simulators) will be used in the cave complex without obtaining a

waiver through the commander of the operations group.

 Eye and ear protection are required.

There are three cave complexes at NTC that challenge units

and provide a more realistic training environment.

POC is SFC Josue A. Pinos (SW13B), (760) 380-7056 or

DSN 470-7056, e-mail <sidewinder13b@irwin.army.mil>.

Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System

(APOBS)

By Sergeant First Class Josue A. Pinos

The APOBS is now a system of choice of rotational engineer units at NTC. The APOBS, which is relatively new to

conventional forces in the Army, was live-fired during NTC’s

Mine Awareness Training in March 2003. NTC continues to

develop and improve mobility and countermobility tactics employed by combat engineers. This system provides commanders with another alternative to reduce antipersonnel obstacles.

Opposing Force (OPFOR) TM-89 mines directly under the line

charge will be destroyed also because of their seismically influenced fuse.

Cave Complex Tunnel

By Sergeant First Class Josue A. Pinos
July-September 2003 Engineer 47

Characteristics, Capabilities, and Features

 Two-person portable

 Total weight of 123.5 pounds

 Clears a 2-meter by 45-meter path through antipersonnel

mines and wire obstacles

 Provides a 35-meter standoff

 Operates in delay or command mode

 Can be fired in under 2 minutes in the delay mode

 Simple and rapid operation

Highlights of Rules of Engagement

 The APOBS team executes proper setup procedures.

 The APOBS team simulates pulling the pin and waits 15

seconds before firing the grapnel cartridge provided with

the APOBS trainer.

 If a grapnel cartridge is not available, an OC fires a white

star cluster to simulate the rocket launch.

 Eight seconds later the OC will detonate a grenade simulator to replicate the detonation of the line charge.

 The OC will administratively clear any antipersonnel mines,

antitank mines, and wire, beginning 35 meters from the point

of launch and providing a 2-meter by 45-meter footpath.

 The unit must clear any mines left in the path using appropriate proofing/reduction techniques.

 Unprotected personnel within the 75-meter surface danger

zone of the line charge will be assessed as casualties.

NTC offers a great opportunity for employing the APOBS.

POC is SFC Josue A. Pinos (SW13B), (760) 380-7056 or

DSN 470-7056, e-mail <sidewinder13b@irwin.army.mil>.

Mine Effects Simulator (MES)

By Sergeant First Class William Sutton

Battlefield fidelity is a critical aspect of every training environment. However, mines and mine replication during training

historically challenge trainers. Fortunately, a coordinated effort by NTC, several TRADOC schools, and the Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation is

improving the situation for Army units. These efforts resulted

in the acquisition of 4,750 Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)-compatible MES mines for use at NTC

beginning in late summer 2003. The purpose of this new equipment is to increase battlefield realism and better simulate the

real-world effects of popular foreign antitank mines. The

TM-89 antitank mine is the primary one used at NTC and replicates typical training issues. Before the implementation of

the MES mines, the only way to adjudicate a minefield was for

an OC to overwatch the event. The verification and validation

of this important system will be complete by spring and will

likely lead to additional future procurements of the MES.

Description

The MES has a tan body with a blue ring on top. Designed

with the dimensions of a Volcano mine, the MES contains the

components necessary to electronically inflict simulated battle

damage to combat vehicles. The mine can be used in a mine

shell to simulate a conventional mine, or it can be used alone

to simulate a scatterable mine. The MES simulates the effects

of antitank mines by emitting a signal to vehicles equipped

with a MILES II and an MES receiver antenna. The MES receiver antenna is already part of the current MILES II and

uses a radio frequency signal from the mine to the antenna.

This training mine operates using two common AA batteries

that should last up to 6 months. Soldiers simply depress the

TEST/ARM switch on the side of the MES to test and arm the

“mine.” The MES becomes active 2 minutes after the switch is

depressed. To manually disarm the mine, simply execute the

same action.

APOBS Launch

Mine Effects Simulator
48 Engineer July-September 2003

Usage

The MES will be employed by the OPFOR to replicate the

TM-89 antitank minefields. When used with the mine shell, it

will replicate both the standard OPFOR conventional minefields

and minefields emplaced by the mobile obstacle detachment.

Highlights of Rules of Engagement

The effects of the MES will be automatic and will minimize

the need for OC adjudication. However, rules of engagement

will—

 Assess the vehicle if it straddles or strikes the mine.

 Assess casualties for troops in the open within a radius of

25 meters of the detonating mine.

 Require a 1-pound block of explosive placed next to, but

not touching, the mine to reduce it when conducting a

manual reduction.

All other reduction technique rules of engagement remain

unchanged.

Mine effects simulators will provide NTC with increased

training realism and improved battlefield effects and will allow

a more productive training environment.

POC is SFC William Sutton (SW04T), (760) 380-5058 or DSN

470-5058, or e-mail <sidewinder04t@irwin.army.mil>.

Joint Readiness Training Center

(JRTC)

Engineer Equipment Platoon Leadership:

Operating in Support of a Light Brigade

Combat Team

By Sergeant First Class Steven J. SanPedro and Staff

Sergeant Joey W. Dunn

A trend in recent rotations at the Joint Readiness Training

Center is that the platoon leader (PL) and platoon sergeant

(PSG) perform duties as the blade team leader (BTL). This

trend has developed as the BTL consistently takes a back

seat to either the PL or the PSG during the linkup, control, and

execution of blade teams in support of maneuver units. A direct result is that there are shortcomings in preparing and

executing the brigades’ survivability effort. Either the PL or

the PSG is becoming the main point of contact for the supported unit when previously it was the BTL. To the supported

unit, the PL or PSG appears to be the BTL rather than the

brigade-level survivability command and control element. Each

of the platoon’s key leaders has a very important role in the

platoon’s survivability mission in the planning, preparation,

and execution phases of the platoon’s operation.

PL Duties and Responsibilities

The PL has the primary responsibility for planning and executing the brigade’s force protection efforts and ensuring that

his survivability plan is integrated with the maneuver plan. This

great responsibility requires the PL to be very proactive. During

recent rotations, the PL has been leading a single blade team

throughout the operation. The PL can—and sometimes should—

provide command and control for the blade teams during execution. However, the PL must collocate with the brigade tactical

operations center (TOC) during critical times in the planning process and return to the battlefield during the preparation and execution phases. The required product from the planning process

is the survivability timeline. The PL should assist with and provide expert feedback on the platoon’s capabilities and its ability

to support the brigade commander’s priorities of work, including

the maintenance and rest plans. The PL works closely and maintains constant communications with the brigade engineer, assistant brigade engineer, and PSG to coordinate details for execution

of missions such as providing fuel, maintenance, and security

escorts.

During execution, the PL should battle track the survivability efforts and the overall common operational picture of the

battlefield. He must ensure that every member of the platoon

knows the status of the routes, obstacles, and friendly and

enemy minefields and forces. A method that works well for

tracking the survivability effort is for the BTL to send updated

survivability status reports on the company net to the PL.

Reporting on the company net allows the company command

post in the brigade rear engineer cell (BREC) to receive the

updates at the same time the PL is receiving them from the

BTL. This gives the BREC the current status and reduces the

amount of times the information is handled from the point of

origin. The BREC can then forward the updates to the brigade

main engineer cell (BMEC) at the brigade TOC.

As the PL observes the current tactical situation, he may need

to reassess and update the survivability timeline in order to give

the brigade engineer the most current estimate and updated

timeline. Additionally, the PL is responsible for the overall standard of the survivability positions provided for the brigade task

force. The PL should coordinate logistics with the PSG for important sustainment items such as vehicle parts, food, fuel, water,

and ammunition. The PL ensures the quick identification, evacuation, and repair of all critical engineer equipment assets and

should coordinate with supported units for security and movement escorts to and from jobsites. There are many similarities in

duties between the equipment PL and the task force engineer.

(The duties and responsibilities of the task force engineer are in

FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat

Operations [Airborne, Air Assault, Light].)

PSG Duties and Responsibilities

The PSG plays a unique role in the survivability process.

Not only does he have the numerous responsibilities of his

own position, but he also must know and understand the PL’s
July-September 2003 Engineer 49

NCO Roles and Responsibilities in C2 Nodes

By Sergeant First Class Danny Petersen

The overarching role of staff noncommissioned officers

(NCOs) is to free up staff officers and enable them to make

critical decisions in a timely manner. Given that, people often

assume that the primary function of NCOs in command and

control (C2) nodes is to ensure that the generator is fueled

and that the shift change occurs on time. Nothing could be

farther from the truth or more harmful for efficient operations.

To help NCOs better understand their roles and responsibilities, they can refer to many doctrinal references; tactics,

techniques, and procedures; and combat training center lessons learned. The most common doctrinal publication used to

establish individual roles and responsibilities in the heavy

engineer battalion tactical operations center (TOC) is Field

Manual (FM) 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations

(Armored). Although Chapter 2, “Command and Control,” does

not spell out the specific responsibilities for the operations

sergeant and battle staff NCOs, there are numerous implied

tasks. Additional publications, such as the Center for Army

Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter titled “Tactical

Combat Maneuver Training Center

(CMTC)

job and be able to step in without notice to execute those

duties. The PSG should maintain the current tactical and logistical battlefield situation. He is the primary technical adviser to the PL and should provide expert advice on the

platoon’s capabilities during survivability planning. The PSG

is the technical expert on operator proficiency and noncommissioned officer skills. In addition to focusing on the overall

platoon effort, he should be available for technical advice to

the BTLs when needed. Most importantly, the PSG must track

the platoon logistically and supervise the requisitioning of its

supplies. This involves a great deal of coordination and constant follow-up with the company and forward support battalion in order to be successful.

The PSG should control the collection of casualties and

ensure that casualties are evacuated to the appropriate level.

An easily overlooked part of this process is following up on

the requisition for personnel to replace those that are lost and

then focusing on the integration of the new personnel as replacements are received. The PSG must take the lead in enforcing the platoon’s maintenance program, ensuring that parts

are getting ordered, and tracking the document numbers until

the parts arrive. Once the parts are on hand, the PSG must

either get the parts to the vehicles or get the vehicles evacuated back to the maintenance area for repair. The PSG should

receive and distribute the platoon’s load of food, water, ammunition, and fuel. Most of these items will be provided by

the supported units through daily logistics packages. However, if the supported unit does not adequately provide the

items, the PSG must step in and make sure the platoon gets the

supplies it needs to function.

BTL Duties and Responsibilities

The BTL is the direct link between the platoon and the

supported unit and must conduct linkups with the “CINC”

dozer or other designated unit representative. For initial linkup

procedures, the BTL must have a battle drill that is easily

understood and executed by the blade team once it arrives on

site. Much of the idle time on the battlefield can be attributed

to the time waiting at a unit while the BTL is conducting linkup.

Once on site, the blade operators must know what they are

digging in and know that no matter what happens, they can

get started on high-priority survivability efforts for that unit.

During the linkup process, the BTL must coordinate for fuel,

food, water, or any other support needed from the supported

unit. After the linkup, the BTL should know the unit representative, the survivability requirements for the unit, when and

where refueling will take place, and the location of all logistical

support. Additionally, the BTL should confirm the unit’s mission, the current enemy threat, the number of assets, and the

terrain within the unit’s area of operations in order to provide

survivability recommendations based on the ability of the blade

team to provide a sound survivability position. The BTL must

adhere to the survivability timeline, to include the implementation and management of the maintenance and rest plans.

Furthermore, the BTL should forward an updated status of

the survivability effort at the position and coordinate early for

the linkup, movement, and preparation of the next unit he will

be supporting.

Summary

Each of the key leaders—the PL, the PSG, and the BTL—

has an important role in planning, preparing, and executing

the survivability plan. Proper understanding and implementation of these roles will provide the best opportunity for a successful plan. A good survivability timeline—with emphasis

on the survivability standards—will leave every brigade asset on the battlefield with a doctrinally proven survivability

position.

Sergeant First Class SanPedro is an Engineer Equipment

Platoon observer-controller at JRTC. Previous assignments

include Assault and Barrier Platoon sergeant, 562d Engineer Company (SEP), Fort Wainright, Alaska; and squad

leader, Light Equipment Platoon, 27th Engineer Battalion,

Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Staff Sergeant Dunn is an Engineer Equipment Platoon

observer-controller at JRTC. Previous assignments include

instructor/writer Dozer Phase, 62E Course, 577th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and construction equipment supervisor and squad leader, Light Equipment Platoon,

27th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Operations Center” (No. 95-7, May 1995) and an engineerspecific CALL Newsletter addressing TOC operations (No.

99-12, October 1999), are helpful as well. Although these two

references are an average of six years old, they provide a basic

framework for TOC NCOs that is still applicable today. The

following discussion applies mostly to units operating in an

analog manner, although the main principles apply even when

a unit becomes digital.

Typically, the operations sergeant and his shift NCOs have

the background and experience to understand the six TOC

functions—receive information, analyze information, submit

recommendations, distribute information, integrate resources,

and synchronize resources—from FM 3-90.3, The Mounted

Brigade Combat Team, Chapter 3. TOC NCOs who know what

information is important and how that information affects the

mission become a real combat multiplier in the TOC. These

NCOs are usually former platoon sergeants or squad leaders

who understand how decisions made at the TOC affect the

“guy on the ground.” In contrast, the battle captains assigned

to the TOC may be young lieutenants awaiting platoon leader

duties, more experienced lieutenants awaiting the Captain’s

Career Course, or more experienced captains either awaiting

company command or having recently completed command

and pending a permanent change of station (PCS). The differing levels of experience may be vast. By providing both experience and continuity, TOC NCOs bring significant value to

the fight—experience that manifests itself as a smoothly operating and functional TOC. At times, NCOs may feel that TOC

operations are officer business, given the extensive use of

computer programs such as TerraBase and Command and

Control for Personal Computers (C2PC). However, the bottom

line is that the operations staff will succeed or fail as a team of

officers and NCOs and, in the process, will either enable the

commander or relegate him to insignificance, based on the

level of situational awareness the TOC maintains. The table

below depicts actions NCOs can execute to facilitate the six

command post functions. Although not all-inclusive, the table

provides useful examples that can serve as a foundation for

developing a unit TOC standard operating procedure

(TOCSOP).

50 Engineer July-September 2003

Receive Information

Analyze Information

 Monitor key equipment losses (which may lead to a task-organization change).

 Monitor information pertaining to the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR).

 Update overlays and charts, as necessary, to maintain situational awareness.

 Compare engineer TOC overlays with those of the brigade; if discrepancies exist, determine the

cause and remedy.

 Monitor proposed timelines and glide paths; compare these to subordinate-unit activity reports,

and look for discrepancies.

Command Post Functions and NCO Actions

Function Actions

Submit Recommendations

 Provide insight on NCO issues and how proposed plans affect subordinate units.

 Provide recommendations based on experience for time requirements (such as movement and

execution of mine-clearing line charge [MICLIC] reloads and armored combat earthmover [ACE]

dig rates).

Distribute Information

 Inform the brigade of any changes to the combat power slant.

 Brief all key personnel according to shift-change brief and schedule.

 Use the system to file and maintain orders and reports.

 Assist in orders production and publication.

 Use the system to display information for key leaders (example provided in the chart on page 51).

Integrate Resources

 Compare engineer overlays with other Battlefield Operating System overlays (such as combat

service support and fire support [FS]) to ensure cursory integration; look for disconnects.

 Monitor unit linkups for all task-organization changes; post when complete.

Synchronize Resources  Compare engineer timeline with brigade and subordinate-unit timelines; look for disconnects.

 Monitor reports as received by the radio/telephone operator (RTO).

 Ensure that the RTO records reports and maintains log.

 Update unit/key leader locations on map when received.

 Update combat power slants according to the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP), when required.
The chart above depicts an information display system that

a battalion operations sergeant can easily establish. Staff officers, more often than not, fall in on existing systems and use

what is available until they can make their own assessments

about what information is needed. If a comprehensive and

user-friendly system is in place and used by the NCOs, staff

officers will experience a seamless transition and will develop

more efficient TOC operations.

Further, how TOC NCOs execute and improve the information management and display system may be as crucial as the

system itself. The attitude of “this is how we’ve always done

it” may quickly turn people off in their attempts to improve the

system. TOC systems must constantly be analyzed, and improved when and where necessary, while being integrated

into the unit’s TACSOP and TOCSOP. The TOC NCO should

listen to other staff members and use their ideas to help improve products and mechanisms. Remember that people making suggestions are on the same staff and use these same

systems, so they also have a vested interest in efficient operations. However, the engineer battalion operations sergeant

should not just look internally to his staff. He must be familiar

with the supported maneuver brigade TACSOP and ensure

that the engineer battalion and maneuver brigade TACSOP

complement each other. This is most critical in terms of reports

and combat power tracking. Having complementary TACSOPs

will generally yield more accurate information and improve

information flow. When information tracking and management

systems are not synchronized with the supported maneuver

brigade, they generally will not work well for the engineer

battalion and will likely cause redundant information management systems to satisfy brigade- and higher-level information

requirements.

NCOs must also understand the roles of the staff officers

they work with in the TOC. By understanding staff officer

roles and relying on their own experience, TOC NCOs are more

readily available to help with planning operations, providing

intervention before problems escalate, gathering required information, and assisting an officer’s transition to battle

captain.

NCOs who are charged with TOC responsibilities, and who

are proactive and research the previously referenced publications, communicate a positive intent to the chain of command

that they want to be combat multipliers in the staff. For such

NCOs, the chain of command should immediately begin the

process of getting them to the Battle Staff NCO Course

(BSNCOC), which is the only course that strictly places NCOs

in all staff positions from division to task force level. This

shows NCOs how all the pieces fit together and how they can

directly affect every facet of the operation. Further, the

BSNCOC teaches NCOs the skills that are necessary to develop and maintain efficient TOC systems. Educated and enthusiastic staff NCOs who understand their role in the TOC

provide significant value to the team. Instead of just “doing

their time,” staff NCOs will likely find working in the TOC a

very rewarding and eye-opening experience.

Sergeant First Class Petersen is the engineer battle staff

NCO observer-controller at the CMTC. His previous assignments include assault section sergeant/combat engineer vehicle commander, 82d Engineer Battalion, Germany, and

Assault and Obstacle Platoon sergeant/operations sergeant

in the 58th Engineer Company, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OPFOR), Fort Irwin, California.

July-September 2003 Engineer 51

Note: Time-sensitive data should always have an “as of” time posted.

Information Display System

Sample Wing Charts - Defense

Timeline or Glide Path

Map With

Current Graphics

Standard “Drop” Hooks

(Should also have key locations posted, such

as locations of Class IV/V points)

Commander’s

Critical Information

Requirement

Battalion

Slant

Survivability

Matrix

Countermobility

Matrix

Shift

Change

Brief

Database

Operation

Matrix

Brigade

Mission

Brigade

Intent

Engineer

Battalion

Mission

Engineer

Battalion

Intent

Risk

Management

Worksheet

Current

Task

Organization

Light and

Weather

Data

Main Supply

Route

Status

Current

Order

Number
52 Engineer July-September 2003

Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor,

and other global hot spots have shown that most

theater or Joint Task Force-level engineer staffs are

largely unfamiliar with the capabilities, limitations, and employment of prime-power assets. Because the 249th Engineer

Battalion (Prime Power) is the only unit of its kind in the Army,

staff planners simply lack exposure to the unit and training in

the employment of its assets. Furthermore, the current doctrinal

guidance in Field Manual (FM) 5-422, Engineer Prime-Power

Operations, frequently comes up short in bridging the gap

between theory and practice because the manual was written

before prime power was reorganized into the 249th Engineer

Battalion in 1994. (FM 5-422 is being revised and will be

published as FM 3-34.483, Engineer Prime-Power

Operations.)

The following four lessons have proven to be the most

important and most repeated comments over the course of the

past two years of operations.

“All Things Electrical”

Often, engineer planners pigeonhole prime-power

soldiers into one or two specific missions rather than

capitalizing on the full range of their capabilities. In fact,

the prime-power production specialist (military occupational

specialty [MOS] 52E [21P as of October 2003]) is the most versatile

and best educated of the “green-suit” electrical specialties in the

Department of Defense. Having completed an academically

rigorous 50-week course and several technically challenging

missions each year since entering the field, each prime-power

soldier is capable of expertly accomplishing virtually any electrical

mission, including technical assessments and design of power

systems; installation, operation, and maintenance of power plants

and distribution systems; maintenance and repair of circuit

breakers and protective relays; and quality assurance on electrical

contractors.

Recent missions which have showcased the versatility of

prime-power soldiers include—

 Civil reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

 Installation and operation of four power plants in the

Afghanistan theater.

 Base camp planning and design in Iraq.

 Technical reconnaissance of dozens of potential bases in

Turkey.

 Construction of an overhead electrical-distribution system

at Baghram Airfield.

By Captain Geoff Van Epps

Prime-Power Considerations

for Engineer Planners

Power plant installed in Kyrgyzstan
July-September 2003 Engineer 53

 Electrical assessments in the Philippines.

 Maintenance of the backup power plant at Incirlik Air Base,

Turkey.

 Acting as the contracting officer’s technical representative

on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) power

contracts.

Engineer planners who recognize the full spectrum of prime

power’s capabilities and use prime power accordingly will not

only improve the quality of support that engineers can provide

but will concurrently realize great time and cost savings.

Long Logistical Tail

I

n general, prime-power units lack the capability to selfsustain below the company level. Since the prime-power

platoon is the basic building block in terms of capability

(and the company headquarters’ current deployment to

Baghdad is its first for any operation since prime power was

reorganized as a battalion in 1994), this means that most often,

deployed prime-power units will need administrative, supply,

maintenance, and other support.

The prime-power platoon will require help in ordering and

receiving parts and supplies since it has neither an organic

supply noncommissioned officer nor a parts clerk. Lacking

any mechanics other than for its generators, the platoon

requires assistance with wheeled-vehicle and engineer

equipment maintenance. With no personnel section, it needs

support in processing finance and administrative actions.

Finally, a prime-power platoon will require engineer support

for excavation or trenching for installation of a distribution

system.

If the company headquarters were to deploy (for instance,

if two or more platoons simultaneously deployed to the same

area), it would bring some of the support capability that the

platoon lacks. However, prime power would still lack vehicle

maintenance capability and the ability to provide its own dig

support.

Although doctrine in this area is fuzzy at best, recent lessons

learned have shown that an individual platoon is best tied in

with a colocated engineer battalion (combat)(heavy) or a

similarly organized construction task force. The company

headquarters, being a theater asset, would report directly to

the senior engineer unit, whether an engineer command, an

engineer brigade (theater Army), or another engineer unit

proportional in size to the theater headquarters. In cases where

there is no local engineer headquarters of sufficient size, the

best command-support relationship is to keep prime power

attached to the nearest large engineer headquarters but make

the platoon in general support of the local command. While

the actual task organization will vary from mission to mission,

the rule of thumb is to control prime-power assets at the highest

level possible, since their capabilities will be required

theaterwide and the soldiers will end up literally all over the

battlefield conducting assessments, providing design

expertise, offering technical assistance, and executing other

missions.

Managing Expectations

Deploying prime power to support base camp development can be expensive, complex, and timeconsuming, but it still offers the most responsive,

efficient, and cost-effective means of providing reliable, utilitygrade power to large military facilities during contingency

operations. The timeline for procuring the bill of materials

(BOM) required to construct an electrical-distribution system

can be quite lengthy, since most industry has converted to

A prime-power soldier works in the snow to keep the power on.
54 Engineer July-September 2003

lean manufacturing techniques and small inventories, meaning

that most materials are built to order. This can result in delivery

schedules of 60 days or longer for materials. However, the

procurement timeline for BOM can be significantly shortened

by involving prime power in planning early, by anticipating

mission requirements, and by using an “off-the-shelf” USACE

IAP Worldwide Services Power Contract to streamline the

contracting process.

As the 249th Engineer Battalion continues its force

modernization process through fiscal year 2004, more platoons

will be outfitted with the Deployable Power-Generation and

Distribution System, which includes a great deal of “plugand-play” materials that are compatible with Force Provider

and the Air Force’s Harvest Eagle/Harvest Falcon bare-base

packages. Also, a good portion of the BOM for a base camp

electrical system can be found in the Prime-Power Connection

Kit, which is available with many Force Provider sets.

The BOM required for most prime-power missions,

especially for nonstandard base camp construction, can be

expensive, often resulting in initial sticker shock for the

customer. For example, the material procurement cost for the

10,000-soldier base camp at Balad Airfield in Iraq was less

than $10 million, but that cost will continue to grow (along

with all other construction costs) as the standard of living in

the theater improves. The high material cost is inherent in the

significantly higher level of service and greater reliability

afforded by prime-power over unit tactical generators. Engineer

staff officers should anticipate the high cost and prepare the

customer early to help mitigate sticker shock and manage

expectations.

Another customer expectation that needs to be carefully

managed is the time required to install a power plant and

construct an electrical-distribution system. Once the power

plant and associated equipment have been moved to their

desired location (often a Herculean effort in itself

due to the size and weight of the equipment,

special material-handling requirements, and other

factors), setting up the plant and delivering

electricity to the customer is not an overnight

process. Often customers perceive that once the

generators are on the ground, prime-power engineers simply and quickly runs a big extension

cord to all of the facilities on a base camp. On the

contrary, the process of installing a grounding

grid, switchgear, miles of cable, and dozens of

transformers is a time- and labor-intensive

process that requires clear guidance from the

customer and prioritization to ensure that the most

critical loads are serviced first.

Early In, Early Out

With only eight power-generation

platoons on active duty and two

more in the Reserve Component (see

article on page 55), the 249th Engineer Battalion

(Prime Power) is extremely small to be shouldering the U.S.

Army’s entire prime-power mission. Executing multiple

rotations to support combat operations while honoring

standing commitments in Korea, Hawaii, and Europe has

proven to be a delicate balancing act. In September 2002, the

battalion’s soldiers were simultaneously engaging in missions

in the combat zones of Operation Enduring Freedom, preparing

for combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and

conducting disaster relief in Guam, which stretched the unit’s

members to the breaking point. Consequently, prime power

has evolved into an early-entry, contingency solution for filling

military power requirements, with each deploying platoon

capable of installing and operating a power plant, constructing

an electrical-distribution system, and providing technical

assistance and planning to fill follow-on power needs.

 Power during the first 30 to 90 days of an operation should

be provided by unit tactical generators. Prime power provides

a transition from 30 to 180 days into an operation and would

ideally be relieved by either commercial or contract power.

Sources for contracted follow-on power include the Logistics

Civil Augmentation Program, Air Force Contract Augmentation

Program, (Navy) Emergency Construction Capabilities

Contract, and the USACE IAP Worldwide Services Power

Contract. Whatever the source, planning for follow-on power

should begin early—ideally as soon as the requirement for

prime power is identified—to allow for detailed planning and

mobilization and the smoothest possible transition from prime

power to its successor.

Captain Van Epps commands Bravo Company, 249th

Engineer Battalion (Prime Power), Fort Bragg, North

Carolina. His previous assignments include service with the

52d Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) and the 27th

Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Airborne).

Two prime-power soldiers repair an Iraqi generator.
July-September 2003 Engineer 55

I

t is probably the smallest unit currently mobilizing through

Fort Dix, New Jersey, and yet its specialty makes it indispensable to the military. Alpha Company, 6th Platoon,

249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power), is an elite unit of nine

reservists from Attleboro, Massachusetts, that works on hightension power lines and is responsible for making sure that all

power keeps flowing through the system uninterrupted. Just as

the Signal Corps is the Ma Bell of the military, the prime-power

unit can be considered the ConEdison of the military. The fact

that there are so few soldiers who are able to work on hightension power lines means that the well-traveled unit works all

over the United States and overseas on a regular basis.

Normally on active duty about two or three months out of

the year, the unit is brought in for Federal Emergency

Management Agency missions, disaster relief, and power

assessments—in addition to its regular training missions. The

unit also receives orders from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

for active duty special work. As power-distribution experts,

the unit is the only one authorized to work on “energized” or

live power lines. This means that its soldiers can make repairs

while up to 30,000 volts of electricity surge through the lines.

About 80 percent of the unit members are civilian power line

workers. Although the Army does provide a 2-month school

for power distribution and a 1-year school for power generation, having civilian experience gives soldiers the needed

expertise to be able to handle live wires.

Having such a specialized unit in the Army has its distinct

advantages. When the unit goes places, literally millions of dollars

are saved. Working live is important in missions where power

must run continuously during the repair process, such as at

military airports. Besides the cost savings, another advantage of

using the prime-power unit over civilian contractors is that its

soldiers already have all the clearances necessary to work in

secure areas.

In September, Alpha Company replaced its sister unit (Bravo

Company) in Iraq, where it is helping rebuild the infrastructure

of major cities such as Baghdad. Among other missions, Bravo

Company’s power-distribution unit completed work on power

lines that had been attached to a bridge destroyed during the

conflict in Iraq. Those power lines carried electricity to one of

Saddam Hussein’s palaces, which is currently being used as a

U.S. military headquarters.

As might be expected, the soldiers in the unit who work for

municipal and local power companies take a pay cut when

deployed, but that doesn’t seem to faze them. They believe

that what they do is important and that they contribute a

valuable service to their country.

Staff Sergeant Stephenson, a New Jersey National Guard

soldier, is currently mobilized with his public affairs unit at

Fort Dix, New Jersey, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, where he serves as the NCOIC of the broadcast section.

When not deployed, Staff Sergeant Stephenson works full

time as the Public Affairs NCOIC for the New Jersey National

Guard Counterdrug Task Force.

Note: There are no active duty transmission and distribution

specialists (MOS 52G [21Q as of October 2003]); they are all

members of the Army Reserves. The 21 MOS 52Gs stationed in

Attleboro, Massachusetts, are divided into Alpha and Bravo

Companies, 6th Platoon. Both are part of the 249th Engineer Battalion,

which is headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

By Staff Sergeant Robert Stephenson

Live from Baghdad:

It’s Prime Power

Soldiers from Bravo Company, 6th Platoon,

249th Engineer Battalion, erect a pole as

they repair the high-voltage electrical

system at Baghdad International Airport.

The crew sets a pole near the CJTF-180 building at

Baghram Air Base, Afghanistan. A total of 130 45-foot

concrete poles were set there by the 249th Engineer

Battalion. Photos by CW2 Donald McRae
Enlisted PERSCOM Notes

56 Engineer July-September 2003

By Lieutenant Colonel Jack F. Smith

Greetings from your Engineer Enlisted Branch at

PERSCOM. Since I will soon be leaving to become

the Combat Support Division Chief, the next

PERSCOM notes will come from Lieutenant Colonel Margaret Burcham, who is moving here from Germany. It has truly

been a great experience to work with the Engineer Branch

team and serve the soldiers of the Corps of Engineers. While

I am moving into a new position, I’ll still have responsibility

over the engineer community, as well as the Military Police,

Military Intelligence, Transportation, Aviation, and Signal

Corps. So if you have enlisted issues that you think I can

help with, let me know.

Health of the Regiment

The Engineer Regiment is well manned across the Army

(see Table 1). While we have some small shortages in

military occupational specialties (MOSs) 12Z, 51Z, and

81Z, 17 of the other engineer MOSs are above 100 percent.

Our biggest challenge continues to be MOS 12B, which is

enrolled in the Army’s top ten critically short MOSs. Over the

past four months, more than 1,000 new soldiers graduated

from advanced individual training and reported to units in

the field, which has decreased our shortage of skill level one

sappers throughout the force. We fully expect the MOS to be

healthy by the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 04. Most units

also have 12B20 shortages. The primary reason for this shortage of sergeants is due to the number of sergeants on recruiting duty (about three mechanized battalions’ worth of sergeant E5s). Over the next year, we will gradually decrease

that number to get our manning in troop units back to a manageable level.

We do still have significant challenges in MOSs 51M and

00B at the noncommissioned officer (NCO) rank that simply

will not go away until the units do their job to get soldiers

prepped and to their respective promotion boards. I’ve repeated this story several times, but I will not let it go as long

as the NCO shortages continue in these critical engineer

MOSs and anyone asks my opinion.

Recruiting and retention have been well above historical

averages across the Army and in the Engineer Regiment. Our

FY03 recruiting program is all but sold out for FY03, and we

have sold the majority of the first quarter FY04 seats. On the

reenlistment side, all but 3 of our 21 specialties are well above

the five-year historical trend. Current trends indicate that this

success rate will continue. However, our reenlistment rates

for MOSs 12Z, 51Z, and 81Z have been well below the historical average. Apparently, senior NCOs are making a lot of significant career decisions.

As of the publication of this article, there should be no

engineer MOSs under the stop-loss program, which allows

the Army to retain soldiers with critical skills on active duty

beyond their separation date. Soldiers currently serving under stop-loss conditions will be allowed to depart the Army

during the October-December 2003 timeframe. For those of

you who were impacted by the Stop-Loss Program, I want to

express to you my gratitude for the sacrifices you have personally made to serve our country. You all are simply great

Americans.

Table 1. Engineer Enlisted Operational

Strengths (as of 30 May 2003)

Strength

(percent) MOS Authorized

Strength

12B

12C

12Z

8,182 99

672

264

103

94

00B 129 112

51B 882 118

51H 446

51K 116 103

51M 248

51R

51T

51Z

128

256

132

148

121

94

104

105

52E 184 107

1,323 105

62F 277 101

62H

62J

62N

81L

81T

81Z

82D

Total

103 99

664 106

469 101

232 102

470 109

23 96

110 109

15,310 102.6

62E
July-September 2003 Engineer 57

Engineer MOS Conversion

Effective October 2003, all of the engineer MOSs are

being redesignated to a 21-series nomenclature as part

of the Army’s MOS conversion program. Table 2 lists

the deleted engineer MOSs, the new 21-series nomenclature,

and the Professional Development NCO (PDNCO) here at

PERSCOM who manages the respective MOSs.

 These changes will be hard. MOSs 12B, 51B, 62E, and 81L

hold special meanings to us old soldiers, and many of us will

struggle to remember exactly what a 21S or a 21V is. On the

other hand, changes such as these will provide some great

benefits to our Regiment. There are few in the Army who know

what an MOS 00B is or that it is a critical engineer MOS. With

the designation 21D, it will be easy to discern that it is an

engineer MOS.

Although some MOSs in the Army that are being merged and/

or realigned will impact career progressions, NCO development,

and the like, this is not the case for engineers. All of our MOSs

simply change designations, with no impact on career progression, MOS training, or promotion opportunities.

Assignments

A large portion of our active Army is fully committed in

units around the world: three-plus divisions in the

Middle East, a brigade-plus in Afghanistan, a brigadeplus in the Balkans, a division in Europe, and a division in

Korea. This situation leaves only a very small pool of soldiers

to rotate through critical assignments both stateside and overseas. We will be placing soldiers on assignment with even less

than two years time on station to meet pressing Army readiness needs—and with as little as two months notification. As

an institution, we don’t like to do this to our soldiers, but those

are the circumstances we now face in order to meet the needs

of the Army. As the situation stabilizes and our soldiers redeploy, we will be able to return to many of the stabilization and

assignment policies that were in place before the global war on

terrorism, but it will take us some time to get there.

The assignments will come, so be ready. I’ll use this opportunity to put in another plug for the Assignment Satisfaction

Key (ASK) program that can be found on the Army Knowledge Online Web site <http://www.army.mil/ako/> and the

PERSCOM Web site <http://www.perscom.army.net>. You

should go there and update your volunteer and assignment

preference data. Even with our current needs to place soldiers

in Korea and other places, the first thing we still look at as we

look for candidates is the ASK data.

For soldiers deployed overseas, I’m sure you’re wondering

if you’ll be placed on orders as soon as your unit returns to the

continental United States (CONUS). The answer is that many

of you may well be placed on orders. We are reducing strengths

of units in our institutional Army to continue to send replacements overseas. Our intent is to backfill these shortages in our

training base, drill sergeant program, recruiting, Active Component/Reserve Component, and other areas with soldiers who

return from deployment. You’ll be given at least 90 days to

stabilize after your deployment, but then many of you will be

sent somewhere in CONUS. Obviously, it is very important

that you update your ASK data.

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

Table 2. Engineer MOS Conversions

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

MSG

Williamson

12Z 21Z Combat Engineering Senior Sergeant MSG Boyce

81Z 21Z Topographic Engineering Supervisor SFC Banco

51Z 21X General Engineering Supervisor

51B 21W Carpentry and Masonry Specialist

62H 21V Concrete and Asphalt Equipment

Operator

81T 21U Topographic Analyst SFC Banco

51T 21T Technical Engineer Specialist

82D 21S Geodetic Surveyor SFC Banco

51R 21R Interior Electrician

52G 21Q Transmission and Distribution

Specialist

52E 21P Prime Power Production Specialist

62N 21N Construction Equipment Specialist

51M 21M Fire Protection Specialist

81L 21L Lithographer SFC Banco

51K 21K Plumber

62J 21J General Construction Equipment

Operator

51H 21H Construction Engineering Supervisor

62G 21G Quarrying Specialist (Reserve

Component)

62F 21F Crane Operator

62E 21E Heavy Construction Equipment

Operator

00B 21D Engineer Diver

12C 21C Bridge Crewmember

12B 21B Combat Engineer MSG Boyce

21A 21A Engineer Officer MSG Boyce

Old New MOS PDNCO

MSG Boyce
Promotions and Training

With all of the unit and individual deployments around

the globe, we do have a significant number of soldiers who have either deferred or were pulled out of

the NCO Education System. Whether it was the Primary Leader

Development Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course,

or Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, these soldiers

will be rescheduled for schooling as soon as their deployment

and stabilization allows. Many of these schools will be a temporary duty assignment while en route to new locations.

For information on pending selection boards, visit the

PERSCOM Web site. It’s up to you to review your Official

Military Personnel File. You can obtain a copy by following

the procedures posted at the Web site.

Contacting Us

The sole function of the Engineer Enlisted Branch at

PERSCOM is to support soldiers and commanders in

the field. I encourage you to contact your assignment manager, PDNCO, Branch sergeant major, me, or Lieutenant Colonel Burcham with any questions you have about assignments

or professional development. The PERSCOM Web site has

information on how to reach us. Remember, the only thing

in the assignment process that does not have to be a variable

is your preference. Take the time to let us know your

preference.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith has been the chief of the Engineer Enlisted Branch for the past year. He previously commanded the 44th Engineer Battalion in Korea and prior to

that was a war plans analyst at the U.S. Strategic Command,

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Lieutenant Colonel Smith

holds a master’s in nuclear engineering from Penn State, a

master’s in military science from the Advanced School of Military Studies, and a master’s in strategic studies from the Army

War College.

58 Engineer July-September 2003

Regimental Awards - Reserve Component

Lieutenant General Robert B. Flowers

Chief of Engineers

Each year we recognize the best noncommissioned officer,

lieutenant, and engineer company, in each of the components,

for outstanding contributions and service to our Regiment and

Army. Every engineer unit in the Regiment can submit the name

and achievements of its best of the best to compete in these

distinguished award competitions. Only the finest engineer soldiers are selected as recipients of these awards. They will carry

throughout their careers the distinction and recognition of being

the Engineer Branch’s best and brightest soldiers and leaders.

The results of the 2002 Active Component Itschner and Grizzly

Awards and Sturgis Medal selection boards were listed in Engineer, April-June 2003, page 26. The selections for the Reserve

Component are as follows:

The Itschner Award committee selection for the U.S. Army

Reserve: Headquarters Support Company, 463d Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy), Wheeling, West Virginia, and for the

Army National Guard: Alpha Company 1088th Engineer Battalion, 256th Infantry Brigade, Opelousas, Louisiana.

The Grizzly Award Committee selection for the U.S. Army

Reserve: First Lieutenant Mark Dibble, 652d Engineer Company (Multirole Bridge), Ellsworth, Wisconsin, and for the Army

National Guard: First Lieutenant John G. St. Romain, Bravo

Company, 1088th Engineer Battalion, 256th Infantry Brigade,

New Roads, Louisiana.

The Sturgis Medal committee selection for the U.S. Army

Reserve: Sergeant First Class Lawrence Spradley, Headquarters

Major General R.L. Van Antwerp

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

Support Company, 854th Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy),

Kingston, New York.

All of the nominees represented their major commands with

the highest professionalism and dedication to the Engineer Corps’s

vision and deserve our highest praise. The award recipients will

be recognized at the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Ball, tentatively scheduled for 17 October 2003.

For many years, senior leaders of the Regiment have debated

about an appropriate award to recognize the very best engineer

soldier, private through specialist. In keeping with the tradition

of naming such an award after a distinguished member of the

Regiment, the Regimental Command Sergeant Major, along with

other senior sergeants major, recommended and gained approval

for an award named after the most distinguished command sergeant major in the history of our Regiment—the fourth Sergeant

Major of the Army, Leon Van Autreve.

The award is significant for two reasons: first, it was created

to recognize the most outstanding junior enlisted soldier of the

three components of our Regiment as a tribute to one of our

Army’s greatest champions of welfare and care of soldiers and

their families; second, it showcases and highlights the important

and significant service our junior enlisted soldiers provide to our

nation. They are truly our most valued resource, and we wouldn’t

be the Army or Regiment that we are without their selfless and

dedicated service. The Van Autreve nominations will be submitted for FY03 and presented at ENFORCE 04.
July-September 2003 Engineer 59

This was not in their battle plan. They had no training

for this. But American soldiers and Army engineers

answered the call to fight a toxic sulfur fire creating a

boiling lava-like melt that crept toward the Tigris River and

threatened the water supply in southern Mosul, Iraq.

Wearing chemical masks to protect their lungs from

nauseous sulfur fumes, members of the composite task force

“Camp Sulfur” quickly stemmed the advance of the fire while

working four-hour stints in the hot desert terrain. Choking off

the caches of sulfur that constantly refueled the inferno, Army

engineers turned the tide of flames and gradually smothered

the threat to nearby citizens of Mosul. Members of the 326th

Engineer Battalion, 52d Engineer Battalion, 926th Engineer

Group, and 887th Engineer Company cooperated in the effort.

While American forces accomplished this effort without

injury or loss of life, the fire took its toll on an Iraqi fireman

who was killed during the effort. Apparently thrown from a fire

truck in the haste to quell the flames, the man

landed in the lava-like pool and quickly

burned to death. A countryman, trying to save

his friend, was severely burned and evacuated

for medical assistance.

Investigations were underway to determine if the fire was deliberately set as an act

of vandalism or sabotage. Nonetheless, the

response of Army engineers, in partnership

with local Iraqis, prevented this environmental

hazard from becoming a catastrophe.

Mr. O’Hara is a public affairs specialist

and electrical engineer with the Omaha

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Engineers Battle Sulfur Fire

By Mr. Thomas O’Hara

Aerial view of sulfur fires north of Mosul

Photos by Jonas Jordan

The 326th Engineer Battalion officer in charge of fire fighting (left)

discusses sulfur fires with soldiers.
60 Engineer July-September 2003

Can risk management be the solution to everything?

Maybe not, but it can go a long way toward preventing

fatal motorcycle accidents. The Motorcycle Safety

Foundation (MSF) has done a great deal of work to develop

training programs to provide riders with the skills necessary

to prevent motorcycle accidents. Riding a motorcycle can be a

very dangerous sport or activity. However, by training properly

and applying risk management, riders can help prevent

crashes. The Army uses the MSF curriculum for motorcycle

rider training as the standard.

History

I

n the 25 April 2003 issue of USA Today, Jayne O’Donnell

reported that motorcycle fatalities were up in 2002 for the

fifth straight year.1 She indicated that this was a 3 percent

increase. Ms. O’Donnell obtained her information from the

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which has

two very interesting reports on this subject on its Web site at

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/>.

In an article in the April 2003 Countermeasure publication, Master Sergeant Dave Hembroff raised the issue

of motorcycle riders’ risk of being involved in an accident.2

He indicated that a rider who had not taken a rider training

course was nine times more likely to be involved in an injury

accident. Through February of 2003, Army personnel had

18 motorcycle accidents for the fiscal year. Six soldiers died

in those accidents.

Conducting Risk Management

Accidents are normally the result of a series of events

or factors that lead up to the accident. By controlling

or eliminating some of those factors, the risk of being

involved in a motorcycle accident can be greatly reduced.

This is the process outlined in Field Manual 100-14, Risk

Management, that we use for military operations and should

use for all aspects of our lives. There are three primary areas

that should be addressed in conducting risk management for

motorcycle riding: rider factors, motorcycle factors, and road

and traffic factors. See Table 1 for additional information. Each

of these areas contains a number of factors that determine a

rider’s risk of being involved in an accident.

Rider

Riders should always be prepared to ride the motorcycle.

That may sound a little strange, yet it is true. The rider of a

motorcycle must focus his or her attention on the task of riding

the motorcycle as well as the actions of other drivers, wildlife,

and the condition of the road—all at once. This is far more

focus than any automobile driver puts into the task of driving.

The amount of time riders have on their motorcycles has a

great impact on the potential for an accident. The more you

ride, the better rider you become. As service members or

Department of the Army civilian employees, motorcycle riders

are required to complete a course that is offered at most

installations and provides basic information about riding. But

don’t let this be the only course you take. The more training

Motorcycle Rider Risk Mana le Rider Risk Mana le Rider Risk Management

By Mr. Fred E. Fanning

Table 1. Factors to Consider in Risk Management

Type

Rider Experience, training, protective clothing and equipment, consumption of

alcohol and drugs, and lack of sleep

Motorcycle Size, fit, and working condition

Road and Traffic Road and highway conditions

Factors
July-September 2003 Engineer 61

you get, the better rider you will become. Go to <http://

www.msf-usa.org> to get more information about motorcycle

rider courses in your area.

Army Regulation 385-55, Prevention of Motor Vehicle

Accidents, lists the required items of protective clothing and

equipment that each rider must wear. See Table 2 for a complete

list. The quality of the clothing and equipment has a direct

relationship to how much risk is accepted. Riders who purchase

the bare-minimum clothing will reduce their risk of being injured

in a motorcycle accident. However, purchasing quality

motorcycle rider gear can reduce this risk even more. Helmets

are a good example. Riders on a military installation must wear

at least an approved 1/2-shell helmet. However, if they were to

wear an approved 3/4-shell or a full-face helmet, they could

reduce their risk even more. The same thing goes for the shirt

or pants. Riders can wear a regular pair of pants and a shirt

with long sleeves and get by. But they would be much safer if

they wore the new jackets and pants with ballistic protection

sold by many manufacturers today. This ballistic protection is

located in areas where the body is most likely to be injured in

a crash. Using it will greatly reduce the risk of injury in an

accident.

Since riding a motorcycle requires a great deal of concentration, it is surprising that many riders still drink and drive.

If you plan to drink, don’t drive. Your chances of having an

accident are far greater if you have been drinking. Riders should

make sure they don’t take prescription or over-the-counter

medications prior to riding. Read the label, and if it has a warning

about driving or operating heavy equipment or machinery,

that means you don’t ride. Along with these hazards comes

the risk of riding when you’re tired. As you know, it is very

hard to drive a car when you’re tired; it is much worse trying

to operate a motorcycle. You may think that you are riding fine

until an emergency occurs and you can’t react to it.

Motorcycle

Even though you may be prepared to ride, is your bike

ready to be ridden? First, does it fit you? And secondly, is it in

good working order? Is the bike the right size for you? You

can tell by sitting on the seat and putting both feet flat on the

ground. If you can’t do this, the bike is too tall. Now try to

reach all the controls. You must be able to reach the handlebars, clutch lever, brake lever and pedal, throttle, and shift

lever with ease. And is your bike in good working order? How

do you know? The MSF has a preride checklist that is

represented by the acronym T-CLOCS:

 T - tires and wheels

 C - controls

 L - lights and other electrical items

 O - oil

 C - chassis

 S - side stand

By conducting this quick inspection and fixing those items

that don’t work, you can greatly reduce your risk.

Road and Traffic

The last things to consider are the road and traffic conditions. You can choose the place and time you ride; make it

the safest time and place. Don’t ride in areas with limited

visibility or rough and sandy roads. These can cause or

Table 2. Required Protective Clothing and Equipment

Clothing/Equipment Description

Helmet

They come in full face, 3/4 shell, and 1/2 shell. The Department of Transportation or Schnell

Foundation must approve the helmet. The full face provides the best protection followed by

the 3/4 shell. The 1/2 provides the least amount of protection.

Gloves

They should be leather and have full fingers. It is best to purchase motorcycle gloves

because they are sewn to put the seams outside the glove and curve of the fingers.

Shirt

They should have long sleeves and be made of a durable fabric. Consider a jacket or riding

suit with ballistic protection.

Pants

They should be long and made of a durable fabric. Consider pants or a riding suit with

ballistic protection.

Reflective Material Many use a road guard vest or jogging belt. The jogging belt is only visible when it is

worn diagonally across the torso.

Shoes Should be over-the-ankle boots or shoes. No high heels on boots and no large toes. Consider

a pair of motorcycle boots.

Protective Eye Wear Don’t rely on the face shield to protect you. Wear impact-resistant eyewear even if you

wear a face shield. Invest in a pair of impact-resistant sunglasses.
62 Engineer July-September 2003

contribute to an accident. You may also want to avoid heavy

traffic times. Most car and truck drivers are not watching for

motorcyclists and often don’t see them. Not riding in these

time periods can reduce your risk.

Strategy

I

n addition to identifying the hazards and eliminating those

you can prior to riding, the MSF recommends a strategy

for riding your motorcycle. The strategy is known by the

acronym SEE.

 S - Search for hazards constantly as you ride.

 E - Evaluate those hazards first to determine if they have

 an impact on you, then develop a course of action for

each. ach.

 E -Execute the course of action you determined in the

 evaluation step.

Sounds familiar. doesn’t it? This is a constant update of

the risk management process. The more you use it, the better

you will become.

Summary

Whether you are a new rider or have been riding for

20 years, you can become the victim of a motorcycle accident. You can reduce the potential for

that accident by using the risk management process described

in this article to identify and eliminate hazards. Don’t become

overwhelmed by all of the hazards. Riding a motorcycle is

more dangerous than driving a car, and most—if not all—

riders know this. To be a successful rider, control the hazards

you can, and reduce your risk. Let motorcycling be fun and

enjoyable.

For additional information, refer to the U.S. Army Safety

Center Web site at <http://safety.army.mil/home.html> or the

Motorcycle Safety Foundation Web site at <http://www.msfusa.org>.

Endnotes

1

 Jayne O’Donnell, “Traffic deaths rise to 12-year high,”

USA Today, 25 April 2003, p. A-1.

2

 Master Sergeant Dave Hembroff, “Learn and Live,”

Countermeasure, April 2003, pp. 16-18.

Mr. Fanning is the safety director for the U.S. Army

Maneuver Support Center and Fort Leonard Wood. He is

also nationally certified by the Motorcycle Safety Foundation

as a RiderCoach and serves as the RiderCoach/instructor

for Fort Leonard Wood. He can be contacted at

<fred.fanning@us.army.mil>.

The streets of Mosul are slowly but surely being cleaned

by the soldiers of the 37th Engineer Battalion. Labeled

Task Force Neighborhood, the civil operation was

modeled after similar successful projects in Baghdad. The

vacant lots of the city are filled with a variety of garbage––

rotting vegetables, old clothes, and animal waste are the most

easily identifiable. The rest has turned into a sort of brown

and gray compost pile, home for thousands of flies and food

for roaming chickens. This is where Task Force Neighborhood

works.

The engineers arrive at the makeshift dumps with an escort

of soldiers from the 502d Infantry Regiment and an assortment

of tools for cleaning: brooms, shovels, garbage bags, and

wheelbarrows. The soldiers have two missions when they go

out––to clean the neighborhood and to pump money into the

Mosul economy. To achieve these missions, they employ Iraqis

to help them clean. A psychological operations team accompanies the engineers with a taped message informing local

citizens that they can make money helping the soldiers clean

the streets. The unit offers Iraqis “two or three dollars to work.”

The soldiers and Iraqis have at their disposal handheld

tools as well as bulldozers and dump trucks. The bigger

equipment takes care of the largest portions of trash, then

people with shovels and brooms come in to get refuse in hardto-reach places. So far Task Force Neighborhood has cleaned

two vacant lots, one of which had between 30 and 40 dump

truckloads of garbage, and the streets and gutters around a

downtown mosque. The trash carted away goes to a landfill

about a 40-minute drive southwest of town. The engineers

have a long, hard job ahead of them. Cleaning the makeshift

dumps takes a lot of effort and time. Besides getting rid of

newly made dumps all over Mosul, the engineers also have to

work to keep clean the areas they just beautified. One recently

cleaned dump already has trash in it.

Specialist Hutcheson is a journalist with the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky,

serving in Iraq.

Task Force Neighborhood

By Specialist Joshua Hutcheson

each.
July-September 2003 Engineer 63

During a three-day project, engineers of the 101st

Airborne Division spanned the Kazer River, a tributary

of the Tigris River, and gave control of the bridges to

local officials. The construction effort was part of the stability

and support operations the division is conducting in northern

Iraq.

The new bridges eased congestion along Highway 2, a

main artery between Mosul and Erbil, the two largest cities in

northern Iraq. The four-lane highway crossed the Kazer over

two bridges, both of which were partly blown up by Iraqi

forces during the war. The southern span was only partially

destroyed, while the northern bridge was completely disabled.

Iraqi traffic continued to use the bridges, leading to a “rather

unsafe” condition.

The first day of work began when the sappers of the 326th

Engineer Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, cleared away

the collapsed portion of the northern bridge, which leaned

precariously on supporting pylons. Careful placement of C-4

plastic explosives would allow the bridge section to fall to the

riverbed without striking the pylons, which could cause the

rest of the bridge to tumble down. A 25-foot hydraulic excavator

was used to move rubble away from the work area and then to

raise the engineers up under the bridge to place the charges.

Steel pickets and wooden beams were used to wedge

explosives into place, and then fuse line was let out 500 meters

to the detonation site.

Soldiers of the 310th Psychological Operations Company

roamed the area, using loudspeakers mounted on their highmobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to

instruct gathering villagers in Arabic to move back and take

cover. Traffic was blocked from the east and west, and OH-58

Kiowa Warrior helicopters flew over the site, watching for

breaches in safety and security.

Crater charges propelled the end of the bridge upward.

According to the assistant division engineer, the battalion

used more than 1,000 pounds of explosives to knock down the

bridge section and didn’t do any damage to the nearby villages

or harm any people.

The next morning, the 299th Engineer Company of Fort

Belvoir, Virginia, prepared to put up a single-lane medium girder

bridge made of aluminum and especially designed for quick

construction. The unit measured the gap and decided that 16

links of the bridge were needed to span the 34 meters. Soldiers

worked in groups, picking up bridge pieces weighing as much

as 600 pounds and assembling them. First, the bridging

company set up the staging portion of the bridgeworks, which

acted as a launching mechanism for the boom of the hydraulic

excavator. The boom was extended link by link until it reached

the far side. Then the boom was used to support the bridge as

it was pushed over the gap by a large truck.

Though the bridge was constructed quickly, it’s no slapdash

structure, but a one-lane bridge that can hold 70 tons. A section

from the 74th Engineer Company (Assault Float Bridge), Fort

Hood, Texas, arrived and added another lane to the northern

bridge using the Army’s new dry support bridge. The main

advantage in using the dry support bridge is that the launch

vehicle does the heavy lifting during construction. Since

soldiers did not have to pick up the heavy pieces, it took only

eight people to assemble the bridge.

Turning the bridges over to the Iraqi people was one more

step toward restoring the economy and security of the region.

Specialist Woodward is a journalist with the 101st Airborne

Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, serving in

Iraq.

KazeriBridgeiRestoration

By Specialist Robert Woodward

Combat engineers of the 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st

Airborne Division, prepare a counterforce charge used

to blast away a fallen segment of the Kazer Bridge near

Mosul, Iraq, 28 April 2003.

U.S. Army photo by SPC Robert Woodward
Commercial numbers are (573) 563-xxxx and Defense System

Network (DSN) numbers are 676-xxxx unless otherwise noted.

64 Engineer July-September 2003

ENGINEER UPDATE

News and Notes

Deployment Teambuilding at the Army Management

Staff College. Fifteen soldiers from the 1st Information Operations Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, attended a firstever Deployment Teambuilding session at the Army Management Staff College (AMSC) on 24 July 2003. These soldiers will soon deploy for six months to multiple locations in

Iraq.

Why teambuilding? An Information Operations planner at

1st Information Operations Command, who was previously

deployed to Kosovo and knew the inherent problems that

could develop when integrating a small group of subject

matter experts into an already existing staff, searched for a

resource that could provide actionable skills on group dynamics. He wanted tools to assist the team members in

coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating actions in the

information environment of a very diverse group, a multinational coalition, in order to accomplish a common goal.

After finding that there was neither an in-house capability

for such training nor a comprehensive Army course catalog,

the planner contacted AMSC at <http://www.amsc.belvoir.

army.mil>. The chairman of the Department of Leadership

and Management at AMSC worked with the staff to develop a

course that met 1st Information Operations Command requirements. The chairman saw a great opportunity to support soldiers on the battlefield, a goal he says is part of the

charter of the sustaining base program.

According to the chief of the 1st Information Operations

Command Field Support Division, it is quite unusual for a

large Army educational institutional to be flexible enough to

react so quickly since the time lapse was only ten days from

the initial call to the scheduled class. If all goes well, 1st

Information Command will look into the possibility of adding the AMSC course as a regular part of predeployment

training for field support teams deploying from Fort Belvoir

to support land component commanders worldwide.

POC is Ms. Mary Ann Hodges at <maryann.hodges

@amsc.belvoir.army.mil> or (703) 805-4766.

Wolverine. These systems were fielded to the 299th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, late last year. A third battalion set is scheduled for the 4th Engineer Battalion, Fort

Carson, Colorado, in FY04. The last of the Wolverines will be

fielded to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Carson

no later than FY05. Many of the vehicles will come from 4th

Infantry Division when they go from 12 to 9 Wolverines per

battalion. The Project Manager, Abrams Tank Systems manages the Wolverine program.

Airborne Standoff Mine-Detection System (ASTAMIDS).

In May, the Project Manager, Close Combat Systems (PMCCS) awarded a development contract for ASTAMIDS to

Northrup Grumman. The ASTAMIDS sensor will also be developed to fill the Army’s need for an advanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) sensor,

capable of target designation. The goal is for this to be the

embedded sensor on all larger unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs).

Ground Standoff Mine-Detection System (GSTAMIDS).

Development on the Block 0 (Improved Interim VehicleMounted Mine Detector) program is being terminated. An FCSbased GSTAMIDS program will begin in October.

Handheld Standoff Mine-Detection System

(HSTAMIDS). An interim fielding of 200 HSTAMIDSs was

completed in February to support Operation Enduring

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Commanders taking over some of the 200 units in either area of operation

need to plan for operator training time. The radar-based

HSTAMIDS, which is fundamentally different from metal

detectors, requires from 32 to 40 hours of training. Operational testing for HSTAMIDS was conducted in May at

Yuma Proving Grounds. Minor design improvements have

been identified for incorporation in the full-rate HSTAMIDS

production to begin later this year.

Mongoose. This C-130-transportable countermine system is optimized for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Its

explosive net defeats all mines regardless of fuzing. Flight

testing is underway this summer at Yuma Proving Grounds,

and fielding is scheduled for FY05.

Intelligent Munition System (IMS). The PM-CCS awarded

two contracts for the initial phase of IMS development to

General Dynamics and Textron Defense Systems.

POC is Mr. Eric McGrath at <mcgrathe@wood.army.mil>

or (573) 563-4081/4085. Pictures and briefings are available at the TSM-ECS home page at <http://www.wood.army.

mil/TSM/>.

TRADOC Systems Manager-Engineer Combat Systems

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