United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on

Armed Services, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m., EST

Wednesday,

March 4, 1998

MILITARY ATTRITION

DOD Needs to Better

Understand Reasons for

Separation and Improve

Recruiting Systems

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military

Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and

International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the attrition and

recruiting of the military services’ enlisted personnel. At the request of this

Subcommittee, GAO has conducted a series of jobs to determine why the

attrition of enlisted personnel during their first terms of duty has remained

relatively constant despite the increased quality of new recruits. Our work

has included (1) a report outlining the reasons for attrition during the first

6 months of an enlistee’s term,1

 (2) a report recommending how recruiter

selection and incentive systems could be improved to increase recruiter

performance and the likelihood that enlistees will complete their first

terms,2

 (3) an ongoing study to identify reasons for enlisted attrition after

basic training, and (4) an ongoing study of the process of screening

incoming recruits to detect criminal backgrounds.

Today, we would like to discuss the historical problem of attrition and its

costs; the Department of Defense’s (DOD) lack of complete data on why

enlistees are being separated early; our recommendations on ways to

improve the screening of recruiters and recruits; and DOD’s actions thus far

to respond to our recommendations.

Results in Brief Despite increases in the quality of DOD’s enlistees, about one-third of all

new recruits continue to leave military service before they fulfill their first

term of enlistment. This attrition rate is costly in that the services must

maintain infrastructures to recruit and train around 200,000 persons per

year. For example, in fiscal year 1996, the services’ recruiting and training

investment in enlistees who separated before they had completed

6 months totaled $390 million.

Solving the problem of attrition will not be simple in large part because

DOD does not have complete data on why enlisted personnel are being

separated. In our work, we have concentrated on what we have found to

be major categories of separation, such as medical problems and

fraudulent enlistments. Because these types of separations involve the

services’ entire screening processes, we have reexamined these processes

from the time recruiters are selected, through the time that applicants are

prescreened by recruiters, through the medical examinations applicants

1

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

2

Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and Incentive Systems

(GAO/NSIAD-98-58, Jan. 30, 1998).

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
undergo, and through the physical preparation of recruits for basic

training. The process of attracting quality recruits and retaining them

involves many service entities and many processes.

We have recommended ways to improve (1) the data DOD collects to

analyze reasons for attrition, (2) the services’ criteria for selecting

recruiters, (3) the incentive systems for recruiters to enlist persons who

will complete basic training, and (4) the services’ mechanisms for

identifying medical problems before recruits are enlisted. Many of these

recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85). On the basis of

ongoing work, we hope to recommend ways that attrition can be reduced

after enlistees reach their first duty stations and ways that the services can

better screen for enlistees with criminal backgrounds.

DOD and the services have already taken some positive steps in response to

our recommendations and to the National Defense Authorization Act.

However, we believe that DOD needs to take further action to change the

criteria by which recruiters are selected, provide recruiters with more

opportunities to interact with drill instructors, and revise recruiters’

incentive systems to improve their quality of life.

High Rate of Attrition

Continues Despite

Increases in Recruit

Quality

By 1986, recruit quality was at historically high levels. All services had met

or exceeded their overall enlistment objectives for percentages of recruits

who held high school diplomas and scored in the top categories on the test

taken to qualify for military service.3

 Specifically, the percentage of

recruits with high school diplomas increased from 72 percent during the

1964-73 draft period to 92 percent in 1986. Also, 64 percent of new recruits

in 1986 scored in the upper 50th percentile of the Armed Forces

Qualification Test, up from 38 percent in 1980.4

 The services’ success in

recruiting high quality enlistees continued through the 1980s and into the

1990s, with the percentage of high school graduates reaching a high of

99 percent in 1992 and the percentage of those scoring in the upper half of

the Armed Forces Qualification Test peaking in 1991 at 75 percent.

3

See our report Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed (GAO/NSIAD-95-22, Dec. 22,

1994).

4

The Armed Forces Qualification Test is a composite of 4 of the 10 components of the Armed Services

Vocational Aptitude Battery. This battery of tests is given to applicants at high schools, Military

Entrance Processing Stations, or independent sites and is used to determine whether applicants are

qualified for enlistment and military job specialties.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
Studies of attrition have consistently shown that persons with high school

diplomas and Armed Forces Qualification Test scores in the upper 50th

percentile have lower first-term attrition rates. For example, for those who

entered the services in fiscal year 1992 and had high school diplomas, the

attrition rate was 33.1 percent. For persons with 3 or 4 years of high school

and no diploma, the rate was 38.9 percent; and for those with General

Education Development certificates, the attrition rate was 46.3 percent.

Similarly, those who scored in the highest category, category I, of the

Armed Forces Qualification Test had an attrition rate of 24.7 percent, and

those in category IVA had a rate of 40.7 percent.

Increases in the quality of DOD’s recruits since the 1970s, coupled with the

lower attrition rates of those considered “high quality” recruits, logically

should have resulted in lower first-term attrition rates throughout the

services. However, factors other than education and Armed Forces

Qualification Test scores appear to be influencing the early separation of

recruits. First-term enlisted attrition has remained at 29 to 39 percent since

1974. For enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1992,5

 first-term

attrition was 33.2 percent. The Army’s attrition was the highest of all the

services, at 35.9 percent, followed by the Marine Corps at 32.2 percent, the

Navy at 32 percent, and the Air Force at 30 percent.

The highest portion of attrition occurs during the early months of

enlistees’ first terms. Of enlistees who entered the services in fiscal

year 1992, 11.4 percent were separated in their first 6 months of service.

Attrition was fairly evenly distributed over the remaining period of

enlistees’ first terms. The rate was 3.4 percent for those with 7 to

12 months of service, 7.3 percent for those with 13 to 24 months of service,

6 percent for those with 25 to 36 months of service, and 5 percent for those

with 37 to 48 months of service.

Attrition Is Costly On the basis of DOD-provided cost data, we estimated that in fiscal year

1996, DOD and the services spent about $390 million to enlist personnel

who never made it to their first duty stations. Of this total cost, which

includes the cost of DOD’s training and recruiting infrastructure, about

$4,700 was spent to transport each recruit to basic training; to pay, feed,

house, and provide medical care for the recruit while at basic training; and

5

Fiscal year 1992 is the most recent year for which we have complete data from the Defense Manpower

Data Center on enlistees who entered the services and would have been able to complete 4-year

enlistment terms. These attrition statistics include persons with 2-, 3-, and 4-year terms, which would

have expired in fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996.

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
to transport the separated recruit home.6

 We estimated that if the services

could reduce their 6-month enlisted attrition by 10 percent, their

short-term savings would be $12 million, and their long-term savings could

be as high as $39 million.

DOD Does Not Have

Data Available to

Establish Appropriate

Targets for Reducing

Attrition

DOD and the services need a better understanding of the reasons for early

attrition to identify opportunities for reducing it. Currently, available data

on attrition does not permit DOD to pinpoint the precise reasons that

enlistees are departing before completing their training. While the data

indicates general categories of enlisted separations based on the official

reasons for discharge, it does not provide DOD and the services with a full

understanding of the factors contributing to the attrition. For example, of

the 25,430 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1994 and were

discharged in their first 6 months, the data showed

• 7,248 (or 29 percent) had failed to meet minimum performance criteria,

• 6,819 (or 27 percent) were found medically unqualified for military service,

• 3,643 (or 14 percent) had character or behavior disorders, and

• 3,519 (or 14 percent) had fraudulently entered the military.

These figures were based on data maintained by the Defense Manpower

Data Center and collected from servicemembers’ DD-214 forms, which are

their official certificates of release or discharge from active duty. Because

the services interpret the separation codes that appear on the forms

differently and because only the official reason for the discharge is listed,

the Data Center’s statistics can be used only to indicate general categories

of separation. Therefore, DOD does not have enough specific information to

fully assess trends in attrition.

In an attempt to standardize the services’ use of these codes, DOD issued a

list of the codes with their definitions. However, it has not issued

implementing guidance for interpreting these definitions, and the services’

own implementing guidance differs on several points. For example, if an

enlistee intentionally withholds medical information that would disqualify

him or her and is then separated for the same medical condition, the

enlistee is discharged from the Air Force and the Marine Corps for a

fraudulent enlistment. The Army categorizes this separation as a failure to

meet medical/physical standards unless it can prove that the enlistee

withheld medical information with the intent of gaining benefits. The Air

6

We used Navy data to estimate the cost of transporting recruits to basic training, supporting them

while there, and separating them. The other services were unable to provide comparable data.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
Force and the Marine Corps do not require this proof of intent. The Navy

categorizes this separation as an erroneous enlistment, which indicates no

fault on the part of the enlistee.

To enable DOD and the services to more completely analyze the reasons for

attrition and to set appropriate targets for reducing it, we recommended

that DOD issue implementing guidance for how the services should apply

separation codes to provide a reliable database on reasons for attrition.

Reducing Attrition

Will Not Be Simple

In the absence of complete data on why first-term attrition is occurring,

we examined the various pre-enlistment screening processes that

correspond to the types of separations that were occurring frequently. For

example, because a significant number of enlistees were being separated

for medical problems and for fraudulent entry, we focused our work on

recruiting and medical examining processes that were intended to detect

problems before applicants are enlisted. These processes involve many

different military personnel. Recruiters, staff members at the Military

Entrance Processing Stations,7

 drill instructors at basic training,

instructors at follow-on technical training schools, and duty-station

supervisors are all involved in transforming civilians into productive

servicemembers. The process begins when the services first identify and

select personnel to serve as recruiters. It continues when recruiters send

applicants to receive their mental and physical examinations at the

Military Entrance Processing Stations, through the period of up to 1 year

while recruits remain in the Delayed Entry Program,8

 and through the time

recruits receive their basic and follow-on training and begin work in their

first assignments.

Reexamining the roles of all persons involved in this continuous process is

in keeping with the intent of the Government Performance and Results Act

of 1993, which requires agencies to clearly define their missions, to set

goals, and to link activities and resources to those goals. Recruiting and

retaining well-qualified military personnel is among the goals included in

DOD’s strategic plan required under this act. As a part of this

7

A military applicant is sent to 1 of 65 Military Entrance Processing Stations located throughout the

country to (1) take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery to determine whether he or she is

qualified for enlistment and a military job specialty and (2) undergo a medical examination to

determine whether he or she meets physical entrance standards.

8

After it has been determined that a military applicant is qualified, the applicant is sworn into the

service and enters the Delayed Entry Program. When an applicant enters the Delayed Entry Program,

he or she becomes a member of the Individual Ready Reserve, in an unpaid status, and awaits being

called to active duty. An individual may remain in the Delayed Entry Program for up to 1 year.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
reexamination, we have found that recruiters did not have adequate

incentives to ensure that their recruits were qualified and that the medical

screening processes did not always identify persons with preexisting

medical conditions. We believe that the services should not measure

recruiting success simply by the number of recruits who sign enlistment

papers stating their intention to join a military service but also by the

number of new recruits who go on to complete basic training. We also

believe that the services’ mechanisms for medically screening military

applicants could be improved.

Recruiter Selection and

Incentive Systems Are

Critical in Enlisting

Recruits Who Are Likely to

Complete Their First

Terms

We found that recruiters did not have adequate incentives to ensure that

their recruits were qualified. Accordingly, we have identified practices in

each service that we believe would enhance recruiters’ performance and

could be expanded to other services. Specifically, in our 1998 report on

military recruiting, we reported that the services were not optimizing the

performance of their recruiters for the following reasons:

• The Air Force was the only service that required personnel experienced in

recruiting to interview candidates for recruiter positions. In contrast,

many Army and some Marine recruiting candidates were interviewed by

personnel in their chain of command who did not necessarily have

recruiting experience. The Navy was just beginning to change its recruiter

selection procedures to resemble those of the Air Force.

• The Air Force was the only service that critically evaluated the potential of

candidates to be successful recruiters by judging their ability to

communicate effectively and by using a screening test. The Army, the

Marine Corps, and the Navy tended to focus more on candidates’ past

performance in nonrecruiting positions.

• Only the Marine Corps provided recruiter trainees with opportunities to

interact with drill instructors and separating recruits to gain insight into

ways to motivate recruits in the Delayed Entry Program. This interaction

was facilitated by the Marine Corps’ collocation of the recruiter school

with one of its basic training locations.

• Only the Marine Corps conducted regular physical fitness training for

recruits who were waiting to go to basic training, though all of the services

gave recruits in the Delayed Entry Program access to their physical fitness

facilities and encouraged recruits to become or stay physically fit.

• Only the Marine Corps required all recruits to take a physical fitness test

before reporting to basic training, though it is well known that recruits

who are not physically fit are less likely to complete basic training.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
• Only the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s incentive systems rewarded

recruiters when their recruits successfully completed basic training. The

Army and the Air Force focused primarily on the number of recruits

enlisted or the number who reported to basic training.

• Recruiters in all of the services generally worked long hours, were able to

take very little leave, and were under almost constant pressure to achieve

their assigned monthly goals. A 1996 DOD recruiter satisfaction survey

indicated that recruiter success was at an all-time low, even though the

number of working hours had increased to the highest point since 1989.

For example, only 42 percent of the services’ recruiters who responded to

the survey said that they had met assigned goals for 9 or more months in

the previous 12-month period.

To improve the selection of recruiters and enhance the retention of

recruits, we recommended that the services (1) use experienced field

recruiters to personally interview all potential recruiters, use

communication skills as a key recruiter selection criterion, and develop or

procure personality screening tests that can aid in the selection of

recruiters; (2) emphasize the recruiter’s role in reducing attrition by

providing opportunities for recruiter trainees to interact with drill

instructors and separating recruits; (3) encourage the services to

incorporate more structured physical fitness training for recruits into their

Delayed Entry Programs; (4) conduct physical fitness tests before recruits

report to basic training; (5) link recruiter rewards more closely to recruits’

successful completion of basic training; and (6) encourage the use of

quarterly floating recruitment goals as an alternative to the services’

current systems of monthly goals.

Screening Processes Do

Not Fully Identify Persons

With Preexisting Medical

Problems

We have also found areas in which the medical screening of enlistees

could be improved. Specifically, DOD’s medical screening processes did not

always identify persons with preexisting medical conditions, and DOD and

the services did not have empirical data on the cost-effectiveness of

waivers or medical screening tests. In summary,

• the services did not have adequate mechanisms in place to increase the

likelihood that the past medical histories of prospective recruits would be

accurately reported;

• DOD’s system of capturing information on medical diagnoses did not allow

it to track the success of recruits who received medical waivers;

• the responsibility for reviewing medical separation cases to determine

whether medical conditions should have been detected at the Military

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
Entrance Processing Stations resided with the Military Entrance

Processing Command, the organization responsible for the medical

examinations; and

• the Navy and the Marine Corps did not test applicants for drugs at the

Military Entrance Processing Stations but waited until they arrived at basic

training. To improve the medical screening process, we recommended that

DOD (1) require all applicants for enlistment to provide the names of their

medical insurers and providers and sign a release form allowing the

services to obtain past medical information; (2) direct the services to

revise their medical screening forms to ensure that medical questions for

applicants are specific, unambiguous, and tied directly to the types of

medical separations most common for recruits during basic and follow-on

training; (3) use a newly proposed DOD database of medical diagnostic

codes to determine whether adding medical screening tests to the

examinations given at the Military Entrance Processing Stations and/or

providing more thorough medical examinations to selected groups of

applicants could cost-effectively reduce attrition at basic training;

(4) place the responsibility for reviewing medical separation files, which

resided with the Military Entrance Processing Command, with an

organization completely outside the screening process; and (5) direct all

services to test applicants for drugs at the Military Entrance Processing

Stations.

Inclusion of GAO’s

Recommendations in

the National Defense

Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1998

In its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

(P.L. 105-85), the Congress adopted all recommendations contained in our

1997 report on basic training attrition, except for our recommendation that

all the services test applicants for drug use at the Military Entrance

Processing Stations, which the services had already begun to do.

Specifically, the act directed DOD to, among other things, (1) strengthen

recruiter incentive systems to thoroughly prescreen candidates for

recruitment, (2) include as a measurement of recruiter performance the

percentage of persons enlisted by a recruiter who complete initial combat

training or basic training, (3) improve medical prescreening forms,

(4) require an outside agency or contractor to annually assess the

effectiveness of the Military Entrance Processing Command in identifying

medical conditions in recruits, (5) take steps to encourage enlistees to

participate in physical fitness activities while they are in the Delayed Entry

Program, and (6) develop a database for analyzing attrition. The act also

required the Secretary of Defense to (1) improve the system of

pre-enlistment waivers and assess trends in the number and use of these

waivers between 1991 and 1997; (2) ensure the prompt separation of

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
recruits who are unable to successfully complete basic training; and

(3) evaluate whether partnerships between recruiters and reserve

components, or other innovative arrangements, could provide a pool of

qualified personnel to assist in the conduct of physical training programs

for new recruits in the Delayed Entry Program.

DOD and Service

Actions in Response

to GAO’s

Recommendations

and the Fiscal Year

1998 Defense

Authorization Act

DOD and the services have taken many actions in response to our

recommendations and the requirements in the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense

Authorization Act. However, we believe that it will be some time before

DOD sees a corresponding drop in enlisted attrition rates, and we may not

be able to precisely measure the effect of each particular action. While we

believe that DOD’s and the services’ actions combined will result in better

screening of incoming recruits, we also believe that further action is

needed.

As of January 1998, DOD reported that the following changes have been

made in response to the recommendations in our 1997 report: (1) the

Military Entrance Processing Command is formulating procedures to

comply with the new requirement to obtain from military applicants the

names of their medical insurers and health care providers; (2) the

Accession Medical Standards Working Group has created a team to

evaluate the Applicant Medical Prescreening Form (DD Form 2246);

(3) DOD has adopted the policy of using codes from the International

Classification of Diseases on all medical waivers and separations and

plans to collect this information in a database that will permit a review of

medical screening policies; (4) DOD plans to form a team made up of

officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health

Affairs) and the Office of Accession Policy to conduct semiannual reviews

of medical separations; and (5) all services are now testing applicants for

drugs at the Military Entrance Processing Stations. We believe that these

actions should help to improve the medical screening of potential recruits

and result in fewer medical separations during basic training.

In its response to our 1998 report on recruiting, DOD stated that it

concurred with our recommendations and would take action to

(1) develop or procure assessment tests to aid in the selection of recruiters

and (2) link recruiter rewards more closely to recruits’ successful

completion of basic training. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Force Management Policy is planning to work with the

services to evaluate different assessment screening tests. This office will

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
also ensure that all services incorporate recruits’ success in basic training

to recruiter incentive systems.

We understand that DOD plans to form a joint service working group to

address the legislative requirements enacted in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Specifically, the working group will

be tasked with devising a plan to satisfy the legislative requirements for

DOD and the services to (1) improve the system of separation codes,

(2) develop a reliable database for analyzing reasons for attrition,

(3) adopt or strengthen incentives for recruiters to prescreen applicants,

(4) assess recruiters’ performance in terms of the percentage of their

enlistees who complete initial combat training or basic training, (5) assess

trends in the number and use of waivers, and (6) implement policies and

procedures to ensure the prompt separation of recruits who are unable to

complete basic training.

We believe that the steps DOD and the services have taken thus far could

do much to reduce attrition. It appears that the soon-to-be-formed joint

service working group can do more. As the group begins its work, we

believe that it needs to address the following six areas in which further

action is needed.

• First, we believe that DOD’s development of a database on medical

separations is a necessary step to understanding the most prevalent

reasons for attrition. However, we believe that DOD needs to develop a

similar database on other types of separations. Until DOD has uniform and

complete information on why recruits are being separated early, it will

have no basis for determining how much it can reduce attrition. Also, in

the absence of the standardized use of separation codes, cross-service

comparisons cannot be made to identify beneficial practices in one service

that might be adopted by other services.

• Second, we believe that all the services need to increase emphasis on the

use of experienced recruiters to personally interview all potential

recruiters or explore other options that would produce similar results. DOD

agreed with the general intent of this recommendation but stated that it is

not feasible in the Army due to the large number of men and women who

are selected annually for recruiting duty and to the geographic diversity in

their assignments. While it may be difficult for the Army to use field

recruiters to interview 100 percent of its prospective recruiters, we

continue to believe that senior, experienced recruiters have a better

understanding of what is required for recruiting duty than operational

commanders.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
• Third, we believe that an ongoing dialogue between recruiters and drill

instructors is critical to enhancing recruiters’ understanding of problems

that lead to early attrition. DOD concurred with our recommendation to

have recruiter trainees meet with drill instructors and recruits being

separated or held back due to poor physical conditioning. However, the

Air Force has no plans to change its policy of devoting only 1 hour of its

recruiter training curriculum to a tour of its basic training facilities. We

believe this limited training falls short of the intent of our

recommendation.

• Fourth, we believe that the services should incorporate more structured

physical fitness training into their Delayed Entry Programs. All the

services are encouraging their recruits to become physically fit, but there

are concerns about the services’ liability should recruits be injured while

they are awaiting basic training. DOD is currently investigating the extent to

which medical care can be provided for recruits who are injured while in

the Delayed Entry Program.

• Fifth, we believe that, like the Marine Corps, the other services should

administer a physical fitness test to recruits before they are sent to basic

training. DOD concurred with this recommendation, and the Army is in the

process of implementing it. The Navy and the Air Force, however, do not

yet have plans to administer a physical fitness test to recruits in the

Delayed Entry Program.

• Finally, we continue to believe that the services need to use quarterly

floating goals for their recruiters.9 DOD did not fully concur with our

recommendation on quarterly floating goals. DOD believes that floating

quarterly goals would reduce the services’ ability to make corrections to

recruiting difficulties before they become unmanageable. We believe,

however, that using floating quarterly goals would not prevent the services

from managing their accessions. The floating quarterly goals we propose

would not be static. Each recruiter’s goals would simply be calculated

based on a moving 3-month period. This floating goal would continue to

provide recruiting commands with the ability to identify recruiting

shortfalls in the first month that they occur and to control the flow of new

recruits into the system on a monthly basis. At the same time, such a

system has the potential of providing recruiters with some relief from the

problems that were identified in the most recent recruiter satisfaction

survey.

9

Under the current monthly goal system, recruiters are under pressure to make their quota every single

month and, as a result, have difficulty taking leave. Under a quarterly floating goal system, recruiters

would still be assigned monthly goals, and their performance would still be evaluated on a monthly

basis. However, each month the current month’s goal would be added to the goals of the previous

2 months and compared to the recruiter’s performance during that 3-month period, rather than

comparing the current month’s performance to the current month’s goal.

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We would be happy

to respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the

Subcommittee may have.

(703236) Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100