~ ~ . ~ . , $ . . : = ~ ,, ,, ~ 

PROFESSIONAL BULLEllN FOR ARMY ENGINEERS ,, 
LEAR THE WAY 


By Major General Joe N. Ballard 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

Since my last chat, I have had the opportunity to 

speak with brigade and battalion commanders 

throughout the engineer force and with many of our 

great junior officers and noncommissioned officers. It 

is clear that we are hitting the mark as active, enthusiastic members of the combined arms team. We consistently bring to the warfight outstanding support to 

the total force and play an integral role in ensuring 

the attainment of our ultimate goal4ecisive victory! 

So that we may continue to bring outstanding suppon to the warfight, engineer leaders must prepare to 

operate in a tactical environment that's inundated 

with real time, detailed battlefield information. Technological innovations during the early part of the 21st 

century will mark the beginning of a battle command 

era where information drives performance and enhances tempo, lethality, and survivability. Engineers 

will have fully digitized, joint battlefield communications and information systems that unite strategic and 

tactical information nodes, including individual combat 

vehicles, sensors, and even intelligent minefields. 

Digitization of the battlefield is a major leap-ahead 

in the conduct of war and directly supports the combat leader's integration of maneuver, firepower, and 

protection capabilities. As we enter this age of 'third 

wave technology warfare," we must be prepared for 

the profound effects it will have. It will affect not only 

the way we conduct war, but aiso how we terminate 

hostilities, execute peace operations, and "clean-up" 

dirty battlefields. 

As the world changes, our Army is being asked to 

take on more nontraditional missions like peace keeping, humanitarian aid and even battlefield cleanup. 

Captain Kauffman's article (page 2) describes how engineers are key players now in these nontraditional 

missions in Somalia. As the Army's proponent for 

mine warfare, the challenges in this arena are just as 

great as they would be in hostile warfare. The worldwide proliferation of unexploded land mines constitutes a very real threat to noncombatants and 

peacekeeping forces alike. Current studies indicate 

that more than 85 million land mines lie unexploded 

in at least 62 nations (see Major Kowadlo's article, 

page 18). The international community is becoming 

aroused about the humanitarian concerns and 

potential casualties from these unexploded mines. 

While this deplorable situation may defy simple solutions, we have taken the first step toward ensuring 

that future US mines do not contribute to this problem. 

As has been accomplished with the MI6 antipersonnel mine, other conventional mines in their current 

configurations will be retired from use by US military 

forces. Existing mine inventories will be retrofitted 

with advanced fusing mechanisms that integrate conventional mines into the intelligent mine arena with 

digitized command and control capabilities. We envision the need for both antitank and antipersonnel munitions on future battlefields, but not without assurance that positive command and control are 

maintained to eliminate potential residual lethality. 

Although warfare in the early 21st century will be totally joint operations, the Army will remain as the centerpiece for land force dominance. US forces will continue to rely on mine warfare to rapidly terminate 

conflicts. Our Army's mine-warfare program ensures 

that future battlefields will favor friendly forces while 

significantly reducing the potential for collateral damage after the battle is done. 

Third wave technology provides the road map for 

the evolution of mine warfare. We are developing future smart mines that interface with multipurpose sensor networks; locate, identify, and accurately engage 

enemy combat; and then either command detonate or 

autonomously self-neutralize for potential use another 

day. These capabilities will become major considerations as the Army gets involved with operations other 

than war and must deal with situations where longterm mining requirements exist. This technology aliows us to take constructive measures to avoid accidental encounters with noncombatants and not lose 

the detrimental effects of landmines. 

This is just one example that shows how third 

wave technology will impact on the way engineer 

leaders support combined arms operations in the 

2lst century. I challenge each of you to stay abreast 

of this evolution and remain intellectually agile as we 

find new ways of applying technology. Engineers 

must ensure that applications of third wave technology will produce DECISIVE VICTORY! 

Essayons! 
F r-rr L rirlrlr r 7 < 

February 1994 Headquarters, Depaltment of the Army 	 Volume 24 PB 5-94-1 

UNITED STATES ARMY FEATURES ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 2 Operation Continue Hope: An Update on the Sapper 

Effort in Somalia 

by Captain Sheldon S. Kauffman COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 

Major General Joe N. Ballard 8 After a Year in Somalia: A Battalion Commander's View 

by Lieutenant Colonel Peter T: Madsen 

MANAGING EDITOR 10 	Reserve Engineer Training in Europe: The 412th ENCOM 

Catherine Eubanks Program 

by Lieutenant Colonel Dale W.Jones 

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS 

Diane Blankenship 15 War Gaming and Synchronizing an Operation 

James E. Woodbury 	 by Major George G. DeMarse 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER 18 Visualizing MineICountermine Operations as Part of 

Jennifer C. Bolyard Synchronization 

by Major Keith Kowadlo 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 21 	 Synchronization Training 

by Captain Robert McCarty GORDON R. SULLIVAN 

General, United States Army 24 Green-to-Gold: Future Officers from Today's Enlisted 

Chief of Staff by Captain Greg Lane 

29 Counterreconnaissance and Obstacle Integration Official: by Captain Kevin Woods 

*d* 
 34 Recollections 

MILTON H. HAMILTON by Command Sergeant Major (Ret.) Steven J. Rogge 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army 

06323 
 DEPARTMENTS 

Cover photo: A U.S.Army engineer Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

from the 10th Mountain Division guards 26 Lessons Learned 

an alley near the engineer base I" 39 Engineer Update 

Mogadishu, Somalia, during Operation 41 Bridge the Gap Continue Hope. 

IhS \Eill I SSh W46188801 9 preps!ed q.aner6 o, Ce .S AT, i-E. Vens eAprersed we rose of he author end no1 mme ol me 3epament 04Cereer S?"CO A'l h ATSETO5EB Fon Leonard Wow NO EL4736650 SN. 'ense or 19 e ements Tre rorten9 d? not neceser y ,eIlect orc~aL S Am, 

2r3 '2 F9? :cS~P~ . I CR. 3 Dl Fort .eonaro Wow MO an0 emlcia *1e -C 00110n8 "no :o n.1 :?.?no8 or S,DB~?WB nbm~t.onn olner J S Armr c.2 - offices. cat~ons.use OI news items consiitutss neither anirmation of meir accuracy 

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February 1994 
I 

Operation Continue Hope: 

An Update on the Sapper tttort in somalia 

By Captain Sheldon S. Kauffman 

Editor's Note: Conzbat engineer ntissions on the second and 

third rotations to Sontalia differed 

significantly from those accomplished by engineer units during 

the early months of Operation Restore Hope. The following narre 

tiue describes how tensions increased and operations shifted from 

peacen~ahing in the first rotation 

to peacekeeping and small combat 

operations in later rotations. 

Important changes have taken lace in Somalia since US 

ground troops first deployed to 

that country in December 1992 

to support Operation Restore 

Hope. Most of the wuntry is now 

stabilized, the roads are relatively 

safe, and some of the infighting 

among Somali clans has been replaced by more peaceful means 

of decision making. Mogadishu, 

the capital, remains a hot bed of 

civil and military strife, however. 

United Nations and US peacekeep 

ers are currently mnduding mmbat operations in and around 

Mogadishu, including force protection and sustainment. The 

peacekeepers continue to destroy 

captured munitions caches and 

provide road security 

This article describes sapper 

activities in Somalia since April 

1993. From first to last, engineer equipment operators and 

combat engineers (sappen) have 

been critical to the success of 

2 Engineer February 1994 
Operation Continue Hope, as it is 

now called. 

Second Rotation 

S appers of Charlie Company, 

41st Engineer - Battalion. 

10th Mountain Division (Light 

Infantry) deployed to Somalia 

with 1st Brigade Headquarters 

and 1-22 Infantry to replace the 

battalion's Bravo Company. The 

Bravo Company sappers were 

the first to deploy in-country 

with Task Force 2-87 in December 1992 and the last to leave 

from the initial rotation of Operation Restore Hope. Mission 

turnover was completed on 5 

April. Two days later, Charlie 

Company's 2nd Platoon, led by 

2LT Scott Daniels, convoyed 

south to the village of Marka. 

There it performed extensive engineer route, bridge and dam reconnaissance, and provided rns 

bility and demolition support to 

Task Force 1-22's recon and security patrols in and around Marka. 

During those first patrols, the 

young sappers learned some hard 

lessons about the low-intensity 

conflict (LIC) environment. For 

most members of the task force, 

having numerous civilians around 

them while they worked was a 

new experience. Several soldiers 

learned the hard way to secure 

valuable and sensitive items and 

to maintain tight operational security. It was almost impossible to 

decide which local people could be 

trusted and which could not. Unlike the large, fenced-in mmpounds 

that protected soldiers against hostile combatants and unwanted civilian attention in larger cities, the 

temporary unit perimeters in Marka 

provided little or no protection 

against the hordes of nosy, begging 

noncombatants. 

In addition to recon, minesweeps 

and ntunitions denial, the sappers 

and engineer equipment operators 

rebuilt adam and drainage ditch on 

Marka's north side. This construction was done to relieve flooding, 

reopen the road and redme the mosquito population. During the construction, the engineers learned 

more valuable lessons about beach 

excavation; i.e, that tracked vehicles do not fare well in wet sand 

and that construction on beaches 

is complicated by the extremely 

high water table. 

While 2nd Platoon was involved in the combat operations, 

contacts with the local population and nation building typical 

of LIC, 1LT Dan Koprowski, the 

assistant brigade engineer WE), 

was learning another hard lesson 

about LIC. He was tasked to do an 

aerial remn of nearly all the major 

routes in southern Somalia in 

preparation for repatriation op 

erations. LT Koprowski was dismayed to discover that many 

roads built or reopened only two 

months earlier were now impassable due to intervening 

rains and massive shortfalls in 

maintenance. 

US and UN forces found no existing infrastructure in Somalia 

when they arrived in 1992. Even 

when they provided an infrastructure, the country lacked a civil 

support system capable of usingor 

maintaining it. The routes surveyed by LT Koprowski had to be 

reopened before large-scale repatriation or food distribution could 

continue. The lesson is clear: 

Sappers prepare ordnance for dlsposai. Ordnance dlsposai was a 

major mission for englneers throughout Operations Restore and 

Continua Hope. 

February 1994 Engineer 3 
Given limited host-nation support, 

and a nonlinear battlefield, cont,inuous battlefield analysis and 

knowledge of the current situation 

are just as important as they are 

in more conventional operations. 

While LT Koprowski updated 

the engineer battlefield assessment, the ABE noncommissioned 

officer (NCO), SGT Shannon 

Brown, flew to Baledogle to help 

with force protection at the local 

airfield. To avoid pulling sapper 

labor from combat operations, 

SGT Brown provided the needed 

engineer expertise to infantrymen 

and aviators. He helped them design protectiue obstacles and suruiuability positions, instructed 

their junior leaders on construction and began the massive task of 

accounting for AM2 airfield matting throughout Baledogle, 

Mogadishu and southern Somalia. 

These operations continued until 

May, with American forces finetuning their standing operating 

procedures. 

When United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) took 

control of the relief effort, 1st Brigade and its subordinate units 

4 Engineer 

became the Quick Reaction Force 

(QRF). As conditions in Marka 

normalized, the QRF transferred 

control to the Pakistanis and the 

task force and sapper platoon returned to Mogadishu. There they 

conducted civillmilitary operations at the Lafoole orphanage. 

They repaired the school building, 

built benches and desks, put up 

protective barriers and provided 

security for children and care 

providers. The ABE section redesigned and oversaw new construction at the Mogadishu and Baledogle airfields and continued 

managing sustainment engineering for the QRF. 

The QRF began to reinforce the 

Belgians in Kismayo later in May 

as tensions with the local population increased. LT Koprowski 

served as battle captain in the brigade tactical operations center. LT 

Daniels split his platoon into 

squads to support a cordon and 

search of the city. The Kismayo 

operation lasted two weeks and 

ended without incident. 

Soon after returning to 

Mogadishu) the task force moved 

to a base camp in Bardera. From 

Sappers prepare an expedlent 

breaching charge durlng urban warfare training in 

Mogadlshu. On several occaslons, breaching charges enabled patrols to withdraw 

safely from snlper fire durlng 

operations In the clty. 

there they conducted a search and 

attack into Garbahari in which the 

sappersput fiue anti-aircraft guns 

out of action with therntite grenades. Each sapper easily carried 

several of these usefil grenades. 

Although thermite grenades cannot destroy their targets, they can 

make them inoperable. 

After the task force returned to 

Bardera, 1st squad flew back to 

Kismayo with the QRF's quick reaction company to prepare for 

scheduled peace talks. 

The QRF was soon called back 

to Mogadishu to rescue an ambushed Pakistani convoy. This ambush, which left 23 Pakistani 

peacekeepers dead, marked the 

sudden collapse of an uneasy 

peace in Mogadishu. UNOSOM responded to the ambush with aggressive cordon and search operations and attacks on suspected 

Aided strongholds. 

On 12 June the sapper platoon 

executed a nzajor demolition of 

captured mortar rounds, destroy 

ingmore than 1,000pounds ofordname.They assembled the rounds 

under explosive ordnance disposal 

@OD) supervision, placing the 

February 1994 
explosive charges and rounds in 

consecutive layers. EOD personnel then initiated the firing devices set up by the sappers. Thus 

began a sometimes confusingrelationship between the sappers 

and EOD personnel. For the first 

major demolition, the sappers 

needed EOD supervision to teach 

them how to place charges properly. Later the sappers became 

confident of their ability to neutralize conventional ordnance. 

Current doctrine does not adequately address the lash-up of 

engineers and EOD in large-scale 

operations, leaving the issue to 

be resolved by local ground force 

commanders. 

Escalating Tensions 

A	s June progressed, a pattern of escalatine - tensions 

between hostile elements in Somalia and UN and US forces became increasingly evident. LT 

Koprowski and SGT Brown 

served as liaison to Italian special forces to call in American attack helicopter fires during a cordon and search of Aideed's home 

on 17 June. Two days later, 2nd 

Platoon raided an artillery firing 

position and destroyed 34 artillery pieces. Later they participated in a raid on a weapons 

storage site and destroyed thousands of pounds of artillery and 

small arms ammunition. 

Although enemy contacts during combat became frequent by 

the end of June, US casualties remained low. The US engineers 

wounded during Operation Restore Hope's second rotation were 

construction engineers, not sappers involved in combat operations. Three heavy equipment operators from a corps support group 

were wounded in two incidents 

while moving between work sites. 

On both occasions their equipment came under fire after hitting 

mines, and allied units escorting 

the convoy left the engineers when 

the firing began. These incidents 

highlight the importance of running all convoys as combat operations and the need for detailed planning and practice, especially when 

units work with allied forces. 

Enemy attacks of varying intensity on friendly compounds in and 

around Mogadishu occurred almost nightly by late June. These 

attacks involved relatively light 

small arms fire, but the threat to 

the compounds increased significantly on 3 July, when accurate 

mortar fire hit the airfield. A 

rocket-propelled grenade CRPG) 

attack on the Hunter Rase logistics site resulted in two casualties 

on 6 July. 

LT Daniels and three other sappers participated in a raid on 12 

July against Abdi House, the home 

of one ofAideed3s top advisors and 

a known meeting place of his supporters. The raid began with extensive preparation of the objective with TOW missiles fired from 

Cobra gunships. In the assault 

phase, ground troops entered the 

house. Sappers moved through the 

house identifying targets to destroy and collecting captured 

weapons. As the infantry withdrew from the house, the sappers 

initiated thermite grenades on the 

targets. They left on the last helicopter to depart the objective, taking one prisoner. Total time on target: 9 minutes, 30 seconds. 

Cordon and search missions 

continued throughout July as the 

force protection effort around the 

compounds intensified. Sappers 

and other forces destroyed unoccupied buildings around the US Entbassy and University compounds 

to clearfields offire and deny those 

facilities to Sontali snipers. LT Koprowski developed an obstacle 

plan to protect the airfield. The 

equipment section used dozers 

and small emplacement excavators to reinforce clearing operations and increase survivability efforts on all compounds while the 

sustainment effort continued. 

Third Rotation 

The main body of 2-14 Infantry and l/C/41 Engineers, 

led by 2LT Bruce Nelson, arrived 

in Mogadishu 5 August to relieve 

kk Force 1-22. Hostile fire increased significantly when Somali gunmen realized US forces 

were changing over. As 2/C/41 

soldiers sat in the airfield passenger holding area awaiting 

transportation home, they were 

pounded by mortar and rocket 

fire. Meanwhile, Task Force 2-14 

began aggressive cordon and 

searches with the 1lCi41 sappers, 

who also helped the infanhy and 

military police (MP) man checkpoints around the city. Using 

mine detectors to search detainees, the sappers discovered 

many weapons hidden under the 

Somalis' thick layers of clothing. 

Countermobility efforts increased dramatically in response 

to enemy attacks, l/C sappers directed emplacement of miles of 

wire obstacles and antitank 

ditches around the airfield. CPT 

Matt Snyder and SSG Randy 

Montano, who replaced LT Koprowski and SGT Brown as ABE 

and ABE NCO, requested that a 

mechanized engineer platoon with 

combat engineer vehicles and 

mine rollers be brought into Somalia to assist the QRF in keeping 

main supply rout= (MSRs) open. 

To reduce the threat caused by 

travel through Mogadishu, the 

QRF opened a bypass route 

around the city's southern edge. 

While CPT Snyder coordinated for 

additional equipment and personnel, SSG Montano's management 

of the new equipment section increased their output. The engineers added 70,000 square feet to 

the already huge AM2 airfield 

helipad (over 1,000 by 400 feet) 

designed during the second rotation by LT Koprowski. 

On 15 August, the liC participated in another raid aimed at 

February 1994 
arresting key Aideed advisors be- Enemy activity subsided tempolieved responsible for the July kill- rarily in late August, perhaps due 

in@ of US Special Forces and MP to aggressive activity by fresh US 

soldiers. The sappers created an and UN troops. However, the airexpedient breach charge by filling field and embassy compounds 

a U-shaped picket with 8 pounds were soon hit hard again by Soof C-4 explosive. They blew open a mali rocket and mortar fire. After 

new entrance to t,he building by 1 
 enjoying a week doing vertical 

wedging the preconfigured charge i construction tasks in the task 

against an outer wall and detonat- 1 force area, the sappers again went 

ing it. This enabled the assault on the offensive. They conducted a 

team to surprise and overwhelm deliberate attack with the task 

the enemy within. 1 force on a suspected cache site. 

sappers crntin~~eri to inprove 

urotective barriers and suruiu- I 

ability positions on the con?- Combat Operations pounds. The ABE coordinated 

with UNOSOM's operational, in- 0n 25 September, PV2 

telligence and engineer officers Thomas Asbury became 

to analyze Somali actions and de- the first US sapper to sustain a 

velop effective countermeasures. combat-related injury when his 

On 19 August UNOSOM sus- convoy came under direct fire. In 

tained two minor casualties from a hurry to dismount the truck 

the first of several command- and return fire with his M60 madetonated mines along the chine gun, he fell off the truck, 

MSRs. To counter these mines, breaking one rib and bruising 

UNOSOM fabricated a forklift- several others. This happened 

mounted mine roller from when 1st Platoon participated 

tracked-vehicle road wheels and in a rescue team to retrieve a 

angle iron. The makeshift roller helicopter shot down by Somali 

was only minimally effective and gunmen. Four other Americans 

reinforced the need for mecha- were wounded on this mission 

nized engineers and track- and one was killed in action. 

mounted mine rollers. Despite the escalating threat, 

6 Engineer 

Engineers In Task 

Force 1-22 conduct 

convoy security in 

Mogadlehu. In Somalia, every convoy 

had to be treated like 

a combat operation. 

sapper morale remained high. 

The platoon medic, PFC Mark 

Jackson, was always one of the 

first to reach the scene in every 

major action. 

October began with the sappers 

again doing n~inesweeps along the 

MSRs. Tragedy struck when a 

helicopter carrying US Army 

Rangers back from a secret raid 

was shot down on 3 October, in 

downtown Mogadishu. The Rangers were trapped inside the helicopter. Efforts by the rest of the 

Rangers - to rescue them were unsuccessful. 

Finally, UNOSOM organized a 

major rescue effort that included 

Malaysian mechanized forces 

and the QRF. LT Nelson, the 

llCl41 platoon leader, accompanied SSG Reginald Maxwell's 

squad with the lead force; one 

squad went wit,h the follow-on 

force; another remained at the 

airfield to react to hot spots in 

the city. The lead sappers moved 

to the objective in Malaysian 

M113 armored personnel carriers (APC), with LT Nelson riding 

in one APC and SSG Maxwell 

in another. After clearing 

three roadblocks en route, the 

APCs separated at the fourth 

February 1994 
roadblock. LTNelsonand his team 

were forced to continueon foot. 

Meanwhile, SSGMaxwellk APC 

was disabled by an RPG round 

that killed the Malaysian driver. 

As the ramp dropped for the sap 

pers to dismount, they were hit by 

a second RPG volley that wounded 

SGT Cornell Houston and PV2 

Xiong Ly. Both soldiers were able 

to continue the mission. As SSG 

Maxwell checked his team's status, 

a third RPGvolley wounded him in 

the knee.Again, the sappers continued the mission, collecting the 

remaining wounded from t,he rescue force. 

They began withdrawing toward the compound, leading the 

way despite persistent heavy incoming fire. SGT Houston and PV 

Ly, who were serving as point men 

for the wounded, reached the end 

of the wall they were using for 

cover. Fire beyond the wall grew, 

then slackened like a flowing and 

ebbing tide. Finally, SGT Houston 

decided it was time to move. He 

and PV Ly cleared the corner of 

the wall and began crossing the 

open area. Almost at once, they 

were cut down by bursts of heavy 

RPG, machine gun and small 

arms fire. The withdrawal continued along a different route until 

the sappers and the wounded they 

were escorting were picked up by 

trucks from the follow-on force. 

LT Nelson's team continued on 

toward the objective despite intense fire. A 7.62-millimeter round 

smashed the magazine in SPC 

Eric Fullgraf's M16 rifle and gave 

him a superficial shrapnel wound 

in the abdomen. A second later, anot,her round tore through hi upper 

right arm and shoulder, luckily 

missing the bone. An infantry soldier standing between LT Nelson 

and SPC Fullgmf was not so lucky: 

he was killed by enemy fire. LT Nelson had to quit short of the objective 

due to casualties and enemy fire, 

which was so heavy that the team 

t,ook more than 7 hours to withdraw slightly more than 2 miles. 

February 1994 

In some ways the sappers were 

lucb. One mortar round impacted 

within 5 feet of them but incredibly no one was seriously hurt. Another mortar round struck the tree 

beneath which LT Nelson was 

crouching. The tree absorbed most 

of the blast and shrapnel and no 

one was hurt. And while the team 

was moving along a fence approaching a gate, an incoming 

RPG round barely missed SGT 

McCue, hit the gate and blew it 

open. Another time it was skill, not 

luck, that saved the lives of sappers and the wounded they were 

escorting. Shortly before reaching 

the pick-up point, LT Nelson and 

his team were pinned down 

against the near side of a wall they 

were using for cover. The sappers 

used some of their portable demolitions to blow a hole in the wall so 

the force could pass through it 

safely. 

This rescue mission cost 

UNOSOM more than 75 casualties. When the rescue forces reassembled at the University and 

Embassy compounds, SSG Maxwell, SGT Houston and PV Ly 

were evacuated to Germany for 

medical treatment. SGT Houston 

died in Germany of the wounds he 

received in combat. SSG Maxwell 

and PV Ly later returned to the 

US on convalescent leave and 

have since rejoined their company 

at Fort Drum. SPC Fullgraf was 

treated at the aid station and 

returned to light duty with his 

platoon. 

Force Buildup 

A,s ion to rescue the Rangers, 

a result of the costly misthe US government authorized a 

new build-up of American troop 

strength in Somalia. For Fort 

Drum, this meant sending 2-22 

Infantry, A-41 Engineers and 

more support units. Since this 

latest build-up, US engineers in 

Sontalia haue focused on preparing base canzps for the expanded 

force, increasing suruiuability efforts and improving MSR security. The build-up allowed the 

QRF to again become a true 

quick-reaction force. lIC sappers 

trained on breaching drills, and 

trained marksmanship, physical 

fitness and basic soldier skills. 

Well aware of the unstable 

situation in Mogadishu, they 

fully briefed new sappers to 

prepare them for possible conflict escalation. 

Sappers in all three rotations 

built weapons ranges for themselves and others to use in perfecting marksmanship. They also 

completed vertical construction 

projects for various customers. 

Equipment operators worked almost nonstop during their rotations to improve survivability 

and support the constant sustainment needs of the compounds. Sappers conducted many 

more cordon and search and 

demolitions operations. Periodically, they took time out to enjoy the sunshine and relax from 

the tensions of combat and being 

so far from home. 

The sappers, medics, and equipment operators of Charlie Company, 41st Engineers, are combatproven soldiers. As the last 

sappers return toFort Drum, C-41 

is using the lessons learned to prepare for an upcoming rotation at 

the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter and for the next real-world 

mission. Y 

Captain Sheldon S. Kaufian is currently serving as commander of C 

Company, 41st Engineer Battalion, 

10th Mountain Diuiswn (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY Pieuwus assiflments include service in Germany 

and in Sozrthwest Asia during Operatwns Desert Shield1Deser-t Sto~m as 

platoon leadel: assistant S3 and 54, 

company XO and Adjutant of 41st 

Engineer Battalion. A graduate of 

EOAC and the US. Army Ranger 

School, Captain Kauffman holds a 

B.S. in nuclear engineering fvom 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Tbq, 

hw 

A fer a Year in Somalia: 


A Battalion Commander's View 


By Lieutenant Colonel Peter T. Madsen 

Ayear ago the US Army got 

the call to support the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia. Since then many great soldiers have faithfully served the 

United Nations efforts, first by 

assisting the effort to relieve 

widespread starvation and then 

by maintaining peaceful conditions to encourage nation building. Peacemaking and peacekeeping. Not new missions but 

ones that US forces are likely to 

encounter more often in the postCold War environment. Engineers will play a major role in 

both missions. 

During peacemaking operations 

in Somalia, engineers in all services improved the country's infrastructure dramatically, thereby 

improving food distribution and 

security. In the peacekeeping 

phase of Operation Restore Hope, 

engineers gave key support to urban security operations while also 

maintaining roads and major city 

thoroughfares. Force protection 

and base construction support 

were major engineer missions 

throughout both phases. 

ARer this year's experience, I 

believe it is worthwhile to assess, 

evaluate and comment. There are 

lessons in the Somalia experience 

that will translate to future contingency operations. The lessons 

cross the spectrum of training, doctrine, facilities, equipment and 

personnel; they are worthy of 

discussion. 

Good News 

The good news is that the 

soldiers in the force are 

highly motivated, brave young 

men and women willing to do any 

mission they are tasked to perform. Young engineer soldiers in 

Somalia followed leaders into 

combat operations less than two 

months after graduation from 

One Station Unit Training at 

Fort Leonard Wood. And they did 

well. 

In a land where everything is 

scarce, leaders found ways to execute seemingly impossible tasks. 

Civil affairs, psychological operations and interservice coordination 

were performed exceedingly well 

by engineers with little prior experience. Units continue to demonstrate their ability to deploy, respond to a crisis, and plan and 

execute missions. Soldiers continue to demonstrate great flexibility and versatility In addition to 

normal METL-related missions, 

sappers built Bailey brides and 

performed base camp master 

planning while combat heavy 

engineers constructed water well 

rip, built playgrounds at orphanages, and roofed base camp villages with sheet metal. These are 

just a few examples of the varied 

missions engineers performed. 

What does seem to challenge our 

soldiers are long periods of deployment. Short, fast-paced field training exercises do not prepare oursoldiers well for the monotony of a 

long deployment. Yet our leaders 

stood up to that challenge as well, 

most often by providing tough 

training and organizingatbletics. 

But what are the lessons? 

Urban Terrain 

Somalia has given the Army 

a significant urban terrain 

experience. Engineer support to 

maneuver forces on patrols, convoys, and guard duty takes on 

new meaning when it is conducted in a populated city. Cordon and search is t,he new urban 

maneuver for patrolling. Key reaction drills to sniper fire or an 

attack are very difkrent in a city 

alley as opposed those occurring 

on a training area range road. 

Sappers have become key players 

on urban patrols. Packing demolitions in their rucksacks, they 

are always ready to blow holes in 

8 Engineer Februa~y1994 
walls that might otherwise corner them. 

Military operations in urban 

terrain (MOUT) training has always been part of our calendar, 

but where can Army trainers replicate a city of one million, complete with women, children, refugees and street markets? Future 

contingency missions, whether for 

peacekeeping or peacemaking 

purposes, are likely to put soldiers 

in hostile villages, towns and cities. United Nations forces are 

struggling now in the cities of Bosnia. In Haiti, Port-au-Prinw will 

always be the center of activity, 

Training for Army engineers in 

the United States is conducted primarily in nonurban environments. 

Training conducted at the National 

Training Center, Joint hadines 

Training Center, Ranger School, 

Sapper Leader Course, and at most 

home station field training exercises are examples. MOUT cities 

are expensive and require an installation MCA (military construction, 

Army) investment. While that investment is needed, unitsmust look 

for other ways to train now. Old 

World War I1 barracks on a remote 

corner of many installations can 

serve as urban training grounds until better facilities are built. Urban 

training must be a priority. 

Countermine Operations 

Fvery conflict since World 

d~ar I1 has identified the 

need to improve the way we conduct countermine operations. 

Soldiers in Somalia today are 

facing mine threats that range 

from old, patterned minefields 

buried in remote locations years 

ago to command-detonated nuisance mines on key city thoroughfares. Vast quantities of 

mines are oRen found during mrdon and search missions or in remote cache points. Mines from all 

mine-producing nations are found 

in Somalia. 

Yet our mine-detection technology still risks soldiers' lives. Soldiers walking with hand-held detectors or ridingin a D7 dozer with 

a plow attachment and cab enclosure still search for them. Forward looking infrared (FLIR) devices in helicopters have some 

success in identifying mines, but 

putting a helicopter at risk above 

a city is not the answer. Robotic 

detectors make more sense. 

Protective measures are another issue. Army Rangers went to 

Somalia in September 1993 with 

new suits of body armor. Since 

then, more suits have been procured for the forces in theater. 

Where was this body armor in 

January, when units first deployed? Where are the mineblast kits for HWMMVs as they 

escort food convoys in to and out 

of cities? 

From this battalion commander's perspective, a variety of 

activities are working pieces of the 

mine issue at Fort Belvoir, Fort 

Leonard Wood, and in Charlottesville, Virginia. But who has the 

lead and who is directing the scarce 

research and development resources to eliminate overlaps and 

voids? Mine recognition guides from 

each organization show the independence of their efforts. 

The facts are scary, As urban 

populations turn hostile to 

peacekeepers, incidences of command-detonated mines and booby 

trap usage rise. Our best detection 

measure is still t,he individual soldier with a hand-held device. We 

need to do much better. 

Force Protection 

The most important mission 

for a deployed unit is force 

protection. Heavy and light task 

forces were flown to Somalia in 

October 1993 to improve force 

protection. On their heels a combat heavy engineer battalion was 

shipped in with enough Class IV 

materials to build the base for 

the heavy force. 

Engineers will always play a 

key role in designing and constructing the security measures 

needed to protect deployed units 

and improve their living wnditions. Wire fences, guard towers, 

checkpoints and roadblocks are examples of rudimentary construction that combat engineers deployed with maneuver forces will 

always be asked to provide. They 

will need the power tools and 

skills that we tookaway from combat engineer organizations many 

years ago. The same requirements 

for combat engineers were identified during Desert Shield. Units 

fare well today because many good 

carpenters still exist wit,hin the 

NCO Corps, but time is running 

out. The future will have fewer 

combat heavy engineer battalions. 

It is time to retool and retrain our 

engineers. 

The Challenge 

Undoubtedly, other engineer 

lessons can be drawn from 

our experiences in Somalia. Yet 

recent experiences of combat in 

an urban environment, countermine operations, and force-protection challenges highlight engineer training, equipment and 

doctrinal needs. These same 

challenges will likely be faced in 

future peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. The challenges engineers faced in Somalia have taught us lessons we 

must not ignore. Y 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter T.Madsen is 

the battalw~~ commander for the 41st 

Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain 

Division. Other assignments included 

tours with the 8Znd Airbolne Division, Germany, and the Missouri 

River Diviswn. A CGSC gr.arEuate, he 

holds a bachelors degive porn West 

Point and a masters deg~ee in civil 

engineering fiwm Georgia Tech. 
Reserve Engineer Training in Europe: 


The 412th ENCOM Program 


By Lieutenant Colonel Dale W. Jones 

ntil recently, meaningful mission-oriented 

training opportunities in Europe for Re-


sc,rve Component (KC) combat heavy engineers 


were few and far between. Past REFORGER (Re- 


turn of Forces to Germany) exercises, for exam- 


ple, offered excellent training for combat engi- 


neers at corps and division levels. Little atten- 


tion, however, was paid to engineers operating 


at echelons above corps (EAC), where most com- 


bat heavy battalions are located. Now, the 412th 


Engineer Command (ENCOM), in conjunction 


with the engineer staff of the United States 


Army, Europe (USAREUR), has developed a rem- 


edy. It's a program that simultaneously supports 


USAREUR's sustainment engineering require- 


ments while affording valuable METL training 


to the combat heavy battalions and other EAC 


engineer units of the National Guard and Army 


Reserve. 


Background 

Two factors are ~rincipallv responsible for 

4 . " 

the increased Gaining opportinities for 


RC combat heavy engineer units in Europe and 


the development of the 412th ENCOM program: 


the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI) and 


the ongoing drawdown of forces in theater. 


Emphasizing mobility and offensive action in 


support of maneuver elements, ERI reorganized 


divisional engineer support from one large engi- 


neer battalion to an engineer brigade that in- 


cludes an austere brigade headquarters and 


three small but equipment-intensive battalions. Members of the 216th Engineers (Ohio National Guard) use a SEE 

More importantly for the combat heavy to upgrade ranges at the Grefenwoehr Tralning Area. 

10 Engineer February I994 
Members of the 216th I 

,, .,. , 	 Englneer Battalion demolish a World War IIvintage bunker. Some 

demolltlon projects 

were required lo re- 

' 8 J 	 move safely hazards 

prior to constructlon. 

battalions, however, ERI removed them from the engineering capability (the combat heavy engineer 

corps engineer brigade structure. They are now battalions) was drastically reduced (Figure 1). Only 

EAC assets with responsibility in the corps area. one heavy battalion (-1 and one construction supIn USAREUR, ERI was initiated about the same port equipment company capable of performing 

time that the Army's drawdown began in theater. troop construction and sustainment engineering 

The 18th Engineer Brigade, a theater asset consist- missions now reside in theater. This has resulted 

ing of four combat heavy engineer battalions, was in a significant shortfall between sustainment reinactivated in 1992. Only one of its heavy battal- quirements and capabilities. 

ions, the 94th (-1, remains in theater. Two battalions and the brigade headquarters were inacti- Program Development vated, while t,he 293rd Engineer Battalion was 

restructured under ERI and reflagged as the 40th ahe 412th ENCOM program addresses a sigEngineer Battalion of the 1st Armored Division. nificant portion of the shortfall between engiThe upshot of this is that although sustainment neer requirements and capabilities. within a 

engineering requirements in theater diminished month of receiving the tasking, the ENCOM Forsomewhat as a result of the drawdown, sustainment ward, a USARETJR.~~~~~, full-time planning and 

operations staff, had developed a concept for RC trainTheater Engineer 

'Work AIialysis 	 ing and construction in 

Europe. The 22 AGR and 

Reserve soldiers making up Sustainrnent .inn ron,*i, .*monte engineem ,, 
, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,.a 

D 


m 

0 


4 I n-theater t 2 	 !? 

z 

a,


.-c 	 '2- m 

C 	

LU 	 capability + -

Flgure 1 

the ENCOM Forward then 

developed a marketing strategy that was agreeable to 

both USAREUR and RC 

principal staff. By the time 

the 412th ENCOM staff exercise (STAFFEX 93) was conducted in February 1993, 

they had developed a draft 

concept of operations that 

was heartily endorsed by the 

senior leadership. 

The program was then 

briefed to the Chief, Army 

February 1994 	 Engineer 11 
RC Engineer Training and Construction in USAREUR 

412th ENCOM Program Ptrases 

Phase I (Prototype) 1993 

Develop and prioritize the 1994 USAREUR RC troop construction list; par 

Review Committee. 

ticipate i 

,.,..3"+.dc 

n the Construction 

m Manage RC engineer troop construction program at Grafenwoehr and HV,,=~,,=,,, Germany and at 

Camp Darby, Italy. (One battalion at Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels. and one battal, P Darby.) 

Phase I/ (Interim) 1994 

m Serve as RC troop construction agent for USAREUR. 

m Manage Wo battalions and two companies at GrafenwoehrMohenfels,a 

Darby. 

ion at Cam 

nd one b;ittalion at Camp 

Phase 111(Fully Operational) 1995 

Manage four battalions at GrafenwoehrMohenfelsand one battalion at Camp [ 

I 

Figure 2 

Reserve, who stated that it could serve as the "template" for what the Army Reserve should do in 

USAREUR. He also committed to maintaining 

the high levels of overseas deployment training 

(ODT)funding necessary for program success. 

-

ahe program will develop in phases over a 

three-year ueriod beginning in 1993: it will 

be fullv on-line in 1995 - 27 The ultimate

goal is to send five or six battalion-sized combat 

heavy or equivalent engineer units on back-to-back, 

3-week annual training rotations to USAREUR during the peak construction months from April 

through August. The RC engineers will be based 

primarily at major training areas (MTAs) in Germany (Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels). If required, 

the engineers can move to support outlying base 

support battalions (BSBs) and Directorates of Engineering and Housing (DEHs). One battalion will be 

based in Italy to train with and support the Southern European Task Force. 

The engineers' annual training status will cover 

pay and allowances, ODT funds will cover CONUS 

to OCONUS and return travel, and the MTAs and 

BSBs will support the units' housing and messing 

requirements. Engineer construction equipment initially (1993 and 1994) will be drawn from POMCUS but later will be drawn from engineer equipment parks organized and located to support 

projects at the MTAs. Construction materials will 

be funded by USAREUR and drawn by the supported area support group or DEH. 

Construction projects that RC engineers will 

accomplish are designed to provide excellent METL 

(mission essential task list) training for EAC engineer units (typically combat heavy engineer units) 

and to alleviate the sustainment engineering and 

troop construction needs of USAREUR. The mission of a combat heavy engineer unit (company or 

battalion) at EAC is "to perform construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation of facilities and lines of 

communication (LOCs) in support of the theater of 

operations" (FM 5-116, Engineer Operations: Echelons Aboue Corps). Therefore, projects reserved for 

RC engineers will provide training on the individual and collective skills needed to perform this mission. Both horizontal and vertical construction are 

included. Some rotations will also have an opportunity to operate under realistic combat conditions in 

support of maneuver forces. This training will take 

place in one of the maneuver training boxes at 

Grafenwoehr's Combat Maneuver Training Center. 

Project Proposals, Review, 

and Selection 

Appropriate projects for RC engineer training 

and construction will be determined by representatives of the 412th ENCOM at USAREUR's annual Construction Review Committee (CRC). The 

five-member CRC represent USAREUR Deputy 

Chiefs of Staff Engineer, Operations, Personnel, Resource Management, and Logistics. The committee 

selects projects to be funded under the Troop 

Construction Program and assigns them a priority 

based on CINC priorities and the training value for 

engineers, as determined by the 130th Engineer 

Brigade and the 412th Engineer Command. 

February 1994 
Development of projects for the Troop Construction 

Program, of which the 412th ENCOM program 

forms an important slice, follows a five-step process: 

m ASGDEH develop troop construction project 

proposals. 

m 412th ENCOM/130th Engineer Brigade selects 

project proposals, based on CINC's troop construction priorities and engineer training 

value. 

USAREUR CRC develops priority lkt for project funding. 

m DCINC reviews and approves the CRC recommendations. 

USAREUR provides resources for approved 

projects. 

Because more than two years lead time is required to plan and secure slots in the ODT plan, 

participating RC engineer units are identified well 

in advance of the selection process outlined above. 

For example, the 1994 CRC met in June 1993 but 

the 194th Engineer Brigade (Tennessee National 

Guard) received the request in November 1992 to 

perform ODT and troop construction at 

USAREUR's major training areas in 1994. Similarly, the 411th Engineer Brigade (U.S.Army Reserve) knows that it has the mission in 1995, and 

the 30th Engineer Brigade (North Carolina National Guard) is planning for operations in 1996. 

Early identification of engineer construction units 

meets the program's planning requirements and allows the brigades to send design and construction 

I 

.?. ,-

A,' :?? ..,*q:+i:.B 

.;.7. 

. * 

reconnaissance teams to USAREUR after their projects are selected. 

1993Test 

peration Certain Construction, the test case 

for the 412th ENCOM program, was successfully completed in September 1993 by the 216th Engineer Battalion, 16th Engineer Brigade, Ohio National Guard. In late March, an advance party of the 

216th arrived in theater to draw engineer equipment 

from the combat equipment concentration site at Pirmasens, Germany for rail shipment to Grafenwoehr. 

By early April, the fint of eight company (-) construction rotations had begun to construct concrete tank 

turn pads and develop maneuver corridors for the 

Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas. In June, 

the engineers of the 216th were joined by the 728th 

Engineer Utilities Detachment (USAR) from Kentucky. The 728th engineers focused on vertical construction projects. In the process, this training became a total army effort, with Guard and Reserve engineers working and training side-by-side in support of the Active Component soldien. 

By September, the test case was winding down 

as the 216th completed its projects, turned in equipment, submitted after action reports and lessons 

learned to the 16th Engineer Brigade and the 

412th Engineer Command, and returned to the 

U.S. The 412th ENCOM staff, however, did not 

have time to relax. They were deeply involved in 

preparing for the 1994 RC engineer training and 

construction cycle and planning for 1995. 

The 2l6th Engineer Battalion improved maneuver corridors and constructed concrete lank 

turn pads at Grafen. 

woehr and Hohenfels 

MTAs durlng Operation 

Certain Conslruc1lon 93. 

Februa~1994 Engineer 13 
Lessons Learned 

with the completion of the 1993 test case, 

some lessons will be incorporated in future 

RC engineer rotations to USAREUR: 

- Commanders at all levels must develop sound 

training plans that maximize the unique opportunities afforded by overseas deployment training and 

the 412th ENCOM program. 

- A selective "slice" of company- and battalionlevel command and control and support personnel 

is required to augment each construction rotation, 

especially when a rotation is smaller than company 

size. Command and control cells can resolve problems 

of coordination and support, thereby allowing smaller 

construction rotations to focus on work projects. 

- The 412th ENCOM must "design for success" by 

selecting and tailoring projects that can be accomplished within the 18 construction days available to 

each 22-day ODT rotation. Additionally, they must define to mutual satisfaction the customer and unit expectations about the level of support required, construction standards, and management procedures. 

- lb ensure continuity of training operations and 

maintenance activities, select personnel are required for the duration of all construction rotations. These personnel can be provided through the 

Reserve's Linkup Program, the Guard's Key Personnel Upgrade Program, or through short (179 day) 

active duty for special work tours. 

- Troop construction funding, design development, and 

design approval cycles must be integrated into the 

5-year ODT cycle to achieve mherent program planning. 

Conclusion 

The 412th ENCOM's RC engineer training and 

construction program in U~AREURrepresents a "win-win" situation. By assuming a significant portion of the theater's sustainment engineering requirements, the program directly supports 

training and quality of life for AC soldiers stationed in Europe. In training RC engineers in a realistic contingency environment, the program enhances the skills and readiness of Reserve and 

Guard engineers. 

Simply stated, the 412th ENCOM program is the 

best training available for EAC engineers. It includes mobilization, OCONUS deployment, construction, construction management, and reconstitution-xactly what RC engineers will do if called 

up for contingency or war. Id 

Lieutenant Colonel Jones ispmfessor ofMiEita~y Science for 

the Amy ROTCpmgmm at the Uniuersiiy of Terns at Arlington. P~wious assignments include 412th ENCOM liaison 

ofwr to USAREUR; Chief of Plans and Operations, 412th 

ENCOM Forwad; Commander, HHC, 613th Engineer Battalion (Combat); and platoon leader wiih th 86th Engineer 

Battalion (Combat) Land Clearing Team in Vieinam. He has 

a Ph.D. fmm the Uniuersity of Wisconsin-Madison and is a 

gmduate of the Command and General StaffCollege. 

II 


/ By Sergeant First Class Rick Steward 

Acarpenter's square (C-sq~are) has several numoerea measurements ana a tferent scales depending on their use. Three series are manufactured: rafter 

framing, Eureka standard, and standard. The 'Yace" of 

the square has the maker's symbol, and the opposite 

side is the "back." The blade of the "body" is longer an d 

wider than the 'Tongue" blade, which is shorter and narrow. Let's discuss the rafter framing series. 

Rafter framing rules, or explanations, a1 


stamped on the face of the bod) t of the rai 


framing square. 


To determine the length of the wrnmon rafter for 

a building, use the first line of numbeta -",a",*ha .-am. 

fIaming C-square, which gives the lerWfora 1 'foot vertical 

run of the roof.For example, if a roof rises 9 inch,tothefoot,

.-~ look directly under 9 (on the first l~ne ~z.,~-. 

or me oody), .. and 

Framing with a Carpenter's Square 


4ssume yau are installing rafters in a building that Is 

18 feet wide. To determine the common rafter run, divldt ...:A*,. -'.G .A,.,.,-,.. "- wlucrl ut me building in half (18 +2 = 9). ~v~u~t~ply 

that number by the comr non rafter length (9 x 15.00 = 

LllW 

13:5 inches);c:onvert to fseet: (135 t- 12 = 11-114 feet). .. .... . . .... .. , Th;x's all tnere IS to a! ~n tnls example, the common rafter run is 11-114 feet. 

Tongue 

114 4 11

To determine the angle on the ends of the 

tom and top ends), use number 12 on the bol 

C-square and number 9 on the tongue. 

you will see the figure "1 5.00." Thu! s, for a I -foot vertical C Steward is VerNcal 

run, the common rafter I'ength is 15 .OO inches. 'he Engine,er School. 

14 Engineer February 1994 
The following articles an, part of an on-going discussion among Amy engineers about the opemtional tenet of synchronizntion 

and reflect the cornphi@of this ksw. Cbmmats or articles discussing other synchronizafion components ate welmme. 

Synchronization 

"Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the 

decisive point ...Synchronization seeks to gain overwhelming combat 

power...[It/ usually requites explicit coordination among the various units 

and activities participating in any operation ...In a fo~e projection army the 

abili* to synchronize operations becomes paramount." (FM100.5) 

War Gaming and Synchronizing 


an Operation 


By Major George G. DeMarse 

The tactical decision-making 

process provides the framework for commanders and stafk 

to plan and formulate tactical 

plans. It's my opinion that the 

most critical and most misunderstood step in the process is 

course of action (COA) analysis 

and war gaming. This article attempts to answer the following 

questions: What is the fundamental purpose of war gaming? 

How is the war-gaming process 

conducted? And, how do engineers participate? 

The Purpose 

bservations at the National Training Center indicate that few commanders and 

staff officers understand the 

purpose and application of war 

gaming. Although war gaming 

involves assessing a course of action's feasibility and other factors 

(advantages and disadvantages), 

the brigade staff's primary role 

in war gaming is to synchronize 

the capabilities of the brigade. 

Synchronization is timing. In 

war gaming, the brigade staff 

analyzes time and distance as it 

relates to critical events and battlefield functions. 

Current Army doctrine fails to 

highlight the importance of synchronizing through the war-gaming process. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (under 

revision), discusses war gaming as 

part of the commander's estimate 

of the situation. The word "synchronization" is never used to describe the purpose of war gaming. 

At the maneuver brigade level, 

the brigade engineer is responsible for synchronizingand applying 

engineer capabilities to achieve 

the particular effect and outcome 

expected by the brigade commander. The brigade engineer 

must analyze the battlefield 

through time and space to determine when and where to apply the 

assets that will achieve the commander's desired effect. This is 

the essence of war gaming. 

The Process 

W	ar gaming, as the word 

implies, is a mme. 

- In all 

games, there is some degree of 

organization and certain parameters and rules. Without an understanding of the rules, teams 

or individuals normally wander 

about hopelessly. This often happens when brigade sta% don't understand the rules of war gaming. 

Brigade trainers at the National 

Training Center (NTC) have assimilated a war-gaming process 

based on many rotations of observing brigade staffs flounder in war 

gaming. To highlight the importance of organization and synchronization, they have developed a 

February 1994 	 Engineer 15 
-. two-step approach. First they as- /

sess the feasibility of a COA; then 

they produce synchronization. 

This sequence is important. 

The first step, called the hasty 

or initial war game, assesses feasibility through force-ratio analysis. 

In this step brigade staffs begin to 

identify critical tasks and events. 

They cannot synchronize a battle 

without first identifying the critical events, both friendly and enemy Many staffs begin to struggle 

at this point. They assemble to 

war game but invariahly produce 

a synchronization matrix that 

only tells a story They do not produce a precise script that includes 

detailed timing to achieve the desired effects. 

For example, the brigade ongineer or his representative may fail 

to identify a combined arms 

breaching operation as a critical 

event. As the staff attempts to 

war-game and fight the battle, 

they focus on filling the synchronization matrix with tasks-and neglect the timing aspect of the battle. Consequently, the brigade fails 

to mass combat power at the decisive point to support the breaching 

operation The brigade engineer's 

problem lies in not identifying the 

breaching operation as "critical" 

early in the war-gaming process. 

This critical event must be identified before he analyzes the force 

ratios used to determine the forces 

required to conduct the breach. 

The second step, called the detailed or deliberate war game, focuses on synchronizingthecapabilities of the brigade. After the staff 

has completed the initial war game, 

they present their recommended 

COA to the commander. Then they 

conduct a detailed war game based 

on his decision, as shown on the 

figure (page 17). They focus on analyzing time and distance to determine when and where combat functions must be applied to achieve 

the commander's desired results. 

In a breaching operation, the 

brigade staff war-games through 

detailed actions, reactions, and 1 

counteractions. Reverse planning 

is the doctrinal norm for war-gaming a breach. As the staff wargames from actions on the objective back to the line of departure, 

a myriad of tasks are synchronized. For example, fire support 

must be synchronized to determine when and where the artillery 

must be located to provide the desired effect for suppression, obscuration, or counterfire. The staff 

predicts when and where actions 

on the objective will occur. This 

will determine when and where 

the breaching operation will take 

place (point of penetration). The 

staff also war-games other battlefield functions (such as close air 

support, air defense, smoke, casualty evacuation assets, military 

police, and electronic intelligence 

warfare) to position them at the 

right place and time to achieve a 

fully synchronized plan. 

Efficient war gaming requires a 

well trained staff that is intimately familiar with war gaming 

and group dynamin. To be successful, the staff officers must set 

aside ego boundaries and function 

as a group. Staff training must focus on the groups' ability to analyze critical events and predict the 

timing sequence needed to achieve 

synchronization. 

Engineer Participation 

To function effectively in the 

war-gaming process, the 

brigade engineer must understand how he participates as a 

brigade staff officer and how his 

staff participates and war-games 

at the battalion level. As the brigade engineer, the battalion commander must understand his 

role. Moreover, he must understand the roles of other battlefield operating systems (intelligence, maneuver, fire support, 

air defense, etc.) 

On several occasions, I have observed brigade staffs painfully 

grind through the war-gaming 

process. Their heads were not in 

the ball game. Why? Either they 

came unprepared for the wargaming session or the brigade or 

engineer battalion staffs were inadequately trained. The engineer 

staff officer needs the right tools 

before he can effectively participate in the war game. He must 

thoroughly understand his unit's 

capabilities. He also needs to 

know how to best employ his mobilitylsurvivability BOS and how 

it applies to other BOSS. 

The engineer staff officer must 

not wait until he arrives at the 

NTC and starts his first planning 

process to develop EBA products. 

EBA products to support the wargaming process should be continuously maintained at the home station. One excellent technique is to 

develop a battle book that includes 

all the information needed to wargame, integrate, and synchronize 

critical tasks. The battle book 

should include, at a minimum, 

unit capabilities, time and distance factors, movement rates, 

and appropriate doctrinal templates. This information should be 

assembled as it applies to a critical 

task or event. An appendix in the 

initial draft of FM 5-71-3, Brigade 

Engineer Combat Operations, includes a checklist that staff officers can also use to develop a hattle book. 

Doctrinal Needs 

The Army needs to develop 

doctrine that better describes the war-gaming process. 

Student Text 100-9, The Tactical 

Decision-nzaking Process, a nondoctrinal manual used at Fort 

Leavenworth, fails to establish a 

clear picture as to how the wargaming proms is organized and 

performed. While doctrine writers are now revising FM 101-5, 

Command and Control for Cornntanders and Staff, the initial 

draft is mainly a compilation of 
FM 101-5 and ST 100-9.In my 

opinion, the new manual need. a 

chapter that describes how war 

gaming is used to achieve syn- Tactical Decision-Making Process chronization. The Army needs a 

method of defining when to asI Receive the Mission I sess feasibility and when to synIssue lnnial warn~gorder I chronize a COA. 


I The technique taught at the 


rl I Mission Analysis I NTC and described in this article 


I S3 I I S2 I is a good start. It clearly high- 


write Identify: lnital IPB: lights the primary role of war
 planning time.li"e Specnred 1811 Area evaluation 

lrnpl!ed tasks Telraln analysis gaming-to synchronize the battle 

ReEtralnlS WeatheiAigM analysis 

:I Doctrinal templais 

Cmslraints mreat and achieve the effects and out- evaluation 

I Combat power I come expected by the commander. 

It organizes the process so brigade 

I staffs can properly fight the battle 

I Mission Brief to the Commander 1 and focus on synchronizingcritical 

Commandeis plannins guidance events on the battlefield. lnnial PIR 

a 


What Now? 

his article is intended to 

promote interest and generate ideas on how and whiengiI Anavze ilnnal ws. oamel each COA I r - anaiys,~ 

I

I neers conduct the war-gaming I ~ombareb~~s aginst eecndwr 1 argstva~~e 

process. I believe that our ability Rec~mrneldCOA 1 

1 to contribute to the success of a I

I COA Dec,rion Brief 1 battle is related to our capacity 

to war game and synchronize. 

G~veanlenVcancept Combat engineer tasks, both offensive and defensive, require detailed war gaming to ensure all 

I BOSS are integrated to achieve 

1 Detailed War Geme of COA 1 the desired effect. Remember, 

1 Frendv and enew crtllcal events 1851s 1 synchronization is achieved 1 Event template- R8S pian 1 through detailed war gaming. 

The timely application of combat 

power produces the force re- I OPORD Brief 1 quired to mass and destroy the 

enemy on any battlefield. Y 

I issue I 

Order 1 Major George G. DeMarse is cu17~ntly I 

I Write arderlstan annexes serving as the Senior Writer~llnst~uctor Produce overiavs at the Engineer Schml. He pi~uwwly 

serd as a tnsk foive engineel buiner 

and engineer Mwn staff trainer at 

the National noining Center Other assignments include platoon leadel; executive ofice?; and company commandef. in 

the 4th Engineer Battalion, 4th Infanby 

Diuision, F0r.t Carson; and Assistant 

S3, 23rd Engineer Battalion, 3rd AIL 

mod Division. Major DeMarse holds a 

masters degree in business fiwn Husson 

College, Bangor; ME and is a g~nduate of 

the Command and General Staff College. 

February 1994 Engineer 17 

1-

Visualizing 2Minel~o ugtermine Operations 


as Part of Synchronization 


By Major Keith Kowadlo 

he new FM 100-5, Operalions, states that n major 

responsibility of commanders is 

to "visualize" the battlefield in 

order to formulate concepts of 

operations needed to accomplish 

the mission. Embodied in the 

combat function of battle command, visualizing the battlefield 

assists mmmandem with integrating and mordinating combat functions to achieve "synchronization." 

As we engineers grapple with 

the "S" word, we must appreciate 

that the genesis of synchronization lies in our ability to visualize 

the battlefield. Visualization includes the ability to "see" the 

threatandtheengineers'response 

to it. We used to study the Soviet 

threat exclusively. Today, we must 

also be able to visualize new, 

emerging, or unrecognized threats, 

including the mine warfare threat. 

Failure to do so can drastically affect combat operations, as the following vignette shows. 

1 

1 

/

i 

I 

The commander is frushated. Since hi8 entr) into the 

battlefield six days ago, he has 

been unable to get out and 

"see" the battlefield as he was 

accustomed to doing when 

training back at home station. 

He is now forced to wait for his 

vehicularsecurity armada tocrssemble before he can move because traveling on the main supply routes (MSR) is dangerous. 

Things are not going as the 

commander had planned. His 

fire and maneuver are not complementary in the traditional 

sense. There is no enemy at 

which to fire, and his ability to 

maneuver is tenuous at best. 

The resupply convoys frequently run into enemy point 

minefields, seriously disrupting their ability to logistically 

sustain the force. The Stinger 

teams are not being resupplied, which degrades their 

ability to protect the force's 

"lifeline"-the flight landing

; strip (FLS).Mortar roundsand 

potable water are scarce. 

Ground MEDEVACSand Class 

III resupply have slowed down. 

Because of the mine threat, 

the commander orders that no 

vehicles move at night. He 

knows the engineers are doing 

their best to clear the MSRs of 

the point minefields, but their 

efforts are not enough. The engineers never know where to 

concentrate their efforts and 

the staff does not know how to 

handle this kind of operation. 

The commander senses he is 

, losing the initiative; therefore, 

he begins to divert combat 

power to the security escorting 

of convoys. Instead of finding 

and destroying the enemy, his 

massive advantage in firepower is now focused onconvoy 

escort! He wonders if anyone 

appreciates the impact of those 

point minefields on his force. 

18 Engineer February 1994 
"Visualizing the battlefield, its threats and our 


response to those threats, is the starting point for 


engineers in our endeavor to achieve 


synchronization." 


MineICountermine 


Operations 


both war and operations In 

other than war, minelcountermine operations pose a great 

challenge to engineers and commanders. As stated in FM 5-101, 

Mobility, "U.S, forces conduct 

mobility tasks to obtain and 

maintain t,he freedom of both 

tactical and operational maneuver...Countermine is a subcomponent of mobility that concentrates solely on the actions taken 

to counteract a mine or minefield 

through detecting, reducing, or 

bypassing." Mines have historically 

posed a formidable threat to modern ground combat foroes and will 

continue to do so in the future. 

Mine Threat 

he U.S. State Department 

recentlv com~leted a worldwide investigation in which they 

tasked U.S. Embassies to assess 

the magnitude of uncleared land 

mines in their respective countries. Their findings, compiled in 

a report titled "Hidden Killersthe Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines," estimate 

there are more than 85 million 

uncleared landmines in 62 countries, Many of these mines and 

minefields are unmarked and unrecorded. In future battlefields, 

the possibility of Army engineers 

encountering uncleared mines, as 

well as conducting tradition4 mine/-

countermine missions, is great. 

One need only watch the nightly 

news to appreciate the effectiveness with which mines are employed. Easily obtainable on the 

world market, mines are relatively cheap, easily maintained, 

and have a longshelf life. They are 

"on duty" 24 hours a day, require 

no logistical support, and are indiscriminate killers. Additionally, 

today's mines are "smarter" than 

those produced in World War 11. 

Technology enables today's mines 

to arm themselves, distinguish between targets, and self-destruct if 

disturbed. As scatterable and offroute mines increase the lethality 

of the battlefield, they also increase the challenges faced by engineers tasked to clear them. 

Mines are clearly a combat multiplier and are likely to remain the 

poor man's weapon of choice. Our 

response to this threat depends initially on how effectively we can 

detect them. How do you conduct a 

route clearance mission to ensure 

mobility? To neutralize a mine or 

minefield (when not under fire) is 

a relatively straight-forward task 

if you know where to begin. But 

first you have to know where! 

Finding buried mines is a great 

challenge for engineers. 

Mine Detection 

The view from my foxhole at 

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is that engineers are not very good at detecting buried mines. We have assets 

for breaching minefields while 

under fire but we have relatively 

few assets for detecting buried 

mines on MSRs or FLSs. There 

are four detection methods: visual, physical, electronic, and mechanical. The mechanical method 

(mine rollers) holds great promise for detecting buried mines on 

MSRs without tearing up roads 

in the process. However, mine 

rollers are seldom considered at 

the JRTC. Since physical and 

visual methods are either impractical or overlooked, by default we rely on the electronic 

method, the hand-held mine detector. This method, however, is 

slow: Dismounted engineers using mine detectors to conduct 

route sweeping operations require time (FM 20-32, MinelCountermine Operations, suggests 1-3 kilometers per hour 

(kmhr) and 3-5 kmbr for deliberate and hasty sweeps, respectively). Additionally, dismounted 

soldiers present very lucrative 

targets. 

Based on my experience, engineers and commanders do not ap 

preciate the importance of the mobility mission and usually 

underestimate the time required 

for route clearance operations. 

These activities invariablyrequire 

more time and assets than staffs 

allocate, and they can quickly desynchronize a commander's plan. 

This shortfall is indicative of poor 

staff planning, resulting from a 

basic failure to visualize the battlefield. It is my experience that 

units training at the JRTC do not 

adequately visualize the battlefield that the JRTC portrays. 

February 1994 Engineer 19 
1 Compounding this is the slow ' to move forces and material to any The JRTC Environment 1 dissemination ofOBSTINTEL(ob- point in an area of operations is 

stacle intelligence) regarding the basic to combat power and often The battlefield at the JRTC 

is nonlinear and closely re- status of mines on the MSRs and decides the outcome of combat 

sembles a Vietnam environment. the slow reporting of minefields operations." 

The JRTC enemy, or OPFOR (op- already encountered. This infor- If the OPFOR determines the 

posing force), can be hidden any- mation flow is further hindered by mobility of the BLUFOR to be a 

where. Operating in decentral- the lack of appropriate battle center of gravity, he will use mines 

ized 3- to 5-man teams, the drills at the brigade and battalion as an economy of force asset to 

OPFOR caches their mines and task force TOCs on how to handle attack it without respite. This 

other logistical assets and moves reports of minefields. technique allows him to wrestle 

swiftly about the battlefield, at- From my observations of light, away the initiative and to set or 

tacking when they choose. combat engineer companies (with change the terms ofbattle. By sucThe OPFOR can emplace a mechanized engineer augmenta- cessfully visualizing the battlepoint minefield (buried) on an tion) during the past 12 rotations field, the OPFOR determines 


MSR in less than 10 minutes. at the JRTC, synchronization is what is important, thus enhancing 


They harrass BLUFOR convoys the toughest thing for command- his ability to prioritize and allo- 


on the MSRs and use minefields to ers to achieve. The JRTC battle- cate resources. Accurate visualiza- 


initiate vehicular ambushes. After field, like those at the Army's tion allows him to think and act 


their minefield achieves a kill, other combat training centers simultaneously in his mission to 


they reseed it in minutes. Because (CTCs), is as realistic as we can 

defeat the BLUFOR. 


the OPFOR effectively disrupts make it. The CTCs force units to 


unit mobility and forces the fight their toughest fight and work 


BLUFOR engineers to constantly together as part of the combined Battlefield Visualization: 


react to them, the BLUFOR engi- arms team. In the free-play, force- A Starting Point 


neers are routinely kept off-balance. on-force battlefield of the JRTC, 


If the 0PFOR"kills"BLUFORengi- mines are usually the second lead- visualizing the battlefield, 


neers, they emplace additional ing killer and they acoount for more its threats and our reminefields with impunity. Killing than one-third of the fratricides. sponse to those threats, is the 

BLUFOR engineers and destroying starting point for engineers in 

their equipment (i.e., mine detec- OPFOR Visualization our endeavor to achieve synchrotors) is important to the OPFOR. nization. Only through synchroIn order for BLUFOR engineers The JRTC is a two-sided bat- nization will we be successful in 

to survive during a route clear- tlefield with an enemy that our minelcountermine mission. 

ance mission, synchronization is also tries to influence the out- As the ancient Chinese war phinecessary at the brigade and bat- come. The enemy understands losopher Sun Tzu remarked, 

talion task force levels. Synchroni- the importance of visualizing the 'What is of supreme importance 

zation ensures the engineers are battlefield. He knows to avoid in war is to attack the enemy's 

provided with the proper intelli- strength, such as the BLUFOR strategy." We engineers must acgence and security assets. This tanks, because he lacks a direct quire the art of visualizing the 

synchronization is rarely achieved fire weapon that can defeat the battlefield so that we may indeed 

however, leaving the engineers in tanks. He knows how to capital- attack our enemy's strategy, bea reaction mode as they hap- ize on weakness, such as the fore it attacks us. Y 

hazardly attempt to clear routes. BLUFOR's inability to detect 

Rarely are engineers proactive buried mines. Consequently, the Major Kowadlo is the senior 

enough to detect and clear mine- OPFOR disrupts mobility by em- engineer observerlcor~troller at 

fields before BLUFOR vehicles placing numerous point mine- the Joint Readiness Training discover them. It is not uncommon fields (buried) on MSRs because Center. Previous assignments for BLUFOR vehicles to drive di- he knows the BLUFOR tankers include S3, 37th Engineer Batrectly into a surface-laid mine- will think twice before thunder- talion (Combat) (Airborne) and 

field, which is indicative of poor ing down them. By doing so, the group engineer, 3rd Special mine awareness training. OPFOR not only avoids the Forces Group. He holds a masConsequently, the majority of BLUFOR strength but at times ters degree in civil engineering 

minefields at the JRTC are neutralizes it altogether. from Penn State Uniuersity 

cleared the old-fashioned way, one The minelcountermine doctrine and is a registered Professional 

vehicle at a time. in FM 20-32 tells us, 'The ability Engineer in North Carolina. 

February 1994 
Sylnclnronirafion Training 


By Captain Robert McCarty 

The task force S3 briefed the task force contL'L nianderand his conipany contnsanders on the 

scheme of maneuver. He outlined each one's role in 

the upconzing defense. The experienced company 

con~nzanders understood the commander's intent, 

where his main effort was, and how he wanted to 

use fire and ntaneuuer to destroy enemy forces. The 

task force fire support officer highlighted the priority of support and key target numbers. Then, the 

task force engineer aplained the location of obstacle belts, their intents, and the templated enemy 

force. He asked if there were questions. The cornnzander replied, "Those obstacle belts don't support 

my intent or the scheme of ntaneuuer the S3 just 

talked about! Where were you when the staff wargamed and synchronized the plan?" 

The Engineer Officer Advanced Course 

(EOAC)given - at the U.S. Army Engineer - Scllool, reinforces synchronization and tactical planning with Janus, a battle-focused combat simulation. It is used only as a learning tool and is not a 

graded EOAC event. The Janus system, named after a Roman god with two faces, can educate the 

next task force engineer before he is hammered by 

the task force commander. It shows students where 

February 1994 

their plan's weak points are when battlefield operating systems (BOS) are not properly synchronized. 

Janus uses digitized terrain and data models of 

U.S, and foreign combat and combat support systems stored in its memory to duplicate the effects 

of those BOS based on the given terrain. 

The Engineer School has terrain models for both 

the National Training Center in California and the 

area surrounding Fort Leonard Wood. Military and 

civilian instructors within the school serve as computer operators or "puckers" during a simulation. 

These puckers can control battalion, company, platoon, or individual vehicles. The students tell the 

puckers what they want a unit do, and the puckers 

get it done. The puckers relieve the students of the 

detailed operation of the system and allow them to 

concentrate on the main training objectives-understanding synchronization and clear communications. 

Plan -

The exercise begins with EOAC team leaders 

giving a brigade orders briefing that covers 

each major staff function: S2, S3, engineer, and 

brigade commander. This briefing provides the students with information needed bbegin the command 

Engineer 21 
estimate process. Team leaders assign students 

roles in the task force staff, including a commander 

and an executive off~cer. They develop a plan with 

no outside assistance. The staff has representatives 

from each BOS during the planning phase of this 

exercise. As a minimum, students must develop an 

execution matrix and an operation order brief for 

their subordinate company commanden. Other 

staff officers develop the written products needed 

to execute their combat support missions. The S2 

prepares a reconnaissancelcounterreconnaissance 

plan, the fire support officer develops target lists, 

and the engineer develops a time line for a defensive mission. 

This practical exercise allows students to focus 

on the maneuver aspects of planning and executing 

a task force plan. While not the only learning tool, 

Janus simulation allows students to quickly determine how successful their plan is. If students do 

not war-game and synchronize their plan or rockdrill it with subordinates, the lack of planning and 

preparation will become evident during the simulation. The staff gives the senior team leader, who 

role-plays as the brigade commander, a back brief 

before issuing their order. To evaluate how effectively the staff synchronized the plan and how well 

subordinates understood the plan, another team 

role-plays that task force. To reinforce the command estimate process and help understand synchronization, the team prepares a company execution matrix. It is used to execute the plan and 

provide details required by Janus. 

Before the companylteams begin planning, the 

task force staff must ensure the companylteams understand the task force plan. Preparing and using 

a rock drilllrehearsal site best indicates their understanding. A rock drill also allows commanders and 

staff to visualize the plan using a model of the area 

of operations and graphic control measures. The 

task force members can use this training aid during their brief or have the companylteams use it for 

their back briefs. At this point in the process, team 

leaders again stress the importance of synchronization. A 100 percent plan that is 50 percent understood has a 0 percent chance of success; but an 80 

percent plan that is 100 percent understood has a 

90 percent chance of success. 

Prepare

After the task force and the companylteams 

have completed planning, the exercise moves 

to the battlefield preparation phase. During this 

phase, the companylteam players enter their part 

of the plan into the Janus simulation data files. By 

combining a digitized terrain model of the National 

Training Center with a computer program that allows checking lines of sight and fields of fire overlaid with weapons ranges, the students get a lowcost but accurate simulation of the ground reconnaissance done by maneuver company commanders. 

How closely a student follows the task force plan 

reflects how well other students communicated their 

plan. After all companylteam plans are entered, the 

A clvillan "pucker" 

shows an EOAC 

lnternatlonal student the 

locations of units on the 

flank of his company. 

Students use thls 

lnformatlon to ensure 

their portion of the plan 

remains synchronized 

with the task force plan. 

February 1994 
Janus srjtem saves them for later execution. Saving this 

information provides two benefits: prutedion against a 

mmputer malfunction, and the ability to run the plan 

thmugh multiple iterations if after-action =views show 

faulty execution during the battle, not synchronization, 

caused the mission to fail. After planning and pre~- 

tion are mmplete, the execution phase begins. 

Execute 

anus provides a realistic simulation of the 

command, control, and communication problems a task force commander and his staff face during a battle. The staff is in the team room, and the 

companylteams are "out in the field" in front of the 

Janus computer screens. With only maps, graphics, 

and reports from companylteam commanders to 

guide their decisions during battle, the task force 

quickly grasps the importance of clearly communicating the intent and properly synchronizing all 

BOS assets. The task force also learns the importance of the tact,ical operations center (TOC). If the 

task force does not correctly track the battle by 

posting enemy losses, friendly lasses, and other key 

events, such as a chemical strike or execution of 

family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) targets, 

they have no information on which to base decisions identified during the planning process as mitical to mission success. 

While the commander or S3 may be forward, he 

usually cannot see the entire battlefield. The commander depends on his staff to collect reports from 

the companylteams, analyze them to determine enemy intentions, and recommend the best course of 

action. The staff cannot do its job if the companylteams do not report critical information. 

The second team of students (serving as company commanders, fire support teams, and direct 

support artillery) is linked to the team room TOC 

by two primary methods of communication. The 

main method is hand-held, two-way radios that provide realistic battle sounds with squelch and many 

requests for "say again all after." Telephone lines 

provide backup communications for command nets 

because few radios are available. Telephones also 

serve as the primary means of relaying intelligence 

information and requesting indirect fire support. 

The two communications systems replicate the delays associated with observing an enemy target and 

having steel hit that target. 

While observing a computer screen, the company 

commander or his fire support team radios the TOC 

to report enemy locations and request fire. The TOC 

then telephones the direct support artillery student, 

who is sitting at a separate screen. With multiple 

sitings, reports, and fire missions coming in, the 

TOC can and will miss some information or key 

events. Team leaders, who serve as obsel7rersimntrollers, captu~ the missed opportunities, last information, and sound dwisions made at critical times. 

They report their findings in the most important 

phase of this training event the after-action review. 

After-Action Review 

Team leaders document their observations in 

the after-action review format described in 

Training Circular 25-20. After giving an overview 

of the training objectives and the brigade intent, 

team leaders discuss what happened during the 

planning, preparation, and execution phases of the 

exercise. They stress operation order preparation 

and synchronization. Borrowing a technique from 

the National Training Center, opposing force players from the threat office also discuss their plan. 

Team leaders then lead students in a discussion on 

what happened, using BOS and what they saw in 

their roles as staff officers or company commanders. 

Students describe their training in terms of what 

they would sustain and what they would improve. 

At the end of the exercise, students use their perspective and the team leaders' observations to develop lessons learned. Some Janus simulations 

have shown that students at both company and 

task force levels tend to fixate on the close fight of 

a company or platoon, forget to report information, 

or fail to track the battle. These shortcomings result in missed decision points for disengagement, 

fired FASCAM targets, or the late arrival of reserves. Synchronization is the common thread 

throughout the after-action reviews. 

Lessons Learned 

The valuable lessons learned in the after-action review provide new task force engineers 

with a better understanding of synchronization and 

tactical planning. As a result, they are better able 

to provide support to the task force commander 

and his staff as well as to their parent engineer battalions. By using the Janus computer simulation as 

a training twl, students see what really happens 

when BOS are not properly synchronized. ld 

Captain McCarty is a team leader with the EOAC at 

Fort Leonard Wood. He previously served as a company commander. and brigade engineer with the 7th 

Engineer Battalion at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Other assignments include tours with the 14th Engineer Battalion, Fort Ord, California, and the Huntington and 

Pittsburgh Engineer Districts. A graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined 

Alms and Service Staff School, and Command and 

General Staff College, he holds a bachelor's degvee in 

construction management from Auburn University. 

February 1994 
Future Officers From Today's Enlisted 


By Captain Greg Lane 

I

n a constant search for quality officer material, the 

Army taps into its enlisted ranks to find good soldiers with the potential to be officers. These soldiers 

have three possible routes to gain a commission: Officers Candidate School at Fort Benning, U.S. Military 

Academy at West Point, or Army Reserve Officers 

Training Corps (ROTC) offered on approximately 300 

college campuses nationwide. This article focuses on 

the ROTC option, specifically the Green-to-Gold 

program. 

Green-to-Gold is the Army ROTC program that offers soldiers who are currently on active duty an early 

discharge under Chapter 16, Army Regulation 635- 

200, to earn a bachelor's degree and an officer's com. 

mission. The soldier is discharged and attends 

college, taking courses dictated by the academic 

major of the soldier and 

Army ROTC courses. He or 

she is commissioned upon 

graduation with a bachelor's 

degree. 

Soldiers in engineer military occupational skills make 

excellent Green-to-Gold candidates. Many of these soldiers already know the small 

unit tactics and basic soldier 

skills that are key in the 

Army ROTC competitive 

evaluation process. Additionally, many have some college experience, specialized 

training that can transfer to 

college credit, and good GT 

scores. Soldiers with good 

high school records andlor 

some college credit may 

meet the qualifications for 

Green-to-Gold. 

Two ootions are available: 

Cadets James Hallmark (left) and James Hondura (right), formerly sergeants at scholarship and nonscholarFort Campbell, exchange instructions during a field trainlng exercise. Cadet Hondura formerly served as a 128 combat engineer. ship. Selection for a scholarship is competitive and is 

24 Engineer February 1994 
by 

college w UI . .,.-> 

ithly subsist, 

dy paid up 1, 

100,the Arm 

er. 

Nonscholarshlp 

Have two years of college already 

completed (at least 54 semester 

hours). 

Have a GT we of110or higher. 

. Have a cdlege GPA of 2.0 or higher.

. Be -tad by any school offering 

Army ROTC and be accepted by the 

Army ROTC department at that schod. 

Have at least two years of active 

duty when discharged to start college.

. Be recommendedby the cunpany 

cunmandar. 

Be no dder than 29 at graduation 

(waiverable to 32). 

. Pass a medicel examination. 

Monthly subsistence allowance d 

$100 during he school year.

- The opportunity to simultamsiy 

serve in a National Guard or Army 

Reserve unit while a cadet, drawing E5 

pay as per time in service. 

Four-Y 

based on the number of qualified applicants and the 

number of scholarships available. To qualify, a soldier 

must meet the criteria in the table above. 

Soldiers can draw their veterans benefits while in 

Army ROTC if they have served the minimum time to 

quality. For the Montgomery GI Bill, soldiers must 

serve at least 30 months of a three or more year enlistment to qualify. If the soldier has the Army College 

Fund as well, he qualifies for that money; however, 

the money is prorated to the percentage of the enlistment he has served. 

If a soldier wants a scholarship and is qualified, 

what are his chances? In the last five years (FY 89 to 

FY 93), a soldier's chances have been excellent. In 

four of those years (FY 90 being the exception), 

every qualified soldier who applied got a scholarship. 

If a soldier is qualified, he or she should apply! 

The service obligation is eight years after commissioning. This time can be sewed on active duty (if selected), in the National Guard, or in the Army Reserve. Historically, half the ROTC graduates go on 

active duty, and the other half go to the National 

Guard or Army Reserve. 

Though my experience is limited to being Fort 

Campbell's Green-to-Gold program representative 

and a member of Austin Peay State University 

(APSU) Army ROTC department, I have seen great 

rolsrshlp 

success in this program. Green-to-Gold cadets at 

Austin Peay do very well (one, CPT Lance Richardson, was the top cadet in the nation in 1989), and 

they provide maturity and a breadth of experience to 

our ROTC program. They helped us become the toprated, medium-sized Army ROTC program in the nation in 1990. Green-to-Gold cadets are in demand at 

every school that has an opportunity to see what they 

can do. 

If you or any of your soldiers are interested in the 

Green-to-Gold program, contact the Army ROTC department nearest you for information and assistance. 

Each stateside installation (to include Alaska and Hawaii) have nearby Army ROTC departments with responsibility for providing Green-to-Gold coverage to 

that installation. If you are overseas, contact your 

nearest education center and the Army ROTC department of your school of choice for assistance. Y 

Captain Greg Lane is an infantry reserve officer attached to the Army ROTC department at APSU. He 

previously sewed 12years on active duty, including 

tours at Fort Campbell, Korea, Fort Polk, and APSU 

Army ROTC. At Fort Polk, he commanded Company 

E, 3rd Battalion, 6th lnfantry Regiment, and HHC, 

2nd Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He 

is a 1981graduate of The Citadel. 

E Two- and ThrmYeer 

February 1994 Engineer 25 

. Have a GT scwe of 115 or 

higher.

. Heve a collage grade point 

average (GPA) of 2.5 or 

higher. 

' Be accepted by any school 

offering Any ROTC. 

Be accepted by the Army 

ROTC department at that 

schod.

- Have a least two years of 

aotlve duly when discharged to 

start cdlege. 

. Be recammended by both 

the company commander and 

a field grade offloer. 

Be m older than 26 on June 

30 of the year of graduation 

with two years of active duty. 

27 with three years of active 

dm, w 28 with four w more 

years of active duty. 

Pass a medical examination. 

Requirements . Have less than 14 semester 

hours of college work. 

Have an SAT scwe of at least 

850 w an ACT scote of at least 

19. 

Be1 Ity 

black 

offering nrmy nu I 

. Be i the Any 

ROTC ! at that 

schoo 

t Hav, ,. .-. ,.go years of 

active duty when discharged to 

start cdlege. 

Be reoommerded by both the 

company commander and a field 

grade offlcer. 

Be no dder than 26 on June 

30 of the year of graduatlon with 

two years of active duty, 27 with 

three years of active duty, ot 28 

with k years of active 

dl@.

. Pass a medical examination. 

Benefits Tuition complett 3 $8,000 per schwl year. If tuition 

is higher than $8,( ~ypays $8,000or 80 percent, 

whichever is great

. Book allowance or azvs per semestar or $150 per quarter. 

. Mw ice of $100 during the school year. 
LESSONS LEARNED: A 


Midwest Flood of 1993 


By Vern Lowrey 

The following Lessons Learned address military 

disaster relief operations during the massive flooding 

that occurred in the midwestern United States in 

1993. Response to this crisis revealed important lessons in Army preparedness, leadership, organization, 

equipment and safety For more information write to 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School, ATTN: 

ATSE-ESA, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. 65473-6630. 

Or call (314) 563-4007, DSN 676-4007. 

INTRODUCTION. A flood has been described as 

a "disaster in slow-motion." This was certainly true for 

the 1993 flood in the midwestern United States, 

which began in February and continues as this article 

is written (November 1993). Military campaigns were 

fought over 2000 miles of rivers in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 

South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Series of battles were 

fought along individual stretches of the Des Moines, IIlinois, Mississippi, Missouri, and numerous other rivers, streams, and lakes. 

Unlike the damage resulting from a hurricane, 

earthquake, or tornado, the flood damage was not localized or quickly assessed and then remedied by 

the rapid reaction of state and federal agencies. Instead, the military response was built gradually: It 

started at the local level, moved to state levels (including the National Guard), and finally moved 

through the federal level (including active and reserve 

forces and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) as capabilities to fight and recover from the flood were exhausted. Joint operations were conducted between 

Air and Army National Guard forces as well as with 

the Coast Guard. Based on this experience, the 

current doctrine in FM 100-1 9, Domestic Support Operations, appears to be sound in guiding military floodrelief operations. The following topics were identified 

as key observations. 

TOPIC: The military command estimate 

process. 

DISCUSSION: The framework of the military command estimate process was used by all National 

Guard (NG) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) headquarters personnel. Intelligence information was continually gathered concerning the terrain, levees, flood levels, and weather. Current information concerning the employment of local, state, 

and federal resources was also gathered. Based on 

this information, military agency staffs and commanders developed courses of action for flood-fighting and 

flood-recovery operations. Decisions were reached 

and implemented as required. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to use the military command estimate process during disaster-reliel 

training and operations. 

TOPIC: Previous flood-relief operations and 

disaster-relief training exercises. 

DISCUSSION: Flood-relief operations early in 

1993 provided valuable insights and helped foster coordination for responses to flooding that occurred 

later in the year. All operations prior to the major 

flooding events in July and August helped establish 

and improve liaison with local authorities. Army and 

Air National Guard, Active Army, and USACE 

February I994 
personnel had previously participated in joint disaster 

relief exercises with Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) personnel and locai authorities. Although these exercises revolved around various scenarios including earthquake, nuclear power plant 

evacuation, and civil disturbance responses, they 

helped establish lines of coordination between military response forces and civilian agencies. 

RECOMMENDATION: National Guard, Active 

Army, and USACE personnel continue to participate 

in joint exercises as resources and time allow. 

TOPIC: Liaison teams. 

DISCUSSION: All agencies involved in the midwest flood response effort were unanimous in the 

need for effective liaison personnel at emergency 

operations centers (EOC), from the local/county/city 

level to the FEMA level. Liaison personnel often 

were called upon to make immediate, on-the-spot 

decisions concerning military capabilities within the 

intent of the military response plan. They were considered subject matter experts (SME) but lacked 

training to be SME. Liaison personnel required dedi. 

cated communications and transportation 

capabilities. 

RECOMMENDATION: Military response agencies 

provide trained, competent liaison personnel with 

equipment who can coordinate and represent their interests. Allow liaison personnel to make on-the-spot 

decisions based on the intent of the military response 

plan and the commander's guidance. 

TOPE Rules of engagement (ROE). 

DISCUSSION: The presence of National Guard 

forces in flooded areas normally provided a sense of 

secure calm to the local population, negating the 

need to demonstrate a show of force with weapons. 

Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri National Guard personnel 

were not issued weapons or ammun~tion based on 

this premise. Missouri authorized the issue of weapons for security missions when local authorities requested personnel to augment their police capabilities. Kansas National Guard personnel drew 

weapons for local security operations. All personnel 

were thoroughly briefed on the ROE and carried ROE 

cards. These ROE followed standard procedures identified for civil disturbance operations. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continually assess the 

need for weapons and ammunition during disaster relief operations. When weapons and ammunition are 

required for security operations, use standard ROE. 

including rules of deadly force. Thoroughly brief personnel on the ROE and issue ROE cards. 

TOPIC: Release of National Guard forces from 

flood-fighting locations. 

DISCUSSION: National Guard forces initially were 

called to assist with immediate efforts to prevent loss 

of life, assist with evacuations, and provide security 

to evacuated areas. The goal was to have them stay 

only until local authorities could take over the flood recovery efforts. This goal allowed the NG units to be 

deactivated or quickly moved to other locations. Determination of when local authorities could relieve 

them was done by mutual agreement (consensus) between local officials and NG commanders. A common 

technique was to tie their release to a measurable 

event such as river depth, opening of a road or 

bridge, ntc. 

Sometimes it was difficult to get locai authorities to 

realize that they had the capability to continue flood 

recovery efforts without NG assistance. Local people 

wanted the National Guard to continue to patrol 

evacuated areas because they perceived the areas 

would be "less safe" after these forces left. Release 

actions were not fully announced in some cases. 

which made it difficult for local authorities to quickly 

cover the lost capability. 

RECOMMENDATION: Use measurable events to 

establish release criteria with local authorities as 

soon as possible. Continually communicate with locai 

authorities concerning release actions. 

TOPIC: Communications equipment. 

DISCUSSION: Various kinds of communications 

equipment were required during the flood-relief operations. Cellular telephones were used extensively by 

USACE and National Guard personnel except in a 

few areas not covered by cellular telephone towers. 

While several types of ceiiuiar phones were procured 

or donated, those with higher wattage capability did 

the best because they had a larger coverage area. 

Personnel required training on how to use these 

phones, including how to periodically recharge and replace the batteries. Spot shortages of batteries occurred. Each militaly response agency controlled 

their own telephone frequencies. Fax machines were 

provided down to the task force level. They effectively 

provided up-to-date logistics and personnel status information. Both fax machines and E-MAIL were used 

extensively to transmit activation and deactivation orders, Radio coverage was provided by high frequency (HF), single-sideband type of equipment. Local FM radio coverage was provided primarily by 

ANIPRC-127 and ANNRC-12 equipment. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continually assess communications requirements, including existing cellular 

February 1994 
telephone capability and impacts of potential damage 

to existing towers. Procure or plan to procure cellular 

telephones with additional batteries for contingencies. 

Provide each liaison officer with a cellular phone. 

Provide needed cellular phone training. Coordinate 

frequency requirements with local agencies. Provide 

fax machines and E-MAIL capability to the task force 

level. Continue to use FM and HF radios for back-up 

communications. 

TOPIC: Maps. 

DISCUSSION: Map coverage appeared adequate 

to support military response efforts in flooded areas. 

The USGS map scales used were primarily 

1:100,000 and 1:24,000. Locally produced maps included city street maps, and county and state highway maps of varying scales. USACE Flood Plain 

maps were used primarily along the Mississippi River 

basin. Some local maps were outdated and did not 

show recent streets or roads. No difficulties in interpreting the maps were noted. The large-scale maps 

were used primarily in Emergency Operations Centers, while the small-scale maps were used by units 

and personnel on the ground. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continually assess, acquire copies of, and train with updated map products 

for potential disaster relief operations areas. 

TOPIC: National Guard logistics support, 

DISCUSSION: National Guard units that deployed 

with all organic equipment, supplies, and repair parts 

were immediately capable of extended operations in 

the flood-relief effort. Other units that deployed without ail organic equipment, supplies, and repair parts 

had to rely on local supply sources and local transportation. They were not fully capable to fight the floods. 

In states where individuals instead of units were 

called up, logistics support problems were compounded even further. States that provided forward direct support (DS) maintenance contact teams from organizational maintenance support (OMS) shops could 

repair most equipment on-site and had minimal down 

time. States that retained DS capability at their own 

OMS shops provided less timely repairs. Most units 

provided effective preventative maintenance (PM). Because vehicles were continually driving in and around 

water, PM was heightened, especially maintenance to 

keep fluids and seals from being contaminated. Additionally, portable latrines were needed in many areas 

for field sanitation purposes, and refrigerated vans 

were needed to store rations. Personnel required 

large quantities of sunscreen, bug repellent, flashlights and flashlight batteries. 

RECOMMENDATION: Take all organic equipment, supplies, and repair parts when responding to 

disaster-relief missions. Provide foward DS maintenance capability and schedule PM operations throughout the operation. Provide portable latrines, refrigeration equipment, and adequate stocks of individual 

supplies, based on the situation. 

TOPIC: Safety. 

DISCUSSION: To keep personnel safe, commanders used the risk assessment process throughout the 

flood-relief effort. Safety concerns centered around 

prevention of heat injuries, night operations, use of 

life jackets, and protection against tetanus and insect 

bites. All personnel received training on how to spot 

and treat heat-related injuries. Although temperatures 

reached 100 degrees Fahrenheit in some areas with 

high humidities over 80 percent, very few heat related injuries were reported. Personnel were continually hydrated with water, used sun screens, and used 

the buddy system to watch each other. 

Military personnel and equipment needed to be 

easily visible in the dark because operations continued around the clock. Floodlights provided by 

USACE and the Air National Guard were used extensively in critical flood-fighting areas. Several traffic accidents occurred when military vehicles with camouflage paint were not visible at night. This military 

equipment required additional reflective devices such 

as highway warning lights to prevent cars from driving into them. Personnel working at night were required to wear reflective clothing and use flashlights 

and the buddy system. Agencies required that all personnel operating on levees and in and around water 

wear life jackets. The life jackets provided by USACE 

to the National Guard and other agencies saved several persons who were swept away when levees 

broke. Additionally, all military personnel received inoculations against tetanus because of the unsanitary 

water. Adequate stocks of insect repellent were available to ward off mosquitos and flies around flooded 

areas. 

RECOMMENDATION: Continually stress safety 

during disaster relief operations, including operating 

at night. Use the risk-assessment process. Plan for 

specific safety requirements such as the need for life 

jackets and highway warning equipment. 

Mr. Lowrey is Chief, Analysis Division, Directorate of 

Evaluation and Standardization, U.S. Army Engineer 

School. He sewed as the subject matter expert for 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned during the midwest flood disaster-relief effort, 

28 Engineer February 1994 
Counterreconnaissance 


and Obstacle Integration 


By Captain Kevin Woods 

The scout "labon Leader calls the task force 

1. tactical operations center to let them know 

enenly reconnaissance elements are penetrating the 

screen unseen. He can give only general locations. 

Moving slowly and often disntounted, the enenty 

has a distinct advantage in these rolling hills with 

random patches of dense trees, deep draws and nunzerous troils. The terrain's multiple routes through 

slow-go areas and concealed vantage points make 

overlapping surueillance inzpossible. The armored 

task force, planning a defense-in-sector mission, is 

counting on the success of the counterrecon fight. 

The scouts have organized into three obselvation 

posts along the designated screen line 5 kilometers 

in front of the naain body. Their naission is to prouide early warning to the task force, harass the enemy with supporting indirect fire, and (with the 

help of two supporting tank platoons) olestmy enenzy 

reconnaissance elenaents within their capability. As 

the ntorning Light arrives, the frustrated counterrecon elenzent knows it has been unsuccessful-the 

main body will pay the price. 

essons from our combat training centers continually reflect the strong correlution between successful security operations and tactical 

success. This article describes the need for supporting security operations with obstacles and recommends techniques for obstacle employment. 

Most commanders agree on the need for strong, 

successful counterreconnaissance. Deny the enemy 

intelligence--that's the objective. Unfortunately, 

when task organizing the counterrecon force, planners routinely minimize the mobilitylsurvivability 

(MIS) battlefield operating system (BOS) that can 

enhance their chance for success. Maneuver and engineer leaders seldom task organize engineers to 

support the counterrecon mission with countermobility assets. Two common reasons for neglecting 

this BOS are: Engineer work in the main battle 

area (MBA) has a higher priority, and obstacles in 

the security area will limit freedom of maneuver 

and thus have no place in a mobile, aggressive 

counterrecon plan. Both reasons are flawed but 

merit some analysis. 

February 1994 Engineer 29 
Prioritizing Obstacle Effort 

Countermohility (CM) work in the MBA has a 

high priority but because of stale, "samesame" thinking, too often the MBA becomes the 

only area where CM work is planned and obstacles 

are emplaced. The decision to use or not to use obstacles in the security area should be based on the 

maneuver commander's intent. Many maneuver 

commanders, however, are unfamiliar with the 

benefits possible when engineers integrate CM into 

the counterrecon plan and thus fail to task organize for it. 

Omitting CM in the security area in favor of engineer work in the MBA will not necessarily result 

in a greater CM effect in the MBA. Although engineer effort in the security area reduces the quantity of resources available for the MBA, these two 

areas are not mutually exclusive. This is because 

obst,acles in the security area enhance the effectiveness of the counterrecon fight and protect the integ. 

rity and effects of obstacles in the MBA. 

For example, if obstacles in the MBA are observed, reported or prebreached by the enemy because of ineffective counterrecon, the effort spent 

on the MBA obstacles has been seriously diluted. 

Once compromised, ohstacle surprise as well as 

much of their potential effects are lost. Battles at 

the National Training Center have shown that if 

the counterrecon battle is lost, the opposing force 

usually wins and rarely breaches or lases a vehicle 

in any obstacle. 

30Engineer 

Englneer squad leader 

coordinates wllh scouts 

lo ensure obstacles are 

Integrated Into the coun. 

terreconnalssance plan. 

For the task force engineer, the engineer estimate process is the best tool to ensure that the maneuver commander understands and plans for all 

mission requirements. When conducting the engineer estimate, the task force engineer should analyze the maneuver course of action for all engineer 

requirements. Once he understands the requirements for CM in the security area, he can allocate 

capabilities and war-game to determine work priorities. This process balances obstacle efforts between 

the MBA and the security area to best support the 

overall maneuver plan. 

Mobility within the Security Area 

o obstacles in the security area reduce 

friendly freedom of maneuver? They can and 

will-unless &e obstacle plan is integrated with 

maneuver and obstacle emplacement is directly coordinated. Integration begins with the engineer estimate; continues through the critical, on-the-ground 

coordination conducted between emplacing engineers and responsible counterrecon elements; and 

ends when the unit completes accurate recording, reporting and dissemination of obstacle 

locations. 

Units must emplace obstacles in the security 

area as early as possible to make them useful. Because of limited time and the flexible nature of the 

fight, the counterrecon commander usually plans 

and refines much of the fight at his level. Consequently, the task force engineer (and the task force 

stam may not be fully capable of accurately planning 

February 1994 
obstacle groups to support the counterrecon fight. 

By using the engineer estimate, however, the task 

force engineer can pass necessary and valuable information to the engineer element that supports 

the counterrecon force. He should pass information as it becomes available rather than hold it 

for dissemination through a formal operation 

order. 

An event template reflecting the limit of enemy 

advance (LOEA) is especially useful in planning 

counterrecon obstacles. The LOEA is a result of terrain and weather analysis to determine the point 

at which the enemy can observe friendly positions. 

This limit is usually a function of line of sight and 

should include enemy observation capabilities (such 

as infrared, thermal and telescopic). In essence, the 

counterrecon plan is tailored to prevent the enemy 

from going beyond this limit. 

The standard obstacle effects are: disrupt,turn, 

fix and block. These effects provide a common language when referring to an obstacle's desired impact. They do not dictate the design of an individual obstacle. The emplacing unit, in coordination 

with the covering element, is responsible for design. 

ing obstacles to elicit a desired effect. Thus, the 

character of obstacles in the security area will 

normally differ from those in the MBA because of 

differences in the mission and the capability of 

enemy recon units and enemy main body 

elements. 

The enemy recon element's mission is to gather 

or confirm intelligence while remaining undetected. 

To remain undetected, they will report and bypass 

any obstacles they encounter. Friendly units must 

not make the mistake of thinking enemy recon elements will use t,he same avenues of approach as 

the enemy main body or that friendly unit boundaries are relevant to them. As a rule, the more concealment or protection a route provides, the more 

likely enemy recon elements are to use it. This implies that security area obstacles will normally require less t,ime, manpower and materials than 

MBA obstacles. 

Obstacle Placement in the Security 


Area 


1ndividual obstacles in support of the counterrecon fight have the capacity to harass, deceive, 

delay, divert or deny access to the enemy. Moreover, they can function as an alert or early warning 

mechanism. In the security area, these obstacles 

fall into three general categories: obstacles forward 

of the screen line's general trace, obstacles within 

the screen, and obstacles behind the screen in support of the guard force. 

Forward of the Screen 

For a screen mission, combat forces are not normally arrayed to mass fires, but obstacle theory 

does not change. Closest to the enemy are obstacles 

well to the front of the screen and sometimes beyond surveillance. Obstacles in these forward locations serve to immediately slow, caution and deceive enemy recon elements. 

Units planning obstacles in this area should 

place them as far forward as feasible and on terrain likely to be traveled, such as defiles or road intersections. The limit of advance typically restricts 

how far forward units can emplace them. Because 

enemy recon elements will pmbably bypass obstacles (but will report them), obstacles in front of the 

screen should focus on fmntage rather than depth 

or density. Since time is limited and most security 

area obstacles do not need to surprise or kill, surface-laid mines are the norm 

Obstacles forward of the screen serve a useful purpose, but operations this far forward are risky When 

working in this area, stealth is the best means of security Dismounted movement is usually necessary 

Commanders must understand that obstacles in 

this area may not be seen and integrated with 

fires, but they will still produce the desired effect 

of slowing, cautioning and deceiving enemy 

reconnaissance elements. This concept conflicts 

with conventional wisdom, which holds that an 

"...It is the synergy of the close combat triadterrain/obstacles, fires, and maneuver-that will 

ultimately determine the enemy's response." 

February 1994 
Obstacle placement in the security area 

obstacle not covered by fire is ineffective. 

In the figure above, the engineer emplaced two 

obstacles forward of the screen: 

Obstacle 1 is on a dirt road intersection, 2 kilometers in front of OP1. The intersection and obstacle are not observable by the observation posts 

(OPs). The obstacle is an easily detected point minefield consisting of 10 mines. The engineer selected 

this location because the terrain flows naturally 

through this point and the likelihood of use by the 

enemy is high. The desired effect is to disrupt or 

slow the enemy by forcing increased vigilance. Enemy reconnaissance elements will report this obstacle, and in doing so, inadvertently add it to their decision-making process. 

Obstacle 2 is also well forward of the screen. It 

consists of three modular pack mine system 

(MOPMS) minefields emplaced to discourage movement on terrain that OP2 and OP3 cannot see. 

With a width of approximately 70 meters per dispenser, the engineer positioned the MOPMS minefield so that it borders the masked area but can be 

observed by the scouts. When choosing to use 

MOPMS, the engineer had to consider the technical 

limitations that make them a poor choice for some 

missions. MOPMS have a self-destruct time of 4 

hours with three reset options, for a maximum of 

16 hours. A soldier must be within 300 to 1,000 meters to remotely reset MOPMS. 

Within the Screen 

Obstacles emplaced as part of the screen line 

help maintain the usual nonpermeable intent of 

the screen. Therefore, units generally emplace 

these obstacles in areas the screen force identifies 

as vulnerable. Deadspace within overlapping surveillance and routes leading to vantage points are 

common locations. Going with the adage "if it can 

be seen, it can be killed," engineers should emplace 

obstacles in this area to help the screen force "see" 

the enemy. Obstacles that alert (such as booby 

traps and trip wires) are especially applicable. 

These obstacles typically require fewer resources 

but more ingenuity. 

Obstacle 3 is a simple trip wire connected to an 

antitank mine. The engineer placed it on a combat 

trail leading over a heavily wooded ridge because 

OP3 considered this trail a hole within the screen. 

The trip wire serves to alert OP3 as well as the 

guard force. 

Obstacle 4 is composed of concertina wire and a 

point minefield. It blocks the road leading to the 

top of hill 405, which is a significant vantage point 

offering good all-around observation. The wire consists of two 25-meter rows of concertina, and the 

point minefield includes 15 antipersonnel mines 

with trip wires. 

32 Engineer February 1994 
Behind the screen 

Units should emplace obstacles behind the forward trace to reinforce the depth of the screen. 

This is where the guard element will destroy enemy reconnaissance vehicles with direct-fire 

weapon systems. Obstacles in this area help shape 

engagement areas and buy time for tactical 

repositioning. 

To be effective, these obstacles must be integrated into the guard force fire plan. Because the 

guard force mission must remain flexible to cover a 

wide area with sufficient combat power, the initial 

fire plan is likely to change. To the maneuver unit, 

changing the fire plan means shifting vehicle and 

soldier locations. To the engineer it means shifting 

obstacles. Therein lies the challenge: The engineer 

must maximize the use of available time to emplace obstacles, but he must not waste resources 

emplacing obstacles that will not support the 

changed fire plan. There is no simple solution to 

this difficulty, but two suggestions can minimize 

the problem: 

Give the guard force commander time to establish his plan by focusing initial CM efforts forward of and within the screen. 

Ask the guard force commander for the information needed to integrate the CM plan as 

soon as possible. You must aggressively seek 

this essential information. The initial engineer 

requirement is usually "where does the guard 

force commander want to kill the enemy?" 

Knowing this, the engineer can begin to focus 

the guard force CM plan. The guard force commander's intent will determine the intent of 

the obstacle group (block, turn, fix, disrupt). 

The engineer will design an obstacle that 

supports the commander's desired effect, but 

it is the synergy of the close combat triadterrainlobstacles, fires, and maneuver-that 

will ultimately determine the enemy's 

response. 

The counterrecon mission may have many diverse CM requirements, and decentralized engineer 

execution is the best method to support them. Decentralized execution of the CM effort in the security area means that engineer squads must work in. 

dependently and maneuver units must develop 

Class IVand V (mines) basic loads. Engineer 

squads should be free to coordinate directly with 

OPs. If it is a platoon effort, this direct coordination will physically free the engineer platoon leader 

to develop the guard force obstacle plan. 

Obstacle 5 is a two-row minefield. The desired 

effect is to turn the enemy away from the tree line 

along the ridge and into the open, planned engagement area. 

Obstacles 6 and 7 are designed to fixreconnaissance elements, thereby giving the reserve tank platoon additional time to move into the attack-by-fire 

positions. Both groups consist of four 50-meter, tworow minefields. Target reference points on the 

ground, as well as direct communication between 

the obstacle-emplacing element (the engineer platoon) and the overwatching guard element, ensure 

the obstacles are integrated with the fire plan. 

These two fixing groups may also act as disrupting 

groups if encountered by the enemy main body. 

'Ibtal engineer effort in the security area in this 

example is 12 hours. In his company operation order, the engineer company commander directs the 

platoon leader to stop work at a set time, brief the 

counterrecon commander on all completed work 

and conduct a coordinated movement back to the 

MBA along a designated lane and passage point. 

Upon arrival hack in the MBA, the engineer platoon continues to emplace obstacles in support of 

the task force's main body. 

The Pavoff " 

ngineer units can increase their effectiveness 

by establishing a normal association with 

the sco;ts and training this method of obstacle integration with them. Units should be capable of conducting CM work in the security area with either 

squad- or platwn-sized elements and should train 

for both. Once understood, the payoff for providing 

countermobility effort in the security area can he 

significant. 

The counterrecon fight is often the most important phase of the defense. Planning CM to support 

it must not he routinely ignored. Both historical examples and the experience of today's combat training centers clearly show that where engineers concentrate and bring their talents to hear, success 

follows. The counterrecon fight demands that engineers unleash their versatility and look beyond the 

forward edge of the battle area in applying their 

talents. YI 

Captain Keuin Woods is currently assigned to the U.S. 

Amy Engineer School as a small group instructor for the 

Engineer Officer Advanced Course. Preuwus assignments 

include commander, 58th Engineer Company, 11th ACR, 

Germany; and commander, Dl1 Engineer Company, 1st 

ID (Forward), Germany. He is a I983 ROTC graduate of 

Westmont College. 
By Command Sergeant -

Major (Ret.) Steven J. Rogge

In January 1990, the Association of the United States 

Army (AUSA) magazine, ARMY, 

published an article called 'The 

Road to Laos," by Robert P. 

Miller. Miller was an engineer 

lieutenant in the 14th Engineer 

Battalion in 1970-71. The article 

was his account of a large-scale 

operation known as "Dewey Canyon 11" (for the Americans) or 

"Lam Son 719" (for the South Vietnamese Army). Many books 

and articles have been published 

about Dewey Canyon 11, so I 

won't rehash that. One of the 

best books, Into Laos: The Story 

of Dewey Canyon ZZILam Son 

719, by William Keith Nolan, is 

in most libraries. 

I was a combat engineer squad 

leader in B Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, and have vivid 

memories of the experiences 

Miller described. What follows are 

my recollections and interpretations of the operation plus some 

advice for young combat engineers 

in today's Army. Many squad 

members of the 14th Engineer 

Battalion will probably recognize 

themselves in this story. 

Background 

ahe 14th Engineer Battalion 

was headouartered at 

Quang Tri, near the border of 

North Vietnam. Most of the 

companies were working the 

area's road network and improving fire bases for the 1st Brigade, 

5th Mechanized Division, and 

the Special Forces camps that 

necklaced the border. Charlie 

34 Engineer February 1994 
Northern Quang Trl Province 

Company was just south of Quang with a major push across the Ben 

Tri, at Fire Base Nancy, working Hai River at Fire Support Base 

with the lOlst Airborne Division. Alpha 4 (FSB A-4 on map). In 

As I understood the mission, Bravo Company, we had spent Nothis was to be primarily an Army vember and part of December doof South Vietnam (ARVN) venture ing major bridge const~dion on 

with American advice and sup- , QL-1, which led into Quang Tri. 

port. The ARVNs were to establish We also worked on the road netcontrol of the northwest border work out of Cam Lo toward the 

area of North Vietnam and Laos. If river border to the north. Work 

all went as planned, ARVN owner- on Highway QL-9 toward Fire 

ship of this area would stop the Base Vandergrift, We Sanh, and 

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Laos didn't extend far past Fire 

from sending war supplies down Base Carroll and the shadow of 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other that infamous rock pile. 

routes to the Vietcong and regular I remember well when the S3 

NVA forces. There would also be a and the commander 

neat psychological benefit of con- called us squad leaders together in 

trollingme Sanh again and wiping late January 1971 to review aerial 

the slate clean on that disaster. reconnaissance photos of several 

culvertbridge sites. We were told 

that we might soon have a mission 

I 

Preparation I using prefab materials. We were 

to become familiar with a particun December 1970, there were lar site because there would be no 

indications that something on-ground before the 

big was coming up. Quang Tri mission. The photos had no grid rn 

became the scene of incredible so we do any ter. 

culvert assembly activity, M4T6 ,in association or planning, H-frame construction, and other 

prefab operations. Of course, 

with all the extra work, rumors Assignment 

abounded. Almost everyone believed the United States was go- s a squad leader, I didn't 

ing to invade North Vietnam ttend any intelligence 

February I994 

briefings or planning sessions. I 

was only told that we would 

move out in a few days and to 

prepare for a bridgelculvert mission. We were not to plan on 

coming back for weeks or maybe 

even months. 

I checked the demo box real well 

and replaced all the blasting caps 

and C4 with new stuff. At this 

point, I had been in Vietnam for 

almost two years and was pretty 

good at guessing. When I could go 

to supply and change demo and 

ammo with no questions asked, 

and get new magazines and some 

blastingmachines-well, that told 

me it was a big operation. However, I still thought we were going 

to North Vietnam. New poncho 

liners, new rain gear, and C-rations were handed out like we 

were "somebody" We loaded our 

rucks on the back of the squad's 

&ton dump truck and got in line. 

The driver scrounged some 5-galIon cans and filled them with diesel in case we got separated from 

the company fuel truck. 

The line moved very slowly. 

Everybody was heading out of 

Dong Ha, past Cam Lo, for Fire 

Base Vandergrift. When we got 

there, it was either full or the battalion commander didn't want to 

Engineer 35 
mess with the traffic and conges- were not evacuated. Finally, sometion. Or maybe, right from the be- one determined the area should 

ginning, Bravo Company wasn't have only antipersonnel mines, 

going there. Anyway, we went not antitank. Acouple of D7 dozers 

down the road a few more clicks to were unloaded and started scrap 

a bend and stopped beside a fence. ing the brush, weeds, and small 

Somebody from battalion S2 told j trees to make a clearing about 400 

us this was our staging site and it meters in diameter. There were 

was in the middle of an old mine- some small explosions-just enough 

field. He gave the company com- to cause some excitement after the 

mander a minefield report form long, slow ride. 

that had been filled out by the 

French in the 1950s. (of course, it 

was in French!) Engineer Corner 

We started to clear the mine- e 

field by the book, but the ground wsecurity, and started to 

moved in, established 

was incredibly overgrown and put up triple standard concertina 

mine detectors just weren't feasi- wire. Right across the road, 

ble. A few guys got some shrapnel there was a 30- to 40-foot bluff 

from an antipersonnel mine but where battalion headquarters, or 

at least the battalion S3, moved 

in and established a small helipad. It soon became known as 

'Zngineer Corner." I don't know 

who named it, but we all liked 

the name and in future days Engineer Corner acted as a good 

reference point. 

Most of the 5-ton dump trucks 

pulled pole trailers loaded with 

three or four 20- to 24-foot tubes of 

36-inch culvert. These were already prepared with slings for future helicopter delivery We did final checks and then crawled into 

the culverts to sleep, Just before 

midnight, the squad leaders were 

given prepare-to-move orders. 

The truck drivers and the equipment on the trucks remained in 

place. The squad leaders and the 

rest of the squad checked out and 

activated mine detectors. We were 

lined up at the exit of Engineer 

Corner and given a bad aerial photo 

of our culvertbridge mission site. 

The photo was no help at all. 

We moved down route QL-9 toward Khe Sanh. The night was 

unbelievably dark, and all the 

teams stayed bunched up tight. 

The road hadn't been used for 

months and was extremely overgrown; no one knew if it was 

mined or not. Teams of engineer 

mine detector operators led the 

way and alternated, but we had no 

confidence in this method of advancement. We moved slowly because of overgrown brush, darkness, and unfamiliar territory. 

Except for a bulldozer and an APC 

or two up front, we were all on foot. 

The whole scene was eerie. The 

blackout lights on the dozer and 

APC cast weird shadows, and it 

looked like we were moving down 

an endless, round tunnel about 10 

feet in diameter. That was the extent of our world and there was 

some griping and bellyaching. 

Everybody had an idea about what 

they would do if they were in 

charge. Finally, vehicle lights were 

turned on, and we were happy 

When my mine detection team 

36 Engineer February 1994 
was up for a turn, I overheard the 

leaders discussing the slow progress and deciding not to use mine 

detectors. The comment, "Let's 

thunder this mother," was greeted 

with approval from all. That was a 

wise decision made on the spot by 

aggressive leaders. Our speed 

picked up a little then, but the 

dozer still made a few wrong turns 

and had to backtrack and restart. 

Mission 

The mission of the 14th was 

to open the road to Khe 

Sanh. As we moved down the 

road, engineer squads dropped 

off at problem areas and were 

tasked to fix the problem for continuous wnvoy traffic. I can't remember which culvert/bridge site 

number was assigned to my 

squad, but we eventually got 

there and were left alone in the 

night while the rest of the party 

continued on. Soon, even their 

noise stopped. Because squads 

were shorthanded, there was 

only four of us. We set up security and waited for dawn. Having 

studied the photos, I expected 

the only site preparation needed 

would be a little dozer work, and 

a dozer and an operator were 

also part of my team. At first 

light, I was to inspect the blownout bridge to see if the abutments were st,mng enough for an 

AVLB or an M4T6 dry span. If 

not, I was to choose a culvert site. 

It was the rainy season, and our 

bridge was now a ravine with 

steep banks and rushing water. 

Inspection revealed the bridge 

abutments would not support an 

M4T6. The abutments, about 30 

feet high, had crumbling concrete 

and timbers that could not be repaired using field-expedient methods. There were no good culvert 

sites but I had to put a culvert 

system in someplace. About 0600, 

the dozer started a bypass. By the 

time the dozer operator had 

worked his way down to the 

bottom of the ravine, he hit some 

soft ground and ended up sunk 

over the tracks. I immediately 

called for a backup dozer. About 

this time, the skies were filled 

with flying cranes and other choppers carryingsling loads of culvert 

tubes and M4T6 13-frame assemblies. I had already reported the 

condition of the abutments, so a 

load of culvert was on the way The 

chopper operator called to pop purple; we did and got our culverts. 

We chose another site about 5 

meters from the buried dozer and 

had to manhandle the culvert into 

position. We placed two 36-inch 

tubes on the bottom and one on top 

in a pyramid shape. There was one 

extra tube of culvert in case it was 

needed. The dozer operator cut fill 

from the banks and approaches to 

cover the culverts. He did great 

work in a short time, and our bypass was soon ready. A few vehicles were already waiting to continue on toward Khe Sanh, and we 

let them go through. 

Our squad was responsible for 

the road a few clicks in each direction from our site. We were to keep 

traffic moving, improve and widen 

the road (with only a dozer), and 

regulate traffic across the bypass. 

Initially, the traffic pattern concept allowed vehicles to go both 

ways, but in many places the road 

wasn't wide enough for that to 

happen. On more occasions than I 

care to remember, a truck going 

one way would meet a truck going 

in the opposite direction. There 

they would sit, front bumper to 

front bumper. They both had the 

most important mission in the 

world and would not back up or 

allow the other to pass. With the 

heayr traffic, it only took a few minutes for hundreds of vehicles t~ be 

stopped and unable to progress. I 

especially hated it when that hap 

pened on my sedion of road. 

The dozer operator, however, 

was always willing to help. He 

would approach one of the trucks 

(after I had warned them) and, 

with a verbal warning to the 

Americans or a sign language 

warning to the ARVN, start to 

nudge them toward the edge of the 

bank and off the road. That would 

usually clear the mess, but it 

wouldn't be long before two other 

hardheads would be in the same 

situation. As I recall, an MP finally 

came up with a solution: have the 

road open for 11 hours going one 

direction only, then an hour of 

maintenance for the engineers, 

then 11 hours going the other direction. This commonsense solution really worked. Vital supplies 

were able to get through, and 

equally vital empty trucks became 

available for future loads. 

Disabled vehicles that completely blocked traffic were simply 

dozed over the edge. Luckily for 

us, one of the first vehicles to go 

over the edge in my area was 

loaded with about eight pallets of 

C-rations. We took a few cases of 

the C-rations and never worried 

about food resupply. The trucks 

that went over loaded with ammo, 

though, made us nervous. We 

didn't have the men or the time to 

continually guard them and no 

other security was available. Our 

fear was that the NVA would light 

up the night with a trailer load of 

8-inch rounds. 

Just after we got the tubes of 

culvert, a chaplain showed up and 

wanted to condud services. I told 

him I was pressed for time; he said 

it wouldn't take long to pray for us, 

so I let him set up. He kept his 

word and talked for a few minutes. 

We prayed, felt better, and then he 

left. I don't know his nameor unit; 

he just showed up. Maybe that's 

why the second culvert site was 

better, we got it in faster, and traffic moved sooner than I thought 

possible. 

We knew from the amount of 

ground and air traffic that this operation was incredibly huge, and 

we felt good that we were part of 

it. The squad and I took pride in 

our little section of road and did 

February 1994 
our best to improve and maintain 

it. After a couple of days, I received 

a tasking to provide two squad 

members for other missions. They 

worked the whole area-from laying matting and runway repair at 

Khe Sanh with the 27th Engineer 

Battalion to helping rebuild a 

Bailey bridge. 

Bailey Bridge 

Rebuilding 

The Bailey bridge incident 

should never have happened but did. The Bailey bridge 

&as installed near Fire Base 

Vandergrift. It had a high load 

classification but was not safe for 

an M88 tank retriever towing an 

M60A1 tank. I think Alpha Company, 14th Engineers, was responsible for that bridge; they 

had built a suitable bypass for 

big loads. When an M88 towing 

an M60A1 approached and 

wanted to cross, the bridge guard 

told them to use the bypass. For 

whatever reason, the M88 crew 

started across the Bailey anyway. 

They almost reached the other 

side before it collapsed. Of 

course, that required all traffic to 

use the bypass, which was restrictive and took longer to negotiate. Additional Bailey bridge 

material was brought up, and A 

Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, (with some fillers) installed 

another bridge. That mission 

would not have been needed if 

the M88 crew had listened to the 

engineer bridge guard. 

Well, I've rattled on and on, but 

we all have some favorite war stories. This operation was exciting 

for me and provided immense satisfaction because engineer soldiers contributed significantly to 

the success of a large operation. 

Lessons Learned 

As I look back at the Vietnam War and my actions 

n that war, I can see that my 

;ingle, most important accom-

~lishmentwas the ability to suc-

:essfully complete independent 

~perationsand missions as a 

:ombat engineer squad leader. 

l'he companies and battalions to 

~hichI was assigned were never 

~ithoutan abundance of mis-

;ions. Consequently, engineer 

jquads were often attached to 

nany different units and had a 

wide variety of missions. Senior 

leaders could not be at every site 

all the time. They provided trainIng and guidance, but eventually 

ue squad leaders headed for the 

lungles pretty much on our own. 

We were tasked out and worked 

iirectly for artillery or infantry 

units. We were automatically afforded the respect of being the 

engineer "experts." 

Today, combat engineer squad 

leaders often lead and prepare the 

way for maneuver elements and 

task forces going to war. Army 

training programs, therefore, 

must allow squad leaders to develop the skills and confidence 

they will need to make sound en* 

neering decisions quickly in the 

heat of battle. A training program 

that encourages independent actions, coupled with training in a 

cohesive engineer unit environment, produces the best qualified 

squad leaders. This training 

should not focus entirely on the 

squad leader but include how the 

squad will function in the absence 

of the leader. 

Today, the training for our engineer squads must encompass 

more than just battle drills and 

task-oriented scenarios Senior 

NCOs and officer leaders must 

emphasize the value systems of 

our Army and our nation. Soldiers 

who embrace, without qualification, their oath to defend our Constitution will be those who emerge 

as the next generation of successful leaders. Inmy opinion,what an 

engineer squad does or fails to do 

on the battlefield has more impact 

In the outcome of that battle or 

lostile situation than virtually 

my other similar-sized element of 

:he U.S. Army 

If I was a young squad leader 

starting out today, I would ensure 

:hat I was an expert in much more 

:han the "normal" engineer tasks. 

raking care of a squad means 

knowing the leadership skills of 

forging that squad into a team and 

sccomplishing the mission despite 

any adversity or hardship. I would 

also do whatever I could to minimize self-inflicted wounds that 

needlessly become a hardship. I 

would knowHow to thoroughly maintain 

my vehicle and communications gear. 

How to use the supply system 

so my squad bad what it 

needed and had it on time. 

More about living and working 

in field situations than the average person really cares 

about. 

My chemical detection equipment and procedures inside 

and out. 

I could go on, but the main concept is that I would never be satisfied with meeting a minimum requirement. Successful soldiers 

and leaders train to proficiency A 

positive attitude and an in-place 

values system are the prescription 

for a healthy combat engineer 

squad. Y 

Command Sergeant Major IRet.1 

Rogge is the business manager of the 

Aimy Engineer Association at Felt 

Leonard Wood. He retired born the 

U.S.A~myin I989 after seruing 22 

years on actiue duty and 4years with 

the Minnesota Aimy National Guard 

(ARNG). His assignments included 

tours in Vitnam; Germany; Fort Lewis, Washington; and three tours at 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He 

also served as an advisor for the 

Minnesota ARNG and as a recruiter 

in Peoria, Illinois, and South Bend, 

Indiana. 

February 1994 
w 

i I ENGINEER UPDATE 

Commercial numbers are (314) 563-mxand Defense Sys. tem Network (OSN) numbers are 676-muunless athelwlse 

noted. 

Directorate of Training (DOT) 

Directorate of Combat 

Developments (DCD) 

Environment Branch. A new Environment Branch in the 

Engineer School is responsible for developing and exporting environmental awareness training support packages to all proponent schools within TRADOC. This initiative is in response to 

TRADOC direction that all schools integrate environmental awareness training into their programs of instruction by 31 March 1994. 

Initial packages were distributed in January and additional material is being developed. POC is Major David Neeley. -4122. 

51T Advanced Individual Training (A171 Course. The 

first 51T AIT course will begin on 4 April 1994 at Brown Hall, 

Fort Leonard Wood. This course signifies the consolidation of 

the 82B (construction surveyor), 818 (technical drafting specialist), and 51G (materials quality specialist) MOS into the 51T 

MOS (technical engineer specialist) at the 10 level. The 19-week 

course incorporates the latest drafting and survey automated 

technology in the construction industry; it is not a consolidation 

of the old courses. Soldiers graduating from 51T AIT will arrive 

at their units well versed in the newest construction systems 

fielded. POC is CPT Andrew Goetz, - 4114 or (314) 596-0997. 

62F, Crane Specialist, AIT Training. Class No. 508, 31 

May-19 July 1994, will be the last to provide 62F soldiers with 

training on the 12-112T crawler and the 20T rough terrain crane 

at Fort Leonard Wood. This action is in response to Department 

of Army direction to turn in the 12-li2T crawler and two models 

of the 20T rough terrain crane. Additionally, no monies will be 

spent to purchase repair parts or do GSidepot maintenance. 

After 1 June, all critical crane tasks except dragline will be 

taught on the hydraulic crane. Operators trained on hydraulic 

cranes easily adapt to performing the same tasks on mechanical 

cranes after they learn the controls. Three tasks in the 62F soldier's manual now trained at AIT will be trained at units: 

4 Install Dragline 

4 Excavate an Area with the Dragline Bucket 

Dredge Material from an Area with the Dragline Bucket 

POC is CPT Steven Passey, -4112. 

M9 ACE Scarifier. Lessons learned from the Combat 

Training Centers reveals two major causes of blade damage 

when opertors use the scarifier. First, damage results when operators use the scarifier in soil conditions that exceed the intended purpose of the equipment. M9 ACE News 'N' Views, 

August 93, states, 'The intent of the teeth is to assist in cutting 

through hard, rocky soil, NOT to dig through nearly solid rock." 

Second, damage occurs when the M9 ACE travels cross-country 

with the blade unfolded. The solution is to fold the blade in accordance with TM 5-2350-262-10. Failure to follow these instructions can cause serious injury to the operator or damage to the 

equipment. POC is SFC Tommy Simmons, -4085. 

February 1994 
Forklift Attachment for MW24C 2-1/2 CY Loader. A 

quick-release forklift attachment may soon be approved for the 

Case MW24C 2-112 CY Loader. Testing on the forklift assembly 

package began in September 1993 and will conclude in May 

1994. The Engineer School is evaluating the 10,000-lb forklift attachment, a quick-disconnect plate, and necessary modifications to 

the existing bucket. The three-piece assembly may be available for 

purchase through the Federal Supply System as early as May. 

The forklift attachment assembly will be packaged as a complete kit with all required hardware and will cost about $6000. 

The initial installation process requires 32 to 40 man-hours. 

Once installed, the quick disconnect system provides a fast and 

safe means of attaching and detaching the forklift assembly or 

the 2-112 CY bucket without leaving the cab of the loader. POC 

is CW4 Melad Smith, -4074. 

Robotic-Technology lnsertion Activity (R-TIA). MG Ballard's initiative to bring engineers to the forefront of robotic systems development has resulted in the establishment of a Robotics-Technology lnsertion Activity (R-TIA) at the Engineer School. 

The intent is to put prototype robotic systems in soldiers' hands 

for their evaluation and input to the development process. In FY 

94, engineers at Fort Leonard Wood will have the opportunity to 

evaluate an unmanned Combat Engineer Vehicle; an unmanned 

miniflail for breaching antipersonnel minefields; the Canadian 

JINGOSS, which is a mine-detection system for route clearing; 

CROSSBOW, which is a remote-controlled side attack, antivehiclelantitank land mine; and a prototype unmanned engineer armored vehicle. An unmanned HMMWV and unmanned 5-ton truck 

may also be evaluated in FY 94. POC is Dr. Robert Sickler, -4079. 

User Warning for Luxfer Air Cylinders. All Luxfer 4500 

psi hoop-wrapped SCBA air cylinders manufactured before May 

1985 have the potential to rupture, causing serious injury or 

death. Recall notices have been issued but about 15 percent of 

the units remain in the field. A protective steel neck ring that will 

eliminate the hazard can be retrofitted to the cylinder. For more 

information, call LUXFER at (909) 684-5110 or Buddy Dennard, 

Dobbins AFB, DSN 468-2736. POC is Mark Totzke, -4080. 

249th Engineer Battalion Award. The 249th Engineer 

Combat Battalion (Heavy) has been awarded the Meritorious 

Unit Commendation for the period 8 December 1990 to 27 April 

1991. This award was based on the battalion's actions during 

Desert ShieldIStorm. 

Although the battalion was inactivated in October 1991, individuals assigned to the unit during the award period are authorized to have the award annotated to their military personnel records. Additionally, individuals are authorized to wear the award 

(ribbon) as personal awards on the uniform. For information and 

documentation, call LTC Philip Federle at (703)614-5863 or DSN 

224-5863. 

Forkllft attachment (view 1) 

Forkllft attachment (view 2) 

Engineer Branch Safety Office 

(EBSO) 

News and Notes 

40 Engineer February 1994 
- BRIDGE THE GAP 


By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

ur forces can be deployed from anywhere 

in the world. To maintain this capability requires great leadership by our soldiers and a great 

NCO Corps. To succeed in this profession you must 

love being a soldier and love being a leader. You 

must believe in your country and your Army, be in the 

best physical and mental condition, and be technically 

and tactically proficient. If not, find a new profession." 

SMA Richard A. Kidd 

Sergeant Major of the Army 

This quote from the Sergeant Major of the Army 

; is inspiring and sets the standard for all soldiers, 

especially Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Without doubt, NCOs love being soldiers and leaders and 

believe in their country and their Army. Other tenets 

of this quotation need special attention and are the 

subject of this article. 

NCOs must become technically prdicient so they can 

successfully perform all tasks and functions related to 

their position, including the ability to operate and maintain 

all assigned equipment. The Self-Deveiopment Test 

(SDT) plays a vital role in measuring proficiency in 

technical and leadership skills. NCOs should use this 

tool to monitor and set goals for their own technical 

proficiency. But self-development does not stop with 

the SDT. It is the NCO's responsibility to seek out college courses and the recommended CMF-related 

courses and activities located on the Career Development Modei to improve his or her leadership skills. 

NCOs must develop technicaliy and tactically 

trained soldiers who have discipline, are physically 

strong, mentally tough, and highly motivated. NCOs 

must train their soldiers on every task critical to 

wartime mission accomplishment so those soldiers 

will be confident of their ability to perform well under the difficult and demanding conditions of battie. 

Effective training is the key to sustaining the mobility, 

deployability, and lethality of today's combat-ready 

Army. Technically and tactically proficient NCOs are 

the key to (and result of) effective training. 

To develop effective training, NCOs must know 

and use the nine principles outlined in FM 25-101, 

Battle Focused Training. Three of those principles 

are discussed here because they are at the heart of 

what a successful NCO is all about. 

Performance-Oriented Training. Soldiers train 

better, faster, and to a higher degree of proficiency 

when they know the task, conditions, and standards. 

Training becomes more effective when soldiers must 

perform to a standard rather than simply complete a 

procedure within a time frame dictated by a training 

schedule. Enforcing performance standards helps 

NCOs identify and correct training deficiencies and 

provides an accurate assessment of combat 

capabilities. 

Train to Chalienge. NCOs must provide training 

that is tough, realistic, mentally and physically challenging, and that excites and motivates their soldiers. 

Challenging training builds competence and confidence by developing new skills. It instills loyalty and 

dedication and inspires excellence by fostering initiative and enthusiasm. Challenging training builds aggressive, capable soldiers. 

Train to Sustain Proficiency. NCOs must ensure 

that once soldiers have trained to standard, they 

maintain proficiency through sustainment and opportunity training. Sustainment training reinforces skills 

and tasks already mastered by the soldiers. Opportunity training is the conduct of preselected, preplanned 

critical tasks that require little explanation. It is conducted when proficiency has been reached on a primary task and time is available. For example, a combat engineer squad leader may conduct opportunity 

training on the identification of threat mines while waiting for his squad to participate in a manual breach of a 

minefield. NCO leaders should prepare for opportunity 

training by preselecting critical tasks that fit the above 

described criteria before every scheduled training event. 

In summary, NCOs must establish themselves as 

experts in training and team building. NCO leaders 

must ensure their soldiers can cope with the complex, stressful, and lethal situations they will encounter on the next battlefield. They must train technically 

and tactically proficient soldiers who are mentally and 

physically strong and who are ready for deployment 

from anywhere in the world. In addition, NCOs must 

pass on the legacy that in this profession you must 

love being a soldier, love being a leader, believe in 

your country and in your Army, or find a new 

profession. 

February 1994 Engineer 41 
Members of the 2nd Battalion, 370th Regimental CombatTeam, 92nd 

Infantry Division, build a bypass on a road blown out by Germans 

in Cutigliano, Italy, October 1944. The 92nd Division was one of two 

predominantly African-American divisions in World War II. U.S. Army 

Slgnal Corps photo. 

PIN: 072-2- .