U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

68–482 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

GLOBAL TERRORISM:

SOUTH ASIA—THE NEW LOCUS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 12, 2000

Serial No. 106–173

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

JOHN P. MACKEY, Investigative Counsel

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 10

Alan W. Eastham, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South Asian

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 13

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 46

The Honorable Peter T. King, Representative in Congress from New York ...... 48

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania ...................................................................................................................... 49

The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey .... 50

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from New

York ....................................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from Florida ...... 54

The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan ....................................................................... 56

Alan W. Eastham, Jr. .............................................................................................. 69

Additional material submitted for the record:

U.S. Department of State On-the-Record Briefing Release from Secretary

of State Madeleine K. Albright, and Michael Sheehan, Counterterrorism

Coordinator ........................................................................................................... 77

Newspaper editorial from the Washington Times by Ben Barber on ‘‘Afghanistan: Seat of Terrorism Shifts to South Asia,’’ dated Tuesday, May 2,

2000 ....................................................................................................................... 78

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GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA—THE NEW

LOCUS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. I am pleased to call to order today’s hearing

on global terrorism. In particular, we will focus on the most recent

shift in the patterns of international terrorism to South Asia. This

move away from the more traditional Middle East-based terrorist

activity clearly deserves our attention and careful policy analysis.

Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted

that the shift of the center of gravity for international terrorism

has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest Asia.

Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-1980’s,

the Administration publishes a report called Patterns of Global

Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the public with

the latest trends and developments in international terrorism.

The report for 1999 establishes that South Asia is the new locus

of international terrorism, presenting both a regional threat and a

growing threat to our nation. We will examine what this new trend

means for our nation.

Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master terrorists

like Usama bin Laden and his radical supporters. We have on display today the State Department’s wanted posters for bin Laden, offering a $5 million reward for his capture.

Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban to

its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east, also contributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new locus of international terrorism.

Recent press reports indicate that the Russian intelligence services believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan promised to help

Chechen rebels with weapons, training, and possibly even with

trained fighters from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban

vehemently denied those serious Russian charges. We will examine

that issue today as well.

Through a coordinated law enforcement approach, many terrorist

threats emanating from South Asia were thwarted last year. As a

result, American deaths from terrorism were down to five in 1999,

one of the lowest levels in several years, and for that we are grateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ful. It is a sad but undeniable fact that Americans are often the

most frequent terrorist targets around the globe.

The 1999 annual terrorism report notes that we have repeatedly

asked Pakistan to end their support to elements that conduct terrorist training in nearby Afghanistan. We also asked that Pakistan

interdict travel of all militants to and from camps in Afghanistan,

to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistical support for the camps.

In addition, the State Department’s latest terrorism report notes

that Pakistan officially supports Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism.

The recent report from the congressionally mandated National

Commission on Terrorism noted Pakistan’s occasionally excellent

cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. However,

the Commission also pointed out the consistent Pakistani support

for terrorism in Kashmir. The Commission’s report also called for

naming Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism so that all the

sanctions against such a terrorist nation could be applied.

The new threat of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from the

region can often be found in a loosely knit group of terrorists once

trained and hardened in the war against the former Soviet Union

in Afghanistan.

Today on the new battlefields in Chechnya and Kosovo, where

war-making and fighting skills are honed and perfected, some of

these radical Islamic elements have been learning skills that later

can be used against our nation and others in radical terrorist acts.

South Asian also presents new concerns for the war on drugs. By

taxing rather than fighting the drug trade, the Taliban has effectively sided with the heroin producers and against innocent people,

particularly our young people. The drug trade is also proving to be

a lucrative resource for bin Laden’s terrorist network.

We are fortunate to have with us today the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism in the Secretary of State’s Office, who helps prepare the annual report on global terrorism and can help us sort out

what this new shift means.

We are also joined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

South Asian Affairs. Both of these witnesses will bring their expertise to our inquiry today.

Ambassador Sheehan, who, of course, oversees the preparation of

the global terrorism report, is prepared to answer any questions on

terrorism, and of course, no member is limited on what area of the

globe he would like to address.

Before we start with our witnesses, I welcome any comment from

our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you for calling this hearing. Both the State Department report and the Bremmer Commission report point out what

we have suspected for some time, that global terrorism is increasingly a collaboration and a coordinated effort.

As you have indicated, it has moved from its home in the Middle

East and North Africa now into South Asia, and certain factors, the

disintegration of Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era, the situation

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in Pakistan, a country that is now once again in military rule with

a weakened civil society, and increased influence of religious clerics

and their schools makes for a dangerous situation.

Usama bin Laden, seen often as the primary enemy of the

United States or one who has chosen the United States as his primary enemy, seems to make his home in that region.

We in this country need to work with our allies globally. We have

had some cooperation from Pakistan through the years, but reading

this last June 25 New York Times magazine article on the education at religious schools leaves one with a very uneasy feeling.

The authors go on to talk about these jihad factories where young

men are educated in a way that seems to direct them to take on

the West.

We have had cooperation from Pakistan, but we also have challenges coming from there, and we certainly feel that the reestablishment of democracy and a civil society is critical to make

progress in that country.

The Afghanistan situation is much more complicated. A country

that has seen war for so long, its political situation has disintegrated. The economic situation has left many in despair, and it now

seems to be a country that processes drugs and terrorists more

than almost any other activity.

We need to pull and work with our allies and friends to contain

and end this threat, which as you pointed out, often targets Americans first.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Any other Member seeking recognition?

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and

thank you very much for holding this hearing.

As we discuss terrorism in South Asia, I think it is important to

renew the Members of this Committee and the public’s acquaintance with the request that I have made for the last 3 years concerning American policy toward the Taliban because, as we examine terrorism in South Asia, one cannot help but recognize that if

it were not for the fact that the Taliban are in power, there would

be a different equation going on. There would be a whole different

situation in South Asia.

After a year of requesting to see State Department documents on

Afghan policy, and I would remind the Committee that I have stated that I believe there is a covert policy by this Administration, a

shameful covert policy of supporting the Taliban, the State Department after many, many months—actually years of prodding—finally began giving me documents, Mr. Chairman. In the assessment of those documents, I have found nothing to persuade me

that I was wrong in my criticism.

I might add, however, that there have been no documents provided to me even after all of these years of requesting it. There

have been no documents concerning the time period of the formation of the Taliban. Again, I would hope the State Department gets

the message that I expect to see all of those documents.

The documents that I have read, Mr. Chairman, indicate that the

State Department time and again has had as its position that they

have no quarrel or that it would give them no heartburn to have

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the Taliban in power, this during the time period when the Taliban

was struggling to take over Afghanistan.

Although the Administration has denied supporting the Taliban,

it is clear that they discouraged all of the anti-Taliban supporters

from supporting the efforts in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban,

even so much as when the Taliban was ripe for being defeated on

the ground in Afghanistan. Bill Richardson and Karl Inderfurth,

high ranking members of this Administration, personally visited

the region in order to discourage the Taliban’s opposition from attacking the Taliban when they were vulnerable, and then going to

neighboring countries to cutoff any type of military assistance to

the Taliban, this at a time when Pakistan was heavily resupplying

and rearming the Taliban.

What did this lead to? It led to the defeat of all the Taliban’s

major enemies except for one, Commander Masood in the north,

and left the Taliban the supreme power in Afghanistan.

So when we hear today about terrorism and crocodile tears from

this Administration, let us remember this Administration is responsible for the Taliban. This Administration has acted in a way

that has kept the Taliban in power.

One last note. Many people here understand that I have been in

Afghanistan on numerous occasions and have close ties to people

there, and let me just say that some of my sources of information

inform me of where bin Laden was. They told me they knew and

could tell people where bin Laden could be located, and it took me

three tries before this Administration responded to someone who

obviously has personal contacts in Afghanistan to even investigate

that there might be someone who could give them the information.

And when my informant was actually contacted, he said that the

people who contacted him were half hearted and did not follow

through, did not appear to be all that interested, appeared to be

forced to be talking to him.

Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about terrorism. We are concerned about the Taliban because we believe in human life and

human dignity. The worst terrorist acts of the Taliban are committed against the women of their own society, and let us not forget that.

But none of the terrorism which we will hear about today by Mr.

bin Laden or others would be taking place with Afghanistan as

their home base if it were not for the policies of this Administration. This Administration has had a policy concerning the Taliban

which has created this terrorist mess, which I predicted in this

body on numerous occasions 3 and 4 years ago.

So I think I am pleased that you have called this hearing today,

but let’s keep this testimony in perspective.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

I am pleased to recognize the Minority Whip, the gentleman from

Michigan, Mr. Bonior.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your indulgence and your courtesies for letting me say a few words this morning.

I want to thank you and all the Members of the Committee for

the opportunity to be with you today. I look forward to the testiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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mony that Ambassador Sheehan and Deputy Assistant Secretary

Eastham will be presenting.

On earlier occasions, the Administration has expressed the importance of working with Pakistan in addressing terrorism in

South Asia. I also believe that cooperation with Pakistan continues

to be very much in our national interest.

Combating and preventing global terrorism is one of the most serious challenges facing America’s foreign policy in this new era. It

is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan, as a longstanding ally

of the United States, is committed to cooperating with the United

States on terrorism. Its record shows that.

Sanctioning Pakistan would serve no purpose other than to isolate them and aggravate the social and economic and political challenges in the region.

I also strongly believe that the Taliban support for terrorism and

its harboring of Usama bin Laden must be condemned in the

strongest possible terms.

We must also respond to the threat, and I believe that is where

Pakistan plays a very critical role. We must remember that it is

not in Pakistan’s interest to have the Taliban on its border. It is

also not in Pakistan’s interest to have terrorist groups operating

within its borders, and it is clearly not in India’s interest to have

Pakistan isolated, thereby producing a greater threat to peace and

stability in South Asia.

While it is undeniable that some terrorist groups operate in

Pakistan, Pakistanis themselves are often the victim of terrorism.

Moreover, Pakistan has been cooperating with the international

community and the United States in counterterrorism efforts. In

1995, Pakistan turned over Ramzi Yousef, involved in the World

Trade Center bombing, to the United States. In 1997, Pakistan

helped apprehend Miur Amal Kanzi, who shot several people outside the CIA headquarters, and in 1998 and 1998, Pakistan handed

over two suspects involved in the bombing of our embassies in Africa.

I know from my talks with General Musharraf when I visited

Pakistan and India in April that he is committed to dealing with

the Taliban. He has met with one leader of the Taliban and is prepared to meet with others in Afghanistan.

Throughout my trip I gained a new appreciation of the unique

challenges facing the region. I also came away more convinced than

ever that the United States must play a proactive role in helping

to meet those challenges. There are serious challenges and threats

which exist in Pakistan, but I also know that General Musharraf

and General Aziz in Pakistan are well aware of what needs to be

done.

Pakistan has a responsibility to address terrorism in South Asia,

but I believe we do, as well. The United States bears special responsibility in South Asia. During the war in Afghanistan, the

United States armed Pakistan’s neighbors and militants. Then, in

my view, we callously abandoned the region.

The result of that neglect has been disturbing: the Taliban, taking control in Afghanistan; the critical economic conditions in India

and Pakistan, not to mention the nuclear weapons development

that has taken place.

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Now we have an obligation to do our part to help establish stability in South Asia, and it is in our interest to do so. The threat

of nuclear conflict and terrorism in South Asia is very real. We

must reduce this threat and halt the arms race in South Asia, but

I believe that unless Kashmir is addressed, Mr. Chairman, no real

progress can be made.

If we turn our attention away from the region as we did after the

war in Afghanistan, we risk further erosion, violence, and disillusionment.

We are uniquely positioned as a longstanding ally of Pakistan

and as an emerging friend of India to bring the parties together.

Given the stake in South Asia, punitive economic sanctions are

clearly counterproductive. Democracy will be strengthened not by

economic sanctions, but by economic aid.

Funds for cooperative counterterrorism efforts, economic development, civil society building, and respect for the rule of law are

needed. The answer is not to further sanction Pakistan or India,

but to open up possibilities for cooperation.

I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee

and the Administration as we respond to this serious issue and develop an approach to South Asia that recognizes our responsibilities in the region and strengthens our cooperation with our friends

and allies.

I thank you for your time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bonior.

I am going to ask our Members to please be brief so that we can

get on with the hearing.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I want to fully associate myself with the statements made previously by the gentleman from

Michigan. I think the statement was cogent, precise, and right to

the point.

It is really a sad commentary, at least in my experience serving

as a Member of this Committee, how we have applied such a double standard toward our relationship with Pakistan.

I think this country has been a friend of ours, through thick or

thin, and it seems that we have been kicking this country. Every

time we always need a whipping boy, we seem to always have

Pakistan, which is where we always do this. I thank the gentleman

from Michigan for the statement to that effect. We should not limit

whatever seems to be the support for friends who support the

issues affecting India, but we also have to be mindful of the fact

that Pakistan is just as much a friend of ours as is India, and I

want to commend the gentleman from Michigan for that statement.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for

calling this hearing.

As my colleague from Southern California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who

I know has worked with you in the past and myself on his request

for documentation, I share his frustration with the Administration’s lack of cooperation in providing this documentation.

Let me also say that I think that there has been a lack of purpose on the mayhem and anarchy coming out of Afghanistan. For

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many years now, we have held hearings to try to get the Administration to focus on the lack of policy, the lack of a strategy to try

to bring resolution to what has happened there in Afghanistan.

It seems to me that we are not dealing with the terror that is

coming out of the region, given the fact that there has been a great

call for a policy to try to do something about resolving the underlying problems that have given rise now to Afghanistan offering

Usama bin Laden and others a place to do business, a place to prepare for the next round of terrorist activity.

But this is a result of a lack of focus in our foreign policy in

South Asia, and I hope that we can muster some attention and resolve in the future to develop a strategy to deal with Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Royce.

I am going to have to ask unanimous consent that the statements by Congressman Peter King, Congressman Joseph Pitts, and

Congressman Jim Saxton, in charge of the special oversight panel

on terrorism of the Armed Services Committee, be included at this

point in the record.

[The prepared statements of Representatives King, Pitts, and

Saxton appear in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Without further delay we will proceed with

the witnesses. Our first witness today is the Honorable—— Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. I would like to make an opening statement.

Chairman GILMAN. Please make it brief so that we can get on

with our witnesses.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate any attempt to understand and thwart the presence

of terrorism anywhere it appears in the world. But I hope this

hearing provides the critical analysis that is much required.

Last October I wanted to take a family who are my constituents

to the White House to observe the arrival ceremony of the then

leader of Italy. Because I have had such a miserable experience

with White House security, I phoned ahead of time and told them

what gate I was arriving at and, of course, reporting the requirement of name, Social Security number, etc., for myself and informed the White House that we would be arriving in separate

cars. We were told fine and everything would be OK.

I was driven to the White House by a young, 20-year-old white

staffer of mine, and my guests were driven in a separate car by another staffer of mine, a young woman of color. Before I could get

into the White House, I was insulted at the White House gates because the Secret Service representatives mistook my young black

staffer for the Congresswoman of 6 years and asked me to prove

my identity. After getting inside the White House, I was challenged

at every checkpoint by the Secret Service yet again.

That was nothing compared to the experience of my guests who

had been invited by me and who were being escorted by my staffer.

They had been vetted by the Secret Service and by White House

protocol, but when they showed up, I guess all of the Secret Service

anti-profiling lessons just flew out the window as they had with me

earlier. The family consisted of a 16-year-old child in her silk PakiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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stani cultural dress and her father, whose hair is beautiful, thick,

black, and curly. He also sports a beard.

And so despite all of the correct procedure of communicating with

White House protocol, despite the added precaution of calling the

White House to let them know the specific gate that we would be

arriving at, none of the precaution and preparation on our part

worked. I almost did not get inside, and unfortunately my guests

did not get inside.

I have to admit that I was angry. I was angry that my guests

were denied admission for an event that their Congresswoman had

invited them to. I was angry that they had been ordered by Secret

Service to get out of the car being driven by my staff person of color

who had never ever been treated before in such a manner.

They were dog sniffed at the White House gates as if they were

common criminals, and then they were never admitted to the event

to which they had been invited, and I was tired. I was tired of

being humiliated every time I tried to exercise my very existence

as a Congresswoman, tired of people who looked like me and who

think like me being persecuted just because we exist.

I have to admit that I shed a tear on that day for the humiliation

of my constituents and of myself. But the 16-year-old girl put her

arms around me, and she said, ‘‘That’s OK. I’m used to it.’’ After much publicity, the First Lady graciously invited the entire

family back and gave them a personal apology.

Now, I am sure you are wondering what does this have to do

with the subject at hand. I think it has everything to do with the

subject matter of today.

Unintended consequences of our own policies and hasty disengagement from those consequences. It is far easier to blame the

victim than to solve the problem.

A few months after my White House experience with my guests,

the country awoke to news that the Secret Service was being sued

by a few courageous black Secret Service agents who had the guts

to say that something was rotten inside the Secret Service, and immediately it became clear how that grotesque mistreatment of me

and my guests on that day flowed logically from the systemic mistreatment of minorities within the very organization itself and, indeed, our American community at large.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that today this Congress is not going to

do to Pakistan what the Secret Service did to my Pakistani American constituents. We need a comprehensive approach to the problem of terrorism, and I will support that. But we also need to be

balanced, and we need to get to the root problem and not deal with

just the symptoms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This hearing on global terrorism addresses a subject of great concern not only to the people of this nation, but to people from nations all over the world. We have been the unfortunate witnesses

of numerous terrorist attacks all over the world that have destroyed or altered the lives of individuals on nearly every continent.

9

Whether it is in embassy bombings in Africa, government and

commercial office buildings in Oklahoma and New York, car bombs

in Ireland, mosque shootings and school bus bombings in Israel,

kidnappings in South America, or plane hijackings in Asia, terrorism is a misguided and hateful method of addressing discontent

with governments and other groups by targeting random, innocent

people.

It is essential that the United States and all nations of good conscience work together on the best methods of combating global terrorism.

The U.S. Government, beginning with this Congress, has a special responsibility as the world’s only super power to set an example of even handedness and just dealings when it comes to fighting

terrorism. Too often this nation’s government and its peoples have

chosen to unfairly target ethnic, racial, and religious groups, domestically or overseas, who are different from the majority of

Americans when trying to address a social ill or increase our national security.

Throughout American history, these scapegoat groups have included Native Americans, African Americans, Italian and Japanese

Americans, Jews, and most recently Arabs and Muslims. Policies

based on the misguided targeting of ethnic groups when trying to

address our domestic or national security has led to unconstitutional practices, such as indicated by my colleague Cynthia McKinney, racial profiling and the use of secret evidence.

Our focus on terrorism in Southeast Asia should not be for the

purpose of condemning or casting aspersions on a particular nation

or people because their predominant religion or form of government

is different from ours. Congress must additionally resist playing favorites between one nation over another, no matter what political

forces pressure us to do so.

In one of the background documents prepared by the Committee,

Afghanistan and Pakistan were the two countries singled out as

concerns in a region where incidents of government and organizational terrorism exist in many nations. Both nations have experienced major government upheavals and instability in their recent

past, and certainly the legitimacy of the Afghan Government is in

question.

However, the government of Pakistan has demonstrated continued cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism despite certain internal pressures that question U.S. cooperation.

Pakistan has arrested and extradited suspects in the murder of

CIA agents and in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New

York and our embassies in Africa.

According to the U.S. Government, Pakistan is considered a

friendly nation to the United States and has done a good job in providing security for our embassy and has, overall, been an ally of

the United States in our counter-terrorist efforts.

While there may be room for improvement, and certainly there

is, in Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, that improvement will

come from a continued close relationship with the United States,

where information and methodologies are shared for the benefit of

both nations and the rest of the world.

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Undue criticism will only drive a wedge between us and benefit

no one. The United States has a responsibility to be a facilitator

in Southeast Asia to additionally help reduce terrorist acts between

nations, just as we have been doing in the Middle East.

In closing, let me just remind my colleagues that this hearing focuses on Southeast Asian-centered terrorism. Terrorist acts are a

worldwide issue targeted toward people of all backgrounds by terrorists of all backgrounds.

The recent report of the National Commission on Terrorism

noted that today’s terrorists are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations.

So I would just say, let’s make sure that we are fair and even

handed as we look at this issue and not take sides, because we cannot help if it appears as though we are on one side as opposed to

the other. If we are going to be the facilitators, we need to have

an even hand so that we can make sure that we can continue communication with all nations, and then we can combat this terrorism

that is going on around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

We will be continuing our testimony right through the vote on

the journal. I have asked one of our Members to go over and return

quickly.

We will now call our first witness today, the Honorable Michael

Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, where he has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S.

counterterrorism policy.

Ambassador Sheehan was confirmed by the Senate in August

1999. His office chairs the Working Group for Counter-Terrorism,

which develops and coordinates policy, manages the State Department Task Force that responds to international incidents, and coordinates government efforts to improve cooperation with foreign

governments, including the Administration of the anti-terrorism

training assistance program.

Ambassador Sheehan’s background includes serving as Deputy

Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs and as a Special Advisor to the representative of the Secretary General of the U.S. mission to the

United Nations.

Ambassador Sheehan retired as a lieutenant colonel in the

United States Army after a career that included two tours on the

National Security Council’s staff. He is a graduate of the United

States Military Academy at West Point, adjoining my congressional

district.

Ambassador Sheehan.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members

of the Committee, and thank you for this opportunity to address

the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia.

11

In our annual report to Congress this year, Patterns of Global

Terrorism, 1999, we describe the shift in some detail. This was one

of the two trends we identified as the most important recent developments in terrorism, the other being the shift from well organized

and hierarchical groups supported by state sponsors of terrorism to

the loosely organized international networks of terrorism that are

often able to raise funds and sustain themselves by smuggling narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other types of fund

raising.

Mr. Chairman, I just returned from the Philippines and before

that Colombia, where this new type of terrorism is manifesting

itself in a very dangerous way. It was very troubling for American

interests in both of those countries of longstanding importance to

the United States.

I purposely addressed the trends that I alluded to earlier on the

very first page of my introduction in this report to show the importance of these trends, and the increased willingness and ability of

terrorists to seek refuge in South Asia are disturbing developments. They require us to refocus our diplomatic energies and policy tools as well.

I have a fairly lengthy written statement that I will submit to

the record, Mr. Chairman, and I will briefly cover some of the main

points of that statement in my oral remarks this morning.

Chairman GILMAN. So ordered without objection.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I will talk about three

areas this morning in my oral remarks. No. 1 is why South Asia.

What is important about South Asia?

Second, what we are doing right now.

And, third, what we will do next to deal with this evolving

threat.

Why has South Asia become the locus for terrorism around the

world? Primarily the reason is Afghanistan, and the complete collapse of the state of Afghanistan starting in 1979 with the invasion

of the Soviet army. The long and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan

attracted fighters from around the world, many of them at our bequest, in the mid-1980’s.

The proximity of Afghanistan to other conflicts, such as Kashmir

and others in Central Asia, also contributes to making it a hub of

this type of activity. In addition, the welcome mat provided by the

Taliban to these fighters that are often supporting the Taliban’s

fight against the Northern Alliance often also find refuge in Afghanistan for other agendas that they have in different parts of the

world.

In Afghanistan, the situation is exacerbated by an explosion of

narcotics trafficking and finances involved with that, a virtual

arms bazaar throughout the country, and religious extremism that

is fostered in many of the Madrases in Afghanistan and nearby

Pakistan.

Afghanistan came to the forefront of attention of the United

States, although we had known about it. The increasing support for

terrorism in the region came to the forefront after the bombings of

our embassy in East Africa in August 1988. Also, last year, as Congressman Gilman mentioned in his opening remarks, we had a

good year, only five deaths of Americans from international terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
12

rorism, the lowest in many, many years, three in Colombia and two

in Central Africa.

We did have continuing threats coming from South Asia, including the terrorist threat around the millennial period that manifested itself in Jordan, that wound its way back into Afghanistan;

the hijacking of an aircraft from India that wound up on a runway

in Kandahar; and various other threats that manifest themselves

around the globe and often have tentacles leading back to the leadership in the camps in Afghanistan.

Why is Afghanistan important? Why is South Asia? Let me mention three reasons.

First, the most immediate are the threats that directly affect us

around the world today, and as many of you know, recently the

State Department has put out an additional warning, a public announcement of warnings as terrorist threats have increased around

the world recently, many of those, again, winding their way back

to Afghanistan.

Second, the terrorism that emanates out of this part of the world

threatens regional stability. As mentioned by some of the Members

here in Pakistan itself, Kashmir conflict, other conflicts in Central

Asia, reaching into the Caucasus and the Middle East and beyond.

And finally, over the longer term, as the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism, I am concerned about the caldron of terrorism

that is bubbling out of Afghanistan and will continue to threaten

American interests in the longer term.

What are we doing to confront this threat? We are moving on a

lot of different fronts. I will, again, break those into three areas.

First, on the immediate front, we are working 24 hours a day

times 7 days a week to disrupt any cells that threaten Americans

around the world. Working with our liaisons with law enforcement

and intelligence organizations around the world, we are actively involved in disrupting any activities that threaten American interests. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is ongoing continuously,

both the threat our count-threats.

Second, we are working very actively to isolate and contain this

threat with pressure on the sanctuary of these groups.

Over the longer term, third, is what I refer to in the report and

often in many of my remarks. We want to drain the swamp, which

is a term I use to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations that

need space in order to organize its leadership, plan its activities,

train its fighters, assemble its equipment and arms in order to conduct attacks. And the primary swamp that I am concerned about

right now, Mr. Chairman, is in Afghanistan, although there are

many others around the world as well.

Let me say a word about resources while I have the opportunity.

I thank this Committee particularly, many of the Members of this

Committee and the staff, for the support they have given my office

over the years. I would like to emphasize we have two important

funding requirements in front of the Congress right now, a funding

for the anti-terrorism assistance program and for a center for antiterrorism security training, CAST, that are being requested by the

Administration.

Right now, in particular, the funding for the CAST seems to be

in great jeopardy. This center will help us train not only our diploVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
13

matic security personnel, but primarily, it will train those law enforcement and security people that work with us on a day-to-day

basis around the world to disrupt those cells I referred to earlier.

We need, in the 21st century, a 21st century terrorist training

facility in order to confront the 21st century terrorist threats. I appreciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and others on the Committee

as we work forward on this requirement.

In conclusion, I would like to remind that our efforts to combat

terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with our support from Capitol Hill and often from this Committee. Carefully

calibrated counterterrorism legislation, such as those regarding

state sponsorship, the foreign terrorist organizations, and others

are very key to our efforts.

Sufficient resources and the public discourse such as the hearings are also key. Your support coupled with the force of our sustained diplomatic and political efforts will help us drain the swamp

in Afghanistan and in other states that are not mustering the political will to confront terrorists.

We have had a great deal of success in the past 20 years, Mr.

Chairman. This success can be attributed to our commitment to

stay the course in a tough counterterrorism policy and to rally

international support. Applying diplomatic pressure, raising political will and levying sanctions, these actions have made many corners of the world intolerable for terrorists.

We must continue to stay the course while adjusting to new geographic threats and a changing face of terrorism. We must maintain strong political will within the Administration and in the Congress to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do the same.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before

your Committee today. I look forward to answering any of your

questions or Members of the Committee.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheehan appears in the

appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan.

We have with us Alan Eastham, who has a long record of service

in the State Department and in the service of his country. He is

now a Special Assistant and Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

He was involved with the Near East and South East in his responsibilities for a number of years, including Sri Lanka and as the

India Desk Officer.

He has been a staff officer in the Office of Combating Terrorism,

and he has had a wide range of experience overseas, in South Asia.

You may proceed, Mr. Eastham.

STATEMENT OF ALAN W. EASTHAM, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. EASTHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to you and

the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to

come here today to talk about an issue of great importance to the

United States and its interests in South Asia.

Let me also express the regrets of Assistant Secretary Karl

Inderfurth, who was originally invited to attend this hearing. He

14

is presently on his way back from a visit to China where he consulted on South Asian issues with the Chinese Government, coincidentally on the same day as Ambassador Holbrooke was there to

talk about other issues relating to South Asia and other parts of

the world.

I would like to begin by talking about some of the events, actions

we have taken since the last time we had an opportunity to testify

before Congress regarding terrorism in South Asia. I would remind

the Committee that in October 1999, the Security Council of the

United Nations unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 1267, which

calls on the Taliban to hand over Usama bin Laden to a country

where he can be brought to justice.

Since October of last year, we have been diligently monitoring

the application of the sanctions which were applied in that resolution, which include effects on financial transactions affecting the

Taliban and a ban on flights by the Afghan National Airline, which

is controlled by the Taliban, outside Afghanistan.

With Russia and other countries we have been talking in recent

weeks about the situation in Afghanistan, including terrorism.

With India this year we have established a joint working group on

counterterrorism which first met in February of this year.

India has also agreed to accept and work closely with a legal attache at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, and a country which has

not yet been mentioned in this morning’s proceedings. With Sri

Lanka, a friendly country which has been fighting an insurgent

group that employs the weapon of terrorism, we have enjoyed excellent cooperation in a number of areas related to

counterterrorism.

I have a lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I will at this

point summarize if that would be agreeable to you.

Chairman GILMAN. With unanimous consent, so ordered.

Mr. EASTHAM. Thank you.

Ambassador Sheehan and his colleagues have rightly stressed

the shifting locus of international terrorism to South Asia. Though

several South Asian countries face terrorist threats of one kind or

another, terrorists in Afghanistan pose the greatest threat to U.S.

interests, lives, and property in the region, and it will be that country which is largely the subject of my testimony today.

I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the Committee of a number of tragic incidents which have occurred over the

past several years in the region for which I bear some responsibility.

Beginning in March 1995, members of the Consulate General

staff in Karachi were murdered in transit between their homes and

the office. That case remains under active investigation to this day.

A similar incident occurred in late 1997 in which four American

businessmen were shot to death, and that case also is under investigation.

In Kashmir in July 1995, several foreign tourists were abducted

while hiking in the mountains of that region. I have to say that we

have devoted a great deal of time and attention to the case of Mr.

Donald Hutchings, the American citizen who is still missing from

the incident, and with whose family we are still in touch. We are

still very actively pursuing that case.

15

Ambassador Sheehan has mentioned the hijacking of the Indian

Airlines flight last December, which had a profound effect and

some relation to the earlier kidnapping in Kashmir by the fact that

one of the Indian prisoners who was released as a result of the demands of the hijackers was also the subject of demands of the kidnappers of the Americans from 1995.

At present the hijackers were last seen at the airport in

Kandahar, Afghanistan. The gentleman who was released from Indian custody is presently in Pakistan. There have been no arrests

in that case.

And I would also draw your attention to November 12, 1999,

when the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was the subject of

a rocket attack from parked vehicles.

The reason I bring these cases up, Mr. Chairman, is to remind

you that there is still a clear and present threat from terrorism in

the South Asia region. It affects U.S. interests. It affects U.S. personnel. It affects U.S. property, and it is certainly worthy of this

Committee’s attention and the attention of the Congress.

There have been many other such incidents against Indian interests in Kashmir, bombings in cities in India and Pakistan and attacks, as I mentioned, against the government of Sri Lanka by the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which we have designated as a

foreign terrorist organization.

These include an assassination attempt in December against Sri

Lankan President Kumaratunga, which injured her and killed several other people. It is clear that the trend is toward more and

more deadly attacks against targets in South Asia.

We have strongly condemned these attacks in the region, as we

do everywhere in the world. It is not acceptable and, indeed, reprehensible for individuals and groups to adopt this tactic as a

means of achieving political goals.

With respect to Kashmir, Mr. Chairman, the President, when he

visited South Asia in March, set out a number of principles which

call for restraint, rejection of violence, respect for the line of control

in Kashmir, and for India and Pakistan to renew their dialogue.

We believe those principles are eminently practical and that they

would, if pursued actively by the parties in South Asia, lead to a

reduction in U.S. violence and, indeed, considerable U.S. support in

that regard.

It is Afghanistan, however, where the shifting locus of terrorism

is most pronounced. I have in my written statement for the record

addressed the historical factors in some detail. I know that Mr.

Rohrabacher has also addressed more recent history.

I would just note, however, the immense suffering of the Afghan

people over the last 20 years since the invasion by the Soviet army

of that country in December 1979. One major factor to which Ambassador Sheehan has already alluded is the fact that over the past

20 years an entire generation of young men has grown up who

know nothing but war.

There is also an entire generation of young women who have

come into mature life during that period who have known nothing

but suffering, and it is toward peace in Afghanistan that our efforts

are directed.

16

Sadly for the Afghans, the brutality and ruthlessness that they

learned in fighting the Soviets has carried over into fighting other

Afghans as the Afghan civil war continued for the past 10 years.

The breakdown of central authority in Afghanistan, the all too

easy access to the tools of terrorism in the form of weapons and explosives, and the rise of ideologies in which violence against innocents is considered a legitimate tool, have contributed to an increase in international terrorism emanating from that region.

The rise of the Taliban has also been a contributing factor. The

Taliban had no previous experience when they took power in Afghanistan in administering a government. They had little experience with the outside world. They had a strong ideological motivation based in Islam and in the Pushtu-based society from which

they derive, and they had a strong need for support from any quarter.

This led them to depend on extremely questionable outside

sources of support, including those who advocate violence from outside Afghanistan, and increasingly the financial benefits of the narcotics trade.

They have since demonstrated that they support and sympathize

with goals from outside the region, which include the removal of

U.S. forces from the region of the Gulf, and they have taken no significant steps to curtail the pursuit of terrorist means to achieve

goals emanating from Afghanistan.

Ambassador Sheehan has outlined the steps we are taking to defend ourselves and to push back international terrorism. We have

repeatedly demonstrated this over the past several years.

One factor I would also like to note, Mr. Chairman, is the need

for governments to realize that support for their groups will backfire. These groups always, and I stress always, pose a threat to the

stability, security, and other real national interests of their hosts

and patrons, no matter the short term political advantage which

might be seen from activities against national adversaries.

The Taliban in Afghanistan have yet to learn this lesson.

At the same time that we have been pressing the Taliban to take

action to prevent the use of their territory for international terrorism, we have been careful to continue contributing to humanitarian programs in Afghanistan. We have provided support for

schools. We are the major donor of food assistance to Afghans. We

provide medical supplies and most recently have just announced a

new $4 million donation for drought relief in Afghanistan, a country which is suffering from a significant drought which may lead

to significant suffering and starvation in that country.

We have had, we think, a positive impact on the lives of ordinary

Afghans because it is not their fault, and they should not suffer because the people who control that country support international

terrorism.

With respect to Pakistan, several members have noted the close

relationship we have had over the years with that country. We

have also worked together against terrorism. Pakistan has offered

its cooperation, as has been noted previously during this hearing.

Pakistan wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan. After

all, Afghanistan is next door to Pakistan. It has considerable influence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban.

17

Pakistan has made known its view that the presence of Usama

bin Laden in Afghanistan is an obstacle to stability, and Pakistan

makes the point that it does not control the Taliban.

We will continue and have urged Pakistan to use every aspect of

its influence with the Taliban to convince them to deal with this

issue in the manner called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution

1267.

We are also very concerned at the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. The country has taken some recent, very welcome steps to address this problem and has arrested a number of persons wanted

for terrorist crimes, as has already been noted, and has announced

it’s taking a close look at foreigners living in Pakistan to insure

they’re there for lawful and peaceful purposes.

I would note that the Pakistan press today, Mr. Chairman, reports that a senior delegation from the Pakistan Interior Ministry

will be going to Afghanistan later this month to talk to the Taliban

authorities about matters pertaining to terrorism and narcotics,

and we welcome that as a manifestation of Pakistan’s intent to

deal with this problem as it affects that country.

We are also concerned, as I noted, because both Pakistani and

U.S. interests have been attacked in that country. Some terrorists

and their supporters certainly continue to live in and move through

Pakistan. This includes the organization formally known as

Harakat-ul-Ansar, which was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.

We will continue to urge Pakistan to take action against such

groups and to take all steps necessary to see that it does not become a safe haven or a safe transit point.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can take as the example the counternarcotics cooperation we have enjoyed with Pakistan for the past

20 years. We have come to the point where it is possible to see the

end of the road for opium production in Pakistan. We have had exemplary cooperation with that country in this area, and we hope

that we can take that as a model for cooperation on

counterterrorism.

I thank you very much for the opportunity. I will be happy to

take your questions, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eastham appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Eastham and Secretary

Sheehan.

Let me first address Ambassador-at-Large Michael Sheehan. At

your recent Central Asia terrorism meeting here in Washington,

sponsored by the State Department, several of the government representatives from nations in the region impacted by radical Islamic

terrorism talked about terrorist camps within Pakistan, as well as

Afghanistan.

Are you aware of any terrorist training camps inside of Pakistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, our primary concern regarding camps is in Afghanistan, and I talked to those members of

all five countries from Central Asia that came to our conference.

We had very productive discussions with them. They were all concerned primarily about Afghanistan and the camps there.

18

The situation in Pakistan is complicated. I may need a closed

session to go into some more details on some of the aspects of it.

In our annual report, we do mention the movement of terrorist

groups through Pakistan. Primarily my concern is the camps are

in Afghanistan. Often in order to leave Afghanistan, many terrorists move through Pakistan, particularly through Peshawar and

out through the region, but they also move north through the Central Asian states as well.

But I think any other details regarding some activity of those

camps we might do in closed session; but I would underscore to

you, Mr. Chairman, the major source of camps for the training of

those types of groups reside in Afghanistan.

Chairman GILMAN. But my question is: specifically, are there any

training camps in Pakistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I reviewed that question

carefully with my analysts before coming up here. I think I need,

based on their advice, to talk to you about that in a closed session.

Chairman GILMAN. A number of the Central Asian countries indicated that there was information of terrorist camps in Pakistan.

Are they accurate? Are those statements accurate?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think I would

have to discuss that in a closed session.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. With regard to both panelists, what

is your candid view of the level of cooperation that we’ve received

from Pakistan in recent years in the fight against international terrorism in the region?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, the Pakistani Government

has cooperated with the U.S. Government in counter-terrorist actions over the past many years, and it continues to do so actively

as we speak right now regarding helping us deal with specific

threats to our security, both those threats that affect us within

Pakistan, our embassy, and other points of interest, but also regarding individuals that may be within Pakistan or transiting

through Pakistan.

So in that regard, they get fairly good grades on cooperation on

specific cases. The other side of the ledger, I must say, is their policies in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Kashmir that contribute to the problem of terrorism that emanates out of Afghanistan. So it’s a mixed record. They cooperate, but they also have

policies that are very troubling to us, and we have had very frank

discussions with them on those policies and urge them to address

those issues.

We remain closely engaged at a very high level with the Pakistanis on these issues, and my particular concern is their relationship to the Taliban and how that affects our interest in

counterterrorism.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Sheehan.

Secretary Eastham, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just add that I would second Ambassador

Sheehan’s remark regarding cooperation on specific cases. The

threats to U.S. installations—— Chairman GILMAN. Would you put the mic a little closer to you?

Mr. EASTHAM. Sure. The threats to U.S. installations, facilities,

personnel, and interests in Pakistan receive the highest level of coVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
19

operation from the Pakistan Government. As Ambassador Sheehan

has noted, the question of the Taliban and on the pursuit of longer

term interests with respect to Afghanistan has an effect on Pakistani attitudes with respect to that country.

It would not be inappropriate to mention that policies toward

Kashmir also have an effect, but I think that I would endorse Ambassador Sheehan’s remarks.

Chairman GILMAN. To both panelists, why has the State Department failed in not designating the Pakistani based LET group

[LASHKAR-e TAYYABA], a foreign terrorist organization, especially since the legal threshold is not very high?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, every 2 years, actually by

legislation, the Congress requires us to review foreign terrorist organizations. However, this year I have also decided, within the limited resources in my office, to review other groups during the year

because we can designate them as terrorist organizations at any

time during the year.

We are currently reviewing the LET, the LASHKAR-e

TAYYABA, actively for its designation as a foreign terrorist organization. The work has been done at the analytical level within the

State Department. It is a very complicated and legal process, the

designation of a foreign terrorist organization, and right now we

are working with the Department of Justice and Department of

Treasury to complete that legal analysis.

We have been challenged twice in the past on our designation of

FTOs in the U.S. court system, and we have won both times. So

it is incumbent on us to be very well prepared before we designate

a group for terrorism, and right now the LET or the LASHKARe TAYYABA, I think you are referring to, is under close review

right now, and I expect, Mr. Chairman, to have an answer as to

whether they will be designated within the next weeks, perhaps

months, depending on that legal process.

Chairman GILMAN. We would hope you would keep this Committee informed of your progress in that direction.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think one of the things that we want to make sure people see

clearly is that our concerns here are isolated to terrorist activities

and threats directed at the United States and our allies, and that

what we want to make sure does not happen is that we do not

want to create the appearance in any way that there is a conflict

here between the West and Islam or, you know, people of the Muslim faith.

These are isolated incidents, and certainly most of Islam, like

most religions, focus on peaceful relations with their neighbors. So

I just want to make sure that the fact that we happen to focus on

this region today does not leave people with any other impression.

My first question is that I am getting the sense, more and more,

that it is hard to figure out what comes first, but there is an economic aspect to all of this. You look at Colombia, and you find the

drug lords and the terrorists there. You go to Lebanon and you find

in the Bekaa Valley they are growing poppies. You come to this

area, and again, the drug trade, you can look at it and see that the

drug trade is an easy way to make lots of money.

20

The relationship here seems to be very tightly woven. So this is

my first question. How much of the activity here is profit motivated, trying to make money off drugs with a little bit of fervor on

the side for your terrorist organization, and how much is terrorism

with its own goals associated with that?

The second question is: What are the countries that have relationships and provide assistance to the Taliban and the government in Afghanistan?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I am sorry. What was the second question, again?

Mr. GEJDENSON. The second question is: Which countries have

relations with the government in Afghanistan and provide assistance, military, other than humanitarian, of course?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. All right, Mr. Gejdenson. On the first

question regarding your question about terrorism and its economic

roots, etc., you are absolutely right that most of the terrorism that

I see, as the Coordinator when I look around the world, emanates

from places where there is a breakdown of state control. The old

days of state sponsorship have really waned considerably, although

there are a few that I have great concern with, but those are less

of my immediate concern.

When you have a complete breakdown of lawlessness in a place

like Afghanistan, where you have the confluence of narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, other types of illicit activity, coupled with

these other terrorist groups, you find this phenomenon at a high

rate.

In Afghanistan there are both types of terrorists, those that seem

to be just in the profit business and others that are politically motivated. Some of them are just politically motivated, and those are

some of the ones, frankly, that are more troubling.

The ones that get caught up in narcotics trafficking and other

elicit activities sort of lose interest in their terrorist goals. They’re

still of major concern, but not as threatening as the ones that are

very focused on their political agenda. So there is a little bit of both

in Afghanistan.

Regarding your second question on support for the Taliban, the

Taliban finds itself extraordinarily isolated around the world today.

Initially they were recognized only by three governments: by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudis and

the UAE both have an extraordinarily strange relationship with

the Taliban right now, and I have discussed that issue with both

of them at very senior levels.

They have put a lot of pressure on the Taliban on a lot of issues

regarding terrorism, narcotics traffic, and others, and have been cooperating with us on bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban.

The other country is Pakistan. Its relationship with the Taliban

is also longstanding and complicated, and I would not exactly describe it as very warm at this point. I will let Al Eastham respond

to this in more detail, but I know that the Pakistani Government

is engaging the Taliban right now regarding all of the issues that

we are concerned about in trying to get them to turn around their

policies. Whether those efforts will bear fruit remains to be seen,

but those are the main countries with relations with the Taliban.

21

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just add that, on your first question regarding the nexus between drugs and terrorism, the Taliban have

an ambiguous position on this. They say that the drug trade is unIslamic, but they seem to permit it to occur and, indeed, to tax it

along the way as a source of revenue; and this is a dichotomy in

their policy, which is a little bit difficult to deal with because the

two policies are completely opposite.

We have been doing a great deal to focus on the problem of interdicting narcotics flowing out of Afghanistan. We have been working

with all of Afghanistan’s neighbors in this direction and also with

the U.N. drug control program.

There is a dilemma in trying to suppress the narcotics traffic in

Afghanistan. You have to provide assistance to the country to be

able to do that, and that is very hard for us to do with the Taliban.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Under the present restrictions, are we able to

do democracy building in, for instance, Pakistan with the present

sanctions? The present leadership in Pakistan is arguing it is trying to establish democracy at the grassroots level. Can we participate in that or are we blocked from doing that with our sanctions?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We can, Mr. Gejdenson, and we do.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And if I could indulge my colleagues, one last

thing. Are there any countries supplying weapons to the Taliban at

this point?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think I will have to go in closed session

on that as well, Mr. Gejdenson. What I know about that is from

classified sources. I will be glad to talk to you about it after this.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.

You might check with Mr. Rohrabacher for any other information

you need on Afghanistan. He seems to be very knowledgeable about

the military situation there.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This is a joke. I mean, you have to go to

closed session to tell us where the weapons are coming from?

Well, how about let’s make a choice. There is Pakistan or Pakistan or Pakistan. Where do you think the Taliban—right as we

speak—are getting their weapons. I have not read any classified

documents. Everybody in the region knows that Pakistan is involved with a massive supply of military weapons and has been

since the very beginning of the Taliban.

Let me just state for the record here before I get into my questions that I think there is a—and it is not just you, Mr. Ambassador, but it is this Administration and perhaps other Administrations as well. I do not believe that terrorism flows from a lack of

state control. A breakdown of state control, and all of a sudden you

have terrorism.

That is not what causes terrorism. What causes terrorism is a

lack of freedom and democracy, a lack of a means to solve one’s

problems through a democratic process.

Afghanistan from the very beginning, when the Reagan Administration was involved with helping the Afghans fight the Russians,

which were engaged in trying to put a totalitarian government

there; because of Pakistan’s insistence, a lion’s share of our support

22

went to a guy named Hek Makti Argulbadin, who had no democratic tendencies whatsoever.

And since the Russians left, the United States has not been supporting any type of somewhat free, somewhat democratic alternatives in Afghanistan, and there are such alternatives, and those

of us who have been involved know that.

So there is no democracy or freedom in Afghanistan where people

who are good and decent and courageous have a chance to cleanse

their society of the drug dealers and the fanatics that torture and

repress especially the women of Afghanistan. The men of Afghanistan are not fanatics like the Taliban either. They would like to

have a different regime.

Only the United States has given—and I again make this

charge—the United States has been part and parcel to supporting

the Taliban all along and still is, let me add. You do not have any

type of democracy in Afghanistan. You have a military government

in Pakistan now that is arming the Taliban to the teeth.

And in Kashmir, what have you got? You have got an Indian

Government that supposedly is democratic, steadfastly refusing to

permit those people to have an election to solve the problems there

democratically. You have got Christians; you have got Seeks

throughout India and Pakistan and Jamou where the people’s

rights are being denied them. It is a breakdown of democracy on

the subcontinent, not a breakdown in state control that is causing

the violence that threatens the world right now.

Let me note that 3 years ago I tried to arrange support, aid, humanitarian aid to a non-Taliban controlled section of Afghanistan,

the Bamiyan area. Mr. Chairman, the State Department did everything they could to thwart these humanitarian medical supplies

from going into Bamiyan.

And we have heard today that we are very proud that we are

still giving aid to Afghanistan. Let me note that aid has always

gone to Taliban areas. So what message does that send the people

of Afghanistan? We have been supporting the Taliban because all

of our aid goes to the Taliban areas, and when people from the outside try to put aid into areas not controlled by the Taliban, they

are thwarted by our own State Department.

Let me just note that that same area, Bamiyan, where I tried to

help those people who were opposed to the Taliban, Bamiyan now

is the headquarters of Mr. bin Laden. Surprise, surprise.

Everyone in this Committee has heard me time and again over

the years say unless we did something Afghanistan was going to

become a base for terrorism and drug dealing. Mr. Chairman, how

many times did you hear me say that?

This Administration either ignored that or are part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Again, I am sorry Mr.

Inderfurth is not here to defend himself, but let me state for the

record at a time when the Taliban were vulnerable, the top person

in this Administration, Mr. Inderfurth, and Bill Richardson personally went to Afghanistan and convinced the anti-Taliban forces not

to go on the offensive. Furthermore, they convinced all of the antiTaliban forces and their supporters, to disarm and to cease their

flow of support for the anti-Taliban forces.

23

At that same moment, Pakistan initiated a major resupply effort,

which eventually caused the defeat of almost all of the anti-Taliban

forces in Afghanistan.

Now, with a history like that, it is very hard, Mr. Ambassador,

for me to sit here and listen to someone say our main goal is to

drain the swamp—and the swamp is Afghanistan—because the

United States created that swamp in Afghanistan, and the United

States policies have undercut those efforts to create a freer and

more open society in Afghanistan which was consistent with the

beliefs of the Afghan people.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield for one statement?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I was wondering. During the time that the Administration supported the Taliban and created this policy, who

was President during those years?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, there were several Presidents, and I

would say that George Bush has to accept some of the blame, but

I think the current Administration—no, the Taliban did not exist

before that, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Gejdenson, one of the other myths is that the Taliban were

part and parcel of the Mujahadin. The Taliban, as both of you

know, were not part of the Mujahadin. The Taliban basically sat

out the war and came on the scene afterward. Mu Omar was not

a renowned commander in the Mujahadin.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher, did you want the witnesses

to respond?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, one last note. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Muslims are the victims of terrorism just as much as anyone

else. In fact, Muslims are suffering more than anyone else, and I

agree with my colleagues that we have to be very careful. Mr.

Gejdenson was absolutely right in making sure that as we look at

this Taliban drug-related terrorism that is now affecting all of us,

that we do not do something to send a message that this is something to do with the Islamic faith because it does not. They are victims as well.

And if you have any comments, please feel free. Thank you for

giving me 5 minutes.

Chairman GILMAN. Did the panelists want to respond at all?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Sheehan.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. First of all, Mr. Rohrabacher, I am sorry

that you think that it is a joke that I will not respond on the issue

of support for the arms for the Taliban. The information that I

have, which I cannot respond by public sources, is based on intelligence methods, and I do not have the authority to speak about

that in this session, but I will be glad to talk to you or other Members afterward.

Second, regarding the responsibility the U.S. Government has for

Afghanistan in the situation there, I do not accept that conclusion

at all. The United States did participate in helping the Mujahadin

reject the Soviet occupation in the mid-1980’s, and that was a policy that I think was a correct one at that time.

24

The situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of that state since

1979, has primarily to do with the situation in Afghanistan. Certainly there were those responsible, whether it was the Soviet occupiers or those who were involved in the civil war that has waged

there for 20 years, but the idea that the U.S. Government is responsible for everything in Afghanistan is not true.

The idea that we support the Taliban I also reject, as well, completely. I have spent 18 months in this job leading the effort within

the U.S. Government and around the world to bring pressure on

the Taliban. After the bombing of the embassies in East Africa,

when I got hired for this job, I have made it my sole effort, my primary effort in this job to bring pressure on that regime.

The U.S. Government leads that effort in providing pressure on

that regime. My office leads that effort within the U.S. Government. We started with an executive order in August 1999 that

brought sanctions to bear on the Taliban. We led the effort in the

United Nations to bring international sanctions against them.

We are also leading the effort internationally right now to look

at further measures against the Taliban. It is the U.S. Government

that is leading that effort. We are ahead of everybody else to bring

pressure on the Taliban, and the Taliban knows it. Those other

member states within the United Nations and the other communities know our efforts to bring pressure to bear on that organization because of its support for terrorism.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Eastham, did you want to comment?

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, sir, I would.

I would be happy to defend Mr. Inderfurth if you would like, Mr.

Rohrabacher, even if he is not here in person.

I would just note that I have spent nearly 15 years of my life

working on this part of the world. I was with the Mujahadin at Peshawar from 1984 to 1987. I was in the consulate at Peshawar at

that time, and I have been back on this account now. I began my

6th year on the South Asia account this time around this week.

I was in Pakistan when you were trying your effort to put airdrop assistance into Bamiyan. So I am quite familiar with the history of the whole episode.

And I can say that at no point, at no point in the last 6 years

has the United States of America offered its support to the Taliban.

This is why I think that despite the fact we have provided you

nearly 1,000 documents in response to the requests of the Chairman that you have not been able to find the support for the

Taliban, because it is not there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is incorrect, by the way, and I will state

that for the record. That is incorrect. I have found several references and documents that have been kept from me indicating

what our policy formation about the Taliban has been. So that it

not accurate.

Mr. EASTHAM. Well, we have a fundamental difference of opinion

then about the record of what this Administration has done with

respect to the Taliban.

But I will say that our goals with respect to the Taliban have

shifted over the past 2 years almost since the East Africa bombings. When the Taliban first came into power in Afghanistan, we

25

had an agenda which addressed terrorism, narcotics, human rights

including the rights of women, and bringing peace to Afghanistan.

We tried to address all of those at the same time.

After the East Africa bombing, the terrorism problem became

much more acute and a much higher priority in terms of what we

were doing, but we have been addressing all of these issues since

the first day the Taliban came into being, and particularly since

they came to power in Kabul.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just had a couple of questions I wanted to ask Mr. Eastham.

Is Afghanistan currently a full fledged member of the United Nations?

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, it is.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And by all standards, 187 members of the

United Nations recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan through

the Taliban?

Mr. EASTHAM. I am not an expert on this, but I think I can address it in terms general enough that I do not make a major mistake.

Afghanistan’s credentials as a member of the United Nations

have never been rejected by the credentials committee, and the

Northern Alliance delegation, the delegation representing the entity headed by Burhannudin Rabbani still occupies the seat of Afghanistan at the United Nations.

At the same time the Taliban has a presence in New York as a

group, but they do not sit in United Nations councils.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The Taliban group does not sit in the

United Nations council?

Mr. EASTHAM. That is correct.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. But by all legitimacy, all other nations do

recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in its bilateral as well as multilateral relations?

Mr. EASTHAM. No, that is not correct. There are only three countries that have formally recognized the Taliban as the governing

entity in Afghanistan. Those three are, as Ambassador Sheehan

mentioned, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan. No other country

has, to my knowledge, established formal diplomatic relations or

recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are our closest allies and we committed a tremendous amount of arms and assistance to these two

countries to fight Soviet invasion; is that correct?

Mr. EASTHAM. That’s correct.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And what was the approximate amount in

value of what we gave in terms of armaments and everything to

these two countries to fight Soviet invasion?

Mr. EASTHAM. I cannot characterize any amounts which might

have been provided under programs other than the assistance provided Pakistan. With respect to Pakistan, we provided something

26

in the neighborhood of $3 billion, $3.2 billion in official assistance

from 1982 until the imposition of sanctions in 1990.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I wanted to ask Secretary Sheehan. You

mentioned that you still have concerns about the policies that the

Pakistani Government has concerning terrorism, and I want to

know what specific policies does the Pakistani Government have

that is of concern to the Administration.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We have concerns on both fronts, the east

and the west. In the east, starting with Kashmir, we have concerns

about the Pakistani Government, particularly their intelligence

service support to groups that we have designated as foreign terrorist organizations and support for those groups that are operating in Kashmir in that situation there.

Second, and of more immediate concern to me, is Pakistan’s long

relationship with the Taliban, which started in late 1994 when the

Taliban emerged in Afghanistan and continues to this day. They

are the primary relationship, the Taliban, that Pakistan has.

But as I mentioned in my remarks, it is a complicated one. The

Pakistanis increasingly understand, I believe, they increasingly understand the threat that the Taliban and its policies have and the

backwash back into Pakistan itself.

So we have concerns with the Pakistanis on both of those issues

that we have talked to them about at the highest levels.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As you know, the political situation in Pakistan has also been very serious. We have a military general who

felt very strongly that he had to take control of the government because of the problems. Do you think that maybe it is not because

that they are not anti-terrorist but because they just do not have

the proper resources to properly control their borders when these

terrorists go through its territories?

What are we doing to give assistance to the Pakistani Government to alleviate this problem perhaps? Are we assisting them accordingly?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think the chief executive, Mucharev,

definitely has his hands full, and as he has said many times before,

his primary concern is turning around the economy in Pakistan,

which is truly in tough shape.

We do support Pakistan in a variety of different ways, and perhaps Al Eastham is better equipped to answer that question. We

have had long ranging consultations with them on how to help

them move in the proper directions in terms of democratic reform,

in terms of economic reform, which will give them the strength politically to make some of the tough decisions they have to make regarding terrorism.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You know, there is a sense of hesitancy. If

I were a Pakistani leader, I remember a couple of years ago, and

my good friend from California will recall, Pakistan paid $600 million up front for the aircraft that we were supposed to deliver, and

we never did.

How are we to deal with other countries if we do not keep our

promises in that respect?

Mr. EASTHAM. Well, we reached an understanding with the Pakistan Government which settled that claim a year ago, and we are

27

in the process of implementing a settlement which is satisfactory

to both sides regarding the question of the aircraft.

The aircraft delivery was denied, however, I would note, because

of legislation which required a Presidential certification relating to

the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. We were constrained by the legislative factor.

We also have a considerable burden of sanctions relating to Pakistan in the nuclear field, potentially in the terrorism, religious freedom, and narcotics fields, and the ultimate sanction which exists

now, which is the sanction against U.S. assistance——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My point——

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time has, but I just want to make my

point here, which the fact that this government or this country

paid $600 million, and all of a sudden we have all kinds of restrictions, and then we hung onto their money for years until just now

we made this settlement, and to me that is very unfair. It is one

sided.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. We will be continuing right through the vote.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I am particularly concerned about the

social stability of Pakistan. Regional security is at risk of being seriously undermined if the troubling social trends we have seen continue. I am especially concerned about the Madras schools whose

curriculum encourages radicalism, and as you recognized, Ambassador Sheehan, in your testimony, you mentioned anti-Americanism as well.

This is the same style education which gave rise to the Taliban

and its militarism and the Taliban’s horrible human rights practices, especially with respect to women. I think there’s a direct

cause and effect between this type of propaganda that occurs in the

schools.

Now, Pakistan, in my view, is on dangerous ground with the operations of these schools, and I believe that the continuation of this

education threatens the very foundation of the Pakistani state, and

I think it threatens India, and I think it threatens the entire region.

I have spoken with Pakistani Government officials and have

been told that General Musharraf is working very hard to emphasize the teaching of science and the teaching of technology in these

schools and trying to develop a different curriculum, one that

would contribute to economic development and lift Pakistanis out

of poverty.

I also wanted to recognize your statement in your report, Ambassador, where you say terrorism is a perversion of the teachings of

Islam, and I want to commend you for making that observation in

your report.

My question, though, is to what extent is the central government

of Pakistan having success in modifying what these schools are

teaching Pakistan’s young people. You discuss in your testimony

28

their intentions. Have there been effective actions that are occurring there?

As I say, I think this is cause and effect, and I would like to

know your observation.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Let me take a first crack, Mr. Congressman. I am sure Mr. Eastham will have some comment as well.

Mr. ROYCE. Sure.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I am glad you asked the question about

Madrases. It is an important one, and one that has to be carefully

reviewed. This is an issue that has been of concern with me from

the first day on the job.

Madrases are nothing more than schools that have filled a vacuum in Pakistan where there are very often no schools or bad

schools, and many Madrases are good schools run by legitimate

people with the proper purpose in mind, to educate their children.

There is a small percentage of them that are of concern to us.

Those are ones that have a radical or extreme underpinning, that

promote ideologies that are threatening. In fact, some of the

Madrases along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan contributed to the radicalization of many of the fighters that now are

of great concern to us.

The issue of education in Pakistan is a fundamental one, and the

issue of Madrases is a careful one for the Pakistani Administration

to deal with. They have talked to us about wanting to gain control

of the small number of those extreme Madrases and shutting them

down, and also to have better control of the curriculum of some of

the other Madrases that are trying to do the right thing educating

the youth of Pakistan.

So it is a complicated question, one that I think the Pakistani

Government understands. They understand also the sensitivity of

the issue and are working to address it.

The progress will not be measured in the short term, Mr. Congressman. It will take time, and we will have to see what success

they have in addressing that issue.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I commend you for your focus on education and

propaganda because that question and which direction that takes

is going to have a very real consequence in terms of terrorism in

very short order.

Let me also make the observation to the extent that we can deescalate tensions between Pakistan and India and reduce the overall budget dedicated to armaments, those are funds in South Asia

that instead can go into public education so that there is not the

need for the development, the creation of these alternative sources

of education.

Part of the problem in South Asia is the degree of the budgets

in these countries that goes toward military armaments.

Now, I would like just for a second to bring up another issue that

is a little bit outside the scope of this hearing; but I serve as Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, and in reading your report, it

mentions the Revolutionary United Front and Sierra Leone. This

is a Libyan trained and Liberian backed organization whose practice has been cutting off the arms and legs of little children in Sierra Leone.

29

If you go into Freetown, there are several thousand amputees,

many of them as young as 2 years old. That organization, known

as the RUF, has made war on a democratically-elected government

and should be listed as a terrorist organization. I would hope you

would consider in your next report doing so.

I say that because many Members of this Committee, including

the Ranking Member, including the Chairman of this Committee,

have spent considerable time on this issue of Sierra Leone, and this

report should reflect the reality of what is happening on the

ground. I do not feel that was reflected by the fact that RUF is not

mentioned as one of these organizations.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Ms. McKinney.

Mr. ROYCE. Could I have a response to that though, Mr. Chairman, if I could, on the RUF especially?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We will review the RUF during this year,

as well as before the end of our 2-year period. I am familiar with

that organization. Much of the activity they are involved with falls

more in the box of war criminality, which is a heinous crime in either case. Whether they fit into the box of foreign terrorist organization is under review, Mr. Congressman, and I will stay in touch

with you on that.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to say to Mr. Sheehan that I think that that

is a totally inadequate and insufficient response to that question.

I would like Chairman Royce to know that on May 6, 1999, I wrote

a letter to the President, to the Secretary of State, and I presume

it got down to you as well, asking for the designation of RUF as

a terrorist organization, and I can tell you that I got not a single

straight answer from this Administration in response to that.

Now, it appears to me that this Administration has cleaved itself,

in its policy, to rapists of 12-year-old little girls and of hand choppers. So that response is totally inadequate. You have had it under

review for far too long, and you still have not done anything about

it, and you are still supporting the RUF.

I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher, too. It appears to me that the State Department is excellent at writing revisionist history. In Mr. Sheehan’s testimony, you state that this instability can be started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and

the decade-long civil war which followed.

That kind of passive language reminds me about what has been

said about Mozambique by the opponents of Frelimo and that civil

war that was visited upon Mozambique most unnecessarily; by the

opponents of MPLA and the civil war that was visited upon Angola

by those who opposed MPLA; about the civil war that was visited

upon South Africa by the opponents of the ANC, and in each of

those instances it was U.S. policy to support the other guys.

And so now we get to hear these testimonies that include the

lack of information in terms of the U.S. role. Congressman

Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher are absolutely right

30

that the United States did have a role to play in the current situation in Afghanistan. We provided weapons there, and we left those

weapons there. And so if there is any instability, we do not need

to just point the finger and say that the problem is Afghanistan’s,

as you have said earlier. The problem is also ours, and we need to

deal with that.

Additionally, and I guess finally, on page 6, Mr. Sheehan, of your

written testimony you say if there is a criminal in your basement

and you aware that he has been conducting criminal activities from

your house, even if you are not involved in the crimes you are responsible for them. In fact, your willingness to give him refuge

makes you complicit in his actions, past and present.

I would just suggest that that message that you delivered to the

Taliban’s Foreign Minister is also applicable to the United States

itself, and it certainly ought to be applicable to the policies that we

have formulated and pursued with respect to Africa. We have supported criminals on that continent, continue to support criminals

on that continent, and for some reason seem incapable of making

people pay for the crimes that they commit, and of course, we are

complicit in those crimes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Would you like to respond, Ambassador?

Ms. MCKINNEY. No need for a response because you will not get

anything of any substance.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I will respond, Mr. Congressman.

First of all, on the RUF: Murder, rape, cutting off of arms are

heinous crimes. They are not necessarily terrorism. They can be

terrorism, but not necessarily international terrorism by the definition that we are required to respond to by the legislation that we

are given.

My office reviews the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, and I receive no pressure. If I got pressure from anywhere

else in the building, it would have no effect on me. If I determine,

if our office determines that the RUF meets the criteria to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the criteria of the legislation that is clearly spelled out, we will do so.

Second, regarding our role in Afghanistan, I have repeatedly said

many times and before we have played a role in Afghanistan in the

1980’s, one I thought was an appropriate one at that time, and contributed to the situation there. I think we should acknowledge that

and be part of the solution in Afghanistan.

But I do not think the U.S. Government is responsible in the entirety for the situation, for the chaos and suffering in Afghanistan,

or for the rise of terrorism from that region.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Well, I am the Chairman. So I have a little prerogative. What a

miracle this is. I actually have more than 5 minutes.

Before I go on, this Committee will recess as we get into the next

vote, and Chairman Gilman will be back. In the meantime I will

do my mischief.

First of all, let’s talk a little bit about terrorism. Terrorism is not

just when someone who is outside government commits an act of

violence against unarmed opponents, whether civilians, noncombatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
31

ants, etc. Terrorism can also be conducted by a government, and

there are lots of terrorist examples of what government does at

times, for example, in the Kashmir, and let us not forget that when

we are discussing South Asia.

To make matters worse, you have terrorism, as I stated before,

when there is a lack of democracy, and in the Kashmir and Dramu

and other places where not as much, but other terrorist acts

against Christians and Seeks and others throughout India, but at

least in the Kashmir there has been a denial of the democratic

process.

Now, wouldn’t the democratic process help solve this situation in

Kashmir?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that in all parts

of the world where I face the threat of terrorism that democratic

processes, the strengthening of state institutions, and particularly

democratic state institutions in the long term is the remedy.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Because in Afghanistan if they had a

more democratic type government—and I have been pushing as you

know for the king to come back and serve as a transition toward

a more democratic society—people would have a chance to vote and

express themselves and to weed out these evil people who are involved in drug dealing and repressing of their own people, the repressing of the women population in Afghanistan. So that would

actually help if we had a more democratically oriented government

there as well, wouldn’t it?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Let me just say that in your denials

to the charges that I made, you were very good at general denials,

but there was no denial of some specific charges. So I would like

to address you about them now.

I charged that the aid that the United States has been giving has

been going to the Taliban controlled territories, especially during

that time period when one-third of Afghanistan was being controlled by non and anti-Taliban forces. Specifically I used the example of the Bamiyan effort in which we tried to help the folks down

there who my sources said were in great deprivation and starving,

and the State Department undermined that effort.

And we mentioned earlier there is an aid program going on to

Afghanistan. Ten percent of Afghanistan is still controlled by antiTaliban forces. Is any of the aid that we are giving going to this

anti-Taliban area?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I think I will defer to Mr.

Eastham. I know that since my tenure in this job in the last 18

months or so that I have seen no evidence of that type of policy,

but for previous time I will let Al answer.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer to the question is, yes, there is aid

flowing to all areas in Afghanistan. That is a function, however, of

accessibility, of how you get it to them. There is assistance which

flows through the United Nations, which is the implementers of the

program, into the north via Tajikistan and also through the Chitral

area of Pakistan, as well as to the 80 percent of the country

that——

32

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. So your answer is, yes, that currently

that one area in the Panjsher Valley now controlled by Commander

Masood, they do receive humanitarian supplies.

Mr. EASTHAM. I cannot take you specifically to the Panjsher Valley because access to the Panjsher Valley is blocked from the south

by the Taliban.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But, of course—— Mr. EASTHAM. In order to get—— Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. It is not blocked from Tajikistan,

right.

Mr. EASTHAM. Yes, but there is assistance which flows into all

areas of Afghanistan through these U.N. programs that we support.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. You’re on the record. Thank you very

much. That is not what my source is saying.

Mr. EASTHAM. Now, with respect to Bamiyan, I want to take you

back to the period 2 or 3 years ago that you are referring to. In

fact, at around that same time I made a trip from Pakistan to

Kandahar to talk to the Taliban about the blockade which they had

imposed at the time upon assistance to Bamiyan because at the

time Bamiyan was controlled by non-Taliban forces from the

Hazara people there.

One of the main effects of the trip by Mr. Richardson and Mr.

Inderfurth that you have so criticized was to attempt to persuade

the Taliban, in fact, to lift that very blockade of Bamiyan, which

we followed up with discussion in Islamabad in which the Taliban

did, in fact, agree to a partial lifting to enable foodstuffs to go into

Bamiyan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. So we traded it off for the Taliban.

They were going to lift their blockade, and we were going to disarm

all of their opponents.

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir, that is not the case.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. Well, go to disarming the Taliban’s opponents, and by the way, this has been reconfirmed in everything

that I have read, both official and unofficial.

Are you trying to tell us now that the State Department was not

at that crucial moment, when the Taliban was vulnerable, disarming the Taliban’s opponents? Did not Mr. Inderfurth and the

State Department contact all of the support groups that were helping the anti-Taliban forces and ask them to cease their flow of military supplies to the anti-Taliban forces?

Mr. EASTHAM. At that time we were trying to construct a coalition which would cutoff support for all forces in Afghanistan from

the outside.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I take it that is a yes to my question——

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir, you have left out——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the Taliban——

Mr. EASTHAM [continuing]. The cutting off the Taliban part.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the Taliban were not included. What

happened right after all of those other support systems to the resistance groups had been dismantled because of Mr. Inderfurth’s

and Mr. Richardson’s appeal and the State Department’s appeal?

What happened not only immediately after? Even while you were

making that appeal, what happened in Pakistan?

33

Was there an airlift of supplies, military supplies between Pakistan and Kabul and the forward elements of the Taliban forces?

The answer is yes. I know.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You told me because——

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. It is secret information.

Mr. EASTHAM. The answer is closed session if you would like to

dredge up that record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. OK.

Mr. EASTHAM. That would be fine.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I do not have to go into closed session because I did not get that information from any classified document.

That information is available to anybody watching the scene up

there. They know exactly what happened.

Mr. Inderfurth; Mr. Bill Richardson, a good friend of mine, doing

the bidding of this Administration, basically convinced the antiTaliban’s mentors to quit providing them the weapons they needed

with some scheme that the Taliban were then going to lay down

their arms, and immediately thereafter Pakistan started a massive

shift of military supplies which resulted in the total defeat of the

anti-Taliban forces.

Now, this is either collusion or incompetence on the part of the

State Department as far as this Congressman is concerned. The

people will have to look at the record and determine that for themselves, and when this Congressman says this Administration has

a covert policy of supporting the Taliban, I see examples of what

I just described over and over and over again.

I have read the documents you have given me, and the documents over and over again to me indicate that the State Department has been telling the Taliban, ‘‘Hand this over, bin Laden, and

we can deal with you.’’

Now, I am not going to quote because it is secret information.

None of the documents I have seen, by the way, should have been

classified, and let’s get to those documents.

Why haven’t I been provided any documents about State Department analysis during the formation period of the Taliban and about

whether or not the Taliban was a good force or a bad force? Why

have none of those documents reached my desk after 2 years?

Mr. EASTHAM. Congressman, we were responding to a specific request dealing with a specific time period, which I believe the commencing period of the request for documents was after the time period you are talking about. We were asked to provide documents

by the Chairman of this Committee from 1996 to 1999.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ah, I see. You found a loophole in the Chairman’s wording.

Mr. EASTHAM. No, sir. We were responding to the Chairman’s request.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You found a loophole in the Chairman’s

wording of his request so as not to provide me those documents.

You know, I am the only one here. I am not the Chairman of the

Committee. I would never get the opportunity to have a back-andforth with you except in times like this.

34

The State Department has taken full advantage of its use of

words in order not to get this information out. I am looking forward

to more documents.

I will say this. I have spent hours overlooking those documents,

and there has been nothing in those documents to persuade me

that my charges that this Administration has been covertly supporting the Taliban is not accurate.

Feel free to respond to that.

Mr. EASTHAM. It is not true. I have to negate the whole thesis

that you are operating under.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. OK. Then the other option is the

State Department is so incompetent that we have done things that

helped the Taliban and put them in a position of having hundreds

of millions of dollars of drug money and power in Afghanistan and

undercutting the anti-Taliban forces. This is not intent. This is just

incompetence.

Mr. EASTHAM. That is a judgment you can make.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. EASTHAM. And if you want to make that judgment, that is

up to you, Congressman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Mr. EASTHAM. I would just observe that it is considerably more

complex than that to deal with people over whom we have so little

influence as the Taliban.

I have been myself, by my count six times, into Afghanistan on

both the northern side and the southern side, and I have met innumerable times with Taliban officials to attempt to achieve U.S. objectives, and I have to tell you that it is a tough job.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I believe it is.

Mr. EASTHAM. I would like to introduce you to some of them

some time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, I have met many Taliban. Thank you.

And as you are aware, I have met many Taliban and have talked

to them, especially when you disarm their opponents and you participate in an effort to disarm their opponents at a time when they

are being resupplied militarily. I guess it is very hard for them to

take us seriously when we say we are going to get tough with

them.

Mr. EASTHAM. You keep saying that, but it is not true. The

effort——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are just saying——

Mr. EASTHAM [continuing]. The effort was to stop the support for

all the factions in——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. You did not deny that we disarmed their opponents. You just said we were doing it with the

Taliban as well. But as I pointed out, which you did not deny, the

Taliban were immediately resupplied, which means that we were

part and parcel to disarming a victim against this hostile, totalitarian, anti-Western, drug dealing force in their society. We were

part and parcel of disarming the victim, thinking that the aggressor was going to be disarmed as well, but it just did not work out,

at the moment when Pakistan was arming them, I might add.

35

I have got just a couple of minutes, and then we are going to

have to recess this. There is a 5-minute vote on. Could I have this

on the screen, please? Can we put the vote on the screen?

Two minutes. The Administration is saved again. All right. Let

me just say I think that the Administration—Bill Richardson is a

wonderful guy, and I think Rick Inderfurth is sincere. I think the

record here is abysmal, and again, it is not state power we are

talking about.

We abandoned these people in Afghanistan, the wonderful people. The Taliban did not defeat the Russians. You know that. You

were there at the time. The Taliban were not even in the field at

that time. They did not exist. They were kept back, and we abandoned those wonderful, courageous people in Afghanistan who were

not fanatics when they were fighting for their homeland.

We could have come back with an Afghan policy, and this Congressman supports an Afghan policy that would provide a real commitment, $100 million for de-mining, $100 million to help set up

a democratic process, $100 million so that we can help them plant

other things rather than poppies for narcotics. Let’s have a real

commitment by this Administration.

We have seen no such policy initiatives from this Administration,

just excuses and word games, but I thank you both because you do

a good job, and you are both patriots, and I appreciate that.

This Committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. GILMAN [presiding]. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a different

line and get off of South Asia for a moment.

On page IV of the State Department’s April 2000 Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, there is a paragraph. Let me read the

paragraph into the record.

As direct state sponsorship has declined, terrorists increasingly have sought refuge wherever they can. Some countries on the list have reduced dramatically their

direct support of terrorism over the past years, and this is an encouraging sign.

They still are on the list, however, usually for activity in two categories: harboring

of past terrorists, some for more than 20 years, and continuing their linkages to designated foreign terrorist organizations. Cuba is one of the state sponsors that falls

in this category.

Could you amplify on that? Am I to conclude that there is evidence that the Castro regime is no longer in the business of exporting terrorism and revolution in this hemisphere? Mr. Sheehan, Ambassador?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, Congressman. I would say regarding

Cuba that their support for terrorism has declined dramatically

over the years, and right now its active support for terrorism is

scant.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Is scant? You said there were some linkages to

foreign terrorist organizations. Could you enumerate those organizations?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. The main ones we are concerned

with are the two Colombian groups, the FARC and the ELN.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thought that might be the case, and I have a

problem with that, and let me tell you what it is. Recently, in fact,

36

there was a story in the Colombian press, and the headline is

‘‘Cuba to play a role in Colombia peace talks.’’ You are not suggesting that we should leave Cuba on this list because of their involvement in the Colombian peace process, which

I understand has been done at the behest of the Colombian Government.

For the record, I think it is important to note that there are four

other countries that are involved in this multilateral effort to move

the peace process along. Those countries are France, Spain, Norway, and Switzerland, and they are described as the friends of the

process with the ELN, and I am aware obviously of the history of

the ELN and its historical relationship with the Castro regime.

But I would suggest that this is an occasion where we would welcome, if you will, Cuban involvement in terms of moving a peace

process along that I would suggest is the ultimate answer if we are

going to do what we hope to do in terms of staunching the flow of

cocaine and heroin into the United States.

I would be interested in your response, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think the issue of Cuban involvement with the FARC and the ELN is not really the principal

one. I do not think that alone would keep them on the sponsorship

list if they were able to assure us that no terrorists of those organizations are there, because those are very violent organizations that

threaten American lives in Colombia every day and are responsible

for the deaths of many Americans and damage of a lot of material

and property.

So their relationship, those groups, is a little different than the

Europeans, but I think that one of the——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I interrupt, Ambassador?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is important to note that the FARC has

a physical presence and an office in Mexico, and the ELN has a

physical presence in Germany, and you know, both the FARC and

ELN have a presence in Spain.

You know, these distinctions are very, very subtle that you are

making here.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And, you know, these nuances are almost imperceptible to my eye.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Right. The other reason Cuba is on the

list of state sponsorship, because it provides safe haven to numerous terrorists that we are interested in from the past, and that is

why I mention in here many of them go way back.

Some of them are the Machiteros that were involved in the

killings of Americans in Puerto Rico and other places and providing

safe haven to those former terrorists. I did, Mr. Delahunt, personally write this introduction, and what I was saying in here, I was

signaling to countries like Cuba that there is a difference, their

support for terrorism between now and before, and that their

record for support for terrorism is very small, but they do have

issues.

If they want to address those issues and want to move forward

on those issues, we would welcome that, as we would with all seven

of the state sponsors. What I was trying to do in my report is sigVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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nal to them that, yes, their issues are relatively small, dramatically

different from the Cold War Era. That era has passed us, and they

could take steps to address these issues and be considered for the

list in the future.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I could indulge the Chair for one more question.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That brings to mind a recommendation that was

put forth by Ambassador Bremmer and his bipartisan commission

when he suggested that there be an intermediate level or designation in terms of a government as a state sponsor of terrorism.

I am sure you are aware of that. Something less than an officially designated state sponsor or terrorism, but something that

would, I believe, give the American people and Members of this institution, as well as Members of the Senate, a more realistic and

accurate appraisal of where these particular states are in terms of

the hierarchy of supporting terrorism.

Does the Administration have a position? Have you reflected on

the recommendation by the commission?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, I have been aware of this

issue since I took this job, and that the perception among some

around the world is that once you get on the list of state sponsorship, you never get off, and that list is deemed as political by some.

In that regard, I have looked to try to very clearly articulate why

countries are on the list and what it would take to get them off of

the list.

I studied carefully Jerry Bremmer’s proposal. I have discussed it

primarily at the staff level here in the Congress, to find more flexible approaches to find another step on or off the list, what might

more accurately reflect the real situation of support for terrorism

by different states, and we have not come up with a formal position

on that yet.

There are some drawbacks that I have heard from Members,

staff members of this Committee, as well as on the Senate side,

also some concerns within the Administration, but I think we are

carefully reviewing it.

I understand the desirability of that, what benefits it could have

to us, and we should have a response hopefully soon on whether

we have a proposal for you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would urge that because I really think it is

very important to recognize that in this particular area there are

varying shades of gray, and it is very difficult, as you well know,

to describe things in black and white terms without creating a distorted picture.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here.

I am concerned about terrorism for a lot of reasons. Personally

I feel that all terrorists are like all dictators. They are all cowards,

and this is their way of overcoming the fact that they are usually

38

not too well educated, and they are misguided, and they try to inflict some of their misery on other people.

I know that in the past Pakistan has been a friend and an ally,

but I am concerned that they perhaps are not ferreting out as

many of the terrorist as they should, and I feel like they could really do a lot more to get rid of the terrorists within the limits of their

country.

Do you feel the fact that Pakistan is spending so much on their

nuclear weapons program could diminish the amount of resources

they have to run an effective anti-terrorism program? Could there

be a correlation there?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, I am not sure, but I would

say this in answering your question, that Pakistan, in order to develop the political space to take on some of these terrorist issues—

because it is a political issue for them to take on some of these

groups—in order to have the political space in order to do that,

they need to take certain steps to reform themselves politically,

economically, and socially. Clearly a smaller defense budget would

help them, enable them to take on some of this reform.

So if there is a relationship in terms of defense spending and

their ability to reform, their defense budget takes a huge chunk of

their public sector funding. If they were able to put more of those

resources in some of those other issues, it might give the Pakistani

Government more space to move in the direction we would like

them to go on counterterrorism.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Thank you.

At times I feel that too many Americans and maybe even some

Americans in Congress become complacent about the threat of terrorism and will not be concerned about it again until we have some

more acts of terrorism like we had a few years ago, both from

Americans and from some people from this South Asia area.

Do you feel that today the State Department has adequate resources to conduct surveillance and anti-terrorism activities, and if

so, why, and if not, what additional resources would it take to get

the State Department up to the level that we would consider a top

notch, top drawer type level of anti-terrorism activity?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate

that question.

There are two parts of it. The first part is do we have the security funding to do the protection of our embassies. Actually Dave

Carpenter, my colleague who does diplomatic security, is best prepared to answer that. I am sure he has laid that out up to Congress, what resources he needs.

But I would say this on the parts that I manage, which overlap

with Dave’s in a lot of areas. The anti-terrorism assistance pro- gram, we have asked for $38 million this year. We have got the Administration’s request. We are hoping to get full funding for that

when the appropriations committees come together in conference

later on in the year. Right now I believe the House side has given

us full funding, but the Senate has not.

We also asked for $40 million to fund a counterterrorism training

center which would help train diplomatic security personnel, as

well as provide training for those security officials that we work

with overseas. That is really the key. They are the front line of deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
39

fense for Americans in our battle against counterterrorism. They

help protect our embassies. They help protect airports that American people travel through, the borders. There are a lot of Americans overseas. These are the front line of defense. They are our

counterparts on the intelligence and law enforcement.

We need a first class facility in order to train those people to

build the type of relationships we need. The Administration has

asked for funding for that, and we are having treat difficulty in the

appropriations process, and we certainly could use your support on

that, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. You say you want to build a facility to do this antiterrorism training?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. That is correct. Right now we train in

seven different locations around the country on a catch-can basis,

sort of standing room only types of arrangements with different facilities. It is just not a way to run a railroad.

We would like to create our own training facility where we can

bring in these people and establish the long term relationships that

are really going to pay dividends for the security not only of our

embassies, but for Americans that travel, live, and work abroad.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I bend over backward not to bring up parochial issues into my discussion, but since you raise the issue, the

U.S. Marshal’s training site is within my district, and I visited it

several times. It is at Camp Beauregard. It used to be Fort Beauregard, and they have really a top facility. Do you use that at all?

If I am not mistaken, they do some State Department things.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. We do some stuff there, yes, Congressman, a great facility.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I would like to formally invite you to do all

of your training there, and I guarantee you we will work to get

what you need.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman would yield for just a moment.

Mr. COOKSEY. Sure, I will yield to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I just wanted to point out that there is a

military base on Cape Cod, no swamps, no bugs, the sounds of

waves and sands that is 5,000 acres there, Ambassador, and I am

sure that you would be warmly welcomed there.

Mr. COOKSEY. I would tell my friend from Massachusetts that

after I got out of the Air Force I was in the Guard for a while, and

we trained up there one summer. It is a nice facility. That was in

the summer of 1970 or 1971, but they had some narrow bridges up

there, and it is just not an ideal place to go.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. 1970 to 1971.

Let me, I guess, conclude this hearing by asking a few questions.

Mr. Delahunt talked about the connection, I believe, between Cuba

and the FARC guerrillas and the ELN. The other committee on

which I serve is the Government Reform and Oversight Committee,

and we have a subcommittee that deals with national security and

terrorism, and we have done some work in that area. There is no

question from the information that we have and pictures that we

have seen that the Cuban Government has been working with the

FARC guerrillas and the ELN.

As a matter of fact, the leaders of the FARC guerrillas, if you

look at pictures of them, they are wearing Che Guevara type beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
40

rets. They use the same basic techniques that he used, and we believe there is a connection there, and I wonder why you folks are

not aware of that.

Are you aware of that?

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, we are aware of the connections, the long connections of the FARC and the ELN to Cuba.

Let me say this about the FARC and the ELN. The FARC is one

of the more violent foreign terrorist organizations that I deal with,

responsible for 10 Americans dead and 3 missing since 1980.

Mr. BURTON. Right.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. It is high on my list. They are involved

in kidnapping, extortion in Colombia that is of enormous concern

to us.

The ELN, although not as deadly in terms of numbers, wreaked

tremendous amount of damage to American interests in oil pipelines in Colombia. These are two very serious and dangerous terrorist organizations.

Primarily though I would say this, Congressman, that they do

not depend on support from Cuba. They do have links from Cuba,

but quite frankly, as you know very well, they are able to generate

funding and weapons right there at home.

Mr. BURTON. No, I understand. They are getting as much as $100 million a month from the drug cartels.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Exactly.

Mr. BURTON. And from kidnappings and everything else, but

they do go to Cuba. They do do some training with the Cubans, and

they are in concert with one another.

The reason I am concerned about that, and probably Mr.

Delahunt and others, is Venezuela is right there. We have got the

entire Central American and the Panama Canal and everything

that is right in that area, and if that is not handled properly, then

that whole area could be in jeopardy.

Cuba has always had an eye toward revolution in South America

and Central America. That is why they supported the Sandinistas,

the FMLN, and why Che Guevara went into South America in the

first place. So there is a connection there, and I hope the State Department pays particular attention to that.

One other thing that I would like to talk about, and I am sorry

that I was absent. I had to go to the floor, but there has been a

lot of talk about Pakistan, and Pakistan has been an ally of ours

for 50 years. They helped us during the problems that we had in

Afghanistan. They were a conduit for military equipment and

weapons going in there to stop the Russians—the Soviet Union.

They worked with us in Somalia. They worked with us during the

entire Cold War. They have always been an ally of ours.

Whenever we talk about terrorism involving Pakistan, it seems

that there is always a reluctance to talk about the problems right

across the border in India. In India, we have half a million troops

in Kashmir gang-raping women, going in the middle of the night,

taking people out of the houses and killing them and torturing

them, and people just disappear.

In Punjab we have had a similar problem over the years. It has

gone on for a long time. I have got the statistical data, which I will

not go into, but I will submit it for the record.

41

And I do not understand why we pay so much attention to our

friend who has been with us through thick and thin, and we do not

say anything about India who was an opponent of ours during the

entire Cold War. They were a nonaligned nation that built Soviet

MIG’s. They built Soviet tanks. They were on the Soviet side when

[Flight] 007 was shot down by the Soviets. They were the only nation in the world that did not condemn them.

Yet we continue to kick our friend for 50 years, Pakistan, in the

teeth, and we do not pay any attention to the problems that we see

in India.

In Pakistan, when you talk about the terrorist activities, they

worked with us on Amil Kanzi. He killed a CIA officer in Virginia.

He was arrested by the Pakistanis and extradited to the United

States. Ramzi Yousef was accused and convicted of involvement in

the terrorist attack on New York’s World Trade Center. He was arrested by Pakistani officials in Pakistan and extradited to the

United States.

I am not pronouncing these names right, but I think you know

who they are.

Sidque Odey was involved in the bombing of a U.S. embassy in

East Africa, was apprehended by Pakistan and turned over to Kenyan authorities. Khalid Deek was implicated in the 1998 bombings

of U.S. embassies in East Africa, was arrested by Pakistan and extradited to Jordan.

You know, Pakistan was picked as a vital area in December

1999. The National Commission on Terrorism report, which was released on June 5, said Pakistan’s cooperation was vital in warding

off terrorist attacks planned for the millennium.

You know, I just hate to see us have a hearing and attack somebody who does have problems. Do not misunderstand. They have

problems, and I would like to see those resolved. I would like to

see free and fair elections once again returned. I am sure you

would as well.

But the thing that concerns me is we ought to give a little bit

of leeway and deference to those who are always there when we

need them. They are always there when we need them.

And then, right across the border, you look at India whom we

show a great deal of deference to, who has not always been there

when we need them, and I just do not understand that double

standard, and it bothers me.

If you would care to comment, you can.

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, Pakistan is a great friend

to the United States for a long time. I served on active duty in Somalia and again in Haiti. In Somalia, I served with the Pakistanis,

and they did a great job there, and they were with us. I was on

the phone when President Bush called the government of Pakistan

to ask for their participation in 1992. I was on the NSC staff. They

immediately responded and sent troops into Somalia. They were actually already there before we led the coalition in December 1992.

Again, in 1994, I served on active duty again with the Pakistanis. The Deputy Force Commander in the operation in Haiti was

a Pakistani general who was outstanding and a good friend and a

professional officer.

42

These are good friends, and it is difficult for me when I deal with

the Pakistani counterparts on some of the tough issues that we

have with them.

You mentioned some of the people they have helped arrest over

the years, and that is absolutely true, and all of those people are

very important. The problem is that too often the terrorists, after

they conduct an act, are heading back to Pakistan. Ramzi Yousef,

who blew up the World Trade Center, was arrested in Pakistan.

Odey, the other guy you mentioned who blew up our embassy in

East Africa, hightailed back to Pakistan.

That is a problem. The problem is, and, yes, they helped arrest

them, but their policies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir and at

home are helping to promote an environment where these folks are

being generated out of there and coming back there after they conduct attacks. So it is a mixed record.

They understand the threat. We talk to them about it frankly.

I want to stay engaged with Pakistan and help them through this.

They are friends.

The threat actually, Congressman, as you know, not only affects

us. It affects them as well, and that is why we have to stay working with them to address the problem.

Mr. BURTON. Let’s talk about this double standard again, and

then I will summarize and we can get on with this and let somebody else have the last question or two.

You know, we have penalized Pakistan because of their nuclear

development program, and yet India has not been penalized. India

has a nuclear program, and we put severe limitations on military

exports to Pakistan because they decided to do something that they

thought was necessary to protect themselves in the event that

there was an attack by India, and there have been a number of

wars, as you know, between the two.

And so, this double standard does exist, and I think it is something that the State Department and other agencies of our government ought to take a real hard look at. I will not belabor the point

because my time has run out and I am going to yield to Mr.

Delahunt, or whoever wants to finalize because you have to leave

in about 3 minutes, and that is that Kashmir and Punjab continue

to be real terrible tragedies in human rights violations. We just do

not talk about that enough.

There are 500,000 troops in Kashmir, a like number in Punjab.

The atrocities continue. We do not do anything to put pressure on

India to stop that, and we should because they go on year after

year after year, and people are suffering and they are being tortured. Women are being gang-raped by Indian troops, and Amnesty

International has reported on that.

I mean it is reported on, but our State Department and our government seems to want to keep this on a low profile basis. Why,

I do not understand, because we jump all over Pakistan, but we do

not say anything about India, and when we do it is very, very low

key.

Mr. EASTHAM. I think you can take as your guide, Mr. Chairman,

what the President of the United States did in going out to South

Asia. We have been very clear that the desire to buildup a relationship with a country that has a billion people and that will repVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
43

resent a significant force in world affairs in the coming century is

not at the expense of our old friend and ally Pakistan.

I have personally lived for 5 years of my life in Pakistan, have

significantly pleasant memories of that time. I have also spent a

couple of years in India, and I can tell you that it is possible to pursue a good relationship with each of these countries at the same

time and simultaneously. I am convinced of that.

With respect to the Punjab and Kashmir situations that you

mentioned, I had the opportunity to accompany your colleague, Mr.

Ackerman, up to Kashmir on his trip there several years ago, if you

will recall that. I have been working on the problem of Kashmir.

I know the leadership both of the government in Kashmir as well

as the opposition in the form of the All Parties Conference; I can

tell you that we do not sweep that under the rug or ignore it, while

at the same time pushing on Pakistan for different reasons.

We are trying to address all of them at once, and I hope you will

take that as a sincere commitment.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I will take you at your word, but I hope you

will make it a little higher profile because we have some of our

Seek friends here. We have friends from Kashmir who are in the

audience and from Pakistan, and they know very well first hand

the problems that are existing over there, and year after year after

year we listen to them. Our heart bleeds for them, and yet the conditions continue.

We are the greatest power on earth supposedly right now, and

we ought to be doing everything we can to end that tragedy over

there.

With that, Mr. Delahunt, do you have any more comments?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand they must leave.

Mr. BURTON. If not, well, then we appreciate your being here,

and the Committee stands adjourned.

[At 12:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call

of the Chair.]

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JULY 12, 2000

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