[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDONALD HASER 

Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Case No. CT2020-0029 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. CR2020-0094 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 19, 2021 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

D. MICHAEL HADDOX TODD W. BARSTOW 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 261 West Johnstown Road 

TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON Suite 204 

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Columbus, Ohio 43230 

27 North Fifth Street, P.O. Box 189 

Zanesville, Ohio 43702-0189 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

Wise, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Donald Haser appeals his conviction and sentence 

entered in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas on one count of Aggravated 

Burglary and one count of Domestic Violence, following a guilty plea. 

{¶2} Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶3} The relevant facts, as set forth at the plea hearing, and procedural history 

are as follows: 

{¶4} On January 28, 2020, officers with the Zanesville Police Department were 

dispatched to a residence at 567 Hedgewood Avenue. The caller indicated that a female 

by the name of A.A. was inside the residence and was being shot numerous times with a 

BB gun by Appellant Donald Haser, who was on the trespass list for 567 Hedgewood 

Avenue. 

{¶5} Officers arrived and made contact with A.A. She had visible injuries to the 

back of her neck as well as the back of her legs. She told officers that Appellant had shot 

her numerous times with a BB gun and had dragged her around the basement. 

{¶6} The officers were then able to speak with a witness, Eileen Stout, who 

indicated that she was in the basement when she heard the basement door kicked open. 

Ms. Stout advised that Appellant was tightly grasping A.A. by the top of her head around 

her hair and dragged her down the stairs into the basement. She indicated that A.A. was 

repeatedly asking Appellant to stop, telling him that it hurt. Appellant then hit A.A. with a 

closed fist and pushed her across the room. Ms. Stout then exited the basement area 

returning upstairs. 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

{¶7} Appellant has six prior convictions for domestic violence. 

{¶8} Appellant was subsequently arrested. 

{¶9} On February 12, 2020, Appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

burglary, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. §2911.11(A)(1), one count of 

domestic violence (two or more priors), a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 

§2919.25(A), one count of kidnapping, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 

§2905.01(A)(3), and one count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, in 

violation of R.C. §2903.11(A)(1). 

{¶10} On April 6, 2020, pursuant to a negotiated plea deal, Appellant pled guilty 

to the counts of aggravated burglary and domestic violence. 

{¶11} On April 27, 2020, a sentencing hearing was held. On the count of 

aggravated burglary, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a minimum term of 11 years, 

but up to 16.5 years in prison. On the count of domestic violence, Appellant was 

sentenced to 36 months. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a 

minimum sentence of 14 years and a maximum of 19.5 years. 

{¶12} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignments of error for review: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY NOT 

MERGING THE OFFENSES OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND DOMESTIC 

VIOLENCE FOR PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. (R. Entry, 4/30/20; T. 4/6/20; 4/30/20). 

{¶14} “II. THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO AN INDEFINITE 

TERM OF INCARCERATION PURSUANT TO A STATUTORY SCHEME THAT 

VIOLATES APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. (T. 4/6/20; 

4/27/20; R. Entries 4/30/20). 

{¶15} “III. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, THEREBY 

DENYING HlM HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS 

GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. (T. 4/6/20; 

4/27/20; R. Entries, 4/30/20).” 

I.

{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred by 

failing to merge the aggravated burglary and domestic violence offenses. We disagree. 

{¶17} Appellate review of an allied-offense question is de novo. State v. Miku, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2017-CA-00057, 2018-Ohio-1584, 111 N.E.3d 558, ¶ 70, citing State v. 

Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 12. 

{¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has made clear that “[i]t is possible for an 

accused to expressly waive the protection afforded by R.C. §2941.25 [the merger statute, 

describing when multiple punishments may be imposed for two or more offenses], such 

as by ‘stipulating in the plea agreement that the offenses were committed with separate 

animus.’ ” See State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015–Ohio–2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, at 

¶ 20, quoting State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 29. 

{¶19} Appellant herein argues that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to 

consider merging the sentences even if the sentence was agreed to. By failing to seek 

the merger of convictions as allied offenses of similar import in the trial court, a defendant 

forfeits his or her allied offenses claim for appellate review, except for plain error. See 

State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015–Ohio–2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 21. 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

{¶20} In State v. Rogers, supra, the Court reaffirmed that even if an accused 

shows the trial court committed plain error affecting the outcome of the proceeding, the 

appellate court is not required to correct it. Id. at ¶ 23. Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 

52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only 

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 

804 (1978), paragraph 3 of the syllabus. 

{¶21} State v. Underwood, supra, states: 

When a sentence is imposed for multiple convictions on offenses that 

are allied offenses of similar import in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), R.C. 

2953.08(D)(1) does not bar appellate review of that sentence even though 

it was jointly recommended by the parties and imposed by the court. 

{¶22} The Eighth District has held that when the transcript demonstrates the state 

and defense counsel specifically agreed that the offenses were not allied, the issue of 

allied offenses is waived. State v. Yokings, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98632, 2013–Ohio– 

1890; State v. Carmen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99463, 2013–Ohio–4910; State v. Ward, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97219, 2012–Ohio–1199. In said cases, the Eighth District 

distinguished Underwood based on the fact that merger was not discussed as part of the 

agreed sentence in Underwood. In fact, Underwood explicitly states: 

[W]e note that nothing in this decision precludes the state and a 

defendant from stipulating in the plea agreement that the offenses were 

committed with separate animus, thus subjecting the defendant to more 

than one conviction and sentence. When the plea agreement is silent on 

the issue of allied offenses of similar import, however, the trial court is 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

obligated under R.C. 2941.25 to determine whether the offenses are allied, 

and if they are, to convict the defendant of only one offense. 

{¶23} Id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶24} In the instant case, Appellant did not seek merger at the trial court level. 

Rather, Appellant and the state of Ohio entered into a negotiated plea agreement in this 

case, wherein the state agreed to dismiss the kidnapping and felonious assault counts in 

exchange for pleas of guilty to the counts of aggravated burglary and domestic violence. 

Appellant stipulated in his plea agreement that the counts of Aggravated Burglary and 

Domestic Violence do not merge. On the last page of the written plea agreement, it is 

stated “[t]he parties stipulate that the counts herein do not merge.” 

{¶25} Further, defense counsel confirmed that understanding during the plea 

hearing. (Plea T. at 4). During the plea hearing, defense counsel specifically stated that 

the statements made by the prosecutor were correct, that the plea form was accurate, 

that he had reviewed said form with Appellant, and that it was his belief that Appellant 

changed his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. (Plea T. at 4). At the plea 

hearing, Appellant himself also affirmed that he understood that he was pleading guilty to 

two separate counts. (Plea T. at 4). 

{¶26} Additionally, even at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel’s argument 

was not for merger but rather for concurrent sentencing. Defense counsel even stated 

“I’m not really saying they merge but – because I know they don’t, but ...” (Sent. T. at 12). 

{¶27} “[W]here the transcript demonstrates that the state and defense counsel 

agreed that offenses were not allied, the issue of allied offenses is waived.” State v. Black, 

8th Dist. No. 102586, 2016-Ohio-383, ¶ 18. Here, that agreement came not only through 
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

counsel, but also was incorporated into the actual plea agreement that Appellant himself 

signed. 

{¶28} The record in the case before us satisfies the requirements of Underwood, 

supra. The parties had an agreement the offenses would not merge, and Appellant 

received the benefit of the bargain by the dismissal of the kidnapping and felonious 

assault charges. Underwood does not require the trial court to determine whether the 

offenses actually merge before accepting the plea when the parties have specifically 

entered into an agreement that they do not merge. It is when the parties fail to discuss 

the merger that the trial court is obligated to determine if the offenses are allied offenses. 

{¶29} Based on the terms of the plea in the instant case, we find the issue of allied 

offenses is waived. Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II., III.

{¶30} In his second and third assignments of error, Appellant argues that the 

Reagan Tokes Law, specifically, R.C. §2967.271, is unconstitutional. In his third 

assignment of error Appellant also argues he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel for counsel’s failure to raise the constitutionality at sentencing. 

{¶31} The state maintains that the issue of the constitutionality of the Regan 

Tokes Law is not ripe for review. However, the state nonetheless maintains the law is 

constitutional. 

{¶32} This Court has previously addressed whether a challenge to the 

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law is ripe for appellate review where the defendant 

has yet to serve the minimum term and yet to be subject to the application of the Reagan 

Tokes Law. This Court has repeatedly held the issue is not ripe for review. See State v.
[Cite as State v. Haser, 2021-Ohio-460.]

Clark, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00017, 2020-Ohio-5013; State v. Downard, 5th Dist. 

Muskingum No. CT2019-0079, 2020-Ohio-4227; State v. Manion, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 

No. 2020 AP 03 0009, 2020-Ohio-4230; State v. Kibler, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020- 

0026, 2020-Ohio-4631 State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020-CA-2021, 2020-Ohio5501; and State v. Buckner, 5th Dist. Muskingum CT2020-0023, 2020-0024, 2020-Ohio2017. 

{¶33} The Sixth District has reached the same conclusion in State v. Maddox, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. CL-19-1253, 2020-Ohio-4702, and State v. Velliquette, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-19-1232, 2020-Ohio-4855. Likewise the Fourth District recently found the issue not 

ripe for review in State v. Ramey, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 20 CA 1 and 20 CA 2, 2020- 

Ohio-6733. 

{¶34} For the reasons set forth in our prior opinions, we find Appellant’s assigned 

errors not ripe for review. Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶35} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Muskingum 

County, Ohio, affirmed. 

By: Wise, J. 

Hoffman, J., concurs. 

Gwin, P. J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

JWW/kr 0210 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2020-0029 9 

Gwin, P.J., concurs and dissents

{¶36} I concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s First Assignment of Error. 

{¶37} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion concerning ripeness and 

Appellant’s Second and Third Assignments of Error for the reasons set forth in my 

dissenting opinion in State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist., Licking No. 2020 CA 00021, 2020-Ohio5501. 

{¶38} I further note that the Ohio Supreme Court has accepted a certified conflict 

on the issue of whether the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act is ripe for review on 

direct appeal or only after the defendant has served the minimum term and been subject 

to extension by application of the Act. See, State v. Maddox, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19- 

1253, 2020-Ohio-4702, order to certify conflict allowed, State v. Maddox, 160 Ohio St.3d 

1505, 2020-Ohio-6913, 159 N.E.3d 1150(Table); State v. Downard, 5th Dist. Muskingum 

No. CT2019-0079, 2020-Ohio-4227, appeal accepted on Appellant’s Proposition of Law 

No. II, State v. Downard, 160 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2020-Ohio-6835, 159 N.E.3d 1507 

(Table)(Sua sponte, cause held for the decision in 2020-1266, State v. Maddox).