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41–800PS 2008

AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 24, 2008

Serial No. 110–97

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

LAURA RICHARDSON, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chairman

JIM MATHESON, Utah

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLIE A. WILSON, Ohio

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

MIKE ROSS, Arizona

LAURA RICHARDSON, California

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director

RACHEL JAGODA BRUNETTE Democratic Professional Staff Member

MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Democratic Professional Staff Member

TIND SHEPPER RYEN Republican Professional Staff Member

PIPER LARGENT Republican Professional Staff Member

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C O N T E N T S

April 24, 2008

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 6

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7

Statement by Representative Phil Gingrey, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 7

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9

Prepared Statement by Representative Laura Richardson, Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 9

Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 10

Prepared Statement by Representative Adrian Smith, Member, Subcommittee

on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 10

Witnesses:

Dr. Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security Laboratory, Science

and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13

Biography .......................................................................................................... 19

Mr. Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process and Technology,

Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21

Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode Island

(URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science Partnership; Co-Director, DHS

University Center of Excellence in Explosive Detection, Mitigation, and

Response

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Biography .......................................................................................................... 27

Dr. Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29

Biography .......................................................................................................... 32

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 34

Page

IV

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security Laboratory, Science

and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security .................... 44

Mr. Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process and Technology,

Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security 51

Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode Island

(URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science Partnership; Co-Director, DHS

University Center of Excellence in Explosive Detection, Mitigation, and

Response ............................................................................................................... 55

Dr. Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo ..... 56

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AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Aviation Security Research and

Development at the Department of

Homeland Security

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2008

1:00 P.M.–3:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

On Thursday, April 24, 2008, the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation

will hold a hearing to review the aviation security-related research, development,

testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities of the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). This hearing will also explore how the Transportation Security Laboratory

and other components of DHS support the needs of the Transportation Security Administration, the aviation industry, and passengers generally through research, development, and education.

2. Witnesses

Dr. Susan Hallowell is the Director of the Transportation Security Laboratory

(TSL), a component of the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T).

Mr. Adam Tsao is the Chief of Staff of the Office of Operational Process and Technology of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

Dr. Jimmie Oxley is a Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island

and Co-Director of the DHS Center of Excellence for Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response.

Dr. Colin Drury is a distinguished Professor and Chair of the Department of Industrial Engineering at the University at Buffalo.

3. Brief Overview

• The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in 2001 to act

as a centralized federal authority to manage transportation security efforts in

the United States. The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) provides

support for TSA’s mission through research, technology development, testing

and evaluation, and technical support for deployed technologies. TSL became

part of the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate in FY 2006. Previously, TSL was managed by the Federal Aviation Administration.

• Research priorities at TSL are generally set through the transportation security Integrated Product Team, which convenes stakeholder components of

DHS, including TSA, to discuss capability gaps and determine which R&D

projects are most likely to meet users’ needs. Additionally, TSL coordinates

with DHS S&T’s explosives division and will work with the newly formed

Center of Excellence for Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response. The

lab also tests and certifies equipment submitted by outside vendors for eventual inclusion on TSA’s qualified product list (QPL), which allows vendors to

sell those products to TSA.

• Technology development priorities are also influenced by outside requirements stemming from intelligence or publicity of particular threats, such as

the liquid explosives incident in August 2006.

• TSL has particular expertise in testing and evaluation, and hosts specialized

laboratories capable of handling explosives for technology validation. However, TSL currently does not have the capacity to test screening technologies

4

in a realistic setting, where a network of devices are used to detect potential

threats. Additionally, TSL does not carry out field tests of technology, but

does provide technical support to TSA for technologies in use at airports.

4. Issues and Concerns

Will the ongoing research, development, testing and evaluation projects at

the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) meet the Transportation Security Administration’s present and future needs? Is there adequate investment in basic research at TSL to allow the lab enough flexibility to address

rapidly emerging threats? TSA is responsible for setting technology development

priorities at TSL through the Integrated Product Team process, but budget limitations and demand for immediate technological responses to high-profile threats

(such as liquid explosives or shoe bombs) can distract the lab from longer-term

needs. Additionally, because of variations in airport design and passenger capacity,

TSA cannot have a standard checkpoint design that works at every airport. A good

solution to these conflicting pressures is strong investment in basic research, which

provides the scientific basis to allow the laboratory to be flexible in its response to

emerging threats and varying needs.

Does TSL’s testing and evaluation of aviation security technology provide

adequate information to the end-users at TSA? How are the tests designed,

and what are the criteria for success? Are technologies that are tested or

certified by TSL ready for deployment? If not, what additional efforts are

necessary to bring technologies to full readiness, and how does TSL contribute to those efforts? TSL’s testing and evaluation (T&E) protocols are considered a model for the Department of Homeland Security, but some technologies are

deployed by TSA in spite of technical or operational issues (TSL does not control

deployment schedules). Many of these issues could be identified or resolved if TSL

was able to test devices in a realistic checkpoint scenario that incorporates a

networked system of devices and carries out tests based on screeners’ and passengers’ needs and capabilities. Moreover, as technology develops, TSL must continually update performance and technical standards to address new capabilities and

new requirements.

Additionally, at its current capacity, TSL will likely have an increasingly difficult

time keeping up with TSA’s needs. According to the Director of TSL, their work for

TSA has tripled since April 2006 while funding for the lab has decreased. If this

imbalance continues, T&E capabilities at TSL will continue to suffer.

Does TSL adequately incorporate human factors engineering and humantechnology interface principles into technology design and testing? How do

TSA and TSL test and evaluate whether human-technology interface principles have been properly applied in the design and manufacturing of aviation security technologies? To move passengers and luggage efficiently through

checkpoints, screeners need technology to help them search for contraband or dangerous items. As the list of forbidden items grows in response to newly identified

threats, screeners’ jobs become more and more difficult and need improved technological responses. The best technologies take into account screeners’ technical skills

and needs and looks at the ‘‘human-technology interface;’’ how well technology

meshes with those skills and needs. Moreover, since these technologies are used in

a public setting, passenger acceptance is also crucial. Designers must consider

whether passengers would object or be seriously inconvenienced by technologies before they are deployed to avoid public outcry that might ultimately harm the aviation industry by driving away customers. Some recent controversies, such as the deployment of the back-scatter machine—which appears to virtually strip-search passengers-could have been avoided through careful attention to human-technology

interface issues.

5. Background

Technology plays a major role in aviation security operations. Screeners employed

by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employ a variety of sensors to

scan passengers and luggage for dangerous items quickly and efficiently. Many of

these technologies, as well as other security devices, are developed, tested, or certified at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, NJ. This

lab, part of the DHS S&T Directorate, conducts research, development, testing, and

evaluation (RDT&E) for explosives detection and other transportation security related technologies with the goal of deploying these technologies to TSA.

The Transportation Security Laboratory, a component of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA before its transfer to the DHS Science and Technology

5

Directorate in FY 2006, hosts specialized facilities for research, development, testing, and evaluation of innovative technologies for detecting threats to the transportation sector. In addition to basic and applied research and technology development,

TSL carries out certification, qualification, and assessments of technologies developed by private industry for use by TSA.

The laboratory has built capacity in a number of technology areas critical to

transportation security, including bulk and trace sensors, devices for understanding

the physics of explosions, technology for enhancing explosion survivability, communications equipment, and access control technologies. There are also six laboratories

at TSL dedicated to testing explosives and weapons detection equipment. Finally,

in addition to its RDT&E capacity, TSL also maintains models of all deployed technologies at the Atlantic City facility for troubleshooting and technical support purposes.

RDT&E priorities for TSL are generally set by TSA, though they are influenced

by the work of other DHS S&T components, including the Homeland Security

Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) and the DHS S&T Explosives Division. DHS S&T uses a formal process that convenes Integrated Product

Teams (IPTs) comprised of officials from DHS components who advise the S&T Directorate on their technology needs, thus informing specific research priorities. The

planned transportation security IPT will be lead by TSA and will include stakeholders such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) who will select transportation security related technology development projects for TSL to undertake. To

date, TSA has indicated that they are especially interested in projects for enhancing

checkpoint security. TSL also coordinates with the Explosives Division of DHS S&T,

which is guided by a separate but related explosives IPT that is currently focusing

on standoff detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

TSA is also responsible for guiding testing and evaluation (T&E) priorities at TSL.

Tests are constrained by the various lab capabilities, but TSL is able to carry out

testing and validation for a wide array of technologies, including devices for baggage

and personnel inspection, cargo inspection, infrastructure protection, and conveyance protection. The technologies that are tested at TSL include those developed internally, as well as by outside industry. TSA can specifically request certification

of outside products for a qualified product list (QPL) that TSA uses to determine

whether a technology is suitable for procurement and deployment. The laboratory

will also begin developing plans to create a testing facility to model a full airport

checkpoint, which would examine the technical performance of various technologies

when they are integrated into a realistic system. TSA is also planning to build a

similar facility for field testing technologies that are integrated into a checkpoint,

but the aim of that facility would be technology operations and robustness.

6

Chairman WU. I would like to welcome everyone to this afternoon’s hearing on aviation security research and development at

the Department of Homeland Security. Since 2001, aviation security has vastly improved. There are new policies in place to help

protect passengers and aircraft, and aviation security professionals

are better trained to detect dangerous items. Of course, technology

plays a critical role. Significant advances in aviation security technologies have led to screening equipment that is faster and more

reliable than the last generation, allowing Transportation Security

Administration screeners to process passengers and baggage efficiently while still keeping prohibited items off planes.

However, improvements still need to be made. Last year, a Government Accountability Office test of airport checkpoints found that

explosive devices could be smuggled through undetected. There

have also been recent news reports highlighting security failures,

including a January 2008 CNN segment that featured a TSA employee slipping a bomb past screeners in a planned test. One of

GAO’s key recommendations for dealing with these shortcomings

was to invest in improving security technologies.

The Transportation Security Laboratory, or TSL, is at the forefront of developing the next generation of aviation security technology. This laboratory, which was transferred to the DHS Science

and Technology Directorate in fiscal year 2006, serves as the Nation’s key resource for transportation security-related research, development, testing, and evaluation. In addition to groundbreaking

research on explosives, TSL develops and validates passenger and

luggage screening technologies, certifies devices developed by private industry, and provides technical support to TSA for deployed

technologies.

Rigorous testing and evaluation are an important step towards

ensuring that new technologies meet TSA’s technical needs. Currently, TSA works closely with the laboratory to develop test protocols and define criteria for success. But the security failures discovered by GAO and others illustrate the need to constantly update

tests to ensure that technologies can deal with emerging threats.

Technologies deployed before they are truly ready cement the perception that aviation security is nothing but theater.

Finally, we often forget that a technology is only as successful as

the person operating it, and this is especially true in the aviation

security sector, where screeners must determine whether objects

identified by screening technologies are truly dangerous. Additionally, passengers also play a key role in any technology’s performance and success. If passengers find screening technologies too

cumbersome or too intrusive, the consequences can ripple across

the entire aviation sector. TSL and TSA must work together to ensure that human factors are taken into consideration from the first

stages of technologic development.

Dr. Hallowell has said in the past that she envisions a checkpoint in the future where no one has to empty their pockets, take

off their shoes, or try to fit their toothpaste and deodorant into a

tiny plastic bag in order to get on an airplane, and I for one truly

look forward to that day. The Committee applauds that goal, and

I want to work with you all and the TSA to ensure that the next

7

generation aviation security technologies are effective and efficient

while meeting the needs of all screeners and passengers.

I would now like to recognize my friend and colleague, the Ranking Member from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DAVID WU

This hearing will come to order. Good afternoon. I’d like to welcome everyone to

this afternoon’s hearing on Aviation Security Research and Development at the Department of Homeland Security.

Since 2001, aviation security has vastly improved. There are new policies in place

to help protect passengers and aircraft, and aviation security professionals are better trained to detect dangerous items. Of course, technology plays a critical role. Significant advances in aviation security technologies have led to screening equipment

that is faster and more reliable than the last generation, allowing Transportation

Security Administration screeners to process passengers and baggage efficiently

while still keeping prohibited items off planes.

However, improvements still need to be made.

Last year, a Government Accountability Office test of airport checkpoints found

that explosive devices could be smuggled through undetected. There have also been

recent news reports highlighting security failures, including a January 2008 CNN

segment that featured a TSA employee slipping a bomb past screeners in a planned

test. One of GAO’s key recommendations for dealing with these shortcomings was

to invest in improving security technologies.

The Transportation Security Laboratory, or TSL, is at the forefront of developing

the next generation of aviation security technology. This laboratory, which was

transferred to the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in FY 2006, serves as

the Nation’s key resource for transportation security-related research, development,

testing, and evaluation. In addition to ground-breaking research on explosives, TSL

develops and validates passenger and luggage screening technologies, certifies devices developed by private industry, and provides critical technical support to TSA

for deployed technologies.

Rigorous testing and evaluation are a crucial step towards ensuring that new

technologies meet TSA’s technical needs. Currently, TSA works closely with the laboratory to develop test protocols and define criteria for success. But the security failures discovered by GAO and others illustrate the need to constantly update tests

to ensure that technologies can deal with emerging threats. Technologies deployed

before they are truly ready cement the perception that aviation security is nothing

but theater.

Finally, we often forget that a technology is only as successful as the person operating it. This is especially true in the aviation security sector, where screeners must

determine whether objects identified by screening technologies are truly dangerous.

Additionally, passengers also play a key role in any technology’s performance and

success. If passengers find screening technologies too cumbersome or too intrusive,

the consequences can ripple across the entire aviation sector. TSL and TSA must

work together to ensure that human factors are taken into consideration from the

first stages of technology development.

Dr. Hallowell has said in the past that she envisions a checkpoint of the future

where no one has to empty their pockets, take off their shoes, or try to fit their

toothpaste and deodorant into a tiny plastic bag in order to get on an airplane. The

Committee applauds that goal, and I want to work with you and the TSA to ensure

that next generation aviation security technologies are effective and efficient while

meeting the needs of all screeners and passengers.

I’d now like to recognize my colleague, the Ranking Member from Georgia, Dr.

Gingrey, for an opening statement.

Mr. GINGREY. Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, and I want to

apologize in advance to our distinguished panel because I am going

to have to step out after I make the opening statement, hopefully

to come back because I don’t want to miss all of this important,

very, very important hearing from such a distinguished panel. Dr.

Oxley, I see you are a Professor of Chemistry. I have a degree, a

BS, in chemistry from Georgia Tech from a long time ago. I hope

if you are still doing any teaching that you grade a little easier

8

than those monsters that I had at Georgia Tech. In any regard, Mr.

Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today on

the Department of Homeland Security’s aviation security program.

Aviation security is an issue that affects every Member of Congress, as passengers across the country put their faith in the

Transportation Security Administration to have the technology in

place to keep them safe as they travel. We have an excellent opportunity today to discuss how to best put the immense creative talent

of our country’s scientists an engineers to use to prevent acts of terrorism in our airports and skies. Aviation continues to be a target,

no question about it, as evidenced by the publicized liquid explosive

plot from 2006 and of course the attempted attack by the famous,

infamous shoe bomber, Richard Reid, back in 2001.

A successful attack like the tragic one that did occur on September 11, 2001, would yield an immediate and catastrophic loss

of life, create economic losses throughout the aviation industry and

possibly beyond. In fact, I think if that occurred today, it would be

a lot more devastating economically than it was back in 2001, what

with the price of jet fuel and the airlines struggling.

But there is no easy, all-encompassing solution against a cunning

and committed enemy. We must continually review and refine

every defense and seek out new ideas and technologies that will

better nullify the threats that will continue to be there. And we

must also recall that this is but one challenge to implementing an

effective, efficient, and evolving defense of our homeland.

I am eager to hear what the witnesses have to say about this

challenge and how we can improve our current aviation security efforts. Mr. Chairman, we must also ensure that our substantial investments of R&D and new aviation security technologies work as

advertised. They are coordinated throughout the government, include appropriate university researchers and private-sector companies. And to that end, I am particularly interested in hearing how

the TSA and Transportation Security Lab witnesses describe their

relationship and what is the plan for the future. Formerly part of

TSA, the Transportation Security Lab became part of the Science

and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security back in 2006. The lab possesses many of the world’s foremost

experts on all kinds of aviation security technology and of course

supports research, development, tests, and evaluation of activities

based on the requirements and the priorities of TSA.

Within the wide aviation security industry, some have had difficulty understanding the roles and the responsibilities of TSA and

TSL and how other institutions, like universities, national labs, or

private companies can best contribute. I hope that our witnesses

today will be able to clarify and clearly and concisely lay out who

is developing our aviation security strategy and how that strategy

is being implemented. How can a university researcher determine

what TSA’s most pressing, basic research needs are? How can a

private company translate broad equipment requirements to technical specs that can lead to a commercially available product? Is

there a standard process for tests and evaluation of new technologies? The answers to these questions will lessen confusion outside of the Department of Homeland Security and it will allow TSA

to create more successful partnerships.

9

Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel, and with that, I will yield back the balance of my

time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PHIL GINGREY

Good afternoon, Chairman Wu. Thank you for holding this important hearing

today on the Department of Homeland Security’s aviation security programs. Aviation security is an issue that affects every Member of Congress as passengers across

the country put their faith in the Transportation Security Administration to have

the technology in place to keep them safe as they travel.

We have an excellent opportunity today to discuss how best to put the immense

creative talent of our country’s scientists and engineers to use to prevent acts of terrorism in our airports and skies.

Aviation continues to be a target, as evidenced by the publicized liquid explosives

plot from 2006 and the attempted attack by ‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid in 2001.

A successful attack like the tragic one that occurred on September 11, 2001 would

yield an immediate and catastrophic loss of life, and create economic losses throughout the aviation industry and possibly beyond.

But there is no easy, all-encompassing solution. Against a guileful and committed

enemy, we must continually review and refine our defenses and seek out new ideas

and technologies that will better nullify the threats against us. We must also recall

that this is but one challenge to implementing an effective, efficient, and evolving

defense of our homeland. I am eager to hear what the witnesses have to say about

this challenge and how we can improve our current aviation security efforts.

Mr. Chairman, we must also ensure that our substantial investments in R&D and

new aviation security technologies work as advertised, are coordinated throughout

the government, and include appropriate university researchers and private sector

companies. To that end, I am particularly interested in hearing our TSA and Transportation Security Lab (TSL) witnesses describe their relationship and plans for the

future.

Formerly part of TSA, the Transportation Security Lab became part of the Science

and Technology Directorate of DHS in 2006. The lab possesses many of the world’s

foremost experts on all kinds of aviation security technology and supports research,

development, test, and evaluation activities based on the requirements and priorities of TSA.

Within the wider aviation security industry, some have had difficulty understanding the roles and responsibilities of TSA and TSL and how other institutions

like universities, national labs, or private companies can best contribute. I hope that

our witnesses today will be able to clearly and concisely lay out who is developing

our aviation security strategy and how that strategy is being implemented.

How can a university researcher determine what TSA’s most pressing basic research needs are? How can a private company translate broad equipment requirements to technical specifications that can lead to a commercially available product?

Is there a standard process for test and evaluation of new technologies? Answers

to these questions will lessen confusion outside of DHS and allow TSA to create

more successful partnerships.

Again, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel and with that Mr.

Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman WU. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey, and we look forward to

your return once you have taken care of other very important

tasks.

If there are other Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, the statements will be added at this point in the

record.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE LAURA RICHARDSON

Thank you Chairman Wu for holding this very important hearing today, and our

witnesses for your attendance.

In a post 9/11 world, is there a topic that is more important than the one we are

discussing today? That awful day back in 2001 stole our innocence and put our nation and Congress on high alert. No longer could we take for granted the safety of

10

the two million passengers that pass through our nations airports. Our enemies

raised the stakes, and it was critical that we responded thoroughly in order to minimize the chances that an event like 9/11 could never happen again.

While there has not been another terrorist attack on our soil since 9/11, at times

it seems like we are two steps behind the terrorist in a reactionary mode. First

there was the shoe bomb incident. As a result we all have to take our shoes off

when we pass through security checkpoints. Then there was the threat of liquid explosives, which forced TSA to ban passengers from carrying liquids on board. While

no one could have predicted these events, it is imperative that TSA and other federal agencies tasked with protecting all of us are more proactive in their attempts

to protect us. This can be achieved if we were to heed the advice that our witness

Jimmie C. Oxley offered in his written testimony, and that is to ‘‘increase communication to technology suppliers with respect to emerging threats, scenarios and

threat levels.’’ We simply can not protect ourselves, if our researchers do not know

the extent of the threat.

On that note my staff recently had the opportunity to visit the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories in Gaithersburg, MD, where the

scientist there are conducting research into trace explosive detection. While the

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) is the primary source for aviation security

R&D, I hope that these two agencies can collaborate on more research projects, because every federal agency plays a vital role in aviation security on some level.

Let me conclude by stating that the timing of this hearing could not be better as

most of my colleagues, including myself will travel by air back to our districts for

the weekend.

I look forward to this discussion, and I hope that we as a committee can learn

from this hearing what we can do to assist TSA, and DSH in their ongoing efforts

to protect all who travel in the United States.

Mr. Chairman I yield back my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE HARRY E. MITCHELL

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is tasked with managing

transportation security efforts to ensure that our airline passengers can fly safely.

However, as the number and type of threats continues to increase, it is essential

to ensure that TSA has the tools it needs to protect airline passengers.

The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) supports the TSA through research, technology development, testing and evaluation, and testing support for security technologies.

Clearly safety and security must be our top priorities. But we also need to ensure

that our new technologies are practical, and can work in a realistic passenger

screening setting.

I look forward to hearing more from our witness on how we can keep our passengers safe.

I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ADRIAN SMITH

Thank you Chairman Wu. It’s a pleasure to be here this afternoon for this subcommittee hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Laboratory and aviation security. Subcommittee Ranking Member Gingrey has

been detained at a meeting of the House Armed Services Committee and will be

joining this hearing when possible. He has an insightful opening statement that he

will submit for the record and which I urge everyone to read.

There is an obvious and immediate need for improvements in aviation security

within the U.S. and around the world. Airlines continue to be targeted for attack,

and new types of threats are being exposed everyday. We need the help and support

of scientists and engineers to defend against the wide variety of explosives and

weapons that could be used in an attack.

Members of Congress take a lot of flights back and forth between Washington and

our homes. And while we may feel like aviation security experts ourselves after the

hundredth flight, the real expertise is before us today. The panel has a wealth of

experience and knowledge in this area, and I’m looking forward to learning what

I can from you.

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Before closing, I would also like to echo a statement in Dr. Gingrey’s prepared

remarks. A large number of companies and individual researchers have looked at

how they might improve aviation security after the tragic events of 9–11. However,

within this wider aviation security industry, the roles and responsibilities of TSA,

TSL, and other institutions like universities, national labs, or private companies are

poorly understood. In your testimony today, I hope the witnesses can provide clear

and concise guidance for how our aviation security strategy is set and how that

strategy impacts technology development.

Again, thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Mr. Chairman, I

will yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman WU. And now I am delighted to introduce our expert

panel. Dr. Susan Hallowell is the Director of the Transportation

Security Laboratory. Mr. Adam Tsao is the Chief of Staff of the Office of Operational Process and Technology which handles technology procurement issues for the Transportation Security Administration. I actually had to read that phrase three times this morning so I wouldn’t trip over it right now. Dr. Jimmie Oxley is a Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island and is the

Co-Director of the newly awarded DHS University Center of Excellence for Explosives Detection—see, I should have read that more

carefully—Explosives Detection, Mitigation, and Response. And finally, Dr. Colin Drury is a Distinguished Professor and Chair of

the Department of Industrial Engineering at the State University

of New York at Buffalo.

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony should be about

five minutes long after which the Members of the Committee will

have five minutes each to ask questions. Please feel free to summarize your written testimony, and we shall begin with Dr. Hallowell.

STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN HALLOWELL, DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY LABORATORY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. HALLOWELL. Good afternoon, Chairman Wu and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me to appear

before you today and provide information about the Transportation

Security Laboratory which is part of the Department of Homeland

Security’s Science and Technology Directorate.

The Transportation Security Laboratory has historically been responsible for turning aviation security applied research into prototypes and products. Following the PanAm 103 tragedy in 1988, the

Aviation Security Improvement Act was enacted by Congress. This

law mandated the development of technology that could be certified

to be reliable and detect explosive materials concealed in checked

baggage. This resulted in the creation of the Aviation Security Laboratory, my lab, which at that time was an element of the Federal

Aviation Administration in 1992.

The ASL received direct funding by congressional line explosives

detection, infrastructure protection, human factors, and aircraft

hardening. Congress also required that the FAA develop a certification standard that would define the performance requirements

for an explosive detection system which we call EDS in terms of

probability of detection, false alarm rates, throughput rates, and

detection of specific types and configurations of different kinds of

explosives. The EDS Certification Standard was established and

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published in the Federal Register in 1992, and the lab certified its

first EDS unit in 1994.

The ASL was integrated into the newly formed TSA after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and was renamed the Transportation Security Laboratory. The TSL provided the intensive accelerated effort

necessary to develop, mature, and certify technologies necessary to

support the historic deployment of aviation security technology

screening devices in American airports. During this timeframe,

new standards of performance were created for TSA and several

technologies were qualified or certified. In 2003, the TSA and the

TSL joined the new Department of Homeland Security; and in

2006, the TSL became part of the Department’s Science and Technology Directorate.

In the ever-changing landscape of potential threats, the Transportation Security Lab continues to be recognized as the foremost

resource for applied research development, integration, and validation of leading-edge science and technology for detection and mitigation of explosives and conventional threats.

The lab continues to work to provide both technical and procedural solutions that will work in the field. The TSL performs R&D

at the request of the S&T directorate. The laboratory currently

supports S&T explosives division, checked baggage, air cargo, and

checkpoint program efforts. TSL also performs work for the TSA on

an as-required basis. This includes certification, qualification tests,

and technology assessment testing. TSL is also the go-to laboratory

for a number of government agencies that are looking for explosive

detection devices.

Tests and evaluation activities at the TSL encompass two independent functions. The independent tests and evaluation function

is responsible for evaluating mature technologies that may meet

TSA security requirements that are suitable for piloting or deployment, and principally this supports the TSA needs. The research,

development, test, and evaluation function has responsibilities

ranging from evaluation of applied research, to prototype development and maturation and supports S&T or other R&D customers

that we have at the laboratory.

These two groups set their priorities using different methodologies. The IT&E group has a strong relationship with TSA’s Office

of Security Technology in that they frequently discuss testing requirements, priorities, and the results of those testing evaluations.

Results support TSA decisions for field trials, deployment, or their

investment strategies. The IT&E office judges detection worthiness

and product readiness. The customer of TSA sets the requirements,

and the laboratory designs each test to determine if candidate systems meet those requirements. The types and frequencies of independent testing at the TSL has tripled in the last two years as acquisition by TSA has become more diverse as more explosives and

more weapons detection equipment has become commercially available for testing.

In general, there are three kinds of tests administered by the

independent testing evaluation team. The Certification Test is focused on providing laboratory certification of matured explosive detection equipment. Certification is recognized as the world standard for explosives detection.

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The Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a security system meets the requirements specified in the TSA-initiated Technical Requirements Document. The results from this test, along

with TSA-conducted pilots, field trials, generally result in a determination of fitness-for-use by TSA.

Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the

general capability of a system. The results of these evaluations of

candidate security systems drive future development efforts or

operational evaluations.

DT&E testing at the TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses,

and the vulnerabilities of technologies as they mature. The primary

focus is to ensure that technology is robust and ready to go to the

final stages of testing done by the independent test and evaluation

group.

While the TSL performs testing certification of technologies, its

responsibility of TSA as our customer——

Chairman WU. Dr. Hallowell, if you wouldn’t mind summing up

in just a little bit.

Dr. HALLOWELL. Certainly, sir. In conclusion, I would just like to

say that the focus of R&D and test evaluation is done by the TSL,

and our focus is to develop immature and transitioning technology

to detect explosives. We have a close relationship with our customer which is TSA, and it allows us to understand the customer

needs. The TSL does stand proudly behind the fact that every piece

of security equipment that is in American airports has gone

through the hands of people in our laboratory.

Chairman Wu and Ranking Member who left and distinguished

Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for giving me the

opportunity to provide this testimony.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hallowell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN HALLOWELL

INTRODUCTION

Good Afternoon Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished

Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me to appear before you today to provide you with information about the Transportation Security Laboratory, part of the

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate

(S&T).

The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) has historically been responsible

for turning aviation security applied research into prototypes and products. The

Laboratory emerged from many years of work by Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)

officials to increase aviation security, originally in the light of high-jacking incidents

in the 1970s. The Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 (Public Law 93–366)

granted the FAA authority to pursue methods aimed at preventing high-jacking,

and this authority was strengthened by the 1985 International Security and Development Cooperation Act (Public Law 99–83), which led to growth and expansion of

the FAA’s research and development program.

During the 1980s, threats to aviation safety began to include bombs as well as

high-jacking threats, and the sorts of technology needed for detection and screening

purposes started to change. Following the PanAm 103 tragedy in 1988, development

of state-of-the-art technology that the FAA Administrator could certify as reliably

able to detect explosive material in checked baggage was recommended. These recommendations, codified in the Aviation Security Improvement Act (Public Law 101–

604) in 1992, resulted in the creation of the Aviation Security Laboratory (ASL) at

the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center, in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

The new ASL launched a multi-tiered program to develop automatic methods to

detect threat amounts of explosive in checked luggage as well as develop hardened

aircraft containers capable of preventing another tragedy. The ASL received direct

funding by congressional line explosives detection, infrastructure protection, human

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factors, and aircraft hardening. The Commission’s mandate also required that the

FAA develop a Certification Standard that would define the performance requirements for an Explosive Detection System (EDS) in terms of probability of detection,

false alarm rate, throughput rate, and detection of specific types and configuration

of explosives. The EDS Certification Standard was established and published in the

Federal Register in 1992, and the ASL certified the first unit, an InVision CTX 5000

System, in 1994.

Following the events of 9/11, the Aviation Security Laboratory was renamed the

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) and joined the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA); in 2003, the TSA and the TSL joined the new Department

of Homeland Security, and in 2006 the TSL became part of the Department’s Science and Technology Directorate. As a federal laboratory and extension of the Directorate, the TSL’s domain and customer base continue to grow. In the dynamic

environment in which we live, where both foreign and domestic entities pose real

threats, the Transportation Security Laboratory is recognized as the foremost resource for applied research, development, integration, and validation of leading edge

science and technology for the detection and mitigation of explosives and conventional weapons threats. The Laboratory is more than a research institution, however; it is committed to providing technical and procedural solutions that work in

the field. This testimony provides an overview of TSL’s research, development, test

and evaluation activities, its customer interactions, and its roles in technology

transfer.

TSL’s Role in Setting Aviation Security Research, Development, Testing

and Evaluation Priorities

Although the TSL provides research and development (R&D) input, the TSL does

not set priorities for this work. The TSL performs R&D at the request of the S&T

Directorate, and priorities for this work are set primarily by the customer components. Under Secretary Cohen instituted the Capstone Integrated Product Team

(IPT) process to set priorities for the Transition portion of the S&T Directorate’s

budget. Transition programs are focused on providing technology solutions to meet

customer need in the zero to three years timeframe. Through this process our customers identify and prioritize their capability gaps to mission performance, which

allows the Directorate to respond with applicable technology solutions to fill these

gaps. Aviation security efforts fall under the Transportation Security Capstone IPT

managed by the S&T Directorate’s Explosive Division. TSA is the customer lead for

this IPT. TSL currently supports S&T Explosives Division’s checked baggage, air

cargo, and checkpoint program efforts. The Research portion of the Directorate’s

budget is not completely tied to Transition programs but aligned to provide breakthrough science to support longer-term (outside of three years) needs of the customer.

The Capstone process has lead to a better understanding of customer needs and

how they set priorities, but it also has challenges given the large number of identified capability gaps and the expanded role of the Explosives Division beyond aviation and transportation explosives detection. As a result, the current funding for

aviation security R&D for explosives detection is about what it was in 1996 (in absolute dollars).

With the use of S&T ‘Core Funding’ resources, TSL also performs work for customers on an as-requested basis. This involves pop-up requests from TSA, both from

the TSA Office of Security Technology (OST), and from TSA field offices and airports. TSL has also done work for the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard,

DHS Customs and Border Protection, the Department of State, and the Department

of Defense. These organizations utilize the TSL as a ‘go-to’ laboratory for explosives

detection RDT&E. The lab conducts RDT&E evaluations of commercial off-the-shelf

(COTS) and next-generation prototype detection equipment, provides laboratory and

field testing standards for deployed explosives detection systems, and acts as subject

matter experts to consult on a wide variety of issues involving weapons and explosives detection.

Test and evaluations activities at TSL encompass two independent functions: The

Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) function is responsible for evaluating mature technology that may meet TSA’s security requirements, suitable for piloting or

deployment, and the Research and Development function has responsibilities ranging from applied research, to prototype development, to technology maturation that

produces prototypes suitable for evaluation by the Independent Test and Evaluation

Team. These two groups set their priorities using different methodologies.

The IT&E group has a strong relationship with the TSA’s OST, in that they frequently discuss testing requirements, priorities and results of evaluations. TSL conducts three main kinds of independent verification and validation tests: certification

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tests, qualification tests, and laboratory assessments. These will be discussed in

greater detail in the next section of my testimony, ‘‘TSL’s Testing and Evaluation

Procedures.’’

The types and frequency of independent testing at the TSL has tripled in the last

two years, as acquisitions by TSA have become more diverse and more explosives

and weapons detection equipment has become commercially available. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill for FY 2008 directs DHS S&T ‘‘to

report on the costs and benefits of charging companies for certification of their products (at Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) ) in light of the potential to provide enhanced certification services and the capital improvement needed to safely

house the ITE program.’’ S&T has performed the review as directed and believes

that TSL should be allowed to charge companies for certification of their products.

Since 1992, the TSL has carried out their Congressional responsibilities while serving as the focal point for technical exchange and excellence in the field of security

technology with industry, academia, other federal and State agencies and foreign

governments. Allowing TSL to charge companies for certification of their products

is appropriate for this enduring and mature laboratory. The scope of investment required to meet the expanding workload of the Lab addresses infrastructure and personnel investment required.

TSL’s Testing and Evaluation Procedures

Review of test and evaluation activities. There are different kinds of Test and

Evaluation (T&E) activities at the TSL. Independent Test and Evaluation Activities

include certification, qualification, and assessment testing, and generally speaking,

are performed to determine if detection systems meet customer defined requirements. Developmental Test and Evaluation Activities (DT&E) activities are designed to verify that a prototype or near COTS system has met performance metrics

established within the R&D program, such that it can proceed to the next R&D

stage. Additionally, R&D may look at the science and technology issues behind the

technology, along with the development of critical simulants or standards to perform

laboratory or field testing of explosives.

Independent Test & Evaluation: TSL’s Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E)

group conducts independent verification and validation of detection systems for

transportation commerce inspection (people, goods, and baggage). Results support

decisions of DHS operating elements (such as TSA) for field trials and production

or deployment, as well as key program milestones, bench-marking, and investment

strategy. The IT&E office judges ‘‘detection-worthiness’’ and product readiness. The

customer sets the requirements, and TSL designs each test to determine if candidate systems meet those requirements.

The Certification Test Program is reserved for detection testing of bulk and trace

explosives detection systems and equipment under statutory authority 49 U.S.C.

§44913 for checked baggage. The focus is on providing laboratory certification of matured explosives detection equipment, certifying that salient performance characteristics, such as the probability of detection of all categories of explosives with appropriate false alarm rates and throughput rates, are met. The details of types and

masses of explosives and false alarm rates are classified. EDS must be certified before they can be deployed. P.L. 101–604 defined the requirement for certification of

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), and P.L. 107–71 defined the requirement for

certification for Trace Explosives Detection Systems. Certification is recognized as

a world standard for explosives detection. The TSL is ISO 9001:2000 registered for

certification of explosive detection systems.

The certification process is clearly defined in the EDS Certification Management

Plan (1993) which is available to those entities seeking systems certification. The

certification test protocols were developed by a panel of experts (the National Academy of Sciences). Certification tests are performed with dedicated personnel, with

the Test Director and an independent third party observer present. In the last two

years, TSL has certified eleven bulk EDS and six trace EDS.

Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a security system meets customerdefined requirements as specified in a TSA-initiated Technical Requirements Document. This test, along with piloting (field trials) generally results in a determination

of fitness-for-use. This process is modeled after the certification process, and is defined within the Qualification Management Plan. Unlike the Certification Test, the

requirements of the Qualification Management Plan typically expand beyond detection functions to include operational requirements. The Qualification Test Program

is conducted under statutory authority different from certification testing. Covered

by 10 U.S.C. 2319, 41 U.S.C. 253(e) and FAR Subpart 9.2 Qualification Requirements, the result of Qualification Testing is a recommendation of whether candidate

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systems should be placed on a Qualified Products List (QPL). TSL has conducted

56 qualification tests in the last two years.

Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the general capability of

a system. These evaluations of candidate security systems are carried out in accordance with interim performance metrics, and the results drive future development efforts or operational deployment evaluations. While the IT&E group practices best

scientific principles in test design, execution, and evaluation of data, assessment criteria are determined by the customer (TSA) and the customer’s needs. TSL has conducted 124 such assessments in the last two years on bulk EDS and 26 on trace

EDS in the last two years.

Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is performed by the R&D team at the

TSL, and involves testing in a controlled environment to ensure that all system or

product components meet technical specifications. These tests are designed to ensure that developmental products have met major milestones identified within the

R&D project.

DT&E testing at the TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities

of technologies as they mature and gain capability. The primary focus is to ensure

that the technology is robust and ready for Certification Testing. The criteria for

success are based on the operational needs of the customer and it is mainly based

on technical performance and the component agency’s Concept of Operations

(CONOPS). Based on this key input, the customers’ requirements are translated

into technical requirements with testable metrics of performance. These metrics of

success, and how they will be assessed, are detailed in the test plan.

The ultimate goal is to ensure that equipment that will be deployed in the field

is usable, effective, reliable, and maintainable over its operational lifetime. Thus,

the time spent in DT&E assures that promising research and technology development transitions smoothly to the field and the end-users.

TSL’s RDT&E personnel also perform testing of basic scientific principles, development of laboratory and field simulants and standards, testing of breadboard systems or components, testing of prototype systems, and testing of near-COTS or

COTS systems to determine if systems meet the minimum requirements of the customer, and are ready to transfer over to TSL’s IT&E testing.

Basic scientific principles are tested or measured utilizing expertise and advanced instrumentation at TSL to learn chemical or physical properties of materials

(threats) or interactions with materials. This includes performing X-ray Diffraction

and high energy X-ray/CT measurements on existing and home made explosives

(HME) to determine the fundamental properties necessary for detection in COTS

EDS systems. Similarly, ion chemistry measurements are collected to verify detection or interferences that may exist with ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) based explosives trace detection (ETD) systems.

Testing and development of Simulants and Standards are critical to the

T&E of explosives detection systems both in the laboratory and field. TSL has developed many sets of bulk explosives simulants (for X-ray and CT systems) that allow

testing of EDS systems without the need for the presence of dangerous bulk explosives, permitting systems to be tested in laboratory settings and for testing in the

field for government customers. TSL has also developed a number of trace explosives standards for TSA, such as standards that are used for quality control (QC)

checks on lab and fielded ETDs, trace particle standards to contaminate surfaces

(baggage, laptops, vehicles, etc.) to verify proficiency of both the screener and ETD

as a system, and a number of verification standards that other government performers or industry utilize to measure the efficiency of their ETD system.

Breadboard EDS systems, which are developed either at TSL, industry, academia, or a government laboratory, are tested or evaluated by TSL as part of a

product developmental cycle. This testing allows TSL to utilize explosives threats

to measure the technology’s feasibility to meet the customers’ defined requirements,

or in some cases, general requirements to develop technology for S&T without specific agency requirements, but with minimum technology specifications. Often,

Human Factors evaluations or assistance are brought into the process to provide

early guidance with the end-users requirements for usability, interface, and suitability.

Prototype testing encompasses early developmental systems, which are typically

provided by industry, academia, or government laboratories. Prototypes undergo

testing to learn about detection capabilities and gaps, in order to improve and transfer the systems to the final production stage.

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R&D Assessment of production stage prototypes is where TSL determines

if a system is ready to be transferred over to IT&E for critical customer evaluation.

This testing looks at the minimum detection requirements of the evaluated system,

the human factors considerations for field use, issues with false alarms, interferences, and systems engineering requirements. Often this is where industry will

get a chance to perform final product modifications to meet the intended customer’s needs.

Certification Readiness Testing is a DT&E test conducted to provide quantitative evidence that a system meets (or fails to meet) the performance requirements prior to certification testing. This test is conducted in stages, in order to grow

the candidate equipment performance so that it will be robust enough to have a

good probability of passing the certification test. While certification may take only

a few weeks to administer, Certification Readiness testing may take several months

to a year of hard lab work with the industry partner to mature the candidate explosives detection system. Typically, the TSL presents increasingly harder Improvised

Explosives Device (IED) concealments to candidate explosive screening equipment,

and the vendor must, in turn, refine hardware and software to achieve detection of

explosives with high levels of detection and low false alarm rates.

The results of all of the above RDT&E activities normally end up in technical documents which, along with oral debriefings, are provided to the customer. This provides them with clear and concise test plans, T&E data, summaries, comments and

conclusions. With CRDAs, similar non-sensitive reports and debriefs are provided to

the industrial partner to ensure they have gained the insight necessary to bring

their product to the next step in the developmental process.

Coordination with other DHS components. TSL works closely with TSA in the

translation of customer requirements into TSA technical requirements that have

performance metrics of success, so that requirements are testable. The IT&E group

provides the customer with high quality test data that guides decisions concerning

operational robustness and detection capability of available systems. The IT&E

group also regularly convenes working groups, contributes to IPT meetings, and produces rapid assessments to support TSA’s efforts. The TSL has also shared its expertise with other DHS components, including the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Secret

Service.

The TSL looks forward to contributing our expertise to the University Centers of

Excellence (CoEs) in the areas of transportation and explosives. TSL personnel are

working with the S&T Explosives Division to identify and evaluate potential research projects of interest, and TSL will be part of the proposal review chain. TSL

has welcomed assorted undergraduate and graduate students as part of the DHS

Scholars and Fellows program over the years. It should be noted that, prior to the

establishment of the DHS CoEs, TSL has had a long and fruitful relationship with

academia, via the Grants and Cooperative Agreement programs (FAA Grants Program). With these funding mechanisms, TSL has been able to work with academia

to develop and perform RDT&E on novel next-generation explosives detection systems.

TSL and Technology Transfer

While the TSL performs testing and certification of technologies, it is the responsibility of TSA to define and judge readiness for deployment. Technologies passing

certification are demonstrated to have efficacy, but do not necessarily demonstrate

operational robustness. Deployment decisions are, in part, based on unique laboratory tests conducted at TSL that cannot be conducted in the field, along with operational utility evaluations conducted by TSA. If TSA encounters operational issues

with a piloted or deployed system, TSL stands ready to provide subject matter expertise to understand the issue and assist in corrective action. Several examples of

TSL’s assistance in these situations are described with other technologies we have

transferred below. Occasionally, TSL has taken the initiative to develop product

support systems (e.g., the Image Quality phantom and trace quality control aids) to

improve operational performance.

In terms of technology transfer, in addition to the clear technology transfer milestones that equipment certification and qualification play, the TSL offers continuous, daily support to enable this process. Some efforts are obvious, such as subject

matter expert support for TSA programs, and some are more nuanced, such as refinements to federal security officer’s training for explosives recognition, or training

concerning use of an explosives detection system.

In addition to testing and certification, TSL continues to work with TSA as they

plan for deployment. The Lab helps TSA develop appropriate training modules for

newly deployed technologies. The TSL also continues to work with the TSA to aid

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in the monitoring and oversight of the configuration of each piloted or deployed system. As systems are upgraded to become more operationally robust, the TSL assesses the extent and nature of system changes, and occasionally calls for system

recertification if changes may affect the performance criteria of the system. Finally,

the deployment of explosives detection systems to the airports has created a secondary industry at the TSL: We have created high fidelity explosive simulants, test

articles, quality control aides and other diagnostic tools that TSA uses to validate

that the equipment or screeners are performing at the appropriate high standards.

TSL/TSA Transition Activities

TSL has worked with TSA to transition many programs that could improve transportation security. Examples of ongoing work include:

• TSL has been actively pursuing R&D relative to improving detection by

bomb sniffing dogs, and provide training tools for canine handlers, training

aids for canines and canine performance assessments for canines to TSA’s National Explosives Detection Canine Training Program.

• TSL has a strong tradition of Human Factors expertise, and TSL’s Human

Factors group is currently involved with a number of projects in support of

TSA. These efforts are critical to ensure that sophisticated equipment can be

easily, safely, and effectively used by thousands of screeners in the field. Past

activities included the creation of a selection test for X-ray screeners for TSA’s Office of Human Capital; this was transitioned to TSA in 2001 and it has

been used to hire all TSA screeners since then. Currently, the TSL Human

Factors team are:

Æ Providing a formal analysis of the so-called ‘‘re-screening problem’’ for a

joint U.S.–Canadian Working Group, and looking at possible alternatives

to re-screening of checked bags of Canadian origin at U.S. airports.

Æ Working on the development of On-Screen Alarm Resolution (OSARP)

procedures for Cargo, which presents new and different challenges to

screeners using EDS.

Æ Participating in a TSA pilot on the development of Cargo screening procedures for privately operated independent air carriers that acquire Xray, Advanced Technology (AT) and Explosives Trace Detection (ETD)

equipment.

Æ Participating in TSA’s Passenger Screening Program workgroup to develop measures of screening effectiveness. TSL also supports research on

screener performance, screener attention focusing techniques, screener

fatigue, and optimizing screener interfaces, which efforts are expected to

contribute to TSA processes in the future.

Æ Providing support to the TSL’s Independent Test & Evaluation (IT&E)

group assessments of Whole Body Imagers (WBI) for TSA. In the last

year, Human Factors staff supported TSA with 14 separate WBI assessments examining the effects of multiple technologies, passenger poses,

privacy settings, and threat sizes on threat detection capabilities.

Æ Through a long-term research grant with the University of Central Florida, TSL’s Human Factors experts have created a new and highly effective method for training TSA screeners to detect threats in carry-on bags.

This new method has been shown to produce significant increases in

threat detection in lab studies, and an initial pilot showed improved IED

detection for screeners with this new training method. A comprehensive

pilot study is being planned with TSA’s Office of Technology Training to

test 300 screeners across at least 20 different U.S. airports.

• TSL also has a tradition of supporting mitigation efforts and has assisted

TSA’s Office of Security Technologies with mitigation-related technology. In

the late 1990’s, TSL successfully blast-tested two hardened aircraft luggage

container prototypes (HULD’s), which were subsequently certified to existing

FAA airworthiness requirements. In 2006, the TSA’s Office of Security Technology implemented the HULD Pilot Program in response to 9/11 Commission

recommendations, the objective of which was to determine operational impact

(security benefits, durability, maintenance, training impact, and cost) of any

subsequent HULD implementation. During the course of the HULD Pilot,

TSA placed a total of 25 HULD’s into operational service trials; to date, 20

HULD’s have been removed from service at predetermined intervals (between

100–350 flights), and TSL has blast-tested these in order to determine the effects of operational service on continued HULD blast resistance. Over the

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next six months, TSL will complete explosive testing on the HULD’s remaining in operational service.

Other Examples of Technology Transfer

TSL also provides technology transfer through its Communications and Radio

Frequency Identification (RFID) group. These activities include:

Æ Cockpit-Crew Emergency Communications System Flight Tests. TSL provides

expertise and flight tests to support TSA’s Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) development of the FAMS Air-to-Ground Communications Architecture.

Æ Cargo RFID Seals Project. TSL is providing recommendations and test bed

support for TSA’s efforts to have a Cargo Screening System using RFID seals

in place for 100 percent of all cargo shipments by August 2010.

Æ Canine Mass Transit Remote Sensor Project. This project is providing a pilot

of a Canine Stand-off Situational Assessment for First Responders and was

initiated by the TSA Deputy Administrator.

Æ Regional Maritime Security Coalition/Cargo Information Action Center. TSL

contributed subject matter expertise and assistance with transference of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Network technology to Pacific Northwest Airports and Columbia River Seaports, linking TSA Federal

Security Directors at Portland International and feeder airports with the U.S.

Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, FBI and State and Local Port Authorities and Emergency Management Centers.

Æ Atlantic City International Airport Testbed. TSL is working with the South

Jersey Transportation Authority for in-situ RDT&E site for airport-related security technologies and systems.

Another major role that TSL plays in technology transfer is working with industry

via Cooperative Research and Development Awards (CRDAs). The CRDA

mechanism allows industry to mature their technology in partnership with the U.S.

Government. TSL provides industry with a unique opportunity to perform RDT&E

(laboratory evaluation) of its products with real explosive threats that are not typically available to the private sector, while at the same time providing industry with

subject matter expertise to assist in the final development and maturation of technology. This allows Industry a path to mature technology that will meet performance standards required for DHS applications. To date, these activities have been

limited due to lack of government funding and infrastructure/laboratory constraints.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the primary focus of the R&D and the test and evaluation at the

TSL is to develop, mature, and transition technology to detect explosives. TSL combines a profound awareness of terrorist capabilities with penetrating insight about

the operational environment. The Laboratory’s close relationship with its customers

allows us to fully understand customer needs and incorporate operational considerations into our R&D. By applying fundamental understandings of science, systems

engineering, and test and evaluation protocols, the Laboratory is a unique national

asset that is perfectly positioned to continue providing effective technology solutions

for national security. The TSL stands proudly behind the fact that every piece of

security technology presently deployed in the Nation’s airports has at some point

traveled through our doors. Whether it is during development, qualification, or certification, the hands and minds of the TSL team have played a role in all of today’s

technological solutions for the detection of explosives and conventional weapons in

transportation security. Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished

Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to

provide this testimony today.

BIOGRAPHY FOR SUSAN HALLOWELL

Dr. Hallowell is the Director of the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), a

Federal Laboratory of the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This laboratory is responsible for researching,

developing, and evaluating solutions to detect, deter and mitigate improvised explosive devices used against transportation systems. Prior to this, she was manager of

the Explosives and Weapons Detection R&D Branch of the Transportation Security

Laboratory.

Dr. Hallowell was recently recognized, in 2007, by Under Secretary Jay M. Cohen,

S&T/DHS, with the Under Secretary’s Award for Program Management. She superVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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vised the transition of her lab within DHS from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the Science and Technology Directorate. Dr. Hallowell moved the

TSL in a new direction by reinventing it as a test and evaluation laboratory responsive to customers in all components of the DHS and to stakeholders in the public

and private sectors. She has worked for the DHS, TSA, and FAA for over 15 years

in the area of explosives detection research and development, and is an expert in

the area of trace detection of explosives. She has written numerous publications and

has received many awards in this area. Prior to working for the FAA, she worked

as a research chemist for the U.S. Army, in the area of detection of and protection

against chemical warfare agents, and technical measures supporting CW treaty

verification.

She was granted a Doctor of Philosophy in Analytical Chemistry from the University of Delaware in 1989 for work in the area of biosensor development. She holds

a Bachelor of Arts from Western Maryland College with a major in chemistry. Dr.

Hallowell is a member of the American Chemical Society, the American Association

for the Advancement of Science, the New York Academy of Science, National Association of Female Executives, and is an elected member of Sigma Xi, the society of

research scientists.

Chairman WU. Thank you very much, Dr. Hallowell. Mr. Tsao,

you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. ADAM TSAO, CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE OF

OPERATIONAL PROCESS AND TECHNOLOGY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. TSAO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon,

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. I am

honored to be here today to appear on behalf of the Transportation

Security Administration to discuss our research, development, and

testing needs and discuss how S&T supports our mission.

If it pleases the Committee, I would like to request that my written testimony be submitted for the record.

As you know, TSA operates at over 450 airports. WE operate

screening operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week across six

time zones. On a daily basis our 43,000 transportation security officers will see two million passengers or 1.8 million bags. My job as

the Chief of Staff for Operational Process and Technology is to

make sure the technology we feel provides the men and women of

TSA the best opportunity in a very demanding environment

against a determined foe.

As Dr. Hallowell pointed out, in 2006, the Department of Homeland Security consolidated all research, development, and testing

functions of the component agencies within the DHS S&T Directorate. As such, TSA relies heavily on S&T to satisfy our basic applied and development research needs. At the same time, we maintain responsibility for operational testing and evaluation, operational integration, and deployment of new security technologies.

We are also the ones that set the security strategy and that everybody works off of. We have a very strong relationship with each of

the divisions of the S&T Directorate, but we have a particularly

close affiliation with the Transportation Security Lab. Our histories

go well back to when these activities were in the FAA. We depend

heavily on, as Dr. Hallowell said, independent test evaluation at

TSL. I know all the professors there, I know all the doctors, I know

all the projects that they are working on. We talk on a daily basis.

We have a very open dialogue on the information we need as well

as the ways they can help us.

21

For each technology, we will identify the requirements that have

to be met, and then the IT&E group will take those requirements,

develop a test plan, test it, provide us the results. We will take

these thorough and unbiased results and we will take them into

consideration as we make our policy and investment decisions.

I think there were also some questions about how we participate

in the S&T capstone integrated product teams. Last year I believe

was the very first year for this process, and we engaged at a very

high level. Administrator Holly himself co-chaired the first round

of the explosives IPT with the Director of the U.S. Secret Service,

Mark Sullivan. The process has been extremely valuable to us.

Through the process, I think we have been able to better articulate

our operational needs, not just our technical needs, but our operational needs to the rest of the department. Also, it has given us

a fuller understanding of the needs of the other operating components, and it has given us opportunities to enter partnerships that

we don’t think we would have otherwise considered.

So, Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to highlight our progress in making aviation more secure, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tsao follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADAM TSAO

Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and Members of the

Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to discuss the research, development, and testing/evaluation needs of the TSA and how the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate supports the TSA mission.

TSA is the global leader in transportation security. We operate at airports across

the country, 24 hours a day, seven days a week across six time zones. TSA employees screen more than two million passengers and 1.8 million of pieces of luggage

daily. It is my job to provide the right technology to the field to support our vital

security operations.

As an operating agency, we rely heavily on S&T Directorate to satisfy our basic,

applied and developmental research and development. We have a strong working relationship within each division of S&T Directorate, with a particularly close affiliation with the Transportation Security Lab (TSL) in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consolidated all research,

development, and test and evaluation functions of its component agencies, with the

exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, within the DHS S&T Directorate to achieve efficiencies through economies of scale. As required by the FY 2006 DHS Appropriations Act, the S&T Directorate assumed responsibility for the TSL from TSA. Since

then, TSA has relied almost exclusively on the TSL for testing needs.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS AT TSA

TSA works with the Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) group at TSL to

develop programs that test whether or not a new technology meets its stated requirements. After completing testing procedures, the IT&E group provides TSA with

thorough, unbiased testing results. We use the results to make policy and investment decisions.

TSA’S ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY TESTING

For each new technology, TSA develops and identifies the requirements that must

be met for a procurement to proceed. The IT&E group within the TSL then takes

these requirements and develops a testing program to determine whether or not a

new technology meets the stated requirements. The role of TSA in designing these

technology tests varies and is based on operational needs and the criticality of the

technology and corresponding processes and procedures.

Both the TSL and the DHS S&T Directorate divisions have a strong working relationship with TSA. Their collective efforts are divided broadly into six areas.

The six areas are described in more detail, below:

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• Basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields of physical, engineering, environmental, social, and life sciences related to long-term national needs.

• Applied research includes all efforts directed toward the solution of specific

problems with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions.

• Advanced development includes all efforts directed towards projects that have

moved into the development of hardware for field experiments and tests.

• Operational testing verifies that new systems are operationally effective, supportable, and suitable before deployment.

• Operational integration is the process by which TSA enables successful transition of viable technologies and systems to the field environment.

• Deployment is a series of actions following the determination that the: baselined product or system meets TSA’s performance, operational, and user requirements and is accepted by the program manager and integrated product

team; designated locations are selected, configured, and optimized for product/

system integration into the screening operating system and the installed

product/system passes acceptance testing at the designated location; logistics

support is in place and all users are trained for operational use of the product/system. Only then is the product/system declared commissioned or cleared

for use.

Additionally, DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for conducting basic and applied

research, advanced development, and developmental test and evaluations. TSA

maintains responsibility for operational testing and evaluation, operational integration, and deployment of new checkpoint screening technologies.

Integrated Product Team (IPT) Process

The S&T Directorate Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) began with 11

Capstone IPTs: Information Sharing, Border Security, Chem/Bio Defense, Maritime

Security, Cyber Security, Explosives Prevention, Cargo Security, People Screening,

Infrastructure Protection, Inter-operability, and Prep & Response.

At their February 26th, 2008 meeting, the Technology Oversight Group (TOG) determined that the Explosives Prevention Capstone IPT would be split into two

IPTs—one focused on Transportation Security and the other on Counter-Improvised

Explosive Devices (C–IED). As the result of this breakout, there are now a total of

12 Capstone IPTs. The Transportation Security Capstone IPT will be chaired by the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and address priorities relative to

venues (Airports, Mass Transit, and Maritime), checkpoints including air cargo, and

explosives characterization and homemade explosives (HME). The C–IED Capstone

IPT will be chaired by the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) and the United

States Secret Service (USSS) with the objective of providing the technology to address the IED threat per Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19.

The IPTs program has been successful in many of its goals, including establishing

budgetary funding priorities as part of the FY09 budget process and to prioritizing

the research and development needs of TSA. As of November 2007, the Explosives

Detection Division Capstone IPT has shown that TSA is able to articulate to DHS

S&T Directorate a clear understanding of its science and technology needs to procure solutions that not only meet stringent detection thresholds, but also meet

throughput requirements in support of the aviation sector.

TSA’s involvement in setting user requirements for technologies developed or

funded by S&T Directorate.

TSA no longer has primary responsibility for funding or managing the research

and development of airport screening technologies. TSA does however remain primarily responsible for developing functional requirements for new technologies, including setting threshold standards for detection, and for conducting operational

tests and evaluations of these technologies in airports. In the future, TSA’s involvement will likely vary based on the maturity and criticality of the technology, as well

as the operational rigor required to implement it.

Apart from the research and development efforts under S&T Directorate, TSA invests annually in engineering projects designed to improve or upgrade existing technology as new requirements are generated. In certain cases, existing technology is

unable to support new requirements due to hardware or software constraints. In

these instances, TSA undergoes a proposal solicitation process to evaluate new technology systems whose enhanced functionality will meet the revised requirements.

23

CONCLUSION

The needs of people must continue to drive the focus of transportation security.

The American people and the traveling public require a transportation infrastructure that can be secured without the expense of unreasonable burdens. The people

in our workforce require investments that will allow them to perform effectively and

grow professionally. The people within our homeland security partnerships and network require cooperation, communication, and leadership. The strength of these relationships has been fundamental to our progress and must continue to remain a

focal point as we move forward.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to highlight the progress TSA

has made in aviation security. I look forward to our continued work together and

would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Chairman WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Tsao. Dr. Oxley,

please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. JIMMIE C. OXLEY, PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND (URI); CO-DIRECTOR,

URI FORENSIC SCIENCE PARTNERSHIP; CO-DIRECTOR, DHS

UNIVERSITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE IN EXPLOSIVE DETECTION, MITIGATION, AND RESPONSE

Dr. OXLEY. Thank you, Chairman Wu and Congressman Smith.

I always like to talk to Smiths since I am married to one.

The question I was asked—three questions and the third question I think Dr. Hallowell has answered admirably, so I am going

to start with the question about current state of research and explosives, and I gave first of all a very general answer because we

do—all countries do current research in explosives. We have a very

minor effort in the U.S. The NRC report that was published in

2004 estimated we had two dozen chemists working in energetic

material new chemical synthesis. Now, I am talking about new

military explosives, I am not talking about counter-terrorism type

issues when I say that. We do work on formulating new devices to

make our explosives safer to handle, more effective, and have

longer or shorter lifetimes depending on what it is we are trying

to accomplish. Device-centered research also occurs at the military

labs. We are we are going on military labs and national labs. That

is a general answer to a question of tell us about explosive research.

Governments all over the world put restrictions on military explosives. Despite that fact, if you look at the table I gave you, you

will see that half of the explosive incidents have been with military

explosives, in fact, not with commercial explosives, which may

speak very well to the control that folks exert on commercial explosives.

You asked me a question about liquid explosives. Since solid explosives perform equally well to liquid explosives, we usually prefer

to handle solid explosives, less handling problems. There is not new

research, or very little, in new liquid explosives. However, there is

much more literature on liquid explosives and what you see is terrorists pulling out that old literature and making use of things that

are commercially available like hydrogen peroxide or nitro methane. These are not surprise materials, they are just taking advantage of what is already known.

We do need to have new research in detection across the board.

The issues with detecting liquid explosives are related to (a), if

manufacturers detect what they are asked to detect, and they have

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said we would like to know ahead of time what we are going to be

asked next. They can’t afford to have instruments detecting a

threat that hasn’t been asked for because it raises a false alarm

rate. So you go right where you are asked and that type of detection.

The issues with liquids are we don’t want to open the bottles, so

it is a sealed container issue, and we have all the same issues if

we have a well-filled solid to deal with. Detection issues must be

addressed.

Concerning the chemicals themselves, we need some basic research in detonation to see what commodity chemicals that we are

not aware of could be detonable. We need basic research in that

area. There was a famous chemist in the World War II timeframe

who said give me enough peanut butter and I will blow up the

world, and we don’t know if he is right or not about that one.

In this country we use 6.4 million metric tons of ammonium nitrate a year. Worldwide production is 39 million metric tons with

nine million metric tons in transit. Urea is four-fold in terms of

production and export of urea, and I have given you a table on

those two issues. I consider those two the premiere explosive precursors to take a look at, and indeed the House and the Senate

have passed the Secure Ammonium Nitrite law, and I believe that

DHS is going to administer that. I think we need to look at a handful of explosive precursors for administrative control. That is very

doable. We have been collecting this data since the 1980s, 30 years

of data on who the end-users are. We just haven’t really worked

at making that a useful policy in terms of interdicting and following what happens from the manufacture to the end-user of specific precursors.

If I now move my 26 seconds to detection issues, across the board

we have issues on getting the sample to the detector. We need

basic particle surface studies in that area. Those are primarily for

the detectors that require a molecule of the explosive to get into

the instrument.

Our other detectors rely on a signal, an emission-type technology

and those are bulk detectors and stand-off detectors. They have to

have an emission signal. We need lots of development, but we need

some basic research into what is physically, scientifically possible

to do.

And my last point is that the manufacturers across the board

and they come into my lab and they say, help us out. We want to

know what is happening next. And if you want to engage the wonderful research that universities can do and the vendors themselves can do, we need a little better flow of information.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Oxley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIMMIE C. OXLEY

What is the current state-of-the-art in explosives research, especially as relates to

homemade and liquid explosives? What are the key knowledge and capability gaps,

and what types of research projects are needed to fill these gaps?

Little explosives research in the United States (U.S.) is focused on making new

explosives, i.e., new chemicals. A 2004 National Research Council (NRC) report (Advanced Energetic Materials) wrote: ‘‘The U.S. effort in the synthesis of energetic materials at present involves approximately 24 chemists, several of whom are approachVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ing retirement.’’ In the National Labs or Military Labs new formulations and new

devices may be sought with goals of safer, more destructive, longer or shorter shelflife. Device-centered research undoubtedly proceeds under government contract labs,

as well.

Despite the fact that responsible governing bodies have emplaced various administrative controls to keep military explosives out of the hands of terrorists and criminals, international terrorism has relied heavily on these. Interestingly, military,

rather than commercial, explosives have generally been their tool. This fact either

speaks well of industrial safe guards or points the finger at State-sponsored terrorism.

The military has few applications for liquid explosives. Solid explosives perform

equally well and have less handling and storage issues. For this reason, little new

research in liquid explosives is performed. However, the old literature is rife with

descriptions of liquid explosives, many of which are readily prepared and some of

which, e.g., hydrogen peroxide and nitromethane, are commercially available. Liquid

explosives are a detection challenge only because, in the past, detection equipment

manufacturers had not been asked to detect them and because U.S. policy is not

to open bottles. This does not mean liquids cannot be detected; the difficulty is the

same as with any number of military or homemade explosives under these conditions. Research in all areas of detection is required.

The U.S. began to focus on homemade explosives after the bombing of the Murrah

Federal Building (April 19, 1995). One tangible result was a 1998 NRC book ‘‘Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings.’’ In 2006 various governments began to

use that report as guidance on explosive precursors. What has not been done is to

follow the report recommendations for testing of materials to identify actual explosive precursors.

A methodical study is needed to identify the likely explosive precursors.

We must probe the fundamentals of detonation to identify the energetic materials

which could be made detonable with modest effort.

My criteria for homemade explosive threats are simple: (1) the required synthesis

must be minimal—mix and use or mix and separate; and (2) large amounts of the

precursor must be available and readily acquired so that large a bomb can be assembled. [‘‘Large’’ bomb is part of the criteria with the rational that the bomb

should be more of a threat than a gun or rifle.]

First on my list of homemade explosives are ammonium nitrate (AN) formulations

and urea nitrate.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) made kilogram-scale bombs mixing

AN with icing sugar. Timothy McVey used AN with the traditional industrial fuel—

diesel. In 2006 the U.S. manufactured ∼6.4 million metric tons AN, its usage split

between agricultural and industrial applications. Indeed, most commercial exploVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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sives are AN based. Worldwide about 39 million tons of AN are manufactured annually at about 200 chemical plants and about nine million tons of AN end up on the

export market.

Worldwide urea production is significantly greater than AN—133 million metric

tons annually and 31 million tons in export. Urea is used in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, NOΧ abatement, and melamine synthesis (which with formaldehyde, forms

resins used in adhesives, laminates, coatings and textile finishes). Urea is made

from ammonia and carbon dioxide; typically plants producing ammonia produce

urea as well. Ammonia is produced using natural gas and nitrogen from air; thus,

areas with cheap natural gas make ammonia: China, Russia, Ukraine, the Middle

East and Latin America. Urea plus nitric acid form urea nitrate; therefore, it is not

surprising that urea nitrate, rather than AN, is frequently used by terrorists in the

Middle East.

In investigating all avenues of preventing terrorist bombings, we should consider

administrative controls on the most likely to be used homemade explosive precursors. We should consider administrative tracking of a small number of precursor chemicals (e.g., AN, urea, nitric acid, hydrogen peroxide, chlorates) from

manufacturer to end-user. Such a program would involve identification of potential precursors and their legitimate place in society. It would require the cooperation

of the manufacturers from the time the product left the factory through distributors,

traders, and transporters to end-users. Such a system would not evolve overnight,

but it should be possible with modern computer technology and international cooperation. Of course, it will not stop all diversions, any more than our present controls stop illicit use of military explosives. A 2007 NRC report ‘‘Countering the

Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices’’ recommends among other areas of research:

‘‘Perform case studies of actual IED construction and events to determine whether

and how resource control might be implemented, with the eventual goal of developing

the ability to model the connection between resources and the IED threat chain.’’

How does current university research in the field of explosives and explosives detection contribute to technology development for aviation security? How is university research coordinated between institutions and with the Federal Government?

Failing to prevent a bomb from being made, we must consider detection of the

bomb. Detection methodologies can be divided into those which require the actual

explosive molecule to enter the instrument—these are called particle or vapor detection—and those which can detect characteristic emissions from the bulk explosive.

Emission detection techniques can be passive, relying on a natural emission from

the chemical, or active, probing the chemical with some sort of radiation to cause

emission. Emission detectors can be differentiated as those having the potential to

see, (1) with special detail, through sealed containers—check luggage or cargo—

‘‘bulk’’ detection; or (2) through the atmosphere at distances—‘‘standoff’’ detection.

Trace techniques are at various levels of development. Even the commonly fielded

ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) faces many operational challenges. For all trace

techniques probably the toughest problem is getting the sample, the explosive molecule, into the detector. Solid explosives, generally, have low vapor pressure. Therefore, detection equipment attempts to sample microscopic particles, rather than

vapor. To get a ‘‘detect’’ particles of explosive must be present; harvesting techniques must remove the particles from the surface; and the transfer technique must

get the particles into the business end of the detector. Basic surface-particle interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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actions need to be studied. I understand the National Institute of Standards and

Technology is working in this area and the Transportation Security Lab is funding

further work.

Among emission detection techniques we find some of the most significant successes and the biggest gaps. As you know standoff detection and cargo screening

need further research. As with other detection technologies we can expect to see imperfect systems fielded, but they can only improve with time, funding, and experience. One of the recommendations of the NRC report (‘‘Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices’’ 2007) I would like to emphasize: ‘‘Determine the fundamental physical limits on the active and passive detection of arming and

firing systems, as well as the physical and chemical limitations for trace

and standoff detection.’’ One last gap I wish to highlight. If Universities are to significantly contribute

their vast research skills to the National needs, we need a more open access to information in this area of threats and detection. I fully understand the need not to

give terrorists information, but in many cases it is those who would help us whom

we are keeping in the dark. Uniformly the technologies providers have asked: ‘‘Increase communication to technology suppliers with respect to emerging

threats, scenarios and threat levels.’’ ‘‘Provide threat and precursor information to enable development of broad detection strategies.’’

BIOGRAPHY FOR JIMMIE C. OXLEY

Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley is Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island

(URI) and Co-Director of the URI Forensic Science Partnership and Co-Director of

the recently announced DHS Center of Excellence in Explosive Detection, Mitigation

and Response. Dr. Oxley has authored 80 papers on energetic materials. She worked

with the FBI simulating the World Trade Center bombing, with Forensic Explosive

Lab of the Defense Science and Technology Lab (UK) examining large fertilizer

bombs, and with ATF/TSWG studying the behavior of pipe bombs. Dr. Oxley has

taught over two dozen explosive short courses for various government labs and

agencies and has served on five National Research Council panels: Commercial

Aviation Security (1995–98); Marking, Rendering Inert, & Licensing of Explosive

Material (1997–98); Chemical Weapon Destruction (1998–99); Advanced Energetic

Materials (2001–02); Basic Research Needs to Interrupt the Improvised Explosive

Device Delivery Chain (2005–08).

Chairman WU. Thank you very much, Dr. Oxley. Dr. Drury,

please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN G. DRURY, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

AT BUFFALO

Dr. DRURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to this

hearing on such an important issue. I am a Human Factors Engineer from University at Buffalo, State University of New York. My

research covers human performance in inspection systems from

manufacturing industry through civil aviation to detection of

threats on people. I have worked with people on the front lines

such as TSA screeners and also been a member of committees on

research in this field such as the NRC’s committee on assessment

of security technologies.

Human factors engineering uses data on the performance of humans, for example, security screeners; in complex systems, such as

aviation security; to design better systems that make best use of

the unique capabilities of both human and the automated devices

to reduce error and increase throughput. There are three aspects

of aviation security, three measures that we have already heard

about. These are important, mis-threats, false alarms, and time

taken to process each item. All of these translate into two overall

measures, risk and delay.

28

To integrate human factors engineering into the design of future

technological systems, we can use successful design techniques

from other areas, design of military systems, civil aviation cockpits,

chemical and nuclear facility control rooms have all be done.

The first step is to recognize that humans are going to be present

in security systems. The traveling public is no more trusting of

completely automated security systems than they are of unmanned

airliner cockpits. The issue is not whether we can eliminate the

human but how best to use the human who is going to be there.

An example is the in-line check baggage inspection system at

many airports. It is based on 3–D scanning of each bag. Automation is used to highlight those areas that contain a potential threat.

This is a search function. The highlighted bag is shown to the

human operator who has to mark it for further inspection or pass

it. This is a decision function. Humans are relatively quite reliable

in decisions whereas machines are much more reliable in search.

So this is quite sensible.

In general, automation is allowed to perform rapidly within strict

rules while humans provide the flexibility to respond when the

rules don’t apply.

The next steps after this are to design specifically for the humans. They human interface with the technology, the training programs, they interface between people, for example, at check points.

There are standard techniques in human factors that have been

used in these other fields to do this.

Currently, the TSA has professionals within the human factors

engineering area with expertise at the Transportation Security

Lab. And all of these are currently listed as members of the

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, but they have been working extensively with researchers and manufacturers on improvements to the interfaces as well as longer-term research studies

such as developing selection procedures for screeners and human

problems in container security. They have also funded some more

fundamental studies of human factors engineering and security.

For example, I have got a one-year grant from them at SUNY.

Could more be done? Certainly. The last time I visited a manufacturer which was a couple years back, there was little evidence

of using human factors engineering professional expertise in design

of systems. Without early involvement of human factors engineering, the human in the system may not make the ultimate decisions

resulting in increased risk and passenger delay.

We can measure the effectiveness of human factors engineering

as we have been talking about in security equipment in two ways.

The first way is to evaluate whether the machine shows evidence

of having human factors engineering used. The second way and the

third way is to evaluate the performance of the whole system, the

human plus the equipment. And if this is done correctly, with performance measures and observations measures, we can measure

the errors and performance times to get a figure of merit for the

system. But the observations provide the locus of any performance

defect, so we can see perhaps why these things are happening.

To sum up, overall there is really no down-side to using human

factors engineering in the design of security systems. Without it

predictable performance lapses can occur, leading to increased risk

29

and passenger delays. The additional cost of incorporating human

factors engineering early in the process has been found in aviation

and military domains to be rather low.

Thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Drury follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLIN G. DRURY

In your testimony please answer the following questions:

1. What role does human factors engineering play in the design and testing of aviation security technology? How well do current aviation security technologies incorporate human factors engineering and human-technology interface principles?

2. How does human factors engineering impact the effectiveness of these technologies

to detect or deter threats? What are the possible detrimental effects of not involving human factors engineers throughout the technology design process?

3. How should the Transportation Security Administration and Transportation Security Laboratory test and evaluate whether human-technology interface principles

have been properly applied in the design and manufacturing of aviation security

technologies?

I am a Human Factors Engineer from University at Buffalo: State University of

New York. I have spent much of my life in research and intervention in the area

of human performance in inspection systems. This started in manufacturing industry (cars, electronics, glass products) but transitioned to aviation inspection of civil

airliners and inspection of people and goods for security threats. My CV provides

samples of the technical papers published in inspection for manufacturing, aircraft

maintenance and security. This work, as with all Human Factors Engineering

(HFE), involved working with people on the front lines (e.g., maintenance technicians, TSA screeners) as well as membership in committees on research and development in this field (e.g., the NRC’s Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies in Transportation, and the FAA’s Research, Engineering and Development

Advisory Committee).

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is a discipline dating from World War II that

uses data on the performance of humans (in our case security screeners, airline passengers) in complex systems (in our case aviation security) to design better systems

that make the best use of the unique capabilities of both humans and automated

devices while reducing the impact of their respective limitations. The diagram of the

airport security system used by the National research Council (Figure 1) shows the

level of complexity and the numerous places where humans can both make errors

and act to prevent errors.

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Standard texts in this area include Wickens, Lee, Liu and Gordon-Becker (2002).

It has a record of designing systems to prevent human error and inefficiency, beginning in the military but subsequently moving into civil aviation and industrial systems. If HFE is not used, then often the system errors only become apparent when

the system is put to operational use, for example the control room and training deficiencies at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station.

There are three aspects of aviation security inspection performance where humans

have a large impact: missed threats (failure to stop a threat), false alarms (stopping

a person/item that is not a threat) and time taken to process each passenger or baggage items. All translate into two system performance measures: risk and delay.

HFE applied to aviation security inspection can, and has, addressed each of these.

A good example is the Threat Image Projection System (TIPS) which presents images of guns, knives and IEDs to screeners performing an X-ray screening task. This

counteracts the known human tendency to detect fewer threats when there is a low

probability that any single item contains a threat. TIPS has the added benefit of

providing embedded training and performance measurement for screeners. TIPS act

as a motivator to screeners, as well as reducing monotonly, but it must be technically well-executed to prevent non-threat-related artifacts from cuing the screener

that a TIPS image is being displayed. HFE tells us that these three aspects of performance trade off against each other. In any given system, fewer missed threats

are accompanied by more false alarms (e.g., National Research Council, 2007, p. 25;

McCarley et al., 2004). Also there is a Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off in that fewer

threats are detected if insufficient time is devoted to the inspection of each person

or item (Drury, Ghylin and Holness, 2006). Mathematical relationships can be used

to model these trade-offs (Drury, Ghylin and Schwaninger, 2007), so that we can

deploy security systems to meet specific needs. The interaction between the screener

and the technology is not the only application of HFE to security systems: passengers too interact with the system. Obvious examples are queuing at airports,

where the screening delays turn into passenger dissatisfaction (Marin, Drury, Batta

& Lin, 2008), and HFE input into helping novice passengers deal with the complexities of required tasks in a timely manner.

To integrate HFE into design of future technological systems for aviation security,

successful design techniques from other domains can be used. HFE has been successfully applied to the design of most military systems, to civil aircraft cockpits and

to chemical and nuclear facility control rooms. The issue in all of these, as in aviation security, is to use data on human behavior to blend the automation and human

components of a system so that human and automation each do what they do best.

This is known as Allocation of Function (e.g., Hollnagel and Bye, 2000; Lee and

Moray, 1992) and has been applied to inspection tasks previously (Hou, Lin and

Drury, 1993)

The first step is to recognize that humans will be present in all security systems.

The traveling public is no more trusting of completely automated security systems

than they are of unmanned airliner cockpits. The issue is not whether we can eliminate the human, but how best to use the human who will be there. An example is

the in-line checked baggage inspection systems at many airports. The technology is

based on 3–D scanning of each bag to build a 3–D image of the bag. Automation

is used to locate areas of potential threat (e.g., atomic numbers associated with explosives) within the whole bag, i.e. a search function. The bag image with the potential threat area highlighted is displayed to the operator who then has the decision

function of choosing to pass the bag as ‘‘no threat’’ or mark it for further screening,

typically hand search (which is itself not error free). This allocation of functions between the automation (search) and the human (decision) capitalizes on known

strengths and limitations of humans in inspection (Hou, Lin and Drury, 1993). For

humans the search function is consistently quite error-prone, while the decision

function (with suitable training and aiding) can be reliable (Drury and Spencer,

1997). Overall, automation provides the ability to take rapid and consistent action

within strict rules, while humans provide the flexibility to respond when the rules

do not apply (e.g., Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens, 2000).

Having decided what roles humans and automation should play in each future

system, the next steps involve designing specifically for the human. This means

working from the human outwards rather than the technology inwards. It means

devising the interfaces between the human operator and the technology, identifying

the training (and retraining) required for top performance, and designing the interfaces between the front-line operator (e.g., screener) and others in the system (e.g.,

other front-line personnel, supervisors, law enforcement officers, etc.). Interface design uses standard HFE methods with data and models of human functioning (from

sensory and cognitive capabilities to physical size and strength) and applies it to design of the physical interface and computer software (Wickens et al., 2002). ApplicaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
31

tions range from comfortable seating and sightlines (e.g., for X-ray screeners) to

human computer interaction (e.g., display and response logic for body scans or

checked baggage inspection) using standard texts, e.g., Helander, Landauer, &

Prabhu (1997). Training design can be based on well-known adult learning techniques. Design of human—human interaction can use techniques from either Crew

Resource Management (CRM) or socio-technical systems design (STS) as found in

Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm (1999) and Taylor and Felten (1993) respectively.

Many comprehensive systems exist for including the human in the design of complex systems, e.g., Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente, 1999) and even earlier in Systems Analysis (Singleton, 1974). All of these methods will help eliminate errors in

the final human-machine system.

Currently TSA has HFE professional expertise at the Transportation Security

Laboratory, although none of these professionals are currently listed as members of

the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. They have worked with researchers

and manufacturers on short-term improvements to the interfaces as well as on

longer-term research studies such as developing selection procedures, socio-technical

systems design of the whole security checkpoint and human problems in container

security. They have also funded some more fundamental studies applying cognitive

science to security modeling, including a one-year grant to me at UB:SUNY as listed

in my disclosure letter to the committee. Could more be done? Most certainly. There

are new ideas where HFE expertise can be incorporated early in the design process.

A recent example is data fusion, that involves humans as one of the many sensors

whose data is fused to enhance decision-making, (e.g., NRC, 2007). Most manufacturers and researchers still see the physics and chemistry of detection as central,

with design for the human in the system limited to training design and design of

the computer screens and response keys. The last time I visited a manufacturer (for

the NRC Committee) was several years ago but there was no evidence of using HFE

professional expertise in systems design. Without early involvement of HFE, the

human in the system may not make optimum decisions, and by then only small

changes can be made to the system at evaluation time. This does not ensure that

risk and passenger delays have been minimized.

How can we measure the effectiveness of HFE design in security equipment? This

is important to ensure that we are indeed designing the systems optimally. Two alternatives are possible: examining the equipment for evidence that HFE has been

used in its design, and/or evaluating the complete system (equipment plus human)

and analyzing its performance and errors. Both have been used successfully. A design checklist can be rather simplistic for complex equipment embedded in operational systems, but the design procedures can also be reviewed to see how the

deasign team took HFE into account. The TSL has used such a checklist to assist

machinery designers in applying HFE to their products. The current, and recommended, method is to evaluate the performance of the complete system in as

close as possible to real use conditions. Here we can measure the errors and performance times and also observe and interview users. This evaluation gives a figure

of merit for the system (misses, false alarms, delays) and uses behavioral observation and structured interviews to examine the locus of any performance deficits.

Overall, there is no down-side to using HFE in design of security systems. Without it, predictable performance lapses occur, leading to increased risk and passenger

delays. The additional cost of incorporating HFE has been found in aviation and

military domains to be low.

References

Drury, C.G., 1994, Function allocation in manufacturing. In S.A. Robertson (ed),

Contemporary Ergonomics 1994 (London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd), 2–16.

Drury, C.G., Spencer, F.W. (1997). Measuring human reliability in aircraft inspection. Proceedings of the 13th Triennial Congress of the International Ergonomics

Association ’97, Tampere, Finland, Vol. 3, 34–35.

Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Holness, K. (2006) Error analysis and threat magnitude for carry-on bag inspection. Proceedings of the Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting—2006, 1189–1193.

Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Schwaninger, A. (2007) Large-Scale Validation of a Security Inspection Model, Contemporary Ergonomics 2007, Taylor & Francis,

London.

Helander, M., Landauer, T. & Prabhu P. (1997) Handbook of Human-Computer

Interaction (2nd Edition) Amsterdam, North Holland.

Helmreich, R.L., Merritt, A.C., & Wilhelm, J.A. (1999). The evolution of Crew Resource Management training in commercial aviation. International Journal of

Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19–32.

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Hollnagel, E., and Bye, A. (2000). Principles for Modeling Function Allocation. Int.

J. Human-Computer Studies. Vol. 52, pp. 253–265.

Hou, T.-S., Lin, L. and Drury, C.G. (1993). An Empirical Study of Hybrid Inspection

Systems and Allocation of Inspection Function. International Journal of Human

Factors in Manufacturing, 3, 351–367.

Lee, J. and Moray, N. (1992). Trust, control strategies and allocation of function in

human machine systems. Ergonomics 35(10), 1234–1270.

Marin, C.C. Drury, C.G., Batta, R. and Lin, L. (2007) Server Adaptation in an Airport security System Queue. OR Insight, 20.4, 22–31.

McCarley, J.S., Kramer, A.F., Wickens,C.D., Vidoni, E.D. & Boot, W.R. (2004) Visual

Skills in Airport Security Screening. Psychological Science, 15(5), 302–306.

National Research Council (2007) Fusion Of Security System Data To Improve Airport Security, The National Academies Press, DC.

Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T.B. and Wickens, C.D. (2000). A model for types and

levels of human interaction with automation. IEEE Transactions on Systems,

Man and Cybernetics—Part A: Systems and Humans, Vol. 30 (3), May 2000.

Singleton, W.T. (1974) Man-Machine Systems (Penguin, UK).

Taylor, J.C. and Felten, D.F. (1992) Performance by Design, Prentice Hall.

Wickens, Lee, Liu and Gordon-Becker (2002) Introduction to Human Factors Engineering (2nd Edition), Prentice-Hall, NJ.

BIOGRAPHY FOR COLIN G. DRURY

PROFESSIONAL PREPARATION

University of Birmingham, Ph.D., Engineering Production specializing in

Ergonomics, 1968

University of Sheffield, B.S., Honors Physics, 1962

APPOINTMENTS

2007–present—SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo, SUNY.

2002–2007—UB Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo, SUNY.

1979–2002—Professor of Industrial Engineering, University at Buffalo, SUNY.

1976–1979—Associate Professor of Industrial Engineering, SUNY–Buffalo.

1972–1976—Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering, SUNY–Buffalo.

1968–1972—Manager of Ergonomics, Pilkington Brothers Ltd., St. Helens, England.

1967–1968—Visiting Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering, UMass at Amherst.

1962–1964—Research Engineer, Motor Industry Research Association, Nuneaton,

England.

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES and MAJOR AWARDS

Colin Drury has been actively researching inspection tasks since the 1970s, for

which he was awarded the Bartlett Medal of the Ergonomics Society in 1981. In the

1980s he started applying this to aircraft safety inspection through a series of FAA

grants, resulting in successful Best Practices Guides to several Non-Destructive Inspection techniques used in aviation. For this work he was awarded the FAA’s Excellence in Aviation Research Award in 2005, and the Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society’s A.R. Lauer Award in 2005. In the 1990s he applied this to security inspection with contracts from the Air Transport Association and Atlanta’s

Hartsfield Airport. He has served on several NRC/NAS committees and panels on

aviation security technology, during which he has studied the security systems at

many airports in USA and Europe. For this work with TSA and FAA he was awarded the American Association of Engineering Societies’ Kenneth Andrew Roe Award

in 2006. He is currently a member of INTERTAG, the international human factors

coordinating group on aviation security. In 2003 he was awarded a TSA grant to

form the Research Institute on Safety and Security in Transportation (RISST) at

University at Buffalo. In 2008 he was elected as Honorary Fellow in The

Ergonomics Society, UK.

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PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (OUT OF OVER 300)

(i) PUBLICATIONS MOST RELATED TO TESTIMONY

1. Marin, C.C. Drury, C.G., Batta, R. and Lin, L. (2007) Server Adaptation in an

Airport security System Queue. OR Insight, 20.4 22–31.

2. Drury, C.G. (2001). A unified model of human security inspection. Proceedings

of Third International Aviation Security Technology Symposium, Atlantic City,

NJ, 27–30.

3. Drury, C.G., Hsiao, Y-L., Joseph, C., Joshi, S., Lapp, J. and Pennathur, P.R.

(2008) Posture and performance: sitting vs. standing for security screening,

Ergonomics, 51.3, 290–307.

4. Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Holness, K. (2006) Error analysis and threat magnitude for carry-on bag inspection. Proceedings of the Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting—2006, 1189–1193.

5. Ghylin, K.M., Drury, C.G., Batta, R and Lin, L. (2007) Temporal Effects in a

Security Inspection Task: Breakdown of Performance Components Proceedings

of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Societ 51sty Annual Meeting—2007, 93–

97.

6. Drury, C.G., Ghylin, K.M. & Schwaninger, A. (2007) Large-Scale Validation of

a Security Inspection Model, Contemporary Ergonomics 2007, Taylor & Francis,

London.

7. Ghylin, K.M., Drury, C.G., & Schwaninger, A. (2006). Two-component Model of

Security Inspection: Application and Findings. Proceedings of the 16th World

Congress of the International Ergonomics Association, 2006.

8. Panjawani and Drury, C.G. (2003). Effective interventions in rare event inspection. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 47th Annual

Meeting, 2003, 41–45.

9. Drury, C.G., Saran, M. and Schultz, J. (2004) Temporal Effects in Aircraft Inspection: What Price Vigilance Research? Proceedings of the Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society 48th Annual Meeting—2004, 113–117.

10. Drury, C.G. (2001). Human Factors and Automation in Test and Inspection, In

G. Salvendy, Handbook of Industrial Engineering, Third Edition, Chapter 71,

John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1887–1920.

11. Hong, S.-K. and Drury, C.G. (2002). Sensitivity and validity of visual search

models for multiple targets. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomic Science, 1–26.

12. Drury, C.G., Green, B.D., Chen, J. & Henry, E.L. (2006) Sleep, sleepiness, fatigue, and vigilance in a day and night inspection task, Proceedings of the

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th Annual Meeting—2006, 66–70.

(ii) OTHER SIGNIFICANT PUBLICATIONS

1. Karwan, M., Morowski, T.B. and Drury, C.G. (1995). Optimum Speed of Visual

Inspection Using a Systematic Search Strategy. IIE Transactions, 27, 291–299.

2. Hou, T.-S., Lin, L. and Drury, C.G. (1993). An Empirical Study of Hybrid Inspection Systems and Allocation of Inspection Function. International Journal

of Human Factors in Manufacturing, 3, 351–367.

3. Baveja, A., Drury, C.G., Marwan, M.H. and Malon, D.M. (1996). Derivation and

Test of an Optimum Overlapping-Lobes Model of Visual Search. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics—Part A: Systems and Humans, 26(1),

161–168.

4. Drury, C.G. (1997). Ergonomics and the quality movement (The Ergonomics Society 1996 Lecture). Ergonomics, 40(3), 249–264.

5. Mazumder, S., Drury, C.G. and Helander, M. (1997). Binocular Rivalry as Aid

in visual search–r—95/539A, Human Factors, 39(4), 642–650.

6. Drury, C.G. (2001). Inspection. In W. Karwowski, (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors, Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1249–1253.

7. Drury, C.G. (2001). Human Factors and Total Quality Management. In W.

Karwowski, (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors, Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1246–1248.

8. Drury, C.G. (2005). Inspecting, Checking and Auditing, particularly of Human

Factors. In G. Salvendy (ed.), Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics, J.

Wiley & Sons, Inc., NJ.

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9. Drury, C.G. (1992). Design for Inspectability. In M.H. Helander and M.

Nagamachi (ed), Design for Manufacturability: A Systems Approach to Concurrent Engineering and Ergonomics. Taylor & Francis, Ltd., London.

10. Drury, C.G. (2003). Service Quality and Human Factors. AI and Society, 17(2),

78–96.

11. Drury, C.G. (1985). Stress and Quality Control Inspection. Chapter 7 of Job

Stress and Blue Collar Work. C.L. Cooper and M.J. Smith (Eds.) John Wiley,

Chichester, UK.

12. Human Reliability in Quality Control. (1975) C.G. Drury and J.G. Fox (Eds.),

Taylor & Francis, London.

13. Drury, C.G. (2000). Global Quality: linking ergonomics and production. International Journal of Production Research, 38(17), 4007–4018.

SERVICE ON NATIONAL RESEACH AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES

1. National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council

• Human Factors Committee, member, 1997–2004

• Panel on Musculo-Skeletal Disorders, co-chair, 1998

• Workshop on Work-related Musculoskeletal injuries: The research base, 1998,

co-chair of the steering committee

• Panel on Musculoskeletal Disorders and the Workplace: Low Back and Upper

Extremities, member 1999–2001

• Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, member 1992–1996

• Committee on Evalauation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, member 2000–2002

• Committee on Monitoring at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, member 2004–2005

• Committee on Deployment of New Technology for Aviation Security, member,

1999–2004

• Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies in Transportation, member, 2004–

• Committee Continuing Operations at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, member 2006–

2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Chair, Science and Technology

Working Group (STWG), 2000–2004

3. Transportation Security Administration, Scientific Advisory Panel, 2004–2005.

4. Federal Aviation Administration Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC), member 2002–2007, Chair Human Factors Committee,

2003–2004.

5. International Aviation Security Human Factors Technical Advisory Group

(InterTAG), member, 2004–

DISCUSSION

Chairman WU. Thank you very much. At this point, we will open

our first round of questions, and the Chair recognizes himself for

five minutes.

It is not that we don’t have better things to do, but we do fly a

lot. We Members of Congress do fly a lot, and we, at times, well,

we speculate about all sorts of things. And after September 11, one

of the things we speculated about is if you were to bring down an

airplane, how would you do it? And top of the list for those of us

in the Oregon delegation was a flammable liquid. That was in the

fall of 2001 or the winter of 2002, and yet my recollection is that

restrictions on liquids or the focus on liquids didn’t occur until

much more recently.

Now, you all are responsible for implementation and for research.

We Members of Congress are not scientists. We are not reputed to

35

be very smart, but how come we were thinking about something

that TSA didn’t start looking for until much later, and was research being done in this field prior to the implementation of limitations on liquids on board airplanes? Dr. Hallowell, Mr. Tsao,

would you care to handle that first?

Dr. HALLOWELL. Well, first off, I believe the FAA prohibits handling flammable liquids on aircraft, and I know this because they

took a whole bunch of rum from me coming back from an island.

Chairman WU. Well, I know the FAA prohibits that, but there

was no method of—there was not an active search or prohibition—

I mean, the prohibition might have been in place but I believe until

relatively recently you could take a large bottle of something,

whether it is rum or water, on board an airplane. When did the

ban go into place where it was actually looked for by the TSA?

Mr. TSAO. We actually implemented the ban on August 10th of

2006.

Chairman WU. So that is a four and one-half year window——

Mr. TSAO. Yes, sir.

Chairman WU.—from September 11 to the ban.

Mr. TSAO. Yes, sir.

Chairman WU. Did folks think that that might be a threat?

Mr. TSAO. We did look at, and some of that predated my time

at the agency, but we did look at the various threats to civil aviation and the threats of—whenever we look at risk, we really look

at three components of risk. One, what is the threat stream? Is

there an adversary interested in this? What is the adversary’s ability to carry that out? Two, what is the consequence? What will happen if the adversary, and three, what is the inherent vulnerability

of the system? So I think when you start looking at those factors,

the threat of a flammable liquid taking down an aircraft is relatively low compared to other threats at the time. During August

of 2006, it was determined that there was a new threat using a liquid explosive which was judged to be powerful enough to cause catastrophic damage.

Chairman WU. Forgive me, Mr. Tsao, if I am, you know, imagining things that can’t happen, but it was another Member of our

delegation, one much more senior—who is much more senior than

I and with substantial aviation experience. The methodology would

just be to take a bottle of gasoline, run down the aisle, and have

one person behind you ignite the stream and the consequences

would be pretty dire.

Mr. TSAO. Relative to other threats we are facing, sir. We believe

that is a lower threat.

Dr. OXLEY. Chairman, may I say something?

Chairman WU. Please.

Dr. OXLEY. The difference between a deflagration, a burn, and a

detonation is huge.

Chairman WU. Yes.

Dr. OXLEY. And I think that is what Mr. Tsao is telling you, that

relatively speaking, the detonation threat that came in late 2006,

the summer of 2006, was substantial.

Chairman WU. But if you have a burning cabin, I mean, that is

a bit of a concern in an airplane, isn’t it?

36

Dr. OXLEY. Certainly, and there is a whole group I have run into

in—I don’t know if they are FAA or TSA—that is looking at protecting aircraft from fire.

Chairman WU. Well, you know, the point of the question is not

what has happened in the past. The point of the question is are

you properly identifying threats for the future?

Mr. TSAO. We believe so. Again sir, take three parts of our methodology. What are the adversaries looking at, what are the inherent vulnerabilities to the system, and what are the potential consequences, primary and secondary?

Dr. OXLEY. And I wanted to add that prior to the overt ban on

liquids, our lab was already doing research because we had been

asked by a federal agency to do so. So this was not a surprise that

these liquids were a possibility. It was just a prioritization. If everything is looked at once, you miss the high priority items.

Chairman WU. I understand, at least among the Oregon delegation, the flammable liquid scenario is our number one, and we

found it rather curious that that was not on other folks’ list. Dr.

Oxley, what you had to say is the most comforting thing that I

have heard thus far.

I recognize the Member from California for five minutes—Nebraska. My apologies. It is California without an ocean.

Mr. SMITH. I will get back to you on that.

Chairman WU. California with a football team.

Mr. SMITH. Needing a little extra work there. But thank you,

Chairman Wu, and witnesses.

Again, I am not an expert. You are. I guess if routine or repetition makes us experts, some of us could be in terms of airline security.

I think Dr. Drury you might be best to respond to this, but how

do you decide, you know, what the threshold is for a discretionary

decision as someone is—as a TSA worker—is going through a check

point?

Dr. DRURY. The rules are fairly clearly written by this TSA and

TSL. But the point about having the human in there is that they

make fairly routine decisions pretty well. The better you can organize it so that they are doing what is called rule-based work so

they follow a set of rules, just as in landing an airliner. You have

a set of rules, a rule-based decision system. So you have a pilot in

there who can look for things that aren’t covered by the rules, look

for the unusual things. The person who found explosives coming

over the border into Washington State, for example, customs agent,

security agent there, this was a beautiful piece of human following

things that weren’t directly part of the thing you have to do every

time. So humans have two functions, one is to follow a set of rules

where those rules apply, and they do that reasonably well. They

don’t do it perfectly but neither do machines. And the other one is

to bring their unique human capabilities into there of reasoning it

out so it is not a rule-based decision. It is called a knowledge-based

decision where you work things out from first principles. Yes, this

looks suspicious. I will do this.

Mr. SMITH. So there is—I mean, I don’t expect a quick formula

necessarily, but I am curious as to how or what the approach is.

Sometimes what would appear to be common sense to me doesn’t

37

appear to be common sense as I go through a checkpoint at an airport. And I am just using my own anecdotal experience from repetition. But can you explain how perhaps they eliminate some of those

decisions?

Dr. DRURY. Many of them are rules they have to follow. For example, when they check on your ticket and so on. So there are

strict rules they have to follow here. And at the checkpoint, they

have got higher levels of authority. They can pass things up, too,

if needed. So they are not entirely on their own. But they are the

first people who can trigger a response. So if they trigger a response, the system can move ahead. If they don’t trigger a response, it doesn’t. So in some ways it is reasonably optimum for

them to make some false alarms to make sure that they have got,

they have covered the things that are unusual.

Mr. SMITH. For example, and I hate to get hung up on details

here, but a container that its ultimate capacity exceeded the restriction but its obvious contents are far below the limits and yet

the whole line is stopped, the passenger is asked how much exactly

or letting them know that it is going to go in the trash or whatever

the case is. I mean, to me that could be avoided. Am I missing

something?

Dr. DRURY. No, I have had exactly the same thing where I was

carrying a small amount of liquid in a larger container and they

were following rules. You know, their first line of defense is to follow the rules, and if you look at the consequences for not following

them, you can see why people might wish to follow them because

they could be checked up on easily and somebody could say—you

or I could be a person going through testing them and saying do

they follow the rules. So in this case, they wouldn’t. Does it make

sense on every occasion? I don’t think so, but the question is which

error do you want to make? And I think the error of potential inconvenience of passengers as I was and presumably you were is

probably less than letting something through that could be construed as a threat.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Tsao, if you wouldn’t mind elaborating perhaps on how the rules are made? And also, would someone with more seniority or more authority be able to just automatically pass over something such as that? Maybe if you could speak

to uniformity as well?

Mr. TSAO. Certainly. I think one of the real difficulties for our

screening workforce is again the number of people we see in any

given day, two million passengers a day going through various different types—coming with very different travel patterns, you know,

whatever they are coming through. It is difficult for us to train for

every single opportunity or exception that may occur. And so giving

the screeners leeway which we are leaning towards is very difficult

to train. We are moving toward a system where instead of being

a rules-based system, you focus more on your interaction with the

passenger. But again, that is very complicated for us to initiate and

we are just starting that. But it really comes down to volume. You

may have two ounces of water in a 16-ounce bottle, we will let you

through, but does that mean the next 400 people in line do the

same thing? So it becomes a process where you have got to draw

the line somewhere. And then unfortunately the next time you will

38

know, don’t come with a 16-ounce bottle with only two ounces of

liquid in it. That is the only way we can keep the lines moving. It

is the only way we can have a consistency of product.

Mr. SMITH. And so you would argue then that they actually end

up doing it faster? And I will accept that. That does make—— Mr. TSAO. In the long run, yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH.—sense.

Mr. TSAO. Again, if you have too many exceptions, you know,

every time you have got to call over a supervisor to answer certain

things, is it worthwhile for the traveling public? Is it worthwhile

on a security basis to again start making exceptions to every possible scenario that can go through?

Mr. SMITH. Is it conceivable that the smaller the number of passengers through a checkpoint on a given day, the stricter the scenarios seem to be?

Mr. TSAO. Again, sir, the screeners and the screening supervisors

are instructed to follow a set of standard operating procedures.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WU. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska and recognize the gentlelady from California.

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To my colleague

there from Nebraska, being a graduate of both UCLA and USC, I

would say they neither have the coast, football or a basketball

team. They need a little help coming from the west side. We are

going to get a gingerly game going here.

I have three questions, and if you could be as brief as possible

because they are going to call votes in a moment. Dr. Hallowell, in

your written testimony, you note that funding for aviation security

R&D for explosives detection has not increased in real dollars since

1996. What budget would you have requested, why, and how would

you use it?

Dr. HALLOWELL. Yes, ma’am. I think I would have been inclined

to ask for budgets that were very similar to what we received in

2004, 2005 timeframe in that there are still daunting R&D issues

that we really haven’t attacked properly. And here I am thinking

screening of cargo which certainly is looming on the horizon and

a few other technological breakthroughs that we need to pursue to

have some technology enablers to look at other things such as

checkpoints that are more user friendly and more integrated and

faster as well.

Ms. RICHARDSON. Would you supply this Committee in the future

that information?

Dr. HALLOWELL. Yes, ma’am, I will take that for the record.

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Thank you. My second question is what

is the status of the frequent traveler program? I heard a little bit

about it six months to a year ago where if people who fly on a regular basis, they would get a certain kind of ID card and it was

being used, piloted at a few of the locations. What is the status of

implementing that program?

Mr. TSAO. Yes, ma’am. I believe you are referring to the registered traveler program?

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. TSAO. That program is basically a private-sector program. It

is run by a coalition of private-sector interests which we interact

39

with. I am not the expert on that program. I can tell you it is out

of the pilot stage and it is being broadly used at some of the airports. We have been asked to evaluate some of the technology that

they have used, but I am really not qualified to answer any of the

programmatic questions.

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Could you supply this Committee with

the information—— Mr. TSAO. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. RICHARDSON.—of who is doing the program how the results

are?

Mr. TSAO. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. RICHARDSON. And then my third and final question which I

think is to you, Mr. Tsao, how many TSA employees would you say,

a percentage, are non-U.S. born and how do you recruit?

Mr. TSAO. I am afraid I am going to have to get back to you on

both of those questions, ma’am. I don’t know specifically any of the

statistics.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I realize that the Oklahoma City bombing that

occurred was a domestic issue. One of the things I oftentimes get

in the airport of people who notice how many people are not U.S.-

born who are working as TSA employees. And so I am just curious

what the percentage is and what you do to recruit for everyone. So

I look forward to that information as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I hit my deadline in enough time for

the gentleman from Nebraska to tease me again.

Chairman WU. We will do a quick round. Those bells, horns,

whistles, et cetera, you hear in the background are calling us to

votes, and it will be a lengthy series of votes. So it is my intention

to permit all Members who wish to do so to ask one further round

of questions and then to adjourn the hearing.

And I have only one question, and this is for the entire panel and

this is about research priorities. You know, my understanding is

that the TSL priorities are set by DHS S&T Directorate which is

supposed to look to its customer components, specifically TSA. How

do you integrate research priorities from other sources such as the

Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee

and industry stakeholders, and also, since IPTs focus on short-term

technology development priorities, how do you determine priorities

for long-term and more basic research? And I look forward to commentary from folks outside of TSL and TSA also.

Dr. HALLOWELL. Yes, sir. I think right now the research priorities are being driven by the capstone integrated product teams

Under Secretary Cohen has set up. He has a number of capstone

integrated product teams, certainly the one, government explosives

detection, is chaired by Administrator Polly and also has other sitting Members as well. The purpose of that capstone team is to

identify gaps that need to be addressed in terms of what the customer needs. It is the role and responsibility of the Science and

Technology Directorate to turn those gaps into an idea of what

kind of research, enabling research, needs to be conducted to start

identifying the R&D needs. So prioritization is made within S&T.

The capstone process has just really initiated this year, and I believe it has been fairly successful. The point is the integrated product team is not just a two-year initiative. This was actually driving

40

R&D that goes out far into the future. Adam, would you like to

comment as well?

Mr. TSAO. Yes, sir. I think the community is really starting to

come together, and quiet honestly, it has been sparked by Admiral

Cohen’s institution of IPT’s. Last year was the very first year for

that, and I think we have learned a lot about who we are and who

has expertise within DHS and outside of DHS. And that community is coming together through this process.

Chairman WU. Doctors Oxley or Drury, would either of you care

to comment on the setting of priorities and the balance between

short-term and long-term research?

Dr. OXLEY. I certainly hope that that is something that we will

accomplish in setting up our new center which has been announced

but not officially awarded yet. It is something we are having constant discussion on and reaching out to the entire community of

folks, not just the university people so that we are in touch with

that.

I think to counteract terrorist bombings and IED’s, it is going to

take a multi-prong approach. It is not simply protection, it is prebomb making and it is post-bomb making. So it is hardening. And

all of those issues are addressed at various places, and we hope to

pull them together.

Dr. DRURY. Purely from a human factors engineering point of

view, there has been considerable work done but focused largely on

the screening process. There are a lot of other areas where this

work needs doing on a more developmental, short-term basis. I

think there is a lot more work that needs doing on a long-term

basis of how people make decisions under stress effectively and

how you can support them in doing that.

Chairman WU. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Nebraska?

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tsao, if you wouldn’t

mind, how does TSA determine aviation security strategy and

equipment requirements? Do you consult with the technical expertise at TSL in order to do so? And furthermore, how does science

and technology adjust its R&D efforts to reflect the equipment requirements from TSA?

Mr. TSAO. Thank you, sir. We absolutely discuss—we have a very

open dialogue with TSL. Again, we set the requirements. We know

what the threat streams are, we know what the vulnerabilities are,

we know what our screeners need. We are understanding our passengers I think better than we have in the past. So it is incumbent

upon us to set the tone on where research and development, both

short-term and long-term, need to go.

As far as how we determine the technologies, often something

will come through the door. It looks promising. TSL, will you look

at it? Does it do what it say it is going to do? They will test it. Yes,

it does what it says it is going to do. Okay. We will look at it. If

it can do what it says it can do, how can we use it? All right. Now,

this is how we are going to use it. Will using it in this manner

meet our operational needs? They will go back and a look and say

yes, in this manner it will detect with a certain probability of detection, a certain false alarm. We will go back and then we may—

ased on that laboratory results we may start a pilot and it may

41

turn out that in the airport environment, you know, this brand-new

widget cannot handle the volume of people we need to put through

it. Or in some cases there are a lot of very promising technologies

where the timetables are just too long. I mean, we really need to

average any process we have. It can’t really go beyond 15 or 20 seconds, otherwise you start significantly, you know, jamming up our

checkpoints which causes additional security problems.

So there are things that may be useful but they need to get

themselves engineered to the point where they meet our operations. If all that occurs and we find something that meets our detection needs, meets our operational needs, we know it is not going

to break down. We know that the screeners are going to be able

to use it. We deploy that stuff fairly quickly. I think one example

you might see, in the work we had done with the lab, is the procurement of the FIDO Paxpoint. This was a piece of equipment

that was really in a rack looking for bombs. We were able to modify

it to look for the emerging homemade explosive threat. We did

that, made a procurement, had it on the street in less than six

months. So I mean, we are really trying to be more, I should say,

adaptive as the threats come in.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Hallowell, in your testimony

you state that the independent tests and evaluation group and research and development group ‘‘set their priorities using different

methodologies’’. How do you see these methodologies varying and

how would their priorities compare with those laid out by TSA?

Dr. HALLOWELL. Well, there are two different teams of my people

in my laboratory. The independent test and evaluation team really

does the kinds of tests and evaluations that directly support activities planned by TSA for piloting or deployment. So that particular

team works very, very closely with Mr. Tsao and his group to determining their priorities. And this happens every day. Priorities

will change based upon what their interests are and what the

threat level is in Intel and things like that. So far we have been

actually able to test almost everything I believe he asked us to do

and get it done on a fairly timely basis.

The other team, the R&D team, actually is doing different things

for a living. They are looking at technology at various technology

readiness levels. So it could be like a breadboard or a prototype,

and those things typically come out of R&D land, although we do

have a pretty active program where we work directly with industry

under cooperative research and development agreements to help

mature technology.

So if you work for a company, you think you have a solution that

can find a bomb, what I say to you is please bring it to my laboratory and let us shake it down. And the way we shake it down is

of course we have every flavor explosive and we can evaluate it understanding well what our customer needs are so we can advise

companies as to how to grow their technology to get closer to the

requirements of the customer.

So that is more of an R&D kind of look-see, how are you doing,

what can you do, what can you not do, and what are the opportunities for improvement.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

42

Chairman WU. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California?

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Tsao, in your testimony you said that

talking about the standard and your turning around products, in

your testimony you say that TSA develops and identifies the requirements that must be met for procurement to proceed. We have

heard from aviation security industry stakeholders, however, that

testing new technologies sometimes suffers because new and

emerging technologies are tested against old standards of performance. What is TSA doing to update those standards in light of new

technologies, and what support does TSL provide to this process?

And finally, how do you engage in the private sector when setting

performance standards for these newer technologies?

Mr. TSAO. Yes, ma’am. I guess it all goes to what our current capabilities are and what the needs are. If we are talking about a

new technology competing with the old technology, that new technology has to do at least what that old technology does. So there

is very little we can do about or we would be interested in doing

in degredating those standards.

However, if there are situations again where our capabilities are

not where they are supposed to be and we see a new technology,

we are very flexible in the sense that it gives us a chance. If you

have something that gives us a chance, you know, I am not going

to hold it to a standard that is not reachable in the short-term.

That just doesn’t make any sense from a risk standpoint.

Now, we would expect that over time you would be able to get

to, you know, develop and again provide more capabilities, but we

are in a very adaptive world and I need to be as adaptive as possible.

Dr. HALLOWELL. Yes, ma’am. I would just like to add to that that

often TSA does come to us, and they are interested in the technology and they ask us what is the art of the possible? Right now

we are involved in doing a market survey and also just evaluating

technology for a product line that the CTO is very interested in. So

we do an evaluation of what is available and advise them so they

have a heads up. It is a little bit more than just detection, but we

do look at emerging technology to help TSA.

Chairman WU. I thank the gentlelady, and before we bring the

hearing to a close, I want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying before the Committee today. The record will remain open for

additional statements from Members and for answers to any followup questions that Members of the Committee staff may ask of the

witnesses. I thank you all for making the journey for your presence

today, and despite whatever our discussions have been through this

process, I actually feel better about going to the airport the next

time I will be going. Thank you very much for being here today.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(43)

Appendix:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

44

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Susan Hallowell, Director, Transportation Security Laboratory, Science

and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

Q1. In your written testimony, you said that funding for aviation security R&D for

explosives detection has not increased in real dollars since 1996.

How has the lack of investment affected aviation security generally?

A1. Aviation security is continually improving with the introduction of new homeland security technologies. For example, in April, the Department announced checkpoint technology improvements that will further strengthen aviation security while

decreasing the hassle factor for travelers. The S&T Directorate’s work in transportation security R&D will lead to the next generation of passenger screening. This

includes stand-off detection of explosives, detecting suicide bombers, improving the

capabilities of canine explosives detection teams and creating the next-generation

passenger checkpoint. Investment in this and other aviation security R&D is based

on priorities identified by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the

Administration, as supported by Congress.

Performers carrying out aviation security R&D include the S&T Directorate’s

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) as well as universities, national laboratories and industry.

Q2. What projects have been delayed or canceled because of a lack of funding?

A2. The S&T Directorate’s investment in R&D related to aviation security includes

a broad range of activities across the S&T Directorate. Several projects address priorities identified by TSA through the S&T Directorate’s capstone Integrated Product

Team (IPT) process. Those priorities include:

– Technologies to screen people for explosives and weapons at fixed aviation

and mass transit checkpoints—In particular, to allow higher detection rates

with minimal disruption to passenger flow;

– System solutions for explosives detection in checked and carried bags—In

particular, automated systems to screen for conventional explosives, liquids,

weapons, and homemade explosives;

– Capability to detect homemade or novel explosives—In particular, characterizing potential homemade explosives for use in developing detection systems

for screening at checkpoints;

– Optimized canine explosive detection capability—In particular, techniques,

training tools, and methods to improve performance for all transportation

venues; and

– Technologies for screening air cargo for explosives and explosive devices—In

particular, technologies for screening break-bulk, palletized, and containerized air cargo.

Lower priority project areas that are not funded or have reduced funding include:

(a) development of containerized and palletized cargo inspection technologies, (b)

shoe scanner technology development, (c) advanced explosives detection systems for

checkpoints and checked baggage, (d) enhancing trace ‘‘puffer’’ portals, and (e) developing integrated checkpoint systems.

Q3. How will the continually decreasing investments affect aviation security as a

whole over the next five to ten years?

A3. The investment in aviation security technology is not ‘‘continually decreasing.’’

There are numerous projects across the S&T Directorate that will help ensure the

safety of passengers throughout the transportation sector. The S&T Directorate’s investment in aviation security R&D spans basic research to technology transition to

customers in a number of areas, including hostile intent, transportation security and

countering improvised explosives devices. Investment which explicitly applies to detecting and mitigating explosives on aircraft was $23.5 million in FY 2007 and $25.3

million in FY 2008. The President’s FY 2009 budget request of $42.3 million nearly

doubles that amount. The S&T Directorate plans to continue significant investment

in aviation security R&D in the out years.

Q4. You noted that TSA is responsible for setting performance requirements for technology.

45

Has TSA done an acceptable job at sharing their performance requirements for

new technology in a timely and useful manner?

A4. The process for receiving requirements from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has improved with the implementation of the S&T Directorate’s

Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. Through this process the S&T Directorate

receives requirements from TSA and designs programs that will develop products

to meet these requirements. In addition, there is frequent and open discussion between the S&T Directorate and TSA on the development of certification and qualification requirements for specific products.

Q5. What improvements are necessary in the communication between TSA and TSL?

A5. The S&T Directorate’s capstone IPT process brings leadership and staff from

TSA and TSL together to discuss research and development priorities and plans.

While the IPT process has improved communication, security requirements for the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can change rapidly given the adaptation of terrorist techniques. This makes having numerous and open lines of communication vital. Examples of ongoing efforts to improve communication with TSA include:

• The S&T Directorate has detailed several of its Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) staff to TSA. A test engineer was detailed to TSA’s Network

Management group to support cargo projects and a Human Factors subject

matter expert is about to begin a detail to TSA headquarters. This should facilitate open and frequent dialogue about TSA requirements with TSL R&D

personnel knowledgeable in the science of detection and deterrence.

• The S&T Directorate and TSA are looking for ways to exchange expertise to

provide input on available technology opportunities. The S&T Directorate’s

R&D scientists at TSL recently investigated millimeter wave technology, and

are providing an overview of the technology’s capabilities to TSA.

• The S&T Directorate plans to schedule more frequent program and technical

reviews between TSA and TSL, which should contribute to collateral pursuit

of optimal security solutions.

Q6. You describe the Transportation Security Laboratory as ‘‘committed to providing

technical and procedural solutions that work in the field.’’ Yet TSL does not

carry out field testing of technology.

How does TSL gather information on technology successes and failures after

those technologies are deployed?

A6. The Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) group at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) receives information on post-deployment performance

through regular briefings from teams conducting field performance verification testing for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as well as during S&T

Directorate Integrated Product Team (IPT) project-level IPT meetings, where deployment issues are routinely discussed.

Q7. What steps does TSL take to improve technologies after problems are identified,

and how do you test whether those problems are indeed solved?

A7. When issues arise in the field, TSA notifies the lab and TSL works with the

vendors to address problems. This often includes review of the vendor’s Engineering

Change Proposal (ECP) to, in part; determine if additional testing is required to

validate the solution. In addition, TSL maintains an operational version of a given

product, and pursues diagnoses of field issues by trying to replicate problems on

these maximally performing systems. When new threats are identified, as with the

homemade explosives threat, TSL works closely with TSA to identify capability gaps

and pursue solutions with industry and international partners.

Q8. In your testimony, you argue that the Transportation Security Laboratory

should be allowed to charge companies for certification of their products.

If TSL was authorized to charge for certification services, how much additional

lab capacity and how many additional employees would need to be created in

order to offer this service, especially given TSL’s increasing workload from TSA?

A8. If the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) was authorized to charge for

certification services, TSL would need to increase laboratory capacity and employees

over the next several years as follows:

46

a) Administration of Customer Charging. TSL estimates this would require additional personnel to perform financial management, financial analysis, customer coordination and scheduling services.

b) Infrastructure Investment. In order to accommodate the increasing need for

services, TSL would need to add (i) an Explosive Storage Facility, (ii) an

Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) Facility, (iii) a Test Article Storage

(non-explosive) Facility and, (iv)Expanded Office Space.

c) Personnel. TSL would need to add eight additional personnel to meet the

added workload, including four general/system engineers, one mathematician, one explosives specialist and two explosives handlers.

d) Operations and Maintenance. TSL would require additional Operations and

Maintenance investment to support the new facilities and added workload.

These investments would enable TSL to fulfill the inherently governmental function of maturing and certifying technology and expand testing and development to

additional customers.

Q9. How would TSL determine which products to accept for certification, and how

would you set performance requirements?

A9. The S&T Directorate’s Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) performs certification at the request of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), using

performance requirements set by TSA. As DHS develops standards for other DHS

applications (beyond transportation security), the S&T Directorate plans to certify

equipment for other applications. Vendor products that have achieved a sufficient

degree of technical readiness would be accepted on a first-come, first-served basis,

provided TSL has sufficient capacity to take on work beyond its DHS directed workload.

Q10. Would all companies be charged for testing services, or only those that approached TSL without a request from TSA?

A10. TSL does not plan to charge companies that are responding to a request from

TSA. TSL would charge companies that approached TSL without a request from

TSA. These may include, for example, international technology developers.

Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey

Q1. Frequent travelers are continuing to enroll into the Clear Traveler Program that

allows them to navigate security lines at airports more expeditiously. While

Clear is one example of how a private company can work to both keep us safe

and move us through the security screening process in a speedy manner, to what

extent does the Federal Government partner with companies such as this to stay

on the cutting edge of security screening and airport safety?

Furthermore, since this is the general direction that we are moving for aviation

security, what potential challenges will we face in terms of public/private partnerships in this realm, the storage of biometric information, and the continued

advancement in aviation security technologies?

A1. In support of a formal, systematic approach for coordinating with stakeholders

and facilitating an effective and efficient exchange of information regarding Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requirements and future deployments of

screening technology, the Industry Outreach group within the TSA Office of Security

Technology (OST) was created to formalize the communication mechanisms by

which OST, customers, and security partners exchange ideas, information, and operational expertise. Collaboration on the technology security requirements and deployment strategies leads to the successful deployment of cutting-edge, state-of-the-art

technology solutions.

In order to ensure that the TSA is increasing its efforts to strengthen the relationship with security partners, Industry Outreach regularly participates on industry

and association-sponsored panels to discuss technologies available for passenger,

baggage, and cargo screening. Currently, Industry Outreach is in the process of organizing industry roundtables where security partners will be afforded a better understanding of TSA’s vision for future technologies. Industry representatives will

also be asked to provide the OST with feedback regarding their concerns. OST understands the importance of receiving industry feedback and to that end the ‘‘Planning Guidelines and Design Standards for Checked Baggage Inspection Systems,’’

distributed in October 2007, now has an e-mail address where our industry security

partners can submit comments for consideration in the next version of the guideVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
47

lines. The OST Industry Outreach also participates with the Office of Commercial

Airports in TSA’s Office of Transportation Sector Network Management on a regular

basis. Individual airports are encouraged to contact OST Industry Outreach with

any airport specific concerns they may have. In addition, Industry Outreach also

regularly conducts site visits and attends conferences. Industry Outreach is also

supporting a new planning process for airports to apply for fiscal year (FY) 2009

and FY 2010 funding for electronic baggage screening systems.

As mentioned above, on September 11, 2007, TSA issued the ‘‘Biometrics for Access Control Qualified Products List.’’ This document is an excellent example of how

TSA is working with industry to stay on the cutting edge of biometric technology.

This qualified products list (QPL) is intended to identify biometrics devices for access control systems which have been tested and found to be in compliance with performance specifications as set forth in the Guidance Package Biometrics for Access

Control published on September 30, 2005. The testing/qualifying process is a continuous, open, and ongoing activity and is not intended to endorse one product over

a competitor’s product, and the TSA does not recommend one over another. The

QPL is established merely to provide information to airport operators on products

that have been tested and meet TSA standards, for their use in conducting source

selections and procurement actions, if needed. Users are cautioned to only rely on

the presence of a product on this list as one important but not comprehensive piece

of information in an overall airport biometric acquisition and deployment decision.

OST is currently working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to establish a process to qualify biometric testing facilities to further

update this QPL (Transition Phase), while also working with NIST and other organizations within the Department of Homeland Security, to develop an agency-wide

biometrics testing lab accreditation process. Once that process is established, testing

labs must obtain NIST Accreditation (NVLAP) in order to test devices for inclusion

on the QPL. Manufacturers may submit their devices to a NVLAP accredited lab

of their choice and the lab will submit test results to TSA for analysis and inclusion

on the QPL.

All manufacturers/vendors of biometrics for access control systems may participate in planned future testing and the QPL will be periodically updated to include

new information about existing products and additional products that qualify. Government and industry working together will ensure that the biometric systems are

effective, reliable, and secure.

The potential challenges in the storage of biometric information include privacy

protection, records retention, and the systems required to house the data. However,

only minimal data is stored on the Registered Traveler (RT) card. The card contains

only enough biometric data, stored within an applet on the card, to confirm a person’s identity when he or she travels. As a safeguard against biometric theft, fingerprints are not stored on the RT card as an image, but as biometric template data

which prevents unauthorized parties from replicating the fingerprint image.

TSA will continue to look toward partnership opportunities to assist in expediting

the security process.

Q2. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and people in its

aviation security and other modes of transportation?

A2. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) constantly advances its technology usage to stay ahead of emerging threats. We know there’s no single silver

bullet technology, no game-changing technology that will, at once, take us back to

pre-9/11 convenience. But by upgrading what we do have—our workforce and technology resources—and combining this with the other layers of security and process

innovation, we can get the security result we need, with a lot less hassle for passengers.

TSA’s layered approach to security seeks to identify and deter threats well before

they reach the Nation’s airports, railways, highways, mass transit, ports and pipelines. This risk-based security strategy relies on transportation-specific intelligence,

so TSA coordinates closely and shares information with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, the intelligence and law enforcement communities,

other government departments and agencies such as the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration, and the transportation industry.

Transportation-specific intelligence is critical to TSA’s overall risk-based security

strategy, and the products of such intelligence provide a threat framework to

prioritize limited security resources.

TSA reviewed all modes of transportation and set risk-based priorities. These priorities focus TSA’s attention and limited resources—both people and technology—

on the most critical issues. TSA has conducted or participated in various risk analyses that compare risks across different transportation modes, including the DHS

48

Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment. Surface transportation, transit,

and rail are, like aviation, high priorities for TSA. The level of funding is determined by the degree to which TSA can effectively mitigate the risks, compared to

the degree with which industry and other stakeholders can mitigate the risks.

TSA takes a network approach to transportation security and views it as a shared

responsibility and effort among all of TSA; the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS); other government agencies and entities at all levels, including federal, State,

local, tribal and territorial; and owner-operators.

Much of the Nation’s aviation infrastructure is federally owned. Surface modes of

transportation are approximately 95 percent privately owned and operated. They receive security funding support from multiple streams (i.e., State, local, private, as

well as federal). The Department has consistently stated that responsibility for surface transportation security is a shared responsibility among a variety of stakeholders, including State, local, and federal agencies, and private owners and operators. The appropriate role for the Federal Government includes: using the substantial resources already in place and providing critical information; setting national

priorities; developing transportation security fundamentals; coordinating ongoing efforts; and encouraging certain actions that reduce risk to the Nation’s transportation system.

The bulk of federal spending in aviation security has covered the compensation

and benefits of Transportation Security Officers, who work every day in more than

450 airports nationwide to ensure the skies remain secure. Aviation security allows

for point defense. We can seal off an area of the airport and only permit entry to

those with tickets who have passed through screening.

The rail and mass transit modes do not accommodate this type of approach. These

systems operate over a broad geographic spread with numerous stations and transfer points providing the efficiency and fast-pace that are essential to moving thousands of passengers, particularly during daily rush hours. The point defense approach taken at the airports is neither practicable nor desirable. Rather, an integrated strategy, tapping the strengths of the Federal Government, State and local

governments, and passenger rail and mass transit agencies, must be pursued.

In evaluating the resources required to address surface transportation risk issues,

it is important to account not just for TSA’s budget and statutory obligations in

aviation, but also the substantial efforts, capabilities and expertise that already

exist in the surface transportation environment, as well as very different operating,

legal, and resource requirements. Therefore, the level of TSA’s budget allocated to

surface transportation security relative to aviation only partially reflects the overall

relative risk between them. In fact, TSA does give attention and priority to surface

transportation, but TSA’s role relative to the security partners in the networked approach is different than it is in aviation.

The appropriate way, therefore, to determine the appropriate mix of technology

and people in aviation security and other modes of transportation, is to use the

same criteria that we use to evaluate all proposed security measures. These criteria

are based on risk management (how substantial is the risk that the measures addresses and how much does it mitigate the risk), layers of security (how does the

measure complement and enhance other existing security measures) and the needs

and constraints posed by any given mode of transportation where the measure

might be applied.

Q3. Please respond to the three questions below:

What is the technical background of employees working at TSL?

A3. The S&T Directorate’s Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) federal staff

is composed of scientists (physicists, chemists, research psychologists and mathematicians) and engineers (aerospace, mechanical, chemical and electrical), certified

project managers, explosive handler specialists, safety and security specialists and

administrative personnel.

Q4. How many of your employees have science or engineering degrees?

A4. Twenty three percent of TSL staff members have obtained doctorate degrees,

mostly in science and some in engineering, 38 percent of the staff hold Master’s degrees in science or engineering and 11 percent of the staff holds Bachelor’s degrees,

predominately in science and engineering. The rest of the staff has Associate’s degrees in a variety of areas. About 70 percent of the staff performs technical roles,

while the remainder perform program management, administrative or safety and security functions. Of the technical staff, about half support research and development

(R&D) activities and half support test and evaluation activities for the Integration,

Test and Evaluation (IT&E) and R&D groups.

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The TSL federal staff is supplemented by an equivalent number of contractors as

well. Their technical background and distribution of labor functions are similar to

the distribution of the federal staff.

Q5. Can TSL recruit qualified scientists to perform testing and evaluation without

also providing for opportunities to perform basic and applied research?

A5. The S&T Directorate successfully recruits highly qualified test engineers as

well as scientists to work at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL). Highly

qualified professionals are attracted by the range of work conducted at TSL, which

involves basic and applied research in the development of new standards and technologies. Many of these professionals are also attracted by TSL’s rich history of successful product development and technology life cycle management as well as the

international recognition TSL has received for its role in the development of standards, protocols and test articles necessary for detection technology assessments.

However, due to the length of time it takes to hire, we do loose recruits to other

jobs.

Q6. Your testimony describes how TSL uses core funding to respond to unforeseen

requests for scientific and technical advice.

How much of your budget has gone to these activities over the last five years?

A6. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the Transportation Security Laboratory’s (TSL’s) budget has been used to meet unforeseen, rapid response requests

from TSA and other customers. These requests have included rapid turnaround

analyses of developing or deployed technologies, requests for advice on technology

suitability, and requests for analysis in support of TSA’s project-level Integrated

Product Teams (for cargo, checked bag and checkpoint technologies).

Q7. Do you believe TSL is prepared to quickly respond to similar requests in the future?

A7. Yes.

Questions submitted by Representative Laura Richardson

Q1. In your written testimony you note that funding for aviation security R&D for

explosives detection has not increased in real dollars since 1996.

What budget have you requested and how would you use it?

A1. Aviation security is continually improving with the introduction of new homeland security technologies. For example, in April, the Department announced checkpoint technology improvements that will further strengthen aviation security while

decreasing the hassle factor for travelers. The S&T Directorate’s work in transportation security R&D will lead to the next generation of passenger screening. This

includes stand-off detection of explosives, detecting suicide bombers, improving the

capabilities of canine explosives detection teams and creating the next-generation

passenger checkpoint. Investment in this and other aviation security R&D is based

on priorities identified by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the

Administration, as supported by Congress.

Performers carrying out aviation security R&D include the S&T Directorate’s

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) as well as universities, national laboratories and industry.

The S&T Directorate’s FY 2009 budget request for Laboratory Facilities funding

in support of the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) is $21.55 million. This

would fund TSL operations, maintenance, employee salaries and expenses. In addition, the S&T Directorate’s budget request includes program funding that would

fund activities at TSL. A significant portion of this investment would come from the

S&T Directorate Explosives Division’s FY 2009 budget request of $96.15 million to

fund the following programs. TSL will be one of the performers carrying out this

work.

– Homemade Explosives (HMEs) Program—Investigates all potential detection

technologies capable of detecting and distinguishing explosives and flammable liquids from benign liquids (e.g., drinks, hygiene products and contact

lens solutions).

– Cargo Program—Develops advanced air-cargo screening systems and improves canine detection capabilities.

– Check Point Program—Develops advanced capabilities to detect explosives

and concealed weapons, including small Improvised Explosives Devices

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(IEDs) or HMEs, which terrorists could use in the hostile takeover of mass

transit.

– Manhattan II Program—Initiates cost performance tradeoff studies to provide

TSA better information upon which to acquire the ‘‘best performance and affordability’’ screening systems.

– Conveyance Protection Program—Assesses risks and mitigates consequences

of intentional assault on air, surface and marine vehicles.

– Explosives Research Program—Improves explosives detection capabilities by

performing multi-disciplinary research and development in imaging, particle

physics, chemistry, and algorithms. These result in the development of enhanced detection capabilities and lead to next-generation detection systems.

– Deter Program—Conducts social and behavioral sciences research to identify

actionable indicators and warnings of IED threats posed by individuals and

groups in the United States.

– Predict Program—Develops technologies to secure U.S. borders that will automatically identify, alert on, and track suspicious behaviors that precede a suicide bombing attack; and automatically identify and prioritize the risk of likely potential targets of attack.

– Detect Program—Develops advanced technologies to detect explosive threats

to the Nation’s aviation, rail and ship transportation systems.

– Respond/Defeat Program—Conducts R&D to better respond to and defeat explosive threats.

– Mitigation Program—Reduces the effects of bombs that cannot be detected or

cannot be rendered safe through practical and available means.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Adam Tsao, Chief of Staff, Office of Operational Process and Technology, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

Q1. How does TSA define field testing protocols? In what ways do field tests differ

from lab tests and certification procedures, and how are the results reported to

TSL?

A1. Independent operational (or ‘‘field’’) testing and evaluation (OT&E) is the means

by which the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Security

Technology (OST) characterizes the operational effectiveness and suitability of viable security technologies and systems in the field environment. Operational testing

uses typically-trained operators and maintainers, operating production-representative systems, in accordance with the approved concept of operations within the intended operational environment.

Operational testing primarily differs from laboratory or certification technical

testing in the degree of operational realism afforded by testing within the intended

environment. In addition, OT&E supports increased focus on suitability evaluation

areas (including operational reliability and maintainability, logistics supportability,

manpower and personnel requirements, training, and human factors engineering)

through use by the intended target audience and with the intended support concept.

As such, OT&E results present the most realistic portrayal of anticipated system

performance within the field environment.

The Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)

provides TSA with results of their laboratory testing through classified briefings and

formal reports. TSA operational field tests are conducted subsequent to laboratory

testing. The results of field testing are for TSA use and it is not a requirement to

provide operational test reports to TSL. Although results are not formally reported

back to the TSL, the TSL does provide representatives to TSA project specific Integrated Product Teams. All program aspects, including operational test results, are

discussed in this forum.

Q2. According to Dr. Hallowell, the Transportation Security Laboratory has formal

procedures in place to ensure that they are responding directly to TSA’s research,

development, testing, and evaluation needs. How successful has TSL been at

meeting TSA’s needs? Does the Integrated Product Team process capture adequate information about TSA’s capability gaps and research priorities? Are there

any changes to this process that you would recommend?

A2. The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is in its initial stages, having just

been included in Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) fiscal year (FY)

2009 budget. The IPT has been organized into 13 capstones programs, to complement the research and development efforts of TSA. The Explosives Detection Division Capstone IPT was created during the current FY 2009 budget cycle.

This initial pilot program was successful in many of its goals, including establishing budgetary funding priorities as part of the FY 2009 budget process and in

prioritizing the research and development needs of TSA. As of November 2007, the

Explosives Detection Division Capstone IPT has shown that TSA is able to articulate to the Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and Technology a

clear understanding of its science and technology needs to procure solutions that not

only meet stringent detection thresholds, but also meet throughput requirements in

support of the aviation sector.

Currently, a more in-depth report card of the IPT Process is premature at this

time, as the program is still too new. As already stated, the goal of the IPT Process

is to address and reach a better understanding of the operational needs of TSA and

to ensure the research and development efforts of TSA are timely and relevant. Initial feedback on the initial capstone program has been very promising.

Q3. How often does TSA turn to the Department of Energy’s National Labs or private labs to carry out testing that could be performed by the Transportation Security Laboratory? In those instances, why does TSA choose to use resources

other than TSL, and what is the added cost to TSA?

A3. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) actively pursues a number

of options to readily interject new screening technology into the operating environment. TSA coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and

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Technology Directorate (S&T) to determine the most efficient way to achieve that

goal. In general, TSA and DHS choose to use the National Labs when the opportunity is available to leverage existing expertise that has been developed for other

government programs. It would be cost prohibitive for S&T to develop similar in

house capability and expertise.

Q4. In her testimony, Dr. Hallowell says that ‘‘it is the responsibility of TSA to define and judge readiness for deployment.’’ How does TSA determine whether a

technology is ready for deployment? If technologies are deployed in spite of expressed reservations from TSL, what steps are taken to ensure that those technologies meet performance and technical requirements?

A4. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers evaluation products from a variety of sources (including the Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) and other technical testing data sources,

such as independently validated vendor information) in considering readiness for deployment of security systems and technologies. In addition to reviewing the demonstrated effectiveness and suitability of candidate systems (as evaluated against

Operational Requirements Documents, procurement specifications, and other applicable statutory and regulatory requirements) as noted during both developmental

and operational testing, the TSA Office of Security Technology also considers the

operational capabilities afforded by the system of interest, as well as resource requirements, operational need, and threat information, among others, in determining

how and whether a system should be deployed.

Q5. How are human factors taken into account when developing functional requirements for new technologies? In what ways do requirements take both screener

and passenger needs into account?

A5. Human Factors Engineers participate at every stage of the requirements development process and in system reviews. They ensure that requirements for human

interfaces effectively address usability and ergonomic aspects. These requirements

are written to ensure that screening equipment is user friendly so that operators

can work efficiently and safely and passengers will be able to submit to screening

in ways that are safe and minimize stress. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate work together to provide human factors input into requirements development, system and critical design reviews, and system qualification. TSA then evaluates Human Systems Integration when systems are piloted in the field.

Q6. Dr. Drury’s written testimony describes the Threat Image Projection System

(TIPS) as one example of how human factors research can positively affect the

efficacy and speed of aviation checkpoints. TIPS enhances screener performance

by randomly inserting threat images to ensure that screeners are regularly presented with potential threats and can react accordingly. Does TSA plan to include a system like TIPS in airports?

A6. Threat Image Projection (TIP) is currently active on over 1,800 TIP Ready Xray (TRX) machines at all passenger screening locations nationwide. TIP provides

screeners experience in identifying threat objects including improvised explosive devices, guns, knives, and other deadly and dangerous prohibited items (i.e., martial

arts weapons, tools, and brass knuckles, among others). The TIP library contains

over 2,400 fictional threat images captured at various angles and difficulty levels.

TIP serves as an invaluable, multi-functional system that extends well beyond an

evaluation tool; it provides immediate feedback and functions as a reinforcement

system that increases screener accuracy. TIP enhances screener attentiveness and

vigilance through random and periodic presentations and exposure to new and

emerging threats. TIP results, which have been collected and analyzed on a monthly

basis since January 2004, have shown a steady increase in screener performance on

threat detection. These results are used to track trends in screener performance on

threat detection, as well as identify additional training needs.

Q7. What is the technical background of employees working at TSA? How many of

your employees have science or engineering degrees? How has TSA staffed its

teams responsible for developing functional requirements for new technologies

with respect to R&D expertise?

A7. Overall, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) tracks the education

level completed, such as Associate degrees, Master’s degree, and so on. We do not

capture the course of study; that is, Engineering vs. English, mathematics or biology. Attached is the information available about degrees.

53

TSA’s Office of Security Technology (OST), which is primarily responsible for developing functional requirements for new technology, has 77 employees on board. Of

that number, approximately 40 employees have science or engineering degrees,

many with advanced graduate degrees and a few with Doctorate level degrees. The

OST staff includes a Chief Scientist and Chief Engineer, adequately addressing the

need for research and development expertise and the functional requirements for

new and emerging technologies. OST continues to hire in the science/engineering

fields.

Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey

Q1. Your testimony states that ‘‘TSA’s involvement will likely vary’’ in future technology development and implementation. What factors would lead to decreased

involvement by TSA in any particular aviation security project?

A1. The statement about the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) involvement in future technology development does not mean that TSA envisions decreased participation in future efforts. Based on the maturity of screening technology at the time of assessment as well as the operational rigor required for implementation and integration, the project areas of responsibility are shared but will

vary between TSA and the rest of the Department of Homeland Security.

Questions submitted by Representative Laura Richardson

Q1. What is the status of the Registered Traveler (RT) Program?

A1. The current phase of the Registered Traveler (RT) Program is known as the

Registered Traveler Inter-operability Pilot (RTIP). The RTIP is entirely fee-funded

and intended to test inter-operability between multiple RT Service Providers. A

Service Provider (SP) is a private sector vendor chosen by a Sponsoring Entity to

implement RT as its agent. As of May 2008, 19 Sponsoring Entities, participating

airport authorities or air carrier operators, are operating RT at 18 airport locations,

three Transportation Security Administration approved SPs are hosting operational

RT Programs, and approximately 110,000 participants are active in the RT Program.

Q2. How many TSA Employees are not US Citizens? How do you recruit TSA Employees?

A2. Currently, all Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees are

United States citizens.

TSA participates in various recruitment activities to enhance awareness of opportunities for employment with TSA and maximize the number of highly qualified candidates for consideration. Recruitment efforts include posting job vacancies on

USAJobs, web boards, college campuses, and in various print media. TSA recruiters

participate in career fairs and conferences nationwide; establish relationships with

community-based organizations, educational institutions, military associations, and

cultural organizations. TSA recruiters also participate and attend professional assoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:16 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 041800 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\T&I08\042408\41800 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ciation conferences to network with colleagues, business leaders and individuals in

the field who may be resources for identifying qualified candidates. TSA also participates in Department of Homeland Security corporate recruiting events and job fairs,

including Veterans Outreach efforts.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode Island

(URI); Co-Director, URI Forensic Science Partnership; Co-Director, DHS University Center of Excellence in Explosive Detection, Mitigation, and Response

Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

Q1. You noted in your testimony that operational difficulties undermine the performance of explosives-detection technologies currently in use in the field. Do existing

tests and evaluations of explosives detectors adequately predict these field performance challenges? If not, what additional tests should detectors be subject to

in order to ensure high quality performance and robustness?

A1. It is a general phenomenon that lab-scale results will not be directly applicable

to real-world scenarios. Therefore, there is an intermediate step—the pilot-scale. In

airport security, the pilot-scale is use of a new device or protocol at a few select airports (test-beds) under carefully controlled conditions. Still, the final performance

will also be affected by repetitive use and by incorporation of ‘‘lessons-learned’’ improvements. These steps cannot be avoided. The only way to speed this process is

by use of more test-bed facilities. The obvious lack in present technologies is the

need to include ergonomic considerations at an early point in instrument design.

Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey

Q1. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and people in its

aviation security and other modes of transportation?

A1. It is important to continue vigorous funding for developing and improving technologies—old and new. However, ergonomic factors should be considered early in the

development. Presently, people are used in security screening at points where instruments fail. It would be better to assign assets keeping in mind that people are

better at decision-making and instruments are better at screening. The only way to

get the right balance is to continue and expand use of test-bed arenas.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Colin G. Drury, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo

Overall Response: These are excellent and thought-provoking questions that will

help advance the cause of improved security, and particularly the role of Human

Factors Engineering in helping assure that improvement. I thank the Chairman and

Ranking Member for the chance to respond.

Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

Q1. In your opinion, is there adequate awareness of the need for human factors engineering in the private aviation security technology industry? If not, how should

the Transportation Security Administration change their performance requirements to compel companies to consider human factors when designing technology?

A1. There was much talk in security about Human Factors since before TSA was

formed, but the term tended to be used rather loosely in the aviation security technology industry. It often meant ‘‘training’’ or ‘‘human resources’’ or ‘‘computer screen

design.’’ This has improved over the years, so that the equipment manufacturers I

have met have a more realistic view of human factors as an engineering discipline.

I am still not convinced that they see it as a systems engineering discipline, with

all that implies about designing from the start for the human operators rather than

meeting a set of fixed requirements.

To ‘‘compel companies to consider human factors when designing technology’’ it

would be useful for the TSA to set requirements for the design process as well as

requirements for the finished product. These could include employing at least one

Human Factors Engineer and ensuring that the process of design was documented

to show how that design input was used. Currently full membership in the Human

Factors and Ergonomics Society in the USA would ensure adequate technical competence in Human Factors Engineering, but full certification by the Board of Certification in Professional Ergonomics (BCPE) would represent proven expertise in practice of the Human Factors Ergonomics discipline. The design process for the variety

of different security systems is unlikely to benefit from rigid requirements. It would

be preferable to have a process that called for the manufacturer to use good Human

Factors Engineering practices in the design and demonstrate this to competent

Human Factors Engineers in DHS (e.g., DHS’s Science and Technology or TSL’s

human factors personnel). Of course, the government Human Factors Engineers

would need to demonstrate the same level of credentials called for above.

Q2. You mentioned in your testimony that technology can be tested for human factors by either analyzing the final product or carrying out field testing. Are there

options for carrying out performance tests in the lab that would reveal any

human-technology interaction problems?

A2. In my written testimony I mentioned both of these as valid evaluation methods.

Analyzing the final product for compliance with Human Factors Engineering guidelines may not be as successful because, as noted in the testimony, security technologies are complex and varied so that no single checklist could hope to ensure a

well human-engineered system. The field testing alternative favored in the testimony could encompass a range of testing from breadboard testing of early prototypes in a laboratory through to in-service trials at airports or other points of entry.

Product and system testing has a long history in Human Factors Engineering, and

all levels have been used at different times on many systems. We now have excellent software for simulating working systems using computer workstations so that

more realistic tests can be applied at an early stage of systems development. For

example, with X-ray screening of carry-on baggage it is quite possible to test new

technology and algorithms for detection of threats prior to the technology actually

being available for in-service use. In this way we can test, for example, increased

system resolution (as was done at TSL) to determine whether or not increased resolution will make any practical difference to threat detection performance.

In all off-line testing it is easier to detect problems than to assure future performance. If the simulated system works well under test conditions, then it may still

have undiscovered problems in the field (e.g., maintenance errors), whereas if problems are found during testing they almost certainly would occur in field conditions.

Where the test is sited, laboratory vs. field, may be less important than the psychological and biomechanical fidelity of the simulation in predicting future in-service

57

performance. The choice of participants, for example, is crucial. Using personnel

from the development team introduces a bias as they both know too much about

the new system and have poor current experience of the in-service situation. Similarly using a subject pool of university students may answer some questions (e.g.,

how well do novices perform under different display options) but is unlikely to yield

valid predictions of in-service performance. The measures in off-line testing are also

important. As noted in my written testimony, we can take measures beyond performance (hits, false alarms and throughput) under test conditions. We can be prepared to observe human-system interaction errors and interview experienced users

after the test to help determine not just that a problem exists but why it exists and

how to prevent it. Because off-line testing is controlled, we can use a broad range

of threat types and methods of concealment to determine in advance of service use

where difficulties are possible, and where the greatest strengths of the new system

lie. The textbook Evaluation of Human Work by J.R. Wilson and E.N. Corlett (3rd

Edition, 2005) has chapters on many of the issues of human factors testing from

simulator fidelity to experimental design.

Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey

Q1. Your written testimony describes the Threat Image Projection System (TIPS) as

one example of how human factors research can positively affect the efficacy and

speed of aviation checkpoints. Can you tell us a bit more about that program

including where it was developed and at what cost?

A1. This is a question for which I do not have complete data, so I would refer you

to TSL for full information on who exactly developed TIPS and what it cost. I would

expect that Dr. Hallowell would be able to make this information available. TIPS

was developed at the TSL and won the team the FAA’s Distinguished Achievement

in Technology Transfer Award. The idea behind TIPS is that it provides realistic

test images of threats to the screener during actual operations. These threats images are superimposed almost seamlessly onto items (carry-on bags etc.) that are

actually passing through the X-ray scanner at the time and so the threats appear

to be items within the bag. The screener presses one of two buttons to release the

bag: OK if no threat is seen and Not OK if a threat is seen. If there was a TIPS

threat projected onto the bag, the screener gets a response to the effect that they

missed a threat (if they indicated OK) or a congratulation on correctly detecting a

threat (if they indicated Not OK). When they correctly detect a threat they are instructed to re-inspect the bag in case it also contains an actual threat. The data on

hits and misses of TIPS images is collected automatically on most newer X-ray

equipment and is downloaded periodically for analysis.

There are five main advantages of the TIPS system:

A. Because of the very low rate of actual threats, TIPS images provide a means

of increasing the effective rate of threats in a realistic manner. The higher

the effective threat rate, the better the performance in almost any inspection

task.

B. This increase in effective threat rate also tends to reduce any time-on-task

decrease in performance due to fatigue (the Vigilance Decrement).

C. The rapid feedback of success / failure data to the screener also reduces any

vigilance decrement. True feedback is problematical in any inspection task,

as we almost never know the true presence of a threat. If we did know that,

there would be no need for the inspection! Thus the artificial (but realistic)

feedback provided by TIPS overcomes a longstanding problem in maintaining inspection performance.

D. Data can be collected on individual screeners, whole screening lines, complete checkpoints and even whole airports for monitoring purposes. In any

inspection task, the system will make errors and that is true of automated,

manual and hybrid inspection tasks. Collecting the TIPS data on errors permits analysis of differences between screeners, checkpoints etc. and so can

point up instances of both high performance and low performance. Action

can then be taken to reward or retrain individual screeners, or seek to replicate good screening lines or checkpoints.

E. Finally, the database generated by TIPS can be used to answer many research questions. For example, if threat detection does indeed decrease with

time on task (vigilance decrement) the magnitude of the effect should be

measurable in TIPS data. It should also be possible to test time-of-day effects, effects of growing screener expertise, the effectiveness of changes to Xray set-up or procedures, etc.

58

Note however that for any of these to occur, the TIPS data must be valid. Thus

the TIPS library of images must be large enough to avoid screeners recognizing images already seen. Also the managerial procedures must be followed reliably, for example ensuring that screeners actually sign out when they take a short break. The

TIPS data collection system should not malfunction. Also, managers with little

knowledge of statistics must beware of over-interpreting data from small samples.

In fact QinetiQ in the UK has developed excellent software that helps interpret

TIPS data, and specifically warns when the data are insufficient to evaluate a particular screener.

Q2. How should TSA determine the appropriate mix of technology and people in its

aviation security and other modes of transportation?

A2. This is a key question in any application of Human Factors Engineering, and

so is especially relevant to security systems. At the most simplistic level, my written

testimony included: ‘‘Overall, automation provides the ability to take rapid and consistent action within strict rules, while humans provide the flexibility to respond

when the rules do not apply (e.g., Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens, 2000).’’ This

is a general guideline but more specific information is needed for each particular

system. The Allocation of Function literature (e.g., Hollnagel, E., and Bye, A. (2000).

Principles for Modeling Function Allocation. Int. J. Human-Computer Studies. Vol.

52, pp. 253–265) gives techniques for applying this methodology, as does the automation literature (e.g., Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T.B. and Wickens, C.D. (2000).

A model for types and levels of human interaction with automation. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, Vol. 30 (3),

May 2000). There are complete design methodologies under the headings of SocioTechnical Systems Engineering (Taylor, J.C. and Felten, D.F. (1992) Performance by

Design, Prentice Hall) and Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente, K.J. (1999). Cognitive

Work Analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum) which lead to specific answers in specific instances.

Note that there may be quite different appropriate mixes of technology and people

in different detection systems at a single checkpoint, and certainly between different

modes of transportation. The task of searching an X-ray image of a cargo container

is many times more difficult for a human than searching a carry-on bag image for

similar threats. Minimally-aided human search may well be an effective solution for

the smaller task, but software assistance in at least the search function would probably be required for a whole container to achieve the same level of threat detection.

Æ