Filed 8/16/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re 

 ANDRE PIERRE HARRIS 

 for Change of Name.

 B322152

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22STCP00711

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.

Andre Pierre Harris, in pro per, for Petitioner and 

Appellant.

____________________

Andre Pierre Harris is the name on Harris’s birth 

certificate. Harris applied to the trial court in March 2022 to 

change his name to :Minko: Yona-Gvinge: El-BeyR. On the 

ground that Harris has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court 

denied Harris’s petition. We affirm because there was no abuse 

of discretion. (See In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608, 609.)

Before the hearing on his petition, Harris published his 

request four times in a newspaper of general circulation, as 
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required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1277, subdivisions 

(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3). Had his request for a change of name been 

for purposes of gender affirmance, under Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 1277.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2019, 

publication would not have been required.

The trial court evidently ran Harris’s name through law 

enforcement records and found “warrant(s).” It issued a tentative 

opinion stating it planned “to deny the petition on the ground 

that petitioner has an outstanding warrant(s).” Its final order 

stated that, “[h]aving heard from petitioner,” the court was 

adopting its tentative ruling and the petition was denied without 

prejudice. The “petitioner may reapply.” 

Harris’s appellate record does not describe his court 

hearing. Nor does this record elaborate the number or nature of 

the “warrant(s)” that were the focus of the court’s ruling.

By statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law 

enforcement records when considering Harris’s petition to change 

his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use 

the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 

(CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to 

determine whether a name change applicant must register as a 

sex offender. “If a court is not equipped with CLETS or CJIS, the 

clerk of the court shall contact an appropriate local law 

enforcement agency, which shall determine whether or not the 

petitioner is required to register . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1279.5, 

subd. (f).) 

By passing this statute, the Legislature sought to ensure 

people required to register as sex offenders cannot change their 

names to frustrate the registration requirement. 
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If this law enforcement check reveals the applicant has 

outstanding warrants, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial 

court to deny the name change until the applicant rectifies the 

situation. Arrest warrants are written orders, signed by a 

magistrate, commanding the arrest of named people. (4 Witkin & 

Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law Pretrial (4th ed. 2023) Issuance and 

Service of Warrant, § 18; see Pen. Code §§ 814-816.) Bench 

warrants may issue for bailed defendants who do not appear. 

(4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law Pretrial, supra, § 18.) 

Arrest and bench warrants serve the public interest by 

bringing people to court who should come to court. Because 

warrants name the wanted person, a name change could 

frustrate their function. People wanted by law enforcement 

should not be able to use the legal system to avoid obligations to 

the legal system. 

Harris argues this is a case of mistaken identity. He cites 

page 18 of the record, which ostensibly is a request for judicial 

notice he filed in the trial court. This request, however, begins 

with a set of factual assertions in the nature of a declaration or a 

brief. Harris avers he is a “living soul, the Spiritual man made 

from the dust with the holy breath of the Creator YHWH (God) 

[Genesis 2:4-7].” He is a “native born Mu’ur, native to this land . 

. . .” (Cf. U.S. v. Hillman (7th Cir. 2015) 610 Fed.Appx. 574, 575-

578 (unpublished) [conviction affirmed despite Habib Jimananu–

Bey’s argument that the government failed to prove he pretended 

to be a diplomat from a foreign country because the Mu'ur 

Republic did not exist]; City of Shaker Heights v. El–Bey (2017) 

86 N.E.3d 865, 866-867 [Brandon Profit El–Bey claimed to be a 

national of United Washitaw de Dugdahmoundyah Mu'ur; court 

rejected appeal, commenting that many courts “have rejected 
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similar challenges to convictions based on ‘sovereign citizen’ or 

‘sovereign nation’ arguments”].) 

Harris’s request contained other assertions, as well as a 

request that the court take judicial notice of submissions Harris 

made to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the 

Federal Trade Commission. 

These submissions are not relevant to Harris’s petition to 

change his name. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

failing to discuss this ostensible request for judicial notice. 

On appeal, we cannot adjudicate a factual question about 

mistaken identity. The trial court invited Harris to resubmit his 

name change application. The trial court is the proper forum for 

initial resolution of Harris’s factual claim.

Harris asserts a procedural violation. He argues no one 

objected to or appeared to oppose his application, so the trial 

court was obligated to grant his petition. He writes that the 

court denied his “name change petition in favor of [a] third-party 

interloper from another state without requiring the party to file 

written petition objecting to the name change, and without 

requiring the party to appear in court to testify with firsthand 

knowledge to claims of controversy against the name.” 

The record contains no evidence about a third party. We 

interpret Harris’s objection to mean that he is familiar with a 

warrant issue, that he believes someone in another state is 

responsible, and that he argues the trial court must approve his 

petition if no one from that other state appeared or filed 

objections in this California trial court. 

This argument is mistaken. 

The statute does allow people, in writing or in person, to be 

heard and to appear in opposition to name changes. For 
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instance, a court denied one Eugene Weingand’s petition to 

change his name to Peter Lorie. The famous actor Peter Lorre

protested the petition by the unknown Weingand, who was no 

relation to Lorre but while working as a real estate agent had 

passed himself off as Lorre’s son. Weingand bore a physical 

resemblance to Lorre, and affected a manner of speech similar to 

Lorre’s, but had no family connection with the name Lorre or 

with any name sounding like Lorre or Lorie. The court held it 

was no abuse of discretion to deny this name change petition. 

(Weingand v. Lorre (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 289, 291–294.) 

Certainly people can appear to oppose a name change. If 

no one appears, however, the court is not required to approve the 

change. The statute does not mandate approval if no one has 

registered written or oral opposition. The provision about sex 

offender registration proves this. That provision implicitly 

authorizes a court, on its own, to deny a name change. Whether 

other people do or do not raise objections is immaterial.

Harris levels a different but invalid attack by suggesting 

the court unethically engaged in the practice of law by 

representing a “third-party interloper.” 

It is possible for judges to violate ethical principles by 

undertaking their own factual investigations into a case being 

tried to a jury and then calling and questioning their own 

witnesses before that jury. (See Ryan v. Commission On Judicial 

Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 536–537.) 

This trial court did nothing like that. This court’s conduct 

was proper. A statute mandated its approach: the court “shall 

use” law enforcement databases to determine whether the name 

change applicant must register as a sex offender. (Code Civ. 
6

Proc., § 1279.5, subd. (f).) Harris’s charge that the court acted 

unethically is in error.

Harris suggests the court improperly relied on hearsay by 

considering the warrants against him. Harris forfeited this 

objection by offering no timely or specific objection in the trial 

court. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)

Harris filed a motion in this court to compel a finding in his 

favor, arguing that we failed to schedule timely oral argument 

and that no brief opposed his appeal. We deny this motion: oral 

argument was in the normal course, and the absence of an 

opponent does not imply decisive merit. (See Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.220(a)(2).)

On July 20, 2023, Harris filed another document titled 

“Letter and Notice of Mandatory Judicial Notice of the Indian 

Civil Rights Act of 1968 referenced as Title II of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1968.” This document is a combination of a declaration 

asserting facts, a brief asserting legal arguments, and a request 

for judicial notice of a federal statute. We do take notice of this 

statute, but it has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. We 

disregard the aspects of the document that make factual 

assertions and legal arguments. The trial court and not the 

appellate court is the right place for factual presentations. We 

have not requested, and we do not accept, further legal briefing.

///
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DISPOSITION

We affirm the order and do not award costs.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

GRIMES, J.