148 [86 Op. Att’y

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SEARCH AND SEIZURE COMPUTATION OF STATUTORY 15-DAY

PERIOD FOR EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANT 

June 22, 2001

The Honorable Jerry F. Barnes

State’s Attorney for Carroll County

You have asked for our opinion as to when the 15-day statutory

time limit for the execution of a search warrant commences. 

In our opinion, the 15-day period should be computed

beginning on the day after the search warrant is issued by a judicial

officer.

I

Statutory Time Limit

The Maryland criminal code sets a time limit for the execution

of search warrants issued by Maryland courts. It states in relevant

part:

... [A]ny search or seizure under the authority

of [a] search warrant ... shall be made within

15 calendar days from the date of the issuance

thereof and after the expiration of the 15-day

period said warrant shall be null and void. If

... it appears ... that the property was taken

under a warrant issued more than 15 calendar

days prior to seizure, [the] judge must cause it

to be restored to the person from whom it was

taken. 
Gen. 148] 149

 As part of code revision, this statute is being recodified as §1-203 1

of the new Criminal Procedure Article, effective October 1, 2001. See

Chapter 10, Laws of Maryland 2001.

See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1) (“[the warrant] 2

shall command the officer to search, within a specified period of time not

to exceed 10 days...”). That rule authorizes state courts, as well as federal

courts, to issue search warrants at the request of federal law enforcement

officials. If a Maryland court issues a warrant under the federal rule, the

10-day limit in that rule – or any shorter time period stated in the warrant

by the issuing judge – would pertain.

Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27, §551(a). A search 1

warrant that is not executed within 15 days after its issuance is to be

returned to the issuing judge. Maryland Rule 4-601(d).

The 15-day period was added to the predecessor of §551 in

1950. Chapter 81, Laws of Maryland 1950. This requirement is “of

sub-constitutional status, since neither Article 26 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights nor the Fourth Amendment included such a

requirement.” In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149,

162-63, 458 A.2d 820, cert. denied, 296 Md. 414 (1983) (recounting

history of §551). 

Presumably, the purpose of the 15-day limit is similar to that

of the 10-day limit for the execution of search warrants issued under

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Both rules help ensure 2

that a search warrant is not executed after the probable cause

supporting the search has grown “stale” as a result of a delay after

the warrant is issued. See United States v. Sgro, 287 U.S. 206

(1932); Donaldson v. State, 46 Md. App. 521, 527-31, 420 A.2d 281

(1980). See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure §3.7(a) (3d ed.

1996). Of course, the facts and circumstances of a particular case

will determine whether any delay in execution has resulted in the

dissipation of probable cause. As Judge Moylan explained in an oftquoted passage:

The ultimate criterion in determining the

degree of evaporation of probable cause,

however, is not case law but reason. The

likelihood that the evidence sought is still in

place is a function not simply of watch and

calendar but of variables that do not punch a

clock: the character of the crime (chance
150 [86 Op. Att’y

encounter in the night or regenerating

conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic or

entrenched?), of the thing to be seized

(perishable and easily transferable or of

enduring utility to its holder?), of the place to

be searched (mere criminal forum of

convenience or secure operational base?), etc.

The observation of a half-smoked marijuana

cigarette in an ashtray at a cocktail party may

well be stale the day after the cleaning lady

has been in; the observation of the burial of a

corpse in a cellar may well not be stale three

decades later. The hare and the tortoise do not

disappear at the same rate of speed.

Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 172, 331 A.2d 78, cert. denied,

274 Md. 725 (1975), aff’d, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). In the absence of

a specific deadline set by the issuing judge, the 15-day limit has been

deemed a “reasonable time to allow” for the execution of a warrant.

Griffin v. State, 232 Md. 389, 392, 194 A.2d 80 (1963). 

II

Computation of Time

The Annotated Code of Maryland provides a general rule for

the computation of time limits set forth in statutes. It provides: 

In computing any period of time prescribed or

allowed by any applicable statute, the day of

the act, event, or default, after which the

designated period of time begins to run is not

to be included. The last day of the period so

computed is to be included unless ... [i]t is a

Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the

period runs until the end of the next day,

which is neither a Sunday or a holiday....

When the period of time allowed is more than

seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays

shall be considered as other days ....
Gen. 148] 151

 That rule provides, in pertinent part: 3

(a) Computation of time after an act, event,

or default. In computing any period of time

prescribed by these rules, by rule or order of court,

or by any applicable statute, the day of the act,

event, or default after which the designated period

of time begins to run is not included. If the period

of time allowed is more than seven days,

intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are

counted.... The last day of the period so computed

is included unless ... it is a Saturday, Sunday, or

holiday, in which event the period runs until the

end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday,

or holiday ....

Maryland Rule 1-203(a).

 The statute was recodified in its current form in 1997. Chapter 31, 4

§6, Laws of Maryland 1997. 

Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 1, §36. The Maryland Rules

contain a similarly worded provision. Maryland Rule 1-203(a).3

The purpose of the statute, which is essentially a codification

of the common law rule, is to provide a uniform method of

computing any period of time prescribed by statute. Equitable Life

Assurance Society v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262, 508 A.2d 137

(1986). It thus brings a “degree of certainty” to the law and also

avoids prejudice to a party “if the triggering event occurs toward the

end of the day.” Id. at 265. See also Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md.

513, 538, 740 A.2d 1004 (1999). 

 Notably, the statute creating a uniform rule for the

computation of time was first enacted in 1941. Chapter 522, Laws

of Maryland 1941, originally codified as Article 94, §2. This was 4

prior to establishment of the 15-day time limit for the execution of

search warrants now codified in Article 27, §551. Thus, it is

presumed that the Legislature created the 15-day period in §551 with

the knowledge that the uniform method for computation of time

would be applied and, by not specifying otherwise, approved of the

use of that method of computation. Equitable Life, supra, 306 Md.

at 263. See also Hampton v. University of Maryland at Baltimore,

109 Md. App. 297, 307, 674 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 343 Md. 333,

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1032 (1996).
152 [86 Op. Att’y

III

Conclusion

In our opinion, a search warrant issued by a Maryland court

under Article 27, §551, must be executed within 15 calendar days

after it is signed by the issuing judge. The 15-day period is to be

computed in accordance with Article 1, §36, and therefore begins on

the day after the warrant is signed.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Robert N. McDonald

Chief Counsel

 Opinions and Advice