Headquarters, Departmen f of the Army February 1993 
By Major General Daniel W. Christman 

Commandant. U. S. Army Engineer Scl~oal 

1 nterestlng times! When you read this, we wrll have 

I undergone our first Presidential pollt~cal party transition in 12 years. However, we must not lose sight of 

the fact that the fundamentars of our national nl~litary 

strategy wrll not change during thrs process. A summary of some military objectives that will not change 

include the following: 

Provide robust power projection capabilities to 

promote deterrence and stability 

r Maintain forward presence forces abroad 

8 Conduct peacekeeping, human1 tarian ass~stance, 

disaster relief, and other "restoration" onerattons 

n Develop and provrde strong nation assistance or 

security assistance capnbrFities 

m Participate rn Army domesttc missions designed 

to contrtbute to the nation's moral and social 

fabrrc 

Provide forces that are capable of conduct~ng contlnuous operattons across the entire operatronal 

continirum 

These object~ves wrll shape the future operations of 

our Army as the international envlronment continues 

to evolve. Our Army, and especially the Corps of Engineers, must be poised and r~ady to perfortn its mrssions in virtually any theater under any conditions. 

More specifically, we must contrnue to maintain our 

vast combat capabilities while increasing our abtllty to 

respond to contingency mlssi~ns in operal~ons other 

than war. Not easy to do In a per~od crf decreasing 

resources, Yhis w~lt he our greatest challenge in the 

foreseeable future' 

To meet this challenge, we engrneers must contrnue 

to be a dynarn~c and diverse arm d the greatest Atmv 

the U S has ever seen We must con?rnue to explort 

and refine our cr nrq ife capabilt res to provlde assislance 

111 operations other than war, and to better posrtlon our 

Army for the 21 st century. Thrs ~ssue of ENGINEER 

describes some of the drverse capabilrt~es of our Corps, 

from expert sapper skills to Hurricane Andrew responses The Corps\response to Hurricane Andrew rn 

Florida and Louisiana and Hurrtcane lniki in Hawaii 

typifies the broad scope of engineer missions. Lessons 

learned: from the disaster-relref operalons are In an artlcle beginnlng on page 26. 

The human challenge in Somalia is another example of our Corps' drverse missions. Cofonel Bob 

Flowers, the joint task farce engineer for this operation, has built a team consisting af six personnel from 

the Eng~neer School. In addition to providing engineer 

command and control, they are assessing the needs 

for infrastructure improvements and will prov~de valuable information to the Englneer Corps on future requirements for this mission area. Also, Mr. Vern 

Lowrey, of our Directorate of Evaluation and Standardizat~on, was deployed to Somalia in January w~th 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned team. His asslgnment is an example of our commitment to the 

'Total Army" cancepr that is so vital In an era of shrinkIng resources. M~re on this important mission will appear rn future rsstles of ENGINEER 

Humanitarian relief mrssions and nation assistance 

are not new to engineers. Our chief of staff has In 

fact described them as 'Yradit~onal" Army rniss~ons, 

However, they are becoming increasingly complex: 

they broaden our perspective, challenge our creativity, 

and provide our nation and our Army with opportun~tjes to foster conditions for peace and peacetime 

corn petition 

Realty looking fornard to fclrther developing some of 

these thoughts with you during the Senior Engineer 

Leaders Training Conference 93 (SELTC 93). which will 

be held here at ithe Engineer Center on 20-24 April Th~s 

year's theme is "Decisive Victory."' Key speakers will discuss topics such as "Engineer Roles In the Ana~nrnent 

of National Oblectives. ' 'Crisis Response: Forced Entry 

Operations,'"'Crisis Response: Decisive Operations," 

and "'Preservmg Peace in America's Largest Theater." 

Additionally, breakout working sessions will tackle current issues related to heavy and l~ght divisions, corps 

mechanized and wheeled divisions, corn bat heavy and 

topographic un~ts, and engrneer roles rn disaster relret, 

~ncluding some emerging lessons learned 

As you can see, there IS a varied and demandrng 

agenda for th~ fifth annual SELTC Look forward to 

seerng marly of yo11 here at Fort Leonard Wood as we 

cont~nue to prepare our Army and our Corps for the 

challenges expected In the 21 st century. Essayons! 
Iw 

Februarv 1993 Volume 23 PB5-93-1 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

FEATURES ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT LEONARD WOOD 2 Responding to Hurricane Andrew: 

The 10th Mountain Deploys to Florida ... 

by Lfeulenarit Colonel Peter Madsen and Major Wayne 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT Whiternan 

Major General Daniel W. Christman 6 ...The 43rd Engineers Link Up 

by Major Ailen 6.Estes and First Lieutenant Alex Lucas 

MANAGING EDITOR 10 Functional Area Assessment Resolves Engineer Issues 

Cathenne Eubanks by Colonel Wyiand Leadbetter 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Lynne M. Sparks 14 Engineers Vie for Expert Sapper Honors 


by Captain Geoff Gillespie 


GRAPHIC DESIGNER 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 20 Close Up: Engineer Restructure Initiative 

by Alan Schlie 

28 The Sheffield Method of Bridge Demolition 

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: by Major Ira Joe Davis 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 32 Deploying from Two Places at Once: A Challenging General. United States Arm). Experience Chief of Staff by Captain Paui J. Karnaze 

Official: 38 Philippine Engineers in Nation Assistance: The Huk 

Campaign *4- by Captain Janies R. Weber 

MILTON H. HAMILTON 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretaiy of the Army 

03398 
 DEPARTMENTS

Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

Cover: SGT Brian Coderre of "C" Baftely, 9 Personal Viewpoint 26 Lessons Learned 

116th Field Artillery Army National Guard, 

Palmetto, Florida, provided sec~ntyfor out- 17 Book Review 35 Engineer Solution 

side perimeter of the Florida City Park Dis- 18 Engineer Safety 43 Engineer Update 

tribution Point. (U.S. Army Photo by SGT 25 Engineer Problem 45 Bridge the Gap Zedrick G. Rockeft) 

ENG~NEER~!SSY0046-:9890) 8s preoaied cualrery by tile US &my i; ot exilenNse v~ewsexpressed are those of the sutiror and do not necessary 

g~,-eer Schoof. ~rn ATSE-TDM.PB ~o-f~eo~ara vvood MO 651736650 .CI!~CIO~ICI~I ~rmy orTRADDC ms,ttons 001 doe5 the mnient cnange or supe:~

secolld Gloss posmgage is oaa et Fo,?LeonarO Wood MO err! add1 oral rnallnp sadr informaton n othe. awoal Army ptibcat8cns ENGINEER reserves!he i~ghf 

0lt#CC'5 l" eel nn:cra! 

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8e:~n40: ~rlnyE.I~neers ATTII ATSCTDM-1'9 Fon ;~eolarawood M:: 55473~ EUGINEEF~~C ?e aui,or

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::I,! IELIVBSIS :o ieceve copes and u:xi aaClasj changes rh;r.,o be sen! lc i\~ 

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3, ;>oc-men.s i:rN Cn,et Val: -,s' 9:anch Slop SSOM. 'Nas!rtngtan OC 

DSCUMEH. EbGiNEEfi presen15 protesonai i'~'or.-la:!wd1'5Qneo to krc;: 29;::: ~dc~e~~ cna?gps 'a; rrerso-al slrcscrpi 01:s shot~8oass be $mi :n :he

Army crjganeers mlormea ofru~rs:~i iinii elve14,y OF~~C~O~~C~~:~ w,!hr :he#.aiezs 5110~r~n:~:~t~i7:! ~o~.zrenl~ 
Hurricane Andrem deonstated south Florida on August 24, 1992. Hardest hit mere ifomestead, Florida City, 

and other communities in south Dude County. By request of 17lorida's pouermr and rrpproval of President 

Bush, federd troops, active and reserve, mere sent to Florida to assist in the cleanup operation. The 10th 

Mountain. Division and the 43rd Engineer Battalion assisted in this mission. 

Three days after Hurricane 

..Andrew ravaged the Florida mainland south of Miami, 

the XVlII Airborne Corps sent a 

"be-prepared mission to the 10th 

Mountain Division, Fort Drum! 

New York. The 10th would 

deploy to south Florida to assist 

in the hurricane relief operations. With sketchy details and 

some assumptions. the 10th 

began mission analysis and 

planning 

Leading problems included how 

large of a force to deploy, how to 

tailor the engineer assets, and 

what ltinds of equipment and how 

much of each type to send. 

On 1heeveningofAugust 30: the 

10th Mountain received their 

deployment order: leaders would 

go first to analyze the situat,ion 

and provide guidance for the 

division's deployment. Along with 

the order were deployment specifics that addressed time lines, 

staging areas, and sorties--but little infonnation about the ground 

mission. Therefore, the same 

problems (kinds of equipment and 

amount of each) existed, so they 

relied on their engineer battalion's 

initial planning. As a minimum, 

the 10th decided to take chain 

saws, small emplacement excavators (SEES), bucket loaders, 

dump trucks, carpenter and pioneer tools, and sappers and 

equipment operators t,rained to 

use the equipment,. 

The Engineer Battlefield 

hen the 10th arrived in 

wFlorida, the soldiers' initial reacrion to the hurricane's 

devastation was awe. What. they 

had seen in newspapers or on 

television was nothing compared 

with t,he actual destruction in 

Homestead, Florida City, and 

other parts of south Dade Count.~.Homestead Air Force Base 

was hit head-on; the only thing 

left undamaged was the runway. 

Trees were toppled everywhere, 

utility lines and traffic lights were 

down, mobile-home parks were 

flattened, and debris was evelywhere. Portions of roofs in many 

housing areas were ripped off, exposing interiors to the elements; 

water damage was extensive. 

Gale-force winds, upward of 180 

miles per hour, had ripped glass 

from every building. As a result, 

there were mountains of debris, 

traffic gridloclrs, utility outages, 

and general crisis and fear 

throughout the devastated area. 

For a castlebearer, it was an engineer battlefield. 

The 841st Engineer Battalion, 

Florida Army Reserve, was the 

first. engineer force on the ground 

in the Task Force Mountain sector. 

They were tasked to clear debris in 

Florida City, a rural agricultural 

community south of Homestead. 

Their initial efforts were to clear 

trees, fencing, house debris, and 

telephone poles from roadways 

and thoroughfares. 

Equipment operators from the 

43rd Engineer Battalion, Fort 

Benning, supported the 841st. A 

brigade-sized task force from the 

82nd Airborne Division, Fort 

Bragg, was located nort,h of the 

Task Force Mountain sector and 

was supported by the 27th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg. The 

20th Engineer Brigade, Fort 

2 ~~~i~~~~ By Lieutenant Colonel Peter Madsen and Major Wayne Whiteman 
Rrngg, p~nvitied general support 

to the Corps are2 oioperntir~ns 

The tquipm~nt nrrd~ri la rlran 

up thr debrlr; and lce~p RIE th~ englrlrer-.= re:lti!b to drplny frotn Fort 

Drum tror'k~l~g was not :~vnilahle. 

To sr~lx.~ I his prul~lrm, SIIP 10th 

Mnun t nin Divi~ion cnltsted h(4p 

from the ,Joint Task Forrc Engine~r.; Commanricr, 20t h Engineer Brigade; and Jarksonrill~ 

District Commander. Corps of En- 

~inwrs to contract for commercial 

burk~t loaclers and dump t rurk 

Thq initially requ~sted 50 hucket 

loadcrq nnd 2000 dump trucks Tor 

th~i entire corps sector h~cause no 

one lrn~w hnw Tar fh~ ~ngltl~f~rs 

would have. to haul I he debris. 

T11rre d;-1ys Inter, rnrps contracts hroug-lit the initin1 cquipment package of rwr) Inadcrs ntid 

t~n trucks ir~tr, thr Task Fnrce 

Mountain :wttrr The nrxt day 

an ~dd i t ional 15 bur-ltrt Io:+dpr~ 

and 73 dt~mp truck< :3rriv~tI 

Us1 t~g t h~ ror~~rn~l-ulal P~U I pment , Task Furr~ 3lounl ain personne1 began to organize thr 

drhr~s ccleal-nnce missir>n 

Tog~t h~r, infantry art ~llery, 13nd 

engineer unt ta brought debris to 

the roadeide, helpcd fill hucket 

loaders and dump trucks, and 

rIeared the awn5 The chomb~n~d 

Top: The magnitude of the devastation from Hurricane Andrew challenged 

relief efforts. 

Bottom: Cunlng through the debris was a major task for engineers. 
arms tcn ms used con~rncrcial 

eqrr ipmen t ~n cle:ln up d~hris 

whil~ arg3nir rtquipm~n t was 

IJP~ II~ i'lotvn in An unexperted 

sou rrP of 5uppr)rt can~e from 

many vnlunterr nrf:.-lni~at ions 

and rnui~iripalit r n Florida 

znd other couthc~st~rii staxes 

Thcse Frnu p= sent flucliel 

t~wic1rr.k. tiurnp :r-uclis, and rh~rry pirkrrs fn ;~tt~mc-nt ~rluiprnent in fh~ I-Ir)n\~.;tr.zd Dppzrtmen t or Pui)l~i. I'i'orlrs 

Ty#Tir~i .+i ~il~ vqulpmrnt inn-site, 

the 10th Moun~~~ti Divqli 11 r~qt~ned wn-nr-lc +t.cto~-.: In Ihr. 

i qt and 2nd Brigiid~.~, the ;lui:~- 

tlon hri~;~d~. and the divisicln arr~.:ult:i: CRC~ l?ri,pade wa.c rwlmrlsiblr- for a11 ~-~li~f a~tivltl~~ 

w~th En 1t3 .T-rlnr, thr 10th hlountn~n Dr\,laiut> lead~rs anti Florid;* 

City. I lrmiclct(-.ad. and wuth D~P 

C~unty off'1cia1~ i II~PT~C~PCF j (1 

kwp on tnp of thc clc;+nup operst lqns; br:garlr cnrnmandcr~ asgigned woi-lc prioritips; and 

brigade rngin~e~s advised the 

maneuver rommanders of these 

prioril ie. 

Thp top priorit,y was to remow 

dehrlq f'rom aseRs i hat aff~ctrd 

sanitnt~nn or jrnpr:drd rights nf 

L\ :I), Afl~1. clpl?rls renlovnl in 1 hew 

rr~tiral area.;; was unde~' rtlntrol, 

th~ en~nr~r- t'ucus ,shifted to punst ruct trig re1 it.1' c-amp5 and i'ood 

, rl~str-lbutlon s1t.e; 4:Pnt tit ips), ;ISqtst 111g gulilir ut 11 il!. cwwc and 

clcarirlg (lpbriq f'i.oiii park:: ancl 

rwr~at IC~ RPP~C 

Thc 93711.1 Gmup r:anstrtt~'ted 

rwn rclief rn~r~ps with 700 2nd 

1,3,fll) pel-son cnp:lcitics, rrspect ~vc.Iy Earh camp had ~hower and 

I2undry faciIit IPF. administration 

center.;. nnd ~IIII~F; nrpm. Utility 

~ngin~rs I tistall~d t hc ~l~ctrical. 

wntrr, and ~w:tg~ syst~tna in the 

rn-111pq The .58Fith Entrinw~. Company, I\-ith 4.5 bridge trucks, 

t1,anspclrred I~utn~nit~r~at~ supplies tn the ramp5 R~stnring 

school pc)unds th~t~ became R. 

jcjin t effort Army t rnnpq rleard 

the ext~rlar grounds; Nnyv SeaIwes and Flxrines repnirrd 1-oof5 

2nd int~rior*; As a result or this 

Mflitary and civilian 

contracted engineer 

equlpment hauls 

debris from publlc 

rlghts-of-way to 

dump sites. 

joint effort. morc than 90 ~rcent. 

of the damnpd schools opened by 

S~pt~mher 14th. 

( 'P~sk Torcr Mountain ~urre~riwi 

far 9~v~raJ reasnns. one or which 

was t h~ integration of echelons 

RIJOVP corps (EAC 1 ~ngine~r un~ls 

In carly September, FRTjSCOM 

n1c.1-t cd and drpioved s~v~ra l engi.l;nwr fnrrrs intn the theater The 

kTlT! .Alrhorz~c. Cn1.p;: placed thrl 

937t h Lngin~er Group OPCON to 

t h~ 101 11 Di\,i:ir>n The 937t h 

qerv~cf :-IS ihr cntmmnrld and (.ontrol hendqusrtrrs for f hr- 4%-d En- 

~ineer Rnitnltan, tbr f'F:ir.d Englnef.1- Cu~npatly, t h~ 586t h 

Ili~gi 11~er .C'omp;3ny. ;rnd i he 84 1st 

, Engineer B~ttnl~on, The 41st Enginper Battalion remained organic 

to thr 113th Mountsin Division, 

with moqt of its aswt~ atrachwl tn 

h1.1ga.adr~< In r~vpril1 sertnr~ Their 

as~~ts includrd sappers, chain 

wwg. SEEq. nnrl dump trucks 

Tht. EAC units meshed quickly 

l,~~r>au?e t h P 4 15 t Engi n Rn t - 

talio~i'q c.nginccr optar c? t' IO~Y section contrnlled the ~ngincer iorcc~ 

The comnlander of the 4 1st served 

a? the divtslon enFneer, whll~ the 

comm:~nder OF the 937th Group 
... - 

send as thr senior PnpnePr cornmander to Task Forre Mnun ta~n 

With this asrang~ment, ~nte,yat- . . Ing EAC force was tranqp~r~lni fit 

the d ~v~slon level and d lffer~nrrs 

in report in^ and standard np~rating procedures were r~solved 

withtn pnprneer channel< 

The critical nature of the rel~ef e 

effort did not allow for norn~al 

staff integ-ration pl*wedutrs The I 

EAC had to resporid qulrl;ly wlth I '- . what they I~ad available tn prov~de 

~rnmed~ate rel~ef' to the hurricane 

victims. 

Other organizations contributed to the success of the disaster relief ef'fnrt Thp Carp4 of 

Engineers, Jacksonville District, 

augmented w~th volunf ~ers 

throughout the Army Corps of Members of the 202d Red Horse Eng~neer Squadron, as part of the joint relief Engi neersb con icp7 effort, load a log onto an artrcularing front loader. (Photo by TSGT Rose 

potable water, dumpsters. port- ~~~~~ld~. USAF-) 

able toilets, roof rnverl ng, 

trail~rs for ~chonls. r~n(:in~. :and 

utllity services Six 1arp pl-jvatp 

companirr; oprned burn cite5 

throughnut th~ sector 50 tnillt~i-t. 

and rivillan units ru~llcl h,4~1 I 

dphria into Iheln TIIP F'rdrral 

Emergency IvIanag~rnen t :Zg~nry 

(FEMA) contracted for sl~arin~ 

mohlle-home parks and hooking 

up uf ilities to temporary trailrrs, 

IT h ich became scm ipe~rnanent 

homes to displaced families 

llving in relief camps. 

m~sk Force Mounininys par- 

, , tic~pation in the Hurriranr 

AnJrcw rpl~ef oper:lt~nns urn..; a 

sucress. Tni t ~:llly, however, they 

were not we11 q.nchronizml with 

the Corp~ of Enginw1.c. 7h xulv~. 

t lr n t prohl~~n. ITSAC F, I iaisnns 

cmrd~natrrl with bh~ 10th hlnuntain Divr.cion and loral munic~pal 

and cw nty pv~rnments to forus 

~fforts on the ~intnediatc nedr; of' 

cornmuniti~s hit by the bur. 

ricane. Con~mercially contract4 

engineer equipment allowed 

troops to start. cleanup opprstions within days after the disaiter Rriyad~ en~inee1-s In ench 

sectni. defrn~d thc.~r ~nrssiona and 

~q.:ign~d prioritlrs basod nn 

nwd. Agq:.l+r*s~:~~, rlr?sc cclord lnat 101: 1% 11 cll'rr orgnli~zntio~is, 

~olunrr~rs. FFM.4, ;tnd the 

Gorp:; nf Engi ricer..: allowed 

divesional en,~incers to vnice 

tl~cir conccrns and n~~ded arlions. The results were quick 

relier from the crisis artd a clear 

path t.owarcl rpcovery. Military 

tsonp units redeployed, and by 

early October, FEMA and 

USAC F, were the main agenci~s 

invnlc-rd in thr! continuing relief 

opera t ion^ 

Zrren though diqaster tclief is 

nnt a rommonly irnined mission, 

if dicl riot difCr-.r murh from a wartimr eituat [on Mission anab.iis 

at thc home starlorr. early aswE.imeli t I 11 FPL'~ w, and ynehizatinn nT kc-!. ncset.~ nl lowed 

10th >IOU nt:3i n D~vir~nn cnfiine~r.~ to c.xert their exp~rf isr 

on a diffpreni kind of batt l~field 

They responded quickly and efficiently to this t imp-s~nsit ive 

m is;ivn and werP ~ffective 

thrcrugh:houl the ~ntire oprnt.ian. 

Their reFpnnslvp and censtructive efr~rtq truly l>c.n~frtzd the 

citiz~n? of south Fll>r1c38 

Lrcr~r~vtc~:rt Coforic( Prfar T, 

.llarlsrr! r.: ~hc. !lottn!~cdl~ rr)r?7- 

nr(t??dcr for rhc ,Ilst E11g:necr 

Brrtt~~l~ort, iOth hrlo;:?~.la~n D!'- 

ctislon Dthrr nssi,pr~n~rr~ts T~Iclrldild toi~rs roi rjl fJrc R2nd 

A1 rbarnc Drv~stnrr, Gcrrnan~, 

nnd the 12.l~s.cot:ri Ri[.~r Dit~l~ion -4 CGSC prrrrlurrte, Ilr 

Ito/d,s a bnr.ir ~lor.i: ilc~rep frnrn 

Mi.,.;t Porns nrid n ~llrisfer< iicgrpc in rrtiil e?~ginrcria~ jror?? 

(;ro~gsn Trch. 

i7fqjor IVnyrr.u Il'h itcmnn In fhc 

S3 of rhc -!lsf Fr1g:r:r~r Rattolton. P~PIVIOI.G ~ssiprir~~~nts 

I nulrrrlr fisstsz'rr 71 f profi.ssor of' 

cir tl nnd nlrchntzrcn: .?ngtnrTryfrl,g 12t \vi:qt r?cjl t, r70n:~3c!ly 

~0~ll"l~rl del' for t/r r 2nd fin- 

'prn~cr &oitsl!nn, o):(! s-! fgr 1 I 78,fir Enyrn~rr- Aur!oi:on. 

Hr :.c o grndrrcte of \\+st Poirlf I orid COSC orid z! u 

t7rnstes.s dpgrp~ ~rz r~l-ll enpt.neori np front rh17 Mcssach~~setrs In.;titute of Twh- 

 to log^.. 
whc 431.d F.nginrel+s. Fort Benning, Georgia, 

, , returned from a field es~rrise th~ day heforr 

Hu~ricane Andrrrv struck Staff membc~ imrncdiately stopped rvork on the field exerclsp rerovely 

opr-rations and prepnrrd lhree cont inpency plans in 

rclsponse f rl th~. disaster, t~s~sed nn mi ldance frnrn 

h iphcr h~;qrltlunrters: 

I 8cn3 200 wldier=, matnl~~ he ax?^ eqtrrpment 

rvpesators and rqu iprnenl, I cj c-le~sl. d~br~'; Kpep 

support tn the :~b~olute mrnimum 

SencI 200 solc!t~rq without ~quipmcn t Sr_lldier~ 

would tisr ~rku ipm~nt from thr 3'flqt Enzineer 

Rattnliotl. a U S. .,4rmy RPS~ITQ Gorp5 conlha t 

engineer h~t t alion hr~adquarlcrecl in Mian11 

About one week later, the 43rd received an execution order to send 200 soldiers. to replacc the volunteers of the S4lst En$neer Baltalion, who needed 

to rettrrt~ to their civtllan jobs 011 :'\upst 3 1. 200 

soldiers dppnrtcd Fn1.t Bennir~g hy con~mercial bus 

Th~v joined their reservp t:ounterpnrt~ who wPre 

r-lrnniug up clcl11.is it1 t hc hnrd-hit Florida City 

arm "The evenl was hiqtnr6ic, if f~r nothing else, it 

~mphasized the tot a1 Army concept," said 

1,1eu ienflnr tyolone l Rnhel-t L Davis. Commander, 

l:<rcl F;ng~ricer Ratt,3liotl "It w:i~ the firs: time that 

1 know of tvht1i.e an :Irt 1v0 tinit ~PII rn besirl~ 2nd 

upcrat t.d t IIP ~II iprliont nf n Reserve Compnneul 

~ltlt ." 

BPCJUSP of the scope of t h~ clisaster, the :~rIvanc~ 

party determined that the entin. 13rcl Engineer 

Battalion, with the 63rd CSE Company at inched. 

nppded to deploy. The 13rd.s sear J~t:~chmens arranprd for cnrnmercial hu..; tran~pnrtntion. 
~-r:m~n~sciat Ilnt. haul Sot. the heavy ~qulpmt-nt, and 

ccnvny rlrawnrc for 127 ~~chirlr.: ntl tho ;30-mile 

rand rn;~ t-ch 

I1"nrn flip 4.1rd rind fi?ir.cl nrrr\-i.ri in F~(~I'I~R, they 

l.vt:rp a,%< tgnprl trl work ~n r h~b ar.rirlr. ~.r~jr>~.zt eel t.1~ r ht. 

101 I: lltbul~tain Ilivi5ion Tl~~ir i111ti:iI :i~~~g~>n~c:r~~ 

w;-ir tn clrb:tr thb. tjilnrrnnus pil!'~ r'f ddll-ls rl~nr lined 

t hrt. srl.r,!i>ts Sclldrer,< xvi:Ia't frrrl;~ hnu~v i I? Irriu;~ pii:lr.- 

LII~ LIP ~AIY:~~IIILII~ 111 cigl~~ .'T~IP ~LI!I~C ~VP)*+~ 11wi I[L 

?(I in 2 n), fu r'thr11- I Ira11 10 f~er t'r;-!m t lie 1:ui-b." 

s;:xrr,tj u.'i~?t:ii~~ Tibt?y \Ti !WIT. {hni ~ii;~ mlc:r. G:lrrl (-'sb; 

C'irnp:u'iy "Ru: tf'son~ronr> RS~PI~ fnl' he!p t~r. ,147- 

:.1011+1" 4:021 lcj11't CICL it thc~nselv~s, we dirln't I~esitat~ 

to l~ild ti ha11(-1." TIIV ~rluip~nent and squads nrwe 

divid~d Into teams nf Innd~i-5. dump trucks. rellterl 

~~ud vl~ipper~. 2nd chain saws. ll'ith this act ion 

pIn 11, t 11 e sold 1~1.5 cle:,trr-d cn t irp st.l.~s~ .< in :i mnt tcr 

oi hour; Tho ~01cli~r-s h;3d to ha~lcllp the dptjris 

pilps with ext 1-3 cautifii~ ~PCRL~SC t.!~ey caontuinpd 

*,vr*i~:h ing fl-vm t r:ish and ranst rur:liun material fn 

tiypr)dw.r~~ic~ nerrIlr.r :3nil dt%:jcl animals. Down(-TI 

poiv~~ I~~IF--, {very anothvr hazard Iycausr. some I?: 

thov presunld?d rlcad r-alhrir-.d. elcc3ft.iri ty from homes 

ol.~rati n~ o!% ?;pnerLit or po\ces . - I he <::r.ci rlnginvrrs hnulcd morrt I ha11 ?.,1!fif' 

lr);~d; !:i ii#-l>r.i~ 3 nd pui ;-timu t :?,:ir?rl m I IF- *In ~~tc11 

clump 1ru4:I.: \I'hil~: Io~:il ~:II;,~ :311d i.o~~~ity a$~~i~-ie: 

.ic?~~ar il'1{-,1 t hr- clump sit(+: rmh~nglny r%ri~tcIit~r~ti< cr,mpllci~~e.d thr, qituati~!~ One J;? !h~ Jump \vould hi! 

I*~O?P<I: th~IICS~ lay 3 ~j>~r:;ll P:IS.i was r~ql~ll'ed lo 

I~W it: and st~mr-tllnt-~s I hp .<cllcj~~r-; haci t =r.p;lrat.P 

t hr? ltrtd.; ill to l?~irr~al~lr! ;~tlrl tir;nbur.n:~kll~-. luat(--r~al 

Suc.11 c.,,tnf.~~.;iorl rl1.1~t.l;r.l prcyr~~:, :3nd rvr~t~tzr:~lig 

me 43rd uses a 

bucket loader to 

scoop up tne 

enormous 

amount of debris 

left by Hurricane 

Andrew. 

the 48rd WRS taslrcd to heIp run fh~ dump Trucks 

wet+? lind up rtvc or ~jx dcep wnifing to dump 

r hci~ Iflad?. anrl burning operations ran mncurrent 

w~th duinping 

ij'lth rn two r~c.rks, th~ Corps of EIIA~HPF~S had 

I.OII~~CI ~rl R-lt 11 11i:llly rivillan agcnri~s that the 

rnili~~i~?. ronrr~hu tto11 tr~ th~ total haul effort 

d\:.~ntllprI Thr. I;!rd t11~n rr:orl~nl~rl its prininry cffllt+t t<j <r~~?tl'~t*tl113 tc11r I'I~IP~ fit tll~ (.'anrp!xll 4120 

tc.1113) AH<! the Hc~lnt,;t+lail. M tddl~ $rI~onl-: (78 

t+>t~ts~ Tli* ~F.II(~ s~t~i M.~'TC c'ir7~ignqrl tv ~~rnv~de 

tern pt-)i.;3r.?. yhclter fur people rvha had 10s t t h r.ir 

Ilrnnlt.5 'bpical I?, i lVo fnclml lips shnr~d arsl arldard 

.4r+rny GP ln~diurn tent 

InitialL?: tt!e 43rd wns t~sked orllv to hu~ld tent 

floors and provide clertricity, huh t11e.v also built 

sllom-~r units, constructed a parking Int. install~d 

secur~ty lights, and built a Fmge stage. T~P seli~f 

camps providrd cscsllrnt hainink. opportunit ics in 

plumLing, elvcf r~cal, cnl-penliy, nncl equipmrnt 

c~peralor ~k~lls f(.r tli~ snldler~ uf the 431.~1 Material 

arrlu isit ion wsq cirnplified throueh ~un lt Class A 

agents and 3 I-lonirstcnd city rontrnct with R locnl 

hai.dwnrc gtorr 2nd electric~I suppli~r 

The+ 4::l-d's b3.c~ ramp ni 1-Iorneqtrad Bnyfrnnt 

IJavIt ~VA; I:II*- ibr lli~ ~CIV iile? Inref. er~rru,oli to etore 

:III the ~qu I l.,t?~ent rrl :I r.r%rnIlc?~ hr4;-lr7y Pnl?;lliper !1:3tt .I 1 t41n T!lr> sold~r.rq I rv~d In I rat11 --. :lrlrl iiioh~l~ 

kirCh~tl tr;lil(.i.~ \vel-c. cnn;r~tid:~tccl to rrwtr a hattnlion-sizpd dining Fac~lity 'The park had running 

rv:~f 01. 70 plurnlw- qu ~clcly built 1n:i kp-sh ift r 1 ;hr l~rr>fs I l1t5 h~it tal ton ran a rnm~letr: n~ilil~tcnancr 

opr~nt inn, inclu tlin~ 1 htrd ;hop support for hot h 
Eng~neers set up GP medium Tents as temporary shelters 

for hurricane victims in South Flor~da. 

,chml sh 

: and crf 

Inal Ccln 

LESSQNSLEARNED. Additional Lessons 

regarding disaster assistatlce missions are in th~ LRS- I 

sons Learned feature be~nrzing on page 26. 

Iss~~e: If disaster relief will he an engineer m ission. th~ Englneer S lould predesign some 

tent-cib base can~p~ ?ate a package similar 

to the Army Functic lponent +. $+ vst,em 

(AFCS,. 

Discu-qsion: Recaus~ ~nginccrs construct t~mporary rampa in crisis situation.; on lv periodici~lly~ they are not Fully trained for f he tack. 

Predesign~d ramps wou Id Izelp unit.; respond 

quickly in a d~snster relief effort. If relief camp 

ror~struction is 1.0 become a common mission Tor 

combat heavy battalions, the Engineer SrhooI 

shoultI provid~ the 51R electrir.ians, who specialize in interio~ wiring, training in cxt.erior pompr 

distribution. 

JSSILP: Class A agents and accounts with local 

velldors arc essential. 

Discussion: To construct relief camps quickly, a 

unit needs immediate access to materials Thp 43rd 

1 Enginwt Battalion deployed with I cvo ordering officers and three Clas "4 agents. Hoinestead cii.y 

helped establish accounts wi t,h a local hardware 

store and an electrical supplier for nhtaining 

materials. These vendors were able to acqulre 

materials from anywhere in the greater h!i:lrni 

arett. 

set. th~' hntt~l~r)~l m~c>r1tu:i11,1. rclrnted pIat\.wn. nnp .Vlnjor Alicr; C Estes IS tllr Rntt~nl~rtn S.7 fir I!ip, da?. off ~\*ich n{-.r:I\ \Vlt h I he Ilt-t't ic wnrk ..;r,ht.dule -1.3rd Engl~l~,~:. Boftcitor:. For? R~rznr Grnrgza. A 

~:lrI thr. rrnl.~rt,:inty hour holv Iorlg ?lap:; ~vn~~lri Ll,:.~t Par nt ,? r~:r?~tl~ ft:, he IIO-5 prvr ni n.9trr.s dcgr~rs 171 

rerns~n it] I21ol*~da, rn~rnlp, w~lf:~rr~. and recrpntI(3n c/ ~et / P~?E! t~ wr-1 r??? f+tv71 3tci ~/brd 1 ?P rt,erst t?' !-!c 1s n 

hr-ran~e ;in irnpm-tnt~r IqCue. 'b'h~ cll~plain con- r+~g~sfcrcr! ,DTC~~~TS~OII~ / (?nRI nwr : !; 1.1 rg~ /(I. :l,ft\tJ tlr~ct l:cl rr-l~gir~us splhvsce.: nnrl ar1+:-1rtg~rl fnr ;I f~jrjl k Est~.* prr,~'lr~ely YQ~~*P(I ~/litll fhr- -36th l?~t,q1 ~zpp 

:-nnf.rbrt ~n the Ilaae camp 'I'lltl Ftlarni T-Turriranes Gro y) htxrdqrrol-tcv-. rind 7.1.9(h Erl!:~ RPC'T Rutonti .\I ianli Dulph in5 hnt h dnt~:-itrd tirke~q Tor root- talron clnd trtupJzt in th~ Ertglnrrr Sr'hool nr,d hall :7:4tnc?, and thc Corps 3nd division SF?? up rust Drpartnzent of ,lferhanirm? af Itrest Potni. and r~laxatinn aress. 'l'he 43rd's '~IHSP camp hnd a 

volleyball cnurt, gan1c.s. t~levisiorr, and a lagnoll 

for .+m~rnrning {Thp lagoon was 1101 the mnqt firsf 1,irutennnf AIPX Lucrr,~ is !lie brrl/crllon rrl.rl 

popular .;pot ~Fter onp wlrli~r pullrvd out a 3-foot e~tgzncer for fhc? 412rd Enpincer Rnrtnl:nn. Jlr. I q o 

12zrraruda ) grnd~intr of th~ Air!wrn~ ond PorA ftnclur rotlrsps. 

Abouf (7n~ mnnth after thp~r ~rrival, the 431.d 3 LT Lurrrs has serz~~ri as plnfrmn leodrr of o i:vrt?- 

had rnmplctc.rl t ltelr n1ls.sInn and prepar~rl tn rol ond earfhntour np plr11m.01 ctr~rl nq cc.om,t~~~y 

r~rlr,.p!o!. tr, F12ri Evllnlll~. Thp 481.d Kn"c~n~r!r Rat- P.VCC~I tzur nffi~rr. 

tn1:cn snd rb~ (i3rtl I'S?, Cornpan? returned to I-'ort w 

S~nnlng 011 S~ptmnhpr 25 ~uif h ~hr. prirle and 

lLnoa trcl~c. that they h:qd r~tponcie:f ~up~l'hly in 

i I rnlh 8 t~e+c! 
Terminate the GEV - Now! 

klirt~l~ it'= rimc to rrafurl thp 

d~bnt~ an t~rmin.~tinr the COI~- 

h;j: rtlnc-er v~:hirl~ (CLI-1 Ther~ IS 

rlv que7lLr;ru th~t tfi~ CELL ik ;I 

tn:~r n:iyna:-~re :~ntl rcadine- nlI~~tlrx~- Onp nr+cl OII?~ &nrc ul 

th;~ tnrc t h;v i ):I ro~dinsq nvrrfij2F.s 

to s.: that it 15 ccns~~trntly tblmv 

stfindmd Hnw~ver, t t~e IKWQ~ to 

dr~h~t~ w*:QI\P ~(IUIICI T~P ~lw-qih 

fc~r. t hc CEl' vn th~ h21: l~lield .I!IL! 

thfl ref-'l.~c.emrni hr. th~ c%\i fthf. 

171 ~~-P>I('~OYJ I!PW I- my hjitnrn 

I ~ttr 11 pf~vt?t - 'Cone" the $ L\' rlo\r.! 

hi+ i-. not a nrw debate In 

f~ct, the ~Irmy decis~cln fo 

rrpl:)r~ the I'EV with the $71 

Rrwcher up pa^ complete, mlrl rt 

9110:: ld k fiflrid t hrs dw~cj~ Nor is 

the notion of zttinz rid oT thc CEV 

Iv-rr Yrjt Im1y ap. (kncrnl S~jnt. 

She fill-m~?r Unmnl~nclrr. In Chief, 

S .-2:.my Eurogr (C'TXC, 

L'S.kRElR), rrlcu~n~nenclcd rrclnwc-- 

in2 ,311 ('I?[:-: frum Ziirny ~~~PF'RI 

S:~in:'? ~<.r..~t c3n 2xP:1.; Ilmd (*-lrrn the 

t'i ,I1 l?!+.q t ~~v'II~TI~~I~IF~ TQX~!T~ Or r-7- 

rrS:I\-p drnvt~t!me, rnrnbin~l xxrth 

LI~I t~c:~~=n~~~~~ ri?3t tn~s !JIIY<~UW 

pc~rC3nncu-l 11~ t!ip I '1.T ~(11lr3 !F prInrrn~.rl l~y o't11t.l. rsornbat vr.5 ~t-lrs 

a11:l ;i.-tc>tn -, nrfr;i rlir t n h rs:l\-y 

d~\.iqicns :Intitfrn lr ditcht~ don't 

hrwe to tr l-~ru.,~rhcd wlelv wit,!) the 

CEV mrhdh:~ttl rblodpl, .\I~L,RT also 

can ~Son~t thnt ta-It 

Aildi~ic)nal1y the PEL% d~rnnlition pn is extremely limitcd rn 

range and acctiracy G~n~ml Snint 

concludccl that demolition targets 

could he enga~ed bv the >I1 tank 

Thcl M 1'9 arcuracy is a quantum 

lrnprovempnt nvor thr CEVs accuracy, xlthough t he M 1 high-vxplosjve ant itnnlc (HEAT, rouncl's 

d~-=trurtlv~ ~ifect is 1-3 than thnt 

of the CE\''.-- 165mm hiKh-explasive plost~r IREPI round 

parahl~ ciestructiv~ offiirt can be 

pru\'~dcd sil-npl?, I>y firing more 

HE.YI' cln he targ~t. In sum, the 

C'Th'(:, YSARET-TR roncludecl th:lt 

nu M 1 :an t:'kt> out fortifications 

tt70' Tl~~ref(~r(l, the CEG' iq nut mission PSSPH t t~ I 

3T:li1:,. I;rri~-y dlvrq~on~ now et~jo~' 

3 i~il! i.(!tn~~l~mcnt of 519 ..SCFs 

?.ht> rn:ikc ri tilt: diff;-l+r.ncc 1:: nus 

r~h~t~rl~-t:~.e:t~hir~g ~;jpc?brl~ ty 

iihrtl thc- CEL' ~3; rhp only hnrCIPIII~ r;lrt hnrr)x,pr in th~ fi;.rtv 11 

~+!wi-ly appr~~~iijted a$ taeadinp?... *'p~cln~ ~rem " Thp CEt''... ag~ 

and low density have h~storrcall?~ 

cornkli n~d tokeep that paring 

it~rn'= readiness rating below 

stnndilrd, often at n C4 rating (nni 

rcndyr All thnt has changed 

Thr 319 ACE is now the 

r't'tg~neers' prpn~ler protctht rd 

enrthmov~r for brsarh lng nperations Thuq. a C4 rcadin~sc status 

Ibr t I:P CEC' no lonjier rend@- th~ 

cntirc? PnFlneer hattallon C.1 I!-: 

nrr.l-all tnissicn c-spnhility JII fact. 

;n:nrl u~lit~ IIOIV ~(l~~lpped ylwith tl~~ 

179 .lC E su Iyprl ~y-e!~ uppr:~rlr, 

s4:;i~llnes; ~rh~n CICVs ~TP down, 

:~!ld %mtl 3I.P P1ITSUIng ill1 *Xt3!llp- 

--! . ' , , ,- ',. 

-- --m 

ending acclll i~l t IO!~ r~t' ! hrl 

M 1 Urencher. 1 rr-~.rr~n!r.~!ld 

that. f h~ Arm. r~plat:l-r r h- VEX, 

with IT1 tanks f:cluipperl IT;:!; 

p[ows. By nialti ng :his int.~ri~ir 

adjustment. we ~1l1 rr.pl:~ce n !I 

ui~r~li~l~le v~hir1,i. wi tlt a relraljl+: 

one equipp-1 wlfh a pirw !!l:irIe 

The grpnter gun nvr,u rJr?' 

achievrd wiih thp Y!P wiil al.;ir 

improve our ability to Fn5:?r-:sL 

st.andnff demo rnrpt 2 lTe --:a>. 

PVF~ .ju?f if? pr~du~-l i!?n i:: :In 3,: I 

I-IF!I' round for ''?~unk~l--%llrs:~~::r" 

(YpF II?t~~lOZl': :!.E :qll.I: 

*~r1uipped u4tth plor,w p~r.>.~.lclr.? 

~hc: PE~I~IF,:~PI* f~yc12 T.u;!~l~ :q (>:IIRmon, rr*;rr?ily ~i~pv?.~ n!:l,~ cha>sis 

todr.? --not years l'rnrti nr:r:. 

l'tiis snlu~in~~ will ;~ll,:)\~- 1.1:- rrb 

bpgin rcsi>lvln r~z~r., 31 c,oinhaL 

~?~<tf-~n dort~t~~~~i~at EQLI 13qk1~~r 

well ahead of the 11: !ril-.-z~-h~~r'.: 

fi~ldrng For c3xnl:1p!r.. lT.fJ 

prebahly c:ln det~rmj lib- I :"" nr 

timum n~znlber nnc! 1ypt3 of ruqu~recl tnnintenatlc~ p:.r=nn~l.i 

\Vr ran reso::,r ~I?E~>.:.II nr >1!1r1 

pill npry ISSUPF, ~>reccyj hc-11 I1 i:!J 

1 i~t au~hnt'iz~~? ~i9(?liilc"' I*?' 

iPI,I,:;5SLl 1=7lit.q, eti. ..21 :Ilk. 

same tim~, :ah12 cl orf:3!:17:i t ifin 

and equipment ['I'(>!:) pl:rso~lnt.I 

:pare< f~!- I lit- 3T1 tirr~,ich;r :\*11' 

seln:lln v~lid3ted 
Functional Area Assessment 

'sues 

"The focus.,. was 

modified to concentrate 

on restructuring the 

Army while maintaining 

total force readiness 

during a period of 

unprecedented change 

and turmoil. " 

By Colonel Wyiand Leadbetter 

he Army constantlv undergoes change. The current effort to reduce the slre of the Anny tn 

response to the collapse of the Soviet Union has 

forced signlf~cant chanqes In the total engineer force 

structure in the Act~v~ and Reserve Components. 

Changes In a large bi~r~aucrali~ organlzaZ~orl can be 

challenging, and those projected for ihe Army over 

the next few years w~ll s~gn~flcantly affect many 

aspects of the military engmeer structure The magnitude of these changes requires so~cific ~versjghts 

at all Army levels to ensure that they are accompl~shed with mlnirnum disrupt~on to the units 

~nvolved. 

To help manage changes at the Department of 

the Army IDA) level. the Vice Ch~ef of Staff of the 

Army WCSA) ~nrtiated the functional area assessment (FAA) process In 1983 The process provided 

a means for the Army to rdentify and resolve issues 

that precluded or inhibited the execution of shoRterm plans and programs. The intent was that 

through issue resolut~on, the Army, organized by 

fi~nctional areas in a stovepipe structure, would be 

forced to solve problems through horizontal 

integration. 

Ttle FAA's focus was on specific program objecr~ve tnernarandunl (POM) years and un~ts that 

would be affected most by the programmed 
changes. The goal was to ensure tnat all tactors 

relevant to oryanlzal~onal development and 

matenel acquls!t~on and fieldlr~g were integrated 

rnto the force wlth rn~n~rnal rrnpact on read~ness. 

Ideally, eacti Arnny furictronal area was to cond~rct 

an FAA every :wo years 

I 

I 

I 

The Engineer FAA 

Objectives 

Accomplish the restructuring effort with minimum adverse 

impact on: 

- The soldier 

- Readiness 

- Modernization by force package 

- Personnel, traint ng, and leadership development 

- Materrel redistribution 

- Doctrine 

- Total force integration 

Resolve issues at the lowest level that may inhibit 

restructuring effort. 

, engineer FAA, in 1984, was an tntense 

of the total engtneer Funct~onal areas 

sp~ctflcally strircture, doctrine, tralnrng, persann~l, 

and rnater~el Issues In these arpas were discussed 

thoroughly and resolved at the lowest pflss~bta level 

Issues that coclld not be resolved went to the VCSA 

for resolut~on Whrle candirctrnq the f~rst FAA. the 

process of lior~zontalnteqratlon between all Army 

members, ~ncrr~d~ng malor Army cnmmands 

(MACOMsl, proponen1 schools, u~lts, ancl agencies 

that prov~ded solutions to rssues that hacl be~n unresolved for years. seemed to work. The Impact was 

felt thrnclghout the Army: the FAA process was here 

to stay 

The Second engineer FAA, In 1987, also resolved 

rssues successfully. Dur4nq the Pers~an Gulf War. the 

process was suspended but not forgotten. In October 

1991, th~! VCSA reaffirmed the Army's comrnrtrnent to 

the FAA process The focus, however, was modified 

to coricentratP on restructuring th~ Army while maintainlng total force readmess during a period of unprecerlented change and ti~rrnoll, The purpose of the 

pfocess was refined to look at the Impacts of restructuring on S~PCI?IC functronal areas throughocrt the 

POM vears. It would be u~ri to promote a well-coordinated, comprehensive, and cost-effective transition 

to a srnaller force, whik rna~ntarnlng erllphas~s on 

warfight~ng read~ness. rnaxrmtrinq combat power, and 

accomplishing force m sdem~zatinn. 

The 1992 FAA 

n June 1992, the Eng~n~er School was ~nforrn~cl 

that an engbnPQr FAA was scherlul~cl fnr presentation to the YSCA in October Th? schnol's Svslerns 

Pr~or~ty Integrat~on D~vlsron (SPI D), Dlrectnrate nf 

Combat Developments (DCD) was taskecl ta l~ad the 

effort A world-wrde message to all MACCMs Army 

agencres. and engrneer un~ts announced the FAA and 

requested Issues for cons~deration. 

An FAA team, consisting of one colonel, two 

NCOs, and a DA civilian, was ~stabl!shed wrthrn 

SPlD and comrnrtted full t~me to the project. Major 

General Chnstman. Engineer Schnol Cnmmandant. 

provided guidance to better focus their efforts. He 

dentifled equipment that needed rrnrnedtate attention 

and requested that the team be sens!tlve to th~ mlx 

of Act~ve and Reserve Compnnents and f~~lly Integrate both into the FAA prncess MG Chrlstman 

belteved that a new rii~nd set was rertil~rrri to focus attentron on th~ national strategy for cnsr~ response, includ~ng forcr? projectron, forced entry, national assistance, and disaster relief. 

Issues were fonvarded to SPlD throughout June 

and July. The team catalogrr~d each issue and ass~gned a polnt of contact (POC) a! the Engrneer 

School. The POCs rev~ewed each rssue and 

resolved prubl~rns at th~ lowest pnss~bte level. Issues were catalogu~d according to TRADOC's 
Purpose 

Examine the Impact of restructuring the Army through the 

POM years on the engineer functional area 

Ensure well-coordinated, cornpre hensive, and costeffective transition to a smaller force focusing on ... 

- Maintaining wartime readiness 

- Maximizing combat power 

- Selective farce modernizat~on 

- Soldier welfare 

Concept-Rased Reqi~~rernents System (CBRS) 

rnodern~zatlon functions doctrine, training, leader 

:If?velopment. organlzat~on, and materiel (DTLOM). 

An rssue $was consrdered resolved when the inrtiator and tl?~ school's POC concurred wrth the 

solzltion. A steering committee at the Engineer 

School revrcwed ttie team's work and prov~ded 

gt~~rlanc~ throughout the process. PeriodrcaTly, a 

qecleral ~Il~cer ~n-process revrew (IPR) was conrlcrct~d to ensure that the FAA process was in line 

wrth MG Chr~stman's intent, 

By nnrd-Ar.lgust, 120; issues had been tdentifi~d. 

and 105 of lherr~ had been resolved at the Engineer 

Schoot Thc rernarnlng 15 were approved by the Comrnanclan! for presentatron to the VCSA. 

The revlpw ptocess, however, was not com1'11ete. During September and October, TRADOC 

and the Comblned Arms Center commanders, a 

co~lncll of coloncls and a general officers steering 

cornm~ttpe at DA, and the Deputy Chief af Staff for 

Op~ra!~ons and Plans (DCSOPS) reviewed the f 5 

ISSUFS. After their revlew. ID issues rema~ned. The 

FAA was nr?w ready :or presentation to the VCSA. 

T~P fnllow~ny isstres werp presented at a briefing 

corrdtlcted on Nov~rnber 12, 1992, in Washington, 

QC, 

I Splif responsibility for U. S. Army topography. 

Current Department of Defense directives and 

Arrn~ reg~rlations split responsibrlity for topographv between DCSOPS, Chief of Engrneers, 

and Dcprtty Chref of Staff for Intelligence 

IDCSINT) CansequentEy, there IS no slngle POC 

on the DA staff for topograph~c issues. Split 

responsibility makes it increasingly difficult to 

managc raprdlv ~lxpandrng d~gital data 

capah~l~tlel; 

u Digital dafa comrnunicatiun requirement. 

There is an expanding requirement for digital 

topographic data and products at all levels. 

These demands potentially will swamp limited 

tactical communication capabilities. 

n Direct supparf (DS) maintenance nnd repair 

parts availability for engineer units. Mantenance and repair-parts suppon for many engineer ~lnlts recently was transferred to 

ordnance area suppod companies. Slnce then, 

engineer units have lacked timely DS support. 

Active diver requirement. The necessity for 

Army dlwng srn~ts tn the active force was being 

queshoned. 

Recruiting 008 and 52E personnel. It 15 drf - 

f~cult to recru~t divers and prime power perssnnel because of the demanding enlrance criteria 

and extenswe train~ng required for prof~clency in 

these rnll~tary occupatio~ial specialties. 

Career management fieXd (CMFJ grade sfructure. The 51 CMF grade structure lacks the 

promot~on potentla1 available ~ri other CMFs. 

B Commercial off-the-shelf equipment 

(COTS). Current Army procedures for acquiring COTS equipment da not prowde equipment to support training or long-term mantenarlce requirements. 

r imbalance in the RCGbufldozer fleet. C~lrrent 

distrlbutlorl of the M9 ACE needs to be revised 

to change the mix of ACES and bulldozers at the 

corps Fevel. The ACE should be removed from 

the TOE of any unit, spec~f~callyight d~vrsrons, 

that will never receive the vehicle because of 

reduced procurern snt L~ght drv~s~ons require the 

new deployable engineer universal comllat 
eartfirn over (DEUCE), wh~ch IS a 30,000-pound 

hulldozer that can travel at 30 miles per hour 

and has a new rubber track that elrrniriates the 

requrrernent for prrme mover. Additional ACES 

are requlred to fill shortages in engineer units in 

Force Package 1 

Digilal data collection and generation. Current Army systems are unable to suffrciently exploit overhead civilIan and military data collec. 

tfon assets. Army topographic engineers require 

an expanded capability to access these assets 

and prnv~de near real-trme tnpographic products 

ta cnmmanders The topograph~c imagery inteqrsflon prorntype (TIIP) rs a system of 

hardwatr? and software that provrcles this capablt~ty The current plan to fl~ld ;1 srngl~ prototype 

svstFm sflould he expanded to five systems - 

nne !or each of the four topographic banalrons 

and one for the tra~ning base 

Overaged, low density construcfion equipment. Much of this equtpmar~t 1s serlousl!, overaged, but we clo not expect to replace rt in the 

curren: fiscal envlronmpnt. whit^ procurement is 

prog:anlmed rn the POM, it IS always deleted 

befmr~ the vear o: execut~on. No resources are 

curren:ly ~derltlfied !n maintam toe large quarit~trcs of overaged constrl~ct!on equipment that 

will remain In the f~~ld many years past 

prolected life spans. 

Issue Resolution 

FAA tearn worked closely with oth~r Army 

aaenctcs and commands di~nng this per~od to 

dot ne thc solutrclns tn each ilnr~solved Issue. In 

most caser. consensus was ach~eved on a referred 

sot~lt~on Wh~re agr~emeqt was not poss~ble, mult~ple 

s~lut~ons were h1~)t7l1gtitnrl the presentation In 

response, the VCSA provic'ed immed~ate suppost for 

the follcrw~nu programs 

a Prn~ur~went of the heavy assa~ilt bridge and 

breather rn the current POM. 

Procurement of TllP sfstems for each 

topograf~tllc battalion and !he trainmg base in 

the FY 96 POM 

Procurem~nt of the DEUCE for hght d~v~sions in 

:he FY Rti POM. 

lnvestnierlt strategy of $25 rnillron per year for 

procurement of low denslty engrneer constructlon Pqu~llrnent In the current and FY 96 

pC)vs. 

Establishment of an AMC task force to evalrmte 

overaged eny tncer constnlct~nn equtpment 

The VCSA tasked his staff and other Army agencles and commands to fcrrther evaluate more content~ous issues and ro return at a later date for final 

resolutions. Hem Directed DCSOPS to fold diver requirements 

into ongoing Joint Chiefs of Staff's roles and 

mission stud~es and to bring COTS management 

and procurement under control. 

Directed the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logisttcs 

(DCSLOG) to include Class IX resupply for engineer DS maintenance sections in the ongoing 

total asset vis~bilrty and strategic cornrnunrcat~on 

~n~t~attve, Addltionallly, directed DCSLOG to 

develop a schcdule to ret~re overaged engineer 

construct!on eqr~iyrnent. 

Directed FORSCOM to review engineer equlpmcnt stat~oning at the National Training Center. Pre-position the corps' sl~cs of engineer 

eqi~ipmenthat normally would be tasked to 

support a maneuver unit That equipment 

would be avaiiable to un~ts participating in 

Iralnlng at Fort Irw~n. 

Directed his 5taff ta prepare a topographic 

s~ngle POC Issue paper for dec~sion by Army 

leadersh~p 

In closlng, the VCSA praised the engineers for 

their outstanding efforts in Desert Shield. Desert 

Storm, and th~, dtsaster relief operat~uns rn CONUS. 

He Fncllcated lhat lhese rec~nt combat and peacetime 

actions prove engrneer force versatll~ty and support 

their future viability. HE! closed by saylng that engineers are leadrng the Army's efforts to integrate the 

total force into the FAA process. He stressed that enylneers must be vigilant as tlie Army's watchdogs in 

the environmental arena 

In all aspects, the 7992 FAA was an ~~nqual~fied 

success It reaffirnled the importance of the FAA 

process 70 engrneers and the entire Army community. 

As a result, engineers arp now better prepared to address upcorning f~scal arid structural changes By 

using the FAA process engineers can view the fsltur~ 

as an oppoflunlty to manage chanqe w 

Col~nel Leadbetler is chief of the Systems Prrarr!y fntegration Dwisron rr) the Directorate of Combal 

develop men!^ at the Engrneer Schoof. He pi-evjously 

served as chief of the Engrneer 2nd Mme war far^ 

Divisrons, of the Eng~neer and M~ne Warfare Directwata at Fsri Monroc, Vjrgmia. COL Leadbetfer has a 

masters degree /ti englneerrog from George 

Washrngton Unrverstty and 19 a graduate of the Command and General Staff Colieg~ and the National 

War Colleg~. 
Engineers Vie for Expert Supper Honors 

':/l ?PZ:.' I twn f to d?r!clop u n-ompefifmn ?;rrirlrrr rr/ thr. EI.?:~~~.; Ie,ti~ tr?.niar? Bad~r~ pFIJJ/ orld K.X~YIT F7iiPlr? ,\f,-dr8-c ( R(7(!,ytb 

lRFL411r:/ co??tpehtr,~ns ?/?of ttie t'nn us,? tr. &mnn.ctrctc o?:r sl:i!!? nc .SC~~SI-S. I IC:OR~ ~f to bc CI physirni!? ond mr.nrnl!\, c/rmnr?d 

my ~crnt that inclvrlrs the rotnl s,vectr?l m of Iigh I erzqrr.~~~ crnd I!gh t rr!fnnfl>t shilIs rvqrtuwi io r)pc?tate tn ti?,? 2,7fj: Infnn!?? 

Dfzlision (L!,ghi ;. I uJ,cn r2prc! it to hr art ttrr~llcnt1.r~ i?l!n,q n.sacssrr?rn f fit. the t)afla!io~~. A; the r(ir~pl~ti0~t 0:' ilt~ (:o?~:,=rhl~?n, 

rsm TJr R~arl',= dlrrrtivr, 

I lip pxppt-1 ~apprl- test rvns 

~-~~atedilnd~t~=rrdnn~nl~~i~-~-~tn 

thr 63th L;;l~gln+~r Ratt~l~on 

+hnTielrl 8arr:lc.k; IT:I~~ aii CRPt:111: Tln~ \;os-;~nau ctudird [ha 

(1 1r~*rt lvt' ,IHII dr<qfl PCI nh~~t !I,PS 

zntI prwedure~ SOT t ht- trh-l EIP 

annlyzrrl ti~r h;-itfnl~nt~-, rn~ssrnn 

t~ch~iirnl knowledgr thi~t in- 

, Pro\uid~ a trninill~ 3s ~pl] 3s 

cludrd corninon tasks. sapper 1 pv,ltt;3tion opportunity 

sIcllls, air ~sqauit ~I~IIIs, and a 

pli>..;irnl fitness o~qr+srnrnt CPT 

\'~~st~~at~'':c~I!ject~vt.-\veretoa I.lqvc'l(jp a J~tnanJinr ~nd 

,,II:I I I+J:ICIII~ tt=5t or ~npp~r 

(12El :4t?d ~~l~n1~llGIl +i<lll: 

rn Kcacopnk~~ .:ippcrc Tnv tllt11t. 

rurnh:lt ~ng~nwr 4tj 11s n ncl c~- 

es5rnl 1~31 tark I l~t and suppni+tiri,cl 

~ndicidunl ts~ks ;qs u~lj nr rtlplit 

S1.orn conltn:q~~drrs, ~taif ~lffic~w, 

and senlor NCOs Then hc 

d~veloped a list uf skills and ! 

fraorrlina~y phyiiral rendir~~sc 

C;aup the stattlh of indivitlunl 

ski11 ahilitles to assps= training prcficienc~. 
rl.~li~r~~* r;~<ks, t~rckp~i 1r1tt1 riv~ 

(.:-I! t+~:fjt-~~s. ~4,~rr~ ~dpr~l ifit4 LC) 511 p13(>1'1 thc\~~bj~c:tivt~s Thp* ,.at~!p:t+Il.ir:s 

WPI'U: 21 xvrit tr!n tr.~t, phy+ir.;il tit- 1 

nrss n?;s~~$menl, clnyt~i~h~ kind 

navlpnr lrlrl, h:.~i~cI.=o prol'ici~ncy 

in '7.5 indivi~iu:11 skill^, a11d a 12- 

111ilt1 rnacl tiwrch Ail \?I3 a~id 2li3 

.=<)ldicrs in tho Ci51.!1 Hutt:lliot~. 

rt~.c:i l.cI I~.ss of r:j n k. pm t't icipaterl. 

'T:: wrn rt~ro~ition as .lri expt1r.l 

say;pr.~:, so1dic.l-s II:~ t.c) receive ;I 

Gl.1 on t?r~c!~ task 

1'15.itt~n Psf. 4 romprrhti~sive 

px;-lm tvas dc-.f~ivpcd lo rlotcrmine 

ti:c~ ~o[r-llers' l;nfi\vl~d~.,.~ of' ! 2j3 

(sIcII! 1~~~12 1 :hr~uyh :.:I, air ASsnu!t. :~nci r-otnrnr*n lask test ir~g 

i C'T''. I I ta5k. It ;va+ :I li~nr~d iest. 

t3nd FioIJ Manun1 3-24 was ihc 

? .' 

- -. t- =% -, .: - 

- - -. -3 . . . so,.- . . . . a 1.- . ,-' P .I. I 

+ I ,I . - 

* -6 - , *: , - *- ,= 

-. .., , i ,'-- . . , 

- . a I 

Dr r. -. *? .-I 

- .- .* '. 

b . -, -. - wm 

> 

3, I- 

- 

or] ;?LI I h(~r.~ i.e~l r.pfplpnc.r Sol- The 12-mile road march was the make-it-or-break-it point for many candidates. 

(-1 -3 - - b 7 ?. kl;lcl f rl +fyJr(? %I> p{-. lhPLln ! u31- 

TTlr:, I.:, [ <I p:,:<,,\ :.\ f 2 :I 

Ph?rsi'c" 7br'm "'hl' 

~V:F r hln .IV~?:J, P~,~I(.;\I J"I~ lt~','; 

'I'PCT I.IFPTI. u<ir>?, r!i~:e k;lF, ST:~:T(~- 

"c' "f >" F'('illfi Per 'r'nl to 

ri2(hl? I.rP a (.;!:I Stal~ci:~rds fbr yu:lj- 

~rp~arrd.;r~-~r~~~.:~~~.o~~di~l~ti~Yh'l 

2 1 - 2 0. ..x-P !*cb ri r r 1 u n f{jyi:~d 

Drfll nncJ :2';,~hl Nar'ignfio~. Sf-rl(:tie~s' n:lvigal inn 

_; k i t I.+ xv+.::.c. :c-si PC! usi ll:n; the 

di\.iqion*s EIB ;cc1ur5c. Suldicrs EzacE 

to :~tt,airr Ljr~!. t-lut ~f'fi~.'e points on 

day [;III~ n21vignt !;,>11 anrl two out of 

I h~+*l p~t:t.s on l!jt-. night clearl- 

!.w I<n tl I II y ('t JU 1-5~. 

""n"s+Dr' C'"?~I)Q~~"~' T~sf. 

'~hist~!.;t~.;~~t~l~!~~.~rt~~iher:o~np1.t if inn ?PYS di~~n~.~~~stsnt er! 

' Train inu T'lan rnanua\s. P:>l-tiri- tvh i(*l~ {*;L!I i?o LYI>~I> QII i~l~.~is~l.~[(-* 

pants t~,uld r~tcqt on t\vr> ,ask5 1 p:.ilA tlf thb3:r 11 ~i:fr.t~-rz~. :4II t lit. ;:#Istill r~main c.nmpc-titivc?. ,,I,, -I-<, %.f,!:+i h, ,t+ tl ,,x-,-~ q.1 1 ,I- I':I~I~>. 

1 i d rck. 1.1, i. 1 1-nrr ir..?~! : 1 i.6 .I-: ij~ii:,~la.. : :lI,/illrl~u:- 

L!.:I+ ~l~L~ fj~~ql :.jr~<j TI,,.~;: <r~j~/j1l;~ 1 ,.c!Lgp Ill, I,;k!., Lrlr-,,qLf ,c,n I :.I 11 

~v~t~t I!Y : IIP cci111!74 it ior~ 1 I ub~,~q phi,4>- ~.~~I~c,!;~;~ ~.,~~~lpt;~~,~:~ 

~aTc~i]~11r~1P~;~~~3n~3,t.~,5i;i,r~l I 

stanrfarri.~ (;?I. a :i-ht~rlr rn,1r.r.l1 WII li 

fu 11 c:nml>;a 1 rlclnd-h, .;:irluFy the 65th Fmml 

crluipmen t, u7t:apotl. m21sIi. I;r~l:?:.. 

;1nd 30-pound rurk ,. \Yhrtt d ist in- rh+fr!u litif: t hp r.rbt~lpr:~itn11 

KUishpCf tbiS In:l rrh rTon, rij i':'rcu It h~r:~uso T h~ 

Ott lFLr$ w:18 tl,P cnuTTc,. ril:qn t~.)::i ;s :t c!ivlsil-rn;31 iighr c,nhi31,- it xvnT uph i 1 [, i t,cludirlE: a ?,,lnc-.~?r h:?~ t :%I irjrr w ht:~s~ rom- 

%mile stri:t c-h t h;-it rr1.5~ ~xc?i-e 1 Ilnil pnnics , nre ~vnri~~u:il!y oil th~ go, 

1 fp~"~.1 WI th SI'\'PI':I~ .+3101*t, 

,<]lar.p i 1lL] i rles, Se\ocm I 1.rl (-'1'31].> ,~t. 

thpI'i31 lKpF1l,S:l pprr,a~tdnil,:,s :5:,lL ,lt 

~ouwes rr!~n;trkcd that tl~i-: r*f~:~cl 

rh~ e: n il Er~rlu-tlt 1~- su ppor:; t hr: 

-loin1 !7~ndil1t!--.; 'l'r>it~il:.e: C.:entrhr. 

:I 11c.l dcpl~;.s T <> .\USI r:~ I in51 t~rl i !I 

:l~~ter islz~~td: 11;1waii. F~:~dir:!! 

:) t i:!~: W~IPT-I :311 1:0r11 p:111 rc>s rr811 !~ 

!r:lin lip ;IIIC~ p;q~~irip:~tp ill 

r.~r~~~iyv!t I T I~)!I 1~1f hv111 T?I;I.~<IY td~s- 

: V:I< 1 IV::S tlr:h,:~ rl~, 1 ~Ilpi-~=:il ~IG. 

!-L, I~V+Y:C.I., t t~c-* l-~:i~ :;)I ::>?I t~i:l r~ij~.~i 

rr, (:?~n~r, I ,~ci:,!l~i~r*, ~11:ii :I[I 1 ?PI 

:4ni! 2 1 F, +,~?f.li&:r= ;:~TI~~wIQ~? ;I 1111 

~,~~~~i(:rnipcl ~~YJI I S~icrfb~z. fllr i h i.5 

: i~.<t-t-i~nr.- ~Ot~llj~i 11 11.~11, r:?111~- to 

nl-il?. spvr-11 s~Il.lic!r,: li~u*c.vr!: nll 

i~;irtil*~ F;~~l( F th?. (h:),jll.-t il icltl 

t:r~ttel- t railled and C.;~~PI. to ~0~11- 

t 11~11' it)^ lit? 10 :u:'r~)tt>pli~!~ c-fimbrtt i r~lnrch way the mn=r ~!~zllr.ng:l nc of 

~llyitlr.~~ t:l?lic !~IcI[~ ltl\'~.I~ ! +I ,p,r,>A,.(,b,r,5 ~l~(: ~~c~,I~.5~~, [,(>fi illlet I; 1.1 111 gh :3 1, c"TT t:7~li.<. i~tirl ai 1. ns- I!. ~~~l~~.,~l ,<.! ill ,..n [;\, h cb,i.a: ;,,rli~,r 

+311lt I;.IP:~c~ i~i 2 l:!t,tick\ ~ynvirl:~ti- Lvll,j ,v(,rp pst r:.T,)r, j+. pt ,J,b:,,:L, [I!, [ii 

werr t,81reo froo: the T;I fib F,~- 

pert 3qPdical ~~d~~, :jir ,kq1, 5chr,nl, (1'1'1: ;ylnrj SoEiEit.r 

ment Fvents were ;;r:ided on ;I :incl dc.:~r.:t~l ah(- ~itle f.;rprsrt GO!i\TO GO basis. 'Sw~nty-live 

pi1.f lripnlit- Silldie~r who pai~! !irt Q ;I pin Iilr +!I P cspert sapper 

taslc?, indurli~>g rnin~!count.esmine 

wasCilre, Ci~~~irjlit iu115, Icnfits. lashink- and ~vir~ Lirr.5, rnmrnunirntionr: sltifls. u-c.npons Ictro\r.ledge. 

slin~ Ioadhir %=snutl operalint~s. 

.211cl firs( :lid. ~v~rr. tet.crl. Stn~ld- 

:311 ~IIF? test t.oml~u~ir~i rr; ~vel.t! 

awasdpr! th~ ~.trpe~l r;;?ppl~~ /bin. 

The Rrwards , ' c appc8t- ln thr li.51h dc-~jy~i~l :I 

pin nt~d a t.r.t-tificnt~ fctr t-t 

:ille 

;Sft~~.-aci iqn 1.e~11t: !'t-~lr~ I fisth 
The Expert Sapper Test ernphasised testing and training. Each carididate was 

thorouohlv -, debriefed on their oerformance for each activiw Here SSG Chaoman 

assesses SSG Lee's knowledge of the AN-PSS 11 mine deiector. 

sho\ved that all levels supprtcd two 

main area51 the test's ability to 

determine extrao~uiinary sldiers 

and its training value. Many of the 

65tlr's young privaks and spialists 

were excited and challenged when 

they had to demonstrate their 

abilities on skill IeveLs two and three 

task. kting at these levels gave 

lhe soldiers an idea of what they 

could expect to do as a team or 

scluad la3der in a combat situation. 

They could start meeting the chal- 

!cilg-pjof the future. 

Soldiers at all levels gained an 

understanding of the skills and 

standards that they had to meet. 

Specialist Christopher Kelly, 

1ieadqual.ters and Headquarters 

Company. expressed his view of 

the test "The things I failed I felt 

were minor. I now know what I 

need to do. I think that with good 

personal preparation next year, I 

can pass. It was a good test." 

By studying the test results, 

leaders could identify areas where 

more training or better training 

tactics were needed. The com-

~nander gained insight into individual soldier's abilities in terms 

of skills, spirit, morale, and endurance First Sergeant Michael 

Balch. Alpha Company, agreed. 

"The [expert sapperl test is an excellent idea to use as a vehicle to 

train our soldiers toward a goal of 

achieving expert knowledge in 

their primary MOS." 

The 65th Engineer Battalion is 

proud of its expert sapper competition and will share the program 

with anyone who asks. They intend to conduct the test annually 

and hope to increase the success 

rate to 25 percent or higher next 

year. Thucydides, in History of the 

Peloponnesian Wars, may have 

stared it best when he said, 'We 

must. remember that one man is 

much the same as another, and 

that he is best, who is trained in 

the severest school." w 

Captain Geoff Gdlespie, an 

Ai~stralinn exchange office:; is nssign,erl to the asszstant division engineer section in the 65th Engineer 

Battalion, 25th Infantry Diuision 

(Light), Hawaii. He is a 1982 

graduate of the Officer Cadet 

School, Portsea, Australia. 

(Per 

v 

t is imporl tant that. we SICL ,LOW 

. .for two reasons. First and 

forelnost, we I~ngineersneed to reston? our ck libility wil ih the com- .-- bined alms ibrce. We are now, and 

haw2 been, ul ?reliable because our 

CE\ 7s are ha!rd to maintain and 

oftein are 1101t available. Far too 

many ... -.--. rnarleuver commanders 

literally scoff in disgust at CEV 

readiness. That skepticism is starting to join a festering (though undeserved) disdain for the capabilities and reliability of the M9 ACE. 

Because the engineers' reputation is 

in precarious jeopardy, I strong:[Y 

urge us to act quickly C)ur engine er 

force will Ovel Tome thk ; skepticis,m 

~

only when we replace the CEV with 

a reliable breaching vehicle and 

when we demonstrate the reliability 

-O 'Le M9 ACF 

rondly, tl ce envimnt will new ?rthan it is 

In the near rusure, aready 

scan3e IFSOUN :es will become even 

scan3er. and c< )mpetit,ion for the few 

~ema~ningresources will be brislr. 

Now is the time to demonstrate the 

merits of an M1 cht~ssir nterim breaching needs. 

There are more issucDbu b3Ais 

debate (on both sides), but time is 

running out. One brig1 ~t note: bfY 

division commandc?r, Mailv >r 

Gen :kwell, is solidly in 

favo :ing the CEV with an .. . MI with plow, and he has formally 

submitted a proposal to Major 

General Christman for consideration. Perhaps you'll joil I us in su Pporting this proposal! 

Colonel J. B. ihh) ONeill is commander of the 24th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) Engineer 

Brigade. His preuious heavy 

division experience irzcli~des service 

in the 16th Engineer Battalion, 1st 

Armored Division, and as battalion 

commander, 17th Engineer Bnttalion, 2nd Armored Diuision. 
I 

Book Review I i 

- 1 fightlng soldiers' story of 

tl: Iitirean IVar, fronl thp 

surprfse iiivnqinn through the 

dlffjcvlt F~ghtlnp on thr- 11.nt.sh 

t~rraln of thp Iiorcan pvninsula 

to lt. ~nc~nnrlus~ve encl~ng. Thr 

1~'ssnn: ~c;BI*H~.~ frorn tllis rnnflict 

r?1115t not b~ 10~t 011 DIIT newly 

P~PC~ pd Pr~3idrnt RII~ hi5 C~IOSP~ 

clnnle=t if*. inti-rnat lnn;\l, and 

~t~;I!ti~t+>r ~d\*:~:i~~ 1i1p li;~~ P heard 

~nl!lt:~ry le;trJ~~-; I PI! 113. "N? nlnrc ,. r;~;k .Smirh-;'' f<ut w~. a~<f 

our polit ~c.:~l le:ad~lr;: mud rlndcr. 

s~;and t h 12 t r,3~~.Cfy 111 order ro 

prvvPnt rl .;~rnilat' n~currei~c~ 111 

thc Future 'To ensurn tve pr~rv111~ 

Iraarler= w1t.h nppropriati- :~rlvicw, 

ti11 uq rnl.lsL nlru unrler~tand 

tl-rc !nrli~iclual anci unit rqadin~w 

requ lrprncni = nf ortr :~rmori fnrCP.= Thi~ i.; ~spe-.rillly Imporrant 

it1 lrg!~~ r>t' thb= r~.~rr~.rlt force 

rcdvct /on 

7"h:s Grnd ur I,C5rr 1s a (:OIIIpr~.lir:n~ive nnrl impl-iv.csively wrictun histop compilrd from many 

wul-re,;- of'flrlnl rcr'nrds, operat.i~n~l jtjurn:.ll,s, hi?t(?rj~s, mPmolrs. :~nci nc\v?papel-s 'The mosr 

rmprjrtant. ref'eretlc~s ~VF~P the 

p~r+>nal n:-irratis.~s of men whl3 

s~rvrd in Kol-en 'I'he- added a 

11 u !rl:in char~~r-rpl- tn the bonk, 

m:lhi112. it c-x+rr-!lneI,v iilf crest ing to 

?*P:.~<I ~$5 w~:[j 35 ::I l~~;~r~ii~~~ I?Xpc':'lc'llc,: m. 

I I-:.. I:,(-Nrk hl'911+ wif 11 n =upprh 

shor.1 t.ww-;.ien' ~oi the yclE!ticsl and 

rnrl~l:l!.;i s~tu.?llin at li~r? tlnle 111 

til!tr~-~ th~ \~c~,lk ,is 3 ?I~r:\n~-t 

l~~idr-r*' fi~tii C.(~II~~;III~ ram- 

~niindet.;' ;tory If I.; a h!qVrriy r~f 

their ~~perirnr~?~, prlin, iuFf~ring. 

and unprzparednpss Fc-hr~n hnch 

irnm~diatsly draws you into t!:e 

h~art of thp subjwt atid doe.; not, 

let you pxit u11;il th~ hnok is 

finishtd Early on _YOU HI+@ along- 

~Ide the cou~*:i~.ous Colonel Snaith 

and !I!< mrr fvnm the untr:~inpd 

B$tll JnTrluL~y D~VI~IOII, n.;kinfi 

what you roulcl hnv~ dnne r.o <top 

the qupericn- 1nv;asron fr~rcc L~~:Pz. 

you nt-e w~th th~ 71 h hI:~ri~~ea. 

flyhi lng val!-tra~nwi Chlnc4e at 

fh~ ~'~CII~~;IIII Rrsqr lvolr, :sncl *!?on 

~vlth t hr "id irll:3nry ll~\rr*ion on 

I T~nrttrreak Ilicl~lTl~r. Elr~. 3, (3 c.olnl-~;lt I~atlcr 

;it ~>la;t'un~ c'urnprtny, and hnr t~lion 

level& ciur~n~ tlil; \Tar Lr.=ing hiq 

e\p-rlc.JIr[> ant! tnatly pqfional 111- 

tQnIf*Wib he i4r,\rrlh~~ f IIP f(~e11ngs. 

~I-~CSI~TPG. ~ild ~PL-II-S of t t~r =()Icltrrs, xvfl FVII cr~ahlrq the r.c~a.?rr t~ 

~l~~tir~~~t,~n~l the' nct tpn-: and 

fi-ustlxr~ Jnc of thfm W~IO fnu?h? 

Rcctdrr-, czrl ;~pply ; I1 i.: to t!lrir 

o~v!=~ exprrwnci.5 2nd b~g;n to apju nior ICRIJPW til otrr t~ln(l(.~+n :Irmy 

12 (*~v~rpd ;11 rhts I71)ok The tnwe 

you study hislnry, th~ tl~orr YOU 

find that 111~~ Iessn~s clo not 

chan~e-and t hry recur pjtvry 

time an army is mentally and 

pt>y~ic;tlF?- u npl+pp~i-ecl 1 ~r figh r 

Snld;~r.? in stn;lll 11n!t5 c.ilrl >ztb 

r his t~oolr in t!lra~r. r i.a~nittg lnt !hrthr mlgp nu su rviv:q l 

'Tt~rc hook murt bc rr:ld ;-11ic! 

wc. must bc- tmined !'or cont:n - 

grncy, -short-notice. nprra( tonTIIF Korran J!?ar was 3 contillpnry oper:it,ian thai got out .bT 

hancf-som~thin~ WP must no' 

Irt happen a~nin IfT\'t. must 

prop~rly prPparP and CI~U I? 711~ 

snirllcrs for the first fight, whr:r, 

thyf must win. 

'I'his hcrok alsc rn~tqt hc ~P:~cI 13; 

our smlor civ~l~f~~t ~FLI II~II~~FIY~ 

IP:JCI(~I-~ TI: PI-^, will ,3 1 \VR,VF kw 

:nnic~ risks l-lui11 ~n ta I hi. dpf~ns~ 

hutir;c.t. ~II t f TIS.~~ 111~3~ ncr: !>I 

:-lt the t1xi)~~~yt.? of' OII r <L~~c!I~!IT 

The ntrillnr pilints ol~r lil;u, crinrc3l that c:onr,cpt 1s \.%:ri mur: :; !!I 

pl-or-u re [h~. h~st, wll:-tp(?ns for C.LI r 

fiqht ing soldiers. Wc. must pmvide! t.h~m r 11 c mnbi1it)- rr.(~u:~.r?d 

for succr9L IVp must cnnt in!~r- ti, 

provirl~ :he111 illc he<! t!-a111:n~. 

like thgt nf'fer~d i~t our :-01:12~:!1 

Irainrnc: rentcl-5 Thlc Kl:li:' ,.)! 

r -I an ex,-i- llc-n I 

per.=pr-r*tis~~. nn\r.ar anrl .+~!di~r:~. 

and \vt:,3t t hcay rc-qulrc. !n KI:I-\-~~~( 

and be ~ictr~l'io~~ 
are Safe Distances? 

By Master Sergeant William Green, Jr. 

Fa onm! A Loud explosion rips throi~gh the arr. and c,e~r rmgs out Tron, happy so~r,,e,s. Another 

st]: c-1ssfuI denrolrti~n mission. But. wait! A strange 

sound IS heard, followed by a weak scream for help. 

Arl acc~d~rit--an ~lnplanned ev~nt--has occurred A 

soldter was stnick by a piece of shrapnel 

Ttirs Zrag~c sccnarrn has occurr~d 32 trrnes In the 

past fclur wars, resulting In four deaths and 28 

c~r~o~~sly inlurud snld~erc Not long ap a peec of 

metal was pmpellerl from ;I detonation sltc lrsto in? 

fac~ of a soldrsr standrng bel-r~nc! an an~m ilni?ion 

veh~cle 200 meters awav Althotlyh the shrapnel 

r~movecl rnosf of hrs fact, th~ ~cld~er 1s strlt alive 

"A freak accrdenf.' you mrglit say, or 'the price of 

doing b:~siness." or "accidents come with the prcfesslon ' Yot~ have prnbably heard leader5 repeat these 

or slrnilar phrases Phrorlghotrt your career A more apprnpr~ate phrase, ho~vever, is ',fail~r;re to enforce the 

Warldard.' 

Marntn~nlng n safe distance is critrcnl to avoid~rlg a 

der~rolitlon accrdent A few months ago, a sold,., 'pr 1n 

one Llnl: was s~!t~ng on !he ground about 180 meters 

'rom a dctonar~on srte when a prece ox shrapnel 

str~~ck h~in in the cl-rest He lrved only 3 hotirs. Aga~n, 

leaders had fatled to etisirre the minimum safe d?stance from thr detonation. 

For those few enqlneers who have rntssed the experf~nce of stana~ng in a 5-second Clailstorm, don't 

live your fantasy on a demolbron site, That s called 

garr~blrny w~th vour life. Garnbl~ng that a plece of 

shrapnel or dehr~s has not ldeqhficd you as ~ts land 

Ing zcrne 

What are the odds that a ptocc of shrapnel has 

thn iralectory and force 10 S~:IOIISIV Inlure or kill ,> 

soldrerq Thrzt Tough q~~eqtinn depends nn several 

factors The number of d~~0llt10~ rrIIsSlonS takrng 

place on ary ylven day worldwtde the number of 

soldters part~clpatrnq In the, den'rolltrons, and th~ 

arnocrnl ~f rlebr~s and fragments that becoi~es atrborne. Other variables that affect the equat~on are 

the welght and shape of the demolition, soil content. 

arr dens~ty, angle of project~on, and veloc~ty. The 

result nS a c~mplrcated equatton by which to determine your odds 

Bcrt f~r the 32 soldrers ~nvolved In explns!ves accidents in the past 48 months, the answer 1s slrnple: 

Enforce the standard! The comrnon-seise standard 

says that the greater Ihe distanc~ you are from the 

explos~on, the smaller the chance of b~~ng struck by 

shrapnel 

Srme leaders continue to knowingly v~olate the 

m~nirnum safe d~stances rather than enforce the 

standard To be safe. leaders must go to thc: appropriate documents for guidance. When Ihes~! documents differ< use whichever distance IS the greatest 

The purpose of all demolition training is !o 

prcparc for combat, where the realtty is that sold~ers 

cannot always move to a safe distance. Wi!? that in 

mind, every leader must ask himself. "Do the tralnInq risks outwetgh the cost?" To m~n~mire the rrsk in 

any srtuatlon, the Safety Branch recrlmnends that 

leaders use the best product on the rnarket today 

risk management, Thls easy-to-use product can enhance soldiers' safe?y without hindering the success 

of a mlsslon. Risk management ensures that standards are known and rtsks are controlled (eliminated 

or reduced). 

To hc effcct~ve, the rules and five-step process for 

r~sk rnanaqemer'lt must be fully understood by all personnel rnvolved: 

RUFFS nf risk management: 

r l ntegrate rlsk management into plann~nq 

m Accent no lrnnecessarv r~sks 

Make r~sk declslclns at the proper level 

Accept risk if benefits outweigh the cost 
The frve-step process: merit process is easy to irse and will identify control 

Identify the hazards and assoc~ated r~sks 

Assess the rrsk 

measures that may prevent another pointless injury 

or death Don't be a leader who has to say, "If only I 

had enforced the standard, this accldent would not 

Develop controls have happened. " 

r I rnplernent controls Standards lor demolition tralnlng are ptov~ded in 

Chapter 18 of AA 385-63 and Chapter 6 of FM 5-250. Supervrs~! Know and enforce them. Minirnr~m safe distances for 

It IS the responsrbllity of leaders at all levels to en- some demolitions are shown below. 

sure subordinates know and fallow the rules and 

regulations that pertarn to ranges and the tvpe of MSG Wr!lram Green Jr. IS the Engrneer Branch Liarson 

dern olltlon framing be~ng conducted.The risk manage- NCQ at the United States Army Safely Center, Fort Rucker 

Minimum Safe Distances 

Oemolit~nri Type AR 385-63 FM 5-250 (pages 6-6 and 6-7)" 

1- - - - 

Bare charges 

Cratering charges 

30 tt 

Use The rnissle hmard dlstmce Snme IS AR 38543, as shown on 

Less lhan 27 pounds llkl - 300 meters (see page 6-6, FM 5-250 

para 7 8-1 1 for exception 

27 - 500 tbs - distance in meters equals 100 

limes the cube root of the pounds of explmive 

More than 500 Ibs - minimum of 800 mctcrs I 

Usc ~hc m~ssile hazard distance f~hove) 

Not mentloned in AR 

i Shaped charges 

275 meter; In defiEade 

Same as for 15 Ib 

! MI A2 Bangalore 

torpedos 

I 

Steel cutting charges Charge no! to exced 2 pounds Musl be fired in 

an Rpproprlafe confining structure with an 

excavated pi1 at lemt one meter deep, If fired in 

an ovn pit, m mat made of hornpfype material 

should mver the charge. Personnel should bc at 

lmst 300 mntem away In defilade, preferably 

undor cover. 

Less ttran 30 kg - 330 me!srs 

More Ihan 30 kg - 530 rncterj 

1 ,OM meters Distance mny be 

reduced lo 300 me!ers when fired 

vedicslly into lhe ground. I 

%me e.e for 15 Ib I 

1 000 rne!srs ~f p-rswnncl are al r'qkt 

angles lo *IS If In Ihc l~nc of -1s 200 

me!ers 'or ~tnrdr~g !3~150mel .md 100 

me:ors lor prnne prr-,mncl 

, 1,000 meters 

I Breaching charges 1 (concrete) 

Cbargcs on concrete should not exceed 30 

pounds and should be pl~ced or the s dr: n~arest 

2hc observers Dersonnel should be at lest 300 

meters In def~lade An uncccuared distance of 

900 me!ers mus! be provided on thE side 

opposltc the charge. 

1.090 meters. Elstarroe msv be 

reduced :o 500 meters II personpel arc 1 

prone and wearing kwlx 

* For FM 5-750: Numbers from chart on page 6-7 must be compared to chart on page 6-6. 

The sale dlstancs is the farthest of the two distances. 
By Alan Schlie 

became complicated to the point of not working as 

4 :;:,<. :.)i i,:~~~>s (KLO?) ;in!? !r; l!;~?c!eep s!~ battles progressed. Additionally, such impromptu struc-

!:;+i,?!,jc:, !:ri7:ef-:p,~,ti~,q+ . '- ! turing fostered a false sense of flexibility at the corps < ,,,, . 

. ,.

. ,.>J ~ ;;, ~,7,,;,.?.. , .L., .! 5- be res,~.i!nstvero th? level. . ...,.r .. .,,~.? ,. ,..,,;!<7:><i~!r.g,!.::,c~:u,:,-<!,~!!/1!7;cf?:;!::#:,<.f.~ 

, . , , , <,, ~J- , , . ,,., ... ,-a. L%ve!T,.,:: f.7:;ge :? !i<L,,: *:;!?,Tee: 

,.,.-,:I' I,,:.: ,.r.:~>,.i -. F 

The ERI Solution 

R :),I:!;(. -:8,r,I;;; :~,;,,::.b3,J!:t, ,~:, t.,,,9, -a.C,, ,L J.J,tc! [I! 

'-RI, developed in 1988 and 1989, provided suffi-

,~,!,;,!.+~,,. .! ..., ,,;;-,," .,:, .,,.,. qcient engineer assets organic to the divis~on .. ... 

and simplified command and control, communicaw t ,; :'.~ ,.![L!;~;:,+<:!r, ,,:!::,b ::,,.. /,<;?nv, f::,'(: :;rC): re tions. maintenance, and supply. Under this concept .. , , ,,, .,,,~< engineers would habitually associate with a warfighting maneuver unit, thus increasing responsiveness 

and building teamwork. ERl's focus was not only on 

the heavy division but also on providing maneuver 

As Conimandant of the U.S. Army Eng~neerSchool. 

Major General Richard S. Kem's announcement in 

1986 set in motion events that would mesh engineer 

mlsslons with AirLand Battle tenets and lead to the current Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI). With the expected publcaton of an evolutionary FM 100-5,Operat;ofis, in May 1993, the terin AirLand Battle (ALB) and 

the concept of AirLand Operations (ALO) will no longer 

be used. but the tenants remain unchanged. This artlcle describes the ERI structure, how it was fieided, 

and results of the fielding. 

Background 

*qince World War 11, engineers have faced - serious battlefield defic~enciesbecause of cumbersome organizational structure and antiquated 

equipment. Engineer support to the close combat 

heavy combined arms team was broken, and there 

were not enough engineers organic to maneuver forces. Attempts to correct the problem by assigning ad 

hoc task forces forward out of corps assets overloaded engineers at all echelons. Command and control (CZ), communications, maintenance, and logistics 

comrnanbers at corps and division levels with 

dynamic, flexible, and responsive engineer support to 

influence the battle. Restructuring corps combat engineer battalions. combat support equipment companies, and bridge companies retained the corps' 

capability and flexibility. 

TRADOC reviewed the heavy division engineer 

brigade's ERI table of organization and equipment 

(TOE) in October 1990. Headquarters. Department of 

the Army (HQDA) approved the TOE In March 1991. 

and the 1st Armored Division and 3rd Infantry 

Division, located in Europe, converted in August 

1991. The conversion process in engineer units Armywide has continued since 1991, with all but National 

Guard units now converted. The new organizational 

structure embodied combined arms teamwork and 

current warfighting doctrine. During the developmental and approval time frame. TRADOC and HQDA 

had three ongoing force-design processes that impacted on the engineer force structure and ERI: 

TRADOC's AirLand Operation force-design 

process focused on lean not robust. 

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) 99 force structure 

review process exam~nedmajor conflict areas 
arrd how the Arniy would respond to natronal 

secc~rlty threats. 

I The Army was restructuring to reduce conventlanal forces In Europe, 

The ERI destgn antic~pated changes that ALO 

would cause In div~s~anal headquarters and 

maneuver brigades. This was done by creating the 

dual tactical operations center (TOC) of plans-operations, a tactical command post (TAC), and a REAR. 

The requirement for an engineer presence at these 

locations came lrom the ALB-Future White Paper and 

TRADOC Parnphlet 525-5, A~rLand Operations. 

Under ALO, the englneer brigade headquarters 

and headquarters detachment (HMO) would disappear, and selected posrtions would be ~~tatned as 

part of the div~slon's staff These positions would he 

included In the dlv~sinn HHC TOE. Engrnc~r battallons would beconC? organic to the maneuver 

l~rlgades iV111le retaintnq their identlty, these batral~ons wcrulcl lose them support platoons to the forward suppan battalions (FSB). To prevent excessive 

lass nf englneer personnel throllyh these consolldations, personnel strength caps were ~mposed. This 

meant that spec~fic off~cer ft~nctions coi~ld not be 

documented. 

The RPW FM 100-5 does not call for th~t force structuring aclvar~ced by ALO. Thus. ~f EPI did not evolve 

as previously planned, the orig~nal organizational 

structure would rernarn solid, The primary rntent was 

to correct recognized battlef~eld deficiencres, not 

second-gu~ss future force structure and rloctr~fie 

Under the ER1 desryn, th~ englnenr brlgacl~ headquarters prcv~cles advlce and ass~stancp to the 

division staff The focus IS slrlctly snglneer, and the 

commander rn the f~eld must he rnnovativc In the techniques employed to provide lhat support. The br~yad~ 

HHD cannot provide combat scrvice support for the 

subordrnate engineer battalions and IS extremely 

limited in supporting itself. 

The brigade HMD depends on the drvision HHC for 

its combat service support. Therefore, rt is essential 

that the div~sion HHC be capable of provld~ng that 

support when the brrgade HHD 1s established In the 

fi~ld To correct any supporl deficiencies, ~t may b~ 

necessary to change the divis~on HHC's modifled 

table of organization and equipment (MTOEI. At the 

beglnnlny of ERI d~velnprnent, the Engineer Schnol 

recogn~z~d tha: TOCs operated on 2 24-hour basis 

and requlred double-shlh mnnntng, so trade-ovs were 

necesqay wher: strength caps 11m1:ed what was 

allowed 

ERI Issu~s 

T 

he follow~ng issu~s coricernlng personnol anr! 

equipment wPrP rdentlflecl by field commanrl~rs 

when they tested the ERI structure 

Thts pos~!ion focuses on 

gathering engrneer intelligence nn the onposing force 

Collecting gerieral rnilgtory order of battle lnforrnation 

IS of secondary importance. Multiple shifts and 

gineer res' 

I I 

Division Comparison 

Requlrea substnnlial augmsntatlon rrd 

for vlnualty any typo rnlsslo~ 

Hiative After engineer restructure initiative 

f~han~es caused by ERI ) 

Better command and control capability to receive corps augmentation 

Corps units task organized based on MET-T 

AS1 bridging (less AWs) pooled at corps, task organized to divisions based on MET-T 

Mast sustainment engineering and heavy suwivabitty equipment pooled at corps 
Structure Comparison 


Engineer Support to Maneuver Brigade 


Before engineer restructure inillative 	 After engineer restructure inlliative 

CO HO MAINT 

24 7&17 04 23-23 

Equipment Recaplfvlallon 

13. 	APC 2. ME8 

6 - AVLB 2- SEE 

1 .M548 1 .HEMTT CGO 

I.Volcano 6 -ACE 

2. CEV 7 -ST Dump 

4. MICLIC 

locations dictate that more than one officer must have 

S2 skills, Thus, the TOE includes several plans and 

operations positions that have overlapping knowledge 

and skills in the intelligence arena. An NCO monitors 

the reconnaissance and intelligence collection effoit 

and performs full-time security duties. The brigade 

HHD has an MI-qualified tactical intelligence officer to 

monitor general intelligence work. 

i:o.!;i?~iir~icafioi~-E:ectronics (C-E! Officer It

was not possible to duplicate this position at both the 

brigade and battalion levels. While the position's importance was not overlooked, supervisory strategy 

was the compromise. A C-E officer at the brigade 

ievel (assisted by an NCO) distributes signal instructions and plans C-E networks. NCOs at battalion and 

compariy levels complete that strategy. 

2?2;::t?!?:i!!c~ C~'?!CL~?. The need for this position 

was rscognized initially but was not documented 

based on the priorities used to select officer positions. The brigade maintenance warrant officer (WO) 

and senior NCO track maintenance and readiness at 

the brigade level. The WO also provides expertise for 

engineer equipment maintenance within the brigade. 

At the battalion level, the support platoon has a 

platoon leader. platoon sergeant, WO, and motor sergeant, each with spec~fic duties to support the 

commander's maintenance plan. 

Officer Because the brigade staff is located 

close to the division staff, there is no NBC officer asEqulpmenl Re~apitul~lton 

29 .APC 2 - Carrier CP 

(2 - AVLB 6 - CEV 

12 - MICLiC 6 -Volcano 

6 - HEMTT CGO 6 - MYIB 

21 -ACE 9 - HEMM Fuel 

6. SEE 2 - ME6 

3 - 5T CGO 6 - 5T Dump 

signed at the brigade level. NCOs with NBC responsibilitles are provided at the brigade and battalion levels. 

Cha.p/*in. When the TOE was approved, manpower regulations did not authorize a chaplaln in the 

engineer battalion. The chaplain from the maneuver 

battalion was expected to provide services for engineers as well as infantry and armor personnel. A 

two-person ministry team was eliminated from the 

HHD because the unlt was small and an extension of 

the division staff. 

Equipment Records Clerks. The TOE consolidates equipment records and repair parts at one 

location to save overhead. While contact maintenance teams will be sent out when necessary and 

individual mechanics may be attached to platoons or 

companies, they will all belong to a single maintenance section. Consolidation makes it almost irnpos 

sible to break the unit into equal groups. 

Drivers. The addition of vehicles and drivers for 

executive officers (XOs), command sergeant majors, 

and first sergeants was not supported doctrinally by 

the engineers. While transportation for the unit's 

"problem solvers" remains a very real need, the TOE 

cannot be changed until vehicle allocation rules are 

revised. The Engineer School therefore had to 

choose either a wheeled or tracked vehicle for the 

battalion commander. Because the XO's tactical position is at the TAC, the school decided that the battalion commander needed a tracked vehicle to 
facrlltatc movement on the battlefield. The XO's 

wheeled veh~cle would be available for either officer, 

when requtred. 

:'JC)~! pc dir~c7. Thrs rnitratlve, develap~d by the 

Quartermaster School and approved by thp Chef of 

Staff of the Army, was rmplemented Army-wide in 

1969. Under the Army fieid-feeding plan, a soldier is 

fed by the nearesr facility. The QuaRerrnaster School 

d~veloped ratron Issue and accounting procedures to 

accommodate th~s method of field fecding. Unrts 

must adjust therr method to accommodate local clrcwlnstances The Qunrtermast~r Sclio~l rs evaluallng 

comments from the tra~nlng cpnters and w~ll solve 

probierns caused by the tncreased coordlnatron, plan^ 

ning and expended rnanhoi~rs 

t: ,>''':r.'~fl Some equipment changes have already been approved and incorporated III the 

Commander's TOE Handbook (DA TOE Handbook 

05330L-CTH}, whlch is scheduled for publrcatlon irl 

mid-1993 Inclus~on of the following items in the base 

TOE, as puhl~shed In thc consolidated TOE update. 

1s scheduled to occur by Apr~l 1993: 

I A water trailer and camouflage netting have 

replaced the collapsible drum and ~ts t~edown 

and the towing and l~ftlng assembly in th~ englneer company (TOE 0533SL). 

Two small emplacement excavators (SEES) will 

be retained In each englnwr company Operator 

spaces for these vehrcles are creat~rl by convertIng two 120s to 62Js in the obstacle sect~on Additional support equipment for the SEE IS also 

~ncluded 

w The Engineer School has requested that engineer companies retain two 5-ton dump trucks 

In the obstacle sect~on The maneuver bngarlc 

has very limited capabrl~ties to transport the rer(ulr?d amounts of barrl~r and demollt~orl 

rnat~rlals Thus, if engineers need rnater~als tn 

execute rnob~ll!y arid countermob!l~tv tasks :he 5- 

?on dump trucks, as extsting, on-hand eqtllpment, can rectify the shotfall Thrs rec~tlest IS 

still under corlslderatlon 

The support platoon (TOE 05536L) w~ll receive 

four engine anatyzer sets. This will allow one 

srmplified test equipmenVinternal conillustion engine (STEIICE) to be deployed wrth each contact narnterlance truck while onF! is maintained 

at the ma~ntenance section's field site. The support platoon w~ll have two steam cleaners rnstead of one ta tncrease the~r rnarntenance and 

decontamlnat~on capabrlitles. 

lore engine 

) 

r, 

I 

I Changcs caused by ERI ' 

Downsized combat baltslrons --;, Grentsr deployab~lity and agility 

Maintaining combat banalions at corps -+ Corps conrrnander retains Ilexlbtltly 

All br~dglng sssets {less ARBS) pooled al corps, task organized to divisions 

CSE companies are repository ol heavy survlvabllity, c~un!emrob,lity equipment 

Combat heavy battalions become "EACH nsset, retaln respons~b~l~ty In Corps area 

Corps Comparison 

ei restructure initiative 

, ;1ffi037 

1 x 136 

qqqqq+ 4x74 3x36 6xAZO 3x791 DrArl4 1x565 

mp5-1m Ribbon MGB 

1x125 Sxl84 Ix17A 5x102 5~107 

Atter engineer restruclure Initiative 

@ ,.g3, 

1 xi36 

I_&&+? 2 K 78 Gx 496 I x 533 I x 565 

I 

I I fi rk1 

Albbcn 

Ix125 9x176 1x178 5x1112 5x107 

Nollonal corps enngrncsr hrfgade generaled by a corps of 3 heavy dlvislons. 1 tight anfanfry dlvrsbn and 1 armoretl cavalv rPg~ment 

-. .- 
What ERI Did 

w Englneer br~qade created w~th three englnser battal~ons In arrnor~d dlwsions 

Onp hattallon lor Pach gmtmd mancuwr brigade 

- No "Uedlcalefl" engineers lor d~rnstonal cavalry squadron, av:atlon br~gade. 

or other drvlsronal units 

m All d~v~s~onal bridging reorganized and moved to corps 

m Dmslnnat engineers focused on oftense and rnoblllb, 

- Design was pardtel to AtrLand ElaRle.Fu?ure workshops 

- Desyn assumed 80 porcont oflense. 20 percent aetense 

- Dss~gn prov~dea only far a hasty defense 

- Scatterable mmcs provldcd dynamrc countermr~biliy capabilily 

- Suw~vah~llry capabfltty severely cunailed 

- Susta~nrncnt englnccrmy capabtlity was no: a prrorlty 

1 Signri~cant combat engineer capability remained at corps 

Mechan~zcd engineer banallons 

Wheeled combat engrneer hattahons 

Combat support equipment companies 

Assault float br~dge and medium glrder bndge companies 

he following ongoing initiat~v~s are outs~de the 

engineer Tunctlonal area but will Impact on 

revlsrons to the ERI TOE: 

The chaplain manpower rule was changed se that 

a chaplain with an ass~stant and a veh~cle will be 

placed In each battallon and in the bngade. 

The mall clerk manpower rule was changed so 

that each battallon will have a mail clerk. 

The chem~cal officer manpower rulg was revised 

su that each brigade staff w~ll have two cheni~cal 

officers. 

The PAC clerk rule was revtsed so that each battallon w~ll have one addttional clerk. 

I The supply clerk rule was revised so that each 

company will have a supply specialist. 

A thr~e-medic crew IS assigned to each APC 

that is used as an ambulance. Those APCs will 

be added to the battalion in sets af two. 

rn The legal clerk rule was reused so that each battalion bvill have one clerk. 

The latest manpower initiat~ve readjusts the planning factors used to determ~ne the annual ava~labfe 

MOS prodrlct~ve manhours (AAMPH). By increasing 

the AAMPH, the n~~niber of persons needed to perform a function, such as supply clerk, 1s rsduced. 

Wh~le the AAMPH directly affects the number of 

mechanics it "bleeds" over into all manpower requirement calculatrons. The Enylneer School has not yet 

validated the final Impact of thts rn~tiatlve. 

While these changes may not seem srgn~ficant, 

they improve capab~l~ties without disrc~pting the approval p:ncess for ERI and without impeding the 

plans lo held ERI organizations. Both were key considerattons at the time, since the Engineer School's intent was not to change ERI until many of the conversion pains were worked through and the dust settled. 

To better support the ERI battalions wrth~n the 

heavy division, ordnance and quartermaster 

proponents have increased the number of personnel 

In the forward supaort battalion and the marn support 

hatttalion (MSS) The rna~ntenance company, FSB 

(TOE 43009t000) has added a 17-sold~er englneer 

support team. Ir! response to thc d~v~slon's Increase 

In engineers, the marn s~~pport cornpany (TOE 

42604L100) has been ~ncreased by three soldiers 

and the service and sclpport company, MSB (TOE 

42007L100) has been increased by seven sold~ers. 

Engineer brigades in heavy divisions should coordrnate w~th thelr ~nstallatlon MTOE manager to ensure the proper support units are documented. 

The Engineer School's Dtrectorate of Combat 

Dcveloprnents IS reexamining ERI requirements 

based on the revised FM 100-5 and its evolutron of 

current operational precepts, as opposed to full acceptance of ALO concepts. Sufficient field experiences dur~ny war and peace time have beer! validated 

and will allow rnean~ngful changes to be made to the 

engrneer bngade, heavy div~sion TOE m 

Nan Schl~e 1s a rntl~tary organnahcn and equlprnenl analyst 

wl!h the I31rec:orate of C~rnhat Dev~!~pmen!s A retfred 

command serpant malor, most of hts act~ve duty career 

was s,~ent m d~vlsronal ong~ncer bafiatt2n.s 
PROBLEM: Determine the most eff~c~ent method of destroying the s~rnply st~ppclrted, 

reinforced - concrete, beam and slab bridge shown below uslng C4 explosives 

t = 75 meters (rnJ 

Reference: Fill 5 250 

Eny!nmr Solrit~on on page 35. 

section 

ew 

le view 

Engineer 25 

- 
Disaster Assistance Missions 

By Major James R. Brannon 

u 

hr? fo!lowmg Lessons Learned address d1sr7sfer 

relief In the past ttlree years {Sept~mber 1989 - 

Scotember 1992), U, S. mfliraty forces have 

responded to three hvrrrca~Ps and fwa fyphoons that 

struck der?se!v popu/a ted areas. After Hie most recent 

slorms. Humcane Andrew ~n Florida and Lowsiana 

and Hurrirane Sntkf m t-tawair, Army eng~neer sulrl,ers 

provided r~lr~f serv~ces, cleared arrrl hauled debm, 

p:oduced and drs trihuted water, restored power; and 

conslrvcted Irf~ support centers (tpnl crtles). These 

miFs!ons revealed in;pomnt I~ssons In pr~paredness. 

leadershlp orgarlizahon, equ~~rnenf, and safety. For 

nwre mf~nnattnrr write fn Commandant, U.S. Army 

Englne~r School. ATN. ATSE-ESA-L. Fun Leonard 

LVood. MMO. 65473-6630. Or, call (3 14) 563-5303, 

DSN 67G-5303 

!,~S[IE To rapidly deploy the right combination of 

forces and equ~pment !ailor~cf for a disaster IS dif 

ficult Lack of specrfic missmn gu~dance and poor Pnginner ~rlt~lllqenc~ fromthe d~sar;t~r zone comblne ro 

make s~rcll d~plovnicnts Aspec~ally challenq~r;y. 

DfSf;[ISSlQN A few unit5 that deploved to 

Flor~da found !hey were short of needed tools, sets, 

hlis. and outf~ts (SKOs). Some also lacked critlcat 

ha~11 capab~hty for heavy Fqcr~prnent Whrle those challcnqes were overcome through an unprecedented 

lorril operation, some ~rnits could have been better 

prepar~d. 

Eng~neers responding to natural disasters must be 

prepared to accomplrsh a variety of horizontal and 

vertical missions For hurrica~e clean up, a primary 

task IS debris removal. This reqirires large numbers 

ot cham saws, dump trucks, and bucket loaders An 

unanticipated mrssion in Flortda was the masswe effort required to clean up and open several dozen 

etenientary and secondary schools, wh~ch entailed extensive electrical and interior work. The requirement 

to set up life support centers created heavy demands 

for carpenters and el~ctricians (and the~r SKOs). Not 

everyone brought all thew tools. One commarider observed: "The kn~tral engineer rn~ssion NEVER includes all eventual tasks! Nobody IS smart enouqh to 

deflne everything In advance " 

RECDA4MENDATION: If possible, units should 

take their entire TOE to a disaster site. They should 

take all SKOs, generators, cham saws, pumps. and 

lighting sets. Anticipate the need for light- and heavyduty electr~cal work, temporary tenting, power generation and Ilgfiilng, carpentry, temporary plurnbtng, 

water purification, and road clearance To Increase 

haul capacity, take sld~ racks tor cargo trucks Take 

portable l~ghts and generators. wh~ch can do double 

du!y for round-the-clock constructror? and operations. 

ISSUE. Disasler areas face cr~tical shortages of 

needed suppl~es and constructlor- materials. Lumberyards. hardware stores, and other vendors niay be 

closed or desrroyed. Items these si~ppiiers normally 

provlde may not be available, 

DISCUSSION. The scope of the damage from 

tlurrlcane Andrew was unprecedented, Almost every 

item for basic human needs had to be hauled in and 

distributed. While this was captured in local and national news, the need for plywood, nails, tools, plastic, canvas, electrical wire, and other hardware ltems 
largely went unnoticed. Be aware that in any disaster 

area some local vendors may engage in price 

gouging. 

RECOMMENDATION: Within reason, purchase 

equipment and materials you are likely to need 

before deploying. Specifically: Purchase additional 

chain saws with extra blades and chains (allow for 

two 24-inch models per squad, and one 30-inch or 36-

inch model per platoon). Units will also need 

plywood, forklift pallets (they make excellent foundations for tent flooring), nails, exterior Romex type 

electrical cable, duct tape, electrical tape, PVC glue 

and sealant. 12-foot and 16-foot ladders (for hanging 

cable and interior electrical work), and some fluorescent lighting fixtures (for tents). Take the National 

Electrical Code (NEC) book to ensure your work is 

up to a standard that can be hooked into city power. 

ISSUE: Hurricanes and other disasters often 

destroy all major means of communications. 

Telephone lines, power poles, radio towers and transmitters, and cellular telephone towers may be out of 

service for days or weeks. Communications will be a 

premium issue for engineer units. 

DISCUSSION: Hurricanes Andrew and lniki knocked out all communications. In Dade County, Florida, 

only two of five cellular telephone towers survived the 

storm. Because communications systems for Active, 

Reserve and state National Guard forces vary widely, 

cellular phones may be the best way for federal, state, 

and iocai agencies to keep in touch. In Florida, for example. Army reserve frequency modulated (FM) communlcations were not compatible with mobile subscriber 

equipment (MSE) from the XVlll Airborne Corps. Additionaily, local police, fire, county sheriff, ambulance services, hospitals, and municipal governments could not 

communicate with military forces. Military FM and 

civilian FM used entirely different frequency bands and 

were incompatible. While the best overall military communications system for static use was MSE, cellular 

phones were valuable, especially when communicating 

with other mobile military forces or civilian agencies. 

Local police all carried cellular phones. By using cellular 

phones, Army units increased their operational 

credibility with many civilian agencies. 

RECOMMENDATION: Contract for and take at 

least enough cellular phones to mimic the unit's command net. Use FM radios, cit~zen band (CB) radios, 

and cellular phones to communicate with civilian 

agencles, people who are stranded and need help, 

and each other. Be prepared for confusion and disjointed communications in the area of operations. 

Other "communications" devices you may need include portable facsimile (fax) machines, personal 

computers (and lap-tops), MCS computers, copy 

machines, and MSE fax machines. Be aware that 

you may need to modify a computer with a fax board 

to interface with an MSE fax machine. 

ISSUE: Large natural disasters probably will require more federal military aid than one DOD agency 

can provide. Joint operations with Army, Navy, 

Marines. Air Force, Coast Guard, or allied forces may 

play a role in disaster relief. This type of operation requires unique skills, knowledge, and special duties. 

DISCUSSION: Throughout the area of operations. 

military commanders must integrate with several overlapping civil governmental agencies (city, county, and 

state). Public utilities (water, electrical, phone, gas, 

sewage, and garbage) operate across broad political 

and geographic areas, and each has its own organization and relationships with local governmental agencies. 

Because military units in Florida did not understand 

these interrelationships and levels of authority and 

responsibility, it was drfficuk for them to coordinate work 

and communications. Maneuver commanders who 

carved up an area with divisional boundaries found 

themselves slicing up cities, counties, and municipal 

and county utility districts. As a result, city and county 

agency personnel were confused as to which military 

commander was "in charge." This created a need for 

multiple liaison officers, burdened communication systems, and caused some duplication of work effort. 

RECOMMENDATION: By using the intelligence 

preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process as a 

guide, engineer commanders should know the level 

of coordination that exists in the disaster area. They 

must determine if municipal governments have coordinated utility support and repairs. where the top 

authority lies, and who is in charge. They must become familiar with police and fire jurisdictions, public 

utility districts, and hospital districts. 

If coordination between agencies is broken, engineer commanders must help "fix:' it. The objective is 

to re-establish the local government's ability to function properly. Thus, normal channels of operations 

should be employed to the maximum extent possible. 

Be prepared to commit liaison officers to as many 

levels of government as necessary to keep communications open and missions orderly. Officers and 

senior noncommissioned officers should be familiar 

with the way local governments and public utility districts operate. They should also be familiar with the 

capabilities and structures of Navy Seabees. Marine 

engineers, and Air Force base civil engineering 

squadrons and Prime Beef Units. 

(Continued on page 31) 
he U.S +4rmy hac used cxplosivr-% to dest rny 

I).L hridg~s for dwacle? but has nwer hwd a 

pv TPFS to idcntifv thr most effici~nt way to do so. 

?'his problem wnq resolved 'h~ intepating the Sheffield method or briclge d~molition into Chapte.r 4 of 

Fli! 5-250, EEe~.~ios~ves and Bentoiittons [Jw ne 1992) 

The method is described in Chapt~r 11 but is not 

lahpled as "Sheffield." 

The Sheffield rnethod is a result of a stutly condlictrd by the Department of Civil and Structural 

En~neering. at t,he Un~v~sit,v of Sh~ffi~ld, 

England, from Scptemh~r 1971 tn tl'lugust 197.1. 

T'hc study, dlrected I? the British Royal Arniament 

Rewnrch and D~velopment Establishment, 

a ~~alyzcd existing hridges u nd~r dvna~nic load inr 

conditions It also drvelopsd procedures to ensurc 

t,h~ most ~ff'ici~n k usrl nf explosives irl performing 

bridg~ d~lnolitio~i missinn.;. 'I'hwr data base inclucled analyr;~~ of Inore tknn 15,000 Eurap~.nri 

br~dqes. Researrhcrs compnr~d their findln~h with 

cs~stlng Rr~rish nrld U S rlnny dot-tl-111c Ior llridge 

clrmolir ion nnsslotl.;. Ry adopt ing the Slzrf'l~~ld 

111(!thrxl. thr U S Army ~tand~rdized bridge ddr101il~ot~ prncedurec Rrnona thr ,4rneri~:>n, Hritlsk, 

Canadian. and Australii3n (tIECA1 ;?rrnie:: 

Bridge Demolition 

he pu wosc oi a 11 hridp d~mnlit.ion missions 

is to create grips in the hridge by attacking 

ke\ br~dge colnpanents The intent 1s to create gaps 

I 

Thp minimurn desil-rd gap 1s -5 mcrcw peat.cs 

than the enemy's assault I~ridping capah~lizies. For 

planning purposes, th~ ~liinimum gap is 25 m~ters, 

but the preferred gap is 35 metem. To obtain the 

tninimum gap on spans less than 25 mctprs. one or 

130th ends of the bridge are cratered, Uernolished 

hridge sites r;hould be mind, ancE the debris shnuld 

be bonhy trapped t,o further slow the enemy's bridging effo~ts 

Two tnininlum ponditions must ex is^ to ensure 

succ~ssfu I hridye id~mol ition: 

A collapse m~chanisnl mu5t be formed. 

Once formed, the coll3pse mechanism must be 

allowed to mnvc far enough under the bridge's 

wight to create th.r desired obstacje. 

Bridges arc stable struu(ur~s. They must support 

their own wl'eigh 1 (dead load) plus the w~i~ht of the 

croscinp traffic (dynamic live I~atl j. The i ntenfion of 

thr Sh~ffi~lrI method i~ l'ir~tn irbntify thp rrifjcal 

mrmhprs nnT ihe hridg,rr fc3r d~strurtion so that the 

hrrdg~ rollnpscs under rtc nwn u.~~{:hl r the collapse 

nlechnnism, Pernnrl, the hrrclep ml:sI llnv~ q11ff1- 

cient space 1.~1 movr 3- ~t fntl~ tn prevent jamming 

or pinnir~~ -41 I hridgr. drrnnl~t~on n~rssio~ls are 

designed to be completed with a tninilnunl amount 

of tim~, manpower. and explosives Previou~ 1,T.S. 

4rmy bridge cienlolltion doctrinp did not address 

thesp conrorns 

Bridge Types and Bridging Principles 

Inrep enough to der~al an enemy's aswult Z~ridging 

capnbilities and rendpr thc l~ridp militarily un- T n use the Sh~fficld method properIy. enrepa~mhle This force~ the to coilcen trate ef- gncers must first rateprize the hridgc as a 

forts on oth~r crossing sites or to at tempt si~l"~ply supported, continuous, or miscellaneous 

d~liberate bridging operat inns Either way. it slow? structure Bridges ma!, haw either single or multit he enemy's morn~tl t urn. pl~ spans .4 mult~ple-*pan hridg~ may rnntain bdh 

2fi Frlgr n rer 
dion depth r a al piers. 

Main r ... -- 

Cc 

Ire 

at 

Figure 1 

simply supporred and con t inuuu.~ spans. To 

cat~gorize a l~rid~~ just by its appearanre is difficu It; u~h~never possihlo, const ruct ion drawings 

should he used Because this is seldom, practical. 

~ngincers muqt have n rn~thod to cate~orize bridp 

structurw r2pidb. Som~ principle4 and construction practiwn can help with this prnrr;;s 

'Bending rnompnt is th~ governing factor in ninst 

bridp~ dmigns, 'The con~truction depth gen~rally increasw at the loration ef mnsitnum bentling 

moment; the fl~nq,lrl tIllrl<n~ss may ~lso increase on 

stwl ~t-ritlg~r~ a1 the point, nf maximum hending 

tnornent Arcording to the principles of material 

.ici,nce, the maximu111 twndi~~g. moment c>n a simpIy supported span occur.5 at the midpoint, The maximum b~ndin~ rnom~rit for a continuous span occurs 

at tbr ~l~t~rmediatc support? By using r his inforrnntion. enci~le~l.s in the field I-nn categorize rnnst 

;truchrtal mam nlinu~us. 

mstnr rnstruclmn depth deanFlange plates frequently lhidren over piers and 

some!rmes at rnidspan. 

sualty a single line 01 

mnngs at each plet. 

spnna into one of the thrrp major c~tegories, Fiprr 

1 ran hp used as n g~tidc in the cat~gorrzation 

process. 

About 94 pcrct~nt nf all hridg~s are either simply 

supported or continuous tj~es MiscelIanmus 

bridges m~ke up the remaiuin~ 6 percent of bridge 

types Rridp~s III th~ ~ni~cellnn~r~us ~iltegmy inr1ud.p susppnsion spans, swinp-spa11 and lift. 

l9rid~~. kascti l~ bridges. vert ical-lift bridges, and 

float hriciys Thc SheffieId method provides 

detailed dernull tton techn~ques for <imply supported and continuous spans. Procedures to 

demolish iniscellaneous bridgas are drscussecl 

separately in FM 5-250 

As R rule, contintlous spans are more difficult to 

dpstroy than simply support4 spans and require a 

venter amount of esplosives. When r n doubt abnu t 

the bridge t~p, assume it is rotitil~t~ous. This 
- - . . . . . - . -- "... 

length iL,. total end clearance (E), 

and averaw length of the bearing 

supports (I,,) (Figure 2.) The three 

attack methods for [.he simply supported bridge are 

the bottom. top. and angled attack. 

The bottom att,ack is the preferred method for 

destroying sin~ply supported spans. It provides 

some cover and concealment for the demolition 

party and allows use of the hridge up to the point 

of delnoliiinn I! is particularly useful for bridges 

with steel stringers, where charges can be placed 

inside the channels of the steel members. Bottom 

attack are generally not used on concrete beam or 

slab bridges because of the difficulty in attaching 

charges Use of the Sheffield method allows engineer planners to calculate the minimum required 

end clearance (ER) to prevent jamming when using 

a botto~n attack. This value is compared with E to 

ensure ja~n~nirlg will not occur. If E is less than ER, 

the unit must use a different attack method or 

blow one or both abutments to provide additional 

end clearance. 

Top attacks are used primarily on concrete beam 

and slab bridges where a bottom attack is impracti30 Eiigineer 

conservative approach will guarantee 

bridge demolition though not the most 

efficient use of explosives. .4fter the 

bridge is categorized into one of the 

main categories, it is further classified 

by using !lip decision trees shown in 

FM 5-250, pages 4-10 and 4-15. Compasite steel and concrete construction 

is classified according to the major 

longitudinal load-carrying members in 

the span. Once the span is fully 

categorized, engineers use the tables 

in Appendix H, FM 5-250, to decide 

the best method for destroying the 

Figure 3 

I L-q I+E~ 

4 

H 

t & E=E,+E2 

LSI + LU L, = - 2 

41 

cal. In the top attack, the Sheffiald method enables 

the engineer planner to calculate the length of cut 

required (LC) to prevent jamming. 

The concrete-stripping charge is a new technique 

used to create the LC for reinforced-concrete 

bridges. The charge cuts a ditch across the span 

and all the way through bhe depth of the bridge. 

The concrete-stripping charge destroys all of the 

minor reinforcing steel and damages most of the 

major reinforcing steel. The inajor reinforcing steel 

should fail in tension when the compressive concrete is removed. When using the concrete-stripping charge, the ditch width iWd) is compared to 

the LC to ensure that jamming will not occur. If 

necessary, the charge is increased to ensure that 

the necessary cut is obtained. 

An angled attack may be used when end 

clearance is not a problem. When using the angled 

attack, all bridge members must be cut (span, hand 

rails, service pipes, and so forth). The point of attack is located between the midpoint and a point 

bridge. Figure 2 

Simply Supported Spans 

S imply supported spans are the 

easiest type of bridge to 

destroy The vecommended point of 

attack is always at the midspan to 

take advantage of the maximum 

bending moment generated by the 

bridge dead load. l'he line of attack 

should be made parallel to the face 

of the bridge abutments to reduce 

the possibility of twisting and jamming. 'Po use the procedures in FM 

5.250 for a sirr~ply supported span, 

four critical dimensions must be obiainerd. iot:ll hvidrrp danth (HI snsn 
one-third the length from one end of the span The 

(cut is made at 70 degrees to the horizontal to 

prevent lamming. 

Continuous Spans 

C ontinuous spans generally are more difficult 

to destroy than simply snp~orted spans be- . . .. cause they have no common point of attack. The 

Sheffield method provides recommended attacks for 

each t,ype of continuous span. The line of attack 

should still be made parallel to the face of the abutments to prevent twisting and jamming. The critical dimensions for planning the attack of a continuous span arc L, which is measured from the 

centerline of the bearings, and t,he bridge rise (HI, 

which is measured from the springing to the top of 

the deck. (Figure 3. page 30.) 

Continuous steel and concrete bridges usually 

are attacked by cutting the span on both sides of 

the intermediate supports The concrete-stripping 

charge used for sirnplg supported concrete spans 

can aiso he used ibl. contiouous spans. The Sheffield mothod recommends locations for cuts that. 

will create an unbalanced Lending moment in the 

span. This bending moment will cause the span to 

collapse. Because of their design, continuous 

concrete spans often require two-staged attacks to 

ensure their complete destl.uction. The first. attack 

destroys the concrete; the second attack removes 

the reinforcing steel. Therefore, continuous concrete bridges should not be used for planned 

reserved demolition targets. 

Arch and portal bridges are attacked by calculat,. 

ing the minimum LC required to ensure their 

destruction. Although the formulas for each type 

are different, the procedure is the same as for simply supported top attacks 

The Sheffield method of bridge demolition is the 

most significant change to US. Army demolitioii 

tlnctrine in the last 20 ycars h'ou: for the first 

!imta, engineers can accurately calculate the minimum ilmount of c:xplosi\.ei t~ecessary to guarantee 

the complete destruction of most bridges. ?'his will 

improve engineer support to the maneuver clements and better use the limited resources nvailahle on the bat.tlcfieId 

(Lessons Learned, continued) 

ISSUE: Many engineer units do not have contin 

gency plans for natural disasters. 

DISCUSSION: U.S. Army engineers will respond 

to many disasters. Whether fighting fires in the Rocky 

Mountains or quelling civil disturbances in inner 

cities, federal military forces wiil continue to serve the 

immediate needs of U.S. citizens and our allies when 

natural or man-made disasters occur. Some units, 

such as the 25th Infantry Division (Light), Fort 

Shafter. Hawaii, have disaster response as one of 

their contingency missions. Disaster relief is on their 

division mission essent~al task iist (METL). 

Contingency plans are valuable because they can 

speed up the deployment process, even though they 

may require some modification for any given disaster. 

Unit local~ty has no bearing on the type of disaster 

you may be assigned to deal with. Units from as far 

away as Fort Drum, New York, and Fort Riley, Kansas deployed to Florida in response to Hurricane 

Andrew. Air National Guard units from Alaska supported Operation Garden Isle in Hawaii. 

RECOMMENDATION: CONUS-based oontingency pianning and rapid force projection have replaced 

our Army's forward deployment posture. Contingency 

pianning for natural disasters is good practice and 

good training. In the absence of guidance from higher 

headquarters, engineer units should prepare contingency plans to support major disasters (fires, floods. 

tornados. hurricanes, earthquakes, and civil disturbances). Determine the equipment and material needs 

for each scenario. organization and manpower requirements. deployment sequencing, and your unit's 

sustainment needs. Prepare equipment load plans 

and checklists showing where to obtain critical equipment and materials. And, remember to evaluate your 

own intelligence needs that may drive the makeup of 

key personnel in the advance party. 

Major Brannon is an analyst ~n the U.S. Army Eng~neer School. Previoiis assignments include platoon 

ieader, DEH operations and executive officer, assistant S3, and company commander He is a registered 

professional engineer tn Texas. 

Mnjor Unr~is is t11e S3 of the 1st Engineer Brlgade 

at Fort L~oi~ard Urood, Missouri. He has serued in 

thc 54th Engineer Battaiion and the 307th Engineer 

Baitalzon. Major Dauis has a BS degree in ciuil engiricering and is a graduate of Con~nzand and 

General Staff College. 
A Challenging .r' d Experience 

The 937th Engineer Group is an achue Arn~y 

41 c~iginecr ,groiLp ot Fort ~ile,y, Knnsas. he^ 

grorrp consists of a heoiiqiinrters conzpa1zy, the 34th 

Er~gineer Battalion, 541 st Mnintennnce Battalion, 

a11r1 the 16th Mobile Aril~,y Sr~rgical Hospital. The 

937th Group u:ns called to assist in tile disaster 

rellef effort froni fTurri(.a~~e Andreii. Hoiueuer, 

Colonei Greenu:alt and the t<acticni con~nzand post 

!(:ere at Fort Leonnrd Wood, Missot~.rz, participating 

in [L field exercise iirth tile 5th Engir~eer Battoliotl. 

Kes]~ondtr~g tothi, relief effort niearzt deploying the 

937th froi~i. tico 1orotlo11.s ir:ithrn 66 hours. This czrticle clescribea iior~ th~s took place. 

J ust when you think yim've cover~d all the b:ises, they slide in a cuwe hall that messes 

up the whole game plan, r2ctually; I felt like I did 

not elen know what gerne I was playing when I 

returned from leave late on the night of Septernhcr 1. I( was about 2230 when my wife and I 

walked through the door, tired fro111 our flight, to 

find a message on the answering machine. My assistant S4, the group staff duty officer, had left a 

message that. something was up. He did not say 

niuch except. that we had an 0300 staff planning 

session at headquart.ers with the group executive 

officer. At. first 1 thought that it was n welcome 

home joke by my lieutenant, but then I detected a 

serious tone in his voice that. told me lhis was no 

pun, I decided to call him at the duty phone numt~r and. 

At Fort Riley 

0 200300S September 1992: The warning order 

was out. We did not know exactly when the exec:u!io~l order would come or when we would leave, 

but we now had a mission-participate in Task 

Force Wright to provide comma~id and control for 

debris cleanup operations in south Florida. Quite a 

tnouthful, but what did it mean? Questions began 

to surface: 

Who will go-group headqirarters, the 34th Engineer Battalion, or both? 

m What are our critical personnel shortages'? 

Who wtll conduct the prepat? for overseas 

movement (POM) ordw and when? 

What are our criticnl equipment shortages? 

\4%at mission or. region-specific items might be 

required (additional haul assets, Class IV, 

maps of south Florida, additional communications equipment, assorted batteries, SSSC supplies, mosquito nets, hug spray, 2-quart callteens, and work gloves)? 

What about Colonel Greenwalt, Group Commander, and the tactical i:ommand post 

(TAC)? The TAC provides command and control for engineer-specific missions that group 

elements conduct in forward locations. I1 also 

can be the advance party for the group. TAC 

equipment includes a built-up HMMLW 
Soldiers and equipment board a C-5 at 

Forbes AI~ Fteld en 

route to Homestead 

AFB. Limited time re 

quired tne equipmem to t>e moved 

by alr rather than by 

rarl. (Photo by SFC 

W. Fleming.) 

~~onii~cted to a 577 tcnt extrii=inn witl-I rnm- Tnpeka, Ibnsas, and then by 6-5~ lo Hnrnemu nicat 10us and work ~TCRS, thrr~ HMM\.Llre .:!pad .l\FI3 

for rommund ~lrd cotitrnl, :~nd n d1es~1 gpner- II ISrdifr~ttg clfhr*ers and rlnss :2 a"~ee~ts, who arri- '1'11~ rrrbw ccrn~1si-s rjl the 52. 53. S': opera. wnu Id buy rltission-u.is~.n tral ~upplres InrwlIy. 

ttnrt+- niticcr. 53 ronst.r~icr~nn off~c~r, SX qtnff hnd to hr c~rttf!ed 

NC'O, r:on~n~unicat~cln? SC0, mechanir. arid 

Vnur ~~IvPI-:RTT) ric.r.kr Additional rqmmu nlcztronq aqirte wnuld k~ Xryu~sed rn ~PPI:ICP fllnsr t t1~ l~t lnfant~y 

\l'e -rhr_.dule~lr a vidro trlr.r-onfr.ran8+c fgr n l1?0 to L)IY~~ICII ulll;~ 3196 korrou-~d for TZEFOf(CER 

(1 iqcus5 thc missinn with (.'olon-l Grrvnwalt i31vlstnn Gl would x-lsqist 111 Fillitlp ~quipment 

All ,gou p huadquart~rs' comm~klncnts th~+ough 

At Fort Leonard Woad @rr u!lel. tvouId be cnnct.ll~d. 

P~rxonnel, tvr:rrlld take wenpons :ind ammu nib~ t'o~nnl~t~d~.~' :~nd thk~ '..I,\(-' lhnd 3 114 t le n~r~l-p t IC~ twr;~r, Inad:. 

4! !,. inr{v:?~i~tiuti allrju t the* 1ni5s:on- they 11;td 

-il.er l fi ~IFI 1.J ropy d-plqvn>cn t l>rrlr-,~. frci~n 

!.'@F<SCC)3T arnurld n~idn igli t BPC~LIFP r,f the in~nlrld~ar~ n,-.r.ri~ ill F!oricl~. the b~.-r~uy: tvoulcl c!c!plr>y 

~vlth in dn:,~,: nnT IVPC'I~S C)I. nlnuths, nft~r !lot il'lcaII:.>II 'rh(:ri:ti>r~. 111~ 7'!1C tvr~ul[l c!~pjpy C~OIII Fc17.t 

1 ,c-wn:q thcl C\'r>r~frl to I'nrnest ead .Aj I, Forcme 1::1.<c. 

Fll~r.idn, (!~ICP 1.11tl'ti. thr: T:IIJ wnu lil rrro1.41 itlat~ 

trrlth @n-?ittl. ~LE!IPI. itnil sut,odil>atc unit7 nnd 

<ccu rr. ;in n re;; fol* t he ma in hndy fi-om 1;ol.t Ri lqy. 

'rhc vidvo re!~onnfcr~nr~ ~nslvrr~d mnny (1T our 

~.~IIC:.?I io11.5: 

II Th;. 'TAC' would drplcy by 21'-130.; I'rom Fort 

1xonnr.d Wr-wd to Hom~str-nd AFR 

Tho group's rnnin hod? ~voulcl dcplny by huws 

and transpnrt trucks to Forhrs .41r FirId, 

F::=icl~ yrwn ~t~nulrl t:jke :+ Ttve-d:~y supply of 

mr~:?l.- rwdv rn eat OIREsl 

I'!?? rcjrttc~ n ~nq quest ~un was, how wou!d t h~ T.1C 

drp?cy ~nd \vho npou Icl support t hpm' 

Thc 5th Etiginrcr B~tta1ion went ovel.hnard hi.tpIn? t he T;2C d~pluy They pvnvided work, spwe. nirlnad SPVC~RI 1st :. :ra~~~pnrtali~n s~~pport. and issued 

1 pipi By IlfiOn rrn S~pt~inh~r '2, the TAl: 

crpw nfil< prepring the I~P~~C~PS nncl equipln~n~ f(>r 

thr i-lirlift. R!- /)TOO, the 5th Gnyn~~r's rorn~ncinrt-8- 

t ions .~peci:111sts had inst3 1I~d n~obile subsrriher 

r~dio and t~l~ph~ll~. Pquipnl~nt in 11~0 VCFII~~~S. 

The vehirl~s lhrn wcnr :o th~ wash mrk. wherc 

nOL pn.sr?~~nel h~lprd prepzl-e them For nlrIiTt 

M~anwhile. T:IC p~rsonnrl con1+din:2t~d with 3th 

Engi nwrs for equ ~pmcnt and qwppl re... By 1,230, 

thr E14TM\ZTs were rleancd, loaded, and prepnred 

for bonrcliii?. The nnlj. lt~m left was to complete 

the H:izard.r~~s Clrm-ancr and Air-Load 
Movement Plan by 1400. At 1430, the vehicles were 

weighed and loaded; the first C-130 departed Fort 

1,eonard M1ood at 1500, and the second one left 

about two hours later. 

Back at Fort Riley 

T he group's main body began to prepare for 

movement. After the video teleconference, 

the executive officer briefed company personnel 

while the staff published a modified packing list, 

identified nondeployable personnel, coordinated to 

fill personnel and equipment shortages, acquired 

Class IV for blocking and bracing, and prepared 

personal gear. We had no air-load movement plans 

on file, so the new unit movement officer created 

the data. 

On September 3, the installation POM team conducted a POM in the morning followed by vehicle 

load-out. in the afiernoon. However, neither aircraft 

schedules nor departure times had been established 

by late afternoon. At 1430, t,he emergency operations 

center (GOC) informed the group that they would not 

depart until September 7 or 8. Thus soldiers were 

preparing to gn liome when a message arrived from 

FORSCOM (about 2000) stating that they would fly 

from Forbes Field the next morning. The unit. 

prepared for air movement throughout the night, 

securing the vehicle loads, performing preliminary 

airlift inspections, and staging and loading vehicles 

onto transporters for movement. 

September 4 began with formation at 0430 to 

draw weapons and protective masks, verify airlift 

manifsst. information, and release soldiers for 

breakfast. At 0600: the unit departed Fort Riley for 

Forbes Field. The UMO and the unit completed all 

paperwork and loaded i.he first C-5, which departed 

Forbes Field at 1400, about 66 hours after notification. The second aircraft was delayed 24 hours because of mechanical problems. Most of the personnel deployed on t,he first aircraft, leaving the UMO 

and :i skeleton crew t,o deploy 011 the second 

aircraft. The total count was 82 soldiers, 12 

HMMLWs, 9 HMMWV trailers, four 5-t.on cargos, 

one 5-ton cargo trailer, 4 small CONNEXs, and a 

headquarters-worth of equipment and tents, which 

were deploved hy two C-130s and two C-5s 

Lessons Learned 

A deployment that requires movement from 

two locations by the same unit produces many 

lessi,ns learned Some of them are positive affirmations that plans on paper work, while others prove 

that what is on paper does not always pan out. 

H Be flexible. The Son of FRED (Fort Riley Emer. 

gency Deployment Support Plan, revised) is a 

good guideline, hut it. is unrealistic when given 

less than the recommended 15 days to 

deploy. 

Develop air-load as well as rail-load movement 

plans ahead of t~me, and keep them in movement books Existing plans can be modified 

quicker than new ones can be created. 

Establish and train movement teams to alleviate delays and coordination problems. 

Use an external unit's motor pool personnel to 

prepare the departing unit's vehicles for movement. These personnel can perform maintenance and on-the-spot repairs, weigh and 

steam-clean vehicles, and assist in departure 

airfield control group (DAG) operations. This 

gives the deploying maintenance personnel 

time to pack tools, manuals, equipment, and 

repair parts. 

H Create a list. of movement preparation items. 

These items are not necessarily RiITOE 

authorized but. are essential to efficiently 

prepare the unit for movement Include 

petroleum down-loading pumps, lifiing shackles, outside lighting, and blocking and bracing 

materials. 

Assign external personnel as ordering officers 

and Class A agents. These become full-time 

jobs when associated with engineer units because of the great variety and quantity of 

items, especially Class IV, that must be purchased locally to perform construction missions. Staff members are busy with their 

primary functions and may not have time to 

purchase items locally. Using external personnel also eliminates any conflict of interest 

problems that could be perceived. 

It is inspiring to see a unit respond to the unexpected and succeed. Everything does not always 

happen according to plan. Our group never anticipated an order t,~ deploy in 66 hours from kwo 

separate locations. However. when a unit practices 

what it plans, change is not necessarily disastrous. 

This would not be the last change to occur on the 

deployment. The worm-up was over, and now it 

was time to play ball, Y 

Cuptoin Pnui Karnnte is the S4 for the 937th Engineer Group. Fort Riley, Knnsns. He received an 

ROTC con~nzzssion and a bachelor of science degree 

from the UniuersiQ of Kansas. He is also a 

graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course and 

the Quartern~aster Officer Advance Course. Previous assignments include positions in the HHC, 

Berlin Brigade and the 5/502d Infantry Parachute 

Regiment. 
SOLUTION: 

The Sheffieid method is the preferred method of bridge demolttion. An introduction to 

this method is provided in the article, "The Sheffield Method of Bridge Demolition", 

beginning on page 28. 

Step 1. Recon and categorize the bridge as a simply supported, concrete beam slab 

with bottom support. 

Step 2. Obtain the following critical dimensions: 

L = 15rn 

H = 1.m 

E = €1 + E2 = 0.1 + 0.1 = 0.2m 

Ls = LB, + LS2 = -- 1.5 + 1.5 = 1.5111 

2 2 

Step 3. Determine a method of attack from Table H-3 (Attacks on Simply Supported 

Bridges), FM 5-250. 

Use Serial 20, Deck Bridge, Bottom Support Method Ill. A top attack is appropriate. Cut 

at midspan with a concrete-stripping charge. 

Note: Serials 18 and 19 are for use only on slabs, . . 

Step 4. Calcuiate the minimum length of cut (LC) to prevent jamming in the top attack: 

HIL = 1.4 

- 

= 0.093 (round up to 0.10 for Table H-2, FM 5-250) 

15 

WL = 0.150 (from Table H-2, FM 5-250) 

LC = (LJL) (L) = (0.1 50) (1 5) = 2.25m 
7 tngineer Solution 

r 

Step 5. Corrlpare the ditch width (Wd) from the concrete-stripping charge with the 

required LC: 

Wd = 2h + 0.3 

h = overall roadway and beamislab depth 

Wd = z(1.4) 1 0.3 = 3.1 m > LC = 2.25m 

Therefore, one row of charges is sufficient 

Step 6. Calculate the amount of explosives required for the concrete-stripping charge 

Seams 

P = 3.3 (3.3h t 0.5)~ (pounds of TNT per meter) 

P = 3.3 r(3.3) (1 4) + 0.51~ = 442.9 pounds of TNT per meter 

I Amount per beam = (pounds of TNT per meter) (beam width) 

= (442.9) (0.5) = 221.5 poi~nds of TNT per beam 

I Determine the equivalent amount of C4 reqirired per bean1 (divide by the RE factor) 

I Deternline the number of packager of C4 required per beam 

N = Charge weight = 165.3 = 132.2 

Package weight 1.25 

Round up to 133 packages per beam. 

Slabs 

P = 3.3 (33h + 0.5)~ (pounds O~TNT per meter) 

P = 3.3 [(3.3) (0.5) t 0513 = 32.8 pounds O~TNT per meter 

Amount per slab = (pounds of TNT per meter) (slab width) 

= (32.8) (1.0) = 32.8 pounds of TNT per slab 

36 Engineer 
EI IYII IE~=I. dution 

10 pkgs C4 

Determine the equivalent amount of C4 required per slab (divide by the RE factor). 

- 

32.8 = 24.5 pounds of C4 per slab ~ 

1.34 

Determine the number of packages of C4required per slab. 

N = Charge weight = 24.5 = 19.6 - - . - 

Package weight 1.25 

Round up to 20 packages per slab. 

Total charge equals the (number of beams) (packages per beam) + (number of slabs) 

(packages per slab) 

P = 5(133) + 5(20) = 765 packages of C4 per slab. 

Note: To reduce the amount of explosives required by one-third, tamp each pound of 

explosives with two filled sandbags. 

Thrs ENGINEER Problern/Solution was submined by Major Ira Joe Davis. Currenlly the 53 for 

the 1st Engineer Brigade, Furl Leonard Woud, hlajor Davfs formerly served as chief, Combat 

Engfneenng D~vlsfor, Depilflrnent of lnstruclion. US Army Engineer Scliool. 

Engineer 37 

- 
By Captain <James R. Weber 

o effectively combat a counterinsurgency, a 

countiy must. coordinate political. psvcholoei- -. 

cal, sociall economic. and uiilitary factors. 'The engineers of the Armed Forces of the Philippiries 

(AFP) played a significant role in the successful 

campaign against the communist guerrillas, known 

as the FIulrhong 3'Iapagpalaya ng Bnyan (IIuks) or 

People's 1,ibrration Ariny. in the late 1940s and 

1950s Because of policy changes in t.he pc~litical 

arena, the government and the anny lost significant support from !he people When Lht. administration turned its efforts to r~building the 

country by using the army engineers, the people's 

perception of the government and the army improved. Some of t,he AFP's missions, which included upgrading roads, building bridges, constructing schoolhouses, and drilling wells, helped improve [.heir image. 

To counteract the communist influence, the IJ.S. 

limited its role iri nation assistance to technical expertise aiid monetary aid. ?'he US. gave the Philippines $250 million in economic aid over a five-ycar 

period, and the K.S. Army sent a Joint United 

States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAC:) to prov~de technical assistance Although American ellgineer units did not participate in t,he civic action 

missi~~ns after 1946, engineer officers continued to 

serve on the JUSMAG staff. 

U.S. Army MG 

Daniel, Chief of 

JUSMAG, 2nd LTG 

Cruz. Chief of Staff 

of the AFP, confer 

about engineer 

equipment. 

(Photos courtesy 

Alvin H. Scaff, The 

Philippine Answer 

to Communism, 

Stanford University 

Press.) 
i 

o; Itbayat Pacific -9 sabtang Ocean 

Q Babuyan Islands 

South 

China 

Sea 

newly formed republic. The Philippine President, Manuel Roxas, 

developed a policy of all-out. force to 

eliminate the I-Iuks. \\%en the army 

and the Philippine constabulary indiscriminantly shelled villages that they 

suspected to be Huk strongholds, support turned away from the government and toward the FIuks. 

Elpidio Quirino became president, 

in 1948. He changed the brute-force 

policy to one of conciliation by t,rying 

to collect weapons from the Huks 

and granting them amnest.y. After a 

few months, Quirino's conciliatory 

policies failed, and t,he Huks continued to consolidate their power. 

In 1950, the Huks staged largescale raids to show how weak the 

government was. In response, the administration returned to the bruteforce policy, which again proved to be 

unsuccessful. For example, when the 

constabularj killed innocent civilians 

at Maliwalu. Pampanga, the people 

condemned this action. An officer 

wrote that people supported the 

kIul~., simply because soldiers abused 

innocent people Because of such actions and mistakes made by the 

government, the Huks gained control 

over large parts of the country 

Policy Shift 

n September 1950, Ramon Magsaysay assumed the duties of 

/ Scwetary of the Department of National Defense. Magsaysay itnpleThe Philippines 

Background 

fter the Japanese invaded the Philippines in 

AV arch 1942, the Communist Party of the 

Phil~ppines (CPP) formed the Hukbalahap (People's 

Army Against the Japanese) or the Huks. By fighting t.he Japanese, the Huh won support for the communist. cause from the Filipino people and I-cniained 

an influential organization after the war ended. It 

was then that t.he CPP changed the name of their 

military branch to the People's 1,iberation Army. 

In July 1946, when the Philippines gained their 

independence from the United States, t,he Huks 

began a terrorist campaign to seize control of the 

-. . 

mented many needed reforms wit,hin 

the armed forces and was instrumental in altering the government's approach toward the Huks The government had 

learned two i~nportant lessons regarding the Hulcs: 

it. needed the respect and cooperatiori of the people, 

and the people might support the government if it. 

dealt with the I-Iuks in a just, and humane way. 

Magsaysay was the driving force behind the shift 

in the administration's policy He developed a twofold approach to the counterinsurge~~cy: army battalion combat teams would conduct small unit, 

raids against the Huks, and the army would perform civic action n~issions. To accomplish the civic 

action missions, army engineers staffed the 

Economic nevelopment Corps (EDCOR) to build 

farm settlements, freshwater wells, road networks, 
Engineers of the 

AFP clearing thick 

jungle for a road. 

bridges, and school5 Creating EDCOK was an in)- 

portant development in the ri~unterinsurgcncy, 

Farm Settlements. Many Filipinos were 

tenant farmers who did not own their land. The 

communists demanded land for the landless. 

Through EDCOR, Magsaysay offered the Huks and 

other peasank 25 acres of land and a governmentbuilt house. Not surprisingly. the people looked 

favorably on this program. The count,ry had plenty 

of jungle land; the problem was how to make the 

jungle usable for agriculture. Magsaysay turned to 

the army for an answer to this dilemma. The Engineer Service Battalioll (Composite) was tasked to 

transfer the land into crop-producing areas. In 

February 1951. EDCOR opened 75,000 acres of 

land for settlement,. 

The luost important benefit from the EDCOR set,- 

tlement program was the public's perception of the 

government. Even though fewer than 300 former 

Huk families and 1,000 total families reccived 

farmland frorn the government. Mags;~ysay scored 

a moral v~ctoy. He publicized this initiative and 

showed that. he could provide land for the landless 

faster t.han the Huks could. Through EDCOK, Magsaysay converted some of the die-hard communists 

and gained support from the general population 

toward the government.. The EDCOR farms were 

an immediate display of government reform, and 

peasants began to believe that the administration 

actually cared for their welfare. 

The Huks retaliated. In April 1953, three officers 

and two enlisted men frorn the Philippine Corps of 

Engineers were en route to inspect a site designated for an EDCOR farm when Huks ambushed 

and killed them. The governlnent. honored t,he slain 

engineer officers by naming farms after them: the 

new project was named for Captain Paredo, and 

the existing ones were named for Major Arevalo 

and Lieutenant Gallego, 

Liberty Wells. Army engineers assisted in a 

well-drilling program because many rural 'communities did not have a good supply of drinking 

water. They drilled as many as 60 artesian wells in 

one 45-day t,ime period. This liberty well project 

was so important to the Filipinos that they est,ablished a Liberty Wells Association. Their slogan 

was a Chinese proverb that said, "God bless those 

who dig wells, build bridges, and construct roads." 

This work continued to enhance the people's 

confidence in the army and the Philippine 

government 

Road Networks. Before World War Two, the 

Philippines had a fairly good road network. 

Numerous roads and bridges were damaged during 

the war because of the fighting between the allies 

and the Japanese. While American engineers 

repaired the transportation system enough to support their own offensive to retake the islands, they 

did not restore all of the roads. The poor road condi. 

tions benefited the Huks because foot travel was 

more feasible than vehicular travel. They moved 

around on foot, making it. difficult for the government to track t,hem. 
The ~eople blamed the government for the poor 

roads. Again, the government. turned to t.he Pngiueers for help. From 1946 to 1952, they repaired 

263 bridges and 385 miles of roadway, making all 

the roads that existed before the war operational. 

Besides repairing existing roads. the engineers 

built new ones. W~en Mngsnysay was President of 

the Itepublic of the Philippines, he emphasized the 

construction of secondary roads. These feeder roads 

helped villages ihat once were considered remote. 

Farmers then were able to trade their goods and 

deliver their crops ensier than when lhey traveled 

on footpat'hs through dense vegetatiun. By rest,oring and consrrucling the road network, the Philippine people were able to see their government at 

work for them. 

Schoolhouses. In 1954, President Magsaysay knacted a program to build schoolhouses 

t.hroughout underdeveloped areas of the country. 

The 1st Engineer Construction Group, which was 

formed in Februaly 1954, manufactured and 

erected about 500 prefabricated schoulhouses in 

one year. To help the schoolhouse program, the 

army organized an Engineer Forestry Company to 

produce lumher 

I 

Operation Redemption. The government 

continued its positive influence through another initiative, Operation Redemption, which started on 

January 7, 1954, as a symbol of rornrnitment to support the peasants. This time the arxny targeted the 

deserted hamlet of Luis Taruc, the Iiuk leader. ?b 

improve living conditions, 3,000 army engineers and 

trainees cleaned up the area, built roads, and dug 

wells The project was successful, and witllin one 

year, moip than 2,000 Filipinos inhabited the town 

The End of Hostilities 

y 1954, when large-scale fighting between 

the government and the Huks ended, the 

army had captured and killed rnany Huk leaders. 

The People's Liberation Army Committees disbanded, and Luis Taruc surrendered in May 1954. 

The government was victorious for several reasons: 

the highly mobile battalion combat teams attacked the 

Huks incessantly, the government received intellig~nce 

information fmm its growing public suppollen on the 

location of the Huks, and Magsaysay used the army in 

a sorioeconon~ic sole as well as in its niilitaq role 

An EDCOR settlenlent built by engineers. 

Eng~zcer 41 
Expanded Civic Action 

T he engineers continued to be involved in civic 

action programs after the fighting ended. With 

a decreased military threat, the army started transferring soldiers from the infantry battalion combat 

teams to the engineers. Consequently, the 1st Eng.ineer Construction Group increased its personnel 

st:l.ength. Government leaders continued to emphasize socioeconomic programs because they realized 

that many of the conditions that contributed to the 

spread of the conimunist movement still existed. Con. 

tinuing the progTams meant involving the engineers. 

As a result of this involvement, the army organized additional engineer units t,o work on rural 

developinent programs. In January 1956, the 1st 

Engineer Combat Group was formed, which consisted of lst, 2nd, and 3rd Engineer Combat Battalions. This unit. was designated as a combat en-, 

gineer group. but. its main function was to help the 

1st Engineer Construction Group complete civic action projects. For example, the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion constructed the 9-lrilometer AgoncilloBosohoso-Gulod road in Batangas, which mainly 

consisted of feeder roads. The 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion built many roads, bridges, and 

prefabricated school buildings in central and northern Luzon. 

These types of civic action projects continued 

into the lat,e 1950s The government's plan for land 

reform produced positive results. The EDCOR program expanded and more peasants obtained their 

own land to far111 The original civic-action 

progmms of the feeder roads, liberty wells, and 

prefabricated schoolhouses continued lo have a 

high priority because they provided essential ser- 

\-ices to an increasing number of people. 

Conclusion 

nder Magsaysay's leadership as Secretary of 

National Defense, the Philippine army 

proved that. they could effectively accomplish tasks 

outside the normal military realm. As president, 

Mapaysay orchestrated all government agencies to 

address each element of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the Philippine engineers helped to rebuild the 

country and combat the Huks. They helped in rural 

development programs, improved the peasants' 

quality of life, and contributed to the successful execution of the counterinsurgency. The Philippine 

government began land reform and funded many 

projects with grants and loans with the economic aid 

the US. provided. However, the Corps of Engineers 

of the Philippines Armed Forces deserves much of 

the credit for he success of the civic action programs 

Bibliography 

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Souvenir Program - 24th Anniversary of the Corps of Engineers, 

1961. 

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Souvenir Progrant - Silver Jubilee of the Corps of Engineers, 

1962. 

Bashore, Captain Boyd T, "Dual Strategy for 

Limited War", Readings in Counter-Guerrilla Operations, Fort. Bragg, North Carolina: U. S. Ariny Special Warfare School, 1961. 

Beckett, Ian F. W. and John Pimlott, Arnted Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency, New York: St. 

Martin's, 1985. 

Felder, Louis F., Socioeconontic Aspects of 

Counterinsurgency, A Case History: The Philippines, Washington, D. C.: Industrial War College 

of the Armed Forces, 1963. 

Galula, David, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 

Hammer, Major Kenneth M., "Huks in the Philippines," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin M. 

Osanka, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 

McCuen, John J., The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole 

Books, 1966. 

Romulo, Carlos P., Crusade in Asia, New York: 

John Day, 1955. 

Scaff, Alvin H., The Philippine Answer to Contntunisnt, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. 

Seekins, Donald M. "Historical Setting," Philip. 

pines A Country Study, ed. Frederica M. Bunge, 

3rd ed., Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 

Printing Office, 1984. 

Tirona, Lieutenant Colonel Tomas C., "The 

Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign," Modern 

Guerilla Warfare, ed. Franklin M. Osanka, New 

York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Y 

Captain Jantes R. Weber, a graduate of the U.S. 

Military Acadenty, is currently assigned as the Engineer Officer Aduanced Course Operations Officer. 

He is a graduate of the Cavalry Officer Basic 

Course, Arntor Officer Advanced Course, and Contbincd Arnts and Seruices Staff School. Other assignments include positions with the 2d Arnzored Caualry Regintent nnd the 1st Infantry Diuision. 
E==? I ENGINEER UPDATE 

1 I 

Commercial numbers are (314) 563-XXXX and Defense System 

Network (DSN) numbers are 676~XMX unless otherwise noted, 

Directorate of Training and 1993 Senior Engineer Leaders Training Conference (SELTC). 

Doctrine (DOTD) The 1993 SELTC for Active and Reserve Component senior leaders 

will be held on April 20-24 at the Engineer Center. A District Commanders Conference and SELTC adivities will be held concurrently 

on April 21 -23, with registration beginning on April 20. The 

Regimental Dinner is scheduled for April 23, Invitations will be 

mailed early in February POC is CPT Steve Chi. -5335. 

ENGINEER Readership Survey. Thanks are extended to 

those readers who responded to ENGINEER3 survey. Responses 

will be used to improve the content and quality of future issues. 

Many units indicated that we have an incorrect address on file or 

that they do not receive the number of copies required. To fix 

those deficiencies, send your old and new addresses and the 

number of copies requ~red to: Engineer Professional Bulletin. Attn: 

ATSE-TDM-PB, Fort Leonard Wood. MO 65473-6650. POC is 

Jennifer Bolyard, -7644. 

CEV M970 

Cartridge, Subcaliber Ammunition Training Device (M970). 

Fielding of the M970 training device for the Combat Engineer 

Vehicle (CEV) will resume in February 1993. Units in Germany will 

receive the M970 training device in February. Korea and CONUS 

units will begin receiving the device in March. Devices to the 

remaining engineer units in CONUS will be fielded through Septem~ 

ber 1993. The fielding plan for February and March is shown below. 

Engineer Units Location 

Februay 93 

58th CO Baumholder. GE 

16th BN Fuerth GE 

40th BN Baumholder GE 

12th BN Bad Kreuznach, GE 

10th BN Wuerzburg, GE 

82nd BN Barnberg, GE 

23rd BN Hanau. GE 

~arth 93 

2nd BN CP Castle, Korea 

44th BN Kirnpo. Korea 

97th BN For! Irwin. CA 

129th BN St. Anthony, ID 

286th BN Bellingham, WA 

132nd BN Sacramento, CA 

NTC Blue Force Foit Irwin. CA 

The M970 device is a simple-to-use trainer that does not require any new equipment team training or spare parts. Units 

are authorized to use the device upon receipt. POC is Bill 

Good. -7637. 
Bailey Bridge Video Tapes. Two new video tapes, Bailey 

Bridge Construction. Parts I and 11, are available in TASC film 

libraries Army-wide. Bailey Bridge Construction, Part I, TVT 5-30, 

describes bridge site preparation from reconnaissance to completion of the site layout. Construction of a Bailey bridge is described 

in Part 11. TVT 5-31. It describes the complete construction of a 

100-foot double-single Bailey bridge with an upgrade to doubledouble capacity. POC is Dave Shafer, -7749. 

AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector. Productiori tests have identified a Directorate of Combat 

defect in all ANIPSS-12 mine detectors, Investigation revealed 

that the bracket on the search head where the telescopic pole Developments (DCD) . . 

attaches is cracked or broken. This defect does not render the 

unit moperable. The detector can be used until repair procedures 

become available. All defective sets should be retained until disposition instructions are received from ATCOM. POC is SFC 

Michael Craig, 7993. 

Concept Evaluation Program (CEP). The CEP is a Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) program that provides quick, 

innovative testing to resolve training and combat development issues. Proponents such as the Engineer School use the program 

to refine materiel requirements or determine the operational and 

training potential of new materiel. It is used to assess the potential for adapting commercially available items or modifying existing Items and prototypes to sat~sfy user requirements. The program is also used to evaluate nonmaterial applications, such as 

testing of doctrine, training and organizations, Ideas for potential 

candidates for CEP can be submitted to: Commandant, USAES, 

Ann: ATSE-CDM, Fort Leonard Wood. MO 65473. POC is Dr. 

Merrill Stevens. -7500 

Special Studies. Input froni enqineer units 1s requested to Directorate of Evaluation and 

support two special studies conducted recently at the Engineer 

Center. Both studies concerned the aualiw of trainina soldiers Standardization (DOES) , , - 

recelve-one involved the physical fitness of graduates; the other 

reviewed the adequacy of maintenance training. Send comments 

or suggestions to improve the training (in these or other areas) of 

soldiers you receive from the Engineer Center to: USAES, Attn: 

ATSE-ESE, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. POC is Jerry 

Wauthier, -5297. 

Reserve Training Office. We welcomed Major Joe Aldridge, Reserve Component (RC) 

Chief of Reserve Training, in November 1992. He is the point of 

contact for ReSe~e Component configured courseware (K3) 

products. Questions may be addressed to: Commander, USAES, 

Attn: ATSE-ID-TDR. Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473. MAJ 

Aldridge may be reached at -7522. 
- BRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

write this as I finish my first week serving you as 

the Engineer Center Command Sergeant Major 

(ECCSM). I'm filled with excitement, enthusiasm, 

anxiety, and anticipation. And. I'm more than a little 

humbled by the honor bestowed on me, as weil as 

the responsibilities that lay ahead of me. 

As I was leaving Germany, a soldier asked, "Sergeant Major, aren't you scared by all this?" I couldn't 

help but think about what General George S. Patton, 

Jr., said: "All men are a little frightened ..." A little 

frightened? Yes, but I'm optimistic that we have a 

great team that is able to take on challenging missions and win! Decisive victories are our legacy. Ensuring future successes is our challenge. So, let me 

introduce myself, share some of my goals with you, 

and discuss the kirid of leadership we need to nurture 

I am 39 years old and have 20 years of active duty. 

I served three tours in Germany. My leadership style 

is making soldiers feel confident that they can approach me anytlme. anywhere, about anything. The 

contributing factor for attaining my posit~on as the 

ECCSM is SOLDIERS! The soldiers I've been responsible for, directly or indirectly, did what I asked. At the 

same time. my commanders believed in my ability to 

accornpiish the mission. I am a stickler for leading by 

example. My favorite quote, which I use and teach 

others is. "In order to be successful in anything you 

want to do, you must have a goal." 

I have three goals to accomplish at the Engineer 

Center: 

Establish two-way communications from the 

Engineer Center to units in the field. 

m Ensure that the quality training taught here is 

tough, realistic and, above all, safe. 

Continue to promote quality-of-life issues for 

single soldiers and families on Fort Leonard 

Wood. 

The kind of leadership we noncommissioned officers need to nurture is genuine concern for new soidiers. For some of them coming into the Army. the future seems uncertain. As leaders we face many 

challenges: changes in Europe, changes in force 

size and structure, budget reductions, MOS consolidations, and the retention of quality soldiers. New soldiers are concerned about whether their leaders really 

"care about me and my situation." If we do uncaring 

things to soldiers during their first days in a unit, i.e. 

brush them off because we leaders are "busy," leave 

them out of major training events, or let them wait for 

days to in-process, they will only remember the "bad 

things. Those memories can harm their integration 

into a unit. 

When we say, "Leaders care for their soldiers," we 

mean they are genuinely concerned about the 

problems soldiers face from day one! Leaders care 

"bone deep" not just "skin deep." When a soldier has 

a personal problem, the caring leader strives to assist 

in dealing with the problem head-on, whether the 

problem occurs during the soldier's reception or 

during reassignment to a unit. The leadership counseling manual. FM 22-1011 helps leaders develop the 

necessary skills to assist soldiers with their personal 

and professional qrowth. . 

Leaders must understand their soldiers in order to 

identify their problems and to assist as they strive for 

excellence. Leaders nurture their soldiers so they understand the rules, both formal and informal. For example, how to meet appearance standards, how to 

feel proud about what they do and the unit they 

belong to, and when to shout their motto when saluting-such as, "Hoo-ah, sir. Essayonsl" 

Beionging to a team is important to both soldiers 

and their leaders. As we spend time with our soldiers 

in different activities, let's make them feel they're important. Make them feel they are an integral part of 

the unit, and help them become functioning and impor. 

tant members of our unit-our team! 

Firm and caring leadership creates a climate in 

which soldiers become motivated, enthusiastic, and 

willing to perform any mission. Soldiers always 

respond well to a leader who listens to their concerns, 

provides advice and assistance, and deals with them 

honestly and fairly. A positive climate develops through 

a sincere and continuous effort over time, not just 

during scheduled counseling to meet a requirement. 

I challenge you to set goals and look forward with 

pleasure to working with you to accomplish them. 
ENaNEm PROFEmowL BULLETIN 

US WY ENQP(EER SCHOOL 

AVN: ATE-mH-PB 

' FORT LEONARD WOOD, Mil 

-. . 

Rmpnfit. and 12 days of.row&t*i 

ng from both the n'orth an 

east ot the Alaska-Canada bc 

,000 soldiers and 

bullt the 1.523 mlle-br 

nicknamed the ALCAp. 1 

. ... , I

loto and en courtesy of Don Menzler. me mska hgnway The Dougks Prlnilng Co., LTD. Ednanron, Albena. Canads, 

PIN: 07(1.895-o00 .; 

. ..~ , .