RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1628-21 

 A-1629-21

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

D.B. and D.H., 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF S.B., 

a Minor. 

____________________________

Argued September 18, 2023 – Decided November 30, 2023 

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, 

Docket No. FN-16-0160-20.

Ted G. Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, argued the 

cause for appellant D.B. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1628-21

Defender, attorney; Ted G. Mitchell, of counsel and on 

the briefs).

Beth Anne Hahn, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant D.H. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Beth Anne Hahn, on the briefs).

Michelle J. McBrian, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney 

General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; John Joseph Lafferty, IV, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Cory Hadley Cassar, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for minor S.B. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis 

Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Cory 

Hadley Cassar, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

In these consolidated appeals, defendants D.B.1 (mother) and D.H. (father) 

appeal from the August 31, 2021, Family Part order finding they abused or 

neglected their then four-year-old daughter, S.B., within the meaning of 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), by using narcotics while caring for S.B. and allowing S.B. 

to have access to drug paraphernalia, including empty glassine packets of 

suspected heroin and capped and uncapped syringes. The August 31 order was 

1

 We use initials to protect the privacy of the family. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 
3 A-1628-21

perfected for appeal by a December 21, 2021, order terminating the litigation. 

We affirm. 

I.

On June 28, 2020, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency 

(Division) executed an emergency removal of S.B., pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.29 and -8.30, following a police referral prompted by defendants' arrests. A 

fact-finding hearing was conducted over three days in June and August 2021, 

during which several witnesses testified for the Division and documentary 

exhibits were admitted into evidence. Defendants also testified on their own 

behalf. 

At the hearing, Paterson Police Officer Randy Nouh, a seven-and-one-half 

year veteran, testified that before 7:30 a.m. on June 28, 2020, he and two other 

officers responded to D.B.'s apartment based on a 911 call reporting a 

"[d]omestic assault." As Nouh approached the front door, he heard 

"[s]creaming, yelling, a lot of noise in the background, [and] a little girl's voice." 

After Nouh "knocked on the door" to announce the officers' presence, a child, 

later identified as S.B., "opened the door." Through the open door, Nouh 

observed an individual, later identified as D.H., "[standing] in the 
4 A-1628-21

background . . . staring into thin air." Nouh and the other officers "entered the 

apartment" to investigate the reported domestic dispute. 

Once inside, Nouh observed that the apartment "was in disarray." He

recounted that "empty heroin glassin[e] packets" were "everywhere" and within 

S.B.'s reach. Nouh also observed that D.H.'s "eyes were bloodshot red," "his 

clothing was disheveled," and "he did[ not] appear to be in his right state of 

mind." While speaking to D.H., D.H. told Nouh that "he needed help" and 

volunteered that he "was under the influence" of "heroin and . . . crack" and that 

he had been "up all night" using the illicit substances. Next, Nouh spoke to

D.B., who had initially locked herself inside the bathroom. After exiting the 

bathroom, D.B. "admitted to using heroin" "earlier in the morning" and admitted 

to taking unprescribed "Xanax." In addition, both defendants presented needle 

exchange program cards to Nouh, demonstrating their ability to obtain sterile 

syringes "[f]or their heroin addiction," and Nouh observed "capped and 

uncapped" "syringes throughout the home." 

During cross-examination, Nouh admitted that he did not "collect th[e] 

heroin packages" to preserve as evidence, "test the packages for residue of 

heroin or other drugs," or "take picture[s] of [the glassines and syringes]." Nouh 

also acknowledged that he did not have a warrant to enter and search D.B.'s 
5 A-1628-21

apartment, that he "[was] not given . . . consent by an adult to enter," and that 

he did not "provide [D.B. or D.H.] with a Miranda[2] warning" before speaking 

with them. However, Nouh maintained that "[he] did not interrogate [D.B. or 

D.H.]" and that defendants voluntarily "made admissions" about their drug use. 

After obtaining supervisory approval, both defendants were arrested for 

child endangerment and a referral was made to the Division. According to 

Nouh, D.H. was transported to St. Joseph's University Medical Center (St. 

Joseph's) after he requested "medical attention." Although D.B. initially refused 

medical treatment, she was also transported to St. Joseph's "for a pre[-]existing 

injury on her right wrist which appeared . . . infected." 

According to D.B.'s certified medical records from St. Joseph's, which 

were admitted into evidence without objection, D.B. "report[ed] shooting [four] 

bags of heroin around 7:30 [a.m.] to 8[:00 a.m.]" the day of her arrest and 

"not[ed] that it[ was] . . . normal to her." D.H.'s certified medical records were

also admitted into evidence, "[s]ubject to the [c]ourt excluding any embedded 

hearsay."3 According to his medical records, D.H. "admit[ted] to using cocaine 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

 

3

 Although the judge sustained D.H.'s objection to the admission of any 

embedded hearsay contained in the medical records, D.B. did not join D.H.'s 

objection. 
6 A-1628-21

[the night before], [two] bags of IV heroin a few hours ago, and drinking 

[alcohol] overnight." 

After receiving the police referral, Zulay Beltran, a Division supervisor, 

responded to the Paterson police station and interviewed D.B. Beltran testified 

that D.B. made several admissions to her regarding illicit drug use. Beltran also 

testified that D.B. "appeared . . . very drowsy" and "under the influence," and 

recalled that D.B. "would lose her balance" when she was standing. 

Jenny Sierra, a Division caseworker, accompanied Beltran to the police 

station and interviewed S.B.4 S.B. told Sierra that she lived with both parents 

and police had come to her house earlier that day because "her mother had a 

temper tantrum . . . [after] her father accused her mother of taking his stuff." 

When Sierra asked "what [S.B.] meant by stuff," S.B. "indicated that it was 

mom['s] and dad's medicine," which they took to "ma[k]e them feel better." S.B. 

described the medicine as "white stuff" that her parents put "in a needle" which 

they "would then put . . . in their arm[s]." S.B. stated that she "would observe 

both [parents] taking the medicine together," and that the "medicine" would 

make them "very tired and sleepy." S.B. also stated that her father "would get 

4

 Although Nouh had indicated that S.B. "appeared to be fine," Sierra testified 

that S.B. "looked dirty" and "[h]er body odor had a foul smell to it." 
7 A-1628-21

mad . . . when he didn't take his medicine" and that he would "throw [D.B.] 

around the house" and "push [D.B.]," and that D.B. would then "hide in the 

bathroom." 

Both defendants testified, refuting the Division's proofs. D.H. denied that 

"there were syringes, capped and uncapped, and glassine baggies in plain sight" 

in the apartment. D.H. also claimed that "[Nouh] was lying" when he testified 

that he (D.H.) had made admissions about drug use. D.H. denied "ever us[ing] 

drugs in front of [S.B.]" and accused the Division of "concoct[ing]" the entire 

case. 

According to D.H.'s version of events, he went to D.B.'s apartment around 

6:30 a.m. on the morning in question to see his daughter before work. During 

the visit, he got into a heated verbal argument with D.B., as a result of which 

D.B. retreated into the bathroom and a neighbor complained about the noise. 

When the police arrived, D.H. claimed they handcuffed him and questioned him 

without advising him of his Miranda rights. D.H. stated he was asked whether 

he lived in the apartment, what he was doing in the apartment, and what his 

relationship was to D.B. D.H. testified that after he was questioned, the officers 

"pulled [D.B.] out of the bathroom," "put her in handcuffs," and "proceeded" to 

search her "drawers" and "closet" inside her bedroom. Although D.H. admitted 
8 A-1628-21

requesting medical attention, he denied telling anyone at the hospital about drug 

use. He explained that he wanted medical attention because he thought he "was 

going to pass out" from the police encounter. D.B.'s testimony mirrored D.H.'s. 

After the hearing, in an August 31, 2021, oral opinion, the judge found 

that the Division met its burden of showing that D.B. and D.H. "abused or 

neglected [S.B.]" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). After 

recounting the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary exhibits, the 

judge posited he was "faced with competing testimony" and "exact opposite 

stories," with D.B. and D.H. "basically den[ying] everything." To resolve the 

"[c]ompletely divergent positions" taken by the parties, the judge found the 

"hospital records" particularly persuasive, explaining: 

When someone goes to the hospital[,] in order to treat 

someone they have to take a detailed history from that 

patient. Because in order to be able to treat them they 

have to know what their symptoms are and what their

recent history is. And I note hospital workers are not 

law enforcement officers. They have no ax[e] to grind 

in this case. 

 The judge summarized the evidence contained in the hospital records as 

follows: 

[D.B.] tells the person that took the history, "Patient 

reports shooting four bags of heroin around 7:30 a.m. 

to 8[:00] a.m. noting that it's normal to her." Now this 
9 A-1628-21

is something that's asked of her while the hospital has 

to determine her treatment and what's wrong with her. 

I also note [D.H.] when asked by the hospital 

staff, he stated[,] "He admits to using cocaine last night. 

Two bags of I.V. heroin a few hours ago and drinking 

alcohol overnight. Patient states that he did not use 

these substances in an attempt to harm or kill himself." 

 Then, in specifically assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the judge 

found Nouh's testimony to be "credible," "reasonable," and "inherently 

believable." The judge noted that Nouh was "an experienced police officer," 

"provided forthright answers," had a "good demeanor," and had "no special 

interest in th[e] case." The judge also found that Nouh's "testimony 

was . . . supported by the hospital records as to the statements made by both 

defendants in terms of using . . . illicit substances." The judge also credited 

Sierra's testimony about S.B.'s statements. However, the judge noted that the 

information S.B. provided to Sierra during the interview about defendants' drug 

use was "not the basis for [his] decision." 

 In contrast, the judge "[did] not find either [D.H.] or [D.B.] . . . to be 

credible [witnesses]." The judge explained that during D.H.'s testimony, he

"came across . . . as being angry" and "his testimony [was] largely contradicted 

by . . . [the] credible testimony of . . . the hospital records . . . and . . . Nouh." 

As to D.B., the judge acknowledged that D.B. "gave straight answers and . . . 
10 A-1628-21

did not really avoid questions," but concluded that her testimony was also 

"largely contradicted by other credible testimony, mainly the hospital record, 

and . . . the credible testimony of . . . Nouh." 

 Next, to determine the admissibility of Nouh's testimony regarding the 

drug paraphernalia he observed while inside the apartment, the judge addressed 

whether Nouh lawfully entered D.B.'s apartment. The judge concluded that "the 

police . . . had the right to enter [D.B.'s] apartment to investigate the emergency 

that they were responding to under the [c]ommunity [c]are [t]aking [d]octrine." 

Because the officers were responding to a domestic dispute, the judge found that 

the "officer[s] had a duty, not just to stand and speak with the two parents" but 

to "investigate" if there was "anyone . . . causing danger to the child or the parties 

in that home." Critically, the judge pointed out that the drug paraphernalia 

"[was] found in plain view." 

Turning to the Miranda issue defendants raised to challenge the 

admissibility of their unwarned admissions of illicit drug use, the judge noted 

that the officers were "responding to an emergency," "there were no accusatory 

questions asked," and the questioning occurred "when the police first came in 

the apartment." The judge concluded that "Miranda warnings were not 

necessary" for defendants' admissions to Nouh at the apartment. However, the 
11 A-1628-21

judge determined he would not consider D.B.'s admissions to Beltran during her 

interview at the police station. 

Following the evidentiary rulings, the judge applied the pertinent 

provisions of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) to the credible evidence presented at 

the hearing and concluded that the Division met its burden "by a preponderance 

of the evidence." The judge determined that defendants "failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care in protecting their child by using strong narcotics . . . 

while their four-year-old child was in their care and by allowing the child to 

have access to various items of narcotics paraphernalia, including empty 

glassines and capped and uncapped syringes." The judge found that these 

circumstances were "sufficient proofs of [imminent] danger and substantial risk 

of harm" and "enter[ed] a finding of abuse and neglect" against defendants. 

In these ensuing appeals, in A-1628-21, D.B. raises the followings points 

for our consideration: 

[POINT I] 

UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO A HOME, CUSTODIAL 

QUESTIONING AND INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES 

TO GATHER SUPPOSEDLY AMPLE EVIDENCE OF 

DRUG USE SHOULD HAVE BARRED USE OF A 

POLICE OFFICER'S CLAIMS ABOUT WHAT HE 

OBSERVED OR STATEMENTS HE ATTRIBUTED 

TO A MOTHER TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT WITH 
12 A-1628-21

INDELIBLE, LIFE-LONG CONSEQUENCES 

UNDER N.J.S.A. [9:6-8.21(C)(4)]. 

A. A Police Officer's Entry Into [a] 

Home [t]o Investigate [a] Neighbor's Noise 

Complaint After [a] Child Opened [t]he 

Door Was Not Justified [b]y [t]he 

Community Caretaking Doctrine, Barring 

Use of [t]he Officer's Alleged 

Observations. 

B. The Trial Court's Use [o]f 

Statements Attributed [t]o [a] Mother By 

[a] Police Officer Who Questioned Her 

While [i]n Custody and [i]n [t]he Presence 

of Her Child Violated Her Right [t]o 

Notice [o]f [a] Right [t]o Remain Silent, 

[t]o Counsel and [t]o Due Process. 

[POINT II] 

A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO A MOTHER 

AFTER BEING ARRESTED, CONTAINED IN A 

HOSPITAL RECORD BUT LEFT UNEXPLAINED 

BY ANY [DIVISION] WITNESS AND OBTAINED 

WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY, WAS NOT 

ADMISSIBLE AS A STATEMENT MADE FOR 

PURPOSES OF DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT AND 

ITS USE WAS PLAIN ERROR[.] (NOT RAISED 

BELOW). 

[POINT III] 

EVEN ASSUMING DRUG USE BY D.B. WHILE 

CARING FOR HER CHILD, EVIDENCE DID NOT 

SHOW SHE PROVIDED LESS THAN THE 

MINIMUM DEGREE OF CARE, CREATED 
13 A-1628-21

IMMINENT DANGER OR A SUBSTANTIAL RISK 

TO VIOLATE N.J.S.A. [9:6-8.21(C)(4)(B)]. 

In A-1629-21, D.H. raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I 

THE PATERSON POLICE DEPARTMENT'S 

WARRANTLESS, NON-CONSEN[S]UAL SEARCH 

OF [D.B.]'S APARTMENT AND QUESTIONING OF 

[D.H.] WERE ILLEGAL; THEREFORE, THE 

STATE'S SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION IN THIS 

QUASI-CRIMINAL MATTER LACKED THE 

COMPETENT EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO 

SUSTAIN A TITLE 9 JUDGMENT. 

A. The Officers' Non-Consensual Entry 

and Warrantless Search of [D.B]'s 

Apartment Were Not Authorized by the 

Community Caretaking Doctrine; 

Therefore, Any Evidence or Testimony 

Generated as a Result of the Search Are 

Inadmissible. 

. . . . 

B. Contrary to the Trial Court's 

Conclusion, Miranda Warnings Were 

Required; Absent these Warnings, the 

Fruits of the Police Investigation Were 

Inadmissible in the State's Title 9 

Prosecution. 

POINT II

HOSPITAL RECORDS OBTAINED IN THIS 

INVOLUNTARY FASHION, IN A CUSTODIAL 

SETTING, WERE NOT FOR DIAGNOSIS OR 
14 A-1628-21

TREATMENT AND ARE THEREFORE 

INADMISSIBLE. (NOT RAISED BELOW). 

POINT III 

EVEN IF THE PATERSON POLICE 

DEPARTMENT'S SEARCH AND INTERROGATION 

WERE LEGAL, AND HOSPITAL RECORDS 

ADMISSIBLE, [THE DIVISION] NEVERTHELESS 

FAILED TO PROVE [D.H.] ABUSED OR 

NEGLECTED HIS DAUGHTER WITHIN THE 

MEANING OF TITLE 9. 

Both the Division and the Law Guardian urge us to reject defendants' 

arguments and affirm the judge's abuse and neglect finding. 

II. 

We begin with a recitation of the governing principles. To succeed in a 

Title 9 fact-finding proceeding, the Division must prove "that the child is 'abused 

or neglected' by a preponderance of the evidence, and only through the 

admission of 'competent, material and relevant evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Fam. Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)). 

An "abused or neglected child" is, in relevant part, a child under eighteen 

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has 

been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming 

impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or 

guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . 

in providing the child with proper supervision or 

guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to 

be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.] 
15 A-1628-21

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).] 

A parent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care "refers to conduct 

that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." Dep't of 

Children & Fams. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 305 (2011) (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of 

Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999)). Willful or wanton negligence 

"implies that a person has acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others." 

G.S., 157 N.J. at 179. It is "done with the knowledge that injury is likely to, or 

probably will, result[,]" and "can apply to situations ranging from 'slight 

inadvertence to malicious purpose to inflict injury.'" Id. at 178 (citations 

omitted). "However, if the act or omission is intentionally done, 'whether the 

actor actually recognizes the highly dangerous character of [the] conduct is 

irrelevant,' and '[k]nowledge will be imputed to the actor.'" N.J. Div. of Child 

Prot. & Permanency v. S.G., 448 N.J. Super. 135, 144 (App. Div. 2016) (second 

alteration in original) (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at 178).

"Because the primary focus is the protection of children, 'the culpability 

of parental conduct' is not relevant." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. 

III, 201 N.J. 328, 344 (2010) (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at 177). 

"Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care is to be analyzed in light of the 

dangers and risks associated with the situation." G.S., 
16 A-1628-21

157 N.J. at 181-82. "When a cautionary act by the 

guardian would prevent a child from having his or her 

physical, mental or emotional condition impaired, that 

guardian has failed to exercise a minimum degree of

care as a matter of law." Id. at 182. The mere lack of 

actual harm to the child is irrelevant, as "[c]ourts need 

not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably 

impaired by parental inattention or neglect." In re 

Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999) 

(citation omitted). 

[S.G., 448 N.J. Super. at 144-45 (alteration in 

original).]

When evaluating these appeals, "our standard of review is narrow." Id. at 

142. 

We will uphold a trial judge's fact-findings if 

they are "supported by adequate, substantial, and 

credible evidence." [N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. 

v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)]. We "accord 

deference to fact[-]findings of the family court because 

it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the 

witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses 

special expertise in matters related to the family." [N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 

(2012)]. 

. . . . No deference is given to the court's legal

conclusions which are reviewed de novo. N.J. Div. of 

Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.G., 445 N.J. Super. 324, 

342 (App. Div. 2016). 

[N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.H., 460

N.J. Super. 212, 218 (App. Div. 2019) (second 

alteration in original).]
17 A-1628-21

If the trial court's rulings "'essentially involved the application of legal 

principles and did not turn upon contested issues of witness credibility,' we 

review the court's corroboration determination de novo." N.J. Div. of Child 

Prot. & Permanency v. A.D., 455 N.J. Super. 144, 156 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting 

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513, 521 (App. 

Div. 2017)). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' 

or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene . . . to ensure that there 

is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 

88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 

605 (2007)). 

In reviewing evidentiary rulings, "we afford '[c]onsiderable latitude . . . 

[to a] trial court in determining whether to admit evidence, and that 

determination will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" 

N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521 (alterations in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child 

Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478, 492 (App. Div. 2016)). "An 

abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis."'" Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. 

Div. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). 
18 A-1628-21

Defendants challenge both the admissibility and the adequacy of the 

evidence relied on by the judge in concluding that S.B. was abused or neglected 

within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). As to admissibility, 

defendants contend that because Nouh's warrantless entry into D.B.'s apartment 

was not justified under the community-caretaking exception to the warrant 

requirement, Nouh's observations should have been suppressed under the 

exclusionary rule. 

Under the community-caretaking doctrine, 

[c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . . 

when police officers have acted not in their law 

enforcement or criminal investigatory role, but rather 

in a community caretaking function. In today's society, 

police officers perform "dual roles." On the one hand, 

they carry out traditional law enforcement functions, 

such as investigating crimes and arresting perpetrators. 

On the other hand, police officers perform a wide range 

of social services, such as aiding those in danger of 

harm, preserving property, and "creat[ing] and 

maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the community." 

[State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (second and

third alterations in original) (citations omitted).] 

In Bogan, our Supreme Court recognized that the community-caretaking 

role of law enforcement "extends to protecting the welfare of children" and 

reflects "the State's general parens patriae duty to safeguard children from 

harm." Id. at 75. As a result, as long as the role was not "a pretext to conduct 
19 A-1628-21

an otherwise unlawful warrantless search," the Court would not "handcuff police 

officers from fulfilling a clear community caretaking responsibility, particularly 

one that might prevent imminent harm to a child, merely because the officers 

are engaged in a concurrent criminal investigation." Id. at 77. Thus, in Bogan, 

the Court concluded that a police officer did not "engage[] in an unlawful 

search" when the officer "had an independent basis, separate from any criminal 

investigation, to inquire whether a responsible adult was attending to [a child] 

and to ask a parent simple questions concerning a child's safety and welfare." 

Id. at 79. The Court held the officer "was lawfully on the premises . . . , and 

given the plain view doctrine, the police did not have to wait for judicial 

permission to question and eventually take [the] defendant into custody." Ibid. 

However, without "some species of exigent circumstances, the 

community-caretaking doctrine is not a basis for the warrantless entry into and 

search of a home." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 321 (2013). Instead, when 

exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a communitycaretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a home under 

the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." Vargas, 213 N.J. at

323. The emergency aid doctrine "is derived from the commonsense 

understanding that exigent circumstances may require public safety officials, 
20 A-1628-21

such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of 

protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State v. Hathaway, 

222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 

586, 598 (2004)). 

Under the emergency-aid doctrine, the State must show "(1) the officer 

had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] that 

he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to prevent 

serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between the emergency and 

the area or places to be searched." Id. at 470 (first alteration in original) (quoting 

State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012)). Still, "[t]he emergency-aid 

doctrine . . . must be 'limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the 

need for immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting Frankel, 179 

N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in plain view by a public 

safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not exceeding the scope of 

the search,' that evidence will be admissible." Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470 

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600). 

While there are similarities between the emergency aid and community 

caretaking exceptions, the two exceptions are doctrinally separate and distinct. 

See Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1598 (2021) (rejecting 
21 A-1628-21

that a police officer's "'caretaking' duties creates a standalone doctrine that 

justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home"); see also State v. 

Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining that the 

community caretaking and emergency aid exceptions are "related, but separate 

exceptions[ that] have been used interchangeably in the past"). "The community 

[-]caretaker exception asks whether the police are 'engaged in "functions, [which 

are] totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 

relating to the violation of a statute."'" Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. at 192 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App. 

Div. 1998)). The emergency-aid exception focuses on an objectively reasonable 

belief an emergency exists, immediate action is needed to avert potentially 

serious harm to an individual, and there is a reasonable nexus between the 

emergency and the area to be searched. Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470. 

 Here, police were dispatched to D.B.'s apartment after a neighbor reported 

a domestic dispute. Upon arrival, Nouh heard "[s]creaming, yelling, a lot of 

noise in the background, [and] a little girl's voice." After Nouh knocked, S.B. 

opened the door and revealed D.H. standing in the background "staring into thin

air." Based on Nouh's confirmation that a domestic dispute was in progress, the 

fact that a child rather than an adult answered the door, and Nouh's observation 
22 A-1628-21

of a seemingly intoxicated male standing in the apartment, Nouh had a duty to 

enter the apartment to inquire whether a responsible adult was caring for the 

child and to ascertain whether the other party to the domestic dispute required 

immediate emergency assistance. 

Police officers need not "'stand by in the face of imminent danger and 

delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious time is expended 

obtaining a warrant.'" Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 469 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 

599). Under the circumstances, Nouh had "an objectively reasonable belief that 

immediate action was needed to avert potentially serious harm to an individual, 

and . . . delay in securing a warrant was not an option." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 

136. Nouh's warrantless entry into D.B.'s apartment was therefore equally 

justified under both the community-caretaking and the emergency-aid doctrine. 

 Once Nouh was lawfully inside, he observed the apartment in disarray 

with "empty heroin glassin[e] packets" in plain view and within S.B.'s reach. 

Nouh also observed "capped and uncapped" "syringes throughout the home." 

"We do not believe that a police officer lawfully in the viewing area must close 

his eyes to suspicious evidence in plain view." State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 

237 (1983); see Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470 ("If . . . contraband is 'observed in 

plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not 
23 A-1628-21

exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." (quoting 

Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600)). "The question is not whether the police could 

have done something different, but whether their actions, when viewed as a 

whole, were objectively reasonable." Bogan, 200 N.J. at 81. 

We are satisfied that overall, the officers' "carefully modulated response" 

to "swiftly moving events and uncertain circumstances" was objectively 

reasonable. Id. at 80. Because Nouh was justified under the circumstances in

entering D.B.'s apartment, his testimony about his observations once inside the 

apartment was admissible. See Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 140 (explaining that the 

officers' entry into a home to assure the safety of a child following an anonymous 

9-1-1 report of domestic violence was permissible under the emergency aid 

doctrine "[b]ut once there was no longer an objective basis to believe that an 

emergency was at hand, '[t]he privacy interests of the home [were] entitled to 

the highest degree of respect.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 

State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 384 (2003))); Bogan, 200 N.J. at 65 (upholding 

under the community-caretaking doctrine an officer's entry into an apartment to 

ascertain the welfare of a child who was home from school with no apparent 

excuse in a residence that had been the site of a reported sexual assault earlier 

that day). 
24 A-1628-21

Defendants also argue that the judge should have excluded their 

admissions as violative of their Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants contend 

their incriminating statements regarding illicit drug use were inadmissible 

because Nouh failed to administer Miranda warnings when the officers entered 

D.B.'s apartment. 

"The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that '[n]o 

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 

himself.'" State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 100 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting 

U.S. Const. amend. V). "In New Jersey, the privilege is derived from the 

common law and is codified in our statutes and rules." Id. at 101; see N.J.S.A. 

2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 503. 

It is well established that 

the prosecution may not use statements, whether 

exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates 

the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 

privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 

in any significant way. 

[Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.] 
25 A-1628-21

Thus, to trigger the need for Miranda warnings, "the defendant must be in 

custody and the interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement." P.Z., 

152 N.J. at 102. "The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been 

a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the 

objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the 

status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors." Id. 

at 103. 

"[P]olice may conduct general on-the-scene questioning of a suspect, as 

authorized by Terry v. Ohio,[5] without giving Miranda warnings." State v. Toro, 

229 N.J. Super. 215, 220 (App. Div. 1998). For example, in State v. Pierson, 

223 N.J. Super. 62, 65, 67-68 (App. Div. 1988), the defendant was detained for 

thirty minutes at the scene of a fire investigation while police requested 

identification, asked why he was there, and then investigated his story. We 

explained that "[t]he investigative techniques adopted by the officer were neither 

harassing nor intimidating." Id. at 67. We concluded that "[a]s [the] defendant's 

restraint constituted a permissible investigatory detention rather than rendering 

him in custody, the absence of Miranda warnings did not preclude the 

5

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
26 A-1628-21

evidentiary use of [the] defendant's responses to the officer's questions." 

Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. at 68. 

In State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 2005), we

addressed "the applicability of Miranda warnings in the context of an officer's 

response to a call about a domestic dispute" by analogizing the situation to "field 

investigations" under Terry and "traffic stops" authorized by Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). We "recogniz[ed] that police action subsequent 

to entering the residence is likely to involve some restraint on the occupants' 

freedom of action." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431. However, we explained that 

"[d]espite the restraint on freedom of action involved in Terry and traffic stops, 

an officer is not required to give Miranda warnings before asking questions 

reasonably related to dispelling or confirming suspicions that justify the 

detention." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 431. 

We saw "no basis for applying a different analysis or standard in 

determining the need for Miranda warnings when the police encounter with the 

person questioned begins with the officer's response to a call about a domestic 

dispute," and held that "[t]he fact that such an investigation typically takes place 

in the suspect's home away from the public view is not an inherently coercive 

circumstance." Smith, 374 N.J. Super. at 432. Thus, when police officers 
27 A-1628-21

respond to a domestic dispute call, "[t]he question is whether a reasonable 

person, considering the objective circumstances, would understand the situation 

as a de facto arrest or would recognize that after brief questioning he or she 

would be free to leave." Ibid. In Smith, we concluded that Miranda warnings 

were not necessary because "[t]he questioning was brief, lasting a matter of 

moments," "[was] related to dispelling or confirming the officer's suspicion," 

"[was] neither harassing nor intimidating," and "was not a stratagem or phrased 

to coerce an admission." Id. at 435. 

Applying these principles, like the judge, we conclude that under the 

totality of the circumstances, Miranda warnings were not necessary. Nouh 

responded to D.B.'s home after a neighbor reported a domestic disturbance. 

When he arrived at the scene, Nouh heard yelling inside the apartment and a 

little girl's voice. After Nouh entered the apartment, by D.H.'s own admission, 

he was asked: "[D]o you live here?" "[W]hat are you doing here?" and "[W]ho 

is [D.B.] to you?" Based on Nouh's testimony, which the judge credited, the 

questioning occurred at the beginning of the encounter, prior to Nouh receiving 

supervisory approval to arrest defendants. "Custody at the time of questioning, 

from the perspective of the reasonable person, not the likelihood of future 

custody, is determinative." Smith, 347 N.J. Super. at 433. 
28 A-1628-21

As in Smith, Nouh's "questioning" of defendants was "brief," "related to 

dispelling or confirming [Nouh's] suspicion" that defendants were engaged in a 

domestic dispute and was "neither harassing nor intimidating." Id. at 435. 

Indeed, Nouh's questioning was "not a stratagem or phrased to coerce an 

admission," ibid., and the incriminating statements regarding illicit drug use 

were volunteered spontaneous admissions, see State v. Brabham, 413 N.J. 

Super. 196, 210 (App. Div. 2010) ("Miranda has no application to statements 

that are 'volunteered.'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)). Thus, the 

evidentiary use of defendants' statements was permissible.6 

Next, defendants challenge the admissibility of the medical records from 

their June 28, 2020, visit to St. Joseph's following their arrest as well as their 

statements recorded within the medical records. They assert their out-of-court 

statements made to medical personnel constitute inadmissible hearsay that was 

6

 We need not consider and express no opinion as to the admissibility of D.B.'s 

incriminating statements to Beltran at the police station because they were not 

considered by the judge. See State v. Helewa, 223 N.J. Super. 40, 51-52 (App. 

Div. 1988) (equating Division caseworker to a law enforcement officer and 

requiring the caseworker to administer Miranda warnings to a parent who was 

arrested and confined during interview); State v. Flower, 224 N.J. Super. 208, 

220 (Law Div. 1987), aff'd, 224 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988) (suppressing a 

confession a defendant made to a Division investigator while arrested and 

confined in a county jail because the investigator failed to inform the defendant 

of his Miranda rights). 
29 A-1628-21

not subject to the medical-treatment exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(4), because the examination was not for purposes of diagnosis or 

treatment but for incarceration. 

At the fact-finding hearing, D.B.'s medical record was admitted into 

evidence without objection. Therefore, we review the admissibility of D.B.'s

medical record and her out-of-court statements embedded within the medical 

record for plain error. Plain error is any error that is "clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "[A]n appellant faces an especially high 

hurdle in an appeal from a civil bench trial to establish that the admission 

of . . . evidence constitutes 'plain error.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency 

v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2016). Indeed, "hearsay subject to 

a well-founded objection is generally evidential if no objection is made." Id. at 

348-49. D.H.'s medical record was admitted subject to D.H.'s limited objection 

to the admission of any embedded hearsay. Therefore, we review the 

admissibility of D.H.'s medical record for plain error but review the 

admissibility of D.H.'s out-court-statements embedded in the medical record for 

abuse of discretion. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231

N.J. 354, 366 (2017). 
30 A-1628-21

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement "offer[ed] in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted." N.J.R.E. 801(c). Generally, "[h]earsay is not 

admissible except as provided by [the New Jersey Rules of Evidence] or by other 

law." N.J.R.E. 802. One such exception is the so-called business record 

exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), which excludes from the hearsay rule: 

[a] statement contained in a writing or other record of 

acts, events, conditions, and, subject to [N.J.R.E.] 808, 

opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time of 

observation by a person with actual knowledge or from 

information supplied by such a person, if the writing or 

other record was made in the regular course of business 

and it was the regular practice of that business to make 

such writing or other record. 

Thus, "[t]o qualify as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), a writing 

must meet three conditions: it must be made in the regular course of business, 

within a short time of the events described in it, and under circumstances that 

indicate its trustworthiness." State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 387-88 (2015) 

(citing State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985)). Hearsay embedded in 

otherwise admissible business records "must satisfy a separate hearsay 

exception." J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 347-48; see N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. R.W., 438 N.J. Super. 462, 466-67 (App. Div. 2014) (noting that 

notwithstanding the admissibility of Division records that meet the business 

records exception, hearsay embedded therein must meet other hearsay 
31 A-1628-21

exceptions in order to be admitted); N.J.R.E. 805 (providing that "[h]earsay 

within hearsay"—such as the content of a business record—"is not excluded by 

the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with 

an exception to the rule"). 

Another pertinent exception to the prohibition against hearsay are 

statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Such 

statements: 

(A) [are] made in good faith for purposes of, and is 

reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment; 

and 

(B) describe[] medical history; past or present 

symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their 

general cause. 

[N.J.R.E. 803(c)(4).] 

 

Our Supreme Court has long recognized "the declarations of a patient as 

to his [or her] condition, symptoms and feelings made to his [or her] physician 

for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment are admissible in evidence as an 

exception to the hearsay rule." Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 501 (1971). The 

"rationale for that departure from the hearsay rule is that such statements possess 

inherent reliability because 'the patient believes that the effectiveness of the 

treatment he [or she] receives may depend largely upon the accuracy of the 
32 A-1628-21

information he [or she] provides'" the medical professional. R.S. v. Knighton, 

125 N.J. 79, 87 (1991) (quoting Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on 

Evidence § 292, at 839 (3d. ed. 1984)). Nonetheless, hearsay obtained during 

evidence gathering and medical consultations conducted purely in preparation 

for litigation remain inadmissible. State in the Int. of C.A., 201 N.J. Super. 28, 

33-34 (App. Div. 1985). 

Additionally, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) exempts party statements against 

interest from the general hearsay exclusionary rule. This includes statements by 

the party declarant which, at the time of its making, were contrary to declarant's 

"pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest, or so far tended to subject declarant 

to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in declarant's position 

would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true." Id. 

"The statement-against-interest exception is based on the theory that, by human 

nature, individuals will neither assert, concede, nor admit to facts that would 

affect them unfavorably. Consequently, statements that so disserve the 

declarant are deemed inherently trustworthy and reliable." N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 

at 498 (quoting State v. White, 158 N.J. 230, 238 (1999)). 

Further, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1), a "[d]efendant's own statements 

are admissible as statements of a party-opponent" if the statements are offered 
33 A-1628-21

against him in the action. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 348 (citing N.J.R.E. 

803(b)(1)). "[W]hen the proffered evidence is 'the [opposing] party's own 

statement,' there is no pre-condition to admissibility requiring a legal conclusion 

drawn by 'application of [the New Jersey] Rules of Evidence to adduced facts.'" 

Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 419-20 (App. Div. 2012) (citation 

omitted) (first quoting N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1); and then quoting Est. of Hanges v. 

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383 (2010)). "The issue is purely a 

factual one—whether the party-opponent made the statement." Id. at 420. 

Guided by these principles, we discern no error and no abuse of discretion 

in the admission of the medical record as to either defendant. The records were 

admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and the 

embedded hearsay was admissible under several other exceptions, including the 

medical diagnosis or treatment exception, as well as a statement against interest 

and of a party-opponent. Although defendants were arrested prior to treatment, 

given their respective medical conditions, there can be no question that their 

statements about drug use were made to hospital personnel for the purpose of 
34 A-1628-21

diagnosis and treatment, and no credible dispute that the incriminating 

statements were made by the parties themselves.7 

We reject defendants' suggestion that because they had already been 

arrested when they were being treated, hospital personnel acting in a law 

enforcement capacity had a duty to administer Miranda warnings. Defendants' 

proposition is unsupported by any legal authority. See Flower, 224 N.J. Super. 

at 218 (noting that "not all questioning . . . constitute[s] acting in a law 

enforcement capacity"). We also reject D.B.'s belated contention that her 

medical record was not properly authenticated. "[I]t is settled that 

circumstantial evidence is acceptable for authentication of written material." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.T., 354 N.J. Super. 407, 413 (App. Div. 

2002). 

Here, an attached certification stated that each defendant's medical record 

was signed by the director of medical records services. The certification also 

7

 "Our conclusion that various embedded hearsay statements were evidential is 

not at odds with N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(2), which states that 'only competent, 

material and relevant evidence may be admitted' in a fact-finding hearing. 

Hearsay does not relate to proof's relevance, see N.J.R.E. 401, or competence, 

see N.J.R.E. 601." J.D., 447 N.J. Super. at 350 n.5. "Indeed, based on the 

doctrine of invited error, inadmissible hearsay was deemed acceptable evidence 

in M.C. III, 201 N.J. at 342," to sustain a finding of abuse and neglect. J.D., 447 

N.J. Super. at 350 n.5. 
35 A-1628-21

stated that the record had been "made in the regular course of business of th[e 

hospital]," that "it was in the regular course of business of th[e hospital] to make 

said records," and that "[t]he records were made at the time of condition and/or 

occurrences reported therein or within a reasonable time thereafter and 

accurately reflect[ed] the condition and/or occurrence." Such a certification 

from the records custodian provides satisfactory evidence and suffices to 

authenticate the records for purposes of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). See N.T., 445 N.J. 

Super. at 500 (holding that an "employee's certification" supported the 

admissibility of a record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)). 

Finally, defendants contend that even if all the evidence was admissible, 

it was inadequate to support the judge's finding of abuse or neglect.8 D.B. asserts 

"[t]he record did no[t] contain sufficient credible evidence that [her] drug 

use . . . amounted to gross negligence that created imminent danger and a 

8

 Because we have decided that defendants' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 

were not violated in the circumstances of this case, we need not address whether 

the exclusionary rule even applies to a Title Nine proceeding. See Delguidice 

v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 84, 92 (1985) (applying a balancing test to 

decide whether "application of the exclusionary rule [was] appropriate" and 

concluding "the Law Division's finding of entrapment and dismissal of criminal 

proceedings should not prevent the use of the incriminating evidence in 

appellant's licensing hearing before the Racing Commission"); see also P.Z., 152 

N.J. at 112 ("We decline to tip the balance by requiring additional protections 

for the parents of abused children to be imported from our criminal 

jurisprudence into Title Nine proceedings."). 
36 A-1628-21

substantial risk of harm to [S.B.]," or that she "was impaired." Similarly, D.H. 

argues the Division failed to produce "[a]dequate, substantial, credible, and 

competent evidence supporting any level of impairment, such that it 

impacted . . . [D.H.'s] ability to care for [S.B.]" or that he provided less than a 

minimum degree of care for S.B. 

We reject defendants' contentions and affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed in the judge's comprehensive August 31, 2021, oral opinion. The 

judge's conclusion that defendants "failed to exercise a minimum degree of care" 

and placed S.B. in imminent danger and at substantial risk of harm was amply 

supported by competent and credible evidence. In N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. V.F., we affirmed a finding of abuse or neglect within the 

meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) predicated on two officers' testimony that 

the defendant was under the influence and unable to care for his minor children. 

457 N.J. Super. 525, 537-38 (App. Div. 2019). Based on their observations, the 

officers testified that the defendant "had blood shot eyes, was groggy, had 

slurred speech, was unable to provide coherent responses to simple questions, 

and had to use the wall for support while attempting to walk or stand on his 

own." Id. at 537. We rejected the defendant's contention that the proofs were 

deficient because the Division relied solely on the officers' observations and 
37 A-1628-21

"presented no physical evidence, such as blood or urine tests, to prove he was 

under the influence at the time" and there was no evidence "of drug 

paraphernalia in his house that would indicate drug use." Id. at 536-37. 

Here, the evidence included Nouh's and Beltran's observations, 

defendants' incriminating statements to Nouh, and the contents of defendants' 

medical records. The proofs showed defendants were under the influence of 

"strong narcotics" while caring for S.B. and exposed S.B. to danger by allowing 

her to have access to drug paraphernalia, "including empty [heroin] glassines 

and capped and uncapped syringes." See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency 

v. B.O., 438 N.J. Super. 373, 385 (App. Div. 2014) ("Parents who use illegal 

drugs when caring for an infant expose that baby to many dangers due to their 

impaired judgment."). 

Affirmed.