IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

BENJAMIN ORVOLD and COREY 

ORVOLD, husband and wife, and the 

marital community composed thereof,

Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

 v.

WILLIAM MERSHON and DEBRA 

MERSHON, husband and wife, and the 

marital community composed thereof,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

 No. 86628-1-I

 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

COBURN, J. — The parties are families owning property in adjacent lots of a 

neighborhood with a roadway that ends in a cul-de-sac. The paved road that provides 

access to both properties is on the Orvold property, which is thus a servient estate to 

the Mershon property for ingress and egress by written easement and covenants. The

Orvolds alleged trespass and waste on their property arising from the Mershons parking 

their vehicles on the easement road shoulder on the Mershons’ side of the cul-de-sac, 

and sought injunctive relief to cease such parking as well as damages. They also 

alleged harassment by the Mershons. The Mershons counter-claimed for harassment.

The trial court dismissed the Orvolds’ trespass claim under partial summary 

judgment and their waste claim under CR 41 during a bench trial. The court found that 

both parties had unlawfully harassed each other, issued restraining orders against both 
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parties, and denied attorney fees to both. Both parties appeal the final order, and the 

Orvolds appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their trespass claim.

We affirm the dismissal of the trespass claim where the Orvolds alleged that the 

Mershons knowingly entered the Orvold property without permission, but in response to 

the summary judgment motion clarified that they were not disputing the Mershons’ right 

to park on the shoulder of the easement without permission from the Orvolds. Because 

the trial court did not make all the necessary findings of fact to support the antiharassment order against both parties, we vacate the order and remand for further 

proceedings. We also reverse the trial court’s denial of the Mershons’ request for 

attorney fees for having successfully defended the Orvolds’ waste claim. 

FACTS

Benjamin and Corey Orvold, and Debra and William (who goes by Alan) 

Mershon, live across the street from each other in a Puyallup neighborhood that ends in 

a cul-de-sac. When the original owners of the area created plats, they also included an 

ingress-egress easement which provided that all owners were entitled to unrestricted 

use of the street, in common with the other owners, including parking on the shoulder of 

the road. The section of the roadway easement between the Orvold and Mershon 

homes is within the boundary lines of the Orvold property. 

The center of controversy in this litigation is a section of paved road shoulder on 

the side of the cul-de-sac in front of the Mershon home where they sometimes park. 

This is the “disputed area.” It is adjacent to a gravel parking strip that was created by 

the previous owners of the Mershon home and subject of a prior litigation involving 

those previous owners. Martin v. Orvold, No. 53831-8-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 
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Mar 9, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2053831-8-

II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. In Martin, we held that the previous owners to the 

Mershons had adversely possessed the gravel parking strip from the Orvolds. Martin, 

slip op. at 17. 

In 2021 the Martins sold their property to the Mershons. Tensions rose between 

the Orvolds and Mershons around a month after the Mershons moved into the property. 

The Orvolds were unhappy that the Mershons and their guests parked in the disputed 

area even when their driveway or the gravel parking strip was not full. In early July, the 

Orvolds’ counsel sent a letter to the Mershons telling them they did not have permission 

to park anywhere on the Orvold property, including within the ingress and egress 

easement. 

In September 2021 the Orvolds sued the Mershons, alleging that despite their 

formal notice and demand, the Mershons had continued parking on the Orvold property 

“for two weeks without moving a vehicle, and including intentionally maneuvering 

vehicles to ensure one is parked on the Orvold property at all times.” The complaint 

alleges that the knowing entry of the Mershon vehicles on Orvold property “amounts to 

trespass, and has caused damage to Plaintiffs and the Orvold Property, including but 

not limited to any costs of restoration and Plaintiff’s lost use of the property.” The 

Orvold complaint requested injunctive relief prohibiting the Mershons from parking “on 

any portion of the Orvold property” as well as treble damages against the Mershons 

under RCW 4.24.630, the statute governing liability for wrongful waste or injury to the 

land. Additionally, the Orvolds sought an anti-harassment protection order under former 

RCW 10.14.080 (2019). 
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The Mershons filed a counterclaim for “quiet title/declaratory relief” which asked 

that the court “issue declaratory relief quieting title as to the scope of the easement to 

allow parking on the sides of the roadway in a non-interfering fashion to vehicular traffic 

and ingress egress out of driveways and adjacent parking spaces.” They also 

petitioned for an anti-harassment protection order under chapter 10.14 RCW. The 

Mershons later amended their answer, removing the counterclaim of quiet title. 

In January 2022 the Mershons moved for partial summary judgment dismissal of 

the “trespass/injunction” claim. They presented evidence that the easement was 

created for the benefit of all owners of properties abutting the easement and that it has 

been a neighborhood practice for more than 10 years to allow parking along the paved 

shoulder of the easement in a non-interfering manner. 

In response to the motion for partial summary judgment, the Orvolds argued they 

were not claiming that parking is never allowed and did not seek a judicial determination 

as to whether parking on the easement is allowed. The Orvolds conceded that a Road 

Maintenance Agreement (RMA) executed between previous owners of the lots at issue 

provides the Mershons access and use of the easement. The RMA provides: “It is 

agreed that each of the Owners is entitled to unrestricted us[e] of the Street, in common 

with the other owners for foot and vehicular ingress and egress by themselves and their 

invitees.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the 

Orvolds’ trespass claim with prejudice while preserving a claim for waste. A bench trial 

was held in late January and early February of 2023.
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After the Orvolds rested, the Mershons moved under CR 41 to dismiss the 

unlawful harassment and waste claims. The court granted the motion as to the waste 

claim. That left only the issue of unlawful harassment claimed by both parties.

The court found that both the Orvolds and Mershons had committed acts of 

unlawful harassment against each other and entered restraining orders against both 

parties. The court denied both party’s request for attorney’s fees, finding neither had 

substantially prevailed. Both parties appeal the final orders. The Orvolds also appeal 

the summary judgment order. 

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Dismissal of Trespass Claim

Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings and affidavits show 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Voorde Poorte v. Evans, 66 Wn. App. 358, 360-61, 832 P.2d 105 

(1992) (citing Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wn.2d 174, 177-78, 759 P.2d 455 (1988)). A 

‘material fact’ is a fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. Balise v. 

Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963). The burden is on the party 

moving for summary judgment to demonstrate there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact, and reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved against 

the moving party. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn.2d 345, 349, 588 P.2d 

1346 (1979) (citing Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494-95, 519 P.2d 7 (1974)). 

Summary judgment is then appropriate if the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, “fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
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party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Young v. 

Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). 

“Trespass” is an “‘interfere[nce] with the right to exclusive possession of 

property.’” Grundy v. Brack Family Tr., 151 Wn. App. 557, 566, 213 P.3d 619 (2009)

(alteration in original) (quoting Gaines v. Pierce County, 66 Wn. App. 715, 719, 834 

P.2d 631 (1992)).1 To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must establish “‘(1) an 

invasion of property affecting an interest in exclusive possession, (2) an intentional act, 

(3) reasonable foreseeability that the act would disturb the plaintiff's possessory interest, 

and (4) actual and substantial damages.’” Id. at 567 (quoting Wallace v. Lewis County, 

134 Wn. App. 1, 15, 137 P.3d 101 (2006)). A plaintiff “‘who cannot show that actual and 

substantial damages have been suffered should be subject to dismissal of [their] cause 

upon a motion for summary judgment.’” Lavington v. Hillier, 22 Wn. App. 2d 134, 149, 

510 P.3d 373 (2022) (quoting Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wn.2d 677, 

692, 709 P.2d 782 (1985)).

The Orvolds first challenge several findings from the order of partial summary 

judgment.2 However, we review summary judgments de novo, performing the same 

inquiry as the trial court and viewing the facts (and reasonable inferences therefrom) in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wn. App. 672, 

685, 124 P.3d 314 (2005) (citing Khung Thi Lam v. Global Med. Sys., 127 Wn. App. 

657, 661, 111 P.3d 1258 (2005)). Because this court places no weight on any “findings 

 1 A plaintiff may bring an intentional trespass claim or a negligent trespass claim 

(essentially a negligence claim). See Grundy, 151 Wn. App. at 566. Here, we address only 

intentional trespass because that is what the Orvolds pleaded.

2 The Orvolds challenge summary judgment findings of fact 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 

and 22.
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of fact” entered in that judgment, such findings are superfluous and carry no weight on 

appeal. E.g. Hamilton v. Huggins, 70 Wn. App. 842, 848-49, 124 P.3d 314 (2005) (“The 

function of a summary judgment proceeding is to determine whether a genuine issue of 

material fact exists. It is not . . . to resolve issues of fact or to arrive at conclusions 

based thereon.”). We decline to review the Orvolds’ assigned errors to the summary 

judgment’s “findings of fact.”

The Orvolds correctly argue on appeal that an easement does not shield the 

holder from an action for trespass where there is evidence of misuse, overburdening, or 

deviation from the easement. Fradkin v. Northshore Util. Dist., 96 Wn. App. 118, 123, 

977 P.2d 1265 (1999). But the Orvolds did not assert this theory in their complaint. 

Under their claim of trespass and request for injunction, the Orvolds alleged that

• “Defendants knowingly entered the Orvold Property, without permission.”

• “Defendants knew, or had reason to know, that they lacked authority to enter 

upon the Orvold Property.”

• “The foregoing conduct of Defendants amounts to trespass, and has caused 

damage to Plaintiffs and the Orvold Property, including but not limited to any 

costs of restoration and Plaintiffs’ lost use of the property.”

It is undisputed that the “trespass” alleged relates to the “disputed area” which is part of 

the easement. After the Mershons filed their motion for partial summary judgment with 

evidence of the existence of the easement and establishing the Mershons’ right to use 

the easement and park on its paved shoulder, including the disputed area, the Orvolds 

no longer disputed that the Mershons had the right to park in the disputed area and no 

longer suggested they needed the Orvolds’ permission to do so.

In their response to the motion for summary judgment, the Orvolds claimed they 

“have made clear throughout their pleadings, they are not seeking a judicial 
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determination as to whether parking is allowed within the ingress and egress 

easement.” They argued that the “issues are solely related to the Mershons’ intentional 

misuse of the easement.” However, the Orvolds made no mention of the existence of 

an easement in their complaint and did not seek to amend their complaint. “A party who 

does not plead a cause of action or theory of recovery cannot finesse the issue by later 

inserting the theory into trial briefs and contending it was in the case all along.” Dewey 

v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No., 10, 95 Wn. App. 18, 26, 974 P.2d 847 (1999) (citing Molloy v. 

City of Bellevue, 71 Wn. App. 382, 385-86, 859 P.2d 613 (1993)).

The appeal before us is the dismissal of the Mershons’ trespass claim as 

asserted in their complaint. The Orvolds conceded below that there is no genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether the Mersons and their invitees could park in the disputed 

area and could do so without the Orvolds’ permission. The Orvolds’ trespass claim thus 

fails, and was properly dismissed on summary judgment, because the Orvolds failed to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element (actual and 

substantial harm) of their claim. See Lavington, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 149 (cited and 

quoted above). 

The Orvolds argue that the trial court committed a logical error by summarily 

dismissing their claim of trespass while not dismissing a claim of waste for lack of 

damages that they “had not pled.” But, under RCW 4.24.630 liability for trespass exists

if a party “wrongfully causes waste or injury to the land,” or “wrongfully injures personal 

property or improvements to real estate on the land.” Porter v. Kirkendoll, 194 Wn.2d 

194, 212, 449 P.3d 627 (2019). The Orvold complaint expressly requested “judgment 
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against Defendants for triple damages pursuant to RCW 4.24.630, and otherwise 

permitted by statute, rule or equity.” 

In dismissing the trespass claim, the trial court observed that the Orvolds’ waste 

claim under RCW 4.24.630 remained preserved for trial. The Orvolds do not cite to any 

authority to support their argument that dismissal of one claim is error when a court 

should have dismissed even more claims. It is obvious from the record that the Orvolds 

brought the trespass claim as a way to prevent a potential future adverse possession 

claim. When pressed to identify their damages, the Orvolds argued that the threat of 

“future adverse possession claims” is a cognizable harm they experience from the 

Mershons parking on the Orvolds’ property, which right could be defended by “an 

injunction [which] is a proper remedy to prevent further trespass.” However, the issue of 

adverse possession was not before the trial court and is not before this court. We

decline the Orvolds’ invitation to address any findings the trial court may have made as 

to the issue of adverse possession, and conclude that the trial court did not err in 

dismissing the Orvolds’ claim as to intentional trespass.

Anti-Harassment Orders

The parties each contend that they did not engage in unlawful harassment and 

challenge the court finding otherwise. However, the court’s findings of fact are 

insufficient to permit review.

The Orvolds, in addition to claiming that the Mershons parked in the disputed 

area when their driveway was available for parking, alleged that the Mershons “have 

acted aggressively and maliciously toward Plaintiffs, including confronting Plaintiffs on 

their own property, calling them names, yelling and swearing at Plaintiffs, and keeping 
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Plaintiffs and their home under surveillance.” The Mershons claim that since they 

moved in, the Orvolds have harassed them by “parking in gravel parking space, 

confronting guests, with threats, loud music, strategic parking of garbage/recycling cans 

to interfere with ingress/egress, driving aggressively at invitees of the Mershons, 

parking their car [in the disputed area] despite having more than enough parking on 

their own side [of the road].” 

They both requested an anti-harassment protection order under former chapter 

10.14 RCW. 

Under CR 52(a)(1), “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the 

court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law.” Following 

a bench trial, we review a trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are 

supported by substantial evidence, and then review whether those findings of fact 

support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Tiller v. Lackey, 6 Wn. App. 2d 470, 484, 

431 P.3d 524 (2018). Findings of fact “should at least be sufficient to indicate the 

factual bases for the ultimate conclusions.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 

728 P.2d 138 (1986). A conclusion of law is “a result which follows from examination 

and consideration of circumstances in a particular case and interpretation and 

application of legal principles to those facts.” City of Tacoma v. O’Brien, 85 Wn.2d 266, 

272, 534 P.2d 114 (1975). Where a trial court fails to enter the required factual findings, 

an appellate court “cannot review an assignment of error which requires consideration 

of whether there was sufficient evidence to support such findings.” State v. Denison, 78 

Wn. App. 566, 570, 897 P.2d 437 (1995). However, findings of fact that do little more 

than “parrot” statutory requirements may not be invalid if they are specific enough to 
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permit a meaningful appellate review. Matter of W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d 342, 363, 469 

P.3d 1190 (2020) (citing In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 143, 904 P.2d 1132 

(1995)). 

The relevant portions of former RCW 10.14.020(2) (2011) provide:

(1) “Course of Conduct’’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a 

series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity 

of purpose. “Course of conduct” includes, in addition to any other form of 

communication, contact, or conduct, the sending of an electronic 

communication, but does not include constitutionally protected free 

speech. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the 

meaning of “course of conduct.” 

(2) “Unlawful harassment” means a knowing and willful course of 

conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, 

harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate 

or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a 

reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall 

actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

The alleged harassing course of conduct is therefore “tested both subjectively 

and objectively in that it must be ‘such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer 

substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to 

the petitioner.’” Burchell v. Thibault, 74 Wn. App. 517, 521, 874 P.2d 196 (1994)

(quoting former RCW 10.14.020(1) (1987) and referencing City of Everett v. Moore, 37 

Wn. App. 862, 866-67, 683 P.2d 617 (1984), which found an unlawful harassment 

ordinance lacking an objective standard to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).

Both parties argue that they cannot be restrained by civil anti-harassment orders 

because their conduct did not cause substantial emotional distress to the other party. 

While the trial court did enter written findings of fact at the conclusion of trial, 

none of the court’s findings established either that a reasonable person would have 

suffered substantial emotional distress from a party’s actions, or that any member of the 
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two families did, in fact, suffer such distress from the conduct of the other party. The 

trial court instead listed conduct by the respective parties that it found “was not done to 

harass” or “was done to harass” the other family. The trial court then found that the

“course of conduct as listed above constitutes unlawful harassment, pursuant to RCW 

7.105.010.”3 Based on these conclusions that unlawful harassment had occurred, the 

trial court restrained both parties. Nowhere does the trial court make any finding of 

substantial emotional distress, objectively or subjectively. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 218-

19; Former RCW 10.14.020(2). Although we may supplement otherwise-inadequate

written findings by reference to the trial court’s oral decisions or statements in the 

record, the record before us does not contain an oral record of the trial court’s findings 

and conclusions.4 See State v. Holland, 98 Wn.2d 507, 518, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983).

We need not address any remaining arguments as to the harassment claims 

from the parties because the lack of necessary findings as to substantial emotional 

distress requires us to vacate the anti-harassment orders and remand for further 

proceedings.

Injunction

The Orvolds requested a permanent injunction under RCW 7.40.020 to prevent 

 3 Both parties properly cited the applicable anti-harassment statute in their complaints, 

former RCW 10.14.080. However, both parties later cited to the current civil protection order 

statutes, chapter 7.105 RCW, in their motions for attorney fees. Afterwards, the trial court then 

followed suit and also cited the new statute in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. But the 

effective date of chapter 7.105 RCW is July 1, 2022. The applicable statutes in the instant case 

are in former chapter 10.14 RCW (2019). The relevant definitions of “unlawful harassment” and 

“course of conduct” did not substantially change. See RCW 7.105.010(6)(a) and (37)(a).

4 After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the parties to return for the reading of 

the court’s draft findings later that afternoon, or possibly the next day if the court had an 

unexpected scheduling conflict. However, no additional report of proceedings exists as to 

findings and neither party cites to any finding of substantial emotional distress.
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the Mershons from damaging or parking “anywhere on the Orvold property,” which 

presumably includes the disputed area. They requested the injunction as a remedy to 

both their trespass claim and their harassment claim. They contend the court erred in 

not granting their request. 

The record is not altogether clear whether the trial court intended to grant an 

injunction or conflated the injunction statute with its ability to restrain under the antiharassment statute. The court found

As to the Orvolds’ request for an injunction, under RCW 7.40.020:

a. The Orvolds have a clear legal and equitable right to use their property 

as they see fit, without harassment from others;

b. The Orvolds have a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that 

right, given the Mershons have purposefully harassed the Orvolds;

c. If the Mershons are not restrained, the Orvolds will suffer actual and 

sustained injury.

But the court did not list the Mershons’ parking in the disputed area as harassing 

conduct under finding of fact 36 where the court found 

The following conduct of the Mershons was done to harass the Orvolds, to 

wit:

a. Placement of the disabled camera to point at the Orvolds’ property;

b. Filming and cell phone recording of the Orvolds; and,

c. Name calling, under the totality of the circumstances.

But the court in finding of fact 28 said the “Mershons’ continuous, including 

overnight parking from August 30, 2021 through September 2, 2021 blocking 

access to the Disputed Area was harassment.” Despite the fact the Mershons 

never requested an injunction, the court also found that 

As to the Mershons’ request for an injunction, under RCW 7.40.020:

a. The Mershons have a clear legal and equitable right to use their 

property as they see fit, without harassment from others;

b. The Mershons have a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that 

right, given the Orvolds have purposefully harassed the Mershons;

and,
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c. If the Orvolds are not restrained, the Mershons will suffer actual and 

sustained injury.

Moreover, the trial court made no mention of granting or denying an injunction in 

its ruling. 

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an injunction and its 

decision regarding the terms of the injunction for abuse of discretion. Kucera v. 

Dep’t of Transp., 140 Wn.2d 200, 209, 995 P.2d 63 (2000). An injunction is 

distinctly an equitable remedy and is “frequently termed ‘the strong arm of 

equity,’ or a ‘transcendent or extraordinary remedy,’ and is a remedy which 

should not be lightly indulged in, but should be used sparingly and only in a clear 

and plain case.” Id. (quoting 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 2, at 728 (1969) 

(footnotes omitted)). “Accordingly, injunctive relief will not be granted where 

there is a plain, complete, speedy and adequate remedy at law.” Id. (citing State 

v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 298, 312, 553 P.2d 

423 (1976)). Specifically, parties who seek relief by temporary or permanent 

injunction must show (1) that they have a clear legal or equitable right, (2) that 

they have a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and (3) that 

the acts complained of are either resulting in or will result in actual and 

substantial injury to them. Id. “An injunction is an extraordinary equitable 

remedy designed to prevent serious harm. Its purpose is not to protect a plaintiff 

from mere inconveniences or speculative and insubstantial injury.” Kucera, 140 

Wn.2d at 221 (emphasis added) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 96 Wn.2d 785, 796, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982)).

We do not review this issue because the record does not establish if the 
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trial court granted or denied the request for an injunction. Even if the trial court 

determined that an injunction is not warranted given the relief granted under the 

anti-harassment statute, those orders are vacated and require remand.

Attorney Fees and Costs

Both parties challenge the denial of their request for attorney fees. 

Whether a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees is a question of law that 

we review de novo. Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 

(2014). In Washington, attorney fees are recoverable by the prevailing party only when 

permitted by contract, statute, or on a recognized ground of equity. Leingang v. Pierce 

County Med. Bureau, Inc., 131 Wn.2d 133, 143, 930 P.2d 288 (1997). 

The Orvolds requested attorney fees and costs under the anti-harassment 

statute, though they cited to RCW 7.105.310 instead of the applicable former RCW 

10.14.090(2) (1992). The Mershons requested attorney fees and costs under RCW 

10.14.090 and also under RCW 4.24.630, the basis of the waste claim. The Orvolds do 

not appeal the dismissal of the waste claim. 

Under former RCW 10.14.090(2) the court may require the respondent in an antiharassment action to reimburse the petitioner for their incurred costs, including 

reasonable attorney fees.5 Because we vacate the anti-harassment orders and 

remand, we need not address the denial of attorney fees on this basis. 

Under RCW 4.24.630(1), “the person is liable for reimbursing the injured party for 

the party's reasonable costs, including but not limited to investigative costs and 

reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation-related costs.” The mutuality of remedy 

 5 RCW 7.105.310(j) also provides for the award of reasonable attorney fees at the “broad 

discretion” of the trial court. RCW 7.105.310(1).
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doctrine provides that if “one party would be entitled to receive attorney fees if it 

prevails, the opposing party is likewise entitled to fees if it prevails.” Rowe v. Klein, 2 

Wn. App. 2d 326, 342 n.2, 409 P.3d 1152 (2018); Fairway Est. Ass’n of Apt. Owners v. 

Unknown Heirs, Devisees of Young, 172 Wn. App. 168, 182, 289 P.3d 675 (2012). 

The trial court denied both parties’ requests for attorney fees because it found 

that neither had substantially prevailed. The court applied the wrong test.

In general, a prevailing party is one which receives an affirmative judgment in its 

favor. Schmidt v. Cornerstone Inv., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 148, 164, 795 P.2d 1143 (1990) 

(citing Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Tacoma v. McCaffrey, 107 Wn.2d 181, 195, 728 

P.2d 155 (1986)). “If neither party wholly prevails then the party who substantially 

prevails is the prevailing party, a determination that turns on the extent of the relief 

afforded the parties. If both parties prevail on major issues, it is appropriate to let each 

bear their own costs and fees.” Transpac Dev., Inc. v. Oh, 132 Wn. App. 212, 217, 130 

P.3d 892 (2006) (citing Rowe v. Floyd, 29 Wn. App. 532, 535, 629 P.2d 925 (1981)). 

But while the substantially prevailing standard set forth in Rowe may be appropriate in 

some cases, it is inadequate where multiple distinct and severable claims are at issue. 

“In such a situation, the question of which party has substantially prevailed 

becomes extremely subjective and difficult to assess.” Instead, a trial court

should take a “proportionality approach” when requested to award 

prevailing party attorney fees. “A proportionality approach awards the 

plaintiff attorney fees for the claims it prevails upon, and likewise awards 

fees to the defendant for the claims it has prevailed upon. The fee awards 

are then offset.”

Transpac, 132 Wn. App. at 218 (citation omitted) (quoting Marassi v. Lau, 71 Wn. App. 

912, 917, 859 P.2d 605 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Wachovia SBA Lending, 

Inc. v. Kraft, 165 Wn.2d 481, 490-91, 200 P.3d 683 (2009)).
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The waste claim is distinct from the harassment claims. The Mershons prevailed 

in defending the waste claim and obtaining a dismissal. The trial court abused its 

discretion in denying the Mershons’ request for attorney fees under RCW 4.24.630. 

Fees on Appeal

The Orvolds and the Mershons both request attorney fees on appeal under RCW 

7.105.310(1)(j). 

RAP 18.1(a) provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees on appeal if 

“applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or 

expenses on review” and the party properly requests it. Where a statute allows an 

award of attorney fees at trial, an appellate court has the authority to award fees on 

appeal. Bloor v. Fritz, 143 Wn. App. 718, 753, 180 P.3d 805 (2008) (citing Standing 

Rock Homeowners Ass’n v. Misich, 106 Wn. App. 231, 247, 23 P.3d 520 (2001)). Even 

if the parties had requested attorney fees under the applicable statute, RCW 

10.14.090(2), such an award is discretionary. We decline to award fees because neither 

party has prevailed on appeal as to the issue of unlawful harassment.

CONCLUSION

The summary judgment dismissal of the Orvolds’ trespass claim was proper. We 

vacate the anti-harassment orders against both parties for lack of necessary findings of 

fact. Because the determination as to whether harassing conduct rises to the level of 

“unlawful harassment” turns on whether the conduct causes a reasonable person to 

suffer substantial emotional distress and also actually causes substantial emotional 

distress, the trial court on remand is to reconsider its findings and conclusions as to the 
86628-1-I/18

18

harassment claims based on the existing record. The trial court abused its discretion in 

denying the Mershons’ request for attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.24.630, and 

must reconsider their request on remand. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand for further proceedings.

WE CONCUR: