United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

April 1998 DEFENSE

COMPUTERS

Year 2000 Computer

Problems Threaten

DOD Operations

GAO/AIMD-98-72

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-278156 

April 30, 1998

The Honorable Fred Thompson

Chairman

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Stephen Horn

Chairman

Subcommittee on Government

 Management, Information and Technology

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III

House of Representatives

The Year 2000 problem results from the inability of computer systems at

the year 2000 to interpret the century correctly from a recorded or

calculated date having only two digits to indicate the year. Time is running

out to correct Department of Defense systems that could malfunction or

produce incorrect information when the year 2000 is encountered during

automated data processing. The impact of these failures could be

widespread, costly, and potentially disruptive to military operations

worldwide.

For an organization as large as Defense—with over 1.5 million computers,

28,000 systems, and 10,000 networks—addressing its Year 2000 problem is

a formidable task. Several Defense components are larger than most civil

agencies and, in addition to the computers themselves, thousands of

embedded microprocessors used in a variety of equipment such as

telephone switches, traffic control, security, and elevator control systems,

and some weapons systems must be checked for Year 2000 vulnerabilities.

In view of the impact this problem can have on warfighting and military

support missions, you requested that we review the Department of

Defense’s program for solving the Year 2000 computer systems problem.

In response to your request, we have separately reviewed Year 2000 efforts

being carried out by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Defense Logistics

Agency (DLA); the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS); the

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); and three central design

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activities.1 This report assesses (1) the overall status of Defense’s effort to

identify and correct its date-sensitive systems and (2) the appropriateness

of Defense’s strategy and actions to correct its Year 2000 problems.

Results in Brief The Department of Defense relies on computer systems for some aspect of

all of its operations, including strategic and tactical operations,

sophisticated weaponry, intelligence, surveillance and security efforts, and

routine business functions, such as financial management, personnel,

logistics, and contract management. Failure to successfully address the

Year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disrupt any of

Defense’s mission-critical operations.

Defense has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote

sharing of information, and encourage components to make Year 2000

remediation efforts a high priority. However, its progress in fixing systems

has been slow. For example, the department is still assessing systems even

though it originally anticipated this would be done in June 1997. In

addition, Defense lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce

good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete

picture of its progress in fixing systems. For example:

• There is no program office or full-time executive in charge of the

departmentwide effort.

• Information being reported to Defense by components does not provide a

reliable indication of program status because it is not being validated for

accuracy or completeness.

• Defense has not issued adequate guidance to its components on key issues

concerning status reporting, interfaces, and testing.

• Defense has not determined, at the departmentwide level, which systems

have the highest impact on its mission.

• Defense is not ensuring that its components are preparing written

interface agreements and contingency plans.

As a result, Defense lacks complete and reliable information on systems,

interfaces, other equipment needing repair, and the cost of its correction

efforts. It is spending limited resources fixing nonmission-critical systems

even though most mission-critical systems have not been corrected. It has

also increased the risk that (1) Year 2000 errors will be propagated from

one organization’s systems to another’s, (2) all systems and interfaces will

1

The Army’s Logistics System Support Center, the Navy’s Fleet Material Support Office, and the Air

Force’s Standard Systems Group.

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not be thoroughly and carefully tested, and (3) components will not be

prepared should their systems miss the Year 2000 deadline or fail

unexpectedly in operation. Each one of these problems seriously

endangers Defense chances of successfully meeting the Year 2000 deadline

for mission-critical systems. Together, they make failure of at least some

mission-critical systems and the operations they support almost certain

unless corrective actions are taken.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine (1) the overall status of Defense’s effort

to identify and correct its date sensitive systems and (2) the

appropriateness of Defense’s strategy and actions to correct these

systems. In conducting our review, we used our Year 2000 Assessment

Guide to assess Defense’s Year 2000 efforts.2 This guide addresses

common issues affecting most federal agencies and presents a structured

approach and a checklist to aid in planning, managing, and evaluating Year

2000 programs. The guidance, which is consistent with Defense’s Year

2000 Management Plan3

 describes five phases—supported by program and

project management activities—with each phase representing a major

Year 2000 program activity or segment. The phases and a description of

each follows.

• Awareness - Define the Year 2000 problem and gain executive-level

support and sponsorship for a Year 2000 program. Establish a Year 2000

program team and develop an overall strategy. Ensure that everyone in the

organization is fully aware of the issue.

• Assessment - Assess the Year 2000 impact on the enterprise. Identify core

business areas and processes, inventory and analyze systems supporting

the core business areas, and prioritize their conversion or replacement.

Develop contingency plans to handle data exchange issues, lack of data,

and bad data. Identify and secure the necessary resources.

• Renovation - Convert, replace, or eliminate selected platforms,

applications, databases, and utilities. Modify interfaces.

• Validation - Test, verify, and validate converted or replaced platforms,

applications, databases, and utilities. Test the performance, functionality,

and integration of converted or replaced platforms, applications,

databases, utilities, and interfaces in an environment that faithfully

represents the operational environment.

2

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997); first issued

as an exposure draft in February 1997.

3

Version 1.0, April 1997.

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• Implementation - Implement converted or replaced platforms,

applications, databases, utilities, and interfaces. Implement data exchange

contingency plans, if necessary.

During our review, we concentrated on Defense’s department-level Year

2000 Program, managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command,

Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD C3I), who is also the

Defense Chief Information Officer. To determine how Defense

components and their organizations were implementing Defense policy

and managing their Year 2000 program efforts, we also reviewed Year 2000

efforts being carried out by Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters, three

Defense agencies, and three central design activities. We also visited a

number of other organizations including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Global Command Control System (GCCS) Program Office, and the National

Security Agency. The scope and methodology of these individual reviews

are detailed in the following GAO reports:

• Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight

(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998).

• Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000

Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997).

• Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 Issues

(GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997).

• Defense Computers: SSG Needs to Sustain Year 2000 Progress

(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997).

• Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000

Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997).

• Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000

Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997).

Reports on the Army and Navy Year 2000 programs are being developed.

We also reviewed efforts by the department to improve the Defense

Integration Support Tools database (DIST), which serves as the Defense

inventory of automated information systems and is intended to be used as

a tool to help Defense components in correcting Year 2000 date problems.

The scope and methodology of this work is further detailed in our report,

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for

Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997).

In conducting the individual component reviews and assessing oversight

efforts from Defense headquarters, we reviewed and analyzed official

memoranda and other documents discussing Defense and component Year

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2000 policy and procedures; the June 1996 and February 1997 Defense and

component responses to Year 2000 questions from the House Government

Operations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight; the January 1997

Action Plan for Year 2000 Information Technology Compliance; Defense’s

May 1997, August 1997, November 1997, and February 1998 component

quarterly reports on Year 2000 program status to ASD C3I, and Defense’s

subsequent department-level reports to the Office of Management and

Budget; Year 2000 status briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by

the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DISA, DFAS, and DLA; early

drafts and the final April 1997 versions of the Defense Year 2000

Management Plan; and Year 2000 inventory data compiled by ASD C3I,

Defense components, and their subcomponents.

We also reviewed and monitored Year 2000 Internet homepages

maintained by various contractors, government agencies, ASD C3I, DISA, the

Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and subcomponents; and

minutes of federal, Defense, and Air Force Year 2000 Working Groups. In

addition, we held discussions with various Defense Department,

component and subcomponent officials concerning Year 2000 problems,

corrective actions, and related operational and programmatic impacts of

the program. We conducted structured interviews on program policies and

practices with Defense Department and component-level Year 2000

program officials. We also reviewed the output of various Defense

computer generated databases and management information systems

related to Year 2000 activities, but did not verify the integrity of the data in

these systems.

Our audit work on this overview report was conducted from August 1997

through February 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from Defense.

The Acting Principal Deputy of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

provided written comments, which are discussed in the “Agency

Comments and Our Evaluation” section and reprinted in appendix II.

Background Most of Defense’s automated information systems and weapon systems

computers are vulnerable to the Year 2000 problem, which is rooted in the

way dates are recorded, computed, and transmitted in automated

information systems. For the past several decades, systems have typically

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used two digits to represent the year, such as “97” representing 1997, in

order to conserve electronic data storage and reduce operating costs. With

this two-digit format, however, the year 2000 is indistinguishable from

1900, or 2001 from 1901, etc.

As a result of this ambiguity, systems or application programs that use

dates to perform calculations, comparisons, or sorting may generate

incorrect results when working with years after 1999. For example, the

Defense Logistics Agency’s Standard Automated Material Management

System is used to manage Defense’s vast inventory of supplies. Because it

uses dates to automatically target items for deletion, the system

erroneously targeted more than 90,000 items for deletion before Defense

discovered the problem in 1996.

In addition, any electronic device that contains a microprocessor or is

dependent on a timing sequence may be also vulnerable to Year 2000

problems. This includes computer hardware, telecommunications

equipment, building and base security systems, street lights at military

installations, elevators, and medical equipment. For example, Defense

components reported to ASD C3I in February 1998 that more than half of the

over 730,000 personal computers they had checked had a Year 2000

problem.

For Defense, the Year 2000 effort is a significant management challenge

because it relies heavily on computers to carry out aspects of all

operations, and time for completing Year 2000 fixes is short. For example,

the department is responsible for more than 1.5 million computers, 28,000

automated information systems, and 10,000 networks. Its information

systems are linked by thousands of interfaces that exchange information

within Defense and across organizational and international lines.

Successful operation after January 1, 2000, requires that Defense’s systems

and all of the systems that they interface with be Year 2000 compliant.

Should Defense fail to successfully address the Year 2000 problem in time,

its mission-critical operations could be severely degraded or disrupted.

For example:

• In an August 1997 operational exercise, the Global Command Control

System failed testing when the date was rolled over to the year 2000. GCCS

is deployed at 700 sites worldwide and is used to generate a common

operating picture of the battlefield for planning, executing, and managing

military operations. The U.S. and its allies, many of whom also use GCCS,

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would be unable to orchestrate a Desert Storm-type engagement in the

year 2000 if the problem is not corrected.

• The Global Positioning System (GPS) is widely used for aircraft and ship

navigation (commercial and military) and for precision targeting and

“smart” bombs. The ground control stations use dates to synchronize the

signals from the satellites and maintain uplinks to the satellites. Failure to

correct Year 2000 problems could cause these stations to lose track of

satellites and send erroneous information to the millions of users who rely

on GPS.

• The Defense Message System (DMS) is being developed to replace the aging

Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN). These systems provide critical

capabilities such as secure messaging for important operations such as

intelligence gathering, diplomatic communications, and military command

and control. Should Year 2000 problems render DMS or AUTODIN inoperable

or unreliable, it would be difficult to monitor enemy operations or conduct

military engagements.

• Aircraft and other military equipment could be grounded because the

computer systems used to schedule maintenance and track supplies may

not work. Defense could incur shortages of vital items needed to sustain

military operations and readiness—such as food, fuel, medical supplies,

clothing, and spare and repair parts to support its over 1,400 weapons

systems.

• Billions of dollars in payments could be inaccurate because the computer

systems used to manage thousands of defense contracts may not correctly

process date-related information.

• Active duty soldiers and military retirees may not get paid if the systems

used to make calculations and prepare checks are not repaired in time.

Defense’s Year 2000

Efforts to Date

Defense plans to resolve its Year 2000 problem using a five-phased process

comparable to that in our Year 2000 Assessment Guide. In keeping with its

decentralized approach to information technology management, Defense

has charged its components with responsibility for making sure that all of

their systems correctly process dates. The Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD C3I), as the

Department’s Chief Information Officer, is responsible for leading Defense

efforts to solve the Year 2000 problem. Further, Defense is requiring the

components to reprogram existing funds to correct their systems and will

provide no additional funds for Year 2000 fixes. As of February 1998,

Defense estimated that it would cost $1.9 billion to address its Year 2000

problem, but as discussed later, we question the reliability of this estimate.

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To increase the awareness of the Year 2000 problem and to foster

coordination among components, Defense has taken the following actions:

• In a November 27, 1995, memo, the ASD C3I alerted components to the

problem and called on them to begin corrective actions if they had not

already done so.

• In December 1996, Defense established the Year 2000 Steering Committee,

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to oversee progress, provide

departmentwide guidance, and make decisions related to the Year 2000.

Members, which include the department’s chief information officers, chief

financial officer, general counsel and the acquisition executive also

discuss Year 2000 issues and exchange information on their programs. The

Steering Committee began meeting in September 1997.

• Defense established a Year 2000 Working Group to support the activities

and deliberations of the Steering Committee. The group is chaired by an

ASD C3I staff member. Each component has assigned a representative to the

group to investigate Year 2000 and cross-functional issues, provide

recommendations, identify and share lessons learned, and avoid

duplication of effort within Defense.

• In October 1996, the ASD C3I began a series of interface workshops intended

to better coordinate Year 2000 efforts in various functional areas. These

workshops are intended to ensure information systems and processes that

exchange data are assessed and will be Year 2000 compliant. Workshops

are conducted for specific functional areas and will continue until Year

2000 problems are resolved.

• In April 1997, Defense issued its Year 2000 Management Plan, which

formalized its Year 2000 strategy and delineated the activities involved in

each phase of its five-phased approach to remediation. The plan also

identified responsibilities of the Year 2000 Steering Committee, the Year

2000 Working Group, the ASD C3I, the Defense Information Systems Agency,

and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Systems;

established reporting requirements, target completion dates, and exit

criteria for each of the program phases; provided guidance on estimating

costs; and provided a compliance checklist.

• In May 1997, Defense enlisted its Inspector General to help oversee the

department’s Year 2000 program, validate the data on Year 2000 status

being reported by each component, identify problems areas, and

recommend corrective actions.

• In July 1997, a Defense Science Board panel was convened to determine

whether the department’s strategy, priorities, resources, and funding are

sufficient to ensure that all mission-critical systems will be corrected in

time.

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• Defense has extensively used the Internet to establish Year 2000 home

pages, information libraries, and links to other federal and nongovernment

Year 2000 organizations, to enhance awareness and understanding of the

Year 2000 problem.

In February 1998, Defense reported to OMB that it had 2,915 mission-critical

systems and 25,671 nonmission-critical systems. According to Defense,

1,886 mission-critical systems need to be repaired and about half of these

are in the renovation phase and a third in the validation phase. In addition,

Defense now reports that 15,786 nonmission-critical systems need to be

repaired, an increase of over 6,500 systems from the number reported by

components in November 1997. Like the mission-critical systems, about

half of these nonmission-critical systems are reported to be in the

renovation phase.

Defense has taken a long time in the early phases of its Year 2000 program

and its progress in fixing systems has been slow. For example, Defense

took 16 months to issue its Year 2000 Management Plan, 1 year to establish

the Year 2000 Steering Committee, and an additional 9 months for the

Committee to hold its first meeting. In addition, Defense is still assessing

systems even though it originally anticipated that this would be done in

June 1997. In February 1998, Defense reported that only about 130

mission-critical systems had completed repairs since November 1997.

Technology experts like the Mitre Corporation and the Gartner Group,

estimate that about 70 percent of an organization’s total effort will be

required for the renovation, validation, and implementation phases. With

less than 20 months remaining and most mission-critical systems in these

three phases, Defense is running out of time to make the necessary repairs

before the Year 2000 deadline. Specific reported totals for February 1998

are shown in table 1. As discussed later in this report, we question the

reliability of this information.

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B-278156 

Table 1: Reported Status of Defense

Year 2000 Efforts (as of February 1998) 

Mission-critical systems

(2,915 systems)

Nonmission-critical

systems

(25,671 systems)

Number Percenta Number Percenta

Compliant 530 18.3 8,196 31.9

To be replaced before 2000 330 11.3 380 1.5

To be retired before 2000 164 5.6 1,309 5.1

To be repaired 1,891 64.9 15,786 61.5

Reported status of systems to be repaired

In awareness phase 0 0 4 0.1

In assessment phase 22 1.2 340 2.2

In renovation phase 873 46.2 8,296 52.6

In validation phase 695 36.8 4,241 26.9

In implementation phase 130 6.9 2,644 16.7

Corrected 171 9.0 261 1.7

Source: Defense information reported to the Office of Management and Budget. We did not

independently verify this information.

aPercentages do not total 100 percent due to rounding.

Information on personal computers and communications and facility

equipment reported by components is provided in table 2.

Table 2: Information Reported to

Defense on Other Equipment Total

inventory Compliant Noncompliant Unknown

Personal computers 826,762 350,694 381,882 94,186

Communications devices

(including telecommunications

equipment) 88,166 52,117 17,216 18,833

Facility devices (includes

such items as elevators,

security systems, medical

equipment) 100,421 27,041 14,264 59,116

Source: Defense information reported by components. Only compliant systems were reported to

the Office of Management and Budget. We did not independently verify this information.

Previous GAO Reviews of

Component Year 2000

Efforts

We have separately reported on Year 2000 efforts being carried out by the

military services, three Defense agencies, and three central design

activities. Our reviews have shown that individual components have also

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taken positive actions to increase awareness. For example, the Air Force

established an Air Force Year 2000 Working Group comprised of focal

points from each major command, field operating agency, and direct

reporting unit. The group has focused on such matters as sharing lessons

learned, eliminating duplicative efforts, sharing resources, and tracking

component progress. Also, the Air Force and other components, such as

DFAS and DLA, each developed written Year 2000 plans that adopted the

five-phased approach. In addition, these components, as well as some

other organizations, such as the central design activities we reviewed,

established Year 2000 program offices and designated program managers.

However, there were systemic weaknesses in component Year 2000

programs. For example, many of the components failed to develop

contingency plans during the assessment phase to ensure that critical

operations can continue in the face of unforeseen problems or delays.

They also were not effectively planning to ensure the availability of needed

testing facilities and resources. And they had not fully identified interfaces

or communicated their Year 2000 plans to their interface partners. Finally,

none of the three military services had developed accurate and reliable

cost estimates as their systems were assessed. Our findings with regard to

these reviews are noted throughout this report and are detailed in

appendix I.

Defense Is Not

Effectively Overseeing

and Managing Year

2000 Remediation

Efforts

In view of the magnitude of the Year 2000 problem, our Assessment Guide

recommends that agencies plan and manage the Year 2000 program as a

single large information system development effort and promulgate and

enforce good management practices on the program and project levels.

The guide also recommends that agencies appoint a Year 2000 program

manager and establish an agency-level Year 2000 program office.

Defense has not supported its decentralized approach to the Year 2000

effort with a program manager or an agency-level Year 2000 program

office. Instead of establishing a department-level program office, Defense

assigned five full-time staff members in the Office of the ASD C3I to oversee

the progress of 23 major components and over 28,000 information systems.

The group does not have authority to enforce good management practices,

direct resources for special needs, or even to question the validity of the

data being reported from components.

In addition, this group is not supported by an executive that can focus on

the Year 2000 problem full-time. For example, the ASD C3I, who has been

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assigned to lead the effort, is also responsible for (1) providing guidance

and oversight for all command, control, communications, and intelligence

projects, programs, and systems being acquired by Defense and its

components, (2) chairing the Major Automated Information System

Review Council, (3) serving as the principal Defense official responsible

for software policy and practices, and (4) establishing and implementing

information management policy, processes, programs, and standards.

Furthermore, Defense has not promulgated and enforced good

management practices for Year 2000 corrective efforts. For example,

Defense has not provided guidance and authoritative direction needed to

ensure that components effectively (1) identify “a system” for purposes of

Year 2000 reporting, (2) communicate Year 2000 plans to interface

partners, (3) address conflicts between interface partners, and (4) identify

common standards and procedures to use in testing. In addition, it has not

been validating the information being reported by its components for

completeness and accuracy or tracking component progress in completing

important Year 2000-related activities, such as contingency planning,

acquiring additional test facilities, and prioritizing systems.

Because it lacks strong management and oversight controls over Year 2000

remediation efforts, Defense has failed to successfully address a number

of steps that are fundamental to correcting mission-critical systems on

time.

• First, Defense does not yet have a complete inventory of systems. Without

this, it cannot reliably determine what resources it needs or identify

problems requiring greater management attention.

• Second, Defense has not ensured that mission-critical systems are

receiving a higher priority than nonmission-critical systems.

• Third, Defense has neither identified all system interfaces nor ensured that

its components are effectively working with their interface partners to

correct the interfaces.

• Fourth, Defense has not ensured that facilities are available for Year

2000-related testing or that component testing requirements are

consistent.

• Fifth, Defense does not know if components have developed contingency

plans necessary to ensure that essential mission functions can be

performed even if critical mission systems are not corrected in time.

• Sixth, Defense does not have a reliable estimate of Year 2000 problem

correction costs.

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These weaknesses and their impact on Defense’s Year 2000 remediation

efforts are discussed in the following sections.

Defense Does Not

Have an Accurate and

Complete Inventory of

Systems

Our Assessment Guide noted that a key part of the assessment phase is to

conduct an enterprisewide inventory of information systems for each

business area. Such an inventory should include specific information such

as the business processes that systems support, the potential impact on

those business processes if systems are not fixed on time, and the

progress components are making in correcting their systems. This

provides the necessary foundation for Year 2000 program planning.

Defense, however, does not yet have a complete and accurate inventory of

its systems and other equipment needing repair. As a result, it does not

have a clear picture of its overall Year 2000 correction efforts and it cannot

reliably determine what resources it needs or identify problems that

require greater management attention.

Defense is requiring its components to submit quarterly Year 2000

progress reports and to input system information into the departmentwide

database of automated information systems, known as the Defense

Integration Support Tools (DIST) database. However, many components are

still identifying their systems, interfaces, and/or other equipment that may

be affected by the Year 2000 problem, such as telecommunications

equipment, elevators, and security systems. For example,

• Defense components are still adding systems to the inventory; the total

number of nonmission-critical systems increased by over 3,700 systems

between November 1997 and February 1998.

• The Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security

Agency, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology have not yet identified other equipment needing repair such as

personal computers and telecommunications equipment.

• Eleven components, including the Defense Information Systems Agency

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have not yet identified interfaces.

In addition, Defense headquarters does not validate the information it is

receiving from its components for accuracy or completeness before

reporting its status quarterly to the Office of Management and Budget.

Similarly, Navy headquarters does not validate the information being

reported by its components and system managers. The Army and the Air

Force have enlisted their audit agencies to help validate information being

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reported by components. These audits have identified large discrepancies

between information maintained by the services and information

maintained by individual system owners.

Further, Defense has not provided sufficient guidance to components to

ensure they use a common definition of a “system” for reporting purposes.

This has further degraded the accuracy of Defense’s inventory reporting. If

not precisely defined, one “system” can be interpreted to mean a small

application comprised of a few hundred lines of code or the entire

collection of systems aboard a major weapon system. At Defense, a variety

of interpretations are being used. For example, in August 1997, the Air

Force’s F-16 and F-15 weapon system programs reported each system

aboard an aircraft (86 and 32 systems, respectively) while the C-17 and B-2

programs treated all onboard systems as a single system. Since each

system must be corrected individually, aggregating onboard systems into a

single system causes Defense’s inventory to be understated. In addition,

while some organizations reported these smaller applications that

downloaded and processed information from their major automated

information systems, the Defense Logistics Agency did not consider these

programs as systems. With some organizations reporting on these systems

and others, like DLA, not reporting them, Defense’s inventory is further

understating the number of systems that need to be corrected.

Recent Classification of

DIST Database Has

Further Decreased Its

Effectiveness

On February 4, 1998, due to concerns that extensive and detailed

information on all of the department’s mission critical systems was

available on the Internet, the ASD C3I classified DIST as “secret”—meaning

that anyone requiring access to the database must have a validated

security clearance and access to secure computer and communications

equipment. DIST was removed from the Internet and will remain

unavailable until detailed access and security procedures are developed

and put in place. As a result, at the close of our review, DIST was not

available for system managers to update the Year 2000 status of their

systems or determine the status of interfaces or interfacing systems, and

Defense and component Year 2000 officials could not use it as a program

management tool. In addition, organizations such as the Navy, which rely

on the DIST for their only source of inventory information, were directed to

create separate databases to meet their quarterly inventory reporting and

program management requirements.

In commenting on our draft report, Defense officials told us that ASD C3I

was in the process of defining options for a new database to replace DIST.

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The new inventory, which Defense intends to be unclassified, would not

have as much detailed information on systems as DIST; instead, it would

only contain Year 2000-relevant data. ASD C3I officials plan to have the new

system in place by mid-summer 1998. Until this new system is in place,

Defense will lack a central source for inventory and status information on

Defense’s Year 2000 program. In addition, the new database will be as

ineffective as DIST unless components ensure that the information they

submit is accurate and complete and Defense headquarters validates their

submissions.

Defense Has Not

Effectively Prioritized

Systems for

Correction

According to our Assessment Guide, an important aspect of the

assessment phase is prioritizing the remediation of the systems that have

the highest impact on an agency’s mission and thus need to be corrected

first. This helps an agency ensure that its most vital systems are corrected

before systems that do not support the agency’s core business.

Defense’s Year 2000 plan states that the highest priority should be given to

systems that are critical to warfighting and peacekeeping missions and the

safety of individuals. The plan makes each component responsible for

prioritizing its own systems. This approach is flawed. Since all

components’ functions are not equally essential to Defense’s core

missions, Defense cannot define its priorities simply by aggregating

components’ priorities. For example, as noted in a Defense Science Board

report,4

 Defense has no means of distinguishing between the priority of a

video conferencing system listed as mission-critical by one component and

a logistics system listed as mission-critical by another component. If it had

such a means, the board estimated that the number of “priority

mission-critical systems” would be reduced by a factor of 10 or greater.

Once Defense decides the relative priority of its mission-critical systems, it

will still need to ensure that its mission-critical rather than

nonmission-critical systems receive focused management attention and

resources. However, according to its status reports, Defense is correcting

nonmission-critical systems nearly as quickly as its mission-critical

systems. In February 1998, it reported that 83 percent of its

mission-critical systems being repaired were in the renovation or

validation phases versus about 80 percent of it nonmission-critical

systems.

4

Interim Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Year 2000, January 12, 1998; final report

has not yet been issued.

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

Defense Lacks

Assurance That

Interfaces Are Being

Appropriately

Addressed

Defense systems interface with each other as well as with systems

belonging to contractors, other federal agencies, and international

organizations. For example, supply orders originating from the military

services are filled and payments to contractors are made through

automated interfaces. Therefore, it is essential that Defense agencies

ensure that external noncompliant systems not introduce and/or

propagate Year 2000-related errors to compliant Defense systems5

 and that

interfaces function after January 1, 2000.

Defense has held a series of Interface Assessment Workshops for

individual functional areas such as finance, logistics, and intelligence in

order to raise awareness of the interface problem. While these workshops

have helped to acquaint high-level managers with the nature and extent of

interface problems, much more effort is needed to assist system managers

in making corrections.

First, as noted earlier, the department does not know how many interfaces

exist among its systems. Seven of 28 components (25 percent) including

the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not report interface information on their

February 1998 inventory. In addition, four components, including the

National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office

reported their interfaces as “to be determined.” Three additional

components—including the Navy, Defense Intelligence Agency and Air

Force Intelligence—reported interfaces, but had not yet determined

whether they were affected by the Year 2000 problem. The longer it takes

Defense to identify all interfaces and determine which ones need to be

corrected, the greater the risk will be that it will discover too late in its

Year 2000 effort that systems will not be able to accommodate the Year

2000 changes from a connecting system.

Second, Defense has not provided sufficiently definitive guidance to

establish (1) who is responsible for correcting interfaces and (2) how

conflicts—for example, who should fund corrective actions—between

interface partners will be resolved. Such guidance is necessary since

interface problems will likely cut across command, functional, and

component lines and may involve contractors, other government agencies,

and international organizations.

5

An example of this type of problem occurred in July 1997. During a joint operational exercise, system

clocks were turned forward to test their ability to handle dates after 1999. One component of Defense’s

Global Command and Control System failed to operate properly as a result, and, in turn, began sending

error messages to the main computer. These messages caused the main computer to shut down, even

though it had not experienced any Year 2000 problems itself.

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

Finally, in order for interfaces to work, both ends need to know what to

send and what to expect. This requires formal documentation of the

details on data formats, the timing of format changes, etc. While the

April 1997 Management Plan directed components to prepare written

agreements with their interface partners, Defense has not provided

guidance to its components on what the content of interface agreements

should be. Components have been slow in responding to the Management

Plans direction. For example, at the time of our review, none of the

components we reviewed had completed preparation of all required

interface agreements. The Army Year 2000 project office reported that its

components were behind in their efforts to do so. Defense components

have concurred with our recommendations to date concerning the need to

develop interface agreements. However, they are still not being uniformly

required across the department. Until these agreements are prepared,

Defense components will run the risk that key interfaces will not work.

Defense Is Not Fully

Prepared for the

Testing Phase

The validation (testing) phase of the Year 2000 effort is expected to be the

most expensive and time-consuming. Experts estimate that it will account

for 45 percent of the entire effort.6

 As Defense’s Year 2000 Management

Plan notes, the testing phase will be complex since “components must not

only test Year 2000 compliance of individual applications, but also the

complex interactions between scores of converted or replaced computer

platforms, operating systems, utilities, [networks], databases, and

interfaces.” In some instances, the plan notes, Defense components may

not be able to shut down their production systems for testing, and may

have to operate parallel systems implemented on a Year 2000 test facility.

Also, because over 17,500 systems will require testing prior to the

March 1999 testing deadline, it will be important to plan for the use of

testing resources carefully.

To mitigate risks associated with testing, our Year 2000 Assessment Guide

calls on agencies to develop validation strategies and test plans, and to

ensure that resources, such as facilities and tools, are available to perform

adequate testing. Validation strategies are developed at an

organization-wide level to ensure that common testing requirements are

used by all locations. Our Assessment Guide further notes that this

planning should begin in the assessment phase since agencies may need

over a year to adequately validate and test converted or replaced systems

for Year 2000 compliance.

6

According to the Mitre Corporation and Gartner Group.

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

Defense lacks an overall validation strategy that specifies uniform criteria

and processes which components should use in testing their systems.

Defense’s Management Plan includes a checklist for certifying Year 2000

compliance, but does not require components to use it. Likewise, a

number of major components—including DFAS, the Navy, the Air Force,

and the Army—have not developed such strategies nor were they ensuring

that the organizations reporting to them did so. As a result, Defense runs

the risk that all systems and interfaces will not be thoroughly and carefully

tested.

Another important aspect of planning for the test phase is to define

requirements for test facilities. As our Year 2000 Assessment Guide notes,

agencies may have to acquire additional facilities in order to provide an

adequate testing environment. Because of the length and complexity of the

testing phase and the potential that facilities may not be available, our

guide recommends that this planning begin in the assessment phase. We

found that the Navy, the Air Force, the Army had not yet begun this

planning. The Defense Information Systems Agency, which operates the

Department’s central computer centers, has only recently begun assessing

what the demand for its facilities will be. The longer Defense waits to

begin assessing the demand for and the adequacy of test facilities, the less

time it will have to acquire additional facilities or otherwise ensure that all

mission-critical systems can be tested before the Year 2000 deadline.

Contingency Planning

Oversight Is

Inadequate

To mitigate the risk that Year 2000-related problems will disrupt

operations, Defense’s Year 2000 Management Plan and our Year 2000

Assessment Guide recommend that agencies perform risk assessments

and develop realistic contingency plans for critical systems and activities.

Recent OMB directives7

 require quarterly reporting of contingency planning

activities. Contingency plans are important because they identify the

manual or other fallback procedures to be employed should systems miss

their Year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in operation. Contingency

plans also define the specific conditions that will cause their activation.

Since many of its systems are critical to mission performance and Defense

has fallen behind its own Year 2000 schedule, Defense must develop

contingency plans now for essential mission functions. However, although

Defense’s Year 2000 Management Plan identifies the need for contingency

planning to ensure continuity of core processes, Defense is not routinely

7

OMB’s November 1997 quarterly Year 2000 report directs agencies to develop contingency plans and

requires that summary contingency plan information be provided to OMB for any mission-critical

system that is behind schedule in two consecutive quarterly reports to OMB.

Page 18 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

tracking the status of contingency plans or ensuring that its components

are developing them. The need for oversight is serious since many of the

components we reviewed were not developing contingency plans until we

recommended that they do so. For example:

• At the time of our review of their programs, DLA and the Naval Supply

Systems Command (NAVSUP) had no contingency plans because they

expected that all of their systems would be completed by the Year 2000

deadline and would function correctly. This assumption is not well

founded because even if systems are replaced or corrected on time, there

is no guarantee that they will operate correctly. In addition, in the event

that replacement schedules slip, components may not have enough time to

renovate, test, and implement a legacy system or identify other

alternatives, such as manual procedures or outsourcing. For example, one

system used to help manage DLA’s mission-critical $5-billion a year fuel

commodity operations had already slipped 4 to 5 months behind its

October 1998 scheduled replacement date. Both DLA and NAVSUP began

developing contingency plans after we raised these concerns.

• The Air Force was not tracking the extent to which these plans were being

developed by its components for mission-critical systems, and, at the time

of our review, five system program offices we surveyed had not prepared

such plans. In response to our report, the Air Force began ensuring that

contingency plans were developed through Air Force Audit Agency spot

checks and management reviews. It also plans to develop contingency

plans at crisis response centers as well as incorporate Year 2000 scenarios

into existing contingency plans.

• DFAS was preparing contingency planning for noncompliant systems to be

replaced before the Year 2000. However, it was not requiring contingency

plans for systems being renovated. We noted that DFAS faced a risk that

systems being renovated may not be corrected by January 1, 2000, and

may not operate correctly even if completed. In response, DFAS began

developing contingency strategies for these systems.

In January 1998, the military services briefed the Defense’s Year 2000

Steering Committee on the status of contingency planning for

mission-critical systems. The Army and Air Force reported that they had

completed contingency plans for 49 percent and 30 percent of their

mission-critical systems respectively. The Navy is only requiring

contingency plans for systems planned to be renovated after June 30, 1998,

or implemented after January 1, 1999. Using this criteria and the Navy’s

current schedule, less than 2 percent of the Navy’s 812 mission-critical

systems are required to have contingency plans.

Page 19 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

Defense Lacks

Reliable Cost

Information

As Defense’s Year 2000 Management Plan and our Assessment Guide state,

a primary purpose of the assessment phase is to determine the size and

scope of the Year 2000 problem and to prioritize remediation activities.

Reliable cost estimates are needed to ensure that adequate resources will

be available for Year 2000 activities. Once reliable estimates have been

established, they can provide a baseline to measure program progress and

to improve future program management. In addition, because Defense is

funding Year 2000 efforts from existing budgets, reliable Year 2000 cost

estimates are needed to assess the impact on future information

technology budgets.

Defense relies on its components to estimate the cost of their Year 2000

efforts, but it has not required that they use a consistent estimating

methodology or that they update the estimates when more reliable cost

information becomes available during the assessment phase. Defense

merely sums up the cost estimates it receives from components to

produce the estimate it provides to OMB. As a result, Defense’s Year 2000

cost estimate is neither reliable nor complete, and does not provide a

useful management tool for assessing the impact of the Year 2000 problem

or determining if sufficient resources will be available to complete its

fixes.

To make a first rough estimate, Defense suggested that components use a

cost formula derived from the Gartner Group and the Mitre Corporation,

which recommends multiplying the number of lines of code by $1.10 for

automated information systems and by $8 for weapons systems. This

rough estimate was to be refined by conducting a detailed cost analysis

based on more than 30 cost factors as the component progressed through

the assessment phase and learned more about its systems and the

resources that would be required to fix them. These include such factors

as:

• the age of systems,

• the skill and expertise of in-house programmers,

• the strategy that the agency is pursuing (strategies that involve keeping the

two-digit code, for example, may be much less expensive than those that

involve changing the two-digit code to a four-digit code),

• the clarity and completeness of documentation on systems,

• the availability of source code, and

• the programming language used by the systems.

Page 20 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

However, Defense did not require that components use these factors in

preparing their quarterly cost estimates or that they refine their rough

estimates as more reliable information became available during

assessment. The difference between an estimate based on a more reliable

analysis of data collected during the assessment phase and an estimate

based on the Gartner formula and similar methodologies can be

significant. For example, in August 1996, the Army’s Logistics Systems

Support Center used the Gartner formula to project Year 2000 costs for its

huge Commodity Command Standard System. Based on this formula, it

estimated that it would cost $8.4 million to correct the system. In

April 1997, the Center conducted a detailed cost analysis based on data

collected during the assessment phase, and found that Year 2000 costs

would actually be about $12.4 million—a 50 percent increase over the

original estimate.

While Defense’s Management Plan suggested that components revise their

cost estimates as more reliable information becomes available, it has not

ensured that components are doing so. While some components may have

refined their estimates with each report to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy continue to provide

only rough order-of-magnitude estimates using the Gartner formula or

other formulas provided by contractors, or have omitted significant cost

items from their estimates. For example:

• The Army’s November 1997 estimate of $429 million did not include costs

for 36 systems.

• The Navy’s November 1997 estimate of $293 million did not include cost

information from about 95 percent of the program managers in the Naval

Sea Systems Command. Naval Air Systems Command also indicated that

many program managers were not reporting costs. The Navy estimate also

did not include an estimated $15 million associated with fixing telephone

switches.

• The Air Force’s November 1997 estimate did not include the cost of fixing

telephone switches, which was estimated to be between $70 million and

$90 million.

Until Defense has a complete and reliable cost estimate, it will not be able

to effectively allocate resources, track progress, make trade-off decisions,

or resolve funding disputes.

Page 21 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

Conclusions Defense operations hinge on the department’s ability to successfully fix its

mission-critical computer systems before the Year 2000 deadline. Yet

Defense has left it up to its components to solve the problem themselves

without establishing a project office, led by a full-time top-level executive,

to (1) enforce good management practices, (2) prioritize systems across

the department based on criticality to core missions, (3) provide guidance

on areas that components should be addressing consistently and ensure

that they are doing so, (4) direct resources for special needs, and

(5) ensure that data being reported to the Office of Management and

Budget and the Congress is accurate. As a result, Defense lacks complete

and reliable information on systems, interfaces, and costs. It is allowing

nonmission-critical systems to be corrected even though only a small

percentage of mission-critical systems have been completed. It lacks

assurance that facilities will be available for testing. And, it has not

ensured that essential mission functions can be performed if critical

mission systems are not corrected in time. Until Defense supports

remediation efforts with adequate centralized program management and

oversight, its mission-critical operations may well be severely degraded or

disrupted as a result of the Year 2000 problem.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

• Establish a strong department-level program office led by an executive

whose full-time job is to effectively manage and oversee the Department’s

Year 2000 efforts. The office should as a minimum have sufficient

authority to enforce good management practices, direct resources to

specific problem areas, and ensure the validity of data being reported by

components on such things as progress, contingency planning, and testing.

• Expedite efforts to establish a comprehensive, accurate departmentwide

inventory of systems, interfaces, and other equipment needing repair.

Require components to validate the accuracy of data being reported to

OSD. Provide guidance that clearly defines a “system” for Year 2000

reporting purposes.

• Clearly define criteria and an objective process for prioritizing systems for

repair based on their mission-criticality and ensure that the “most”

mission-critical systems will be repaired first.

• Ensure that system interfaces are adequately addressed by (1) taking

inventory and assigning clear responsibility for each, (2) tracking progress

in Year 2000 problem resolution, (3) requiring interface agreement

documentation, and (4) providing guidance on the content of interface

agreements and who should fund corrective actions.

Page 22 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

• Develop an overall, departmentwide testing strategy and a plan for

ensuring that adequate resources, such as test facilities and tools, are

available to perform necessary testing. Ensure that the testing strategy

specifies the common criteria and processes that components should use

in testing their systems.

• Require components to develop contingency plans to ensure that essential

operations and functions can be performed even if mission-critical

systems are not corrected in time or fail due to Year 2000 problems. Track

component progress in completing these plans.

• Prepare complete and accurate Year 2000 cost estimates so that the

department can assess the full impact of the Year 2000 problem, ensure

adequate resources are available, and effectively make trade-off decisions

to ensure that funds are properly allocated.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In reviewing a draft of this report, the Acting Principal Deputy of the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence concurred with all of our

recommendations to improve Defense’s Year 2000 program. Specifically,

Defense agreed with the need to establish a strong central Year 2000

program office and has appointed a full-time executive to lead the

department’s efforts to solve the Year 2000 challenge. Defense stated that

this office will have sufficient authority to enforce good management

practices. In addition, Defense stated that the DOD Year 2000 Management

Plan is being revised to (1) define criteria and processes for prioritizing

systems, (2) formalize guidance on identification and documentation of

interfaces, (3) establish common testing conditions and dates for attaining

Year 2000 compliance, and (4) provide for development of contingency

plans in accordance with GAO’s recently issued guidance.8

 The revised

Management Plan is scheduled to be issued in April 1998.

However, in concurring with several of our recommendations, Defense did

not indicate how it would implement them. Instead, it reiterated current

practices which to date have not resulted in reliable and complete

inventory, progress, and cost data. For example, Defense concurred with

our recommendation to establish an accurate departmentwide inventory

of its systems and a clear definition of the term “system.” But, it then said

that components will continue to validate the accuracy of data submitted

for its new database using audit agencies and other independent validation

techniques recommended by OMB and claimed that it had already clearly

8

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19

Exposure Draft, March 1998).

Page 23 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

defined the term “system” in a March 1997 memorandum from ASD C3I and

in DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Components have

not submitted accurate data to Defense to date, and these actions do not

indicate that Defense will validate these data to ensure their accuracy in

the future as we recommended. Further, the documents cited do not

define the term “system” effectively and, as we reported, components have

interpreted the term inconsistently.

Likewise, Defense concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary

of Defense prepare complete and accurate Year 2000 cost estimates, but

then cited current cost estimating guidance and procedures, and noted

that it had “requested the Components to improve their estimated costs by

using actual figures as they became available.” It added that the Secretary

of Defense, through the Year 2000 Steering Committee, will use these

estimates to assess the impact of Year 2000 problems, make trade-off

decisions, and ensure adequate resources are available. Again, these

actions describe current practices which have resulted in incomplete and

inaccurate cost estimates. Despite requests from Defense that they refine

their cost analyses and prepare complete cost estimates, components

continued to provide unreliable and incomplete cost data. Until Defense

takes additional action to implement our recommendation to require and

ensure that components use a more reliable methodology and report

complete costs, it will not have the reliable information it needs to allocate

resources, track progress, make trade-off decisions, and resolve funding

disputes.

We are providing copies of this letter to the Ranking Minority Members of

the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on

Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight; the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority members of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government

Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Senate

Committee on Governmental Affairs; the Subcommittee on Defense,

Senate Committee on Appropriations; the Senate Committee on Armed

Services; the Subcommittee on National Security, House Committee on

Appropriations; and the House Committee on National Security. We are

also sending copies to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the

Assistant to the President for Year 2000; and other interested parties.

Copies will be made available to others on request.

Page 24 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
B-278156 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this letter, please call me

at (202) 512-6240. Other major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III.

Jack L. Brock, Jr.

Director, Governmentwide and

 Defense Information Systems

Page 25 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of

Defense Component

Year 2000 Efforts

28

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

35

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

41

Tables Table 1: Reported Status of Defense Year 2000 Efforts 10

Table 2: Information Reported to Defense on Other Equipment 10

Page 26 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Contents

Abbreviations

AMC Army Materiel Command

ASD C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence

AUTODIN Automated Digital Network

CCSS Commodity Command Standard System

CMM Capability Maturity Model

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DIST Defense Integration Support Tools

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DMS Defense Message System

DOD Department of Defense

FMSO Fleet Material Support Office

GCCS Global Command Control System

GPS Global Positioning System

LSSC Logistics Systems Support Center

NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SSG Standard Systems Group

Page 27 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 28 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 29 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 30 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 31 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 32 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 33 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix I 

GAO Reviews of Defense Component Year

2000 Efforts

Page 34 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 35 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 22.

Now on p. 22.

Page 36 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 22.

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 22.

Now on p. 23.

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 23.

Page 39 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s March 27,

1998, letter.

GAO Comment 1. Defense’s additional comments have been incorporated as appropriate

but have not been included in the report.

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

John B. Stephenson, Project Director

Keith A. Rhodes, Technical Director

Ronald B. Bageant, Assistant Director

Carl M. Urie, Assistant Director

Madhav Panwar, Technical Assistant Director

Brian C. Spencer, Technical Assistant Director

Alicia L. Sommers, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Brenda A. James, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Robert L. Crocker, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Cristina T. Chaplain, Communications Analyst

Atlanta Field Office Carl Higginbotham, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Christopher T. Brannon, Staff Evaluator

Teresa Tucker, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Chicago/Dayton Field

Office

Robert P. Kissel, Jr., Evaluator-in-Charge

Steven M. Hunter, Senior Evaluator

Robert G. Preston, Senior Evaluator

Thomas Hewlett, Staff Evaluator

Denver Field Office John A. Spence, Information Systems Analyst

Kansas City Field

Office

George L. Jones, Senior Information Systems Analyst

Denice M. Millett, Senior Evaluator

Michael W. Buell, Staff Evaluator

Karen S. Sifford, Staff Evaluator

(511636) Page 41 GAO/AIMD-98-72 Defense Year 2000 Overview
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