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 - W INTER 19 7 9
 

The Bridge
 

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UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 

FORT BELVOIR 

Com mander/Commandant 

MG James L. Kelly 

Assistant Commandant 

COL Robert S. Kubby 

Command Sergeant Major 

CSM Frederick I. Eisenbart, Jr. 

DIRECTORATES 

Directorate ot Combal Developments 

COL Gene B. Welch 

Directorale of Training Developments 

COL Robert M. Bunker 

Directorate of Training 

COL Robert E. Conroy 

Directorale 01 Evalualion 

MAJ Terrance C. Ryan 

Delense Mapping School 

COL Heclor Wood 

UNITS 

Engineer Cenler Brigade 

COL David O. Cooksey 

Engineer Training Brigade 

COL James H. King, Jr. 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER 

MAJ Sandor I. Ketzis 

EDITOR 

Jerome J. Hill 

ILLUSTRATOR 

William Ruth 

e .... gineer .....r... . ~V THE COVER 

German demolitions, artillery bornbardment, and continuous heavy tralfie led to the collapse of the t.udendorf Bridge at Remagen on 17 March 

1945. But not before U.S. engineers 

had constructed a lifeline of supplementary bridges which enabled 

the Allies to press the offensive 

against the Nazi forces. See page 8 

for the complete story. 
yruq ­

e glrleer
 

\JOLUME: 9 VVINTER 1878 NUM~E:R3

FE:f:\TURE:S 

4 BRIDGING FOR THE 1980s AND BEYOND 

by Hal Do tterer 

8 THE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN 

by Lieutenan t Ronn ie Chai Chang 

12 INTEGRATING ENGINEERS INTO THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM 

by Captain Dale Robert son 

15 WINTER REFORGER 79: LESSONS LEARNED 

by Colonel Jerome B. Hi lmes 

18 TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS 

by Captain John F. Rybicki 

22 THE COMBAT HEAVY BATTALION IN FORWARD SUPPORT 

by Major Francis R. Skidmore & Major Jo hn A. Mu/lans 

27 GUIDELINES FOR NEW LIEUTENANTS 

by Captain James B. Norwood 

page 13 

32 INTERSERVICE COOPERATION PAYS OFF AT TAEGU 

by Lieutenan t Michael Hull ihan 

DE:PARTME:NTS 

2 NEWS & NOTES 37 COMMANDER'S UPDATE
 

34 ENGINEER PROBLEM 38 ENLISTED CAR EER INFO
 

35 RESERVE COMPONENTS 40 THE "SCHOOL SOLUTION
 

36 OFFICER CAREER INFO
 

page 18 

ENG INEER ISan aut ho rized pub l ic at io n of the US Army Enq inee r Center and Fo rt Be lVOir Un less spec if ically stat ed . m atenal ap pe ari ng herem 

does not necessari ly reflec t offi ci al po licv. thmklng or e ndorse me nt by any agen cy of the U S Arm y All photographs contarnec he rein are of ­

fiCial U S A rmy ph otog raphs unless ot he rw ise cr ed ited Us e of funds for pr intIng th is publ ication was appr oved by Head qua rte rs Depa rtment o f 

t he A rmy. o n 23 February 1979 Material he re in may be re printed prov idi ng c red it ISgIve n to EN GIN E ER and the auth o r • The ENGINEER rmssio n IS to Inc rease un der standing of t he role and Impo rta nce o f eng ineers on th e ba ll te fleld and to promo te the oro tessio nal develo p me nt of all 

me m bers of the A rmy enq ineer tarnuv ENG IN E ER pr ov io es t ime ly and authon tatrv s mtormatron on Ar my eng ineeri ng co nc epts, plans pouc res 

doctri ne. proc ed ur es, oper at ion s. eq uiprne nt. and developmen ts to ac tive A rm y uruts, the Rese rve C omponents . tra in in g and ed uc atio n centers 

fac il it ies ng ne an d other branch ag encies and activit ies worlowide - Direct c orrespo ndence Wit h E NGIN EE R 1$ auth or ized and en ­

c ouraged rnc urn es. lett e rs to t he editor . man uscnpts, ph otogr aph s and gen eral corr espo ndence should be se nt to Ed rto r. ENGINEER 

MagaZin e , U S A rm y Eng Ineer Ce nter Fort Be tv oir. VA 22060 Te lephone AUTOVON 35 4·500 1 or Comme rc ial 703 -664· 4001/3082 If a rel urn o f 

m anuscri pts o r mate rial IS desired . a se lf -addressed . stamp ed e nvelo pe IS re ourred - Co ntro lled Circulat ion postage IS paid at M e rri f ield , VA 

- ENG INEER IS available by subscrrpt io n Se nd check Or mo ney ord e r. pay able to Supen nte ndent of Do cu me nts, to. S upe ri nte nde nt o f 

Doc u me nts US G ov ernmen t Pri nting Office . Washi ng to n. DC 20 402 Subs cr rptron rates are $5 50 per year domest ic (Inc lud ing A PO and 

FPO addresses) and $6 90 fo r for e ig n add re sses IndIVid ual co pies are also availa ble . at $325 eac h fo r domest ic addr esses and $4 10 each 

for fore ig n add resses 
News & Notes
 

ANNUAL TRAINING 

Specialist Five And rew B. Hill, a heavy equipm en t operator assigned to Com ­

pany A, 926th Enginee r Ba ttalion, Birm ingh am , AL, puts a scoop load er to 

good use durin g annua l training at Camp Shelby, MS . Train ing activities for 

th e 926th and its sub ordinat e units inclu ded the pr epara tion of runways, 

min efields , fire br eak s, ta nk a nd drainage ditc hes, and other construction projects. (USA R ph oto by Paul Adams) 

ENLISTEE TREATMENT
 

STANDARDS
 

A recent TRADOC directive has 

established new standa rds for 

trea tme nt of Arm y recruits. The 

cha nges will be appa rant from th e 

mom ent a new enlistee rep ort s to 

his reception stat ion . " Shock will 

not be used on receptees by 

RECSTA cadre." according to the 

TRADOC dir ective . Such tr aditi on a! pr ac ti ce s as makin g 

receptees stand at a brace . ru n on 

and off bu ses with luggage, a nd 

ot her forms of har assmen t are now 

prohi bited. So is the " skinhead" 

haircu t. Trainess may now wear 

mu staches in accordan ce with Army regul ati ons. The philosophy 

und erlying these changes is to 

"tra in soldiers by build ing on their 

strengths a nd by shoring up their 

weaknesses. It is not to tear the m 

down and build them up aga in." 

T hese changes resul ted fro m an 

eigh t-month review of entry training at nin e Army training centers. 

TOPO SUPPORT SYST EM 

A mod ern system to pr ovide 

critical terra in data to tactical 

commanders is on the way. A 

$16.4 million contract to produce 

42 un its of the Topographic Support System (TSS) has been awa rded to the American Development 

Corporati on of South Carolina. Initial field ing of th e TSS, designed 

to improve the capa bility of field 

tapa un its. is anticipated in 1982. 

T55 will consist of seven int er dep en dent su bsys te ms, inclu din g ma p r ep rod uc t ion : 

storage, retrievaI, and distribu tion 

of topo inform ation ; on-site terrai n 

data collection; survey support ; 

cartogra phic revision; mosaicking, 

dra ft ing, and rectificati on; and 

comma nd and control. 

2 WINTER 1979-80 
CORPS REASSIGNMENTS 

MG Harry A. Griffith and MG Bennett L. 

Lewis have been appointed as comma nders 

of th e Cor ps' Ohio River and North Atlan tic 

Division s. re specti vely . . . COL Maximilian Imhoff has been appoi nted as the 

first com mander a nd director of th e Corp s' 

new W ater Resou rces Sup port Center at 

For t Belvoir . VA , , . Lloyd A. Duscha has 

bee n selected as the new Ch ief of the 

E ngineering Division, Civil Works Directorate, aCE _ . _ COL Samuel P. Collins, 

Jr., has been appointed as d istrict enginee r 

for the Corps' Vicksburg District . . . 

$1 BILLION CORPS PROJECT 

The Corps of Engineer s is the construc ­

tion agent for a 5> 1 billion project to design 

and constr uct two strategic air bas es in 

Isra el. Constr uction has a lready begun a nd 

is scheduled for completion within thr ee 

years. Con struction will include runways 

and parking apr ons, aircraft she lters, a nd 

othe r operationa l and support facilities, in ­

clud ing utilities, roads, and housing. A 

Corps of Enginee rs sta ff in Tel Aviv and at 

two site offi ces is ma nagi ng the const ruc tion 

effort . The new ba ses will be locat ed near 

Beer Sheva and Elat in the Ncgev Deser t. 

JOB ESTIMATING SYSTEM 

Th e Dire cto ra te of Engin eering and 

Hou sing. US Army Sup port Comma nd, 

Hawaii ha s impleme nted a minicomputer 

based Job Est imat ing Syste m (JES) for use 

in preparing deta iled work estimates. The 

syste m is designed for use with the WANG 

22001' min icom puter. The system delivers a 

more acc urate detailed estima te an d reduces 

the total esti mating hou rs by 40 per cent , 

thus allowing Integr ated Fac ilitie s System 

inspections to he con ducted without hirin g 

addit iona l personnel. 

RUNWAY REPAIR EXERCISE 

Filling and compacting craters was j ust one of four cruc ial tasks accomplished by memb ers of A Co mpany , 27th En gineer Battalion (C) 

(A) dur ing FT X SaUD SH IEL D in Ma y. Never before had the Army 

test ed its entire pack age of run way repair by an airborne com bat 

engineer assau lt force . The air drop included TWO dozers, four loader s, 

five tr ucks, two jeeps, an air compressor, an d a pioneer tool tr ailer. 

Withi n six hou rs of the drop , Alpha Company engineers h ad de rigged 

and asse mbled all eq uipment, cleared all airfield craters and vehicle 

hulks of mines and anti-ha ndling devices , and tilled and compacted 

all craters. Compaction by the 250 CFM air compresso r above was 

succ essful due to a combi na tion of goo d wea ther and sma ll craters, 

b ut larg er craters and lor ba d weathe r would have created a more 

seri ous cha llenge . Thus, inclu sion of a l J-wheeled roller , a sheepsfoot 

roller , and / or a vibr atin g compactor in the rep air pack age is being 

conside red . 

ENGINEER 3 
.
 

" 

.' 

. " .' " 

BRIDGING 

FOR 

THE 19805.... 

by Hal Dotterer 

4 

Pew are aware of the development program 

going on at Fort Belvoir as well as in Germany and England which, when suc cessfully 

comp leted, may require revolutionary changes to 

US and NATO tactical bridging conc epts of operation and organizational struct ures. It will cert ainly 

enable us to launch br idges across a wider range of 

gaps under assault or near assault condition s in 

ju st a matter of minutes. 

The objective of the program, known nati onally 

as " Bridging for 1985 and Beyond " (BRG 851 ) and 

internationally as " Bridging in the 80s" , is to 

develop a family of bridges with a common bridge 

girde r that will be used in all three tacti cal bridge 

roles , i.e ., assault role. dry support role, and wet 

support role. All bridges will be mech an ically launched and retrieved by a common launch 

mech anism mounted on either a nation al main battle tank chassis or a special wheeled vehicle , each 

with a two-man crew . Girder reinforcemen ts, such 

as a cable reinforcing system for long, clear-span 

bridges, or piers for mu lti-span bridges, will also 

WINTER 1979·80 
be included in th e family . All bridges will be 

designed to accommodate military load class 

(MLC) 70 tr acked loads. 

Assault bridges will vary in length from 17 to 31 

meters (in 7-mete r inc remen ts) with launch tim es 

of th ree to five minutes. 

Dry su pport bridges (fixed bridges) will vary in 

length from 17 to 52 meters (in 7-meter increments). Launch times will be 10 to 30 minu tes 

by one to three wheeled launchers. Th e cab le reinforcing system will be required for bridges over 31 

meters long. Bridges longer than 52 meters will be 

possible using piers. Piers may also be used to increase the load classifica tion of dry support bridges 

to ena ble them to accommoda te th e Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) load ed with th e XM I. 

Wet Support bridges (float bridge s) will vary in 

length (in 14 meter increments) with emplacement 

rates of six meters (20 feet) per minute. 

Mounting the assault bridge on the XMI chassis 

will affor d th e cross-country mobility and crew protecti on needed to provide close support to tank 

ENGINEER 

eq u ip pe d a ssa ult elements. The wh eele d
 

tr ansporter/ Iauncher will be designed to provide
 

the on-road speed and maneuverabili ty needed to
 

keep pace with support elements. Wh eeled
 

tr ansporters/l au nchers will also be design ed to
 

provide th e off-road mobi lity needed to reach
 

bridge launch sites.
 

The need for the system is tied directly to the
 

perceived threat in Europe in the 1990-2000 time
 

frame. In this environment, tactical bridging
 

operations within the division and corps ar ea will
 

be opposed by an enemy with sophisticated bat­


tlefield surveillance and reaction ca pabilities. The
 

threat will come from manned surveillance air­


craft, tactical aircraft capable of accurate ord­


nance delivery, and conventional and guided ar­


tillery.
 

Bridging missions, therefore, must be completed
 

before enemy forces can dam age or destroy the
 

bridge . To do so, bridges must be built, essential
 

traffic must cross, and th e bridg e dismantled and
 

relocated before th e tactical air or artillery threat is
 

applied. Erection time for current US hand erected
 

bridge system s, particularly dry support bridges,
 

ar e too slow to defeat the threat. Even the current
 

Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB)
 

system , which ca n emplace a bridge 63 feet /19.3
 

meters long in 2-3 minutes, is limited by the fact
 

that it cannot be extended when the gap width ex­


ceeds 60 feet/1 B.3 meters.
 

The logistical support requirement s of current
 

US tactical bridges is compounded by the fact that
 

there is no commonality between th e several bridge
 

systems in th e inventory. Each requ ires different
 

assembly and disassembly procedu res. Several dif­


ferent transport vehicles are required. None of the
 

....and BEYOND
 

curr ent bridge systems are designed to connect to
 

any of the oth er systems when the assets of diverse­


ly equipped bridge units are requ ired to span a
 

major wate r barrier.
 

Developm ent of this new bridg e system requ ires
 

tha t we reexam ine current operational concepts for
 

all three bridge roles and chang e them where
 

necessary to take advantage of the improved
 

capabilities of the new system and the unique
 

benefits offered by a common girder. The
 

orga nizational structures of bridge units will have
 

5 
- - ·.

Prototype st-meter bridge on the wheeled transporter/launch vehicle 

to be revised drastically as a mechanically launched 

bridge system replaces the remaining manpowerdependent, hand erected bridges in today's inventory. 

ASSAULT BRIDGE EMPLOYMENT 

Essentially, the day-to-day employment of 

assault bridges will follow operational procedures 

similar to those used with the current AVLB, with 

one notable exception. That is, to implement a recent doctrinal decision, all of the assault bridges in 

the division will be centralized in the divisional 

engineer battalion and operated by AVLB sections 

of an AVLB platoon organic to each engineer line 

company. The traditional close association between engineer line companies and maneuver 

elements will ensure that assault bridges are 

located well forward, thus enabling them to support assault crossings by combined arms teams. 

When its emplacement is approved by the crossing force commander, the bridge is brought forward under the over-watch fire of the lead tactical 

elements and emplaced quickly . The bridge will 

move by the most direct route to the crossing site, 

remaining on-road where possible . Bridges 

emplaced by an assault bridge section will be 

retrieved by the same section when the bridge is no 

longer needed by the assault force , unless a bridge 

is required at that location for follow-up and combat service support traffic. In such cases, the 

bridge will remain in place and a replacement 

bridge for the assault launcher will be provided by 

. - -- - _ .. .....:::... . .. ..... ... .._--_. 

the support Bridge Section of the battalion. 

This change to the assault bridge concept of 

operation is proposed in order to take advantage of 

one of the benefits offered by the common girder. 

With the BRG 8S + system, the old concept of 

replacing an assault bridge with a support bridge 

will no longer be valid, since the replacement support bridge will be identical to the assault bridge 

being replaced. 

Engineer AVLB platoons (one per line company, 

four per divisional engineer battalion) will be 

equipped with six launchers, six 24-meter bridges, 

and three pier modules. This allocation will enable 

each launcher to carry either a 17 or 24-metcr 

bridge as determined by gap reconnaissance 

reports. By combining platoon assets, 31-meter 

bridges can be launched under assault conditions, 

while 38 and 4S·meter bridges can be launched 

under near-assault conditions (some exposure of 

personnel). Again, by combining platoon assets, 

bridges 24, 31, 38, and 4S meters long each 

capable of accomodating the HET with XM1, can 

be launched under near-assault conditions. 

DRY SUPPORT BRIDGE EMPLOYMENT 

Dry Support Bridge assets of the Divisional 

Engineer Battalion/Separate Brigade Engineer 

Company will be used to back up AVLB 

capabilities by replenishing armored launchers 

when the bridges they have laid are to remain inplace for combat support/combat service support 

traffic. Dry support bridges will also be emplaced 

6 WINTER 1979-80 
within the division ar ea to facilit ate lateral movement of maneuver clements and combat suppor t/ combat service support tratftc by bridging wet 

or dry gaps up to S1 meters wide. Dry supp ort 

bridges will be emplaced by the Support Brid ge 

Section of the divisional engineer battalion/ 

sepa ra te brigade engineer compa ny at locatio ns 

selected in coordination wit h the division 

GJ/brigade S3 and approved by the division/ brigade commander. 

After the bridge site has been reconoitered and it 

has been determined that the requ ired span is 

within the capability of a dry support bridge, a 

bridge girder, tailored to span the gap . will be 

assembled (using organic MHE, i.e., crane or 

wrecker). After picking up the assembled girder, 

the wheeled transporter/launch er(s) will proceed , 

on order, to the brid ge site to launch the bridge. 

Travel will be on-road as much as possible. Crosscountry travel will be used only when necessary to 

by-pass obstacles and to reach off-route launch 

sites. 

Each Support Bridge Section (two per Division 

Engineer Battalion, one per separ ate Brigade 

Engineer Comp any) will be equipped with three 

wheeled lau nchers, one 31-meter bridge, two 

24-me ter bridges, one pier module, and one cable 

reinforcing modu le. This allocation will enable 

each section to span a var iety of wet or dry gap s 

from 16 to SI meters wide and reinforce one 

30-meter bridge to accomoda te loads such as the 

HET loaded with the XMl. Multiple crossings (up 

to three) will be possible acr oss gaps of23 meters or 

less. 

Dry Support Bridges of the Corps Bridge Company will be used to supplement divisional bridge 

capabilities by providing additional bridging as required, by spanning gaps that exceed the 

capabilities of the divisional battalion's Support 

Bridge Section, and by ernplacing reinforced 

bridges capable of accommodating HET/ XM1 

loads across gaps greater than 30 meters wide. Dry 

support bridges will be emplaced by the Dry Support Platoon of the Corps Eng ineer Bridge Company. Th e platoon will be equ ipped with four 

wheeled tr ansporte rs/launchers , four 31-meter 

bridges, six pier modul es, and two cable reinforcing modules. General purpose transportation, i.e ., 

flat bed trailers, will be requ ired for movemen t of 

the pier and reinforcing modules. 

WET SUPPORT BRIDGE EMPLOYMENT 

Under this proposed organizati onal and operational concept, the corp s bridge company would 

provide the only float bridge capability with in the 

division/ corps area. The basis for this revoluENGINEER 

A 24·meter bridge on an M60A 1 chassis during mobility tests 

tion ary change in concept is the fact , established by 

gap distribution studies, that a vast majority of 

gaps throughout the world are under 30 meter s 

wide. In Europe 96.9 percent of all gaps are 30 

meters or less and 97.5 percent are SO meters or 

less. 

Based on these studies, the BRG 85 + dry support bridges allocated to the divisional engin eer 

battalion will be abl e to spa n, in 30 minutes or less, 

97.5 percent of all gap s that the division may expect to enc ounter. Since the locati ons of all major 

water barriers are wen known, adequate planning 

and coordination for a major river crossing operation will ensure that the wet support bridge 

cap ab ilities of the corps bridge company are provided as required to cross the remaining 2.5 percent of gaps . 

Wet support bridges will be emplaced by Wet 

Support Platoons of the Corps Engineer Bridge 

Company. Each of three platoons will be equipped 

with ten wheeled transporters/launchers, 16 sevenmeter interior bays, and four 8.S-meter ramp bays. 

This equipment will enable eaeh platoon to build 

one 129-meter bridge or two 31-meter rafts. 

Those who must look into the future and dare to 

predict when things are likely to happen say th at 

this new family of bridges should be ready for field 

service by 1989. Realistically , much can, and 

usua lly does, happen to a research and developmen t program over a ten-year period . Optimistically, all th at we hope for will come to fruition . On the 

other hand , we may have reached too far. We'll 

see. Nevertheless, once in awhile it is good for the 

spirit to tak e an opti mistic look int o the future. 

Hal Dotterer. a previous contributor to ENGINEER. is a 

Com bat Dev elopment Materiel Analyst with the Ma teriel 

System s Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, 

USA ES , specializing in military bridge systems. 

7 
The Bridge
 

at 

REMAGEN
 

by LT Ronnie Chai Chang 

--­
While engineers labored to complete repairs to the 

bridge, rivets in the steel arches began to shear, popping like rifle shots. Within seconds, the bridge 

rotated to the upstream side, pulled its approach 

spans off their rollers, and dropped into the river. But 

the bridge had served its purpose. Other means for 

crossing the Rhine, at or near Remagen, had been 

established. 

First Army engin eers began planning to cross the 

formidable Rhine River barrier while participating 

in the Allied drive through Belgium during July 

1944. By mid-September, tons of Class II and Class IV 

bridging had been stockpiled, but by 22 October, prospects for an early crossing had faded due to the stiff 

Nazi resistance. 

In February 1945, the Allied High Command decided 

the First Army was not to cross the Rhine. Stockpiling of 

bridge equipment ceased and bridge units were 

transfered elsewhere. 

By early March, III Corps of First Army had reached 

Cologne on the Rhine. The rest of First Army wheeled 

southeast to strike the enemy flank and rear in the Eifel 

region bordering the Rhine and to link-up with Third 

Army slicing up from the south toward the confluence of 

the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers. Hopes of find ing intact bridges over the Rhine were virtually non-existent as 

th e Germans destroyed dozens of bridges along the vital 

barrier. 

The Ninth Armored Division was disposed to the right 

flank of the southeastern pincer of III Corps to facilitate 

a cro ssing of the Ahr, a Rhine tributary and the subsequent link with Third Army. In their path lay the small 

rail junction town of Remagen , on the west bank of the 

Rhine. Significant only in that it contained the Ludendorff rail bridge. Remagen did not figure in any plans for 

a crossing. 

The ruggedness of the terrain in th e West erwald 

region across the bridge and the poor quality of roads 

from the west were unsuitable for tanks and any large 

maintenance and depo installations necessary to support 

a major river crossing. Without its bridge, Remagen was 

ju st another milestone. 

But on 7 March 1945, the Ludendorff Bridge took on 

great significance when th e first scouts of Company A, 

27th Armored Infantry Battalion. 9th Armored Division 

peered down on Remagen . The br idge was intact, still 

spanning the Rhine, the only br idge left across the great 

ENGINEER 

barrier. Poor morale and chaos and confusion in the 

German Command left an opportunity begging to be exploited . 

U.S. commanders reacted switftly . Lieutenant Hugh 

Mott, a plattoon leader in Company B, 9th Armored 

Engineer Battalion, recalled being told by his task force 

commander: " Matt, General Hoge wants you to get out 

onto that bridge and see if it's mined or loaded with 

TNT, and whether it'll hold tanks. I'll give you fire support from my tanks and you'll have infantry scouts out 

there too." It was a virtual suicide mission . 

Enemy gunners across the river could rake the bridge 

with fire. Even more ominous was the possibility that th e 

bridge might blow at any moment. This possibility was 

reinforced when the engineer detachment consisting of 

Mott and two of his most able NCOs set out for the 

bridge; before they reached it, a hughe geyser of rock 

and dirt erupted as the Germans blew up the vehicle approach ramp on the western side, leaving a 30-feet 

crater. But th e bridge still stood. The Americans swiftly 

started across and German machine gun s promptly 

began their deadly clatter. 

Across the river, German engineers worked frantically. Their main dernoliton circuit had been 

broken probably by American tank fire and they 

were prevented from fixing it by that same fire. The Germans then lit the primary cord fuse to emergency demolition charges placed to do the greatest damage. With a 

tremendous roar, these charges exploded . but, when the 

dust had settled. the bridge was still standing. 

The three engineers ran out and began cutting every 

wire they could find, bringing great relief to the infantrymen accompanying them. In the middle of the bridge, 

the engineers climbed down to find four packages of 

TNT, each weighing 20-30 pounds, tied to I-beams 

underneath the deck . Working quickly, they cut the 

wires and dropped the charges harmlessly into the river. 

9 
First Army soldiers and equipment pour across the Remagen Bridge 

Seconds later, the three men were back on the bridge 

cutting a heavy cable. 

Moving across the bridge, the engineers methodically 

hunted for the master switch controlling the German 

demolitions and eventually found it near the eastern end . 

Cutting the wires leading from it, they returned to look 

for other caches of explosives. Altogether, the engineers 

removed 2,000 pounds of explosives placed in approximately 150 separate charges. One of the largest weighed 

500 to 600 pounds and was found correctly wired and 

primed for demolition, and with the fuse cap blown . By 

that time, other engineers had joined the intrepid 

threesome and were busy checking the approaches for 

mines and working on a solution to the huge crater. 

Close inspection revealed that the German demolition 

efforts had inflicted considerable damage. The main 

multiple panel joint of the eastern truss was blown and 

some flooring and several floor beams were blown away. 

Significant engineer repair efforts were required before 

the Lundendorff Bridge could be utilized by more than 

foot traffic . 

Three main repair tasks were carried out concurrently: 

repair of the bridge flooring; re-garding of the approach 

ramps from the bridge to roadways along the Rhine; and 

strengthening of the vital support panel joint adjacent to 

the northern pier. All work was carried out under heavy 

enemy fire, including artillery which at time limited work 

parties to two-man teams. 

Makeshift repairs to shattered planking were effected, 

utilizing lumber from captured houses in Remagen. 

Gaping holes were roped off. Cable was stretched to help 

strengthen parts of the lower chord of the bridge. At 

10 

midnight 17 March, armored engineers under Matt's 

direction gave the signal that tanks could cross the 

bridge. 

Nine tanks crossed the Rhine before a tank destroyer 

fell into one of the holes in the flooring , stuck and effectively blocked further crossing. It was not until 0530 the 

next morning that engineers dislodged the vehicle after 

using crowbars and pushing and pulling with other 

vehicles for hours. Tanks and vehicles again rumbled 

across the bridge and within 24 hours of its capture, 

scores of vehicles and some 8,000 troops had crossed to 

establish a bridgehead. 

More than a single lifeline was needed to exploit the 

bridgehead, however. Within a day or two, only a small 

fraction of the engineers at Remagen were actually on the 

bridge itself. First Army's river crossing equipment was 

pushed forward to bridge parks near the Rhine. Eighteen 

forward supply dumps were established and over 100 

trucks with 5-7 ton semi-trailers were pressed into service. 

Ferries were established at three locations by the 86th 

Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion: just south of 

Remagen at the junction of the Ahr and the Rhine; in the 

center between Remagen and its neighbor, Erpel across 

the Rhine; and just north of Remagen between the towns 

of Unkel and Unkelbach. The establishment offerries at 

these locations consisted of the assembly of 5-ponton 

rafts and the grading of approach roads on the Rhine 

banks. These ferries were operated until 13 March, 

which time a floating treadway bridge and a heavy ponton bridge were established across the Rhine in the 

Remagen area. 

Construction of the heavy ponton bridge by the 

1159th Engineer Combat Group and the treadway 

by the 1111th Engineer Combat Group began on 

10 March. From the onset. engineers suffered heavy 

casualties from German artillery fire , small-arms fire , 

and air attack. On the heavy ponton bridge located to the 

south of Remagen near the Ahr River , 14 4-boat rafts 

reinforced with pneumatic rubber tloats were assembled 

"by feel" after dark. The next day, under cover a heavy 

smoke screen, the rafts were anchored into position. The 

entire bridge, 935 feet long and built for Class 40 loads , 

was completed in 291/~ hours. 

The treadway bridge site was also subjected to intense 

artillery fire . Located just north of the Lundendorff 

Bridge, it had to be re-built three times after German 

gunners blasted the first 450 feet. The cost in human 

lives was seventeen men, all killed by artillery tire. The 

additional loss of three air compressors helped make the 

feat of completing the 1,032 feet bridge in 321/~ hours 

even more remarkable. 

On 17 March, while engineers labored to complete 

repairs to the Ludendorff Bridge, rivets in the steel ar­ ;; 

ches began to shear, popping like rifle shots. Within 

WINTER 1979·80 
seconds, th e bridge had rotated to th e upstream side, 

pulled its approach spans off their rollers and dropped 

into th e river. Of the 200 men worki ng on the bridge, 10 

were killed, 18 missing and 63 injured. The cumulative 

effect of German demolit ion charges, artillery and bomb 

attacks, heavy traffic for five da ys (unt il the ponton and 

tre adway bridg es were opened on 12 March), and repair 

efforts utilizing cranes and air compressors, finally 

brought the old railroad bridge down. However, th e 

bridge had served its purpose. Other mean s for crossing 

at or near Rem agen , including ferri es, ponton, and 

treadway bridges, had been established . 

With the collapse of the Lud endorff Bridge, First 

Army authorized construction of a Class 40 float ing 

Bailey a mile north of Remagen . In a remarkable 

engineer feat, the 148th Eng ineer Combat Battalion bu ilt 

the l ,244-foot bridge on Bailey pontons with 32-foot 

floating bays in 47 hours and 4S minu tes. With th e completion of the Bailey, maintenance of troops across the 

Rhine ceased to be a major problem. Together with other 

The collaps ed Ludendorff Bridge a t Remagen 

bridges, it made the bridgehead's supply lines secure. 

Th e bridgehead itself proved significant. It not only 

reduced German moral e, but it also directed German 

forces fro m strategic locations along the elongated Rhine 

defen se network . Flung piecemeal into savage bu t 

disorganized counter- attacks agai nst the Remagen 

bridgeh ead , the diverted forces were later helpless to 

resist subsequent Allied crossings, thus hastening the 

end of the Nazi Germany. 

Th e engineer effort in pre serving the Lud end orff 

Bridge until supplementary bridges could be built was 

tremendously signifi cant. Without the lifeline provided 

by th e bridges and ferries, the bridgehead was doomed. 

And the effort to destroy the Nazi war machine would 

have been even more costly.

...
 

Lieut enan t R onnie O. Choi Chang wrote the abo ve article while 

att ending th e Engineer Officer Basic Course at th e U.S . Army 

Engineer Sc hool. Fort Belvoir. VA . He has since been assigned 

to th e lst Engin eer Batt alion. lst In fantry Di vision , 
The preponderance of existing guidelines on engineer combat support to the combined arms team is focused at the division and brigade levels. Yet the fluid nature of today 's battlefield requires more responsive engineer effort, particularly 

at task force level. This article addresses the role of the task 

force engineer in support of a combined arms task force. 

Integrating
 

Engineers
 

into the
 

Combined
 

Arms TeaDl
 

by CPT Dale Robertson 

The commander of the Opposing Force 

(OPFOR) has bee n assured by his staff th at 

prep arations for the att ack are well underway. Indeed, he is impressed with the manner in 

which his subo rdinate commanders arc making 

spot checks to prevent last-minute delays. 

Artillery units move into positi on and ta nk crews 

loa d their ammunition. Motorized rifle units make 

last-minute checks of their BMPs. 

The OPFOR commander knows that he will 

have to hit hard and advance rapidly if the attack is 

to be succ essfu l. In order to maintain a rapid advance an d, thereby, gain a foothold in Western 

Europe, he also knows that his artillery will have to 

sup press a large per centage (40 to 60 percent) of 

NATO weapo ns, especially antitank weapons. 

Assessing his division 's nume rical superiority 

over the NATO forces, and combining that assessment with the added assu rance of reinforcements, 

if necessary, the OPFOR commander is very optim istic . 

Meanwhile, the commander of the 1st Brigade, 

3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), is pla nni ng an 

act ive defe nse to halt the anticipated OPFOR attack. He presents his conc ept of the active defense 

to staff membe rs and designates specific responsibilities for eac h. With his operations officer and 

Brigade Engineer, he decides where to place rein12 WINTER 1979-80 

i 
forcing obstacles to best support the tactical plan . 

Th e Brigad e Commander makes it clear to his 

Engin eer tha t lateral points between task forces 

must be kep t open . Hence, obstacles sited a long 

thes e routes will be res erved demo lition targets . 

Other eng ineer responsibilities include digg ing in 

th e Brigade CP , protective slots for th e Brigad e 

trains, and maintenance of 20 kilometers of roa d in 

the Brigad e trai ns area. Th e Brigad e En gineer 

ana lyzes his responsibilitie s while returning to his 

... ... "": .. . 

.. MECHANIZED 

..' INFANTRY ;. 

TACTICAL 

AIR 

: ., . .. ., 

:"0 

...... . ::. 

CP o He th ink s of the man y tim es he has made 

similar ana lyses in th e past. But this is different. 

This is no exercise , this is for real. 

Moving quickly, the Brigade En gineer assigns 

one engineer platoon to eac h of two task forces (TF 

1-7 and TF 1-3) and retain s one platoon in genera l 

support of the brigade. Task Force engi nee rs 

qui ckly attach the equ ipm ent th ey'll need an d set 

out to link up with th eir respective Task Force 

commanders. 

Arriving early, the Task Force En gineer suppo rt ­

ing TF 1-7 ana lyzes the terrain and iden tifies those 

features which may affect his mission . The Task 

Forc e commander and his engin eer have worked 

together numerous times before , so th at ea ch 

underst ands the other's requirements in the ac tive 

defense. The engineer is confi dent th at his per son ­

nel possess the technical skills nec essary to su pport 

the Comb ined Arms Task Force. The Task Force 

commander, acutely aware of the limited manpower and resource con straints of his eng ineers, 

will task them accord ingly. 

The TF 1-7 commander requests spec ific input 

from his eng ineer on how to best use th e terrain . 

How can they structure the terrain to the ir advantage, while, at the same time, reinforce the terr ain 

with obstacles to th e disadv antage of the OPFOR 

armor. He stresses th at all obstacles mu st be tied in 

closely with his ATGM and tanks. 

Th e Task Force commander stresses t he need for 

rapid movement from position to position via 

covered and conc ealed ro utes . He kn ows that if his 

tank s and APCs ca n be seen, they can be hit, and if 

they ca n be hit , th ey can be killed. Having 

pr esen ted his mobili ty and countermo bility requ irem ents to his engineer, the Task Force commander details his survivability requ irements 

whi ch require engin eer effort. Th en he proceeds to 

pr ioritize th em , based on their impo rtance to his 

ta ctical scheme. 

Unl ike his counterpa rt support ing Task Forc e 

1-7. the Engineer supporting TF 1-3 does not have 

a good working relationship with the Task Force 

commander. In past training exercises, his 

enginee rs have been only spora dically integr ated 

into the concept of operations. The TF commander 

does not ide ntify any specifi c engineer responsibilities during his initial briefi ng. Left in the 

da rk , the TF 1-3 En gin eer cannot properly allocate 

his resources to support th e tactic al plan . His 

piecemeal efforts are, thus , unprodu ctive. 

M eanwhile, th e Engineer for TF 1-3 prepares 

the following list of engineer responsib ilities, based on priorities esta blished by th e 

TF commander : 

(I)	 Prepare obsta cles to support the antitank 

weap ons systems; 

(2) Provide for battlefield mobility; 

(3)	 Prep are hull down defilade and/ or protective positions for TOWs, tanks, and APCs; 

(4)	 Dig in Task Force CP ; 

(5)	 prepare alte rn ate figh tin g positi on s within 

th e Battle Positi on ; 

(6)	 Prepare subsequent Battle Position s in a 

similar mann er ; 

(7)	 Con struct decoy sites with in the Battle 

Position. 

Utilizing the bucket load er and 0 7 tra ctor atta ched to his pla toon, th e TF 1-7 Engi neer and his 

ENGINEER 13 
men work throughout the night to accomplish their 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions. 

Upon his return from Brigade Headquarters, the 

commander of TF 1-7 Engineer and his men work 

throughout the night to accomplish their mobility, 

counterrnobility, and survivability missions. 

Upon his return from Brigade Headquarters, the 

commander of TF 1-7 summons his Engineer and 

conducts an inspection of the engineer effort. He 

finds that the Task Force CP is well dug in, thanks 

to the tractor dozer. Team A, which includes tank 

platoon, two infantry platoons, three TOW sections, and a mortar section, have gotten considerable help from the engineer platoon's bucket 

loader. 

The M60A2s of the tank platoon are in hull 

down fighting positions with only their main guns 

and cupolas visible . Alternate positions with 

covered and concealed routes have been constructed. A bridge has been prepared for demoliton 

and will be executed later to become a dynamic 

obstacle. 

Engineer efforts are equally visible to the Task 

Force commander at the locations of Teams Band 

C. Combat engineers are providing technical ad ­

vice to infantry soldiers during the construction of 

individual fighting positions and the preparation of 

proper camouflage. Protective obstacles are being 

emplaced in front of each team's position to delay 

and disrupt approaching OPFOR vehicles. Decoy 

sites are being constructed. The combined arms 

concept is working! 

The commander of TF 1-7 is convinced that 

engineers have provided his forces with the 

capability to successfully conduct the active 

defense when the attack begins. 

Unfort unately, the Engineer for Task Force 

1-3 is equally convinced that disaster is irnmiment. Although he had the initiative to 

allocate his engineers to the various teams within 

TF 1-3, they had not been integrated into the combined arms team. 

Obstacles were not tied in with antitank weapons 

systems. Indirect fires on obstacles were not 

preplanned. Routes between positions were often 

not improved and did not offer natural cover or 

concealment. Equipment was dug in, but since 

there were no established priorities, some elements 

were completely overlooked. Information on the 

location of subsequent Battle Positions was received only indirectly. 

At 0700 hours the following day , OPFOR artillery began their artillery preparation 

(Podgotovka). Smoke and steel filled the air as 

both Task Forces scrambled into protective 

shelters. 

TF 1-7 was under heavy bombardment when a 

BMPs came into range of it's antitank weapons. ., 

Slowed and canalized by point rninefields, reinforced natural obstacles, well-placed road craters, and 

other prepared obstacles, TOW gunners began to 

score hits at 3,000 meters. 

At 2,000 meters, advancing OPFOR tanks were 

brought under fire by well-concealed M-60 tanks. 

Artillery fire kept the advancing armor formations 

buttoned as friendly tank, TOW, and Dragon gunners continued to destroy enemy tanks. 

By moving between hull down positions and tak ­

ing advantage of the covered and concealed routes 

between alternate firing positions, TF 1-7's losses 

were comparatively low. Survivability preparations 

had been put to a severe test and had passed with 

honors. 

In contrast, TF 1-3's active defense did not fare 

nearly as well. OPFOR armor maintained a high 

rate of advance across TF 1-3's front. Since 

obstacles had not been sited to take advantage of 

ATGM weapons, few enemy tanks were destroyed. 

Thin-skinned friendly vehicles such as APCs 

received exceptionally high losses from OPFOR artillery. TOW weapons were either destroyed or suppressed because they had little or no protection. Inadequate camouflage resulted in OPFOR sagger 

gunners rapidly locating and engaging exposed 

M-60 tanks at maximum range. Vehicles moving 

between alternate firing positions were silhouetted 

against ridge lines or slowed by unimproved trails, 

thus contributing to an already high rate of loss. 

The result was not surprising. Task Force 1-3 

suffered more than 50 percent casualties in the first 

eight minutes of battle and was declared combat 

ineffective. 

In retrospect, it should be obvious that the commander of TF 1-3 failed to properly utilize his 

engineer resources. By not assigning priorities of 

engineer effort, his Engineer was forced to operate 

in a vacuum. As a result, the engineer potential as 

a combat multiplier was neutralized . 

The lesson is clear. Integration of the Engineer 

system into the combined arms team must take 

place during peacetime. Th ere will be no margin 

for error when the battle begins.

... 

Captain Dale Robertson is currently assigned as an In­

stru ctor with the Tactics and Operations Division.
 

Department of Combined Arms, US Army Engineer
 

School. Fort Belvoir, VA. Prior to his current assign­

ment. he was Commander ojCompany A. 82nd Engineer
 

Battalion. USAREUR.
 .. 

t, 

j 

14 WINTER 1979-80 
\Nin't:er 

" 

AEFCIRGER'7,9 = 

'T

_ 

by COLJerome .B. Hil~es

- " lie "most startling .lesson derived from FTX 

Certain Sentinel /REFORGER 79, in this 

. ... engineer'sopinion; occurred before the exercise started. It is simply this: war in Europe during, 

the . Whiter iIl be far more difficult than at any 

other time of the year. 

lnthe icy grip of a severe winter, it is a theater 

'that favors 'the -attacker. Ice in ports and .on .roads 

aggravates the already complicated mission OF 

receiving reinforcements, equipping them, and 

moving. them . into combat: EquipmentJiecomes 

halk~ batteries-die, ships cannot dock, rnechanized vehicles slide off roads, and bitter cold add to 

"t he fog of war .." Laying' o(m ineft elds 'b ecomes 

cumbersome inrneter-deep snow and their-effec­

•tiveness becomes doubtful unless special rrieasures 

ate taken. Ground fog is more prevalent than normal and-takes longer'to dissipate. 

FTX 'Cetain Serrtinelwas an impressive preview 

, of. how the first fe\y days of	 ~ar in the dead of 

~intet; might go ...In spite the' confusion,bitter 

cold,' and treacherous roads, the combined arms 

te'am waged successful .r

ENGINEER 15 
'

. 

Mechanized emplacementof antitank mines during advers'e weather requires prior planning 

The important lessons derived from Certain Sentinel also chart us a course of actions to improve 

engineer support in the future . These lesson's 

underscore and reinforce the lesso ns le-arned during REFORGERS 77 and 78. 

LESSON 1 

The battlefield will be lethal and thethreatfrom 

enemy air.and artillery is sizable. We need to provide ourengineers armored cover so that they 

can survive artillery and small arms fire. 

, LESSON 2 

The lack 0]" mobility is painfully obvious to 

anyone who has observed Corps engineers trying to 

keep up with the mechanized combined arms 

teams,' or seen a brace of dozers scuttling from a 

work site toward their low-bed s .as enemy armor 

comes into.sight. Mechani:z;iqg ourCorps engineer 

battalions and adding the Universal Engineer 

Tractor (UET)to the inventory will provide badlyneeded surv ivability and mobility capabilities. 

LESSON 3 

Com munications equipment for command and 

controlof our typically wictespread engineer forces 

are woefully inadequate. We need systems that can 

cover distances of 60 to 80 kilometers, and which 

have t he capability of monitoring three netsfrom a 

company commander's jeep. The alternative is a 

reorganization of engineers within a division Area 

o£Operations (AO). Suc f an alt ern ative would be 

very costly. 

LESSON 5 

We need winter camouflage items. 

coveralls, winter camouflage nets, and white 

panels, coverings, or. winter camouflage patterns 

for equipment -are necessary. If a c0!UP~ny can be 

seen, it will be hit; if it is hit, it will be decimated. 

Our cam ouflaged equipment is painfully outstanding in winter woods and snowy settings. 

LESSON 6 

We need a different engin;er organization to be 

effective , in"the combined ar ms tea m. We 

need ari engineer major to cont rol eng ineer forces 

(typically two companies) supporting a maneuver 

brigade. Four different configurat ions were tried 

during Certain Sentinel in 'order to ascertain ' the 

b~st organization for the br jgade engineer. It 

became obvious th at .the company com mander can-, 

not handle two companies of engineers and still be 

at the Brigade TOG when need(:d. An engineer rna; 

jor in the Brigade-;fOG proved to be the best solution.He shoilldbe the Brigade ..Engineer, commanding a beefe d-up'engineer; company, with a captain 

as executive officer. 

There were 7,000 engineers whopatticipated in 

REFORGER 79---: 11 percent of 't he combined 

arms forces-e and, they weren't enough - About 

2,000 eng ineers were committed to construction 

support, maneuver damage, andcontrol ofthe exercise. There was a void of engineers from the 

Brigade r ear bou ndary to the Corps rear boundary. 

Within .a division AO, there were normally 2,000 

e'ngi~ rs, or two battalion;s worth. 

There 'appea rs to be considerable merit to 

recognizing this requirement with an organizatiorral solution. After three tours with combat 

engineers in V Corps and VflvCorps, I' m convinced 

16 WINTER 1979·80
 
that an engineer regiment in the division, 'with a 

mini-battalion supporting each brigade, is needed. 

It would merely recognize the configuration we 

practice every FTX. I'm also convinced that the 

current officer shortage and space crunch will 

never permit that size force in the division. 

A compromise is clearly in order. The three companies that provide direct support to the three 

maneuver brigades of the division should be increased by two line platoons and be commanded by 

a major (brigade engineer). He should have a captain as executive officer to execute the brigade 

engineer's operations plan. 

Other companies in the battalion, except the 

bridge company, could remain essentially unchanged. The bridge company should be replaced 

with a line company to give the division engineer 

some flexibility in supporting a fourth brigade or 

task force, as well as a cavalry squadron and/ or the 

division rear. 

LESSON 7 

Logistics is still a problem. In Certain Sentinel, 

the barrier haul logistics were practices as well as I 

have ever seen. Nevertheless, the logistics requirements for minefields remains considerable. 

We need a small lethal antitank mine (such as in 

FASCAM) but conventionally fused. This would 

give us a four to one advantage over our bulky 

MISs. A conventional follow-on antitank mine will 

go a long way toward relieving our barrier logistical 

problems. 

We also need the Ground Emplaced Minefield 

Scattering System (GEMSS) and the M180 rapid 

cratering system to speed obstacle emplacement in 

a short-fused, come-as-you -are war. 

During Certain Sentinel, I witnessed the 

smoothest division-size river crossing operation imaginable. The 1st Armored Division put an Assistant Division Commander in charge of the operation and a Corps engineer battalion headquarters 

was provided to do the work . The division placed 

various staff personnel in the battalion headquarters and from a single room in a Gasthaus, the 

entire operation was conducted with the precision 

of a Swiss watch. More than 3 ,200 vehicles crossed 

without incident andwithlittle congestion. In-fact, 

there were no major problems. 

The Medium Girder Bridge was used several 

times, occasionally with a Chinook as the prime 

mover. It proved to be a very flexible and efficie nt 

new system. 

Although Europe in winter's icy clutch favors the 

attacker, there are two factors which fa vor the 

defender. First, the rivers freeze over just enough 

to impede assault crossings, but not nearly enough 

to form the base for an ice bridge. This enhances 

the obstacle value of defense along a river line . 

Second, the severe cold doesn't last long, typically two to four weeks. Sudden thaws saturate 

previously frozen ground, making cross-country 

movement slow, and even impossible in some 

cases. 'W hen rivers swell, floating chunks of ice endanger bridging operations, a new factor which 

must be considered. The defender can integrate 

these factors into his plan and partially offset some 

of the disadvantages cited at the beginning of this 

article. 

SUMMAlty 

The 7,000 combat engineers who supported th e 

maneuver forces during Certain Sentinel acquitted 

themselves well. With typical engineer hustle, they 

worked day and night to help maneuver commanders structure the battlefield. They did it with 

dated equipment. With the exception of our bridging equipment , the tools with which our combat 

engineers worked belong to another era. We must 

modernize these tools if we want ou r combat 

engineers to keep pace with other members of the 

combined arms team. 

Colonel Jerom e B, Hilmes is the Commander of th e Zth 

Engineer Brigade and is the VII Corps Engineer. The Zth 

Engineer Brigade provided engineer forces fo r both 

BLUE and ORANGE f orces during REFORGER 79. 

and was responsiblefor man euver damage. emergency 

repair. and construction; 

ENGINEER 

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ENGINEER 17 
,
 

Tactical Employment 

of 
The purpose of this article is to rationalize the use of 

atomic demolition munitions (ADM) as an antipersonnel weapon without detracting from its current 

use as an engineer demolition. Points developed here are 

not intended to answer all questions involved in this concept, but are intended to stimulate thought and controversy. In response to specific questions posed during 

military appropriations hearings before Congress for 

Fiscal Year (FY) 1975, then Secretary of Defense James 

Schlesinger stated that theater tactical nuclear weapons 

will be employed: 

". . . in response to an overwhelming Warsaw Pact 

conventional attack where the consequences of conventional defeat are deemed more serious than nuclear 

escalation. Theater nuclearforces would be employed in 

conjunction with conventional forces within clearly 

perceivable limits to halt the aggression through a 

dramatic reversal of the tactical situation. " 

These " clearly perceivable limits" are preplanned 

nuclear weapons packages consisting of specific weapons 

and yields for use in well-defined locations within exact 

time limits. ADM logically may be included in these 

packages. 

The purpose of this package will be to neutralize large 

enemy formations in order to produce the "dramatic 

reversal of the tactical situation." I suggest that current 

nuclear weapons employment doctrine include the use of 

ADM as a weapon . The use of ADM against personnel 

would not be any more escaltory than would the use of 

nuclear artillery or nuclear air strikes. The use of ADM 

against personnel should not be considered revolutionary 

but as another option for an already operational tool in 

our efforts to win the "first battle." 

ADM are planned for employment against materialtype targets to destroy massive structures (that is, 

bridges, dams, road networks) and thereby reduce the 

enemy's maneuver ability by creating obstacles., The use 

of ADM closely parallels that of conventional explosives. 

The use of ADM, however, is exemplified by savings in 

time, manpower and logistical support and offers an increased demolition capability along with certain "bonus" 

effects that can enhance obstacle effectiveness and are 

potentially hazardous to troops. 

These bonus effects include thermal radiation, which 

can significantly increase damage to targets by burning; 

initial and residual nuclear radiation, which can incapacitate troops and contaminate large areas of the battlefield; and tree blowdown, which can make by-passing 

any obstacle more difficult. 

Each ADM in this hypothetical family has an 

"on-call" remote-firing capability that greatly increases 

the weapon's battlefield potential. This remote capability 

consists of either a wire-firing or radio-firing option for 

detonation upon command. This system is both 

lightweight and man-portable and can be emplaced 

either at ground level or below the surface, and its effects 

can be varied and controlled by selected burial depths. 

Any attack from Eastern Europe into the West 

would bring with it numbers of men and equipment superior to the defending NATO forces. Extirnates on present NATO versus Warsaw Pact force 

strengths are numerous and much debated. There are so 

many variables to consider that detailed analysis is not a 

simple task . 

Some widely accepted figures are available for 

analysis, however. It presently is estimated by the 

Defense Department in its annual report to Congress 

(FY 1978) that Warsaw Pact forces would outnumber 

their NATO counterparts in medium tanks by about 4 to 

1, in armored personnel carriers (APCs) by about 3 to 2 

and in artillery by over 3 to 1. 

Current production schedules of the United States and 

the Soviet Union are not narrowing this equipment gap. 

In fact, in FY 1977, the Soviet Union outproduced the 

United States in medium tanks by 6 to I, in APCs by 3 to 

I , and in artillery pieces by 8 to 1. In major ground force 

weapons systems, the United States has a substantial 

lead over the Soviet Union only in helicopters (3 to 2) and 

in tactical nuclear warheads (2 to 1). 

Recently published NATO estimates suggest that, in 

local penetrations on a European battlefield, the Soviets 

may engage NATO defenders with as many as 600 tanks 

across a S-kilometer front . That is roughly one enemy 

tank every 2S feet over a front of approximately 3 miles. 

Though the Soviets would not attack in an exact linear 

formation, the depth of the first echelon attacking force 

could be as little as 200 to 300 meters. This force would 

be followed by mechanized infantry and other tank formations to exploit the penetration and mop up by-passed 

NATO forces. 

Such attacks undoubtedly would be made over highspeed avenues of approach simply because the terrain 

must be favorable to such a formidable force in order for 

it to maneuver. In southern West Germany where US 

forces are currently assigned, major avenues of approach 

for massive combined arms formations are limited and 

ENGINEER 19 
easily recogn izable. These high -speed avenu es of ap­ Tactical air and a rtillery ass ets are high -priority 

proach are candidates for ADM employment to impede target s and extreme ly vulne ra ble on the modern 

enemy movement by crea ting large craters or other battlefield . Artiller y system s a re susceptible to 

massive obs tacles whi ch would mak e these approaches hostile weapons locator system s that ca n detect inco ming 

imp assable to a highl y mech ani zed for ce. These rounds au tom atically and direct immedi ate counterfire 

obstacles would slow th e enemy' s momentum an d delay ag ainst th ose positions. This, coupl ed with the fact that 

his formations in large killing zones th at would be NATO is outnumbe red in a rti llery pieces by over 3 to 1, 

susceptible to either air or artillery-delivered nuclear or makes it imperati ve that a rtillery be used cautiously and 

conventional counterattack . selectively, especially the nu clea r-cap able wea pons. 

Pre sently, a number of nucl ear systems exist which Highly flexible nuclear art illery mu st be spared for ac tual 

hav e as their primary mission th e de structi on of ene my enemy pen etration threats or for local counteratt acks 

forma tions. All th ese system s, however , inclu din g guided and counterbattery fire. 

and un guided rockets, tube-l aunched artillery rounds Tactical air-de livered system s a re also highl y 

and air- de livered syste ms, have a delivery error which vulnerable. One need only study the devastating effect 

could detract from thei r overa ll effectiveness. Delivery that the Soviet-supplied Egyptian air defense syste m had 

error results in larger wa rheads being used to ass ure th e on th e Israeli Air Forc e in the 1973 October War. The 

de sired coverage of a tar get element. Lar ger yields in­ United States can no longer count on unchallen ged air 

cr ease sa fety distances required for civilians a nd friendly supe rio rity over th e battlefield. There will surely be a 

forc es an d may result in un desirabl e colla teral damage fight for con trol of th e skies, and this fight will have a 

over mu ch larger ar eas . high priority in the ea rly allocation of available aircraft. 

These syste ms are excellent for ta rgets of op port unity Aircraft simply will not be availabl e for all close air supwhich may appea r on th e battl efield un expectedly. Bu t, port mission s th at tactic al commanders may desire, and 

for high-speed ave nues of appro ach, it is possible to those th at are avail abl e will fa ce a leth al air defense 

pr epl an targets and "seed" an a rea with muni tions in an­ envelope over the battl efield. 

ticipa tion of an en emy attack with out delivery error and Conceivably, ADM can take up some ofthis b attl efield 

with out allocating valu abl e air an d a rt illery assets. " slack" where it is known that large mech anized formaADM EFFECTS ON SPECIFIC TARGET ELEMENrS 

(Hypothetical ADM Family) 

YIEL D IN KILOTON S 

TARGET ELEMENT DAMAGEIINJURY 0.2 1.0 2.0 5.0 

Highway Trus s Bridge	 Moderate 80m 230m 340m 530m 

Severe 40m 200m 140m 210m 

Tracked Vehi c les - Ape s Moderate 70m 180m 260m 400m 

Severe 40m 110m 150m 210m 

Tracked Veh icles-Tanks	 Moderate 50m 130m 180m 260m 

Wheeled Military Vehicles	 Moderate 70m 180m 260m 400m 

Casualti es/Exposed Person nel	 IP 230m 410m 560m 710m 

IT 310 520m 700m 890m 

LL 460m 710m 850m 1190m 

Cas ualties/Perso nnel in APCs	 IP 210m 390m 520m 670m 

IT 290m 490m 660m 830m 

LL 430m 680m 900m 1120m 

Casualt ies/Pe rsonnel in Tanks	 IP 160m 320m 440m 560m 

IT 240m 420m 560m 710m 

LL 370m 590m 790m 980m 

NOTES:	 Moderate Damage'--major repair s needed to return item to service 

Severe Damag e- total reco nstruction necessary before item can Der epaired and ut il ized . 

IP-immediate permanent incapacitation; personnel will beco me incapacitated w ithin fiv e min utes; death will occ ur 

in one to tw o days. I IT- immediate transient incapacitation; personn el become incapacitated within five minutes and remai n so 30 to 45 

minutes; per sonnel wi ll part ially recov er, but death wi ll occur within fo ur to six days. 

LL-personnel become functionally im paired within two hours, but may respond to medical assist ance before 

death in several weeks. \ 

20 WINTER 1979-80 
tiODS must advance , such as mountain passes and defiles 

and across major bridges and autobahns. 

As an example , consider an enemy attack across a 

3-kilometer front down a high-speed avenue of approach 

with mechanized infantry and armored forces. If an 

ADM were em placed on the surface and a remote firing 

option were used, a commander could have the munition 

detonated as the enemy approached. 

A single 2-kiJoton (KT) weapon would damage ene my 

tanks 180 meters in all directions and APCs out to 260 

meters. This could neutralize 12 percent of the attacking 

armor and 17 percent of the APCs in a single blast. Personnel in th ose tanks would be susceptible to initial 

nuclear radiation and would becom e immediate 

casualties out to 560 meters (37 percent of all tanks 

crews). Personn el in APCs would bec ome immediate 

casualties out to 660 meters or 44 percent of all moun ted 

mechanized infantry . These crews would become 

casualties from an initial radiation dose within minutes 

of th e detonati on and eventually succumb to this exposure. 

Delayed casualties resulting from this nuclear blast 

cou ld reach approximately 70 percent of th e entire force . 

Again, th ese casualties would result from a massive dose 

of initi al nuclear radiation, would bec ome incapacita ted 

within hours and eventually would die. Ch aos and confusion would be added as bonus effects for the defenders 

and would likely pr esent good targets to modern antitank 

systems. 

Besides the se effects to men and equ ipm ent, a crater 

approximatel y 30 meters in diameter and 13 meters deep 

would be formed at the point of det onation, and dry fuels 

would be ignited over a total area of 10.2 square 

kilometers. Troops in the open would receive seconddegree skin burns up to 530 meters fro m ground zero . 

Fallout, induced ground rad iat ion and fires could 

enhance the effectiveness of the obstacle. 

Even greater effects could be obt ained if the system 

were emplaced and detonated above the ground such as 

in an abandoned building. Not only would blast and 

therm al damage be enhanced, but residual radiation 

would be reduced, allowin g friendly troops to operate in 

th e affected areas sooner. 

There are other points to consider. If an ADM is to 

be detonated when an enemy axis of attack is in the 

best position for destruction , the executing comma nder mu st know exactly when to give the order to fire . 

This means that he will have to "sense" the enemy either 

by means of a forward observer, the ADM assembly team 

itself or by some electronic surveillance equipment. If 

personn el are to be used as th e eyes of the commander in 

observing the enemy, a minimum safe distance mu st be 

observed for each yield so th at no danger from the 

detonation occurs. This distance can vary from 610 

meters for a .2-KT weapon detonation on the surface to 

2,320 meters for a S-KT weapon with the observer in a 

protected position. 

Since maximum destructive force would be delivered 

to the enemy when the weap on was as near the center of 

ENGINEER 

the enemy force as possible , it may be best to have the 

enemy reconnaissance and advance guard elements pass 

by the weapon in order to cause maximum damage to the 

main body. It also may be desir ed to use conventional 

obstacles such as min es and ditches to slow the main 

enemy force or to bring the main body under antitank 

guided missile fire to stop it or reduce speed as it a~

proached the best positi on for destruction. After the 

detonation, reconnaissance and advance guard elements, 

now cut offfrom the destroyed main body, can be attacked and eliminated. 

Such a weapon would have to be well-camouflaged 

and possibly moved off of the center of advance to 

lessen the possibility of detection. If the weapon is 

placed wen before the a rr ival of the enemy, camouflage 

should be no problem. Our hyp othetical2-KT ADM is 5 

feet long and only 21

/ 2 feet in diameter with an approximate weight of 500 pounds. Other systems in this famil y 

can be as small as 3 feet long and onl y 15 inch es in 

diameter with a weigh t of only 100 pounds. Camouflaging an object this size should not be a maj or undertakmg. 

Where terrain demands, the system can be buried 

and , as the depth of burial is increased, the radius of 

damage decreas es. As a rul e of thumb, the radiu s of 

damage is reduced by 10 meters for every meter that the 

system is buried down to a depth of approximately 10 

meters. If the syste m is to be buried and used as an 

antipersonn el-type weapon, a depth of burial in excess of 

10 meters would not be practical. 

Since the damage radii can be controlled by th e depth 

of burial, th e commander is given an even gre ater flexibility in his planning . With only a limited number of 

yields available, significant modifications in damage 

radii can still be achieved by varying the depths of burial. 

This modifyin g ability can be used to reduce .collateral 

damage a nd also reduce safety distances for friendly 

troops oper ating in the area. Preplan ned targets with 

predetermined yeilds using ADMs and a minimum of 

tr ained personnel can increase the commander' s battlefield flexibility greatly. 

With our own small numbers of deployed forces, every 

concept th at could economize force s and maximize 

firepower effectiveness at the front must be con sidered . 

The ADM is a reliable and available system that cou ld be 

used now as a weap on without modification to th e system 

itself. Only a change in doctrine, thinking and tr aining 

would be needed to make the AD M a mor e potent tool 

and take full advantage of its total capability by enlarging its battlefield role from simply demolition to weapon. 

III 

Captain Ioh n F. Ryhicki was th e senio r instr uctor ofth e A to m ic 

D emolit on Mun ition s Bran ch . Dep art ment or Military 

Engine ering, Directorate of Trainin g. U.S, Army E ngineer 

Sc hoo l. Fort Belvoir. VA. prior to his most recent tou r as 

Branch Advisor. R eadiness Group Fort Kn ox . H I' has also ser ved in Germ uny as ADM platoon leader. 9th Engin eer Batralion, 

an d us Chie f, VII Corps T echnical E valu ation In sp ection Team 

(A DM) . 

21 
Dozer operators sharpen their skills at antitank ditching during ARTEP 

the 

COMBAT HEAVY
 

battalion 

In 

FORWARD
 

support 

by MAJ Francis R. Skidmore and MAJ John R. Mullans 

The 94th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) in the 

three years following conversion has found the 

concept of forward combat support to be a viable 

one, although not the only one for a heavy battalion. 

Combat heavy engineers can contribute effectively in 

their traditional rear area construction role and also in 

combat support of forward maneuver forces . But the 

combat heavy battalion has unique strengths and 

weaknesses, which must be carefully considered before it 

is deployed forward. 

To understand the role of the combat heavy battalion, 

it is necessary to understand the corps engineer force 

structure in Europe. The active engineer force structure 

today is based on three engineer battalion organizations: 

the divisional battalion, the corps combat battalion, and 

the combat heavy battalion, supported by other 

specialized engineer units. 

22 WINTER 1979-80 
Winning the first battle of the next war in Europe requires that every component of the combined arms 

team be employed to maximize the combat power of 

our maneuver forces. In recognition of this, construction battalions in Europe converted to combat heavy in 

1975 and 1976. At that time, questions arose as to the 

effectiveness of such units in forward support. 

Current Army doctrine dictates that most combat 

enginer assets immediately available to the corps commander be committed wel1 forward in the brigade areas 

(Fig. 1). Divisional engineer battalions have the mobility 

to remain with the maneuver forces and the protection t o 

survive in a high-intensity environment. Their missions 

center on emplacement and removal of obstacles and 

providing protection to the division's fighting forces. 

Corps combat battalions increase the corps' combat 

effectiveness by providing engineer combat support and 

general engineer work and by reinforcing divisional 

engineer units. To achieve the mobility to match their 

missions, the corps combat engineer battalions in 

Europe wil1 someday adopt the armored personnel carrier as the squad vehicle, replacing the current 5-ton 

dump truck. This change will allow corps engineers to 

operate more effectively with forward maneuver forces 

but will, of course, reduce their capability for general 

engineer support work . 

This engineer force structure is a compromise between 

the numerous general engineer support requirements 

and the fiscal and manpower constraints placed on the 

engineer slice of the total force structure . There are many 

more potential engineer requirements than forces to accomplish them. With lighter, more mobile combat 

engineers positioned forward, the engineer combat battalion (heavy) provides an engineer capability for the remaining engineer requirements in both forward and rear 

areas. 

The Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) is organzed and equipped by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE 5-115 , modified by MTOE) 

to perform three basic types of missions: 

1. Construction of roads, airfields, pipelines, etc; 

2. Combat support and general engineer work ; 

3. Infantry operations; 

The battalion is structured with a headquarters company, an equipment support company, and three line 

companies. Line companies have the bulk of the line 

ENGINEER 

strength with two general construction platoons and one 

heavy equipment platoon each. The support company 

adds another equipment platoon and a direct support 

maintenance platoon . Total equipment and construction 

personnel capabilities are listed in Tables 1 and 2. 

Construction is the traditional mission of the construction battalion, the predecessor of the current combat 

heavy battalion. The construction mission is still appropriate in forward areas and is now properly termed 

combat construction. The range and lethality of modern 

artillery and air delivered weapons enables the enemy to 

destroy vital main supply routes. forward supply systems 

and distribution centers over an extremely large area. 

The density and location of towns and urban areas on all 

major routes present choke points easily blocked with 

debris and rubble created by long range weapons. 

Enemy air and artillery emplaced mine systems represent other potential obstacles which may disrupt the 

logistical supply system. Forward deployment of a combat heavy battalion to overcome such obstacles is an excel1ent utilization of its assets and perhaps the essential 

salvation for a combat engineer force that has sacrificed 

some general engineer capability for mobility. 

In combat, the six construction platoons become basic 

combat engineer platoons, with pioneer tools and dump 

trucks for equipment. The battalion's heavy earthmoving 

equipment from its four equipment platoons provides the 

greatest advantage to the maneuver force s. In particular, 

the active defense offers an excellent opportunity for 

employment of the equipment. 

Working behind a covering force preparing the main 

battle area, the equipment emplaces tank ditches to 

channelize the attacking enemy armor and to render it 

more vulnerable to infantry, armor, artillery and airdelivered anti-armor systems. Of equal importance is the 

protection provided defensive forces by the construction 

of strong points and defilade fighting positions. 

In the offense, however, this equipment is extremely 

limited. Neither the l G-ton tractorl2S-ton trailer combination nor the 290M rubber tire tractor/scraper have 

the mobility to keep up with advancing or penetrating armored forces. 

23 
TABLE 1
 

MAJOR EQUIPMENT ASSETS
 

ENGIN EER COMBAT BATTALION
 

(HEAVY) 

07 Dozers 13 

Front End Loaders 9 

290 Tractor w/18 Cy Scraper 9 

290 Tractors wlo Scrapers 6 

Graders 9 

25 Ton Cranes 5 

Backhoes 3 

10 Ton Tractor/25 Ton Trailer 21 

5 Ton Dump Truck 32 

20 Ton Dump Trucks 8 

Rollers, All Types 6 

Water Purification Units 2 

An additional strength of the combat heavy battalion is its equipment maintenance capability, 

which allows the battalion to depl oy an independent, self-contained force . Direct support mechanics can 

operat e forward as contact teams, while shop facilities 

provide back-up support from field locations. This greatly increases the operational value of th e heavy equipment. 

In addition to limited mobility, the 94th Engineer Battalion has found that inad equate communications equipment is a major constraint to proper comma nd and control in combat engineer operations. Thus, specific mission assignments in th e forward battle ar ea provide a better utili zation of battalion assets than direct support or 

attachment of combat forces , which depend on mobility 

and good communications. 

Execution of the infan try mission must be considered 

an extreme choice tak en only under drastic emer gency 

conditions. It provides the maneuver commander with a 

light infantry force weak in communications and crew 

served weapons. It also deprives him of the engineer support he needs to enha nce the comb at power of his 

maneu ver forces. 

The tra ining program for combat heavy battalions in 

Europe ret1ects the trade-oft's between a real peacetime 

con struction mission and the wartime readiness requirement. It is possible, however, to achi eve a high state of 

training readiness for forward depl oyment under these 

conditions. 

Training in 18th En gineer Brigad e hea vy battalions is 

scheduled to allocate 7S perc ent of traini ng time to construction projects and 2S percent of the time to comb at 

an d combat support tr aining (Figure 2). Constru ction 

projects ten d to be plat oon-sized in scope and provide excellent opportunities for development of vertical and 

horizontal constru ction skills. Thus, a pr oper selecti on of 

projects insures that soldiers are well prepared for tr aditional rear area missions in the event of war. 

TABLE 2
 

CONSTRUCTION MANPOWE R ASSETS
 

ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
 

(HEAVY)
 

Construction Helper 6 

Carpenter 72 

Construction Foreman 35 

Heating & Ventilation Specialist 6 

Plumber 18 

Water Supply Specialist 6 

Electrician 36 

Engineer Equipment Mechanic 39 

Asphal] Specialist 2 

Dozer Operator 13 

Crane Operator 9 

General Machine Operator 34 

Grader Operator 15 

Wheeled Tractor Operator 15 

Front Loader Operator 11 

Construction Machine Supervisor 16 

Truck Driver 84 

ConstructionSurveyor 6 

Construction Draftsman 6 

Combat Engineer 1 

TOTAL 430 

I 

V' 

Training for forward depl oyment , which is oriented 

on combat engineer or combat ta sks, is more of a 

challenge for a constructi on-oriented battalion, bu t 

it can be accomplished. The approach of the 94th 

Engineer Ba ttalion in this regard is typical of other combat heavy battalions in th e 18th Brigade. First and 

forem ost , the construction pr ogr am itself has proved to 

have appli cability to forward a rea missi ons . Th e 

challenge of managing actu al constru ction project s provides excellent leadership training for officers and NCOs. 

Managing men , materials, and transportation against 

time deadlines, or researching engineering manuals to 

solve pr oblems, are processes common to all engineering 

situations . 

In addition , equipment platoons, which comprise 40 

percent of the battalion's line platoon strength , receive 

excellent training in actual construction projects as 

operators become skilled on their equipment. Equipment "stick time" is the single most imp ortant element 

for insuring a professional response to tank dit ch, hull 

defilade, or maneuver support missions in the forward 

area. 

It is recognized, however, that additional training is 

required to supplement tr aining derived from the construc tion program. Consequently, 2S percen t of all training is combat engineer oriented and conducted to 

minimize forward depl oyment limitations of th e heav y 

engineer battalion. Particularl y useful are training exercises which stress forward deployment. For exa mple. two 

24 WI NT ER 1979-80 
FEBA rEBA 

Q9 

I I I 

X 

~DIV ~DIV ~DIV r

X X X X X X I 

I ( I I ICORPS II I

I IICORPS II I 

I I ICORPS 

X X X 

II II 

~OIV(-) II I I I CORPS C-)

X 

X 

X It 

I~I i 1:1CORPS 

II 

XX II I I ICST (HV)

I

Ir;~~1 X 

X Iii-Ix I 

r XXX 

of the brigade's combat heavy battalions (the 94th and 

79th) participated in recent REFORGER combined 

arms exercises and learned important lessons on how to 

work and communicate with the combat units. Going 

further back, in 1976 and 1977, the 94th conducted extensive testing on tank ditching techniques which contributed to doctrine on dimensions and construction 

methods. With continued emphasis on these missions 

during company ARTEPs, equipment platoons maintain 

a high state of readiness for forward deployment. 

No-notice readiness tests, company ARTEPs, and 

basic weapons qualification constitute the remaining 25 

percent of scheduled combat engineer training. Scheduled properly, this training assures that a1l units in 

engineer combat heavy battalions are reasonably proficient in their forward area combat support missions. 

Skill Qualification Testing is adding a new dimension 

to the training program. As Soldiers Manuals and 

various test comp onents for engineer and support MOSs 

are incorporated into the program, additional training 

time and management effort will be allocated for the 

testing procedures. 

In summary, the combat heavy engineer battalion 

should not be a substitute for an additional corp s combat 

ENGINEER 

THE CORPS 

ENGINEER 

FORCE 

STRUCTURE 

FIGURE 1 

battalion in the forward area. Its mobility, weapons, and 

communicat ions are not adequate in a mechanized environment. With current peace-time constraints, the 

combat heavy battalion operates infrequently with combin ed arms uni ts. 

Properly utilized on a mission or area basis, however , 

it can significantly multiply forward combat power of 

maneuver forc es in a defen sive situation which requires 

combat construction, tank ditching , strong point construction, and defilade protection for both tactical and 

support vehicles and facilities. In Europe today, the 

engineer comb at heavy battalion has proved itself effective in combat support as well as combat construction, 

and will be ready for forward deployment during a conflict. 

Maj or Francis R. Skidmore is currently serving as a R esearch 

Associate/or th e Lawrence Liverm ore Laboratory in Livermore. 

CA . He was assigned as th e S-3 of the 94th Engin eer Battalion 

(C) (Hlfrom lll~l' 1976 through Augu st 1977 and as 94th Bat ­

talion Exec utive Officer /rom Augu st 1977 through July 1979. 

Maj or John R . Mullans is currently serving as th e Execu tive Officer ojthe 94th Engineer Battalion. He served as th e S-3 o] th e 

94th/rom Augus t 1977 to July 1979. 

25 
Guidelines
 

for
 

New Lieutenants
 

by CP"T James B. Norwood 

W\NTER ,979-80
 
Leadership is an individual thing. No one ever 

became a leader by memorizing endless 

" laundry lists" of leadership techniques and 

applying them scientifically to his relations with his 

subordinates. Rather, the successful leader uses 

those time-honored leadership principles like the 

artist's paint. A dozen artists may use the same 

paint to portray the same scene, but the brush 

strokes of each one will be different, as will the use 

of color and hue. So it is with leaders: each one 

must develop his own style, applying the principles 

he has learned with his own brush strokes and coloring them with his personal strengths and talents. 

As a new lieutenant, you are faced with the 

challenging task of developing your own leadership 

style in a world peopled with men and women who 

have more experience than you, but who depend on 

you daily for leadership and guidance. Here are 

some notes, taken from my own experience, to help 

you weather the storm until that moment when you 

know what you want your painting to look like. 

One of the first things you will notice that you 

lack is experience. In the Army, e~erience is 

everything. Quite often, the man with experience is 

in charge whether anyone intended for him to be or 

not. Soldiers respond to the man who knows how to 

get the job done. No one expects you to arrive with 

experience. They will expect you to gather it quickly. You must learn from everything that you do and 

you must do as much as possible to gain experience. Do not be content to ride along letting 

others do all the work. One of the most dangerous 

things you can do is to pretend that you know what 

you're doing when you really don't. No one resents 

a beginner as much as he does the guy who 

pretends to know it all when he doesn't. 

The first corollary to gaining experience is asking questions. You must ask questions to learn. 

People expect you to ask a lot of questions. It shows 

that you want to learn how to lead them effectively 

and it shows that you are interested in them and in 

their work. Never be afraid to ask questions. More 

about questions later. 

Be a leader, not a laborer. It's easy to get lost in 

the fun of doing manual labor. You have entered 

an interesting profession and there are a lot of 

tasks that can be fulfilling in themselves. Your job, 

though, is to lead and manage. You will have many 

things going on at one time and you must be aware 

of all of them continuously. As soon as you get personally involved in one task, you lose control of all 

the others. Let the soldiers do the work and the 

NCOs supervise and teach: that's their job. You 

make sure that all of them are doing their jobs and 

that your entire communications complex is being 

erected efficiently and according to plan . 

Keep abreast of changes. In garrison or in the 

field things are changing all of the time. There's an 

old saying that "change is normal. " It is! You are 

the link between your soldiers and your commander, your unit operations section, a battalion 

systems control center (SYSCON), and any other 

outside source of information. When something 

changes, your people depend on you to know and 

to tell them. Know who makes changes that affect 

your platoon or its mission. Maintain contact with 

them and probe frequently to find out what's going 

on . 

In addition to being a link between the commander and the soldier, you are a buffer between 

ENGINEER 27 
them. You buffer informati on pa ssing both up and 

down the chain of comma nd . This does not mean 

that you misrepresent facts or fail to pass on essen ­

ti al information or orders. It does mean that you do 

not rep eat everything you hear verbatim. Think 

abo ut how you can best pr esent infor mation or 

orde rs to convey the appropri ate message. Consider pe rsonalities, pre judices, and levels of experien cc before spea king . You mu st develop an approp riate threshold of response to th e things you 

hear. If you overreact, you will lose credibi lity like 

th e littl e boy who cried " wolf! " If you underreact, 

the n people will believe they are not gett ing th e 

whole sto ry whe n you spea k. 

Find people's strengths and use th em . I regard 

this as one of my most import ant personal techniqu es. It doesn't mean that you don' t train people to 

overcome their weak areas - that is an essential 

part of your job. It does mean tha t when things get 

hot and you need a maximum effort from every 

sold ier, you sho uld kn ow what you can expect from 

every soldie r. At times like th a t it mak es no sense 

to ha ve your best field wireman run power cable 

while a relatively inexperienced man who is a whiz 

with th e 58-86 switchboa rd tries to untangle the 

maze of wires leading to th e brigad e command 

post . That switchboard man will have his momen t 

of glory later when the wires ar e in . Let him run the 

I t is a fund amental law of human nature th at 

peopl e will do what you expect of the m. If you 

expect the m to do well, th ey will a lmost invari abl y fa ll over th em selves trying to meet your expectation s. Ex pect proficien cy. Expec t efficiency. 

Let your peopl e know that you expect these th ings 

and rewa rd the m when th ey pr oduce exempla ry 

results. 

Be concerned! Your level of concern retlects in 

everything you a nd your troo ps do. If you ar c indifferent , th ey will be, too. You ca nnot expect anyone 

to do a goo d job just to sat isfy him self : if you have 

better things to do, so does he. One of my commanders put it very succinctly when he cautioned 

me to sim ply " Give a damn! " 

power line while th e wire whiz gets those vita l circu its hooked up. Every soldier feels good whe n he 

does some thing th at he kn ows he does well. Wh en 

he kn ows he's doing poo rly, he becomes confuse d, 

resentful a nd slow. Goo d trai ning will eliminate 

most of th e problem bu t som e guys will always be 

better at certain tasks. Kn ow who does what well. 

A lwuys fo llow up. Never expec t th at some thi ng 

will be done just because you told someone to do it. 

Check, check a nd recheck! Afte r a whil e you will 

develop a reput ati on among your men for checking 

up and things will get done. Don't bec om e complacent! As soon as your tr oop s realize you have stopped checking , they will sto p doing . 

28 WINTER 1979-80 
Ask questions. I said before that this would 

come up again. It will come up again after this! I 

cannot overemphasize the importance of asking 

questions. Questions unnerve the unprepared. 

When you start questioning the man who is doing a 

job poorly or incorrectly, he will become nervous. 

He doesn't really know if your are ignorant and 

curious or if you know all the correct answers and 

are merely testing him. Quite often he will blurt out 

the information that he is doing the job wrong or 

taking unauthorized short cuts. On the other hand, 

the man who is doing the job well will welcome you r 

questions because they give him a chance to show 

off his knowledge and skill. Once he's told you how 

good he is, he's committed to a program of excellence. 

In the field. the mission is always first. there is a 

lot of debate about whether the mission or the men 

come first, but the argument is fatuous. Troop 

welfare during the first 36 hours of a field problem 

is a matter of prior planning. If you have to become 

concerned with problems like food, clothing 

shelter, latrine preparation or related affairs during those first hours, then you did not plan properly. You must check to insure that the plans and arrangements you made are carried out on time and 

properly; but, if you have to stop the execution of 

the mission to get someone fed or to take care of 

some other morale or welfare related problem, then 

you blew it before you ever left the motor pool. 

During the entire field exercise you must plan for 

your troops' welfare in advance so that you do not 

become involved in crisis management. In performing your mission , crisis management cannot be 

avoided; in troop welfare matters, it usually can be. 

Never criticize a fellow officer. It degrades the 

officer corps as a whole and it makes you look 

stupid because you have no more regard for your 

own profession than to degrade it. 

Be open to advice . One of the things that 

distinguishes man as an intelligent animal is that 

he learns from the mistakes of others. Your peers 

may offer you advice based on their mistakes. 

Learn to recognize and use the good parts of their 

advice, your superiors may have a lot of advice based on their mistakes. r personally have a great deal 

of very sound advice based on a dazzling array of 

my own mistakes. Much of that is in these notes. 

Tru st your company commander. He has a 

vested interest in your success. After all , the better 

you do at your job, the better he looks to his commander. 

You must support your commander. Never 

criticize him or his orders. You do not have to 

agree with him or take credit personally for an 

order that appears to be stupid, but you must never 

express your dissatisfaction openly to the troops. 

Simply make it plain that this is what the platoon 

ENGINEER 

has been directed to do and that you intend to see it 

done well. 

Learn when to sit down and shut up. Any good 

commander will encourage discussion of his directives if you have something meaningful to contribute. Disagreement, if expressed in private, will 

seldom cause anger. Once the commander has 

heard all the facts and has made a decision, 

however , it is time to stop bickering and get on with 

it. Some commanders will permit their policies to 

be challenged in public; others will not. Learn 

which type you've got before opening your mouth. 

Honest mistakes will be forgiven. Everyone expects lieutenants to make mistakes. Never make 

the same mistake twice! The first time is ignorance, 

the second marks you as an incompetent, or as a 

slow learner. Nobody wants either of those! 

Take care of the troops . Make sure they have 

proper food and clothing and they get enough 

sleep . Make sure they get paid on time. These concerns are easy to manage in garrison but they can 

be a real headache in the field. Be aware of their 

problem,. both individually and as a group. 

Soldiers' problems are not always like your problems. Maturity and a college background make a 

big difference in how we deal with problems. 

Sometimes, when you think you are receiving shoddy treatment from an agency or facility, you will 

find that you are actually receiving preferential 

treatment because you are an officer. You should 

see what the troops go through! Part of your job is 

to help your soldiers solve their problems. 

Counsel continuously. You cannot expect a man 

to turn out the quality of work you desire if you 

never tell him how far he is from the mark or how 

close to it. Take every opportunity to tell your people how they are doing. Don't be afraid to tell a 

man he's doing poorly. How can he improve if he 

doesn't know he needs to? This is especially important if you are going to have to prepare an efficiency report on him. 

Be fair. Never pick or play favorites even if 

someone seems to deserve special treatment. The 

platoon leader's "favorite" quickly becomes an 

outcast and is distrusted by his peers. This destroys 

the team spirit necessary to get things done. The 

platoon leader's credibility is destroyed in the eyes 

of those who do not see anything special about his 

" favorite." Never characterize yourself as a " good 

guy" or a " bad guy." Good guys are taken advantage of. Bad guys alienate everyone. Just be fair. 

Be consistent. Never leave anyone in doubt as to 

where you stand. I have never met a soldier who 

didn't prefer having a boss he didn't agree with, 

but whose views and policies he clearly understood, 

to having a boss who is wishy-washy or can't make 

up his mind. Something that's good today should 

29 
be good tomorrow. What was un acceptable yesterday should be un acceptabl e a week from now. 

Treat everyone with respect. Most people deserve 

it. The few who don't sh ould receive it anyway, if 

only because it is your policy to respe ct everyo ne. 

When you be come known as a man who respects 

others, your troops will begin to respect you 

whether they want to or not. We all value th e 

esteem of others and tend to return it in kind. A 

coro llary to this is that you sho uld deliver criticism 

in private and praise in public. Criticism is much 

mo re likely to be constru ctive if there is no one pr esen t to overhear and cause the recipient embarrassment. Praise goes a lot further when you deliver it 

in front of a man's peers. 

If the top NCO doesn' t want to get involved , make 

him. If he just will not get involved , th en ta ke ca re 

of th e problem yourself and coun sel with your unit 

first sergea nt on str aightening him out. You must 

support th e NCO chain of command! If the NCOs 

do not have faith in their own chain of command 

and in your willin gne ss to support it, th en they will 

not con tribute to running the plat oon and you will 

be on your own. In any confr ontation between an 

NCO a nd an enlisted man you must suppo rt the 

NCO. You may have to get with your platoon 

sergeant lat er and have him counsel the NCO for 

being an idiot in his handling of the sold ier, bu t 

never ca use the man the embarrassment of being 

counseled in front of a subordinate. I have seen 

many cases where it was necessar y to int ervene to 

Treat everyone with respect 

Always support your commander 

Learn when to sit down and shut up 

Be open to advice Ask questions 

Take care of the troops Guidelines
 Always set the example 

Be fair and consistent Be concerned 

Don't believe everything you hear
 

Never criticize a fellow officer
 

Always support your NCOs
 

You must always set the example . It migh t be 

more accu rate to say th at you are always setting th e 

example, whether you intend to or not , so set a 

good one . T he choi ce in setting the exa mple is not 

yours. You are their leader and the tro op s tend to 

imitate you . If you t ake sh ort cuts, so will your 

men . If you fail to take a job seriously, so will they. 

If you exp ect specia l treatment or privileges, they 

will, too . You can never expect anyone in your platoon, reg ardl ess of age or experience , to beh ave 

better th an the exampl e you set. Your act ions. not 

your wor ds, set the sta nda rds. 

Always suppo rt you r noncom m issioned of ficers. 

Do not ever criticize or degr ad e one in fro nt of his 

peers or his subo rdinates. Confli cts between peer s 

are inevitable . It is the plat oon sergeant's job to 

straighten these out . If th e problem is brought 

directly to you, grab your plat oon sergeant and get 

him on it. Don 't deal with it directly yourself un less 

your platoon sergeant is un avail able within th e 

time frame in which the pr oblem must be resolved. 

stop an inju stice in progre ss, but it has always been 

possible to do it without embarrassing the NCO or 

correcting him on the spot. 

Utilize available experience. In other words, 

listen to your experie nced sergean ts. Solicit th eir 

advice and opi nions. You mu st mak e the final decision, but you need not make it in igno ran ce. 

Som etimes it pays to listen to your soldie rs, too . 

Oc cas iona lly you will be surprised by what they 

kn ow. 

Here's my f avorite technique again: ask questions.' Questions show th at you care. Ask abo ut 

fami lies, abo ut finances, abo ut the chow in the 

mess hall. Ask about jo b satisfaction and about 

ideas to improve thi ngs. Don 't be nosey about personal detail s, but let your men kn ow that their well 

being matt ers to you. Ask your squ ad and sect ion 

sergeants abo ut their men. They should kn ow a lot 

abo ut each of their people and thei r problem s. 

Wh en you ask them ab out these things, they will be 

pr ompted to find out. 

30 WINTER 1979-80 
Life is full of traps for the unwary. If you have 

given any th ought to the complexity of your 

mission as a tactical Signal platoon lead er , 

you have fig ured out that there must be a hundred 

gremli ns out there waiti ng to trip you up. Here are 

a few of th e more common ones to be pr epared for. 

Don 't let yourself becom e confused. One of th e 

un iqu e (a nd fun l) as pects of th e Sign al Corps is 

th at it is not unc ommon for 25 or 30 things to be 

going on at once. This is especially true when a 

Signa l center is setti ng up to go into operation. 

Your job is to bring everyt hing togeth er at once, 

but you can't do it if you' re confu sed. Fortu nately, 

it's simple to avoid confus ion. Plan carefu lly, 

organi ze in ad vanc e and as k questions! 

Neve r fear appearing to be stup id because yo u 

ask questions . If you are ignorant, the troops will 

find out whether you ask qu estions or not. You 

look a lot smarter when you are trying to find out 

what is going on th an you do when you foul the job 

up because you didn't kn ow something. There are , 

however, a couple of cautions involving questions. 

Unless the person you are asking is known to be ab ­

solutely trustworthy, always check out his answer 

before act ing on it. This is especially true when the 

answer indicates that a third party is not doing his 

job pr operly. Man y a lieuten ant has embarrased 

himself by asking a sergea nt why he didn't allow a 

man suffi cient time to eat lunch , onl y to find th at 

the man spent half of his lunch hour at th e PX 

looking a t phonograph records. Also beware of advice from your lower ranking people . Mu ch 01' it 

will be good, bu t some ma y lead you to take 

dangerous or destructive sho rt cuts. 

Don 't believe everything yo u hear. Many th ings 

a re sa id pur ely for your "benefit." Some things a re 

flat wrong. Always chec k out wha t you hear or 

over hea r before acti ng. 

Be aware th at p roblem s call be hidden from you. 

No matter how close your relationship with your 

NCO s may ap pea r to be , no matter how mu ch tr ust 

seems to be excha nged between you and your platton sergeant, you will always b e an officer. You 

cannot become "one of the guys." There will 

always be somet hing you do not kn ow. Do n't be 

surprised or shaken when something crops upespecially some kind of personal pr oblem of one of 

your NCO s-just be continuously pr ep ared to deal 

with the unexpected. It is seldom tha t a mission 

relat ed pro blem will be hidden from you. Most of 

the time , when the hid den problem pops out, you 

will need to exercise compassion to deal with it. Occasiona lly you will become aware of things th at you 

really don't need to know about. Some things are 

purely NCO matters. You have to learn to 

distinguish th e problem that needs investig ating 

from the one tha t is better left to othe r hands. 

One of the most destructive pitfalls th at befalls 

young lieutena nts is the fear of coun selin g older 

ENGINEER 

------~

NCO s. Most lieu tenants feel awkward counselin g a 

man with ten times more experience th an they 

have. You have to avoid tha t tr ap . Old er men mak e 

mistak es in spite of their experience. Sometimes a 

man 's experience acts against him becau se he 

learned something wrong and ha s been doing it 

wrong for years. Age and experience do not make a 

man right. Yo u should document your counseling 

sessions. l anc e had to tir e a plat oon sergea nt who 

ju st couldn 't get it togeth er. I man aged to get rid of 

him before he dam aged the platoon too badl y, but 

only becau se of exte nsive counseling with copious 

docum entation . 

Don 't f all into the 'you th ink yo u 're good" trap. 

When you make decisions which affect a soldier 

ad versely, particularly when you recommend action by the company commander under Article IS, 

the soldier is liable to attack you emotionally. He 

may accuse you of " playing God" by judgi ng him 

for his wrongdoing. He may point out that you 

haven't been perfect all of your life, either, and you 

have no bu siness being so hard on him . Qu ite often 

he will succeed in making you feel badly . Making 

such judgments is, however, part of your job . You 

must do it. Your superiors expect you to make 

value judgements and so do your sub ordinates. If 

you fail to do it, you will create disord er and chaos 

in your platoon . Don't let these incidents 

discourage you. 

The tr oops kn ow everything tha t you do. I mentioned before that you are going to set the example 

whether you want to or not. You a re the most visible man in the platoon and you don 't really have a 

privat e life. If you drink too mu ch, the troops 

kn ow. If you do dope, they k now. Ifyour pers onal 

life is a mess, it can' t be hidden from th em. If you 

a re dishonest or une thi cal, it will be common 

kn owledge. You mu st be clea n if you int end to have 

the respect of your men. 

After reading these notes you have probably 

noticed th at there is nothing here to tell you wha t 

ac tions to tak e in accomplishing your job or mission. Those things are found in your unit SOP and 

ofte n vary from one unit to the next. The issue her e 

has been lead ership: how you get your people to do 

wha t it is that you want th em to do. If you ar e a 

successful lead er , your unit will always accomp lish 

its mission , becau se the men will not let th emselves 

fail. The most imp ortan t thing th at you will do as a 

new lieutenan t is to develop leadership in yourself. 

S et the example. 

Be con cerned. 

A sk questions.' 

III 

Captain Jam es B. Norwood is currently an ope rations/ 

training of ficer in the lst A viation Brigad e (I t Fort 

Rucker. AL. Th is article first appe ared in the Spring 

1979 issue of THE A RMY COMM UNICA TOR. 

31 
Inters ervice
 

Cooperation
 

Pays Off at Taegu 

by LT Michael Hullihan 

The Taegu Modulu x Dormitory construction 

project was a prime example of interservice 

cooperative and merits examination in terms 

of advantages and lessons learned. 

The $1 .2 million housing project for Air Force 

personnel was considered a requirement upon the 

activation of a new fighter squadron at Taegu Air 

Base, Republic of Korea. Construction of this type 

of Air Force billeting facilities in overseas locations 

is normally the responsibility of Air Force Constructi on Engineering Squadrons, with contract 

construction by local nationals as an alt ernative . 

But in the ca se of the Taegu Modulux Dormitory 

project, the distanc e from the project site to the 

nearest CE squa dron, along with the prohibitive 

cost of civilian labor , led proj ect planners to seek 

other means of construction. 

By combining forc es with Army engineers, an interservice con struction team was formed . The two 

units involved were th e Arm y's 802nd Engineer 

Battalion (C)(H) and the Air Force's SS4th Construction Engineering Squadron. To better understand the significance of the cooperative effort, a 

famili arity with the missions and organization s of 

the two units is necessary. 

The mission of the 802nd Engineer Battalion 

(C)(H) is self-sufficient horizontal and vertical con ­

struction. It has high equipment density and a high 

diversification of skills in operational units. Each 

general construction platoon, for example, is com ­

prised of a wide variety of skilled personnel, tools, 

equipment and vehicles. A 40-man unit can move 

int o a rem ote a rea, construct-battle environment 

stru ct ures, provide security for th e work site, perform combat engineering missi ons, and fight as infantry. 

A noteworthy feature of the B02d is the Kor ean 

Augmentation to United State s Army (KATUSA) 

program in which approximately half of the personnel of some Arm y units ar e Kor ean soldiers. 

KATUSA soldiers are int egrat ed int o all elements 

of an Army battali on and fall under the sam e chain 

of command as their U.S. counterparts. 

While the 802d is well suited for opera ti ng in 

a combat environment, its cap ability to 

construct large scale permanent stru ctur es 

is limited. Personnel and eq uipment necessary for 

stru ctural steel work, heating, air conditioning, 

and secondary power systems are not present. 

The SS4th Con struction Engineering Squadron 

(CES) is organized as a deployabl e he avy rep air 

and air base facility con struction unit. Its vertic al 

construction assets are managed acco rding to individual skills. Thus, carpenters, electricians, 

masons, etc., work out of centralized shops. Since 

most squadron projects are in the base are a, shops 

can supply specific skills required by a number of 

concurrent projects. Under normal cir cum stances, 

e.g. when the squadron is depl oyed as a unit. this 

system affords effici ent use of personnel. 

The location of the Ta egu Modulux Dormitory 

proj ect , however, dictated a system modification . 

Construction of the facility required the establishment of an " operat ing locati on" considerably 

removed from squa dron headquarters. Personnel 

and equipment to be used at Taegu Air Base were 

detached fr om the headquarters to meet the requirements of the pr oject. 

Combining Army, Air Force and KATUSA 

soldiers int o a constru ction team required an adjustment of operating procedu res. The system 

which evolved was a crew-typ e breakdown of personnel. With th e high number of diversified ta sks 

to accomplish the mission, to ma intain supervisory 

control over tr oop s, and to ra ise the exp ertise level 

of individual soldi er s. 

Under the crew system, Army, Air Force and 

KATUSA soldiers were separated int o specifi c skill 

construction team s. Each team was placed under 

the immediate control of th e most knowledgeable 

soldier, regardless of rank. Included in each crew 

were personnel undergoing on-the-job training. 

32 WI NTER 1979-80 
A number of unexpected benefits were derived 

from the use of the crew system. Development of 

working relationships between Army, Air Force, 

KATUSA personnel meant overcoming interservice, cultural and language differences. Air Force 

personnel were given the opportunity to work with 

Korean soldiers on a day-to-day basis. Army personnel became acquainted with the organization 

and operating procedures of Air Force units. Most 

important, new construction techniques were 

derived from a diverse pool of experience . 

Interservice cooperation during the course of 

construction insured responsive equipment support. While the 802nd had the heavy equipment , 

pneumatic and gasoline operated tools. and some 

of the hand tools required , it was not authorized 

the type or amount of tools peculiar to modulux 

construction. 

The 554th CES, on the other hand , had ready 

acces s to tools and equipment for specialized 

construction tasks. By combining assets, con ­

struction speed and quality were greatly enhanced . 

In some cases, both the S02d and 554th possessed 

comparable equipment (e.g. hydraulic and winch 

cranes). The option to choose between two different models of the same item of equipment gave 

project managers additional flexibility . 

A major factor in any construction project is 

materiel procurement. During the Taegu project, 

this factor became critical. Due to siting complications, which delayed allocation of funds, much of 

the materiel required could not be requisitioned 

until the pr oject start date. To avoid job stoppage 

for lack of materiel. alternate supply sources were 

necessary. Again, the ability to draw on both Air 

Force and Army assets proved beneficial to project 

completion. Lateral support for critical items, such 

as lumber and plumbing fixtures, was obtained 

through both Air Force and Army channels. 

In some instances, construction materials were 

purchased from local sources. While formal 

negotiations were handled by the Korean Procurement Agency. KATUSA soldiers were instrumental 

in preliminary inquiries and coordination of 

delivery. A KATUSA mason, for example, ordered 

ready-mix concrete on a daily basis. Since he knew 

the specifications and intended placement configuration, he was able to accurately translate the 

directives of the site engineer to the local batch 

plant manager. 

To summarize, the Taegu Modulux Dormitory 

project points out several advantages of interservice 

cooperation. Foremost among these are efficient 

use of equipment and manpower, quicker materiel 

procurement, and responsive equipment support. 

The training value of joint U.S. Air Force/Ll.S. 

Army projects should also be considered. Interservice efforts are imminent in future conflict situations. Recognizing this fact and preparing military 

ENGINEER 

Army and Air Force engineers combine efforts on Taegu dormitory project 

engineer units to work together increases 

readiness. Other projects of the magnitude of the 

Taegu Modulux Dormitory construction could be 

managed in a similar manner. lnterservice 

cooperation is certain to improve the efficiency and 

training of Air Force and Army units alike. 

III 

First Lieut enant Mich ael F. Hullihan is currently att en ­

ding graduate school at th e University ofIllinois. He was 

assigned as a platoon lead er with the 802nd Engineer 

Battalion (e) (H) from December 1977 through Jun e 

/979. 

33 
Engineer Problem 

SITUATION 

You are th e com ma nder of Company 

B, 59th Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

(Mech). in direct suppo rt of a mech ani zed infantry att ack on a fortified ene my 

position toward the south . Your 3rd Platoo n , in direct su pport of Task Force 1-6 . 

h as been assigned as avenue of app ro ach 

alo ng a two-lan e high way thro ug h heavily 

wooded terrain . Your other platoo ns are 

heavily com mitt ed. 

You receive a ca ll fro m your J rd Pla ­

too n Lea de r that lea d clements of T F 1-6 

have enco unte red two cr aters astride the 

h igh way. The first crater is approximately 16 met ers across. An eleme nt of the TF 

has been d ispatche d on a roa d bypassing 

the craters to the west, b ut it has encou ntered a rec tangular log crib and roa d 

mini ng. 

Your Plat oon Lea de r rep orts th at the 

elem ent attemp ting th e bypas s h as squad 

vehi cles and tools and that direct small 

arms tire on the crib has ceased . The t ask 

force comm ander wants both routes 

opened, with the highw ay ro ute having 

top pr iority. 

The batta lion S-2 has pr ovided you 

wit h the following int elligence: the 

weather will remai n fair for the next J·5 

days; winds are ge nerally north to sout h : 

inver sion atmospher ic conditions exist ; 

a nd ene my arti llery has a ra nge of JO 

kilometer s with nu clear a nd chem ica l 

capabilities. 

In add itio n to organic assets, th e 

following resources are attached to th e 

3rd Platoon; an AVLB section organic to 

th e Combat Support Company. l-6 Armor: two each 5· to n dum p trucks with 

pole trailers; and one Comba t Engineer 

Vehicle (CE V). In add itio n to each 

sq uad 's basic load of dem olitio ns. th e Jrd 

Platoon has three sets of M- 1S7, 10 sets 

of bangalore , and 150 smoke pots . 

o 

{~ENEMY HELD 

HIGH GROUND 

PROBLEM 

Your Plat oon Leader says he can span adequa te fill is available in a borrow pit 

the second crater with a n AVLB, but he 600 mete rs north , but he fee ls such an 

is not sure how to attack the first crater, ope ra tion would take too long. He also 

especially since th e ene my has long range asks you ifhe sho uld sen d the CE V to the 

dir ect fir e cove ring the obstacle . He h as bypass roa d to assis t in reducing the log 

considered filling th e first crater, since crib . 

See THE SCHOOL SOLUTION, page 40 

34 WI NTER 1979-80 
Reserve Components
 

SPECIAL WEEKEND COURSES 

Offi cers and NCOs responsible for 

tr aining in their respective u nits a re encourage d to attend one or more of the 

special wee kend courses offe red by the 

U.S . Army En gineer Sch ool at Fori 

Belvoir during the remainder of FY 80. 

Five weekend course s have been condu cted since October 1, and eight more 

are sche duled between Decem ber 1 and 

Ap ril 13, 1980. 

Selected studen ts shou ld be familiar 

with th e subject matt er since inst ruction 

is fa st-paced and not designed for initial 

learn ing. Cou rses offere d during the remainder of FY 80 are ind icated below: 

Det ailed infor mation on th e program 

or qu est ion s rega rding enrollmen t should 

be addressed : Commanda nt; US Army 

Engin eer School; ATT N: Unit Train ing 

Se cti on ; Fort Belv oir , VA 22060 . 

Te lepho ne numbers for more information are : lNW ATS 800 -336 -3095, Ext. 

3008; Commercial 703-664 -3008 ; a nd 

AUTO VON 354-3008 . 

NEW TRAINING PROGRAM 

Gua rd a nd Reserv e enlisted per sonnel 

may now enr oll in adva nced ROTC 

course s a nd conti nue to serve in a 

Reserve Compon en t un it, according to a 

recen t Depar tmen t of th e Army announcem en t. In a ddition, ROTC ad ­

vanced course cade ts may enlist in Army 

Nation al Gu ard or Army Reserve units as 

officer trai nees. It is called the Army 

ROTC / Selected Reserve Simultaneous 

Membership Program (SMP ) and requi res Reserve Component (RC) enlis ted 

status for eligibility. 

SMP par ticipants will drill with 

Reser ve Compo nent units as officer 

trainess . They will hold the rank of cadet 

and be pa id for the enlisted gr a de and 

yea rs of ser vice reache d . However, pay 

will not be less t han th at for gra de E-S. 

Individu als will also receive ROTC training for whic h th ey will be paid a monthl y 

subsis tence allowa nce of S100 up to 20 

mon ths. 

Upon completion of ROTC tr aining, 

SM P p articipan ts will be commissioned 

and assigned to USA R or ARNG units 

until they grad ua te from college . At th eir 

request, th ey will then be considered for 

Regul ar Arm y appoin tments or threeyear active duty tours, or the y may be 

able to fulfill their obligation in Reserve 

Com po nent units. 

Enlisted RC members and ROTC 

ca dets must meet the followin g criteri a to 

qualify for participation in th e progr am : 

• Be a United States citizen; 

• Be enrolled or intend to enroll in 

ROTC advanced courses; 

• Have at least four years remaining 

on the ir enlistment when they enroll in 

SMP: 

• Be less th an 25 years old when ac ­

cepte d into th e pro gr am; 

DAToES OFFERED CO,URSE 

NUMBER COURSE TITLE 

December 15·16 

December 15-16 

February 2·3 

February 2·3 

March 1-2 

March 1·2 

March 29·30 

April 12-13 

80 SP·6 

80 SP-7 

80 SP;8 

80 SP-9 

80 SP-10 

80 SP·11 

80 SP·12 

80 SP·13 

Roads and Airfields in the 

Theaterct Operations 

Engineers in River Crossings 

Fixed Bridging 

Engineers in River Crossln'gs 

MinelCountermlne ffardware, 

Doctrine, and Operations at 

Battalion Level 

Elements of Terrain Evalua· 

tion 

Military·Explosives and their 

use 

Engineer Play in Games and 

Simulations 

ENGINEER
 

• Have complete d bas ic combat 

train ing, Mi lita ry Science I and II , basic 

ROTC summe r ca mp, junior ROTC or 

one year at a service acade my to qualify 

for entry into a dva nced RO TC : 

• Be enrolled, or plan to enro ll with 

at least two yea rs rem ain ing (or be a n ad ­

vanced RO T C ca det ), in a full-time 

course of instruction lea ding to a 

Bachelor or advanced deg ree at a college 

or univ ersity hosti ng or havi ng a crossenrollment ag ree men t with a nother 

schoo l hostin g Army ROTC progra ms. 

Individuals on ROTC scholarships or 

particip a tin g in a fe de r a l tuit ion 

assistance progra m a re not eligible to 

enroll in the SMP. 

NEW OER SYSTEM 

The new Officer Effic iency Report 

(OER) syste m will be impleme nte d in full 

for the Army Reserve effective I 

February 1980. An OER for an y period 

endi ng on or after th at dat e will be submitted on th e new DA Form 67-8 . Unlike 

th e Act ive Arm y, implementat ion of the 

new O ER system for the Reserve will nor 

be preceded by a closeout re port . It is 

essenti al. th erefore. to th e orderly transition of th e new system th at un it com ­

manders insure the timely preparation 

a nd sub miss ion of the current OER 

forms (DA Form 67-7) as they become 

du e. T he new syste m will incorp orate the 

use of a support for m, DA Form 67·8 -1, 

to assist th e rat er and rated office r in 

det erm ining the jo b re quire ments and 

objectives which will serve as a ba sis for 

th e OER. Technical advice and /or 

assistance can be obtained fro m RCPA C 

(AV 693-737117876). 

TRANSFERS TO THE IRR 

New Army policy requires that certain 

enlisted members of Troo p Program 

Units be transferred to the In active 

Ready Reserve in lieu of disch arge . The 

action applies to soldiers sepa rating fro m 

th e Activ e Army, the Army National 

Guard , and the Arm y Reserve pri or to 

completing the ir six-year military obligation. The new poli cy, effecitv e I Octob er, 

is designed to assure th at no member is 

discharged who ha s a pot en tial for useful 

serv ice under condition s of full mobili zatio n. The new policy applies only to per ­

sonnel separa ted for one of the following 

reasons after successfully comp leti ng 

ba sic trai ning or at lea st eight week s of 

one-statio n- u ni t-t rain ing : dep endency; 

expeditious disch arge pr ogram; hardship; inab ility to perform prescribed 

duties du e to parenthood ; sole su rviving 

sons/ da ughters and surviving fa mily 

members; and un suitabil ity. 

35 
Officer Career Info
 

MAJORS 

The critical sho rt age of engineer majors is a continuing problem, particularly 

in t he area of professional de velo pment 

in " other" spec ialti es. T he cu rre nt 

ut ilization rat e of 8S percen t in sp ecialty 

code 21 assign ments ofte n precludes 

qu al ification in a n eng ineer officer's 

ot her specia lty pri or to reaching the 

prim ar y zone for promotio n t o lieu tenant 

colone l. 

T he 1979 se lection list for the Command and Genera l Staff College is 

schedu led to be rel eased in mi dDecember . 

COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS 

Most engi neer officers aspire to attend 

gradua te schoo l during the first 10 years 

of milita ry service . Un fort u n a tely, 

however, E ngineer Br anch is co nst ra in ed 

fr om app roving all requests for graduate 

sch ooling . So me of th ose constraints are 

exp lained below: 

• Professional Development Needs. 

At te ndance at th e Engin eer Office r Ad ­

vance d Course and succe ssf ul completion 

of a com pa ny com mand tou r are 

minimum requirements. Ove rseas eq ui ­

ty , experience at battalion staff level , an d 

overall manner of performance ar e ot her 

primary det erminants. 

• Gilly those disciplines verified as 

"shortage discipline s" arc eligib le for 

gr ad ua te st udy . Cu rrently. the shortage 

list incl udes Geodetic Scien ce, Engineerin g O R SA , En gin eerin g Ph ysics , 

E ngineerin g Nuclear Effects, Engin eer ­

ing Electronics, an d AD P. En gineeri ng 

Admini stration is no t ava ila ble at this 

time for fu ll time study and a very lim ited 

number of officers will be pe rmitted to 

study Civil Engineering du rin g FY 80. 

All shortage disciplines are technical in 

n ature. As a result, undergraduate 

b ackground (both subject material and 

grades) is im portant , since it ha s a direct 

im pact on an ind ividu al' s acceptance for 

grad uate scho ol, the d uration of schooling , and the indiv id ua l officer's ability to 

successfully meet degree requi rements. 

• Th e tota l num ber of officers at te ndin g school directly affects our ability to 

m e et o t h e r Army r eq u ir emen ts , 

Ther efore. E ngineer Branch has a ceili ng 

on th e total nu mb er of com pany grade 

engi neers who ca n attend scho ol at any 

one time under all progra ms. Th e result 

is that scho oling re mains extre mely cornpetitive in terms of manner of performance. pr ofession al developmen t. and 

tim e in se rvice. 

Desp ite th ese const ra ins, En gin eer 

Br anch conti nue s to receive and use a full 

"fair share" of schooling quo tos. Officers 

who fee l they meet all th e requirem ents 

for schooling at t he graduate level are invited to app ly. AR 621· 1 gives applica ­

tion det ails . En gineer Bran ch will also 

respond to written or tel ephonic queri es 

rega rding evalua tion of competiti veness 

for sch ooling. 

OPMD REORGANIZAnON 

A plan for the reorganization of 

MI LPE RC EN 's Officer P er son n el 

Mana gem ent D irector at e (O PM D) was 

app rove d in August. Scheduled to tak e 

pl ace over a 19-mon th period, the 

reorgan ization is de sign ed to provide efficient and effec tive " life cycle" career 

man agem ent for t he Ar my's offi ce rs 

under the Officer Per sonnel Man agement Syst em (O PMS). 

VERTICALLY STRUCTURED
 

MANAGEMENT
 

T he app roved reorgan ization plan ca lls 

fo r three vert ica lly structured car eer 

management d ivision s-s-Corn bat Arm s 

D ivision . Combat Support Arms Division, an d Combat Se rvice Support Division-responsib le for assignme nts of 

lieutenants throug h lieutena nt colone ls. 

The Colonels Division and Warrant Offic er s D ivision will be retained with out 

change fr om the presen t structure . 

This vertical structuring will enable 

OPMD, for the first tim e sin ce the inception of OPMD, to provide career 

management ba sed on a " life cycle" concept for comm issioned officers. Under 

t he current structu re, when an officer is 

selected for promot ion to major, resp onsibility for man agemen t of his ca ree r 

moves from one of t he com pa ny grade 

division s to th e Maj ors Division . Resp onsibi lity is again shifted up on that officer's 

selection for prom ot ion to lieute na nt colonel and colonel. 

SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT 

Under the new structure. an officer's 

ca reer will be ma naged by one of the 

three career division s fro m th e day he 

enters the Army as a second lieutenant 

t hr ou gh select ion for promotion to colonel. T h is not only improves total 

man agem en t b ut a lso gives office rs a 

single point of conta ct througho ut th eir 

ca ree r (0 1 through OS) . 

Each com missioned officer will be 

man aged by one of t he three ca reer div isions based on ac cession specialty. Those 

officers who hold ac cession specialties 11, 

12, 13, 14, or 15 will be man aged by the 

Com ba t Arms Division . Man aging tho se 

officers with ac cess ion specialities 21. 25 . 

27,3 1, 3S, 36, 37, 72 , or 74 will be the 

respon sibili ty of th e Combat Support 

Ar ms Di vision . T he Comba t Ser vice Su pport Divisio n will man age t hose officers 

with acc ession specialties 42 , 43 , 44 , 71, 

75, 76, 77,81,82.87,88, and 92 . 

OTHER SPECIALTIES 

In addition to an accession specialty, 

eac h commissioned offi cer ob tains 

an othe r specialty by the eight h yea r of active commissioned service . Officer s arc 

then avai lab le for a ssig nm ent in both of 

th eir specialties. Accomplishing effec tive 

man a geme nt o f offi ce rs in both 

spe cia lties. Id eally, ea ch of t he 40 

specialties would be man aged by a 

sepa rate career man ager. How ever, 

beca use the reorgani za tion struct ure is to 

be accom plished within existing manpower resources, pr ovidin g a separa te 

car eer manager fo r eac h specialt y would 

requ ire expans ion of th e existing TDA 

and would be cost prohibitive. 

In decid ing how man agemen t responsibility fo r th ese non accession speci alties 

would b e dist ributed among the th ree 

ca ree r divisions, each ver tical division 

was given res ponsibility fur managemen t 

of nonaccession spe cia lties based upon 

existi ng specialty pairings, training, and 

experience of the officer corps. In most 

cases, th e accession spec ialty which had 

the largest percentage of officers holding 

the pa rticular nonaccession specialty was 

assi gned management resp onsibility for 

that sp eci alty. A complete list ing of a ll 

specia lties and t he division re sp on sib le 

for mana ging each spe cia lty is available 

up on req uest. 

PHASED IMPLEMENTATION 

T he reorgan izat ion of OPMD will be 

accomplish ed in phases over a pe riod of 

36 WINTER 1979-80 
app roxi ma tely 19 mont hs and will commen ce once auto ma tic data processing 

syste ms su pport pa ckages ca n be 

prepa red . Phase I will con sist of th e 

reorga nization of the fu nctio na l divisions. Current ly, th ere are th ree functiona l division s: Personn el Operations 

Division, Professional Develop ment Division, and Officer Distribu tion Division . 

Un der th e new struct ure, functiona l 

operatio ns will be perform ed by a Personnel and Training Division , an Officer 

Distr ibu tion Division , a Plan s, Progr am 

and Analysis Division , a nd an Admin istra tive Support Offi ce. 

In Ph ase II the company gra de divisions will be reorganized into three ca reer 

division s. The divisions will provide the 

base for Phases III and IV , which incorporate th e Majors and Lieutenant Colonels Divisions int o the career man agement division s crea ted in Phase II. 

Phase V will be devoted primaril y to 

prep aring an afte r actio n report on th e 

reo rga nizatio n effort . 

An organizatio n cha rt showing the 

stru cture of OPMD aft er reorganization 

is also availab le up on requ est . 

FLEXIBILITY NECESSARY 

Alth ough th e plan ca lls for th e 

reorgan ization to be accomplished over a 

period of 19 mon ths, a great deal of flexibility will be necessa ry. Following completion of each phase, that ph ase will be 

studied and analyzed before beginning 

the next ph ase. Th e purpose of thi s 

analysis is to surfa ce any pr oblems 

associated with a particular phase and 

provide solut ions to th ose problems 

before moving to th e next phase. It is expected th at through th is process the 

reorganizati on can be mad e in an orde rly 

mann er and mi nim ize any adverse impact on the office r corp s. 

In summary, the ultima te purp ose of 

the OPMD reorganizat ion is to achieve 

" life cycle" man agement in all OPMS 

specialties while at the same tim e deve lop 

the most effective orga ni zation for wartime. While speci fic internal actions an d 

implementation dates are not prov ided in 

this article, plans are curre nt ly being 

develop ed to pr esent detailed briefin gs 

on the new organization during OPMD 

visits to office rs in the field . Officers are 

encourage d to tak e adva ntage of the 

vari ou s opport unit ies to learn abou t the 

OPMD reorganization and its effect on 

th eir career management and professiona l development in the future. 

Commanders Update
 

LTC ROBERT OLIVER LTC ROBERT D. BROWN , III 

5 th Eng ine er Batta lion (C) 588th Engineer Battalion (C) 

Fort Leonard Wood , MO Fort Polk, LA 

LTC CHARLES E. CHANDLER LTC EVERETT R. THOMAS 

11th Eng ineer Battalion (C) 864th Eng ineer Battalion (CH) 

Fo rt Belvoir, VA Fort Lewis, WA 

LTC JOHN M. O 'CONNOR LTC CARLOS W. HIC KMAN 

15th Eng ineer Battalion 3rd Battalion , 4th Brigade 

znc Armored Division Fort Leonard Wood , MO 

Fort Hood , TX 

LTC JOHN DORR 

LTC CLAIR GILL 9th Engineer Battalion 

13th Engi nee r Battal io n USAREUR 

7th Infantry Division 

Fort Ord , CA LTC ROGER F. YANKOUPE 

12th Eng ineer Battal io n 

LTC LAWRENCE G. AlLINGER 8th Infantry Division 

20 th Eng ineer Battalion (C) USAREUR 

Fort Campbell , KY 

LTC DAVID SPANGLER 

LTC ALBERT J . GENETTI, JR. 84th Eng in eer Battal ion (C H) 

43rd En g inee r Ba ttalio n (C H) Schofield Barracks, HI 

Fort Be nn in g , GA 

LTC LERO Y PAUL 

LTC CAL D. JOH NSON 2nd Eng ineer Battalio n (TO PO) 

46t h Engineer Ba tta lion (C H) 2nd Infantry Division 

Fo rt Ruc ke r, AL Camp Casey, Korea 

LTC JAM ES W. KEYS LTC FRANK PATETE 

92nd Engineer Battalion (C H) B02nd Eng ineer Batta lion (C H) 

Fort Stewart, GA Camp Humphreys, Korea 

LTC DANIEL M. WILSON LTC ALE XANDER JOHNSTON , III 

299th Engineer Battalion (C) 326th Engineer Battal ion (C)(AMBL) 

Fort Sill , OK Fort Campbell , KY 

ENGINEER 37 
Enlisted Career Info
 

REVISED PROMOTION 

WORKSHEET 

A revised Promot ion Point 

Worksheet (DA Form 3355) is now 

being used in conjunction with th e 

semi-centra lized prom otion system 

for advancement to grade s ES and 

E6. 

The worksheet is a standarized 

scoring form used to determine the 

number of promotion points achieved by each soldi er recomme nded for 

pr omotion list sta nding . The scores 

from the worksheet ar e used by DA 

to det ermine the pr om otion poin t 

cut-off scores announced monthly by 

MILP ERCE N. 

Th e revised worksheet retains the 

1,000 promotion point s ceiling, but 

point categories have been modified 

and points redistributed . The revised 

works heet is designed to provide 

soldiers competing for promotion 

wit h a means to infl ue nce their pro ­

motion chances. Spec itic emphasis 

on th e new workshee t was given to 

those areas where soldiers could incr eas e their poin ts t hro ugh individual effort and in itia tive. 

Major changes o n the new 

worksheet are summarized below : 

• SQT: Points will be based on 

th e " GO" Raw Scor e shown on the 

Individu al Soldi er Rep ort (ISR). 

This cha nge permits more tim ely use 

of test results. Adju stm ent of points. 

however, will occur only during normal recomputation peri ods. 

• NCOES Course: E4s who compl et e the Primary Lea dership 

Course, the Primary Noncommissione d Officer Cou rse. or the 

Primary Technical Course will be 

awarde d 30 points. ESs are award ed 

30 points for completion of the Basic 

NCO Cour se or th e Basic Technical 

Course. Th e new worksheet also 

recognizes complet ion of OJE (onthe-jab-experience) by awarding IS 

points for certification at the tim e of 

initial board appearance, and one 

point per month thereafter, until a 

38 

--------------------------------------------------------­

tot al of 30 points ar e achieved. 

Sold iers and comma nders should 

recogni ze that resident course att endance is the best and quickest means 

of achieving th e maximum number 

of points in this item. 

• Awards and Dec or ations : The 

value of points for peacetime awards 

and de corations has been increased. 

Additional badges have been included for points, and Certificates of 

Achi evem ent now qu alify for th e 

award of points. 

• Co rr espo nde nce Subcourse: 

Th e point value has been tripl ed to 

one promotion point for each five 

credit hours satisfact orily completed . 

• High School: The soldi er who 

has a high school diploma or GED 

equival ency certificat e will be 

granted 7S points. 

Although use of th e new workshe et beg an in October , pr om otions 

ba sed on the new scores will not 

begin until January 1980. Until th en. 

th e old scores will continu e to be used in det ermining promotion s. New 

work sheets and scor es for pr om otion 

to ES becom e effective 1 January, 

while th e effecit ve dat e for prom otion to E6 is 1 Februar y 1980 . 

COUNSELING STATEMENTS 

An inc reasing number of career 

soldiers are refusing to take th e 

ne cessar y actions to meet length-ofservice requirem ents which mak e 

the m eligible for overseas reassign ­

men t. To be eligible for an overse as 

assignment, soldiers mu st have at 

least 12 months remaining in the service upon their arrival overse as . 

Anyone with less than 12 month s remaining has the option of extending 

or reenli sting to meet this minimum 

tim e-in -servic e requirement. Or he 

may sign a counseling statement and 

be deleted fr om orders. 

But feedback from soldiers who 

sign counseling sta tements indicates 

that in many cases they are not 

awar e of th e tot al cons equences of 

th eir ac tions. A counseling sta tement is a self-imposed bar to 

reenli stm ent and places a soldi er in 

the following status: he loses his promotion eligib ility; he is prohibited 

from reenli sting for at least 93 da ys 

following sep ar ati on ; he loses his option to reenlist even after 93 days 

without first obtaining a DA approved waiver. [1' the waiver is obtained , 

he still loses at least two grades from 

th e gr ad e he held at the time of his 

disch ar ge. 

Requests to withdraw counseling 

statements prior to ETS can only be 

approved by MILPERCEN for 

soldi ers serving in CONUS and only 

by th e major overseas commander 

for soldiers se rving overseas. 

REVISED PROCESSING SYSTEM 

In an effort to streamline reassignment processing , a new regulation , 

AR 612-10, ha s been written and is 

being distribu ted to the field. It 

became effective 1 October and includes significant improvements in 

the methods used to prepare soldie rs 

for reas signment. 

Key are as which the new reg addresses are reassignment processing 

and the spons orship and orientation 

program. It applies to all soldiers in 

grades ES through 06 and also to 

those Els and E4s who desire to 

move their dep endents to or fr om an 

overseas area at government expense . It also a pplies to tho se junior 

enlisted so ldiers who are AIT 

graduates and have dependents with 

medical , dental, physical , emotional , or in tellectual problem s. It 

does no t ap ply to soldi ers being 

reassigned between units on th e 

same installa tion, to thos e bein g 

reassign ed to schoo ls as stude nts, or 

to thos e being reassigned for separa ­

tion purposes. 

The syste m outlined in the new reg 

is desi gned not only to make 

reassignment s eas ier for soldiers and 

their dependents, but also to lessen 

the workl oad for MILPOs and commanders. Sp ecific respons ibili ties 

have been assigned to each of those 

individuals involved-the gain ing 

a nd losing comma nder , the MILPO, 

the appointed sponsor, and th e 

soldier being reassigned. Meeting 

WI NTER 1979·80 
th ese resp on sibilities is critical to th e 

success of th e system, so if you' re 

fac ing a reassignmen t in the near 

future, ge t hold of a copy of the new 

reg and look it over. It could save 

you a lot of head ach es later. 

OCS CHANGES 

Until recently, so ldie rs attendi ng 

OCS did so in a PCS status. It has 

now been de termined that the 

14-week course is mor e ap propriate 

for tempor ary duty (TD Y) than a 

perman ent cha nge of station . 

Ther efore, unl ess ca ndidates are 

assigne d Sp ecialty 11 (I nfa nt ry), 

they will atten d th e co urse in a 

" T OY enro ute" sta t us. 

Th os e c a n d idates assig ne d 

Specia lty II an d th ose selecte d for 

Ranger training following completion of th e course will be assigned 

PCS to Fo rt Benning, t he only location for officer ca ndidate training 

since 1973 . 

Anot he r o es poli cy cha nge 

relates to the assign me nt of acces ­

sio n specialities. Pr eviou sly, ca ndidates did not receive thei r spec iality design ation unt il they had completed ro ughly three- fourt hs of the 

co urse. Each ca ndidate now has this 

info rmation prior to departing his 

old duty station for Fort Benning. 

The new proced ure allows the 

soldier whose ultimate assign me nt is 

to a CONUS ins talla tion to leave his 

fa m ily in current hou sing , or move 

them to th e ultim ate duty statio n. 

Candidates whose ultimate assign ­

ment is overseas have no option; th ey 

mu st leave t heir dependent s in current ho using, unl ess they choose to 

move them a t th eir own expe nse. 

Governmen t qu arters will not be 

availabl e at Fo rt Benning for 

dep endents of office r can d idates, exce p t t hos e assigne d a ccessio n 

Sp ec iality 11 a nd pe S'd to Fort Bennmg. 

The deadl ine for receipt of OCS 

a pplicatio ns for Class 3-80, sched uled to beg in on 6 April, 1980, is 7 

January. The Application for Ap ­

poi nt ment, DA Form 6 1, mu st be 

su b m itted th ro ug h cha n nels to 

M ILPERC EN . 

INSTRUCTORS NEEDED 

Second career op po rtu nities arc 

now open to Army officers and 

NCOs (0 1 to 06 and E6 to E9) in 

Ar my Junio r Reser ve Officers' 

Train ing Corps (AJR OTC) . Personnel who a re within one year of retiremen t or who have retir ed within the 

last five yea rs may qualify. AJ ROTe 

is offered at 670 high sch ools nat ionwide. In st ru ction includes lead ership 

de ve lo p m e n t , m ap rea d i ng. 

mar ksm anship , methods of in struction a nd military history. Classroo m 

instructi on is au gmented by military 

drill, or ien tat ion trip s, field trips, 

mini-summer ca mps, and orie nteering. Ad dit iona l info rm ation conce rning pay, working hours, be nefits , 

ctc., may be obtaine d from ROTC 

Region Headqu arters at Fort Bragg, 

Fort Knox, Fort Riley, or Fort 

Lewis. 

The Missing Issue 

If you did not receive a Summer edition of ENGINEER 

Magazine, the reason is simple. We did not publish a 

magazine labeled as the Summer edition. The Springedi· 

tion, published in May, was followed by the Fall edition, 

which you should have received in early September. We 

skipped the Summer edition-on paper, only-so that the 

magazine would reach the field at the beginning of each 

season, rather than at the tail end. Henceforth, you can expect to recieve quarterly issues at or near the onset of 

Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. 

ENGINEER 39 
The School Solution
 

You decide to reduce the first crater astride the 

highway and to reduce the log crib on the bypass 

road. To breach th e crate r, you mu st first eliminate 

observed ene my fir e. So, you request obscuring 

smoke and suppressive art illery fire on th e enemy's 

dir ect fir e positions. Since wind and inversion conditions ar e favorable , you also decide to use smoke 

pots to form screens at all three work sites. 

To redu ce the first crater, first clean all min es 

manually (blow in place) from the vicinity of th e 

work area a round the lips of th e crater. Th en fill 

approximately th ree meters on ea ch side of th e 

crater and employ th e AVLB to spa n the remaining 

16-meter gap . Use the CEV to backfill and achieve 

minimum compact ion. An estimated 72 cubi c 

meters of fill is required, whi ch is equivalent to 16 

5-ton dump truck loads . Two trucks will have to 

make five round trips to the bo rrow pit 600 meters 

away, while one truck will have to make six round 

trips to th e pit. You estima te that it will tak e ap ­

pr oximately 30 min utes to till and an other five 

minutes to place th e AVLB across th e crater gap. 

In reducing the log crib, you mu st first clean all 

mines manually from the crib's vicinity. Then 

dest roy the front and rear vert ical posts with 

timber-cutting demoliton cha rges. Place 30 to 40 

pounds of demolitions in the backfill at two-thirds 

the depth of the fill. Th en tamp and detonate 

simulta neo usly. Clea r the resulting rubble manually. 

Th ere are three factors in the breaching operation. First , the observed enemy tire must be 

eliminat ed pri or to the breaching at tempt. The second factor is the tactical commander's priorities. 

Alth ough the CEV is ideally suited for destroying 

log cribs, it could not be used for th at purpose 

because of tactical priorities. Third, you must insur e that your platoon leader recovers the two 

AVLBs as soon as trail elements of th e task force 

have passed th e crater so th at they will be availab le 

for use again as th e TF advances. Of course, you 

should advise your battalion commander or S-3 

th at th e cra ters exist. Repair of the crate rs for 

passage of division rear elements is his respon sibility. 

We've got a problem . ENGINEER Magazine is published for the benefit of 

all Army engineers, including Engineer officers, Engineer enlisted personnel, and DA civilians employed in engineer-related jobs. The problem is that 

apparently many of them never see the magazine. During recent months , I 

have increased the number of copies mailed to many engineer units/activities, but I fear that more copies-per-unit/actlvlty is not the solution. I 

think the solution lies with commanders, activity chiefs , first sergeants, 

command sergeants-major, and others responsible for getting the word 

down to troop level. Apparently too many magazines are winding up in the 

desks, lockers, or quarters of individuals, rather that in dayrooms, offices, 

lounges, and other places where engineer personnel congregate. With a 

limited press run dictated by a tight budget, it is impossible to increase free 

distribution by a substantial amount. So read it and pass it on, or pay the 

price for your own personal subscription. 

Editor 

' U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ' 979 -0-620-06514 

40 WINTER 1979-80 
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