A Personal Viewpoint 


The Counter Obstacle Team 


by CPT Frank J.Smith 

Momentum is the key to success in 

the AirLand Battle. The combat 

engineer mission is to breach ohstacle systems, continuously clearing the way for a rapid maneuver 

force initiative. This task becomes 

increasingly difficult as troops move 

through first echelon Threat forces 

into prepared, deliberate defenses. 

It's tough work, but a well-equipped, 

trained, and organized force can do 

it. 

Unfortunately, we aren't ready to 

do that job today. Limited and outdated equipment and inadequate 

training programs-even at NTChamper engineer capability to 

accomplish this vital mission. And 

though Threat ohstacle emplacement capabilities are perceived as 

powerful, few professionals fully 

appreciate Threat ability to create 

complex ohstacle systems on the 

AirLand Battlefield. 

A clearer picture of Threat doctrine 

and U.S. limitations can lead to only 

one conclusion: The Counter 

Obstacle Team (COT) concept must 

be adopted as AirLand Rattle doctrine. Cnly then can the combined 

arms team he a combat effective 

force strongenough to break through 

complex obstacles and hold the 

offensive. 

COMPLEX OBSTACLESA SOVIET STRENGTH 

Sov~et doctrlne dictates that a 

strong obstacle defense is the hasls 

for a successful offense A single 

lesson from hlstory shows why 

Using ohstacles skillfully, the 

Soviets cnppled the German offense 

at the Battle of Kursk, then took the 

offensive on the Eastern Front 

As this cr~tlcal hattle opened, the 

Germans attacked from the North 

andSouth, hoping to take thec~tyin 

apincermovement On thefirst day, 

the northern pincer lost 200 tanks, 

25,000 men, and its momentum. 

After a brief success, the southern 

plncer lost over 300 tanks. German 

progress halted short of Kursk, and 

the Soviets mounted their own 

offensive campaign. 

How did the Russians do it? They 

stopped the attack with six integrated defensive belts defended by 

minefields and obstacles. Minefield 

density averaged 2,400 antitank and 

2,700 antipersonnel mines per mile 

of front. 

Current defensive doctrine 

Threat philosophy has changed 

little since World War 11. Echeloned 

forces, massed fires, shock, surprise, 

and complex ohstacle systems are 

still typical of Threat defenses. 

Defenses range from hasty preparation for an imminent attack to prepared defenses along anentire front. 

The defense level depends upon 

METT-T. 

Threat doctrine always aims to 

torn the defense around and mount 

a counterattack. Hasty defenses aim 

to repel or delay attackers. Expendable units hurl themselves at 

attacking forces that destroy or 

bypass hasty defenses. If Threat 

forces cannot regain the offensive, 

the prepsred Threat posture is 

assumed. 

Prepared defenses are echeloned 

in security, main defense area, and 

counterattack forces. Security forces 

present ohstacles and direct fires to 

delay and deceive enemy forces. 

Main defense areas are complex 

belts of minefields, ohstacles, and 

strongpoints designed to canalize 

and trap attacking forces in unfavorable terrain, where they can he 

destroyed by indirect and direct fires. 

When the fires are lifted, expendable counterattack forces destroy the 

remaining enemy force. At the Battle 

of Kursk, the Soviets sacrificed an 

entire tank regiment in 3 hours in 

such a counterattack. Threat tactics 

are expensive-and effective. 

AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE 

AirLand Battle doctrine dictates 

that only offensive hattle leads to 

the complete destruction of enemy 

forces. To attain this goal, forces 

must concentrate on critical times 

and places, surprise the enemy, and 

maintain speed. 

Typical scenarios require a mechanized engineer platoon to support a 

task force or maneuver battalion by 

continuously breaching lanes 

through ohstacle systems. Since 

AirLand Battle doctrine offers few 

chances for deliberate operations, 

speed is essential. Assault hreaches 

must be completed in minutes, so 

that maneuver units can move 

through obstacles quickly and continue the attack. Otherwise, maneuver forces lose momentum and 

risk being destroyed in place by 

enemy fires. 

Stumbling blocks for 

U.S. mobility 

Even in a hest-case scenario for a 

full-strength engineer platoon with 

AVLBs and a CEV, engineers are 

ill-prepared to conduct assault 

hreaches through the ohstacle systems found in the Threat security 

zone and main defensive area. 

Standard demolitions such as 

hangalore torpedos take too long to 

breach vehicle lanes through minefields. Linecharges such as the MI73 

and MI57 are not available for 

training. Moreover, these line 

charges will he available only in 

limited quantities during the first 

critical weeks of hostilities. 

While AVLBs can span tank 

ditches, they cannot breach minefields. Current doctrine dictates that 

CEVs breach fortifications, wire 

obstacles, and rubble. With few 

exceptions, CEV crews are trained 

to do only those tasks, and are 

therefore unprepared to breach 

minefields. 

The MCLIC, ROBAT, COV, 

rollers, andmine plows may oneday 

(continued on page 24) 
VOLUME 17 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

ENGINEER CENTER 

AND FORT BELVOIR, VA 

COMMANDER/COMMANDANl 

MG Richard S. Kern 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 

COL lames R. Whitley 

CHIEF OF STAFF/DEPUTY 

INSTALLATION COMMANDER 

COL Robert R. Hardiman 

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR 

CSM Matthew Lee, Jr. 

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING 

AND DOCTRINE 

COL Robert L. Keenan 

CHIEF OF PUBLICATIONS 

Patricia S. Kitchell 

MANAGING EDITOR 

Betty R. Graham 

FEATURES EDITOR 

Penelope Schmitt 

ASSOCIATE EDITOR 

PFC Eric Cramer 

DESIGNER 

lim Wilson 

TYPOGRAPHER 

Linda Paradi5 

On the Cover 

Russian armor preparing to cross 

an MTU-20 assault bridge under 

CBR conditions.Theinsignia shown 

is the Soviet engineer troop patch. 

Art: Jim Wilson 

NUMBER 1,1987 

FEATURES 

7 Combat Engineers inthe Defense of Mother Russia 

by CPT Joseph J. Duda 

10 	 The Soviet Engineer on the Battlefield 

by SFC Peter L.Bunce 

14 	 Soviet Countermobility Operations 

by COL Frederick E. Parker, 111 

16 	 AirLand Battle Doctrine-The Red Army Responds 

by CPT F. Michael Real and Penelope Schmitt 

18 	Water Supply to Soviet Ground Forces 

by Dr. Donald E Neasr 

20 	 Soviet Engineer Equipment 

by SFC Peter L. Bunce 

22 	 The One-Hour Minefield 

by CPTPhilip L. Reed 

26 	 Testing Engineer Equipment at Fort Knox 

by LTC Davrd S.Barber 

29 	 Countermine Operations inEl Salvador 

by MAJ James K. Waters 

32 	 AVLBs/CEVs-Upgrading the Fleets 

by MAJ William R. Fast 

DEPARTMENTS 

Inside Front Cover: A Personal Viewpoint 

2 Clear the Way 

3 Bridge the Gap 

4 SchoolNews 

13 Engineer Problem 

31 Regimental Update 

34 Engineer Solution 

35 News & Notes 

36 Career Notes 

37 Past in Review 

ENGINEER(ISSNO04fi-IBR!))ispublishedquarterlyhy theUSArmy Rates for domestic addresses including APO and FPO are 811.00 per 


En$neer School. Fort Relvoir, VA 22060. Material does not necessarily year, $3.00singleeopies. Rater for fnreignaddressesare$l350peryear, 


reflect official policy of the U.S. Army. 83.76 sinele copies. 


CONTENT is not copyrighted. Material may be reprinted if credit is TI, subscribe or change your address, contact the Superintendent of 


given to El(r'IN~:EI{and to the author. Documents, ATTN: Chiet MailList Branch. Stop SSOM, Washinmn, 


MILITARY SURSCRlPTIONSareavailnblefreetoall engineerand DC 20402. 


engineer related units by writing ENGINEER. 


CORRESPONI)ENCE, letters to the editor, manuscripts and photu. POSTMASTER: Second Classpostageispaid at Fort Belvoir, VA, and 


graphs be apnt to ENGINEER, A~N: zgl~), ATZA-TD.~,stop additional mvilingofficea. Sendaddres~chsngrtoE~VGINEER,ATZAFort Relvuir. VA 22060.5291 Telephone: (703) 664~3082, AV 354. TD-P, Stop 291r). Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.5291. 

PERSONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are available through the Superintend~ntof Documents. US. Government Printing Office. 
Y-- LEAR THE WAY

bv MG R~chardS. Kern, Commandant, U.S.Army Eng~neerSchool 

Knowledge of Threat methods 

is vital to our readiness 

As professional soldiers, we must beready to goto war 

-today. We are not ready if we don't know how 

potential adversaries will fight. After the first bullet is 

fired, we will pay the priceof every blind spot withlives. 

In this issue of Engineer, we take a hard look at our 

counterparts in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. 

The Soviets set high standards for the doctrine, equipment, and organization of their forces. A study of their 

engineers gives us valuable information about the 

strenrths and methods the Soviets will bring to the 

battlefield. 

Let's consider the Warsaw Pact's strength. The Pact 

outnumbers NATO 2 to 1in tanks, 2.2 to 1in artillery 

and mortars, and 1.8to 1in APCs. These ratios do not 

give Pact forces theruleofthumbratio-3 to l-thatthe 

attacker needs to win. Soviet doctrine prefers the even 

heavier 8to 1ratio for attacking forces, anticipating the 

high losses inherent in offensive operations. 

Rut even at current strength, the Warsaw Pact could 

mount a successful offensive. Presenting a mix of 

offensive thrusts and defensive operations across its 

front, the Pact could attain its desired force ratios in 

selected areas of attack. Butthis would require economy 

of force action in defensive sectors. 

These defensive sectors could be the windows of 

opportunity we need to implement AirLand Battle 

doctrine -but only if we anticipate the Soviet defense 

and know how to breach it. We must also know the 

Soviets' offensive use of engineers in order to site our 

own obstacles for maximum effect. Knowledge ofThreat 

methods is vital to our readiness. 

Thorough knowledge of Soviet defense methods can 

help us to advise maneuver commanders on the best 

way to breach enemy obstacles. The engineer and his 

maneuver commander must develop battle drills for 

breaching in stride, or expect failure. This is why the 

Soviet capability to employ scatterable mines deserves 

our closest attention. Itmeans that we may have to start 

breaching operations in our own assembly area and 

continue breaching through movement to contact and 

into the attack. 

As engineers, you must understand the capabilities of 

Threat engineer equipment. You have to know the gap 

crossing and countermine capability of the motorized 

rifle regiment before you can evaluate the defensive 

potential of the sector your unit is defending. You must 

also know the numbers of different types of equipment 

and their placesin the forcestructure. Forexample, you 

should know instantly that a position approached by 

two armored engineer tractors (IMRs) is a focus of 

attack, since each Soviet division has only two. In the 

heat of battle, this information must be in your headthere won't be time to look it up. 

A firm grasp of Soviet doctrine can reveal enemy 

intentions and plans at a glance. If minefields are 

surface laid and contain no antipersonnel mines, and 

no work is being done, chances are the enemy will soon 

resume the attack. A sudden, unexplained halt in the 

attack followed by rapiddigging in of vehicles by MDK2 entrenchers, is a clear warning-expect a nuclear 

attack. 

Some of you may think that the G-2/S-2 should be 

called upon for this kind of analysis. But as engineers, 

our valuable knowledge of engineer operations enables 

us torecognize enemy engineer courses of action. And if 

we know the enemy, our educated guesses are more 

accurate. 

This issue acquaints you with our expected 

adversary-but more than that, it encourages you to 

know more about theThreat. Don't stop here. Go to your 

S-2s and examine studies andintelligencereports. Most 

of your units receive our Engineer School Periodic 

Intelligence Reports (PERINTREPS). Read, heed, and 

apply what you learn from them. 

As Sun Tzu said in THE ART OF WAR-"Know 

yourself. Know yourenemy. Then you will be victorious 

in a thousand battles." 

2 ENGINEER No. I, 1987 
RIDGE THE G 

by CSM Frank B. Gibert, U.S. Army Engineer School 

What you can do-right 

unit preparedness 

Glance at this issue's cover-you see a lot of Soviet 

hardware. Examine the articles, and the army behind 

thathardware comes into focus. Read between thelines, 

and you catch a glimpse of the soldiers who are the 

Threat. Measure what you see against your soldiering, 

your army, your hardware. Are you ready to fightand win? 

First, consider the hardware. The descriptions in SFC 

Bunce's article "Soviet Engineer Equipment" (page 20) 

tell you what to look for, and what various pieces of 

equipmentwill do. Someitems,likethe towedmineplow 

(PMR), are similar to U.S. equipment in capabilitiesand in limitations. Other items are specialized to work 

in unfamiliar ways, and you must use your 

imagination-not just your experience-to defeat them. 

Think about your own hardware. Is your maintenance 

flawless? Are your operator skills top quality? Read this 

issue's article on AVLR/CEV readiness (page 32). Are 

you thoroughly familiar with every maintenance and 

training opportunity available to keep engineer equipment fully mission capable? Could you get the last 

ounce of speed and power if you needed it to stay with 

the momentum of a breaching operation? 

Second, compare your assumptions about the Soviet 

Army with what you see on these pages. You won't meet 

a "best case" or "worst case" army on the battlefieldyou'll be up against the real thing. The articles about 

historical development and current doctrine in the 

Soviet Army give you some valuable insights. 

Pay close attention to the organization and methods 

of the specialized engineer detachments discussed here. 

Take note of the information about minefields and 

minelaying techniques described. Can your unit meet 

these units and overcome these obstacles? If not, what 

can you do-right now-toimprove unit preparedness? 

Third, take time to learn something about soldiering 

in the Warsaw Pact armies. The Soviet soldier is 

obedient, courageous, rigorously trained-and expendable. He routinely puts in 14-hour days, and is 

accustomed to intense, repetitive training. 

now-to improve 

It's easy to see where U.S. and Soviet military 

philosophies differ-we set a higher value on the 

individual lives of our soldiers and the quality of those 

lives. You can best show dedication to the lives of your 

soldiers through training. Confident, competent troops 

are ready to survive in battle-even against trained, 

dedicated opponents. 

What can you change to make yourself and your 

leadership more effective? 

The Soviets value unquestioning obedience. What 

about you? Maybe you do get obedience from your 

troops-but you can do better. Encourage them to "ask 

questions later." Listen to them for sound ideas. 

The Soviets train unrelentingly. What about you? Set 

aside time to study Threat capabilities; schedule more 

training. Remember, squad-level training is the most 

important deterrence we have against superior 

numbers-and you can do more. Commit yourself to 

develop smart, safe trainers and establish realistic 

training environments. Make after-action reviews an 

effective part of your leadership style and your development of subordinates. 

The Soviets are ready to spend lives for victory. What 

about you? In combat our lives will be on the line-Be 

ready! Make sure your unit is trained to go into battle 

with a better-than-even chance for victory-confident 

and competent because they know you have madethem 

the "Best they can be." 

CSMFrank B. Gibert is Command Sergeant Major of 

the U.S. Army Engineer School. Hecomes to the school 

fromHHCof the 7th Transportation Group, Ft. Eustis. 

CSM Gibert has held numerous assignments as an 

Army Engineer Diver in the United States, Germany, 

and Korea. He holds a B.S. in Physical Education from 

Bowling Green State University. CSM Gibert's military 

education includes troining in salvage diving, deep sea 

diving, marine engineering, air transportability, and 

systems analysis. He is also a graduate of the NCOES 

Faculty Development Course and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 3 
School News 


Department of 


Military Logistics (DML) 


Logistics Branch The Logistics Branch, DML, wastransferred to Department of Combined 

Moves: Arms on 1October 1986. Undera memorandum of understanding signed by 

the directors of both units, the table of distribution and allowances was 

moved intact from the 809th to the 554th Battalion. 

The Logistics Branch is now DCA's Combat Logistics Division, with 

separate logistics and maintenance management branches. CPT Cynthia 

Guiten is the Chief ofthe Logistics Branch. CW4 Pedro Arroyo is the Chief 

of the Maintenance Management Branch. 

These units are responsible for providing logistics and maintenance 

management training for officers attending EOAC and EGBC, and to 

noncommissioned officers attending ANCOC. 

52F Branch Trains Resident training in aviation ground power units (AGPU) for BNCOC 

on AGPU: 	 52F20 students began 20 February 1987. In the past, the 52F Branch sent 

personnel to aviation unitsin the field to receive this training. AITTraining 

in AGPU for 52F10 students will beganin October 1987. This training meets 

the need created by the possible future addition of 52F personnel to aviation 

units. 

Defense Mapping School (DMS) 

Reach Out and 	 Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) provide Defense Mapping School instrucTeach Someone: tion around the world. Recent MTTs have included analytical photogrammetric positioning system (APPS) training aboard Navy aircraft carriers 

and terrain analysis training in Active Army and Reserve units. 

During 1987, DMS's scheduled MTTs to PACOM (in the spring) and 

EUCOM (in the fall) will export the 5-day Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy 

Staff Officer Course (MCGSOC) and the 4-day Introduction to Digital 

MC&G Data Course. The primary target audience is nontopographic 

staff/action officers (topographic customers), but others are welcome. 

These MTTs can be tailored to specific needs in each theater by adding 

MICROFIX-T, APPS, or other subjects. Make your need known early; 

contact your local topographic officer or the DMS registrar, AV 354-2383, 

commercial (703) 664-2383. 

4 ENGINEER No. I. 1987 
Department of Combined Arms (DCA) 


Commandant's 	 The first Commandant's Award for Excellence in Writing was presented 

Writing Awards 	 to CPT John McElree, EOAC class 7/86, on 12 October 1986. The second 

award was given to CPT Kenneth Bunning, USMC, on 5 December 1986. Presented: 	 CPT Edward Ching, EOAC class 9/86, received the third award on 30 

January 1987. Sponsored bythe Association oftheunited States Army, the 

award is a placlue given to the advanced course student who produces the 

best research paper on the topic of his choice. 

New Training- 	 Engineer lieutenants will face the myriad challenges posed by the 

New Manuals: 	 Brigade Engineer better prepared, thanks to recent doctrinal changes in 

training and doctrinal writing efforts made by the Tactics, Training, and 

Doctrine Division of DCA. On the training side, 39 hours of instruction on 

engineer and manuever tactics have been added to the EOBC and grouped 

with existing lessons to form a 118-hour module known as "Task Force 

Engineer." This. coupled with new efforts in doctrinal literature, will give 

the Engineer lieutenant many of the tools necessary to be both a platoon 

leader and battalion staff officer. 

Additionally, DCAis developing two new manuals to address needs from 

the field. FC 5-102-1, Transition to Defense, covers the critical period of 

transition in which the engineer is faced with multiple requirements and 

little time to complete them. FC 90-13-1. Obstacle Breaching Procedures, 

bridges the gap between FC 90-13, Counterobstacle and River Crossing 

Operations, and engineer drills. 

Thoughts from 	 The booklet Reflections: GeneralBruce C. Clarke's Thoughtson Creating 

a Distinguished 	 Outstanding Units, an anthology assembled from the many work8 of 

General Bruce C. Clarke, former Commander in Chief, USAKEUK, is now Engineer: 	 available from DCA. To order a copy, contact: Director. Department of 

Combined Arms, USAES, ATTN: ATZA-TC-C, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060- 

5341. For more information on the availability of this book, contact 

Department of Combined Arms, AV 354-4991, commercial (703) 664-4991. 

Department of 

~ilitar~ Engineering (DME) 

Dynamite and TNT The Army is no longer procuring military dynamite and TNT. ProcureStores to be Depleted: ment of C-4 will be continued to meet all engineer needs. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 5 
F"r School News 

Directorate of 


Training and Doctrine (DOTD) 


Manuals Being 	 Field circulars for FM 5-71-100. Engineer Operations in Support of Close 

Developed: 	 Combat Heauy Forces, andFM5-71-101, Engineer Opcrationsin Supportof 

Close Combat Light Forces, are scheduled to be published in FY 88. FM 

5-100-16, Engineer Operations. Echelons Ahooe Corps, currently being 

developed hy DME, will beout in field circular format during4th quarter FY 

87, with the FM to be fielded in FY 88. 

Directorate of 


Combat Developments (DCD) 


Engineer Functional Afterfine-tuningat the8 January Proponent/ARSTAFbriefing, the 1987 

Area Assessment 	 Engineer Functional Area Assessment was presented to the Army Vice 

Update: Chief of Staff on 29 January 1987. In addition to representatives of the 

USAES, the briefing was attended by representatives from HQDA, 

TRADOC, AMC, National Guard Bureau, Chief of Army Reserves, and 

other MACOMs. 

As a result of this FAA, 62 issues involving equipment shortages. MOS 

structure imbalances, and unit conversions will be worked on hy the 

Engineer School and the various MACOMS, and progress on resolving 

these issues will be tracked at quarterly in-progress reviews. The Engineer 

School was also directed to conduct a systems program review (SPR). 

A complete list of the issues, and actions to resolve them, is available. To 

receive thislist and any other information on this FAA, contact LTC Robert 

McDonald, Department of Combined Arms, ATZA-CDO, Fort Belvoir, VA 

22060, AV 354-3182, commercial (703) fi64-31824. 

6 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
Cornbat engineers 


by CPT Joseph J. Duda 

9

In the eyes of Soviet military 

leaders, combat engineering 

is a vital asset to the national defense, both in the past and 

in current conflicts. Historical 

material in the Soviet military 

report, Combat Engineer Support, 

portrays military engineers as a 

significant factor in military successes.' This important manual 

argues that Russian and Soviet 

engineers have adapted and modernized to ensure victories and 

strengthen defenses ever since the 

time of Ivan the Terrible. 

In itself, this view yields valuable 

insight into Soviet doctrinal attitudes. It reveals a Soviet belief that 

military leaders have a history they 

mean to maintain-a history of 

continual, flexible progress toward 

mastery over the evolving military 

situation. 

PRE-SOVIET PERIOD 

Since their borders lack natural 

defensive features, the Russians 

learned early to use defensive techniques and linear terrain fortifications on a large scale. Under Peter 

the Great (1689-1725), combat engineering became a structural element 

of the Russian Army. Tsar Peter 

commissioned the first sapper company in 1713, and in 1716, he 

approved definite engineer and 

sapper missions. He also provided 

for military engineer training of 

officers in the field forces. 

ENGINEER No. 1, I987 7 
During the war against Sweden 

(1700-1721). Russian military engineers proved their worth, building 

an impregnable camp at Grodno 

and impressive fortifications at 

Kronstadt. At Poltava, their technicalinnovations in defensive fortifications ensured a Russian victory. 

Military engineering did its part 

in ripening the French for attrition 

on Russian soil during the War of 

1812, as Russian fortifications 

exhausted and bled Napoleon's 

forces at Borodino. Later, Baron 

Henri Jomini ruefully commented: 

"Russia is a country which it is easy 

to get into, but very difficult to get 

out of." 2 

In the Crimean war, Colonel Franz 

Todleben's military engineers surrounded Sevastopolwith rifle trenches and used electrically detonated 

mines to harass theenemy. Although 

the Russians were unable to break 

the siege, these fortifications held 

the British and French at bay for 11 

months? 

Despite radical changes after 1917, 

the Soviets continued to put the 

powerful lessons of defensive military engineering to good use in 

securing their borders against 20th 

century invaders. 

THE SOVIET PERIOD 

In Combat Engineer Support, 

General-Colonel Kolibernov divides 

the development of the theory and 

practice of modern engineer support 

into three periods, each of which 

saw refinement of engineer support 

to combined arms warfare. These 

are-

* The Consolidation of Bolshevik 

Control (1920 to June 1941). 

The Great Patriotic War (June 22, 

1941 to May 9,1945). 

The Postwar Period. 

Consolidation of 

Bolshevik Control 

The lessons of World War I and 

the Civil War with the White forces 

influenced Soviet military engineering during the Consolidation of 

Bolshevik Control. In 1920, the 

futmre Marshal of the Soviet Union, 

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, emphasized 

the importance of engineer 

achievements to the Workers' and 

Peasants' Red Army, saying in 

Engineer Support of Operations, 

"The senior commander. in order to 

By 1941, the 

Soviets had 

excellent theorzes 

on the engin~ 

support of ba 

However, the, 

were deficient in 

equipment and 

t7 

eer 

tttle. 

maintain full freedom of maneuver, 

must turn his main attention and 

apply his best forces and means to 

the conduct of military engineer 

affairs." 

Later, Germany and the Soviets 

cooperated on military matters 

under the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. 

Many Soviet officers attended 

German staff courses before Hitler's 

ascent to power in 1933. Although 

Stalin later executed many of these 

officers, the interchange of tactical 

ideas retained an influence. As a 

result, Soviet combat engineers 

developed techniques for employing 

antitank obstacles-small, flat 

explosive charges that could break 

the treads of armored vehicles. 

The Red Army modernized its 

combat equipment as the nation 

industrialized in the 1930s. Its field 

regulation of 1936 defined engineer 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks and areas of responsibility for different level commanders. Equipment produced to 

support these missions included 

several types of antitank mines, 

demolition charges, excavators, and 

trenching machines. 

In the Spanish Civil War (1936-

1939) and the Soviet-Finnish War 

(1939-1940), the Soviets experimented with military engineer support, developing prototypes of protectivestructuresandseveral camouflage methods. As World War I1 

approached, many of these innovations were still under development. 

The Great Patriotic War 

By 1941,the Soviets had excellent 

theories on the engineer support of 

battle. However, they were deficient 

in equipment and training. When 

the Germans attacked, pushing the 

Soviets back to the outskirts of 

Moscow and Leningrad, engineer 

support was carried out "partially 

and with inadequate skill." Still, 

engineer obstacles and support 

played a significant role in turning 

the tide of the Nazi onslaught. 

On November 28, 1941, the 

Supreme High Command issued an 

order criticizing inadequate 

organization in engineer support of 

combat operations, complaining 

that "a significant number of regimentsanddivisionsdo not know the 

elementary laws and methods of 

individual fortifications and engineer preparation of positions." The 

primary engineer support missions 

in the defense were defined as 

follows: 

Prepare field defensive areas and 

positions. 

Emplace obstacles. 

Prepare troop maneuver routes. 

The Soviets employed their restructured battalion defensive area 

at Kursk. There, when "forces employed deep echelon defense, the 

systems of trenches...p ermitted the 

successful repulse of the most powerful enemy groups, and thereafter, 

the changeover to an all-outcounteroffensive." s 

Colonel H. R. Dingler of the 

German General Staff called the 

Soviets "masters at digging in and 

erecting field foritifications. They 

are infallible at discovering positions which are essential for future 

operations." 

On July 2,1943, thesupreme High 

Command issued the order On the 

Employment and Neutralization of 

Mine Obstacles. It stated: "Unfortunately, despite two years of war 

experience, combined arms commanders still have not learned to 

correctly employ mines, and our 

engineer troops have not learned to 

secretly and quickly lay and breach 

minefields."' These deficiencies 

resulted in several innovations in 

Soviet combat engineering. 

To combat enemy tanks, the 

Soviets established mobile antitank 

reserves, including combat engineer 

8 ENGINEER No. 1, I987 
units supplied with antitank mines. 

They also created mobile obstacle 

detachments (POZ) at the regiment 

and division level. In regiments, 

fully manned POZs included a platoon of combat engineers, a wheeled 

vehicle, and 100 antitank mines. In 

divisions, they included a company 

of combat engineers, 2 vehicles, and 

300 antitank mines. 

These detachments increased the 

combat effectiveness of obstacles 

and antitank artillery weapons. The 

Sovietsalso produced mine-clearing 

devices for tanks and a bangalore 

torpedo, the UZ-1, which cleared a 

path up to 6 meters wide. Small 

sapper elements that accomplished 

many mobility missions are also 

especially interesting. Kolibernov 

notes that these combat support 

elements were predecessors of the 

current Mobility Support Detachment (OOD). 

The major engineer support missions in the offensive were-

* Prepare assembly areas. 

Clear and control passages in 

friendly and enemy obstacles. 

Provide close support of tanks in 

the attack. 

Establish and maintain crossing 

sites at water obstacles. 

Prepare routes for moving artillery and second echelon forces. 

Prepare obstacles for repulsing 

counterattacks. 

Fortify lines of advance. 

THE POSTWAR PERIOD 

Soviet combat engineer texts divide the postwar period into two 

phases. The first extends from V-E 

Notes ' E. S. Kolibernov, V. I. Kornev, 

and A. A. Soskov, Combat Engineer Support, Military Pub. Hs., 

Moscow, p. 4. Unless otherwise 

noted, all direct quotations are 

from this source. 

Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, 

and Felix Gilbert, Makers of 

Modern Strategy, edited by 

Edward M. Earle, Princeton University Press, NJ, pp. 77-92. 

Kolibernov et al., Combat Engineer Support, and Ian Hogg, The 

History of Fortification, St. 

Martin's Press, NY, NY, pp. 

148-62. 

TA 

Pe 

support ot battle zn 

modern comb 

arms operatic 

ined 

)ns. 

day to 1953. The second extends 

from 1953 to the present. 

In the first postwar phase, the 

Soviets reorganized engineer support and troop training based on the 

experiences of the Great Patriotic 

War. Offensives were to start from 

close contact with the enemy. The 

goal was to perfect engineer support 

of battle in modern combined arms 

operations. Engineer support missions were-

* Fortify defensive areas, positions, 

and assembly areas for offensive 

operations. 

Breach obstacles at the forward 

edge and to the depth of enemy 

positions. 

Create and maintain crossing 

sites at water obstacles. 

The second postwar phase, called 

the "second revolution in military 

affairs," sawthesoviets adaptcombat engineer support to the nuclear 

battlefield.8 It was assumed that 

offensives would rarely begin with 

closeenemy contact,and rear forces 

would come forward to begin the 

offensive. Engineer troops were to 

Harriet Fast Scott and William F. 

Scott, The Armed Forces of the 

USSR, 3d ed., Westview Press, 

Boulder, CO, p. 11. 

Scott and Scott, p. 11 

F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer 

Battles, Ballantine, NY, NY, p. 

195. 

'Red Army Field Regulations of 

1943,trans. by Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service, JPRSUMA-85-006, January 17,1985. 

8 William E. Odom, "Soviet Force 

Posture: Dilemmas and Direcclear the way, allowing a rapid 

advanceandpreventingdelaysthat 

could make forces vulnerable to 

weapons of mass destruction. 

The Soviets sought bothnew engineer equipment and task organizations to accomplish engineer missions on the nuclear battlefield. The 

primary missions became-

* Create fortifications to protect 

forces from the effects of nuclear 

weapons. 

Eliminate aftereffects of nuclear 

explosions. 

Prepareroutesof advancethrough 

areas of mass destruction and 

radioactive contamination. 

These complex tasks require coordination of engineer troops with civil 

defense troops? 

Soviet engineer troops are reportedly ready to perform these 

tasks. The Ministry of Defense 

paper, Red Star, often carries articles 

about the heroic exploits of combat 

engineers in Afghanistan. This 

strong focus on engineer troops at 

work in current battle situations 

shows a sober awareness that success demands further adaptation of 

engineertechniques and superb engineersupport - - to combined arms operations. 

CPTJoseph J. Duda is assigned to 

the U.S. Armv Russian Institute 

undertheFA0 trainingprogram for 

the Soviet and East European area 

specialty. He served with the 7th 

Engineer Brigade in Germany and 

the Engineer School Center and 

Training Brigades at Fort Beluoir. 

He is a registeredprofessional engineer in Virginia. 

tions," Problems of Communism, 

July-August 1985, pp. 1-14. LTG 

Odom describes the three revolutions in military thought which 

stimulated changes throughout 

the Soviet system. Although not 

directed to specifics of Soviet 

combat engineering, the article 

shows how the Sovietsrespond to 

new developments in technology 

and other factors affecting military power. 

Scott and Scott, pp. 265-66, 367, 

discuss current organization and 

missions of Soviet engineer 

troops. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 9 
The Soviet engineer 
 -"%-

,."?. -k

,..,;v"zL;; '~k In the action of the engineer troops, 

a prominent place is held by supporting 

on the terrain ...I 

N. A. Lomov 

by SFC Peter L. Runce 

9

The Soviet view of the modern 

battlefield isno different from 

our own: like us, they see a 

lethztl, fast-moving, dangerous environment. Speed, mass, breadth, 

surprise, and depth in the attack 

remain primary tenets of Soviet 

battle doctrine. Even though scenarios admit the possibility of conventional warfare, the brevity of 

nuclear battlefield time frames still 

rules. The Soviets expect to conduct 

war principally at the operational 

level, and to make high speed offensives the tour de force of their 

operational art. 

High-speed offensives rely on 

simple, easily executed tactics. On 

the modern battlefield, such tactics 

depend upon ample engineer support. This article explores the use of 

engineer elements in the Soviet 

Army's ground forces. 

ORGANIZATION 

Engineers in the Red Army 

Engineer troops in thesoviet military structure are independent of 

the service branches, reporting 

directly to the Minister of Defense. 

10 ENGINEER No. 1.1987 

Engineers maintain their own military schools system for officers. The 

Higher Military and Military Command schools are equivalent to a 

combined West Point and officer 

basic course. The Military Academy 

is roughly equivalent to a combined 

officer advanced course and CAS3. 

Still another technical engineering 

school offers a five-year curriculum. 

Theengineersprovidesupport "for 

combat operations of all services 

and service branches" and "are 

subdivided into general (combat 

engineer) and special categories 

(pontoon and bridge, assault crossing, highway, works service, camouflage, construction, and others)." 

Engineer units may be components 

of ground force units or assigned "to 

an army, front, supreme command 

reserve, navy, air, or one of the other 

services of the armed force^."^ 

In the ground forces, one engineer 

company supports each division's 

four maneuver regiments, and one 

engineer battalion supports the division. Bridging and assault crossing units excepted, Soviet engineer 

units are equipment- and personnelholding units whose subordinate 

elements are task-organized into 

specialized engineer detachments. 

The divisional engineer 

battalion 

The divisional engineer battalion 

consists of a headquarters company 

and four line companies: a sapper 

company, an engineer road company, a pontoon bridge company, 

and an assault crossing company. 

The battalion's structure and organic equipment are shown in the 

table. 

The regimental engineer 

company 

The regimental engineercompany 

is a divisional engineer battalion, 

without bridging or assault crossing 

elements. It has a headquarters and 

services platoon, a sapper minelayer 

platoon, a road-bridge platoon, and 

two sapper platoons mounted in 

personnel camen3 

Engineer detachments 

Except for bridging and assault 

crossing units, both regimental 

engineer companies and divisional 

engineer battalions organize their 
subordinate elements in the same 

way. The major detachments are the 

Movement Support Detachment 

(OOD), the Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol (IRD), the Reconnaissance/Obstacle-Clearing Detachment (OR), and the Mobile Obstacle 

Detachment (POZ)? 

The 00Dis usually built around a 

road company. It moves 1to 2 hours 

ahead of the main force, reconnoiters 

the main march route, removes 

mines and similar obstacles, bridges 

water obstacles, and marks routes 

along each main axis of advance. 

The IRD is often attached to other 

reconnaissance elements to scout 

routes of march and estimate requirements for removing obstacles. 

The OR essentially performs the 

mission of the OOD and the IRD, 

although it can operate as part of an 

OOD. 

The POZ is formed by divisional 

and regimental level engineers 

around minelayer platoons, sometimes reinforced by sappers: thePOZ 

often works with the Antitank 

Reserve, especially in the offensive. 

Based on scales of equipment, it 

appears that thedivisional engineer 

Unit Equipment 

Headquarters company 

Reconnaissance platoon 

Sapper company 

Headquarters platoon: Mine plows, mine rollers, dozer blades 

Minelayer platoon: Three GMZ self-propelled mine plows 

Sapper platoons (2): Armored personnel carriers 

Road company 

Road platoons (2): BAT-dozers, TMM truck-mounted 

scissor bridges. AVLBs, IMR engineer 

vehicles 

Bridge construction platoon: Bridging elements, crane 

Field fortification platoon: BTM or MDK ditch diggers 

Pontoon bridge company: Half-set of PMP ribbon bridge. 118 

meters of class-60 bridge, longer 

elements with lower classifications, 

or rafts of various sizes 

Assault crossing company: Twelve K-61/PTS/PTS-M tracked 

amphibious transporters 

Platoon: Three GSP-ferry sets (or two platoons, six 

GSP sets in tank divisions1 

Source: Isby. David C., Weapons and Tactics oftheSovierArmy 

(London: Jane's. 1981 ), p. 331. 

ENGINEER No. 1, 1987 11 
- - - - 

battalion is more capable of deploying both an OOD and an IRD, while 

the regimental engineer company is 

more likely to use an OR.5 

Employment of engineers 

in battle 

As the basic tactical unit of the 

Soviet ground forces, the regiment 

has its own organic engineer support. At division level, the Soviet 

commander can use his engineer 

elements to supportthe main axis of 

his advance, thus reinforcing his 

main area of interest without requiring reinforcement from the Army. 

In turn, the Army can use its engineerunits to reinforceits own major 

axis. 

Engineers in the attack 

The employment of engineer detachments is keyed to the Soviet 

preference for tactical and strategic 

surprise. The aim is to attack when 

opposing units are not in defensive 

positions, and to attack from the 

march. Thus neither side has the 

benefits of the defense, and must 

fight the Soviets' preferred type of 

combat, the meeting engagementfi 

Engineer support is designed to 

maintain the momentum of the 

Soviet advance.Thedivision deploys 

its OODs and IRDs along its major 

axis of advance, and the regiments 

put out their ORs along their major 

axes. Depending on enemy opposition, the OODs and ORs operate as 

far in advance of the major elements 

of the units as possible, preferably 

with or ahead of the marchingunit's 

advance guards. The ORs also remove obstacles to flanking or enveloping attacks? 

During the advance or attack, the 

POZ, often teamedwiththeantitank 

reserve, is usually placed centrally 

in the unit's deployment-between 

the first and second echelons. It 

counters threats to the unit's flanks 

1,squic.klv deployingantitank minefields rovrrrd hv the antitank missiles or gunsofthe antitank reserve? 

Engineers in the defense 

Eneineer elements are inteerated 

into thecombined arms operationin 

the defense. Much OOD and OR 

equipment can be used to reinforce 

defenses, although the POZ is responsible for defensive minefields 

12 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 

and demolitions while still being 

available, with the antitank reserve, 

to block penetrations into unit defensive position~.~ (See "Soviet 

Countermobility Operations," p. 14.) 

River-crossing operations 

Each Soviet division has both a 

pontoon bridge company and an 

assault crossing company. Most 

Soviet armies also have pontoon 

bridge regiments and assault crossing battalions. A typical pontoon 

bridge regiment can put in six times 

the amount of bridging the divisional engineer battalion can, while 

the assault crossing battalion normally musters 3 dozen tracked 

amphibians and up to 2 dozen GSP 

ferriesJO 

The Sovietsexercisetheirbridging 

capability often, and large river 

crossings are often a highlight of 

major exercises. In Druzhba 84, held 

in Poland, engineers accompanied 

forward detachments to the water 

obstacle. The commander decided to 

force the river obstacle under the 

cover of night. "In a very short time 

both shores of a deep water obstacle 

were linked by a pontoon bridge. 

The fording operation by mechanized and armored subunits and 

artillery lasted several hours."" 

An assault river crossing from the 

march, the preferred method, starts 

as forward detachments of the 

marching regiments and divisions 

arrive at the water obstacle, where 

they immediately attempt to seize 

bridges "and other operating 

crossings." Advance guards then 

Notes 

arrive. They destroy enemy units, 

screen approaches, and attempt to 

force a crossing, primarily with 

amphibious personnel carriers on 

the move to develop the attack in 

depth. Pontoon bridge subunits, 

moving with the forward detachments, start building bridges as soon 

as the opposite bank has been seized 

and small arms fire is no longer a 

serious danger. 

The unit main body approaches 

the water obstacles at maximum 

speed, its high crossing rate hastened by amphibious transporters 

and ferries. Tanks usually do not 

snorkle the water obsta~le.'~ 

In a deliberate river crossing, 

engineers prepare roads and crossing sites, loading points for amphibious transporters, preparation sites 

for snorkeling tanks, and points for 

unloading bridging. Most personnel 

carriers cross the river while artillery 

preparation is still raining down on 

the far bank. At the same time, 

tanks prepare to snorkel the water 

obstacles. 

As personnel carriers begin to 

secure the far bank, tanks follow 

underwater. Engineer subunits 

accompany the forward elements 

and, as they advance, begin to prepare the far bank for bridging and 

ferrying. As soon as the far bank is 

secure enough, bridge units hit the 

water. The operation then proceeds 

like the assault from the marchJ3 

Extraordinarily elaborate preparations are a matter of record. Expatriate Soviet officer Viktor 

Suvorov's book The Liberators 

N. A. Lomov (ed.), Scientific and Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Moscow, 1973 (translated and published 

by the U.S. Air Force, 1975), p. 106. 

Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the 

USSR, 3d ed., Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984, pp. 265-66. 

"avid C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, Jane's, 

London, 1981, p. 331. 

Ibid, pp. 327-29. 

5 	Peter L. Bunce, "The Soviet Reaction to a Flank Threat," Armor, 

November-December 1985, pp. 28-29. 

"harles Dick, "Concepts of Operation: Organization, Plans, and 

Pros~ects." and Christo~her Donnellv. ". "The Face of the Future 

att tie field," lectures presented at the Royal United Services Institute 

for Defense Studies, 1 March 1984. From unofficial notes by the 

author. 
I 

Engineer Problem 

During a bridge reconnaissance. you gather the appropriate 

information needed to design a Bailey bridge. The required 

crossing classification is 60 traffic. Determine the following: 

1. Initial bridge length. 58' *I 

2. Construction type. 

3. Initial grillage type. 

4. Roller clearance. Near side 

5. New bridge length. - 6. New truss type. 

REFERENCE: FM 5-277, Bailey Bridge, Chapter 4 	 Bank soil is hard 

consolidated clay. 

Problem/Solution submitted by CPT Sreven W. Chandler, 

Departmenf of Mllltary Eng~neering. 

reports that in a river-crossing exer- Soviet engineering troops are previous assignments include duty 

cise, on the Dnepr in 1967, the perhaps the world'slargest andmost as an intelligence analyst for 4th 

Soviets actually paved the river. In lavishly supported engineer corps. En, 69th Armor and 4th Brigade, 

fact, steel mesh was placed on the They are a critical forcemultiplier in 4th ID(M), and a number of cavalry 

river bed and concretepanelsformed the high-speed offensive, the center- positions in 7th, IOth, and 11th 

corridors across the river bank. The piece of Soviet operational art. Well- Armored Cavalry in Germany, and 

panels prevented snorkeling tanks supported with a variety of special- 11th Armored Cavalry in Vietnam. 

from becomingdisoriented. Thesteel ized engineer equipment and fielded He has also served with 13th Engimesh on the river bottom was used in greater force than most of their neers as a CEV commander and 

to support thelarge number of tanks Western counterparts, Soviet engi- reconnaissance sergeant. SFC 

(5,187)expected to cross the riverJ4 neering troops are formidable Bunce received his BA in history 

This feat, propagandaploy though opponentson themodern battlefield. from Chapman College in 1982, and 

it may have been, was nevertheless his MA in international relations 

an impressive engineer achieve- Sergeant First Class Peter L. from Southern California in 1984. 

ment. Other exercises, such as Bunce is the Squadron Intelligence He is also a recent graduate of the 

Druzhba 84, suggest that Soviet Sergeant for 2d Squadron, 3d Operations and Intelligence Course 

river-crossing methods are effective. Armored Cavalry Regiment. His at the USA Sergeants Major 

Academy. 

Bunce, pp. 28-29. 

Isby, p. 329. 

lo Ishy, p. 331. 

"Warsaw Pact Exercise in Poland." Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 

August, 1984, pp. 230-31. 

l2 	A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, Moscow, 1970 (translated and published by the U.S. Air Force, 1976), pp. 194-95. 

l3 Sidorenko, pp. 197-99. 

l4 Viktor Suvorov, The Liberators, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1981, p. 

70. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 13 
by COL Frederick E. Parker, 111 

9

As a Soviet force prepares to 

mount an assault, units move 

forward to form-up areas. 

Each subelement commander's initial activity is to identify defensive 

positions for his weapon systems. 

Crews and engineer equipment operators begin to dig defilade positions 

for weapons; they keep digging until 

the assault begins. In the form-up 

area, the commander develops a fire 

plan and chooses locations for engineer obstacles. The unit now has 

fall-back defensive positions and a 

detailed plan to be used if the initial 

attack fails. As part of the fire plan, 

engineer obstacle sites are chosen 

along the avenue of advance to deny 

mobility to opposing forces. 

This typical countermobility 

operation is an integral part of the 

planning and execution of all aspects of Soviet operations. 

Soviet engineer ohstacles 

Engineer obstacles include any 

actions taken to inflict losses and to 

delay and impede movement in all 

types of battles. Their obstructive 

effect is directed against land forces, 

watercraft, and helicopters. In the 

attack and in meeting engagements, 

Threat obstacles cover forward areas 

and flanks, repel counterattacks, 

and strengthen captured positions. 

In the defense, where they cover 

strong points and reinforce natural 

obstacles, engineer obstacles have 

added importance-here, the ability 

to make more extensive use of them 

is a major advantage. 

Emplaced obstacles repel the 

enemy, reduce the tempo of the 

attack, and impede enemy operations. They are built to conform to 

terrain, current weather conditions, 

and prevailing climatic conditions. 

Designed to remain firm against 

enemy fire power and breaching 

efforts, obstacles must allow the 

attack force to remain mobile and 

must work as an integral part of the 

fire plan. 

Explosive ohstacles arecreated by 

means of high explosives, liquid 

explosives, and mines. Nonexplosive 

obstacles, such as wire obstacles, 

earth works, abatis, and dragons' 

teeth, are constructed. 

Mixed minefields, discussed at 

length below, are the primary obstacle used by Soviet forces in combined arms battle. They can be 

quickly emplaced, and they are 

difficult to breach. In front of protectivepositions and entrenchments, 

they automatically create effective 

combined obstacles. 

Obstacle complexes-natural and 

engineer obstacles clustered in a 

relatively small area-deny use of 

critical avenues of approach. An 

engineer company may prepare a 

system of obstacle complexes on 

avenues of approach up to 30 kilometers long, particularly on constricted roadways. The company 

startsat the front and works toward 

the rear. At naturally constricted 

areas, obstacle complexes tie the 

natural obstacle to a series of point 

obstacles such as road craters, 

bridge demolitions, off-route mines, 

and small minefields that block 

approaches and bypasses. 

Antitank (AT) ditches may be 

mechanically dug after all survivability positions are prepared. In 

some terrains, antitank ditches are 

created by use of explosives. This 

methodisused in the hard ground of 

clay/rock desert areas, in frigid 

northern regions, and in coastal 

areas, where such ditches are less 

vulnerable to wave action than 

mines. 

Mixed minefields 

Since mixed minefields are the 

most commonly encountered Threat 

obstacle, they deserve close examination. Threat mixed minefields 

differ from their U.S. counterparts. 

in which antitank and antipersonnel 

(AP) mines are often placed in the 

same minefield. Instead, the Soviets 

lay a mixture of antitank and antipersonnel fields. Antipersonnel 

fields, laid in front of Soviet forces 

and antitank minefields, are intended to strip the infantry and 

engineer breaching elements from 

attacking enemy tank forces. 

The basic characteristics of mixed 

14 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
minefieldsare their density and their 

mine outlay. In Soviet minefield Typical antitank minefield 

doctrine, the term density is used to 

express the amount of position rrond )O - 300 me ,ters 

frontage protected by minefield Depth j0 - 120 me .ters 

obstacles, in meters. Mine outlay Distance bt.~wat.~ L ~ S !O - 40 meters

expresses the number of mines per 

kilometer of minefield. 

Number of ---..- '"wm <, 

2 n--+* "a - -2 'L.=L.zL.,

I etween mi 4 - 6 for antltank m ines 

Soviet minefields do not form a 

long, thin line. They are a series of 

short interrelated obstacles placed 

across tank approaches. Some Soviet 

authors indicate that spacing between minefields should prevent 

attacking tank platoons from 

clearing the gap, but that friendly 

movement should be possible to 

units that know where the gaps are. 

Minefield laying methods 

The mixed minefield may be laid 

by hand, machine, or remote means, 

andis alwayscovered by fire. Mixed 

minefields are emplaced by both 

engineers and combined arms elements. Engineers and remote minelaying systems are responsible for 

minefields in front of the forward 

9 - 12 for antihull m ines 

( 550 - 750 ant~track ml nes 

Outlay "In 1,000 + antitr:ack 

effectlve 500 + ant~hr111 

Probabihtj approxlmately 0.57 antitrack (75C ?,or A .,~~~,, ,.,,A, destructrun normal ' approximately u no anrlnuli tztuu/ 

pical anti 

10 - 300 mt ""A-


lepth LO - 50 met ers 

Ilistance b etween ro. 5 meters ()r more 

Ilistance b eween mir I meter fc Ir high ex1 . . .. 2 tlmes letnal raalu 

fragmelltation 

Outlay "normal" &,"do- 3,000 f or high ex plosive <..",....".., 300 for . 100 - lLaw..,c.,. atlon

Outlay "m creased 2 - 3 tlmef 

effectlveness" 

Probabiht:i of 5 to 12 for HE (2,00O/krn) 

edge of battle and on primary 

avenues into formations.-Combat 

destruct1on to 0.15 for Frag (100/km) 

arms elements emplace obstacles to 

cover positions and occupied areas. 

Whenever possible, minefields are 

emplaced at night in order to achieve 

surprise throughout the defense. 

Combat arms units hand emplace 

minefields in front of the forward 

edge of their position. In contact, 

antitank minefields are emplaced 

using a mine cord laid perpendicular 

to the front. When the unit is not in 

contact with the enemy, mine cords 

arelaidparallel to thefront.Atrench 

is dug to establish a startinglinefor 

minelaying. Combat arms crews 

may also use a pace method. 

A temporary combat formation 

known as the mobile obstacle construction detachment (POZ) is an 

important Soviet engineer force 

element. This is a platoon-sized to 

company-sized element with minelaying equipment and logistics 

vehicles that carry explosives and 

mines. A typical regimental POZ 

with three towed mineplows (PMR) 

carries 1,200 AT mines, 2,000 AP 

mines, 3tons of high explosives, and 

10 to 20 shaped charges. The POTS 

The POZ creates obstacle complexes and defensive obstacles, and 

lays mines during battle. While it 

acts independently to establish obstacles in defensive preparations, 

the POZ usually works with the 

antitank reserve during a battle. 

Potential obstacle emplacement 

locations are designated forthe PO2 

at each halt during movement. The 

detachment receives straightforward orders-"place an antitank 

minefield from that barn to that 

clump of trees." 

Engineer-sapper units emplace 

mines beyond the forward edge of 

battle positions. Mechanical minelayers, trucks, armored vehicles, and 

helicopters with chutes supplement 

hand emplacement. Mechanical 

minelayers work at rates of 600 

buried mines per hour to 2,500 

surface-laid mines per hour. Thus a 

POL equipped with threeminelayers 

could, in 15 minutes, lay a buried 

minefield covering 1 kilometer or 

surface lay a similar minefield in 5 

minutes. 

The Soviet obstacle defense is 

avenues of approach, obstacles are 

emplaced by remote means or by 

inserted obstacle detachments, 

partisans, or special operations 

teams. Terrain and combat situation 

always dictate the method for 

mining and the distance between 

rows. False minefields may conceal 

minefield locations and obstacle 

systems. 

Armies that oppose Soviet or 

Soviet-trained forces can expect to 

meet obstacle systems that enhance 

natural obstacles and show the 

imaginative use of explosives and 

mines. 

COL Frederick E. Parker, III is 

the U.S. Army Engineer School 

Director of Combat Developments. 

He has served in diuisional, corps, 

and combat heavy battalions and 

on corps, major Army Command, 

and HQDA staff. 

load may be greater under some characteristically deep, andextends 

circumstances. into their rear area. On dangerous 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 15 
AirLand Battle Doctrine 

-the Red Army responds ~.. 

&,.I........ -> 


by CPT F. Michael Real 

After watching the Red Army 

operate under a first strike 

The Red Army Response 

The Soviet prescription for successful attack requires heavily 

massed forces. It defines a 3 to 1 

....~,. - r '...'.,<".,', 

.. -.._,,-, .. ,:,a--::t-.-*.~. . 'I. ..':,-; : ratios of up to 8 to 1 to assure ...... I : ii, 3+ , !-.. ....... . .L.;.;~.!. <. < .....:.

: : success-they expect heavy losses 
 ,__>..- . - h 

.+,.:,;.. ;--.*s :. z--. . - .*., . *,>2!:.? ,Y 7, . ' . ' ,. on the AirLand Battlefield. .... ..,. ............ -.--.$*.':'- :.~ *'. .... 
 .... ...........<:. .?.,:. . , ...>n,. 

... .

.;,*.,, 

..; 

... ,-, :: , , , . - , Warsaw Pact materiel superiority .. ,. . : . ..l*


. , ..,_ . ... . ~:., :.-..I . ...... over NATOforces actually runs at a . . ...... * ...... ...... ......... . 
 .......... . ,.. , ratio of only 2 to 1.Attacks must be 
 . 

<. .... 

. .. '. . ,, ; concentrated if the Soviets are to 

To maintain the attack on the 

reconnaissance, to overcome obare critical to coordinating a combined arms attack, protecting them 

must now be a top priority task? 

The Red Army is also taking steps 

to enhance the survivability of 

attacking elements. More traffic 

areas infested with remotely delivered mines. More elaborate 

camouflage, deployments concentrated in radar dead space, and 

heavier terrain fortifications can 

also be expected. 

Troops may be more dispersed, 

achievedesiredstrength. Elsewhere and armor is unlikely to be openly 

16 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
deployed in columns in the rear 

areas. Tactics to protect armored 

vehicles and self-propttlledwenpons 

rcportt!dlv includt~st~ttingsm:rll fires 

along advance routes, to draw heatseeking munitions away from their 

intended target^.^ 

The Engineers' Role 

The Soviets are building an increased engineer capability to fight 

the AirLand Battle. In the past, Red 

Army doctrine has placed engineers 

squarely in the front lines. In rear 

areas, engineer tasks centered on 

water supply and logistical mobility. 

Now Soviet concern for survivability, mobility, andcountermobility in 

depth calls for combat engineer 

presence through the entire battle 

area. This includes-

* Greatly increased earthmoving 

and entrenching capabilities to 

enable armor and troops to dig in 

as a defense against deep strike 

munitions. 

Increased countermine assets in 

response to FASCAM, deployed 

around assembly and supply 

areas and lines of communication 

to counter FASCAM and other 

rear area obstacles. 

Highly mobile engineer teams 

available to support gap-crossing 

sites throughout the battle area, 

and stockpiles of structural assets 

near all likely crossing sites to 

respond to expected accurate, 

deep strikes against bridge and 

crossing sites. 

Implications for the West 

The message is this-the Soviets 

are on to us. They are moving to 

adopt strategies and weapon systems similar to our own. They are 

diagnosing our tactics to invent 

defenses that can degrade our 

effectiveness-and countermeasures 

that can cripple an attack. 

On the positive side, AirLand 

Battle doctrine is causing the 

Warsaw Pact armies to invest 

heavily in defensive equipment, 

personnel, and strategy for the first 

time in 30 years. 

But the Soviets have consistently 

found ways to restructure and redeploy their assets in order to 

counter powerful enemies. If we are 

to maintain the offensive strategy 

inherent in AirLand Battle doctrine, 

we can't let our tactics become stale 

formulas, or assume that our defenses are impregnable. 

Today, we hold theinitiative. Only 

continued inventiveness will allow 

us to keep it. 

CPT F. Michael Real is Threat 

Manager, Directorate of Combat 

Developments, USAES. He has also 

served as Brigade Engineer Company Commander and S4 with the 

lOthEngineerBattalion,3d Infantry 

Division in Germany, as a Souiet 

Engineer Intelligence Analyst at 

FSTC, and Platoon Commander, 

XO, and assistant S3 in the 4th 

Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson. 

CPTReal has a B.S. in Geology from 

Weber State College, and is a graduate of EOAC, the Joint Intelligence 

Managers Course, and the CGSC. 

Penelope Schmitt is Features 

Editor for ENGINEER. 

' Engineer Support of Combat in Special Conditions, 1985; translated 

from Russian by U.S. Army Foreign Science andTechnology Center, 

FSTC-HT-1024-85(August 1986). 

Sally Stoecker, "Soviets Plan Countermeasures to FOFA," International Defense Reuiew, November 1986, p. 1607. 

Engineer Support of Combat in Special Conditions, p. 175. 

For a recent discussion of thisissue, see MG Thomas S.Swalm, USAF, 

"AirLand Battle Doctrine and the C3CM Strategy," AirLand Bulletin 

No. 86-4,31 December 1986, pp. 6-10. 

Stoecker, p. 1608. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 17 
Water supply to 

Soviet ground 

forces 


Conflicts are won as much by ;1;1knowledgeoftheenemy as by 

forceof arms. Although this 

pmnary principle of military education is often invoked, we seldom give 

Threat combat servicesupport activities the scrutiny they deserve. A 

moment's reflection makes it clear 

that support is vital to the success of 

any mission, and should draw as 

much attention as we give, say, the 

Soviet second echelon. An important 

and often neglected aspect of such 

support is water supply. Disrupting 

or degrading this essential supply 

could severely impede a Threat 

offensive. 

USING WATER 

Water is of the utmost importance 

to combat units. An adult's normal 

physiological water requirement is 

about 3 liters a day, but the body 

may demand 10 to 12 liters to do 

stressful work in high ambient 

temperatures. 

The Soviets reflect these needs in 

precise water-use norms. For combat 

personnel, their norm is 10 liters per 

day; in high temperatures, 15 liters. 

A division may use up to 150,000 

liters of drinking water daily. Under 

adverse conditions-especially in 

contaminated or arid areas-water 

is issued at the minimum rates of 2.5 

liters per person (for no more than 5 

days in moderate conditions) and 4 

liters (for no more than3daysin hot 

weather). 

The Soviet consumption norm for 

sanitation and bathing is 45 liters 

per person per day. A division will 

use 675,000 liters per day for these 

processes. 

Impotable water can be used to 

decontaminate and disinfect weapons, equipment, and supplies. The 

Soviets have developed detailed 

water normsforthese tasks, ranging 

trom .5 liters for cleaning an assault 

riflc with damocloths to 600 to 1.000 

liters to decontaminate a vehicle 

with a water jet. 

Amounts needed for simple washing and vehicle supply include 75 

liters to wash a wheeled vehicle and 

an estimated 1.5 liters a day to keep 

its radiator filled. 

SUPPLYING WATER 

Soviet water supply doctrine 

covers both potable and impotable 

water, and states that the threat of 

"enemy use of mass destruction 

weapons" (NBC weapons) creates 

an urgent need to hold adequate 

supplies in both water-abundant 

regions and desert and semiarid 

areas. This doctrine indicates preparedness for large-scale contamination of open water reservoirs and 

other sources. 

Tasks that support water supply 

to troops in the field are divided 

among various units. Reconnaissance and acquisition of water 

sources and water purification are 

performed by the unit's organic 

engineer component. At regimental -

level, this means a company of about 

60; at division level, a battalion; and 

at army level, a regiment. 

Equipping the water supply point 

and distributing water are engineer 

functions. Thechief of the Chemical 

Service and the Senior Regimental 

Surgeon maintain constant dosimetric, chemical, and sanitary 

control over water quality. The NBC 

instructor, dosimetry officer, and 

chief paramedical officer (Feldsher) 

of the battalion monitor water 

sources. These organizations often 

conduct water reconnaissance 

activities. The using units must 

protect and maintain their water 

distribution points and equipment. 

Water supply and 

distribution points 

Water supply points at water 

sources are often set up close to the 

battalion. Detachments that operate 

separately from the main forces 

receive water and hot food at the 

same time. In the defense, it is considered expedient to put supply 

points in the various company or 

battery areas, inside or near the 

defensive perimeter. When arid 

conditions, scarcity, or contamination make it impossible for battalions to have individual water 

supply points, troops receive water 

from water distribution points. 

These supplies of transported water 

reserves are located in or near the 

regimental area. 

Criteria for selecting a water 

supply point include not only the 

quantity and quality of the water, 

but also the availability of sidings, 

suitable roads, and protective and 

camouflaging terrain. Soldiers set 

up asanitized protective zone with a 

radius of 50 to 100 meters around 

each point. Markers and/or signs 

indicate the points, distribution 

locations, and accessroutes. Control 

posts are set up on the approaches. 

On rivers and streams, water distrihution has these priorities: water 

supply points, bath facilities, water 

for animals, and vehicle washing. 

Bunkers and trenches protect personnel and equipment near the 

supply point, and all equipment is 

camouflaged. 

Drilling for water 

Soviet doctrine encourages use of 

18 ENGINEER No. 1, 1987 
surface water and existing water 

networks because of the ease of 

supply. When these sources are 

unavailable, the army is fully prepared to drill for water. 

Threedrills available in the Soviet 

inventory are the MsChak-15, UDV15, and UDV-20. All are auger-type 

power drills operated by two men. 

Each can extractwater at a depth of 

15 meters. Thesedrills have a special 

tap for breaking rock and a built-in 

filter and piston pump that makes 

newly-drilled wells productive 

immediately. 

The MsChak-15 can be set up in 

1.5to 2.5 hours by two soldiers, and 

can extract 1,300 liters per hour. The 

UDV-15 can be emplaced in 1to 2 

hours by two people and will produce 

2,000 liters per hour. The UDV-20 

canextract water at arateof 1,800 to 

2,000 liters per hour. 

Pumping equipment 

The Soviets use several pumps. 

The small tubular pump, MTK-2M, 

can be used for ground water up to 7 

meters below the surface, pumping 

water 10 to 20 meters above the 

surface. The pump can be set up by 

three or four men in 3 to 4 hours; it 

extracts 1,300 liters per hour. 

For open basins or wells with a 

maximum depth of 6 meters, the 

Soviets use the BKE-4 pump, its 

capacity is 2,400 to 3,600 liters per 

hour. Two soldiers can set up this 

pump in 20 minutes. 

The M-600 motor pump is used to 

pump water from large basins. Its 

12-horsepower engine pumps 3,600 

liters per hour with a crew of two. 

The KPN piston pump can pump 

5,000liters per hour from shafts over 

150 millimeters in diameter. Its 

workable depth is 90 meters. 

Storage equipment 

For water storage, Soviet forces 

use flat containers of rubberized 

fabric with the designations RDV5000, RDV-3000, RDV-1500, RDV100, and RDV-12. The numbers 

indicate liter capacity. The 5,000- 

and 3,000-liter tanks are protected 

with attached covers, while the 

necks of the smaller tanks are tied 

for protection. 

These tanks are disinfected and 

set up at water distribution points in 

enclosed sites on level areas cleared 

of objects that might puncture the 

fabric. If extended storage is planned, troops cover the soil beneath 

the tanks with hoards, straw, and 

rushes. 

0therwnte.r-holding devices in the 

Soviet invrntorv include the ,\\'TS28 tank trailerU(2,800 liters), RTS1200 tank cistern (1,200 liters) RE6000 tank (6,000 liters), BTR-100 

tank (100 liters), and RB-12.5 backpack wineskin (12.5 liters). 

Purifying water 

To keep water potable over an 

extended period, it is chlorinated up 

to 0.8 to 1.2 milligrams per liter. 

Boiled water can be stored for a day, 

then it must be boiled again or 

chlorinated. To distill water, the 

Soviets use the POU and POU-4, 

each of which can produce 300 liters 

per hour of fresh water. The OPS, a 

truck-mounted distiller, can produce 

1,800 liters per hour. Each of these 

devicesrequires a set-up time of 90 to 

120 minutes. 

The MAFS-l 'Itration 

station is one of several items the 

Soviets use to purify ground and 

surface water. This purification 

system can supply up to 2,000 cubic 

meters per hour and requires a fiveman crew and driver. Water is 

pumped from the source to rubherized fahric tanks where coagulation 

and sedimentation take place. It is 

then pumped to the MAFS-1 unit 

where it is filtered, decontaminated 

by activated carbon and/or ion 

exchange, chlorinated, dechlorinated if necessary, and then stored 

in other rubberized fabric tanks for 

distribution. 

The MAFS-2 can purify water 

uncontaminated by radioactivity at 

a rate of 8,000 liters per hour and 

radioactive contaminated water at a 

rate of 4,000 liters per hour. The 

MAFS-3 is a truck-mounted filtration station which can purify 

naturally, chemically, and radioactively contaminated water. 

Assembled on a truck and two-axle 

trailer, the MAFS-3 consists of a 

filter, 2 dechlorinators, 3 M-600 

motor pumps, RDV-5000 rubberized 

tanks, instruments, and filtering 

agents. Production rates are 7,000 to 

8,000 liters per hour. 

Clearly Soviet water supply doctrine plans meticulously for the 

tactical problems related to water 

supply just as they have for other 

combat service support functions. 

In the Soviet Army nothing is left to 

chance. However, war is often ruled 

by the unanticipated. It seems likely 

that the realities of battle could upset 

these rigid norms and jeopardize 

Threat operations. This is NATO's 

challenge. 

Dr. Donald E. Nease is an Intelligence Research Specialist. Threats 

Directorate, ConbinedArmsCenter, Fort KS. 

ENGINEER No. 1, 1987 19 
SOVIET 


ENGINEER EQUIPMENT 


by SFC Peter L. Bunce 

9

Soviet engineer units are 

lightly manned compared to 

U.S. units. Regimental engineer companies have60 to 70officers 

and men; divisional engineer battalionsin tank divisions have about 

30 officers and 400 men.' This 

compares to about 150 in a U.S. 

Army engineer company and about 

900 in a divisional combat engineer 

battalion. 

Equipment makes up the difference-Soviet engineer units have 

more machines, and they arehighly 

specialized (see the table).2 This 

article reviews thecharacteristicsof 

newer andimportant systemsin the 

Soviet engineer components. 

TMM-heavy truck-mounted 

bridge. The TMM has advantages 

over the AVLB, which the Soviets 

also field. The TMM functions on 

softer ground and spans wider gaps 

than AVLBs. (The British Chieftain 

Mk. 6 spans the widest gap for an 

AVLB-20-meters). The truckmounted TMM is lighter, and still 

puts out a class 60 bridge. TMM 

sections can be joined to form a 40- 

meter span-the job takes 45 to 60 

minutesin daylight, 60 to 80 minutes 

at night. Each regimental engineer 

company has a four-vehicle set, each 

divisional engineer battalion has 

two (six per division total). 

GMZ-self-propelled, armored 

mineplow vehicle. Based on the SA4 GANEF chassis, the GMZ carries 

208 antitank mines. It can bury four 

mines a minute, 4 to 5.5 meters 

apart. It reloads in 12 to 15minutes. 

The GMZ is held by sapper companies in divisional engineer battali on^.^ GMZs are the core of 

divisional POZs, and probably work 

closely with divisional antitank 

assestslikethe MT-12 100millimeter 

antitank gun. 

20 ENGINEER No. I, 1987 

IPR-underwater reconnaissance 

vehicle. Apparently based on the 

251 122-millimeter, self-propelled 

howitzer chassis, tbeIPRis thought 

to have internal ballast tanks and 

cowled propellers that enable it to 

move across the bottom of water 

obstacles. Its 10-meter snorkel and 

pennantsallowittomarklanes.The 

poweruperatedshovel-likedeviceon 

the hull front mav enable it to take 

river-bed and bank samples. No 

basis of issue is yet known, but IPRs 

might be usedin the reconnaissance 

platoons of divisional engineer battalion headquarters companies? 

UR-77-tracked self-propelled 

line charge vehicle. Rocket-propelled 

line charges are a rapid mineclearing method; the best known of 

theseis the British Giantviper. The 

UR-77 is a dedicated line-charge 

vehicle that appears to be based on a 

2S1 chassis. A photograph published 

in 1983 in Steven J. Zaloga's Soviet 

Tank Today shows a 2S1-likevehicle 

with a rocket-propelled line charge 

being fired, apparently in Czech 

service. If this is the UR-77, it may 

replace the BTR-50K line charge 

first identified in 1974.5 

Notes 

Force Modernization 

The recent appearance of the 

MT-T tracked transporter has led to 

a number of new engineer vehicles. 

The MT-T has theT-64 tank suspension and thelate model T-72 engine. 

It appears to be a heavy artillery 

prime mover, like the older AT-T 

family. A new BAT-2 combat dozer 

(replacing BAT and BAT-M), a new 

PTS-2 tracked am~hibian(re~1acine 

MDK-2 and MDK~M) ha;e already

appeared with the MT-T as foundation.6 Since the IMR combat engineer tractor is based on the 

obsolescent T-55 chassis, an IMR-2 

may reasonably be expected to 

appear before long. 

Anew bridgefamily, the Amphibious Bridging System (Tracked) or 

ABS(T) recently appeared in the 

Group of Soviet Forces, Germany 

(GSFG). Dual pontoons mounted on 

a tracked amphibian chassis fold 

out before the vehicle enters the 

water, where it can link up with 

other ABS(T) units to form bridges 

or rafts.7 The ABS(T) may be a 

replacement for the PMP ribbon 

bridge, the GSP heavy ferry, orboth. 

Clearly, the Soviet engineerforces 

David C. Isby, Weapons and Tacticsof theSoviet Army, Jane's,London, 


1981, p. 331. 


Isbv. DD. 331-43. 


3 "GMZ Tracked Minelayer," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 2, no. 5, 11 

August 1984, p. 187. 


"IPR Amphibious Engineer Vehicle," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 3, no. 


3,19 January 1985, p. 99. 


"New Soviet Transporters," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 6, no. 1,12 July 


1986, pp. 18-19. Stephen J.Zaloga, Soviet Tanks Today, Tanks Illustrated 


No. 4. Arms and Armor Press, London, 1983, p. 42. 


"New Soviet Transporters." 


"New Soviet Amphibious BridgingSystem," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 


6. no. 2, 19 July 1986, p. 70. 
field an impressive array of special- test, and deploy new systems to SFC Peter L. Bunce is the 

izedequipment. Someofthesystems enhance the engineer contribution Squadron Intelligence Sergeant for 

offer capabilities not matched by on the AirLand battlefield. And we 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry 

the NATO armies' engineer assets. must field a capable, well-trained Regiment. 

The challenge to the west is mani- engineer force that mans wellfold. We must ensure that our current maintained and skillfully operated 

inventory of equipment can be used equipment. 

to its fall capacity. We must design, 

Comr IATO 

Spectallzea tnglneer tqulpr nent ..

(less militarized civilian equip mentl . ., 

West 

British Germany T~~IICII 

rea venlcie Iauncnea IVI I U-LU lvlaunl nvLa Cliteft: in AVLB Bi ber 

Mk. 6 

Truck Launched E TMM/KI 

IMR nrT 

Combat Englneer Veh~cle M728 CEV Centurion Mk. 5 

(Dem o bun) - 'AVRE

D~tching Machine (Narrow) 

Ditch~ng Machine IWid~l ,....., ...-..-.. 

Combat Dozer BAT-M/l M9 ACE 

Wheeled Doze1 PKT 

Floating Pontoon Bridge PMP Ribbon Bridge R~bbon Bridge PFM 

Self-propelled Ferry GSP CEFA 

,, *. ,". Track ius Transporl 

self-p~"v~~l~" urn1 dge/Ferry MAB

Underwater Recot IPR 

Vehtc le 

Veh~cle-mounted Mine Detector DIM/DIM-7 

Towe'd Mine Plow PMR 3 Bar M ine Plough 

,.mn"l,oA h","~, Self-i.,urc8rcu r.~~18G~low GMZ 

e-charge 

Towed/Dragged Line Charge Giant Vinpr 

Helicopter Minela yers HIP Mine Chutes 

Mine Scatter Syst em MI28 GEMSS Range M548GA1 MiWS 

Mine Roller Syste Tank-mount1 

Mine Roller 

M~ne Plow System KMT-4/ Track-width ......" .'lough 

Mine Plow 

Tank-mounted Do zer Blade IBTU M60A3 Doze r Chieft;$in Dozer 

ENGINEER No. 1, I987 21 
The 

one-hour 

minefield a rapid drill for 

by CPT Philip L. Reed 

The maneuver farce commander 

points to a spot on,his map. "We 

need an obstacle here," he tells the 

engineer. Their objective-to block 

the primary high-speed armor 

avenue of approach into the forcecan best bemet by alargeminefield. 

But there are problems. This engineer has never seen a helicopterdelivered M56 mine dispenser. His 

battalion's M57 mine plow is useless 

in mud or frozen ground. Besides, 

it's rusted and parts aren't available. 

Those high tech mine systems he 

was taught at school aren't available 

either. Thereality? His platoon must 

lay mines by hand, and doing the 

job according to doctrine takes 

time-lots of time. 

Combat engineers must meet such 

problems with methods that bring 

them up tospeed with themaneuver 

forces concept of mobile armor warfare. The rapid minefield-layingdrill 

that follows is a response developed 

by personnel of B Company, 16th 

Engineer Battalion. It gives any 

mech/armor division rapid mining 

capability. Using this method, 

troops in MI13 armored personnel 

carriers can emplace multiple belts 

of surface-laid antitank mines. 

THE TASK 


Emplace a 1,000-meter front 


minefield in 1hour or less 


Conditions. Day or night. Any 


environment. Driver track com-


combat engineers or 


mechanized infantry 


mander (TC) buttoned up. Mission 

received and troop leading procedures initiated. Given a mechanized 

combat engineer platoon and its 

organic assets. 

Standards. Minefield front, 100 

meters. Minimum linear density 

.5,0,0 (at least one antitank (AT) 

mine per 2 meters of front). Rows 

must he a minimum of 8 meters 

apart at every point, and minefields I 

must be marked oa-all four sides 

(NATO requirements). Minefield 

must be emplaced within 1 hour of 

arrival at the target site. 

Resources. Four MI13 APCs with 

radios, each manned by a driver, 

TC, and two mine handlers, and 

supplied with 145 M15 heavy AT 

mines, a 10.meter length of rope, 

cargo tie-down netting, DR-8 spool 

with 1,500 meters minefield marking 

tape, and minefield marking poles 

and signs (20 each), and a 3-pound 

hammer from the hand emplaceable 

minefield marking set (HEMMS). 

PREPARE 

Load vehicles 

The engineer platoon assembles 

at the engineer company forward 

supply point (FSP), and prepares 

the platoon APCs. All equipment 

normally carried inside thevehicles, 

including seats, is removed. 

Arm, place on safe, and load the 

145 M15 heavy AT mines in each 

vehicle. Stack the mines along the 

right side wall and the front wall 

behind the driver and engine compartment. Secure the mines with 

netting, if available. Careful 

stacking and driver awareness reduces the risk of mines slipping 

duringmovement. 

Once the APCs are manned, remaining platoon personnel and 

equipment remain with theengineer 

company FSP, or proceed to construct other obstacles. 

Perform reconnaissance 

The platoon leader may conduct a 

reconnaissance of the target area in 

one of the platoon's other vehicles or 

conduct therecon when the platoon 

arrives at the target rally point (RP). 

Make a final check 

In addition to the spool and other 

optional minefield marking materials, the crew must have the 10- 

meter length of rope to trail behind 

the APC, measuring the distance 

between mines. 

Move 

The platoon moves to the rally 

point near the target, conducts final 

checks, and deploys to the minefield 

edge. The orientation and limits of 

the minefield are determined hy the 

leader's initial recon. 

22 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
EMPLACE THE MINEFIELD 

Step One: Position the vehicles 

Keying from vehicle 1 (platoon any single point is 8meters. 

leader), vehicles 2,3, and 4 follow at At the halt, without commands, a 

a 20- to 30-meter interval, then turn soldier in each APC emplaces one 

and halt (figure 1).Remember, the pole, drops the 10-meter rope (tied to 

minimum distance between rows at the towing pintle) from the rear door, 

Step Two: Lay mines - Platoon leader in APC 1 slowly desired. Drivers of vehicles 2,3, and 

drives forward, (2 to 3 miles per 4 align from the vehicle to the 

hour!. Other APCs follow, keeping driver's left. 

the 20- to 30-meter interval. Each Vehicles 1 and 4 place intervehicle places its next mine when mediate poles approximately 50 

the end of the trailing rope reaches meters apart, depending upon terthe previously emplaced mine. Per- rain (figure 1). This marks the front 

fect alignment is not necessary or and rear edge of the minefield andis 

Figure 1 

*+Ix. . . . .X . . . . .X 

A~rnpo~nt 

for I .mine x pole IAPC V mlne mark~ng signs 

Step Three: Mark 

When the APCs reach the far side serving the other vehicles, and 

of the minefield, the platoon leader records the minefield on DA Form 

halts, waits fur all other vehicles to 1355,Minefield Record. 

come on line and halt, then orders Vehicle 2 moves and marks side D 

"MARK." All four APCs then place (figure 2); vehicle 3 marks side C; 

one pole. and vehicle 4 marks sides A and B. 

The platoon leader in vehicle 1 A fenceis thuscreated by planting a 

moves to the best position for ob- pole, attaching marking tape to the 

Figure 2 

Side A (Enemy) 

x - - L x _ -L- - x ... . r 

I 

arms and lays the first mine. Each 

mine is placed by a mine handler 

sitting just inside the rear hatch. 

The ramp always remains in the 

closed position. 

necessary for later marking. These 

poles, along with the end poles, 

identify the minefield limits in high 

grass or darkness. When necessary, 

directional lights from a HEMMS 

can be attached to the pnlen. 

Step 2 Step 1 

4 

m x. . m. K 

. . . . w. x 

poles, and slowly driving forward 

while reeling out tape. The APC 

halts to emplace minefield marking 

signs on the tape at 50-meter intervals. The handlers never dismount. 

Drivers and TCs watch the minefield boundaries to ensure the fence 

is offset 15to 20 meters. 

-- L ---x 

i 

x--- -T----X . . ... X-.m+
 T - - X -

01 Side D 

(Contznued on next page) 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 23 
TRAINING NOTES 

If there is enemy contact during 

emplacement, all vehicles exit the 

minefield, driving straight ahead, 

and assemble at the platoon RP. 

To counter Sovietline charges and 

breaching techniques, lay multiple 

belts, thus extending minefield 

depth. 

Install anti~ersonnel mines later. 

if time and situation permit. The 

M21 heavy antitank mine (tilt rod) 

is not usable for this method, because 

it must be buried. Tilt rod mines can 

be emplaced later if the situation 

permits. 

To make lanes and gaps, halt the 

vehicles and place marking poles, or 

dismount later and clear mines from 

the lane by hand. 

Testing has shown that mines do 

not fall in neat rows as would be 

expected. Variations of speed, terrain, intermediate marking, and 

driver visibility ensure a random 

dispersion of mines and, more 

important, at least one AT mine per 

2 meters of front. 

SUCCESS IN THE FIELD 

This drill was tested for 4 months 

culminating in a 14-day operational 

test at Hohenfels Training Area in 

March 1984. The results were excellent. Troops couldemplace and mark 

extended front minefields during - periods of limited visibility, regardless of ground conditions. Unitsused 

concrete mines about the size and 

weightof theM15ATmine. Surfacelaid mines proved hard for buttonedup armored vehicles to detect in tall 

A Personal Viewpoint (continu ed from inside front cover) 

increase minefield breaching capabilities; however, all these systems 

are developmental. Defense budget 

constraints may put them on hold 

for several years. 

Small wonder maneuver units at 

the NTC are often destroyed while 

negotiating obstacles. As they are 

now organized, engineers can't 

effectively conduct assault breaches 

with current equipment. 

Current doctrine dictates that 

assault breaches will be made by 

coordinated and rehearsed actions 

of task-organized support, assault, 

and breaching forces. Yet these 

forces are not currently taskorganized into a standard obstacle 

breaching team (the Counter 

Obstacle Team). 

THE COUNTER OBSTACLE 

TEAM CONCEPT 

The Counter Obstacle Team is a 

combined arms force made up of 

assault, support, and breaching 

forces.* In a tv~ical .. COT scenario. 

an attacking task force is led by 

scouts, followed by an armor company, the breaching force, and successive maneuver units. The size 

and types of units are METT-T 

dependent. 

Obstacles are reconnoitered by 

scouts. If no bypass is available, 

then maneuver forces assume 

various roles. The lead tank company becomes an assault force and 

secures the far side by direct fire. 

The second maneuver unit (in this 

case the mechanized infantry company) becomes a support force providing overwatch fires for the 

breachiugforce. The breachingforce 

is commanded by an engineer platoon leader or the tank company 

XO. This task organization must be 

automatic and precise. It can only 

be achieved if the assault, support, 

and breach forces are predesignated, 

well-rehearsed, and ready to be taskorganized into the COT. 

The COT ably negotiates complex 

obstacle systems with current 

organizations andequipment. Using 

a CEV for assault breaches, AVLBs 

for tank ditch crossings, and three 

engineer squads, the engineer 

lat to on can function successfullv. 

However, the CEV is not a 

minefield-breaching panacea. More 

able engineer equipment is neededif 

grass, at night, or-painted wbitein snow. 

This simplemetbod uses onlyTOE 

equipment and requires no modifications orfabrications. Experienced 

teams can do the job in under 20 

minutes. When time is short and an 

obstacle is urgently needed, this 

method may be the answer. 

CPT Philip L. Reed is currently 

assigned to the U.S. Army Training 

Board at Ft. Monroe, VA. He also 

commanded B Company, 16th 

Engineer Battalion, 1st Armor 

Division, Fuerth, Germany. CPT 

Reed is a 1978graduate of Texas A & 

M University, with a degree in engineering technology. 

the COT concept is to be fully 

exploited. 

The engineer slice of the entire 

Counter Obstacle Team can easily 

accommodate equipment currently 

in development. As the ACE, 

MCLIC, COV, ROBAT, rollers, and 

mine plows become available to 

augmentthe COT, themakeupof its 

engineer component can be adjusted 

to fit METT-T. 

The combined arms team is currently ill-prepared to negotiate 

complex obstacle systems in stride. 

The Counter ObstacleTeam concept, 

achievable to a limited degree with 

current assets, is aneffective method 

of obstacle reduction. No time should 

be wasted-if we adopt the COT 

concept as AirLand Battle doctrine, 

we can make engineer mobility 

forces combat ready TODAY. 

CPT Frank J. Smith is currently 

assigned to the III Corps staff at 

Fort Hood, Texas. He receiued a RA 

from Texas A & M University in 

1982, and is currently pursuing an 

MS degree. A graduate of EOAC, 

CPT Smith has served as a line 

platoon leader and MCM platoon 

leader andas theassistant S3in the 

17th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, 

Texas. 

*The COT concept (or a resemblance thereof) bas been used by the following 

organizations: 17th Engr Bn, 2d AD, Fort Hood; 16th Engr Bn, 1st AD;, Federal 

republic of Germany (FRG): 12th Engr Bn, 8th ID, FRG: 23d Engr Bn, 3d AD, FRG; 

10th Engr Bn. 3d ID, FRG. 

24 ENGINEER No. 1, 1987 
Past in Review (continued from 

in the 46th Army part of the 

Southwestern Front. In the area of 

the LXVI Rifle Corps, 12th Army 

massed some 300 combat engineers 

with the first assault detachments. 

THIRD PERIOD 

1944 to 1945: 

Expanding Offensive Operations 

In the final year of the war, Soviet 

engineers refined and expanded 

their reconnaissance and crossing 

operations. 

Crossingthe Narew andthe Oder 

To prepare the Narew crossing, 

engineers assessed German defenses, 

collected data on enemy crossings, 

and searched for suitable crossing 

points. They passed their findings 

to the armies along with aerial 

photos of the western bank. 

Using this information, the 48th 

Army's chief of engineer troops 

issued a diagram of the Narew to 

corps and divisions and assigned 

engineerreconnaissance subunits to 

specific areas. Reconnaissance 

platoons from the 399th and 73d 

Rifle Divisions detected minefields 

and barbed wire and marked possible approaches to the river. 

Meanwhile, four engineer reconnaissance platoons from the 57th 

Combat Engineer Brigade and a 

platoon of the 104th Ponton Bridge 

Battalion, under covering fire, surveyed the river for both a low-water 

and a floating bridge site, and for 

raft crossings. Close and continuous 

cooperation between the chief of the 

eneineer troous and the chief of the 

Army intelligence section ensured 

the operation's success. 

During the Berlin Operation, 

combat engineers in the Second 

Belorussian Front Zone studied two 

channels and a swampy flood plain 

of the Oder. They found crossings 

and concealed approach routes, set 

up a network of observation posts, 

and swept for minefields. They made 

41 measurements of both channels, 

established 67 bridges, crossings, 

and fords, and discovered 23 minefields and 11 pillboxes. As a result, 

they provided 19 routes for troops 

and 8 canals for moving rafting 

equipment to the West Oder. 

Conductingdeep reconnaissance 

Behind-the-lines reconnaissance 

page 37) 

was standard in the engineer repertoire of support to the Soviet 

offensive, and the latter period of 

the war saw engineers intensify their 

scrutiny of enemy defensive lines. 

As successful operations opened the 

way, commanders began to send 

combined arms and engineer reconnaissance groups deeper into 

enemy positions. 

To prepare for the Uman-Botosani 

Operation (4 to 9 March 1944), the 

staff 3f the engineer troops of the 

27th Army, Second Ukrainian Front, 

sent out a reconnaissance group 

from the 6th Assault Combat Engineer Brigade. This unit penetrated 

over 15 kilometers behind enemy 

lines and found 6 fords and 26 

bridges for troop crossings. 

Such activities were essential to 

the massive offensives of 1944 and 

1945, like the Bagration or OderVistula operations, which featured 

high rates of advance. In these 

months, the Soviets proved their 

ability to take full advantage of 

weaknesses in enemy defenses by 

penetrating lines and carefully 

preparing for the advance. The 

success of Soviet exploitation and 

pursuit depended on accurate engineer intellieence. 

Exploiting mobility 

Motor and air-dropped mobile 

engineer reconnaissance units also 

proved valuable. In the Vistula-Oder 

Operation (January and February 

1945), motorized combined arms and 

engineer reconnaisance subunits 

moved ahead of advancing troops to 

capture and hold crossings until 

forward detachments arrived. 

Similar operations took place 

elsewhere. The 13th Army reconnoitered with mobile engineer detachments along theFirst Ukrainian 

Front, while chasing the enemy to 

the Oder. Before other forces arrived, 

a detachment of two truck-mounted 

companies from the 281st and 282d 

Combat Engineer Battalions reached 

the river with 13 pontons and set up 

crossings. 

LEARNING FROM THE PAST 

By the end of the war, the Soviets 

had reorganized and integrated 

engineers as aneffectivecomponent 

of their combined arms team. While 

the war continually expanded in 

scope and pace, the Russians expanded engineer effectiveness and 

added, refined, and elaborated 

techniques. They mastered riverreconnaissance procedures. They 

used engineer troops for in-depth 

reconnaissance of positions behind 

water obstacles. They exploited 

aerial photography data. They cooperated closely with combined arms 

teams for successful river crossings. 

Repeatedly, the Soviets demonstrated a capacity to identify opportunities and exploit them to the fullest. 

The current edition of the Soviet's 

Combat Engineer Support bases 

doctrine on these successful methods, illustrating each doctrinal 

principle with examples from the 

various battles. United States Army 

Field Manual 90-13, River Crossing 

Operations, 1978, lays out essentially the same doctrine for United 

States Engineers. However, theU.S. 

manual does not draw on the excellent resource offered by historical 

examples. 

Our soldiers could usefully supplement FM 90-13 by studying both 

Allied operations and the engineer 

operations that led the Soviet advance across Europe. Such study 

would enrich U.S. eneineers' oractical knowledge of operations on 

similar terrain. It would teach 

another lesson too: the Soviet 

Army's record of imaginative, flexible, engineer responsiveness in the 

Great Patriotic War demands our 

close attention. 

Note: Additional readings on Soviet 

Engineers can he found in the 

"Military Affairs" subseries, in the 

USSR Reports series prepared by 

Joint Publications Research Service 

(JPRS) and Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS). These 

are available through NTIS and 

post/school libraries. Peter Vigor's 

Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory gives a 

useful picture of Soviet military 

doctrine and thinking. 

Dr. Barry Fowle is a historian in 

the Office of History, Office of the 

Chiefof Engineers. After23 yearsof 

service, he retired from the Army as 

a lieutenant colonel in 1971. Dr. 

Fowle holds a PhD in history from 

the University of Maryland. 

ENGINEER No. 1.1987 25 
Testing engineer equipment 

at Fort Knox 

by LTC David S. Barber 

"...and teeting was conducted 

at FortKnox, Kentueky."You've 

seen this phrase many times in 

articles about new engineer equipment. Butwhyisthe Home ofArmor 

testing engineer equipment? 

Engineer user testingat Fort Knox 

serves a vital function in the acquisition process. It gives the decision 

maker and the combat developers 

information on how a typical engineer unit and engineer soldiers will 

use a new system on the battlefield. 

Both concept evaluation program 

tests (CEPs) and operational tests 

(OTs) are conducted by engineer 

officers and NCOs in the Armor and 

Engineer Board. These majors, 

captains, E7s, and E8s ensure that 

all the issues of the tests are completely and candidly addressed. 

The test schedule is arduous. A 

typical test lasts two or three 

months, and test days may he 24 

hours long. Proper test execution 

requires extensive coordination for 

troop support, facilities, supplies, 

vehicles, testing areas, and ranges. 

Recent TOE troop experience is 

desirable for both the officers and 

NCOs.Theymustlead andmotivate 

their soldiers, acting as company 

The counter oljstacle vt ~hiclehrearhc.~an antitank ditch. 

Soldiers are a key part of user 

testing, since their performance 

indicates the system's utility on the 

battlefield. Their comments and 

suggestions about systems weigh 

heavily, and are included in the test 

report. 

Realistic Testing Available 

at Knox 

Although not collocated with the 

Engineer School, Fort Knox is an 

excellent testing environment. The 

194th Armored Brigade provides 

invaluable support, and can offer a 

combined arms scenario for testing. 

Also at Fort Knox are the 19th 

Engineer Battalion(Corps Combat), 

the 522d Engineer Company (organic to the 194th), and the 13th 

Engineer Company (Construction 

Support). 

These units have supported engineer testing by providing player 

troops, constructing obstacles, and 

performing other engineer missions. 

They also supply TOE vehicles such 

as the M-l and M60A3 tanks, 

Bradley fighting vehicles, heavy 

expanded mobility tactical trucks 

(HEMTT), and high mobility multipurpose wheel vehicles (HMMWV). 

as well. The Armor and Engineer 

Board's carpentry, metal, electrical, 

and machine shops can fabricate 

many items to support testing. In 

fact, the remote obstacle breaching 

assault tank (ROBAT) was first 

fabricated at the board, and its 

concept demonstrated in 1981. 

User goals are the standard 

Fort Knox's tests are based on 

user goals. They are designed to 

reduce the risk surrounding the 

decision to acquire or reject equipment or systems. Does a badly 

needed item constantly break 

down?-then it is more a liability 

than an asset. What if theequipment 

can do the job, but is socomplex that 

many soldiers cannot operate or 

maintain it? The decision maker 

must determine whether equipment 

can he fielded or must undergo more 

development. Millions of procurement dollars are at stake, as are 

urgent needs for equipment in the 

field. 

User tests at Fort Knox put typical 

TOE soldiers into a new system, 

then examine its performance in 

scenarios that replicate combat 

missions. In such settings, the uncommanrlers and iirst sergeants I,'ort Knoxcontribur~~sth~~org;~nicforesren c.ft~.n Iwgins to occur. 

during the tests. c;jpatrilities of the rornh~nrd ihards llrre's n tvp~rirl instancr During 

26 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
a mine-dispensing test, a radio 

remote control device failed to 

perform as expected. When normal 

maintenance procedures couldn't 

correct the problem, the contractor 

took the item for repair. The fault 

proved to be mud on the remote 

control device. The contractor's 

recommendation?-inform all test 

players that the deuice must be kept 

free from dirt and mud! Since dirt 

and mud can't be eliminated from 

the battlefield, only two choices 

remained: redesign the item to 

function properly in field conditions, 

or reject it as unusable. 

The Concept Evaluation 

Program 

The CEP test determines whether 

a system actually works as envisioned. It should occur early in the 

acquisition cycle. Prototype equipment can be modified if testing 

indicates the need for changes. The 

concept of employment can be 1 . . . .. . , -,. ., .....:.. .. c . ?--. :* ... 

:A 

alteredif different scenarios point to 

hpttm m.-thoria Sappers of the 522d Engineer Company use the --""--

When soldiers are brought into auger attachment to bore holes for cratering 

the CEP,equipmentcan bedesigned charges, in tests of the Canadian M113 specially 

and modified to fit theirca~ahilities. equipped 

enabling them to make the equipment yield its expected performance. 

Contractor representatives often 

train troops on the new systems. Engineer soldiers in MOPP 4 test procedures for 

Thus the contractor can easily mounting the GEMSS Flipper on an MI13 APC. 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 27 
A COV breaches steel obstacles duwing a concept evaluation test. 

identify minimum standards for the 

system and write them into the 

requirements document that will 

support funding for the project. 

Last spring, a CEP was conducted 

for the counterohstacle vehicle 

(COV). Combat engineers are 

acutely aware of the need for such a 

vehicle. The capability to breach 

complex or compound obstacles 

consisting of mines, ditches, wire, 

and urban rubble from a protected 

platform has long been desired. 

However, the type of vehicle and 

appropriate attachments, crew size, 

and operation were still unknowns. 

Working closely with engineers 

and technicians from Belvoir 

Research, Development, and Engineering Center, a CEP was conducted at Fort Knox in 1986. The 

prototypevehicle demonstrated that 

a compound obstacle could be 

successfully breached from a closedhatch armored vehicle. The prototype also proved able to construct 

vehicle fighting positions, tank 

ditches, and combat trails through 

heavily wooded areas. 

The CEP showed, however, that 

major design modifications are 

needed to improve visibility from 

the COV and to deal with its 74-ton 

weight. The Directorate of Combat 

Developments, USAES, is evaluating the results of this and other 

tests to determine the exact configuration required. 

A CEP can also be used to evaluate 

a concept developed by another 

country. Last July, a modified 

Canadian MI13 specially equipped 

vehicle (SEV) underwent CEP testing. To increase sapper efficiency, 

28 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 

especially at the squad level, 

Canadian engineers have modified 

their MI13 squad APC by adding 

hydraulic tools. The tools are 

powered by a hydraulic pump that 

works on direct drive from the 

M113's engine. Using the power 

tools, squads can complete engineer 

missions in a shorter time with less 

manpower. 

The Operational Test 

The OT is designed to test the 

operational suitability, military 

utility, and operational effectiveness 

of a system-in other words, the 

hardware, software, training, maintenance, and logistics ofthe system. 

The OTtestis a dress rehearsal that 

usually occurs just before a type 

classification decision is made. 

System development should he 

mature by this time, and any modification must be made on the actual 

production model. 

The GEMSS auxiliary mine dispensing system (FLIPPER) test 

completed in March 1986 shows the 

benefits of an OT. The test was 

designed to verify the reliability, 

availability, and maintainability 

(RAM) characteristics of the system. 

The RAM tells the decision maker 

how much of the time the system 

will he available to the unit and how 

often it will he down for maintenance. 

Each test followed the mission 

profile conceived by the Directorate 

of Combat Developments, USAES. 

In this case, the tests required 

FLIPPER to dispense 360 to 400 

mines in three belts 1,000 meters 

long. Missions were conducted in 

MOPP4, cold weatherclothing,and 

normal field uniform, both in daylight and at night. Four different 

vehicles were used: the MI13 APC, 

5- and 2'h-ton trucks, and the M548 

tracked cargo carrier. Inert mines 

replaced actual M74 and M75 

GEMSS mines. 

Aftertwo weeks, numerous failures 

of the flywheel and tire assembly 

brought the tests to a halt. The 

material developer, US Army Armament Research and Development 

Command (ARDC), designed a new 

assembly and rushed it to Fort Knox. 

With the new assembly, over 12,000 

mines were launched without a 

failure, and the reliability criteria 

were met. 

The testingprograms at Fort Knox 

thus make the Home of Armor an 

excellent combined arms testing 

ground that ensures adequate realism, and affords the opportunity to 

test new systems in both developmental and fine-tuning stages. 

LTC David S.Barber is currently 

in the Program Managers' Course, 

Defense Systems Management 

College at Fort Beluoir. He was 

previously the Chief of the Combat 

Support Branch, Engineer Test 

Division of the U.S. Army Armor 

and Engineer Board at Fort Knox. 

He also serued as the exchange 

officer to the School of Military 

Engineering in Sydney, Australia. 

LTC Barber is a 1969 USMA graduate, has a master's degree in 

mechanical engineering from 

Arizona State Uniuersity. He is a 

registered professional engineer in 

Virginia. 
Countermine operations 

in El Salvador 

by MAJ James K. Waters 

Vietnam taught us that mine and 

countermine operations don't always involve large barriers, sophisticated equipment, and highly 

trained emplacing and breaching 

teams. Instead, the enemy may 

harass and demoralize opponents 

with randomly placed mines and 

booby traps. 

We changed to meet the countermine threat in Vietnam-changed 

tactical techniques, individual 

training, and equipment use. Unit 

leaders learned to disperse troops 

and select routes carefully. Soldiers 

learned to identify mines. Combat 

engineers learned to use existing 

equipment to locate mines. We met 

the Threat. 

Today, countering small mines in 

a low intensity conflict must again 

become a priority. This article reviews a success in combat development-the countermine effort 

of the Republicof El Salvador Armed 

Forces (ESAF). Cooperation between 

ESAF and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 

has been the key to success. The 

results?-guerrilla mine warfare is 

less effective, and ESAF ground 

tactical operations are more successful. 

Assessing the Threat 

Salvadoran guerrillas find many 

uses for mines and booby trapsthey employ them to terrorize 

civilians, deny access to guerrilla 

base camps, warn of approaching 

troops, restrict enemy movements, 

and slow or disrupt operations. 

Most guerrilla-fabricated mines 

are made from materials like sheet 

metal, wood, plastic pipe, and commercially available chemicals. 

ENGINEER No. 1, I987 29 
SFC Mark Goode inspects a White 

Fabricators use a metallic blasting 

cap detonation system. It is unsophisticated, but extremely effective. So effective, in fact, that mines 

and hooby traps account for 80 percent of ESAF casualties. Hundreds 

of civilians have also been killed, 

crippled, or maimed. 

It is worth noting that captured 

guerrilla documents on mine and 

booby-trap employment were originally prepared in Hanoi-the 

guerillas still heed lessons taught by 

their Vietnamese comrades. Unfortunately, some countermine 

lessons we learned in the Vietnam 

conflict have faded from our institutional memory. To recapture these 

lessons, USSOUTHCOM planners 

used earlier versions of current 

manuals as a basis for ESAF doctrine, training, and force structure. 

The Countermine Response 

Cooperation between ESAF, 

USSOUTHCOM, Troop Support 

Command (TROSCOM), U.S. Army 

South, and the U.S. Military Group 

in El Salvador resulted in a successful countermine . Dropram . for El 

Salvador. 

A TROSCOM study identified 

equipment that could enhance 

ESAF's countermine ability. The 

TROSCOM team found that U.S. 

Army mine detectors (AN/PRS-7/8 

6000 commercial metal detector witih Salvadoran trainees. 

and AN/PSS 11) could do the job, 

hutrequired extensive maintenance. 

Since nearly all mines and hooby 

traps used by the guerrillas contained some metal, TROSCOM suggested a commercial metal detector. 

The White 6000 detector proved a 

reliable, low-cost tool for detecting 

mines, and the Salvadoran government bought a supply on the open 

market. 

The TROSCOM team also recommended protective clothing. Natick 

Laboratories. which develo~s U.S. 

Army individual clothing and 

equipment, quickly produced overboots designed to reduce blast 

effects, Kevlar "blast chaps" to 

reduce fragmentation wounds to the 

legs and torso, and clear-lensed 

goggles for eye protection (dark 

lenses obscure trip wires). Nearly all 

this gear is available from commercial sources. 

Because the protective clothing 

weighs up to fourteen pounds, it is 

worn only when soldiers are 

sweeping areas known to be mined. 

Unless intelligence reports the 

presence of mines and booby traps, 

units rely on visual cues during 

routine patrolling. operations. 

The USSOUTHCOM provided 

training for the countermine program. U.S. Army South designed 

and producedrealistic guemlla-style 

mines and instructional charts, and 

the U.S. Military Group in El 

Salvador coached host country 

soldiers to become trainers. The 

trained ESAF officers and NCOs 

then returned to their units ready to 

teach mine recognition and self 

protection. 

One ESAFinfantrybattalion took 

the lead as a test bed unit. This unit 

received intensive training on 

countermine operations and advanced patrolling techniques. Each 

company organized, trained, and 

equipped a three-man countermine 

team. 

The team's operating concept is 

simple-When the unit enters a 

suspect area, the team is called forward and begins to sweep for mines. 

As mines are detected, they are 

marked and destroyed in place. No 

attempt is made to recover the 

mines-they are usually boobytrapped. These teams also use the 

metal detectors to locate hidden 

caches of supplies, weapons, and 

ammunition. 

To gain an important psychological point, government forces have 

severely restricted their own use of 

pressure sensitive mines. The 

Salvadoran government informs 

citizens of the dangers and indiscriminate nature of guerrilla mines 

and booby traps, using radio and 

30 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
Regimental Update 


Former Engineer On 12 February 1987, letters were sent to the 353 Active and Reserve 

Named DMOC: Component (USAR and ARNG) commanders of engineer commands. 

brigades, groups, battalions, and separate companies requesting nominationsfor Distinguished Members of the Corps (DMOC). The letters, signed 

by the Chief of Engineers, LTG Elvin R. Heiberg, 111, requested one officer 

(active or retired) and/or one enlisted (active or retired) from each of the 

above-mentioned units be nominated as DMOC of the Corps of Engineers. 

DMOC nominees must have served in the Corps. 

DMOC activities, spelled out in AR 600-82, The 73.5.Army Regimental 

System, are ceremonial in nature and areintended to promote and enhance 

the history and traditions of the Corps. Examples of DMOC activities 

include: participating in award ceremonies, speaking on history and 

traditions at dinings-in, and other similar functions. 

On 10 March 1987, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on the occasion of his 

farewell address to Engineer Officer students and faculty, General (USA 

Retired) Bruce C. Clarke was designated as the Corps of Engineers' first 

Distinguished Memher.The presentation was made by the Corps' Honorary 

Colonel, LTG (USA Retired) Frederick J. Clarke. Participating in the 

ceremony were MG Richard S.Kem, USAES Commandant, and the Corps' 

Honorary Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major of the Army (USA, Retired)Leon 

L. Van Autreve. General Clarke, who wascommissioned a secondlieutenant 

of engineers in 1925, was cited for his long and close relationship with the 

Engineer School, as well as his distinguished career as a soldier, leader, and 

a statesman. 

television stations and newspapers. 

In response, civilians have begun 

directing police to mines and booby 

traps. 

Perhaps the best means of limiting guerrilla mine warfare is interdiction of component materials or 

finished mines before emplacement. 

Thus, gathering information on 

mines is part of the intelligence collection effort. Both battalion and 

brigade intelligence officers emphasize enemy mine capability as an 

essential element of information 

(EEI). Police and military patrols 

are alert for this information. Police 

watch local markets to detect purchases of raw materials that might 

be used to construct mines and hoohy 

traps. Informers are also useful-on 

one occasion, an informer uncovered 

a cache of more than six hundred 

mines. 

Results 

The effectiveness of this countermine program is evident in the 

increased confidence and aggressiveness of units trained and 

equipped to fight the countermine 

battle. Test bed battalion soldiers 

now operate with little or no fear of 

enemy mines and booby traps. 

Casualties have fallen by nearly a 

third-only 5 injuries occurred in 

the last month of 1986. Moreover, 

the guerrillas seem to have lost 

prestige in the eyes of the civilian 

community. 

The Salvadoran project has produced a wealth of information and 

technical data on countermine 

measures and equipment. The lessons learned in El Salvador can be 

applied in other areas of low intensity conflict. Both the host country 

and the United States are winners. 

The guerrillas are losing-losing 

prestige, losing ground, losing 

popular support. 

MAJ James K. Waters is countermine project officer, Small Wars 

Operations Research Directorate. 

HQ SOUTHCOM. Before staff 

assignmen,ts to the National Guard 

Bureau and HQ, Army Materiel 

Command, he was Director, Plans 

and Training, Carlisle Barracks, 

and Commander, HQ Company, 

Army War College. MAJ Waters has 

servedin Vietnam, instaffpositions 

with the 8th Infantry Diuision in 

Germany,und with the82dAirborne 

Diuision. He holds a RA in history 

from Methodist College, and is a 

graduate of OCS, Airborne and 

Ranger Schools, the Jungle opera^ 

tions Course, and Command and 

General Staff College. 

ENGINEER No. 1, I987 31 
Upgrading 


the Fleets 


by MAJ William R. Fast 

THE CHALLENGE 

Both the M728 combat engineer 

vehicle (CEV) and the armored 

vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) 

have been fielded for more than 20 

years, and will continue to support 

M60A3TTS tanks in reserve components well past their 30-year mark. 

Yet these systems now strain to 

keep pacein maneuvers with the M1 

Ahrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. They also have logistic 

problems. Fleets compete with newer 

equipment for maintenance support, 

and face directed reductions in 

PLL/ASL-parts, that is. 

For 10 years AVLB/CEV readiness rates haveoften been below the 

MGO-series tank. In today's Army of 

Excellence, this cannot continue. 

TAKING ACTION 

The Army intends to improve and 

maintain both systems until replacements are fielded. At the urging of 

the U.S. Army Engineer School, the 

AVLB and CEV are now readiness 

report pacing items in engineer 

companies. They are also targeted 

for an all-out readiness offensive in 

the Army Materiel Command. 

Tank-Automotive Command 

(TACOM) and Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command 

(AMCCOM) are fixing systemic 

wholesale level problems with the 

AVLB/CEV systems, while the 

Army 1,ogistics Assistance Community helps engineer units solve 

immediate readiness problems. 

Their goal?-achieve and maintain 

the systems at 90 percent fully 

mission capable. 

In 1984, the U.S. Army Materiel 

Command's Materiel Readiness 

Support Activity conducted a fielded 

system assessment of both the 

AVLB and CEV. Their findings, 

with ideas from a joint TACOM, 

Engineer School, and Ordnance 

School readiness working group, are 

the foundation of the readiness 

offensive. Several programs are now 

upgrading AVLB/CEV assets. They 

areModification application 

plan (MAP) 

By FY 1989, modification kits and 

application funds are expected to be 

available for applying compatible 

M48/M60-series tank improvements 

to AVLBs/CEVs. These modifications, shown in the table, enhance 

survivability, safe operability, and 

maintainability. 

Overhaul program 

Depot-level deficiencies qualify 

many AVLBs/CEVs for overhaul. 

TACOM's Combat Vehicle Evaluation Team identifies candidates in 

annual visits to each installation or 

major command. This year, TACOM 

programed ten AVLBs and twelve 

CEVs for overhaul in CONUS and 

USAREUR. To ensure responsive 

replacement, future overhaul schedules were designed to minimize overhaul turnaround time. 

Request for assistance 

program 

Some commands intensively manage equipment deadlined for over 30 

days. TACOM's Director for Readiness validates and expedites repair 

parts to support this effort. Requests 

for assistance may he sent directly 

to Director of Readiness at TACOM 

by message, letter, or telephone. The 

supporting logistics assistanceoffice 

will provide TACOM's response 

within 5 working days. 

Other improvements 

Improved training. Threemilitary 

occupational specialties (MOS) are 

primarily responsible for operating 

and maintaining the systems. They 

32 ENGINEER No. I, I987 
Produc 

ili 

vement! 

Clean A 

Smoke I 

Dr~ver's 

Improve 

Passlve 

M240 h 

Second 

AN, ,%,P< 

me uppllcatlon on: AVLB L~V 

X X 

Armored lop Loading Alr Cleaners 

RISE Engine (IDS 

Eng~neSmoke 

Srenade I 

Nlght VIE 

td Vision ( 

Night vis 

Aachlne C 

Magnet~cBrake (IC 

HIU/ VZ?. 

Automa 

Laser PIULS~LWII 

Secure 

dlate dirt 

'Ion mod1 

stions 

opular Ni 

Ion 

iun (IDS) 

Adapter tiardware 

d by depc 

.. . 

rt TACO 

fork order 

M depot 

coordlna 

maintena 

tors coop 

nce divis 

erate to s 

Ion and 

chedule 

< 

:r System < 

< 

un~t)^ x 

re applie, ams at ~nstallac~onor unit 

Ioca1lons. txce~tionsare unlr-level rnalntenance iUnit1. and IDS for 

interme 

installa1 

modifict~~~. 

are MOS 12F, Engineer Tracked and repair. Until the scissors bridge TACOM AVLB Item Manager now 

Vehicle Crewman;MOS63Y, Track- technical manual is revised, a gen- coordinates issues of newly coned Vehicle Mechanic; and MOS 45N, era1repairprocedure has been issued verted or overhauled AVLBs to avoid 

M60Al/A3, Turret Mechanic. In to field units. Depot-level repair mixing thefleets. 

addition to normal training pat- procedures are being developed to Enhancing technical assistance. 

terns,improvedinstructionforthese return unserviceable panels and SelectedTACOMlogisticsassistance 

MOSS includes- components tostock.Thebridge will representatives (LARS) in CONUS 

MOS 12F: The Engineer School probably become reportable as a recently trained on AVLB/CEV 

offers a CEV skill performance aid component of the AVLB under the operation and maintenance so they 

for all crew positions. The Project next revision of AR 700-138, Army could better serve their units. In 

Manager, Training Devices, will Logistics Readiness and Sustain- AMCCOM,theyalreadymonitorthe 

release CEV video disk gunnery ability. This will give the bridge status of M728 CEV turrets and 

simulators to the field in January needed visibility at all levels of provide unit-level assistance. Units 

1988. management. should report any nonmissionMOS 63Y: Beginning in FY 1988, Fastersparesacquisition. Second- capahle supply parts requisitions to 

mechanics will get 5 more weeks of ary spares for both the AVLB the supporting LAR. Maintenance 

trainingin basicautomotivemainte- hydraulic launcher system and the assistanceis only a pbonecall away. 

nance. This training should improve scissors bridge were part of the 

their ability to troubleshoot and Army's FY 1986 procurement of COMMAND 

diagnose problems. launcher mechanisms and bridges RESPONSIBILITY 

MOS 45N: The Ordnance School for the AVLB conversion program. Until now, we've focused on 

is preparing an exportable training This measure reduced costs and management efforts to improve 

package for CEV turret repair. improved prospects for receiving AVLB/CEV readiness. There is, of 

Better technical manuals. All quality items on time. course, another key player-the 

AVLB technical manuals have been Uniform AVLB fleets. Many commander.Withoutcommandemrevised to reflect product improve- Active Army units have both M48A5 phasis, effortsof AMC andTRADOC 

ments through the MAP (see the and M60A1 AVLBs on hand. Their will be in vain. 

table). Scissors bridge manuals will suspension systemsand automotive Monthly reports by LARS show 

be revised in the near future. CEV controls differ. To reduce logistical that readiness degradation is often 

maintenance manuals are now re- problems, AVLB fleets should be caused by inadequate training and 

vised, and a total revision of CEV uniform at battalion level. Where discipline. Here are the findings: 

repair parts manuals has begun. possible, assets should be trans- Drivers and crews inadequately 

Improved bridge serviceability ferred to achieve uniformity. The trained. 

ENGINEER No. I, 1987 33 
AVLB/CEV operated with incomplete crew. 

Inadequate inspection of automotive systems. 

Improper use of diagnostic tools 

and gages. 

Poor troubleshooting,resultingin 

incorrect use of parts. 

Overworking vehicles, especially 

speeding or overusing CEV's 

blade. 

Infrequent operation and failure 

to exercise hydraulic systems 

regularly. 

Failure to perform organizational 

and support maintenance. 

These deficiencies have been 

brought to the attention of the 

service schools. Still, increased emphasis on proper operation and 

maintenance procedures is needed 

at all levels. 

THE FUTURE 

Although new equipment is projected for the mid-1990s, the AVLB 

and CEV may have to fill the gap 

until the year 2000. Improvements 

in training, maintenance, supply, 

and command emphasis are keys to 

readiness. The 90-percent fully 

mission-capable goal can be met 

only if all concerned address their 

areas of responsibility. All engineer 

soldiers are challenged to do their 

part to keep the AVLB and CEV 

ready. 

MAJ William R. Fast wrote this 

article while assigned as Assistant 

Project Manager, M60 Tanks, 

TACOM. He is currently a student 

at Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth. MAJ 

Fast holds a BS degree in Engineering from Iowa State Uniuersity 

and an MS degree in Systems 

Managementfrom the Uniuersityof 

Southern California. He is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course and the Materiel 

Acquisition Management Course. 

~n~ineer Solution -

1. Initial bridge length: Add the gap. safety setbacks. and roller 

clearances. Remember, since a panel is 10 feet long. the bridge 

must be built in 10-foot increments. 

Gap 58 feet 

Safety setbacks (prepared abutments) Near side 3.5 feet 

Far side 3.5 feet 

Initial roller clearance Near side 2.5 feet 

Far side 2.5 feet 

lnitial bridge length 

58 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 = 70 feet 

2. Construction type: 

Design load classification 60W/60T 

Construction type Double-single (DS) 

3. lnitial grillage type: Determine the actual soil bearing capacity 

(SBC). You may have to round down to a selected value. Note. 

always use grillage type 1 at a minimum. 

Actual SBC Selected SBC Grillage Type 

Near side 5 3.5 1 

Far side 5 3.5 1 

4. Roller clearance: Determine the distance from the center of clearance of the rocking roller to thecenter of clearance of the base plate. 

Near side 4.5 feet 

Far side 4.5 feet 

5. New bridge length: Remember, since a panel is 10 feet long, the 

bridge length must be rounded up to the nearest 10 feet. 

58 + 3.5 t 3.5 + 4.5 + 4.5 = 74 feet or 80 feet 

6. New truss type: 

Triple-single (TS) 

34 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
News & Notes 


Composite bridge under development 

The TROSCOM Fort Belvoir truss chord, made of high-modulus When they arrive at the site, the 

Research and Development Center graphite fiber andepoxy resins, will modules will he rotated 90 degrees 

hasawardeda$6.1millioncontract form the main stress-carrying and expanded. Because of their 

to Foster &Miller, Inc..ofWaltham, member and enable the bridge to unique design, they will expand in 

MA, for the design, fabrication, support 70 tons over gaps 180 feet two dimensions, providing bridge 

and testing of a module, composite- wide. sections 60 feet long, 15 feet wide, 

material bridge which will be erected Useof thesecomposites will result and 80 inches deep. Joined by steel 

three times as fast, using far less in a bridge 27 percent longer than pins, the complete bridge will then 

manpower and equipment, as the the current standard medium girder be pushed across the traversing 

dry gap bridge now used by the bridge, butweighing40 percent less. beam by a crane on one of the transArmy. It will also cut necessary manpower ports. Six men will complete the 

Composite materials are the new from 33 to 6 and transportation operation in 45 minutes, compared 

lightweight, high-strength materials needs from 14 trucks to :imodified to the thirty men working 3 hours it 

of aramid fibers, carbon, and epoxy trucks. now takes to erect the main girder 

that have been used successfully in The 60-foot modules of the future bridge. 

spa& and aircraft, as well as skis, bridge will be carried and launched The cuntract calls for 240 feet of 

tennis rackets, and the Army's new by trucks equipped with rollers and the experimental bridging to be 

helmet. cranes. Each module will weigh 7% delivered to the Center in 1989. 

In this design, composites will he tons and measure 20 feet by 7% feet 

used in the top and bottom chords, by 180 inches when folded for 

tensile tierods, and traversing beam. transport. 

A filament-wound, high-stability 

Solar energy technology 

counters battlefield detection 

Troop Support Command's easiestthingtofindonavehiclewas persisted for over a year. Bulova 

Researchand Development Center, its exhaust system. Enemy sensors estimates that it may be possible to 

as part of its responsibility as the could pickit up and useit to targetor reduce a vehicle's detectability by 

Army's leading laboratory for identify the vehicle. Then. I came 200 percent. F:valuation will concamouflage, has found a way to use across an article about the com- tinue with three additional trucks 

solar energy technology to protect posites used as solar energy col- this year. 

Army equipment from detection by lectors. They retained heat rather Vendors have estimated that 

thermal sensors. than radiating it into the atmos- significant protection against 

Working in the Center's Counter- phere. I gottheidea of using them to detection could be provided for as 

surveillance and Deception Division, plate vehicle exhausts." little as $30 per vehicle. 

Richard Rulova developed the idea Bulova started the work with the Bulova recommends that 'rank 

of using black oxides of nickel or composites as part of the Center's Automotive Command begin a prochrome, substances used in solar in-house laboratory independent duct improvement program to incollection panels, to reduce the research (ILIR) program. Last year, corporate these coatings into their 

amount of heat emitted by the as the first step, the Center awarded standards where possible. He also 

exhaust systems of Army vehicles. a contract to plate the exhausts of recommends that the Center eval- 

"I started working on this about a six 2%-ton trucks with black nickel. uate equipment currently under 

year and a half ago while I was The tests have shown measurable development for possible applicadoing some infrared studies," reduction in the amount of heat tions of this treatment. 

Bulova recalled. "I noticed that the given off by the trucks, which has 

ENGINEER No. 1, 1987 05 
NCQ and Enlisted Soldiers Branch 

S 51C All personnel holding MOS 51C, Structures Specialist, were converted to 

SIB, Carpentry-Masonry Specialist, in October 1986.Letters explaining the liminated Army's rationale for this change were mailed in llecember 1986 and 

January 1987. Commanders and personnel officers should also have 

received these letters. If you are affected by this change and have not 

received your letter or desire further information, contact Enlisted Branch, 

MII,PERCEN, AV 221-8329, commercial (202) 325-8329. 

Enlisted Branch For enlisted enginee dvice, call the Enlisted Engineer~ranch 

hotline-AV 221-7150, a1 (703) 32.5-7150. When you are asked for 

the number of the person you are calling, dial 325-7710. Following the 

instructions you recieve, leave your full name and social security number. 

Your career advisor will respond the next ring normal office hours. 

Changes in In October 1986,the Army announced changes toits policyon permanent 

PCS change-of-station moves. The primary focus of these changes is the 

Cy reduction of PCSmovesfromone CONUSinstallation to another. Although 

other policy changes will soon be announced, it is anticipated that most 

CONUS personnel requirements will be filled by soldiers returning from 

overseas. Increased time-on-station requil.ements will slow down PCS 

moves. Overseas commands still have priority, so CONUS-basedpersonnel 

volunteering for overseas assignments are unaffected. 

Upcomzng zssues o fENGINEER may nave a 

look, as we make format changes to comply with 

w UA Tor pr' 

nalpul inform 

Army Engineers of current developments and 

ergzng kge. Fc

-",ning isUwGUdill add, 

a1 engi SUPP, 

Engineer support to facilities 

Engin ARNC 

Low il 

Weinviteyour contributions and your comments. - a. 

36 ENGINEER No. 1,1987 
Past in Review 

Soviet engineer support 


to river-crossing operations in the 


Great Patriotic War 


by 


Dr. Barry W. Fowle 


Office of History, OCE 


9

Much current Soviet combat 

engineering doctrine was 

forged in the crucible of the 

Great Patriotic War against Nazi 

Germany. As they defended their 

homeland, consolidated their forces, 

and drove home their offensive, the 

Soviets continuously revised doctrine and tactics. 

The lessons of the war underpin 

SovietdocOline today forgood reasonthey show a history of success. The 

Soviets answered the challenge of 

war flexibly and creatively even 

under difficult circumstances. They 

developed responsive. efficient organizational structures, and they 

added effective techniques to their 

repertoire as they fought. Just as the 

Russians continue to study the 

history of their achievements, we 

should attend to the lessons they 

value. 

FIRST PERIOD 


June 1941to November 1942: 


Reorganizing 


When the Germans invaded in 

1941, the Soviet Army was illprepared to direct and conduct 

engineer combat operations in support of combined arms warfare. 

Nanengineer commanders often 

wasted engineer resources. 

The Russians acted quickly to 

improve their situation, showing a 

capacity to respond flexibly under 

stress. Even as the Germans drove 

deepinto theirterritory, they created 

an organizational structure that 

gave engineer officers more control 

over engineer forces. 

Thechief of Soviet Army engineer 

troops became a Deputy People's 

Commissar of Defense. Chiefs of 

engineer troops were appointed 

deputy commanders of fronts (Army 

groups), and staffs were set up for 

engineer troops in the fronts and 

subordinate armies. Once engineer 

officers took charge of engineer 

troops, they usedresourcesskillfully 

and flexibly to support combined 

arms operations. 

SECOND PERIOD 


November 1942to January 1944: 


Gaining Experience 


After major successes at Stalingrad and Kursk, the Soviets pressed 

their strategic initiative across the 

many rivers that lay in the path of 

their drive toward Germany. Soviet 

Army engineers now acquired vast 

experience in assault crossings of 

major waterways. 

Reconnaissance methods 

As the army moved, principles for 

using and controlling engineer 

troops changed. Basic engineer 

resources wereattached tocombined 

arms formations and units, and a 

new engineer brigade organization 

improved command and control. The 

reorganized engineer staffs included 

reconnaissance specialists and an 

engineer plan for reconnoitering 

water obstacles. 

Reconnaissance wasa step-by-step 

operation. First, engineers studied 

maps, photos. andinformation from 

local residents, partisans, and prisoners. As troops approached a river, 

engineers determined its width, 

depth, current speed, and bottom 

conditions. They then chosecrossing 

sites, gathered information on existing crossing structures, studied 

approach routes, and identified local 

crossing equipment and supp!ies of 

wood. 

As Soviet engineers began to plan 

large-scale crossings, their reconnaissance expanded to take in entire 

operational areas. Each front collected information on rivers and 

passed it to subordinate units. Continuous movement through operational areas was now supported by 

comprehensive engineer plans that 

covered all rivers and major terrain 

features. 

Crossing the Dnepr 

The September 1943 crossing of 

the Dnepr proceeded with staged 

reconnaissance. First, the front's 

engineer troop staff compiled a file 

describing the river in the zones of 

the planned crossing. This file was 

issued to engineer troop staffs of the 

6th and 12th Armies. 

At this level, engineers reconnoitered both the river and the 

enemy. In the 6th Army zone, reconnaissance was madeby subunits 

of the fi2d Field Engineer and the 

5th Ponton Bridge Brigades. Subunits of the 4th Ponton Rridge, the 

11th Assault, and the 62d Field 

Engineer Brigades, and the 8th 

Ponton Rridge Regiment did the 

work for the 12th Army zone. 

In the zone of the 7th Guards 

Army of the Steppe Front, engineers 

took an additional step. Because 

demolition of the Dnepropetrovsk 

hydropower plant had diverted the 

Dnepr's channel in 1941, aerial 

photography and airreconnaissance 

examined the channel's new course. 

As a final preparatory step, engineers chose sites for three floating 

bridges and one low-water bridge. 

They also pinpointed enemy positions and established routes for 

moving troops to crossings. 

Combat engineers served in the 

forefront of the Dnepr crossing. A 

squad of engineers opened minefields on the far side of theriver with 

the support of submachine gunners 

(continued on page 2.5) 

ENGINEER No. 1,1987 37