Joint Engineer Training 


.~Dlpmnmo(th~&uly 
LEAR THE WAY 


By Major General Joe N, Ballard 

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School 

his issue of ENGINEER centers on 'qointness"- 

the ability of U.S. Army engineers to train and 

conduct operations with our sister services. On the 

surface, operating in a joint environment seems simple enough; after all, these are other Americans 

whose language we speak and whose uniforms look 

somewhat familiar. In practice, however, jointness is 

very difficult. Even the professional terminology, the 

jargon, can be baffling. Each service has a host of 

minor differences in terms of training, equipment, organizations, and doctrine. The additive effect of these 

differences can be disruptive enough to halt operations until specific arrangements can be put into 

place. An ancient military toast went, "Confusion to 

the Enemy!" and glasses were emptied of spirits. 

Confusion is as debilitating as panic and, above all, 

we must not confuse ourselves. The true test of jointneSS is smooth operations from the very start with 

engineer units of any service who may be conducting 

operations together for the first time. The great cartoon military strategist, Pogo, once observed, "We 

have met the enemy and he is us." We cannot afford 

such a self-made enemy. 

Our National Defense Strategy has been recast 

from the basis of containment of a hostile, ideologically polarized, global threat with the demise of the 

Soviet Union toward a "more historically normal" condition of protecting American interests on a regional 

basis. The work to redefine the missions of the U.S. 

Army and to recast the internal organization of the 

Army for this role is, as yet, incomplete. The engineer 

force structure in both the combat and construction 

engineering missions is subject to restructuring and 

downsizing. Because it is not clearly understood outside the engineer community, the construction mission is especially vulnerable to well-meaning but unwise external restructuring efforts. Engineers must 

not be resistant to change or hold on to cherished 

but obsolete policies. On the other hand, we must 

guard against "hollowing-out" of capabilities that 

history and our experiences tell us are essential. 

On 3 January 1914, seven months before the start 

of World War I, David Lloyd George, a future prime 

minister of Great Britain, was quoted in a London 

newspaper. In the interview, Lloyd George 

denounced thefolly of expenditure on armaments and 

declared that the state and prospects of the world 

were never more peaceful, During the current recasting period in American military history, the responsible policy can only be to clearly and consistently articulate our professional judgement. Engineers must 

be especially clear about operational-level engineering missions, joint and combined considerations, and 

notional force designs. 

'Training is the glue that holds the Army together." 

Not an original thought on my part or the first time 

this Observation has been made, but it is constantly 

being proven by events in places that seemed far 

away from American interests just a few years ago: 

Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Engineer soldiers must 

be well-trained and confident in themselves, their buddies, and their leaders to perform and survive in the 

diverse settings so common in today's world. In some 

ways a soldier's profession is more hazardous now 

than it was at the height of the Cold War. Since the 

end of the Cold War, some 700 American soldiers 

have received Purple Heart medals for wounds received during foreign operations. 

A major "growth industry" within the military services these days is predicting the future. Many very 

bright people are extending the past into the future. 

That's always a risky business at best because only 

the shadows of future great events are cast into the 

present. "Scientific preiictors" generally have a similar record as the ancients who based their statements 

on the behavior and entrails of birds and goats. 

Thinking about the future and planning for arriving at 

a future condition is prudent management. Basing 

conclusions on the certainty of a future state is imprudent and, even worse, dangerous. 

In summary, exciting times. . . no doubt about it! 

Times filled with the innovative thinking of creative 

men and women and tempered by the training of engineers, who understand how the laws of physics and 

the strengths of materials affect human endeavors. 

We must learn how to achieve synergy, not rivalry, 

with our sister services; study our profession; and 

understand the political processes of our powerful 

democracy, while acknowledging the continuities of 

history. Essayons! 
Fl r - December 1994 Headquarters, Department of the Army volume 23 PB 5-944 - I 

UNITED STATES ARMY / FEA TURES 

ENGINEER CENTER AND 2 Joint Civil/Construction Engineer Training: It's A Reality 

FORT LEONARD WOOD by Connie S. Welch and members of the Detailed Analysis 

Group 

COMMANDERICOMMANDANT 11 	 Navy Seabees and the Civil Engineer Corps: Providing 

Major General Joe N. Ballard 	 Skills to the Joint Environment 

by Rear Admiral Jack E. Buftington, CEC, USN, and 

Lieutenant Commander Michael Bowers, CEC, USN 

MANAGING EDITOR 18 The Mine-Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC): Avoiding an 

Catherine Eubanks Engineer's Nightmare 

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS by Captain Frank T: Akins 

Diane Blankenship 29 Enhancing Survivability Operations 


Shirley Bridges by Major George DeMarse 


Eleanor D'Avignon 


SPC Virginia Espree 34 Sand Grid: A Multipurpose Construction System 

by Sergeant First Class Donald H. Purinton and Sergeant 

GRAPHIC DESIGNER First Class Roger L. Harrison 

Jennifer C. Bolyard 40 	Harvesting a Partnership: A Captain's Perspective 


by Major Brian Loggins 


By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 44 Heavy Division Engineer Commander's Handbook 

by Captain David Brinkley 

GORDON R. SULLIVAN 50 Auftragstaktik: Mission-Based Leadership General, United States Army 	 by Brigadier General Karl Hoffman Chief of Staff i 

55 Light Engineers in Urban Cordon and Search Operations 

Official: by Major Martin N. Stanton 

60 Engineer Support ~. to Theater Aviation 

by First Lieutenant Amy Klopotoski and Sergeant First Class 

MILTON H. HAMILTON Timothy J. Funk 

Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army DEPARTMENTS 07502 
 Inside Front Cover: Clear the Way 

Cover photo: Amy and Marine soldiers 24 Letter to the Editor 64 Past in Review 

train together on sun/eJng techniques at 25 Lessons Learned 67 Engineer Update 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Photo by 32 Personal Viewpoint 69 Bridge the Gap 

Jim Anderson. 58 Engineer Safety 

ENGiNEW (ISSN 0048-19893) is prepared quark* by Re US. Army Enel- Views expres~ea are mose of the eumor and not mose of me Depament of Deneer School, ATTN: ATSE~T-PD-EB, Fari Leonard Wood. MO 65473-6850. Sec~ fenne or ib elemenb The conteob do not necessarily rensct omcia U.S. Amy 

md Class postage is pad a! Fort Leonard Wwd MO and additional maing po5Bons, end do not chnnge or supersede informauon in omer US. Army publionic=. cations. Use of news items canst~tvteoneimer amrrnation of melr accuracy 

nor product endorsement ENGINEER reserves the right to edit material. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to ENGINEER, the Prolesoional Bulletin for Army Engineers, ATTN: ATSE-T-PD-ES Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473- CONTENT 1s no! copyrighted. Matarla may be reprinted If Credit is given to 

ENGINEER and me author. 

CORRESPONDENCE, imra to me editor. menuscripb phomgrepha, oficisi OFFICIAL D~STRIBUT~ONID targeted to all engineer and engineer-related 

unit requests to receive eopiex end unit addre- changes should be sent to EN- "nib. 

GINEER, at me preceding address Telephone: (314) 563-4104. OSN 575.4104. PERSCNAL SUBSCRlPTlONS are available by contacting me Superintendent 

DISCLAIMER: ENGINEER presenB professional information designed to keep of Documenb, P.O. Box 371954. Piburgh, PA 15250-7950. Address changes 

Army engineers intomed of current and emerging developmems wimln melr ar- lor personal subscriptions should also be sent to me Superintendent of 

eas or expelrlse for the purpose of enhancing meir professional deveiopment Daeumenb, 

December 1994 

6650 
Joint Civil/Constru<tion Engineer Training: 


By Connie S. Welch 

ajor changes affecting engineer training 

are sweeping through the Department of 

Dc.fenie. Since Aumst 

., 

1993. Armv. Air Force. <, 

Na~y,and Marine Corps personnel have worked 

closely to design more efficient and cost-effective 

ways to train initial entry service members in common civil and construction engineer (CICE) skills. 

As a result of their efforts, consolidated and collocated engineer training is scheduled to begin at 

various locations in fiscal years (FY) 95 and 96. 

The Interservice Training Review Organization 

(ITRO) anticipates that benefits resulting from interservice training will include multiservice appreciation for different tactics, techniques, operating 

procedures and engineer equipment in addition to 

significant cost savings. Appreciation for other services' engineer capabilities will lead to improved interoperability and may stimulate joint construction 

equipment and repair parts acquisition programs. 

This is a "good news" story for military engineering and our nation's defense. The complex ITRO 

process and program strategies described in this article are followed by the personal perspectives of 

committee representatives from the other services. 

Changes began in August 1993, when the 

Civil/Construction Engineer Interservice Training 

Review Organization's Detailed Analysis Group 

(DAG) was formed at the mandate of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The purpose of the DAG was 

to review the C/CE functional areas of all four services to determine if there were cost savings or training efficiencies that could be realized through consolidation or collocation. While some consolidated 

engineer training among the services has occurred 

for many years, this is the first initiative that includes all four services in common skills training. 

DOD leaders realized that military reductions 

and diminishing resources pmvided the ITRO 

December 1994 
Establish totality of 

se~icer'ClCE programs 

ITRO Study Strategy 

Establish commonalitywhat to include and 

I

exclude from study 

Develop course models 

Design curriculum 

L-~:rl Negotiate feasible site

L n 

Develop costs for options 

I implement II 

i Present DAG's 

recommendationV, 

Executive Board 

Receive Executive Board 

and JCS approval 

study team an opportunity to design programs and 

a Cross fertilization of engineer operating train all service members with common engineer procedures. skills while attaining efficiencies and savings. The 

mandate by the Joint Chiefs and the ITRO Execu- w Standardization of training techniques. 

tive Board, therefore, was to expand study areas Standardization of equipment for future acqui- and work toward definite "go" decisions. 'Wake it sition and commonalitv. 

-

happen!" was the edict. 

The Army was designated to chair the C/CE DAG. 

First, Brigadier General Robert Flowers and then 

Brigadiez3General Phillip Anderson, the prior and current assistant commandant, U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, met the challenge of thk 

complex project with zest and a strong will to succeed. 

The tone of the study was set early Each services' representative (voting member) was empowered to make decisions and plan for their service. 

DAG members included Captain John Lehman, 

Commanding Officer, Naval Construction Battalion 

Center, Gulfport, Mississippi; Lieutenant Colonel 

Scott Smith, Commander, 366th Technical Training 

Squadron, Sheppard Air Force Base, 'kxas;Lieutenant Colonel Charles Rivenbark and (now) Lieutenant Colonel Mark Jennings, Headquarters, U.S. 

Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; and Lieutenant 

Colonel David Boothe, Director of Department of 

Construction Engineering, U.S. Army Engineer 

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. These individuals bought into the project and led the way in 

making the study a success. They recognized the 

many benefits to be derived from consolidating or 

collocating engineer training, over and above the 

obvious possibility of cost savings: 

b 

a Improved effectiveness of repair parts when 

operating in a joint environment. 

The DAG developed a strategy (above) to accomplish the study and mapped a course of action that 

included a detailed flowchart with milestones. The 

approach used to develop course models in the joint 

arena is similar to that used in a college or university A student (service member) decides on a major 

(MOS),and then selects, takes, and passes certain 

courses to be granted that degree (certificate). 

An airman, for example, must successfully complete certain training modules to become a certified 

equipment operator, plumher or structure specialist. As shown in the equipment operators'course 

model, page 4, an airman takes about six weeks of 

common core subjects (graders, loaders, dozers, and 

excavators) with the other three services. He takes 

tractor-trailer and compactor operations training 

with the Army and Navy, forklift training with the 

Navy, and crane and water-distribution training with 

the Army Finally, the Air Force has a senice-unique 

track only for airmen, where he trains on sweepers. 

The end product is a well-trained Air Force equipment 

operator, who has received a large part of his or her 

training in classes with soldiers, sailors and marines. 

December 1994 Engineer 3 
Approved Study Results tor CivillConstruction Engineers 

Equipment Operators 

Engina Technldsns 

The DAG met its milestone of making a recommendation for approval to the ITRO Deputy Executive Board by 15 December 1993. The recommended 

stratem was approved by the ITRO Executive Board 

and the Assistant Chairman of the Joint ChieG on 31 

March 1994. 

Equipment Operators' Course Model 

Army 

Navy 

4 Engineer 

FMI Leonard Wwd MO 

or1 Leonard Woo4 MO 

ort Leonard Wood. MO 

Shsppard AFB. TX 

shopp~dAFB, n 


Abad- Prwing Ground MD 


The DAG is now plunging into the implementation process. This difficult part of the ITRO process 

promises to be especially challenging because of the 

continually shrinking DOD budget. The major portion of the curriculum development (i.e., course design, programs of instruction, and lesson plans) has 

been completed and coordinated 

between services. Curriculum 

products are now moving forward 

for approval from each service. 

In the year since the study began, much time and effort have 

gone into changing the joint training concept into reality-and to its 

current state. The approved study, 

now ready for implementation, will 

require extensive planning, coordination, and attention to detail as 

DAG members hammer out the 

many issues yet to be resolved. lb 

prepare for full implementation 

next year, the DAG must resolve 

some complex issues, including 

Facilities 

- Determine billet,ing standards. 

- Allocate specific buildings for 

administration, maintenance 

and training that meet each 

service's requirements. 

- Determine standards for 

training facilities. 

December 1994 
Be- -L_ 

, .~, - ~ ~~p 

Army and Air Force students ext~nguish a simulated aircrafl crash fire at the DOD Fire Protfction School. 

Equipment 

- Identify equipment to be shipped from one 

training site to another. 

- Determine condition standards for equipment 

being shipped from one training site to another. 

-Determine the most effective time to ship 


equipment. 


- Resolve maintenance issues. 


Instructor Training CoursesiCertification 


- Determine content and location of instructor 

training. 

- Determine standards for instructor certification. 

Performance Rating Process 

- Establish an instructor rating chain. For 

example, determine how a Navy instructor 

working for an Air Force course chief will be 

rated on an Army past. 

At this point, implementation milestones have 

been set and responsibilities assigned. The plan of 

adion is aggressive and will require the continued 

cooperation, coordination and dedication that have 

gotten the DAG and its supporting cast to its current state. The end state is that joint training for 

engineers will begin in October 1995. 

The benefits of joint training to the Army and 

the Engineer School are evident. As a result of this 

study, Fort Leonard Wood's average daily population will increase by approximately 277 students, 

December 1994 

instructors, and support personnel, and about 

$800,000 will be added to the annual operating 

budget. Additionally, ITRO brins a diverse mission 

to the post. Joint CICE training provides both a onetime and recurring DOD cost savings. More importantly, the joint training process will produce the 

same highly trained Army soldier in every caseand 

in some cases a better technically trained soldier. 

The ITRO study has been a great opportunity It 

has allowed members of the working group to join 

with sister sewices in a common endeavor to gain 

engineer training efficiencies and savings. Additionally, it will place all services' engineers in a training posture that mirrors probable joint operations 

of the future. Actions such as ITRO are vital if 

the U.S. military is to train to standard within 

limited resources. Results of this study provide 

an avenue to do business better in the Department of Defense-and to provide our nation with 

highly skilled, capable engineers trained to operate 

in a joint environment. Y 

Connie S. Welch is executive officer for the CivillConstruction Engineer DAG Chairman and technical director 

fo~the Department of Construction Engineering, U.S. 

Army Engineer School. She previously served as technical 

director for the Engineer School's Department of Instruction. Mrs. Welch holds a bachelor's degree porn Southwest Missouri State Uniuersity. 
Joint Civil/Construction Engineer Training 

An Air Force Perspective 

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott L. Smith 

Under the auspices of the 

Interservice Training Review organization (ITRO) and 

the Military Training Structure 

Review (MTSR) project, each of 

the military services tasked their 

respective civil/construction 

(CICE) functional communities to 

participate in a Detailed Analysis 

Group (DAG) study. The purpose 

of the study was to conduct a 

top-down review of CICE technical training to assess what opportunities existed to consolidate 

the training presently being conducted by all branches of the 

armed forces. The key objective 

of this assessment was to determine, where feasible, how DOD 

could consolidate CICE training 

and conserve resources to the 

maximum extent possible. In 

striving to achieve this objective, 

the DAG was also responsible for 

improving training effectiveness, 

maintaining or improving combat 

readiness, and eliminating or reducing infrastructure. This whole Electrical systems apprentice training at Sheppard Air Force Base. 

review/study effort, inanaperationalflyingwing,and War College resident course, 

from my perspective as the Chief acivil engneer technical training where jointness was a daily motto, 

of the USAF team squadron in Air Education and and although I personally think 

the DAG, has been and Training Command's largest jointness is absolutely critical to 

to be a once-in-a-career 'pportu- wing. Just about the time1 thought DOD's success in the future, I had 

and Read On if I'd been given far more opportuni- reservations about being able to 

you are interested in ties to make a difference than make it happen. My main teacher 

why. most at my grade and experienoe over the last 20-plus years, ProfesI have had great opportunities level, I was given the task to spear- sor Experience, had virtually conin my career to serve at field, ma- head the USAF team on the DAG, vinced me there are far more madjor command and Air Staff levels. When handed this tasking, I blocks than alternate routes 

The icing on the cake has been the must admit I was a tad pessimis- available to achieve the loRy and 

chance toserveas asquadron cam- tic. The reason was my concern right goal of jointness. Nonethe 

mander two times and for two to- about really being able to achieve less, after recovering from the intally different kinds of squad- "jointness." Although I had just itial shell shock of the tasking, I 

rons-a civil engineer squadron finished the USAF 10-month Air could see that this was a once6 Engineer December 1994 
Structures training at Sheppard Air Force Base. 

in-a-career opportunity. I could 

help breach amyriad ofroadblocks 

and, where necessary, help build 

routes to take the Air Force and 

other services' CICE training 

where it need4 to go to achieve 

success in the 21st century 

I also knew that getting this 

done would be a big, big challenge! 

It would take a lot of smart, openminded, nonparochial follcs worliing together to get the job done 

and done right. It would also require some tough decision making 

by the senior leadership in all 

services. Last, but certainly not 

least, it would create demands for 

some choice cuts out of the sacred, 

shrinking money cow to really 

make it happen. 

At the time of this writing, I am 

elated to report that, with the outstanding help of my counterparts 

in the other services and the DOD 

senior leadership, we have successfully seized the opportunity 

and we are meeting t,he challenge 

The arduous time and effort expended by the DAG 11% resulted 

in recommendations that will consolidate andlor collocate training 

in the following specialties: fire 

air conditioning and refrigeration I (A,); 

i 

i 

electrim,; uMities, structures, pavement and equipment 

operations; engineering assis- 

( tance; and construction equipment mechanics. Training for 

these specialties is target,ed to be 1 spread across seven DOD installations, where the best capability ' and capacity already exist to ac- ' conlmodate them: Fort Leonard I Wood, Missouri; Aberdeen Proving 

1 Gmund, Maryland; Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina; Sheppard Air Force 

Base (AFB), Texas; Goodfellow 

AFB,Rxas;Gulfport, Mississippi; I and Port Heuneme, California. 

The DAG referred these reammendations to the ITRO Deputy 

Executive Board (DEB) early in 

1994, and the DEB approved them. 

The recommendations were forwarded to the ITRO Executive 

Board, which gave its approval. As 

a result, the DAG is now posturing 

to prepare the implementation 

plan. In this massive undertaking, 

the DAG will determine how to 

make the t~ainingmoves happen as 

effectively and efficiently as possible. As the DAGworks through this 

process, I am optimistic that we will 

tion that has made our efforts 

highly successful so far. 

From my viewpoint, when all is 

said and done with this ITROI 

MTSR project, all of us in the 

CICE business will reap significant benefits from the long overdue initiative to train jointly For 

example, we will all gain a much 

better perspective of what each 

service's CICE follcs are tasked to 

do and why. By training together, 

we will be much more ready and 

able to fight together when the 

time comes. We will make strides 

toward standardizing our equipment and operating techniques, 

which in turn will save time and 

money. These benefits, as well as 

many others, will set us-and 

those who follow us-up for success in the future. I challenge everyone in the CICE business to help 

make this success a long-term reality by building on the jointness 

foundation the ITRO initiative is 

putting in place. ld 

Liezitenant Colonel Smith serves as 

commander. of the 3fi6tk Technical 

Training Squadron, Sheppard Air 

Force Base. He holds masters degrees 

from Texas A&M Uniuersity and the 

University of Wyoming and is a 

protection; heating, ventilating, sustain the extraordinary coopera- gradlate of the Air War College. 

December 1994 Engineer 7 
Joint Civil,'Constr~~ctionEngineer Training 

A Navy Perspective 

By Captain John Lehman 

When selected as the 

Naw'e lead for the Interservice Training Review Organization (ITRO) study on construction engineer training, I am sure 

that I had the same concerns and 

questions as my counterparts from 

the other services. I knew what 

the Seabees of the Navy muld do 

and how they were trained, but I 

knew very little about the engineering capabilities of the other 

services. Although I had seen some 

of their equipment and had met 

some of their officers (usually at 

SAME mnferenoes), I was not familiar with their training methods or technical capabilities. 

The letter of appo~ntment from 

the Chief of Naval Education and 

Tra~ningsaid my goal was to "improve the cost effectiveness of 

training" by consolidating or colloeating training with other services. By doing so, we could eliminate duplication and reduce the 

amount of equipment and training aids required. 

The letter appointed three other 

knowledgeable memhers to our 

I team: twoofF~cerswhowerediredly I involved in Seabee training and a 

/ third, a retired Seabee master 

I chief, who headed the Seabee Doctrine and Policy Branch at our 

headquarters in Washington, D.C. 

Fortunately, two of these team 

members had previous experience 

with the Navy's zero-based training and education review, which 

like ITRO, was aimed at eliminat- 

, ing waste and duplication within 

1 the training process. 

I At our first all-service Detailed 

Analysis Group (DAG) meeting at 

Instructors check a water-depth gauge during joint ArmyINavy well-drilling training at Port Hueneme, 

California. 

8 Engineer December 1994 
Fort Leonard Wood, in September 

1993, several things surfaced. 

First, each service had different 

titles for their specialty skills. 

Some of the "engineer" functions 

we identified were not accomplished by construction engineer 

units in other services; instead, 

they were accomplished by other 

groups, such as transportation. 

Each service had a foreign language of acronyms and course 

numbers, which frequently required translation. We each felt 

that our service had the "best" 

training program, equipment 

and facilities. And, all participants were willing to talk 

about their strengths, but nobody mentioned their training 

weaknesses. 

After comparing student numbers, course lengths, curricula, 

and possible training locations, we 

learned that we could adjust curricula to improve the quality of 

training, and everyone felt more 

comfortable. Then came the first 

real test: to have our subject matter experts, all top-notch E6s 

through E8s who were proud of 

what they taught, hammer out a 

program that outlined which 

training objectives were common 

and which were service unique. 

We assumed that we could identify 

a core curriculum for each skill 

that. would apply to all students. 

But we also knew there would be 

some service-unique curricula 

that would benefit only a single 

service. Questions had to be answered: Could we use the same 

curriculum if some services use a 

brand%" bulldozer and others use 

a brand "Z" bulldozer? W111 the 

ITRO courses provide enough operational "stick" time in the field? 

Can we do this or that? 

After much discussion, all committee members were confident 

that the answer to these and similar questions was, 'Ywwe can." 

Additionally, under ITRO students will receive some trainingon 

simulators or equipment that all 

services do not have now but expect to receive in the future. As our 

meetings progressed, the rationale for "why we can't" soon became 

opportunities to enhance training-'buhy we must!" 

Costs were a major factor we 

had to consider, and we had many 

questions. Do we need more equipment, new training aids, more facilities, or more instructors or 

support facilities? What will be 

the one-time set-up msts for each 

scenario and which service will 

pay? Will training spaces or barracks need to be expanded? Can 

any of the services avoid constructing a facility they were 

planning to build? Will the recurringannual costs for the 13-week 

entry-level classes increase or 

decrease? 

Equipment was another concern. Two services use mostly tactical equipment while the other 

two use mostly commercial equipment. Therefore, we had to decide 

if we should split the training in 

half or force-fit the four services 

together. Training together could 

result in more service-unique 

courses than common core courses 

and could ultimately increase 

costs. 

The ITRO process continued 

and things seemed to fall into 

place. By December 1993, the 

DAG had costed, recosted, adjusted curriculum, and settled on 

one of twelve alternatives as the 

most cost effective. Under the recommended alternative, Navy Seabees will receive quality entrylevel training at four centers of 

training excellence: the Seabee 

Centers at Gulfport, Mississippi, 

and Port Hueneme, California; 

Sheppard Air Force Base, Qxas; 

and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

The executive board approved our 

alternative in March 1994, and 

ITRO was on its way 

Next came an even tougher 

challenge-implementation. 

Where would we start the move? 

This was a major decision because, 

in many cases, we needed to move 

out at one site in order to accommodate a move in from another 

site. Our challenge was to decide 

which domino to play first. Moving 

the administrative and instructor 

organizations to a base belonging 

to another service requires that local detachments be established, 

permanent change ofstation orders 

be cut, memoranda of understanding be drafted and intersemice support agreements be effected 

with the hosts. We are making 

these decisions and implementing 

required chaw now 

Just yesterday someone asked 

me, 'Besides saving money, what 

will be gained from ITRO?" I didn't 

have to think long to reply: Since 

Desert Storm, the U.S. military 

has operated as a joint force in 

nearly every significant operation-whether it was a regional 

contingency, humanitarian relief, 

disaster recovery or nation assistance scenario. After the services 

implement ITRO, military engineers will know that each technician, carpenter, electrician, equipment operator, mechanic, 

plumber, engineering aid, steelworker, and fire fighter received 

the same basic training, regardless of their service. In the future, 

as the services move to a standard 

fleet of military tactical vehicles, 

we will be ahle to reduce parts 

support in the field and work more 

closely together. Even though each 

service still has its own missions 

and functions to perform, each 

service can better contribute to 

the overall missions of the Department of Defense because we 

better understand the capabilities of all the services. After all, 

we will all have trained together 

since 1996. Id 

Captain John Lehman serves as commanding office,; Naval Consti.uetion 

Regiment, Gulport, Mississippi. He 

holds a master's deg~~e in civil engineering fiom the UniversiCy of %as, 

Austin, and is a ~egistered professional engineer in Pennsylvania. 

December 1994 
Joint CiviliConstruction Engineer Training 

A Marine Corps Perspective 

By Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Rivenbark (Retired) 

The Marine Corps considers the 

Military Training Structure 

Review (MTSR) orocess. as ner- . . formed under the current Interservice Training Review Organization 

CTRO), as an opportunity to accomnlish several zoals:

- Reduce our training costs without sacrificing training quality. 

There should be no noticeable 

difference between the Marine 

a unit receives from the Marine Corps Engineer School 

and one received from the joint 

school. 

Use the infrastructure available 

at other service's facilities to reduce the Marine Corps' investment in the training effort. By 

making more effective use of existing facilities, we can avoid 

the construction of additional 

facilities. 

testin:: course, and advanced petrocrash, fire, and reseue training is 

collocated with the Naval Aviation 

Schools at Naval Air Station, Memphis. In addition, we participate, on a 

quota system, in other training and 

education,suchastheAmyEngineer 

Off~cerAdvanced Course. materials 

- leum courses. 

Throughout the MTSR process, 

load now shouldered by individual 

Marine engineer units to upgrade 

operator licensing will be reduced. 

Let me explain why this will occur. 

Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps 

has only one military occupational 

suecialtv for ooerators of all our enour instructions were to search for 

reasons to consolidate rather than 

to search for reasons to remain sepal rate. The Marine Corps' engineer 

philosophy was that each basic 

course consolidated must then colloI cate with the associated journeyman (NCO)course. Therefore, when 

our engineer equipment hasic 

courses were determined to be compatible for consolidation, we 

planned to collocate our NCO, senior NCO and warrant officer courses 

with them. The end result will be 

&eer equipment (MOS 1345).Current Marine Corps training does not 

license basic engineer operators at 

school; instead, students are licensed after they join their new 

unit. Weuse this system because the 

individual organizations (Marine 

W~ngSupport, Force Service Supuort Grou~.and Division) use diiferkt types bf heavy equipment. After 

the new course model is implemented, Marine students will receive training on several types of 

equipment not included in our current program. Because students 

will learn to operate more types of 

eclui~mentunder the ioint trainina 

lvlannes. ! would be to consolidate only our ba- 1 primary &n for the training reCapita'ize On existing training 

organizations to reduce Our 

investment 

training .-. the same number of 

Interservice training is not a new 

concept for the Marine Corps. We 

have been involved in consolidated 

and collocated training for several 

years. Long before the Joint Chiefs 

mandated the current round of consolidation efforts, Marine Corps engineers were conducting consolidated and collocated training. We 

conduct consolidated bulk fuel 

training at the Army Quartermaster 

Center and conduct consolidated 

drafting and surveying training at 

the Army Engineer Center. Marines 

now participate in consolidated explosive ordnance disposal training 

at Indian head, Maryland, and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Our 

sic operator and mechanic courses, 

leaving the remainder of the training at the Marine Corps Engineer 

School. 

The beauty of the new ITRO pmcedure is the manner in which course 

models are constructed. Subject matter experts from all services have 

equal statuswhen they create acourje 

model. This ensures that the unique 

needs of each service are identified 

and satisfied. 

In the new engineer equipment 

course model, the Marine Corps anticipates providing to the Fleet Marine Force equipment operators who 

are even more qualified than today's 

course graduates. As a result, the 

that the entire block of engineer 

equipment training for both operators and mechanics will be either 

consolidated or collocated with the 

other services. The alternative 

views, common sensewasthe rule we 

used during every decision-making 

session. Joint engineer training, as 

recommendedduring theMTSR process, will truly assist in training Marines for the Marine Air-GroundTask 

Force. Y 

Lieutenant Colonel Riuenbarh iretired) was the Maline Cop representative for the Civil 1Construction 

Engineer Detailed Analysis Group. 

He last served as the head, Real 

Pmpe&y Maintenance Activity Policy 

Section and MOS Specialist for Utilities and Engineers, Headquarters, 

U.S.Marine Corps. He is a registered 

professional engineer in Xrginia and 

North Carolina. 

cdncept, Marine units will have 

more time to concentrate on preparing for deployment and increasing 

readiness. 

Although the 'bottom line" was the 

10 Engineer December 1994 
Navy Seabees and the Civil Engineer Corps: 

Providing Skills to the Joint Environment 

By Rear Admiral Jack E. Buffington, CEC, USN, and 

Lieutenant Commander Michael Bowers, CEC, USN 

n today's climate, 

military numbers 

and assets are decreasing, missions are becoming more diverse, relian= on reserves in war 

plans is increasing and 

joint operations are commonplace. As this trend 

continues, military professionals must learn 

about and work with 

their counterparts in fellow services. This article 

introduces the Naval 

Construction Force component of joint service 

engineering and contingency construction. 

Civil Engineer 


COVS Officers Seabees constructing a K-Span building during Cesen ShieldISlorrn. 


Since 1867, Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers have been responsible for building and maintaining the Navy's shore 

establishment. For the past 52 years, CEC officers 

have led Seabee construction battalions in a multitude of missions. Through the years, these men 

and women have been recognized by the Navy and 

Marine Corps as engineering professionals. Today, 

all CEC officers have a bachelor's degree in engineering or an engineering-related field, and more 

than half of them have earned graduate degrees, 

primarily through Navy-funded postgraduate 

December I994 

school. Additionally, professional registration is a 

key milestone for promotion to senior ranks within 

the CEC. Overall, 42 percent of active duty officers 

are registered professional engineers or architects, while 90 percent of 05s (commanders) and 

100 percent of 06s (captains), 07s and 08s are 

regist,ered. 

Civil Engineer Corps officers serve in a variety of 

billets around the world. Analogous to some aspects 

of the Army Corps of Engineers, most of our officers 

are dedicated to stateside or overseas base facility 

maintenance and repair functions, or they supervise 

Ew'neer 11 
1-

Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as 

host nations. Through these educational 

abee Er and challenging assignments, officers di- 

-	 4 gest what it means for our military servOperation of construction ices to be "interoperable." 

Equipment I equipment, transportation, At any given time, about 100 officers 

Operator (EO) i blastingirock crushing, are attending graduate schools or joint 

I well drilling, and paving. 1 service schwls or serving as instructors 

or staff at the Naval Civil Engineer Construction and auto- 'I 

Corps Officer School and the Naval Fa11 Construction 1 motive equipment mainte- 1 cilities Contracts Training Center (both 1 Mechanic (CM) 	 nance, repair, overhaul, i 

I in Port Hueneme, California) or the Na- 1 and manaaement. ti val Construction Training Centers in 

Carpentry, masonry, rein- I/ Port Hueneme and Gulfport, Missis- 'I Builder (BU) forced concrete, and sippi. The remaining 10 percent of our 

j, interior finish work. I officers are serving in a variety of opera- 

!! tional oomwnents of the Seabees. 

Welding, structural steel 


Steelworker (SW) erection, sheet metal and Seabees 


!I ductwork fabrication. --


Ij 	 I aval Construction Battalions - f I 	 General electrical, tele- I Construction the Seabees - were established 

1 Electrician (CE) ' phone systems, and power The Seabees have established 6 	 : generation and distribution. a reputation based on their 

j plumbing, airconditioning motto: construinzus, batuintus: "we 

1 systems,waterproduction build, we fight." During World War 11, 

Utilitiesman (UT) / and distribution, sanitary from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, they 

1 and waste disposal. went ashore with U.S. Marines to 

i build airstrips and bases. In Europe, 

Engineering technician, they took part in amphibious invaEngineering Aid (EA) sions from Sicily to Normandy. Since 

the 1960s, Seabee civic action teams 

have been invited to developing naIn a Seabee battalion, tradesmen are organized in tions to build and repair schools, hospicompanies by related skills. Equipment operators and tals, orphanages, utilities, roads, and 

mechanics, as well as the battalion's complement of bridges. Seabees in Vietnam built 

vehicles and equipment, form one company. The camp bases from the Mekong Delta to the 

maintenancelutilities construction company consists of demilitarized zone. In the 1970s, Naconstruction electricians and utilitiesmen. Builders and val Mobile Construction Battalions 

steelworkers, who are vertical construction tradesmen, (NMCBs) began to expand a commugenerally are organized together in one or two nications station on the island of Dicompanies, based on their mission and the number of ego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. 

detachments. Engineering aids form part of headquarters Eleven years later, with the help of 

civilian contractors, Diego Garcia 

had evolved into a large naval facility capable of supporting both ships 

the construction of shore facilities by independent and aircraft. 

contractors through Resident Officer in Charge of Seabees recently participated in Somalian reConstruction offices. One-fifth of our officers serve lief efforts and in a variety of other independent 

in staff billets assigned to the Naval Facilities Engi- and joint service contingencies and disaster-recovneering Command (NAVFAC) headquarters in Alex- ery operations. During Operations Desert Shield 

andria, Virginia; the Pentagon; or fleet or Marine and Desert Storm, Seabees built aircraft hangars 

Corps shore and operational commands. Thirty-four and taxiways, ammunition supply points, perimestaff billets are designated as 'joint" duty There, ter defenses and camps for thousands of troopsCEC officers bemme familiar with engineering prac- primarily Marines. Recently, Seabees have helped 

tices; contingency construction techniques; warfare in recoveries from earthquakes in California, mondoctrine; and philosophies and objectives of the Army, soon floods in Bangladesh, hurricanes in the 

12Engineer 	 Decemher 1994 
a ._ 

Nearly 800 Seabees were involved in recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. Here, they are 

cleaning up a neighborhood in Dede County, Florida. 

Caribbean and a major volcanic eruption in the 

Philippines. 

Some 325,000 Seabees and CEC officers served 

in World War 11. Currently 10,000 Seabees and 

1,375 CEC officers serve on active duty, while an 

additional 1,200 officers and 16,000 reserve Seabees are integrated into NavyIMarine Corps warfighting doctrine. Until 1993, women were excluded 

from operational components of the Seabees. This 

year, however, both officer and enlisted women are 

being fully integrated into all Naval Construction 

Force (NCF) units. 

Seabee Mission 

aased on current doctrine, the Seabees provide the following -support .. to the U.S. Navy

and Marine Corps and, when directed, to other services and agencies of the government: 

# Responsive military advanced base construction support, including operat,ional, logistics, 

underwater, shore, and deep ocean facilities 

construction, maintenance and operation. 

Military construction in support of Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. 

Capability to defend projects, camps and convoys. 

Amphibious assault and ship-to-shore construction support. 

Battle damage repair operations 

Disaster control and recovery operations. 

Civic action employment. 

The Seabees usually are linked with Marine 

Corps contingency plans, providing the Fleet Marine Force and MAGTFs extensive construction 

capabilities not inherent to Marine engineer 

forces. For example, the Seabees provide ammunition supply points, expeditionary airbases, operations buildings, port improvements or construction, warehouses, paved roads, and high voltage 

electrical distribution. mica1 NCF projects also include follow-on enhancement work, which may 

have been initiated by other engineer units such 

as Marine Engineer Support Battalions, Combat 

Engineer Battalions, or Marine Wing Support 

Squadrons. Enhancement projects include constructing gravel or paved roads from pioneered 

lines of communication, completing expeditionary airfields installed by other engineer units, 

and installing permanent bridges to allow reuse of expeditionary bridges in the forward 

areas. 

While working on projects, NCF units provide onsite defense for their construction sites or they join 

with other units as part of a defense force. 

NCF personnel, however, are not trained or equipped 

for all combat support tasks.Unlike Army and Marine Corps combat engineer units, explosive breaching of obstacles; minefield installation, marking or 

clearing, explosive ordnance disposal; and other combat engineer support tasks associated with direct support to ground comhat elements are not normally executed by NCF units. In contrast, NCF units are 

highly skilled construction specialists, capable of executing general engineering (general combat service 

support, sustainment engineering, and survivability 

December 1994 Engineer 13 
- - 

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Organization NCB acts as the direct mordinator and technical advisor to 

fleet and component commandNMCB ers desiring or requiring Seabee support. 

r 

Headquarters 

Company L 

I 

Vertical 

Construction 

Companies 

1 

Naval Construction Regiment (NCR). A deployed regiment direds the distribution of 

battalions and other NCF assets 

in theater, monitors task progress and quality of mnstruct,ion, and reviews ongoing plan- 

- ning and operations. During 

Equipment and Utilities and peacetime, two active training 

Horizontal 

Construction 

Company 

Camp Maintenance 

Company 

regiments are mponsihle for 

the readiness of NMCBs. They 

are located at the construction 

battalion centers at Gulfport 

and Port Hueneme. In addition 

enhancements) that exceeds the current capabili- to the two training regiments, two active duty and 

ties of many other engineer units. four reserve regiments are available to deploy to regional conflicts. 

Seabee Organization Naval Mobile Constmtion Battalion(NMCB). 

Eight active duty and 12 reserve battalions form Naval Construction Brigade (NCB). part of today's NCF. Composed of 24 officers, 745 

Two NCBs are under the operational con- enlisted personnel and 230 pieces of construction 

trol of the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and equipment, an NMCB is capable of self-sufficient 

Pacific Fleets. The 2nd NCB is located in Norfolk, deployment by air or by sea within six days of notiVirginia; the 3rd NCB is located in Pearl Harbor, fication. For rapid deployment, each battalion is 

Hawaii. As higher echelon commands, the brigades equipped with an air detachment (AIRDET) of 89 

normally are not deploy&. Exercising administrative men and supporting civil engineer support equipand operational control over regiments operating ment. The AIRDET is capable of deploying indewithin their geographical area of responsibility, an pendently lo an austere environment on Air Force 

Seabees performing runway repairs in Somalia. 

14 Engineer December 1994 
-

Naval Construction Force 

1
 ,-

Unit 

~e 

Naval Construction Brigade 

Naval Construction Regiment 

I 


Naval Construction Regiment (Training) - 1 I I/ Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 8 1 12 

( Naval Construction Force Support Unit 

1 Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1 - / 2 / 1

( Underwater Construction Team I I. Construction Battalion Unit l i - 1 

11 Naval Beach Group I

1 Amphibious Construction Battalion 

-A! 


2 1 - 1 1 

transport aircraft within 48 hours notice. The battalion is also capable of forming task-oriented detachments up to one-half the size of the battalion, which 

operate independently in combat or low intensity conflict environments. 

Adding to the self-sufficiency of the battalion, 

NMCBs are manned with several officer and enlisted ratings besides Seabees and CEC officers. 

They include: corpsmen, dental technicians, mess 

specialists, supply officers and various supply personnel, personnelmen, yeomen, gunners mates, 

postal clerks, and disbursing personnel; plus a doctor. dentist, chaplain, legalman, photojournalist, 

and a Marine Corps senior enlisted advisor The 

battalion also has a team of skilled individuals certified in sea embarkation and air embarkation 

through a joint service or Air Force school. 

Amphibious Construction Battalion 

(PHIBCB). Deployed with amphibious readiness 

forces, the mission of the two PHTBCBs is to provide immediate "over-the-beach support to Marine 

forces. They provide a logistics link between ship 

and shore during amphibious operations. Personnel 

in an amphibious battalion are skilled in floating 

and elevated causeway construction, installation 

and operation of ship-to-shore fuel systems, and 

assembly and operation of self-propelled pontoon 

barges for cargoiequipment transfer operations. 

The 53 officers and 991 enlisted personnel assigned 

to a PHIBCB provide necessary beach improvements and camp support for the Naval support element of a joint operation. 

Underwater Construch'on %am (UCT). The 

two UCTs are self-sustaining construction diving 

units that consist of six CEC officers and 99 enlisted personnel. They provide a wide range of underwater construction capabilities, including construction, inspection and repair of ocean and 

waterfront facilities, underwater battle damage 

assessmentlrepair, and underwater construction 

support of amphibious operations. Each UCT has 

three active and two reserve air-deployable diving 

teams plus a shore support component. UCT ONE 

is located in Little Creek, Virginia, and UCT TWO 

is in Port Hueneme. 

Construction Battalion Unit (CBU). Nineteen CBUs are located at bases in the United 

States. Each unit is composed of one officer and 44 

enlisted personnel. Peacetime employment of a 

CBU centers on construction and repair of shore 

facilities at installations where they are assigned. 

The CBU contingency mission, however, is to provide construction, operational, and maintenance 

support of rapidly deployable 250-bed or 100-bed 

combat-zone, disaster-relief, or low intensity conflict hospitals. When necessary, two CBUs are combined to support a 500-bed or larger fleet hospital 

construction mission. 

Reserve Units 

Construetion Battalion Maintenance 

Unit (CBMU). Two CBMUs manned by 

reservists are available for recall. A CBMU consists 

of 7 officers and 329 enlisted personnel. Their mission is to provide maintenance (public workslminor 

construction) support to a forward base before or after construction has been completed. This plan allows NMCBs actively engaged in a conflict to redeploy to more forward battle areas or to another 

geographical region, if necessary A CBMU also provides limited defensive warfighting capability, eliminating the need for civilian construction personnel 

in a combat zone. 

Naval Construction Force Support Unit 

(NCFSU). The reserve NCFSU includes 12 officers and 202 enlisted personnel. It provides logistical and engineering support to multiple NMCBs in 

December 1994 
"Despite the forces at work diminishing our assets 

and manpower...we must strive to build interservice 

relationships on common ground." 

theater by augmenting the following mission areas: 

design, planning and estimating, construction material expeditingidelivery; heavy equipment maintenance and repair; and long-haul transportation, 

paving, and concrete placement. 

Peacetime O~erations 

Seabee battalions operate on a rotation cycle 

that has them operationally deployed for 

sevcsn months outside the continental U.S., followed by seven months of home-port duty for training and refitting. During a 7-month deployment, 

bat,talions embark to forward deployment sites in 

Guam, Okinawa, Spain, and Puerto Rico. While 

overseas, the NMCB functions independently, under the auspices of the area commander, performing preplanned on-site construction. Projects include construction of permanent paved roads, replacement of electrical distribution systems, construction of new buildings and utilities, rehabilitation of barracks, or other such construction. On deployment, a battalion typically will send detachments on various construction missions within the 

operating theater. Between 13 and 100 personnel, 

led by senior enlisted Seabees or junior officers, deploy directly to sites such as Honduras, Panama, 

Cuba, Japan, Korea, and several islands in the South 

Pacific. On deployment, battalions emphasize construction training, command and control skills, safety, 

and autonomom operations. Frequently, battalions on 

deployment also participate in area joint exercises, 

such as Team Spirit in Korea and Joint Chieb of Stam 

NATO joint-combined exercises in Europe. 

Recent Joint Operations 

Seabees have participated in a variety of joint 

service operatiom in the past few years. Recent 

exa~rlples of NCF elements in the joint arena follow: 

Operation Desert ShieldlStorm, 1990-91. 

One regiment, four battalions, one tailored 

NCFSU, two CBUs and one UCT deployed in support of Navy and Marine forces. In Southwest Asia, 

the Seabees constructed 4,750 buildings (some KSpan), aircraR hangars, six million square feet of 

aircraft parking aprons, 14 galleys to feed 75,000 

people, and a 40,000-man enemy POW camp. They 

also maintained 200 miles of unpaved desert fourlane divided highway as main supply routes, 

erected fences and steel security towers, installed 

major electrical distribution systems and sanitation 

facilities, constructed thousands of meters of concrete decks and walls. and fabricated mock artillerv 

pieces and tank turrets. 

Hurricane Andrew Recovery, Florida, 

August 1992. Working with the Army Corps of 

Engineers and Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew, the 

equivalent of one Seabee battalion from several units 

assisted in the recovery effort. Under the JTF, the 

Seabee effort was concentrated on restoring 278 

schools damaged by the hurricane. In 13 days, Seabees repaired roo&, insulation systems, air conditioning, and electrical power in nearly 200 schools--the 

equivalent of more than $2 million in repair work. 

Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, 1993: One 

regiment and two battalions deployed, attached to a 

Marine expeditionary unit commander. The Seabees 

worked hand-in-hand with coalition engineering 

units and Army, Air Force, and Marine engineers to 

construct encampments and repair roads, bridges, 

airfields and other facilities in country CEC officers 

managed construction contracting support by Brown 

and Root via a Corps of Engineers logistics contract. 

Deployed Medical Facility, Zagreb, Croatia, 

1994. Since March, 34 Seabees have provided public works and minor construction support to the contingency hospital, originally set up and operated by 

the Army and Air Force. Due to their embark 

skills, a team of five Seabees are assigned to the 

United Nations airfield to coordinate flight-line operations. These equipment operators act as a cargo 

handling and manifesting unit, loading and unloading US., Russian, and other forces' transport 

aircraft. 

Operation Sea Signal, Guantanamo Bay, 

Cuba, 1994. Two Seabee AIRDEB worked closely 

with an Air Force RED HORSE unit, Army Logistics Task Force 64 penonnel, an Air Force Prime 

BEEF unit, and Marine engineers to construct 

migrant camps, security, and sanitation facilities 

for more than 40,000 Cuban and Haitian refugees. 

Restore Haiti, 1994. An amphibious Seabee 

battalion deployed in support of a potentially aggressive over-the-beach invasion, which was diplomatically averted. Several CEC officers have mobilized for logistia contracting needs in Haiti. CEC 

December 1994 
Navy Seabeea worked 


diligently with the 


Army, Air Force, and 


Marine engineer units 


to construct tent 


camps at Guantanamo 


Bay, Cuba, for Haitian 


and Cuban refugees. 


Seabees erected addi- 


tional refugee camps 


in Panama and on the 


island of Grand Turk. 


officers and a UCT team, under the direction of the 

JTF engineer, inspected port facilities, piers and 

harbor cranes to determine the extent of repairs 

required for continued operation support. 

Joint Initiatives 

Joint Publication 1, released in 1991 by the 

JCS, is a capstone document that guides joint 

warfare concepts. As stated in this publication: 

"Serucce skills form the very core of our combat capabilities. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successfil joint operations are impossible without the capabilities 

developed and embodied in each service..." 

This document further embraces the importance 

of interservice "team building." Fully involved in interservice teamwork, the Seabees are supportive of 

several initiatives aimed at improving service 

interoperability. 

Perhaps the greatest area in which to exploit improvement is the training environment. Specifically, 

progress to date by the Interservice Training Review 

Organization (ITRO) has been promising. Soon, our 

construction engineer t,echnicians will he trained at 

five consolidated training centers of excellence. The 

Seabees will host training for carpentets, builders, 

structures (Air Force carpenters) and steelworkers at 

Gulfport and mechanics at Port Hueneme. Equipment operators and engineering aids are scheduled to 

attend training by the Army at Fort Leonard Wood, 

while the Air Force is planning to train electricians, 

plumbers, and utilitiesmen at Sheppard Air Force 

Base, Texas. 

More importantly, it will be increasingly crucial 

that our engineering officers, who will be placed in 

strategic positions of responsibility at unified commands, gain greater exposure to engineers of other 

services. Two ways in which this can be accomplished 

is through improved officer billet exchange 

December 1994 

programs and guest seminars at advanced engineer 

officer courses. Further, by participating in activities sponsored by the Society of American Military 

Engineers (SAME) and by developing a strong joint 

professional reading program, our officers will gain 

tremendous insight into views expressed by their 

counterparts and the JCS. 

We must also place more emphasis on procurement and logistics. Weapons systems, communications equipment, and other equipment and parts 

compatibility in the field must be optimized. Intersewice and theater-level working groups should 

continue to plan service responsibilities for longhaul transportation, chemical-biological detection 

and decontamination, bulk liquids storage and 

transfer, and development of water resources. Moreover, associating together on research and development issues offers unique economies of scale. 

The Future 

Joint efforts create a common perspective from 

which to plan and operate. Ultimately, unified operations fundamentally shape the way we 

think about and train for war. And despite the 

forces at work diminishing our assets and manpower, ostensibly making each service fight for its 

own resources, we must strive to build interservice 

relationships on common ground. We must understand each service's mission and capabilities and create doctrine for effective operations. Collectively, we 

need to further improve in many engineering aresand the Seabees stand ready to move forward with 

the other branches of our joint team! Y 

Rear. Admiral Jack E. Buffington, CEC, U.S. Na~y, is the 

Commander, NAVFAC, and the Chief of Civil Engineers. 

In April 1994, he became the president of SAME. 

Lieutenant Commander Bowers selves in the Seabee Division of NAVFAC. 
-- 

The Min 

An, 

By Captain Frank T.Ahins 

10 Noveniber 1994, 1005 hours: It was a hot 

morning--even for Africa--and the on-going war 

was heating up. Lieutenant Colonel Ross Chamberlain, engineer battalion commandel; received a 

FRAGO for the next day's mission from the brigade 

task. fbrce commander According to intelligence, the 

eneniy had enzplaced a 150-meter-deep mine-andwire obstacle directly in the path of the task force, 

and a bypass was out of the question. LTC Chamberlain was directed to task organize into the task 

force breach team and to conduct a deliberate 

breach in support of the brigade's offensive mission. 

Preparaiion went as planned, and every engineer 

company commander reported their engineer systems to be fully niission capable. The OPORD was 

received at 1800 hours, and checks and rehearsals 

were executed to standard. Simulated MICLIC firings occurred during rehearsals at a secure location 

that closely resembled the anticipated enemy obsta,. 

cle. Wake-up was at 0245 hours, and the tush force 

was moving by 0350 hours. When the anticipated obstacle was encountered at 0730 hours, the task force 

suppressed, obscured, and secured the intended 

breach site. Enemy forces were held at bay by wellcoordinated direct and indirect fires. LTC Chamberlain's blood boiled, and he could already taste unequivocal victory. Every available MICLIC was 

moved forward-but they failed to fire! The task 

force lost momentum and began to receive withering 

direct and indirect fire. 'We're dying out here!" 

gasped the task force commander over the radio. 

Then...silence. 

hTC Chamberlain awoke in a cold sweat. On 

leave with his family in Maine, he knew he 

had to go back to the battalion and take care of the 

"MICLIC nightmare" while there was timdefore 

18 Engineer 

the upcoming National Training Center rotation. 

'We must have an effective program enforced by 

my chain of command to make those things work," 

he thought. Then he drafted this outline: 

Maintenance and Training Program 

MICLIC Malfunctions 

'kctical Assembly Area Checks 

Assault Position Checks 

LTC Chamberlain drove back to his unit and 

called a meeting with the company commanders, 

the XO, the S3, the 84, the command sergeant major, and the maintenance technician, and presented 

his maintenance and training concept. The company commanders admitted that they lacked indepth knowledge of the MICLIC and were not satisfied with current MICLIC training. An effective 

training program definitely was needed. 

The battalion maintenance technician had recently 

called Rock Island Army Depot and had a draft maintenance plan ready for review. He reported that the 

MICLIC had technical malfunctions that could be 

reduced but not always eliminated. He would review an after-action report on the MICLIC from Operations Desert ShieldIDesert Storm to ensure that 

all problems identified in it were addressed in his 

plan. The S3 would give professional development 

classes to officers and NCOs on the operation of 

the MICLIC and work with the maintenance technician to synchronize maintenance and training. The 

54 ensured that the inert and live charges were 

ordered. He recommended that the M68 inert line 

charge containers remain with the unit rather be 

returned to the ammunition supply point because 

these containers have electrical connectors that can 

be reused for set-up and prefire checks. ARer several days of planning and consultation at the user 

level, their program was ready for trial. 

December 1994 
Maintenance and Training Programs 

The maintenance technician reported that,

JL during motor stables, launcher and trailer 

maintenance were ignored until the line charge 

was needed. Squad leaders did not have the necessary technical manual (TM 9-1375-215-14&P, 1992 

issue) or technical bulletin (TB 43-0001-36-5, 1 

January - 31 March 1994 reporting period). In addition, critical parts were missing on MICLIC 

launchers and trailers. He called the battalion publication NCO to order the manuals. Then he met 

with the S3, and they agreed on the following 

program: 

Maintenance Program 

Develop routine command-enforced maintenance checks for the launcher and the trailer, 

including systematic checks with an inert line 

charge or empty inert charge container. 

Involve leaders directly to ensure that maintenance deadline deficiencies are corrected. 

Training Program 

Focus the officer and NCO professional development classes on MICLIC operation. 

o Ensure that live and inert line charges are 

available for training; obtain empty M68 inert 

line charge containers to use during set-up 

and prefire checks. 

Reserve the range for live MICLIC training after everyone can correctly perform set-up and 

prefire checks. 

Develop internal checklists and closely monitor on-site maintenance and training events 

for the MICLIC: 

- Perform preventive maintenance checks and 

services (PMCS) of the launcher and trailer 

'by the book." 

- Use TM 9-1375-215-14&P and TB 43-0001-36-5 

in garrison and the field, and perform followup checks to ensure that deficiencies are 

corrected. 

- Perform prefire checks in the tactical assemhly 

area and in the assault position; use inert and 

live line charges in training. 

Desert Storm MICLIC after-action report, all material work orders, and TM 9-1375-215-14&P and TB 

43-0001-36-5.Then he compiled the following list 

of known MICLIC malfunctions that he wanted to 

curtail or prevent: 

o The arresting cable breaks when the rocket 

reaches its apex. 

The rocket does not fire, or it fires hut does 

not travel far enough. 

o The rocket fires but does not leave the launcher. 

The launch arm is damaged when the 

MICLIC is towed over rough terrain. 

The launch arm alignment pins are damaged when the MICLIC is towed over rough 

terrain. 

The rocket does not fire even though preliminary checks show that the entire electrical firing circuit is good. The rocket is labeled "MISFIRE according to procedure and is shipped 

back to the factory; there, the rocket is tested 

and fires. 

The neutral safety switch gives false readings. 

The neutral safety switch plug wires are easily damaged. 

The cable routing from the MICLIC to the 

towing vehicle degrades the vehicle's nuclear, 

biological, and chemical (NBC) capability. 

The trailer is damaged when it is towed at 

speeds exceeding 15 mph. 

The trailer's quick-release mechanism malfunctions when it is dusty. 

The firing and rocket systems lack sufficient 

redundancy. 

o The MICLIC cannot be fired unless the trailer 

is on relatively level and stable ground. 

The M34 blasting machine tests "GO yet 

lacks enough voltage to fire the MICLIC. 

o The fuze malfunctions. 

The safety switch assembly is cross-wired 

from the factory (wires are not color coded), 

yet checks indicate "GO." 

The entire electrical system cannot be tested 

without live or training linear charges. 

MICLIC Malfunctions The following checklists were developed to reT duce the number of MICLIC malfunctions. The 

he battalion maintenance technician called checklists, however, do not replace TM 9-1375-215-

Rock Island Army Depot and reviewed the 14&P, TB 43-0001-36-5,or common sense. 

December 1994 Engineer 19 
Tactical Assembly Area Check1 

1. Obtain the appropriate manuals: 

(a)TM 9-1375-215-14&P (The 1992 issue is current). 

(b)TB 43-0001-36-5 (1January - 31 March 1994 reporting period). It has electrical check 


information not found in the current technical manual. 


2. Configure the launcher and trailer as follows: 

Launcher/NSN Authorized Trailer 

MK155 MOD 011055-01 -203-5883 M353 only 

MK155 MOD 111055-01 -281 -2770 M353 or M200A1 

MK155 MOD 211055-01-340-6084 M353 only 

MK155 MOD 311055-01 -327-3106 M353 or M200A1 

The launcher and trailer must be "married up" correctly and the turnbuckles must be secure 

and tight. Otherwise, the charge will jump around during towing and deployment, possibly causing a misfire. Items 4 and 5 give the correct procedure. 

The M200A1 t,railer must be modified; TB 9-2330-323-30 contains the necessary instructions. 

3. Position the linear charge on the launcher so the guide bars of t,he linear charge are between the cross members of the launcher, as shown: 

cross member 

'1. Bolt the launcher tightly t.o the trailer with flatwashers, lockwashers, 15116-inch nuts, and 

U-bolts. 7 

3. Secure the linear charge to the trailer's lifting rings with all four turnbuckles. Tighten the 

turnbuckles, then use a 1 1/8-inch open-end wrench to tighten the locknuts on the turnbuckles. 

The open face of the turnbuckles should point away from the container. 

Caution: Do not secure the linear charge container to the launcher or the charge may 

not fire correctly (see the following illustration). 

. ~ ~- - .. ~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~ 

20 Engineer December 1994 
Secure charge 

using turnbuckles 

6. Check the fuze installation by feeling through the nylon sock after the launcher is on the 

trailer Ensure that the electrical wires running under the sock are taped on one side of the arresting cable and that the arming wire is on the opposite side. If the electrical wires are not taped 

separately from the arming wire, then complete the following steps: 

(a) Remove the hose clamp. 

(b) Pull back the nylon sock. 

(c)Align the electrical wires on the side of the arresting cable that is opposite the arming wire, 

and secure the electrical wires with masking tape. 

Caution: Use paper masking tape, which will break away (not stretch) during deployment. Neuer use electrical or "I00mph9'tape because it will stretch during deployment (see 

the illustration below). 

Electrical wires Paper masking tape 

-

1. Avoid pulling on the arresting cable when working with the fuze. Pulling may damage the 

shorting loop built into the end of the arresting cable. The shorting loop is a system safety feature 

that prevents accidental detonation of the line charge. 

I?. Secure the fuze in the fuze holder after completing the fuze installation procedure, as shown: 

Fuze hdder area 

Line charge container) 

Arresting cable 

anchor point 

December 1994 Engineer 21 
Caution: An unsecured fuze may be damaged when the line charge is deployed and 

result in a misfire. 

9. Position the protective nylon cover on the linear charge container after the assembled fuze 

is installed in the fuze holder The protective nylon cover must be peeled back from the center lo 

install the rocket motor. The nylon cover, part of the basic issue items, should be in the launcher 

storage compartment. It protects the charge from dirt. 

10. Loop the rocket bridle cables 18 inches and insert them under the cable sheath on the 

launch rail during the rocket motor installation Use electrical tape to secure the cable under the 

cable sheath in three locations, as shown: 

Eleclricnl laps 

le: Cabls under s 

(Nole: Cabls unde, 

Ensure that the cable on top of the linear charge is in an "S" pattern from the rear to the front 

of the linear charge container. The cable sheath helps the charge deploy Point the rocket harness 

connector forward (toward the minefield) and position it toward the front of the linear charge container to achieve the "S" pattern. This pattern minimizes whipping action during deployment, 

which may cause a misfire (see the illustration). 

22 Engineer December 1994 
Caution: Handle the MK22 Rocket Motor with extreme care because the electrical lead 

at the rear of the rocket motor breaks easily. Always lift the rocket from the box byplacing your hands around the rocket tube. Do NOT lift the rocket by the bridle cables or the 

electrical lead. 

To prevent a misfire, position the rocket motor electrical lead over the end of the linear charge 

container; do not tie, secure, or tangle the lead to the launcher. Do NOT throw lead wires over the 

launching rail. 

11. Protect the rocket from road shock if the MICLIC must be towed before it is fired. 

(a) Lower the launch rail as far as possible to take pressure off the hydraulic system. 

(h) Insert the ball lock pins in the lock position. 

(c) Use the foam packing insert from the rocket motor shipping bodcontainer to protect the 

motor during transport, as shown in figure below: 

(1) Trim an inch from the bottom of the Foam insert so it will fit between the rocket motor and 

the linear charge. 

(2) Place the insert under the rocket motor headcap. This allows the rocket motor to rest on the 

foam insert instead of on the linear charge container. 

Do not allow the rocket motor to hit the front of the linear charge container when the launch 

rail is lowered. If it does, the charge container is installed incorrectly. Refer to item 3 and reinstall the linear charge. 

To avoid internal damage to the MICLIC, t,ow it over smooth roads whenever possible. Do not 

exceed 15 mph if the MICLIC must be towed over rough terrain. In wet conditions, check the 

brake drums for internal buildup of mud and debris. The quick-release mechanism must be free of 

dust and dirt to function properly 

12. Ensure that at least two M34 blasting machines are in the vehicle that will tow the 

MICLIC at the time of firing. As stated in TM 9-1375-203-15, Change 1, depot and division personnel must test the blasting machines before deployment to ensure that they deliver the correct 

amount and duration of voltage. This complete check will ensure the blasting machines function 

when needed. 

December 1994 Engineer 23 
Assault Position Checklist 

Double-check the MICLIC after it is prepared for 

firing if it was towed. The MICLIC must be in a covered and concealed position during the check. 

1. Place the ball lock pins in the raised position 

and put the launch rail in the firing position. 

2. Open the protective cover. Allow the cover to 

hang over the sides of the container, but ensure 

that it does not interfere with the linear charge. 

3. Ensure that no part of the linear charge or 

rocket bridle cable hangs out of the container. 

4. Ensure that the rocket bridle cable is under 

the cable sheath. 

5. Ensure that no more than 18 inches of bridle 

cable is looped up from the rocket motor to the cable sheath. 

6. Ensure that the bridle cable lays in an "S" pattern on top of the linear charge. 

7. Ensure that the fuze is securely installed in 

the fuze holder. 

8. Insert the firing pin in the rocket motor headcap. 

Reporting MICLIC Malfunctions

If the MICLIC malfunctions after performing all of 

the checks, report the equipment malfunctions to 

Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command 

(AMCCOM)Rock Island, Illinois, as described in AR 

75-1.As a minimum, call Mr. Eyskens, AMCCOM, at: 

DSN 793-7535; commercial (309) 782-7535. Or use 

the E-mail address: QASlCaU-EMI-I2.ARMy.MIL, 

The datafax number is:DSN 793-7136 or commercial 

(309) 782-7136. If AR 75-1 is not available, check with 

the MOS libraly, the ammunition supply point, or the 

battalion S4. If not available from those sources, call 

the Army "Fublication Hotline": (410) 671-253313775. 

Call only when absolutely necessary 

After Preparation and Training T 

TC Chamberlain prcsseci his <un~nu&rs, 

]!and MiCLiC tmining beeante systpnuLtic and 

effective. On 15 January, the battalion went on alert for 

a possible deployment to the Mi& East. 'It looks as if 

our trainingjust might save our hides," LTC Chmnberlain exclaimed to the S3. 'Ye,sir!" responded the S3. 

'But you should, see the poor performance of the field 

sanitation teams and the ragged condition of the mobile 

kitchen tmilers." LTC Chan~berlain glared and then 

mad to the Sl, '1want to see those conzpany contntanders in my ofice now!" 7tnever ends," he thought 

as he heard bootspounding up the hall to his ofice. 'We 

correct one problent and then there are two more. Jut 

onother day in the Corps." Id 

Captain Frank T. Akins serves as Chief of Demolitions at 

the U.S. A17ny Engineer School. He is a graduate of the 

Engineer Officer's Aduanced Course and CAS3 School. 

Letter To The Editor 

Reference: "Advances In Mine Wadem: Antitank Mines," by 

William C.Schneck, Malcolm Visser, and Stuart Leigh, ENGINEER magazine, November 1993. 

Gentlemen: 

i read your subject report'htitank Mines" with great interest. As the chief of the German Mine Documentation Center, I 

am very interested in this subject area. Included in our mission 

is the documentation of all worldwide produced mines. 

In order to prevent ihe dissemination of inaccurate information, permit me to make some remarks regarding the German 

mines and mine system. 

1. Table 1: The Antitank (AT) Mine FN-M8 is produced in 

Sweden and was introduced into use by the Swedish Any. 

That mine, when intmduced in the German Army, was designed as antitank mine DM 31. It is a further development [upgraded version] of the FFV-028. The difference in the DM 31 is 

a self-safe(y mechanism, seen on its exterior through a red 

marked casing, that is pushed out afler expiration of the mine 

effectiveness, thereby signing the safe-state of the mine. Contrary to the FFV-028, me DM 31 can be reactivated by mine experts after the expiration of the safe-state. . Adiierenfation of 

both of these mines is, therefore, necessary and worthwhile. 

2. Table 2: The AT mine PM-60 is a mine of the former National Peoples Army (East German Army - NVA) that was not 

taken into the permanent inventory of the Bundeswehr. All stocks 

will be destroyed and it shwid not be in your documentation. 

3. Table 3: in addtian to the two mentioned delivery systems, the Bsndeswehr has the rocket launcher LARS (range 

8 - 14 km, 180 mfles) and MARS (range 40 km, 336 miles), 

both of which can shoot the AT mine AT-2. The documentation 

should be expanded to include these iwo systems. 

With friendly greetings. 

Potocnik. Captain. German Army. 

Authors' Reply 

The information provided by Captain Potocnik of the Bundeswehr on the DM-31, PM60 and the German mine delivery 

system is most welcome. The sharing of such information between allies is important for ensuring intemperability and 

thereby success in future operations. 

However, we believe the East German manufactured PMdO 

adtank mine should remain on Ux list of mines that may be encountered by U.S. (and allied) forces in future contingency operations. Even ihough the Federal Republic of Germany is destroying 

the stockpile of PMGOs inherited from East Germany, this mine 

may still be encountered in parts of Am'ca and Southeast Asia, 

where it was exported by the mmmunisk durlng the Cold War. 

William C. Schneck 

Malcolm Visser 

Stuart Leigh 

24 Engineer December 2994 
---------------------------------- 

Lessons Learned: 

Working with the M9 ACE 

By Peggy McAvenia, Sergeant First Class Tommy Simmons, 

and Sergeant First Class William Whitacre 

The following lessons apply to U.S. Army and Marine Corps engineer units that are authorized the 

M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE). The lessons 

are based on a post-fielding training effect~eness 

analysis (PFTEA) survey performed by the Directorate 

of Evaluation and Standardization in the fall of 1993. 

Fielding of the ACE, which began in 1988, has 

been completed for most Active Component (AC) 

Army units and is still under way for Reserve Components (RC) units. Many units have experienced maintenance and operation problems with this vehicle. To 

confirm information reported by field commanders, 

Engineer School leaders requested that a PFTEA be 

performed before fielding was completed. Therefore, 

AC units that had employed the ACE in training or in 

combat for a year or more were surveyed in September 1993. The issues identified in that survey are summarized under Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers (DTLOMS) headings. 

Doctrine 

ISSUE: In the field, the ACE is being used primarily for survivability tasks, such as digging fighting 

positions. 

DISCUSSION: The ACE was designed primarily 

to support mobility operations and some countermobility missions. In the field, however, engineer units use 

the vehicle primarily for digging fighting positions during survivability operations. 

Soldiers use a 

pair or ACES to 

construct an anti. 

tank ditch. 

December 1994 Engineer 25 
FUTURE RESOLUTIONS: To decrease the 

amount of time maneuver units need to construct 

fighting positions using the ACE, the Engineer School 

has developed a modified (hasty) two-tiered fighting 

position. (See article, page 29). The school has also 

revised work-rate planning factors for the ACE to 

more accurately reflect the vehicle's diverse capabilities. The revised factors will appear in FMs 5-71-2 

and 5-71-3, which are scheduled for publication in fiscal year (FY) 95. Until then, information about the 

planning factors will appear on the Engineer Bulletin 

Board System (EBBS) and in the PFTEA report. If 

your unit needs access to EBBS, call (314) 563-

0131, extension 3-5305, for information on securing a 

systems operation disk. 

Training And Leadership 

ISSUE: Maneuver units operate the ACE beyond 

its capabilities. 

DISCUSSION: Since bulldozers have been removed from the table of organization and equipment 

(TOE) of engineer support units, maneuver commanders often request that support units use the ACE to 

perform mobility, countermobility and survivability 

tasks formerly performed by dozers. Some maneuver 

unit commanders ignore the blade capabilities and 

digging sites recommended by their engineer officers. 

Instead, they request that operations be performed in 

soils or rocky terrain that exceed the capabilities of 

the ACE. The result is damaged vehicles and, sometimes, injured personnel. 

Survey results show that many ACE operators 

travel with the blade in the lowered position because of the time required to fold the blade. This 

practice must stop! It is a serious safety hazard 

and may also cause extensive damage to the 

blade. At Fort Leonard Wood, operator training for 

the ACE has stressed the need to travel with the 

blade in the folded position since 1990. At that time, 

the lowered blade was identified as a factor that contributed to the deaths of two soldiers involved in a 

training accident. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

Engineer officers and noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) must ensure that the ACE is employed 

properly within its capabilities and limitations. 

ACE operators must travel with the blade in the 

folded position. Until an automatic blade folder is 

installed, units must allow for a delay of 20 to 30 

minutes to fold the blade. 

Unit leaders and equipment operators must be 

trained to employ the equipment properly. At the Engineer School, leadership training on the ACE has 

been added to the Basic and Advanced Engineer 

Officer Courses and to the Basic NCO Course. 

It will soon be added to the Advanced NCO 

Course. 

FUTURE RESOLUTION: The Engineer School 

should develop guidance on the types of soil and terrain where the ACE can and cannot operate safely. 

ISSUE: There is a direct relationship between a 

unit's organizational readiness rate (ORR) and its 

level of operator and mechanic experience, sustainrnent training and degree of supervision. 

DISCUSSION: Unit leaders expect to receive fully 

trained, journeyman-level operators from the Engineer School, who do not need supervision when they 

operate the ACE. They also expect to receive mechanics who are well versed on repairing ACEspecific problems. This level of training is not possible, given the time restrictions and additional training 

requirements in the MOS 12F and 625 Advanced Individual Training (AIT) courses. Survey results show 

that units with short train-up times and limited supervision of ACE operators have low ORRs. Inadequate 

supervision also contributes to increased accident 

rates. The average experience level of ACE mechanics is less than one year. While that experience level 

is typical for newly fielded equipment, sustainment 

training in the unit is required to achieve and maintain high ORRs. 

RECOMMENDATION: To improve ORRs for the 

ACE, unit leaders must establish sustainment training 

programs for both operators and mechanics. They 

must also establish dig sites for operator sustainment 

training. New operators must be closely supervised 

for at least one or two years, depending on the frequency of task performance on the vehicle. 

ISSUE: Units must provide more opportunities for 

operator training on the ACE. 

DISCUSSION: Survey results show that 78 percent of the ACE operators have one year of experience or less in performing tasks with the equipment. 

The lack of operator experience results in high levels 

of vehicle maintenance. In the PFTEA survey, all 

units with short train-up times or limited training opportunities for their ACE operators had high maintenance levels. 

RECOMMENDATION: It is critical that units act 

aggressively to develop training opportunities for their 

ACE operators. By doing so, they will increase their 

level of expertise and significantly reduce maintenance costs. 

ISSUE: ACE operators who are separated from their 

units need close supervision by engineer leaders. 

DISCUSSION: Few new ACE operators receive 

close guidance or supervision when they are sent to 

26 Engineer December 1994 
The M9 ACE is used ta dig a vehicular fighting position. 

support maneuver units. The primary reason for close 

supervision is to prevent accidents and misuse of the 

equipment by the supported unit. New operators usually lack the seasoned judgement of their supervisors 

and may force the ACE to perform beyond its capabilities or cause damage while operating the equipment 

in difficult soil conditions. 

RECOMMENDATION: To ensure proper procedures are followed when the ACE is separated from 

its engineer unit, the equipment operator must be supervised by senior career management field (CMF) 

12 personnel. The supervisor should serve as the 

control or point of contact for the engineer unit and 

the maneuver commander. 

Organization 

ISSUE: Efficient use of MOS 12F personnel. 

DISCUSSION: Survey results show that most 

units use E4-grade soldiers to operate the ACE. 

However, when the ACE is to be separated from the 

engineer unit or when one ACE is operated by itself, 

commanders prefer to use E5-grade soldiers as the 

operator. Higher grade soldiers are preferred because 

of the degree of responsibility and experience required in those situations. 

RECOMMENDATION: For more effective ACE operations, unit leaders should consider the operator's 

experience level when assigning personnel to engineer equipment. Use the most experienced sergeants 

as ACE operators. Use less experienced operators 

for the AVLB and CEV. 

December 1994 

ISSUE: Table of organization and equipment 

(TOE) deficiencies. 

DISCUSSION: ACE operators currently are assigned to combat engineer company line platoons. 

Because training resources are limited, they usually 

are not cross-trained in their MOS 12F tasks to operate the CEV and AVLB. The lack of qualified supervisors and experienced operators in line platoons adversely affects unit readiness for ACE 

operations. 

RECOMMENDATION: Engineer commanders consolidate their ACEs in garrison to maximize the effectiveness of equipment training and maintenance. 

FUTURE RESOLUTION: Engineer School leaders 

are studying the feasibility of consolidating the ACEs 

in the assault and obstacle platoons. Consolidating 

them in one location may facilitate effective cross training and enhance maintenance management and the 

employment of engineer equipment and personnel. 

ISSUE: Engineer companies lack the organic 

capability to maintain the ACE properly. 

DISCUSSION: Fielding of the ACE has increased 

the maintenance problems that engineer companies 

encounter with their combat engineer vehicles. The 

number of mechanics authorized to engineer companies was not increased when the ACE was fielded, 

which added to an already heavy maintenance requirement. Also, MOS 626 mechanics attending AIT 

are trained on maintenance systems not specific vehicles, such as the ACE. In spite of these limitations, 

engineer companies must be innovative in solving 

Engineer 27 
their maintenance problems. For example, units 

might consider consolidating their ACES at the garrison level. 

RECOMMENDATION: Units should consider using Logistics Assistance Office (LAO) technicians, 

who are available on most AC Army installations, to 

help solve maintenance problems on the ACE. 

Units may also consider hiring civilian mechanics to 

maintain this vehicle. To ease the pressure on engineer unit mechanics, assign the most experienced 

mechanics to the ACE. Unit leaders must support 

sustainment training for both ACE operators and mechanics because training is key to improving maintenance levels. 

ISSUE: An alternate operator is required to safely 

perform some tasks with the ACE. 

DISCUSSION: Sulvey results suggest that an 

alternate operator is required when the ACE is operated continuously and when the tracks and road 

wheels are changed. 

RECOMMENDATION: Units designate and train 

an alternate operator to assist during continuous operations and some maintenance operations. 

Materiel 

ISSUE: Materiel improvements are needed for the 

ACE. 

DISCUSSION: The ACE is now in phase Ill of its 

Systems Improvement Plan (SIP). Most of the materiel issues revealed in the PFTEA are being resolved 

by the SIP. Brief descriptions of materiel improvements included in phases Ill and IV of the SIP follow: 

w Hydraulic troubleshooting: Completely rewrite 

all procedures. 

w Final drive redesign: Redesign the oil fill indicator and improve the output shaft seals. 

w Automatic track tensioner: Develop a system to 

automatically adjust the track tension when the 

operator switches between sprung and unsprung 

modes. 

Hub redesign 

Hardened track pin 

w Automatic blade folder: Enables the operator to 

remotely fold and unfold the dozer blade from 

the crew compartment. 

w Steel dozer blade 

w Actuator mounting rings: Provide a stronger 

mounting point. 

Bowl floor access plates: Provide better access 

to front actuators for troubleshooting and 

maintenance. 

w Hydraulic test points: Reduce the need to connect and disconnect hydraulic lines when 

troubleshooting problems. Move the test points 

to more accessible locations. 

RECOMMENDATION: The Engineer School continue to implement the SIP program. The Tank Automotive Command continue to develop an updated 

logic tree hydraulic troubleshooting chart. 

ISSUE: ACE operators and maintenance personnel lack reference materials for the vehicle. 

DISCUSSION: The current (1986) 12F STP does 

not contain tasks for the ACE. Other publications frequently are not distributed at the operator and maintainer levels, where the work is performed. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: Leaders must provide 

ACE operators and mechanics access to current 

manuals. Also, units must provide copies of publications such as the M9 ACE News and Views to operators and mechanics. 

FUTURE RESOLUTION: The Engineer School is 

developing a new MOS 12F Soldiers Training Publication (STP), which is scheduled for publication in the 

1st quarter of FY 96. Sections of the draft publication 

pertaining to the ACE will be placed on the EBBS by 

December 1994. 

Soldiers 

ISSUE: The ACE lacked developmental considerations for Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) issues. 

DISCUSSION; The ACE was developed beforethe 

MANPRINT program was implemented; however, future 

modifications of the vehicle will address new and unresolved MANPRINT issues. Some examples are described in the previous Materiel section. 

FUTURE RESOLUTION: Issues identified during 

this PFTEA survey indicate that problems arise when 

aggressive user input and front-end analysis of potential MANPRINT-related concerns are lacking. The 

PFTEA also clearly shows the value of the MANPRINT program. Future acquisitions must identify and 

resolve MANPRINT issues early in the materiel-acquisition process. 

Peggy McAvenia is an instruction systems specialist 

with the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, 

U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES). 

Sergeant First Class Tommy Simmons is a combat development NCO with the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAES. 

Sergeant First Class William Whitacre is a senior training developer with the Directorate of Training, USAES. 
-*. I --. 4 - , -~-yc,+ ,, . 

(/ 

-;,-.,--:a-$!+--- . .: La.!: .., - -r -..<2:$*.':. > ..~.. ....T*-- ,+*i:.i :,w;:> q-' .~.*vv~:, ~~2r:& ~ 

-t#L' -' + %.9:?--%f1 w&E*~""'i~' .e'ii:-& 

r1 7 ENHANCING SURVI\QlBILIII 


By Major George DeMarse 

Current Army doctrine 

stresses the importance 

Top View 

of having balance and a range 

of options to be successful on 

the battlefield. As battles are 

Slope 

fought, combatant forces are 

required to attack or defend 

in a deliberate or hasty fashion. The engineers' ability to 

- Al a minimum, elope equals 31 (approximately 334. 

- 3-tool clearance around vehicle is not required. 

support the maneuver mission 

is primarily influenced by this Side View 

basic nature of combatattack or defend. Regardless 

of the engineer function, our 

ability to contribute to the 

maneuver mission hinges on 

the ability to provide options 

that maximize our engineer 

capabilities. 

The foIlowing information I Front View I 

explains and clarifies recent 

changes in U.S. Army survivability doctrine. To provide additional flexibility in survivability operations, the 

Engineer School has developed 

two hasty fighting positions 

(Figures I and 2). In developing 

these positions, the primary intent is to enhance engineers' 

contribution to defensive op- 

! 

! 

1 1 

Il 

I/ 

1 

Length 

26 

A 

Width 

16 

Dimensions (feet) 

B 

-- 

Turret10apih 

C 

1 

1 

1, 

erations and to best utilize 

survivability assets on the 

battlefield. Figure 1. Modified Two-Tiered Hide Position 

December 1994 Engineer 29 
Top View 

.slope must be 10' or less (ievel tenain) for MI lo engage Mfh main gun 

- Ramp angle varfes with terrain. 

- 3.1001 ciearance around vehicle is not required. 

I Side View 

Line of sight 

--'"'"'7-- -

I 

Front View 

1 Dimensions (feet) 

C 

Length Width Turret Depth 

26 16 10 

Figure 2. Modified Twc-Tiered Fighting Position 

In combat, time is critical, and 

planners template it based on predictions concerning the terrain 

and enemy and friendly forces. Defensive operations require the defender to predict where and when 

he expects to enwunt.er the attacker. Battlefield preparations in 

the defense follow an evolutionary 

process. fls time permits, units 

conduct defensive preparations 

and continue to improve their battle positions. Vehicle fighting positions evolve from hasty to deliberate as the situation develops. 

As a unit transitions to a defensive operation, the engineers usually begin to construct hasty pitions in preparation for 

counterattacks and unexpected 

enemy actions. Combat engineers 

I support this phase of the defensive ' operation primarily by concentratI ing their effort on the enemy's I 

I most likely avenue of approach. 

; Initially, M9 ACES (ACES) are I used to construct hasty positions 

forward. Combat engineers concentrate on preparing hull defiI 

I lade and modified two-tiered hide 

1 and fighting positions, which are 

I constructed based on METT-T 

I For example, a task force comI mander decides to array his form 

I 

, as depicted in Figure 3, page 31. 

1 Based on MET-T, he positions a 

I maneuver company team on the 

southern flank to overwatch the I engagement area. The task force

: engineer recommends that com-

; pany teams in the south and the 

I center (A and B) receive priority 

30 Engineer Decemher 1994 

: 

-

for survivability support. 

Therefore, the ACE operators 

begin to construct hide positions to protect those units from 

indirect fires and observation. 

The task force staff war-games 

the engagement area fight and 

expects it to last about 4 minutes. The company team in the 

south initially fights from 

their modified two-tiered hide 

and fighting positions, maintains a proper stand-off, and 

subsequently fights in sector 

until the enemy is destroyed. 

It is given specific engagement 

and target criteria to take the 

best advantage of the modified 

two-tiered positions. The commander designates a break 

line to prevent a decisive 

engagement. 

The company team in the 

north (C) has suitable natural 

cover and concealment; it requires minimal blade effort. 

The company in the center requires extensive survivability 

effort. They need ACES to construct modified two-tiered positions for temporary protection 

until dozers arrive from corps to 

complete the deliberate positions. Based on the war game, 

the company in the center can 

I expect to receive the brunt of the 

1 attack. Those soldiers are expected to maintain the fight while I 

I the other companies maneuver 

1 and fight the enemy in depth. 

I An important consideration for 

1 the commander is the interrelaI tionship between the fight and 

I 

, the survivability plan. Time is alI ways a constraining factor. If sol-

! diers can save 30 minutes or 

I more on constructing each vehiI cle position, or if they can take I 

I advantage of the terrain and 

1 eliminate the need to construct 

I some positions, then they can 

1 maximize their ability to survive 

I and fight in a mobile or area deI fensive battle. I

, The modified two-tiered 

I hide and fighting positions are 
1- -

< - % 	 -- \ 

I \' 	 / \-- 'I 

/ 1 / I 

1 / I / 

/ 

I /

/ \ /

'.--, 	 , \_--

,

. 

I 

1 

/I-* 

- / 

,

- --1 / 

/ 


/ 


I 

/ 

I / -.

I I , I I \ \ 

\ 

Reserve Ir 

.,

, 

Figure 3. Task Force Defense 

designed to help units take I position to engage enemy targets. I all engineer mission. Engineer 

maximum advantage of the time I Engineers cannot rely com- I leaders must consider the aspects 

and equipment available to I pletely on two-tiered, deliberate I of METT-T, recommend approprithem. The hide position (Figure I fighting positions while preparing 1 ate options, position engineer as1) is most useful in situations ' for defensive operations. The ' sets at the right time and place, I where the friendly vehicle can en- modified two-tiered positions de. I and supervise execution of the 

gage the enemy from a flank or 1 scribed above provide options that I plan. By employing the added surinconspicuous position. It is not I take advantage of the terrain and i vivability positions described 

designed to protect the vehicle I are well suited for an engagement 1 above on the battlefield, engineers 

while it fires. As the crew acquires I area fight. Engineers must under- I can provide options that better 

the target, the vehicle moves out of stand the capabilities of the ACE support the defense as it proits hole to engage the enemy tar- I and employ it accordingly The [ gresses from a hasty to a deliberget. When the engagement is fin- I ACE is best suited to construct I ate operation. w- ished, the vehicle can either re- I hasty fighting positions. Dozers, 	 I 

turn to its hide position or 

I provided by corps, will come for- 	 I Major Geo7ze DeMarse is the senior 

I uritel./insti.uctor at the Engineer maneuver against the enemy. I wardandmnstmddelibemtefight-	 I .qphnni nl.orlinr,c~,r , +-- F.""""-u"J 

cn.r,rr/ -" - The modified two-tiered I ing~sitions.AsdefensivePRPara- I task fovce engineer trainer and engifiehtine~osition - -. (Firmre - 2) , 

oroL~ 	 ~ 

' tions mature and evolve, engiIICX2IY I nee? battallon staff ,, tracner at the Ne

I "ides both a hide position and a j must construct and improve Surviv- twnal 'Daining Centel: Other assignfighting position for the vehicle. I ability positions by employing a 

I ments include platoon leader; execuThis position is most useful where I combination of dozers and ACES. I tiue ofice~: and company commander I . 

the natural slope of the terrain I Engineer survivability doctrine, I zn the 4th Engineer Batlalion, Fort 

Carson; and assistant 53, 23id Engi- allows the vehicle to effectively en- I like defensive operations, evolves I 

I neer Battalion, 3rd Annored Diuision. 

gage its target. The vehicle re- , to create the best conditions for I Major DeMarse holds a masters demains in the hide position until I success on the battlefield. Engi- I gree in business and is a graduate of 

the target is acquired; then it I neer soldiers and equipment are I the Command and General Staff 

moves to the forward slope of the I fully capable ofexecuting theover- I College. 

December 1994 	 Engineer 31 
!tkiumphant March or Swan Song? 

By Sergeant First Class Thomas Moeller 

aintenance is easy Main- be many things. I submit that for I you ever heard that before? As a 

tenance operations are engineer units to accomplish their ' saying it is cute. As an attitude 

difficult! The first rule of mainte- mission (their reason for exist- it is revealing. As a commander's 

nance is - 'lf it's not broke, don't ence), properly performed mainte- expectation it is unrealistic. 

fix it." Maintenance operations nance is of the most value. Main- There are deeper problems in 

have no simple rules, only com- I tenance in some units is like a bad that philosophy than unrealistic 

plex solutions. Maintenance is / habit-veryone seems to be try- expectations. It assumes that 

performed on equipment-trucks, ing to break it! In other units, sol- 1 maintenance is only the motor sertanks, radios, weapons, and air- diers try to forget it exists. Rut in geant's responsibility It does not 

craft. Maintenance operations in- I units that have good maintenance support an equal distribution of 

clude every soldier, every act,iv- i values, mission accomplishment is work. It causes serious morale 

ity, and every asset of the unit. easily achieved. problems. And, it usually interThey are affected by every environ- , feres with maintenance plans. 

mental factor imaginable--time, 1 Soldiers i Good maintenance isn't something 

money, personnel, weather, facili- that happens during the night, afties, command climate, etc. oday's maintenance soldier ter all the troops go home (night 

Effective maintenance opera- has a more demanding job shifts are seldom effective), nor 

tions begin with a plan that incor- than ever before. Fielding new does it happen overnight (unlike 

porates doctrine, training, leader I equipment, aging on-hand equip- UPS deliveries). 

development, organization, mate- ment, fewer dollars, fewer per- Maintenance is a full-time misrial, and soldiers (DTLOMS) to I sonnel, and fewer units are facts sion and should not he attacked 

the fullest extent to reach specific I of life. The current focus on de- , without an OPORD or mainteobjectives. The plan becomes dy- ployability has become a driver nance plan. A proper mental attinamic and evolutionary. It begins 1 not a goal. New personnel arrive tude-knowingwhat is valued-is 

with soldiers and requires each 1 with, fewer basic skills. The com- / necessary when preparing for any 

soldier's willingness to do what is I plexlty of new diagnostic equip- i mission. 

right for the unit. The com- ' ment means on-the-job retrain- ! Attitude adjustment begins 

mander's most important roles I ing for the "old hand." CD-ROM with leaders. Their willingness 

are to create that willingness ! manuals and ULLS computers mist be apparent and contagious, 

and to focus the will of the en- I create a "future tech" environ- and their values must coincide 

tire unit. on maintenance. ment that is conducive to instant with those of the unit. Attitudes 

Thomas Peters and Robert Wa- information but not instiant are reflected in words: Mechanics 

terman, in their best-selling book 1 maintenance. And equipment are not "grease monkeys." The 

In Search of'Excellence, identified / readiness rates must be main- motor pool is not a "shade tree 

one characteristic common to suc- tained or commanders and units operation." Nor is it the local 

cessful companies: All members of 1 are subject to pressures not expe- auto dealership with drop-it-offthe organization understood what 1 rienced since the days of Zero by-9-and-its-ready-by-4 service. 

the company, as an organization, i Defects. 'We've done so much for Attitudes are also reflected in acvalued. Arguably, what is valued j so long with so little, we can do i tions: The motor pool is the place 

in an engineer organization could anything with nothing!" Have where a unit is built and trained 

32 Engineer Decenzher 1994 
while maintenance is performed. 

Each task is an intrinsic part of a 

complex and comprehensive maintenance plan (OPORD), designed 

to have everyone contributing, 

with specific phase lines to cross at 

directed times. It is everyone's 

mission to keep the world's best 

equipment running and ready 

- nit personnel must work 

as a team to keen their 

equipment operational. That includes all equipment, from the 

smallest hand tools to the largest 

rolling stock, from shovels and 

wheelbarrows to dump trucks 

and cranes. When equipment is 

due a scheduled service, the entire team must be involved to ensure that it is completed on time 

and to standard. Each soldier 

plays a vital part in the overall 

scheme. Maintenance is everyone's job, not just the equipment 

operator or personnel in the motor pool. 

The equipment operator must 

participate at the scheduled service to ensure that "his" equipment 

receives the best service possible. 

The newest team member is there 

to assist and learn, so that one day 

he or she can become a top-not,ch, 

maint,enance-conscious operator. 

Other team members are there because their presence builds pride 

and esprit de corps. Leaders are 

there to ensure that everything 

runs smoothly and to teach and 

set an example. Good maintenance can't be performed from the 

platoon command post or the 

snack bar; it requires every 

leader's presence. Everyone needs 

to crawl under, over, and around 

the equipment,. 

The most demanding PT I ever 

experienced was an activity called 

The Mairztenance Derby. We 

crawled under, over, and around 

every piece of equipment in the 

motor pool. We had to locate certain U-joints, bleeder valves, 

grease fittings, frame members, 

and the like on every piece of 

equipment in the unit, and we 

were timed and scored in the process. The results opened some eyes! 

Maintenance is training and 

must be conducted the same way: 

focused, interesting, challenging, 

and free from distractions. Every 

soldier must be trained on the new 

equipment. The current levels of 

sophistication found in on-board 

computers and diagnostics, 

"smart" engines, and other stateof-the-art automotive features 

make equipment. training a challenge. Units must invest in training opportunities seldom envisioned before. Leaders should 

consider innovative incentives, 

such as allowing mechanics to 

wear .4SE certification patches on 

coveralls worn in garrison. 

Maintenance takes a lot of 

effort. It's not magical! It's not an 

illusion, and it doesn't happen 

with smoke and mirrors. Motor 

sergeants keep nothing up their 

sleeves, nor can they pull rabbits 

out of their BDIJ caps. Maintenance activities, from daily PMCS 

sessions to periodic services, must 

be scheduled and religiously followed. If other missions must take 

priority, they must be the exception because, sooner or later, the 

absence of proper maintenance 

will tell the tale. 

Leader Development 

Kf ingrained maintenance val- 

.-ues are the foundation of anv 

Iwogram, then leader development is the cornerstone. Did you 

ever see a sergeant carrying 

around the last three years' issues of PS Magazine during motor stables? No, of coune not! 

But, did you ever see an NCO 

with articles on every piece of 

team equipment, clipped from 

the last three years' worth of PS 

Magazine, neatly indexed in a 

dog-eared, well-worn pocket 

guide? And he was using the 

guide to supplement maintenance being performed by team 

members gathered around the 

equipment. Did you ever see an 

NCO pull out an electronic notebook and refer to it for maintenance tips he had cached in digits for display on a backlighted 

LCD screen? If you have, then 

you've seen leadership you 

should emulate. 

Training, seminars, and conferences conducted (often free of 

charge) by commercial manufacturers provide access to new ideas 

and techniques. Attending a local 

trade show or reviewing the latest 

trade magazine may reveal techniques of significant importance 

and result in saving time and 

money. Maintenance seminars 

should be offered at functions like 

the Senior Engineer Leader Training Conference (SELTC), and special seminars should be conducted 

during warrant officer and advanc~dNCO courses. 

Organization - mixing the number of mei' chanics authorized in a 

unit is an impossible t,ask for a 

commander, even if that piece of 

our organization is broken. That 

task must be performed by the 

Engineer School leadership. But, 

commanders can supplement their 

maintenance organization, ensure 

that operators are qualified on 

equipment as a part of unit licensing procedures, and prevent opemtor hopscotch-the senseless moving of operators from one piece of 

equipment to another. 

Materiel 

aintenance plans must 

integrate the operational -

use of supporting elementswreckers, welders, contact 

trucks, and common tool sets. In 

addition to securing and using 

tools provided for maintenance, 

(Continued onpage 43) 

December 1994 
-- 

By Sergeant First Class Donald H. Purinton and 

Sergeant First Class Roger L. Harrison 

ilitary engineerr build many types of strue 

( )i:?/:.'Itures. While a wide variety of construction 

materials are available, a geosynthetic called sand 

grid has been the most tested and proven. Although 

often overlooked by Army engineers, sand grid is an 

excellent method of field-expedient construction. It is 

made from high-density polyethylene and is aed to 

confine and mmpact granular soils such as sand during the construction or repair of roads, airfields, field 

fortifications and other expedient structures 

Development 

and grid, known commercially as Presto 

GEOWEB Cellular Confinement System, was 

developed at the U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station (WES), Vicksburg, Mississippi, during 

the late 1970s in a cooperative research effort between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the 

Presto Products Company, Appleton, Wisconsin. 

The original concept involved confining and compading sand or sandy soils in interconnecting cellular elements, called grids, to produce a load-distributing pavement base layer. The resulting design is 

honeycomb-like in appearance. When filled with 

sand, the grid can be used to expediently construct 

pavement structures in areas with poor trafficability. The fill material can be in-place or locally borrowed, poorly graded sands found almost anywhere 

in the world. 

Road construction with 

rand grid proceeds 

quickly. Here, soldiers are 

expanding and emplacing 

sand-grid sectlons at 

Fort Story, Virginla. 

34 Engineer December 1994 
Availability 

and grid sections (National Stock Number 

5680-01-198-7955) are expendable Class lV 

supply items that cost $181 each. The plastic grids 

are available in 11-foot by 8-inch by 5-inch collapsed sections that weigh 110 pounds each. When 

fully expanded, the sections measure 20 feet by 8 

feet by 8 inches. Sand-grid construction is very economical, costing about $1.50 per square foot. 

Sections of sand grid are palletized for deployment 

and are delivered in 3,000-pound pallets that contain 

25 collapsed sections. One M872A1 40-foot trailer 

load of pallets contains enough sand grid to wnstruct 

one-half mile of 16-fwt-wide mad. The sections are 

easily dismantled and collapsed for reuse. 

Uses 

'$and grid is easy to use. And the basic construction procedures are the same for all of 

its inany uses: expand and emplace sections, fill 

with soil, and compact. 

Expedient Road Construction. Theater-ofoperation road construction initially provides only a 

trafficable surface. These roads are built to accomplish a specific mission in the most direct and efficient manner possible. Designs are simple, require 

minimum skilled labor and use local materials 

whenever possible. In many theater situations, 

sand grid meets these construction requirements. 

Sand-grid mad construction greatly improves 

wheeled vehicle trafficability over sand and sandy 

soils. A squad-sized work crew can quickly wnstruct a sand-grid mad using scoop loaders, light 

bulldozers and vibratory wmpaction rollers. The 

use of rough-temain forklifts; water distributors; 

asphalt distributors; long-handled, round-pint 

shovels; and 8-foot by 4-foot by 318-inch sheets of 

plywood can increase the effectiveness and speed of 

construction. 

Sand grid does not hold up well under tracked vehicle traffic. Tracked vehicles, however, have good 

trafficability through loose or cohesionless soils and 

can use shoulders outside of the staked right-ofway 'lb allow for tracked vehicle traffic, mark off a 

lane parallel to and near the sand-grid road. If 

tracked vehicles must cross the sand grid, protect 

it by placing a layer of gravel at the crossing. 

Airfield Damage Repair. Following enemy attacks, engineers must repair airfields quickly, using 

the most expedient methods of airfield damage repair (ADR). The sand-grid method, using the 

GEOWEB Cellular Confinement System with a 

fiberglass reinforced polyethylene PRP) matting 

cover, provides a suitable runway surface. It enables engineers to repair bomb-damaged runways 

quickly and efficiently. 

The ADR kit used to repair bombed runways 

measures 18 112 feet by 7 feet by 19 112 inches. It 

contains eight 20-foot by 8-foot by 8-inch sand-grid 

sections, weighs about 5,310 pounds, and contains 

enough materials and equipment to repair a 25-foot 

bomb crater. The kit is air-transportable and can 

be air-dropped. Repair crews can adjust sand grid 

to crater dimensions simply by cutting and piecing 

December I994 
sections together. Sand grid with an FRP matting 

cover can withstand 500 '-15 sorties, 200 C-141 

sorties, or 300 C-130 sorties. 

The resources required for ADR depend on the 

amount and type of damage, equipment and pelsonnel available, materials on hand, and soldier expertise. As a general rule, one platoon-sized work crew 

for each bomb crater can quickly and efficiently repair a damaged airfield. 

Field Fortifications. Survival on the battlefield depends on the quality of protection provided 

by fighting and protective battlefield positions. 

Field fortifications are designed to protect personnel, weapons systems, vehicles and equipment 

while deceiving the enemy 

Two types of sand-grid sections are available for 

constructing field fortifications: 

Standard sections are essentially the same 

as those used in roadway construction but 

are narrower. 

B Notched sand grid is a standard section that has 

been modified to allow revetment construction 

with complete sand and soil confinement on the 

Sand-gridlayer #2 

Law of irnprvious membrane 

1-13"1 '"1r 

I Imn 2 314"

AL I* L13.' / -i 

Center strips for notched grid 

I_55" 1 

sides. It eliminates the need for a filter fabric 

between layers of sand grid and allows multiple layers to be filled. Notched sand grid can 

be constructed more rapidly than standard 

sand grid. 

314" 

L 

Sand-grid sections for field fortifications are 

manufactured in black, green and tan. Camouflage 

paint can be added to protect them from ultraviolet 

degradation and to reduce enemy detection. The 

sections are used to construct artillery positions, 

helicopter revetments, overhead protection, blast 

and fragmentation protection and bunkers. 

Sand grid is effective against small-am fire up to 

.50-caliber and near-miss artillery rounds. 

Many advantages can be realized by using sand 

grid to construct field fortifications. For example, 

field fortifications made with sand gridCost 28 percent less t,han those made with 

sandbag revetment materials. 

r l J L2.. J L 2" J L2" 

A 

WeM Idnt on 

next plastio strip Centered on weld joint Weld joint on 

this plastic strip 

End strips for notched grid 

I 1 

[ j 

Occupy 50 percent less space than those 

made with sandbags, although they weigh 15 

percent more. 

1 

8" 
U-Pickets as anchors 

Stretch out sand grid 

Clear and level ground 4 feet wide 1 Fill using shovels 

andlor front-end loader 

Level, Using UPicket as screed 

Place filter fabric 

together for long revetments 1 1 

Stagger joints in long revetments 

h 

S Add new layer of sand grid and fill Finished revetment 9 layers maximum L 


8. 

Construction of standard sand-grid revetment 

December 1994 Engineer 37 
GEOWEB retaining wall syst TOPhalf of outer cellsfllled 

with topsoil and seeded 

Granular inflll 

Existing or reconstructed dike 

- NotchedGEOWEB retaining wall system 

Flood level 

Normal water level --- / Edstlng or reconstructeddike 

Fortillcations of dikes and levees using standard and notched sand grid. These methods replace sandbags and allow rapid 

construction to increase the height of a structure. 

Are more durable than those made with cloth 

sandbags and have a longer life expectancy. 

Some revetments made with sand grid are in 

good condition three years after corlstruction, 

while sandbag revetments may require repair 

after only six months. 

Require from 40 to 70 percent fewer manhours to construct than those made with conventional sandbags. 

Take half the time to mnstrud and yield the 

same amount of protection as an overhead protective cover system made with standard sandbags and loose earth. 

Other Expedient Structures. In addition to 

the uses already described, sand grid can be used 

for earth-retaining walls; drainage-channel linings; slope erosion control and stabilization; and 

river fords, dikes, and levees. Some examples 

follow. 

Sand grid can be used as protection for drainage 

channels. The St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) decided to use it as an alternative to reinforced concrete and concrete slab channel linings. 

They chose sand grid because it offered significant 

cost-savings benefits. By using sand grid, they 

eliminated the need to construct concrete formwork 

and the need for reinforcing steel and expansion 

joints. The sand grid provides a permanent, flexible 

form and acts as a series of expansion joints when 

filled with concrete. A cost-saving feature is that no 

overfill is required over the depth of the cells, 

which makes it easy to calculate the amount of concrete required. Since 1987, the St. Louis MSD has 

used sand grid filled with concrete for channel protection. They estimate that sand-grid construction 

costs about 30 to 40 percent less than traditional 

concrete construction. 

The U.S. Forest Service used sand grid filled 

with coarse aggregate to construct a 16-foot-wide 

by 40-foot-longriver ford in the ChattahoocheeOconee National Forest to replace a log stringer 

bridge. Replacing this bridge before sand grid was 

available required the construction of an 8-inchdeep by 14-foot-wide mesh-reinforced concrete ford, 

which cost from $6,000 to $12,000. The ford made 

with sand grid costs about $3,000. 

The great flood of 1993 will be remembered for 

many years. We all witnessed the destruction that 

December I994 
took place as river waters crested and overtopped 

protective dikes and levees. The flood caused an 

estimated $20 billion in damages. The U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers distributed in excess of 31 million sandbags to hold back flood waters. Most of 

the dikes and levees were reinforced with sandbag, 

and filling and placing them was time-consuming 

and required thousands of people. 

It is possible to fortify dilces and levees with sandgrid construction. Using sand grid requires less time 

and fewer personnel than other methods, and it allows workers to rapidly increase the height of a dike 

or levee to prevent overtopping. Because of its loadsupport capabilities, sand grid can be built with 

heavy construction equipment, which significantly increases the construction rate. When sand grid is used 

to construct temporary dikes and levees, the structures also function as a temporary dam. WES evaluated a sand-grid system tinder conditions of varying 

water levels and wave actions to prove its usefulness. 

They concluded, 'Thiis typeof structure, either temporary or permanent, holds promise as an expedient alternative to sandbag structures." 

Synopsis 

and grid is a multipurpose construction sys- 

... tem. It is an economical, effective and often 

overlooked resource that can be adapted to a wide 

variety of construction applications. Sand grid is 

available to military engineers and can be easily 

transported and installed. It requires less time, effort and maintenance than conventional construction materials. For more information on the uses of 

sand grid, call the Department of Construction Engineering, U.S. Army Engineer School, at (314) 596- 

0131 (Extension 3-762017610)or (Defense Switched 

Network) 676.762017610; or write to Commander, 

U.S. Army Engineer School, Attention: ATSE-TCT-H, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473. 

SFC Purinton is an instructorlwriter for the Engineer 

School:9 Department of Constmetion Enginee~ing. He 

previously served as technical engineering supervisor and 

platoon sergeant, 802nd Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

(Heavy), and as a senior instructor for the Materials Quality Specialist Course. SFC Purinton is a graduate of the 

Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) 

and holds an associate$ degree in construction management from Park College. 

SFC Harrison is an instructorlwriter for the Engineer 

School's Department of Construction Engineering. He previously served asplatoon sergeant, 568th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), and as a senior instructor for the 

Csneral Constrmtion Equipment Course. SFC Harrison 

is a gmduate of ANCOC and holds an associatek degree 

in construction management fromPark College. 

Additional Reading 

Field Circular 5-104-1, Airfield Damage Repair, October 1985. 

Field Manual (FM) 5-103, Suruiuability, 

June 1985. 

FM 5-410, Military Soils Engineering, December 1992. 

FM 5-430-00-1,Planning and Design of 

Roads, Airfields, and Heliports in the Theater 

of Operations-Road Design, August 1994. 

Training Circular 5-340, Air Base Damage 

Repair (Pavement Repair), December 1988. 

The Presto GEOWEB Cellular Confinement 

System, Bmchure, Presto Products Company, 

Appleton, Wisconsin, 1992. 

Grau, R. H.; Bush, A. J.111; Coleman, D. L.; 

Godwin, L. N.; and Webster, S. L., Dwt Control in Desert Emironments, Miscellaneous Paper GL-92-2, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways 

Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, 

January 1992. 

Green, H. L., and Williams, T. P., Installation of Air Pansportation Airfield Damage 

Repair Kit, Instruction Report GL-90-1, U.S. 

Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station,Vicksburg, Mississippi, February 1990. 

Hayes, P.G.,Expedient Field Fortifications 

Using Sand-Grid Construction, Whnical Report SL-88-39, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways 

Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, 

October 1988. 

Martin, S., Dike and Levee Fortification and 

Reconstruction Using Presto GEOWEB Cellular 

Confinement Systems, Presto Products Company, Appleton, Wisconsin. 

Pence, L. M., Jr. A Plastic Ford, You've Got 

Zb Be Kidding, Engineering Field Notes, U.S. 

Forest Service, United States Department of 

Agriculture, Washington, D.C., Volume 19, 

January-Februaw 1987. 

Webster, S. L., Sand-Grid Demonstration 

Roads Constructed for JLOTS N Tests at Fort 

Story, Erginia, Technical Report GL-86-19, 

U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment 

Station,Vicksburg, Mississippi, November 1986. 

December 1994 Engineer 39 
By Major Brian Loggins 


Bistrict assignments with 

the Corps of Engineers can 

be both challenging and rewarding for military engineers. My 

experience at the Fort Knox Area 

Office in 1992, as a captain, is a 

case in point. During this assignment, I was introduced to "partnering," which was then a new 

concept in the Army's commitment 

to Rtal Quality Management. 

As the lone "green suiter" and 

the newest guy in the Fort Knox 

Area Office, I was not surprised to 

learn that I would be the project 

engineer for renovation of the Fort 

Knox commissary. At $1.6 million, 

the Corps of Engineers considered 

the renovation a small project; and 

I assumed a few renovations to a 

grocery store would be easy. However, examination of the project 

drawings and specifications 

showed that the project would be 

more complex than I initially 

thought. In fact, it had the potential to be a nightmare. It was a 

major overhaul that included 

everything from replacing the 

lighting, refrigeration equipment, 

and heating and air-conditioning 

units to wnstructing a new manager's office and a hreakroom for 

the grocery baggers. All of this, 

and more, must be done while the 

commissary remained open for its 

nearly 2,000 customers per daywith business as usual! 

The district commander suggested that we partner the project. 

Knowing little about this concept, 

I did some research and learned 

that its goal is to bring the key 

: players of a project together as a I team, working for the good of the 

The contractor coordinated his schedule with the store manager on a weekly basis to minimize inconveniences 

to shoppers. Here, work progresses while the store is closed. 

40 Engineer December 1994 
project and for customers satisfaction, as opphsed to working for individual goals. Partnering improves 

product quality and produra winwin solutions to problems. 

This project was well suited to a 

partnership. It was a complexundertaking that would require difficult 

decisions and safety considerations. 

Cmrdination, teamwork, flexibility, 

and open mmmunications with eve 

ryone inwlved were essential. A 

partnership would ensure that these 

requirements were met. 

The contractor immediately 

said 'yes" when asked if he would 

be interested in partnering the 

project. That simple agreement 

set the partnership in motion. 

The next step was to present a 

workshop where we would form a 

team and set project goals. 

The Workshop 

he workshop, held on 7-8 

December 1992. was attended by all of the project's 

key players: the Corps, the 

contractor, the commissary 

manager, the Fort Knox Directorate of Public Works, and the 

architect-engineer. Attendees included everyone from field representatives to the senior leadership of those organizations. 

Their participat,ion was critical and demonstrated a high 

level of commitment to the 

partnership. 

The workshop was professionally facilitated by an-"outsider" 

from New Mexico, whom we hired - -

from a list maintained by the dis- Theteam approach to problem solving proved successful, especially during 

trict office. He was worth every complicated and hazardous operations such as lifting air conditioning units 

cent. Having an impartial, skilled onto the roof. 

facilitator ensured that everyone 

had an equal voice. ~h~ team- maintain open oommunications, we partnership, the contractor added 

decided to meet weekly to share pro- 1 a bnghtly colored sign depicting building - exercises helDed us relax,

-

generated ooen com~unications~1 gressreports and monthly to dkus 1 the logo to a sign in front of the 

and kept the group focused on and the partnership. commissary 

ting goals and having fun. At this We also chose a partnership logo 

point, everyone was totally com- andmotto. Thecornucopiaand the I 

.The Partnership mitted to the project. . . ! motto, "Harvesting Partnership" 1

After we became a team, wo de- seemed most fitting for a com- fter the workshop, the proveloped goals and objectives. To missary project. To announce the Aject picked up momentum. 

December 1994 Engineer 41 
gaPARTNERING AGREEMENT 

FOR 

THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT TEAM 

FOR THE FORT KNOX COMMISSARY RENOVATION 

FORT KNOX, KY 

Mission Statement 

We will a,c>rktogether .I rn open.c<x,prr.ui!c .?ndprofcsst,nal inmner to 

lpr<~vdcawfe. 1.ly,hquality FL~ Knoh Cunln,orng. rcc,.lv,3!1on. wnlh mln8mal dt,ruption to Lhe customer. 

Goals and Objectives 

Cooperative Relationship 

.Open conununicnlion 

Team approach to decision mnking/problcm solving 'monthly (Field)

'5 Mnv93 LAlIl , .. Flexibiiily among all partners 

F a on project -not personalities 

No formal disputes 

Miiimiae written corresponde!rce 

Have lots of FUN! 

Customer Satisfaction 

.Minimize "store" inconvenience

.Provide accessible equipment 

Provide maintainable equipment

- Provide prompt response Lor critical equipment service 

Meet equipment installation schedule 

Minimize and coordinate utility Intemptions

- Establish acceptable job sequence 

On Schedule 

Mutuallv aereed master schedule , -Address ~heduleweekly with two week look ahead 

-Achieve mutually established milestones 

Timely resolution 

- Twoday maximum (onsite) 

-Oneweek maximum (field) 

- Thty days for change orders requiring more funds 

Jointly established priorities 

-Team connrrrenceat weckly meetings 

- Flexibility to accommodate each others priorities 

Quality 

llu~ldr~th.lutrework(assumcr rfirrtwr QAIQC)

.Meet or ercred requtremmb (K 5pr;r) 

Meet or exceed customer expectations 

Identify and discuss key submittals before submitting to achieve correct 

submittals on a first time basis 

Develop and maintain DECA as an equal partner 

Safety 

.No lost-time accidents 

No public/customer accidents 

Conduct thorough Activity Hazard Analysis (AHA) 

Conduct thoroughsafety indoctrination nnd weekly toolboxmeetings - Discus AHA daily 

Comply with Accident Prevention Plan 

Within Budget 

Fair proclt to Contr.lctor (mdddng Sub.conlmil.,r~i 

Coutaan total cn+t~rowthto wllhln i",

.Pr.laa~velyPLI\II.. I.)III~RS thrvitp.1, V/F prm.u 

42 Engineer December 1994 
We brainstormed and solved all 

issues and potential change orders as a team. And, because the 

contractor was involved in the 

problem solving, his price proposals for changes were usually very 

reasonable. 

At first everything went well. 

Then, within a few days, we experienced two on-the-job safety problems. The contractor agreed with us 

that while neither incident was 

very serious, a pattern seemed to be 

developing. He and his staff immediately took corrective action and 

briefed all of their employees. The 

next day he informed us that one 

individual had been fired and a foreman replaced. While this initially 

seemed extreme, I was impressed 

with the contractor's commitment 

tosafety and to the partnership. His 

action was effective-no more 

safety problems occurred. 

At the weekly progrcss meetings, the pro.ject manager for the 

prime contract,or briefed the 

schedule for the next two weeks, 

and the subcontractors briefed the 

status of their work. This kept everyone informed and prevented unwanted surprises.All issuesraised 

were discussed openly among 

team members. The commissary 

manager was especially pleased 

with the progress and the quality 

of work performed. 

Each month we met to discuss 

and assess the partnership. 

These meetings allowed the field 

representatives to evaluate how 

the partnership was working. 

There were rarely any negative 

comments. 

As the work progressed, a high 

level of trust and confidence developed among the partners. Of the 

many examples of cooperation, 

professionalism, and teamwork 

that occurred, two were especially 

significant: 

8 While the contractor was replacing the front door to the 

commissary, a temporary entrance was made for customers. As Memorial Day weekend 

approached, the commissary 

manager realized that the 

temporary entrance would be 

inadequate for the large crowd 

expected. When alerted to the 

problem, the contractor voluntarily modified his schedule 

and installed the new door in 

time for the weekend. 

When the contractor needed to 

remove an old refrigerated 

case ahead of schedule and on 

very short notice, the commissary manager came to his aid. 

He quickly gathered some of 

his employees from their 

scheduled tasks to empty produce from the case. 

These examples illustrate the 

partners' commitment to the project and to customer satisfaction, 

and they underscore the value of 

the partnering concept. 

Assessment 

Rartnering is similar to 

what we exnerience dailv" 

as soldiers. We are all members 

of a team, whether it's a battalion staff, a squad, or "this" project team. During the renovation 

project, I learned the importance 

of developing trust and team 

spirit among team members. If 

team spirit is not developed, 

team members may concentrate 

on their hidden agendas instead 

of on team goals. The power of a 

team, when individual skills 

and resources are combined, is 

enormous. 

At Fort Knox, forming a partnership was the key to the success 

of this project. And now, because 

we harvested a partnership, the 

commissary and its customers are 

reaping the benefits. Y 

Major Brian Loggins is director of 

quality for the Louisville District, Corps 

of Engineers. He forrne~.lyserved as 

cluef of qualzky msumnce at the Fort 

Knmc Area Office Major Loggins is a 

graduate of Enclerbilt Unwemiiy. 

(Personal newpoint, continued 

soldiers must be trained in tool 

maintenance! The plan must outline priorities and procedures for 

obtaining repair parts. Leaders 

must listen! Soldiers know what 

is needed to perform maintenance. Encourage suggestions, 

innovations, and time-saving 

techniques. 

Doctrine 

aintenance plans must 

embrace every asset, 

every resource, every bit of expertise, and every communication channel to which the unit 

can gain access. Channels include logistic assistance offices 

(LAOS); IDEAS, TIPS, and 

SMART programs; contemporary 

maintenance publications (PS 

Magazine);standing operating 

procedures from other units; the 

exchange of ideas and policies 

throughout the command; project 

manager and item manager offices; and civilian manufacturing 

publications. The list is endless 

and is limited only by imagination 

and drive. Once in place, those 

channels must be maintained if 

they are to be worthwhile. 

My challenge to you is this: 

How good is your maintenance operation? Has the commander identified the organization's values? Is 

your maintenance plan realistic, 

goal oriented, value reinforcing, 

well coordinated, and fully supported? Does each team member 

have a vital part to play in executing the plan? Is each maintenance 

session conducted as leader-supervised team training? Will your 

maintenance operation be a triumphant march or a swan song? 

SFC Moeller is a Force IntegratorlForce Readiness NCO with the 

Directorate of Combat Developments, 

U.S.Army Engineer School. He will 

retire from the Army w2h more than 

20 years of seruice as an engineer 

equipment repaimr in January 1995. 

December 1994 
"A con~batengineer conzpany, structured to operate at the FEBA, focuses on mobility, 

countern~obility,and suruiuability operations. It is the lowest engineer echelon that can 

plan and execute 24-hour operations in support of lnaneuuer forces." 

Field Manual 71-123 

By Captain David Brinkley 

our heavy division engineer company has v realigned into a new force structure, hut

there is no doctrine to help you, the engineer company commander, understand the employment, 

capabilities, and limitations of the company in its 

new structure. FM 5-71-100 describes the division's 

combat engineer brigade but is not very useful at 

task force level and below. FMs 71-2 and 71-123 

still refer to pre-restructured engineer organizations and capabilities. Here is the good news-help 

is on the way! The U.S. Army Engineer School is 

producing doctrinal manuals for the divisional engineer battalion and company that are scheduled to 

be released a?coordinating draRs in FY 95. The following information provides some interim guidance 

to alleviate misconceptions and to serve as an employment guide until the doctrine is published. The 

information, work rates, and capabilities highlighted 

aE based on an 18-monthstudy completed at the National Training Center (NTC)from March 1992 thmugh 

August 1993. Restructured divisional and cow combat engineer wmpanies that supported 18 mechanized infantry task forces were included in the study. 

Under the new structure, the major missions 

for divisional engineers-mobility, countermobility, and survivability (M/CM/S)-have not 

changed. However, to effectively support the task 

force, commandets must understand their roles 

and responsibilit,ies under the engineer restructure concept. (For more information about the 

restructure concept, see two articles in the August 

1994 issue of ENGINEER, beginning on page 40.) 

-Command and Control 

he engineer company normally provides the 

task force with a planning cell that consists 

of the engineer company command post and is capable of 24-hour operations. This mobile planning cell 

usually operates out of an armored personnel carrier (APC) or a HMMWV. It is generally led by the 

engineer company executive officer (XO), who acts 

as the task force engineer plans officer and provides the task force with an experienced engineer 

leader in the tactical operations center (TOC). The 

cell includes the company operations sergeant, the 

driver, and the NBC and communications sergeants 

as shift NCOs. 

Engineer Cell Functions 

Prepare a detailed terrain analysis of the task 

force area of operations. The XO works with 

the task force 52 section to develop this 

analysis. 

Evaluatethe enemy's M/CM/S capabilities for 

integration into the task force situation 

template. 

Recommend M/CM/S capabilities for use 

during the task force tactical decision-making 

process. 

Track engineer operations within the task 

force area of operatlons and partlcipate in the 

task force plannlng process. 

44 Engineer December 1994 
This prototype AVLM was designed by the Directorate of Combat Developments at the Engineer School, 

The prototype is currently undergoing testing and evaluation by the Army Materiel Command. lype 

classification of the design is anticipated by October 1996. 

Mobility 

he modern, heavy task force, with its associated engineer company, has twelve times the 

mobility capability of the heavy task force a decade 

ago. Although this represents a quantum improvement in capability, it has created an equally large 

challenge in planning and correct usage. The engineer planning cell must estimate how many breaches 

the task force can perform, based on the depth and 

width of each lane and the propxed breaching technique. For example, assuming that lanes are to be 4 

meters by 100 meters (this constitutes a one-way, 

vehicular lane), a balanced task force with all organic 

and attached assets should be able to breachTwo dismounted lanes or one lane per 

engineer platoon. 

Six lanes with tank plows or one lane per 

operational tank plow combination. 

m Four lanes with line charges or one lane 

per MICLIC. 

Four 17-meter gaps or one gap per operational AVLB. 

A unit's lane-making capability is constrained 

by several factors. A major factor is the operational readiness of the breaching systems, which 

are often combinations of a vehicle and a breaching system. For example, a unit's MlAl tank 

may be operational, but its attached mine plow 

may be inoperable. Or the MICLIC may be operational, but its mnveyance system may be inoperable. In both cases, maintenance problems degrade the lane-makingcapability of the task force. 

The density, design, and location of enemy minefields and other obstacles are also important when 

calculating lane-making capability For example, 

the presence of a 200- by 800-meter, artillery-delivered FASCAM minefield will effectively double the 

breaching equipment required to create a lane. 

Similarly, the presence of antitank ditches, which 

require specialized equipment to breach, will affect 

the number of lanes a task force can create. 

Terrain is another factor that affects breaching 

capability. For example, the task force can create 

lanes in rough terrain with dismounted engineers; 

in mcky terrain with explosive line charges; and in 

smooth, cleared soil conditions with tank plows. 

The engineer planning cell should recommend a 

breaching technique based on terrain and the types 

Mobility Planning Checklist 

0 Determinethe breaching capacity of the task force 

based on standard 4- by 100-meter lanes. 

Constrain the breaching capacity by 4 meters 

through the expected enemy minefield depth. 

Determinewhich of these breaching assets are 

available: 

- Tanks and plows

- MlCLlC and carrier 

- AVLB and carrier 

- Engineer squad carriers and squads 

- CEV and M9 ACE 

Choose the breaching method based on terrain 

conditions. 

D Determinethe amount of marking material required 

to mark potential lanes. 

Constrain for 50- to lwpercent redundancy. 

December 1994 
Obstacle Construction Capability Per Engineer Company -. . -- ..... . . . . .--.. . . .. . 

Obstacle Capability I Remarks 1 Hand-empiaced m~nef~eld 200 meters per hour loo meters per hour per platoon 1 

Antltank drtch 50 meters per hour A two-ACE team is required to 1; construct one antitank ditch 

555 meters per 15mln~ Construction time for a blocking 

EMSS m~nef~eid 500 meters per 15 mint 

Table 1 

of obstacles to be breached. The Engineer School 

recommends that a task force have 50- to 100-percent redundancy of breaching assets for any breaching operation. This limitation constrains the number of lanes a task force can effectively create. 

The task force is capable of crossing gaps with 

its AVLBs, CEVs, or M9 ACES (ACES). It can bridge 

four 17-meter gaps. The CEV or ACE can fill small 

gaps such as antitank ditches and road craters. 

Most units in the NTC study converted one or two 

AVLB carriers into armored vehicle-launched 

MICLIC IAVLM) vehicles and used them to carry 

t,he MICLIC. This conversion should be a METT-T 

decision based on an analysis of the potential gaps 

to be crossed. Note: Currently, DA has issued a safetyuse message restricting use of AVLMs pending approval of a standardized design. A design submitted 

by the Engineer School is now under study by the 

Army Materiel Command (see photo, page 45.) 

wm Countermobility 

nlike mobility, most of the countermobility 

effort available to the task force comes from 

the engineer company. Because it now has one less 

platoon, t,he new engineer company may appear to 

have less countermobility capability than it had 

prior to restructuring. However, the new mine and 

mine-dispensing systems enable the engineer wmpany to exceed their previous countermobility capability. Table 1shows the capabilities of the engineer company to create obstacles and planning 

factors for obstacle construction. 

The engineer planning cell must provide the task 

force S3 with an estimate of the number and types 

of tactical obstacles that the engineer company can 

provide to support the direct-fire weapon systems. 

The initial estimate should be simple and definable 

The M9 ACE was designed to be the primary 

earthmover for the heavy 

divlslon engineer company. However, many 

combat engineer companies will have the D7 bulidozer in lieu of the ACE. 

46 Engineer December 1994 
The dismounted combat 

englneer continues lo 

br~ngversatility to the 

balliefieid through his 

adaptability and flexibllity. This is parlicuiarly 

important given today's 

complex englneer rnsslon requirernenb. 

and state the number of obstacles that can be constructed. It should include an NLT start time and 

an estimate of materials required. 

Obstacles should be designed according to FM 

20-32 and should be described as tuning, fwcing, 

blocking, or disrupting to avoid confusion in obstacle placement or design. Most engineer companies 

in the NTC study group used the fixing obstacle as 

their 'base" obstacle when developing an estimate 

of obstacle capability. During the war-gaming session, the staff will use the obstacle estimate to 

develop obstacle groups and the obstacle overlay. 

The number of obstacles a company creates is a 

function of their construction rate, constrained by 

obstacle design and time lost to travel, preparation, 

Countermobilit y Plannir list 

Determlne how manv obstacles are ootentiallv 

available. 

Determlne when th 

Determine when the rasa rorce WIII oe 

for the englneers to begin work. 

Ask when the maneuver company/tean 

have thelr respective engagement area 

sufflclently developed to incorporate 

countermobility efforts. 

O Determlne the amount of Class IV and Class V 

materials available for preparation of the 

defense. 

Ask if the task force manewer companyfleams 

will emplace obstacles and where this 

additional effort wlll be used. 

Determine obstacle restrictions. 

lln work. 

ready 

1s wlll 

S 

equipment maintenance, crew rest, and resupply 

The training level of the engineer unit significantly 

impacts their ability to produce obstacles and construct fortifications. Also, the time spent comtructing antitank ditches reduces the amount of time 

available to construct fighting positions. The average engineer company in the study group emplaced 

approximately 200 meters of obstacle frontage per 

hour and 50 meters of antitank ditch per hour. For 

planning purposes, the Engineer School recommends a planning factor of 10 hours for obstacle 

construction. This figure is constrained for the obstacles listed in 'Thble 1.The remaining 14 hours a 

day are used for movement, mine-dump preparation, maintenance, and resupply and refitting. 

Engagement area planning must be completed 

before effective countermobilitv work can beein. - Without a plan, the task force will not realize any 

enhanced combat potential from the obstacle emplacement effort. Nevertheless, the length of time required for the maneuver companyitearns to develop a 

direct-fire plan and to build the engagement area results in more engineer work delays than any other 

factor. Engineen can start work before the engagement area has been completed, but they cannot always do so productively until the direct-fire plan is 

developed and the weapon systems are sited. 

I -

Survivability 

he engineer company is equipped to construct 

vehicle and crew-served positions for the task 

force. The planning cell normally provides the task 

force S3 with an estimated number of positions 

that can be dug, based on engineer equipment and 

time available. The estimated number is constrained 

December 1994 Engineer 47 
Work 

(As: --

* Crew-served weapons positions 

Table 2 

Number of Two-TieredFighting Positions Equipment 

by movement requirements, construction rates, 

equipment availability, operator proficiency, and 

soil or terrain conditions. The planning cell should 

recommend where positions can be built for maximum advantage and where positions are not feasible because of soil conditions. Ultimately, the number of positions that can be built is determined by 

the direct-fire plan. Unless the direct-fire systems 

are properly sited, position construction for these 

elements may be wasted or misdirected effort. 

The task force generally takes several hours to 

plan the defensive battle, reconnoiter the engagement area, and develop direct-fire plans at the 

maneuver companylteam level. The NTC study 

showed that engineer equipment is usually stationary and unemployed during that time. However, 

commanders must maximize engineer equipment 

time without wasting the unit's effort. Air defense 

artillery, mortars, TOC, and combat train areas 

often receive no survivabilitv effort because work 

2 Dozers 

7 M9 ACES 

3 SEES* 

priority is allocated to direct-fire systems. 

One alternative is for engineer units to fortify 

the indirect, air defense, and combat support systems during that time. These phsitions require less 

precise ground positioning and are less timeconsuming to construct than direct-fire positions. 

This engineer effort will increase the overall survivability of the force without degrading the direct-fire 

system fortifications. 

Doctrinally, an engineer company can prepare 12 

two-tiered fighting positions and 30 crew-served 

weapons positions in a 24-hour period. For planning, 

the Engineer School recommends a factor of 15 hours 

Survivability Planning Checklist 

Determine how many positions can be built. 

Determine which type of position is 

recommended. 

Determine it there are any dlgging restrictions. 

Ask when the equipment will be available. 

Ask when the maneuver cornpany/teams will be 

ready to start position construction. 

24 Hours 36 Hours 48 Hours 60 Hours 

per blade team per day for fighting position construction. The remining 9 hou~sare used for maintenance, repair, refueling and travel. Table 2 shows 

work rates and planning factors for the engineer 

company to construct two-tiered fighting positions. 

12 

12 

30 

a Limitations 

he NTC study compiled data for 18 force-onforce operations and identified several limitations. The following limitations have since been mirrored in operations at other combat training centers: 

Logistics. The most significant limitation facing the engineer company is its austere logistical 

organization. The company has no organic maintenance, Class IX material, recovery, or medical evacuation capabilities. These assets are consolidated with 

the engineer battalion. This is a significant change 

from the previous engineer organization. 

18 

19 

Communications. The engineer company may 

experience extended lines of communication with 

the engineer battalion. Engineer battalion trains 

are normally found in the brigade support area. 

Generally, when the engineer company is working 

well forward, the task force combat trains are between the engineer company and the engineer battalion trains. All engineer companies in the NTC 

study ultimately became attached to their respective task forces because of extended distances to 

the engineer battalion trains. 

Maintenance. The engineer battalion is 

authorized three maintenance support teams 

(MS%) in the headquarters maintenance section. 

An attached engineer company should come with 

an MST from the engineer battalion, but there 

are only three MSB to support three engineer 

companies and the HHC. This places a burden on 

the task force because most engineer-specific 

equipment is low-density, high-maintenance, and 

specialized. The task force does not normally maintain the PLL required for equipment in the engineer 

company, nor does it have the expertise or the experience to properly repair this equipment. Also, 

engineer battalions generally have a consolidated 

48 Engineer December 1994 

24 

25 

32 

32 

45 I 60 75 
PLL, which makes it difficult to prepare Class IX 

packages for each attached engineer company The 

engineer battalion should receive an MST fmm the 

forward support battalion to facilitate speedy battlefield repair. Future battalion organizations will 

have modular CSS functions that will better support separate company operations. 

Recovery Assets. The engineer battalion maintenance section does not provide for recovery assets 

within each company The two recovery vehicles 

(M88s) allocated to the engineer battalion must support the entire engineer battalion across the maneuver brigade sector. The engineer commander must 

plan for self-recovely during oombat. Frequently, 

companies in the study group used AVLBs for adhoc recovely 

Special 'Ibols. The engineer company has several specialized pieces of equipment. The M9 ACE, 

SEE, M728 CEV, and M48A5160 AVLB all require 

special maintenance skills and special tools. The 

engineer battalion MTOE authorizes unly a single 

special tool for some equipment, such as SEE and 

ACE special tool sets. Because these sets must be 

shared by three companies, the engineers are 

severely limited in their ability to fix forward or 

quickly repair the specialized equipment. This 

issue may be alleviated when the battalion support 

platoon is redesigned (currently under way) to support modular, separate operations. 

Medics. The engineer company generally receives two medics from the HHC. Because no ambulances are authorized for the engineer battalion, 

the company must use organic, soft-skinned, or 

cornhat vehicles to evacuate the wounded. This additional burden on the ta?k force medical platoon 

limits their ability to support the engineer company on an area basis. The commander must understand the medical support plan in order to evacuate engineers quickly and efficiently. 

Operationu2 Readiness. Data mmpiled during 

the NTC study showed that, when in direct or general support (DS or GS),engineer companies waited 

extended periods of time to receive repair parts, supplies, and Classes V, and M material during their 

NTC mtations, Many of the DS companies in the 

study group suffered operational readiness rates ranging between 20 and 50 percent after five days of combat operations, without any combat losses. Combat 

Maneuver Training Center Hohenfels reports similar 

1.rend.s. In the NTC study, readiness rates were directly elated to operator training and leader involvement in operator supervision, especially for low-density 

engneer equipment like the ACE. 

Equipment Recovery. Companies that are DS or 

CX must recover damaged or repairable equipment 

December 1994 

past the task force UMCP and field trains to the 

engineer battalion UMCP in the brigade rear. 

These distances may be extensive and overburden 

an already austere organization. Until changes to 

the organization are approved, the engineer company must plan for self-recovery to a maintenance 

collection point. 

Command and Control. Command and control 

(C2) are also potential shortcomings for the engineer mmpany. Most engineer companies lack a dedicated C2 vehicle for the company command post. 

The company XO and commander share an M998 

and an M113.42, and the mission dictates which vehicle supports the engineer planning cell. Because 

neither is adequately configured to be a command 

post vehicle, the engineers are limited in their ability to effectively integrate into the task force TOC. 

The M577 is the preferred vehicle for the engineer 

command post and should be included in future 

force structure changes. Until then, integrated engineer command post and task force TOC operations 

will be limited. 

Looking Forward 

he new divisional engineer organization provides a modernized task force with superior 

breaching capability, better engineer C2, and increased survivability and countermobility potential. 

These improvements greatly enhance the mobility of 

the force and its ability to defend and survive on the 

modern battlefield. The increased capability has been 

accomplished with a smaller, better-equipped force 

strncture that has some limitations, mostly in the logistical arena. Even better force mobility and protection will be provided as the Volcano and wide-area 

mine WAM) systems, MI-based breacher and 

bridger, and improved engineer squad carriers are 

fielded. As the engineer company structure changps, 

doctrine will evolve to support that change. In the 

meantime, the guidance in this articIe should fill 

the void in doctrine and assist you and your mmpany as it supports the maneuver force. The engineers now have a force structure that can fully and 

adequately support the heavy task force any place 

and any time. Ld 

Captain Brinhley is thep~ima,y author ofFM 5-71-2, 

Task Force Engineel. and Engineer Company (Armored). 

Previous assignments include obseruer/controller at the 

NTC; company commander and battalion S3 with the 

78th Engineer Battalion (Gelmanyi; and Brigade Engineer, 54,and platoon leader with the 1st Engineer Battalion, Fort Riley. He is a graduate of the Command and 

General Staff Officer's Course and CAS3. CPT Brinkley 

has a bachelo~ of engineering degree from Virginia 

Tech. 
- - 

- - 

Brigadier General Karl Hoffman, German Amzy 

Corps of Engineers, spoke to U.S. Army Engineer 

Scfwol staff in October 1994, concerning his uiews 

on independent ntission analysis and ntilitary 

leadership. 

qoday I will speak about auffmgriahtih, which 

mwmeans mission-t.ype orders. I will try to expl21in what the word implies and whether this important leadership concept can be revitalized. 

Command and control of mobile formations on 

the modern battlefield is a challenge. For decades, 

all forces have been looking for command and control procedures that are appropriate for this challenge. In the 1970s, Colonel T. N. Dupuy, a leading 

American military historian, made a survey of Prussian-German command and control procedures 

used during the 19th and the 20th centuries. Dupuy found that from 1807 to 1945, PrussianGerman armies had been consistently superior to 

their opponents in terms of quality, command and 

control procedures. The results of Dupuy's research 

were supported by a follow-up study conducted by 

Martin van Creveld, a Hebrew military historian. 

Accordingly, experts, first from the U.S.A., soon 

demanded that German procedures (called 

auftragstaktik) be adopted. 

One point is evident: If it is true to say that the 

German combat effectiveness was superior, we 

must examine the reason why It was certainly not 

a higher degree of braveness that led to this superiority Many nations have put forces of admirable 

braveness on the battlefield. And there is nothing 

like an innate German superiority in combat effectiveness. Numerous wars have shown how quickly 

the quality of a nation's military forces can change. 

For example, in the middle of the 18th century, 

Prussians and Hanoveranians defeated French 

forces without much effort, even when the latter 

were clearly superior. In 1806107 the French 

defeated the Prussians whenever they met. In 

1813115 it was again the Prussians who defeated 

the French, except when Napoleon held the French 

command. 

Apparently, units from all nations fight bravely if 

some basic requirements are met: a convincing reason to wage war; an internal bnd, keeping the soldiers together; the presence of officers and NCOs the 

soldiers trust; and a sufficient supply of arms. 

Roots of Combat Effectiveness 

hose are reasons why soldiers fight. But it is m?dnot enough to have soldiers fight effectively. In 

m:i rly cases, a high degree of combat effectiveness 

may be the result of superior tactics. But tactics arc 

not the only root of a high degree of combat effectiveness. This is shown by the battle for Crete, in 1941. 

In that battle, the Germans had air superiority. 

But the British-Greek defenders had more and 

much better trumps to play They ruled the ocean. 

They were overwhelmingly superior by numbers. 

They held prepared positions. At that time, paratroopers and airborne troops could carry little more 

than their handguns; their first assault echelons 

had only a few light mortars and a few radio sets, 

at best. Only after an airfield had been seized was 

it possible to send in light cannons. It was impossible for the Germans to supply tanks, armored infan. 

try fighting vehicles or trucks, although those vehicles were available to the defending units. Even 

worse, the defending units knew the German radio 

code. So they were familiar with every detail of the 

German plan of attack, including the time of attack 

and landing zones. 

Using parachutes and gliders, the attacking 

German units landed literally within the positiom of vastly superior defending forces, who 

knew exactly when and where the Germans 

would attack. Nevertheless, the attacking forces 

were successful. They seized an island of strategic 

December 1994 
East end of Remagen railroad bridge which collapsed 17 March 1945, spilling several hundred engineers into the Rhine 

River at Remagen, Germany. By waiting for orders to seize the bridge, the U.S. lost the Initiative. German forces were able 

to reinforce their troops and finally destroy the bridge. While the U.S. ultimately succeeded, immediate action according to 

the Auflragstaktik principle might at least have saved many lives. 

importance and caused casualties in the enemy 

lines that exceeded the number of their casualties 

many times over. 

It was not superior tactics that brought about 

the victow. Under the described conditions, German tactics were soon reduced to a desperate struggle for survival, performed by small, isolated units. 

The attacking forces never had a chance to perform 

a planned combined arms battle or tactically employ their units and formations. 

So, there existed another significant factor besides tactics. This factor was so strong that it offset 

the terrible disadvantages with which the German 

paratroopers and mountain troopers had to struggle. In searching for this factor, we turn to Field 

Marshal Lord Carver, the former British Inspector 

December 1994 

General. During the Second World War, he participated in many German-British combats as a frontline soldier in Africa, Italy, northern France and 

Germany In his book Dilemmas of the Desert, Lord 

Carver wrote that time and again British units 

were defeated because they failed to move; instead, 

their unit leaders waited for orden or for approval 

of their intentions. This implies that forces will 

fight effectively if the soldiers' braveness is supplemented by two factors: good tactics and initiative 

(enterprise)--or the willingness of officers, NCOs 

and enlisted men to act independently and, if need 

be, even contrary to their obsolete mission. 

The importance of acting independently results 

immediately from the characteristics of war. War is 

the domain of uncertainty, friction and, otten, sheer 

Engineer 51 
chaos. It will remain so because war is not waged 

by machinery but by soldiers operating machinery 

So, war is a fight between opposing forces of will 

and mind. Soldiers' reactions in the face of danger 

and death, however, are unpredictable. Managerial 

planning and careful realization of detailed plans 

may not show soldiers the way through uncertain 

situations, frictions and chaos. 

When the unexpected occurs, those waiting for 

new orders will lose. But those who react faster 

than their opponents will win. They will act like a 

chess player who moves two pieces at a time while 

his opponent moves only one. If history is not misleading, auftragstaktik is one way to call forth this 

quick and independent action. 

History 

nfortunately, few books or articles provide 

information on the historv and origin - of

auftragstaktik. Yet this concept is an important 

and sententious phenomenon. Those who have developed auftragstaktik and have applied this system for the first time appear to have considered it 

something ordinary, which did not require any special explanation, theory or terminology. Even the 

term is quite new: It was used commonly only after 

the Second World War, when what it defined no 

longer existed. 

Anglo-Americans use the term "mission-type orders" for auftragstaktik. This implies that the essence of auftragstaktik is to give the subordinate 

commander a general mission, while leaving him 

much liberty in terms of executing the mission. If 

you adhere to this interpretation and then compare Allied and German combat orders written 

during the war, you will find surprisingly few differences and not find anything to explain differences in the forces' combat effectiveness. Commanders who commanded their troops from the 

front lines did this not to have a better view, but 

to have the ability to intervene quickly and immediately with subordinate formations in executing 

the mission. Changing only the wording of operation orders will, therefore, not make it possible to 

revitalize or adopt auftragstaktik. 

Contemporaries Evaluate 

n the mid-19th century, Prussia already looked 

back on a long tradition of unusual devotion to 

the profession and duty. The tradition of respect 

for the subordinate's dignity, which was uncommon 

at that time, was just as long. That tradition was 

the basis for the natural development of auftragstaktik. The command and control procedures were 

not created at that time, nor were they conscientiously developed from a philosophy or by necessity. Instead, they evolved by themselves and were 

considered normal and natural. This conclusion is 

evident in documents written by authors from four 

nations: 

Prince Friedrich Karl, field marshal not only 

by rank, but soldier and military leader, 

wrote: "All in all, the Prussian officer corps, 

unlike any other forces, seem...to have developed an unusual longing for independence 

from superiors and a willingness to assume responsibility...This attitude also had an undisputable impact on our battle tactics. Prussian 

officers do not tolerate any restrictions by regu 

lations and schemes, as is the case in Russia, 

Austria, the United Kingdom ... We give ... free rein to the ingenuity of the individual soldier, perfom our arts more easily and support 

any successful action independently, even 

when this may be contrary to the intentions of 

a military leader." 

Thirty years later, an Englishman made the 

followingjudgement in what he explicitly 

called a "critical study" of imperial Germany: 

'Xowhere in the world, independent thinking 

and liberty of action is fostered and promoted as much as in the German forces, 

from the commanding general down to the 

last NCO." 

A Russian general, who had acted as an observer during the entire German-French war 

in 187011871,concludes his two-volume report 

as follows: "Actually, the eventual success of 

the Germans was obtained due to an incredible extent of independent enterprise by the 

lower-ranking leaders on all levels down to the 

lowest one, which was displayed on the battlefield and outside of it." 

w Shortly after the German-French war, an officer presented a speech at the Ecole Superieur 

de Guerre--without exception, all course participants had fought in this war. He said: "A 

common characteristic of all German officers 

was the firm determination to keep the initiative by all means ... while the soldiers were incited to devote themselves completely and to 

ad autonomously, and while all soldiers were 

obliged to think, to check and to create their 

own conceptions ... The NCOs were the backbone of the Prussian forces ... a precious support of the officers.Their special responsibilities, backed by a respect which was unknown 

in other armies, guaranteed them to hold an 

honorable and envied position. The Prussian 

forces were proud of them." 

December 1994 
"When the unexpected occurs, those 

waiting for new orders will lose. But 

those who react faster. . . will win." 

These writings indicate that the command and 

control procedures of auftragstaktik had not been 

grafted on an optional basis. Rather, auftragstaktik 

was founded on many decades of national education, respect of the person, and the dignity of lowerranking officers, NCOs and enlisted. Last but not 

least, auftragstaktik was the result of constant observation and promotion of professional skills over 

decades, which resulted in self-assuredness and 

self-confidence. 

One facet was very important, even crucial: 

Foreign observers recognized that the high degree 

of independence was not restricted to the battlefield. They noted that it existed "on the battlefield 

and outside of it." They perceived independence 

and self-confidence not only among officers but also 

among NCOs and enlisted. 

These observations show to what extent liberty 

of action (i.e., execution of a mission by its sense 

not by its wording) was part of a general style of 

living. That style of living is not promoted or revitalized by merely changing the wording in item 3b 

and following the Operational Command STANAG 

2024, describing the execution of the mission (or 

any order). 

Prussian Command and Control 


Procedures 


t first glance, the Prussian command and 

control procedures may appear to be the 

same as the procedures of other forces: The officer 

assessed the sit,uation, made a decision, developed 

an operation plan and, based on that plan, set up 

the missions for subordinate units. The subordinate was given his commander's intent and orders, 

assessed the situation, made a decision, and so 

on-down to the level of the squad leader. These 

procedures were the same in all armies; but in 

the Prussian-German forces, the emphasis seems 

to have been shifted: The mission embraced in 

the statement of the commander's intent had 

higher priority than any detail of the execution 

process. 

This fact may seem to be insignificant but it is 

not. For, if an unexpected situation developed, it 

was easier for German commanders to question the 

validity of the then-obsolete mission and act independently instead-as long as they followed the intention of their next superior. 

Thus, if there is a characteristic feature, essence or substance of auftragstaktik, it is not a 

definite extent (listing) of details or how to execute the mission. The characteristic feature is the 

clear emphasis on the intention of the next superior-and a corresponding reduction in the importance of the mission received. When Field Marshal Prince Friedrich Karl reproved a major, in 

about 1860, the latter justified his action by replying that he had executed a strict order. Then the 

Prince rebuked him: "The King has turned you 

into a major because he thought you knew when 

not to obey an order." Such anecdotes (this one 

seems to be true, by the way) belong to the standard repertoire of some forces. 

Remarkably, this story was referred to many 

times, even in semi-official publications of the Prussian forces. So it is no surprise that a military leadership regulation in 1906 included a passage which 

obliged officers to verify that the mission received 

was still appropriate in view of the situation and 

the intention of the next superior. 

Revitalization of Auftragstaktik 

hatever was left of auftragstaktik vanished after the breakdown of Germanv 

in l'ii5. Many years later, interest in auftragstaktik rose again. Perhaps it arose because 

NATO member nations were looking for a way 

to balance the high Warsaw Pact superiority in 

terms of quantity by establishing higher quality 

in terms of command, control and leadership. 

Or perhaps there was another reason: A future 

conflict between high-technology forces may be 

dominated as much by electronic warfare as 

forces in the Second World War were dominated 

by armored vehicles. In the future, military 

December 1994 
commanders will face quickly changing situations (i.e., obsolete missions). They will be unable to turn to superiors because radio connections will be jammed. Initiative and independent 

action will, therefore, be even more important in a 

future war than they were in former conflicts. 

This brine about much more than just the question of how operational orders are worded. Wording 

is important. Yet, another issue needs to be addressed: Are the officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers in the armed forces capable of implementing 

auftragstaktik? 

What does that mean? It means that the military 

needs soldiers from all ranks who, upon facing an 

unexpected situation, start to think automatically: 

"When my superior gave me this mission he (or 

she) could not foresee this situation; so I will not 

follow the obsolete mission but will follow the intention of my superior." If the situation has 

changed completely and not even the superior's intention and operation plan are appropriate for the 

new situation, our soldiers must think: "When my 

superior developed this intention and operation 

plan, he could not foresee this situation. Therefore, 

I must consider the mission and my superior's operation plan obsolete. Instead, I must do what my 

superior would have ordered if he had faced this 

situation." 

Such command and control procedures will result in chaos if those involved are not excellently 

trained or are not experts in their fields. Independent action can be the rule only if it is based on 

excellent professional skills. That is the first requirement of auftragstaktik. 

The second requirement is a high degree of selfconfidenc~.Independent action, (i.e.,auftragstaktik), will develop only if--

Soldiers consider themselves experts in their 

fields. 

Commanders are proud to be part of the 

military. 

NCOs and officers prefer their military leader 

assignment to anything else (and do not secretly long for an assignment in the headquarters--next to the almighties with the red general's collar patches, if possible). 

The third requirement of auftragstaktik is especially difficult to meet. It concerns the superiorsup to those who personify the primacy of polit,ics. 

For them, it will be possible to support (or revitalize) auftragstaktik only if they accept having subordinates who act differently from what they may 

have expected. If superiors intervene too often, too 

early or too forcefully, they may prevent a few mistakes from happening. But they will blunder because they will prevent independence from 

growing. Independence is the root of high combat effectiveness in a force. 

Superiors must understand that, apart from lack 

of discipline, there is only one reason for reprimanding subordinates: inactivity or waiting for orders to 

come from the top. That is easier said than done. 

But support for or revitalization of auftragstaktik 

means, first, to educate superiors not to act on subordinates. It is easier to herd sheep than lions-but 

lions act stronger against the enemy 

The last requirement of auftragstaktik is the prevailing leadership style within the forces. For many 

military units, everyday business is ruled by SOPS, 

statistics, inspections and tests; activities are predetermined by regulations, rules and instructions. Allegedly, many military leaders are fully occupied 

with evaluating statements and statistics provided 

by subordinates, and with compiling new statistics, 

statements and reports. They have little time left 

for their most important job-to visit their troops. 

These visits should not be to monitor and check 

their troops once again hut to watch and listen and 

learn. Officerswho live in a permanently monitored environment will not develop the braveness 

and willingness to take the risks associated with independent action, nor will they rely on their own 

judgement first if this is suddenly required. 

Military leaders who want their soldiers to 

take risks and act independently, those who 

want, in effect, to introduce auftragstaktik, must 

support its development during peacetime. They 

must select, promote and educate appropriate personnel and maintain an adequate level of professionalism. Military leaders who do that will obtain the desired results. They will achieve 

auftragstaktik, which is the willingness of soldiers to act independently and the ability to do 

this in a reasonable way. 

Those who think auftragstaktik is nothing but 

a way of wording operation orders have missed 

the point. Those who think they can introduce 

auftragstaktik from above or order it to be fostered within units are like the farmer who sows 

wheat in the desert. There is only one way to 

achieve auftragstaktik: You must ignore it. Instead, you must concentrate on building forces 

that are intrinsically characterized by independence, maximum professional skills and confidence. In such forces, independent action will be 

a matter of course. 

Thank you. 

Y 

For more inforn~ationabout the concept of 

auftragstnktih, readers are invited to call LTC Reinhold Hocke, Gerntan liaison officer at the Engineer 

School, at (314) 563-4029. 

December 1994 
Light Engineers in Urban 


By Major Martin N. Stanton 

how intensity conflict and operations other 

than war (LIC/OOTW offer many opportunities for employing engineer units in innovative and 

unusual ways. An effective action in Somalia was 

the employment of a platoon from the 41st Engineer Battalion (~i~ht) in a cordon and search operation in the town of Kismayu in February and 

March 1993. The platoon was attached to Task 

Force (TF)2-87 Infantry 

The Situation 

n a cordon and search operation, a perimeter 

(cordon) is emplaced around an area to prevent 

the escape of individuak or groups, who are the target of a search. TF 2-87 found it difficult to restrict pedestrian movement between parts of the 

city that had been searched for weapons and thhse 

that had not. To search the city "one bite at a 

time," the engineers first had to control pedestrian 

traffic. The rules of engagement (ROE) allowed 

them to fire without warning on people with visible 

weapons; all others had to be challenged and apprehended. Because of the large population of Kimayu (over 60,000), it was difficult to do this with 

the limited number of troops available (less than 

one battalion of Belgian paratroops and TF 2-87 Infantry). For example, while soldiers stopped one person crossing a street, a hundred others could walk 

by-it was not possible to stop them all. The many 

narrow, twisting streets in Kismayu also made it a 

challenge to keep people from slipping through the 

cordon with weapons hidden in their clothing. 

The Operation 

rpF 2-87's solution was a technique called 

L "speed wiring." The intent w& to rapidly 

establish a concertina fence around the area to be 

searched. By creating a substantial but nonlethal 

obstacle, the engineers could delay the Somalis 

long enough to conduct a weapons search. When 

December 1994 
Installing a cordon uslng the speedvvlre technique 

End cordon Search units 

Doubls-"rend esncatin.,.nca 

-

----- dna C be C0YI.d b"CO"Cern". 

,nlsn(ry.a*unn. 

Begin cordon 

constructing the obstacle, the engineers relied on 

the following tenets: 

m Stealth (to allow unobtrusive emplacement). 

Speed (to prevent the Somalis from reading to it). 

m Reinforcement (to improve its obstacle value). 

Security (to prevent intentional or unintentional breaches). 

The battalion operations order provided the engineer platoon leader with the boundaries for the 

search area and the type of obstacle to be installed. 

Engineers loaded trucks with enough concertina wire 

to create an obstacle several kilometers long. Infantry soldiers established a cordon around the search 

area just before daylight, and the engineers began to 

emplace the speed-wire obstacle. 

Speed wiring required that trucks move down 

the road at a walking pace, while soldiers threw 

concertina strands out at intervals of 25 to 50 meters. Engineers walking behind the trucks spread 

the concertina and linked the strands together. 

Working quietly, they established the initial halfmile-long, side-by-side, double-strand fence in less 

than 15 minutes. Then, they pounded pickets in 

the dirt road and placed one strand of the wire on 

top of the other. They established exits through the 

fence at 250- to 300-meter intervals and posted soldiers by them to check people who tried to leave. 

Much like a fisherman's net, the wire obstacles allowed soldiers time to search people and to apprehend and disarm those with weapons. The engineers and an infantry platoon patrolled the fence to 

provide security and prevent a breach. 

The wire fence was a complete success the first 

day it was used. Since it had been constructed 

quietly during the night, the Somalis within the 

cordon awoke to find a battalion of Belgian and a 

battalion of American soldiers preparing to conduct 

a detailed search of their neighborhood. Many of 

them tried to flee but were stopped by the wire. 

Rather than try to go through the fence, many 

armed young men returned to the cordoned off area 

to hide their weapons. The few who attempted to 

breach the fence were halted by engineer and infantry guards. Occasionally, donkeys or other animals 

became entangled in the wire and had to be cut 

free. The engineers watched closely t,o ensure that 

unattended children were not caught in the wire. 

Associated Tasks 

Search for Weapons. When searching for 

hidden weapons, the engineers used tools 

in their pioneer kits to smash locked doors and 

search under floorboards and above rafters. To 

breach doors and walls, they used the winch on 

their HMMWV, or they attached one end of a chain 

to the HMMWV's towing pintle and the other end 

to the door. Chain saws would have been useful to 

cut through doors and walls, but they were not 

available. A lesson learned is that units should 

take chain saws when they deploy on a cordon and 

search operation. 

The engineers also used mine detectors to locate 

weapons hidden under piles of refuse, in dung heaps, 

or in fresh graves. Somalis rarely buried people with 

metal objects, so if the mine detedors indicated that 

there was metal in a fresh grave, it was almost always a weapon. The Somalis often hid weapons in 

such unsavory sites, hoping that the searching 

troops would be too squeamish to look for them. By 

56 Engineer 
- - 

the end of the first day, the combined USiBelgian 

force had found almost 100 small arms and several 

crew-served weapons, as well as various types of 

grenades, mortar bombs, and antitank rounds. 

Destroy Captured Weapons. The engineers 

used demolitions to safely destroy the weapons, explosives, and ammunition that they captured. Because the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel were occupied with more complicated 

demolitions or bomb disposal, the engineers were 

called upon to destroy captured weapons. They 

used demolitions to safely destroy the weapons, explosives, and ammunition that had been captured. 

Construct Detainee Compounds. As armed civilians were detained, TF 2-87 planned to construct 

a detainee compound at the airfield base camp, 

thinking they would have to guard and provide for 

prisoners. Fortunately, the Belgians relieved the 

task force of this responsibility. Although the engineers did not build a compound in Kismayu, the 

ability to quickly erect a detainee facility is essential in this type of operation. Detainee compounds 

need a more secure fence than those erected for a 

cordon and search operation, usually one made of 

triple concertina or, as a minimum, double concertina intertwined with tanglefoot. 

Assessing the Results 

ay establishing a cordon along the streets in 

Kismayu, TF 2-87 effectively sealed off the 

area to be searched. Local conditions made it easier 

to establish a cordon in that city than in many 

other urban areas: The buildings were too far 

apart to allow civilians to escape across rooftops, 

and there were no sewer systems or other subterranean avenues of escape. In urban environments 

Task Force 2-87 captured 

more than 300 weapons in 

the cordon and search operation. The weapons reflected 50 years'of small 

arms development and 

ranged from MI 6s and 

AK47s to Bren guns and 

Lee Enfield rifles. They Included 50caliber machine 

guns, bolt-action rifles, 

hand and rocket-propelled 

grenades, mines, and mortar 

rounds. %me of the weapons were in good condnion; 

others posed a greater danger to their owners than to us. 

with these escape routes, accurate maps are critical 

if the cordon is to be effective. Guarding each possible exit requires many soldiers, but if a military intelligence sensor team is available, sensors may be 

used in the sewers or on the out-of-the-way overhead avenues. Then the commander can maintain 

part of his reserve forces as a "sewer reaction force" 

to move to and intercept escape attempts detected 

by the sensors. In most urban areas, soldiers need 

to build nonlethal obstacles and provide security 

for them. These obstacles can be built with a mix of 

concertina, CS powder, broken glass or metal caltrops, trip flares,or even welded bars, grates, or 

doors. Use of lethal obstacles such as land mines is 

normally governed by ROE. 

Making the Difference 

ngineers were a key combat multiplier to TF 

2-87 during the demanding cordon and search 

mission in Kismayu. Using limited resources, they 

were able to assess situations and devise plans to successfully use traditional obstacles in innovative ways. 

The Kismayu experience shows that leaders at all 

levels must be aware of engineer capabilities and 

constantly search for ways to use them as a combat 

multiolier. In Kismavu. ". effective emolovment . - of engineers made a significant difference in the success 

of the cordon and search mission. hi 

Major Stanton, an Infantry ofier, is an Assistant J5 policyi at the United StatesA?my Central Command, McDill 

Air Force Base, Florida. P~leuious assignments include senior brigade advisor, Saudi Arabia National Guard: and battalion S3,2-87 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division. He holds 

a master's degree in national defense and stmtegic studies 

from the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Islund. 

December 1994 Engineer 57 
Manaqinq w IF l!?JtixA<x dstociatndl with


Equipment 

By Mark Totzke 

Rhe M9 Armored Combat 

Earthmover (ACE), like 

any new system, is being fielded 

with design characteristics that 

may pose risks to operators and 

equipment maintainers. Due to 

resource constraints, no system 

can be designed for perfectly safe 

operation under all conditions or 

operate in all environments and 

against all threats. The following information describes possible safety risks associated with 

the ACE and how to reduce 

them. 

M9 ACE Accidents 

s with other engineer 

eaui~ment. . . the overall 

nr~lnber of reported accidents 

involving the ACE has been 

low. This is because the Engineer School and most engineer 

units adhere to high training 

standards and have implemented effective risk-management programs. 

Since the ACE was first fielded 

in 1988, several equipment operators and maintainers who failed to 

follow the established procedures 

have been involved in accidents. 

For example, a soldier recently 

had a foot amputated after it was 

crushed while he performed maintenance in the bowl of an ACE. He 

and the operator had apparently 

confused some prearranged hand 

signals, and the blade was lowered 

on his leg. 

The pible occurrence of this 

scenario was identified during the 

development process for the ACE. 

Rather than redesign the system, 

however, decision makers determined that risks to soldiers would 

be minimized by requiring that 

the blade be locked in the "up" 

position before anyone worked in 

the bowl. 

There are other similar, although less serious, incidents 

where soldiers found established 

procedures inconvenient and developed their own methods. For instance, soldiers often travel with 

the blade of the ACE down and 

ignore the caution to raise the 

blade in rough or uneven terrain. 

Training documents highlight this 

requirement, and it is reinforced 

in ACE training. As the post-fielding training effectiveness analysis 

(PFTEA) survey reveals, however, 

the time required to lock the blade 

in the up position takes from 20 to 

30 minutes. This delay creates an 

inconvenience to mission accomplishment and the urge to take 

unacceptable risks. Traveling with 

the blade down may cause the operator to lose control of the vehicle 

and has raised the overall fleet 

costs for the ACE because of equipment damaga. ACE operators and 

maintainers must use risk management before they deviate from 

the established procedures and 

standards, especially in this period of shrinking resources. 

Risk Management 


Process 


The key to successful risk 

Ij management is to identify 

and implement suitable countermeasures for hazards and, 

for high-level risks, to allow the 

decision to be made by a higher 

authority. In the accident described earlier, the soldiers 

should have contacted their 

chain of command; then they 

probably would have been required to perform the operation according to established 

procedures. 

Fort Leonard Wood's risk-management program has served as a 

model for use at other TRADOC 

schools. It combines the common 

sense of engineer soldiers with a 

systematicmethod to identify hazards and prevent accidents. The 

program enables personnel to recognize hazards in a fast-changing 

environment, develop appropriate 

countermeasures, and carry out 

risky operations safely 

December 1994 
wnen operatea accoralng to nanaara, tne ~9 ACE 1s a sate ana enecttve plece of equ~pment. Here, an operator 1s not 

using the M9 ACE according to standard; he did not fill the bowl with dirt for ballast. 

When developing equipment 

such as the ACE, the Engineer 

School actively participates in a 

system safety design effort to 

identify and eliminate the most 

serious deficiencies that may create hazards for operators and 

maintainers. It is a continual giveand-take process between contractors, system safety engineers, and 

decision makers. For nondevelopmental (off-the-shelf) materiel acquisitions, engineers conduct a 

market investigation to carefully 

compare the safety characteristics 

of all candidate systems. The result 

of the acquisition process is equipment that can complete the mission 

but still has inherent design flaws. 

Engineers compensate for these 

flaws through a risk-management 

training program that aggressively 

addresses all aspects of the flaws 

and how to overcome them. 

Long before the ACE was 

fielded, hazards that could not be 

designed out of the system were 

translated into "Caution" and 

"Warning" statements in the 

training literature. Programs of 

instruction and lesson plans were 

developed to ensure that trainees 

become familiar with the equipment and have the knowledge to 

do their job safely Training programs at Fort Leonard Wood are 

designed to ensure that soldiers 

are well-versed in the techniques 

of risk management. 

Accidents involving Army personnel (militsuy and civilian), now drain 

the budget of nearly $1 billion per 

year. In an era ofshrinkingresoum, 

it is imperative that everyone learn 

and use risk-management procedures during their daily activities. 

Readers are encouraged to call 

the Engineer Branch Safety Ofice 

and relate their experiences with 

the ACE and other engineer equipment. We want to learn about incidents that could help improve 

training or identify a previously 

unknown system deficiency. 'b obtain a copy of Fort Leonard Wood's 

risk-management regulation, 

write to: Commander, USAES, 

Attn: ATSE-CDC-S, Fort Leonard 

Wood, MO 65473;or call (314) 563- 

0131, extension 3-7346. Use the 

risk management process to increase the realism of training in 

your unit while minimizing risks 

to personnel! 

MI: lbtzke is a systems safety en&- 

neer with the Directorate of Combat 

Developments and the Engineer 

Blanch Safety Oftice, U.S. Amy Engineer School. MI: lbtzke holds bachelor's degrees in mining and general 

engineering from Sourthern Illinois 

University and the University of 

Illinois. 
By First Lieutenant Amy Klopotoski and 

Sergeant First Class Timothy J. Funk 

mormmaphic surwors deployi 

: ing. "to the battlefield pivide L 

prtzise-positioning data (latitude, 

longitude and elevation) to many 

users. Army users of topographic 

information include Command 

and Control, Field Artillery, Air 

Defense Artillery, Signal, Military 

Intellig~nceand Army Aviation. 

The survey platoon from the 

29th Engineer Battalion in Hawaii is the only Active Component 

topographic survey unit in the Pacific theater The platoon focuses 

on wartime missions and technical 

readiness through varied training 

exercises. Once each quarter it deploys with division artillery units 

to practice quick-respome, precise-positioning skills. 

The platoon's most recent challenge was a two-month deployment to Alaska. It's mission was to 

complete safety and navigational 

aid (NAVAID) surveys for three 

U.S. Army airfields: Allen Army 


Airfield at Fort Greely, Wain- 


wright Army Airfield at Fort Wain- 


wright, and Bryant Army Heliport 


at Fort Richardson. On the sur-


veys, the platoon positioned the SPC Gotl ng observes an angle whl e PFC Gamnos records tbe mgle from 

airfield's NAVAIDs, identified h:gn atop a hanger at Bryant Army Hesipon, FoA q'cnardson, A 3~43. 

60 Engineer December 1994 
nearby obstructions and estab- (rewn) team was sent to the three some points were difficult to find. 

lished the airfield elevation. This airfields. It determined the swpe Upon arrival at Allen Army Airwas done to comply with a Federal of required support, including bil- field, the surveyors taskorganized 

Aviation Administration (FAA) leting and transportation. The re- into two crews: the level crew and 

requirement that safety and con team also located existingsur- the Global Positioning System 

NAVAID surveys be conducted on vey control points on and around (GPS)/observation crew. Crew 

all U.S. airfields every five years. the airfields. These were points members rotated to different jobs 

Although the deployment was where the horizontal and vertical on each airfield to gain experience 

projected to last three months, the pasitions were determined to a in different surveying skills. 

survey platoon completed the job high degree of accuracy Data for The level crew recovered and 

in two months, at a considerable these points exist in files called verified vertical control points 

mt savings. Support received from trig lists; they include station de- (benchmarks). Before using a conorganizations throughout Alaska scription cards and survey control trol point in a survey, the surveycontributed to the mission'ssuccess. schematic diagrams. 01s checked the trig data to ensure 

Using military personnel to do During the rewn, the team re- that the point had not shifted 

the three surveys cost about quested trig lists from many since it was emplaced. Then, they 

$90,000. In comparison, hiring an sources, including the Army Corps used differential levelingmethods 

outside contractor would have cost of Engineers, Alaska Distrid; the to determine the elevation of variabout $200,000 for each airfield. State Bureau of Land Manage- ous points on the runway Starting 

Compared with the cost of hiring ment; and the University of at one benchmark, the level crew 

contractors, deploying Army topo- Alaska-Fairbanks. The trig lists ran a continuous level line 

graphic surveyors for the mission described where to locate the through the airfield and closed on 

was a minimal expense, and the points using local reference marks a sewnd benchmark. They estabexperience provided outstanding such as roads or buildings, many lished the elevation on each end of 

training for soldiers. of which were established in the the runways and every 100 feet 

The Alaska project offered the early 1940s. At Fort Greely, a rural down the centerline of the runsurvey platoon an opportunity to undeveloped area, the surveyors ways. They ran spurs off the main 

simulate a real-war mission com- found the points relatively easily. level line to establish elevations 

bined with real-deployment con- However, at the other two air- on the three airfields'barometers. 

siderations. One month before the fields, located near the growing The GPSIobservation crew replatoon deployed, a reconnaissance cities of Fairbanks and Anchorage, covered and verified horizontal 

Imaginary Surfaces 

20:l Slope ratio 

40:l Slope ratio \

7:l Slope ratio 1x1feetabove airfield elevation 

500 feet horizontal elevation 

G 

Pi Prlmaw surface \ /

0 Transifionat surface 

C ADoroachdeoarture clearance surface (slow1 

D ~bproachd<~artureclearance surface (ho;iz&ntal) 

E Inner horizontal surface 

F Conical s;rface Figure 1 

G Outer horlzontai surface 

December I994 Engineer 61 
-6) observed 

Object 

SUN^^ 

control 

point 1 

survey 

control 

point 2 

Figure 2. Intersection 

survey control points. Verificationof 

the points was accomplished using 

the static GPS surveying method 

(see insert) todetermine the position; 

then the points were compared to 

data in the trig list. After verifying 

three horizontal pints, they med 

the points to establish more wntml 

points on the airfield. The crew observed all of the airfield obstructions 

and NAVAILIs at those control 

pints. They determined airfield obstructions by drawing imaginary 

surfaces on a topographic map at 

various heights above the airfield 

elevation, as shown in Figure 1.The 

surfaces extended approximately 

10 nautical miles in all directions 

&om the airfield runways. 

After establishing control points 

with geodetic-quality GPS receivers, the GPSIobservation crew 

used conventional surveying 

methods to provide precise horizontal positioning for the obstructions and NAVAIDs. The two 

methods used to determine positioning were intersection and 

sideshots (Figures 2 and 3). 

On two of the airfields, the surveyors employed a third method of 

positioning, using a GPS surveying method called pseudokinematic surveying and pmessing. 

Survey 

control 

point 2 

The GPS receivers employed the 

method in a rapid surveying mode. 

Keeping two receivers on known 

positions and the third receiver 

roving from point to point, the surveyors quickly positioned many 

NAVAIDs on the airfields. Then 

they positioned the rovingreceiver 

directly over the NAVAID and collected data for 8 to 10 minutes at 

each position. They repeated the 

process one hour later. 

The airfield surveys were time 

comuming and occupied several 

sites on each airfield, including 

the runways. The airfields could 

not shut down during the survey, 

so the survey team chief maintained constant coordination with 

the survey teams, airfield operations and the control towers. 

When a control tower was closed, 

the surveyors kept one eye lwking 

through their instruments and the 

other eye on the sky because they 

usually shared the runways with 

C-12 aircraft or helicopters. 

After the field data were collected, the surveyors converted 

their field notes to abstract sheets, 

which they used for position computations. The surveyors used a 

computer program that calculated 

positions faster than they could 

Observed 


angles 


I 

survey 

control 

point 1 

Figure 3. Sideshots 

have calculated them manually 

These programs were written by 

Sergeant Terry Klock, a topographic surveyor formerly assigned to the 29th Engineers. 

Back at Fort Shafter, the surveyors compiled the data and created an airfield Obstruction Chart 

(OC), the final product. It was sent 

to Army Aviation at Cameron Station, Virginia, for approval. While 

drafting the OC acmrding to specifications can take as long as the 

field work, a computer-aided design 

system (CADS) speeded up the 

draRing process by allowing them 

to store the drawing digitally The 

automated database they created 

for each airf~eld now canbe updated 

easily every 5years. 

The Alaskan project was cost 

effective and it allowed soldiers 

to receive intense training in 

both satellite and conventional 

surveying methods. The soldiers' 

enthusiasm and up-to-date techniques helped them achieve accurate results and complete the surveys ahead of schedule. In light of 

budget reductions and downsizing, providing soldiers opportunities to work in their trained areas benefits both the soldiers and 

the Army 

62 Engineer December 1994 
Surveying with the Global 


Positioning System 


Most soldiers in the Army use 


GPS receivers to assist them in 


navigating from one point to an- 


other. Only a few soldiers know 


they also can use geodetic-


type GPS receivers to deter- 


mine the position of any point 


on the earth's surface within 


millimeters. 


To use the method, called 


static GPS surveying, the an-


tenna of a geodetic-type receiver 


is plumbed over a known control 


point, and two or more other re- 


ceivers are plumbed over the 


points to be established. All of 


the receivers then simultane- 


ouslv collect data for one to two 


hours from at least four satel- 


lites. The collected data from 


all of the receivers are down- SGT Long checks the placement of a Global Positioning System antenna wosltloned on an aDwroach liaht at Wainwriaht Army Airfield. The 

loaded into a computer; and the surveyors used pseudokjriematic surveying procedures tb determine 

azimuth, the distance and the the Drecise position of the iiahts. 

I difference in elevation ibase- 1 

line vectors) are computed be- References First Lieutenant Amy Klopotoshi is 

tween the stations using GPS the executive officer for Headquarters 

M~~ ual 5-232, ~ Company, 29th Engineer Battalion. data processing software. ~i~ld T	 ~ ~ -

These vectors are applied to graphic Surveying, 1989. 	 She previously served as survey platoon leadel; 29th Engineei- Battalion. 

the known position and then Technical Manual 5-232, Ele- ILT Kloootoski is a graduate of the / adjusted using "least square" I ments of~urvevino. , -, 1971. I ~nzinee; Officer Basic course' and 

adjustment software. This soft- the ~a~~ing, 

-

Charting and Geodesy Department of Defense Publica- I - ware produces an adjusted po- 	 Officer5 Course. She holds a bachesition relative to the known po- tion Glossary of MaPPiflg, Charting 	 lor's degree in journalism from 

sition that is based on the 	 and Geodetic Temn,198sl. 	 1 syrwuseunivemi&. 

user's requested datum. (Da- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sergeant First Class Timothy 3.Funh 

tum is the point-of-origin and Publication, NAVSTAR Global Po- is a training developer at the U.S. 

orientation on an ellipsoid for a sitioning System Surveying, Engi- Anny Engineer School, Fort Leonard 

specific set of survey control.) neer Manual 1110-1-1003, 14 Wood. He served as the platoon serBy using the GPS method, June 1993. geant of the survey plntoon, 29th Entopographic surveyors can lo- gineer Battalion, and led his squad Federal Aviation Administra- in the first use of GPS surveying in cate positions more accurately tion Publication 405. Speclfica-	 combat during Operation Desert and in a fraction of the time it tions Airport Obstruction Chart 

would take using conventional Storm. SFCFunk is agraduate of the 

and Related Products, February Advanced Noncommissioned Offieer surveying methods. 1986. Course and holds an associate$ degree 

from Hawaii Pacific University. Y 

December 1994 	 Engineer 63 
Past in Review 


@ngineerB anb tge 


Battle of tX)e Bulge 


By William C. Baldwin 

ecember 1994 is the 50th 

anniversary of the Battle 

of the Bulge. During that battle, 

American and Allied forces 

turned back Hitler's last great 

offensive in western Europe. 

Often fighting as infantry in desperate circumstances, engineers 

played a critical role in the early 

days of the offensive. One of 

their major contributions was to 

delay German armored columns 

long enough for Allied units to set 

up defensive positions. The engineers' experience in the Bulge 

demonstrated that engineers must 

always be prepared for any unexpected missions a combat situation may thrust upon them. 

Although D-Day landings on 

June 6, 1944, gave the western 

Allies a beachhead in northern 

France, it took almost two months 

of bitter fighting to break out of 

Normandy's hedgerows. After the 

breakout, Allied armies raced 

across France, liberated Paris and 

headed toward the German frontier. The severe strain that the 

rapid advance placed on Allied logistics, along with bad weather 

and stiffening German resistance, 

eventually slowed the offensive. 

By mid-December 1944, American 

armies had reached the Roer River 

inside Germany and the West Wall 

along the Saar River in eastern 

France. Between these two fronts 

lay the Ardennes, a hilly, densely 

forested area in eastern Belgium 

through which the Germans had 

attacked France in 1940. 

Five American divisions and a 

cavalry group held the 85-milelong Ardennes front. The difficult 

terrain and the belief that the 

German army was near exhaustion convinced the Allied commanders that the Ardennes sector 

was relatively safe. Thus, three of 

the divisions were new, and the 

other two were recuperating from 

heavy losses suffered in the 

Huertgen forest. 

After months of retreat, Hitler 

decided on a bold gamble to regain 

64Engineer December 1994 
Engineers sweep for mines in the snow during the Ardennes campaign. 

the initiative in the west. Under positions in the face of powerful 

the cover of winter weather, the German armored columns. Many 

Germans massed large forces op- engineer units played important 

posite theArdennes. Theyplanned roles in the Battle of the Bulge, 

to crash through the thinly held but the following vignettes show 

American front, cross the Meuse how those engineers imposed 

RiveranddrivetoAntwerp. Before critical delays on the offensive 

daybreak on December 16, the forces, whose only hope for sucGerman army launched its Iast cess lay in crossing the Meuse 

desperate offensive and cam- River quickly 

pletely surprised the AIIies. Lieutenant Colonel Joachin 

As the American front in the Ar- Peiper, a Nazi SSofficer, led one of 

dennes collapsed, the Allies rede- , the armored columns. His route 

played their forces to fill the gap. / went near the town of MaImedy ' While these troops were moving and toward the villages ofstavelot 

into position, the Army had to rely and Trois Ponts. The headquaron rear area troops already in the ters of the llllth Engineer ComArdennes. Many of those units bat Group was in Trois Ponts, and 

were corps and Army engineer one of its units, the 291st Engineer 

battalions that were scattered Combat Battalion, had detachthroughout the area in company-, ments working throughout the 

platoon- and even squad-sized area. When he learned on Decemgroups. Engineers who had been ber 17 of the German breakengaged in road maintenance and through, the commander of the 

sawmilling operations suddenly llllth Groupsent Lieutenant Colofound themselves manning road- nel David E. Pergrin, the 27-yearblocks and preparing defensive / old commander of the 291st, to 

December 1994 

Malmedy to organize its defense. 

Although most of the American 

troops in the area were fleeing, 

Colonel Pergrin decided to hold hi 

position in spite of the panic and 

confusion. He ordered his engineers to set up defensive positions 

around the town. During the afternoon of the 17th, engineers manning a roadblock on the outskirts 

of Malmedy heard small arms fire 

coming from a nearby crossroads. 

Then terrified American soldiers 

staggered up to the roadblock. 

They brought word of the Malmedy massacre, in which Peiper's 

troops murdered at least 86 cap 

tured American soldiers. 

Bypassing Malmedy, Peiper 

headed toward Stavelot, where 

Colonel Pergrin had sent another 

detachment of the 291st. 

Equipped with some mines and a 

bazooka, the engineers and some 

armored infantry soldiers delayed 

the German column for a few 

hours, but the small American 

Engineer 65 
A soldier from theslst Engineer Combat Battalion checks a TNT charge on a tree during the Battle of the Bulge, 

force was no match for the panzers. 

Peiper's column pushed through 

the village, and its lead tanks 

turned west toward Trois Ponts. 

Shortly before the Germans 

broke through the roadblock at 

Stavelot, Company C of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Fraser's 5lst 

Engineer Combat Battalion, also 

part of the 1111th Group, received 

orders to defend Trois Ponts. Reinforced by an antitank gun and a 

squad of armored infantry, the 

company prepared bridges for 

demolition. When Peiper's tanks 

came intoview, the engineers blew 

up the main bridge leading into 

the village. 

By the evening of December 18, 

the small American force at Trois 

Ponts had come under the command of Major Robert B. Yates, 

executive officer of the 51st, who 

had come to the village expecting 

to attend a daily staff meeting. 

Fearing that the Germans would 

discover the weakness of his force, 

Major Yates tried to deceive 

the enemy. During the night, 

the engineers repeatedly drove 

the company's six trucks into Trois 

Ponts with their 1ight.s on and 

drove out with their lights off to 

simulate the arrival of reinforcements. They put chains on their 

only four-ton truck and drove it 

back and forth through the village 

to create the impression that they 

had tanks. An American tank destroyer, which had slipped into the 

river a few days earlier, provided 

the artillery It caught fire and its 

shells exploded at irregular intervals throughout the night. The 

ruse apparently worked, because 

the Germans never launched a determined attack on the village. 

On December 20, the 82nd Airborne Division, which was trying 

to block the German penetrations, 

learned of the small force holding 

Trois Ponts. When the paratroopers moved into the village, Major 

Yates greeted their commander 

with, "Say, I'll bet you fellows are 

glad we're here!" American troops 

eventually destroyed Peiper's armored column. 

Farther south, engineers were 

also caught in the massive German attack. On December 17, the 

VIII Corps commander ordered 

his 44th Engineer Combat Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel 

Clarion J. Kjeldseth, to drop its 

road maintenance, sawmilling 

and quarryingoperations and help 

defend the town of Wiltz, in Luxembourg. The 600 men of the 44th 

joined a ragtag force consisting of 

some crippled tanks, assault guns, 

artillery and divisional headquarters troops. Attacked by tanks and 

infantry on December 18, the engineers held their fire as the tanks 

roared by and blasted the German 

infantry following behind. Forced 

to retreat by the weight of the German attack, the defenders moved 

back into the town and blew up the 

bridge over the Wiltz River By the 

66 Engineer December 1994 
next evening, the small American darkness. Unsure of his target in units participated valiantly in a 

force was surrounded and running the gloom, Private Bernard sometimes desperate attempt to 

low on ammunition. The soldiers Michin waited until the German stem the tide of the unexpected Gerattempted to escape but few made tank was only 10 yards away be- man counteroffensive. Relying on 

it back safely: Among the heavy fore firing hi bazooka. The explo- their initiative and training in deAmerican casualties was the sion knocked out the tank and fensive operations, Army engineers 

equivalent of three engineer compa- blinded him. As he rolled into a establiihed roadblocks with whatnies dead or missing. The defenders ditch, Private Michin heard ma- ever troops and weapons were at 

of Wiltz, however, had slowed the chine gun fire close by He threw a hand. They blew up bridges, 

German advance and given other grenade at the sound, which planted minefields and succeeded, 

American troops time to rush to the ceased, and struggled back to his often at the cost of heavy casualdefense of a critically important platoon. Private Michin, who re- ties, in delaying the powerful Ger- 

-roads some 10 miles to the gained his sight several hours later, man armored columns. The dewest-the town of Bastogne. received the Distinguished Service lays that the engineers helped to 

With the American defenses Cross for hi bravery under fire. impose gave the Allies time to 

west of Bastogne collapsing, the During the evening of the 19th and bring in reinforcements and seal 

corps commander ordered the last the morning of the 20th, the lOlst off the German penetrations. The 

of his reserves to defend Bastogne Airborne Division, which had Battle of the Bulge demonstrated 

until reinforcements could arrive. rushed to the defense of Bastogne, that engineers could make a major 

The reserves included the 35th relieved the 158th and the 35th En- contribution to the outcome of an 

Engineer Combat Battalion, a gineer Combat Battalions. German important campaign. 

corps unit, and the 158th Engi- panzers and troops continued to 

neer Combat Battalion, an Army push west and north of Bastogne, William Baldwin is a historian 

unit which happened to be work- and eventually surrounded the in the Office of History, Heading in the area. On the morning of American defenders in the town. quarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

the 19th, German tanks attacked Throughout the Ardennes, divi- Engineers, Alexandria, Viran engineer roadblock in the sional, corps and Army engineer ginia. 

IYUUJ 

1 I ENGINEER UPDATE 1 I 

Commercial numben are (314) 563.xux and DefenseSystem 

Network (OSN) numbers are 676.- unless otherwise noted, 

Directorate of Training (DOT) Environmental Handbook and Video. Two new tools have 

been developed to assist company-level leaders with environmental responsibilities. Training Circular (TC) 5-400. Unit Leaders'Handbook for Environmental Stewardship, was distributed in 

September 1994. The handbook contains recommendations to 

ensure compliance with Army environmental goals and policies, 

as well as federal, state, and local laws and regulations. Called 

the "Dash 10 manual, it delineates before, during and after 

checks for units conducting a field training exercise (m. 

Acase-study video and lesson plan will promote environmental 

ethics, unit environmental operations, and use of TC 5-400. The 

video's four segments highlight compliance programs and how to 

conduct before, during and after-action environmental checks 

during an FTX. The video is scheduled for distribution to TASC 

offices in April 1995. POC is CPT Richard Heitkamp, -4122. 

ENGINEER Mail-List Update. Thanks are extended to those 

who have responded to the ENGINEER mail-list update letter we 

distributed in October. Responses are used to correct addresses 

and to adjust the number of magazines distributed. Units that have 

not yet responded are encouraged to return the entire letter, 

even if there are no changes to report. To request an update 

letter, call (314) 563-41 04. POC is Catherine Eubanks,-4104. 

December 1994 
Directorate of Evaluation and M9 ACE Post Fielding Training Effectiveness Analysis 

Standardization (DOES) (PFTEA) Report. Copies of the PFTEA report were sent to all 

Army and Marine Corps units owning the M9 ACE in November. 

The report contains survey results and comments from ACE 

operators, mechanics, supervisors and unit commanders. Additional copies may be obtained by calling Ms. McAvenia, at (314) 

563-4009. POC is Vern Lowrey, -4007. 

Engineer Personnel Proponency Warrant Officer Basic Course Extended. Starting with 

Office (EPPO) Class 05-95, 6 January 1995, the 919A Warrant Officer Basic 

Course at Fort Leonard Wood will be extended from 11 weeks 

to 17 weeks. The extended class will provide additional training in diagnostics, troubleshooting, battlefield damage assessment and repair, and case studies. POC is Mr. Mello, (314) 

596-0837. 

Reserve Components (RC) 

News and Notes 

Reserve Component Combined Arms and Services Staff 

School (R-CAS3). ReSe~e, National Guard, and Title 32 AGR 

officers in the Fort Leonard Wood area may now attend CAS3 in 

a centralized location. CAS3, now required for promotion to 

major, is available through the 5038th USARF School satellite 

unit. Class 94-03 began 5 November. Eligible officers completed the Phase I correspondence course before the schoolhouse phase. After eight weekend drills and two weeks at Fort 

Leavenworth, they will be CAS3 graduates and will have fulfilled their required professional education for promotion to 

major. 

Other changes to academic requirements for enrollment in the 

Command and General Staff College include grade of major and 

completion of CAS3. This makes CAS3 the hingepin for future 

successful careers and an important professional milestone. 

POCs are LTC Jim Smith, -4085 and LTC Herb Hiatt, (314) 

774-5645 or (31 4) 596-0302. 

Department of Defense Fire Protection School. The new 

Department of Defense Fire Protection School, at Goodfellow Air 

Force Base. Texas, will officially open on 19 January 1995. The 

school currently trains military and civilian Air Force, Army and 

allied forces personnel. Marine Corps personnel are scheduled 

to participate beginning in October 1995. Course graduates receive DOD ceritfications ranging from entry-level fire fighter 

through the supervisory level of fire chief. In addition to classrooms and equipment storage facilities, the school has a stateof-the-art live fire training area, a training towerlresidential burn 

building, and a fire truck maintenance facility. POC is SFC Robin 

Compton, (91 5) 654-4827 or DSN 477-4827. 

December 1994 
- BRIDGE THE GAP 

By Command Sergeant Major Roy L. Burns, Jr. 

U.S. Army Engineer School 

Command and training developers and trainers here 

Reflections to resolve problems through improved parts availabilA ity, equipment upgrades and better training strates I look back on my last two years as command gies. I'm confident that our efforts will have a positive 

sergeant major of the Engineer Center and effect on equipment readiness. 

reminisce about my initial excitement, enthusiasm, New Equipment. The Engineer Center is working 

anxiety and anticipation for this position, two early to orocure several new enaineer - svstems. includina:- goals come to mind: Improve two-way communication 

between the Engineer Center and field units, and en- The Grizzly (fomerb called the Breather). Itis an 

sure that the quality of training taught at Fort Leonard MI chassis-based breaching system that will replace 

Wood is realistic. touah. and above all, safe. the CEV fleet on a two-for-one basis. The first unit . .,. To improve communication with field personnel, I equipped is scheduledfor fiscal year (f?) 99. 

have visited about 80 percent of our engineer units, The Wolverine (formerlythe Heavy Assault 

both CONUS and OCONUS. After meeting with unit Bridge (HAB). Another MI chassis-based system, 

leaders and soldiers, I brought their concerns back to 

the Engineer Center for resolution. The Senior Engineer Leaders Training Conference (SELTC), held 

each April at Fort Leonard Wood, has helped improve 

communication. There, senior leaders from all units 

meet to discuss personnel, equipment, training, and 

doctrinal issues. Afterwards, Engineer Center personnel 

work diligently to fix problems bought to our attention at 

the conference. The improved communication is achieving benefitsfor the entire engineer community. 

The quality of training at Fort Leonard Wood continues to be tough, realistic, and safe. To improve training effectiveness, the Engineer School's Directorate 

of Training (DOT) has recently reorganized. The DOT 

has three departments that are responsible for the development and execution of training. The Department 

of Tactics and Leadership is responsible for the Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and warfighting training. The Department of Combat Engineering is responsible for career management field (CMF) 

12 training; and the Department of Construction Engineering is responsiblefor CMFs 51 and 62 training. 

They are working hard to ensure that high quality, 

tough, realistic and safe training is conducted in all 

programs of instruction. 

Of the many other initiatives put forward during my 

tenure here, I will review three: 

Unit Training and Equipment Improvements. 

Engineer School personnel are working to resolve the 

low operational readiness rates of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV), the Armored Vehicle-Launched 

Bridge (AVLB), and the Armored Combat Earthmover 

(ACE) vehicle fleets. We are working closely with 

equipment managers at the Tank Automotive 

it will launch a 24-meter, military load class 90, 

Leguan-type bridge. The first unit equipped is 

scheduled for 2000. 

The Improved Common Bridge Transporter. This 

modified M977 HEMTT chassis will be used to 

transport the ribbon bridge. The system will be a 

one-for-one replacement of current bridge transporters. Fielding will begin in FY 96. 

These are a few of many systems being procured 

to ensure that engineer soldiers have the best equipment possible to accomplish their missions. 

Personnel Issues. The drawdown has affected engineers as it has everyone in the Department of Defense, but we are working diligently to lessen impacts 

on the engineer force. One initiative is to consolidate 

military occupational specialties (MOS) wherever possible. We have consolidated MOS 51G (materials 

quality specialist), 81B (construction draftsman) and 

828 (construction surveyor) into MOS 51T (engineer 

technician). We are now working to roll MOS 12F into 

MOS 128. The aim is to eliminate the low density 

12F MOS and improve opportunities for advancement. We have also opened the enlisted and noncommissioned officer specialties of MOS 12C (engineer 

bridge crewman) and 122 (combat engineer senior 

sergeant) to women. This was done to provide contlnued promotion and assignment availability to women, 

while meeting the needs of the engineer force. 

I have learned much in the last two years, but one 

thing stands out. The Engineer Center is here to help 

engineer units resolve their equipment, training, doctrine and personnel issues, and to establish the regimental azimuth for the future. Let us hear from you! 

December 1994 Engineer 69