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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

DENNY LEE RUHL 

Appellee 

Appellant No. 1753 MDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000344-2016 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2017 

Denny Lee Ruhl ("Ruhl") appeals from the order, entered by the Court 

of Common Pleas of Lancaster County on September 23, 2016, which 

designated him a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP").1 After careful review, 

we affirm. 

On December 3, 2015, Ruhl was charged with four counts of indecent 

assault,2 two counts of corruption of minors,3 and two counts of unlawful 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24. 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). 
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contact with minors.4 Ruhl engaged in various acts of sexual misconduct 

with nine-year old J.E. and eight -year -old P.E. from February 2015 to 

November 2015. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Ruhl pled guilty 

to all counts on April 25, 2016. He was sentenced to two to four years of 

incarceration, to be followed by twelve years of probation. Additionally, the 

trial court ordered Ruhl to be evaluated by the Pennsylvania Sexual 

Offenders Assessment Board ("SOAB"). At the time of the plea, Ruhl waived 

the requirement that his evaluation be completed prior to sentencing 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a)5. See Commonwealth v. 

Whanger, 30 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2011) (defendant can waive pre - sentence requirement in written colloquy). 

After his evaluation by the SOAB, the Commonwealth requested a 

hearing to establish whether Ruhl should be classified as an SVP pursuant to 

section 9799.24. The hearing was held September 23, 2016, and the court 

issued an order that same day concluding that Ruhl should be classified as 

an SVP. Ruhl filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on October 20, 

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1). 

5 After conviction, but before sentencing, a court shall order an individual 

convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed by the SOAB. The 

order for an assessment shall be sent to the administrative officer of the 

SOAB within ten days of the date of conviction for the sexually violent 

offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a). 

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2016. Ruhl filed his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on November 2, 2016; the 

Commonwealth did not file a response to Ruhl's statement. 

On appeal, Ruhl raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that the Defendant was an SVP. 

2. Whether the Court erred in relying upon the opinion of Dr. Stein, 

where said opinion was improperly based on unproven allegations 

(regarding T.W.) which were not part of the factual basis to the plea. 

Trial Court Opinion, at 3. 

An SVP is defined as: 

An individual determined to be a sexually violent predator under 

section 9795.4 (relating to assessments) prior to the effective 

date of this subchapter or an individual convicted of an offense 

specified in: 

(1) section 9799.14(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9) 

or (10) (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) or an 

attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit any offense 

under section 9799.14(b)(1), (2), (3), 

(9) or (10); 

(4), (5), (6), (8), 

(2) section 9799.14(c)(1), (1.1), (1.2), (1.3),(2), (3), (4), 

(5) or (6) or an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to 

commit an offense under section 9799.14(c)(1), (1.1), 

(1.2), (1.3),(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6); or 

(3) section 9799.14(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) 

or (9) or an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit 

an offense under section 9799.14(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 

(6), (7), (8) or (9) 

who, on or after the effective date of this subchapter, is 

determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 

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9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality6 

or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage 

in predatory' sexually violent offenses.8 The term includes an 

individual determined to be a sexually violent predator or similar 

designation where the determination occurred in another 

jurisdiction, a foreign country or by court martial following a 

judicial or administrative determination pursuant to a process 

similar to that under section 9799.24. In addition, the term shall 

include any person convicted between January 23, 2005, and 

December 19, 2012, of any offense set forth in section 

9799.13(3.1) (relating to applicability) determined by a court to 

be a sexually violent predator due to a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that made the person likely to engage in 

predatory sexually violent offenses, which person shall be 

deemed a sexually violent predator under this subchapter.9 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24, after conviction but prior to 

sentencing, a trial court must order an individual convicted of a sexually 

violent offense to be assessed by the SOAB. Cf. Whanger, supra. Once 

6 "Mental abnormality" is defined as "[a] congenital or acquired condition of 

a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a 

manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual 

acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of 

other persons." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

7 "Predatory" is defined as "[a]n act directed at a stranger or at a person 

with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or 

promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization." 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

8 "Sexually violent offense is defined as "[a]n offense specified in section 

9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) as a Tier I, Tier II or 

Tier III sexual offense." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

9 Ruhl was convicted of the offenses listed in section 9799.14(b)(8), section 

9799.14(c)(5), and section 9799.14(d)(8). 

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the SOAB receives the court's order, the administrative director appoints a 

member to conduct an assessment to establish whether the individual should 

be classified as an SVP.1° 

Section 9799.24(b) provides: 

An [SVP] assessment shall include, but not be limited to, an 

examination of the following: 

(1) Facts of the current offense, including: 

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims. 

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means 

necessary to achieve the offense. 

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim. 

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim. 

(v) Age of the victim. 

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual 

cruelty by the individual during the commission of 

the crime. 

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim. 

(2) Prior offense history, including: 

(i) The individual's prior criminal record. 

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior 

sentences. 

(iii) Whether the individual participated in available 

programs for sexual offenders. 

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including: 

(i) Age of the individual. 

(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual. 

(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental 

abnormality. 

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the 

individual's conduct. 

10 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

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(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment 

field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of re -offense. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b) (emphasis added). 

A determination of an individual's SVP status may only be made after 

the SOAB's assessment and hearing before the trial court.11 The proper 

analysis for experts testifying at an SVP hearing is whether the defendants 

satisfy the statutory definition of an SVP, specifically, whether they suffer 

from "a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to 

engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. 

The fact finder is free to reject, accept, or give some weight to admitted 

expert opinion evidence. Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 

1041 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

The question for the trial court determining an individual's SVP status 

"is whether the Commonwealth's evidence, including the Board's 

assessment, shows that the person convicted of a sexually violent offense 

has a mental abnormality or disorder making that person likely to engage in 

predatory sexually violent offenses." Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 

852, 863 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9792 (repealed), as 

amended 2011, Dec. 20, P.L. 446, No. 111, § 12). On appeal of a trial 

court's classification of an individual as an SVP, the function of the Superior 

Court "is one of review, and not of weighing and assessing evidence in the 

11 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e). 

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first instance." Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 223 (Pa. 2006). 

"In conducting sufficiency review, we must consider the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, which prevailed upon the issue at 

trial." Id. at 218 (citation omitted). This Court will reverse a trial court's 

determination of a sexually violent predator status "only if the 

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to 

enable the trial court to determine that each element required by the statute 

has been satisfied." Brooks, supra at 860. 

In the instant case, the Commonwealth presented testimony from 

Robert M. Stein, Ph.D., who conducted Ruhl's SOAB assessment. Dr. Stein 

concluded that Ruhl met the requirements for SVP classification because he 

suffered from a mental abnormality, namely pedophilic disorder, which 

"describes sustained sexual interest in young children," and that he 

exhibited predatory behavior. N.T. SVP Hearing, 09/23/16, at 13-14. Dr. 

Stein described predatory behavior as "either an act directed at a stranger, 

or, if it's a familiar person, anything that either initiates or establishes or 

maintains or promotes sexual victimization." Id. at 13. Here, Dr. Stein 

noted that the evidence supported a finding that Ruhl's multiple acts of 

sexual assault "serve to promote a sexually victimizing relationship with 

each victim." Id. at 13-14. Dr. Stein concluded that there was sufficient 

evidence indicating Ruhl "would re -offend in the future if given unsupervised 

access to young girls." Id. at 14-15. 

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In making his determination, Dr. Stein considered the factors 

enumerated in section 9799.24(b). Dr. Stein based his conclusion on "the 

acts with the children in this case and the history provided to police that 

there was sufficient evidence that [Ruhl] 'has harbored sexual interest in 

children for a period of greater than six months.' Trial Court Opinion, 

12/19/16, at 8 (citing N.T. SVP Hearing, 09/23/16, at 13). 

Ruhl's history, which was based in part on uncharged conduct, is what 

led Dr. Stein to determine Ruhl's behavior was predatory. Dr. Stein relied 

on a police report from T.W., a family member of Ruhl's, regarding an 

incident in 1999 where Ruhl molested her. Ruhl was twenty-one at the time, 

while T.W. was nine. N.T. SVP Hearing, 09/23/16, at 8-9. Even though this 

incident was not prosecuted, Dr. Stein relied on it because during the instant 

investigation, Ruhl told his wife about the incident, the police interviewed 

T.W., who confirmed the incident, and a report made to Childline regarding 

that incident was discovered. Id. at 8-9. Dr. Stein testified that had he not 

considered the uncharged and unproven allegations by victim T.W., the 

period of more than six months would not have applied. Id. at 17. 

At the SVP hearing, Ruhl presented testimony from Timothy P. Foley, 

Ph.D., who reviewed the information given to Dr. Stein and made his own 

report. Dr. Foley analyzed the same factors as Dr. Stein, but concluded that 

Ruhl was not an SVP. Specifically, he testified that his opinion differed from 

Dr. Stein's because of the weight given to the previous allegations in 1999. 

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Dr. Foley did not believe Ruhl had a sustained interest in children to render a 

diagnosis of pedophilic disorder based on the few incidents reported in this 

case over a short period of time. Thus, he could not conclude that Ruhl had 

a mental abnormality. Dr. Foley testified that he did not consider the 

incident in 1999 to make his determination because he would not rely on 

hearsay allegations that did not result in criminal charges in forming his 

decision.12 Ultimately, Dr. Foley concluded that Ruhl was not an SVP 

because he believed Ruhl "was less than likely" to reoffend in the future 

based on his Static -99 score.13 N.T. SVP Hearing, 09/23/16, at 37. 

After careful consideration of the reports of both Dr. Stein and Dr. 

Foley, as well as all of the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court 

concluded that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ruhl was an SVP. The trial 

court gave more weight to Dr. Stein's testimony than Dr. Foley's, as well as 

to Pennsylvania statutory and decisional law, which: 

does not require an actual psychological diagnosis in order for 

there to be a mental abnormality which would classify an 

individual as a Sexually Violent Predator or that any assessment 

tool, such as the Static -99, must be utilized in lieu of clinical 

12 The charges Ruhl plead guilty to occurred between February 2015 to 

November 2015, which is a period of greater than six months. 

13 The Static -99 is an actuarial risk assessment tool that compares an 

individual to 30,000 people on a number of factors and is correlated with 

recidivism percentages over five to ten years. See N.T. SVP Hearing, 

09/23/16, at 11. 

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judgment to determine whether a defendant is less like[ly] to re - offend. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/16, at 10. 

Ruhl alleges that the evidence before the court was not clear and 

convincing as to whether he suffered from a mental abnormality that would 

make him likely to commit predatory sexually violent offenses in the future. 

To support this argument, Ruhl relies on a contradiction in Dr. Stein's 

testimony regarding his reliance on the unproven allegations from 1999 to 

achieve the six-month time period necessary for a medical diagnosis of 

pedophilic disorder. We find Ruhl's claim is meritless. 

The trial court clarified this inconsistency. Dr. Stein explained that his 

response to the cross-examination question at issue was meant to indicate 

that without the six-month timeframe he would not be able to give a medical 

diagnosis of pedophilia. N.T. SVP Hearing, 12/09/16, at 30-31. The term 

"mental abnormality," as used in section 9799.12, however, "is a creation of 

statute and not a medical diagnosis." Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/16, at 11. 

Thus, the trial court and Dr. Stein both resolved that even if the six-month 

period for pedophilic disorder was not met and no consideration was given to 

the unproven allegations from the 1999 incident, the facts of this case still 

support a conclusion that Ruhl has a mental abnormality, as defined by 

statute. 

Ruhl also claims that the trial court erred in relying on Dr. Stein's 

opinion because his opinion was based on the unproven allegations from the 

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1999 incident with T.W., which were not part of the factual basis of his plea. 

In reviewing a challenge to an SVP determination, this Court must "examine 

all of the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth, 'without consideration as 

to the admissibility of that evidence.' Meals, 912 A.2d at 224, fn. 14 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1989)). A 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge to an SVP determination "requires the 

reviewing court to accept the undiminished record of the case in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth." Id. at 218. Furthermore, 

Pennsylvania law makes apparent that in determining SVP status, an 

evaluator is not restricted to the fifteen factors listed in the statute. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b) ("An assessment shall include, but not be limited 

to[...]") (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 

337, 360 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting "[t]he statute governing the SVP 

assessment does not limit the expert's consideration of information only to 

that admitted at trial or at the guilty plea proceedings"). 

Ruhl also claims that other experts in the field would not rely on 

unproven allegations to make an SVP determination. Appellants Brief, at 18. 

In Prendes, this Court held that SOAB expert opinions fall within the 

general rules of expert witnesses. Prendes, 97 A.3d at 360-361. Thus, an 

SOAB expert's opinion may be based on facts or data he or she has been 

made aware of or personally observed as long as experts in the field 

reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the 
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subject. Id. The facts or data the expert used need not be admissible for 

the expert's opinion to be admitted. See Pa.R.E. 702, 703 The SOAB 

expert must also state the facts or data on which his or her opinion is based. 

See Pa.R.E. 705. Thereafter, the rules of evidence place the burden of 

exposing any weaknesses in the expert's opinion on opposing counsel. 

Prendes, 97 A.3d at 361 (citing In re D.Y. 34 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. Super. 

2011)). 

Here, Dr. Stein's report outlines the criteria he used in reaching his 

opinion and the basis for his opinion in accordance with the rules of 

evidence. N.T. SVP Hearing, 12/09/16, at 6. Ruhl argues that because Dr. 

Foley did not rely on the police reports of the non -adjudicated incident, this 

shows that it is not typical for other experts in the field to rely on such data. 

This claim is without merit. Showing that one expert did not rely on such 

data does not prove other experts in the field do not reasonably rely on it. 

Additionally, by agreeing to the introduction of Dr. Stein's report and failing 

to raise any objection to its admission before the trial court, Ruhl waived any 

argument that Dr. Stein's report was improperly based on unproven 

allegations that were not a part of his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. 

Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

The Commonwealth presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient 

to allow the trial court to determine that Ruhl should be classified as an SVP. 

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The trial court did not err by relying on Dr. Stein's opinion, which was based 

in part on uncharged allegations. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court order classifying Ruhl as an SVP. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

/ 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/1/2017 

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