[Cite as State v. Sexton, 2012-Ohio-658.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

 ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

 : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 11-COA-033 

DONALD S. SEXTON : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland Municipal Court, 

Case No. 11-CR-B-00339 

 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 7, 2012

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant: For Appellee: 

 

TIMOTHY E. POTTS DAVID M. HUNTER 

Good & Potts, LLC Acting Assistant Law Director 

10 East Main Street Ashland City Law Director’s Office 

Ashland, OH 44805 1213 East Main Street 

 Ashland, OH 44805 

 
[Cite as State v. Sexton, 2012-Ohio-658.]

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Donald S. Sexton appeals from the July 8, 2011 

judgment entry of the Ashland Municipal Court overruling appellant’s Motion to 

Suppress. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On April 8, 2011, appellant was a passenger in a vehicle which was 

stopped by Officer Aaron Kline of the Ashland Police Division for a cracked 

windshield. Upon identifying the individuals inside the vehicle, Kline discovered that a 

Florida warrant existed for appellant’s arrest for narcotics, and requested that a K-9 

officer be dispatched to the scene of the traffic stop. 

{¶3} A K-9 officer duly arrived and circled the vehicle as appellant and the 

driver remained inside. In the meantime, Kline told the occupants not to move and to 

keep their hands visible. 

{¶4} Kline noticed appellant’s left hand moving slowly, as though he was 

trying to hide something, and ordered him out of the vehicle. As Kline handcuffed 

appellant, he asked him what he was reaching for. Appellant advised that he had a 

baggie of marijuana near his crotch. Kline uncuffed appellant, patted him down, told 

appellant to retrieve the baggie, and then took possession of the baggie and 

marijuana. 

{¶5} Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the motor vehicle 

stop, arguing, in part, that appellant’s statement regarding the baggie of marijuana 

was not voluntary and violated the procedural safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-033 3 

{¶6} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the State presented 

the testimony of Officer Kline. On July 8, 2011, the trial court overruled the Motion to 

Suppress, noting that the patdown of appellant was justified for officer safety, and 

Kline’s inquiry about what appellant was reaching for was a logical extension of the 

patdown. The trial court held that the inquiry was justified, appellant’s response about 

the baggie therefore should not be excluded, and appellant had voluntarily turned over 

the marijuana. 

{¶7} It is from this decision that appellant now appeals. 

{¶8} Appellant raises one Assignment of Error: 

{¶9} “THE ASHLAND MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING 

STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHILE 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS IN CUSTODY, PRIOR TO BEING ISSUED 

MIRANDA WARNINGS, IN RESPONSE TO AN EXPANSIVE, OPEN-ENDED 

QUESTION BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER THAT WOULD BE REASONABLY 

LIKELY TO ELICIT AN INCRIMINATING RESPONSE FROM 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, AS WELL AS EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT 

THEREOF, THEREFORE, IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S FIFTH 

AMENDMENT RIGHTS.” 

{¶10} Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not suppressing his 

statement and the resulting evidence of the baggie of marijuana because he was in 

custody when Kline asked him what he was reaching for, and therefore he should 

have been afforded Miranda protections. We disagree. 
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-033 4 

{¶11} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court’s ruling on 

a motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s findings of 

fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine 

whether the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 

597 N.E.2d 1141(4th Dist.1991); State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 621 N.E.2d 

726 (4th Dist.1993). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the 

appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court 

can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, State v. Williams, 86 

Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141(4th Dist.1993). Finally, assuming the trial court’s 

findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly 

identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue that trial court has incorrectly 

decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing 

this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference 

to the trial court’s conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in 

any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641 N.E.2d 1172 (8th 

Dist.1994), State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906 (4th Dist.1993), 

and Guysinger at 594. 

{¶12} In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact 

and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness 

credibility. Guysinger at 594. Accordingly, an appellate court is bound to accept the 

trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-033 5 

{¶13} Appellant does not contest the trial court’s findings of fact but asserts 

that the court below erred in applying the public safety exception to Miranda to the 

facts of this case. 

{¶14} A defendant has a constitutional right against self-incrimination under 

both the Fifth Amendment to the United State Constitution and Section 10, Article I of 

the Ohio Constitution. In interpreting this right, it has been held that the state may not 

use statements stemming from a custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 

demonstrates the use of certain procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against 

self-incrimination. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. The well-known Miranda warnings 

were thus created. Id.

{¶15} The public safety doctrine is an exception to the Miranda requirement. 

The public safety doctrine excuses compliance with Miranda where exigent 

circumstances exist and where there is an immediate need to protect the general 

public, an individual person, or the officer involved. In these public safety situations, 

there is an overriding need to save a human life, or to rescue persons whose lives are 

in danger. New York v. Quarels, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 

(1984) (“ The doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda do not require that it be applied in all 

its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by 

concern for public safety.”) 

{¶16} In this case, Officer Kline observed appellant’s hand moving after he had 

advised appellant to keep still and to keep his hands visible. Kline then removed 

appellant from the vehicle and cuffed him to ensure that he was not reaching for a 

weapon, simultaneously asking appellant what he was reaching for. Kline’s inquiry 
Ashland County, Case No. 11-COA-033 6 

was reasonably prompted by his concern for officer safety, to which appellant admitted 

possessing the baggie of marijuana. Additionally, the question asked by Officer Kline 

was not designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence. 

{¶17} The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s Motion to Suppress 

because Kline’s inquiry and appellant’s resulting admission fall within the public safety 

exception to Miranda. 

{¶18} The sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶19} The judgment of the Ashland Municipal Court is affirmed. 

By: Delaney, P.J. 

Gwin, J. and 

Hoffman, J. concur. 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 
[Cite as State v. Sexton, 2012-Ohio-658.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

DONALD S. SEXTON : 

 : 

 : Case No. 11-COA-033 

 Defendant-Appellant : 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion on file, the judgment of the 

Ashland Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs assessed to Appellant. 

 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN