IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2013-KA-00831-COA LATANYA BUCKNER APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/16/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF W EILL SR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES RICHARD MULLINS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ROBERT SHULER SMITH NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, ARMED ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS; AND COUNT II, ARMED CARJACKING, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY W ITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED: 09/27/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ. GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Latany a Buckner was c onvicted of arm ed r obbery a n d a r me d carjacking. Buckner appealed her conviction. Due to the death of the court r eporter, there is no f ull and accurate transcription o f Buckner’s trial. As a result, we cannot conduct a m eanin g f ul appellatereview, so we reverse and rem and this case f or a new trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Marcell Cox w as robbed and carjacked by Jami l C hancellor in March 2012. Cox worked a s a barber at E l e g a nt Coif f ures Beauty and B arbershop, located in Jackson, Mississippi. As Cox was leaving work that day , Chancellor held him at gunpoint, took his key s, and entered his car. Cox’s coworker and f r iend, Donnie Patton, cam e to Cox’s def ense by shooting at C hancellor, w hich injured his f a ce. Cha n c e l l o r f

led o n f o ot, but he was quickly f ound and arrested. ¶3. In April 2012, Chancellor gave a statem ent to the police, say i ng that Buckner had

a l l e g e d l y i n s t ructed him to r ob her boss. Buckner also worked at Elegant Coif f ures as a sty list. In the weeks bef

ore the robbery and carjacking, Buckner’s car was stolen f rom the parking lot of E legant C oif f u res. Chancellor alleged that Buckner blam ed her boss f or not having cam eras installed to watch the parking lot. According to Chancellor, Buckner then conspired with him to rob the owner of the shop, Charles I rving, on the day when he would have m oney on him w hen leaving the b a r b e r s h op. Though B uckner and Chancellor apparently

intended to rob Irving, Chancellor robbed Cox, who was the m anager. ¶4. On J

u l y 18, 2012, Buckner and Chancellor w ere indicted f or arm e d robbery and arm ed carjacking. Af

ter seve r a n c e f

or trial, Chancellor was convicted on both counts prior to Buckner’s trial. ¶5. Buck n e r w e nt to trial on March 11-14, 2013. The jury f ound her guilty of both charges, and the trial court sentenced her to two concurrent thirty -y ear sentences. O n March

219, 2013, Buckner f iled a m o tion f

or a judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court subsequently denied her m o tion. ¶6. Buckner then appealed. However, bef o re preparing t he transcript, the court reporter died. Much of the trial ’ s p r oceedings were i m possible to t ranscribe because of the court reporter’s “pen writing” shorthand technique. Portions of t he trial were t ranscribed f rom the available tape recordings, but there is no com plete transcript. ¶7. In an ef

f ort to rem e dy this problem , Buckner f i led a s tatem ent of the evi d ence pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c). The State f iled an objection to her statem ent of the evidence. Af ter m ore tapes and shorthand books w ere given to the trial

c o u r t , B u c k ner supplem e nted her statem e n t of the evidence, and the State o bjected to th e supplem ent. Following a hearing regarding the record, the trial court entered i t s own
statem ent of

the evidence pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e). ¶8. Buckner now asserts m ultiple issues on app e a l

. B e c ause we cannot provide a

m ea n i n g f u l appellate review d

ue to the lack of a com

plete transcript, we are com pelled to

reverse the trial c ourt’s j u dgm ent and rem and the c ase to the trial court f or a new trial. Consequently , we will not address Buckner’s rem aining issues.
ANALYSIS ¶9. Buckner contends that d u e to the lack o f a n accurate and com plete transcript, she has been denied due process and a m e aningf ul appellate review. W e agree. ¶10. “[ W ]hen a def

endant tim ely and properly perf ects an appeal, i t is the d

uty of the court reporter to prepare and f

ile a transcript and to certif y the transcript as an accurate account of

3the proceedings.” W a tts v. State , 717 So. 2d 314, 316 (¶6) ( Miss. 1998) (citing M.R.A.P. 11(c)). The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held that “ no m eaningf u l a p p eal or postconviction proceeding can be had where no t ranscript or equivalent picture o f t h e trial proceedings exists.” Chapman v. State , 167 So. 3d 1170, 1173 (¶9) (Miss. 2015) (citation

om itted). As such, R

ule 10(c) p r ovides the f

ollowing procedure to s upplem ent m issing portions of

a record:
If no stenographic report or transcript of all o r p art of the evi d e n c e or proceedings is available, the appellant m ay prepare a statem ent of t he evidence or proceedings f

rom the best available m eans, including recollect i o n . The statem ent should convey a f a i r , accurate, and com

plete account of what transpired with respect to those issues t hat are the bases of appeal. The statem ent, certif

ied by t he appella n t o r his counsel as a n accurate account of the proceedings, shall be f iled with the clerk of the trial court within 60 day s af ter f i ling the notice of appeal. Upon f iling the statem ent, the appellant shall sim ultaneously serve n otice of the f il i n g o n t h e appellee, accom panied by a short and plain declaration of the issues the appellant i n t e n d s t o present on appeal. I f the appellee objects to the statem ent as f iled, the appellee s hall f

ile objections with the clerk of the trial c ourt within 14 day s af ter service of the notice of the f

i ling o f the statem ent. A ny dif f erences r egarding the statem ent shall be settled as set f

orth in subdivision (e) of

this Rule. ¶11. Here, Buckner f

ollowed the procedure outlined i n Rule 10(c) by subm itting a
statem ent of the evidence to wh i c h t h e S t ate objected. Buckner t hen f iled a supplem ental

statem ent of the evidence. The trial court, taking these statem ents into consideration, as well

as t he a nticipated issues on a ppeal, constructed its own statem ent of the evidence. The trial
court’s statem e nt covers m any of the m issing portions of

the transcript. ¶12. Though the trial court provided a statem ent of the evidence in an ef f ort to f ill in the
gaps l ef t by the m i ssing portions of the transcript, this statem ent m u st constitute a “ suf

f icient equivalent” to t he m i ssing p ortions of th e t r a n s cript in order f or this Court to consider the

4m erits of the claim s raised by Buckner. Chapman , 167 So. 3 d at 1174 (¶12). “ A suf f icient equivalent of the r ecord, a t a m inim um , would include enough m a t erial inf orm ation specif

ic

to the claim s raised f

o r the trial court j udge to f a irly c onsider the m erits of each issue.” Id. Buckner challenges p ortions o f the trial court’ s s t a t e me n t of the evidence, particularly its recollection of Detective E ric Sm ith’s testim ony . But Buckner m u st show that the m issing transcript and inadequate statem ent of the evidence necessitate a reversal. ¶13. “[ W ]hen an appellant is represented b y the sam e counsel at trial a n d on appeal, the appellant ‘is required to show s pecif ic prejudice b y the m issing portions of the record in order to m andate reversal and rem and f or a n ew trial.’” Cox v
. Miss. Dep’t of Corr. , 969 So. 2d 900, 9 04 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting W a tts , 717 So. 2d at 318 (¶10)). However, “when a def

endant is represented on appeal by counsel n ot involved at trial, counsel cannot

rea s o nably be expected to s how specif ic p rejudice.” Chapman , 167 S o. 3d at 1173 (¶9) (citation om itted). Here, Buckner is represented by dif f erent counsel on appeal t han at trial

a n d, a c cordingly , she is not required to show s pecif i c prejudice. E ven i f t his w a s n o t t h e case, this Court f

inds that she has shown prejudice suf f icient to m andate a reversal. ¶14. THE JUDGMENT O F THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IS R EVERSED, AND THIS CASE I S R E M A NDED FOR A NEW TRIA L . A L L COSTS OF T HIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P. J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

5