UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4972

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANA RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (4:10-cr-00025-FL-1)

Submitted: May 31, 2011 Decided: June 22, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research 

and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. 

May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ana Rodriguez appeals from her eighteen-month sentence 

imposed upon revocation of her supervised release. On appeal, 

she asserts that her sentence is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. We affirm.

Rodriguez contends that her sentence was procedurally 

unreasonable for three reasons. First, she argues that the 

court did not provide sufficient reasoning for its sentence.

Second, she maintains that the court relied on a nonmandatory 

Guidelines policy statement to run the violation sentence 

consecutive to the sentence on new criminal conduct alleged in a 

separate North Carolina indictment. And third, Rodriguez 

asserts that the court improperly used the revocation sentence 

to punish her for the new criminal conduct. Rodriguez also 

states on appeal that the sentence imposed exceeded a term of 

imprisonment sufficient but not greater than necessary to 

achieve the purposes of sentencing.

A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable 

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In 

making this determination, the court first considers whether the 

sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry 

takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of 
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fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review 

for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making its review, the court 

“follow[s] generally the procedural and substantive 

considerations that [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original 

sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into 

account the unique nature of supervised release revocation 

sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. 

A sentence imposed upon revocation of release is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence 

imposed upon revocation of release is substantively reasonable 

if the district court stated a proper basis for concluding that 

the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A reviewing court 

should affirm if the sentence is not unreasonable. Id. at 439. 

Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will the court “decide whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable.” Id. “[T]he court ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Id.
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When imposing sentence, the district court must 

provide individualized reasoning:

The sentencing judge should set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority. . . 

. Where the defendant . . . presents nonfrivolous 

reasons for imposing a different sentence than that 

set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge 

should address the party’s arguments and explain why 

he has rejected those arguments.

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The 

Carter rationale applies to revocation hearings; however, “[a] 

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post 

conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 

547 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Here, the district court considered Rodriguez’s 

argument for a concurrent sentence and rejected it. The court 

noted that the decision to run the revocation sentence 

concurrently or consecutively to the sentence for the new 

criminal conduct was within its discretion and that it was 

exercising its discretion to impose a consecutive sentence. 

There is no error on this basis. The court explicitly 

considered the Guidelines range and the § 3553 factors that it 

was permitted to consider. Although Rodriguez argues that her 

sentence punishes her for the new criminal conduct alleged in 

the North Carolina indictment, the court did not make any 
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statements in this regard. This speculative argument does not 

support a procedural sentencing error. As such, we conclude 

that Rodriguez’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.

We next turn to the substantive reasonableness of 

Rodriguez’s sentence. Given the court’s broad discretion, we 

conclude that the reasons stated were substantively sufficient. 

The court rejected Rodriguez’s request for a concurrent sentence

after hearing argument and considering Rodriguez’s concession 

that she continued the cigarette trafficking conspiracy while on 

supervised release. Thus, imposition of the eighteen-month 

sentence for Rodriguez’s violation of supervised release was not 

an abuse of discretion. 

Moreover, Rodriguez faces a heavy burden in 

challenging her sentence. Even if she could establish that her 

sentence was unreasonable, she would still need to show that it 

was plainly unreasonable. A sentence is “plainly unreasonable” 

if it “run[s] afoul of clearly settled law.” Thompson, 595 F.3d 

at 548. Rodriguez has not cited clearly settled law that was 

violated by the district court’s sentence, and the record does 

not reveal any such obvious error.

We therefore affirm the sentence imposed upon 

revocation of supervised release. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED