GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2000 F-22 AIRCRAFT

Development Cost 

Goal Achievable If 

Major Problems Are 

Avoided

GAO/NSIAD-00-68

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Estimates of Performance for Key F-22 Parameters 22

Appendix II: Criteria Established by the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the F-22 Program 23

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 24

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 25

Related GAO Products 26

Tables Table 1: Comparison of Schedules for First Flight Dates of Test

Aircraft 9

Table 2: Comparison of Planned, Current, and Needed F-22 Airframe 

Performance Flight Test Point Accomplishment Rates 11

Table 3: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural 

Integrity Tests 12

Table 4: Comparison of Air Force Planned and Projected Assembly

Hours for Flight Test Aircraft 4003-4009, December 1999 16

Table 5: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters 22

Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above

Budget, January Through December 1999 15

Figure 2: Actual and Planned Contractor Personnel Levels in 1999 16

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280222 Letr

March 14, 2000

Congressional Committees

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1998,1

 we reviewed the Air Force’s engineering and manufacturing 

development program for the F-22 aircraft. The F-22 is an air superiority2

aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries 

(stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges. It has 

integrated aviation electronics (avionics) to greatly improve pilots’ 

awareness of the situation surrounding them. The objectives of the F-22 

development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F-22 

flight test aircraft and 25 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, 

integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the 

support and training systems. The F-22 is being developed under contracts 

with Lockheed Martin Corporation (for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney 

Corporation (for the engine).

For this report, an update to a report we issued in 1999, we assessed the 

extent to which the F-22 development program is meeting its performance, 

schedule, and cost goals.3

 We also determined whether the Air Force is 

likely to complete the development program as planned without exceeding 

the cost limitation established by the act. The act also requires us to certify 

whether we had access to sufficient information to make informed 

judgments on matters covered in this report.

There is a congressional cost limitation for the F-22 development program. 

The limitation is currently $18.880 billion, but Department of Defense 

(DOD) officials said the limitation is being revised and is expected to be 

$20.4 billion, with the amount to officially be announced in May or June 

2000. The revision is mostly to recognize program direction included in the 

fiscal year 2000 appropriation act, which added flight test aircraft to the 

1

 P.L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997).

2

 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by 

land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy. 

3 F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals 

(GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999).
B-280222

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

development program. The Air Force plans to complete the development 

program, which began in 1991, in August 2003. As of December 1999, the 

Air Force had accepted two flight test aircraft and had completed over 500 

flight test hours—about 13 percent of the planned total.

Results in Brief In 1999, the Air Force made progress in demonstrating the F-22’s expected 

performance. The Air Force continues to estimate that by the end of the 

development program, the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals. 

At this time, we have no evidence indicating that the performance 

parameters will not be met. However, the Air Force’s performance 

estimates are based on limited flight test data, computer models, ground 

tests, and analyses and will not be confirmed until flight tests are 

completed. 

While the development program made progress in achieving its schedule 

goals in 1999, some tests and scheduled activities established in 1997 were 

delayed because of continuing problems such as delays in delivery of flight 

test aircraft and in completion of testing of nonflying ground test aircraft. 

Even though the Air Force encountered problems that caused delays in 

completing flight and other test activities, it has not extended the August 

2003 completion date of the development program and therefore may not 

be able to complete development flight tests before the development 

program is scheduled to end. Further, the schedule for completion of 

avionics development appears optimistic. Avionics is being developed in 

segments (blocks), with completion of each segment dependent on 

completion of prior segments. Although it postponed the completion dates 

of the first two avionics software segments from the 1997 schedule, the Air 

Force moved up the completion dates of subsequent segments.

In late 1998, the Air Force identified $667 million in potential cost increases 

that could cause the development program to exceed its cost limitation. By 

December 1999, the Air Force had identified an additional $90 million 

because of higher than expected contractor costs, bringing the total 

potential cost increase to $757 million. Despite these potential cost 

increases, the F-22 development program could still be managed within its 

cost limitation because the Air Force and contractors have identified

$860 million in potential cost offsets. Should further significant cost 

increases materialize, however, the development program may need to be 

scaled back, or other ways may need to be found to reduce the costs. 

Challenges remain in completing the development program within the 

congressional cost limitation and as scheduled. However, the Air Force has 
B-280222

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

identified sufficient cost offsets to more than cover all identified potential 

cost increases and is aggressively managing the program. As a result, we 

are making no recommendations.

In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Defense stated 

that it concurred.

Background Since the beginning of the F-22 development program in 1991, the Air 

Force’s estimated cost to develop the aircraft has increased. Cost trends in 

1995 showed a potential for costs to increase further. Concerned about 

these growing costs, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition established the Joint Estimating Team to estimate the most 

probable costs to complete F-22 development and production. The team 

consisted of personnel from the Air Force, DOD, and private industry. The 

team concluded in 1997 that additional time would be required to complete 

the development program and estimated that costs would increase from 

$17.4 billion to $18.688 billion. The team recommended several changes to 

the development program’s schedule, including slower manufacturing for a 

more efficient transition from development to low-rate initial production 

and an additional 12 months to complete avionics development. The Air 

Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics generally adopted the team’s recommendations to extend the 

development program schedule, including the dates for accomplishing 

interim events.4

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a 

cost limitation of $18.688 billion (an amount that mirrored the team’s 

estimate) for the development program. The act instructed the Secretary of 

the Air Force to adjust the cost limitation for the amounts of increases or 

decreases in costs attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 

1997, and for compliance with changes in federal, state, and local laws 

enacted after September 30, 1997. Since then, the Air Force has adjusted 

the program’s cost limitation to $18.880 billion. DOD officials said the 

limitation will be adjusted again to $20.4 billion in May or June 2000 to 

recognize the program’s fiscal year 2000 legislation, which added flight test 

aircraft to the development program.

4

 For more information on the team’s recommendations, see Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring 

of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).
B-280222

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

For fiscal year 2000, the Air Force requested $1.6 billion for initial 

production of six F-22 aircraft. Both authorization and appropriations acts 

for fiscal year 2000 established further congressional direction for the 

program. The authorization act5

 required that before initial production 

begins, the Secretary of Defense must certify that the test plan is adequate 

for determining whether the F-22 is effective and suitable for its mission, 

and that the development program can be executed within the cost 

limitation. The appropriations act6

 did not approve initial production but 

approved funding for acquisition of additional flight test aircraft with 

research, development, testing, and evaluation funding. The act restricted 

award of a fully funded contract for initial production until (1) the first 

flight of an F-22 with block 37

 avionics software is conducted; (2) the 

Secretary of Defense certifies to congressional defense committees that 

criteria identified in the act for award of initial production contracts have 

been met; and (3) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reports 

on the adequacy of testing to measure and predict the performance of 

avionics systems, stealth characteristics, and weapon delivery systems. 

Extent to Which F-22 

Development Program 

Is Meeting 

Performance Goals

In December 1999, the Air Force estimated that by the time the 

development program ends, the F-22 will have met and in many instances 

exceeded the goals for major performance parameters. These include 

10 parameters on which the Air Force reports regularly to the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. At 

this time, we have no evidence indicating that the performance parameters 

will not be met. However, we observe that the Air Force’s performance 

estimates are based on limited flight test data, computer models, ground 

tests, and analyses. Most ground and flight tests will have to be completed 

before the estimates are confirmed.

Table 5 in appendix I shows the goal for each parameter, the estimated 

performance for each parameter as of December 1999, and the Air Force’s 

latest estimates of the performance expected to be achieved for each 

parameter by the end of the development program. 

5

 P.L.106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999).

6

 P.L.106-79 (Oct. 25, 1999).

7

 Block 3 is the third major avionics software segment, which brings most avionics software 

into an integrated system.
B-280222

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Extent to Which the 

F-22 Development 

Program Is Meeting 

Schedule Goals 

The F-22 development program made progress toward meeting its schedule 

goals in 1999. It carried out flight, engine, and avionics tests and met a 

crucial test requirement deadline. However, the Air Force did not achieve 

several goals established in 1997, when the program was last restructured. 

In particular, the development flight test program has been delayed and 

may not be able to complete the number of flight tests planned before the 

development program is scheduled to end in August 2003, the schedule for 

completion of avionics development appears optimistic, and tests of 

nonflying ground test aircraft are behind schedule. Further delays in 

completing these activities could delay the completion of the development 

program, thereby increasing development costs.

The Air Force has modified many of its detailed schedules, delaying and in 

a few instances, moving up the dates for which various events are 

scheduled to occur. The Air Force said the 1997 schedule is outdated and it 

no longer manages the program to achieve the schedules of events as 

restructured in 1997. They said many events were not achieved as planned 

and the schedules had to be revised to reflect different plans for completing 

development at the same time. Because the program was last restructured 

in 1997 and the congressional cost limitation mirrored the program as 

restructured, we used the cost and schedule plans established in 1997 from 

the team’s study as an analytical baseline in our assessment of cost and 

schedule goals for the F-22 development program.

Progress Made in 1999 Through 1999, the Air Force completed over 500 flight test hours (about 

200 of which were completed in 1998), conducted avionics and engine test 

activities, and began testing the nonflying ground test aircraft. By 

December 1999, the Air Force had met test requirements set by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as a 

prerequisite for acquiring production representative test aircraft approved 

by Congress for fiscal year 2000. The test requirements are included in 

appendix II.

Some of the more notable tests conducted on the F-22 in 1999 included

• supercruise (sustained flight at 11⁄2 times speed of sound without using 

engine devices that consume significant amounts of fuel);

• flight with open weapon bays;

• ability to operate at many different altitudes and speeds in flight zones 

E-2, E-2A, E-3, E-3A, and E-4;
B-280222

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

• flight with thrust vectoring8 in unconventional situations;

• structural (static) tests up to 100 percent of the design limit load on 

critical structure (full requirement is to test the aircraft’s structure to 

150 percent);

• demonstration of the second major F-22 avionics software segment 

aboard a Boeing 757 flying test bed;9

• demonstration that the engine allows the aircraft to fly throughout its 

planned flight regime (engine full flight release); 

• flight up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the maximum required 

(demonstrated in late 1998); and

• complete initial radar cross section testing of a full-scale model.

Flight Test Program May 

Not Be Completed as 

Planned

Information provided by the Air Force indicates that, unless certain 

problems are resolved, a significant percentage of the flight test program 

may not be completed as planned before the development flight tests are 

scheduled to end. The Air Force is experiencing several problems 

executing the flight test program on schedule: (1) deliveries of some test 

aircraft have been delayed by over 8 months, (2) completed test aircraft 

have required more modifications than expected, and (3) the flight test 

program efficiency—the number of test points10 accomplished for each 

flight test hour—has been less than planned. According to an Air Force 

analysis, if these problems persist, 37 to 50 percent of the total planned 

flight test hours would not be completed by the time F-22 development is 

scheduled to be completed. 

The Air Force, in June 1999, reported further delays11 in test aircraft 

deliveries because of additional delays in wing deliveries and repairs

8

 Changing the direction of the thrust generated by the aircraft’s engines to make the aircraft 

more maneuverable.

9

 Tests involved primarily the radar, not the more sophisticated integrated avionics 

capability, which includes communication, navigation, and identification and electronic 

warfare functions.

10 A test point is one of thousands of measurements of the performance of individual 

functions of the aircraft and its components in a range of conditions and flight 

environments.

11 For a description of previous delays in the completion of test aircraft, see F-22 Aircraft: 

Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, 

Mar. 15, 1999).
B-280222

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

needed to the aft (rear) fuselage.12 Table 1 compares the first flight dates of 

test aircraft as planned in 1997 with the first flight dates as planned at the 

time of our last report in March 1999 and the Air Force plan as of June 1999.

Table 1: Comparison of Schedules for First Flight Dates of Test Aircraft

a

Actual date of first flight.

Because of manufacturing problems, the third test aircraft (4003) will be 

delivered over 8 months later than planned in 1997, and the next four flight 

test aircraft will also be delivered late. However, the Air Force has not 

extended the date for completion of the development program. As a result, 

the Air Force now has over 29 fewer flight test months available to 

complete the development flight test program and has lost over 626 flight 

test hours that would have been available had these aircraft been delivered 

on schedule. Flight test time is essential to verify an aircraft’s specific 

features and to reduce the risk of structural or performance problems 

emerging after production begins.

12 In April 1999, an airframe structural strength analysis indicated insufficient strength in a 

panel in the rear of the airframe. Development aircraft are being repaired to provide 

additional structural strength.

Test 

aircraft

First flight dates 

as planned in 

1997

First flight dates 

as planned in 

March 1999

First flight dates 

as planned in 

June 1999

Total delay of

first flight

dates (months)

as of June

1999

4001 May 1997 September 1997a September 1997a 3.37

4002 July 1998 June 1998a June 1998a -0.33

4003 June 1999 November 1999 February 2000 8.17

4004 August 1999 February 2000 May 2000 8.67

4005 January 2000 March 2000 June 2000 5.67

4006 May 2000 May 2000 August 2000 2.73

4007 September 2000 September 2000 October 2000 0.73

4008 February 2001 February 2001 February 2001 0

4009 June 2001 June 2001 June 2001 0

Total 29.01
B-280222

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Furthermore, the June 1999 schedule for conducting first flights of aircraft 

4005 through 4008 may also be overly optimistic. In December 1999 the Air 

Force reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics that delivery of aircraft 4005 through 4008 was 

expected to be further delayed, delaying first flight dates of these aircraft 

by 2 to 3 months. Air Force officials told us that they would have to pay 

overtime labor rates to meet the original schedule and that they are willing 

to accept later delivery to save money.

Air Force officials also told us that one of the major reasons the flight test 

program may not be completed as planned is that the two deployed F-22 

test aircraft have required many more modifications than anticipated since 

flight tests began in September 1997. As a result, these aircraft have not 

been available for the planned amount of flight testing. 

The flight test program has not been as efficient as expected. A gauge of the 

efficiency of flight tests is the number of test points achieved in each flight 

test hour. Flight testing through December 1999 did not achieve test points 

at a sufficient rate to complete the flight test program as planned. At the 

current rate, the development program may not achieve as much as onethird or more of its planned flight test points by the time operational testing 

begins. The program is currently achieving 8.1 test points per flight test 

hour. To complete the program as planned, the Air Force would have to 

increase its rate to 12.5 test points per flight test hour for the remainder of 

the airframe performance portion of the flight test program (see table 2). To 

achieve 12.5 test points per flight hour, the Air Force will have to increase 

the accomplishment rate to a level substantially above the planned 

accomplishment rate of 11.3.
B-280222

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Table 2: Comparison of Planned, Current, and Needed F-22 Airframe Performance 

Flight Test Point Accomplishment Rates

The Air Force maintains that it is managing the flight test program 

aggressively by improving test efficiency, prioritizing work, and reducing 

overall test point requirements without affecting weapon system 

capabilities. However, if the flight test program continues at about its 

current flight test point accomplishment rate, the Air Force will have to 

eliminate over 35 percent of the airframe performance flight test points—in 

other words, it will not be able to complete over one-third of the flight test 

points unless more flight tests hours are flown or flight tests are extended.

Avionics Development Is 

Behind Schedule, 

Remaining Schedule 

Appears Optimistic

In 1997, a study team concluded that avionics development could take as 

much as 12 months longer than planned because of delays in the 

development of major avionics segments, known as blocks (1, 2, 3, and 3.1). 

Completion of each avionics segment depends on completion of prior 

segments. Block 1 was completed13 behind schedule. Currently, block 2 is 

also expected to be completed behind the 1997 schedule, and the majority 

of initial software development tasks related to blocks 3 and 3.1 have been 

delayed between 1 and 14 months behind the 1997 schedule. Although it 

postponed the completion dates for blocks 1 and 2, the Air Force moved up 

the planned completion dates for blocks 3 and 3.1. According to the current 

avionics schedule, the Air Force is planning on blocks 3 and 3.1 being 

completed 5 and 3 months, respectively, earlier than the dates considered 

realistic by the study team. If the Air Force’s current avionics schedule is 

not achieved, additional costs will be incurred to complete avionics 

development. 

Flight test accomplishment 

plans

Flight test

points

Flight test

hours

Flight test point

accomplishment rate

(per flight test hour)

Planned accomplishment 20,125 1,787 11.3

Accomplishment through 

December 1999 4,121 505.7 8.1

Accomplishment needed to 

complete airframe performance 

flight test program as planned 16,004 1,281.3 12.5

13 Completed to the point that it is placed on an aircraft in preparation for flight testing.
B-280222

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

There have also been significant delays in the start of avionics flight tests. 

Flight tests of block 1, which were supposed to begin aboard the fourth test 

aircraft in August 1999, have been delayed until May 2000. At the same 

time, flight tests of block 3 are still planned 5 months earlier than the date 

considered realistic in 1997. 

Testing of Nonflying Ground 

Test Aircraft Continues to 

Be Delayed 

Two major tests of the structural integrity of the F-22’s airframe have been 

delayed significantly. Static testing is designed to ensure the aircraft will 

withstand stresses throughout the aircraft’s flight regime, and fatigue 

testing subjects the aircraft to the structural stresses expected within its 

planned life. These tests are important to reduce the risk of structural 

problems emerging during the production phase. The completion dates for 

these tests have been delayed 13 and 14 months, respectively. Table 3 

shows the delayed completion dates for these tests.

Table 3: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural Integrity 

Tests

Extent to Which the 

F-22 Program Is 

Meeting Cost Goals

The F-22 development program can be managed within the cost limitation 

of $20.4 billion only if the current completion date for the program is not 

extended and if additional cost increases can be managed within the 

current projected surplus. The Air Force and contractors have identified 

initiatives to produce sufficient cost offsets to complete the development 

program within the cost limitation. The Air Force reports that these 

initiatives will total about $860 million, or $103 million more than needed to 

offset the total projected cost growth of $757 million. However, there are 

risks that (1) contractor costs will continue to exceed budgets more than 

expected and (2) overhead costs for the F-22 program will increase 

because sales of the C-130J cargo aircraft, which is manufactured in the 

same plant as the F-22, have been lower than expected, thereby increasing 

overhead costs to the F-22 program. Furthermore, as explained previously, 

there is the possibility that flight tests and the development program itself 

Test 1997 plan March 1999 plan

December 1999 

plan

Total delay

(months)

Static October 1999 February 2000 November 2000 13

Fatigue December 1999 September 2000 February 2001 14
B-280222

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

will be extended if aircraft manufacturing and avionics problems continue 

or if the Air Force is unable to reduce the necessary modifications to test 

aircraft or increase the efficiency of the flight test program. Any of these 

conditions could increase program costs. 

Status of Initiatives In late 1998, the Air Force identified $667 million in potential cost increases 

that could cause the development program to exceed its cost limitation. To 

keep development program costs from exceeding the congressional cost 

limitation, the Air Force and contractors developed a number of cost 

reduction initiatives aimed at offsetting the projected $667 million cost 

increase. The Air Force reported in December 1999 that these initiatives 

were expected to result in $730 million in offsets to the F-22 development 

program cost. These initiatives include the following: 

• Contractor management efficiencies ($360 million). Lockheed Martin 

has developed a number of initiatives to improve the efficiency of 

assembling the F-22 while reducing costs. One of these involves closing 

some contractor laboratories earlier than planned. Another is a 

management approach that emphasizes reduction of unneeded steps in 

the manufacturing process. Air Force officials stated that initiatives 

implemented through November 1999 would achieve an estimated

$328 million of cost savings, but initiatives expected to result in

$32 million of savings have not yet been implemented. 

• Applying management reserve ($180 million). This is essentially an 

accounting adjustment. Management reserve is the balance of funds 

available within the contract price that the contractor has not budgeted 

for planned work. The purpose of management reserve is to provide 

flexibility in managing increases and decreases in budgets and the 

actual costs of completing the planned work. Because the contractor’s 

costs exceeded budgeted amounts, the management reserve balance 

(totaling $180 million) will be used to offset the increased costs. One 

effect of this action will be that the contractor will not have flexibility in 

managing future cost increases. 

• Deferring weapon testing ($140 million). The Air Force deferred 

indefinitely tests of some weapons to be carried externally on the 

aircraft because the F-22’s primary mission is to carry weapons 

internally. Carrying weapons externally would substantially decrease 

the F-22’s stealth capabilities. The deferral reduces F-22 development 

costs but may require the costs, when incurred, to be charged to an 

account different from the one used for F-22 development. 
B-280222

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

• Eliminating all remaining government studies for which funds have 

already been allocated ($50 million) and applying the funds to cost 

increases in other F-22 development program activities.

The Air Force also plans to exempt the F-22 development program from 

contributing to a servicewide research fund, thus freeing up an additional 

$130 million. In testimony before the House Committee on Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 

International Relations, the Air Force announced in December 1999 that it 

would not take funds from the F-22 development program to pay for small 

business innovative research programs intended to benefit the Air Force as 

a whole. The funds are usually taken from most Air Force programs. This 

initiative, however, may require other Air Force programs to make up for 

the loss of research funds that would have been obtained from the F-22 

program.

With $730 million in offsets and an additional $130 million available from 

not contributing to the servicewide research fund, the Air Force has a total 

of $860 million to offset the $757 million in projected cost increases. This 

provides a surplus of as much as $103 million to absorb additional cost 

increases if necessary.

Contractor Costs 

Continuing to Grow More 

Than Projections

Contractor costs continued to increase in 1999 and again exceeded 

available budgets by more than projected. Through 1998, contractor costs 

had exceeded available budgets by a total of $185 million since the Joint 

Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. Lockheed Martin had 

expected its costs for 1999 to exceed the available budget by another 

$40 million for a total of $225 million since the Joint Estimating Team 

program restructure in 1997. But by September 1999, costs for the year 

exceeded the $40 million expected growth, despite the contractor’s 

establishment of plans to limit the cost growth. Through December 1999, 

costs had exceeded available budgets by $80 million in 1999, for a total of 

$265 million since the Joint Estimating Team program restructure in 1997. 

This brings into question the contractor’s ability to control costs enough to 

complete the development program as planned within the cost limitation. 

The Air Force attributes these cost increases to production labor costs, 

manufacturing support and assembly labor cost overruns, and certain types 

of work performed out of sequence. Delayed software deliveries and 

avionics redesign, rework, and supplier overruns also contributed to cost 

increases. The Air Force acknowledges that because of the contractor cost 
B-280222

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

increases in 1999, overall development program costs are likely to grow by 

an additional $90 million above the projected cost growth of $667 million. 

Figure 1 compares actual cost growth with Lockheed Martin’s projections 

from January through December 1999.

Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget, January Through December 1999

Among the factors contributing to higher contractor costs and 

manufacturing problems is the fact that the next four flight test aircraft are 

projected to take more hours than planned to assemble (see table 4). Also, 

except in April, the number of contractor personnel assigned to the 

program was consistently higher than planned for 1999 (see fig. 2). Labor 

costs make up a large portion of total program costs; therefore, taking 

longer than planned to assemble the aircraft and maintaining consistently 

higher personnel levels than planned increases program costs above 

estimates. 
B-280222

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Table 4: Comparison of Air Force Planned and Projected Assembly Hours for Flight 

Test Aircraft 4003-4009, December 1999

Figure 2: Actual and Planned Contractor Personnel Levels in 1999

Potential Impact of C-130J 

Sales on Program

Unexpectedly low sales of the C-130J cargo aircraft produced by Lockheed 

Martin may affect F-22 program costs. The C-130J, the F-22, and several 

other weapon systems are produced or modified at the same Lockheed 

Test 

aircraft

Planned

assembly hours,

December 1999

Projected

assembly hours,

December 1999 Difference

Percent

difference

4003 269,360 274,158 4,798 1.8

4004 232,546 260,471 27,925 12.0

4005 207,342 228,260 20,918 10.1

4006 205,822 220,991 15,169 7.4

4007 201,815 201,815 0 0

4008 197,168 197,168 0 0

4009 175,919 175,919 0 0

3,200

3,400

3,600

3,800

4,000

4,200

4,400

4,600

4,800

5,000

5,200

Actual 5,052 4,809 4,726 4,503 4,576 4,576 4,408 4,416 4,177 3,912 3,641 3,563

Planned 4,568 4,648 4,662 4,528 4,397 4,479 4,209 3,992 3,846 3,490 3,407 3,279

January February March April May June July August September October November December

Total personnel
B-280222

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Martin plant in Marietta, Georgia. Lower C-130J production would mean 

that a larger share of plant overhead costs might have to be absorbed partly 

by the F-22. The assumption had been that 24 or 25 C-130J aircraft would be 

produced each year. However, it now appears the C-130J program will not 

achieve these production rates. Only 19 aircraft were produced in fiscal 

year 1999, and only 17 are estimated to be produced in fiscal year 2000 and 

16 in each of the following 3 fiscal years. The Defense Contract 

Management Command analyzed this new information and concluded that 

this reduction in aircraft production could result in approximately

$45 million in unabsorbed overhead costs per year at the plant. This 

amount would need to be absorbed by all government programs at the 

plant, including possibly the F-22 program. The specific impact of all this 

on the F-22 program has not yet been determined.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with a draft of our report. DOD’s comments are 

reproduced in appendix III. DOD suggested additional technical changes, 

which we incorporated in the report where appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine whether the development program is likely to meet 

performance goals, we analyzed information on the performance of key 

performance parameters and those sub-parameters that are measured. We 

compared performance goals established by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with the Air Force’s 

current estimates of performance in December 1999 and at completion of 

development. The performance parameters are shown in appendix I. 

To determine whether the program is expected to meet schedule goals, we 

reviewed program and avionics schedules and discussed potential changes 

to these schedules with F-22 program officials. We also compared current 

schedules with those developed in 1997 as a result of a study by the Joint 

Estimating Team. We tracked progress in the flight test program, evaluated 

schedule variances in the contractors’ performance management system, 

and compared planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual dates. 

We tracked technical problems in manufacturing and assembling the 

development aircraft.

To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost limitation, we 

examined (1) the extent to which the development program cost goals are 

being met, (2) Air Force plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2001, and 
B-280222

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

(3) consistencies between the program funding plan and the cost 

limitation. We compared the estimated cost at completion of the prime 

contracts with planned amounts, evaluated cost variances identified in the 

contractors’ cost reporting systems, and reviewed the status of initiatives 

designed to avoid cost growth.

To assess the extent to which the F-22 development program was meeting 

its performance, schedule, and cost goals, we required access to current 

information about test results, performance estimates, schedule 

achievements and revisions, and incurred costs. The Air Force and 

contractors gave us access to sufficient information to make informed 

judgments on the matters covered in this report.

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.; the F-22 

System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the 

Defense Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed 

Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Tactical 

Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle, 

Washington. 

We performed our work from April 1999 through February 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Senator John W. 

Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Senator 

Ted Stevens, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations; the Honorable Representative Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Representative Jerry Lewis, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations; the 

Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten 

Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to 

others on request. 
B-280222

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Please contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or Robert D. Murphy at (937) 

258-7904 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
B-280222

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Appendix I

Estimates of Performance for Key F-22 Apendxies

Parameters ApendxiI

Table 5: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters

Key performance 

parameters

Goal (acquisition 

program baseline)

Estimated 

December 1999 

performance

Estimated 

performance at 

completion of 

development 

Supercruise 100 percent 115 percent 115 percent

Acceleration 100 percent 114 percent 114 percent

Maneuverability 100 percent 104 percent 104 percent

Airlift support 

(C-141 equivalents)

8 7.4 7.4

Sortie generation 

rate

100 percent 100 percent 100 percent

Radar cross section 

(front sector only)

100 percent Estimated to meet 

requirements (data 

classified)

Estimated to meet 

requirements (data 

classified)

Mean time between 

maintenance 

(hours)

3.0 3.0 3.0

Payload (missiles) four medium-range, 

two short-range

six medium-range, 

two short-range

six medium-range, 

two short-range

Combat radius 100 percent 123 percent 123 percent

Radar detection 

range

100 percent 117 percent 117 percent
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Appendix II

Criteria Established by the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics for the F-22 Program ApendxiI

Criteria to be completed before approval to award contracts to acquire six 

aircraft for fiscal year 2000 (awarded in Dec. 1999): 

• Demonstrate flight up to 50,000 feet.

• Engine full flight release.

• Conduct weapon bay open testing (initiate data analysis).

• Complete avionics integration laboratory integration of the operational 

flight program block 1.1 software and deliver to manufacturer.

• Complete critical design review for avionics block 3 software.

• Complete aircraft 4004 fuselage, wing, and empennage mate.

• Demonstrate supercruise.

• Release avionics block 2 software to the flying test bed.

• Complete static test up to 100 percent of the design limit load on critical 

structure.

• Conduct flight test operations in zones E-2, E-2A, E-3, E-3A, and E-4.

• Complete initial radar cross section full-scale pole model testing.

• Demonstrate high angle of attack post-stall flight with thrust vectoring.

• Complete aircraft 4003 flight preparation up through installed engine 

runs.

Criteria that are prerequisites for approval to award contracts to begin lowrate initial production (planned for Dec. 2000): 

• Complete first portion of engine initial service release qualification test 

(2,150 total accumulated cycles, 1⁄2 full hot section life).

• Complete air vehicle final production readiness review.

• Complete first flight on flight test aircraft 4003, 4004, 4005, and 4006.

• Complete flight test aircraft 4008 fuselage, wing, and empennage mate.

• Complete static structural testing.

• Complete critical design review for avionics block 3.1 software.

• Complete avionics block 3.0 first flight, initiate testing of block 3.0 

unique functionality.

• Conduct flight testing on flight test aircraft, including initiating radar 

cross section flight testing, initiating high angle of attack testing with 

weapons bay doors open, and initiating separation testing of Air 

Intercept Missile-9 and the Air Intercept Missile-120.

• Initiate fatigue life testing with the goal of completing 40 percent of first 

fatigue life.
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Appendix IV

GAO Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

Acknowledgments Mark Abraham, Marvin E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Edward R. 

Browning, Shirley Johnson, Don M. Springman, and John Van Schaik made 

key contributions to this report.
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-68 F-22 Aircraft

Related GAO Products

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58, Dec. 7, 1999).

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT&E Programs

(GAO/NSIAD-99-233R, Sep. 23, 1999).

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal 

Year 2000 (GAO/OCG-99-26, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and 

Manufacturing Development Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, 

Mar. 17, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 

Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137, Mar. 25, 1998).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals (GAO/NSIAD-98-67, Mar. 10, 1998).

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program

(GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997).

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on 

Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100BR, Feb. 28, 1997).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).

Air Force Embedded Computers (GAO/AIMD-94-177R, Sep. 20, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, 

May 5, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

(707413) Letr
Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of 

reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to 

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit 

cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are 

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and 

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list 

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone 

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain 

these lists.

Orders by Internet:

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, 

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at: 

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, or Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• e-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00