REPORT ON THE MOLDOVAN

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Southern Moldova, the Security Zone, and Gagauzia

March 22, 1998

A Report Prepared by the Staff of

the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

May 1998

COMMISSION ON

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225-1901

EMAIL ADDRESS: CSCE@MAIL.HOUSE.GOV

INTERNET WEB SITE: http://www.house.gov/csce
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

234 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6460

(202) 225-1901

csce@mail.house.gov

http://www.house.gov/csce/

ALFONSE D’AMATO, New York, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Co-Chairman

JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

MATT SALMON, Arizona CONRAD BURNS, Montana

JON CHRISTENSEN, Nebraska OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts HARRY REID, Nevada

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland BOB GRAHAM, Florida

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

Executive Branch

HON. JOHN H. F. SHATTUCK, Department of State

VACANT, Department of Defense

VACANT, Department of Commerce

________________________

Professional Staff

MICHAEL R. HATHAWAY, Chief of Staff

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Deputy Chief of Staff

E. WAYNE MERRY, Senior Advisor

MARIA COLL, Office Administrator

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Communications Director

ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor (Vienna)

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel for International Trade

SANDY LIST, GPO Liaison

KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion

RONALD MCNAMARA, Staff Advisor

MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the

leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. Since then, its membership has

expanded to 55, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. (The

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, has been suspended since 1992, leaving

the number of countries fully participating at 54.) As of January 1, 1995, the formal name of the

Helsinki process was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic

and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, it undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve

conflict within and among the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of permanent

representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various

locations and periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION (CSCE)

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance with the agreements of the OSCE.

The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives, nine

members from the U.S. Senate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and

Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and Senate and rotate

every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff of approximately 15 persons

assists the Commissioners in their work.

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates information on Helsinkirelated topics both to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports

reflecting the views of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing information about the activities of the Helsinki process and events in OSCE participating States.

At the same time, the Commission contributes its views to the general formulation of U.S.

policy on the OSCE and takes part in its execution, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings as well as on certain OSCE bodies. Members of the

Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of

non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from OSCE participating States.
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CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 1

II INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

III. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 3

IV. ELECTION LAW/PROCEDURES ....................................................................................... 4

V. ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS.................................................................................... 5

VI. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................... 7

VII. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 8

APPENDIX: Republic of Moldova Parliamentary Elections: Preliminary Statement

issued 23 March 1998 by the Election Observation Mission ................................................... 9
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This report is based on a Helsinki Commission staff delegation visit to Moldova to observe

the March 22, 1998 parliamentary elections as part of the delegation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA), headquartered in Copenhagen,

Denmark. The OSCEPA delegation was headed by Mr. Markus Aaltonen, Chairman of the Foreign

Affairs Commission of the Finnish Parliament.

The Moldova Election Observers Mission comprised 160 observers from the OSCEPA, the

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Participating states, the OSCE Mission to

Moldova, local Embassies, and NGOs.

Commission staff members Wayne Merry and John Finerty observed the elections in the

Gagauz territory in southern Moldova, and in villages south of the city of Tighina, near the security

zone with Transdniestria, respectively. Mr. Finerty also traveled into Transdniestria to observe the

ability of Moldovan citizens from Transdniestria to vote at polling stations on the right bank of the

Dniestr River, controlled by the Moldovan Government.

The Helsinki Commission thanks Mr. Kare Vollan, on-site coordinator of the OSCE Election Observer Mission and the staff of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights for their support and assistance during the visit, as well as

U.S. Ambassador John Todd Stewart, Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller, Political Officer

Sarge Cheever, and acting Defense Attache Captain Greg Mahoney, US Army.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 On March 22, 1998, Moldova held its second multi-party elections to the 101-member

parliament since achieving independence in August 1991. The Communist Party, which

had been under legal prohibition until 1994, won just over 30 percent of the vote, translating into 40 seats out of 101.

 The results were a rejection by the voters of the previously powerful Agrarian Democrats,

who did not cross the 4 percent threshold required for entry as a party into the new parliament. The election law required that a party/bloc or individual candidate garner 4% of the

votes cast before being eligible for a seat in Parliament. Other big losers were the

protocommunist Socialist-Unity bloc, which had taken second place in the 1994 parliamentary elections.

 Of the fifteen political parties on the ballot, the remaining 61 seats were secured by three

center-right parties: the Party of Democratic Forces (PDF); the Democratic Convention;

and the Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (MDPM).

 There were over sixty independent candidates on the ballot, none of whom broke the 4

percent threshold for entry in the new parliament.

 There were no significant irregularities or major election law violations observed by Commission staff or reported by other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA) observers. A major exception to the OSCEPA judgment was the situation in Transdniestria where neither candidates nor voters had even

close to adequate conditions for exercising their civil rights.

 In a preliminary assessment on March 23, 1998, the elections were judged as a whole,

satisfactory by the Election Observer Mission.

 The new Moldovan parliament opened its session on April 21, 1998. Deputies are elected

for a four year term.

II. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Moldova is located principally between the Prut River on the west and the

Dniestr River to the east, between Romania and Ukraine. A sliver of the country, the left bank or

Transdniestria region extends beyond the Dniestr River and borders on Ukraine. The 4.3 million

population is 65 percent ethnic Romanian, with significant Ukrainian (14 percent) and Russian (13

percent) minorities. Gagauz, Bulgarians, Roma and Jews constitute the bulk of the remainder.

Moldova and Romania were united between World Wars I and II. Following seizure by the

Soviets in World War II, Moldova became a Soviet republic. The parliamentary elections were

the second such multi-party elections held since Moldova achieved independence in August 1991.

The first were held in 1994. (See Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe report, Moldovan Parliamentary Elections, February, 1994.) President Petru Lucinschi was elected in December

1996, replacing President Mircea Snegur, elected in December 1991.
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Although some political and cultural figures in Moldova had earlier pressed for reunification with Romania, such a step does not currently enjoy significant public support. Furthermore,

reunification is strongly opposed by Slavic and other minorities.

In 1991, pro-Soviet forces on the left bank of the Dniestr claimed that their human rights

were being violated by the central government and established a Dniestr Moldova Republic with

the city of Tiraspol as its capital. With the assistance of Russian armed forces left in Transdniestria

after the Soviet collapse, the secessionists consolidated their control over the territory after a brief

but bloody conflict with Moldovan forces in the summer of 1992. Unrecognized by the international community, the DMR government continues to control most of Transdniestria. (For details of the Transdniestrian conflict, see The Transdniestrian Republic: A Case of Politicized Regionalism, Pal Kolsto and Andrei Malgin, Nationality Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998.) An OSCE

mission established in 1993 has been engaged in negotiations between the Moldovan Government

and Transdniestria, with the aim of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to the conflict within

the framework of international law.

Besides the security zone checkpoints manned by Russian, Transdniestrian, and Moldovan soldiers or police, Transdniestrian authorities have set up separate customs check points to

control traffic entering and exiting Transdniestria and Chisinau-controlled Moldova.

Inasmuch as Trandniestrian authorities refused to allow conduct of the elections on territory

under their control, the Moldovan Government designated thirteen polling places on the right bank

near the security zone where Moldovan citizens from Transdniestria could cast their ballots.

Gagauzia

In southern Moldova, a pro-Soviet faction of the Gagauz ethnic minority (approximately

153,000 in the entire republic) had proclaimed a Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic in August

1990, with its capital in the city of Comrat. In 1994, however, Chisinau and Comrat reached a

power sharing agreement that created the Gagauz Autonomous Region (GAR) and granted it significant autonomy, including a separate legislative assembly to deal with strictly regional issues.

(For details of the Gagauz autonomy agreement, see Jeff Chinn and Steven D. Roper, Territorial

Autonomy in Gagauzia, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998.)

The GAR is not a territorially-contiguous entity, but consists of a number of towns and

villages in the vicinity of Comrat that voted for inclusion in the GAR. The Gagauz language is a

Turkic dialect. Few Gagauz speak Moldovan/Romanian, and Russian serves as the public language. The Gagauz are traditionally Orthodox in religion, adhering to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In general, establishment of the Autonomous Region has been a successful case of a tolerant central government policy toward an ethnic minority. Although the Gagauz compromise of

1994 did not specifically address the issue of districting for the Moldovan parliament, the Gagauz

leadership opposed retention of the one-country, one-constituency arrangement and favored instead the creation of distinct election districts representing specific constituencies (See Section IV,

below). They saw the present arrangement as placing the Autonomous Region at a disadvantage in

terms of national representation and inconsistent with the spirit of the compromise.
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III. BACKGROUND

Fifteen political parties and blocs, many with similar sounding names and platforms, as

well as 67 individual candidates, received ballot status. The parties/blocs spanned the economic

spectrum from committed collectivists pledging significant government control of the economy to

rightist free-market advocates. In the background loomed the issue of Moldovas international orientation: toward Europe and the West, or toward the Commonwealth of Independent States and the

East.

In the runup to the 1998 parliamentary elections, there had been considerable realignments

within and among the major parties, as well as the emergence of a powerful and previously-proscribed Communist Party. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the nomenklatura-laden Agrarian

Democrats (PDAM), secured 43 percent of the vote and 56 seats. The second place finisher, with

22 percent of the vote and 28 seats, was the proto-communist Socialist-Unity Party, a predominantly Slavic descendant of the Gorbachev-era Interfront. The moderately Romanian nationalist

and free-market oriented Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals finished third with about 9 percent

and 11 seats; the pro-reunification (with Romania) Christian Democratic Popular Front (CDPF)

was the fourth party to break the 4 percent barrier, with 7.5 percent of the vote and 9 seats.

By 1995, however, the Agrarian Democrats had suffered fissures within its ranks, and defections from the party had reduced its plurality in the parliament to 43 seats. In August 1997,

Parliamentary Chairman and PDAM leader Dmitru Motspan proposed postponing the 1998 parliamentary elections for a year, claiming that elections would polarize society and destablize the

complicated socio-political situation. (Interfax, 26 August 1997)

Meanwhile, former deputy speaker Dumitru Diacov had left PDAM to lead the new Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (MDPM). (For details on the political realignment

in PDAM, see Vlad Socor, Major Political Realignment Looming in Moldova, Prism, Jamestown

Foundation, July 21, 1995.)

President Petru Lucinschi, the most popular of the current Moldovan political figures, was

formally neutral and did not openly endorse any party. However, it was clear that MDPM was

Lucinschis representative, as he had lent the MDPM his ballot symbol, the lark, from his presidential race. The MDPM presented a moderately reformist image, calling for privatization of agriculture and a Western approach to economic reforms, while charting a course between the collectivists on the left and the adherents of the Romanian national identity on the right.

Former President Mircea Snegur was elected in 1991 as a middle-of-the-road reformer opposed to reunification with Romania, but was defeated four years later by then-Chairman of the

Parliament Lucinschi. Snegur subsequently allied his Party of Rebirth and Reconciliation with his

erstwhile bete-noir the CDPF to form the Democratic Convention of Moldova (DCM) bloc in

1996. While the DCM played down the reunification issue, it did support close links with Romania

and a faster pace of integration with Europe, as opposed to association with the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States.
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By 1996, leaders of the Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals, had reorganized into the

Party of Democratic Forces (PDF), with parliament deputy Valery Matei as chairman. The PDF

favors a market economy, and like the DCM, looks to the West instead of the East. Although

identified with, and sympathetic to, the Romanian cultural movement, the PDF was attacked in the

press shortly before the election for allegedly attempting to bring into the parliament a Baptist

with Orthodox votes by not identifying one of its candidates as a leader of the Baptist Church.

(See Boris Vieru, Political Parties and God, Flux, March 6, 1998). Injunctions against the PDF

were reportedly delivered from the pulpit in a number of Orthodox Churches, especially in rural

areas.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party (CP), outlawed for the first three years of Moldovas

independence, re-emerged in 1994 and took advantage of widespread discontent over the countrys

poor economic situation. The CP pledged to bring more order to the economy, crack down on

corruption, and restore the achievements of socialism that had allegedly been lost in the first

years of independence. In addition, the CP called for closer integration with the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS). Unlike the Socialist Unity party, whose economic outlook proscriptions

differed little from the Communists, the latter took a strong position in favor of Moldovan unity.

CP Party leader Vladimir Voronin is an ethnic Moldovan from Transdniestria.

Four individual candidates subsequently bowed out of the race. Sixteen candidates from the

Party of Social and Economic Justice took themselves off the party list in mid-March, claiming that

their leader, Maricica Levitschi forced them to swear on the Bible an oath of everlasting political

fidelity.

IV. ELECTION LAW/PROCEDURES

Logistics

The election law of November 27, 1997, provided the parameters for parliamentary elections, presidential elections, elections to local office, and referenda.

 On the national level, the elections were directed by a nine-member Central Election Committee (CEC) confirmed by the Parliament. Additionally, each party/bloc and candidate was entitled to appoint a member of the CEC with a non-binding consultative vote. The Central Election

Committee is mandated, inter alia, to coordinate the activity of all electoral bodies for the preparation and conduct of elections and distribute funds for conducting the election. Each of Moldovas

45 administrative districts had a District Election Council which oversaw the operations of the

approximately 2,000 local Polling Station Bureaus, i.e., the precinct polling station workers serving an estimated 2,300,000 voters.

As had been the case in 1994, the entire country constituted one single electoral district, i.e.,

deputies were elected at large instead of from particular election districts (Title III, Art. 73, p. 2 of

the election law). The victorious parties/blocs and individuals would divide up seats in the 101-

member parliament according to a proportional system. In order to qualify for any parliamentary

seats, a party/bloc or individual was required to garner 4 percent of the total vote.
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The ballot was a cumbersome, three-page stapled booklet containing a list of parties and

blocs interspersed with the names of the independent candidates. Voters were required to place an

X in the box next to the party, bloc, or candidate they preferred.

Polls were open from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.

Media

The only three television stations that broadcast throughout Moldova are state-owned, and

the government owns and operates several major radio stations. The CEC established a broadcast

schedule of free time for parties/blocs and individuals on state television and radio. Parties/blocs

were accorded twice the amount of timeone and a half hours of television, three hours on radio

as individual candidates.

Parties and candidates could also run paid advertising on state television. There was a report

that state television had offered additional air time at reduced rates to two of the parties expected to

do well in the elections: Democratic Convention and the Prosperous and Democratic Moldova

bloc.

Private media outletselectronic and printwere permitted to accept or reject advertising

as they chose, but were required to report their election related advertising to the CEC. (For a

description of media structures in Moldova, see the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

for 1997, U.S. Department of State.)

Funding

Parties/blocs and candidates were allowed to received contributions from citizens of Moldova

and domestic legal entities (i.e., registered groups). Funds received to finance their campaigns were

placed in bank accounts specified as an electoral account. Financial records were to be disclosed

to a newspaper with country-wide circulation and the CEC. Parties/blocs and candidates were

allowed to receive interest-free loans from the government, the amount of the loan was determined

by the CEC. Contributions by foreign entities or non-citizens of Moldova were prohibited.

V. ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS

Helsinki Commission staff observed polling stations in the Gagauz region and in the Causeni

administrative district south of Tighina, adjacent to the security zone. Two of the polling stations

observed (Nos. 24 and 33, villages of Raskaietsi and Copanca respectively) were among the thirteen designated by the Moldovan Government for voting by Moldovan citizens from Transdniestria,

in addition to registered voters from the precinct itself. The Transdniestria ballot box was maintained separately from the main ballot box. In addition, the Commission observer crossed into

Trandniestria to check on ease of passage for Moldovan citizens who wished to vote on the right

bank.

For the most part, the conduct of both the actual voting and the ballot count was commensurate with generally-accepted OSCE standards. There were no significant irregularities or major

election law violations observed by Commission staff or other OSCEPA/ODIHR observers, although a number of procedural irregularities created the potential for abuse.
6

At the precincts visited there was no sign of intimidation of voters or of local election commission workers, no political agitation or propaganda, and nothing to indicate a citizen could not cast

his ballot freely. No one approached the foreign monitors with complaints about the voting process,

although a number of persons voiced their dissatisfaction about aspects of government policy, the

state of the economy, international affairs, and other issues. In some polling stations a festive atmosphere prevailed, with the village brass band reminding the community of election day. In rural precincts there was considerable crowding in the morning hours, inasmuch as most inhabitants are accustomed to voting early. Later in the day most precincts were fairly quiet with no waiting.

As provided in the election regulations, uniformed police officers were present in the polling stations but did not interfere in the work of the local committees. No attempt to influence voting

was observed. After the polls closed, an officer guarded the door while the count was underway.

Local election officials were generally conscientious and competent, if occasionally harried

by the crush of voters at peak hours. In many cases, they had worked previous elections. They

provided information requested by observers without difficulty, and in most cases were friendly

and cooperative (reflecting, in part, the excellent work of Long-Term Observers from the Office of

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights before the election). So far as the spot observations of

the monitors could determine, regulations were followed in voter registration and ballot issuance.

Domestic monitors were present in all polling stations visited, with full ability to observe

voter registration and the ballot box. The domestic monitors did not participate, but could stand or

sit directly behind the local committee officials to observe the vote count. Some monitors were

overly tolerant of procedural irregularities, declining to challenge shortcomings in the counting

process even when their own parties would have benefitted.

 Family voting and voting outside the booths persisted, particularly at peak voting times,

as the polling stations were simply too small to accommodate the volume of voters. As noted by

other observers in many former Soviet states, elderly persons routinely sought and received assistance from family members, friends, or polling officials in marking their ballots.

 Several observation teamsincluding the Commission observers --noted that some polling station commissions did not take a total count of ballots before dividing them into separate

stacks for parties and individual candidates during the count. The monitors believe these deficiencies were not intended to abuse the accuracy of the count but to hasten the lengthy and laborintensive counting process. In at least one case, some slackening of work quality appeared during

the vote count as the night progressed. Failure to adhere to the legally-mandated procedures eliminated critical safeguards against miscounting or abuse.

In a Gagauz precinct, when the international monitors noted that not all ballots were properly scanned, the chairwoman ordered a second count with emphasis to her coworkers to review the

entire ballot. This review produced a number of invalid ballots (from voters who obviously believed they could vote both for a party and for an individual candidate), although even this recount

was far from thorough due to the casual approach of some of the counters.

Moldovan authorities had arranged for buses to cross into the Slobozia region of

Transdniestria to transport voters to their assigned polling stations in Causeni region. However,
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these buses were stopped by Transdniestrian authorities at the customs checkpoint and not permitted to continue. If people want to come across the bridge and get on the bus, they can, said the

lieutenant colonel in charge of the post. The bus drivers had been instructed to go to the town

centers across the river and pick up voters who might have gathered there. Observers drove to the

town centers, with Transdniestrian security surveillance following. There were no apparent takersunder the circumstances, not a surprise.

At one polling station, voters from Transdniestria who had driven in their own vehicles

reported that they had been stopped by Transdniestrian customs officials and asked their destination. The voters responded that they were on the way to the Sunday morning flea market. Others

reported that their names were recorded, a departure from usual practices, i.e, a car may be stopped

and searched on occasion, but names are not recorded. The same was the case in the Dubasar region

of central Transdniestria where border and customs patrols checked passports of persons travelling to the Moldovan-controlled village of Cochieri taking information from people as to their

destination and purpose of trip. (Nezavisimaya Moldova, March 23, 1998)

Ultimately, only 3,000 Moldovan citizens from Transdniestria managed to take part in the

voting. (Quo Vadis, Moldova? Vlad Socor, Jamestown Daily Report, May 4, 1998)

Anecdotal evidence would indicate that older voters overwhelmingly supported the Communist Party, while many younger persons favored the pro-Lucinschi MDPM. The notable dearth of

young adult males from polling stations was explained time and again by local interlocutors with the

statement, they are all working in Moscow due to the poor state of the Moldovan economy. Reflecting pre-election public opinion polls, resolution of the stalemate with secessionist Transdniestria

the most salient Moldovan issue for the outside worldwas rarely mentioned by voters.

In the event, both regions covered by Commission observers voted heavily for Voronins

Communist Party, with second place going to the MDPM. Conversations during the course of

election day revealed a strong throw the rascals out attitude toward the national capital, reflecting

a widespread belief that much of the political leadership is corrupt, incompetent, or both. Where

did the money go? was a frequent question. However, President Lucinschi himself was often cited

in positive terms.

VI. RESULTS

Unlike the 1994 elections, when the results were announced over two weeks after the elections, 99 percent of the ballots were processed by the evening of the next day. The results of the

elections fulfilled predictions that the voters would winnow the contenders down from fifteen parties/blocs to four or five. Only twenty-seven deputies of the previous parliament were re-elected,

although not necessarily on the same tickets as in 1994. None of the independent candidates, who

were also required to break the 4 percent threshold, managed to win a seat. A court challenge to this

4 percent requirement for individual candidates proved unsuccessful.

With approximately two thirds of the eligible voters taking part in the election, the breakdown was as follows:

The Communist Party received a little more than 30 percent of the vote (40 seats), followed

by the Democratic Convention at slightly less than 20 percent (26 seats), Movement for a Demo-
8

cratic and Prosperous Moldova with 18 percent (24 seats), and the Party of Democratic Forces at

just under 9 percent (11 seats). The other eleven parties and blocs, including the Agrarian Democrats, did not break the 4 percent threshold.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Economics: Despite some positive macroeconomic trends in Moldova, much of the population continues to suffer economic distress. A public opinion poll in March 1998 disclosed that only

19 percent of the electorate had expected to live better a year from that time.....down from 26

percent in February. The Agrarian-Democrats suffered for having presided in the legislative branch

over the economic stagnation of the past four years. The Unity-Socialists were doubly disadvantaged, having had a significant faction in the previous parliament, and also presenting a left wing

economic program similar to that of the Communists. Given the choice between Communists or

neo-Communists, voters on the left clearly preferred the real thing.

Reform: Despite the impressive plurality of the Communist Party on the left, voters on the

whole moved away from statism and neo-statism toward the reformist positions of the three parties

in opposition to the Communists.

Ethnicity: While precise ethnic polling statistics cannot be deduced, it would appear that the

left still commands the loyalty of the Slavic population (approximately 35 percent) and the right is

the province of the ethnic Romanian/Moldovans (approximately 65 percent).

President Lucinschi: President Lucinschis personal popularity apparently helped the MPDM

in the countryside, given a party list that was top heavy with candidates from Chisinau.

The Odd Coupling: The DCM alliance between former foes, President Snegur and the CDPF,

proved to be an astute move, even if only temporarily. Clearly, many voters did not object to the

ideological compromise made by both sides.

Transdniestria: As indicated by both pre-election public opinion polls and anecdotal evidence, the Transdniestria situation was not a major issue with voters. The political party (Speranta)

that made internationalization of the Transdniestria issue a cornerstone of its platform fared poorly.

Consolidation?: In the 1994 parliamentary elections, there were thirteen parties/blocs on

the ballot. Four years later, that number increased by two. In both elections, voters rejected the

smaller organizations and chose to go with prominent personalities and familiar political organizations. However, 24 percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not break the four percent

barrier. Whether future potential candidates attempt to consolidate forces and submerge their individual political ambitions, or whether they prefer to go once more into the breach four years from

now remains to be seen.

Standards: In terms of conduct of the elections themselves, the Moldovan Government has

demonstrated that where it controls the territory it can adequately carry out multi-party elections,

within the constraints of the paper ballot system. Long-term advisors may still play a useful role in

eradicating remaining glitches.
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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 22 MARCH 1998

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

ISSUED ON 23 MARCH 1998

BY THE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

The following statement is based upon the observation of 15 Long Term Observers and

close to 150 Short Term Observers having visited more than 30 % of the polling stations in the

Republic of Moldova.

This is only a preliminary statement. No final assessments can be drawn until the vote count

and verification procedure has been completed, and the results have been published. A comprehensive report will be issued in the coming weeks which will contain more detailed analysis and recommendations.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The election process was as a whole satisfactory. The candidates could compete under generally good conditions, and the voters could freely express their will on election day. A major

exception to this positive assessment was Transnistria, where - due to the lack of de facto control by

the Government of the Republic of Moldova - neither the candidates nor the voters had even close

to adequate conditions for exercising their civil rights.

No significant deficiencies were observed during the pre-election period or on election day.

However, further improvements can be made, in particular with regard to the legal framework, the

voters registers and the media campaign.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Election Observation Mission is pleased to note that a number of the recommendations

issued by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission after the Presidential Elections in 1996

have been worked into the new electoral legislation. A permanent Central Election Commission

has been established, and adjustments have been made to the voting and counting process.

The Parliament has decided on an electoral system including a single constituency covering

the whole country, and with proportional distribution of seats. This system may be appropriate in

countries with no geographically concentrated minorities. However, if there are clear regionally

based minorities, a system that provides for political competition within regions is normally used.

This can be done by dividing the country in a number of constituencies. Complaints have been

raised by representatives from the Gagauzian authorities that the law does not give sufficient possibility for the Gagauzian population to have a political competition between parties within their

Autonomous Territory. It is recommended that this issue be addressed as a matter of priority when

reviewing the election law in view of future elections. This could also be of relevance for Transnistria.

Another issue of controversy has been whether the 4 % threshold was to be applied also to

independent candidates. The Election Observation Mission does not have an opinion on the issue
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as such. However, the Election Observation Mission has emphasised the importance of having

clear and unambiguous rules defined well in advance of the election. After the Parliament had

decided that the threshold was to be applied even for independent candidates, the President filed an

appeal with the Constitutional Court. Unfortunately no decision was taken before election day.

Therefore today it still remains unclear whether the 4 % threshold will apply to the independent

candidates. This may have affected the voters choice.

VOTER AND CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

The Voters Registers are still not accurate. A number of the voters (approximately 6 % of

those actually voting) had to be entered manually into supplemental lists, indicating that they had

not been registered before the elections. This creates some uncertainty with regard to the control of

the voting process.

THE CAMPAIGN

The electoral campaign was conducted in a generally calm manner.

However there were again some instances of inflammatory language during the campaign.

In one case a party was attacked because of the religious faith of one of its candidates, and in

another case Nazi symbols were used to characterise another contestant. Despite such regrettable

incidents, there was an improvement in the general tone of the campaign.

Several issues related to the campaign were solved before the campaign became intense.

The decision that nobody could campaign from a public office reduced the possibility for using

public funds and infrastructure for campaign purposes. It was also clarified that schools could be

used as campaign venues when there are no classes. Some parties complained that they had not

been given access to public buildings for their meetings, but contestants have generally been treated

equally throughout the country in this respect.

MEDIA

The electoral campaign was also widely reflected in the mass media and every electoral

contestant had access to the electronic as well as print media. The State Media gave the contestants

a fairly equal access to present their programmes. At the same time, the state media made little

effort to analyse the content of the campaign, and therefore only contributed in a limited manner to

helping the voters in making their choice.

President Lucinschi appeared on 22 February, 1 March and the day before election on state

TV, where he gave recommendations to voters, although without mentioning party names. If an

elected president expresses his preferences, this should normally be done in a campaigning context

and outside of the time slots allocated to him in his official capacity.

Another major obstacle for voters to build up their mind is the lack of real independent

media in the country.
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ELECTION DAY

The voting and counting on election day was performed in an orderly and professional

manner, and the people involved were committed to their important task. Some areas can still be

improved:

 The design of the ballot paper made the counting process complicated, the stamping of the

ballots less efficient and the annulling of withdrawn candidates cumbersome.

 In many instances all ballot papers were stamped before opening the ballot box, contrarily

to the law and instructions.

 Unauthorised persons were present both during the voting and the count.

 The decision on valid and invalid votes was still too strict in some polling stations, and in at

least one place, the observers were not allowed to check the decision regarding the void

votes.

 The training of party observers should be improved.

 Family voting is still a common practise, in particular in the villages.

 The rules for the re-conciliation of votes were not clear to all Polling Station Bureaus.

In the Polling Station of Varnita, which had been designated for Transnistrian voters, the

arrangements for receiving the number of voters that could be expected were not adequate. There

was little control with arrangements against double voting, but later during the day the situation

was improved by organising the voting tables by alphabet of the voters surname.

TRANSNISTRIA

The region on the left bank of the river Nistru is not under de facto control of the Government of the Republic of Moldova. It was therefore necessary to make arrangements for these elections similar to those established for the 1994 and 1996 elections, by inviting voters to come over to

the right bank to vote in thirteen special polling stations set up for voters who reside in the

Transnistrian region.

This is unfortunately not an adequate arrangement for giving all citizens a possibility to

exercise their right to vote. Under normal circumstances the electorate would be served with between 400 and 500 polling stations. The responsibility for this situation rests squarely with the

Transnistrian authorities.

Based upon an oral agreement made in a meeting on 20 January with the Transnistrian

authorities, and confirmed on the telephone on 9 March, the Central Election Commission organised

buses to cross over to the left bank to bring voters back to the thirteen polling stations. The vast

majority of these buses were on election day prevented by the Transnistrian authorities from crossing over to the left bank, and even regular buses were stopped or delayed in some cases, apparently

as the result of an order originating from the Transnistrian security apparatus. There were also
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reports of intimidation of some Transnistrian voters on election day and the days leading up to it. In

some regular buses, the control of persons went beyond the usual one, and names were recorded.

People told the observers that they were afraid. These serious and deplorable manipulations, which

have to be condemned by the international community, deprived a vast number of voters from

exercising their right to vote.

The turnout in these polling stations was less than half of the turnout during the 1996 Presidential election. Even though the number of eligible voters is uncertain, this represents less than 1-

2 % of the electorate in Transnistria.

Upon invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova of 14

January 1998, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europes Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) established an Election Observation

Mission in Moldova for the 22 March Parliamentary elections.

Mr. Kåre Vollan was appointed by the ODIHR as the On-site Co-ordinator in January,

upon being seconded by the Government of Norway.

Mr. Markus Aaltonen, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Finnish

Parliament, was designated by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office as a Special Co-ordinator to the

Election Observation Mission.

Mr. Dumeni Columberg was appointed Head of the Council of Europe Parliamentary

Assembly delegation.

This statement is based upon the collective findings of observers seconded by 30 countries, by parliamentarians and public officials representing the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Participating states, the OSCE

Mission to Moldova, local Embassies, as well as a number of NGOs. In total, 145 short term

observers and 15 long term observers were deployed throughout the Republic of Moldova.

For more information, please contact the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Telephone (+373 2) 23 76 73 / Facsimile (+373 2) 23 76 69, The OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly, Rådhusstræde 1, DK-1466 Copenhagen K, Denmark, Telephone (+45) 33 32 94 00

/ Facsimile (+45) 33 32 55 05 or The Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, Telephone (+33)

3 88 41 22 88 / Facsimile (+33) 3 88 41 27 76