Filed 3/22/23 Yu v. Broadway Hollywood Homeowners Assn. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

HELEN YU, as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BROADWAY HOLLYWOOD 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B317443

 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 20STCV24864,

 BC553215)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.

Miller Barondess, James Goldman for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

The Judge Law Firm, Stephen M. Levine for Defendant and 

Respondent.

__________________________________
2

An owner of a condominium in a common interest 

development sued the homeowner’s association for declaratory 

relief, alleging the association violated its governing documents 

and applicable statutes by charging fees to third parties for valet 

parking. After a bench trial, the court found the valet fees 

violated no governing document or statute and entered judgment 

for the association. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This is the second lawsuit concerning valet parking at the 

Broadway Hollywood, a 10-story historical building on the corner 

of Hollywood Boulevard and Vine Street in Hollywood, a noted 

tourist destination. 

The Broadway Hollywood was not designed to 

accommodate on-site parking in such a way as to comply with 

modern parking codes. To permit renovation of the building, the 

City of Los Angeles (city) granted a variance to parking codes in a 

conditional use permit (CUP) issued on July 14, 2005. One 

condition for the use permit was that valet service “be made 

available to residents and customers of the facility 24 hours a 

day, seven days a week.” (Italics added.)

The city required that the developer execute and record a 

master covenant that would constitute the developer’s 

“acknowledgment and agreement to comply with all the terms 

and conditions established” in the site plan review approving the 

CUP. The agreement was to “run with the land and be binding 

on any subsequent owners.” The developer recorded the master 

covenant on August 2, 2005.

The Broadway Hollywood Homeowner’s Association (the 

association) adopted this master covenant as one of its “governing 

instruments.” Also included in the governing instruments were 
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the CUP, a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and 

Restrictions (CC&Rs), and a residential handbook.

Section 9.5.1(a) of the CC&Rs stated, in pertinent part: 

“From time to time the Board may determine that all excess 

funds in the Operating Fund be retained by the Association and 

used to reduce the following year’s Regular Assessments.” 

In 2007, the developer entered into a parking agreement 

with a valet service to secure offsite valet parking for a monthly 

fee. However, in 2008, the association ended off-site valet 

parking for visitors to the building. 

By 2013, Helen Yu, the principal of a law firm with an 

office in the Broadway Hollywood, and trustee of the YL Trust, 

which owns the office, had become dissatisfied with the 

association’s parking policy. She sued the association on the 

trust’s behalf, seeking a declaration that the association’s 

parking program violated the CUP by depriving association 

members of the right to make valet parking service available to 

their customers. After a bench trial, the court concluded that the 

association’s parking program failed to comply with the master 

covenant or CUP. 

We affirmed the resulting judgment, holding that the CUP 

and master covenant obligated the association to provide valet 

parking to association members and their customers. (Yu v. 

Broadway Hollywood Homeowners Ass’n (Mar. 7, 2019, B280977, 

B284599) [nonpub. opn.] (Yu v. Broadway I).) We expressed no 

opinion on whether the association could charge a fee for valet 

parking.

On June 18, 2019, the association’s board met to discuss, as 

reflected in the agenda for the meeting, “proposed changes to 

guest parking policy.” On June 26, 2019, the association’s
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members were notified that a valet parking program for 

customers would begin on July 1, 2019. 

On June 28 and July 5, 2019, the association’s board met in

executive session to discuss, as reflected in the agenda, 

“Implementation planning and review of new pilot valet parking 

program for compliance [with the Appellate] Court ruling.” The 

board voted to impose $20 for a half day of valet parking, $40 for 

a full day, and $75 for overnight parking, commencing July 29, 

2019.

On July 16, 2019, the association’s board met to discuss, as 

reflected in the agenda for the meeting, how “Customer valet 

service [was] to be implemented and run according[ to] the 

language of the CUP,” and how businesses wishing to have their 

customers use valet parking would be required to register with 

building management. The minutes reflect that the board 

indicated there would be a cost of $20 for parking for four hours, 

$40 for eight hours, and an $80 maximum per day. 

On July 30, 2019, the association sent a letter to its 

members advising them that valet service would be provided for 

customers at the rate of $20 per four hours with a daily 

maximum of $80.

Yu objected to the new parking policy. 

In September 2019, Yu moved the superior court for an 

order to show cause (OSC) why the association should not be held 

in contempt for violating the judgment in the first lawsuit. The 

court issued the OSC but on November 22, 2019 discharged it, 

finding that any challenge to the association’s parking policy 

would have to proceed by way of a new lawsuit. 

On June 5, 2020, the association’s board met in executive 

session to discuss, as reflected in the agenda, “parking rates.” It 
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decided to lower valet parking rates to $12 for two hours, $20 for 

two to four hours, and $30 for more than four hours.

On July 1, 2020, Yu sued the association, seeking

declaratory relief concerning the enforceability of the 

association’s decision to impose valet parking fees, an injunction 

to prohibit such charges, and restitution of fees already collected. 

As of the date of trial, every resident at the Broadway 

Hollywood paid a monthly valet parking assessment of 

approximately $350 per vehicle. 

Yu’s theory at trial was that the new valet parking policy:

(1) violated Civil Code section 5600, which prohibits a 

homeowners association from imposing an assessment or 

fee that exceeds the amount necessary to defray the costs 

for which it is levied;

(2) violated the association’s governing documents 

because the board gave insufficient notice that fees would 

be imposed for parking; and 

(3) was improper because no governing document 

authorized the imposition of fees for providing valet 

services to customers, as required by the CUP and master 

covenant. 

The court held a virtual bench trial, at which four 

witnesses testified.

Sean Bieber, the association’s general manager, confirmed 

that the association is a nonprofit organization and testified that 

the association based its valet parking rates on a survey of 

properties in the area. Bieber admitted that no board meeting 

agenda specifically identified the imposition of fees as an item of 

discussion, but fees were discussed during the meetings 

themselves. He also admitted that the association incurred no 
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additional costs as a result of providing valet parking to 

customers. 

Bieber testified that the additional revenue generated by 

valet parking reduced the otherwise applicable monthly parking 

assessment to homeowners who used the service. 

Christopher Adoian, the president of Proper Parking, the 

association’s valet service contractor, testified that no additional 

valets, staff, or offsite parking spaces were needed to provide 

valet service to customers of the association’s members. 

Eric Bescher, the association’s president, testified, and 

Bieber confirmed, that no additional costs would be incurred for 

providing valet parking to customers of the Broadway 

Hollywood’s tenants over those associated with providing parking 

to the tenants themselves. For example, Bescher conceded, 

Proper Parking did not increase its contractual fee as a result of 

the decision to provide customer parking. 

Yu testified that association assessments were sufficient to 

cover all parking costs, including all costs relating to valet 

service. 

No evidence at trial indicated that member assessments 

were insufficient to cover all parking-related costs.

No evidence indicated that any board meeting agenda 

mentioned fees imposed for valet parking, except (arguably) the 

agenda for the June 5, 2020, meeting, which mentioned “parking 

rates.”

On August 12, 2021, the trial court issued a proposed 

statement of decision. It concluded that Civil Code section 5600, 

which limits assessments and fees an association may impose, 

applied only to fees imposed on association members, not those 

imposed on third parties such as the members’ customers. The 
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court found that setting the amount of valet parking fees was a 

matter of discretion, and no evidence established that the fees 

imposed by the association were arbitrary or unreasonable.

Yu objected to the proposed statement of decision on 

several grounds, but the court overruled all objections, adopted 

the proposed statement as final, entered judgment in favor of the 

association, and awarded it $77,300.29 in attorney fees. 

DISCUSSION

Yu contends that the association’s imposition of fees for 

valet parking for the members’ customers is improper for three 

reasons.

A. The Parking Fee Does Not Violate Subdivision (a) of 

Civil Code Section 5600

A common interest property development exists where a 

separate property interest is coupled with an interest in a 

common area or membership in an association. 

Common interest developments are governed by the DavisStirling Common Interest Development Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et 

seq.; hereafter the CID Act).

Subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 5600 of the CID Act 

states that a homeowner’s association “shall levy . . . assessments 

sufficient to perform its obligations under the governing 

documents.”1

1 Civil Code section 5600 provides:

“(a) Except as provided in Section 5605, the association 

shall levy regular and special assessments sufficient to perform 

its obligations under the governing documents and this act.

“(b) An association shall not impose or collect an 

assessment or fee that exceeds the amount necessary to defray 

the costs for which it is levied.” 
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Here, the association preliminarily argues, and the trial 

court found, that section 5600 applies only to assessments levied 

on association members, not fees imposed on third parties. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. 

Subdivision (a) of section 5600 states that an association must 

levy assessments sufficient to perform its obligations under the 

governing documents. In Yu v. Broadway I, we held that the 

governing documents obligated the association to provide valet 

parking to association members and their customers. Because 

the statute concerns an association’s obligations, and one of the 

obligations here relates to members’ customers, the statute 

applies to that obligation. 

Therefore, subdivision (a) of section 5600 imposes a duty on

the association to levy assessments sufficient to provide valet 

parking to members’ customers.

Yu contends that valet parking fees charged to customers of 

the association’s members violate subdivision (a) of section 5600

because, Yu argues, valet parking must be financed exclusively 

by member assessments, not third party fees. We disagree.

In construing section 5600, “ ‘ “as with any statute, we 

strive to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” ’ 

[Citations.] ‘Because statutory language “generally provide[s] the 

most reliable indicator” of that intent [citations], we turn to the 

words themselves, giving them their “usual and ordinary 

meanings” and construing them in context [citation].’ [Citation.] 

If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume the 

Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the 

statute governs.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1111.)

Undesignated statutory references will be to the Civil Code.
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Here, the language of section 5600 contains no ambiguity. 

It states only that an association must levy assessments 

sufficient to perform its obligations. It does not state that 

association obligations must be financed exclusively through 

assessments.

This conclusion is bolstered by subdivision (b) of section 

5600, which governs the imposition of an “assessment or fee,” 

thereby implying than an association is permitted to impose fees 

in addition to assessments to perform its obligations.

B. The Parking Fee Does Not Violate Subdivision (b) of 

Civil Code Section 5600

Yu’s real contention concerns the application of subdivision 

(b) of section 5600. She argues that undisputed evidence 

admitted at trial showed that the imposition of valet parking fees 

in this case violated subdivision (b) because they exceeded the 

cost of providing valet parking. We disagree.

Subdivision (b) of section 5600 provides than an association 

“shall not impose . . . an assessment or fee that exceeds the 

amount necessary to defray the costs for which it is levied.”

Here, the evidence at trial established that association 

members were assessed $350 per month for parking.

The evidence also established that customers were charged 

a fee for valet parking.

Finally, the evidence established that valet parking for 

customers resulted in no additional cost.

No direct evidence established that the $350 monthly 

assessment plus parking fees exceeded the amount necessary to 

defray parking costs.

Yu relies on an inference to support her conclusion that in 

this case, assessments plus fees exceeded costs. First, she relies 
10

on her own testimony to the effect that the monthly $350 parking 

assessment covered the cost of valet parking. From this fact and 

the fact that fees were collected, Yu infers the assessment plus 

fees exceeded the cost of valet parking.

But even if we accept this inference, it does not follow that 

the parking fee policy violated subdivision (b) of section 5600 by 

exceeding the amount necessary to fund parking because the 

assessment, to which the fee was added, could change. No 

evidence suggested it could not change, and Bieber testified that 

the additional revenue generated by valet parking reduced the 

otherwise applicable monthly parking assessment.

Therefore, it was possible, given the evidence, that the 

calculus of parking assessment plus parking fees could change by 

reducing the assessment. Yu therefore failed to establish that 

the assessment plus fees exceeded parking costs.

Even if no actual reduction in the monthly parking 

assessment has yet occurred, nothing prevents the association 

from retroactively reducing the assessment to account for 

increased parking revenues resulting from fees charged to third 

parties. On the contrary, the governing documents provided that 

excess funds could be retained by the association and used to 

reduce the following year’s assessments.

Yu argues that the fee schedule imposed by the association 

was based on no reasonable estimate about the expense of valet 

parking. The point is irrelevant. It was Yu’s burden in the first 

instance to show that the monthly parking assessment plus 

parking fees exceeded the amount necessary to defray parking 

costs. As discussed above, she failed to do so. The burden thus 

never shifted to the association to justify its fee schedule as 

reasonable and nonarbitrary.
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C. Notice

Yu contends the board’s decision to impose valet parking 

fees violated “applicable notice requirements.” We disagree.

Section 4920 obligates a homeowners’ association to “give 

notice of the time and place of a board meeting at least four days 

before the meeting” and to provide an “agenda for the meeting.”

Here, evidence at trial established that the board gave at 

least four days notice before its meetings and provided agendas.

Yu argues the June 2019 decision to impose fees for valet 

service was improper because the agenda for the meeting at 

which those fees were discussed did not specifically mention 

parking fees. We disagree. The agenda stated that “proposed 

changes to guest parking policy” would be discussed at the 

meeting. Section 4920 requires no further specificity.

Yu argues for the first time in her reply that the 

association violated the notice provision of section 4360. Because 

this argument appears only in the reply, we deem it forfeited.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover its 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.