UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO: 20-23223-CIV-BLOOM

DRAGAN JANICIJEVIC, on his own 

behalf and on behalf of all other similarly 

situated crew members working aboard 

BAHAMAS PARADISE CRUISE LINE 

vessels

Plaintiff,

v. 

CLASSICA CRUISE OPERATOR, LTD., 

PARADISE CRUISE LINE OPERATOR 

LTD. INC., 

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION

SETTLEMENT AND CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS

Plaintiff is very proud to announce to this Court that the Parties have reached a Global 

settlement with Defendants – after many extensive Zoom and telephonic mediation sessions before 

nationally recognized mediator Rodney Max, Esq. – that will fully resolve this nationwide class 

action. As described below, the settlement is in all respects an excellent one considering the 

inherent risks of litigation. Under the settlement, the Defendants will create a fund of $875,000.00

to resolve this dispute which will be used to make cash payments to crew members for contractual 

wages and any amounts due for time worked without pay. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests entry of 

an Order granting preliminary approval of the class action settlement as set forth in the Parties’ 

Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release (finding that the proposed settlement “falls within 

the range of reasonableness”), preliminarily certifying a nationwide class for settlement purposes, 

and approving notice to all Settlement Class Members for their comment. Defendants dispute the 

factual and legal claims made by Plaintiff, have agreed to the Settlement Class only, but disagree 

that the class could otherwise be certified. See Defendants’ position on the lawsuit in the attached 

Class Action Settlement Agreement Settlement, which is incorporated and adopted herein as if set 

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forth in full for purposes of brevity. See Exhibit 1. Defendants do not oppose the relief sought 

herein based on the Settlement attached hereto. Id.

The Settlement’s benefits were the result of rigorous, arm’s-length negotiations by the 

Parties and their counsel under the direction of a distinguished mediator, Rodney Max, Esq. See

Declaration of Rodney Max dated September 8, 2020 (hereinafter “Max. Decl.”) (attached as 

Exhibit 2). Notice of this Settlement will be disseminated to Class Members via direct mail, email, 

and the establishment of a settlement website. 

Undersigned counsel were well-positioned to evaluate and negotiate this Settlement 

because they have been investigating and litigating seafarer wage claims for many years. Indeed, 

Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina & Winkleman, P.A., are experienced and capable in the field of 

maritime claims for cruise ship passenger and crew member injuries and lost wages owed to crew 

members, including class actions, and have successfully represented claimants in other litigation

of this nearly exact nature. Further, the Moskowitz Law Firm PLLC, is a preeminent class action 

law firm representing plaintiffs against insurance companies, mortgage companies, cruise lines, 

consumer product sellers, and spearheaded the litigation and resolution of over 30 nationwide class 

actions for homeowners against the major mortgage providers in the country. 

Further, the informal discovery in this action included the production of financial data and 

Defendants’ business practices. Despite that work, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class faced 

significant hurdles in litigating their claims to resolution, including potential arbitration. As such, 

and given the immediate and substantial benefits the Settlement will provide, there is no question 

that the Settlement is “within the range of reasonableness” and warrants preliminary approval. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Class Action lawsuit alleged Defendants’ failure to abide its contractual agreements 

with its crewmembers. Plaintiff claimed that pursuant to Plaintiff’s employment contract, 

Defendants are required to pay Plaintiff and the Class two months of wages and/or Basic Pay 

Severance upon Defendants terminating Plaintiff’s employment contracts. When the COVID-19

pandemic halted all sailings, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unilaterally terminated Plaintiff and 

the Class’ employment contract, and forced all crewmembers aboard the ship to sign a document 

stating they were voluntarily staying onboard, without pay, violating their contracts. Plaintiff’s 

claims also include the alleged failure to timely repatriate crew members. Plaintiff claims the crew 

were unnecessarily kept on the ships for months on end, many thousands of miles away from their 

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homes and families. The Defendants contest the factual and legal predicate for the Plaintiff’s 

claims, assert that arbitration would be applicable and that a class would not be susceptible to 

certification. See Exhibit 1. Defendants have, however, agreed to resolve this case to avoid 

protracted and expensive litigation for settlement purposes only. Id.

Based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s previous experience in successfully litigating claims against 

cruise operators, the Parties agreed in August 2020 to commence an early mediation. The Parties 

retained Rodney Max, and began a series of telephonic mediation sessions, including an all-day, 

nine hour Zoom mediation session on August 18, 2020. The Parties could not reach a resolution at 

the August 18th session, but further discussions continued and resulted in the class action 

settlement. 

The Parties fully resolved this matter, after days of discussions, and executed a Term Sheet 

on August 21, 2020. That same day, the Settling Parties announced their settlement and filed a 

joint motion to stay the case while the Settling Parties formalized their Agreement. (ECF No. 12.) 

Pursuant to the joint request to stay, the Court administratively closed this case on August 24, 2020

“without prejudice to the parties to file a settlement agreement for the Court’s consideration and/or 

appropriate dismissal documentation.” (ECF No. 13). The Parties subsequently finalized and 

executed the Agreement. A copy of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1. 

1. The Settlement Terms and Agreement

A. The Proposed Settlement Class 

all seafarer-employees who were employed, worked and were physically present on the 

Cruise Defendants’ vessels Grand Classica and Grand Celebration anytime between 

March 18, 2020 until August 20, 2020. “Seafarer-employees” shall not include Cruise 

Defendants’ corporate officers or corporate directors. 

B. Monetary Relief

The Settlement Agreement affords members of the Settlement Class significant monetary 

relief. (Exhibit 1 at ¶ 2.45.) A settlement fund in the amount of $875,000.00 will be created to 

provide cash payments to Settlement Class Members for contractual wages and for time worked 

without pay. The Settlement Fund will be allocated as follows: first it will be used to pay any 

attorneys’ fee and expense award to Co-Lead Class Counsel and any incentive award to Class 

Representative that are approved by this Court in accordance with the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement, and any and all administrative costs (the result is the “Net Settlement Fund”). The Net 

Settlement Fund will be divided and distributed as individual allocations to the Settlement Class 

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Members who do not opt out. If the Claims Received exceed the Net Settlement Fund, each 

Settlement Class Member shall have their amounts reduced pro rata. Any remaining Net 

Settlement Funds that remain after final approval and distribution to valid and approved class 

members shall revert to Defendants.

C. Release of Claims against Defendants

In exchange for the relief provided by the Settlement, members of the Settlement Class will 

release the Defendants, as well as all other entities included in the definition of “Released Parties” 

set forth in the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 2.36 and 15), from:

Cruise Defendants and any and all of their respective past, present and future parents, 

subsidiaries, affiliated companies, corporations, divisions, joint ventures, and entities 

in which Cruise Defendants have a controlling interest, and any and all of their 

respective past, present and future officers, directors, managers, general and limited 

partners, members, principals, insurers, insureds, employers, employees, consultants, 

independent contractors, shareholders, attorneys, advisors, predecessors, successors, 

associates, related entities, servants, assigns, representatives and agents. 

D. Class Notice

Class notice will be disseminated directly to Class Members via direct mail or email at the 

addresses provided by Defendants’ employment records at their last-known mailing address in the 

forms attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit 2 assuming it is approved by the Court. 

(Id. ¶¶ 2.27 and 7). The notice will be sent within thirty (30) days of the entry of the Preliminary 

Approval Order. (Id. ¶ 7.1). The Settlement Administrator will also establish a website on which 

Settlement Class members may review the Settlement Agreement and its exhibits, and for those 

Class Members who must file a claim, the ability to file a Claim Form online. (Id. ¶ 7.3.). 

Settlement Class Members may opt out or object by following the prescribed process. (Id. ¶ 10).

Due to the fact that there are less than 300 crew members in the Settlement Class, the 

Defendants, and the law firm of Foreman Friedman, P.A., will primarily administrate the settlement 

in good faith, with the participation and oversight of Co-Lead Class Counsel. If Defendants’

written or computer records conflict with information submitted by a claimant, counsel for both 

Parties shall in good faith attempt to resolve the conflict. If unable to do so, the dispute shall be 

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resolved by Rodney Max, Esq. or another mutually agreeable third party whose decision as to that 

claimant shall be final. The costs for such review shall be paid out of the Gross Settlement Fund.

E. Class Counsel’s Fees and Expenses and Named Plaintiff’s Case Contribution Award

The Parties stipulate in the Agreement that The Moskowitz Law Firm PLLC and Lipcon, 

Margulies, Alsina & Winkelman, P.A. will serve as Class Counsel. (Id. ¶ 2.7). Class Counsel’s 

application for attorneys’ fees and expenses for all of the various law firms involved shall not 

exceed 30% of the Settlement Fund, plus expenses. (Id. ¶ 17.1). Defendants will also pay the

named Plaintiff a service award if approved by the Court not to exceed $5,000.00. (Id. ¶ 17.2) 

The Court may consider whether to approve these awards separate and apart from its analysis of 

the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement. (Id. ¶¶ 17.1, 17.2)

G. Final Approval and Objections

Class members may object to the settlement no later than ninety (90) days after the 

Preliminary Approval Order. (Id. ¶ 2.29.) The Motion for Attorneys’ Fees shall be filed within 

seventy-five (75) days after the Preliminary Approval Order (id. ¶ 17.1) and the Parties shall 

respond to any objections no later than 10 days prior to the Final Approval Hearing (id. ¶ 10.7).

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT.

Settlement “has special importance in class actions with their notable uncertainty, 

difficulties of proof, and length. Settlements of complex cases contribute greatly to the efficient 

use of judicial resources, and achieve the speedy resolution of justice[.]” Turner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 

2006 WL 2620275, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006). For these reasons, “[p]ublic policy strongly 

favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.” In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 

493 (11th Cir.1992). “Approval of a class action settlement is a two-step process.” Fresco v. Auto 

Data Direct, Inc., No. 03-cv-61063, 2007 WL 2330895, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2007). 

Preliminary approval is the first step, requiring the Court to “make a preliminary determination on 

the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms.” Id. In the second step, after 

notice to the class and time and opportunity for absent class members to object or otherwise be 

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heard, the court considers whether to grant final approval. Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 2010 WL 

2401149, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010). 

Under Rule 23(e), in weighing a grant of preliminary approval, district courts must 

determine whether “giving notice is justified by the parties' showing that the court will likely be

able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of 

judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B)(i–ii) (emphasis added). Id.

The amended Rule 23(e)(2) requires courts to consider whether:

(a) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class;

(b) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;

(c) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

i. the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

ii. the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the 

class, including the method of processing class-member claims, if 

required;

iii. the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of 

payment; and

iv. any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and

(d) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 

F.R.D. 11, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 

Further, the standard for preliminary approval of a class action settlement is not high—a 

proposed settlement should be preliminarily approved if it falls “within the range of possible 

approval” or if there is “probable cause” to notify the class of the proposed settlement and “to hold 

a full-scale hearing on its fairness[.]” In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 

1384 (D. Md. 1983) (citation omitted). Applying this standard and the new standard of Rule 23, 

this settlement is an excellent one by any measure and should be preliminarily approved. 

A. The Settlement Is the Product of Good Faith, Informed, and Arm’s-Length 

Negotiations among Experienced Counsel.

At the preliminary approval stage, district courts consider whether the proposed settlement 

appears to be “‘the result of informed, good-faith, arms’-length negotiation between the parties 

and their capable and experienced counsel’ and not ‘the result of collusion[.]’” In re Checking 

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Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The settlement terms in 

this case are the product of significant give and take by the settling parties, and were negotiated at 

arm’s length. The Parties participated in mediation sessions with Rodney Max, Esq., a wellrespected mediator with significant experience resolving complex suits. Mr. Max and the Parties 

participated in mediation sessions in August 2020. (Max. Decl. ¶ 12). The very fact of Mr. Max’s 

involvement weighs in favor of preliminary approval. See, e.g., Lobatz v. U.S. In re Educ. Testing 

Serv. Praxis Principles of Learning & Teaching, Grades 7-12 Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619-20 

(E.D. La. 2006) (use of court-appointed special master to oversee mediation evidenced procedural 

fairness of negotiating process); In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 2338151, at *6 

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004) (that “[a] respected and dedicated judicial officer presided over the 

lengthy discussions from which this settlement emerged” belied any suggestion of collusion); 

Poertner v. The Gillette Co., 618 Fed. Appx. 624, 630 (11th Cir. 2015) (settlement achieved only 

after engaging in extensive arms-length negotiations moderated by an experienced mediator belies 

any suggestion of collusion).

The Parties’ extensive negotiations were also informed by considerable investigation and 

informal discovery by Class Counsel. See Lipuma v. Am. Express Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1316–

17 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (approving settlement over objection and concluding that class counsel had 

sufficient information to evaluate fairness of the settlement based on informal discovery); 

Francisco v. Numismatic Guaranty Corp. of Am., 2008 WL 649124, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 

2008) (same); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming that class counsel 

had sufficient information to evaluate the settlement despite “very little formal discovery [being]

conducted and ... no voluminous record in the case”); In re Jiffy Lube Securities Litig., 927 F.2d 

155 (4th Cir.1991) (affirming that plaintiffs were sufficiently informed about the strength of the 

case as a result of evidence obtained through informal discovery); see also Linney v. Cellular 

Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir.1998)) (“in the context of class action settlements, 

‘formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table’ where the parties have sufficient 

information to make an informed decision about settlement.”). Documents were informally 

produced in this litigation and have been carefully reviewed by Class Counsel. In advance of and 

during the mediation, Defendants provided Plaintiff and Class Counsel with additional information 

concerning this Action. 

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B. The Settlement Falls Squarely within the Range of Reasonableness.

As a result of this mediation process, the Settlement provides considerable monetary relief 

to the Settlement Class, and falls well within the range of possible approval. Under Rule 

23(e)(2)(C), the relevant inquiry is whether the proposed settlement affords relief that “‘falls 

within th[e] range of reasonableness, [and] not whether it is the most favorable possible result of 

litigation.’” McWhorter v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2019 WL 9171207 *10 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 

1, 2019) (quoting Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 290, 338 (W.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 

166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Grant, 2019 WL 

367648, at *6; accord Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, L.P. v. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., 212 F.R.D. 400, 409–10 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (Because “[t]he 

determination of whether a settlement is reasonable is not susceptible to mathematical equation 

yielding a particularized sum ... [,] [t]he mere possibility that the class might receive more if the 

case were fully litigated is not a good reason for disapproving the settlement.”).

As described above, this Settlement provides cash payments to affected crew members 

which represent a significant percentage of the potential damages in this action. The Settlement 

is unquestionably within the range.

1. Monetary Relief

The Settlement provides significant monetary benefits. All Settlement Class Members who 

make a claim are eligible for two types of payments. Wage Claim Type 1 claimants will receive 

payment of two (2) months crewmember wages at the rate of pay established by each Settlement 

Class Member’s contract of employment in effect as of March 18, 2020 with the amount of the 

payment based on the salary listed on the employment contract for each Approved Claim. Wage 

Claim Type 2 claimants will receive a payment of $1,000.00 for each Approved Claim for any and 

all work performed on the Cruise Defendants’ vessels during the Claims Period for each Approved 

Claim. (Id. ¶ 4.4). This represents almost a complete recovery for class members. Federal courts 

hold that settlements providing the class with a percentage of the recovery sought in litigation are 

reasonable in light of the attendant risks of litigation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brennan, No. 10-cv4712, 2011 WL 4357376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011) (“[T]here is no reason, at least in theory, why 

a satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of a single 

percent of the potential recovery.”); Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542-43

(S.D. Fla. 1988) (approving recovery of $.20 per share where desired recovery was $3.50 a share 

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because “the fact that a proposed settlement amounts to only a fraction of the possible recovery 

does not mean the settlement is inadequate or unfair”); Fisher Bros., Inc. v. Mueller Brass Co., 

630 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (approving settlement providing recovery of 0.2% of sales). 

“Moreover, when settlement assures immediate payment of substantial amounts to class members, 

even if it means sacrificing speculative payment of a hypothetically larger amount years down the 

road, settlement is reasonable[.]” Johnson, 2011 WL 4357376, at *12. 

Plaintiff and the Settlement Class faced significant hurdles in litigating their claims to 

resolution, including overcoming Defendants’ defenses, including potential dismissal of these 

claims in favor of arbitration. Each Class Member stands to recover a significant percentage of the 

amounts they would be entitled to as a result of the settlement. The Settlement’s monetary recovery 

falls well within the range of reasonableness.

C. The Settlement Saves Plaintiff and the Settlement Class from Considerable 

Litigation Hurdles.

Any evaluation of the settlement benefits must be tempered by the recognition that any 

compromise involves concessions by the Parties. Indeed, “the very essence of a settlement is 

compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Officers for Civil 

Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Had litigation 

continued, Plaintiff and Settlement Class members would have risked not prevailing on their 

claims, or having to proceed in arbitration. 

D. Class Counsel Believes the Settlement Is Reasonable.

Significant weight should be attributed to the belief of experienced counsel that the 

negotiated settlement is in the best interest of the class. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings 

in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 659, 666 (D. Minn. 1974) (recommendation of 

experienced counsel is entitled to great weight); DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1178 

(8th Cir. 1995) (“The views of the parties to the settlement must ... be considered.”). Class 

Counsel are experienced and capable in the field of maritime claims for cruise ship passenger and 

crewmember injuries and lost wages owed to crewmembers, including class actions, and have 

successfully represented claimants in other litigation of this nearly exact nature. Further, Class 

Counsel has also been appointed Lead or Co-Lead Class Counsel in dozens of class actions 

representing plaintiffs against insurance companies, mortgage companies, cruise lines, consumer 

product sellers, and spearheaded the litigation and resolution of over 30 nationwide class actions 

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for homeowners against the major mortgage providers in the country. Based on this experience, 

and decades more with class action lawsuits, it is Class Counsel’s informed opinion that, given the 

uncertainty and expense of pursuing these claims through trial, the settlement is fair, reasonable, 

adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class. 

E. No Additional Agreements Required to Be Identified.

The Parties represent that there are no agreements required to be identified under Rule 

23(e)(3). 

II. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS.

“It is well established that a class may be certified solely for purposes of settlement [if] a 

settlement is reached before a litigated determination of the class certification issue.” In re 

Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. 654,659 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (brackets in original). 

“In deciding whether to provisionally certify a settlement class, a court must consider the same 

factors that it would consider in connection with a proposed litigation class,” save manageability, 

“since the settlement, if approved, would obviate the need for a trial.” Id. 

A. The Settlement Class Meets the Four Requirements of Rule 23(a). 

The policies underlying the class action rule dictate that Rule 23(a) should be liberally 

construed. See Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 168 F.R.D. 315, 323 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Plaintiff satisfies

all four requirements of Rule 23 (a) as set forth below.

1. The Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.

Rule 23(a)(1) requires Plaintiff to show that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder 

of all members would be impracticable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “While there is no fixed rule, 

generally a class size [of] less than twenty-one is inadequate, while a class size of more than forty 

is adequate.” Williams, 280 F.R.D. 665, 671-72 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Cheney v. Cyberguard 

Corp., 213 F.R.D. 484,489-90 (S.D. Fla. 2003)); see, e.g., Anderson v. Bank of S., N.A., 118 F.R.D. 

136, 145 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (“[T]he size of the class and geographic location of the would-be class 

members are relevant to any consideration of practicality.”); Checking Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. 

at 671. The proposed class in this case, which includes hundreds of crewmembers, well exceeds 

the minimum threshold. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). 

The numerosity requirement is satisfied here.

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2. Questions of Law and Fact Are Common to All Settlement Class Members.

Rule 23(a)(2) requires class action plaintiffs to identify questions of law or fact common 

to the proposed class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “The threshold for commonality is not high.” 

Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 490. Commonality requires a showing that the class members’ claims 

“depend on a common contention” and that the class members have “suffered the same injury.” 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). “[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), 

even a single [common] question will do[,]” id. at 2556 (brackets in original), and “where a 

common scheme of conduct has been alleged, the commonality requirement should be satisfied.” 

Checking Overdraft, 275 F.R.D. at 673-74.

Plaintiff’s claims here depend on the common claims for damages under U.S. General 

Maritime Law and/or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, the Seaman’s Wage Act, (46 U.S.C. 

§10313, 46 U.S.C. § 10504), for breach of the Plaintiff and Settlement Class Members’ 

employment contracts, for false imprisonment, and for negligent misrepresentation. All members 

of the putative class were injured if at all in the same manner. See Williams, 280 F.R.D. at 672

(finding commonality where “all members of the propose class were injured in the same manner, 

namely by being charged inflated premiums for the FPI”). Thus, while only one question of law 

or fact is required, many common questions capable of class-wide resolution arise here, including 

whether Defendants violated the above statutes, contracts, and common laws for all crew members 

These issues satisfy commonality. See, e.g., id. at 672 (“The determination of the truth or falsity 

of the Plaintiffs’ allegations that Wells Fargo and QBE engaged in a scheme to force-place 

insurance with inflated and excessive premiums will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 

of each one of the claims in one stroke.”). 

3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of Those of the Settlement Class.

Rule 23(a)(3) requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that his claims are typical of those held by 

the proposed class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality and commonality are related, with 

commonality referring to “the group characteristics of the class as a whole” and typicality focusing 

on the named plaintiff’s claims in relation to the class. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 

Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 686 n.23 (S.D. Fla. 2004). “Any atypicality or conflict between the named 

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Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the class must be clear and must be such that the interests of the 

class are placed in significant jeopardy.” Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 491.

Plaintiff’s claims in this case arise from the same alleged course of conduct and are based 

on the same legal theories as those brought on behalf of the proposed class. Plaintiff and every 

class member were not paid their contractual wages, or were forced to work without pay. As a 

result, Plaintiff and every other member of the proposed class were damaged if at all in the same 

way. Plaintiff and the class seek redress through common Federal statutory claims and breach of 

contract. All of these questions are common to the entire class.

4. Plaintiff and Their Counsel Are Adequate Representatives.

To satisfy Rule 23(a)(4), the representative parties must “fairly and adequately represent 

the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requirement is satisfied when the class 

representatives have (1) no interests antagonistic to the rest of the class and (2) counsel who are 

“qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” Cheney, 213 F.R.D. 

at 495. “Adequate representation is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence.” Association 

for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 464 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 

a. Plaintiff Does Not Have Interests Antagonistic to Settlement Class Members.

Adequacy exists where a class representative shares common interests with the class and 

seeks the same type of relief for himself and the settlement class members. See Tefel v. Reno, 972 

F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Kreuzfeld A.G. v. Carnehammar, 138 F.R.D. 594, 600 (S.D. 

Fla. 1991). Here, Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those held by the Settlement Class. The 

class definition includes only those who were subject to Defendants’ conduct. (Ex. A ¶ 2.43). All

class members were treated in the same manner. (Id.) Thus, the critical issues in this case—the 

existence, implementation, and lawfulness of Defendants’ conduct—are common issues. Plaintiff

and absent class members share a common goal: to recover the amounts owed to them as a result 

of Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)(4). See Williams, 280 F.R. D. at 673-74.

b. Settlement Class Counsel Are Qualified and Experienced.

The attorneys who seek to represent the Settlement Class in this case are highly qualified 

to serve as class counsel, have been investigating these claims for months, and have served as lead 

and co-lead counsel in some of the largest class actions in the country, as well as insurance-related 

complex cases. The law firms that Plaintiff seeks to name as Class Counsel in this action are

Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina & Winkleman, P.A. and The Moskowitz Law Firm, PLLC. Class 

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Counsel has successfully prosecuted numerous maritime claims, insurance and consumer class 

actions and are well respected in the community that they serve. A copy of Class Counsels’ Firm 

Resumes are attached hereto as Composite Exhibit 3.

B. The Settlement Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

In addition to meeting the four requirements of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff seeking class 

certification must satisfy one subsection of Rule 23(b). Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 489. Plaintiff here 

seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), under which certification is appropriate if (1) common 

questions of law or fact predominate over those affecting only individual class members and (2) 

class treatment is superior to other adjudication methods. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The latter 

question implicates manageability concerns, which do not bear on certification of a settlement 

class. See Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. at 659.

Here, “irrespective of the individual issues which may arise, the focus of the litigation 

concerns the alleged common course of unfair conduct embodied in [Defendants’] scheme to” 

deprive the Settlement Class of its wages and other damages. Id. at 676. Proof of the scheme may 

be made by evidence that would remain the same regardless of class size or composition. Common 

issues would predominate over any individual issue. 

Moreover, giving all class members the option to accept a comprehensive resolution of the 

their claims in this action or opt out of it would be far superior to litigating each of their claims 

separately, especially since the actual damage amounts for each individual class member are low

Williams, 280 F.R.D. at 675. Accordingly, the Court should certify the proposed class. 

III. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1) provides that the “court must direct notice in a 

reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Class notice should 

be “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 

of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

The Parties’ proposed notice plan readily meets this standard. The Settlement Agreement 

provides that the Settlement Administrator shall distribute class notice and claim forms by firstclass mail in the form attached as Exhibit 2 to the Settlement Agreement to all identifiable class 

members no more than thirty (30) days after the Court enters the Preliminary Approval Order. (Ex. 

A ¶ 7.1). The Settlement also provides for an internet website through which Settlement Class 

Case 1:20-cv-23223-BB Document 17 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2020 Page 13 of 16
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Members can acquire information, and allows those class members that have to file claims to 

submit claims online. (Id. ¶ 7.0.). 

The notice itself also satisfies the requirements of the Federal Rules. It provides, among 

other things, a clear definition of the Settlement Class; a description of the underlying lawsuit and 

the material terms of the Settlement; instructions as to how Settlement Class members may make a 

claim and determine whether they are eligible to do so; an explanation of objection and opt-out 

rights and a date by which Settlement Class Members may opt out, and information regarding how 

to do so; instructions as to how to object to the Settlement and an objection deadline; the date on 

which the Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing; and the internet address and toll-free number 

from which class members may obtain additional information about the Settlement and its terms. 

(Id. at Ex. 2). 

IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT THE UNDERSIGNED FIRMS AS 

CLASS COUNSEL.

The Parties have defined Class Counsel to include the undersigned law firms. (Ex. A ¶ 

2.6). Plaintiff and the undersigned now move the Court to appoint these firms as Settlement Class 

Counsel. Undersigned counsel have significant experience litigating these cases, as well as other 

nationwide class actions.

V. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARY ENJOIN PARALLEL 

PROCEEDINGS.

Finally, the Court should enter an order preliminarily enjoining all Settlement Class 

Members who do not execute and timely file a Request for Exclusion from the Settlement Class 

from filing, prosecuting, maintaining or continuing litigation in federal or state court based on or 

related to the claims or facts alleged in the this Action. This type of injunctive relief is commonly 

granted in preliminary approvals of class action settlements pursuant to the All Writs Act. 

The All Writs Act authorizes the Court to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 

of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1651(a). The Act empowers the Court to enjoin “conduct which, left unchecked, would have had 

the practical effect of diminishing the court’s power to bring the litigation to its natural 

conclusion.” In re Am. Online Spin-Off Accounts Litig., No. CV 03-6971-RSWL, 2005 WL 

5747463, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2005) (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 

1359 (5th Cir. 1978)). 

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All individual actions that may be brought by Settlement Class Members who do not opt 

out should therefore be enjoined pending the Court’s determination whether to finally approve the 

proposed Settlement. Accordingly, pursuant to its authority under the All-Writs Act, the Court 

should include in its order a preliminarily injunction against parallel proceedings pending the 

settlement approval process. See, e.g., Shelby v. Two Jinns, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-03794-AB-GJS, 2017 

WL 6347370, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2017) (entering an injunction against asserting released 

claims pending settlement approval and concluding that it is “necessary to protect and effectuate 

the settlement, this Order, and the Court’s flexibility and authority to effectuate this settlement and 

to enter judgment when appropriate, and is ordered in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction and to protect 

its judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651(a)”).

VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING.

Should the Court grant this Motion, Plaintiff will file their motion for final approval of the 

settlement on a date set by the Court. Plaintiff requests that the Court schedule the Final Approval 

Hearing no less than 120 days after entry of the order preliminarily approving the settlement.

CONCLUSION

The Court should enter an order granting preliminary approval of the settlement. 

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 2020. 

By: /s/ Adam M. Moskowitz

Adam Moskowitz, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 984280 

adam@moskowitz-law.com 

Howard M. Bushman, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 0364230

howard@moskowitz-law.com 

Joseph M. Kaye, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 117520 

joseph@moskowitz-law.com 

THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC 

2 Alhambra Plaza 

Suite 601 

Coral Gables, FL 33134 

Telephone: 305 740-1423

-andBy:/s/ Michael Winkleman 

Case 1:20-cv-23223-BB Document 17 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/11/2020 Page 15 of 16
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Michael A. Winkleman 

Florida Bar No. 36719 

mwinkleman@lipcon.com

Daniel W. Grammes 

Florida Bar No. 1010507 

dgrammes@lipcon.com

Andrew S. Freedman 

Florida Bar No. 091087 

afreedman@lipcon.com

Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina & Winkleman, P.A. 

One Biscayne Tower, Suite 1776 

2 South Biscayne Boulevard 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone No.: (305) 373-3016 

Facsimile No.: (305) 373-6204 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was filed electronically via CM/ECF on 

the 11th day of September, 2020 and served by the same means on all counsel of record.

By: /s/ Adam Moskowitz

 

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