T he P o st

- C o nv ic tio n P roce d ure Ac t was ado p t ed by t he T enness ee G eneral A ss em b l y i n 19 6 7 upo n t he 1
r ec ommen dat i on s of

t h e T en n es s ee La w Rev i s i on Commi s s i on . T h e pu r pos es of t h e ac t , i n r ec og n i t i on of t h e n ee d f

or an ad eq ua t e p ro ce d ure f o r t he co nsid era t i o n o f

co nsti t uti o na l claim s, are as f o l l o w s: ( a) T o provi de a post

- convi ct i on proces s at l eas t as broad i n s cope as ex i s t i ng f eder al s t at ut es un der wh i ch c l ai ms of

v i ol at i on of

c on s t i t u t i on al r i g h t a s s er t ed by per s on s con v i ct ed by t h e s t at e cou r t s of T en ne ssee are d eterm i ne d i n fed era l co urts und er the fed era l ha b ea s co rp us st atutes. ( b) T o pr ov i de a pr oce du r e i n s u ch c as es t h at i s s wi f t a n d s i mpl e an d e as i l y i n v ok ed. (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE SUP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE June 4, 200 8 S es sio n 

### TERRANCE N. CARTER v . RICKEY BELL App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 3766 Monte Watkins, Ju dge

No. M2006- 01363-SC-R11- HC - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2009

GA RY R

. W AD E , J

. , d i s s en t i n g. Irespe ctfully

dissent. In my view, our leg islature has grante d trial courts with broad statutory a uth or ity to t ra ns fe r c la ims fi le d in

the wrongjurisd ic tio n und e r t he re me dia l pr ov isi on s f

ound in Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 1 6- 1- 11 6 ( Sup p. 20 08 ). Mo re ov e r, thi s Co ur t ha s tr a dit ion a lly e n c o ur a g e d

th e d i s p o s i t i o n o f c o l o r a

b l e c l a i m s o n th e m e r i t s r ath e r th ano np r o c e d

ur a l gr o un d s . In conseque nce, I

would reve rse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appe als and rema nd to the trial court for a tra nsfer of the claim to the cour

t havingjurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Procedure Ac t. Bac kgr ound Th e re l ev an t facts are as stated by the majority . On August 29, 2005, the Petiti oner w as convicted of

possession of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial c ourt imposed a s e v e nye ar

s e nt e n c e . N i n e m o nth s l at e r , th e P e t i t i o n e r , wh i l e i n c ar c e r at e d i nD av i d s o nC o unty, filed a pro se petition for writ of ha beas c orpus in the Davidso n C o u n t y C ri minal Court. The Petitioner contende d that he had been illega lly sentenc ed to seven year s, when, a s a Rang e I offe nder for a class C felony , he only

qualified for

a ter m o f b et wee n three and six year s. See State v. Bur khart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). He further alleg ed that his guilty

plea wa s “not knowing ly

and voluntarily

enter ed,” a

claim of c onstitut ional violation subject t o revie w under the Pos t- Convic tio n Pr oc e dure Ac t of 19 67

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 03 (2 00 3) ; se e , e .g ., Ho we ll

1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1 (c) T o pro vi d e f

o r f ul l f act he ari ngs t o resolve d i sput ed fact ual is sues , a nd for com p i l at i o n of a reco rd t o en ab l e fed era l co urts t o d eterm i ne t he suf f i cien cy o f

t ho se he aring s. ( d) T o provi de f

or deci s i ons s uppo r t ed by opi ni ons , f act f i ndi ngs a nd c o ncl us i ons of l aw, wh i ch d i sclo se the g ro un d s o f d ec i si o n a nd reso l uti o n o f d i sp uted f

ac t s. G ary L. A nd ers o n, P o st

- C o nvi ct i o n R e lief in T enness ee– Fo urt een Y ears o f Jud i ci al A d m i ni st rat i o n U nd er t he P o st

- C o nvi ct i o n P roce d ure Ac t , 4 8 T enn. L

. R ev. 6 0 5 , 6 0 9

- 1 0 (1 9 8 1 ) (quo t i ng F. D enni s, A P o st

- C o nvi ct i o n P roce d ure A ct f o r T enness ee (Fi rs t D raf t ) § 1 0 2 (2) (T enn. Stat e A rchi ves) ).
In A nd ers o n v. Stat e, N o . M 2 0 0 4

- 0 2 1 1 6

- C C A

- R 3

- H C , 2 0 0 6 W L 73 9 8 8 5 (T enn. C ri m . A p p . M ar. 23 , 20 0 6 ), 2 t he C our t of

Cri mi nal Ap peal s cons i dere d t he propri et y of a p ro se p et i t i o n for w ri t o f ha b eas co rpus rel i ef

fi l ed in W ayne C o u n ty, the p la c e o f t h e p e tit io n e r M a n n y T . A n d e rs o n ’s im p riso n m e n t. A n d e rs o n a lleg e d th a t h e h a d no t kn o w ing ly and v ol un t ar i l y en t er ed a pl ea whi ch corr es po nded t o t he j udgment of convi ct i on. Af t er conc l udi ng t hat Anders on was not en t i t l ed t o habea s co r pus rel i ef , Judge D avi d G

. H ay es , wri t i ng f or t he C our t of

Cri mi nal Ap peal s , conf i r med t hat h a b e a s c o r p u s re lief w a s n o t ap p ro p ria te b u t re m a n d e d the p ro c e e d ing to W a yn e C o u n ty t o tra n sfe r th e p e tit io n to D av i ds on Coun t y Cr i mi n al Cour t , t h e cou n t y of c on v i ct i on , f

or c on s i der at i on as a c ol or abl e cl ai m f or pos t

- con v i ct i on (c o n tinu e d ...) -2- v. State, 185 S.W .3d 319, 330-37 (Te nn. 2006) (c onsideringchalleng e to knowingand volunt ary natur e of ple a in p os t- c onvi cti on pro c e e din g s) . H e sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d th e tr ia l c ourt

to “pr omp tly rema nd [the] ca s e t o the Criminal Court of Maury County [the plac e of his convic tion] . . . for appropriate disposition.” On J une 8, 2006, the trial court summ arily dismiss ed the pe tition, findi ngthat the Petitioner had fa iled to establish that his conviction or sentenc e wa s “voi d o r illeg al,” grounds for ha beas c or pu s r e lie f. Se e Ho g an v . M il ls, 16 8 S. W.3 d 7 53 , 7 55 (T e nn . 2 00 5) . T he tr ia l c ourt did no t, h o w e v e r , a d dr e s s th e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s r e qu e s t t o r e m an d th e c a s e t o th e C r i m i n a l C o urt o f M a ur y C o unty. After war d, the Petitioner filed a timely appea l, but he did not file a sepa rate post-conviction petition in Maury County Criminal Court withi n the one year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ) (2003) . The Court of Criminal Appea ls a ffirme d the denial of habea s corpus re lief and further held that the Da

vidson County

Criminal Court lacked the statutory authority to transfe r the constitutional claim to the Maury County Criminal Court, which had exclusive jurisdiction over a ny alleg ed grounds for post-c onviction relief. Ana lys is Habe as Corpus and Post-Conviction Th e statut or

y pr ov ision s gove rn ingha be a s c or pu s r e lie f a

nd po st- c onvic tio n r e lie f i n Tenne ssee a

re two “ separ ate a

nd distinct” p ro ce du re s . Summers v. State, 212 S.W .3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007) . “Any

person imprisoned or

restra ined of liberty , under any prete nse whatsoeve r . . . may prosec ute a writ of habea s corpus, to inquire into t he cause of such i mprisonment and re straint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-101 (2000) . An application for writ of ha beas c orpus “sh o u l d be made to the court or judg e most convenie nt in point of dist anceto the applicant, unless a suff icient re ason be g iven in the petition for not applying to s u ch court or judg e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 29- 21-105 (2000). In most inst ance s, this court is in the county wher e the pe titioner is incarc erated. 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2
re lief:
N ot wi t h s t an di n g t h i s h ol di n g , w e ar e con s t r ai n ed t o n ot e t h at “ [ a] pe t i t i on f or h abe as c or pu s ma y be t reat ed as a p et i t i o n unde r [ t he P o st

- C o nvi ct i o n P roce d ure Ac t ] when t he re lief a nd pro ced ure aut ho ri zed by [ t he A ct ] ap p ear a d eq uat e and a p p rop ri at e . . . .” T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 5 (c). I n co nsi d eri ng w h e the r a p o st-co n v ic tio n p e ti ti o n sta te s a c o lo ra b le c la im fo r re lief, the p o st-co n v ic tio n c o u rt is to t ake t he f

act s al l eged as t rue. See T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 6 (f ) ( 2 0 0 3 ).
Ande r s on , 2006 W L 739885, a t * 3.

T he p et i t i o n m ust be f

i l ed “ wi t hi n one (1) y ear of t he d at e o f t he f i nal act i o n o f t he hi ghest s t at e ap p el l at e co urt 3 t o whi ch an appeal i s t ake n or , i f no appeal i s t ake n, wi t hi n one ( 1) y ear of t he dat e on w hi ch t he j udgment became f i nal

. . . . ” T enn . C od e A nn . § 40- 30

- 10 2(a) ( 20 06 )

. T he one y ear s t at ut e of l i mi t at i ons i n po s t

- convi ct i on ca s es i s s ubj ect to c e rta in e x c e p tio n s, no n e o f wh ic h a re re le v a n t i n the p re se n t ca se . S e e T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 0 -1 0 2 (b ).

“ [I ]t m ust be bo rne i n m i nd t hat t hey were no t prep ared by counsel , but b y a lay m an unl earned i n t he l aw. T he 4 al l egat i o ns o f

a pro s e co m p l ai nt are hel d t o l ess s t ri ngent st and ards t han f o rma l p l ead i ngs d raf

t ed b y l awyers , and t he te st is wh e the r it ap p e a rs b e yo n d d o u b t t h a t t h e p la intiff c a n p ro v e no se t o f f

a c ts in su p p o rt o f h is c la im w h ic h w o u ld (c o n tinu e d ...) -3- A trial cour

t may grant a writ of habeas corpus “only when ‘it appea rs upon the face of

the judgme nt or the rec ord of the proc eeding s upon which the judgment is render ed’ that a convicting court wa s without jurisdi ction or authority to sentenc e . . . or that a . . . se ntenceof imprisonment or other restra int ha s expi red.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (quotingArc her v. S t at e , 8 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d

1 5 7 , 1 6 4 ( T e nn . 1 9 9 3 ) )

. T h e b ur d e ni s o nth e p e t i t i o n e r t o e s t a b l i s hb y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the c halleng ed judgment is void or that a ter m of imprisonment has expired. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291 -9 2 (T en n . 1964). I f the pe tition fails on its face to state a c olorable c laim for a writ of habeas co rp u s , the trial cour t may then summarily

dismiss the petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 2 1 -1 0 9 (2000); Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260. In contra st, a petiti oner may seek r elief unde r the Post-Conviction Procedure Act “when the conviction or sente nce is void or voi dable be cause of the a bridg ment of any

right gua rante ed by

the Constitution of Tenne ssee or the Constituti on of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-103. “A post-c onviction proce edingis commence d by filing, w ith the clerk of

the cour t in which the conviction occ urre d, a wr itten petition naming the state as the re spondent.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-104(a ) (2006)

. 3 A pro s epetiti o n i n a post-convic tion case is “he ld to less stringent standa rds than for

mal pleading s draf

ted by lawyers, and the test is whether it a ppear s beyond doubt that the [petit ioner] can prove no se t of fac ts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Swanson v. State, 7 4 9 S.W .2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1988) (quotingBax ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Tenn. 1975))

. Although a pro s e litigant g ener ally must a dhere to the same proce dural rules as one repr esente d by counsel, this Court has previously ruled that a “ pro s e petition cannot be held to the standar ds of a pe tit ion dr a ft e d b y

a lawye r. ” I d. at 735. Mo re ov e r, the tr ia l c ourt ha s th e dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity 4(

. . . con t i n u ed) 4
en t i t l e h i m t o r el i ef

. ” B ax t er , 523 S. W

. 2d a t 939.
O u r i n t er medi at e cou r t s h av e a ddr es s ed ( an d re ac h ed c on f l i ct i n g re s u l t s ) i n s i mi l ar ca s es . See A n der s on , 2006 5 W L 7 3 9 8 8 5 , at * 3 (af

f i rming t he W ayne C o unt y C i rcui t C o urt ’ s d eni al of hab eas corp us rel i ef but d i rect i ng t he co urt t o tr ansf er t he case to t he D avi d son C o unt y C ri m i nal C o urt for do cket i ng as a p o st

- co nvi ct i o n m at t er). B ut s ee S t at e v. D arde n, N o . W 2 0 0 1

- 0 1 8 3 3

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 20 0 2 W L 14 8 2 7 9 8 , at * 2 (T enn. C ri m . A p p . Fe b

. 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat t he Lake Co un t y Co ur t di d not ha ve j ur i s di ct i on over p ost

- convi ct i on i s s ues and was wi t hout au t hor i t y t o t r ans f er t hos e i s s ues t o R o b ert son C o unt y ); Sm i t h v. H ess o n, 63 S.W

. 3 d 72 5 , 72 8 (T enn. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) (f i nd i ng no aut ho ri t y t o t rans f er). T h es e dec i s i on s , h owe v er , di d n ot i n cl u de an y c on s i der at i on of t h e t er ms of

T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 16- 1- 116. -4- to treat a petition for habeas corpus relief as one for post-conviction relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-105(c ) (2006)

. Transf er of C ases These principles arethe bac kdrop for the question of firs t i mpression posed in this case: whether a trial c ourt should transfe r grounds for post-c onviction relief contained in a pro se pe tition for ha beas c orpus to the court having pr oper jurisdiction. Iwould have a nswere d in the aff

irmative. 5
In Norton v. Everha

rt, 895 S.W .2d 317 (Tenn. 1995), the petitioner f iled a pro se petition fo r a writ o f h a

beas corp us in t

he Mo rg an Co unty

Cr imi na l Co ur

t se e kin gre vie w o f a

pa ro le re v o cat i o nd ec i s i o n . T h e tri al co urtd i s m i s s edth e p et i t i o n , fi n d i n g th atth e p et i t i o n er d i d n o tal l ege any possible gr ounds for ha

beas c orpus re lief. The Court of Criminal Appe als, which a pplied the relax ed standard a

pplicable to pro s e proce eding s, reve rsed, concludingthat the trial cour t had the inhere nt power to tra

nsfer the habe as cor

pus petition to Davidson County for r eview a s a petition for cer tiorari. I d. at 318. After g ranting an application by the S tate for permission to appea l, this C ourt reinstated the judgme nt of di smissal, holding “that a court lackingsubject matter jurisdiction over a ca se has no authority to tr ansfe r it, unless that authority is spe cifica lly confe rre d by statute, rule, or constitutional provision.” I d. at 319. Importantly , howeve r, J ustice F rank D rowota, writing f or a unanimous cour

t, also o b s er v ed that “both judicial e conomy and our . . . policy

of disposing of c a se s o n th e me ri ts, rathe r t ha n f or te c hn ic a l re a so ns , w ou ld b e be tte r s e rv e d b y the a do pti on

of a ru le allowingcourts without subject matter jurisdiction to transf er the case to a

ny proper court.” I d. at 320 (empha sis added). B ased upon a desire to fac ilitate the consideration of claims on their substance rathe r than their form, or lack there of, this Court “invite[d] the leg islature to ena ct a br oad tra nsfer statute.” I d. Shortly afte r the de cision in Norton, the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly enac ted a br o ad, re me dia l tr ans fe r p ro vis ion . T he statut e , e ff e c tiv e on Ma y 23 , 2 00 0, pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Notwithstanding a

ny other provision of law

or rule of court to the c ontrary , when a n orig inal civil action, an a

ppeal from the j udg ment of a c ourt of g ener al sessions, or a p et i t i o nfor r eview of

a fina l decision in a conte sted ca se under the Uniform Administrative Procedur es Ac t, compiled in titl e 4, cha pter 5, is fil ed i n a st ate or c ounty c ourt of re c or d o r a g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ourt and su c h c ourt

de te rm ine s th at itA 19 94 comp ut er s ear ch perf ormed by t he H ar var d Law Revi ew e s t i mat ed t hat t he U

. S. Supr eme C our t ha d 6 ref erred t o dict i o nari es i n m o re t han si x hundred cases . N o t e, Lo o ki ng i t U p : D i ct i o nari es and S t at ut o ry Int erpret at i o n, 10 7 H ar v. L. Rev. 143 7, 143 7 (1994 )

. T he C our t di d s o re cen t l y i n i t s cons i dera t i on of l i t i gat i on t o whi ch a met r op ol i t an g ov er n men t of

t h i s s t at e wa s a pa r t y , Cr aw f or d v

. M et r o. G ov ’ t of N as h v i l l e an d D av i ds on Coun t y , T en n . , 129 S. Ct

. 846, 8 5 0 (20 0 9 ). T he C o urt , charged wi t h d ef i ni ng t he t erm “op p o se” as i t i s used i n s ect i o n 20 0 0 e- 3 (a) o f chap t er 42 of t he U .S . C o d e , co n c lud e d tha t “‘ o p p o se ,’ b e ing left un d e fine d b y the s ta tu te , ca rr ie s its o rd ina ry m e a n ing ” a n d lo o k e d to di ct i on ar i es f

or i t s a n s we r . I d. -5- lacks jurisdiction, the cour t shall, if it is in the interest of justice, tr ansfe r such a ction or appe al to any

other such c ourt in which the a ction o r ap peal c ould have be en brought at the time it was orig inally filed. Upon such a transfe r, the action or appe al shall proce ed as if it had be en orig inally filed in the cour

t to whic h it is transf

err ed on the date upon which it was ac tually fil ed in t he cour

t from which it was transfe rre d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 1-116 (e mphasis added)

. The que stion in this instance is whethe r this statute g overns in these circ umstances. I believe that it does, whether

by the plain meaningof the words or by the historical conte x t of the leg islation. I f that is so, the trial court had the duty to transfe r the post-c onviction claim in the interests of justice. Plain Meaningof Section 16-1- 116 Wel l- de fi ne d p re c e pts a

pp ly to q ue sti on s o f s tatut or

y int e rp re tatio n. Our c hie f c on c e rn is to car ry out leg islative intent without broade ning or restric ting the statute beyond its int ended sc ope. Houghton v. Arama

rk Educ. Re s., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). When a statute is c lear , we a pply the plain meaningwithout complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. J ohnson, 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to e nforc e the written languag e. Abe ls ex re l. Hunt v. Ge nie Indus ., I nc. , 202 S.W. 3d 99 , 1 02 (T e nn . 2 00 6) . It is on ly wh e n a statut e is ambiguous that courts may ref ere nce the broade r statutory scheme , the history

of the leg islation, or other sourc es. Parks v. Te nn. Mun. L eague Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W .2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998)

. When attempting to asc erta in the plain meaningof a statutory text , courts will often re ly on dictionaries f

or widely-ac cepte d definitions of indiv i du al words and te rms. See, e.g ., State v. 6 Meeks, 262 S.W

. 3 d 7 1 0 , 719-20 (Te nn. 2008) (inter pretingTenn. R. App. P. 3(c) (1)) ; Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truc k, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tenn. 2008) (inter pretingTenn. Co d e Ann. § 47-18-109( a)( 1)); State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W .3d 925, 927-28 (Te nn. 2007) (inter pretingTenn. Code A nn . § 3 9

- 1 3

- 4 0 4 ) ; St ate v . Pi c k e tt , 2 1 1 S. W. 3 d 6 9 6 , 7 0 5 ( T e nn . 2 0 0 7 ) ( inte r p r e ti ng Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 1003(a) ). Rece ntly , this Court specific ally identified B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary as an a uthoritative informational source . Edmondson, 231 S.W .3d at 928 (“When the L eg islature do e s n ot p ro vid e a

sp e c if ic de fi nit ion

fo r a statut ory te rm , th is C ou

rt may loo k to oth e r s ourc e s, including Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary , for guidance .”). Although relianc e on dictionaries does n ot absolve us of our

duty to consider the “ statutory context in which the words ar e used, the underlying fac ts, the leg islative history , and prior judicia l decisions ” whe n construinga statute a s a whole, Waldschmidt v. R eassur e Am. L if e I n s . Co., 271 S.W .3d 173, 176 n.2 (Tenn. 2008) , a dictionar y-6-

may be an inva luable tool for deter mining the plain meaning of individual ter ms, such as “origina l civil action.” At the time the Gene ral Asse mbly enac ted sec tion 16-1-116 in 2000 , t h e l at est edition of B la c k’ s L aw Dic tio na

ry pr ov ide d the fo llo wi ng de fi nit ion of “ c ivi l ac tio n” : “[a ]n ac tio n b ro ught t o enfor ce, r edre ss, or protec t a private or civil right; a noncriminal litigation.” Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 30 (7th ed. 1999). A“private right” was de fined a s “[a] personal right, as opposed to a right of the pu bli c or the state .” I d. at 13 23 . A“ c ivi l r ight, ” on the oth e r h and , w a s d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s: 1. The individual rights of persona l liberty guara ntee d by the B ill of Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as we ll as b y leg islation such as the Voting Rights Act. C Ci v i l ri gh t s include esp. the right to vote, the right of due proce ss, and the right of equa l protection under the law. 2. CIVI LL I BERTY I d. at 2 4 0

. The sy

nony m “civil liberty” wa s defined a s “[f]reedom from undue g overnme ntal interfe renc e or r estraint.” I d. at 239. By the us e o f

th is d e f in it io n , a p e ti ti o nc o nta in in ga

c la im o f c o n s ti tuti o n a l a

b r id g e me nt qualif ie s a s “ [a]n

a c tio n b ro ught t o e nf

or c e , r e dr e ss, or

pr ote c t a pr ivate or

c ivi l r ight. ” In th is instance, the Petitioner, who sought to protect his “individual rights of persona l liberty guara nteed by the B ill of Rights” and his “[f]reedom f rom undue go v ernme ntal interfe renc e or r estraint,” claimed his ac tion was to protect a civil rig ht gua

rante ed by

the United States Constitut ion. Although the dictionary

definition of “c ivil action” included only “non-c riminal liti g ation,” and a c laim und er t h e P o s t-Conviction Procedure Act is an attack upon a c riminal conviction or sentenc e, B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary limit ed the de finition of “criminal pr ocee ding” to a deter mination of “a person’ s guilt or innocence [or] a convic ted per son’s punishment,” or “a criminal hearing or tr ia l.” I d. at 1221

. He re , the Pe tit ion e r did no t see k to est a bli sh his guil t or inn oc e nc e or to se t hi s punishment; i n s t ea d , he pre sented a collater al cha lleng e to the constitutionality of his earlier conviction, a pr ocee ding this Court has pre viously described as not strictly

criminal in nature . See Watkin s v . St ate , 9 03 S.W .2 d 30 2, 30 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) (“ A p os t- c onvic tio n p ro c e e din gis a hy br id aff air

. . . which is c onsidered unde r c iv il rule s o f proc e du re .”). Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 16-5-108( a)( 2) (1994) grants the Court of Crimi nal Appeals appellate jurisdiction in post -convic tion case s as ca s es “instituted with refe renc e to or a rising out of

a criminal case.”There is no contra diction, however , in holding that a post-c onviction claim i s a civil action, but one inst ituted “with re fer ence to or arisingout of” litiga tion that qualified as criminal in nature. At most, the langua g e us e d c re ate s so me ambi guit y a s to wh e the r a

po st- c onvic tio n p e tit ion

qu a lif ie s a s a “ c ivi l action.” I f a post-c onviction action fits the plain meaning of “civil action,” it must only fall outside the meaningof “origina l civil action” if it is not “orig inal.” The ter m “orig inal” in its most natural meaningref

ers to any j u ri s diction which is not appellate. See Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary at 856P r i or t o ado pt i on of Supr eme Co ur t Rul e 28, howev er , t he r ul es of ci vil p ro ce d ur e we r e g ene r al l y deemed 7 appl i ca bl e t o pos t

- con v i ct i on pr oce edi n g s . W at k i n s , 903 S. W

. 2d a t 305. -7- (def ining “ orig inal jurisdiction”). A post-conviction claim is a new , collater al cha lleng e to an e arlier judgme nt, not an appea l. Edwar ds v. State, 269 S.W .3d 915, 919-20 (Tenn. 2008 ) ( “Inde ed, rec ognizi ngthe limited nature of T ennesse e’s ha beas corpus pr ocedur e, the L eg islature ena cted the Post-Convi ction Procedur e Ac t to provide a c ollatera l proce dure that allows state cour ts to consider and to re medy

a broa der r ang e of c laims.”). In conseque nce, I

cannot c oncur with the majority ’s conclusion that “orig inal civil action” unambiguously

excludes actions for post-c onviction relief. It is my opinion that the term includes a c tio ns fo r p os t- c onvic tio n a nd ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f – bo th of whichare a c tio ns by pr ivate individuals to enforc e their pe rsonal civil rights. I f, howe ver, the phrase qualifies as a mbiguous, or if the re is r e a so n to thi nk

that th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y int e nd e d to e mpl oy a de fi nit ion

oth e r t ha n it s plain meaning , it is our duty to asce rtain intent by consideration of the leg islative history

of a statute. Contex t of Section 16-1-116 Section 16-1-116 wa s enac ted ag ainst a bac kground of prior judicial dec isions considering the appr opriate a

pplicati o n o f procedura l rules to litigation involving both civil and c riminal e le me nts . N e ith e r t

he ru le s o f c ri min a l pr oc e du re nor t he ru le s o f c ivi l pr oc e dure a pp ly to p os tc o nv ic tion procee dings, e x cept a s specific ally provided by

statute or Supreme Court Rule. See Tenn. Sup. Ct

. R. 2 8 § 3 ( B )

. T h is Co urt h a s p r e v io u s ly a d dr e s s e d

th e n atu r e o f p o s t- c o nv ic ti on 7 pr oc e e din g s: Th e pr oc e dura l c ha

ra c te ri sti c s of the po st- c onvic tio n re me dy sh ou ld b e a

pp ro pr iate to the purposes of the reme dy . Whil e the post-c onviction proce edingis separate from the orig inal prosec ution proce eding , the pos t-conviction st ag e is an extension of the orig inal proce edingand should be re lated to it insofar a s fea sible. P o s t

- c o nv i c t i o nr e v i e wh a s b e c o m e ane s t a b l i s h e d p arto f th e c r i m i n a l p r o c e s s . In fo rm ulatin g a ru le we re c ognize that the po st- c onvic tio n p ro c e e din gis p ro c e dura lly s e p ar at e an d

a p artf r o mth e o r i g i n a l c r i m i n a l p r o s e c ut i o n . Itm ay b e i n i t i at e d b y a petition for habe as cor

pus. It seeks not to convict, but to set aside a conviction which is void or v o i dable be cause of the a bridg ement of c onstitut ional rights . . . . The proce dure by

which a criminal conviction may be set aside is c ivil in nature , there fore it is tried unde r the Rules of Civil Procedure and less stri n gent evidentiar y rules app ly

. I f th e p e t i t i o n e r i s un s u c c e s s f u l i n h i s a

p p l i c at i o n h i s c r i m i n a l s t atus is reta ined. Watkins, 903 S .W.2d at 305 (quoting AB A Standards f or Criminal J ustice, Standard 22- 1.2) (2nd Ed.) (inter

nal citation omitted) (empha sis added).T he s peci f i c h ol di ng i n W at ki ns r ega r ding t he t ol l i ng of t he po s t

- convi ct i on s t at ut e of l i mi t at i ons ha s been 8 superseded by a s t at ut o ry am end m ent

. See S eal s v. Stat e, 23 S.W

. 3 d 27 2 , 27 5

- 7 6 (T enn. 20 0 0 ).

O n e o b se rv e r h a s c r it ic iz e d t h e c o u rts th a t ha v e im p le m e n te d the P o st-C o n v ic tio n P ro c e d u re A c t f o r th e ir 9 t end ency t o place “ unnecessar y judi ci al res t ri ct i o ns o n t he avai l ab i l i t y of p o st

- co nvi ct i o n rel i ef

. ” A nd ers o n, 48 T enn. L. Rev

. a t 662. -8- By the application of these princ ip l es, we previously deter mined that Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 28-1-106 ( 1980), which toll ed the statute of l imitations in “civil causes of a ction” fo r m e nta l i nco mpe te nc y , a pp lie d to po st- c onvic tio n c a se s. Watkin s, 90 3 S. W.2 d at 30 5. Whil e 8 confirming“the f

undamental nature of the rights lit iga ted within the post-conviction proce ss a nd the important function this process se rves w i t h i n our criminal just ice sy stem,” the Court in Watkins chose not to “quibble” as to whethe r the proc eedingwould be cla ssified as civil or c riminal. I d. at 30 4- 05 . Q uo tin g Smith v. B e nn e tt, 36 5 U. S. 70 8, 71 2 (1 96 1) , thi s Court ru le d th at “ [t]he ava ila

bil ity of a pr ocedur e to re g ain liberty l o s t t h ro u gh criminal proc ess ca nnot be made c ontinge nt upon a choice of labe ls.” Watkins, 903 S .W.2d at 305. Thus, when the Ge nera l Assembly enac ted sec tion 16-1-116, it did so in the historical perspe ctive that cavilingdistinctions between “c ivil” and “criminal” should not frustrate pr ocedur al re course . Statut or y c onte xt, li ke our e arl ie r p re c e de nts , s up po rt s th e a pp lic a bil ity of 16 -1 -1 16 to p os tc o nv ic ti o n

a n d habea s corpus a ctions. Significa ntly , section 16-1- 116 does not exclude either ha beas corpus or post-conviction ca ses. Moreove r, that the statute was enac ted afte r our de cision in Norton, wi tho ut s pe c if

ic e xclu sio n, imp lie s th at tr ans fe rs of pe tit ions f

or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n me t w ith leg islative approva l. See State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn. 2003) ( sta t i n g t h at the leg islature is presume d to know exis ting law when leg islation is en ac t ed ). S i milarly , there is no specific provision in the habea s corpus statutory scheme that either allows or prohibits the transfe r of a ha beas c orpus ca se to the cour t of conviction for further

proce eding s under the Post-Conviction Procedur e Ac t. In the abse nce of specific statutory guidance , the g ener al provisions of sec tion 16-1- 116 should control. In my view, sec tion 16-1-116 clea rly vests the trial c o u rt s wi t h the authority to transfe r a post-conviction claim from one county , which has no jurisdiction, to another, which doe s. Had the trial court, in this instance, e x erc ised that authority , the post-conviction proce dure w ould have be en available to the Petitioner under Te nnessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102( a). I n the context of due proc ess, a r

uling on the me rits is alway s pref era ble t o the procedura l bar, even if the re sults are equally unfavor able. 9 Our a dmo nit ion

in Watki ns is a

pp lic a ble he re : “ Th e ava ila

bil ity of a pr oc e dure to re g a in liberty lost through c riminal proce ss cannot be ma de conting ent up o n a ch oice of labels.” 903 S.W .2d at 305 (quotingSmit h, 365 U.S. at 712). B eca use I believe that the trial court ha d the statut or y a uth or ity to t ra ns fe r t he c a se to th e c ourt

of c onvic tio n f

or pr oc e e din g s und e r t

he Pos tConviction P roce dure A ct, I would reve rse and rema

nd for transfer to the Criminal Court of Maury County

.-9- ______________________________ GA RYR. WA DE , JUST I CE