J-S11013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWARD DIETER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1762 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-09-CR-0003601-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

Appellant, Edward Dieter, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on June 16, 2022, following his bench trial conviction for driving while 

operating privileges were suspended/revoked – driving under the influence 

(DUI) related, third or subsequent offense, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(iii). We 

affirm.

We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On April 22, 2021, while on patrol, Officer Samuel Ladd of the 

Bensalem Police Department observed a green Toyota truck with a tinted 

cover over the license plate parked in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn Express. 

N.T., 6/16/2022, at 5-6. Officer Ladd exited his patrol car and walked closer 

to the truck because he could not read the license plate number due to the 

tinted covering. Id. at 19. Officer Ladd could only read the license plate at a 

distance of “[l]ess than 10 feet.” Id. at 24. Officer Ladd then “waited for [the 
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truck] to move[,]” followed the vehicle out of the parking lot and through two 

traffic lights before initiating a traffic stop. Id. at 6. Following one car-length 

behind the truck, Officer Ladd could not see the license plate because of the 

tinted cover. Id. at 7. Once stopped, Appellant was not able to produce a 

valid driver’s license to Officer Ladd. Id. at 11. When Officer Ladd entered 

Appellant’s name and date of birth into the police database, he learned that 

Appellant’s license was suspended for DUI-related offenses. Id. The incident 

was recorded on police dashboard and body cameras and played for the trial 

court during the suppression hearing. Id. at 12-16.

On May 19, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the 

aforementioned crime. On June 13, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial 

motion seeking to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, 

arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate a 

traffic stop. On June 16, 2022, the trial court held a suppression hearing 

wherein Officer Ladd and Appellant testified. The trial court denied 

suppression. Id. at 27. Appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded 

directly to a stipulated bench trial. Id. at 28-30. The Commonwealth 

incorporated the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing into the record. 

Id. at 31. The trial court found Appellant guilty of driving while operating 

privileges were suspended/revoked – driving under the influence (DUI) 

related, third or subsequent offense. Id. at 32. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a mandatory term of six to 12 months of incarceration, with credit 
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for time served, plus a fine of $2,500.00. Id. at 41. This timely appeal 

resulted.1 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

where the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause but 

was a pretextual stop?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (complete capitalization and lettering omitted).

Appellant argues that, in this case, “it is clear that the officer stopped 

[Appellant’s] vehicle solely because of an obscured license plate[,] there was 

no investigation beyond the officer’s initial observation of the license plate 

which would provide additional information as to whether a violation of [] the 

Motor Vehicle Code had occurred[, and, t]herefore, Officer Ladd was required 

to possess probable cause before initiating the traffic stop herein.” Id. at 

11-12. Appellant asserts that a review of the police dashboard camera video 

“does not confirm the [o]fficer’s assertion that the license plate cover was 

tinted” and his license plate was plainly visible. Id. at 12. Instead, Appellant 

claims that Officer Ladd used the tinted license plate as “pretext to gather 

information for another investigation” because “another officer requested that 

[Officer Ladd] identify Appellant and his passenger.” Id. at 14. More 

specifically, Appellant explains that Officer Ladd testified “quite clear[ly] that 

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1

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 13, 2022. On July 14, 2022, 

the trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

complied timely. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) on December 21, 2022. 
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he wanted to have contact with Appellant and his passenger so he could 

identify them, as part of another investigation, wholly unrelated to Appellant’s 

vehicle.” Id. at 15. Finally, in further support of his claim that the traffic stop 

was pretextual, Appellant maintains that “Officer Ladd was grasping at straws 

in an attempt to justify the stop he initiated” because he originally told 

Appellant “he was pulled over because of a broken taillight.” Id. at 14. 

Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

is as follows:

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on the 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the trial court are subject to plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a 

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. Also, it is within the 

suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal 

quotations, original brackets, and citations omitted).
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This Court has previously recognized:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and 

Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect 

individuals from unlawful searches and seizures. It is 

well-established that “[a] vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under 

the Fourth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 

108, 113 (Pa. 2008), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 809-810 (1996). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police 

officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer 

observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (stating, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prevent police 

from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or 

suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense”), 

citing, Chase, 960 A.2d at 113. “[A]ny violation of the Motor 

Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext 

for an investigation of some other crime.” Harris, 176 A.3d at 

1020.

The United States Supreme Court has explained,

[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure's “mission” - to address 

the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to 

related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction 

is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the 

seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction 

are - or reasonably should have been - completed.

[The Supreme Court] concluded that the Fourth Amendment 

tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not 

lengthen the roadside detention. [A] traffic stop can 

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a 

warning ticket. ... The seizure remains lawful only so long 

as unrelated inquiries do not measurably extend the 

duration of the stop. [A police] officer, in other words, may 

conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful 

traffic stop. [The police officer, however,] may not do so in 

a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable 
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suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an 

individual.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic [citation, a 

police] officer's mission includes ordinary inquiries incident 

to the traffic stop. Typically[,] such inquiries involve 

checking the driver's license, determining whether there are 

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 

automobile's registration and proof of insurance. These 

checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the 

traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated 

safely and responsibly.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-355 (2015) 

(citations, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted); 

see also Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 149-150 

(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating, “within the context of a lawful traffic 

stop, [‘]mission related[’] inquiries addressed to the traffic 

violations which originally prompted the detention [are 

permitted], as well as incidental inquiries aimed at ensuring the 

safe and responsible operation of vehicles on the highway”).

Thus, in sum, even if a traffic stop is a pretext for an investigation 

of another unrelated crime, the traffic stop is lawful provided (1) 

a police officer observes a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, 

even if a minor offense, and (2) the traffic stop lasts no longer 

than is necessary to effectuate the “mission” of the traffic stop, 

which is to address the Motor Vehicle Code violation and attend to 

related safety concerns. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (stating, a 

police officer's “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).

Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 2023 WL 2470282, at *4–5 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(unpublished memorandum) (footnote omitted).

2

The Motor Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful 

to display on any vehicle a registration plate which [] is illegible, obscured, 

covered or otherwise obstructed in any manner at a reasonable distance

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2

 See Superior Court I.O.P. 65.37(B) (Superior Court may rely on unpublished 

memorandum decisions filed after May 2, 2019 for their persuasive value).
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[and/or] has a tinted plate cover.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332(b)(3) and (5). 

Regarding Section 1332, this Court has previously determined that 

“[p]robable cause is established where, from a reasonable distance, 

characters on a registration plate are illegible or the plate is at least partially 

obscured.” Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 282 A.3d 796, 801 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 290 A.3d 1271 (Pa. 2023).

Here, the trial court concluded:

In the present case, [the trial court] found the testimony of the 

officer involved, credible and convincing. Based on the facts 

indicated by the record, officers observed Appellant [] operating a 

green, Toyota truck with a tinted cover on its license plate. 

Initially[,] the officer observed the vehicle in the parking lot of the 

Holiday Inn Express. The license plate was so obscured that it 

was necessary for the officer to exit his vehicle to read the 

characters on the plate. [When] Appellant [drove out of] the 

parking lot, the officer followed for a short period of time, finding 

the license plate obstructed by the tinted cover. The officer’s 

observation of the traffic violation [was] sufficient to establish 

probable cause. Not only was the court provided with credible[] 

and convincing evidence from the officer, the dash[board] camera 

video was admitted into evidence as [an] exhibit[.] The 

dash[board] camera video provides insight into the reason for the 

stop, and in this particular case it is evident the license plate was 

obstructed. For these reasons, [the trial court] found the officer 

had probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop in which Appellant 

[] was the driver.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, at 5-6. The trial court further rejected 

Appellant’s contention that the traffic stop was pretextual, opining “there was 

no significant ulterior motive for conducting the traffic stop [where] the officer 

provided specific, articulable facts to demonstrate probable cause existed, 
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describing his close proximity to the vehicle, and yet the license plate 

remained unintelligible.” Id. at 8. 

Upon review of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, 

applicable law, and the trial court’s decision, we discern no error in denying 

Appellant’s request for suppression. Despite the fact that a tinted or obscured 

license plate is a minor infraction of the Motor Vehicle Code, it is unlawful to 

employ a tinted license plate cover or display a license plate that is illegible, 

obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed when viewed from a reasonable 

distance. Officer Ladd testified that he initiated the traffic stop at issue after 

he was unable to read Appellant’s license plate from a reasonable distance, or 

one-car length away, because it was obscured and obstructed with a tinted 

cover. Officer Ladd could only read the license plate by exiting his police car 

and walking closer to Appellant’s vehicle. Because Appellant was clearly in 

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, Officer Ladd had probable cause to initiate 

a traffic stop. Moreover, the traffic stop did not last longer than necessary to 

address the Motor Vehicle Code violation and attend to related safety 

concerns. Here, Officer Ladd inquired about Appellant’s driver's license to

ensure his vehicle was operated safely and responsibly. As such, the traffic 

stop was lawful, even if initiated as a pretext for investigation of an unrelated 

crime. Finally, we note that upon our review of the video from Officer Ladd’s 

body camera, upon approaching Appellant, Officer Ladd told Appellant that he 

was stopped for both a broken taillight and for having a tinted cover over his 

license plate. At the suppression hearing, Officer Ladd admitted that he 
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mistakenly told Appellant that he conducted the traffic stop for a broken 

taillight, but that it was only “one of the reasons” given for the stop. N.T., 

6/16/2022, at 17; see also id. at 9 (“[U]pon viewing my video, his taillight 

was never out.”). Officer Ladd testified that “the tinted cover was still the 

reason [he initiated] the [traffic] stop.” Id. at 9. The trial court validly 

determined that Officer Ladd articulated factual observations that established

probable cause to support the instant traffic stop. We discern no error. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied suppression and Appellant’s sole 

appellate issue is without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge King joins.

Judge McLaughlin files a Concurring Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023