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AFFIDAVIT

I, Special Agent Christian Hull, being duly sworn, do hereby and depose and state:

Affiant’s Background

1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and have 

been employed in this capacity since July 2019. I am currently assigned to a squad in the Palm 

Beach Resident Agency of the Miami Division that investigates a wide variety of federal crimes, 

including health care fraud, money laundering, and unlawful distribution and dispensing of 

controlled substances. Prior to joining the FBI, I worked as a police officer and ultimately as a 

detective in the Robbery/Homicide/Sexual Assault Unit for another law enforcement agency.

2. I am personally involved in conducting a joint investigation with other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies into alleged criminal activities perpetrated by DR. 

MICHAEL LIGOTTI (“LIGOTTI”), the owner of primary care and addiction treatment clinic 

Whole Health, LLC (“Whole Health”), as well as several of his staff members and associates. The 

information contained in this Affidavit is based upon a review of public and private records, 

interviews, and other investigative activities conducted by law enforcement personnel assigned to 

this case.

3. I am submitting this Affidavit in support of a criminal complaint charging 

LIGOTTI with conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1349, and in support of an application under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

for a warrant to search:

a. The premises of Whole Health, located at 402 SE 6th Avenue, Delray Beach, 

Florida 33483, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida 

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(more particularly described in Attachment A) for the items described in 

Attachment C; and

b. One Apple iPhone XS Max cellular telephone belonging to LIGOTTI (more 

particularly described in Attachment B) for the items described in 

Attachment D.

4. Because this Affidavit is provided for the limited purpose of establishing probable 

cause for an arrest and search warrant, I have not included all information known to me regarding 

this investigation, but rather have set forth only those facts necessary to establish probable cause 

to believe that the defendant has committed the charged offense and that Whole Health and 

LIGOTTI’s cellular telephone contain evidence of crimes, fruits of crime, and property designed 

for use, intended for use, or used in various crimes

The Search Locations

5. Whole Health is located at 402 SE 6th Ave, Delray Beach, Florida 33483, in Palm 

Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida, as more particularly described in Attachment A 

(incorporated fully herein by reference).

6. LIGOTTI’s Apple iPhone XS Max cellular telephone is identified by International 

Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 310410216579641, International Mobile Station Equipment 

Identity (IMEI) 353093104988769, and associated with AT&T telephone number (561) 809-7960,

as more particularly described in Attachment B (incorporated fully herein by reference).

7. I have probable cause to believe that evidence of, fruits of, and property pertaining 

to the following crimes, as set forth in Attachments C and D, will be found at the above search 

locations.

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a. Conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1349; 

b. Substantive health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347;

c. Substantive wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343;

d. Money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957;

e. Conspiracy to distribute, dispense, and possess with intent to distribute and 

dispense controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and

f. Substantive distribution, dispensing, and possession with intent to distribute

and dispense controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

The Charged Offense

8. Federal law makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly or willfully execute or 

attempt to execute a scheme or artifice: (1) to defraud any health care benefit program or (2) to 

obtain by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money 

or property owned by or under the custody or control of a health care benefit program, in 

connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1347(a). Conspiracies and attempts to commit health care fraud also are violations of federal 

law. 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

9. To be convicted of healthcare fraud, one need not have actual knowledge of 18 

U.S.C. § 1347(a) or the specific intent to violate it. 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b).

10. A “health care benefit program” is defined as “any public or private plan to contract, 

affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any 

individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item, or 

service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.” 18 U.S.C. § 24(b). In this 

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case, LIGOTTI billed private insurance policies and Affordable Care Act insurance plans, both of 

which fall within the definition of “health care benefit programs.”

11. Federal law also makes it a crime for anyone who, having devised or intending to 

devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, to transmit or cause to be transmitted “by means of wire, 

radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, 

pictures or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” 18 U.S.C. §1343.

The Defendant and His Medical Practice

12. According to the Florida Department of Health, LIGOTTI is an Osteopathic 

Physician, License Number OS9035, which was issued on September 10, 2003. The license is 

clear and active and expires on March 31, 2022.

13. On July 20, 2005, LIGOTTI filed documents with the Florida Secretary of State, 

effectively organizing and incorporating Whole Health as a medical clinic, with its principal place 

of business later noted on subsequent corporate filings to be at 402 SE 6th Avenue, Delray Beach, 

Florida 33483, in Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida. Whole Health advertises 

its practice as an urgent care facility, a family doctor, and an addiction treatment medical office; 

however, the majority of Whole Health’s patients are insured individuals who are addicted to 

substances such as drugs and alcohol. 

14. LIGOTTI is the ultimate decision-maker at Whole Health, and he is the only 

physician at the practice. He employed TARGET 2 as his office manager. TARGET 2, alongside 

LIGOTTI, would interview prospective employment candidates.

15. LIGOTTI and his staff of nurse practitioners (“NPs”) and Physician’s Assistants 

(“PAs”), collectively the “Medical Staff,” purportedly provide medical treatment to patients both 

onsite at Whole Health and in some instances offsite at partner facilities. During office visits, 

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Whole Health patients are often required to submit blood and urine specimens that are tested at 

Whole Health’s in-house laboratory, or at external laboratories located throughout the country. 

16. LIGOTTI and his Medical Staff prescribed many opioid-addicted patients 

buprenorphine1in the form of Suboxone, Subutex, and Zubsolv. From in or around 2012 to in or 

around 2020, LIGOTTI prescribed more than 265,000 pills of buprenorphine to more than 2,800 

patients.

17. Services provided by Whole Health staff are billed to the patients’ insurance 

companies for reimbursements to be made to Whole Health. From on or about May 1, 2011 to on 

or about March 31, 2020, Whole Health submitted more than $235 million in claims to five private 

insurance companies and Medicare, and received over $30 million in payment.

18. In addition to billings submitted by Whole Health, between on or about January 1, 

2013 until on or about February 3, 2020, LIGOTTI authorized sober homes and addiction 

 

1 Buprenorphine is a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Schedule III opioid that has a 

strong potential for abuse. It is the only medication approved for the treatment of opioid abuse 

disorder that can be dispensed by a pharmacy and used at home. Buprenorphine can suppress 

withdrawal symptoms, decrease opioid cravings, and block the effects of other opioids. As detailed 

further herein in paragraphs 33-35, Suboxone and Zubsolv are commercial names for 

buprenorphine combined with naloxone, an opioid antagonist. Subutex is the commercial name 

for buprenorphine without naloxone. If a substance containing buprenorphine and naloxone is 

crushed and snorted or injected, the naloxone effect can block buprenorphine’s euphoric effects 

and potentially bring on opioid withdrawal symptoms. Because it lacks naloxone, Subutex is 

generally prescribed to pregnant women and individuals who are allergic to naloxone. While 

Suboxone, Zubsolv, and Subutex have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration 

(“FDA”) for clinical use in connection with treatment of opioid dependency, because 

buprenorphine is itself an addictive opioid and its side effects mirror those of other opioids, it can 

be misused, and safety precautions and clinical guidelines must be followed. Its use is heavily 

regulated at both federal and state levels. Clinicians are responsible for ensuring that medications 

like buprenorphine, with high potential for misuse, diversion, and abuse, are used with caution to 

ensure patients are taking them appropriately and not diverting them. A drug test that is positive 

for an opioid, such as morphine, and does not show signs that the patient is taking their prescribed 

buprenorphine, should prompt the healthcare provider to consider a change in the treatment plan, 

including ending the buprenorphine prescription, since the patient may be diverting the drug.

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treatment facilities he partnered with, often as their Medical Director, to bill insurance companies 

approximately an additional $66.9 million in claims, of which $17.5 million was paid. 

19. Furthermore, LIGOTTI authorized excessive laboratory testing for patients from 

these sober homes and addiction treatment facilities, which resulted in approximately $379 million 

in additional submitted claims from on or about January 1, 2013 to on or about March 3, 2020, and 

approximately $73.6 million in payments to laboratories. 

20. Adding these amounts together, the volume of claims that LIGOTTI and his 

conspirators submitted and caused to be submitted exceeds approximately $681 million billed and 

$121.9 million paid by Medicare and private insurance companies.

21. Insurance claims and payments are generally submitted to and paid by insurers via 

wire communications. A review of the billing and bank records shows this was in fact the case at 

Whole Health, and that LIGOTTI was aware of this.

22. As detailed more comprehensively later in this Affidavit, LIGOTTI has engaged in 

illegal conduct that includes a) quid pro quo referral relationship agreements with both indicted 

and unindicted co-conspirators, wherein LIGOTTI agreed to become a Medical Director at an 

addiction treatment facility or sober home, and authorized unnecessary and duplicative testing

through standing orders for testing of addicted patients at these facilities, in exchange for a 

requirement that these facilities bring their patients to Whole Health, allowing LIGOTTI and 

Whole Health to bill medical treatment for their patients at his own clinic; b) insurance billing 

fraud, to include billing for services not rendered and billing for medically unnecessary services; 

and c) unlawfully dispensing and distributing controlled substances, specifically, buprenorphine.

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Background on Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation

23. In recent years, South Florida, particularly Palm Beach and Broward Counties, have 

become destinations for drug and alcohol addicts seeking assistance in becoming and remaining 

sober. Reports estimate treatment for substance abuse is Palm Beach County’s fourth largest 

industry, with revenues in excess of $1 billion per year. Substance abuse treatment is regulated 

under state and federal law, which describe a continuum of care including, from most intensive to 

least intensive, inpatient detox, partial hospitalization (“PHP”), intensive outpatient (“IOP”), and 

outpatient (“OP”). Persons undergoing treatment on an outpatient basis, whether in PHP, IOP, or 

OP, will elect to live in a “recovery residence,” also known as a “sober home” or “halfway house,”

with other persons who are also in treatment and committed to a drug- and alcohol-free lifestyle.

While these terms for the residences are commonly interchanged, they are referred to herein as 

“sober homes.”

24. Detox is meant for individuals who are still addicted to and using controlled 

substances and/or alcohol. Detox facilities are inpatient facilities where patients are assisted in 

dealing with the effects of withdrawal from the complete cessation of using drugs and/or alcohol.

After successfully completing detox, patients receive treatment for their underlying addiction in 

the form of outpatient care, either through PHPs, IOPs, and OPs. PHP, IOP, and OP patients attend 

facilities on an ongoing basis where treatment is rendered, generally in the form of therapy 

sessions. The distinction between the three relates to the amount of therapy time on a daily or 

weekly basis, and patients generally transition from detox to PHP, then to IOP, and finally to OP 

as they overcome their addiction.

25. Medical and osteopathic doctors play an essential role in substance abuse treatment. 

Without a doctor, patients at the substance abuse treatment centers would not receive prescriptions 

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for drugs, receive treatment, or have urine, blood, or other bodily fluid testing. Bodily fluid tests, 

which are prescribed by the doctors, are billed to health plans by the substance abuse treatment 

centers, as are patient evaluations performed by a physician.

26. Title 18, United States Code, Section 24(b), defines “health care benefit program”

as “any public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, 

item or service is provided to any individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing 

a medical benefit, item, or service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.”

27. Private insurance companies, including Blue Cross Blue Shield (“BCBS”), 

Humana, Aetna, United HealthCare, Cigna, and others, offer health care coverage directly to 

consumers and through employers, including ERISA and non-ERISA plans. They also manage 

health care plans offered to federal employees. All of these health care plans (jointly referred to as 

“the health plans”) affect commerce and are “health care benefit programs” for purposes of 18 

U.S.C. § 24(b). The health plans cover medical and clinical treatment costs of rehabilitation in 

accordance with the terms of their policies and state and federal law, including requirements that 

testing and treatment be medically necessary, provided by properly licensed facilities, and 

provided in accordance with the terms of the health plans’ contracts, including the requirement to 

collect co-pays and deductibles. 

28. Sober homes, conversely, typically do not provide medical care or clinical services 

to their residents, but operate solely as group residences where residents can live with a support 

network of others in recovery. Since sober homes are merely places to live, they generate income 

to cover expenses through the collection of weekly or monthly rent paid by their residents, just as 

with any other landlord-tenant relationship. Even though a sober home is supposed to be merely a 

place to live, in recent years, some sober homes have seized upon the opportunity to bill insurance 

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companies and have entered into agreements with medical providers (such as LIGOTTI) who 

purport to offer primary care to residents. Those providers may also authorize testing to be 

conducted at the sober home, or billed by laboratories for such sober home patients.

29. The Florida Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) is responsible for 

licensure and oversight of addiction treatment facilities that provide Detox, PHP, IOP, and OP 

programs in the State of Florida. One of the requirements that DCF places on these facilities is that 

they have a medical director.

Federal Guidelines for Substance Abuse Treatment

30. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental 

Health Services Administration, Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (“SAMHSA”), also 

promulgated guidelines for substance abuse treatment. Those guidelines referred to varying levels

of treatment provided based on the severity of the addiction, including, for purposes of this 

Affidavit, Intensive Outpatient Programs (“IOP”).

31. The American Society of Addiction Medicine (“ASAM”) is a professional medical 

society representing over 6,000 physicians, clinicians and associated professionals in the field of 

addiction medicine. ASAM published the ASAM Criteria, which was a collection of objective 

guidelines that give clinicians a way to standardize treatment planning and where patients are 

placed in treatment, as well as how to provide continuing, integrated care and ongoing service 

planning, including for Detox, PHP, IOP, and OP treatment services.

32. According to both ASAM and SAMHSA’s guidelines, IOPs were formal substance 

abuse treatment programs that adhered to a set of formal guidelines. IOPs had to be overseen by a 

qualified professional. Clients had to receive a thorough evaluation to determine the stage and 

severity of their illness, including medical and mental disorders. Qualified medical personnel were 

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to assign clients to a formal treatment plan. The IOP was accountable for the treatment or referral 

of the client to additional services as necessary. The IOP was obligated to maintain contact with 

the client until recovery was completed. ASAM and SAMHSA’s guidelines recommended that 

IOPs provide at least nine hours of treatment per week, typically in three, 3-hour sessions. Clients 

at IOPs also were supposed to attend at least one 30-60 minute individual counseling session per 

week.

33. One form of treatment for substance abuse involves the use of a prescription 

controlled opioid, buprenorphine, in order to wean addicts off of illegal opioids, including heroin.

Brand names of these medications include Suboxone and Zubsolv (which also contain naloxone)

and Subutex. Only licensed physicians can prescribe these medications. Because drugs containing 

buprenorphine are Schedule III controlled substances, meaning that there is a strong potential for 

abuse, resulting in fatal and non-fatal overdoses, prescribing physicians also must have two 

registrations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). The first registration is the 

standard “DEA number,” required to prescribe any controlled substance. The second registration

is a “DEA X-number,” which is granted to a limited number of physicians with valid “DEA 

numbers,” who have completed a training program on substance abuse treatment and have fulfilled

other regulatory requirements.

34. In 2000, Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act (“DATA”), which 

amended the Controlled Substances Act to permit physicians to treat opioid addiction using 

schedules III-V, FDA-approved narcotic drug products without having to obtain a separate DEA 

registration as a narcotic treatment program. Those registered with the DEA as DATA-waived 

physicians could treat 30 or 100 patients at any one time. In 2016, Congress passed the 

Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (“CARA”), which amended the Controlled 

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Substances Act to permit nurse practitioners and physician assistants registered with the DEA to 

also treat opioid addiction based on state authority. In 2016, the Department of Health and Human 

Services published a Federal Register Notice which increased the patient limitation to 275 for 

physicians.

35. LIGOTTI was assigned DEA Registration Number BL8491134 on or about

September 12, 2003. On or about September 20, 2006, LIGOTTI obtained his Practitioner-DW/30, 

a designation by the DEA that allowed LIGOTTI to treat up to 30 opioid addicted patients using 

schedules III-V FDA-approved narcotics, such as buprenorphine, without having to obtain a 

separate DEA registration as a narcotic treatment program. On or about November 12, 2013,

LIGOTTI obtained his Practitioner-DW/100, allowing him to treat up to 100 opioid addicted 

patients with approved narcotics as described above, and on or about September 20, 2016, he 

obtained his Practitioner-DW/275, allowing him to treat up to 275 opioid addicted patients with 

approved narcotics. LIGOTTI’s Practitioner-DW/275 registration expires on or about March 31, 

2021.

Payment for Substance Abuse Treatment

36. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”), Pub. L. 111-

148, and other federal laws expanded the availability of private insurance to pay for substance 

abuse treatment in several ways. First, the ACA allowed parents to maintain health insurance for

their children through their own insurance policies until the children reached the age of 26. Second, 

federal law mandated that substance abuse treatment and other mental health treatment must be 

covered and reimbursed by insurance policies in the manner and at the same levels as other medical 

treatment. Third, the ACA required insurance companies to cover individuals regardless of prior 

existing conditions. Fourth, annual and lifetime caps on coverage were removed. Fifth, the ACA 

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created insurance exchanges that allowed uninsured individuals to apply for and obtain coverage 

from private insurers. The combination of these provisions created insurance coverage for patients 

and substance abuse treatment that had previously been excluded from coverage.

37. These federal laws created access to coverage through a number of avenues, 

including health plans sponsored by private employers, federal health care benefits programs, and 

health plans offered directly by private insurance companies. Private insurance companies

administer health plans sponsored by private employers and governmental employers. Health plans 

sponsored by private employers are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 

of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., while those sponsored by governmental employers 

and certain others are exempted from ERISA’s jurisdiction.

38. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak 

(“Amtrak”) was a private, for profit, Government Corporation, that operated a nationwide system 

of passenger rail transportation. As part of its employee benefits package, Amtrak established 

employee health and welfare benefit plans to provide healthcare to their employees, including their 

spouses, domestic partners and dependent children (collectively, “dependents”).

39. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (“FEHBP”) provides federal 

health care benefits to federal employees and their dependents. The United States Office of 

Personnel Management (“OPM”) managed the FEHBP and contracted with various insurance 

companies to offer these benefits. FEHBP reimbursed the various insurance companies it 

contracted with for the money the insurance companies paid out for medical benefits, items and 

services for federal employees. BlueCross/BlueShield (“BCBS”) was one of the various insurance 

companies contracted by the Office of Personnel Management to offer medical benefits, items and 

services to federal employees under the FEHBP.

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40. Both ERISA and non-ERISA health benefit plans were offered or administered by 

private insurance companies, including Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Aetna, Humana, Cigna Behavioral 

Health, Cigna Health & Life Insurance Company, United Behavioral Health, and United Health 

Group.

41. All of these health benefit plans were “health care benefit programs,” as defined in 

18 U.S.C. § 24(b), that is, public or private plans or contracts “affecting commerce, under which 

any medical benefit, item or service is provided to any individual.”

42. Under state and federal law, all of these health benefit plans were only responsible 

for claims for services that: (a) were “medically necessary,” (b) were provided by a properly 

licensed service provider, and (c) complied with the terms of the health care plan, including the 

obligation to pay co-insurance and deductibles.

43. Bodily fluid testing, which involves conducting tests on a patient’s urine, blood, 

and saliva, can be used to detect recent drug or alcohol abuse by a substance abuse treatment 

patient. Urine Analysis or urinalysis (“UA”) testing is used to detect recent drug or alcohol use. 

44. Substance abuse treatment facilities conduct UA testing in order to determine 

whether a patient has been using any drugs or alcohol. A point of care (“POC”) cup can test for as 

many as 12 different types of drugs. The POC cup can cost less than $5 and provides an immediate 

result as to whether a sample is positive or negative. In addition to POC testing, drug screen 

analyzers and liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (“LCMS”) are an enhanced type of UA

testing conducted in laboratory settings. Single urine specimens that undergo drug screen analyzers 

and LCMS testing can be billed to insurance companies in excess of $5,000.

45. Insurance plans often provide guidance to service providers, including physicians, 

substance abuse treatment centers, and laboratories, on the type and frequency of testing that will 

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be reimbursable. This guidance is based on policy statements from ASAM, publications by expert 

researchers in the area of substance abuse treatment, and policies of federal and state government 

agencies. For example, BCBS issued guidance on November 15, 2013, stating that, in certain 

circumstances, drug-screening tests could be used in connection with substance abuse treatment 

where a patient is suspected of drug misuse and there was a suspicion of continued substance 

abuse. Drug screening tests were not medically necessary, however, where simultaneous blood 

and urine testing was occurring or where testing was merely a routine part of a physician’s 

treatment protocol.

46. In 2014, BCBS provided more specific guidance, stating that, in an outpatient 

substance abuse treatment setting, weekly POC/screening tests could be medically necessary 

during the stabilization phase of treatment for a maximum of four weeks. Once patients reached 

the maintenance phase, such screening would be appropriate only once every 1-3 months, and such 

tests should be limited to 15 total during a 12-month period. More sophisticated definitive 

laboratory testing should be used only in specific situations, such as where an unexpected positive 

test was inadequately explained by the patient or there was a need for quantitative levels to 

compare with established benchmark, and should be limited to 12 tests in a 12-month period.

47. BCBS specified that urine drug testing did not meet the definition of medical 

necessity in the case of: (1) routine qualitative or quantitative urine drug testing (e.g., testing at 

every visit, without consideration for specific patient risk factors or without consideration for 

whether quantitative testing was required for clinical decision making); (2) more sophisticated 

definitive laboratory testing is used instead of or as a routine supplement to ordinary 

screening/POC testing; (3) simultaneous blood and urine specimen testing; and (4) testing for 

residential monitoring.

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48. To bill insurance companies for UAs and other bodily fluid testing, substance abuse 

facilities often submit claims on Form CMS 1450, also known as the Health Insurance Claim Form 

(“HICF”), to the client’s respective insurance company. Before billing for the UAs, providers must 

first obtain a prescription from the patient’s medical doctor, who must deem the UA medically 

necessary. HICFs contain, among other information, the client’s name and biographical 

information, his or her insurance information, diagnosis, date and place of service, the standardized 

procedure codes, the number of units provided, the total dollar amount being charged and name 

and location of the billing company. The procedure code and the unit volume assist in determining 

the dollar amount at which the client’s insurance company will reimburse the provider. Completed 

HICFs can be printed and mailed to insurance companies or they can be submitted electronically.

When the HICF is submitted, the provider certifies that the contents of the HICF are true, correct 

and complete.

The Defendant’s Involvement in Health Care Fraud

49. Numerous former patients, employees, and associates working with LIGOTTI have 

provided information to law enforcement regarding fraudulent activity being conducted by 

LIGOTTI, together with his staff at Whole Health and others. As outlined below, LIGOTTI (a) 

entered into quid pro quo agreements with both indicted and unindicted co-conspirators to provide 

“standing orders” for medically unnecessary tests at sober homes and addiction treatment facilities

as their purported Medical Director, and in return these treatment facilities brought their patients 

to Whole Health, and LIGOTTI was allowed to bill for patients from these facilities for false and 

fraudulent treatments and testing at Whole Health; (b) engaged in wide ranging insurance billing 

fraud, including billing for services not rendered, and billing for medically unnecessary services; 

(c) billed for medically unnecessary UA and blood tests simply to generate revenue without 

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utilizing the test results in patients’ treatment; (d) billed for therapy services that neither he nor his 

staff were qualified to provide, and which never occurred; and (e) unlawfully dispensed and 

distributed buprenorphine, a DEA Schedule III opioid that has a strong potential for abuse.

LIGOTTI’s Quid Pro Quo Schemes

50. A “quid pro quo” scheme is a scheme in which one party does a favor in exchange 

for a return favor from another party. LIGOTTI employed a quid pro quo scheme whereby he 

would, as purported Medical Director, provide owners and operators of sober homes and addiction 

treatment centers with standing orders that authorized laboratory testing for patients at their 

facilities, without regard to medical necessity, in exchange for a nominal salary and a valuable inkind benefit: access to a stable of insured addiction treatment patients from those sober homes and 

treatment centers. The addiction treatment center and sober home owners benefited by virtue of

their ability to bill and get paid by private insurers for such tests authorized by LIGOTTI. The 

testing laboratories benefitted by being able to bill and get paid by private insurers for the 

medically unnecessary testing authorized by LIGOTTI as the purported Medical Director for these 

sober homes and treatment centers. LIGOTTI benefitted by being able to bill the patients’ 

insurance companies for additional expensive, medically unnecessary tests, including UAs and 

blood tests.

51. In addition, the entire referral network made possible by LIGOTTI authorizing such 

false and fraudulent testing for these addiction treatment centers, sober homes, and testing 

laboratories by his signing of standing orders often facilitated kickback relationships between these

parties and individual recruiters or brokers for these entities, as the sober home and treatment 

center owners (through these brokers) received kickbacks from the owners and operators of the 

laboratories in return for sending specimens their way for testing.

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52. The primary money maker for LIGOTTI and Whole Health was a scheme that 

involved billing insurance companies for medical services and lab tests purportedly performed by 

Whole Health staff. He billed his patients’ insurance plans exorbitant amounts for excessive and 

medically unnecessary services that often included thousands of dollars for blood and urine tests, 

which could range from approximately $1,800 to more than $26,000, and approximately $350 for 

a single office visit. By way of example, for one patient’s single office visit on or around March 

24, 2015, Whole Health billed Aetna $25,900 in tests, with an additional $480 for purported 

therapy and $350 for an outpatient visit fee. Based on billing data that law enforcement has

received and recent reports from patients, there is reason to believe that this pattern of excessive 

billing continues to this day.

53. LIGOTTI ensured a steady supply of insured patients at Whole Health by 

establishing agreements with sober home owners and addiction treatment facility owners 

(collectively referred to as “owners”) operating in South Florida. LIGOTTI incentivized these 

owners to steer insured patients to Whole Health in two primary ways. First, LIGOTTI greatly 

reduced or completely waived monthly medical director fees he charged to owners to act as their 

purported Medical Director. Second (which had the potential to be much more lucrative to the 

owners), he signed standing orders medically authorizing laboratories to conduct regular definitive

drug testing for all patients at these owners’ sober homes or facilities.

54. According to several witnesses, including Cooperating Defendant 1 (“CD1”),

Cooperating Defendant 4 (“CD4”), and Cooperating Defendant 5 (“CD5”),2 as described below,

 

2 The various CDs (cooperating defendants) discussed herein are all cooperating in the hope of receiving a sentencing 

benefit, or, in the case of those cooperating defendants who have not yet been convicted, a favorable plea agreement 

or charging benefit. Information provided by the cooperating defendants has been independently corroborated by law 

enforcement, and thus there is reason to believe that the information provided by the cooperating defendants is truthful, 

credible, and reliable.

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LIGOTTI routinely created and provided standing orders for UAs to testing laboratories, sober 

homes, and addiction treatment centers. These facilities used these standing orders to order UAs 

from clinical laboratories under LIGOTTI’s authorization, which stated the tests were medically 

necessary, and then these clinical laboratories and/or these facilities billed private insurance 

companies for the tests. None of these tests could be billed to patients’ insurance companies 

without LIGOTTI’s authorization. Rather than selecting individual UA testing schedules based 

upon a patient’s drug use history, period of sobriety, or any other individualized evaluation, 

LIGOTTI simply signed these standing orders that authorized testing wholesale and without regard 

to medical necessity, and he did so in the same manner consistently for the vast majority of the

patients purportedly under his care. Based on the patterns seen in this investigation, there is reason 

to believe that LIGOTTI often signed such standing orders without first seeing or evaluating the 

patients. 

55. The standing orders signed by LIGOTTI, which were provided to the FBI by Whole 

Health pursuant to a subpoena for records, often included language affirming that the tests 

LIGOTTI authorized were medically necessary, that LIGOTTI understood that he would be 

provided the results for tests he ordered, and that he would review these test results as the 

authorizing physician. Patient files obtained from Whole Health show that LIGOTTI did in fact 

receive at least some of these laboratory test results.

56. For example, on or about August 8, 2016, LIGOTTI signed a standing order for 

Laboratory 9, which contained the attestation that he understood that “[e]ach laboratory test 

ordered must be appropriate and necessary for the patient’s personal set of clinical circumstances,” 

and that LIGOTTI would “review the laboratory test results.”

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57. According to CD1, who pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and received a ten-year prison sentence, he/she and LIGOTTI had 

a “wink-wink” relationship. CD1 owned and operated a sober home and an addiction treatment 

facility. As part of the relationship, LIGOTTI would sign a standing order for CD1 and CD1 would 

send his/her patients to LIGOTTI’s office, where LIGOTTI would bill their insurance for 

additional testing and services. On one occasion, an insurance company accidentally mailed CD1

an $8,000 or a $9,000 check for a patient’s blood test that was supposed to go to LIGOTTI. CD1

did not witness LIGOTTI sign the standing order in person. However, he/she knew LIGOTTI 

signed it because if LIGOTTI had not, CD1 would never have sent his/her patients to LIGOTTI.

CD1 described LIGOTTI’s business model as “giving away his prescription pad.”

58. A review of the insurance claims CD1’s sober home submitted to BCBS revealed 

approximately $2,453,400 billed for urine drug tests ordered by LIGOTTI from on or around April 

19, 2012 to on or around July 21, 2013. BCBS reimbursed CD1’s sober home approximately 

$647,456 for these tests. According to CD1, LIGOTTI could not see every patient and could not 

review every urine drug test result. LIGOTTI never spoke to CD1 about the patients’ urine drug 

test results. Based on my training and experience, and facts gathered during this investigation, CD1 

could never have received any money from BCBS for urine drug testing without LIGOTTI’s

approval.

59. According to CD1, he/she was not initially paying LIGOTTI to act as the Medical 

Director of his/her treatment facility. However, at some point, LIGOTTI came to CD1 and said, “I

can’t do this anymore unless you pay me.” CD1 explained that if there wasn’t a payment made to 

LIGOTTI to be Medical Director, their arrangement looked like “horse trading” and a kickback 

arrangement.

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60. Cooperating Defendant 2 (“CD2”), who was arrested at the state level for patient 

brokering and who ultimately served federal prison time as a result of violating the conditions of 

his/her federal supervised release, operated three addiction treatment facilities and hired LIGOTTI 

to act as Medical Director at one of them. LIGOTTI offered to act as CD2’s Medical Director for 

$500 per month. As part of the agreement, however, LIGOTTI stipulated that LIGOTTI would 

keep the right to bill for blood testing of CD2’s patients.

61. LIGOTTI sent a nurse practitioner and a phlebotomist to CD2’s facility to see 

patients, to draw blood, and to prescribe medications such as Suboxone (a Schedule III controlled 

substance) and Klonopin (a brand name for clonazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance). CD2

did not bill insurance for any of the services provided by LIGOTTI’s staff. CD2 believed LIGOTTI 

was billing for these services, and that was the reason LIGOTTI only charged $500 per month to 

act as Medical Director.

62. At some point, LIGOTTI recommended that CD2 use Laboratory 1 to test the 

specimens of CD2’s patients. After this recommendation, CD2 began sending specimens to 

Laboratory 1. CD2 set up a shell company to receive kickback payments from laboratories for 

urine drug tests ordered by LIGOTTI. On or about June 21, 2016, LIGOTTI signed a “Protocol 

Set-Up” form, also known as a standing order, authorizing Laboratory 1 to test the specimens 

originating from CD2’s shell company. The “Protocol Set-Up” was provided to the FBI by 

LIGOTTI’s criminal defense attorney in response to a subpoena for records from Whole Health.

63. In addition to the “Protocol Set-Up” form described above, Whole Health turned 

over an additional 136 standing orders through which LIGOTTI authorized laboratory testing for 

numerous addiction treatment facilities and sober homes. Based on my experience working 

addiction treatment fraud and laboratory testing fraud cases, I know that these standing orders are 

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incredibly valuable to sober home and addiction treatment facility owners. By signing these 

standing orders, LIGOTTI enabled the owners to routinely test their residents or patients for urine 

drug tests that could be billed to insurance companies in excess of $5,000 per test, without regard 

to medical necessity or the individual patients’ needs. Many of the owners had illegal kickback 

arrangements with the laboratories that could not have occurred without LIGOTTI’s medical 

authorization to conduct these tests. LIGOTTI understood that his signature on these standing 

orders ensured the owners would continue to steer their patients to Whole Health, allowing 

LIGOTTI a continuous stream of patients that he could bill for excessive and medically 

unnecessary services.

64. The laboratories utilized through these standing orders often included laboratories 

thousands of miles away and rural hospitals that did not have the capability to perform these tests 

adequately and in a timely fashion that would assist in guiding patient care.

Billing Fraud and Related Kickback Schemes

65. Health care fraud kickbacks are arrangements made between parties in which one 

party refers patients to another through services, goods, or medicines, and the receiving party 

receives remuneration for that referral. As described further below, LIGOTTI’s actions facilitated

a web of kickbacks between owners and operators of laboratories, sober homes, and addiction 

treatment centers.

66. TARGET 1, LIGOTTI’s business partner and close friend, acted as a laboratory 

broker, also commonly referred to as a “lab rep,” for LIGOTTI. TARGET 1, who was interviewed 

by the FBI in March 2019, referred to himself as a “matchmaker” in that he would find owners 

and operators of urine drug testing laboratories and introduce them to LIGOTTI. TARGET 1 acted 

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as a lab rep for four different laboratories used by LIGOTTI. These four laboratories will herein 

be referred to as Laboratories 2 through 5.

67. TARGET 1 admitted to the FBI that he was receiving payments from the 

laboratories he matched up with LIGOTTI. A review of TARGET 1’s bank records corroborated 

that his corporate Wells Fargo bank account received approximately $1,629,154 in deposits from 

Laboratories 2 through 5. From on or about December 4, 2015 to on or about February 15, 2017, 

Laboratory 2 paid TARGET 1 approximately $686,120; from on or about June 9, 2016 to on or 

about March 7, 2017, Laboratory 3 paid TARGET 1 approximately $718,284; from on or about 

April 7, 2017 to on or about June 19, 2017, Laboratory 4 paid TARGET 1 approximately $89,000; 

and from on or about April 16, 2017 to on or about January 23, 2018, Laboratory 5 paid TARGET 

1 approximately $135,750.

68. According to TARGET 1, LIGOTTI never asked what Laboratory 2 was paying 

TARGET 1. TARGET 1 recalled that he may have said to LIGOTTI something along the lines of, 

“Oh my god, I got a check for $10,000” but, according to TARGET 1, LIGOTTI would have 

responded by saying he preferred not to hear that. LIGOTTI would tell TARGET 1 he was happy 

for TARGET 1 and hoped he was wildly successful. LIGOTTI told TARGET 1 he did not need 

people thinking TARGET 1 was giving LIGOTTI anything. According to TARGET 1, LIGOTTI 

did not want it to even “sniff” as if the two were making money from the labs. LIGOTTI once told 

TARGET 1 that he should not rely solely on the lab income.

69. When interviewed, TARGET 1 agreed that the money he received from 

Laboratories 2 through 5 would not have happened without LIGOTTI’s signature on, and approval 

of, standing orders.

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70. A further review of TARGET 1’s bank records shows that TARGET 1 took 

approximately $938,850 of the approximately $1,629,154 he received from Laboratories 2 through 

5 and invested that money into ARROW PASSAGE RECOVERY (“APR”). APR is a treatment 

center operating out of Massillon, Ohio, which is co-owned by TARGET 1, LIGOTTI, and 

LIGOTTI’s wife. When interviewed, TARGET 1 confirmed that he and LIGOTTI are 50/50 

owners of APR. Based on the foregoing, as well as my experience and training, there is reason to 

believe that LIGOTTI benefitted from the illegal laboratory kickbacks paid to TARGET 1 through 

TARGET 1’s $938,850 investment into APR.3

71. CD1, who pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1349, and received a ten-year prison sentence (as described in paragraph 57), admitted 

that his/her sober home and addiction treatment center would offer patients free room and board 

and airline tickets to entice patients to come to his/her facilities. Once there, per CD 1, patients 

could be billed for UA testing thanks to LIGOTTI’s standing orders.

72. Cooperating Defendant 3 (“CD3”), who pled guilty to patient brokering at the state 

level and was sentenced to one year in prison, also acted as a laboratory broker for LIGOTTI. CD3 

was interviewed by the FBI in December 2019. He/she described TARGET 1 as a “lab rep” and 

“a competitor of mine.” CD3 would see TARGET 1 at Whole Health when CD3 was there to pick 

up urine and blood specimens. CD3 recalled that “there was a pile for him and a pile for me.” CD3 

estimated visiting Whole Health one to two times per week to pick up the specimen boxes.

73. CD3 had an arrangement with Laboratory 6 (“Laboratory 6”) where he/she would 

receive illegal kickbacks in exchange for the urine and blood of insured patients. Prior to accepting 

 

3 During TARGET 1’s interview, TARGET 1 said he and LIGOTTI sat down with Law Firm 1, a healthcare law firm, 

to ask if they could go forward with the financial relationship at APR without getting in trouble. According to 

TARGET 1, the attorneys said yes, and gave their approval to TARGET 1 and LIGOTTI in writing.

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specimens from new accounts such as sober homes or treatment facilities, Laboratory 6 required 

that a doctor complete onboarding paperwork. When signing up a new account, CD3 would take 

the onboarding paperwork to LIGOTTI’s office for his signature and would later provide the 

completed paperwork to Laboratory 6. After this occurred, CD3’s new accounts could begin 

sending specimens to Laboratory 6. A review of Laboratory 6’s bank records show that Laboratory

6 paid CD3 approximately $3,328,799. CD3 estimated that between 80 and 90% of the specimens 

he/she sent to Laboratory 6 were ordered by LIGOTTI.

74. CD3 believed LIGOTTI liked him/her because he/she brought LIGOTTI a lot of 

business. LIGOTTI never asked CD3 for money in exchange for the urine and blood he was 

providing to CD3; instead, LIGOTTI asked CD3 to “let people know what you think of me.” CD3 

would recommend LIGOTTI to sober home owners whose residents did not already have a medical 

doctor. LIGOTTI was aware of the patients CD3 was responsible for referring to Whole Health

because Whole Health’s patient intake forms listed the name of each patient’s sober home, and 

LIGOTTI knew which sober homes had been referred by CD3. Additionally, the onboarding 

paperwork from Laboratory 6 that LIGOTTI signed listed CD3’s name on it.

75. LIGOTTI had the capability to complete blood and urine tests in-house at Whole 

Health. CD3 knew that LIGOTTI was out-of-network with insurance companies, and believed 

LIGOTTI offered up these otherwise billable specimens to CD3 and to TARGET 1 for two 

reasons: first, because LIGOTTI knew insurance companies would not reimburse Whole Health

for the specimens of certain insured patients, so he gave them to CD3, whose laboratory 

(Laboratory 6) had better insurance contracts that would likely be reimbursed; and second,

LIGOTTI wanted to “incentivize” CD3 and TARGET 1 to keep sending new patients to Whole 

Health. CD3 referred to this practice as LIGOTTI “keeping some meat on the bone.”

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76. CD3 confirmed that Laboratory 6 would not have paid him/her any of the 

$3,328,799 were it not for LIGOTTI. CD3 said that if LIGOTTI had not signed off on the lab tests 

he/she would have tried to have found another doctor.

77. CD4, who was charged with patient brokering at the state level and has not yet been 

convicted or sentenced, was another laboratory broker who worked with LIGOTTI. CD4 was 

interviewed by the FBI in June 2020. CD4 worked as a broker for Laboratory 7 (“Laboratory 7”). 

CD4 estimated he/she had a minimum of 12 accounts with LIGOTTI, and during the summer and 

fall of 2016, LIGOTTI was the provider on every sober home account CD4 had.

78. CD4 estimated meeting in person with LIGOTTI five times. During one meeting, 

LIGOTTI told CD4 he had an “informal agreement” wherein the treatment center would send 

LIGOTTI their blood and LIGOTTI would serve as their Medical Director at a low fee. 

79. CD4 also had frequent interactions with TARGET 2. CD4 would drop off “sign 

up” forms from his/her lab for LIGOTTI to sign. CD4 met with TARGET 2 two to three times at 

first before meeting with LIGOTTI, with each meeting being tied to a new account. Once CD4

had more of a presence, LIGOTTI invited CD4 back to his office for a meeting. TARGET 2 would 

sign LIGOTTI’s name on laboratory requisition forms, which CD4 questioned. When CD4 asked 

TARGET 2, “Are you sure you can do that?” TARGET 2 told CD4 that “it’s fine, it’s the same 

thing as a signature stamp.” CD4 never saw LIGOTTI sign anything. The laboratory requisition

forms were given and left with TARGET 2, and CD4 would return and get them later. CD4 saw 

TARGET 2 sign the forms on one occasion, and TARGET 2 signed about 15 of them.

80. CD4 described the process related to his/her sober home accounts and LIGOTTI as 

follows: CD4 promised money to a sober home owner who had patient urine but did not yet have 

a laboratory or an approving physician. CD4 would go to LIGOTTI and have him sign Laboratory 

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7’s standing order. Laboratory 7 would then send supplies to the sober home to facilitate urine 

collection. Once collected, urine would be sent from the sober home to Laboratory 7 for testing.

After the test, Laboratory 7 would bill the respective patient’s insurance company, and the 

insurance company would ultimately reimburse Laboratory 7. Laboratory 7 billed insurance 

companies approximately $5,500 per test three times per week. After receiving reimbursement, 

Laboratory 7 would then pay CD4 via wire, which was usually between $200-300 per specimen.

CD4 would then pay the sober home owners $150-200 per specimen. CD4 paid “bogus” account 

reps, meaning friends or relatives of the sober home owner, or he would pay the sober home owner

directly.

81. According to CD4, sober home owners would always take their patients to 

LIGOTTI. CD4 would only pay the sober home owners if they sent their patients to LIGOTTI.

82. Laboratory 7’s test results were sent into an electronic portal. CD4 knew LIGOTTI 

never reviewed these test results because LIGOTTI’s office never asked for login information to 

access the provider portal.

LIGOTTI’s Additional Billing Fraud Schemes

83. Health care billing fraud schemes often involve billing for services not rendered, 

billing for medically unnecessary tests, or “upcoding,” which involve billing for a higher and more 

expensive standard of care than was actually rendered. LIGOTTI’s billing fraud included billing 

for excessive and duplicative testing as well as billing for services not rendered by LIGOTTI.

84. LIGOTTI liberally signed standing orders for laboratory brokers and sober home 

owners, authorizing medically unnecessary tests, as an incentive to ensure they supplied a steady 

stream of insured patients to Whole Health (as described above in paragraphs 50-80). Additionally,

once at Whole Health, LIGOTTI billed the patients’ insurance plans exorbitant amounts for 

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excessive and medically unnecessary services. Based on billing data that law enforcement has 

received and recent reports from patients, there is reason to believe that this pattern of excessive 

billing continues to this day.

85. For example, an analysis of private insurers billing records for Whole Health has 

revealed that LIGOTTI billed a Blue Cross Blue Shield Patient (T.M.) more than $485,000 for 

services from on or about August 1, 2013 through on or about July 1, 2019; a BCBS patient (K.P.)

more than $707,000 from on or about January 1, 2013 through November 30, 2016; an Aetna 

patient (O.B.) over $591,000 from on or about May 23, 2014 through on or about April 5, 2018; 

and an Aetna and Cigna patient (J.S.) more than $840,000 from on or about November 26, 2013 

through on or about February 27, 2020.

BCBS and United Healthcare Identified LIGOTTI Billing Fraud Schemes

86. LIGOTTI has been under investigation and pre-payment review by at least two 

private insurance companies since at least 2014. Specifically, United Healthcare (“UHC”) flagged 

LIGOTTI for pre-payment review beginning on or around January 2014, and all of Whole Health 

has been under review since in or around February 2017 for all billing codes. Blue Cross Blue 

Shield has also placed LIGOTTI and Whole Health under pre-payment review since on or before 

January 13, 2017.

87. Additionally, LIGOTTI and Whole Health filed a civil suit in 2016 alleging that

UHC withheld payments in violation of ERISA. Ligotti v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 16-

60558-cv-RKA (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2016). In LIGOTTI’s Complaint, which has been amended 

three times, he admits knowledge of UHC’s Special Investigation Unit (“SIU”) flagging his 

account as early as January 2014, and that the investigations related to misrepresentations and 

being involved in “quid pro quo” schemes. Indeed, LIGOTTI’s Third Amended Complaint in the 

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UHC matter states that UHC attempted to “improperly condition payment” of LIGOTTI’s claims 

on his agreement to assist in UHC’s investigations against treatment facilities and sober living

homes that were also engaging in fraudulent billing.

88. LIGOTTI continued his practice of “misrepresenting his services” (billing fraud) 

and engaging in quid pro quo schemes with treatment facilities and sober home well after he was 

made aware by private insurers that those practices were not acceptable.

Patients of Whole Health Who Identified Billing Fraud Schemes

89. LIGOTTI billed the BCBS insurance policy of Confidential Witness 1 (“CW1”)

approximately $485,365 and received approximately $151,745 for services provided between on 

or about August 1, 2013 and on or about July 1, 2019. CW1, who last saw LIGOTTI as recently 

as in or around July 2020, first learned of LIGOTTI in or around 2013 while living in a sober home 

in Fort Lauderdale. The residents of the sober home were all required by the sober home owner to 

get into a van and drive to Delray Beach to see LIGOTTI. CW1 thought this was unusual given 

that LIGOTTI’s office was an hour away.

90. In or around October 2018, CW1 was living at a different sober home in Boynton 

Beach. While there, he/she attended Treatment Facility 1. Treatment Facility 1 required all their

patients to go to LIGOTTI’s office and transported them to LIGOTTI’s office once a week in a 

van. CW1 did not know why the treatment facility required the patients to go see LIGOTTI, and 

he/she heard one patient in LIGOTTI’s office saying, “I don’t know why I am here.” CW1 

described his/her trips to LIGOTTI’s office in the van as being “miserable.” He/she estimated 

spending two hours at the office during these trips because he/she had to wait for all the patients 

to finish their visits before the van left.

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91. Treatment Facility 1 conducted urine drug tests two to three days per week.

Additionally, LIGOTTI’s office conducted a urine drug test for each patient who visited his office.

CW1 would have thought Treatment Facility 1 and LIGOTTI would have shared the drug test 

results with each other, but CW1 saw no evidence that LIGOTTI’s staff was aware of the results 

of the tests she took at Treatment Facility 1 and vice versa.

92. Upon entering Whole Health for a visit CW1 signed in and went into a bathroom 

to collect a urine sample, which was required. Prior to going into the bathroom, a “buff” security 

guard gave him/her an empty cup and required him/her to place his/her belongings into a lockbox. 

CW1 then went into the bathroom, and provided the sample, unsupervised. No one from 

LIGOTTI’s office ever went over CW1’s urine or blood test results with him/her, except for a 

couple occasions when he/she tested positive for drugs. For a period of time, he/she was actively 

using drugs while attending LIGOTTI’s office. During this time, he/she remembered a LIGOTTI 

staff-member told him/her he/she tested positive for cocaine or morphine. Regardless, CW1 still 

left the office with a prescription for buprenorphine. According to CW1, this showed that the test 

results did not matter.

93. CW1 indicated that he/she harbored suspicions about LIGOTTI because LIGOTTI

and his staff always pressured him/her into providing blood samples. Regardless, he/she continued 

to see LIGOTTI as recently as in or around July 2020 to obtain refills on his/her prescriptions for 

Zubsolv, a buprenorphine product. According to CW1, LIGOTTI’s office took CW1’s blood 

whenever they wanted. CW1 would argue and say, “I don’t know why my blood is being taken. It 

has already been taken.” LIGOTTI’s staff would tell CW1 that he/she had to continue to provide 

it because the tests were “routine.” CW1 tried to talk LIGOTTI’s office out of taking his/her blood, 

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but they have pushed back and told him/her it was routine. After visits to LIGOTTI’s office, CW1 

would tell his/her dad, “They took my blood again today.”

94. Although CW1 only visited LIGOTTI’s office to receive refills on his/her

prescriptions, he/she felt LIGOTTI used his/her medical history simply to justify doing additional 

tests on him/her. LIGOTTI’s staff talked him/her into having an ultrasound, even though he/she

kept telling them he/she had already had an ultrasound done by his/her OBGYN. CW1 allowed 

LIGOTTI’s office to do the ultrasound “just to get them to shut up.”

95. Even though CW1 never underwent therapy sessions while at LIGOTTI’s office, 

Whole Health billed his/her insurance for 30-minute therapy sessions that purportedly occurred 

during 18 different office visits between on or about May 18, 2016 and on or about September 20, 

2017. The billed amount on these claims totaled approximately $3,300, and BCBS reimbursed 

Whole Health approximately $2,340.

96. A review of Whole Health’s BCBS claims data showed that LIGOTTI billed 

CW1’s insurance approximately $485,665, and was reimbursed approximately $151,745. Claims 

were submitted for blood and urine tests for over $419,000 between on or about August 1, 2013 

and on or about July 1, 2019.

97. LIGOTTI billed the BCBS insurance policy of Confidential Witness 2 (“CW2”)

approximately $223,010 and received approximately $2,616 for services provided between on or 

about June 10, 2014 and on or about December 19, 2018. Similar to CW1, Whole Health billed 

CW2’s insurance for 30-minute therapy sessions that, according to CW2, CW2 never received.

Although insurance claims submitted by Whole Health indicated to BCBS that CW2 was 

diagnosed with hallucinogen dependence, generalized anxiety disorder, and myalgia, CW2 never 

had any of these diagnoses. CW2 only saw LIGOTTI to obtain Suboxone refills. He/she had urine 

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drawn regularly but LIGOTTI never reviewed the results with him/her, except for possibly during 

his/her first visit. After one visit when CW2 had his/her blood drawn, he/she received an 

“outrageous bill” in the mail from an unknown laboratory. CW2 and his/her mother went to 

LIGOTTI’s office to complain and afterward never again heard from the laboratory again.

98. Confidential Witness 3 (“CW3”), who was interviewed by the FBI in September 

2016, attended LIGOTTI’s office as a patient approximately once per month, but sometimes more 

frequently. While there, LIGOTTI drew blood on two or three occasions, but CW3 indicated there 

was more blood work billed to his/her insurance than was actually done. LIGOTTI would look 

patients “up and down” and look for something wrong. CW3 felt like LIGOTTI was trying to find 

something to bill and that the treatments were not medically necessary. CW3 would provide urine 

samples at LIGOTTI’s office, which he/she thought was odd because he/she was also providing 

his/her urine at Treatment Facility 2 (“TM2”) three to four times per week.

Employees of Whole Health Who Identified Billing Fraud Schemes

99. In addition to LIGOTTI’s patients identifying fraudulent billing practices occurring 

at LIGOTTI’s office, former employees identified similar conduct as well.

100. Confidential Witness 4 (“CW4”), who was interviewed by the FBI in January 2017, 

worked at Whole Health as a nurse practitioner (“NP”) from in or around July 2016 to in or around 

November 2016.

101. CW4 typically saw 25 to 40 patients per day at Whole Health, while the practice

saw more than 100 patients per day. According to CW4, LIGOTTI was adamant that every patient 

submit urine during every visit. CW4 further stated that LIGOTTI would get angry with employees 

who forgot to collect urine and yelled at them to fill cups with toilet water if they had to. The cups 

that patients urinated into were unmarked and not monitored. One of LIGOTTI’s lab employees 

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would not label the specimens, which led to specimens whose originator could not be determined.

Before October 2016, all drug screens were signed off by LIGOTTI. However, sometime after 

October 2016, LIGOTTI started putting other nurse practitioners’ names on the drug screens.

102. According to CW4, TARGET 2 asked CW4 for his/her NPI number because 

TARGET 2 wanted to put CW4’s name on urine drug screens. CW4 had knowledge that his/her

signature was forged for some urine drug screens. In October 2016, TARGET 2 asked CW4 to 

write prescriptions for drugs that patients did not need. TARGET 2 demanded that patients get 

prescriptions even though they had not been seen by a medical professional.

103. CW4 further stated that LIGOTTI sent some specimens to external laboratories and 

used a color-system to organize which specimens went to which labs. For example, specimens 

highlighted in yellow were designated for one lab, specimens highlighted in pink were designated 

for the wife of CD3’s lab, specimens highlighted in another color were designated for Laboratory 

8 (“Laboratory 8”), and specimens tested in-house were highlighted in a yet another color.

LIGOTTI told CW4 he/she needed to figure which laboratories to send patients’ blood to, a

decision that was based on insurance reimbursements.

104. CW4 also indicated that LIGOTTI had a series of panels that LIGOTTI used to test 

patients’ blood called the “recovery panel.” The recovery panel was run on patients when they 

started, then every three months or if the patient relapsed. Compensation for blood tests done by 

Whole Health could range between approximately $19,000 and approximately $26,000 per patient.

105. Confidential Witness 5 (“CW5”), who was interviewed by the FBI in June 2017,

worked at Whole Health as a nurse practitioner (“NP”) from in or around May 2016 to in or around 

December 2016. Similar to CW4, CW5 stated LIGOTTI pressured CW5 to get urine samples from 

patients. The requirement for a urine sample did not matter what the person was seeing the doctor 

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for. According to CW5, LIGOTTI said, “even if you have to scoop urine out of the toilet, you have 

to do it.” CW5 was also pushed to get blood from patients, which he/she believed was unnecessary 

if blood had already been taken.

106. CW5 learned that at some point, LIGOTTI began putting his/her name and the 

name of two other Whole Health NPs on laboratory documents. CW5 also learned that his/her

name was being forged on laboratory requisition forms, which CW5 understood was done at 

LIGOTTI’s direction.

107. The NPs at Whole Health were not allowed to see the patient charts after LIGOTTI 

saw them. CW5 was aware that LIGOTTI “checked off” a diagnosis code in a chart of a patient he 

did not see, a practice CW5 described as “upcoding.” CW5 saw the chart and what LIGOTTI had 

done and challenged him, but LIGOTTI gave him/her a nonsensical answer.

108. Confidential Witness 6 (“CW6”), who was interviewed by the FBI in January 2020, 

worked at Whole Health as a nurse practitioner from the late summer of 2015 to the spring of 2016.

109. He/she described Whole Health as being busy and he/she estimated seeing between 

30 and 45 patients each day. He/she saw addiction treatment patients who were there to be 

medically cleared before they could begin addiction treatment at an offsite treatment center. These 

patients were brought into LIGOTTI’s office every day in “druggy buggies,” which were 15-

passenger vans that contained anywhere from 10 to 15 addiction treatment patients. TARGET 2

pushed the staff to see more patients and used to ask them if they knew of any treatment facilities 

that needed LIGOTTI’s office to see them.

110. CW6 felt that most of the treatment centers that bought patients to LIGOTTI’s

office were “crooked.” The centers popped up quickly and went out of business shortly thereafter; 

and the owners were often drug dealers. Patients at LIGOTTI’s office have talked to CW6 about 

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getting drugs from the treatment facilities they attended. When reviewing patients’ urine drug test 

results, he/she found patients who tested positive for illicit drugs. When he/she told LIGOTTI 

about these conversations, and about the patients who tested “dirty,” LIGOTTI told CW6, “We

don’t get involved with those facilities and what they do.”

111. CW6 observed LIGOTTI and TARGET 2 having closed-door meetings with 

“strange people” a couple of days per week. These individuals were not patients, but CW6 could 

tell they were in recovery. CW6 believed that most of them were owners of detox facilities, IOPs,

and PHPs. The meetings usually lasted between 30 and 40 minutes, and when they were finished,

LIGOTTI, TARGET 2, and whoever else they were meeting left appearing happy.

112. CW6 never observed patients receiving 30-minute psychotherapy sessions at 

LIGOTTI’s office; there were no psychologists or counselors onsite.

113. Confidential Witness 7 (“CW7”), who was interviewed by the FBI in February 

2020, worked at Whole Health as a medical technologist full-time in Whole Health’s laboratory.

He/she was at Whole Health from 2015 to late 2017 or early 2018.

114. Whole Health’s clientele was primarily made up of drug rehab patients. Whole 

Health performed lab analyses on urine and blood specimens, and according to CW7, there were

a lot of urine and blood tests conducted. Every Whole Health patient provided a urine or blood 

sample if Whole Health thought it was necessary. No one from Whole Health monitored the 

patients while they were providing urines samples.

115. CW7 was very familiar with what a normal urine sample should look like. He/she

could tell from a visual analysis if the urine was fake. If the urine was believed to be fake, CW7

would advise LIGOTTI. Sometimes LIGOTTI would make the patient provide another sample,

and other times he would tell CW 7 to just run the test anyway. On one occasion, a patient was 

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supposed to provide a urine sample and provided two cups in which the urine inside clearly looked 

different. The same patient name was written on both cups but, according to CW7, the urine did 

not appear to be from the same patient. CW7 told LIGOTTI about the incident and LIGOTTI

instructed CW7 to run the test anyway.

116. Similar to urine drug tests, blood tests were run in-house at Whole Health. The 

blood tests primarily tested for diseases, not drug abuse. The full recovery blood panel was a very 

detailed test that LIGOTTI wanted run on drug addiction patients every three months. CW7 felt 

the blood test was run redundantly. CW7 and another employee who worked in the Whole Health

laboratory would complain to each other about running the same tests so often for the patients. 

They would say, “We just did this,” and ask if they needed to test it again. CW7 would sometimes 

ask herself if it was really necessary to test this extensively every three months, but also understood 

this clientele group would lie to physicians. On occasion, the tests were ordered more frequently 

than every three months. In these instances, CW7 would sometimes ask LIGOTTI, “Hey we just 

did this, how much more will this test do for you?”

117. CW7 remembered several instances of “bad urine” and “bad blood” draws being 

produced. Bad blood draws would occur due to a drug abuser being “hemolyzed.” This occurred 

when a drug abuser could only produce small amounts of blood that were insufficient to perform 

the test. CW7 saw several blood draws that were inadequate and unable to be tested. He/she would 

tell the physician’s assistant or LIGOTTI that these were bad specimens, but Whole Health staff 

and LIGOTTI would say to just run the test. This happened every once in a while. LIGOTTI and 

one of his PAs would push back on the issue of bad blood draws. They wanted the test run even 

when CW7 said the test would not provide any analysis or any benefit to the patient.

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118. CW7 knew some of the tests should not have been run. He/she began writing in the 

notes section of the Whole Health’s computer system, known as the LIM system, “per DR. 

LIGOTTI” on the tests he/she and the other laboratory employee felt were not a necessity or a bad 

specimen. Traditionally, CW7 never put notes on the tests. If a test had a note made by CW7, this 

meant the test was run against his/her advice.

119. CD5, who was interviewed by the FBI as recently as July 2020, worked at Whole 

Health as an NP from in or around May 2016 to in or around May 2017. CD5 expects to be charged 

with federal health care fraud conspiracy charges (18 U.S.C. § 1349) related to his/her conduct 

with LIGOTTI in the near future, and is cooperating in hopes of a favorable plea agreement or 

charging benefit.

120. In addition to working as an NP for LIGOTTI, CD5 would find addiction treatment 

facilities as new business for LIGOTTI. At LIGOTTI’s direction, CD5 would present the facilities 

with three options for hiring LIGOTTI as a purported Medical Director: (1) the facility would pay 

$4,000, with $2,000 of that going to CD5 and the other $2,000 going to a psychiatrist hired by 

CD5 to be the Medical Director; (2) CD5 would find a psychiatrist to be a Medical Director for 

$2,000, but CD5 would see the patients and LIGOTTI would bill for the patient visits. There would 

be a paper chart for the patient at LIGOTTI’s office and LIGOTTI would send a medical assistant 

or phlebotomist to the facility; or (3) the facility would pay $500 per month and LIGOTTI would 

be the Medical Director. CD5 was in several meetings where he/she was told LIGOTTI did not 

actually bill the facility the $500/month, per their agreement.

121. CD5 found the fact that LIGOTTI was purportedly Medical Director of facilities 

that did not pay him to be a problem. CD5 explained that the benefits for LIGOTTI being the 

Medical Director, without any payment from the facility, were: (1) he could bill all those patient 

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visits, (2) he had a high-complexity, physician-owned lab (“POL”) in his office, which he used to

run $17,000 blood tests on those patients, (3) he could run urine tests on those patients, and (4) he 

could run genetic tests on those patients.

122. LIGOTTI told CD5 that he would bill for a certain type of lab, then would keep 

raising the price until he got the maximum an insurance company would pay, then that is what the 

price for the lab tests would be set at.

123. CD 5 explained that the sober homes would bring patients every month to LIGOTTI 

and he would do the lab testing of patients at his own laboratory. The sober homes patients also 

had lab testing done at the sober homes per LIGOTTI’s standing orders.

124. During CD5’s employment with LIGOTTI, NPs were unable to prescribe 

Suboxone. Some nurse practitioners at Whole Health would just call in prescriptions under 

LIGOTTI’s DEA license number, or just called TARGET 2 directly to fill the prescription. This 

was happening without LIGOTTI ever seeing the patient. CD5 described TARGET 2 as the “pivot 

point” for everything that happened in the office. According to CD5, CD5 had the impression that 

TARGET 2 knew everything that happened in the office.

125. CD5 never observed any therapy sessions being completed inside of Whole Health,

and did not know of any therapists working there.

126. CD5 also observed a different standard of panels being completed for 

“scholarshipped” or uninsured patients.4 LIGOTTI’s office would either not complete blood tests, 

 

4 “Scholarshipping” is a term I am familiar with based on my training and experience, which is used by 

sober home owners and patients to describe individuals who lack health insurance but are nonetheless 

granted a place to stay in a sober home, and whose treatment is paid for by the facility, based upon their 

affiliation with insured individuals, such as romantic partners who are also receiving treatment or living at 

the facility, or patient recruiters.

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or test a different panel for uninsured patients to reduce the cost in lab work. If LIGOTTI’s office 

saw the same patient, one was insured and one was not, different panels would be run.

127. The evidence provided both by Whole Health patients and Whole Health employees

shows that LIGOTTI’s primary concern was obtaining blood and urine from insured patients.

Evidence gathered suggests that LIGOTTI did not collect these specimens so he could utilize the 

results to guide patient care; he collected these specimens to make money from insurance 

companies. LIGOTTI’s intent to defraud is demonstrated by his instructions to scoop water out of 

the toilet; or to run urine and blood tests when his staff indicated the results would be worthless 

because the specimen-provider could not be identified, or because the patient was hemolyzed.

Based on my experience, I know that billing fraud schemes alone generally do not harm the 

patients whose insurance plans who are defrauded. However, LIGOTTI was defrauding an

extremely vulnerable patient population already prone to frequent overdoses that can result in 

death, and he was providing a captive audience of addicted patients with buprenorphine 

prescriptions to ensure their continued return.

LIGOTTI’s Letter to DCF

128. On or about September 13, 2013, LIGOTTI drafted a letter to DCF in which he

stated in part, “I was astonished and outraged to learn that my name and license may be currently 

used in an unauthorized fashion by entities involved in the treatment of patients/clients in recovery 

for drug and alcohol dependence.” Despite the substance of the letter, in the nearly seven years 

since LIGOTTI drafted it, he continued to authorize addiction treatment centers and sober homes 

to order medically unnecessary urine drug tests through the laboratories, as described above. Thus, 

there is reason to believe LIGOTTI sent this letter to DCF as a manufactured defense, which 

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LIGOTTI could point to at a later time as evidence showing he did not know that treatment 

facilities were using his name and license to order costly urine drug tests.

LIGOTTI’s Unlawful Drug Distribution

129. Although LIGOTTI was only authorized by the DEA to treat 100 patients with 

buprenorphine from on or about November 12, 2013 to on or about September 20, 2016 (as 

previously explained in paragraph 35) he exceeded this amount for 16 consecutive months 

beginning in or around May 2015. In or around August 2016, his violation of the DEA regulations 

peaked when he prescribed buprenorphine to 287 unique patients; nearly tripling his allowed 

number of monthly patients, which was 100.

130. According to numerous patients interviewed by law enforcement officers assigned 

to this investigation, Whole Health prescribed buprenorphine to patients regardless of their drug 

test results. Based on my training and experience, as well as consultation with Dr. Clark, an expert 

on addiction treatment medicine (described further in paragraph 134), Whole Health’s failure to 

review or factor these drug test results in prescribing buprenorphine was a dangerous practice, 

especially given the potentially deadly combination of mixing buprenorphine with 

benzodiazepines (i.e. Xanax, Valium, and Ativan, all Schedule IV controlled substances).

Furthermore, CW1 told the FBI that he/she obtained buprenorphine from LIGOTTI’s office as 

recently as July 13, 2020.

131. LIGOTTI exceeded his 100-patient-limit, and prescribed buprenorphine to drugaddicted individuals whose drug test results would have shown that more buprenorphine was likely 

to harm them. An analysis of LIGOTTI’s prescriptions revealed that 12 patients died while having 

an active buprenorphine prescription from LIGOTTI. While I do not contend that all of these 

patients died as a direct result of LIGOTTI’s last prescription, the search warrant requested herein 

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seeks to obtain Whole Health patient files for individuals who died under LIGOTTI’s care, which 

will allow further investigation into LIGOTTI’s actions, or inaction, leading up to their deaths, and 

are likely to contain evidence of crimes including, but not limited to, health care fraud.

132. Certain patients interviewed by the FBI had knowledge of, or in some cases 

participated in, diverting the buprenorphine prescribed by LIGOTTI. Buprenorphine has a street 

value and is a Schedule III opioid because of its potential for abuse. A review of LIGOTTI’s

prescription drug monitoring program (“PDMP”) data5 showed that over 400 patients received 

prescriptions for buprenorphine from LIGOTTI filled their prescription at least three days before 

their prior prescription was set to have run out.

133. According to addiction treatment experts, medications like buprenorphine which 

have misuse, diversion, and addiction potential should be used with caution in people who have 

addictive disease. When these medications are prescribed for people with addiction, it is standard 

of care to perform diversion control protocols, including drug testing, pill counts, and checking 

state PDMPs. It runs counter to that standard of care to provide patients with more medication 

prior to their prior prescription running out, as LIGOTTI did.

Expert Consultant Findings on Billing and Other Fraud Schemes

134. The law enforcement team investigating this matter consulted with an expert in 

addiction treatment, Dr. Kelly J. Clark. Dr. Clark is a licensed Medical Doctor (M.D.) in Florida 

(and in ten other states), and also has a Master’s in Business Administration (M.B.A.). She has 

over 20 years of experience in the addiction treatment field; is board-certified in addiction 

medicine and psychiatry; is a distinguished fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and 

 

5 A PDMP is an electronic database that tracks controlled substance prescriptions in a state. PDMPs can provide health 

authorities and prescribers up to date information about controlled substance prescription patterns and patient 

behaviors.

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the American Society of Addiction Medicine; has been a Chief Medical Officer for two multi-state 

addiction treatment companies; and worked on various national guidelines establishing the 

standards of care for addiction treatment and testing. Since April 2019, Dr. Clark has served as the 

Immediate Past President of the American Society of Addiction Medicine (and was a former 

President), and remains on its Board.

135. Dr. Clark recently provided expert testimony at trial in the Southern District of 

Florida in two cases regarding allegations of addiction treatment fraud, one of which was against 

a physician (United States v. Abovyan, Case No. 18-80122-CR-MIDDLEBROOKS (physician 

defendant); United States v. Ahmed, Case No. 19-60200-CR-COHN/MORENO) (owner and 

executive of sober homes and addiction treatment facility). Dr. Clark has been retained as an expert 

in other addiction treatment fraud cases, and was admitted as an expert witness after a Daubert

hearing before this Court on June 26, 2019 (United States v. Snyder, et al., Case No. 18-80124-

CR-ROSENBERG).

136. Dr. Clark has reviewed a subset of LIGOTTI’s patient records and billing claims, 

and found that the standard protocol for LIGOTTI’s office was to use blank laboratory order forms 

to send UA specimens for expensive laboratory testing. The expert opined this was like using a 

pre-signed, blank prescription pad—the specifics of the testing were left to others to fill in.

137. Dr. Clark found that LIGOTTI’s UA testing patterns showed evidence of excessive

and unnecessary testing done on a routine basis. She found new tests were routinely ordered and 

done before LIGOTTI received results for prior ones. She also found that patients were not 

required to provide samples consistent with unadulterated human urine, despite preliminary testing 

showing the presence of adulterants or that the specimens were watered down. These and other 

samples were routinely submitted for expensive definitive testing. Based on this consultation, there 

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is reason to believe that LIGOTTI did not use these UA tests in order to make treatment decisions, 

but rather as a revenue-generation device. Thus, Dr. Clark’s review corroborates the witness 

testimony and other evidence described herein.

138. Dr. Clark found that LIGOTTI’s standard practice was to bill for blood tests that 

were not medically necessary nor appropriate, and that these blood tests were not done to treat 

patients but for revenue generation.

139. Dr. Clark found that these medically unnecessary UA and blood tests ordered by 

LIGOTTI represented a pattern, that LIGOTTI was aware of the high amounts that private insurers 

were billed for these tests, and that this was his standard practice at Whole Health.

140. Dr. Clark found an additional pattern of billing for services, specifically psychology 

and psychotherapy services, that LIGOTTI and his staff at Whole Health were not qualified to 

provide.

141. Dr. Clark identified claims for medical services at Whole Health that were not 

documented as having occurred, or for higher levels of service than the medical record indicates 

were provided (also known as upcoding).

142. Finally, Dr. Clark found that LIGOTTI and his staff at Whole Health regularly 

prescribed controlled substances and other medications of abuse, diversion, and addiction outside 

of the legitimate practice of medicine, and while ignoring possible evidence of diversion.

LIGOTTI’s Recent Conduct and Liquidation of Assets

143. LIGOTTI has known that he and his conduct related to Whole Health have been 

under investigation since he was served with a Grand Jury Subpoena for records from Whole 

Health in or around October 2016. After recent FBI interviews of current and former employees, 

LIGOTTI has made multiple efforts to liquidate his assets and shut down Whole Health. Based on 

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my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that individuals under criminal investigation, 

specifically white collar criminals, frequently liquidate assets, hide assets, close or significantly 

change the business conducting the fraud, and utilize other individuals to conceal money or 

property obtained as a result of fraudulent conduct.

144. On or about May 1, 2020, LIGOTTI’s wife applied for an approximately $196,647 

loan for Whole Health from the federal Paycheck Protection Program (the “PPP Loan”). 6 The PPP

loan, intended to cover Whole Health’s payroll expenses estimated at roughly $78,658.80 per 

month, was approved and disbursed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) and a financial 

institution/lender on or about June 22, 2020.

145. On or about May 6, 2020, LIGOTTI’s primary residence, 717 Seagate Dr., Delray 

Beach, FL 33483, was listed for sale with an asking price of $5,695,000. This property was 

purchased in 2014 by LIGOTTI and his wife. Analysis of a Whole Health Bank of America 

account ending in 0135 (“Whole Health BOA Account”) for the period from 2013 to the present 

 

6 The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act is a federal law enacted in or around 

March 2020 and designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans who are suffering 

the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the 

authorization of up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses, 

through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program (defined previously as “PPP”). In or around April 

2020, over $300 billion in additional PPP funding was authorized by Congress.

In order to obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business must submit a PPP loan application, which is signed by 

an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan application requires the business (through its authorized 

representative) to acknowledge the program rules and make certain affirmative certifications in order to be eligible to 

obtain the PPP loan. In the PPP loan application, the small business (through its authorized representative) must state, 

among other things, its: (a) average monthly payroll expenses; and (b) number of employees. These figures are used 

to calculate the amount of money the small business is eligible to receive under the PPP. In addition, businesses 

applying for a PPP loan must provide documentation showing their payroll expenses. A PPP loan application must be 

processed by a participating financial institution (the lender). If a PPP loan application is approved, the participating 

financial institution funds the PPP loan using its own monies, which are 100% guaranteed by Small Business 

Administration (“SBA”). Data from the application, including information about the borrower, the total amount of the 

loan, and the listed number of employees, is transmitted by the lender to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.

PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain permissible expenses—payroll costs, interest on 

mortgages, rent, and utilities. The PPP allows the interest and principal on the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the 

business spends the loan proceeds on these expense items within a designated period of time after receiving the 

proceeds and uses a certain amount of the PPP loan proceeds on payroll expenses.

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reflects that it consistently received payments from healthcare companies, which are proceeds of 

this health care fraud scheme. During the relevant time period, over $1,000,000.00 was paid from 

the Whole Health BOA Account toward the deposit for the purchase of and continued mortgage 

payments on this property.

146. Another residential property owned by LIGOTTI, located at 3860 Lone Pine Rd., 

Delray Beach, FL 33445, and believed to be occupied by LIGOTTI family member(s), has been 

on the market since on or around June 7, 2018, and has a current asking price of $799,000. This 

property was purchased by LIGOTTI and his wife in 2007. In 2013, over $75,000 was paid from 

the Whole Health BOA Account toward the mortgage on this property. Between 2013 and the 

present, LIGOTTI was paid approximately $14,189,667.35 into his personal BOA account ending 

in 3646 from the Whole Health BOA Account. During that same timeframe LIGOTTI’s personal 

BOA account ending in 3646 paid over $550,000 toward the mortgage on this property.

147. On or about May 28, 2020, the property where Whole Health is located, 402 SE 6th

Ave., Delray Beach, FL 33483, was listed for sale with an asking price of $3,999,999. This 

property was purchased by 3 STAR LLC, a company whose managing members are LIGOTTI and 

his wife, in 2013. That year, LIGOTTI made an initial deposit payment for the purchase of this 

property from his personal BOA account in the amount of approximately $47,500. 

148. A typical winding down of a medical practice would involve the sale of the practice, 

including the sale of the assets, accounts receivable, and goodwill associated with the practice.

Here, LIGOTTI appears to simply be shuttering Whole Health without transferring the practice 

and its assets to another provider.

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149. On or about July 13, 2020, LIGOTTI notified his patients via letter that Whole 

Health would be closing on August 7, 2020. The following day, LIGOTTI placed an ad in the Palm 

Beach Post advertising the closure.

150. Also on or about July 13, 2020, a settlement conference was held on a civil lawsuit 

between LIGOTTI/Whole Health and the private insurance company United Health Care 

(previously defined herein as “UHC”). LIGOTTI/Whole Health filed a civil suit against UHC in 

2016 asserting that UHC withheld payment on claims submitted by LIGOTTI/Whole Health. UHC 

and LIGOTTI/Whole Health reached an impasse at the settlement conference.

151. On or about July 15, 2020, LIGOTTI and his wife (collectively “the LIGOTTIS”) 

filed a Chapter 11 Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition (the “Petition) (In re Ligotti, No. 20-bk-1766

(Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020) (Mora, M.).

152. The Petition was technically deficient in a number of ways. First, the Petition did 

not attach the following required forms: Form 106Sum, Summary of Your Assets and Liabilities 

and Certain Statistical Information; Form 106A/B Schedule A/B Property; Form 106C, Schedule 

C, The Property You Claim as Exempt; Form 106D, Schedule D, Creditors Who Hold Claims 

Secured by Property; Form 106E/F, Schedule E/F, Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims; Form 

106G, Schedule G, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; Form 106H, Schedule H, Your 

Codebtors; Form 106I, Schedule I, Your Income; Form 106J, Schedule J, Your Expenses. 

Additionally, the LIGOTTIS did not file a Declaration Concerning Debtor’s Schedules, Statement 

of Financial Affairs, and Statement of Current Monthly Income.

153. While the Bankruptcy Court has granted the LIGOTTIS until July 29, 2020 to cure 

these deficiencies, there are facts within the current Petition that law enforcement has reason to 

believe are potentially false based upon the investigation into the LIGOTTIS’ financial affairs.

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154. In the Petition, the LIGOTTIS estimate that their assets are worth between 

$100,001 - $500,000.

155. In the Petition, the value of the property located on Lone Pine Road is listed as $0. 

The outstanding mortgage balance on this property is listed as $695,000. This property is currently 

on the market for $799,000. The LIGOTTIS list the mortgage on this property as an unsecured 

claim of $695,000. Not only is the value of the property grossly understated, but the fact that there 

is likely equity is not accurately represented by the LIGOTTIS to the Bankruptcy Court.

156. Similarly, the LIGOTTIS list the value of their primary residence located on 

Seagate Drive as $0. The outstanding balances of the two mortgages on this property total 

$3,634,403. Again, with the property value listed as $0 and the property on the market for 

$5,695,000, there is likely equity on this home.

157. The filing of this incomplete and inaccurate Petition potentially suggests that the 

LIGOTTIS were in a rush to receive the protections afforded by the automatic stay of any creditors’ 

efforts to collect afforded to them under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

158. Furthermore, the Petition does not provide a full or accurate picture of the 

LIGOTTIS’ wealth. The LIGOTTIS own multiple corporations which money is filtered through, 

including: 3 STAR, LLC (which owns the Whole Health office building); WHOLE HEALTH, 

LLC; KRUGER INDUSTRIAL SMOOTHING, LLC (a shell corporation unrelated to industrial 

smoothing, named after a corporation from the 1990’s sitcom “Seinfeld”); and CML 

ENTERPRISE, LLC (a company which has a 50% ownership interest in a treatment center in 

Ohio).

159. In sum: (1) Whole Health requested and received nearly $200,000 via the PPP on 

June 22, 2020, (2) the LIGOTTIS have listed three properties for sale which, if sold for near asking 

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price, would yield $10 million, with the LIGOTTIS likely recouping some equity invested in these 

properties, (3) LIGOTTI has announced plans to completely close Whole Health with just four 

weeks’ notice to patients, without any apparent attempt to sell the assets and goodwill associated 

with the business; and (4) the LIGOTTIS filed an incomplete, inaccurate individual Chapter 11 

Petition that may have been filed in order to invoke an automatic stay of debt collection efforts. 

160. Based on our knowledge, training, and experience, the law enforcement team 

investigating this matter has reason to believe that the LIGOTTIS have taken these actions in an 

attempt to hide assets, confuse and mislead law enforcement and creditors, and/or as preparatory 

steps to fleeing this district. Their recent actions, specifically the closure of Whole Health and 

listing of their primary residence for sale, necessitate immediate response by law enforcement to 

prevent further divestment of assets and, potentially, flight from this jurisdiction.

There is Probable Cause to Believe Evidence Will Be Found at Whole Health and in 

LIGOTTI’s Cellular Telephone

161. Healthcare providers are required by private insurance companies and Medicare to 

maintain records for all patients for which treatment was rendered. In addition, based on my 

knowledge, training and experience, and the experience of other law enforcement officers assisting 

in this investigation, I know that healthcare providers sometimes keep evidence of a crime, 

property used to facilitate the crime at the addresses where they practice.

162. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, and the experience of other law 

enforcement officers assisting in this investigation, I know that individuals involved in illegal 

distribution of controlled substances often keep evidence of a crime and property, such as 

controlled substances, prescription pads, ledgers, receipts, contact information of associates, notes, 

and cash at the places in which they do business.

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163. During a routine patient visit in July 2020, CW1 saw that his/her patient chart from 

his/her medical file was within the Whole Health office, located at 402 SE 6th Ave., Delray Beach, 

FL 33483. 

164. On or around July 13, 2020, LIGOTTI sent his patients a letter notifying them that 

Whole Health would be closing on August 7, 2020. The letter stated that patient records would be

forwarded by Whole Health to the patient’s new practitioner upon the patient signing a release. 

165. On or around July 14, 2020, LIGOTTI posted an ad in the Palm Beach Post 

announcing the closure of Whole Health and advising patients to contact the office for copies of 

medical records.

166. According to open source information, LIGOTTI’s cell phone number is (561) 809-

7960. Also, a cellphone belonging to CD6, who knows that he is a target of the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office and the FBI for various federal crimes, but has not yet been charged, lists “MICHAEL 

LAGOTTI”[sic] and “drligotti@gmail.com” as the contact associated with this phone number.

167. A review of AT&T subscriber information for this cell phone number shows Whole 

Health as the “Financial Liability Party” for the account. LIGOTTI’s wife is listed in AT&T 

records as the user. AT&T identified LIGOTTI’s cell phone as an Apple iPhone XS Max, IMSI 

310410216579641, IMEI 353093104988769.

168. There is probable cause to believe that LIGOTTI’s cell phone will be on his person 

when he is arrested. Based on my training and experience, I know that individuals with cellular 

phones typically keep them on or near their persons.

169. Based on records obtained during the course of this investigation, from on or about

September 2, 2015 to on or about June 25, 2020, LIGOTTI and TARGET 1 shared approximately

1,975 phone calls and approximately 669 texts. From on or about January 16, 2016 to on or about

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June 26, 2020 LIGOTTI and TARGET 2 shared approximately 575 calls and approximately 1,513 

texts. Based on my experience as an investigator, I know that conspirators often use text messages 

to communicate information related to the fraudulent conduct they are engaged in. The texts with 

TARGET 1 and TARGET 2 show that LIGOTTI is currently using his cell phone to communicate 

with his co-conspirators. Additional analysis of LIGOTTI’s phone records show that LIGOTTI 

texted with others involved in the scheme, including but not limited to CD2 and CD3.

170. CD5 described how he/she communicated with both LIGOTTI and TARGET 2 

during his time at Whole Health as it related to the prescribing of Suboxone. Specifically, CD5 

communicated via text message with LIGOTTI and TARGET 2 when a patient needed a 

prescription for Suboxone. CD5 would go to the facility and see patients. Then, if a patient needed 

Suboxone, he/she would group text LIGOTTI and TARGET 2. CD5 knew this text was essentially 

for TARGET 2 to call in the prescription for LIGOTTI. LIGOTTI would reply “yes” in the group 

text and never questioned CD5’s requests.

171. Based on my training and experience, and as further described in paragraph 174 

below, I am also aware that, even when users of iPhones—such as LIGOTTI’s cellular phone—

delete content, computer forensic software can be used to sometimes partially or fully recovered 

deleted content. Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that, even if LIGOTTI has deleted 

some correspondence with conspirators from his phone, its search and seizure may nonetheless 

yield evidence of a crime or fruits of a crime.

172. Based upon CW1’s recent visit to Whole Health, LIGOTTI’s letters to patients, and 

LIGOTTI’s newspaper announcement, there is probable cause to believe that there are patient files 

and instruments related to health care fraud and illegal drug distribution described above within 

the Whole Health office, located at 402 SE 6th Ave., Delray Beach, FL 33483. Based upon witness 

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reports regarding LIGOTTI’s use of text messages to communicate with co-conspirators, I submit 

there is also probable cause that there is evidence of criminal activity, including health care fraud 

and illegal drug distribution, in LIGOTTI’s Apple iPhone XS Max.

Searches of Computers and Other Electronic Media

173. As described above, and in Attachment C to the Application for a Search Warrant, 

this application seeks permission to search and seize records that might be found at Whole Health, 

in whatever form they are found. One form in which the records may be found is electronically on 

a computer’s hard drive or other storage media. Thus, the warrant applied for would authorize the 

seizure of electronic storage media all under Rule 41(e)(2)(B).

174. I submit that if a computer or storage medium is found in Whole Health, there is 

probable cause to believe records relating to the fraud scheme will be stored on that computer or 

storage medium, for at least the following reasons:

a. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that computer 

files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after 

they have been downloaded onto a storage medium, deleted, or viewed via 

the Internet. Electronic files downloaded to a storage medium can be stored 

for years at little to no cost. Even when files have been deleted, they can be 

recovered months or years later using forensic tools. This is possible 

because when a person “deletes” a file on a computer, the data contained in 

the file does not actually disappear; rather, the deleted data remains on the 

storage medium until it is overwritten by new data.

b. Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in free 

space or slack space – that is, in space on the storage medium that is not 

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currently being used by an active file – for long periods of time before they 

are overwritten. In addition, a computer’s operating system may also keep 

a record of deleted data in a “swap” or “recovery” file.

c. Wholly apart from user-generated files, computer storage media – in 

particular, computers’ internal hard drives – contain electronic evidence of 

how a computer has been used, what it has been used for, and who used it. 

To give a few examples, this forensic evidence can take the form of 

operating system configurations, artifacts from operating systems or 

application operations, file system data structures, and virtual memory 

“swap” or paging files. Computer users typically do not erase or delete this 

evidence because special software is typically required to complete the task. 

However, it is technically possible to delete this information.

d. Similarly, files that have been viewed via the Internet are sometimes 

automatically downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache.”

e. Based on actual inspection of other evidence related to this investigation, I 

am aware that computer equipment was used to create and maintain 

electronic patient records, billing records, and laboratory records as part of 

the fraud scheme. Given the fraudulent billing from Whole Health and the 

fact that there are computer systems currently located at the physical 

locations of Whole Health, there is probable cause to believe that the 

computers were used to create fraudulent documentation to support the 

submission of fraudulent claims to private insurance, to create 

communications relating to the fraudulent claims, or to store other evidence 

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of the health care fraud scheme on the computer. Interviews with witnesses

also show there is probable cause to believe that computers at Whole Health 

contain a Laboratory Information Management (“LIM”) system used to 

manage and store information relating to fraudulent testing practices.

175. Forensic evidence. As further described in Attachments C and D, this application 

seeks permission to locate not only computer files that might serve as direct evidence of the crimes 

described on the warrant, but also for forensic electronic evidence that establishes how computers 

were used, the purpose of their use, who used them, and when. There is probable cause to believe 

that this forensic electronic evidence will be on any storage medium at Whole Health because:

a. Data on the storage medium can provide evidence of a file that was once on 

the storage medium but has since been deleted or edited, or of a deleted 

portion of a file (such as a paragraph that has been deleted from a word 

processing file). Virtual memory paging systems can leave traces of 

information on the storage medium that show what tasks and processes were 

recently active. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs store 

configuration information on the storage medium that can reveal 

information such as online nicknames and passwords. Operating systems 

can record additional information, such as the attachment of peripherals, the 

attachment of USB flash storage devices or other external storage media, 

and the times the computer was in use. Computer file systems can record 

the date files were created and the sequence in which they were created,

although this information can later be falsified.

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b. As explained herein, information stored within a computer and other 

electronic storage media may provide crucial evidence of the “who, what, 

why, when, where, and how” of the criminal conduct under investigation, 

thus enabling the United States to establish and prove each element or 

alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion. In my training 

and experience, information stored within a computer or storage media 

(e.g., registry information, communications, images and movies, 

transactional information, records of session times and durations, internet 

history, and anti-virus, spyware, and malware detection programs) can 

indicate who has used or controlled the computer or storage media. This 

“user attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of 

occupancy” while executing a search warrant at a residence. The existence 

or absence of anti-virus, spyware, and malware detection programs may 

indicate whether the computer was remotely accessed, thus inculpating or 

exculpating the computer owner. Further, computer and storage media 

activity can indicate how and when the computer or storage media was 

accessed or used. For example, as described herein, computers typically 

contain information that log: computer user account session times and 

durations, computer activity associated with user accounts, electronic 

storage media that connected with the computer, and the IP addresses 

through which the computer accessed networks and the internet. Such 

information allows investigators to understand the chronological context of 

computer or electronic storage media access, use, and events relating to the 

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crime under investigation. Additionally, some information stored within a

computer or electronic storage media may provide crucial evidence relating 

to the physical location of other evidence and the suspect. For example, 

images stored on a computer may both show a particular location and have 

geolocation information incorporated into its file data. Such file data 

typically also contains information indicating when the file or image was 

created. The existence of such image files, along with external device 

connection logs, may also indicate the presence of additional electronic

storage media (e.g., a digital camera or cellular phone with an incorporated 

camera). The geographic and timeline information described herein may 

either inculpate or exculpate the computer user. Last, information stored 

within a computer may provide relevant insight into the computer user’s 

state of mind as it relates to the offense under investigation. For example, 

information within the computer may indicate the owner’s motive and intent 

to commit a crime (e.g., internet searches indicating criminal planning), or 

consciousness of guilt (e.g., running a “wiping” program to destroy 

evidence on the computer or password protecting/encrypting such evidence 

in an effort to conceal it from law enforcement).

c. A person with appropriate familiarity with how a computer works can, after 

examining this forensic evidence in its proper context, draw conclusions 

about how computers were used, the purpose of their use, who used them, 

and when.

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a. The process of identifying the exact files, blocks, registry entries, logs or 

other forms of forensic evidence on storage medium that are necessary to 

draw an accurate conclusion is a dynamic process. While it is possible to 

specify in advance the records to be sought, computer evidence is not 

always data that can be merely reviewed by a team and later passed along 

to investigators. Whether data stored on a computer is evidence may depend 

on other information stored on the computer and the application of 

knowledge about how a computer behaves. Therefore, contextual 

information necessary to understand other evidence also falls within the 

scope of the warrant.

b. Further, in finding evidence of how a computer was used, the purpose of its 

use, who used it, and when it was used can be necessary to establish whether 

particular information is or is not present on a storage medium. For 

example, the presence or absence of counter-forensic programs or anti-virus 

programs (and associated data) may be relevant to searching the user’s 

intent

176. Necessity of seizing or copying entire computers or storage media. In most cases, 

a thorough search of a premises for information that might be stored on storage media often 

requires the seizure of the physical storage media and later off-site review consistent with the 

warrant. In lieu of removing storage media from the premises, it is sometimes possible to make an 

image copy of storage media. Generally speaking, imaging is the taking of a complete electronic 

picture of the computer’s data, including all hidden sectors and deleted files. Either seizure or 

imaging is often necessary to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data recorded on the storage 

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media, and to prevent the loss of the data either from accidental or intentional destruction. This is 

true because of the following:

a. The time required for an examination. As noted above, not all evidence 

takes the form of documents and files that can be easily viewed on site.

Analyzing evidence of how a computer has been used, what it has been 

used for, and who has used it requires considerable time, and taking that 

much time on premises could be unreasonable, particularly during the 

ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. As explained above, because the warrant 

calls for forensic electronic evidence, it is exceedingly likely that it will be 

necessary to thoroughly examine storage media to obtain evidence,

including evidence that is not neatly organized into files. Additionally, it is 

possible that files have been deleted or edited, but remnants of older 

versions are in unallocated space or slack space. This too, makes it 

exceedingly likely that in this case it will be necessary to use more 

thorough techniques. 

b. The volume of evidence. Storage media can store the equivalent of millions 

of pages of information. Additionally, a suspect may try to conceal 

criminal evidence; he or she might store it in random order with deceptive 

file names. This may require searching authorities to examine all the 

stored data to determine which particular files are evidence or 

instrumentalities of crime. Reviewing that information for things 

described in the warrant can take weeks or months, depending on the 

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volume of data stored, and would be impractical and invasive to attempt 

on-site.

c. Technical requirements. Computers can be configured in several different 

ways, featuring a variety of different operating systems, application 

software, and configurations. Therefore, searching them sometimes 

requires tools or knowledge that might not be present on the search site.

The vast array of computer hardware and software available makes it 

difficult to know before a search what tools or knowledge will be required 

to analyze the system and its data on the Premises. However, taking the 

storage media off-site and reviewing it in a controlled environment will 

allow its examination with the proper tools and knowledge.

d. Variety of forms of electronic media. Records sought under this warrant 

could be stored in a variety of storage media formats that may require offsite reviewing with specialized forensic tools

177. A wireless telephone (or mobile telephone, or cellular telephone) is a handheld 

wireless device used for voice and data communication through radio signals. These telephones 

send signals through networks of transmitter/receivers, enabling communication with other 

wireless telephones or traditional “land line” telephones. A wireless telephone usually contains a 

“call log,” which records the telephone number, date, and time of calls made to and from the phone.

In addition to enabling voice communications, wireless telephones offer a broad range of 

capabilities. These capabilities include: storing names and phone numbers in electronic “address 

books;” sending, receiving, and storing text messages and e-mail; taking, sending, receiving, and 

storing still photographs and moving video; storing and playing back audio files; storing dates, 

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appointments, and other information on personal calendars; and accessing and downloading 

information from the Internet. Wireless telephones may also include global positioning system 

(“GPS”) technology for determining the location of the device.

178. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that electronic devices 

can store information for long periods of time. Similarly, things that have been viewed via the 

Internet are typically stored for some period of time on the device. This information can sometimes 

be recovered with forensic tools.

179. Nature of examination. Based on the foregoing, and consistent with Rule 

41(e)(2)(B), the warrant I am applying for would permit seizing, imaging, or otherwise copying 

storage media that reasonably appear to contain some or all of the evidence described in the 

warrant, as well as LIGOTTI’s Apple iPhone XS Max, and would authorize a later review of the 

media or information consistent with the warrant. The later review may require techniques, 

including but not limited to computer-assisted scans of the entire medium, that might expose many 

parts of a hard drive to human inspection in order to determine whether it is evidence described by 

the warrant.

Biometric Features

180. The warrant I am applying for would permit law enforcement to obtain from certain 

individuals the display of physical biometric characteristics (such as facial characteristics) in order 

to unlock devices subject to search and seizure pursuant to this warrant. I seek this authority based 

on the following:

a. I know from my training and experience, as well as from information found 

in publicly available materials published by device manufacturers, that 

many electronic devices, particularly newer mobile devices and laptops, 

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offer their users the ability to unlock the device through biometric features 

in lieu of a numeric or alphanumeric passcode or password. These biometric 

features include fingerprint scanners and facial recognition features. Some 

devices offer a combination of these biometric features, and the user of such 

devices can select which features they would like to utilize.

b. If a device is equipped with a facial recognition feature, a user may enable 

the ability to unlock the device through his or her face. For example, Apple 

offers a facial recognition feature called “Face ID.” During the Face ID 

registration process, the user holds the device in front of his or her face. The 

device’s camera then analyzes and records data based on the user’s facial 

characteristics. The device can then be unlocked if the camera detects a face 

with characteristics that match those of the registered face. Facial 

recognition features found on devices produced by other manufacturers 

have different names but operate similarly to Face ID. According to 

apple.com, the model of iPhone used by LIGOTTI, the Apple iPhone XS 

Max, uses Face ID. 

c. In my training and experience, users of electronic devices often enable the

aforementioned biometric features because they are considered to be a more 

convenient way to unlock a device than by entering a numeric or 

alphanumeric passcode or password. Moreover, in some instances, 

biometric features are considered to be a more secure way to protect a 

device’s contents. This is particularly true when the users of a device are 

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engaged in criminal activities and thus have a heightened concern about 

securing the contents of a device. 

d. This affidavit seeks authorization to search LIGOTTI’s iPhone XS Max 

cellular telephone. The passcode or password that would unlock this device 

is not known to law enforcement. Thus, law enforcement personnel may not 

otherwise be able to access the data contained within the device, making the 

use of biometric features necessary to the execution of the search authorized 

by this warrant.

e. I also know from my training and experience, as well as from information 

found in publicly available materials including those published by device 

manufacturers, that biometric features will not unlock a device in some 

circumstances even if such features are enabled. This can occur when a 

device has been restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked for a certain 

period of time. Thus, in the event law enforcement personnel encounter a 

locked device equipped with biometric features, the opportunity to unlock 

the device through a biometric feature may exist for only a short time.

f. Due to the foregoing, the warrant I am applying for would permit law 

enforcement personnel to hold LIGOTTI’s Apple iPhone XS Max, more 

particularly identified in Attachment B, in front of LIGOTTI’s face and 

activate the facial recognition feature, for the purpose of attempting to 

unlock the device in order to search its contents as authorized by this 

warrant.

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Forfeiture of Properties

181. Based upon on information provided by the United States Attorney’s Office for the 

Southern District of Florida, I am aware that certain property is subject to criminal forfeiture to 

the United States upon LIGOTTI’s conviction of the offenses alleged in this Affidavit. 

182. Upon conviction of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 or 1349, as alleged in this 

Affidavit, LIGOTTI shall criminally forfeit to the United States of America any property, real or 

personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the 

commission of the offense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7). 

183. Therefore, the property that is subject to criminal forfeiture upon LIGOTTI’s

conviction of the violations alleged in this Affidavit includes, but is not limited to, the following 

real properties, including all buildings, improvements, fixtures, attachments and easements found 

therein or thereon, which are known and numbered as follows:

a. 717 Seagate Drive, Delray Beach, Florida 33483;

b. 3860 Lone Pine Road, Delray Beach, FL 33445; and

c. 402 SE 6th Avenue, Delray Beach, FL 33483.

CONCLUSION

184. Based upon the foregoing, I submit that this affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to 

establish probable cause to believe that, from on or about January 1, 2013 and continuing through 

the date of this affidavit, in Palm Beach and Broward Counties, in the Southern District of Florida, 

and elsewhere, DR. MICHAEL LIGOTTI, together with employees of Whole Health, and other 

addiction treatment center owners, sober home owners, and laboratory personnel, and others 

known and unknown, conspired to commit (a) health care fraud, that is, to knowingly and willfully 

execute, and attempt to execute, a scheme to defraud any health care benefit program and to obtain, 

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ATTACHMENT A

Property to be searched

The property to be searched is Whole Health LLC, located at 402 SE 6th Ave, Delray Beach, 

Florida 33483, in Palm Beach County.

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ATTACHMENT B

The property to be searched is an Apple iPhone XS Max cellular telephone, identified by 

International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 310410216579641, International Mobile Station 

Equipment Identity (IMEI) 353093104988769, and associated with AT&T telephone number 

(561) 809-7960.

This warrant authorizes the forensic examination of the device for the purpose of 

identifying the electronically stored information described in Attachment C.

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ATTACHMENT C: ITEMS TO BE SEIZED FROM WHOLE HEALTH

The items described below from January 1, 2013 to the present:

1. All of MICHAEL LIGOTTI’s (“LIGOTTI”) or WHOLE HEALTH (“WH”) records related 

to the submission of claims to insurance programs, including but not limited to, claim forms, 

remittance advice forms, payment records, copies of explanation of benefit forms, records 

showing the receipt of payments, correspondence, whether they are in paper or electronic 

format;

2. Any and all health care billing manuals, coding books, bulletins, and updates;

3. Documents, manuals, instructional materials, related to the treatment of addiction and 

associated bodily fluid testing and treatment;

4. Any and all financial records, documents, and materials related to LIGOTTI and WH,

including but not limited to correspondence, bank records, checkbooks, copies of checks, check 

stubs, check registers, vouchers, invoices, journals, wire transfers, canceled checks, loan 

records and records of transfers of funds; tax returns and related documents; and other financial 

records establishing the disposition of income;

5. Organizational charts;

6. Patient files, including, but not limited to the patients listed in Exhibit 1 to Attachment C, which 

is attached hereto;

7. Any and all corporate records for LIGOTTI owned or controlled entities and WH, including 

but not limited to corporate documents and all amendments thereto and all minutes of Board 

of Director meetings;

8. Any and all company training materials, manuals, client lists, marketing materials, policies or 

directives relating to the administration of or billing for sober homes, detoxification, intensive 

outpatient programs, partial hospitalization programs, laboratories, and hospitals, applicable to 

employees, agents, independent contractors, representatives, sales persons, or marketers in the 

performance of their duties;

9. Any and all accounting records for LIGOTTI and WH, including but not limited to all general 

and subsidiary ledgers, including balance sheets, income statements, financial statements, work 

papers, check registers, expense reports and all underlying documentation from January 1, 

2013 to the present;

10. Any and all personnel and payroll records of those employees, agents, independent contractors, 

or representatives related to, paid by or associated with LIGOTTI or WH. Such personnel 

records may include employment agreements, contracts, correspondence, application, 

resumes, records of position held, job descriptions, telephone numbers, records of 

remuneration or wages, and other documents that reflect the names and identifying information 

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of employees, agents, independent contractors, and representatives, from January 1, 2013 to 

the present;

11. Communication between amongst LIGOTTI, any employees, agents, or contractors of WH,

and any therapists, clinical directors, nurses, physician assistants, managers, owners or other 

health care workers that are either employed by or act as agents of a sober home, addiction 

treatment center, laboratory, or hospital;

12. Applications for licensure and documents related to licensure;

13. Wire transfer records, postal money orders and/or commercial money orders, checks and other 

monetary instruments;

14. Cellular telephones;

15. Computers, hard drives, or other physical object upon which computer data can be maintained;

16. Any information regarding LIGOTTI and WH employees’, agents’, or contractor’s schedules 

or travel;

17. For any computer, computer hard drive, or other physical object upon which computer data 

can be recorded or maintained (hereinafter, “COMPUTER”) that is called for by this warrant, 

or that might contain things otherwise called for by this warrant:

a. All electronic records and data relating to LIGOTTI or WH’s patients or business 

associates;

b. Logs, registry entries, configuration files, usernames and passwords, documents, 

browsing history, user profiles, email, email contacts, chats, instant messaging logs, 

photographs, and correspondence evidencing who used, owned, or controlled the 

COMPUTER at the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or 

deleted;

c. evidence of software that would allow others to control the COMPUTER, such as 

Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software, as well as evidence of the 

presence or absence of security software designed to detect malicious software;

d. evidence of the lack of such malicious software;

e. evidence of the attachment to the COMPUTER of other storage devices or similar 

containers of electronic evidence;

f. evidence of counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are designed to 

eliminate data from the COMPUTER;

g. passwords, encryption keys, and other access devices that may be necessary to access 

the COMPUTER;

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h. documentation and manuals that may be necessary to access the COMPUTER or to 

conduct a forensic examination of the COMPUTER;

i. contextual information necessary to understand the evidence described in this 

attachment.

The term “COMPUTER” includes all types of electronic, magnetic, optical, 

electrochemical, or other high speed data processing devices performing logical, arithmetic, or 

storage functions, including desktop computers, notebook computers, mobile phones, tablets, 

server computers, and network hardware.

As used above, the terms “records” and “information” include all of the foregoing items of 

evidence in whatever form and by whatever means they may have been created or stored, including 

any form of computer or electronic storage (such as hard disks or other media that can store data); 

any handmade form ( such as writing, drawing, painting); any mechanical form (such as printing 

or typing); and any photographic form (such as microfilm, prints, slides, negatives, videotapes, 

motion pictures, or photocopies).

This warrant authorizes a review of electronic storage media and electronically stored 

information seized or copied pursuant to this warrant in order to locate evidence, fruits, and 

instrumentalities described in this warrant. The review of this electronic data may be conducted 

by any government personnel assisting in the investigation, who may include, in addition to law 

enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, and technical 

experts. Pursuant to this warrant, the FBI may deliver a complete copy of the seized or copied 

electronic data to the custody and control of attorneys for the government and their support staff 

for their independent review.

Addendum to Attachments C and D

With respect to law enforcement’s review of the seized material identified in Attachment 

C and D, law enforcement (i.e., the federal agents and prosecutors working on this investigation 

and prosecution), along with other government officials and contractors whom law enforcement 

deems necessary to assist in the review of the seized material (collectively, the “Review Team”)

are hereby authorized to review, in the first instance, the seized material.

If, during the review of the seized material, the Review Team finds potentially privileged 

materials, the Review Team will: (1) immediately cease its review of the potentially privileged 

materials at issue; (2) segregate the potentially privileged materials at issue; and (3) take 

appropriate steps to safeguard the potentially privileged materials at issue.

Nothing in this Instruction shall be construed to require the Review Team to cease or 

suspend review of all the seized material upon discovery of the existence of potentially privileged 

materials within a portion of the seized material.

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EXHIBIT 1

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ATTACHMENT D: ITEMS TO BE SEIZED FROM CELLULAR TELEPHONE

The records described below from January 1, 2013 to the present:

1. Records, information, and communications, including text messages and email 

correspondence, related to the testing and treatment of patients provided by LIGOTTI, WH, 

testing laboratories, addiction treatment facilities, and sober homes;

2. Records, information, and communications related to the submission of claims to insurance 

programs, including but not limited to, claim forms, remittance advice forms, payment 

records, copies of explanation of benefit forms, records showing the receipt of payments, 

and correspondence;

3. Records, information, and communications relating to documents, manuals, and instructional 

materials related to the treatment of addiction and associated bodily fluid testing and treatment;

4. Any and all financial records, documents, and materials related to LIGOTTI and WH,

including but not limited to text messages and email correspondence, bank records, vouchers,

scans of checks, invoices, journals, wire transfers, loan records and records of transfers of 

funds; tax returns and related documents; and other financial records establishing the 

disposition of income;

5. Records, information, and communications relating to organizational charts;

6. Patient files, including, but not limited to the patients listed in Exhibit 1 to Attachment C;

7. Any and all records and communications relating to LIGOTTI-owned or controlled entities 

and WH, including but not limited to corporate documents and all amendments thereto and all 

minutes of Board of Director meetings;

8. Any and all records, information, or communications, including text messages and email 

correspondence, relating to company training materials, manuals, client lists, marketing 

materials, policies or directives relating to the administration of or billing for sober homes, 

detoxification, intensive outpatient programs, partial hospitalization programs, laboratories, 

and hospitals, applicable to employees, agents, independent contractors, representatives, sales 

persons, or marketers in the performance of their duties;

9. Any and all records, information, or communications, including text messages and email 

correspondence, regarding accounting for LIGOTTI and WH, including but not limited to 

balance sheets, income statements, financial statements, work papers, expense reports and all 

underlying documentation from January 1, 2013 to the present;

10. Communication, including text messages and email correspondence, between amongst 

LIGOTTI, any employees, agents, or contractors of WH, and any therapists, clinical directors, 

nurses, physician assistants, managers, owners or other health care workers that are either 

employed by or act as agents of a sober home, addiction treatment center, laboratory, or 

hospital; 

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11. Records, information, and communications relating to LIGOTTI and WH employees’, agents’, 

or contractor’s schedules or travel; and

12. Evidence of user attribution showing who used the device described in Attachment B.

As used above, the terms “records” and “information” include all of the foregoing items of 

evidence in whatever form and by whatever means they may have been created or stored, including 

any form of computer or electronic storage (such as hard disks or other media that can store data); 

any handmade form ( such as writing, drawing, painting); any mechanical form (such as printing 

or typing); and any photographic form (such as microfilm, prints, slides, negatives, videotapes, 

motion pictures, or photocopies).

During the execution of the search of the device described in Attachment B, law 

enforcement personnel are authorized to hold the device specified in Attachment B in front of the 

face of Michael LIGOTTI to activate the facial recognition feature, for the purpose of attempting 

to unlock the device in order to search the contents as authorized by this warrant.

This warrant authorizes a review of electronic storage media and electronically stored 

information seized or copied pursuant to this warrant in order to locate evidence, fruits, and 

instrumentalities described in this warrant. The review of this electronic data may be conducted 

by any government personnel assisting in the investigation, who may include, in addition to law 

enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, and technical 

experts. Pursuant to this warrant, the FBI may deliver a complete copy of the seized or copied 

electronic data to the custody and control of attorneys for the government and their support staff 

for their independent review.

Addendum to Attachments C and D

With respect to law enforcement’s review of the seized material identified in Attachment 

C and D, law enforcement (i.e., the federal agents and prosecutors working on this investigation 

and prosecution), along with other government officials and contractors whom law enforcement 

deems necessary to assist in the review of the seized material (collectively, the “Review Team”) 

are hereby authorized to review, in the first instance, the seized material.

If, during the review of the seized material, the Review Team finds potentially privileged 

materials, the Review Team will: (1) immediately cease its review of the potentially privileged 

materials at issue; (2) segregate the potentially privileged materials at issue; and (3) take 

appropriate steps to safeguard the potentially privileged materials at issue.

Nothing in this Instruction shall be construed to require the Review Team to cease or 

suspend review of all the seized material upon discovery of the existence of potentially privileged 

materials within a portion of the seized material.

Case 9:20-mj-08265-BER Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/30/2020 Page 78 of 78