Strategic Forum 107

Number 107, March 1997

**After the Madrid Summit:  
***Parliamentary Ratification of NATO Enlargement
**by Sean Kay and Hans Binnendijk**
**Conclusions**
-     The prospects are reasonably good that all 16 NATO nations will eventually ratify the NATO accession protocols for new members.  However,  it may be difficult to meet the informal goal of April 1999 for new members' full admission into NATO.
-     For parliamentary ratification to move in a timely manner, the accession negotiations between NATO and invited countries will have to be completed quickly-perhaps by December 1997.
-     Six European nations, for different reasons, may require a special effort to ensure ratification.
-     The process would be enhanced by early U.S. Senate ratification.
-     Progress in the NATO-Russia Charter and enlargement costs are likely to be the two major issues of contention in parliaments.
**Setting the Pace and Tone of Ratification**
After the Madrid NATO Summit in July, public attention will quickly shift to ratification of accession protocols for countries invited to negotiate membership in NATO.  An informal target date for the  entrance of new members into the Alliance has been set for April 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary.   While enlargement will probably be ratified by the NATO parliaments, it faces difficult hurdles and may not be completed by April 1999.
Most NATO countries currently indicate a strong hope that the U.S. Senate will move first to ratify new members joining NATO.  Since the Europeans are likely to wait, the U.S. Senate will have to ratify by no later than the spring of 1998 if the other NATO parliaments are to have sufficient time to finish their own ratification procedures with a view towards completion in April 1999.  Any prolonged Senate debate which delays ratification could prompt similar delays in European parliaments which will be watching the pace and tone of the U.S. discussion closely.  The U.S. Congress has indicated interest in enlargement.  For example, in 1996 the 104th Congress adopted the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act with over 80 percent support in both houses.  However, the various resolutions of congressional support have been non-binding and there has yet to be a substantive public debate.  Getting not only the required 2/3 majority in the Senate, but also the support of the House of Representatives for funding the costs of integrating new members into NATO could require some skillful, yet time-consuming negotiations.   If the process is delayed and carries over into the 1998 congressional election calendar, the timetable for NATO enlargement may face a serious obstacle in the United States.
**States Where Ratification May Undergo Difficulty**
While it is difficult to predict what the political climate will be, it is possible to identify some of the major issues and potential hurdles likely to affect enlargement ratification in the NATO countries.   As the accompanying table demonstrates, NATO enlargement is likely to proceed in a relatively straight-forward manner in Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  However, there are six European countries in which ratification may have difficulties due to a variety of procedural or political reasons. Of these, Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands are expected to ratify NATO enlargement eventually.  Serious problems could arise in Turkey and Greece.
**Belgium** is not likely to cause a problem.  However, ratification may take a long time due to a variety of procedural issues in the parliament.  While unlikely, regional assemblies may demand to be involved in the decision with regards to any budgetary impact of enlargement.  Additionally, a 2/3 majority is required in each house of parliament where there have been increasing doubts about the merits of NATO enlargement.
**France's** ratification will be complicated by elections in the spring of 1998 which are likely to dramatize all parliamentary debates.  In particular, the role of the European Union (EU), NATO command structure reform, and the Chirac policy of rapprochement with NATO could be linked to the ratification debate in France.  Official French backing for Romania joining the first round of enlargement may also become a source of parliamentary debate if Romania does not have a clear perspective towards membership.  Costs will be a particular concern for a budget under strain from France's European Monetary Union (EMU) commitments and high unemployment. 
**Italy** could pose procedural delays.  Parliament is likely to place a high value on a stable relationship with Russia as well as the status of Slovenia.  Cost issues are likely to be a major source of debate as well.   While there is a complicated governing coalition, there is nonetheless general support for the goals of NATO enlargement.
**The Netherlands** presents difficulties for procedural and political reasons.  Any accession protocol will likely be examined by the Council of Ministers before it can be signed by the head of state.  Once submitted to parliament, internal procedures could delay the process.  NATO enlargement is a lively issue in Parliament where the costs, military implications, impact on Russia, and questions over whether likely new members have adequate civil-military relations or can pay their share of the costs of membership are major areas of concern.  Moreover, the current three party ruling coalition includes the conservatives, of whom leading officials have signaled strong opposition to enlargement and insist that enlargement proceed in a way that enhances stability and does not undermine relations with Russia.
**Turkey** has consistently stated that it can not support NATO enlargement in the absence of a clear prospect for Turkish membership in the EU. The government may eventually support enlargement but maintains that it will not be ratified in parliament absent compensation from the United States or the EU.  Turkey also has concerns over changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and NATO-Russia relations.  Additionally, a weak governing coalition in Turkey may make internal debate  contentious and protracted.
**Greece** is not likely to reject NATO enlargement on its own merit.   However, the timing and success of Greek approval could be linked to processes ongoing in the Turkish government and parliament.  If Turkey is perceived as having been given sweeteners for its vote on NATO enlargement that are to Greece's detriment, then enlargement may face a serious problem in the Greek parliament.   Additionally, debate over costs and sensitivities to the Russian position on enlargement could impact the ratification schedule.
**Potential Problem Areas for Ratification**
In all NATO parliaments, a number of issues are likely to emerge as major points of concern, including:
**Russia's** relationship with NATO will be of paramount concern to all NATO parliaments.  While NATO enlargement is likely to proceed independently of NATO-Russia Charter developments, this perspective may not translate so easily into parliamentary debates.  Indeed, the status of NATO-Russian relations will likely be of key interest in the U.S. SenateCparticularly if coupled with arms control issues.  Criticism from the U.S. Senate and elsewhere may come both from those who think that too much has been done to satisfy Russia and those who think that NATO has not gone far enough.  If the debate is dominated by such arguments the ratification process itself could worsen the Western relationship with Russia.  Additionally, Russian President Boris Yeltsin=s plan, confirmed at the U.S.-Russia Helsinki Summit, to submit the agreed Charter to the Duma for ratification could complicate the entire NATO-Russia relationship.  Finally, there is likely to be an effort by some Russians to make the NATO ratification process as difficult as possible for some Western parliaments.

**Cost estimates** for NATO enlargement have  contributed to a general confusion as to what NATO enlargement will actually cost taxpayers in NATO countries.  Estimates range from a low-end U.S. Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement estimating $27-35 billion over 12 years, to a Congressional Budget Office study forecasting costs as high as $120 billion.  It is unclear how the cost debate will emerge in parliaments because getting a clear understanding of the costs can only be attained during the actual accession negotiations.  Nonetheless, it is possible that European governments may raise a **"reverse burdensharing"** issue if they are asked to pay a higher proportionate price for enlargement than the United States.  Parliaments may question allocating resources for Central and Eastern Europe when their own domestic entitlement programs are being cut dramatically.  Moreover, NATO parliamentarians are likely to question the degree to which new members can afford the costs of their commitment to collective defense in NATO.
**A League of Nations Syndrome**-in which the United States builds up a security system for Europe and then walks away from itCis a major concern among Europeans over NATO enlargement. While it  is highly unlikely, the level of concern in Europe over the strength of the transatlantic relationship will in many ways be measured by the pace and tone of the American debate over enlargement.
**The presentation of accession protocols** by governments to their parliaments could also affect the pace of the ratification process in the NATO member states.  In particular, it will likely be easier to approve several states as a package that to vote state-by-state. A state-by-state vote raises the chances that a given parliament may approve some invitees but reject others.  A rejection of one or more states could send dangerous signals to the remaining membership aspirants.  Moreover, if Romania and Slovenia are not invited, or there is not a clear prospect for their eventual membership in NATO, France and Italy may have ratification difficulties.
**Failed suitors**, those countries which aspire to join NATO but are not likely to receive membership for the foreseeable future, could pose a special problem for some NATO parliaments.  Any implication that the first wave of enlargement will be the last may raise substantial concerns in Denmark and Canada in particular.  Of special interest will be the status of the three Baltic countries-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania-where it will be important to emphasize the open door provided by the enhanced Partnership for Peace program and the Atlantic Partnership Council.  Also, institutions such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe each make important contributions to European security and stability and will continue to play a key role for NATO and non-NATO countries alike.
**Recommendations**
Several steps increase the likelihood of ratification by April 1999.
-     Support for NATO enlargement by the U.S. Senate should come early and often. A formal Senate resolution of bipartisan support of the decisions made at the Madrid Summit-shortly after the summit-would send a positive signal to the other NATO parliaments.
-     Have a clear goal for completion of accession negotiations between NATO and the invitees,         perhaps by December 1997.
-     Coordinate concerted efforts in cooperation with the North Atlantic Assembly-NATO's interparliamentary organization-to assure ratification in other NATO countries.
-     Use cases where parliaments have gone on the record in support of NATO enlargementCas has been done in the U.S. Congress and in the Danish Parliament-to create momentum in the ratification process. 
-     Focus high level attention on the accession protocols to prevent extraneous issues from affecting ratification in Turkey and Greece.
Dr. Sean Kay is a Visiting Scholar at INSS where he specializes in European security and NATO.  Dr. Hans Binnendijk is the director of INSS.  Dr. Kay can be reached at (202) 685-2344, by fax at (202) 685-3866, or by e-mail at [email protected].  Dr. Binnendijk can be reached at (202) 685-3838, by fax at (202) 685-3972, or by e-mail at [email protected].The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty.  These include reports oforiginal research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk
Editor - Jonathan W. Pierce

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