* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-60487

__________________

D.J. (BUD) WHITE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RUSH HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., and its subsidiary; RUSH FOUNDATION

HOSPITAL; JAMES C. MCELROY, JR., President of Rush Health

Systems, Inc.; WALLACE STRICKLAND, Administrator, Rush

Foundation Hospital; TIMOTHY H. MOORE, Personnel Director,

Rush Foundation Hospital; DARRELL WILDMAN, Chief Financial

Officer, Rush Foundation Hospital; RICK BEASLEY, Material

Manager, Rush Foundation Hospital, 

Defendants - Appellees.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Mississippi

(4:94-CV-62-LN)

______________________________________________

May 9, 1996

Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this age discrimination case, appellant D.J. "Bud" White

appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Rush

Health Systems, Inc. ("Rush") on the grounds that White failed to

make a prima facie case of constructive discharge. We affirm.
1 Rush also named several individual employees in the lawsuit.

The district court dismissed the claim against the individual

employees because they were not "employers" under the ADEA. White

does not challenge this on appeal.

2

White's lawsuit stems from events surrounding the

computerization of Rush's purchasing department where White had

been the purchasing agent. Following the decision to automate

purchasing procedures, Rick Beasley, a thirty-seven year-old

employee, was assigned to head the department. White retained his

title, but Beasley had the responsibility for automation. As a

result of the computerization, many of White's old duties became

obsolete. White asserts that Beasley took over or reassigned all

of White's job functions leaving him with essentially nothing to

do. Despite the transfer of job responsibilities, it is undisputed

that White suffered no decrease in pay, benefits, or hours of

employment. His job title did not change. He was never asked to

resign or retire. On March 15, 1994, White met with the personnel

director who explained to White his job duties postcomputerization. Nonetheless, two days later, White, who had been

an employee of Rush for twenty-eight years, resigned at the age of

sixty-five.

White then sued Rush1 alleging that he was constructively

discharged on account of his age in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Rush moved for summary

judgment on the basis that White failed to make a prima facie case

of constructive discharge. The district court agreed; this appeal

ensued.
2 Rush hotly contests this issue contending that White still

retained significant job functions.

3

We review a summary judgment under well-established standards.

Blakeney v. Lomas Info Sys., Inc., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir.

1995); see Sterling Property Management, Inc. v. Texas Commerce

Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 32 F.3d 964, 966 (5th Cir. 1994).

The district court properly denied White's ADEA claim because

White failed to make a prima facie showing of constructive

discharge. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,

the plaintiff must initially establish that he was discharged.

Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc). Because White was not actually discharged, he must show

constructive discharge. Constructive discharge occurs when the

working conditions are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable

person in the employee's shoes would feel compelled to retire.

McCann v. Litton Sys., Inc., 986 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1993). 

White cannot make a prima facie showing of constructive

discharge on the summary judgment evidence presented. Accepting

White's testimony as true, at most, White can only demonstrate that

his job functions were given to other employees.2 It is undisputed

that he retained his job title, salary, benefits, and hours.

Consequently, none of the usual indicia of a constructive discharge

are present. See McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 741

(5th Cir. 1993) (describing demotion, performance of inconsistent

or more onerous duties, and reduced pay as usual factors

surrounding constructive discharge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694
3 White's testimony is that he resigned because he had nothing

to do. While one co-worker's affidavit includes a conclusory

statement that Beasley "when possible, tried to put down and

humiliate Mr. White," there is no summary judgment evidence that

this was ever done in White's presence. As such, White could not

have been influenced to resign by this alleged humiliation. See

McKethan, 996 F.2d at 741 (holding that derogatory comments made at

awards banquet in front of employee insufficient to show

constructive discharge).

4

(1994). Being retained in a newly-created position "without a

description and little in the way of job duties" does not reach the

level of constructive discharge. See McCann, 986 F.2d at 949, 951-

2; see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755

(5th Cir. 1986) (demotion of high school athletic director to a

non-coaching position did not establish constructive discharge),

aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 491 U.S. 701

(1989); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1990)

(demotion, plus a pay-cut, and loss of supervisory duties did not

amount to constructive discharge). 

White also fails to demonstrate any additional aggravating

factors to implicate constructive discharge. He was not forced to

train his new supervisor. There is no summary judgment evidence

that White was harassed about his retirement plans. Likewise,

there is no summary judgment evidence that White was humiliated by

his supervisors.3 Furthermore, White did not pursue internal

grievance procedures that we have counseled is necessary before

resignation for constructive discharge. See McKethan, 996 F.2d at

741; Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th

Cir. 1993). Finally, we note that when asked in his deposition why

he retired White did not articulate a forced or constructive
5

discharge, but instead stated that he anticipated someone would

eventually "get up enough nerve to tell me to go home permanently"

and indicated his belief that once he sued the company he could not

continue to work there. Under the particular circumstances, no

reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign. See

Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir.

1994). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.