### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 139 -CR

K e nne th Wa r r e n St oc k, A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-01 -42 2 , HO NORAB LE SAM RO B ERTSON , JR., JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
Th is c a se c on c e rn s w he the r a pp e lla nt K e nn e th War

re n St oc k w a s d e nie d h is r ig ht t o a spee dy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; T ex . C o n s t . art. I , § 10; Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05 (West 2005). Af ter Stock wa s arr ested for driving while intox icated in 2001, his ca se wa s repe atedly rese t and li ng ere d on the docke t for 35 months befor e it went to trial in 2004. Stock was incar cer ated f

or one y ea r during this ti me, and he asser ted his rig ht to a speedy

trial from jail and fo llo wi nghis re le a se . T he Sta te e xpla ine d th a t th e de lay wa s d ue t o an ove rc ro wd e d ju

ry do c ke t. Th e f i r s t t r i a l i n 2 0 0 4 r e s u l t e d i n a m i s t r i a l d u e t o a d e a d l o c k e d j u r

y . F o l l o w i n g a s e c on d tr ia l in 2005, a jury

convicted Stock of

felony driving while intox icated, a nd the cour

t assessed punishment at 15 y ear s in prison. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 49.04 ( We s t 2 0 0 3 ) (d ri ving w hile intox icated) , § 49.09 (West 2006) (enha nced of fense ).2 I n light of a

pplicable United States Supre me C ourt and Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls prece dent, we c onclude that Stock was denied his r ight to a spee dy trial. Acc ording ly , we
reve rse the tr ial court’s judg ment of convic tion and order the prosec ution dism issed. On August 2, 2001, Stock was arre sted for driving while intox icated. H e re mained incar cer ated a fter his a

rre st due to a

n inability to post bond. Stock w as cha rg ed with fe lony

driving whi l e i n tox icated on Aug ust 15, 2001. His case w as initially set for tria l on March 18, 2002. O n Marc h 1 5, 20 02 , Sto c k re qu e ste d a nd re c e ive d a c on tin ua nc e ba se d on his ne e d to l oc a te a wi tne ss. Af te r t wo a dd iti on a l post

po ne d tri a l set tin g s, the Sta te re qu e ste d an d re c e ive d a c on tin ua nc e on July 3, 2002, due to a c onflict with the prosec ution of another c ase.

On Aug ust 26, 2002, St ock filed a motion for speedy

tr i al

. I n his moti on, Stock
asser ted that he would “ be pre

judiced should trial not be held on or be fore September 3, 2002, f or the re ason that he ha s been he ld in the Hay s C o u n t y J ai l , u n ab l e to post bond, for ove r one y ear .” On September

3, 2002, the trial co urt held a he aringon the motion for spee dy trial, during which S t o ck ’s co u n s el co mp l ai n ed t h at “[ S t o ck ] h as b ee n i n j ai l s i n ce Au gu s t 2 , 2 0 0 1
. W e’ v e tr i edt o go to trial—this is the fourth time.” A s a re sult of the hear ing, the trial judg e orde red that Stock be
re l ea s edfr o m j ai l o n a p e r s o n al re co gn i z an ce b o n d

. W h en t h e S t at e p ro t es t ed , t h e t ri al j u d ge explained: Iunderstand your position, but he’s been in jail for an aw ful ly long time. We’r e lim iti ngc ourt

ro om s pa c e . We ’r e do in g al l we c a n h e re . T he on ly jus t th ingto do—we have g ot a Speedy Trial Act motion her e. I ’m g oing to ha ve to le t h i m go completely

if Ihold him in j ail and he’ s not reac hed in a r easona ble time.
Th e tr ia l ju dg e the n instru c te d the c le rk of the c ourt to m a rk Sto c k’ s c a se a s “ so me kin d o f p ri or ity
c a se . . . [to ] g e t se t on

the do c ke t A SAP ” a nd

state d th a t he did

no t w a nt t

he c a se “ to b e a

six- mon th delay .”On the date of the June 8, 2004 hear ing, Stock’ s case had been delay ed appr ox imately 34 1 months since his arre st in August 2001. 3

Despite this instruc ti o n

b y th e tria l c o u

r t, Stock’ s case continued to be r epeatedly rese t and re mained pending on the docket long afte r the Septembe r 3, 2002 hea ring . On April 5, 2004, Sto c k fil e d a

mot ion to s e t a sid e the ind ic tme nt f or fa ilure to a ff

or d a sp e e dy tr ia l. Ahe a ri ngon

thi s motion was held on J une 8, 2004, during which both pa rties ag ree d that the case had been set for tria l a total of nine times. At this hearing , Stock’s counsel a cknowledg ed that the c ourt’s docke t had bee n
overc rowde d but arg ued that “that’s no rea son for this [case] not to be dismi ssed.” The assistant district attorney

for the State r esponded:
Ithink it’s clear, and there ’s bee n no alleg ation that the State has made any kind of int e nti on a l de lay

in t his c a se . I t’ s n ot t

hat w e have tr ie d to de lay the c a se in o rd e r t o somehow impair the de fense . Be cause Ithink the Court w ill re cog nize that it’s the overc rowde d nature of the jury dockets as we ll as the fac t that jail cases tend to g et prec edenc e over individuals who are out on bond, as the def endant in this case has be e n s inc e he wa s r e le a se d in Au g us t of

20 02 , the Court s h a ve re fe rr e d to thi s a s a neutra l rea son for the delay and one—w hile it does weig h ag ainst the State, it does not wei g h a s h e a vil y

a s in a sit uatio n w he re the Sta te wa s a pp a re ntl y int e nd ingto delay the ca se in order

to prejudice the def

ense.
The a ssistant dist rict attorne y also arg ued that Stock’s motion should be denied because Stock had not claimed pre

jud i ce resulti ng from the de lay . Stock’s counsel re sponded that the leng th of the delay supported an infere nce of ac tual prejudice under Zam or an o v . S tat e , 8 4 S. W. 3 d

6 4 3 , 6 4 9 ( T e x. 1 Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ), a nd that Stoc k co uld te sti fy re g a rd ingdir e c t e c on omi c c os ts, “ de str uc tio n” of his j o b , we ek l y

re qu i re m en t s t o re p o rt t o a b o n d i n g co mp an y an d t o p e r f o r m u ri n al y s es , n o th av i n g a driver’ s license, a

nd being confine d in jail for a y ear during which time his case was re peate dly rese t f o r tr ia l. T h e tr ia l ju d g e d e n ie d St o c k ’ s mo ti o n to s e t a s id e th e in d ic tm e n t f o r f a il u r e to a f

f ord a speedy trial and instructe d the cler k to make Stock’s ca se “n u mber one ” on the doc ket. He4

acknow ledg ed that althoug h t h e co u rt ’s bac klog c reated a “ questionable c all” for his ruling, the District Attorney ’s offic e had, in his view, ma de a g ood faith ef fort to g et the ca se tried. Stock’s case was tried to a jury for the f irst time on J uly

6, 2004, approximately

35
mon ths a ft e r h is a

rr e st i n A ug

us t 20 01
. At the be g inn ing of the tr ia l, Sto c k re -u rg e d his mot ion

to
se t a sid e the ind ic tme nt f or la c k o f s pe e dy

tr ia l and that motio n w a s o nc e a g a in d e nie d. Th e July 2004 trial ultimately

resulted in a mistrial due to a deadloc ked jury

. After the mistrial, the pa rties neg otiated and e ntere d into a five-y ear plea a g ree ment. I n acc ordanc e with the plea ag ree ment, Stock enter ed a guilty

plea at a hea

ring on Aug ust 1 7 , 2 0 0 4
. However, at the sentenc ing he aringon November

8, 2004, the t rial j udg e advised the parties that he wa s rejec ting the ple a ag ree ment. Stock the n w ith dr e w h is guil ty

ple a , a nd the c a se wa s r e se t. A f e w mon ths la te r, on Janu a ry 4, 20 05 , the c a se wa s on c e a g a in c a lle d f or jur y tr ia l. At this setting, St ock re-urg ed his motion to s et aside the indictment for lac k of spee dy trial, and the trial judg e denie d the motion. However , the trial wa s unable to pr ocee d beca use not enoug h jurors

arr ived for jur

y selec tion. On J anuar

y 28, 2005, Stock f

iled a first amende d motion to set aside the indictment for fa ilure to aff ord a spe edy

trial. The case was rese t for trial on Fe bruar y 22, 2005, at which time the trial c ourt hea rd and de nied Stock’s amende d motion. The case was then trie d to a jur y be g inn ingth at day , F e br ua ry 22 , a nd the jur y c on vic te d St oc k o f f

e lony dr ivi ngwh ile intox icated. A t the punishment hearingon Fe bruar y 25, 2005, the cour

t sentence d Stock to 15 y ear s in prison. On appe al, Stock assert s t h at h e was denied his rig ht to a speedy trial under the fede ral a nd state constitutions and state law. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Tex. C onst. art. I , § 10; Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. ar t
. 1
. 0 5. We apply a bifurc ated standa

rd of r eview to Stock’s
c on sti tut ion a l sp e e dy -t

ri a l c la im. See Zamorano , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 4 8 (c i t i n g State v. Munoz , 9915

S.W .2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Specifica lly , we revie w the trial court’s decision under “an a buse of discr etion standard f or the fa ctual compon en ts, and a de novo standard f or the leg al components.” Id. Be cause the fa cts of this case are undisputed, the primary issue conce rns the leg al signific ance of the fa cts to Stock’ s claim that he was unconstitutionally denied a speedy trial. See id. I n Barker v . W

ingo , 40 7 U. S. 51 4, 53 0 (1 97 2) , the Un ite d Sta te s Sup re me Court he ld that a bala

ncing test must be used in determining wheth er an accuse d has bee n denied his fe dera l constitutional right to a spe edy trial. Althoug h the rig ht to a speedy trial under the T exas Con sti tut ion

is i nd e pe nd e nt o f t

he fe de ra l g ua

ra nte e , th e Te xas Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s h e ld that a bala

ncing test identical to the one e stablished in Barker is to be used in deter mining whe ther a def endant ha s been de nied his state constitutional right to a spe edy trial. De e b v . S

tat e , 815 S.W .2d 692, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

The Ba rk e r b a l a n c i n g t e s t w e i g h s t h e f o l l o w i n g f

o u r f a c t o r s : ( 1 ) l e n g t h o f

t h e d e l a y, (2) r eason f

or the delay , (3) asser

tion of the rig ht, a

nd (4) pr ejudice to the a ccuse d. Ri v e ra v . S tat e , 990 S.W .2d 882, 889 (Tex. Ap p . — Au s t i n 1 999, pet. re f’d)

. No sing le fa ctor is nec essar y or sufficie nt to establi s h a v i o l at i o n of the de fenda nt’s rig ht to a speedy

trial . S ha w v . S tat e , 117 S.W .3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Length of Delay

The leng th o f th e d e la

y is me a s u r e d f

r o m th e ti me th e d e f

e n d a n t is a r

r e s te d or formally acc used. Ha rri

s v . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citi n g United States v. Marion , 4 04 U. S. 3 07 , 3 13 (1 97 1) ). Ge ne ra lly , a ny de lay ov er on e y ear ha s b e e n h e ld sufficie nt to trigg er the speedy -trial inquiry

. Shaw , 1 1 7 S.W .3d at 889. I n this case, Stock wa s
arr ested and indicted for f elony driving while intox icated in August 2001. He wa s incarc erated for6

thi s o ff e ns e fr om Au g us t 20 01 un til Se pte mbe r 20 02
. He did no t g o to tr ia l ( fo r t he fi rs t ti me ) u

nti l J uly 6, 2004, approximately

35 months after his ar

rest. He was not convic ted until Febr uary 2005, approximately

42 months after the arr est. The State c on ce d es t h at this length of de lay in the prosec ution of Stock’s case is sufficient to trig g er the speedy -trial inquiry

. There fore , the burde n of excusing the de lay

rests with the State. Se e Ri v e ra , 990 S.W .2d at 889.
Reason for the Delay

A re lated issue is the re ason the g overnme nt of fer s to justify the delay

. Zamorano , 8 4 S.W .3d at 649. Courts assig n differ ent weig hts to differe nt rea sons. Id. For example, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order

to hamper the defe nse will weig h heavily ag ainst the State, while a “more neutra l rea son such as ne g lige nce or overc rowde d courts should be we ighte d less heavily

but never

theless should be consider ed since t h e u l t imate re sponsibili ty for suc h
c ir c u ms ta n c e s mu s t r e s t w it

h th e g o v e r

n me n t r a th e r

th a n w it

h th e d efe ndant.” Id. (q u o t i n g Barker , 407 U.S. at 531).

I n Sh aw v. Sta te , the def

endant wa s indicted in Dec ember 1997 for a g g ravated sexual assault of a

child. See 117 S.W .3d at 886. Afte r one tria l resulted in a hungjury , the ca se was not retrie d until Februa

ry 2001. Id. On appeal , t h e defe ndant asser ted a spe edy -trial violation. Id. at 889. The S tate offere d two rea sons to justi fy the 38-month delay

betwee n the def

endant’ s indictment and the second trial: the defe ndant’s motions for continuanc e and the crow ded cour t docket. Id. The court of c riminal appea ls held that althoug h the def endant wa s responsible for sever al months of the delay , “a crow ded court docket is not a valid re ason for delay and must be counte d ag ainst the State, althoug h not heavily .” Id. at 890. The court then c oncluded that be cause “the State did not justifyThe State fur ther e x plains that the delay betwee n the J uly 2004 mistrial and the sec ond trial 2 in F e br ua ry 20 05 re su lte d f

ro m Sto c k’ s se c on d re qu e st fo r a c on tin ua nc e in Aug us t 20 04 , th e pa rt ie s’ g ood faith negotiations resulting i n a failed plea ag ree ment in November 2004, and a single rese t due t o a s m al l j u ry

tu rn o u tat t h e J an u ary

2 0 0 5 t ri al s et t i n g. Fo r p u rp o s es o f t h i s ap p ea l , we d o n o twe i gh the delay cause d by

these e vents ag ainst the State. Ther efor e, the issue in this appea l is whether the State can justify

the 35-month delay

betwee n Stock’s indictment and his first trial in J uly 2004. 7 most of the leng thy

delay in this case , . . . this factor, too, we ighs in fa vor of f inding a violation of [t he def endant’ s] right to a spee dy trial.” Id. He re , th e Sta te a rgue s th a t Sto c k’ s r e qu e st f or a c on tin

ua nc e in Ma rc h 20 02 , a s w e ll

a s an ove rc ro wd e d jur

y do c ke t, jus tif

ie d th e 35 -m on th d e lay

be tw e e n St oc k’ s in dic tme nt a nd the fi rs t trial in J uly

2004. Whil e Stock’s reque st f or continuance made him responsible for some por tion 2 of t h e d el ay , t h e re cord shows that Stock’s reque sted delay was brie f (suff

icient time to locate a witness) and Stock wa s rea dy to proce ed with trial in relatively short order

. The re cord r efle cts that the State also r eq u es t ed a continuanc e duringthis ti me fra me. Additionally , at the September 3, 2002 hear ing on Stock’s motion for speedy trial, the t rial court acknow ledg ed that the docke t was
overc rowde d and i n s t ru ct ed both the cle rk and the prosec utor to g ive Stock’s ca se pre fer ential treatment to avoid a “six-month delay .” Ne verthe less, the ca se wa s delay ed for an ad d i tional 22
mon ths a ft e r t

his he a ri ngbe fo re g oin g to t ri a l in July 20 04 . T he Sta te of

fe rs no e xplanatio n f

or thi s de lay e xce pt fo r the c ourt ’s ov e rc ro wd e d d oc ke t. A lth ou g h th is j us tif ic a tio n is no t w e ig he d h e a vil y ag ainst the State, it i s , n ev er theless, weig hed ag ainst the State bec ause it is the g overnme nt’s responsibility

to bring criminal ca ses to trial. See Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 649. On this recor d, we find that the State has not justified the leng thy delay betwee n Stock’s indictment in Aug ust 2001 and the first trial in J uly

2004.8

Ass e rtion o

f t he Rig ht A d e fe nd a nt’ s ass e rt ion in the tr ia l court of his ri g ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l “ is e nti tle d to strong evidentiar

y weig ht in deter m i n i n g whether the def endant is beingdeprive d of the rig ht.” Barker , 40 7 U .S. a t 53 1- 32 . “ F a ilure to a sse rt tha t r ig ht w ill make it d if

fi c ult fo r a de fe nd a nt t o prove that he wa s denied a speedy trial.” Id. at 532. A def endant’ s reque st for a dismissal rathe r than a pr ompt trial setting “ma y attenuate the streng th of his claim.” State v. Range l , 980 S.W
. 2d 840, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Nonethele ss, a defe ndant has no duty to bring himself to trial. Id.

Stock filed a motion for spee dy trial in Aug ust 2002 r equesting that his c ase be set fo r t ri a l on or be fo re Se pte mbe r 3 , 2 00 2. At thi s p oin t, h e ha d be e n in c a rc e ra te d a nd un a ble to p os t bo nd fo r on e y e a r. Af

te r that mot ion wa s de nie d, the c ourt re se t the tr ia l se ve ra l tim e s. Sto c k c la ims that he wa s rea dy

at ea ch of the se setting s. The prose cution does n o t d i spute Stock’s claim of
rea diness. On April 5, 2004, Stock filed a motion to dismiss the i ndictment for failure to af ford a speedy trial. A hearing on this mot ion was held on June 8, 2004, during which both par ties ag ree d that the ca se had be en set for trial a total of nine times. Af ter the trial judge reje cted the ple a ag ree ment in November 2004, Stock filed an amende d motion to set aside the indictment for lack of spee dy trial on J anuar

y 28, 2005. I n sum, the rec ord shows that the State wa s on notice of Stock’s a ssertion of his rig ht to a spee dy

trial beg inning in Aug ust 2002, but failed to ac t in any meaning ful way

to effe ct a spe edy tr ia l du ri ng the 22 mon ths fo llo wi ng Sto c k’ s f ir st m oti on . Ind e e d, the Sta te did no t a c t qu ic kly

un til Stock filed a motion seeking dismiss al of the indictment on spee dy trial g rounds in J une 2004. He then re -asse rted his spee dy trial claim in J anuar

y 2 0 0 5
. Although two out of his three motionsThe re cord r efle cts that Stock had moved his per manent re sidence to Florida. 3 9 so ug ht d ism iss a l r a the r t

ha n a tr ia l se tti ng , th e re c or d s ho ws that Sto c k pa rt ic ipate d in t

wo jur y tr ia ls in Jul y 20 04 a nd

F e br ua ry 20 05 . O n th is r e c or d, we fi nd that Sto c k s uf

fi c ie ntl y a sse rt e d h is rig ht to a speedy

trial.
Prejudice Caused by the Delay

The rig ht to a speedy

trial is desig ned to protec t three d iscernible inter ests: (1) preve ntion of oppressive pr etrial inca rce ration, (2) minimi zation of the acc used’s a nx iety and
conce rn, and ( 3) l i m i t ation of the possibility that the ac cused’ s defe nse will be impaired. Barker , 407 U.S. at 532. A showing of ac tual prejudice to these intere sts is not require d. R a n gel , 980 S.W .2d at 844. Rather, the defe ndant nee d only make “ some showing ” that he ha s been prejudice d by

the delay

. Id. I n th is c a se , St oc k ma

ke s a str on g sh ow ingof

pr e jud ic e c a us ed by th e de lay . F ir st and for emost, he wa s incarcer ated f or one y ear

awa iting trial. The rec ord shows that during that y ear , the trial wa s rese t four times. At the September 3, 2002 he aringon Stock’s motion for speedy trial, the trial judge acknowledg ed that Stock had been i n jail “an a wfully long time” and that “I ’m g oin g to h a ve to l e t [Sto c k] g o c omp le te ly if I ho ld him in ja il a nd he ’s no t re a c he d in a re a so na ble time.” I n addition to pretria l incarc eration, St ock testified at the Fe bruar y 2005 trial that the dela

y had ca used substantial interfe renc e with his employ ment prospec ts and that the e conomic costs and inconvenienc e of trave ling back and forth for urinaly ses and tria l settings we re bur densome. The 3 State has fa i led to contra dict or re but Stock’s assertions of pre judice. Ac cording ly , we f ind that10

S t o ckh as m et h i s b u rd en o f s h o wi n g p re j u d i ce an d

t h at t h i s fa ct o r w ei gh s i n fa v o r o f f i n d i n g a speedy -trial violation.

Conclu sion We find that all four factors a rticulated in Barker

we ig h in fa vo r o f r e lie f. F ir st, bo th parties a g ree that the 35-month delay betwee n Stock’s indictment and th e first trial was sufficie nt to t ri g g e r a sp e e dy -t ri a l in qu ir y . Se c on d, the pr ima

ry c a us e fo r the de lay wa s an o ve rc ro wd e d d oc ke t, wh ic h w e mus t w e ig h a g a ins t the Sta te
. Th ir d, Sto c k r e pe a te dly a sse rt e d h is r ig ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l. Finally , Stock produce d evidenc e of pr ejudice that the State failed to re but. Be cause we fi nd that Stock’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we reve rse Stock’s c onviction and orde r the prosec ution dism issed. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 28.061 (West 2006).

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Pemberton, Waldrop and B . A. Smith* Reverse d and Dismissed Filed: January

22, 2007 Pub lis h

* Be fore Be a Ann Smith, J ustice (r etired) , Third Court of Appea ls, sitting by assig nment. See T e x. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003( b) (West 2005).