U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

73–365 2001

S. HRG. 106–1022

A SYSTEM IN DISARRAY: THE LACK OF

STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING IN

PROTECTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 27, 2000

Serial No. J–106–100

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

JON KYL, Arizona

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

MANUS COONEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

BRUCE A. COHEN, Minority Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

GARRY MALPHRUS, Chief Counsel

GLEN SHOR, Legislative Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE MEMBER

Page

Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina ........ 1

WITNESSES

Ungar, Bernie L., Director, Government Business Operations Issues, General

Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement

and attachments ................................................................................................... 3

Hast, Robert H., Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations,

U.S. General Accounting office, prepared statement ........................................ 15

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Responses of GAO to Questions from the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice Oversight ............................................................................ 29

(1)

A SYSTEM IN DISARRAY: THE LACK OF

STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING IN PROTECTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2000

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STROM THURMOND, A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Senator THURMOND. The subcommittee will come to order.

There are many symbols which citizens commonly associate with

their government, and some of the more traditional icons are those

of the Capitol and the White House. In recent years, this list has

expanded to include those mysterious looking men in black suits

and dark sunglasses who spend their days whispering into the

cuffs of their shirt sleeves and shadowing high-ranking government

officials. Today’s hearing is going to focus on just who these personnel are, how well trained they are, and how good a job they do

in guarding executive branch officials.

At one time, those who had protection assigned to them was a

relatively short and sensible list of the men and women who were

truly at the very senior levels of Government or who were in possession of highly sensitive information critical to national security.

As someone who has spent a considerable amount of time in

Washington, it recently struck me that I was seeing more and more

individuals at less and less senior levels of Government being accompanied by protective details. In an effort to confirm my observations, I requested the General Accounting Office to study this issue.

After a year of hard work, extensive research, and careful analysis, the GAO has completed their report on this matter and has

discovered some unsettling issues regarding who is protected in the

executive branch and how they are protected. While our witnesses

will get into this matter in greater detail through their testimony,

I do want to highlight some of their findings which I find troubling

and in need of reform.

First, there is no standardization in training, tactics, equipment,

radio frequencies, and so on. Next, there is no standardization in

2

who protects executive branch officials. Presently, 42 different officials are protected by 27 different agencies.

Next, the costs associated with protecting executive branch officials have jumped by almost 50 percent from 1997 to 1999. The

number of people assigned to dignitary protection jumped by 73

percent during that same period.

In some cases, inspector general personnel are used for dignitary

protection. In many cases, there is no statutory authority for those

who are providing the protection to actually do so. There is a lack

of threat assessments, meaning there are individuals being protected who may have no legitimate need for security or who have

too much security.

This list goes on and on, and is carefully explored in what is an

excellent GAO report, ‘‘Security Protection-Standardization Issues

Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials.’’ Frankly, I am

disturbed by much of what is brought to light in this report, which

describes a system in disarray.

It seems that if we are concerned enough about the welfare, safety, and security of someone, we should be concerned enough to ensure that the protection they are receiving is the best it can be.

This GAO report clearly indicates that there is an overwhelming

need to bring reform, standardization, and discipline to this system

and to do so as quickly as possible.

Protecting someone goes far beyond simply assigning burly and

intimidating agents to an official. They involve gathering intelligence, conducting threat assessments, doing careful advance

work, and coordinating extensively with other law enforcement

agencies. The tactics and strategies involved in successful protection operations are probably beyond the capabilities of many of the

organizations now involved in this undertaking, and considerable

opportunities exist for streamlining the current system.

Among other steps that need to be taken is stopping the use of

inspector general personnel for dignitary protection. Inspectors

general are supposed to be dedicated to fighting waste, fraud, and

abuse, not serving as bodyguards. And furthermore, carrying out

dignitary protection duties represents a clear conflict of interest.

I would be inclined toward consolidating the bulk of all protective

functions for the executive branch under one agency or to carefully

split threat assessment and protective actions between two agencies. The bottom line is that having 27 different organizations conducting protective duties is inefficient, counterproductive, and undermines efforts to effectively safeguard those who truly need security.

I am looking forward to the testimony of our witnesses and the

suggestions they will have regarding how to address this issue. As

protection is carried out now, it is done in a disorganized and haphazard manner where taxpayer dollars are being wasted on security that is likely inefficient or ineffective in many cases. More significantly, lives are being potentially endangered. Quite obviously,

this is a matter which must be resolved with the utmost expediency, and the necessary reforms should be made in time for the

new administration to implement.

I am now pleased to introduce our witnesses for this afternoon’s

hearing: Mr. Bernie Ungar, the Director of Government Business

3

Operations Issue, and Mr. Robert Hast, Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, both of whom serve at the General

Accounting Office.

Before we hear your statements, please allow me to commend

you on what is a very thorough and well-done report. I appreciate

all your hard work, and this document will certainly be very beneficial to us as we tackle what is a very serious issue.

Mr. Ungar, will you please begin your testimony at this time?

STATEMENT OF BERNIE L. UNGAR, DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT

BUSINESS OPERATIONS ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON,

DC, AND ROBERT H. HAST, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC

STATEMENT OF BERNIE L. UNGAR

Mr. UNGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hast and I are

pleased to be here this afternoon to help the subcommittee look at

and assess the issue of protection for high-level executive branch

officials. We are accompanied this afternoon behind us by two of

our key staff who worked on this assignment—Mr. Thomas Wiley,

from the Office of Special Investigations, and Mr. Robert Homan,

from our General Government Division.

What I would like to do is summarize, if it is okay with you, our

statement and, of course, have the entire statement submitted for

the record.

In brief, we found that officials in 42 positions at 31 different

agencies receive protection from a variety of agencies and protective personnel. As you indicated, security is provided on a decentralized basis, with 36 of the officials being protected by personnel

from their own agencies and 6 officials being protected by other

agencies, such as the Secret Service or the Marshals Service or the

State Department.

In the 3-year period that we covered, which was fiscal years 1997, 1998 and 1999, agencies reported spending over $74 million

for protection of these high-ranking officials. Costs were reported to

have increased 49 percent from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 1999,

and the number of staff providing that protection increased by over

70 percent during that period.

With respect to legal authority, we found that only two of the

agencies providing the protection, the Secret Service and the State

Department, had express, specific statutory authority to provide

protection. The other agencies were providing protection under a

variety of authorities.

For example, 11 of the agencies cited deputations from the Marshals Service as the authority which they provided protection for.

And there is possibly a dilemma somewhat there, in that the Marshals Service has said that it may not renew these deputizations

in the year 2001.

In addition, we found that some agencies lacked specific authorities that would be appropriate and helpful and necessary in providing protection, such as arrest authority or investigative authorVerDate 31-AUG-2001 07:14 Sep 08, 2001 Jkt 073365 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B365.XXX pfrm04 PsN: B365
4

ity. For example, eight agencies said they did not have authority

to investigate threats against their protected officials.

In terms of threat assessments, we found that these are very

critical documents or processes which the protection agencies—at

least the key agencies who have this as a primary mission told us

very clearly that they are very important for determining the need

and the level of protection. Despite the importance of these documents, we found that only those agencies such as the Secret Service or the Marshals Service or the State Department and a few others that had protection as their primary mission had actually conducted and documented detailed threat assessments.

Most of the agencies that were providing protection had not prepared a detailed written document explaining what the threats

were and discussing how those were going to be mitigated. In addition, none of the agencies had made any linkage between a threat

assessment and the level of protection that was being provided.

Without that kind of a linkage, it was difficult to determine the appropriateness of the level of protection being provided, or even the

need for that in some cases.

Some of the agencies lacked authority, they said, to actually do

threat assessments or to gather intelligence about potential threats

against the protected officials. Most of the agencies that we covered

said that they really did favor a central repository for threat information and for basically gathering this information, storing it and

disseminating it in a uniform way.

With respect to training, again, that was done on a more decentralized basis. Eleven agencies that we covered provided their own

training. Sixteen of the agencies obtained training from another

agency or another source in the country. The amount and type of

training, the source of the training, varied among the agencies. Six

agencies told us that they had particular difficult in getting training for some of their people, either because of lack of space in training facilities within the Government or lack of funds or lack of

time.

We found that many of the agencies relied on their field staffs

to provide protection when their protected official traveled within

the country. Generally, though, we found that the field staff received less training than the headquarters staff, and in some cases

the field staff who provided protection received no training.

Most agencies that we dealt with in our review said that they favored standardized training. They felt it was very important to

make sure that those folks who were providing protection receive

the training that they need, that they receive this consistently, and

that they are able to perform in the same way in case of events

or emergencies, particularly when protected officials are appearing

jointly at the same event.

In terms of centralized protection—that is, should one agency

provide all the protection or most of the protection, or should it operate in the current decentralized manner—that turned out to be

a very difficult issue. Most agencies that we talked to did not favor

centralized protection, for a number of reasons. The key reason

seemed to be that they felt it was very important to develop a high

trust level between the protected official and the protectors. And

they felt that if an outside agency were to come in, the same level

5

of trust may not exist. In addition, they felt that it would be helpful to have knowledge of the agency’s program and culture, and

also that there would be more control over the type of protection

and the nature of protection if it were within the agencies.

On the benefits side, there were some that were identified. Possibly, there would be more uniform quality or level of service if protection were centralized. Equipment would be perhaps more evenly

available. Procedures would be more standardized, and in the field

there would possibly be, and more likely be more consistent service.

One issue that was not clear—and we weren’t able to resolve this

in the time that we conducted our review—was cost. It wasn’t

clear, and data aren’t available for us to tell you whether or not

it would be more costly or less costly to have a central agency providing the protection versus the manner in which it is currently

being done.

What does all this mean to us? We concluded that the safety of

high-level government officials is a very important activity. It can

certainly affect confidence that the public has in government. It is

also important from the standpoint that many of these protected officials, particularly the Cabinet agency heads, are in line for presidential succession, and that certainly has national security implications.

It is very clear that the costs for protection have increased significantly over the last few years. It is also clear that the protection

is provided in a very fragmented way, in the sense that there is

no one organization or person in the executive branch that is responsible for overseeing this issue. It is basically up to each agency.

We felt that both the Congress and the executive branch need to

have greater assurance that the protection is being provided in a

rational and a reasoned way, and that right now there is not a way

for the Congress or the executive branch to have confidence that

that is the case. That led us to our recommendation that the Office

of Management and Budget designate either an individual or a

group of people knowledgeable in this area who could study the

issues that we have identified and raised, and make recommendations both to the executive branch and to the Congress.

We also believe, of course, that the Congress needs to take a look

at these recommendations, make sure that whatever agency or

agencies are providing protection have appropriate legal authority

to do so and they have the necessary resources. OMB agreed with

our recommendation to it, believed that it would take some time to

carry it out, but agreed that it would put a group together or a designated individual and go ahead and study these issues.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our summary. We would be happy

to answer any questions that you might have.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Hast, do you have any statement you

want to make?

Mr. HAST. I do not. I will just be glad to answer any questions

you have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. I will ask some questions and either one of

you can answer them.

It is clear that the costs and amount of security protection that

executive officials receive has increased greatly since 1994 and

even in the past 3 years. Do you find these sharp increases troubleVerDate 31-AUG-2001 07:14 Sep 08, 2001 Jkt 073365 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B365.XXX pfrm04 PsN: B365
6

some, especially given the lack of overall responsibility for executive protection, and do you expect this problem to continue if no action is taken?

Mr. HAST. Mr. Chairman, I think that the costs need to be audited and to be examined. However, I think both the domestic and

the international climate over the last ten years have changed. I

think what happened at the World Trade Center and what happened in Oklahoma City and what happened to our embassies in

Africa and the amount of kidnappings that are taking place internationally have caused the threat levels to have gone up, and I

think have influenced the extra cost that has gone into protection.

Senator THURMOND. Currently, the cost of providing protection is

spiraling and appears to be based more on personal preference of

the official being protected than the need for protection. Do you

agree that it is essential that there be a uniform, objective method

for determining how much security, if any, officials in the executive

branch need?

Mr. HAST. Yes, I would say we do.

Senator THURMOND. How precise is the cost information that was

provided to you by the agencies you studied?

Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Chairman, they weren’t very precise. For the

most part, they were largely based on estimates. There were some

agencies that did have very specific information, but a number of

agencies didn’t track these costs systematically, particularly in

those cases where they used field personnel to protect their official

when they traveled. Some of the information, like I said, was estimated.

I think overall we would say that the cost information that they

provided us is very likely to be understated, and it is more likely

that the cost would be more than the $74 million that we identified

with the agencies’ assistance.

Senator THURMOND. Your report found that three-fourths of

agencies do not provide detailed written threat assessments to justify the protection that officials receive. Do you think it is critical

that threat assessments be prepared to ensure that resources are

being spent wisely and efficiently?

Mr. HAST. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think the key to the

amount of protection necessary is the threat assessment. By analyzing the threat domestically in various overseas areas, by analyzing this and making a threat assessment you are able to allocate

the proper amount of resources. Without a threat assessment, you

are really just guessing.

Senator THURMOND. Would a threat assessment center be an

asset or simply another drain on money? In other words, what

guarantees do we have that agencies participating in a center will

actual share information with one another?

Mr. HAST. I believe in the area of threat assessment the sharing

of information is very good, and I think that a national threat assessment center would be very useful in determining the amount

of protection needed by various protected individuals.

Senator THURMOND. The mission of inspectors general has nothing to do with security protection. Indeed, because their mission is

to investigate and audit agencies, there are ethical questions with

having them protect the chief of the agency they review. Wouldn’t

7

these concerns be addressed if inspectors general were no longer involved in providing security?

Mr. UNGAR. Well, I think the agencies would have to find an alternative source to provide the protection. Now, the U.S. Marshals

Service has said that it would certainly favorably consider providing that protection if asked to do so. I think that we know that

there are a number of concerns right now in those situations in

which the inspectors general do provide the protection with regard

to whether or not the role of providing this protection compromises

their independence in actually assessing what is going on within

the agencies.

When the Inspector General Act was created, it was anticipated

that the inspectors general would be independent of the program

operations within the agencies, that they would not operate programs. And I think it is clear that one might construe providing

protection as somewhat programmatic in nature. And certainly if

there was some issue that came up with respect to alleged improprieties with respect to the protection itself or that was associated

with the protected official, there certainly could be a question

raised there about independence.

Bob, did you have anything additional?

Mr. HAST. I think that once they become involved in a program,

they can no longer audit that program and it compromises their

independence.

Senator THURMOND. Almost everyone agrees that training needs

to be standardized for those who protect executive branch officials

and that legal authority is currently insufficient. Wouldn’t the most

efficient way to solve these problems be for personnel of one agency, such as the Marshals Service, to provide protection?

Mr. HAST. Yes; I think that, given the resources, I think one

agency would be able to provide protection, and I think that even

more important than one agency providing protection is the standardization of training. I think if one agency provided all of the

training and all details in a protective environment were operating

under the same standards and guidelines, I think it would cause

much better coordination at things such as inaugurations, conventions, and other events where we had a large number of protectees

showing up.

Senator THURMOND. What would be the effect on executive

branch protection if the United States Marshals Service stopped

granting special deputy status to those currently doing protection

work?

Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Chairman, I think that obviously there would be

a problem because 11 agencies right now depend upon those

deputizations for the authority to provide the protection. Of course,

they have told us that if they don’t have that deputization, then

their ability to actually provide protection is going to be quite jeopardized in terms of carrying out those key functions of being able

to investigate threats, use force if necessary, and make arrests if

necessary.

So I think they would be quite concerned about their ability, and

as I indicated, I think an alternative source would have to be provided for those officials that would need to continue to be protected.

8

Senator THURMOND. If there is no standardization of training,

use of force policies, and tactics, how well are legitimate protective

needs of dignitaries being served?

Mr. HAST. I think it depends on the level of training each individual detail receives, and I think at this point we are not sure

that each protective detail is receiving the same level of training

as the others. So I think standardizing this training under one

agency would give us a level of confidence in the type of protection

that we are providing to these high-level officials.

Senator THURMOND. With the lack of standardized training and

policies that currently exist with executive branch security details,

did any of the agencies you contacted in the course of preparing

this report express concerns of conflicts that could occur when two

or more protective details are at the same function?

Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Chairman, we did get on at least one occasion

expression of a concern about the lack of coordination that occasionally or sometimes takes place during events when officials from

more than one agency appear and you have different protective details.

Apparently, in some cases—and we didn’t really review these,

but we were told by the agencies or by personnel that there were

some instances where threats were made against one official that

the other protective force did not know about, or things weren’t as

well coordinated as the folks felt should have been.

Senator THURMOND. If training were to be standardized, I suspect many would argue that the Secret Service would be the logical

agency to conduct the training. Given the existing complaints of

some agencies about the ability to secure protective detail training,

how would we make certain that the Secret Service or any other

agency that was given the training mission did not put its own

agency’s needs before the executive protection training it is supposed to give other organizations?

Mr. HAST. I believe that in passing that type of legislation and

giving them that authority, there would have to be safeguard built

into the legislation so that when the funding was given, there was

a guarantee that they would be able to provide the services.

Mr. UNGAR. Also, Mr. Chairman, I know we have spoken to, during the course of our review, the Federal agencies that now do have

the capacity to provide the training. And whether it be the Secret

Service or the Treasury Department or the State Department, none

said right now that they have adequate capacity to provide this

kind of training to the rest of the Government.

So if a mandate of the nature you are speaking about were to

come about, it would be very critical that there be an appropriate

consideration of the resources that would be needed to provide this

protection so that they would be able to do it for all the different

personnel.

Senator THURMOND. Your survey of those protected would seem

to indicate little to no interest in cutting back on the number of individuals who are protected or in the number of personnel assigned

to protective details. More specifically, your report states, ‘‘Most of

the protected officials or their staffs said the individuals holding

these positions automatically receive security protection because of

their visibility and the types of issues that they handled.’’

9

By that reasoning and logic, it would seem that other senior officials at executive branch agencies would also be in danger. How far

down an agency’s chain of command should we extend protective

services? At what point do we say we have adequately protected all

those potentially at risk because of their job?

Mr. HAST. I believe that we go back to the threat assessment,

Mr. Chairman. I think that if we are conducting proper threat assessments, we should determine which individuals need protection,

now long they need it, when that protection is no longer necessary.

Without conducting a thorough threat assessment, it is really

someone’s best guess who needs protection.

Mr. UNGAR. Mr. Chairman, also I think, as we point out, right

now this decision is an agency-by-agency decision. Perhaps that is

the way it will be in the future, but there certainly isn’t anybody

essentially within the executive branch, in the White House, or

anywhere else from what we could determine that really has any

overall responsibility for looking at this very issue that you raised.

Perhaps enunciating an executive branch policy or even some

kind of a process to perhaps take a look at this—obviously, it is

going to be very important for certain Cabinet folks who are in line

of succession, but on the others it would be based on the threat assessments that were made.

Senator THURMOND. Gentlemen, I want to thank you very much

for your testimony. We appreciate your appearing before us today

and for all your hard work.

At this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent that two articles be inserted in the record, the first from the Washington

Times, which reports that the bodyguard for the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has left his weapon in the HUD cafeteria on several occasions.

The second article is from the Washington Post and concerns language that is supposed to be contained in a soon to be released Appropriations Committee report that directs the FBI to get the

‘‘. . . Hostage Rescue Team out of the dignitary protection and

event security business.’’

[The articles referred to follow:]

10


Insert offset folio 22 here 73365A.001
11


Insert offset folio 23 here 73365A.002
12


Insert offset folio 24 here 73365A.003
13


Insert offset folio 25 here 73365A.004
14

Senator THURMOND. I would also like to ask that the record remain open for one week for additional questions and materials.

Anything further you would like to say?

Mr. UNGAR. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance

and your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Ungar and Hast follows:]

15


Insert offset folio 27 here 73365A.005
16


Insert offset folio 28 here 73365A.006
17


Insert offset folio 29 here 73365A.007
18


Insert offset folio 30 here 73365A.008
19


Insert offset folio 31 here 73365A.009
20


Insert offset folio 32 here 73365A.010
21


Insert offset folio 33 here 73365A.011
22


Insert offset folio 34 here 73365A.012
23


Insert offset folio 35 here 73365A.013
24


Insert offset folio 36 here 73365A.014
25


Insert offset folio 37 here 73365A.015
26


Insert offset folio 38 here 73365A.016
27


Insert offset folio 39 here 73365A.017 A
28

[EDITOR’S NOTE: The U.S. General Accounting Office Report ‘‘Security Protection Standardization Issuer Regarding Protection of

Executive Branch Officials,’’ dated July 2000, is retained in the

Committee files.]

[Whereupon, at 2:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

(29)

A P P E N D I X

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

RESPONSES OF GAO TO QUESTIONS FROM THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON

CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT

Question 1. Some agencies have expressed concerns about one agency providing

security protection because they say the protective agents should be familiar with

the policies, programs, and culture of the agency they protect. This appears to be

a weak explanation for the status quo. Are these factors more important than having an agency provide protection that has an extensive background and experience

in protecting officials?

Answer 1. We believe that training and experience in providing security protection are generally more important than familiarity with the policies, programs, and

culture of the protected official’s agencies. However, a familiarity with the policies,

programs, and culture of the protected officials’ agencies could be helpful in cases

where threats are received by individuals who are affected by those agencies’ policies and programs.

Question 2. Does aggressive prosecution of someone responsible for an assault on

a federal official, even if it is done as part of a political protest, play an important

part in protection?

Answer 2. Aggressive prosecution could play an important role for some individuals—for example, those who are not totally committed to the cause of a protest

group. However, for those individuals who threaten public officials and are mentally

unstable, criminal prosecution may not deter their actions. Instead, those individuals are often referred to psychiatric facilities.

Question 3. To what extent are senior government officials using protective personnel and details to ‘‘pad’’ their entourages, inflate their image, and appearance

of importance?

Answer 3. This issue was not an objective of our review. Thus, we did not evaluate the extent to which this may be occurring.

Question 4. How do we prioritize who truly needs protection?

Answer 4. Protection should be based on threat assessments for officials and national security considerations, such as whether officials rein the line of presidential

succession. Our review found that no one in the Executive Branch is currently responsible for handling issues relating to the routine protection of Executive Branch

officials overall. Therefore, we recommended that an individual or group appointed

by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget consider whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the routine protection of top Executive

Branch officials.

Question 5. Who should decide the level of protection that someone receives?

Answer 5. We believe that the unit responsible for protecting officials should be

responsible for deciding the level of protection to be provided.

Question 6. Even if we were to leave executive protection as a decentralized operation as it is now, it seems obvious that there will have to be some significant

changes to how protective duties are executed. Issues such as authority, training,

equipment, etc., all must be resolved. Can this be done without centralizing protective duties?

Answer 6. We believe that centralized training and threat assessment could be

provided without centralizing protection services. Congress would need to decide

30

whether one or more agencies should have specific statutory authority to provide

protection.

Question 7. Would the interests of Executive Branch security be served by requiring the standardization of training, tactics, threat assessments, etc.?

Answer 7. Yes, the establishment of a standardized protection training program

and additional sharing of protective intelligence could enhance security protection

for top federal officials. Standardized protection training could instruct federal protective personnel in the same basic techniques and procedures, which could help ensure effective coordination of protection when protective personnel from multiple

agencies are working at the same event. Further, threat assessments that link the

level of threat to the size of the protective force could help ensure that the level

of protection provided and the amount of money spent on protection are appropriate.

Question 8. With proper time and resources to prepare, do you believe the Marshals Service has the expertise to protect Executive Branch officials, especially given

the fact that the Marshals Service already has the responsibility for protecting federal judges?

Answer 8. Yes, we believe that any of the agencies with security protection as one

of its primary missions, including the Marshals Service, has the expertise to protect

Executive Branch officials. However, the agencies indicated that they would need

additional resources to assume these additional responsibilities.

Question 9. Is the traditional model or protection, in other words, personnel with

weapons body guarding the principal, still a useful way of doing business?

Answer 9. Yes, the traditional model of protection, which includes personnel with

weapons, is still useful because it provides top Executive Branch officials with a certain comfort level in their interaction with the public and serves as a deterrent to

harm in some cases.

Question 10. In your report, you say that the Secret Service has determined that

persons who actually pose threats to public officials ‘‘often do not make threats, especially direct threats.’’ If that is the case, what good is a threat assessment center?

How does one guard against these ‘‘stealth threats’’?

Answer 10. The establishment of a threat assessment center would provide a formal mechanism to facilitate the sharing of a database of protective intelligence

among center members. Detecting patterns of behavior in known would-be attackers

and determining whether a person of possible concern to agencies had previously

come to the attention of any other agency for protective reasons would assist security personnel in preparing threat assessments for their protectees. Also, in preparing threat assessments and making the database applicable to a wide range of

protected officials, information on controversial issues and events outside the normal realm of law enforcement needs to be included.

A protective intelligence information-sharing program serves as a key component

of a comprehensive protection program to prevent targeted violence. Agency security

officials said that the benefits of establishing a central repository of protective intelligence would be to (1) provide access to protective intelligence for agencies that cannot afford to establish their own intelligence-gathering operations, (2) provide uniformity in the dissemination of and access to intelligence, and (3) allow agencies to

be informed about threats against other individuals who are in the presence of their

officials.

Question 11. In your report, you cite a 1998 report by the Secret Service which

says that ‘‘* * * attackers and would-be attackers often consider multiple targets,

who may live in different jurisdictions * * *.’’ Would a threat assessment center be

able to gather information about a threat against a governor of a state that might

become a threat against an Executive Branch official visiting that state?

Answer 11. It would depend on the authority provided to the center and the willingness of the participants to share this information. In this regard, proposed legislation in the 106th Congress, H.R. 3048, would authorize the Secret Service to establish a National Threat Assessment Center to facilitate the sharing of threat information by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with protective responsibilities. The House of Representatives passed this bill on June 26, 2000.

Question 12. Is there room for a consolidation of training facilities? Take for example the State Department. Is there no reason that their dignitary protection training

could not be contracted out to the FBI, Army, or Secret Service?

Answer 12. Yes, consolidation of training facilities is possible. The Secret Service

indicated that it was interested in providing standardized protection training for

federal agencies, and that additional employees and funding would be required to

create an adequate infrastructure to accommodate such an effort. A State Department training official said that the State Department could train other agencies’

31

protective personnel at the proposed Center for Anti-Terrorism and Security Training, an interagency facility planned for the Washington, D.C., area to be managed

jointly by the Diplomatic Security Service and the Capitol Police. Marshals Service

officials said they could conduct training for personnel protecting agency heads at

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), in Glynco, GA, but thought

that the training should take place near Washington, D.C., where most of the protective personnel are located. The FLETC Director informed us that FLETC currently does not have the facilities, expertise, or funding to train all federal personnel

security personnel at its Glynco facility, but expressed an interest in having FLETC

coordinate personal security training at a new facility in the Washington, D.C.,

area. We did not obtain information from the Army or the FBI on their capacity

or willingness to provide standardized protections training.

Question 13. What are the implications of receiving training from private security

firms that might be made up of retired Secret Service agents, Deputy U.S. Marshals, Diplomatic Security Service, and/or those who served in the military’s Special

Operations Command? If there are no negative implications, is ‘‘outsourcing’’ Executive Branch protection training in order to assure standardization and guarantee

training slots a legitimate option to consider?

Answer 13. Outsourcing Executive Branch protection training is a legitimate option for certain law enforcement agencies, provided the training is conducted by an

organization with all the proper certifications and a proven track record of performance. This approach would facilitate standardization for those agencies and guarantee training slots, as needed. Further, for those agencies without training facilities, private security firms that have their own training facilities could provide protection programs that are both tailored to meet agencies’ specific needs and scheduled at the convenience of the participants. A study would have to be done, however,

to determine the most cost-effective approach.

Question 14. Your report stated that twenty of the twenty-seven agencies that provided protection said they relied on their field personnel to provide supplemental

protection when officials leave the Washington, D.C. area. What guarantee do we

have that those out in the field have any protective or other specialize training? Is

the level of protection being provided by field personnel acceptable, or is it nothing

more than creating an impression of security and protection?

Answer 14. The amount of protection training received by field personnel who provided protection varied considerably among the 27 agencies. Agencies with security

protection as on of their primary missions indicated that their field personnel received more training and protection experience than field agents at some other

agencies. During our review, three agencies reported that their field personnel who

were used to provide protection had received no protection training, and two agencies reported that their field personnel received 2 to 3 days of protection training.

This level of training is not acceptable because protection concepts and procedures

are constantly changing. Field personnel providing protection support should understand their role as part of a cohesive protection team that is providing a secured

environment for the protectee.

Question 15. Your report indicates that state and local law enforcement agencies

would like to train at a central protection training facility. If such a facility were

to be established, would it be able to accommodate state and local law enforcement

officers assigned to dignitary details?

Answer 15. Whether a central protection training facility cold accommodate state

and local officers would depend on its stated mission and the amount of resources

provided for its operation. The mission could include the training for state and local

agencies’ protective personnel. The goal of centralizing training would be to have all

protective details (federal, state, and local) using the same protection concepts and

procedures. This would enable the various protective details to better interact and

be more cohesive while working together.

Question 16. How substantively different are the skills of someone who specializes

in protection from someone who is assigned to a tactical team? Is someone who is

a member of a federal tactical team in possession of the requisite skills and tactics

required to protect someone?

Answer 16. The skills required for personnel who provide protection and those law

enforcement officers who are members of a tactical team have some similarities, for

example, in firearms training, but are substantially different. This is because the

mission for protective details and tactical teams are completely different; thus, the

training requirements are not the same. The primary mission of personnel assigned

to protective details is to provide a secure environment for the protectee. This is accomplished through threat assessments, physical security advances, security postings, protective formations, and coordination of security with other law enforcement

32

agencies. The primary mission of a tactical team is to respond forcefully, if necessary, to a known or potential threat or hostile situation.

Question 17. Your report recognized ethical issues with Inspectors General providing protection to Executive Branch officials. Please outline what these issues and

problems are.

Answer 17. A potential conflict of interest could exist by having protective and investigative responsibilities within the same office. For example, an Office of Inspector General (IG) may be responsible for investigating an agency official who is also

being protected by IG staff. In a March 2000 legal memorandum from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding special deputation of IG

personnel to protect agency heads, the OLC indicated that using IG agents to provide protection to agency officials arguably could compromise the IG’s independence

and objectivity in performing an agency watchdog function, and that even the appearance of conflicts of interest could undermine the effectiveness of an IG in pursuing his or her mission. Further, the OLC memorandum cautioned against using

IG agents to provide protection on a long-term basis because it might appear to circumvent Congress’ prohibition against vesting program operating responsibilities in

the IGs.

Æ